THE ELIMINATION OF THE WESTERN PRESENCE IN CHINA:
THE COMMUNIST VICTORY AND ITS AFTERMATH

by

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Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Beverly Hooper
ABSTRACT

When the Chinese Communists came to power during 1949, they were faced with a diminished but still substantial Western presence in their country, the representatives and symbols of a century of imperialist activity in China. The present study analyses the process whereby, in the four years following their victories in the major cities, they effectively eliminated that remaining presence from China. It takes issue with those analysts who see the question basically in an immediate foreign policy context. They argue that there were two distinct phases in the Communists' treatment of the Western presence - a period of moderation followed by one of far more extreme measures - and that the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and more particularly China's entry into the war four months later, marked a decisive turning point or watershed in their policies and actions.

This study argues that the Communists' treatment of the remaining Western presence was determined by more basic, long-term factors: their strong anti-imperialism (both as successors to a century of reaction against imperialism in China and as ideological adherents to the Leninist theory of imperialism) and their firm commitment to establishing a socialist society. The combination of these two factors precluded any future role for the existing Western presence in China. The Communists' decision to permit Westerners to remain temporarily in China and even to continue their activities was prompted, not by a policy of moderation, but by pragmatism in the interests of avoiding economic and social disruption during the immediate takeover and transitional 'New Democracy' periods. Having decided not to expel the Western presence outright, the Communists astutely utilized it for their own material and political purposes, in particular to help establish and consolidate their authority.

At the same time, the Communist authorities - from the earliest months of their rule - exerted strong economic, psychological and at times physical pressures on the Western presence. Pressures on individual interest groups varied according to their involvement with past imperialism, the degree of their incompatibility with socialism, and particularly their immediate usefulness or otherwise to the authorities. While Western economic and educational establishments were generally
subjected to less severe pressures than were missionaries, in particular Catholics, the pressures exerted on all groups were directed towards their eventual eradication from China. The Communists' actions during the Korean War period, while admittedly of increased intensity, largely represented the continuation and the culmination of earlier pressures. Indeed, the ideological intensity of the period gave the Chinese Government, which had consistently proclaimed an official policy of protecting foreign nationals, a 'legal' pretext to bring to completion its underlying aim of eliminating the Western presence from China.
The student of China's modern history (whether studying in China or in the West) is made very conscious of the role played by the West in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the manner in which a series of 'unequal treaties' enabled Western merchants and manufacturers, missionaries and educators to pursue their material, religious or more 'philanthropic' interests in China. The student is also made aware of the substantial nature of this presence: the network of treaty ports and especially concessions and settlements - distinctive foreign enclaves superimposed on traditional Chinese cities - in which these Western interests were centred and from which emanated the culture and 'way of life' of the West.

Yet living in China towards the end of the Mao era, one was also very conscious of being in a country where the West currently played virtually no role at all and where - even more than in the Soviet Union - one was completely cut off from the lifestyle, products and culture of the West. Only the physical remnants of the Western presence remained, now put to other uses. The buildings of the still distinctive former concessions and settlements in cities such as Guangzhou, Tianjin and Wuhan served mostly as municipal government offices, schools and residential accommodation; the huge Catholic Dongtang (Eastern Church) on Beijing's main shopping artery, Wangfujing, was a primary school; the Yanjing University campus, once the pride of the American-sponsored Christian colleges network, was the most run-down part of Beijing University, a focus of political activity during the Cultural Revolution and subsequent ideological campaigns. Most noticeable, of course, was the former 'foreign section' of Shanghai, centred on the multi-storey solid buildings on the Bund which - while still giving foreign visitors the impression of being in a 'proper city' - was no longer the nerve centre of a large Western commercial network. Nearby, the stores of the once well-known Nanking Road and Avenue Joffre sold mostly Chinese-produced goods instead of the latest products from Europe and the United States, while the city's movie patrons watched Chinese films in cinemas where they had once absorbed American culture - as interpreted by Hollywood. Gone too were the human representatives of the Western
presence in China: the taipans of the great hongs and their offsiders; the Catholic and Protestant missionaries who had vied for the souls of the Chinese people; the educators with their liberal, democratic, Western ideals; the wide range of people who had made up the socially diverse and cosmopolitan foreign communities.

How had this significant change come about? While the Western presence had declined considerably during the Sino-Japanese War and a few isolated remnants remained until the Cultural Revolution, the change was centred basically on the period between 1948 and 1952, the year before and the years immediately following the Communist victory in China. This period is the focus of the present study which analyses the process whereby the newly victorious Chinese Communists effectively eliminated the Western presence - which for over a century had played a political, economic, religious and cultural role in China - from their country.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

But for a large number of people, in a variety of geographical locations, this work would have been neither started nor completed. My thanks go to the Australian National University for providing the funds not just for a Ph.D scholarship but for field research outside Australia. In particular, I owe thanks to Professor Wang Gungwu, Head of the Department of Far Eastern History, for his initial and continuing encouragement; to Con Kiriloff for his inspired Chinese language teaching; to Dr Stephen FitzGerald (formerly Head of the Department of Far Eastern History and the Contemporary China Centre) for his overall supervision of my work.

I also wish to express my appreciation to the Myer Foundation for the grant of an exchange scholarship to China in 1975-1977 which permitted me to study at the Beijing Languages Institute and Beijing University during another transitional period in China's recent history. My thanks go, in particular, to my teachers in the History Department of Beijing University who, even during a difficult political period, gave me some understanding of the Communists' perception of the history of Western imperialism in China, and to my Chinese fellow-students for occasionally expressing doubts that history is as straightforward as propagandists - whether communist or otherwise - like to portray it.

I am also grateful to the librarians in the libraries and archives I used both in Australia and overseas, including the Menzies Library at the Australian National University, the National Library of Australia, the School of Oriental and African Studies and the British Museum in London, the Missionary Research Library, Columbia University and St John's University in New York City, and the Maryknoll Mission at Ossining, New York. In addition to the researchers I met overseas, I benefitted from the presence at the Australian National University of a number of visiting scholars who discussed my subject with me and who offered advice on source materials overseas. They included Professor Wolfgang Franke, Professor David Hawkes, Dr Mark Elvin, Dr Ellis Joffe, Dr Ross Terrill and Dr Bill Jenner.

My thanks also go to the large number of former Western residents in China (only some of whom are listed in the bibliography) who gave freely of their time to discuss their personal experiences in China.
before, during and after the Communist victory. Although many of their lively reminiscences and anecdotes do not, unfortunately, have a place in an academic thesis, these people helped rescue my research from the blandness of official Communist rhetoric and brought to life the atmosphere in China during the late forties and early fifties.

During the final preparation of this thesis I have been fortunate in having the assistance of Jack Hooper who made many useful suggestions and who carried out the time-consuming task of proofreading. I thank Salli Vaughan-Demets for her speedy typing of the manuscript, undertaken mostly during a hot Australian holiday period when there were far better things to do. Throughout my time in the Department of Far Eastern History, Marion Saville has been a good-natured provider of administrative advice.

Finally, I owe a special debt to Dr Timothy Wright who, while having no official responsibility for the supervision of my work, devoted a great deal of time and energy to reading and commenting on the draft manuscript. His incisive criticisms and useful suggestions, for which I may not always have appeared overly grateful at the time, have been of immense value in completing this study. Both he and others helped me to avert many errors; the responsibility for those that remain is mine.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Amateur Dramatic Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAT</td>
<td>British-American Tobacco</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOTRA</td>
<td>Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>China Association Bulletin</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>China Association File: The Civil War and Subsequent Conditions</td>
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<td>CAMC</td>
<td>China Association Minutes and Circulars</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CIM</td>
<td>China Inland Mission</td>
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<td>CMB</td>
<td>China Missionary Bulletin</td>
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<td>CMOHP</td>
<td>China Missionaries Oral History Project</td>
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<td>CMV</td>
<td>Congregation of the Mission: Vincentians</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Chinese Press Review, Shanghai</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
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<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<td>ICI</td>
<td>Imperial Chemical Industries</td>
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<td>NCDN</td>
<td>North China Daily News</td>
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<td>NCNA</td>
<td>New China News Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>SCMP</td>
<td>Survey of China Mainland Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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NOTE ON THE TEXT

The *pinyin* system of Romanization is used in this thesis. The following is a list of place names and institutions which occur regularly in the text, together with the spellings used in the English-language sources of the period (where these differ from the *pinyin* version).

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<td>Yanjing</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Issues

'The history of modern China is a history of imperialist aggression,' declared Mao Zedong in 1940. One of the major themes of China's modern history is the impact of imperialism on China and the Chinese reaction to that impact. Both Western and Chinese historians customarily date China's modern history from the Opium War of 1840-1842 which marked the beginning of the imperialist era in China. Much of the historical writing on modern China revolves around the theme of imperialism; it covers analyses of the imperialist assault as such and debates on the extent of the imperialist impact on China's traditional society, economy and culture. Discussions of the Chinese reaction to imperialism range from specific issues such as the spasmodic outbursts against missionaries, the Boxer Uprising and the Nationalist Government's efforts to rid China of the 'unequal treaties,' to the broader question of the role of imperialism in the development of Chinese nationalism.

The chief enemies of the Communist revolution, as described by Mao Zedong, were imperialism and feudalism, and the Communists had long emphasized their aim of driving imperialism out of China. By the time the Communists came to power during 1949, both the imperialist presence as such and its privileges had substantially diminished - compared with their peak in the early decades of the twentieth century - as a result of the rise of Chinese nationalism, the Sino-Japanese War and the prospect of Communist rule. But the presence was still considerable. With the elimination of Japanese imperialism, its chief proponents were Britain and the United States, and its major components were business and religion - the original 'twin symbols of Western imperialism' - extending into an educational and cultural presence, and backed up by a widely dispersed diplomatic and consular presence. All had gained access to, and spread through, China under the privileges and protection of the 'unequal treaties' and, regardless of whether their impact had been positive or negative, were closely linked with imperialism.

Within four years of the Communists' victories in the major cities, China's new rulers had not only abolished 'all special privileges of imperialist countries in China,' as they had promised, but had virtually
eliminated the remaining imperialist presence from China. The few remaining representatives of the business presence, centred on Shanghai and Tianjin, were mostly trying to hand over their assets 'voluntarily' to the Chinese authorities and to obtain exit visas to leave the country. The even fewer remnants of the religious presence were mostly in gaol. Western-style education and culture had largely disappeared, as had the foreign communities in the former treaty ports, even Shanghai. Virtually the only Westerners who remained in China voluntarily (apart from some stateless persons who had nowhere to go) were those people who, for a variety of reasons, had decided to throw in their lot with the new regime - at the risk of being labelled as 'Reds' in their own countries - and worked as language teachers, translators, or writers of anti-imperialist material for the Chinese Government.

Although many academic works have been devoted to the earlier phases of the imperialist presence in China, comparatively little attention has been paid to its elimination by the Communists. Those studies which have dealt with, or briefly referred to, this issue fall into three basic categories. The first, and the bulk of the writings on the subject, concentrates basically on the fate of particular groups of Westerners after the Communists came to power. In many cases, the post-1949 period forms a concluding chapter, section or merely a few sentences to round off the history of a particular group of Westerners in China. These studies include Nigel Cameron's general historical account of contact and confrontation between Chinese and Westerners, Columba Cary-Elwes' study of Catholic and Protestant missionaries in China, and Jessie Gregory Lutz's work on the Christian colleges. Individual case studies such as Philip West's work on Yanjing University and Sherman Cochran's study of the British-American Tobacco Company similarly have concluding sections on the post-1949 period.

Also within this category are a number of works, mostly academic dissertations, which focus largely or solely on the post-1949 experiences of a particular interest group in China and also see the issue basically in terms of the group's decline and eventual departure from China. These include Creighton Lacy's and Virginia Unsworth's dissertations on Protestant and American Catholic missionaries respectively, and Thomas Thompson's work on Jardine Matheson's problems in extricating itself from China. More 'popular' works in this vein include Noel Barber's largely anecdotal account of the fate of half a dozen Britishers (mainly
businessmen) after 'the fall of Shanghai.' Supplementing these works, and providing much of the major source material for them, are the many personal memoirs, especially by former missionaries, describing their experiences and ordeals at the hands of the Communists.

The second major category of studies which contains references to the end of the imperialist presence in China consists of works on post-1949 China by both historians and political scientists. Despite the importance of the concept of imperialism in CCP ideology, such studies - even those which concentrate on the early years of the People's Republic - pay only scant attention to this subject. Admittedly, the Communists had far more pressing problems on their hands when they came to power, especially the consolidation of their authority and the rehabilitation of the economy. Also, studies of the Communists' policies and actions justifiably focus on those issues which were of continuing relevance throughout the Mao - and even the post-Mao - era, not those which fairly quickly ceased to be important. But there is an additional reason why the elimination of the imperialist presence from China may have received little attention. It does not fit neatly into the conventional categories within which contemporary China is generally analysed, belonging neither to the study of Communist China's domestic policy - whether political, socio-economic or cultural - nor to its foreign relations, but falling somewhere between these areas.

In fact, the third category of studies - an extension of the second - which refers to the elimination of the imperialist presence from China looks at the question basically in the framework of China's foreign relations, especially with the United States and Britain, an approach which tends to underestimate both historical and domestic policy factors. Even those studies which treat the subject from the Communist side (such as those by John Gittings and Michael Hunt), rather than in the context of American or British foreign policy, see the Communists' treatment of Westerners in the context of the particular country's foreign relations with China, mostly within the narrow time framework of the immediate period.

What conclusions have these various commentators reached about the Communists' treatment of the Western imperialist presence in China? The most general image is probably that presented by Nigel Cameron in his book Barbarians and Mandarins. Cameron concludes a four hundred page historical account with the brief statement:
As soon as the Communist government assumed power, they expelled the Westerners from China. Once more, and for the first time since the end of the Ming dynasty in 1644, the Chinese took into their own hands the destinies of their country.\(^{15}\)

The expressions 'expelling the Westerners,' 'expelling the foreigners' and 'the expulsion of the foreigners' have come into almost general use to describe the elimination of the Western imperialist presence from China.\(^{16}\)

Some historians and political scientists, even those who discuss the issue only briefly, reach a slightly more complex conclusion. In essence, they argue that there were two distinct phases in the Communists' treatment of the remaining representatives of the imperialist presence: a period of moderation followed by one of far more extreme measures. They see the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and more particularly China's entry into the war four months later, as a decisive turning point or watershed. Ezra Vogel, for example, states: 'Many Chinese had pleasant relations with foreigners and realized the economic and technical advantages of more foreign contacts. These factors constituted a restraint that might have prevented expulsion, but the restraint was undone by the Korean War.'\(^{17}\) Writing in a similar vein, Bill Brugger states that 'towards the end of 1950... the formerly permissive attitude towards/foreign residents hardened.'\(^{18}\) In a detailed study of one element of the imperialist presence, in this case American missionaries, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker goes a step further. She maintains that the Chinese Communists initially pursued a policy of toleration which 'might conceivably have accommodated ongoing missionary contacts with China' had it not been 'cut short' by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.\(^{19}\) The implication of such a statement is that the Communists' elimination of at least this element of the imperialist presence occurred because of the Korean War; had there been no war, events might well have taken a different course.

These interpretations of the elimination of the Western imperialist presence - where they are not merely repeating generalizations made by other commentators and thereby building up a conventional interpretation of the issue\(^{20}\) - are the logical, if somewhat superficial, outcome of examining certain types of evidence. An initial period of moderation is suggested from an examination of what the CCP and particularly Mao officially said they were going to do - that is, protect all foreign nationals and their property - not what they actually did in practice;
and also from a concentration on sources detailing the experiences of those Western groups which received the least harsh treatment at the hands of the Communists, notably Protestant organizations and educational establishments in urban areas. Just as the Communists' relative silence (apart from repetitive guarantees) about the imperialist presence in the initial period appears to indicate a policy of moderation, so too does their widely publicized assault on the Western presence, particularly Catholic missionaries, during the Korean War ostensibly seem to indicate a dramatic change in their policy. In fact, the degree of publicity the Communist media gave to the issue was less a function of any change in basic policy than a reflection of the use the Government wished to make of it in any particular political context.

The present study, using a combination of Chinese Communist sources and Western materials (including archival material and interviews) argues basically that a continuing Western imperialist presence in China — whether economic, religious or cultural — was incompatible with both the Communists' anti-imperialism and their plans to establish a socialist society. The motivation underlying their treatment of the Western presence throughout the early Communist period was anti-imperialism: a nationalist response to what they saw as over a century of humiliation at the hands of the imperialist powers. To a large extent, the Chinese Communists were only completing a process begun by the Nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s; they were the first ruling group with sufficient power to bring the process to completion. Once the Communists came to power, any continuing Western presence became increasingly redundant as they moved towards the establishment of a socialist society (even in the transitional 'New Democracy' period) in which all aspects of life — politics, economics, education and culture — were to be transformed along Marxist-Leninist lines. The combination of the Communists' nationalism and their plans for a socialist society demanded the elimination of the existing Western presence in China, with its history of special privileges and partial independence from official Chinese control, and the establishment of a new, officially-controlled relationship with the outside world.

Following this argument, the present study will attempt to demonstrate that, contrary to the views expressed by some commentators, the Korean War was not a decisive turning point or watershed in the Communists' treatment of Westerners, marking the end of a period
of moderation. Far from initially having a 'permissive attitude' to Westerners, the Communists put strong pressures on all aspects of the Western presence almost as soon as they came to power. Their decision not to expel Westerners outright but to permit some of them to carry on their activities during the early transitional phase (while at the same time exerting strong economic and psychological pressures on them) was prompted, not by an underlying policy of moderation, but by short-term pragmatism in the interests of avoiding social and economic disruption, in particular to the urban economy and educational system.

What occurred during the Korean War was an extension and intensification of the same pressures, prompted and exacerbated both by the war itself and by the general ideological intensity of the internal mass campaigns aimed at eliminating all subversive elements within China. During this period, the Communists utilized the Western presence, and even the process of its elimination, in accordance with their new major priority: that of mobilizing the population both for the war effort and for the internal mass ideological campaigns. At the same time, the tense atmosphere gave the Communists the pretext to bring their underlying aim - that of eliminating the imperialist presence - to completion. The Korean War unquestionably speeded up the elimination of the imperialist presence, but the process was already well under way before the outbreak of the war.

After discussing the roots of the Communists' policies (which provided the basic motivation for their treatment of the Western presence), this study will examine first the extent of the Western presence in China during 1947-1948, and second, the expectations of various groups in the face of Communist successes and their decisions of whether or not to remain in China under the new Government. The bulk of the study deals with the period from the Communist takeover of the major cities in early 1949 until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Individual chapters discuss the Communists' policies and actions towards the Western imperialist presence as a whole and towards particular groups - business, religious, educational and cultural, and diplomatic and consular - as well as the responses of these groups. The final chapter examines the culmination and intensification of the Communists' actions during the Korean War.
The Roots of Communist Policy

Chinese Communist policy towards the Western presence in China was closely linked with the two basic goals of the Communist revolution itself. First, it was an anti-imperialist, nationalist revolution, aimed at reasserting China's independence. Second, it was a social revolution, directed towards the complete transformation of Chinese society along Marxist-Leninist lines. These two basic goals directly affected the remaining Western imperialist presence in China: the former most directly because of the West's involvement in a century of imperialism in China; the second more indirectly because a continuing Western bourgeois, capitalist presence was incompatible with the society the Communists envisaged for China.

The importance of imperialism in determining the CCP's outlook on the world and hence its policies towards Western nations, commented upon by John Gittings and Albert Feuerwerker, was probably even more relevant to its attitudes towards the Western presence inside China. The major facets of Western imperialism had all taken advantage of the 'unequal treaties,' obtained by force against a weakened China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to pursue their particular interests in China. All had become 'partners in imperialism.'

The 'unequal treaties,' as well as opening China (beyond Guangzhou) to foreigners through the establishment of treaty ports, gave the imperialist powers - led by Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Russia (after 1895 they were joined by Japan) - a number of special privileges, enjoyed by all under the 'most favoured nation' clause. These privileges, while not totally extinguishing Chinese sovereignty as had happened in large areas of Asia and Africa, combined to reduce China to what Sun Yat-sen called a hyper-colony and what the Communists termed semi-colonial status. Two of the privileges effectively removed foreigners in China, as well as sections of Chinese territory, from Chinese legal jurisdiction. The first was extraterritoriality which made individual foreigners subject only to the jurisdiction of their own consuls. The second was the establishment of foreign concessions and settlements in a number of treaty ports. These areas - they included the International settlement (originally the British and American settlements) and the French concession in Shanghai, and the concessions of a number of powers in Tianjin, Hankou and Guangzhou - were under foreign administration and controlled by foreign police. They were, in fact,
self-governing foreign enclaves in China. In 1898, following the accelerated scramble for influence in China, the major foreign powers acquired leaseholds in which Chinese sovereignty was totally extinguished. The leaseholds (including Britain's Weihaiwei and the New Territories, adjacent to Hong Kong, and Germany's Jiaozhou Bay area in Shandong province) served as focal points for surrounding 'spheres of influence' where the relevant power obtained railway and mining rights.

Additional privileges were applicable mainly to particular interest groups. Economic interests enjoyed a low import and export tariff of up to 5 percent ad valorem, the freedom of navigation for foreign ships both in Chinese internal and territorial waters (a privilege also utilized by foreign naval vessels) and, following the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, the right to establish manufacturing concerns in the treaty ports. The fundamental rights of missionaries to reside permanently in the interior (other foreigners were limited to the treaty ports) and to purchase or lease land there were acquired under the Sino-French Treaty of 1860.

These treaty provisions, enforced - and indeed expanded - by the use of military and diplomatic power, formed the background to the steady expansion of Western interests in China after 1840. Western imperialism in China reached its zenith on the eve of World War I, by which time some ninety ports were open to foreign commerce and usually residence, and Western companies had come to dominate the small modern sector of the Chinese economy. Thus, foreign interests, including the still small but expanding Japanese holdings, controlled most of China's railway system (either directly, or indirectly through loan contracts), the greater part of cigarette manufacturing and almost half the cotton textile industry; approximately 90 percent of modern coal mining was in the hands of foreign or sino-foreign companies. Moreover, three Chinese government instrumentalities were under Western (predominantly British) control: the Maritime Customs Service, the Salt Administration (after 1913) and the Post Office; the major Western powers also ran their own postal services. Christian missionaries were active in every province of China, having established a network not just of mission stations but of hospitals and educational institutions.

The foreign residents who were the human embodiment of these interests lived mostly in foreign enclaves in the treaty ports, particularly in the concessions and settlements which existed in sixteen of them. These foreign enclaves - the largest were in Shanghai, Tianjin,
Hankou and Guangzhou - bore all the features of colonialism and their Western residents frequently exhibited characteristic colonial attitudes towards the few Chinese people with whom they came into contact, mostly employees and servants. The foreign presence as a whole was backed up not just by diplomatic representation in Beijing but by a wide network of consular offices. Britain had consular representation in some twenty-eight treaty ports, reflecting her preeminent role in foreign imperialism in China; Russia, Germany, the United States, France and other countries had offices in a lesser number of ports.31

This panoply of Western interests was only temporarily shaken by World War I, returning after the war in almost equal strength. It was now, however, faced with two budding rivals. During the war, Japan had become a major imperialist power in China and following her Twenty-one Demands of 1915 had embarked on a thirty-year attempt to control China's economy and politics. Against both the Western and Japanese presence stood emerging Chinese nationalism,32 heir to a tradition dating back to the nineteenth century but now much more aggressively resisting foreign penetration and analysing the causes and consequences of the foreign presence.

Emerging from this analysis has been a debate on the imperialist impact on China which is still unsettled today; sharp differences mark discussion of the impact even in material terms.33 Chinese nationalists of all types (from Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong),34 as well as a number of mostly leftist Western commentators, have argued that the impact of imperialism was both large and extremely negative, distorting Chinese economic development by destroying the native handicraft industry and preventing the growth of Chinese capitalism. They contend that imperialism played a 'crucial role' in reducing China 'to such a sorry state in the first half of the twentieth century.'35

A number of Western analysts, however, discount these arguments. First, they maintain that the overall impact of imperialism was small. In the words of Rhoads Murphey, who is an extreme exponent of this view, imperialism 'made only the smallest of dents in the material fabric of traditional China.'36 Murphey and others argue that the impact was limited basically because the imperialist presence was geographically confined largely to the east coast and the Yangzi area, and more particularly to the treaty ports - in a country where the focus of life was 'earthbound China.' Western economic activity was grafted on to, rather
than fused with, the traditional economy and had very few linkages with the domestic economy. These analysts put forward a similar argument in the case of the cultural impact of imperialism. Despite the exertions of Christian missionaries, whose activities were also concentrated on the cities and towns of the coastal provinces (although their rural representation was greater than that of other Westerners), less than 1 percent of the Chinese population was converted to Christianity; large numbers of these were reputed to be 'rice Christians.' Western higher education and culture were also concentrated on the major treaty ports which, in many ways, were virtual island enclaves on the periphery of Chinese society.³⁷

Second, some of these analysts have argued that the economic impact of Western imperialism, while small, was on balance not harmful but beneficial to China. Trade and foreign investment introduced modern technology and methods of organization; according to Robert F. Dernberger, 'the foreigner served as a necessary agent to start the Chinese economy on the road to modernization.'³⁸ The introduction of Western methods similarly applied to foreign medicine and education, particularly in the scientific field.

It is, of course, almost impossible to judge the material impact of imperialism in isolation from other factors. Indeed, imperialism's quantitative impact on China (which has almost certainly been exaggerated by Chinese nationalists and Marxists) is of only limited relevance in assessing the Chinese perception of, and attitudes towards, imperialism. More important was what has been described as the profound impact of imperialism 'on the Chinese mind.'³⁹ This impact was an amalgam of a variety of factors: the imperialist presence itself (but more particularly its association with the humiliation of defeat and the derogation of Chinese sovereignty), the privileges enjoyed by Western interests and individuals, and the exclusivist lifestyle and often haughty, colonial-style manner of many of the representatives of imperialism in China.⁴⁰

The vehement reaction against imperialism perhaps shows best how great was its impact on the minds of the Chinese. 'In a sense the whole of the history of modern China can be seen as a reaction to imperialism ...' states historian Lucien Bianco.⁴¹ This reaction lasted for over a century: from the early 1840s when the imperialists made their first incursions into China until after the Communists came to power in 1949. It came from diverse sections of the community and took varying forms: from the official attempts of successive Chinese rulers and governments
whatever their political colour) to contain the imperialists and revise or cancel the 'unequal treaties,' to violent physical outbursts against individual representatives of the imperialist presence.

At the risk of over-simplification, Chinese anti-imperialism can be divided into two basic phases. The first, from about 1860 to the turn of the century, was part of what has been described as Chinese tradition-oriented or conservative nationalism. Its main exponents were the conservative scholar-gentry, the peasantry, and at times the Qing court itself which was torn between reacting against the imperialists and obtaining support or finance from them to retain power. Protests were at this time directed mainly against Christian missionaries who were becoming a major threat and challenge to the power of the scholar-gentry at the local level. They took the form of 'popular' outbursts and uprisings, from spasmodic anti-missionary incidents (culminating in the Tianjin Massacre of 1870) to the Boxer Uprising at the turn of the century.

The second phase of anti-imperialism emerged during the early years of the twentieth century; it was one of the basic components (along with the concept of social revolution) of modern Chinese nationalism. In contrast to the earlier phase, the movement was basically urban, led by intellectuals and spreading to the emerging merchant class and urban proletariat. The movement intensified after Japan's Twenty-one Demands of 1915 and particularly following the May 4th Movement in 1919. This phase of anti-imperialism saw the violent outbreaks against Western business and missions of the 1920s: economic boycotts and violence in a number of cities in 1925 following the May 30th Incident in Shanghai, and more outbursts during the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928 which led to the evacuation of businessmen and missionaries from the Yangzi area and the rendition of British concessions at Hankou and Jiujiang.

Modern Chinese nationalism split into two streams following the Nationalist-Communist break of 1927. The newly-established Nationalist Government took formal steps to end the special privileges of Western imperialism which was, in practice, already on the defensive because of the strong tide of nationalist feeling sweeping the country and the growing dominance of Japanese imperialism. In late 1928 the Chinese Government succeeded in restoring China's tariff autonomy and during 1927-1931 it secured the relinquishment of a few concessions. It also regained effective control of the Maritime Customs Service, the Salt
Administration and the Post Office. Even Western educational institutions, which had previously been largely independent of official control, were required to sinicize their administration and curricula. But extraterritoriality and many of the concessions and settlements remained. Although the Western powers had agreed in principle to give up these basic privileges (the Nationalist Government had made a futile unilateral declaration in January 1930), it was not until 1943 that they finally revoked extraterritoriality and gave up their other remaining 'special privileges.' This action had little immediate significance because of the Japanese occupation but it did bring to an end the formal privileges obtained by Western imperialism under the unequal treaties. In the post-war period, however, the Nationalists fell back on assistance from the West, this time from the United States, and were themselves accused of betraying Chinese nationalism.

From the late 1920s, the CCP formed a distinct second wing of the nationalistic movement. The Communists were successors to the long history of Chinese anti-imperialism; indeed Mao had called himself an anti-imperialist well before he embraced Marxism-Leninism. At the same time they added a new dimension to Chinese anti-imperialism, giving it a theoretical structure in accordance with Lenin's theory of imperialism. Chinese Marxist publications from Qi Shufen's 1925 work *China under Economic Aggression* to Hu Sheng's classic study *Imperialism and Chinese Politics* put the blame for China's economic problems squarely on imperialism and launched strong attacks against the activities of the imperialists in China.

In December 1939 Mao himself clearly outlined the integral role of anti-imperialism in the Communist revolution. The revolution's two major enemies, he stated, were feudalism and imperialism; of these two 'the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation is the principal one.' According to Mao, China had been reduced to a colony and semi-colony - by the Japanese and 'other imperialist forces' - not just politically (through the unequal treaties) but also through economic and cultural aggression. In addition to the frequently expressed nationalist arguments that imperialism had destroyed China's self-sufficient natural economy and retarded the development of Chinese capitalism, Mao chas­tised the imperialists for their policy of cultural aggression which, he alleged, was conducted through such activities as missionary work, the establishment of hospitals and schools, and the publication of newspapers.
in China. The foremost task of the Chinese revolution, stated Mao, was to overthrow imperialism.\textsuperscript{54}

If the Communists' reaction against the imperialist past appeared to allow little place for a continuing Western presence in China, their vision of their future society equally seemed to preclude any role for Western interests in China. The second determinant of the Communists' policy towards the Western presence in China was their commitment to building a socialist society. Since the establishment of the CCP in 1921, the Party had consistently proclaimed its firm allegiance to Marxist goals, even though Mao Zedong had adapted Marxist-Leninist theory to Chinese conditions and, in particular, adopted the strategy of peasant (as opposed to urban proletarian) revolution as the means of achieving power.\textsuperscript{55}

The Marxist society which the CCP envisaged for China allowed no eventual role for private enterprise, religion, private education or non-socialist culture. First, public ownership of the means of production was an integral feature of a socialist economy. Second, religion was completely contrary to Marxist materialism, although the Chinese Communists - like the Russians - explicitly guaranteed the freedom of religious belief, arguing that religion was a product of social conditions and would disappear as those conditions changed.\textsuperscript{56} Third, culture and education were to be geared to the socialist cause; at the 1942 Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art, for example, Mao stated that proletarian art and literature were 'part of the whole proletarian revolutionary cause' and hence 'subordinate to politics.'\textsuperscript{57} Western interests in China - as representatives of bourgeois, capitalist society - were thus complete anathema to the CCP's plans for a Marxist-Leninist future.

As the Communists themselves acknowledged, however, there was no question of establishing a socialist society as soon as they achieved power. The Chinese revolution, according to Mao, had to go through two stages: first a democratic revolution, then a socialist revolution. The first step was to change the colonial,\textsuperscript{58} semi-colonial and semi-feudal form of society into an independent, democratic society; the second step was to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society. This concept of stages of revolution was nothing new; indeed it was a basic feature of Marxist ideology. Before a socialist revolution could be carried out, there first had to be a bourgeois democratic revolution. Fitting the Chinese experience in with the Marxist model, Mao argued that
the bourgeois democratic stage of China's revolution had basically commenced with Sun Yat-sen's revolution of 1911 (following the May 4th Movement of 1919 the leadership had, he said, passed from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat) and that the initial phase of China's socialist revolution - which Mao called New Democracy - fell within this bourgeois-democratic stage. Mao did not spell out long he anticipated the completion of the New Democratic phase would take, stating only that it would 'need quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight.'

Although Mao was careful to relate his concept of New Democracy to Marxist stage theory, its particular characteristics were designed to serve China's immediate needs, as Mao readily admitted. 'We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us,' he stated in 1940 when spelling out the basic features of New Democracy. Politically, New Democracy was to be based on the union of all revolutionary (anti-imperialist and anti-feudal) classes in China: the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie, but under the leadership of the proletariat. This broad political union was designed to appeal to as broad a consensus of the Chinese population as possible and in particular to gain the support of liberal elements (including intellectuals and professionals) who did, in fact, drift to the left as they became disillusioned with the Nationalists but who were not always prepared to give all-out support to Marxism-Leninism. Although the Communists clearly stated that New Democracy was only their minimum programme and a transitional stage to full socialism, many Chinese appear to have been preoccupied with the immediate present and paid more attention to the political features of New Democracy - which Communist spokesmen astutely stressed - rather than those of communism.

The economy of New Democracy included government control of trade and the confiscation of state and bureaucratic capital (specifically that of the 'four big families'). The Communists did not, however, propose confiscating private enterprise in general nor forbidding the development of such capitalist production as did not 'dominate the livelihood of the people.' The continuation of private enterprise, at least in the short term, was necessitated by the Communists' inexperience in urban areas and their lack of trained personnel, together with the need (in conjunction with the aims of the moderate political line) to obtain the support of private entrepreneurs to minimize economic disruption and to rehabilitate
the damaged economy. The proposed takeover of all Nationalist (including former Japanese) and bureaucratic capital would strain the Communists' resources to the limit.

In contrast to New Democracy's rather moderate political and economic features, which fell far short of socialism, its culture appeared to be more akin to the envisaged socialist model: it was to be a scientific, national and mass culture. In being scientific, New Democratic culture was opposed to all feudal and superstitious ideas. While theoretically opposed to religion, however, the Communists continued to guarantee the freedom of religious belief. As a national culture, New Democratic culture was to uphold the dignity of the Chinese nation as well as linking up with the socialist and new democratic cultures of other nations. As a mass culture, its basic function was to serve the workers and peasants.65

Despite the Communists' somewhat moderate plans for the initial period of their rule, there seemed to be little place for a continuing Western presence in China even during this transitional phase. As Mao constantly reiterated, anti-imperialism was one of the two basic goals (along with anti-feudalism) of the New Democratic revolution.66 Although the New Democracy economy permitted the continuation of private enterprise, this did not appear to extend to foreign-owned enterprises. Indeed, Mao specifically stated that a beneficial feature of those groups which were to be permitted to continue their activities was that they - unlike bureaucratic capitalists - had 'no ties, or comparatively few, with imperialism.'67 Similar limitations applied in the religious field. While Mao stated that the Communists could never approve of religion, there was the possibility of a political union even with religious people as part of the overall 'anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front.'68 In the cultural sphere, Mao conceded that China should assimilate 'a good deal of foreign progressive culture' but stressed that feudal and imperialist culture had to 'be swept away' before China's new culture could be built up.69

Although Mao was very specific about the anti-imperialist nature of the New Democratic revolution and implied that it allowed no place for the representatives of the imperialists, he did not clearly spell out the Communists' precise intentions regarding the remaining Western interests in China.70 Even in the post-war period he stated only that one of the declared objectives of New Democracy was that of 'doing away with the special privileges of imperialism in China.'71 This statement was
somewhat obscure because the imperialists' formal privileges had in practice ceased to exist following the wartime relinquishment of extra-territoriality by Britain, the United States and other Western nations - a factor which Chinese Communists conveniently ignore when discussing (and taking credit for) the elimination of Western imperialist privileges from China. But whilst the formal privileges were gone and Western interests in China had further declined during the Sino-Japanese War, there still remained in China a considerable Western presence whose representatives by and large enjoyed a privileged existence compared with the bulk of the Chinese population and who were continuing, conspicuous symbols of a century of Western imperialism in China.
Notes


3. Mao, 'Be concerned with the well-being of the masses, pay attention to methods of work,' 27 January 1934, Selected Works, I, 147.


10. See individual chapters and bibliography.


A striking example of this approach is Warren W. Tozer, 'Last bridge to China: The Shanghai Power Company, the Truman Administration and the Chinese Communists,' *Diplomatic History*, 1:1 (Winter 1977), 64-78.

Cameron, *Barbarians and Mandarins*, p.418.


Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, p.69.


For example, Brugger, *Contemporary China*, pp.77, 107, cites Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, pp.69-71, as his source.


The magnitude of the imperialist presence in China in the early twentieth century is discussed in detail by Feuerwerker, *The Foreign Establishment in China*, passim.

In 1915 there were Maritime Customs stations at forty-eight of these ports. ibid., p.2.


ibid., p.37.

See below.


ibid., pp.122-28, 221-34.


For a clear outline of this phase, see Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1969), pp.16-19. Its major features are described by Ch'en, *China and the West*, pp.140-42.


Richard W. Rigby, *The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), chapters 5, 6. The experiences of Western businessmen and missionaries are graphically described in the China Association's records and missionary journals of the period.

These included the British concessions at Jinjiang and Xiamen and the Belgian concession at Tianjin.

But not those of Germany or Russia: Germany had lost its special privileges during World War I and the new Soviet Government had renounced the privileges acquired by its Tsarist predecessor.

For details of the agreements, see Wesley R. Fishel, *The End of Extraterritoriality in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), pp.213-15. The title of this book is misleading; the book deals with the complete history of extraterritoriality in China and only chapter 11 is concerned with its abolition.

Mao told Edgar Snow that in 1917, when he was still a student at the normal school in Changsha, he was 'definitely antimilitarist and anti-imperialist.' At that time he described his ideas as a 'curious mixture' of liberalism, democratic reformism and utopian socialism. Mao dated his conversion to Marxism from the summer of 1920. Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, new edition (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1972), pp.174, 181.

Based on his influential work, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

Qi Shufen, *Jingji qinlue xia zhi Zhongguo* [China under economic aggression] (Shanghai: published by the author, 1925). This book was initially issued under the title *Diguozhuyi tieti xia de Zhongguo* [China under the iron heel of imperialism].
52 Hu Sheng, Diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo zhengzhi [Imperialism and Chinese politics] (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1952).

53 Mao, 'The Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,' Selected Works, II, 313. See also ibid., 315.

54 ibid., 311-13, 318.

55 On the Communists' strategy and goals, see Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp.52-70, 112-17, 136-38.


57 Mao, 'Talks at the Yenan forum on literature and art,' May 1942, Selected Works, III, 86.

58 This referred to the imperialist activities of Japan, as distinct from other imperialist countries, in China.


62 This general attitude was commented on by Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years, pp.20-21.

63 Zhang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong), Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung) and Chen Lifu (Chen Li-fu).


65 ibid., 380-81.


67 Mao, 'On New Democracy,' Selected Works, II, 381.

68 ibid.

69 ibid., 369, 380.
Mao had on occasion hinted at the nationalization of some foreign-owned economic establishments when he grouped together imperialist and bureaucratic capital. In 'The Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' he stated that the new democratic revolution 'economically ... aims at the nationalization of all the big enterprises and capital of the imperialists, traitors and reactionaries....' In 'On New Democracy' he quoted a declaration made at the First National Congress of the Guomindang in 1924 (during the period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation) that 'enterprises ... whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state' and maintained that this was 'the correct policy for the economic structure of the new-democratic republic.' Mao, Selected Works, II, 327, 353.

Mao, 'The present situation and our tasks,' Selected Works, IV, 167.

CHAPTER 2
THE WESTERN PRESENCE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Following the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Western imperialist interests in China faced the problem of reestablishing themselves - after the wartime evacuation or internment of many of their representatives - in a post-war world that was seeing the eclipse of colonialism throughout Asia and Africa. In China, never a formal colony, the twenty-year contest between the Nationalist Government and its Communist rival was coming to a peak. During 1947 and early 1948, while the two sides were fighting out the vital stage of the Civil War in basically rural areas of central and north China and the Northeast, life in Nationalist-held China - especially in the cities where most Westerners resided - was becoming more and more insecure. The authorities faced a mounting economic crisis (caused particularly by the rampant inflation), labour unrest, and the growing politicization and leftism of students and intellectuals. The US Government's support of the increasingly unpopular Nationalists created strong waves of anti-American sentiment: first, because the Americans were blamed for prolonging the Civil War; second, because of the behaviour of American servicemen who, unlike other foreign residents in China, enjoyed 'special privileges' which amounted to extraterritoriality. General displays of rowdyism and drunkenness, together with a number of specific incidents (including the nationally-publicized Beijing rape case, the drowning of two Chinese by drunk American servicemen and the stabbing of a pedicab driver) added fuel to the student movement and created a general anti-American and even anti-foreign atmosphere.

It was in this unstable situation that the remaining Western imperialist presence found itself in China on what has been called 'the eve of Communist takeover.' With the elimination of Japanese interests during the war - and the earlier disappearance of Russia and Germany from the imperialist scene in China - the only countries still with significant interests in China were the original three treaty-makers: Britain, the United States and, to a lesser extent, France. After over a century, their major activities still reflected their earlier interests in the country. Britain's interest was overwhelmingly commercial. The United States, while having some economic interests, was more involved with missionary (particularly Protestant), educational and other
'philanthropic' activities, together with cultural pursuits. France was especially prominent in Roman Catholic missionary work and also played a small role in the economic field.

The major components of the Western imperialist presence, providing the framework within which this study will be carried out, were business, religion, and culture and education. Although the diplomatic and consular presence would normally be treated as part of the study of international relations, it is also relevant to the present study since its widely dispersed activities in China had come about because of the 'unequal treaties.' The imperialist presence as a whole was focussed on the former treaty ports, especially Shanghai, where the representatives of individual interest groups made up the foreign communities which were themselves regarded by the Communists as centres and symbols of 'imperialist aggression' against China.

The remaining 'Western imperialist presence' in China was not entirely synonymous with the remnants of what Albert Feuerwerker has described as the 'foreign establishment' in China in the early twentieth century. It did not, for example, include Russian refugees who sought refuge in China after the Bolshevik Revolution (or Jewish refugees who fled from Europe to Shanghai in the 1930s). On the other hand, in accordance with the Chinese Communists' conception of 'cultural imperialism,' the broad cultural and educational presence covered not only Western-owned or operated establishments but also the presence of Western culture, including literature and films, in the Chinese community at large. (This study does not, however, extend to the influence of Western education and culture on the Chinese community, in particular on Chinese intellectuals.)

Admittedly, the Communists' own conception of exactly what constituted the remaining Western imperialist presence in China was at times hazy and confused. In theory, they excluded individual 'foreign nationals,' putting them in a separate category from the establishments and representatives of the imperialists. In practice, the distinction frequently broke down - particularly during the ideological hysteria of the Korean War - and the 'imperialist' label was attached to virtually all foreigners in China except Soviet Russians. Because the Soviet Union's own new presence in China during the early Communist period was of a radically different nature, the term 'Western' as used here explicitly excludes the Soviet Union; the Soviet presence will be discussed separately where it is relevant to this study.
The Business Presence

Although most Western commentators are imprecise about the level of Western investment in China in the post-war period, Chinese economist Wu Chengming puts the figure for direct foreign investment in 1948 at just under US$1,500 million, about the same as pre-war investment by countries other than Japan. Britain's share of this amount was approximately one-half. The most striking features of British investment, which were to become readily apparent in dealings with the Communists, were its overwhelming focus on Shanghai (approximately four-fifths of all investment) and its concentration in the hands of a few huge enterprises. According to Chinese economist Wei Zichu, approximately 60 percent of all British fixed assets in Shanghai were owned by only seven concerns: three huge merchant houses or hongs which had started out as trading companies and ventured into a wide range of commercial and manufacturing activities, and four enterprises whose activities were more narrowly focussed.

Of the three large hongs, the most prominent was Jardine, Matheson & Co Ltd, which had made some of its early profits from dealing in the opium trade during the 1830s. In 1948, Jardine Matheson, which was based in Hong Kong, had branches in Shanghai (larger than its Hong Kong office), Tianjin, Hankou and five other Chinese cities, as well as agents in another ten, mostly ports on the Yangzi. Its activities covered a wide gamut of the import-export trade, shipping, insurance, cotton manufacture and brewing, both under its own name and through its subsidiaries operating under the 'Ewo' ('righteous harmony') label. Next came Butterfield & Swire which had commenced operations in China in 1867 and, like Jardine Matheson, had expanded into manufacturing after the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki granted foreigners the right to establish manufacturing enterprises in the treaty ports. Its interests were focussed on shipping and on the sugar and paint industries with subsidiaries functioning under the Taikoo ('great and ancient') label. The third company, E.D. Sassoon & Company, had been an early China trader but became one of the giant hongs only in the 1930s when it made large investments in real estate followed by expansion into commerce and heavy industry.

The four concerns with more narrowly focussed activities were all subsidiaries or branches of multinational companies. British-American Tobacco had been reorganized in 1934 as the Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company; it controlled a large part of the Chinese cigarette market, both
importing tobacco and manufacturing cigarettes. The Asiatic Petroleum Company was owned by Shell and shared the bulk of the import and distribution of oil and kerosene throughout China with the American company, Standard Vacuum. Imperial Chemical Industries imported and distributed fertilizers, dyestuffs and industrial chemicals, while China Soap, which was owned by Lever Brothers, manufactured and distributed soap and toiletries. The activities of these four enterprises, as well as those of the three huge hongs, were intermeshed with those of the major banks, in particular the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation which in 1948 had branches in eleven Chinese cities. Along with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and smaller foreign banks, it financed a large amount of China's foreign trade.

The relative power of these individual enterprises was apparent from the role they played in the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce which in 1948 represented over 160 British firms in the city. Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce was Jardine Matheson's John Keswick, whose brother W.J. (Tony) Keswick chaired the China Association at the London end, giving the company a continuing dominant role in decision-making on the course of British commerce in China and its relations with the British Government. The Chamber of Commerce's Secretary was J.A. Blackwood, the Shanghai head of Butterfield & Swire, while the fourteen-man General Committee included representatives of Sassoons and the above-mentioned four companies and two banks. This situation was paralleled in the British Chambers of Commerce in Tianjin and Hankou where, like Jardine Matheson and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, many large companies had their major branches.

After Britain, the United States had the largest economic investments in China; in 1948, American direct investment was variously estimated at between one-third and one-half of the British figure. American economic interests in China had been insignificant until the 1920s and she had nothing to match huge merchant houses like Jardine Matheson or Butterfield & Swire. Investments were concentrated on public utilities (the Shanghai Power Company, representing the largest single American investment, and the Shanghai Telephone Company) and local branches of oil giants such as Standard Vacuum and Caltex, as well as General Electric, the National City Bank and other banks, and American Express.
More important to the United States in the post-war period was the country's trade with China. The American share of China's foreign trade had increased dramatically from its pre-war level, partly because of her relative economic prosperity compared with Britain and Western Europe, and partly because of the artificial situation caused by American exports to China in the form of aid, as well as military shipments to the Nationalists. In 1948 United States trade with China had an estimated value of US$360.5 million - about three times the immediate pre-war level - and accounted for approximately 48 percent of China's imports and 20 percent of her exports. In contrast, trade played a relatively minor role for British economic interests. In 1948, Britain supplied only about 8 percent of China's imports and received less than 4 percent of her exports, a slight overall proportional decrease compared with before the war.19

The only other Western nation which still had significant economic interests in China was France.20 Ninety percent of France's total investment of approximately US$200 million was in real estate, heavily concentrated in property owned by the Roman Catholic Church, and she played only a minor role in industry and commerce.21 Of other foreign countries with investments in China, only Belgium had an estimated investment of over $20 million.22 Thus, whilst the foreign economic scene in the former treaty ports, and particularly in Shanghai, ostensibly appeared to be cosmopolitan in nature - ranging from the Dutch trading company J. Krijgsman & Company to Danish shipping lines and the Swiss medicinal firm Hoffman-La Roche - the Western business presence in China in the post-war period was overwhelmingly dominated by Britain and the United States.

Although non-Japanese foreign investment in China remained at much the same level as in the immediate pre-war period, business turnover and confidence were much lower. By 1948 Western businessmen generally agreed that their position had become completely hopeless under the Nationalists. Their problems had two major sources.23 The first was the internal economic decline, brought about partly by the disruption caused by the Civil War: shortages of raw materials and export goods, labour unrest and above all, the rampant inflation. The Chinese National dollar, valued in June 1946 at 2,020 to US$, had by early August 1948 depreciated to over 7,000,000 to US$.24 On 19 August the Nationalists introduced the new gold yuan in a last-ditch attempt to stem the
inflationary tide; by the end of the year it had depreciated from its original value of four to the American dollar to 120 to US$1. The effects on industry and commerce - both Chinese and foreign-owned - were drastic. According to the chairman of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, for example, the rampant inflation had 'resulted in an almost complete cessation of business' for the bank.

The source of the second major problem experienced by foreign business was the Nationalist Government itself. In an effort to balance its trade, the Government had implemented severe import controls in November 1946, bringing to an end the spectacular China market of the immediate post-war period. Extremely small import quotas, combined with the shortage of export goods and the Government's slowness in adjusting the exchange rate, seriously affected the profitability of traders. In any case, the Government would not permit profits to be remitted overseas. The activities of foreign businesses were even further curtailed by the Government's own increasing participation in industry and trade: both through government trading companies - such as the Universal Trading Corporation and the Central Trust of China - and through the huge enterprises which were run by families with strong government links (bureaucratic capitalists in Communist terminology) and given special privileges. The increasing official and semi-official role in industry and commerce, set against a near collapsed economy, meant that by mid-1948 some Western businesses were 'doing little more than hanging on in the hope that better days will come.'

The Religious Presence

The second of the 'twin symbols of Western imperialism,' religion, was less focussed on a national basis than the economic presence. The basic division was rather that between Catholic and Protestant interests, whose freely expressed mutual antipathy and different names in Chinese (tianzhujiao and jidujiao) only reinforced the feelings of some Chinese that they were virtually two distinct religions. Their missionaries' nationalities and languages accentuated the division. Catholic missionaries were mainly from continental Europe, particularly France and to a lesser extent Spain and Italy, although their numbers were bolstered by Americans in the early twentieth century. The Protestant presence was largely Anglo-Saxon and English-speaking, coming chiefly from Britain, the Commonwealth and the United States.
In the post-war period, both Catholic and Protestant missions faced the task of reestablishing themselves following the large-scale evacuation and internment of missionaries and the destruction or damaging by Japanese forces of a large amount of mission property. Overall, the Catholic representation in China was the largest, in terms of both the number of missionaries and converts. In 1947-1948 there were approximately 5,500 Catholic missionaries in China: about 3,000 priests and some 2,500 brothers and sisters. The total number of Protestant missionaries was approximately 4,000. Whilst the number of Catholic missionaries had increased significantly since the 1920s, the Protestants had never regained their position of the early 1920s when they had approximately 8,000 missionaries in China. In the mid 1920s their numbers had halved following evacuation during nationalistic anti-missionary outbursts - aimed especially at Protestant missions - and they had again left the country during the Sino-Japanese War. Protestant missionaries, living in China with their families and normally taking periods of furlough outside China, had traditionally been - and would continue to be - more responsive to internal political and social pressures than were Catholic missionaries who lacked immediate family considerations and whose commitment to converting the Chinese often took precedence over personal safety.

The number of Catholic converts outnumbered Protestants by over four to one: in 1947-1948 there were an estimated three million Chinese Catholics and 700,000 Protestants. These relative proportions did not, however, reflect the influence of the two missionary groups. This was weighted in favour of the Protestants because of their different location and activities: factors that partly determined their treatment by the Communists.

The Catholic presence in China was the most widely dispersed, organized into twenty archdioceses (all in provincial capitals) as well as eighty-six dioceses and thirty-six prefectures, and with substantial concentration on rural areas. Its basic aim was conversion - the saving of souls - with the focus not so much on the individual as on families and even entire villages, and its subsidiary educational and welfare activities fitted in with this goal. Catholic education (with a high component of religious teaching) was concentrated on primary and some secondary education; in 1948 an estimated 320,000 students attended some 4,500 Catholic schools, mainly small parochial schools. The Catholic
church ran a few large hospitals but its major medical focus was on small
dispensaries associated with mission stations; in 1947-1948 it had an
estimated eleven million dispensary consultations. Its 'mercy works'
were concerned largely with foundling homes and orphanages (it had some
32,000 orphans under its care) where the prime aim was baptism and the
saving of souls, and bringing up children in the Catholic faith.\textsuperscript{35}

In contrast, the Protestant churches concentrated particularly on
urban areas, especially on the east coast and Yangzi areas.\textsuperscript{36} Since the
early twentieth century, their purely religious activities had gradually
become secondary to the goal of reaching the Chinese nation as a whole
through appealing to the elite educated groups in urban areas whom they
saw as the country's future leadership. This 'modernist' emphasis
(which characterized the Protestant churches as a whole) was reflected in
the emphasis on education, health and social reform.\textsuperscript{37} In the first
quarter of the twentieth century, the Protestant churches had enjoyed
considerable influence in China when they found themselves temporarily
linked with the forces of social reform intent on the modernization
and transformation of Chinese society. Somewhat ironically, this
Westernization and modernization movement included the development of
Chinese nationalism and culminated in the mid-twenties in a violent
reaction against the West. But the Protestants' educational and medical
emphasis persisted; unlike the Catholics, this was focussed on large
hospitals, especially teaching hospitals, and on secondary and higher -
rather than primary - education. In 1948, there were 203 Protestant
hospitals in China and 227 middle schools.\textsuperscript{38} The emphasis on higher
education was reflected in the network of thirteen Protestant univer-
sities - compared with only three Catholic universities.\textsuperscript{39}

A significant exception to the general Protestant pattern of urban
concentration and educational and social reform activities was the China
Inland Mission which had been established in 1860 by Englishman Hudson
Taylor specifically to send missionaries into the Chinese interior where
few Protestants had previously ventured.\textsuperscript{40} The largest of all the
Protestant groups in China, in 1948 it had about 770 missionaries in the
country.\textsuperscript{41} The CIM was international (though predominantly British) in
membership and, whilst undenominational, was highly evangelical in
theology. Unlike most other Protestant mission societies, it had
continued to concentrate almost solely on evangelization and, apart from
small dispensaries and schools, played only a small role in medicine.
and education. The CIM's rural emphasis - in some places its missionaries were the only foreigners in the area - and its emphasis on religious, rather than reform, activities, made it more akin to the Catholic presence. However, in contrast to the Catholics, it retained the Protestant evangelization policy of public preaching and individual conversion, rather than converting families or groups and concentrating its religious teaching on the converted.

There were a number of additional differences between the Catholic and the overall Protestant presence in China that were also significant for their future treatment by the Communists. A fundamental factor was the structure of the church in China. All Catholic mission groups - from Lazarists to Benedictines - came under the tight central authority of the Vatican, represented in China by Papal Nuncio Antonio Riberi whose function of superintending the Catholic Church in China (in addition to being a diplomatic representative to the Nationalist regime) was to bring him into direct conflict with the Communists. The Protestant churches had no such central authority. Organizations such as the Foreign Missions Conference in the United States were characterized more by internal disagreement amongst membership denominations than by internal cohesion or uniform dogma. Reflecting the tight central control of the Roman Catholic Church, its representation in China was rather more dominated by a foreign hierarchy and foreign priests. In 1948, there were approximately 8,000 Chinese Catholic priests, brothers and sisters compared with 5,500 foreigners. There were also about 8,000 ordained Chinese Protestants - but this was double the number of foreigners. The Protestant churches had long emphasized the importance of creating a national church in China; the National Christian Council (a representative body for Protestant activities in China) had had a majority Chinese membership as early as the mid-1920s.

Catholic and Protestant missions in China drew on different sources of financial support. The Catholics relied chiefly on local income, mainly from their huge rural land holdings and urban real estate. The Protestant effort, in contrast, was supported largely by voluntary contributions from its supporters in the more affluent countries - particularly the United States - of the West.

A further difference was the question of political attitudes. In the post-war period the Catholic Church and its missionaries were much more closely linked than the Protestants with the policies of the
Nationalist Government, through vocal spokesmen such as Yu Bin, the Archbishop of Nanjing. Protestant attitudes were less clearcut. Some missionaries, especially those engaged in social welfare work, were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the corruption of the Nationalists and the mounting pauperization and destitution of the Chinese population. These differing attitudes were to become even more pronounced as a Communist victory became a certainty.

The Education and Cultural Presence

In the field of higher education, in particular, Christian missionary activities only bordered on 'Christianizing' and spilt over into what might be termed the introduction of the Western (especially the American) 'way of life' into China. This way of life ranged from the ideals of a Christian, liberal, democratic society - as represented in higher educational curricula and activities - to the novels and films of popular Western culture. Nearly all came under what the Communists labelled as 'cultural imperialism.' 'There is in China an imperialist culture,' stated Mao, '...fostered not only by the cultural organizations run directly by the imperialists in China but by a number of Chinese who have lost all sense of shame.' Although the Communists also included Western religious activity in China under the label of 'cultural imperialism,' their somewhat different treatment of the 'culture and education' (wenjiao) category warrants its separate discussion.

To the forefront in terms of Western cultural influence were the Christian colleges in China. Formed out of mergers of mainly secondary colleges during the first decades of the twentieth century, the dominant group - the Protestant colleges - were supported by the major Protestant denominations and came under the central direction of the United Board of Christian Colleges in China, based in New York. The US Government acclaimed the colleges for having contributed to the 'reservoir of educated Chinese oriented towards the United States' and stressed their importance - along with other American interests - as 'purveyors of American influence' in China.

The thirteen Protestant and three Catholic colleges were all located in major centres; only the West China Union University in Chengdu was outside the coastal provinces and the Yangzi area. Best known amongst the Protestant colleges were Yanjing University in Beijing (where John Leighton Stuart was Chancellor before becoming American Ambassador to
China in 1946), St John's in Shanghai, Lingnan University in Guangzhou, and the women's Jinling (Ginling) College in Nanjing. Of the Catholic universities, Furen University in Beijing and Aurora University in Shanghai were the most prominent.

In 1948, the Protestant colleges had a total enrolment of approximately 11,000 students which, together with the 4,000 students at the three Catholic colleges, represented approximately 10 percent of the country's enrolment in higher education. Of the Protestant colleges' total staff of approximately one thousand, only about two hundred were Westerners, a dramatic change from the mid-1920s when they made up over 60 percent of the total. Apart from the predominantly British and Canadian foreign faculty at the West China Union University, the overwhelming majority were Americans. The proportion of Western staff - mostly French-speaking priests - at the three Catholic universities was significantly higher; for example, almost half the teachers at Aurora University were non-Chinese.

Representing by far the broadest network, the Protestant colleges were modelled along the lines of small American denominational colleges and, in the words of their historian Jessie Gregory Lutz, were 'mediators of Western civilization' in China. Focussing on the teaching of the English language, mathematics, science and medicine, they had traditionally prepared Chinese for further study overseas (especially in the United States) and to work in Government ministries requiring English. In fact, the acquisition of the English language had tended to become more highly prized by students than the colleges' liberal education. Many students utilized the colleges simply as an avenue for learning sufficient English to obtain employment in commercial firms in the treaty ports and there were loud and frequent complaints from missionary teachers about the numbers of students leaving before graduation.

The original characteristics of the institutions as Western-style Christian colleges had also been undermined when they were forcibly sinicized and secularized as a result of the nationalistic fervour of the mid-1920s and particularly the 'restore educational rights' (shouhui jiaoyu quan) movement. The colleges were compelled to register with the Chinese authorities, to have greater Chinese representation both at faculty and administrative levels (in 1925 all the College Presidents had been Westerners), and to teach religion only as a voluntary option.
During the post-war period, college students participated in the strident anti-Nationalist and anti-American student movement, to the annoyance of American diplomatic and consular representatives in China who reprimanded them for being ungrateful for the assistance being given to China by the United States. By 1948, the atmosphere on many of the Christian college campuses - like other university campuses - was 'revolutionary and intensely political.'

In addition to higher education, Western 'cultural' institutions in China included information establishments and the Western-owned press. Most closely linked to Western governments were official information agencies such as the British Information Service and the United States Information Service. These establishments had libraries containing Western literature, showed Western films, and generally spread positive information about the way of life in their countries. Less directly linked with officialdom were associations such as the British Council and Alliance Francaise which carried out similar functions with a greater focus on specifically cultural activities such as the sponsorship of musical performances and lecture evenings.

Whilst foreign-owned newspapers and journals were read mainly by the foreign community, they also provided Chinese who had studied English or French with information about the West which was not always available in the Chinese press. In 1948 the Western press in China, which in the second decade of the twentieth century had included eleven British, five American and three French newspapers (in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Hankou) had been reduced basically to three English-language publications, all in Shanghai. Two daily newspapers, the conservative British-owned North China Daily News (then in its ninety-eighth year of publication) and the American-owned Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, chiefly reflected the interests of the British and American commercial communities respectively. In contrast, the American-owned China Weekly Review, which focussed more on China than on events overseas, had built up a reputation in the twenties and thirties as an outlet for 'liberal' political views under its editor J.B. Powell, whose son Bill edited the publication after his father's death in 1947.

The presence of Western culture in the Chinese community went far beyond that owned or funded by foreign governments and private entrepreneurs. Emanating mainly from the former foreign concessions, it reached large numbers of Chinese people living in and around these areas and
covered everything from Western classical music to the latest popular songs, from coffee to coca-cola. But probably its most pervasive and far-reaching element - certainly the one arousing the most hostile response from the Communists - was the American movie film. Following World War I, foreign films, in particular from the United States, had come to dominate the Chinese film scene, especially after the introduction of colour and sound in the mid-1920s. As Jerome Ch'en has pointed out, their contents - ranging from Western jazz music to 'frivolous, promiscuous and sophisticated Western women' - created an entirely different image of Western life from that which Christian missionaries had long been attempting to purvey to the Chinese people.66

The Official Presence

Western officials in China, who were charged with the role of reporting on the country's political developments as well as protecting the interests of their nationals in China, were themselves to become objects of the Communists' attention as part of their assault on the remaining imperialist presence. Most Western nations had embassies in China; these were now back in Nanjing after a wartime sojourn at Chongqing, the Nationalists' temporary capital. In 1948, the ambassadors of the major Western powers were the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson (a career diplomat whose previous posting had been Yugoslavia), the American Ambassador, John Leighton Stuart (a Chinese-born missionary educator and former Chancellor of Yanjing University) and French Ambassador, Jacques Meyrier, who was currently Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.67

Most Western governments also had consular offices in the major cities, including at least Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing. The countries with the widest representation - reflecting their greater interests in China - were Britain and the United States, while the location of consulates-general and consulates was largely a product of their past economic, and to a lesser extent missionary, interests in China. In late 1948, Britain had consular representation in a total of twelve cities.68

In addition to the major coastal and Yangzi ports, they ranged from Shenyang (Mukden) in the Northeast to Urumqi (Tihwa) in Xinjiang province and Kunming in Yunnan. As well as the twelve centres manned by the British, the United States also had a consulate at Dalian (Dairen), which had been under Soviet-dominated Communist control since the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945.69
The Shanghai Focus

The Western presence in China was far from evenly dispersed. Apart from the scattered activities of the China Inland Mission and some Roman Catholic missionaries, it had always been focussed overwhelmingly on the coastal provinces and the Yangzi, and more specifically on the treaty ports. Despite the end of extraterritoriality during the war, the former foreign concessions were still strikingly non-Chinese in appearance and their foreign inhabitants were largely isolated from the Chinese people. The centres of Western population - with their European style buildings, wide avenues, foreigners' clubs, tennis courts and golf courses - ranged from the bustling port city of Tianjin and the war-damaged former concessions in Hankou strung out along the bank of the Yangzi, to the more segregated island enclaves of Shamian in the Pearl River at Guangzhou and the tiny sub-tropical island of Gulansu off the coast from Xiamen.

But even the large Western commercial centres of Tianjin and Hankou were completely overshadowed by China's largest city, Shanghai. In the post-war period, Shanghai's former International settlement and French concession were still the major focus of the Western imperialist presence in China - whether economic, religious or cultural. To the 'old China hand,' often a second or third generation Shanghailanders, Shanghai was the city that had been built on a swamp, transformed by a century of Western commercial enterprise into the fourth largest city in the world, variously known as the New York, the Chicago or the Paris of the East. To the approaching Chinese Communists, Shanghai was something quite different. Labelled as the 'monument of imperialism in the East,' it was a visible symbol of imperialist aggression against China in all its manifestations. Not surprisingly, Shanghai was to be the focal point of the interaction and confrontation between the newly victorious Communists and the remnants of the imperialist presence in China, and a large part of the present study is concentrated on this city.

Shanghai was above all the focus of the Western - in particular the British - economic presence in China. As well as being the location of four-fifths of British investment in China, Shanghai had almost three-quarters of the country's import-export trade passing through its port and the city's major public utilities were all run by Western companies. Indeed, the Western economic presence in China was symbolized in just one street - the Bund (few foreigners ever called it Zhongshan Lu), probably the most famous Western road in Asia. On the stretch between Avenue
Edouard VII (the border between the former French concession and International settlement) to the west and Suzhou Creek to the east were the multi-storey offices of the great hongs - the Jardine Matheson Building, Butterfield & Swire, and Sassoon House, as well as the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (symbolically guarded by two huge stone lions), the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, the Shell Building and the offices of several insurance companies, shipping lines, and manufacturing and trading companies.\(^7\)\(^6\)

Also on the Bund were the accoutrements of the Western economic presence: the exclusive and stuffy Shanghai Club (no foreign women admitted, let alone Chinese of either sex), the distinctively domed Cathay Hotel where Noel Coward was said to have written *Private Lives* in just four days, the *North China Daily News* building (the home of the British community's daily newspaper - also known as 'the old lady on the Bund'), and the British and American Consulates-General. Over Suzhou Creek with a superb view back along the Bund was the oddly-named Broadway Mansions, housing the foreign press corps, from where Chiang Kai-shek's troops would stage their final defence of the city.\(^7\)\(^7\)

Shanghai had a reputation, above all, as a materialistic money-making metropolis, from the more stalwart hongs to the get-rich-quick traders who had made and lost fortunes in the city. The acquisitive 'Shanghai mentality' was denounced by foreign missionaries and Chinese patriots alike. 'Their life had no higher ideal than the amassing of money' wrote Chinese nationalist and former Chancellor of Beijing University, Jiang Menglin (Chiang Monlin) in a scathing indictment of Shanghai's foreign masters and its Chinese compradores and hangers-on.\(^7\)\(^8\)

As the Filipino Consul-General in the city saw it, Shanghai suffered from a surfeit of materialism (not to mention moral degeneration) and had little time for spiritual matters.\(^7\)\(^9\)

Yet Shanghai had long been a major focus of Western missionary activity in China, ever since the arrival of two representatives of the London Missionary Society almost as soon as the port was opened to foreigners in November 1843.\(^8\)\(^0\) Catholic institutions ranged from the huge Jesuit mission, established during the 1850s on the western outskirts of the city - with its seminaries, schools, orphanages and observatory - to another fifty-three churches, primary and secondary schools (eighty-six in all), Aurora University, orphanages and old people's homes, as well as the Hospital St Marie and a mental hospital.
Protestant institutions covered a similar range: they included the Anglican Holy Trinity Cathedral (built in neo-Gothic style), Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and other churches, primary and secondary schools, and - reflecting the Protestant emphasis on higher education - St John's University and the University of Shanghai, both of which had medical schools and attached hospitals.

Shanghai was also an important administrative centre for missionary activities throughout the rest of China. Most Catholic and Protestant missionary societies had their major offices for China in Shanghai. The Catholic Central Bureau, which coordinated Catholic activities throughout the country, was based in the city, as were the major publishing houses of both religious groups, producing translations of the Bible and other religious works together with English and French language journals for their representatives in China.

It was also in Shanghai that Western education and culture were especially pervasive. With three of the largest Christian universities, as well as Christian secondary schools, the city was an important centre for Western-style education in China and many English or French-speaking graduates obtained employment with Western firms. This group of Chinese, particularly those who also studied overseas, represented the most Westernized of Shanghai's 'Westernized Chinese.' For the affluent, there were the fashionable shops on Nanking Road and Avenue Joffre, where the 'New Look' dominated shop windows during 1948 and where one could buy the suitable attire for cocktails in the lobby of the Park Hotel, advertised as 'the smartest rendezvous in town.' But affluent or otherwise, few residents of Shanghai escaped some form of contact with Western culture, as did large numbers of people in other parts of China. For many, access to the Western, and particularly the American 'way of life' came via the movie film. During 1948, over a million movie patrons a month - approximately half the total viewing audience - packed Shanghai's forty cinemas to see American and British films. These ranged from Son of Lassie to King Kong, from Humphrey Bogart in Dead Reckoning and Bing Crosby in Blue Skies to Greta Garbo's stunning portrayal of Ninotchka - the story of what happened to one earnest young Communist when brought face to face with the bright lights, 'good life' and decadence of the West.

