A STUDY OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ELITE
IN
PHILIPPINE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT, 1946-1963

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by
Dante C. Simbulan
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This Thesis represents the original work and investigations of the undersigned.

DANTE C. SIMBULAN
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Elite Concept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Elite</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Elite</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Procedure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE PHILIPPINE ELITE: HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS AND DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ruling Class in Pre-Conquest Times</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>Principalia</strong>: <strong>Cacique</strong> Bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under Spain</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugation, Conversion and</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principalia</strong> Metamorphosis</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caciquism</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>Principalia</strong> and the Philippine</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHAPTER I: THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA I: THE CONTEMPORARY SETTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Principalia and the Americans</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Federalista Party</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Elite and 'Political Democracy'</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA II: THE POLITICAL ELITE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Pattern and Recruitment</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Entry to top Public Positions</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Elite Positions</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Entry to Elite Positions</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Elite Positions</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status and Background</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of Living</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational Membership</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Origin</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Origin</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Dominant Families</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resume</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE ART OF KEEPING POWER: THE ELITE IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICS</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature of Philippine Political Parties</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Heritage of the Past</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Postwar Political Parties</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Origin and Factional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure of Labor or Mass Parties</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization and Leadership</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods and Practices</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER PAGE

Class, Cultural Norms and Politics 261
Money, Goods and Services 271
How Much? 271
Uses 276
Sources 293
Symbols, Slogans and Practices 321
Ideology and Political Formulas 321
Other Symbols and Slogans 328
Other Practices 335

VI. THE ART OF WIELDING POWER: THE ELITE IN GOVERNMENT 354
The Formal Structure of Power 355
The Practical Aspects of Power 362
The Rewards of Office 367
Appointments 367
Office as a Means to More Power 375
The Economic Rewards 384
Salaries, Allowances and Public Funds 384
Bureaucratic Capitalism 389
Recapitulation 414

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 418
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None of the above, however, are responsible for any errors of omission or commission or for viewpoints expressed. These are the writer's sole responsibility.

Dante C. Simbulan
This study is an attempt to describe and analyze the Philippine elite and its role in politics and government.

Materials for the study were gathered during field investigation and research. A combination of methods and procedures were used including biographical analysis, interviews, a questionnaire survey, and an examination and analysis of documents, official records, newspapers and periodicals.

Analysis of data reveals the continuing pattern of leadership recruitment from a small upper strata minority which is characterized by economic and social prominence. This group, designated in this study as the principalia class, has traditionally been the dominant source of political leaders in the country.

The claim to power of this group is based on the superordinate position it occupies in the social structure. Possessing the key values necessary for the exercise of influence such as wealth, education, prestige, and skill, it also acquires power.
Historical, economic, and cultural factors serve to explain the dominant position of this group in Philippine society. Historically, the *principalia* class has been the dominant class. It evolved from the hereditary upper class aristocracy in pre-conquest Philippines, the *maharlika* class. Western colonization did not materially affect the dominant position of its members vis-a-vis the masses. Endowed with certain privileges and allowed to retain their economic possessions, they became willing agents of successive colonial administrations.

The absence of any far-reaching economic change has meant the continuation of old economic and social relations. Most land, which is of prime importance in an agricultural economy, remains under the control and ownership of a very small minority of landed families, while the vast majority of the peasantry has retained much of its traditional serf-like status. Commercial and industrial growth is slow. The middle class is weak and is closely dependent on elite support and patronage.

Cultural factors, such as the kinship system, the *compadre* system, and superior-inferior relationships mingle with other factors to produce a complex system
of dependency which is often exploited by the elite in their bid for political power.

The competition to attain political decision-making posts is characterized by the effective use of the resources which the elite control. Political organizations are essentially elite organized, financed, and led. The absence of mass organizations preclude the possibility of political alternatives outside the elite system.

The high concentration of formal power in the hands of power-holders, accentuated by the general lack of public opposition, gives public officials considerable licence in the exercise of their powers. Often, these powers are abused. In office, the elite politician seeks to maintain, not only his position, but also to advance his interest or the interests of his class. Government then becomes a provider of benefits to elite interests.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Politics is the study of influence and the influential... The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get... Those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass.

Harold D. Lasswell

THE PROBLEM

Each country has its own peculiar social conditions and stage of political development. In some countries, social stratification has become less marked, the gaps separating the various classes have been narrowed, outmoded institutions have been modified or changed, consequently resulting in the rise to importance of other groups within the community and producing a 'toning down' effect on the influence of the more dominant group. In others, social and economic changes have not kept pace with changes in other spheres. The effect is the persistence of the traditional imbalance between social groups, an imbalance that often results in the dominant

group's enjoyment of most of the benefits from the changes while other groups remain relatively unaffected. This may happen when political advance is not accompanied by similar progress in other spheres, when 'liberal institutions' and 'political democracy' are transplanted and superimposed over old patterns of social and economic relations.

The fact that the Philippines has passed through a feudal stage, whose influences are still strongly manifested today in agrarian economic organization and in the behavior patterns and attitudes of both the elite and the masses is an important consideration that must be taken into account in any inquiry into the nature of political leadership. Entrenched landlords on the one hand and a numerous, dependent, landless peasantry on the other are still very much in evidence. The introduction of laissez-faire principles and capitalist techniques of production in the economy has not yet produced a significant 'new middle class'. Industrial and commercial development is still in its infancy and many members of the landlord class have become the leading 'middle class' entrepreneurs.

From time to time, strikingly similar comments and observations are made as to the present nature and character of leadership in the Philippines. Pye, for
instance, made the observation that

the dominant characteristic of all the political systems of Southeast Asia is that they are still, as in the traditional and colonial periods, sharply divided between the ruling few, who possess a distinctive outlook and culture, and the vast majority of the population, who are oriented to village units and the peasant's way of life.  

Similarly, Malcolm, an American official of long residence in the Philippines, observed that

The Filipino social system divides among [along?] class lines. On the lower level are the **taos**. On the higher level are the **caciques** or **ilustrados**. Sandwiched between the two widely separated extremes is the middle class.

The **taos** are peasants who constitute the rural laborers of the Islands. They are the largest group in number, but provide the smallest count in the matter of education. Hard workers in the fields, although often paid barely living wages, they are resigned to their lot, if not stirred by leaders to violence. The sad fate of the **taos** has been that from time immemorial they have all too often been oppressed by their employers and preyed upon by usurers...

The **caciques** are large landowners or persons of influence. Small in number, but wealthy, well

---


3 George A. Malcolm was Dean, College of Law, University of the Philippines (1912-17); Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court (1917-36); Staff member, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines (1936-40) and Professorial Lecturer, University of the Philippines (1948-49).
educated, and cultured, they constitute the ruling class.  

More recently, David Würfel noted that 'to a larger extent than in any Southeast Asian country, except bureaucratic-capitalist Thailand and Communist North Vietnam, the Philippine economic and political elites are coterminous'.

The above and other observations made by some scholars are remarkable in their similarity. Yet, what is noteworthy is that in spite of such suggestion of the existence of an oligarchical situation, the picture that emerges is somewhat obscured, especially when viewed in the light of other comments from the same writers. Würfel, for example, has written elsewhere that 'the Philippines, thanks in part to American tutelage, today enjoys the most democratic government in Southeast Asia.' Malcolm, in the same book where he described the Filipino 'ruling class', has also referred to the Philippines as the 'show

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4 First Malayan Republic, (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1951) p. 36.


window of democracy in the Far East*. Coleman, drawing on Pye's study of Southeast Asia politics, has made the Philippines a 'model' of political democracy. These observations tend to blur the leadership picture for they suggest the existence side-by-side of 'democracy' on the one hand and a 'ruling few' on the other.

One difficulty seems to be partly due to the limitations imposed by the 'models'. The symbolic reality -- found in the political rituals and in the official utterances of the elite -- is confused with the objective reality. What ought to be is often mistaken for what is and deviation from the established social myths is usually looked upon with disapprobation. Fred Riggs has expressed this view quite well and he calls it a 'vicious circle': 'the more artificial and remote from reality the alien models, conventional wisdom, and clichés accepted by an entrenched intelligentsia elite', he wrote, 'the more difficult it becomes for realistic

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7 Malcolm, op. cit., Chapter I, p. 21.
8 See concluding chapter in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 559-60; also Table 6, p. 564.
9 Much, of course, depends on what one means by 'democracy' but the two terms obviously suggest divergent connotations.
thinking and scholarly research to gain acceptance -- the more "subversive" such activities appear to be. 10

Many of the prescribed Philippine political science textbooks (for college and high school), for instance, are centered on the Constitution, treated in a straight descriptive-historical manner. This 'singly denatured approach,' aptly noted Colin A. Hughes, may in fact be 'a way of promoting elite maintenance by pretending that the democratic constitution tells all.' Indeed, the formal structure and the mechanics of power are very well covered, but the persons exercising power have not received the attention that they deserve.

It was with this problem in mind that this study was undertaken. There is a need for research on the nature of leadership in the Philippines for in this field may be found some of the important clues that may lead to the proper appreciation of the serious problems facing the country. Who, in Philippine society, become the power-wielders? How broad, or narrow, is the social base from which they are recruited? Are there any distinct social formations from which they are drawn? What are their economic interests? How do they attain positions

of influence and power? How do they wield power? The answers to the above questions have vital implications for the future.

In the quest for answers to the above questions, the study has focused its attention on a particular group -- the modern principalia class or, in its English equivalent, the socio-economic elite.

THE ELITE CONCEPT

The term 'elite', like many significant concepts, has been utilized to advance diverse points of view. A mere listing of the names of the proponents of the theories of the elite and the ruling class will indicate the dynamic nature of the concept. Men of varied political persuasions such as Saint-Simon, Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, Auguste Comte, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto were among the early writers on the subject. Among the recent 'elitists' may be mentioned

Karl Mannheim, Robert Michels, C. Wright Mills, Harold Lasswell, and others. The term has been alternately applied to the 'right' leaders (Saint-Simon) 'Scientific priesthood' (Compte), leaders of the 'social forces' (Mosca), 'superior' beings (Pareto) and to the men who occupy the 'institutional command posts' (C. Wright Mills).

(11 (cont'd)


Marx's ruling class, of course, refers to those who own and control the means of production.

In spite of the fact that the elitist and ruling class writers have not always been talking of the same groups (although, there is an obvious overlapping), they seem to be unanimous on one point: they were analyzing individuals, social groups or classes possessing certain characteristics or attributes that placed them at the top or near the top of the social structure.

For purposes of this study, then, the term elite shall be made to refer to those individuals who are 'holders of high positions in a given society'. Under this definition, there could be as many elites as there are values. Thus, there may be elites of wealth (economic elite), power (political elite), prestige (social elite), and so forth. Also, elite status may be attained by any individual who becomes 'successful', that is to say, who acquires the key values of the society which are necessary for the exercise of influence. The elite concept, therefore, is theoretically independent of the class concept.

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14 Ibid.
But there is a tendency for the concentration of these values not only in the same hands but also in the same social strata. Wealth may not only bring more wealth but may also facilitate the acquisition of power, prestige, and other values. In short, when persons become 'elite' in relation to several of these key values and have, therefore, a high generalized influence, we say that they are the elite of society.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, in a country characterized by a marked degree of social stratification, with wide gaps dividing social classes, there will likely be a high inequality in the sharing and distribution of key values such as wealth, education, power, prestige, and skill among the various social classes. Under these circumstances 'the elite concept may be used with reference to the upper strata...in which case it includes not only the individuals with high generalized influence but also their families'.\textsuperscript{16}

The term socio-economic elite as used in this study, therefore, merely emphasizes the membership of an individual, who occupies a high position in the functional hierarchy, in a social class hierarchy. In

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}
other words, the term *socio-economic elite* merges the elite concept (which normally refers to a group of 'successful' individuals) with the *class* concept. The term *socio-economic elite*, as shall be seen later, also becomes useful as an analytical tool in determining whether there is an overlap or coincidence between the political elite and the socio-economic dominants (*socio-economic elite*).

**Political elite**, or the elite of power, refers to the 'power holders of a body politic' and includes 'the leadership and the social formations from which leaders typically come...'. Again, there is no assumption made that the power holders come from a distinct social formation. This was in fact one of the objects of the empirical investigation conducted by the study and the data gathered are presented and analyzed in Chapter IV. The distinction is necessary, for, as previously mentioned, if key values such as wealth, prestige, and power merge in the same hands, then we have located the elite.

Finally, it should be pointed out that those who compose the elite may themselves fall into different gradations. From the definition given, it is clear

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that the elite may be seen as individuals with varying degrees of influence depending on how much of the key values of wealth, prestige, power, education, etc., they possess. But as a class, they are easily distinguishable from the masses.

There are terms used in the study such as principalia, cacique, and others but these were actual names given to particular groups in Philippine society and are defined or explained as they are encountered in the text.

METHODOLOGY

No single 'approach' was adopted in this study. The nature of Philippine society, with its class and economic system and its semi-fused structures whose functions often overlap, necessitated the adoption of a broad focus in order to better understand the full implication of leadership. This implies that leadership and power must be seen in the context of the total social environment and existing institutions; it also stresses the need for the techniques and findings of other related disciplines such as history, sociology, anthropology and economics. Behavioral techniques in the gathering of empirical data have been employed but historical and institutional analysis have not been abandoned. This was a complicated and difficult task but was considered necessary for a deeper understanding of the problem.
The aim was to look closer at the trees but at the same time not to get lost and see none of the forest.

**Research Procedure.** Fieldwork for the study was carried on from December, 1962 to December, 1963. During these twelve months, compilation of elite biographical materials, intensive interviewing, examination and analysis of documents, official records, newspapers and periodicals were made. Provincial field trips and a questionnaire survey were also conducted.

Since one of the main aims of the study was to discover who become the political leaders in point of social and economic characteristics, the first task was to identify the individuals who have held certain public positions during the period under review.\(^{18}\) Accordingly, biographical data were gathered on top officials who have served from 1946-63, namely, all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Cabinet members, (those listed in the Official Directories), Senators (1947-64), members of the House of Representatives, and Justices of the Supreme Court.\(^{19}\) The data gathered were reduced into tables,

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\(^{18}\) This portion of the research operation is an adaptation of Lasswell et al.'s suggested framework of elite research. Cf. *The Comparative Study of Elites*, op. cit.

\(^{19}\) Further details of the procedure, major sources of data, and treatment of the material are given in Chapter IV. See particularly Footnote 8.
using the comparative frequency metric,\textsuperscript{20} to determine whether the members of the political elite have common social class characteristics which can give clues to the social circulation of the power holders. Did new types of political leaders appear? How did the leaders compare with the rest of the population in point of social class characteristics? Data on age, year of entry to top public positions, pre-elite positions, age at entry to elite positions, and years in elite positions gave a collective picture of the career and recruitment pattern of the political elite.

A simultaneous operation was the questionnaire survey conducted sometime in February 1963. It was not the intention of the survey to discover provincial 'power elites' as suggested by Schulze and Blumberg\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} This technique is the accumulation of data on certain selected characteristics of an elite group during a given time period and making a comparative analysis to determine what changes have taken place within the group. These characteristics are then compared with the rest of the society. (Cf. Lasswell et al., \textit{The Comparative Study of Elites}, op. cit., p. 27)

since the study was focused rather on the national elite. Instead, the main objective was to form a general picture of the composition of those who were considered the local socio-economic dominants, the bases of their influence and 'prominence' and their participation in politics.22

Five knowledgeable persons in each province were selected to compose the panel, namely, the Provincial Treasurer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, the President of the local Jaycee, and the provincial correspondent of the Philippine News Service. A covering letter of instructions explaining the questionnaire and the meaning of 'prominent' and 'influential', together with corresponding letters of introduction were attached to the questionnaire.23 All in all, 364 questionnaires were distributed (five in each of the 56 provinces or 280, and 84 for the pre-tests to junior and senior cadets

22

23

A sample of the form appears in the Appendix.

Director Carlos P. Ramos of the Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines kindly furnished the covering letters of introduction for the Provincial Treasurers and the Division Superintendent of Schools, General Dominador F. Garcia (Chief of Constabulary) for the PC Commanders, Mr. Jose G. Morada (National President of the Jaycees) for the Jaycee officials, and Mr. Osmundo Abad Santos (Manager of the Philippine News Service) for the provincial newspapermen.
of the Philippine Military Academy who came from different provinces of the Philippines). The response was about 52% (189 out of 364) and each province had at least a panel member who responded. There were some provinces where all panel members responded. An average of twenty families in each province were mentioned.

As previously stated, the aim was to form a general picture of the local socio-economic dominants. As it turned out, however, the questionnaire data furnished important information which was found useful in the analysis of the top political elite. Many of the top power holders from 1946-63 (except those originally from Metropolitan Manila) were mentioned. Information concerning the socio-economic bases of their influence (land ownership, profession, or business) and members of their families and relatives (by blood or affinity) who were elected or appointed to important public office provided the necessary clues which were checked against official and other sources.

A master list of landowners with holdings of 50 hectares and above was particularly found useful. This was kindly furnished to the writer by Mr. Arturo P. Sorongon who made a study of landed estates in the
Philippines in 1955. Data on ownership or control of banks, insurance companies, mass media, public utilities (shipping lines, land transportation, electric power plants, telephone) forest concessions and pasture leases were also accumulated from the Central Bank, Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Radio Control Office, Public Service Commission and the Bureau of Forestry.

The provincial contacts established through the questionnaire survey were also found useful during the provincial field trips conducted from April to June 1963. Intensive interviews were conducted in seven provinces (Ilocos Sur, Pampanga, Albay, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Misamis Oriental, and Davao) although side trips to several other provinces were made along the way. Members of the provincial panel were the main contacts who introduced the writer to persons mentioned in the questionnaire survey. Both the informal and the guided interview methods were utilized. The points of concentration were on the nature and composition of the local elite, the relationships between the local and the national elite, the socio-economic base of the elite,

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the requisites for local political leadership, the manner in which social, economic and political influence is exercised, ownership and control of the local mass media, and the thinking of the elite on the major questions or issues of the day. Inquiries were also made on the recent history of the political contests in the various provinces visited. Two hundred and twenty-seven persons were met through the panel members. Of these, 108 were government officials (Governors, Vice-Governors, Provincial Board members, City Mayors, Vice-Mayors, Town Mayors, Councilors, Provincial Treasurers, Constabulary and police officers, military personnel, Judges and Fiscals); 39 were professionals (lawyers, physicians, teachers, etc.), 12 were local political party leaders, 17 were businessmen, 10 were press and radio people, 9 were religious leaders, 4 were labor leaders, 8 were executives of private business and industrial firms, 9 were big landowners and 11 were plain folks. Of these 227, however, only 118 were intensively interviewed.

The material for the rest of the study came from historical documents, official records, newspapers and periodicals, other published and unpublished sources, and interviews with national officials and political
party leaders. These are indicated in the bibliography and footnotes. Observations were made while Congress was in session, especially during the deliberations on the Land Reform Code. Interviews with some Senators, Congressmen, and landowners were made in connection with the bill. Party conventions of the Nacionalista Party and the now defunct Labor Party, political rallies in Manila and Pampanga, and the conduct of the election in Manila, Quezon City and Pasay City were likewise observed.

The study is organized as follows: Chapter II traces the historical beginnings and development of the Philippine elite from pre-colonial times to the end of the colonial period. Attention is focused on the position of the elite in the social structure and the characteristics which distinguished them from the rest of the society. Elite functions and roles at various stages of Philippine history and elite relations with the colonial administrations are also discussed.

An examination of the postwar status of the modern principalia, or the socio-economic elite, is made in Chapter III. Analysis of the social and economic setting is made to determine whether a rearrangement in the social structure has occurred. Did the old
principalia disappear? Did a new type of elite develop? In other words, was there a transformation in elite composition or were new recruits merely added? Chapter III also examines the present class system; a rough estimate of the various social class categories including the modern principalia class is likewise made.

Chapter IV is a statistical and analytical study of the political elite. Empirical data bearing on the career patterns, socio-economic background, regional origin, etc., are presented and analyzed. The objective is to determine the ties of the political elite with the social structure, whether there are any distinct social formations from which they were drawn. What were the common characteristics of the political elite? A discussion of the politically dominant families is also included. (A selected list of these families as established from official sources, provincial interviews, and the questionnaire survey is in the Appendix).

Chapter V deals with the nature of Philippine political parties and the role of the elite in these political organizations. The rest of the discussion centers on the methods and practices employed by the elite in their competition to attain political decision-making posts. Chapter VI examines the manner in which
power was exercised with the aim of illustrating the position of the power-wielders vis-a-vis the total society. How were elite interests and positions maintained?

Finally, the last chapter contains a summary of findings of the study.
CHAPTER II

THE PHILIPPINE ELITE: HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS AND DEVELOPMENT

Philippine society has traditionally been rigidly stratified and leadership has always been closely associated with the top strata of society. Whether under native or foreign rule, this pattern has persisted through the centuries — from pre-colonial times to the present.

A. THE RULING CLASS IN PRE-CONQUEST TIMES

Before the coming of the Spaniards in the early part of the sixteenth century, Philippine society did not form a single national unit but was fragmented into small, independent organizations called barangays. 1 Antonio de Morga, a high Spanish official who came to the Philippines about the time when the Spaniards were consolidating their control and one of the recognized chroniclers of pre-Spanish Philippines, reported that

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1 Barangay is a Hispanized term derived from balangay, the name of the boats in which the early Malay settlers came to the Philippines, and which was also applied to their political organizations. Cf. Eufronio M. Alip, Political and Cultural History of the Philippines. (Manila: Alip and Sons, 1954) p.56.
There were no kings or lords throughout these islands who ruled over them as in the manner of our kingdoms and provinces; but in every island and in each province of it, many chiefs were recognized by the natives themselves. Some were more powerful than others, and each one had his followers and subjects, by districts and families; and these obeyed and respected the chief.2

The barangay, which was a family-government structure, consisted generally of from thirty to one hundred families although there were some large barangays and barangay confederations having up to 7,000 inhabitants.3

Barangay society was divided into three major classes: (1) the maharlika, or nobility; (2) the timawa, or freemen; and (3) the serfs and slaves (aliping namamahay and aliping sagigilid).4

The nobility was the ruling class. From its ranks was drawn the datu which meant 'chief' or 'monarch'.

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4 Alip, op. cit., p.61. Some historians treat the serfs and slaves as separate classes but as Phelan noted, the 'slaves' resembled debt peons having some similar characteristics as the serfs although they are in a much lower category. Cf. Phelan, op. cit., pp.20-1.
other regions, the ruler was called **rajah**, **hadji**, or **sultan**. Thus at the time of the conquest of Manila, it was ruled by Rajah Lakandula, a direct descendant of Rajah Malang Balagtas, one-time ruler of the Madjapahit Empire.\(^5\) Other titles conferred on the members of the nobility were **Gat** and **Lakan** for men (the equivalent for 'Lord' in English or 'Don' in Spanish), and **Dayang** for women.\(^6\)

The **timawa** were next in rank to the nobility. They paid no taxes, owned lands and were free to select their own occupations. They, however, owed allegiance to the **datu**, accompanied him in his hunting or fishing trips. They also went to war with him.

The **aliping namamahay** were basically debt peons who worked for the **maharlika** or the **timawa**. Owning no lands or work animals, they built their homes on lands owned by their superiors. For tilling the lands of their lords, they received as compensation a portion of the harvest. They were essentially the equivalent of the present-day

\(^5\) *Ibid.*, p.142. In the Moslem regions of Mindanao today, leadership is still mainly exercised by the **sultans**, **datus**, **hadjis**, etc.

\(^6\) *Vide*, Luther Parker, 'The Gats and the Lakans', *Philippine Magazine*, vol.XXVII, January 1931.
kasamas or taos in rural Philippines. The aliping sagigilid, though called slaves, were not precisely chattels as the slaves in Roman times or North America in the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. While at times they could be sold (if they were not household servants), they could own and dispose of property. They could also attain freedom by purchase, marriage, voluntary action of the lord etc. The children of the serf and the aliping sagigilid acquired the status of their parents.

Chieftain or datu status was hereditary but a member of the maharlika might become a datu through wealth and physical prowess.

These principalities and lordships were inherited in the male line and by succession of father and son and their descendants. If these were lacking, then their brothers and collateral relatives succeeded. Their duty was to rule and govern their subjects and followers, and to assist them in their interests and necessities. What the chiefs received from their followers was to be held by them in great veneration and respect; and they were served in their wars and voyages and in their tilling, sowing, fishing, and the building of their houses. To these duties the natives attended very promptly whenever summoned by their chief. They also paid the chief tribute (which they called buiz), in varying quantities, in the crops that they gathered. The descendants of such chiefs, and their relatives, even though they did not inherit the lordship, were held in the same

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Phelan, op. cit., p. 21; Alip., op. cit., p. 63.
respect and consideration. Such were all regarded as nobles, and as persons exempt from the services rendered by the others, or the plebians, who were called timaguas (timaw'a, Rizal). Exactly the same right of nobility and chieftainship was preserved for the women as for the men. When anyone of these chiefs was more courageous than others in war and upon other occasions, such a one obtained more followers and men; and the others were under his leadership, even if they were chiefs. These latter retained to themselves the lordship and particular government of their own following, which was called barangay among them.8

The members of the maharlika class, in keeping with their status, lived pompously. Thus, Morga described a street scene:

Both men and women, especially the chiefs, walk slowly and sedately upon going to their visits, and when going through the streets and to the temples; and are accompanied by many slaves, both male and female, with parasols of silk which they carry to protect them from the sun and rain. The women walk ahead and their female servants and slaves follow them; behind these walk their husbands, fathers, or brothers, with their men-servants and slaves.9

As a ruler, the datu had immense powers and exercised multi-functional roles. He was law-giver, judge, chief executive, and military leader. As judge he was often assisted by a group of elders called maginoos

8 Morga, op. cit., pp.119-21.
who also belonged to the maharlika class. He had control of the land although the actual title was vested in the barangay. He also controlled trade, fishing, etc.

There is, however, one important characteristic of this pre-conquest power structure. Although the social divisions were fairly rigid (but not as rigid as the Indian caste-system), it was 'bound together in a kinship system of mutual dependence essentially patriarchal in character.'

Phelan also noted that because of this feature, knowledgeable Spanish observers recognized that the Philippine dependency system 'lacked the harshness and brutality of European slavery'.

B. THE PRINCIPALIA: CACIQUE BUREAUCRACY UNDER SPAIN

SUBJUGATION, CONVERSION AND COLLABORATION

The colonization of the Philippines by the Spaniards brought an end to the absolute dominion of the ruling datus over their respective jurisdictions. The highly-fragmented nature of the barangay governmental units facilitated their conquest by the foreigners.

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10 Alip, op. cit., p.56.
11 Phelan, op. cit., p.22.
12 Ibid.
The initial policy of the Spaniards in consolidating their political control was the adoption of the encomienda system. Under this system, vast areas of lands were apportioned among 'loyal and deserving' Spaniards who became known as encomenderos. The indios (as the Spaniards called the Filipinos) who lived within these areas were placed under the control of the encomenderos and were forced to pay tribute.\(^\text{13}\)

In trying to bring about the complete subjugation of the Filipinos, the Spaniards had to utilize force and religion. Priest and soldier, cross and sword, were both employed. The encomenderos, particularly, were brutal in their methods:

The religious, fearing that the conquered would be repelled by the religion of the conquerors, often decried the forceful methods with which the encomenderos went about their task. Such

\(^{13}\) The encomiendas in the Philippines were not the precursors of the latifundia or hacienda system which developed much later in the nineteenth century. Rather, they were designed more as political subdivisions in which the encomendero was given the power to collect tribute in his encomienda as well as the basic powers and duties of government such as executing and enforcing the laws of the Church and the State, preserving peace and order, giving religious instruction, providing military protection, etc. Subsequent developments showed, however, that the encomenderos were more interested in the exercise of their power of tribute collection and neglected their other duties. Cf. Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, 3rd ed. (Madrid: Andres Ortega, 1774) Libro VI, Titulo IX.
fears, although plausible, proved in fact groundless. Actually by their very blood and fire methods the encomenderos rendered a service to the religious by breaking the backbone of native resistance.\textsuperscript{14}

This 'service' rendered by the \textit{encomenderos} to the religious facilitated the conversion of the Filipinos. The friars concentrated first on the children of the \textit{datus} and then on the \textit{datus} themselves.

What the religious usually requested was that some of the children be committed to their care. The chieftains might shun the monastery for some time, but out of a combination of curiosity and fear they would hand over some of their children to be educated by the religious. Evangelization followed a standard pattern. The children of the chieftains were first indoctrinated, and then the chieftains themselves were persuaded.\textsuperscript{15}

With the conversion of the \textit{datus} to Catholicism, the consolidation of Spanish control over the rest of the population followed.

The \textit{datus} were destined not to lose their leading roles insofar as their relation with their people was concerned. Lacking adequate personnel to preserve their authority in the Islands, the Spaniards decided to utilize the members of the native upper class to assist the central government in administering the villages.

\textsuperscript{14} Phelan, \textit{op. cit.}, p.54.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p.55.
It should be noted that during this time, as throughout the Spanish rule, there were only a few thousand Spaniards in the Philippines, with most of them concentrated in Manila. The central government therefore had to resort to the friars and the native members of the upper class to exercise their control over the indios. The Spaniards, following the tested principle of divide et impera, were careful not to disturb the social status of the local chieftains. They changed the Filipino title datu to the Hispanized Cabeza de barangay (head of the barangay). They also conferred upon the datus certain privileges designed to make them loyal.

As early as 1573 the Agustinian prelates urged Philip II to preserve this group [the nobility] as a privileged class. In 1594 Philip II granted two concessions to the headsman of the Philippines, privileges previously granted to the Indian caciques in America. Both the headsman and their eldest sons were exempt from the paying of the annual tribute as well as from participation in compulsory labor projects. They also enjoyed certain honorific tokens of prestige. They enjoyed honors similar to Hidalgos of Castile, including the privilege of using the Spanish "don".

17 Phelan, op. cit., p.122.
Primarily because of this treatment as a privileged group, the members of the Filipino upper class became willing agents of Spanish colonial administration. They were employed by the Spaniards as tribute collectors in their respective barangays. This function, as we have noted, was not a new one for the cabezas. The only difference was that under the new dispensation, they had to hand over the tributes collected to the encomenderos. Because the cabezas were given quotas to collect and were required to pay whatever shortage, they often collected more than what was required. In this task, they employed methods that often matched those of the Spaniards.

Tributes far exceeded the official tariff...the tribute rolls were seldom kept up to date, with the result that sons often had to pay the tax on a dead father. The encomenderos were collecting their tribute with blood and fire methods without providing their wards with any of the protective services established by law. The agents of the encomenderos were harsh and brutal. Native chieftains, who frequently acted as tribute collectors, were a scourge. Many encomenderos compelled their wards to pay tribute in a scarce commodity, which goods the encomendero then resold at a handsome profit.18

The widespread abuses that accompanied the encomienda system disgusted even the Spanish friars who

18 Ibid., p.95.
made representations with the King leading to its eventual abandonment as a method of political control.19 Alcaldías (provinces) and pueblos (towns) replaced them and became the local units of government. The alcaldías were headed by the Spanish alcalde mayores.

The establishment of the pueblos opened new positions to the native upper class. The highest official of the pueblo was the gobernadorcillo (literally, petty governor) and the title of capitan was conferred upon him. The gobernadorcillo was assisted by tenientes (deputies), alguaciles (subordinate employees), a constable, and inspectors of fields, cattle, etc. 20 The position of gobernadorcillo was 'elective' with the franchise limited to twelve of the most senior cabezas who made three nominations in the presence of the parish priest, the outgoing gobernadorcillo and the Spanish alcalde mayor (provincial governor). The final choice was made either by the central government or, in the case of more remote

19 The exact date of abolition of the encomienda system in the Philippines is not known. While provincial governments and towns intended to replace them started to be organized by the end of the sixteenth century, records show that up to 1766, there were still several thousands of private encomiendas. See Blair and Robertson, vol. L, p.78.

20 Kalaw, op. cit., p.25.
provinces, by the provincial governor. The other officials of the pueblo were also selected during the meeting. 21

These then, composed the principalia class: 22 the hereditary cabezas and the whole set of 'elective' officials. Throughout Spain's rule of over three hundred years, they monopolized public positions open to Filipinos. They constituted the voting and privileged class in Filipino society.

PRINCIPALIA METAMORPHOSIS

The principalia as a class, however, underwent some changes. Apart from the loyal collaboration which the members gave to the conquerors owing to the privileges they enjoyed under pax hispanica, and which separated them from their fellow countrymen, there were other changes that took place. Acquiring Spanish education and learning the Castilian language, they became 'different' from their people who were not given the same opportunities. Living in the poblaciones or cabeceras,

21 Initially, all adult males nominated three candidates and the Spaniards selected one to serve as gobernadorcillo, but this was changed in 1642 by Governor Corcuera. See Blair and Robertson, op. cit., vol. L, pp.208-9.

22 Principalia is derived from principales, i.e., the 'principal' members of the community.
they became more isolated from the masses of their countrymen. Finally, the infusion of the *mestizo* element, resulting from the racial mixture between Spanish officials, soldiers, priests and prosperous Chinese merchants on the one hand and Filipino women on the other, produced the *mestizo* character, not only in outlook and culture, but also in physical features as well which, up to this day, is so prominently manifested in the *principalia* class. These changes warrant closer examination.

Education was one of the most neglected aspects of Spanish colonial administration. There was no attempt at all to establish a system of popular education for nearly 300 years of Spanish rule. Whatever education that existed was practically limited to the *principalia* class. Phelan, for example, noted that the aim of training the sons of chieftains (who often board for a few years at the parish residence called the *convento*) was to have 'an elite class who could act as intermediaries between the Spaniards and the Filipino masses'.

Joseph R. Hayden, Professor of Political Science of Michigan University and a former American Vice-Governor

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of the Philippines, wrote on the state of Spanish education:

Toward the end of the Spanish regime a one-room school for boys and another for girls was found, with the great stone church and convent facing the plaza in almost every center of population in the Islands [cabecera or poblacion]. But these schools, in which the catechism, mechanically taught with the liberal aid of the rod, was the chief subject of instruction, were attended chiefly by the children of the upper-class Filipinos, those who lived in the towns where the schools were situated. A very few of the wealthier 'Indios' set their sons and daughters to advanced and expensive private institutions, somewhat comparable to American boarding schools.\(^{24}\)

It was only towards the end of Spanish rule that the authorities began to think of popular education. In 1863, a Royal Decree was issued providing for a system of primary instruction for the first time\(^{25}\) but, as Del Rosario noted,


Among the 'advanced and expensive' private schools referred to by Hayden are the University of Santo Tomas (established by the Dominican Order in 1611), Colegio de San Juan de Letran (Dominicans-1620), and Ateneo de Manila (Jesuits-1859) for boys and the 'colegios' for girls are Colegio de Sta. Isabel (1630), Colegio de Sta. Rita (1719) Colegio de la Concordia (1868), Assumption Convent (1892). Up to this day, many of these religious educational institutions are among those that are referred to as the 'prestige' schools in the Philippines. Originally established by the Spaniards for their children, they soon accepted the children of the upper class Filipinos. (Cf. 1903 Census of the Philippines, vol. I, p.336.)

All the laws, decrees, circulars etc., which were issued for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening the education of the people were dead letters, because the [Spanish] parish priests scattered throughout the country, making use of their influence, privileges and governmental powers, tenaciously and constantly opposed the education of the popular masses.26

As of 1903, or four years after the Americans replaced the Spaniards as the colonizers, there were only 76,627 persons or 1.6 per cent of the population ten years old and over who had education beyond primary instruction.27 We can assume that these were mostly members of the principia.

The cabecera complex, or as what the anthropologist Donn Hart calls today the 'Philippine plaza complex',28 started to manifest itself as a definite settlement pattern when the Spaniards built their churches in centrally-located areas and wanted the Filipinos to be resettled bajo de campana (literally, 'under the bells').

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26 Ibid., p.594.
28 Professor Hart made an anthropological community study of settlement patterns in the Philippines in 1950 to 1952. His findings show the distinct concentration of the principalia in and around the plaza. (The plaza is often used interchangeably with poblacion, centro or cabecera.) See Donn V. Hart, The Philippine Plaza Complex: A Focal Point in Culture Change (Yale University: Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1955).
Phelan observed that 'the results certainly were not as sweeping as the missionaries wanted, but preconquest decentralization was sufficiently reduced so that Filipinos were brought into some contacts with Hispanic culture'.

Among these 'Filipinos brought into some contacts with Hispanic culture' and who settled in the cabecera or plaza with their residences clustered around the church, school and town hall were included most of the members of the principalia. This interesting aspect of principalia resettlement pattern and its implications shall be explored further in the succeeding chapters, but what is important to note at this point is that this phenomenon contributed to the development of a distinctive outlook among the principalia, since they were the ones most influenced by Hispanic culture through their close contacts with the Spaniards while the bulk of the indio peasantry remained in their remote villages.

The mestizo element of the principalia class, unlike its Mexican and other Latin-American counterparts, was not solely a mixture of the Spanish and the native.

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29 Phelan, op. cit., p. 49.
Rather, it was predominantly a racial mixture of the Filipino with the Spanish and Chinese, with the latter being much more numerous.

Most of the Spaniards who came to the Philippines as a general rule, did not bring women with them. John Bowring who made a visit to the Philippines in 1858 noted that 'the number settled in the islands of women of European birth is small, and generally speaking they are the wives of the higher Spanish functionaries and of superior officers in the army and navy, whose term of service is generally limited'. As a result, racial mixing between the Spaniards and upper-class Filipino women were not uncommon. Bowring noted that

...it is seldom that the highest society is without a large proportion of mestiza ladies, children of Spanish fathers and native mothers. The great majority of the merchants and landed proprietors belong to this class, and most of the subordinate offices of government are filled by them.

The available evidence on this racial mixing suggests that they were mostly informal unions. One historian, for instance, writes that 'in those days mestizo and

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31 Bowring, op. cit., p.68.
33 Bowring, op. cit.
illegitimate were synonymous terms. There were also cases of *donjuanismo* among the friars and 'flagrant violations of the monastic vow of chastity obviously set a demoralizing example to the rest of the clergy'.

The number of Spanish *mestizos* was however small and did not probably exceed more than 35,000 by the end of Spanish rule. The primary reason for this, as already mentioned, is that the Spaniards never settled in the Philippines in great numbers. In contrast, the Chinese *mestizos* exceeded 200,000 at this time.

The Chinese had had contacts with the Filipinos even antedating that of the Spaniards. Available evidence, however, indicates that they began settling in the Philippines in greater numbers with the start of the Spanish galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Chinese

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34 Phelan, *op. cit.*
merchants traded silk for Mexican silver, and brought other imports from China and distributed them in Manila and Central Luzon. By the 1580's they were in sufficient numbers to be assigned by the Spaniards a separate colony in Manila called the Parian. Skilled in commerce and trade and as artisans, they soon monopolized these activities.

The Chinese, like the Spaniards, mixed racially with Filipina women. Marriages and informal unions produced a Chinese mestizo population at first in Manila (with most of them concentrated in the Binondo area), and later in the provinces. Wickberg points out that conscious attempts of the Spaniards in converting the Chinese to Catholicism contributed to the creation of these mestizo communities.

...the fact that marriages between Chinese and indias, when both partners were Catholics were legally recognized and encouraged resulted in the creation of special communities of mestizo. The most important of these was the Binondo community, across the river from the walled city of Manila.  

Apprently, the aim was to create 'a dependable group of Catholic Chinese merchants and artisans loyal to Spain'  

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39 Phelan, op. cit., p.11.  
TABLE 2.1

CHINESE MESTIZO POPULATION, BY PROVINCES, IN 1810*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>INDIOS</th>
<th>MESTIZOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albay</td>
<td>103,935</td>
<td>2,398.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antique</td>
<td>39,325</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td>23,985</td>
<td>5,596.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batangas</td>
<td>127,920</td>
<td>3,997.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulacan</td>
<td>143,910</td>
<td>20,037.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cagayan</td>
<td>76,752</td>
<td>162.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calamianes</td>
<td>15,990</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camarines</td>
<td>159,900</td>
<td>2,398.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capiz</td>
<td>87,145.5</td>
<td>396.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraga</td>
<td>19,183</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavite</td>
<td>51,967</td>
<td>7,195.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebu</td>
<td>151,905</td>
<td>4,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilocos</td>
<td>361,270</td>
<td>4,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iloilo</td>
<td>167,895</td>
<td>1,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laguna</td>
<td>95,940</td>
<td>3,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>68,007.5</td>
<td>306.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>13,169</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misamis</td>
<td>18,388.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negros</td>
<td>41,574</td>
<td>799.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nueva Ecija</td>
<td>9,750</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampanga</td>
<td>127,920</td>
<td>20,937.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangasinan</td>
<td>159,900</td>
<td>3,997.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samar</td>
<td>88,595</td>
<td>791.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayabas</td>
<td>71,955</td>
<td>162.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tondo (N. Manila and Rizal)</td>
<td>143,910</td>
<td>35,077.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,395,676.5</td>
<td>120,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The strange decimal figures are due to the use of the factor 6.5 (number of persons per tribute) multiplied by the number of tribute-payers adopted by Comyn. The above figures are, therefore, estimates based on the tributes paid.
and perhaps a group of Catholicized Chinese mestizos that 'would excel in higher education and assist the Dominicans in the spiritual conquest of China'.

By 1810, the Chinese mestizo population, whose distribution in the provinces is shown in Table 2.1, had reached an estimated 120,621. (See Table)

It can be seen from the Table that the areas of mestizo concentration are Tondo (which then included a major portion of Manila and what is now the province of Rizal), the Central Luzon provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga and Pangasinan, the Southern Tagalog provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna and some provinces of the Visayan Islands. Importance is attached to these figures for, as shall be seen later, the areas of mestizo concentration are also those that produced the most number of top public officials.

How did the Chinese mestizos attain positions of prominence? It should be noted that the mestizos, being part-Filipinos, spoke the dialects and knew the ways of the Filipinos better than the Spaniards. These were distinct advantages. Like their Chinese fathers, the

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41 Ibid., p.68-9.
42 See Chapter IV (Section on 'Regional Origin').
mestizos were primarily merchants at first but soon expanded into landholding. Starting as inquilinos (lessees) of haciendas owned by religious corporations and other landholders, they accumulated wealth by subletting the lands they leased at a profit, or by employing indio kasamas (share tenants).

Some of the lands in question were sublet by the inquilinos for amounts in excess of the rent owed by the inquilino to the landowner. Others were worked according to the kasamahan system, by which the actual tiller received a percentage of the crop, the inquilino taking the rest, from which he paid his rent.43

There were two other methods of wealth and land accumulation which were connected with each other (and which are still in use up to this day). One of these was usurious money-lending. The Christianized indios had taken to their new religion with enthusiasm, particularly in the celebration or observance of religious occasions such as fiestas, baptisms, marriage feasts, funerals, etc. These occasions entailed a great deal of spending for there were many saints to be honored and many guests to be invited. The peasantry, perhaps following the lead of their 'leaders', indulged in their own little way in

'conspicuous consumption'. They borrowed money from their landlords and other money-lenders at usurious rates of interests. For those who had no lands, this was one sure way of sinking deeper into debt peonage and poverty. For those who had small plots of land, it was one way of losing them. The common instrument in the latter transaction was the pacto de retro or 'deed of sale with right to repurchase'. The borrower mortgaged his land for ready cash and was given a definite time within which to 'repurchase' it. In most cases, the indio small landholder was seldom able to redeem his land which then went to the money-lender.\footnote{Zuñiga, ibid., pp.364-5, 398, 440, 492-3, cited in Wickberg, ibid., p.76.}

The Chinese and Chinese mestizos went into this money-lending business extensively. The Chinese mestizos particularly started to accumulate more and more lands such that the Spaniards became concerned and as early as 1768 there were laws against the use of the pacto de retro -- specifically, against its use by the Chinese and the Chinese mestizos.\footnote{Wickberg, op. cit., p.77; Cf. 'Contratos usurarios', Revista general de legislacion y jurisprudencia, XXV (Madrid: 1864), p.176.}
There were good reasons behind this land accumulation which led to the growth of the hacienda system in the nineteenth century.

A succession of events led to the expansion of commerce and trade. The establishment of foreign trading houses in Manila started from 1814, the termination of trade monopoly by the Spanish Royal Company in 1835, the opening of the port of Manila to foreign trade in 1837 and other ports in 1855, all these produced an expansion of Chinese and Chinese mestizo activities who 'sent their purchasing agents eastward to Leyte and Samar, southward to Caraga and Misamis, and westward to Negros and Panay to buy up local products for sale to foreign merchants in Manila'.

The mestizos of Cebu, Molo and Jaro carried on an important trade collecting raw materials in the Visayas and transporting them to Manila where they sold them to Chinese or European merchants for exports overseas.

There was an important consequence of these increased trading activities. As Philippine agricultural products such as leaf tobacco, hemp, sugar, coffee, etc. began to be exchanged in increasing amounts for the European and

46 Ibid., p.82.
47 Ibid.
other manufactures that came into the country, lands for commercial agriculture also started to be in great demand. The rush for land began. This process was vividly described by David Barrows, one of the early American officials in the country:

To this period [of commercial expansion] is due the propagation of the hemp fields of Ambos Camarines, Albay and Sorsogon; the planting of the innumerable coconut groves; the sugar haciendas of Pampanga and Negros; the tobacco fields of Cagayan and the Ilocas provinces; the coffee of Batangas... One thing is to be noticed, and is important in estimating the future development of the Islands. The money that was invested here was not brought in by capitalists but was made here. Haciendas arose from small beginnings, and this continued prosperity apparently suffered no diminution or check until it was interrupted by the ravages and desolation of warfare. One point must be noticed, however, in regard to the addition of this wealth to the islands and that is that it was not evenly distributed among the population but went to enrich certain families largely Spanish and mestizos, as well as the old native aristocracy -- the "principales". The great mass of the population secured few gains or material benefits from this increased wealth of the archipelago.48 (Emphasis supplied.)

That the Chinese mestizo, has taken his formal place in principia ranks by virtue of his wealth (and prestige resulting from such wealth), was observed by Zuniga. In Binan, Laguna, he says, the Chinese who had settled and married there and the Chinese mestizos are

the ones who have the best houses for they are the ones 'that compose the principalia of this town'.

To what can we account this remarkable rise to prominence of the mestizo? Aside from their skilled money-making activities and methods of land accumulation already described, they were also loyal supporters of Spanish hegemony in the Philippines. Correctly assessing their stakes in the society, they became ardent upholders of the status quo. Like their other principalia counterparts -- the Spanish mestizo and native aristocracy -- they have become thoroughly Hispanized. Thus, Wickberg notes:

If the mestizos' political record was apparently pro-Spanish, their cultural record was certainly so. There seemed to be no attachment to Chinese culture, and, instead a very strong affinity for a Philippine version of Hispanic culture. Their interest in Catholicism was particularly strong. Individually and corporately they generously endowed local Catholic churches, the centers of local Spanish cultural influence. Their contests with the indio gremios were very often matters of precedence in religious festivals, seating in the churches, and the like... The Chinese mestizo, clearly, was as hispanized -- if not more so -- as was the urbanized indio.50

The foregoing discussions have been focused on the changes that have occurred within the principalia. These

50 Wickberg, op. cit., p. 89.
changes, however, did not materially affect the basic character of the principalia as a class. If there was any effect at all, it was towards a further differentiation of the members of the principalia from the masses. Their virtual monopoly of public office and higher education, their recognition and treatment by the Spaniards as a special privileged group, their common stakes in society, their distinctly different culture and outlook as compared to that of the masses -- all these produced an extraordinary homogeneity in the principalia class in spite of its ethnic diversity.

CACIQUISM

One of the outgrowths of principalia oligarchy is what is often known as caciquism. Pelzer stated that

The Spaniards introduced the term cacique or chief, into the Philippines from Haiti and applied it to the datos, or cabezas de barangay, and the other leading families of a community. By recognizing them, the Spaniards helped the caciques to preserve their power over the people and gave them the opportunity of getting more and more land into their hands, of making more and more people financially dependent upon them (inasmuch as they were the tax-collectors), and of reducing freeholders to the status of tenants.51

Caciquism, as it developed in the Philippines, broadly means 'boss rule'. As already described above, the newly-commissioned cabezas took to their task as agents of the Spaniards with enthusiasm. Acting as intermediaries between the Spaniards and their people, they took the various opportunities for enrichment. The oppressive polo (forced labor) and the vandala (compulsory sale of farm products to the government)\(^{52}\) were two such forms of enrichment. Some of the lands that used to belong to the barangay gradually became private property of the cabezas.\(^{53}\) Much later, when the Spaniards attempted to issue land titles only a few acquired them and these were often caciques. Pelzer states in this connection:

To the great majority of peasants, accustomed to unwritten rules of land tenure, the land law was too involved, the idea of land title too strange... The comparatively few people who acquired legal titles were mostly persons belonging to the cacique group, and these often laid claim to more land than actually they had a right to. Thus in many cases peasants who had felt secure in the possession of their land and had not known or cared about titles were suddenly confronted with the fact that a wealthy person, with the law behind him, was

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\(^{52}\) Vide Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, vol.XVII, pp.78-80; vol.L, p.221.

\(^{53}\) Phelan, *op. cit.*, p.117.
claiming their land. These peasants were then driven from it or forced to become tenants.54

The retention of the pre-conquest system of debt peonage (now called kasamahan) maintained the traditional socio-economic base of the principalia and kept the indio to their serf status. Having both wealth and local political power, and given their role as enforcers of oppressive colonial policies, the tendency towards 'bossism' seemed inevitable. The principalia metamorphosis that has been discussed also contributed a great deal towards caciquism. Having become 'different' from the indios and having developed affinities with the Spaniards, it was expected that they act more like the latter. Whatever position the Spaniards gave him, whether as a prosecuting attorney, as a municipal president, or even as the chief property owner, 'he dominated everything... and he directed the masses like a god'.55 An article

54 Pelzer, op. cit., p.90. This technique of landgrabbing by the caciques was among the causes of later agrarian uprisings and, in some cases, the cause of killings of landlords in the hands of the dispossessed. A case in point is the Hacienda Esperanza in Nueva Ecija. From its original area of 6,000 hectares in 1906 (1 hectare = 2.47 acres), it expanded to 15,700 hectares in 1925. About 5,000 claimant-farmers lost the subsequent judicial proceedings and became 'interdictos'.

which appeared in a local newspaper\textsuperscript{56} during the Revolution gave a description of the cacique as a person 'who always claimed the prerogative of guiding the affairs of the community'.

... In all the details of public life, you will see him interfering, either directly or indirectly, by means of his agents, in order to further his own personal interests and swell his pockets. During election time, he does a great deal of manipulating, making justice conform to his personal whims...\textsuperscript{57}

Caciquism, in fact, was one of the causes of the Philippine Revolution.

\textbf{THE PRINCIPALIA AND THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION}

The Philippine Revolution of 1896 was an unexpected result of the reform movement started by the ilustrados, the alienated intellectual members of the principalia. The 'propagandists' as they were called were a group of young intellectuals who left the Philippines and studied in Europe, most of them in Spain, in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In Spain, they agitated for much-needed reforms in the Philippines. It should be noted that the Spaniards, during the latter part of their rule, developed a growing suspicion of some of the educated members of the principalia. The increasing


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
number of those who came from Europe with liberal ideas further increased this suspicion. The Spaniards became more repressive, especially after the Cavite Mutiny of 1872. Three Filipino priests, Fr. Burgos, a Spanish mestizo; Fr. Zamora, a Chinese mestizo, and Fr. Gomez, a pure blood Tagalog, were mistakenly implicated in the uprising and executed in the garrote. The Cavite Mutiny produced waves of arrests and banishments to the Marianas Islands. Soon propaganda and agitation for reforms at home and abroad began to mount. Among the demands were to make the Philippines a province of Spain, representation in the Spanish Cortes, removal or expulsion of the friars (who had become big landowners), secularization of the parishes, etc. From the above demands, it can be seen that the 'propagandists' were reformers and not revolutionaries. In a platform drawn in one of their Lodge meetings in Spain, they demanded: "...we want our country declared a Spanish province, with

59 The Marianas Islands then formed part of the Spanish dominion.
60 Alip, op. cit., p.89.
all the rights and obligations. In a word, we want reforms, reforms, reforms.61

But the reformers produced a revolution instead. A mass organization called the Katipunan led by Andres Bonifacio, a Manila worker, started an uprising in 1896. The reaction of the caciques to the armed uprising is illuminating. Many of them flocked to the Spanish authorities to make protestations of loyalty to Spain. Many denounced the Katipunan. Le Roy stated in this connection that

> Everywhere natives of position hastened to assure the Spanish authorities of their loyalty, this being almost as true in the Tagalog towns outside of Cavite as elsewhere in the Islands. Some of these were mere sycophants, some (particularly in Pangasinan, Pampanga, La Union, North Ilocos, and the Kagayan Valley) really meant it, and all without exception felt such a step to be necessary for their own safety...62

But in 1898, when the Revolution showed signs of succeeding as the power of 'mother' Spain began to crumble, the caciques changed their tune and began to join its banners. Among the 'latecomers' were many of those who a few years ago were denouncing not only the Katipunan

61 See Teodoro M. Kalaw, La Masoneria Filipina (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920) p.98.
62 Le Roy, op. cit., p.93.
but even the reformer-propagandists'. Don Felipe Buencamino, for instance, wrote a manifesto praising Governor General Weyler and demanding 'death to the traitors who disturb our public peace and tranquility'. 63 In 1898, he was a Cabinet member of the Revolutionary Government. A close look at the composition of the Malolos Congress (1898-1899) will show that most of its members represent the cream of Filipino aristocracy. 64

63 Quoted in Majul, op. cit., p.60. Part of the manifesto reads: 'It is true that the innocent can live calmly under the protection and the civic courage of the Governor and Captain General, His Excellency, Señor Don Valeriano Weyler. We are sure that the most worthy Marquis of Tenerife [Weyler] ...likes and loves us, for the many decrees which he has issued for all branches of government are clear and evident proofs thereof... What more then can we ask for or desire? One would have to be blind, or be bereft of reason not to recognize the blessings that we enjoy under the beneficent shadow of the Spanish Flag. Death to the traitors who disturb our public peace and tranquility... Long live General Weyler... Long live the Philippines, for Spain, and for Spain our beloved mother country.'

Gen. Weyler, praised to high heavens by the caciques in the Philippines, incidentally was the same Weyler who started the 'concentration camps' in Cuba. During the Cuban Revolution, he herded men, women and children in 'Campos de reconcentracion' where 'scores of thousands fell victim to starvation and disease...50,000 perished in Havana alone. See Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950) pp.34 and 36.

