THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, 1975-1985:
A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE

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DECLARATION

This paper is my own original work. All sources used have been appropriately cited.

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The unity of the industrial democracies remains crucial to the survival of democratic values and of the global equilibrium. We must at least answer the perennial questions of all alliances: How much unity do we need? How much diversity can we stand? An insistence on unanimity can be a prescription for paralysis. But if every ally acts as it pleases, what is the meaning of alliance?¹

(The recent US foreign policy under the Nixon Administration has used the) established alliance relationship primarily to increase United States leverage... The concept underlying such a strategy was Ptolemaic, pre-Copernican; it perceived the United States as the center of the cosmos with other nations in orbit around it. Rejecting the fiction of equality that would require to factor the views of our allies into common decisions, we would expect our allies to follow our lead without grumbling while we measured their value to us by the degree to which the uncritically supported our actions. We would try, in the terms of an historical parallel, to convert the Delian League into the Athenian Empire.²

¹ H. Kissinger, "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to a Postwar Foreign Policy", a speech delivered in Chatham House in 1982, p.44.

INTRODUCTION

Japan and the United States, two bitter wartime enemies, have become two of the closest and perhaps most important allies in the world today. Given the dissimilarities between the two countries, the U.S.-Japan alliance is, indeed, a remarkable achievement. In spite of the marked differences in culture, tradition, language and ethnicity, the two countries share a basic similarity in that they are now industrial democracies, embracing democratic values and a free economy.

Although the post-war U.S.-Japanese relationship can be viewed as a remarkable success, diverging national interests and differing perceptions have troubled the relationship from time to time. These create an ever-present potential for mishandling and misunderstanding, as were the textile dispute in 1969-71 and the "Nixon shocks" of 1971. Although Japan has been the cornerstone of the U.S. strategy of forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, recent U.S.-Japanese relations have been strained by chronic economic friction and U.S. demands for an increased Japanese defence effort.

This paper deals with the strategic aspects of the current U.S.-Japanese relationship. It focusses on the period from 1975 to the present because since the late 1970s, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship has entered a
new phase. Recent trends indicate that Japan seems to be increasingly integrated into the U.S. global alliance system. Some indications of this are joint defence planning, military technology cooperation and joint military exercises. But questions which need to be answered remain. Is Japan really prepared to meet the U.S. demands? What are the implications of the deepening military ties between the U.S. and Japan for the security of Japanese interests, or for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region? How can a more stable U.S.-Japanese security relationship be developed?

The first chapter of this paper provides the background for examining these questions. The first section of Chapter I offers a brief description of the development of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and of domestic factors which affect Japanese security policy. The second section examines the politico-strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region and canvases the likely threats to Japan. The development of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces and Japan's defence expenditure constraints are discussed in the third section.

The second chapter focuses on the specifics of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. The first section examines the contents of U.S. pressures on Japan and the ways that those pressures have been applied to Japan. The notion of defence burden-sharing and the Japanese response to U.S. requests are also dealt with. The following section examines three main issues in the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship. They are the Japanese role in the defence of
sealanes, U.S.-Japan military technology cooperation and visits by U.S. warships to Japanese ports. The profound implications of each of these are analysed in some detail.

Chapter III examines the possible prospects for a more stable U.S.-Japanese security relationship and offers some tentative suggestions on:

. how the current strategic relationship can be changed;
. how Japan can develop a desirable defence policy for the security of Japanese interests; and
. what Japan can do to decrease tensions and build confidence in the Asia-Pacific region.
A Historical Overview of the U.S.-Japanese Relationship and Japanese Domestic Aspects: 1945 to the present

The new era of the post-war U.S.-Japanese relationship began with the U.S. occupation commanded by General MacArthur. MacArthur had an enthusiasm for the idea of Japan as the Switzerland of Asia. That is to say, a peaceful and prosperous neutral. Under the occupation policies of democratization and de-militarization, which went some way toward meeting this goal, were significantly implemented. The new constitution, adopted in 1946, has been fervently accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Japanese. Article IX of the constitution unequivocally states pacifist ideals:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Despite the initial American objective of de-militarizing Japan, however, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led Japan, under the direction of General MacArthur, to set up the Police Reserve Force. The Peace Treaty and
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were signed in September 1951. In July 1954, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were established.

From 1950 to 1970, the U.S. Forces in Japan played a significant role as a buttress of U.S. Far Eastern strategy. Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty states:

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

Indeed, the U.S. Forces took full advantage of bases in Japan (particularly in Okinawa which was under direct American control until 1972) during its involvement in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Japanese foreign policy was necessarily constrained by the U.S.-Japanese alliance, for Japan did not establish rapport with the communist states of Asia, especially mainland China.

Nevertheless, Tokyo was able to avoid its involvement in any military conflicts in the region. This can be attributed to the "Yoshida Strategy", which was formulated during the Yoshida-Dulles negotiations in the early 1950s. Prime Minister Yoshida, though supporting the alliance

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1 49 countries signed the Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union and China did not participate in the signing. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was revised in January 1960. For the text of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, see Appendix A.

2 See, for example, J.B. Welfield, "Australia and Japan in the Cold War", in Peter Drysdale & Hironobu Kitaôji (eds.), Japan and Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1981), pp.385-418.
relationship with the United States, vehemently resisted Dulles's request for a major Japanese rearmament. Yoshida pointed out to Dulles that: the Japanese economy was weak; rearmament was prohibited by the constitution; the Japanese had an aversion to military matters after the disastrous Pacific War; and that a rearmed Japan would impair relations with its neighbours.3

The late 1960s and 1970s saw increasing strains in economic relations. Politically, the period saw considerable inconsistency in U.S. attitudes toward Japan, and East Asia for that matter. President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" of July 1969 raised doubts as to the reliability of the U.S. defence commitment to Japan. More significantly, Japan was shaken by the 1971-72 "Nixon shocks". On July 15 1971, the United States suddenly announced Kissinger's ongoing negotiation with Peking and Nixon's visit to China of 1972. This news was a great shock to the Japanese government which had hitherto faithfully followed American policy on China. Japan, a loyal ally of the U.S., had not been consulted at all. Although the Sino-American rapprochement turned out to be extremely beneficial to Japan, there is no question that the "Nixon shocks" did raise the question of the

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credibility of the alliance. On August 15 1971, Nixon suddenly announced a temporary 10 percent surcharge on imports and a suspension of the U.S. dollar's convertibility into gold. Furthermore, in October 1971, Japan was forced to accept the American demands in the long dispute over textiles. In the summer of 1973, the U.S. suddenly announced an embargo on all soybean exports, "overlooking the fact that American soybeans were a principal source of protein in the Japanese diet and that the highly profitable American soybean industry had been in large part developed to meet Japanese demands". Although the embargo was soon lifted, the Japanese "were appalled by America's easy oversight of their country and its callous disregard of vital Japanese requirement".

Additionally, President Carter's announcement — subsequently shelved — of the withdrawal of U.S. ground

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5 The United States "indicated that it would impose textile quotas by executive order under the tenuous authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act if agreement were not reached by October 15. Japanese government leaders...saw acceptance of an unpleasant textile agreement as necessary to help salvage the larger U.S.-Japan relationship. Premier Sato and his advisers saw no reasonable alternative except to yield to the American pressure," I.M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clapp, Haruhiro Fukui, Managing An Alliance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976) pp.44-45.

6 Reischauer, op.cit., p.333.

7 Ibid., p.334.
combat forces from South Korea was also perceived by the Japanese as an instance of inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy. Japan, recognizing a decline of U.S. interests in the security of Asia, realized the need for its own increased defence effort and formulated the concept of "comprehensive national security" under the initiative of Prime Minister Ohira in July 1980.  

Since the late 1970s, the United States, increasingly aware of what it perceives as a Soviet military buildup, has significantly amplified its demand that Japan should share its defence burden for the security of the Western alliance. In 1976, following the Sakata-Schlesinger talks in 1975, a Sub-committee on Defence Cooperation was established. The "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation", formulated in 1978, opened the way for joint defence planning. Pressed by U.S. requests, Japan has accepted the responsibility of defending 1,000 miles of sealanes and the transfer of Japanese military technology. Tokyo has also expressed its intention to cooperate


9 U.S.-Japanese military co-operation is currently underway mainly in the following areas of activity: (1) Joint Exercises; (2) Exchange of Intelligence Information; (3) Mutual Support Logistics; (4) Coordination of Readiness Stages of U.S. and Japanese Forces; (5) Division of Defense Reponsibility by Function and Geography; (6) Command and Coordination; and (7) Cooperation in Other Areas of the Far East. For details, see Larry A. Niksch, Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues (Report No.81-158F, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 7, 1981).
technically with the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative research programme.

However, as is discussed in Chapter II, the United States has not yet been fully successful in its attempt to make Japan a full-fledged member of the Western alliance. This is primarily because of the strong political constraints imposed on Japan's ability to fully accept the U.S. demand.

The most visible constraint is Article IX of the Japanese constitution, which limits Japan's military capability. Because of this, Japanese security policy must be "exclusively defensive" in character. Offensive weapons such as ICBMs and long-range strategic bombers cannot be maintained. Also, Japan cannot despatch its military forces abroad nor exercise the right of collective self-defence.\(^\text{10}\) Japan also has the principle of restricting arms exports to certain countries such as the Communist block states.\(^\text{11}\)

Moreover, Japan adheres to the three non-nuclear principles of "not possessing, not manufacturing and not introducing nuclear weapons into the country"; though the credibility of these principles is subject to question,


\(^{11}\) According to Defense of Japan 1983, the Three Principles on Arms Export declared in 1967 provide that "arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted: (1) Communist bloc countries; (2) countries subject to embargoes on the export of arms under the United Nations resolutions; and (3) countries which are involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts." See also the government Policy Guideline on Arms Export of February 1976. Defense of Japan 1983, p.211.
since the U.S. government is determined to keep the location of nuclear weapons secret to "maintain effective deterrence".\textsuperscript{12}

Furthermore, Japan has managed to be seen as keeping its defence spending below 1 percent of GNP, complying with the 1976 Cabinet agreement.

It must be emphasized that all of the above-mentioned political constraints are strongly supported by the majority of Japanese. According to an \textit{Asahi Shimbun} poll conducted in May 1984\textsuperscript{13}, 74 percent of those interviewed were opposed to an increase in defence expenditure, and only 14 percent were in favour of that increase. As for the question of the future of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the result was as follows:

- The SDF must be strengthened 11\%
- The SDF must be maintained at the present level 61\%
- The SDF must be scaled down 16\%
- The SDF must be abolished 5\%
- Others. No answer. 7\%

Regarding the 1 percent of GNP barrier, another opinion poll conducted in March 1985 has indicated:\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer stated in 1981 that U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons regularly entered Japan's ports. He commented later in \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, "If the United States is to provide defense for Japan, it is obviously impossible for American naval vessels to change their armaments every time they enter Japanese waters". \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, 31 May 1981.
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, June 18 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, March 17 1985.
\end{itemize}
The 1 percent-of-GNP ceiling must be observed  58%
The 1 percent-of-GNP ceiling should be abolished
and a new ceiling should be established  22%
A sufficient budget should be devoted to
defence without any ceiling  5%
Others. No answer.  15%

Thus, although the majority of Japanese support the
existence of the SDF, there are many who oppose any
increase in defence spending, an enlargement of the SDF,
and the abolishment of the 1 percent of GNP barrier.
Indeed, the pacifist tendency which has characterized the
post-war public sentiment has yet to fade away. 15

However, despite the persistent public feeling against
increased military power and despite legal constraints such
as Article 9 of the constitution, the Japanese SDF has been
"steadily and significantly" strengthened with the result
that Japan now ranks eighth worldwide in military
spending. 16 Moreover, public debate on security matters
is no longer taboo. Gerald Curtis, a respected Japan
specialist at Columbia University, testified in U.S.
Congressional Hearings:

...there is now in Japan a greater degree of
consensus than ever before in support of the
self-defense forces and the maintenance of the

15 For example, an Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in March
1981 showed that 30 percent of those interviewed
supported the policy of 'unarmed neutrality'. Asahi

The nature of the domestic debate has undergone a fundamental shift from a confrontation between those opposing military measures at all, on the one hand, and those seeking some degree of defense capability, on the other, to a debate now essentially between defenders of the status quo and advocates of an expansion of the nation's military power ... [However], there is strong opposition both to fundamental change in the role of the self-defense forces and to the rapid development of Japan's military strength.17

In order to get a clear picture of the current debate on Japan's security issues, reference should be made to Mike Mochizuki's well-balanced article published in *International Security*.18 Mochizuki discerns four major schools of strategic thought in Japan. First, there is 'political realism', or "the main-stream of Japanese strategic thought". The 'political realists" are primarily concerned with "the political and diplomatic implications of Japan's security policy"; domestically, they are sensitive to the persistent pacifist feelings and cautious about the option of Japan's major rearmament. Internationally, they strongly support the U.S.-Japan alliance and oppose the idea of an autonomous defence. They do feel the need for Japan to take on more of the defence burden as a member of the Western alliance, but they do not seek "to formulate a doctrine designed to

18 Mochizuki, op.cit.
improve Japan's deterrence capability by cooperating militarily with the United States".19

Secondly, Mochizuki describes 'unarmed neutralism' which "ultimately seek[s] a termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the signing of friendship treaties with Japan's neighbours". The 'unarmed neutralists' strongly oppose the U.S. 'nuclear umbrella' over Japan and advocate Japan's initiatives for the promotion of peace and disarmament.20

Thirdly, there is a cluster of 'Japanese Gaullists' who "seek a strong Japanese military force not only to deter aggression but also to project national power". The 'Japanese Gaullists' favour a revision of both the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Japanese constitution, and endorse the need for Japan to have an offensive

19 The 'political realists' include such scholars as Fuji Kamiya, Masataka Kōsaka, and Yōnosuke Nagai. The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), established in 1978, represents the main strategic research institute for this school of thought. See ibid., pp.158-163.

20 Proponents of 'unarmed neutralism' include such scholars as Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Hiroharu Seki and Jirō Kamishima. 'Unarmed neutralism' is the Japan Socialist Party's mainstream argument. See ibid., pp.163-165; It is noteworthy in passing that the Socialist Party's position seems to be gradually changing. For example, Masashi Ishibashi, Chairman of the Socialist Party, argues that the SDF is unconstitutional but it is lawful. His theory is that "the SDF as an entity contravenes the provisions of Article 9 of the Constitution ... but it is at the same time an entity established legally through proper procedures in the Diet ... the SDF should be reduced and disbanded through legal procedures." See Asian Security 1984, RIPS, Tokyo, pp.202-203.
capability such as nuclear weapons and carrier task forces. The influence of the 'Gaullists' remains quite limited, but their potential cannot be underestimated.\(^{21}\)

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Mochizuki indicates the emergence of 'military realism' which represents a 'new strategic perspective' in Japanese thought. The 'military realists' recognize that the shift in the U.S.-Soviet military balance has occurred in both global and regional terms, and advocate intensified U.S.-Japan military collaboration, and a substantial military buildup, emphasizing the growing 'Soviet threat' to Japan and the Western alliance. They do not support a Japanese nuclear force, but argue for the creation of "Joint U.S.-Japan deterrence".\(^{22}\) Mochizuki astutely notes that "Japanese military realism will harmonize the best with the perspective of most American defense planners", but questions whether or not military realism will be politically stable in the Japanese context.\(^{23}\)

Yōnosuke Nagai, a prominent Japanese 'political realist', observes the current political climate in a

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21 The 'Japanese Gaullists' include such scholars as Jun Etō and Tetsuya Kataoka. See Mochizuki, ibid., pp.166-168.

22 The most prominent proponent of this position is Hisahiko Okazaki, former Director-General of the Research and Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 'military realists' include influential Diet members such as Shin Kanemaru, former Director-General of the Defense Agency, and many of the retired SDF officers. the Japan Center for Strategic Studies is the main research group for this school. See ibid, pp.168-175.

23 Ibid., p.179.
similar vein. According to Nagai, the 'military realists' are mainly represented by some key interests of Japanese decision-making, which include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency and the Right-wing factions of the Liberal Democratic Party. Those institutions are increasingly supportive of Japan's greater defence efforts to meet U.S. demands.24

Moreover, pressures for a militarily strong Japan might also come from the rising self-confidence among the Japanese or what one observer has called "Japanese big-power chauvinism".25 Although the rising Japanese self-confidence does not seem to have transformed into pressure for increased military capability, cautious judgement would not conclude that it will not. An editorial of the Yomiuri Shimbun of August 15 1983 stated: "Public statements to the effect that Japan no longer has anything to learn from the West are increasing, prompting a growing emotional resistance overseas. Apparently Japan is projecting the undesirable image of an arrogant

24 See Yōnosuke Nagai, "Yoshida dokutorin wa eien nari", Bungeishunju, May 1984. While admitting the emergence of a "hawkish coalition" formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency and the Right-wing factions of the L.D.P., Nagai believes that as long as powerful government departments such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry maintain the traditional "Yoshida Strategy", the mainstream of post-war Japanese strategic thought, Japan will resist pressure for U.S.-Japan military collaboration.

upstart". The "Shunjū" column of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, commented on August 16, 1983:

In an earlier age of the mystical experience of viewing the sunrise from the summit of Mount Fuji, the world's most graceful mountain, made the Japanese believe that they were somehow special. This led to the emergence of a 'chosen race' fallacy. The belief that the Japanese were a chosen race was thought to have disappeared with Japan's defeat in the war. But today, as Japan ascends to the very pinnacle of prosperity in the world economy, we can detect a trend toward a return to this kind of conceit.

There is also an indication that Japanese public sensitivity toward military affairs is getting eroded inch by inch by "the vestiges of ultra-nationalism". The manifestations of this trend could be found in some political and social events such as official visits by all Prime Ministers since 1978 to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese military men killed in battle were enshrined, and the recent controversy over history.