Even Western government representatives in Shanghai enjoyed a more prominent position than in many other cities. Admittedly, Nanjing was
the diplomatic centre but it tended to be considered something of a backwater and officials in Shanghai not only had a heavy load of consular work but also did substantial political reporting. The staffs of consular offices included career diplomats as well as consular and administrative personnel. In late 1948 the two leading Western officials in Shanghai were the British Consul-General, Robert (later Sir Robert) Urquhart, and the American Consul-General, John Cabot. Urquhart, a career diplomat but not a China specialist, replaced A.G.N. Ogden in early November, just as a Communist victory was becoming a certainty. His American counterpart, John Cabot - a Bostonian with a Harvard and Oxford background - had been in Shanghai since the beginning of the year. Like Urquhart, Cabot was a career diplomat with no previous experience of China; his chief acquaintance with communism before arriving in Shanghai had been a recent short spell as American Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia. Both Urquhart and Cabot - located at the hub of the Western presence in China - were to come into the Shanghai limelight during the buildup to the Communist victory and its aftermath.

The Semi-Colonial Lifestyle

Whilst most of the former treaty ports had their visibly distinct foreign enclaves, it was also in Shanghai that the 'semi-colonial' lifestyle of Western residents continued to be most visible and the 'imperialist mentality' most blatant. Like their colonial cousins in India and Africa, the majority of the purveyors of the West and Westernization had - despite the formal end of extraterritoriality - remained largely segregated from the local population and led for the most part a highly privileged existence. In 1948, Shanghai had a foreign population of approximately 40,000, slightly over half its pre-war level. The 4,000 British and 2,500 American nationals - the major representatives of the imperialist presence - were outnumbered numerically, but not in terms of influence, by members of two refugee groups: about 8,000 White Russians and 5,000 European (German and Austrian) Jews. Shanghai had long enjoyed a reputation as the most cosmopolitan city in the world - with French, Italians, Portuguese, Filipinos, Indians and a dozen or more other nationalities - and its associations and clubs reflected its international makeup: from the British St George's and other patriotic societies, to the American Women's Club, the Italian Club, the Portuguese Residents' Association and the Russian Emigrants' Association.
But the No.1 place in the social hierarchy still undoubtedly belonged to the British, whose long presence in Shanghai and preeminence in the city's commercial life - Shanghai's raison d'être - were reflected in a broad range of community and social organizations. Guided by the British Residents' Association and British Community Interests (which significantly shared their fulltime staff with the British Chamber of Commerce), the British network included the prestigious Shanghai and Country Clubs, the St George's, St Patrick's and St Andrew's Societies, a British school and hospital, and golf, rowing and bowling clubs. The Amateur Dramatic Club (known as the ADC) had been entertaining British and other foreign residents with regular performances of English drama since 1867; its offerings during 1948 included the domestic drama, *The First Mrs Fraser*.92

At the top of the social ladder in Shanghai were not colonial officials as in formal British colonies, or even the consular representatives who had once been the chief officials in the concessions, but - in keeping with the city's commercial purpose - the heads of the great hongs. In 1948 the top 'taipan' was unquestionably John Keswick, the forty-two year old Eton and Cambridge-educated head of Jardine Matheson.93 Keswick's predominance was not just a product of his own position but of the family's century-long tradition in China, since William Jardine - the uncle of Keswick's grandfather - had first set up an office in Shanghai in 1843. If John Keswick could not become Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council (like four Keswicks before him)94 because of its post-war replacement by the Chinese-run Shanghai Municipal Government,95 he did hold the powerful position of Chairman of the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce as well as a number of community positions including that of Chairman of the St Andrew's Society.

Although John Keswick's public utterances were usually carefully measured in an effort to protect his company's interests - as much under the Nationalists as they were to be under the Communists - the old merchant spirit which had long characterized the British attitude in Shanghai occasionally reared its head. Speaking to the Shanghai Rotary Club on 18 March 1948, Keswick concluded his address with some extempore words of lighthearted advice which were somewhat undiplomatically published in the *North China Daily News*. When British companies sent representatives to China, he said, the 'taipan' in London had traditionally told them: 'Remember, young man, when you get to China, to keep the Sabbath and anything you can get your hands on.'96
As the *North China Daily News* also commented, the Keswick's family record was 'unparalleled in Shanghai, and probably anywhere else in the Far East.' Butterfield & Swire's operations in Shanghai were headed not by its fourth generation Swire family chairman, John Swire (who was based in Hong Kong), but by J.A. Blackwood who lacked the long family connection with the China trade. Other top taipans included Victor Sassoon, head of the Sassoon real estate and commercial network, John Liddell of the trading firm Liddell Brothers, and W.J. (Billy) Hawkings, the Shanghai director of another trading firm, Wheelock Marden, who was also Chairman of the British Residents' Association and the Shanghai Rotary Club. These influential 'old China hands' lived in huge villas, mostly in the Hongqiao (known as Hongjiao) area on the southwest outskirts of Shanghai, entertained lavishly either at home or at the Cathay or other leading hotels, played golf at the Hongqiao Golf Club, and discussed the 'good old days' in China at the Shanghai Club, where one's position at the 100-foot long bar was determined by one's status in Shanghai's social hierarchy.

The Americans and the French had similar communal organizations, although these were much less extensive than the long-entrenched British network. The varying atmosphere and reputation of the three communities - reflecting somewhat stereotyped national characteristics - were perhaps best reflected in their social clubs, the hub of the foreign community's social life. Located on busy Bubbling Well Road, the somewhat inappropriately named Country Club - run by the British - had a reputation for exclusiveness and stuffiness, though it had become somewhat more relaxed since the war. The Americans' Columbia Club was more accessible and had a relatively free-and-easy atmosphere. Liveliest and most popular of all was the French Club (Cercle Sportif de Shanghai) which had a broad international membership, a reputation for excellent cuisine and the best-sprung dance floor in Shanghai. Although Shanghai's social life never fully recovered its pre-war gaiety, by mid-1947 some of the former atmosphere was being restored. 'The clubs are crowded with smartly dressed people,' reported one young resident. 'The lovely houses in the outer suburbs are all being done up and there are terrific cars on the roads.'

At the bottom of the foreigners' Shanghai social ladder were the poorer of the White Russians. The wealthier, or smarter, had arrived in China with diamonds and other valuables and had built up businesses.
ranging from import-export firms and department stores to beauty parlours, restaurants and pastry shops. Others eked out an existence by gradually selling off their valuables. Those with no resources and little knowledge of English (the main commercial language) found it difficult to obtain employment; some young women joined the throngs of so-called 'cocktail hostesses' and others resorted to begging - along with destitute Chinese - from the rich foreigners.99

Whilst the more prosperous of the White Russians (particularly those who claimed a title) were marginally acceptable in 'Shanghai society,' Eurasians and Chinese were generally considered to be beyond the pale. Shanghai's Mayor Wu Guozhen100 and other top municipal officials were entertained at receptions and dinners hosted by the taipans but the contact did not normally continue further down the social ladder. Family associations with Chinese people were especially frowned upon. As a British lawyer working for Shell put it: 'The man with the Chinese wife, and the man who was known to have had a Chinese mother, were usually unacceptable in the cocktail-party atmosphere of the British community.'101 It was this traditional imperialist attitude towards China and the Chinese - ranging from condescension to blatant racism - as much as the foreigner's formal privileges in the country, that had traditionally provoked tension and which would arouse the greatest initial reaction after the Communists' victory in Shanghai.102

Comfortably cocooned from the China of the Chinese, Western residents saw Shanghai's social rumblings and mounting economic chaos during 1948 largely in terms of the effects, if any, on their own business activities and everyday lives.103 'Old China hands' complained that the rampant inflation was ruining foreign trade, but those foreigners drawing salaries in overseas currencies (unlike Chinese who were losing their life's savings) were mildly amused by the incredible price hikes, doing their accounting and housekeeping in thousands and later millions of Chinese National dollars. 'I am still dazzled by the amounts we deal in,' wrote one shopper in December 1947. 'Eggs are $2,000 each' - the equivalent of less than two cents.104 By March 1948 bread cost $35,000 a loaf.105 In the same week the price of a cinema ticket ranged up to $70,000 (still one-fifth the cost in London);106 by early August it had increased to $3 million.107

Although foreign manufacturers and other employers were anxious about the increasingly leftist attitudes of workers and the developing
labour unrest - particularly after the Nationalists' currency reforms of August 1948 proved a dramatic failure - Chinese servants were still both plentiful and cheap: 'A normal house has an amah for children, a wash amah, a coolie, a house-boy and a cook.' Newcomers to Shanghai continued to be impressed by the plethora of servants, just as they had always been on arrival from the West. 'One only has to press the bell for any service,' commented a young single UNRRA employee.

Even the most impressed Westerners were quick to point out that there were also frustrations to living in Shanghai. Filthy beggars, many deformed, pulled at one's clothes on the streets; coming home late at night there were invariably corpses lying around waiting to be collected - unpleasant sights and smells that appear to have affected most Westerners' sensibilities rather than pricked their colonial consciences. Nor was the lifestyle as lavish as it had been in the 'good old days,' complained those people who had known the halcyon times of the twenties and thirties. But there were still ample compensations, just as there had long been for Westerners living in Shanghai. It was not just a matter of servants and cheap tailors but the whole colonial-style society: the unceasing round of golf, tennis and swimming - all in spacious, segregated club surroundings; the cocktail parties, balls and dances. 'Sometimes when I get completely exasperated,' wrote the young UNRRA employee, 'I just make myself realize just how much I'd miss this life anywhere else in the world.' All in all, China was 'still a wonderful country for foreigners.'

If the end was near, few seemed to realize it. Rural missionaries occasionally arrived in Shanghai during 1948 with stories of the Communists' mistreatment of fellow-missionaries. The North China Daily News featured the odd report of the latest Communist successes in the Northeast and central China, hidden amongst more prominent features on the birth of Prince Charles (duly toasted at the Shanghai Club), the twenty-fifth wedding anniversary of George VI and his Queen, and reports of the Nationalists' latest claimed victories. Although these victories became less frequent as the year wore on, the newspaper continued to concentrate on 'good news,' having reminded its readers: 'We should squeeze what pleasure we can from life, as we can and when we can.'

Of the many balls held during 1948, one of the highlights of the social season was the St Patrick's Day Ball at the Country Club on 17 March. Admittedly it could not be on 'as grand a scale as in the good
old days,' as the press announcement of the event forewarned.\textsuperscript{113} Still, as one of the five hundred people present wrote enthusiastically: 'Everyone in Shanghai was there - lots of whom would never get into the Country Club at any other time, as it is very fussy about who is admitted. Chinese are not allowed even as guests.'\textsuperscript{114}

It was a long way from the Country Club - with its ten tennis courts, squash courts and glass-roofed swimming pool - to a China Inland Mission station at Hechuan, sixty miles up the Jialing River from Chongqing in the western province of Sichuan. There, two elderly women missionaries - recently joined by an American Mennonite couple - were attempting to bring Christ to the Chinese people.\textsuperscript{115} But to the fast approaching Chinese Communists, the Country Club in Shanghai and the small China Inland Mission station at Hechuan were equally symbols of imperialist aggression; their very existence had come about because of the 'special privileges' obtained by force against a weakened China.
Notes


2. ibid., pp.52-58; United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter, *FRUS*], 1947, VII, 1-6, 12-15; *FRUS*, 1948, VII, 260-330 passim. The material published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* consists largely of telegraphic communications between the State Department and the US Embassy and US consular offices in China. When quoting from these volumes, I have spelt out abbreviated words in full and filled in obviously missing words in brackets.


6. That is, not including loans to the Chinese Government which dramatically inflated the United States figures for total foreign investment in the post-war period.

7. The precise figures given by Wu Chengming for total direct foreign investment are US$3,364,732 million for 1936 and US$1,487,109 million for 1948. These include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1948</th>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>970,715</td>
<td>715,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>263,787</td>
<td>385,029</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>185,379</td>
<td>226,133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20,103</td>
<td>26,329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9,256</td>
<td>14,537</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>14,149</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,823,623</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>46,995</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,374</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wu Chengming, *Diguozhuyi zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi* [Imperialist investments in old China] (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1958), pp. 52-53. Wu's figures for 1936 are slightly higher than those cited by Hou Chi-ming, *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p.16, who puts total direct foreign investment at US$2,681.7 million. Hou, ibid., p.235, points out that the discrepancy is due to his and Wu's different definitions of the term 'foreign investment.' Wu defines foreign investment in China as the total amount of assets that foreigners 'controlled' (that is, 'the total assets, instead of the
owner's equity or proprietorship of a foreign firm, are included.') For Wu's methods of estimation, see his Appendix, pp.147-88. Since Hou Chi-ming's statistics do not extend into the post-war period, Wu Chengming's 1936 figures are used for the purposes of comparison.

See note 7 above.

Wei Tsu-chu [Wei Zichu], 'British enterprises in China and their profits,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 June 1952, 727. This is a translation of part of Wei's book of the same title, published in Beijing in 1951. I have been unable to obtain a copy of the original publication. According to Carl F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p.395, in 1929, 77 percent of British investment had been in Shanghai, 9 percent in Hong Kong and only 14 percent in the rest of China.


Jardine Matheson companies included the Jardine Engineering Corporation, the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, the Shanghai and Hongkew Wharf, as well as Ewo Cotton Mills, Ewo Cold Storage Company, Ewo Press Packing Company and Ewo Breweries. For details of Jardine Matheson's history and activities, see 'The house of Jardine Matheson & Co., and the development of Hongkong,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 April 1948, 331-35; Thompson, 'Imperialism and Revolution in Microcosm,' chapter 1.

On the history of British-American Tobacco, see Cochran, Big Business in China, passim.

British-American Tobacco, the Asiatic Petroleum Company and Imperial Chemical Industries were popularly known as BAT, APC and ICI respectively.


See note 7. Although Wu Chengming's estimate for 1936 (US$263.8 million) corresponds fairly closely to Hou Chi-ming's figure of US$244.6 million for the same year, his estimate for 1948 of US$385 million is significantly higher than figures normally quoted. These range between US$200 million and US$300 million, which correspond to Wei's statement that American investment at the time of 'liberation' was less than one-third of the British amount. Wu, Diguozhuyi zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi, p.52; Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, Appendix (table 45); Wei, 'British enterprises
in China and their profits,' 725. See also Agnes Roman Miller, 'American investments in the Far East,' Far Eastern Survey, 3 May 1950, 84; 'Memorandum on United States Interests in China,' FRUS, 1949, VIII, 648-49.

17 On the history of American investment in China, see Remer, Foreign Investments in China, chapter 15.

18 In 1978, the Shanghai Power Company was the largest claimant on the People's Republic for assets frozen in December 1950, followed by Esso, Standard Oil, Caltex, International Telephone and Telegraph, and General Electric. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1978, 43.


20 On the history of French investments in China, see Remer, Foreign Investments in China, chapter 19.

21 Wu, Diguo zhi zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi, p.52. According to Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, p.20, an unusual feature of French investment in 1936 was the large proportion (21 percent of direct investment) represented by property held for income by Roman Catholic missions.

22 See table in note 7.


27 The Times (London), 6 May 1948.

Whilst there had been some Russian Orthodox missions in China, both the level of representation and the body of converts 'were so small that in estimating the influence of Christian missions in China they can be all but ignored.' Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China*, p.825.


The precise figures were given as foreign priests: 3,090, foreign religious: 2,351. 'Summary of the Principal Statistics of 1947-48,' China Missionary Bulletin (hereafter CMB), November 1949, 203.

The precise figure of 4,062 was sometimes quoted, although a number of these missionaries were on furlough. Frank T. Cartwright, 'Protestant missions in Communist China,' Far Eastern Survey, 28 December 1949, 301-302.

The figure for 1925 was 8,158, although a number of these were also home on furlough. Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China*, p.773.

CMB, November 1949, 203; China Reconstructs, May 1980, 28.


In 1925 four-fifths of Protestant missionaries had been located in the coastal provinces and the lower Yangzi valley, and nearly three-quarters of Protestant church membership was in the coastal provinces. Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China*, p.774.


See below.

On the early history of the China Inland Mission, see Dr and Mrs Howard Taylor, *Hudson Taylor and the China Inland Mission* (London:
Morgan & Scott, 1918). For details of its activities during 1948, see the Mission's monthly journal, *China's Millions*.


42 For the historical development of the differences, see Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China*, passim and especially pp. 826-31.

43 See pp.278-79.

44 Of the precise total of 7,810, only 2,698 were priests. 'Summary of the principal statistics of 1947-1948,' CMB, November 1949, 203.

45 New China News Agency [hereafter, NCNA], Beijing, 23 November 1950 (*Survey of China Mainland Press* [hereafter, SCMP], no.23, 5 December 1950).

46 Known in the West as Paul Yu-pin. See pp.174-75.


49 Before 1947 it was called the Associated Boards for Christian Colleges in China.

50 'Memorandum on United States Interests in China,' *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 649-50.

51 The following historical background is based chiefly on Lutz, *China and the Christian Colleges*. The most detailed case study of an individual Christian college is that by West, *Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations*. For details of the activities of the Protestant colleges' activities in the post-war period, see the journal, *China Colleges*, published by the United Board of Christian Colleges in China.


53 In 1947-1948 there was a total enrolment in higher educational institutions of 155,036 students. For statistics on enrolments since 1928-1929, see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, 'The reorganisation of higher education in Communist China, 1949-61,' *China Quarterly*, 19 (1964), 147.

54 *China Colleges*, February 1949, 3-4.


56 *China Weekly Review*, 29 October 1949, 133.
Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, p.3.

ibid., pp.505-506. Whilst there were detailed statistics on the graduates of the Christian colleges, Lutz comments that no statistics were kept on those students who left before graduation.

ibid., chapter 8.

ibid., pp.409-443. For details of the student movement in the post-war period, see Pepper, Civil War in China, pp.42-93.


Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, p.444.


Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China, Table, p.109.

On the background of these newspapers, see Ch'en, China and the West, p.226. On the China Weekly Review's history, see J.B. Powell, My Twenty-five Years in China (New York: Macmillan, 1945), passim.

Powell edited the Review from 1918 to 1947.

Ch'en, China and the West, p.219.


Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, Beijing, Guangzhou (Canton), Qingdao, Chongqing, Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou (Swatow), Kunming, Shenyang (Mukden) and Urumqi (Tihwa). This was a significant reduction from 1913 when Britain had twenty-eight consular offices in China. Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China, p.37.

For a first-hand account of the experiences in Soviet-dominated Dalian of the American Consul, Paul Paddock, see Paul Paddock, China Diary: Crisis Diplomacy in Dairen (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977). A temporary American consulate at Changchun, opened in May 1947 when the Communists would not allow US officials to go to Harbin to reopen the United States Consulate, had been withdrawn in January 1948 during the Communist offensive in the Northeast. FRUS, 1948, VII, 800.

On Shanghai's history as the focus of the imperialist presence in China, see Rhoads Murphey, Shanghai: Key to Modern China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1953); Ernest O. Hauser, Shanghai:

But despite its dominance by the British, never the 'London of the East.'

China Digest, 31 May 1949, 14. The China Digest was an English-language outlet in Hong Kong for the Chinese Communists. It was the predecessor of People's China, published in Beijing.

Wei, 'British enterprises in China and their profits,' p.724.


These included the American-owned Shanghai Power Company and the British-owned Shanghai Gas Company, Shanghai Waterworks Company and Shanghai Electric Construction Company.


On the history of the Bund and Nanking (Nanjing) Road, Shanghai's most fashionable shopping street, see Shanghai shi Huangpu qu geming weiyuanhui xiezuo zu, Shanghai shifan daxue lishi xi [The writing team of the revolutionary committee of the Huangpu district of Shanghai, the history department of Shanghai normal university], Shanghai Waitan Nanjing lu shihua [History of the Bund and Nanjing Road in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Renmin chuban she, 1976).


Mariano Ezpeleta, Red Shadows over Shanghai (Quezon City: Zita Publishing Corp, 1972), chapter 13. The theme of the 'moral degeneration of the Shanghai foreign community and the city at large' is taken up at length by Ch'en, China and the West, pp.213-18.


ibid., passim. See also CMB, February 1949, 217-19; CMB, September 1949, 55.

The headquarters of the China Inland Mission were located in Shanghai, not overseas (basically in London or New York) as was the general case.

NCDN, 5 August 1948.
Dagongbao (Hong Kong), 18 November 1950 (SCMP, no.19, 29 November 1950); NCDN, 19 November 1950.

NCDN, 1948, passim.

Who's Who, 1949, pp.2830-31. Urquhart was originally in the Levant Consular Service and transferred to the Foreign Office in 1938. Apart from postings in the United States (New Orleans and Washington), his overseas service had been in the Levant.

Who's Who in America, 1950-1951 (Chicago: A.N. Marquis Company, 1950), p.402. See also Cabot's obituary, Newsweek, 9 March 1981, which described him as a 'Boston Brahmin.' As Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade in 1947, Cabot was credited with having informed Washington that a break between Tito and Stalin might be imminent.

In May 1947 the Shanghai Police Bureau put the total foreign population at 47,812. China Association Bulletin [hereafter, CAB], no.20, 20 January 1948. Shanghai's foreign population in 1936 had been approximately 73,000. This figure included 20,000 Japanese, 15,000 Russians, 9,000 British, 5,000 Germans and Austrians, 4,000 Americans and 2,500 French. Murphey, Shanghai, p.23, citing Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report, 1936. On the growth of Shanghai's foreign community between 1844 and 1937, see Ch'en, China and the West, p.207.


The Russian refugees had been in Shanghai since the early 1920s when they fled the Bolsheviks in eastern Siberia; their numbers had reached a peak of around 20,000 when more arrived from Harbin after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. In 1947 close on 6,000 had accepted the Soviet Government's offer of citizenship. The 5,000 German and Austrian refugees were the remnants of the 17,000 who had been able to enter the International Settlement in Shanghai without visas in the late 1930s during the refugee flight from Nazism. Temporary rather than permanent residents, their repatriation and resettlement had been under way since the end of the war, organized as part of the 'displaced persons' scheme by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and later by the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO), and had speeded up after the establishment of Israel in May 1948.


The following discussion of Shanghai's foreign community is based on reports and features in the British-owned Shanghai newspaper North China Daily News during 1947-1948 and personal accounts including Ezpeleta, Red Shadows over Shanghai, passim; Eleanor Beck, 'My life in China from 2 January 1946 to 25 September 1949' (unpublished diary in the possession of the author); Stephen Garrett, 'Discovering China' (unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author); interview with David Middleditch, 21 August 1979. For a sympathetic,
colourful report on the life of foreigners (especially British) in Shanghai shortly before the Communist victory, see Barber, *The Fall of Shanghai*, chapters 1-3. Accounts of the history of Shanghai's foreign community and its characteristics in the pre-war period include *NCDN*, Centenary Supplement, 3 August 1950; Ch'en, *China and the West*, pp.206-234; Feuerwerker, *The Foreign Establishment in China*, pp.4-8.

92 *NCDN*, 18 October 1948.


94 The most recent (and last) Keswick incumbent had been John Keswick's elder brother, W.J. (Tony) Keswick, who shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War had survived an assassination attempt by a Japanese resident at a ratepayers' meeting in Shanghai. *NCDN*, Centenary Supplement, 3 August 1950.

95 On the relationship between the Shanghai authorities and the foreign community during the post-war period, see Justin Littlejohn, 'Chinese Shanghai,' *Spectator*, 23 July 1948, 104. 'Justin Littlejohn' was a pseudonym used by John Keswick in his occasional writings for the British and Hong Kong press.

96 *NCDN*, 19 March 1948.

97 *NCDN*, 3 August 1950.

98 Beck, 'My life in China,' entry for 16 June 1947. Eleanor Beck was an Australian who worked in Qingdao, Jinan and Shanghai as a finance officer for UNRRA and later for BOTRA (Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs) in 1946-1949.

99 According to Ch'en, *China and the West*, p.217, the 'Russian invasion' of the prostitute market in Shanghai had substantially lowered the rates for Caucasian prostitutes.

100 Known in the West as K.C. Wu.


102 Some prize examples of the workings of the 'imperialist mind' in China during the early phase of the Western presence in China are cited by Murphey, *The Outsiders*, chapter 8; Ch'en, *China and the West*, pp.43-48, 213-18.

103 For a description of Shanghai's economic and social distress at this time, see Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, chapters 1, 7.

104 *CAB*, no.19, 20 December 1947.

105 *NCDN*, 1 March 1948.
106 *NCDN*, 5 March 1948.

107 *NCDN*, 4 August 1948.


109 ibid. UNRRA: *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*.

110 ibid., entry for 15 August 1948.

111 See pp. 64-66.

112 *NCDN*, 28 March 1948.

113 *NCDN*, 2 March 1948.

114 Beck, 'My life in China,' entry for 18 April 1948.

The end of the Sino-Japanese War saw the Chinese Communists in control of much of northeast, north and central China, with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists holding the major cities. After American mediation efforts finally broke down in January 1947, the two sides were locked in fullscale civil war. Whilst the Nationalists had some initial successes, from mid-1947 Communist troops gradually gained the upper hand. By mid-1948 they had regained their earlier positions and also taken a number of strategic cities including Luoyang and Kaifeng, leaving Government forces holding only the large cities in the area (including Jinan, Shenyang, Beijing and Tianjin) and small surrounding enclaves.

The final phase of the Civil War began in the early autumn of 1948 when Communist forces launched offensives against Jinan (the capital of Shandong), which they captured on 24 September, and the major cities of the Northeast. On 1 November, Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army captured Shenyang (Mukden), defeating the remaining Nationalist forces in the Northeast and leaving the Communists free to complete the conquest of north China. The next day, an American diplomat in Nanjing, John Melby, wrote in his diary:

Mukden surrendered yesterday and that, I guess is that. All that is needed now is a few mopping up operations and the sweep to the Yangtze will be complete. Nothing can save Peiping, Tientsin, and other less known enclaves....

If Westerners still had any doubts about a total Communist victory, these were expelled when Communist forces brought the immense Huai-Hai campaign to a successful conclusion with the capture of Xuzhou in mid-January 1949, opening the way to Nanjing, Shanghai and the rest of China.

For the remaining representatives of the Western presence in China, there was no longer any real choice of evacuating to 'safe' parts of China as they had done in the war against Japan and even during the past two years when a number of missionaries had fled the Communist advance and sought refuge - temporarily they hoped - in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. The only alternatives, unpalatable though they might be, were either to leave China indefinitely or to stay on under a
Communist government. It was neither an easy nor a clearcut decision. The abandonment of Western interests had to be weighed up against an assessment of what life would be like for Westerners in a Communist-governed China.

Pronouncements on the subject by the Chinese Communists did little to help Westerners reach a decision. Indeed, the Communists seemed to be completely contradictory. On the one hand they had consistently attacked all aspects of the imperialist presence in China and even their plans for a transitional New Democracy phase appeared to allow little room for a continuing Western presence. Yet during their advance in 1948 they appeared to moderate their policy - at least in the eyes of most Westerners - when they specifically promised protection to foreign nationals and their property. A radio broadcast picked up at Shenyang in late April stated: 'The Communist Party and Army will resolutely protect ... foreigners in China,' with the proviso that they obeyed the law and refrained from 'offensive acts.' During the autumn offensive against Jinan and the major cities of the Northeast (the first centres with significant foreign populations to come under Communist control), Communist broadcasts specified the CCP's policy towards individual groups of foreigners, stating that 'foreign consulates, missions and their personnel as well as foreign nationals and their property will be given protection without discrimination.' These assurances were formally embodied in the Eight-Point Proclamation issued by Lin Biao on 24 December during the offensive against Tianjin and Beijing, and repeated in similar proclamations issued by Mao Zedong and Zhu De before the occupation of Nanjing and Shanghai. As well as guaranteeing the safety of foreign nationals, the Communists sometimes went a step further by implying that they should remain in China. Before they took Shanghai, for example, they sent mimeographed letters to individual community leaders. Signed by Mao and Zhu, these letters requested foreigners to stay at their posts and - just in case they were not aware of its existence - enclosed a copy of the Eight-Point Proclamation.

The Communists' varying treatment of the few Westerners who came under their control during 1948 did little to solve the apparent contradiction and assessments of the likely future for Westerners became tied up with the general debate about the nature of Chinese Communism and the sort of regime its leaders intended establishing in China. Were Mao and his followers true Communists in the Russian mould? More importantly,
were they merely puppets of the Soviet Union and under constant direction from Moscow? Or were they, at the opposite extreme, Chinese nationalists in Marxist clothing who, despite their assertions to the contrary, would establish a Titoist-style regime in China? Whilst the old argument that they were not Communists at all but merely 'agrarian reformers' had by this time largely lost credence, there was still the question of whether they would set up a genuine 'united front' government as they promised.

There were no simple answers. Even the normally strongly opinioned New York Times stated that China's Communists had 'long been a mystery.' Diplomats were as vehement in their disagreement as were the most uninformed amongst Western residents in China. Although some American historians have commented on the misconceptions about the nature and intentions of the Chinese Communists on the part of American decision-makers and even so-called China experts, the Communists' own varying and vague statements made any precise assessment extremely difficult.

More importantly, purely rational assessments of the Chinese Communists were clouded by the current Cold War situation (the Soviet-dominated Cominform was established in March 1947 and the Czech coup and Berlin Blockade took place in early 1948) and informed spokesmen and uninformed individuals alike tended to fall back on their own attitudes towards, and prejudices about, communism. To many people, particularly those Americans affected by the anti-communist hysteria already sweeping the United States (hearings of the Un-American Activities Committee were held in Washington in July-August 1948), Mao and his followers were pure and simple 'Reds' or 'Commos' who would form a monolithic Communist bloc with the Soviet Union and put the whole of the 'free world' under threat. Some commentators regarded the Chinese situation as more complex. At the risk of being labelled as 'pink' or even as communists themselves, they expressed disgust with the corruption and ineptitude of Chiang Kai-shek's government, tended to see the Communists fundamentally as nationalists rather than as Russian-style communists, and hoped that their victory would at least bring political stability to China and rescue the country from economic misery.

Whilst those people who divided the globe into the 'Commos' and the 'free world' anticipated that Westerners who stayed in China might well face discriminatory treatment and even physical danger, those with contrary opinions thought that the Communists' assurances that they would protect foreign nationals and their property might possibly be genuine.
In suggesting that a basically nationalistic, rather than a pro-Moscow, policy might result in relatively favourable treatment for Westerners, however, these commentators seriously underestimated the influence of the imperialist past on the Chinese Communists' thinking.

Political perceptions of the Chinese Communists also played a significant role in the responses of individual interest groups. But in addition to assessing the Communists' attitudes to Westerners, they had to take into account the Communists' overall policies towards the activity in which they were engaged—private enterprise, religion, private education, and so on. In many cases, the Communists' statements on these questions had been little clearer than those on Westerners. Discussion by particular interest groups—first on their likely treatment by the Communists and second on whether or not they should remain in China—was characterized by disagreement and dissension even within the same group.

Business

Although the Communists denounced Western economic aggression against China and implied that their intention to permit the continued existence of private enterprise (at least during the New Democracy period) did not extend to Western economic interests, they virtually urged Western businessmen to remain in China, promising protection to Western property as they advanced in north China and including Shanghai business leaders amongst the recipients of the mimeographed letter which urged foreigners to stay at their posts. Faced with this ambiguity, business interests in China—like other groups of Westerners—looked closely at the experiences of their fellow-nationals as they came under Communist rule in an attempt to assess their own future prospects. Unlike missionaries who were scattered throughout rural areas, they had little direct experience of the Chinese Communists before the beginning of the urban offensive in the Northeast in early 1948. Initial reports were unpromising. In late February, when the Communists occupied the Liaodong Gulf port of Yingkou, they entered the premises of the Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company (BAT), removed machinery, took cash from the safes and looted virtually all the private homes of the company's employees. The company's two local British representatives were arrested. Following their release in early April, the men were permitted to operate the cigarette factory in the presence of two People's Liberation Army officers and twenty soldiers, but found
themselves placed in the awkward position of being without cash and unable to meet the workers' strident demands (encouraged by Communist cadres) for immediate payment of their wages.\textsuperscript{15}

Britain's Ambassador to Nanjing, Sir Ralph Stevenson, commented that the events at Yingkou gave 'a discouraging indication of the manner in which the Communists may be expected to behave to large commercial concerns, whether foreign or Chinese, in the towns which they occupy.'\textsuperscript{16} He admitted that the removal of machinery from the Yingkou factory was in accordance with standard Communist practice when taking towns that they did not expect to hold permanently;\textsuperscript{17} similar action had been taken at nearby Anshan and Liaoyang. In fact, Yingkou was reportedly one of the few towns to escape the more extreme excesses, including the large-scale destruction of private property, committed by undisciplined troops during the urban campaigns in the first half of 1948.\textsuperscript{18}

By the time the Communists began their major assault on the cities in September 1948 with attacks on Jinan and Shenyang, the Party had both tightened discipline over its soldiers and lower level cadres in an effort to safeguard industrial enterprises and promised to protect foreigners and foreign-owned property. Initially, at least, the promises appeared to be kept. On 28 November, when Communist troops entered the Kailan Mining Administration's port facilities at Qinhuangdao, the southern warehouse, the club, offices and residences had already been looted by Nationalist army remnants and local labourers in the twenty-four hours since the departure of Nationalist soldiers. In contrast, the Communists were reportedly 'polite and courteous,' restoring order, posting sentries at important points and issuing proclamations that no damage to Kailan property or injury to personnel would be tolerated. While stating that they would take over all Government property and services in the town, the Communists promised not to touch property owned by Kailan.\textsuperscript{19}

With the Communists' statements and actions still producing a far from conclusive picture of their intentions, the Western business community and other commentators on economic affairs became involved in the general debate on the nature of Chinese Communism. Would the new Government's economic programme adhere closely to the Russian communist model or would it assume some sort of independent Chinese nature? If, as some people predicted, the Chinese closely followed the Soviet and East European example,\textsuperscript{20} there seemed to be little hope for Western business
interests. Even the Communists' assurance that private enterprise would not be confiscated did little to alleviate the pessimism of American Ambassador Stuart who predicted that economic life in Communist-controlled China would initially resemble Russia's NEP (New Economic Policy) period of 1921-1927 when, despite the continued existence of some private enterprise, 'foreign business in Russia was very badly treated.'

Reflecting the less pessimistic views of some other American diplomats in China, Consul-General Cabot in Shanghai was hopeful that the Communists would 'pursue moderate lines at least for a while and will encourage foreign business to continue operations.' The British Foreign Office also predicted that British interests in China 'may be able to carry on at least for a time.' Like Cabot and the Foreign Office, many Western businessmen and commentators anticipated that China's new leaders - Russian-style communists or not - would be forced to temper ideology with pragmatic considerations if they were going to pursue their declared goals of economic rehabilitation and industrial development.

First, they argued, the Communists lacked technical expertise and trained administrative personnel; their rural background left them ill-equipped to manage urban industry and commerce, whether Chinese or foreign-owned. According to Shanghai financial correspondent, J.R. Kaim, the Communists were 'conscious of the tremendous difficulties they now face [and] do not now wish to force foreign investments out of the country,' although he anticipated that they would be eliminated eventually. Second, some maintained, the interests of foreign traders - if not of industrialists and others - might well be protected because the Chinese needed imports (particularly industrial equipment and gasoline) in order to maintain existing industries, let alone to develop new ones. The Communists' proclaimed trading policy was to control, but not to eliminate, foreign trade; imports were to be limited to materials essential to economic reconstruction while the country would export industrial and agricultural products from which to draw foreign exchange. The view of the Chairman of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation that China had 'clamorous needs ... for capital goods from abroad' and needed to exchange exports for imports already seemed to be substantiated by the establishment of trading links (mostly on a barter basis because of the Communists' lack of foreign currency) between Hong Kong and the Communist-held northern ports of Yingkou, Yantai (Chefoo) and Tanggu.
The important question for Western traders was: where would the bulk of China's import needs come from? Many commentators dismissed the notion that the Soviet Union would be the chief supplier and argued that, despite the apparent ideological affinity, Russia's own wartime devastation and immense postwar reconstruction needs meant that any assistance to China would be minimal - as Mao himself had envisaged in 1944. 'Help from the USSR will not be large enough by a long way,' predicted the influential *Far Eastern Economic Review*. The British and American Governments were so convinced that China would be forced to turn to the West that they envisaged trade - and more particularly the threat of its withdrawal - as a bargaining weapon: the British to secure moderate treatment for their commercial interests in China and the Americans to obtain an improvement in 'Communist manners and policy towards Americans.'

Since the Communists were giving few specific indications of their future attitude towards the Western business presence, there was only one possible course of action: await the takeover. The 'wait and see' policy, as it became known, was adopted - with varying degrees of enthusiasm - by the majority of Western business interests. The British, with the greatest stake in China, took the lead in deciding to remain. 'What alternative did we have? We couldn't just abandon our investments,' maintained Hubert Collar (a representative of Imperial Chemical Industries in Shanghai and later the Secretary of the China Association), even with the benefit of hindsight over thirty years later. In the House of Commons on 9 December 1948, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin paid tribute to the 'steadfast manner' in which the British in China were 'facing the difficult situation ... confronting them.' The Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce was less interested in high-sounding rhetoric than in practical assurances of protection for its interests and put forward a proposal, subsequently rejected by the Government, that the British seek the cooperation of the American and French Governments in formulating a joint scheme for the protection of at least Shanghai's foreign-owned public utilities, including power, water works, gas, telephone and trams.

American businessmen had less to gain economically and more to fear personally by remaining in China. With capital investments totalling only about one-third of the British amount, their attention was focussed on their $360 million annual trade with China. But even if the optimism
about future trade was justified, the United States would have to compete with European countries who were already supplying an increasing proportion of Chinese imports as their postwar recovery gained momentum and who did not suffer the stigma of having supported the Nationalists. Faced with vociferous anti-American statements from Communist-controlled territory and widespread anti-American demonstrations in Nationalist areas, many American companies initially considered withdrawing from China.

The differing responses of British and American businessmen were also related to the support - or lack of support - they received from their respective governments. Although British merchants had a long tradition of complaining (through the Shanghai and Tianjin British Chambers of Commerce and the London-based China Association) that the British Government was not doing all it could to further their interests, they enjoyed the basic support of their Government. A Foreign Office memorandum on the China question, forwarded to the State Department on 5 January 1949, stated that the British Government intended officially to encourage British interests to carry on in China. Indeed, the hope of obtaining improved treatment for British investments, together with a sizeable share of China's foreign trade, was to be a major reason for Britain becoming the first non-communist Western government to recognize the People's Republic in January 1950, to the annoyance of the US Government which consistently maintained that commercial interests were secondary to the 'far greater and graver issues' of the possible Communist domination not only of China but of the remainder of Asia as well.

This policy of subordinating commercial to political interests caused the US Government to exhibit somewhat contradictory attitudes towards American businessmen in China and created friction between the two groups. On the one hand, the US Government - while urging the general evacuation of Americans in early November - did not think it desirable that representatives of 'important interests' (whether business, religious or education) should leave China, although it would not officially advise them to remain since this would necessitate 'assuming partial responsibility for any untoward effects resulting from such advice.' But the US Government's policy towards China gave American businessmen good reasons for being reluctant to stay in the country. First, they were unsure of whether their Government would even permit
them to continue trading with China. The influential journal *Business Week* expressed strong doubts that trade with China would be countenanced\(^1\) and there were rumours - denied by the State Department - that the Government had approached oil companies in the United States about a possible embargo on Communist-held areas of China.\(^2\) Such rumours hardly encouraged companies such as Caltex and Standard Oil to maintain their representation in China. Second, American businessmen feared 'very rough treatment' at the hands of the Communists because of their Government's continued support for the near-defeated Nationalists.\(^3\) They accused the US Government of failing to adjust its policies to political realities. 'In view of [the] Government debacle in Manchuria and Government defeats elsewhere, it is too late for such aid to be effective,' they complained in December 1948.\(^4\) With arms and ammunition continuing to arrive for the Nationalists in US Navy ships as late as November and December, many expressed reluctance to await the takeover unless they had official assurances of protection, or at least of special consideration should last-minute evacuation prove necessary. For example, officials of the Shanghai Power Company warned that, without such assurances, they were prepared to abandon their entire operation, threatening the breakdown of Shanghai's light and power supply.\(^5\)

The US Government was unsympathetic. Acting Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, authorized the Shanghai Consul-General verbally to assure American businessmen (as well as heads of missionary and educational organizations) only that they would be given identical consideration to consular staff. At the same time, he reminded businessmen that they, like missionaries, had 'long recognized that there are certain risks incident to their profession not shared by persons [in] similar professions.' So far as the Shanghai Power Company was concerned, he merely warned that the departure of key employees of the company, even at the last moment, would seriously jeopardize the predominant American interest in the company.\(^6\) The editor of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, Randall Gould (who was also a director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai), later compared the situation of American businessmen with the 'much more solidly united positions of Shanghai British organizations and their home government' and lamented their inability to make their views heard in Washington and New York.\(^7\)

If an unsympathetic government and the prospects of falling prey to the Communists' anti-American hostility militated against the
retention of an American business presence in China, commercial rivalry finally prompted many Americans to stay. In one of his many attempts to persuade the US Government to take a more consistent attitude towards its businessmen in China, Shanghai Consul-General Cabot reminded the State Department that it would 'not be to the national interest to abandon positions held by Americans.... It is evident that some of the other foreigners in Shanghai are hoping that they may benefit....'\(^{48}\) Those 'other foreigners' were basically the British, who were only too aware of the head start they had over the Americans because of their Government's relative aloofness from the Nationalist-Communist confrontation.

Nor did British businessmen have much sympathy for their American competitors. Although the British Consul-General, Robert Urquhart, constantly attempted to play down the dissension between the two groups, he admitted that some British 'smaller men, remembering how the Americans have tried to grasp as much of the China trade as they could, will be keen to grab back.'\(^{49}\) British businessmen, as well as diplomats, confessed that they had little time, in particular, for the post-war newcomers to the China trading scene, regarding them as fly-by-nighters who sought quick profits wherever they went, panicked at the first sign of trouble, and ruthlessly abandoned their obligations.\(^{50}\) 'This is not the British way of doing things,' commented a British Shell representative in Shanghai. 'We prefer to ... stand our ground and face developments with equanimity and calm.'\(^{51}\)

**Religion**

In assessing their prospects in a Communist-controlled China, Western missionaries faced a welter of contradictions. The Chinese Communists were vehemently opposed to all religion, yet they explicitly guaranteed religious freedom. They denounced Western missionaries as instruments of cultural aggression but they promised to protect all foreign nationals and their property. Like businessmen, therefore, missionaries looked to the experiences of their fellow-workers in Communist-controlled areas, always conscious of the violent treatment they had received at the hands of the Communists in the 1920s and early 1930s.\(^{52}\)

The experiences of both Chinese Christians and foreign missionaries during the post-war period left doubt as to whether the Communists even intended to fulfill their guarantee of religious freedom, far less allow foreign missionaries to continue working in China. Between 1946 and
early 1948 - and particularly in the provinces of Chahar and Rehe (Jehol) during the winter of 1947-1948 - advancing Communist units in central China and the Northeast seized church property, closed mission schools, and imprisoned or killed both Chinese and foreign priests. The most violent single episode occurred with the seizure in August 1947 of the Trappist Monastery at Yangjiaping in south Chahar. By the following May, thirty-three of the seventy-five resident monks were dead (twenty-eight Chinese, three French, one Dutch and one Canadian); six had been executed by the Communists and the remainder died after maltreatment in prison.53

Estimates of the total number of Catholic and Protestant missionaries killed by advancing troops ranged from sixty to one hundred, the overwhelming majority Roman Catholic.54 According to a Jesuit report of early 1948, during the years 1946 and 1947 alone the Communists had killed forty-nine foreign priests, looted or destroyed over five hundred mission stations, confiscated four hundred churches for their own use and looted or destroyed another two hundred, and closed down over one thousand mission schools.55 Although Protestants did not usually experience the same degree of violence, the China Inland Mission reported that some of its missionaries had suffered bitter persecution while others were subjected only to restriction and strain. Evangelization had been halted everywhere.56

The destruction, looting and killings led to the large-scale evacuation of missionaries, both Protestant and Catholic, from threatened areas. A few took up new postings outside China (mostly in Japan and Southeast Asia) but the majority withdrew to Nationalist-held territory, just as they had done during the war against Japan. Whilst many Protestant missionaries (particularly those of the China Inland Mission) were relocated in south and southwest China, most Catholics went only as far as Beijing and Tianjin, intended as places of temporary refuge until they could return to their former missions.57 In March 1948, American priest Joseph McCormack, who had been in charge of the Maryknoll mission at Fushun in Liaoning province, reported from Beijing that every other Order in the Church seemed to be represented in the city - some 1,200 priests in all.58

In early 1948, however, the Communists' policy towards missionaries appeared to enter a new phase of moderation, as indicated by the changing tone of their official broadcasts. In December 1947, at the peak of the winter assault, the Communists had warned missionaries in central China:
'All missionaries are sent out to China for espionage and to report military movements. We want to get rid of all you young fellows.' But in February 1948 the Communists disassociated themselves from the murder of three missionaries (including two Americans) in Hubei province, attributing it to local bandits. They reiterated their official policy of religious freedom and stressed that there was 'definitely no reason for killing peaceful foreign missionaries.' By April-May official pronouncements were putting greater stress on the protection to be given to foreign missionaries, although there was also the provision that this did not extend to those who 'participate in any work connected with American aid' to Chiang Kai-shek, or 'engage in other activities of intrigue in liberation areas.'

During the second half of 1948 the Communists both included missionaries in their proclamations guaranteeing the protection of all foreign nationals and maintained that they were protecting church property and allowing churches, mission hospitals and schools to remain open in newly-occupied areas. Their claims appeared to be borne out by reports from some missionaries in the newly-occupied cities of Jinan and Zhengzhou, as well as some parts of Shandong, and also by stories of the release of priests who had been arrested and maltreated between 1946 and early 1948. But not all the reports were favourable. Whilst Swedish Baptists were able to continue their work in Shandong, the activities of some other missionaries in the same province had reportedly been stopped. 'The rosy picture' painted by American Presbyterians in Jinan in mid-November changed within a month to fears that mission property would soon be taken over. As Communist power was consolidated in newly-occupied areas and civilian officials took over from the PLA, some missionaries reported that a pattern was emerging in the treatment of both foreign and Chinese Christians: an initial phase of leniency with proclamations of 'religious freedom' followed by a second phase which included pressure on the churches and the takeover of Christian schools and medical services.

Faced with contradictory statements from the Communists and conflicting reports from missionaries in Communist-occupied areas, both foreign missionary boards and their individual representatives - like many other Westerners - tended to fall back on their own political preconceptions in attempting to assess the Communists' attitudes to their presence in China. The political views of Protestants were extremely
diverse, covering the whole spectrum from ultra-conservative at one extreme to liberal or 'progressive' at the other. In keeping with these views, their attitudes to the Chinese Communists ranged from strong hostility (not unlike that of the Catholic Church) on the part of basically evangelical organizations such as the China Inland Mission, to the more liberal responses typified by some missionaries engaged in reform and welfare activities, and the extremely progressive views (labelled as 'pink' by conservatives) of some young missionaries and particularly university educators.

Protestant missionaries backed up their own political preconceptions with the appropriate report or rumour about how the Communists were treating missionaries. In response to allegations that the Communists had stopped mission activity in some areas of Shandong, for example, one correspondent to the inter-denominational journal Christian Century asked whether it was the Communists or the missionaries who were at fault, claiming that the withdrawal of missionaries before areas fell into Communist hands only identified the church with the Nationalists.67 Another correspondent pointed out that, contrary to some of the pessimistic reports, a Friends Service Unit medical team had experienced no problems at all in its work with the Communists at the International Peace Hospital at Yan'an.68 As his critic pointed out in turn, the hospital had always been a 'show window' for the Communists and could hardly be cited as evidence of how the new regime would treat even medical missionaries.69 Nor was the Friends Service Unit (formerly the Friends Ambulance Unit) typical of missionary welfare activities in China; it had gone into Communist territory of its own initiative rather than being absorbed by the Communist advance; it was non-partisan, pacifist, owned no property, and did not evangelize.70

On the question of the possibility of working with the Communists, some missionaries engaged in educational and welfare activities stressed the need for a realistic attitude. Despite the opposing world views of communism and Christianity, they emphasized the common social purpose of the two groups. 'We want to show the Communists that we are in the business of helping people too,' stated Frank Cartwright, Secretary of the Division of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Church.71 Ignoring the US Government's hostility to communism as an ideology, the Foreign Missions Conference of North America - strongly under the influence of liberal viewpoints - suggested that missionaries should be 'pro-Christian,
not anti-Communist' and should 'approach Communists with intelligent understanding.' Conservatives would not have a bar of such a policy and argued that cooperating with the Communists was akin to 'compromising with the devil.'

Roman Catholics, like the conservative element of the Protestant Church, would brook no suggestion of compromise with communism. Papal encyclicals had long attacked Marxist materialism for its denial of God and Spirit and for undermining human dignity. In 1937 Pius XI had labelled communism that 'dangerous barbarism which aims at upsetting the social order and undermining the very foundations of Christian civilization.' As late as December 1948, when the Communists were poised to take Beijing and Tianjin, Vatican Radio provocatively voiced its support for the near-defeated Nationalists, expressing 'grave apprehension' at the decline of a government which had 'offered to the missionaries a sufficient freedom for the exercise of the apostolate.' The Catholic assault on communism took a practical turn in June of the following year when, with the Communists' victory in China all but complete, Pius XII announced the excommunication of all Catholics 'who profess, and particularly those who defend and spread, the materialistic and anti-Christian doctrine of the Communists.' Catholics had no doubt that the antagonism was mutual. Despite occasional favourable reports from Catholic missionaries in China during the second half of 1948, the Church discounted any notion that the Chinese Communists might fulfil their promise of 'religious freedom' and allow Catholic missionaries to continue working in China: 'The basic ideology of world communism is such that Catholics can expect nothing from its followers but hostility.' From the start, the policy of the Roman Catholic church was one of direct confrontation with the Communists - a confrontation of which they were only too aware.

For both Protestant and Catholic missionaries - unlike most other Westerners - the decision of whether to remain in China was not necessarily linked to their perception of the Chinese Communists or even to their anticipated treatment by the new Government. Indeed, the groups that were the most uncompromisingly hostile to the Communists - Catholics and the China Inland Mission - were also the most determined to stay. For the Christian church as a whole, leaving China would mean the abandonment of a century's efforts to bring Christianity to one quarter of the world's population; for many individual missionaries it would mean
admitting the failure of a lifetime's work and dedication. The reluc-
tance of many missionaries to leave China in the face of the Communist
victory made them 'the most troublesome' of all foreign residents in the
eyes of consular officials who had the responsibility of officially
protecting their nationals in China.80

Most Protestant mission boards put the onus on individual
missionaries, but even after evacuation warnings were issued by embassies
and consulates in November 1948 they intimated that their missionaries
should remain in China wherever possible. In January 1949, the annual
meeting of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, which
represented sixty-one American Protestant groups, reported that no single
group intended ordering its missionaries out of China.81 However, the
high-sounding ideals expressed at Protestant conferences about compromise
and cooperation with the Communists did not always strike a responsive
chord amongst missionaries, particularly Americans, in the field. Even
American mission board representatives in Shanghai expressed doubts about
the wisdom of not evacuating missionaries (and particularly wives and
children), only to be criticized by their headquarters for being unduly
alarmist.82

Protestant journals subsequently claimed that the Protestant
churches were maintaining a strong representation in China and that
missionaries who were deciding to leave the country were mostly those
with young families, in poor health, elderly or due for retirement.83
But the prospects of being in China under the Communists were sufficient
to prompt the departure of almost two-thirds of those Protestant
missionaries who were left to make the decision for themselves. By July
1949, when the Communists had crossed the Yangzi and had only to 'clean
up' south and southwest China, approximately 1,700 Protestant mission-
aries remained in China (including the 770 China Inland Mission represen-
tatives who individually had no choice in the matter),84 compared with
the post-war peak of about four thousand. Despite the more severe
evacuation warnings being issued to American nationals, the proportion of
American missionaries remained fairly constant at about one half.85

In creating an exception to the general policy of leaving the
decision to individual missionaries, the China Inland Mission stated
categorically that it was 'not planning to evacuate' its missionaries
from China.86 On the contrary, the CIM continued to send new recruits to
China and train them for work in the interior. At the end of 1948, over
sixty newly-arrived young men and women embarked on Chinese studies at the CIM language school in Chongqing. To the surprise even of other CIM missionaries, another fifty-one recruits would be sent to China in late 1949, commencing their language studies in Chongqing - one of the few remaining Nationalist outposts - two weeks after the establishment of the People's Republic.

The Roman Catholic Church also combined a vehement anti-Communist stance with a strong determination to retain a presence in China. Despite the Catholic Church's expectation of hostility and even persecution, Pius XII confirmed in February 1949 that missionaries should remain at their posts. Quoting the Gospels, he told a visiting Prefect Apostolic from China: 'The good shepherd gives his life for the sheep, the hired hand however flees.' When questioned further about whether missionaries should stay in China and risk imprisonment, rather than being useful elsewhere, he reiterated: 'You shall be witnesses for me.'

Although the Catholic Church made much of its intention to maintain a presence in China in the face of possible persecution, in practice the retention of missionaries was selective in anticipation of the troubles ahead. Just as foreign business enterprises were retaining essential personnel, so too did the Church retain those missionaries whom it considered 'essential to the care of souls.' The American Maryknoll group, whose missionaries appeared particularly vulnerable because of Communist hostility to Americans, gave its local bishops the responsibility of deciding who should leave China but laid down general guidelines that sisters, language students and those in poor health should be evacuated in the face of serious danger. At the same time it stressed that it did not contemplate 'any such thing as a wholesale withdrawal of priests.' Looking back on the period over thirty years later, Thomas Walsh (Maryknoll's Superior-General at the time) expressed the policy in more down-to-earth language: 'We knew which men could take it and which men couldn't. We left them there or got them out accordingly.'

The general pattern of evacuation tended to follow the Maryknoll guidelines. Language schools were either closed down or relocated in Hong Kong. A number of priests, brothers and particularly sisters (including many who had been displaced from or fled their missions during the Communists' assault of 1946-1948) either went home or took up new posts in Japan, the Philippines and other countries. Because of the
public image the Catholic Church was attempting to present, it did not reveal statistics of the precise numbers leaving China. Certainly, the proportion of Catholic missionaries evacuated from China was smaller than that of Protestants. While over half the Protestant missionaries left China before the Communist victory, over half the Catholic missionaries still remained in the country in early 1951, despite their subjection to varying periods of extremely heavy official pressure.

Acknowledging the dangers ahead, the Catholic Church made public declarations about the challenge of 'Godless Communism' and the need for courage, personal sacrifice and even martyrdom. Any individual missionaries who had doubts about their Church's decision to retain a missionary presence in China usually kept them to themselves. But in December 1948, the outspoken American Maryknoll priest Joseph McCormack wrote a 'secret' letter (intended to go no further than the Maryknoll Council) to his Superior-General in the United States: 'If it were my business I would definitely order them out now,' he stated. Cutting through the rhetoric of courage and potential martyrdom, he issued a prophetic warning: 'I can guarantee the world that the Church has not a chance when the commies have consolidated their holdings.'

Education and Culture

The Communists' attacks on imperialist 'cultural aggression' and their plans to establish, even in the New Democracy period, a culture that was scientific, national and directed at the masses, appeared to allow little scope for either Western cultural establishments or Western culture in the Chinese community. Like businessmen and missionaries, however, Westerners involved in cultural activities looked mainly to what was happening in areas coming under Communist control as 'evidence' of the new Government's likely policy in practice. In the field of higher education, in particular, the initial experiences gave some hope that the institutions would be able to continue their operations.

Contradictory reports about the treatment of Christian missionaries in Shandong province had led to the evacuation of several faculties of Qilu (Cheeloo) University in Jinan, including the medical school and the College of Arts and Sciences, before the Communists' arrival. But soon after they took the city on 24 September 1948 the new authorities permitted the remaining nursing school, hospital, theological college and high school, to resume classes. 'The relations between us are friendly
and pleasant,' wrote a British member of staff.\textsuperscript{97} Similar reports came from Yanjing University situated on the northwest outskirts of Beijing after it was occupied in December during the siege of the city. Some classes were continuing as usual, reported a foreign correspondent who crossed Communist lines.\textsuperscript{98} This was verified by William Empson, an English professor at Beijing University in the centre of the city, who continued to cycle out to Yanjing and back each week to give his regular Shakespeare lecture. Whilst some of his fellow-nationals thought him somewhat of an eccentric and feared for his safety, Empson was more perturbed by the declining attendances at his classes on \textit{Macbeth} and \textit{Hamlet}.\textsuperscript{99} Encouraged by the favourable reports, the controlling board for the thirteen Protestant universities, the United Board for Christian Colleges in China, decided that it would continue to give the colleges every support, including funding, 'so long as it is possible for the colleges to continue their work in accordance with the basic Christian purpose.'\textsuperscript{100}

Like other Protestants working in China, the universities' Western staff had varying opinions about the Chinese Communists and the prospects of working under the new Government. About half - around one hundred - decided to stay on in China.\textsuperscript{101} Whilst even those who stayed expressed a wide diversity of political views, Christian educators had an overall reputation of representing the most 'progressive' element amongst Protestants in China. Appalled by the corruption of the Nationalist regime and the economic misery that surrounded them, some were privately enthusiastic about the prospects of a Communist victory and hoped that they would be able to help in the building of 'new China.' In the words of Ralph Lapwood, a mathematics lecturer at Yanjing University who had originally gone to China under the auspices of the London Missionary Society, 'we expected to be able to continue working under a united front government.'\textsuperscript{102} William Sewell, an English Quaker who had taught chemistry at West China Union University in Chengdu since 1928, prepared for the Communist victory by privately studying Marxist texts.\textsuperscript{103} Like many other progressives, neither Lapwood or Sewell saw any basic contradiction between their Christian beliefs and Communist ideology; if the rhetoric was different, the social goal of improving the lives of the people was similar. This progressive Protestant attitude was to bring some Christian educators into conflict with their home mission boards when the political climate hardened following the outbreak of the Korean War.\textsuperscript{104}
For both cultural establishments run by Westerners and the purveyors of Western culture in the Chinese community as a whole, there was little opportunity to gauge the Communists' attitudes before they took cities with significant Western communities: Tianjin and Beijing and, more particularly, Shanghai. Overall, the Western information services kept functioning as part of their governments' official consular operations, as did the English-language newspapers in Shanghai. In Shanghai, too, the cinemas kept screening American films and the Chinese population kept flocking to see them; during the month of April 1949 - the month before the Communists entered the city - just over one million people attended American films out of a total viewing audience of approximately 2.3 million.¹⁰⁵

**Official Representation**

Although it was customary international practice to retain diplomatic and consular representation in a country when its central government was changing hands, the decision to remain in China was not a completely automatic one. In fact, the American and French Governments initially considered transferring their ambassadors to the new seat of the Nationalist Government; they eventually decided to follow the same course as the British and Commonwealth Governments and remain in Nanjing.¹⁰⁶

When the defeated and fragmented Nationalists left officially for Guangzhou on 23 April 1949¹⁰⁷ - as Communist troops were crossing the Yangzi - the only country to transfer its main diplomatic representation to Guangzhou was the Soviet Union. This action was seen as being somewhat ironical at the time but later events demonstrated the reasons for the Russians' actions.¹⁰⁸

Like other Western residents, ambassadors and diplomats in Nanjing debated the likely attitudes of the Communists to their remaining presence. Even though they were more informed than most other Westerners, their opinions varied just as widely and revolved around the same basic question: the extent to which the new Government would closely follow the Russian communist model. 'There were two broad lines of opinion,' Indian Ambassador Sardar Panikkar later commented. One was represented by Dutch Ambassador Baron F.C. van Arsen who, circulating a memorandum based on the experiences of diplomats in Moscow during the Russian Revolution, argued that the Communists would be tough and that 'there was no use depending on international law and usage.' The opposing
opinion, expounded with vigour by Australian Ambassador Keith Officer, was that the Chinese Communists would treat diplomats well in order to 'gain the good opinion of foreign powers.'

The retention of consular offices was more closely associated with the continuing presence of Western interests and nationals in China, although their customary role of protecting the welfare of foreign nationals was supplemented by the quasi-diplomatic function of serving as political 'listening posts.' The British Government adopted a general policy of maintaining all its offices at full strength. On 18 November 1948, three weeks after warnings were issued to non-essential British nationals to leave north China, the Foreign Office informed consular officials and other foreign service staff (both men and women) that they were 'expected to remain at their posts' so long as they were needed. If necessary, wives and children of consular personnel could be evacuated.

The US Government was predictably more wary about retaining its widely dispersed consular offices in China. In principle, it decided not to withdraw its consular representation, as it had recently done in Albania with the result that it was cut off from all information about the country's internal developments. But the initial policy in China was one of experimentation, with the first consular post to come under the Communists to act as a 'guinea pig' to determine 'if and how a consular office would function in communist controlled territory.' Ambassador Stuart admitted that no accurate prediction was possible of the Communists' attitudes but he assumed, quite wrongly as it turned out, that they would respect consulates' 'customary rights and prerogatives.' His opinions appeared to be validated by the promise, made before the Communist attack on Jinan in September 1948, that foreign consulates and their personnel would be protected, subject to the proviso that they 'obey the laws ... and carry on no destructive activities.'

This proviso proved more significant than the promise for Angus Ward, the American Consul-General at Shenyang who was later accused of espionage activities. On 18 November 1948, just over two weeks after the Communists captured Shenyang, the Consulate-General's radio transmitter was confiscated when Ward refused to hand it over to the authorities. Although Ward was reportedly being held under house arrest with the entire Consulate-General staff, the State Department considered that Shenyang was not a typical case because of strong Soviet influence in the Northeast and decided to retain its other consulates, at least for the
However, it transferred 'non-essential personnel,' in particular women employees, to posts outside China and evacuated the majority of dependents of both diplomatic and consular officers to Manila.

The Foreign Community

For members of particular interest groups, the decision of whether to remain in China was to a large extent made by their leading representatives, often outside China. For some individual Westerners, the decision was a much more independent one. To a large extent, of course, the fact that they had a choice at all was based on the decision of major interest groups - especially economic establishments which formed the basis of the largest foreign communities - to remain in China. But individual members of the communities - whether they were lower ranking employees of large commercial firms, had their own small businesses, or worked as teachers, doctors or dentists - still had to decide personally whether to risk life in China under the Communists.

In making the decision, they looked not only to the example being set by leaders of the commercial communities but also to the advice of their Government officials. Western governments clearly distinguished between what they considered to be 'essential' and 'unessential' to the Western presence. Even the American Government, for all its anti-communism and lack of official encouragement, recommended the retention of 'important interests' - whether business, religious or educational - in China. But it and other Western governments treated the question of 'unessential' personnel in accordance with the traditional policy of advising nationals to leave a region or country when they were exposed to personal risk.

Despite the Communists' assurances of protection, there still seemed to be grounds for fears for the security of foreign residents. First, the encouraging reports from some Westerners in newly-occupied centres had to be weighed against the continuing Communist torrent of anti-imperialist rhetoric. This was directed particularly at the United States because of its continued aid to the Nationalists but the British Ambassador in Nanjing feared that British subjects (and no doubt others) might well inherit 'some of the odium attached to Americans.' As past experiences in China had shown, he said, 'anti-foreign agitation is apt to become indiscriminate in its victims regardless of what particular
nation it was initially directed against. A second, and more immediate fear, was the possible exposure of Westerners to actual fighting during the takeover period and more especially the breakdown of law and order between the retreat of Nationalist troops and the establishment of Communist authority. The previous three years had seen mounting anti-foreign hostility in Nationalist-held territory and, in such an atmosphere, Western officials feared that their nationals might well become targets of hostility and even mob violence during the interim period.

Most governments therefore reacted to the imminent Communist takeover of the major cities with restrained advice that those people lacking major commitments in China should leave while adequate transportation was still available. In late October-early November 1948, warnings were issued to 'non-essential' Britshers in Beijing and Tianjin, as well as to other Europeans including French, Belgian and Greek nationals. The American warning to residents in the Beijing-Tianjin area, originally scheduled for release on 26 October, was delayed because of pressure by Chiang Kai-shek, but finally issued on the day Shenyang was captured - 1 November.

Whilst the American notice for the Beijing-Tianjin area was similar to warnings issued by other governments, over the next two weeks the United States took the initiative and opted for the virtual fullscale evacuation of its nationals from China. Nanjing and Shanghai were added to the original American warning on 5 November, followed by Qingdao and Hankou. On 13 November, American evacuation policy entered a more dramatic phase when Ambassador John Leighton Stuart informed the Secretary of State that, because of the rapid deterioration in the Nationalists' position, the time had come 'to initiate emergency evacuation procedures for practically all of China,' including the distant consular districts of Chongqing, Kunming and Guangzhou. On the following day, American consuls were instructed to advise United States nationals in their districts that, unless they were prepared to remain in China 'under possibly hazardous conditions,' they should prepare to evacuate. Transportation facilities were being arranged for Americans and, where space was available, for other foreign nationals, by the United States Naval Forces in the Western Pacific under Vice-Admiral Oscar Badger.
Individual reactions to the rash of warnings ranged from apprehension to sheer panic. 'Something approaching hysteria has gripped large numbers of Americans,' stated Fulbright Fellow Derk Bodde in Beijing three days after the first warning was issued. Not just the American community but the entire foreign population was affected. 'It might be going too far to say that they [the Americans] started a panic, but it is perfectly fair to say that their actions created very great anxiety,' wrote Britain's Consul-General in Shanghai, Robert Urquhart.

The normally restrained British Consul-General, fearing that some members of the British community 'would be swept away against their better judgement,' was angry that his American counterpart, John Cabot, had not consulted British or other consular officials before issuing the evacuation notice in Shanghai on 5 November. In a private memorandum to the British Ambassador in Nanjing, Urquhart accused the Americans in general of undue haste and alleged that Cabot, in particular, was 'so indoctrinated by popular ideas of communism' that he was 'not minded to accept any risk.' According to Urquhart, Cabot had already shipped all his effects and was 'prepared to quit his flat at five minutes' notice.' When pressed by journalists in Shanghai for a statement on the British attitude, Urquhart was noncommittal but said he thought that the British 'would be standing fast for the time being.' Although he maintained that the press was exaggerating the differences between the American and British attitudes, in a speech to the Shanghai Rotary Club in early December he played down the possibility of disorders in Shanghai and strongly intimated that all Britishers, except perhaps wives and young children, should remain.

On the evacuation question, John Cabot was certainly even more strident than his normally apprehensive Ambassador in Nanjing, John Leighton Stuart, who had initially thought that the evacuation warning for Shanghai might be delayed for a while but had issued it on 5 November following an 'urgent plea' from Cabot. But the contrary stands taken by the two consuls-general were a basic reflection of their governments' differing positions in China and a symptom of their growing divergence on the China question, including official recognition of a Communist regime. As individual Americans were quick to point out, they had greater grounds than the British for apprehension about their treatment by the Communists because of the Truman Administration's past and continuing assistance to the Nationalists. In contrast, the British Government had remained aloof...
from the conflict, supplying neither material support nor military aid to
the Nationalists. With apparently less to fear than the Americans, and
more to gain by staying in China because of greater commercial invest­
ments, it was easier for British officials to be more restrained in their
advice.

The conflicting opinions and advice did little to help Westerners -
particularly those who were neither American nor British - to make a
decision. Despite general apprehension about the Communists, many people
were extremely reluctant to leave China. A large number of Westerners,
particularly in Shanghai, did not even consider themselves to be foreign
expatriates; when a Chinese person occasionally told them they 'should go
home,' they replied that their home was Shanghai. Some were second or
even third generation Shanghailanders; they had grown up in the city,
attended its foreign schools and universities, and joined the commercial
community. As one new arrival commented, the British Shanghailanders had
even developed their own manner of speaking: 'a peculiarly unmusical
nasal accent - a sort of high-pitched cross between east coast American
and Sydney Australian.' For the Westerner who had spent virtually all
his life in Shanghai, departure meant a break with a whole way of life
and the need to establish new roots elsewhere.

Personal economic interests were also at stake. For those people
with their own small businesses, there was the prospect of even greater
personal loss than that faced by representatives of the large British and
American companies in China. Regardless of their occupation, Westerners
faced the problem of selling houses and other possessions on a rapidly
falling market. The North China Daily News was filled with advertise­
ments for houses, cars, refrigerators and other household goods. In
early December 1948, barely a month after the American evacuation warning
was issued in Shanghai, it reported that second-hand cars which a few
months earlier would have brought from US$1,500 to US$2,000 were now
selling for between $400 and $500. The longer people wavered in their
decision, the more they stood to lose.

The initial panic caused by the rash of American warnings died down
when the leading representatives of both the British and American commer­
cial communities, as well as large numbers of missionaries and educators,
decided to remain in China. And despite the warnings, there was still
something of an air of unreality about all of China really becoming
communist, particularly in Shanghai where some people still thought that
what was happening in other parts of the country could never really happen in the 'Paris of the East.' Acknowledging the ostrich-like attitude of many Western residents, John Keswick commented at the end of November 1948: 'If you are an old China hand and have stood sufficiently long at the Club bar, you could convince yourself that the Communists will never come to Shanghai.' In January 1949 the Communists occupied Tianjin and then Beijing, brought the huge Huai-Hai campaign to a successful conclusion and were on their way south to the Yangzi. Yet at the end of February a young UNRRA employee who had just moved into a new apartment in Shanghai wrote home: 'I have been busy having curtains, bedspread and slip covers for the chairs made.'

