TIMES OF DARKNESS: Ethnicity and the causes of division within the Rhodesian guerrilla groups.

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This dissertation is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts of the Australian National University.

June 1981
This thesis is my own work and all sources used have been acknowledged.

June 1981.
For Jacqui and Michael
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<td></td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African National Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANYL</td>
<td>African National Youth League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBZ</td>
<td>Botswana/Bulawayo/Zimbabwe Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMZ</td>
<td>Malawi/Mozambique/Zimbabwe Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Security Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>People's Caretaker Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFO</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF (ZAPU)</td>
<td>Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe African People's Union)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA ANC</td>
<td>South African African National Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People's Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU (PF)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Liberation Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Liberation Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZ</td>
<td>Zambia/Zimbabwe Province</td>
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Our revolution is a complex one. Too often we have been accused of being unprepared. The truth is that in Rhodesia it has ups and downs, bright and dark moments. In our revolution are many ups and downs. That in Rhodesia is perhaps a part of the new African National consciousness, which has emerged in the present differences between the traditional political structures based on tribal lines and the whole country, which is now supported by former nationalists of other countries. I should like to say that the fight is only for the freedom of the people and the fight for freedom is not for a single man, but for all. Anyone who is fighting for freedom is fighting for the freedom of the whole nation. I believe that the struggle is one that the whole nation will have to fight. We have to guard against the enemy of our people.
Our revolution is a complex one. Too many powers have vested interests in our dear Zimbabwe. Because of this, our revolution has ups and downs; times of sorrow and times of joy; times of light and times of darkness. Changes in our revolution are many and sudden. 1

(Ndabaningi Sithole, 1976)

Tribal man in Rhodesia is indeed passing, in fact has passed into history.

That in Rhodesia there is now a single African National consciousness is clear. The present differences between the two barred political parties in Rhodesia are not tribal. Each of the parties embraces the whole country and is supported by former Matabele and Mashona tribesmen - now nationalists of Zimbabwe. 2

(Herbert Chitepo, 1970)

I am deeply worried that ugly monster called Tribalism, that we had fought and killed, is raising its dangerous head again. I should remind every one of you that tribalism is our great enemy. It is our God-given duty to fight it with might and main, and kill it once and for all. Anyone who espouses tribalism is the greatest enemy of our struggle and of Zimbabwe...we should learn that tribalism is a fire that will consume each and everyone of us. Let us fight tribalism; let us guard against it. 3

(Joshua Nkomo, 1975)

1. In a document to Uganda's President Amin, cited in Summary of World Broadcasts, (London), ME/5314/B/5, 17 September 1976.


INTRODUCTION

The political history of the Rhodesian guerrilla groups was one of dissension, division and internecine conflict. From 1963, when the concept of armed struggle was first seriously discussed, until the Lancaster House Conference in London in late 1979, when the guerrilla forces led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo agreed to a ceasefire, the guerrilla groups suffered a series of debilitating divisions which detracted from their claims to represent Rhodesia's black majority and also affected their ability to pursue the armed struggle. Few nationalist movements in any revolutionary war have been beset by such serious and persistent divisions. This thesis seeks to determine the causes of division within the Rhodesian guerrilla groups during the "war of liberation" - the second "Chimurenga" - and to explain the importance of ethnicity in the generation of division.

Division has, to varying degrees, affected all guerrilla groups in Africa. In no area of southern Africa in which a liberation struggle has taken place has there been a single nationalist party not disturbed by factionalism or unchallenged by rivals. In some areas up to half a dozen rival groups have competed for popular support and external assistance. In Angola, the Popular Movement for

1. The use of the terms "tribe" and "tribalism" have been severely criticised by some sociologists and anthropologists in recent years. Although "ethnic group" and "ethnicity" are also lacking in precision they have the advantage of being free from pejorative connotations, and will consequently be used throughout the thesis.
the Liberation of Angola, the Front for the National
Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola have been in constant conflict for
more than a decade. In Mozambique, the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) emerged as a major force
only after internal divisions and rivalry from the Mozambique
Revolutionary Committee. Even after independence from
Portugal the FRELIMO Government was threatened by the
military actions of an increasingly effective dissident
group. Namibia has been least affected by division, with
the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) being
the only important party after the early demise of the South
West African National Union. By the late 1970s, however,
under the patronage of South Africa, a large number of legal,
internal parties emerged in Namibia to rival SWAPO. In South
Africa, the African National Congress (SA ANC) split in the early
1960s, leading to the formation of a rival group, the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC). Both the SA ANC and the PAC
suffered further division during the 1970s, while the
emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement further
factionalised the nationalist movement.

In Rhodesia, to an even greater extent than in the
rest of southern Africa, division was the bane of the
nationalist movement. In 1963 the nationalist movement,
until then generally united under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo, divided into two opposing and hostile camps: the
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Nkomo; and
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Ndabaningi Sithole. This ZAPU/ZANU division persisted throughout the 14 years of the armed struggle which began in 1966, and even after the establishment of a black majority rule government in 1980. In 1970/71, some years after ZAPU and ZANU had fled into exile, ZAPU's political and military hierarchies split, leading to the defection of a large number of senior officials and Party members. These former ZAPU members, together with a number of ZANU officials, eventually formed a new exile group. In 1974 a number of ZANU guerrilla commanders, dissatisfied with the activities and mismanagement of the group's military leadership, rebelled. Violent clashes within ZANU resulted, culminating in the death of the Party Chairman, Herbert Chitepo. In late 1975, while their political leaders searched for a peaceful settlement, ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas formed the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) to re-launch the guerrilla war. Bloody clashes between ZANU and ZAPU members during 1976 forced the abandonment of this "joint guerrilla command". In early 1976 Robert Mugabe and a number of recently released ZANU political and military leaders sought to regain control of ZANU by purging the remnants of ZIPA. During 1977 and 1978 Mugabe, with the assistance of Josiah Tongogara, the ZANU guerrilla commander, consolidated his position by purging ZANU of most other apparent and potential rivals. A series of divisions and internecine clashes also wracked ZAPU between 1977 and 1980, leading to the death of a number of senior Party members and
seriously affecting ZAPU's military capability.

Rhodesian guerrilla leaders, nationalist spokesmen and independent commentators consistently identified "tribe" as a crucial factor in nationalist politics, and during and after each serious division in the nationalist movement, "tribalism" was cited as the primary cause of the fracture. In 1977 an American journalist argued that "the tribe remains the most important element in black politics in Rhodesia". A black Rhodesian academic, writing about the divisions within the nationalist movement, claimed that the "...liberation movement has been torn apart by tribalism and regionalism..." An international commission into the assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo found


that "...the objective of Zimbabwe's liberation was submerged beneath the weight of personal and tribal ambitions. The Commission found abundant evidence of tribal and regional manifestations in ZANU". Although Xan Smiley, a noted authority on African affairs, pointed out how "Zimbabwean factionalism has been inspired by the mixed-up pressures of ethnicity, ideology, tactics and personality", he stated that "there is no doubt that personality and ideology shrivel into insignificance as the tribal factor grows by the day. All the leaders have at one time striven to transcend ethnic differences. All have failed." The object of this thesis is to examine the role of "tribalism" in Zimbabwean nationalism, to explore both the nature of the phenomenon and to assess its significance in the major rifts which occurred between and within the guerrilla groups after 1963.


Although one scholar has been able to determine a "strong statistical relationship between tribe and party membership",\(^1\) based on a small sampling of African students in the United States, most assertions of ethnicity within African nationalist or guerrilla groups have been based on a cursory examination of the areas of greatest support for the various parties or on assessments of the ethnic make-up of the guerrilla armies.\(^2\) In an effort to establish more accurately the influence of ethnicity this thesis will examine the ethnic composition of the political

1. Barnett F. Baron, "Southern African Student Exiles in the United States", Journal of Modern African Studies, (London), Vol. 10, No. 1, 1972, pp. 73-91. Baron inquired of Southern African Student Program students the reasons for the divisiveness of southern African liberation movements. Very few students referred to "tribal" loyalties as a divisive element: "In describing why they had joined a party, none mentioned tribal identity, and only three gave it as a reason why others had joined. Nevertheless... there was a strong statistical relationship as a whole between tribe and party membership for the Angolans, Rhodesians, and South-West Africans". pp. 84 and 85.

and military hierarchies of the Rhodesian guerrilla groups before, during and after each of the major rifts, to determine whether ethnic groups received preferential treatment when appointments, demotions and promotions were made.  

When nationalists and commentators have referred to the influence of "tribalism" within the Rhodesian guerrilla groups they have usually had in mind two levels of ethnic rivalry and identity: Ndebele against Shona; and Shona sub-group against Shona.

1. A wide variety of sources have been consulted to determine accurately the ethnic background of Rhodesian nationalist and guerrilla leaders. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that evidence of ethnic affiliation is occasionally contradictory and not clear-cut. In addition, while the Shona kinship system is basically patrilineal, which means that kinship through males is stressed over kinship through females, (M.F.C. Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples: An Ethnography of the Contemporary Shona, with Special Reference to their Religion, (Gwelo), 1976, p. 37.), a number of nationalist leaders "adopted" the ethnic group of their mothers; for instance, Josiah Tongogara and Joseph Msika. In such cases the adopted ethnic affiliation will be given first, with the patrilineal affiliation in brackets. The use by many guerrilla leaders of "Chimurenga", or "forest", names during the armed struggle to disguise their identities also adds to the problem of determining ethnic affiliation. In the text, the individual's "Chimurenga" name will be given first, with the real name in brackets.
sub-group, The Shona² (see Table 1) are a collection of
different dialect groups, who have occupied large areas
of Rhodesia for hundreds of years. There are
six Shona sub-groups identified by cultural,

1. Sources consulted on Rhodesia's ethnic composition
and relations between the Shona and the Ndebele
include: Terence Ranger, "The Rewriting of African
History during the Scramble: the Matabele Dominance in
Mashonaland", African Social Research, (Manchester), 4,December
1967, pp. 271-282; N.M.B. Bhebe, "Some Aspects of
Ndebele Relations with the Shona in the Nineteenth
Century", Rhodesian History (The Journal of the
Central African Historical Association), (Salisbury),
Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 31-38; D.N. Beach, "Ndebele Raiders
and Shona Power", Journal of African History, (Cambridge),
Vol. XV, No. 4, 1974, pp. 633-651; A.J. Dachs, "The
Course of African Resistance in Southern Rhodesia",
Rhodesian History, Vol. 1, 1970, pp. 95-101; Lawrence
Vambe, An Ill-Fated People: Zimbabwe Before and After
Rhodes, (London), 1972; William Rayner, The Tribe and
its Successor; An Account of African Traditional Life
and European Settlement in Southern Rhodesia, (London),
1962; David Chanaiva, The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case
of Colonial Historiography, Eastern African Studies,
VIII, (Syracuse University), February 1973; Hilda Kuper,
A.J.B. Hughes and J. van Velsen, "The Shona and Ndebele
of Southern Rhodesia", Ethnographic Survey of Africa,
(Southern Africa), Part I, (London), 1952; J.F. Holleman;
Shona Customary Law, (Cape Town), 1952; Harold D. Nelson,
et. al., Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia, (Washington),
1975; A.J.B. Hughes, Kin, Caste and Nation Among the
Rhodesian Ndebele, (Manchester); 1956, J.F. Holleman,
"Some 'Shona' Tribes of Southern Rhodesia", in
Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman, Seven Tribes of British
Central Africa, (Manchester), 1959, pp. 354-395; Herbert
J. Spiro, "The Rhodesians and Nyasaland", in Gwendolen
M. Carter (ed), Five African States Responses to
Diversity, (New York), 1963, pp. 361-470; and
Bourdillon, op. cit.

A third and much less identifiable form of ethnicity was
the influence of clan relationships. Greater research into
the background of individual nationalist leaders is
necessary before accurate assessments can be made about
the role of such relationships, and they are not dealt
with in any detail in this thesis.

2. See in particular Bourdillon, op. cit.
linguistic and historical differences, each of which occupies a different geographic area (see map, p. viii). The sub-groups are divided into a number of patrilineal clans, each of which has its own clan name (Mutapo), and sub-clans. The clan names (similar to English surnames) distinguish groups of kin related through the male line.¹

There is evidence of rivalry and conflict between the Shona sub-groups in the years before and after the arrival of the Ndebele. It seems, in fact, that the Ndebele exploited the jealousies and rivalries between the Shona sub-groups during their invasion of western Rhodesia.²

The Ndebele invaded what is today western Rhodesia in the 1830s and drove the Shona (mainly Kalanga, Rozvi and other peripheral ethnic groups, such as the Venda) from the area or integrated them into their own society.³

1. Ibid, p. 37.
3. At the time of their invasion north of the Limpopo the Ndebele were a heterogeneous ethnic group, composed of a Nguni nucleus and Sotho captives. The Sotho, captured during Chief Mzikazi's devastating campaigns in the interior of South Africa, were obliged to learn the Zulu language and adapt themselves to Nguni customs and were regarded by the Ndebele as second class citizens: the Ndebele were the elite; the Sotho the proletariat. The subjugation of the Shona peoples of western Rhodesia enabled the Ndebele to assimilate another ethnic group into their ranks. The Sotho people rose in stature and treated the Shona newcomers with contempt. Despite their enhanced status the Sotho were still regarded as inferior to the Ndebele; marriage or sexual intercourse between Nguni and non-Nguni members was forbidden.
TABLE 1

ETHNIC COMPOSITION 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage of Black Population</th>
<th>Approximate Numbers</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Black Population</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>North and East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHONA</td>
<td>5,005,000</td>
<td>South-east, centred around Fort Victoria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>1,430,000</td>
<td>Centred around Salisbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>1,170,000</td>
<td>East, centred around Umtali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>845,000</td>
<td>North-central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korekore</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>780,000</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rozvi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>South-east, centred on Chipinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndua</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>South and West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALANGA 2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>West, along the border with Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDEBELE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>910,000</td>
<td>Peripheral areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS (including Sena, Tonga, Venda, Sotho and Shangaan)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Adapted from Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, 1969 Population Census Interim Report II: The African Population, April 1969. In the 1969 census, 26 percent identified themselves only as Shona, with no particular sub-group, but the above percentage break-down of the sub-groups is generally accepted as accurate. The Rozvi seem to have been largely integrated into other Shona sub-groups and no longer really exist as a separate entity.

2. The Kalanga, though a Shona sub-group, relate more closely with the Ndebele. See below, p.10.
By the late nineteenth century, the Ndebele were divided into three castes: the original Ndebele (Zansi); the Sotho people captured during the Ndebele migration north earlier in the century (Enhla); and the more recently integrated Shona (Holi). Distinctions between the castes, although blurred over the years, remain a significant element in Ndebele society, with the critical distinction being between the Zansi and the other two castes.¹

Following the Ndebele invasion, and the subjugation of the Kalanga, the Ndebele engaged in periodic, and often brutal, raids on the Shona to the east. During this period the Shona acquired an understandable resentment for the Ndebele, while the Ndebele came to see the Shona as weak and cowardly. Even the lowest caste Ndebele, the Holi, considered themselves superior to the Shona. Differences between the Ndebele and the Shona continued into the twentieth century, and were often expressed through the formation of "tribal associations". In Bulawayo, during the first half of this century, for instance, the Matabele Home Society campaigned against the granting of trading licences to the Shona and to the non-indigenous peoples.

¹ In describing the clan divisions within Ndebele society, distinction will generally be made between the Zansi, who will be referred to as "Ndebele", and the Enhla and Holi, who will be grouped together as "Kalanga/Ndebele". "Ndebele", however, will also be used generically when the ethnic cluster is being compared with the Shona.
In 1954, the same society successfully opposed the naming of an African residential quarter by a Shona name. The Shona were also organised within societies, and the Mashona Cultural Society campaigned for Shona unity and the protection of Shona culture and traditions. One study written about Bulawayo during the early 1940s claims that "...tribalism was so rife that we had occasional fighting between the Shona and Ndebele, the former were so hated that most of them found it very difficult to stay in Bulawayo".¹

Modern commentators have either argued or assumed that these historic rivalries underlay the divisions in the nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s. In doing so, they generally saw ethnic affiliation as ascriptive; that is the Ndebele, the Shona and the Shona sub-groups were people bound together

by primordial loyalties.\(^1\) Hence, a man born of Karanga parents (or in fact, with just a Karanga father), and brought up in Karanga society, was a Karanga; politically he would consistently be motivated by atavistic sentiments and attachments. Using the ascriptive approach, ethnicity becomes a relatively fixed phenomenon: a Karanga, is a Karanga, is a Karanga. Ethnicity thus creates the basis for "continuous political loyalty to tightly knit groups".\(^2\)


It will be shown here that, as an explanation of division within and between the Rhodesian guerrilla groups, the ascriptive definition of ethnicity is simplistic. Ethnicity, it will be argued, is "situational". That is, ethnicity is only relevant in certain situations when "...those under scrutiny define their situation in terms of ethnic indicators and act on that determination."\(^1\)

The situational approach to ethnicity is more dynamic and complex. It argues that ethnic identities are fluid and that there may be over-lapping layers of ethnic belonging. Thus, in the Rhodesian context, the Karanga referred to above may see himself in different situations as a Shona, a Karanga, a Ndanga (a sub-group of the Karanga), the member of a chiefdom or as a clan member. At any given time he may see himself as any one of the above, or as none of them. The saliency that a member of an ethnic group assigns his ethnicity may wax and wane. Nevertheless, as Cynthia Enloe writes in her book *Ethnic Soldiers*:

> The outside observer should not mistake low saliency for the disappearance of ethnic consciousness altogether. The unmobilised ethnic group is an ethnic group in hibernation. If conditions pose opportunities or threats for which ethnic ties are germane, ethnicity may once again take on vitality and political significance.\(^2\)

1. Ibid., p. 39.

The thesis will show that numerous factors caused division within the Rhodesian guerrilla groups: personal ambition; differences over strategy and tactics; disputes between the guerrilla cadres and their political and military leaders; interference by interested African, Western and Communist states; ideological differences; paradoxically, the issue of unity itself; and finally, ethnic rivalries and animosities. Different factors were more important at different times, and the role of ethnicity also varied. Although ethnicity was seldom the initial cause of division it became important at a second stage, after rifts had begun to appear in the hierarchies of the guerrilla groups.

The existence of ethnic differences, loyalties and rivalries enabled guerrilla leaders to appeal to easily discernible and usually sympathetic groups in their endeavours to obtain or retain personal political power. Ethnicity served as the vehicle by which threatened political and military leaders sought to protect or enhance their positions. During times of crisis leaders used ethnic bonds to elicit support, and subsequently distributed rewards along ethnic lines to cement support. Post-division promotional patterns almost invariably favoured the ethnic group of the leader whose faction had emerged victorious. Conversely, at times of organisational stability, ethnicity was not politically relevant. At such times, individuals from various ethnic groups were often appointed to senior party positions.

* * * * *
The divisive history of Rhodesia's guerrilla groups during the 1960s and 1970s cannot be studied in isolation from the history of Rhodesia during this period; the major events of these years, the struggle for majority rule, the numerous efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement and the disjointed course of the guerrilla war, affected the internal cohesion of the exiled parties and their relations with each other. It is necessary, therefore, to include an account of these developments for the story of division to become intelligible, including the early history of the nationalist movement for, without some knowledge of the formative years before 1963, it is impossible to understand the intrigues of exile politics.

There are numerous problems associated with writing about a guerrilla war which is still in progress, or which has only recently ended. The extreme emotions engendered by the struggle often colour the reporting of events and much that has been written about the Rhodesian guerrilla groups and the armed struggle has had a propaganda purpose. In addition, there is no comprehensive study of the nationalist movement, and little scholarly work has been done on the origins and development of the guerrilla war. It has been possible to piece together the disparate history of Rhodesia's guerrilla groups by consulting the numerous publications of the exiled parties, writings of guerrilla leaders, official Rhodesian documents and a vast array of newspapers, magazines and books. These sources have been supplemented by interviews in Rhodesia in 1977 and 1980 with some of the main participants in the events of the
past two decades. Of those nationalist and guerrilla leaders who were interviewed most belonged, or had belonged, to ZANU, and almost all had resigned or been expelled from the Party following one or other of the innumerable fractures that beset ZANU during the 1970s. Those interviewed do not represent a cohesive group, and many were former rivals or bitter enemies. Interviews were essentially unstructured, although a set of similar questions about the background and political or military career was asked of each respondent. Most of those interviewed were extremely frank in discussing anything but the current political situation, and where possible their stories have been checked against published sources.

The assessment in this dissertation are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, some understanding of the reasons for the inability of the guerrilla groups to reconcile their differences, both internally and with each other, is important if one is to understand the nature of the conflict in Rhodesia. Indeed, the history of Zimbabwe since April 1980 seems sadly to indicate that the future of the country will be shaped as much by violent political division as by any other factor.
CHAPTER I

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1955-1964

The strengths and weaknesses of the Rhodesian nationalist movement and its array of guerrilla groups, and the basis of their future strategy, tactics and ideology, largely evolved during the decade prior to the flight into exile in 1964. Many of the leading nationalists of the 1960s and 1970s also established the basis of their future support during these formative years. In addition, the ethnic alliances and rivalries which developed during this period formed the foundations for some of the squabbles and internecine clashes which beset the nationalist movement during the next two decades.

The major split of 1963 divided the nationalist movement into two opposing and hostile camps. The nationalist movement was to remain polarised throughout the 14 years of armed struggle, and even after the establishment of a black majority rule government in 1980. While the fracture was caused primarily by differences over tactics, and by frustration at the lack of success of Joshua Nkomo's policies, these issues and problems were exacerbated by educational and personal differences. Nevertheless, the split, by broadly dividing the Shona and the Ndebele, did assume an ethnic complexion.
The modern nationalist movement in Rhodesia began to take root during the mid-1950s in the black townships which circle Salisbury and Bulawayo. Although the early development of the movement was slow and hesitant, apparent general black acceptance of white rule had begun to give way. During the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the burgeoning nationalist movement was united under the leadership of Joshua Mqabuko Nyongola Nkomo. An orator of some skill and magnetism, Nkomo was able against considerable odds and pressures to knit together disparate groups and personalities and lay the foundations of a strong movement.

Nkomo was born in June 1917 in the Semukwe Reserve, Matabeleland, about 100 kilometres south of Bulawayo. Although Ndebele, Nkomo was from the second strata of

Ndebele society (his grandfather was a Sotho). In 1947, after matriculating in South Africa, he returned to Rhodesia and was employed as a social worker by the Rhodesian Railways, the first African to be given such a position. Until 1949 he continued his education by working externally for a degree from the University of South Africa. After graduating, Nkomo took to wearing his gown and mortar-board around the streets of Bulawayo, much to the amazement of many whites. This penchant for ostentation remained with him. In later years, as "Commander-in-Chief" of a powerful guerrilla army, Nkomo wore the uniform of a Soviet general, complete with epaulettes and brass buttons.

By 1951 Nkomo was Secretary-General of the Rhodesian Railways African Employees' Association, the most powerful black organisation in the country. In 1952 he used this position as a stepping-stone to nationalist politics, when he was elected President of the nascent black nationalist group, the African National Congress (ANC). Despite Nkomo's efforts, the ANC was unable to attract a significant or national following and he was only able to keep the group alive in the Ndebele-dominated Bulawayo area.

In 1957 the remnants of the ANC merged with another small nationalist group, the Salisbury and Mashonaland-based African National Youth League (ANYL). James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Henry Matuku Hamadziripi, Edson Sithole and other prominent Shona had formed the ANYL in 1955. In order

1. Despite later claims that his parents were peasants, Nkomo was born into a well-to-do family who owned 1,000 head of cattle in the Matopo district. See Segal, op. cit., p. 207 and "People in the News: Joshua Nkomo", op. cit.

2. "Nkomo: Visionary or Traitor?", op. cit.
to attract Ndebele support, Nkomo was elected President of the new group, which was also called the African National Congress. According to a Rhodesian journalist, Lawrence Vambe, who was writing some years later, Chikerema and Nyandoro realised that it was necessary to involve the Ndebele in the leadership of the nationalist movement to prevent the polarisation of tribal support.\(^1\) Successor nationalist groups during the early 1960s continued this policy. Their executives came from a broad cross-section of Rhodesia's ethnic groups.

During the 1950s and early 1960s the ANC and other nationalist parties were ideologically moderate, working within the law and seeking black majority rule on the principle of one man, one vote. The ANC advocated little change in the existing political or economic structures.\(^2\) Despite its moderate image, the ANC was proscribed in early 1959. Nearly five hundred ANC members were detained, and some like Chikerema, Nyandoro, Hamadziripi

1. Lawrence Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, (London), 1976, p. 278. Also see Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 20 and 58.

2. The ANC's first statement of principles stressed the group's moderate objectives:

   Its aim is the national unity of all the inhabitants of the country in true partnership, regardless of race, colour or creed. It stands for a completely integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere, and in the social, political and economic advancement of all. It regards these objectives as the essential foundation of that partnership between peoples of all races, without which there can be no peaceful progress in this country...

   Quoted in John Parker, Rhodesia: Little White Island, (Johannesburg), 1972, p. 64.
and Edson Sithole were not released until late 1962 or 1963.¹

The National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed on 1 January 1960 to replace the ANC. Nkomo, who had not been arrested in 1959, was overseas. Many other prominent nationalist politicians remained in jail. Consequently a caretaker executive, headed by Michael Mawema, one of the few experienced nationalists still at large, was empowered to direct the group's affairs.²

In the latter half of 1960 - a time of great optimism within the nationalist movement - many university-educated Africans, a large proportion of them Manyika or Zezuru,³ became active in nationalist politics for the first time.⁴ Among them were Herbert Chitepo, Ndabaningi Sithole, Tichafa Parirenyatwa, Robert Mugabe and Edward


2. Mawema served from January to September 1960. Leopold Takawira held the position between September and the Party Congress in November.

3. The course of white settlement during the late 19th and 20th centuries generally brought the Manyika and Zezuru into closer contact with European educational institutions than other ethnic groups.

4. Of the ANC leaders, only Nkomo had completed tertiary education: Chikerema completed secondary education to junior certificate level and was later expelled from two universities for political activity; Nyandoro had only seven years' schooling; Moyo had a certificate in building and carpentry; and Msika also had a limited academic education. Initially, the educational background of the NDP leadership differed little from that of the ANC: Mawema had a primary teacher's certificate; Silundika and Takawira had attended university, but neither had obtained a degree; Moton Malianga had matriculated in South Africa; Stanlake Samkange had only two years' secondary education; and Enos Nkala had no secondary education at all. See Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., and Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, (London), 1972, pp. 140-141.
Ndhlovu. The success of the NDP leadership in attracting so many educated Africans was a turning point for the nationalist movement. Even at this early stage, however, tensions began to emerge between the educated and the less educated within the movement. During his first speech as an NDP member in June 1960, Robert Mugabe emphasised the need for educated members to be loyal to the elected leadership: "It will be necessary for graduates, doctors, lawyers and all others who join the NDP to accept the chosen leaders, even if these may not be university men". The inherent tensions were aggravated by the years of inactivity which followed and contributed to the major split in the nationalist movement in 1963, when many of the better-educated members, including Mugabe, Chitepo and Sithole, broke from Nkomo's leadership and formed a rival party.

Ndabaningi Sithole was perhaps the most prominent of the well-educated Africans to join the nationalist movement at this time. Sithole was born in July 1920 in a mud hut at Nyamandhlovu, north of Bulawayo.


2. According to Cary and Mitchell, from this time onwards, a more "precise, carefully thought-out policy - and a more militant and radical stance - replacing the redress of grievances as the main objectives of the movement", can be observed. Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 137.


His father was Ndau, a small Shona sub-group which straddles the border with Mozambique, and his mother was Ndebele. Sithole spent the first 13 years of his life in Matabeleland. His early education was fragmentary, but by the age of 19 he had passed his Standard VI. In 1941 he qualified as a primary school teacher, and spent the next few years teaching, mainly at kraal schools.

In 1950 Sithole joined the United Methodist Church. While teaching at the Mt. Selinda American Methodist Mission, which is in a Ndau area, he gained his Bachelor of Arts from the University of South Africa. In 1955 he was sent to the Newton Theological College near Boston in the United States. He stayed there for three years, studying theology and working on his first book, *African Nationalism*.  

Following his return to Rhodesia, Sithole decided that it was time to enter nationalist politics. He laid the foundations of his future political career in 1959 when he became President of the African Teachers' Association. Sithole's overriding political ambition, coupled with his intellect and persuasive manner, brought him quick promotion within the NDP. He soon gathered around himself a group of friends and supporters such as Mugabe, Takawira and Chitepo, and in the next few years drew heavily on these alliances to further his political career.

The inaugural Congress of the NDP was held in Salisbury in November 1960. Although Ndabningi Sithole and five others contested the presidency, Nkomo was elected, and returned to Rhodesia a few days later. Some of the better-educated blacks who had recently joined the movement, such as Sithole, Takawira, Mugabe and Chitepo, were also included in the Party's National Executive.

The NDP was banned on 10 December 1961 and on 17 December was reconstituted as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). ZAPU's goals, structure and activities were indistinguishable from its predecessor's. The ZAPU Executive, like the executives of the ANC and NDP, reflected an ethnic balance, both between the Ndebele and Shona, and between the Shona sub-groups. Realising the dangers of creating an ethnic imbalance these early nationalist parties selected executive members not only because of their ability, but also because of their ethnic affiliation. Office bearers in the National Executive included:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Nkomo</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tichafa Parirenyatwa</td>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndabaningi Sithole</td>
<td>National Chairman</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopold Takawira</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Malianga</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moton Malianga</td>
<td>Secretary for Public Affairs</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Chikererema</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Msika</td>
<td>Secretary for Youth Affairs</td>
<td>Zezuru (Shangaan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement Muchachi</td>
<td>National Organising Secretary</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Moyo</td>
<td>National Treasurer</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Washington and Moton Malianga are brothers. Both were born at Old Umtali Mission, a United Methodist Church settlement in Rhodesia's Eastern Districts - Washington in 1926 and Moton in 1930. Bishop Abel Muzorewa was born at the Mission in 1925 and another prominent nationalist figure, Simpson Mtambanengwe, in 1930.

2. Chikererema was still in detention.

3. Msika's father was Shangaan and his mother Zezuru. However, he was born in a Zezuru ethnic region (Chiweshe Reserve, Mazoe District) and is usually described as Zezuru.
ZAPU was banned on 20 September 1962 and many leading members were restricted for three months to the area surrounding their home villages; Nkomo, as before, was out of the country. Following pressure from Ndabaningi Sithole, Enoch Dumbutshena and Tanganyika's Julius Nyerere, Nkomo returned to Rhodesia, and he, too, was restricted. Nkomo now decided that no new movement would be formed to replace the proscribed ZAPU. His decision added to the growing opposition to his leadership within the Party Executive, and contributed to the split some months later.

By 1963 Nkomo realised that the new Rhodesian Front (RF) Government would soon declare independence unilaterally. He believed that the nationalists could best take advantage of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) if they were outside Rhodesia when it occurred, and were prepared to establish a government-in-exile which could compete with the white regime for international recognition. There was considerable resistance to this suggestion within the ZAPU Executive, but Nkomo persuaded the doubters that this strategy was approved by Nyerere and other African leaders.¹

The departure of the entire National Executive to Dar es Salaam in April 1963 stirred widespread African resentment in Rhodesia. On 12 April the Executive met Nyerere. Many were shocked when he rebuked them for leaving Rhodesia and learnt that he had not sanctioned

¹. Shamuyarira (1965), op. cit., p. 176.
their departure. Describing this meeting much later, Nathan Shamuyarira, a prominent nationalist politician, claimed that, "This was a moment of bitter disappointment in their personal relations with Nkomo, and became an obvious factor in the split three months later".  

The inaugural conference of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), held in Addis Ababa in May 1963, indicated once again to Ndabaningi Sithole and others the grave reservations many other African leaders had about Nkomo and his decision to move the Party Executive into exile. Immediately following the Addis Ababa conference, most members of the Executive returned to Dar es Salaam, and a power struggle ensued.

During their three months in Dar es Salaam, many members of the Executive had become increasingly concerned about ZAPU's lack of direction and the lack of progress and action. Criticism of Nkomo came mainly from Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Moton Malianga, Enos Nkala and Robert Mugabe. In July 1963 Enos Nkala, Nathan Shamuyarira and nine other ZAPU members urged Nkomo to give up the policy of "fighting from outside" and to face the Rhodesian Government head on in a policy of "confrontation". Nkomo declined their advice.

1. Ibid., p. 177
2. Nkomo later claimed that: The Conference went very well. Our case was well received. To suggest that there was any form of reluctance by any of the independent countries, because of one reason or another is the biggest lie ever told about our political and diplomatic relations with African countries. Ibid., p. 178
3. Ibid., p. 181
Opposition to Nkomo within the Executive was on four major issues: his policy of "circumvention" rather than "confrontation"; his refusal to form a new political party to replace the banned ZAPU; his indecisive leadership; and concern that many African leaders had expressed a lack of confidence in his leadership. Several National Executive meetings were held to discuss these problems and, more specifically, the question of leadership. Nkomo avoided the meetings and returned to Salisbury. Here he discovered that the dissidents within the Executive had been in contact with local ZAPU officials and were criticising his leadership. On 6 July Nkomo precipitated a split in the Party by denouncing his opponents as enemies of the nationalist movement and by sending a cable to Dar es Salaam suspending the rebellious National Executive members. Those named by Nkomo included Ndabaningi Sithole, Enos Nkala, Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe, Nathan Shamuyarira, Washington Malianga, Maurice Nyagumbo and Henry Hamadziripi.

A meeting to depose Nkomo was then convened in Dar es Salaam by the seven Executive members in Tanganyika: Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, Washington Malianga, Jason Moyo, Clement Muchachi and Joseph Msika. Moyo, Muchachi and Msika - three of the "old guard" nationalists and long-time supporters of Nkomo - declared the meeting unconstituional and left. Those remaining elected Sithole President in place of Nkomo.

The rebellious Executive members returned to Rhodesia and on 8 August 1963 the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed under Ndabaningi Sithole's leadership.¹

Basically, the split was provoked by differences over tactics, and by frustration at the lack of success of Nkomo's policies either in changing the attitude of the Rhodesian Government or in persuading the British Government to intervene. These issues and problems were exacerbated by educational and personal differences, and assumed an ethnic complexion. The following tables show the ethnic and educational backgrounds of the ZAPU and ZANU National Executives, and the dates at which the members began to participate in nationalist politics.

¹. The nascent ZANU came under immediate and at times intense criticism. It sought to answer its critics by attacking Nkomo and ZAPU, and insisting that only a break with the past could bring about change. In ZANU Times, one of the group's first publications, ZANU put its case:

People in the streets have expressed their disgust at the strive (sic) that goes on between the new party and the establishment. Let me tell you therefore, that the men who have banded together to form ZANU are driven by ... a strong impulse and a noble, unflinching mission in their hearts. You have no idea the kind of life those who are building the Party, the young pioneers, live in order to make their dream come true. They have given up their moneys, their comfort, their safety and the security of their families (in face of intimidation by Nkomo followers) to strive for evolution of a just government and a just strong nation. Make no mistake about it. Determined they are to get there.

"Editor's Letter" ZANU Times, No. 1, September 1963, published by the Regional Council of the Western Province of ZANU at No. 44 Lobengula Street, Bulawayo - SR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Joined Movement</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>Tertiary Education by 1963</th>
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<tr>
<td>Joshua Nkomo*</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Kalanga/</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
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<td>James Chikerema</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secretary for Presidential Affairs</td>
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<td>George Nyandoro</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Jason Moyo</td>
<td>Treasurer General</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Kalanga/</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Ndebele</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Shangaan)</td>
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<td>1961</td>
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<td>George Silundika</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>Kalanga/</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>early 1950s</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
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<td>Secretary for Youth &amp; Culture</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jane Ngwenya*</td>
<td>Secretary for Women</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Kalanga/</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<td>Willie Musarurwa*</td>
<td>Secretary for Public Relations</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel Munodawafa*</td>
<td>National Chairman</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enoch Dumbutshena</td>
<td>Legal Affairs Counsellor</td>
<td>late 1940s</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<td>William Mukarati*</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<td>Edward Ndhlouvu</td>
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<td>unknown</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
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<td>Boniface Mhariwa Gumbo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alois Z. Wingwiri*</td>
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<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>Tertiary Education</th>
<th>Tertiary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ndabaningi Sithole*</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopold Takawira*</td>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Yes, but failed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe*</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddison Zvobgo*</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Yes, but failed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enos Nkala*</td>
<td>Treasurer General</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Shamuyarira</td>
<td>Deputy Treasurer General</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Chitepo</td>
<td>National Chairman</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edson Sithole*</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Mawema*</td>
<td>National Organising Secretary</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanlake Samkange</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Publicity</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Secretary for Public Affairs</td>
<td>1962?</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Mzenda*</td>
<td>Deputy National Organising</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Nyagumbo*</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Matuku Hamadziripi</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson Mtambanengwe*</td>
<td>Secretary for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Manyika (Ndau)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisha Mutasa</td>
<td>Secretary for Welfare &amp; Legal Affairs</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moton Malianga*</td>
<td>Secretary for Youth and Culture</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Tekere*</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Youth and Culture</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Detained in 1964
1. There is some confusion about the composition of the ZANU National Executive following the Party Congress in May 1964. Some members appointed to the Executive after the split from ZAPU in 1963 were replaced or assumed different positions. There is no single, comprehensive list of the Executive in May 1964, and the following table is drawn from numerous sources, including Nathan Shamuyarira, "The Majority Parties 2: ZANU", Venture, (London), Vol. 17, No. 9, October 1965, p. 31. Francis Mgazimbi Musembure and Mrs Maria Chakonda may, however, also have been Central Committee members; see Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism, (London), second edition, p. 43.

2. Maurice Nyagumbo joined ZANU at its inception in August 1963 as the Party's first Organising Secretary. He lost this position to Mawema at the May 1964 Party Congress and was elected as Deputy Secretary for Public Affairs. He was detained in 1964 and spent most of the next 15 years in detention. See Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 71 and 72, and Diana Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe: Who's Who 1980, (Salisbury), 1980, pp. 52 and 54.

3. Although Mtambanengwe's father was Ndau, he was born at Old Umtali Mission in the Eastern Districts, and was also brought up in this essentially Manyika area. He is generally considered to be Manyika, and according to one report is the nephew of Bishop Abel Muzorewa (Muzorewa was born at Old Umtali Mission in 1925, and Mtambanengwe in 1930). See Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 198, and Godwin Matatu, "A Still Birth in Zimbabwe", Africa, (London), No. 94, June 1979, p. 22.
Some ZAPU leaders accused ZANU of dividing the nationalist movement along "tribal" lines - between the Ndebele and the Shona. For instance, Willie Musarurwa, a long-time supporter of Nkomo, angrily criticised ZANU in a statement soon after the division:

Despite its leaders' protestations ZANU has, for the first time, divided Zimbabweans along the tribal seams. Those who started canvassing for the Party purposely left out Matabeleland and the people have naturally reacted accordingly. There are some who are unashamedly preaching Mashona (particularly Makaranga) supremacy. They cannot be persuaded that this is a very dangerous gospel to preach - and a very antiquated one in an Africa that is striving to be one.

Despite the assertions of Musarurwa and others, the split did not take place along straight Shona-Ndebele lines. As the tables indicate, it was essentially a cleavage between an alliance of the Kalanga/Ndebele, Ndebele and Zezuru - who had established the nationalist movement in the mid-1950s, and who generally had little formal education - and those well-educated Shona who had joined the movement in about 1960. There was only one Ndebele in the ZANU National Executive; the rest were Shona - two Ndau, five Karanga, three Zezuru and seven Manyika. All but six members had received some form of tertiary education; and the majority had first entered nationalist politics in 1960 or the late 1950s. In contrast, the ZAPU Executive contained one Ndebele, five Kalanga/Ndebele, seven Zezuru, two Karanga, and one Manyika; only five had received tertiary education; and the vast majority had joined the nationalist movement during the early and mid-1950s.

Following the split, the word "intellectual" was used pejoratively by ZANU's opponents. Abel Muzorewa, writing many years later, claimed that "ZAPU... leaders exhorted the masses to oppose ZANU as the party of the educated elite. School teachers, nurses, doctors and even ministers like myself were to be viewed as the 'enemy'."

Such accusations continued even into the 1970s. In 1972, for instance, George Silundika, a leader of ZAPU's exiled wing, in describing the 1963 split and the establishment of ZANU, claimed that "the founders of ZANU .... inclined toward a legalist elitist movement, led by people with degrees and emphasising 'intellectual' status as a necessary element of leadership." ZANU's "intellectual" image was, in fact, a source of weakness for the Party, limiting its support from the less-educated man-in-the-street and the "tribal" Africans - who were generally distrustful of highly-educated Africans as being pseudo-Europeans.

In early August, in response to the formation of ZANU, Nkomo called a mass meeting of Party members at Cold Comfort Farm, a few kilometres out of Salisbury. The People's Caretaker Council (PCC), in fact ZAPU without the ZANU members, was formed. In an effort to retain influence


3. Interviews in Depth: Zimbabwe ZAPU '2' - George Silundika, (Richmond), 1974, p. 20; Liberation Support Movement's Ole Gjerstad's interview with Silundika.

