AMERICAN POLICY AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE NATIONALIST CHINA: A SURVEY OF MAJOR AMERICAN HISTORICAL LITERATURE OF CHINA'S CIVIL WAR

By

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DECLARATION

Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work.

Xiao Lu
August, 1987
Dedicated to my parents
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INTRODUCTION

As a so-called Old China Hand, I would suggest to the new administration that it study with great sincerity of purpose the idea that we "lost" China. It has been a phony idea all along peddled by the China Lobby. Let's drop it. Then and only then can the administration ... begin to evolve and pursue an objective and, we hope, effective policy regarding China.¹

When John Carter Vincent gave this unsolicited advice to the Eisenhower administration in 1953, he had already been forced to resign from the Foreign Service by McCarthyism. It was no casual remark. Few other people in the American diplomatic history could have had such genuine understanding and penetrating insight into Chinese political realities. Not surprisingly, however, instead of dropping the idea of the "loss" of China, the American policy-makers dropped Vincent, a conspicuous blunder for which the United States would pay dearly in the days to come.

In retrospect, John Vincent's informed comment touched upon an issue in Sino-American relations which was bound to be controversial in

the following three decades: what led to the Communists' takeover in 1949 and the subsequent hostility between China and the United States?

Like any momentous event, the downfall of Nationalist China and the establishment of the People's Republic has given rise to a host of historical explanations. Few incidents in diplomatic history have received more attention, with hundreds of works published which seem to have exhausted almost every piece of available information.

With great seriousness and profound insight, most of the academic writing on Sino-American relations between 1944 and 1949 has focused on investigating the role of United States policy in the "loss" of China. In spite of the fact that all the irresistible forces working towards the downfall of Nationalist China have been examined in great detail including rising Chinese popular discontent leading to national paralysis; economic and social decay within China; rampant and ruinous inflation; reliance by Chiang Kai-shek on cliques of trusted but selfish supporters; Russia's covert connection with the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) and the long-term unwavering struggles of the CCP, the focus has almost always been on the White House, with ample philippic and recrimination.

As journalists, historians, political scientists and other academics all exert influence on the general public with their views, the literature concerning the "loss" of China understandably had an impact far beyond mere historiographical significance. One of the most notorious consequences of it was the dismissal from the American Foreign Service of some of its most brilliant diplomats, in particular John Paton Davies, John S. Service and John Carter Vincent, for allegedly sympathizing with communism and knowingly laying the basis for Mao's victory. An extreme example of the absurdity of this episode in American political history was
Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack on the loyalty of Secretaries Marshall and Acheson.¹

A more destructive role of the idea, however, was in prompting the United States into its two biggest military involvements since the end of the Second World War. In 1950, the United States plunged itself into the military conflict at the Korean peninsular, an escalation which was considered by General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as involving the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy".² Hardly had the Americans washed their hands of it than they found themselves trapped in the jungles of Indo-china, engaging in another bloodshed of no less tragic consequences.

It hardly needs emphasizing that East Asia was then a strategic theater of secondary concern only to the United States. Europe was the region of highest priority. The prospect of Soviet armies sweeping across Europe strained Western nerves sufficiently to deter any post-war American administration from slackening the pace of NATO's military build-up. Another focus of attention was the protection of the Mediterranean and the Arab oil states. In view of this, to be tied up in prolonged wars in Korea and Vietnam must have put the White House incumbents on the horns of a dilemma.

Among the many causes of going through the two tragic wars, certain "lessons in history", especially that of Munich in 1938 and of the "loss" of China in 1949 played a role. The desire to check the advance of communism and show the determination to restore American prestige and

¹See Page 13
credibility left no room for other alternatives. In a sense, the wars in Korea and Indo-china were an extension of the enmity and hatred between Communist China and anti-communist America.

Though it is unanimously agreed that the American failure in China had chronic and inimical repercussions on the subsequent disorientation of US policies in Asia, there has been no concurrence on exactly where the damage was done. Anthony Kubek argued that "[w]hen the United States unwittingly assisted the wrong side in gaining control of China proper, Korea and Vietnam became inevitable involvements."¹ Though sharing the remorse for America's consecutive setbacks, John S. Service, a former American diplomat in China, was not echoing Kubek when he said, "If the United States had been able in 1945 to shed some of its illusions about China, to understand what was happening in that country, and to adopt a realistic policy in America's own interests, Korea and Vietnam would probably never have happened."²

There is nothing wrong with critics laying the blame on demonstrable reasons for failure and most of the reproachful views are in fact quite justified. What should be guarded against is giving vent to frustration and anger in ways which block a broader perspective and result in rash conclusions.