26 Cited in ibid., p.46.
27 Cited in ibid., p.47.
28 See Allan Patience, "The Japanese Defence Debate", paper (work-in-progress draft) read to the International Relations and Third World Politics section of the 26th Annual Conference of the Australian Political Studies Association, University of Melbourne, August 28, 1984.
29 Denis and Peggy Warner note: "Yasukuni, the Patriots' Shrine, or Shrine of the Righteous Souls, was the most sacred to many people in Japan. The dead did not die, but waited, enshrined and deified, until called to fight alongside the living" cited in Patience, ibid, p.9; Premier Tōjō, one of the top "war criminals" of World War II, is now enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine. Radha Sinha, Japan's Options for the 1980s (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1982), p.249.
textbook revisions.\textsuperscript{30}

However, it must be emphasized that the public feeling against a military buildup remains remarkably strong, as the opinion polls cited before clearly indicate. Also, it is important to note that the 'military realists' represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency and the Right-wing factions of the L.D.P. have to be seen against the powerful Ministry of Finance and substantial numbers of members of the L.D.P. and opposition parties, which oppose a rapid increase in military spending. Moreover, major newspapers exert significant influence against strengthened military capability.\textsuperscript{31}

Therefore, it is, indeed, likely that the major political constraints such as Article IX of the constitution will be maintained.

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\textsuperscript{30} Some history textbook authors were instructed by the Ministry of Education to rewrite accounts of Japan's military activities during World War II. One author was reportedly compelled to use the word shinshutsu (advance) instead of using shinryaku (invasion) in his description of Japan's invasion into Manchuria and China. See, for example, Patience, ibid., p.8.

\textsuperscript{31} Because of the serious budgetary restrictions caused by deficits and the accumulated national debt, the Ministry of Finance is especially reluctant to increase defence spending. The amount of national bonds reached the level of US$46,000 million in 1983, which is about 40 percent of Japan's GNP. See Shunji Taoka, "Japan's Role As 'A Member of the Western Alliance'", in Joseph Godson (ed.), Challenges to the Western Alliance (London: Times Books, 1984), p.126; Also see Government Decisionmaking in Japan: Implications for the United States, report submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 1982, p.IX.
Taking all of the political constraints and pressures for the military buildup into account, then, where is Japanese security policy headed? How will the U.S.-Japan security relationship develop? One determinant surely is Japanese perceptions of the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, which is the subject of the next section.

The Current Politico-Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

In examining the significance of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and in assessing current Japanese security policies, a basic understanding of the current politico-strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region is essential. Although the focus of analysis in this section will be on Japan's geo-political position and the superpowers' perceived interests and military capabilities in the region, it might be useful to look at three important politico-strategic contests - Sino-Soviet rivalry, the tension in the Korean peninsula and the military conflict in Indochina.

Although military preoccupations of the local states and the military deployments of the surpowers are two main factors contributing to the ongoing militarization of the region, it is critically important to recognize that the Asia-pacific region embraces diverging ideologies and threat perceptions, ethnic, religious and cultural
variations, and wide-ranging differences in political and economic developments.

The situation in the Korean peninsula can be characterized by visible tension and instability. The ideological context still governs relations between Pyongyang and Seoul. The possibility of a military clash in the Korean peninsula remains a major concern to the Japanese. Whereas the situation in Indochina does not directly affect the security of Japan at present, the possibility of an escalation in the Indo-Chinese conflict cannot be ruled out. Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and its dominance in Indochina is a major security problem for the ASEAN States. Some states like Thailand are worried about Vietnam's relationship with the Soviet Union. A solution to the stalemate in Indochina has yet to be found. On the other hand, Sino-Soviet rivalry, potentially a vital factor in the future strategic climate of the region, seems to be maintaining a certain equilibrium.

(1) Japan's geo-political position.

In assessing the politico-strategic environment surrounding Japan, the geopolitical position of Japan should be carefully examined, because it does affect Japanese threat perceptions and Japan's defence planning. In geo-political terms, Japan's position is both advantageous and vulnerable.

Japan's geographical location offers Japan and the U.S. an advantageous position for surveillance in peacetime of any movement of Soviet forces in the region, and for
operations in wartime, such as mining and sealing off the three narrow straits (Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya Straits) through which the majority of Soviet surface ships, based in Vladivostok, must pass. Moreover, in any contingencies in East Asia, Japan can be a useful base for logistic support and for assisting with communications between U.S. forces. Indeed, as Hisahiko Okazaki notes, Japan "is ideally suited as a base for forward deployment of U.S. Forces". The utility of U.S. Forces in Japan is, of course, well recognized by U.S. defence planners. Lt. Gen. George G. Loving testified in 1979:

U.S. Forces have established an extensive logistic base and communications network in Japan. Petroleum terminals at several locations in Japan provide about 80 percent of the total U.S. storage capacity west of Hawaii. Ammunition storage facilities in Japan have over one-half the land based capacity in the Western Pacific. The Yokosuka ship repair facility is the largest drydock west of Continental U.S. and is able to handle the largest carriers. Major sea and aerial ports which were essential in supporting both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts are operated by U.S. Forces in Japan.

32 See, for example, U.S.-Japan Security Relationship: The Key to East Asian security and Stability, Report to the Committee on Arms Services, Senate, March 22, 1979. Senator Hart observes: "The joint security requirements of Japan and the United States require Japan to have the capability to seal off the exits from the Sea of Japan quickly in time of crisis or conflict. These exits ... can be closed without great difficulty by mines, tactical aircraft, and naval forces". p.12.


It should be recognized, however, that the geo-strategic location of Japan, perceived as advantageous to the defence of the Western interests, has to be viewed against profound geo-political vulnerabilities of Japan. Firstly, although Japan, being a chain of islands, cannot be easily attacked in the form of an invasion, it is inherently vulnerable to missiles and long-range bomber attacks, because of its small landmass and heavily concentrated population. Secondly, Japan almost totally depends on imported energy resources. Unlike the United States, which is far less dependent on foreign energy resources, and is an exporter of a large amount of food, Japan imports more than 80 percent of its energy needs, over 60 percent of its grain consumption and virtually 100 percent of iron ore, bauxite, copper and many other resources. This is a matter of life or death for Japan. Therefore, Japan has to be concerned not only with the maintenance of international trade but also with the stability of resource producing areas of the world.

(2) The superpowers' perceived interests and objectives.

(a) U.S. perceived interests and objectives.

The United States is a Pacific power with growing interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific region is now showing the most vigorous economic growth in

the world. U.S. trade with the Asia-Pacific region accounts for about 30 percent of its total trade, some $136 billion in 1982, outstripping its trade with Europe. For the United States, East Asia is not only an important source of natural resources and manufactured products but is offering expanding investment opportunities. Many of the East Asian countries, of course, benefit greatly from their close economic relations with the United States. Indeed, as some astute American observers note, the U.S. economy is now challenged by the growing competitiveness of East Asian economies.36

Politically and strategically, the Asia-Pacific region is viewed as a vitally important region of U.S. interests. The Americans determined at the outset of the cold war to commit themselves to the security of East Asia. The United States has fought two wars in the region since 1950. Most significantly, the "Vietnam trauma" affected subsequent U.S. foreign policies, leading to the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which declared that the United States would minimize its military involvement in the region. President Carter's announcement of the withdrawal of ground combat forces from South Korea, though finally shelved, was perceived by U.S. allies in Asia as a decline in the U.S. commitment to the region.

Nevertheless, the U.S. security commitment to its allies and friends in the region remains firm. Richard

36 See, for example, Roy Hofheinz, Jr. & Kent E. Calder, The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
Armitage, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, wrote recently:

A strong and visible U.S. presence is now all the more essential throughout the (East Asian) region to prevent intimidation of our friends and allies by the growing Soviet military might and to assure those nations who share our values or interests that America’s commitment to the region remains firm.37

Washington, increasingly aware of the growing "Soviet threat", has embarked on a massive military modernization programme to expand its war-fighting capabilities not only globally but also in the Western Pacific. At the same time, the U.S. efforts in asking its allies to share a greater defence burden have been intense.

However, despite the U.S. determination to remain a Pacific power and its collective security efforts in the region, it is not at all inconceivable that the U.S. security relationships with its allies could be seriously undermined in the foreseeable future. The recent 'crisis' in U.S.-New Zealand relations has indicated that U.S. nuclear policy was unacceptable to the New Zealanders.38

Whether or not the United States will be able to successfully manage the security ties with its other allies is still an open question, though it is likely that the


U.S. will remain the strongest military power in the region throughout the 1980s.

(b) Soviet perceived interests and objectives.

The Soviet Union, with three-fourth of its territories in Asia, has also played a significant role in the Asia-Pacific region. It has global as well as regional interests. There is a widely accepted view, however, that the Soviet policy in East Asia has been a "spectacular failure". The U.S.S.R.'s military potential is very impressive, and on a par with only the United States, but Moscow has failed to translate its growing military power in the region into political, economic, or ideological influence throughout East Asia. 39

The most significant Soviet failure is that it could not prevent the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochements. The result is the emergence of an "anti-Soviet coalition", formed by the United States, Japan and China.

Secondly, the Soviet policy towards Japan has been viewed by the Japanese as extremely heavy-handed. Indeed, anti-Soviet sentiments among the Japanese have increased significantly not only due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but because of the persistent Soviet military

buildup and Soviet behaviour in the region. The building of military bases in the Japanese-claimed Northern Territories, the deployment of the Minsk, Backfire and SS-20 in the Soviet Far East, the shooting down of the Korean Air Liner, threatening Soviet statements about Japan and Soviet military activities around Japanese territories have all contributed to the Japanese hostility to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet "threat" perceived by the Japanese has encouraged closer military ties between Japan and the United States.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union, notably lacking economic and technological capacity to extend its influence as well as lacking ideological appeal, has failed to participate in the development of ASEAN's economic prosperity. Because of the Soviet military buildup and its military aid to Vietnam, many of the ASEAN states are becoming closer to the Western camp. Thailand and Singapore, for example, now perceive the immediate threat to their security as coming from Vietnam supported by the Soviet Union.


42 Donald S. Zagoria, "The Strategic Environment in East Asia", in Soviet Policy in East Asia, p.20.
Thus, the Soviet Union, with friendly relations with only Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, Laos and Cambodia, has been remarkably unsuccessful in extending its political and economic influence. The only instrument on which Moscow seems to rely is its military capabilities and military aid to its allies in the region.

There seems to be little prospect in the 1980s, however, of any significant Soviet military reduction in East Asia. The growing strategic importance of Siberia and the Soviet Far East and the U.S.S.R.'s obsessive security considerations will probably not allow Moscow to retard its military buildup.43

Strategically, Soviet territories in the Far East and Siberia are of vital importance to the security of the U.S.S.R. Major Soviet ICBM and IRBM complexes and one of its major SLBM bases are located in Siberia. Furthermore, the economic and political importance of the region will undoubtly increase since those areas are one of the world's greatest, untapped areas of natural resources.44

A vital consideration is the fact that Moscow sees its Siberian possessions "as a vulnerable frontier, sparsely populated and with a Pacific seaboard over 10,000 kilometres away from the Russian heartland".45 The Soviet Pacific

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43 See Dibb, op.cit.

44 "Siberia accounts for 20 percent of Soviet electric power output, 50 percent of her oil production, 40 percent of her gas output, and over 30 percent of her coal, timber and fish", see ibid. p.8n.

seaboard is also flanked by hostile, anti-Soviet states. Indeed, the geo-strategic disadvantages of the U.S.S.R. in this region must be one of its major preoccupations. The Soviet naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk suffer severe weather and geographic conditions. Most significantly, the access of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, based in Vladivostok, might be obstructed in wartime by Japan and the United States.

In sum, although the pursuit of its interests in the region is frustrated by several handicaps, the Soviet Union is likely to continue efforts i) to strengthen its military capabilities in the region; ii) to weaken the U.S.-Japanese alliance system; iii) to contain China and concurrently seek to improve its relations with China; and iv) to prevent the development of any strategic ties between ASEAN and the United States.46

(3) The Military Balance in the Region.

Several points should be made at the outset about the difficulties of objectively assessing the military balance. First, because much of the military information is classified, only information in the public record has been utilized.

Secondly, since enormous uncertainties and mis-calculations are highly conceivable in a severe crisis or

46 Testimony of Zagoria, Soviet Role in Asia, pp.53-54.
actual war, even a reasonably cautious analysis of the military situation must be taken with reservation.

Thirdly, it is virtually impossible to quantify all of the relevant factors in assessing the military balance among the states concerned. There are significant differences or asymmetries in perceptions, number, capability, doctrine, missions, geographical position, demographic trends, and other factors. In the European theater, the Eastern and Western blocks are clearly demarcated. The East Asian region, as already noted, is complicated by the diverse threat perceptions, interests and heterogeneous character of the states. Indeed, Asian perspectives on security do not necessarily coincide with the global perspectives of the superpowers. Many Southeast Asian states see the major threat to their stability as coming from within the country rather than from outside.

(a) The Naval Balance in the Pacific

The modernisation and growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in recent years is "the most striking and widely noted change in the Far Eastern military situation (see Table 1). The Soviet Pacific Fleet, which is primarily designed for operations against the U.S. and its allies, is estimated by the Western allies as the largest of the four Soviet fleets. It has about 135 submarines, including 12

47 Langer, op.cit., p.269.
Delta-class and 12 Yankee-class SSBN, a Kiev-class aircraft carrier Minsk and other major vessels, including the new Ivan Rogov-class amphibious assault ship Aleksandr Nikolaev.  

Table 1. Strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSGN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carrier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruiser, guided missile</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer, guided missile</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate, guided missile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruiser, light</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*After 1979 Krirak I and II are classified as frigate, guided missile


The primary mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is to protect its SSBN forces, based at Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka and to secure this deployment in wartime. The SS-N-8 missile (range about 7,800 km) on the Delta-I and II class and the SS-N-18 missile (range about 6,500 km) on the Delta-III class have the capability to be launched against the U.S. mainland from inside the Sea of Okhotsk.  


Although Moscow has been continuing to strengthen the Pacific Fleet, its capabilities should not be assessed as superior to those of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Indeed, the Soviet Pacific Fleet faces a number of difficulties. First, it lacks adequate air cover for extended naval operations. Secondly, it lacks forward bases and logistic support for sustaining operations at long range. 51 Thirdly, most of the Pacific naval forces, based at Vladivostok, must pass through one of three narrow straits (Tsugaru, Tsushima, or Soya) to have access to the Pacific. But these choke points, as already mentioned, could be mined and sealed off by the U.S. and Japan.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet has, indeed, formidable capabilities, reinforced if necessary by the even more powerful forces of the U.S. Third Fleet in the Eastern Pacific. 52 Table 2 below shows U.S. forces deployed in the Pacific, including ground, air, marine air and naval forces.

Above all, the U.S. Fleets in the Pacific have enormous ASW capabilities that enable the U.S. to track and


Table 2  US Forces in the Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Air Forces</th>
<th>Marine Air</th>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>South Korea:</td>
<td>South Korea:</td>
<td>59 ftr &amp; attack aircraft</td>
<td>2 attack carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 div (155 tks)</td>
<td>48 F-16 ftrs</td>
<td>incl F-4, A-4, A-6</td>
<td>35 cruisers, destroyers &amp; frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36 F-4E ftrs</td>
<td>and AV-8B</td>
<td>13 attack subs (11 nuclear-powered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 A-10 ftrs</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 amphibious ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan/Okinawa:</td>
<td>1 MAF (34 tks)</td>
<td>Okinawa:</td>
<td></td>
<td>36 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 bn landing team</td>
<td>72 F-15C/D ftrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36 F-16 ftrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 R-4C ftrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48 F-4E/G ftrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp;</td>
<td>Hawaii:</td>
<td></td>
<td>127 ftr &amp; attack aircraft</td>
<td>4 attack carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Pacific</td>
<td>1 div less 1 bde</td>
<td>California:</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>51 cruisers, destroyers &amp; frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13 tks)</td>
<td>Hawaii:</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33 attack subs (31 nuclear-powered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 marine bde</td>
<td>Arizona:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24 amphibious ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>California:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Trident SSBN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 marine div</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(143 tks)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: div = division  
               bde = brigade  
               bn = battalion  
               MAF = marine amphibious force  
               MAU = marine amphibious unit  
               tk = tank  
               ftr = fighter  
               sub = submarine


According to a former NSA officer, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we know the whereabouts at any given time of all its naval forces, including its missile-firing submarines... We know where their submarines are.

Admiral Hyman G. Rickover also claimed in 1978 that the Soviets have never detected any of the 41 U.S. Polaris submarines that have carried out 1500 patrols since 1960, whereas the U.S. Navy has kept track of all Soviet submarines because of superior U.S. electronic surveillance.

53 See Zagoria, "The Strategic Environment", op.cit., p.49.

and noisier Soviet submarines.\textsuperscript{55} A report prepared by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1980 indicates that the U.S. Seventh Fleet is "the only navy deployed in the region with extensive sea-based fleet air defence capability - a vital asset in any extended conflict in open ocean theaters. It is also the only fleet with a significant capability to project air power ashore".\textsuperscript{56}

In terms of readiness, the U.S. naval forces are far ahead of their Soviet counterparts. Paul Dibb notes that "only about 10 per cent of the (Soviet) fleet's principal surface combatants and submarines are normally deployed outside home waters in the north-west Pacific ... [and] only 15 per cent of the SSBN force is normally on alert at sea at any time, compared with 55 per cent of U.S. submarines."\textsuperscript{57}

Additionally, Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay should not be overestimated. Soviet forces based in Vietnam could be quickly demolished in wartime by U.S. forces based in the Philippines or Guam.\textsuperscript{58}

Moreover, U.S. Pacific Naval Forces are being significantly strengthened, and their war-fighting capabilities are being upgraded. The recent U.S. Naval force improvement includes the addition of sophisticated

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. Also see Ian Bellany, "Sea Power and the Soviet Submarine Forces", \textit{Survival}, January/February.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Japan's Contribution}, p.63.