4. Members and officials outside Rhodesia continued to call the Party ZAPU, and to avoid confusion the name PCC will be avoided; Day (1967), op. cit., p. 80.
at the grassroots level, Nkomo reorganised the old ZAPU party structure by decentralising the organisation and creating smaller and more numerous branches. Partly as a result of this reorganisation, ZAPU remained, at least until the early 1970s, larger and more influential than its ZANU rival. Despite the efforts of its well-educated and articulate Executive ZANU was unable to present a serious challenge to the dominant position of ZAPU, and even during the early years of exile ZANU remained very much a minority Party.

During late 1963 and early 1964, ZANU's efforts to recruit members and to consolidate its position often led to violent clashes with ZAPU members. The clashes, which were confined mainly to High Fields and the Salisbury area, led directly to the banning of the two parties in August 1964. Nkomo had been detained some months earlier, in April 1964. Many other ZAPU and ZANU members were arrested during the year, and the infrastructure of both groups was virtually destroyed. By the end of 1964 most leaders from the two groups were in detention, including Joshua Nkomo, Joseph Msika, Josiah Chinamano, Lazarus Nkala, Clement Muchachi, Willie Musarurwa, Samuel Munodawafa and Jane Ngwenya of ZAPU, and Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe, Eddison Zvobgo, Simon Mzenda, Edgar Tekere, Maurice Nyagumbo and Moton Malianga of ZANU. Most spent the next 10 years in detention.

* * * *

In the decade between 1955 and 1964 the nationalist movement emerged as an important factor in Rhodesian politics. The imprisonment of many of its leaders in 1959, and again in 1964, and the proscription of successive nationalist parties, retarded the development of the movement but failed to prevent it from growing in popularity and influence. The formative years also saw the foundation of future political alliances and the emergence of personal tensions and animosities. Despite Nkomo's predominant position in most nationalist parties during this early period, other contenders for leadership emerged, and attracted cliques of followers, based partly on ethnic affinity, but also on shared experiences and common ambitions. The establishment of such cliques later helped to cause rifts which, as will be shown, often developed along clear ethnic lines.

The ZAPU/ZANU split of 1963 was largely the result of dissatisfaction with Nkomo's leadership, and the failure of his strategy and tactics. Those who supported Nkomo were generally long-time colleagues, who had been involved with him since the early days of the nationalist movement, and were less well-educated than the ZANU dissidents. Nevertheless, ethnicity seems also to have played a part in the fracture. An examination of the National Executives of the two parties shows that the split did, at least in broad terms, take place along ethnic lines: ZANU's leadership was almost exclusively Shona; while ZAPU's represented an alliance of Kalanga/Ndebele, Ndebele and Zezuru. Because of the importance and extent of the cleavage, nationalist leaders sought support mainly from members of their
own ethnic group to bolster their own position, or to strengthen that of their faction. This first, and somewhat constrained, manipulation of ethnicity served as a foretaste of future and more obvious divisions along ethnic lines. Time reinforced the 1963 Shona/Ndebele division, while in the early 1970s the Zezuru deserted both ZAPU and ZANU.
CHAPTER II

INTO EXILE: 1964-1966

Although Rhodesian nationalists had experimented with violence in the early 1960s, generally they had tried to change the political system by working within it. The continuing failure of constitutional methods, government attacks on successive nationalist parties, and the arrest of most of their leaders forced the nationalists to turn increasingly to organised violence to achieve their objectives. In late 1963 and 1964 a number of senior ZAPU and ZANU members went into exile and began seriously to prepare for the armed struggle.

Although both nationalist parties remained under the nominal control of their elected leaders, Nkomo and Sithole, and limited communication was possible between the exiles and their imprisoned leaders, their first priority was to establish leadership structures in exile.

1. In 1962 and 1963 a small group calling itself the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) conducted a number of sabotage attacks, particularly in the eastern districts. Although ZAPU denied any connection with the ZLA, the group was led by a triumvirate of ZAPU Executive members and a Youth leader. See Anthony R. Wilkinson, "Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and Assessment", Adelphi Paper, No. 100, (London), Autumn 1973, p. 6; and Day (1967), op. cit., p. 104.

The broad ethnic division between ZAPU and ZANU, which had been evident in their 1963/64 National Executives, reappeared in their exile hierarchies. ZAPU remained an essentially Ndebele and Zezuru-based organisation, while ZANU's leaders were all from sub-groups of the Shona.

James Chikerema, the ZAPU Vice President, Noel Mukono, in charge of establishing ZANU's armed wing, and Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's National Chairman, isolated from developments in Rhodesia, and engaged primarily in keeping their fledgling parties alive, were beset by numerous and major problems during the first years of exile. The personal antagonisms and inter-Party clashes that had accompanied the formation of ZANU in 1963 followed the nationalists into exile, and clashes between rival groups of supporters occurred with some frequency. The vital search for secure and friendly host countries, in which they could establish training camps, supply dumps and operational headquarters, and for donors prepared to supply instructors, and the massive amounts of material necessary to equip their growing armies, aggravated the divisions between ZAPU and ZANU, and also led to their eventual identification with the Soviet Union and China respectively. While relations between ZAPU and ZANU remained bad, neither party suffered from serious internal dissension during this period, and there were few, if any, signs of ethnic politicking.
ZAPU - Chikerema

In late 1963 and 1964, in an effort to ensure ZAPU's continued existence if it was banned, Nkomo sent abroad five National Executive members, most of whom had already spent some time in detention: James Chikerema; Jason Moyo; George Silundika; Edward Ndhlovu; and George Nyandoro. Chikerema was the most senior of these ZAPU officials, and following Nkomo's arrest in April 1964 Chikerema was designated Acting President for as long as Nkomo, ZAPU's "President for life", was detained. As one of the founders of the Rhodesian nationalist movement, Chikerema's credentials were exemplary. He was an experienced organiser, had good contacts in the Soviet Union and China, and was both charismatic and popular. During the next decade, however, his penchant for power, political intrigue and manoeuvre often led him to clash with friends and comrades. Perhaps more than any other nationalist leader, Chikerema used his ethnic background to further his political career. ZAPU suffered accordingly during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

1. Nkomo wanted those who had already been imprisoned to serve the Party from exile.

2. Silundika was the first NDP Representative in Cairo in mid-1960, and was restricted in Rhodesia between late 1962 and 1963; Day (1967), op. cit., p. 96.

3. Ndhlovu was the NDP Representative in Accra in late 1961, and ZAPU Representative in Cairo during 1962; Ibid., p. 97. At the time Ndhlovu was stationed in Dar es Salaam.


Robert James Dambaza Chikerema (known as "Chik") was born in the Zwimba Reserve, a Zezuru area, near Salisbury in May 1925.\(^1\) His childhood was hard and lonely.\(^2\) He received his early education at the Kutama Mission School, where his father taught. He then went to Natal and Cape Town for his secondary and uncompleted tertiary education. His political activities began at Marianhill where he joined the SA ANC and later the South African Communist Party.\(^3\)

1. The Zwimba Tribal Trust Land produced a disproportionate number of nationalist figures during the 1920s. Apart from Chikerema, Stanlake Samkange (1922), Chief Jeremiah Chirau (1923), Willie Musarurwa (1927), and Robert Mugabe (1928) were all born there.

2. According to Lawrence Vambe, Chikerema's "...father always insisted that he must grow up in perfect obedience to parental authority... He believed that children must learn to suffer and to stand up for what was right and just and for their Christian faith. He was not squeamish about using the cane, and young Robert received more than his fair share of corporal punishment from his father". Vambe (1976), op. cit., p. 275.

3. Ibid., p.276. Vambe sees this as a rejection of his parental and Christian upbringing.
In 1953 he discovered he was to be arrested and fled back to Rhodesia.1

From 1955 Chikerema devoted his time to the nationalist movement and he was involved in the establishment of the ANYL and the reformed ANC. His activities in these early nationalist parties, however, quickly attracted the attention of the authorities, and in 1959 he was arrested and detained. He was released in 1963 and, on Nkomo's advice, left the country.

At first Chikerema was not instructed to direct ZAPU's activities from abroad, but rather to coordinate the Party's overseas activities.2 Consequently, during these early years of exile, Chikerema travelled extensively in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (which he visited on several occasions) and Asia;3 as he explained some years later,

1. Ibid. According to Vambe, Chikerema's short stay in South Africa had altered his perception of white-black relations, and of society in general:

...the Cape was then one area in British Southern Africa where the concept of freedom for all men, black and white, was still upheld both in theory and to a great extent in practice. There was considerable racial tolerance and segregation was at a minimum...

In Cape Town he had come into contact with some of the most eminent non-white intellectuals in South Africa, men and women with experience in resisting aggression. Now he was to begin to use this knowledge among his own people who were sorely in need of sophisticated leaders.

2. Day (1967), op. cit., p.87; Nkomo was still largely controlling ZAPU from detention.

3. Ibid., p.102.
"...to negotiate for a bigger intake of our cadres for military training...and to seek financial and material support".¹ Little effort was made by Chikerema and his colleagues during 1963 and 1964 to establish a permanent ZAPU headquarters in exile, and initially they moved between ZAPU's foreign liaison offices, particularly those in Dar es Salaam (where the ZAPU Executive had been based during 1962 and 1963) and Lusaka.² However, during the second half of 1964, and certainly by the time of Zambia's


2. Successive Rhodesian nationalist groups had maintained offices in a number of African countries during the early 1960s, and although at the time of the 1963 split several ZAPU representatives had defected to ZANU, the Party moved quickly to reestablish the offices and appoint new representatives. (Day (1967), op. cit.). Following ZAPU's banning in Rhodesia in August 1964 these external offices became increasingly important to the Party: issuing press statements; producing periodicals; and seeking out financial, material and training assistance from their host country. By late 1964, ZAPU had quite senior Party members based in at least five independent African countries: Zambia (Amos Ngwenya); Tanzania (B.S. Madheia); Ghana (Ronald Isaac Sibanda); Egypt (Stephen Nkomo, the Party President's younger brother); and Algeria (Moloaoa Noko).
independence in October 1964, Chikerema had firmly established ZAPU's headquarters in Lusaka.¹

In Lusaka, Chikerema formed a five-man External Liaison Committee, composed of those National Executive members who were in exile, to direct the external affairs of the Party:

**TABLE 5  ZAPU EXTERNAL LIAISON COMMITTEE: 1964-1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Chikerema</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Nyandoro</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Moyo</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Silundika</td>
<td>Secretary for Publicity and Information</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Ndhlolvu</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Kaunda had strongly and publicly supported Nkomo when ZANU was formed, and in April 1964 had, in fact, announced his recognition of Nkomo as the "leader of the Southern Rhodesian people". He now provided ZAPU with almost exclusive support. The extent of Kaunda's support for ZAPU, and Nkomo in particular, provided the Party with a secure sanctuary and an important and influential friend in African and international forums. See, for instance, "Kaunda on PCC-ZANU Split", African Pilot, (Salisbury), Vol. 1, No. 5, 1965 (no date), pp. 1 and 2. During the late 1960s, as ZAPU's fortunes declined, and ZANU emerged as the more effective of the two guerrilla groups, Kaunda was forced to reconsider his stance, and Zambia provided support to both groups, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm and commitment. See Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict, (London), 1974, p.19; and Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence, (Boulder), 1979, p.247.
According to Silundika, during the first years of exile, "...the leadership used to discuss all matters freely, decide collectively and accept responsibility collectively".\(^1\) At least until the late 1960s, the External Liaison Committee seems to have functioned fairly smoothly, with no signs of strain or difficulty between the Zezuru and Kalanga/Ndebele members of the Committee. However, the frustrations of life in exile, the failure of ZAPU's first guerrilla operations, and Chikerema's aggressive and somewhat dictatorial style of leadership, eventually led to the collapse of the leadership structure and the polarisation of the hierarchy along ethnic lines, with the Zezuru - Chikerema and Nyandoro - opposed by the Kalanga/Ndebele - Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu.

One of Chikerema's primary tasks in exile was to build up ZAPU's armed wing. In 1959 Nkomo had arranged military training in China for six NDP members,\(^2\) and some limited assistance was subsequently provided by the Soviet Union.\(^3\) A Special Affairs Department,

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headed by Chikerema, was later established, within which there was a five-man War Council. As Chikerema and Moyo were the only members of the War Council in exile in Lusaka, the main responsibility for establishing the army, and later of directing the armed struggle, lay with them. However, Moyo later claimed that between 1964 and late 1967 "...there was an element of passiveness on the part of the War Council - i.e. no participation in the spade work; in the camps their participation was lukewarm". According to Moyo, the real work of establishing the army, then known as the Zimbabwe Revolutionary People's Army, was done by the Party's Military Command.

There is little substantive information about the composition of the Military Command, but the most senior


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
ZAPU military personnel during the second half of the 1960s included:¹

TABLE 6 ZAPU MILITARY COMMAND - LATE 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akim Ndlovu</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Dube (Sotsha Ngwenya)</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robson Manyika</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumiso Dabengwa</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred &quot;Nikita&quot; Mangena</td>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lookout Masuku (Lameck Mafela)</td>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Mpoko</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Shona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrose Mutiniri</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like the External Liaison Committee, ZAPU's military wing was generally balanced between Kalanga/Ndebele and Shona, particularly Zezuru. The Military Command, to an even greater extent than the political leadership, seems to have acted as a cohesive body during this period, and there were no signs of divisions developing along ethnic lines. However, the disintegration some years later of the External Liaison Committee into two ethnic factions - Kalanga/Ndebele and Zezuru - also affected the military leadership, and when ZAPU split irrevocably in 1970/71, the Zezuru military elite joined Chikerema and Nyandoro in breaking with the Party.

¹ Much of the information on the composition of the ZAPU military wing comes from interviews held in Salisbury during February and March 1980 with former ZANLA members who worked with ZAPU's armed wing for some time, particularly with Webster Gwauya who was interviewed in Salisbury on 23 March 1980.
Following the 1963 split, ZAPU and ZANU continued for a short period to receive support from both China and the Soviet Union. By 1965 the growing ideological dispute and the intense rivalry between the two powers led to a polarisation of support, with Moscow supporting ZAPU, and Peking backing ZANU.\(^1\) The training of ZAPU recruits in the Soviet Union took place on a fairly large scale from late 1963 onwards. ZAPU's growing reliance on Soviet instruction, and material and financial assistance, as well as contact by junior and senior cadres with Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism, led to a gradual reassessment and re-orientation of the Party's objectives.

The personal rivalries, ethnic antagonisms and inter-Party clashes that had accompanied the formation of ZANU, followed ZAPU and ZANU into exile. Relations between the two nationalist parties remained tense throughout the 1960s, and clashes between rival groups of members and supporters were not uncommon in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam.\(^2\)


2. As Nathan Shamuyarira noted some years later: "In African capitals and at international and regional conferences, the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU devoted more time to their inter-party rivalry than to the fight against their common enemy." Nathan Shamuyarira, "National Liberation through Self-Reliance in Rhodesia, 1956-1972", (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1976), p.490; quoted in Anglin and Shaw, op. cit., p.250.
Chikerema and his fellow exiled National Executive members saw ZAPU as the only authentic voice of the people of Zimbabwe. Contact between ZAPU and ZANU members was forbidden, and ZAPU leaders spent a good deal of their time and energy attacking ZANU at international forums and through innumerable mimeographed circulars and periodicals. Chikerema, for instance, in a statement in June 1964 described ZANU as "...a handful of misguided and power-hungry so-called intellectuals...". ¹ Later in June, a ZAPU publication distributed in Accra echoed Chikerema's disparaging remarks:

Small men, like a captured rabbit in an enclosure, tend to hit their heads against solid rocks. As a result of that, they find their heads bleeding out the little brain which was contained therein, and leaving the rocks as solid as it has been (sic).

This is the same case with the small men in the Zimbabwe African National Union. They are knocking their little heads against the solidarity built and cared for by the people of Zimbabwe. ²

In May 1965 a ZAPU pamphlet accused ZANU of being a creature of "imperialism", and boasted of the Party's demise:

ZANU was watered, tended by the imperialists till it sprouted like a seedling in a garden... But the attempt was ill-conceived, for the imperialists had underestimated the peoples' determination to crush everything that was meant to delay their march to freedom... The peoples' rage crushed and exterminated the parasitical and cancerous clique within three months. By October 1963, ZANU was a forgotten factor in Zimbabwe except to the few outside the country who were misled or had a hand in its formation who continuously harped about its existence. ³


2. "The So-Called 'ZANU Inaugural Congress'", The Zimbabwe Review, (Accra), 29 June 1964 (no volume or number).

ZANU responded to these public attacks with stinging diatribes against ZAPU leaders, but as its resources were smaller, so was the amount and probably the effect of its criticism.

Despite numerous attempts by the OAU and individual African states, ZAPU leaders consistently refused to countenance unity with ZANU. ZAPU's attitude towards unity with ZANU was one of contempt: ZANU did not exist as a factor in nationalist politics, and those who had broken away should return to the fold.

On occasion, the rivalry between the two nationalist parties led to violent clashes and gun battles; usually the fighting seems to have been initiated by ZAPU. In mid-1964, fighting between ZAPU and ZANU members compelled Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) to issue a "stern warning" that it was "not prepared to allow Northern Rhodesia to be a fighting ground between members of political parties of other countries", and that it was prepared to deport those responsible and to close down party offices.

1. See, for instance, "The PCC Clique Faces a Revolt from its Erstwhile Supporters", Chimurenga: ZANU Special Bulletin, (no place of publication), 27 December 1965, pp. 3 and 4; ZANU criticism of Chikerema and Nyandoro in particular.

2. For instance, in mid-1965, Jason Moyo described a resolution by an OAU Council of Ministers' Meeting, calling on ZAPU and ZANU to unite, as a scandal and an insult to Zimbabwe's black majority:

   Come what may ZAPU will never unite with a clique of misguided individuals who were inspired by the imperialists to attempt to destroy the unity of the people of Zimbabwe...

Government recognition "did not entitle members of ZAPU to eliminate their rivals by methods which disturbed the peace of the country".¹ However, incidents continued to take place. In early April 1965, for instance, Zambian Police raided a house in Lusaka, and arrested nine ZAPU members who had kidnapped two ZANU cadres, and in March 1966, fighting broke out amongst a crowd of 300 ZAPU and ZANU members at Ndola.² These clashes between ZAPU and ZANU members, which continued into the 1970s, were caused by organisational rivalries. However, the clashes, by pitting Ndebele against Shona, also reinforced the ethnic division between the two parties.


2. The trouble began when ZAPU learned that Herbert Chitepo, the ZANU National Chairman, was addressing his members inside the UNIP main office. According to a UNIP official ZAPU believed that the decision to allow ZANU to hold its meeting in the UNIP office indicated that ZAPU was losing official Zambian recognition. Africa Research Bulletin, op. cit., 1-31 March 1966, p. 497.
In April 1964, when Joshua Nkomo and many other ZAPU leaders were detained, Ndabaningi Sithole and most of ZANU's Executive members remained free. Yet the Party did not take the precautionary moves that ZAPU had made in anticipation of a further crack-down on the nationalist movement. ZANU, despite the more militant attitude of its leadership, was consequently less prepared for the move into exile in 1964.

ZANU's Gwelo Congress in May 1964 established the Party's armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The ZANU guerrilla commander Josiah Tongogara explained some years later that "they could not exactly call it a liberation army so it was constituted as a unit of the Party's Department of Public Affairs". The Department was headed by a 24-year old journalist and founder-member of ZANU, Noel Mukono. In July 1964 Mukono, who had been detained for a short period in June, fled to Blantyre. He was probably accompanied by Stanley Parirewa, a ZANU


2. There is little published information available on Mukono. Some personal details were provided during an interview in Salisbury on 8 February 1980. Also see brief biography of Mukono, "Former journalist and detainee", Rhodesia Herald, 17 August 1979, following his election as a Member of Parliament.

3. Interview with Mukono, Salisbury, 8 February 1980.
representative in Lusaka prior to his expulsion by Kaunda in June 1964.\(^1\)

Mukono - a Manyika - and to a lesser extent, Parirewa - a Zezuru - were responsible between 1964 and 1965 for laying the foundations for ZANU's guerrilla army. Most other leading figures involved in the establishment of ZANLA were also from the Manyika or Zezuru sub-groups, and a close and lasting relationship developed between them and Mukono. The Karanga, the other main Shona sub-group represented in ZANU's 1964 National Executive, did not play any major role in the establishment of the Party's armed wing during the first year or two of exile.

A large number of senior and middle level ZANU officials, many of whom were Karanga, who would have assumed leadership positions in exile with Mukono and Parirewa decided instead to further their education. Henry Hamadziripi, for instance, ZANU's highest ranking Karanga not in detention, left Rhodesia after the Gwelo Congress and travelled to Dar es Salaam. Late in 1964, after spending about six months

\(^1\) Day (1967), op. cit., p.99. In Blantyre, Mukono and Parirewa received the enthusiastic support of Hastings Banda, President of the nationalist Malawi Congress Party, who had supported ZANU since its formation. (Day (1967), op. cit., p.71). Banda mistrusted Nkomo and saw Sithole as "...more able, honest and sincere", (Ibid.). To some extent Banda's support during this period nullified the loss of Zambian assistance and provided ZANU leaders and cadres with a temporary, but secure, sanctuary.
assisting Herbert Chitepo, Hamadziripi went to London to pursue his studies. Here he joined Simpson Mtambanengwe, ZANU's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and for a time the Party's Chief Representative in London. Although Hamadziripi and Mtambanengwe joined Mukono in Lusaka in 1965, other ZANU officials, such as Nathan Shamuyarira, Deputy Treasurer General, Rugare Gumbo, Kumbirai Kangai, Mukudzei Mudzi, Zebediah Gamanya and many other more junior Party members spent the second half of the 1960s at universities in Britain and the United States. Although their absence during this period probably detracted from ZANU's effectiveness, their reintegration into ZANU's political structure during the late 1960s and early 1970s was largely responsible for the revitalisation of the Party. At the same time, however, the return of these mainly Karanga officials placed new strains on the fine ethnic balance within the Party's leadership.

During the early 1960s, Ghana was a magnet for African revolutionaries and among the many who were attracted by Kwame Nkrumah's pan-Africanism and promises of military

1. Interview with Henry Hamadziripi, Salisbury, 26 March 1980. Also see "S.R. African Granted UK Permit", Rhodesia Herald, 14 October 1964. In 1962, the ZAPU National Executive had authorised Hamadziripi to further his education at Ruskin College, Oxford. In late 1965, ZANU requested that he return to Africa, and he left Oxford three months before his final exams.

2. Mtambanengwe had also left Rhodesia during 1964; Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., p.199.

3. By the late 1970s there were as many as twenty British and American-educated Ph.Ds within ZANU's hierarchy.
assistance and training was the small group of ZANU leaders based in Blantyre and Dar es Salaam. In the latter part of 1964, Mukono, following an unsuccessful Rhodesian attempt to kidnap him, accompanied by Stanley Parirewa, Felix Santana and eight other ZANU members, flew to Ghana in a Russian plane provided by Nkrumah. ZANU established an office in Accra, and between September 1964 and March 1965 about 40 ZANU members received guerrilla and sabotage training from Ghanaian and, more importantly, Chinese instructors.

1. Interview with Mukono, Salisbury, 8 February 1980.

2. The office was initially run by Davis M'gabe and then by Parirewa, who became responsible for the training program.


The main emphasis was spent on teaching us sabotage: how to use British-made dynamite to blow a bridge or building, throwing Chinese hand grenades and how to make our own bombs.

Very little time was spent on teaching us to use rifles and sub-machine guns, on the grounds that we were not to engage in positional warfare.

In lectures we were taught the principles of war and guerrilla tactics according to Mao Tse-tung, given lectures on the Peoples' Army of China and shown film of how they fought the Japanese. We also had lessons on how and from where to begin the Zimbabwe Revolution.

This first, limited and somewhat tentative Chinese involvement with ZANU was largely the product of the Sino/Soviet split. In January 1964 Chikerema had visited Peking at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and relations between ZAPU and China seemed good. However, during the course of 1964, as China's ideological struggle with the Soviet Union grew more pronounced, Peking embarked on an independent foreign policy, both on a State-to-State level and on a Party-to-Party level. As most of the major African guerrilla groups moved into the Soviet orbit because of their long-standing ties with the USSR, China grasped the only option left open to it and began to support "extremist splinter groups". ZANU fell into this category and soon began to receive substantial Chinese assistance.

ZANU's relations with China developed gradually during the 1960s, and by the early 1970s the Party was proclaiming its official ideology to be "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought". Whilst ZANU's political leadership continued to see the developing relationship with China as

1. Day (1967), op. cit., p.102. Chikerema claims to have addressed 2,000,000 people in China's Tien an Men Square during his visit, Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., p.59.

2. According to Day (1967), op. cit., p.102, China provided ZAPU officials in Dar es Salaam with $14,000 during this period.

3. Alan Hutchison, China's African Revolution, (London), 1975, p.240: China has traditionally supported the smaller African guerrilla groups. After about 1970, however, China also lent considerable support to several of the more prominent, and often leading, African guerrilla groups.
a means of gaining much needed material and training support, many ZANLA members, who were trained in the PRC, came to see the fight for Zimbabwe's liberation as part of a broader struggle against "imperialism", "colonialism" and "international capitalism". During the mid-1970s, ideological differences contributed to a number of divisions which split the Party and seriously affected its fighting ability.

Mukono does not seem to have stayed in Accra for long and, by late 1964 or early 1965, he was in Dar es Salaam, where he continued to build-up ZANU's exile structures and plan for the coming armed struggle. In March 1965, at Mbeya on the Tanzanian/Zambian border, Mukono briefed a number of the 40 or so ZANU members who had completed their training course in Ghana. Their orders were to attack white-owned farms, kill whites and to disrupt the May 1965 General Elections in Rhodesia. The primary intention was still to provoke British intervention. Beginning in April, the groups crossed in to Rhodesia, where most were quickly captured.

1. The ZANU office in Dar es Salaam during this period was headed by Wilfred Pasipanodya; Day (1967), op. cit., p.98.
4. Amongst those arrested and detained was Emmerson Mnangagwa, who, in early 1980 became a senior minister in independent Zimbabwe's first government.
Despite the failure of these initial attempts at organised violence, ZANU continued to send cadres for training. At least four members of the group which had trained in Ghana—Felix Santana, William Ndangana, Bernard Mutuma and Cilas Mushonga—were sent to China for further instruction. After their return, ZANU established a training camp at Chunya, about 33 kilometres from Mbeya, where Santana, the camp commander responsible for training, Ndangana, Mutuma and Mushonga trained other ZANU recruits.  

This first group of ZANU "militants", none of whom seem to have been Karanga, largely owed their positions and hence their loyalty to Mukono. In 1966 a second ZANU group, this time containing a large proportion of Karanga, were sent to China. The group of 28 cadres included Josiah Tongogara, Cletos Chigowe and Justin Chauke, all of whom assumed senior positions within ZANU's nascent military wing on their return.

In late 1965, following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the ZANU Central Committee, meeting in detention at Sikombela, appointed Herbert Chitepo Director of External Affairs. The Central Committee was concerned that "adequate machinery" had not been established to utilise the "skills and talent" of those ZANU members

1. Interview with Joseph Chimurenga, Salisbury, 23 March 1980.
who had been trained in Ghana and China,\(^1\) and it was decided "...that those few members of the Central Committee who were outside should create a structure for the prosecution of the armed struggle".\(^2\) Chitepo, the Party National Chairman, was the senior ZANU member in exile and he was consequently charged "...with the task of leading the armed struggle from outside".\(^3\) Chitepo was to play a central role in moulding the inchoate ZANU into a strong guerrilla force.

Chitepo, who was born on 5 June 1923 near Bonda in the Manyika tribal area of eastern Rhodesia, bore little resemblance to the fiery and dictatorial Chikerema.\(^4\) Chitepo's father died when he was three and he spent most of his youth, and received his early education, at mission schools near Inyanga. At twenty, he travelled to South Africa to continue his education. In 1949 he graduated from Hare College with a Bachelor of Arts. He then travelled to London where he worked as a research assistant in Chishona at the London School of Oriental and African Studies. In 1954, after further study in London, he became a barrister.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Chitepo returned to Rhodesia in the mid-1950s and set up practice. This required an amendment to the Land Apportionment Act to enable him to occupy chambers in Salisbury city centre. He spent much of his time after 1957 defending African nationalists. Time and again he found himself confronted by the degrading aspects of Rhodesia's social system: at one time a Native Commissioner required Chitepo to conduct his defence of an accused African while he sat cross-legged on the floor. Nevertheless, for some years he resisted becoming closely involved in the burgeoning nationalist movement. He seems to have decided early in his life to fit into the existing social environment and to try and change it from within. In the mid and late 1950s he was closely associated with white liberals and multi-racial groups. Yet, as the momentum of nationalist politics began to accelerate during the early 1960s, he became increasingly involved in the movement's activities. Later, during the long years in exile as the problems and frustrations of isolation mounted, Chitepo, like many other of his fellow exiles, came to see the world and the problems of his black Zimbabwe in a new light, and he became a committed Marxist.

In 1960 Chitepo joined the NDP and, when that group was banned, he joined ZAPU. In 1961, a journal reviewing the growth of black nationalism in Africa said of Chitepo: "A skilful lawyer with a growing practice, he is likely to be drawn into the African struggle against white dominance in southern Rhodesia". Yet Chitepo again resisted the

1. Segal, op. cit., p.58.
temptation, and in 1962 he accepted the position in Dar es Salaam as Director of Public Prosecutions. Nevertheless, he joined ZANU at the time of that group's formation in August 1963, and in 1965, following the call from the ZANU Executive members in Sikombela, he resigned from his position in Tanzania to devote all his energies to ZANU. He had finally succumbed.

Although Tanzania had lent its almost exclusive support to ZANU since 1963, perhaps because of Chitepo's position as Chief Prosecutor, the Party had been unable to set up a headquarters structure on the scale that Chikerema had eventually organised in Lusaka. During 1965, under Chitepo's direction, ZANU's small Lusaka office was upgraded, and many of the Party's most senior officials moved there from Dar es Salaam and London, including Chitepo, Mukono, Washington Malianga, Mtambanengwe and Hamadziripi.¹

In Lusaka, Chitepo established an executive body called the Revolutionary Council, which numbered up to 16 members. Membership was by appointment, with Chitepo as permanent head.² Although Chitepo was nominally responsible to the Chimurenga General Council, composed of the entire

1. A large office was retained in Dar es Salaam, initially under Wilfred Pasipanodya and from late 1966 under Lovemore Chihota. ZANU also had offices and representatives in several other African capitals, including Blantyre (Stanley Parirewa), Lusaka (Percy Ntini), Accra and Cairo.

membership of ZANU both inside Rhodesia, in practice he had unlimited authority. The Revolutionary Council consisted of those Central Committee members who were in exile and others who were emerging from ZANU's military wing.¹ The precise composition of the Revolutionary Council is unclear, but the following seem to have been members at some stage during the mid and late 1960s:

**TABLE 7  ZANU REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: 1966-1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Chitepo</td>
<td>Chairman and Permanent Head</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Secretary for Public Affairs</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson Mtambanengwe</td>
<td>Secretary for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Manyika (Ndau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Matuku</td>
<td>Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamadziripi</td>
<td>Chief Political Commissar 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Malianga</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Karanga (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mataure</td>
<td>Chief Representative in Tanzania (?)</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Mutuma</td>
<td>Chief Instructor and Camp Commander - Chunya</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix Santana</td>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Parirewa 3</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. Ibid. Nathan Shamuyarira and Stanlake Samkange, both members of the ZANU Executive who were not detained, decided against joining the ZANU exile leadership in Lusaka, and instead pursued academic careers in the United States. Shamuyarira nevertheless maintained a close involvement in nationalist politics and in 1968 became ZANU Secretary for External Affairs. Samkange seems to have played little part in nationalist politics again until the mid-1970s.


3. Parirewa was transferred to Lusaka from Blantyre in mid-1966, where he was appointed to the Revolutionary Council; Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 85-87.
## ZANU REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: 1966-1969 (contd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percy Ntini</td>
<td>Chief Representative in Zambia 1</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cilas Mushonga</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ndangana</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cletos Chigowe</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Mutasa</td>
<td>Operational Commander 2</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovemore Chihota</td>
<td>Chief Representative in Tanzania (1966)</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the Revolutionay Council was an eight-man committee, headed by Mukono, responsible for the supervision of ZANU's military affairs: ³


TABLE 8

ZANU MILITARY PLANNING COMMITTEE - 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Chairman and Director of Operations 1</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman and Deputy Director of Operations 2</td>
<td>Karanga (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix Santana</td>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ndangana</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mataure</td>
<td>Chief Representative in Tanzania (?)</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Mutuma</td>
<td>Chief Instructor and Camp Commander - Chunya</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cilas Mushonga</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cletos Chigowe</td>
<td>Security, Intelligence and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not possible to judge from such limited knowledge of the make-up of the Revolutionary Council and the Military Committee whether any Shona sub-group was numerically dominant: the Manyika, Karanga, Zezuru and Ndau were represented on both bodies, although the Manyika filled slightly more positions. Indeed, the main decision-making group within ZANU's exile hierarchy - the Central Committee members, Chitepo, Mukono, Mtambanengwe and

1. Mukono initially only chaired the committee, but after the start of ZANU's guerrilla operations, in April 1966, he was also designated Director of Operations; Ibid.

2. Tongogara has claimed that from about mid-1966 he took basic "...command of all military aspects of the army", Ibid.
Hamadziripi - was dominated by Manyika.

Ethnicity does not seem to have been a problem within ZANU's exiled leadership during the early years of exile. However, relations between the Shona sub-groups deteriorated during the late 1960s - at one level between the Zezuru and all the other sub-groups and, at another level, between the Manyika and the Karanga - causing a series of devastating fractures.

The most serious division, that between the Manyika and the Karanga, which almost destroyed ZANU ten years later, was partly fuelled by Chitepo's decision to establish the Party's headquarters in Lusaka. In Zambia, ZANU was able to draw on the support of the large number of black Rhodesians permanently resident in the country. A large proportion of this group, particularly in the Mumbwa District outside Lusaka, were Karanga, who had left the poor soils of Fort Victoria and Selukwe in search of better land, jobs and education.¹

1. Interview with Joseph Chimurenga. Amongst those Karanga who moved to Zambia in the late 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s to seek employment or to further their education were Josiah Tongogara, Percy Ntini, Joel Mandaza, Joseph Chimurenga, Elias Hondo and Emmerson Mnangagwa. Tongogara, Ntini, Chimurenga and Mnangagwa were in fact related, and the first three all came from the same village near Selukwe; interviews with Chimurenga and Webster Gwauya, 24 March 1980. Gwauya, who left Rhodesia in 1967, and later became ZANU's Chief Representative in East Africa, is also related to Tongogara, Ntini and Chimurenga.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, as ZANLA began to draw on black Rhodesians living in Zambia to bolster its ranks, the Karanga came to make up a disproportionate percentage of its members. While the first ZANLA members and commanders, (such as Mutuma, Santana and Ndangana), were mainly Manyika or Ndau, the second generation (such as Tongogara and Chigowe) and later trainees recruited in Zambia, tended to be Karanga. Joseph Chimurenga, a leading ZANLA commander during the late 1960s and 1970s, has claimed that "from the beginning three-quarters of the militants (that is ZANLA members) were Karangas". Despite the Karanga numerical domination of ZANLA the Manyika continued to exercise effective control over the Party's political and military wings during the 1960s and early 1970s. The efforts of the Karanga, led by Henry Hamadziripi and Josiah Tongogara, to rectify this situation eventually provoked a major split in the Party.

* * * * *

The move into exile by both ZAPU and ZANU had been hurried and essentially unplanned. The parties had formulated no coherent or precise objectives and, at least initially, their primary concern had been organisational survival.

1. Interview with Chimurenga.
The hastily-established exile hierarchies of both parties reflected the broad ethnic divisions which had been evident in their 1963 and 1964 National Executives in Rhodesia: the ZAPU External Liaison Committee and Military Command were composed mainly of Zezuru and Kalanga/Ndebele; while ZANU's Revolutionary Council and Military Planning Committee had no Ndebele members, and were generally balanced between the Shona sub-groups - although Manyika filled most of the senior positions.

There seem to have been few problems of an ethnic or personal nature within the exiled leaderships of either group during this period of general organisational stability. The difficult task of transforming political parties into irregular armies, coupled with the isolation and loneliness of exile, seem to have submerged, if only temporarily, the differences and antagonisms within ZAPU and ZANU.

The move into exile did nothing, however, to improve relations between ZAPU and ZANU. To the chagrin of both Kaunda and Nyerere, Rhodesia's nationalist leaders spent little of their time organising for the coming armed struggle, and a great deal of it touring foreign capitals, or at the OAU and other international forums, where they sought to defame or destroy their rivals. Violent clashes between groups of rival supporters also occurred with some frequency, especially in Zambia.
Despite the nationalists' concentration on inter-party rivalry and bickering, some small effort was made to establish armed wings, and by late 1965 between 700 and 800 ZAPU and ZANU members had received, or were receiving, military training.\(^1\) However, the transition from political party to guerrilla group, and the search for external support, in themselves increased the gulf between the two parties. Not only were the two groups forced to compete for assistance, but they also became entangled in African inter-state relations and indirectly involved in the Sino/Soviet dispute. While the support of Tanzania and Zambia was vital to the survival of ZAPU and ZANU, such support also consolidated, and even aggravated, the rift within the nationalist movement. ZANU's Nathan Shamuyarira explained some years later that "if Tanzania and Zambia... had both supported only one party in the period 1964-71, it is almost certain that the other party would have died a natural death because of the lack of a secure sanctuary near Rhodesia".\(^2\) Support from China and the Soviet Union had a similar effect—guaranteeing the survival of both groups, while at the same time fuelling the division. ZAPU and ZANU came to be seen as

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1. Rhodesian government estimate; The Rhodesian Legislative Assembly Debate, (Salisbury), 2 February 1966, pp. 11-12.

pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese respectively. While this ideological characterisation was somewhat simplistic, there were ideologues in both groups. At the time, ideological differences within and between ZAPU and ZANU, and differences between those who sought a closer relationship with either China or the Soviet Union, seem to have had no effect on the unity of either party. In the 1970s, however, ideological differences contributed strongly to the development of divisions within the guerrilla groups.
CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF EXILE: 1966 - 1972

In 1966 ZAPU and ZANU began to infiltrate guerrilla groups into Rhodesia. By 1969 the disastrous failure of these operations had generated serious strains within the leaderships of both groups. The ZANU leadership responded to these problems by re-examining the Party's strategy of armed struggle and reorganising its political and military structures. ZAPU, on the other hand, under the dictatorial rule of James Chikerema, lacked the organisational flexibility necessary to allow such changes, and a power struggle ensued within the Party's political leadership. The two contending factions sought support from members of their own ethnic group. ZAPU eventually split along ethnic lines, resulting in the formation of a third exile party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), the leadership of which consisted entirely of Zezuru. By 1972 ZAPU was dominated by Kalanga/Ndebele. ZAPU's military wing had virtually disintegrated, and it was not until the late 1970s, after years of rebuilding that its guerrilla force came again to equal ZANU's in size and capability.

Although the cohesion of the ZANU political leadership was also affected to some extent by the loss of many Zezuru members to FROLIZI, ZANU was, by 1972, easily the larger and better organised of the exiled groups. At the same time, the rough ethnic balance between the Manyika, Karanga and Zezuru, which had been a feature of ZANU's political and military hierarchies since 1963, had disappeared. The Party's leadership was now finely balanced between Manyika and Karanga.
The War Begins and All But Ends

At twenty minutes to twelve on the night of 1 April 1966 a small group of ZANLA guerrillas crossed the rain-swollen Zambezi River, which forms the border between Zambia and Rhodesia. The guerrillas were accompanied by a number of senior ZANU political and military leaders, including Henry Hamadziripi, who was in charge of this first infiltration of guerrillas into Rhodesia, Noel Mukono, Felix Santana, Percy Ntini, Charles Dauramanzi and John Mataure.¹

After crossing the river the guerrillas formed into two sections.² Their orders were to destroy the Beira-Umtali pipeline, and to attack white farmers and police. The two sections were divided, however, about their ultimate objective. According to Hamadziripi, those guerrillas who had been trained in Tanzania by Ndangana and Santana were still seeking to ignite a black uprising, and hence sought to "register their presence".³ On the other hand, those guerrillas who had been trained in China, "the really hard-core, ... wanted a traditional guerrilla war".⁴

1. Interview with Hamadziripi. Soon after the guerrillas had crossed into Rhodesia, Ntini died when his car plunged into the Zambezi and was swept some miles down the river.


3. Interview with Hamadziripi.

4. Ibid.
The platoon directed to attack the pipeline was soon apprehended, and on 13 April a further seven guerrillas were captured. The rest continued to move southwards in the direction of Salisbury.¹

On 29 April, in the long grass plains of Sinoia in northern Rhodesia, a small group of ZANLA cadres, who had been trained in Tanzania and Ghana waited in ambush. After a violent clash, seven guerrillas were killed.² They had registered their presence, and the second Chimurenga had begun. The Chinese-trained group bided its time, and according to Hamadziripi, was not detected until December.³

The differences of approach between the locally-trained and Chinese-trained guerrilla groups is indicative of a larger debate that took place in ZANU, and to a lesser extent in ZAPU, during the second half of the 1960s. The period 1966 to 1968 was a time of experimentation for ZANU, during which "...various tactics of guerrilla warfare were tested".⁴ Henry Hamadziripi admitted some years later


3. Interview with Hamadziripi.

that during the 1960s ZANU's guerrilla leaders had not fully grasped the theory of guerrilla warfare.\(^1\) It was only with the emergence of a new generation, who found the idea of guerrilla warfare more appealing than had the traditional leadership, that the theory of guerrilla warfare was studied and applied.\(^2\) Differences between the traditional leaders and the guerrilla cadres about strategy and tactics was a source of discord and even division throughout the period of the armed struggle.