It is the intent of this sub-thesis to examine the contending themes of American scholars of United States-China relations in the period of 1944-49 and endeavor to establish that what happened in China in those years was largely motivated, propelled and determined by social and

political movements in China. The outcome was beyond the control of the United States and the "loss of China" has been a misguided concept.

With this aim, Chapter I reconstructs the context which provoked competing ideas and disparate interpretations of American China policy. In the interests of brevity, the selection of historical facts is confined to controversial issues pertaining to the "loss-of-China theory".

By reviewing the documentation related to this theory, Chapter II attempts to show that the CCP became stronger than the Kuomintang (the KMT) by aligning itself with the poor majority, and by adopting an anti-capitalist stance. The inevitable result was the emergence of a Chinese government neither as democratic nor as friendly as postwar American governments hoped to foster.

In Chapter III, the causes of the Kuomintang's defeat are investigated. Contrary to the wide-spread allegation that Washington's appeasement of the Communists and its reluctance to provide Chiang with more effective support were the chief cause of the Nationalists' debacle, it was the corruption and impotence within the KMT which doomed the regime.

America's failure in China should not be attributed to the follies of any particular individuals in successive Administrations. Chapter IV attempts to dissect the constraints which governed the policy-making process and concludes that the adoption of a more sensible policy was unlikely.
CHAPTER I: POLICY MODES AND DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES

The practice of international politics could be both stimulating and frustrating. Its stimulus lies in the demands it makes on the skills of statesmanship of all the participants. Every move needs to be weighed with caution and decisiveness. It would be frustrating when the outcomes of well-advised moves are not what is expected. This unpredictable nature of diplomacy revealed itself in China in the latter half of the 1940s. In designing a post-war world order, President Roosevelt could not possibly foresee that in a few years time the United States would join hands with Japan, then her bitter foe, in a military alliance against China, her wartime ally. It took most spectators by surprise when the Communist forces swept across China and drove the Nationalist armies into the sea.

The sudden and dramatic victory of the CCP in 1949 left the Americans greatly confused and badly shaken. Some even considered it the greatest defeat in American history. All the US political, economical and military investment in China had resulted only in a formidable enemy aligned with the Soviets and ready to face the Americans in "cold" as well as hot wars. It was no wonder that cynical maneuverings of American policy makers become a source of public suspicion and argument.

A narrative detailing the complex and often bizarre activities of those years is beyond the scope of this sub-thesis. However, they could probably be reduced to the conjunction of special envoys and extravagant aid. There were four major missions to China in a period of three years

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and billions of dollars were spent. Central to the "loss-of-China" theory were, chronologically, (1) the Dixie Mission, (2) the Hurley Mission, (3) the Yalta Conference, (4) the Marshall Mission, and (5) American aid to the KMT.

1) The Dixie Mission was proposed by General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American Commander in the China-Burma-India Theater and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell and his staff anticipated the necessity of sending personnel to northern China, where Japan had her largest single concentration of land forces, to gather intelligence for a future assault. As it was an area where the Communist Chinese had their main bases, Chiang Kai-shek expressed his concern and reservations. Being fully aware of the importance of the mission, President Roosevelt decided nevertheless to approve it and sent Vice-president Henry Wallace to make a preliminary report.

Wallace went inadequately prepared and unwisely ignored a briefing drawn up by John Service. His eight-day visit to China in June, 1944, produced little result except to finalize the dispatch of a US Army Observer Group to Communist territory.

Known as the Dixie Mission, the group arrived at Yenan on July 22, 1944, which marked the commencement of a quasi-official relationship between the CCP and the United States government. The mission included John Service, John Emmerson, John Davies and David Barrett and had the task of collecting information on Japanese forces, the Communist order of battle, weather and communications, and the rescue of downed Allied pilots. The group established a rapprochement with the Communists which became a focus of controversy in later years.
2) Hurley, an American general who had worked for Roosevelt in the Middle East, went to China only three months after Wallace. According to the President's directive, Hurley's principal mission was "to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stiwell, to facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command over Chinese armies placed under his direction." Apart from that, the President's emissary surprised everyone with an unannounced trip to Yenan. As far as his mediating role is concerned, he proved unworthy of Marshall's expectation that he "could pour more oil on the troubled waters out there ..."