64 '...in their personalities [membership] they were representative not of the people as a whole, but of a minutely educated class separated from the ignorant masses by a gulf so great as to be almost incomprehensible to the American without experience in the Orient' (Hayden, op. cit., p.165).
No doubt, there were capable men among this group of 'latecomers' in the Revolution. Among these may be mentioned Cayetano Arellano, Florentino Torres, Benito Legarda and T.H. Pardo de Tavera. But these men abandoned the Revolutionary cause as easily and as fast as they joined it. When the former American 'allies' against the Spaniards showed determination and ability to crush the Philippine Republic, many of the principalia Revolutionary officials began to waver. As early as October, 1898, some started deserting Aguinaldo's cabinet. Pardo de Tavera resigned as Director of Diplomacy on October 30, 1898, on the pretext that he differed with Aguinaldo on foreign policy. After the Mabini Cabinet fell, Paterno who now headed the new Cabinet began talking of 'autonomy' under the Americano. Soon, the principalia 'revolutionaries' began the exodus to Manila.

C. THE PRINCIPALIA AND THE AMERICANS

THE FEDERALISTA PARTY

On December 23, 1900, 'one-hundred and twenty-five pro-American upper-class Filipinos met at No. 36 Calle de Villalobos, Quiapo, Manila, and organized the Federalista

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65 See C.A. Majul, 'The Life and Mind of Mabini', This Week, June 1, 1958, p.29.
Party'. Among the founders of this Party were Pardo de Tavera, Cayetano S. Arellano, Frank S. Bourns (an American manager of a big lumber company and close associate of Dean Worcester), Florentino Torres, Ambrosio Flores, Jose Ner, Tomas Del Rosario, Arsenio Cruz Herrera, Felipe Buencamino, Fabie, Roxas, Artacho, Tirona, Dancel, Reyes and others. It must have been heart-breaking to the revolutionary fighters for independence, many of whom were still fighting and dying in the battlefields, to find many of their former 'leaders' now organizing a party whose main platform was annexation to America! Mabini, in one of his letters to a friend (Aquilino Calvo), bitterly lamenting this betrayal, wrote that 'those who tire after a few months of struggle do not serve for anything except to carry the yoke of slavery'. The Republican Army also issued orders to arrest and shoot any member of the Federalista Party and confiscate his property. One order even went to the extent of threatening to shoot any local officer of the Revolutionary

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67 Quoted in Majul, Mabini, Life and Mind, op. cit., June 8, 1958, p.36.
government 'who tolerated the existence of the Federalista Party in his jurisdiction'. But all these counter-measures were of no avail. With the full backing of the American Army, the Federalista Party soon spread its influence and organization throughout the Archipelago so that 'the party included in its membership substantially all of the men of first importance in the Islands'. The Federalista Party's accomplishments in its collaboration with the Americans were impressive. Its
tireless peace-making efforts resulted in the surrender of fourteen generals, twenty-eight colonels, twenty majors, six chiefs of guerrillas, forty-six captains, one hundred and six lieutenants, two thousand six hundred and forty soldiers, and 4,440 cannon [sic] guns and revolvers.

For this effective help in the 'pacification' campaign, the Federalistas were given appointments by the Americans to most of the positions open to Filipinos.

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69 Ibid.
at the time. William H. Taft, first Civil Governor of the Islands (later President of the U.S.), acknowledged this when he said:

...the fact that a man was a member of the Federal Party was always a good recommendation for him for appointment, for the reason that we regarded this Federal Party as one of the great elements in bringing about pacification, and if a man was in the Federal Party it was fairly good evidence that he was interested in the government which we were establishing...72

By 1903, three Federalistas -- Dr Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Don Benito Legarda, and Don Jose Luzuriaga -- were already members of the top governing body: the Philippine Commission.73 From 1901-1906, most of the appointive and elective posts -- national, provincial, and local -- were in their hands.74 Other high positions given to top Federalistas were the following: Don Cayetano Arellano - Chief Justice, Supreme Court; Don Victorino Mapa - Associate Justice, Supreme Court; Don Florentino Torres - Associate Justice, Supreme Court. Other prominent Federalistas became Bureau Directors, Judges

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74 Ibid.
of Courts of First Instance, and public prosecutors. Among the latter were those who had a hand in the prosecution and sending to the gallows or to long prison terms, hundreds of their countrymen who only a short while ago were being 'led' by them (before their surrender to the Americans). Recto observed:

It is well to remember that under this Act [Ley de Bandolerismo, Act No. 518, Nov 12, 1902] within a period of ten years only, hundreds of Filipinos who remained in the mountains in opposition to the American regime were sent to the gallows, or imprisoned for life or for 30 or 25 years. These were General Macario Sakay and his fellow officers and men, and hundreds of others. Separate criminal informations were filed against them in the various courts of first instance of the country, and in all of them the different judgments of conviction were affirmed unanimously by our own Supreme Court.

What sort of men were the Federalistas? An examination of the background of some indicates their mixed loyalties, their upper class background, their ethnic origins, and the high positions they occupied.

Dr Trinidad Pardo de Tavera (First President of the Federalista Party). He descended from 'a line of noble families in Spain', born in 1857; educated at Ateneo, University of Santo Tomas (M.D.) and Paris, France; taught medicine under Spanish Dominicans, U.S.T. In the

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75 Claro M. Recto, 'The Role of Political Parties', 1960 Commencement Address, University of the Philippines, Manila Chronicle, April 19, 1960.
76 Ibid.
latter part of the Revolution (1898), he joined and became Secretary of Foreign Relations in the Revolutionary Government; seeing imminent defeat from the Americans, he resigned in October, 1898; escaped to Manila where he 'founded La Democracia in 1899, the first pro-American daily in the Philippines'. ('Biography', Encyclopedia of the Philippines, vol.III, pp.424-5.)

Don Cayetano Arellano (Co-founder, Federalista Party). Son of Don Servando Arellano, a Spaniard, and Dona Crisfora Lonzon of Orion, Bataan; educated under the care of a Dominican friar, San Juan de Letran U.S.T.; served under the Spaniards as Regidor (City Councilman of Manila); member, Council of Administration; one of the 'latecomers' in the Revolution, he nevertheless became Secretary of Foreign Affairs of its government; escaped to Manila while Philippine-American war was going on; 'with the advent of the American sovereignty, Arellano cooperated with General Otis in the organization of the Courts'. He became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1899. (Various sources.)

Dr Frank S. Bourns (only American co-founder of the Federalista Party). Manager of an American timber company; member of the Taft Commission; was in the Philippines twice before the American occupation of the Philippines 'on zoological collecting trips with Dean C. Worcester'; 'during the early days of American occupation, he was employed in various capacities and established a spy system, coming into contact with all kinds of natives, whose confidence he gained through his knowledge of the languages and his method of treatment'. (1903 Census of the Philippines, vol.I, Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1905, p.505; Senate Doc.331, 57th Congress, 1st Session, pp.319-20.)

Don Florentino Torres (Co-founder, Federalista Party). Born in 1844; educated in San Juan de Letran, U.S.T.; served in Spanish government as Fiscal Interino of Binondo; Judge, CFI (1888-1891); 'Teniente Fiscal de la Audiencia', Cebu; 1899 -- first Attorney General during the U.S. Military government; became Associate Justice, Supreme Court. (Various sources.)

Don Ambrosio Flores (Co-founder, Federalista Party). Born in Manila, he was a First Lieutenant in the Spanish
Army; later joined the Revolution; became a General; Secretary of War in the Luna Cabinet. After joining the Federalistas, he was appointed the first Provincial Governor of Rizal. ('Biography', Encyclopedia of the Philippines, vol.III, p.472.)

Don Felipe Buencamino (Co-founder, Federalista Party). Born in San Miguel, Bulacan; educated under private tutors, and U.S.T.; was 'Realtor' of Audiencia of Manila, Fiscal, and Judge, under the Spaniards. Buencamino at the start was not a thorough-going revolutionist... In fact, he was...an officer of the Spanish army...fought in Kamansi...Mt. Arayat where he displayed his fighting spirit...was decorated [Oct 16, 1897] by the Spanish government with a cross of Charles III...was appointed by Gov. Gen. Agustin, Lieutenant Colonel of the Voluntary Force, consisting of eight hundred soldiers. ...was made a full colonel...made notable engagements in San Antonio Abad, Zapote Bridge and Muntinglupa [against Filipino Revolutionaries]... On September 26, 1898, he was 'Secretario de Fomento' of the Revolutionary Government...changed allegiance... joined Federal Party and was appointed member of Civil Service Board. ('Biography', Encyclopedia of the Philippines, vol.III, p.336.)

Don Gregorio Araneta (Member, Federalista Party). Born in Molo, Iloilo; educated at Ateneo and U.S.T.; was auxiliary Register of Deeds and later member of Advisory Board (1898) under the Spaniards; joined Revolutionary Government in 1898 and became Secretary of Justice, Aguinaldo Cabinet; 1899- appointed member of Supreme Court in U.S. Military Government; 1901-1906 Prosecuting Attorney, Manila; 1906-Attorney General; 1907-member, Philippine Commission. (Various sources.)

There was a definite partiality towards the members of the Federalista Party shown by the Americans. The same method followed by the Spaniards in their dealings with local leaders in the initial phase of their conquest was now being re-enacted but on the national level. There were 'several expedients' used by the Americans, according to Recto:
To insure the supremacy of the Federal Party, liquidate the remnants of the resistance movement, discourage all independence propaganda, and stabilize the new regime, several expedients were resorted to:

1. Monopoly of patronage for those affiliated with the Federal Party;

2. Enactment of the Sedition Law (Act No. 292, Nov. 4, 1901) which made it a criminal offense 'for any person to advocate independence or separation from the U.S., whether by peaceful or other means, or to publish pamphlets advocating such independence or separation'; and

3. Approval of the Act of Brigandage or 'Ley de Bandolerismo' (Act No. 518, Nov. 12, 1902) under the provisions of which any person could be sentenced to death, to life or from 25 to 30 years imprisonment, for stealing a carabao if it could be proved, even by circumstantial evidence, that the accused was a member of an armed band organized for the purpose of stealing carabaos or other personal property, without the need of establishing that he actually participated in the robbery but that he was a member of the band.77

The facts cited above by Recto and other evidence such as the arrest and incarceration of political and labor leaders known for their advocacy of independence disprove the belief that 'even before American rule was fully established, the Filipinos were encouraged to create political parties'.78 (Emphasis supplied.)

77 Ibid.
78 Lucien W. Pye, 'The Politics of Southeast Asia', in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960) p.97. Among those jailed under the 'Sedition Act' were Dr Dominador Gomez and four other
THE ELITE AND 'POLITICAL DEMOCRACY'

The four decades beginning from the year 1900 may be considered as the period of intensive Americanization in the Philippines. The impact of this influence, however, was greatest in the political sphere. The political party system, government organization, electoral practices, etc., were all patterned after the American model.

In the analysis of this transplantation of political institutions to a different setting, several important factors need to be considered.

The first of these is the social setting itself. When the Americans gained control of the Philippines, Philippine society was very much the same as it was during the early Spanish times. David Barrows, General Superintendent of Education, said in his Senate testimony in 1902:

'We find in the Philippine Islands...two generally large elements, one of which is commonly known as the gente ilustrada, which is the cultivated class, and the other is the gente baja, or the subordinate class...'

78 (continued) Leaders of the Union Obrera. These were also the organizers of the original Partido Nacionalista in 1901 which was suppressed by Governor General Taft. Other political parties which were not permitted to exist were the Partido Liberal, the Democrata Party of 1902, and the Republican Party formed in 1905. Cf. Dapen Liang, op. cit., p.66; J.R. Hayden, op. cit., p.907, footnote 4*.
If you go into a town of ten or twelve thousand people you will meet a dozen, and generally less, families who represent the dominant social element there, who are cultivated, who have received some Spanish education, who have wealth, social position...they live in handsome houses, and they have great social influence...

My observation...is that they are directly descended, or at least their social prestige is a direct inheritance, from the conditions which the Spaniards found there three hundred years ago... The rest are a population who have no education, who have no wealth, and who are controlled economically and socially by the upper class...79

Similarly, a member of the principalia (a Provincial Governor) described the nature of the social structure in his province of Negros in 1902:

Wealth and poverty in the country are, as a rule, permanent. The former is the patrimony, if so it can be called, of the higher class... because it pursues the ideal of living comfortably, luxuriously, and in pleasure...

Almost all are engaged in agriculture...Poverty is characteristic of the working class, and is of a permanent character.80

Don Mena Crisologo, Governor of Ilocos Sur, described the masses as 'very docile and obedient to constituted authorities and so timid that, although they suffer vexation from the persons who exercise some authority in their towns, they seldom complain'.81

80 Ibid., p.526.
81 Ibid., p.511.
Spanish mestizo Governor of La Union, described in 1902 the Ilocano peasant as 'submissive, obedient, and of a timid character'.

On the other hand, the Spanish bishop of Vigan, a Dominican friar, said in a testimony before an American committee that 'the natives [caciques] are always prone to abuse their authority. If someone here is not above them [justifying priestly domination] they will abuse their authority all the time... They are terrible to their own people -- very tyrants [sic].'

William H. Taft described caciquismo as the 'subjection of the ordinary uneducated Filipino to boss or master who lives in his neighborhood, and who, by reason of his wealth and education, is regarded as entitled to control by the ignorant tao... Those who are educated and wealthy among them adopt European customs, European dress, European manners with eagerness.'

The mestizo element continued to be dominant in society. This was further bolstered by the addition of full-blooded Spaniards to the ranks of the principalia at

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82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p.508.
84 Ibid., p.531.
the beginning of American rule. It should be recalled that there were Spaniards who have made their fortunes in the form of land and other interests, while they were the rulers in the Philippines. Under the terms of an American legislation, most of these Spaniards who chose to remain in the Islands became 'Filipino citizens'. The Philippine Bill of 1902 passed by the U.S. Congress provided that:

All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.85

These Spaniards who became Filipino citizen remained at the top of the social strata even after Spain's defeat in the war. Hayden's comments are revealing:

In the Philippines the significance of the division of society into two widely separated classes between which a small middle class is slowly developing is accentuated by the fact that the upper class is largely composed of

85 Section 4, Article 4, Philippine Bill of 1902.
Filipinos with a noticeable infusion of Chinese and Spanish blood. By no means all of the population who are of Spanish or Chinese extraction belong to the upper class; few people are found in the upper levels of society, however, who have no blood relationship with one or the other of these foreign races... That together they furnish a disproportionately large percentage of the leaders in every field of activity throughout the Islands.

...There has...been a certain amount of feeling, even among Filipinos, that the creation of a strong unified Philippine state would be made more difficult by the overweighting of the upper class by Filipinos who are differentiated from the great body of the people by noticeably foreign characteristics. 86

The above are the more or less unanimous comments of both local and foreign observers. This is the social setting when the American colonial administration passed Act No. 82 on January 31, 1901, creating municipal governments and extending the franchise to any of the following:

1. Those who occupied the position of municipal capitan, gobernadorcillo, alcalde, teniente, or cabeza de barangay or municipal councilman;

2. Those owning real property worth at least $500, Philippine currency, or who pay annually any kind of tax to the sum of $30 or over;

3. Those able to speak, read and write English or Spanish.87

The American authorities, by requiring the above qualifications (although without specifically mentioning it), practically limited the franchise to the principalia class. Three separate groups appeared to be included in the qualifications, but these were in most cases the same group of people. American Vice-Governor Hayden himself acknowledged that 'under these qualifications the electorate closely approximated the small group of Filipinos who had comprised the principales in the pueblos during the Spanish regime'.

A direct consequence of this policy was that in the first municipal elections held in 1901, only 49,523 persons (or 1.8 per cent) qualified as electors out of a population of 2,695,801 in 390 municipalities. The following table provides a good comparison in the number of people allowed to vote during the first two decades of American rule. (See Table 2.2.)

From the Table, it can be seen that during the early critical years of political tutorship — when the foundation of the party and electoral systems were being laid — political participation was limited to no more

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88 Hayden, op. cit., p.267.
TABLE 2.2

POPULATION AND NUMBER OF REGISTERED ELECTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>POPULATION* (Thousand)</th>
<th>REGISTERED ELECTORS** (Thousand)</th>
<th>PER CENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,695***</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>6,624</td>
<td>150.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>7,844</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>8,575</td>
<td>248.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919****</td>
<td>10,324</td>
<td>717.3****</td>
<td>6.9****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*** Population in 390 towns.

**** The property qualification was removed in 1916.

than 3 per cent of the population; even three years after the elimination of the property qualification (in 1916), the electorate was still less than 7 per cent of the population.

The political party system that evolved was, in the main, a continuation of the Federalista experience and tradition. The Nacionalista Party which replaced the Federalista as the party from 1907 to 1946 was only 'different' in the sense that its members, unlike the Federalistas, did not want the Philippines to be annexed
permanently to America but wanted independence. From
the point of view of recruitment of its leaders and
members, it was exactly the same as the Federalista
Party. Its membership consisted in the main of the cream
of the Philippine plutocracy -- landlords, propertied
professionals, and businessmen. In fact, not a few of
its leaders and members were former Federalistas. 90

Writing on the nature of Philippine political parties,
Recto pointed out that they 'were born and nurtured
before we had attained the status of a free democracy'. 91

The result [he said] was that they have come to
be caricatures of their foreign model with its
known characteristics -- patronage, division of
spoils, political bossism, partisan treatment
of vital national issues. I say caricatures
because of their chronic shortsightedness
respecting those ultimate objectives the
attainment of which was essential to a true and
lasting national independence. All over the
period of American colonization they allowed
themselves to become more and more the tools of
colonial rule and less and less the interpreters
of the people's will and ideals. Through their
complacency, the new colonizer was able to
fashion, in exchange for sufferance of
oratorical plaints for independence and for
patronage, rank and sinecure, a regime of his
own aims and in his own self-interest. 92

90
This aspect of party defections, carried over today,
will be discussed in Chapter V.
91
Recto, op. cit.
92
Ibid.
Recto's observations do not seem to be overdrawn when one looks at the record. The members of the elite, secure in their positions of power and with no effective challenge from non-elite sources, became mostly pre-occupied with petty struggle for power among themselves.

One result of this was the development of personalismo of the Latin-American variety. Individual politicians, feeling 'powerful' enough, began to assert themselves as the leaders. This was of course in line with the cacique tradition. But the American colonial administration encouraged it. In a master-ward relationship, it is much more convenient for the master to be dealing with a few 'bosses' than with many of the wards. The Speaker of the Assembly had, since 1907, for instance, been openly recognized as the 'Leader of the Filipino People' and 'the American administration, which openly recognized his extra-legal but vital position as the first citizen of his country, by necessity and choice dealt with the Speaker in matters of legislation, and to a much lesser extent those of appointment and administration'.

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93 Hayden, *op. cit.*, p.171.
Commission revealed, for example, that during the later years of the Forbes administration, legislation became largely a matter of private arrangement between the American Governor-General and the Speaker. As early as 1910, some members of the Assembly were actually accusing Speaker Osmeña of 'caciquism'.

Osmeña was the Leader up to 1921. Quezon started to challenge Osmeña's personal leadership with the creation of a Senate in the bicameral Philippine Legislature in 1916, after the former became the Senate President. From then on there was a continuous struggle between the Osmeña faction and the Quezon faction. Their factional names reveal the nature of their power struggle: Osmeña's faction was called the Unipersonalista faction while Quezon's (the challenger) was called Colectivista. This ceaseless personal fight went on until 1935 when there was a 'fusion' between the warring groups and Quezon's paramount dominance remained unquestioned until his death in America in 1944. During this latter period, also, a system of one party government by the

Nacionalista Party of Quezon and Osmeña developed.

Senator Juan Sumulong, attacking this one-party arrangement in an article in 1935 entitled 'Despues de la Coalicion, el Diluvio' said that the system received the support of the rest of the principalia oligarchy because

...even those who were most offended and most mortified [by the personal contest between Quezon and Osmeña] forgot their anger when they began to perceive that the abnormal political situation might bring about the desired disintegration of the political oligarchy which had completely dominated our national politics for a quarter of a century.96

The oligarchy, Sumulong added, had been alternately under Osmeña and Quezon 'but had always been managed by both in association and in community'.97

Senator Sumulong himself belonged, in a wider sense, to the oligarchy that he assailed, but he was a sort of intellectual 'rebel' -- one who might even be accused of 'subversion' had he written the following today:

I do not wish it understood that I favor a political status quo in the belief that the existing majority and minority parties represent all the legitimate interests of the country...In reality, I am of the belief that the majority and minority parties represent almost exclusively

97 Ibid.
the intelligentsia and what we would call the Philippine plutocracy, and that the needy classes have no representation in these parties, and for these reasons they have no voice nor vote, even only as minorities, in the formulation of governmental policies. This belief has often made me wish to see in the legislative and executive branches of the government authorized spokesmen of the laboring class, be they called socialists, sakdalists or communists.98

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98 Ibid.
CHAPTER III

THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA I: THE POSTWAR SETTING

This chapter examines the postwar social and economic setting with the aim of determining what changes, if any, occurred which might have produced a rearrangement in the class structure. Did the old principalia disappear and was it replaced by a new one? In short, did a new elite class develop? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the nature of the Philippine social structure from the background of its environment.

A. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

No society may be said to be truly static for structures are generally in flux. Sociologists, however, speak of a 'changing' society and a 'static' society depending on the presence or absence of certain dynamic factors that may produce social and economic changes resulting in the restratification of society. Thus, a 'changing' society may be characterized by
limited extremes of wealth and poverty, rapid industrialization, wide occupational opportunities, minimum of class distinctions, education open to all with needed ability, etc. A 'static' society manifests the opposite of the above; its economy is agrarian based, great social and economic inequalities exist, class distinctions are markedly apparent, and an aristocracy is dominant in the social, economic and political spheres.1

Philippine society manifests a dualism which defies a simple explanation. Fred Riggs, in his proposal for the study of the Philippine social structure, suggested the term 'prismatic' instead of 'underdeveloped' or 'transitional' to describe this characteristic.2 Some of the common indices of 'change', such as the increase in educational facilities, signs of industrialization and commercial growth in Manila and in some urban centers, are apparent. Also, it is commonly observed that the Philippines is one of the


most 'westernized' among the 'developing' states (and 'westernization' is often associated with change in the social structure, even producing a new elite class). In spite of all these, however, one sociologist remarked that the '[Philippine] class structure has shown relatively little change from pre-Spanish days to the present time.' To what can we attribute this seeming contradiction?

B. FACTORS OF PERSISTENCE

As was noted in the preceding chapter, both Spain and the United States erected the superstructure of their colonial regimes upon the foundations of existing social and economic institutions. In the process of consolidating their control, both utilized effectively the principia, thereby institutionalizing the status and role of the latter as a ruling class. A direct consequence of this policy was of course the preservation of the social and economic dominance of this group.

The advent of 'free enterprise', public education, representative government, and popular elections, in

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4 Hunt, op. cit., p.158.
the American period did not essentially alter the existing power relations. Since the basic economic structure remained essentially intact, 'change', or what others would call 'modernization' became circumscribed. The innovations did not permeate evenly to all levels of society. Traditional pattern of economic and social relations continued to persist and the prosperity associated with 'progress' had generally been confined to a limited group in society.

This does not imply, however, that the principalia continued to be a caste-like elite and that entry to elite status is closed. Elite status is largely determined by the possession of certain key values essential to the exercise of influence. Such values as wealth, skill, power, respect, and enlightenment, are often the desired values of people in most societies. Theoretically, therefore, elite status may be attained by any individual who acquires these values and is not limited to any particular class.

But the sharing and distribution of these values differ from culture to culture, from country to country. Where these are widely shared or distributed, larger and broadly-based elites may emerge; where
there is high inequality in their sharing, a small and narrowly-based elite often results. There is, however, the tendency of concentration or agglutination of these values in the same hands since possession of any, some, or all of these values enhances the acquisition of more of the same or the other values. The better-off an individual is, the more opportunities in life he enjoys. Wealth may not only bring more wealth but also facilitates the acquisition of power, prestige, etc. Those categorized as belonging to the elite of wealth may also be the best educated, the most skilled, the most prestigious, and the most influential in the field of decision-making.

In a country where no far-reaching social and economic change has yet affected the vast masses of the people and where wide gaps separate social classes, the possession of these values tend to be concentrated, not only in the same hands but also in the same social strata. As Skinner had aptly remarked, 'in nicely stratified societies the elite concept may be used with reference to the upper strata of a society, in which case it includes not only the individuals with high generalized influence but also their families'.

THE RURAL SETTING

The Philippines of the 1960's is still basically an agricultural country with about 70 to 75 per cent of the people living in the rural areas. The dominant position of agriculture in the economy is indicated by the fact that in 1962 over 61 per cent of the employed labor force were engaged in agriculture and related activities; manufacturing and commerce accounted for only 11.2 and 9.7 per cent, respectively.

The land is favoured with fertility and rich natural resources but because of the extreme inequality in land ownership, the semi-feudal, subsistence-type of land tenure, and the backward methods of cultivation

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6 The extent of urbanization in the Philippines has not been clearly established. The term 'urban' has been defined to include chartered cities and poblaciones (centers of municipalities). But, as Cressey has pointed out, 'extensive rural areas exist within the legal limits of most cities' and that most of the municipal administrative centers or poblaciones 'are rural villages and should not be considered as urban communities'. (Paul F. Cressey, 'Urbanization in the Philippines', Sociology and Social Research, vol. 44, no. 6 (July-August 1960), pp. 402-9. Nevertheless, according to the above definition, the 1948 Census figure for urban population was 24.1 per cent; the 1960 Census figure was very much lower (14.3 per cent) but was disregarded. (Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1962 Statistics, 1962 Statistical Handbook of the Philippines (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1963), p. 20.

7 Philippine Statistical Survey of Households, no. 11, 'Labor Force' (Manila: April, 1962), Table 13, p. 21.
resulting in very low productivity, the vast majority of the peasantry live in grinding poverty.

Land ownership is heavily concentrated in the hands of relatively few families. This heavy concentration was shown by a government study of landed estates published in 1955 which shows that of a total farm area of 5.7 million hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres), nearly 2.4 million hectares were owned by only 13,859 persons having farm-holdings of 50 hectares and above. It should be noted that this does not even give the entire picture for this list of landowners showed that not a few of them belong to the same family (by blood or affinity). In several cases, the same persons were listed as having holdings in various provinces. (These are, therefore, counted separately as though they were different individuals.) Nevertheless, it was shown that only

8 Department of Finance, A Study of Landed Estates in the Philippines, by Arturo P. Sorongon (Manila: ICA, 1955). The writer is indebted to Mr Sorongon for having furnished him with the complete list of landowners included in the above mentioned study.

9 A landlord of Negros interviewed by the writer, for example, stated that 'a great number of the hacenderos here in Negros are related to each other and most of them come from Iloilo.' This was confirmed by other hacenderos from Iloilo and Negros and the writer's data on intermarriage among the elite.
about 0.36 per cent of the people owned 41.5 per cent of the nation's total farm area. The biggest landowners (i.e., those owning 1,000 hectares or more) owned 515,466 hectares and there were only 221 of them in the whole country. 10 (See Table 3.1). It may be expected that some change can have occurred since the government study was made some ten years ago and two 'land reform' laws have been passed since then. 11

Any

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Category</th>
<th>No. of Owners</th>
<th>Per cent of All Families</th>
<th>Area Owned (Hectares)</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Farm Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-200</td>
<td>11,770</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1,142,196</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-500</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>435,257</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1,000</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>286,885</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 and over</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>515,466</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>13,859</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2,379,804</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Finance, A Study of Landed Estates in the Philippines, 1955, by Arturo P. Sorongon, op. cit. Total farm area at the time of the study was 5,726,558 hectares; population was 22.2(m).

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10 A Study of Landed Estates, op. cit. Among the 221 top landowners are Americans, Spaniards, Spanish mestizos, the Church and some religious corporations, naturalized Chinese, Chinese mestizos (with Chinese surnames) and others who, though having Hispanicized names, may include descendants of mestizos, too. The sultans and datus of Mindanao are the exceptions.

11 Republic Act no.1400 (1955), known as 'Magsaysay's Land Reform Act' and 'The Land Reform Code of 1963', passed during the Macapagal administration.
change in the situation, however, may not be significant because the 'land reform' laws have not really been implemented. As of 1961, for instance, six years after the passage of Magsaysay's Land Reform Act (R.A 1400), the government had acquired less than 20,000 hectares.\(^\text{12}\) As for the new Land Reform Code of 1963, no expropriations have been made under it as of this writing.\(^\text{13}\) In fact, the change seems to be towards the direction of continued land accumulation by the propertied class on the one hand and growing landlessness and tenancy on the other.

In 1903, for example, only 18 per cent of agricultural workers were tenants. This figure increased to 35 per cent in 1933, 37.4 per cent in 1948, and 48 per cent in 1956. In 1961, it was already 50 per cent.\(^\text{14}\)


\(^{13}\) The 1963 Land Reform Code has already been questioned in the courts by the landed interests for its 'dubious constitutionality' and by President Macapagal's own party cronies in the Senate. See, for example, 'Liwag tags DM land program Poll Stunt', *Manila Chronicle*, September 12, 1964, p.1; *Sunday Times*, September 20, 1964, p.12-A.

A comparison of land ownership (of land 50 hectares and above) during a fifty-year period (1903-53) also confirms the increasing rate of land accumulation.

In 1903, 0.8 per cent of the people owned 35 per cent of total farm area; in 1953, 0.36 of the people owned 41.5 per cent of total farm area. In other words, while the number of landowners owning 50 hectares and above had proportionately decreased, the total area of their landholdings had considerably increased.

In marked contrast to this very small minority of landed gentry were the numerous peasants -- tenants and farm laborers -- who, in many cases, did not own even the patch of land on which their nipa huts stood. Just what is the extent of landlessness? The Land Tenure Administration made the following estimate in 1961:

Available census statistics show that 50 per cent of all Filipino farmers are tenants. However, if farm laborers are included, the same statistics show that about seven out of every ten persons gainfully employed in agriculture are tenants and farm laborers -- a ratio of 70 to 100. Considering that the percentage of farms operated by tenants and farm laborers is a popular measure

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of landlessness, there is then in the Philippines a high percentage of landlessness.\textsuperscript{16}

It should be noted that there were almost six million gainfully employed persons in agriculture in 1962.\textsuperscript{17} From the percentage estimate made above by the LTA, it would mean then that there were about four million landless peasants in the Philippines.

The land situation in 1948 is shown in the following Table:

\textbf{TABLE 3.2}
\textbf{LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES 1948}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AND AREA</th>
<th>PER CENT OWNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. AGRICULTURAL LAND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 hectares and above</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-99 hectares</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-19 hectares</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 5 hectares</td>
<td>26.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>65.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. NON-AGRICULTURAL LAND*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Land</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Land</td>
<td>97.0 (cont.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes mineral land, forest and swamp.

\textsuperscript{16} Land Tenure Administration, \textit{Annual Report FY 1961-2}, \textit{op. cit.}, p.3.

\textsuperscript{17} Philippine Statistical Survey of Households, no.11, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.22-23.
TABLE 3.2 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AND AREA CATEGORY</th>
<th>PER CENT OWNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. COMMERCIAL LAND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Land</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Land</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Families: 3.5 (M) = 100.0 per cent.


The landlessness among the people indicated in Table 3.2 had increased since 1948 for, as already mentioned, the rate of tenancy had jumped from 37.4 per cent in 1948 to 50 per cent in 1961. One of the major causes of tenancy is land alienation by small landholders and 'part-owners' as a result of indebtedness to landlords and other usurious money-lenders. This continuing land alienation was also confirmed by McMillan and Rivera in their 1954 Survey of Households in Central Luzon. Among those categorized as 'part-owners' (that is, a portion of their holdings has been alienated and were already reduced to part-tenant status), 83 per cent of them came from families which were 'full-owners'.

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18 Generoso F. Rivera and Robert T. McMillan, An Economic and Social Survey of Households in Central Luzon (Manila: June 1954), p. 64.
landlessness and tenancy on the one hand and concentration of land ownership among a few families on the other is illustrated in Table 3.3.

The figures in Table 3.3 show that tenancy, in general, increases with landlessness. The data also reveal that concentration of land ownership increases with both landlessness and tenancy. In the heavily tenanted provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, Capiz, and Negros Occidental, for instance, between 0.66 per cent to 0.77 per cent of total of families own from 58.9 per cent (Nueva Ecija) to 72.5 per cent (Pampanga) of all farm lands. In these provinces, the trends seems to indicate that about one per cent of the people own between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of all farm lands. This trend is also manifested in the other provinces. In summary, the combined data in the 1948 Agricultural Census, Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 and the government study on landed estates clearly bring out two important points: first is that the vast majority of the people in this predominantly agricultural country are landless; and second, that the minority owning land are further divided into two: the big landholders who comprise less than one-half of 1 per cent, yet own nearly one-half of all
### Table 3.3

**LAND OWNERSHIP AND TENANCY IN SELECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>A. TOTAL NO. OF FAMILIES</th>
<th>B. PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WITHOUT LAND</th>
<th>C. PERCENTAGE OF TENANCY</th>
<th>D. NO. AND PER CENT OWNING 50 HAS. OR OVER</th>
<th>E. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HARVESTED AREA OWNED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td>17,972</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>34 (0.18%)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batangas</td>
<td>100,043</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>334 (0.33)</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohol</td>
<td>101,112</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>300 (0.29)</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulacan</td>
<td>74,138</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>152 (0.21)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capiz</td>
<td>81,290</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>601 (0.74)</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavitte</td>
<td>50,942</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>205 (0.40)</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebu</td>
<td>213,156</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>229 (0.11)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iloilo</td>
<td>144,238</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>844 (0.58)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laguna</td>
<td>64,957</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>100 (0.15)</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>185,853</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>293 (0.16)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negros Occ.</td>
<td>172,173</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>1,041 (0.66)</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nueva Ecija</td>
<td>84,201</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>645 (0.77)</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampanga</td>
<td>70,788</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>553 (0.78)</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangasinan</td>
<td>173,943</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>334 (0.19)</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizal</td>
<td>120,767</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>111 (0.09)</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarlac</td>
<td>60,511</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>412 (0.68)</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambales</td>
<td>24,490</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>103 (0.42)</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**1960 Census of Agriculture, Table 6a, by province.


****Computed from figures in Study of Landed Estates, ibid., and total harvested area, by province, in Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agricultural Economics Division, *Crop and Livestock Statistics, 1954 and 1955*, Project no. 1, Table 3, pp. 10-11.

//Data show that the 111 owners own 41,194 hectares out of a total harvested area of 34,410 hectares. This discrepancy may be due to the fact that Rizal province is an industrial area and a sizeable portion of it is not farm land.
there is to own in agricultural lands, and the small landholders who are predominantly concentrated in the below-three-hectare category.

The land tenure system has retained much of its traditional features. It is the general practice among landowners, most of whom are absentee-landlords living in the urban areas, to fragment their lands into small, uneconomic holdings averaging between two and three hectares and employ tenants or farm laborers.¹⁹ This practice in the land tenure system has been one of the most enduring practices that has persisted through the centuries. One writer noted that...

...there has been a remarkable historical continuity in Philippine agricultural organization. Wealthy Filipinos have exploited their holdings by means of tenant farming and debt peonage from preconquest times to the present. The pre-Hispanic mamamahay, his seventeenth-century successor, the casamajan farmer in the eighteenth-century, and the modern tenant farmer all have cultivated the land under various systems of share-cropping and debt peonage that differ among themselves only in detail but not in substance.²⁰

¹⁹ Tenancy is generally of two kinds namely, share-tenancy (kasama system) and leasehold or cash-tenancy (inquilino system) but 'some 95 per cent of all tenant farmers are share (kasama) tenants'. (U.N., Report on the Progress in Land Reform, New York: Department of Economic Affairs, 1954, p.132; cf. 1960 Census of Agriculture (Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manila, 1963), Table 51 (By province).

²⁰ Phelan, op. cit., p.15.
There are several explanations that may be suggested for this notable continuity of the landlord-tenant relationship. The first is that most landowners find it more advantageous to utilize cheap and abundant labor intensively. To engage in large-scale farming requires large capital outlays which could be profitably invested elsewhere. Landowners also have to pay higher wages to semi-skilled farm workers and possibly deal with an organized body of farmers from which, at the moment, they are relatively free. Under the present arrangement they only have to deal with tenant families individually. Also, since some of their lands are not contiguous, having acquired these from small holders in separate parcels, the most 'practical' way is to have the former owners work for them as tenants. Finally, the practice is a habitual carry-over from the age-old cacique-system. Land ownership in the Philippines is not merely an economic fact. It still carries with it immense cultural values that immediately elevates the landowner above the mass. Belonging to the landed gentry means having peasants under one's control and authority. For the landlord-tenant relationship is not, as one landlord would like to put it, an ordinary 'form of partnership in which
the landlord contributes the land and... the tenant contributes his labor.21 The kasama does not qualify as Adam Smith's 'economic man' who tries to advance his interest by entering into a rental contract with the landlord as an equal bargainer. Rather, he is not unlike the serf, born into a system where his status and roles are already determined. He may sometimes be fortunate to have a 'generous' landlord; or 'reform laws' may even be passed by a landlord-dominated Congress. But as long as the landlord-tenant relationship remains, he will continually be the victim of an inferior status that keeps him in poverty, indebtedness, and even exploitation. Speaking of the Filipino tenant, a U.N. study reports:

The share tenant works under the full and exclusive authority of the landlord, who has a "first and preferential lien over all but 15 per cent of the tenant's share of the crop to cover any indebtedness to the landlord. The tenant's situation is further aggravated by grossly usurious rates of interest [ranging from 25 per cent to 400 per cent] on borrowed moneys, lack of an economic marketing system, regressive tax system and oppressive tenancy practices."22

21 'A Landlord Speaks up', Philippines Free Press, April 6, 1963, p. 46.
The landlord-tenant relationship, therefore, contributes to the preservation of the principalia -- non-principalia dicothomy.

Aside from the tenants are the farm laborers and small owner-cultivators. The farm laborers are hired on a daily wage or piece-work basis. They, too, are landless and their lot is no better than the kasamas for they receive very low wage rates and labor under extremely poor working conditions. The farm laborers in the sugar plantations of Negros (called sacadas), for example, are exploited both by the hacenderos and the contratistas. The latter are labor contractors who earn money by acting as middlemen with the sacadas as their 'merchandise'. A Jesuit priest trying to unionize the sacadas described how the system works:

There are between twenty to thirty thousand sacadas recruited every year who come mostly from Panay island and are brought to Negros during the milling season by contratistas. A contratista enters into a contract with a hacendero binding himself to supply so many laborers. He gets an advance from the hacendero, usually an average of ₱40.00 per laborer. The money is given to the family of the laborer to tide them over while the laborer is away. Although it is later on deducted from the sacada's earnings it is sometimes given to him with interest. The sacada is also often cheated in food, in the weighing of the sugar cane that he cuts, hauls and loads.
The contratista gets a commission and he earns over ₱1.00 per day per laborer that he supplies. Some of the contratistas are public officials, town mayors and chiefs of police.23

'The carabao (water buffalo)', said the informant, 'is sometimes better off than the sacada. The owner, at least, takes care of it when it gets sick, so it can work again. When a sacada falls ill while working in the fields, he is sent away and replaced with a healthy one.'24 During the sugar boom in 1963, profits of hacenderos rose by over 2,000 per cent. The wages of their laborers (₱2.50 -- or about six shillings a day), however, remained the same. A columnist wrote in this connection:

The sugar boom is still zooming, but the workers of Sugarlandia are still earning the same. I can just imagine how they feel seeing their "amos" [bosses] buy more cars

23 Personal interview, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, June 6, 1963. Some Negros landlords have branded the priest a 'communist' because of his efforts in trying to organize the sacadas. 'He has brought trouble here', one hacendero informed the writer.

24 A typical contract between a hacendero and contratista provides that the contratista must supply the hacendero (planter) with 'able-bodied workers' and 'in case one or more of the said laborers failed to work due to illness or other circumstances not the fault of the planter, the contratista will immediately replace the said laborer in order that the work of milling activities of the planters shall not be hampered.' (Contract to Supply Laborers with Bond, a contract between a Negros landlord and a contratista).
and jewels, remodel their homes and acquire more lands while they are snowed under by rising prices...Here are the hard facts of the sugar boom: The old unfluctuating price was $14 per picul, produced at a cost of $12 per picul. While the price of sugar has risen to $66.25, the cost of production has risen to only about $15. The income of the sugar baron has thus shot up from $2 to $51.25 per picul. If he has a net production of 5,000 piculs per crop year, for instance, this means an increase of net income from $10,000 to $256,250 per crop year. On the other hand, the wage of the sugar plantation workers remains steady at $2.50 a day!

The plight of the sacadas has aroused official concern but the system is carried on. The Governor of Antique, one of the provinces that supply sacadas, for instance, acknowledged that the term sacada hurt the entire province but 'the stigma is now being erased since the sacadas are not being exploited as much as before'.

The last group among the peasantry also worth mentioning are the small owner-cultivators. Their holdings are very small, their methods of cultivation

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A hacendero (who was a high provincial government official in 1963) reasoned out that 'the laborers are all right with what they presently get'. He added that they do not complain unless 'outsiders' agitate them because 'they're used to that kind of life'. Personal interview, Bacolod City, June 6, 1963.

are crude and their families are large. Because of these factors, among others, they often become indebted to big landlord and other money-lenders who usually exact usurious rates of interests.

THE URBAN ECONOMIC SETTING: PATTERN OF GROWTH

The Philippine economic system may be said to result from the combination of two legacies. The first is the feudal-type of agricultural arrangement institutionalized by the Spaniards in the encomienda and, later, in the hacienda and kasama system. The second is 'free enterprise'. 'The Philippine society', says Frank Golay, 'for better or for worse, has made an unambiguous decision to organize its economy on the basis of private initiative...in which economic activity by the individual is rewarded liberally. This enterprise type of economic organization is a legacy of American colonial rule...'

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The average farm area cultivated by owner-cultivators is about 2.5 hectares. The average Filipino family is composed of six members, but peasant families are generally much bigger. Cf. Ernie Singson, 'All Tenants Live in Poverty' Manila Bulletin, February 6, 1963.

However, 'free enterprise' principles such as 'free competition', 'free market', 'freedom of contract', etc., have a limited social area of operation. 'Free enterprise' has not supplanted the semi-feudal arrangement in the rural areas, but has complemented it; hence, it exists side-by-side with the hacienda and kasama system. The field of 'competition' is dominated by foreign capital and a relatively few wealthy families. The government also enters the field but the widespread system of patronage and spoils liberally mixed with the kinship system where the socio-economic dominants, their relatives and henchmen occupy key posts in 'public corporations' often turn it into something like a branch of private enterprise, characterized by what are commonly referred to as 'anomalies', 'graft', and 'corruption'. (This government participation will be discussed in Chapter VI).

Foreign capital occupies a dominant position in the economy, particularly in large enterprises. Like most colonized countries, the Philippines became a profitable area of investment for foreign capital. Cheap labor, raw materials, land, and tariff preferences gave big profits and attracted investors. By 1936,
the picture of foreign investment was described by Kurihara as follows:

The American investment in the Islands before the war was about a fifth of the total investment. According to a survey, made by the U.S. Department of Commerce, of direct investment in the Philippine at the end of 1936, the investment in the Philippines stood at $92,000,000 while American investments in China amounted to $91,000,000 and those in the Netherlands East Indies were estimated at $70,000,000. Outside capital also dominated banking and public utilities in the Philippines. Sugar production was controlled largely by American and Spanish capital. Gold, iron ore, and chromite production was controlled largely by American and to a certain extent by British capital. Spanish interests dominated the tobacco industry. Half of the investment in the cordage industry was American, the other half Spanish. Chinese capital dominated the timber and lumber industry. Chinese and Japanese together controlled about two-thirds of the retail trade.29

The total investment in the sugar industry in 1935 was estimated at over $500 (m); $185 (m) of this was invested in sugar centrals broken down as follows: American -- 33 per cent, Spanish -- 23 per cent, other aliens -- 1 per cent, Filipino -- 43 per cent.30 In coconut oil

production, there were some 8 large plants, 2 of which were American-owned, 2 British, 1 Chinese, and 1 Filipino. The three largest soap factories were American, Swiss and Chinese. There were 30 companies manufacturing tobacco products and 60 per cent of the capital was Spanish; the rest was American, Swiss, Chinese and Filipino. Just immediately before World War II, the following foreign investments were reported: American — $258.5 (m) per cent or 60 per cent of total foreign investments; Chinese — 47.8 (m) or 11 per cent; Spanish — 41 (m) or 10 per cent; British — $37.8 (m) or 9 per cent; Japanese — $32.2 (m) or 8 per cent; Others $6.6 (m) or 2 per cent.32

The postwar foreign investment picture in the Philippines followed the prewar pattern with U.S. capital topping the list. In the beginning of 1962, private U.S. direct investment was placed at $440 million, distributed in mining, public utilities, oil refining, plantations, trade, manufacturing, banks, insurance,

31 Ibid. The statistics appearing here are based on the Waring-Dorfman report of 1937 cited in Hartendorp. Ibid., pp. 30-34.

and others. Carroll found in his 1962 study of 'large' Filipino manufacturing establishments (i.e., those, employing 100 or more workers) that 'about two cases of foreign entrepreneurship were found for every case of Filipino entrepreneurship'. (Emphasis supplied). Of the 92 entrepreneurs finally included as 'Filipinos' in his study, 21 reported at least one grandparent born outside the Philippines and five of these reported one parent born abroad.

Since after the war, there has been increasing agitation among the Filipino elite for 'Filipinization' of industry and some gains seem to have been made on this score. Having acquired political control from the Americans, their next task seems to be towards

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34 John J. Carroll, 'Filipino Entrepreneurship in Manufacturing' Philippines Studies, vol.10, 1962, p.106. After other exclusions, Carroll came up with a list of 275 entrepreneurs employing 100 or more workers of which 183 were foreign and 92 were Filipinos.
35 Ibid. This also illustrates the mestizo component in the business group. In the list of top property owners in the City of Manila, the same ethnic composition as in ownership of big estates was noted: Americans, Chinese, Spaniards, Spanish and Chinese mestizos, the Catholic Church and some religious orders. There were also other Europeans. (Source: City Assessor's Office, Manila, 1963).
having a greater participation in the control of the economy. This is manifested in slogans like 'Filipino First', and in legislation such as the 'Nationalization' [actually, 'Filipinization'] of Retail Trade. There are, however, several difficulties encountered by the elite in their drive for greater control of the economy. First, American investors are protected by the 'parity' amendment to the Philippine Constitution which gave them the same rights as Filipino citizens in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of all Philippine natural resources, and the operation of public utilities shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by United States citizens. Another difficulty is the elite's commitment to 'free enterprise' and their recognition for the need of foreign capital in the economic development of the country. Also, some of the elite are connected in one way or another with foreign firms, either as business associates, stockholders, or members of the board of directors.

36 Republic Act No. 1180, passed in 1954 mainly affected the Chinese who controlled the retail trade.

37 See Amendment to the Philippine Constitution titled, 'Ordinance Appended to the Constitution', under Art. XV.
directors. Some lawyer-politicians (who are top government officials) are legal counsels or have other connections with some big foreign firms. As shall be discussed later (in Chapter VI) this duality of positions has produced some interesting results.

In spite of these inconsistencies in the elite's position, however, there seem to be strong grounds for concern in the extent of foreign control of the economy. The rationale of 'parity', for example, was to attract foreign capital; data shows, however, that during the 10-year period from 1950 to 1960, 'foreign capital received for investment amounted to only $19.2 million; remittances of earnings, profits and dividends by foreign firms amounted to...$215.7 million'. In other words, there was a heavy capital drain from the country instead of the expected rapid economic development.

The 'free trade' with America during the Commonwealth period extended through 1954, or eight years after independence, contributed to the

38 See for example, 'Justice Mariño on Stonehill's "Blue Book" List'; also, 'NP's Reply to Marino Raps', both in Philippines Free Press, July 20, 1963, pp.6-7, and 68-69, respectively.

development of a shaky agricultural economy. (This 'free trade' extension, also part of the Bell Trade Act of 1946, ended in 1954; thenceforth, an annual 5 per cent increase in duty was provided until January 1, 1973, when full duties shall be imposed.) This arrangement, in the words of Jenkins, 'tailored the economy of the Islands to fit the American market'.

...To the United States came agricultural raw materials and products needed for manufacture in this country, and from this nation went industrial goods and commodities vital to an underdeveloped economy. American exports also included foodstuffs such as wheat and flour, for owing to excessive specialization on export products the Philippines though an agricultural nation, was unable to feed itself.

The big plantation owners and hacenderos were benefited by this arrangement for it assured them of a ready market for their products at premium prices. However, it proved harmful to the economy as a whole since the American market demanded raw agricultural products such as sugar, copra, hemp, etc., and American, Filipino, and other investors channelled their capital into

41 Ibid., p. 38.
these few, specialized crops, while the country's industrialization became retarded due to the influx of duty-free manufactured goods from the U.S.\(^4\)

Furthermore, these ventures required the maximum use

\(^4\) The trade with the United States under the arrangement of 'free trade' embodied in the Bell Trade Act of 1946 are revealing. Since there were no reciprocal arrangements until the Laurel-Langley revision in 1955, American manufactured goods entered the Philippines duty-free in unlimited quantities while Philippine exports to the U.S. were limited by 'quotas'. The following were the trade figures during the post-war 'free trade' period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports (Million $)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Exports</th>
<th>Imports from U.S. (Million $)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>515.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>304.1</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>880.0</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>415.7</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>939.2</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>363.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>938.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>491.2</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>510.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>276.3*</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>349.8*</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>606.0</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>506.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>704.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


of unskilled labor which received very low wage rates, contributing to the depressed level of existence of the Filipino peasantry.

The nature of investments were not conducive to rapid economic growth. The Filipino capitalist is known for his 'timid' nature. He invests in 'sure' ventures such as land and real-estate speculations, export-import business, logging, etc. and follows the Schumpeterian 'cluster-effect', i.e., the tendency to imitate a successful venture instead of innovating into a new one resulting in the heavy concentration of capital in high-profit areas. While perhaps profitable to the investor and has less risks, it is exploitative rather than developmental in character and the slow and unbalanced economic development of the country is partly due to this factor. The survey report of the staff of the IBRD described the industrial base as 'narrow' and 'consists essentially of a range of consumer goods' industries heavily

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dependent on imported raw materials'. Many of these industries, particularly those categorized as 'new and necessary', have been established with government subsidies and tax-exemption privileges; but they are mostly what are commonly referred to as packaging, assembling or finishing establishments. Some are extensions or affiliates of parent companies abroad.

**PATTERN OF CONCENTRATION**

One interesting feature of most Philippine business organizations is their exclusive nature. They are often family affairs with the father as president, a son the vice-president, the wife is treasurer, daughters or sons-in-law are directors. These are called the 'closed family corporations'. Carroll's findings, for instance, showed that the enterprises founded by 72 out of the 92 entrepreneurs in his study were

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family-controlled. Most of the business organizations on the local level (provinces and municipalities) except the branches of the big corporations centered in Manila, follow this 'family-type' of organization. There are also the inter-family corporations which are business alliances of two or more elite families. Finally, there are the 'open' corporations whose stocks are sold to the public. The last group are, however, few in number as shown by the listings in the stock exchange. A further illustration of the limited nature of public participation in business is the fact that in 1959, there were only 50,000 stockholders in the whole Philippines or about one-fifth of 1 per cent of the population.


48 Espiritu, op. cit., p.43.
The pattern of concentration in land ownership, it appears, is duplicated in the business sector. Many of the top businessmen, in fact, belong also to the big landowning families such as the Madrigals, Lopezes, Aranetas, Jacintos, Elizaldes, Osmeñas, Cojuangcos, Sycips, Zobels, De la Ramas, Yu Ke Thai, Sorianos, Tuasons, Aboitizes, etc., to cite a few examples. Among this top group are the old Spanish and mestizo families, discussed in the preceding chapter, whose fortunes were built in the latter part of Spanish rule and the early part of the American regime. These families operate or are connected with big business empires that are nationwide in their scope. The Elizaldes (a full-blood Spanish family but of Filipino citizenship), for example, have 18 business entities involving mining (gold, silver, copper, iron), sugar plantations, insurance, shipping, sugar centrals, and mass-media (radio broadcasting and TV, with chains of radio stations all over the country). This single family employs 'no fewer than 20,000 people whose dependents number around 100,000'.\(^{49}\) The Araneta

\(^{49}\) 'On the Economic Side!' Philippines Free Press, February 2, 1963, p.12. A member of the family, Joaquin M. Elizalde, was Cabinet member during the Quirino administration.
family operates the Araneta University, FEATI University, Republic Flour Mills, AIA Feed Mills, Republic Soya, Premier Paper these under the management of Salvador Araneta, with his wife Victoria (of the Lopez family); J. Antonio Araneta, lawyer and businessman is president of Botica Boie, Gregorio Araneta, Inc., and Erlanger and Galinger; Vicente Araneta is president of the Equipment and Marketing Corporation and the Gregorio Araneta Machineries, Inc., (GAMI). The family has also substantial shares in the FEATI Bank. The Lopez family has a network of interests in sugar mills, plantations (sugar, rice and coconut), jute bag factory, inter-island shipping, insurance, banking, real estate, educational institutions, mass media (1 national daily, 4 TV stations, and 23 radio stations all over the Islands), a lime factory, and a cement factory.

50 G.L. Galvan, 'Progress through Family Solidarity', Weekly Graphic, August 26, 1964, p. 35. The following family members have held top government posts: Salvador -- Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; J. Antonio -- Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; Vicente -- Head, Agricultural Co-operative and Credit Financing Administration. Brother Luis is a successful architect, Fr. Francisco Araneta is Rector of the Ateneo University. (Ibid. See also Appendix, Manila).

51 List of owner-operators, Radio and Television, Radio Control Office, Department of Public Works and Communications; The Philippines Who's Who, by D.H. Soriano
The Cojuangco family has its interests in extensive sugar and rice plantations, one plantation practically encompassing a whole town in Central Luzon, owns controlling stocks (90 per cent) in one bank and about 30 per cent in another; operates sugar mills, has interests in shipping, insurance, etc. 'The family name Cojuangco is synonymous with untold wealth in Tarlac and Bulacan provinces', wrote their biographer.\(^{52}\)

\(^{51}\)(cont)
and Isidro L. Retizos (Quezon City: Capitol Publishing House, Inc., 1957 ed.). The father, Don Benito Lopez was former Iloilo Governor; Fernando was former Vice-President and Senator at the time of writing. He was also co-founder of the Democratic Party in 1963 and one of the top leaders of the powerful 'sugar bloc'. (See also Appendix, Iloilo.)
As of 1963, eight families own or control all the 10 TV commercial stations and 78 of 95 commercial radio broadcasting stations. These families are the Lopezes, Roceses, Elizaldes, Sorianos (American), Stewarts (American, but under the name of the Filipina wife), Lindenbergs (American?), Ceas (former Senator), and Eduardo Lopez. Three of these families (Lopezes, Roceses, and Sorianos) also own or control almost all of the national dailies and weekly magazines. The single exception is the Manila Daily Bulletin, owned by Hans Menzi, some Americans and others. (Source: Radio Control Office and interviews with members of the press.)