The clash at Sinoia brought a hostile reaction from ZAPU. Despite their military and organisational superiority, ZAPU had been pre-empted by their rivals. In retaliation, Chikerema, with the agreement of ZAPU's External Liaison Committee, denounced the ZANU decision to launch guerrilla warfare as "irresponsible action".\(^3\) Nevertheless, in July and August 1966, after further ZANLA groups had infiltrated Rhodesia, a series of four different ZAPU groups crossed into north-eastern, northern and north-western Rhodesia. As with the earlier ZANU incursions, most of the guerrillas were quickly captured or killed.\(^4\) In

1. Interview with Hamadziripi.
2. Ibid.
January 1967, Lardner-Burke, the Minister for Law and Order, told Parliament that by the end of 1966 nearly 100 trained "terrorists" had been killed, and that the Security Forces were on top of the "terrorist situation".¹

The first few months of 1967 were relatively free from incident. Those actions which did occur took place mainly in the north-east and involved ZANU guerrillas. In late 1967 ZAPU began to prepare for major incursions, which were again designed to provoke British intervention. Unlike ZANU, the ZAPU guerrillas were organised into large groups and were also in alliance with the SA ANC.²

The first combined ZAPU/SA ANC group of about 80 guerrillas entered Rhodesia between Victoria Falls and the Botswana border, near Kazangula, at the end of July.

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1. See A.M. Bruce-Brand, Report of the Secretary for Law and Order for the Year Ending 31st December 1966, (Salisbury), 1967. The annual reports of the Secretary for Law and Order provide a useful account of the early guerrilla incursions. Unfortunately, the worsening security situation in the early 1970s prompted the Rhodesian authorities to suspend distribution of the report after 1972. Also of value are the British South Africa Police Annual Reports, (Salisbury), 1966-1971.

2. The decision of the SA ANC to enter into an alliance with ZAPU, and to infiltrate armed groups through Rhodesia, was brought about by the SA ANC's failure during the early 1960s to infiltrate guerrillas back into South Africa after training. The creation of the alliance was also facilitated by Chikerema's membership of the SA ANC and the South African Communist Party during the early 1950s. In 1965, the South African Minister of Justice reported that 85 persons had been arrested returning to South Africa after military training outside the country; House of Assembly Debates, (Cape Town), 11 June 1965, col 7918, in Sheridan Johns, "Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare - a South African Case Study", Journal of Modern African Studies, (London), Vol. 11, No. 2, 1973, p. 283, footnote 2.
1967.\(^1\) ZAPU's objective was to infiltrate a large group into the centre of Rhodesia in order to establish a number of liberated areas.\(^2\) However, the decision to use what amounted to conventional warfare tactics and to confront the Rhodesian Security Forces directly led to the joint forces suffering heavy casualties.\(^3\) Other factors also contributed to the failure of the joint operations. The guerrillas failed to attract the assistance of the local population. On a number of occasions their presence was given away to the Security Forces. Like ZANU, ZAPU made no efforts to politicise the local people prior to the incursions. The planning of the operations was also inadequate. Maps often proved inaccurate, and several groups became lost. Supplies of food and water were also lacking.\(^4\)

Between late December 1967 and early January 1968, a second large ZAPU/SA ANC force entered Rhodesia from Zambia. Contrary to the disastrous tactics employed during the previous incursion, the force, under orders, avoided contacts with the Security Forces and began to mobilise and to politicise the local population. They were also to establish a series of camps extending southwards from the border with Zambia and

1. ZAPU's forces were led by Sotsha Ngwenya, who later became ZAPU's Chief of Operations; The Zimbabwe Review, (Lusaka), Vol. 6, No. 384, March/April 1977, p.12.

2. Maxey (1975), op. cit., p.64.


and to live off the land. The discovery of this group by the Security Forces resulted in a series of clashes and the death of 56 guerrillas and five Security Force members. Further incursions by ZAPU and ZANU occurred during the second half of 1968, but, in common with the previous infiltrations, the groups soon clashed with Rhodesian forces, and suffered heavy casualties.

* * * * *

The guerrilla incursions of 1966, 1967 and 1968 were unsuccessful. The main ZAPU/SA ANC operations of 1967 and 1968 failed to bring about British intervention or to establish liberated areas in Rhodesia and, like the limited ZANU incursions, were quickly suppressed. The guerrillas suffered extremely heavy casualties and failed to inflict much damage on the Security Forces, or even to damage the morale of the white minority. Between 1966 and the end of 1968, about 150 guerrillas were killed for the loss of only 13 members of the Security Forces. In addition, a further

2. Ibid., p. 238.
292 were apprehended and convicted by the High Court.¹ Heavy guerrilla losses in Rhodesia affected the morale of others still in training. The return of wounded guerrillas caused further morale problems, since it was now obvious that the guerrillas were not having the impact that their leaders claimed.² The infiltration of guerrilla bands into Rhodesia continued to occur during the late 1960s and early 1970s but on a much reduced scale; 1969 was, in fact, devoid of clashes.³

The successive military defeats suffered between 1966 and 1968 led to a re-thinking of guerrilla strategy and tactics which laid the foundations for the escalation of the war during the second half of the 1970s. On the other hand, the dismal failure of these early incursions also led to the emergence of serious problems within ZAPU and ZANU which eventually produced conditions in which ethnicity became politically relevant.

2. Interview with Putterill.
ZANU - Reorganisation and Reassessment: 1969 - 1971

ZANU had moved into exile with little preparation and planning, and its military and political structures had been hastily established. Cadres only recently returned from generally inadequate training programs had been infiltrated into Rhodesia with little thought about overall strategy or tactics. The expectations of immediate success, and of mass uprisings, faded as successive groups of guerrillas were quickly found and eliminated. ZANU had never been a large organisation, but by 1968/69 the crushing military defeats, and the subsequent defection of cadres from its ranks, had all but destroyed its rank-and-file, and ZANLA was forced to engage in the abduction of Rhodesians resident in Zambia to replenish its depleted ranks. ZANU, under the capable leadership of Herbert Chitepo, responded to these difficulties by reorganising its political and military hierarchies, and by examining its past mistakes. Consequently, the personal rivalries and the divisions which might have developed during such a difficult period were kept in check. By 1971, ZANU was emerging as the more powerful of the two exiled Rhodesian guerrilla groups.

* * * *

In late 1968, in an effort to rebuild their shattered guerrilla armies, and following pressure from the OAU to step-up their military operations, ZANU and ZAPU resorted to kidnapping Zambian citizens and Rhodesians resident in Zambia. The case of Joseph Chimurenga, who later became a member of the
ZANLA High Command, illustrates clearly the manner, extent, success and ethnic implications of ZANU's abduction program.  

Joseph Chimurenga, whose real name is Joseph Siwela, was born in Selukwe, a Karanga area in southern Rhodesia, in 1944. In 1964 he travelled to Zambia in an effort to continue his schooling. Following a strike at the school during a period of nationalist campaigning, it was suggested that he should leave, and between 1966 and 1967 he worked as a petrol pump attendant. Chimurenga had bought a ZANU membership card before he left Rhodesia and he was soon appointed Youth Organising Secretary for Zambia's Southern Province.

In early 1968, ZANU called on all its Party members who were willing to undertake military training to register their names. Although Chimurenga and many others registered, they subsequently refused to go for training "...because it was obvious that the leadership were not going to send their friends for training". The Party then resorted to compulsion.

One night in late August 1968, four armed ZANU members broke into Chimurenga's house in Choma and kidnapped him. Together with 14 other abductees, Chimurenga was driven to Lusaka, and then on to ZANU's Tanzanian training camp at Chunya. At the camp Chimurenga and his group joined 68 other Rhodesians who had been kidnapped in Zambia a month earlier. As explained in the previous Chapter, because of the large proportion of Karanga amongst the Rhodesian

1. On the whole the information on Chimurenga and ZANU's abduction program comes from a four-hour interview with Chimurenga in Salisbury on 24 March 1980.

2. Ibid.

population resident in Zambia, many, if not most, of those abducted were Karanga. Apart from Chimurenga, they included Meya Urimbo and Fox Gava, both of whom were soon to rise to senior positions in ZANLA.

This influx of Karanga into ZANLA, and their rapid rise within the military hierarchy, facilitated the emergence of rifts within the Party's political leadership and between the political and military elites. For the first time since ZANU's formation, the predominant position of the Manyika was threatened. It was not until the mid-1970s, however, that rivalry between the Manyika and Karanga gave rise to serious problems within the Party.

The abductedees received eight to nine months training at Chunya. Initially the training in guerrilla warfare was conducted by ZANU instructors, and regular army training by Tanzanians, but in January 1969 Chinese instructors arrived at the compound and assumed responsibility for much of the irregular training. This was the first time that Chinese instructors had trained ZANU cadres in Tanzania, and it was indicative of the increasingly close relationship between ZANU and the PRC.

Zambia reacted swiftly to the kidnappings. UNIP's National Secretary issued a circular letter in September 1968 in which he spelt out the Government's policy in unmistakable terms:
No Nationalist Organisation is permitted to recruit Freedom Fighters in Zambia and no Zambian resident should take part in any Foreign Nationalist Organisation's activities...

Our worry, as Freedom Fighters, is that it is a pity that our comrades (in) ZAPU and ZANU are forcing people to be recruited. There can be no such person as a forced Freedom Fighter. ¹

In October, 17 ZANU members and 41 ZAPU members were expelled from Zambia for "kidnapping and abduction".² ZANU's abduction program subsequently ceased, and the Party concentrated on training those it had recently "recruited", and on examining its past mistakes and its "...revolutionary strategy".³

A Special Review Conference of ZANU members met in Lusaka between March and April 1969 to examine ZANU's military and political structures, discuss the reasons for


the military failures of the previous few years, and to refine the Party's ideological orientation. Herbert Chitepo later referred to 1969 as "...a watershed in our revolutionary struggle...", and the Review Conference did indeed alter the direction and effectiveness of ZANU as a revolutionary guerrilla organisation.

1. Some years later an official ZANU publication described the results of the Conference:

... (it) taught the Party that the enemy was strong and that victory could not be realised without relying on the broad masses of the people. Little had been done in terms of organising and mobilising the masses for the armed struggle. This in addition to the Zambezi River which constitutes a strategic obstacle had accounted for the little progress in the first four years of the armed struggle.

The other negative factors had been the shortage of modern weapons and the absence of a military background in the Party cadres and leadership. Equally serious was the lack of a rear base with a sound ideological and theoretical basis. In the light of this, the years 1969 and 1971 were devoted to the reorganisation of the Party orientation and reviewing of its strategic and tactical approach to the armed struggle and to the thorough going preparation for the resumption of an arduous armed struggle.

"Chimurenga - A People's War", op. cit., p.11.

By 1969 the membership of the Revolutionary Council had grown from 16 to 19 and was proving to be ineffectual. The Review Conference approved a re-organisation of ZANU's exiled political leadership. The Revolutionary Council was subsequently replaced by an eight-man Dare-re-Chimurenga, after the War Council of the Shona during the late nineteenth century. The Dare assumed the role of "...the supreme external authority of the Party".\(^1\) It was claimed that this administrative reorganisation would strengthen the Party by facilitating policy-making and military decisions.

For the first time, the membership of ZANU's exiled executive (the Dare) was elected. All Party members were eligible to vote. It is important to note that the proportion of actual ZANU Party members, that is those who had bought Party cards, was never high. Very few ZANLA members, even at the time of Robert Mugabe's election as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe in 1980, held Party cards. At the 1969 Review Conference the Party's voting population consisted of ZANU's Provincial Council in Zambia, its District Councils and Branches in Zambia and Malawi, and the Party's foreign representatives.\(^2\) At the 1971 Review Conference\(^3\) members of the Military High Command were also permitted to vote.

1. ZANU Political Program, 1 August 1972, (published 27 November 1973, no place of publication), p.14. Also see Mwenje No. 2, "ZANU's political programme", (Lusaka), 1 August 1972, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit., p.250. The Political Program seems to have been published first in 1970; see "ZANU and the Unity of Zimbabwe People", Zimbabwe News, (Lusaka), Vol. 2, No. IV, September 1970, pp.4-5, in which extracts of the Program are published.

2. Interview with Noel Mukono, Salisbury, 8 February 1980.

3. It had been decided that Review Conferences would be held every two years.
Although the election of Dare members proved to be a popular and effective measure at the 1969 Conference, it also introduced the prospect of manipulation and of voting along ethnic lines. At the time of the Conference, however, rivalries between the Shona sub-groups do not seem to have been a factor in the election of Dare members. The ethnic balance between the Manyika, Zezuru and Karanga, which had characterised ZANU's leadership hierarchies since the Party's move into exile, was retained; there were three Manyika, three Zezuru and two Karanga in the 1969 Dare. No Ndebele was elected to the Dare, re-affirming the basic division within the Rhodesian nationalist movement between the Shona and the Ndebele. There existed, in effect, a permanent state of organisational crisis and threat, and during the rest of the 1960s and the 1970s the ethnic division between the two guerrilla groups was confirmed and reinforced.

**TABLE 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Chitepo</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson Mtambanengwe</td>
<td>Secretary for Political Affairs</td>
<td>Manyika (Ndau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hamadziripi</td>
<td>Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukudzei Mudzi</td>
<td>Administrative Secretary</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Shamuyarira</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taziana Mutizwa</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Parirewa</td>
<td>Secretary for Welfare and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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</tbody>
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The Manyika continued to fill the most senior positions within the Party's executive: Chitepo retained the Chairmanship; Mukono the top military position, Secretary for Defence (the Secretary for Public Affairs euphemism was dropped);
and Mtambanengwe relinquished the External Affairs portfolio to become Secretary for Political Affairs. Nathan Shamuyarira, who had returned to Africa in 1967 after graduating with a B.Sc. from Princeton University, and had subsequently lectured at the University of Dar es Salaam, was appointed Secretary for External Affairs. Taziana Mutizwa replaced Washington Malianga as Publicity Secretary, and Mukono's old colleague, Stanley Parirewa became Secretary for Welfare and Social Affairs. The Karanga held positions on the Dare: Henry Hamadziripi, who became Secretary for Finance; and Mukudzei Mudzi, Administrative Secretary, who had recently completed a degree at a university in the Soviet Union.

ZANU's military structure was again reorganised, following minor changes in June 1967.¹ A Military High Command replaced the Military Planning Committee, and was made responsible "...for the planning and execution of all military operations in accordance with the general strategy laid down by the Dare...".² The reorganisation separated the administration of ZANLA from the political administration, which was made the responsibility of the Dare. The Secretary for Defence in the Dare, Noel Mukono, who had been responsible for directing ZANU's military affairs since 1964, was put in charge of the High Command.


2. ZANU Political Program, op. cit., p.16; and Mumbengegwi op. cit., p.97.
The precise composition of the Military High Command at this time is not known. It is probable, however, that the members of the 1965 Military Planning Committee retained their positions in the new High Command. Josiah Tongogara remained Chief of Operations, a position he had assumed in 1967, and several new Departments were created and placed under his control, such as logistics, training and intelligence.¹

ZANU's ideological orientation was also scrutinised at the Review Conference. The imprisonment of ZANU's most prominent leaders in 1964, soon after the Party's first and only Congress, had prevented the formulation of a coherent Party ideology. The absence of an agreed Party ideology had caused some problems for ZANU's exiled cadres and leadership, and disputes concerning the Party's correct ideological orientation had soon emerged. In 1968, for instance, an anonymous deserter from ZANLA explained why he had abandoned the Party and the armed struggle:

1. "Umtali Attack - 'The beginning of our war'", op. cit., p. 29.
Some of my friends have returned to Rhodesia and been killed; others have been captured. Why do I stand apart? ... I want a revolution, not just a nationalist armed struggle. You can't have it half way. I am a Maoist. The Party should control the whole movement, military as well as political. If I'm going to get killed in Rhodesia, I want to know I am dying for a real revolution, not just a change in regime like there has been in Kenya. 1

According to Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, the ZANU representative in Australia and later in Zambia, it was decided at the Review Conference that

...the ZANU line shall be guided by Marxism-Leninism to the extent that it applies to the concrete situation in Zimbabwe. Where Marxism-Leninism could not be applied, then the inventive genius of our people would take over. 2

Following the Conference ZANU statements were couched in increasingly Marxist terms. The reformist policies of the ZANU of the mid-1960s gave way and were replaced by the dogmas of scientific socialism and Marxism-Leninism.

Nevertheless, as will be shown in later chapters, ZANU's commitment to Marxism-Leninism (and later to Mao Tse-tung thought) remained a matter of debate and dispute within the Party during the rest of the 1960s and the 1970s.

1. "From China with Love", The Guardian, (Manchester), 8 April 1966. In 1974 Zimbabwe News, ZANU's official publication, also referred to the ideological vacuum in which the Party found itself during the early years of exile:

Few Zimbabweans had, until the late 1960s, the slightest knowledge of Marxism and guerrilla warfare. Only a handful had read anything by Marx, Lenin, Mao and other minor revolutionary leaders and writers of the 19th and 20th Centuries. Insulated from the outside world and circumscribed in Rhodesia (sic) with its obsession against communism, the vision of liberation among Zimbabweans was completely blurred. National liberation was seen as merely the replacement of the white settlers without changing the social situation and structure.


Following the examination of its failures between 1966 and 1968, the ZANU leadership decided to "...change its whole strategy in Zimbabwe". Four major changes in strategy were made:

The first...was to make our war a long-term one. Up until this time there was an over optimism about quick victories... The second strategy was to make our struggle a People's war... The third strategy was to combine political and military struggles... Our combatants are not only military men but also are social reformers... Finally, the cornerstone of guerrilla warfare is the creation of base areas... 2

Although ZANU conducted few guerrilla operations in Rhodesia between 1970 and 1972 (nor for that matter did ZAPU), it took several important measures consistent with its new approach to the armed struggle in preparation for the future infiltration of guerrillas: contact was made with the Mozambican guerrilla group, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); ZANU cadres began the slow process of politicising blacks in Rhodesia's north-eastern border region; and preliminary contacts were made with black students and lecturers at the University of Rhodesia.

In 1968 FRELIMO had extended its guerrilla activities from northern Mozambique into Tete Province, which borders north-eastern Rhodesia. Chitepo and Hamadziripi had established contact with the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane as early as 1964, but the relationship had lapsed. According to Hamadziripi, contact was renewed in 1969 "...to our mutual advantage". In November ZANU sent four ZANLA members to Mozambique to work with FRELIMO. Three of those chosen had been abducted in Zambia one year before, and had only just completed training courses in Tanzania - Meya Urimbo, the Group Commander, Joseph Chimurenga, his deputy, and Ernest Kadungure. The fourth member was Justin Chauke. The increasing importance of the Karanga in ZANLA is apparent here; two of the four, Urimbo and Chimurenga, were Karanga,

1. Interview with Hamadziripi.

2. Ibid., and "The People's War", Zimbabwe News, (Maputo), Vol. 9, No. 3, March-April 1971, p.11. The ZANU leadership had come to see events in Rhodesia and Mozambique as intricately linked: "...if Mozambique falls, it will be only hours before Rhodesia goes... In our region of operation, the struggle is against oppressive forces, a war of freedom, between black and white. In our country, it is a racial war. The death of a white man in Mozambique benefits the black man a lot. The death of a white Rhodesian soldier equally is to the advantage of our brothers in FRELIMO. We are fighting the same war...". Mutuku Hamadziripi interviewed by Albert Mvula, "Interview: ZANU's Ten Years", Africa, (London), No. 26, October 1973, p. 97. The ZANU/FRELIMO relationship was also facilitated by the fact that members of both parties had trained together in Tanzania and China since the early 1960s: Josiah Tongogara, who was elected ZANU Chief of Defence in 1973, and Samora Machel, who assumed the leadership of FRELIMO in 1970 had, for instance, trained together in China during the early 1960s.

3. Interview with Chimurenga.
while Chauke, a Shangaan, was widely believed to be Karanga.¹ All four were also from ZANLA's "second generation", and were therefore closer to Josiah Tongogara than his superior Noel Mukono.

During 1969 and 1970 Urimbo, Chimurenga, Chauke and Kadungure fought alongside FRELIMO and, more importantly, carried out "reconnaissance".² In January 1971, according to Tongogara, ZANU submitted a program of action to FRELIMO;³ and later in the month a "scouting team", consisting of the same four ZANLA members, crossed into Rhodesia "...to survey the area and ascertain the possibilities".⁴ The four guerrillas, unarmed and with forged documents, spent the next two months⁵ avoiding Security Force patrols and travelling from Mukumbura to Centenary, Mt. Darwin and Bindura. In February they crossed back into Zambia, where they reported that the situation was "...tough, but favourable".⁶

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid; according to Chimurenga "...our main duty was reconnaissance not fighting".
4. Ibid.
5. Interview with Chimurenga.
6. Ibid.
During the rest of 1971 and 1972, ZANU guerrillas carried vast quantities of supplies, equipment and arms into Rhodesia in preparation for its north-eastern offensive, which began in December 1972.¹

As well as preparing for the resumption of the war in the countryside, ZANU began in the late 1960s to "penetrate"² the University of Rhodesia. By 1969 an "inner circle" had been established within the University and "underground operations" began.³ The key student organisers were Basil Chimbodza (who later became a member of ZANU's Chimurenga General Council) and Dick Chikara and, from the staff, a recently returned American-trained Doctor of Philosophy, and lecturer in biophysics at the University, Joseph Taderera.⁴ According to Hamadziripi, in 1970 students started crossing into Zambia during their holidays and were sent back after training: "This was very important. For the first time we were operating with the new generation".⁵ This process was facilitated by the debate caused by the Pearce Commission in 1971/72. Apart from the

2. Interview with Hamadziripi.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. For further information on Taderera see "African Doctor Returns", Sunday Mail, (Salisbury), 1 June 1969, and Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 257.
5. Interview with Hamadziripi.
obvious advantages of having trained members and sympathisers at the University, many students during the early 1970s gave up their studies to join ZANU in exile on a full-time basis. Their presence in ZANLA and in administrative jobs in the Party's political wing contributed to the revitalisation of the Party, but also caused a number of new strains, as difficulties began to develop between the "literates" and the "illiterates".¹ This distinction would contribute to rifts in the Party which developed during the mid and late 1970s.

* * * * *

By 1971, seven years after a handful of ZANU leaders had fled into exile, and five years after the disastrous beginning of the second Chimurenga, the Party was emerging as the more powerful of the two exiled Rhodesian nationalist groups. It had responded to the failure of its first guerrilla incursions with flexibility and calm, re-examining its organisational, strategic and ideological deficiencies, and rectifying them. While rivalry between the Shona sub-groups, particularly between the Manyika, Karanga and Zezuru, continued to simmer just below the surface, they had yet to affect the stability of the Party's exiled hierarchies.

¹. Interviews with former ZANLA members in Salisbury, February/March 1980.
ZAPU - Division and Disintegration: 1969-1971

We have not yet entered the most painful stage of our struggle; that phase is coming.

If some of us would wish to be hesitant and treacherous at this rather preparatory stage, what will they do when the flow of blood and the sound of steel meeting steel will have become the order of the day? 1


During the late 1960s and early 1970s, ZAPU was plagued by a struggle for power by two factions within its exiled political leadership. The frustrating and lonely years of exile, the military defeats of the 1960s, and the personal ambitions and excesses of some Party leaders, fuelled division and led to occasional internecine clashes. While ZANU reconciled emerging rifts and problems through a reorganisation of its political and military structures, the ZAPU leadership lacked the necessary organisational flexibility and differences within the Party gradually developed along ethnic lines, as members of opposing factions sought support from members of their own ethnic group. By 1972 the Party had split irrevocably.

* * * * *

Between 1964 and 1967 control of ZAPU's growing armed wing was in the hands of the Military Command administration, to whom, according to Jason Moyo "...credit for maintaining discipline under difficult conditions should be given".\(^1\) Nevertheless, there were some problems in ZAPU camps during this period. In July 1967, a captured ZAPU guerrilla claimed that differences between Shona and Ndebele cadres had led to clashes in Zambia:

> To my knowledge they will never defeat the Government. There is tribalism within the Party. When we were staying in the Lusaka camp, Matabeleland people were better privileged than Mashonaland people.

Mashonaland people were apt to think that the Matabele were making the Party for themselves... We had several occasions when we were fighting over that and it demoralised the minds of the people to come and fight for Freedom. 2

Generally, however, the standard of discipline and morale seems to have been fairly high during this period, and clashes between ZAPU's Ndebele and Shona cadres seem to have occurred only rarely.

In late 1967 ZAPU's senior military planning body, the War Council, at last "...began to take an active interest in army administration."\(^3\) The Military Command and


the War Council held occasional meetings to "...plan the strategy of the struggle", and meetings were also held with members of the SA ANC armed wing.1 Although Moyo later claimed that "everything seemed to be improving and some progress was realised", serious problems were developing.

In 1968 a large group of SA ANC guerrillas fled from training camps in Tanzania to Kenya, and sought political asylum. The dissidents claimed that their former camp commanders had been living extravagantly, that "tribalism" flourished, and that only pro-Soviet positions were accepted. They further claimed that the first ZAPU/SA ANC operation into Rhodesia had been "...a suicide mission staged merely to eliminate dissent and to demonstrate to potential suppliers of material aid that the SA ANC was actively engaged in armed struggle".2 SA ANC spokesmen denied the allegations, which may well have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, problems certainly did exist within the military and political wings of both the SA ANC and ZAPU.

Beginning in mid-1969, the situation within ZAPU's military wing deteriorated rapidly and seriously. A mutiny by a small guerrilla unit in a staging camp in Zambia spread to other camps.3 In February 1970 Moyo claimed


that since mid-1969

...there has been a steady decline of a serious nature in our military administration and army. Military rules have been cast overboard. Relations between some members of the War Council and the military administration are strained. Attitudes are cooked. Accusations of a serious nature have been made. Military administration and War Council meetings are no longer held. Planning of strategy is seriously lacking. There is no coordination in the deployment of cadres in Zimbabwe.¹

The virtual disintegration of ZAPU's guerrilla forces during 1969 heightened the differences within the exiled political hierarchy, particularly between the Zezuru, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro on the one hand, and the Kalanga/Ndebele, Jason Moyo, George Silundika and Edward Ndhlovu on the other. According to Silundika "the essential conflict focused on the question of power", and in particular on Chikerema's increasingly arbitrary leadership:

Until 1968 the leadership used to discuss all matters freely, decide collectively and accept responsibility collectively. In 1969, however, Chikerema started to avoid meetings and discussion, refusing to convene the External Liaison Committee.

...ZAPU cannot be run like a company where the director alone can decide everything, including who is sacked and who promoted. It is a political organisation and the leadership must be responsible and accountable to the militants and the masses for all its decisions. No leader can simply use the people as instruments to satisfy personal whims. ²

Differences within the External Liaison Committee came to a head in early 1970 after Chikerema unilaterally

1. Ibid
2. Silundika interview, op. cit., p.11.
3. Ibid., pp.9 and 10.
authorised a British television crew to film a ZAPU guerrilla camp in Zambia. To the fury of Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu, the documentary, which was televised in London in January 1970, was so detailed that it was possible to identify some of the guerrillas. During the next few months, in three extraordinary documents, accusations of "tribalism", corruption and nepotism amongst ZAPU's guerrilla forces and within the political hierarchy, were made public.

On 25 February Moyo circulated a paper entitled "Observations on our struggle". Moyo criticised Chikerema's decision to permit the television crew to film ZAPU guerrillas, which he claimed, had compromised the safety of ZAPU members, without his knowledge as a member of the National Executive, High Command, and War Council. To prevent the further deterioration of the ZAPU army and rectify other problems

1. In the interview with Granada Television in October 1969, Chikerema enunciated a revised ZAPU strategy for the war:

   ...this is really a protracted struggle - we do not intend to finish in a matter of two, three, or four or five years - this is a protracted struggle ... The type of war we fight depends on - on changes of tactics and I can tell you we've changed our tactics... We will combine both. Where they meet us and intercept us we will stand and fight...where they don't see us we will go and organise our masses.


within the Party Moyo called for the reform of ZAPU's political and military structures, a review of the strategy of armed struggle, and the extension of the War Council. In order to step-up recruitment, as "...it is becoming almost impossible to recruit personnel from Zambia...", Moyo also produced a blatantly "tribal" program for recruitment from inside Rhodesia and subsequent training and deployment. As ZANU's Nathan Shamuyarira stated some time later, the program "...divided our people into ....tribal regions". Moyo suggested that in 1970 ZAPU should recruit 861 cadres, who would be recruited on a regional basis. For instance, 214 cadres would come from Bulawayo and the same number from Salisbury. The program was obviously designed to bring about Ndebele/Shona parity within the ZAPU armed wing. While Moyo claimed that his "Observations" were aimed at strengthening and unifying ZAPU, it is apparent that he was also motivated by a desire to enhance the position of the Kalanga/Ndebele within the Party, either by diluting Chikerema's powers or by purging Chikerema and other leading Zezuru such as Nyandoro.


2. Ibid., p. 147. Zambia had recently introduced measures to prevent the abduction of Zambian citizens and Rhodesians resident in Zambia by ZAPU and ZANU. See pps. 82 and 83.


On 17 March 1970 Chikerema replied in a document entitled "Reply to 'Observations on our struggle'".\(^1\)

Chikerema began by denying that the "War Council", "National Executive", or "People's Council", all referred to by Moyo, existed. He argued that the Cold Comfort Farm conference of August 1963 had delegated complete control to Joshua Nkomo:

No councils, no Committees were set up, no individuals were elected to any post by anybody. The mandate was given to one man, to elect to, to appoint to, to dismiss from, and post any officer. In the context of the above analysis, I was appointed by this one man on whose full shoulders the whole destiny of the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe was deposited, on whose full shoulders the representatives of the five million people of Zimbabwe place their hopes and unquestionable trust to lead them to full realisation of their hopes and aspirations.\(^2\)

Chikerema rejected Moyo's suggestion for a five-man War Council claiming that this would "...by implication remove my authority over my departments and have them run for me".\(^3\)

He insisted that he and Nkomo had "...constructed the whole structure of the People's Caretaker Council, appointed all its office bearers comprising of all members of the national executive, all members of the People's Council, all regional and district officers". He claimed that this structure was directly responsible to Nkomo.

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2. Gibson, op. cit., p.171.

3. Ibid.
"...or to his agent specifically delegated authority to exercise his mandate..." and "...the man so specifically delegated ... is me".  

Referring to Moyo's document, Chikerema stated that:

...from beginning to end, (it) states a position of calculated hypocrisy, calculated manoeuvres for positions and influence in the party and the army. It is intended to protect clans, and tribal corruption in the party and army. It is not a truthful analysis, it is not a revolutionary heart searching of the ills that have befallen the party and the army.  

In reply to Moyo's comment about ZAPU's guerrilla forces, Chikerema admitted that the situation was bad: "Yes comrades, the party and the army is in dismay (sic). It has no team spirit. It is corrupt, and therefore not sincere to its objectives". Chikerema implied that this situation was the fault of Moyo, Silundika and Ndlovu. He further claimed that during an examination of the guerrilla forces he had found:

2. Ibid., p.150.
3. Ibid.
...a shocking state of affairs, the depth and height of decay, corruption, nepotism, tribalism, selfishness, and gross irresponsibility on the part of the military administration from top to bottom...

The army has been divided into tribal factions. The party is divided into tribal factions and clannish empires. There are cadres that are more equal than others in both the party and the army. There are cadres that are given special treatment on tribal and clan considerations in both the party and the army. They have places rented for meeting and sleeping with their girl friends. They are the most smartly dressed. They never run short of money, and, in fact, some of them have boasted, that as long as so and so still holds the position he holds, they will never suffer.  

Chikerema also strongly attacked Moyo's proposed recruitment, training, and deployment program, accusing him, at least by implication, of "tribalism":

(The program) reveals clearly the kind of thinking the authors have in mind. Tribal parity is stretched to try and overshadow the reality and facts concerning true population distribution in these regions.

I find that deployment of combatants and arms is put at par in some regions, disregarding the population content of these regions. Has the Bulawayo region the same population content as the Salisbury region? . . . Is the population of Nkai region the same as the population content of the Sinoia region?

Through what kind of spectacles do some of us view the liberation armed struggle in Zimbabwe? It appears to me, we have become so parochial and are fast losing the true homogeneity so clearly prevalent in our Zimbabwe people. Some of us have very unfortunately become victims of parochial selfishness.  

1. Ibid., p.154.
2. Ibid., p.159.
Chikerema concluded his 15-page diatribe by declaring that he was assuming full control of ZAPU and its armed wing.¹

On 21 March 1970 Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu responded to Chikerema's attack in a document entitled "On the coup crisis precipitated by J. Chikerema":²

On 17 March...the party was plunged into a crisis... It was a coup...for a man who has no country, plunging the only hope of the people, the party, into the sorry mess of his personal power ambitions.³

Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu accused Nyandoro of being in league with Chikerema. Chikerema, in his "Reply to 'Observations on our struggle'", had made thinly-veiled attacks on Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu, alleging that they were motivated, at least in part, by "tribalism". Moyo and his colleagues now brought the question of "tribal" favouritism more clearly into the open:

Right through this document Chikerema creates the impression that all other officers and people of the party are wrong, and have made mistakes, practised tribalism and nepotism, manoeuvres and so on except himself, Nyandoro and their tribe. If this on its own is not tribal bias then there is no tribalism.⁴

They also claimed that Chikerema had been holding "...private meetings...with groups of his own tribe..." behind the back of ZAPU's Lusaka District Council:

1. Ibid., pp.156-160.
3. Ibid., p.162.
4. Ibid., p.163.
The District Council obtained direct evidence of the tribal disaffection he was sowing among ordinary members of the Party and his calculated undermining of his colleagues...

This adventure of Chikerema was a desperate effort to exploit tribal sympathy as a basis to salvage his image in anticipation of drastic action over the film... 1

Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu refused to allow Chikerema to run ZAPU on the "...basis of 'I'". 2 They further rejected Chikerema's absolute control of the Party and denied that they owed their appointments to Chikerema. 3 Nevertheless, they argued for reconciliation and moderation to settle the crisis:

Any difficulties confronting the party and the struggle at the present moment, be they of tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and manoeuvres are the collective responsibility of us all in the national executive including Chikerema and Nyandoro who are trying to jump and pass the buck to others. None of us can escape management or mismanagement of the party by the simple trick of pointing fingers at others and then descending to use and involve junior officers of the party by baiting them into a pseudo-military structure. We have to pick up our problems, sort them out coolly and solve them as a national executive in fulfilment of our responsibility without involving cadres, officers and members as has already been done by Chikerema. 4

1. Ibid., pp.165-166.
2. Ibid., p.162.
3. Ibid., p.163.
4. Ibid., p.168.
Finally, Chikerema's seizure of power was declared "null and void".¹

Despite the stated willingness of Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu to resolve the struggle for power within the Party's leadership "coolly", no reconciliation between the rival leadership factions was possible. By the end of March 1970, ZAPU was divided along ethnic lines: the majority of the Zezuru stood by Chikerema and Nyandoro; and the Kalanga/Ndebele and Ndebele supported Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu.

On several occasions these divisions within the Party erupted into conflict. Nyandoro received police protection for a short period of time because he thought he was being "hunted down by some Ndebele soldiers".² On 24 April 1970 Shona supporters of Chikerema tried to kill Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu outside a ZAPU hostel in a Lusaka suburb.³ In the ensuing gun battle

¹. Ibid., p. 167
². Maxey (1975), op. cit., p. 16.
³. Anglin and Shaw, op. cit., p. 254. Also see Maxey (1975), op. cit., p. 16.
several people were wounded, one of whom may have died later. Further bloodshed was only averted by the timely intervention of the Zambian police. Kaunda subsequently warned that if ZAPU could not solve its internal differences the group would be asked to leave Zambia.

Commenting on the clash at the hostel and the problems facing ZAPU, the Zimbabwe News, ZANU's official publication, which at the time was edited by a number of senior Zezuru Party members who clearly supported Chikerema, made a bitter attack on the Ndebele "tribalists" in ZAPU:

Our struggle is once more at the mercy of committed tribalists. These are people who will not believe that anyone with a Shona name has any right to exercise the functions of leadership. And to prove their "point" these tribalists last week organised a tribal massacre at their "State House" in Lusaka...

1. The Zambian Minister of Home Affairs claimed that the victim had died of a dog bite, not gunshot wounds; Anglin and Shaw, op. cit., p. 269, footnote number 64. Maxey (1975) op. cit., pp. 16-17, with a rather quaint twist, claims that after the clash the Chikerema and Moyo groups made an effort to work together, and that an indication of this reconciliation was given when "...a large number of Shona members attended the funeral of an Ndebele soldier who had died of rabies". Obviously this was the victim of the Shona attack on the hostel.
It is unfortunate that it has taken a tribal shoot-in (sic) for the world to know who these criminals really are: authentic tribalists whose loyalty is not to the revolution but to their tribal group...

At this point we can only wonder what must be going on in the heads of these bloody tribalists... Do they suppose that this revolution can be won by appealing to the cheap pride and arrogance of one tribal group? And which sane "hole" will continue giving support to a leadership that openly abuses and shamefully goes about in bars preaching tribal obscenities against another tribal group. 1

In late May 1970, in a call for unity, Herbert Chitepo, the ZANU National Chairman, declared:

We need in Zimbabwe to return to the spirit of 1896, when our forefathers, Shona and Ndebele, faced the common threat of white settlement. The workers and peasants of 1970 must unite to overthrow the white settler capitalists and racists. We have a national duty as leaders of the Zimbabwe revolution to bring this about. Those who stand in the way of unity will be condemned by future generations as the betrayers of the revolution of the peasants and workers. 2

Later in the year Chitepo again disparaged the influence of "tribalism" in the nationalist movement, and spoke of the

1. "Down with Tribalism!", Zimbabwe News, (Lusaka), Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1970, pp.3, 4 and 9. The "editorial collective" at this time included Taziana Mutizwa, the ZANU Publicity Secretary, and Zebediah Gamanza, Deputy Chief of Information. Both Zezuru, they broke with ZANU in 1971, and joined Chikerema in the Zezuru-based nationalist party, FROLIZI. A "hole" is the lowest of the Ndebele castes.

movements substantial unity of method, objective and "tribe":

Tribal man in Rhodesia is indeed passing, in fact has passed into history.

That in Rhodesia there is now a single African National consciousness is clear. The present differences between the two barred political parties in Rhodesia are not tribal. Each of the parties embraces the whole country and is supported by former Matabele and Mashona tribesmen - now nationalists of Zimbabwe.

There is a new force at work, a new vision and a new imperative. The people see a new hope and a new society in front of them. They have embraced it and they will inexorably follow the vision to the end.

Chitepo's appeals fell on deaf ears and during the rest of 1970 the split within ZAPU grew wider. Unfortunately for ZANU and Chitepo, "tribal man" had not "passed into history": in 1971 several leading ZANU members resigned from the Party and joined Chikerema in a Zezuru clique; and several years later Chitepo was assassinated during an intra-Party dispute in which the influence of ethnicity was most apparent.

In June and July 1970 Chikerema approached ZANU for talks on unity. Some ZANU members, aware that Chikerema now represented only a Zezuru faction within ZAPU, argued that Chitepo should not enter into negotiations. In view of his own previous calls for unity, Chitepo felt he had to meet Chikerema. Chitepo's decision may also have been

influenced by the fact that within ZANU there were many Zezuru who sympathised with Chikerema whom they saw being squeezed out of power by the Ndebele. Chikerema, in fact, while talking with Chitepo, was engaged in more frequent talks with Nathan Shamuyarira and Taziana Mutizwa, two of the three Zezuru members within ZANU's Dare. Subsequently, when Chikerema eventually broke from ZAPU, he took with him not only a large number of ZAPU Zezuru members but also many from ZANU.

The ZAPU split erupted again on the night of 11 March 1971 when a group of young ZAPU guerrillas led by Walter Mtikulu, kidnapped 21 ZAPU political and military leaders. They also sent a letter to the OAU demanding an end to faction fighting in ZAPU. The rebels later claimed that their aim had been to force their leaders to join them in the guerrilla camps, though it seems that their real aim was to prevent talks on the proposal of ZAPU/ZANU unity.

This mutiny within ZAPU finally broke the patience of the Zambian authorities. The Zambian police arrested more than 200 ZAPU members and placed them in remote camps. During the next few months the Zambian Justice Minister presided over a series of meetings at which the various ZAPU

factions gave their points of view. He finally issued an ultimatum to ZAPU; either unite under Chikerema or be expelled from Zambia. More than 100 cadres chose the latter course and were arrested. At the end of July and the beginning of August 1971, 129 ZAPU cadres were (after consultation with the OAU) handed over to the Rhodesian Government. ZAPU could ill-afford to lose these well-trained and battle-hardened cadres, and their loss not only led to a deepening of the tensions and conflicts within ZAPU, but also badly depleted ZAPU's armed wing at a time when ZANU was beginning to grow in size and influence. ZAPU's SA ANC allies also saw that they could no longer rely on ZAPU and began to seek new allies. ZAPU carried out no guerrilla operations


2. In a television speech in January 1973 Smith referred to this group of former ZAPU guerrillas whom he said were "handed over to the Rhodesian authorities through mutual agreement". See Simbi V. Mubaka, "The Rhodesian Blockade of 1973 and the African Liberation Struggle", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, (London), Vol. 12, No. 3, November 1974, pp. 301 and 311, footnote 14. Some of these 129 guerrillas were brought to trial in Rhodesia. It was revealed at that time that some had been members of the 1967 ZAPU operations into Wankie. "Guerrillas charged with murder in Rhodesia", The Times, (London), 9 November 1971, p. 7. At least three of the group were subsequently executed; Anglin and Shaw, op. cit., p. 254.