The growing grievances between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell could hardly be explained by a mere conflict of personalities. It was rather a conflict of military strategies. Stilwell stressed the importance of a combined land and air offensive against the Japanese, which postulated that the Burma Road was opened and the delivery of supplies ensured by a reorganized Chinese army. Unwilling either to commit his soldiers to the Burmese jungle or to reorganize his armies, the Generalissimo found General Chennault's alternative of fighting the Japanese with American aircraft more appealing. Chennault promised to bring about the "downfall of Japan" within one year if he was provided with one hundred and five fighters, thirty medium bombers, twelve heavy bombers, and sufficient replacements. However unrealistic the proposal might have been, the air strategy was used by Chiang as an excuse for disfavoring the Burma campaign. Stilwell's contempt for Chiang's reluctance and his insistence on military reform served only to antagonize the Generalissimo. Despite President Roosevelt's telegram on September 18, 1944 demanding that

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2Ibid, p. 148
Chiang place all his forces under Stilwell's "unrestricted command", the Generalissimo succeeded in removing the General from his post with the help of Hurley.¹

On November 7, 1944, Hurley flew to Yenan. During the next two days, the Communists worked out a five point proposal for a settlement, to which Hurley gave his support.² Upon his return to Chungking, however, Hurley found Chiang against it and had to back down. The Communists considered this as a betrayal and the failure of Hurley's trip to Yenan created distrust on both sides which cast a shadow on future negotiations.

3) By the time of the Yalta Conference in February 1945, President Roosevelt had given up hope that China would be a major ally in the war. This was exemplified in one of his last and most controversial acts as president. He bargained away Chinese sovereignty during his negotiation of the Yalta Agreements on the Far East. In partial payment for Soviet help in the defeat of Japan, Roosevelt promised his support for a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria and North China incorporating the same "rights" claimed by Tsarist Russia before 1904. These "pre-eminent interests" included control of railroads and port facilities. In addition, the agreement guaranteed the status quo, which meant Soviet domination, in Outer Mongolia. Lest it appear that Roosevelt had presumed to negotiate for the Chinese in their absence, the President insisted that the final agreement include the stipulation that those portions affecting China would "require [the] concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek". However, the document also contained the promise that Roosevelt, "on advice from Marshal Stalin", would "take measures" to assure Chiang's

compliance. One such inducement was Roosevelt's gaining Stalin's commitment to conclude a treaty of "friendship and alliance" with the Nationalist government of China.

The Yalta agreement was carefully incorporated into Roosevelt's grand design for a Far East strategy. It reflected, on one hand, his deep disappointment at China's wartime contribution and his support for a limited expansion of Soviet influence in Northeast Asia with the hope for closer Soviet-American cooperation. It showed, on the other hand, his reluctance to abandon altogether his old idealism about China and his ongoing campaign to sustain Chiang's regime as the sole representative of a postwar great power. He sought also to separate the Chinese Communists from any potential Soviet support.

Whether President Roosevelt could have accommodated his China policy to postwar reality cannot be known. A few weeks after signing the Yalta Far Eastern accord he was dead. His successor was hardly aware of even the existence of such an agreement. As a Senator during the war, Truman's main interest had been investigating corruption and waste in the domestic defense industry. His involvement in foreign affairs was limited and the complex interplay of internal intrigue and big power competition was incomprehensible to him. As he admitted, "All these deep, dark ramifications are entirely too much for me to work out. ... Diplomacy has always been too much for me--especially diplomacy as it is practised by the great powers."1

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1Truman to Lillie Knight, February 9, 1943, Chinese Situation Folder, Box 51, Senate-Vice-Presidential File, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Memorial Library, Independence Missouri.
What differentiated the new president from his predecessor, as far as Washington's China policy was concerned, was not his off-the-record lack of zeal in wrestling with diplomatic complexities but the substantial modification of Roosevelt's Yalta initiatives.

Two events following Truman's inauguration fundamentally altered the meaning of Roosevelt's commitment at Yalta. First, the successful test detonation of the first atom bomb in New Mexico on July 16, 1945 gave the United States an unrivalled position of nuclear monopoly. Second, the onset of the Cold War soon after rendered postwar Soviet-American cooperation irrelevant. Despite Truman's vehement denial, the use of the bomb was meant not only to end the war but also to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and weaken its position of pressing claims against China. Although a Cold War consensus within the United States grew from many issues which had little to do with Asia, it poisoned the atmosphere of American-Soviet relations in general and compelled the Truman Administration to view Russia's intention in Northeast China with suspicion and hostility.

The policy modes of the two presidents differed radically in regard to great power relations and the conflict between the policy of containment and the Yalta agreements predetermined the evolution of American policy towards China.

4) Soon after V-J Day, General George C. Marshall, the influential wartime Chief of Staff, made a further and final attempt to reunite China. At the outset there were a few illusory signs that the mission might succeed by bringing about a cease-fire and a political consultative conference to be conducted at the beginning of 1946. However, the
flimsy structure soon collapsed and the truce ended. By the end of the year, the American efforts for a coalition in China reached an impasse.