The big jolt for the foreign residents of Shanghai finally came on 20 April when the Royal Navy frigate, *Amethyst*, sailing up the Yangzi to Nanjing on the very day that Communist troops were preparing to cross the river to take the capital, was fired on and taken captive by the Communists. The whole affair was probably an unfortunate accident but it vividly demonstrated that the days of imperialism and gunboat diplomacy in the Far East were well and truly over. Although the British community was reportedly outraged when the dead and wounded British naval officers and seamen were brought back to Shanghai, the British Chamber of Commerce - which once would have demanded prompt retaliatory action - urged the British Government to play down the affair for the sake of Britain's future relations with the Chinese Communists.

'One by one people are making up their minds to leave,' wrote the UNRRA employee a week after the *Amethyst* affair, while the United States Navy, the Royal Air Force and commercial airlines were all stepping up their evacuation programmes. But many Westerners left it to almost the last moment. As late as 24 May - the day before the Communists marched into the city - an Alaskan Airlines DC4 picked up fifty-eight foreigners at Longhua Airfield, within sight and sound of the Nationalist-Communist confrontation, and made its final flight for 'Operation Flying Dragon.' If those Westerners who remained in Shanghai (including approximately 3,000 Britishers and 1,500 Americans) were understandably jittery, British community leaders reflected on the many political turmoils that their predecessors had been through in China and put on a calm front. 'We believe that we shall be able to see ourselves through,' declared the top British taipan and Chairman of the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce, John Keswick.
The Communist Victory

The majority of Westerners in China came under Communist rule in two phases during 1949: the first phase was in January when the Communists entered Tianjin and Beijing; the second, during April-May when they took the Nationalist capital of Nanjing and the city of Shanghai. In the three weeks following the establishment of the People's Republic on 1 October, Communist forces reached Guangzhou - the initial point of contact between Chinese and Westerners - and the former coastal treaty ports of southeast China. By the time they arrived in the Sichuanese capital of Chengdu on 25 December (disrupting the Christmas celebrations of missionary teachers at the West China Union University), the Nationalists had fled to Taiwan and virtually all Westerners in China - apart from a few missionaries in rural areas of the southwest and northwest - were under Communist rule.

The fears expressed by some Westerners, in particular diplomatic and consular officials, that the actual takeover would expose them to physical danger were not generally borne out. Most cities and towns with significant foreign populations were surrendered by Nationalist troops after little or no fighting. The only city where a large number of Westerners found themselves in the thick of the Nationalist-Communist confrontation was Tianjin.145 Chiang Kai-shek's decision to defend the city resulted in their having what one Britisher described as a 'thoroughly uncomfortable time'146 on 14 and 15 January when the PLA besieged Tianjin with a fierce artillery barrage which devastated much of the city, killed or wounded large numbers of civilians and caused a communications blackout. Damage to foreign property was said to have been fairly slight considering the amount of shelling, with the exception of the Shell Company's installations: two warehouses, 5,000 drums of kerosene (the entire stock) and 200 tons of diesel oil well up in flames after an explosion which rocked the city. British-American Tobacco's office compound was also largely destroyed in the shelling (although the company's representatives reported that its cigarettes were safe) and the staff quarters of Imperial Chemical Industries suffered severe blast damage. But properties owned by Jardine Matheson and Butterfield & Swire were only superficially damaged and many other foreign-owned establishments, including those of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, were virtually unmarked. The city's foreign residents, who had barricaded themselves in consulates,
homes and offices, eventually emerged shaken but unscathed, apart from the occasional injury caused by flying glass.\textsuperscript{147}

In contrast, Beijing and Nanjing - the future and current capitals - had a comparatively painless transfer to Communist rule. Scarcely a shot was fired during the 'siege of Beijing'; the Communists wanted to preserve the city as intact as possible. The main problems for Beijing's residents (including the 2,000 foreigners) during the six-week winter siege was to stretch out their stocks of food and coal, as well as coping with the periodic lack of electric light caused by the Communists' control of the power station.\textsuperscript{148} On 23 January, Nationalist General Fu Zuoyi finally negotiated a surrender and withdrew nearly all his troops from the city before the Communists marched in on 31 January.\textsuperscript{149} Almost three months later, Nationalist troops simply evacuated Nanjing during the night of 21-22 April (followed by the Government's official departure the following night) before the entry of the Communists on the morning of the 24th.\textsuperscript{150} Foreign ambassadors and their skeleton staffs sat tight as planned, although the \textit{Amethyst} incident a few days earlier had introduced a last-minute note of tension into the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{151}

For the majority of the foreign residents of China's largest city, the 'liberation of ... the monument of imperialism in the Far East'\textsuperscript{152} or the 'fall of Shanghai'\textsuperscript{153} - depending on one's political stance - was no more dramatic than waking up on Wednesday morning, 25 May, to see white flags on buildings including the Central Police Station and groups of young Communist soldiers patrolling the streets.\textsuperscript{154} Like many Westerners, the Filipino Consul-General, Mariano Ezpeleta, was unimpressed by what he saw. The youthful soldiers, dressed in ill-fitting green coarse cotton uniforms and flat rubber shoes, looked like 'shy little country boys' as they wandered around 'open-eyed, obviously bewildered by the ornate and magnificent buildings of the city.... As victorious war heroes, they were a flat flop.'\textsuperscript{155}

Some foreigners were not let off quite so easily. When Nationalist soldiers fell back north of Suzhou Creek to defend the road to the port of Wusong (from where defeated troops were evacuating to Taiwan), about six hundred foreigners were trapped just behind Nationalist lines, the majority in the Embankment Building and a few in Broadway Mansions and other multi-storey buildings. Another five to six hundred were marooned in 'no man's land' along the Bund, where they took refuge in the British and American consulates-general, and in the offices of Jardine Matheson
and other firms. During the subsequent three-day 'battle for Shanghai,' the trapped and marooned foreigners slept in hallways or rooms as far as possible away from the line of fire and kept friends and press agencies in the Communist-held parts of the city informed of their welfare by telephone. The multi-storey buildings across Suzhou Creek were topped by Nationalist guns and looked like becoming prime targets. But the Communists wanted to preserve the city and were also anxious not to inflict casualties on the civilian population whose support, or at least acquiescence, was vital to a smooth transition to Communist rule. 'They fired often and made a lot of noise,' wrote the Filipino Consul-General, 'but as intended, nobody was getting hurt.'

By 28 May it was all over and, in the words of the North China Daily News, the 'foreign community emerged from the battle of Shanghai with a few scars, but no casualties.' Although Shanghai was already under the administrative control of Communist General Chen Yi, the city gave the deceptive appearance of having returned to near normal. The streets were once again crowded with buses, hawkers and rickshaws; foreign firms and foreign consulates on the Bund were open for business. Newspaper advertisements proclaimed that it was also 'business as usual' for the Broadway Mansions Beauty Shop, as well as for Glamour Gowns and the Gascoyne Cafe ('the ideal place for a rendez-vous') on Avenue Joffre. Lawrence Olivier was starring in Hamlet at the Capitol Cinema and I Wonder Who's Kissing Her Now was screening at the Grand.

The smooth and speedy occupation by the PLA of most Chinese cities largely prevented the rioting and even anti-foreign violence feared by some Western officials. Departing Nationalist soldiers and local residents indulged in sporadic looting but, apart from a few isolated incidents, did not turn their attention specifically to foreign residents. On their arrival, the Communists quickly established their authority and posted up the Eight-Point Proclamation which included the guarantee of protection to foreign nationals and their property. Although the newly-arrived soldiers did not generally have the appearance of 'victorious war heroes,' even the most anti-communist Western residents were impressed with what became commonly described as their 'exemplary behaviour' which was in striking contrast to the unruly conduct of Nationalist soldiers over the past few years. As the surprised Filipino Consul-General in Shanghai put it: 'They indulged neither in plunder nor in shooting, in lust nor in looting.'
Now highly disciplined after the lapses which had occurred in the Northeast, the PLA generally lived up to its claim that it was no occupying force but a 'people's army.' In Shanghai, for example, soldiers refused to accept even hot water or tea without payment and slept on the pavement rather than enter people's homes. Their personal behaviour towards foreigners was correct but formal; they answered questions politely and briefly but refused to engage in further conversation.

Even missionaries in rural areas were initially impressed. When PLA soldiers first appeared outside a church or mission compound, it was often to paint the characters zongjiao ziyou (religious freedom) on the walls. This action, together with the immediate publication of the Eight-Point Proclamation which also guaranteed the protection of schools and hospitals, generally prevented any of the feared disturbances. Apart from visits from groups of curious soldiers and the occasional borrowing of household equipment and vehicles (at this stage carefully looked after and promptly returned), the takeover troops initially did little to impede the missionaries' activities.1^2

But the enthusiasm about the excellent behaviour of the victors was comparatively shortlived. First came frustration as Communist officials rejected virtually all attempts at contact, whether by Western businessmen who wanted to discuss the Communists' attitudes to foreign investment and trade, journalists keen for interviews with China's new leaders, or consular officials anxious to establish informal relations with the authorities.1^3 The often heated debate about the Communists' likely reaction to the Western presence seemed irrelevant, at least for the moment. 'Far from finding ourselves beset by a Gestapo, we could hardly locate officials of any sort,' commented American Randall Gould, editor of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury.*1^4 Within only a few weeks, Gould's own widely-publicized confrontation with the Communist authorities was to demonstrate that Westerners in China were henceforth to be ignored or given attention - not always welcome attention - as and when it suited the purposes of China's new rulers.
Notes


4 See p.65.

5 Ward to Secretary of State, 8 May 1948, FRUS, 1948, VII, 816.

6 Freeman to Butterworth, 1 October 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 844.

7 China Digest, 28 January 1949, 8-9; 8 May 1949, 9, 19.

8 China Association Minutes and Circulars [hereafter CAMC] 49/M/7, 31 May 1949. See also Reuter report in NCDN, 5 November 1948.

9 See below.

10 New York Times, 24 April 1949. Cf. New York Times, 1 November 1944, which maintained that the Chinese Communists were 'in fact, peasant agrarians.' See also Tsou, America's Failure in China, p.224.

11 On the wideranging attitudes of American officials and commentators in the post-war period, see Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp.177-236. The differing opinions of American diplomats in China during early 1949 are strikingly portrayed in FRUS, 1949, VIII, passim.

12 See, in particular, Tsou, America's Failure in China, chapter 6. See also Waldo Heinrichs, 'American China policy and the cold war in Asia: a new look,' in Borg and Heinrichs, ed., Uncertain Years, p.286: 'Discussion of the Chinese Communists at the State Department ... was like a seminar in adolescent psychology.'

13 See p.56.

14 Reuter report in NCDN, 5 November 1948; CAMC, 49/M/7, 31 May 1949.

15 British Consulate-General, Tianjin, to British Embassy, Nanjing, 9 April 1948, Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 371/69533; Stevenson to Foreign Secretary, 7 May 1948, ibid.

16 Stevenson to Foreign Secretary, 7 May 1948, FO 371/69533.

17 Yingkou was recaptured by Nationalist troops but retaken by the Communists before the end of the year.
Pepper, Civil War in China, p.386. For details of the breakdown of soldier and cadre discipline in the Northeast, see ibid., pp.386-87.

Chinese Association File: The Civil War and Subsequent Conditions [hereafter CAP], Report by a member of Kaifan Mining Administration staff, Qinhuangdao, 13 December 1948 (enclosure in Nathan to China Association, 22 December 1948).

See pp.56-57.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 6 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 919.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 902.

The British Embassy (Washington) to the Department of State, 5 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 5.


'Industry and trade in New China,' China Digest, 11 January 1949, 8.

A. Morse, Address to Annual General Meeting of the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 5 March 1949. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 March 1949, 284. Communist imports from Hong Kong included tyres, paper, industrial raw materials, machine parts and tools, which were bartered for export goods including soya beans, peanut oil and bristles. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 January 1949, 108.

Mao told American diplomat John Service that the Chinese Communists could 'not expect Russian help' because of Russia's suffering in the war and her own reconstruction needs. 'Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service) of a conversation with Mao Tse-tung, 23 August 1944,' sub-enclosure in Gauss to Secretary of State, 28 September 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI, 613.


The British Embassy (Washington) to the Department of State, 5 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 5.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 27 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 30. The US Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow was of the opinion: 'If assumption is correct [that] China must eventually turn to West instead [of] Soviets for economic aid, our only strength is withholding trade until concessions are made.' Kohler to Secretary of State, 7 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 35.
Interview with Hubert Collar, 7 August 1979. Mr Collar worked in China from 1921-1949 and during the Sino-Japanese War (when he was interned) was Chairman of the British Residents' Association in Shanghai. From 1953 until 1971 he was Secretary of the China Association in London.


CAMC, 48/F/20, 13 December 1948.

See Far Eastern Survey, 1 June 1949, 121-23.


The British Embassy (Washington) to the Department of State, 5 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 5.

See pp.145-46.

Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas), 20 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 51.

Acting Secretary of State to Stuart, 23 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 892-93. The same point was made by W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, in a discussion with John Kopelman, Vice-President of the Shanghai Power Company, on 30 November 1948. ibid., 904.

Business Week, 4 December 1948, 111.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 901.

Smyth to Secretary of State, 27 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 899.

Statement by President, Tianjin American Chamber of Commerce, reported in Smyth to Secretary of State, 10 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 929. See also Cabot to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, ibid., 901. For a strong expression of these sentiments, see Business Week, 4 December 1948, 111.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 22 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 891; Cabot to Secretary of State, 23 November 1948, ibid., 894-95. For a detailed discussion of the Shanghai Power Company's attitude and dealings with US Government officials, see Tozer, 'Last bridge to China,' 65-69.

Acting Secretary of State to Cabot, 23 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 893.


Cabot to Secretary of State, 23 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 894.
Urquhart to Stevenson, 24 November 1948, enclosure in Stevenson to Foreign Secretary, 29 November 1948, FO 371/69596.

Interview with Hubert Collar, 7 August 1979. Similar views were expressed by Sir John Addis, formerly First Secretary, British Embassy, Nanjing, 1947-1950. Interview with Sir John Addis, 4 September 1949.

Stephen Garrett, 'Discovering China,' p.117.

Unsworth, 'American Catholic Missions and Communist China,' pp.42-44.


Press release by Jesuit Missions, New York, 6 February 1948, in FO 371/69533.


ibid.; Christian Century, 4 February 1948, 132. The China Inland Mission transferred its missionaries in Shanxi, as well as threatened areas of Shaanxi, Hebei, Henan and Anhui, to the lower Yangzi region and to southwest China. The Quebec Foreign Missionary Society (a Catholic society) switched its activities to Yunnan province.

Maryknoll: Fushun 1948-1951, McCormack to Walsh, 8 March 1948. One week after McCormack's departure, Father Maurus Pai, a Chinese priest working in the Fushun vicarate, was shot by Communists on the charge that 'he was teaching the American religion.' A second priest was also sentenced to death but escaped. ibid., McCormack to Walsh, 20 February 1948.

Bacon to Secretary of State, 24 January 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 811.

Clubb to Secretary of State, 26 April 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 822.

Clubb to Secretary of State, 8 May 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 827.

China Digest, 2 November 1948, 2; 14 December 1948, 5.

Turner to Secretary of State, 11 October 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 847; British Consulate-General, Tianjin, to British Consulate-General, Shenyang, 24 June 1948, FO 371/69537.


Strong to Secretary of State, 18 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 942-43. See also NCDN, 12 February 1949; CMB, March 1949, 338.


'Ming Sung,' Christian Century, 27 October 1948, letters column, in response to Hanson, Christian Century, 29 September 1948, letters column.
The Friends Service Unit had taken a convoy of medical supplies to Yan'an in February 1946, before the breakdown of the Marshall truce, and had operated continuously in Communist territory since December 1946. Its workers were regarded by the Communists as members of an 'international voluntary relief agency' rather than as Christian missionaries. For a detailed description of the Friends Service Unit's experiences with the Communists, see Spencer Coxe, 'Quakers and Communists in China,' Far Eastern Survey, 29 June 1949, 152-55. See also Lewis Hoskins, Report of the Administration to the [Friends Service] Unit, enclosure in Stevenson to Foreign Secretary, 21 July 1948, FO 371/69537.

CMB, February 1949, 226.

For a detailed account of the Vatican's attitude to communism in general and to the Chinese Communists in particular, see Unsworth, 'American Catholic Missions and Communist China,' chapter 5.


ibid.

Melby, Mandate of Heaven, p.353.

CMB, March 1949, 226; CMB, March 1949, 336.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 30 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VIII, 902-903.

For example, CMB, February 1949, 226; Frank W. Price, 'Bitter dilemma in China,' Christian Century, 15 December 1948, 1367. This pattern is confirmed by Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' p.232.


This is suggested, but not made specific, in Frank T. Cartwright, 'Protestant missions in Communist China,' Far Eastern Survey, 29 December 1949, 301-302.

ibid.

*China's Millions*, November-December 1949, 71.

Reported in *CMB*, June-July 1951, 491.


ibid.

Interview with Thomas Walsh, 18 September 1979.

*CMB*, January 1949, 74; Maryknoll: Shanghai Correspondence, 1948-1951, Mulcahy to Walsh, 14 December 1948.


Maryknoll: Shanghai Correspondence, 1948-1951, McCormack to Walsh, 14 December 1949. McCormack had gone from Beijing to Shanghai when it proved impossible to return to the Fushun mission.


*NCDN*, 24 December 1948.

Interview with Sir William Empson, 6 August 1979. William Empson, English poet and Professor Emeritus of English Literature at Sheffield University, taught English literature at Beijing University from 1947 to 1952.

*China Colleges*, February 1949, 1.

*China Colleges*, October 1949, 4.


See *Christian Century*, 3 January 1951, 5.

*Dagongbao* (Hong Kong), 18 November 1950 (*SCMP*, no.19, 29 November 1950).

The President's Office and the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Control Yuans had already been transferred to Guangzhou, and the Examination Yuan to Chongqing, in December 1948. The Acting President, Li Zongren (Chiang Kai-shek had officially resigned the Presidency on 21 February) did not initially accompany the Government to Guangzhou, spending two weeks in Guilin before being persuaded to resume office.

See Chapter 8.


Telegram, British Embassy, Nanjing, to consuls, 18 November 1948, FO 371/69596.

For details see 'Policy respecting retention of consular posts in areas occupied by Chinese Communists,' *FRUS*, 1948, VII, 809-60.

Acting Secretary of State to certain diplomatic and consular officers, 17 November 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 889. See also Stuart to Secretary of State, 5 May 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VII, 813-15; Stuart to Secretary of State, 11 August 1948, ibid., 821-22.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 5 May 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VII, 813-14; Stuart to Secretary of State, 15 November 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VII, 838.


Acting Secretary of State to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers), 12 January 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1215. For details of the Ward affair, see pp.249-51.

*FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 876-96 passim.

See, for example, memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers), 12 January 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1215.

During 1948 Western governments had advised persons residing in the interior of north China to evacuate areas threatened by the Communists. See, for example, CAMC, 48/G/10, 13 February 1948; Stuart to Secretary of State, 2 January 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 809-10; Stuart to Secretary of State, 3 May 1948, ibid., 823-24.

Stevenson to Foreign Office, 29 November 1948, FO 371/69596.

See p.23.

Clubb to Secretary of State, 27 October 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 865; Franklin to Lamb, 5 November 1948, FO 371/69596; *NCDN*, 29 October 1948.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 24 October 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 859; Stuart to Secretary of State, 29 October 1948, ibid., 867. Plans to issue a mild warning for Beijing, Tianjin and Jinan as early as May 1948 had been abandoned after the Nationalist Government's Vice
Foreign Minister, Ye Gongchao (George Yeh) protested that such action would have 'unfortunate psychological effects.' Stuart to Secretary of State, 1 June 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 834–35. See also Acting Secretary of State to Stuart, 2 June 1948, ibid., 835–36.

123 On the development of American policy, see 'Evacuation of Americans from China,' *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 809ff and *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1210ff.

124 *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 871–76.

125 Stuart to Secretary of State, 13 November 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 885.

126 Stuart to Secretary of State, 14 November 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 885-86.


128 Urquhart to Stevenson, 24 November 1948, enclosure in Stevenson to Foreign Office, 29 November 1948, FO 371/69596.

129 ibid. This appears to have been an oversight in Cabot's panic (see below). The State Department had been adamant that the warnings originally planned for May 1948 should not be issued until after discussion with British officials. Clubb to Secretary of State, 27 May 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 832; Assistant Secretary of State to Stuart, 28 May 1948, ibid., 833.

130 Urquhart to Stevenson, 24 November 1948, enclosure in Stevenson to Foreign Office, 29 November 1948, FO 371/69596.

131 ibid.

132 ibid.

133 Reported in Cabot to Secretary of State, 10 December 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 926.

134 Stuart to Secretary of State, 2 November 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, VIII, 871; Stuart to Secretary of State, 3 November 1948, ibid., 872; Cabot to Secretary of State, 4 November 1948, ibid., 873. After the initial panic died down, Cabot was adamant that the evacuated wives and children of official personnel should not return to China and he challenged Stuart's initial agreement to their return in an angry cable to the State Department: 'I wish to go on record as believing emphatically this is no time for dependents to be returning to Shanghai area.' Cabot to Secretary of State, 20 February 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1230.


136 *NCDN*, 6 December 1948.

137 Keswick to China Association, 30 November 1948, enclosure in CAMC, 48/G/48, 14 December 1948.


CAMC, 49/G/19, 2 May 1949. On 30 July 1949, the Amethyst made a daring escape from its Communist captives. The action was commended by Prime Minister Atlee and King George VI sent a message of congratulations on the 'daring exploit.' The Chinese Communists, in contrast, called it 'a base and cruel criminal act' because a large number of people aboard a Chinese steamer, which was sunk by the Amethyst during the escape, drowned in the Yangzi. *The Times* (London), 1 August 1949; *Dagongbao* (Shanghai), 3 August 1949 (*CPR*, no.941, 3 August 1949).

Beck, 'My life in China,' entry for 29 April 1949.


CAMC, 49/F/9, 26 April 1949.

Apart from Tianjin, the only other city with a significant foreign population to come under heavy bombardment was Xiamen (Amoy). The Nationalists defended the island of Gulansu (where most foreign residents lived) to enable their troops to evacuate to Taiwan; during the four-day battle in mid-October foreign residents took refuge in basements and cellars. Interview with David Morrell (Assistant Manager of Butterfield & Swire, Amoy, 1949-1951), 22 August 1979.


For first-hand Chinese and Western accounts of the Communists' victory in Tianjin, see *China Digest*, 8 February 1949, 15; *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 46-50, 54; CAMC, 49/F/2, 24 January 1949; interview with Elspeth Ewing (administrative employee at the British Consulate-General, Tianjin, 1948-1950), 10 July 1979.

The Communists' offer to supply the city with electricity was rejected by Fu Zuoyi because of its propaganda value to the Communists.

For first-hand accounts of the Communist takeover of Beijing, see *China Digest*, 8 February 1949, 16-17; *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 59, 72, 75-79; 1053; Andrew Roth, 'The fall of Peiping,' *Nation*, 29 January 1949, 125-26; Andrew Roth, 'Peiping's new look,' *China Weekly Review*, 19 February 1949, 290-91; Bodde, *Peking Diary*, pp.96-99; Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, pp.315-57; interview with Sir


See note 139 above.

*China Digest*, 31 May 1949, 14.

For example, Barber, *The Fall of Shanghai*.


*Ezpeleta, Red Shadows over Shanghai*, pp.185-86.

ibid., p.189.

*NCDN*, 28 May 1949.

*NCDN*, 29 May 1949. See also Cabot to Secretary of State, 28 May 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 351-52.

In the Hongkou (Hongkew) district of Shanghai, for example, a group of fleeing Government soldiers looted the property of 'sixty European Jewish refugees, tearing up bedding and destroying most of what they were unable to take away. *NCDN*, 29 May 1949.

For example, Rossi, *The Communist Conquest of Shanghai*, pp.33; Ezpeleta, *Red Shadows over Shanghai*, p.193; Randall Gould, 'Shanghai during the takeover, 1949,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 277 (September 1951), 84.

*Ezpeleta, Red Shadows over Shanghai*, pp.193-94.

This was a common comment in reports from both Catholic and Protestant missionaries. See, for example, *CMB*, January-December 1949, passim; Maryknoll: *Accounts of South China Priests*; Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' passim.
See, for example, report on situation in Tianjin in CAF, Vignoles (Shell) to China Association, 25 February 1949; report on situation in Shanghai in British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to China Association, 19 July 1949, CAMC, 49/F/15, 20 July 1949; Rossi, The Communist Conquest of Shanghai, p.38.

Gould, 'Shanghai during the takeover, 1949,' 84. Otto van der Sprenkel, a teacher of English at Nankai University in Tianjin commented: 'We were not regimented, nor were we bullied. Something much more galling happened to us; we were ignored.' Otto B. van der Sprenkel, ed., New China: Three Views (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), p.21.
CHAPTER 4
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNIST POLICY

Following their victory, the Communists - far from having a 'permissive attitude' towards Westerners - quickly initiated measures which were directed towards their eventual elimination from China: measures that increased in intensity, but did not change their basic nature, during the Korean War. These measures were the product of a consistent, deliberate policy on the part of China's new rulers. This chapter will discuss the basic nature of the Chinese Communists' policy towards the Western presence as a whole, the makers and implementers of this policy, and its overall application to all foreign nationals in China - focussing particularly on the foreign community in Shanghai - before the Korean War.

A Communist Policy
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Communists' policy towards Westerners was based, on the one hand, on a long history of nationalist reaction against imperialism, and on the other on a firm commitment to building a socialist society in the future. The Communists' statements and actions following their assumption of power demonstrated their continuing commitment to both nationalism and socialism.

'The Chinese people have stood up!' declared Mao Zedong in his opening address to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 21 September 1949. In the Common Programme, issued a week later, the Communists reiterated that 'all special privileges of imperialist countries in China' must be abolished. In practice, Chinese nationalism demanded the eradication not only of all vestiges of continuing imperialist privileges but of even the symbols of a century's unequal treatment. Throughout the early Communist period, the underlying feature of the Communists' treatment of Westerners was the vigorous, aggressive assertion of national independence, accompanied by an almost pathological desire to make Western groups and individuals alike recognize and even publicly acknowledge that the Chinese people were now the 'masters of China.' Those who had long been humiliated now took every opportunity to humiliate.

At the same time, Mao reiterated that China was to develop steadily 'into a socialist and communist society.' There has been some debate on
whether or not the policies of the Chinese Government in the first two to three years of Communist rule can, in fact, be described as 'socialist.' Maurice Meisner, for example, maintains there was 'little that was specifically socialist in the policies pursued by the Communists in the early years of the PRC.' In particular, he argues that the Communists' urban policies and programs were ones which any strong national government would have undertaken under the circumstances.... These included the establishment of social order, the control of inflation and introduction of a viable currency system, and the revival of industrial production and commerce.

As Mao had stated, however, the New Democracy period was intended as a first stage, or transitional period, on the road towards socialism. Whilst the Communists' early urban policies and programmes may not have been specifically 'socialist' in nature, they did pave the way for the establishment of a socialist state. From the earliest months of their rule, for example, the Communists played a growing role not just in economic activity but in virtually all aspects of Chinese life, including education and culture. Western interest groups therefore felt not just the Communists' underlying anti-imperialist pressures, but also - along with Chinese interests - the Government's growing encroachment on their activities. The encroachment of the state varied in intensity and manner, according to whether it intended eventually to integrate establishments into their own system - as was basically the case with manufacturing industry and educational institutions - or suppress them completely and replace them with the Marxist-Leninist model, as applied to religion and culture. In the former case, establishments were subject to increasing supervision and control, as Mao had intimated in On New Democracy; in the latter case they were gradually suppressed. Regardless of the West's past history in China, therefore, Western involvement in the economy, religion, education and culture became increasingly incompatible with the 'new China' being created by the Chinese Communists, even in the New Democracy period.

The relative importance of the nationalist and socialist elements of the Communist revolution in general - or the extent to which the Chinese Communists were first 'Chinese' or first 'Marxist-Leninists' - continued to be the subject of controversy after they came to power. Indeed, it has been a major continuing subject of debate amongst China commentators. Whilst the cementing of the alliance with the Soviet Union in February
1950 appeared to confirm the arguments of those who maintained that the Chinese Communists were not just Marxist-Leninists but little more than puppets of Moscow (this view had to be revised following the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s), other commentators - such as Lucien Bianco - have maintained that Chinese Communism was 'first and foremost the triumphant assertion of Chinese nationalism.' As Stuart Schram points out, however, both extreme approaches tend to reflect a certain emotional or political bias and the 'problem is less to evaluate the relative importance of the Chinese and communist factors in the composite entity "Communist China" than to grasp how they interact....' Indeed, it was the combination and interaction of these two factors, admittedly with nationalism initially very much to the forefront (at least in the cities), that made any continuing Western presence in China virtually out of the question.

The combination of the nationalist and socialist elements also means that the Chinese Communists' treatment of Westerners is not readily comparable with any other country: whether Asian nationalist nation or communist nation. Other Asian nationalist governments establishing their independence following a colonial past - for example, India and Indonesia - had been reduced to formal colonies and unlike China suffered the complete loss of their sovereignty. Their new rulers, however, were mostly Western-educated, middle-class elite who established bourgeois democracies modelled on the Western pattern. Following independence, they did not seek completely to eliminate the remaining Western presence but rather to come to terms with it. Indonesia, for example, positively encouraged foreign investment while even non-aligned India continued to accept it. Nor is China, in aiming eventually to establish a socialist society, directly comparable with the Soviet Union, which did eliminate Western interests and virtually cut itself off from the bourgeois capitalist world. Unlike China, however, the Soviet Union lacked the heritage of a long period of imperialist penetration.

There is also the question of whether China's traditional image of herself as the centre of the universe was itself a further factor affecting the treatment of Westerners in China after 1949. Although Feuerwerker, for example, argues that anti-imperialism - and not any vision of sino-centrism - was the central factor determining Communist China's outlook on the world, the two cannot be completely separated. The vehemence of Chinese anti-imperialism undoubtedly derived partly from
the extent to which her former feelings of centricity and power had been drastically undermined by the foreign barbarian, reducing China from a once proud nation to a humbled and humiliated one. Even though China had not completely lost her sovereignty, as had countries such as India and Indonesia, her century-long experience with imperialism had been a shattering one, leaving a legacy which helped account for the strength of Chinese - including Communist - anti-imperialism.

The combination of the Communists' strong anti-imperialist assertiveness and their movement towards a socialist society ostensibly appeared sufficient to lead to the official expulsion of the remaining Western imperialist presence from China. Yet, far from carrying out 'the violent expulsion of the Westerners in 1949,' as Jean Chesneaux claims they did,¹⁴ the Communists made no move officially to expel Westerners from China as they came to power during the year, or even once the People's Republic was established on 1 October. Such action was prevented by pragmatic considerations - domestic and, to a lesser extent, international. As Doak Barnett commented during the early stages of Communist rule, the Communists were 'doctrinaire in their basic beliefs, but flexible in adapting means to achieve their ends.'¹⁵

Domestically, the Communists faced immense social and economic problems; Mao himself admitted that the victory over the Nationalists was only 'the first step in a long march of ten thousand li.'¹⁶ When they came to power in 1949, their immediate and major priorities were to consolidate their authority and to rehabilitate the war-damaged economy, as Mao had envisaged in 1940 when he outlined the relatively moderate political and economic aspects of New Democracy, which he reiterated on 30 July 1949 - just a month after the Communists took Shanghai - in his article On the People's Democratic Dictatorship.¹⁷ First, in their attempt to gain widespread political support, the Communists presented a moderate political image by establishing, as they had promised, a 'united front' government which included a large number of non-Communists. Although this government was seen as a union of all the 'anti-imperialist' classes and there was a reservoir of strong anti-imperialist sentiment in China, the outright expulsion of Westerners may have appeared an extremist move, particularly in the eyes of Western-influenced intellectuals (and certainly Chinese Christian leaders).

Second, in rehabilitating the war-damaged economy - from restoring communications and industrial production to bringing the rampant inflation
under control - the Communists permitted the continued existence of the
private sector of the Chinese economy, excluding 'bureaucratic capital'
which they confiscated as they had warned. As part of their attempt to
minimise economic disruption during the early Communist period, they also
decided to permit Western economic interests to continue their activities,
despite the Government's strong underlying anti-imperialism. Similarly,
in attempting to minimise social disruption in the transition period,
they took over only Government-operated educational institutions, allowing
private educational establishments - including the Christian colleges -
to continue operating in the short term. Indeed, by deciding to remain
in China (partly in response to the Communists' own guarantees), these
Western groups helped smooth China's transition to Communist rule.

The connection between the non-expulsion of Westerners and foreign
policy considerations is somewhat more dubious. On the one hand, the
Communists undoubtedly wanted to create the image of a reputable govern­
ment worthy of a place in the international diplomatic arena and especi­
ally in the United Nations. The outright expulsion of all Westerners, or
even of those who were of little practical use to the Communists (such as
missionaries engaged in purely religious rather than educational activi­
ties), could only have sullied this image. Whilst possibly being re­
strained from adopting a policy of expulsion, however, the Communists' sub­
sequent treatment of Westerners appears to have been largely independent
of immediate foreign policy considerations, as will be discussed below.

Overall, then, the Communists' treatment of any single group of
Westerners in China was the outcome of their association with the three,
sometimes conflicting, determinants of Communist policy - present
pragmatism, the reaction against past imperialism and the commitment to
future socialism. The significant differences in the treatment of par­
ticular groups of Westerners (for example economic and religious
interests) reflected to a large extent their relative usefulness to the
Communist authorities in the short term.

The Communists' actions resulting from these determinants belied the
predictions made by many Westerners on the eve of the Communist victory.
First, some Western commentators had posed a false dichotomy between
nationalism and communism, making the error of thinking that the Chinese
Communists must fit into either one category or the other. This error
was magnified by seeing the issue in a purely ideological context: if
the Chinese Communists were basically Marxist-Leninists and allied with
the Soviet Union they would be extremely hostile to the West and to Westerners in China; if they were not basically Communists but Chinese nationalists they might be better disposed towards the West and even to Westerners in China. In coming to this conclusion, commentators seriously underestimated the strength of Chinese anti-imperialism, regardless of political allegiances.

Second, many Western commentators had overestimated the connection between China's immediate foreign relations and the treatment of Westerners in China, initiating an interpretation of CCP policy that has remained influential right up to the present. This attitude was true both of Americans, who predicted that they would receive significantly worse treatment than other Westerners because of continuing American aid to the Nationalists, and of Britishers, who anticipated that their Government's relative aloofness from the confrontation might put them in a more favourable position and who urged speedy recognition of the new Government as a means of improving their prospects. In practice, the Communists' pressures on the Western presence - based fundamentally on anti-imperialism and the transition to socialism - were to a large extent independent of immediate foreign policy considerations. The representatives of individual countries, notably those of the United States and Britain, received relatively similar treatment: the Communists' pressures on the American presence (as distinct from the media rhetoric) were marginally, but not significantly, more severe than those on the British and other Westerners. Rather, the Americans were regarded by the Communists as only the most recent exponents of 'imperialist aggression' against China. In addition, the treatment both of Westerners overall and of the representatives of any one country varied to only a limited extent according to the changing state of international relations. Although the serious deterioration in Sino-Western relations following the outbreak of the Korean War - and especially China's entry into the war - certainly led to greater pressure on virtually all aspects of the remaining Western presence, this development was as much connected with the internal suppression of subversive elements as with the state of international relations as such. Overall, a more significant variable was the particular interest group to which the person belonged. Even additional variables within groups (for example, Protestant versus Catholic missionaries) were frequently more important than the Westerner's nationality.
The Makers and Implementers of Communist Policy

The basic guidelines for dealing with the Western presence in China, like those for other policies adopted by the new Government, were established by Mao Zedong. Mao had long been voluble about imperialist aggression against China but extremely vague about his intentions concerning the imperialist presence in China. But on 5 March 1949, after the takeover of Tianjin and Beijing and just before the final assault on Nanjing and Shanghai, Mao finally presented the guidelines for dealing with the remaining imperialist presence. His comments took up one section of a ten-section report delivered to the second plenary session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP. Although the Communists regarded this report, together with Mao's article of 30 June 1949 (On the People's Democratic Dictatorship), as forming the basis of the policies embodied in the Common Programme, it was not published in the Communist press at the time and Western commentators appear to have been unaware of its references to the imperialist presence. While playing no role for Westerners in clarifying Communist policy, it was virtually the only reasonably specific statement ever made by the Communists on their intentions concerning the remaining Western imperialist presence in China.

In his report, Mao acknowledged that the era of imperialist domination in China would be over with the fall of the Nationalists, but that, in practice, the 'economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists' were still there, as well as the 'diplomatic personnel and the journalists recognized by the Kuomintang.' Mao's guidelines for the treatment of these establishments clearly reflected the conflicting pressures operating on the Communists: the pragmatism of the present set against the imperialism of the past and the vision of a socialist society in the future. Whilst prescribing immediate and definite action against diplomatic establishments and 'imperialist propaganda agencies' (the former were to be denied legal status and the latter abolished), Mao allowed for a degree of flexibility regarding economic and cultural establishments. These would be 'allowed to exist for the time being,' he said, although they would be subject to the Communists' 'supervision and control.' At the same time he signalled their eventual demise when he stated quite clearly that they would be 'dealt with ... after country­wide victory.'

Any contradiction between this statement and the Communists' earlier guarantees of protection for various groups of foreign nationals and
their property was avoided, at least in theory, by drawing a distinction between the establishments of the imperialists and individual foreigners from the same imperialist countries. 'As for ordinary foreign nationals,' Mao stated, reiterating his earlier guarantee, 'their legitimate interests will be protected and not encroached upon.' This was repeated in the Common Programme of 29 September - the forerunner to the Constitution - which declared, inter alia: 'The People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall protect law-abiding foreign nationals in China.'

Whilst Mao established the basic guidelines for dealing with the Western presence, the implementation of the policy was in the hands of a number of senior CCP and government officials. At the central level, the figure most closely involved with the issue (as with many other government policies) was Zhou Enlai, in his capacity both as Premier and as Minister for Foreign Affairs. At local levels the policy was overseen by government heads (such as Mayor Chen Yi in Shanghai) but was more directly implemented by the directors of the municipal Alien Affairs Bureaux. The two major figures during the formative period, both in directing policy and in having contacts with Westerners - on the few occasions that these took place - were Zhang Hanfu, who was Director of Alien Affairs in Tianjin following the Communist victory and moved to Shanghai after the Communists took the city, and Huang Hua, Director of Alien Affairs in Nanjing and later in Shanghai. Both Zhang Hanfu and Huang Hua had close connections with Zhou Enlai and were later to become top members of his Foreign Ministry staff.

Many Western observers regarded the Chinese Communists and even their leaders as 'country bumpkins' who had had little experience of foreigners - either at home or abroad - and suggested that this was partly responsible for their allegedly contradictory and outrageous actions towards Westerners. Yet this was far from true of those who were dealing with the question of the Western presence at the top level. Zhou Enlai, Zhang Hanfu and Huang Hua had either travelled overseas for part of their education or had attended one of the Christian colleges; they had had frequent contacts with Western diplomats at Chongqing during the war and with Western journalists and American negotiators at Yan'an.

Best known to Western diplomats and journalists of all the Chinese Communists was Zhou Enlai. As the CCP representative at Chongqing during the war, and later as its major negotiator with the Nationalists and the Americans, Zhou had gained a reputation as a sophisticated,
Zhang Hanfu had worked as Zhou's aide at Chongqing where he was also editor-in-chief of the Communists' daily newspaper, *Xinhua ribao*. He spoke fluent English and in 1945 had visited the United States as one of two Communist aides at the Founding Conference of the United Nations. In July 1949 Zhang married Kong Pusheng who had even closer links with the West. A graduate in English from Yanjing University, she had a Masters degree in theology from Columbia, had worked at the United Nations in New York after the war, and was also to become a member of the Foreign Ministry. In August 1949, Zhang Hanfu was described by John Keswick, Chairman of the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce, as 'having a somewhat scholarly air and a by no means unpleasant personality ... he is impressive, in fact, about the only leader who has impressed me favourably since the takeover.' Like Zhang Hanfu, Huang Hua spoke fluent English and in 1936 had acted as an interpreter for Edgar Snow. He had studied at Yanjing University under John Leighton Stuart and had been one of the university's first students to join the Communists at Yan'an. Like Zhang, he had also worked with Zhou Enlai at Chongqing during the war and in 1944-1945 had served in Yan'an as the Communists' liaison officer to the US military mission and as their representative dealing with Western correspondents.

The major figure dealing with Westerners outside the immediate 'Zhou circle' was Chen Yi, the Mayor of Shanghai where much of the confrontation with the Western presence was to take place. A veteran army commander, Chen had previously had less contact with foreigners than the city's directors of Alien Affairs, Zhang Hanfu and later Huang Hua, although - like Huang Hua - he was later to be China's Foreign Minister. Like many other Communists, Chen had studied in France as a youth and in 1944, while at Yan'an, had become acquainted with American journalists and members of the US military mission. Diplomat John Paton Davies described Chen at that time as a man of 'commanding presence, evident vigor and determination.'

The personnel responsible for the policies carried out by individual government ministries - whether concerning economic, religious or educational matters - are less easily identifiable. Under the 'united front' government, a number of committees and ministries were headed by non-Party members. Literary figure, Guo Moruo, who was described as a 'non-partisan democrat,' was Chairman of the Culture and Education Committee, Ma Xulun (who belonged to the China Association for the Promotion of
Democracy) was Minister for Education, and Li Dequan (a member of the Guomindang Revolutionary Committee and the widow of Christian General Feng Yuxiang) Minister for Health. Although these people made public pronouncements on issues concerning Westerners (Li Dequan, for example, launched the vehement campaign against Catholic orphanages), they were often little more than 'front' spokesmen for the Communists. The real power in many cases was said to rest with Party men who sometimes acted as Vice-Ministers, such as Lu Dingyi and Chen Boda in the Culture and Education Committee, and Qian Junrui in the Ministry of Education.

Despite the fragmentation of policy implementation, what emerged was a consistent programme of pressure on all aspects of the Western presence, varying according to the basic elements already discussed. It is difficult to assess whether there was any dissension at high levels over this policy: that is, a radical or extremist attitude compared with a more moderate approach. Whilst there were certainly internal Party differences over a number of policy issues (for example, the nature and extent of the new Government's association with the Soviet Union), there would seem to have been fairly general agreement amongst the Communist leadership - and even amongst non-Communist members of the 'united front' government - that the remaining Western imperialist presence, and even the symbols of imperialism, should be eliminated from China.

What may have existed was some disagreement over the intensity and speed with which the process of elimination should be carried out. The policy that was adopted was a fairly gradualist, pragmatic one, and there were occasional signs that some Party officials and cadres wanted more drastic action; for example, the official expulsion of missionaries or the refusal to allow Christian colleges to accept foreign funding. Zhou Enlai put the brakes on such extreme action, pointing out that it was simply not in the country's immediate interests. But it would be wrong to classify Zhou as having a moderate policy. As the prime overseer of the elimination of the Western presence - as well as of the Government's overall domestic and foreign policies - Zhou saw the issue in its broader political and economic context and took every opportunity to utilize it accordingly. When more drastic action was taken during the Korean War, this was a product of the general ideological extremism of the period (both concerning foreign policy and the clampdown on divisive elements inside China) and not due to the ascendancy of more extremist elements in policy-making.
The implementation of Communist policy: Foreign nationals

The treatment of different Western interest groups in China varied considerably according to their involvement in the basic factors determining the Communists' policies and these groups will be discussed individually. Regardless of their activity in China, however, all individual Westerners came under the general heading of 'foreign nationals' whose protection Communist spokesmen continued to guarantee, in contrast to the stated intention to 'deal with' Western imperialist establishments. In practice, however, the distinction between the two categories quickly broke down as the Communists embarked on a programme of anti-imperialist, nationalist self-assertion. The proviso to the guarantee of protection - that foreign nationals must be 'law-abiding' - became more important than the guarantee itself and the authorities cloaked their anti-imperialist assaults on individual Westerners with a veneer of legality.

The basic regulation of foreign nationals, particularly controls on their residence and movement, was little different from procedures carried out by a number of other governments, especially socialist ones. All foreign nationals had to register with the authorities and receive a residence certificate, the basic document permitting them to live in China. Depending on the period of its validity, the certificate was subject to renewal every three, six or twelve months, and some of the last Westerners remaining in China in the mid-1950s would be subject to de facto expulsion when the authorities simply refused to renew their certificates. Within the designated city or town, foreign nationals were not permitted to change their place of residence without official approval; in theory, they were not even allowed to stay away from their place of residence overnight without permission.

A residence certificate entitled the foreigner only to reside in the designated city or town and a travel permit was necessary to leave it. Even the Summer Palace on the outskirts of Beijing and Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum were at times considered 'beyond limits'; the granting of permits to visit these scenic spots - and more particularly to visit other cities - was spasmodic and sometimes appeared arbitrary. For example, in September 1949 some American consular officials in Beijing received permission to visit Tianjin, but officials working in Tianjin were refused permits to travel in the opposite direction. Overall, travel permits were only infrequently granted, a restriction that particularly affected missionary work, and foreign nationals in general
were virtually immobilized. The Government also had complete control over the departure of foreign residents from China through the issuing of exit permits. Before obtaining the necessary permit, foreign nationals had first to advertise their intention to leave China in the local press to allow people with claims on them to come forward, and also find a guarantor in China for any future claims. These requirements could, and would, be utilized by the authorities to delay the departure - for two years or more - of some individual businessmen, missionaries and even consular officials.

It was the manner in which the regulations were implemented, rather than the regulations themselves, that demonstrated the underlying anti-imperialist motivation of the new authorities. The administration of Communist policy was in the hands of the local Alien Affairs Bureaux and the regulations were carried out by a number of government offices including the Public Security Bureau, the Customs Office and other departments which established special sections for foreign residents. Even the process of registration at the Public Security Bureau could be a daunting experience. Foreigners were questioned in detail, not just on their reasons for being in China, but on their Chinese friends, their income, and even their private lives. Prying interviewers asked such questions as 'what kind of books do you read?' 'do you smoke?' and even 'do you have a Chinese mistress?' The foreigner who gave facetious replies was met with blank stares and even accusations of arrogance, with constant stern reminders that the foreigner could no longer do as he pleased in China. Even more disconcerting to some Westerners were 'house calls' by officials from the Public Security Bureau. Just as the entry and occupation of rural mission compounds was to become commonplace, many urban Westerners were at some stage subjected to the experience of arriving home or at their office to find a number of officials either waiting to question them or going through their possessions.

The brusqueness, officiousness and sometimes plain inquisitiveness of minor officials - whether anti-imperialist trained Communist cadre or long-suffering Nationalist official (many of whom were retained by the new administration) - could to some extent be attributed to their sudden sense of personal power in the face of foreigners who had once thrown their weight around in China. But this was bolstered by a high level policy both of deliberately palming off foreigners - regardless of their 'status' - on to these minor officials, and of officially
encouraging the display of national self-assertion against what was seen as a century of imperialist aggression against China.

One early indication of this self-assertion policy was the official insistence on the use of the Chinese language in all communications between foreigners and the authorities. Although missionaries and some diplomatic and consular officials were normally trained in the Chinese language, many other Westerners had never learnt more than a few words of Chinese. 'Old China hands' who spent a working lifetime in China were particularly guilty on this score. For example, Hubert Collar, a representative of ICI and the wartime Chairman of the British Residents' Association in Shanghai, had been in China almost continuously since 1921 but readily admitted that he had only 'picked up a few words here and there.'

Since the earliest days of imperialism in China, English had been the main commercial language and foreigners frequently ridiculed Chinese people's sing-song intonation when they spoke English and their mistakes in pronunciation.

Now the tide had turned. Staff at the Radio Office who had previously used English refused to acknowledge questions directed to them unless they were in Chinese. One disgruntled foreigner complained to the North China Daily News that, in response to a simple query about sending a radiogram, an official had thrust a cardboard sign reading 'Speak Chinese Only' in his face and his colleagues had laughed loudly and puffed out their chests. In such situations, foreigners who could not communicate in Chinese had to provide their own interpreters. The policy of using Chinese was uniform at all levels. When John Keswick met Director of Alien Affairs, Zhang Hanfu, on 29 August 1949, the interview was conducted through an interpreter. Keswick knew that Zhang had a reputation for talking volubly in fluent English and later commented that, although Zhang spoke no English during the interview, he 'did not bother to hide that he understood it.'

The same policy was applied to written communications. All letters, whether sent within China or abroad, had to be addressed in Chinese characters, with the addition of an English-language address being permitted if the recipient was a foreign national or if the letter was being sent overseas. Similarly, Customs documents - previously processed in English - were henceforth to be printed and processed in Chinese. This meant the instant redundancy of the 140 foreign Customs employees who, in the words of the newspaper, Wenhuibao, were 'voluntarily resigning and
applying for permits to return to their native countries. Even foreign-owned or operated economic enterprises were not immune. The American, British and French-owned public utilities of Shanghai were directed by the Public Utility Department to use only the Chinese language on all customer accounts.

Whilst many foreigners expressed annoyance at what appeared to them to be petty and niggling measures, the Chinese asserted that they were designed 'to uphold China's national prestige' and that they symbolized the beginning of a new era of national independence. According to Wenhuibao, the continued use of English even on electricity accounts 'betrayed a strong sense of colonial influence.' In a highly sensitive frame of mind with few thoughts of common international practice, the new authorities were in no mood to take heed of ostensibly rational arguments such as that presented by the North China Daily News. Attempting to meet the Chinese on their own ground, rather than simply condemning their attitude as did many disgruntled foreigners, the newspaper argued that the use of a number of languages in establishments such as the Post Office was not a denial of national spirit but merely an efficient way of doing things.

The Communists' policy of national self-assertion put all individual Westerners in a vulnerable position, particularly since the distinction which they officially made - and continued to make - between ordinary foreign nationals and representatives of the imperialists was virtually non-existent in practice. Indeed, by breaking a regulation or being involved in a small incident, foreigners became not just minor law violators but personal symbols of a century of imperialist aggression against China. Whilst there were spasmodic incidents between Chinese and foreigners in Tianjin and Beijing after the Communists' victories in January 1949, it was in Shanghai that foreigners were the most susceptible. There was probably little chance of avoiding at least some outbreaks of hostility towards the foreign population of the city - the focus of the imperialist presence in China - especially with the people constantly being told that they were now the 'masters of China.' Rather than either ignoring or officially controlling such outbreaks, the authorities took the opportunity to channel the hostility - and ever to exacerbate it - by blowing up minor incidents for their own political purposes.

Within just three weeks of the Communist victory in Shanghai, the new leadership embarked on a programme to wipe out what it saw as a
century of 'national humiliation,' belying the excuse made by some Communist sympathizers that the delays in establishing contacts with Western residents were due simply to administrative unpreparedness. During the first phase of the programme in mid-June 1949, Shanghai newspapers featured a series of articles about individual foreigners involved in minor incidents and accidents with Chinese residents: an American who refused to pay a pedicab driver and set his dog loose on him, a dispute between a German dyeworks employer and a Chinese worker over some bolts of cloth, an alleged assault by the Norwegian manager of the British-owned United Brewery on a Chinese employee. Like these incidents, accidents involving foreigners and Chinese - often due as much to the chaotic traffic conditions as to the guilt of any one party - were blamed completely on the foreigner, as when a French motorist knocked over and injured a PLA officer riding a bicycle and a British estate agent's car ran into a pregnant Chinese woman.

Regardless of the 'crime,' the accused foreigners were uniformly endowed by the press with the crude stereotype of the foreign imperialist: arrogant, often drunk and treating the Chinese as inferior beings. 'The nationals of all the imperialist countries have from beginning to end considered the Chinese people to be in a class lower than themselves, before whom they may display an air of superiority as they please,' declared a press editorial entitled 'Please stop acting like overlords.' Despite the vehement rhetoric, the accused persons were usually let off with a stiff reprimand after they had confessed their guilt, published apologies in the press, and paid compensation to their victims.

The second phase of the assertion programme developed into a highly-organized and widely publicized campaign. It was the first Communist campaign involving foreigners which utilized techniques that soon became familiar in dealing with both foreign and Chinese recalcitrants: the use of individuals as personalized targets or negative models to discredit the group they represented - in this case 'foreign imperialists.' The earlier incidents (which continued intermittently during the second phase) had involved a fairly random collection of individuals of various nationalities with the authorities seizing upon, rather than creating, opportunities for adverse publicity. In contrast, the individuals singled out for more intensive press coverage and criticism were representatives of the two major imperialist powers in China - Britain and the United States.
During the latter part of June 1949 - and in some cases extending through to September - Shanghai's newspaper readers were treated to the continuing sagas of what became known as the Matheson, Olive and Gould cases. Admittedly the authorities did not have to look far for suitable incidents to 'blow up' into major cases. While the progressive China Weekly Review warned foreign residents that they would have to be particularly careful in their behaviour, to the point of bending over backwards to avoid being involved in ugly incidents, many foreigners in Shanghai - unused to bowing to Chinese authority - were easily provoked when faced with the new assertiveness and abrasive manner of minor officials and even their own Chinese employees.

When Bill Matheson, a British inspector of the Shanghai Tramway Co, refused on 20 June to extend a Chinese inspector's sick leave, he became involved in a scuffle with the man who was allegedly knocked to the ground and injured. An even more inviting target (at least to the local authorities) was William Olive, a United States vice-consul, who was accused of driving his car into a public rally on 6 July and of refusing to stop when ordered to do so by a traffic policeman. During a subsequent interrogation at the Public Security Bureau, Olive initially refused to identify himself and became involved in a fist fight with his questioners. Both Matheson and Olive were detained by the police. Matheson was held for over a week and released only when the Manager of the Shanghai Tramway Co apologized for the incident and promised to discharge him; Olive spent almost three days in gaol and was finally released after making a public apology for his behaviour and guaranteeing that he would not repeat 'such errors.' The third major case, involving American Randall Gould (editor of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury), was basically a labour dispute over Gould's attempt to close down the paper following the censorship of an article he wrote and will be discussed later in this study. The case became associated with the other two in the Shanghai press when Gould allegedly beat up some workers who called at his apartment on 2 July. Following a hearing at police headquarters, Gould issued a public apology.

The Matheson, Olive and Gould cases were grouped together in the Chinese media to illustrate the continuing misdemeanours of foreign imperialists and to warn that such behaviour would not be tolerated in liberated China. 'All is not well with imperialism,' proclaimed a poem published in the evening newspaper Xinmin wanbao on 12 July:
You
Oliver, Matheson and Gould
Shall be summarily told:

You, you and you
You have been in Shanghai
Putting on high and mighty airs
Violating law and order;
Now that you are stopped
Is it not to be expected? ...

When the tables are turned,
We Chinese have no further need for you knaves.
Imperialists beware,
All is not well with you any more.76

As with the earlier incidents, the main characteristics attributed to the three men were those of the traditional foreign imperialist stereotype: arrogance, highhandedness and particularly the display of physical violence towards Chinese people whom they were said to regard as inferior beings.77 The portrayal of the foreigner as a large, gross and even barbaric character was exemplified in a press report of the arrest of Matheson on 23 June: 'During the arrest, the handcuffs which were to be used on Matheson were found to be inadequate in view of the bulky size of the man, and ropes were used instead to bind him up.'78 The arrest had, in fact, taken place at 11.30am at the Shanghai Tramway Co's central office and even the Chinese press report gave no indication that Matheson had offered any resistance.79

The rhetoric of the press reports on the incidents sometimes seemed petty and even childish. But the self-assertion campaign served a number of practical purposes. First, it was a strong warning to foreign residents and their governments alike that the Communists meant business when they said that the Chinese were now masters in their own country, a sentiment reiterated at the highest official levels. In his report of 3 August 1949 on the work of the Shanghai Military Control Commission, Mayor Chen Yi referred to the punishment of 'certain foreigners' for violating the laws and regulations of the Government. 'The period of the imperialists' enjoying special rights in China has disappeared with the downfall of the Kuomintang reactionaries,' he declared. 'Foreigners would do well to bear in mind this fact. If their memories are bad, it is timely and necessary that I take this opportunity to remind them once again.'80

There is no denying the strength of the Communists' anti-imperialist, nationalist sentiments. 'Our nation will never again be an insulted
nation,' declared Mao in September 1949. But at the same time the Communists astutely utilized Chinese nationalism in their bid to gain the support of the population, particularly in bourgeois Shanghai where suspicion of the Communists' socialist motives was still running high. The Communists' tough words - if limited measures - against the city's resident imperialists demonstrated to the population that China was at last going to have a government which was able to take firm and decisive action, not just against the current representatives of imperialism in China, but against a whole century of imperialist aggression. 'Nothing of a like nature has ever taken place during the last 100 years,' proclaimed Xinmin wanbao when commenting on the public apologies made by the accused. The newspaper contrasted the Communists' firm actions against those of the Nationalists whom it maintained 'would do anything to please foreigners' and under whose rule had occurred such insults to the Chinese people as the infamous Beijing rape case. Now the tables had turned. 'No longer is China a colony, or the Chinese people the slaves and beasts of burden of the foreign imperialists.'

Whilst the authorities seized on the opportunities presented by the anti-imperialist sentiments in the city, not everyone in Shanghai was badly disposed towards the foreigner. As the focus and centre of a century's interaction between Chinese and foreigners, Shanghai probably had the country's most pro-foreign as well as its most anti-foreign elements. This ambivalent attitude towards foreigners and the West - sometimes present even in the one individual - was to come to the surface when the authorities attempted to suppress Western culture, especially American movie films. The self-assertion campaign was therefore also part of a general effort completely to discredit the resident foreign imperialist in the eyes of those Chinese still strongly influenced by - and inclined towards - the West.

Effects and Reactions
The stringent regulations imposed on foreign nationals and, more particularly, the widely-publicized incidents in Shanghai, had a speedy effect on attitudes towards remaining in China under the Communists. On 26 July 1949 - barely a month after the Communists' entry into Shanghai - the US Consul-General reported from the city that the incidents had 'dampened any initial enthusiasm' with which the foreign community may have regarded its future under Communist rule. Far from protecting foreign
nationals, as the Communists had promised, they had allegedly embarked on a 'systematic plan to humiliate foreigners.'\textsuperscript{66} Although some of the major representatives of the imperialist presence, in particular missionaries and British businessmen, thought of their spiritual or material interests, gritted their teeth and initially resolved to carry on, many other people - especially Americans - who had earlier decided to 'wait and see' quickly decided that they had seen enough.

As early as mid-July, Western governments - led by the United States - began planning to send relief ships to Shanghai to evacuate those of their nationals who wanted to leave China. The imposition of a sea blockade in late June by the Nationalists (it included Shanghai but did not reach north as far as Tianjin) only made foreign residents more jittery and the task of evacuating them more difficult. After securing the agreement of both the Nationalists and the Communists, the American President Line ship, General Gordon, eventually arrived in Shanghai and on 25 September evacuated some 1,220 foreigners (including 365 Americans and 161 Britishers).\textsuperscript{67} The General Gordon was followed in October by one French and two British ships which between them evacuated almost another 800 foreigners.\textsuperscript{88}

At this stage the Communist authorities generally granted the desired exit permits, at least to those people whose presence it had no particular wish to retain in China; eighteen key American businessmen were refused permission to leave on the General Gordon,\textsuperscript{89} setting a foreboding precedent for the larger British business presence if and when it decided to leave as well. While usually granting permits, however, the authorities did not make the departure of any Westerner an easy matter and abrasive officials took every opportunity further to annoy and castigate the increasingly frustrated foreigner. Even to apply for an exit permit, foreigners had to queue up very early in the morning - with an interpreter if they did not speak Chinese - often only to be sent away either for further documentation (if they were sufficiently advanced in the queue) or to be told to return the next day. The prescribed advertising of the intention to leave China gave servants and other employees the opportunity to make extravagant claims which had to be settled before a permit would be granted. After the foreigner was notified that the application was successful - regular lists of successful applicants appeared in the official press - he or she again had to go through a lengthy process at the Public Security Bureau to obtain the permit.
On departure, brusque Customs officials made thorough searches of most people's luggage, sometimes even ripping out the linings of suitcases. 'I have never been so thankful for anything in my life as I am to be here,' wrote a former UNRRA employee on board the General Gordon after it finally left Shanghai. 'Don't let anyone fool you about Communism.'

Although isolated incidents between Chinese and individual foreigners continued throughout the early Communist period, the utilization of these incidents by the authorities was limited basically to the campaign in Shanghai in the three to four months immediately following their victory. More persistent were their general pressures on Westerners, particularly heavy taxation, which created major problems for business enterprises and missionary establishments (these will be discussed separately), community institutions and individual property-owners alike. Western-run social clubs, hospitals, schools and even the Holy Trinity Cathedral all complained that they were being taxed out of existence.

Taxation pressures, together with the departure of large numbers of Westerners (there was another general exodus following the decision of the US Government in January 1950 to withdraw its remaining consular representation from China), caused a drastic change in the appearance and social activities of the foreign community. Performances of the Amateur Dramatic Club declined to the point where the Lyceum Theatre was regularly being rented out to Chinese organizations. The ADC's 1949-1950 season was described as one of the most difficult in its eighty-three year history; the concluding performance for the season in May 1950 - Terence Ratigan's Playbill - ran for only two nights. The once prosperous social clubs were all operating at a loss and bordering on bankruptcy, despite drastic measures such as that of the formerly 'exclusive' Country Club which decided to admit Chinese members to swell its dwindling ranks. There were even suggestions that the clubs should be amalgamated into a single international club. But the Shanghai Club - 'a very sacred affair' for the upper British echelon as an American doctor put it - clung to its independence in spite of the changing times. 'If Chinese, Americans and women members are allowed in, some of the "old timers" are likely to have a fit,' predicted the doctor.

With British business attempting to salvage its worsening position - at least until about April 1950 - compared with the speedy decision of American business interests to attempt to leave China, the British became even more dominant in Shanghai's foreign community. British
community leaders such as John Keswick of Jardine Matheson and W.J. (Billy) Hawkings, Chairman of the British Residents' Association, presided over annual get-togethers of organizations such as the St Andrew's Society, hosted weddings in the absence of relatives, and attended the round of farewell parties. In the words of an English lawyer, the British 'were taking a proper lead in keeping up the morale of the foreign community.' Their daily newspaper, the *North China Daily News*, admitted that the new atmosphere of general austerity, as well as the declining foreign population, was having a severe effect on Shanghai's social life. But its social page - virtually the only part of the newspaper which was not heavily censored - did its best to keep the old spirit alive. On 25 June 1950 - the day the Korean War began - it featured a large report on the opening of the 'summer season' at the Cercle Sportif de Shanghai. Men in white dinner jackets and women resplendent in ball gowns had danced on the terrace, it reported with some nostalgia, and the occasion had acquired 'some of the glamour and gaiety for which in past days Shanghai was famous all over the world.'
Notes

1 Mao, Opening address at the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 21 September 1949, Renmin ribao, 22 September 1949.

2 Article 3, Common Programme..., Renmin ribao, 30 September 1949. This statement was essentially identical to that made by Mao in 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' on 25 December 1947 (see p.15). The official English translations, however, are sometimes slightly different, exchanging the words 'abolish' with 'do away with' and 'special privileges' with 'prerogatives.' In Chinese the terminology was identical: 'quxia... tequan.' For English translations, see, for example, Daily News Release, 30 September 1949, 144; Mao, 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks,' Selected Works, IV, 167.


5 Meisner, Mao's China, p.90.


7 For details of how this was carried out in the economic field, see Dorothy J. Solinger, 'Socialist goals and capitalist tendencies in Chinese commerce, 1949-1952,' Modern China, 6:2 (April 1980), 197-224.


10 Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p.74.


12 Foreign economic interests (in 1913 some 33 percent of the capital of private Russian companies was foreign-owned) had been confiscated as part of the new Soviet Government's general nationalization programme. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. (London: Allen Lane, 1969), pp.18, 89.

13 Feuerwerker, 'Relating to the international community,' p.52.


16 Mao, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship,' Selected Works, IV, 422.

17 ibid., 411-24.


19 ibid., 363.

20 According to Gittings, The World and China, p.166, no original text exists for this report. It is therefore not cited in Takeuchi Minoru, chief compiler, Mao Zedong Ji [Collected writings of Mao Zedong], 10 vols, (Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1970-1976). The report was, however, apparently broadcast over the Communists' Xinhua (North Shaanxi) radio station on 24 March 1949; the most significant part of the report, Mao's statement that the centre of gravity of Party work had shifted from the countryside to the cities, was subsequently commented on during 1949-1950 by Western writers. See Stuart to Secretary of State, 6 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 369; S.B. Thomas, 'Government and administration in China today,' Pacific Affairs: 23:3 (September 1950), 250. (More recent commentators have cited the printed version in Volume IV of Mao's Selected Works which first appeared in 1960.) Somewhat surprisingly, there is no record in Foreign Relations of the United States of American diplomatic officials in Nanjing, Beijing or Guangzhou remarking on the report, even though they frequently commented on significant Xinhua (North Shaanxi) radio broadcasts in cables to the State Department. Even if part of the speech concerning the shifting of the Party's activities was broadcast, however, it is possible that the section concerning the Communists' intended treatment of the Western presence was excluded, since the Communists normally preferred to keep Westerners in the dark about their intentions concerning their future.

21 Mao, 'Report to the second plenary session...,' Selected Works, IV, 370-71.

22 ibid., 370.

23 Article 59, Common Programme..., Renmin ribao, 30 September 1949.


26 ibid., I, 29. Kong Pusheng was the sister of Kong Peng, who was married to Qiao Guanhua. All worked on Zhou Enlai's staff in the Foreign Ministry after the establishment of the People's Republic.

27 CAMC, 49/G/61, 29 September 1949.

Chen Yi was concurrently Chairman of the Shanghai Military Control Commission.


Memorandum by Davies, 27 December 1944, *FRUS*, 1944, VI, 753.

The Culture and Education Committee (one of the four government committees) had under its wing the Ministries of Culture, Education and Public Health, the Academy of Sciences, and the News and Publications Administration.


See pp.285-86.


ibid., I, 183.

These differences came to a peak in the Northeast where Gao Gang developed strong political ties with the Soviet Union which continued to exert strong influence in the area. Gao was purged from the CCP in February 1954. On the Gao Gang affair, see Meisner, *Mao's China*, pp.130-32.

See p.120.

See, for example, statements by General Li Tao, a spokesman for the People's Liberation Army general headquarters, and Ke Bainian, who had headed the Foreign Affairs Research Office at Yan'an in 1946-1949 and later became a prominent diplomat. *China Digest*, 14 June 1949, 11; 2 November 1949, 9.

Regulations were published in the local presss soon after the Communists' arrival in the major cities. See, for example, *Jiefang ribao*, 30 May 1949 (*CPR*, no.901, 29-31 May 1949); *Dagongbao*, 1 June 1949 (*CPR*, no.912, 1 June 1949); *Dagongbao*, 15 June 1949 (*CPR*, no. 912, 15 June 1949). The regulations as implemented in Shanghai and Beijing respectively are described by Rossi, *The Communist Conquest of Shanghai*, pp.79-81; Bodde, *Peking Diary*, pp.145, 175, 219-20. That the same basic regulations were applied in cities with smaller foreign populations is apparent from a report on the 112 foreign nationals remaining in Fuzhou in *Dagongbao*, 22 September 1949 (*CPR*, no.976, 22 September 1949); interview with David Morrell (Assistant Manager, Butterfield & Swire, Xiamen, 1949-1951), 22 July 1979.

Smyth to Secretary of State, 12 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1109. See also Bodde, *Peking Diary*, p.175.

See pp.168-69.

See p.297.
gonganju. Also translated as Public Safety Bureau.


See, for example, Garrett, 'Discovering China,' p.122; Kidd, *All the Emperor's Horses*, pp.156-58; interview with David Middleditch (Trading Department, Jardine Matheson, Shanghai), 21 August 1979.

When Fulbright fellow Derk Bodde was interviewed in Beijing for his residence certificate, for example, he identified his four interviewers as holdovers from the former administration, while he assumed that a fifth man sitting behind him in a corner was a Communist cadre. Bodde, *Peking Diary*, p.220.

This complaint was the most common amongst businessmen. See pp.142-43.

Interview with Hubert Collar, 7 August 1979.

*NCDN*, 18 June 1949.

CAMC, 49/G/61, 29 September 1949. cf. CAF, J.A. Blackwood, Butterfield & Swire, Shanghai, to John Swire & Sons, London, 1 September 1949: 'Great stress has been put on the use of Chinese in all negotiations.'


ibid.


*NCDN*, 19 June 1949.

In April 1949, Derk Bodde recorded in his diary: 'Suspicion of foreigners seems to be growing, and annoying incidents have been reported.' In May he stated: 'There have been some unpleasant incidents here lately.' Bodde, *Peking Diary*, pp.145, 174. On Tianjin, see van der Sprenkel, ed., *New China: Three Views*, pp.24-25.

'He is also pleasant to learn that other cities under Communist rule are not experiencing the same difficulties as Shanghai.' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 July 1949, 97.


ibid. See also *Jiefang ribao*, 15 June 1949 (CPR, no.912, 15 June 1949).