\textsuperscript{57} Dibb, op.cit., p.21, p.23.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, p.24; Also see testimony of James A. Kelly, \textit{Soviet Role in Asia}. 
ships such as the Carl Vinson, a nuclear-powered attack carrier, and the New Jersey battleship. Admiral Holloway testified in 1982 that the U.S. navy modernisation programme including the expansion of the U.S. Fleet to a 600-ship Navy "will, for the first time in many years, provide the capability to realistically commit ourselves to the support of our allies in the Western Pacific as well as in assuring an ability to protect our own and allied vital security interests in the Indian Ocean".\(^5^9\)

Furthermore, in the summer of 1984, the U.S. sea-launched cruise-missile (SLCMs) or the Tomahawks began to be deployed on surface ships and attack submarines to offer "enormous potential for raising the striking power of (U.S.) Pacific forces."\(^6^0\) The new naval operating rules called 'Flexible Operation', adopted in 1982, are now in force, leading to the upgraded operational capabilities of U.S. navy.\(^6^1\)

In sum, although the Soviet naval power has been growing consistently, the U.S. naval forces in the region are apparently still in a superior position. Furthermore,


U.S. forces can count on the support from their powerfull allies in the region.

(b) The Ground Forces Balance

Some 52 of the total 191 divisions are stationed in the Soviet Far East, Siberia and Central Asia. Most of these forces are oriented towards China, and only three divisions in Sakhalin and Kamchatka, and Soviet troops in the Northern Territories are considered to be designed for contingencies in the region.\textsuperscript{62}

Since the late 1970s, Soviet ground forces have been strengthened in quality and mobility. They have heavy firepower and good air defence capability, supported by surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery and so on.

Although Chinese ground forces surpass the Soviet counterparts numerically (see Diagram 1), the Soviet forces outweigh the Chinese forces in terms of combat performance and mobility. Nevertheless, the Soviet positions are essentially defensive and it may be that only limited penetrations by the Soviets into Chinese territory are possible.\textsuperscript{63}

Garrison forces in the Japanese-claimed Northern Territories cannot be taken as posing a serious threat to

\textsuperscript{62} Dibb, op.cit., p.21.

\textsuperscript{63} Langer, op.cit., p.268; Dibb, ibid., p.21.
Diagram 1. **Deployment and Dispositions of Troops Along the Sino-Soviet Border**

**Comparison Between the Chinese and Soviet Ground Force Levels in the Sino-Soviet Border Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Soviet Union</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52 Divisions</td>
<td>68 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 470,000</td>
<td>More than 1.5 million troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Siberian Military District

The Central Asian Military District

The Transbaikal Military District

The Far Eastern Military District

China

Soviet Union

Military District (Region) Headquarters

Navy Base

Novosibirsk

Irkutsk

Shenyang

Ulanbaatar

Wulumuchi

Beijing (Peking)

Shenyang

Khabarovsk

Haihe

Vladivostok

Beijing Military Region

Shenyang Military Region

Lanzhou Military Region

Japan, since four full divisions of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces are maintained on Hokkaido. The buildup of Soviet ground forces in those islands was probably a reaction to the Sino-Japanese peace treaty and Moscow's desire to secure the Sea of Okhotsk.

(c) The Air Forces Balance

Although Soviet air attacks on enemy land targets are highly unlikely short of a global war, the modernisation of Soviet air forces has given the U.S.S.R. the capability to attack the U.S. and its allied forces in the region. Current improvement of Soviet air forces includes the deployment of the Mig-25 Foxbat interceptor, the Mig-23 Flogger fighter, the Su-24 Fencer fighter-bomber, and the supersonic TU22M Backfire bomber.

The location of the Soviet air bases and the range of the aircraft stationed in the region would suggest that Soviet air forces there are oriented toward China. However, as Dibb argues, over 30 Soviet naval aviation Backfires, based at Alekseyevka on the Soviet Pacific

64 For a detailed analysis of the Soviet-Japan Ground Forces Balance, see Asian Security 1981, pp.80-81.

65 Langer, op.cit., p.268.

66 The Su-24 Fencer fighter-bomber has a combat radius of 1600 kilometres carrying two nuclear weapons. Dibb, op.cit., p.21. Backfire bombers have an operating range of 4,200 kilometres, carrying one or two AS-4 Kitchen air-to-ship cruise missiles with a range of 300 kilometers. Asian Security 1984, p.66.

67 Dibb. ibid., p.21; Langer, op.cit., p.269.
coast, pose "a serious threat to U.S. air-craft carriers, because these Backfires can operate as far away as Midway, Guam and the Philippines without refuelling". Nevertheless, the Soviet air force in the region must be weighed against the powerful U.S. tactical air forces including F-15 and F-16 fighters and cruise-missile capable B-52 bombers. Indeed, the Soviet air force would face the threat posed by "the 650 U.S. Navy and Marine aircraft that belong to U.S. Pacific Fleet, plus about 1000 aircraft from Japan, South Korea and other U.S. allies in the Pacific."69

The capability and strength of the U.S. air force in the region is also improving significantly.70 For example, about 40-50 F-16s will be deployed at Misawa air base in Japan, from 1985. According to the Japanese Defense White Paper (1984), the planned deployment of F-16s "will uphold the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, enhance deterrence and contribute to the peace and security of Japan and the Far East".71

(d) Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Forces

Although Soviet goals behind the significant buildup of its strategic and tactical nuclear forces remain unclear, the USSR has the military potential to attack the

68 Dibb, ibid., p.21.
69 Ibid., p.21.
U.S., China, Japan, South Korea and U.S. bases in the Asia-Pacific region. Major Soviet ICBM and IRBM complexes and bases for one of the two Soviet SLBM headquarters are located in Siberia. About 35-40 per cent of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces and more than 30 per cent of its SS-20s and strategic bombers are based in the region. Diagram 2 shows the location of SS-20s and their range.

Diagram 2. Areas Where SS-20s Are Deployed and Their Range

However, the tremendous capabilities of the Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear forces must be weighed against their U.S. counterparts, whose counterforce capabilities are considered dramatically superior to those of the Soviet forces.\textsuperscript{73}

Given the risk of nuclear escalation, the actual use of the nuclear forces is unlikely, though current emphasis by both the U.S. and the USSR on war-fighting capabilities, which are designed to "enhance" deterrence, must be assessed as highly destabilising. As some astute strategists indicate, the war-fighting strategy may lower the nuclear threshold.\textsuperscript{74}

It should also be noted that no arms control discussions covering the Asia-Pacific region have been seriously initiated by the superpowers or any major powers in the region, though the region is one of the most heavily armed in the world.

Four important conclusions emerge from the foregoing account of the military balance in the region. Firstly, although the current Soviet military buildup deserves careful attention, the Soviet military position in the region can be interpreted as basically defensive. Moreover,

\textsuperscript{72} Dibb, op.cit., p.23.

\textsuperscript{73} See, for example, Desmond Ball, "Management of the Superpower Balance", in T.B. Millar (ed.), \textit{International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region} (St Lucia : University of Queensland Press, 1983).

\textsuperscript{74} See, for example, William Arkin, "The Nuclear Balancing Act in the Pacific", \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}, December 1983.
as Wolf Mendl argues, a reasonably realistic assessment of
the military balance requires the analysis of both strength
and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{75} Soviet weaknesses are, as has been
discussed, considerable.

Secondly, even in the purely military sense, the U.S.
military forces, plus those of its allies, have an
advantage over Soviet military forces. Indeed, James A.
Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense testified in
July 1983:

I would say that U.S. forces, because of our forward
presence, constitute something a little bit more in
our favor than equivalency. I do not think that we are
overall at a major disadvantage to the Soviet Union in
Asia militarily.\textsuperscript{76}

Thirdly, the alleged Soviet threat to Japan should not
be exaggerated as it has been by some Japanese and American
observers. The Soviet threat to Japan must be assessed as
only potential.

Above all, the superpowers and the states in the
region share a vital interest: This is to avoid war and to
reduce tension and conflict in the region.

(4) The threat to Japan

No matter what Soviet intentions might be, it would
seem prudent to accept the possibility that Japan is
potentially threatened by the formidable Soviet military
capabilities, which are now represented by modern Soviet

\textsuperscript{75} Wolf Mendl, Western Europe and Japan Between the

\textsuperscript{76} Testimony of James A. Kelly, Soviet Role in Asia,
p.562.
weapons systems such as Tu22M Backfire bombers, Mig 23/27 Flogger fighters, SU-24 Fencer fighter-bombers and its strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, if we assume the contingency of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. bases in Japan could well become prime targets for Soviet armed attacks. Allen S. Whiting testified in July 1983:

The targets (of the Soviet SS-20's and Backfires in the Far East) can be Chinese but they also are more likely to be arraigned against U.S. targets, U.S. bases in Japan in the west Pacific and of course U.S. naval forces.77

Commenting on the U.S. nuclear support facilities in Japan, The Defense Monitor has indicated:

Four KC-135 tanker planes are kept on continuous ground alert at Kadena to refuel B-52 nuclear bombers en route to Soviet targets. Command and control centers for communications with SAC's bombers are located at Kadena and Yokota and a similar facility for control of U.S. ballistic missile submarines is at Yosami. Undeniably, these and other U.S. bases and ports in Japan are prime targets for nuclear strikes in the event of war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.78

Indeed, the vital functions and formidable capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan could well become a serious threat to the Soviet forces in a global war contingency. Therefore,

77 Testimony of Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Role in Asia, p.147.

78 Center for Defense Information, "The Defense of Japan: Should the Rising Sun Rise Again?", The Defense Monitor, No.1, 1984, p.3; Also see W.M. Arkin & D. Chappel, "Kakusensisō no saizensen kichi—Nippon (Japan as a High Threat Area)"; Sekai, February 1985, pp.140-146.
those U.S. forces may well be on the Soviet target list in
the event of a global war.

Moreover, the Soviet Union could be potentially
threatened by Japan's economic and technological potential.

I.I. Ivkov, a Soviet analyst, stated:

It is well known that it is primarily a country's
industrial base and the existence of skilled manpower
which constitute the foundation of military industry.
Both these factors are present in Japan.\textsuperscript{79}

How, then, does Japan intend to cope with a
potential Soviet threat? What are Japan's current defence
capabilities? How have Japanese defence policies been
formulated?

The Japanese Self-Defense Forces

(1) The SDF - planning, force structure and equipment

Between 1953 and 1977, four defence build-up
programmes were developed, resulting in a steady increase
in Japan's defence capability. However, the strategic
concept underlying these programs was not clear. The thrust
of these programs was that Japan should have a defensive
capability which would enable Japan to deal effectively
with limited aggression without U.S. help for an initial
period, and that Japan would depend on the U.S. for
offensive operations.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Cited in Langer, op.cit., p.264.

\textsuperscript{80} See Makoto Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security
Policies", in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign
Policy of Modern Japan (Berkely: University of
California Press, 1977); and Yukio Satoh, The
Evolution of Japanese Security Policy (London: IISS,
Adelphi Paper No.178, 1982).
The guidelines for the current Japanese defence policy were spelled out in the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) adopted in 1976. Masashi Nishihara summarises the assumptions inherent in the document as follows:

1. There is "little possibility of a full-scale military clash between the East and the West or of major conflict possibly leading to such a clash"; 
2. There is "little possibility of limited military conflict breaking out in Japan's neighborhood"; and 
3. The existence of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement (plus the equilibrium between the two superpowers) can prevent full scale aggression against Japan. 81

In the case of possible aggression, the NDPO stipulates that:

1. Against indirect aggression Japan "will take immediate responsive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage"; 
2. In case of limited and small-scale aggression, Japan will repel it, "in principle without external assistance"; 
3. In cases in which aggression cannot feasibly be dealt with without assistance, Japan will continue unyielding resistance until "such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced"; and 
4. Against nuclear war, Japan "will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States." 82

The important elements of the NDPO lie in the "maintenance of a minimum level of military power for Japan and continuance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty". 83

Based on the NDPO, the necessary force structure was formulated (see Table 3). In short, the NDPO seeks to

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82 Ibid.
83 Nishihara, ibid., p.181.
remedy deficiencies in the SDF and to improve its capability, particularly air defence and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.84

Table 3
Comparison of Force Levels by the "Annexed Table" of the National Defense Program Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>National Defense Program Outline</th>
<th>At the completion of FY1982</th>
<th>At the completion of &quot;56 Chugyo&quot;</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized number of SDF personnel</td>
<td>180,000 Men</td>
<td>180,000 Men</td>
<td>180,000 Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units deployed regionally in peacetime</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Structural modernization to be examined and reorganization to be planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Composite Brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Operation Units</td>
<td>1 Armored Division</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Training Brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Helicopter Brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile Units</td>
<td>8 Anti-aircraft Artillery Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Renewal plan of 2 groups to be studied and the necessary measures to be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations)</td>
<td>4 Escort Flotillas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Units)</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Units</td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Two squadrons shortage (aircraft shortage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Units</td>
<td>2 Flotillas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft Units</td>
<td>16 Squadron</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-submarine Surface-Ships</td>
<td>About 60 Ships</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>About 30 aircraft shortage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>16 Submarines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>About 220 Aircraft</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>About 190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning Units</td>
<td>28 Groups</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interceptor Units</td>
<td>10 Squadrons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Fighter Units</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning Units</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile Units</td>
<td>6 Groups</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Renewal plan to be studied and the necessary measures to be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>About 430 Aircraft</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>About 400</td>
<td>About 30 aircraft shortage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The priorities of the current defence buildup effort are specifically stipulated in the "Mid-term Defense Program

84 For the current S.D.F. equipment, see Appendix B.
Estimate (FY1983-87)" or the so-called "56 Chugyo".

Emphasis is placed on these capabilities:

1. improve and modernize air defense, anti-submarine warfare and water's edge defense capabilities suitable for our land and geography surrounded by sea,

2. improve on a priority basis electronic warfare capability, sustainability, combat readiness, and invulnerability, and

3. improve and modernize the command communication, logistic support and education and training systems.85

If the goals of this plan are achieved, Japan will obtain 138 F15 intercepters, 8 groups of improved Hawk surface-to-air missile system, 72 P-3C anti-submarine patrol planes and other sophisticated weapon systems (See Table 4).

Table 4 shows the order achievement rate for major equipment during the first two years of the 1983-84 defence programme ("56 Chugyo"). Although the "56 Chugyo" does not seem to be proceeding according to schedule, the force level goals set up in the "56 Chugyo" will be achieved probably by 1990, because the new Mid-term Defense Program Estimate for 1986-1990 will most likely set the same goals as the "56 Chugyo".86 Additionally, according to Yūkō Kurihara, Director-General of the Defense Agency, primary emphasis will be placed on logistic support and sustainability - the stockpiling of ammunition, the

Table 4. Achievement Rate for Orders of Major Equipment Under the 1983-87 Program
Estimate as of 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orders in '83-'84</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Achieve-</th>
<th>Short-</th>
<th>Total Strength at Completion of Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ment rate</td>
<td>fall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 74 tanks</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New 155mm howitzers</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1S antitank helicopters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (improved Hawk)</td>
<td>2 groups</td>
<td>3 groups</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>1 group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destryers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3C antisubmarine patrol planes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational planes</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF (F-15 fighter interceptors)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


improvement of equipment, and the training of personnel - instead of on front line equipment. 87

A number of shortcomings and deficiencies of the SDF, including inadequate logistic support and sustainability, lack of coordination of the three branches of the SDF for integrated operations, and limited early-warning systems, 88 will gradually be improved. However, this does

87 Ibid. p.390.
88 For details, see Satoh, op.cit.
not necessarily mean that the ongoing improvement of the capabilities of the SDF will meet United States requirements. For example, as we shall see in Chapter II, the protection of extended sea-lanes by the Japanese SDF will not be possible for a long time to come.

(2) Defence expenditures

The Japanese defence expenditure, while remaining a small share in terms of the percentage of GNP, has grown substantially since the inception of the SDF. In terms of the rate of annual increase, Japan's military spending has increased on the average of 7 per cent per annum in real terms over the past decade, which surpasses the 3 per cent objective of the NATO countries.89

Nonetheless, Japan has managed to keep its defence expenditure below 1 per cent of GNP since 1967 (see Table 5).90 Rapid economic growth has enabled Japan to acquire relatively modern and efficient defence capabilities. The Cabinet decision to set up a 1 per cent


90 If U.S. and NATO accounting method were used - to include veterans' benefits and pensions, Japanese defence spending in 1982 reached 4.5 trillion yen, or 1.6 percent of GNP. Kent Calder, "The Rise of Japan's Military-Industrial Base", Asia Pacific Community, Summer 1982, pp.27-28.
### Table 5

Japan's Budgeted Defense Expenditures, Growth Rate, Percent of GNP and Percent of General Account, 1958-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Defense-related Expenditures (Billion yen)</th>
<th>Percent Change From Previous Year</th>
<th>Percent of GNP</th>
<th>Percent of General Account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Defense Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>156.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>10.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>156.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>461.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>10.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1961</strong></td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>9.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Defense Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>208.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>8.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>241.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>8.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>275.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>8.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>301.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>8.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>340.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,366.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>8.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third Defense Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>380.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>422.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>483.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>7.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>569.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>7.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>670.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,527.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fourth Defense Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>800.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>935.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,093.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,327.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,512.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,668.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>6.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,690.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,901.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>5.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,094.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,230.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2,400.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,586.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,754.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,934.6</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ceiling on defence expenditure has so far been observed, though it has been criticised by many Western observers as well as Japanese commentators.⁹¹

It is true that the 1 per cent of GNP ceiling in itself was not a reflection of real military requirements but rather a political ploy. Nevertheless, it can be justified for the following reasons. Firstly, the 1 percent of GNP barrier is supported by the majority of the Japanese. As has already been noted in the first section of this chapter, the Japanese public oppose any increase in defence spending. Secondly, the 1 percent-of-GNP ceiling has, in effect, constrained the pressure for substantial military buildup of Japan. Thirdly, because of the visible limit imposed on defence expenditure, Japanese defence developments have not been perceived as threatening by neighbouring countries. Hirosuke Kojiraoaka, an influential Diet member, argues that the 1 percent of GNP barrier symbolizes the Japanese commitment to international peace.⁹²

However, given the ongoing growth of defence spending, Japanese defence expenditure will soon surpass the 1 percent-of-GNP ceiling.