\(^{52}\)Who's Who, ibid., p.70; Interview with a banking official. Jose, Sr. was former member, House of Representative and Governor of the government's Rehabilitation Financing Corporation; his son Jose, Jr., is Tarlac's Representative; a son-in-law (son of a former Cabinet) is Tarlac's Governor; the wife of Jose, Sr. belongs to the Sumulong family of Rizal (another 'politically dominant' family) and a son-in-law operates one of the largest private Universities (enrolment over 30,000) in the Philippines. (See Chapter IV, 'Politically Dominant Families' and Appendix, Tarlac.)
The above were cited as illustrations of the nature and extent of the economic activities of the top families. The concentration of ownership and control of land and business (including private educational institutions and the mass-media) is further bolstered by intermarriages among the elite. Thus, the Aranetas married into the Lopezes and the Yulos into the Aranetas, the Osmenías into the De la Ramas and Jacintos, the Cojuangcos into the Sumulongs, the Aquinos and Reyeses into the Cojuangcos, the Madrigals into the Paternos, Gonzaleses, Vasquezes, etc. Mention has already been made of the relationships among the landed families in the provinces of Negros and Iloilo. In Central Luzon, it is not uncommon to find elite relatives (cousins) being married to each other to preserve the family properties. There seems to be a pattern, too, in these intermarriages. The old Spanish families and Spanish mestizos tend to retain their exclusiveness and become self-perpetuating minorities within the elite sub-society. Thus there are, for instance, the Elizalde-Diaz Moreau-Von Kauffman cluster; the Aboitiz-Moraza-Mendieta union, the Ayala-Zobel-McMicking-Ortigas-Soriano-Roxas-De Montemar family links, the Roces-Pardo-Prieto-Legarda family group, and so forth. The Chinese (naturalized)
and Chinese mestizos tend to do the same (Sycip-Yuchengco-Uy-Tiu-Yu-Liu; Yao Shiong Shio-Cua Guiock Hong; Cojuangco-Chichioco, etc.), although it is now more difficult to trace this trend as this distinction tends to be lost through time -- names are Filipinized (or rather, Hispanized) and Chinese exclusiveness disappears. Nevertheless, the Chinese racial origin is still found in a marked degree among many of the wealthy elite by their distinctive physical features and even in the altered family names of some of them (e.g., Lichauco, Chiongbian, Yuchengco, Tuason, Tan, Sycip, Syquia, Dee, Gochangco, Roxas Chua, etc.). All these intermarriages contributed to the further concentration of wealth since kinship in the Philippines, as shall be discussed later, has a strong influence on social interaction and behavior.

The pattern of concentration is reflected geographically. Metropolitan Manila is the single metropolis that dominates the entire country. It has become the financial, commercial, manufacturing and

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Metropolitan Manila includes Manila and the surrounding suburbs of Quezon City, Pasay City, Caloocan City, Makati, Mandaluyong, Parañaque and San Juan. Its total population in 1960 was 2.2 million. Vide 1960 Census of Population, vol. II, Summary, op. cit.
cultural center of the archipelago. All of the major banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are in Metropolitan Manila. It is also the main center of trade and commerce. Fifty-four per cent of all manufacturing establishments (having 20 or more workers) are in this area and more than half (51 per cent) of all workers employed in manufacturing establishments in the above category are concentrated here.¹⁴ No less than 12 private universities (owned by elite families and religious corporations) and one state university are in Metropolitan Manila. Finally, it is the political center of the nation.

But the apparent growth and modernity of Metropolitan Manila and a few urban centers have not been shared by the rest of the country. Much of the countryside is still characterized by an antiquated kind of life not very different from the kind which the Spanish conquistadores found when they first set foot on these Islands. One still finds the peasant in his world of the nipa shack, the wooden plow and the carabao. Indeed, Manila and the countryside seem to depict the wide contrasts between the elite and the masses.

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C. THE PHILIPPINE CLASS SYSTEM

The Philippine class system reflects the combined heritage of its historical development. The marked influence of the traditional class system, in which society was divided into a very small but powerful upper class aristocracy of hereditary maharlikas, a group of timawas who owed allegiance to the aristocracy, and a large lower class group of dependent and landless alipins, is still noticeably evident. In this traditional system, there was no pretense of equality and people took it for granted that fate had placed them in the position they occupied. The Spanish influence is found in the attitudes and behavior of the upper class such as their disdain for manual labor, their aloofness and aristocratic mien, and a domineering, although sometimes paternalistic, authoritarianism. The sociologist Hunt observed that

In the Philippines, there is a definite effort to give members of the upper class a common cultural viewpoint. It appears that upper class position is associated with a certain Spanish-European pattern which makes for a separate sort of 'we-group' feeling or a 'consciousness of kind'. One writer has observed that Spanish is termed 'the language of the aristocracy' in the Philippines.

55 Hunt, op. cit., p.133.
56 Ibid., p.136.
The American contribution seems to be in the tempering of upper class attitudes and behavior. The accepted democratic 'formulas' have made some members of the upper class -- especially politicians -- pay at least lip service to egalitarian principles and 'the American stress on social mobility...has greatly influenced the younger generation of educated Filipinos'. The gap, however, between pronouncement and reality is still very wide.

MANIFESTATION OF CLASS: ELITE AND NON-ELITE

There are many evidences which distinguishes the elite in the Philippines from the non-elite. Class distinctions are perpetuated by the differences in the schools. The children of the elite attend mostly the Catholic religious schools run by Americans, Spaniards, and other Europeans. These are called the 'prestige' schools in the Philippines. Many send them later to finishing schools abroad. In this respect, the elite receive a particular sort of training and their distinctive type of culture is maintained. In contrast, the lower class send their children to the government schools which, owing to inadequate financial

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p.137.\]
support, are overcrowded and ill-equipped. Many of them do not finish the four grades 'guaranteed' by the Constitution.\(^{58}\) Class differences between the children going to the government schools and the religious schools are easily discernible. The well-dressed, uniformed children of the elite stand in marked contrast to the shabby, barefooted boys and girls in the barrio schools. The class pattern in education is also maintained by the differences in tuition fees. A comparison of tuition and other fees charged by five 'prestige' schools and five non-sectarian schools in Manila shows, for example, that the former exceed the latter on the average by 173 per cent, 153 per cent, 107 per cent and 50 per cent in Primary, Intermediate,

\(^{58}\) The Bureau of Public Schools data on 'dropouts' show that during a 10-year period the average percentage of those who enrolled in Grade I and reached Grade IV was only 66.4 per cent from Grade I to Grade VI, 38.5 per cent and from Grade I to High School, 15 per cent. See 'School Statistics', The Manila Chronicle, September 12, 1964, p.17; The Manila Times, October 5, 1964, p.24-A. Government survey data also show that the literacy of those in Grade IV was only 53.8 per cent and in Grade VI, 65.1 per cent. This means that many of the 'dropouts' are illiterates or soon lapse into illiteracy. This raises doubts on the common claim on the high 'literacy' rate (72 per cent) which is mainly based on figures of school attendance.
High School, and College, respectively. These, according to an informant from the Education Department, do not include the 'other fees and contributions not sanctioned by this office' which are often collected in religious schools.

Education is one of the hopes of those from the lower classes to break through the class barrier. It has become a sort of panacea, a magic passport that enables one to escape from one's social class. But education costs money. There have been cases reported of small landholders going into debt, mortgaging their small possessions and work animals, just to give a son the chance to escape from the life of the peasant. Unfortunately, this ambition seldom materializes for these persons often fall victims of the so-called 'diploma mills'. Run by profit-motivated individuals, these 'educational' institutions offer 'cheap' education

59 The five private sectarian schools are Ateneo University, La Salle College, San Beda College, Holy Ghost College (girls) and Assumption Convent (girls). The non-sectarian schools are Far Eastern University, National Teachers College, MLQ University, University of Manila, and National University. Source: Bureau of Private Schools statistical data and personal interviews.
to the masses. One writer commented, in this connection, that

...we can't produce an efficient educational system that has profit as its primary objective. In such a situation, owners of educational institutions with an eye to quarterly or semi-annual dividends must hire teachers who will take any kind of salary. After their 'education', they often end up among the ranks of the unemployed or else must seek the help of the elite to gain employment in positions not commensurate with their educational 'attainment'. Employers are selective and prefer those with the same 'school tie' or else those coming from the schools with the 'name'.

In the matter of the residences of the elite, there is a pattern in place and type which distinguishes

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60 'An example of rapacious exploitation of gullible boys and girls was one...which allegedly earned nearly ten million pesos in one year for its stock holders'. (George A. Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist, Chapter X, serialized in Manila Times, September 23, 1957.)


62 There are lawyers without clients, for instance, who end up as clerks in government offices, or teachers with the income of laborers.
them from the rest of the community. In Metropolitan Manila, where most of the top elite have their residences, there is a notable clustering in the fashionable suburban areas of Quezon City, Makati, San Juan, and Mandaluyong.

The exclusiveness of elite residential areas is maintained by expensive land which is beyond the reach of average citizens. Morris Joepenlatz (Juppenlatz?), a U.N. technical assistant, observed that

With the income levels, government policies, private ownership and land tenure system prevailing in Metropolitan Manila, not only will a big portion of the population be denied the chance of a decent shelter in a decent community environment but at least 70 per cent of the growing population over the next 17 years will be unable to afford a piece of urban land...circumstances will force these people to swell the squatter colonies already existing.\textsuperscript{63}

The Ayala lands (owned by the Spanish families previously discussed) in Makati, for instance, which covers about 1,700 hectares and where the exclusive 'Villages' of

\textsuperscript{63}\textit{Philippines Free Press}, May 25, 1963, p.12. The Ayala family group alone owns over 10 per cent of total land in Metropolitan Manila. The area of Metropolitan Manila in 1946 was 7,330 hectares and this increased to 16,000 hectares in 1963 but 'much of the land in periphery is held by a few families or controlled by land speculators'. Thus, while much of this land remained idle, half a million Manilans were crowded, into an area of 940 hectares. One-fifth of the Manila population lived in slum areas; the squatter population was 200,000. Morris Joepenlatz (Juppenlatz?), \textit{Ibid}. 
Bel Air, San Lorenzo, Urdaneta, etc. are located, have portions which have risen in value from ₱50 per square meter in 1959 to ₱500 per square meter in 1964. In this area lives a small high-income group 'which contribute about 90 per cent of Makati's income'.

Forbes Park, called the Philippine's millionaires row, is also in Makati just across the 'Villages'. Costly mansions and bungalows can be found in these areas. The 'Villages' and Forbes Park maintain their own services and security system.

In the provinces, the local elite generally live in the poblaciones, most of them clustered around the plaza, where the important buildings are concentrated — the munisipyo (town hall), the church, and the school.

In Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for instance, people still refer to the portion of the town around the poblacion (western side) as the kamestisuan (from mestizo) where

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64 John Yench (ed.) 'We Mean Business', Weekly Graphic, September 9, 1964.
65 Ibid.
66 As discussed earlier in Chapter II, this principalia residential pattern was established during the Spanish regime, Its modern manifestation was the subject of an interesting study by Donn V. Hart. See his The Philippine Plaza Complex: A Focal Point in Culture Change, op. cit.
big, Spanish-style houses of stone and hardwood (narra and yakal) still stand. The naturales (native) side in the eastern sector have houses mostly made of bamboos and nipa. Rafael Palma, in describing his town, wrote that 'there was a sprinkling of stone houses around the church which were owned by the rich proprietors and the "cabezas de barangay"'.

Class distinctions are also emphasized by the elite's propensity to display their possessions. Hart, for instance observed in his 1952 study:

...Most Filipino principalia, it would appear, prefer to display their wealth, to build elaborate houses, dress pretentiously, and impress visitors with their financial resources. One need but to dine with a wealthy Filipino family to realize the tendency toward conspicuous consumption of wealth.

---

67 Rafael Palma, My Autobiography (Manila: 1953), pp.3-4.
68 Hart, op. cit., p.50. A woman columnist also wrote in this connection: 'We in the Philippines...are still expected to be grateful to our landlords for letting us gape through their magnificent fences at their immense houses, where the lapdogs and hounds cavort among the imported rosebushes and the ten-course dinners are the rule; for gladdening our ignorant ears with their expensive musiomakers; for allowing us to catch a glimpse of their young people just home from a European capital dressed and scented like duchesses and movie stars; and perhaps (if one is lucky) for getting splashed with mud off the tires of a Cadillac (why, if it weren't for them we'd probably not even get to look at a limousine! (C.G. Nakpil, 'My Humble Opinion'), Manila Chronicle, June 13, 1955, p.4.
Some other evidences of a class system that has endured can be found in the normative ways of behavior among the people. In the relationship between landlord and tenant, for example, there is a general recognition of what is 'proper'. Thus, a tenant on a visit to his landlord's residence in the poblacion does not come as a visitor or a guest but as a member of the household help. He would not pass through the main door but use the back. If he brings his family with him, say during the town fiesta, his wife proceeds to the kitchen to help the servants while his children perform some household chores. The tenant makes himself useful by preparing the lechon (roast pig) or doing some other odd jobs. All of these are done without any compensation or payment as part of the landlord-serf relationship. This relationship is extended although in a modified form, to the urban setting. Whether in the office or factory, the jefe or 'boss' expects his subordinates to show not only deference but also subservience to him. One writer calls this attitude 'conformity'.

This conformity is manifested in other phases of the Filipino's culture. The teacher, for example, who should be the most articulate protester, because he is expected to have a mind trained for analysis and criticisms, is often a cowed creature whose main virtue is
obedience to rules. Government people appear to be no better who should be the best equipped to judge what is happening in matters that vitally affect the people. Religion has often become a social organization where people also talk the same way and think the same way.\textsuperscript{69}

Social superiority and leadership roles are reserved for the \textit{principalia}. Whether in social, economic, religious and, as shall be shown later, political matters he assumes his 'proper' place. During \textit{fiestas} and other religious celebrations, for example, the elite display their social superiority by assuming the posts of leadership such as managing the decoration of the church, preparing the carriages of saints (which they usually own) for the religious procession, donating sums of money for the bands that parade around the town. Inside the church, they usually have special seats reserved for them, with their names painted or carved, which they own.\textsuperscript{70} Hart also observed this:

What is the role of the Church in making the barriofolk aware of social class differences? [he asks]...the vivid contrasts between the municipal mayor, prosperous merchants, and landlords who live in the poblacion and the typical barrio farmer are reflected in the activities of the church.

\textsuperscript{69} Pura Santillan-Castrence, 'Encounter with the West', \textit{Progress}, op. cit., p.95.

\textsuperscript{70} 'These pews are placed by the wealthy people of the town who have their names carved on the back'. Renato Tayag, \textit{Sinners of Angeles} (1960, Author's Publication), p.27.
In some Catholic churches the more prosperous devotees have private niches for personal altars and reserved church benches labelled with the family name. These benches have been donated to the church by the family. Barrio folk stand rather than sit in an empty family bench. As one Filipino author states: "...the tenants know that these (benches) are not intended for them, and... they keep away."^71

In baptisms, weddings, and funerals, there is the same emphasis on social class differences. The fees are divided into 'classes', ranging from the 'ordinario', reserved for the common folk, to the 'special first class' for the very rich. Also, some of the tombs of the rich are virtual mansions. Thus, from birth to the grave, class distinctions are preserved.

**THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA**

This chapter centered on the examination of the general socio-economic setting. It was indicated that there had been no remarkable change in the economic structure and that old economic relations continue to persist. Further, the trend of economic growth does not suggest the creation of new social forces which may broaden the base of power. On the other hand, the

^71 Hart, *op. cit.*, p.18. 'During Lenten, you will see the tenants parading the saints owned by the caciques', said one Vigan informant. 'These tenants also render free personal services in the caciques' homes'. (Ilocos Sur interview, April 27, 1963.)
pattern of concentration of wealth seems to suggest the opposite. Finally, evidences of old social relations show that the principalia character of the elite is still very much in evidence.

The old and the new principalia are basically the same in composition, i.e., they both consist of the socio-economic dominants in the community. Also, in view of what has been stated above, i.e., that no major rearrangement in the social structure has taken place, the old character and composition of the principalia has, therefore, been preserved. Why then call it modern principalia? The only reason is because while the old was caste-like, entry to the new principalia is now possible. Higher education, although limited in effect insofar as the common people are concerned, makes it possible for one to cross class lines. The man with higher education, if possessing talent or the qualifications needed, may be recruited by the principalia either in business or politics in which case he may continue to rise, acquiring other values such as wealth, power, etc. He may thereby become a bona fide member of the elite class. The man who accumulates wealth may also join the principalia directly. The fact, however, that there has been no
major restratification, i.e., the top elite continue to be very small in composition, indicates that social mobility is still rather slow.

How large is the elite class? Obviously, it is impossible to give an exact number since the term elite itself is relative, i.e., persons possessing the different key values necessary for the exercise of influence such as wealth, power, prestige, and education can themselves fall in different gradations and it all depends on the classifier how refined his distinctions should be. How much influence? How much wealth? However, a rough estimate can be made. Since we have defined the principality class as consisting of the socio-economic dominants in the community, then we can associate them with the members of the upper strata. The problem, therefore, revolves around an estimate of social class composition.

The following data on income distribution, land ownership, occupation, education and general levels of living should be able to provide the reader with important clues as to the general nature of the Philippine class structure. A very rough estimate may also be made on the various social class categories based on the above socio-economic indicators.
1. **Income.** Table 3.4 shows the distribution of families, income, and real property by income class.

**TABLE 3.4**

**PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES, INCOME, AND REAL PROPERTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME CLASS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REAL PROPERTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below ₯2,500</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>₯2,500-enburg 4,999</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>₯5,000-enburg 9,999</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>₯10,000 and over</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Philippine Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission, 'Percentage Distribution of Families, Income, Expenditure, and Real Property by Income Class for Calendar Year 1960'.

It can be seen from the figures that the top income class receiving ₯10,000 and above comprise only 1.1 per cent of all families in contrast with the 88.3 per cent of all families receiving only ₯2,500 and below. Also this top 1.1 per cent owns almost one-third of all real property which is just 9 per cent less than that which the 88.3 per cent owns.

2. **Land ownership.** Referring back to Table 3.2 on page 85, it can be seen that only 0.18 per cent of all families own lands in the 100 hectare and above category; 1.68 per cent in the 20-99 has. category;
6 per cent in the 5-19 bracket; and 92.1 per cent in the below 5 hectares and those owning none. The area owned is not necessary (although Table 3.1 gives this information for 50 hectares and above) since we are more interested in the area category.

3. Occupation. Table 3.5 shows the occupational picture in 1962 by major occupation group. Note should be made that the high status occupations (professional, proprietors, managers, etc.) include 'salaried and wage workers'. Census data show that out of the 7.4 per cent in these two categories, nearly 3 per cent were 'wage and salary workers'. (See Table 3.5) They also include small proprietors and low-income professionals.

4. Educational Level. In 1960, only 1.87 per cent of the population were college graduates while 2.43 per cent had at least one year of college education. The figures for 'High School' and 'Elementary' are totals for the different years. Over twenty-nine per cent did not attend school. (See Table 3.6).

---

TABLE 3.5
EMPLOYED PERSONS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, APRIL, 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Total (thousands)</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and related workers</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors, managers, administrators and officials</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, office and related workers</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesmen and related workers</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, farm laborers, fishermen and related workers</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in mine, quarry and related occupations</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in operating transport occupations</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, factory operatives and workers in related occupations</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual workers and laborers, n.e.c.</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and related workers</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation not reported</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 3.6
HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED BY PERSONS 6 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>PER CENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population, 1960</td>
<td>27,087,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 6 years old and over</td>
<td>21,557,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No grade completed</td>
<td>29.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary (total: years 1 to 7)</td>
<td>55.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School (total: years 1 to 4)</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College (total: years 1 to 3)</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **General Levels of Living.** The 1960 Survey of Households of the Bureau of Census\(^{73}\) reported that of the 4.8 (m) dwelling units in the Philippines, only 585,000 or 12 per cent were made of durable materials while the rest (88 per cent) were either made of nipa, bamboo, etc. (58 per cent), or a mixture of these non-durable materials with wood, G.I. roofing, etc. (30 per cent). Only 15.4 per cent used electricity for lighting while the rest used kerosene lamps, candles, wax, coconut oil, etc. Eighty per cent depended on open wells, forced pumps, artesian wells, rain water, spring, lakes and rivers for water supply. Only 7.6 per cent had flush toilets while the rest (92.4 per cent) used open pits, antipolo system, communal toilets or had none at all (45 per cent had no toilets). For cooking, 92.8 per cent used wood in what are often the pre-Spanish kalans (earthen stoves) while only 1.3 per cent used electricity. Only 11 per cent had radios while 89 per cent had none.

From the data above, an estimate of the various social class categories may now be made. (See Table 3.7).

\(^{73}\) Summary of Census of Population, vol.II. (See Part II -- 'Housing').
TABLE 3.7

PHILIPPINE SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION: AN ESTIMATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Estimated Annual Income</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPPER CLASS: Landowners with more than 100 hectares; big businessmen; highly successful professionals; top government officials.</td>
<td>₱15,000 and over</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER MIDDLE CLASS: Landowners with 20-100 hectares; established professionals; most businessmen; executives and officials in large businesses or government.</td>
<td>₱5,000-₱14,999</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER MIDDLE CLASS: Small landowners with tenants (5-19 hectares); skilled and white-collar workers; owners of small retail business; most teachers; minor government officials.</td>
<td>₱2,500-₱4,999</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER CLASS: Tenant farmers, landless farm laborers, unskilled and semi-skilled workers; most of the handicapped; household servants; most government clerks; some teachers; peddlers; most sari-sari store owners; owners of small farms without tenants (Below 5 hectares); most office workers.</td>
<td>₱2,499 and below</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is to be noted that the data on income distribution have no detailed figures on income class above $10,000. The 0.5 per cent estimate for the ' $15,000 and over ' category is, therefore, the writer's estimate. However, it may even be a generous estimate since the U.N. figures in 1948 for the $14,000+ show that there were only 2,000 recipients for the whole country.\textsuperscript{74} Also Carroll's estimate in 1962 for the same category was only 0.1 per cent.\textsuperscript{75} As already stated, the estimate given is a rough one and it is not intended to convey a comprehensive analysis since additional and more detailed data would probably be needed for this purpose. Nevertheless, since the main aim was to make an educated guess on the probable size of the principalia, it perhaps serves the purpose. From the table, it can be seen that the combined figure for the upper and upper middle class is 4.0 per cent; giving an allowance of 1 per cent, the socio-economic dominants in the community then would probably not exceed 5 per cent. In other

\textsuperscript{75} Carroll, \textit{op. cit.}, p.113.
words, leadership roles are reserved to about 50 in every thousand.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{76} Compare with the estimate of Dr David Barrows, General Superintendent of Education, in 1902: 'a dozen, and generally less families who represent the dominant elements', in a town of ten or twelve thousand. (1903 Census, vol. I, op. cit., p. 510).
CHAPTER IV

THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA II: THE POLITICAL ELITE

In the preceding chapter, the study has discussed how the principalia-non-principalia character of the Philippine class system has been preserved and how principalia leadership roles in the economic and social spheres have survived. The question that must now be explored is whether the principalia character of political leadership has likewise been retained.

The present chapter presents data and analysis which bear on the proposition that the colonial pattern of leadership previously described has not undergone any major change; that the new principalia class -- the social and economic dominants in the community whose historical beginnings and later development, status, and functions have been discussed in the two preceding chapters -- continue to remain politically dominant,

1 The study has adopted Lasswell's definition of 'political elite' as comprising 'the power holders of a body politic' and include 'the leadership and the social formations from which leaders typically come....' Vide, Harold D. Lasswell et al., The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952), p.13.
contributing a majority of the formal power-wielders, albeit under somewhat different circumstances brought about by political independence and other 'modern' influences.

In this chapter, we shall examine the biographies of public leaders in the Philippines, concentrating on those who have held top public positions from 1946, the year the Philippines became politically independent, to 1963. The investigation focuses on their career patterns, their socio-economic status and background, and their ties with the social structure. The objective is to determine whether there are patterns or trends in the characteristics of the men who occupied and are occupying top public office during 17 years of post-colonial status. How wide, or narrow, is the social area of recruitment? How long do they stay in power? How representative are they of the community? What are their occupations, educational level, income, etc.? What are their economic interests and associational memberships? From what regions do the top men come from?

The group includes all the Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Cabinet members (Secretaries of Executive Departments listed in the Official Directories) from
1946-63; all the Senators from 1947-63; all members of the House of Representatives from 1946-63; and all the Justices of the Supreme Court from 1946-63. All in all, biographical data bearing on the above questions were gathered on six Presidents, two Vice-Presidents, 59 Cabinet members, 55 Senators, 299 Representatives and 25 Justices of the Supreme Court, or a total of 446.

Adequate data on 1946 Senators are not available.

There were actually five Vice-Presidents but three of them became Presidents; Osmeña had no Vice-President.


For comparative purposes, separate data on certain indicators was also gathered on the 1957 Philippines Who's Who elite after removing all those who have been included in our political elite and foreigners, leaving a list of 212 individuals. Those included in Who's Who according to the compilers, are the 'notable living Filipinos and residents of the Philippines who are successfully established in their various profession and callings'. (op. cit., p.iii). The aim is to provide a cross-reference that can shed light on certain characteristics of the political elite and other elites.
The period covers the administrations of five Presidents as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidents Administration</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roxas</td>
<td>1946-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quirino</td>
<td>1948-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magsaysay</td>
<td>1953-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia</td>
<td>1957-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macapagal</td>
<td>1961-63...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, during this period eight elections were held: four national and four local. This period covered, then, makes it possible for us to discern whether new types of leaders, in point of social class characteristics, have appeared or are appearing.

A. CAREER PATTERN AND RECRUITMENT

AGE

The first clue to the 'continuity' of political leadership in the Philippines is the age distribution of

5 President Osmeña, who served up to April 1946, was included among the Presidents.
6 Still in power in 1965.
7 The national elections were held in 1946, 1949, 1953, and 1961; the local in 1947, 1951, 1955, 1959, and 1963. The President, Vice-President, one-third of the Senators (eight) and all Representatives (104 in 1963) are elected during national elections; Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors, members of the Provincial Board, City and town Mayors, Vice-Mayors and Councilors, and eight Senators are elected during local elections.
the power group. Almost all of them were born between the last two decades of Spanish rule and the first three decades of American rule (See Table 4.1).

**TABLE 4.1**

**YEAR OF BIRTH OF POLITICAL ELITE***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR OF BIRTH</th>
<th>PRESIDENTS, VICE-PRESIDENTS, CABINET MEMBERS (1946-63)</th>
<th>SENATORS (1947-63)</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVES (1946-63)</th>
<th>SUPREME COURT (1946-63)</th>
<th>TOTAL Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1880</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-90</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1900</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-05</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-10</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-15</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-20</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-25</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-30</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-35</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The table comprises 97 per cent of total political elite. Percentages do not all add to 100 due to rounding.
The oldest among them are one President, born in 1878, who uninterruptedly occupied top public office from 1907 to 1946; a Senator, born in 1874, who was in the Senate from 1922 to 1953; a Representative, born in 1879, who has been a member of the Legislature since 1928 and who, at the age of 86, was still occupying his seat in Congress in 1965. The youngest are three Representatives all born before 1935, and are grandsons or great grandsons of top public officials.

From the above table, we note, too, that 89.4 per cent of the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Cabinet members, 70.5 per cent of the Senators, 62.8 per cent of the Representatives and all of the Justices were born in the last two decades of Spanish rule or the first decade of American rule. Many in this group had still some Spanish education, at least in their early schooling. Looking at the total political elite, however, we find that the

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8 President Osmeña was appointed Governor of Cebu in 1904. He occupied that position until 1907 when he was elected to the First National Assembly.

9 Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona.


majority (86.3 per cent) were born between 1891 and 1920. We shall discuss later how the above facts also serve as an important clue to the socio-economic status of the political elite when their educational background is examined.

YEAR OF ENTRY TO TOP PUBLIC POSITIONS

'Top public positions' refer to any of the posts which are considered, for purposes of analysis, of elite category, i.e., President, Vice-President, Senator, Representative and Justice of the Supreme Court. Table 4.2 shows the year of entry to these top public positions.

We notice in Table 4.2 the continuity in political leadership: 33.4 per cent of the Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Cabinet members, and 43.6 per cent of the Justices had reached top public positions on or before 1941, i.e., during the time when the Philippines was still under American rule. It should be pointed out that all these pre-war leaders, some of whom had reached the top as early as 1907 and stayed there all these decades, were, during the period covered by this study (1946-63), the most senior members of the power group. Furthermore, many of those who have reached the top of the political pyramid from 1946 onwards had held
TABLE 4.2

YEAR OF ENTRY TO TOP PUBLIC POSITIONS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR OF ENTRY</th>
<th>PRESIDENTS, VICE-PRESIDENTS, CABINET MEMBERS (1946-63)</th>
<th>SENATORS (1947-63)</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVES (1946-63)</th>
<th>JUSTICES, SUPREME COURT (1946-63)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1910</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1920</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1930</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1940</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1946</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1950</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=60) (N=55) (N=299) (N=24) (N=438)

*The table comprises 98 per cent of total political elite. Percentages do not all add to 100 due to rounding.*
important positions such as Provincial Governors, City Mayors, executive positions in the national government, Justices of the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance Judges, etc., during the American colonial administration. They, therefore, belong to the same category as those who have reached the top before 1946.

The above data support the proposition that there had been no major change, not only in the type of leaders, but also, in many cases, even in individual leaders. The top political leaders who dominated pre-World War II politics who were still alive were the men who led the newly independent republic. Those who died had their sons, relatives, or colleagues who carried on. The leaders of the government and the Nacionalista Party in 1945-46 were the same 'old guard' who had been in power since the early decades of American rule. Even the faction of the Nacionalista Party (the Liberal Wing) which is now the Liberal Party was led by members of these 'old guard' who defected to form a 'new' party. But there was no new type of leadership that successfully emerged.

12 From 1907 up to the factional split in 1946, the Nacionalista Party of Osmena and Quezon was the Party in Philippine politics. This will be discussed further in Chapter V.
### Table 4.3

**PUBLIC POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO FIRST ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT TO TOP POLITICAL POSTS INDICATED***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PRESIDENTS (1946-63)</th>
<th>VICE-PRESIDENTS (1946-63)</th>
<th>CABINET MEMBERS (1946-63)</th>
<th>SENATORS (1947-63)</th>
<th>JUSTICES, SUPREME COURT (1946-63)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate President</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Secretary</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Justice</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court of Appeals &quot;</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy**</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Mayor</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None or Unspecified***</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=6)</td>
<td>(N=5)</td>
<td>(N=49)</td>
<td>(N=52)</td>
<td>(N=23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The table comprises 90 per cent of the top public officials in the above categories during the periods indicated.

**Bureaucracy** here is merely classificatory; many of the public officials indicated under it are not career public servants in the bureaucratic sense. Most are 'political appointees' to positions in the Executive department below the level of cabinet secretary; it includes those given executive positions in government-owned or controlled corporations. Applied to the Justices, however, the term refers to the lower rungs of the judiciary.

**See explanation below.
PRE-ELITE POSITIONS

The public positions held by the top power group prior to their first election or appointment to elite posts give further evidence to support the basic proposition on the continuity of political leadership in the Philippines. They also indicate the pattern in which particular officials are recruited (See Table 4.3). It can be seen from the table that the succession process follows a more or less hierarchical pattern. Presidents come from the Vice-Presidency, Senate, or the Cabinet; Vice-Presidents are recruited from the Senate and the House; Cabinet members from Congress, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the 'Bureaucracy'; Senators from the House of Representatives, Cabinet and the Judiciary, etc. This is, however, a collective picture and an examination of individual cases of those who reached the very top shows that they started at a relatively higher level than the rest.

Since the Representatives are the most 'junior' members of the political elite, their pre-elite positions deserve a closer examination in order to discover one of the major sources of recruitment of power-wielders. Table 4.3-A shows the public positions held by the members of the House of Representatives in our group prior to their first election to Congress.
TABLE 4.3-A
PUBLIC POSITIONS HELD BY REPRESENTATIVES,
(1946-1963), PRIOR TO FIRST ELECTION TO CONGRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Offices - 85(28.6%)</th>
<th>Bureaucracy (National)*** 40(13.5%)</th>
<th>Executive Positions (Govt. Office, Board, Corporation or Agency) 29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>24 (No.)</td>
<td>'Technical Assistants or Advisers' of top public officials 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Gov</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Municipal and City Officials 35(11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov'l Board</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mayor 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Public Defender'</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Councilor 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov'l Fiscal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Justice of the Peace 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Fiscal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, Prov'l Hospital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov'l Treasurer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov'l Engineer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov'l Educ. 0**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary, Prov'l Board</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Court of First Instance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 294(100.0%)

*The table comprises 98.3 per cent of Representatives during the period indicated.
**Superintendent of Schools, School Supervisor.
***Same explanation as in Table 4.3.
****See explanation below.

The table reveals the same 'chain of command' pattern manifested in Table 4.3, with the provincial and municipal officials supplying 120 out of the 160 Representatives who have held public office prior to their first election to Congress, and the 'bureaucracy' supplying the rest. The appointments in what have been
categorized as the 'bureaucracy' were, and still are, under the control and allocation of the principalia faction in power. It is a generally accepted fact in the Philippines that these are the political 'plums' distributed by national leaders to their relatives, favorites and loyal provincial leaders. This makes it quite difficult for 'new' men outside principalia circles (and areas of influence) to emerge from this group. Even the lowest ranked in the elected hierarchy -- the local officials -- are drawn mostly from the members of the local principalia. Survey findings of the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, confirm this observation:

The mayor like the provincial governor, is generally from the dominant economic or social group in his community...The mayors interviewed by the survey group had generally achieved their office by long years of service to the party or by demonstrating leadership in some other phase of community life...The political apprenticeship of the mayors was generally

This practice, borrowed from the American patronage and spoils system and complicated by the Philippine kinship system, has already been formalized in the so-called '50-50 Agreement' between the Executive Department and the House of Representatives in 1959. This was an agreement which 'envisaged the division of new positions [in the government] between members of the Lower House and Malacañang' (See Gregorio A. Francisco and Raul P. de Guzman, 'The 50-50 Agreement' in Patterns in Decision-Making, Raul P. de Guzman (ed.) (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1963,) p.117).
confined to party activities. Several of them had served on council or in some other municipal capacity before assuming their present office.  

The Governors generally come from lower local officials, although there seems to be a two-way movement, from Governor to Representative and vice versa.

In the sample covered by the Institute survey, all of the governors had served in government before their election. About half of the governors, in addition to serving as municipal councilors, had been congressmen from their districts. Others had served as elected members of the provincial board, a congressman, and a provincial board member before his election. Only one of the men interviewed had not held an elective position, previous to assuming the governorship. Prior to his first term, however, he had been a municipal judge for several years.  

There is of course a historical explanation for this. As pointed out in Chapter II, the trend established by the Spaniards in setting up the principalia class as a privileged group and as source of gobernadorcillos and other local administrators was continued by the Americans. They, like the Spaniards, also selected men from the principalia class in the appointments to public office. In the elections that they introduced, they favored the

15 Ibid., p. 45.
propertied class by introducing property and literacy qualifications to the franchise. This resulted, of course, in the legitimization and further entrenchment in power of the principia as a class. Thus, 'political democracy' in the Philippines was founded and based, from the beginning, on principia superiority and dominance. The property qualification was removed in 1916 (only the literacy qualification remains) but the pattern has already been set and it continues to this day.

There are three other features in the recruitment and career pattern of the political elite which should be pointed out.

The first is that those elected or appointed directly to top elite positions outside the immediate and formal government hierarchy tend to come from the top or near the top of the socio-economic pyramid. These appear in Tables 4.3 and 4.3-A under the 'none or unspecified categories'. Of the five in the Cabinet under this category, for example, two are millionaire-businessmen (J. Elizalde and B. Valencia), one is a top medical practitioner\(^{16}\) (Paulino Garcia), one is a son-in-law of a President (E. Valencia), and the last is a daughter of

\(^{16}\) *Who's Who*, op. cit., p.110.
a wealthy businessman-landowner, who was himself a Senator (Madrigal). The same is true of the eight Senators and the 134 Representatives. They are mostly top lawyers or other professionals, businessmen or big landowners (or a combination of these three). As a further illustration of this point, of the 134 Representatives who did not hold public office prior to their first election to Congress, 65 or nearly half were actively engaged in the practice of law (some as associates of well-known practitioners, Senators and Representatives); 36 or over one-fourth were managing their lands, were in business or were business executives; 21 were teaching law, medicine, engineering, and other courses, in various universities (in addition to the active practice of their respective professions). Four of the eight physicians practicing their profession had their own (or their families') hospitals and clinics.

The second feature, related to the first, is the noticeable increase in the number of Representatives who did not hold public positions prior to their entry to elite posts but followed the direct route. Comparing

the Representatives with the other officials in this regard (see 'none or unspecified' category in Tables 4.3 and 4.3-A), we find the following percentages of those who went directly to elite posts. Cabinet members -- 10.2 per cent; Senators -- 17.3 per cent; Representatives -- 45.1 per cent. (There were no direct entrants to the Presidency or the Vice-Presidency.) To what can we attribute this sudden rise in the number of Representatives (134) going directly to elite posts?

It is suggested that this is an indication of the difference in the career and recruitment pattern of the political elite during colonial and post-colonial periods. Under the Americans, the typical career pattern of the political elite was to start from below, 'clerking' in national government offices or as a municipal councilor. It must be noted that these were already 'high status' positions then and were generally reserved to the few in the higher-educated segment of the population. Thus, even members of the upper principalia entered these posts. (This explains the 'lowly-origin' myth among some members of the political elite.) With the advent of independence and with the increasing number of the educated group, the elite tend to start higher in their political careers. The evidence for this can be found
FIGURE I
THE POLITICAL ELITE:
PATTERN OF RECRUITMENT

UPPER PRINCIPALIA:
1. SONS, OTHER RELATIVES OF POLITICAL ELITE.
2. TOP PROFESSIONALS
3. BIG BUSINESSMEN
4. LARGE LANDOWNERS

LOWER PRINCIPALIA:
(LOCAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DOMINANTS)

Non-Principalia Recruits
1. Higher Education plus Political Patronage
2. Economic "Success": Business, Profession, etc.

LEGEND:
→ = Major source
⇒⇒⇒⇒ = Minor source
in Table 4.2 (Year of Entry). From this table, it is shown that of all the political elite, the Representatives have the most number who entered elite posts 'late', i.e., 87.6 per cent of them entered top public posts after independence in 1946. It is also this group, as indicated above, which produced 45.1 per cent of direct entrants to top public positions. Figure I diagrams the general pattern of recruitment of the political elite.

The last feature that must be pointed out from Tables 4.3 and 4.3-A is that there is no 'one-branch' career among the top power group. There is a prevalence of moving from one governmental branch to another, e.g., Justices of the Supreme Court may come from the Legislative or Executive branch as well as from the Judicial branch; members of the Judiciary do become politicians and politicians join the Judiciary, etc. No 'separation of powers' in career development seems to restrict the power group in this respect.

**AGE AT ENTRY TO ELITE POSITIONS**

Members of the political elite entered top public positions at a relatively young age. Two out of every three (67.7 per cent) reached top public office before the age of 45 (See Table 4.4).
### Table 4.4

AGE AT ENTRY TO TOP PUBLIC POSITIONS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE (1946-63)</th>
<th>PRESIDENTS, VICE-PRESIDENTS, CABINET MEMBERS (%)</th>
<th>SENATORS (1947-63)</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVES (1946-63)</th>
<th>JUSTICES, SUPREME COURT (1946-63)</th>
<th>TOTAL (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 - 30</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 35</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 - 40</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 45</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 - 50</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 55</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 - 60</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 - 65</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=57)</td>
<td>(N=54)</td>
<td>(N=299)</td>
<td>(N=23)</td>
<td>(N=433)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Top public positions* refer to any of those categorized in the table. The table comprises 97 per cent of total political elite.
Four of the six Presidents (66.7 per cent), one Cabinet member and nine Senators (16.7 per cent) reached top public positions before the age of 30! It must be emphasized that what are being considered in Table 4.4 are top public positions and not the initial or even pre-elite positions. This consideration then should add point to the relative youthfulness of the political elite at the time they reached top power positions. The immediate explanation of this is that many of them started their public careers during American rule when there was a scarcity of educated and qualified personnel to fill those appointive positions in the bureaucracy open to Filipinos. But the supply of this educated group came mostly from the principalia class. As the 'Filipinization' of the bureaucracy progressed, i.e. as more positions at the higher levels were opened to Filipinos, many of the political elite attained higher ranks rapidly. Many of them shifted to elective posts while some of those occupying elective offices got high executive appointments.

YEARS IN ELITE POSITIONS

We have seen that, in general, the elite group enters top public positions at a relatively young age. How long do they stay in power? Table 4.5 furnishes this information.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF YEARS</th>
<th>PRESIDENTS, VICE-PRESIDENTS, CABINET MEMBERS (1946-63)</th>
<th>SENATORS (1947-63)</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVES (1946-63)</th>
<th>JUSTICES, SUPREME COURT (1946-63)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 yrs or less</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 25</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 30</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 35</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 - 40</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=52)</td>
<td>(N=55)</td>
<td>(N=299)</td>
<td>(N=23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*'Top public positions' refer to any of those categorized in the table. The table comprises 96 per cent of the total political elite.
The data refer to the cumulative number of years in which members of the power group actually held any of the top public positions categorized above.

The data show that members of the Philippine political elite remain in power a long time, much longer than, say, members of the American political elite which remain at the top on the average of three years. Even if the story is not yet complete, for many of the persons in the group are still in power and it is not known how long they will stay there, yet the data already show that 32.7 per cent of the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Cabinet members, 52.7 per cent of the Senators, 27.5 per cent of the Representatives, and 56.4 per cent of the Justices have been in top positions for eleven years or more.

While Table 4.5 gives only the actual number of years they have held top public positions, some of them have been in public office all their adult lives. One Senator had been in the government service from 1901-63 and had been dubbed the 'political colossus of Northern

---

Luzon; he was 79 when he left the Senate. Two Senators started their public careers in 1909, one ending in 1957, while the other died in office as Senator at the age of 82. Still another Senator died in office at the age of 76 after having been in public office for 51 years. Mention has been made of a President who occupied public office uninterruptedly from 1904 to 1946, and a Representative who occupied his seat since 1928 and at the age of 86 was still there in 1965.

The above facts clearly illustrate the stability of the political elite. There is an important consequence of this long stay in power: fewer individuals will occupy a given post during a certain period of time. This is clearly reflected among the Representatives in the group. Table 4.6 gives the number of positions to be filled during given election years and the number of new members elected.

The figures in Table 4.6 are revealing in the sense that fewer and fewer personnel are being added every Congressional election year. From 69 per cent in 1949,

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*21* Senator M.J. Cuenco; Vide, S.O.D. 1960-61, pp.33-34.
### TABLE 4.6

NUMBER OF SEATS AND NUMBER OF NEW MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DURING GIVEN ELECTION YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SEATS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF NEW MEMBERS</th>
<th>PER CENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97*</td>
<td>100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For purposes of this table, the 97 Representatives elected in 1946 have been considered as 'new' although quite a number were pre-war Representatives.

the proportion had dropped to 29 per cent in 1961. This illustrates, too, the limited character of the personal circulation of the power group.

### B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND BACKGROUND

Thus far evidence has been presented to show the continuity in political leadership in the Philippines from colonial to post-colonial periods. The next step is to delve deeper into the socio-economic status and background of the power-wielders. We shall try to do this by examining some of the standard indicators of social class status as applied to this group.
EDUCATION

The fact that the vast majority of the Philippine political elite comes from families which could give them distinct advantages is shown by the superior educational level they have attained. The power-group are almost exclusively drawn from a small college-educated minority of the population. Data from Table 4.7 show that 96.7 per cent of top Executive officials, 96 per cent of Senators, 92.3 per cent of Representatives, and 100 per cent of the Justices are college graduates. Furthermore, with the exception of the Representatives, the remainder who did not have a college degree have at least spent a year in college. Only 12, or 4 per cent of the Representatives did not have college education. Putting it more explicitly, over 97 per cent of the total political elite (427 out of 439 in the group in Table 4.7) comes from a very small college-educated group in the population which, in 1948, comprised only 2.7 per cent of the total population 25 years of age and over. 22

22 This may, in fact, be a generous comparison for if we recall from Table 4.1 (Year of Birth), the vast majority in the group (87.0 per cent) were born before 1915 and therefore had finished their education before 1940. This means that a more appropriate year of comparison would be 1939 when the college-educated group is even very much lower. The 1939 Census figures, however, did not have detailed data to enable us to have the desired comparison.
TABLE 4.7
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF TOP EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS,
1946-1963*

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL COMPLETED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th>NONE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gr.IV-V</td>
<td>Gr.I-V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gr.I-III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COLLEGE GRADUATE</th>
<th>COLLEGE (1-3 yrs)</th>
<th>HIGH SCH GRADUATE</th>
<th>INTERMEDIATE GRADUATE</th>
<th>(Gr.VI-H.S.III)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESIDENTS,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICE-PRESIDENTS,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABINET MEMBERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-63 (N=60)</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-63 (N=55)</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESENTATIVES:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-63 (N=299)</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-63 (N=25)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINE POPULATION,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 YEARS OF AGE AND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER: 1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=6.9 million)**</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The table comprises 98.3 per cent of total political elite during the periods indicated.
### TABLE 4.8

**COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED BY TOP PUBLIC OFFICIALS, 1946-1963***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colleges or Universities</th>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Vice-Presidents</th>
<th>Cabinet Members</th>
<th>Senators</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Supreme Court</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE (RELIGIOUS)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Beda College</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ateneo de Manila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letran</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Santo Tomas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Carlos University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four others (Catholic)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silliman (Protestant)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE (NON-SECTARIAN)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Law School</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Manila</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far Eastern University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Rizal College</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the Philippines</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Others***</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABROAD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Others****</td>
<td>2 (1.9%)</td>
<td>3 (3.4%)</td>
<td>2 (0.6%)</td>
<td>3 (6.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTENDANCES:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107 (100.0%)</td>
<td>88 (100.1%)</td>
<td>353 (100.0%)</td>
<td>44 (100.1%)</td>
<td>592 (100.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NUMBER OF TOP PUBLIC OFFICIALS | 52 | 53 | 244 | 20 | 369 |
| AVE. NO. OF ATTENDANCES | 2.06 | 1.66 | 1.37 | 2.2 | 1.6 |

*The table comprises 82.7% of all top public officials in the above categories during the periods indicated. 369 top public officials (out of 446) had 592 attendances in the colleges and universities mentioned above.

**San Beda College, De La Salle, Univ. of San Agustin, St Scholastica, and Colegio de San Jose (Cebu).**

***Philippine Normal School, Phil. School of Commerce, Phil. Constabulary Academy.***

Spain, France, England; 'Others' refer to Japan (1 Senator).
These facts become even more striking when we bear in mind that over one-half of the general population 25 years and over (or 55.5 per cent) did not have any schooling in 1948. One need hardly emphasize, too, that higher education in the Philippines as elsewhere has, in general and since colonial times, been closely associated with those possessing economic means, for even the so-called 'diploma mills', which are run by profit-motivated educational-entrepreneurs are expensive enough to be beyond the means of the average Filipino. However, the political elite did not just go to any college or University. The data show that the private (and expensive) 'prestige' schools run by foreign religious orders are the largest source of the political elite, claiming 31.4 per cent of the group while another 26.4 per cent attended other private schools. Moreover, 14.2 per cent of the elite studied abroad, with the U.S. claiming 88 per cent of all those who had schooling in foreign countries; 25.7 per cent went to the University of the Philippines, the State University which was established by the Americans during the early part of their rule, presumably to counter-act the long established influence of the Catholic religious schools (run mostly
by Spanish friars) on the principalia class. During the entire American administration, therefore, U.P. was (and still is) one of the top prestige schools and it was also one of the chief training centers of the political elite, particularly in law.

Another fact that can be established from Table 4.8 is that on the average, the elite attended more than one college or university. The data show that the 369 in the group who have specified the colleges or university they attended had a total of 592 'attendances', meaning that most of them had attended more than one college or university. The average number of attendances is 1.6 for the whole group; the Justices, have the highest with an average of 2.2, followed by the Executive officials.


24 The Americans were not, however, completely successful. Although the public schools set up gained much prestige initially and many sent their children to them, the elite, particularly the upper principalia members, continued sending their sons to Letran, San Beda, La Salle, University of Sto. Tomas and other private religious schools -- the Philippines' equivalent of England's 'public schools' -- for their elementary, secondary and arts education. They send them later to the University of the Philippines, the 'Escuela de Derecho', National Law College (UM), etc., for their training in law in preparation for a political career. The study's data, however, show only the schools attended for their college education.
with an average of 2.06 'attendances'. This is another clear indication of the high socio-economic status of the group. While 97.3 per cent of the population cannot reach college, most of the political elite have attended more than one college or university.

An interesting comparison at this stage may be made in the college attendance among the political elite, the 1957 Who's Who elite, and Carroll's manufacturing elite.²⁵ (See Table 4.9).

From the table we find a remarkable similarity in the colleges attended by the three elite groups: 83.8 per cent of the political elite, 83.2 per cent of the Who's Who elite, and 81.2 per cent of the business elite, attended the same 9 colleges and universities in the Philippines or have gone abroad. This becomes all the more striking when the fact is considered that there were in 1946, for example, 498 private colleges and 5 public schools offering collegiate courses.²⁶

From the data, the trend in career differences is also noted. More of the political elite went to U.P.,

### Table 4.9
COMPARATIVE DATA ON COLLEGE ATTENDANCE OF VARIOUS ELITES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colleges or Universities</th>
<th>Political Elite</th>
<th>Who's Who Elite</th>
<th>Carroll's Business Elite*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE (RELIGIOUS)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. of Sto Tomas</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ateneo de Manila</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letran, De La Salle, San Beda</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE (NON-SECTARIAN)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Law and Univ. of Manila</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Rizal College</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the Philippines</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABROAD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S., etc.</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Attendances: 592, 298, 91
Number of Elite: 369, 212, 66
Ave. No. of Attendances: 1.6, 1.4, 1.4

*John J. Carroll, *op. cit.*, Table 52, p.186.*
Philippine Law School and University of Santo Tomas, where they mostly took up law while more of the business elite (7.7 per cent) went to Jose Rizal College (which specializes in Commerce and Business Administration), as compared with the 1.7 per cent for both the political and Who's Who elites. Data on the number of attendances indicate that on the average, the political elite have more college schooling than the other elites with an average 'attendance' of 1.6 as compared with 1.4 for the other elites.

OCCUPATION

The Philippine political elite is extremely unrepresentative of the citizenry in terms of occupation. The Bureau of the Census, for instance, listed only 2.9 per cent of the employed labor force as 'professional', technical and related workers in 196227 with the 'professionals' not exceeding 1.5 per cent of the gainfully employed,28 yet 84 per cent of the political elite were professionals and the rest were either landowners, businessmen, or business executives (See Table 4.10). It can be

TABLE 4.10
LISTED MAIN PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION OF TOP EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS, 1946-1963*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>PRESIDENTS, VICE-PRESIDENTS, CABINET MEMBERS (1946-63)</th>
<th>SENATORS (1947-63)</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVES (1946-63)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 67</td>
<td>N = 55</td>
<td>N = 299</td>
<td>N = 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. PROFESSIONAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>51 (76.2%)</td>
<td>46 (83.5%)</td>
<td>257 (86.0%)</td>
<td>354 (84.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>35 (52.3%)</td>
<td>40 (72.7%)</td>
<td>207 (69.3%)</td>
<td>282 (67.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer**</td>
<td>6 (8.9%)</td>
<td>1 (1.8)</td>
<td>21 (7.0)</td>
<td>28 (6.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Officer</td>
<td>4 (6.0)</td>
<td>2 (3.6)</td>
<td>6 (2.0)</td>
<td>13 (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educator***</td>
<td>2 (3.0)</td>
<td>2 (3.6)</td>
<td>5 (1.7)</td>
<td>12 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others****</td>
<td>1 (1.5)</td>
<td>1 (1.8)</td>
<td>8 (2.7)</td>
<td>10 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BUSINESSMAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSINESS EXECUTIVE</td>
<td>9 (13.4%)</td>
<td>6 (10.9%)</td>
<td>15 (5.0%)</td>
<td>30 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FARMER-LANDOWNER</td>
<td>6 (8.9%)</td>
<td>2 (5.5%)</td>
<td>27 (9.0%)</td>
<td>36 (8.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. UNSPECIFIED</td>
<td>1 (1.5%)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>67 (100.0%)</td>
<td>55 (99.9%)</td>
<td>299 (100.0%)</td>
<td>421 (99.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Percentage totals do not all add to 100 due to rounding.)

*Many of the top public officials listed more than one occupation or profession but for purposes of this table, the writer selected only one, with the profession having the first priority. It should be noted, therefore, that the 'professions' are the most accurately reflected while 'businessman' and 'farmer-landowner' are grossly under-represented since many of the 'professionals' are businessmen or landowners (or both) at the same time.

*Includes civil, mining, electrical and chemical engineers.

***Includes owner-operator of an educational institution, teaching in a college or University, teacher, etc.

****Three dentists; two accountants, three newspapermen, one architect, one social worker, and one leader of a 'religious organization' (also a landowner).

aTwo retired generals of the Armed Forces (graduates of Military Academy).

bFour guerrilla officers, one reserve officer, and one pilot (graduate of Military Academy).
seen from the table that there is not a single one with 'low-status' occupation among them. 29

Among the professionals, the lawyers top the list. 67 per cent of the top executive and legislative officials are lawyers. (If we include the Justices, who inevitably, are all lawyers, the figure becomes 73 per cent of all the political elite). However, only a quarter of 1 per cent of the gainfully employed in the labor force are lawyers. 30

The same trend may be observed in the data on local elective officials. The 'high status' occupations contributed 92.5 per cent among the Governors, 87.1 per cent of Vice-Governors, 89.3 per cent of City Mayors, 71.4 per cent of City Vice-Mayors and 77.3 per cent of Municipal Mayors (see Table 4.10-A), with the professionals showing the same dominant position as in Table 4.10. Also, the lawyers provide the largest number of local elective officials among all the various occupations (with the sole exception of the Mayors who

There were, however, four Representatives who listed 'logger', 'miner' and 'labor leader' together with their other professions or occupations. One, the son of a landowner, listed 'businessman and labor leader' (H.O.D., 1962-65, pp. 19, 95-96); another is a 'lawyer, labor leader and logger' (operator of a timber concession -- Ibid., pp. 20 159-60); another one is a 'farmer, miner, geologist' (executive of a mining company -- Ibid., pp. 170-71); and the last one is a 'lawyer and labor leader' (Ibid., p. 19).