63 Jiefang ribao, 19 June 1949 (CPR, no.915, 18-20 June 1949).
64 Dagongbao, 28 June 1949 (CPR, no.921, 28 June 1949). For comments on the incidents by the American Consul-General in Shanghai, see Cabot to Secretary of State, 16 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1166-67; Cabot to Secretary of State, 26 June 1949, ibid., 1184-86.
66 An exception was the case of Frenchman, G. Herrgesell. In addition to the payment of compensation for medical care and replacing the man's bicycle and clothing (see note 63 above), he was sentenced to fifteen days' hard labour. Jiefang ribao, 19 June 1949 (CPR, no.915, 18-20 June 1949).
67 The use of campaign techniques against elements of the Western presence was highly developed during the Korean War. See chapter 9.
70 There were reports in Beijing that the Central Government was displeased with the action of the Shanghai authorities in this case. For more details of the Olive case (in association with the denial of diplomatic and consular privileges), see pp.248-49.
71 Jiefang ribao, 8 July 1949 (CPR, no.927, 7-8 July 1949).
72 Dagongbao, 3 July 1949 (CPR, no.925, 2-5 July 1949).
73 World culture, 15 July 1949 (CPR, no.934, 19 July 1949).
74 For details of the labour dispute involving Gould, see pp.130-31.
75 Jiefang ribao, 5 July 1949 (CPR, no.925, 2-5 July 1949). For Gould's version of the incident, see Gould, 'Shanghai during the takeover, 1949,' 190. See also Cabot to Secretary of State, 5 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1195-96.
76 Xinmin wanbao, 12 July 1949 (CPR, no.932, 15 July 1949).
77 See, for example, Jiefang ribao, 8 July 1949 (CPR, no.927, 7-8 July 1949); Xinmin wanbao, 13 July 1949 (CPR, no.932, 15 July 1949); World culture, 15 July 1949 (CPR, no.934, 19 July 1949).
78 Shangbao, 26 June 1949 (CPR, no.920, 25-27 June 1949).
79 ibid.
80 China Weekly Review, 20 August 1949, 221. In publishing the full translated report, the editor of the China Weekly Review expressed his opinion that it was 'important reading ... as a record of the past two momentous months.' ibid., p.219.
81 Opening address at the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 21 September 1949, Renmin ribao, 22 September 1949.

Xinmin wanhao, 13 July 1949 (CPR, no.932, 15 July 1949).

See pp.218-19.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 26 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1184. See also New York Times, 11 July 1949.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 7 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1201.

NCDN, 26 September 1949. For details of the evacuation plans, see FRUS, 1949, IX, 1261-1353.

NCDN, 11, 18 October 1949.

See pp.138-39.

Beck, 'My life in China,' entry for 25 September 1949. This entry contains a detailed description of the procedures involved in obtaining an exit permit.


See p.253. This time the US Government and the American President Lines failed to obtain the Nationalists' approval for the General Gordon to come to Shanghai and those people wishing to leave Shanghai had to travel first by rail to Tianjin. NCDN, 13, 14, 16, 27 April 1950.

NCDN, 14 May 1950.

Stephen Garrett, a lawyer for British Shell and Chairman of the Country Club, later wrote: 'We opened the doors to all nationalities and even, let it be recorded, to Chinese.' Garrett, 'Discovering China,' p.126. See also CAB, no.48, 20 May 1950.

Dunlap, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, p.58.

See chapter 5.

For details of these social activities, see the 'Roundabout' column of the NCDN.

Garrett, 'Discovering China,' p.127.

NCDN, 30 April 1950.
NCDN, 25 June 1950. The newspaper's report the following day on the outbreak of the war led to a three-day suspension. See p.209.
Unlike ordinary foreign nationals, for whom the Communists did not prescribe any discriminatory action - at least in theory - the major Western interest groups in China were all subject to a specific discriminatory policy. According to Mao, economic and cultural establishments (which included missionary institutions and covered the bulk of Westerners' activities in China) were to be allowed to exist for the time being, subject to official supervision and control, and 'dealt with' following country-wide victory.\(^1\) Whilst the Communists' treatment of particular establishments varied - mainly in accordance with their immediate pragmatic considerations - they began putting strong pressures on all aspects of the Western economic and cultural presence as soon as they came to power. These pressures resulted first from their underlying anti-imperialism, and second from the increasing role of the state in economic and cultural activities.

The pressures exerted on Western business enterprises, in particular, appeared to some observers from hindsight to have been relatively mild in the first year to eighteen months of Communist rule. This was especially the case with British establishments. Frank Moraes, for example, stated in 1954: 'The government appeared to be willing to trade with them [British business houses in China], and on the whole it had treated them fairly until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. From then on the Communists' attitude had grown progressively lukewarm and then hostile.'\(^2\) Contemporary sources reveal a different picture.\(^3\) Most of the pressures on Western business which Evan Luard, for example, associates basically with the period of the Korean War - the increasing role of the state in their activities (including control of the market for raw materials and finished products), heavy taxation and the enforced employment of redundant labour (resulting in the need for large remittances from abroad) and the refusal to permit unprofitable enterprises to close down - were exerted from the early months of Communist rule.\(^4\)

Indeed, even before the outbreak of the Korean War, British businessmen - representing the major foreign investors in China - reached a state of desperation following a variety of futile efforts to salvage their position. 'Their ability to continue in business is at an end,'
declared the frustrated Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce in April 1950.\(^5\) Like the managers of large American firms who had even more quickly become disillusioned and tried to withdraw from China, the continued activities of British business in mid-1950 were mainly due, not to optimism about their economic prospects, but to their inability to extricate themselves from China.

Certainly, in dealing with economic interests more than with any other aspect of the Western presence, the Communists were influenced by immediate pragmatic considerations, both before and following their victory. But these considerations did not have as positive an effect as some Western commentators had predicted.\(^6\) First, the assurances made to Western business before the assumption of power - assurances that Western representatives gradually realized were not going to be fulfilled - were basically part of a fairly successful attempt to prevent business firms from abandoning their investments before the Communists' arrival. Similarly, the relatively favourable treatment initially accorded to the Kailan Mining Administration in early 1949 was probably calculated to impress Western industrialists in Shanghai and prevent them from leaving China and perhaps even sabotaging their investments before departure.\(^7\)

Second, the Communists' pragmatism meant that, whilst most Western enterprises were permitted to carry on their activities (indeed they were forced to do so even if they wished to close down), they were at the same time subjected to heavy pressures associated with the authorities' attempts to overcome the immediate economic problems they were facing - in addition to pressures resulting from the Communists' anti-imperialism and the increasing role of the state in activities previously performed by private enterprise.

The Economic Environment

When the Communists came to power, the urban economy was in a state of collapse, the product of a decade of warfare (the Sino-Japanese War followed by the Civil War) as well as the Nationalists' corruption and ineptitude. Industrial production was approximately half its pre-war level; communications were in a state of disarray, affecting transport and internal trade; unemployment in the cities, swollen by refugees, was at a high level.\(^8\) Worst of all, the inflation that had gathered momentum in the post-war period had persisted following the Nationalists' last-ditch currency reform of August 1948. The gold yuan, issued originally
at four to US$1, had by February 1949 fallen to 2,660 to US$1 and by late April, as the Communists took Nanjing and prepared for the assault on Shanghai, to 205,000. On the eve of the Communist entry into Shanghai in late May, the market rate for the yuan had reached over 23 million to US$1.

The economic malaise inherited by the Communists was only aggravated by new problems. First, floods during 1949 - reportedly the worst since 1931 - caused severe food problems for the cities, especially Shanghai. Second, on 26 June 1949 - just one month after the Communists' victory in Shanghai - the Nationalists instituted a sea and air blockade of the China coast. With the exception of a few shipments by American and British blockade runners in September-November 1949, the blockade brought an almost complete halt to trade between the outside world and Chinese ports from Shanghai to Fuzhou for almost a year. The effects, in particular on industry and commerce in Shanghai, were immediate and crippling. Industrial production slowed down even further and in some instances ceased altogether because of power and raw material shortages; the virtual extinction of the import-export trade affected not only traders but associated shipping, banking and insurance activities.

Tianjin, like other northern ports, was outside the Nationalists' range and even experienced a temporary boom when a number of Shanghai-based exporters shifted their operations to the city. But the limited rail facilities and the additional expense of transporting goods meant that only a trickle of the normal trade was being conducted.

On their assumption of power, the Communists had two major, associated aims regarding the economy. One was economic rehabilitation. Mao forecast that China's economic recovery would take about three years - or a little longer. The initial major priorities were to establish fiscal and financial stability, to restore communications, and to revive industrial output - a task made particularly difficult by the blockade.

The Communists' second major economic aim, even during the rehabilitation period, was to extend and consolidate the state's control over the economy; in the Communists' own words, to coordinate and regulate all components of the economy - including private enterprise - under the leadership of the state-owned economy. Although the period 1949-1951 has conventionally been seen as one of cooperation between the Government and the private sector - tantamount even to a 'honeymoon' -
right from the start the Communists exerted control over the private sector, paving the way for what they described as 'the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce.' Their economic measures included the regulation of foreign trade and increased state participation in trading activities, as well as the extension of control over the supply of raw materials, markets and labour conditions.

The implementation of this dual economic policy - rehabilitation and the initial steps towards state control - affected both Chinese and foreign enterprises. But the Communists' anti-imperialism and their goal of eliminating Western business (even while utilizing its continuing presence) - compared with the intention to permit Chinese private enterprise to continue at least in the short term - led to the discriminatory treatment of Western businesses. In continuing to espouse the official line that they were not discriminating against foreigners, the Communists put the blame for the problems being experienced by Westerners squarely on the Nationalist blockade. Whilst the blockade was certainly partly responsible for the Communists' harsh measures, their fairly uniform pressures on Western enterprises were applied before the blockade commenced (notably in Tianjin and especially on the Kailan Mining Administration in the first half of 1949) and continued after it lifted, and were also applied outside the blockade - again particularly in Tianjin.

The Rehabilitation of the Economy and Western Enterprise

In pursuing their first goal - that of rehabilitating the economy - the Communists undertook a number of measures which either directly or indirectly affected Western enterprises. First, in attacking inflation (by mid-1950 it had successfully been brought under control) they instituted a deflationary policy which included heavy taxation. The vigorous measures both to extend the scope of taxation and to collect it promptly were major factors in stabilizing the currency but they imposed a heavy burden on Western enterprises which were particularly vulnerable because of their outside sources of funds.

Although a uniform national system of taxation was not inaugurated until February 1950, foreign enterprises and individuals alike were confronted with a bevy of taxes almost as soon as the Communists came to power. These ranged from a commodity tax of 100 percent (later increased to 120 percent) on imported wines to a motor car tax of approximately £60
per quarter; but the two taxes which proved most burdensome were business and land tax. In July 1949 the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce complained that the problem of taxation was 'developing seriously' following reports from foreign firms outside Shanghai that a levy (described as an 'income and business tax') had been imposed on Chinese and foreign businesses. In some cases the levy was retrospective; an amount of £800,000 imposed on Tianjin businesses covered the six-month period July-December 1948 before the Communists took the city, and the £200,000 concurrently levied in Hankou (occupied by the Communists in May 1949) covered January-June 1949. Foreign firms usually received a joint share of the total levy, to be divided amongst them according to presumed ability to pay and business done in the period prior to assessment. According to a number of reports, they were being heavily discriminated against in comparison with Chinese firms.

Many firms predicted that they might well be crippled by the levy but there appeared to be no alternative but to meet the authorities' demands. Failure to pay on time incurred a penalty of up to double the tax for twenty days' delay, possible refusal of registration and even the expropriation of property. In response to complaints about the levy, the Tianjin authorities stated that firms 'must pay first and appeal afterwards.' On 12 July, three days before the payments fell due in Tianjin and Hankou, the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce telegraphed the China Association in London: 'Our view is that the regional authorities in the majority of ports mean business and there is no option but to pay under protest or to suffer penalties.'

With trade in Shanghai at a virtual standstill because of the blockade and the authorities courting the city's Chinese private entrepreneurs in an effort to save the urban economy from collapse, business tax was imposed more gradually in the city. Comparatively moderate regulations were issued on 12 August 1949, only to be superseded by new regulations on 16 January 1950 which, in a strenuous effort to control inflation, increased taxation by 30-100 percent. The methods of collection and control were as rigorous as those in other cities; late payments were subject to an additional levy and in March 1950 taxation inspectors paid 'visits' to many foreign firms which resulted in numerous allegations of tax evasion. In Shanghai it was the imposition of a new land tax, inaugurated in August 1949, that proved most debilitating. Huge increases in the assessed value of land and in the rate of taxation
marked the beginning of the squeeze on Shanghai's foreign property owners which eventually led many of them (particularly those with unproductive property) to bankruptcy. According to the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce, the land tax had by mid-1950 already 'proved ruinous' to a number of Western business enterprises as well as to cultural and charitable institutions.22

The second major economic pressure on Western enterprises arose out of the Communists' attempt to stabilize wages and thus gain the support of workers in restoring production. As protection against continuing inflation, the authorities linked wages to a basic commodity: millet in the north and rice in Shanghai.29 This policy proved extremely burdensome to employers in Shanghai when, during the summer of 1949, a scarcity of rice in the city (caused by the Nationalist blockade and floods in Jiangsu and Anhui) forced the price of rice up to the equivalent of £170 per ton, almost four times the world price.30 Because the exchange rate was not adjusted at the same pace, factory wages escalated from the equivalent of about £2.10.0 per month at the time of Shanghai's takeover in May to about £15 per month in August,31 a situation which proved crippling to those firms which were already dependent on remittances from overseas to remain solvent.32

These rising wage levels would not have been so ruinous had businesses been able to retrench labour. With external trade at a standstill and many factories idle, particularly because of the depletion of raw material stocks (in September 1949 Shanghai's factories were reportedly operating at only 30-40 percent of post-war production levels),33 many firms found themselves with large numbers of superfluous employees. 'Two or three hundred clerks sat around our offices with virtually nothing to do,' commented a British Shell lawyer in Shanghai.34 But employers were unable to dismiss workers. On the contrary, they became targets for strident demands from current employees for wage rises and supplementary benefits, and even from former employees for reinstatement or severance pay.

'Labour is employing mob tactics to enforce demands for increased wages and employment of superfluous staff,'35 reported the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce on 4 July, while the British Consul-General in Tianjin informed the Foreign Office on 28 July: 'Foreign employers of labour are at the mercy of labour unions who appear at present to be quite out of hand and at liberty to subject employers to daily humiliation
and blackmail. When verbal discussions with employers proved unproductive, workers resorted to more extreme measures, ranging from strikes (as occurred in mid-July in the case of 170 employees of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation) to mob action which frequently resulted in a lock-in of employers. On 23 June, for example, a large force of former temporary employees of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company invaded the company's Shanghai office, demanded that they be placed on the permanent payroll and barricaded five company officials in their offices. Two weeks later, the American Consulate-General in the city came under siege when two hundred former employees of the US Navy Port Facilities (dismissed when the US Navy withdrew from Shanghai at the end of April 1949) attempted to force their way into the building.

The outbreak of labour unrest was by no means limited to foreign firms. On 23 June the American Consul-General in Shanghai reported that the situation was 'bordering on anarchy' not just in foreign but also in Chinese industrial enterprises; Shanghai's Mayor Chen Yi later stated that some two thousand labour disputes had occurred in the city during the month of July alone. Alarmed by mobs of militant workers, some Chinese factory owners simply closed down operations. Many of those who attempted to continue production could not meet the rising wages and, having no external reserves on which to call, handed their enterprises over to labour. With the authorities pursuing their policy of confiscating former Nationalist-owned enterprises, some Chinese entrepreneurs reportedly claimed that they had been financed by Nationalist capital in the hope that they could extricate themselves from labour's rowdy demands.

The labour unrest was not a direct product of official policy but the outcome of a complex relationship between the new authorities and labour. With the Communists portraying themselves as the liberators of the people, Chinese workers were in no mood for gradual change and set about putting into practice - with or without official sanction - the Communists' assurances that they were now the 'masters of China.' The authorities initially pursued a basically 'hands off' policy towards militant labour. With only a tenuous hold on China's still-suspicious urban populace, they were unwilling to risk antagonizing labour even though the disruptive activities were threatening the continued operation of private industry which Mao regarded as vital to China's economic rehabilitation.
In this situation the continued presence of Western business enterprises served a useful purpose. Pursuing their aim of gaining the support of the urban work force while at the same time bringing it under official control, the authorities publicly attempted to channel labour discontent against the resident 'foreign imperialists.' Most Western enterprises experienced some labour problems but the Communists concentrated their attention, not on major firms whose activities they did not wish completely to disrupt, but on more readily dispensible enterprises and especially individual businessmen, some of whom had already closed down their businesses and/or left China. One of the most widely publicized disputes was that involving severance pay for employees of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, while a case concerning former employees of the US Navy Port Facilities in Shanghai, though not a private enterprise, exhibited similar features. Like the publicity concurrently being given to the alleged misdemeanours of individual foreigners, these cases were magnified out of all proportion to their significance, being featured regularly (at times almost daily) in virtually all Shanghai newspapers.

Although the publicity given to labour cases had similar goals to that being given to incidents involving individual Westerners, it was aimed more specifically at the urban work force. First, and most importantly, the authorities were attempting to divert attention from the city's continuing economic problems and focus it instead on the foreign imperialists - to the point of using them as scapegoats for the current situation. Foreign employers were accused of continuing to oppress workers 'in the old imperialist manner.' Indeed, Randall Gould at the Post had allegedly been oppressing his employees ever since he had become the paper's editor almost twenty years earlier, while the workers - by their blood and sweat - had built up the newspaper into a profitable establishment with the finest printing press in Shanghai.

Second, in their bid to gain the support of labour, the authorities utilized the disputes to demonstrate that they did indeed represent the interests of urban workers. The ultimate 'victories' of the workers (in the Post and US Port Facilities cases the payment of substantial severance allowances) came about following intervention by the Communist authorities who, while presenting themselves to Western businessmen as objective mediators of disputes, presented themselves to Chinese workers as their new protectors. When the Post dispute was finally resolved, for
example, *Jiefang ribao* claimed that, whilst the workers had indeed carried out an 'heroic struggle,' their final victory was attributable 'to the attitude of the People's Government in safeguarding the rights of the people in sponsoring justice,' an attitude for which the workers were said to be 'deeply grateful to the People's Government.'

Third, the magnification of the labour disputes into virtual mass campaigns helped the Communists bring recalcitrant labour under official control by facilitating the organization, mobilization and direction of workers into activities considered more appropriate to the leadership's goals. Individual disputes involved not only the employees of the company concerned but Chinese working in associated enterprises. In the *Post* dispute, for example, a committee of workers from all the foreign-owned public utilities in Shanghai was organized to issue statements of support for the *Post*'s workers.

Despite the political use made by the Communist authorities of labour disputes involving Western enterprises, their attitude towards these disputes was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the widespread publicity they gave to the disputes - including day-by-day reports on lock-ins - undoubtedly incited other workers to make strident demands against their foreign employers. On the other hand, the authorities occasionally stepped in if the workers seemed to be getting out of hand, in spite of their wariness about exerting official control because of the risk of alienating labour support. In the case of the besieged Standard-Vacuum office, for example, the demonstrators were eventually dispersed by an Army officer who instructed them to adopt the more formal procedure of presenting their demands to the Military Control Commission's Labour Bureau. This ostensibly contradictory pattern of behaviour was similar to the concurrent provocation and suppression of anti-missionary activities, and part of the Government's overall policy of encouraging anti-imperialist sentiments but at the same time attempting to keep their display firmly under official control.

Labour pressure on Western enterprises decreased to only a limited extent when the Shanghai authorities, having decided that they could no longer allow labour such a free hand because of the disruption to production, issued two sets of regulations on 19 August 1949 which were aimed at preventing further disruption to industry and commerce. Intended also as a model for other cities, these regulations laid down detailed procedures for settling labour disputes in private enterprises.
through mediation by the Shanghai Labour Bureau (and if this failed through the People's Court), forbade employers from ceasing production or reducing wages and employees from striking or obstructing production, and established procedures for the hiring of workers and their dismissal on payment of prescribed severance allowances. The authorities warned workers that, although some of their demands were justified, these could not be implemented for the time being because of the economic situation.\textsuperscript{51} The regulations to some extent brought the labour situation under control but foreign employers now found themselves at the mercy of officialdom instead of at the mercy of their own employees. Both the Labour Bureau and the People's Court continued to ingratiate themselves with labour by resolving the overwhelming majority of disputes in their interests and many decisions were denounced by Western businessmen as being 'economically ludicrous.'\textsuperscript{53} In an attempt to preserve a modicum of credibility, the authorities occasionally decided in favour of Western enterprises in the most outlandish cases. For example, when 106 former employees of the Ewo Breweries (a Jardine Matheson subsidiary) demanded reinstatement, the Labour Bureau ruled in favour of the management after it was discovered that most of the workers had left the Breweries either during or even before the Japanese occupation. Whilst the Communists and their supporters played up this decision as an example of the Labour Bureau's unbiased arbitration,\textsuperscript{54} the Ewo case was an exception to the general pattern of satisfying Chinese claimants at the financial expense of the foreign employer.

Second, the procedures for the dismissal of workers (even with severance pay) and more particularly the closure of unprofitable enterprises existed only in theory. With unemployment on the increase, especially in the first months of 1950 when the Government inaugurated its own retrenchment programme as part of its successful but drastic attack on inflation,\textsuperscript{55} foreign firms found they were still unable to dismiss workers. As for the formal measures which ostensibly existed to facilitate the closure of enterprises: some foreign firms would still be fighting this battle in five years' time.

The State: Encroachment and Control
The Communists' second economic objective - to coordinate and regulate the economy under 'the leadership of the state-owned economy' - also seriously affected the level of activity and profitability of foreign
enterprises: traders, ancillary services, and manufacturers and industrialists. First, in the commercial sphere, the Communists both substantially increased the level of state participation in trading operations and implemented stricter import/export controls: two factors which had already frustrated Western traders in the post-war period.\textsuperscript{56}

Whilst trade with the West was, in any case, seriously depleted between mid-1949 and mid-1950 because of the Nationalist blockade, the Government's actions established the pattern for future foreign trade activity.

Soon after coming to power in the major cities, the Communists set up state-operated trading companies for major export and import items, and from early 1950 began establishing a number of national trading corporations (all under the Ministry of Trade) to coordinate the activities of these state companies, beginning the move towards a foreign trade monopoly.\textsuperscript{57} At the beginning of 1950 the state trading companies already controlled an estimated 30 percent of the total value of foreign trade; by the end of the year the figure was to reach 53 percent.\textsuperscript{58} Although only a limited number of export items were government monopolies,\textsuperscript{59} private traders - Chinese and foreign alike - found it almost impossible to compete with the state trading companies even in other commodities because the Government granted them subsidies, controlled transport facilities and established unrealistic exchange rates. As the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce commented, 'Government operations do not necessarily bear any relation to world market conditions.'\textsuperscript{60} On the import side, the level and range of imports was severely restricted because of the Government's attempt to balance foreign trade and its policy of permitting only essential imports, such as raw cotton, oil, machinery, chemicals and rubber. Whilst imports of essential goods were permitted under licence, in practice licences were obtainable virtually only to import against finance by self-provided foreign exchange. The only chance of business for private importers, therefore, was with concerns which could pay with funds from abroad.\textsuperscript{61}

The level of activity of Western trading companies in China was also affected by the realignment of China's trading relations with the outside world. Mao's statement of 30 June 1949 that the Chinese intended 'leaning to one side'\textsuperscript{62} - Russia's side - and more particularly the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in February 1950,\textsuperscript{63} dashed the hopes of those Western commentators who had predicted that the Communists would
follow a more independent course, partly because of their need for raw materials and capital goods from abroad and the anticipated Russian inability to satisfy that need.\(^{64}\) Although Mao kept the door open to the West when he stated that the Communists were prepared to do business 'with all foreign countries' (provided it was conducted on the basis of equality),\(^{65}\) China's foreign trade was in practice increasingly being directed towards the Soviet Union. In 1946, the Soviet Union had accounted for only 1.6 percent of China's foreign trade (compared with the United States share of 53.1 percent); in 1950 the Soviet figure was already 23.36 percent, just ahead of the United States at 23 percent. By 1952 an estimated 72 percent of China's foreign trade was to be conducted with the Communist bloc (chiefly the Soviet Union).\(^{66}\) This dramatic increase was, of course, due partly to the Nationalist blockade from mid-1949, followed by an American embargo on exports of 'strategic goods' to China from November 1949 and more comprehensive American and later United Nations embargoes during the Korean War. But whilst the Communists were undoubtedly prepared to countenance Western trade with China when this was considered essential to the country's rehabilitation and development - as was demonstrated by renewed trade with Western Europe following the Korean War - even a limited continuing role for Western traders in China was ruled out by the growing role of state trading companies.

Like Western traders in China, companies providing ancillary services also found themselves with state rivals for their business. With foreign trade increasingly concentrated in the hands of the state trading corporations, the People's Bank began assuming the role of major foreign trade financier that had previously been occupied by Western banking institutions such as the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. Similarly, the Government established its own insurance organization, the China People's Insurance Company, with which all state trading corporations insured their business. By May 1950 the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce anticipated it was 'inevitable that much of the business which was previously underwritten by Foreign Companies and the private Chinese Companies will find its way to the Government-sponsored organs.'\(^{67}\)

Private industry and manufacturing did not so much face state competition as the Government's complete control of the economic environment in which they operated. As part of the official policy of bringing private enterprise 'under the leadership of the state-owned economy,' the authorities - through their increasingly monopolistic state trading
companies - controlled both the supply of raw materials to industry and the market for its products. It was through these controls that additional pressures were exerted on Western industrial enterprises such as British-American Tobacco and the Kailan Mining Administration. In squeezing British-American Tobacco, the authorities first allowed them an inadequate allocation of leaf tobacco and other materials, and second established low selling prices which made production uneconomic. Similarly, the Kailan Mining Administration was paid at below cost for its coal and received low barter rates for coal against flour supplies (in which workers were partly paid), as well as being squeezed by the railway administration when it attempted to transport coal to Qinhuangdao for export. In both cases, the Government's increasing control of raw materials and/or the market severely exacerbated the heavy taxation and labour pressures already being felt by the companies.

Effects and Reactions

The increasing encroachment of the state on the activities of Western enterprises, together with financial and labour pressures (themselves partly caused by the Communists' economic problems, in particular the Nationalist blockade) had a disastrous effect on Western businesses in China. In order to meet their overheads, many firms had to draw on local reserves and/or saleable stocks; as these dried up they were forced to obtain remittances from their head offices overseas. On 4 July 1949, one week after the imposition of the Nationalist blockade, the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce estimated the drain on Sterling balances in England and Hong Kong for British firms in Shanghai alone at £250,000 per month. Within two weeks it had reached an estimated £375,000 as a result of the near doubling of wages in terms of Sterling. The effects were not uniform. Worst hit were those firms (principally industrialists and manufacturers) which had large labour forces and which were dependent on imported raw materials and/or the sale of their products in China. In contrast, some firms with low overheads were still able to cover their costs. But the large merchant houses which had a variety of commercial, financial and industrial interests were operating at an overall loss. Jardine Matheson, for example, disclosed in London in early August 1949 that it was remitting £50,000 a month to China.

The economic pressures on Western enterprises, as well as the less easily measured psychological pressures, led many businesses to question
their earlier decision to remain in China. Was there any long-term future for them in the country - even when the Nationalist blockade was lifted - with the state sector expanding its economic activities and the Government's trade relations being oriented towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc? Whilst the effects of the Communists' pressures on different businesses varied, the decision of whether or not to stay in China was split more on a national basis than according to the type of business activity. The differing attitudes earlier expressed by British and American business interests widened as a result of the increasing difficulties. The Americans, who had stayed on reluctantly in the face of widespread anti-American agitation and their Government's continued support for the Nationalists, speedily decided that the time had come to leave; the British, with more substantial commercial interests, initially dug in their heels and made intense efforts to retrieve their position. The attempts of both national groups to extricate themselves from their worsening situation - whether by completely withdrawing from China or improving their position inside China - proved largely ineffective. As they gradually came to realize, the Communists had the upper hand, with the power to force them to continue operating their enterprises - or at least to pay heavy taxation and employ redundant labour at high wage rates - for as long as it suited them to do so.

*The American Attempt to Withdraw*

American businessmen did not even wait to feel the full weight of the Communists' pressures. On 29 July 1949, just over two months after the Communists entered Shanghai, *New York Times* correspondent Henry Lieberman reported from the city that there had been 'a complete reversal in the American attitude toward the prospects of foreign business in China ... since the first few weeks of Communist rule.' Originally encouraged by the Communists' discipline and apparent eagerness for trade, American businessmen had since 'gone through a steady process of disillusionment.' On 31 July, the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai submitted a memorandum (through the State Department) to the head offices of the major American companies operating in China. 'The general opinion of many American businessmen,' it stated, '... is that the time to liquidate and leave China is overdue and that continued resistance will be costly and dangerous.' The Chamber of Commerce warned that companies must expect the substantial if not total
loss of all physical assets (estimated at $150-200 million) including properties, stocks and contracts covered by letters of credit, and would face excessive demands for severance pay and possibly the payment of substantial sums as guarantees or special taxes before foreign staff members obtained exit visas. In response to the memorandum, representatives of the major American companies operating in China (particularly oil and banking interests) held a meeting with State Department officials on 4 August. After a lengthy debate, they decided that 'every effort should be made' to get American staff out of China, with the individual companies issuing appropriate instructions to their offices in China.

The memorandum from the Chamber of Commerce and the subsequent discussions at the State Department accentuated the conflicting priorities - commercial versus political - of American business and government. In addition to listing the 'destructive pressures' to which American businessmen in China were being subjected by the Communists, the Chamber of Commerce also forecast that, until there was a fundamental change in US-China relations, the atmosphere would not be conducive to the development of American business in China. American aid to the Nationalists, said the Chamber of Commerce, had aroused 'widespread hatred for American through all China' which had only been aggravated by the Nationalists' blockade of Chinese ports 'made possible by American warships, planes, fuel, bombs and ammunition.' The Chamber of Commerce warned the State Department of the implications of continued military aid and made the futile request that the Government sever relations with the Nationalists.

Although American business interests understandably felt frustrated by their Government's China policy, a claim made at the meeting that the United States Government was 'responsible to a great extent for present Communist actions' was exaggerated. Certainly, the Communists' extreme measures against American official Angus Ward - and more particularly their general diatribes against American imperialism - were at least partly incited by the Truman Administration's continuing pro-Nationalist, anti-Communist stance. But behind the rhetoric and the deliberate provocation of public feeling against the United States, the Communists' actual treatment of American business interests was basically the same as that of British concerns: increasing state encroachment on their activities, heavy taxation and acquiescence in the demands of labour. As British businessmen and their Government were soon to discover to their chagrin, a lack of direct support for the Nationalists and even diplomatic
recognition of the new Communist government were no guarantee of creating an atmosphere which was conducive to doing business in China.

The decision made by American business interests to withdraw from China was one matter; the practice of withdrawal another. When the American evacuation ship General Gordon left Shanghai on 25 September 1949, its 1,220 passengers included all the American officials, missionaries and educational personnel who had applied for exit permits, as well as a large number of junior and middle-ranking employees of American firms, but not eighteen key personnel of the major American companies operating in Shanghai. On the surface at least, a major factor in the refusal of exit permits to these men appears to have been pressure on the authorities from labour unions, despite the new labour regulations of 19 August. Unions reportedly distrusted the replacement of top American personnel by Chinese management committees and sought the retention of American 'hostages' to ensure there were funds available to pay for the continued employment of workers and meet their demands for increased wages and subsidiary benefits. The Communist authorities were still wary about antagonizing labour; least of all did they want to be seen ignoring the demands of Chinese workers in favour of the much-condemned foreign imperialist.

In some cases, official approval was granted for the issue of exit permits to American personnel, only to be withdrawn after the relevant company's labour union had protested to the authorities. When four Standard Vacuum and three Caltex representatives called at the Public Safety Bureau on 14 September to collect their exit permits after their names had appeared in Jiefang ribao, they were told that the permits would not be issued because of opposition from the companies' labour unions. The President of the Shanghai American Chamber of Commerce, C.V. Schelke of Anderson, Meyer and Company, received identical treatment. Northwest Airlines' representative in Shanghai had actually received his exit permit and was about to board the General Gordon when a delegation from the company's labour union approached a police officer at the gangway and requested that he not be permitted to leave Shanghai.

But whilst pressure from labour unions was an important factor - and whilst officials cited unresolved labour issues as the reason for withholding permits from fifteen of the eighteen men detained - in some cases it may well have been only a convenient pretext. The oft-repeated claim by the authorities that they had no intention of refusing exit permits so
long as all outstanding business, including labour questions, had been settled,\textsuperscript{87} does not always appear to have been borne out in practice. In the case of the four Standard Vacuum and three Caltex men, for example, the labour unions reportedly received full backing from the authorities when they rejected the establishment of Chinese management committees, thereby necessitating the retention of the American management.\textsuperscript{88} Although the departure of these Americans would have eased the way for increased Communist control and the eventual takeover of the companies, the authorities appear to have needed little labour pressure, if any, to force the men to stay on in Shanghai. As the American Consul-General surmised, they probably feared that the departure of all American personnel would jeopardize the continued operation of the companies and the future inflow of vital oil and petroleum supplies.\textsuperscript{89}

The two major cases in which labour issues were not given as the reason for refusing exit permits were those of the Shanghai Power Company and the Shanghai Telephone Company, neither of which had any outstanding labour disputes which could be used as a pretext.\textsuperscript{90} The managers of these companies were simply told that their presence was necessary to ensure the continued competent management of the two public utilities. Shanghai's usually sceptical American Consul-General, Walter McConaughy, thought that on this occasion the Communists were 'possibly sincere.'\textsuperscript{91}

As McConaughy also suggested, the refusal of exit permits to key American personnel in each important American firm in Shanghai was probably a high level policy decision, possibly made in Beijing.\textsuperscript{92} The actions of the authorities created an ominous precedent, not just for American firms in the economic upheaval of the immediate post-takeover period, but for British and other business interests in the longer term: the detention of one or more senior staff members of major firms as 'commercial hostages' to ensure the continuation of operations, or at least the continued payment of taxes and employees' wages, if necessary with funds from abroad.

Having been forced to remain in China, American business interests were faced not only with continuing pressures from the Communists but also with the threat of controls on their trading activities by their own Government. Since April 1949, the US Government - under strong pressure from the China Lobby - had been attempting unsuccessfully to persuade the British Government, which was much more concerned than the Americans about the fate of its commercial interests in China, to participate in an
embargo on exports (at least of 'strategic materials') to Communist China. At a Round Table Discussion on China held at the State Department on 6-8 October 1949, representatives of American companies with interests in China (including the First National Bank, International General Electric and the American and Foreign Power Company - owners of the Shanghai Power Company) came face to face with men such as Harold Stassen, George Kennan and John D. Rockefeller III. Whilst the businessmen - wishing to make the best of their representatives' continued enforced presence in Shanghai - predictably argued that trade with the Communists should continue so long as it was possible to do business with them, their opponents urged the complete cessation of trade in the hope of creating economic difficulties for the Communists which would discredit them and hopefully bring about their downfall.

In spite of the pleas of business interests, rigid controls on the export of strategic goods to China came into effect in November 1949 and were a forerunner to the complete trade embargo that was imposed first by the United States and later by the United Nations during the Korean War. American businessmen still remaining in China therefore found themselves with little prospect of resuming their trading activities when the blockade was lifted because of their own Government's policies but unable to leave China because of the Communists' policies.

The British Attempt to Retrieve Their Position

In contrast to the Americans, British business interests initially opted to remain in China, despite the continuing necessity for sizeable transfers from the United Kingdom to meet their overheads. Although British businessmen increasingly complained that their Government was subordinating their interests to United States policy (particularly on the blockade question), their decision not to withdraw from China had the basic support of the British Government. In mid-August 1949, when the Americans were already making plans to leave China, a Foreign Office memorandum expressed the opinion that 'Western commercial and financial interests should endeavour to maintain themselves in China for as long as possible.' Whilst recognizing that foreign economic interests in China were likely 'sooner or later to be faced with the threat of expropriation,' the Foreign Office predicted - somewhat over-optimistically as it turned out - that some sort of trade and compensation agreement might eventually be secured, provided the normal channels of commerce
remained open. Stressing the identity of British government and commercial interests, as compared with the rift in the American camp, the Foreign Office stated: 'We do not share the view, which we gather to be that of the United States authorities, that foreign merchants who have stayed behind have put themselves in the position of hostages in their search for private gain and are therefore deserving of little sympathy.'

While the attention of American businessmen was focussed on withdrawal from China, British business interests initially made strenuous efforts to retrieve their position. First and foremost, they attempted to discuss their problems with high level Communist officials, only to discover that no one wanted to talk with them. '[I] spend all day and every day trying to get to someone in authority, but am balked everywhere,' commented the manager of the Kailan Mining Administration from Tianjin after the Communists had been 'mercilessly squeezing' the enterprise for some four months. In mid-July 1949, almost two months after the Communist victory in Shanghai, the British Chamber of Commerce in the city admitted that it had 'not yet found a way of establishing contact with responsible officials.'

On the rare occasions that the authorities agreed to interviews, the exchanges were invariably formal and unproductive. At the end of August, Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce Chairman, John Keswick, was finally received by both the city's Director of Alien Affairs, Zhang Hanfu, and Mayor Chen Yi. Keswick complained to Zhang about the lack of liaison between the People's Government and foreigners and said that businessmen 'felt like people waking up in the night without a light and trying to find their way round the furniture.' In reply, Zhang merely said that foreigners should have no difficulty knowing what was going on if they read the newspapers and studied the announcements. In response to Keswick's precise requests that the authorities adjust the exchange rate (because of the wage burden brought about by the increased price of rice) and take prompt action against continuing breaches of labour discipline, Zhang stated evasively that conditions would improve in general if there was an end to the blockade. Although Zhang claimed during the interview that he was 'well disposed to the British' and said he understood that they had many difficulties, Keswick later admitted in his personal record of the discussions: 'I cannot claim that there are any concrete results from the meeting.' The British Chamber of Commerce's hope that Keswick's interviews might have opened a channel for continuing
communication and discussion with the authorities proved mistaken. Six months later, in February 1950, the Chamber of Commerce complained in writing to Zhang that 'foreign business leaders have not been received, nor consulted, and appear to have been ignored.'

Admittedly, the Communist authorities had a lot on their plate, particularly in Shanghai. But, while ignoring British businessmen, they were reportedly consulting and seeking the advice of private Chinese entrepreneurs. Why the difference? First, there was a basic contradiction between the Communists' general assurances to Western businessmen (originally made partly to prevent their departure) and their actual intentions: eventually to squeeze out Western economic enterprises. Since they were not going to admit this intention, it was far easier not to have any contact at all. On the few occasions when high officials received Western businessmen, they merely repeated the same vague assurances while, in practice, a different policy was being pursued.

Second, the authorities' disregard of British businessmen was part of their overall policy of nationalist self-assertion and they intentionally set out to ignore and even to humiliate these major representatives of imperialism in China. Just as the Communists' denial of special status to diplomats and even ambassadors contributed to their new national self-assertiveness, so too undoubtedly did their refusal to have discussions with, or even reply to letters from, 'old China hands' such as the Keswicks and the Sassoons. In contrast to the past, these men could no longer fall back on their Government to support their commercial interests with physical force. John Keswick might publicly admit his pride in his family's long history in China - and to being a direct descendant of William Jardine who had come to Shanghai in 1843 under the provisions of the first of the 'unequal treaties' - but such facts could hardly have endeared him to China's new rulers.

Instead of conducting high level discussions with the 'old China hands,' therefore, the Communist leadership only frustrated and exasperated them further by palming off even the most 'eminent' of them on to minor officials whose lack of authority to make decisions on even minor issues seemed to be matched only by their lack of expertise on economic questions. One British businessman in Shanghai, for example, complained that even quite important jobs were often 'filled with what looked like farmer's boys or half-baked university students' who appeared to be 'sadly lacking in any signs of understanding of an urban economy such
as Shanghai's.' The complaints were not confined to Shanghai. In October 1949 a number of British businessmen in Tianjin (including representatives of Jardine Matheson, Butterfield & Swire, British-American Tobacco and the Asiatic Petroleum Company) commissioned Englishman Michael Lindsay to submit a memorial to Premier Zhou Enlai, whom he knew personally, on their behalf. Lindsay told Zhou that, while taxation and the tendencies towards monopolization by government organizations were seriously worrying British businessmen in the city, their most general complaint was that they 'almost always had to deal with very junior employees who would never take any responsibility and very often did not really seem to understand the business at all.' The authorities' attitude, he said, had already led the representatives of some firms to believe 'that the policy of the new government is to squeeze out all foreign business firms.'

Frustrated by their failure to discuss their problems with 'responsible officials,' British businessmen looked to other avenues in the effort to salvage their position. First, they arranged for publicity to be given in London to their plight, in the vain hope that 'the echo might come back to the ears of the People's Government.' On 21 July 1949, during a Foreign Affairs Debate in the House of Commons, Minister of State Hector McNeil stated that attempts to form a relationship with Communist representatives in China had so far been rejected and that the position of British business was 'causing considerable anxiety.' On the same day the Manchester Guardian published an article entitled 'Hard times for Shanghai's British traders' and on 23 July the Economist carried a similar report. The publicity proved to be ill-timed; any impact that the disclosures might have had - either in Britain or in China - was soon lost amongst far more dramatic events on the China scene. The escape of the British frigate Amethyst from the Communists' clutches on 30 July and the release of the White Paper on United States Relations with China on 5 August aroused the ire of the Communist authorities and, whilst their policy towards Western business interests was pursued largely independently of current political issues, these major events were hardly conducive to a relaxation of pressure on any representatives of the imperialists in China.

With the Communists appearing to be immune to both verbal and published complaints, some British businessmen began agitating for more drastic action to salvage their position. One widely ventilated
proposal, first suggested in late July 1949, was for a restriction or prohibition on Sterling remittances to China, to be instituted by the British Treasury in order to avoid the responsibility being placed on individual companies. At this stage, the scheme did not get off the ground because of a lack of unanimity amongst the principal British firms. Some, led by Sassoons, argued that the stoppage of remittances was the only practical step now available; it would check the outflow of money while at the same time bringing the situation in Shanghai to a head. But a few firms, especially those which were still able to cover expenses in China without calling on remittances, were wary about taking measures that would antagonize both the Chinese authorities and the labour unions and possibly lead to the exertion of even heavier pressures. The Shell Company, for example, stated adamantly that it did not in any way support such a proposal.

A second proposal for direct action, aimed not at the Communists but at the near-defeated Nationalists, was to attack the major immediate cause of the loss of trading income and the unrealistic exchange rates: the Nationalist blockade. British businessmen in Shanghai acknowledged that the lifting of the blockade was by no means the whole answer to their problems but they agreed that it would go a long way towards getting the trade of the port going again and that it would introduce a note of realism into the foreign exchange value of the renminbi (people's currency). Through the China Association in London, they urged the British Government to approve naval protection for merchant shipping going in and out of Shanghai. But the Government, while encouraging its businessmen to remain in China when the Americans were preparing to leave, and while already diverging from the United States on the recognition question, would not consider taking independent action to break the blockade. Minister of State Hector McNeil informed the China Association that the American Government - still hopeful that such a blockade might possibly be effective - was 'quite adamant in its refusal to contemplate such action.' The British Government did, however, unofficially endorse a short burst of blockade-running by Jardine Matheson and Butterfield & Swire ships and even provided them with a naval escort - but only up to the three-mile limit. The blockade-running came to a virtual end after the Nationalists strengthened their control of the Yangzi during November 1949, shelled a number of ships and left others stranded both inside and outside the three-mile limit.
As in the past, the British Government’s refusal to give full backing to its commercial interests in China (regardless of the political repercussions) aroused the anger of the ‘old China hands’ who accused the Government of subordinating British interests to American policy. Somewhat distorting the situation, they declared that British businessmen had stayed on in Shanghai on the understanding that they were acting in accordance with Government policy and that they could expect support in their purpose. In a final act of desperation recalling days long gone, the Chairman of the China Association, W.J. Keswick, wrote a personal letter to Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin. Portraying himself as a ‘merchant adventurer’ appealing to the British Government just like his predecessors during the last 150 years in similar situations,’ Keswick made an emotional appeal not just for British trade but for the maintenance of Britain’s alleged prestige ‘in that part of the world where so great are British interests and the importance of showing to the newcomers Great Britain’s capabilities of strength.’ He concluded: ‘I beg you to adventure, act – and wrangle, if needs be, in international courts afterwards.’ Keswick’s appeal was as out of date as was his statement to a meeting of the China Association that British merchants would have ‘to be prepared to do a little buccaneering’ just as they had done one hundred years earlier. As a more realistic Ernest Bevin briefly and bluntly told Keswick and other members of a China Association delegation, ‘the days for that kind of thing are gone.’

Thwarted in every attempt to solve their problems, British commercial interests looked to an improvement in political relations between Britain and the Chinese Communists – hoping that this would reverberate on economic relations – and urged speedy recognition of China’s new rulers. Unlike their proposed action on the blockade, on this issue there was no basic rift between the attitudes of British businessmen and their government. Whilst the United States opposed quick recognition of Communist China on both political and economic grounds – on the latter it argued that the withholding, rather than the granting of, recognition would be an economic bargaining weapon – the British Government planned to recognize China’s new government once it was formally established. Acknowledging that the protection of British commercial interests was a major consideration, a Foreign Office memorandum of 15 August 1949 concluded that ‘after a certain stage delay in proceeding with recognition might seriously prejudice Western interests in China
without any compensating advantages being obtained. However, despite heavy pressure from British commercial interests - finding themselves on this occasion in the unusual company of extreme left political groups - it was not until 6 January 1950 (after an attempt at a 'common front' policy by Western and Commonwealth nations had broken down and India and Pakistan had independently recognized the People's Republic) that Britain officially recognized the new Chinese Government. Even then, it was the first non-Communist Western nation to do so.

Instead of welcoming recognition and the opportunity for economic relations, as both British officials and businessmen had hoped and even anticipated, the Chinese Government merely took the opportunity to reprove the British for acting basically out of commercial motives. 'Bevin may talk his head off in the communique,' stated Dagongbao, 'but there is no denying the fact that the British decision is entirely based on their own actual needs and interests.' On the practical level, the Chinese held out few economic benefits from recognition, apart from admitting that China would be needing large quantities of machinery and repeating the general principle that the Government was 'prepared to trade with all countries,' England not excepted. Even the anticipated official channel of communication between the British Government and the Chinese leadership, which commercial interests hoped to utilize to make their voice heard, failed to eventuate when - to the puzzlement of the British - recognition did not lead automatically to the establishment of diplomatic relations in accordance with customary international practice.

The earlier argument of the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce that recognition was essential if British businesses were to expect any sympathy from local administrators regarding taxation and recalcitrant labour had a hollow ring when Communist officials showed themselves no more willing than they had been earlier to discuss these problems. On 2 February 1950 (admittedly barely four weeks after recognition) the China Association stated that the anticipated improvement in relations had 'unhappily ... proved to be a false hope.' The growing despair of the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce was reflected in its letter a week later to the Director of Alien Affairs, Zhang Hanfu, in which the earlier diplomatic niceties and polite requests gave way to anger and frustration as it summarized the contradictions between the Communists' promises and their actions. Western businessmen had stayed on in China...
'at the express invitation of Chairman Mao,' the Chamber of Commerce pointed out. But instead of being granted the promised 'equality of treatment,' they were being unfairly discriminated against in comparison with Chinese private entrepreneurs. Whilst Chinese business leaders were consulted, foreign businessmen were ignored; while Chinese businessmen were allowed to travel freely within China as well as to and from Hong Kong, foreign businessmen were denied the same privileges. The Chamber reminded Zhang Hanfu of the Communists' official policies on which foreign businessmen had based their own policies and hopes: Mao's Eight Point Proclamation and his statement that the new Government was willing to establish trading relations with all countries. The letter was not answered.

British businessmen had no cards left to play. After over a century of British mercantile activity in China (and just six months after the establishment of a national Communist government), the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce revealed on 4 April 1950 that many firms had 'now come to the conclusion that their ability to continue in business is at an end.' While stating that the broken economy and the blockade were largely responsible for the economic ills of British business in the short term, it acknowledged that British enterprise in China was finished because of a more fundamental factor: the new Government's intention to govern the country both politically and economically along communist lines. In emphasizing this factor, however, businessmen continued to be virtually blind to the other - and underlying - influence on the Communists' actions: their nationalist feelings against a century of imperialist economic incursions and privilege. The strength of this legacy was demonstrated when, in taking steps to establish trading relations with Britain in 1952-1953, the Chinese Government ignored those firms with past experience in the China trade (many of whose representatives were still attempting to extricate themselves from China) and negotiated contracts with companies which were free of the 'taint of imperialism.'

The British Chamber of Commerce now suggested that, instead of attempting to overcome their hopeless situation, British businessmen should be concentrating on 'finding ways and means to cut their losses.' At the London end, a meeting on 17 April of representatives of ten of the major British companies operating in China (including four Jardine Matheson enterprises, Sassoons and British-American Tobacco) cast
aside their earlier reticence about cutting off remittances to China. They subsequently instructed their Shanghai representatives that, if local resources were insufficient to pay overheads and taxation, the enterprises must be closed and placed on a caretaker basis retaining legal ownership.  

'Britain may abandon her £250 million stake in China,' declared the *North China Daily News* on 25 April 1950. But as a number of American companies had already discovered, there was no question of simple abandonment. Having realized that they had no future in China, British businessmen on the spot also realized that there was no easy way out of the country. In reply to the London meeting's decision to cut off remittances to China, the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce abruptly pointed out that there was 'little hope' of putting such a plan into practice and spelt out the ways in which the Communist authorities had British businesses completely at their mercy. The closure of businesses was not permitted without the prior approval of the Government and this would almost certainly be withheld until management had secured labour's agreement both to the necessity for closure and an acceptable pay-off. In any case, Government spokesmen had stated that the closure of factories would not be permitted whilst the means of running them still existed. As for retaining legal ownership, this was impossible unless legal obligations, including taxation, were met. And what the London meeting had termed placing enterprises on a 'caretaker basis' was virtually impossible; the presence of at least one senior foreign manager with the power of attorney was insisted upon. In short, said the Chamber of Commerce, the stoppage of remittances did not offer the hope of early closure and would certainly mean labour rowdyism. On receiving this advice, the China Association reluctantly acknowledged that the proposal was 'not practicable.'  

A month later, the Nationalist blockade of Chinese ports was lifted when the Communists finally took the Zhoushan Islands. This removed one immediate cause of the loss of trading income for many firms but the effect was limited because of the Communists' other pressures. While expressing its relief that the blockade had ended, the China Association commented: ' [This] by no means indicates the ending of the troubles of the British community in Shanghai, which in many ways are as difficult as ever.'
Through a deliberate policy of pressure on Western business enterprises, which was only exacerbated by intentional indifference to their increasing plight, the Communists had by mid-1950 reduced a large number of British firms - like the Americans before them - to extreme pessimism about their prospects in China and the desire (but not the means) to close down their businesses and leave the country. Somewhat ironically, the remaining American 'commercial hostages' were to extricate themselves from China more easily - if more dramatically - than the British, soon after China's entry into the Korean War.
Notes


5. CAMC, 50/G/29, 4 April 1940.


13. The number of ships calling at the port increased from 64 in July 1949 to 70 in August and 101 in September. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 January 1950, 114.


15. Article 26, Common Programme..., *Renmin ribao*, 30 September 1949. On the proposed relationship between the various sectors of the economy, see Articles 26, 28-31.


Nathan Papers, letters from Pryor to Nathan, January-June 1949.

'New China has conquered inflation,' *People's China*, 16 May 1950, 3-4; Yang Pei-hsin, 'How China conquered inflation,' *People's China*, 16 June 1950, 7-9.


The effects of taxation on Western business interests, particularly in Shanghai, are outlined in British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, *Annual Report*, 1949, pp.11-15.

CAMC, 49/F/13, 14 July 1949.

ibid.

ibid. See also Nathan Papers, Pryor to Nathan, 8 July 1949: '... foreign firms are being assessed at a level quite disproportionate to the amount of business they do.'

CAMC, 49/F/13, 14 July 1949.

ibid.


ibid., p.11.


CAMC, Memorandum for the press regarding the situation in Shanghai, 4 August 1949.

ibid.


Stephen Garrett, 'Discovering China,' p.130.

CAMC, 49/G/40, 4 July 1949.
CAMC, 49/G/47, 28 July 1949.

Xinwen ribao, 13 July 1949 (CPR, no.930, 13 July 1949).

FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1178-79.

ibid., 1197-1201.


Cabot to Secretary of State, 23 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1178.

Chen Yi, 'Inaugural address at the opening session of the Second Shanghai Conference of People's Representatives,' 5 December 1949. All Shanghai newspapers, 14 December 1949 (CPR, no.1041, 15 December 1949).

China Weekly Review, 8 October 1949, 79.

On the background to the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury case, see p.110.


Jiefang ribao, 12 September 1949 (CPR, no.968, 10-12 September 1949).

Wenhuibao, 1 July 1949 (CPR, no.924, 1 July 1949).

Cabot to Secretary of State, 24 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1179.

See pp.179-80.

'Provisional procedures for mediating and settling labour-capital disputes in private enterprises,' 'Provisional measures for settling disputes arising from resumption of production and returning to work,' 19 August 1949, Dagongbao, 19 August 1949 (CPR, no.955, 23 August 1949).

ibid.

'Conditions in Shanghai,' Appendix to CAB, no.81, 20 February 1953.

China Weekly Review, 8 October 1949, 79.

Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China, pp.92-93.
See p.28.

On the establishment of state trading companies, see Lo Hua, 'Communist China's Foreign Trade,' in Union Research Institute, Communist China, 1949-1959, 3 vols (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1961), III, pp.2-10; British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, Annual Report, 1949, pp.6-7; Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 September 1949, 317; 26 January 1950, 109, 114-15; 30 March 1950, 413-14.

By 1955 the proportion reached 99.2 percent. Lo Hua, 'Communist China's Foreign Trade,' p.5.

By mid-1950, these were: bristles, soya beans, tungsten, antimony and tin. British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, Annual Report, 1949, p.7.

ibid., p.7.

ibid., pp.2, 5.


Its full title was 'The treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,' People's China, 1 March 1950, 25-26.


Mao, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship,' Selected Works, IV, 416. See also Article 57, Common Programme..., Renmin ribao, 30 September 1949.

Figures based on Chinese Maritime Customs and other official statistics, collected by Lo Hua, 'Communist China's Foreign Trade,' pp.2-3.


CAMC, 49/G/40, 4 July 1949.

CAMC, 49/F/15, 20 July 1949.


CAF, notes of a meeting held on 3 August 1949.

CAF, memorandum of 3 August 1949. The wording in the published version is slightly different. See McConaughy to Secretary of State, 31 July 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1279.

According to McConaughy to Secretary of State, 9 August 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1286-87, the meeting was attended by representatives of the National City Bank, Chase Bank, Bank of America, Standard Vacuum, Caltex, Ebasco International, International General Electric, and International Telegraphs and Telephones (Shanghai Telephone Company). The minutes of the meeting state that the American Foreign Power Company (Shanghai Power Company) was also represented. CAF, meeting of representatives of American companies (with China interests) with Mr Walton Butterworth, 4 August 1949.

CAF, meeting ... with Mr Walton Butterworth, 4 August 1949. The decision of the meeting was telegraphed to Shanghai in Acheson to McConaughy, 9 August 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1286-87.

The list, described as a 'tentative tally' by the US Consul-General, comprised: Caltex (3), Standard Vacuum (4), Chase Bank (2), Northwest Airlines (2), and one representative of the National City Bank, Andersen Meyer & Co, Shanghai Power Company, Shanghai Telephone Company, American Express Company, Shanghai Wharf Warehouse and BOTRA (Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs). McConaughy to Secretary of State, 5 October 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1349-52.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 14 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1337-38.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 5 October 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1350. Schelke had applied for an exit permit as a test case but did not intend leaving Shanghai at this stage.

See, for example, statements by secretary of Mayor Chen Yi and Alien Affairs Department official during conversation with Caltex officials, reported in McConaughy to Secretary of State, 14 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1337.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 5 October 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1351-52.

ibid., 1351-52. Before finally refusing to issue exit permits, the authorities had given Caltex, in particular, the runaround. The approval notice had finally appeared in *Jiefang ribao* on 14 September 1949 after an earlier refusal to issue permits, allegedly because of labour objections, followed by a meeting between the Caltex Chinese Committee and the secretary of Mayor Chen Yi, attended by the Caltex Shanghai Manager. The terms offered by Caltex were allegedly more liberal than those prescribed in the regulations of
19 August. During September, the Tianjin managers of American oil companies were also refused exit permits, ostensibly because of unresolved labour disputes. McConaughy to Secretary of State, 14 September 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 1337.

The other case was that of A.L. Branning, a skilled BOTRA engineer responsible for raising part of the BOTRA fleet of twenty-five ships sunk prior to the takeover of Shanghai. Branning's contract was not due to expire until early 1950. McConaughy to Secretary of State, 5 October 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 1351.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 5 October 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 1352.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 7 October 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 1352.

Department of State to the British Embassy, 21 April 1949, in FRUS, 1949, IX, 844-45. For detailed material on the prolonged discussions see ibid., 817-905.

'Transcript of Round Table Discussion on American Policy toward China, held in the Department of State, October 6, 7, and 8, 1949,' in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings..., Eighty-second Congress, First Session, Part V, pp.1617, 1635-41. See also H.C.K. Woddis, 'Former US secret state documents reveal trend for trade with China,' Eastern World, May 1952, 16-17.

FRUS, 1949, IX, 888-905.

Memorandum from the Foreign Office dated 15 August 1949, entitled 'China,' enclosure in Douglas to Secretary of State, 17 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 58.

ibid., 59.

Nathan Papers, message from Pryor to Nathan, 17 April 1949. Pryor finally had an interview with Liu Shaoqi in early May. In late July the British Consulate-General in Tianjin commented that he (Pryor) was the only foreigner in the city to have made contact with a Communist official who could exercise real authority. Nathan Papers, Pryor to Nathan, 14 May 1949; CAMC, 49/G/47, 28 July 1949.

CAMC, 49/F/15, 20 July 1949.

Record of interview with Zhang Hanfu, 29 August 1949, enclosure in CAMC, 49/G/61, 29 September 1949.

British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to the Director of the Bureau of Alien Affairs, Shanghai, 9 February 1950. enclosure in CAMC, 50/F/7, 9 March 1950.

ibid.

In his interview with John Keswick, for example, Shanghai's Mayor Chen Yi denied that the Communist authorities planned to make conditions impossible for the continued residence and trade of foreigners in the city. CAMC, 49/G/61, 29 September 1949.
See pp.246-47.

NCDN, 19 March 1948.


See, for example, Nathan Papers, Pryor to Nathan, 21 June 1949.

'The position of British business in China and its effect on Sino-British relations and on British foreign policy,' enclosure in CAMC, 49/E/15, 1 November 1949. Michael Lindsay was an adviser on communications to the Chinese Communists from 1941 to 1945 and revisited China in 1949. Shanghai's Mayor Chen Yi told Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce Chairman, John Keswick, that Lindsay 'had been of great help to their Party.' CAMC, 49/G/61, 29 September 1949. See also Michael Lindsay, 'China: report of a visit,' International Affairs, 26:1 (January 1950), 22-31.

CAMC, 49/G/43, 21 July 1949.


Economist, 23 July 1949.

See p.92, n.140; China Digest, 24 August 1949, 3.


Note of meeting between China Association delegation and Mr Hector McNeil, Minister of State, on 28 July 1949, enclosure in CAMC, 49/G/48, 29 July 1949.


Note of meeting between China Association delegation and Mr Hector McNeil, Minister of State, on 28 July 1949, enclosure in CAMC, 49/G/48, 29 July 1949. Although both the British and US Governments had protested to the Nationalists that the 'temporary closure' of Chinese ports was illegal, the US Government had some hope that the Nationalists might be able to mount an effective blockade. See Nolde, 'The US and the Chinese "Blockade",' 57-61.

For details of the British Government's unofficial agreement to give limited support to the idea of running the blockade and attempts at blockade-running by both British and American ships, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 October 1949, 499; CAMC, 49/G/73, 14 November 1949; CAMC, 49/G/82, 14 December 1949; Nolde, 'The US and the Chinese "Blockade",' 57-61.

CAMC, 49/F/16, 11 August 1949.


CAMC, 50/G/25, 17 March 1950.

CAMC, 49/G/64, 11 October 1949; CAMC, 49/G/65, 19 October 1949. See also Nathan Papers, Pryor to Nathan, 24 October 1949.

In the words of US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, 'once we begin according recognition we will have released what little bargaining power now is in our hands.' Stuart to Secretary of State, 17 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 25.

Memorandum from the Foreign Office dated 15 August 1949, enclosure in Douglas to Secretary of State, 17 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 61.

For details of the British parliamentary and press debate on recognition, see Luard, Britain and China, pp.73-82.

The only governments to have recognized the People's Republic before India were the Communist bloc and Burma. The Indian Government, strongly encouraged by their former Ambassador in Nanjing, Sardar Panikkar, recognized the PRC on 30 December 1949, followed by Pakistan on 4 January. Norway and Ceylon recognized the PRC on the same day as Britain, followed by Denmark, Israel, Finland, Afghanistan, Sweden and Switzerland within the following two weeks.

Dagongbao, 11 January 1950 (CPR, no.1062, 11 January 1950). See also Xinwen ribao and Wenhuibao, 11 January 1950 (CPR, no.1062, 11 January 1950); 'No illusions about imperialism,' China Digest, 16 January 1950, 14.


See p.254.

CAMC, 49/G/64, 11 October 1950.

CAMC, 50/G/10, 6 February 1950.

British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to the Director of the Bureau of Alien Affairs, Shanghai, 9 February 1950, enclosure in CAMC, 50/F/7, 9 March 1950.

CAMC, 50/G/29, 4 April 1950.

See p.295.

CAMC, 50/G/29, 4 April 1950.

CAF, China Association, London, to British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, 17 April 1950. The meeting was attended by senior representatives of the Shanghai and Hongkew Wharf, Ewo Cotton, Ewo Breweries, Ewo Cold Storage (all Jardine Matheson enterprises), Sassoons, British-American Tobacco, China Soap, Calico Printers, Orient Paint, and Patons & Baldwins.
139 NCDN, 25 April 1950.

140 CAF, cable from Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce to China Association, 27 April 1950.

141 CAMC, 50/1/2, 16 May 1950.

142 CAB, no.49, 20 June 1950.
CHAPTER 6
RELIGION

The Western religious presence in China, because of its Protestant/Catholic makeup, urban/rural location and diverse activities, was subject to varying treatment by the Communist authorities. Overall, however, missionaries were put under greater pressure - particularly as individuals - than were business interests; the differences were to become acute during the Korean War but were already quite apparent before mid-1950. Although the Communists' treatment of Western economic establishments was strongly influenced by immediate pragmatic considerations (which admittedly had an intensifying as well as a restraining effect) and was partly associated with the short-term moderate policy towards all private enterprise in China, such pragmatic considerations were not involved in the treatment of religious institutions, Christian or otherwise. The only restraining factor in the treatment of Christian missionaries who were involved in basically religious activities was the preclusion of outright expulsion because of the wish - at least initially - to present a moderate domestic and international image. Those elements of missionary work which were useful to the Communists (schools, hospitals and other medical and welfare services) received somewhat more lenient treatment in the short term than did purely religious activities. The Christian colleges, in particular, were dealt with in a manner more akin to business enterprises and will be discussed separately as part of the Communists' overall policies towards Western education and culture.

The restrictions and pressures exerted on missionaries and their institutions before mid-1950 - like those on Western business enterprises - established the basic pattern of the Communists' behaviour and indicated that they envisaged no role for a continuing Western missionary presence in China. The period 1948 to mid-1950 was not, as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker claims, one of 'an unlikely peace' between Chinese Communists and missionaries - even American missionaries - with the Communists pursuing a policy which 'might conceivably have accommodated ongoing missionary contacts with China' had it not been 'cut short' by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Rather it was a period characterized by the gradual stifling of missionary activity which increased in intensity, but
did not change its basic intent (that is, to eliminate the missionary presence) after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Communist pressure on Western missionaries, like that on other aspects of the Western presence, was basically the outcome of two separate components: the movement towards a Marxist-Leninist society in the future and the reaction against past imperialism. In the case of missionaries, however, these two components were not always distinct because the Christian religion - and not just its foreign purveyors - had itself come from the West and had spread throughout China under the protection of the unequal treaties and other special privileges enjoyed by Westerners.

Towards State Control

Despite the Communists' fundamental opposition to religion, in theory it appeared to be more assured of a future in China than was private enterprise. Whilst the guarantee of a role for private enterprise was specifically limited in time until the transition to a socialist economy could be undertaken (although this was forecast as lasting 'for a long period'), the 'freedom of religious belief' - already enunciated by Mao Zedong on a number of occasions - was guaranteed in the Common Programme of September 1949 and was later to be enshrined in the Constitution of the People's Republic. In practice, the earlier expressed and associated freedom - to oppose religion - became the dominant feature of Communist policy because of the basic incompatibility between religion and the Marxist ideology adopted by the Chinese Communists. 'We are assured that we will have freedom of religion but at the same time we are warned that we must expect attacks on religion in full force,' wrote an American Episcopalean missionary in Hankou soon after the Communists' victory.

Thus, whilst the Communists' treatment of private enterprise was directed partly towards the eventual incorporation of many existing establishments (both Chinese and foreign) into the state-run economy, their ultimate goal for religion - whether Buddhism, Islam or Christianity - was its eradication. Although the Communists officially maintained that religion would eventually die away of its own accord with changes in social conditions, they were conscious that this would not come about so easily in practice. If religion was going to persist in China, it would need to be brought under tight state control.
'Freedom of religious belief' therefore came to mean the freedom to believe (but not necessarily to practise, far less preach) under government-controlled and directed religious associations.

The Communists' treatment of the three organized religions in China - Buddhism, Islam and Christianity - eventually assumed this uniform pattern, with overall religious policy being in the hands of the Religious Affairs Bureau. The Chinese Buddhist Association was established in May-June 1953 and the Chinese Islamic Association in May 1953.

There were two distinct Christian associations: the Protestants' Three Self Movement which was launched in July 1950 but not officially constituted until April 1951, and the National Patriotic Catholic Association, not finally established until July 1957. Holmes Welch's statement that the Chinese Buddhist Association was 'used primarily as an instrument for remolding Buddhism to suit the needs of the Government' could also be generally applied to the other religious associations. Even the limited 'religious freedom' possible within these confines came under attack during ideologically extremist phases such as the Cultural Revolution.

The treatment of individual religions, however, differed right from the start because of practical considerations. Buddhism, for example, received short shrift from the new Government. Labelled as a 'group of parasites living on the worship of the ignorant for clay gods and carved wooden statues,' Buddhist monks and nuns were forced to engage in 'productive labour.' Their monasteries, nunneries and temples were turned to 'productive use' and their land holdings were confiscated during land reform. A report of February 1950 on the experiences of Buddhist monks and nuns in Shanghai since the Communists' victory some nine months earlier illustrated the speed of the new Government's actions. Five hundred of the two thousand Buddhist monks and nuns in Shanghai's three hundred odd temples, monasteries and nunneries had already been dispersed from the city, some of the men recruited by the Communists for the army's march south and others, including women, sent back to their native villages. Their places of worship and seclusion had been converted into public mess halls or into workshops where former monks and nuns produced hosiery, towels, cotton shoes, and quilted cotton uniforms for the Shanghai Railway Administration. In official Communist terminology, Buddhist monks and nuns were already heading 'in a new direction, towards becoming useful members of society.'
Although the Communists denounced Islam, like Buddhism, as a remnant of feudal superstition, they had domestic and international reasons for moving against it much more cautiously.\textsuperscript{14} China's Muslims, largely of non-Han racial origin, were regarded by the Communists as members of national minorities rather than as a religious group.\textsuperscript{15} Living mainly in the northwest (including Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Shaanxi) they had a long historical reputation for fierce independence and resistance to Chinese rule - more recently, in 1937, they had driven the Chinese Communists out of Gansu - and were not readily controllable from faraway Beijing. On an international level, the new Chinese Government, ideologically alienated from the United States and seeing itself as a communist model for the Third World, wished to cultivate good relations with Islamic nations in the Middle East and Africa, as well as nearby Pakistan and Indonesia.

For these reasons, and also bearing in mind the problems experienced by the USSR Government in dealing with Muslims in Soviet Central Asia during the 1920s, the Chinese Communists adopted a cautious policy towards the Islamic religion in China. Communist troops moving into the northwest in the second half of 1949 were warned to respect the Muslims' religion and customs, to the point of not making a noise outside mosques or posting notices on their walls.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the early conciliatory policy, there was continuing Muslim resistance to the Communists, including a revolt by Kazakhs in north Xinjiang during 1950 and early 1951.\textsuperscript{17}

The third major religion in China, Christianity - with approximately three million Catholics and 700,000 Protestants - lacked the weight of Islam, either in numbers of adherents concentrated in particular areas or in having foreign associations which the Communists did not wish to antagonize. In fact, Christianity was vulnerable to attack fundamentally because of its foreign associations - in Communist terminology its 'imperialist connections.' According to K.M. (Sardar) Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to Nanjing (and later to Beijing) and a vehement Asian nationalist: 'To have believed that a religion which grew up under the protection of foreign powers, especially under humiliating conditions following defeat, would be tolerated when the nation recovered its authority, showed extreme shortsightedness.'\textsuperscript{18} In dealing with Christianity in China, the Communists therefore first sought to rid the Church of its 'imperialist connections,' ostensibly in the name of
establishing a 'patriotic Chinese Church' but in practice as a means of bringing it under official control.