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⁹¹ However, the fiscal 1985 defense expenditure is expected to surpass the 1-percent limit due to additional budgetary appropriations in the middle of the fiscal year. Japan Times Weekly, December 8, 1984.

CHAPTER II

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP: 1975-1985

U.S. Attitudes Toward Japan

(1) General overview

In recent years U.S. pressures applied on NATO allies and Japan for increased burden-sharing have been intense and persistent. Many Europeans and Japanese, indicating that "profound Soviet weakness and vulnerabilities explain Soviet defensive efforts and, at the same time, make unlikely any direct Soviet assault on the West,"\(^1\) show some reluctance to share the U.S. perception vis-a-vis the "Soviet threat". The U.S. allies are also concerned with the Reagan Administration's emphasis on war-fighting capabilities and the notion of a limited nuclear war in the European theatre. Many commentators in Europe and Japan have repeatedly suggested a profound apprehension about the confrontation-oriented attitudes of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, although the Europeans viewed economic cooperation with the Soviets as "the consequence of detente",\(^2\) the current U.S. administration, arguing that the Soviets had "taken advantage of detente", scrapped detente policies and virtually denied

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the genuine pursuit of dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration, in the eyes of many in Europe and Japan, seems to be totally lacking in comprehension of the serious implications of the high-handed U.S. attitudes toward its allies.

The U.S. pressures applied on Japan are two-fold: economic and security-related. In economic areas, Washington complains about the tremendous trade imbalances caused by Japan's exports to the U.S., tariff barriers against U.S. agricultural and other products, and the difficulties for the U.S. in penetrating the Japanese market. Since the mid-1960s Japan has consistently registered a trade surplus with the United States. In 1984, the trade deficit of the United States with Japan reached approximately US$36.8 billion, again, the highest figure in its history. Japan, as a cooperative ally of the United States, has taken

3 President Reagan stated at a press conference in 1981: "Well, so far detente's been a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims. I don't have to think of an answer as to what I think their intentions are ... the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, (and) to cheat..."; Alexander Haig argued in the same year: "... the detente policies were bankrupt, to be very frank and to use blunt terms. We ... have made it clear that we are not going to muck around in the internal affairs of developing nations... We have seen precisely the opposite in (the Soviet) conduct..." cited in Robert D. Glasser, "Detente: Did the Russians Take Advantage?", an unpublished paper. Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, September 1984.


several measures such as further opening its own markets to foreign suppliers and voluntary restrictions on its exports to the United States, nevertheless, there are many potentially serious economic issues to be resolved between the two countries. Further deterioration of the economic relationship may in some way or other spill over into other aspects of the relationship, for example, security relations.

Indeed, another equally serious issue facing the two countries is the issue of defence burden-sharing. Although Japanese defence spending has increased on the average by 7 per cent per annum in real terms over the past decade, which is far above the 3 per cent spending objective of the NATO allies, Washington has consistently pushed Japan to "do more" in its defence effort. Firstly, the United States complains strongly about the fact that Japan spends less than 1 per cent of G.N.P. on defence, while many of the NATO allies spend far more on defence in terms of percentage of G.N.P. Secondly, Washington has urged Japan to speed up the implementation of its defence expansion programmes — particularly to improve its surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and logistical support capabilities and its air defences. Thirdly, the United States has pressed Japan to accept the mission of "undertaking primary responsibility to defend air and sea approaches of Japan up to 1,000 miles".6 Finally, American officials have requested Japan


The analysis of the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region in Chapter I has indicated that there is, at present, no imminent or serious military threat to Japan's security. Given the absence of an imminent threat and the likely persistence of the U.S. security commitment, what would strengthened Japanese forces achieve? Is it strategically and politically plausible for Japan to assume a regional security role? Is it likely that strengthened Japanese military forces and an enhanced security role would lighten the U.S. defence burden? Or would a Japanese contribution to the U.S. war-fighting strategy increase tensions and ambiguities, thus unnecessarily provoking the Soviets to a further military build-up? To say nothing of the unease among Asian neighbours and the promotion of the militarisation of the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. attitudes toward Japanese defence policy, therefore, need serious scrutiny.

There is, in fact, a considerable degree of diversity, even confusion, in American expectations regarding Japan's defence efforts. Some officials and commentators are assertive to the point of heavy-handedness in demanding increased Japanese military capabilities, others are
sceptical of or cautious about an enhanced Japanese security role.

The Reagan Administration has asked the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to fulfill the following three missions:

1. Sea control involving "offensive and defensive capabilities against Soviet submarines, surface ships, and aircraft over a wide ocean area ... (extending) 1000 miles out from Japan".

2. "Mining and blockading the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits connecting the Sea of Japan with the open waters of the Pacific, thus preventing access by Soviet naval vessels from bases in eastern Siberia into the Pacific."

3. The building up of an air defence system capable of inflicting "heavy losses on Soviet tactical fighters and long-range bombers, particularly the Backfire bomber."\(^8\)

The Reagan Administration believes that these missions assumed by the Japanese SDF would be "a potential component of a wartime strategy of holding the oil-rich Persian-Gulf by shifting sizeable US forces from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean".\(^9\) In a global war scenario conceived by Pentagon analysts, strengthened Japanese forces would help to attain two strategic objectives: (1) "preventing the Soviet Union from establishing military domination over North-East Asia, including Japan itself"; and (2) "blocking Soviet forces in eastern Siberia from moving south to attack US forces traversing sea and air routes through the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia into the Indian Ocean."\(^10\)

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\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) Ibid.
In order for Japanese naval and air forces to successfully achieve these objectives, the Reagan Administration has suggested that Tokyo "review" the force structure stipulated in the 1976 Defence Program Outline. The U.S. delegates at the Japan-U.S. Security Conference in June 1981 laid out "a force structure that would have Japan add four squadrons of F-15 fighters to the 10 squadrons of interceptors set in the outline. Japan's destroyer force would increase from 60 to 70, and the submarine target would go up from 16 to 25". The U.S. side also suggested "an anti-submarine aircraft force of 125 P-3Cs", and called for "the establishment of a three-month supply of ammunition (including missiles)".11

U.S. Defence Secretary Weinberger reportedly indicated in March 1982 that "Japan should attain this kind of force structure by 1990", affirming that such a Japanese military build-up "will require substantial improvements in military capabilities ... and increases in defence spending substantially greater than the current annual growth rate".12

In the Japan-U.S. Top-level Talks, held on 24 September 1984, a wide range of security issues regarding U.S.-Japan military cooperation were discussed. According to the discussion paper prepared by the Japanese Defence Agency, the main issues raised in that conference include (1) the

11 Ibid., pp.34-35.
12 Cited in ibid., p.35.
installation of an OTH radar in Japan; (2) joint military exercises involving F-16 Fighters of the U.S. forces in South Korea; (3) the use of satellites by the Japanese SDF; (4) studies on sealane defence planning; and (5) improvement in "interoperability" between U.S. and Japanese forces. Weinberger especially emphasised the importance of upgrading "interoperability" particularly through the standardisation of weapons systems and the heightening of joint military exercises.13

Furthermore, the Reagan Administration is currently pressing the European allies and Japan to formally support and participate in the Strategic Defensive Initiative research programme.14 Pentagon specialists expressed special interests in the possibility of a Japanese technical contribution to the SDI programmes; particularly in the areas of electro-optical technology and milli-waves.15

Thus, what the current U.S. Administration wishes to see is Japan, as a full-fledged member of the U.S.-dominated Western alliance system, significantly contributing to the U.S. global war-fighting strategy. The U.S. emphasis on "interoperability", which is said to be the key to Command, Control & Communications (C³) system in support

13 See Asahi Shimbun, September 24, 1984.
14 Asahi Shimbun, March 27, 1985.
of the U.S. Pacific Command,\textsuperscript{16} would probably reduce the self-reliance of the Japanese self-defence policy and promote further integration of Japanese forces into the U.S. war-fighting strategy.

With regard to the SDI, besides the dubious nature of the concept, the technical feasibility, enormous cost, implications for arms control talks, possible intensification of offensive counterforce capabilities, and inevitable Soviet responses,\textsuperscript{17} the U.S. request for Japanese participation in the programme can be taken as a symbolic event in the security relationship. Unlike some European officials, who openly criticised the SDI programme,\textsuperscript{18} the Japanese government, attracted by the U.S. emphasis on it being "defensive in conception" and employing "non-nuclear means",\textsuperscript{19} has shown its special interest in assisting the SDI research programme. Indeed, the United States is straightforwardly asking for Japanese participation in a global security system. Although the SDI programme will not become a reality for the next few

\textsuperscript{16} See V.O. Lang, "Interoperability - The Key to C\textsuperscript{3} Systems in Support of USPACOM", and N.K. Weatherbie, "C\textsuperscript{3}S in Japan: Coordination and Change", Signal, February 1984.


\textsuperscript{18} See, for example, Guardian Weekly, April 14, 1985; Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1985; and New York Times, March 16, 1985.

\textsuperscript{19} Sydney Morning Herald, March 22, 1985.
decades, if ever, what is clear is the insatiable quest of the U.S. for outright leadership in the Western alliance system and perhaps for absolute predominance in the world.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the U.S. proposals described above do not represent a single, monolithic American attitude toward Japan. There is a wide range of opinions among the Americans. Richard Betts, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues for a different attitude from those of the current Administration. Although Betts advocates the need for a substantially improved Japanese SDF and for political manipulations designed to break the 1 per cent of GNP limit of Japanese defence spending, he emphasises a defensive role for the SDF in contrast with the Pentagon's view that Japan needs to develop both defensive and offensive capabilities against Soviet military forces. The thrust of his proposals may be summarised as follows:

1. improved coordination of command, control and communications for wartime operations;

2. improvements in logistics and war reserve stock such as ammunition, "enabl[ing] the services to fight for more than 30 days on their own";

3. improvement in "the qualitatively and functionally balanced but skeletal force structure, ... with a cardre emphasis as a base on which to expand in event of emergency or policy change";

4. "defensively-oriented tactical air and naval forces ... Naval emphasis, especially on tactical ASW, and without development of symbolically threatening capital ships like attack carriers makes sense in terms of Japan's vulnerabilities (the SLOCs) and strengths (high technology and shipbuilding); improvement in mining capabilities enabling "the MSDF to take over the mission of closing off the Sea of Japan";
5. encouragement of direct purchases of U.S. weapons rather than coproduction. (emphasis added)  

Betts' argument may be acceptable to many Japanese defence planners who favour substantially improved Self-Defense Forces.

Kenneth L. Adelman, currently Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, expresses an extreme, indeed unrealistic view of Japanese security policy. He argues that Japan should take the following seven steps in the coming years:

1. Japan should play a major role in world affairs and "become an active supporter of the industrialized democracies...";
2. Japan should provide more assistance to distant Western friends such as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan;
3. Japan will need more care in its handling of U.S. economic pressures and interests;
4. Japanese defence cooperation with the United States must be strengthened at the working level;
5. "Private arrangements by U.S. and Japanese security 'think tanks' need to be pushed by officials on both sides of the Pacific";
6. "While working closely with the United States in the entire security realm, Japan should begin a number of unilateral measures to boost her security which do not incur large costs ... Japan should begin to discard: (a) the 1 percent barrier on defense spending; (b) the principle of an exclusively defensive policy which prohibits possession of offensive weapons; (c) the prohibition on sending Self-Defense Forces abroad in any contingency; (d) export control on defense equipment; (e) relegateing security matters to the Self-Defense Agency rather than to a full-fledged Ministry of Defense; and (f) the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, manufacturing or permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons..."

7. The Japanese Constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should be revised (emphasis added).\(^21\)

Adelman's extreme view is also shared by some U.S. Congressmen. In fact, several U.S. Congressional resolutions of 1981, for example, proposed measures such as revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese patrols of the Indian Ocean, and Japanese payment of a $20 billion security tax to the United States.\(^22\) Congressman Findley, arguing for House Concurrent Resolution 172 regarding sea lane security and U.S. defence policy toward Japan, testified in March 1982:

I believe that the 1000 mile "limit" should only be an intermediate goal for Japan and not the ultimate objective of its defense capabilities ... the sea lanes of communication all the way to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf are vital to Japan's self-defense. ... future enhancement of Japanese military capabilities should extend Japanese patrols and measures beyond the 1000 mile distance.\(^23\)

It must be highly disturbing, for many in Japan, that Kenneth Adelman, a prominent member of the current U.S. Administration, and Congressmen like Findley should hold such extreme and unrealistic views. Their views can be taken as a striking manifestation of what Priscilla Clapp and


\(^{22}\) See testimony of Francis J. West, Jr., U.S.-Japan Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 1, 1982, p.28.

\(^{23}\) See testimony of Paul Findley, ibid., pp.477-478; The Reagan Administration does not support the call for Japanese patrols to the Indian Ocean. See testimony of Francis J. West, Jr., ibid., p.46.
Morton Halperin have called the "inevitable harmony" image of Japan. According to Clapp and Halperin, the "inevitable harmony" image of Japan is characterized by the conviction that "the interests of the United States and Japan are identical and that Japan can be counted upon to act as an agent of the United States in Asia". It envisions "an economically strong, rearmed Japan promoting the interests of the United States in Asia and relieving the United States of a substantial portion of its burden". These Americans tend to see U.S.-Japanese relations only through the lens of military organizational interests. They grossly underestimate Japanese domestic political considerations and the implications for Japan's Asian neighbours. If the U.S. government formally asked Japan to take Adelman's 6th and 7th steps as described above, it would be completely counterproductive, because it may well not only engender anti-American sentiments on the part of the Japanese public but also seriously undermine Japan's relationships with neighbouring countries. Glen Fukushima argues:

A militarily powerful Japan would signal a fundamental change in its relationship with the United States ... Forcing Japan to remilitarize would only provoke anti-American resentment in some circles and bolster a 'go-it-alone' attitude among neo-nationalists.


Gerald Curtis also criticises American hardliners' view in a similar vein. His argument is that:

... a major and rapid Japanese expansion of military capabilities and a broadened definition of the mission of the self-defense forces to give them a regional security role would represent a fundamental reordering of the power balance in East Asia in ways that would not only raise the level of tensions with the Soviet Union but also arouse fears among other Asian countries about Japanese intentions.  

... a Japanese move to become a major military power would inevitably involve the extensive development of Japanese defense industries and their entry into the international armaments market. This also is not in our interests.

Curtis's view appears to be shared by Henry Kissinger, who is not only a prominent scholar with historical insight but also an experienced practitioner of international affairs, when he stated in November 1983 that if Japan were to take on the major responsibility for its own defence it could well stir up "a kind of nationalism which would fill many countries with extreme uneasiness". Kissinger believes that "the present alliance structure serves the interests of Pacific peace quite well even if it is marginally more expensive [to the U.S.]".

Although the majority of American spokesmen do favour either the persistence of the current level of the Japanese SDF or a substantially enhanced Japanese security role, there are some who shrewdly indicate the moral superiority

28 Australian, November 8, 1983.
of Japan's post-war record of low military spending and high economic growth. Franklin Weinstein writes,

Japan presently offers the world a model of a nation that possesses major power status without the military attributes usually associated with such status. This enables Japan to make a virtually unique contribution to the creation of a peaceful world order ... Japan's example ... is a step in the right direction.29

The foregoing account of U.S. attitudes toward Japanese security policy thus indicate that the Americans are not at all of one voice. The views of the Reagan Administration or of Adelman and some congressmen must be taken as part of the American voices vis-a-vis Japan. However, since so many of the Americans now argue for Japan assuming an expanded defence burden, it is necessary to examine closely the notion of defence burden-sharing.

(2) The issue of burden-sharing

The issue of burden-sharing is, ultimately, a subjective matter. A Congressional Research Service Report, Defense Burden Sharing: U.S. Relations with NATO Allies and Japan, prepared by Stanley R. Sloan, depicts the problem of defence burden-sharing in this way:

... determining what is an equitable sharing of alliance burdens is, ultimately, a subjective political process. There is no scientific formulation for determining objectively correct shares or cost/benefit relationships. Self-interest naturally dictates that U.S. officials should try to get the allies to do whatever will relieve the defense burden confronting the American people. Similarly, European and Japanese

officials see it as their responsibility to pursue defense spending policies consistent with their political mandates and responsibilities. (emphasis added)³⁰

Richard Betts, with U.S. national interests in mind, argues that some "tolerable extent of disparity" in the amount of defence expenditure is "not only acceptable but desirable to Washington, first as the price of retaining a superpower prerogative to dominate both the alliance and the strategic triangle with the PRC and USSR, and second as insurance against such a degree of Japanese independence that over the long term Pacific relations could become as reminiscent of the 1930s as of the 1950s ... Washington could tacitly accept, say, roughly double the proportional burden of Japan but not quadruple as at present".³¹

Several points can be made about Japan's sharing of the Western defence burden. Firstly, unlike the Japanese, who tend to think of their defence in regional terms, the Americans consider their defence needs primarily in terms of the global military balance. So, many Americans quite naturally conclude that Japan, as a member of the Western alliance, should contribute more equally to the "common defence", especially when Japan can afford to do so. Robert Scalapino, for example, expects Japan to contribute to the global military balance when he maintains that "analyses based on a concept of Japanese national interests must come to grips with the fact that Japan is now a global power.