That is, 0.26 per cent in 1961. 1962 Statistical Handbook, op. cit., pp. 34 and 38.
TABLE 4.10-A  
LISTED MAIN PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,  
1959-63* 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>GOVERNORS (N=54)</th>
<th>VICE GOVERNORS (N=54)</th>
<th>CITY MAYORS (N=28)</th>
<th>CITY VICE-MAYORS (N=28)</th>
<th>MUNICIPAL MAYORS (N=1,199)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PROFESSIONAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>30(55.6%)</td>
<td>26(48.2%)</td>
<td>16(57.1%)</td>
<td>15(53.5%)</td>
<td>329(27.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>4(7.4%)</td>
<td>6(11.1%)</td>
<td>1(3.6%)</td>
<td>2(7.1%)</td>
<td>33(2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1(1.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2(7.1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11(0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1(1.8%)</td>
<td>2(3.7%)</td>
<td>1(3.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>104(8.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BUSINESSMAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8(14.8%)</td>
<td>7(12.9%)</td>
<td>4(14.3%)</td>
<td>1(3.6%)</td>
<td>138(11.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FARMER-LANDOWNER**</td>
<td>5(9.3%)</td>
<td>3(5.6%)</td>
<td>4(14.3%)</td>
<td>2(7.1%)</td>
<td>312(26.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PROPRIETOR</td>
<td>1(1.8%)</td>
<td>3(5.6%)</td>
<td>1(3.6%)</td>
<td>2(7.1%)</td>
<td>145(12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. OTHERS</td>
<td>4(7.4%)</td>
<td>7(12.9%)</td>
<td>3(10.7%)</td>
<td>8(28.6%)</td>
<td>272(22.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>54(99.9%)</td>
<td>54(100.0%)</td>
<td>28(100.0%)</td>
<td>28(100.0%)</td>
<td>1,199(99.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage totals do not all add to 100 due to rounding.


**In the questionnaire of the Commission on Elections, the term used was only 'farmer'. A subsequent interview by the writer with a staff member of the Statistical Division, Commission on Elections, confirmed the writer's impression that 'farmer' here meant 'landowner' and not 'tenant farmer' nor 'farm laborer'. Landowners in the Philippines, though mostly absentee-owners living in the urban centers, call themselves 'farmers', 'planters', 'agriculturist', etc. Vide Official Directories of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 1946-63.
have more 'farmers' in their ranks). These data also confirm the findings of the Institute of Public Administration (on provincial and municipal officials) previously cited.

The reader must, however, be cautioned about the uses of Tables 4.10 and 4.10-A. While they are useful in analyzing individual professions or occupations, for the purpose of distinguishing 'high-status' from 'low-status' occupations, or for general classification, they do not give the complete occupational picture of the political elite for they do not fully describe the 'businessmen' and the landowners'. This has already been suggested in Table 4.10 (footnote) but it needs further clarification.

One of the important features of the 'occupations' of the Philippine political elite is their multiple character. Owing perhaps to the semi-fused nature of social and economic institutions, and the concentration of values (wealth, skill, education, power) in elite hands, the power group tend to perform multiple roles and engage in various activities at the same time. Thus a lawyer is often not merely a lawyer, but may turn out to be a businessman, an 'educator' (either teaching or operating his own school), a planter (landowner) or even
a labor leader. If he is in business, he does not stick to one line but expands to other fields including the acquisition of land. A landowner, likewise, will probably expand into business activities. It is unlikely, therefore, to find a member of the political elite relying on a single occupation, much less to find one depending exclusively on his governmental post, as his source of income.

Because this interesting aspect cannot be quantified, it may be better to take some illustrations of these 'multiple' occupations. In the following pages are brief passages and extracts from the biographies of some of the 1946-63 power group.

**Cabinet member Salvador Araneta (Lawyer).** Aside from Araneta University, Salvador is president of the P42,000,000 Republic Flour Mills, the AIA Feed Mills, Chairman of Feati Industries, Republic Soya, and Premier Paper, and founder of a coming yeast factory. He was founder of the Far East Transport Inc., with Eugenio Lopez [brother of another Senator] He was co-founder and first president (1946) of the Feati Institute of Technology... ("Progress through Family Solidarity-4" Weekly Graphic, Aug. 26, 1964, p.35).

**Cabinet member Primitivo Lovina (Businessman, Realtor, Banker).** President and founder of Southern Investments, Inc. Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co.; Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Primitivo Lovina and Co., Inc; Montilla Motor Co. Director of Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. He was also an executive of several government corporations and agencies -- member of the National Economic Council, Government Enterprise Council, Insular Sugar Refining Corporation, and others. (Who's Who, p.166a).
Cabinet member Jaime Hernandez (Accountant). Owns major interest in the Bicol Electric Company, University of Nueva Caceres, University of the East, etc...Headed the accounting firm Jaime Hernandez & Co., and became the President of the Philippine Institute of Public Accountants...He 'served as...member, board of directors, Philippine National Bank. Aside from being a university official, he also taught law and accounting at the Far Eastern University and the graduate school, University of the East'. (Who's Who, p.129.)

Cabinet member Joaquin M. Elizalde (Businessman). 'Member of a distinguished family of Manila, connected with almost every important business in the Archipelago, Mr Elizalde was educated in Spain, England and Switzerland, with one year of service in the Spanish Army'. (Ency., vol.XVII, p.173*) The Elizalde family has 18 business entities involving mining, sugar plantations, insurance, shipping, sugar centrals, rope factory, rum distillery, lumber business, mass-media (TV and radio broadcasting with chains of radio stations all over the country), etc. The family employs 'no fewer than 20,000 people whose dependents number around 100,000'. ('On the Economic Side', Philippines Free Press. Feb 2, 1963, p.12.)

Cabinet member Mariano Garchitorena (Planter). Son of Don Andres Garchitorena 'one of political bulwarks of Bicolandia', he took over the plantations when his father retired from active farming and business... 'became the militant exponent and advocate of the interests of the abaca planters'... 'While in business and farming, Garchitorena, though not actually in active politics in the sense that he was a candidate for any elective office, made his influence felt in Bicolandia's politics...He was consulted, and his help was sought, in the selection and election of candidates...'. (Ency. vol.XVII, p.207-8.)

Senator Jose C. Locsin (Listed occupation -- Physician and Landowner). 'A prominent sugar planter... has son Domingo, 'a highly successful agriculturist who owns and manages large tracts of lands and fishponds in Capiz',...he also 'manages the President Roxas Rural Bank'. (S.O.D., 1954/50-51.)
Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino was President, Western Mindanao Lumber Co., Inc.; Mindanao Lumber Development Co., Inc. and G.E.A., Incorporated. He was Vice-Chairman, Bd. of Directors, Polytechnic Colleges of the Philippines; practicing Civil Engineer-Contractor, 1947-52; he was Director, Reinsurance Co. of the Orient; Bataan Pulp and Paper Mill, Co. Inc.; Music Corporation of the Philippines; Philippine Engineers Syndicate; Rico Finance Corporation. He was also former President, Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines; Chamber of Producers and Exporters, etc. (Mimeographed 'Curriculum Vitae'.)

Senator Fernando Lopez (Listed occupation -- Lawyer and Businessman). "Younger of two sons of Don Benito Lopez, former Iloilo governor... he took direct management of the vast Lopez [family] interests...
'The lawyer-businessman was appointed Iloilo City Mayor in 1945 by Pres. Sergio Osmeña. The vast family interests today include extensive sugar, coconut and rice plantations, sugar centrals, 4 TV Stations, 1 National newspaper, 23 radio stations, educational institution, insurance, real estate, banking, etc. (Who's Who, pp.163-5.)

Senator Cipriano P. Primicias (Listed occupation -- Lawyer). "Senator Primicias... is also a lawyer of note, an educator and an agriculturist". (S.O.D., 1954/77.)

Senator Eulogio Rodriguez (Listed occupation -- Businessman)
"Even while in politics, Rodriguez never abandoned his business ventures. He founded a family business enterprise in 1928: The Philippine Trading Company. In 1929, he organized an insurance company, the Luzon Surety Company, Inc., and in 1930 the Luzon Investment Company. He was one of the organizers of the National Life Insurance Company. Recently, he founded the Eulogio Rodriguez & Co., to handle his real estate holdings. In 1952, he organized the Rodriguez Rural Bank..." (S.O.D., 1954/92.)

Senator Oscar Ledesma (Listed occupation -- Lawyer). "He practiced law but devoted most of his time to the management of the vast family hacienda of sugarcane..." He became President of the Philippine Sugar Planters Association. (S.O.D., 1954/43.)
Representative Reynaldo P. Honrado (Listed occupation -- Lawyer). President: Crown Mines, Inc., and International Loan and Financing Corp. He is also Vice-Chairman Committee on Franchises. (H.O.D. 1958/183.)

Representative Sebastian C. Moll, Jr. (Listed occupation -- Mining Engineer). After graduating from the Colorado School of Mines, "he assisted his father in his vast business enterprises and in managing their mines... He belongs to one of the wealthiest families in Bicolandia". He is chairman, Committee on Mines. (H.O.D., 1946/73-74.)

Representative Manuel S. Enverga (Listed occupation -- Lawyer, Economist, Educator and Businessman). "Although he is busy with his duties as Congressman... he still finds time to attend to his varied activities as an educator and a businessman. As an educator, he is the founder and President of the Luzonian Colleges... and Professor of the Graduate School of the University of Sto Tomas;... As a businessman, he is the President of Quezon Development Bank, Luzon Broadcasting Co., Inc., and publisher, The Star of Southern Luzon (Newspaper)". He is a member, Committee on Banks, Currency & Corporations (H.O.D., 1962/208-9.)

Representative Francisco M. Lecaroz (Listed occupation -- Lawyer and Businessman). "Aside from practising the law profession, he manages his transportation business in Marinduque, the Lecaroz Transit and the Marinduque Transportation Company. He is Vice-Chairman, Committee on Transportation & Communication. (H.O.D., 1962/153-4.)

Representative Carlos M. Fortich (Listed occupation -- Rancher and Lumberman). "Considered as the "Political King and father of Bukidnon"... He is a rancher and is also engaged in the lumber business..." He is a member, Committee on Agriculture & Franchises. (H.O.D., 1962/57-58.)

Representative Tito M. Dupaya (Listed occupation -- Businessman). "A business executive, Congressman Dupaya manages and owns many enterprises. He owns the Lal-lo Ice Plant, the Lal-lo Rice Mill, the Lal-lo Transportation Company, and the Dupaya Trading. He is also the president of the Lal-lo Rural Bank. He is Chairman, Committee on Reparations. (H.O.D., 1962/63.)"
Representative Ramon M. Durano (Listed occupation -- Lawyer and Businessman). "Congressman Durano holds the degree of B.S. in Education and Bachelor of Laws. Well-known in business circles, he owns and operates one of the biggest coal mines in the province of Cebu". At one time, he was branch manager of the Cebu National Coconut Corporation. "Today he owns and operates an electric light and power plant, a truck and motor car assembly factory, a printing establishment, a real estate firm, and an insurance company". (H.O.D., 1962/84.)

Representative Juan S. Alano "He is a lawyer by profession and a planter by avocation". (H.O.D., 1946/31.)

Representative Pedro S. Baculio (Listed occupation -- Lawyer). "His father is a cattle king, copra producer and a farmer in Northern Mindanao...He fought against the two wealthiest and formidable political Big Wigs of that province, ex-Governor Pelaez and ex-Governor Borromeo". (H.O.D., 1946/38-39.)

Representative Remedios O. Fortich (Listed occupation -- Rancher, Businesswoman and Social Worker). "Hon. Remedios O. Fortich, widow of the late Congressman Carlos A.H. Fortich is at present the President and Manager of the Bukidnon Lumber Co. She is also a rancher". She is a member of the Committees on Agriculture and Cattle Industry. (H.O.D. 1946/56.)

Representative Maximino Noel (Listed occupation -- Planter, Businessman). "Congressman Noel is a planter and a businessman", He is a member of the Committee on Landed Estates (H.O.D., 1946/77-78.)

Representative William L. Chiongbian (Listed occupation -- Businessman-Rancher). "Congressman Chiongbian is a businessman and rancher by occupation. A shipping magnate, he is the President of the William Lines, Inc. and the Far East Fishing and Canning Corporation. He was voted "Shipping Man of the Year" by the Philippine Business Writer's Association in 1951... member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Banking Corporation and the Philippine Coconut Producers' Federation, Inc... owner of the Pangamuran Cattle Ranch in Zamboanga del Norte which is considered as one of the largest and most modern in the country today". He is a member, Committees on Banks, Transportation & Communications. (H.O.D., 1958/243-4.)
Representative Apolonio Marasigan (Listed occupation -- Businessman). "A successful business executive, his interests are numerous and diverse. He is in the copra trade, operates water and land transportation, has a gasoline station, and raises rice and coconuts in his vast landholdings". (H.O.D., 1962/47.)

Representative Jose B. Laurel, Jr. (Listed occupation -- Lawyer, Law Professor and Banker). "He is managing partner Laurel Law Office; Chairman of the Board, Philippine Laterite Corporation; Director of the Philippine Banking Corporation, Chairman of the Board, Lahi, Inc.," (H.O.D., 1962/50.)

Representative Eugenio Baltao (Listed occupation -- Lawyer, Farmer, and Businessman). "A lawyer by profession, he is a businessman-farmer by avocation...he is president of the Nueva Ecija Tobacco Growers Association. (H.O.D., 1962/182.)

Representative Vicente F. Gustilo Sr. (Listed occupation -- Physician and Planter). "Congressman Gustilo dedicated his time to sugar cane farming. He served as Vice-President of the National Federation of Sugar Planters and was also its Acting President for some time. Prior to his first election as Congressman, he was President of the Victorias Milling District Planters' Association, Inc..." (H.O.D., 1962/172.)

Representative Agustin M. Gatuslao (Listed occupation -- Lawyer). "A lawyer by profession and a sugar planter by avocation..." (H.O.D., 1962/176.)

Representative Miguel Cuenco (Listed occupation -- Lawyer). "Hon. Miguel Cuenco has been a member of the House of Representatives since 1931, with a brief interruption in 1946-1949... "Congressman Cuenco is also a businessman. He is the Vice-President of the Bisaya Land Transportation Company, Inc.,... engaged in bus transportation and shipping in the Visayas and Mindanao. He is the manager of the shipping department of the company. He is also an educator". (H.O.D. 1962/91-92.)
Representative Tereso Dumon (Listed occupation — Businessman and Labor Leader). "Congressman Dumon, who headed various business enterprises in Cebu, was cited as "Businessman of the Year" in 1954 by the Cebu Press Club. He was former president of Dumon Company, Mindanao Minerals, Inc., and Pacific Lines, Inc. He was also former vice-president Pan-Oriental Match Co., Inc., former assistant manager of Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. and Insular Navigation, Cebu. At present he is the vice president of Batyak, Inc. "Congressman Dumon was born...to Urbano Dumon, landowner and farmer..." (H.O.D., 1962/95-96.)

Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr. (Listed occupation — Business Executive). Son of a former President, he taught business administration at UP, FEU, and Ateneo. "In 1940, he was designated Attorney-in-Fact and Administrator of the properties of his illustrious father in Cebu (real estate and farming)... formerly President of both the Esso Coal Company (Cebu Coal Mining) and the Esso Agricultural Corporation (Agriculture). He became President of the Esso and Co. Inc. (real estate) in 1942. In 1946, he was President of the Essel Incorporated (Cebu agricultural development) and simultaneously President of the Cebu Heights Co., Inc. (Cebu real estate subdivision). "In 1948, Congressman Osmeña, Jr. became President of the De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc. (shipowners and agents) and later elected member, Board of Directors, Philippine Air Lines, Inc, in 1949. In 1950...he was elected member of the Boards of Directors of the Philippine National Bank and the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation [Government firms.] "Congressman Osmeña was Governor of Cebu (1951-55), Mayor of Cebu City (1955-57), Congressman (1957-61), Chairman, League of Provincial Governors and City Mayors of the Philippines (1957), and member of the National Executive Committee and the Five-man "Super-Committee" of the Nacionalista Party. (H.O.D., 1958/112-13.)
The above biographical sketches are self-explanatory. They illustrate the general character of the political elite's economic ties with the social structure. They also provide unmistakable evidence that the political elite, aside from the commanding power positions they hold, occupy dominating posts in the economic and social spheres which give them great rewards both in income and the deference necessary in maintaining their elite status.

**INCOME**

From the data on occupation presented above, it is to be expected that the political elite should be among those in the top-income bracket. The various sources of income, generally, are: salaries and allowances from public office, rent derived from property (agricultural lands, urban real estate, buildings, and others), private practice of law and other profession, business, dividends from shares of stocks, directorships in private corporations, and others.

As of 1963, the following were the official salaries received by top public officials: President -- ₱30,000; Vice-President -- ₱15,000; Senate President and Speaker of the House -- ₱16,000; Senators and Representatives -- ₱7,200; Chief Justice, Supreme Court -- ₱21,000;
Associate Justice, Supreme Court — ₱20,000; and
Department Secretaries (Cabinet members) — ₱12,000.
(These have recently been increased, with the increases ranging from 33 to nearly 300 per cent.)

The above official salaries of Philippine top public officials may not be high when compared to what their counterparts in other countries get, but in relation to the per capita income of the country, they are quite substantial. Furthermore, the lowest paid among them, the legislators, are actually getting very substantial sums in allowances in what are often dubbed as 'secret salaries'. One writer commented:

Over one-third of the ₱45.7 million or some ₱16 million goes exclusively into Congressmen's pockets in the form of constitutional and secret salaries. The quota in allowances for each law-maker is ₱150,000 or ₱15,000,000 in all for the 102 House members. Their pay according to the rate fixed by the constitution is ₱7,200 each a year...

31 A bill was passed by Congress in 1963 (effective after the tenure of the present crop of officials whose salaries are fixed by the Constitution) increasing the above salaries as follows: President, ₱30,000 to ₱48,000; Vice-President, ₱15,000 to ₱32,000; Senate President and Speaker of the House, ₱16,000 to 32,000; Senators and Representatives, ₱7,200 to ₱28,000; Chief Justice, Supreme Court, ₱20,000 to ₱28,000; Associate Justice, Supreme Court, ₱20,000 to ₱28,000; and Cabinet Secretary, ₱12,000 to ₱24,000. Cf. The Philippines Herald Magazine, May 25, 1963, pp.6-7.
All told, each House solon will get P157,200 this year, counting both the legal and the illegal salaries. No country in the world has been known to have rewarded its lawmakers so fabulously.  

There are, of course, the additional private sources of income that have been mentioned above. Indeed evidences available to the study indicate that the bulk of their income comes from sources other than their 'official' salaries. In connection with this point, the Free Press also noted that

In addition to their 'secret salaries' or allowances, Representatives and Senators get retainers if they are lawyers; others make a lot of money as industrialists, businessmen, franchise-holders hacenderos, bankers.

This observation is well borne-out by the findings of the GSPA survey previously cited. Table 4.11, derived by the writer from the raw data of this survey, shows the sources of income other than official salary and allowances.

The facts established by the sample survey reveal that not a single legislator depended on official income alone, and that Senators, on the average, have nearly three (2.8) other sources of income. The same is true for the Representatives (2.6 average). These varied sources of income also confirm the study's findings on the 'multiple' nature of elite economic activities.

A more concrete illustration of how much money the members of the political elite make is shown by the annual

### TABLE 4.11

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATORS, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME</th>
<th>SENATORS</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rentals (Real Estate and Buildings)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Salary of wife/other members of family</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Private Practice (Law)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other Profession</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shares or Stocks</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Business</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Others</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>284.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>260.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=19)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### AVERAGE NO. OF 'OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME'

- **SENATORS**: 2.8
- **REPRESENTATIVES**: 2.6

*Percentages exceed 100 because of overlaps.*
gross income of Senatorial candidates in 1963. Of the sixteen candidates of the two major parties (Nacionalista and Liberal Parties), four had annual personal gross incomes ranging from ₱100,000 to ₱465,000; eleven had incomes from ₱20,000 to ₱65,000; only one reported earning about ₱13,000. If we refer back to Table 3.4 in Chapter III (Distribution of Income), we note that only 1.1 per cent of all families in the Philippines receive incomes of ₱10,000 and above in 1960. Moreover, it must be added that the above were declared personal incomes for purposes of taxation and anyone conversant with the tax system in the Philippines and the major

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34 As a result of rampant charges of enrichment against politicians while in office, candidates were required, starting in 1963, to submit statements of annual incomes during the two years prior to an election with their certificates of candidacy.

35 Cf. Edward R. Kiunisala, 'Senatorial Candidates, Their Incomes and Income Tax', Philippines Free Press, September 21, 1963, p.5. We consider these sixteen as members of the political elite even if they were only candidates then because not one was really a 'new' face. Seven were re-electionist Senators, five were Cabinet members (three of whom were incumbents) and four were incumbent Representatives. In fact, all are included in the power group herein considered.
problems that plague it would know the implication of this. 36

STYLE OF LIVING

The members of the principalia class, as pointed out earlier, are noted for the luxury and conspicuousness of their consumption. The obvious danger of exhibiting too much of their affluence in a society that has millions of poor and underpaid workers and unemployed does not seem to deter them. Thus, Malcolm notes with alarm:

Irresponsibility in more devious forms is evidenced in extravagance in private life. It is manifested in costly mansions, cars, jewelry, and gowns. In my three visits to the Philippines after World War II, I have been increasingly astounded by the luxurious homes and the gay night life. Sitting in the lobby of the Manila Hotel I have observed with awe the elaborate parties attended by the elite...

If any of the fashionable cocktail circuit crowd ever viewed the Walled City's hovels or Tondo's teeming squalor, they were the exceptions. Indeed, all too few serious-

36 For instance, charges of flagrant tax evasion, tax avoidance, etc. are made against certain people and top public officials from time to time but apparently 'nothing happens'. See, for example, 'How much Does He Pay?' Philippine Free Press, April 20, 1963, p.1; 'The Diokno Question', Ibid., June 8, 1963, p.6; 'Vital Tax Reform', Ibid., March 23, 1963, p.7; 'Millions Lost in Tax Exemptions', Weekly Graphic, February 26, 1964, p.8-B.
minded Filipinos realize that the gulf between a rich minority and the poverty-stricken majority is widening. In their own thoughtless way, the expensive society people are helping the cause of subversion.  

There are numerous evidences of the high style of living among the elite. By direct observation, even the most casual observer cannot fail to see the distinctive kind of life and the 'different' world they live in. The national newspapers, too, report in great detail in the society pages, the exclusive circles they belong to, the kind of parties they give, the expensive clothes and personal adornments they wear, their local and foreign fashion designers, who just arrived and who are leaving on a world tour, the kind of weddings their children have, etc. More importantly, the papers also tell us who 'they' are. A Society editor, for instance, reports the wedding of a Senator's daughter:

37 George A. Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist (Serialized in The Manila Times, Vide September 27, 1957 issue, p.2.)

One familiar with Philippine history, of course, knows the numerous revolts and uprisings in the countrysides since Spanish times up to the present. (The peasant-based Huk uprising has not yet been totally crushed). Today, one reads of the periodic 'crime waves' in the urban centers, the more common 'solution' to the 'problem' however, is to increase the police forces and arm them with modern, high-powered weapons (such as the recently devised 'pistolized automatic carbine'), the employment by the rich of more personal bodyguards and private police, stiffer penalties for crimes against property and persons, higher walls and stronger steel bars in the homes of the rich, etc. (Cf., for instance, The Manila Times, September 7, 1963, p.1).
Amidst a setting of elegance and grandeur, J.P., eldest child of Senator and Mrs A.P. and E.R. Jr., were married... in Forbes Park, thus uniting two of Manila's most socially prominent families in what is generally described as 'a perfect match'... Josie's glittering diamond head-dress dazzled the eye. Her gown of off-white satin had an ovi cummerbund, its two heavily beaded side panels and ribbon-decorated center panel ending in a five-meter train much wider than the carpet laid along the church's center aisle... It was a solemn wedding, with Rufino Cardinal J. Santos officiating over the rites, a nuptial mass following afterwards.38

The 'dazzling diamond head-dress' was specially ordered for the wedding by the Senator's wife 'through her jeweller from Antwerp' and cost her P200,000.39

The couple had a three-month honeymoon around the world.40

Another politician's daughter, not to be outdone, had another 'wedding of the year'. 'Her wedding gown, flown in from Yves St Laurent of Paris, has floral appliques and lace ornamentation. A diamond tiara added sparkle to Minnie's bright countenance...etc.'41

The visit of the King and Queen of Thailand to the Philippines in 1963, for example, was a cause of great worry among many of high society's matrons. Their great problem, reported a woman columnist, was 'how they could out-dress and out-look Queen Sirikit'. There was a Senator's lady who in anticipation of the grand occasion, was reported to be 'ordering a special diamond tiara which promises to dim Queen Sirikit's world famous jewels'.

The affluence of Filipino politicians is shown by the gifts some of them give to their families. A ranking Congressional leader was reported to have given his family a custom-built Mercury car costing $(U.S.)30,000, while another 'powerful politician' gave as a Christmas gift to his son 'a small lot in Quezon City' (the 'small lot' costing $60,000).

In Bacolod City, where many of Negros sugar hacenderos reside, mansions and modern bungalows in the 'rich' areas stand in sharp contrast to the numerous rows of nipa huts and hovels in the 'poor' areas. In

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44 Ibid.
the streets, there is a direct contrast between wealthy matrons and old women (and children) beggars, the former getting off from shiny, brand-new cars to visit beauty parlors or do their shopping, the latter squatting in front of department stores and street corners with outstretched hands. 'In Bacolod', one observer writes, 'it is not surprising to see an average of three or four-car garages'.

It is not generally considered unusual to see a hacendero visiting his plantation in an air-conditioned Land-Rover, upholstered with airline-cushioned seats and complete with a transistorized stereo set. Nor is it considered fantastic anymore to find a marble-fitted bathroom, a TV set and an interphone in every room of the affluent Negrenses' house.

The social life of the elite is a continuous whirl of cocktail-parties, 'asaltos', bienvenida-despedida parties, fashion shows, 'merienda-cenas', 'charity-drives', mah-jong sessions, etc. There is always an excuse for such affairs: a welcome for a group of politicians' wives returning from abroad, a formal presentation of a young daughter to 'society', an asalto-birthday party for a top official wife, a 'Hawaiian' luncheon given by the

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46 Ibid.
Inner Wheel Club or the Zonta, a farewell to someone's children going to finishing schools in America or Europe, etc.

The residences of the political elite, like most of the wealthy families in the Philippines, are concentrated in the Metropolitan Manila area. Over 89 per cent of the Senators, for instance, and 82.8 per cent of the Representatives have residences in this area. (There is, of course, a significance to this and we shall explore this interesting aspect further when we shall discuss the elite's regional origins.) A cross-check with the Who's Who group (the Philippines' national elite) reveals that over 70 per cent have also their residences in Manila. Furthermore, the areas of residence between the two groups are notably similar, with the greatest concentration in the fashionable residential areas of Quezon City, San Juan Heights, Makati, etc.

Data also show that majority of the political elite have more than one residence: one usually in the province whence they come and another in Metropolitan Manila.

GSPA Survey, op. cit.
In addition, not a few of them have vacation houses in Baguio,48 where they stay at the most for about two or three months a year during the hot summer months, leaving them unoccupied under their caretakers throughout the rest of the year. The government continues to maintain the official vacation houses set up by the Americans during their rule: Mansion House—built for the American Governor-General is now the President's official vacation house; Government houses at Cabinet Hill for Cabinet members and at Justices Hill for the Justices. All these, like the privately-owned houses of the elite, are usually untenanted throughout the year and are just left under the caretakers.

Car ownership is a recognized status-symbol in the Philippines. Cars are very expensive owing to the very

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48 Baguio is a city up in the mountains of Benguet, Mountain Province. Located at a plateau about 5,000 feet above sea level, it has a dry, temperate climate (temperatures ranging between 45 degrees and 78 degrees throughout the year). The Americans finding the climate very suitable, proceeded to have government vacation houses built there where top officials could escape from the heat in Manila during the summer months. Soon, it came to be known as the 'summer capital' as most top government officials and the wealthy flocked there during summer. To this day, the practice has continued and the elite have built magnificent vacation homes there. Cf. Dean Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1921), Chapter XVII, 'Baguio and the Benguet Road', pp.449-487.
high import taxes levied on them. Consequently only few can afford them. In 1962, for instance, there were only about 100,000 cars in a population of 29.2 million or one car in 290 persons. However, the data on car ownership of the 48 legislators in the GSPA sample survey show that they own no less than 12 cars or an average of 2.6 cars each. (Some of them own other vehicles such as jeeps and Land Rovers.) Many of the cars they own are big and expensive American cars. One Senator owning eight cars, for example, had one Lincoln Continental, two Cadillacs, one Chrysler Imperial, one Oldsmobile Station Wagon and three others whose make the correspondent cannot correctly give 'since the Senator changes his cars quite often'.

**ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

Membership of the political elite in various voluntary organizations reflects the nature of their occupational activities, economic interests, cultural ties and social status.

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49 1962 *Statistical Handbook*, op. cit., Table 49, p. 83.
50 The Senator's private secretary.
51 The entries in the biographical data for this item were not sufficient to be quantified.
The professionals are mostly members of their respective professional organizations. The lawyers belong to the Bar Association or the Lawyers' League, the Physicians to the Medical Association or the Philippine Federation of Medical Practioners, etc. Some (especially the Representatives) are members or officers of professional associations in the provinces.

Some of the economic interest groups which claim membership among the political elite (including some of the professionals) are the National Federation of Sugar Planters, local planters associations, Tobacco Growers Association, Philippine Coconut Planters Association, Chamber of Producers and Exporters, Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Industries, Philippine Lumber Producers' Association, etc. This is of course in line with the

52 The officials of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines offer an interesting illustration of the close correlation between leadership in economic organizations and public leadership. Of eleven presidents of the CCP from 1945 to 1963, all have held high public office as follows: 3 -- Senators; 2 -- Cabinet members; 2 -- Central Bank Executives; 4 -- Executives of Government Corporations, Bureaus, or Agencies. (The CCP presidents from 1945-63 were: Gil J. Puyat, Aurelio Periquet, Sr., Antonio de las Alas, Teofilo D. Reyes, Sr., Cesar M. Lorenzo, Ben R. Medrano, Primitivo Lovina, Marcelo S. Balatbat, Gaudencio E. Antonino, Alfonso Calalang, and H.R. Reyes. Cf. Laureano Ma. Rivera, 'The CCP is Dynamic Champion of Filipino Businessmen', in a magazine entitled 7th National Convention of Filipino Businessmen, February 21-24, 1963, Baguio City.)
multiple character of occupations that have already been discussed. The sugar group, particularly, is very well represented with some of its top officers and representatives having occupied or are occupying seats in the Cabinet, Senate and the House of Representatives. Most knowledgeable Filipinos are familiar with the powerful 'sugar bloc' led by top Hacendero-politicians from Iloilo and Negros.

Membership in Catholic religious organizations is high, with the Knights of Columbus (headquarters in America) having the most number of members among them. Others which have some members from the Cabinet and Senate are Catholic Action, the Catholic Women's League and the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines. A few Cabinet members and Justices are also members of religious societies such as Holy Name Society and Apostleship of Prayer. A number of Cabinet members, Senators and Justices hold foreign decorations like the Gran Cruz de Isabel de Catolica (Spanish), Knight Commander of the Order of King Charles III (Spanish), Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem (Church), and the papal 'Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice'.

Other memberships in foreign-based organizations include the American Bar Association, Solidaridad
Filipino-Hispanico, Inc., Academia Española dela Lengua, Colegio de Abogados de Madrid, and various American universities' alumni associations. Among the civic organizations, the Rotary Club seems to be the most popular, followed by the Lions Club and the Jaycees.

It is, of course, good politics to be members of 'patriotic', 'service' and 'public policy' organizations like the Veterans groups, Anti-Communist League, Free Enterprise Society, Boy Scouts of the Philippines, Community Chest, Red Cross, Philippine Constitutional Association, Knights of Rizal, and others, and a number of the legislators particularly are affiliated with these organizations, mostly as officers or ranking members.

The high social status of members of the Philippine political elite is also indicated in their membership in prestigious golf and country clubs such as Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Manila Golf Club, Baguio Country Club, etc., in elite social clubs such as Casino Español, Club Filipino, Philippine Columbian, Kahirup, Mancommunidad, and similar exclusive clubs.

The total picture portrayed by these various associational memberships of the political elite suggests again their economic ties, their highly-westernized
outlook and foreign (mainly Spanish and American) attachment, their prestigious occupations, their superior social status and perhaps even their conservatism.

ETHNIC ORIGIN

One distinctive feature of the principalia class is the dominant mestizo element in its composition. In Chapter II, the traditionally dominant role of this mestizo group in Philippine history has been discussed. It has been shown how Spanish personnel of the colonial administration (and some members of the clergy, as many historians report) and Chinese merchants mixed racially with women belonging to the native principalia and which, through time, produced a mestizo class that can be distinguished from the bulk of the people not only by their physical features but also by their outlook, their socio-economic position and consequently, the dominant political roles they played. This group first became highly Hispanized and, later, very Americanized. They were the minority who spoke the Spanish language for instance, even in their homes and among themselves. The Chinese mestizo element particularly lost its attachment to Chinese culture, and developed instead a partly-European, partly-indio type of culture which has been referred to previously as the mestizo culture.
Today, the modern *principalia* continue to manifest this *mestizo* character which is a feature that distinguishes them from the masses of Filipinos of Malay stock. But while one notices this distinct division between the *principalia* and *non-principalia* on ethno-economic and political grounds, there seems to be widespread consciousness about it, particularly as it concerns the Chinese *mestizo* element.

The data provide confirmation of this hypothesis. Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon was a Spanish mestizo and was often referred to as the 'Kastila' (The Spaniard). Four of six postwar Presidents have either Chinese or Spanish racial strain. The two Vice-Presidents in the sample are *mestizos*, one Chinese and the present one, Spanish. Among the 1963 legislators surveyed, 68.4 per cent of the Senators and 51.7 per cent of the Representatives reported that they have either Malay-Chinese, Malay-Spanish, and Spanish-Chinese racial ancestry. (One Senator reported having Malay-German blood.)\(^\text{53}\) It should be noted that these are self-classifications by respondents (or their relatives and staff) and it is possible that the figures are, in fact, understated. (The writer noted

\(^{53}\text{GSPA Survey, op. cit.}\)
that some classifying themselves as of pure Malay stock have slant eyes or fair skin not characteristic of the Malay race).

They speak either Spanish or English, often even in their homes. Of the group in the above survey, for instance, 73.6 per cent of the Senators and 50 per cent of the Representatives spoke Spanish at home as a child; all of them now speak English. In contrast, only 2.1 per cent and 39.5 per cent of the population in 1960 can speak Spanish and English, respectively.\textsuperscript{54} Spanish and English continue to be among the three official languages (together with Tagalog).\textsuperscript{55} But Tagalog, while an official language, is seldom heard, for instance, in the deliberations of Congress.

REGIONAL ORIGIN

Another important clue to the social sources of Philippine top political leaders is the significant concentration of their places of birth in Manila and 18 provinces (out of 56) shown in red on the map (See

\textsuperscript{54} Cf. 1960 Census of the Philippines, 'Population and Housing', vol. II, p.16.

\textsuperscript{55} This policy of having three official languages was incorporated in the Philippine Constitution (Art XIV, Sec. 3).
map, Figure II). The red-shaded areas supplied the following top leaders from 1946 to 1963: 56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidents</td>
<td>5 of 6</td>
<td>(83.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Presidents</td>
<td>4 of 5</td>
<td>(80.0)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet members</td>
<td>48 of 59</td>
<td>(81.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senators and Speakers, House</td>
<td>44 of 59</td>
<td>(74.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justices of the Supreme Court</td>
<td>21 of 24</td>
<td>(87.5)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*As already mentioned, three of the Vice-Presidents later became Presidents; hence, for purposes of tabulation, they have been included among the six Presidents.

Representatives are excluded from the tabulation on regional origin for obvious reasons, but Speakers of the House who are selected not on regional considerations but on other criteria have been included.
TABLE 4.12  
PLACE OF ORIGIN OF TOP POLITICAL ELITE, 1946-63, 
BY REGIONS (NUMBER AND PER CENT)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=67</td>
<td>N=67</td>
<td>N=59</td>
<td>N=24</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRAL LUZON PROVINCES:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva</td>
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<td>EciJa, Pampanga, Pangasinan,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarlac, Zambales)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANILA &amp; TAGALOG PROVINCES:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Rizal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VISAYAN PROVINCES:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Capiz, Cebu, Iloilo, Negros</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occ., Leyte, Bohol)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN 3 REGIONS:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Manila &amp; 18 Provinces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Other Provinces Supplied:</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Provinces Supplied:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* 55 Senators from 1947-63; four Speakers, H.R.
** One unspecified.
*** Population in 1960: Manila and 18 provinces -- 49.9 per cent; 16 provinces -- 26.3 per cent; and 22 provinces supplying none -- 23.8 per cent.
FIGURE II
PLACE OF ORIGIN: THE PHILIPPINE ELITE

MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES

LEGEND
INTERNATIONAL TREATY LIMITS
PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

LEGEND:
- RED-SHAD PROVINCES
SUPPLIED:
79.4% of Political Elite
83.5% of WHO'S WHO Elite
85% of Manufacturing Elite
In Table 4.12 it can be seen that with the exception of the Senators and Speakers these over-represented areas supplied over four-fifths of all the top leaders from 1946 to 1963. The percentage for Senators and Speakers, while lower than the others, is nevertheless significant since, as a matter of practice, the existing major parties continue the old system of 'regional representation'.

Again, if the political elite is compared with the other elites, we notice (as in the colleges they attended) an extraordinary similarity in their places of origin. Of the 212 Who's Who notables that have been considered for comparison, 177 or 83.5 per cent came from exactly the same regions as the political elite. Data on regional origin of Carroll's top business leaders show that over 85 per cent of his 92 manufacturing

\[57\]

During the American regime, Senators were elected by 'Senatorial districts' of which there were 12 for the whole country. The present political 'divisions' implicitly accepted by both parties in the selection of their respective eight Senatorial candidates are: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Metropolitan Manila, Tagalog region, Bicol region, East Visayas, West Visayas, and Mindanao. In spite of this geographical representation, however, Senators are elected 'at large'. In other words, while the political parties continue to adhere to the fiction of 'geographical representation', the Senators elected continue to come mostly from the red-shaded regions. This is shown by the high percentage of representation (74.6 per cent) that these regions manifest.
entrepreneurs came also from the same red-shaded areas (less the provinces of Bataan, Pangasinan, Zambales and Leyte). Sixty-eight per cent originated from Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan. In other words, the places of origin of the business elite is even more concentrated. (See Table 4.13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMPARATIVE PLACES OF ORIGIN OF VARIOUS ELITES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANILA &amp; 18 RED-SHADEN PROVINCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLIED:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The present writer derived the percentage estimate from Carroll's 'index of representation'.

The same pattern is shown in the regional origin of top-level bureaucrats. In a study of higher civil servants, Francisco found that 67.5 per cent came from Manila and the surrounding provinces of Central and Southern Luzon and 16.6 per cent came from the Visayas.58

In short, 84.1 per cent of the 'higher civil servants' came from approximately the same areas while only 15.9 per cent came from the rest of the country.

This singularly unique pattern in the regional origin of most of those who become top leaders may be correlated with several factors.

First, these regions, having been the areas of earliest settlement by the Spaniards, became the centers of trade, education, communication and administration. Consequently, the members of the principalia who were within these centers had better opportunities than those in the more remote areas. Metropolitan Manila, particularly, became the hub of colonial administration both under the Spaniards and the Americans. As mentioned earlier, it has developed into the single metropolis that dominated the whole country and has become today, as then, the financial, commercial, manufacturing, educational and political center of the nation. Together

Cebu for example, was settled in 1565, Iloilo in 1580, Manila in 1571, Pampanga in 1572, etc. The others, prior to their becoming provinces much later, were parts of those which were settled earlier. Bataan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, for instance were parts of Pampanga; Capiz was part of Iloilo; Leyte and Bohol were parts of Cebu. Negros Occidental was part of Cebu and Iloilo, etc. (See, 'Geography, History & Climatology', 1918 Census of the Philippines, vol.I, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920).
with the surrounding provinces, it also contributed the majority of the business, *Who's Who*, and the political elite. That this is a continuing trend has been confirmed by data on residences. We found that most of those in the three groups we have studied have also their residences there.

The second factor is related to the land situation. It is not merely a coincidence that the provinces that produced the greatest number of leaders are those that have the highest concentration of land-ownership. Data has been presented that shows the strong landlord-element in the power group. The sugar barons of Iloilo and Negros and the landlords of Central Luzon, for example, have always been among the leaders within the governing class since colonial times. Conversely, it is also in most of these provinces where we find the highest degree of landlessness and tenancy (See Table 3.3, Chapter III).

A third factor is in line with the study's discussion on the mestizo character of the principalia class. The data presented in Chapter II show that these over-represented provinces are in fact the regions of high mestizo concentration, with Comyn's estimate of 90.2 per cent in 1810 for 14 of the 17 provinces and Census estimates of 61 per cent in 1903 and 66.5 per cent in 1948.60

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60 Vide Table 2.1, Chapter II, this study; *1903 Census*, vol. II, p. 210; *1948 Census*, vol. III, Part I, p. 383.
Finally, it is to be noted that many of these provinces are densely populated. However, their total population is less than one-half (49.9 per cent) of the Philippines total. On the other hand, the 38 other provinces, whose population is more than one-half of the whole population of the Philippines, supplied only 20.7 per cent of the total number of top public officials. Equally significant is the fact that 22 of these 38 provinces (population: 23.8 per cent) supplied none at all.

C. POLITICALLY DOMINANT FAMILIES

The study has so far treated the principalia class as a whole and has presented data to show that, like the old principalia, it continues to be politically dominant and has in fact contributed a major portion of the formal power-wielders during the period under study.

There are, however, families within the principalia class who are more politically active than others. These families have been aptly called 'political dynasties'.

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for the reason that they produce successions of political leaders, sometimes not only during two or three decades but, in numerous cases, even for generations. Furthermore, this political dominance is enhanced by intermarriage. Below are a few examples:

'Congressman Jose Cojuangco, Jr., comes from a family of politicians. His great grandfather [sic, actually grandfather] the late Melencio Cojuangco, was the first assemblyman of Tarlac. His father, Jose Cojuangco, Sr., was also a Congressman. Junior is the third generation legislator in his mother's family. His maternal grandfather, the late Juan Sumulong was a Senator; Senator Lorenzo Sumulong and former Congressman Francisco Sumulong are his mother's brothers'. (H.O.D., 1962/236.)

'Congressman Primicias Jr was born on April 17, 1931. His parents are Senate Majority Floor Leader Cipriano Primicias, Sr., and Nieves Benito'. His grandfather was 'one of the founders of Alcala, Pangasinan'. He was a former 'Alcalde'. (H.O.D., 1962/200 and survey.)

'Hon. Jose M. Laurel IV is the fourth generation solon in the Laurel family. He is the oldest son of former Speaker Jose B. Laurel Jr., and the grandson of former Senator Jose P. Laurel, Sr. His great grandfather, Judge Sotero Laurel, was a member of the Mololos Congress [1899] and Secretary of the Interior in the Aguinaldo Cabinet' (H.O.D., 1958/71.)

'The Lawenko clan is a political institution in this town of Albay, for Representative Lawenko's father was in politics since 1907 until he died in 1932'.
...His opponent is the scion of the wealthiest family of the first district of Albay...' (H.O.D., 1946/60)*

Representative Josefina B. Duran is the widow of the late Congressman Pio Duran... born in Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija, the youngest child of Vicente Belmonte, 'a political colossus of the town', and Julia de los Reyes. An elder brother, Gabriel, had been Representative and later Governor of the province. (Grandfather occupied a provincial post under the Spaniards) (H.O.D., 1962/37-38.)

'Politics... was not new to the Magalona family. His [Senator Enrique Magalona's] father, Vicente, and his uncle, Carlos, were the dominant figures in local politics during the Spanish time'.

'In five consecutive elections, Enrique Magalona was elected Rep. of First District of Negros Occidental...' (S.O.D., 1954/57.)

That this is a widespread phenomenon is shown by the fact that the study has identified 169 of these families found in every province of the Philippines and Manila. (The list of these politically dominant families appears in the Appendix.) Among these 169 families, there were 38 further affinal relationships (indicated by vertical lines and footnotes in the list). These families produced no less than 584 public officials

*The 'wealthy opponent', Lorenzo Ziga, was also a former Representative whose brother Venancio was Governor of the province while his sister-in-law (wife of the Governor) was former Representative, Cabinet member and, at the time of writing, a Senator. (Cf. H.O.D., 1957/45.)
or an average of 4.5 public officials per family. Moreover, among these public officials are 203 individuals, or 34.7 per cent, who occupied top public positions which we have considered as of elite category as follows: 7 Presidents, 2 Vice-Presidents, 15 Cabinet members, 42 Senators, 127 Representatives, and 10 Justices of the Supreme Court. (Many of these top officials held other posts, too, but only the highest position was considered. See Appendix. The others were Provincial Governors, Ambassadors, Ministers, Generals and other officers of the armed forces, other local elective and appointive officials, and those occupying appointive positions, in 'Executive Agencies'.

The nature of the relationships in these families may be consanguinal, affinal, or a combination of both. There are the male-line type which sometimes extend from a great-grandfather who was a cabeza de barangay, a gobernadorcillo, or a capitan -- all members of the caste-like principalia during Spanish times -- down to

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62 See Appendix. As indicated in the footnote of the list, the number of public officials mentioned represent only those who have been identified from data available to the study. There may be more.
63 Included is one who served during the Japanese occupation.
the great grandson who, just fresh from school, has already been 'prevailed upon by the masses' to serve them. These types, by their nature, may span through several generations and are most apparent among the long-established members of the traditional **principalia**. Variations are the father-brother-son, father and son (or sons), or just the brothers types. Examples of the male-line type are the Cojuangcos of Tarlac, the Sumulong and Rodriguezes of Rizal, the Laurels of Batangas, the Priniciases of Pangasinan, the Osmeñas of Cebu, the Qurinos of Ilocos Sur, the Magsaysays of Zambales, the Montanos of Cavite, the Fuentebellas of Camarines Sur, etc. This type is the most numerous and may be found in practically every province.

Then there are the affinal types of relations; two politically dominant families from the same province 'merge' when members of their families marry. This results sometimes in a situation where, instead of two different families competing for political supremacy in a province, the contest becomes an intra-family quarrel e.g., the Paredes-Valera contest in Abra, the Abeleda family's feud in Mindoro Occidental, and others. Other examples of political merges within the province through marriage are those of Fornier-Villaverts of Antique,
the Lopes-Ledesmas of Iloilo the Romualdez-Velosos of Leyte, the Locsin-Montelibanos of Negros Occidental, the Liboro-Abeledas of Occidental Mindoro, the Cojuangco-Aquinos of Tarlac the Ututalum-Abubakar-Rasuls of Sulu, etc. Unions of political families from two different provinces also occur such as those of the Paredes-Clarins (Abra-Bohol) Belmonte-Durans (Nueva Ecija-Albay), Fortich-de Laras (Bukidnon-Misamis Oriental), Lecaros-Marasigan (Marinduque-Batangas), Marcos-Romualdezes (Ilocos Norte-Leyte), Rodriguez-Magsaysays (Rizal-Zambales) Cojuangco-Sumulongos (Tarlac-Rizal), Padilla-delas Alas (Rizal-Batangas), etc.

An interesting development in recent years is the husband-wife team. There are, for instance, (at the time of writing) several of these husband-wife teams occupying top public offices at the same time. Examples are the Zigas of Albay (wife -- Senator, husband -- Representative); the Forniers of Antique (wife -- Governor, husband -- Representative); the Duranos of Cebu (wife -- City Mayor, husband -- Representative); the Crisologos of Ilocos Sur (wife -- Governor, husband -- Representative); and the Nepomucenos of Pampanga (wife -- Representative, husband -- Governor). Cases of wives taking over their husbands' elective positions immediately after the latters'
death are not unusual. Finally, there are also cases of in-law teams such as a father-in-law, son-in-law team in the Senate (Rodriguez-Magsaysay), and even a mother-in-law (Governor), son-in-law (Representative) combination (Serra Ty-Pimentel).

There is one important feature of this family dynasty system that needs to be pointed out. Looking at the various positions of the members of these 'political dynasties', it will be noted that they can be generally categorized into two: on the higher level are the top public positions which have been previously considered as of elite-category and, on the lower level, those that fall mostly under the 'pre-elite' posts which we have noted in Tables 4.3 and 4.3-A. The implication of this is that the younger members of the family are now in precisely the same posts occupied by their elders before reaching top public positions and that under 'normal conditions' and, in due time, they should be able to follow their footsteps, thereby ensuring the continuity of the family's political dominance.

D. RESUMÉ

The problem that was presented in the beginning of the chapter revolved around the nature and character of
political leadership in the Philippines. Who are the power-holders? Are there distinct social formations from which they are drawn? What common characteristics do the political elite have?

The empirical data and other evidence presented above provide documentation to the main proposition that the principalia-type of leadership which developed during the colonial period has not materially changed; that today's power-wielders continue to be drawn predominantly from the socio-economic dominants in the community, the group designated as the modern principalia.

The career pattern and recruitment of the political elite clearly indicate that there had been no new type of leadership that emerged since 1946. The new leaders continue to manifest the same social class characteristics as the old principalia.

Their superior level of education, the exclusive nature of the colleges they attended in the Philippines and their schooling abroad, the high-status character of their occupation, their high income, style of living, associational memberships, etc. -- all suggest their membership to the small upper strata minority.

The limited nature of the social area of recruitment has also produced a dynastic sort of political elite
in the form of family political monopolies. Although these 'family dynasties' may be said to have been produced by formal procedures sanctioned by the democratic political formulas (i.e., elections, appointments of relatives, etc.) the hereditary nature of these 'successions' are the telling symptoms of the existence of an oligarchical system.

The Philippine political elite, we also noted, are not only political decision-makers. From their ranks are found landowners, bankers, shipping and land transportation magnates, owners of newspapers, TV and radio stations, owner-operators of private universities, colleges and other educational institutions, industrialists, directors of private corporations, importer-exporters, timber concessionaires, owner-operators of public utilities, government franchise-holders, lawyers and big corporations (both Filipino and foreign), and other high-income professionals. Socially, they belong to the most prestigious and exclusive organizations. Membership in 'service' and 'public policy' associations provides them with further avenues for social leadership.
The above illustrate the ties of the political elite with the social structure. They also show that the nature of their leadership is not merely 'political'. Power, wealth and prestige tend to merge in the same hands.
CHAPTER V

THE ART OF KEEPING POWER: THE ELITE IN POLITICS

...the electoral contest takes place between organized minorities controlling the disorganized majority of voters, who may choose between a small number of candidates presented by those minorities.

Gaetano Mosca

This chapter examines the nature of Philippine political parties, and the methods employed by the elite in politics. How is elite dominance in the socio-economic structure reflected in political organizations? How is the blending of democratic 'political formulas' with the existing norms, as influenced by traditional practices and the class system, manifested in elite political techniques and behavior? Finally, how do the elite make use of their general superiority over the masses in politics?

A. THE NATURE OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

THE HERITAGE OF THE PAST

In order to understand better the present nature of Philippine political parties, it is necessary to sketch briefly some of their important features as they developed in the past. For this purpose, a diagram which shows the beginnings and development of political organizations is presented in Figure III to supplement the discussion which follows.

On the left half of Figure III is shown the development of Philippine political parties from 1900 to 1941. A few features in the diagram need further explanation.

The first feature that should be noted is that the political parties or factions that developed had one common beginning: the principalia group which, as was previously noted, comprised the ruling class under the Spaniards. The first formal political party, the Federalista Party, organized in 1900 under the auspices of the American authorities, has already been discussed in Chapter II. This party, as was pointed out, was the only one legally recognized and allowed to exist by the colonial authorities up to 1906 and its composition was predominantly upper class. The elements who leaned
FIGURE III

PHILIPPINE POLITICAL GROUPS AND PARTIES, 1896-1963

1896

CABANAN
(Mass Revolutionary Society)

SPANISH COLONIAL AIM.

1898

PHIL. REVOLUTIONARY GVT.

CABANAN OR PRINCIPALES

1900

Radicals
(Irrationalists)

Conservatives
(Pacificos)

AMERICAN COLONIAL AIM.

1903

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Quimungan)

Partido Liberal
(Quimungan)

1906

Partido Nacionalista
(Queson)

1917

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Queson Faction)

1919

Partido Liberal
(Queson)

1921

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Queson Faction)

1923

Partido Democratico
(Queson)

1924

NACIONALISTA CONSOLIDADO
(Queson)

1928

Communist Party

1930

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Queson)

1931

Partido Democratico
Disolved

1933

Socialist Party

1934

NACIONALISTA LIBERAL PARTY
(Queson)

1936

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Queson-Qimungan Faction)

1938

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Queson-Qimungan Faction)

1941

NACIONALISTA PARTY

1942-1945

JAPANESE OCCUPATION

1946

PHILIPPINE REPUBLIK

1946

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Liberal Wing - Quimungan faction)

1947

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(LIBERAL PARTY)

1949

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(LIBERAL PARTY)

1951

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(CITIZEN'S PARTY)

1953

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(CITIZEN'S PARTY)

1955

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(Ramos-Quimungan faction)

1957

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(LIBERAL PARTY)

1959

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(LIBERAL PARTY)

1961

NACIONALISTA PARTY
(LIBERAL PARTY)

1963

LABOR PARTY

SOURCES:


Dapang Liang, The Development of Philippine Political Parties, (Hongkong South China Morning Post, 1939).


towards the masses, the radicals or irreconcilables as they were called, who demanded complete and immediate independence did not prosper. The parties or organizations they formed such as the first Nacionalista Party (1901) of Poblete, Gomez, and Alvarez, the Union Obrera (or Workers Union, a militant labor organization formed in 1902 by Don Isabelo de los Reyes and later continued by Dr Dominador Gomez) and the Republican Party (1905) of Gregorio Aglipay, the Bishop of the Revolutionary Government who seceded from the Roman Church, were all banned.\(^2\) Other parties, which mildly hinted on independence as a remote goal such as the Partido Liberal and the Partido Democrata were also short-lived. Also, as previously mentioned, the Federalistas had practically a monopoly of public positions open to Filipinos up to 1906 and it was only then that the second Nacionalista Party was allowed to be formed. Like the Federalista, the new party was also composed of members of the principalia. From its political victory over the

Federalistas in the 1907 election, until the grant of political independence by the Americans in 1946, the Nacionalista Party reigned supreme. Thus, opposition and ruling parties belonged to the same socio-economic group.