Although the movement to 'reform' the Christian Church in China was not officially launched until the second half of 1950 and has been linked with the anti-imperialism of the Korean War period by some commentators, its development can be traced from the earliest months of Communist rule. Like most social and cultural reforms, it was not officially inaugurated by the Communist authorities but by a group of 'progressive' Chinese spokesmen - in this case mostly Protestant laymen - who had some hopes that Christianity might be able to survive in China if it co-operated and compromised with the Communists. Just two days after the Communists entered Beijing, Zhao Zichen (Dean of the School of Religion at Yanjing University and one of the six vice-presidents of the World Council of Churches) wrote a letter to the American liberal Protestant journal, Christian Century, entitled 'Days of rejoicing in China.' Zhao stated that Christians in China were often too bourgeois in outlook and that 'an interpretation of the faith in relation to Marxism and Chinese culture' was necessary. In mid-June, three weeks after the Communists' victory in Shanghai, the newspaper Dagongbao set the reform movement in motion in the city when it published a letter entitled 'The Christian awakes' from five Chinese Christians who expressed their opposition to the exploitation of religion by imperialism. Following further correspondence, Wu Yaozong (a YMCA secretary who was to become the most prominent spokesman for Christian reform) wrote a series of articles for the newspaper. Wu proclaimed that the Church must cast off its imperialist ties and carry out the three principles of independence, self-support and self-propagation: principles which were to become the basis of the Protestants' Three Self Movement (sanzi yundong).

The movement took on a more structured appearance in early 1950 following visits to various parts of the country by 'progressive' Protestant delegations to liaise with local Protestant leaders in the interests of 'promoting a movement for the reform of Christianity.' In March, nineteen Protestants signed a widely-publicized statement entitled 'A message from the Christians of China.' The message pointed out that much of the church administration was still in the hands of missionaries, and in many instances church policies were still determined by mission boards abroad. Policy determination and financial administration must be passed over to Chinese leadership where this had not already been done.
Finally, in early May 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai and other government representatives held three meetings in Beijing with approximately twenty Protestant leaders from different parts of the country.29 Following these discussions, Wu Yaozong and government representatives drafted the Christian Manifesto which was approved by Zhou Enlai and which, despite initial opposition from a number of Protestant leaders, was to become the basic policy statement of the Three Self Movement.30 Denouncing Christianity's connection with imperialism, the Manifesto proclaimed that Christian churches and organizations in China must 'purge imperialistic influences from within Christianity itself' and that the movement for autonomy, self-support and self-propagation 'should complete its tasks within the shortest possible period.'31

The Manifesto was to be published in late July 1950 over the signatures of forty prominent Protestants; by the end of September it had reportedly been signed by over three thousand Protestants from all over the country.32 In October the Biennial Meeting of the National Christian Council, the central organization for Protestant churches in China, adopted the Manifesto following the exertion of strong government pressure.33 This marked a new official direction for Protestantism in China: the replacement of its association with the West by cooperation with the new Chinese Government.34

Conspicuous by its absence from the entire reform movement was the Roman Catholic Church. As Pan Zinian (Director of the Central-South Department of Education) later complained, such a campaign was 'not so easily developed in the Catholic Church.'35 The Vatican's continual denunciations of atheistic communism had already created a hostile atmosphere between the Chinese Communists and both Chinese and Western Catholics in China; the Papal Decree of June 1949 - announcing the excommunication of all Catholics 'who profess, and particularly those who defend and spread, the materialistic and anti-Christian doctrine of the Communists' - put the two on a collision course.36 In the words of Shanghai's North China Daily News, the church had 'declared war.'37 The Vatican's challenge was put into practice in China through its Papal Nuncio, Archbishop Antonio Riberi, who urged Catholic bishops in China to do everything in their power to oppose communism.38

The lines were drawn: Catholics were branded as 'reactionary' even by Protestant advocates of Christian reform39 and they were excluded from membership of the religious delegation to the Political Consultative
Conference held in September 1949 to establish a national government. It was not until November 1950 that the Government was able to 'persuade' a group of Chinese Catholics to declare their opposition to imperialism and their allegiance to the new Communist state. Their statement inaugurated a prolonged period of official pressure on Chinese Catholics – culminating in intimidation and large-scale arrests in the mid-1950s – to support a 'patriotic reform movement.'

If the Communist authorities were intent on severing the Christian Church's links with the West as part of their goal of bringing it under official control, what future could there be for missionary activity in China? Despite oft-repeated statements that the imperialists had used religion 'as an instrument of aggression, exploitation and deceit in China,' the continued presence of missionaries was not completely ruled out – at least in theory. The March 1950 'message from the Christians of China' stated that, although policy determination and financial administration would in future be in Chinese hands, missionaries could still be involved in 'special service projects.' At the same time, it warned missionaries that they would have to make 'difficult physical and mental readjustments,' living in economic austerity (possibly without their families) and subject to travel restrictions.

The subsequent Christian Manifesto, while not specifically referring to missionaries, gave a clearer idea of what lay in store for them when it stated that Christian churches and organizations which were still relying upon foreign personnel and financial aid 'should work out concrete plans to realize within the shortest possible time their objective of self-reliance and rejuvenation.' As even the liberal journal Christian Century (which had initially expressed sympathy with the idea of Christian cooperation with the new Government) later admitted, the Manifesto spelt 'the beginning of the end of missionary activity in China.' When details of Zhou Enlai's May meeting with Protestant leaders and the framing of the Manifesto started leaking out in June 1950, a number of Protestant missionaries in China also expressed the opinion that the writing was on the wall for missionary work in the country.

While the Government somewhat ambiguously continued to promise protection to all foreign nationals and their property, in practice it was pursuing a policy towards missionaries which was in line with the spirit of the Christian Manifesto. Although Zhou Enlai maintained in May
1950 that no missionaries would be forced to leave China, he revealed that the Government had every intention of eliminating their presence. Missionaries who left China on furlough were not being granted re-entry visas, he stated, nor were visas being granted to new missionaries. What he did not reveal was that, since the early months of Communist rule, the authorities had been attempting to speed up the process, if not of quickly eliminating the entire missionary presence then at least of achieving a similar purpose by preventing missionaries from carrying out their normal functions.

Pressures on Missionaries

Between the Communist victory and mid-1950, missionaries were subjected to increasing pressures which severely restricted the scope of their activities, virtually immobilized them and cut them off from large sections of their congregations. Like other foreign nationals, their initial favourable impression of the Communists - with soldiers quickly establishing order and even painting the characters zongjiao ziyou (religious freedom) on church and mission walls - soon became soured. As some missionaries had already reported from parts of north and east China occupied during the latter part of 1948 (after the Communists had tightened troop discipline and reiterated their guarantee of religious freedom), the 'hands off' policy was soon followed by one of interference.

These changes tended to follow the transfer from military to civilian authority and the arrival of Communist propaganda teams in the area to spread the new materialist, anti-imperialist ideology. Although the subsequent restrictions on missionaries were far from uniform (differing according to a number of variables which are discussed below), there was an overall increase of pressure during late 1949 and early 1950. The establishment of the People's Republic on 1 October and the reiteration in the Common Programme of guarantees of protection to foreign nationals and freedom of religious belief do not appear to have moderated the Communist practice of gradually stifling missionary activity. Far from it: many missionaries reported increased pressures in the early spring of 1950. 'The coils are tightening daily,' commented American Vincentian Bishop John O'Shea in March, seven months after the Communist occupation of his Ganzhou (south Jiangxi) diocese where the restrictions had so far been relatively mild. That the eventual aim
was to pressure missionaries into leaving China was indicated by reports that, along with the intensification of restrictions, missionaries were sometimes 'unofficially invited to leave' by officials - a practice which became widespread after China's entry into the Korean War.\textsuperscript{53}

The assault on missionaries was two-pronged: first, against the missionaries themselves, and second (in conjunction with the suppression of Christianity as a whole), against the participation of Chinese Christians in their activities. Like other Westerners, but often to a greater extent, missionaries were subjected to a range of physical restrictions as well as to psychological and economic pressures: the temporary or permanent occupation of part or all of mission premises (including schools, dispensaries, hospitals and orphanages), the refusal of travel permits, heavy taxation, detention and even arrest. In addition, the Communists curtailed the missionaries' effectiveness through an assault on their Chinese followers: Chinese priests were made to do productive labour whilst lay Christians were alienated both from Western missionaries and from the Church in general by a combination of ideological pressure and even physical restraint.\textsuperscript{54}

The most widespread initial assault on missionaries was the Communists' use, occupation and virtual takeover of part or all of mission premises for their own purposes. In small towns and villages such action was understandable; the church or mission compound was often the only large building in the area suitable for quartering occupying forces and later civilian administrators, for storing grain and other foodstuffs, or for holding public meetings. But in towns and large cities alike, many missionaries found themselves squeezed into a smaller and smaller part of their former premises and often finally squeezed out altogether. 'All the stations of the diocese, including the central station, are at least partially or temporarily occupied,' stated a typical China Missionary Bulletin report of May 1950 on the situation in one Catholic diocese in Hunan province.\textsuperscript{55}

This thinly disguised occupation of missions, which was contrary to the Communists' guarantee to protect the property of foreign nationals, was described by the authorities as the 'lending' of premises to Chinese 'guests,' euphemisms which missionaries used cynically in their letters and reports. 'Our friends at the China Inland Mission [two elderly German women] are entertaining 150 guests,' wrote American Mennonite Dorothy McCammon from the Sichuanese town of Hechuan.\textsuperscript{56} And a China
Inland Mission worker in Quxian (Zhejiang) reported: 'We are "lending" the chapel these days to various organizations for their meetings.' Missionaries complained that resident Chinese 'guests' often treated their ostensible hosts with derision and contempt, subjecting them to personal searches and failing to return 'borrowed' property. 'They do not consider that we have rights,' reported a CIM missionary from a rural Guizhou mission which had about one hundred 'guests' on the compound, while a fellow CIM missionary wrote from Luoshan in Sichuan: 'Our comrades visit us daily, and seemingly are very fond of our things.'

As well as restricting many missionaries to a small part of their mission compounds and even limiting their access to their own churches, the authorities also often forbade them from preaching outside the mission. China Inland Mission workers, to whom open-air preaching and tract distribution (particularly on market days) were vital, reported from a number of centres that their activities were being confined to their chapels. Even when missionaries were permitted to preach beyond their compounds, they were frequently prevented from travelling outside the town in which they lived. The travel restrictions imposed on all Westerners (a travel permit was needed to go outside the city or town limits) were felt particularly keenly by missionaries - both Catholic and Protestant - because of the importance of visits to outstations and surrounding villages. Even after the setting up of the appropriate administrative machinery, the lack of which was sometimes initially blamed for the situation, permits were rarely granted. In February 1950 China Inland Mission headquarters in Shanghai reported that its missionaries were finding it almost impossible to obtain permits: 'From all quarters have come statements that this situation is causing real difficulty.' Catholic missionaries similarly reported from a number of areas that their apostolic work had been brought almost to a standstill because of the travel restrictions. Nor were missionaries holding administrative positions at the missions' Shanghai headquarters - such as Methodist Ralph Ward and Presbyterian Frank Price - able to obtain permits to visit their supervisory areas.

The usual justification given by the authorities for refusing travel permits was concern for the missionaries' personal safety. Certainly, continued resistance to the Communists was still rife in late 1949 and early 1950, particularly in Hunan, Fujian and the southwest provinces of Guizhou, Guangxi and Yunnan, where both Nationalist troop remnants and
local 'bandits' made travel hazardous. 64 As a number of missionaries discovered, even towns and villages were not immune from attack, particularly at night. In the Yuanling diocese in Hunan, two rural Catholic missions were completely pillaged in June 1949 and seven others suffered robberies. 65 At the China Inland Mission outside Bijie in Guizhou, bandits badly beat up a doctor and his wife; 66 another woman missionary at the lepersarium later disclosed that for two months after the attack she slept in her clothes because banditry was still rife in the area. 67

Aware that the death of any foreign missionary would be blamed on the Communists rather than on 'bandits' (as had sometimes happened during the Civil War), the authorities were understandably wary about letting missionaries venture into the countryside. The simplest action was simply not to grant travel permits. An alternative, particularly in less threatened areas, was to put the onus completely on the missionaries themselves; in Jiangxi province one CIM missionary had to write a letter absolving the authorities from all responsibility whenever he went outside the town of Luoping. 68

But the 'bandit' argument, while valid in some cases, was so frequently and widely used that it became little more than a convenient formula - a useful pretext for virtually immobilizing foreign missionaries, or at least for cutting them off from each other and also from large numbers of Chinese Christians and potential converts. And whilst missionaries had trouble getting permission to visit outstations, those already living in the countryside did not always experience restrictions on their travel in the opposite direction - only to find that they were unable to return. 69 Nor did the few missionaries wishing to leave China - helping to fulfil the Government's ultimate objective - at this stage normally experience serious problems in obtaining travel and exit permits. According to a report from Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) in Chahar, Catholic priests were permitted to leave the city only if they wished to return to their native countries: 'If such a request is made, it is easily complied with.' 70 Similarly, foreign missionaries were reportedly prohibited from travelling on the railway between Suiyuan and Datong unless it was to leave China. 71

A further pressure exerted by the Communist authorities in suppressing missionaries' religious activities - and also facilitating the takeover of their schools and hospitals - was the imposition of heavy
taxation, a problem which Protestant and Catholic missionaries shared with Western businessmen and private individuals alike. While the failure to pay taxes normally led only to the imposition of heavy fines on Western business enterprises, some missionaries found themselves personally vulnerable. Priests at a mission in the Nanyang diocese in Henan, for example, had their personal property taken away when they were unable to pay the prescribed taxes, while a Trappist brother in the Chengdu diocese in Sichuan was imprisoned for a month for failing to pay the taxes imposed on his monastery. Some smaller missions were forced to close, not as a result of direct occupation and/or the squeezing out of missionaries, but simply because they were unable to meet the taxes levied on their property. By June 1950, the China Bulletin was predicting that the small number of Protestant missions which had so far had to close down for financial reasons 'will begin steadily to increase.'

Like their fellow-Westerners in Shanghai, missionaries were also vulnerable to detention or imprisonment. Whilst most of the Shanghai cases concerned traffic violations or alleged assaults on individual Chinese, however, the charges against missionaries - especially Catholics - already encompassed a wide range of specific and general charges and sometimes involved the holding of public trials: features that were to become commonplace during the anti-missionary assault of 1951. One such case occurred in Luoyang in March-April 1949 when a Catholic bishop and two priests were tried on charges ranging from failure to obtain a travel permit to visit country parishes and hiding cases of relief medicines, to encouraging celibacy in order to depopulate China and being agents of the foreign imperialists and exploiters of the Chinese people. After lengthy interrogation and two public trials (one in the Luoyang Cathedral and one out-of-doors when the three men were kept standing for seven hours), Bishop Bassi, who had already spent eight days in prison for not obtaining a travel permit and a further four months under house arrest, was released. Father Theodori, Vicar-General and Bursar of the Luoyang diocese, was found guilty of hiding a number of cases of relief medicine (he claimed that he had put them underground as a precaution against looting during the takeover of the city) and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and six months' house arrest.

The most ominous charge in the case was that against Father Zotti, Director of the Luoyang Catholic Hospital, who was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and a further year under house arrest for allegedly
causing the death of a woman in childbirth. The dying woman had been brought to the hospital by her husband who begged the priest to operate, despite his warnings that the operation had virtually no chance of success. A month later, the man was reportedly urged by Communist officials to bring a charge against the priest. Such accusations of negligence in caring for Chinese patients were to reach their peak in the orphanage 'scandal' of 1951, but they were already being used against some medical missionaries well before the heightened ideological tensions of the Korean War period.

At this stage, however, the Communist authorities' efforts to persuade Chinese people to denounce foreign missionaries - particularly those engaged in medical work, relief and education - were not always successful. 'An attempt by the Reds to more or less force the refugees to make trouble for us fell so flat that they gave up,' reported John Sullivan, Tianjin representative of the Catholic Welfare Committee of China. At Xinxiang (Henan) a priest at a Catholic middle school was charged with boxing the ear of a pupil (who had allegedly kicked him first) and the school's director was arraigned on the more general charges of employing a former Nationalist soldier who had not registered with the authorities and of having deterred Catholic students from participating in public meetings. But when the authorities attempted to stage a public trial, they were unable to persuade Catholic teachers or students to denounce the two men; the priest was subsequently forbidden to continue teaching, but the school's director merely received a reprimand. Under the pressures engendered by the mass campaigns of the Korean War period - particularly the weeding out and imprisonment or execution of alleged counter-revolutionaries - Chinese Christians were to become much more amenable to official pressure to denounce their foreign associates or teachers.

As well as attempting to utilize Chinese Christians in their assault on foreign missionaries, the Communist authorities were concurrently putting strong pressures on Chinese priests and laymen alike to give up both their association with the foreign exponents of the 'imperialist religion' and their practice of Christianity as a whole. Continuing publicly to espouse the 'freedom of religious belief,' the authorities frequently exerted pressure by way of practical obstacles rather than direct prohibition. The religious activities of Chinese priests and pastors were not considered by the Communists to be productive and, like
Buddhist priests and nuns, they were expected to work for a living. Whether occupied in tilling fields, selling vegetables, weaving stockings or making shoes, their religious training and activities became limited to 'after hours.' At one China Inland Mission bible school, for example, the Chinese trainees began classes at 5.30am, worked at carpentry and woolspinning from 8am to 6pm, and studied again until 9pm.

Indirect pressures were exerted on lay Christians to inhibit them from attending church services. Communist soldiers or policemen sometimes stood at the back of the church with their rifles, interrupted services or catechism classes to ridicule the doctrine, taunt the catechists or deliver lectures denouncing both religion and imperialism. Even more intimidating to some worshippers was the official recording of their names and addresses. At one Catholic church in Nanyang (Henan), for example, police officers forced Christians attending Mass on feast days, which attracted larger attendances than usual, to remain in the church after the service and give their names and addresses for registration.

The mere presence of groups of Communist soldiers or police outside churches and mission compounds proved sufficient to deter many from practising their religion publicly. Gregory Gilmartin, a Maryknoll priest in the Guangxi town of Pingluo, reported that the stationing of guards at the mission's entrance had led to 'very diminished numbers attending Mass' on the first Sunday after the Communist occupation in December 1949. By March 1950, Chinese Christians who attempted to enter the mission premises were 'always questioned and sometimes given a rough time.' The 'rough time,' reported in a large number of incidents, included being quizzed about the reasons for going to church and ridiculed for believing in the 'superstitious ceremonies' of foreigners and imperialists. In some cases, villagers walked several miles to attend Mass only to be stopped at the church entrance and told to return home to produce something useful instead of wasting their time. When American Robert Greene alleged that the action of soldiers in preventing Christians from entering the Maryknoll mission in Dong'an was incompatible with the 'freedom of religion' sign painted on the mission wall, the officer-in-charge replied with one of the many standard justifications for the Communists' apparently contradictory actions:

Freedom of religion means that you have freedom to practise your religion here. The people also have freedom of religion ... [but] no religion should take
the people from their work. The Chinese people - all of them - must be productive citizens of the State.37

Variables in Treatment

Although missionaries as a group were generally subjected to greater pressure and intimidation than were most other Westerners, their individual experiences varied markedly. The major variables in their treatment by the Communist authorities, clearly apparent in this early phase and becoming even more pronounced during the Korean War, were: the missionaries' religious persuasion, the type of activity in which they were involved, whether they lived in urban or rural areas, and their period of time under Communist rule. The Communists' treatment of any one missionary or missionary group resulted from the interaction of all these variables. At one extreme - those most tolerated by the Communists - were Protestants, particularly educational and medical personnel, in the major centres of foreign population. At the other extreme - missionaries subjected to the greatest hostility - were rural Catholics engaged in purely religious activities who lived in the longer-occupied northern and northeastern provinces.

Whilst Protestants, especially those concerned basically with evangelical activities, suffered along with Roman Catholics, by far the greatest hostility throughout the early Communist period was directed at Catholic missionaries: from the persecutions in the Northeast of 1946-1948 to the more subtle pressures of the immediate post-liberation period and the final assault during the Korean War. In the early post-liberation period, the activities of some Protestant missionaries, particularly teachers and doctors in the cities, were interfered with hardly at all. When they did suffer restrictions greater than those experienced by all Westerners, these were often petty and irritating rather than critical to their continued work. Even the China Inland Mission, more vulnerable because of its largely evangelical activities and because its missionaries were located away from the major centres of foreign population, reported in March 1950 that, despite the many adverse reports from its missionaries, there had been 'fewer untoward and hostile incidents than had been expected.'88

In contrast, the China Missionary Bulletin reported a stream of heavy assaults on the activities of individual Catholic missions throughout 1949. By January 1950, the editors had decided that, for the sake of
missionaries remaining at their posts, they would henceforth report only
the 'more propitious events of the Missions' and not 'the countless
vexations and restraints to which the church is being subjected.' Nevertheless, the stories which the journal continued to feature (by May
1950 it was refraining from naming the diocese in which the events had
taken place) revealed a general pattern of pressure on Roman Catholic
missions far more severe than that on Protestant missions - from the
occupation of mission property to the detention and trial of missionaries
and the intimidation of Chinese Christians. Reports from particular
areas confirmed the discriminatory treatment of Catholics. Commenting on
the treatment of missionaries around the Chongqing area in Sichuan, for
example, American Mennonite Dorothy McCammon stated that the Protestant
missionaries she knew of 'didn't suffer too much injustice' compared with
the Catholics.

The Communists' comparative hostility to Catholic missionaries can
be seen as a product of the three basic determinants of their attitudes
towards all aspects of the imperialist presence: their greater involve­
ment in past imperialist activities, their greater incompatibility with
the Communists' plans for the future, and their relative lack of useful­
ness during the transitional New Democracy period. Communist antipathy
towards the imperialist religion as preached by Protestant missionaries
was to some extent tempered by their history of involvement in social
reform and welfare activities - particularly by Americans - including
education and medical work. Although some Catholic missionaries had been
engaged in similar activities, they were much better known for their
material acquisitions in China. After gaining access to the Chinese
interior under the unequal treaties, the Catholic Church had become a
large rural landowner. It was also one of Shanghai's biggest real estate
operators. To the Chinese Communists - and not to them alone - its
representatives in China appeared more as aggressive foreign capitalists
and imperialists than as social reformers concerned with the welfare of
the Chinese people.

More recently, the Catholic Church had become closely associated
politically with the Nationalist regime and, by extension, with the China
policy of the United States. Even during the Civil War, the Vatican had
continued to express vocal support for the Communists' opponents. The
Archbishop of Nanjing, Yu Bin, had been closely identified with Chiang
Kai-shek, both as a member of the Executive Yuan and as an active
campaigner and publisher on behalf of the Nationalist Government. Like Cardinal Tian Gengxin, the only Chinese cardinal, he was in America in 1949 and did not return to China after the Communists' victory.

So far as the future was concerned, the Chinese Communists saw some possibility of compromise with Protestantism through the creation of a reformed 'patriotic' church. While ultimately involving the cutting of all links with the West, this policy was not basically opposed by most missionary boards - a truly indigenous church was theoretically the ultimate aim of Protestant missionary activity - and was vocally supported by progressive Protestant missionaries in China. The Communists' formula for Protestantism in China was thus compromise (admittedly on their own terms), not conflict, in the process of bringing it under state control. Although this new patriotic church would be free of 'imperialist connections,' the Communists' more moderate attitude extended to the treatment of Protestant missionaries. But there was no real chance of compromise with Roman Catholicism - either its Chinese or Western representatives - as the authorities were discovering in their largely futile attempts to 'reform' the Catholic Church in China. To the Communists, the Vatican's claim for the loyalty of a section of China's population, necessitating opposition to the new Government's materialist Marxist ideals and allegiance to a foreign Pope, was only another example of foreign imperialist intervention in China's internal affairs. The restraints which applied to the authorities' treatment of Protestant missionaries in China did not therefore extend to their Catholic counterparts.

Immediate pragmatic concerns also prompted the Communists' more moderate treatment of Protestant missionaries. As in the past, Protestants had a greater degree of involvement in education and medical work. Indeed, the type of activity being carried out by missionaries (whether Catholic or Protestant) was the second variable determining their treatment by the Communists. Most vulnerable were purely religious activities. Amongst Protestants, for example, the basically evangelical China Inland Mission suffered more than most other missionary groups. Individual missions sometimes found that, while their religious activities were virtually extinguished, they were able to continue their educational or dispensary operations. Although the Government's ultimate aim was the eradication of religion and its replacement by Marxist ideology, it did not intend basically to eradicate missionary
institutions - whether education, medical services or other welfare
operations including orphanages and old people's homes - but to take over
their functions.

The Communists' eventual intention to integrate these missionary
establishments - like Western business enterprises - into their own net-
work was temporarily moderated by pragmatic considerations: the con-
tinued use both of foreign expertise and foreign funds to give the
Communists a breathing space. At the same time, the establishments were
subjected to strict Communist supervision and control, a feature graphi-
cally demonstrated in the case of the Christian colleges which will be
discussed separately. However, missionary schools, hospitals and other
institutions were by no means all permitted to continue operations; their
treatment depended on the other interrelated variables - whether they
were Catholic or Protestant, whether they were in urban or rural areas,
and their length of time under Communist control.

The third major variable in the treatment of missionaries was their
location in urban or rural areas. Best treated were missionaries in the
major centres of foreign population, followed by those in provincial
capitals and the larger cities; at the bottom of the list came mission-
aries in towns and villages. In cities with the largest foreign popu-
lations - Shanghai (where most Catholic and Protestant mission boards had
their China headquarters), Tianjin and Beijing - the Communist authori-
ties generally treated missionaries little differently from other
Westerners, subjecting them only to the usual travel restrictions and
petty frustrations. Wishing to portray a 'correct' public image of
observing their guarantee of religious freedom and sensitive to any
allegations that they were not fulfilling that guarantee, they did not
single out individual missionaries as 'models' for press attacks in
either the nationalist assertion campaign or labour disputes, although
they could undoubtedly have found suitable targets. In fact, the entire
squeeze on missionaries up to mid-1950 was carefully unpublicized (the
authorities denied that it was happening at all), unlike the later
assault on missionaries as 'imperialist spies' which was publicly
utilized by the Communist media to add intensity to the political cam-
paigns of 1951 as well as justifying the complete elimination of the
missionary presence.

In cities outside the major centres of foreign population, the
authorities also generally adopted a more moderate attitude than they
did in the countryside, as indicated in letters and reports from both Protestant and Catholic missionaries. Dr Frank Cartwright, Chairman of the China Committee of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, reported in December 1949 that Protestant churches in villages and market towns had suffered 'more serious injury than have those located in the cities.'100 The experience of the Presbyterian Church of the United States (Southern) in Jiangsu bore out this generalization. While its work in the larger cities was reportedly continuing 'much as usual,' large numbers of outstations had been forced to close - 106 in the Suqian mission field alone and similar numbers in the neighbouring fields of Qingjiang and Yancheng.101 Similarly, American Vincentian Joseph Gately informed his Philadelphia headquarters in February 1950: 'In Ganzhou (South Jiangxi) all is well. In the big city there are not the headaches of the countryside.'102

The Communists, in addition to being more concerned about maintaining their image of religious freedom in large cities than they were in the countryside (where missionaries were usually the only foreigners and were inhibited from reporting their worsening situation in letters to the outside world), appear to have had a deliberate policy of first eliminating missionaries from rural China where 70 percent of Chinese Protestants and 80 percent of Chinese Catholics lived.103 On the basis of his experiences in Wuhua (Guangdong), Maryknoller Howard Trube suspected that 'despite the high-sounding guarantees ... secret orders had been issued to impede the Church' in the rural catechumates.104 There were also reports that the authorities stepped up their suppression of Chinese Christians once missionaries left a particular area.105

Pressures on rural missions were admittedly intensified in the north and northeast by the carrying out of land reform, which included the confiscation of church lands and was often accompanied by the banning of public meetings, including church services.106 However, the land reform programme did not commence in south, southeast and west China - where CIM missionaries, Catholic Vincentians and others were already complaining about their discriminatory treatment in rural areas - until after the promulgation of the national Agrarian Reform Law on 30 June 1950.

Although the pressures on rural missions might well have been instigated by the central authorities, the severity of the measures cannot be attributed solely to official policy. As one CIM worker indicated, missionaries were suffering particularly adverse treatment
'in country districts where the central authority is less strongly felt' — prey to the idiosyncracies of local cadres who lacked the discipline of the occupying forces whose 'hands off' policy had impressed many missionaries. In his 1950 May Day speech summarizing the Communists' achievements and problems during the previous year, Liu Shaoqi admitted that there had been 'many shortcomings and errors' amongst some cadres who, instead of strictly pursuing State and Party policies, had adopted 'a rude manner of work, taking no heed of the actual situation....' And if Western consuls and businessmen in Shanghai complained that they had to deal with ignorant, youthful 'country yokels,' missionaries in provincial towns and villages frequently found themselves at the mercy of even less educated cadres who were not even subject to the close control of higher officials. Communist spokesmen and their apologists admitted that 'cadres assigned to the rural areas have in general been less well informed than those who entered the cities.'

Large sections of the rural population had been subjected to what Liu Shaoqi called the 'rude manner of work' adopted by some cadres but foreign missionaries appeared to be particularly vulnerable. They were a readymade target for those Communist cadres who were newcomers to the area and who had the task of establishing their authority, as well as gaining the support of and mobilizing the often suspicious local population. Locally recruited cadres, inheritors of a century of rural anti-foreignism which had occasionally resulted in violent outbursts against missionaries, had the opportunity to assert their new authority and even to pay off personal grudges against the foreign missionary in his segregated mission compound. 'They ended up being more hostile and hastier than the old Party members from the north,' commended Maryknoller Francis Daubert on his experiences in the Guangxi town of Lipu.

The lack of tight central control over local officials was evident from the varying treatment meted out to missionaries in the same area. While Catholic priests in the Nancheng diocese of Jiangxi (where missionaries generally suffered comparatively little interference before mid-1950) reported that they were 'able to carry out their work substantially,' those in the neighbouring diocese of Yujiang complained that the civil authorities seemed to 'overstep the spirit and letter of religious liberty promised by the People's Government in Peking,' requiring missionaries to obtain permission before conducting any religious ceremony and submit a daily report listing the names, ages and
occupations of all persons attending these ceremonies. There were marked discrepancies of treatment even within a single diocesan district. Whilst some Maryknoll priests in the Guangzhou diocese received permission to travel in the countryside, others were denied permits; some Vincentian primary schools in the Ganzhou diocese were allowed to operate but others were not. The Vincentians' continuing contradictory experiences led Bishop John O'Shea to conclude in February 1950: 'Much depends on the attitude of local authorities. Many still interpret the laws and orders from the Central Government according to their own sweet will.'

The Beijing Government and its spokesmen, consistently maintaining that the Communists were fulfilling their official guarantee of religious freedom, dissociated themselves from what they termed the 'abnormal conditions' being experienced by some missionaries. They attributed these conditions to the 'misunderstanding of the lower ranks of the political workers who do not have a full grasp of the real government policy in regard to religious bodies.' It was true, as official spokesmen pointed out, that excesses were 'to be expected during the first days of the revolution.' But if local authorities sometimes interpreted the policy of the Central Government 'in accordance with their own sweet will,' the overall uniformity of their actions (including the use or takeover of mission property, prohibitive taxation, and the general intimidation of both missionaries and their Chinese priests and congregations), set against the background of their early attempts to bring the Christian church in China under Communist control and cut its links with the West, indicated that the Government was pursuing a deliberate policy of gradually squeezing Western missionaries out of China. And whilst the 'abnormal conditions' experienced by hundreds, if not thousands of individual missionaries (both Protestant and Catholic) did not always have official sanction, the Beijing Government was indirectly inciting both local authorities and the population at large with its media attacks on imperialist aggression and religious superstition.

Seeking nationwide support, the Government allowed local officials a degree of licence to vent their long-felt hostility against the foreign missionary who, like all foreigners remaining in China, also served as a convenient focus of attack during the transitional period of social and economic instability. But the Government balanced licence with control; it turned a blind eye to local excesses only until they threatened to get
out of hand. In April 1950, amidst growing criticism that the Government was not adhering to its guarantee of 'religious freedom,' the central authorities decided that some local officials were going too far (or at least moving too quickly) and publicly called a halt to their more excessive actions. Reiterating the official policy on religion, they prohibited the outright seizure of religious buildings, at least without 'prior consultation' with their occupants.\textsuperscript{118} The following month, when some militant Communist cadres in Beijing were using fiery language against missionaries and even suggesting that they be expelled from China, Premier Zhou Enlai warned that the anti-foreign excesses of the 1920s would not be permitted to recur.\textsuperscript{119} Even during the Korean War, when they were utilizing the latent anti-missionary sentiment in China to add intensity to the mass political campaigns, the central authorities kept a firm hand on the hostility that they themselves were deliberately provoking.

The fourth major variable affecting the treatment of missionaries at any particular time was the period they had spent under Communist control. Their treatment up to mid-1950 ranged from severity - bordering on persecution - in areas of the north and northeast, where they had been under the Communists for up to three years, to comparative non-interference in some other areas of China - especially the south and southeast - where they had been subjected to Communist control for barely six months. The period under Communist control was significant for two reasons: first, the stage reached by the Communists in consolidating their power and implementing their economic and social policy - including that towards missionaries; and second, the CCP's overall line ('leftist' or more moderate) towards missionaries at the time of takeover.

In the north and northeast - unlike most parts of China - even missionaries in the cities were under heavy assault. At Yingkou, for example, the Catholic mission was taken over for use as a public school and as housing for local families;\textsuperscript{120} in Qiqihar the Catholic Cathedral was used by the authorities as a storehouse.\textsuperscript{121} The pressures were even stronger in rural areas where land reform (completed in northeast and north China, apart from Suiyuan, by mid-1950) combined with heavy taxes and psychological intimidation to force the closure of the majority of missions. By early 1950, Catholic missionaries had been squeezed out of eight of twelve districts in the Yingkou diocese and every one of the twenty outstations was occupied.\textsuperscript{122}
Qi Qi diocese, only six remained open in mid-1950. Official hostility was so strong in some areas that priests (whether foreign or Chinese) did not 'dare to contact Christians and vice versa,' while the saying of Mass was prohibited outright in many surviving churches.

The Protestant story was similar. Even the *China Weekly Review*, which consistently played down - and even justified - the Communists' pressures on missionaries, admitted that between 70 and 80 percent of all rural Protestant churches in the north and northeast had been closed by the second half of 1949. Whilst the China Inland Mission reported that its activities in south and southwest China were continuing with only minor restrictions, it disclosed in February 1950 that a very large percentage of its churches in the north had had to close.

The particularly adverse situation of both missionaries and Christianity in general in the north and northeast was partly a legacy of the 'leftist excesses' of the 1946-1948 period. Admittedly, the tightening of army discipline and the renewed promises of 'religious freedom' during 1948 had initially eased the situation; some goaled priests were released and several churches, schools and hospitals were permitted to reopen. But large numbers of churches and missions had already been destroyed, local Christians had been permanently alienated from the Church through fear, and local cadres had not always reformed their ways in accordance with the Government's official guarantees. The 'ultra-leftist' phase was, however, only partly to blame for the missionaries' adverse position in mid-1950. The halting of most physical violence after mid-1948 had only been replaced by the exertion of the less direct pressures that were becoming familiar in large areas of China and the stage reached in the north and northeast by mid-1950 - the virtual strangulation of mission activity - gave an indication of what other areas could expect as Communist control was consolidated and the new Government's economic and social policies were put into effect.

At the opposite extreme, in some of the areas occupied by the Communists only in late 1949 - particularly the south and southeast provinces - the authorities' interference in the activities of missionaries, even Roman Catholics, was comparatively mild before mid-1950. In the Nancheng diocese of Jiangxi, for example, Catholic churches and schools continued to function without restrictions and local authorities were reportedly 'easily dissuaded' from using churches for public meetings.
Thomas Malone, noted in his diary in March and April 1950 that, although he was unable to obtain a travel permit to leave Guangzhou, the work of his priests in surrounding Guangdong dioceses had gone on without serious interference since the arrival of the Communists in October 1949.128 As late as mid-1950, the Catholic Cathedral in Fujian's capital, Fuzhou, was still attracting seven hundred worshippers a day,129 while reports from rural missions in the province also indicated a policy of lenience. In the western town of Tingzhou the Catholic mission was said to be 'wonderfully quiet' and Communist soldiers were polite and apologetic when they searched the mission premises after two hundred 'bandits' had forced their way into the town and murdered a number of people.130 Although the presence of bandits made travel in the countryside precarious and even life in rural towns hazardous, their suppression occupied much of the Communists' attention in the newly-occupied areas of south and southeast China and helped give missionaries a short respite. Writing of his experiences in the Guangxi town of Lipu after its occupation by the Communists in November 1949, Maryknoller Francis Daubert commented: 'During the first year it wasn't too bad. The main objective was the suppression of the bandits ... practically all Nationalist troops who had taken to the mountains.'131

But there were already indications that the initial phase of 'toleration' would soon be followed, as in areas of China under Communist control for longer periods, by one of pressure and intimidation. First came the economic pressures. The favourable reports from Tingzhou in early 1950 that the work of Catholic missionaries 'had not been hindered in the least' were accompanied by complaints that heavy taxes were beginning to create 'a real problem for the Mission.'132 Catholic missionaries from the Ji'an diocese in Jiangxi stated that, although relations between civil officials and the Church were continuing 'without incident,' all missions in the diocese were experiencing financial difficulties because of heavy taxation.133

For missionaries who had been under Communist rule for only a short time, there were two regional variables which created exceptions to the general pattern. The first was the exertion of heavy pressure on missionaries in west China, especially Sichuan, almost as soon as the Communists came to power. This appears to have been at least partly due to the Christian Church's relative newness and weakness in the area. In general, Christian missions dated from only the early twentieth century
and, with the exception of the West China Union University, there was little in the way of Christian education and medical services.\textsuperscript{134}

The second regional variable was the moderate treatment - even compared with other areas under Communist control for only a short time - of Christian missions in northwest border provinces including Gansu, Xinjiang and Ningxia. Anxious to appease the region's large Muslim populations, the authorities put a good deal of stress on their official policy of 'religious freedom' and were reportedly inhibited from attacking any religious group, Christians included. In early 1950, Catholic missionaries in the Gansu capital of Lanzhou reported that they enjoyed 'nearly complete freedom';\textsuperscript{135} similar reports came from China Inland Mission workers in the Ningxia town of Pingluo.\textsuperscript{136} Both commentators attributed the lack of official pressure to the presence of large numbers of Muslims. In April 1950, when many Catholics throughout the country were being intimidated from attending church services, the observance of Easter went on as usual in the northwest provinces - to be followed two months later by the celebration of the Feast of Ramadam, with even greater pomp and ceremony, by the Muslim inhabitants.\textsuperscript{137}

Compared with the above four variables, the nationality of missionaries does not appear to have been a significant factor in determining their treatment by the Communists. Throughout 1949 and early 1950 the anti-imperialist rhetoric in the Communist media was focussed strongly on the United States, reaching fever pitch over specific allegedly hostile American actions such as the withdrawal of US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart from Nanjing and the publication of the White Paper on China in August 1949.\textsuperscript{138} Yet this media hostility, set against the US Government's continuing support for the Nationalists, was not strongly reflected in the Communists' treatment of American missionaries who accounted for approximately one half of all Protestant missionaries but only a small proportion of Catholics. There were only occasional signs of Americans being subjected to greater pressure: for example, some Protestants in central China felt that the White Paper had made the local authorities more belligerent towards American missionaries in the area.\textsuperscript{139} Overall, however, the missionaries' religious persuasion, activities, urban or rural location, and their period of time under Communist rule, appear to have been much more significant variables during 1949 and early 1950 - and continued to be so even in the Korean War. Indeed, Americans were particularly heavily represented in the group best treated by the
Communists: Protestants working in health and education (especially the Christian colleges) in the major cities.

Effects and Reactions

Even though the Communists' pressures on the Western religious presence in China were subject to wide variation, by mid-1950 missionary activity overall had been severely restricted. Whilst urban Protestants were still to feel the full weight of the Communists' assault, Catholic spokesmen admitted that the lives of many of their missionaries in China had 'become a succession of wearying, unfruitful days.' These pressures, set against the Communists' initial moves to sever the Chinese Church's links with imperialism - and at the same time bring it under state control - indicated that the writing was on the wall for foreign missionaries.

Yet the Communists' actions had not resulted in the large-scale exodus of Christian missionaries from China. The anxiety of many Westerners - particularly Americans - to leave China on the first available ship (following their speedy disillusionment with the new Government) was not matched even by American Protestants. When the General Gordon left Shanghai on 25 September 1949, for example, its 1,220 passengers included only 66 North American Protestant missionaries. The few Protestant missionaries who left China before mid-1950 did so for similar reasons as their colleagues had left on the eve of the Communist victory: they were elderly, in poor health or had young families in China. Having 'given it a go,' they no longer wanted to expose themselves or their families to the increasingly apparent risks of life under the Communists. Whilst some who were due, or overdue, for furlough insisted on remaining in China because they knew they could neither be replaced nor have the opportunity to return, others accepted that their time in China was over.

A further argument for leaving China stemmed from the Government's constant anti-imperialist tirade and more particularly its moves to cut the Christian Church off from its 'imperialist connections.' Some missionaries began to realize that their continued presence in China was doing more harm than good; they were becoming an embarrassment to both their Chinese colleagues and their congregations. As one young Protestant missionary put it: 'The most difficult development is that our Chinese friends feel compelled to cut off their contact with us....
We meet, we say hello, we move on. If the Christian Church was to have any chance of survival in China, some already concluded, the sooner it was no longer open to accusations of 'imperialist connections' the better. This argument was to become a fundamental reason for the complete withdrawal of Protestant missionaries after the intensification of anti-imperialist hostility at the end of 1950, but it was already being expressed by a few missionaries whose Chinese colleagues privately intimated that they would be better off without them, particularly as the details of Zhou Enlai's May meeting with Protestant spokesmen and the subsequent Christian Manifesto became generally known in Christian circles.

Whilst some Protestant missionaries on the spot realized that their time in China was limited because of the Communists' basic policies, a number of American mission boards - particularly those representing the liberal wing of the Church - put much of the blame on their own government. Like American companies with business interests in China, they expressed anger at the US Government's continuing support for the defeated Nationalists. Some individual mission boards (such as the Churches of Christ in America) put pressure on the US State Department to adopt a more 'realistic' policy towards China, including recognition of the People's Republic. However, they failed to obtain overall Protestant support and it was left to sixty-eight mission representatives, acting as individuals, to forward a strongly-worded letter to the US authorities urging recognition of the Chinese Government. Without recognition, they warned, American missionaries in China lacked even consular protection. In fact, British recognition of the People's Republic in January 1950 was of as little benefit to British missionaries as it was to British businessmen; it did not lead to the Communists' acknowledgement of the official status of consular representatives still in China, far less to the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations. When a British consular official attempted to intervene on behalf of an arrested British nun in 1951, he was himself accused of improper behaviour and forced to submit a personal apology to the People's Government.

In contrast to most Protestant boards which continued to leave the decision of whether to remain in China to the individual missionaries in the field, the China Inland Mission retained the right of deciding if and when its missionaries should leave. Despite the severe restrictions placed on its evangelical activities, extreme pessimism about its future
in China, and even murmurings from some missionaries in the field that the time had come to leave, it reiterated that its missionaries were to remain in China. In February 1950, the General Director, Bishop Frank Houghton, defended the decision of the CIM Council, pointing out that the opportunities of the previous few months - limited though they might have been - would have been lost had the China Inland Mission abandoned China before the Communist victory. 'Conditions in China are difficult and sometimes dangerous,' he stated, 'but we firmly believe that we should press forward with the work while we can, whether our term of usefulness is to be reckoned in months or years.'

The Communists' even greater pressure on Catholic missionaries had, predictably, only strengthened the resolve of the Roman Catholic Church to remain in China, not out of optimism about the future but to challenge Godless Communism. After all, the Church had been born in persecution and had made its initial gains under persecution. 'The darkness of the hour does not spell defeat,' declared the China Missionary Bulletin. 'It is simply the element of battle.' Indeed, the problems being experienced by Catholic missionaries might even be God's way of making them recall 'the true realities - patience and suffering and trust in God.'

Despite the high-sounding Catholic rhetoric, the Communists' pressures were already taking their psychological toll on Catholic missionaries, particularly those in north and northeast China who had suffered at the hands of undisciplined Communist soldiers and cadres in 1946-1948, followed by persistent pressure during 1949. 'We all need a rest,' admitted Bishop Lapierre from Siping (southwest of Changchun), 'but this is not the time to take a rest.' In Guangzhou, the Maryknoll Society Superior for South China, Thomas Malone, had to resist an 'offer' by the authorities to permit priests to go across the border to Hong Kong - for medical treatment or simply for a break - on what was ostensibly a one-week travel permit. Because of the fear (indeed, the virtual certainty) that they would be stranded in Hong Kong, like three Maryknoll priests who had failed to obtain permission to return to China, Malone did not take advantage of the offer.

By mid-1950, the Communists had already gone about as far as they could go (and sometimes further) in suppressing missionary activity without grossly exceeding the bounds set by their own 'legal' guarantees of protection to foreign nationals and religious freedom, and their desire to present a public image of adhering to these guarantees. Although they
were murmurings from some officials that all missionaries should be expelled from China, there seemed little need to resort to such extreme measures – at least against Protestants. The official policy of not issuing re-entry visas or permitting new missionaries to come to China would eventually eliminate the Protestant missionary presence; even CIM missionaries would at some stage be withdrawn for furlough. Writing in mid-1950, before the intensification of Communist pressure, a Western commentator forecast that by 1952 'almost all Protestant missionaries will be out of China.'

But the Government could not so easily squeeze out Catholic missionaries who often spent a working lifetime in China without furlough. In mid-1950 it seemed that the Catholic challenge to the Communists was to some extent proving effective and that Roman Catholic missionaries in China would be shifted by nothing less than direct expulsion, an act which ran counter to the Government's guarantees and desired image. Within a few months, China's entry into the Korean War and the resulting mass political campaigns against both the external imperialist enemy and internal counter-revolutionaries was to give the Government a convenient pretext for a 'legal' assault on the remaining missionary presence.
Tucker, 'An unlikely peace: American missionaries and the Chinese Communists,' 104. Tucker reaches her conclusion from an examination of the Communists' official statements and guarantees (rather than their practices) and the experiences basically of Protestants, mainly in large cities, who received the most moderate treatment of all missionaries in China, as will be discussed below.

China Digest, 11 January 1949, 7.


See p.13.


For a discussion of the Chinese Communists' attitude to religion (and a comparison with the Russian view), see Rensselaer W. Lee III, 'General aspects of Chinese communist religious policy, with Soviet comparisons,' China Quarterly, 19 (July-September 1964), 161-73.

The Religious Affairs Bureau was established at a national level in January 1951. Headed by He Chengxiang, it came administratively under the Government's Culture and Education Committee, but actually took orders directly from the Party's Propaganda Department until 1952 and thereafter from the United Front Department. Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1, p.296.


For detailed analyses of the Chinese Communists' policy towards Buddhism, see Welch, Buddhism under Mao, passim, and Bush, Religion in Communist China, chapter 9.


ibid., 174.
The following is based on John Lindbeck, 'Communism, Islam and nationalism in China,' Review of Politics, 12:4 (October 1950), 473-88; and Bush, Religion in Communist China, chapter 8.

Estimates of the number of Muslims in China in the late 1940s vary widely, ranging from the official Communist estimate of 10 million to other estimates of between 20-30 million. See Lindbeck, 'Communism, Islam and nationalism in China,' 473, and Bush, Religion in Communist China, pp.264-65. According to Bush, p.265, the number of Han Muslims was approximately 5 million.

Bush, Religion in Communist China, pp.268-69; CMB, November 1949, 276.

Bush, Religion in Communist China, pp.269-70.


For a detailed history of the Communists' actions in bringing the Protestant churches under state control, and its frustrated attempts to do the same with the Roman Catholic Church, see Bush, Religion in Communist China, chapters 4 and 6.

The most active spokesmen for the reform movement were representatives of the YMCA and YWCA, the National Christian Council (the central organization for the Protestant churches in China) and the nonconformist Protestant churches. In addition to T.C. Chao (Zhao Zichen) and Y.T. Wu (Wu Yaozong) – see below – individuals who were particularly prominent in the movement (whether as signatories to the various letters and declarations, members of 'liaison' teams between the Government and the Church as a whole, or in meeting Zhou Enlai) included the General Secretary of the National Committee of the YMCA, Y.C. Tu (Du Yujing), the General Secretary of the Church of Christ in China, H.H. Tsui (Cui Xianxiang), the president of Jinling College, Wu Yifang, and Methodist Bishop Z.T. Kaung (Jiang Changchuan).

T.C. Chao (Zhao Zichen), 'Days of rejoicing in China,' Christian Century, 2 March 1949, 266. Dr Chao later wrote a second article, 'Red Peiping after six months,' Christian Century, 14 September 1949, 1066-68.


Wu had been head of the publicity department of the YMCA since the 1930s. In September 1949, he was the unofficial leader of the religious delegation to the preparatory committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Dagongbao, 20 December 1949 (CPR, no.1045, 20 December 1949).

Christian Century, 29 March 1950, 398-400. Of the nineteen signatories, eleven were on the Executive Committee of the National Christian Council and five were on the National Committee of the YMCA or YWCA. As their critics pointed out, the signatories did not officially represent the Protestant churches in China.

ibid., 399.

Bush, Religion in Communist China, 41-42; CMB, September 1950, 787; China Missionaries Oral History Project, Claremont Graduate School [hereafter, CMOHP]: E.L. Ikenberry.

For the history of the Manifesto and the manoeuvres surrounding its adoption, see Bush, Religion in Communist China, pp.177-83.


Renmin ribao, 5 December 1950.

Bush, Religion in Communist China, p.180. This is also apparent from an account of the meeting written by Y.C. Tu, General Secretary of the National Committee of the YMCA and one of the most prominent spokesmen for church reform. China Monthly Review, December 1950, 133-34.

Western missionaries had been excluded from attending the meeting. In Tu's words, it was an historical event because it had 'been planned and conducted entirely by Chinese Christians.' China Monthly Review, December 1950, 133.

Changjiang ribao (Hankou), 1 April 1951 (SCMP, no.94, 13-16 April 1951).

The decree was drawn up on 28 June 1949 and published in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 13 July 1949. It is partially translated and discussed in CMB, September 1949, 9-10.

NCDN, 16 July 1949.

See pp.278-79.

For example, statement by T.C. Chao, 'Red Peiping after six months,' Christian Century, 14 September 1949, 1067.

There were five Protestant delegates, one Muslim (in addition to Muslims representing national minorities) and two Buddhist delegates.

A statement advocating the severing of all ties with imperialism and the launching of a movement for the self-support and reform of the Catholic Church was reportedly signed by over five hundred Roman Catholics in Guangyuan in northern Sichuan. NCNA, Beijing, 12 December 1950 (SCMP, no.30, 14 December 1950).

On the resistance to the Communists' efforts to 'reform' the Catholic Church, see Bush, Religion in Communist China, chapter 4.


*Christian Century*, 15 November 1950, 1348.

Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.354, 367.

See, for example, Ke Bainian, 'New China’s Foreign Policy,' *China Digest*, 2 November 1949, 9.

*CMB*, September 1950, 787; CMOHP: E.L. Ikinberry. Since the Government did not release any details of Zhou Enlai's May meetings with Chinese Protestant leaders, the reports of what took place were largely second-hand.

See p.66.


Congregation of the Mission: Vincentians [hereafter, CMV], O'Shea to Leary, 12 March 1950. Analysing the experiences of Protestant missionaries in central China, Creighton Lacy states that the development of pressures (particularly in the spring of 1950) appeared 'on the whole to be gradual, but they served as "straws in the wind" before Korea.' Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' p.390. See also ibid., pp.353, 386.

*CMB*, January 1950, 97.

The following discussion is based chiefly on replies to a questionnaire by 225 Protestant missionaries (excluding representatives of the China Inland Mission) analysed by Lacy, 'Protestant Missions'; letters from missionaries published in 'China Notes' in the China Inland Mission's monthly journal *China's Millions*; reports from individual Catholic dioceses featured in the 'Monthly Chronicle' of the *CMB*; individual missionaries' published memoirs, unpublished reports and letters (including those of the American Catholic Maryknollers and the Congregation of the Mission: Vincentians, the two largest American Catholic groups in China), and interviews with missionaries (both personal and those in the Claremont Graduate School's CMOHP).


McCammon, *We Tried to Stay*, p.115.


*China's Millions*, May 1950, 56.

ibid.

In June 1950, Mao Zedong acknowledged that there still remained 'more than 400,000 bandits scattered in remote regions.' Mao, 'Fight for a fundamental turn for the better in the nation's financial and economic situation,' 6 June 1950, Selected Works, V, 29.

See below.

See, for example, China's Millions, September 1949, 60; Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.525-26; CMB, June 1950, 587-88.

See, for example, CMB, January 1950, 194.

Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, John J. Sullivan.

Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, Gregory Gilmartin.
This contrast is clearly reflected in the differences between reports in the China Missionary Bulletin in 1949-mid 1950 and those cited by Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' passim.

McCammon, We Tried to Stay, p.140. See also Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.313, 466.


See p.68.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Yu Bin (Paul Yu-pin) had accompanied the National Government to Chongqing and made a number of trips to Europe and the United States as its envoy. After the war he was closely associated with Yishi bao, the strongly pro-Nationalist newspaper of the Chinese Catholic Cultural Association. Following the Communist victory, he organized the Chinese Catholic Cultural Mission to South America to enlist support for the Nationalists. Howard L. Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967-1971), IV, 66-67.

Known in the West as Cardinal Thomas T'ien. ibid., III, 268-69.

See p.164.

See pp.198-200.

This generalization is based on CMB, 'Monthly Chronicle,' 1949-June 1950; Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.496-97, 503-508.

In the east China area, for example, street preaching and the distribution of tracts were banned in most places except Shanghai. Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.341, 361.

Frank T. Cartwright, 'Protestant missions in Communist China,' Far Eastern Survey, 28 December 1940, 303. Cf. statement by the China Inland Mission that, where difficulties were being experienced by its missionaries (located throughout China but now concentrated in the central and western provinces) they were 'usually in country districts.' China's Millions, September-October 1949, 60.

United Board of Christian Colleges in China, General Files, 1945-1958, M./14, Presbyterian Church of the United States (South), China Bulletin No.12, 10 October 1949. On the experiences of other Protestant missionaries, see Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.340, 383.

CMV, Gately to Leary, 14 February 1950. The Vincentians' Ganzhou diocese had eighteen main stations and 270 outstations.

NCNA, Beijing, 23 November 1950 (SCMP, no.23, 5 December 1950).
Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, Howard Trube.
Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, passim.
Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.390, 420.

China's Millions, September-October 1949, 60.
Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, Francis Daubert.

CMB, July-August 1950, 68.

ibid.
CMV, O'Shea to Leary, 29 October 1949.
CMV, O'Shea to Leary, 2 February 1950.

'A Message from the Christians of China,' Christian Century, 29 March 1950, 398. For a similar 'progressive' Western comment, see China Weekly Review, 21 January 1950, 120.


CMB, April 1950, 405-406. For the limited effects of the Government's action, see CMB, June 1950, 583; July-August 1950, 685, 686.
Reported by Ernest Leroy Ikenberry who administered Protestant relief funds for the National Christian Council. CMOHP: E.L. Ikenberry.

CMB, May 1950, 493.
CMB, September 1949, 770.
CMB, July-August 1950, 680.
ibid., 606.
CMB, November 1949, 795. See also CMB, January 1950, 189-90.
CMB, June 1950, 589.

CMB, July-August 1950, 687. See also ibid., 689.

CMB, July-August 1950, 687-88.

Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, Francis Daubert. See also ibid., Herbert Elliott; CMB, May 1950, 500.

CMB, July-August 1950, 686.

CMB, March 1950, 201.

Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.448-69.

CMB, May 1950, 494.

China's Millions, March 1950, 34.

CMB, February 1951, 188-89.

Dagongbao, 13 August 1949 (SCMP, no.949, 13-15 August 1949); China Digest, 24 August 1949, 3-5; Daily News Release, 20 April 1949; People's China, 1 April 1950, 5.

Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.360, 467. In general, comments on discriminatory treatment against Americans (both before and during the Korean War) were noticeably absent from the responses to the questionnaire, as Lacy himself comments. ibid., pp.314, 395, 616.

CMB, July-August 1950, 606.

Far Eastern Survey, 28 December 1949, 301.

Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.232, 320, 400.

Winburn T. Thomas, 'Soul-searching in China,' Christian Century, 10 August 1949, 936. Cf. McCammon, We Tried to Stay, p.135: 'We grew almost overly sensitive to the turned head and the downcast eye as we met friends on the street.'

Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' pp.366, 399, 400, 431-42; McCammon, We Tried to Stay, p.135; CMOHP: Edward Pearce Hayes. (Mr Hayes was a Methodist relief administrator in Fuzhou.) See also McConaughy to Secretary of State, 10 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1272. A missionary board cited by Frank Cartwright as having advised its missionaries to evacuate from areas coming under Communist control (probably the Lutherans) gave as one of the five principal reasons for its attitude: 'presence of the missionaries might bring undue risk to Chinese associates.' Far Eastern Survey, 28 December 1949, 305.

For example, statement of 13 October 1949 by the United Christian Mission Society (based in Indianapolis): '... the final decision as to continuing any phase of work in China is left up to the missionaries on [sic] the field.' For this and similar statements by North American mission boards, see *Far Eastern Survey*, 28 December 1949, 304-305.

*China's Millions*, February 1950, 10. See also *China's Millions*, November-December 1949, 71.

*CMB*, July-August 1950, 607. See also *CMB*, September 1950, 701.

*CMB*, October 1949, 180.

*CMV*, Walsh (Maryknoll) to Konen (St Vincent's Seminary, Philadelphia), 17 February 1950.


E. Bruce Copland, 'The Christian church in the Communist state: a missionary view,' *Theology Today*, 7:3 (October 1950), 341.
The continued presence in mid-1950 of some of the major components of the Western educational and cultural presence in China - the Christian colleges, a British and an American-owned newspaper, and a limited range of American and British films - outwardly gave the impression that the Chinese Communists were pursuing a moderate policy towards Western education and culture, just as their takeover or suppression in the early stages of the Korean War ostensibly indicated a dramatic change of policy. The contrast was illusory. In practice, the authorities began exerting strong pressures on the remaining representatives of Western education and culture in China soon after they came to power, in accordance with Mao's statement that the imperialists' cultural establishments - like their economic establishments - were to be brought under official supervision and control and 'dealt with' following country-wide victory.¹

In dealing with Western education and culture, the Communists' reaction against past imperialism was combined with their moves to establish in China - even in the transitional New Democracy period - an education and culture that was 'national, scientific and popular.'² The new direction of Chinese culture was overseen by the Government Administration Council's Culture and Education Committee, headed by Guo Moruo; under its direction came both education and a broad range of cultural pursuits ranging from literature, art, drama and film, to broadcasting and the press, the natural and social sciences, and even public health and sport.³

Whilst China's new culture appeared to allow no place for the Western bourgeois model,⁴ the Communists' treatment of different aspects of Western education and culture varied in accordance with their immediate usefulness or otherwise to the authorities. Just as the initial retention (and utilization) of Western business interests in China was part of the Communists' overall use of private enterprise for economic rehabilitation, so too was a relatively moderate policy towards the Christian colleges associated with the temporary utilization of all private education to avoid unnecessary disruption to the educational system. In both these cases, the Communists intended eventually to integrate at least some of the establishments into their own system, not to suppress them altogether. The more
specifically 'cultural' presence in China - whether owned or supported by Westerners, or more widely dispersed in the Chinese community - was generally subjected to greater official pressure because the new Government's basic aim was its suppression and replacement by Marxist-Leninist culture. Despite their varying treatment by the Communists, all aspects of Western education and culture in China were well on their way to extirpation by mid-1950. Their final takeover or suppression during the early stages of the Korean War merely brought the process to completion.

Education

The Government's treatment of the Christian colleges in China was a product of its policies both towards private education in general and towards Western-style, Christian-oriented education in particular. Private educational establishments, like private business enterprises, were initially permitted to continue their activities. A contemporary Western commentator described the Communists' educational policy in the New Democracy period as being 'calculated to arouse a minimum of resentment toward the new government and to discourage unnecessary interruptions in established routine.' As the Communists intended - but not all Westerners recognized - this moderation was only a temporary expedient until the Government was ready to implement its plans for the new educational system.

Although the Chinese educational system was not completely re-organized - and private education nationalized - until 1952, the Communists quickly began exerting influence over the administration of educational institutions and altering their curricula, in accordance with the statement in the Common Programme that the old educational system, subject matter and teaching methods would be reformed systematically. The stress in the future was to be on technical education, and a 'scientific historical viewpoint' was to be applied to the study and interpretation of the social sciences. Most of the changes - in Chinese and Western-subsidized private educational institutions alike - were not implemented through specific directives; as in the case of some other reforms - for example in the religious field - the authorities relied on progressive Chinese within the establishments.

Indeed, university teachers and especially students were amongst the most progressive of all urban Chinese. Intellectuals had become increasingly disillusioned with the Nationalists, even if they were not
all prepared to welcome the new regime with open arms. Students were the most vocal of the Communists' urban supporters; many who had left to join the Communists now came back to the universities whilst others revealed themselves as former underground members of the CCP. These teachers and students took a leading role in reorganizing the universities from within, insisting on the democratization of the university administration with teachers, students, and workers' representatives all playing a role in decision-making. The functions performed by the new decision-making committees included the selection of staff, the determination of salaries and the control and disposal of university finances. In the Christian colleges, Westerners were noticeably absent from these committees.

Whilst all higher educational establishments (as well as secondary and even primary schools) were gradually transformed in accordance with the Communists' new educational programme, the Western-sponsored Christian colleges were especially vulnerable because their basic purpose - the teaching of a Western liberal education with a Christian basis - ran directly counter to the Communists' plans for a technically-oriented education on a Marxist ideological base. As the reforms were implemented, the basic purpose of the Christian colleges was therefore increasingly undermined. First, with the new emphasis on technical education, enrolment in technical fields - especially engineering and medicine - increased, whilst those in the liberal arts declined. Those students who did study the liberal arts soon felt the effect of the Government's intention to apply a scientific historical viewpoint to subjects such as history, politics and international relations. Even in English courses, the emphasis shifted from literature to practical language study. Second, religious studies came under direct attack. In 1931 the Nationalists had decreed that religion could be taught only as a voluntary option, not as a compulsory course. Now the Communists removed it from the curriculum entirely. In theory, students were still permitted to study religion and conduct religious activities on an extra-curricular basis; in practice they were put under strong pressure to give up religion completely. Communist cadres and progressive students ridiculed those students who still attended bible reading classes and the college administration frequently scheduled meetings and labour sessions at the same time as Sunday church services.

In addition, compulsory courses in Marxist-Leninist ideology challenged both 'religious superstition' and the liberal values that the
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colleges had traditionally attempted to inculcate in their students. At Yanjing University, for example, students were required to study Historical Materialism and Social Evolution for three hours a week in the first semester, and the Principles of New Democracy for three hours a week in the second semester. Arts and social science students also had to take six hours a week of Political Economy. Admittedly courses on ideology were nothing new to Chinese students; the courses on Marxism replaced the former Civics courses which had been compulsory under the Nationalists.

While preparing the way for the eventual integration of the Christian colleges into the Chinese educational system, the Communists astutely continued to utilize both the colleges' foreign funding and the expertise of their Western personnel, just as they did with Western business establishments. The Government's decision to continue to permit the acceptance of foreign funds (all the universities were partially supported with funds from abroad), despite opposition from some radical elements, was a further illustration of its pragmatism in dealing with Western-financed establishments during the transitional period. At a meeting between Government representatives and religious leaders in May 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai squashed a suggestion that the Government should immediately cut off all financial ties with the West. He reportedly asked Yanjing University's president, Lu Ziwei, how long his university could survive without foreign backing; when Lu replied maybe for a few months, Zhou retorted that it would therefore be silly to take such action. In a further discussion with Lu later in the year, the Premier was quite blatant about the Government's motives when he stated that the university could continue to accept aid from abroad 'just as water from a robber's spring can be used for irrigation.'

The authorities were also prepared to make use of Western teachers, particularly in foreign languages and the sciences where skills were in short supply, so long as they played no role in the administration and conformed to the new ideological demands. On 2 June 1949 - a week after the Communists' victory in Shanghai - the press attempted to scotch rumours that foreign teachers at St John's University would suffer discrimination. But at the same time it took the opportunity to reiterate that the imperialists had always utilized missionaries to make the colleges bases 'for launching imperialist aggression against China.' At a meeting between the Shanghai Higher Education Department and
representatives of the city's private colleges on 7 June, foreign teachers were indirectly warned that the former situation whereby Chinese personnel had been regarded as subordinate to foreigners would no longer be tolerated. Whilst the proportion of Western teachers in Protestant universities was already very low - there were only ten remaining at St John's University and four at the University of Shanghai at the beginning of the 1949-1950 academic year - about half the teachers at the Catholic Aurora University were French priests, a situation that the Higher Education Department implied would not be permitted to continue when it complained that all the teachers in medicine and astronomy were foreigners.

In practice, Western teachers found themselves under criticism as curriculum changes were implemented. Teachers of English, for example, had to give up using Western 'imperialist' material even in language courses. One teacher at West China Union University in Chengdu who had frequently used short stories from the *Reader's Digest* was strongly criticized by her students and had to find more 'suitable' teaching material. Although the pressures were initially fairly subtle, Western teachers found themselves becoming increasingly redundant. First, as part of the Communists' suppression of the use of the languages of the imperialists, all teaching (apart from foreign languages) had to be done in Chinese. Second, the system itself began undergoing basic changes that included the full-scale adoption of the Soviet educational model, the arrival of Soviet teachers and eventually the replacement of English by Russian as the primary foreign language.

While being prepared in the short term to accept Western financial support and expertise, the Communists would tolerate absolutely no opposition to their administrative and curriculum changes. This was graphically demonstrated when the Catholic Fathers (American and German missionaries of the Divine Word) at Furen University in Beijing attempted to resist moves by progressive teachers at the university to establish a governing committee free of foreign membership and to introduce classes on Marxism-Leninism with accompanying attacks on religion. In mid-1950, after almost eighteen months of dissension and attacks on the university's imperialist nature in the Communist press, the matter finally came to a head when the university's Catholic sponsors, through their representative at the university, Rector Harold Rigney, decided to cut off their annual subsidy unless the Communist authorities agreed to a
number of conditions. These included the appointment of a new Board of Trustees by the Catholic Church, to have the power of veto over the employment of personnel, and the dismissal of five politically active professors. When the authorities predictably rejected these demands, the order’s headquarters (reportedly under instructions from the Vatican) refused to grant a subsidy for the financial year 1950-1951. In October 1950 the Ministry of Education formally took over the university amidst a welter of official accusations that the Catholic Church had made an 'attempt at interference ... in the sovereignty of Chinese education.' On his discussions with Education Minister, Ma Xulun, Rector Harold Rigney later stated he was told that 'the only connection the Church could continue to have with Fu Jen [Furen] was to finance it,' a situation that was already rapidly approaching in the Protestant colleges.

In fact, by mid-1950 the Communist authorities had already deprived the Christian colleges of many of the features that made them distinctive as Christian liberal colleges. In May, the United Board for Christian Colleges in China, after assessing reports from individual campuses, summarized the ways in which their basic ideals had already been impaired by the actions of the Communist authorities. On the question of the Christian nature of the institutions, it stated that there was an atmosphere of tension because of the materialist and atheistic teachings of communism. Instead of encouraging the arts and sciences in which liberal ideas were generally nurtured, there were strong pressures for vocational courses, as well as compulsory courses in communist ideology. More generally, academic quality had been impaired because of the shorter periods of training than had previously been considered necessary and the distraction of both teachers and students by political matters. The overall picture was one of 'very serious developments, both actual and threatening, which cause us grave concern now and for the future.'

Although Philip West stresses that Yanjing University - like other Christian colleges - still retained its institutional independence in mid-1950 (and that this was lost during the Korean War), institutional independence was virtually all that the colleges did retain at this time. That the Government intended to subject them to further pressures - in accordance both with its anti-imperialism and the transformation of the educational system along socialist lines - was evident from statements made in mid-year. First, in May 1950, Vice-Minister of Education, Qian Junrui (who reportedly wielded the real power in the Ministry), set out
the Government's educational policy in the initial issue of *Renmin jiaoyu* [People's Education]. Qian stressed, inter alia, that education 'must be thoroughly national, that is anti-imperialist' and 'must eliminate remnants of illusion about American imperialism [and] worship for Western capitalist civilizations.' Second, at the First National Conference on Higher Education held in the first week of June 1950, Minister of Education, Ma Xulun, stressed that institutions of higher learning throughout the country were to be systematically readjusted and brought under centralized control. These twin requirements, rather than the subsequent ideological hostility of the Korean War, signalled the beginning of the end for Western-sponsored higher education in China.

In view of the substantial undermining of the Christian colleges' basic ideals, their overseas sponsors began to ask whether they should continue to support the colleges. On 9-10 May 1950, the United Board for Christian Colleges held its annual meeting in New York, amidst murmurings that it was only funding communist teachings which were hostile both to the Christian religion and to Western liberalism. Despite the 'very serious developments,' however, the meeting decided to adhere to its decision of December 1948 to continue supporting the colleges and made an initial financial appropriation for 1950-1951. Far from deciding to cut off funds to the colleges, the United Board launched an appeal for US$500,000 to offset the drying up of private sources of support in China and the non-payment of tuition fees.