³⁰ Sloan, op.cit., p.12.
³¹ Betts, op.cit., p.25.
economically, with global interests and ... a far greater stake in a stable, peaceful, open world than most societies". Betts, refuting the notion that Japan does not possess global military interests, argues:

... the United States has no more need for extended strategic involvement - indeed less - than Japan. Anything Japanese can say about the low level of threat or protection by buffers of water, Americans can say better. If trade were seriously obstructed the United States would be discomfited but could survive without complete economic collapse. Japan might not.

It is true that Japan's survival does depend on global sea traffic. As Shunji Taoka indicates, "To support a population of 110 million and the second largest economy in the free world, Japan is annually importing 600 million tons of raw materials and food, equivalent to the cargo load of roughly 30,000 ships." Even on a wartime economic footing, "197 million tons would be required annually to maintain the Japanese living standard at the minimum level set for social welfare recipients".

The question, however, is what strategies are best suited for ensuring the shipping of a large quantity of imports. Is a militarily strong Japan, with an extended

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33 Betts, op.cit., p.24.


35 Ibid.
security role and a tremendous convoy system, the answer? Or are the strategies suggested by Betts or the Reagan Administration the best possible answer? What is needed is a close examination of the costs and benefits of Japanese strategies.

The second problem with the notion of burden-sharing concerns differing national approaches to security problems. The proponents of burden-sharing argue that the viability of the U.S. commitment to Japan depends on the determination of Japanese to defend themselves. As Franklin Weinstein indicates, this way of thinking is partly based on the American misinterpretation of the Japanese attitude toward defence. The crucial reason for Japan not substantially expanding its military capabilities is not primarily because of the lack of Japanese determination to defend themselves but because of "Japan's extraordinary pacifism [which] is rooted in the country's peculiar historical circumstances and is reinforced by a belief that there are no imminent threats to Japan's security." As the Vietnam experience affected the subsequent U.S. attitude toward foreign policy, so did, perhaps more vitally, the "Japanese memories of the tragic battles, horrible devastation, and the narrow-sighted, arrogant military leaders of pre-war Japan." Therefore, to misunderstand the efforts and aspirations of

36 Weinstein, op.cit., p.271.
37 Taoka, op.cit., p.125.
the Japanese may ultimately evoke a surge of anti-American sentiments among the Japanese.

The third point about burden-sharing is that it may be counterproductive to raise the issue of burden-sharing in the Asia-Pacific region, if the emphasis is military-related. For one thing, as already noted in Chapter I, there is no clear demarcation between Western and Eastern interests in the region. The "Soviet threat" is not the Asian preoccupation. Indeed, diverse regional interests, represented by regional Asian states with historical differences and cultural diversity, should be protected and enhanced. It can be argued, therefore, that the notion of Western defence burden-sharing by Japan does not fit well in the Asian context. Rather, if substantial defence burden is assumed by Japan, it may well contribute to the militarisation of and superpower confrontation in, the region. This is, of course, not in the regional interests of Asian states.

(3) U.S. policy approaches

The focus of the U.S. pressures on Japan before the Reagan Administration had been not on the specific role and force level of the Japanese military forces but on the level of Japan's defence expenditure. The Reagan Administration, placing "'consistency' and the need to demonstrate 'loyalty' and 'commitment' to U.S. allies and friends at the top of
its policy priorities**, has emphasised specific Japanese military roles and missions in and around Japan.*

However, the efficacy of the U.S. pressures will ultimately depend on how Japan responds to them, not in rhetorical terms but in terms of actual policy formulation. Given the persistence of very real political constraints in Japan and the unlikelihood of a radical change in the strategic environment in the near future at least, the current U.S. expectations may finally result in disappointment and frustration on the part of the American officials. Nevertheless, the U.S. pressures applied on Japan will almost certainly continue as the Report, Government Decision Making in Japan: Implications for the United States, submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1982, has clearly recommended:

... the most effective way to obtain change in Japanese policies in accord with U.S. interest is for the United States to apply steady pressure and persuasion, especially at the working level of the bureaucracy, the party, and among non-government interest groups... (emphasis added)

Therefore, for Japan, it is necessary to examine closely the contents and implications of U.S. requests in the light of Japanese national interests. How, then, has Japan responded to the current U.S. pressures?

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39 Sutter, *Dealing with Japan*, p.34.

Japanese Responses

The Japanese leaders, acknowledging the paramount importance of a harmonious relationship with the United States, have devoted considerable energy and attention to placating a large range of U.S. pressures. It may be said, without much exaggeration, that Japanese security policy has been formulated by the unyielding U.S. pressures rather than by Japan's own threat assessment and strategic thinking. Indeed, as General Curtis observes, "a deeply entrenched postwar pattern of Japanese-American security relations" has been and continues to be one "in which Japanese leaders ask the United States what it wants them to do and then, after feeding this American 'demand' through the domestic political system, emerge with a 'concession' that leaves everyone dissatisfied and resentful".\(^{41}\) So far Washington has been far from satisfied with Japanese responses but could Tokyo not afford to fully accommodate U.S. proposals?

Nevertheless, recent Japanese leaders are becoming somewhat assertive in dealing with demands of the United States.\(^ {42}\) Since 1977, Japan has increased its contribution

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42 Concurrently, Japan is also becoming more vigorous in enunciating a Japanese security role. This may be attributed to the following factors, which have already been briefly examined: vociferous U.S. pressure; Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia; Japanese recognition of a relative decline of American strength; favourable attitudes of China and some Asian states towards a Japanese defence buildup; rising self-confidence among the Japanese; and "the vestiges of Japanese ultra-nationalism".
to the costs of U.S. forces in Japan. In the field of diplomacy, Japan has affirmatively responded to American requests. Tokyo has boycotted the Moscow Olympic Games, and increased its technical and economic assistance to strategically important states such as Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. In 1978, as already noted, the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation" were formulated, clearing the way for joint defence planning and military cooperation. Furthermore, Prime Minister Suzuki's remark about Japan's intention to assume responsibility for the 1,000 miles sealanes defence was taken as official by the Reagan Administration, as Defence Secretary Weinberger stated in his Annual Report FY 1985:

Prime Minister Suzuki enunciated the goal for Japanese roles and missions when he stated in May 1981 that defense of Japan's territory, its airspace, and its sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles are legal under Japan's constitution and are, in fact, its national policy (emphasis added).

Prime Minister Nakasone, an unusually outspoken L.D.P. leader and former Director-General of the Defense Agency,

43 At present, Japan spends annually about $1 billion on the maintenance of U.S. military bases in Japan. "This averages over $21,000 for each of the approximately 46,000 U.S. military personnel in the country, a contribution higher than that from any other U.S. ally." See testimony of Fred Ikle, East-West Relations: Focus on the Pacific, Hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, Senate, June 10, 1982, p.19.


expressed his perspective in a *Washington Post* interview in 1983:

... the whole Japanese archipelago or the Japanese islands should be like an unsinkable aircraft carrier putting up a tremendous bulwark of defense against infiltration of the (Soviet) Backfire bomber. To prevent Backfires from penetrating through this wall should be our first goal. The second target objective should be to have complete and full control of four [sic] straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities. The third objective is to secure and maintain the ocean lines of communication.46

Nakasone consented to military technology transfers to the United States. His government has also enunciated its support for the U.S. SDI research programme. In a committee session of the House of Councillors in March 1985, both Nakasone and Foreign Minister Abe referred to the "Star Wars" proposal as "defensive" in conception. Nakasone reportedly added that "[w]hat the U.S. President said personally carries weight."47

In September 1984, a report *Challenges and Opportunities in United States-Japan Relations*, prepared by the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission, which consisted of influential private citizens of the two countries, was submitted48 to President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone. The two leaders, in their talks in January 1985, specifically referred to this report as "an excellent


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starting point for charting the future course of our relationship." How does the report envisage the future of the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The report basically argues for increased Japanese defence efforts and a development of further defence cooperation between the two countries. Although the thrust of the report is not dissimilar to the official views of the two governments, there are some interesting points that deserve attention. First, the report warns that "the justification for Japanese defence efforts should be founded on the need to attain performance capabilities and overcome defense gaps" and not on defense spending per se.50 Second, the report strongly advocates vigorous technical cooperation between the two countries in developing new defence systems.51 Third, the Advisory Commission believes that "arguments for increased [Japan's] defense effort should not be based on the status of trade issues.... The rationale for an effective defense posture by the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific, ... stands on its own merits."52 Fourth, the Commission members advocate Japanese participation in "multilateral peacekeeping operations through logistical support as well as the dispatch of non-uniformed and, possibly, uniformed

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50 The U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission, op.cit., p.85.
51 Ibid., p.86.
52 Ibid., p.88.
The last noteworthy point is that the Advisory Commission members argue for "explor[ing] initiatives in the area of confidence building measures". Though acknowledging that the possibilities may be limited and not much can be expected, the report says "modest measures would provide some reassurance as to the intent of the parties, democratic mutual restraint, and in favourable circumstances serve as building blocks for broader understandings". The report concludes with an acceptance of a global role for Japan with the words: "Today, Japan and the United States share technical leadership in the world. Both are powers with global interests and responsibilities ... if we work together, we have an unprecedented opportunity to lead the world into a new century of economic growth and political stability (emphasis added)."

In assessing the Japanese attitudes towards the U.S. demands, the following three points must be considered. Firstly, the Japanese government is promoting military collaboration with the United States without sufficiently informed public debate and without real consensus on the specifics of security issues. Secondly, Japan appears to have tried to meet the U.S. demands without making any constructive criticism or counter-argument of U.S.

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., pp.84-85.
55 Ibid., P.107.
assertions. William Watts calls for a more mature relationship between the two countries. His argument is that:

... we have not yet learned how to disagree. Disagreement without rancor between nations is possible, as in a good marriage, when there is a depth of common understanding, trust, and friendship that allows the partners to move constructively beyond the area of immediate discord.\(^{56}\)

Indeed, if Japan is a close ally of the United States, she should be in a position to say 'no' in matters that Japan cannot accept in light of Japanese interests.

Finally, although the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission has recommended some initiatives for developing confidence building measures, Japan has failed to propose any significant measures in promoting arms control and disarmament in the region. Just reiterating good intentions in front of the Asian audience does not promote the stability of the region in any significant way. Japan should search for constructive political measures for its region.

**Sea Lanes Defence Planning**

Emphasis is currently being placed in Japan's defence planning upon the defence of Japan's Pacific sealanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese coast. Based on the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation, joint studies on sealanes defence have been conducted. There has also been an increase in joint military exercises involving the Japanese SDF and the U.S. military forces. Recent trends

have indicated that Japan seems to be moving to fully accept the U.S. proposals, namely 'sea control' of the North-West Pacific, mining and blockading of the three straits between the Sea of Japan and the Pacific, and the establishment of an air defence against Soviet tactical fighters and long-range bombers. The relevant questions are: how do the Japanese SDF intend to protect the 1,000 miles sealanes? What capabilities will be necessary? And most importantly, what are the implications of Japan's sealane defence planning for the security of Japan and for stability in Asia?

(1) How can sealanes of communications (SLOCs) be protected?

According to Defense of Japan 1984, "capability to protect sea lines of communication" is defined as the capability consisting "of ensuring the safety of maritime transportation in the event that the free navigation of our vessels is obstructed in waters, ports, harbors and straits adjacent to Japan". Against Soviet anti-sealanes of communication (SLOC) campaigns, the Japanese SDF is planning to secure maritime transportation "through the accumulated effect achieved by incorporating various operations including (1) surveillance, (2) escort of vessels, (3) defense of ports and harbors, and (4) defense of straits." The Maritime SDF (MSDF) is developing four main capabilities: ASW capability, anti-surface vessel

57 Defense of Japan 1984, p.106.
58 Ibid.
striking capability, air defence capability at sea and mine warfare capability.\textsuperscript{59}

In order to 'sanitise' Japan's Pacific sealanes, strong ASW is essential. That is, the MSDF should have the capability to detect, localise and attack enemy submarines obstructing Japanese sea traffic in the ocean adjacent to Japan, and perhaps the 1000 miles sealanes out from Japan's shores. Admiral Tsugio Yata, former chairman of the joint staff council of the Defense Agency argues that the primary aim of the MSDF naval operation is only to "make it difficult for hostile aircraft and submarines to attack our ships. It would, of course, be better to be able to destroy every attacker and even more desirable to prevent the presence of any potential attacker."\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, Yata argues that the closing of the three straits is important in the prevention of Soviet submarine obstruction of Japanese vessels in the Pacific Ocean.\textsuperscript{61}

However, this does not entirely ensure the safety of Japan's vessels because there would already be Soviet submarines operating in the open sea. In such a case, the MSDF would have to protect a zone extending 1,000 miles from Japan's shores through naval operations such as "search and

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Cited in Japan Times Weekly, November 20, 1982; See also Tsugio Yata, "Tobaku Gichō no 'Shiren Bōei' Ron", Bungeishunju, April 1983.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
destroy" missions and convoy defence operations. According to Admiral Yata, the primary equipment for "search and destroy" missions is the P3C anti-submarine patrol plane. One P-3C dropping more than a dozen sonobuoys for underwater detection has the capability of conducting anti-submarine surveillance over an area the size of Kyūshū. For convoy defence operations, escort flotillas would be used. One escort flotilla is composed of one DDH (destroyer with helicopters) and two DDGs (destroyer with missiles). The helicopters, in this case, could be effectively used for localising and attacking enemy forces. The MSDF currently possesses four escort flotillas, and these flotillas are expected to be equipped with TASSs (towed array sonar system), thus further improving the ASW capability. Additionally, as for essential merchant ships, the MSDF would offer direct protection by organising convoys with anti-submarine Patrol planes.

Submarines are not the only threat to the sea-lanes. Soviet long-range naval aviation could also threaten the safety of the Japan's maritime traffic. In the case of a Soviet threat, the merchant vessels would have to navigate in routes, made safe by cover through the Air SDF (ASDF).

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63 Yata, op.cit., p.141.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.
Also, these vessels would have to be escorted by MSDF destroyers equipped with surface-to-air missiles.\textsuperscript{66} Admiral Yata admits that none of these operations are completely fool-proof, but they would have a cumulative effect "like body blows in boxing".\textsuperscript{67}

Thus, an anti-SLOC campaign would almost certainly be a war of attrition. \textit{Securing the Seas}, a detailed study conducted by the Atlantic Council Working Group indicates that "the ASW campaign is characterised by many encounters, each having a low probability of kill".\textsuperscript{68}

(2) SLOC Defence Capabilities

To fulfill the missions of the 1,000 miles sealanes defence, it can be argued that the current level of the SDF capabilities is far from adequate. Indeed, the Japan Defence Agency acknowledged in 1980 that "in wartime, the MSDF could protect at most only half the 400 merchant ships per month required to supply Japan with minimum import needs".\textsuperscript{69}

If capabilities are assessed in terms of the 'sea control' missions the United States has in mind, rather than in terms of the defence of the waters immediately surrounding Japan, the SDF is currently dogged by numerous shortcomings as one American specialist indicates in the following terms: The MSDF lacks sufficient capability to deal with Soviet

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p.143.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, p.144.
\textsuperscript{68} Nitze, et.al., op.cit., p.345.
\textsuperscript{69} Niksch, op.cit., p.34.
nuclear submarines and attacks from enemy aircraft and surface vessels. The MSDF also "lack[s] surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles assets as well as modern electronic equipment". The MSDF air arm has no interceptor or attack aircraft. "The Air Self-Defence Forces has not been integrated into an air defence scheme for Japanese surface ships ... [The MSDF] has only one minelaying vessel, and most of the mines are obsolete and not ready for immediate use in an emergency.... Japanese air bases would appear to have a minimum survivability in wartime" because they lack modern surface-to-air missile defence and have outdated radar sites. Therefore, "[i]t is unlikely that the ASDF could control the skies over Japan and adjacent waters in the face of attacks by modern Soviet MiG-27s, Mig-23s, and Su-19s, which have become the backbone of the Soviet attack fighter force in eastern Siberia." Moreover, the ASDF is ill-prepared to cope with Soviet Backfire bombers. Lastly, the SDF lack sufficient logistics, and has "little sustainable combat capacity".  

Indeed, if Japan is seriously considering fulfilling the 'sea control' missions of the North West Pacific which would involve both offensive and defensive operations, a substantial buildup of the SDF is necessary. However, the issue of the sealanes is problematical. Why should Japan take the responsibility of the sea-control of North-West Pacific? What are the implications for the security of Japanese interests? How realistic is it to assume that the

70 Ibid., pp.33-35.
Soviets would conduct significant anti-sealane operations in a major war? Does the Japanese public understand what the U.S. and Japanese defence policy-makers are thinking about and attempting to implement? How would Japan's Asian neighbours perceive Japan's sealanes defence planning?