A second feature is the looseness of party affiliation or identity. As can be seen from the diagram, there was a continual factional break-up, fusion or consolidation, then division again, until all these were resolved by the establishment of a one-party system in 1935 under Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon, whose personal dominance in governmental and party affairs aptly earned him the title of 'supreme leader' or El Supremo. This pattern demonstrates that although the Nacionalista Party assumed several forms during a generation of continued political dominance, the 'parties' that emerged were really factions formed by certain defecting leaders with their respective personal 'followers'.

A third feature, related to the second, is that the break-ups or divisions were mainly due to personal rivalries for party dominance between top leaders or personal revolts against the leadership. Sandiko's

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3 For a full discussion of this interesting period, see Hayden, op. cit., chapter VII, 'One-Party Government'.

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secession from the Nacionalista Party in 1914 and his merger with the Progresistas was a revolt against the 'oligarchy dominated by Speaker Osmeña,' which was 'subservient to the Americans.' Also, as mentioned in Chapter II, the break-up of the Nacionalista Party into two factions in 1921 was brought about by the personal rivalry of Osmeña and Quezon, the former advocating leadership by a single person (unipersonalista), and the latter (and challenger) wanting collective (colectivista) leadership. They merged again in 1924 under the Nacionalista Consolidado, with Quezon emerging as the dominant figure, only to break up again in 1933 into two factions of Antis (a group led by Quezon which was against the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law) and the Pros (led by Osmeña which was in favor). The electoral triumph of Quezon's faction in 1934 followed by the 'coalition' of his group with Osmeñistas on June 16, 1935, produced the one-party system which endured until independence in

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4 Hayden, Ibid., p.322.
5 That the break-up was due to personal rivalry rather than to differences in principle was demonstrated by the fact that the Antis, who triumphed in the factional fight, succeeded in having the Tydings-McDuffie (Independence) Act passed by the U.S. Congress, which was essentially the same as the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act to which they objected. Cf. M.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p.151; Hayden, Ibid., p.362.
1946. There were no genuine differences of political principles among the contending political figures who struggled for power. The political 'parties' were essentially aggregations of men who held identical views on basic social, economic and political problems. They were parties of the 'haves' who came from the same social class, who had the same stakes in the status quo, and who represented the same interests. This condition explains the paucity of real and basic issues in Philippine politics which persists to this day. As one Filipino political scientist had correctly observed, 'the working issues and conflicts in Filipino politics are the intramural problems and differences which arise among men who understand one another, because they come from the same social class and, therefore, regard the problems of politics from the same vantage point in the social structure'.

A final feature that needs emphasizing is that no working class (or counter-elite) political groups or parties were able to prosper. The precedent established by the colonial authorities in the suppression of the Union Obrera during the early years of occupation was

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continued and it is manifested in various forms to this day. It seems that what Merton calls a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' is true in this case. Labor, in the eyes of the elite, was closely associated with sedition and must be carefully watched. Because of this, labor in fact became seditious. Labor groups, whether composed of the peasantry or urban workers, were always watched with suspicion whenever they formed political associations designed to promote their members' interests through collective action. The standard elite defense was that these were 'subversive' groups whose aims were inimical to 'national interests'. The American authorities and the elite felt that they had valid reasons for the violent suppression of mass organizations or parties such as the Colorums, the Tangulans, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the Sakdalista Party, for these groups had indeed staged uprisings or had engaged in

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7 After declaring the first recorded strike in the country against the Fabrica de Tabacos in 1902, Don Isabelo de los Reyes was jailed for four months for 'sedition'. Dr Gomez, who succeeded de los Reyes as leader of the Union Obrera was also prosecuted after the Labor Day parade in 1903 for 'sedition' and for 'organizing an illicit, subversive and illegal association'. Cf. Department of Labor, Fact-Finding Survey of Agrarian Problems in the Philippines (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1937), p.80; 'State of the Unions', The Manila Chronicle, May 1, 1958.
rebellious activities at various times. The evidence, however, seems to indicate that these groups may have been 'goaded into ferocity by despair'. Although the authorities often attributed these happenings to 'religious fanaticism' (e.g. the Colorum and Tangulan uprisings) or to alien-oriented agitators (e.g. Socialists, Communists, and Sakdalistas) who wanted to subvert the 'democratic' order, the disturbances were in fact rebellion against real and existing social injustices. One American observer, for instance, wrote in connection with the Tayug uprising: 'I doubt...if you could find ten Americans in the Islands who do not believe that the poor peasants who rose against constituted authority at Tayug were rebelling chiefly against "caciquism", agrarian oppression and Constabulary abuses.' Indeed,

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there was utter neglect of their interests and welfare by those in the government. As Hayden noted in connection with the Sakdal uprising, 'nothing could more clearly suggest the chasm between the classes in the Philippines, or the danger of revolt that is faced by the minority of 'haves' that rule the majority of have nots'.

There were also cases of denials of basic guarantees provided by the 'bill of rights' involving freedom of association and the exercise of civil rights, such as the refusal by the authorities to grant permits for public meetings, denial of the use of insular mails, and even the use of violence by landlords in preventing their tenants from joining organizations of their own choosing.

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10 J.R. Hayden, Ibid., p.391.
11 Cf. Hayden, Ibid., p.393; also People of the Philippines vs. Crisanto Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos, 57 Philippine 372-5.
12 During the turbulent thirties, the authorities kept a constant watch on known 'dissidents' and those suspected of receiving subversive literature from abroad were barred from the use of insular mails. Cf. The New York Times, March 27, 1930; Hayden, Ibid., p.383.
13 Kurihara, for instance, noted that there were occasions in the 1930's when tenants who became members of the Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra (AMT) and the Socialist Party were found dead, 'murdered in cold blood' by private guards of sugar centrals or by the police. (See Kenneth Kurihara, Labor in the Philippine Economy, op. cit., p.28.) Luis Taruc one of the leaders of the AMT and the postwar Huk rebellion, also complained: 'When the landlords heard
these circumstances, it was extremely difficult for a peaceful and legal non-elite political opposition to develop. These unfortunate developments led to disaffection and dissidence which continued in some parts of Central Luzon up to the present time. It has also resulted in the virtual monopoly of 'legal' competition for political power by the parties of the elite.

**POSTWAR POLITICAL PARTIES**

*Common Origin and Factional Divisions.* The postwar development of political parties has generally followed the prewar pattern. As can be seen on the right half of Figure III, there was only one 'mother' party from which they emerged: the prewar Nacionalista Party led by President Osmeña. The same looseness and flexibility

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13 (Continued) of their tenants joining the AMT, they tried intimidation, threatening to evict them. Some tenants bowed to such pressure, losing sight of their rights in their anxiety to provide for their families. Others who were more militant refused to be evicted and called for help from the AMT. Then a strike of all the landlord's tenants would protest the eviction. The landlords called the Philippine Constabulary to carry out the eviction or used their own private armies, such as the special police of the Baluyots, one of the biggest landowning families and an old political power in the province. When we had to, we fought the Special Police and the PC.' (Luis M. Taruc, *Born of the People,* New York: International Publishers, 1953, p.39.)

14 Quezon died in New York in 1944 while head of the Philippine government in-exile, leaving Osmena at the helm of the Commonwealth Government.
of membership and practically the same reasons for factional divisions were evident. The pattern was started in the postwar period by President Manuel Roxas when, as Senate President, he challenged President Osmeña's leadership, formed his own faction — the 'Liberal Wing' of the Nacionalista Party — and ran for the Presidency against the latter in the first postwar election held in April 1946. Roxas won.

In 1949, a year after Vice-President Elpidio Quirino took over from President Manuel Roxas, the new Liberal Party (the former 'Liberal Wing' of the NP) was split into two factions. Senate President Jose Avelino, who was late Roxas' campaign manager in 1946 and who by 1949 was in control of the Liberal Party machinery wanted to challenge Quirino for the presidential nomination. But President Quirino was decided on running for re-election. It seemed that it was because of this challenge that Quirino ordered an investigation of Avelino's conduct. Avelino was ousted from the Senate Presidency, was charged with 'anomalies' in connection with the beer and other

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15 President Manuel Roxas died of a heart attack on April 15, 1948, in the U.S. Clark Air Force Base in Pampanga.
scandals 'from which it is believed, he profited a huge sum'. Avelino's reaction to this investigation is interesting:

Why did you have to order an investigation, Honorable Mr President? If you cannot permit abuses you must at least tolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in reality we are not? We are not angels. And besides when we die, we all go to hell.18

Avelino abandoned the Liberal Party and formed his own Liberal Party which was called the LP 'Avelino Wing'. (See Figure III.) He ran for President but lost to Quirino. After the elections, Quirino and Avelino were reconciled. In the so-called 'Union Club Entente', the two were reported to have patched up their quarrel, Quirino agreeing to have Avelino's suspension from the Senate lifted (he was found guilty of the above mentioned charges and suspended for one year) on condition that the 'Avelino Wing' Senators (Emiliano Trio Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Vicente J. Francisco and Avelino) would vote for the proclamation of Quirino and Lopez in the Senate. (It should be noted that the NP at this time

was reported to be planning to block Quirino's proclamation as President owing to the wholesale frauds and terrorism perpetrated by the Liberal Party during the 1949 Presidential elections.) There seems to be substance to this reported agreement as was shown by the fact that Avelino's suspension from the Senate was indeed lifted, he and the other Avelinistas in the Senate voted for the proclamation of Quirino and Lopez, and he and his wife left for Europe and America on a pleasure trip, and President Quirino made a formal announcement that Avelino was travelling as his (Quirino's) personal envoy abroad.

Up to 1953, the Liberal Party was in power. But the local elections in November of 1951, however, reflected a change in the political wind. Official corruption had

19 Alip, op. cit., pp.346-7. Many observers believe that this was one of the worst in post-war Philippine elections. In several provinces, the number of registered voters exceeded the population. Violence and terrorism were rampant. The Commission on Election figures on the number of voters, for instance, showed that the registered voters in 1949 exceeded the 1951 registered voters by 477,917. (1949 = 5,231,224; 1951 = 4,754,307.) In a personal interview, Commission on Elections officials informed the writer that many registration lists in the provinces of Lanao, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Cavite, and others 'were padded, ballot boxes were lost, voters were coerced, and many killings were reported'.

20 Alip, ibid.
grown to enormous proportions. Describing this period, Sol H. Gwekoh, biographer of Philippine Presidents wrote:

The Liberal party had its heyday during the terms of Roxas and Quirino from 1946 to 1953. But the exercise of that power was horribly misused and terribly abused by certain party men with the commission of wholesale and flagrant election frauds, political terrorism, violence, maladministration, etc. These abuses were highlighted by the infamous Chinese immigration quota scandal in which senators, congressmen, Malacanang officials and other influence peddlers exacted from ₱2,000 to ₱5,000 from every Chinese immigrant; the equally infamous racket concerning the deportation of Chinese Communists in which top suspects shelled out as high as ₱200,000 each; the racket involving 27,000 overstaying Chinese which continued to be the source of some powerful official's tong money and electoral campaign funds; the ₱5,000-bed installed in Malacanang by a Liberal administration; the import control, and the scandalous Tambubong real estate deal.

Quoting from a news item, Gwekoh continued:

Stories were told of big parties given by graft-made individuals whose guests included the so-called best people: high society, dignitaries of the church, and prominent public officials. The high and mighty enjoyed their hospitality and food and wine and small talk, and the grafters were in turn invited and accepted as guests in the best homes. Even the best people betrayed no sign of condemnation; on the contrary, they showed implied approval.21

By 1952 Quirino's own Defense Secretary, Ramon Magsaysay (LP Representative from Zambales), started to criticize the administration. On February 28, 1953, he resigned from the Liberal Party and joined the Nacionalista Party, which promptly made him their Presidential standard bearer in the November 1953 elections. Other defections followed. Ambassador Carlos Romulo, recalled from the U.N. by President Quirino to deliver the key-note address at the LP convention, presented himself instead as a candidate for the presidential nomination during the convention. He was, however, dissatisfied with the proceedings and walked out.\footnote{Romulo wanted a secret ballot but the motion was lost. Cf. Hartendorp, \textit{op. cit.}, p.284.}

Vice-President Fernando Lopez, the LP running-mate of President Quirino in the 1949 elections also abandoned the LP and with Romulo formed the Democratic Party. Under this banner, Romulo ran for President and Lopez for Vice-President, but several months later both withdrew and joined the NP against the Liberals. The Liberal Party continued to be racked with disension. In a speech before the ruling hierarchy of the LP on February 25, 1953, President Quirino showed his concern on this development. He said:
...we lose ourselves in mutual recriminations, in internal squabbles, in political or partisan or sectional differences that are distracting us and allowing the Opposition to capitalize on them. They are small differences -- not fundamental ones. In Cebu for instance, Osmeña would like to dominate the province. Cuenco objects. In Leyte Torres says, 'Well, we are Quirinistas. We should lead the policy of the administration because we won in the last election'. Ribo, the Avelinista, says, 'No, we have already combined ourselves. Let us get together, pull together'. In Pampanga, we have two rival colossi -- David and Baluyut. What shall we do? Their differences are not fundamental. Party principle or questions are not involved. They revolve around leadership. They are jockeying for influence, for power, in order to win recognition as the leader of the province and eventually of the nation.23

The Liberal Party lost the elections and the NP ruled until 1961. The sudden death of Magsaysay in a plane crash in Cebu in 1957, however, produced some side-effects in party alignments. The young men who surrounded Magsaysay, became disenchanted with the NP and the new President (Garcia) and seceded from the Party, forming the Progressive Party of the Philippines.24 By this time, Senators Recto and Tanada had also broken away from the NP and formed the Nationalist-Citizens Party,

24 Founded by Manuel Manahan, Magsaysay's former Customs Commissioner, who ran for President in the 1957 elections.
only to 'coalesce' again with the NP in 1959. The Progressive Party was joined by disenchanted Liberals and Nacionalistas, and they formed the 'Grand Alliance' (See Figure III). But the 'Alliance' failed to make much headway in the 1959 elections and in 1961 they joined the Liberal Party. The electoral victory of the Liberals in the 1961 elections had interesting results. Just a few months after the elections, a number of Nacionalista Congressmen formed a group called the 'Allied Majority' which joined the Liberals. Later their followers in the provinces were defecting 'en masse' to the Liberals. In 1963, political manoeuverings were already being made for the 1965 Presidential elections. Vice-President Pelaez, a probable LP contender for the Presidency, was implicated by his own party in the Stonehill scandal. He resigned from the LP and joined the NP in 1963. Senate President Marcos another contender for the presidential nomination, also broke with President


26 For example, in Davao, 1,000 NP followers became LP men; Batangas, 500; Surigao, 1,200; Zambales, 3,000; Surigao, 1,200; Abra, 1,000. Vide, Manila Chronicle (Provincial Department), issues of 1962: October 4, 10, 14; November 19, 26, 27; and December 2.

27 This interesting event will be discussed in the last section.
Macapagal who signified his intention to get the nomination himself. Some of the 'Grand Alliance' members have also broken from the LP and were contemplating on establishing a new 'Third Force'.

**Failure of Labor or Mass Parties.** There were two instances in the postwar period when peasant and labor groups attempted to compete directly for political power but in both instances they failed.

The first occasion was the organization of the Democratic Alliance in 1945. The circumstances leading to the formation of this political group are significant and warrant special consideration for they indicated a deviation, even only for a brief period, from traditional elite political aggrupations. Its eventual disintegration, however, demonstrated the problems encountered by the non-elite in attempting to share political power with the elite. It also showed the strength of the traditionally-established forces.

There had been two important developments occasioned by the war and the Japanese occupation of the Philippines which were directly linked with the formation of the

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28 At the time of writing, Senate President Marcos, Liberal Party President up to 1964, was running for the presidency as the official candidate of the **Nacionalista** Party.
Democratic Alliance. One was the problem of 'collaboration' with the Japanese and the other was the 'peace and order' problem brought about by the emergence of an armed guerrilla peasantry during the Japanese occupation.

As is usually the case, the dominant political elements generally collaborate with a victorious regime, whether domestic or foreign, in order to maintain their dominant positions and to safeguard their interests. This has already been demonstrated in the study's discussion of the principalia's role under the Spaniards, the 'support' that the leading members gave to the Philippine Revolution when it showed signs of success, their hasty abandonment of the same when it faced imminent defeat, and the enthusiastic collaboration they gave to the American colonial regime. The only probable exception to this is when a new regime unmistakably shows its hostility to elite interests, when it threatens to dispossess them or reduce their privileges and influence; in which case, they resist by force or other means in the name of 'patriotism' or some other slogans that appeal to, and can arouse the support of, the masses.

The Japanese military regime, while harsh, was not basically hostile to the elite. It was no surprise,
therefore, that many of the elite collaborated with the Japanese. One Congressman, for instance, claimed that '17 of the 22 surviving senators and 60 of the 88 surviving members of the House had been collaborators "like himself"'.

But there were also resistance groups who fought the Japanese throughout the occupation. Among these was a peasant-based guerrilla army, the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or the People's Army Against the Japanese) which was led by the Commonwealth-discredited Socialist and Communist leaders. Aside from fighting the Japanese, the Hukbalahap also organized local governments in Central and Southern Luzon.

This development, therefore, threatened to disrupt the traditional landlord dominance in these areas. Furthermore, the war had created the opportunity for the discontented peasantry in Central Luzon to settle old scores. Although they looked upon the Japanese invaders as their immediate enemy, they probably had not forgotten the years of exploitation and oppression they suffered

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30 They organized the BUDC barrio councils and municipal governments. By war's end, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Laguna had Huk provincial governors. See Taruc, op. cit., p.152.
under their landlords. This was complicated by the fact that many of the landlords collaborated with the Japanese and 'they became in the eyes of the tenants not only the exploiters of the masses but also traitors to their country'. Kidnappings, confiscation of property, and killings were reported. The reckoning came swiftly. Many of the landlords sought sanctuary in Manila or elsewhere and the peasants were left masters of the countrysides.

When the Americans returned in 1945, they found these local governments set up by the Huks in Central and Southern Luzon. The American military under General MacArthur and the Commonwealth government of Osmeña faced a dilemma. What was to be done with the collaborators? What about the left-wing-led peasant guerrillas?

It should be noted that there was a clear-cut Washington policy on Japanese collaborators and it was that 'those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political

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31 Claude A. Buss, 'Introduction' in Shirley Jenkins, American Economic Policy Towards the Philippines, op. cit., p. 5.
and economic life of the country'. Clearly, this official Washington policy was difficult to carry out. There were several factors that tended to work against it. The first was that if 'those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country', it would have meant a major disturbance of the prewar status quo for, as already mentioned, many of the elite collaborated with the Japanese. This would have caused some considerable rearrangement in the power structure. The second was that some of those who collaborated were personally close to General MacArthur. President Manuel Roxas, for example, was one of his aides in Corregidor with the rank of Brigadier-General. President Osmena, too, was in a similar situation. Most of those who served under the Japanese belong to his Nacionalista Party and some were also very close to him. To carry out Roosevelt's policy strictly, therefore, would mean the destruction of his own Party. A third factor was the de facto control by the peasant Huk guerrillas of large areas in Central and Southern Luzon.

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33 Official policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress on collaborators, quoted in Abaya, op. cit., pp.67-8.
Even if they fought the Japanese and the landlords who collaborated with the Japanese, still they were led by left-wing elements. Were they also going to be 'rewarded' for their resistance activities as promised by MacArthur and Osmena during the Leyte landing? Or even tolerated? In order to understand what happened next, the political variables that interacted must be clearly identified. There was the official American policy emanating from Washington which decreed what was to be done with collaborators; there were the non-official American business interests in the Philippines whose stakes were in the return of a prewar status quo; there were the landlord-vested interest groups whose dominant positions in the political and economic life of the country were threatened not only by a leftist-led armed peasantry

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34 Cf. Abaya, ibid., pp.54, 219. The Editor of the American Chamber of Commerce Journal wrote: 'The Huks claimed to have fought no less than 1,200 separate engagements with the Japanese and units of the Japanese-organized Constabulary which were sent against them, killing over 30,000 Japanese and perhaps 1,000 constabulary men. To some extent in 1942, and very fully in 1943 and 1944, they played a large part in preventing Japanese seizure of the rice harvests in Central Luzon. By 1944 they controlled large areas and set up a number of local governments. They saved the lives of a number of American airmen forced down in their territory, among them Colonel Atkinson, and the areas they controlled became places of refuge for hunted men in Manila.' A.V.H. Hartendorp, op. cit., pp.137-8.
but also by official U.S. policy, brought about by their own war-time collaboration with the Japanese. 35

General MacArthur, who was the real power in the Philippines during those times, resolved the matter. In a precedent-setting act, he singled out Manuel Roxas while ordering the confinement of the other top collaborators.

At Tubao all the officials [who served the Japanese] were taken into custody by the U.S. Army as they arrived, were questioned, and then sent ahead of their families to Bilibid prison in Manila -- all except Roxas who was allowed to proceed to Manila with his family on orders from MacArthur's headquarters. 36

Soon different 'categories' of collaborators were made. One by one, they were set free until practically all were cleared and were reinstated to their prewar positions. 37

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35 See U.S. Secretary of Interior Ickes' implied suggestion on this point in his 'Introduction' to Hernando Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines, op. cit., pp.10-1.

36 Hartendorp, op. cit., p.151. U.S. Secretary of Interior Ickes later on wrote: 'MacArthur promptly set free the collaborationist Roxas and to cover his collaborationist activities with a thick coat of whitewash,... Without benefit of civil investigation into Roxas' relationship with the Japanese, he liberated him from detention with the other members of the puppet government.' (Harold L. Ickes, 'Introduction' Abaya, ibid., p.9.) Actually, as reported above, Roxas was never detained.

37 The formal solution to the 'collaboration' problem, however, came in January 1948 when Roxas, as President, issued the long-awaited Amnesty Proclamation. A few months later, the Peoples Court was abolished. Cf. Hartendorp, op. cit., p.249.
Meanwhile, the drive to establish peace and order in Central Luzon included the abolition of the local governments set up by the Huks and the replacement of left-wing officials with landlords and other anti-Huk elements. For most of these appointed officials, the only solution to the peace-and-order problem was the elimination of the peasant Huks and whatever influence they have established in the rural areas. This attitude could be understood in the light of what had been said before regarding the traditional enmity of these two groups before and during the war. The methods employed were often violent. Also, while on the one hand the authorities were demanding the surrender of arms of the peasants, on the other hand they helped and encouraged the arming of Civilian Guards, the so-called 'private armies' of the landlords. In this task of establishing 'peace-and-order', the landlords and the authorities had the backing of the U.S. Army. Wurfel wrote in this connection:

After the war, at the same time that most guerrilla groups were given recognition for services rendered to the American cause, Huk leaders Luis Taruc and Castro Alejandrino were imprisoned by the U.S. Army. U.S. military police assisted the Philippine constabulary and the private landlord's armies, called 'civilian guards' or 'temporary
police', in restricting left-wing political activity, thus encouraging armed resistance. 38

This was the situation in which the Democratic Alliance was formed. This political aggrupation drew within its fold certain groups, including prominent individuals, of varied political beliefs but who, nevertheless, had a common denominator in the anti-collaborationist issue. They were mostly composed of resistance groups, professionals identified with the Civil Liberties Union, journalists, and labor leaders. Judge Jesus Barrera, former president of the Civil Liberties Union and presently a Justice of the Supreme Court, became its President; Osmeña's under-secretary of Finance, Jose Hilario, was Vice-President, and Rafael Ledesma was Secretary-Treasurer. The Directors were Jose B.L. Reyes, presently also a Justice of the Supreme Court, Atty. Manuel Crudo, Dr Vicente Lava, and Atty. J. Antonio Araneta. Later, Huk leaders Luis M. Taruc, Juan Feleo, Pedro C. Castro and Mariano Balgos became additional officers. 39 What drew these men together? There were those who fought and resisted the Japanese

throughout the war, whose comrades-in-arms, friends, and relatives fell under the guns of the Japanese and their agents, and who were embittered to find many of the collaborators back in the saddle; there were the liberals, deeply concerned with the trend towards the arbitrary use of force and deprivation of civil rights occasioned by the 'mailed-fist' solution to the peace and order problem; finally, there were the socialist and communist leaders who probably saw the futility of pursuing an armed struggle against the combined forces of the government and the landlords, supported by the might of the United States Army. The left-wing group probably also realized the value of the Alliance. They stated that the fight against reaction required the widest possible united front and '...with its broader and more far-reaching appeal, the Democratic Alliance was the best channel through which the people could flow away from the parties that were dominated by landlords and compradores'.

In the first postwar election in 1946, the Nacionalista Party (Osmeña Wing) and the Democratic Alliance formed a coalition. At that time Senate

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40 Taruc, op. cit., p.215.
President Manuel Roxas had already left the NP and had formed his own faction. His political opponents, particularly the DA, had been bitterly denouncing his 'collaborationist' activities and his connection with the vested interest-landlord group. The DA put up three candidates for Senator (Judge Jesus Barrera, Dr Emilio Javier, and Atty. J. Antonio Araneta) and six candidates for the House of Representatives (Dr Jesus Lava for Bulacan, Luis M. Taruc and Amado Yuzon for Pampanga, Jose Cando and Constancio Padilla for Nueva Ecija, and Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac). Of the nine DA candidates, all six candidates for Representatives from Central Luzon were elected. However, when the new Congress, which was dominated by the Liberals, met it refused to seat the six DA Representatives, together with three NP Representatives and one NP Senator, although all of them had been duly certified as elected by the Commission on Elections. The Liberals alleged that they had been elected through fraud and violence. But one of the real reasons may well have been the fact that the necessary amendment to the Constitution granting 'parity' rights to American businessmen in exchange for war damage
payments and tariff preferences (which the vested interest groups, particularly the sugar landlords and other business interests, favored) might have been placed in jeopardy as the required three-fourths majority for a constitutional amendment would not be possible with the ten oppositionists taking their seats and voting against. The more obvious reason, of course, was the 'left-wing' tag placed on the DA which under the then existing situation could not be tolerated by the elite.

Thus ended the first postwar deviation to the traditional pattern of elite political aggregations. The second came in 1963 when the Lapiang Manggagawa (Labor Party) was formed. (See Figure III.) This organization was however, short-lived. Even while efforts were being made to organize it in 1962, its President, Cipriano Cid, was already complaining 'that the party organizers are now being closely watched' and told them to 'expect blows

42 See supra, Chapter III; Cf. Shirley Jenkins, op. cit., Chapter VII; David Wurfel, op. cit., p. 441.

43 Cf. Villareal Committee Report, op. cit. Shortly after the 'unseating' proceedings, the Huks staged an uprising and fought a long and costly guerrilla war. Most of their leaders have been killed or captured and many of their followers have surrendered but there are signs of a growing resurgence. Cf., for example, Carlos Albert, 'The Huks Mean Business', Weekly Graphic, February 3, 1965, p. 3.
from political parties', adding that 'persecution must be anticipated'. 44 Formally launched on February 3, 1963, it broke up in August of the same year. The Labor Party's candidate for Mayor of Manila, Roberto Oca, was recruited by the Nacionalistas and became 'their' candidate while other leaders of the Party 'coalesced' with the Liberal Party. 45

The above historical evidence, then, demonstrates the continuity and stability of elite control of the established political organizations. Because of this virtual monopoly, the competition for political power is reduced among themselves. This in turn explains a number of things: the identicality of their programs and political principles, the absence of class or ideological issues, the looseness of party affiliations and interchangeability of personnel, and the personal nature of the 'issues' that are presented before the electorate. The lack of public opposition or an opposition emanating from another socio-economic group may also explain the freedom (or license) in which power is often arbitrarily exercised.

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

The organization of the two major parties, the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party, are essentially identical. The formal structure follows the American model. Their rules provide for the establishment of conventions and committees at various levels paralleling the governmental structure -- national, provincial, city and municipal. The national convention is supposed to be the supreme authority in the party. The conventions are to select the candidates of the party to be presented to the electorate in their respective jurisdictions. Provincial and City conventions also are to elect delegates to the national convention and members of the party committees shall govern the party between conventions. Theoretically, therefore, the formal structure seems to rest on a democratic basis.

Beneath this formal facade, however, are the realities of power relations in the social structure. In the provinces and municipalities, there are elite family factions, with their respective followers, whose rivalries are formalized by their affiliation with political parties. For instance, in Cebu, 'politics for

46 Rules of the Nacionalista Party, 1961; Rules of the Liberal Party, 1963. However, the U.S. system of 'primaries' have not been adopted.
the last 50 years has been a struggle between the Sottos against the Osmeñas, the Cuencos against the Osmeñas, and recently the Durano-Dumon-Zosa group against the Cuenco-Osmeña fusion.\(^{47}\) In Abra, a high provincial official stated that 'Abra politics revolve around the two family factions -- the Paredeses and the Valeras'.\(^{48}\) In Misamis Oriental, the local politicians are ranged in competing factions; 'even before the war, the fight was between the group led by Don Gregorio Pelaez against the faction of Don Gregorio Barromeo'.\(^{49}\)

In Mindoro Occidental, the factions even belong to the same family. In 1962, Agpalo noted that

One interesting dimension of the present leadership in Occidental Mindoro is that political power has concentrated in one family -- the Abeledas. The first appointed governor...is Damaso Abeleda... The first elected Congressman...is Jesus Abeleda...the younger brother of Damaso. In the 1953 regular election Jesus ran again... He was opposed by a relative, Felipe Abeleda...

There are other Abeledas holding top official positions in Occidental Mindoro. One of the members of the Provincial Board

\(^{47}\) Personal interview, City, City Vice-Mayor, May 1963. See Appendix - Cebu.

\(^{48}\) Personal interview, April 1963. As previously mentioned (see Chapter IV), these two families are related by affinity.

\(^{49}\) Personal interview with a City Councilor, Cagayan de Oro, May 1963.
is Potenciano Abeleda... The governor is Arsenio Villaroza... also an Abeleda [his grandmother is Tomasa Abeleda, aunt of former Governor Damaso Abeleda].

... The present Abeleda leadership, led by Congressman Felipe Abeleda, is affiliated with the Liberal Party... The Nacionalista wing of the Abeleda clan is led by former governor Damaso Abeleda and former Congressman Jesus Abeleda.50

In the municipal level, there is a similar pattern. Hollnsteiner, in her study of power in Hulo, found that 'the elite... make up the core of the factions... [and] to the voters the elite are the party. The voter identifies and allies with the elite individuals; the party name, itself, is merely a convenient label for this alliance.'51

Rivera and McMillan in their study of rural Philippines noted that 'political leadership usually is centered in, or controlled by, small groups of large landowners, many of whom live in the poblaciones'.52

Philippine political parties then are loose alliances of these elite groups with their respective followers. The active control of the party organization, however, is in the hands of members of the elite who are office-holders. Under party rules, these party men who are office-holders become automatically members of the party hierarchy (party committees) and the party conventions, being *ex-officio* members of these bodies. The party president is usually a top elective official such as the Senate President or the Speaker of the House,\(^{53}\) although the real Party Leader is the President if the party is in power. This again, as was previously noted, is a carry-over from the Commonwealth period when the national Leader was also the Party Leader.\(^{54}\) The top governing body in the party is the National Executive Committee, although the NP had a much smaller (nine-man)

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53 LP Presidents from 1946-1963 were Senate President Avelino, Speaker Perez, former Speaker Jose Yulo, then Vice-President Macapagal, Senate President Marcos and Speaker Villareal; NP President from 1949-1963 was Senate President Rodriguez.

54 For instance, in 1939, Speaker Jose Yulo who was then the President of the Nacionalista Party acknowledged this when he stated: 'President Quezon, in his role of supreme leader of the party in power, has been given full power to set the date for the party convention.' *The Tribune*, May 29, 1939. Quoted in Hayden, *op. cit.*, p.440.
'Ruling Junta'. The Executive Committee is composed of the party president, some senators, representatives, governors and city mayors and some former top public officials. The number of members varies. It tends to be smaller when the party is in power and gets a bigger 'representation' when the party is out of power. A much bigger body is the National Directorate, from which the members of the Executive committee are selected and it is composed of all Senators, Representatives, Governors, and City Mayors who are members of the Party. At a lower level are the provincial and city committees which again are composed largely of public office-holders or ex-officials. Finally, at the lowest level is the municipal committee which is composed of the local political leaders.

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55 The nine-man NP 'Ruling Junta' in 1964 was composed of the Senate President, two Senators, two representatives, two officers of the NP League of Governors and City Mayors, and two from the private sector (one ex-Senator and one big businessman who was also an ex-official). Vide The Manila Bulletin, July 22, 1964.

56 The Executive Committee of the ruling Liberal Party in 1963, for example, had seventeen members while the NP had forty-three. Cf. The Manila Times, April 7, 1963, p.1.

57 There are also party workers at the barrio and precinct levels but they assume an insignificant role in the party organizational structure.
There are other interesting characteristics of elite party organization. One of these is a leader-follower feature which extends from the top, where the concentration of power is greatest, down to the local leaders. The party hierarchy resembles a pyramidal structure where the highest leaders have their 'men' -- actually leaders of subordinate importance who in turn have their 'supporters' in their provincial 'bailiwick's' or strongholds.\(^58\) The latter, also men of substance and prominence, have their own followings among the local elite in the municipalities. Finally, the last group have their sub-leaders, who also endeavor to obtain their own 'followers'.\(^59\) No serious attempts are made to solicit party membership from the masses.

The links in this chain are, however, loose for the ties that bind the organization together are not based on commitment to definite political beliefs or principles which differ from those of other parties. Since, as already noted, the existing political parties are essentially alliances of leaders emanating from the same

\(^{58}\) Thus, in the illustration cited on page 230 there were the 'Quirinistas' and the 'Avelinistas'.

socio-economic groups, no class lines or ideology based on class distinguish one political party from another. Their political ideas are essentially the same. An analysis of party platforms, for instance, shows the marked similarity of their programme.\textsuperscript{60} Under these circumstances, it is not difficult for party shiftings and realignments to take place. As an illustration, since 1946 two Presidents, two Vice-Presidents, five Senate Presidents, and forty out of sixty-six Senators have changed parties, and some of them have shuttled back and forth several times.\textsuperscript{61} These party realignments among the top leaders are reflected on the local level in line with the leader-follower dichotomy. Thus, if one top elite leader shifts his party affiliation, his henchmen from his bailiwick merely follow suit.\textsuperscript{62} There is no loyalty to the party or commitment to political principles but only loyalty to the person. The reply of the President of the


\textsuperscript{61} One Vice-President, for instance, has changed party affiliation five times.

\textsuperscript{62} This phenomenon was also observed in Hulo. See Hollnsteiner, \textit{op. cit.}, p.58.
Mayor's league of a Northern Luzon province, when asked about his party status, is revealing:

We are all 'patriots' now. [Party defectors have been called 'patriots' for they usually give 'patriotic' reasons for changing their party affiliation.] We follow Senator P. Where he goes, we go. You see, we get more benefits this way if we cooperate with the administration.63

Reference had already been made of the 'Allied Majority', formed just after the victory of the Liberal Party in the 1961 elections. Composed of twenty-seven Representatives who were elected as Nacionalistas, this group started to make overtures with the Liberals so they could 'cooperate' with the administration. Not long thereafter, nearly all joined the Liberal Party. Soon their followers in the provinces followed suit.64 There are various reasons for party shifting. Among the top party leaders, the usual reason is their rivalry over certain elective positions. Aspirants for top elective posts who feel that they have no chance of getting the nomination by their party or who feel that the convention had been 'rigged' in favor of some other aspirant are offered berths or concessions by the other party and they often accept. For instance,

63 Personal interview, April 1963.
64 See supra, footnote 26; also The Manila Chronicle, January 10, 16, 1962; April 13, 1962.
Senator Osias in the 1953 NP national convention tried to contest Magsaysay's nomination. But the NP top hierarchy had already decided on Magsaysay. Osias complained that the convention was 'rigged', saying:

It would not have mattered if I lost out to a sensible and overwhelming choice of the Party as long as it was done so in a democratic, non-insulting manner, instead of cajolery, illicit pledges.65

In a desperate effort to appease him so he would not transfer to the Liberal Party, 'Rodriguez [the NP President] proposed that both he (Osias) and Rodriguez head the eight-man senatorial ticket of the party'.66 But Osias joined the LP which made him the Senate President. Nacionalist Party Senator Jose Zulueta, who was also defeated by Garcia in the nomination for Vice-President also joined the Liberal Party. The practice of enticement is not uncommon, particularly if the discontented member of the other party is a big man or it will help the gaining party in the power struggle. Thus, in the 1961 Liberal Party Vice-Presidential nomination, a group of Liberal Party leaders headed by Representative

66 Coquia, ibid.
Cases and Senator Osias initiated a move to present a resolution drafting Nacionalista Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., who was at odds with then President Garcia. Osmeña was indeed drafted. He lost to Pelaez, however, but claimed that the latter's nomination was 'clearly railroaded'. The press report announcing the selection of the Liberal Party Senatorial ticket in the 1961 elections also illustrates this point:

The Liberal party top command last night picked six official candidates for the Senate, but left the door open for the possible inclusion of recalcitrant Nacionalista senatorial aspirants in its eight-man ticket.

The decision not to fill the two remaining vacant berths followed close on the heels of reports that negotiations were underway between representatives of the Liberal Party and Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez, concurrently Nacionalista Party president.

The choice of Rodrigo, Manglapus and Manahan was a mere formality. This arrangement was in accordance with the terms of an agreement that brought the three Grand Alliance leaders back into the Liberal fold.

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68 Ibid.
This development, however, had its reverse effects, since old Liberal Party members who wanted the nominations themselves threatened to defect to the Nacionalista Party, protesting 'the "despotic" manner in which Vice-President Macapagal had influenced the selection of six official Liberal Party senatorial candidates'.

Other causes of party disaffection, which are still common today, have been mentioned by Aruego: the failure to get a share of 'pork barrel' for one's bailiwick; failure to get certain privileges known to be within the power of the party to give; preference given by a political superior to a personal rival; failure to secure appointments of certain favorites for certain positions and so forth. Membership, therefore, remains flexible.

The illustrations already cited in connection with party conventions suggest another important characteristic of elite parties, namely the concentration of power at the top of the party hierarchy. National party conventions are held every election year to select candidates for

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70 Ibid. 'Disgruntled Liberal Party's threaten to bolt party', May 26, 1961.
71 Aruego, op. cit., p.774.
national positions. However, in most cases the delegates assemble to confirm choices and private agreements previously made by the top party leaders or, in the case of senatorial nominees, to submit names on the convention floor. The final selection, however is made by the top hierarchy after the convention. This seems to be in accordance with the accepted norms influenced by traditional practices. The top leaders often exercise powers and prerogatives technically reserved to the convention and the delegates acquiesce.

The 1961 LP national convention is a good example of what the delegates in a national convention 'decide' and what 'choice' is left for them after certain agreements have been made by top party leaders. In this convention, the then Vice-President Macapagal and Senator Marcos were vying for the presidential nomination. The delegates started to arrive in Manila to make a 'choice' between the two but just two days preceding the convention, Marcos withdrew. Then on the day before the convention, the LP party hierarchy announced the 'major decisions that will be taken up at the convention' as a result of Marcos' withdrawal, among which were the following: (1) Macapagal would be proclaimed as LP presidential candidate after which he would step down
from the presidency of the party in favor of Marcos;

(2) The convention would sidestep the issue of
Macapagal's running-mate and the choice of the eight
senatorial candidates and instead would approve a
resolution leaving the decision in the hands of the LP
National Executive Committee. (Emphasis supplied.)
The press also reported that 'it was...understood that
Marcos will remain as Senate Minority leader and if the
Liberal Party gains an upper hand in the Senate, he
would become the Senate President'. The 1963
conventions of both parties manifested the same pattern.

Before the NP convention was held

The party president, Senate President Eulogio
Rodriguez and Senator Arturo M. Tolentino,
the real power in the NP junta, have already
announced that the convention will meet only
to propose candidates. It will be the NP
national directorate that will dispose.

Similarly, in the LP, six of the eight senatorial
candidates were personally picked by the President two
months before the party convention, and were 'formally
endorsed' in a caucus of the LP Executive Committee prior

73 Ibid.
74 'The goose is cooked!', The Weekly Graphic editorial,
March 27, 1963, p.l.
to the convention. The above arrangements seem to meet the approval of everybody in the party until someone or a group in the hierarchy decide to contest the informal choices made. The manipulations and the 'undemocratic' nature of the proceedings are then exposed by the aggrieved party member.

The 1961 NP convention, for instance, was a stormy one. Senate (and Party) President Rodriguez wanted to contest President Garcia's re-election. He charged that 'the NP national convention was rigged' to favor the latter. Rodriguez complained that provincial conventions were being manipulated by the henchmen of President Garcia so that only the followers of the Chief Executive would be selected as delegates to the national convention. Manila's Mayor Lacson, a Rodriguez partisan, charged that 'half of Manila's delegates were followers of Congressmen Augusto Francisco and Joaquin Roces...who are all Garcia supporters'. He complained

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75 The Manila Times, April 7, 1963; cf. Weekly Graphic, ibid. During the LP convention, 'Marcos [the LP President] was a one-man nominations committee'. See Carolina S. Malay, 'At the Convention', The Manila Times, ibid.
77 Ibid., January 22, 1961.
that Senator Cipriano Primicias [a Garcia man] had
unilaterally revised the list of Manila delegates to
the convention previously approved and ratified by the
NP National Executive Committee. 

Mention had already been made of Senator Osias' defection to the LP in 1953 after having complained that
the NP convention was 'rigged' by the party leaders.
Commenting on this incident, Romulo and Gray, Magsaysay's biographers, later on wrote:

The Convention was in a sense, rigged, as Nationalist Senator Camilo Osias charged during its session... Nevertheless the public wanted Magsaysay, so that there could hardly be any resentment over the fact that its leaders had, in this case at least, anticipated the people's desires. When Osias, the only other candidate for nomination, accused the Nationalist bosses of 'fixing', he was technically right.

As regards the selection of candidates for local posts, the procedure usually followed is for the candidates to secure the endorsement of the party hierarchy or the locally recognized 'political kingpin'. Those favored by top party leaders can be assured of becoming the 'official' candidates. Conventions are sometimes

79 Ibid.
dispensed with and the area declared a 'free zone', especially when there are rival factions within the party that may precipitate a break. In such event, several aspirants may claim to be the 'official' candidates of the party, who may be 'proclaimed' separately in a gathering of their respective factions or during a public rally by members of the party hierarchy. Top party men who have their provincial bailiwicks to maintain are, of course, involved in local politics. They have to be sure that their 'men' will be in positions of power so they can be assured of effective support. In the process, realignments often occur. The 1963 election in Cebu illustrates this point. The old political rivals, the Osmeña and Cuenco families, had since 'fused' to face a common threat — the Durano-Zosa-Dumon triumvirate. However, President Macapagal entered the picture with the announced support for Rene Espina as official LP candidate for Governor. Osmeña, an NP (but Macapagal's compadre) said he might agree if all the rest of the slate, from Vice-Governor down to the last Councilor were his men. On the other hand, Senator Cuenco, an LP, was demanding three positions for his faction -- a Senate berth for his son (he got it but lost in the elections) Vice-Governor (for Councilor Paquiao) and
Vice-Mayor (for Councilor Crystal). One informant said that the 'fusion' might break up because of this. 81

B. METHODS AND PRACTICES

The elite, as has been described in the preceding chapters, are possessors of certain resources that give them the great advantage which facilitates the acquisition of more of these resources. The possession and control of money, credit and wealth; the control over jobs, the control over information, their superior education, the skills they possess; and the prestige and status resulting from the above -- all these not only elevate them above the masses but also give them the tools that are effectively utilized to acquire power and which, in turn, often lead to the acquisition of more resources and more power. The few who are recruited by the elite, who possess other values but not wealth, initially, often acquire it after being elevated into power. We have seen in Chapter IV, for instance, that the members of the top political elite are not only political decision-makers. From their ranks are found large landowners, bankers, owners of newspapers, TV and radio stations,

81 Personal interviews, May 1963.
owner-operators of private universities, colleges and other educational institutions, businessmen, stockholders or lawyers of big corporations (both Filipino and foreign), and other professionals. Moreover, as discussed in the preceding section, those who compete for power are directly or indirectly linked with government which gives them control of public resources that are often utilized in their struggle for power. The elite, as will be seen, also make use of the established norms, as influenced by traditional social and economic relations, in their competition to attain official decision-making posts. All the above elements, combined with the practices of political democracy, produce a unique and interesting mixture. Not infrequently, the political rivalry among the elite become so intense that violence may be utilized.

CLASS, CULTURAL NORMS AND POLITICS

Much of the elite's political behavior in their interaction with the masses becomes meaningful when one considers their respective positions in the social and economic structure and the norms that have evolved within the system.

Various studies made by sociologists, anthropologists and other social scientists seem to support the proposition that social interaction among Filipinos is
still generally reckoned in terms of power and wealth. Lynch, in his study of social class in a Bikol town, for example, found that the conception of class division among members of the Canaman community was towards a two-class system: an upper class and a lower class, the former playing 'the role of "big people" (Dakulang tao) in relation to "little people" (sadit na tao)'.

As landlords big people do more than own the land that is worked by one or more tenants. Ordinarily they are expected to give moral, medical, and economic assistance to tenants in any emergency or need. This entails advice and patronage, often intercession with an official in the town or in Naga, perhaps even the writing or supervision of the drawing up of some legal document.

Lynch concluded that 'the primary quality criterion of the upper class is economic security, that of the lower class, insecurity'. Tiryakian, in his prestige evaluation of occupations in several Philippine municipalities, found that the frames of reference of his respondents in their perception of the occupational hierarchy were in terms of power (particularly among

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Ibid., p.120.

Ibid., p.133.
rural respondents), economic security, and social prestige, in that order. Similarly, among urban (Manila) workers, some of the authority values that Bulatao found, for example, were as follows:

1. One looks to authority figures for help in obtaining a job and other benefits;
2. It is good to establish good relations with a tycoon or manager;
3. Benefits come by way of patronage and gift.

The previous discussion and illustrations on the organization of political parties demonstrate that even among the elite politicians themselves, the leader-follower dichotomy is manifested. Of course, when amour propre or pride is hurt or ambition intervenes, or when patronage is interrupted, it often leads to a shifting of loyalties but the system still operates in the new setting.

The above were cited to illustrate the point that, in general, the Filipino, whether elite or non-elite, consciously or unconsciously, tends to think and behave

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in terms of the principalia-non-principalia dichotomy: of big and small, of superiors and inferiors, of leaders and followers. Thus the 'big' person often becomes the object of solicitations, of petitions. He becomes a dispenser of favors from whom the subordinate could seek 'tulong' (help) because the former is 'malakas' (powerful) or 'mayaman' (rich). This, of course, gives the 'big' person a potent tool by which control over those who seek his favor and patronage is facilitated.

The political function of interest articulation, i.e., the formulation and expression of interests, is coursed through the elite politician. The members of the lower class, whose values and expectations are shaped to a large extent by the existing social and economic relations, are largely inarticulate and must rely on their superiors to articulate for them. Generally lacking effective organizations of their own, they must either make use of their individual efforts, which are ineffective, or must seek elite intervention. Because they lack the education and are ignorant of the strange ways of 'government', and because they are often ignored by bureaucrats, some of whom often want to do things in exchange for 'something', they often choose the latter course. Conditioned by a built-in position of inferiority
in the socio-economic structure, the lower class individual does not demand for a right or a service which may be legally due him whether from his landlord, employer, or the government. He asks for it as a personal favor and, if granted through the personal intercession of the elite, he feels grateful for it. He would have *utang na loob* (or a 'debt of gratitude') which must be repaid sometime either in terms of a 'regalo' (gift) or votes. Through this system, government is manipulated through connections or through personal intervention of the elite, and *pull* from someone who is 'malakas' is often necessary in seeking a job, promotion, or transfer. This explains why the average citizen, if he follows the formal channels, must patiently bear the red tape and wait, while if he seeks the help of an influential person who follows a short-cut course in an informal behind-the-scenes manipulation, one who can go directly to the top man, the matter is 'fixed' immediately. This, again, further enhances the politician's position. His intercession becomes highly-valued and is sought after. The rural peasant, particularly, has been conditioned by the landlord-tenant relationship to think that only through the landlord or some influential persons can he get some attention from the government.
Under this system, also, many aspirants for appointive government posts must have kapit (pull) or seek the tulong of an influential person. Often, even if qualified but lacking in connections, the aspirant may not get the job; but with the right backing, though sometimes unqualified, he often gets the job. In promotions, the procedure is often the same. One must have a 'padrino' or a 'backer' especially when there is competition. And this has become a general pattern. A former school teacher, for instance, complained:

...how many often went ahead who had nothing but pull and politics, and who continued to be tyrants and contemptible Hitlers before their subordinates, while fawning bootlickers before their immediate superiors. How often have the purveyors of authority often got the promotions, those who had connections with the powerful, those who knew how to give gifts, those who were experts at pasikat. While those who had nothing but faith in themselves, those who never stopped to learn, who burned the midnight oil, who had ideas, often revolutionary to those who had nothing but threats and deadwood between their ears, how often were those who were truly worthy never got the break, were forced to be patient to compromise with fate, or else get out of the system. For you could not fight, you could not change overnight the system. If you chose, it did not care, you could go, there were many others who would never question, and therefore would plod along unquestioningly.87

An executive of a government bureau likewise complained that the interference with his program objectives ...comes from the fact that I have no real control over a man who owes his loyalty to a Congressman...discipline breaks down now. The man who gets his first job through a Congressman will also try to get a promotion the same way. Most of those we have to accommodate aren't even eligible.88

Yet, in spite of such complaints which are often based on rational criteria, the cultural norms, some feudal perhaps in their origins, others colonial, provide some degree of stability to the system. The superior-inferior relationship described above, though reminiscent of caciquism, is still generally accepted. The subordinate whether in the field, factory or office, is still generally a cowed creature before his superior.89

The kinship system and the Spanish contribution, the compadre system, are other influences which lessen the impact of informed criticisms on 'nepotism' and the so-called tayo-tayo or spoils system. The American influences of 'rugged individualism' and laissez-faire have merged with the kinship system and have produced what H. Otley Beyer calls an 'anarchy of families'. The existence of the family corporations and the political

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88 Quoted in Francisco and de Guzman, 'The 50-50 Agreement', op. cit., p.349.
89 Cf. supra, chapter III, 'Manifestation of Class'.

family dynasties side by side with 'free enterprise' and 'political democracy' attest to this.

The Filipino family is characterized by the close family ties. From childhood, the Filipino is taught loyalty not only to his nuclear family but also to his other relatives. He develops an obligation to help his relatives and expects in turn to be helped by them when he needs it. But his relatives are many. Kinship is reckoned bilaterally, that is, both on the paternal and maternal side. Since the Filipino family is generally large, a person thus inherits a network of kin from both parents. Furthermore, affinal relationships are also recognized as part of the kinship system. Upon marriage, a member of the family acquires also the spouse's kin.

The Spanish contribution, the compadre system or ritual co-parenthood, also provides an additional bond that strengthens personal ties. Through Catholic baptism (and the Philippines is 83.6 per cent Catholic), and confirmation of a child, one acquires ritual 'relatives'. The child becomes the godchild (or inaanak) of the sponsors, the latter become his godparents (ninong or ninong.

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90 Catholic Directory of the Philippines, 1963 (Manila: Catholic Trade School, 1963), Statistical Index.
ninang), while the parents of the child and the sponsors become compadres and comadres. These relationships are also extended to marriages; the marrying couple becomes inaanak sa kasal; the sponsors would be ninong or ninang sa kasal, and the parents and sponsors would be compadres and comadres.

The elite politician makes effective use of these cultural tools. The superior-inferior relationship is still exploited, though perhaps not as much as before. Many tenants still vote for the landlord's candidate. Some public school teachers interviewed also intimated that 'sometimes' superior officials would 'encourage' them to vote for particular candidates. (One landlord in Pampanga, however, complained that since the Huks became active, his tenants have become 'hardheaded'.) The politician, as a dispenser of favors or patronage, of course, collects during election time the utang na loob

92 Cf., for example, Lynch, 'Social Class in a Bikol Town', op. cit., p.121; in the Hulo study, a tenant was punished for having 'turned traitor' to a landlord who, apparently, feeling more 'lenient', reported that more hard-hearted landlords...forced their tenants to move off their land because of disloyalty in politics. Hollnsteiner, op. cit., pp.98-9.
debts owed to him in the form of votes. Many of the politician's relatives, if he is in a position of power, will most likely be in government positions, too. Through his influence and connections, he manages to have them appointed to certain positions. If he is recognized as a 'political kingpin' in his province or district, a politically-inclined relative may also run for an elective post and most probably win. (See illustrations of these cases in supra, Chapter IV.) These relatives will of course, work for him and they, too, have their own network of personal relations, compadres, and alliances. The same is true with the compadres. A compadre may be of superior, equal, or inferior status. To his compadres of superior or equal status he may expect favors or patronage if they are in positions of power in exchange for political support.

To his 'inferior' compadres, too, he can expect support in exchange for patronage and favors within his capacity

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93 See, for example, this study's Appendix. While from time to time the appointment by the elite 'ins' of relatives to government posts is sometimes condemned by the 'outs', they could not be too vocal about if for they themselves do it when they are the 'ins'. The general populace do not seem to show much social disapprobation for, in the first place, the cultural norms sanction it and, in the second place, they cannot do much about it anyway. Cf. 'RCA nepotism charges listed', The Manila Times, February 19, 1964, p.1.
to give. They, too, become beneficiaries of the politician's largesse if they are within the latter's orbit of influence. Within this complex system of relationships, the cultural norms of leader-follower and utang na loob (or the obligation to repay a favor received) operate.

 Relatives and compadres of equal or inferior status, with their respective network of relationships, and alliances, then, add to the following of the elite politician which he has developed through his subordinate leaders. Together, they form his personal organization, his faction, which he may ally with other elite politicians to constitute the political party.

MONEY, GOODS AND SERVICES

How Much? The widespread and often extravagant use of money and other economic resources by politicians are of common knowledge to all who are familiar with Philippine elections. Pye, for instance, made the comparative estimate that 'the Philippines spent nearly four times as much, in proportion to per capita income, on its 1957 presidential campaign as was spent on the American presidential campaign of 1956'.

94 Lucien W. Pye, 'The Politics of Southeast Asia', in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p.126.
The official accounting of campaign expenditures of political parties is required by law. The Revised Election Code, for example, provides that the treasurer of a political party must file a statement of his account of contributions and expenditures together with the names and addresses of the contributors and persons receiving the expenditures. It likewise provides that individual candidates must do the same, that 'no candidate shall spend for his election campaign more than the total amount of the emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate' and that any candidate found guilty of violating the above (and other particular provisions of the code) 'shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or, if he has been elected, from holding the office'.