3. At its Third Consultative Conference at Morogoro, Tanzania, in late April 1969, the SA ANC decided that the alliance with ZAPU should not only be continued but strengthened; Johns, op. cit., p. 291, from Sechaba, 3 July 1969, p. 10. By 1970, however, the SA ANC had "quietly dropped" its insistence about the correctness and necessity of the alliance, and shifted its attention to other means of returning its guerrillas to South Africa; Johns, op. cit., p. 291.
between 1970 and 1972, and it was not until the late 1970s, after years of reorganisation and rebuilding, that ZAPU's guerrilla forces again came to equal ZANU's in size and capability.

The ZANU biennial Review Conference in August 1971 decided against unity with ZAPU. The official ZANU position was expressed by Richard Hove, the Party's newly-elected Secretary for External Affairs, in a press statement in October 1971:

In view of the serious factional split in ZAPU, that party was incapable of reaching a considered decision on so vital an issue as unity... The division in ZAPU is basically tribal and its origin had nothing to do with unity and for ZANU to join hands with a tribal faction would be to put a seal of legitimacy to the politics of tribalism in Zimbabwe. We think that tribalism is counter-revolutionary. We will consider unity when ZAPU has resolved its internal tribal contradictions. 1

Following the failure of the unity talks with ZANU, Chikerema and Nyandoro and their supporters, almost all of whom were Zezuru, left ZAPU and were instrumental in forming a new exiled nationalist party, FROLIZI. Chikerema's departure from ZAPU virtually brought to an end his involvement in the mainstream of nationalist politics. Paradoxically, from this time onwards, both his greatest strength and greatest weakness remained his reliance on Zezuru support. During the rest of the 1970s Chikerema, usually with his confidant Nyandoro, moved between a number of minority parties and loose coalitions, but his views and actions were of little consequence to the direction of the liberation struggle.

1. ZANU Press Release, (Lusaka), 9 October 1971, signed by ZANU's Secretary for External Affairs, Richard Hove.
A large number of ZAPU's exiled Zezuru members, who had remained loyal to Nkomo during the crisis of 1963, left the Party with Chikerema. Their departure did not influence the standing or loyalty of those Zezuru members in detention in Rhodesia - such as Joseph Msika, Josiah Chinamano and Willie Musarurwa - who remained close to Nkomo and who regained senior Party positions following their release in 1974. Nevertheless, a general feeling of distrust seems to have pervaded relations between ZAPU's Zezuru and Kalanga/Ndebele members from this time onwards.

Jason Ziyapapa Moyo, a Kalanga/Ndebele, assumed the leadership position vacated by Chikerema. Jason Moyo was born in 1927 near Plumtree on the border with Botswana. According to an official ZAPU publication, The Zimbabwe Review, his father was a peasant "whose life was in his soil". He was a member of the small Rozwi ethnic group (the kingmakers of the Shona), which had been integrated into the Ndebele nation during the 1830s. Like several other nationalist leaders, his introduction to politics was through unionism, and in the early 1950s he became General Secretary of the African Artisans' Union. He later joined Nkomo's Bulawayo Branch of the African National Congress, became Secretary and later Chairman. In November 1961, after a short period in prison, he was elected a member of the National Executive of the NDP. When the NDP was proscribed, he joined ZAPU as Treasurer General. Moyo stood

by Nkomo during the crisis of 1963 which resulted in the formation of ZANU. With Chikerema, Nyandoro, Ndlovu and Silundika he travelled to Lusaka in 1963/64, where ZAPU's External Liaison Committee was established. Moyo apparently spent 1964 and 1965 in Moscow at the Patrice Lumumba University and he was an important element in the development of relations between ZAPU and the Soviet Union.¹

Following Chikerema's departure, Moyo undertook a major reorganisation of ZAPU's political and military wings.² ZAPU's armed forces were renamed the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA),³ under the control of a High Command of six members, plus a number of regional commands.


   ...liberation would not be meaningful to the people if it achieved empty political power without absolute control of means of production. He stood for the cause of the masses - clear cut socialism without neocolonialist trappings or coatings.


   In 1976, shortly before his death, Moyo stated in a radio broadcast from Moscow:

   We don't limit our revolution to liberation. We think of our revolution even after the war of liberation has ended: the revolution of the system in Zimbabwe, the creation of a new system altogether, a system serving the interests of all the people of Zimbabwe and not a few monopolies as is the case now.


3. Also known as ZPRA.
A Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Council (ZIPRC) was also established as the ruling body of ZIPRA and "...to ensure the participation of all wings of the Party in the development of the armed struggle".\(^1\) Represented in ZIPRC were the Department of Political Commissariat, the High Command of ZIPRA, the National Executive and the various "mass organisations" of the Party. The External Liaison Committee remained the Party's day-to-day decision-making body. With the departure of Chikerema and Nyandoro, the four-member External Liaison Committee was totally dominated by Kalanga/Ndebele - Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu, and Dumiso Dabengwa.\(^2\)

**TABLE 10 ZAPU EXTERNAL LIAISON COMMITTEE : 1971-1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jason Moyo</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Silundika</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Ndhlovu</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumiso Dabengwa</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *


2. Ibid., p.5.
Although the initial impetus for the division in ZAPU was Chikerema's political ambition and his desire to dominate the affairs of the Party, ethnicity became important at a later stage as the two leadership factions sought to protect their positions. The sharing of power within ZAPU's External Liaison Committee between two ethnic groups, the Zezuru and the Kalanga/Ndebele, ensured that differences over the distribution of power, or over questions of policy and tactics, quickly assumed, or were seen to assume, an ethnic dimension. As the rift in the political hierarchy widened, Party leaders sought support from members of their own ethnic group, causing the rival factions to develop along ethnic lines. Thus the struggle in ZAPU, which originally had been concerned with the question of personal political power, eventually developed into a conflict between the two ethnic groups. The influence of ethnicity is clearly shown in the composition of the External Liaison Committee following Chikerema's departure - the victorious Kalanga/Ndebele promoted members of their own ethnic group to the executive, to the total exclusion of the Zezuru.

1. See "Dengezi - the 'clay that fights unity...", Zambia Times, (Lusaka), 12 September 1971, and Enoch Dumbutshena, Zimbabwe Tragedy, (Lusaka), 1975, pp.49 and 124 for a somewhat different interpretation of the split in ZAPU. Dumbutshena, a long-time Chikerema supporter, argues that Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu had formed a secret Kalanga organisation within ZAPU, called "Dengezi". The objective of the "Dengezi" was to capture power from the Zezuru and the "pure" Ndebele, both in exile and in Rhodesia: "...ZAPU leaders who are Kalanga, under the false claim of being Ndebele...cling to tribalism and think tribally in their efforts to gain advantage for members of their own tribe".

The struggle within ZAPU between the Zezuru and the Kalanga/Ndebele also to some extent affected ZANU. Many Zezuru within ZANU sympathised with Chikerema and Nyandoro and favoured unity. However, at ZANU's biennial Review Conference, held on 8 August 1971, the move to unite with Chikerema's faction of ZAPU was easily defeated. ZANU subsequently announced that it was discontinuing negotiations with ZAPU. The Conference also resolved that ZANU cease all talks about unity and concentrate on the armed struggle. The Party was seized by a fear of being swindled into a bogus unity, and it is likely that this experience influenced the thinking of the leadership in negotiations on unification in late 1974, during the so called "detente exercise". The decision not to unite with Chikerema's faction of ZAPU was not unanimous. A vocal and influential group within ZANU, led by Nathan Shamuyarira, Stanley Parirewa and Taziana Mutizwa, argued strongly during the Review Conference about the merits of unity with Chikerema. In the ensuing election, Shamuyarira and Mutizwa lost their

3. See M. Sithole. (1979), op. cit., pp. 53 and 161. Masipula Sithole, the younger brother of ZANU's founding President, Ndabaningi Sithole, claims that his information on the Review Conference comes from Lovemore Chihota, with whom he spent "some time" in May 1973.
positions in the Dare. They resigned from ZANU and later joined Chikerema in FROLIZI. Parirewa, who was re-elected, resigned his position in the Dare as Secretary for Welfare and Social Affairs after only two weeks. He also joined FROLIZI.¹

While the defection of Shamuyarira, Mutizwa and Parirewa to FROLIZI adversely affected ZANU's administrative wing, from the purely military point of view the Zezuru-Kalanga/Ndebele split in ZAPU worked largely in ZANU's favour. Although one or two relatively senior ZANLA members joined FROLIZI, ZANU's armed wing was boosted by the arrival of a number of senior and experienced ZAPU military commanders and cadres, most of whom were Zezuru. Robson Manyika, ZAPU's Chief of Staff, was the most senior of these recruits. Thomas Nhari, Rex Nhongo,² and Nhongo's younger brother David Todhlana, also joined ZANLA in 1971/72, and another ZAPU guerrilla, Elliot Seke, joined in 1973. While Nhari, Nhongo, Todhlana and Seke had not held senior positions in ZAPU, all four rose quickly through ZANLA's expanding ranks during the mid-1970s.

1. His position was left vacant until the next Review Conference in 1973.

2. Nhongo's real name is Solomon Mutuswa.
The loss of Shamuyarira, Mutizwa and Parirewa left the Dare with no Zezuru members. The election of Parirewa, however, seems to indicate that voting at the Review Conference was not based on ethnic favouritism and rivalry, but rather on substantive issues, such as the question of unity with ZAPU. Nevertheless, the subsequent defection of the three Zezuru to FROLIZI, seems to have been prompted more by a sense of ethnic loyalty, that is loyalty to the Zezuru, than a genuine desire to unify ZANU and ZAPU.

Following the departure of the Zezuru, two new members were introduced into the Dare. Richard Hove, the son of Mike Hove, who was first elected to the Federal Parliament

1. In a departure from the conduct of the previous (1969) Review Conference, members of ZANU's Military High Command participated in the election of the Dare. See M. Sithole (1979), op. cit., p. 55.
in 1953, replaced Shamuyarira as Secretary for External Affairs. Hove had recently completed a University degree in Britain, where he had been ZANU's Chief Representative. Although Hove was Karanga, and in fact distantly related to Josiah Tongogara, he was personally close to Chitepo. Washington Malianga who had been Publicity Secretary until the 1969 Conference regained his former position, and replaced Mutizwa. All other Dare members retained their 1969 portfolios.

A new Military High Command was also appointed at the 1971 Review Conference:

TABLE 12  ZANLA MILITARY HIGH COMMAND - 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Defence and Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Karanga (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ndangana</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary - Zambia/Zimbabwe (ZZ)</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meya Urimbo</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary - Malawi/Mozambique/Zimbabwe (MMZ)</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox Gava</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary - Botswana/Bulawayo/Zimbabwe (BBZ)</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cletos Chigowe</td>
<td>Chief of Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mataure</td>
<td>Chief Political Commissar</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Mutuma</td>
<td>Chief Camp Commander</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix Santana</td>
<td>Chief of Training</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Interview with Chimurenga. Chimurenga did not list Mutuma and Santana as members of the Military High Command. However, Mukono, in an interview on 8 February 1980 strongly implied that both were members of the High Command. Also see M. Sithole (1979), op. cit., p.81; Sithole claims that Santana, and also another Manyika, George Mupini, were members of the High Command. Mupini's membership seems most unlikely. Drawing on ZANLA's recent experiences with
The composition of ZANLA's Military High Command in 1971 was very similar to that of the Military Committee established in 1966/67. Mukono, Tongogara, Santana, Ndangana, Mataure, Mutuma and Chigowe all retained positions in the military hierarchy, although in a number of cases their responsibilities had altered. However, the inclusion of Meya Urimbo, Fox Gava and Justin Chauke, all "second generation" ZANLA members who had been "recruited" during the late 1960s, represented a substantial change. While Mukono and his original group of ZANLA members, Santana, Ndangana and Mutuma, continued to dominate the Party's military wing, Tongogara's influence, and that of his Karanga supporters, was rapidly increasing.

Following the 1971 Review Conference, the Dare and Military High Command were dominated by Manyika and Karanga: the Manyika had four of the eight Dare positions, and four out of ten positions in the Military High Command; while the Karanga occupied three and four positions respectively. No other Shona sub-group was represented in the Dare, while there was only one Ndau and one Shangaan in the High Command. The Manyika retained the most senior position in both the political and military hierarchies.

Eduardo Mondlane's Mozambican guerrilla group, ZANU adopted the FRELIMO system of operational provinces (interview with Chimurenga). Rhodesia was divided into three Provinces: Zambia/Zimbabwe (ZZ Province) - the northern third of the country; Malawi/Mozambique/Zimbabwe (MMZ Province); and Botswana/Bulawayo/Zimbabwe (BBZ Province). For each Province a Provincial Secretary was appointed to oversee the organisation and development of the armed struggle. In theory within each Province there existed a Provincial Command Structure, with a Commander, Political Commissar, Security Officer, Logistics and Supplies Officer, Medical Officer and Transport Officer. At the time of the 1971 Review Conference only MMZ Province seems to have had a complete Provincial Command structure. (Interviews during February/March 1980 with a number of former ZANLA members, including Chimurenga).
During 1971 and 1972, numerous attempts were made by Zambia and Tanzania and the OAU (Liberation Committee) to force the warring Rhodesian guerrilla groups to unite. The exertion of considerable pressure brought about the formation of united fronts and joint military commands, but could not reconcile the personal and ethnic rivalries and animosities between ZAPU and ZANU. Not only were these efforts to impose unity on ZAPU and ZANU unsuccessful, they also facilitated the emergence of a third exile group, FROLIZI.¹

* * * * *

Following the violent conflict between ZAPU factions which took place during 1970 and 1971, Zambia's President Kaunda was determined to unify the Rhodesian guerrilla groups. On 25 August 1971, Mukuka Nkolosa, Kaunda's Special Representative at the Liberation Centre in Lusaka, stated that if ZAPU and ZANU did not achieve unity within two weeks they would face possible expulsion.²


These threats apparently produced immediate action. On 1 October 1971 members of ZAPU and ZANU announced at a Lusaka press conference the merger of the two groups to form FROLIZI:

...we, members, militants, leaders and fighters of...ZANU, and...ZAPU, have gathered here to formally bury the hatchet, to forget all past differences, and to unite in an anti-imperialist United National Front to wage a resolute, long-term people's struggle against British Colonialism and its settler agents in Zimbabwe. 1

Nkolosa immediately congratulated the FROLIZI leadership:

I will tell them (OAU) that you are united... Those who opposed unity of Zimbabweans are very few and would never succeed in splitting the masses... The United Front is a wonderful achievement. This is what we, the Zambian people have been waiting for. We are 100 per cent behind you. We are jubilant to see you have patched up your differences. 2

Despite the optimism of FROLIZI's first press releases, 3 and the statements of Nkolosa and other Zambia spokesmen, the formation of the new Party failed to unite ZAPU and ZANU, and led merely to an alliance between the Zezuru from the two groups. ZAPU and ZANU continued to function as separate groups and, instead of merging the rival organisations into one, FROLIZI added to the division within the nationalist movement and the problems of the exile guerrilla groups.


3. See for instance, Nathan Shamuyarira, "Explanation of why FROLIZI was formed", in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit., pp.171-179.
Numerous senior ZANU and ZAPU political and military officials, almost all of them Zezuru, joined FROLIZI. Three former or serving members of ZANU's Dare - Stanley Parirewa (elected 1969 and 1971), Nathan Shamuyarira (1969) and Taziana Mutizwa (1969) - joined FROLIZI. They were accompanied by lesser ZANU figures such as Godfrey Savanhu, Wilfred Pasipanodya (former ZANU representative in Dar es Salaam), Lovemore Chihota (once ZANU's Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam), Fiddian Kashiri (ZANU's Chief Camp Commandant) and Zebediah Gamanya (ZANU Deputy Representative in Dar es Salaam and Deputy Chief of Information). Chikerema and Nyandoro joined FROLIZI from ZAPU's five-man External Liaison Committee. Other ZAPU members who crossed over to FROLIZI included Stephen Parirenyatwa (ZAPU Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam), Luke Munyawarara, Tshinga Dube, Ambrose Mutiniri, and Elliot Masengo.

FROLIZI's interim executive, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), established in October 1971, attempted unsuccessfully to provide an ethnic balance. Although the Revolutionary Command Council included an Ndau and a Ndebele, the rest of the leadership were Zezuru.
TABLE 13  FROLIZI REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL -
OCTOBER 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>Former Party Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelton Siwela¹</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Savanhu</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Chikerema²</td>
<td>Secretary for Military Affairs</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Nyandoro²</td>
<td>Secretary for Organisation, Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Shamuyarira</td>
<td>Secretary for Research, Finance and Foreign Relations</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshinga Embassy Dube</td>
<td>Secretary for Communications</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovemore Chihota</td>
<td>Secretary for Administration &amp; Transport</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the presence of some experienced nationalists, FROLIZI's leadership was largely made up of younger and relatively unknown personnel. The Chairman, Shelton Siwela, was a former ZAPU guerrilla commander and Political Commissar; he had been on two guerrilla operations into Rhodesia. The Secretary General, Godfrey Savanhu, was the son of Jasper Savanhu, a Minister in Sir Roy Welensky's Government, and had

1. M. Sithole (1979), op. cit., p.89 claims that Siwela was Manyika.

joined ZANU in 1965. Despite the presence of these younger nationalists in FROLIZI's executive, the real force behind its establishment was James Chikerema. Chikerema, fearing that his early assumption of the FROLIZI leadership would not be tolerated by the Zambian Government and others, bided his time in a relatively junior military portfolio. Eventually, however, he and his old colleague, George Nyandoro, ousted Siwela and Savanhu and assumed control of the new Party.

During the latter part of 1971 and most of 1972 Chikerema chose to remain very much in the background. Nevertheless, at FROLIZI's inaugural Congress, held in Zambia between 21 August and 5 September 1972, Chikerema and Nyandoro were elected to the Party's most senior executive positions, while the younger members of the original leadership were voted out of office. Siwela was made responsible for training FROLIZI's army, but after several weeks he, Savanhu (who was not even elected to the 30-member Central Committee) and Charles Goromonzi (who was in charge of political education at the Zambian camp), fled. Siwela and Savanhu returned to the United States to continue their briefly interrupted university studies.¹

Following the 1972 elections all positions in the Revolutionary Command Council were occupied by Zezuru.

¹. Lovemore Chihota also eventually left FROLIZI. He too went to the United States, where he studied political science; M. Sithole (1979), *op. cit.*, pp.56 and 95.
### TABLE 14

**FROLIZI REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>Former Party Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Chikerema</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Nyandoro</td>
<td>Secretary for Foreign Relations</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Parirenyatwa</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luke Munywarara</td>
<td>Secretary for Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliot Masengo</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Shamuyarira</td>
<td>Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiddian Kashiri</td>
<td>Political Secretary and Commissar</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Parirewa</td>
<td>Secretary for Labour Relations and Social Welfare</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rift within ZAPU, which had begun in 1969 as a struggle for personal political power, and had evolved into a conflict between the Zezuru and the Kalanga/Ndebele, ended in the formation of FROLIZI's 1972 RCC. Despite early efforts to present FROLIZI as a party of unity, it became a party only of the Zezuru. Its formation provides the most blatant example of ethnicity in the divisive history of the Rhodesian guerrilla groups.
Despite the presence of several leading nationalists, and the initial support of Zambia and the OAU, FROLIZI was unable to attract a significant following and conducted few operations into Rhodesia. In June 1973, largely because of FROLIZI's inactivity, and Chikerema's dictatorial rule, 1 Nathan Shamuyarira, Stanley Parirewa, Fiddian Kashiri and Taziana Mutizwa led many of those Zezuru who had joined FROLIZI from ZANU back into ZANU. In all, three members of FROLIZI's eight-man Revolutionary Command Council, and another 19 ordinary members, rejoined ZANU. The loss of the former ZANU members was a serious setback for FROLIZI. FROLIZI's contribution to the guerrilla war had been insignificant, and its energies were now totally directed towards organisational survival. 2

*    *    *    *    *    *

1. Shamuyarira later described Chikerema's leadership as "...not as democratic as I would have wished"; Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 204.

2. In February 1973, Elliot Masengo, head of FROLIZI's military wing also resigned after alleging that the group's leadership was isolated and that it approach was old-fashioned and unrealistic. See Kirk, op. cit., pp. 3-38.
In 1966 there had been two Rhodesian guerrilla groups; by 1971 they had split and spawned a third. The splits in ZAPU and ZANU were caused by a number of factors, including the military failures of the late 1960s, the frustrations of life in exile, the heavy-handed efforts of the OAU (Liberation Committee) to impose unity, Chikerema's increasingly arbitrary leadership, and differences within ZANU about unity with ZAPU. Clearly, ethnicity also played an important role. The defection of Zezuru to FROLIZI from both ZAPU and ZANU, and the eventual domination of FROLIZI by Zezuru, were indicative of the use and role of ethnicity in the development of divisions within the Rhodesian guerrilla groups. In times of organisational strain or personal threat, guerrilla leaders sought, and usually received, the support of members of their own ethnic group. The ethnic make-up of the FROLIZI, ZAPU and ZANU political and military hierarchies following the formation of FROLIZI clearly shows that leaders gave preferential treatment to members of their own ethnic group when appointments and promotions were made, both to secure their own positions, and also as a reward for support and assistance.

The much-vaunted guerrilla war which began in 1966 was disastrous for the ill-prepared and disorganised ZAPU and ZANU. During the latter half of the 1960s both groups suffered heavy casualties and defections from their military forces. While ZANU learnt from its mistakes and reorganised its military and political structures, the ZAPU leadership could not cope with the gradual disintegration of its guerrilla forces. In consequence, an internal struggle for power ensued. The two leadership factions in ZAPU each sought support
from members of their own ethnic group. This process eventually resulted in the defection of Zezuru members and officials, including the Vice President, the Secretary General, and the Chief of Staff. The disintegration of ZAPU along ethnic lines also affected the cohesion of the ZANU leadership; the refusal of the Dare to unite with Chikerema's Zezuru faction of ZAPU led to the resignation of a number of Zezuru from ZANU's political and military wings.

At no time in the past had the ethnic nature of the rift in the Rhodesian nationalist movement been as obvious as it was in 1972. The division between the Zezuru/Ndebele on the one hand, and the Shona sub-groups on the other, which had characterised the National Executives of ZAPU and ZANU in 1963/64, and which had originally been reproduced in their exile political hierarchies, had changed during the late 1960s and early 1970s: the Zezuru had deserted both ZAPU and ZANU and united within FROLIZI's Revolutionary Command Council, whose eight members were all Zezuru; within ZAPU's External Liaison Committee all four members were now Kalanga/Ndebele; while ZANU's seven-man Dare was precariously balanced between the Manyika, with four members, and the Karanga, with three.

The unsuccessful commencement of the armed struggle, instead of unifying the exiled parties in the face of their common enemy - the Rhodesian Security Forces - compounded the divisions within the nationalist movement, provoked intra-party dissension and struggles for personal political power, and also aggrevated ethnic rivalries and animosities. This pattern would be repeated in the future; military failure and political turmoil would often be accompanied by factionalism and the disintegration of long-standing ethnic alliances.
CHAPTER IV


By 1972 ZAPU, and even the newly-formed FROLIZI, were virtually moribund, while ZANU, reaping the benefits of its earlier reorganisation, was growing in strength and capability. Late in the year, following many months of preparation and intensive efforts to politicise the local black population, ZANLA launched its north-eastern offensive. During the next two years ZANU expanded the area and intensity of its operations, confronting the Security Forces with their most serious threat to date, and laying the foundations for the major escalation of the guerrilla war which took place during the late 1970s. The success of the north-eastern offensive, and the general belief within the Party that military victory was imminent, provoked a struggle for power within ZANU's political and military hierarchies, in which a number of Party leaders sought support from members of their own ethnic group in order to enhance their positions.

As the war escalated, ZANLA grew from a force of about 80 trained guerrillas in 1971 to about 800 in 1974. This rapid growth was accompanied by increasing demands on the Party's administrative structures, and communications and medical facilities. In late 1974,
dissatisfaction with the mismanagement of the Party's leadership led to a rebellion by some ZANLA members against the Military High Command, which since 1973 had been dominated by Karanga. Differences within the Party's recently restructured leadership, and between the High Command and some members of the Dare, about how best to react to the grievances of the guerrillas were compounded by debate within the Party about the "detente exercise", a regional attempt to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. ZANU eventually split into two warring camps, and a struggle for power, essentially between the Karanga and the Manyika, followed.

By the end of 1974, just two years after the resumption of the armed struggle, ZANU was in total disarray and the guerrilla war had virtually ceased. Many of ZANU's exiled political leaders were either dead, or had been expelled from the Party. The Party's disorganised remnants were scattered and leaderless, in camps in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique.

* * * * *
The North-Eastern Offensive

We have suffered too much for far too long. Patience we have had; reasonable we have been. We have now drawn the line. Enough, we say.

There is only one thing we want: our country...we shall have it...we shall have our country by the only means that developments have left us: armed struggle. 1

(Henry Matuku Hamadziripi, 1972)

Rhodesia's northern border with Mozambique is rugged and inhospitable. A ribbon of African Tribal Trust Lands, 80 kilometres wide, and stretching more than 300 kilometres along the border, separates the white farming areas from the Zambezi River and Mozambique. The Zambezi Escarpment, 1,000 metres above the floor of the Zambezi Valley, is a vast area of dense bush, difficult, wild and sparsely populated. Water is scarce and sleeping sickness, malaria and bilharzia are endemic. 2 The Korekore who inhabit most of the region have a militantly anti-white tradition, and were the backbone of the 1896 Shona Rebellion.

It was into this area in mid-1971 that ZANU began to infiltrate small, highly trained groups of guerrillas. 3


2. Keith Simpson, "If a child smiles it's well", Sunday Mail, (Salisbury), 3 June 1973, p. 2, wrote of the children below the Zambezi Escarpment - "all are undernourished, all are ravaged by bilharzia and malaria".

3. Unless otherwise cited the information in this section is from a four-hour interview with Chimurenga in Salisbury on 24 March 1980.
Initially only 45 "political commissars", the bulk of ZANLA at the time, were involved in the infiltration. The guerrilla group, under the command of Joseph Chimurenga, was faced with numerous and major problems. Re-supply and communications were difficult. The nearest ZANU staging-base was at Chifombo on the Zambia/Mozambique border, 200 kilometres and several weeks walk from the front. Chimurenga did not have complete freedom of action, and he ran into problems with the High Command, particularly with Mukono and Tongogara, over a number of issues, including relations with FRELIMO, the importance of traditional African magico-religious beliefs to the proselytisation of the local population, and the structure of the Provincial Command.

Chimurenga's relations with his small group seem to have been good. Despite his limited education, Chimurenga is bright and articulate and, following his time with FRELIMO, his credentials as a guerrilla were exemplary. In 1974, following Chimurenga's replacement by a less capable and respected commander, the fine balance between the ZANLA leadership and the guerrillas broke down, resulting in a violent rebellion and the almost total destruction of the Party.

1. According to Chimurenga, ZANLA numbered only 81 trained cadres at this time.
Between March and December 1971, Chimurenga and his 45 comrades ferried arms, ammunition and supplies from the ZANLA camp at Chifombo, across the Zambezi River, and into north-eastern Rhodesia, in preparation for the resumption of the armed struggle. The 45 guerrillas were split into two groups, one on each side of the Zambezi. In order to understand the reasons for the rebellion in ZANU, it is necessary to describe in some detail the personalities involved in establishing the new front and also the changes which occurred in ZANLA's command structure for MMZ Province during the early phases of the north-eastern offensive.

The composition of ZANLA's Provincial Command for MMZ Province during the preparatory stage in 1971 is shown in the following table:
### TABLE 15

**ZANLA PROVINCIAL COMMAND MMZ PROVINCE—**

**NORTH-EASTERN OFFENSIVE 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inside Rhodesia:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Chimurenga</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations (PFO) Commander</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Nhari</td>
<td>PFO Political Commissar</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Mpunzarima</td>
<td>PFO Security Officer</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephas Tichatonga</td>
<td>PFO Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnabus Chipembere</td>
<td>PFO Deputy Political Commissar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>PFO Deputy Security Officer</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemist Ncube</td>
<td>PFO Deputy Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zambia/Mozambique:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>PFO Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Rauya</td>
<td>PFO Political Commissar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Gwindingwi</td>
<td>PFO Deputy Political Commissar</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FNU)** Homba</td>
<td>PFO Deputy Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, ZANLA's command structure was generally balanced between Karanga, Manyika, Shangaan and Zezuru, and there were no signs of ethnic infighting or politicking during these preparatory stages of the north-eastern offensive. Two Karanga - Chimurenga and Mpunzarima - held two of the three most senior positions within Rhodesia. They were also both

1. Interview with Chimurenga.
2. Full name unknown.

---

1. Interview with Chimurenga.
2. Full name unknown.
related to ZANLA's Chief of Operations, Josiah Tongogara. Justin Chauke, the senior commander of the other side of the Zambezi, was also a close personal friend of Tongogara.¹ Most, if not all,² of the important positions within the Provincial Command were thus held by "second generation" ZANLA fighters. ZANLA's first members, who had trained in Ghana and China at the time that Mukono was in charge of ZANU, were engaged primarily in training ZANLA recruits in Tanzania.³ Tongogara's affinity with and influence over commanders like Chimurenga, Chauke, and Mpunzarima meant that the expansion of the north-eastern offensive came to be seen in the Party as a victory for Tongogara and his policies and clique, rather than for Mukono, who was still Chief of Defence.

Two Zezuru, Thomas Nhari and Rex Nhongo, were also members of the Provincial Command. Both had only recently joined ZANU from ZAPU, and had been included in the command structure to ensure that the "...ZAPU people would feel at home".⁴ They had been "re-trained" by ZANLA after joining the Party,⁵ and their presence in the Provincial Command seems to have caused no problems; they were both, in fact, experienced and able fighters.

In early 1972, after much of the work of ferrying arms, equipment and supplies into Rhodesia had been completed, Chimurenga and other senior cadres at the front decided that

2. There is no biographical information available on many members of the Provincial Command.
3. William Ndangana is an exception. During 1971 he was Provincial Secretary for the Zambia/Zimbabwe Province (ZZ Province).
4. Interview with Chimurenga.
5. Ibid.
it was necessary to adjust the command structure prior to launching the group's first operations. The 45 "commissars" were divided into two sectors under the overall command of Chimurenga: the Nehanda Sector, numbering 22 cadres, was to operate between Centenary and Mt. Darwin; and the Chaminuka Sector, 23 cadres, was to operate between Mt. Darwin and Bindura. In common with the previous command structure for MMZ Province, there was a fair balance between the Shona sub-groups:

TABLE 16 ZANLA PROVINCIAL COMMAND MMZ PROVINCE - 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Chimurenga</td>
<td>PFO Commander</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Rauya</td>
<td>PFO Political Commissar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Mpunzarima</td>
<td>PFO Security Officer</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>PFO Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nehanda Sector:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bond (Paul Murwira)</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakarai Badza</td>
<td>Political Commissar</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Chamurwa</td>
<td>Deputy Commander and Political Commissar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Sectorial Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaminuka Sector:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Gwindingwi</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnabus Chipembere</td>
<td>Political Commissar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Nhari</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephas Tichatonga</td>
<td>Sectorial Commander</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.

2. Chimurenga's role was to supervise the two Sector Commanders, organise the distribution and division of arms, ammunition and supplies, and maintain relations with PRELIMO - whose leaders were becoming concerned about the number of ZANLA deploying through their areas of operation, as Rhodesian Security Force patrols were increasingly being directed against PRELIMO camps; interview with Chimurenga.
The decision to reorganise the command structure caused some problems between the guerrillas at the front and ZANU's military leadership in Lusaka. Mukono and Tongogara, in particular, were concerned that Chimurenga was infringing on their area of responsibility. Eventually, when the new structure was shown to work, they came around. Chimurenga later commented disparagingly, "They had never fought, we had".\(^1\) Difficulties between the guerrillas and the High Command continued, however, particularly over Chimurenga's efforts to involve the local spirit-mediums with ZANLA's burgeoning infiltration, and his increasingly strained relations with FRELIMO.\(^2\)

1. Ibid.

2. In order to gain the support of the population Chimurenga, who like many nationalists retained a strong belief in traditional African magico-religious practices, sought, without the approval of his superiors, to gain the assistance of the Svikiro, the spirit-mediums, who had considerable influence in this backward region. (See Peter Fry, Spirits of Protest: Spirit-Mediums and the Articulation of Consensus Among the Zeezuru of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), (Cambridge), 1976; "Rhodesia: The Relevance of African Spiritual Beliefs to Security", Salisbury home service, 30 September 1975, SWB, ME/5023/B/6, 3 October 1975; interview with District Commissioner Jim Latham by David Cordell, and Rhodesian Parliamentary Debates, (Salisbury), Vol. 83, 29 March 1973, 1072.) Svikiro played a leading role in almost all of the colonial rebellions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Allen F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambezi Valley 1850-1921, (London), 1976, particularly p.128; T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7: A Study in African Resistance, (London), 1967, particularly pp. 268-310; and Terence Ranger, "The Role of Ndebele and Shona Religious Authorities in the Rebellions of 1896 and 1897", in Stokes and Brown, op. cit., pp. 126-128. Some sociologists have speculated on the existence of close links between the various spirit-mediums of the Shona. For instance, H. Kingsley Garbett writes that during "...times of stress when secular authority was being undermined, or when chieftans could not stand alone against invaders, ... links within and between spirit-realms were activated to provide a framework for political and, sometimes military,
activity on a wide scale". The existence of such links between spirit mediums may partly account for ZANLA's success, between 1972 and 1974, in gaining the compliant assistance, if not the active support, of much of the population in north eastern Rhodesia. See Kingsley Garbett, "Spirit Mediums as Mediators in Korekore Society", in John Beattie and John Middleton (editors), Spirit Mediumship and Society in Africa, (New York), 1969, p. 113; Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia", African Affairs, (London), Vol. 73, January 1974, pp. 28-29; and Wilkinson (1973), op. cit., p. 15.

One of the most important of the Korekore spirit mediums is Nehanda, whose influence is dominant in the Mazoe area and in Chiweshe - and after whom one of ZANLA's two operational Sectors had been named. A human embodiment of Nehanda was hanged for her part in the 1896 rebellion, and Chimurenga explained that "Nehanda had fought long ago and could provide help now". In June/July 1972, after receiving directions from two of Nehanda's "servants", Chimurenga, Justin Chauke and another ZANLA cadre met Nehanda, a wizened and crippled old woman, in northeastern Rhodesia: "Nehanda's brother was called Chimurenga and therefore I was her brother and she became my sister, and I had to look after her". Nehanda told Chimurenga, "Now the ground is open and you can deploy your soldiers. The war will be won, but people will die". (Interview with Chimurenga). To Chimurenga, Nehanda's "recruitment" was a great advantage and an important omen of coming success. Some of his superiors, however, saw it a little differently. Chimurenga claims that he was told to ensure that Nehanda was not captured by the Security Forces, and he therefore decided to take her to Mozambique. As she couldn't walk, Chimurenga and the others carried her. A short while later the Rhodesian Security Forces "...discovered she had been taken", and launched large scale attacks into Mozambique. Chimurenga's relations with FRELIMO were already strained, and following the raids it was decided to take Nehanda to the ZANLA camp at Chifombo. This further exacerbated his problems with FRELIMO, as Nehanda was also their spirit medium, and created new ones between Chimurenga and ZANU's political and military leaders. Chimurenga, anticipating their reaction, wrote to Meya Urimbo, Provincial Secretary for MMZ Province, explaining Nehanda's importance. While Urimbo apparently sided with Chimurenga, Tongogara and Mukono, did not. Nevertheless, her influence on the preparatory stages of the guerrilla war soon became obvious, and she remained at Chifombo until her death.
Unlike the incursions of the 1960s, the new ZANLA offensive had clear political aims. Following the guidelines set by ZANU's 1969 and 1971 Review Conferences, the guerrillas were instructed to avoid direct confrontation with the Security Forces and to concentrate instead on the politicisation and mobilisation of the local population.

1. As one Rhodesian army officer said in January 1973, the primary objective of the guerrillas now was "to subvert the local Africans and win them over to their side, not to fight us", in Ian Mills, "Hunting the Enemy on Our Borders", Rhodesia Herald, 12 January 1973, p.13. Another member of the Security Forces complained in 1973 that:

   In the old days our own blacks in the tribal areas were just about 100 per cent loyalist. The moment strangers entered an area, the local chief would get a message to us. Now things are different. The terrorists are getting among us without warning. What's more we are finding instances where terrorists are getting help from our blacks;


A ZANU publication issued five years after the first incursions wrote of the work of these first infiltrators: "They carried out painstaking organisation and mobilisation of the masses and the military reconnaissance that facilitated the launching of the major guerrilla offensive". "The People's War", Zimbabwe News, (Maputo), March-April 1977, Vol. 9, No. 3, p.11.
By late 1972, Chimurenga decided that enough work had been done amongst the local black population, and that the time had come to restart the armed struggle. Soon after midnight on 21 December 1972 the Nehanda Sector, under the command of James Bond and Jack Chamurwa, attacked a white-owned tobacco farm 200 kilometres north of Salisbury. In response to this and other attacks, the Security Forces launched a large-scale search and destroy operation and succeeded in killing or capturing a number of guerrillas. Yet, because of the preparation of the previous few years, and the support of much of the local population, the Security Forces were unable to quell the rebellion completely and numerous guerrilla-initiated actions followed in the next few months.

1. Interview with Chimurenga. "Altena Farm", owned by Marc de Borchgrave and his wife, nestled in rugged hill country on the Zambezi Escarpment. The attack was the first on a white-owned farm since that on the Vijeon property at Hartley in May 1966. The attack lasted for only 30 seconds and resulted in little serious damage. On 22 December, in the same general area, "Whistlefield Farm" was attacked. Ironically, Marc de Borchgrave and three of his young children were staying at the farm as guests of the owners when the guerrillas attacked.

2. The guerrillas initially concentrated their attacks against white farms, Government employees, and village headmen. White farmers with bad reputations as employers came under particular attack. Chimurenga explained ZANLA's strategy in an interview eight years later: "Centenary was the farming area of the whites. The white farmers were always on call-up, and Smith's Ministers lived in Centenary. Our strategy was to destroy the economy, by destroying agriculture." Attacks on white farms, and other white-owned property, brought the guerrillas sympathy from the local Africans, while the execution of corrupt, or disliked Government employees and even of fair and well-loved village headmen, showed locals the power of "revolutionary justice". It was not until 1973 that the guerrillas were forced to engage in coercive terror on a large scale. In Anatomy of Terror, a booklet published in Salisbury in mid-1974, the Government detailed alleged guerrilla atrocities. Between 1972 and May 1974, 89 incidents of guerrilla brutality were said to have occurred.
All the initial guerrilla attacks were the work of the Nehanda Sector. The Chaminuka Sector, under Kenneth Gwindingwi, was not as well organised and suffered fairly heavy casualties during the first half of 1973. The remnants of the Sector eventually escaped into Mozambique where its command structure was reorganised. Gwindingwi was replaced by Barnabus Chipembere, and sent back to Lusaka. Tongogara's influence with the guerrillas at the front was further enhanced by the inclusion of Josiah Tungamirai in the Chaminuka Sectors command structure; for like Chimurenga andMpunzarima, Tungamirai was related to Tongogara.\(^1\) Chipembere was killed in late 1973 when a Security Force patrol attacked what Chimurenga described as a "bush wedding" between Chipembere and a young guerrilla recruit, and future Zimbabwe Government Minister, Teurai Ropa.\(^2\) Nhari was appointed Commander of the Chaminuya Sector in place of Chipembere.

### TABLE 17  CHAMINUKA COMMAND STRUCTURE - 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnabus Chipembere</td>
<td>Sector Commander and Political Commissar</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Nhari</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephas Tichatonga</td>
<td>Security and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tungamirai</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Interview with Chimurenga. Tungamirai was part of a group of 15 cadres who reinforced the ZANLA force in northeastern Rhodesia during early 1973. Also amongst the 15 was Rex Nhongo's brother David Todhiana.

During 1973 ZANLA increased its area of operation and small groups of guerrillas began to penetrate further south, into Chiweshi, Bushu and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands.¹ Later in the year, as the wet season began, and during early 1974, guerrilla operations were again stepped up. By December 1973 the Security Forces claimed to have killed more than 200 guerrillas and captured an undisclosed number. Twenty-five Security Force members, four South African Police and 57 civilians were also reported to have been killed.² The north-eastern offensive was steadily escalating, and had already presented the Security Forces with greater problems than the large-scale operations of the 1960s.

By 1974 ZANLA's armed strength operating in and into Rhodesia was probably about 250, and its total armed strength was probably about 800. This represented a significant increase in size; in 1971 ZANLA had consisted of only about 80 trained cadres. This rapid and substantial growth created serious


administrative problems within ZANU and eventually led to complaints by guerrilla commanders of mismanagement by the Military High Command. There were no signs of this, however, at the time of ZANU's Review Conference in late 1973.