(3) 'Sea Control' missions in a global war

Although it is possible to visualise a variety of contingencies which might dictate Japan's 'sea control' missions, the contingency most likely being considered in secret joint defence planning, is undoubtedly a global war with the Soviet Union. Hisahiko Okazaki, former Director-General of the Research and Planning Department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, writes:

... the only plausible instance in which Japan could be involved in a war would be in the event of a global war. Such a war is, of course, unlikely, but it is not impossible - for both superpowers possess vital interests over which they are prepared to risk, or to fight, a war. A central concern of Japanese strategy, therefore, must be the probable nature of this war.71

Okazaki argues that "war may be conducted in a constrained fashion as the two sides attempt to avoid escalation to full-scale nuclear exchanges, however global the war may be."72 In a protracted global war, either conventional or nuclear, Okazaki argues that "there would exist powerful incentives to end the war with some form of modus vivendi, such as a cease-fire or a truce".73

72 Ibid., p.194.
73 Ibid.
Indeed, given the geo-strategic importance of Japan, Japan may not be in a position to avoid its involvement if deterrence fails and Japan itself is attacked. But in such a contingency, should Japan concentrate on defending its homelands or should it actively cooperate with the U.S. forces by assuming the missions of 'sea control' in the North-West Pacific? It can be argued that the missions of 'sea control' in the wider defence zone would involve Japan in enormous risk-taking.

Firstly, if Japan attempts to blockade the three straits after a Soviet attack on Japanese islands or ships, Japanese action would be perceived by the Soviets as an extremely offensive action, and thus in order to secure the passage of their submarines provide the Soviets with a good excuse to invade Japanese coastal areas. The Soviet Union would also resort to nuclear blackmail.\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, from the standpoint of the security of Japanese interests, the blockading of the three straits must be assessed as extremely risky, even if the U.S. determination to retaliate with nuclear forces is assured. Hisao Maeda, former Chief of the First Research Office of National Defence College, criticises the strategy of blockading the three straits in the following words:

> If Japan were to blockade the three Straits, the Soviets might well respond by launching a limited nuclear strike on Hokkaido, Tsushima and the area around the Tsugaru Strait. Because U.S. troops are not

\textsuperscript{74} See Taoka, op.cit., pp.128-129; Also see Osamu Kaihara, "Japan's 'Sea-Lanes' Mission Is Only a Wishful Thought", Asian Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1983.
stationed in those areas, they would not be directly involved. Even if other areas except Okinawa were attacked, there would be few American casualties, since American forces in Japan number only 50,000 (there are more than 200,000 in West Germany), two-thirds of them in Okinawa and the rest scattered over an area nearly the length of the U.S. West Coast.  

In spite of this, there is no question that from the American global perspective, closing off the three straits would be essential. Admiral James L. Holloway III testified in 1982 that:

Our strategy for the Pacific Theater in the circumstances of a general war with the Soviet Union is based upon the premise that if the Soviet Pacific fleet can be prevented from widespread deployment into the vast expanses of the Pacific, the Navy's task of protecting our base facilities and our essential lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Theatres will be enormously simplified. The success of this strategic concept depends to a large degree on the ability of the United States and its allies to block the exists to the Sea of Japan and bottle up the Vladivostok based Russian fleet units; and the utilization of Japanese air bases as a barrier against the movement of Soviet long range aircraft from their bases in the Vladivostok complex to the shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean.

No matter how compelling the U.S. argument that Japan, as its close ally, must fully cooperate with U.S. forces, it should be recognized by both U.S. and Japanese defence planners that Japan's ultimate security interests could be significantly jeopardized by the blockading of the straits. Decisions of such magnitude should not be taken without public support, stemming from full and informed debate.

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Secondly, given the limited Soviet resources available for anti-SLOC operations and Soviet mission priorities (the anti-SLOC mission is undoubtedly of relatively low priority), it can be argued that the need and likelihood of Japanese missions in the defence of sealanes are unduly exaggerated. Most Western naval analysts agree that current Soviet wartime missions include (1) Strategic nuclear strike; (2) Destruction of enemy naval forces; (3) Support for ground force operations; (4) Interdiction of enemy sealanes; and (5) Protection of own sea lines of communication. Among these missions, the security of the Pacific Fleet SSBN force based at Petropavlovsk is a major Soviet preoccupation. The large number of smaller naval vessels allocated to the Soviet Pacific Fleet "are clearly oriented toward command of their own contiguous waters such as the Sea of Japan and Okhotsk and support of ground force activities along the Soviet East Coast". Securing the Seas indicates that only about 12 submarines, 6 of them obsolescent, would be allocated for the interdiction of ports and sealines of communication in the entire Pacific

77 Paul Nitze, et.al., op.cit., p.84; Regarding the possible Soviet threat to the security of sealanes in Southeast Asia, Michael Leifer argues that Moscow "has interests other than military in seeking to uphold freedom of navigation through maritime narrows in Southeast Asia". It is noteworthy in this regard that the USSR disposes of a substantial merchant marine with a total in excess of 7,800 vessels, which include nearly 500 oil tankers and 11 liquid gas carriers. See Michael Leifer, "The Security of Sealanes in South-East Asia", Survival, January/February 1983.

78 Paul Nitze, et.al., ibid., p.114.
and Indian Ocean. Thus the Soviet Union does not possess naval assets capable of conducting anti-SLOC campaigns for any extended period.

Thirdly, during a major 'protracted' military confrontation in the Pacific, where Japan would have to assume 'sea control' missions, the Soviet Union might well feel impelled to attack military bases in Japan, such as the P-3C bases in Iwakuni, Misawa and Kadena and VLF station in Yosami and five LORAN stations in other areas. Indeed, if the Soviets were being beaten in their conflicts with the formidable U.S. forces, they might risk nuclear escalation rather than seeking a war-termination unfavourable to them.

Securing the Seas also indicates:

... the use of nuclear weapons could significantly increase submarine attack capability. The results are likely to be so significant that they cannot be ignored. Even if the Soviets did not choose to go nuclear at the outset, they might elect to do so during the conflict if our ASW efforts were successful in a conventional conflict.

In this connection, it might be prudent to keep in mind Soviet nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Robert Jervis argues that "the nuclear war the Russians are thinking of is one without restraint. Whether they struck out of the blue, pre-empted in a crisis, or responded to the use of nuclear weapons by the West, they would seek the best military solution to the problem (emphasis added)". According to

80 Ibid., p.366.
Benjamin Lambeth and Kevin Lewis, "nothing in Soviet thinking remotely approximates the Western idea of sparing enemy cities for 'intrawar bargaining'.... [T]he conception of the initial period of war envisages rapid, intense, and simultaneous nuclear strikes against very large numbers of countermilitary and countervalue aim points in combination".82 Needless to say Japan is entirely vulnerable to any nuclear attack by the Soviets.

(4) The Japanese Public Attitude

Despite the ongoing progress in joint studies on the sealanes defence between U.S. and Japanese defence planners and increasingly active joint military exercises, the Japanese public attitude toward the issue of sealanes defence is characterized by ambivalence and lack of understanding. This was shown in the 1982-83 Potomac Associates data, where an overwhelming percentage of the Japanese public responded with "Don't know" to basic questions on sealanes defence strategies (See Table 6 below).

82 Cited in ibid., pp.106-107.
Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan does not need to be able to protect its sea lanes within a 1,000 mile radius</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan needs to be able to blockade the three straits (Soya, Tsushima, Tsugaru) connecting the Sea of Japan with the Pacific in case of emergency</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should not conduct joint maneuvers with U.S. forces</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*relevant updated 1983 findings are shown in parentheses


Even Osamu Kaihara, former secretary-general of the National Defense Council, wrote in *Asian Wall Street Journal* in September 1983 that "I cannot understand what the advocates of protecting the sea lanes and blockading the straits are really thinking." See Kaihara, *op.cit.*

(5) Asian perceptions

Although Japan's Asian neighbours, in general, seem to concur with the need for a greater Japanese responsibility

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83 See Kaihara, *op.cit.*
in her own defence, they have persistently expressed misgivings about Japanese military developments in the post-war period and Japan's security role in East Asia.

With regard to Japan's 1,000 miles sealanes defence planning, there is considerable ambivalence, even reservation in the attitudes of Asian neighbours. There seems to be only a broad consensus that, if Japan's security policy is strictly consistent with its 'exclusively defensive' posture, Japan's sealanes defence planning is acceptable. Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines, stated in 1983 that "(o)ur experience in recent history makes us view with apprehension any move of Japan to build up its military strength far beyond what it needs for defence," adding that "(w)e would not want the Philippines to be a base of the Japanese patrols".\footnote{84} Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond remarked that insofar as Japan's sealanes defence planning is designed entirely for its own defence and is part of Japan's greater defence burden-sharing, "it would seem to be reasonable", though he hastened to add that "we see no immediate justification or need to have Japanese warships on patrol in our region."\footnote{85}

Regarding the geographical scope of Japan's sealanes defence planning, the Japanese Defence Agency, though admitting that the geographical scope "depends on the situation at the time", takes the view that the protection

\footnote{84} Quoted in "Japan and the Defence of Asia", Asia Week, February 11, 1983, p.50.

\footnote{85} Ibid., p.49.
of SLOC in sea waters beyond 1,000 nautical miles from Japan's shores does not belong to Japan's security scope.\textsuperscript{86}

Even if Japan is firm in this expanded, but still limited geographical scope and if this is recognized by Asian leaders as necessary for Japan's own self-defence, Japan's substantial military build-up, demanded by the United States as a requirement for the sealanes defence missions, may eventually re-awaken Asian fears. President Marcos has indicated that "(o)ur peoples are one with the peoples of the ASEAN in expressing legitimate concern and apprehension that Japan may once again employ its military might to dominate the region."\textsuperscript{87} Moreover, an extended Japanese security role might well exacerbate the already negative images of Japan generally shared by the peoples of East Asia. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, of Chulalongkorn University, describes Thai images of Japan in this way:

... many Thais have a negative image of Japan ... they see Japan as being exploitative and imperialistic ... In the popular press it is not unusual to see references to the dangers of Japan's remilitarisation ..., Japan's extreme self-interestedness ..., and economic imperialism. More specifically, a majority of the Thai elite think that Japan is a threat or potential threat, citing economic domination as the main danger.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{86} Defence of Japan 1983, pp.75-76.

\textsuperscript{87} "Japan and the Defence of Asia", op.cit., p.50.

If Japan perceives its seaborne commerce to be seriously threatened by a Soviet naval buildup, it would need to expand its security dialogue with its neighbours. Indonesian Lieutenant-General Sutopo Juwono has advocated "a link between any Japanese defence buildup and the increased capabilities of ASEAN's own forces. Japan's military capability should not be increased without a corresponding increase in ASEAN military capability".\(^{89}\) Japan's running "ahead of the rest" in the security field could eventually lead to serious repercussions unfavourable to vital Japanese economic interests in the region.

**U.S.-Japan Military Technology Cooperation**

Cooperation in the field of military equipment and technology exchanges constitutes a critically important element of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Post-war Japanese history clearly suggests that Japan's weapons procurement and production has been vitally influenced by advanced U.S. arms-making technology. Since the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954, Japan has purchased military equipment primarily from the United States. Although since 1962 Japan has consistently procured more than 80 percent of its defence equipment from domestic production,\(^ {90} \) its most advanced and sophisticated defence equipment has been acquired from the United States. Recent

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\(^{89}\) Cited in Keal, op.cit., p.103.

\(^{90}\) Defense of Japan 1984, p.274.
Japanese purchases of U.S. military equipment include sophisticated U.S. weapons such as "Tar Tar" ship-to-air missiles, high-performance 20mm machine guns, E-2C early warning aircraft, C-130H transport aircraft and "Harpoon" surface-to-ship missiles.\(^91\)

Through co-production programmes with the United States, Japan has also sought to develop advanced defence systems. Some important military equipment, including F-15J interceptor fighters, P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, F-100 jet engines, self-propelled 203mm howitzers, MK-46 torpedo and AIM-9L sidewinder air-to-air missiles, are domestically produced under U.S. licenses.\(^92\) In 1982, the Japanese government revealed that 32 detailed arrangements had been made between the two countries concerning defence equipment, materials, services and other assistance.\(^93\)

However, despite the Japanese effort in improving military capability and promoting 'self-sufficiency' in defence procurement, the Japanese military sector at present represents only a minor part of the Japanese economy. In fact, in fiscal year 1982, the value of Japan's defence production was 1,049.5 billion yen, which was only 0.46 percent of the total value of its industrial production.\(^94\)

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Moreover, the share of the Defense Agency's research and development (R&D) expenditures of the total R&D expenditures in Japan was only 0.63 percent in 1980, in marked contrast to the U.S. figure of 23 percent for the same period. In terms of government R&D expenditures, the contrast between the United States and Japan is quite striking: only 2.4 percent of government R&D expenditures were devoted to military purposes in Japan, against 48 percent in the United States. Thus, at present, most Japanese researchers and engineers are working for civilian industries unrelated to military production.

There are two major issues that must be examined in evaluating the future prospect of U.S.-Japanese military cooperation. The first concerns U.S. military co-production programmes in Japan and their industrial implications. The second major issue is the transfer of Japanese "dual-use" technology, which has both civilian and military applications.

(1) Technology transfer through defence co-production

There are two apparent reasons for the Japanese preference of procurement of military equipment through co-production rather than purchase of the finished equipment: 1) the Japanese desire to maintain military self-sufficiency in the production of basic military

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equipment; and 2) the technical spinoff that can be used for the development of commercial products. Indeed, Japan has been successful in capitalizing on advanced U.S. military technology for the development of civilian aircraft. The U.S. General Accounting Office noted in 1982 that "[b]uilding on the experience and technology gained through military coproduction programs, the government of Japan is assisting in the development of the civil aircraft industry, along with other high technology export industries".

There is no doubt that military co-production has been a significant contributing factor in the fostering of the Japanese civil aircraft industry. Kent E. Calder notes that the technical spinoff from previous licensed production of the F-86 and the F-4 Phantom made it possible for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to develop the MU-300 Diamond 1 business

96 See Klare, op.cit.; also see "Rearming Japan", Business Week, March 14, 1983, pp.76-83. There are, of course, benefits for the United States in allowing defence co-production in allied countries. First, the United States receives visible economic benefits through licensing and technical assistance fees, research-and-development recoupment, and the sale of equipment, tools and weapons system components. Second, the Pentagon hopes that defence co-production will "improve U.S. allies' military readiness through expansion of their technical and military support capability and ... promote U.S. allies' standardization and inter-operability of military equipment." See "Technology Transfers a 'one-way street'", p.82; see also testimony of Admiral Robert L.J. Long, International Security Issues, Hearings before the Armed Services Committee, Senate, April 25, 1983, pp.21-22.

97 Cited in Klare, op.cit., p.77; also see "Technology transfers a 'one-way street'", Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1982, p.82.
jet, thus turning Mitsubishi into an aggressive competitor of the Cessna Citation.\textsuperscript{98} In 1982, Mitsubishi had orders for more than 120 Diamond 1 aircraft, and was producing the aircraft at the rate of eight a month for final assembly in Texas by a subsidiary, Mitsubishi Aircraft International Inc.\textsuperscript{99} At present Mitsubishi is also trying to develop a new commuter aircraft carrying 30-40 passengers.\textsuperscript{100}

Mitsubishi is not the only company that has benefited from U.S.-Japan defence co-production. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, another big defence contractor of Japan, produces the Lockheed P-3C aircraft under U.S. license. Kawasaki is also involved in the production of BK-117 twin-engine helicopter with cooperation with Germany's Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, and striving to develop a world-wide marketplace.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, many major Japanese electronic firms have now become interested in developing military technologies. Hitachi, Toshiba and Fujitsu have recently established defence divisions. Nissan Motors, a mammoth Japanese automaker, is currently developing missile technology, particularly solid-fuel booster rockets. In


\textsuperscript{100} Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Japan's Growing Strategic Role", \textit{Aviation Week & Space Technology}, 4 February 1980, p.53.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., pp.41-42.
1983, Nissan signed a technical cooperation agreement with the Martin Marietta Corporation, the U.S. manufacturer of the Patriot missile.\(^\text{102}\) Calder indicates that "the sophistication of Japanese industrial policy, and the timing of various international aircraft development projects involving Japan, suggests that current (Japanese) military production plans are only the point of departure for a comprehensive civilian-oriented aircraft industry development program which could severely threaten U.S. dominance of much of the world aircraft industry within five to ten years."\(^\text{103}\)

Although Japan has been benefited considerably from the transfer of U.S. technology, there have been costs associated with it. Firstly, Japan recognizes that the investment is worth the costs, but the licensing and technical assistance fees to U.S. companies are far from negligible. According to a Pentagon estimation, co-production of some items costs Japan two to three times as much as buying the equipment directly from the United States.\(^\text{104}\) In view of the budgetary constraints on Japanese defence spending, as the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission report also recommends, it may be considerably cost-effective and perhaps desirable for Japan to purchase major new weapons systems directly from the United States


\(^{103}\) Calder, *op.cit.*, p.31.

\(^{104}\) "Technology Transfers a 'one-way street'", *op.cit.*, p.82.
rather than manufacturing them through licensed production in Japan.\textsuperscript{105}

Secondly, since the acquisition of new high technology is undoubtedly enhancing Japanese domestic arms production capabilities, co-production may create strong incentives for an erosion or abrogation of the ongoing Japanese policy of imposing ban on arms exports. In fact, many aerospace officials believe that Japan's policy of prohibiting the export of military hardware will be changed in the mid to late 1980s.\textsuperscript{106} Political pressures for expanded commercial opportunities for the arms industry also come from business circles such as Keidanren and from some significant elements of the L.D.P. Yoshihiro Inayama, chairman of Keidanren, publicly supported in 1982 a review of the three arms-export principles.\textsuperscript{107}

Thirdly, from the standpoint of an increased Japanese self-reliant defence posture, co-production plans seem to have both positive and negative effects on Japanese defence planning. As already noted, U.S.-Japan defence industry cooperation through co-production contributes to an improved Japanese military capability and an expanded domestic production base. However, given the still meagre R&D expenditure for military equipment and the ongoing political constraints on arms export, Japanese weapons procurement

\textsuperscript{105} Challenges and Opportunities in United States-Japan Relations, p.86.

\textsuperscript{106} Robinson, op.cit., p.54.

will continue to be under the dominant influence of the United States. This may be an undesirable situation for those who support a more self-reliant defence posture for Japan.