The above provisions of the law are, however, largely ignored by politicians. In the 1959 senatorial and

96 Sections 43, 48 and 29, respectively, ibid.
97 A Commission on Elections official stated that it is very difficult to enforce the above provisions of the law because it requires an action or protest by someone and because most, if not all, of the serious contenders for office violate the law, no one protests. He added that if the law were enforced, probably all elective officials will be disqualified for overspending. (Personal interview.)
local elections, for example, the NP treasurer admitted that the party spent about $4.5 million. Also informed estimates, based on personal interviews with party leaders, indicate that in the 1946, 1949, and 1953 presidential elections, the party in power spent between $2-4 million while the opposition party spent between $1-1.5 million. It should be noted, however, that these were expenditures of the party headquarters. Aside from these expenditures, each individual candidate often has his own personal organization to maintain and, therefore, has to raise funds for his own expenses. A rough estimate of campaign costs of individual candidates for the different positions would be: President $1 to $3 (m); Vice-President $500,000 to $1 (m); Senators $150,000 to $500,000; Representatives $80,000 to $300,000; Governors and City Mayors $50,000 to $150,000; Town Mayors $5,000

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98 The statement was made before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing on the charge of Senator Rodrigo that NP treasurer Hernaez had raised $4.5 million for the NP coffers through the barter trade. Hernaez denied this but admitted that he raised $400,000 for the NP campaign and 'not through barter'. The $4.5 million he said was the estimated expenditures of the NP. The Manila Chronicle, March 11, 1960.

to ₱15,000. The amount varies according to place and candidate. Thus, one Representative of Manila spent about ₱300,000 in the 1961 elections while his opponent spent approximately ₱100,000. The affluent Osmeña, Jr., and the industrialist Senator Puyat, both Vice-Presidential candidates in the 1961 elections, were reported to have spent 'several millions' each. The Vice-Governor of a Mindanao province stated that 'it takes over a hundred thousand pesos to get elected governor of the province'. The general trend is for the incumbent (re-electionist) to spend more than the opposition candidate. Smaller constituencies also entail lesser expenses.

Not included in the above estimates are the public works funds, the 'pork barrel', the Social Welfare

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100 The above estimates are based on personal interviews with various political leaders, some of the officials concerned, or members of their staff; Cf. also M.V. Concepcion, The Challenge, pamphlet (Mimeo.) 1959, p.17; R.V. Romero, 'Election Expenses Harm the Economy', The Manila Bulletin, December 27, 1962; and Lande, op. cit.

101 Personal interview with an NP leader.

102 Personal interview, Davao. In Cebu, where the rivalry between the Cuenco and Osmeña factions became so intense in the 1950s, the spending in the gubernatorial race was estimated to be between ₱1 to ₱2 (m) for each of the two major candidates. (Interview with a former Representative, now living in Cebu.)
Administration funds, the 'contingent' funds and other public facilities, resources and some personnel of the government utilized for political purposes by the party in power and also by opposition candidates holding public positions. The total election expenses of all candidates, to include private and public funds, run into tens of millions. One estimate of the total expenses of all candidates in the 1955 local election and the 1957 presidential elections, for example, was ₱60.6 (m) and ₱63.2 (m), respectively.\(^{103}\) Another estimated that in the 1961 presidential election, which was the most costly so far, 'all candidates for all offices spent an estimated ₱80 to ₱150 million, with [President] Garcia himself responsible for nearly half the total sum'.\(^{104}\) It is, of course, impossible to make any accurate estimate for the simple reason that some of these expenses are in the form of public works jobs and services offered to people (whose votes are needed) months before the elections.

\(^{103}\) M.V. Concepcion, \textit{op. cit.}, p.17.

Uses. What makes Philippine elections so expensive? Several explanations seem valid. As previously discussed, neither of the existing parties represent the interests of the vast segment of the population. As representatives of both the landed and business interests, elite politicians cannot attract voters' support on the basis of issues arising out of differences in political principles -- there are none. Consequently, one of the major areas of competition among themselves lie in the field of spending, that is, in the use of the economic resources that they possess and control to win voters' support. Patronage distribution, favor, and dole-giving, even direct vote-buying, figure prominently in this contest.

Another factor that tends to increase the spending is the corresponding increase in the stakes. One politician in Ilocos Sur, for instance, explained that not only the great spending but even the political violence in the province are attributable to the 'high stakes' involved. 'When one is elected to high office, he becomes rich.' 'It pays to spend', he said.105

105 Personal interview. Many Filipinos are of course familiar with these 'stakes' for in every administration since the war, from the Roxas to the Macapagal administration, there were always quite a number of them. There were the reported 'anomalies', scandals, and rackets in the PCAU, the PRATRA, the National Trading
(He was, incidentally, referring to his opponent who was 'in'.)

The elite politician's use of money and other economic resources to win electoral support is, of course, complemented by the high vulnerability of the voting masses to this political tool. Their life is hard. Unemployment and underemployment is acute. Composed largely of economically insecure voters whose value-orientation is geared towards a status of dependency vis-a-vis the elite, the bulk of the electorate becomes easily susceptible to accept the 'help' offered by a campaigning politician, whether it is in the form of goods, jobs, or money, in exchange for their votes.

105 (continued)
Corporation, the NARIC, the NDC, Surplus Property Commission, the Chinese immigration quota, Import control, Tambubong estate deals, the Customs, Internal Revenue, Immigration Bureau, Backpay, Central Bank, PHHC, the Army 'poncho' case and the PX case, foreign exchange licenses, reparations goods, the Stonehill 'web of corruption', to name but a few. Indeed, almost all government offices and government-owned corporations seem to have been affected by the cancerous growth of corruption. (Further discussion on this point appears in Chapter VI.)

106 The status for unemployment and underemployment in April 1962, for example, was: Unemployed 1,012,000 Underemployed 2,190,000 Total 3,202,000 or almost 30 per cent of total labor force (10.7 m).
Direct vote-buying by elite politicians is rampant. It often starts at the convention, where the rival candidates try to outbid each other in buying delegates' votes. This is particularly true when the party leaders cannot agree on an informal choice and several candidates decide to fight it out. Thus, the 1961 NP convention had been described as a 'Bacchanalian orgy of wild spending' for the delegates were given not only transportation and free hotel accommodation, but also women and money.  

The amount given to the delegates vary, depending on the importance of the post sought. In the 1961 NP Convention, many delegates were reported to have received no less than ₱100 each and 'happy delegates carousing at the lavish Bayside nightclub had their checks picked up by Puyat's genial brother...'

In a Manila City Convention, the twelve NP Vice-Presidential aspirants for nomination were the ones who competed in providing the 'wine, women and song', plus cash to the delegates. The reason for the intensity of the contest was the expectation that whoever will be elected to the vice-presidency will ultimately become President. President Garcia, under the eight-year constitutional limitation on the presidential tenure, would only serve three years and three months if elected. Senator Puyat, who won the nomination, was reported to have spent over a million pesos in the convention alone. Cf. also Maximo V. Soliven, 'The Elections of 1961', Philippine Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, January 1962, pp. 3-31; Wurfel, 'The Philippine Elections', op. cit., p. 30.

The Manila Chronicle, June 14, 1961, quoting Time Magazine, June 16, 1961. Wurfel reported a much higher figure of 'several thousand pesos'. See his article on Philippine political finance, op. cit., p. 763.
one candidate for mayor reportedly paid between ₱100 to ₱200 per delegate to get the nomination. The amount paid to voters varies. In Hulo, Hollnsteiner reported the range of ₱5 to ₱50 'depending on the circumstances'.\footnote{Hollnsteiner, \textit{op. cit.}, p.100.} In Manila, one Representative was buying at the rate of ₱20 each while in Ilocos Sur, an informant stated that in the 1961 election Senator P. paid ₱8 although the usual price was ₱5. He added that during this election, 'the province was flooded with money.'\footnote{The informant, a radio political commentator, had a brother who was fatally shot in this province notorious for its political violence.} In Davao, the price range in 1961 was from ₱5 to ₱10.\footnote{Personal interview, City Vice-Mayor. In Cavite, during the 1963 elections, the price per vote was reported to be between ₱20 to ₱30. (Cf. \textit{Philippines Free Press}, November 30, 1963, p.38.)}

But the actual buying of votes during the few days preceding the election is just one aspect of the use of economic resources to influence elections. During the entire incumbency of an elective official, he builds up his 'popularity' not only as a 'man of the masses', but also as the traditional dispenser of favors. He doles out favors and money to his followers who flock to his office or residence:
A politician must have money. Lots of it. He cannot win an election without money. He must have a personal organization, his camp followers, who will work for him. These he must occasionally provide with money. He must build up his public relations by donating to beauty contests, by becoming sponsors in baptisms, confirmations, and weddings where he also spends. He must make donations during town fiestas, give small amounts to those who approach him for help. In my case, I spend between $80 to $100 a day in this manner.112

When Congress is in session, the offices of Senators and Representatives are full of people — relatives, compadres, godchildren, followers, and provincemates — who are there to seek help, jobs, favors, money. Because he has assumed the role of a powerful dole-giver, because he has made many promises during the campaign, he has made many people dependent on him. After his election they start flocking to him. These people must be accommodated if he has to keep his personal organization intact, to maintain his following and thus to keep power. The nature of his promises to his supporters, however, indicate that it was not his intention to fulfill his personal commitments to his followers by utilizing his personal resources. Rather,

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The interviewee was a Vice-Governor, the third-generation politician in the family. Coming from an established family, he married the daughter of a multi-millionaire. His office on the ground floor of his house at 9.00 a.m., was filled with people all seeking help or favors.
the main sources of benefits for his followers were to be government resources, jobs in the different government departments, bureaus, or agencies or in the public works projects, from his share of the 'pork barrel' (if he were with the 'ins'), together with the other public facilities and resources that may be available to him. These will form part of his 'capital'. He can partake of these if he knows how to be a 'practical' politician, if he knows how to deal with the bosses of the party in power (whether it is his own or the opposition).

The party in power has a great advantage in the use of public funds for political purposes. While Congress approves the budget for public works and other government spending, and even outlines how these funds are to be spent, it is the President who controls the release and apportionment of the same. The 'pork barrel' funds, divided among Congressmen of the ruling party who get between ₱100,000 to ₱500,000 each, are legally designed for 'development projects'. In 1961, the total 'pork barrel' fund was about ₱150 (m). The contingent funds of the President which may amount from ₱5 to ₱15

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million are intended for relief during natural calamities. The Social Welfare Administration funds also have their specific purposes. As has been said, however, all of these may be utilized for political purposes.

In a public rally in Pampanga during the 1963 elections, for example, the Secretary of Public Works declared that he was backing the promises of the LP candidate for Governor of bountiful 'mejoras' (improvements) with the 'millions in my department'. During the same meeting, the Governor who was running for re-election, gave the parable of the water tank. He stated that because he is with the party in power, the water tank is always full. In poetic language, he said that 'the President, who is our provincemate and partymate, is the ocean which fills the tank [public works] connected to the hose [himself]'. 'Therefore', he concluded, 'if you elect my opponent, you will not receive any public improvements, the roads will not be repaired, nor will you get funds for other services, because he has no tank.'

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115 LP meeting, Betis, Pampanga, September 28, 1963.
116 Ibid. In the next meeting, his opponent, an ex-Governor, declared that 'the hose that leaks must be replaced'. 'It is true', he said 'that the Governor had made "improvements" during his term but they were mostly family improvements, namely the family Coliseum, the
In the above illustration, two important features need to be stressed which characterize elite politics. First is the tendency towards selective giving and withholding, a sort of carrot-and-stick technique in the disposition of public funds, jobs and services. A second feature is the personalized aspect of the 'giving'. Thus, the repair of a road or a dilapidated barrio schoolhouse, the construction of a bridge or a puericulture center, the distribution of relief funds after a disastrous fire or flood -- all these must bear the brand name of the politician whose intercession made them possible and he endeavors to make it appear that these were personal favors 'given' by him to the recipient group or community, although the funds came from the public treasury and although they are supposed to be done by the government as a matter of duty.

This pattern seems to be a general one. In Mindoro Occidental, for instance, a barrio got a home economics school-building, because its residents voted Liberal while the poblacion, the seat of the municipal government,

116 (continued) family subdivision of fifty bungalows leased to American servicemen near the U.S. Air Base, and the family Movie Theatre.' This charge was left unanswered but the Governor got re-elected, anyway.
which had more school-children and which badly needed one did not get any. 'Sta. Cruz was being punished, in other words, because of its Nacionalista leanings.'\textsuperscript{117}

In the matter of jobs, the loyal political followers of the Liberal Party were the ones 'who got most of the coveted limited employment opportunities at the public works', while the non-supporters were punished with non-employment 'in order to keep the party organization cohesive and the morale of the members high'.\textsuperscript{118}

In Hulo, just before the start of the election campaign,

A rash of projects intended for the welfare of politically sympathetic barrios or Hulo in general breaks out...all done with notable publicity and displaying prominent signs informing the populace through whose pork barrel generosity the deed is being accomplished... Pamphlets are printed detailing the majority party's contributions to the town during its administrations.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} Remigio E. Agpalo, 'The Politics of Occidental Mindoro', \textit{op. cit.}, p.10. A more recent example was the threatened removal of the Antique National Agricultural School from San Remigio to Hantik, Antique, because the wife of Rep. Tobias Fornier won in all towns except San Remigio. As one columnist remarked, 'Congressman Fornier's promise to punish San Remigio must be fulfilled'. 'This is Philippine politics...' T. Valencia, 'Over a cup of coffee', \textit{The Manila Times}, January 5, 1964.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, p.11.

\textsuperscript{119} Hollnsteiner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.95-6.
But the jobs in public works and government offices are not enough even only for the party followers. So they are 'rotated'. The political supporters of the elite politician are given jobs for a few months as temporary employees or casual laborers and then replaced with a new batch. In this manner, the elite politician seeks to satisfy as many followers as possible and to keep up with his 'commitments'.

However, because most of the jobs and positions are created more to satisfy the political 'commitment' of the politician (which help him keep power) rather than to fill a real need, government offices become overcrowded with men and women doing superfluous and unnecessary tasks. This taxes the government treasury heavily, sometimes causing bankruptcy. Mass lay-offs occur from time to time. Thus, in Baguio City in December 1963, the City Treasurer advised the City Mayor, the Councilors, and department heads 'to lay off all their casual employees and laborers because the city cannot afford to pay their salary anymore'. In Pasay City, Mayor Cuneta announced after the 1963 elections the laying off of

'100 policemen and 200 casual employees'. The government-owned Manila Railroad, a favorite 'employment agency' of politicians, had to lay off 2,500 employees in 1963 due to 'economic difficulties'. In Cebu City, 300 casual employees were dismissed also just after the 1963 elections. In 1960, the House of Representatives abolished 2,400 new posts, and an oppositionist Representative denounced particularly, 'the creation of the new items and the increase by a fifty-man personnel for the Office of the President, and the contingent fund as a "tenacious leech" and as a dangerous tool for political recrimination and political patronage'.

A pattern of increased employment before an election and lay-offs after an election is discernible. The case of the Emergency Employment Administration created during the Macapagal Administration, is another good example.

122 '1,500 MRR Workers Laid Off Minus X'mas Bonus', *The Evening News*, December 28, 1963, p.5; One thousand temporary and casual laborers had previously been dismissed. *(Ibid.)*
123 '300 Casual employees dismissed', *The Manila Times*, January 4, 1964, p.1-B.
Congress gave the EEA an appropriation of ₱100 million for a five-year operation in line with the '5-year socio-economic program' of the government. However, it soon developed into a massive political instrument that enabled some of the elite 'ins' to employ thousands of political proteges and ward leaders in the months preceding the elections. This, of course, was denounced by the 'outs' which included some of the 'ins' who were not 'accommodated' who complained that the agency had spent much of the entire amount appropriated in just one year without any visible productivity. Although the motives of those who proposed its abolition may be due to their failure to share in the bounty, still the functions that the EEA performed, such as clearing the esteros of Manila, removing the grass from the moats of Intramuros, building of some feeder roads, etc., were superfluous for they duplicated those of the Department of Public Works and other existing governmental agencies.

An interesting and frank account of the combined use of economic resources to win voters' support was given by a town mayor. A portion of it is quoted below, not only because it shows the typical uses of money and goods in Philippine elections but because it also illustrates much of what has been discussed in this section. The mayor's narration follows: \textsuperscript{127}

I was a candidate for municipal mayor in 1959... Months before the election, I had a clear picture of the situation. The fight would be a tough one for me though I was the incumbent, because I belonged to the faction that was opposed to that of our congressman and the administration. It meant that I would get no share of the huge pork barrel funds allotted to the whole district by our congressman.

After weeks of soul-searching, I came to a decision. In politics, one must be practical if he is to survive... I called on a congressman who was very close to the president and told him that I was ready to support the president. A few days later, we were winging to Manila.

At a Malacañang conference, they offered to make me official candidate for mayor. That was in May. In the first week of June, I received a communication from Malacañang to the effect that the public works earmarked for projects in my town were released. Another letter from the highway district engineer informed me that work on various projects in my town would commence the following week. I was to screen the laborers.

Day and night my house was literally filled with people seeking jobs. Even the followers

\textsuperscript{127} For a full account, see 'Politics Was My Undoing', Philippines Free Press, October 19, 1963, pp.13, 34.
of my opponent came to me and asked for jobs and other favors...

That September, when I got word that our gubernatorial candidate would visit my town, I organized a huge rally on the main plaza to coincide with his arrival...hundreds of people, mostly public works laborers, their wives, and children were in my house to welcome our candidate. To feed them, I had five cavans of corn grits cooked plus a sack of mongo, sardines and dried fish.

I walked beside our candidate on the way to the platform while he was busy distributing envelopes... One glance and I knew the envelopes contained ₱5 and ₱10 bills. My political stock...was greatly boosted. I was greeted with tremendous applause when I delivered my speech. Even while our candidate was speaking, truckloads of supplies were being unloaded in my house. They consisted of clothes -- T-shirts, undershirts, shawls, handkerchiefs, etc., all marked with the name of our candidate for governor, as well as mine. The next day other truckloads of supplies arrived in my house. This time, they consisted of sacks of rice, boxes of SWA (Social Welfare Administration) sardines, and other items like pencils.

Following our strategy, I began distributing the goods four days before election day or on Nov. 7. My leaders in teams of two or three went to their assigned barrios to distribute the T-shirts and undershirts to the men and the shawls to the women in addition to a ganta or two of rice and sardines. I followed the next day to distribute ₱3 per voter. On the 8th and 9th, I unleashed our ultimate weapon. Armed with blank pay rolls, my leaders went from one house to another. Targets were the followers of my opponent. Once the voter promised to vote for me, he or she would sign in the proper space
and... receive P20, the equivalent to one week's work on the road construction project.  

In the rest of the above account, the mayor complained that in spite of the fact that he spent P15,000 of his own personal money (aside from the goods that came from the provincial and national governments), he won only by a small majority and not by the landslide that he expected. He claimed he was 'double-crossed'.

The flow of official funds and patronage is not always done through 'channels' as indicated in the above illustration. Sometimes, it is done direct such as in the presidential election of 1961. While other presidents were more subtle in the utilization of public funds and resources, for political purposes, 'former President Garcia had no qualms about utilizing some of his more salient prerogatives during the [1961] campaign'.

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128 [Ibid.] Other goods and services 'given' to voters during elections are soft drinks, calendars, ball pens, combs, cigarette lighters, some religious items and other consumer goods; during registration and election days, many politicians also provide free transportation to voters, sometimes food. Some big transportation companies supporting particular candidates often give free tickets to voters living outside their voting districts. (For more recent examples, vide Philippines Free Press, November 30, 1963, pp. 33, 38.)

129 [Ibid.], p.34. The most probable explanation is that his opponent was also using the same techniques or was able to raise the 'issue' of graft and corruption effectively.

He travelled around the country either on government plane (such as the Fokker-Friendship), by government-owned railroad or aboard the $2.5 million presidential yacht obtained from Japanese Reparations, the 'Lapu-Lapu'. At each whistle stop or campaign platform, Garcia openly read detailed lists of 'pork-barrel' or public works allocations granted to that specific locality (reminding residents of the area that they had partaken of his official largesse), handed out backpay checks and treasury warrants, or delivered previously unpaid monetary 'bonuses' to Juan de la Cruz. His campaigners had at their command all the combined facilities of government and of government-controlled corporations.\textsuperscript{131}

There was, of course, nothing that President Garcia did in the 1961 election campaign which his predecessors, or his successor, did not do. The only difference perhaps was in \textit{degree} and in the 'openness' in which he utilized official funds and facilities to promote his candidacy. All the others have also used government facilities during election campaigns. Even Magsaysay's candidacy was in a way promoted by utilizing the facilities of the propaganda office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under then Major Jose M. Crisol, while the former was the Secretary of National Defense of Quirino. And all have used the 'pork barrel' and public works funds for political purposes. For these are not purely postwar occurrences. It has been the perennial

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
complaint of the 'outs' even before the war, for instance that 'the present system of government has given the party in power many privileges like pork-barrel legislation and patronage which give very little chance for the minority to get into power'. In short, they form part of the American political legacy to Filipino politicians and they have flourished under local conditions.

There are other occasions when goods and services are doled out by politicians or their families. After a flood, typhoon, or a fire, for instance, the politician or his wife goes to the scene to comfort the victims, bringing some relief goods to the unfortunates. But the group of photographers and public relations men accompanying him or his wife see to it that the act of 'charity' is properly announced in the metropolitan dailies with the picture of the politician dole-giver prominently displayed handing the doles. Sometimes, too, the relief goods themselves are labelled or marked in bold letters with the name of the dole-giver.

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133 One example is 'Operation Puso', launched by the First Lady after the Central Luzon floods in 1960. See also
During the Christmas season, Manila's 'poor people' are gathered in front of Malacañang Palace to receive their 'gifts' from the First Lady of the Land. Months before this occasion, newspapers keep a running account of the organization and activities of the group of wealthy matrons -- wives of politicians, landlords, industrialists, and businessmen -- led by the First Lady. When the day comes for the distribution of 'gifts', the 'poor people' from Tondo and the numerous squatter colonies of Manila and suburbs congregate in front of the Presidential Palace to receive a 'bayong' (paper bag) of rice, a few canned goods, and other items. Thus, in this manner, the politician's stock is further raised.

Poverty, too, not only becomes institutionalized but, as shall be shown later, it also becomes good politics.

Sources. There are a variety of sources of financial support for political spending. The utilization of government funds and other resources for political purposes by those holding power has already been discussed. The

133 (continued)
The Manila Times, January 15, 1964. It is significant to mention, in this connection, that two women administrators of Social Welfare (in charge of providing government relief goods to the 'poor') have been elected to the Senate. Like the distribution of government jobs, the giving and withholding of scarce government-owned goods becomes a potent political weapon.
'ins' particularly have a decided advantage in this regard. In the 1946, 1949 and 1953 presidential elections, for instance, Coquia estimated that between 40 to 65 per cent of party campaign funds came from public sources (public works, provincial and municipal funds).134

As previously noted, the legal provision requiring parties and candidates to submit names and amounts contributed is not followed and no official sources are, therefore, available on private donations. However, by the nature of the parties and the economic ties of the candidates, it is logical to expect that the major bulk of the financing would come from the landlord-business groups.

As shown in Chapter IV, many of the political elite belong to these vested interest groups — as landlords, big businessmen, directors or stockholders of big

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134 Coquia's estimates of sources of party finances (of the party in power) in three presidential elections are as follows:

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<th>1946 (NP)</th>
<th>1949 (LP)</th>
<th>1953 (LP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Fund</td>
<td>P1.0 (m)</td>
<td>P1.5 (m)</td>
<td>P1.0 (m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UNRRA (Govt.)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prov'l. and Municipal Funds</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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</table>

corporations, or as corporation lawyers of big firms, both Filipino and alien. These give them, therefore, a direct line of contact. The 'national' politicians which include the President, Vice-President, the Senators and, in some respects, the Representatives, get much of their campaign funds from the top economic groups -- the big exporters-importers, the manufacturers, the landowning groups -- (e.g. the 'sugar bloc', the 'tobacco bloc', abaca growers, rice producers, etc.) and other businessmen. Favorable or protective legislation, liberal loans from government banks and other financing institutions (e.g., Philippine National Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines, Social Security System, Government Service Insurance System) the awarding of fat government contracts, appointment to key public offices and corporations -- all these, among others, form part of the considerations given in exchange for liberal donations to party funds. An examination of those appointed to key government agencies, for example, shows the close correlation between the economic interest of many of those appointed and the post or office which they held. Thus, one finds big sugar men usually appointed to the Philippine Sugar Institute, coconut men to the Philippine Coconut Administration, some bankers
and financiers (or those connected with them) to the Philippine National Bank and Central Bank, and so forth. Since there are no basic differences between the parties, party considerations do not seem to enter the picture in these donations. As one Negros landowner stated,

The province [hacenderos?] generally goes with the Administration. You see we need loans and subsidies. That is why we don't bother too much with local politics. We are more concerned with national policies, the passage of laws. We need the cooperation of top government people.

Another example was the financial support given to Magsaysay during his bid for nomination in the 1953 Nacionalista Party convention. His biographers report:

Aguinaldo [a wealthy landowner-businessman-industrialist] was able to produce one hundred and twenty thousand pesos, which financed the nomination bid, and ultimately the convention was underwritten by a prominent Liberal who preferred to remain anonymous. (Emphasis supplied.)

Among the oft-mentioned large financiers of political parties and politicians are the wealthy Spanish and Chinese mestizo families whose members have been in

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136 Personal interview.
politics themselves. Roxas in 1946, for example, was reported to have been backed by Soriano, Elizalde, Amado Araneta, Lopez, Fernandez and other big businessmen. Other big names often mentioned are the Yulos, Montelibanos, Roceses, Aranetas (another family), Madrigals, Cojuangcos, Rufinos, Menzi, Ledesmas, Henareses, Delgados, Sycips, Jacintos, Yu Khe Thais, Zobels, Del Rosarios, Puyats, and others. Members of these families have occupied top elective and appointive positions. Andres Soriano was a Secretary of Finance of Quezon in the Commonwealth government-in-exile. A Spaniard, he became a Filipino citizen in 1941 to avoid having his vast assets being frozen in the Philippines and in the United States. Just after the war, he became an American citizen but continued to reside in the Philippines. Except for Yu Khe Thai, all the others have members of their families who have served as Cabinet members, Senators, Representatives, members of the boards of directors of government banks and other financing agencies.

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139 Personal interviews with informed sources close to political leaders.
140 Abaya, op. cit., p. 167.
government-owned or controlled corporations and agencies. Together with Americans, Chinese and other foreign firms, these families own or control a vast segment of the economic resources of the country. Illustrations of their immense economic holdings (which include banking, insurance, landed estates, manufacturing, mining, shipping, educational institutions, mass media, land transportation, and others) have been given in the previous chapters. Also, their intermarriage and other social and economic ties have likewise been pointed out.

Alien business groups, particularly Chinese and Americans, though specifically prohibited by law, also figure prominently in these donations. American businessmen, however, seem to be more concerned with 'national' politicians while the Chinese are involved in both national and local politics. In the 1953 elections, for instance, American business interests, were reported to have contributed $250,000 to Magsaysay's campaign funds. The large contributions to the campaign chests of both the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties and the personal favors, 'donations', and payments (for 'services')

141 Some of these families have been mentioned in supra, Chapters III, IV, and the Appendix.
142 Time Magazine (U.S.), November 23, 1953, p.37.
to individual top politicians by the American businessman, Harry S. Stonehill, may be cited as another example. The public disclosure in 1962-1963 of the details of Stonehill's links with top politicians and government people opened the lid on the usually concealed intervention in Philippine politics of alien businessmen. The case warrants special consideration for it illustrates what may be the established pattern of relationships between some foreign (and Filipino) businessmen and politicians. The case also illustrates some of the important considerations given to businessmen in exchange for financial support to politicians, as well as some aspects of Philippine politics.

Stonehill was an American ex-soldier who had been stationed in the Philippines in 1945. While still in the army, he engaged in business, dealing in Army surplus equipment and other items. In less than a year, he had made about $150,000 in profits. Discharged in 1946, he returned to the U.S., divorced his wife who refused to return with him to the Philippines, and came back to the Philippines where he engaged in various business enterprises.\textsuperscript{143} In a period of less than fifteen years,

\textsuperscript{143} Juan S. Sabado, 'From Rags to Riches', \textit{Weekly Graphic}, August 29, 1962, pp.6-7.
he was able to build what has been called the 'Stonehill empire', which comprised, among others, the U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, the Stonehill Steel Corporation, the Republic Glass Corporation, the Philippine Cotton Development Corporation (now the General Agricultural Corporation), the Atlas Cement Corporation, the Republic Real Estate Corporation, the United Housing Corporation, the Industrial Business and Management Corporation, and the Far East Publishing Company.

Abroad, Stonehill owns the Julius Baer Bank in Switzerland (that bank has denied this), a cigarette plant in Mexico, a cement plant in Nigeria, a bottle and jar plant in Hawaii, and a country club in Oregon.

The assets of these various companies run into hundreds of millions. Stonehill himself is said to be worth more than a hundred million pesos.144

During all those years, Stonehill became a bona fide member of Manila's '400'. He was among the top ten taxpayers in the country. He moved around in the highest social circles, rubbing elbows with top political, social and economic leaders. He contributed to charity. He lived in millionaires' row -- in Forbes Park.

144 Ibid., p.7.
How did Stonehill accumulate this huge fortune in just a brief period of fifteen years? The details were revealed when one of his business associates, Meinhart Spielman, went to the National Bureau of Investigation and complained that he was beaten up by Stonehill and Robert Brooks, another Stonehill associate. Spielman also disclosed to the NBI all of Stonehill's activities and methods of operations. On March 3, 1962, Stonehill and Brooks were arrested, and their offices and residences were searched. Found and confiscated were electronic devices which included telephone-tapping and jamming instruments, tape-recording machines, and a 'walkie-talkie'. Also, among the materials seized were two-way mirrors, moving pictures of high officials filmed individually with actresses and high society matrons in a secret assignation room of Stonehill's...

Voluminous documents, showing Stonehill's modus operandi in business were also seized. These included a small book, which came to be known as the 'Blue Book', containing a record, in Stonehill's own handwriting, of names of top politicians and other high government officials.

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146 'This is Where it Began', Weekly Graphic, July 31, 1963, p.7.
officials, with amounts of money entered opposite their names. Secretary Liwag declared that 'some 100 government men were shown to have received money and other considerations from the American millionaire industrialist and financier'.\textsuperscript{147} It seems that the evidence 'pointed to a plot for economic domination by Stonehill and his crew, with extensive use of bribery and blackmail in all branches of the government'.\textsuperscript{148}

The full contents of the 'Blue Book', however, were not released for over a year for some top officials, including Senators, Cabinet members, and Representatives belonging to the party in power were also mentioned in the list. Furthermore, libel suits were threatened against anyone who would reveal its contents.

Meanwhile, Stonehill and his associates were charged with attempted murder, violation of internal revenue and customs laws and Central Bank regulations, corruption of public officials, influence peddling, smuggling, tax evasion, espionage and other criminal charges. The charges were later changed to 'economic sabotage, tax evasion, political interference, misdeclaration of

\textsuperscript{147} The Manila Chronicle, July 13, 1962, p.15.
\textsuperscript{148} 'This is Where it Began', \textit{op. cit.}, p.7.
imports, schemes and insidious machinations inimical to the interest of the state effected through influence peddling and or corruption of public officials'.  

Spielman was the principal state witness but in the course of the deportation proceedings, he disappeared. Stonehill and his associates were granted bail. On April 22, 1962, Spielman was reported murdered.  

An interesting development occurred during the trial of Stonehill. Stonehill's lawyers perhaps finding it difficult to offset the evidence against their client, decided on a different mode of defense. They disclosed the contents of a document allegedly written by Jose W. Diokno (who was Macapagal's Secretary of Justice and under whose direction the Stonehill raids were conducted) to Manila's Mayor Arsenio Lacson, a portion of which reads:

> Our own trusted men are evaluating the documents seized and I've given specific instructions that all documents incriminating Dadong [President Macapagal] be immediately turned over to you. You will now have him captive. In this way, you will be exercising the powers of a President long before 1965.  

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149 Quoted in F.V. Tutay, 'Stonehill Case', *op. cit.*, p.4.  
151 Quoted in *ibid.*, p.97.
It should be noted that Lacson was an NP man who rebelled against his party in the 1961 presidential elections and became the campaign manager of LP candidate Macapagal who won. Diokno, a Lacson man and also an NP, became a Cabinet member in an LP administration as a fulfilment of one of the 'commitments' of President Macapagal to Lacson in exchange for the political support of the latter during the 1961 elections. If the letter were genuine, it would seem that Lacson and Diokno had an 'insidious scheme to exploit the position of the justice secretary to further the presidential bid of Lacson in 1965'.

Diokno, of course, denied that he ever wrote the letter and branded it 'a big forgery'. The NBI claimed that the signature was genuine, but that it had been written on a blank paper in 1958. But Diokno was relieved as Justice Secretary by President Macapagal.

Because Senators and Representatives had been mentioned as included in Stonehill's 'secret payroll', Congressional investigations were conducted. Diokno, the new Justice Secretary Liwag, and NBI Director Lukban were asked to testify. During the testimony three

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\[Ibid.\]
members of Macapagal's cabinet were mentioned as linked with Stonehill.\(^{153}\) On July 31, 1962, Finance Secretary F.E.V. Sison and Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc resigned from the Cabinet. (The President accepted the resignations but the latter was appointed as Ambassador to the U.S.)\(^{154}\) A few days after the resignation of the two cabinet members, Stonehill who was at the time placed under custody of a congressional committee for contempt (he had refused to answer any question) was taken from congressional custody by presidential order and deported.\(^{155}\)

With Spielman dead and Stonehill out of the country, the political storm over the case really began. Diokno, who became an NP senatorial candidate in 1963, started the fireworks. In a political rally of the NP in Manila, he showed photostatic copies of the Stonehill documents and made insinuations on the identity of one Senator involved. Reading 'Red' and 'De la Rosa' and various amounts entered opposite the names on different dates (total: \(₱90,500\)), he told the crowd that he was not saying


\(^{154}\) Ibid.

that the amounts entered opposite these names were sums of money given by Stonehill to re-electionist LP Senator Rogelio de la Rosa. 'You be the judge on this', he told the crowd. The following week (on July 13, 1963), during a TV-press conference, Diokno came out with more documents from the Stonehill files. One was allegedly a draft of a letter of Stonehill to President Macapagal reminding him of promises that the latter supposedly made just after the 1961 elections regarding the appointment of F.E.V. Sison as Under-secretary of Finance, (with Macapagal himself holding the Finance portfolio) but giving Sison all the responsibilities of Secretary, including chairmanship of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank; the appointment of former Ambassador Manuel V. Gallego as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; the retention of certain officials of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration with which Stonehill had business dealings; and the appointment of a recommendee of Stonehill to the Monetary Board. Two of these 'promises' (Sison's appointment and retention of PVTA officials), Diokno said were fulfilled. Diokno produced other documents. One was a letter addressed to

Sison commending him on his future appointment as Under-secretary of Finance and instructing him to resign from all business and civic positions upon his appointment. Others purported to show that Stonehill sent ₱100,000 to 'Mr Lex' (later identified as Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc) during the height of the 1961 presidential campaign and asked 'Mr Lex' to work for the appointment in the Macapagal Administration of persons identified with the Stonehill group.157

This infuriated the LP top men. The following evening, Justice Secretary Salvador Maríno in a TV-radio appearance, implicated seventeen persons as being linked with Stonehill. Not surprisingly, they were all members of the NP. He charged Diokno of protecting from public disclosure his NP friends. He further charged Diokno of receiving ₱20,500 from Peter Lim (a Stonehill associate) and the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce of which Lim was the leader.158 He further charged that Mr Diokno's involvement with the web of corruption of Stonehill and Peter Lim is accentuated by the fact that the Chinese

157 Ibid.
158 For a full text of the charges, see The Manila Times, July 15, 1963, p.20-A; Vide, also 'Justice Secretary Maríno on Diokno and on Stonehill Blue Book List', Philippines Free Press, July 20, 1963, pp.6-7, et. seq.
Khing Guan Kho, who owns the 'batel' [boat] in which Spielman was murdered, is now the head of the 'Diokno-for-Senator-Movement in Sulu.159

He added that Diokno's outstanding activity 'has been to be the lawyer and defender of Chinese clients and interests' and this is the reason, he said, why Peter Lim was not arrested and deported with Stonehill. He then proceeded to name twenty-five of Diokno's Chinese clients.160

But that was not all, Mariño said that former President Garcia 'was financially assisted by the Stonehill and Peter Lim group both in the 1959 and 1961 elections' and that the former President 'had a long history of unethical tie-up with the Stonehill and Peter Lim Group'.161 To prove his point on the financial

159 Ibid., p.6.
160 Ibid. Diokno later on replied that Mariño's charges were 'foul lies and half-truths'; that his name was not in the 'Blue Book'; that he was retained as a lawyer, not by Peter Lim, but by the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce; that, of the twenty-five clients mentioned, fifteen are naturalized Filipino citizens; and that King Guan Kho (a naturalized Filipino and not Chinese) who owns the Kumpit in which Spielman disappeared, is his client and not campaign manager in Sulu. He said that there is nothing wrong with having some alien clients. Cf. F.V. Tutay, 'The Stonehill Bomb', Philippines Free Press, July 27, 1963.
backing given to President Garcia and the NP, he cited from 'confidential' memorandum and a 'very confidential letter' from the Stonehill documents showing that 'the financing consisted of $3 million undertaken by the financial backers at a quota of $500,000 each to start from August, 1958'. This was corroborated, he said, by a letter, dated July 25, 1959, sent by Stonehill to Nino Ramirez (brother-in-law of Mrs Garcia) which reads in part as follows:

In accordance with our previous plan that the President should not permit a number of people to be soliciting funds from various sources, let us make certain that only four or five large groups are contacted such as a sugar group, Stonehill group, Soriano group, and perhaps, the Elizalde group, who would finance the entire campaign and secure the approval of the projects which they would need.

Marino further charged that from the documents and records on the Stonehill files, the following also appeared to have received from the Stonehill group the amounts indicated: Mrs Leonila Garcia (First Lady) - $200,000; Linda Garcia-Campos (daughter of President Garcia) and her husband, Atty. Fernando Campos - $500 a month 'during their stay in the United States'; Senator Roseller Lim -

162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
'at least' ₱88,900, and he 'performed unethical services for Stonehill'; Representative Natalio Castillo - ₱23,000; former Executive Secretary Juan Pajo - ₱73,000. Mayor Lacson - ₱15,820; Mrs Luchi Lacson - ₱2,000; Ambassador Melchor Aquino - ₱12,000; Representative Joaquin Roces - ₱12,375. Marino likewise declared that Senator Gil Puyat 'served as an implement of the Stonehill group in the Senate'; that Senator Cipriano Primicias 'assisted Stonehill in PVTA'; that Representative Bartolome Cabangbang 'appears to have rendered unethical services for Stonehill'; and that Cosme Garcia (brother of President Garcia) 'had unethical and business relations with Stonehill'.

What did Stonehill get in return for all these payments? Marino asserted that from the Stonehill documents, 'it appears' that Stonehill was assisted by President Garcia and some members of his family in various ways such as securing a huge loan from the government owned Philippine National Bank; approving a 'transaction to export 14 million lbs. of low-grade tobacco in exchange for importing 10 million lbs. of American Virginia tobacco; agreeing 'to split profits on a barter

164 Ibid. Cf. also The Manila Times, July 15, 1963, p.20-A.
transaction; favorable consideration of barter licenses of Stonehill; assistance on various business projects such as the plan to release 10,000 hectares of Isabela land for a rice project, import of 10,000 tons of rice, export of 3 million lbs. of scrap and cigar fillers and the import of 3 million lbs. of Virginia tobacco; intercession with Central Bank Governor Cuaderno for Stonehill's sheet glass enterprise; assistance in stopping the inflow of sheet glass from other countries; prevention of approval of importation of $8 million worth of cotton (Stonehill had a cotton plantation in Cotabato); certifying of bills which Stonehill himself prepared for Senator Puyat and Representative Teves; approval of Stonehill's Republic Glass Corporation; protection 'from harassers'; and many others. Marino averred that Mrs Leonila Garcia 'had agreed to accept £200,000 after award of a Stonehill coke project with her full support', and that a relative of Mrs Garcia 'followed up "an illegal pending deal" with the GSIS for £1,600,000'. He further stated that 'it appears that Mrs Garcia intervened in the matter of the veto of Senate Bill 588 for Stonehill with Atty. Dimataga [Mrs Garcia's relative] as intermediary'.

165

Ibid.
The other officials mentioned, charged Maríño, performed, more or less, similar 'assistance' to Stonehill. Rep. Natalio Castillo, he said, appeared to have 'received from Stonehill ₲10,000 as additional campaign help for signing PTFC [Philippine Tobacco and Flue-Curing] contract exclusion'. Senator Lim, Maríño stated, helped Stonehill in legislation, one letter 'asking him [Lim] to pass a bill to protect local cotton producers'. Maríño charged that Lim appeared to be 'under orders from Stonehill'. In a Stonehill letter, the former American GI, wrote:

I should like to have you [the Senator] follow up for me with [name of a Central Bank official] in order to get the Monetary Board to transfer our [dollar] allocation to the Far East Publishing Corporation [a Stonehill corporation].

The above disclosures created a furor among the NPs. Denials, libel threats, and counter-denunciations followed. Former President Garcia called the charges a 'tissue of lies'. How could he be connected with Peter Lim, he asked,

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166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
Everybody in Manila knows that he [Peter Lim] was the political confidant of the late Mayor Lacson. When the late Mayor Lacson treacherously campaigned against his Party and joined Mr Macapagal, he dragged along with him Mr Peter Lim and presumably all the Chinese elements of his following with the financial resources under their command.\(^{169}\)

If there were millions spent in the 1961 elections, he stated, 'such millions must have been spent against me and for someone else'.\(^{170}\) As regards the favors or assistance that he gave to Stonehill, former President Garcia declared that

A President of a country, whoever he may be, receive petitions, requests, propositions and what not from business executives, farmers, industrialists, politicians and plain citizens. If the President approved any or some of these requests, proposals, etc., in favor of business executives like Mr Stonehill, it does not entirely follow that the President's approval is corrupt... Similar requests or petitions were submitted by other industrial executives like the Sorianos, Zobel, Elizalde, Cabarruses and an endless list of others. Similarly, some were approved, others were rejected and still others re-studied according to their respective merits.\(^{171}\)

Representative Joaquin Roces of Manila said he could not remember having received any money from Stonehill as a government official, 'not even a

\(^{169}\) I[bid.]

\(^{170}\) I[bid.]

\(^{171}\) I[bid.]
contribution for campaign funds in the 1957, 1959 and
1961 elections'. Only Stonehill, he said, could explain
the P1,000 and the P2,375 alleged to have been given to
him (Roces). He, however, remembered having sold a lot
to a newspaperman working as Stonehill's public
relations man and 'I learned later from Jurado (the
newspaperman) himself...that Stonehill helped him buy
this lot'. 172

Diokno defended his friend, the late Mayor Lacson,
and said that 'I knew Mayor Lacson very well and I know
he could not have sold himself to anyone for any sum'. 173
Senator Puyat said that he had 'absolutely nothing to do
with Stonehill -- officially or otherwise'.

When I was organizing a commercial bank for
my family three years ago, a broker approached
me with the request that he be allowed to
invest P600,000 in this bank for Stonehill.
I turned down the request. 174

He called Marino's charge a 'smear campaign to injure
my good name, my honesty, my integrity'. Cabangbang said
he would file a libel suit against Justice Secretary
Marino.

172
Ibid., p.69.
173
Ibid., p.68.
174
Ibid., p.69.
The Stonehill affair, however, did not end there. The NPs counter-attacked with Diokno spearheading the move. In a TV-press conference on July 20, 1963, he came up with a list of eight top Liberal Party men including President Macapagal, Senate President Marcos, Speaker Villareal, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, Representative Manuel Cases, Representative Antonio Raquiza, and Ambassador Amelito V. Mutuc. (It seemed that he got photostatic copies of documents seized from Stonehill before his dismissal as Secretary of Justice.) Citing a document, he claimed that the above top LPs (excluding Rep. Raquiza) received 'hand-outs' in New York from a Stonehill man in November 1960 in the total amount of $5,800.\footnote{The Philippines Herald, July 21, 1963, p.1} On the same day, Secretary Marino also came out with twenty new names, explaining that since the Nacionalistas were clamoring for the 'whole truth', he would oblige. 'The Stonehill documents, papers and files', he said, 'show the link of the following with Stonehill and his associates': ex-Speaker Daniel Romualdez, ex-Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr., Governor Isidre Rodriguez, ex-Senator Edmundo Cea, ex-Senator Decoroso Rosales, ex-Senator Pedro Sabido, Senator Tolentino,
Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, Senate President Ferdinand Marcos, Emilio Abello, Carlos Romulo, Central Bank Governor Miguel Cuaderno, former Commerce Secretary Manuel Lim, Vice-Mayor Jesus Marcos Roces, Antonio Araneta, Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez, Mila Magsaysay, and Representative Aguedo U. Agbayani. These are still mostly Nacionalistas. But there are two big exceptions, namely Vice-President Pelaez and Senate President Marcos. Some observers attach significance to this. The two are the most probable LP contenders for the Presidential nomination in 1965. Since President Macapagal had already been dragged by Diokno into the mess, the 'whole truth' might as well be known. The 'unexpurgated contents' of the controversial 'Blue Book' of Stonehill finally came out and the ninety-seven names included Nacionalistas and Liberals alike with the former out-numbering the latter. Amounts appearing opposite the ninety-seven names totalled ₱2,454,210.63. Aside from those already released by the warring parties, it included among others top-level and second-level

176 Ibid.
bureaucrats, 'newspaper boys' (there were fourteen listed), some police agencies and one 'Major General'.

The public exposure of the Stonehill 'web of corruption' was perhaps unfortunate for both NPs and LPs. Both used the scandal as a political weapon, with the NPs exposing the LPs while the LPs attacked the NPs found linked with Stonehill. But both got hurt in the process. It is probable that some were just mentioned without actually having any relations with Stonehill whatsoever. It is also possible that a few received some 'favors' without doing anything for Stonehill in return. In fact, most of those mentioned denied having anything to do with Stonehill, some claiming that the documents may be 'forgeries', and that the charges and counter-charges were 'lies' or fabrications.

These are, no doubt, possibilities that may occur, particularly, in the heat of internecine quarrels and struggle for power. But there are certain facts which stand out and cannot just be brushed aside: that Stonehill started from scratch and became a multi-millionaire in a short period of fifteen years; that he got certain

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Ibid.
favorable legislation and concessions for his many corporations; that several senators admitted having received the amount listed but that these were either lawyer's fees, loans, or were returned. Also some of the newspapermen admitted having received the amounts listed but these were loans or for 'professional services' rendered. In other words, the evidence seems to suggest that many, if not all, of the documents disclosed may not be 'fabrications' at all.

179 In the 'miting de avance' of senatorial candidates of both parties at the Manila Overseas Press Club held on September 30, 1963, Senator Lim admitted that he had received lawyer's fees from Stonehill 'which was more than some others present had done'. What was wrong with getting fees as a lawyer?, he asked. Cf. The Philippines Free Press, October 5, 1963, p.75.

180 Senator Balao, according to Senator Tolentino, admitted having received the $1,000 recorded in a Stonehill document but that it was a loan which he claimed was paid later. (Senator Tolentino, cited in 'The Big Crack', Philippines Free Press, August 3, 1963, p.4.

181 Senate President Marcos claimed that the $2,000 was offered to him but it was returned. (The Manila Bulletin, July 22, 1963, p.15.)

182 Willy Jurado (who was given a lot by Stonehill) said that he worked for Stonehill as a public relations consultant and that the job 'involved no attempts to corrupt public officials'. Zacarias Nuguid and Jose Nable rendered service on a professional basis, while Ernesto Ilustre admitted having borrowed $250 from Ira Blaustein in New York but 'Stonehill refused to accept it [the repayment] and it remains unpaid to this day'. (Cf. Philippines Free Press, July 27, 1963, pp.88-9.
The above case study, as earlier mentioned, may illustrate a pattern in the relationships between businessmen, alien or Filipino, and politicians. Perhaps Stonehill's methods were more unorthodox, or a little too vulgar, to be 'acceptable' by those who profited from him and yet denounced him later. But that was only after he was exposed. As previously noted, he was one of Forbes Park's high society before he committed the costly mistake of mauling an associate, rubbing elbows with Presidents, Senators, Cabinetmen, church dignitaries, economic czars. Could he be too different? Was Stonehill the only one? One writer offered an answer. There are, he said,

thousands of other Stonehills, alien and Filipino alike, whose pockets are lined with income from smuggling, 'fixed' government contracts, overshipments of logs, sugar, minerals or copra, influence peddling, customs graft...

We have deported one Stonehill. The others are still with us, riding around in air-conditioned cars, mixing with the best, promoting civic and charitable projects, helping the people with one hand and robbing them with the other.

These men have no secrets to their neighbors. Just the same they are much admired, they are held in high esteem.183

The Stonehill pattern of financing elite political activities, it is suggested, is not an isolated one. There may be differences in degree, others may be more 'refined', but they are still essentially similar. The Chinese in the provinces, for instance, have to buy 'protection' and have to contribute, often to politicians of both parties. They are not exactly 'victimized', or if they are, they are often 'willing' victims. For both politician and donor profit from the transaction. There is always the give and take part of it and there are many cases where the alien contributors (like in the Stonehill case) take more than what they give. And, often, they take what is not due them under the law. In this respect, vice operators may be included as willing sources of campaign finances. Gambling syndicates, brothel operators, 'massage clinics', and motel owners are among the sources of political financing, particularly in the urban centers like Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo, and Davao. Other usual sources on the city and provincial levels are public works contractors and suppliers, public utility operators, real estate owners or landowners, and other businessmen. Finally, the local politician in the municipal level sometimes has to rely on financial help from the party leaders above, or has to
raise his own funds, again, usually from local 
businessmen (including Chinese wanting 'protection')
vice operators, landowners, and other moneyed persons.

SYMBOLS, SLOGANS AND PRACTICES

Ideology and Political Formulas. An examination of 
elite public pronouncements and writings would suggest a 
deep commitment to libertarian -- even egalitarian -- 
principles. There is also an apparent deep sense of 
social consciousness and responsibility, of solicitous 
regard for the toiling, 'downtrodden' masses. The pattern 
had been set by Quezon. In a speech he delivered before 
the war, he declared:

We will see to it that the man who works in 
the field or factory gets the proper return 
for his work and we will not let anybody 
exploit him like a beast.

The time has arrived when the poor workers 
in the fields and factories in the Philippines 
must be given their due, for if they are not, 
we will see repeated in the Philippines what 
we see in so many of the countries of the 
world today.184

President Osmena, during the swearing in of the 
members of his Cabinet just after the Second World War, 
likewise expressed his beliefs in freedom and egalitarian 
ideals:

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184 Speech of President Manuel L. Quezon, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, 
February 28, 1936, quoted in Hartendorp, op. cit., p.491.
We hereby affirm our faith in, and adherence to, the principles of freedom and democracy...
We shall re-establish in our country a social and political system...in which government officials and employees are not masters of the people, but their servants...
We stand for the individual liberties, guaranteed by our Constitution, for the right of every man and woman to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness... We stand for a new world, free from want and fear.¹⁸⁵

Osmena's successor, Roxas, in turn promised that 'labor, including farm tenants, will find a champion in my administration -- their just and reasonable claims will be upheld; justice will be done them'.¹⁸⁶ A little later he stated that 'the sweat of the toiler's brow must be fairly and fully rewarded... There must be neither masters nor serfs in our economic system'.¹⁸⁷

Other Presidents and Filipino politicians have more or less followed this style of speech-making. President Quirino, in his Inaugural Address, declared that 'ours is a free country and the civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution are in full force. There shall be no undue impairment of these freedoms so long as I am President.'¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in ibid.
¹⁸⁶ Radio address after his election in April 1946, quoted in ibid.
¹⁸⁷ Inaugural Address, July 4, 1946, quoted in Marcial P. Lichauco, Roxas (Manila: Kiko Printing Press, 1952) p.249.
President Magsaysay had a more unorthodox and simple solution to the problems of the workingman. Referring to the Huks at the height of their rebellion, he said:

They are fighting the government because they want a house and land of their own. All right, they can stop fighting, because I will give it to them. I am going to make the Huk a capitalist. I am going to set up a carpentry shop and let the Huks run it.\textsuperscript{189}

On another occasion, he declared that

Heretofore, social justice has raised fervent but frustrated hopes in the hearts of our less fortunate citizens. We must not permit social justice to be an empty phrase in our Constitution. We must bring it to life -- for all.

In consonance with this purpose, my administration shall take positive, energetic measures to improve the living conditions of our fellow citizens in the barrios and neglected rural areas and of laborers in our urban and industrial centers.

The land tenure system of our country shall be re-examined, to purge it of injustice and oppression.

\textquoteleft Land for the landless\textquoteright shall be more than just a catch-phrase. We will translate it into actuality. We will clear and open for settlement our vast and fertile public lands which, under the coaxing of willing hearts and industrious hands, are waiting to yield sustenance to millions of our countrymen.

Democracy becomes meaningless if it fails to satisfy the primary needs of the common man, if it cannot give him freedom from fear and freedom from want. His happiness and security shall

\textsuperscript{189} (U.S.) \textit{Time} magazine, November 26, 1951, p.25.
be foremost among the goals of my administration. 190

President Macapagal, during his campaign for the presidency went farther by making explicit commitments.

'Under our social program', he said,

we will provide low-cost housing for the average citizen, housing for the poor at nominal rental, and free housing for the aged and infirm. We shall set a program for unemployment insurance, hygienic facilities in the slums and rural areas, land for the landless, and most important of all, additional opportunities for gainful occupation to all citizens willing and able to work who shall thereby contribute to raising the standard of living under conditions of self-help and human dignity. 191

Much of the above pronouncements were also reflected in the party platforms of the two major parties. The 'Bill of Economic Rights' incorporated into the 1953 platform of the Nacionalista party, for instance, proclaimed 'the right of every Filipino laborer who so desires to own as much land as he can till; and to count upon government assistance in securing implements, tools, animals seeds and scientific advice which he may need'. 192

190 Ramon Magsaysay, Inaugural Address (A pamphlet), December 30, 1953, pp.4-5.


192 Platform of the NP for the General Elections of 1953.
Not to be outdone, the LP (in the same elections) promised 'to help [the common man] fulfill his dream of possessing a home for his dear ones and a farm for himself to till'. Even the Democratic Party, a coalition of big hacenderos coming mainly from the 'sugar bloc', stated in its platform that 'no society can thrive, no people can be happy or even moderately secure, unless there is an equitable distribution of the national patrimony of the land from which our people have sprung'. It went on to state that 'human rights are above property rights and must be so preserved'. It, however, made the important qualification that 'the right to acquire and possess property is inherent in the inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that such right must be given the same protection as others pertaining to freedom'.