Justifying its decision, the United Board stated that links with China 'should not voluntarily be broken from this end': a slightly different criterion of action from the earlier statement that support would be given 'so long as it is possible for the Colleges to continue their work in accordance with their basic Christian purpose.' In its attempt to raise money and to assuage criticism of its decision, the Board's magazine, *China Colleges*, did not publicize the current difficulties being experienced in China but instead focussed on the continuation of extracurricular religious activities and the way in which 'the spirit of Christ is still being exemplified in Communist China.' In stressing religious rather than educational goals, this attitude represented to a large extent a reversal to the original aims of the Protestant churches in China. Whilst the United Board appeared almost too willing to compromise with the Communist authorities, it had little choice if it wanted to retain any influence at all in the colleges - as the experience of Furen University had vividly demonstrated.
Western teachers in the colleges also had to reappraise their earlier decision to remain in China, amidst a growing polarization between those who resented the Communists' intervention in the colleges and their more general treatment of Westerners in China, and those who expressed vocal support for the Communists' policies. With increasing control over teaching programmes and frequent absences of students at political rallies and meetings, some decided that the time had come to leave. At the opposite extreme were those who argued that the entire educational system must become more suited to China's current needs (even at the expense of Christianity and Western liberalism) and set about adjusting themselves to the new situation. At West China Union University in Chengdu (which had the largest concentration of Western teachers) British chemistry professor, William Sewell, incurred the criticism of some of his fellow missionaries when he 'went all the way,' wearing Chinese clothing and attending political study meetings.37 At the same university, Canadian Earl Willmott was vocally ecstatic about the presence of CCP officials at the university. Writing for the China Weekly Review, which was fast sliding from representing a progressive Western viewpoint to being a Communist mouthpiece, Willmott stated that the officials had 'contributed wonderfully ... in helping us to learn democratic processes' and expressed full support for a vehement campaign against the alleged reactionary behaviour of the Chinese head of the university's Philosophy and History Department.38

Western missionary teachers such as Sewell and Willmott at West China Union University, and Ralph and Nancy Lapwood at Yanjing,39 were part of an increasingly identifiable small group of progressive Westerners remaining in China. Together with a few Western teachers in government universities and colleges - such as American Robert Winter and Britishers David and Isobel Crook - they often wrote letters or articles in praise of the Communists' policies for the China Weekly Review and even for the Government's foreign language publications, vocally criticizing the attitudes of other Westerners and their own governments' foreign policies towards China.40 The differing attitudes of the progressives and the majority of other missionaries (as well as many businessmen and other foreign nationals) were to become increasingly polarized following the outbreak of the Korean War.41
Culture

Whilst the Western cultural presence in China was in general subjected to greater pressure by the Communists than were educational establishments, the treatment even of different aspects of Western culture varied according to immediate pragmatic considerations. The most dispensable aspects - including establishments disseminating information on the West - were either banned or speedily subjected to heavy censorship. In contrast, the authorities trod cautiously, at least in Western-influenced and socially volatile Shanghai, in dealing with the heavily entrenched American and British movies which represented probably the most bourgeois and decadent aspects of Western culture in China.

The Information Blackout

Within a few months of their victory, the Communists suppressed both the dissemination of information about the West inside China and the passing of information on developments in China to the West. First, the official 'imperialist propaganda agencies' were simply banned outright in accordance with Mao's statement of 5 March 1949. In July 1949, the United States Information Service and the British Information Service were ordered to cease operations, first in Shanghai and a few days later in other cities including Beijing, Tianjin and Nanjing. Denouncing the information services as the 'megaphones of the imperialists,' the Communists justified their actions on the grounds that these offices were part of the diplomatic organs of their governments which did not have diplomatic relations with the Communists. Whilst they utilized the same argument for refusing to recognize the official status of embassies and consulates, they did not require these offices to close down their operations. In practice, the official nature of the information services - which distributed material on the West through news bulletins, photographic exhibitions, concerts, films and their reading rooms - provided a convenient pretext for eliminating a main avenue for the dissemination of Western culture.

In accordance with this policy, the Government did not shut down non-governmental organizations such as the British Council and the Alliance Francaise. Instead, these establishments were strongly warned to eliminate the 'imperialist' aspects of their activities (for example, the British Council's reading room in Shanghai was publicly denounced for having a copy of the London Illustrated News containing a pro-British
report on the *Amethyst* incident)\textsuperscript{45} and were not permitted to hold lectures in public buildings or to advertise their activities.\textsuperscript{46} The different designations of the two types of organizations - which often carried out similar activities - also enabled the suppression of all such American establishments (the US Government's more strictly 'cultural' activities were carried out through the United States Information Service, not by a separate organization like the British Council), but permitted the continuation of the activities of the ostensibly non-governmental Soviet cultural organization VOKS (The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.)\textsuperscript{47}

The other major source of foreign information from the West - the news bulletins issued by Western newsagencies (including United Press, Associated Press and Agence France Press) to both Chinese and English-language newspapers in China - was also eliminated. In Beijing this activity was included in the complete ban on foreign correspondents imposed on 27 February 1949.\textsuperscript{48} In Shanghai, most newsagencies themselves ceased distributing news bulletins, at least to the Chinese press, following the Communist victory; Associated Press was the major agency continuing this activity. On 30 August 1949 the Shanghai authorities instructed the newsagency to cease distributing news bulletins in the city.\textsuperscript{49} Henceforth the major sources of foreign news in China were the official New China News Agency (Xinhua) and the Soviet newsagency Tass.

Whether or not Mao's statement of 5 March 1949 that the Communists were going to 'abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China' also applied to the sending of information abroad by the representatives of Western newspapers and newsagencies was not altogether clear from his statement.\textsuperscript{50} Nevertheless the authorities eventually banned all Western reporting from China. On 27 February 1949 - just one month after their victory in Beijing - the Communists put a blanket ban on all seventeen correspondents and newsagency representatives in the city.\textsuperscript{51} Representatives of the United Press and Associated Press were denounced in the Chinese media for writing reports stating that the reaction of most of the population to the Communists' victory had been somewhat reserved.\textsuperscript{52} The Communists' drastic action - rarely taken in the past by governments even during periods of revolutionary change - was seen by American Fulbright scholar, Derk Bodde, in Beijing as a 'most disturbing act of thought control'\textsuperscript{53} and strongly criticized even by the progressive *China Weekly Review*.\textsuperscript{54} The official justification for the action taken in
Beijing - the needs of the military situation\textsuperscript{55} - had some credibility because the Civil War against the Nationalists was still unresolved, although a Communist victory had already become a virtual certainty.

Following the Communists' entry into Shanghai in late May - by which time their complete victory was only a matter of time - the authorities temporarily permitted correspondents of foreign newspapers and representatives of foreign newsagencies to continue their activities, despite some far from favourable reports on Shanghai under the new regime.\textsuperscript{56} Whilst the sending of information abroad was not affected by the order of 30 August (banning the circulation of news bulletins in the city), some five weeks later - on 6 October - the authorities imposed a complete ban on the activities of all representatives (foreign or Chinese) of newspapers, periodicals, newsagencies and broadcasting stations 'whose home governments have not established relations with the Chinese People's Republic.'\textsuperscript{57} Although the operations of Western correspondents were independent of their governments, this was again a convenient formula to allow Soviet representatives to continue their activities, since the Soviet Union had recognized the new Government a few days earlier.

Whilst the Communists' blackout on Western information from abroad was part of their overall policy of eliminating from China all information and culture which ran counter to the desired socialist image, their ban on Western reporting to other countries was associated with their concept of how best to present a favourable image to the West, or at least to prevent the dissemination of an unfavourable image. Until a few Western correspondents were admitted in the mid-1950s (they were again banished during the Cultural Revolution), information from China was limited largely to reports emanating from the official Chinese news-agency, Xinhua, and a few fellow-travellers and peace or friendship delegations invited to China. Their adulatory reports were balanced to some extent by those of Western residents (as well as Chinese refugees) leaving China but many of these people were intimidated from speaking publicly because they feared retaliatory action by the Communists against their associates who remained in China. The Chinese Communists, even more than the Soviet Russians, became masters of the art of communist cultural diplomacy, which included restricting the access to China of Westerners who were likely to report unfavourably on the regime while cultivating these 'foreign friends' who could be relied upon to present a flattering picture of the Communists and their achievements.\textsuperscript{58}
The Press

The Communists' treatment of the Western-owned press in China was slightly less harsh. Indeed, whilst closing down private Chinese newspapers and permitting them to reopen only after 'reorganization,' in theory they permitted Western-owned newspapers to remain independent of such official control. The differing treatment of Chinese and Western newspapers was, in practice, associated with the Communists' ultimate aims for the two groups: the integration of private Chinese newspapers into the official publications network versus the eventual elimination of Western newspapers. In carrying out this policy, the authorities subjected Western newspapers to heavy censorship right from the start; their period of survival reflected the degree to which they were prepared to bow to official demands to print only 'acceptable' news.

Of the three major Western-owned publications remaining in China - all in Shanghai - the American-owned *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* was the most uncompromising and, as a result, printed its last edition within only three weeks of the Communists' victory in Shanghai in May 1949. A mixture of straight news, gossip, comics and advice columns, the newspaper served as a spokesman for American business interests in Shanghai. Its editor was fifty-one year old Minnesota-born Randall Gould who had worked in China for almost twenty-five years, including eighteen years as the *Post's* editor.

On 15 June 1949 Gould wrote a news story for the *Post* which claimed that the Government's failure to introduce a general wage formula had precipitated a city-wide crisis. According to Gould, the story was 'fair and factual,' although it 'certainly did not reflect credit on the government.' With the day's edition about to go to press, a union delegation demanded that the story be removed from the newspaper. Gould verbally refused to comply with the demand - 'somewhat abruptly' as he himself later put it - and delivered a written order to the news editor to print the paper 'as was.' The printshop workers ignored the news editor's instructions, refused to print the newspaper, and occupied the printing plant. Convinced that he would not be permitted to operate an independent newspaper under the Communists, Gould announced on 23 June (after a radio-telephone discussion with the newspaper's American owner, C.V. Starr, who was visiting Hong Kong) that the *Post* would close down completely on 1 July.
The first signs of censorship had provoked Gould to an immediate and firm reaction; the nature of his reaction only provoked the authorities to more extreme measures. From now on, the issue of editorial independence became subordinated to a bitter personal attack on Gould in the Shanghai press, ostensibly over severance payments for his workers but also using him as a stereotype of the arrogant arch-imperialist. It was almost three months before Gould could finally extricate himself from his employees' demands.65

Whilst the precise role of the Communist authorities in the early stages of the Post dispute was somewhat obscure because of the complex relationship between officialdom and labour, their intention to impose heavy censorship on the Western press was evident from their dealings with the British-owned North China Daily News, the staunch defender of Britain's commercial and community interests in Shanghai. On 10 June 1949, the newspaper reported that Nationalist ship manoeuvres indicated that the Yangzi estuary at Wusong had possibly been mined and that, as a result, all shipping in and out of Shanghai had been suspended until the facts could be ascertained.66 When it was discovered that the estuary had not, in fact, been mined, the official Communist organ Jiefang ribao and other Shanghai Chinese-language newspapers launched a strong attack on the North China Daily News, accusing it of fabricating and disseminating rumours as part of a premeditated attempt by British and American imperialists to 'create difficulties for the Shanghai people.'67

On 22 June, the Director of the Alien Affairs Bureau, Zhang Hanfu, summoned editor R.T. Peyton-Griffin to the Bureau and gave him a severe dressing-down. After threatening to ban the paper, Zhang agreed to allow Peyton-Griffin to tender a 'sincere and humble apology' to the Shanghai Military Control Commission. The Commission subsequently ordered Peyton-Griffin to publish an 'admission of error' in his newspaper. It also instructed him to give an 'assurance that there shall be no repetition of publishing reports detrimental to the interests of the Chinese people,' thereby making quite clear the restrictive conditions under which the foreign press would be permitted to continue operating.68

The North China Daily News subsequently led a tenuous existence, undergoing periodic suspensions when it overstepped the narrow bounds of what was considered to be in 'the interests of the Chinese people.' These included a three-day suspension for 'mistakenly' reporting in June 1950 that South Korea had been invaded by North Korea.69
More significantly, the newspaper imposed strict self-censorship, simply ignoring the large number of incidents and labour disputes involving foreigners which were the major topic of discussion amongst the city's foreign community.

Why the compliant attitude? As the New York Times put it somewhat sarcastically when commenting on the paper's failure to print one word about the arrest of American Vice-Consul William Olive, the British were generally 'trying to ignore both affronts and danger' because of their significant commercial interests in China. The alternative to compliance was almost certain involvement in a Gould-type dispute which was quite out of character for the British in their continuing attempt at compromise with the Communist authorities. The American Ambassador to China, who paid a brief visit to Shanghai at the time, thought that Gould's action was 'as unalterably American as that of his contemporary was realistically British.'

The North China Daily News did, in fact, attempt to cease publication - not with Gould-style drama but through the normal channels - after 30 August 1949 when it was no longer able to publish reports from foreign newsagencies. But it was over eighteen months before the authorities granted the paper 'permission to close.' Although it was not of practical use to the Communist authorities in the same way as foreign manufacturers or the managers of public utilities, its continued existence and particularly its periodic 'lapses' made it an ideal target for the Communists' assaults on imperialism in general and for re-asserting the independence of the Chinese people. 'The liberated and awakened Chinese people cannot be insulted,' declared one of the Jiefang ribao articles attacking the false report of the mining of the Yangzi estuary.

By mid-1950 'the old lady on the Bund' had been reduced to a pale shadow of her former self, a strange combination of official New China News Agency releases and notes on the social and cultural activities of Shanghai's dwindling Western community: the occasional engagement or wedding, the Amateur Dramatic Club's latest production, the British Consul-General's silver wedding anniversary, and the frequent farewell cocktail parties. On 3 August it was to publish a special centenary edition - a final tribute to the history of the British in Shanghai.

Somewhat surprisingly, the longest survivor of the Western press in China was an American-owned publication. The continued existence of the
China Weekly Review for two and a half years after American business, educational and welfare interests were taken over by the Communist Government in the early stages of the Korean War outwardly appeared extraordinary. But unlike the Shanghai Evening Post, which represented business and the more conservative American interests in China, the Review - well-known in the past for its more liberal opinions on China - reflected the progressive attitudes found particularly amongst missionary educators and other Western academics.

Although the Review continued basically to express the attitudes of editor J.W. (Bill) Powell and its other contributors, it also exercised a considerable degree of self-censorship right from the start. In an article on Shanghai's foreign press dated 25 June 1949, it admitted that editors of the foreign-owned press were 'going to have to be extremely careful,' even though it denied - somewhat unconvincingly - that they should 'embark on a program of flattering the new authorities' or suppress anything that 'might conceivably be construed as "offending" the new regime.' Part of the Review's own careful policy involved dissociating itself from, and sometimes even criticizing, the incidents involving its Western fellow-publishers. Powell scolded the North China Daily News for its false report on the mining of the Yangzi estuary and warned that particular care should be exercised 'in the matter of accuracy.' To the great annoyance of Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury editor, Randall Gould, Powell continued to use the Post's printing press to publish his July and August issues after Gould had announced the closure of his newspaper and was locked in an angry dispute both with his workers and with the entire Shanghai media.

Instead of refraining from comments on the incidents between foreigners and Chinese in Shanghai, as did the North China Daily News, the China Weekly Review played the role of explicator and even attempted to justify the Communists' harsh measures. Whilst ignoring the authenticity or otherwise of the charges made against individuals such as William Olive, it reminded its readers that foreigners had enjoyed a better position than the Chinese for one hundred years and now had to 'make an abrupt readjustment' to the new situation. But as the Communists made it increasingly clear that they wanted nothing less than outright admiration for their policies and actions - not just progressive interpretations - the Review was faced with the impossible task of producing a journal which retained a modicum of credibility, even with
progressive readers, as an independent observer of the Chinese scene. By early 1950 it was being attacked in the United States press - hardly an unbiased commentator itself - as a publication which 'never deviates from the communist line and apologizes continuously for the American way of life.'80 Although Powell publicly ridiculed rumours that the Review was officially censored before going to press and also strenuously denied that its contributors were communists (as was implied by the publication's critics),81 its general tone was becoming virtually indistinguishable from official English-language publications such as People's China.82

By mid-1950 the Communist authorities had already demonstrated that there was no longer a place in China for an independent progressive Western journal, far less a newspaper representing the commercial and community interests of the remaining Westerners. A progressive English-language publication was potentially of considerable propaganda value to the new regime, not least because many contributors were themselves Westerners, but the official concept of what constituted 'correct' reporting meant that approved publications lacked credibility in the eyes of all but the Communists' most earnest supporters. Even well-known progressive Western journalists in China writing for the Government's own foreign languages press occasionally expressed misgivings about the official 'corrections' made to their work, particularly the increasing insistence on the use of stilted Communist jargon.83 Other potential commentators preferred to remain silent, recognizing that they could satisfy the Communists' rigid requirements only at the expense of losing credibility with their Western readers, thereby defeating their basic reason for 'explaining New China' to the outside world.84

In early June 1950, having eliminated the dissemination of Western-style news in China, the Government began publishing its own English-language daily in Shanghai. Called the Shanghai News, it had the stated objective of 'helping the English reading public to acquire an understanding of the new Shanghai and the new China as a whole.'85 The newspaper featured lists of foreigners granted exit visas; translations of New China News Agency releases and, somewhat at odds with the official attacks on Western culture, advertisements for the British and American films still being screened in the city.86
Western Culture in the Chinese Community

The attack on the Western cultural presence in China went beyond the cultural establishments specifically owned or managed by Western governments and private entrepreneurs. Whilst the country was not cleansed of bourgeois Western culture even during the Korean War - the Cultural Revolution largely took care of what remained - the assault began almost as soon as the Communists came to power and was well under way by mid-1950. Western literature, art and music all came under varying attack and suppression (according to the degree of their considered bourgeois decadence and sensationalism) but the most prolonged assault was that against the screening of American and British films, particularly in Shanghai. Apart from the alleged misdemeanours of Westerners in Shanghai shortly after the Communists' victory, the campaign against Western films was the most widely-publicized of the Communists' measures against the Western presence in China before the Korean War and will therefore be discussed in some detail.

Whilst there was a speedy clampdown on the screening of Western films in cities including Beijing and Tianjin following the Communist victory, the same process was not repeated in Shanghai after the city's takeover in late May 1949. In fact, the total monthly attendance at British and American films remained at over the one million mark and their percentage share of the market actually increased from 65 percent in the month before the takeover to 72 percent in August. It was not until mid-September that the Shanghai authorities launched an attack on the continued screening of Western films in the city; even then the media rhetoric proved far more severe than the resultant official action.

As with many other reforms undertaken by the authorities, the initiative had to be seen as coming from the people involved, not imposed from above. Long articles by movie critic Mei Duo and dramatist Zhen Baizheng, calling for the strict censorship of American films, were published not in the CCP newspaper Jiefang ribao but in the ostensibly independent Wenhuibao. These were followed by similar calls from the Shanghai Cinema Workers' Union and the Federation of University Teachers, as well as from the editor of Dagongbao. The argument against American films, presented by individual spokesmen, unions and newspaper editors alike, reflected both the Communists' anti-imperialism and the incompatibility of Western bourgeois culture with China's envisaged socialist culture. First, the films were denounced as 'an instrument of imperialist
aggression;' they propagated the alleged might of the imperialists with planes, guns, tanks and warships, and they portrayed the alleged superiority both of the American way of life and of the white race over coloured peoples. The socialist critique of American films was that they intentionally distorted reality and covered up social evils instead of dealing with the true facts of life, particularly the class nature of society. They were, indeed, 'an instrument of the capitalists to drug the minds of the people,' making them forget the contradictions in society for the 'two hours they sit before the silver screen' - whether watching 'crime detection and espionage work portraying ridiculous plots, tragedies of love which play on human feelings, [or] games of love which are deliberately made sophisticated and sexy.'

This latter accusation reflected the contradiction between the society represented by popular American culture and the asceticism and puritanism of China's new socialist society: the bid to cleanse China not just of Western-style bourgeois decadence but of all that was impure and unwholesome in society: sexual license and prostitution, drugs and drunkenness. Not only were 'sexy pictures' incapable of doing one any good, claimed Dagongbao, they were a poisonous influence and 'more likely to drug you and lead you astray onto the road of depravity.' Even in post-liberation Shanghai, claimed press commentators, people were still being 'intoxicated by the "beautiful figure and alluring smile" of Rita Hayworth' and by 'displays of pretty legs' and 'swimming exhibits by half-naked females.' Allegations that the sight of Betty Grable or Esther Williams might 'induce unwholesome feelings of sex' hardly appeared applicable to longtime Shanghai residents, accustomed to the sex-saturated environment of a city which reputedly had more prostitutes per capita than any in the world and where the favours of some foreign women (mainly destitute White Russians) had long been readily procurable. Perhaps more likely to be affected - had they been given the opportunity to see the films - were newly-arrived earnest young Communist soldiers and cadres, reportedly still agog at Shanghai's electric light and tall buildings, let alone a public glimpse of Hollywood-style naked female flesh.

On 19 September, after five days of press buildup, the Literature and Arts Department of the Shanghai Military Control Commission called together the proprietors of Shanghai's cinema houses, employees' representatives and newspaper reporters, to announce that imported films would
be subject to immediate censorship and native-made films to censorship in the near future. Films could be restricted or banned on either ideologi­cal or social grounds: those 'which are anti-Communist and anti-popular in nature ... against the world democratic and peace movements and which serve the aggressive purpose of imperialism' and those which 'tend to encourage sexual license and crime or propagate feudalistic ethics.' Such films were to be divided into three categories according to the 'degree of their undesirable effect': the first category was subject to immediate banning; films in the second category would be permitted to be screened for the time being; and those in the third category would have their examination deferred. Newsreels from Britain and the United States were entitled to no such classification; they were banned without exception on the grounds that they did not 'reflect the true life of the people in those countries.'

Unlike many subsequent Communist campaigns where the buildup of press rhetoric either prepared the way for, or accompanied, new prohibi­tory regulations, on this occasion the rhetoric was much fiercer than the reality. Whilst all cinema houses were required to submit particulars of the imported films they were already holding and which they received in the future, their screening was permitted pending examination. The authorities admitted that the appropriate administrative machinery to implement the censorship policy did not yet exist, allegedly because of a lack of personnel, and announced that the Motion Picture Section of the Literature and Arts Department would temporarily undertake this function. Since the examination of all imported films would take some time, it anticipated that they would continue to be screened in Shanghai 'for a considerable period of time.' In the meantime, the authorities fell back on moral suasion, expressing the hope that all cinemas would exercise care in selecting films and warning that 'complaints from dissatisfied patrons' (no doubt emanating from the Communist-controlled Shanghai Cinema Guild) would result in the immediate examination of the film in question.

The cautious attitude of the authorities appeared somewhat sur­prising in view of their vehement attacks on the allegedly high-handed behaviour of individual American and British 'imperialists' in Shanghai, and particularly the call two months earlier from the National Conference of Literary and Artistic Workers to wipe out 'all reactionary literature and artistic works which serve the interests of the imperialists.'
In Beijing and Tianjin the proportion of American and British films being shown was reportedly already down to 10 percent, all claimed to be of 'educational value.'\textsuperscript{102} The confessed lack of an appropriate administrative machinery for censoring individual films was undoubtedly an issue in a city where the Communists' personnel resources were being stretched to the limit, but this may well have been an excuse - rather than the reason - for the 'go slow' policy. At this stage the authorities did not apparently seriously consider putting an outright ban on American films which would have avoided the need for setting up an administrative machinery at all; \textit{Dagongbao} was careful to point out that censorship did not mean the banning of all American films but only those which contained 'poisonous germs.'\textsuperscript{103}

The authorities' caution probably reflected a discrepancy between their theoretical desire (and undoubtedly pressure from the more ideologically militant in their ranks) to eradicate a blatant example of Western culture from Shanghai, and the practical problems of implementing such a policy. At stake were the interests of movie-goers, as well as those of movie theatre proprietors and their employees. The complete withdrawal of American films would undoubtedly antagonize a large part of Shanghai's huge movie-going population. Whilst the continuing campaign against the arrogant behaviour of individual Americans and other Westerners was undoubtedly popular amongst large numbers of Chinese people, depriving them of the right to see American films was not necessarily so. This disparity, astutely recognized by the city's Communist leadership, reflected the strikingly ambivalent attitude of many Chinese, particularly Western-influenced Shanghainese, towards the West and especially towards the United States and its culture - an ambivalence that came to the surface when the new Government began its pro-USSR campaign.\textsuperscript{104} As \textit{Dagongbao} admitted, there still remained in Shanghai 'a large number of fans who persist in "appreciating" the excellence of American motion pictures.'\textsuperscript{105}

There were good reasons for the authorities being reluctant to take any action that would unnecessarily antagonize large numbers of Shanghainese. After four months in Shanghai, the Communists were faced with a near-collapsed economy (partly due to the Nationalist blockade) and widespread social and labour unrest.\textsuperscript{106} If the films were officially denounced as escapist and allegedly hid the true facts of life, these very characteristics may well have served as a safety valve for
social discontent in newly-communist Shanghai, just as they were accused of doing in the capitalist United States. A claim by one of the spokesmen for the September campaign that the authorities' earlier 'policy of magnanimity' had been brought about by 'regard for the stability of the city as a whole' may not have been as exaggerated as it sounded.  

The withdrawal of American films before suitable substitutes were available would also threaten the livelihood of cinema operators and their employees. In Shanghai, more than in any other city, the authorities were keen to obtain the support of private entrepreneurs whom they considered vital to the transitional New Democracy economy. They readily admitted that one of the reasons for permitting American films to be screened pending censorship was 'consideration of the business of cinema houses'; Dagongbao acknowledged that the number of 'motion pictures of a healthy nature dealing with the true facts of life' was still too small to keep the city's more than forty movie theatres in operation.

To the Chinese Communists, Chinese-produced films - like the use of the Chinese language - were symbols of China's national independence; one of the accusations directed against films promoting American culture was that they drugged the Chinese people into forgetting that they were Chinese. A subsidiary reason given for censoring American films was the promotion of the Chinese film industry which was allegedly stifled by 'imports of decadent and poisonous Hollywood propaganda.' But the development of a state film industry would take time; in July 1949 only three Communist-produced films were screened in Shanghai, compared with 142 American and British ones. Films produced by private Chinese studios before the Communist victory (54 were screened in Shanghai in July) were mostly considered by the new administration to be little more suitable than American films. Criticized for their representation of feudalistic ethics and degenerate behaviour, they were gradually censored along with American films.

After the establishment of the People's Republic on 1 October, the new Ministry of Culture embarked on an ambitious programme to make both feature films and documentaries - regarded as an important medium for spreading Communist ideology - and its Northeast, Shanghai and Beijing film studios (operating under the Central Cinema Bureau) produced forty-four films by the end of 1950. As well as taking over the former Nationalist-owned studios for their own use, the Communists also
indirectly utilized the equipment and personnel of the existing private studios, 'encouraging' them to produce progressive films by advancing production loans, guaranteeing bank credits and reducing their taxes (paving the way for their eventual absorption into the state-operated film industry) as well as incorporating a number of them into state-private joint enterprises.118

But for the moment there was a gap to be filled if American films were to be strictly censored. The only ideologically suitable contender for the Chinese film market appeared to be the culturally prolific Soviet Union. Indeed, if China's new culture was not just going to be national but also link up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of other nations, as Mao stated,119 Soviet films appeared an ideal replacement for the condemned imperialist product. Early in March 1949, barely a month after the Communist entry into Beijing, the official assault on the screening of American movies in the city had been matched by an equally vociferous endorsement of Soviet films. 'Decadent American films to be ousted by healthy Russian films,' declared the Beijing press.120 By September they already represented over 60 percent of all films screened in the Northeast and 33 percent in Beijing and Tianjin, compared with only 6 percent in Shanghai.121

The bid to increase the number of Russian films being screened in Shanghai was inaugurated with the setting up on 17 September (during the press buildup to the announcement of the decision to censor other imported movies) of a distribution agency for Russian and Chinese state-produced films.122 On the second day of its existence it was reported to have received two hundred Russian films for distribution123 and within two weeks its influence on the local cinema scene was clearly evident. Indeed, during the first week of October, Shanghai's cinemas appeared to be celebrating not the birth of an independent Chinese nation, but the cultural attainments of the Soviet Union. The occasional Chinese state-produced film (such as The Crossing of the Yangtse) was completely overshadowed by a profusion of Soviet films, including Volga-Volga, Stephen Razin and Country Bride.124

Despite the fanfare, the Russian films had little impact on the entrenched American movies. Most cinemas virtually ignored the authorities' plea to exercise care in selecting movies,125 they continued to show American films such as Blue Skies and Night and Day at four afternoon/evening sessions while limiting the screening of Russian films
to the 10.30 morning show. Like their fellow cinema proprietors in Beijing and Tianjin, they had already discovered that it was difficult to attract patrons to Russian films. Their 'solemn and weighty themes' appear to have had as little appeal to those movie-goers accustomed to escapist crime thrillers and the titillation of shapely legs as they had to more sophisticated and even progressive students and intellectuals whose tastes ran to *Rebecca* and *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. As a dejected university student in Beijing put it: 'One Russian film would satisfy a man so well that after seeing one of them he did not care to see another one for many days on end.'

In the month of November 1949, American films still attracted more than one million of Shanghai's total cinema audience of just over two million. Only about 160,000 attended the much-heralded Soviet productions, despite the exertion of strong pressure by Communist cadres in factories and universities, group discussions on China's new socialist culture, the offer of half-price tickets and even the organization of free group cinema excursions. During the next six months, the gradual censorship and withdrawal of large numbers of American films, set against a background of pro-Soviet and anti-American media commentary, had comparatively little impact on attendances at Russian films. People simply stayed away from the cinema; Shanghai's film audience dropped from over two million in November to about one and a half million in the following May. During that month, over 400,000 movie-goers still packed the few cinemas screening the remaining American films (mostly repeats of such classics as *Gone With the Wind*, *For Whom the Bell Tolls* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*) while less than half this number watched Russian films in reportedly semi-deserted cinemas. In a speech in late April 1950 attacking American and British films as 'imperialist poison,' the deputy director of the Shanghai Education Board admitted that it was taking time to change the 'deep-seated habits' of the city's movie-goers. Even in September 1950, three months after the outbreak of the Korean War and the intensification of the media attack on American imperialist aggression, the number of people attending American films in Shanghai still exceeded the combined total for the products of the Soviet Union and Chinese state studios.

A full year's moral suasion and vehement ideological pressure had failed drastically to change the preferences of Shanghai's movie-goers. It was only after China's entry into the Korean War in October and the
beginning of the Beijing Government's first major mass ideological campaign that the authorities had the confidence and a sufficiently strong pretext to institute an outright ban on the still influential American-produced films.

The Russian Alternative: An Affront to Chinese Nationalism?

The authorities' experience with American and Russian films was a striking example of their wider problem of persuading Chinese people, particularly in Western-influenced Shanghai, to reject and condemn the Western cultural presence but at the same time to accept and even adore what amounted to a new foreign cultural presence in China. On the one hand, the Communists were stressing that China was asserting its national independence and that its people were finally the 'masters of China.' On the other hand, from the time of Mao's 'lean to one side' speech of 30 June 1949, and more particularly following the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 14 February 1950, the authorities demanded the full-scale acceptance of the Soviet Union not just as an economic, but also as an educational and cultural, model for 'new China.' Whilst the new Soviet economic presence in China was of a fundamentally different nature from the old Western presence, in the area of culture they came into direct juxtaposition.

Vocal attacks on cultural imperialism and the accompanying suppression of Western culture were matched by the introduction and vociferous endorsement, not just of Russian films, but of all aspects of Soviet education and culture. Although the reorganization of the educational system along Soviet lines was still in its nascent stage before mid-1950, the effects were already being felt in primary, secondary and higher education alike, including missionary schools and colleges. The study of the Russian language, which was gradually to supersede English as the major foreign language, was introduced in universities and became a compulsory subject in many middle schools, whilst English was dropped at primary level. In university law faculties, the study of Western law was giving way to that of Soviet law; Soviet scientific theories were replacing Western science. For the most promising graduates there was no longer the prospect of advanced study in the United States or England, as under the former Government, but in the Soviet Union.

The same trend was apparent in the information field. With the elimination of reports from Western newsagencies, Tass (the official
Soviet newsagency) became a major source of foreign news. Similarly, the banning of the United States Information Service was matched by an intensification of the activities of the Soviet Union's Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and more particularly the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Soviet newspapers and journals - including English-language versions of *New Times*, *The USSR in Construction* and *Soviet Woman* - were disseminated widely.

In the cultural field, the replacement of American by Soviet films was matched by a corresponding change in the live theatre. The first play performed by the newly-established People's Art Theatre in Beijing, for example, was Sofronov's modern Soviet comedy, *The Moscow Character*. American and English literature and popular novels gave way to Soviet products (mainly in Chinese translation), with the works of Soviet writers including Gorky, Sholokhov and Ostrovsky backed up by a large range of political and economic works, together with Marxist-Leninist writings. Even Western literature began passing through the 'Soviet filter'; officially approved leftist or progressive writers such as Steinbeck and Dickens, published in the Soviet Union, were sold alongside Russian works. According to a Chinese report of April 1950, Soviet publications were arriving in China in an 'ever-quickening torrent'.

The Russian educational and cultural presence was officially justified in terms of the Chinese Government's proclaimed policy of creating a culture in China that was both national and linked up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of other nations. This was, of course, only part of its overall policy of ideological solidarity and practical alliance with the Soviet Union, cemented in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950. Regardless of the Chinese Communists' underlying motives for forming this alliance - the question of whether it was true ideological solidarity or merely short-term expediency has been keenly debated by diplomats, politicians and academics for some thirty years - one of the practical results of the adoption of the Soviet model of economic development was the need to reorganize the Chinese educational system along Soviet lines. This included an emphasis on Soviet methods in science and technology and the teaching of the Russian language. But the adoption of the Soviet economic model does not fully explain why the Chinese Communists so wholeheartedly adopted Soviet culture as well, creating in China not so much a culture which combined
nationalist and socialist elements as one which formed part of the virtual 'Russification of China.'

One reason for the pro-Soviet cultural offensive, readily apparent in the introduction of Russian films, was that the Soviet Union offered readymade substitutes for the condemned culture of the West. The development of Chinese Communist drama and literature, like a state film industry, would take time. In the meantime, Soviet culture was at least ideologically compatible with the anti-imperialist, socialist aims of the new Government. But this was not the whole answer; the Soviet cultural presence did not immediately fade away as suitable Chinese products became available.

A further reason for the Communists' pro-Soviet cultural policy may have been connected with their continuing need to convince their Soviet 'big brothers' of their sincerity: that they were not just seeking material assistance in their own nationalistic interests but were genuine Marxist-Leninist internationalists. Mao and other leading Communists had frequently attempted to squash the widespread speculation (and the hopes of the Americans) that Communist China might well follow a Titoist line. In his 1948 work, *Internationalism and Nationalism*, for example, Liu Shaoqi had condemned Tito for betraying proletarian internationalism and adopting bourgeois nationalism. At the Czech Party Congress in June 1949 the Chinese delegation reiterated this point, maintaining that there was no trace of bourgeois nationalism in Mao's teachings. But the length of Mao's stay in Moscow (from 16 December 1949 to 17 February 1950), the nature of the agreements and Mao's later comments on the visit indicate that he had some problems convincing Stalin of the CCP's loyalty. '... Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 the pressure on us was very strong indeed,' he admitted in 1956. The Communists' continuing efforts - both before and after Mao's trip - to convince the Soviet Union that China warranted its trust and material support thus included not just a press campaign of adulation for the Russians but the adoption of virtually all aspects of life, including the culture, of the No.1 Marxist-Leninist state.

Inside China, the Communists faced the opposite problem: convincing the population that the adoption of Soviet culture - as part of the acceptance of the Soviet Union as a whole - did not constitute an affront to Chinese nationalism. The direct replacement of American culture by
the Soviet version - evident in the Beijing press statement 'decadent American films to be ousted by healthy Russian films'\textsuperscript{149} - aroused suspicions that maybe China was only swapping one form of cultural imperialism for another. And was there not a contradiction between the denunciation of the use of the English language in the interests of China's national independence and the widespread introduction of Russian language teaching, even in factories and over the radio?\textsuperscript{150}

If there was still going to be a foreign cultural presence in China, was Soviet culture really preferable to the condemned American variety? Despite all the anti-imperialist propaganda, Western and especially American culture still had widespread appeal, not least because a large number of Chinese intellectuals and professionals had been educated in the United States. To these and other Westernized, urbane and admittedly 'bourgeois' Chinese - especially Shanghainese - much of the culture of the Soviet Union appeared, like its films, to be decidedly lacking in sophistication. They were no more impressed with the personal bearers of Soviet education and culture, as well as of economic expertise. These visitors and advisers from the world's leading socialist state appeared to many Chinese as stolid, dour, poorly-dressed people who, far from disparaging the culture and the products of the West, seemed to be buying up all the imported goods they could lay their hands on.\textsuperscript{151} Even some members of the Soviet cultural delegation which visited China in October 1949 left the impression of being gauche and crude,\textsuperscript{152} despite all the press adulation.\textsuperscript{153} Yet the Chinese people were being asked to welcome these foreigners and their culture with open arms.

The disquiet about Soviet culture was admittedly only part of growing suspicion on the part of some Chinese about the Soviet Union's new role in China, which is largely beyond the scope of this study.\textsuperscript{154} Despite murmurings about the Soviet cultural presence, however, the Communists utilized Soviet culture as part of their assault on what Wang Gungwu has called the 'uphill task of converting the Chinese people to a sense of trust and friendship with the Soviet peoples' - a degree of friendship 'that they had never shown to any foreigners before.'\textsuperscript{155} This task was undertaken, in particular, by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association which was formally inaugurated on 5 October 1949 as one of the first tasks of the newly established national Government. The Association launched a Soviet cultural onslaught; it distributed books, showed films and plays, held photographic exhibitions, produced a monthly
magazine Zhong-Su youhao [Sino-Soviet Friendship], organized Russian language lessons, sponsored visiting Soviet writers and lecturers, and arranged reciprocal Chinese visits to the Soviet Union. But continuing complaints about the Soviet cultural presence - themselves partly provoked by the Friendship Association's heavy-handed assault - demonstrated that the Government did not have an easy task in convincing the Chinese people that they should accept and even worship the Soviet way of life, not just in preference to the previously influential American variety but even at the expense of a Chinese national culture. The task was to be made easier during the ideological hysteria of the Korean War when even to question the Soviet cultural presence in China - or not vocally to join in the denunciation of the small remaining imperialist cultural presence - became tantamount to a counter-revolutionary act.
Notes

1 Mao, 'Report to the second plenary session...', Selected Works, IV, 370.

2 Article 41, Common Programme..., Renmin ribao, 30 September 1949.

3 See chapter 4, note 32.

4 Mao did state in On New Democracy that China 'should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment.' Selected Works, II, 380. However, the existing Western educational and cultural presence in China was constantly linked with the West's 'imperialist oppression' of China over the past century.


6 Articles 44, 46 and 47, Common Programme..., Renmin ribao, 30 September 1949.

7 On the attitudes of intellectuals and students towards the Nationalists and the CCP, see Pepper, Civil War in China, chapters 3, 5, 6 passim.


9 For details of the changes, see ibid.; Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, pp.444-61.

10 For comments on the situation at Hangzhou University, see Clarence Burton Day, Career in Cathay (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1955), pp.136-37; China Colleges, December 1949, 3. On Aurora University in Shanghai, see CMB, March 1950, 190.

11 Interview with Barbara Bowman (a British Quaker teacher at West China Union University, Chengdu, 1949-1951), 2 August 1979.

12 West, Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, p.207.
This requirement was speedily implemented. For example, on 2 June 1949, the newly-established students' association at Aurora University in Shanghai decided that, with the exception of French textbooks in the medical faculty, Chinese would in future be used in teaching and at meetings. Similarly, at St John's University in Shanghai, the students' committee recommended in early June that English be retained only for language classes. Dagongbao, 3 June 1949 (CPR, no.904, 3 June 1949); China Weekly Review, 11 June 1949, 29-30.


Rigney, Four Years in a Red Hell, p.15. Following Furen's takeover, Rigney applied for - but failed to obtain - an exit permit to leave China. In July 1951, he was arrested for alleged counter-revolutionary activities and spent four years in prison.

Chung Shih, Higher Education in Communist China, p.22. See also Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, I, 183.
Qian Junrui, 'Dangqian jiaoyu jianshe de fangzhen' [General policy of present educational construction], part 1, *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1:1 (May 1950), 12. See also ibid., 10-11, 13-16; and part 2 of article in *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1:2 (June 1950), 8-11.

Ma Xulun, 'Di yi quanguo gaodeng jiaoyu huiyi bimu ci' [Closing speech to the First National Conference on Higher Education], *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1:3 (July 1950), 11-12.

*China Colleges*, June 1950, 1.

*China Colleges*, October 1950, 3.

*China Colleges*, June 1950, 1.

See p.72.

See, for example, *China Colleges*, October 1950, 1.


See, for example, articles by Ralph Lapwood and Robert Winter (of Qinghua University) in 'Foreigners' view of the year,' *China Monthly Review*, October 1950, 57. See also interview with Robert Winter, 10 March 1979; David Finkelstein and Beverley Hooper, '57 years inside China: an American's odyssey,' *Asia*, 2:5 (January-February 1980), 10-11, 46.

For details of the differing attitudes of the Western faculty at Yanjing University, see West, *Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations*, pp.221-232.


*Dagongbao*, 8 September 1949 (CPR, no.967, 9 September 1949).

Scott, 'Work for the British Council at Nanking in 1949,' 132-43; interview with C.P. Fitzgerald, 14 March 1978. A.C. Scott and C.P. Fitzgerald were on the staffs of the British Council in Nanjing and Beijing respectively.

Clubb to Secretary of State, 20 July 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1097.
See next paragraph.

Jiefang ribao, 30 August 1949 (CPR, no.960, 30 August 1949).

Mao, Selected Works, IV, 370.


Jinbu ribao (Tianjin), 28 February 1949, quoted by Bodde, Peking Diary, p.120. See also Roth, 'Peiping's new look,' 275.

Bodde, Peking Diary, p.120.


Clubb to Secretary of State, 27 February 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1066.

See, for example, reports from Henry Lieberman in New York Times, 13 June 1949, 13 July 1949.

Jiefang ribao, 7 October 1949 (CPR, no.985, 6-7 October 1949).

On the Chinese Communists' development of the art of cultural diplomacy, see Herbert Passin, China's Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1963). For examples of the propaganda use - for both domestic and foreign purposes - made by the Chinese Government of invited visitors and delegates to peace conferences, see 'How foreigners were made to serve the Chinese Communists in the field of foreign propaganda,' Chinese Communist Propaganda Review, no.35, March 1953, 3-7.


The ban of 27 February on foreign reporting in Beijing did, in fact, include the prohibition of the publication of newspapers and magazines by foreign nationals. In practice, the only significant foreign newspapers and magazines still being published in China were in Shanghai.


Gould, 'Shanghai during the takeover,' 186.
ibid.

See p.110.

NCDN, 10 June 1949.

Jiefang ribao, 21 June 1949 (CPR, no.916, 21 June 1949). See also Jiefang ribao, 22, 25 June 1949 (CPR, no.917, 22 June 1949; no.920, 25-27 June 1949). Reports were also carried in other Shanghai papers including Dagongbao, Wenhuibao and Xinmin wanbao (CPR, no.916, 21 June 1949; no.917, 22 June 1949; no.918, 23 June 1949; no.919, 24 June 1949). A long editorial on the incident was published in Dagongbao, 23 June 1949 (CPR, no.918, 23 June 1949). The English-language service of NCNA featured the story under the headline 'Rumour monger exposed' on the front page of its Daily News Release, 24 June 1949.

Jiefang ribao, 25 June 1949 (CPR, no.920, 25-27 June 1949). In accordance with the order, the apology was published on the front page of the NCDN on 25 June.

NCDN, 26 June 1950. Suspension was no novelty to the newspaper. Just one month before the Communist victory in Shanghai, it was suspended by the Nationalists for three days for featuring 'mis-represented news reports on the current military situation' - a factual Reuter report that the Communists had captured Jiaxing and Suzhou. NCDN, 25 April 1949; Huobao, 27 April 1949 (CPR, no.880, 27 April 1949). See also New York Times, 26 April 1949.


Stuart, Fifty Years in China, p.253.

See p.206.

NCDN, 30 March 1951. The final issue of the newspaper was published on 31 March.


See p.34.


ibid.

Gould, 'Shanghai during the takeover,' 188.


Issues of the China Weekly Review in May-June 1950 included the texts of Liu Shaoqi's May Day speech and Dong Biwu's report on relief and welfare, and reports on the outlook for China's small industries and on the changing countryside. Issues of People's China for the same period included the text of Liu Shaoqi's May Day speech and reports on the restoration of Manchurian industry, increased grain production and the conquering of inflation.

This point was made by Nancy Lapwood (joint author of Through the Chinese Revolution) in an interview with the author on 20 July 1979.

Shanghai News, 10 June 1950.

The Shanghai News was published from 10 June 1950 until 31 December 1952 when the 'need of the local English-reading public [had] so diminished that the publication of an English-language daily newspaper is no longer warranted.' Shanghai News, 31 December 1952.

For example, an early attack was made on 'foreign-language pornographic publications' sold at book stalls in Shanghai. Wenhuibao, 14 July 1949 (CPR, no.931, 14 July 1949).


Wenhuibao, 14 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 14 September 1949).

ibid. Wenhuibao was associated with the China Democratic League but, like other newspapers, had been 'reorganized' immediately after the Communist victory and brought under Party control.

Dagongbao, 16 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949). See also Dagongbao, 15, 19 September 1949 (CPR, no.971, 15 September 1949; CPR, no.973, 17-19 September 1949).

Zhen Baizheng, 'The rampant state of American films,' Wenhuibao, 14 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949). See also Dagongbao, 19 September 1949 (CPR, no.973, 17-19 September 1949).

Wenhuibao, 14 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

Dagongbao, 16 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

ibid.

Wenhuibao, 14 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).
Dagongbao, 16 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

On the naivety of Communist soldiers and cadres on their arrival in Shanghai, see Ezpeleta, Red Shadows over Shanghai, pp.185-86.

Jiefang ribao, 21 September 1949 (CPR, no.975, 21 September 1949).

ibid.

Wenhuibao, 14 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949). For the summary report to the Conference made by its Chairman, Guo Moruo on 20 July 1949, see Xinhua yuebao, November 1949, 271-75.

Dagongbao, 18 September 1949 (CPR, no.973, 17-19 September 1949).

Dagongbao, 16 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

See pp.222-23.

Dagongbao, 16 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

See pp.124-25.

Zhen Baizheng, 'The rampant state of American films,' Wenhuibao, 14 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

Jiefang ribao, 21 September 1949 (CPR, no.975, 21 September 1949).

Dagongbao, 16 September 1949 (CPR, no.972, 16 September 1949).

ibid.

Tsai Chu-sheng, 'The Chinese film industry,' People's China, 16 June 1950, 14. See also Dagongbao, 19 September 1949 (CPR, no.973, 17-19 September 1949); Jiefang ribao, 21 September 1949 (CPR, no.975, 21 September 1949).

Dagongbao, 15 September 1949 (CPR, no.971, 15 September 1949).

ibid.

Jiefang ribao, 21 September 1949 (CPR, no.975, 21 September 1949).


In addition to these feature films and documentaries, the state studios produced forty-eight newsreels and dubbed into Chinese seventy-six Soviet films. People's China, 16 June 1950, 14.

In accordance with the policy outlined by Mao in On New Democracy, the Communists permitted private film studios to continue in operation
but took over former Nationalist-owned and 'bureaucratic' enterprises. The new Government's Northeast, Beijing and Shanghai Film Companies were based on the former Changchun Film Company, the Central Motion Picture Company, and an amalgamation of five Shanghai film companies. ibid., 13.


Peiping Digest, 2 March 1949 (quoted by Bodde, Peking Diary, p.118).

Dagongbao, 18 September 1949 (CPR, no.973, 17-19 September 1949).

The East China Motion Pictures Distributor of the Central Motion Picture Supervision Bureau. Dagongbao, 18 September 1949 (CPR, no. 973, 17-19 September 1949).

ibid.

See issues of NCND for 1-7 October 1949.

Jiefang ribao, 21 September 1949 (CPR, no.975, 21 September 1949).

See, for example, NCND, 1 October, 24 December 1949.

Yen, Umbrella Garden, p.179.

ibid.


Shanghai News, 5 November 1950.

Rossi, The Communist Conquest of Shanghai, p.116; advertisements in NCND. For the use of similar pressures in Beijing, see Yen, Umbrella Garden, pp.178-79.


Shanghai News, 5 November 1950.

South China Morning Post, 25 April 1950. For similar comments, see Dazhong dianying, 1 June 1950, l.

Shanghai News, 5 November 1950.

See chapter 10.

CMB, June 1950, 556-57; McConaughy to Secretary of State, 16 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 634-35. For comments on Russian influence in education by February 1950, see S.B. Thomas, 'Recent educational policy in China,' 26.

The following is based on Bodde, Peking Diary, pp.202-203; Yen, Umbrella Garden, p.77; Stuart to Secretary of State, 16 June 1949,
FRUS, 1949, VIII, 386-87; Tsao Ching-hua, 'Soviet literature in China,' People's China, 1 April 1950, 12, 27-28.

See p.206.

People's China, 1 March 1950, 24.

People's China, 1 April 1950, 27. Imported from the Soviet International Book Company, these publications included works in Chinese and Russian, as well as English, German and French.


At the time the alliance was seen by some Western commentators as proof of their earlier argument that the Chinese Communists were little more than puppets of the Soviet Union. However, since the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s and the revelations that relations between the two nations were never as rosy as they were proclaimed to be at the time, the alliance has come to be seen more as a consciously short-term pragmatic step by the Chinese Communists who, realizing that they could not go it alone in the early stages of their rule, decided to ally themselves with the Soviet Union for both economic and strategic purposes. For example, Wang Gungwu, China and the World since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1977), p.32, states 'China expected the dependence to be necessary but temporary.' For variations of this view, see O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The "Great Game" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp.379-84; Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976), pp.56-58; Maurice Meisner, Mao's China, pp.119-21. John Gittings, The World and China, p.155, stresses the military rather than the economic benefits of the alliance, stating that it 'gave China the necessary military backing and political assurance to allow it to relax its efforts in the military field and to embark upon national reconstruction.' See also chapter 10.


This point is stressed by Gittings, The World and China, pp.151-52.


Peiping Digest, 2 March 1949 (quoted by Bodde, Peking Diary, p.118).
Xinwen ribao, 23 November 1949 (CPR, no.1030, 2 December 1949). See also McConaughy to Secretary of State, 16 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 634-35.

Nora Wain, 'The Russians in China,' Atlantic, July 1950, 31-35; Rossi, The Communist Conquest of Shanghai, pp.92, 119; reports on the situation in Shanghai in Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1950, 483-84, and 29 June 1950, 850-52; McConaughy to Secretary of State, 14 November 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 586-87; McConaughy to Secretary of State, 16 December 1949, ibid., 632; Yen, Umbrella Garden, p.77; interviews with C.P. Fitzgerald, 14 March 1978; Sir Lionel Lamb, 6 September 1979. On the official attempts to rectify this negative impression see, for example, Ting Ling [Ding Ling], 'The Soviet people,' People's China, 16 March 1950, 8-9, 28.

According to the US Consul-General in Shanghai, local Russian sources acknowledged that the delegation left China five days ahead of schedule because of the bad Chinese reaction. McConaughy to Secretary of State, 14 November 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 587.

See, for example, Emi Siao, 'Five weeks with the Soviet Cultural Delegation in China,' People's China, 1 March 1950, 8-10.

See chapter 10.

Wang, China and the World since 1949, pp.34-35.

CHAPTER 8
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION

In dealing with the Western diplomatic and consular presence in China, the Communists' aim was not so much to eliminate foreign government representation from China as to restructure it. By mid-1950, they had effectively eradicated the old-style imperialist diplomatic and consular presence, which had first gained access to China under the unequal treaties, and had established in its place the foundation of a new equal international relationship. Indeed, the experiences of the past prompted the Communists to demand not just equal treatment with former imperialist nations but, as evidenced by their somewhat negative reaction to British recognition, to deal with them very much on their own terms.

The Communists' overall treatment of diplomats and consuls who were left over from the old order formed part of the general pattern of the treatment of all Westerners in China and was not closely connected with the current state of their relations with one or more Western nations. It will be argued that there was one significant exception to this overall pattern: the detention for over a year of the US Consul-General in Shenyang, Angus Ward, and his staff. The so-called Ward affair, which provoked outrage in the United States where it tended to be seen as yet another example of the Communists' outrageous behaviour towards Westerners - and particularly towards Americans - in China, was specifically associated with the mounting tension in Sino-American relations.

The Denial of Legal Status
The eradication - without expulsion - of the old-style diplomatic and consular presence from China was basically accomplished by simply refusing to acknowledge the legal status of foreign government representatives still accredited to the Nationalists, in accordance with Mao's statement of 5 March 1949. Although there was no public statement of this policy following the Communists' assumption of power, within just a few days of their victory in Nanjing on 23 April 1949 the new authorities 'politely but firmly informed' heads of mission that they would be given no diplomatic privileges and would be regarded as ordinary foreign nationals. Whilst Mao had referred in his 5 March statement only to diplomatic (waijiao) and not to consular (lingshi) establishments and
personnel, which customarily had a somewhat different status in international law, actions already taken by the Communists in Shenyang, Tianjin and Beijing - and subsequently taken in Shanghai, Qingdao, Hankou and other cities - made it clear that the policy applied to consulates as well as to embassies. When consular officials attempted to establish either personal or written contact with the newly-arrived Communists, they were uniformly and repeatedly told they had no official status because their governments did not have diplomatic relations with the Communists. In practice, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Communists was out of the question before they established a national government on 1 October 1949.

The denial of official status to diplomatic and consular officials meant the loss of their customary privileges and immunities, both those which permitted them effectively to carry out their official functions and those which affected them more personally. 'In fact we had technically ceased to be diplomatists,' commented Indian Ambassador Sardar Panikkar. Basic to the diplomatic and consular function was the freedom of communication: official communication with the Chinese authorities and confidential communication with home governments. Diplomatic and consular officers were simply denied any contact with the authorities on an official basis, rendering impossible their basic roles of acting as a means of communication between governments and representing the interests of resident nationals. When the British Consul in Tianjin attempted to call on the city's mayor he was kept waiting for an hour and then told he would not be received; the US Consul-General in Beijing was equally unsuccessful when he tried to arrange an interview with Mayor Ye Jianying. Written communications, such as a letter forwarded by the consular body in Shanghai to Mayor Chen Yi offering to cooperate with the new authorities, were returned to the sender.

Foreign government representatives were told to address any enquiries to the Alien Affairs Bureau which, in accordance with the Communists' policy, would deal with them only as ordinary foreign nationals. The Bureau refused to accept communications on embassy letterhead or signed by officers using either a diplomatic or consular title. In interviews, Chinese officials carefully avoided referring even to ambassadors as anything other than 'foreign nationals.' They simply refused to discuss incidents involving foreign residents, maintaining that they could deal only with the individual concerned.
Diplomats and consuls also lost - to varying degrees - the right of confidential communication with their home governments: by coded telegraph, radio transmitter or diplomatic courier. The majority of embassies and consulates were dependent on the use of commercial telegraph facilities for the sending and receipt of coded messages, but when telegraphic facilities were restored the Communists explicitly forbade the sending of messages in code. In contrast, their attitude towards the use of radio transmitters (by the few embassies and consulates which held them) was inconsistent. In Shenyang, the first consular post to come under their control, they banned the use of transmitters and ordered that they be handed over to the authorities. The refusal of Angus Ward, the US Consul-General, to comply with the demand was the immediate cause of the placing under house arrest of the entire US Consulate-General staff. While the Communists also banned the use of transmitters in Tianjin after they entered the city in mid-January 1949, their attitude subsequently softened and they did not interfere with their continued use in Beijing, Nanjing and other cities where consulates were located.

The permitted retention of radio transmitters by diplomatic and consular missions in some cities led to a somewhat anomalous situation. In Nanjing, only the representatives of the major imperialist powers (the American, British and French embassies) had their own transmitters, allowing them to continue political and other reporting while officers at other embassies grew bored and restive because of their enforced inactivity. In Beijing and most other cities with consulates, only the United States - the object of the Communists' greatest hostility - had its own transmitting equipment. Fearing that the authorities would utilize any pretext to ban its use, the US Consul-General in Beijing recommended to the State Department that it reject a request from the British Consul-General to relay messages on his behalf.

Why the anomaly? Although the Communists could readily have banned the use of radio transmitters in Beijing, Nanjing and other cities (just as they had done in Shenyang and Tianjin), it was simply not in their practical interest completely to cut off a speedy and confidential channel of communication between representatives of the major Western powers in China and their home governments. This was particularly true at a time when these powers were debating the nature of their future relations with the Chinese Communists, including the question of recognition. But at the same time the Communist authorities were consistent.
and rigorous in implementing their policy of denying official status to
diplomatic and consular officials. Having instituted an outright ban on
the use of code in messages sent by commercial telegraph (understandable
for security purposes while the Civil War was still in progress), they
would have been acknowledging that foreign government representatives had
some special status had they permitted them to use this customary method
of confidential contact with their home governments.

Embassies and consulates were also deprived of confidential mail
services through a diplomatic courier. When facilities for passenger
travel became available, both within China and later with the outside
world, the authorities made it clear that they would not permit this
customary privilege. In late March 1949, for example, the Tianjin
authorities rejected a request from the US Consul-General in the city
(largely isolated because of the ban on radio contact) that a consular
official be permitted to exchange mail with a courier at Dagu (Taku)
Bar.20

The only alternative means of confidential communication was the
sending of coded messages through the open mail; these were subject to
delay and even to confiscation. Eight months after the Communists com­
pleted their victories in Tianjin and Beijing, consular officials were
still complaining that mail between the two cities - only sixty miles
apart - was being tampered with or lost. Efforts to keep communications
open between Beijing and Tianjin included the sending of mail with con­
sular staff (when they could obtain travel permits) and even the use of
private Chinese messengers.21

In addition to losing the privileges which permitted them effec­
tively to carry out their official functions, diplomatic and consular
officials were also deprived of all other customary privileges and
immunities, including exemption from local jurisdiction. They therefore
became susceptible to the same problems that were currently being
experienced by other foreign residents: involvement in incidents over
claims from employees or the violation of minor regulations, the possi­
bility of subsequent prosecution by the authorities, and difficulties in
obtaining exit permits to leave China.

Within a few days of the Communists' arrival, diplomatic and consular
officials found themselves ready targets for both current and former
employees. 'The Chinese servants and employees ... began suddenly to
put forward impossible demands,' commented the normally sympathetic Indian
Ambassador in Nanjing. 'Dismissal for any offence became impossible, except on payment of very heavy compensation.' Particularly threatening to embassy and consular officials was the intervention of the authorities in disputes over wages and dismissals when personal violence was alleged to have occurred. The accused officials were treated in a similar manner to other foreigners: they were summoned to the Public Security Bureau for questioning, sometimes detained, and eventually released after issuing public apologies which were published in the press along with reminders that imperialists may no longer act as they pleased in China.

'The People's Government does not allow the oppression and assault of others,' declared the official CCP newspaper, *Jiefang ribao*, in a lengthy article on the case of a British consul in Shanghai, R.T. Callender. On 6 June 1949, Callender had attempted to discharge two servants and allegedly struck them when they refused to leave the premises. The servants subsequently lodged a complaint with the authorities and Callender was called to the Public Security Bureau, interrogated at length, and released only after making a public apology and agreeing to pay six months' severance allowance and replace the men's torn clothing.

Like Callender, other consular officials in Shanghai were particularly vulnerable during the rash of incidents involving foreigners in June-July 1949. The most widely-publicized case was that of William Olive, a vice-consul at the American Consul-General, whose detention has already been discussed in connection with the 'Olive, Matheson and Gould' campaign. Despite attempts by American consular officers to see him, Olive was held incommunicado for three days on a diet of bread and water. In response to denunciations of their conduct in the American press, the Communist authorities stated that Olive had simply been 'treated as an ordinary citizen' and had received 'the routine punishment meted out to a man violating regulations.'

The deprivation of official privileges and immunities did not come to an end when diplomatic and consular officials were ready to leave China. Like other foreign nationals, they had to meet the authorities' stringent requirements before being granted exit permits: the satisfaction of all outstanding demands and the provision of guarantors. The policy was applied at all levels. American Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, the first head of mission to leave Nanjing after the Communists'
arrival, had his departure delayed for two weeks when the authorities refused him an exit permit until he had provided the appropriate guarantee. Embassy and consular personnel, like businessmen, were not granted permits while they were still involved in labour claims from employees on their private, and sometimes on their official, staffs. At this stage the delays in granting permits rarely extended beyond a few weeks or months. The problem became more serious in early 1950 when the US Government attempted to withdraw complete consular staffs and hardened further during the Korean War when some consular officials, like foreign businessmen, found themselves stranded in China for up to two years while trying to settle their affairs and obtain exit permits.

Chinese Policy in International Law

The Communists' denial of customary privileges and immunities - and the consequences of this policy - met with frequent and rigorous protests on the grounds that their actions were 'in contravention of international law.' For example, a joint memorandum of 12 April 1949 from the consular representatives of six Western countries (Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, Italy and Holland) to Beijing's Mayor, Ye Jianying, complained that consuls still lacked certain facilities for the full performance of their 'legitimate functions' in keeping with 'international law and practice.' These included the usual contacts with local authorities, postal and commercial telegraphic facilities for confidential communication with home governments, and travel for official purposes. When the Nanjing authorities refused to issue an exit permit to American Ambassador Stuart until guarantees had been provided, their demand was said to be 'completely contrary [to] accepted international custom and usage with regard [to] diplomatic and consular officials.' Incidents involving the detention of officials led to even more strident protests. American Vice-Consul William Olive's arrest and physical mistreatment by the authorities, for example, was denounced by Secretary of State Acheson as being in 'flagrant violation established international law re treatment consular officials.'

The assumption underlying these statements, as the protesters also pointed out, was that diplomats and consuls retained their privileges and immunities in territory which was under the de facto control of a regime not recognized by their home governments; in fact, even while the home governments continued to recognize the official government of the country.
They dismissed as irrelevant the Communists' ostensible reason for denying diplomats and consuls official status: that their governments did not have diplomatic relations with the Communists. According to US Ambassador Stuart, 'diplomatic missions have [a] special position, universally recognized under international law even where diplomatic relations may not exist between governments involved.' On the status of consuls, the memorandum forwarded by the six consular representatives in Beijing to Mayor Ye Jianying maintained that 'both in international law and practice Consular offices may and usually do continue to perform their regular functions during periods [of] either civil war or revolution.' The memorandum went on to state: '... we are assured that Consular function by international law and practice ... is quite without reference to [the] question of formal recognition between states....'

In fact, the retention of diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities was not quite such a clear-cut principle in international law as the protesters claimed it to be. The issue of consular status, in particular, became a subject of debate and disagreement amongst international lawyers, with the Chinese Communist case itself part of the debate. Reflecting the contemporary outrage in the United States, Herbert Briggs, Professor of International Law at Cornell University, supported the US State Department's stand and argued that the status of consuls did indeed remain unchanged, even under an unrecognized regime. 'Customary international law clearly establishes the international responsibility of a succeeding government for the acts of its predecessor, as well as for its own acts, in violation of international law.' On the specific issue of the mistreatment of American consular officials, he concluded that the United States was entitled to regard the Communists 'as in violation of international law.'

Certainly, the policy of permitting consular officials to continue their official functions had been adopted by several de facto governments during periods of civil war or revolution. In the 1930s, a number of unrecognized Latin-American revolutionary regimes had not interfered with foreign consular status. In China itself, foreign consuls had on the whole been left undisturbed both by the unrecognized 'Manchoukuo' Government in the Northeast during the early 1930s and in other parts of China which subsequently came under Japanese occupation.

Despite these precedents, L.T. Lee argues in his basic text Consular Law and Practice that there is no hard and fast rule. Analysing in
detail the Chinese Communists' attitude - at a distance of some twelve years from the events - he concludes that a consul's status may or may not be affected by the emergence of an unrecognized regime 'depending solely upon that regime's policy.' According to Lee, there is nothing in international law to prevent a government from according consuls their customary rights and immunities. But 'the consent to his acting as consul is ... subject to withdrawal by the unrecognized regime,' just as it is by a recognized government. Therefore a consul may continue to discharge his functions and enjoy his privileges and immunities under an unrecognized regime, 'not because he has a right under international law to do so, but because he is permitted to do so for policy reasons and by the goodwill of the unrecognized regime.'

The retention of official status by diplomatic personnel, as distinct from consular officers, appears to be even more questionable. When US Ambassador Stuart argued that 'diplomatic missions have [a] special position, universally recognized under international law even where diplomatic relations may not exist between governments involved,' his Minister-Counsellor in Guangzhou, Lewis Clark, reminded the Secretary of State that the status of diplomatic officers at the US Embassy in Nanjing was 'entirely different' from that of consular officers. The diplomatic relationship was basically with the central government, not with local authorities, and they did not share the consuls' customary - if debateable - right to continue their official functions. According to Clark, '... it would seem difficult to establish under international law any claim other than that of safe conduct out of [the] country and protection from molestation of themselves and property in [the] meantime.' As Clark stated, diplomats were entitled in international law to retain their privileges and immunities, which were held on a personal basis and not restricted to their official acts, for a reasonable period of time even after the termination of their official duties. Baron F.C. van Arsen, the Dutch Ambassador and an expert on international law, claimed that the withholding of an exit permit for US Ambassador Stuart until he had provided guarantees had no precedent and was irregular.

With the authorities ignoring both verbal and written protests about their alleged violations of international law, the new head of the US Consulate-General in Shanghai, Walter McConaughy, suggested that the Communists' own interpretation of international law might be a fruitful subject for study by international lawyers both inside and outside the
Apart from the controversial issue of the continued status of diplomatic and consular officials, the Communists' attitude had two unusual features. The first was that, while denying foreign government representatives any official status, they made no move to expel them from China. The more customary procedure, particularly once a central government was established, was officially to terminate their mission which amounted to expulsion. Instead, the authorities simply permitted foreign officials to stay on in China as ordinary foreign nationals, having deprived them of the ability to fulfil their normal functions.

The second unusual feature, which McConaughy stressed, was the Communists' failure to make the customary distinction between diplomatic and consular representatives. Their refusal to deal with consular officers in the absence of diplomatic recognition was based on the premise that consular officers were political agents of their governments in the same sense as diplomats. According to McConaughy, the Shanghai authorities were 'unmoved by all arguments about the permissibility of negotiations on local issues between consular officers and representatives of a revolutionary regime, as well as being unimpressed by the numerous precedents that could be cited.

In practice, the Chinese authorities were responding to a factual situation rather than to an international convention. Although a distinction had traditionally been observed between diplomatic and consular officers, the two functions were drawing closer together in a number of ways. These included the amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular services of most Western nations, the interchangeability of diplomatic and consular assignments with senior officers usually having experience in both fields, and the fact that most large consular offices had political sections carrying out reporting along the same lines as diplomatic missions. All these features applied - to a greater or lesser extent - to foreign consular offices in China. In fact, consulates in the country had always held a quasi-diplomatic position because of the traditional lack of a highly centralized government and the prevalence of semi-autonomous provincial governments. As the US Consul-General in Shanghai admitted, this made more colorable the Communists' contention that 'consuls are [the] same species and same genus as diplomats.'

The Soviet Union, in particular, had been moving towards erasing the distinction between diplomatic and consular officers, partly in the
interests of obtaining the broader diplomatic immunities for its consular officers serving abroad. Whether or not the Chinese Communists consciously followed the Soviet example, or even adopted their policy in response to Soviet pressure, is largely a matter of conjecture. At the very least, it appears that the Soviet Government was either aware of, or anticipated, the Chinese Communists' intentions. It was the one foreign government to transfer its embassy to Guangzhou and it formally closed its consulates in Beijing and Shanghai before the Communists' arrival. In taking this action, the Soviet Government avoided placing both the Chinese authorities and its own representatives in China in an embarrassing situation: a situation which did in fact exist for a short time in Tianjin. After the establishment of the People's Republic, the Soviet Government was able to make a fresh, orthodox start in its relations with China; it recognized the Government on the day following its establishment, appointed Roschin as its first ambassador to Beijing and reopened its consular office in Shanghai.

The Reasons for Chinese Policy

Having decided not to acknowledge the official status of foreign government representatives in China, the Communists' numerous refusals to grant particular privileges and immunities were not a series of provocations but part of an internally consistent policy. According to Lee, even 'the mistreatment of "former consuls," deplorable as it may be, must belong to the same category as mistreatment of any alien civilians.' The question remains: why did the authorities adopt a policy which was different from that usually followed in similar circumstances and which was bound to arouse vehement protests and possibly have repercussions on relations with foreign governments?