(2) Japanese military technology transfer to the U.S. and dual-use technology

In January 1983, the Japanese government acknowledged the importance of a two-way flow of defence-related technologies and formally acceded to U.S. demands for a Japanese military technology transfer to the United States. This decision was made possible by setting up an "exception" to the three principles on arms export and the government policy guidelines on arms export. The implications of two-way exchanges of military technology still remain unclear, but it is useful to look into the background of the U.S. interest in Japanese technologies.

Given the U.S. preoccupation with the necessity for military research and development, it is not surprising that the United States has shown special interest in Japan's advanced technologies in such areas as computer electronics, semiconductor development, industrial robots, sensor devices and fiber optics. It is noteworthy that most items that


have drawn U.S. attention are dual-use technologies, produced by Japanese private companies.

In November 1983 and July 1984, the U.S. Department of Defense sent a technical mission to Japan to investigate some Japanese defence-related technologies. The 1984 mission, composed of 12 private industry consultants and Pentagon experts, visited the Defense Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and eight Japanese electronics-related firms, including the NEC Corporation, Hitachi, Ltd. and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. The mission expressed particular interest in electro-optical technology such as fiber optics for infrared sighting systems and laser technologies for missile guidance and other military uses. At the Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum held in August 1984, the U.S. delegates specified five major items of Japanese technology as possible candidates for technology transfer to the United States. These are gallium arsenide semiconductors for use in high-speed computers; optical fibers and their applications in communications; compound materials such as carbon fibers; and ceramics for engines and heat-resisting alloys for use in turbines. According to the report prepared by the U.S. technical mission, the list of items the United States would like have been extended to 16 areas of technology, including milliwaves, voice recognition and translation


111 Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1984.
equipment, artificial intelligence, rocket propellant technology and Computer Aided Design (CAD). More recently, as already noted, the U.S. government has been considering the transfer of Japanese technologies in the areas of opt-electronics and milliwaves to promote the SDI research programme.

What should be noted here is the fact that the Japanese government does allow private companies to export dual-use technologies, even when those technologies have obvious military applications. There is perhaps no effective way to identify the ultimate use of the technologies transferred by Japanese private companies on a commercial basis. In fact, there have already been a number of potentially controversial cases concerning the transfer of dual-use technology. In July 1982, the MITI permitted TDK Electronics to export radar-proof ferrite paint to the U.S. Department of Defence for the development of the U.S. "Stealth" bomber. The MITI justified this on the ground that it could be used to coat buildings to prevent reflection of TV waves. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, a big defence contractor, was permitted to sell $180 million of helicopters to Saudi Arabia and some to Thailand, reasoning that they are for peaceful purposes. Masayoshi Oiso, a defence analyst at the Nomura Economic Research Institute, however, has indicated

112 Asahi Shimbun September 15, 1984; also see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Editorial, September 4, 1984.
113 Calder, op.cit., p.35.
that "it is an open secret that the two nations arm the
craft after taking delivery".\textsuperscript{114} Another striking example
is the Japanese sale of dry docks worth U.S. $42 million to
the Soviet merchant navy. It was subsequently learnt that
the docks were actually to be used for the Soviet aircraft
carrier Kiev and other warships.\textsuperscript{115}

Thus, the creeping erosion of the Japanese policy of a
ban on military exports was already under way before the
Japanese acceptance of military technology transfer to the
United States. Therefore, it is indeed likely that the new
Japanese high technologies that have aroused U.S. interest
will be transferred to the United States for the research and
development of new weapons systems, and thus contribute to
the further expansion of U.S. arms-making capabilities. The
U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission report recommends technical
cooperation between the two countries in the following words:

In an era when technology can make decisive
contributions to the development of new defense
systems, Japan and the United States, as the world's
two technological leaders, should vigorously pursue
research and development collaboration on two fronts:
in accordance with priorities determined by those with
defense policy responsibilities in the two countries,
and on an ad hoc basis, by arrangement among private
industrial concerns (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{116}

Indeed, as Kent Calder has astutely observed, given the
current trend of electronics intensive weaponry, "Japan's

\textsuperscript{114} Neil Ulman \& Urban Lehner, "Japan Rebuilds Arms
Industry With U.S. Help", \textit{Asian Wall Street Journal},
29 November 1982.

\textsuperscript{115} Tow, op.cit., p.15.

\textsuperscript{116} Challenges and Opportunities in United States-Japan
Relations, p.86.
electronics-oriented civilian production base will gain greater and greater potential military significance... The micro-economics imperative to reduce production cost by expanding global market share and realizing economies of scale gives firms the incentive to export. Should politics not stand in the way, Japan's militarily related civilian high-technology industries will become even more deeply associated with military-industrial complexes abroad".117 If Japan is to remain committed to arms control and disarmament, political measures for controlling the transfer of dual-use technologies will be necessary, for economic and strategic imperatives are leading it into the development of a substantial military-industrial base in Japan.

U.S. Nuclear Port Calls

The Japanese people, through their first-hand experience of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have shown, quite naturally, a strong aversion to nuclear weapons. The three non-nuclear principles of "not possessing, not manufacturing and not introducing nuclear weapons into the country" are a basic Japanese security policy.118 However, the credibility of those principles is subject to question in the case of port calls by U.S. warships, since Washington is determined neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval vessels. Admiral La Rocque testified in 1973 that U.S.

117 Calder, op.cit., pp.34-35.
118 Defense of Japan 1984, p.60.
warships did not offload their nuclear weapons in Japanese ports but that nuclear weapons had been carried into Japanese ports. Former U.S. Ambassador Edwin D. Reischauer also argued that the term "introduction" was not meant to preclude the port calls and transit of nuclear-armed U.S. naval vessels. These statements by former U.S. officials have aroused heated controversy in Japan. Indeed, given the strong anti-nuclear sentiments among the Japanese, and the recently troubled security relationship between the United States and New Zealand, the question of port calls of U.S. warships could become a source of serious aggravation in the U.S.-Japanese alliance relationship. Therefore, the issue of U.S. vessels possibly carrying nuclear weapons into Japanese ports deserves serious scrutiny.

The crux of the issue concerning the U.S. nuclear port calls is the ambiguity which surrounds the official policies of the two countries. The U.S. policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons on its warships would seem incompatible with Japan's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles. Nevertheless, the two countries have managed to maintain a modus vivendi on this thorny issue. There is no official difference between Tokyo and Washington in their interpretations of the Japanese non-nuclear principles. That is, the United States has no objection to the present Japanese interpretation of the non-nuclear principles, which prohibits the port calls and passage through Japanese territorial waters by nuclear-

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armed U.S. vessels. On the other hand, however, the United States is firm in sticking to its policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons on its warships.

With regard to this ambiguity, the Japanese government has repeatedly argued that since the United States does not ask for "prior consultation", we have to believe that U.S. naval vessels making port calls or passing through Japanese territorial waters are not carrying nuclear weapons. Two fundamental questions must be examined: 1) Is the present Japanese policy of ignoring (or tacitly accepting) the ambiguity desirable politically and strategically?; and 2) if there is, in effect, a tacit understanding that nuclear-armed U.S. naval vessels do make port calls and pass through Japanese territorial waters, is

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120 Asian Security 1984, p.204.

121 An exchange of notes between the United States and Japan under Article VI of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates certain matters as the subjects of prior consultation: "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan". For the full text of Agreed Minute to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, see U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Part 5: Japan and Okinawa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senate, January 26-29, 1970, pp.1435-1438.

An oral understanding reached between Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, Jr. defined "major changes in the equipment of U.S. forces" as including the introduction of nuclear warheads and medium- and long-range missiles as well as construction of bases. See Asian Security 1981, pp.148-149.
it strategically imperative? In other words, if both Tokyo and Washington clearly denied the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. warships visiting Japanese ports, would it seriously undermine the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent?

(1) Ambiguity and its costs and benefit

Many Japanese specialists argue that it is politically prudent to leave the question of the port calls of U.S. nuclear-armed vessels ambiguous because the issue is politically very sensitive and ambiguity may defuse anti-nuclear sentiments among the Japanese public. Yōnosuke Nagai, for example, has maintained that the revision of the Japanese three non-nuclear principles is unnecessary because there is, in fact, a tacit understanding among the majority of the Japanese that nuclear-armed U.S. warships are visiting Japanese ports or transitting Japanese territorial waters, adding that the Japanese are better gifted than the Americans in "tolerating ambiguity".122

However, the possibility of the break-down of the Japanese "tolerance of ambiguity" vis-a-vis nuclear issues cannot be ruled out. Recent increases in the number of nuclear-weapon-capable U.S. vessels calling at Japanese

ports, a possible accident involving nuclear-armed warships, and expanding nuclear war-fighting capabilities significantly reinforced by the ongoing deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles could eventually break down the Japanese "tolerance of ambiguity". The assertive U.S. nuclear policy could also result in the collapse of reassurance of the Japanese, thus leading to an aggravation in the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

It could also be argued that retaining incertitude about U.S. nuclear-armed warship port calls discourages informed public debate on one of Japan's vital security problems. As Franklin Weinstein has argued, "[a]mbiguity may promote a false sense of confidence. And it may impede the

123 Nuclear-powered U.S. warships made port calls twenty times in 1982, and the pace of those port calls has been increasing. See Asahi Shimbun, 14 March 1983.

124 There was a case of an actual incident involving potentially nuclear-armed U.S. vessel when on April 9, 1981, a Japanese cargo boat Nisshō-Maru was sunk accidentally by a U.S. SSBN George Washington. Many Japanese were angered when they learned that the U.S. warship had moved off immediately after the collision without initiating any rescue action. See Asahi Shimbun, April 11, 18, 1981.

125 Michael Howard, commenting on a rising anti-American sentiment in many countries of Western Europe, which was prompted by the U.S. emplacement of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Western Europe, argues: "... for an appreciable number of Europeans, what was once seen as the prime requirement of deterrence, that is, the commitment of American power to the defence of Western Europe, no longer provides the political reassurance that once it did...", Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (London: Unwin paperbacks, 1984).
building of the domestic political consensus needed to make commitments viable in times of crisis.\(^{126}\)

(2) Strategic and political significance

U.S. defence planners and many Japanese specialists maintain that the essence of nuclear deterrence lies in uncertainty. Successive U.S. administrations have argued that "U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on ships is justified on the military grounds of preventing adversaries from identifying, targeting and otherwise countering U.S. seaborne nuclear forces".\(^{127}\) Masashi Nishihara, arguing for the revision of the Japanese three non-nuclear principles, maintains that Soviet Backfires and SS-20 missiles in eastern Siberia and its SLBMs in the Western Pacific now have made it imperative for Japan to "give the United States the option of bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese waters and naval ports for transit purposes", concurrently retaining the Japanese right to be consulted about such transitory actions. Nishihara contends that such modification of Japan's non-nuclear policy is necessary in order to deter Soviet nuclear blackmail.\(^{128}\)

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Such a strategic consideration is further supported by political realities. The port calls by U.S. naval vessels are significant for the United States and its allies as a symbol of the effective operation of the alliance. Indeed, given the U.S. reaction to New Zealand's rejection of port visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed U.S. naval vessels, Washington must be worried about the possible effects that New Zealand's decision might have on other allies of the U.S., many of which are much more important strategically for the United States.\textsuperscript{129}

It is, however, also possible to argue that even if it could be guaranteed that U.S. warships calling at Japanese ports or transitting Japanese territorial waters were not carrying nuclear weapons, it would not undermine the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Substantial numbers of American SSBNs and attack submarines in the high seas, capable of launching nuclear strikes, can still make the U.S. deterrent credible. Nuclear strikes could also be carried out from carrier-based aircraft and from long-range bombers.\textsuperscript{130} It is also possible to argue that "in an age


of highly accurate intercontinental missiles and strategic air forces, the carrying of nuclear weapons on surface ships makes little sense; and the dispersion of such weapons at sea is thought to increase the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. 131 Indeed, as Morton Halperin argues, "Given the great destructive power of nuclear weapons and the devastation that even a limited nuclear strike would cause, even a low probability of U.S. nuclear response is likely to be sufficient to deter an action against Japan." 132

Thus, regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. warships in Japanese ports or in its territorial waters, as long as the U.S.-Japanese security relationship remains stable and common interests are maintained, the U.S. deterrent can work in the eyes of the Soviet leaders, thus sufficiently deterring possible Soviet nuclear blackmail.

Finally, the validity of both the U.S. policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval vessels and the Japanese three non-nuclear principles is problematic, in military terms. Many strategists judge that "ships that can carry nuclear weapons are readily identifiable (by its adversaries) from unclassified information". 133 Table 7 shows the number and

131 Robert Sutter, op.cit., p.9.
132 Halperin, op.cit., p.96.
133 The vast majority of U.S. Navy warships in active service today are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. "All 36 of the Navy's ballistic missile submarines carry nuclear-armed ballistic missiles .... Eighty-two of the Navy's 98 attack submarines are (or will be) capable of carrying either 1) the nuclear-armed SUBROC anti-submarine rocket or 2) the nuclear-armed Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM/N)". U.S. Navy Attack
percentage of nuclear-powered and nuclear-weapons-capable U.S. warships.

Table 7 clearly indicates that many of the U.S. naval vessels can carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is highly conceivable that conventionally-armed U.S. warships, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, will be perceived by the Soviets as nuclear armed. The raison d'etre of Japanese and U.S. positions on port calls by U.S. warships is significantly undermined.

The foregoing analysis of the question concerning transitory visits of U.S. Navy warships to Japanese ports suggests three important conclusions. Firstly, although the issue of nuclear port calls is likely to continue to attract considerable public attention, it is very difficult to precisely assess the costs and benefits of the present retention of "ambiguity" regarding the "introduction" of nuclear weapons by U.S. warships into Japanese ports and territorial waters.

Secondly, it would be misleading to hastily conclude that a Washington announcement about the absence of nuclear

133 Continued.
submarines such as Los Angeles (SSN-688), Lipscomb (SSN-685), Narwhal (SSN-671) and Sturgeon (SSN-637) are capable of firing SUBROC and possibly have the capability for TLAMIN. All of the Navy aircraft carriers including the USS Enterprise, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Carl Vinson are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. With the exception of the FFG-7 class ships, "all of the Navy's battleships, cruisers, destroyers and frigates are (or will be) capable of carrying either 1) the nuclear-armed variant of the Terrier surface-to-air missile (SAM), 2) the nuclear-armed variant of the ASROC anti-submarine rocket, or 3) TLAM/N." For details, see Appendix A, in Robert Sutter, Crisis in U.S.-New Zealand Relations: Issues for Congress.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of ship or submarine</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Number that are nuclear-powered</th>
<th>Number that are nuclear-weapon-capable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missile</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36 (100%)</td>
<td>36 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>94 (96%)</td>
<td>82 (84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBINED</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>130 (97%)</td>
<td>118 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4 (29%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
<td>29 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>68 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>65 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBINED</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>9 (4%)</td>
<td>164 (80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL SHIPS ABOVE COMBINED</strong></td>
<td>353</td>
<td>143 (40%)</td>
<td>296 (84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELECTED OTHER SHIPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious landing</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>? (?%) b/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replenishment and tender</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>? (?%) b/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Ships in active service as of January 31, 1985, one aircraft carrier (the USS Forrestal (CV-59)) in the service life extension program (SLEP), and FFG-7, FF-1052, and LST-1179 class ships assigned to the Naval Reserve Force.

b/ Storage of weapons only.

nuclear weapons on its warships calling at Japanese ports or passing through Japanese territorial waters would seriously undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Indeed, it can be argued that the stable U.S.-Japan security relationship and the U.S. deterrent emanating from its enormous nuclear capabilities, particularly its formidable second-strike capabilities, would be enough to deter any significant Soviet offensive action against Japanese interests.

Lastly, given the political symbolism attached to the question of U.S. warship port calls, heavy-handed Japanese action to keep out U.S. nuclear-weapon-capable warships out of Japanese ports, though highly unlikely, would be completely counterproductive. Japan's mishandling of the issue could provoke serious repercussions and over-reaction on the part of the Americans. These might include economic sanctions and congressional resolutions asserting the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The strong American reactions to New Zealand could be taken as a warning to its other allies, including Japan, which is strategically a much more important ally of the U.S.\textsuperscript{134} Nevertheless, the Japanese commitment to non-nuclear policy dictates further persistent efforts to enforce as forcefully as possible the celebrated three non-nuclear principles.

\textsuperscript{134} Despite New Zealand's assertion that it will continue to remain an ally of the U.S., the Reagan Administration cancelled joint exercises scheduled for early 1985 under the auspices of the alliance. It also began to cut down on other military exchanges with New Zealand. See, Sutter, ibid., p.2.
CHAPTER III

TOWARD A MORE STABLE SECUREMENT RELATIONSHIP

In the previous chapter, some important aspects of the U.S.-Japan security relationship were examined. These include U.S. pressures for a substantial Japanese military buildup, Japan's sealanes defence missions, U.S.-Japan military cooperation in developing new weapons systems, and visits by U.S. warships to Japanese ports. The clear indication is that U.S.-Japan military collaboration is proceeding in such a way that Japan is becoming increasingly integrated into the American-led anti-Soviet alliance system. The implications for the security of Japanese interests, though still not entirely clear, are profound. For one thing, U.S.-Japan military collaboration, possibly together with a substantial Japanese military buildup, could eventually jeopardize the current public consensus on defence matters. Secondly, as emphasized throughout this paper, a substantial Japanese military buildup could evoke strong fears and apprehensions among Japan's Asian neighbours, adversely affecting vital Japanese economic interests in the region. Thirdly, U.S.-Japanese military collaboration, particularly joint defence planning and technological cooperation in developing weapons systems, would be perceived by Soviet leaders as offensive or provocative. A likely consequence of this would be further Soviet military buildup in the region. This would be a
de-stabilizing factor, and not at all in the interest of Japan.