This last statement in the Democratic Party platform is perhaps indicative of the general ambivalence in elite pronouncements. This was, of course, a mere repetition of Quezon's 'whenever property rights come in

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193 Platform of the LP for the National Elections of 1953.
195 Ibid.
conflict with human rights, the former should yield to the latter'. Yet, it was also Quezon who, speaking of business and industrial organizations, said that 'we shall support the organization of the producers of abaca, coconut, tobacco, rice, and other articles for the defense and promotion of their interest' and 'shall help industries and continue to work for the welfare of the nation'. Indeed, it would be a mistake to attach too much weight on elite pronouncements and consider these as expressions of their true policies, or as what 'they believe' -- as their 'ideology'.

Ideology, in general, may be said to consist of a complex of ideas, theories, principles, goals, and 'values'. The assumption, of course, is that all these components which make up an 'ideology' are embodied in a logically consistent system. Elite 'values', however, as


197 Ibid., pp.61-2.

198 The term 'value' here has a different connotation than was used in chapter III. As used here, it refers to 'a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection of available modes, means and ends of action'. (Clyde Kluckhohn in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951) p.395.
reflected empirically in elite actions and attitudes and identified in the manner in which they 'experience, perceive and interpret the concrete situations which they confront in life',\textsuperscript{199} may not necessarily correspond with their publicly proclaimed goals and ideas. For, as already discussed in the first part of this section (Class, Cultural Norms and Politics), much of the political behavior and attitude of the elite and the masses are shaped by the respective places they occupy in the socio-economic structure.

Thus, the landlord rules while proclaiming the rights of man. He might promise land reform, and even pass laws to this affect,\textsuperscript{200} but would do everything to prevent full and effective implementation of the same. The reason, of course, is obvious. His economic interests and his ties with the social structure demand that he must work for the preservation of the status quo. The democratic political formula, however, necessitates that,


\textsuperscript{200} The 'passing' of land reform laws was initially strongly resisted but when they were found to be harmless (that is to say, unimplemented due to 'lack of funds', exceptions, amendments, unconstitutionality, etc.), many landlord-legislators became 'land reformers'. 
aside from buying the support of the people through the use of money and other economic resources, the elite politician must seek the support of the 'sovereign' people.

The political formulas are the rituals, symbols and slogans that he creates to elicit support from the masses. They need not be consistent for they are usually eclectic, that is to say, superficial borrowings from the vocabulary of diverse ideologies. Hence, they may all at the same time be 'paternalistic', 'democratic', 'socialistic', or even 'revolutionary'. By their very nature, also, they have to be general and vague. Thus Quezon became the advocate of 'Social Justice', Magsaysay of the 'Bloodless Revolution', and Macapagal will finish the 'Unfinished Revolution'. In spite of so much talk about 'revolutions', however, most of the peasants are still, in 1963, committed to a life of poverty and tied to their landlords.

Other Symbols and Slogans. President Ramon Magsaysay started, in 1953, the so-called 'grass-roots' technique of campaigning. Heretofore, his predecessors relied mainly on the provincial and local leaders to deliver the votes. Quezon during prewar days just made a few campaign speeches over the radio and visited a few provincial
capitals. The prewar politico used to campaign in his Americana (western suit) in keeping with his status. Magsaysay changed all these. He wore simple clothes, sometimes the bakya (wooden clogs), donned the buri hat of the peasant, and went to the barrios to shake the hands of rural folks. In fact, Quirino complained about this tactic of Magsaysay. He said that tactics of riding in caretelas, eating with the people in the market in the barrios or jumping fences and ditches were mere stunts to win votes and may prove that one is able physically but do not necessarily show that one is fit mentally for high political positions.201

But Magsaysay had an effective reply. 'It is sweeter for me', he said, 'to shake the hands of men who earn their bread in honest toil than hold well-soaped hands of men who have enriched themselves through graft and corruption'.202 The people applauded. They found a champion, one who did not only say he was 'for them', but by his attire and manners, he seemed to be 'of them'.

Magsaysay was overwhelmingly elected.

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Manila Chronicle, October 19, 1953.

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Manila Chronicle, October 23, 1953.
Thereafter, it was the era of the 'common man'. Practically every politician -- whether landlord, banker, rich businessman or industrialist -- became the 'champion of the downtrodden'. Their campaign posters are filled with phrases like 'man of the masses', 'friend of the poor', 'defender of the oppressed', 'man of the common tao' and similar slogans.

Poverty has become good politics. Because most of the voting masses are poor, the well-heeled politician has glamorized poverty. If the poor cannot become like him, then he will try to be like them, at least, even only during election campaigns. The idea is to create a 'common man' image to show that he is 'one of them' and, if he succeeds in this, then the implication seems to be that he is, therefore, 'for them'. Some of the techniques of the politician include being photographed (and the pictures are published in the newspapers) while eating with his hands (like the common people), drinking in artesian wells, having a haircut by the barrio barber. A Davao politician, for instance, complained of the palabas (showmanship) of his political opponent, now a Senator who, he said, goes out in the barrios in maong (blue denim) pants, rubber shoes and buri hat and drinks tuba (the barrio folk's drink made from fermented coconut) in sari-sari stores. 'Back in Manila', he said,
'he is riding in a limousine', and lives in a mansion. 'The people do not know that he is only fooling them', he added. 203

The myth of the poor boy who became president had been so successfully advertised that many politicians have imitated it. Highly paid image-makers and public relations men are employed to create a 'common man' image, of a poor but brilliant boy who, despite overwhelming odds, has reached the top through sheer talent and hard work. 204 'I was born poor and now I have a little property made by my brains and my industry', said President Quezon. 205 President Quirino often made references to his 'humble' beginnings. 'Please remember, my friends', he said in a campaign speech, 'my name is easy to remember -- ELIPIDIO QUIRINO. I have no middle initial. I am a poor man -- and have always been.' 206

Again, on another occasion, he said, 'Poor as I am and

203 Personal interview. The informant was himself living in a large, ultra-modern house.
204 Cf. 'Who are the Image-makers?', Weekly Graphic, February 26, 1964, pp. 2-3.
having come from the bottom, I have so conducted myself in public as well as in private life that I can always look straight into any man's eye and tell him to go to hell*. Many Filipinos are, of course, familiar with the story of the 'zacatero' (one who cuts and sells zacate -- or grass for horse feed -- for a living) who became Senate President, and Ramon Magsaysay, the humble 'mechanic' who rose to the Presidency. The biography of a Speaker of the House, for instance, also refers to his boyhood days when 'he learned his farm chores including taking carabaos to pasture'. 'Himself a poor man', his biographer continued, 'he soon became the pride and joy of the people of Capiz.'

It is, of course, easy to romanticize the 'humble' origins of one who has reached the top, especially in an age where well-trained image-makers abound. Yet even the many Horatio Alger 'success' stories found in elite biographies and other records are not always consistent. Quezon's parents belonged to the principalia class. The Quirinos of Ilocos Sur were not poor but

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207 Speech before the Manila Lions Club, August 19, 1950, in ibid., p.213.
208 H.O.D., op. cit., 1963/76.
they were a rich family owning several sailing vessels, called pontings, and possessing a substantial sum in silver money which according to the town's legend, Don Manuel [President Quirino's grandfather and former Governadorcillo of Caoayan, Ilocos Sur] used to measure by the ganta... When baby Elpidio was baptized in the Roman Catholic church of the town the family held a grand celebration that lasted all day... Climax of the activities...was the tossing away of silver coins.210

Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez, referred to as the zacatero, was the son of Petronilo Rodriguez, 'a cabeza de barangay, while his wife was a merchant', and he was educated at the exclusive San Juan de Letran College.211 President Magsaysay, portrayed as the 'poor mechanic' comes from a landed family of Zambales.212 Osmeña and Roxas came from wealthy families with the latter having 'aristocratic lineage, native and Spanish'.213

212 The 1955 list of landowners (in the Sorongon study of landed estates) shows that the Magsaysays and the Del Fierros own nearly 700 hectares of land. Hartendorp, however, wrote that 'the family...owned over a thousand hectares of land' and that 'they lived, not in a nipa hut, but in a roomy, well-built, strong-material house'. (Hartendorp, op. cit., p.4) An uncle, Don Ambrosio, was one of the founders of a large shipping firm.
213 Hartendorp, ibid.
Among the Presidents, only Macapagal can truly claim to be of 'humble origin'. But, as he himself has acknowledged, he rose through the sponsorship of the principalia. He became a 'protege' of the Pampanga landlord-millionaire, Don Honorio Ventura (former Secretary of Interior), who financed his law studies and who launched him in his law career by recommending him to the American law firm of Ross, Lawrence and Selph with whom he became a corporation lawyer. He got a job as legal assistant at Malacañang Palace through the help of the late Chief Justice, Jose Abad Santos, another Pampanga landowner. Finally, it was President Quirino, whom he acknowledged as 'my political benefactor', who launched him in his political career, by which time he was a bona fide member of the principalia class.

But while there may not be sufficient basis to the numerous 'success' stories, the 'common man' myth still persists for, as previously noted, it is good politics. To the elite politician, it is one effective way of

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216 J.V. Merritt, *op. cit.*
winning votes. To the masses, it gives them hope since, as one biographer of Philippine Presidents wrote, 'in a democracy like the Philippines any person possessing the necessary qualifications can be a candidate for the presidency'. 217

In these presidential elections, the really brilliant and the not brilliant individuals as well as the really rich and the truly poor vie with each other for this most coveted position. 218

There is, therefore, hope that someday the son of a kasama may become President. Even to the more discerning, who know that the politicians who come to them are 'different' and can perhaps see through the affectations of his 'gimmicks', there is still the feeling of self-importance. Used to being ignored and neglected, they are suddenly showered with attention by 'these rich people', who embrace them, shake their hands, and promise to champion their causes.

OTHER PRACTICES

However, it is not always sweetness and light that prevails in elite politics. Too often, the competition

217 Gwekoh, _op. cit._, p.viii.
218 _Ibid._
for power is accompanied by coercion, terrorism and the use of force.

Violence in Philippine politics is not one which is specifically directed by the elite politician against the masses but one which arises out of the bitter struggle for power among the elite themselves. There was, of course, one exception. As recounted in the first section of this chapter, the 'peace-and-order' drive in Central Luzon, carried out in 1945-46 to restrict left-wing political activities, often erupted into violent outbreaks between the landlord's private armies, government troops and the U.S. army on the one hand and an armed peasantry on the other. These encounters assumed the form of an elite-counter elite 'confrontation'. Except for this single instance, however, postwar political fraud and violence before, during, and after elections were often the result of the intense rivalry among elite politicians themselves. But, as an old African proverb states, when bull elephants fight the grass beneath is trampled down.

The 1947 election was described at the time as the 'bloodiest in Philippine history'. There was

widespread pre-election violence and election returns from a number of provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao 'were delayed for many days and impossible counts were reported and accepted'. Much worse was to follow. The 1949 election was characterized by even greater violence and fraud. This was the election that produced a pocket rebellion in Batangas, home province of defeated NP Presidential candidate Jose P. Laurel.

This [1949] election was to become infamous as the 'dirty election'. It would be said in 1949 that the Quirino administration permitted 'even the birds and the bees to vote' to perpetuate itself in power. Armed 'goons' guarded the voting places, stuffed the ballot boxes, and by constant gunfire kept the cowed citizens from casting their ballots.

The 1951 election was referred to as a 'clean' election, but that is perhaps by 1949 standards. Actually, the old pattern of terrorism continued. In Negros province, Governor Rafael Lacson ran what was called 'the Negros Republic'. He had a private army numbering more than 1,000 men which terrorized people. It was said that 'Lacson and his henchmen could get away with anything, including rape and murder... Should

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220 Hartendorp, ibid.
222 Vide, Coquia, op. cit., p.32.
anyone challenge Lacson's power, he was courting death... Lacson and his men had no need to fear the law. They were the law.\textsuperscript{223} Moises Padilla, an NP candidate for Mayor in Magallon, Negros Occidental, dared oppose the rule of Lacson and he was publicly tortured and brutally killed.\textsuperscript{224} In Cebu, there were the dreaded 'bongotons', the bearded armed thugs of the Cuencos. These men were killers, mostly with previous criminal records, who terrorized the people.

Army planes filled with stuffed ballot boxes were ordered to take off to strategic voting places. Magsaysay learned that one was leaving the Manila airfield for the South. Infuriated, he began telephoning all parties concerned to stop the flight. Unable to pin anyone down, he summoned a car and rushed, to the Manila airport. He was too late; the plane was already on its way.\textsuperscript{226}

Even Magsaysay admitted that 'high authorities ordered him to commit frauds in the 1951 elections [when he was

\textsuperscript{223} Romulo and Gray, \textit{op. cit.}, p.154.
\textsuperscript{224} \textbf{Philippines Free Press}, September 2, 1954. Governor Lacson was later on charged for this murder, but as is usually the case, his followers (who were just doing his bidding) got the death penalty while Lacson got a less severe punishment (life). At the time of writing, there were already moves for the granting of presidential pardon to Lacson. Cf. \textbf{The Philippines Free Press}, January 26, 1963.
\textsuperscript{225} Personal interviews with the Cebu Constabulary.
\textsuperscript{226} Romulo and Gray, \textit{op. cit.}
Defense Secretary] but that he refused to destroy the people's will'.

The Presidential election of 1953 threatened to be more violent than the preceding ones for pitted against each other in this election were President Quirino who was running for re-election and his former Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay who, as previously mentioned, had gone over to the NPs. Plans for a coup d'état were made, and some reports indicated that it may be carried out with possible American assistance.

When Quirino accused the U.S. of keeping warships in the harbor to land marines, force him out of Malacanang, and put Magsaysay into the palace, he may have had some inkling of the actual plans...

... A skeleton command headquarters was set up in Zambales. Throughout Zambales and the other provinces thousands of weapons were cached at top secret dumps. Armored vehicles, including tanks, were so placed that they could be brought into immediate action.

Magsaysay planned, if need came, to go immediately to the Zambales headquarters, direct operations from there, and announce to the nation that he had set up a provisional

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_Pioneer Herald_, June 1, 1953.
government and intended to advance on Malacanang to depose and imprison Quirino. 228

It should be added that Magsaysay's candidacy had the full backing of the Americans. American businessmen contributed $250,000 to Magsaysay's campaign expenses. But Magsaysay reputedly received a further half million dollars from the Pentagon. The amount was reportedly offered for use in connection with the anti-Huk campaign but 'the half million was quietly transferred to JUSMAG, in Manila, where it would not be necessary for Magsaysay to account for it'. 229 Time magazine reported:

It was no secret that RM [Ramon Magsaysay] was America's boy. For a time, U.S. Col. Edward Landsdale [who earned the title of 'General Landslide' among Filipinos for his role in Magsaysay's election victory] of the U.S. Air Forces took a desk in Magsaysay's Defense Office, and became virtually his mentor and publicity man. Polished, precise William Lacy, Councillor of the U.S. Embassy [actually Lacy was the deputy of Ambassador Raymond A. Spruance] became the man to whom Magsaysay turned daily for counsel. 230

The reported U.S. assistance to Magsaysay in the event of a coup, therefore, seemed to be highly plausible

228 Romulo and Gray, The Magsaysay Story, op. cit., pp.31-2; Cf. also Carlos Quirino, Magsaysay of the Philippines (Manila: Alemar's 1958) and Hartendorp, The Magsaysay Administration, op. cit., pp.2-3.
229 Romulo and Gray, ibid., p.167.
although the direct use of U.S. Marines to force Quirino out of Malacañang, as noted by Magsaysay's biographers, may not have been part of the actual plans. Fortunately, the planned coup d'etat did not come about for, as earlier mentioned, Magsaysay won overwhelmingly over Quirino at the polls.

Subsequent elections have followed a more or less similar pattern as regards the use of fraud and force. In 1957, the election toll was reported as forty-three dead and wounded, while the 1959 figure rose to ninety-four. In the 1961 Presidential elections, 'goons' were reported to have been 'imported' into Romblon where they 'were displaying and cocking their high-powered guns in public'. Ilocos Sur, as always, topped the other provinces in political violence. Government troops were sent to augment the local police forces but the killings and political terrorism continued. Disruption of political rallies, beatings, stabbings and shootings

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while rallies were going on, and ambuscades were reported.\textsuperscript{234} In the 1963 off-year elections, there were '31 provinces [out of 56] which reported a record number of dead and wounded' as a result of political violence.\textsuperscript{235}

The important question is why elite politics sometimes becomes violent. In answer, several factors must be considered. The first is the police-bodyguard system. Since before the war, local police forces have mostly been the personal followers of incumbent politicians. Thus Hayden observed:

During the American period, the municipal police were a joke and a scandal. In a large majority of cases, they were the political henchmen, and in too many instances the personal muchachos of the presidentes and local bosses. Underpaid, only partially trained, and poorly equipped, in some places changed every few months in order that more of the faithful may be rewarded, they often

\textsuperscript{234} Cf. Manila Chronicle, November 10, 1961; 'Pre-poll violence toll rises', \textit{ibid.}, November 12, 1961.

served the reigning local cacique rather than the public. In numerous instances they were instruments of oppression rather than agents of the law.\textsuperscript{236}

On the national level, the national police agency entrusted with peace and order, the Philippine Constabulary, had traditionally been under the control of politicians. Before the war, and until 1951, it was under the Secretary of Interior who was a politician. While placed under the unified command of General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 1951 to help cope with the Huk rebellion, it has recently been concerned again with the policing of elections.

The personal nature of elite political organizations has already been pointed out. Adherents of a party tend to be personal followers of particular politicians. This includes, in many cases, the police agencies. Hayden's observations are still relevant in the contemporary setting as illustrated by the following example in the town of Mabini, Pangasinan:

Violence may possibly erupt any time in this usually peaceful town since the emergence last week of two chiefs of police with separate forces. Despite the refusal of the incumbent chief of police, Gil M. Bustamante, to resign from his position, newly elected LP mayor Demetrio Braganza had appointed his

\textsuperscript{236} J.R. Hayden, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 291.
own nephew Orlando Catalan, a lawyer, police chief.

Bustamante, an NP appointee and the chief of police for the past 10 years, continued to defy Mayor Branganza's order dismissing him from the service.\footnote{Manila Times, January 15, 1964, p.1-B.}

The pattern of personal domination of police forces by the local incumbent politician seems to be a general one. Thus, one observer noted that 'a cursory look into the police system discloses the fact that many of the members of the country's local police forces have no qualifications but their political connections'.\footnote{Oscar Rojo, 'Policemen in Politics', The Philippine Herald Magazine, November 2, 1963, p.5.}

Indeed, the security of tenure of the local policeman seems to depend very much on the capacity of his political boss to remain in office. Because of this, he becomes a rabid partisan, personally loyal to his political godfather for, if the latter loses in an election, he would most probably lose his job, too. The same perhaps may not be said of the Constabulary in general, but there are many instances where political partisanship is shown. While there is more security of tenure, particularly among members of the regular force, political influence and connection oftentimes become a strong determining
factor in matters of promotions and assignments. This is especially the case at the top echelon of command.
Thus, politics intrude in military affairs. Because of this, the Philippine military may not be said to be exactly apolitical.

The reshuffles and transfers of some constabulary and army officers before an election are often noted by the press.\(^239\) As in the use of public funds and facilities, the party in power has a decided advantage with regard to the 'policing' of the elections. In 1961, for instance, then Vice-President Macapagal strongly opposed the use of the Constabulary in policing the elections as he claimed that 'mounting evidence shows that the PC high command was a political tool of President Garcia'.\(^240\) He cited the following to support his charge: 'the recent shifting of PC provincial commanders as shown in the sending of PC partisans to Liberal [party] areas considered critical by Nacionalistas; the unjustified actions in placing areas under constabulary control...; the retention of Brigadier General Isagani V. Campo as PC Chief [said to

\(^{239}\) Cf., for example, The Manila Times, October 2, and 5, 1953; Philippines Free Press, October 3, 1953, and December 19, 1953.

\(^{240}\) 'Macapagal bucks use of PC in policing November polls', Manila Chronicle, October 3, 1961.
be 'very close' to President Garcia] despite his having reached retirement age two years ago'. In Ilocos Sur, one politician belonging to the 'outs' complained that one PC officer, close to a congressman, was very partial. 'He was protecting the "goons" of Congressman...', he charged. He added that 'he even gives them CIS (Criminal Investigation Service of the PC) ID cards'. Likewise, a PC provincial commander interviewed stated that 'the position of a PC commander is difficult. If he does his job well [i.e., impartially] he gets relieved. There are powerful political forces exerted above', he said.

Another PC officer assigned in Cebu complained:

Why should I sacrifice my military career for those...politicians? [Politician] A clamors for the arrest of [Politician] B for gambling. If I do it, it will not only be the personal triumph of A but it will also prejudice my career. You see, B is so powerful he can concoct charges, get witnesses, bribe fiscals and judges, and buy newspapermen to yank out a small fry like me from his job. He can even have somebody killed.

241 Ibid. Cf. also 'AFP Vice-Chief asks PC to keep off politics', Manila Chronicle, June 29, 1961.
242 Personal interview.
243 Personal interview.
244 Personal interview.
The above illustrations point to an advantage of the 'ins'. What about the 'outs'? Claiming, that their lives are threatened with danger, they employ their own personal bodyguards. In many cases, known killers and criminals are hired. One Ilocos Sur politician, for instance, said in a matter-of-fact way: 'We all employ "goons". It is because they [his political opponents] employ "goons". The "goons" here are killers. The more they have killed the better they are as bodyguards. You see, murderers are feared.'

One politician, a provincial official, described political life in Ilocos Sur as the 'survival of the toughest'. Another politician in the same politically violent province justified the use of bodyguards:

The employment of 'goons' is necessary [he said]. Here, if you have no 'goons' your life is endangered. You cannot campaign because you will be trailed wherever you go by the 'goons' of your opponent. If you attack [criticize] him... BANG. So you must employ 'counter-goons'.

Politicians giving protection to criminal elements are not uncommon. One provincial commander mentioned that some killings and other form of violence in his

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245 Personal interview.
246 Personal interview.
province are actually due to personal grudges or drunkenness of the bodyguards of politicians. The perpetrators, however, seek protection and help from their political bosses and they usually get it. In Cavite, one PC officer reported that his men were encountering difficulty in arresting a gang leader wanted for murder, holdups, and robbery in band 'because of the interference of a politician'. There were also reported cases of detained convicts allegedly 'released for election duty' in the 1963 elections.

The employment of bodyguards is a common practice among politicians. In the provinces noted for their political violence, it is not surprising to find politicians moving about during election campaigns accompanied by men armed with pistols, carbines, sub-machineguns and other deadly weapons. When these bodyguards of opposing camps meet, whether in bars, nightclubs, liquor stores or political rallies, an armed clash is sometimes the result. Even the popular Magsaysay employed 'hired guns'.

These men [Magsaysay's bodyguards] labored with such impersonal efficiency that in a crowd even

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members of the campaign party could not tell who they were. They mingled with the people, prepared for any emergency. They were tough and their guns were always on the ready.

One example of the type drafted for this work was a muscleman known only as 'Big Boy'. While riding in a truck one day, he had recognized two Huks as his fellow passengers. He started a fight with them, knocked one out, and shot the other to death. It was shortly thereafter that 'Big Boy' was recruited for the Magsaysay contingent.249

Another factor that contributes to political violence is the large number of firearms circulating. As of December 1963, there were 331,123 registered firearms. These were mostly issued to property owners, businessmen, and public officials or their agents.250 But there are scores of thousands of other loose firearms coming from various sources. Many were the remains of the last war, others were sold by American soldiers from the U.S. bases, and still others were 'home-made'. In Cebu, Ilocos Sur and possibly other provinces there are secret 'paltik' (locally made firearms) factories. Political killings are usually perpetrated with these unlicensed firearms so that ballistic examination cannot

249 Romulo and Gray, op. cit., p.225.
trace the killer. Many politicians' bodyguards are armed with these unlicensed firearms. In 1961, for instance, the PC chief, ordered 'all units of his command to confiscate the unlicensed firearms of the so-called agents of provincial governors'. One provincial governor (Cavite), however, complained of discrimination, alleging that 'the PC command in Cavite is a political tool of Fernando Campos, son-in-law of President Garcia who was a candidate for the lone congressional district of Cavite'.

The often virulent and personal attacks hurled by elite politicians against each other also contribute towards the use of force. The familiar cry of 'bomba', meaning, the unrestrained and personal innuendos bordering on the libelous and the exposure of private and public immoralities, increase the animosities and tension that often end up in gunplay, but the casualties are usually the 'loyal' mercenaries and henchmen. For the elite politician is not for something when he campaigns. In most cases he is just against somebody. Too often, the central theme involves personalities, not concrete programs or principles.

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Finally, the use of fraud itself may be mentioned as another cause of violence. Uses of 'flying voters', (i.e., paid men who register and vote in more than one precinct), preventing electors suspected of supporting the other candidate from voting, vote-buying, snatching of ballot boxes, and other similar practices may invite reprisals from the other side.252

One of the standard elite arguments to demonstrate the 'vitality' of democracy in the Philippines is the fact that 'never in its history...has [it] seen a military coup d'etat, a change of government except by

252

It is difficult to estimate the number of 'flying voters'. In Manila, one informed source estimated that about ten per cent of voters are 'flying voters'. In the 1963 election, the Commission on Elections distributed a special kind of ink to all precincts to combat 'flying voters'. Electoral officials used this ink to 'brand' every voter that had voted between the thumb and the forefinger. There were reports from various precincts, however, to the effect that the ink was 'accidentally' spilled, had mysteriously disappeared, or was not used at all. (Vide, 'Terrorism at the Polls', op. cit., p.38.) One defeated NP gubernatorial candidate in Cotabato in the 1963 election complained that 'the flying voters of the Liberals had a field day'. (Ibid.) One Davao politician narrated that in one election, his opponent was buying votes. Then they met in one locality. 'If he offered P5, I was ready to offer P10. If he made a false move then', he said, 'it would probably have meant the death of the two of us. If I was the target of his bodyguards, he was also the target of mine.' (Personal interview.)
ballot, a dictatorship, forcible expropriation of
property, riots, snake dances or bloody purges.253

Through the ballot, the people overthrew the
messy and scandalous Liberal administration
during the Quirino regime; the people used
it again during the dark and wicked days of
the Garcia administration. The ballot is the
foundation of the government of the people
which we enjoy today. It is the common man's
possession which makes him equal to anyone,
rich or powerful. It is the citizen's own
weapon in the new revolution.254

In view of the limitations to the election process
that have been discussed, however, the above views may
be a little too optimistic. Another view, expressed by
Sorokin, seems to be more relevant to the Philippine
setting during the period under review. Thus, Sorokin
wrote:

When the whole electoral machinery became
monopolized by small cliques of politicians;
when these politicians began to decide who
in each party was to be nominated for what
position; when direct, personal knowledge of
the candidates became impossible for 99 per
cent of the voters; when political propaganda
through press, radio, television and other
means of communication became monopolized by
small caucuses of professional politicians
and power groups; finally when bribery;

253
Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., (NEC chairman) quoted in
Daniel Wolfstone, Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.XLV,
no.12, September 17, 1964, p.511.
254
fraud, threats, punishments and murder began to be used as the instrumentalities of elective campaigns -- then the value of the elective principle had largely evaporated.\footnote{\textit{Pitirim Sorokin, Power and Morality} (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1959) pp.141-2.}
CHAPTER VI

THE ART OF WIELDING POWER: THE ELITE IN GOVERNMENT

In the last two chapters, the study has described and analyzed the character, composition and economic interests of the power-wielders and the manner in which they compete to attain political decision-making posts. It has been shown that the 'social circulation' of the political elite has been essentially confined within the limits of the existing dominant socio-economic groups whose basic interests are tied to land, business, industry or the professions. It has likewise been indicated that Philippine political organizations and political activities are organized, financed and led by the socio-economic elite, and that in striving to assume decision-making positions large amounts of money, time and energy are spent. Even lives are lost in the quest for power.

This chapter attempts to describe and analyze the manner in which the elite exercise power. It investigates the ways in which benefits and resources are allocated and how elite positions and interests are maintained or enhanced in the process. Attention is focused on the
stakes and prizes involved in the political contest and how the participants go about getting what the system has to offer. What are the privileges of power? How do the elite deal with the problems of Philippine society in general?

A. THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF POWER

Before going into the discussion of the main problem, it is necessary to touch briefly on the formal structure in which the participants operate.

One of the chief features of Philippine governmental organization is its high degree of centralization. Not surprisingly perhaps, this organization follows the hierarchical pattern in the social and economic structures.

The system of government is unitary with vast powers concentrated in the national government. Primarily a legacy of the colonial era, when almost everything was decided in Manila, this high concentration of power gives the top national officials a strong control of the whole machinery of government.

The Constitution of the Philippines broadly outlines the major divisions of the government, namely the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary (see Figure IV). It establishes the centers of political
decision-making and also grants powers to those who will man these posts.

The legal and constitutional position of the Philippine President makes him a very powerful person. He is the head of state, and chief of the administrative branch; and 'the executive departments, bureaus and other offices are extensions of his personality'.¹ Immediate powers of supervision are given to Cabinet secretaries over their respective departments but general supervision and control is vested in the President.²

In addition to his role as chief of the administrative branch, the President has under him the Office of the President which exercises direct administrative supervision over all unassigned offices, bureaus, and agencies that are created by Congress from time to time. The President has also under him, through the Cabinet

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2 Ibid. There were in 1963 eleven Executive Departments whose heads composed the Cabinet. The heads of the Office of Economic Co-ordination, Office of the President, Office of Press Secretary, and five other agencies have also been given the status of Cabinet members. (See Figure IV, Note **.)
members concerned, various government corporations such as the National Development Company (NDC), the National Power Corporation (NPC), the National Shipyards and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Manila Railroad Company (MRR), the Rice and Corn Administration (RCA), the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Manila Gas Corporation, the Philippine Tobacco Administration, Abaca Corporation of the Philippines, the Philippine Sugar Institute, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), the National Marketing Corporation (NAMARCO), and others. (See Figure IV.)\(^3\) He has administrative supervision over the government banks and other financing institutions such as the Central Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines, and the Philippine National Bank.

The Constitution likewise provides that the President 'shall exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law'; he has the power to suspend or remove provincial officials for disloyalty to the government,\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Section 10(1), Article VII.
dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office. He has also the power to remove municipal officials for neglect of duty; oppression; corruption; any other form of maladministration in office; and final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. He also has the power to remove for cause, justices of the peace.

By statutory law, department secretaries in the national government have also been given control over the acts of the local governments. Thus, provincial and municipal budgets may be passed upon by the Secretary of Finance; the validity of ordinances and resolutions may be decided finally, at least administratively, by the department head in the national government—formerly the Secretary of the Interior, and now with the abolition of the latter, by the Executive Office...5

Another important power of the Chief Executive is the power of appointment and removal. The Constitution provides that the President appoints the heads of executive departments and bureaus; officers of the Army from the rank of colonel and of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander; ambassadors, ministers, and consuls; members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts; members of the Commission on Elections; the Auditor-General; other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the constitution; and those whom he may be authorized by subsequent laws to appoint.6

5 Aruego, op. cit., p.606.
6 Section 10(3), Article VII; Section 5, Article VIII; Section 1, Article X; Section 1, Article XI.
The President has other powers. He can influence the passage of certain legislation through his power to control the sessions of Congress, to certify to the necessity of immediate enactment of particular bills, and to approve or veto measures that have been passed by Congress. These are in addition to his direct, though informal, influence as titular head of his party, as well as his personal skill as a politician in dealing with members of the opposing political group.

The Philippine Congress is also an important locus of formal power. Aside from its primary function of lawmaking, it shares in the executive prerogatives by its power to create or abolish executive departments, bureaus and other offices; to define their powers; and to appropriate funds for their operations. It confirms the appointments (of specified officials) made by the President through its Commission on Appointments. Congress, also,

has exclusive power to determine the organization, powers, and functions of local governments. It may determine that the number of provinces or municipalities or cities be increased or decreased; that their officials be appointive, not elective; that their term of office be short or long; that their powers be great or little.

7 The Presidential veto power can, however, be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress.
making them more or less autonomous or mere agencies of the national government; that their action on certain matters or even on all matters -- finance, health education, public works, administration of justice, -- be subject to national control. 8

Local governments, then, are practically at the mercy of the Presidency and Congress. Although certain reform measures leading towards more local autonomy have recently been passed, the fact is that this dual Legislative-Executive power over local governments is still strong. The measures that have been enacted are actually minor concessions given by the central government in the exercise of this power. 9 Congress still enacts laws creating barrios or municipalities, creating or abolishing cities, even the changing of names of government schools in far-flung provinces require approval by the national government in Manila. Whether or not this unitary and highly centralized system is desirable in a country such as the Philippines is a question the answer to which will probably depend on many factors. What is certain, however, is that this

8 Aruego, op. cit., p.606.

9 Two measures increasing local autonomy are R.A. 2264, known as the Local Autonomy Act, passed on June 19, 1959; and R.A. 2370, known as the 'Barrio Charter', passed on June 20, 1959.
relationship of national and local governments in the Philippines has contributed immensely to the powers that the top national officials exercise over the rest of the country.

Formal political decision-making in the Philippines is largely centered on this Executive-Legislative axis. The persons who man the top posts in these two branches of the government are the official policy-makers. They are the ones who formally decide 'who gets what and how much'.

B. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF POWER

It is not to be inferred from the above statement, however, that the formal power-wielders are the only participants in the decision-making process. There are other non-governmental groups composed of citizens or non-citizens, who may be able to influence public policies. Questions such as whom to appoint in a governmental post, what legislation will be enacted that favors or protects

Constitutionally, the Judicial branch is a co-equal of, and as important as, the Executive and Legislative branches, but its decision-making functions (aside from the usual functions of administering justice) are mainly limited to making interpretations of the legality or constitutionality of certain Executive and Legislative acts.
a particular individual or group, who will get government contracts, who will get monopolies or semi-monopolies through government franchises and licenses, who will get what public services and how much, what group or individuals will get generous loans from government banks and other financial institutions, whose tax payments will be condoned or reduced, and so forth - all these, though formally decided by official decision-makers, involve personal arrangements, bargaining, pressures, or compromises among the influentials.

The influentials, as has been indicated in the previous chapters, come from the small upper strata minority. They consist of the educated, wealthy or well-to-do groups who command prestige and deference, mainly because of the superordinate socio-economic status they occupy.

There are the affluent party leaders who may not be holding public office at the moment; the landowning groups such as the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, the Philippine Sugar Association, the Federation of Rice and Corn Planters, the Philippine Coconut Producers Association; the industrialist groups represented by the Chamber of Industries of the Philippines; the bankers
and financiers; the exporters and importers and other individuals or groups who have financially supported the power-holders during the political campaign. Mention may also be made of the Catholic Church which has consistently considered the field of education as its traditional sphere of interest; the mass media which, as previously noted, are largely controlled or owned by a few families (the Roceses, Lopezes, Sorianes, Elizaldes, Stewarts, Menzio, Ceas);\(^{11}\) and the civic groups that seek to promote certain projects.

There are the alien businessmen, landowners, or industrialists who, although prohibited by law from intervening in domestic politics, manage to secure what they want in terms of favorable or protective laws, franchises or licenses, contracts, and other privileges, mainly through substantial contributions to party campaign chests or to individual politicians, or through 'favors' and other payments made to public officials. The Stonehill case, discussed in Chapter V, provides a good illustration of this point. (It was noted in this example that Stonehill seemed to have influenced even the appointment of certain top public officials.) The

\(^{11}\) See Footnote 51, p.109.
study considers this group as important because it is able to influence important public decisions. They exercise influence directly or indirectly, through the 'front door' or the 'back door', legally or illegally. This fact is important from the political standpoint since the members of this group, although possessing political disqualifications -- they cannot vote nor run for public office -- manage to get what they want from the system, much more successfully than thousands of the voting citizens.

Two points must be emphasized in this connection. As has been said, these influentials belong to, or generally represent the interests of, the upper-strata urban minority. Because of this factor, the concessions, benefits, or advantages they get are usually of limited application insofar as the total society is concerned.

A second point is that there is a considerable overlapping or interlocking of interests among them. Illustrations have been given of the pattern of multiplicity of interests, not only of the members of the socio-economic elite in general, but also of the political power-wielders as well.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, there are

\textsuperscript{12} For illustrations, vide Chapter III, pp.107-9 and Chapter IV, pp.170-6.
sugar planters who are also 'millers' (sugar mill operators), rice hacenderos, industrialists, bankers, mass media owners, or are engaged in other business activities. There are civic leaders who are also landowners and businessmen. The Church has interests in education as well as in banks, insurance company and landed estates. Many politicians are landowners, businessmen, or lawyers of big corporations. Aside from this interlocking of interests among the elite, there are the family and other social links. These have

13 The Church owns about 87 per cent of the stocks of the Philippine Trust Company, owns the Monte de Piedad Savings Bank, and is a major stockholder of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the latter being owned jointly with the Spanish Ayala group and some other landowners and businessmen. The BPI was the former 'Banco Español' established by the Spaniards in 1851 by Royal Decree. It was 'the oldest bank in the islands,...founded by an order of the Spanish Government uniting the obras pias funds of the four orders of friars in the Philippines. These funds were known as the Santo Domingo, San Francisco, Isabel, and Recoletos, and were derived from legacies of pious Catholics, the incomes from which were devoted to the purposes mentioned in the wills -- such as masses for the repose of the souls of the deceased, or for some charitable object, or for the benefit of the religious order to which the bequests pertained'. (1903 Census of the Philippine Islands, op. cit., vol.IV, p.541.) The Church also owns the Fidelity and Surety Company, owning 4,993 shares out of 5,000. (Articles of Incorporation.) The Church and some of the religious corporations also own haciendas. The Catholic educational institutions in 1962 consisted of 6 Universities, 115 Colleges, 599 High Schools, 328 Elementary Schools and 210 Kindergarten Classes. (Catholic Directory of the Philippines, 1963, op. cit., Statistical Appendix.)
also been discussed in Chapters III and IV. All these are important considerations in the analysis of elite political behavior.

THE REWARDS OF OFFICE

Appointments. One of the most important prizes of the political contest among top public officials is the opportunity to allocate government positions. The chief official participants in this process are the President and other executive officials, and members of Congress.

The top offices, namely, the Cabinet posts and the principal positions in the various government-owned or -controlled corporations and other national agencies are usually filled by the President to fulfill his 'commitments' and to increase the strength and effectiveness of his political machine. These go to top party cronies and other influential individuals (or their recommendees) who have made substantial contributions to the party. Some go to persons who are close to the President. These may be relatives, personal friends, 'provincemates' or 'townmates', top industrialists, bankers, business magnates, or prominent men of the professions. The loyal political leaders who had worked hard for the victory of the President but
who had lost in their candidacies, the so-called 'lame-ducks', are also among the contenders for the top posts.

Thus, President Roxas appointed Miguel Cuaderno, who was the organizer and first President of the Philippine Bank of Commerce in 1939 (now owned by the Cojuangcos), as his Secretary of Finance in 1946.  

He was economic adviser to President Sergio Osmeña until the latter had reorganized the Commonwealth government.... He... worked for the election of President Manual A. Roxas; and was named chairman of the board of directors, National Development Company, and seven government corporations. He was appointed secretary of finance later.

Prominent landowners are often appointed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Reference has already been made in another connection on this pattern of appointing persons whose dominant economic interests are closely related to the public posts they are to occupy. Further illustrations on this point are the government banks and other financial institutions.

Prominent bankers and financiers or persons closely

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15 Ibid. Cuaderno was also the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines from 1948 until his replacement during the Macapagal administration.
16 Those who have occupied these posts were: Mariano Garchitorena - 1946; Placido Mapa - 1949; Fernando Lopez - 1951; Salvador Araneta - 1955; Juan de G. Rodriguez - 1959; Benjamin Gozon - 1963; and Jose Y. Feliciano - 1964.
connected with private banks such as A. de las Alas (Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company), Nicanor Jacinto (Security Bank and Trust Company), Primitivo Lovina (Manila Surety and Fidelity Company), Alfonso Calalang (Security Bank and Trust Company), Arsenio Jison (Manila Banking Corporation) Silvestre Punzalan (Bank of the Orient), Rufino Manotok (Metropolitan Bank), Rodolfo Andal (Manufacturers' Bank and Trust Company), and Leonides S. Virata (Far East Bank and Trust Company), have held top positions as Presidents, Vice-Presidents or members of the board in government banks and financial institutions (Philippine National Bank, Central Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines, and Government Service Insurance System). The study's data on banks and insurance companies also show that of 33 private commercial banks in 1963, 29 (or 88 per cent) had public officials or close relatives in these banks' boards of directors. Top public officials who have held or are holding public office who have been identified are as follows: 8 - Cabinet members; 5 - Senators; 1 - Speaker of the House; 4 - Representatives; 2 - Justices;

Of 69 insurance companies whose records were available to the study, 27 had 50 public officials or close relatives in their boards of directors. Top public officials who have held or are holding public office who have been identified are: 11 - Cabinet Members; 1 - Senate President; 1 - Speaker of the House; 5 - Senators; 4 - Representatives; 2 - Provincial Governors; 3 - Ambassadors; and 2 - Generals.

Appointments (from 1946-1963) to key government corporations or agencies, such as the National Development Company include prominent businessmen, shipping magnates, industrialists and landowners like Manuel Elizalde, Jose P. Fernandez, and Rafael Roces, Roberto Villanueva, and Eugenio Puyat; and in the National Economic Council, Aurelio Montinola, Joaquin Elizalde, Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Salvador Araneta, Jose Cojuangco, and Juan L. Ledesma (1953); Jaime Hernandez, Alfredo Montelibano, Alfonzo Calalang, and Oscar Ledesma (1955); and Eduardo Z. Romualdez and Hermenegildo B. Reyes (1959). All these men are nationally known for their wealth and the extent and diversity of their economic interests. The
data that have been presented in Chapter IV illustrating the occupations of top public officials would further illuminate this point.

Most knowledgeable Filipinos are, of course, aware of the pattern of appointing relatives or prominent 'provincemates' or 'townmates' to important government posts. Appendix A of this study, for instance, shows that many of the members or close relatives of the politically dominant families (in the various provinces and Manila) occupy appointive positions. (See last column, Appendix A.) The pattern is a general one and was observed for all the Administrations covered by this study.

The practice is sometimes denounced. Representative Teodulo Natividad, for instance, charged Agriculture Secretary Jose Y. Feliciano of 'corruption and nepotism', accusing him of 'packing the Rice and Corn Administration, which Feliciano also heads, with relatives and political leaders as casual laborers, drawing salaries as high as P1,243.50 per month'. In a privileged speech in Congress, Natividad presented documents containing the names and salaries of the persons involved. 'In a gesture

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of unprecedented partisanship, abuse of power and wanton disregard of WAPCO and civil service regulations, [Natividad charged], Feliciano hired whole families of his political leaders.²⁰

There is of course, nothing novel in the above illustration. As has been said, this is a general practice in the government service or even in private enterprises.²¹ Even during the Commonwealth period, the practice had been recognized as a widespread phenomenon, making it necessary for President Quezon to issue an executive order 'Prohibiting and Restricting the Practice of Nepotism'.²² Hayden's explanation was that Society in the Philippines is still quasi-feudal in organization. An astonishing number of people are the followers of this leader or that family. Many young men are commonly recognized as being under the patronage of powerful figures in the business, social or political world. There may or may not be direct pressure to assure the rapid advancement of such persons, but it is an observable fact that not infrequently they do rise with surprising rapidity even in the civil service. Other things being at all

²⁰Ibid. In the list that Natividad presented, one family had ten members employed in the RCA and four others had six each.

²¹Reference is made to the 'closed family corporations', discussed in Chapter III, pp.105-9.

²²Executive Order No. 111, August 30, 1937, cited by Hayden, op. cit., p.121.
equal, no one who knows the Philippines can
doubt that 'townmates' or 'provincemates'
get the better of it in the government
offices, as elsewhere. 23

Although the practice is denounced from time to
time, it is carried on, for even those who denounce it
are most probably practitioners of the system. It is,
of course, prohibited by law. In fact, the Constitution
itself provides that

appointments in the Civil Service, except
as to those which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical
in nature shall be made only according to
merit and fitness, to be determined as 24
practicable by competitive examination.

The above provision on appointments to the Civil
Service was extended by executive order in 1950 and
1951 to include officials and employees of government-
owned and -controlled corporations. 25 It also embraces
all national and local officials and employees.

The Civil Service Law on nepotism is also quite
specific as regards the prohibition on the employment of
relatives:

23 Ibid.
24 Article XII, Section 1.
25 Cf. Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr., and Raul P. de Guzman,
'The '50-50' Agreement', in Raul P. de Guzman (ed.),
Patterns in Decision-Making, op. cit., p. 94.
All appointments in the national, provincial, city, and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, whether in the competitive or non-competitive service, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.\(^{26}\)

The intervention of top politicians and other public officials in matters of appointment to the public service, however, cannot seem to be stopped by laws. The political and cultural systems sanction it. Loopholes on the rules are sought (and usually found), the laws are twisted, and even the Constitution is openly disregarded. This is effective power.

Because the practice cannot be stopped, the Executive and Legislative departments have formalized it in 1959 in what has been previously cited as the '50-50 Agreement'. This plan, it should be recalled, 'envisaged the division of new positions between the Lower House and Malacañang'.\(^{27}\) Francisco and de Guzman quoted a Congressman-dissenter as having said in connection with the agreement:

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\(^{26}\) Section 30(a), 'Nepotism', Republic Act 2260.

\(^{27}\) Francisco and de Guzman, \textit{op. cit.}, p.117.
I don't see why they [the President and the House leadership] had to make it a formal arrangement. They could have done it informally; the formal arrangement is immoral. The number of positions created is predetermined not according to actual needs, but according to the number of political proteges to be accommodated. There have to be many new positions as there are Congressmen to carry out the agreement.28

Office as a Means to More Power. The allocation of government posts and other jobs by the power-holders is not, of course, designed merely to accommodate relatives, friends, and political supporters. Public office, as shall be shown later, is a very profitable activity and there is therefore a tendency -- in fact, a strongly established pattern -- towards the consolidation of position aimed at climbing to still higher positions of power. Undoubtedly, this characteristic is not unique to the Philippines. It can appear anywhere. Wealth, prestige, and power are like opium that intoxicates the possessors, making them crave for more.

Reference has been made in Chapter V to the nature of elite political organizations. It has been argued that individual political leaders tend to create personal organizations of their own and that in the process they utilize not only the cultural tools but

28 Congressman Joaquin R. Roces, quoted in ibid., p.111.
also the resources of the government, dispensing favors and patronage whenever they are in power.\textsuperscript{29} The aim of the power-holder is to strengthen his political position. Looking after the interest of moneyed groups and giving them key positions in the government assures him of continued financial backing in his political activities. Although he may be economically very well off himself, he still needs a lot of money during an election campaign, since Philippine elections, as has been seen in the preceding chapter, are very expensive. But, obviously, this is not a one-sided arrangement. The 'interests' provide him with the financial backing that he needs so he can remain in office or seek higher positions, but he must in turn fulfill those expectations or understandings, expressed or implied, which prompted the financial backers to select him as 'their' candidate.

The appointment of his relatives is not only in accord with the kinship system but is also another means of enhancing the family's economic position.

Patronage of his provincemates assures him of a strong provincial bailiwick which he can count on, for

\textsuperscript{29} See Chapter V, p.269-71.
these are most often his own political leaders or their relatives and other recommendees.  

Public office, then, is a stepping stone to higher posts. The Municipal or City Councilor aspires for the mayorship, the Provincial Board member wants to be Governor some day, the Representative would like to be Senator, and so on. This hierarchical pattern of ascent has been illustrated in the analysis of the career patterns of the power group in Chapter IV. There are, of course, exceptions as has been earlier pointed out, and these exceptions are those individuals who come from the top or near the top of the socio-economic pyramid and who follow the direct route to the House, the Senate or to a Cabinet post. None so far has, however, gone directly to the Presidency or the Vice-Presidency.

The power-holder does not rely on the strategic appointments of allies and supporters alone to strengthen his position. He forms other alliances with other politicians who, like him, are also earnestly trying to

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31 See Tables 4.3 and 4.3-A, pp.143 and 144, respectively.
32 Cf. p.147.
33 Cf. Figure I, p.150.
increase their own personal political strength. He makes bargains or secret deals with party cronies or even with leaders of the other party. The overriding aim is to consolidate one's position. This becomes possible for, as has been discussed elsewhere, there is a fluidity in party membership because the major political parties in existence are indistinguishable from each other in point of basic interests, political principles, and composition. There is a free movement of political personnel from one party to the other.

In the November 1961 elections, for instance, the Liberal Party candidates for President and Vice-President were elected; but the Nacionalista Party retained control of Congress. The NP had 75 members in the House as against 29 Liberals; in the Senate, there were 13 Nacionalistas as against 11 LP Senators.\textsuperscript{34} This situation, however, was not to last long. By January 9, 1962, or just over a week after the newly-elected officials had been installed, three NP Representatives (Cebu's Zosa, Durano, and Dumon) joined President Macapagal's LP House bloc.\textsuperscript{35} A week later, these were followed by NP Representative Montano of Cavite. The

\textsuperscript{34} The Manila Chronicle, January 10, 1962.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
latter had a 'patriotic' justification for his defection. He changed party, he said, because he believed that

in order to meet the universal clamor for the immediate solution of the country's most pressing problems the most logical step for the members of Congress to take is to have proper co-ordination and co-operation between the Executive and the Legislative branches of government.  

Montano led a group of 26 other NP congressmen (including the first three mentioned above) and formed the so-called 'Allied Majority'. Conferences and secret huddles with the President and other LP leaders followed. On January 23, 1962, the initial voting for the House leadership showed the trend. The NP which was supposed to have 75 members in the House got only 61 votes while the LP with only 29 members garnered 40 votes. Nevertheless, NP House leader Daniel Romualdez was still elected as Speaker.  

As more of the 'Allied Majority' got the concessions they wanted from the President and the Liberal Party, the LP capture of the House leadership, despite the party's limited numbers, seemed inevitable. By March, 1962, the NP control of the House of Representatives passed to the Liberals. LP

Representative Cornelio Villareal won the Speakership. The NP defectors were given posts as House Committee chairmen and Representative Montano, the leader of the 'Allied Majority', became House Majority Leader.  

In the Senate, where the situation was also precarious for the NP which had only a majority of 2 (13 NP Senators against 11 Liberal), a change also occurred. NP Senator Eulogio Balao, engaged in a political feud with NP President and Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez, defected to the Liberal Party on January 24, 1962, making a 12-12 count in the party alignments. Balao’s defection was so sudden that it caught his former partymates by surprise. Shortly before the opening of the Senate session, he had informed a committee of Congressmen that he was abiding by the NP agreement in a caucus to retain the leadership of the Senate. When his name was called during the voting for the Senate presidency, however, he stood up and announced that he had affiliated with the Liberal Party and was voting for that party’s candidate, Senator

Ferdinand Marcos. Charges of 'opportunism' were hurled. NP Senator Primicias recalled that 'patriotism [which was the excuse given for the defection] is the last refuge of scoundrels'. NP Senators Lim, Tolentino and Ledesma denounced the practice of 'switching parties for personal convenience'. LP Senator Osias (who, as recounted earlier in Chapter V, had himself defected from the NP in 1953) defended Balao and said that 'patriotism is a virtue that should be presumed as existent in the Senate'. Because of the deadlock, no change can be made in the leadership. Under the 'holdover' theory, the NP's retained the Senate leadership.

But the struggle went on for over a year. In January, 1963, NP Senator Alejandro Almendras, who was facing charges of unexplained wealth made by the LP administration, left the country a week before the opening of the Senate session. He had given an

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Further discussion on this subject appears in the next section.
assurance to his NP colleagues that he was just going on a short business trip to Japan and would be back before the session opened. Almendras, however, proceeded to New York where he had an 'ingrowing goiter' removed. The Nacionalistas panicked. The LP, knowing that Almendras was in New York, gave notice of a vote on the Senate reorganization. Almendras sent telegrams stating that he would be back in a few days and asked that the voting be delayed. The Liberals refused and the NP decided on a filibuster, which NP Senator Roseller Lim effectively utilized, discoursing on goiter and its hazards and other matters for nearly 20 hours. Almendras returned and the NP fort was saved. However, in April 1963, or less than three months later, Almendras surprised his NP colleagues by crossing party lines, and voted for LP Senator Ferdinand Marcos as Senate President. NP Senator Oscar Ledesma denounced the act as a 'betrayal of the people's will' while NP Senate-majority floor-leader Cipriano Primicias called it 'the subversion of the sovereign will of the people'.

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45 Ibid.
The above account illustrates one of the main preoccupations of the politicians. These continuous political maneuvers to gain personal or factional advantage, coupled with another time-consuming activity, that of finding government jobs for their respective political leaders, friends, and relatives, leaves very little time for the major tasks for which they were elected. This has led to the common comment among observers of Philippine political goings-on that there is 'too much politics' in the Philippines. What is probably meant is that the struggle for political predominance is very intense and sustained. It does not end with spirited political campaigns which are themselves long. The act of governing itself appears to have become a continuous process of political haggling and intense struggle for political supremacy.


Cf. for instance, Socrates de la Victoria, 'The Curse of the Nation; Too Much Politics', Weekly Graphic, November 18, 1964, p.6 et seq.

For example, the Nacionalista Party held its convention in November 1964 for the presidential elections in November, 1965. The Liberal Party held its own convention in January, 1965 or 10 months before the election. The major contenders had been campaigning around the country for months before the convention.
From the point of view of the power-wielders, however, the time and effort spent in maintaining and enhancing their power positions are worthwhile for there are other rewards that are fused with power. The greater the power that one exercises, the higher are the possible rewards.

THE ECONOMIC REWARDS

Salaries, Allowances and Public Funds. The emoluments of top public officials which include the official salaries and allowances that pertains to their office have been discussed in Chapter IV. It has been indicated that their salaries and allowances are substantial enough to place them among the top income earners. The legislators, particularly, although the lowest paid among the top power group considered, are nevertheless getting huge allowances in what some observers have dubbed as their 'secret salaries'.