Contemporary commentators, assessing the situation in the immediate international context rather than within its long-term framework, tended to link the Communists' actions with the question of diplomatic recognition, although they disagreed on the Communists' motives. One frequently suggested explanation for their denial of official status to diplomats and consuls was that they were rejecting all attempts at contacts on an informal or de facto basis in the hope of forcing de jure recognition immediately a central government was established. Perhaps the interim period was a 'softening up process' which would make both the individual diplomat and his government that much more anxious to
regularize their position through the establishment of formal relations as soon as this became possible.54

As the Counsellor at the US Embassy in Nanjing pointed out, the opposite explanation - that the Communists were not over-anxious for relations with the West - was also a possibility.55 In his discussion of consular status under unrecognized governments, Lee states that the issue had only infrequently become a problem and that this may have been due 'to the eagerness of the unrecognized government to ingratiate itself with the sending state ... in the hope of obtaining eventual recognition.'56 Based on this argument, it would seem that the Chinese Communists had little desire for speedy recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Mao's statement of 5 March appeared to bear this out, at least so far as the imperialist powers were concerned. 'As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries,' he said, 'we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after country-wide victory.'57 While stating that the Communists were willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, Mao added:

... the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China.58

These two explanations - that the Communists were seeking, and were not seeking, recognition - were not as diametrically opposed as they outwardly appeared. On the one hand, there is little doubt that the Chinese Communists wanted diplomatic recognition and acceptance in the international community. In fact, on the day the People's Republic was established, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zhou Enlai, wrote to consular representatives in Beijing (addressing them as private individuals in accordance with the Communists' policy of denying them official status), stating he considered it 'necessary that there be established normal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and all countries of the world.'59 Zhou requested the addressees to transmit to their governments Mao Zedong's Proclamation of the Central People's Government which proclaimed that the Government was 'willing to establish diplomatic relations with any and all governments of foreign
countries which wish to observe principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty.'60 Neither Zhou nor Mao made any mention of the stern proviso made by Mao in his statement of 5 March. On the other hand, as the British Government discovered in January 1950 when it became the first non-communist Western government (and the first of the imperialists) to recognize the People's Republic, the Chinese attitude was in practice basically in accordance with Mao's earlier harsh statement. If the Chinese Government wanted diplomatic relations with imperialist governments, it wanted them only on its own terms. Having been formally recognized, the Chinese Government took the extraordinary step - leaving the British Government and international lawyers bewildered - of agreeing only to the acceptance in Beijing of a representative to 'negotiate for the establishment of diplomatic relations'61 - a negotiating process that was to last over four years. As Mao had said, the Communists were not prepared to grant the imperialists legal status in China while they still had a 'hostile attitude'; in the British case this included maintaining a consul in Taiwan.62

Although the recognition question cannot be entirely ignored in assessing the Communists' motives, their treatment of diplomatic and consular personnel can probably more profitably be seen in the context of their attitude towards all Westerners remaining in China. By staying on in China in the hope of establishing informal links with the Communists, foreign government representatives - particularly those of the imperialist countries - provided the Communists with yet another opportunity for national self-assertion. If individual Americans, Britishers and other foreign nationals who had no formal connection with their governments could be portrayed as exemplifying the 'arrogant imperialist,' how much more was this true of the official representatives of imperialism? With such an opportunity for self-assertion presenting itself, it would perhaps have been even more surprising if the Communists had continued to acknowledge the official position of diplomatic and consular leftovers from the old regime when their right to that position was far from clear even in international law. The Communists' actions illustrated to foreign governments and to the Chinese people both the nation's new-felt strength and the corresponding impotence of those powers which had once responded to the slightest insult with force and demands for more concessions at China's expense. Even though the authorities were denying
official status to government representatives, press reports of their allegedly arrogant behaviour, detention and 'humble apologies' made their former status quite clear by referring to them as 'consul of the former British Consulate-General,' 'vice-consul of the former American Consulate-General,' and so on.63

The denial of official status and the resulting deprivation of privileges and immunities were applied across the board. Representatives of countries with no history of imperialism in China, for example India and Burma, had to suffer for the sins of their imperialist colleagues - Britain, the United States, France and other European countries, which formed the hub of the diplomatic community and had the largest representation in China. When the opportunity presented itself, however, the authorities were to some extent selective in their treatment of foreign government representatives. First, representatives of the major imperialist powers were the chief targets for press attacks resulting from incidents involving claims for payment and alleged assaults. Second, the authorities occasionally modified the 'non-official status' of representatives from non-imperialist countries. For example, Indian Ambassador Sardar Panikkar, who was a vehement Asian nationalist, reportedly enjoyed a cordial - though still unofficial - relationship with Communist officials in Nanjing. This lasted until his departure from China when, unlike the ambassadors of some Western countries, he was exempted from having his baggage searched.64

A Selective Anti-Imperialist Policy?

Even the Communists' treatment of representatives of countries with a long history of imperialism in China was not always uniform. Overall, the greatest problems appear to have been experienced by American officials, followed by those of Britain and France. A striking example of the differences occurred in Shenyang, where these three were the only Western nations with consular representation. The US Consul-General and his staff were under house arrest for almost the whole of 1949, the British Consulate had its power and telephone cut off, and the French were 'consistently treated one degree better.'65

How significant were the differences? Considering the outraged reaction of the US Government to the treatment of its officials, two questions need to be answered. To what extent did the Communist authorities single out American government representatives for particularly
 Were the Chinese Communists being independently hostile and provocative (as many Americans claimed at the time) or were they themselves provoked by the US Government's own provocative statements and actions, with the matter belonging more to the sphere of current Sino-American relations than being part of the overall pattern of the Communists' treatment of the Western presence in China?

Whilst diplomatic and consular officials from a number of imperialist countries were involved in incidents involving their temporary detention and subsequent apologies, there were two cases which appeared to indicate that the Communists were subjecting US officials to discriminatory treatment. These were the arrest and particularly the mistreatment of Vice-Consul William Olive in Shanghai and, more especially, the detention of American Consul-General Angus Ward and his staff in Shenyang. Olive's detention, which provoked an indignant reaction from Secretary of State Acheson, was considered to be outrageous on two grounds: first, that Olive was an American official and not an ordinary foreign national; second, that he was physically maltreated by the authorities. As already discussed, the American allegation that Olive's arrest was 'in violation of international law' was a controversial issue and simply not accepted by the Communist authorities. Second, Olive's physical maltreatment, confirmed by an Indian fellow-prisoner, was at least partly provoked by Olive's own violent behaviour. Even the American Consul-General stated in a report to the Secretary of State: 'Olive was severely beaten (although in fairness resisting authority).'

Indeed, Olive's detention may well have been cut short because he was an American official. The incident occurred at the height of the spate of incidents involving foreigners in Shanghai and the accompanying emotional press campaign; local police undoubtedly took advantage of the opportunity offered by Olive's behaviour (disobeying a traffic order and later losing his temper) both to detain Olive and to castigate and even threaten American consular officials who attempted to contact him. Although a non-Communist police contact of American officials in Shanghai initially thought that Olive might well be held for several months, his improved treatment and subsequent release after only three days apparently came about after intervention by the Shanghai Alien Affairs Bureau. According to an unconfirmed report, the Communist authorities in Beijing were annoyed at the actions of the Shanghai police, probably
because they did not want such a minor event to erupt into an international incident.  

Unlike the Olive affair, the case of Angus Ward was both the direct responsibility of the highest authorities and appeared to involve the deliberate singling out of an American target. Following Ward's refusal to hand over the Consulate-General's radio transmitter on 15 November 1948 (on the grounds that it was US Government property), the Communist authorities placed Ward and his staff of nine under house arrest and cut them off from all contact with the outside world. Approximately six months later, the US Government finally decided to close down the Consulate-General and on 21 May 1949 the US Consul-General in Beijing advised Ward accordingly by registered mail. The authorities eventually allowed the letter to reach Ward on 7 June and on the following day they permitted him to acknowledge the instructions by telegraph. Ten days later, however, the US Consulate-General was 'exposed' in the Chinese media as the centre of a spy ring and Ward and his staff continued to be held incommunicado. In late October, following a fabricated incident, the Consul-General and four staff members were accused in the press of beating up a Chinese employee. The five men were tried on 21 November—not for espionage but on the familiar charge of assaulting a Chinese worker; they were given a six months' suspended sentence and deported from China.

The year-long affair, lasting from the Communists' major victory in the Northeast until after the establishment of the People's Republic, provoked widespread denunciations in the United States and strongly coloured Sino-American relations during this vital period. Ostensibly it appeared to be a deliberate, provocative action on the part of the Communist leadership. Even if the initial conflict over the radio transmitter was a local matter, the holding of Ward and his staff, as well as his subsequent prosecution and deportation, were obviously directed by the top authorities. It has recently been suggested by Western commentators, however, that the Communists' actions in this case were not so much provocative as provoked. John Gittings, for example, suggests that the Communists may well have been justified in detaining the Consulate-General staff on the grounds that they were, in fact, engaged in espionage activities. The US Government's External Survey Department (a successor to the Office of Strategic Services), which the Communists accused of recruiting Chinese and Japanese agents in the Northeast to
collect intelligence information, was indeed an American intelligence unit which reported to the Consul-General. 75

Despite the ostensible seriousness of the espionage charge, whether or not the Consulate-General was 'guilty' does not fully explain why the authorities took the action they did. First, Ward had already been detained for almost seven months before the charge was made. Second, the charge was never acted upon - at least so far as Ward and his American staff were concerned; they were not tried for espionage but on the far lesser - and more frequently used - charge of assaulting a Chinese worker. In any case, the charge of espionage against Americans and other foreigners (both government officials and private individuals) was to become a characteristic feature of the Communists' treatment of Westerners, particularly during the Korean War. 76 Their definition of espionage was an extremely elastic one, extending from underground espionage to a broad range of intelligence and even information-gathering activities. In the Communists' eyes, not just the Shenyang Consulate-General, but most American consulates (as well as those of several other Western countries) were undoubtedly open to accusations of espionage. For example, the American Consul at Dalian, Paul Paddock, reminded the State Department: 'This is strictly intelligence outpost and not ordinary Consulate. New personnel should be trained in intelligence work.' 77 In Shenyang itself, the Communists could probably just as easily have laid espionage charges against the French Consulate-General. The French Ambassador in Nanjing revealed confidentially to US Ambassador Stuart that he had no authority over the Shenyang Consulate-General's transmitter because it was under the control of French Intelligence. 78

Rather than dismissing the Ward affair as a deliberate provocation on the part of the Communists or justifying the actions in terms of the Consulate-General's 'guilt,' the incident can probably be viewed more profitably in the context of the mounting mutual provocation and hostility between the Chinese Communists and the US Government. In early January 1949, the head of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong, Qiao Mu, told an American official that the issue was 'part of [the] larger question of US attitudes toward [the] new government and toward [the] KMT Government....' 79 During 1949, the hostility and mutual verbal provocation intensified: from Mao's attacks on American imperialism and his statement on 30 June that the Communists were going to 'lean to one side,' to the US Government's White Paper on China of 5 August which aroused the
ire of the Communists. The mounting hostility extended to relations between the Communists and US Government representatives inside China: the US State Department told Ambassador Stuart to reject an invitation from the top Communist leadership to visit Beijing before his departure; this action in turn may have been partly responsible for the Communists' diatribes against Stuart as a representative of imperialism following his departure from Nanjing in early August.

Even if the detention of Ward was a deliberate anti-American act, it has to be remembered that US aid to the Nationalists was still arriving in China and that American officials remaining in China were the official representatives of an undeclared enemy. The US Government had been highly conscious of the dangers that American officials might face under the Communists and the US Consulate-General in Shenyang was, in fact, its acknowledged 'guinea pig.' The Communists' eventual playing down of the Ward affair - his arraignment on the familiar assault charge instead of the far more serious charge of espionage, as well as his suspended sentence and deportation in November 1949 - may have been both calculated and timed to remove a major barrier to formal recognition of the newly-established national government by the Americans. Overall, then, the Communists' actions in the Ward affair - unlike their general treatment of diplomats and consuls in China - appear to have belonged to the sphere of current Sino-American relations rather than forming part of the pattern of the treatment of the Western presence in China.

The complex and controversial question of China's foreign relations before the Korean War (especially the issue of United States non-recognition) is outside the scope of this study. However, just as the Communists' decision to deny official status to foreign government officials in China was largely independent of the recognition question, so too did their resultant actions have a limited effect on the recognition policies adopted by foreign governments. For most non-Communist Western governments, the recognition decision was based on broader political and economic considerations. Hence the different decisions taken by individual countries: the Scandinavian nations, Switzerland and the Netherlands speedily recognized the People's Republic; France, Italy and Belgium decided against recognition. At most, the Communists' actions may have helped to reinforce attitudes that were already evolving, whether these were positive as in the British case or negative as in the case of the United States. Certainly the British Government, under
strong pressure from commercial interests, was keen to regularize its position in China. In the case of the United States, the mistreatment of Government officials in Shenyang - which was associated with the mounting hostility between the Chinese Communists and the United States rather than with the denial of official status as such - strengthened the hand of the non-recognition lobby.

The Changing Diplomatic and Consular Scene

The denial of official status to diplomatic and consular officials, resulting in their inability to carry out their normal functions and their personal vulnerability to involvement in incidents and even to detention, raised the question of whether their continued presence in China served any useful purpose. Consular officials were 'spending most of their time in defending themselves rather than in protecting and assisting American citizens,' commented the Chief of the US State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs.84 In Nanjing, the diplomatic corps had become increasingly restless and jittery and, according to the Indian Ambassador, its patience had already 'practically come to an end' by the end of June 1949, just two months after the Communists' entry into the city.85

Whilst nearly all heads of mission (with the notable exception of the Soviet Ambassador) had remained in Nanjing to await the Communists, there was a general consensus that they should leave China before the establishment of a new national government to avoid being placed in an embarrassing diplomatic situation.86 US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart left Nanjing by US Air Force plane on 2 August.87 But it was not until mid-October, shortly after the People's Republic had in fact been established, that transportation (including permission to go through the Nationalist blockade) was arranged for the remaining fifteen ambassadors and five chargé d'affaires,88 and the general exodus of heads of mission got under way in two ships chartered by the British Government and a French ship.89 As Indian Ambassador Sardar Panikkar later recalled, it was a group of disillusioned ambassadors who finally left China. Having taken the decision not to follow the Nationalist Government but to remain in Nanjing, partly as a show of goodwill towards the Communists, they had been unceremoniously stripped of their privileges and subjected to constant indignities by the new authorities. In Panikkar's words, 'it could not be described as an honourable exit and most of the diplomats regretted that they had stayed behind at all.'90
The differing attitudes of the British and American Governments towards retaining their diplomatic and consular staffs in China reflected the growing rift on the question of recognizing China's new government. Apart from the departure of Ambassador Ralph Stevenson and Minister Lionel Lamb, the staff of the British Embassy in Nanjing was retained 'intact for [the] move to Peiping' once the British Government recognized the People's Republic. In contrast, the staff of the US Embassy in Nanjing was cut by about one half. While the British Government did not consider closing down its consulates (even after recognition in January 1950 failed to result in the granting of official status to consular officials), the Americans embarked on a policy of gradual withdrawal. In late July-early August 1949, at the time of Ambassador Stuart's departure, the State Department instructed consulates still remaining in Nationalist-held territory (in Chongqing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou) to close down before the Communists' arrival. In keeping with its general evacuation from China programme of August-September, it ordered the closure of two of its consulates in Communist territory, Hankou and Qingdao (as well as the halving of the Shanghai Consulate-General's staff), leaving only the Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai consular offices still functioning.

The immediate cause of the complete withdrawal of American officials from China in January 1950 was the Government's requisitioning of part of the American consular premises (the 'former barracks') in Beijing. On 6 January 1950 the authorities notified the Americans (as well as the French and Dutch Governments) that they proposed requisitioning that part of their consular property which had been acquired under the 1901 Protocol following the Boxer Uprising. In response, the US Government threatened that, if the requisition order was carried out, it would close all its official establishments in Communist China. The Communists requisitioned the property on 13 January; on the following day US Secretary of State Acheson announced the withdrawal of all American officials from China. Whilst the US Government maintained that its representatives in China were withdrawn because of Chinese provocation, the incident had in reality provided an ideal opportunity for the Americans to withdraw their remaining staff and at the same time make considerable political capital from the action. Having decided against early recognition of the People's Republic (Britain and a number of other Western governments had recognized the new Chinese Government a week earlier), the US Government - which still recognized the Nationalist
regime - could hardly retain its diplomatic and consular officials in China indefinitely.\textsuperscript{100}

By early 1950 a 'new look' diplomatic corps was springing up in China - not in Nanjing but in the new capital, Beijing. The Communists, new to the field of international diplomacy, initially found themselves saddled with a complex three-tiered diplomatic presence.\textsuperscript{101} First there were the officially accredited representatives to the new Government, dominated not by the Western imperialist powers as in the past but by the ambassadors of the Eastern bloc, led by the former Soviet Ambassador to Nanjing, N.V. Roschin. In mid-1950 Roschin was joined by two of his former colleagues in Nanjing, Indian Ambassador Sardar Panikkar and Burmese Ambassador Mynt Thein, as well as by the ambassadors of other governments which had recognized the People's Republic - including Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and Pakistan. The new ambassadors and their staffs enjoyed the customary diplomatic privileges and immunities and were treated in accordance with normal diplomatic practice.

The second tier was represented by the governments of Britain, Norway and the Netherlands which, despite their recognition of the People's Republic, had to content themselves with having only negotiating representatives in Beijing. Soon after British recognition on 6 January 1950, the former staff of the British Embassy in Nanjing transferred to Beijing under their negotiating representative, John Hutchison, formerly Minister-Counsellor for Commercial Affairs in Shanghai. The personnel of the negotiating missions inhabited a diplomatic no man's land; they were unofficially accorded customary privileges and immunities but unsure of when they might overstep the mark.\textsuperscript{102} When they were invited to official functions, for example National Day celebrations, their presence tended to go unmentioned in press reports.\textsuperscript{103} More often, the Chinese authorities held separate functions for them. Their anomalous situation was described by the Indian Ambassador: 'Chinese officials, excepting the Foreign Minister and those connected with negotiations, pretended not to know them and it was therefore embarrassing to have them at the same party.'\textsuperscript{104} The third tier of foreign government representatives - officials of governments (including France, Belgium and Italy) which had not recognized the People's Republic but temporarily retained representatives in Beijing - continued to have no official privileges at all and were vulnerable to the same problems as ordinary foreign nationals.
The situation was largely paralleled by consular representatives in Shanghai. The Soviet Consulate in Shanghai enjoyed official status, as did the Indian Consulate. At the other extreme, consular representatives of governments which had not recognized the People's Republic - such as Italian Paolo Rossi and Filipino Mariano Ezpeleta - were denied all privileges and, like many other foreign nationals, became involved in the lengthy process of attempting to wind up their affairs and obtain permission to leave China. Their unofficial position was shared by British consular officers throughout China who, despite British recognition, did not enjoy even the semi-official status of the British Negotiating Mission in Beijing. They consequently continued to lack any official authority to represent the interests of the British community.

Although the Korean War delayed the conclusion of negotiations by some governments for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations and hardened the attitudes of other governments against recognition, by mid-1950 the new-style diplomatic presence in China was basically established. To the undisguised delight of the Communists, the 'united front' between the former imperialist powers, particularly Britain and the United States, had already split wide open. Despite the ideological hysteria of the Korean War and the Cultural Revolution, the British Government maintained a continuing diplomatic presence in Communist China (although formal relations were not established until 1954), even after the physical mistreatment of embassy personnel by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. In stark contrast, the United States had a lapse of over twenty years in its representation on the Chinese mainland. It was not until 1973, following President Nixon's visit to China, that the US Government had its own 'negotiating mission' - this time called a liaison office - in Beijing, and not until 1979 that formal diplomatic relations were established between the two countries and the first United States Ambassador to the People's Republic arrived in the Chinese capital.
Notes

1 See p.101.

2 Panikkar, In Two Chinas, p.50. See also FRUS, 1949, VIII, 727, 738, 739.

3 Mao, 'Report to the second plenary session...', Selected Works, IV, 370.


5 Formal recognition of the Communists before this date would have been classified as 'premature recognition' which was contrary to international law. Indeed, it was considered by some international lawyers to be 'an act of intervention and an international delinquency.' H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1948), p.8.


7 The following discussion is based chiefly on communications from the American Embassy and American consular offices in China to the US Department of State (printed in FRUS, 1949, VIII, 723-859, 933-1302, passim) and personal interviews with former British diplomats and consular officials, including Sir John Addis (First Secretary, Nanjing, 1947-1950; Beijing, 1950), 4 September 1979; Sir Colin Crowe (First Secretary, Beijing, 1950-1953), 28 August 1979; Joseph Ford (First Secretary, Beijing, 1951-1953), 20 August 1979; Sir Lionel Lamb (Minister, Nanjing, 1947-1949; Chargé d'Affaires, Beijing, 1951-1953), 6 September 1979.

8 Panikkar, In Two Chinas, p.52.

9 Clubb to Secretary of State, 4 February 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1056-57.

10 Clubb to Secretary of State, 7 February 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1060.

11 Rossi, The Communist Conquest of Shanghai, p.38.

12 Stuart to Secretary of State, 7 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 739.

13 See, for example, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1203-204, 1217-18, 1245-46.

14 Stuart to Secretary of State, 13 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 755; Panikkar, In Two Chinas, p.52.

15 Ward to Secretary of State, 15 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VII, 834-35.
16 See p.249.

17 Smyth to Secretary of State, 21 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1052-53.

18 Stuart, Fifty Years in China, p.249.

19 Clubb to Secretary of State, 8 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1067-68. The State Department left the matter to the Consul-General's discretion 'since circumstances may arise making desirable transmission occasional coded message urgent nature....' Secretary of State to Clubb, 11 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1069.

20 Smyth to Secretary of State, 29 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1075.

21 Clubb to Secretary of State, 30 September 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1111. See also Smyth to Secretary of State, 26 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1105.

22 Panikkar, In Two Chinas, p.53.

23 Jiefang ribao, 9 June 1949 (CPR, no.908, 9 June 1949).

24 ibid. See also report of this incident in Cabot to Secretary of State, 11 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1162-63. A similar case involved John Christensen, Assistant Military Attaché at the US Embassy in Nanjing. FRUS, 1949, VIII, 828-31.


26 For the differing Chinese and American interpretations of the incident, see Jiefang ribao, 8 July 1949 (CPR, no.927, 7-8 July 1949); FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1199-1265 passim.


29 FRUS, 1949, VIII, 785-88, 799-803, 808-809.

30 See p.297.

31 Printed in Clubb to Secretary of State, 14 April 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1077-78.

32 Secretary of State to Stuart, 15 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 788.

33 Secretary of State to Stuart, 7 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1205.

34 Stuart to Secretary of State, 7 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 739.

35 Clubb to Secretary of State, 14 April 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1077.

These factors are commented on by Lee, *Consular Law and Practice*, p.52.

ibid., p.49.

ibid., p.50.

ibid., p.54.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 7 May 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 739.

Clark to Secretary of State, 9 May 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 740.

Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p.58.

McConaughy had been in charge of the US Consulate-General in Shanghai since John Cabot's departure (on the same plane as Ambassador John Leighton Stuart) on 2 August 1949. He was promoted from Consul to Consul-General in October 1949. *NCDN*, 22 October 1949.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 10 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1291.


McConaughy to Secretary of State, 10 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1290.

ibid., 1291.

McConaughy to Secretary of State, 10 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1290-91.

*NCDN*, 31 May 1949; McConaughy to Secretary of State, 10 September 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1291.

Smyth to Secretary of State, 26 February 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 1065.

*People's China*, 1 January 1950, 32; *Dagongbao*, 30 December 1949 (*CPR*, no.1053, 30 December 1949.

Lee, *Consular Policy and Practice*, p.52.

This view was expressed by a number of American diplomats in China. See, for example, Clark to Secretary of State, 23 February 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 939; Jones to Secretary of State, 15 August 1949, ibid., 814-15.

Jones to Secretary of State, 15 August 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 815.

Lee, *Consular Law and Practice*, p.52.

Mao, 'Report to the second plenary session...', *Selected Works*, IV, 370-71.
Clubb to Secretary of State, 2 October 1949, FRUS, 1949, IX, 93. In cases where foreign governments did not have consular representatives in Beijing, the letter was sent to their embassies or legations in Nanjing.

Rennmin ribao, 1 October 1949. See also Clubb to Secretary of State, 1 October 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 544-45.


For Chinese comments on British recognition, see Dagongbao, 11 January 1950 (CPR, no.1062, 11 January 1950); China Digest, 16 January 1950, 14.

An occasionally used alternative was to put the individual's position in quotation marks, for example, 'consul of the British Consulate.' Jiefang ribao, 9 June 1949 (CPR, no.908, 9 June 1949); Dagongbao, 15 August 1949 (CPR, no.949, 13-15 August 1949).

Panikkar, In Two Chinas, pp.58, 62. See also Bacon to Secretary of State, 28 October 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 841.

Letter from British Consul, Shenyang, to British Consul-General, Beijing, 9 March 1949, printed in FRUS, 1949, VIII, 951.

Secretary of State to Cabot, 7 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1205.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 7 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1202-1203.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 9 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1213.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 7 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1203-1204.

Reported in Cabot to Secretary of State, 8 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1208-1209.

Cabot to Secretary of State, 9 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1222. On the morning of 8 July, the US Consul-General (ostensibly acting as an ordinary American citizen) had an interview with the deputy head of the Alien Affairs Bureau. Olive noticed an improvement in his treatment in mid-afternoon and was released around midday on the following day.


This summary of the Ward affair is based on FRUS, 1948, VII, 834-49; FRUS, 1949, VIII, 933-1051; NCNA, Shenyang, 18 June 1949 (CPR, no.915, 18-20 June 1949); Wenhuibao, 30 October 1949 (CPR, no.1004, 30-31 October 1949); Wenhuibao, 3 November 1949 (CPR, no.1008, 8 November 1949); Dagongbao, 28 November 1949 (CPR, no.1026, 27-28 November 1949); Jiefang ribao, 30 November 1949 (CPR, no.1028, 30 November 1949). A transcript of part of the trial was published in
Xinwen ribao, 12 December 1949 (CPR, no.1038, 11-12 December 1949) and the lengthy verdict in China Digest, 14 December 1949, 6-8.


Gittings, The World and China, pp.177-78. Although he does not offer any additional evidence, Michael Hunt appears to accept the Communists' charges of an American spy network in Shenyang. Hunt, 'Mao Tse-tung and the issue of accommodation with the United States, 1948-1950,' p.204.

See Chapter 9.

Paddock to Secretary of State, 15 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VII, 802. See also Paddock to Secretary of State, 1 October 1948, ibid., 794: 'Sporadic opportunities occur to obtain important intelligence information.'

Stuart to Secretary of State, 17 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, VII, 846.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 5 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 933. Qiao Mu was an alternate name used by Qiao Guanghua, another close wartime associate of Zhou Enlai and later one of China's leading diplomats.

For details of this invitation and its rejection, see FRUS, 1949, VIII, 766-69.


See p.74.

On the attitudes of different Western governments and their eventual decisions on recognition following the establishment of the People's Republic, see FRUS, 1949, IX, 93-260.

Sprouse to Merchant (Office of Far Eastern Affairs), 15 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 1317.

Panikkar, In Two Chinas, pp.56, 58.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 15 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 757-58; Jones to Secretary of State, 27 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 819-20.

Stuart to Secretary of State, 2 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 809.

Jones to Secretary of State, 5 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VIII, 811.

NCDN, 15 October 1949.

Panikkar, In Two Chinas, p.62.
On the differing attitudes towards recognition expressed by the US and British Governments, see *FRUS*, 1949, IX, 1-97.

Jones to Secretary of State, 27 August 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 819.

*NCDN*, 11 September 1949.


ibid.


Secretary of State Acheson had foreseen this situation as early as July 1949. Secretary of State to Cabot, 27 July 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VIII, 803.

For a first-hand description of Beijing's complicated diplomatic scene and its personnel, see Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, pp.92-95.

Interviews with Sir Colin and Lady Crowe, 28 August 1979; Sir John Addis, 4 September 1949; Sir Lionel Lamb, 6 September 1979.

See, for example, *Renmin ribao*, 2 October 1951, and comment in *SCMP*, no.196, 1-2 October 1951.

Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p.92.
On 1 May 1950, Liu Shaoqi, Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government and generally acknowledged to be the most important figure in China next to Mao Zedong, told a meeting of Party cadres in Beijing: 'Imperialism has been driven from China and the many prerogatives of the imperialists in China have been abolished ... the key to China's front door is in our own pockets....' By this date - less than one year after the Communist victory in Shanghai and only seven months after the establishment of the People's Republic - the Communists' pressures on the Western presence had already caused many individual Westerners to leave China; prompted the withdrawal, where possible, of American business interests and reduced many British business concerns to the desire (but not the means) to leave the country; immobilized Western missionaries and heavily restricted their activities; either eradicated or heavily censored both the Western-owned press and Western culture (in particular movie films) in the Chinese community; and eradicated the 'old style' diplomatic and consular presence.

Had similar domestic and international conditions persisted for China, the remaining Western presence would have become increasingly redundant as the transition to state control - already under way in the early phase of the New Democracy period - gained momentum. Specific pressures on Westerners would probably have increased as the major reasons for restraint - the chaotic state of the economy and the Communists' lack of professional expertise in urban areas - became less compelling. But exactly how the Communists originally intended to deal with what remained of the Western presence in China became a hypothetical question after the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 and, in particular, China's entry into the war in late October. Officially, only Chinese 'volunteers' fought on the side of North Korea and United States forces were part of the United Nations contingent fighting on the South Korean side. In practice, China and the United States were at war, a situation acknowledged in the welter of vituperation emanating from each side. There was little question but that the hostile international environment would affect the Government's treatment of Americans - and by extension other Westerners - remaining in China.
Contrary to the claims of some Western commentators, however, the Korean War was not a turning point or watershed in the Communists' treatment of the Western presence, marking a dramatic change from moderation to extremism. As has already been argued, the Communists, far from initially having a 'permissive attitude' towards Westerners, had from the beginning exerted heavy pressures on virtually all aspects of the Western presence. The Korean War saw an intensification of the pressures to squeeze the remaining representatives of the imperialist presence out of China (while at the same time increasing the difficulty of leaving) and their continued utilization for the Communists' own pragmatic purposes.

Just as the Communists' treatment of the Western presence before mid-1950 must be seen in the context of their earlier priorities - notably a smooth transition to Communist rule, economic rehabilitation and the gaining of widespread support - so too must their more intensive actions after mid-1950 be examined in the context of the major priorities of the Korean War period. This period saw a close association between foreign events, that is participation in the war, and internal policies which were aimed at mobilizing support for the war and consolidating Communist power by eliminating all potentially subversive elements, as well as accelerating the process of state control. These policies were put into effect through a number of mass mobilization campaigns, three of which directly affected - and on occasion also utilized - one or more groups of Westerners remaining in China. The Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign, formally launched in November 1950 following China's entry into the Korean War, generally increased the tension under which all Westerners - not just Americans - were living in China. The addition in late February 1951 of the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries, while instituting a period of virtual terror for the Chinese population, also encompassed Westerners in its net; in particular it affected Catholic missionaries. The third campaign that had an impact on Westerners was the Five-Anti campaign of early 1952 which proved to be the final straw for the remaining Western business presence in China.

The Communists' pressures on Westerners during the Korean War therefore continued to have three basic features. First, there was a persistence and intensification of the underlying pressures aimed at eliminating imperialism from China. Second, the acceleration of state control over all aspects of the economy and society meant that the continuing presence of Westerners in China became more and more redundant.
Third, the Communists continued to utilize the remaining Western presence (or, more accurately, the process of its elimination) but in accordance with their new major priority: the mobilization of the population. The Communists' changing priorities meant that the earlier domestic restraints on their actions no longer applied. Similarly, any considerations of China's international image (and the desire for entry into the United Nations) became irrelevant because of the Korean War.

Although these three elements added up to a policy which at times resulted in the *de facto* expulsion of Westerners from China, the Communists still refrained from adopting an official policy of expulsion. On the contrary; they continued to maintain - with declining credibility - that they were adhering to their original guarantee to protect all law-abiding foreign nationals, giving elaborate 'legal' justifications for their actions and providing Communist spokesmen and foreign 'friends of China' with a convenient formula to quote when questioned on the Government's treatment of foreigners in China.

The Takeover of American Establishments - and Beyond

In December 1950 the Communists took measures against American interests in China which appeared to represent a dramatic break with the overall pattern of their treatment of Westerners: the takeover of all American-owned and funded establishments. First, on 28 December, the Government Administration Council issued an order taking control of American government and private assets, and also freezing American bank deposits in China. On 30 December, the major American businesses in Shanghai (including the Shanghai Power Company, Shanghai Telephone Company, Standard Vacuum, Caltex, General Electric and the Bank of America) were placed under military control. By 17 January 1950, over 130 American firms in the city were under the control of the authorities. Similar actions were taken throughout China in cities where American oil firms, banks and other businesses had branches - ranging from the major centres of Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou, to Chongqing, Kunming and Qingdao.

Second, on 29 December - the day following the freezing of American assets - the Government Administration Council passed its 'Decision on policies for dealing with American-subsidized cultural, educational and relief organizations and religious bodies.' Unlike the order on business assets, which prescribed their immediate takeover, the method of dealing with other American establishments varied. Religious bodies, which
the Government aimed eventually to suppress, were to be brought under the complete management of Chinese believers with the Government continuing to 'encourage' the independence movement. In contrast, cultural and educational, as well as medical institutions, were to be treated 'according to the varying circumstances'; they would either be taken over by the Government and transformed into state-owned establishments, or would remain private institutions to be operated completely by the Chinese people and where necessary receive financial assistance from the Government. Relief organizations were to be directly taken over by the People's Relief Administration.9

The Chinese Government's decision completely to eliminate the remaining American interests in China has tended to be seen in the West as an independent, even hostile, act on the part of the Communists. However, the actual timing of the decision (if not the basic intention) was more provoked than provocative.10 On 16 December 1950, two weeks before the Chinese announcement, the US Government had announced the freezing of all Chinese Communist assets in the United States and also banned the transfer of American funds to the People's Republic.11 This action was an extension of the imposition on 3 December of a complete trade embargo on the People's Republic; it was considered that such an embargo would be ineffective if the Chinese Government was able to transfer its funds out of the United States to buy similar goods from other countries. The possible repercussion on American interests in China was not a major official consideration. Even the State Department - which was not in favour of the unilateral action because of its possible adverse effect on relations with the United Nations and Britain12 - considered that there was 'no longer any valid basis for the theory that United States interests are served by keeping a business foot in the China door.'13

Faced with the US Government's action, the Chinese authorities had little alternative but to take retaliatory measures. First, in the context of international politics and particularly the Korea War situation, they could hardly allow the Americans' provocation to go unanswered, permitting the United States to enjoy privileges in China that the Chinese Communists did not have in the United States. Second, in purely practical terms, the ban on the transfer of American funds to China meant that American-owned or subsidized establishments in China - whether universities, schools or hospitals - could no longer receive funds from the
United States. Once they ran out of reserves they ceased, in practice, to be American-subsidized institutions. As Philip West states in his discussion of Yanjing University, the university 'might well have died simply from the lack of funds' if it had not been taken over by the Chinese Government in February 1951. The Communists therefore either formally took over or gave financial support to those institutions which it wished to retain - notably educational and medical establishments - while allowing religious bodies to become 'self-supporting,' which in practice meant their gradual bankruptcy.

Had it not been provoked, the Chinese Government (still faced with a shortage of trained administrative and professional personnel) may have preferred to delay somewhat its final step against American-funded educational, medical and relief establishments. This was suggested by the very gradual implementation of its decision of 29 December. Following the holding of national and regional conferences, special committees were established of representatives of the relevant ministries, precise measures drawn up for Central Government approval, and the measures subsequently put into practice. For example, a national conference dealing with American-subsidized higher educational establishments, held in January 1951, set in motion the takeover of the Christian colleges. These were 'dealt with' one by one, in order 'to build up models and gain experience.' During February the Government formally took over Nanjing and Shanghai Universities, as well as the Catholic Aurora University which was supported with American funds; in April it took over Fujian Christian University in Fuzhou. Although other colleges retained their private status for the time being (the majority were taken over by the end of the year), by May 1951 the United Board for Christian Colleges admitted that the curtain had already fallen between it and the colleges. It saw 'no hope of an early restoration of past relationships' and turned its attention to Japan and the Philippines and to the sponsorship of Chinese students already in the United States.

Similar conferences were held, and measures adopted, for the integration into the Chinese state or private network of middle schools, hospitals and relief establishments. The treatment of the religious bodies themselves was slightly different because the issue was tied up with the Christian Church's reform movement and the Government's initial aim of cutting Chinese churches off from their imperialist connections. On 24 July 1951, following a number of conferences held under the
auspices of the newly-established Religious Affairs Bureau, the Central Government ordered all Chinese Christian churches and bodies immediately to sever their ties with American missions and other non-American missions principally supported by American funds. American missions in China had to cease their activities at once. In theory, this did not prevent individual Americans from continuing to work in China, provided they played no administrative role. But the Government's continuing official assurances that American missionaries who did not break the law could continue to work in China had little significance because of the current denunciation, imprisonment and deportation of American and other foreign missionaries, particularly Catholics.

Although the Communists' measures against American interests can be seen as an immediate response to American provocation, their concurrent treatment of establishments which were subsidized by foreign countries other than the United States (and which were not affected by the US Government's actions of 16 December 1950) demonstrated their underlying intention to eliminate Westerners from all such establishments and, to a large extent, represented the culmination of earlier pressures. On 29 December 1950, the Government Administration Council had made a second announcement: all foreign-subsidized or operated cultural-educational organizations and religious bodies were required to register with the authorities. This statement initially appeared rather innocuous compared with the announcement on American-subsidized establishments, but subsequent Government statements and actions revealed the intention behind the registration requirement. On 14 February 1951, Huang Hua, Director of Alien Affairs in Shanghai and the Deputy Director of the Registration Office, stated that registration (which was to include the submission of six-monthly statements on the activities and financial situation of establishments) would 'enable organizations having suffered from aggression over long periods to be converted into cultural enterprises of the people.' In a statement made on 1 April, educational spokesman Pan Zinian left no doubt of the Government's intentions. 'Our work is methodical,' he stated. 'First, we will dispose of all American-subsidized institutions and, after acquiring experience, will dispose of those institutions subsidized by other countries.'

In taking over non-American institutions, the Government lacked the blanket authorization it had for dealing with American-funded establish-
ments. Instead, their takeover normally followed published 'revelations'
about the behaviour of their foreign staff and subsequent requests from 'concerned groups' that the institutions should be brought under government control. The French-subsidized Catholic college in Tianjin, for example, was officially taken over by the Government following a request from its Board of Directors after some of its priests were accused of counter-revolutionary activities. The most striking example of this policy, which will be discussed separately, was the takeover - amidst a vociferous denunciation campaign - of Catholic orphanages run by European nuns and priests.

The Government's takeover of non-American institutions did not, however, extend to economic establishments. Instead it maintained its policy of gradual pressure, forcing businesses to continue operating and, where necessary, remitting funds to China to pay their overheads and employees. The Government may well have preferred to continue this policy towards American businesses as well, but the US Government's freezing of Chinese assets in the United States and, more particularly, its ban on the transfer of funds to China, made the continuation of such a policy both politically and economically impossible.

The Foreign Community and 'Imperialist Spies'

With the beginning of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign, the Communists' attack on American imperialism - a major feature of media comment since their victory - reached mammoth proportions. In their effort to mobilize the population for the war effort, the Communists condemned the United States not just for its actions in Korea but denounced it as the major perpetrator of a century's imperialist aggression both against China and against other parts of Asia. This did not mean that other Western nations had been - or were in the present - any less imperialistic; rather they were now portrayed basically as lackeys of the Americans.

The Communists' media onslaught created a violently anti-American - extending into an anti-Western - atmosphere inside China, and the Government's earlier reluctance to take measures that might antagonize those Chinese still influenced by the West disappeared as it brought to completion its earlier assault on the 'Western way of life.' A complete ban on the screening of American films widened out into a sweep against all remnants of Western culture in China following Minister of Culture Mao Dun's verbal attack on everything from American movies to coca-cola, nylon stockings and detective stories. Similarly, the earlier
suppression of the dissemination of information from the West was followed up with the denunciation of those people who still defiantly maintained a link with the West by listening to the Voice of America.\textsuperscript{32} The widely-publicized arrest and five-year imprisonment of a Chinese who was alleged to have sent regular reports to the Voice of America made any contact with the American broadcasts politically dangerous.\textsuperscript{33}

In such an atmosphere, the Communists' pressures on individual Westerners remaining in China intensified. In theory, the Government continued to make a distinction between individual citizens of countries such as the United States and Britain, and the imperialist activities of those governments and their spokesmen. This distinction - which had never really been observed in practice - completely evaporated as the tensions sharpened. Foreigners became even more vulnerable to accusations of behaving in a high-handed imperialist manner and insulting the Chinese people; in addition, the Communists' accusations now frequently had specifically ideological overtones.\textsuperscript{34}

Even teachers in the Christian colleges, who had so far largely avoided involvement in publicized incidents, did not escape denunciation. Early in December 1950, an American teacher of English at Jinling University, Helen Ferris, was publicly denounced after she allegedly changed the phrase 'American forces were sent to Korea' to 'United Nations forces were sent to Korea' in a student's language exercise. Over 1,500 teachers and students attended an accusation meeting and demanded that she confess her reactionary activities in China over the past twenty years and that she be expelled from China.\textsuperscript{35} This incident set the pattern for similar denunciations in other colleges. At the University of Nanjing (Jinling's 'brother' university), two Americans - the Professor of Philosophy and the Professor of Agriculture - were accused of 'acts of slander against the Chinese people' when they questioned the Chinese interpretation of events in Korea;\textsuperscript{36} American teacher Margaret Sheets was accused of similar activities at Huazhong University in Wuhan.\textsuperscript{37} All four teachers were subsequently deported from China. Consular officials still remaining in China were particularly vulnerable as the direct, if unrecognized, representatives of imperialist nations. Now that the US Government had withdrawn all its official representatives, the British and French were the major targets. In early November 1950, the Shenyang authorities expelled the British Consul, L. Steventon, allegedly after he refused to allow a team of men
from the Public Security Bureau to construct an air-raid shelter in the
grounds of the consulate.38 Later in the month, a vice-consul and a
radio operator at the French Consulate in Kunming were also expelled from
China after being charged with attempting to sell radio transmitting and
receiving equipment which should have been handed over to the auth­
orities.39

Although charges against Westerners for spying and espionage activi­
ties did not become commonplace until after the launching of the Campaign
to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries, the deportation on 16 December 1950
of the British Consul in Tihwa (Urumqi), G. Fox Holmes, on such charges
was a preview of what was likely to happen as the ideological tension
increased. In accordance with an agreement between the British and
American Governments, Holmes had taken over the US Consulate's equipment
(including two radio sets) on the departure of its staff from China
shortly before the Communists' arrival. Now Holmes was personally
accused of acting 'hand-in-glove' in anti-Soviet and anti-Communist
activities with the former American Consul, D.S. Mackiernan.40 The ex­
pulsion of Holmes and other British and French consular representatives
proved from hindsight to have been an easy way out of the country. When
their governments finally decided to withdraw their consular represen­
tation from China, the authorities were less obliging and withheld exit
permits from some officials for up to two years.

The strain under which all Westerners were living in China further
increased in late February 1951 when, with the Resist-America Aid-Korea
Campaign still in full flood, the Communists launched their Campaign to
Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries.41 This campaign, which aimed to weed
out all political dissent in China, brought a period of post-revolutionary
terror; as the campaign approached its peak in the summer of 1951 the
Communist media revealed a steady pattern of arrests, mass accusation
meetings, imprisonments and executions. On 12 July Renmin ribao revealed
that the mass execution of 277 counter-revolutionaries had taken place
two days earlier in Tianjin;42 on 12 August Shanghai's Jiefang ribao
reported that one thousand counter-revolutionaries had just been sen­
tenced to prison terms of from one to fifteen years.43

Whereas life in China for Westerners had grown progressively more
uncomfortable since the Communists came to power - and especially since
China's entry into the Korean War - now they began living in an atmos­
phere of personal fear. The official distinction between imperialist
governments and their individual nationals broke down completely as all Westerners (in particular the nationals of the United States and to a lesser extent Britain) became suspect on ideological grounds. Most Westerners found themselves completely cut off from former Chinese acquaintances and friends; the slightest association with even an unofficial representative of an imperialist nation made Chinese vulnerable to charges of counter-revolutionary activities. Westerners themselves became extremely wary about having even social contacts with the official representatives of their government; such contacts laid them wide open to the charge of 'supplying information' which in 1951 meant 'espionage.'

The wife of a British diplomat in Beijing wrote at the time: 'If one is asked to tea with a foreigner who lives anywhere in the Chinese city it is often on the understanding that one will come on foot or in a pedicab and not in an Embassy car.'

Along with Chinese, Westerners became liable to interrogation and personal searches of residences in the quest for signs of counter-revolutionary activities. A number of people were arrested, mostly on charges of concealing arms or radio sets; they were usually given suspended sentences and deported from China. The early arrests were fairly spasmodic and widely dispersed, but in July-August 1951 - when the campaign was reaching its peak - two specific actions by the Communist authorities in Beijing severely shook the foreign community. The first was the roundup and detention on one day, 25 July, of over twenty foreigners in Beijing - Belgians, Dutchmen, Italians and Germans in addition to Americans - who ranged from a doctor, three graduate students and businessmen to Catholic priests and sisters. A few days later the wife of the First Secretary at the British Negotiating Mission in Beijing said it was estimated that something like half the non-Communist, non-diplomatic foreigners in the city were now detained by the authorities. Acknowledging that this figure may have been a slight exaggeration, she stated that it was near enough to give some idea of the scale of things. 'The effect on the remaining foreigners can be imagined,' she wrote. 'If anyone who is not a diplomat is ten minutes late for dinner, you immediately jump to conclusions....' Many of those arrested - including American graduate students Allyn and Adele Rickett - simply disappeared for three or four years; they were imprisoned without trial, subjected to vigorous 'thought reform,' eventually tried and found guilty of espionage activities, and given suspended sentences and deported from China.
The second shock for foreign residents came barely three weeks later on 17 August when the official newspaper *Renmin ribao* announced: 'Seven spies of various nationalities for United States Government sentenced in Beijing.' They included a French bookshop proprietor, the Italian manager of Jardine Matheson's Beijing branch, an Italian bishop, a German businessman and a Chinese of undisclosed occupation. These men received prison sentences ranging from five years to life. The two alleged ring-leaders, fifty-five year old Italian business agent Antonio Riva and forty-seven year old Japanese bookshop employee Yamaguchi Riuchi, received the death sentence. The authorities allowed no time for a public reaction to the verdict - either inside or outside China - and no appeal against the death sentence. On the following day, the same newspaper reported that Riva and Yamaguchi had been executed at 5pm on the previous day, an action which was claimed to be 'in full conformity with the wishes of the Chinese people.' Indeed, the streets Riva and Yamaguchi had been taken through on the way to the execution ground were allegedly 'thronged with people who expressed their feelings at their criminal activities with shouts of "down with imperialism" [and] "suppress counter-revolutionaries."'

The details of this case are unclear and confused. Were the seven men, in particular Riva and Yamaguchi, guilty as charged? The major accusation against the two men - that they had 'conspired to make an attempt on the lives of Chairman Mao and other leaders' at the National Day celebrations on 1 October 1950 at Tiananmen in Beijing appeared to be somewhat fanciful, particularly since the task was apparently to have been undertaken with a trench mortar. Part of the incriminating evidence against Riva was a photograph of him standing next to the old mortar, allegedly taken at the time of his arrest in the previous September, but in fact taken just a few weeks before his execution when, gaunt and bearded (in contrast to his previous cleanshaven appearance), he was brought back to his former home specially to be photographed. As Riva's sister-in-law pointed out at the time, the idea of there being a plot to make such an assassination attempt in the crowds at a National Day celebration seemed too outrageous to be credible.

Did the Chinese Government perhaps feel that it had to fabricate a crime of stupendous proportions against the two men to justify their extreme punishment, at a time when espionage allegations against Westerners (in particular missionaries) had become commonplace and the
penalty was usually imprisonment and eventual deportation from China? Even if the assassination charge was fabricated, were the men guilty of the espionage activities for which they were also charged: collecting information - during the post-war period and following the Communists' victory in Beijing - and supplying this to the US Office of Strategic Services, to the US Occupation Headquarters in Tokyo, and particularly to the US Military Attaché in Beijing, Colonel David Barrett, until his departure from China in April 1950.

Like several other Westerners arrested by the Communists, the alleged ringleader, Antonio Riva, appeared to be far from 'clean,' at least in terms of the Communists' broad concept of what constituted espionage activities - either past or present. Riva had been head of the Mussolini Government's Air Mission in China in the mid-1930s, was rumoured to have headed a Beijing branch of the Fascist Party, and had a reputation as a gunrunner. His sister-in-law later wrote a book protesting his innocence and attempting to clear his name,54 but a number of his contemporaries in Beijing at the time of the Communist victory were unconvinced. According to one acquaintance, he was 'attractive and charming but a crook;'55 another commented that he had 'sold guns to anyone who wanted them and was into everything crooked.'56 Although these acquaintances thought the Communists' more extreme accusation was probably fabricated, they considered that 'he may well have been up to something.'57

Nor is there any doubt that the US Government had long conducted activities in China which fell within the Communist definition of 'espionage.' In addition to its official intelligence activities, it had regularly approached Americans and other Westerners - from missionaries to students - to supply them with what sometimes seemed to be fairly innocuous information on economic and political conditions, and even on their discussions with Chinese acquaintances. American graduate student Allyn Rickett, for example, was imprisoned for - and later confessed to - being an American spy because he had passed on information gained from Chinese associates at Qinghua University in Beijing.58 But the allegation that Riva, Yamaguchi and the other five men formed an American 'spy ring' in Beijing appears rather weak even according to the Communists' own revelations. The subsidiary charge against Yamaguchi, for example, was that he had compiled a card index noting the particulars of prominent figures in the new Government, while that against
Henry Vetch, the manager of the French Bookstore (alleged to be the central focus of the spy ring) was that he knew that Yamaguchi was a spy and provided cover for him. In other cases, the Communists made general allegations that the accused men had supplied 'information' to their ringleader, Riva. Although the published evidence does not add up to a substantial 'spy ring,' the possible involvement of at least some of the accused men in supplying intelligence information to the United States Government cannot be discounted.

Whether or not the men were guilty of 'espionage' activities, the question remains: why did the Government take such extreme action in this case? Although large numbers of Chinese people were being executed almost daily for counter-revolutionary activities, and while a few Catholic missionaries accused of espionage died in prison, Riva and Yamaguchi appear to have been the only two foreigners officially executed by the Communists during the early period of the People's Republic. The Government was only too aware of the extreme nature of the punishment. The execution of Chinese usually received no more than a brief quantitative mention in the press; the execution of the two foreigners was justified in long articles which featured the full proceedings of the so-called trial, the alleged confessions of the accused, and expressions of support for the sentence from non-Communist sections of the community including the democratic parties, Catholic reformers and university professors.

The execution of the two men can probably best be seen as an extreme action during a period of virtual ideological hysteria. Both the severe sentence and the widespread publicity may well have been a conscious decision to make an example of two foreigners. First, the exposure of the American spy ring and the Government's firm reaction added more fuel to the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign and further discredited the Americans in the eyes of the Chinese. In spite of America's professions of friendship for China, stated Professor Mao Yisheng of the Beifang Jiaotong (Northern Communications) University, the facts had 'exposed their shamelessness and barbarity, and shown them to be the mortal enemy of the Chinese people.' Second, the executions, which came at the peak of the counter-revolutionary terror, added to the atmosphere of intense fear. In this context, they were yet another warning to Chinese people about having any contact whatsoever with foreigners, let alone risk revealing information to imperialist espionage agents who were 'perfectly capable of making use of all sorts of fragmentary information' and reporting it
to their governments. More generally, the execution of the two men, rather than their expulsion from China, represented a major act of national self-assertion against a century of imperialism. In the words of Professor Zhang Jingyue of Beijing University: 'Whereas formerly foreigners who violated the law in China were beyond the reach of the law ... and could at worst be deported,' now 'all foreign offenders are subject to being punished according to our law.'

Riva's sister-in-law, who had spent a large part of her life in China, commented that until this episode probably no one quite believed that the Communists would go so far as to execute a foreigner.

Would the Government have executed a Britisher or an American in a similar situation? Diplomatic relations with Britain were still in the negotiating stage and, so far as the Americans were concerned, such an action may have gone beyond the bounds of provocation that the Chinese Government was prepared to undertake even during the Korean War. But there was little scope for a strong international reaction to the episode, particularly since the two executed men were closely identified with their now condemned wartime governments. Also, neither Italy nor Japan (nor, indeed, the nations of the other accused men - France and Germany) had diplomatic relations with China. In terms of the political use made of the episode, the execution of two non-Americans - but on charges connected with American espionage activities - aided the anti-American campaign while not directly inciting the outraged reaction from the United States that even the minor mistreatment of American nationals provoked.

Missionaries

The execution of Riva and Yamaguchi was probably the most dramatic single action taken against foreigners by the Communists but their assault on Western missionaries was more prolonged and far-reaching. During the Korean War period, missionaries in China - especially Catholics - were overall the most harshly treated of all Westerners, continuing the pattern established during the earliest months of Communist rule. By the time the Communists launched their major assault in early 1951, however, the ranks of missionaries in China had already further thinned out, both because of the increased momentum of the internal campaign for the reform of the Christian Church in China and because of the changing international situation.
The Three-Self Movement, initiated at Zhou Enlai's meeting with Protestant leaders in May 1950 before the outbreak of the Korean War and formally inaugurated in July, was endorsed in October by the National Christian Council. Pressures on the Catholic Church to 'reform,' while largely unsuccessful, had by November led to a small group of Catholics announcing their desire for independence from imperialism. To these pressures were added, on 29 December, the Communists' proclamation that American-subsidized religious bodies must come under Chinese control, and their provisions for the registration of other foreign-subsidized religious bodies. In theory, the authorities continued to maintain that individual missionaries, even Americans, would still be able to work in China provided they held no administrative positions and did not engage in reactionary activities. In practice, the pressures which had been exerted on missionaries before mid-1950 - their immobilization, the disruption of their activities and the intimidation of Chinese Catholics - had further intensified in the second half of 1950 and particularly after China's entry into the Korean War.

Once again, foreign mission boards were faced with the decision of whether their remaining missionaries in China should stay or leave. Protestant boards, which had earlier been ambivalent about retaining missionaries in China but had generally encouraged them to stay, now decided that the time had finally come for withdrawal. In early January 1951 the American Episcopaleans, Baptists and Congregationalists instructed their missionaries to apply for exit permits; within a few months they were followed by other American and non-American Protestant boards.

But the real sign that the Protestant presence was coming to an end occurred when the China Inland Mission also decided in January 1951 to withdraw all its missionaries from China, reversing its earlier strong determination to remain. The major reason given for the policy change was the mounting evidence that the continued presence of CIM missionaries was doing more harm than good. There were reports that some local Christians had been persecuted because of their continued association with foreigners and that individual Christians who had previous urged their foreign colleagues to remain in China were now suggesting that the time had come for them to leave. As with other foreigners, the decision to leave China was one matter - obtaining exit permits another. While waiting for permission to leave, missionaries became vulnerable to
detention by the authorities; the last CIM missionary did not finally cross the border to Hong Kong until July 1953.72

The Catholic Church, in contrast, did not alter its basic decision to retain a missionary presence in China. This applied even to American missionaries after the Chinese Government's announcement at the end of December 1950. In March 1951, Bishop James Walsh, a former Superior-General of the Maryknoll Missioners, wrote: 'I think it is the plain duty of all Catholic missionaries ... to remain where they are until prevented from doing so by physical force.' Imprisonment or even death, he continued, 'should simply be regarded as a normal risk that is inherent in our state of life.'73 Catholic rhetoric, now as before, was not matched by Catholic practice; the selective withdrawal of missionaries continued and even accelerated. At the end of January 1951, for example, Maryknoll headquarters authorized 'unessential' personnel in China to apply for exit permits. By this date, there were approximately 3,200 Catholic missionaries remaining in China, compared with some 5,500 in 1947-1948.74

In addition to retaining a missionary presence in China, the Catholic Church continued its attack on Chinese Communism and particularly on the Government's intensified efforts to extend the Christian reform movement to Catholics. Early in 1951, the Papal Nuncio in China, Archbishop Antonio Riberi, distributed a pamphlet entitled, 'The Church in China's Declaration of Principles' which proclaimed that Roman Catholicism was super-national and super-political, that it could not be divided because of international dissension or political changes, and that the so-called 'Catholic church of a certain country' merely meant the breakup of the Church.75 The pamphlet was published in the Communist press in mid-March and denounced as 'irrevocable proof of the attempt on the part of imperialist elements of the Church to sabotage the Chinese Catholic Church's patriotic independence and reform movement.'76 When a group of Chinese Catholics in Nanjing subsequently signed a statement supporting the severance of all ties with the Vatican, Riberi sent a circular letter to Catholic bishops throughout China denouncing the action and labelling it one of 'the wily schemes of the enemy.'77

The stage was set for the final confrontation between the Communists and Catholic missionaries in China; in the ideological tension of 1951-1952 it was bound to be a fierce confrontation. But why did the Chinese Government subject missionaries to a lengthy process of severe treatment
(including denunciation, imprisonment, public 'trials' and eventual deportation) instead of simply granting exit permits to those missionaries who applied to leave China and officially expelling those who still intended to remain? In the ideological heat of 1951, the expulsion of Catholic missionaries - Americans and Europeans alike - could have been justified on the grounds that they were the representatives of the Vatican which was alleged to be 'the tool of American imperialism.' Even the Indian Ambassador, Sardar Panikkar, who had no time for missionary activity in Asia and considered that China had a clear and unanswerable case against missionaries because of their past associations with extraterritorial privileges, admitted that he 'could not understand the policy of the Government in regard to European missionaries.'

Although the Communists had every intention of eradicating the remaining missionary presence, the prolonged, widely-publicized campaign against Catholic missionaries - rather than their quiet departure from China - was of considerable use politically. First and foremost, the assault further discredited the Christian, and especially the Catholic, Church in China as a whole and can be seen as an integral part of the Government's intensifying effort to bring it under official control. Second, the huge accusation meetings (attended by up to eighty thousand people) and the espionage and counter-revolutionary 'revelations' added yet more intensity to the current mass campaigns and gave them an immediate, realistic flavour. Instead of denouncing a distant imperialist enemy in Korea, the enemy was personalized in the form of individual imperialists right in the people's midst. Indeed, the publicized aspects of the Communists' assault had little to do with the missionaries themselves; rather the missionaries were being utilized as convenient targets for the promotion of mass hysteria. This technique was to be developed to a high level in the campaign against foundling homes and orphanages.

One of the Communists' major media attacks was launched against Archbishop Antonio Riberi, the official representative of the Vatican in China. Riberi had been accredited to the Nationalist Government but, unlike most other heads of mission whose governments did not recognize the People's Republic, had made no move to leave China because of his second role of generally superintending the activities of the Catholic Church in China. It was in this capacity that he handled the Vatican's opposition to Church reform, openly distributing anti-Communist material and even proposing the methods that should be utilized to defend the
Catholic Church against the Communists. In May 1951—following revelations that he had opposed the so-called Nanjing declaration of Chinese Catholics—Riberi became the target of a nationwide accusation campaign. He was denounced for his reactionary activities in the Catholic Central Bureau and for organizing the lay Catholic organization, the Legion of Mary (the former was officially closed down and the latter banned), for undermining the reform activities of the Catholic Church, stirring up Chinese people against the Government, and also for supporting Chiang Kai-shek during the war. In late June Riberi was placed under house arrest in Nanjing, subjected to extensive interrogation and put under pressure to 'confess.' However, he escaped actual imprisonment, possibly because of his former diplomatic status. On 4 September he was deported from China amidst continuing widespread publicity, reportedly after the Indian Ambassador Sardar Panikkar and the Swiss Minister Clement Rezzonico had made representations on his behalf to Zhou Enlai.

Many other foreign Catholics were not let off so easily. Following the launching of the Counter-Revolutionary Campaign in February 1951, the Government had accelerated the search of mission property and the interrogation of its occupants, embarking on the large-scale arrest of Catholic missionaries, whether or not they had already applied for exit permits. Charges against individual missionaries fitted into three basic categories. The first was that of conducting specific espionage activities as agents of the imperialists, a charge on which missionaries were frequently guilty in terms of the Communists' broad interpretation of 'espionage' (covering both recent and long past activities) and sometimes guilty even according to more precise definitions of 'espionage.' The most widely-publicized espionage case was that of American Maryknoll Bishop, Francis Ford, whose own imprudence made him a sitting target for attack. Ford had kept correspondence (found during a search by Communist officials) with the US Consul in Shantou which indicated that he had indeed supplied the consulate with a variety of 'intelligence information': in 1926 and 1929 on troop movements (both Nationalist and Communist) in the Meixian area, and in 1940 on roads, highways and agricultural production. More incriminating was a letter from the US Consul in 1936 forwarding a secret telegraph cypher should Ford need to communicate confidentially with the US Consulate. Even Ford's superior in Guangzhou, Thomas Malone, admitted: 'The case against Ford was very serious. It can easily be explained [sic] but whether the judges will be able to
Ford's oversight in retaining the material probably cost him his life. He died in a Guangzhou gaol in February 1952, following a mass accusation meeting and ten months' imprisonment and illtreatment. Yet there was little unusual about Ford's activities. Missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, had long been a source of local 'information' to their embassies and consulates, either by written communication or when they visited a large city. Information on the Communists themselves had from the early days of their operations come largely from missionaries in the field: ranging from reports to the US Government on contacts with Communists in the liberated areas in the mid-1930s, to information supplied even by the strictly apolitical Friends Service Unit to the British Embassy in Nanjing in 1948. Indeed, reports from missionaries had been an important part of the data utilized by Western governments in assessing the Communists' likely attitudes towards foreign nationals in China. Most missionaries who had supplied such information hardly regarded themselves as 'spies' but they had undoubtedly sometimes provided that what could be described as 'intelligence information' to their governments and, in the heated atmosphere of 1951-1952, were with justification viewed with considerable suspicion by the Chinese Communists.

Few missionaries presented themselves on a platter to the Communists in the same manner as Ford, and the authorities sometimes resorted to fabricating evidence of alleged espionage activities. Another Maryknoller, Robert Greene, was accused in April 1952 (after being under house arrest since late 1950) of being an American soldier and spy posing as a priest at Dong'an in the Guilin prefecture. The 'evidence' presented by the Communists included a photograph of Greene wearing a badge (a US insignia he had worn as a chaplain) and a toy medal. Greene's indignant protest that it was his ordination photograph - removed from the mission by the Communists some time earlier - with some doctored additions did not prevent the authorities from subjecting him to an eight-day trial and sentencing him to death, later commuted to immediate deportation from China. The specific espionage charges were outnumbered by more general accusations that missionaries were carrying out 'counter-revolutionary activities under the cloak of religion.' Their crimes were similar to those committed by Archbishop Riberi, and included opposing Christian
reform, being involved with the Legion of Mary and distributing anti-Communist pamphlets. Missionaries could hardly deny these charges; what they denied was that such activities made them 'American imperialist spies.' The charges were by no means limited to Americans; they extended to French, Italian, Belgian and other missionaries alike within the framework that the Vatican was merely the tool of American imperialism.

A third category of charges covered a wide range of particular accusations, many of which had been made before the Korean War; in some cases these were added to spying charges. In those cases where no evidence of espionage could be found or apparently even fabricated, the authorities tended to rely on the number of the crimes allegedly committed rather than the seriousness of any individual crime. One missionary at Wuzhou (Guangxi), for example, was arraigned on a total of eighteen counts, ranging from showing propaganda films and burning Chinese pamphlets to insulting women and saying that the authorities did not permit freedom of travel. More significant was the official revival of non-political allegations which had traditionally been made against missionaries in China; these became particularly pronounced in the campaign against nuns in Catholic orphanages and foundling homes. Charges against Catholic priests sometimes included a sexually-related accusation; these ranged from the Belgian priest in the Suiyuan town of Guisui who had allegedly 'enticed Chinese women followers into adultery' to a Spanish priest in a Catholic primary school in Anqing (Anhui) who was said to have molested fifteen young boys between 1942 and 1949.

Numerous books and memoirs written by Catholic missionaries, as well as reports and letters, reveal - at the best - their subjection to constant interrogation, pressure to denounce associates, varying periods of virtual house arrest, and sudden orders to leave China immediately. At the worst, the authorities detained missionaries for varying periods without trial, put extreme pressures on them to 'confess' their spying activities (both through the mental pressure of 'thought reform' and physical ill-treatment including confinement in tiny damp cells, lack of food and even physical torture), brought them before mass accusation meetings where they were denounced by former Chinese associates, and gave them further prison terms or suspended sentences with immediate deportation from China.

The Communists' overall treatment of Catholic missionaries during 1951-1952 was admittedly far harsher than in the pre-Korean War period.
but three of the same major variables were apparent in their actions. First, Catholic missionaries were more severely treated than the few remaining Protestants. The factors that had earlier accounted for this difference - the Catholic Church's past activities in China, its closer association with the Guomindang and its vehement anti-Communism - were intensified by continuing Catholic opposition to Church reform. Although a number of Protestant missionaries awaiting exit permits were either deported or gaoled on similar 'spying' charges to Catholics, they were not generally subjected to severe ill-treatment in prison. 'I was never tortured,' commented Methodist Olin Stockwell who was the target of a vehement accusation campaign and spent almost two years in gaol in Chongqing. The controversial decision taken by Stockwell, like some other Protestants, to 'confess' his alleged espionage activities - compared with the adamant refusal of Catholics to do so - may have helped save Protestants from more severe physical and mental pressures at the hands of insistent Communist cadres. However, the authorities generally appear to have been more determined to wring confessions from the intransigent Catholics than they were from Protestants. Later reports by released Protestants - men and women alike - tended to concentrate basically on the tedium of their confinement and the deprivation of everyday comforts. One middle-aged American Presbyterian woman missionary who spent a lengthy four and a half years in gaol in Guangzhou, for example, complained mainly about having had her hairpins and underwear elastic removed by Communist guards, making one cake of soap last for two and a half years, and trying to keep her remaining clothing from falling to pieces.

Even denunciation in the media did not automatically mean incarceration for Protestant missionaries. Frank Price, a veteran American Presbyterian missionary and organizer of the rural church in China, was somewhat surprisingly not gaoled after being denounced in the press for using missionary work as 'a cover for subversive cultural aggression by the American Government.' Instead, he was kept waiting in Shanghai with his wife for twenty-two months - all the time expecting arrest - before finally being granted an exit permit in October 1952. Many other Protestant missionaries - like large numbers of Westerners engaged in other activities - experienced prolonged harrassment and difficulty in obtaining exit permits. The experience of Edward Hayes, a Methodist administrator in Fuzhou, was not unusual; he had to return to the Public
Security Bureau twenty-three times before finally being granted permission to leave China. ¹⁰⁹

There also continued to be differences between the authorities' treatment of missionaries in urban and rural areas; many Catholic missionaries suffered their worst treatment when they were incarcerated in their own towns¹¹⁰ before being transferred to prisons in major cities. Although mission boards overseas initially refrained from publicizing even the worst cases because they feared retaliation by the authorities,¹¹¹ by December 1951 the largest American group, Maryknoll, decided that media publicity should be sought in order 'to bring the treatment given to the priests in the backwoods to the attention of the higher-ups in Communist China' because they understood that the central authorities deprecated such acts unless the crimes were considered so serious as to warrant harsh treatment.¹¹²

The attitude of the authorities, both at the central and local level, continued to be somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand they fomented agitation and even anti-missionary hysteria through the nation-wide press campaign and well-publicized accusation rallies. But even local authorities subdued the situation when it threatened to get out of hand. Accusation meetings, for example, often culminated in the impassioned crowd screaming 'sha sha' (kill, kill); the accused was frequently sent back to gaol with a death sentence hanging over his head, only to be told later that he was going to be deported from China instead of being executed.¹¹³ Indeed, the authorities appear to have wanted to avoid being accused of letting missionaries die while under their authority in prison. In September 1952, they released American Vincentian Bishop John O'Shea from gaol in Ganzhou (Guangxi) when he appeared to be on the verge of death after contracting pneumonia.¹¹⁴ 'The Communists are terrified that he will die in prison,' stated a contemporary report from the diocese.¹¹⁵ But they drew a fine line between which missionaries were their direct responsibility and which were not. For a long time they refused to grant an exit permit to a terminally ill missionary, Gertrude Cone, who was also penniless because of the freezing of American assets in Chinese banks. Two days after her eventual arrival in Hong Kong, she died of cancer and extreme malnutrition.¹¹⁶

Despite the Communists' ferocious denunciation of the US Government and American imperialism, the assault on missionaries was still by no means limited to Americans. As already discussed, all Catholic missionaries -
whether Americans or Europeans - were vulnerable to accusations of being American spies in accordance with the Communists' allegation that the Vatican was the tool of American imperialism. Because of the relatively low proportion of American Catholic missionaries (unlike that of Protestant missionaries), the Communists' assault was directed largely at Europeans. In the case of Protestants, American missionaries tended to be more vulnerable to 'espionage' charges (by mid-1952 approximately forty were in prison), although the authorities also gaol ed a number of non-American members of the China Inland Mission and other groups. American missionaries who were not in gaol (whether Catholic or Protestant) did face greater financial problems than non-Americans because of the Chinese Government's freezing of American assets in China and the US Government's ban on transferring assets to China. In April 1951, for example, two Vincentian priests in the Jiangxi town of Tangjiang reported that they had no money whatsoever and that they were actually begging on the streets. Some managed to obtain funds through European associates, although the authorities issued a stern warning to a Swiss priest in Ganzhou that he must not pass on any of the money he had received from Hong Kong to his fellow-Vincentians.