What is suggested by the foregoing analyses of the U.S.-Japan security relationship is that, given the absence of a radical change in the strategic environment surrounding Japan, the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Japan security relationship and the mutual recognition of shared common interests remains the key for the security of Japanese interests. Although other options for Japan, such as a neutralist or a military autonomous stance, are logically possible, \(^1\) they would be counterproductive as well as unrealistic in the foreseeable future. They would elicit much uncertainty in Japan's relationships with Asian states and complicate the power-structure in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, despite the potentially de-stabilizing implications of the deepening military ties between Japan and the United States, it is unlikely, at least up to the late 1980s, that there will be a significant modification in current developments in the security relationship. The strong impetus of the ongoing military collaboration between the two countries comes partly from the American assumption that the "Soviet military buildup" and its "opportunistic adventurism" have to be contained by countervailing forces

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1 See Chapter I and Mochizuki's article "Japan's Search for Strategy" in International Security, Winter 1983/84 (Vol.8, No.3); Also see Radha Sinha, Japan's Options for the 1980s (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1982), pp.198-251. Sinha argues that non-alignment may be the desirable and correct option for Japan.
of the United States and its allies, and partly from the
growing vested interests in both countries, which include
some influential groups and key figures among decision-
makers. The Pentagon and the pro-American Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Defense Agency are
examples of powerful institutions committed to U.S.-Japan
military collaboration. Nevertheless, it may be worth-while
to try to suggest some possible ways and means to modify the
current trend of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship.

The task of this chapter, therefore, is to offer some
suggestions as to the future security relationship of the
two countries. Three major points will be made: 1) The
manner in which Japan can develop a better bargaining
position vis-a-vis the United States, in order to effect
constructive changes to the current strategic relationship;
2) The sort of defence posture that would be desirable for
Japan, in order to secure Japanese interests rather than
their being made subservient to conflicting U.S. aims; and
3) The constructive role that Japan can assume to decrease
tensions and build confidence in the Asia-Pacific region?

Proposals for Constructive Changes to the Current Strategic
Relationship

In previous chapters, it was stated that Japanese
perceptions of the Soviet military threat is not at all
identical to that of the United States. The difference in
perception is understandable, given Japanese political
constraints on its ability to militarily contribute to the
Western alliance, its geo-strategic location, with the
Soviet Union as a neighbour, its inherent strategic vulnerabilities as a small land-mass with a large population, and its dependence on international trade. Therefore, as has already been suggested, it is not always in the interest of Japan to comply with the U.S. demands, which are based on the current U.S. perception of the Soviet Union and its global war-fighting strategy. The question Japan must, therefore, face is how to successfully counter demands of the United States, which could seriously undermine the stability of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

(1) The advantages of a greater cooperation with West European states and an expanded dialogue with Japan's Asian neighbours.

Wolf Mendl believes that Euro-Japan collaboration could be an effective tool in negotiation with the superpowers. He argues that the 'West' means "a collection of pluralist societies which are not dominated by a single orthodoxy to the exclusion of all others" and questions the validity of the American definition of the 'West', often referred to as the 'Free World', which has clear connotations of ideological confrontation between Washington and Moscow. Mendl maintains that it is in the interest of West European States and Japan "not to allow the United States to dictate 'East-West' relations in such simplistic ideological terms". 2

2 See Wolf Mendl, Western Europe and Japan Between the Superpowers (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp.140-165.
There are indeed remarkable similarities between West European states and Japan both in terms of political values and in their relationships with the superpowers. They are geographically close to the Soviet Union and share common interests not only in developing a mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union but also in "not wanting the Third World to be carved up between the superpowers".\(^3\) Therefore, it may be helpful for Japan to develop a relationship with West European states, which would mutually support their shared interests.

At the same time, Japan would have to develop an expended dialogue with its Asian neighbours. As has been indicated, among the variety of perceptions felt by the countries of East Asia, there exists apprehension about a substantial Japanese military buildup. It is, therefore, in the interest of Japan to expand the channels of discussion about security matters with its Asian neighbours.

(2) Diversification of United States contacts

It was stated, in the overview section of Chapter I, that there have been a number of examples of a lack of consultation with Japan by the United States. The American 'tradition' of non-consultation undermines Japanese trust in Washington, as it did when Kissinger visited China in 1971 without Tokyo's prior knowledge. Indeed, for the alliance to

\(^3\) Ibid., p.163.
mean anything it has to include close consultations and contacts based on an equal footing. Therefore, as Gerald Curtis has maintained, it is essential for the United States and Japan "to expand the range of contacts and increase the lines of communication between policymakers and influential publics in the two countries".  

Indeed, as has been emphasized in Chapter II, there are diverse American opinions, which can be reconciled with the Japanese perspective. An expanded range of contacts and wider communications within the United States should be developed to bridge a "perceptions gap" between the two states. In doing so, it is important for the Japanese to be honest and articulate in expressing their views of international security. For example, it may be in the interest of Japan to offer constructive criticism of developments in American nuclear strategy when they are perceived as de-stabilizing. Although port calls by U.S. warships remains an intractable and sensitive issue, there is no doubt that increased deployment of nuclear weapons by the superpowers in the Asia-Pacific region threatens the security of Japan in the long run.


Recommendations for a More Self-Reliant Japanese Security Policy

As is dictated by the constitution and supported overwhelmingly by the public, Japanese security policy has to be 'exclusively defensive'. In other words, the Japanese SDF and Japanese military cooperation with the United States should not threaten Japan's neighbours. The following are recommendations on how the self-reliance of Japanese security policy could be increased.

(1) The maintenance of political constraints

Since it is an undeniable fact that the fundamentals of Japanese security policy, such as the prohibition of offensive weapons; its adherence to the non-nuclear principles, its restrictions on the export of arms, and its constraint on defence spending, are all supported by the majority of the Japanese public, these basic policies should be maintained. If Japan's defence spending surpasses the 1 percent GNP barrier because of additional budgetary appropriations in the middle of the fiscal year 1985, Japan should set up a new ceiling, close to the current level. As noted in Chapter I, the 1 percent of GNP barrier is a policy which symbolizes Japan's commitment to peace.

In the case of possible Japanese participation in multi-lateral peace-keeping operations, the government should encourage wider public debate. Unless the government clarifies the necessity, the purpose and the possible
effects of such operations, it would be opposed by many Japanese. This would be particularly so, if the despatch of uniformed SDF personnel was involved.

It would also be advisable for the Japanese government to devise political measures in order to constrain the pressures for Japanese contributions to American arms-making capabilities. If Japanese technologies are used for the making of offensive, counterforce weapons systems, Japanese cooperation in these areas is sure to be seen as disturbing by the Japanese public, and as provocative by the Soviet Union.

(2) The review of sealanes defence missions and the development of defensive strategies

In Chapter II, it was suggested that Japan's sealanes defence missions raise potentially serious problem for Japanese vital interests. In the final analysis, the 1,000 miles sealanes defence missions would primarily serve U.S. global war-fighting strategy rather than the security of Japanese interests. The focus of Japanese defence policy, therefore, should be on the defence of its homelands and territorial waters. Due consideration should also be given to the improvement of integrated command and control of the SDF's three services and the collection of military intelligence information.

It is also essential for Japan to give more serious thought and consideration to what Wolf Mendl calls "defensive strategies", which are "a mixture of frontier defence, defence in depth, training for guerrilla action
against an occupying power, and civilian defence with a predominant emphasis on non-violent resistance". Mendl argues that "[g]iven its geographical environment and the remarkable homogeneity and social discipline of its population, Japan is an excellent position to develop such an inoffensive strategy which is, indeed, required by its constitution."

(3) Clarification of the purposes and functions of U.S. bases in Japan

For the United States, Japan is the cornerstone of the U.S. strategy of forward deployment. Although Japan depends on the U.S. deterrent, Japan should concern itself with whether or not the American forces and facilities in Japan would really serve the security of Japanese interests and the basic orientation of Japanese security policy. In order to encourage an informed public debate on these matters, the Japanese government should clarify the precise purposes and functions of the U.S. bases in Japan. The Japanese people have every reason to question the possible roles of the VLF communication station in Yosami, the Omega station in Tsushima and the LORAN stations in other parts of Japan, because these stations could be used for sending orders to American SLBMs for a nuclear first strike.

6 Mendl, op.cit., p.156.
7 Ibid., p.157.
Policies Designed to Decrease Tensions and to Build Confidence in the Region

Japan has so far been remarkably reluctant to take on a positive political role in the search for a reduction in regional tensions. Given the peaceful orientation of Japanese security policy, Japan should be in a unique position to promote arms control and disarmament. The necessity of some forms of confidence-building measures has already been recognized in the Report on Comprehensive National Security\(^8\) and in the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission report,\(^9\) but there has been little progress in this field. More serious thought should be given to the development of political measures to reduce tensions and to check any future militarization of the region. Donald Zagorja testified in July 1983 as follows:

The United States, after consulting with its allies and friends in East Asia, should open up arms control discussions with the Soviet Union covering the Asia-Pacific theater. These discussions, like the CSCE, MBFR, and INF talks about the European theater, should consider such measures as confidence-building, conventional arms reductions, naval limitations and theater nuclear arms limitations. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union would be a willing partner in such discussions. The Soviets have in the past year or two offered confidence-building measures to both the Japanese and the Chinese; and they have called for the creation of a so-called "zone of peace" in South-east


\(^9\) The United States-Japan Advisory Commission, Challenges and Opportunities in United States-Japan Relations, A report submitted to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan, September 1984.
Asia. Moreover, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has recently stated that in the absence of arms control discussions in the Asia-Pacific theater, the Soviet Union would have no alternatives but to go ahead with its theater nuclear force buildup...10

The Japanese government should also give substantial support and encouragement to studies on arms control and disarmament in both governmental and private institutions. Japan should look at the possibility of setting up a similar body to the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Daniel Okimoto indicates that Japan has only a small Office of Disarmament within the United Nations Bureau of its Foreign Ministry. This office is "understaffed and inadequately funded, [and] commands little prestige or influence within the Foreign Ministry".11 Such a disarmament agency would not only concern itself with purely technical problems such as proposals for arms limitations and the development of verification technology, but also could look at possible political solutions to the tension in the Korean Peninsula and the military conflict in Indochina.


CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the strategic relationship between the United States and Japan. It seems clear that Japanese military cooperation with the United States has already proceeded to a considerable extent, and is likely to further develop in the foreseeable future. This has been and will continue to be promoted by vociferous U.S. demands and by the "hawkish coalition" represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency and the Right-wing factions of the L.D.P.

It should be noted, however, that the pace of Japanese military buildup and the degree of Japan's involvement in combined security aims may well fall short of assertive U.S. demands. This is because of the strong internal political constraints of Japan, which will almost certainly remain for some time into the future. Article IX of the constitution and public feeling against military buildup are deeply rooted in the post-war political climate of Japan. The "hawkish coalition", although a strong factor for the ongoing Japanese military buildup, is counter-balanced by the powerful government departments such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Furthermore, substantial numbers of the L.D.P. and opposition members will resist a rapid military expansion of Japan.

Nevertheless, given potentially disturbing implications of the deepening military ties between the United States and Japan, Japan should review the current course of the
strategic relationship. By cooperating militarily with the American-led anti-Soviet alliance system, Japan may not only help to accelerate a dangerous polarization of the hostile superpowers, but also promote the militarization of the Asia-Pacific region, thus disregarding the aspirations for peace and disarmament of the majority of the Japanese.
APPENDIX A

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations, and,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.
ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

For the United States of America:
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 2ND
J GRAHAM PARSONS

For Japan:
NOBUSUKE KISHI
AIICHIRO FUJIYAMA
MITSUJIRO ISHII
TADASHI ADACHI
KOICHIRO ASAKAI
APPENDIX B

Japanese Self-Defence Forces: Current Strength

ARMY: 156,000.
5 Army HQ.
1 armd div.
12 inf divs (7 or 9,000 men each).
2 composite bdes.
1 AB bde.
1 arty bde, 2 arty gps; 8 SAM gps (each of 4 btys).
1 sigs bde.
5 engr bdes.
1 trg bde, 2 trg regts.

Army Aviation:
1 hel bde (2 bns) and 5 Gp HQ with 24 sqns/dets.

AFV: 560 Type 61, 390 Type 74 MBT; 425 Type 60, 115 Type 73 APC.

Arty: 380 105mm, 330 155mm incl Type 74 and 75 SP, 70 203mm guns/how; 50 Type 30 SSM; 800 81mm, 560 107mm mor (some SP); 40 Type 75 SP 130mm MRL.

ATK: 1,400 75mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, 106mm (incl Type 60 SP)
RCL: 240 Type 64, 25 Type 79 ATGW.

AD: 170 35mm twin, 37mm, 40mm incl M-42 SP, 75mm AA guns;
2 Type 81 Tan, 144 HAWK, 84 Improved HAWK SAM.

Air: some 28 ac and 370 hel: 20 LR-1, 2 TL-1, 10 L-19 ac;
2 AH-1S, 56 KV-107, 80 UH-1H, 65 UH-1B, 36 TH-55, 139 OH-6J/D hel.

(On order: 84 Type 74 MBT; 9 Type 73 APC; 34 Type 75 155mm, 19 M-110A2 203mm SP how; 8 Type 75 130mm MRL; 9 Type 79, MAT ATGW, 221 84mm RCL; 49 Stinger, 8 Type 81 Tan launchers, 48 Improved HAWK SAM; 1 LR-1 ac; 6 OH-6D, 5 UH-1H, 12 TOW-armed AH-1S hel.)

RESERVES: 41,000.

NAVY: 42,000 (including naval air).
14 submarines: 4 Yushio, 7 Uzushio, 3 Asashio.
31 destroyers: 2 Shirane with Sea Sparrow SAM, 1x8 ASROC ASW msl launcher, 3 ASW hel; 2 Haruna with 1x8 ASROC, 3 ASW hel; 2 Hatsuyuki with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1 Sea Sparrow, 1x8 ASROC, 1 ASW hel; 3 Tachikaze with Tartar/Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC; 1 Amatsukaze with 1 Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC; 4 Takatsuki with 1x8 ASROC; 6 Yamagumo with 1x8 ASROC; 3 Minegumo with 1x8 ASROC; 2 Akizuki; 3 Murasame; 3 Ayanami.
17 frigates: 1 Yubari; 1 Ishikari with 2x4 Harpoon SSM; 11 Chikugo with 1x8 ASROC; 4 Isuzu.
5 large patrol craft: 3 Mizutori, 2 Umitaka.
5 FAC(T).
9 coastal patrol craft.
3 MCM spt ships, 31 coastal minesweepers (9 Hatsushima, 19 Takami, 3 Kasado), 6 Nanago MCM boats.
1 Katori, 2 Ayanami trg, 1 Azuma trg spt, 5 utility ships incl 2 Harukaze.
6 LST (3 Miura, 3 Atsumi); 2 LSU; 37 landing craft.
   Bases: Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato.

NAVAL AIR ARM: (11,000); 93 combat ac, 62 combat hel.
6 Air Wings.
8 MR sqn with 6 P-3C, 58 P-2J, 13 2SF-1, 16 PS-1.
6 ASW hel sqns with 55 HSS-2.
1 MCM hel sqn with 7 KV-107.
t tpt sqn with 4 YS-11M, 1 B-65.
1 utility sqn with 3 UP-2J.
1 test sqn with 2 P-3C, 2 P-2J, 2P-2H, 1 UC-90 ac; 3
   HSS-2A/B hel.
7 SAR flts with 8 Us-1 ac, 6 S-61A, 8 S-62B hel.
5 trg sqn with 6 YS-11T, 15 TC-90, 14 B-65, 32 KM-2, 19
   P-2J, 3 T-34A ac; 3 OH-6J, 6 BE11 47G, 11 HSS-2B hel.
   (On order: 3 Yushio subs; 1 4,500-ton, 10 Hatsuyuki
   destroyers; 1 Yubari frigate; 2 Hatsushima MCM; 17 P-3C, 2
   KM-2, 3 TC-90 ac; 14 HSS-2B, 5 S-61A, 20 H-6D hel; 24
   Harpoon SSM, 3 Mk 15 Phalanx 20mm anti-ship msl defence
   systems).
RESERVES: 600

AIR FORCE: 43,000; some 280 combat aircraft.
6 combat air wings; 1 combat air gp; 1 recce sqn.
3 FGA sqns with 56 F-1.
11 interceptor sqns: 1 with some 20 F-15J/DJ (2nd forming),
   4 T-33A; 6 with 112 F-4EJ; 3 with 61 P-104J.
Air Recce Group: 1 recce sqn with 12 RF-4EJ.
1 aggressor trg sqn with 5 T-2, 2 T-33.
1 tactical tpt wing of 3 sqns with 25 C-1, 6 YS-11.
1 SAR wing (9 dets) with US-2 ac; 29 KV-107 hel.
1 air test wing with 2 F-4EJ, 5 F-15J, F-104J/DJ, 2 T-1, 6
   T-2, 2 T-3, T-33A, C-1, 2 E-2C, YS-11.
1 air traffic control and weather wing with YS-11, MU-2J,
   T-33A.
5 trg wings: 10 sqns with 40 T-1A/B, 59 T-2, 44 T-3, 50
   T-33A.
AAM: Sparrow, Falcon, Sidewinder.
Air Defence:
   3 aircraft control and warning wings and 1 group with 28
   control and warning sites.
6 SAM gps: 19 sqns with 180 Nike-J.
   (On order: 51 F-15J, 6 F-15DJ, 5 F-1 fighters, 4 C-130H tpt,
   12 T-2 trg; 6 E-2C AEW ac; 1 V-107 hel; 5 Type 81 Tan
   SAM launchers.)

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