**Political Intrigue**

Between 14 and 16 September 1973 ZANU held its biennial Review Conference at Kafue, about 30 kilometres south of Lusaka. Because of the success of ZANLA's north-eastern offensive, there was a heightened sense of optimism at the conference, coupled with a growing belief that military victory was imminent and that ZANU would soon be in power in Salisbury.

Two ZANU leaders, Josiah Tongogara and Henry Hamadziripi, both of whom were Karanga, used the Review Conference to enhance their positions within the Party: Tongogara, in a constitutionally questionable effort to replace his long-time rival Noel Mukono as ZANU's principal military official, manipulated the voting procedures at the Conference; while Hamadziripi used the conference to increase Karanga representation in the Dare. Although it is unclear whether Hamadziripi and Tongogara colluded in their endeavours, the conference nevertheless resulted in Karanga domination of both the Dare and the Military High Command to the detriment of the Manyika.

1. The following account is based largely on interviews with some of the participants at the conference, including Henry Hamadziripi, Noel Mukono, Rugare Gumbo and Joseph Chimurenga, in Salisbury in early 1980.

2. Ibid.
As ZANU's north-eastern offensive had escalated during 1972 and 1974, Tongogara, who was widely accepted as the architect of the offensive, had risen in stature within the Party, and particularly within the generally disenfranchised ZANLA. Mukono, on the other hand, was seen by many Party and ZANLA members as something of an anachronism; he had not received military training and he had never fought. It would be better, many argued, if a military man was in charge of ZANU's large and increasingly successful army. Yet Mukono had a number of influential supporters, in particular those Party and ZANLA members with whom he had established ZANU's exile wing and nascent army in the mid-1960s, such as Simpson Mtambanengwe, Washington Malanga, Bernard Mutuma, Felix Santana and George Mupini. Tongogara, in order to ensure that he was elected Secretary for Defence at the conference, decided to manipulate the voting.

Just prior to the conference, Herbert Chitepo and Noel Mukono visited Romania and Yugoslavia in search of increased assistance. While they were overseas Tongogara, who in Mukono's absence was in charge of directing ZANU's war effort, visited the major ZANLA camp at Chifombo, and according to Chimurenga, "...coached people in how to vote" at the forthcoming Review Conference. Thirty cadres, ten from

1. Only Party members were entitled to vote at the Review Conference, and most ZANLA cadres were not card-carrying members of the Party.

2. Interview with Mukono.

3. Interview with Chimurenga.
each Province (MMZ, BBZ and ZZ), not all of whom were Party members, were selected to go to Kafue for the Conference.

When it seemed at the Conference that Mukono might retain his position despite the presence of Tongogara's 30 "comrades", a truck was sent to a nearby FRELIMO camp where, according to Chimurenga, a further 50 ZANU women cadres, who were being prepared for training, were collected and brought to Kafue. Joel Mandaza, a Karanga, and ZANU's District Chairman for the Copperbelt, and other Party officials argued strongly that the 80 cadres should not be allowed to vote as they were not Party members. Chimurenga claims that many of the 80 were recent ZANU recruits from the Mt. Darwin region, and therefore not Karanga. Nevertheless, "...they knew Tongogara best from his time and theirs at Chifombo". In the end they were allowed to vote and Tongogara replaced Mukono as Secretary for Defence. Mukono, who had held the position since 1964, was given the glamorous, but largely powerless, External Affairs portfolio.

Tongogara's motivation seems to have been personal political power, and while he can clearly be accused of manipulating the voting, he seems to have drawn more on his popularity amongst the ranks of ZANU's growing guerrilla army than the support of fellow Karanga, to ensure his election.

Josiah Magama Tongogara was born in Selukwe District, next to Ian Smith's farm.\(^1\) While his mother was Karanga (the

\(^1\) There is little background material available on Tongogara, and much of the above information is taken from Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 253-255; "Tongogara death shock: ruthless and ambitious PF leader", Herald, 4 January 1980; and interviews with ZANU members in Salisbury in February/March 1980 (see confidential annex, footnote 1).
daughter of Chief Chibi), his father was from the small Venda ethnic group. Tongogara in fact saw himself, and was seen by others, as a Karanga. In 1960, after completing Standard VI at an Anglican Mission near his father's farm in the Gamwa Purchase Land, he left for Zambia. He was involved in nationalist politics in Salisbury before his departure, and he joined ZANU when it was formed in 1963. In 1966 and 1967, he trained in guerrilla warfare in Tanzania and China, and, following his return to Zambia, rose quickly through ZANU's military wing. An ambitious and reputedly difficult man, Tongogara was nevertheless respected by ZANU's growing number of guerrilla cadres. But his blatant manipulation of the voting at the Review Conference and his ousting of Noel Mukono, was not received without criticism by some sections of ZANLA. His election to the Dare, and his assumption of control of ZANLA, in fact, began a series of events which eventually led to the disruption of the armed struggle, the disintegration of ZANLA, and his own arrest.

Hamadziripi's role in Tongogara's election is unclear. While he certainly felt that Mukono should be replaced, he later claimed that he had not favoured Tongogara for the position. In an interview in Salisbury in early 1980,

1. See confidential annex, footnote 2.
2. Interview with Hamadziripi; Hamadziripi said that "I was not quite happy" with Tongogara's election.
Hamadziripi said that he would have preferred Herbert Chitepo as Chief of Defence, but that this was "...bitterly opposed" by other Party members. However, Hamadziripi, the most senior Karanga in ZANU, had long been dissatisfied with the Manyika domination of the Party's political and military wings. His success in bringing two relatively junior Party members, Rugare Gumbo and Kumbirai Kangai, both of whom were Karanga, into the Dare at the same Review Conference, would seem to indicate that he was not too distraught by Tongogara's election.

Hamadziripi's actions were directed primarily at enhancing his own position within the leadership. In his efforts to enhance his position Hamadziripi apparently saw advantage in increasing the representation of his own ethnic group, the Karanga, within the Dare.

Gumbo and Kangai had been in Lusaka for only about six months prior to the Review Conference, after studying for some years at North American universities. Gumbo claims that their return was prompted by an appeal by Chitepo for "...ZANU supporters to come to Lusaka and help with increasing the war effort." Other ZANU members, however, assert that Hamadziripi arranged their return during a trip to the United States and Canada in 1972, in a bid to redress the Manyika domination of the Dare. Masipula Sithole, the younger brother of ZANU

1. Ibid.
3. See confidential annex, footnote 3.
President Ndabaningi Sithole, has even claimed that prior to the Review Conference, Hamadziripi was campaigning against Chitepo for the chairmanship of the Dare. While this seems unlikely, Hamadziripi certainly supported the election of Gumbo and Kangai. Gumbo replaced Stanley Parirewa, whose position had been left vacant following his defection to FROLIZI, and Kangai replaced Washington Malianga, who had resigned earlier in the year because of ill-health.

TABLE 18 ZANU DARE - 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Chitepo</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mataure</td>
<td>Political Commissar</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hamadziripi</td>
<td>Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukudzei Mudzi</td>
<td>Administrative Secretary</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugare Gumbo</td>
<td>Secretary for Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbirai Kangai</td>
<td>Secretary for Labour, Social Services and Welfare</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the 1973 Review Conference, the Karanga, for the first time in ZANU's history, had a numerical superiority in the Party's executive. Five out of the eight Dare positions

were filled by Karanga - Hamadziripi, Mudzi, Tongogara, Gumbo and Kangai. The Manyika won three posts: Chitepo retained the chairmanship; Mukono became Secretary for External Affairs; and John Mataure, who had been the Party's Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam, and also a member of the High Command, replaced Simpson Mtambanengwe as Political Commissar. The Zezuru, the most important of whom had rejoined ZANU from FROLIZI only a few months previously and were not eligible for election, were not represented on the 1973 Dare.

1. According to Hamadziripi, Mataure's election was brought about by the same sort of "manipulations" which led to Tongogara's election. Interview with Hamadziripi. Hamadziripi also claimed that Mataure and Tongogara, who had been close friends, fell out soon after the Review Conference: "As soon as Tongogara was elected, he didn't want to work with Mataure and this resulted in the confusion (the Nhari rebellion) and the death of Mataure".

2. It was expected by some Party members that Shamuyarira, Parirewa and Mutizwa would soon regain leadership positions following their return. The Dare, however, issued a directive which effectively barred them from the executive:

- Any person who used to be an official of ZANU but left the Party to join another organisation and took a position in it but who may now wish to return to ZANU could not accept elective post in any of ZANU organisational structures until after a period of two years.

- These individuals who used to be officials of other organisations but had never joined ZANU and now wish to do so could not accept a position in ZANU for at least one year.

- Ordinary members who had left ZANU, or who used to belong to other organisations but who may now wish to rejoin or seek membership in ZANU could accept a post in ZANU after six months in the Party.

- In all the above cases, re-entry into the Party was upon recommendation of a local branch.

M. Sithole (1979), op. cit., p.72.

With election or appointment to senior positions barred Shamuyarira returned to his lectureship at the University of Dar es Salaam, and Mutizwa went to the United States to continue his studies.
A new Military High Command was also elected at the 1973 Review Conference:

### TABLE 19  ZANLA MILITARY HIGH COMMAND - 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
<td>Karanga (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ndangana</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Ndau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meya Urimbo</td>
<td>Chief Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cletos Chigowe</td>
<td>Chief of Security Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robson Manyika</td>
<td>Chief Camp Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Chimurenga</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary (MMZ)</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary (ZZ)</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox Gava</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary (BBZ)</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from Tongogara's automatic replacement of Mukono as Chief of Defence, the major changes to the High Command structure from that selected in 1971, were the removal of Bernard Mutuma and

1. Interview with Chimurenga.
2. According to Chimurenga the role of the Provincial Secretary was changed at the time of the Review Conference, and henceforth the Provincial Secretaries took a more active role in the organisation and direction of the war; Ibid.
3. But only for recruiting; Ibid.
4. As a matter of course the Secretary for Defence in the Dare was appointed Chief of Defence in the Military High Command.
Felix Santana. Mutuma, the able and respected Chief Camp Commander, had been expelled from ZANU earlier in the year for allegedly selling arms to the Namibian guerrilla group, the South West African People's Organisation. With the departure of Mukono, Mutuma and Santana, only William Ndangana remained in a senior military position of the "first generation" of ZANLA members. The "second generation", loyal to Josiah Tongogara-Urimbo, Chigowe, Chimurenga, Gava and Chauke - had finally assumed power. While it is probably not coincidental that four of the five were Karanga, their rise was due in the main to their central roles in the establishment of the north-eastern offensive. Mukono's generation of commanders, apart from Ndangana, had been based in Tanzania, at the training camps, and their participation in the escalating conflict had thus been less direct.

There were two other important additions to the High Command; the former ZAPU members Robson Manyika and Rex Nhongo. Both had shown themselves to be tough and capable guerrilla commanders. Nevertheless, their promotion probably owed as much to their loyalty to Tongogara as to their prowess as guerrillas.

The ethnic polarisation which had occurred in ZANU's political and military hierarchies in 1971 following the defection of the Zezuru, was reaffirmed at the 1973 Review Conference. Overall, however, the conference saw an increase in the number of Karanga represented on the Dare and the Military High Command. The Manyika numerical domination of ZANU's political and military wings, which had been evident since the Party first moved into exile in 1964, had finally been broken.

The displaced Manyika leaders were understandably angered by the manipulations that had led to their failure to gain re-election, and further squabbles and difference in the Party were now seen in ethnic terms. Although many guerrillas at the front were also surprised and disturbed by the results of the Review Conference, the Manyika were powerless to act. They concentrated, therefore, during the rest of 1973 and most of 1974 on organising for the next Review Conference elections scheduled for August 1975.

1. Interview with Noel Mukono and Peter Sheba, Salisbury, 8 February 1980.

2. See M. Sithole (1979), op. cit., p. 58. Because of the "detente exercise" and the disruption caused by the Nhari rebellion the biennial Review Conference was not held.
ZANU Disintegrates - The Nhari Rebellion

During late 1974 and the early months of 1975, ZANU's Dare and Military High Command were confronted by two essentially separate, but nevertheless closely entangled, threats to their unity and eventually to the survival of the Party as an independent guerrilla group: a rebellion by disgruntled ZANLA commanders and cadres; and a mainly southern African-inspired settlement plan, known as the "detente exercise". ZANU's 1973 Review Conference brought ethnic politicking into the ranks of the leadership, and this division between the Manyika and the Karanga was severely aggravated by the problems faced by the Party during the course of the Nhari rebellion. As the rebellion and the settlement negotiations progressed, ZANU split broadly into two warring camps - the Karanga within the Dare and the High Command were opposed to the rebels and to the "detente exercise", while the Manyika, siding with, if not actively supporting the rebels, generally favoured the settlement negotiations.

After the Review Conference, Joseph Chimurenga, who had been promoted to Provincial Secretary, returned to Chifombo. Between January and May 1974 he continued to direct ZANLA's escalating guerrilla war in north-eastern Rhodesia. In May, however, following the unanimous vote of the High Command, Chimurenga was transferred to BBZ Province, and was replaced by a fellow Karanga - Fox Gava.

Chimurenga's relations with FRELIMO, which had been bad for some time, deteriorated to the point where ZANU's overall relations, and hence military capability, were being affected. Rhodesian Security Force raids into FRELIMO-controlled areas of Tete Province had contributed to the souring of relations between the two guerrilla groups, but the primary reason for Chimurenga's transfer seems to have been a clash of personalities between the ZANLA leader and the FRELIMO

2. The Portuguese coup on 25 April 1974 radically altered the balance of power in southern Africa. Within a year white rule in Angola and Mozambique was surrendered, and indigenous liberation movements assumed power. Their victory, although not directly the result of their military activities during the previous decade, brought great hope to the Rhodesian guerrilla groups. However, the end of Portuguese rule in southern Africa also prompted South Africa and Zambia, both fearful of the prospects of an escalating conflict in Rhodesia, to attempt to effect a negotiated and peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. See Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: The Secret Diplomacy of Detente", Africa Contemporary Record, (London), 1976, p.A9.
Provincial Commander and Provincial Secretary for Tete, Jose Moyana. There were two main areas of disagreement - food and women. Meya Urimbo, Chimurenga's predecessor as Provincial Secretary for MMZ, had willingly supplied Moyana and his forces with both, but Chimurenga now refused to do so.¹

Following Chimurenga's departure, Rex Nhongo assumed temporary control of MMZ Province pending Fox Gava's arrival at Chifombo in late May. Although Gava had been a member of ZANLA since the late 1960s, he was less experienced than many of the guerrillas he had now been appointed to lead; Chimurenga later described Gava as "...completely useless in operations".²

A heavy drinker and a womaniser, Gava rarely ventured out of Chifombo. He quickly set about introducing his own administration, and began to promote friends, mainly Karanga, to senior positions, "...some of whom were inexperienced and lacked the necessary qualifications".³

1. Interview with Chimurenga. Following the departure of the Portuguese in 1975 and Mozambique's independence, Moyana became Mayor of Maputo.

2. Ibid.

By the second half of 1974, ZANLA guerrillas and a number of experienced commanders at the front, such as Dakarai Badza, Thomas Nhari and Cephas Tichatonga, were fed up with the excesses and mismanagement of the Gava administration, and began to operate with increasing autonomy. Their major complaints involved shortages of supplies and essential commodities, poor communications with ZANU headquarters, and the failure of the leaders to visit the front. One survivor of the ensuing rebellion claimed later that the cadres reacted against "bad administration - we did not have ammunition for our guns - and corruption, greed and inefficiency". The rebels claimed that the leadership took little interest in the welfare of the guerrillas, and that the High Command was riddled with corruption and "tribalism". The international commission which investigated the rebellion, and the subsequent assassination of Herbert Chitepo, supported the views of the ZANLA cadres and concluded that "...there were genuine grievances among the fighting cadres in the front lines which gave rise to the Nhari rebellion...there was also a lack of integrity and honesty amongst the...ZANU leadership".

In June 1974 a ZANLA Military Tribunal, consisting of Cletos Chigowe, Robson Manyika, Rex Nhongo, Fox Gava and Chigowe's deputy, Patrick Mpunzarima, met in Lusaka to try the rebellious commanders. To punish and humiliate them, some of the commanders were beaten in front of their troops. All but Badza were then sent back to Chifombo. Badza was imprisoned in Lusaka, awaiting the return of Tongogara and Ndangana. Ndangana returned first and immediately set Badza free. This infuriated other Military High Command members, and a full meeting of the High Command was called. Badza was subsequently demoted from his position of Deputy Provincial Field Operations Commander to "...a mere cadre". According to a number of ZANU members, Ndangana sympathised with the grievances of the guerrillas, and during the Nhari rebellion he was the only member of the Military High Command not actively to oppose the actions of the rebellious commanders.

1. Interview with Chimurenga. Chimurenga claims that the commanders had wanted to shoot Gava and Nhongo. Also see Report of the International Commission, op. cit., p. 17.

2. Interview with Chimurenga.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Also see confidential annex, footnote 5.
Badza, together with Fiddian Kashiri, who had recently returned to ZANU from FROLIZI, and a third ZANLA member, were then sent back to the front "against their will". According to Chimurenga, all three now had grievances against Tongogara, Manyika and Chigowo, whom they saw as friends of the hated Fox Gava.¹

In October 1974, while Badza and the others were making their way back to Mozambique, the exiled leaders of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI in Lusaka were asked about their views on the possibility of negotiations with the Rhodesian Government leading to a peaceful settlement.² Both ZAPU and FROLIZI agreed in general terms; they had little option, considering their decayed state. ZANU, on the other hand, resisted strongly; most members of the Dare and the Military High Command were convinced that ZANU would soon achieve military victory.³ Chitepo, in particular, was opposed to the idea of negotiations, and argued that ZANU's organisational independence should be preserved. For some months ZANU's official publication, *Zimbabwe News*, had been stressing the primacy of armed struggle, and in the November issue the editorial, under the heading "Direct confrontation is the only answer to the Zimbabwe problem", argued that ZANU

1. Interview with Chimurenga.
...has since its inception in August 1963 vowed to commit itself to a policy of 'direct confrontation' in order to effect a total change of the social, economic, cultural and political system existing in Zimbabwe. ZANU seeks the complete transformation (not a mere reform) of the capitalist society through a violent revolution... It is only - and only - a violent revolution that will lead to the realisation of this objective. This road of 'direct confrontation' is the one ZANU has chosen... We are certain of victory, united as we are. 1

This theme was strongly re-stated in the December and January editions of Zimbabwe News. 2 Nevertheless, following strong


2. The editorial of the December edition made public the dilemma facing the Party over the "detente exercise":

The people of Zimbabwe are passing through one of the most critical stages of their war of resistance. The major (sic) question facing us and all the democratic and progressive forces in the country after the Lusaka talks...and the detente idea...is whether to carry the revolution through to the end or abandon it halfway... Which of these two roads to choose?...

Smith's suggested talks and Vorster's detente... are nothing but imperialist machinations to wreck the revolutionary movement in Zimbabwe and indeed the whole of Southern Africa...

One classic way of halting or moderating the Zimbabwe Revolution is by denying the revolution its legitimate leadership by either completely preventing the rightful leadership from taking a leading role in the liberation struggle or by diluting the leadership of the revolutionary movement by replacing the radical elements with a more passive and pliable leadership. The whole exercise in Zimbabwe and in Southern Africa in the last few months is intended to achieve this objective.

The question that Zimbabweans are forced to pose is, to whom should the fruits of victory in our war of resistance belong?... We, ZANLA fighters, watered the tree day in and day out and have the most right to gather the fruit...

pressure from the Front Line States, the ZANU leadership eventually agreed to enter into negotiations which dragged on during November and early December.

The position of the ZANU leadership was further confused by the discovery in November of a long-standing leadership dispute between Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe and involving those National Executive members detained in Rhodesia. It was only following pressure from Kaunda and Nyerere that Sithole was reinstated as President. Yet his position as ZANU leader remained in some doubt and Sithole, thrown into the mire of ZANU exile politics following his release from detention to participate in the negotiations, was forced to choose sides in the ongoing struggle between the Party's Karanga and Manyika factions.

About the time Sithole was released from detention, a number of ZANLA commanders in the field, led by Thomas Nhari and Dakarai Badza, finally decided that the only solution to their continuing problems with the Party's military leadership was to seize the Military High Command and replace it with a new one. In mid-November the Military High Command, headed by Josiah Tongogara, was purportedly replaced by one led by Nhari:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Nhari</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakarai Badza</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Tabenga</td>
<td>Chief Political Commissar</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasar Molife</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Mutise¹</td>
<td>Chief of Personnel</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Sheba</td>
<td>Chief Representative (East Africa)</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephas Tichatonga</td>
<td>Chief of Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemist Ncube²</td>
<td>Chief Instructor</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuthbert Chimedza¹</td>
<td>Military Attache (East Africa)</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Chiridza</td>
<td>Chief of Transport</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Chandawa</td>
<td>Provincial Chief of Defence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Nhari High Command and the ZANLA cadres who supported Nhari and Badza were, in Chimurenga's words, "...the

1. Herbert Mutise and Cuthbert Chimedza were apparently included in the Nhari High Command against their wishes, and seem to have played no part in the rebellion. Interview with Chimurenga and other ZANU members in Salisbury during February and March 1980. Chimedza sympathised with the rebellious guerrillas about their grievances, but not with their acts. He was, in fact, promoted to the official High Command after the rebellion had been put down.

2. The Report of the International Commission, op. cit., states that Ncube was Zezuru. However, former ZANLA members who had operated with Ncube claimed that he was Shangaan.
people who started the war...".¹ Most of them were young, in their late teens or early twenties, and had joined ZANU after 1969. Despite the assertions of the international commission into Chitepo's death, the Nhari High Command does not seem to have been selected along regional and ethnic lines.² In fact, the High Command was generally well balanced with three Zezuru, three Manyika, two Karanga (including Chimedza), two Korekore and one Shangaan. Nevertheless, Nhari and his colleagues saw their opponents as the Karanga-dominated official High Command, and the rebellion quickly developed along ethnic lines. Rugare Gumbo, who was involved in an official ZANU investigation of the rebellion in 1974/75, stated in an interview in early 1980 that while "tribalism" may have affected the behaviour of some Dare and Military High Command members, "it is necessary to separate the Nhari group from the political leadership.... At the political level it started to assume a tribal nature, not at the Nhari level".³

That is, while ethnicity was not the cause of the rebels' disaffection, the threat posed by the rebellion to the positions of the Party's executive members, particularly the Karanga

¹. Interview with Chimurenga. There is very little information available about the members of the Nhari High Command and the following is drawn mainly from interviews with ZANLA members in Salisbury during February and March 1980, and in particular with Chimurenga, and Peter Sheba on 2 February 1980. According to one ZANU member (see confidential annex, footnote 6), "The rebellion changed from a military rebellion into a battle between the educated and the illiterate." It is impossible to determine the veracity of this claim, although the rebels do seem to have been generally better educated than their opponents in the official High Command. At least two of the rebel leaders were university-educated: Nhari was a law graduate from the University of Rhodesia (see "The Price of Detente: Kaunda Prepared to Execute more ZANU Freedom Fighters for Smith", (ZANU Document, 1976), quoted in Raeburn, op. cit., p. 36); and Peter Sheba claims to have been active in nationalist politics at the same University (interview with Sheba).


³. Interview with Gumbo.
who dominated the High Command, eventually forced military and political leaders to seek support from members of their own ethnic group.

Following the formation of the High Command, Nhari and a group of about 30 guerrillas succeeded in seizing ZANLA's major base at Chifombo. On 30 November, Nhari and several other ZANLA members left for Lusaka planning to capture the entire membership of the official Military High Command. On 1 December the group arrived in Lusaka, but were only able to arrest William Ndangana, Joseph Chimurenga and Charles Dauramanzi (Officer for Supplies). According to Chimurenga, Ndangana was kidnapped in order to camouflage the fact that he sympathised with the rebels.¹ The prisoners, two of whom were Karanga, were taken to an old FRELIMO camp in Mozambique, where Nhari explained that the group's grievances were directed against the High Command and Josiah Tongogara and Cletos Chigowe in particular, and not the Dare.

The Dare's ability to deal with the burgeoning rebellion was impaired by its involvement in the continuing negotiations with the Front Line States and the other Rhodesian nationalist groups about unity and the "detente exercise" in general.

On 3 December, in the ballroom of State House, Lusaka, Nkomo, Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, of the newly-formed black nationalist group, the African National Council (ANC), met with President Kaunda, Nyerere and Khama to discuss once again the contentious question of unity. While

1. Interview with Chimurenga.
Nkomo and Muzorewa were willing to merge their parties into a single nationalist group, Sithole was under strong pressure from Chitepo and some other Dare and High Command members to resist such a proposal. Nyerere, who realised that the delicate settlement package arranged with South Africa would crumble without nationalist unity, threatened and cajoled Sithole. Sithole, realising that his hold on the Party leadership was tenuous, decided to consult his colleagues.

On 6 December ZANU reluctantly agreed to form a "United Front" with the other nationalist parties. Rugare Gumbo, ZANU's Publicity Secretary, later described ZANU's understanding of the agreement:

After considerable pressure and debate, ZANU and others agreed to form a United Front in the ANC. This ZANU interpreted as a United Front in which some degree of the identity of each of the parties was retained—especially as they continue the armed struggle... 1

On the night of 6 December, the Front Line States presented ZANU with the document detailing the unity agreement: Nkomo was to be President; Sithole Secretary General; and Muzorewa Vice President. 2 According to Gumbo, Nkomo "...interpreted this agreement as amounting to the dissolution of ZANU and ZAPU and that he is now the head of a new organisation." 3 The Dare members were furious and Sithole was instructed to inform the Presidents that ZANU


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.
"...adhered to the United Front idea but rejected the Nkomo interpretation". ¹ Nyerere and Kaunda subsequently described ZANU as "...an enemy of African unity", ² and blamed Chitepo for ZANU's "intransigence", ³ accusing him of wanting to continue the armed struggle merely to "...foster his own ambitions". ⁴ Kaunda warned the Dare that if they did not agree to unity he would throw ZANU out of Zambia. ⁵

To resolve the deadlock, representatives of the four nationalist groups met privately on 7 December. At this meeting, agreement about the form of unity was finally - and for ZANU's part grudgingly - reached: the four parties were to be brought together within the "unified" ANC under the leadership of Abel Muzorewa; the ANC Executive would be enlarged; and at the end of four months a new ANC Constitution, leadership and policy would be determined. ⁶

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. "Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, at Lusaka, Republic of Zambia on 7 December 1974", in Muzorewa, op. cit., pp. 275-276. Beginning in mid-December hundreds of nationalists, many detained in Rhodesia for more than a decade, were also released as part of the "detente exercise". They included several ZAPU National Executive members: Clement Muchachi (Secretary for Youth and Culture), who had been released in November with Nkomo; Willie Musarurwa (Secretary for Public Relations); William Mukarati (Deputy Secretary for Presidential Affairs and Secretary for Welfare); Joseph Msika (Secretary for External Affairs); and Lazarus Nkala (Organising Secretary). Daniel Madzimbamuto, a leading ZAPU official and later a member of the National Executive, was also released. In addition to Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and Moton Malianga (Secretary for Youth and
ZANU's reluctance to become involved in the settlement process was based on two factors: its desire to retain organisational independence; and the belief that armed struggle was the only means of achieving victory. The Dare's final acceptance of the unity agreement was dependent on guarantees that these two factors were recognised and would be met. ZANU's understanding of the agreement was that all four nationalist parties would continue to operate independently while "...the process of merger..." took place.1 This process was to be completed by the time of the ANC Congress in March. However, this was certainly not the understanding of the other

Culture), who all attended the November negotiations in Lusaka, numerous other leading ZANU figures were released, including: Simon Mzenda (Under Secretary for Public Affairs); Edgar Tekere (Under Secretary for Youth and Culture); Enos Nkala (Treasurer General); and Didymus Mutasa.

The release of these leading nationalists was potentially most advantageous for the "unified" ANC. In the longer term, however, their release contributed to the disintegration of the united front, while their integration into the political hierarchies of ZAPU and ZANU exacerbated the tensions already provoked by the "detente exercise" and the Nhari rebellion. Suddenly the leaders who had directed the political and military affairs of ZAPU and ZANU in exile for a decade were replaced by men who had not shared the experiences of exile and the armed struggle and whose outlook and approach had been shaped by the quite different circumstances of detention. During the next few years the resumption of senior party positions by the "detainees" was a continuing source of discontent and division.

nationalist parties, nor of the Front Line States.\footnote{Gumbo and other Dare members continued to state the Party's previously expressed position: "ZANU...remains convinced that the only way to achieve freedom is by continuing the armed struggle".\footnote{During the rest of 1974, and the early months of 1975, ZANU continued to function as a separate and independent organisation, while ZANLA forces in north and north-eastern Rhodesia continued to expand their area of operations. ZANU's intransigence eventually led to the proscription of the Party by the Zambian authorities, and may also have contributed to the assassination of Herbert Chitepo.}

On 6 December, as details of the unity agreement were being finalised, Thomas Nhari and his group returned to Lusaka to discuss their position with the Dare. They could scarcely have chosen a worse time to meet with the Party's political leaders who were preoccupied with what they believed to be a threat to ZANU's organisational survival. A

\begin{enumerate}
\item ZAPU in particular argued that all four parties had been fused into one - the "unified" ANC. The Zimbabwe Review, for instance, in an editorial in July/August 1975, argued that:

\begin{quote}
...the unity signed...was a FUSION of ZAPU, ZANU and Frolizi - total. There is no option in a fusion...to behave at one moment as the African National Council and at another as a former organisation...some Zimbabweans...for perpetual love of divisions have called the Zimbabwe unity in various loose terms such as an 'umbrella' or a 'front'. The ANC is a single unitary organisation - nothing more and nothing less.
\end{quote}

"Editorial: Complicated Transition", The Zimbabwe Review, (Lusaka), Vol. 4, July/August, 4/75, p.3.

\item Gumbo, op. cit., p.7.
\end{enumerate}
decision was taken not to listen to the group's grievances until the kidnapped members of the Military High Command had been released. This decision was conveyed to Nhari and his supporters by John Mataure and by the rebels' main bogey, Josiah Tongogara. In the meantime, Nhari had obtained information that Chigowe was organising a force to oppose them. Believing that there was no prospect of reconciliation, Nhari and his followers returned to Chifombo and prepared for their last stand and a final attack on the High Command members in Lusaka.

On 9 December Nhari and an armed group kidnapped 19 ZANU members and supporters in Lusaka, most of whom were Karanga. Those kidnapped included Tongogara's wife and three children. Sixteen members of the rebel group, including Nhari, were then intercepted by Zambian police and arrested, while six escaped arrest and returned to Chifombo.

During the course of the rebellion, Tongogara and other members of the official High Command, and some Karanga members of the Dare, became increasingly certain that a number of former and serving Manyika members of the Dare (including Chitepo), ZANLA, and the Party's Zambian branches were supporting the rebels and also the efforts of the Front Line States to stop the armed struggle and submerge ZANU within the "unified" ANC. Chitepo was clearly opposed to the unity agreement, but does not seem to have been involved with the Nhari group. Nevertheless, the unity accord and the grievances of the rebels were viewed with some sympathy by a number of disaffected Manyika, who saw both developments as means of regain-

1. A number of detained Dare members told the International Commission that the rebellion had been "masterminded by certain members of the DARE (sic) and other people living in Lusaka", including Noel Mukono, Felix Santana, George Mpini and Washington Malianga; Report of the International Commission, op. cit., p. 17.
ing their former positions within the Party.\(^1\) Noel Mukono, who retained pretensions to the position of Secretary for Defence, may have seen advantages in assisting the rebellion, which was directed primarily against his successor, Josiah Tongogara. Simpson Mtambanengwe, the former Secretary for Political Affairs, and a number of recently demoted ZANLA members, such as Felix Santana and George Mupini,\(^2\) may also have supported Nhari in an effort to regain their former positions. John Mataure, the Party's Chief Political Commissar, who had fallen out with Tongogara after the 1973 Review Conference, was also believed to have been involved with the rebels. According to one member of the Nhari group, Mataure was in fact elected as President of "the new ZANU", at a meeting held by the rebels at Chifombo in early December.\(^3\) While this report cannot be confirmed, it is likely that Mataure was in some way associated with the rebels, and sympathised with their grievances.


2. The International Commission dismissed allegations of Manyika complicity: "At worst the Manyika merely understood the grievances of the Nhari group and sympathised with the young men. They preferred a reconciliation rather than confrontation with the kidnappers"; Report of the International Commission, op. cit., p.45.

Numerous ZANU district and branch officials, mostly Manyika, were also suspected by the High Command of complicity in the rebellion. In particular, Cornellius Sanyanga and Nelson Dziruni, both of whom worked for Zambian-based multinational corporations, were accused of financing the Nhari group. While Chimurenga claims that Sanyanga and Dziruni were motivated by "tribalism", an official ZANU rebuttal of the report into Chitepo's assassination asserted that they led a "conservative faction" within ZANU and masterminded the rebellion in an effort to redress the swing to the left which had occurred at the 1973 Review Conference by eliminating "radicals" within the Dare. The rebuttal also accused Zambia of involvement and of having attempted to "...destroy ZANU from within". Kaunda's increasing fury at the reluctance of the Dare to countenance unity within the ANC provides some credence to this allegation.

While most of those suspected by the High Command of complicity in the rebellion were Manyika, several leading Karanga members of the Party were also suspected. For instance, Henry Hamadziripi was for a time suspected of involvement. So was Richard Hove, previously ZANU Secretary for External Affairs, his wife Sheila and sister Sekai Holland.

1. Lonrho and Shell respectively.
2. Interview with Chimurenga.
3. Ibid.; "They were Manyika and wanted Tongogara out".
5. Interviews with Hamadziripi and Gumbo.
The suspicion directed against the latter three is perhaps explained by their friendship with Chitepo. A Karanga Party official, Joseph Masangomai, and his wife were also accused of being involved in the rebellion.

While the rift in the Party was not along straight ethnic lines, it was increasingly perceived by both sides as essentially a struggle between the Manyika and the Karanga. In mid-December the Military High Command, which was composed of five Karanga, two Zezuru, one Ndau and one Shangaan, set about the systematic elimination of the Manyika leadership of ZANU and on a savage campaign of reprisals against rank-and-file guerrillas who supported Nhari.

The Military High Command reportedly planned to assassinate all those within the ZANU leadership with whose policies they disagreed. For this purpose an "assassination list" was drawn-up which allegedly included Herbert Chitepo, Noel Mukono, Simpson Mtambanengwe, John Mataure, Sekai Holland, Edgar Madekurozwa, Cornellius Sanyanga, Nelson Dziruni and Felix Santana. Most of those on the list were Manyika.

In early December, the Dare set up a "Committee of Three", consisting of Chitepo, Gumbo and Kangai, to inquire into the causes of the Nhari rebellion. Following the


2. Anthony Rider, untitled article, Cape Times, (Cape Town), 28 March 1975, p.1, also claims that Ndabaningi Sithole, the recently released ZANU President, was on the assassination list.

3. In an interview in March 1980 Hamadziripi claimed that he and Chitepo decided to establish the Committee "...to investigate who was behind the whole thing."
kidnappings on 8 and 10 December, the Committee interviewed John Mataure, as he was believed to have driven the car which brought Nhari and his group to Tongogara's house.\(^1\) Because he was under investigation, Mataure ceased to perform his Dare duties, and was "isolated" at a ZANU camp near Lusaka. According to the evidence of some witnesses before the International Commission, he was tied to a tree and tortured for several days.\(^2\)

The Dare also decided to recapture Chifombo. Robson Manyika and ZANU's Chief Representative in East Africa, Webster Gwauya, had recently brought 250 newly trained ZANLA cadres from the ZANU camp at Mgagao, Tanzania, to Zambia.\(^3\) Two hundred of these cadres, under Tongogara, re-took Chifombo some time after 19 December. It is unclear whether the rebels resisted, and whether there were any casualties.\(^4\)

From Chifombo, Tongogara called for a meeting of ZANU's supreme decision-making body, the Chimurenga General Council. He also dispatched a force to save William Ndangana, Joseph Chimurenga, Charles Dauramanzi, Josiah Tungamirai and others, most of whom were Karanga, who had been kidnapped in early December, from execution. Although they were rescued, some of them had apparently been tortured.

Chitepo, Hamadziripi, Gumbo, Kangai and Tongogara arrived in Chifombo on 21 January for the Chimurenga General Council meeting. Of the other members of the Dare, Mudzi

2. Ibid., p. 24.
4. Ibid., p. 24. One hundred and seventy of the invading force, under Hondo, the new PFO Political Commissar for MMZ, left Chifombo on 1 January 1975 for the front.
remained in Lusaka, Mukono had fled the country, and Mataure was in detention. The council, chaired by Chitepo, began sitting on 22 January. Gumbo claimed during an interview in March 1980 that the Council was called to hear evidence for the report being prepared by the "Committee of Three". The meeting, however, took the form of a trial. Those accused by Tongogara of having been involved in the Nhari rebellion included:\(^1\)

**TABLE 21 CHIMURENGA GENERAL COUNCIL 1975 - LIST OF ACCUSED\(^2\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Chitepo(^3)</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noel Mukono</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mataure*</td>
<td>Political Commissar</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson Mtambanengwe</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>Manyika (Ndau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Masangomai</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basil Chimbodza*</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Chiguvare*</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shumba</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekai Holland(^4)</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Hove</td>
<td>Member of the Chimurenga General Council</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Nhari*</td>
<td>ZANLA Officer and Chief of Operations in Nhari Military High Command</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakarai Badza*</td>
<td>ZANLA Officer and Chief of Defence in Nhari Military High Command</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesar Molife*</td>
<td>ZANLA Officer and Chief of Security and Intelligence in Nhari Military High Command</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Those marked with an asterisk were executed soon after the Chimurenga General Council; interview with Chimurenga, and Report of the International Commission, op. cit.
2. Ibid., pp. 25 and 26.
The majority of those cited by Tongogara were Manyika, and, despite the presence of several Karanga among the accused, the rift in ZANU had now developed into a battle between the Karanga and the Manyika. Issues and policy differences were forgotten, submerged in a struggle for survival between two ethnic groups.


4. Sekai Holland was at the time of the rebellion a ZANU representative in Australia.
Some of those accused by Tongogara, including John Mataure, were brought before the Chimurenga General Council, while others were charged and tried in absentia. According to the International Commission, those convicted were sentenced to "go home", a euphemism meaning sentenced to death.\(^1\) However, from interviews with Hamadziripi, Gumbo, Chimurenga and other ZANU members involved in the Nhuri rebellion or its suppression, it seems that the Dare was not aware that those convicted of involvement in the rebellion were going to be executed. Hamadziripi, Gumbo and Chimurenga all claimed that the Dare believed the rebels were to be returned to the front.\(^2\)

A meeting was held on 23 January 1975 between Zambian officials, ZANU leaders, including Chitepo, Mudzi, Kangai and Gumbo, and the rebel group. Nhuri outlined the reasons for the mutiny. It was discovered that the proper channels and procedures had not been followed for expressing grievances, and the group remained in detention. On 24 January, however,

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1. Report of the International Commission, op. cit., p. 27. Tongogara admitted to the commission that some ZANU members, including Noel Mukono, Simpson Mtambanengwe, Felix Santana, Washington Malianga and Edgar Madekurozwa, all of whom were Manyika, were sentenced to death in their absence.

2. Interviews with Hamadziripi, Gumbo and Chimurenga.
Zambian officials were assured by Chitepo that the rebels would not be executed if they were handed back to ZANU. As a result, the Zambians agreed on 27 January to hand over Nhari and his colleagues. They were handed over to Tongogara on 7 February and taken to Chifombo.

At Chifombo, Tongogara, apparently acting without the agreement or even knowledge of the Dare or most members of the Military High Command, ordered the execution of Nhari and his fellow conspirators. The executions were carried out by two Zezuru, Robson Manyika and Rex Nhongo, and by a number of junior cadres. Forty-five ZANLA members were executed, including six members of the Nhari High Command: Nhari, Badza, Tabenga, Molife, Tichatonga and Chiridza. "Retributive justice"¹ was also levelled against other ZANU members during the next few weeks. Edgar Madukurozwa was kidnapped on 7 February, and on Tongogara's orders, was battered to death by Cletos Chigowe and other ZANLA cadres. Basil Chimbodza, who had earlier been involved in establishing ZANU's underground cells at the University of Rhodesia, and Godfrey Chiguvare, a young member of Gumbo's staff, were also killed. Neither had been involved in the rebellion, and as Chimurenga said later of Chiguvare's death, "It was just unfortunate".²

¹ Report of the International Commission, op. cit., p.27.
² Interview with Chimurenga.
Following the Chimurenga General Council meeting at Chifombo the Dare which, apart from Chitepo, was now composed solely of Karanga, added new members to the Military High Command. All were Karanga, again confirming the extent to which the rift in ZANU had developed into a struggle between the Karanga and the Manyika. Many of these additional members

**TABLE 22 ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF ZANLA'S MILITARY HIGH COMMAND - 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elias Hondo</td>
<td>Military Attache</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzinashe Machingura</td>
<td>Camps Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuthbert Chimedza</td>
<td>Provincial Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tungamirai</td>
<td>Provincial Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickson Moyo(^1)</td>
<td>Provincial Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Nyakadzinash</td>
<td>Camps Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliot Seke(^2)</td>
<td>Provincial Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarudzai Chinamaropa</td>
<td>Provincial Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Mpunzarima</td>
<td>Provincial Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Dauramanzi</td>
<td>Deputy Logistics and Supplies Officer</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Moyo was killed in 1975, during a Rhodesian Security Force attack into Botswana.