But there are other economic gains derived from the public treasury other than the official and 'secret' salaries. The legislators have oftentimes used their lawmaking power to secure economic benefits for

Cf. Section on 'Income', pp.177-9.
themselves and their families. One example of this was reported by the press:

Last year [1962] the first year of the new Congress under the Macapagal administration, the solons forced a rider in the General Appropriations Act setting aside ₱6,000 for a world trip for each of them. And when on a world tour, each gets ₱25 per diems, plus expenses for secretarial assistance (meaning wife or child). In addition, the solons specified that while on such trips abroad, each shall carry a 'diplomatic passport', regardless of whether he is going on an official mission or merely on a pleasure-and-shopping spree.50

Other legal methods of securing money from the public treasury is through the yearly budget appropriation. Comparative figures of the annual appropriations of both houses of Congress indicate a sharp increase of from ₱12 million in 1961 to ₱33.6 million in 1963 for the House of Representatives; and from ₱3.4 million to ₱5.2 million during the same period for the Senate.51

The 'library' funds of Congress, for instance, amounted to ₱6.5(m), while the Bureau of Public Libraries which looks after the library needs of the entire country had only ₱1.4(m).52 Knowledgeable persons among

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51 The figures for 1964 were even higher and were as follows: House - ₱45.7(m), Senate - ₱8.2(m). Cf. Weekly Graphic, July 15, 1964, p. 4.
52 Ibid.
Filipinos, of course, know that much of these 'library' funds do not all go to the purchase of books and other reading materials but are diverted for other purposes. Other funds in the Congressional budget include the 'consultants fund' and the 'contingent fund'. The former is 'for specialists in their particular lines who need not hold public office in Congress'.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} It should be pointed out that the 'consultants fund' is different from the funds appropriated in the budget which allocates another substantial amount for technical assistants, special attorneys, law clerks and other researchers specializing in the drafting of bills and in legal research. Furthermore, each senator or congressman is entitled to a big high-ceilinged, well furnished room in the Capitol building, plus an assorted suite of sinecures. By his own decree, he has entitled himself to enormous fiscal allowances for secretaries, clerks, receptionists, and messengers. He can also have a military officer detailed as his technical assistant or aide. He appoints one-peso a-year-agents equipped with badge and gun. In his capacity as a member of a committee (and he has several committees), he can also name personal 'liaison men' or special investigators.\footnote{\textit{Vic Barranco, 'The Most Privileged Solons in the World', \textit{op. cit.}, p.5.}}
It need not be repeated that most of the members of his staff are his relatives (wife, daughter, son, nephew, etc.), political leaders, or other favorites.

From time to time the lid is lifted for a public view of 'what really happens' to these funds. While the information is publicly disclosed at the height of internal quarrels among the political leaders themselves (and, therefore, subject to some degree of bias), yet these disclosures are often undisputed. LP Senator Gaudencio Antonino, for instance, during his personal feud with the top LP leaders disclosed that in 1964, the amount of ₱2.25(m) was appropriated for 'printing or reprinting and binding of records, journals, and other documents for prior year' (Emphasis supplied). Yet, he argued, in 1962 and 1963, the amounts of ₱2.5(m) and ₱2.05(m), respectively, had been appropriated for the same purpose.

Incidentally, it was revealed in Congress that a Visayan solon was able to obtain a fat printing contract from the Office of the Speaker. The contract covers the printing of the journal of Congress. This may not be objectionable, except for the fact that the printing shop happens to be in the Visayas that the proofs have to shuttle back and forth between the Visayan shop and the publications division in Congress.

56 Ibid. Weekly Graphic, p.86.
The 'contingent funds' amounting to ₱595,951 in 1964, are under the control of the Speaker.

With about ₱6,651, the Speaker becomes a very powerful public official. This is especially so during an election year, when the Speaker, as a high party official, has a hand in the choice of candidates or whom to support financially. 57

Senator Antonino stated that the Speaker is 'authorized to transfer items of appropriations'. He concluded that 'a pattern has been set that would make our people believe that members of Congress have an insatiable desire to have more and more funds for themselves to the extent of having become callous to the essential needs of the nation'. 58

Regarding the furnishings of the offices of Senators and Representatives, for which another sizeable amount is likewise appropriated, an informant disclosed that some of the senators and representatives take home some of these (chairs, tables, etc.) at the end of their terms. 59 Also,

certain lawmakers send their printing jobs, such as letterheads, calling cards,

57 Ibid.
58 Quoted in ibid.
59 Personal interview with a Congressman's private Secretary.
Christmas cards, invitation cards, condolence cards and thank-you cards to the bureau of printing, all costs charged to special funds in Congress. At Christmastime and during the election campaign months, the average solon stuffs loads of mail into the postal offices free of charge, because he has given himself a franking privilege. He travels free within the country, by land, sea or air facilities. He has car, gasoline and driver's allowances.  

The utilization for electioneering purposes, of public works funds, including the 'community development funds' more popularly known as the 'pork barrel', has already been discussed in Chapter V. As previously mentioned, it is Congress which approves the budget for public works funds but it is the President who controls their release and apportionment.

Bureaucratic Capitalism. Fred Riggs has defined 'bureaucratic capitalists' as 'elite capitalists who are actually officials in the government'.

They exploit their power position to obtain income from pariah capitalists. Bureaucratic capitalists may also go into business on their own account, using pariah partners to do the work, and they may also obtain quotas and permits for re-sale to pariah collaborators.

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60 Vic Barranco, op. cit.
61 Vide p. 281.
A bureaucratic capitalist may exploit his control over a government agency to make contracts with a firm in which he holds an interest, or utilize his influence over a public corporation attached to his department to name his relatives and friends to lucrative posts in the corporation. Obviously there are many ways for a bureaucratic capitalist to allow his personal interests to modify decisions nominally made for the public interest.

In other words, funds and resources allocated to government agencies for investment or developmental purposes in a prismatic society are used in part to serve the private interests of officials handling these resources. 63

There is probably a certain amount of bureaucratic capitalism in any society that has private profit as a chief motivating factor in its economic system. Businessmen and other economically dominant groups, or those whom they support, are very likely to be elected or appointed to important public positions. When they are in positions of power, the capitalist spirit of private gain is not likely to fade away. It may merge with announced motives of 'public service' or the intent to 'help the masses', but it does not disappear. If there are no checks or other restraining influences, this drive for personal gain often becomes a dominant factor in the power-wielders' political behavior.

63 Ibid.
The fact that, in the Philippines, political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few tends to increase the probability of bureaucratic capitalism. The power-wielders, as has been pointed out, are clothed with highly-centralized formal authority. The social and cultural norms recognize a built-in superordinate -- subordinate relations between the elite and the masses. The 'sovereign people' are mostly ignorant and inarticulate while the power-holders are skilful individuals. Under these circumstances, the power-holders who are not subjected to an effective restraint from the people tend to become arbitrary in the exercise of official power. And the direction is towards the building of private fortunes.

The Philippine Constitution specifically prohibits top government officials from engaging in economic activities affected by the functions of their office:

The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices and their assistants shall not, during continuance in office, engage in the practice of any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control of any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of their office; nor shall they, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. 64

64 Section 11 (2), Article VII.
The members of Congress are also under similar Constitutional prohibition:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of Office...

It is, of course, difficulty for these Constitutional provisions to be enforced for, as has been pointed out earlier, economic power in the Philippines is merged with political power. This has become common knowledge in the country. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, when opposition Senator Tañada 'exposed', in a privileged speech in 1963, the economic activities of two Cabinet members of the ruling LP administration. He charged that Secretary of Commerce and Industry Rufino Hechanova was a director of five commercial or industrial firms and that such firms are 'in some way surely affected by the functions of [Hechanova's] department of commerce

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Section 17, Article VI.
and industry'. 66 He likewise averred that Justice Secretary Liwag, whose office supervises the solicitor general’s office which is charged with the duty of prosecuting violations of the corporation law by a corporation, is also a director of several private corporations. After pointing out the obvious Constitutional violations, he asked:

How indeed do you refuse a position for which in the space of only four months you receive per diems and bonuses totalling P12,000 as in fact Secretary Liwag did from the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., or in five months, receive P3,000 as he did from Pampanga sugar Mills? 67

Tanada concluded by asking: 'When a government official receives more from private sources than from the government itself in per diems and bonuses, whose interests


67 Senator Lorenzo Tanada, quoted in Ibid.
will be really looked after, the government's or the private corporation's?\textsuperscript{68}

Hechanova's and Liwag's replies were similar. Both claimed that they each received only ₱1,000 monthly for all their directorships and that they were representing the various government banks or financial institutions of which they were members.\textsuperscript{69} The latter wrote in a letter to the Development Bank of the Philippines, informing the government bank of his desire to resign from the board of the Marcelo Steel Corporation, that

\begin{quote}
I accepted this position only after I made certain that such membership is not only in accord with sound banking practice, but in line with well-established precedents followed by all past administrations since the inauguration of the Commonwealth. (Emphasis supplied.)\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

The argument that Cabinet members may, by representing government lending institutions, become director of private corporation is, however, tenuous. As Senator Tanada had correctly said,

\begin{quote}
It is no defense that Hechanova [or Liwag] may have accepted those directorships to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Quoted in Ibid.
represent the Development Bank of the Philippines from whom these corporations may have obtained loans. A law does not amend the Constitution. Much less a government bank policy or regulation. 71

While Tañada was on solid ground on this score, he however, picked only two, and these were both political opponents. He failed to mention the numerous others, including those belonging to his political camp. 72 There were LP stalwarts linked with private business or industry whom he failed to mention such as Finance Secretary Rodrigo Perez, Jr., Education Secretary Alejandro Roces, Labor Secretary Bernanrdino Abes, Foreign Undersecretary Salvador P. Lopez, Justice Undersecretary Magno Gatmaitan, former Customs Commissioner Cesar Climaco, Public Works Undersecretary Jose Lachica, General Marcos Soliman, Immigration Commissioner Martiniano Vivo, and Commerce Undersecretary Benjamin Tobias. There were also Nacionalistas who held directorships in private corporations during the NP administration, viz., former Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro, former Justice Secretary Pedro Tuazon, former Executive Secretary Juan

71 Ibid.
72 Tañada, who heads the Nationalist Citizens Party has, since 1949, been in coalition with the Nacionalistas and for all practical purposes has been considered as a member of the latter group.
Pajo, former Finance Secretary Dominador Aytona, former Executive Secretary Fortuanto de Leon, former Foreign Secretary Felixberto Serrano, National Treasurer Vicente Gella, former GSIS General Manager Rodolfo Andal, former GSIS and DBP Chairman Gregorio S. Licaros, and many others.\footnote{For a list of the private corporations in which the above were officials, cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp.7 and 90.}

This study's data on government franchise or license holders show many public officials, former officials or their families who hold pasture leases, lumber concessions, land transportation and shipping franchises, telephone and power plant franchises.\footnote{Some examples are:
(Pasture Land lessees) - Abra-Baleras; Albay-Imperials; Antique-Cadiaos; Bohol-Borjas, and Toribios; Bukidnon-Kintanars, Osmenas, Fortiches, Lluchs, Quisumbings, Pelaezes; Bulacan-Manahans (sold to Santoses); Ledesmas, Fernandezes; Davao-Almendras-Bendigo; Ilocos Sur-Gaculas; Occidental Mindoro-Abeledas, Balmacedas, Levistes, Recto (Rafael); Mindoro Oriental-Abeses; Nueva Ecija-Abeses, Aletas, Liwags; Nueva Viscaya-Madarangs; Misamis Oriental-Cuencos; Mountain Province-Dangwas, Arranz, Duyans; Negros Occidental-Lacsons, Gatuslao-Montinolas; Pampanga-Enriquezes, Alvendidias, Baluyots; Masbate-Gimenezes; Pecsons; Avelinos (Jose), Cojuangcos, Zambales-Barrettos; Zamboanga del Norte-Chiongbians. (Source: Record of Pasture Leases (1963), Bureau of Forestry.)
(Timber Licensees, Officials, or Stockholders of Logging Companies) - Tibles of Albay, Baluyots of Pampanga, Lacson de Leons of Bataan, Magsaysays-Labradors-del Fierros of Zambales, Antoninos of Davao-Nueva Ecija, Toribios of Bohol, Puyats of Manila-Pampanga, Manuel Lim, Manuel Nieto, Cojuangcos of Tarlac, Lluchs, Duranos and Dumons of Cebu, Quisumbings, Ozaetas, Roceses, Mutucs, Moratos, (cont'd.)}
The use of official influence in the acquisition of private property, franchises, licenses, and other concessions from the government has sometimes been the subject of heated political disputes among the power-wielders.

One illustration was the Almendras case referred to earlier. The public exposure of Almendras' acquisition of properties and other assets was made by a fellow Nacionalista, Representative Ismael Veloso, or Davao. In a privileged speech delivered in the House of Representatives, Veloso charged that Senator Almendras, while Provincial Governor of Davao (1952-1958), acquired a fishpond, residential lands, agricultural lands, pasture lands, forest concessions – all worth ₱1,710,400.75

While Secretary of the Department of General Services

74 (cont.)
and Elizaldes. (Source: List of License Agreements as of June 30, 1963, Bureau of Forestry.)
Land Transportation - Paredeses (Yujuico), Halilis, Enriquezes (La Mallorca), Dangwas, Osmeñas (Cebu Autobus), Cuencos (Bisayas Land Transportation). (Source: Public Service Commission.)
Shipping - De la Ramas, Cojuangcos, Chiongbians, Elizaldes, Magsaysays, Cuencos, Madrigals, Montelibanos and Lopezes. (Source: Public Service Commission.)

(1958-1959), Almendras acquired, according to Veloso, additional property valued at ₱1,894,000 which included commercial land, residential land, a 'palatial mansion and residence at 54 Gilmore Avenue, Quezon City', and agricultural land. Finally, while a Senator of the Philippines, Almendras acquired Hacienda Tagulaya in Davao and more lands worth ₱3,850,500, claimed Veloso. These acquisitions total ₱7,454,900 and, Veloso said, they exceeded the net legitimate income of Senator and Mrs Almendras (from salaries, farming and logging business) of ₱248,083) by ₱7,106,817.7°

This bitter denunciation promoted Senator Almendras to lash back at his attacker. Using the Senate floor as his forum, he declared that Veloso was once his political ally. They had parted company in 1957, he said, when he (Almendras) helped bring about the first political defeat of Veloso.77 Calling Veloso's charges 'evil lies', he described Veloso as a 'man who, despite his own personal record shamefacedly professes now to be a champion of morality'.78 He added that he (Almendras) 76

76 Ibid., p. 43.
77 Senator Almendras' statement and excerpts from his Senate privileged speech appear in Philippines Free Press, February 16, 1963, p. 3.
78 Ibid.
had been elected and re-elected by the people of Davao and wondered 'if I committed all the acts ascribed to me by Congressman Veloso as a public official, would the 200,000 voters of the province of Davao have given me such an overwhelming endorsement?' He has always been against graft and corruption in the government service.

Representative Veloso followed up his attack with a bill, which he filed in the lower House, seeking the expropriation of Hacienda Tagulaya, Davao, owned by Senator Almendras. Veloso earlier stated that the hacienda was acquired by Mrs Caridad Almendras (the Senator's wife) from the heirs of a rich landowner, after it has been the object of possible government purchase:

[The] area was the subject of a petition filed in 1956 for the requisition thereof for distribution among its 200 tenant families and occupants, who had solicited the help of Sec. of General Services Almendras for the prosecution of said petition; in violation of the provisions of Sec. 20, Rep. Act No. 1400 and in immoral and inequitable violation of the trust and confidence reposed in the senator by the petitioning tenants of said hacienda,... Sen. Almendras acquired the said land for himself, in his wife's name, under a questionable and dubious 'high finance' arrangement allowed

79 Ibid.
and abetted by the Philippine National Bank.  

Almandras charged Veloso with continuing his 'campaign of vilification'. He said he had bought the land in good faith 'on request of the tenants themselves' claiming that the land had originally been offered for sale by the original owner to the Land Tenure Administration but the L.T.A. could not buy it for lack of funds. There was no unrest or discontent among the tenants since he took over, Almendras said. Veloso was already a congressman in 1956. 'Why did he not file a similar bill then? Is it because he is related by affinity to the person who wanted to buy it [the hacienda] but who was not acceptable to the tenants?', he queried. The Davao congressman, he said, is desperate because he is now facing charges for murder in Davao, an election protest where he is losing and he is about to be investigated for culpable violation of the Constitution by authorising a law which granted an electric franchise to his wife, Rosita Mullet.

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81 'Properties and Assets Acquired by Senator Alejandro Almendras while in Public Office', op. cit.
83 Ibid.
Almendras concluded that 'these acts [for Veloso, an NP], are inspired by the Liberals'.

It might be added that in November 1962, Almendras was charged by the ruling LP administration with the violation of Section 2, Republic Act 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law. This provision of the law states that any public servant who shall acquire properties out of proportion to their legitimate income while in office shall have the same forfeited to the State.

Almendras claimed then that he was being 'harassed' by the LP Administration. He said that his refusal to join the LP so it could win the Senate Presidency prompted this act of 'political vengeance'. He revealed later that 'highly placed Liberals, including Antonino [LP Senator Gaudencio Antonino], had approached him with an undated blank form of affiliation to the Liberal party, and that if Almendras would sign, the graft charges against him for alleged enrichment in office would not be filed, and that the same nature of charges against the Lopez brothers (Senator Fernando and Businessman Eugenio) would be forgotten'.

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
As has been previously mentioned, however, Senator Almendras finally voted for LP candidate Marcos for the Senate presidency although he did not join that party. And the LP administration seemed to have lost interest in pursuing the grave charges originally filed against him.

The Almendras case has not been an isolated one. Since the war many old fortunes have been augmented and new ones have been built through the skillful combination of official influence and the profit-motive. The details may sometimes vary but the general principle is the same: that of making private capital out of public funds and the public domain.

The years immediately following 'liberation' were particularly fruitful ones because the opportunities were many and the absence of effective restraints gave license to the almost uninhibited exercise of money-making activities among public officials.

Reference has been made earlier in another connection to the rampant irregularities that characterized the Osmeña, Roxas, and Quirino administrations. There were the reported 'anomalies' in the distribution of PCAU (Philippine Civil Affairs Unit) and UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) relief
goods; the PRATRA (Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation Administration) and NARIC (National Rice and Corn) mess; the NDC (National Development Company) and the Surplus Property Commission scandals; the Chinese immigration quota racket; the graft money that augmented the income of some public officials from import controls; the backpay, customs, and internal revenue rackets; etc.

The surplus property scandal arose out of the acquisition of U.S. Army surplus property by the Philippine government in September, 1946. The value of the goods that were turned over to the Roxas administration had a procurement value of $1,121,400,000. These were, however, given a 'fair valuation' of P274,000,000.88 President Roxas appointed Placido L. Mapa, Arsenio N. Luz, and Gabriel K. Hernandez to compose the Surplus Property Commission.89 Soon, government officials, their relatives and friends were in 'business'. They disposed of these public property, amassing huge profits for themselves but at great loss to the government. There were reports

88 A.V.H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines (1958), op. cit., p.252. The figures appear as indicated. Official rate of exchange was $1 = P2.

89 The latter is President Roxas' relative. (Personal Interview with a former SPC provincial official.)
that surplus steel rails were sold to the government-owned Manila Railroad Company at about five times their procurement cost and these changed hands several times. An informant narrated how trucks were 'cannibalized' (i.e., tires and other spare parts were removed) before selling them to the public. Several of the top officials were reportedly involved, but they were merely replaced. The loss, however, to the government was tremendous. Out of the ₱274,000,000 worth of goods turned over to the government, only ₱73,460,208.08 were realized.

The Catholic Church, through the Philippine Trust Co., and the San Juan de Dios Hospital (operated by a religious corporation), sold to the government the Tambubong and Buenavista estates in Bulacan in 1949. Although the Philippine government had already paid ₱3(m) for the latter estate during the Japanese occupation, the government had to pay again ₱4.5(m) in 1949. Jean Arnault, a Frenchman who became a naturalized citizen, was the 'middleman' in the transaction and when summoned

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90 Cf. Coquia, op. cit., p.100.
91 Personal Interview.
92 Hartendorp, op. cit.
by an investigating committee of the Senate, he admitted having given about ₱400,000 to 'someone' who negotiated the sale, but he refused to reveal the identity of the person. For this, he was sent to prison for contempt. The Nacionalistas charged during the 1951 elections that the person involved was Judge Antonio Quirino, younger brother of President Quirino.

The import control racket involved the procurement of import licenses for businessmen, particularly aliens, by highly placed influentials who gave their 'services' on a fee of 10 per cent commission. Mention has already been made of the immigration quota racket where ranking Malacañang officials, Senators and Congressmen were able to 'earn' from ₱2,000 to ₱5,000 from every Chinese immigrant by certifying to the good character of these aliens.

The NDC scandal, otherwise known as the 'Caledonia Pile Mystery', involved the 'swindling' of the government of the amount of ₱244,068,000. The NDC Manager, Amado Bautista, and Judge Antonio Quirino were reportedly linked

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94 Vide p.227. Cf. also Coquia, op. cit., p.102, Speaker Eugenio Perez was allegedly allocating the 'quotas' to favored House members.
to this irregularity. Judge Antonio Quirino was also reported to have been involved in the purchase of a TV tower owned by the CAA at a price of ₱10,000. The original cost of the tower was ₱200,000 ($100,000). In the installation of the tower at the Bolinao Electronics Corporation's property (owned by A. Quirino), army trucks, equipment, and personnel were reportedly used.

The Garcia administration has also been linked with numerous "anomalies". The reported "unethical" relations of top officials with alien businessmen and with Stonehill's "web of corruption" has been discussed in Chapter V.

In 1961, Manila's Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, himself a top member of the then ruling NP, disclosed that "the people's own money would be employed [by the NP Administration] to corrupt them" in the 1961 presidential elections. He revealed that:

(1) There is a 'kickback' from every import license for party funds. The license is not released unless the kickback is assured;

(2) Licenses are granted to those who are not entitled to them but who have sworn to support President Garcia;

(3) In the case of sugar planters, no crop loans will be granted without kickbacks;

(4) Millions will be made for so-called developmental loans: ₱150(m) from the margin levy; ₱60(m) from the GSIS, and another ₱100(m) may be tapped from the SSS.97

The goods from Japanese war reparations have been the object of stormy quarrels. In 1961, the then Vice-President, Macapagal, accused President Garcia of 'squandering the Japanese war reparations by allocating them to men around Malacañang and to a favored few'.98 He also charged President Garcia of 'publicly justifying the...money-making activities [of public officials by] his statement that "it is not wrong for a Cabinet official to provide for the security of his family"'.99

The war reparations, it should be noted, were intended to benefit the millions of Filipinos who suffered under the Japanese during the war. The 'Reparations Law', for instance, provides that

It shall be the policy of the Government of the Philippines to utilize all reparations payments...

99 Ibid. The latter statement has been likened with former Senate President Avelino's candid 'What are we in power for?' statement. Cf. Chap.V, p.225.
in such manner as shall ensure the maximum possible economic benefit to the Filipino people and in as equitable and widespread a manner as possible. 100

The actual allocation, however, as correctly stated by Macapagal, was channelled to a favored few. By 1961, for instance, out of a total of $105.2(m) paid in capital goods, $71.76(m) went to the private sector while only $33.44(m) went to the government. 101 The 'private sector' seems to refer to the few who were closely connected, by family, business, or other ties, with the power-holders. The award of a $2.25(m) ship received in reparation to the Sultan Shipping Lines, a corporation headed by Fernando Acuña, first cousin of the late President Roxas, for example, recently became a subject of controversy. Vice-President Palaez who, as earlier mentioned, had abandoned the LP and had joined the NP, charged President Macapagal with 'rank discrimination' against established shipping companies in favor of a 'powerful Liberal Party leader'. 102 Palaez averred that the LP administration's

---

100 Section 1, Reparations Act, June 21, 1957.
award of a ship worth $2.25 million to the Sultan Shipping Company over the objections of the National Economic Council was made 'to please his [the President's] crony'.\textsuperscript{103}

The United Philippine Lines, one of whose founders was Don Ambrosio Magsaysay, a relative of President Magsaysay, also acquired 12 vessels from the government -- 7 cargo-liners from the NDC and 5 other vessels from Japanese war reparations.\textsuperscript{104}

The purchase of three ocean-going vessels in 1949 by the NDC (National Development Company) is another illustration of the role of the government as a provider of benefits to the favored few. The three 'Doña' vessels, as the government-owned ships were called, were operated by the De la Rama Steamship Co. Inc., a private company under the management of Sergio Osmena, Jr. (son-in-law of De la Rama, a shipping magnate)\textsuperscript{105} who secured the contract from the government on a commission basis. While the vessels were making an average gross income of

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Cf. Chapter IV, p. 176.
₱5.5(m) a year, the De la Rama Steamship Company had been declaring losses from their operation. Substantial government loans and huge subsidies are other major benefits provided by the government to the elite. The sugar hacenderos are among the traditional beneficiaries of loans from government banks and other financing institutions.

The 'loans, credits, and accommodations' which the Lopez brothers (Senator Fernando and brother Eugenio) were able to secure from three government financing institutions 'to build their economic empire' were disclosed by Press Secretary Leoncio Parungao, Jr. in 1963 as totalling ₱88,373,000. The disclosures were


'Palace versus Lopezes', Philippines Free Press, January 19, 1963, p.60. The amounts are broken down as follows:

1. Development Bank of the Philippines:

a. Binalbagan Central 32,490,000
b. Pampanga Central 4,788,000
c. Philippine Portland Cement 2,355,000
d. Industrial Company 1,450,000
e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 600,000
f. CBN Broadcasting 2,275,000
g. Southern Lines (shipping company) 1,730,000

Total ₱45,688,000
made, as is usually the case, during the height of a bitter political war. The Lopez brothers denied that they had used political power to build up their business empire and countercharged that President Macapagal had been abusing his political powers to satisfy his (the President's) desire for vengeance against his political enemies.108

It is worthwhile mentioning that the President had, indeed, been centering his attack on the Lopezes, Yulos and Aranetas, all powerful figures of the sugar group. The latter two were top LP stalwarts. Jose Yulo was LP candidate for President in 1957, the running mate of

107 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total (carried over)</th>
<th>₱45,688,000</th>
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2. **Philippine National Bank**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Meralco</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Chronicle</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Binalbagan Sugar Central</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Pampanga Sugar Mill</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting)</td>
<td>485,000</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
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3. **Government Service Insurance System**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Alto-CBN (building construction)</td>
<td>500,000</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>₱88,373,000</th>
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</table>

108 Ibid.
Macapagal. J. Amado Araneta, brother-in-law of Yulo, was also a top official of the LP. But both, like most of the rest of the sugar bloc, supported the then President, Garcia, during the 1961 presidential elections. It could then be true that the pressure emanating from the President might be political vengeance but, whatever the motivation, the important thing, insofar as this study is concerned, is that large amounts of government funds were made available to these groups. It has been subsequently reported that the vast Yulo Canlubang sugar estate had been financed with government funds.

The shipping companies are among the other major beneficiaries of large government loans. With top public officials or former officials as stockholders or directors, they easily secure government funds for expansion of their business.

The enactment of the Philippine Overseas Shipping Act of 1955 (R.A. 1407, September 9, 1955), signed into

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110 As early as 1953, Yulo had already been exposed by J. Antonio Araneta, an NP, as having been able to secure huge loans from the government-owned PNB while a member of the Board of Directors of the government bank. Cf. The Manila Times, October 7, 1953.
law by President Magsaysay, made available an annual
amount of P20(m) for a period of five years 'for loan or
for the construction or acquisition of ocean-going vessels
for resale or lease to Filipino citizens'. The Shipping
Act likewise provided certain tax exemptions. 111

There are other examples of legislation and
administrative policies providing government financial
help which promote elite interests such as the Gold
Subsidy Law, Tobacco Subsidy Law, and so forth, but the
above should suffice to illustrate the point.

Private banks are also beneficiaries of public funds.
Over the last several years they have noticeably increased
in number, so that by 1963 there were no fewer than 33
commercial banks. Landlords, businessmen, politicians
and other public officials have turned to banking, the
reason being their discovery of the profitable technique
of diverting government funds into the vaults of private
banks.112

111
Cf. L. Viloria, op. cit., p.542.
112
For interesting accounts of this point, vide F.V. Tutay,
'Biggest bank frauds?' Philippines Free Press, March 2,
1963, p.10, et seq.; Gene de Gracia, 'Money Talks',
Weekly Graphic, February 26, 1964, p.5, et seq.; Gene de
Gracia, 'Graft in the Central Bank', Weekly Graphic,
February 19, 1964, p.2, et seq.; Villegas-Padilla
controversy in The Manila Times, January 18, 19 and 20,
1964; and the Villegas-Tolentino controversy in The
C. RECAPITULATION

The small upper strata minority which dominates Philippine political and governmental processes utilizes political power to promote its economic interests and to maintain its superior position in the social structure. Power circulates within this group.

The formal governmental structure, which is characterized by a high degree of centralization and of concentration of power at the top, provides an effective means of political control. It also complements the hierarchical pattern in the social and economic structures.

The President is a dominant figure in the governmental hierarchy, but Congress has sufficient power to allow it to bargain with the Executive. However, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary are not exactly autonomous, self-contained loci of authority with strictly differentiated functions for there exists a certain amount of overlapping of powers. Furthermore, the manipulation that takes place within the political system e.g. the destruction of a Congressional majority described above renders the constitutional principle of separation of powers largely ineffective.
The elite system impinges on the formal structure in such a way that informal power-wielders are able to exercise a relatively great amount of influence in political decision-making. This is accentuated by the interlocking of interests, the kinship system and other social links among the elite.

Mass organizations which can act as a restraining influence on elite excesses in the exercise of power are absent. On the other hand, the masses are integrated within the elite system, divided among themselves and playing the role of inarticulate supporters of the elite in a leader-follower relationship. The contest for power, then, is limited to the elite.

Public office is a prized stake in the political contest for it not only confers formal power but provides other rewards as well. Public office is an avenue to more power, prestige and wealth.

Generally speaking, and within the context of the total society, benefits tend to be allocated according to rankings in the social hierarchy. The top elite, the upper principalia, get the most out of the system. (See Figure V.) The benefits are in the form of high governmental positions, favorable and protective legislation, loans from government banks and financing
FIGURE V

THE ELITE IN GOVERNMENT —
PATRONAGE AND FAVOR DISTRIBUTION

UPPER PRINCIPALIA ———— HIGH OFFICE, FAVORABLE AND PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION, GOVERNMENT LOANS, FRANCHISES AND LICENSES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, LOW TAX ASSESSMENTS, OTHER PRIVILEGES

LOWER PRINCIPALIA ———— LOWER GOVERNMENT POSTS, PATRONAGE AND FAVORS ON A SMALLER SCALE, OTHER PRIVILEGES

THE MASSES ———— PETTY FAVORS TO SOME SUPPORTERS
institutions, franchises and licenses, profitable contracts with the government, low tax assessments, and other privileges. The lower principalia get similar benefits but on a smaller scale. The masses, with no effective organization of their own, get petty favors, but only through elite intermediaries. Also, as pointed out in Chapter V, they have to ally themselves — as followers — with an elite leader in order to get a share of the residue of scarce public resources.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Philippine elite has a long history that is marked by a remarkable continuity. The ruling datus, together with the members of the nobility (maharlikas), comprised the ruling class in the pre-Spanish Philippines. With the conquest of the Philippines by Spain, the absolute dominion of the datus was terminated, but they did not lose their leading roles insofar as their relations with the people were concerned. They were treated as a privileged class by the Spaniards and became willing agents of Spanish rule. They alone had limited voting rights and they alone received the benefits of education and economic opportunity to become the privileged class under the colonial administration. This group were called the principalia or principal citizens of the community.

Through the years, the principalia underwent some changes. Slowly but surely, they became more and more 'different' and isolated from their countrymen. They acquired Spanish education, learned the Castilian language,
and started to live 'under the bells'. Also, the mestizo (both Chinese and Spanish) element began to appear among the ranks of the principalia. This infusion of new elements, however, did not substantially affect the character of the elite. There was limited 'circulation' but no transformation. The new entrants were absorbed into the elite system without changing it.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century with the expansion of commerce and trade, land accumulation began to increase, paving the way for the haciendas to grow in number.

The coming of the Americans, who replaced the Spaniards, saw the introduction of novel political techniques. Elections were held but only the elite, although defined more broadly than under the Spaniards, could vote or stand for local office under the property and literacy qualifications that were imposed. Political parties were organized but they were elite parties.

The modern principalia is not unlike the 'old' principalia since they are both composed of the socio-economic dominants in the community. Innovations such as 'free enterprise', public education, representative government, and popular elections were introduced in the American period, but since the basic economic structure
remained essentially intact, change became circumscribed. Traditional patterns of economic and social relations persisted and the prosperity associated with progress was confined to a limited group in society.

There is, however, one difference between the old and the new *principalia*. While the old was caste-like, entry to the new became somewhat easier. Higher education, although of limited application, and accumulation of wealth may provide passports to *principalia* status. This is, however, of little significance as shown by the fact that there has been no major restratification, implying that the rate of social mobility is slow.

The political power-wielders are largely drawn from the socio-economic dominants of the community. Analysis of 446 top public officials from 1946-1963 shows that most of them come from the small upper strata minority. Data on college education, for instance, show that 96.7 per cent of top executive officials, 96 per cent of Senators, 92.3 per cent of Representatives, and 100 per cent of Justices of the Supreme Court are college graduates. The comparative figure for the Philippine population, twenty-five years and over in 1948 was only 0.7 per cent. In occupation, income, style of living, memberships in prestige associations, the data show that
the top public officials belong to the very tiny minority and are not representative of the population. Furthermore, within the limited social area of recruitment, a group of politically dominant families has emerged. These are the 'family dynasties' which may be found in practically all provinces of the country.

The political power-wielders were also found to have multiple occupations. In their ranks were found lawyers - businessmen - landowners - bankers and similar combinations of occupations. Among the group studied, there were also TV and radio station owners, owner-operators of private universities, colleges and other educational institutions, owner-operators of public utilities, lawyers of large corporations, government franchise and license holders, etc. Thus the nature of the leadership of the political elite is not merely 'political' but extends to business, banking, education, the mass-media and the professions.

Philippine political parties are elite parties. A review of their early history shows their common origins. The pre-war parties sprang from the principia group. The Federalista Party, the only party which the Americans permitted until 1906, was a party of the Filipino aristocracy. The post-war parties had also a common
origin in the pre-war Nacionalista Party of Osmena and Quezon. Because opposition and ruling parties are composed of individuals belonging to the same socio-economic group, party identification is rather loose. No differences based on principles, class or ideology distinguish one party from another. Factional break-up, fusion, and consolidation are regular occurrences. Individual or group defections are common. Personal rivalries among top leaders are among the causes of party break-up.

Labor or mass parties have so far failed to prosper. The setting does not seem to be favorable for non-elite parties to develop. Two outcomes are usually the fate of such parties: they are absorbed by either of the two major parties (or by both, as in the case of the Labor Party in 1963) or they turn to more militant activities (as in the case of the Sakdalista Party before the war).

The organization of the two major parties are essentially the same. Formally, they have established rules, after the American model, on party organizations. Informally, the power relations in the social structure impinge on the formal organization. The elite family factions in the provinces become the nuclei of party
organization and politics in the provinces revolve around the interests these elite family groupings. National Party conventions are held regularly, but often are only for the purpose of selecting choices already made by the top party hierarchy. Personal arrangements by the top party leaders are often made behind-the-scene, and the informal choices of the party leaders are then presented for confirmation by the delegates.

Elite politicians employ various methods and techniques in their political campaigns. Effective use is made of the cultural norms and of money, goods, and at times, even violence to win an election. The use of money and goods, in particular, to win electoral support is rampant. Money is used for buying delegates votes at the convention and elector's votes at the polls, and for personal donations and gifts between elections. Candidates may spend from three to thirty times their prospective salaries to secure election and public funds are commonly employed to this end by the party in power. Sources of campaign funds are the public works funds, the 'pork barrel', and the landowning and business interests and others who may want something from the government in return when the candidate supported is in office.
The elite politician also utilizes symbols and slogans to win voter's support. He promises to give land to the landless, to emancipate the serf-like tenant, and not to 'let anybody exploit him like a beast'. During election time, he goes to the barrios, dresses like the peasants and shakes the hands of the rural masses. Thus, the elite politician, every now and then, becomes a 'common man'.

In public office, the elite politician often utilizes political power to promote his economic interests. The highly centralized system of government and the too-much concentration of power at the top provides him with an effective means of political control. The Executive, in the person of the President, and Congress are the centers of control, but between them the President is the dominant force. The interaction of the elite system and the formal structure allows informal power-wielders to exercise relatively great influence in political decision-making. And, inevitably, this influence is utilised for the maintenance of the system under which they have achieved such substantial rewards.
APPENDIX A

SELECTED LIST OF 169 POLITICALLY-DOMINANT FAMILIES, BY PROVINCE, 1946-63\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES (CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE OR APPOINTEIVE POSITIONS(^b)</th>
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<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSI-</td>
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<td>1. ABRA</td>
<td>Paredes</td>
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<td>Valera</td>
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\(a\) Key to abbreviations appears at the end of the Appendix.

\(b\) The numbers represent only those individual members or close relatives definitely identified from data available to the study; it is probable that there may be more than those given. Vertical lines connecting family names indicate further affinal relationships. There are many more politically-dominant families identified but have been omitted due to space limitations.

\(c\) Related by affinity to Clarins of Bohol province.
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<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
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<td>ABRA</td>
<td>Brillantes</td>
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<td>2. AGUSAN</td>
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<td>Sanchez</td>
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<td>Atega</td>
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<td>PROVINCE</td>
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<td>FAMILY'S SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC BASE</td>
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<td>3. AKLAM</td>
<td>Legaspi-Tumbokon&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>1-U / Sec (Cab 1-Rep (Mayor &amp; Rep) &amp; Gov) 1-Mayor 2-For Sv 1-Fishery Bur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urquiola</td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>1-Consul 1-Rep 1-City Police Chief 1-Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ALBAY</td>
<td>Ziga</td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>1-Gov (&amp; Rep) 1-Sen (Rep, 1-Head, Exec Cab) Agen 1-Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duran&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov (&amp; Rep) 2-Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. ANTIQUE</td>
<td>Fornier</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Rep 1-Consul 2-Exec Agen</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villavert</td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Vice Mayor 1-Exec Agen 2-Educ Dept</td>
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<sup>a</sup>Another Tumbokon is a ranking member of the clergy

<sup>b</sup>Related by affinity to Belmontes of Nueva Eciuja province.
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<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>PROFESSION</th>
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<td>ANTIQUE</td>
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<td>6. BATAAN</td>
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<td>1-Exec Agen</td>
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<td>1-Exec Agen</td>
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<td>8. BATANGAS</td>
<td>Laurel</td>
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\[\text{Related by affinity to Lecaroses of Marinduque.}\]
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<td>BUSINESS</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clarin⁵⁵</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>10. BUKIDNON</td>
<td>Fortich b</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>11. BULACAN</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>12. CAGAYAN</td>
<td>Dupaya</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Ligot</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>13. CAMARINES NORTE</td>
<td>Vinzons</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Pimentel</td>
<td>x</td>
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¹ Related by affinity to Paredes of Abra. (Data here not previously included)

b Related by affinity to De Laras of Misamis Oriental.
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<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Sen (Rep &amp; Ambass) 2-Rep</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cea</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Sen 1-Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. CAPIZ</td>
<td>Roxas</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Pres (Gov, Cab, Sen) 2-Sen 1-Cap U/Sec 1-Gov (Hd. Exec Agen) 1-City Mayor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dinglasan-Consing</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Rep 1-CFI</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Vice Gov 1-Coun 1-Hd, Exec Agen</td>
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<td>16. CATANDUANES</td>
<td>Alberto¹</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>3-Mayor 1-Rep (Spkr, Pres-LP) 2-Exec Agen</td>
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¹ Another member is a Catholic Archbishop.
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<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<td>1-Fiscal 1-Rep 1-Exec Agen</td>
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<td>Montano</td>
<td>x  x  x</td>
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<td>1-Mayor 1-AFP 0</td>
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<td>18. CEBU</td>
<td>Osmeña</td>
<td>x  x  x</td>
<td>1-Pres (Gov, Rep, Sen, Vice-Pres) 1-Rep (Gov, City Mayor)</td>
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<td>Cuenco</td>
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<td>1-Cab ( &amp; Gov) 1-Sen (Rep, Gov, Cab) 1-Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Briones</td>
<td>x  x</td>
<td>1-Gov ( &amp; Rep) 1-Sen 1-Sup Ct</td>
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a Another member is a Catholic Archbishop.

b Related by affinity to Chiongbian of Cebu.
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<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<td>Durano-Almendras</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kintanar</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>2-City Mayor 1-Vice Mayor 1-Coun</td>
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<td>19. COTABATO</td>
<td>Pendatun-Matalan-Mangelen</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Prov. Bd 8-Mayors 1-Hd, Exec Agen 1-Coun 1-Educ Dept 1-Jus Dept</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sinsuat</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Cab (Rep &amp; Gov) 1-Rep 1-CFI</td>
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a. See also Almendras family in Davao Province.

b. A Kintanar has continuously represented this constituency since 1934.
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<td>20. DAVAO</td>
<td>Almendras&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raquiza</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Rep 4-Provl Bd 3-Mayor</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. ILOCOS NORTE</td>
<td>Marcos-Romualdez&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Pres (Rep, Sen, Cab, VP) 1-Gov (Bu Dir) 1-Mayor 1-CFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisologo</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 1-Rep 1-Mayor 1-Hd, Exec Agen</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. ILOCOS SUR</td>
<td>Quirino</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>2-Exec Agen 1-Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanidad</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<sup>a</sup> See also Cebu (Durano-Almendras family). Data here are in addition to those given under Cebu.

<sup>b</sup> See also Leyte.
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<td>23. ILOILO</td>
<td>Lopez[^1]</td>
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<td>ILOILO</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>1-Cab Sec 1-Gov 1-City Coun (&amp; PNB Dir) 1-Ambass 1-Sen (Gov, Cab Mbr &amp; VP) 1-Sen (Gov, Ambass, Cab)</td>
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<td>Ledesma</td>
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<td>1-Rep 1-Rep</td>
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<td>24. ISABELA</td>
<td>Albano</td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>1-Vice Gov 1-Mayor 1-Exec Agen 1-CFI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arranz</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<td>Nieto</td>
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<td>1-Ambass (Rep, Cab) 1-Exec Agen</td>
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<td>Fernandez</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<td>Chipeco</td>
<td>x x x</td>
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<td>Yulo</td>
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[^1]: Related by affinity to Aranetas (See Manila).
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<td>Badilles</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Cabili</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>27. LANAO DEL SUR</td>
<td>Alonto</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Dimaporo</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dimakuta</td>
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<td>28. LA UNION</td>
<td>Ortega</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Cases</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Osias</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. LEYTE</td>
<td>Romualdez\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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\textsuperscript{a} See also Ilocos Norte (Marcos-Romualdez). Data here are in addition to those previously given.
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<td>31. MASBATE</td>
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<td>32. MISAMIS OCC.</td>
<td>Chiongbian(^b)</td>
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\(^a\) Related by affinity to Marasigians of Batangas.

\(^b\) Related by affinity to Brioneses of Cebu.
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<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>De Lara(^a)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Araneta (Yulo-Roxas)(^b)</td>
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\(^a\) Related by affinity to Fortiches of Bukidnon.  
\(^b\) Related by affinity to Yulos (see Laguna), and Roxas (see Capiz).
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<tr>
<td>36. NEGROS OR.</td>
<td>Teves</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE: 1-Gov 1-City Mayor 2-City Coun蟼ANGLAL : 1-Rep</td>
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<td>Villanueva</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>1-Gov ( &amp; Rep) 1-Rep 1-Provl Bd 2-Mayor</td>
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<td>37. NVA ECIZA</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>1-Gov 1-Provl Bd 1-Health Dept 1-CFI (&amp; Gov)</td>
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*a* Sister is Rep. Josefina B. Duran (see Albay, Duran family).
<table>
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<td>40. OR. MINDORO</td>
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<td>Joson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Morente</td>
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<td>Infantado</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>41. PALAWAN</td>
<td>Fernandez&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Related by affinity to Aranetas (Gregorio Araneta family - Manila)

<sup>b</sup> Related by affinity to Legardas.
<table>
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<th>PROVINCE</th>
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<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<td>EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIARY</td>
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<td>x x x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abordo</td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>1-Gov 3-Mayors</td>
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<td>1-Pres (Rep, VP) 1-Sen</td>
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<td>1-Vice Gov (&amp; Hd, Exec Agen)</td>
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<td>1-Hd, Exec Agen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-Educ Dept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42. PAMPANGA
- Macapagal
- Nepomuceno

43. PANGASINAN
- Primicias
- Bengson
- Perez
- Estrella
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES (CONSA NGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE OR APPOIN TIVE POSITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PANGASINAN</td>
<td>Fernandez</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE: 2-Mayor, 1-Jus Bur, 1-For Affairs, 1-Health Dept, 1-Educ Dept, 1-Coun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEGISLATIVE: 1-Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. QUEZON</td>
<td>Guinto</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE: 1-Gov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tañada</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>LEGISLATIVE: 1-Sen (Rep, &amp; Vice-Gov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. RIZAL</td>
<td>Rodriguez a</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE: 1-Gov, 1-Hd Govt Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sumulong b</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>LEGISLATIVE: 1-Rep Cab</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Padilla de las Alas</td>
<td>x x x</td>
<td>JUDICIARY: 1-Consul, 1-AFP 0, 1-Exec Agen, 2-Mayors, 1-For Sv</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEGISLATIVE: 2-Rep, 2-Sen</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JUDICIARY: 1-Sup Ct</td>
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</table>

a  Related by affinity to Magsaysays of Zambales.

b  Related by affinity to Cojuangcos of Tarlac.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIZAL</td>
<td>Sevilla-Manglapus</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. ROMBLON</td>
<td>Moreno</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Festin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. SAMAR</td>
<td>Veloso</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rosales-Valley</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avelino</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. SORSOGON</td>
<td>Escudero</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encinas</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a* Related to Velosos of Leyte. Data here are in addition to those given under Leyte.

*b* 1-Archbishop  
1-Priest
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FAMILY'S SOCIODEMOMIC BASE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. SOUTHERN</td>
<td>Yniguez-Espiná</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEYTE</td>
<td>Bantug</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. SULU</td>
<td>Amilbangsa</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abubakar</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rasul</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ututulum</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tulawie</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. SURIGAO N.</td>
<td>Navarro</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVINCE</td>
<td>FAMILY</td>
<td>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</td>
<td>NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES (CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE OR APPOINTEE POSITIONS</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. SULIGAO SUR</td>
<td>Pimentel-Serra Ty</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. TARLAC</td>
<td>Cojuangco&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aquino</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Castaneda</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romulo</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feliciano</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

<sup>a</sup> Related by affinity to Sumulongs of Rizal. Data here are in addition to those given under Sumulong family.
<table>
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<th>FAMILY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. ZAMBALES</td>
<td>Magsaysay</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barretto</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afable</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE</td>
<td>Adaza</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ubay</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR</td>
<td>Sagun-Lim</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enerio</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. MANILA</td>
<td>Albert-Lukban</td>
<td>unk</td>
<td>unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a Related by affinity to Rodriguezes of Rizal. Data here are in addition to those already given.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>FAMILY'S SOCIΟ-ECONOMIC BASE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES (CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANILA</td>
<td>Bagatsing-Sevilla</td>
<td>unk</td>
<td>unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madrigal-Gonzalez</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roces-Villareal-Barrera</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolentino</td>
<td>unk</td>
<td>unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Araneta a</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Related by affinity to Lopezes of Iloilo and Leidos of Or. Mindoro. Data here are in addition to those previously given.*
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP O</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines, Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambas</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap Ct</td>
<td>Court of Appeals Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bur</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cab</td>
<td>Cabinet Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coun</td>
<td>Councilor, City or Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>Court of First Instance, Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBP</td>
<td>Development Bank of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ Dept</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Com</td>
<td>Election Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Agen</td>
<td>Executive Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Sv</td>
<td>Foreign Service (Includes Home Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>General, Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>Provincial Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Justice of the Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jus Dept</td>
<td>Justice Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRR</td>
<td>Manila Railroad Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Philippine National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov1 Bd</td>
<td>Provincial Board member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov1 Sec</td>
<td>Secretary, Provincial Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spkr</td>
<td>Speaker, House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sup Ct</td>
<td>Supreme Court Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/Sec</td>
<td>Cabinet Undersecretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Gov</td>
<td>Vice Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES

Official Directory, Senate of the Philippines, 1954-61;
Official Directory, House of Representatives, 1946-65;
Commission on Elections, Reports of Election Results, 1946-63;
Philippines Who's Who, 1957, op. cit.;
'Builders', ibid. Vols. XVII, XVIII, 1958;
Writer's Questionnaire Survey, 1963; GSPA Survey, 1963; Provincial Interviews;
## QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

I CONSIDER THE FAMILY PROMINENT AND INFLUENTIAL BECAUSE ALL OR SOME MEMBERS ARE: (Please check applicable answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(PROVINCE)</th>
<th>HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL PROFESSIONALS</th>
<th>ABLE TO INFLUENCE NOMINATION OR ELECTION OF LOCAL CANDIDATES</th>
<th>ENGAGED IN BUSINESS</th>
<th>ABLE TO INFLUENCE NOMINATION OR ELECTION OF NATIONAL CANDIDATES</th>
<th>LARGE LANDOWNERS</th>
<th>FAMILY HAS HOUSE IN FAMILY OR SUBURB</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES (<em><strong>) NO (</strong></em>)</td>
<td>YES (___)</td>
<td>NO (___)</td>
<td>YES (___)</td>
<td>NO (___)</td>
<td>YES (___)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>NO (___)</td>
<td>YES (___)</td>
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<td>NO (___)</td>
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<td>YES (___)</td>
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<td>NO (___)</td>
<td>YES (___)</td>
<td>NO (___)</td>
<td>YES (___)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PLEASE LIST MEMBERS OF FAMILY (BY BLOOD OR AFFINITY) ELECTED OR APPOINTED TO IMPORTANT PUBLIC POSITIONS, OR TO POLITICAL PARTY POSITIONS, (LOCAL OR NATIONAL) DURING THE PERIOD 1946-1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(NAME)</th>
<th>(POSITION)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS


Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.


Republic Act No. 1180, 1954.


Revised Administrative Code.


Senate Document No. 331. 5th Congress, 1st Session, p.67.

Summary of the Report, Technical Committee to the President of the Philippines, American Philippine Trade Relations. Washington: 1944.

The Land Reform Code of 1963.


B. BOOKS


Kalaw, Maximo M. *Philippine Government.* Manila: (Author's Publication), 1948.


Morga, Antonio de (Jose P. Rizal's ed.). *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas,* 1609. Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands* Vol. XVI.


Tayag, Renato. *Sinners of Angeles.* (No date: Private Publication.)


C. ARTICLES


Castrence, Pura Santillan. 'Encounter with the West', Progress, Manila Times Publishing Co., 1959.


Corpus, O.D. 'Filipino Political Parties and Politics', Comment, No. 7, 3rd Quarter, 1958.


Majul, Cesar A. 'The Life and Mind of Mabini', This Week, June 1, 1958.


Owens, William. 'Will the Huks Revolt?', Asia and the Americas, February 1946.


'Politics was my Undoing', Philippines Free Press, October 19, 1963.


Sabado, Juan S. 'From Rags to Riches', Weekly Graphic, August 29, 1962.

________. 'Curtains for a "Big-Shot"', Weekly Graphic, August 29, 1962.


'They Who Make Our Laws', 1964 Weekly Graphic series.


... 'Terrorism at the Polls', Philippines Free Press, November 30, 1963.


... 'A Hero or a Heel?', Philippines Free Press, April 13, 1963.

Victoria, Socrates de la. 'The Curse of the Nation: Too Much Politics', Weekly Graphic, November 18, 1964.


'Who got the reparation awards', Philippines Free Press, September 12, 1959.


Yench, John (ed.). 'We Mean Business', Weekly Graphic series.

'P150,000 Allowances Suit Heads for Clash', Weekly Graphic, December 25, 1963.

D. NEWSPAPERS

The Daily Mirror [Manila], 1963.

The Evening News [Manila], 1963.


Malay, Carolina S. 'At the Convention', The Manila Times, April 7, 1963.


E. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS


GSPA Survey.


Lines 11-12: Omit "first" before "municipal elections" to read:

"A direct consequence of this policy was that in the municipal elections held in 1901, only 49,523 persons..."
Lines 1-2 after quotation: The sentence, "The above are more or less unanimous comments of both local and foreign observers" should read: "The above are the more or less similar comments of both local and foreign observers."
Footnote 66 should read:

Line 16-17: The dash (--) after pacto de retro should be replaced by three dots (...) to read:

"...as early as 1768 there were laws against the use of the pacto de retro..."
Footnote 5 - "Ibid., p. 142..." should read: "Alip, op. cit., p. 142..."
Historians need not live during the period which they are writing about. Most historians write about eras or periods before their own time. That Morga was "one of the recognized chroniclers of pre-Spanish Philippines" is borne out by the fact that writers and scholars have quoted from him. The Philippines' national hero, Dr. Jose P. Rizal, drew heavily from Morga when he wrote about pre-Spanish Philippines. He also edited Morga's work, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, 1609 (Cf. Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands: 1493-1898, Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur Clarke Co., 1907, pp. 119-121).

Professor Maximo M. Kalaw (A.B., LL.B., Ph.D.), former Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines, writes that:

"Antonio de Morga, a high royal official in the government who came to the Philippines about the year 1600, is admittedly the most reliable chronicler of the conditions existing in those early pre-Spanish days." (Maximo M. Kalaw, Philippine Government, Its Development, Organization, and Activities, Manila: Author's Publication, 1948, p. 12.)

Professor Eufronio L. Alip, Ph. Litt. D., Professor of History and Political Science, University of Santo Tomas, whom Prof. Corpus thinks is "extremely unreliable for this period," is the author of many Philippine textbooks, including:

(a) Philippine History (Manila: Alip & Brion Publications, Inc., 1948); (b) Philippine Government (College textbook); (c) Political and Cultural History of the Philippines (College textbook); (d) Philippine Government (High School textbook); (e) Philippine Civilization (College textbook); etc. He is also a member of the Philippine Historical Committee and former Executive Secretary of the Philippine Historical Society. It could be possible that Professor Alip, a historian, might have historical materials which Professor Corpus, a political scientist, may not have.

The writer's statement on "hispanization" refers to the principalita elite, that is to say, the native aristocracy, the Spanish mestizos and the Chinese mestizos. Phelan's argument refers to the need of qualifying the view that the whole of Philippine society was culturally "Hispanized." Phelan's view and mine, therefore, are not necessarily contradictory.
The complete statement (Thesis, Lines 16-19) is:

"This ceaseless personal fight went on until 1935 when there was a 'fusion' between the warring groups and Quezon's paramount dominance remained unquestioned until his death in America in 1944."

What is meant here is that the personal struggle for political dominance between Osmeña and Quezon continued even after they temporarily merged their factions in 1924. The proof of this is the fact that in 1933, they again broke up into two political groups—the Pros led by Osmeña and the Antis led by Quezon. From 1935 until Quezon's death in 1944, however, Osmeña seemed to have accepted Quezon's personal dominance.

The comments here were satisfactorily explained during the oral examination. Professor Corpuz did not quote the thesis accurately in his question. He was commenting on the "direct connection" between the percentages of landless families and tenancy" whereas the complete statement in the thesis is as follows:

"That there is a direct connection between landlessness and tenancy on the one hand and concentration of land ownership among a few families on the other is illustrated in Table 3.3. (See pp. 86-87).

In effect, he thought that the direct connection being established by the study was between landlessness and tenancy. The above quotation, however, is believed to be clear enough and perhaps needs no further elaboration.