By the end of 1951, the Communist authorities had expelled nine foreign Catholic bishops (in addition to Riberi) and either officially deported - often under escort - or simply banished over one thousand Catholic missionaries after varying periods of interrogation, house arrest and/or imprisonment. The enfeebled condition of many priests when they crossed the border to Hong Kong told the story of their harsh treatment. Individual missionaries privately expressed their relief at leaving the country in which they had once been determined to remain: 'Even an Irishman's heart would warm at the sight of the British flag greeting exiles crossing the border,' wrote an Irish-American Vincentian on arrival in Hong Kong in late December. Others were not so lucky; at the end of 1951 thirteen Catholic bishops were in gaol in China and five under house arrest; a further three hundred priests and nuns were in prison, most still awaiting formal 'trial.'

Many of the missionaries still remaining in China were 'told' to leave during 1952; by the end of that year, there were only twenty-one American missionaries (both Catholic and Protestant) left in the country. A few missionaries who had been imprisoned during 1951, however, simply 'disappeared' for two, three or four years when they were
finally brought to trial and deported. A handful, like American Maryknoll Bishop James Walsh in Shanghai, remained ostensibly free (though under virtual house arrest) until the late 1950s, and were utilized by the Communist authorities as examples of their official - if irreparably tarnished - policies of permitting the 'freedom of religion' and granting protection to foreign nationals. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the authorities still clung to this formula, to be reiterated over the years by official spokesmen and foreign 'friends of China.' In 1955, when French journalist Robert Guillain asked the Vicar-General of the Beijing diocese how the expulsion of foreign missionaries could be reconciled with religious liberty, he received the reply: 'They were not expelled.... They left, for the most part, of their own accord.'

The Foundling Home and Orphanage Scandal

Catholic foundling homes and orphanages in China - run mostly by European and Canadian nuns - were subjected to a specific assault by the Communist authorities. This assault bore all the features of a mass political campaign: the establishment of 'models' at the local level, the initiation of a campaign by high officials at the national level, the holding of accusation meetings and the mobilization of support amongst relevant groups in the community - all accompanied by nationwide publicity and editorial comment. To outsiders - and no doubt to many Chinese - the wild, bizarre accusations made against Catholic nuns, making this campaign one of the most hysterical and frenzied yet conducted by the Communist Government, appeared even more farfetched than some of the espionage allegations. Yet the campaign served a number of useful purposes not being fulfilled in the more general assault on Western missionaries.

The first blow in what emerged as a carefully-planned national campaign was struck on 28 February 1951 when Guangzhou's official daily newspaper Nanfang ribao and Hong Kong's Communist-run Dagongbao simultaneously accused five Canadian sisters of the Mission of the Immaculate Conception of criminal negligence in managing the Holy Infant Foundling Home in Guangzhou. On 9 March, the signal was given in Beijing for the commencement of a nationwide campaign against foundling homes and orphanages. Presiding over a meeting of delegates from relief, health, educational, youth and women's organizations, China's Minister for Health, Li Dequan, denounced the events in Guangzhou and referred to
similar alleged incidents in Nanjing. She called for 'the strict supervision of all child relief organs' and exhorted people throughout the country 'to expose all imposters who harm Chinese children under the false name of charity.'\textsuperscript{130}

The Nanjing and Guangzhou cases became models for a nationwide campaign. On the day following the Beijing meeting the press featured detailed revelations on the Sacred Heart Home in Nanjing and also the Sacred Love Orphanage in the same city;\textsuperscript{131} two days later similar revelations were published on the Guangzhou foundling home.\textsuperscript{132} First came alarming statistics of the number of infant deaths (94 percent of those admitted to the Guangzhou home)\textsuperscript{133} as disclosed by confiscated records and verified by the digging up of hundreds of corpses. From a high number of deaths and mass graves, it was only a short step to accusing Catholic nuns of 'the malicious slaughter of numerous innocent Chinese children.'\textsuperscript{134} Canadian nuns had allegedly turned the Holy Infant Foundling Home in Guangzhou into a 'murder factory,'\textsuperscript{135} while at the Nanjing Sacred Heart Home infants who 'had not quite ceased breathing' had allegedly been 'put into paper boxes by the foreign nuns for burial alive.'\textsuperscript{136} The reports became even more emotion-charged with the publication in national and provincial newspapers of photographs of corpses, mass graves and bony, sick, ragged-clothed survivors.\textsuperscript{137} Schoolchildren and adults were organized into groups to file through the homes to view the so-called death pits, the rows of open bone-filled coffins and the emaciated survivors.

Within a few weeks, a nationwide assault was under way as the campaign spread to cities as far apart as Tianjin, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing and Guiyang, as well as to smaller towns and even to Hainan Island.\textsuperscript{138} In the search for requisite 'evidence,' Public Security Bureau officials dug up compounds to collect bones for display (it was rumoured that they were sometimes supplemented by pigs' bones);\textsuperscript{139} and put strong pressure on current and former Chinese employees and orphans at the institutions to denounce the nuns and priests.\textsuperscript{140} The procedure for dealing with individual cases was established in widely-publicized reports on the latest developments in the original Nanjing and Guangzhou cases: the organization of protest meetings following the revelations, the takeover of orphanages and foundling homes by the Government in response to 'demands' from the meetings, the arrest of nuns and priests, and mass denunciation rallies against the accused.\textsuperscript{141}
There was little attempt by the campaign directors to explain why Catholic sisters had allegedly ill-treated and murdered Chinese infants. Several reports merely repeated a highly questionable claim made early in the Guangzhou case that the foundling home and orphanage setup was a capitalist racket, with the nuns extracting contributions 'in the name of charity' and using them to lead 'a life of comfort and luxury.' As for deliberately murdering Chinese babies: this was simply another manifestation of the 'traditional imperialist policy of hostility and brutality against the Chinese people.'

The choice of foundling homes and orphanages as a major target for a mass campaign was an astute one. Although the accusations were exaggerated and distorted, they contained enough truth to be credible at least to some people. Catholic spokesmen readily admitted that the death rate amongst infants in foundling homes - mostly new-born babies abandoned because of poverty, superstition and disease - was extremely high, in some cases well over 90 percent. It was the policy to accept all abandoned babies, even on the point of death, because they believed in the immortality of the child's soul and the necessity of baptism for eternal salvation. There were, indeed, mass graves. But in claiming that only a tiny percentage of infants who were admitted to foundling homes still remained alive, the Communist press failed to mention that the general policy was not to keep surviving infants but to arrange for their adoption, preferably by Catholic families. A comprehensive report issued by the Home for Foundlings in the Anhui city of Bengbu, for example, revealed that of 2,165 babies admitted to the home between 1937 and 1947, almost half had died, half had been adopted, and only sixteen still remained at the home: less than the 1 percent figure often quoted by the Communists. Those infants who remained at the homes - the unwanted ones - often suffered from blindness, rickets or hereditary syphilis, as the Communists were quick to point out when they took over the institutions.

A number of specific purposes were fulfilled by the campaign. In terms of mass appeal, it was designed to reach the superstitious and less educated elements of the population. Allegations that foreign missionaries were guilty of espionage activities were too abstract to have any sustained impact on many people, particularly at a time when thousands of Chinese were being arrested and executed for similar crimes. What was needed was a 'crime' with a uniquely non-Chinese flavour. What could be
more appropriate than the label of 'baby murderer' - the symbol of the absolute brutality and inhumanity of the foreign imperialist from the time of the Tianjin Massacre to the current reported activities of American soldiers in Korea, featured in gruesome cartoons with babies dripping blood on the end of their bayonets? It is somewhat surprising that the Communist authorities, who officially denounced anti-foreignism and feudal superstition as contrary to their Marxist ideals, should have intentionally revived traditional xenophobic sentiments. Yet the nuns' denouncers, carefully rehearsed by zealous Communist cadres, made all the old accusations against Catholic nuns and priests: that they sold the blood of babies for transfusions, that they used their eyes to make medicines and even that they served up their livers as delicacies. In an effort to preserve some measure of public credibility, the authorities did not publicize the more bizarre allegations made during mass denunciation rallies. But they were prepared to go to these lengths to arouse the denouncers and thousands of spectators to fever pitch in mobilizing support for the campaign.

Amongst the superstitious and less educated elements of the population, the campaign was undoubtedly aimed chiefly at women. Still overwhelmingly illiterate and housebound, the majority of women were only being affected peripherally by the current ideological campaigns. Stories of child neglect and abuse, even deliberate murder, were calculated to appeal to Chinese mothers, in particular, in a way that accusations that missionaries had hidden firearms or sided with the Guomindang would never arouse them. In fact, the orphanage campaign was by and large a women's campaign; it was aimed at mobilizing women, run largely by women and had foreign women as its chief target.

Like most of the top male officials associated with eliminating the Western presence, the major female figures concerned with the campaign - unlike the women they were trying to mobilize - were educated, politically sophisticated, and could scarcely have believed most of the 'murder stories' they set in motion. Li Dequan, who had presided over the campaign's launching in Beijing, was somewhat incongruously herself a third-generation Christian (through a Protestant) with a Masters degree in theology from Columbia University. Although not a member of the CCP, Li reportedly wielded considerable power as Minister of Health, unlike several other non-Party ministers in the 'united front' government. Her concurrent positions of Chairman of the Chinese Red Cross and
Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Women's Federation (the mass organization for women) also gave her an influential voice in relief and women's affairs.

More significantly, the orphanage case was vigorously taken up by the Democratic Women's Federation. In July 1951, its national Chairman, Cai Chang, one of China's best-known female revolutionary figures and an experienced women's organizer, gave her name to the campaign when she forwarded an emotional appeal condemning the 'malicious killing of Chinese children' from the Central-South Branch of the Federation to the Women's International Democratic Federation. Local branches of the Women's Federation were active at all stages of the campaign, organizing women's protest meetings and mobilizing individual representatives to take the lead at denunciation meetings. 'Mothers arise, let us protect our children,' shouted one woman at a rally for 30,000 in the grounds of the Nanjing Sacred Heart Children's Home, while two of the major accusers at a Wuhan denunciation meeting were mothers whose children had allegedly been forcibly taken away from them.

The assault on foundling homes and orphanages also presented the opportunity to mobilize schoolchildren through their own mass organization, the Young Pioneers. Spurred on by visits to view exhumed corpses and bone-filled coffins, representatives of the Young Pioneers forwarded their own petitions to the Government and the Women's Federation and participated in the denunciation meetings. 'Demand the settlement of the debt of blood,' proclaimed students of two primary schools in Wuhan.

In addition to mobilizing particular sections of the population, the campaign also gave the Government a convenient pretext to take over foundling homes and orphanages and to expel their foreign incumbents. The proclamation of 29 December 1950 had given the Communists the 'authority' to take over American-subsidized relief establishments in China but the foundling homes and orphanages were mostly managed by non-American Catholic sisters and were therefore officially liable only to registration. Following the revelations and denunciations, however, they were taken over individually in accordance with 'public demand.'

The arraignment of European nuns on espionage charges may have seemed too farfetched even for the new Government. This was suggested by the fact that charges against nuns were invariably limited to their maltreatment of infants and children: priests who were involved in the same orphanage cases were usually accused of espionage or counter-
revolutionary activities as well. In the widely publicized Wuhan case, for example, American Franciscan Bishop Rembert Kowalski was accused of concealing military maps - in addition to allegedly being involved in the death of 16,000 infants. In one of the most extraordinary cases publicized by the authorities, a French priest, Robert Lebas, was accused not only of maltreating orphans but of inciting lepers in the Guangdong town of Zhanjiang to stage a rebellion against the Communists when they entered the leprosarium.

Considering the vehemence of the rhetoric and the seriousness of the allegations - amounting to deliberate and premeditated murder - the sentences imposed on the Catholic nuns were surprisingly mild. Of the seven sisters involved in the Nanjing Sacred Heart Orphanage case, all but two (who did receive a lengthy sentence of ten years) were expelled from China. Like the sisters involved in this case, most accused nuns were confined for some time before 'trial' - from a few days to several months - and subjected to pressure to confess; most subsequently received suspended sentences and were expelled from the country. Although these sentences did not appear to be in keeping with their alleged monstrous crimes, the Government had achieved its basic aims in the campaign: to mobilize additional support for the anti-imperialism and counter-revolutionary campaigns, to 'deal with' the major non-American foreign relief organizations, and to get rid of their foreign staffs.

Business
Non-American foreign businessmen did not escape the increased tension under which all Westerners were living in China following the beginning of the Korean War but they did not become particular targets during the early mass campaigns. Indeed, by mid-1951 non-American business was the only major Western interest group still not to have been officially attacked by the Communists. As has already been suggested, the Chinese Government may have requisitioned American economic interests only because of the US Government's direct provocation and it probably saw little point in altering its existing effective policy towards British and other Western economic interests - that of squeezing them financially. Despite the lifting of the Nationalist blockade in mid-1950, the position of Western business had - after an initial slight improvement - steadily worsened, with the authorities continuing to make arbitrary taxation demands, resolving disputes in the interests of Chinese workers,
and refusing both entry visas for replacements for British businessmen in China and exit permits for those in China to leave the country. As a number of British businessmen had realized in April 1950, the Chinese Government had them completely at its mercy; those enterprises that did attempt to close down found themselves faced with exhorbitant demands for severance pay from their employees and the word 'hostages' was bandied around to describe the predicament of businessmen. In late 1951 the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce complained yet again about the 'impossible situation for which there is no solution.'

This situation was exacerbated in early 1952, when non-American business enterprises finally became specific targets during a mass campaign. The Five-Anti Campaign (attacking bribery, tax evasion, fraud, the theft of state assets and the leakage of state economic secrets) was directed against all private industrialists, traders and other businessmen. It was implemented through another period of terror, with official investigation teams looking into the activities of individual enterprises and encouraging employees to inform on their employers. There were the customary denunciations and accusation meetings; a large number of Chinese businessmen committed suicide when they were unable to meet the heavy fines and demands for back taxes.

The impact of the Five-Anti Campaign on the commercial and business scene was devastating, particularly in Shanghai, with many firms ceasing production, commerce coming to a virtual standstill and unemployment increasing. To revitalize those Chinese businesses which were considered 'beneficial to the national economy,' the authorities extended loans and gave the firms processing and production orders, thereby extending state control over them. Despite the Communists' earlier promise that private enterprise would be permitted to exist in China 'for a considerable period,' the campaign signalled the beginning of the end for this sector of the economy. In the words of Premier Zhou Enlai, 'it pushed capitalist industry and commerce a great step forward towards state capitalism....'

Western businesses were affected by the campaign in two ways. First, the virtual economic paralysis had a general effect on foreign as well as Chinese enterprises. Second, the Communists' investigations and punishments extended to the foreign firms themselves. Official investigation teams sealed the books of some British firms, inquired into their activities as far back as 1946, accused them of illegally taking profits out of China and imposed retroactive taxes and fines. The policy of holding
individual managers responsible for the non-payment of dues created a 'general atmosphere of alarm and despondency' and led to increasing numbers of detentions and imprisonments. Even the head of Jardine Matheson in Shanghai, Robin Gordon, was detained for one week when Ewo Breweries, a Jardine Matheson subsidiary, was unable to meet its wages bill in February 1952.

The Five-Anti Campaign proved to be the final straw for British business interests in China. In early 1952, it was estimated that British companies had already remitted approximately £6.5 million to China since the Communist victory. Enough was enough. Almost two years earlier, a number of companies with interests in China had proposed extricating themselves from their already sizeable burden by cutting off further remittances, only to be told by their representatives in Shanghai that such action was completely impracticable because of the Government's policies. Now they sought the British Government's assistance in making official representations to the Chinese with a view to winding up their activities in China.

On 12 April 1952, the Head of the British Negotiating Mission in Beijing, Sir Lionel (Leo) Lamb, delivered a note to the Chinese Government which set out the ways in which British firms had been handicapped from carrying out their 'legitimate trading activities' and warned that the persistence of the situation could only result in the elimination of British business interests in China 'to the detriment of friendly relations with the United Kingdom.' When no reply had been received by 19 May, Lamb forwarded a further letter which, in effect, notified the Government that British firms had decided to close and requested the Chinese Government to facilitate the process by approving the retrenchment of redundant staff, issuing exit permits for non-Chinese staff, and setting up machinery to deal with the custody or transfer of ongoing concerns. On the following day, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, made a statement in the House of Commons in which he outlined the problems being experienced by British firms in China and revealed that the Chinese Government had been requested to make available the necessary facilities for the disposal of British businesses.

'Sic transit gloria,' proclaimed the Far Eastern Economic Review. 'Has the glory of British trade with and within China really departed?' it asked in an article reminiscent of those written two years earlier by commentators who had announced that Britain was about to abandon her
stake in China. But now, as then, the Chinese Government had the upper hand. First, it delayed answering Lamb's second note for over six weeks. Second, when it eventually did reply on 5 July, it utilized the opportunity to reprove the British for their policies towards China. The reply, in the form of a statement by Zhang Hanfu, now a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, reminded Britain that the Chinese Government had declared its willingness to trade with all countries and asserted that the British themselves were to blame for the situation. 'The predicament of British firms in China is the bitter fruit of the policy of trade control and embargo of the British Government,' declared Zhang. Ignoring his Government's pressures on British business since 1949, he maintained that the British had been reduced to the straits of retrenchment or closure of their businesses because of the British Government's policy of bowing to United States pressure to establish trade controls against China in mid-1951.

On the British request for assistance in winding up their businesses, Zhang stated that individual firms may apply to the Government at their respective localities, and the authorities would 'deal with each case according to its own merits and the regulations.' Any questions relating to the termination of the services of employees and workers, applications for exit permits and the disposal of enterprises would be dealt with on the same basis. As the *Far Eastern Economic Review* commented at the time: 'The Chinese statement ... leaves matters very much where they were.'

Following the exchange, the leading British firms (including Jardine Matheson and Butterfield & Swire enterprises, the major banks, Imperial Chemical Industries and China Soap) applied to the Chinese authorities for permission to wind up their operations in China. But the process was a long and complex one, with the authorities continuing to squeeze businesses through taxes and demands for huge severance payments for workers to the point where their liabilities matched their assets and the only possible 'settlement' was to hand over their assets voluntarily to the authorities. This process had already become familiar to British businessmen through the experience of British-American Tobacco, the first major company to sign an agreement with the Chinese Government. During the first half of 1952, after almost two years' negotiations, the Government eventually agreed to sign agreements with individual branches whereby it took over BAT's assets - eight fully-equipped cigarette factories - as a 'voluntary gift.' BAT's Chairman later commented that what
appeared 'on the face of it, as a voluntary transfer of assets was indeed a confiscation of the major order.' Even when the Government finally took over BAT's assets, it did not take over all its financial obligations and the settlement of shareholders' claims took a further year.

BAT's relatively early withdrawal from China led to the expression of 'doing a BAT from China' and its protracted negotiations with the Chinese authorities set the pattern for other companies. The Chinese Government did not conclude agreements with most firms (including Jardine Matheson and Butterfield & Swire) until 1954-1955; the last major British company to leave China was Patons & Baldwins in 1957.

A few British firms had extricated themselves from China more easily when the Communist authorities formally requisitioned their assets. As with the expropriation of American businesses, such measures were usually taken following provocation and ran counter to the preferred pattern of squeeze and pressure. On 30 April 1951, the authorities requisitioned all assets in China of the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell) following the British Government's confiscation in Hong Kong of the Chinese oil tanker Yonghao which had been in the colony since 1948 and whose crew had subsequently decided to return to Communist China. In August 1952 it took over the two major dockyards in Shanghai, the Shanghai Dockyards Ltd. and Möllers Shipbuilding and Engineering Works, after the British authorities in Hong Kong handed over some Chinese aircraft to an American company.

In contrast, the Chinese Government's expropriation in November 1952 of the three British utilities in Shanghai (waterworks, gas and tramways) appears to have been a unilateral action. The press commented only that the utilities were being taken over 'for the public interest of China.' It seems likely that, by this date, the authorities were unwilling to permit such basic utilities to remain any longer in foreign hands. The continued British operation of public utilities for the lengthy period of three and a half years after the Communists' assumption of power in the city was probably due to the authorities' continuing problems in providing sufficient trained personnel to administer these concerns, particularly since the Communists were now themselves operating the former American-owned public utilities (electricity and telephones) which had been taken over in response to US Government provocation in December 1950.
While the Chinese Government was dealing with British companies in China by either obstructing their attempts to extricate themselves from the country or formally requisitioning their assets, it was adding insult to injury by establishing trade relations with other companies in Britain. As the Government constantly reiterated, it did not intend cutting its trading links with the Western world, even though it proposed concentrating on relations with the Communist bloc which by 1952 (prompted partly by Western embargoes) accounted for 72 percent of China's total trade. In April 1952, when the British Government was making representations to the Chinese about the closure of British firms, Chinese Government delegates at an economic conference in Moscow reached agreement with a British delegation of individual businessmen and left-wing politicians for the exchange of goods to the value of £10 million on each side in 1952. On the basis of this agreement, Chinese and British representatives signed a contract in East Berlin on 9 June for £6.5 million as the first instalment. In practice, the development of trade between Britain and China was severely hampered until 1957 by the United Nations' strategic trade controls on China.

The agreement, however, was an early indication of the Communists' intentions for future relations with the West. 'Old China firms' such as Jardine Matheson were highly indignant that they were being bypassed for minor companies with no previous experience in the China trade. Following representations from the China Association, the British Government informed the Chinese authorities that there were 'numerous established British merchants in Shanghai and Hong Kong who are well qualified to negotiate any such arrangements with the CPG [Central People's Government] or its representatives.' But this was exactly the type of arrangement that the Chinese Communists wanted to avoid - either with the 'old China hands' or their official supporters - as part of their overall policy of sweeping away all unequal historical associations with the West and establishing new relationships free from the taint of imperialism.

Effects and Reactions
The Communists' intensified pressures on the Western presence during 1951-1952 had brought to virtual completion their stated intention to 'deal with' the economic and cultural establishments of the imperialists in China. Their rather different proclaimed policy of protecting
ordinary foreign nationals appeared to have been completely compromised by the imprisonment and/or deportation of large numbers of missionaries and other Westerners, but the Communists continued to maintain - somewhat unconvincingly - that they had adhered to their guarantee. For example, in October 1951 - at the height of the internal mass campaigns - Premier Zhou Enlai declared: 'We have resolutely implemented the policy laid down in the Common Program which protects law-abiding foreign nationals.' At the same time, he stated that the 'proper blows' had been dealt in the cases of a 'few foreign nationals' who were espionage and sabotage elements.189

What of the Westerners who had remained in China following the outbreak of the Korean War and who had escaped de facto expulsion? The combination of the media assault on imperialism, the mass campaigns and the increasing pressures on both foreign establishments and individuals had prompted the majority of the remaining Westerners to decide to leave China. The signal that the British Government recognized that even the British presence was finally coming to an end was given in March 1951 when, despite its earlier recognition of the People's Republic, it announced that it was closing down its smaller consular offices in China.190 During 1952 it also announced the closure of the Guangzhou and Tianjin Consulates-General,191 leaving only the office in Shanghai. As the deportation of British consuls in Shenyang and Urumqi had demonstrated, British consular representatives not only continued to lack official status and privileges (compared with the semi-official status of the Negotiating Mission in Beijing) but were themselves extremely vulnerable to pressures and accusations.192

During 1951, even the more progressive of the teachers in the Protestant colleges generally also decided that the time had come to leave, despite the fact that some were offered contracts (following the colleges' takeover by the authorities) to continue teaching subjects such as English. By May 1951 eight of the thirteen Protestant colleges had no Western staff and it was estimated that virtually all Western teachers would have left China by the end of the year.193 Two of the last of the progressive Christian teachers to decide to leave, chemistry professor William Sewell and mathematician Ralph Lapwood, denied that their departure was prompted by the Communists' treatment of foreigners. When Sewell finally left Chengdu in February 1952, he claimed that it was to be reunited with his family which had not returned to China with him.
after spending the war in Hong Kong. In contrast to his earlier period in China, though, he acknowledged that this was no time to bring his wife and children back to China, despite such a suggestion from the Chinese Government. Ralph and Nancy Lapwood, the last Westerners to leave Yanjing University in mid-1952 (almost eighteen months after its takeover by the Government) maintained publicly that they left China because they thought they could better serve the cause of 'new China' by writing and lecturing about it in Britain. According to some of their acquaintances in Beijing, however, their departure was prompted by the denunciation and deportation of Sam Deans, an American engineer at Yanjing. Lapwood had refused to participate in the denunciation meetings and feared that he might well be next.

As earlier, the decision to leave China was one matter; obtaining exit permits another. During 1951-1952 the authorities became more difficult about the granting of exit permits; it was also virtually impossible for many people to find the necessary Chinese guarantor for possible future claims. Even consular officials were detained by the authorities for long periods: Paulo Rossi, the Italian Consul in Shanghai took almost two years to wind up his consulate's affairs and receive a permit; the British Consul in Guangzhou had a similar wait after the British Government announced the closure of the consulate. British businessmen had the same experiences after they finally signed agreements on behalf of their companies to hand over their firms' assets. For example, six representatives of British-American Tobacco did not receive permits until May 1954, almost two years after its properties had been 'voluntarily' handed over to the Chinese Government. Missionaries were the most vulnerable — many were arrested after they applied for exit permits — but the waiting period was fraught with apprehension for all Westerners. As one British resident in Shanghai wrote in January 1952, 'There is the uncomfortable feeling that as a foreigner, if you put a foot wrong, you are for the high jump.'

Although the granting of permission to leave China dragged on in some cases until the mid-1950s, in terms of any sustained activity or influence the Western imperialist presence in China had effectively come to an end by late 1952. The decline was strikingly exemplified in Shanghai, the former focus of the Western — and particularly the British — presence in China. By November 1952, only an estimated 375 Britishers remained in the city, compared with some 9,000 before the war and
4,000 during the post-war period. The departure of Westerners, combined with constant taxation pressure by the Communists, had brought the closure of almost all the British organizations in the city. The British Chamber of Commerce, the staunch defender of British commercial interests, had gone into liquidation, as had the British school. The St Andrew's, St Patrick's and St George's Societies were defunct; the Holy Trinity Cathedral, currently on loan to the authorities, was 'hopeful of being taken over' to ameliorate its unpaid taxation debts and fines; the Shanghai Club and the Country Club were also leased to the authorities. To all intents and purposes, the British presence in Shanghai was over.

But not quite. In the first week of June 1953 - 110 years after they had first established themselves on the mud swamp of Shanghai - the British staged a final grand celebration. The occasion was the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. Three days of festivities, beginning with a Coronation Anglican church service, culminated in a dinner and ball, where four hundred guests (one-third British and two-thirds other nationalities, mostly White Russians) sat down to a dinner of cream of chicken soup, fillets of mandarin with tartare sauce, roast sirloin of beef and Royal iced pudding. The Filipino band played selections from Noel Coward's *Cavalcade* and there were readings of John Masefield's *Coronation Ode* and John of Gaunt's speech from *King Richard II*. After dinner, the guests danced the Eightsome Reel, the Sir Roger de Coverley and other country dances.

The Coronation celebrations, described as taking place against a 'backdrop of disintegration,' were seen as a conscious assertion of 'that unifying force which always brings out the best in British efforts.' But the problems encountered in arranging such a celebration clearly demonstrated the level to which the Communists had reduced the British presence in Shanghai. In a city where people had once enjoyed a standard of living envied both by their compatriots outside China and by the Chinese, the invitations committee had to take special care 'to see that the cost of tickets to the Ball was no deterrent to those people who might otherwise have missed out.' As the organizers lamented, there was 'no British-owned church in which to pray' and 'no suitable British club or building was available in which to dance.' The Holy Trinity Cathedral was 'borrowed' back from the Communist authorities for the Coronation service and the ball was one of the last large functions held in the one surviving
social club, the Cercle Sportif de Shanghai. Once no Chinese had been permitted into the club; now the ball organizers had to have special permission from the authorities to continue their festivities until 2am.

The celebrations were a final requiem for the British imperialist presence in Shanghai. Five days after the ball, the Shanghai People's Government requisitioned one of the last remaining citadels of the British presence, the once prestigious Hongqiao Golf Club. Even the dead were not secure. In October, Bubbling Well Cemetery - where generations of Britishers had been buried - was taken over by the authorities for 'construction needs.' The British Foreign Office was asked to inform relatives that the authorities were prepared to transfer remains - but not slabs or vaults - to a cemetery near Jiangwan about fifteen miles north of Shanghai. China had finally been cleansed of Western imperialism.
Notes

1 Liu Shao-chi [Liu Shaoqi], 'May Day Address,' 1 May 1950, in China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, New China's Economic Achievements, p.16.

2 On China's entry into the Korean War, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

3 See p.4.


5 NCNA, Beijing, 28 December 1950 (SCMP, no.38, 28 December 1950).

6 NCNA, Shanghai, 30 December 1950 (SCMP, no.39, 29-31 December 1950). See also Shanghai News, 30 December 1950; NCDN, 2 January 1951.

7 NCNA, Shanghai, 18 January 1951 (SCMP, no.51, 18 January 1951).

8 NCNA, Beijing, 4 January 1951 (SCMP, no.41, 4 January 1951); NCNA, Beijing, 9 January 1951 (SCMP, no.44, 9 January 1951); NCNA, Beijing, 17 January 1951 (SCMP, no.50, 17 January 1951).

9 NCNA, Beijing, 29 December 1950 (SCMP, no.39, 29-31 December 1950).

10 Even Warren W. Tozer, who blames the US Government for 'closing the Open Door in China,' fails to mention that the takeover of the Shanghai Power Company was provoked by the US Government. Tozer, 'Last bridge to China,' 61, 77.


12 The US Government rejected a recommendation from the State Department and adopted the advice of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 'aid and comfort' should not be given to Communist China 'at a time when that nation is militarily attacking United States forces.' The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, 13 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 680. For details of the different viewpoints and the final decision, see ibid., 663-83.

13 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 13 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 679.

14 West, Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, p.202. The US Government later gave permission to some American funders to resume limited transfers to China. However, by the time the United Board for Christian Colleges obtained authority in mid-January 1951 to
transfer funds, the Chinese Government had announced its decision to 'dispose of' all American-subsidized establishments. It denounced the offer of funds as 'a shameless trick of American imperialism.'


ibid.

NCNA, Beijing, 13 February 1951 (SCMP, no.65, 12-13 February 1951); Shanghai News, 17 February 1951; NCNA, Fuzhou, 28 April 1951 (SCMP, no.100, 28-30 April 1951).

In August, Huazhong University (Wuhan) was taken over by the Government, and in October Jinling and Nanjing Universities (Nanjing) and West China Union University (Chengdu). Changjiang ribao, 17 August 1951 (SCMP, no.159, 22 August 1951); NCNA, Nanjing, 9 October 1951 (SCMP, no.191, 10 October 1951); NCNA, Chengdu, 11 October 1951 (SCMP, no.193, 12-13 October 1951).

China Colleges, May 1951, 3.

NCNA, Beijing, 26 July 1951 (SCMP, no.144, 27-28 July 1951). See also Christian Century, 15 August 1951, 934.


ibid.

See pp.277-90.

'Regulations governing registration of foreign-subsidized or foreign-operated cultural-educational, relief organizations and religious bodies,' NCNA, Beijing, 29 December 1950 (SCMP, no.39, 29-31 December 1950).

NCDN, 16 February 1951.

'Report by Pan Zinian, Director of Central-South Department of Education, made at the second Central-South Educational Work Conference,' Changjiang ribao (Hankou), 1 April 1951 (SCMP, no.94, 13-16 April 1951). This report (five single-spaced typed pages in English translation) was one of the most detailed statements made public on the Communists' plans for the disposal of American and other foreign-subsidized religious, educational-cultural and relief establishments in China.

NCNA, Tianjin, 7 August 1951 (SCMP, no.149, 6-8 August 1951).


See, for example, Hu Sheng, 'American aggression against China through the course of history,' Shishi shouce [Current affairs handbook], 20 November 1950. This article was widely reprinted in newspapers and translated into English in SCMP, no.28, 12 December 1950.
The arguments were developed in detail in the press and in journals such as *Xuexi* [Study] and *Lishi jiaoxue* [Teaching of history]. See also Liu Danian, *Meiguo qin Hua shi* [A history of American aggression against China] (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1951) and Qing Ruji, *Meiguo qin Hua shi* [A history of American aggression against China] (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1952).

30 NCNA, Shanghai, 16 November 1950 (SCMP, no.12, 17-18 November 1950). See also *Shanghai News*, 18 November 1950.

31 NCNA, Beijing, 5 December 1950 (SCMP, no.30, 14 December 1950).


33 NCNA, Shanghai, 18 November 1950 (SCMP, no.13, 19-20 November 1950); *Dagongbao* (Hong Kong), 19 November 1950 (SCMP, no.13, 19-20 November 1950).

34 For details of the intensified pressures on individuals from the end of 1950, see CAB, no.81, 20 February 1953.

35 NCNA, Nanjing, 5 December 1950 (SCMP, no.23, 5 December 1950).

36 NCNA, Nanjing, 7 December 1950 (SCMP, no.25, 7 December 1950).

37 *Dagongbao* (Hong Kong), 23 December 1950 (SCMP, no.36, 22-24 December 1950).

38 NCNA, Shenyang, 4 November 1950 (SCMP, no.3, 3-4 November 1950).

39 *NCDN*, 11 January 1951.

40 *NCDN*, 16 January 1951.

41 'Regulations of the People's Republic of China for the punishment of counter-revolutionaries,' *Renmin ribao*, 21 February 1951.

42 *Renmin ribao*, 12 July 1951.

43 *Jiefang ribao*, 12 August 1951.

44 Peter Lum, *Peking 1950-53* (London: Hale, 1958), p.45. Peter (Bettina) Lum was the wife of (Sir) Colin Crowe, First Secretary at the British Negotiating Mission in Beijing. See also note 54 below.

45 See, for example, NCNA, Beijing, 9 January 1951 (SCMP, no.45, 10 January 1951); NCNA, Changsha, 22 May 1951 (SCMP, no.106, 21-23 May 1951); *Dagongbao* (Shanghai), 5 August 1951 (SCMP, no.151, 10 August 1951).


47 ibid., p.73.

*Renmin ribao*, 17 August 1951.

*Renmin ribao*, 18 August 1951.

*Renmin ribao*, 17 August 1951.


Lum, *Peking 1950-53*, passim. See particularly pp.83-89. Antonio Riva's wife, Catherine, was Peter [Bettina] Lum's elder sister. The two sisters had first gone to China in 1922 with their mother, an American artist. Peter Lum had married and lived outside China between 1940 and 1950; her sister Catherine married Antonio Riva (described by her sister as Catherine's 'childhood sweetheart'), had four children and had not left China since 1927. Peter Lum (Lady Crowe) discussed the episode in detail with the author on 28 August 1979.

Interview with Sir Lionel Lamb, 6 September 1979. Lionel Lamb had been at the British Embassy in Nanjing at the time of the Communist victory and returned to China after leave in January 1951 to be head of the Negotiating Mission in Beijing. The staff of the British Negotiating Mission were particularly familiar with the episode because of Riva's family relationship with the First Secretary, Colin Crowe, and his wife.

Interview with Sir William Empson, 6 August 1979. A teacher of English at Beijing University, William Empson had close contacts with some of the personnel at the British Negotiating Mission and attended a lunch at the Negotiating Mission on the day following the execution.

Interview with Sir Lionel Lamb, 6 September 1979. Although many of the views expressed by Empson, Lamb and other Westerners who lived in Beijing at the time were probably only hearsay, the comments made by Lamb and Empson appear to have typified the general feeling amongst Beijing's foreign community.

Rickett, *Prisoners of Liberation*, pp.32-34, 62-64. Robert Winter, an American who had taught in China since 1923, was similarly approached by American officials. Winter maintains that he never supplied any information to the US Government but that his three months' house arrest during the Cultural Revolution was due to a statement in Rickett's confession (subsequently lodged in Winter's personal file) that Winter had been involved in the same activities as himself. Interview with Robert Winter, 6 March 1979. See also Finkelstein
and Hooper, '57 years inside China: an American's odyssey,' 10-11, 16.

59 Renmin ribao, 17 August 1951.

60 On 18 August 1951 (the day it announced the executions), the national newspaper, Renmin ribao, devoted three of its four pages to the case. See also Renmin ribao, 18, 19 August 1951. The affair received nation-wide publicity and the English-language People's China of 1 September 1951 included a lengthy article on the case as well as a special supplement featuring the texts of the indictment and verdict.

61 Renmin ribao, 19 August 1951.

62 ibid.

63 ibid.

64 Lum, Peking 1950-53, p.89.

65 See p.165.

66 See pp.264-65.

67 See, for example, NCNA, Beijing, 26 July 1951 (SCMP, no.144, 27-28 July 1951).

68 South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 6 January 1951; Christian Century, 17 January 1951, 69.

69 Hongkong Standard, 31 May 1951.

70 Statement by Bishop Frank Houghton, General Director of the China Inland Mission, China's Millions, February 1951, 1.

71 Statement by Arnold Lea, China Director of the China Inland Mission, Shanghai, China's Millions, February 1951, 20. See also 'A report of the Conference of Directors of the China Inland Mission,' 10-17 February 1951, China's Millions, April 1951, 38-40.


73 CMB, June-July 1951, 492.

74 Maryknoll: South China Society Superior Correspondence, 1951, Malone to Walsh, 30 January 1951; Bush, Religion in Communist China, pp.60-61.

75 CMB, May 1951, 384-86.

76 Guangming ribao, 13 March 1951 (SCMP, no.85, 18-19 March 1951). See also Guangming ribao, 17 March 1951 (SCMP, no.85, 18-19 March 1951); CMB, May 1951, 384-88.

77 The statement appeared originally in the Nanjing press on 31 March and was published with Riberi's reply on the front page of Renmin ribao, 24 May 1951.
The Catholic Central Bureau was ordered to cease its activities in mid June 1951 and denounced for publishing and disseminating 'reactionary' publications (including the China Missionary Bulletin and pamphlets opposing Christian reform) as well as being the organizing force behind another 'reactionary' organization, the Legion of Mary. A lay Catholic organization, the Legion's activities in China had expanded as the Communists were approaching and even after their victory. Even if the Roman Catholic Church was suppressed in China, the Legion was to preserve Catholicism as an underground lay movement - teaching the Catechism, carrying out baptisms, reciting the Rosary in people's homes, and visiting the sick. With an emphasis on secrecy, the Legion was a ready target for denunciation by the Communists. Between July and October 1951, they banned the Legion of Mary throughout China. *CMB*, December 1951, 826-31; *NCNA*, Tianjin, 14 July 1951 (*SCMP*, no.135, 15-16 July 1951); *NCNA*, Shanghai, 10 October 1951 (*SCMP*, no.192, 11 October 1951).

See, for example, *NCNA*, Shanghai, 3 June 1951 (*SCMP*, no.110, 1-5 June 1951); *NCNA*, Nanjing, 4 June 1951 (ibid.); *NCNA*, Chongqing, 6 June 1951 (*SCMP*, no.111, 6-7 June 1951); *NCNA*, Beijing, 16 June 1951 (*SCMP*, no.118, 17-18 June 1951); *NCNA*, Shanghai, 17 June 1951 (ibid.); *Shanghai News*, 14 June 1951.

*NCNA*, Nanjing, 4 September 1951 (*SCMP*, no.167, 5 September 1951); *NCNA*, Nanjing, 5 September 1951 (*SCMP*, no.169, 7-8 September 1951). For details of Riberi's deportation and the 'tumultous ovation' he reportedly received on arrival in Hong Kong, see *CMB*, October 1951, 710-12.

Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p.129, claims sole credit for approaching Zhou Enlai on this matter and states that he was later thanked by Rezzonico. The Italian Consul in Shanghai, Paolo Rossi, attributes Riberi's deportation to the 'last-minute intervention' of his fellow-Catholic Rezzonico. Rossi, *The Communist Conquest of Shanghai*, p.138. Panikkar and Rezzonico acted as unofficial advocates to the Beijing Government on behalf of missionaries imprisoned in China.

The pattern of intensifying pressure is well documented in the *CMB* after mid-1950 and in other missionary sources including Maryknoll Archives (Accounts of South China Priests; South China Society Superior: Correspondence 1950-51; and South China Society Superior Diaries 1950-51) and CMV.

These letters were published on the front page of *Nanfang ribao* (Guangzhou), 23 April 1951. Unlike the 'evidence' produced in some other cases, Ford's superior in Guangzhou did not express any doubts that the letters were authentic. Maryknoll: South China Society Superior, Correspondence 1951, Malone to Walsh, 26 April 1951.
Ford's fellow-missionaries were not aware of his death until his former associate Sister Joan Marie (who had been gaoled with Ford) arrived in Hong Kong with the news on 2 September 1952. Maryknoll: South China Society Superior Diaries, 1949-56, Thomas J. Malone, Monthly diary (September 1952).

In February 1935 the United States Consulate-General in Hankou had requested a large number of missionaries to keep it fully informed on Communist movements and on any indications of Russian influence. When the Consulate-General issued a lengthy report on Communist activities in the following September, it acknowledged that one of its main sources was information provided by missionaries. For this and other details of contacts between missionaries and US Government officials, see Fox Butterfield, 'A missionary view of the Chinese Communists (1936-1939)' in Harvard Papers on China, 17 (1961), p.251.

In July 1948 the leader of the Friends Service Unit in Henan, Lewis Hoskins, gave the British Ambassador in Nanjing a copy of a confidential report on the Unit's previous three months' operations in Communist territory. In a subsequent interview at the British Embassy, Hoskins gave the Ambassador additional information and his views on the Communists' activities regarding land distribution, people's courts, their victory in Kaifeng, and the Chinese population's attitude to the Communists in liberated areas. Stevenson to Foreign Secretary, 21 July 1948, FO 371/69537. See also Lewis Hoskins, 'Report of the Administration to the [Friends Service] Unit,' enclosure in ibid.

See, for example, Stevenson to Foreign Secretary, 21 July 1948, FO 371/69537.

Greene, Calvary in China, pp.136-37, 146-49.

NCNA, Beijing, 19 April 1951 (SCMP, no.97, 21-23 April 1951).

One of the early charges in this category was made against the seventy-four year old French Bishop of Tianjin, Jean de Vienne, who had been in China since 1901 and whose subsequent deportation by the authorities denied his wish that he be permitted to die in China. NCNA, Tianjin, 30 May 1951 (SCMP, no.109, 30-31 May 1951); CMB, August-September 1951, 630.

See, for example, 'Six French priests deported from Mukden for counter-revolutionary activities,' NCNA, Shenyang, 16 October 1951 (SCMP, no.196, 17 October 1951); 'Five Italian priests expelled from Sian for espionage,' Qunzhong ribao (Xian), 10 November 1951 (SCMP, no.222, 25-26 November 1951).

Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, Joseph MacDonald.


Guisui is now called Huhhot. NCNA, Beijing, 19 April 1951 (SCMP, no.97, 21-23 April 1951).

Wenhuibao (Hong Kong), 4 May 1951 (SCMP, no.102, 4-7 May 1951).
A wealth of detailed information on the authorities' treatment of American Catholic missionaries is available in forty-two reports by Maryknoll missionaries, written at the request of their headquarters immediately after they left China (Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests). Other Maryknoll archival material reveals a similar general picture, as do the archives of the Vincentian Fathers (CMV). Unlike these factual accounts, most published books and memoirs were written with the aim of informing the public about the evils of communism and were understandably emotional. The more informative of these include: Greene, Calvary in China; Rigney, Four Years in a Red Hell; Sister Mary Victoria, Nun in Red China (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953); Mark Tennien, No Secret is Safe: Behind the Bamboo Curtain (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952).

Cf. Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests and published Catholic memoirs with interviews reported in Lacy, 'Protestant Missions,' and CMOHP. Published books and memoirs by former Protestant missionaries in China include, McCammon, We Tried to Stay, Francis Olin Stockwell, With God in Red China: The Story of Two Years in Chinese Communist Prisons (New York: Harper, 1953); Sara Perkins, Red China Prisoner: My Years Behind Bamboo Bars (Westwood, New Jersey: Revell, 1963).

CMOHP: Francis Olin Stockwell. For more details of Stockwell's imprisonment, see Stockwell, With God in Red China, passim.

See, for example, Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests.

The Christian Century later published a two-part article by Stockwell justifying the wisdom of confession: 'Until I had learned to talk in these terms, there was no hope of release.' His views aroused a strong reaction and were condemned by another former missionary, Kenneth J. Foreman, Jr. In retaliation, Stockwell argued that it was wrong to assume that the missionary was all right and the Communists all wrong. Acknowledging that the Communists' 'brain-washing' had to some extent been effective, he maintained: 'life is not as simple as that ... I had much to confess, and confess honestly.' F. Olin Stockwell, 'What is brain-washing?' Christian Century, 21 January 1953, 73-74; 28 January 1953, 104-106; Kenneth J. Foreman, Jr., 'A more excellent way,' Christian Century, 6 May 1953, 537-38; G. Olin Stockwell's reply, ibid., 538.

American Presbyterian Sara Perkins, for example, states that she refused to make a false confession but that she was only twice subjected to periods of direct indoctrination. Perkins, Red China Prisoner, p.106.

ibid., pp.39, 113-14, 118-20.

Christian Century, 22 October 1952, 1213. Price was one of the major targets at an accusation rally held on 10 June 1951 in Shanghai and attended by over 12,000 people. Shanghai News, 27 June 1951.

Christian Century, 22 October 1952, 1213.

CMOHP: Edward Pearce Hayes.
In his report to Maryknoll headquarters after leaving Guangzhou, Joseph A. Hahn asked his superiors to be careful using the information because he feared that his Chinese guarantor would be severely punished (even executed) if the police even suspected that he had 'talked.' Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, Joseph A. Hahn. See also CAB, no.63, 20 August 1951.

Maryknoll: South China Society Superior Correspondence, 1951. Malone to Walsh, 17 December 1951. See also Walsh to Malone, 17 December 1951, and Lane to Malone, 21 December 1951, ibid.

See, for example, Maryknoll: Accounts of South China Priests, passim.

Bishop O'Shea collapsed several times on the way to the Hong Kong border but recovered in hospital. CMV, Crawford to Leary, 29 January 1951.

'Kanchow - A Mission Survey,' mimeographed paper in CMV.

Christian Century, 4 November 1953, 1258.

Of these, eleven were in prison and the remainder mostly under house arrest. Christian Century, 30 April 1952, 518.

The Millions, May 1953, 5. In June 1952, the China Inland Mission had changed the name of its journal, China's Millions, to The Millions because the withdrawal from China had virtually been completed.

CMV, Crawford to Leary, 9 April 1951.

'Kanchow - a Mission Survey,' mimeographed paper in CMV.

CMB, December 1951, 819. For detailed statistics on the number of bishops imprisoned, under house arrest and expelled during the year, see CMB, September 1951, 627; November 1951, 800; December 1951, 880.

See, for example, photographs in CMV.

CMV, Curtis to Leary, 22 December 1951.

CMB, December 1951, 819.


James Walsh, who had consistently refused to apply for an exit permit, was eventually arrested on espionage charges in 1958. He was released in 1970 after serving twelve years of his twenty-year sentence. Interview with Thomas Walsh, former Superior-General of Maryknoll, 18 September 1979.

Guillain, The Blue Ants, p.203.

See, for example, Yu, 'Campaigns, communications, and development in Communist China,' pp.202-205.
129 Nanfang ribao, 28 February 1951; Dagongbao (Hong Kong), 28 February 1951.

130 NCNA, Beijing, 11 March 1951 (SCMP, no.82, 11 March 1951).

131 NCNA, Nanjing, 10 March 1951 (SCMP, no.83, 13 March 1951).

132 NCNA, Guangzhou, 12 March 1951 (SCMP, no.83, 13 March 1951). The figure was later cited as 97.8 percent. NCNA, Guangzhou, 24 March 1951 (SCMP, no.88, 25-27 March 1951).

133 NCNA, Guangzhou, 12 March 1951 (SCMP, no.83, 13 March 1951).

134 NCNA, Beijing, 26 July 1951 (SCMP, no.144, 27-28 July 1951).

135 NCNA, Guangzhou, 12 March 1951 (SCMP, no.83, 13 March 1951).

136 NCNA, Nanjing, 27 April 1951 (SCMP, no.100, 28-30 April 1951).

137 Photographs in the pictorial section of Renmin ribao, 18 April 1951, for example, included one of a baby allegedly scalded to death by boiling water at the Sacred Heart Orphanage, Nanjing, and one of the 'gruesome death pit' at the Guangzhou institution. See also cartoon, Nanfang ribao, 18 March 1951.

138 NCNA, Chongqing, 23 April 1951 (SCMP, no.97, 21-23 April 1951); NCNA, Hankou, 6 May 1951 (SCMP, no.102, 4-7 May 1951); CMB, May 1951, 442; June-July 1951, 528-29; August-September 1951, 632-33, 638-39; October 1951, 719, 727, 803.

139 For example, Maryknoll: South China Society Superior Diaries, 1949-56, Thomas J. Malone, Monthly diary (November 1951): 'Father John Toomey and Sisters Dominic Marie and Corazon may be due for a public trial. The authorities are gathering evidence against them. The old graveyard was dug up for bones, but these had been moved to a new cemetery some time ago so the diggers found nothing. They were sent back again and ordered to find bones, even pig bones, if no human bones could be found.'

140 CMV: Meyrot to Leary, 24 March 1952. For examples of the denunciations, see NCNA, Beijing, 4 May 1951 (SCMP, no.103, 8-10 May 1951).

141 NCNA, Nanjing, 21 April 1951 (SCMP, no.97, 21-23 April 1951); NCNA, Nanjing, 27 April 1951 (SCMP, no.100, 28-30 April 1951); NCNA, Nanjing, 4 June 1951 (SCMP, no.110, 1-5 June 1951); NCNA, Guangzhou, 24 March 1951 (SCMP, no.88, 25-27 March 1951); NCNA, Guangzhou, 19 May 1951 (SCMP, no.105, 16-20 May 1951).

142 NCNA, Guangzhou, 24 March 1951 (SCMP, no.88, 25-27 March 1951). See also NCNA, Guangzhou, 12 March 1951 (SCMP, no.83, 13 March 1951); NCNA, Hankou, 6 May 1951 (SCMP, no.102, 4-7 May 1951).

143 NCNA, Beijing, 22 August 1951 (SCMP, no.162, 26-27 August 1951).

144 (Rev.) Edoald Berden, 'A question about orphanages,' CMB, May 1949, 666.
Editorial: 'Communist campaign to malign missionary works of mercy,' CNB, May 1951, 379.


In the widely-publicized Wuhan case, for example, forty-nine children were alleged to be suffering from seventeen diseases: seven were blind, three had leprosy, three had smallpox, and three were suffering from mental disease. NCNA, Beijing, 22 August 1951 (SCMP, no.162, 26-27 August 1951).

CMB, October 1951, 720; November 1951, 737-39. On the use of these charges in the past, see Cohen, China and Christianity, pp.39-40, 50.


ibid., II, 847-51.

NCNA, Beijing, 26 July 1951 (SCMP, no.144, 27-28 July 1951).

NCNA, Nanjing, 27 April 1951 (SCMP, no.100, 28-20 April 1951).

NCNA, Beijing, 5 June 1951 (SCMP, no.111, 6-7 June 1951).

NCNA, Beijing, 5 June 1951 (SCMP, no.111, 6-7 June 1951). See also NCNA, Hankou, 6 May 1951 (SCMP, no.102, 4-7 May 1951). The Young Pioneers, an auxiliary of the New Democratic Youth League (later the Communist Youth League) organized children from nine to fifteen years old.

The institutions in Guangzhou, Nanjing and Wuhan (the three most widely-publicized 'model' cases) were taken over by the authorities on 12 March, 1 April and 4 June respectively. By late September, another thirteen institutions had been taken over. CMB, May 1951, 379; November 1951, 737; NCNA, Nanjing, 21 April 1951 (SCMP, no.97, 21-23 April 1951); NCNA, Hankou, 8 June 1951 (SCMP, no.112, 8-9 June 1951).

NCNA, Hankou, 8 June 1951 (SCMP, no.112, 8-9 June 1951); CMB, August-September 1951, 635.

Nanfang ribao, 17 July 1951 (SCMP, no.144, 27-28 July 1951); CMB, August-September 1951, 637; December 1951, 882-83.

NCNA, Nanjing, 4 June 1951 (SCMP, no.110, 1-5 June 1951); CMB, August-September 1951, 631-32.

These pressures are documented in detail in CAMC for the period mid-1950 to early 1952. See also British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, Annual Report, 1951, passim.


As early as mid-March 1952, the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce commented that the campaign, which had 'taken on the aspect of a new terror,' was 'driving many Chinese businessmen to suicide.' CAB, no.70, 20 March 1952.


The former head of Jardine Matheson, John Keswick, had left China in November 1950.

Thompson, 'Imperialism and Revolution in Microcosm,' p.97. Another Jardine Matheson representative, the head of the company's Insurance Department, was detained and fined by the Chinese authorities after he allegedly passed business contracts in Shanghai to Hong Kong, where taxes were more favourable to Jardine Matheson. ibid., p.96.


The documents discussed in this paragraph are collected in 'Correspondence between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Central People's Government of China on British trade in China, Peking, 12th April - 5th July 1952,' China Association, Annual Report, 1953, Appendix, pp.11-15.


CAMC, 52/G/26, 18 June 1952; 52/G/27, 20 June 1952. British-American Tobacco had already applied to close down in April 1950 (see below) and the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell) had been requisitioned by the authorities in April 1951. See p.294.
British-American Tobacco, Annual Reports, 1951-1955. Despite BAT's problems, the company publicly revealed details of its experiences only in its 1955 Annual Report after its remaining six representatives had left China and their welfare was 'no longer in jeopardy.'

On Jardine Matheson's experience with the authorities in 1952-1955, see Thompson, 'Imperialism and revolution in microcosm,' pp.110-45.

ibid. On Jardine Matheson's experience with the authorities in 1952-1955, see Thompson, 'Imperialism and revolution in microcosm,' pp.110-45. ibid., p.152.

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NCNA, Shanghai, 16 August 1952 (SCMP, no.396, 17-18 August 1952).

These were the Shanghai Waterworks Company, the Shanghai Gas Company and the Shanghai Electric Construction Company. At the same time, the Government also requisitioned the British shipping firm MacKenzie and Company's properties in Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan and other cities. NCNA, Shanghai, 16 August 1952 (SCMP, no.396, 17-18 August 1952).

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This was fairly generally known at the time amongst the British community in Beijing. Interview with Joseph Ford (First Secretary at the British Negotiating Mission, Beijing, 1951-1953), 20 August 1979. It is only hinted at in Ralph and Nancy Lapwood, *Through the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 4, 171-72.


CAB, no. 87, 20 August 1953.


CAB, no. 68, 20 January 1952.

CAB, no. 78, 20 November 1952.


CAB, no. 77, 20 October 1952.

The fate of the former British institutions in Shanghai is set out in detail in CAF, 'British institutions in Shanghai, 16 January 1953.' For information on the closure of individual institutions - or their handing over to the authorities - see also CAB, no. 63, 20 August 1951; no. 67, 20 December 1951; no. 68, 20 January 1952; no. 73, 20 June 1952; no. 77, 20 October 1952.

This description is based on a photographic album entitled 'The British Community of Shanghai celebrates the Coronation of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second' in that portion of the China Association Archives retained at the offices of the China Association, London.

ibid.

CAB, no. 85, 20 June 1953.

CAB, no. 89, 20 October 1953; no. 90, 20 November 1953.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION

In less than four years after taking over the major cities in which most Westerners lived, the Chinese Communists had effectively eliminated Western imperialism from China, fulfilling not only their own declared aims but the demands made by anti-imperialists ever since the initial forced Western incursions into China in the 1840s. At the same time, the elimination of the Western presence had been essential to the restructuring of China's economic, educational and cultural life as part of the preparation for the next phase of the revolution: the full transition to socialism which Premier Zhou Enlai announced in December 1952 was now to be undertaken.1

The Chinese Communists, while always pursuing their basic goal of eliminating the Western presence - not by official expulsion but through the exertion of economic, psychological and at times physical pressures - had with considerable skill utilized some elements of the presence to minimize the disruption of the immediate takeover period and to ease the transition to Communist control. On the material front, they took advantage of the expertise and especially the financial resources of Western business firms and educational institutions to keep these establishments operating - or at least employing Chinese at a time of heavy unemployment - while at the same time paving the way for their incorporation into the developing socialist network. Politically, they utilized Westerners to help establish and consolidate their authority, particularly in economically disrupted and socially volatile Shanghai. As the resident representatives of imperialism, Westerners served as scapegoats for China's dire economic problems, as personal targets in a programme of national self-assertion (whereby the new authorities courted the support of the still suspicious urban population) and, as the ideological tension increased during the Korean War, as a convenient focus of attack in mobilizing the population. If Western businessmen, missionaries and others had remained in China in the effort to preserve their own interests, they finished up serving the interests of China's new rulers.

It has been argued throughout this study that the underlying motivations for the Chinese Communists' treatment of the Western
presence in 1949-1952 were anti-imperialism (which had its practical
manifestation in the strong assertion of Chinese nationalism) and the
commitment to establishing a socialist society, and that these goals
were tempered by immediate pragmatic considerations, as demonstrated by
the varying treatment accorded to different Western interest groups in
China. What relevance are these arguments to the analysis of subsequent
influxes of foreigners into Communist China, notably the Soviet Russians
in the 1950s and Westerners and Japanese since the late 1970s? It is
contended that the acceptance of these two new foreign presences did not
substantially contradict the basic elements of Communist policy formu-
lated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Rather, their nature and
reception in China demonstrated both the persistence of the underlying
influences on Communist policy and the willingness to temper basic goals
in the face of practical needs.

The new Soviet Russian presence in the 1950s was incompatible
neither with the Communists' intention to establish a socialist society
nor with their anti-imperialism. Indeed, it was these features that
made the Soviet presence particularly acceptable to the Chinese
Communists. The Soviet Union, far from being incompatible with China's
envisaged society, was the chosen model for its future socialist develop-
ment. In addition, the country was largely free of the stigma of in-
volvement in past imperialist activities in China; the new Soviet
Government had relinquished the 'special privileges' held by its Tsarist
predecessor - an action that had favourably impressed those Chinese
nationalists who were beginning to look to Marxism. Despite this
favourable record, occasional suggestions that the Soviet Union repre-
sented a new foreign imperialist presence in China did appear to have
some credence because of its rapacious activities in the Northeast in
the post-war period and its new presence and even special privileges in
Dalian and Port Arthur. Indeed, by late 1949 there were already mur-
murings amongst the population that China had only switched from
'calling American imperialism "Papa" to calling the Soviet Union by that
name' and that even Soviet assistance might compromise Chinese
sovereignty.²

Nevertheless, the Soviet presence in China was of a basically
different nature from the old imperialist presence. The Russians were
in China at China's request and to serve China's interests: it was
Russian capital and technological expertise that enabled the Communists
to begin their drive for the country's industrialization. As Liu Shaoqi was quick to point out in defending the new presence, the Russians - unlike most of the former foreign imperialists in China - were in China basically as advisers; they were working within the Chinese system and, when they had finished their work, they would return to the Soviet Union.

Problems arising from the Russian presence in China did not reflect its incompatibility with either the Communists' anti-imperialism or the movement towards a socialist society, but were rather indicative of the underlying tension that always existed between the two basic features of overall Chinese Communist policy: strong nationalism and an adherence to Marxism-Leninism. As discussed in relation to culture, this tension became acute when the allegiance to socialist internationalism came in practice to mean the virtual wholesale emulation of the Soviet Union as the leading socialist state. If such emulation sometimes offended the national pride of even the Communist leadership, it was the price they were prepared to pay to obtain the capital, equipment and expertise necessary for China's development into a modern industrialized nation.

More questionable in terms of compatibility with basic Communist policy has been the new substantial Western and Japanese presence in China since the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 and more especially since the Fifth National People's Congress in February-March 1978. This new presence includes traders, bankers and manufacturers - amongst them many of the 'old China' companies. Even British-American Tobacco has resumed the manufacture of cigarettes in China. On the educational and cultural front, the teaching of English and Western technical subjects - with the aid of substantial numbers of Western teachers - has been resumed with a vengeance; the formerly much-condemned American culture (ranging from movie films to coca-cola) has made a limited reappearance in China. Even some of the old 'special privileges' for foreigners seem to have been revived. There are special hotels and shopping facilities, as well as segregated sections of restaurants, from which ordinary Chinese people are excluded.

But this new Western presence in China, while bearing some superficial similarities to the former Western presence, is of a basically different nature. The major difference, of course, is that it did not force itself on China and is not maintaining its presence there under the protection of foreign gunboats. It is in China at the behest of the
Chinese authorities and largely to serve their practical needs. If the Communists turned to the Russians for assistance in the 1950s in their initial bid to develop China's backward economy, they are now turning to the West and Japan — after a not very successful period of self-reliance following the Sino-Soviet split — in pursuing the 'four modernizations': the latest version of their continuing attempt to turn China into a modern, industrialized state. The Western presence is used both directly to provide capital and technical expertise not otherwise available and, through tourism in particular, to generate the huge amounts of foreign exchange necessary for the importation of advanced technology. There continues to be no place in China for some groups of Westerners who were formerly active in the country and who are anxious to return. For example, despite the easing of the Government's suppression of the Christian church, its spokesmen (both Catholic and Protestant) continue to make familiar statements that the Chinese church must be an independent, patriotic one, thereby precluding a renewed foreign missionary presence in China. And although some Western culture is being accepted, the stress is on its classical elements (whether literature, music, drama or film) with the authorities attempting to exclude the more decadent and permissive aspects currently pervasive in the West.

While the Western presence in China has increased dramatically since the late 1970s, its selective nature also reflects a process that had been under way since the early 1950s. As C.P. Fitzgerald has commented, the Chinese Communists, while intent on eliminating all traces of the old imperialist system from China, did not intend completely to cut off relations with the West and Westerners. As demonstrated by their early attempts to establish new trade relations and to restructure the diplomatic and consular presence in China, their aim was rather to reshape relations with the West on the basis of equality or, more accurately, in a manner that suited their own purposes. Thus, a few Western 'experts' had been recruited since the 1950s to work in China as translators and as teachers of English. At the same time, the Government invited a number of 'foreign guests' — mostly fellow-travellers — to visit China, chiefly in the interests of its programme of cultural diplomacy. The admission of Western short-term residents and visitors varied during the Mao era according to the ideological climate; during the Cultural Revolution it came to a virtual halt for several years. In the early 1970s, the Communists resumed their former policy and began tentatively to seek
cultural exchange agreements with Western governments, under which Western students and teachers were permitted to reside temporarily in China in return for the Chinese Government's right to send Chinese abroad to be trained in foreign languages and to gain the other expertise necessary for China's increasing participation in international trade and diplomacy.

There is no doubt that the dramatically expanded Western and Japanese presence in China since the late 1970s reflects a greater degree of pragmatism on the part of the Chinese Government (at present dominated by pragmatically-oriented rather than ideologically-oriented elements) than has been exercised at any time since the early period of Communist rule - and probably even greater than at that time. In dealing with this new Western presence, however, the Chinese leadership - for all its pragmatism - still has to come to terms with the two underlying features of the Western presence which made it so unacceptable to the Communists in 1949: its association with the imperialist past and its underlying incompatibility with socialism. Although it is now thirty years since the Communists effectively eliminated imperialism from China, the imperialist past left a continuing - if gradually fading - legacy on the minds of all Chinese: a strong, indeed passionate, determination that they would never again be dictated to by, far less subordinated to, foreigners in their own country. And despite the apparent retreat from Maoist ideology and even the growth of nascent capitalist practices, the bourgeois capitalist society represented by the new Western presence in China is still basically antithetical to the political, social and economic features of present-day China.

These two factors have influenced the manner in which the Communists have dealt with - and continue to deal with - the reshaped Western presence in China: a presence which is regarded as necessary but not particularly desirable. First, in dealing with individual representatives of the presence, some Chinese officials continue to exhibit streaks of nationalist self-assertiveness combined with deep suspicion of Westerners' anti-socialist bourgeois motives, creating difficulties and frustrations for Westerners that appear at times to conflict with the proclaimed anxiety for Western technology, expertise and foreign exchange. Second, the Chinese authorities attempt to keep the new foreign presence as isolated as possible from the mainstream of Chinese life. The ostensible privileges enjoyed by Westerners that have aroused
murmurs of resentment from some Chinese people are, somewhat ironically, imposed on Westerners by the authorities themselves. Although the degree of segregation has varied even over the past five years—according to slight changes in the ideological climate—it is a constant factor experienced at some time by virtually all Westerners in China, even by scholars and students living in Chinese institutions.

Despite the Chinese Government's attempts to keep the new foreign presence as segregated as possible, the influx of Westerners into China has already begun creating problems for the Chinese leadership. Like the modernizers of the late nineteenth century, they are faced with the problem of utilizing Western education and technology for China's modernization without also accepting the Western 'way of life.' In the eyes of the leadership, this 'way of life'—ranging from the seemingly innocuous matter of Western clothing (strangely symbolized in bell-bottomed trousers) to the more serious issue of Western political ideas—that threatens to undermine not just China's national dignity but even the basic features of China's political and social system. This problem, which is still in its nascent stage, will undoubtedly be a continuing one for China's leadership so long as the country does not revert to its former self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world.

In facing the renewed foreign presence in the 1980s, however, China is in a substantially different position from what it was in 1949. The new Chinese Government was successful in eliminating the remaining imperialist presence from China, an essential prerequisite to taking its place as an equal nation in the world. After thirty years of national self-assertion and consciously wiping out the humiliations imposed by a century of imperialism, the Chinese have largely recovered their former pride and self-respect. Indeed, their preparedness to permit a renewed substantial Western presence in China, and more particularly their ability to structure that presence basically in accordance with their own pragmatic needs, is an indication of their changed status in the world.
Notes


2. Xinwen ribao, 23 November 1949 (CPR, no.1030, 2 December 1949). See also Bodde, Peking Diary, pp.156-57, 199-200; FRUS, 1949, VIII, 587-91, 641.


5. Fitzgerald, Flood Tide in China, p.188.


7. The problem surfaced dramatically in March 1979 when Deng Xiaoping, the major figure in the modernization movement, instituted a clampdown on contact with foreigners and the nascent 'democracy movement,' bringing to an end a short-lived period of relative 'liberalization.'
Note on the Sources

The source materials used for this thesis have a number of distinctive features in the context of the overall study of Communist China. On the positive side, this is one of the few instances where there is material available from both the perpetrators of Communist policy and the objects of that policy: the various Western interest groups and individual foreign nationals. The negative feature of the sources—both Chinese Communist and Western—is the limited and uneven nature of the available material and its strong political bias.

The amount of Chinese Communist material on the takeover and early transition period is extremely limited. The major Communist journals did not commence publication until after the establishment of the People's Republic in October 1949 or, more often, until mid-1950. Holdings of newspapers—including commonly available microfilm series—are fragmentary; my access to only incomplete runs of even major newspapers such as Renmin ribao and Jiefang ribao made it impossible to undertake an overall press survey of the period. There is some access to otherwise unavailable newspapers through the American translation series Chinese Press Review, Shanghai (up to February 1950) and Survey of China Mainland Press (after November 1950) which both provide extensive coverage of articles relevant to Westerners in China. However, the Communist media published material on Westerners only as it suited their propaganda needs; this material therefore far from adequately reflects the overall treatment of the Western presence in China.

Some Western material is available to compensate for the insufficiency of Chinese sources, although this is also uneven. The archives of Western business firms were generally not available to me, being regarded as too sensitive in a period of renewed trading links with China.* The correspondence of the manager of the Kailan Mining Administration (deposited in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford) offered some insight into the issue. More important in gauging the overall direction of Communist policy were the substantial archives of the China Association which include correspondence with British Chambers of Commerce in China and with the British Government. In assessing Communist policy towards

* These grounds were specifically cited when I was denied access to Jardine Matheson's archives which had previously been made available to an American graduate student.
missionaries, the archives of the two major American Catholic groups in China - Maryknoll and the Vincentians - were extremely useful. The archives of a number of American Protestant organizations are also open to researchers (most of the British missionary archives are still closed) but, because of the limited time I had available for research outside Australia, I concentrated mainly on published missionary memoirs and on those missionary journals which gave a wider perspective on Communist policies. Government sources were also uneven. The US Government's published series *Foreign Relations of the United States* was an invaluable source on the experiences not just of diplomatic and consular personnel but also for American business and other interests. The British Foreign Office archives in the Public Record Office, London, which I was able to consult only up to the end of 1948, were on the whole less detailed and useful.

A final source was interviews with Westerners who lived in China during the period. My interviews concentrated on representatives of interest groups where there was otherwise a dearth of material, particularly on the British diplomatic and consular experience. The information obtained at these interviews, while extremely interesting, has to be viewed with some caution because of the small sample and the distance in time from the events. Transcripts of other interviews (for example, those in the China Missionaries Oral History Project) also reflect these problems.
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Nanfang ribao [Southern daily], Guangzhou
Renmin ribao [People's daily], Beijing
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