2. Seke committed suicide in 1976 after joining the ill-fated and short-lived Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) High Command the previous year. Seke had joined ZANU from ZAPU in 1973, following the Zezuru-Kalanga/Ndebele upheavals of 1970/71. See confidential annex, footnote 7.
of the High Command had been involved in putting down the Nhari rebellion, several were particularly close to Tongogara, and Tungamirai and Mpunzarima, like Chimurenga, were related to Tongogara.

As a Manyika, Chitepo's position as Chairman of the Dare had become increasingly precarious during the course of the Nhari rebellion. Although no action had been taken against him at the Chimurenga General Council because of lack of evidence, he remained under suspicion by the Karanga of having been involved in the rebellion. On the other hand, following the council, many Manyika felt that he had sold out his friends and supporters. According to a number of colleagues Chitepo began to act unusually, even irrationally, and "...descended into a private world of self-recrimination and perpetual fear...

In early March, Chitepo remarked to a friend" 
"I don't know what to sacrifice: my life or the Party".

On 4 March Chitepo, accompanied by Henry Hamadziripi and ZANU's intelligence chief, Cletos Chigowe, visited Malawi. Hamadziripi was detained at the airport, allegedly for being in possession of two weapons. In Blantyre, Chitepo and Chigowe contacted a Rhodesian businessman who was also Simpson


3. In an interview in March 1980 Hamadziripi claimed that the trio visited Malawi to arrange for the establishment of a ZANU liaison office. Chigowe, who spoke the local language, was to be the liaison officer (he had not been warned of this). At the airport in Malawi, Hamadziripi claimed that he was told by the security people that someone wanted to see him. He was taken to Blantyre and questioned by the police for four days, and was accused of coming to see "dissidents". He was unaware of Chitepo's death until he arrived at the airport in Lusaka two weeks later.
Mtambanengwe's brother-in-law. Mtambanengwe, who was suspected by Tongogara and others of involvement in the Nhari rebellion, had fled to Malawi some time earlier. While alone with Mtambanengwe's brother-in-law, Chigowe talked about the recent upheavals in ZANU and wrote out a list of those who had participated in the rebellion. Chitepo headed the list. The businessman contacted the police and Chigowe and Chitepo were immediately arrested. Chitepo was later released.

Before he left Malawi he wrote to a Malawi Minister requesting that Chigowe and Hamadziripi be kept in detention:

...it is my view that the longer the two are held the more chance there is of rectifying so many things which are wrong with the party. They are we believe engaged in a diabolical scheme which could wreck the struggle. 2

On 16 March, following his return from Blantyre, Chitepo went to see President Kaunda and told him what had been happening in ZANU during the past few months, and also claimed that his own life was in danger. Kaunda asked Chitepo who was the greatest threat, to which Chitepo replied Chigowe, Tongogara and Hamadziripi. However, Chitepo was also under pressure from other Dare members to seek the release of Chigowe and Hamadziripi, and he apparently asked Kaunda to intervene in securing their release.

2. Ibid., p. 34.
4. Ibid.
According to the International Commission, the Military High Command, with the endorsement of the Dare, decided to kill Chitepo on 15 March. A bomb was reputedly collected from a ZANU transit camp outside Lusaka and given to Joseph Chimurenga who planted it on the driver's side of Chitepo's car. The next morning, 18 March, as Chitepo was backing his car out of the carport, the bomb exploded. He died instantly.¹

It was not clear at the time, and in fact it is still unclear, who was responsible for Chitepo's murder. There had been no detailed reporting of the previous few months of conflict within ZANU. The Nhari rebellion had gone almost unnoticed, along with the executions at Chifombo and elsewhere. The International Commission, which published its findings in July 1975, found that:

The return of Chitepo from Malawi alone, the arrest of Hamadziripi and Chigowe, the possibility of Chitepo having met Mutambanengwe (sic) in Malawi, Chitepo's meetings with Zambian Government Officials... and the report of imminent arrests of ex-ZANU leaders... were the immediate reasons for the decision (of the High Command) to kill Chitepo. The High Command and DARE also feared that Chitepo would reveal the mass executions of suspects which took place before, during and after the Chimurenga General Council at Chifombo.²

According to the Commission, a further reason for the outbreak of conflict in ZANU was:

The all-consuming passion for power was pursued to the extent that the objective of Zimbabwe's liberation was submerged beneath the weight of personal and tribal ambitions...Chitepo was regarded as an obstacle or a 'stumbling block' in the pathway to individual and collective ambitions of the Karanga elements in the DARE.³

2. Ibid., pp. 37 and 38.
3. Ibid., p. 44.
The Commission concluded: "The members of the DARE and the High Command could all...be indicted as principals to the murder of Chitepo because, jointly and severally, they actively desired to bring this about and did, in fact, bring it about".¹ This accusation was strenuously denied by all the accused,² and it is possible that the Chitepo assassination was not directly connected with the Nhari rebellion. Joseph Chimurenga, for instance, in an interview in early 1980, some years after he had fallen out with Tongogara, claimed that "Tongogara could be charged with motive, but not in fact".³ While Chitepo's assassination may well have been the final act in the Karanga attack on the Party's Manyika members and leaders in the wake of the Nhari rebellion, it is equally likely that his death was arranged by Zambian, or other Front Line State authorities, angered by his and ZANU's continuing refusal to abide by the terms of the December unity agreement.

After Chitepo's burial most members of the Dare and the Military High Command left Zambia to avoid arrest:⁴

1. Ibid., p. 49. Also see "ZANU leaders accused of murder". The Times, (London), 9 April 1975.

2. See for instance, "Manifesto of ZANU Political Prisoners in Zambia: An Open Letter", The Zimbabwe News, (Glen Ellyn, Illinois), Vol. 9, No. 2, Jan-May 1976, pp. 15-22. During interviews in Salisbury in February and March 1980, a number of former ZANU and ZANLA members, including some of those accused of involvement in Chitepo's assassination, such as Chimurenga, Hamadziripi and Gumbo, denied that they, the Dare, or the High Command, had been involved.

3. Interview with Chimurenga.

Josiah Tongogara, Justin Chauke, Sarudzai Chinomaropa, Dzinasho Machingura and Josiah Tungamirai went to Mozambique; and William Ndangana, Robson Manyika and Rex Nhongo to Tanzania. Henry Hamadziripi and Cletos Chigowe had been in Malawi at the time of Chitepo's murder and consequently were less suspect than their colleagues, and it was agreed that they should stay in Lusaka. Chigowe, however, left for Tanzania on 28 March. Joseph Chimurenga, Patrick Mpunzarima and Charles Dauramanzi also remained in Lusaka. On 23 and 24 March seventy ZANU officials were arrested in Zambia, including several members of the Dare and a number of ZANU foreign representatives. Subsequently, ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI offices in Lusaka were closed on the grounds that they were "being used for purposes prejudicial to the maintenance of peace, order and good government". In fact, of course, under the terms of the unity agreement signed almost four months earlier, all three parties had been merged into the "unified" ANC.

1. Chigowe was later returned to Zambia by the Tanzanian Government, and Tongogara by the Mozambican authorities.


By March 1975 ZANU was in total disarray. The Nhari rebellion had led to the death of about 150 ZANU cadres, most of whom were ZANLA members. ZANLA's strength prior to November 1974 was about 800 trained cadres. Roughly a fifth of ZANU's guerrillas were therefore killed during a period of only six months, not in clashes with the Rhodesian Security Forces, but between themselves.

ZANU's leadership-in-exile, which had seen the Party grow from a boisterous, and ineffective collection of dissidents and idealists in 1964, to the large, well-armed and trained guerrilla army of the early 1970's, was dispersed and irreparably divided. Chitepo had been largely responsible for holding ZANU's disparate personal and ethnic elements together during the first decade of exile. His death left ZANU with no effective political leadership, and foreshadowed several years of confused re-organisation and bitter recrimination. John Mataure was also dead, and Noel Mukono, who had controlled and directed ZANLA's operations between 1964 and

1. David Martin, "Rhodesian guerrillas executed in Zambia". Observer, (London), 27 April 1975. Chimurenga, in an interview in March 1980, claimed that only 65 guerrillas were killed during the Nhari rebellion, but this would seem to be on the low side.

2. About 600 of ZANLA's trained guerrillas were in Rhodesia; interview with Chimurenga. Kees Maxey, "The Continuing Fight for Zimbabwe", Kroniek van Afrika, (Leiden), 1977, p. 5, claims that at the time of the "detente exercise" ZANLA had about 6000 guerrillas in various stages of training.
1973, fearing for his life, had gone into hiding and played no further part in ZANU. The remaining members of the 1973 Dare - Mudzi, Kangai, Gumbo, Hamadziripi and Tongogara - were imprisoned in Zambia. Another long-serving ZANU official, Simpson Mtambanengwe, ZANU's Secretary for Political Affairs (1969) and Political Commissar (1971), had fled to Malawi. Eight members of the 1973 Military High Command were also detained in Zambia - Tongogara, Ndangana, Urimbo, Chigowe, Manyika, Chimurenga, Gava and Chauke. A large number of senior and experienced guerrilla commanders, such as Felix Santana, George Mupini, Sam Chandawa, Peter Sheba and Kenneth Gwindingwi, also ended their relationship with ZANU. Together with Ndabaningi Sithole and other former ZANU members, they eventually abandoned the armed struggle and became involved in the "internal settlement" organised by Ian Smith in 1977/78.

* * * *

1. Mukono was also detained for a short time.
Ironically, having coped with the strains created by the military failures of the 1960s by reorganising its military and political structures, ZANU failed to adjust to the problems which stemmed from the success of its north-eastern offensive.

During the preparatory and early years of the offensive, the guerrilla command structure in Rhodesia was generally balanced between the various Shona sub-groups, and there were no signs of internal strain or division. However, the success of the north-eastern offensive, and the belief within the Party that military victory was imminent, fuelled a struggle for power within ZANU's military and political hierarchies. Tongogara and Hamadziripi, in particular, drew on support from Karanga colleagues to enhance their positions at the 1973 Review Conference to the detriment and anger of the Manyika. From the time of the Review Conference onwards ethnic politicking became increasingly prevalent within ZANU, and the two major crises facing the Party during the mid-1970s - the "detente exercise" and, in particular, the Nhari rebellion - saw differences of policy and approach quickly develop along ethnic lines.

The primary cause of the Nhari rebellion was the neglect of ZANLA guerrillas at the front by the Gava Provincial administration, and the subsequent High Command support for Gava and Nhongo. These difficulties would probably have been resolved with little violence if the Karanga within the Military High Command, and later in the Dare, had not, as a group, felt increasingly threatened by the rebels.
Although the Nhari group directed most of their complaints and attacks against Tongogara and the Karanga-dominated Military High Command and Provincial administration, their actions were not influenced by ethnicity. Yet as the rift grew wider and became more violent, the Karanga, partly influenced by Manyika support for the rebels and sympathy for the "detente exercise", closed ranks and came to see their opponents as representing the Manyika. Thus, while ethnicity was not the direct cause of the division in the Party, it provoked those threatened by the rebels - the Karanga - to take collective action. The conflict developed rapidly into a struggle for power and survival in which the warring factions largely came to represent different ethnic groups. Even so, both factions contained members of other ethnic groups: within the official Military High Command there were two prominent Zezuru - Nhongo and Manyika - and one Shangaan - Chauke - who sided with the Karanga; while the rebels came from a number of Shona sub-groups, and Nhari himself was Zezuru.

By March 1975 the delicate balance between the Shona sub-groups, which had generally characterised the ZANU leadership since 1963, had been dealt a fatal blow: the Zezuru had been absent from the Dare since 1971; and the Manyika now made their exit. The Karanga were in complete control
of the Party's political and military structures, holding all positions in the Dare, and 15 of the 19 positions in the Military High Command.

Following Chitepo's assassination ZAPU, which for the last few years had been pre-occupied with rebuilding its administration and army after the disastrous conflict between the Party's Zezuru and Kalanga/Ndebele members, took the opportunity to attack the "...shameful intra-ZANU tribalistic squabbles":

...which resulted in an indiscriminate massacre of Manyika cadre by Karanga maniacs... All those Zimbabweans murdered in cold blood (sic) had left their country to fight for its liberation but ended up falling at the callous hands of unpardonable tribalistic criminals whose main and only interest in Zimbabwe is to get themselves into positions of strength at the expense of unsuspecting patriots... We call upon all right thinking Zimbabweans to realise NOW that tribalism, like racism, can never perform a liberatory function in any situation. Tribalism generates hatred, bigotry, prejudice and aggressive suspicion. This is what has afflicted ZANU." 1

This savage attack, similar in many ways to those which ZANU's Zimbabwe News had made against ZAPU during the height of the Zezuru - Kalanga/Ndebele clashes in 1970/71, was retracted in the next issue of The Zimbabwe Review:

The Zimbabwe Review wishes to apologise deeply for any embarrassment likely to have been caused by our last editorial comment which inadvertently made reference to the Karanga and Manyika tribes. The Zimbabwe Review has never taken a tribal posture and did not intend any insult or insinuation against any tribal or other grouping. 2


Despite the blatantly "tribal" nature of the events in ZANU during late 1974 and early 1975, any reference to "tribalism" as a cause of discord or division in the nationalist movement was still taboo.
CHAPTER V

GUERRILLAS AND IDEOLOGUES -

Following the unification of the Rhodesian nationalist groups in late 1974, the assassination of Herbert Chitepo in 1975, and the subsequent imprisonment of ZANU's Dare and Military High Command members, many ZANLA cadres retreated from camps in Zambia to Tanzania and Mozambique. Isolated from developments in Rhodesia, and dissatisfied with the inability of the "unified" ANC's political leaders to bury their differences, ZANU's guerrilla cadres, after consulting with the Party's detained Karanga leaders, formed the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). ¹

ZIPA was dominated by a group of junior and ideologically radical ZANLA commanders and instructors, the most important of whom were Karanga. Initially, therefore, the establishment of ZIPA perpetuated the Karanga domination of ZANU which had begun in 1973 and had been consolidated by the suppression of the Nhari rebellion. Nevertheless, during the course of 1975 and 1976, the nexus between the ZIPA leadership and ZANU's imprisoned Dare and

¹. During 1975 and 1976 ZIPA was often called the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA), or the "Third Force". For a general summary of ZIPA's formation, structure and orientation, see Claudette Monteiro, "ZIPA: The Background to Zimbabwe's Guerrilla Army", African Development, (Dakar), No. 10, 1976, pp. 1233 and 1234.
High Command was broken; differences over ideological tenets, coupled with the desire for personal political power, proved stronger than ethnic affinity. By the end of 1976, the ZIPA leadership was endeavouring to transform ZIPA into a political movement independent of ZANU's traditional leaders.

During the course of 1976 those ZANLA cadres who had formed ZIPA entered into an alliance with ZAPU's armed wing, ZIPRA. A joint Military Committee was established of ZANLA and ZIPRA members to re-launch and direct the guerrilla war. The Military Committee was generally balanced between Shona and Ndebele, and also between the Shona sub-groups, and organisational rivalry and ideological differences, rather than ethnic differences, seem to have caused problems within the Committee. At the front and in the joint camps, however, ethnic rivalry and antipathy led to bloody clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA members. As a consequence, the "joint guerrilla command" was abandoned, and the ZAPU elements returned to Zambia, while ZANLA forces remained in Mozambique and Tanzania under the command of the increasingly autonomous ZIPA leadership.
ZANU in Tatters

If the OAU, the Tanzanian and Mozambique Governments cannot do anything to support the Armed Struggle in Zimbabwe, we shall kindly request to be deported back to Zimbabwe, where we shall start throwing stones. The fighting skill is already here, the weapons we shall get from the enemy and the food we shall get from our masses of the people who have always supported our Armed Struggle. We just cannot afford to stand and stare as the Smith regime and allied forces of reaction whittle away every ounce of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe. If we cannot live as free men, we rather choose to die as FREE MEN. 1

(ZANLA commanders communique from Mgagao, mid-1975).

During the first half of 1975, as nationalist politicians from ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and the ANC manoeuvred for positions of strength and influence within the "unified" ANC, the guerrilla forces in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique were rounded-up and restricted to a number of camps. The Presidents' intention was to enhance the prospects for a ceasefire, and also to bring about the establishment of a unified ANC army. 2 Consequently, the level of military activity in north-eastern Rhodesia dropped dramatically during 1975. By November there were fewer than 80 guerrillas within Rhodesia, 3 and the Minister of Defence stated confidently

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1. Untitled memorandum signed by "ANC Freedom Fighters at Mgagao Camp in Tanzania, 1975" (hereafter referred to as the Mgagao memorandum).

2. Interviews with Elias Hondo, who was in charge of ZANLA's Mozambique-based guerrilla force at the time, and with Webster Gwauya. Gwauya claimed that Zambia was, in fact, planning to integrate all Rhodesian guerrillas into ZIPRA.

3. "Forces can hold down any terror threat", Rhodesia Herald, 7 April 1975.
in his New Years' message that the majority of guerrillas operating in Rhodesia had been eliminated.¹

By mid-1975, ZANLA consisted of about 2,000 guerrillas, almost all of whom were in three camps in Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. Most, about 1,300, were at the large ZANU training camp at Mgagao in Tanzania, where three members of the Military High Command - Rex Nhongo, Dzinashe Machingura and James Nyakadzinashe - had been based since their escape from Zambia following Chitepo's assassination. About 500 ZANLA guerrillas were at the Mboroma camp, near Kabwe, in central Zambia, where they were detained with about 130 ZAPU and 25 FROLIZI guerrillas.² The ZANLA commander at Mboroma was Webster Gwauya, ZANU's Chief Representative in East Africa.³ The third and smallest ZANLA camp was at Tembue in Mozambique. According to the camp commander, and highest ranking ZANU member then in Mozambique, Elias Hondo, "The

1. "Majority of terrorists eliminated", Rhodesia Herald, 1 January 1975. The military successes of the previous year prompted a sense of optimism amongst most white Rhodesians. This was perhaps best captured by Major Brian Barrett-Hamilton, second-in-command, of the Rhodesian Light Infantry who, when addressing a passing-out parade in Salisbury in mid-March, said: "It is true that there are terrorists in the country at present, but there are not enough to go around...so please get yours early"; "Not enough to go round", Rhodesia Herald, 14 March 1976. It is likely that Major Barrett-Hamilton came to regret his statement during the course of 1976, as the guerrilla war dramatically escalated.

2. Interview with Webster Gwauya. There were a further 900 or so ZANU members also detained at Mboroma.

3. Ibid. Gwauya had accompanied Chitepo's wife, Victoria, from Tanzania to Zambia for the ZANU Chairman's funeral. The ZIPRA commander was Lookout Masuku and his FROLIZI counterpart Mamutse. Gwauya was temporarily detained in Zambia following the funeral, but was released when it was discovered that he had not been involved in the assassination. He was then sent to Mboroma.
situation was very difficult and tough in Mozambique, and there were shortages of everything - no ammunition for the front or guns. The Mozambique government wanted us not to continue the war.\textsuperscript{1} The Tembue camp was completely isolated, and very little communication was possible between Mgagao and Mboroma.

ZANLA's large guerrilla force, an embarrassing and unwanted anachronism to the Front Line States and also to some nationalist leaders, was isolated from ZANU's political and military leaders and also from developments in Salisbury, where the parody of settlement negotiations was being played out. As the Zimbabwe News reported some years later, between 1974 and 1976 the link between ZANU's "...leadership and fighters and the supporters at home and abroad completely broke down. There was no chain of command."\textsuperscript{2}

Following the detention of the Dare and Military High Command, the leadership of ZANU was supposedly in the hands of Ndabaningi Sithole and other ZANU Central Committee members who had been released from detention in December 1974. However, Sithole's focus was on events in Salisbury, not on the state of ZANU's currently unimportant guerrilla forces languishing in isolated camps. Sithole was preoccupied with strengthening his position within the shaky "unified" ANC and, for a time, with defending himself against charges of having planned to

1. Interview with Elias Hondo.

assassinate a number of nationalist colleagues. Sithole, in the company of Noel Mukono, Muzorewa and Chikerema, paid only two short visits to the guerrilla camps during the course of 1975. During a visit to Mgagao camp Sithole and the others were bitterly attacked by the guerrillas for their continued feuding, for virtually abandoning guerrillas in north-eastern Rhodesia and for failing to organise supplies and equipment for the men in the camp. (Some of the trainees had in fact starved because of lack of food.) Sithole's relations with ZANLA were also strained by his close association with ZANU's discredited Manyika faction, including Mukono, Mtambanengwe, Santana and Gwindingwi, and for his failure to seek the release of the detained Karanga Dare and High Command members.

Initially, Sithole received at least the tacit support of ZANU's recently released Central Committee members. During the course of 1975, however, this group, which had serious reservations about the "detente exercise" and the concept of a "unified" ANC, began again to move away from Sithole. The final straw for the Central Committee group, and for many of ZANU's Dare and High Command members and for the guerrillas themselves, came in August when Sithole, in league with James Chikerema, established the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). The formation of the ZLC, with Sithole as

1. Sithole and Muzorewa later claimed, with some justification, that they had been refused permission to visit the camps. See Muzorewa, op. cit., pp. 195 and 196.


3. See confidential annex, footnote 8.
Chairman, and the appointments of Simpson Mtambanengwe, Joseph Masangomai, Stephen Parirewa and Noel Mukono to positions on the ZLC committees, and of Felix Santana and Kenneth Gwindingwi to the High Command, was denounced by many ZANU and ZANLA members.¹

Prior to the formation of the ZLC, a number of ZANU leaders in Rhodesia, including Robert Mugabe, Edgar Tekere, Enos Nkala, Maurice Nyagumbo and Herbert Ushewokunze, had begun to recruit youths for military training in Mozambique, and in March 1975, Mugabe and Tekere were sent by the Party's Central Committee to Mozambique to resume contact with ZANU's guerrilla forces.² Mugabe and Tekere were placed in a ZANU camp at Quelimane by Frelimo "under conditions which amounted to

1. Interview with Webster Gwauya. Also see Mgagao memorandum, op. cit., and "The Split in the ANC Widens", op. cit. p. 3.


Renegade Chief Rekayi Tangwena, the traditional leader of the displaced Tangwena people in the Inyanga District, helped Mugabe in his escape. (See "'White Settlers and Snakes' declares veteran Comrade Tangwena on visit to Maputo", Zimbabwe News, (Maputo), Vol. 10, No. 1, January/Februrary 1978, p.1.) Mugabe's departure from Rhodesia was no surprise to the Government, or to the Rhodesian Security Forces. On the night Mugabe slipped across the border orders reached the Security Forces "from the top", to let him go. It was perhaps the Government's intention to sow further disunity within ZANU by letting Mugabe escape. A Security Force patrol, hidden in a valley on the border with Mozambique, watched as Mugabe disappeared over a ridge nearby, and into Mozambique. The next day they found some of his belongings, including his law books. Inside the covers was Mugabe's signature. Interview with Rhodesian military authorities, Salisbury, December 1977.
detention", and it was some time before they were able to establish contact with ZANLA's leadership or rank-and-file. Several other ZANU officials, including Simon Mzenda and Joseph Taderera, were also sent to Zambia, where they attempted to make contact with the ZANLA forces at Mboroma and with the imprisoned Dare members. But following Chitepo's assassination, the situation in Zambia was confused and tense, and the ZANU officials were able to do little more than make liaison with the guerrilla forces, and provide limited legal assistance to the Karanga detainees.

Mugabe and Tekere in Mozambique, and the ZANU officials in Zambia, were not readily recognised or accepted by ZANLA's commanders and rank-and-file, most of whom had joined the armed struggle only in the late 1960s or early 1970s, while Mugabe and the others were imprisoned in Rhodesia. Their leaders were the detained Dare and High Command members in Lusaka, and it was to them that the guerrillas turned in mid-1975 for advice and assistance.

In August 1975, about six months after Chitepo's death, four senior ZANLA members - Dzinashe Machingura, James Nyakadzinashe, Saul Sadza, ZANU's Deputy Chief Representative in East Africa, and Parker Chipoera, a Mgagao camp commander - travelled to Zambia in an attempt to discuss the decayed state of the Party with the imprisoned Dare and High Command members. They were eventually allowed to see Tongogara,

2. Interview with Rugare Gumbo.
Mudzi, Kangai and Gumbo, who were detained at Mpini Prison, in Lusaka. According to Gumbo, he and the others had "formed a strategy of support with Mugabe":

> We were dissatisfied with the ANC agreement as we thought their leadership was responsible for our detention. We were against their plans for a settlement and we were for the armed struggle. We were generally dissatisfied with the 'unified' ANC.

In addition, it is clear that the Dare and High Command members hoped that by establishing ZIPA they would perpetuate their own, and hence Karanga, domination of ZANU and ZANLA, through the auspices of Machingura, Nyakadzinashe and other ZANLA Karanga leaders. While Gumbo claims that the detained Dare members first suggested the establishment of ZIPA, Joseph Chimurenga believes that the Dare merely gave its blessing, and also that the idea of uniting ZANLA and ZIPRA within a "joint guerrilla command", came from the Mgagao commanders. Whatever the true course of events, the four commanders returned to Mgagao where, with other members of the General Staff at the camp, they began to prepare two statements; the first dissociating the guerrillas from the political leadership of the "unified" ANC; and the second proposing the amalgamation of ZANLA and ZIPRA within a "joint guerrilla command".

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Interview with Chimurenga.
While the vast majority of General Staff members at Mgagao supported the establishment of ZIPA, several were wary of denouncing Sithole, who was still ZANU's President, and the other political leaders of the "unified" ANC. Other commanders were concerned about uniting with ZANU's traditional rival, ZAPU. Rex Nhongo, the senior ZANLA member not in detention in Zambia, was amongst the latter group. Nhongo was worried that the unification of ZANLA and ZIPRA would result in some diminution in his position.\(^1\) Nhongo's rise to power in ZANLA had been extraordinarily rapid and not without some luck. In 1971 he had joined ZANU as an ordinary cadre. Through his endeavours as a guerrilla, and in order to placate other cadres recently recruited from ZAPU, he was made a member of the Military High Command in 1973. Nhongo's support for Tongogara at vital stages of the Nhari rebellion, and his fortuitous escape from Zambia after Chitepo's assassination, enabled him to consolidate and enhance his position. While Nhongo had often proved his ability as a guerrilla, he was not an administrator. He realised that the formation of a "joint military command" would necessitate some form of consensual decision-making body, in which lack of administrative experience would work to his detriment, and lead to some dilution of his power.

In view of Nhongo's reservations about ZIPA, the Mgagao commanders arranged in late August or early September for Nhongo to travel to Tembue, ostensibly to make contact with Elias Hondo.\(^2\) Nhongo was accompanied on his visit to

1. See confidential annex, footnote 9.
2. See confidential annex, footnote 10.
Mozambique by Saul Sadza. In Nhongo's absence, the Mgagao commanders wrote and distributed the two memoranda denouncing the political leadership of the ANC, and proposing the establishment of ZIPA.

The memorandum, which proposed the formation of ZIPA has not been made public. The second memorandum, on the other hand, was widely circulated. It was signed by 42 members of the ZANLA General Staff - that is, by all but one of the Mgagao camp commanders\(^1\) and the vast majority of ZANLA's second echelon commanders. Ndabaningi Sithole's brother has claimed that Joseph Taderera was responsible for drafting the memorandum.\(^2\)

While this is unlikely, Taderera certainly influenced the thinking of the Mgagao commanders and was probably involved in some way in its preparation.\(^3\) Taderera had been summoned to Lusaka by the Karanga members of the Dare and the Military High Command following their arrest in March 1975 to represent their (that is Karanga) interests and to retain contact with ZANLA.\(^4\)

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1. Only Sipo Ncube, a member of ZANU's original guerrilla group, Crocodile Commando, who remained loyal to Ndabaningi Sithole, refused to sign.

2. M. Sithole (1979), op. cit., p.120.

3. Between the names of the first two signatories of the memorandum is the letter "J". While this may have been a typographical error, and there are many spelling errors in the list of names, it is possible that the "J" is Joseph Taderera's signature.

In early October two of the signatories, Abel Sibanda and Gibson Gumbo, delivered the memorandum to Ndabaningi Sithole in Dar es Salaam, and then gave copies to the OAU (Liberation Committee), to the Tanzanian Government and to the Zambian and Mozambican embassies in Dar es Salaam. A short time later the second memorandum, proposing the establishment of a "joint guerrilla command", was also submitted to Nyerere.¹

In the first memorandum the Mgagao commanders denounced both the Nkomo and Muzorewa/Sithole/Chikerema factions of the "unified" ANC. The latter three were accused of:

...having done nothing to promote the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe but on the other hand, they have done everything to hamber (sic) the struggle through their power struggle. They have no interest of the revolution or the people at heart but only their personal interests. They cherish an insatiable lust for power. ²

Ndabaningi Sithole was singled out for particular attack. He was accused of deserting ZANU's guerrilla cadres, misappropriating Party funds donated for the defence of the imprisoned Dare and High Command members, pre-judging the findings of the International Commission established to look into the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, and of "tribalism".³ The commanders also registered their "strong disapproval" and "condemnation" of the newly formed Zimbabwe Liberation Council, which was composed of people "...deeply involved in the internal strife within ZANU..." and "...responsible for the death of many

1. See confidential annex, footnote 12.
2. Mgagao memorandum, op cit., p.3.
3. Ibid., pp. 4 and 5.
people in former ZANU". ¹ Noel Mukono, Simpson Mtambanengwe, Felix Santana and Kenneth Gwindingwi, in particular, were damned:

All four men have a sectarian record of corruption and subversion in former ZANU... Why Sithole appointed them in spite of their notorious record of which he is fully aware - we just do not know. This is no time for surrounding oneself with tribal puppets. ²

A few days after he received the memorandum, Sithole attempted to re-establish his position. In a letter from Dar es Salaam, he claimed that since his release from detention he had been working under trying conditions and that he would now try to rectify his failings:

I have not been free to visit the camps as I liked. Every camp visit I have made has been almost a carefully guided tour... Give me time, before you judge me harshly and you will, I am sure, appreciate that I am right with you. Lack of information, and more particularly, lack of real action is the cause of your many grievances, and I cannot blame you. You have my full sympathy. ³

Despite Sithole's plaintive appeal for understanding, he was finished as far as the Mgagao commanders were concerned.

¹ Ibid., p.4.
² Ibid.
³ Quoted in Meredith, op. cit., p.203.
The attack on Sithole, the ZLC and those ZANU members implicated in the Nhari rebellion, are indicative of the close relationship between the Mgagao commanders and the Party's political and military leaders imprisoned in Zambia. Zambia, in fact, was also vehemently abused. The memorandum requested the assistance of the OAU (Liberation Committee), Tanzania and Mozambique "...in ensuring the evacuation of our comrades in Zambia into a safer territory. We consider Zambia to be hostile enemy territory."\(^1\)

Robert Mugabe, ZANU's Secretary General, who had fled to Mozambique in mid-1975 to join the guerrillas, was described as "outstanding":\(^2\)

He has demonstrated this by defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique. Since we respect him most, in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is the only person who can act as a middle man... We can only talk through Robert Mugabe to them. \(^3\)

It is significant that Mugabe is not referred to as a leader, or the leader, of the ZANU guerrillas, but only as "a middle man". Mugabe was virtually unknown to ZANU's rank-and-file guerrillas, but at least by moving to Mozambique he had shown his willingness to resume the armed struggle, and to assist the guerrillas. During the next two years, Mugabe, with the assistance of other ZANU Central Committee members, such as Edgar Tekere and Simon Mzenda, gradually assumed control over ZANU's guerrilla forces but, at this time, he was mainly seen as a figurehead and spokesman for ZANLA.

1. Mgagao memorandum, op. cit., p. 5.
2. Ibid., p.3.
3. Ibid.
The vast majority of the Mgagao commanders were young camp officials, instructors and guerrilla commanders. While they supported the Karanga-dominated Dare and Military High Command, and denounced those Manyika alleged to have sided with Nhari during the 1974 rebellion, an examination of the ethnic background of the signatories of the memorandum does not support allegations that the group was numerically dominated by Karanga. Of those commanders whose background can be determined only 13 were Karanga. There were 17 Zezuru, 6 Manyika, 4 Ndebele and one coloured. Following the degeneration of the Nhari rebellion into an ethnic feud between the Karanga and the Manyika, the Mgagao commanders claimed that they were determined that "tribalism" would no longer influence promotion.

2. See confidential annex, footnote 14.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzinasho Machingura</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Edwin Munyaradzi</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Nyakadzinasho</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Chandada Buritsa</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Taifezwi</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>Tinzwei Goronga</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cris Mangwana</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Grey Mapondera</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abel Sibanda</td>
<td>Ndebele or Zezuru</td>
<td>Parker Chipoera</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmond Kaguni</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>Modern Mutsetse</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akim Mudende</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Tendai Pfepferere</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basten Beta</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Josia Ziso</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Chocha</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Edward Pedzisai</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<td>Nelson Tamwa</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Gibson Gumbo</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<td>Walter Mpfuru</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Rido Pfumo</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natsai Mangwanya</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>Andie Garikai</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jairos Ruredzo</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>Stanley Chigame</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joma</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Selias Tiehafa</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amon Marufu</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Chrispen Rupiza</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etherton Shungu</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Agnew Kambeu</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrings Shiri</td>
<td>Zezuru or Karanga</td>
<td>D. Tichafa</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapera Musewe</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>James Murinda</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Misihairambwi</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>Mathew Gurira</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominic Chinenga</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pirace Ndoda</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enias Nyamande</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Njiri</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Mgagao commanders were influenced much more by ideology than feelings of ethnic identity or rivalry. Most of the commanders were, or had been, instructors at some stage in their careers. Instructors, unlike usual ZANLA trainees, received specialist training in China. The chief ideologue of the group was Dzinashe Machingura, who had been trained in China during the late 1960s, but most of the other signatories of the Mgagao memorandum shared his views on ideology. The more radical orientation of the Mgagao commanders eventually brought ZIPA into conflict with the Party's more conservative traditional political and military leadership, but during these early days of ZIPA their affinity with the Dare and High Command was close.

In November 1975, Dzinashe Machingura and Saul Sadza travelled to Mozambique to discuss the formation of ZIPA with Elias Hondo. They met for three days, probably at the Tembue camp, and established a working committee and an organisational committee, and agreed on a program of action. ZIPA was officially formed on 27 November 1975. At that time the organisation consisted solely of ZANLA cadres.

When it was first formed ZIPA was led by a nine-man Military Committee:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzinasho Machingura</td>
<td>Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elias Hondo</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webster Gwauya</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saul Sadza</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker Chipoera</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Nyakadzinashe</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmond Kaguni</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendai Pfepferere</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The members of the ZIPA Military Committee were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the Mgagao camp commanders, Hondo and Gwauya being the only exceptions. Four of the nine members of the Committee were also members of ZANLA's 1975 Military High Command - Nhongo, Hondo, Machingura and Nyakadzinashe. While the Committee contained a broad balance between the Shona sub-groups - four Karanga, two Zezuru and two Manyika - and also contained one Ndebele, it will be shown that the real power lay with the Karanga, and in particular with Machingura and Hondo. Nevertheless, ethnicity clearly did not influence the election of the members of the Military Committee.

By the time Rex Nhongo and Saul Sadza returned to Mgagao from Tembue, the memorandum proposing the establishment of ZIPA had been distributed. Nhongo, despite his strong
reservations, was thus forced to accept the new body. One other member of the Military Committee, Webster Gwauya, was also concerned with the formation of ZIPA. Gwauya seems to have appreciated the dangers inherent in the establishment of an all-powerful military body free of ZANU's political leadership. Nevertheless, following the agreement of the imprisoned Dare and Military High Command, Gwauya agreed to cooperate with the Mgagao commanders. A number of other ZANLA members, particularly in Mozambique, who had not been party to the Mgagao agreement, were also dissatisfied with the establishment of ZIPA. Although the formation of ZIPA did not fully repair the tattered ZANU, it did bring together, at least for a short time, most of the Party's scattered and leaderless guerrilla forces.

1. Some years later, during an interview in Salisbury, Gwauya expressed surprise at his election to the Military Committee, and defensively claimed: "I don't know why I was included in the Military Committee." Interview with Gwauya.

2. ZANLA commanders such as Anderson Mhuru and Morgan Mhaka, who had been promoted by Tongogara when he made his bid to escape Zambia following Chitepo's assassination, resisted the imposition of ZIPA. They were eventually replaced and sent back to Tanzania for "retraining". Later, during early 1977, when Tongogara attempted to reassert his control over ZANLA and the ZIPA Military Committee, he drew on the support of these displaced and bitter commanders. See confidential annex, footnote 15.
A "Third Force"\(^1\)

Shortly after the formation of ZIPA, a number of senior ZAPU leaders, including Jason Moyo, Dumiso Dabengwa, Alfred Mangena and Ambrose Mutiniri, visited ZANU's imprisoned Dare members at Mpini Prison.\(^2\) According to Rugare Gumbo, it was agreed that ZIPRA should amalgamate with ZANLA, and a "joint guerrilla command" be established.\(^3\) The incorporation of ZIPRA into ZIPA seems, however, to have occurred without the direct consent of ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo. In a document circulated at the preparatory meeting of the Standing Committee of the OAU's Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam in May 1976, a ZANU member, Michael Mawema, claimed that:

> Whilst the ZANLA militants were sorting out their affairs, ZAPU militants were confronted by insistent revisionism in its leadership too (sic). ZAPU militants did not support Joshua Nkomo's constitutional talks with Ian Smith. They believed that Nkomo had sweated out all his nationalism and that his imperial envoys across the world no longer served to enhance the liberation of Zimbabwe. \(^4\)

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1. President Nyerere, in an interview in March 1976, referred to the existence of a "third force", which numbered about 16,000 in camps in Mozambique. This was the first time the phrase had been used. See Martin, "Nyerere: 'We'll Deliver Smith to London'", \textit{op. cit.}

2. See Mitchell, \textit{op. cit.}, p.18.

3. Interview with Gumbo. According to Elias Hondo, however, Dabengwa had nothing to do with the formation of ZIPA.

Mawema also quoted a former ZAPU member who joined ZIPA and whose statement reveals the more radical and militant stance of some ZIPA members and leaders as compared with the traditional leadership:

It was good to look at Joshua Nkomo as a nationalist but it would be a mistake to look at him as a revolutionary leader. His politics is (sic) reformist, accommodationist and reconciliationist and therefore irrelevant and counter productive in relation to the revolutionary politics of the armed struggle. 1

Despite the apparent rejection by some ZIPRA members of Nkomo's leadership, the incorporation of ZAPU elements into ZIPA occurred with the blessing of ZAPU's Lusaka-based committee run by Jason Moyo, Edward Ndhlovu and George Silundika, which remained under Nkomo's overall control.

Tanzania, and to a slightly lesser extent Mozambique and Zambia, supported the proposed formation of a "third force". 2 It was the presidents' aim to by-pass the traditional political leaders, establish a separate guerrilla force and hope that a new political elite, free of the age-old feuds, would emerge from its ranks. The three presidents also probably hoped that the new leadership would be more pliable, and receptive to their wishes than Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and Nkomo had proved to be. In this, they were badly mistaken.

In early 1976 Kaunda released ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres from camps in Zambia, who were subsequently moved to joint training and staging camps in Tanzania and Mozambique. 3 A force of about 2,500 guerrillas was eventually assembled in Mozambique, only a few hundred of whom were ZIPRA.

1. Ibid.

2. Martin, "Nyerere: 'We'll Deliver Smith to London'", op. cit., pp. 1 and 2.

Following the incorporation of ZIPRA forces nine further positions were added to the Military Committee. The Committee was "...established on a parity structure", with nine members from ZANLA and nine from ZIPRA. Those ZANLA members who had been appointed to positions in the Military Committee in November remained within the enlarged Committee. At least seven of the ZIPRA members were senior commanders - Mangena, Dube, Mutiniri, Munyanyi, Mpoko, Mudzingwa and Tshangani - indicating that ZAPU was taking the formation of the joint command seriously.

In order of rank and seniority the enlarged Military Committee consisted of:

1. Martin, "Nyerere: 'We'll Deliver Smith to London'", op. cit., p. 2.
TABLE 25

ZIPA MILITARY COMMITTEE - JANUARY 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred &quot;Nikita&quot; Mangena</td>
<td>Political Commissar</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Dube</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzinash Machingura</td>
<td>Deputy Political Commissar</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elias Hondo</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webster Gwauya</td>
<td>Director of Political Education</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saul Sadza</td>
<td>Director of Finance</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrose Mutiniri</td>
<td>Director of Training and Personnel</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Munyanyi</td>
<td>Director of Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Shona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Mpoko</td>
<td>Director of Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Shona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine Mudzingwa</td>
<td>Director of Medicine</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enoch Tshangani</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Operations</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
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<tr>
<td>(FNU) Sebele</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Political Education</td>
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<td>unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>(FNU) Nyathi</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Finance</td>
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<td>Parker Chipoera</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tendai Phepferere</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Medicine</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
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</table>

1. The names and positions of the members of the ZIPA Military Committee were never officially announced. The information in the above table comes mainly from interviews with former ZIPA members in Salisbury during early 1980, and in particular from interviews with two members of the Military Committee, Elias Hondo and Webster Gwauya. Also see "Rhodesia: Zimbabwe's factional farrago", Africa Confidential, (London), Vol. 18, No. 22, 4 November 1977, p.3; and "Another Serious Blow Against Armed Struggle: Comrade J.D. Dies after Operation", The Zimbabwe Review, (Lusaka), Vol. 6, March/April 1977, p.12.
During 1976, two ZANU members of the Military Committee, Edmond Kaguni and Saul Sadza, were killed during Rhodesian cross-border operations into Mozambique. Kaguni was killed on 9 August during the Rhodesian strike against the ZANU military and refugee camp at Nyadzonya. He was replaced as Deputy Director of Logistics and Supplies by Rex Nhongo's younger brother, David Todhlana. Sadza, who was killed in Mozambique's Manica Province, probably in September, was replaced by Akim Mudende as the ZIPA Director of Finance. Todhlana was Zezuru and Mudende Karanga.

Despite the deliberate balance between ZANLA and ZIPRA members of the Military Committee, the ZANU element, whose guerrillas represented more than 90 per cent of ZIPA's armed strength, was in overall command. While the Committee ostensibly reached decisions on the basis of a majority vote of its 18 members, the ZIPRA members were not always consulted. It was, in fact, the intention of some ZANLA leaders totally to absorb ZIPRA into ZANLA, and also to transform ZIPA into an independent political organisation, free of the "old guard" political and military leaderships of both ZANU and ZAPU. As this became increasingly obvious during 1976, ZIPRA Commander Alfred Mangena and other ZIPRA


2. Mawema, op. cit., p.3.

members of the Military Committee sought to assert greater control over ZAPU's guerrilla forces and over the actions of the Military Committee. Their failure to do so eventually led to the collapse of the "third force".

Of the sixteen ZIPA Military Committee members whose ethnic background can be identified, six were Karanga - five from ZANLA, and Mangena from ZIPRA - five were Zezuru, two others were Shona of unknown dialect group, and three were Ndebele or Kalanga/Ndebele. There was therefore a rough balance between the Shona sub-groups, and also both Shona and Ndebele representation. Ethnicity was not a factor in the selection of the Military Committee. While no ethnic group was numerically dominant, the real power within the Military Committee nevertheless lay with two Karanga, Dzinasho Machingura and Elias Hondo.¹ Both Machingura and Hondo had been appointed to ZANLA's enlarged Military High Command following the suppression of the Nhari rebellion, and were close to the imprisoned Karanga Dare and High Command members. Nevertheless, during 1976, as the ZANLA elements began slowly to transform ZIPA into an independent political organisation, any residual feelings of ethnic or personal loyalty disappeared.

The ideological-orientation and pro-Chinese stance of many of the ZANLA members of ZIPA is evidenced by the establishment in 1976 of the Whampoa Political Academy at

1. According to Webster Gwauya, Rex Nhongo, in theory the ZIPA Commander, was dominated by other ZANLA members of the Military Committee: "ZIPA had control over him. He couldn't do anything without the consultation of ZIPA commanders. We wouldn't allow him to take some decisions unless they were taken together"; interview with Gwauya.
Chimoio, in Mozambique's Manica Province. The academy, named after China's Whampoa Military Academy, which was the training-ground for many of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, provided a six month course in "political education" and "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought". Between 1976 and early 1977, 300 to 400 of ZANLA's brightest recruits graduated from the academy.

Dzinashe Machingura was instrumental in establishing the academy. Machingura's hard-line Maoist views seem to have been tempered by the more moderate views of Joseph Taderera, head of the academy, and Webster Gwauya, the Director of Political Education. Some years later, in an interview in Salisbury, Gwauya denied that ZIPA's ideological line was formulated by Machingura, and argued that they were "...the ideas of the Party. Marxism-Leninism was spelt out a long time ago. Marxism is the basis of Leninism and Mao Tse-tung was a student of Lenin. ZIPA espoused Marxism-Leninism, period." Gwauya's views were similar to those expressed by ZAPU, and some former ZAPU members of ZIPA, such as Augustus Mudzingwa and David Todhlana. While they agreed on the necessity of a Marxist-Leninist revolution for Zimbabwe, they dismissed China's revolutionary experience as unsuited to Africa. The Machingura line prevailed, however, and ZIPA adopted a radical Maoist line.


3. Interview with Webster Gwauya.

While ZANU and ZAPU had moved closer to China and the Soviet Union respectively during the 1960s and early 1970s, and had increasingly adopted the language of Marxism, the exiled leadership of both parties had nevertheless remained essentially moderate. ZIPA, made-up of generally younger cadres who had received political instruction and military training in China and the USSR, radically changed the direction of nationalist politics: if ZIPA had assumed power in Rhodesia during 1976, a Marxist revolution would have ensued.¹

The Military Committee's emphasis on ideology and political education were strongly resisted by Rex Nhongo. In part, Nhongo's later alliance with Josiah Tongogara and Robert Mugabe against the ZANLA members of ZIPA was influenced by his distrust of these politically conscious, and generally better educated, cadres. As in the case of the Nhari rebellion, some ZANU members came to see this split as representative of a division between the "literates" and the "illiterates". While this explanation is too simple, it is interesting to note that following the disintegration of ZIPA in 1977, and the re-establishment of control by Tongogara and Mugabe, the Political academy at Chimoio was closed, and ZANU adopted a more moderate and less partisan ideological stance.

¹. See confidential annex, footnote 17.
War Within the War

The disintegration of ZANU during late 1974 and 1975, coupled with the intervention of the "detente exercise", had resulted in the virtual cessation of the guerrilla war. However, beginning in late 1976 thousands of young black Rhodesians streamed across the Botswana and Mozambique borders to join the guerrillas. In the early stages of the exodus, most recruits came from the eastern border areas and crossed into Mozambique, where they joined ZANLA, now unified with ZIPRA elements within the newly formed ZIPA. From a couple of thousand guerrillas in late 1974, ZANLA grew to 10,000 by mid-1976.

On 17 January 1976 "...after a lull of about ten months because of the 1974/75 detente exercise the guerrilla freedom war resumed in the battle zones of Zimbabwe in full earnest...". The guerrilla forces, for the first time in

1. Rhodesia, once protected on its eastern flank by Portuguese-ruled Mozambique was, after the granting of independence to Mozambique in June 1975, bordered by the euphoric and avowedly Marxist FRELIMO. Rhodesia's 1,000 kilometres of border with Mozambique was now exposed. Unlike the western border with Botswana, and the northern border with Zambia, the area to the east was attractive to guerrilla infiltration.


3. By late May 1976 Mozambican authorities claimed that there were 23,000 Rhodesian refugees in camps in central Mozambique; an increase of 8,500 in a month. Rhodesian officials, while claiming that the estimated 8,500 increase was on the high side, nevertheless conceded that about 5,000 left during April and May. Nicholas Ashford, "23,000 Africans have fled Rhodesia war", The Times, (London), 22 May 1976, p.1.

the armed struggle, were made up of both ZANLA and ZIPRA members, united within ZIPA. 1976 saw an escalation of all aspects of the guerrilla war: greatly increased guerrilla infiltration; incidents of urban terrorism, particularly in the Bulawayo townships; ambushes on main tourist routes; landmines on main tar roads; sabotage of railways and road bridges; and large-scale Security Force cross-border operations against guerrilla bases in Mozambique.1 At the beginning of 1976, Rhodesian authorities claimed that there were only 50 to 80 guerrillas remaining in the country;2 by December there were about 2,000.3

The unification of ZIPRA and ZANLA within ZIPA, and the relaunching of the guerrilla war led to the re-emergence of the old feuds and antagonisms which had plagued relations between ZAPU and ZANU for more than a decade. Tensions and antagonisms, based on ethnic, ideological and personal differences, and on different perceptions about ZIPA's role and future, eventually led to bitter, bloody and protracted fighting between sections of the two guerrilla


armies. In an interview in August 1976, Abel Sibanda, a ZANLA commander and signatory to the Mgagao memorandum, described the nature and extent of the difficulties which existed in ZIPA between ZANLA and ZIPRA cadre, and emphasised the divisive influence of "tribalism":

Although many fighters of the former ZAPU have joined the Mozambican camps, there is another tendency which practices treason; among the mercenaries whom Ian Smith sends out to carry out acts of sabotage, and some of whom have been captured by FRELIMO, there are some former ZAPU members who saw the people's war as an invincible enemy.

On the other hand, it is necessary to develop the work of detribalising some of the ZANU fighters, who were formerly told that they should fight for the Shona people in east Rhodesia and (? against) the Matebele in the west. 1

Fighting between Shona and Ndebele members of ZIPA in fact took place with some regularity, not only during joint operations in Rhodesia, but also in training and base camps in Tanzania and Mozambique.

The first major clash between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces occurred at a camp at Morogoro, Tanzania, on 16 May 1976. According to The Zimbabwe Review, 2 four ZANU and three ZAPU cadres were killed, following a dispute over cooking duties. A guerrilla captured by the Rhodesian Security Forces later in the year, and who had been at Morogoro, claimed that the fighting was stopped only by the intervention of Tanzanian troops. He also claimed that ZAPU and ZANU

members were separated following the clash; ZANU members
were sent to another camp outside Dar es Salaam, and the
ZAPU cadres remained at Morogoro. Following the Morogoro
incident two members of the ZIPA Military Committee went to
Tanzania to investigate the matter with the Executive
Secretary of the OAU (Liberation Committee) and two
representatives from ZAPU and ZANU. However, while at
Morogoro the team was forced to travel to Mgagao where problems
between ZAPU and ZANU cadres had been aggravated by the
Morogoro incident.

According to The Zimbabwe Review, the investigators
discovered at Mgagao that the causes of the conflict were:
ZANU partisan slogans; denunciation of ZAPU leaders by ZANU
members; the presence of Chinese military instructors instead
of instructors from OAU member-states; differences in training
programs, particularly political programs; refusal by ZANU
members to share administrative duties and authority with ZAPU
commanders; and food shortages.

On 6 June, some time after the investigation
team left Mgagao, the pent-up tensions of the previous few months
exploded. According to The Zimbabwe Review, ZANU members
opened fire on their ZAPU colleagues:

They used automatic rifles, light machine guns,
hand grenades. Axes were also used. Chinese
military experts fired light machine guns and
automatic rifles and set their dogs on the
panic-stricken former ZAPU recruits. Firing
continued to 0400 hours on 7 June. Retreating
former ZAPU recruits fell into several pre-
organised ambushes along various escape routes.

1. Chris Reynolds, "Terrorists 'not loyal' to ANC leaders",
Rhodesia Herald, 16 October 1976.
3. Ibid., pp. 6 and 7.
About 50 guerrillas, mainly ZAPU members, were killed during the fighting. The subsequent reluctance of the Tanzanian Government to investigate the clash at Mgagao enraged the ZAPU leadership.¹

In a speech at the annual OAU Foreign Ministers meeting, held in Port Louis, Mauritius, Willie Musarurwa, the ZAPU Publicity Secretary, warned:

> We are at a critical stage in which our human potential itself is being gravely depleted - not on the battlefield of the struggle but in the wild quest for illusive unity.

> The tribalistic drive of a section of the army has been accentuated, resulting in grave problems. ²

Abel Muzorewa, also in Port Louis for the meeting, claimed on 5 July that fighting among guerrillas was claiming a far heavier toll than previous reports had indicated, and that more guerrillas were being killed by each other than by the Rhodesian Security Forces.³

Up to 200 guerrillas may have been killed during ZAPU/ZANU feuds in Mozambique and Tanzania.⁴ The severity of these clashes, coupled with Machingura's continuing efforts to transform ZIPA into a political organisation, eventually led to the disintegration of the "joint guerrilla command", and it was agreed that the two groups should revert to operating separately: ZANU from Mozambique; and ZAPU from Zambia. By September 1976 all ZIPRA forces

1. Ibid., pp. 6 and 8.


4. "Feud between ZAPU and ZANU may have killed 200", Rhodesia Herald, 16 July 1976.
had left Mozambique, and returned to Zambia, where they soon came under the direct control of Joshua Nkomo, whose faith in settlement negotiations had recently, if only temporarily, broken-down.

In early 1977, Alfred "Nikita" Mangena, ZAPU's military commander and ZIPA's Political Commissar, described the separation of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces:

...comrades, there has been a conflict in ZPA (sic) since April (1976), resulting in ZIPRA operating separately. It is clear to us that manipulation of some ZPA elements by some external forces to convert ZPA into a new Zimbabwe organisation by subverting the political leadership which formed ZPA are still continuing (sic). These manoeuvres were some of the fundamental causes of tension in ZPA. ZPA remains a military wing and nothing else, in the quest for national unity and the liberation of Zimbabwe. 1

Because of Machingura's clear intention to transform ZIPA into an independent political movement, Mangena went on to acknowledge that he and ZIPRA were "...subject to the Party and its political leadership...under the Supreme Gallant and Towering Command of Comrade Joshua Nkomo". 2

Some ZIPRA members, including one ZAPU member of the Military Committee, Augustus Mudzingwa, chose to remain in Mozambique within ZIPA. Mudzingwa was one of ZIPRA's more radical members and during the previous twelve months had become a close ally of Dzinashe Machingura. Machingura, Mudzingwa, Hondo and a number of other ZIPA leaders now assumed virtual control of ZANLA and sought to complete the transformation of the guerrilla army into a political party. 3

* * * * *


2. Ibid.

3. Interviews with former ZIPA members.
ZIPA was formed in November 1975 by the Mgagao camp commanders and other ZANLA leaders with the knowledge and blessing of ZANU's imprisoned Karanga Dare and High Command members. The rejection of Sithole and those ZANU members implicated in the Nhari rebellion, and the presence of a number of senior Karanga military commanders in the new military body, perpetuated the Karanga domination of ZANU which had begun in 1973. The composition of ZIPA's first Military Committee shows, however, that appointment was not based on ethnic affinity.

The establishment of the "joint guerrilla command" with ZIPRA later in the year enabled ZANU and ZAPU to relaunch the guerrilla war. However, clashes along ethnic lines between ZANLA and ZIPRA members in camps in Mozambique and Tanzania and during joint operations in Rhodesia, coupled with ideological and organisational differences within the Military Committee, eventually led to the disintegration of the "third force". In addition, the personal power ambitions of some of the ZANLA Military Committee members, who sought to transform ZIPA into a political party, led to the severing of the close relationship between ZIPA and its Karanga mentors imprisoned in Zambian gaols.
CHAPTER VI

MUGABE - "CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO FIRES": 1976-1980

The absence of a recognised ZANU leadership during most of 1975 and 1976 had enabled the development of various factions within the Party. By late 1976 the control of ZANLA was largely in the hands of the ZIPA Military Committee, and Machingura and his colleagues had taken the first steps toward transforming ZIPA into a political movement. The purging of this faction soon after the abortive Geneva Conference, saw the emergence of three broad and somewhat amorphous groups within ZANU, each vying for power: several Karanga Dare and High Command members, in alliance with the remnants of ZIPA, who were dissatisfied with both the political and military leadership of the Party; Tongogara, Nhongo, and a number of generally younger guerrilla commanders; and finally the Central Committee members, led by Robert Mugabe, who had been released from detention at the beginning of the "detente exercise". The struggle for power between these three factions occupied much of the attention of Party leaders and cadres for the next two years.

During 1977 and 1978, Mugabe purged the Party of most apparent and potential rivals, and by 1980, as ZANU President, he controlled a generally unified and increasingly powerful guerrilla army. Missing from the Party's hierarchies, however, were many of those exiled leaders who had helped to establish ZANU between 1966 and 1974, and the younger guerrilla commanders who had remained loyal to the Party during the long and difficult days of the "detente exercise". Most of those who were purged were Karanga, who had been brought together by a common threat to their senior Party positions.
ZIPA and the Geneva Conference

The ill-fated Geneva Conference, a further effort by the Front Line States, South Africa, Britain and the United States to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, achieved little in the way of persuading Ian Smith to transfer power to the black majority, or of reconciling the aspirations and objectives of the numerous black nationalist delegations. It did succeed, however, in bringing to a head the divisions within ZANU which had been developing since mid-1975.

* * * * *

During 1976 the ZIPA Military Committee moved to assert its control over ZANLA forces in Tanzania and Mozambique, and by late in the year ZIPA was recognised by the guerrilla cadres and the Front Line States to be the authentic voice and leadership of ZANU. While maintaining reasonably close relations with the Dare and High Command members imprisoned in Zambia, and with ZANU Central Committee members in Mozambique and Zambia, the ZIPA leaders began quietly to transform ZIPA from an ad hoc military-coordination body into a political movement.

The leading figures behind ZIPA and the attempt to hijack the Party were Dzinashe Machingura and Elias Hondo, but they had the enthusiastic support of most other members of the Military Committee. Rex Nhongo, however, remained opposed to the Machingura concept of ZIPA and loyal to Tongogara and the other imprisoned Dare and High Command members. Nhongo, against his will, was forced to attend and
participate in Military Committee meetings, and, as ZIPA Commander, sign "ZIPA communiques".\textsuperscript{1}

The massive influx of refugees and prospective guerrillas into Mozambique during late 1975 and 1976 enabled Machingura and the ZIPA Military Committee greatly to enhance their influence to the detriment of the imprisoned ZANU leaders. A ZANU publication in early 1977, following the purging of the ZIPA clique and Mugabe's assumption of power, described the nature of the problem:

There was ... the problem of new members who joined the Party during this period but could not be considered as having a broad national character, as being ideologically, politically and organisationally consolidated.\textsuperscript{2}

Young blacks, keen to fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe, thus found themselves entangled in the insidious web of ZANU in-fighting.

Despite the disintegration of the ZIPRA/ZANLA "joint guerrilla command" in mid-1976, ZANU publications and broadcasts continued to refer to operations conducted by ZIPA. These were, in fact, ZANLA actions. It was not until late in the year, however, that Machingura and the other members of the Military Committee felt secure enough to announce publicly their plans for ZIPA. On 22 September, Machingura was interviewed on Radio Maputo. The interview was the first public comment by a member of the leadership of ZIPA, and was the forerunner of numerous press conferences, ZIPA communiques and statements to be broadcast

\textsuperscript{1} Interviews with former ZIPA members.

\textsuperscript{2} "Immediate tasks of the Party...People's War", Zimbabwe News, (Maputo), Vol\textsuperscript{9}, No.2, January/February 1977, p.3.
by Radio Maputo during the next five months. During his 22 September interview, Machingura described the political nature of ZIPA, and in effect announced the dissolution of ZANU:

ZIPA is an army in the traditional sense of the word. But ZIPA is a unique and revolutionary army in the sense that it has a strategic role of transforming itself into a political movement.

The ZIPA structure accommodates the shouldering of both the military and political tasks of the revolution. We have, within the ZIPA structure, a political department exclusively charged with the responsibility of shouldering the political tasks that are normally shouldered by a revolutionary political organisation...

But we have to establish a formal political structure in order to give better political direction to the armed body that is now fighting inside Zimbabwe. And moves to do this are already well under way, moves to transform this organisation into a revolutionary vanguard for the people's struggle.

The control of the Party over the actions of the military, a central aspect of Maoist revolutionary philosophy, had collapsed, and, by September 1976, ZANU was clearly controlled by the gun. The Machingura/ZIPA faction of ZANU became known as the "Workers Party", and new slogans extolling the working class to the exclusion of all others, were produced and circulated, like "Pamberi ne Vashande", "Forward with the Workers". The Whampoa Academy at Chimoio, Machingura's brain-child, but headed by the somewhat more moderate Joseph Taderera, became the focal


point for the development and dissemination of the "Vashande" ideological line. Eventually several hundreds of ZANLA's brightest recruits graduated from the college.¹ Their support for Machingura and the Military Committee seriously complicated Mugabe's later efforts to destroy ZIPA. Machingura's assumption of power in ZANU, the so-called "Vashande coup", represented not only the demise of the "old guard" politicians, but also the emergence of the radicals and the ideologues.

A settlement package worked out by Dr Henry Kissinger, and reluctantly accepted by Ian Smith on 24 September, indirectly brought about the premature demise of the "Workers Party". The ZIPA Military Committee had received the enthusiastic support of Mozambique and Tanzania during its short existence, and Machingura's establishment of the "Workers Party" had also been favourably received. However, ZIPA's immediate and catagoric rejection of the Kissinger proposals led to an equally strong and rapid about-face by the Front Line States. On 5 October, ZIPA sent a memorandum signed by Rex Nhongo to the Presidents of the Front Line States, and to the OAU, explaining ZIPA's position:

"We are determined to fight the Kissinger proposals to the bitter end. We hereby reiterate our unswerving commitment to the total liberation of Zimbabwe through armed struggle.

We do not believe it would be fair to us to be denied the opportunity and the right to fight for complete, genuine independence, as did the heroic people's of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Vietnam, Cambodia, Algeria, Angola and Laos."
On 5 October ZIPA made a further attack on the Kissinger proposals and also an implied attack on Nkomo, Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and ZANU Secretary-General, Robert Mugabe:

The Zimbabwe people, under the vanguard leadership of the revolutionary organisation, the Zimbabwe People's Army, must reject out of hand this present manoeuvre by the Anglo-Americans. It is a line which aims at destroying the people's revolution and putting in its place a semblance of independence, under the control of black puppet nationalists who will themselves be under the control of their Anglo-American imperialist masters.

The people of Zimbabwe must watch out for these new oppressors in black skins... They will speak the language of the people's revolution, when in reality their actions and practices are the opposite of what they utter publicly. They will claim to lead the freedom fighters of the Zimbabwe People's Army, when in practice they do everything to jeopardise, destroy and discredit that army...

Machingura, in a statement in mid-October, finally announced ZIPA's rejection of Mugabe's leadership. Machingura was quoted in the Times of Zambia as saying that ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres would never follow Mugabe's leadership, and that ZIPA had nothing to do with either ZANU or ZAPU, and wanted "nothing at all to do with any of the nationalist leaders jockeying for power in Rhodesia." 2

Samora Machel, in the face of ZIPA's categorical rejection of the Kissinger proposals and of the proposed Geneva Conference, summoned the Military Committee members to Maputo. Machel explained that he believed Zimbabwe would


gain its independence at Geneva, and, that it was necessary for ZIPA to "...defeat your enemy on the battlefield and diplomatically"¹, as Frelimo had done against the Portuguese. After a long and bitter exchange of views, Machel ordered the ZIPA leaders to attend the conference.² The reluctance of the ZIPA Military Committee to attend the settlement negotiations infuriated Machel, and was the turning point in his relationship with the nascent political movement.

The ZIPA delegation-Machingura, Hondo, Mudende, Nhongo, Nyikadzinhashe and Pfepeferere³- arrived in Geneva on 3 December, well after the conference had begun. They travelled to Geneva with some members of the Dare and Military High Command- Tongogara, Gumbo, Mudzi, Hamadziripi and Chimurenga—who had been found not guilty of killing Herbert Chitepo, and had been released in time for the Geneva Conference.⁴ Gathered together in Geneva by December 1976

1. Interview with Webster Gwauya.


3. Gwauya and Todhlanza remained in Mozambique to "...organise the forces, and to talk to them, and make them understand why ZIPA had gone to Geneva..." Interview with Gwauya.

4. Only Cletos Chigowe, who had been found guilty of killing Edgar Madekurozwa, was not released at this time.
were the leading members of ZANU's three most powerful groupings: Mugabe and the other Central Committee members, such as Tekere and Mzenda; the Dare and High Command members; and the ZIPA Military Committee. As the conference dragged on during its final weeks the differences within and between these three factions became obvious. The most serious division, and that most blatant in Geneva, was between ZIPA and the two other factions, which together represented ZANU's "traditional" leadership.

In an interview in Geneva in mid-December, Mugabe was asked to explain the relationship between ZANU and ZIPA:

In regard to the question which has been raised whether in fact we are the political party to which ZIPA belongs or ZIPA is separate ... when ZIPA was created it was as a result of our ZANU leadership, and ZAPU leadership meeting to decide whether we shouldn't start fighting... The question of ZIPA being an entity, a military organ which has autonomy, does not come into it at all. ZIPA, which is synonymous now with ZANLA, is a ZANU wing and so it must be under ZANU leadership.

Despite Mugabe's assertions about the subservient position of ZIPA, Machingura and his colleagues, who had announced before their departure from Maputo that "...ZIPA will be in Geneva as ZIPA and not as part of any political faction now at Geneva", made little effort to hide their displeasure at the proceedings in the Palais des Nations.


On 14 December the conference was officially "adjourned" until 17 January, and the various ZANU delegations departed for Maputo where Mugabe, who had now established himself internationally as ZANU's political leader, began the long and potentially dangerous tasks of unifying the Party and consolidating his position within it.

Mugabe Consolidates his Position

Mugabe's persistent rejection of national unity in our country is not motivated by a sense of patriotism or noble human values of our society, but by his own insatiable vanity and inordinate lust for power, coupled with the keenest sort of sense of his own inferiority and inadequacies and a burning jealousy for qualities in others which he does not possess. He is a cruel, dishonest and inconsummate political actor and a master of intrigue, in particular of playing people and forces against each other for his own benefit.

(Rugare Gumbo, January 1980)

Immediately after his return from Geneva, Mugabe, in alliance with the recently released Dare and High Command members, and with ZIPA Commander Rex Nhongo, set about reasserting the Party's authority over the renegade ZIPA faction. Mugabe felt that he could no longer tolerate the challenge posed by Machingura and the other ZIPA leaders, while Tongogara and the other members of the Dare and High Command saw the Military Committee as a direct threat to their own positions and to control over ZANLA. Presidents Machel of Mozambique and Nyerere of Tanzania, who had previously supported the Machingura clique, now swung behind Mugabe and Tongogara. For Machel and Nyerere, the ZIPA experiment had out-lived its usefulness. Instead of uniting

the various guerrilla armies, the continuing existence of ZIPA was detracting from the efforts of Rhodesia's most powerful guerrilla army, ZANLA, and also from efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement.

The last of the ZIPA commentaries, which had started in September 1976, was broadcast by Maputo Radio on 13 January 1977.¹ In mid-January, the Military Committee called a meeting at Beira to discuss the problems facing ZANU, and to propose a new Party structure which would do away with the concept of the Military High Command. Mugabe feared that ZIPA would use the meeting to re-establish its authority, and told Machel that the Military Committee members were planning to usurp his, Mugabe's, leadership and establish a new political leadership for the proposed resumed session of the Geneva Conference.²

On 19 January, all ZANLA commanders not overseas or involved at the front, were summoned to Beira. At the meeting, which was chaired by Mugabe, Tongogara read out allegations against 25 senior ZANLA commanders, including 7 members of the Military Committee, and a number of Sectoral Commanders. All but one of the 25 - Joseph Chimurenga - were immediately arrested.³ Later in the month, a further 60 or so cadres associated with ZIPA were also arrested.

2. Interviews with ZIPA members, Salisbury, February/March 1980.
3. Interviews with Elias Hondo and Joseph Chimurenga. According to Chimurenga his name was read out, and only Mugabe's intervention saved him from arrest: "Mugabe said you can't include Joseph Chimurenga. He has just been released!"
Of the ZIPA leadership, only Rex Nhongo, who had always been a reluctant member of the Military Committee, and Webster Gwauya and Akim Mudende, both of whom were in Tanzania, escaped arrest. Nevertheless, it took several months after the arrests for Mugabe and Tongogara to reassert their control over the ZANLA camps. Although a number of sympathisers of the Machingura group had retained senior positions within the Party and in the camps, the "Workers Party" was dead, and the influence of the ideologues in ZANU had come to an end.

Ethnicity played no part in the efforts of Mugabe, Tongogara and ZANU's other political and military leaders to purge the ZIPA elements from the Party. While the leading members of the ZIPA group were Karanga, the Karanga also dominated ZANU's executive bodies, the Dare and High Command, and Tongogara was in fact Karanga. The differences between the ZIPA Military Committee and ZANU's traditional leadership were ideological and political, not ethnic.

* * * *

1. Interview with Webster Gwauya. Gwauya was told of the arrests by Rugare Gumbo. He did not agree with the actions taken by Mugabe and Tongogara: "It could have been solved by talking.... I was very influential amongst the cadres and by leaving me behind they probably thought that the cadres would be thought (sic) that my colleagues had done wrong." Gwauya later wrote to Mugabe and Tongogara stating his position. He got no reply, and "....knew that they were also hunting me".

The detention of the ZIPA leadership, while enabling Mugabe to consolidate his position as ZANU leader still further, highlighted and aggravated other incipient divisions within the Party. Support from the Karanga-dominated Dare and Military High Command had been vital to Mugabe's suppression of the ZIPA clique. Now, however, differences within these two executive bodies came to a head.

The Karanga within the Dare and High Command, who had been thrown together by the common threat posed by the Nhari rebels, had to some extent fallen out following Tongogara's execution of the rebels. According to Rugare Gumbo, Tongogara had suppressed the report of the "Committee of Three" on the causes of the rebellion, because it was critical of some of his actions, including the killing of the rebels and the murder of John Mataure: "It was wrong and it grated on our souls".¹ Other Dare and High Command members, including Henry Hamadziripi and Joseph Chimurenga, were also dismayed by the execution of the rebels, and, following their release from detention, they demanded an inquiry into the savage repression of the Nhari rebellion.² A further matter of contention between Tongogara and some other members of the High Command was Tongogara's demotion of William Ndangana, ZANLA Chief of Operations. Shortly after Herbert Chitepo's assassination in March 1975, Tongogara discovered that Ndangana had been assisting the rebels.³ From his cell in Mpina Prison, Tongogara, without the agreement or even the knowledge of most other members of the High Command,

1. Interview with Gumbo.
2. Interviews with Hamadziripi and Chimurenga.
3. According to Chimurenga "Tongogara said Ndangana had arranged the arrests. He blew the whistle on the soldiers at Chifombo."
The informal alliance between Tongogara and the "second generation" cadres, which had in many ways been central to the development of ZANU's north-eastern offensive in the early 1970s, and indeed to Tongogara's own rise to power, had, by early 1977, largely disintegrated. In its place a new and equally powerful clique began to emerge, consisting of Tongogara, and those ZANLA members who had directly assisted him in his suppression of the Nhari rebellion - Nhongo, Mpunzarima, Tungamirai, Gava, and two younger ZANLA commanders, Kenny Ridzai and Denford Munetsi - or who had assisted him in his belated escape from Zambia following the assassination of Herbert Chitepo - including Morgan Mhaka and Anderson Mhuru - and several other young ZANLA members - the most important of whom were Tonderai Nyikai and James Murinda. This odd assortment of allies was based on shared experiences and personal loyalty to Tongogara, rather than common ethnic affinity: four were Karanga; two Zezuru; one Ndebele; and one Korekore.

Those Dare and High Command members who were dissatisfied with Tongogara's leadership - Hamadziripi, Gumbo, Mudzi, Kangai, Chimurenga, Ndangana and Chimedza - joined together in a loose alliance with those ZIPA leaders and sympathisers who had not been arrested in January - including Gwauya, Mudende and Taderera. While this so-called

1. Ibid.

"dissident" group\(^1\) was drawn together by a common distrust and dislike of Tongogara and Nhongo, its members were almost all Karanga. A common threat and conflicting personal ambitions once again led to a heightening of ethnic consciousness.

The differences and rivalry between these two broad factions simmered during the rest of 1977, as each group sought to enhance its position at the expense of the other. Mugabe, endeavouring to restructure ZANU's shattered exile leadership and consolidate his newly won position, was, as Rugare Gumbo stated some years later, "...caught between two fires."\(^2\) Mugabe's response was to play faction against faction, and to introduce political "neutrals" into the Party's leadership hierarchies. Eventually, however, he was forced to take sides in the burgeoning power struggle.

An area of particular dispute between the "dissidents" and the Tongogara group, and later also with Mugabe, was the question of ZANU/ZAPU unity within the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front had been formed on 8 November 1976, just prior to the Geneva Conference. A ZANU publication in early 1977 described the Front as "...not a merger or a fusion; but a national united front with each movement maintaining its own identity, independence and initiative."\(^3\) The Patriotic Front was, in fact, nothing more than "...a tactical front for the purpose of presenting a common approach..." at Geneva.\(^4\) Following the failure of the

1. A name members of the group gained following their detention during 1977 and 1978.

2. Interview with Gumbo.


4. Ibid.
Geneva Conference some efforts were made to strengthen the Patriotic Front, and a Coordinating Committee was established to look into all aspects of the Front, particularly "...the re-organisation of ZIPA as a single national fighting force." ¹ Rugare Gumbo and Henry Hamadziripi, in particular, favoured unity within the Patriotic Front, as did some former ZIPA members.² In early 1980, following their release from detention in Mozambique, Gumbo and the other members of the "dissident" faction explained their position on unity:

...we called for the unity of all the national democratic forces in the country to fight against the common enemy. We called for the creation of a single national army embodied in the Zimbabwe Peoples Army... We called for genuine organic unity in the Patriotic Front as the first step towards national unity. It was on the basis of this crucial issue of national unity that we sharply disagreed with Robert Mugabe...³

In addition to Mugabe, Tongogara and Nhongo also strongly resisted a total unity with ZAPU, believing that it would lead to some diminution in their positions.


2. Interviews with Gumbo and Hamadziripi.

On 31 March and 1 April 1977 a joint meeting of ZANU's Central Committee and top military commanders was held at the group's headquarters in Mozambique.¹ At the meeting, chaired by Robert Mugabe, the old Central Committee was broadened to 30 members, not including those Central Committee members detained in Rhodesia.² The new Central Committee was headed by a 12-man National Executive Committee. Four new departments were created - Manpower Planning, Health, Education and Secretary to the Secretary General (in fact the senior security and intelligence position within the Party).


2. Enos Nkala (Treasurer-General), Maurice Nyagumbo (Deputy Secretary for Public Affairs), Francis Ngazimbi Musembure and Robert Marere (Chairman of the People's Movement).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Secretary General and Head of the Party</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Mzenda</td>
<td>Chief Political Organising Secretary</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Matuka Hamadziripi</td>
<td>Secretary for Manpower Planning</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Tekere</td>
<td>Administrative Secretary</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukudzei Mudzi</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugare Gumbo</td>
<td>Secretary for Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbirai Kangai</td>
<td>Secretary for Welfare, Logistics and Transport</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crispin Mandizvidza</td>
<td>Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Ushewokunze</td>
<td>Secretary for Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Kadungure</td>
<td>Secretary for Education</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cletos Chigowe</td>
<td>Secretary in the Office of the Secretary General</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meya Urimbo</td>
<td>Commissariat</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robson Manyika</td>
<td>Manpower Planning</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<td>Don Muvuti</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akim Mudende</td>
<td>External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzingai Mutumbuka</td>
<td>Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>Welfare, Logistics and Transport</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webster Gwauya</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidney Sekeramayi</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Tavarwisa</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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### Others Without Special Central Committee Functions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Gave</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Dauramanzi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuthbert Chimedza</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Josiah Tungamirai</td>
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<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry Makoni</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarudzai Chinamaropa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teurai Ropa Nhongo¹</td>
<td></td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray Musikavanhu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1. Teurai Ropa Nhongo was ZANLA Commander Rex Nhongo's wife. See "The first - and youngest", *op. cit.*
Because of the strains between the political and military hierarchies which had developed during the mid-1970s, and particularly because of the rapid development of ZIPA as a political as well as a military force, it was decided that a closer integration of the military into the Party's political structure was necessary. The old Dare structure was replaced, and the existing Central Committee and the Military High Command were merged into one "national Central Committee leadership concept",¹ which the Zimbabwe News described as "an historic and revolutionary departure from the traditional separate concepts of political and military leaderships".²

As a result, the new Central Committee was heavily weighted in favour of the military and "much weight was put on the military organs", in order to bring "about the integration of the fighters and the leadership which in turn helps consolidate the ideological unity of the party".³ Eleven members of the expanded 19-man Military High Command formed in early 1975, at the end of the Nhari rebellion, obtained positions in the new Central Committee: Tongogara, Nhongo, Urimbo, Manyika, Chauke, Gava, Dauramanzi, Chigowe, Chimedza, Tungamirai and Chinamaropa.⁴ In addition, three senior guerrilla commanders who had been closely involved with ZIPA were appointed to positions on the Central Committee: Mudende and Musikavanhu (both signatories of the Mgagao memorandum) and Gwauya. However, Ndangana, to

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Moyo and Seke had died in 1975 and 1976 respectively, while three others, Machingura, Hondo and Nyikadzinash, had been detained in January 1977.
the annoyance of the "dissidents", failed to gain a position in the Central Committee.

In an effort to strengthen his position, and weaken that of the other factions vying for power in ZANU, Mugabe appointed a number of fellow detainees to Central Committee positions. Mugabe, Mzenda and Tekere, all of whom had been National Executive members since 1964, regained senior Party positions. A fourth detainee, Crispin Mandizvidza, who had been a member of ZANU's first Central Committee in 1963, and who had been imprisoned between 1964 and 1968, became Secretary for Finance. Mugabe also introduced into the executive a number of new faces, men whose involvement with ZANU had begun only in the late 1960s or early 1970s, and who had virtually no experience with ZANU's exile guerrilla wing. Herbert Ushewokunze, Sidney Sekeramayi and Don Muvuti, all Zezuru, were amongst this group, as was Dzingai Mutumbuka, a Karanga. While Mugabe was generally able to draw on the support of these "imports" and fellow detainees to bolster his own position during the late 1970s, a number of them eventually came to identify closely with either the "dissident" group or the faction surrounding Tongogara and Nhongo.

A new Military High Command also seems to have been appointed at the Chimoio meeting. Mugabe assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief, somewhat diluting Tongogara's position as military supremo, and enabling Mugabe to assert greater control over military matters than had his predecessor Herbert Chitepo. The new High Command was roughly divided
between members of the "dissident" group and Tongogara/Nhongo supporters. Chimurenga's position highlighted the differences and problems between the two factions. Tongogara, realising Chimurenga's experience and his influence amongst the guerrilla cadres, wanted him posted to Angola as ZANU's Military Attache. However, Chimurenga declined the position and, in his own words, "...ended up coaching the Field Commanders".¹

**TABLE 27 ZANLA MILITARY HIGH COMMAND - 1977²**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meya Urimbo</td>
<td>Army Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Gava</td>
<td>Chief of Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dauramanzi</td>
<td>Chief of Training</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimedza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josia Ziso</td>
<td>Chief of Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Taderera</td>
<td>Deputy Army Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Mpunzarima</td>
<td>Deputy Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Mhaka</td>
<td>Deputy Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua</td>
<td>Deputy for Training</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misihairambwi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Baya</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson Mhuru</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander (Tete)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonderya Nyika</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander (Manica)</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Matanga</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander (Gava)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Chimurenga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Interview with Chimurenga
2. Ibid.
The new Central Committee and the High Command once again confirmed the Karanga domination of ZANU: twenty members of the Central Committee were Karanga; seven Zezuru; one Manyika; one Korekore; and one Shangaan. In the High Command there were eight Karanga, four Zezuru, one Korekore and one Ndebele. This domination was, however, illusory. The Karanga were divided amongst themselves, with a number supporting Tongogara against Hamadziripi, Gumbo and the "dissident" group.

Relations between Tongogara and the burgeoning "dissident" group continued to deteriorate following the March/April Central Committee meeting. The groups' leading figures - Rugare Gumbo, Henry Hamadziripi, Mukudzi Mudzi, Joseph Taderera, Cuthbert Chinedza, and Joseph Chimurenga - rejecting the use of force, decided that at the next meeting of the Central Committee an effort would be made to replace Tongogara as Secretary for Defence with Chimedza. However, in mid-August Chimedza and a fellow "dissident", Akim Mudende, died in a car crash in northern Mozambique. Tongogara, who was in the same car, was uninjured. Chimedza's death ended any chance the "dissidents" had of replacing Tongogara. Mysterious circumstances surrounding Chimedza's death, and an alleged cover up by Tongogara and Edgar Tekere, further infuriated the "dissident" group.¹

¹. Interviews with ZANU and ZANLA members in Salisbury, including Chimurenga, Gumbo and Gwauya. Also see "Tongogara death shock", op. cit.

². Ibid.
Just two weeks after Chimedza's death ZANU's new and enlarged Central Committee met for the first time at Chimoio.¹ The meeting examined the problems which had confronted the Party in the recent past and formulated policy on the prosecution of the armed struggle. The meeting was seen as a turning point for the Party and the Zimbabwe News remarked some months later that:

The Chimoio Central Committee meeting marked the final re-emergence of ZANU after the brutal, imperialist engineered 1974-1975 detente. It marked the final victory of ZANU stalwarts against elements that had sought to hijack the Party whose creation and development they neither understood nor had much to do with.²

Despite these reassuring words, Mugabe had only just begun purging the Party of rivals and potential rivals.

At the Chimoio meeting the number of Departments was increased from 12 to 15, necessitating the enlargement of the Central Committee from 30 to 33 members.³

1. Between 31 August and 8 September 1977.
2. "Comrade Mugabe lays the line at historic Chimoio Central Committee meeting", Zimbabwe News, (Maputo), July-December 1977, Vol. 9, Nos. 5 and 6, p. 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Mzenda</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Tekere</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukudzei Mudzi</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meya Urimbo</td>
<td>Chief Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugare Gumbo</td>
<td>Secretary for Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Kadungure</td>
<td>Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Matuku</td>
<td>Secretary for Manpower Planning and Labour</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamadziripili</td>
<td>Secretary for Welfare and Transport</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbirai Kangai</td>
<td>Secretary for Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Ushewokunze</td>
<td>Secretary for Education and Culture</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzingai Mutumbuka</td>
<td>Secretary for Production, Construction and Development</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crispin Mandizvidza</td>
<td>Secretary for Women's Affairs</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teurai Ropa Nhongo</td>
<td>Special Assistant in the Office of the President</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmerson Mnangagwa</td>
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**Deputies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don Muvuti</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webster Gwauya</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tungamirai</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Political Commissar</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddison Zvobgo</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Information and Publicity</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didymus Mutasa</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robson Manyika</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Manpower Planning and Labour</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Welfare and Transport</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidney Sekeramayi</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Tavarwisa</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Education</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Baya&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Production, Construction and Development</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Women's Affairs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Others Without Special Central Committee Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Gava</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Dauramanzi</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joshua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misihairambwi&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Makoni</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray Musikavanhu</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarudzai Chinamaropa</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
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</table>


2. The appointment of Misihairambwi was symbolically important - he was the first Ndebele to be appointed to ZANU's Central Committee since Enos Nkala during the early 1960s. As ZANU Chief of Training Misihairambwi was to play an important role during the next few years as ZANLA again examined the possibility of joint operations with ZIPRA.
The most important change to occur at the conference was Mugabe's formal usurpation of the presidency from Ndabaningi Sithole. Under ZANU's Constitution, the President could be elected only by a conference of all Party members. Mugabe's ability to gain the title was further evidence of his strengthened position and popularity. The position of other former detainees was also enhanced: Mzenda assumed the new Vice Presidential position; and Tekere that of the Secretary General. Didymus Mutasa and Eddison Zvobgo, fellow detainees with Mugabe, Tekere and Mzenda during the 1960s and early 1970s, also gained Central Committee positions.

Mugabe and Tongogara used the Chimoio meeting to dilute even further the strength of the "dissident" group within ZANU's Central Committee and High Command. The most surprising omission from the Central Committee was Cletos Chigowe, Secretary in the Office of the Secretary General, who had been implicated in the assassination of Herbert Chitepo and convicted of the murder of Edgar Madekurozwa. During the course of 1977, Chigowe had allied himself with the remaining ZIPA elements in ZANLA camps in Mozambique. He was replaced by Emmerson Mnangagwa, one of the first ZANLA members, who had been imprisoned between 1965 and 1974, after his infiltration into Rhodesia. Mnangagwa, like so many other senior ZANLA members - Chimurenga, Gwauya, Tungamirai and Mpunzarima - was related to Tongogara. Joseph Taderera, a member of the ZANLA Military High Command, Senior Political Commissar and former head of the Whampoa Political Academy at Chimoio, also lost his position within the Party.

1. Mutasa is related to Kumbirai Kangai. See Didymus Mutasa, Rhodesian Black Behind Bars, (London), 1974, for Mutasa's reminiscences about his time in detention and his relationship with Mugabe, particularly pp. 62 and 139.
2. Zvobgo had been elected ZANU Deputy Secretary General in 1964.
Taderera had been the grey eminence of the ZIPA group led by Machingura, and his purging, and that of Chigowe, were seen by the other "dissidents" as final proof that Mugabe was determined to rid the Party of all rivals.

* * * *

By late 1977, Mugabe had confirmed his position as Party leader and also managed to bring several colleagues and fellow detainees into the Central Committee. However, the rift between Tongogara and Nhongo and the "dissident" faction had widened. The continuing and acrimonious debate within ZANU about unity with ZAPU, coupled with the massive Rhodesian Security Force raids on ZANLA camps at Chimoio and Tembue in November 1977, finally brought the simmering division to a head.

During the second half of 1977, Rugare Gumbo, who had earlier been appointed to head a ZANU investigative committee enquiring into whether ZANLA cadres favoured unity with ZIPRA, staged a series of meetings and discussions in ZANLA camps throughout Mozambique. Gumbo believed he had the support of ZANLA, and the tone and nature of the meetings seem to have increasingly alarmed Mugabe and Tongogara. This perceived threat, together with the Rhodesian raids in November, and the subsequent ZANLA criticism of the Party's leaders, finally prompted Mugabe to take action against the "dissidents".

1. Up to 3000 ZANLA members may have been killed during these raids; interview with Rhodesian military authorities, Salisbury, December 1977.

The raids gave rise to allegations of inefficiency, complacency and corruption on the part of Mugabe, Tongogara, Nhongo and other leaders.¹ Two weeks after the raids, some ZANLA Central Committee, High Command and General Staff members met to discuss the problems facing the Party. The meeting made five demands on the Party's political leadership: the release of the ZIPA commanders; a Party Commission of Inquiry into the deaths of Chimedza and Mudende; a Commission of Inquiry into the raids on Chimoio and Tembue; a Commission of Inquiry into the Nhari rebellion and its suppression; and finally a Commission of Inquiry into the question of unity with ZAPU, and also into ZANLA's "poor military strategy".² These demands were, in effect, a direct attack on Mugabe's leadership and on the competency of Tongogara and his underlings.

By early 1978 Mugabe's patience with the "dissidents" had run out.³ On 8 January all those Central Committee members associated with the group were arrested: Rugare Gumbo; Henry Hamadziripi; Crispin Mandizvidza; Webster Gwauya; and Ray Musikavanhu. The remaining members of the group were now left with only one option, to seize control.

1. Interview with ZANLA members, Salisbury, February/March 1980.

2. Ibid.

On 28 January, while Mugabe and Tongogara were in Malta attending settlement talks with David Owen, Andrew Young and Joshua Nkomo, a group of ZANLA guerrillas, under the command of Joseph Taderera and Cletos Chigowe, attempted to kidnap Rex Nhongo, the senior military official in Tongogara's absence, Edgar Tekere, ZANU's senior political official in Mozambique at the time, and Herbert Ushewokunze. Nhongo escaped capture, however, and after several days of confusion the rebellion was put down by FRELIMO troops and Tekere and Ushewokunze were released. Those members of the "dissident" group not detained earlier in the month were now arrested: including Joseph Taderera; Cletos Chigowe; and Joseph Chimurenga. Mukudzei Mudzi was arrested following his return from Libya at the end of February.\(^1\) In addition, more than 100 members of the General Staff and ordinary ZANLA cadres were detained.\(^2\)

The January arrests were the most serious blow to ZANU's unity since the internecine battles of late 1974 and 1975. Hamadziripi, Mudzi, Gumbo and Chimurenga, in particular, were long-serving and popular members of

1. Kumbirai Kangai and Richard Hove were also detained for a short time, but were released after questioning.

ZANU. Hamadziripi had been a member of ZANU's National Executive since 1963, Mudzi a Dare member since 1969, and Gumbo since 1973, while Chimurenga had opened ZANLA's north-eastern offensive in 1971/72.

The vast majority of those arrested during early 1978, and in fact, all the senior personnel who were detained, were Karanga. Nevertheless, the reasons for Mugabe's purge of the "dissident" group seem to have been conflicting personal ambitions and the traditionally divisive issue of unity with ZAPU. Gumbo, Hamadziripi and their colleagues within the "dissident" group had sought to retain, and perhaps enhance, their positions within ZANU's political and military hierarchies. They had largely been responsible for moulding the inchoate ZANU of the mid-1960s into the strong guerrilla force of the 1970s, and they were unwilling to hand over their hard won authority to other ZANU and ZANLA members whose involvement in the development of the Party was, in their minds, superficial. While ethnicity was not the initial factor influencing the actions of the "dissidents", it became politically relevant at a second stage, when a perceived common threat led to a heightening of ethnic consciousness.
Towards Lancaster House

The worst is yet to come. ZANU has been battle-tested. The enemy can never now defeat us on the battlefield. We have as a Party, become worldly-wise, guided by our correct revolutionary line. We cannot be defeated by imperialism from without. ZANU can only defeat itself from within. This is the brutal truth.

(Zimbabwe News editorial, July-August 1978)

By mid-1978 Mugabe's control of ZANU was in no doubt: the ZIPA clique, led by Dzinashe Machingura, had been out manoeuvred and detained; and many of the politicians and guerrilla commanders who had directed ZANU's affairs during most of the Party's years in exile, and who had questioned Mugabe's right to lead ZANU, were also under arrest. With the support of several fellow detainees and new-comers, and a number of senior military commanders, Mugabe was able between 1978 and 1980 to build ZANLA into a large and effective fighting force.

In 1979 Mugabe once again re-organised ZANU's Central Committee and High Command, bringing more new members into the Party's executives to fill some of the vacancies left by the earlier purging of the "dissidents".


2. Some further unrest seems to have occurred in March 1978. Gideon Sithole, a relative of Ndabaningi Sithole, who defected from ZANU in July, for instance, later claimed that he had been arrested in March following disorders in the Party; see Holman, op. cit. In addition, on 28 November 1978, a ZANU office in Maputo was damaged and a Party member killed as a result of a parcel bomb explosion. While ZANU quickly blamed the Rhodesian Security Forces it is likely that the incident was connected with continuing internal dissension.


4. Interviews with Chimurenga and other ZANLA members in Salisbury, February/March 1980.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Mzenda</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Tekere</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Karanga (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meya Urimbo</td>
<td>Chief Political Commissor</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbirai Kangai</td>
<td>Secretary for Welfare and Transport</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Kadungure</td>
<td>Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Ushewokunze</td>
<td>Secretary for Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzingai Mutumbuka</td>
<td>Secretary for Education and Culture</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teurai Ropa Nhongo</td>
<td>Secretary for Women's Affairs</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmerson Mnangagwa</td>
<td>Special Assistant in the Office of the President</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Muvuti</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddison Zwobgo</td>
<td>Secretary for Information</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Hove</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tungamirai</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Political Commissor</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didymus Mutasa</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Finance</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robson Manyika</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Manpower Planning and Labour</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Welfare and Transport</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidney Sekeramayi</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Health</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Tavarwisa</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Education</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Gava</td>
<td>Chief of Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ndangana</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ndau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarudzai Chinamaropa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Misihairambwi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally Mugabe</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for Women's Affairs</td>
<td>Ghanaian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ethnic Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tongogara</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
<td>Karanga (Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex Nhongo</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Tungamirai</td>
<td>Arms Commissor</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Gava</td>
<td>Chief of Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Dauramanzi</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Misihairambwi</td>
<td>Chief of Training</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Mpunzarima</td>
<td>Chief of Personnel</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Chauke</td>
<td>Chief of Transport and Welfare</td>
<td>Shangaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denford Munetsi</td>
<td>Chief of Finance</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Chief of Health</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominic Chinenga</td>
<td>Deputy Army Commissor</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenny Ridzai</td>
<td>Deputy for Security and Intelligence</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Nhaka</td>
<td>Deputy for Logistics and Supplies</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnew Kambeu</td>
<td>Deputy for Training</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson Mhuru</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonderia Nyika</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinzwei Gorong[1]</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrings Shiri</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Murinda (Bonwell Masani)</td>
<td>Provincial Field Operations Commander</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twarai Tiponi</td>
<td>Secretary to Military High Command</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Khumalo</td>
<td>Military Attache in East Africa</td>
<td>Ndebele/Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edzai Mabhunu</td>
<td>Military Attache</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Tavarwisa</td>
<td>Chief of Education</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ndangana</td>
<td>Chief of Production, Construction and</td>
<td>Ndua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Gorongna was killed during a Rhodesian Security Force raid on a ZANLA camp in Tete during 1979, following his arrest sometime after the other "dissidents".
The internal fractures and internecine clashes of the mid and late 1970s had led to the re-moulding of the ZANU leadership, and although several of the Party's executive members from 1963 and 1964 retained senior positions, the continuity of leadership had generally been lost. By 1979, ZANU's Central Committee was dominated by men and women whose experience of ZANU was either quite recent, or with the Party's internal wing. Untainted by the factionalism of ZANU exile politics, and owing their positions largely to Mugabe's patronage, these new Central Committee members formed a strong base of support for Mugabe. Included amongst this group were Edgar Tekere, Simon Mzenda, Herbert Ushewokunze, Dzingai Mutumbuka, Emmerson Mnangagwa, Don Muvuti, Eddison Zvobgo, Didymus Mutasa, Sidney Sekeramayi and Mugabe's Ghanaian wife, Sally. While Mugabe seems to have chosen these ZANU members largely because of their academic qualifications, ethnicity may also have influenced his thinking - most members of this group were not Karanga. The detention of the ZIPA, and former Dare and High Command members during 1977 and 1978 had ended the Karanga domination of ZANU's political and military hierarchies which had come about during the 1973 Review Conference, and had been confirmed after the Nhari rebellion. By 1979, only Tongogara, Urimbo, Tungamirai, Dauramanzi and Mpunzarima remained in senior Party positions of the 16 Karanga who dominated the Dare and High Command in 1975.

1. See "Sally Mugabe one of three 'foreign' election candidates", Herald, 8 February 1980.
By 1979, ZANU's political and military executives were more evenly balanced, from the ethnic point of view, than at any time since the late 1960s. The Central Committee was composed of twelve Karanga, seven Zezuru, two Manyika, one Korekore, one Shangaan, one Ndau, one Ndebele and one Ghanaian. While the Military High Command consisted of nine Karanga, six Zezuru, two Ndebele, one Shangaan, one Ndau, one Korekore and two Ndebele. Although several fairly distinct factions, broadly corresponding to ethnic groups, continued to exist within the Party's leadership, these were of no concern until after the Lancaster House Conference and ZANU's subsequent assumption of power in Zimbabwe in April 1980.

* * * * *

The struggles and divisions which took place within ZANU between 1976 and 1980 were concerned with the question of power. Mugabe's assumption and consolidation of power and his ruthless purging of rivals, were prompted by his desire to re-establish a strong leadership structure in ZANU following the vacuum produced by the "detente exercise" and Chitepo's assassination, but also by a quest for personal political power. To gain and hold power, Mugabe manipulated the membership of ZANU's political and military executives, and played faction against faction. However, instead of drawing on ethnic support, Mugabe sought to introduce into the Party "outsiders" who owed their positions, and hence their loyalty, to him. Under Mugabe, ZANU's leadership was
highly collective and, in line with Shona traditions of consensual decision-making, Mugabe seldom sought to impose his will against the majority of the Central Committee.

The detention of the ZIPA Military Committee by Mugabe, in alliance with Nhongo and the recently released members of the Dare and High Command, was designed to rid the Party of a powerful group of rivals, whose plans amounted to the dismantling of ZANU. Ethnicity was neither a cause of the ZIPA experiment, nor a factor in its ultimate demise.

The increasing differences and strains which developed during 1977 between the "dissident" faction and Tongogara's group also concerned a struggle for power, as well as differences about tactics and strategy, including the role of the Patriotic Front. The "dissident" group, thrown together by a common fear and hatred of Tongogara, was composed almost entirely of Karanga. As had occurred during previous conflicts within the Rhodesian nationalist movement, threatened political and military leaders sought and received support from members of their own ethnic group. An examination of the membership of ZANU's Central Committee and Military High Command following each of the major rifts and purgings that occurred during this period shows that the dismissals were made along ethnic lines.

By the time of the Lancaster House Conference in late 1979, Mugabe's control of ZANU was unquestioned, and the membership of the Party's two executive bodies, the Central Committee and the High Command, were generally well balanced between the various Shona sub-groups.
CHAPTER VII

NKOMO - "PUT YOUR TRIBES IN YOUR POCKET": 1977-1980

Between 1977 and 1980, while Robert Mugabe was purging ZANU's political and military hierarchies, Joshua Nkomo was rebuilding his Party and his armed forces. As in ZANU the flirtation with the "detente exercise" and the ZIPA experiment had allowed the formation of rival cliques. The question of unity within the Patriotic Front, much favoured by Nkomo and other ZAPU political leaders, was of particular concern to those ZIPRA commanders and members who had suffered at the hands of ZANLA while the two guerrilla armies were "united" in ZIPA. This concern, coupled with severe administration problems which arose in ZIPRA as it expanded in size during the late 1970s, led to a rift between ZAPU's political and military wings. Most of the ZIPRA High Command members who had been involved in the ZIPA Military Committee were Shona, and as the rift developed it came to assume an ethnic dimension, with the Kalanga/Ndebele in ZAPU's military and political wings opposed to the Shona members of the High Command.

Rebuilding ZAPU in Exile

During late 1975 and 1976, following the collapse of the "unified" ANC, Joshua Nkomo held a series of meetings with the Rhodesian Government, and later with British and American officials. Nkomo concentrated on efforts to
find a negotiated settlement and had little contact with, or control over, ZAPU's guerrilla forces. In April 1976, in a belated effort to reassert his authority, Nkomo appointed Jason Moyo second Vice President of ZAPU in charge of External Affairs. Moyo's appointment gave him full powers to deal with "military affairs" as chairman of the Party's external mission. Together with George Silundika and Edward Ndhlovu, Moyo had endeavoured to retain the links between ZIPRA and the ZAPU political leadership. ZIPRA leaders such as John Dube, Alfred Mangena, Tshinga Dube, Ambrose Mutiniri, Gordon Munyanyi and Report Mpoko, while associated with the ZIPA experiment, had also remained loyal to Nkomo. In late 1976, following the disintegration of ZIPA's "joint guerrilla command", and the return of ZIPA forces to Zambia from Mozambique and Tanzania, Moyo and ZIPRA's High Command members began to rebuild ZAPU's guerrilla army.

The High Command which was re-established in Lusaka was composed mainly of those ZIPRA commanders who had held positions on the ZIPA Military Committee, and was broadly balanced between Kalanga/Ndebele and Shona members:

1. ZAPU was at the time referring to itself as the African National Council (Zimbabwe).

### TABLE 31

**ZIPRA MILITARY HIGH COMMAND - LATE 1976 AND EARLY 1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfred &quot;Nikita&quot; Mangena</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrose Mutiniri</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Dube</td>
<td>Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lookout Masuku</td>
<td>Army Commissar</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Venda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassius Moyo</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshinga Dube</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Operations</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Mpoko</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Shona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Munyanyi</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Shona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enoch Tshangani</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FNU) Sebele</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FNU) Nyathi</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In October 1976 Nkomo, still based in Salisbury and hoping for a negotiated settlement, reorganised ZAPU's Central Committee. The new executive was composed of a mixture of former ZAPU (PCC) National Executive members (1963), senior exile leaders who had directed the armed struggle since 1964, former ZAPU officials who had not previously held senior Party positions, and a number of defectors from Abel Muzorewa's original ANC. Following the precedent set by the 1963 ZAPU (PCC) Executive

1. Interviews in Salisbury, February and March 1980, with ZANLA members.

2. The Central Committee had last been reorganised in September 1976, when Nkomo had broken-away from the "unified" ANC; see "Central and National Executive Members: Democratic Choice of the Masses", The Zimbabwe Review, (Lusaka), Vol. 5, No. 1, January/February 1976, pp. 13 and 14.
the Central Committee represented an alliance between the Zezuru, Kalanga/Ndebele and Ndebele. Of those members who can be identified, there were ten Kalanga/Ndebele, one Ndebele, eight Zezuru, five members from other Shona sub-groups, two Xhosa and one Asian. The traditional alliance between the Kalanga/Ndebele, Ndebele and Zezuru, which had not existed in ZAPU's exiled political hierarchy since Chikerema's defection five years earlier, was resumed.

TABLE 32 ZAPU CENTRAL COMMITTEE - OCTOBER 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Nkono</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Chinamano</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Msika</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Zezuru (Shangaan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Musarurwa</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariston Chambati</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Moyo</td>
<td>2nd Vice President</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Munodawafa</td>
<td>National Chairman</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Silundika</td>
<td>Secretary for Information (External)</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clement Muchachi</td>
<td>Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Madzimbamuto</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for External Affairs</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephas Msipa</td>
<td>Secretary for Education</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Kona</td>
<td>Vice National Chairman</td>
<td>Fingo/Xhosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callistus Ndlovu</td>
<td>Representative in the United States</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Adapted from Cary and Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 270 and 271. Mehta filled the position left vacant after the death of William Mukarati in August 1976. The position of National Organising Secretary, held by Lazarus Nkala since 1963, was left vacant. Nkala had been killed in a road accident in December 1975.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amon Jirira</td>
<td>Treasurer General</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumantrai Mehta</td>
<td>Acting Vice Treasurer</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Ndhlovu</td>
<td>External Administration</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenjine Lesabe</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for Education</td>
<td>Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Kahari</td>
<td>Vice Publicity Secretary</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Chinamano</td>
<td>Secretary for Women</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvester Bgoni</td>
<td>Secretary for Presidential Affairs</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Mangwende</td>
<td>Secretary for Chiefs &amp; Affairs</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary for Youth</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary for Defence &amp; Legal Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Dube</td>
<td>Secretary for Political Education</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clement Moyo</td>
<td>Vice National Organising Secretary (4th)</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrator for ANC Property</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elias Hananda</td>
<td>National Organising Secretary</td>
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<td>M. Makuwarara</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for Women</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Padzakashamba</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for Defence &amp; Legal Affairs</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. Takundwa</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for Youth</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munetsi Nziramasanga</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary (3rd)</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Dhlomo</td>
<td>Secretary for Youth (Women)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Marembo</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for Political Education</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Ndabambi</td>
<td>Secretary for Welfare</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Mpofu</td>
<td>Vice Secretary for Welfare</td>
<td>Kalanga/ Ndebele</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trouble in ZIPRA

Following the failure of the Geneva Conference, Nkomo decided that the guerrilla war had to be resumed. He returned to Lusaka in January 1977, where he re-established ZAPU's headquarters. ZIPRA, after years of neglect and months of brutalisation within ZIPA, was disorganised and dispirited. Nkomo was inexperienced in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare and relied on the handful of Central Committee members who had led ZAPU in exile - Moyo, Silundika and Ndhlovu - and on the remnants of ZIPRA's High Command, to rebuild ZAPU's armed forces. The deaths in early 1977 of Jason Moyo and John Dube were serious blows to Nkomo's plans, and in the longer-term the loss of these two able and experienced Kalanga/Ndebele guerrilla leaders enabled the development within ZIPRA of a strong grouping, based around the Shona, which was opposed to Nkomo's policies and leadership.

Moyo was killed by a parcel bomb on 22 January 1977, following his return to Lusaka from the Maputo Conference which formalised the establishment of the Patriotic Front.¹ His assassins were never identified, but it is likely that they belonged to a disgruntled faction within ZAPU angered by his role in establishing ZIPA and also the Patriotic Front.² The killing of ZIPRA cadres in ZIPA camps


2. Moyo's death was a severe blow to the development of the Patriotic Front. ZANU's political and military wings had established a good working relationship with Moyo during the early days of ZIPA. This was not the case with most other ZAPU political and military leaders, whom they generally distrusted.
in Tanzania and Mozambique and during joint operations in Rhodesia during the ZIPA experiment had angered many ZIPRA members and commanders. Of central importance within this faction were several of the ZIPRA members of the ZIPA Military Committee - Alfred Mangena, Gordon Munyanyi, Ambrose Mutiniri and Report Mpoko - all of whom were Shona. John Dube, the experienced and respected ZIPRA Chief of Operations, who may have been able to play a moderating role within the guerrilla hierarchy, died of natural causes in Nigeria just a month after Moyo's death.¹

Immediately prior to Nkomo's return to Lusaka, Moyo had launched a massive recruiting campaign in western and south-western Rhodesia, in a concerted effort to enlarge ZAPU's small and dispirited guerrilla force:

Come and be one of Mr Nkomo's soldiers, so he has an army after independence.

We want no people from ZANU...only people who will fight for Nkomo.²

Eventually tens of thousands of blacks from western Rhodesia joined Nkomo's army, some willingly, others by coercion.³

³. During late 1975 and most of 1976, only about 600 blacks in the Matabeleland area left Rhodesia for guerrilla training. During December 1976 and January 1977, however, about 1,000 blacks were abducted or recruited. This trend continued during the rest of 1977 and 1978. For an account of the largest "abduction" see Nicholas Ashford, "349 school children wait to hear if they are to join Nkomo's guerrillas", The Times, (London), 19 February 1977.
By 1980 ZIPRA numbered about 20,000 armed and trained guerrillas.

The rapid growth of ZIPRA during the late 1970s led to serious administrative problems, similar to those which occurred in ZANLA during the early stages of the north-eastern offensive. Young black Rhodesians, keen to fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe, and awaiting training, were housed for months in isolated holding camps, often without adequate supplies of food and water and without supervision.

Anger and frustration, caused by the ineptness of ZIPRA's overburdened administration, led to morale and discipline problems in many camps in Zambia. The destruction of Party property, and fighting between different factions became common place during 1977. In August, in the most significant clash so far, the ZAPU headquarters, a three-building complex situated in a residential area of Lusaka, came under attack from small arms fire.

In early October Nkomo, in a speech opening an annual conference of Party "militants", attempted to defuse the explosive situation that had developed within ZIPRA. Nkomo admitted that the "'phenomenal growth'" of ZIPRA had brought

...correspondingly numerous problems... The transporting of manpower for recruitment to training centres is now one of our major problems. I know that this has brought about frustration to some of us who have found themselves (sic) in transit camps for several months... We have also had food problems... It is not our wish, comrades, that we should live on sadza and beans, but, as you know, we are not a government. 1

Finally Nkomo warned the "militants" against "tribalistic-tendencies":

The imperialists are trying to pit one section of our people against another. They are trying to foster a tribal division among us. We must never allow this to succeed. ZAPU has never been a tribal organisation. Those who have "tribal tendencies" must get out of ZAPU forthwith... We have, as a party, survived a period during which people were whipped up at "tribal" lines. The attempt failed. It must never succeed. 1

Nkomo's pleas did nothing to quell the disquiet within ZIPRA, and in late December 1977, two further attacks, on consecutive days, were made against ZAPU offices in Lusaka. 2 Some reports claimed that the attackers were members of a rebellious group of ZAPU guerrillas encouraged by ZIPRA commander Alfred "Nikita" Mangena. To quash these rumours, Nkomo held a press conference a few days after the incidents, and introduced a smiling and waving Mangena, claiming that this proved that there was no rift within the Party. 3 Yet, in an indirect acknowledgement that ZAPU was seriously divided along ethnic lines, Nkomo once again attacked "tribalism" within the Party:

1. Ibid., p.5.


There is no such thing as Ndebeles and Kalangas. Once upon a time there were various groups but they became one under one name, known as Ndebele. There is no such thing as Ndebele, it doesn't exist. As much there is no such tribe as Shona, some confused people think Ndebele and Shona are two tribes. We are one intact organisation. We don't think of tribes in Zimbabwe. Put your tribes in your pocket. 1

In March 1978, in a continuation of the internecine rivalry that had occurred during the previous year, an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate Mangena. Mangena suffered multiple bullet wounds and lost a finger in the attack, which took place at a ZIPRA camp about 30 kilometres north of Lusaka. He subsequently received medical treatment in the Soviet Union. 2 A number of Party members were later executed for the attempted assassination. 3

Some months later, in June 1978, Mangena was killed when his land-rover hit a land-mine near Kabanga mission in south-eastern Zambia. Despite allegations that his death was the result of intra-Party factionalism, 4 it seems that the land-mine had in fact been recently laid by the Rhodesian Security Forces, who were beginning to operate on an almost continuous basis on the Zambian side of the Zambezi.

1. "ZAPU rivalry denied", op. cit.
2. Pintak, op. cit., and Holman, op. cit.
Nkomo used Mangena's death to make extensive personnel changes, and to undertake a thorough reorganisation of ZAPU's armed wing and of those Party organs involved with directing the war effort. In his effort to surround himself with people loyal to himself, Nkomo appointed mostly Kalanga/Ndebele to senior Party positions, to the detriment of the Shona, most of whom were Zezuru. For instance, Nkomo overlooked Mangena's second-in-command, Ambrose Mutiniri, a Zezuru, and appointed Lookout Masuku, a Kalanga/Ndebele, to the key position of ZIPRA Commander. In ZAPU's intelligence branch, the National Security Organisation (NSO), the Kalanga/Ndebele were also dominant by mid-1978. The NSO leadership consisted of Dumiso Dabengwa, Akim Ndlovu and Amos Ngwenya - all Kalanga/Ndebele.

Nkomo's most important change, and one which clearly shows his increasing reliance on the Kalanga/Ndebele, was the establishment of a War Council, to allow him more direct control over ZIPRA and the conduct of the war.

**TABLE 33 ZAPU WAR COUNCIL - JUNE 1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Nkomo</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumiso Dabengwa</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akim Ndlovu</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Kalanga/Ndebele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Munodawafa</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increasing importance of the Kalanga/Ndebele over the Shona was also evident within ZAPU's political wing. Although a number of the former detainees who were Shona, such as Samuel Munodawafa, Joseph Msika and Daniel Madzimbamuto, remained close to Nkomo, their influence was dissipated by the growing importance of Kalanga/Ndebele such as George Silundika, John Nkomo and Stephen Nkomo¹ (Joshua's brother). According to one report, during early 1979 Nkomo was beginning to lose touch with several senior Zezuru in the Party with whom he had been close in the past, including Josiah Chinamano (Vice President), Ariston Chambati (Vice Secretary General), and Willie Musarurwa (Publicity Secretary).²

Disaffection within ZIPRA was aggravated between late 1978 and 1980 by a series of large-scale Rhodesian cross-border operations on ZAPU camps and facilities. The raids, which began in October 1978, seriously disrupted ZAPU's plans to infiltrate increasing numbers of guerrillas into Rhodesia. However, the most important area of friction between the ZIPRA leadership and the Party's political leaders continued to be the contentious question of unity with ZANU in the Patriotic Front.

The clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres which had accompanied the formation of the ZIPA"joint guerrilla command" had embittered relations between members of the two

1. Ibid.; "Zimbabwe Rhodesia: Nkomo's isolation", op. cit., p. 2; "Rhodesia: Diplomatic acrobatics", op. cit., pp. 1-3; "Obituary: Alfred 'Nikita' Mangena", op. cit., p. 29; and "Nkomo's address at funeral of Mangena", op. cit.

groups, and the separation of the two guerrilla armies had failed to stop clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres. In late 1977, and increasingly during 1978 and 1979, ZANLA cadres, operating from bases in Mozambique, began to move into south-western Rhodesia, an area populated mainly by Kalanga/Ndebele and Ndebele, and traditionally of ZAPU-orientation. According to Security Force spokesmen ZANLA was attempting to get as far as Plumtree on the border with Botswana.¹ As a result, clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces began to take place, particularly in the Maranda, Belingwe and Glass Block Tribal Trust Lands.² By 1979, such clashes were taking place in many other regions, as competing ZIPRA and ZANLA forces came into contact.

Some elements within both ZAPU and ZANU were strongly opposed to the strengthening of the Patriotic Front alliance. In ZANU the question of unity with ZAPU eventually provoked a further division in the leadership and the purging of many senior and long-standing members. In ZAPU the effect was less devastating, although resulting in a purging of the ZIPRA leadership, and a consequent strengthening of the position of the Kalanga/Ndebele.

1. "'We're winning' says security forces HQ", Rhodesia Herald, 11 October 1977; and "Nkomo's men abduct more than 100", Rhodesia Herald, 20 November 1977.

The question of unity eventually came to a head following a meeting in Addis Ababa of the Patriotic Front's "joint executive committee" in May 1979. The meeting led to the general strengthening of the Front: a Patriotic Front constitution was completed and adopted; and several joint councils, including a Defence Council "...for the purpose of enhancing the war effort...", and a Joint Operational Command, established to improve military cooperation between ZIPRA and ZANLA.¹

On his return from Addis Ababa Nkomo again reshuffled the Party's military leaders, many of whom had consistently opposed the concept of the Patriotic Front. Ambrose Mutiniri, Report Mpoko, and Gordon Munyanyi were demoted from the High Command and appointed ZAPU foreign representatives. All three were Shona, and all had been members of the ZIPA Military Committee. Following the reorganisation, the High Command was composed entirely of Kalanga/Ndebele and Ndebele.

By mid-1979 the strains and ethnic rivalries within ZAPU's military and political hierarchies seem to have reached dangerous proportions. It is possible that a serious rift, similar to that which beset ZAPU in 1970/71, was only averted by the preoccupation of ZAPU leaders at the Lancaster House settlement negotiations during the second half of the year. The different circumstances of involved political negotiation diverted the attention of the Party's emerging ethnic factions.

from their own ambitions and rivalries, and focused attention on the greater prize of political power in a liberated Zimbabwe.

* * * * *

The divisions and internecine clashes within ZAPU, which erupted between 1977 and 1980, largely concerned differences of opinion about unity with ZANU in the Patriotic Front. Other factors, including Joshua Nkomo's efforts to assert and consolidate his control over ZAPU's exiled guerrilla wing, and problems associated with the massive and rapid growth of the Party's armed wing, fuelled dissension within ZAPU. As the crisis in the Party worsened, the rift largely developed into a struggle between two ethnic groups - the Shona and the Ndebele. By mid-1979, the ethnic balance within ZAPU's executive bodies, which Nkomo had re-imposed following his release from detention in 1974, was again breaking down. The High Command, in particular, was dominated by Kalanga/Ndebele, while this ethnic group was also exerting increasing influence over the formulation of political decisions. The further development of this division was only halted by the Lancaster House Conference and by the subsequent general elections in Rhodesia in early 1980, which brought about Zimbabwe's liberation after 14 years of spasmodic and often ineffective guerrilla warfare.
CONCLUSION

The thesis has shown that division within and between the Rhodesian guerrilla groups was caused by a great number of factors including differences over strategy, tactics and ideology, disputes between guerrilla cadres and their leaders, interference by interested states (particularly from so-called host-countries), personal ambition, and ethnic rivalry and animosity. While rarely the initial cause of division, ethnicity was an important, often decisive, factor, once fractures had appeared. In times of organisational crisis, or personal threat, guerrilla leaders used ethnic ties to elicit support in order to obtain or retain personal political power. Subsequently the victorious guerrilla leader distributed promotions along ethnic lines; after almost every major division the ethnic group of the leader whose faction emerged victorious received disproportionate promotion within the groups' military and political hierarchies. At times of organisational stability, however, ethnicity was not politically relevant, and individuals from various ethnic groups were often appointed to senior political and military positions. Ethnicity was therefore situational rather than ascriptive.

The polarisation of voting along ethnic lines which occurred during the Rhodesian general elections in February 1980 revealed the situational character of ethnicity on a national scale. Rhodesia's three million black voters were not just voting for the Party which was most likely to bring peace, as some commentators have
suggested\textsuperscript{1}, nor was the voting greatly influenced by the
different platforms and policies of the various groups.
Of primary importance was who would rule Zimbabwe - the
Shona or their traditional rivals the Ndebele. Despite
the presence of a large number of Shona in ZAPU's political
hierarchy, Nkomo's nationalist credentials and his consistent
appeal to national unity during the elections, ZAPU was
seen by the Shona as a party of the Ndebele, led by a
Ndebele.\textsuperscript{2} The perceived importance of the elections prompted
the related, but often rival, Shona sub-groups to vote as
a bloc for ZANU, and the Ndebele to vote for ZAPU.

Of ZANU's 57 seats it won 56 in the predominantly
Shona constituencies of Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East,
Mashonaland Central, Manicaland and Midlands. Despite the
existence of a number of political parties which were based
on, and appealed to, sub-groups of the Shona - such as
James Chikerema's Zimbabwe Democratic Party, which sought
Zezuru support, and the Karanga-orientated National Democratic
Party - the elections united the Shona against the Ndebele.
For the present, the second tier of ethnicity - rivalry
between the Shona sub-groups - was subsumed by the perceived
threat of Ndebele domination. Although ZAPU presented itself
as a party of all people of Zimbabwe, it won all but five of
its 20 seats in the Ndebele-dominated constituencies of

\textsuperscript{1} See, for instance, Douglas G. Anglin, "Zimbabwe:

Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. Elsewhere the Party fared badly, even though Nkomo's presence in the Midlands enabled ZAPU to make a limited breakout from its western heartland. Even in the Salisbury constituency of Mashonaland East, where only two months earlier Nkomo had been welcomed by about 100,000 enthusiastic supporters, ZAPU failed to win a seat and secured only 30,000 votes.

Although ZANU and ZAPU had fought the elections separately, just as they had fought the guerrilla war, the election result was heralded as a victory for the Patriotic Front. Both Mugabe and Nkomo were aware of the implications of the ethnic polarisation which had occurred at the elections, and both attempted to paper over the problem with references to the enduring unity of the Patriotic Front. On 4 March, for instance, Robert Mugabe, ZANU President and Prime Minister-elect, began his first press conference after the announcement of ZANU's victory with the following statement:

We fought the elections separately but the results go to both the components of the Patriotic Front. It is a victory for the Patriotic Front as a whole. People committed to genuine independence have had the opportunity to prove to the world their allegiance to the patriotic forces. It is a moment of joy for the Patriotic Front.

1. For electoral purposes both ZAPU and ZANU changed their names for the election. ZAPU, hoping to win votes by advertising its commitment to unity, called itself the Patriotic Front. (It was more commonly referred to as PF (ZAPU)). ZANU called itself ZANU (PF), to differentiate it from Sithole's ZANU party. For the sake of clarity and simplicity the two guerrilla groups will be referred to by their traditional titles - ZAPU and ZANU.

The same morning Joshua Nkomo began his press conference in similar vein:

Even if we have won as separate parties, it is the Patriotic Front which has emerged. We fought for Zimbabwe. Finally we have Zimbabwe. 1

Despite these and subsequent statements of fraternity and unity, the organisational, personal, ideological and ethnic differences and animosities which had divided the guerrilla groups in exile for so long followed them into government.

Mugabe's selection of ministers confirmed the continuing importance of organisational and ethnic division. Although his stated aim was to establish a government of "national reconciliation", bringing together the major political and ethnic elements within Zimbabwe, the cabinet he announced in early March was dominated by ZANU, and contained only three Ndebele and two whites. The rest of the 22 ministers were Shona: eight Karanga; six Zezuru; two Manyika; and one Korekore. The Shona continued to dominate nationalist politics as they had done since the mid-1960s.

Following the elections power rested not only with the Shona and with ZANU, but more particularly with Mugabe and the group of Party members he had brought into exile during the previous few years. Very few ministers and deputy ministers could claim any deep involvement in the establishment and administration of the guerrilla armies, or in the planning and execution of the war. Many of the men and women in power in Salisbury in 1980 were virtually

unknown to most of the population (black and white), or to many of the guerrilla cadres who they claimed to lead and represent. Mugabe's purge of ZANU's original exile politicians and guerrilla commanders, which had begun in Mozambique in 1976, was now virtually complete.

Most of the ministers in Mugabe's first cabinet fell into two broad categories: first, long-time nationalists like Mugabe, who had spent most of the last 15 years in detention and only a few years in exile with the guerrillas; and second, younger and often better educated men and women whose involvement in the nationalist movement had begun at about the time of the Pearce Commission in 1971, and who were generally recruited into Mugabe's exiled ZANU leadership or the new government from academic institutions in the United States or Britain. In the ranks of the new government there were few who had served their nationalist apprenticeship in the guerrilla armies which ZANU and ZAPU had established in the mid-1960s. The original guerrilla leaders, such as James Chikerema, Jason Moyo, Noel Mukono, Joseph Chimurenga and Josiah Tongogara had been purged, assassinated or had died in "mysterious" circumstances. However, the political eclipse of the "militants" may prove to be only temporary. They are not without influence in the guerrilla armies of ZANU and ZAPU, and are likely to remain a thorn in Mugabe's side even after the guerrillas have finally been integrated into the National Army.

The divisions which had plagued relations between the Rhodesian guerrilla groups throughout the 1960s and 1970s continued after independence: ZANU and ZAPU government ministers traded insults; rival Party publications wrote
disparagingly of each other's objective and ambitions; and clashes between Party members and between former ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas occurred regularly. This constant bickering and sniping eventually culminated in widespread and bloody clashes in Bulawayo in November 1980 and February 1981, which brought Zimbabwe to the verge of civil war.

These clashes, and the intrigue and infighting which characterised Zimbabwean politics during the first year of independence, had their origin not only in the usual competition between political rivals and in the long and bitter history of struggle between ZANU and ZAPU. Of greater importance was the fact that ZANU's overwhelming electoral victory was brought about by the virtually unanimous support of the Shona. To ZAPU, and the Ndebele generally, what they always feared had come to pass - the Shona were in power, and in the tradition of African politics, the losers were likely to remain in the political wilderness forever.

Following the elections ethnicity has appeared to be relevant on only one tier - Shona/Ndebele. Indeed, the defection of Shona members from Muzorewa's United African National Council, ZANU (Sithole) and ZAPU to ZANU during the past year has created the appearance of growing unity amongst the Shona sub-groups. Mugabe's strong leadership, and his desire, and that of most of his colleagues, to establish a stable and economically strong Zimbabwe has also produced a period of general organisational calm within ZANU. However, the present low saliency of ethnicity amongst the Shona sub-groups in ZANU should not be misunderstood. The experience
of ZANU and ZAPU during the guerrilla war shows that the
political relevance of ethnicity waxes and wanes. In view
of ZANU's history of factionalism it is reasonable to assume
that as Zimbabwe emerges from the present post-independence
honeymoon period ethnic divisions amongst the Shona will
again become important. Several factions based to some
extent on the Karanga, Zezuru and Manyika have already begun
to develop within the Party's Central Committee. In times
of difficulty or crisis ethnic divisions are again likely
to become politically relevant, as Party leaders turn to
members of their own ethnic group for support.

During their almost two decades in exile the
Rhodesian guerrilla groups suffered from a series of
divisions and internecine conflict which affected their
military capability, angered their hosts and detracted from
their claims to represent Rhodesia's black majority.
During these frequent periods of inter-party conflict and
internal crisis ethnicity - both Ndebele/Shona rivalry
and between the sub-groups of the Shona - often served to
exacerbate division, as threatened political and military
leaders sought to protect or enhance their position by
drawing on support from their own ethnic group. While the
politics of government may in many ways prove to be
different to the politics of exile and guerrilla warfare,
the ethnic factor seems bound to remain important.
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