5) American aid to the KMT became part of the United States China policy before V-J Day and amounted to $1515.7 million. After V-J Day, however, and especially after the failure of Marshall's Mission, America's China policy changed, and so did the nature of its aid.

Unlike the visits of previous emissaries, the trip made by General Albert Wedemeyer to China in the autumn of 1947 was not an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. It had the dual task of convincing Chiang Kai-shek that American aid depended on the internal reform of the Nationalist regime and of convincing the American Congress that such aid must be given. Not surprisingly, he failed in the former but succeeded in the latter. In the years between the surrender of Japan and the publication of the *The China White Paper*, the United States gave an aid to the KMT government totalling $2,007.7 million. This did not include sales of U.S. military and civilian surplus property, the provision of advisory personnel in cultural, economic and military fields, or U.S. contributions through United Nations' programs in China. Such enormous spending marked a complete shift from the espousal of a peaceful unification of China to all-out support for a decaying regime.

From 1944 to 1949, United States' presence in China fell into two phases. Prior to 1947 the US made an assiduous but vain attempt to establish a KMT-CCP coalition. It was somewhat biased in favor of the KMT but intended to be a neutral mediator. After 1947 it embarked on a

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2 Ibid, pp. 1042-43
path of exerting every possible means short of military intervention to salvage Chiang's regime from total defeat. It is hard to pin down the exact point when the tide changed but the transition was ushered in at the turning of the year when General Marshall returned to the United States empty-handed and completed sometime in autumn when Wedemeyer visited China with the actual mission of finding out the best prescription for sustaining Chiang's shaky regime. The shift was regrettable and its consequence was 30 years of hostility and confrontation between the United States and China.

Accounts of the 1944-49 period of China's history have taken the form of focusing of specific persons or linking events which attributed to the downfall of the Chinese Nationalists and the failure of American policy. Implicitly or explicitly, most authors have reached the conclusion that the tragedy of American policy was due to human error and could somehow have been avoided.

Three conflicting views regarding the "loss of China" contain the main streams of argument. The indignant accusation of communist conspiracy made by authors such as Anthony Kubek, assumed that many key departments of the United States government had fallen into the hands of Soviet agents. The KMT in 1949 was merely a victim of crooked designers of American China policy. Such a thesis could be perceived as the "McCarthyist school" of view because of the identical convictions it shared with the anti-communist senator. The comparison between the views of Kubek and McCarthy is very striking. Two quotations will serve to point up the similarity:

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this Government are concerting
to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. ... Who constitutes the highest circles of this conspiracy? ... We are convinced that Dean Acheson ... must be high on the roster. The President? He is their captive. ... It is when we return to an examination of General Marshall's record since the spring of 1942 that we approach an explanation of the carefully planned retreat from victory. ... It was Marshall who ... created the China policy which, destroying China, robbed us of a great and friendly ally. ... [It was Marshall who] ... went to China to execute the criminal folly of the disastrous Marshall mission.1

President Truman did little or nothing to eliminate or reduce the often decisive Communist influence in our government. ... His additional inheritance of an infiltrated government was something with which he failed to cope. ... Perhaps the key figure in the China debacle was General George C. Marshall.2

Another view, most popular with many conservative critics in the 1950s and 60s, blamed American governments for being unseemingly noncommittal and inconsistent in dealing with the expansion of the Communists which, when combined with the gross incompetence and decadence of the Kuomintang, resulted in the final collapse. This view has been frequently associated with the works of Herbert Feis and Tang Tsou

1Joseph R. McCarthy, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 97 (June 14, 1951)

and could be referred to as the "Cold War liberalist school". The scholars of this school, according to Michael Schaller, shared "a belief in the monolith of Sino-Soviet communism, ..."¹ "Overemphasizing the naivete of American diplomacy, they attribute policy failures almost solely to Soviet, Communist, and KMT scheming which bedeviled a benevolent, idealist, but bumbling American policy."²

The third contending interpretation, which began to gain general acceptance since 1972, has also been critical of White House policy. It argues that America's crusade against the Chinese revolution destroyed its interests in China. A wiser policy for the United States would have attempted to retain a more flexible posture in China's internal strife and therefore the means to influence developments in China after the establishment of the Communist regime.

This view represented by Barbara Tuchman and Michael Schaller and can be described as the "Red China realist school". It allegedly favours no faction, advocates that the U.S. government should have kept a "degree of flexibility" and ready to cooperate with any leadership in China "which may give greater promise of achieving unity and contributing to peace and security in east Asia."³ In essence this approach takes a more positive view of the CCP and its victory in China and finds the American policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek in the latter half of 1940s inimical to American interests.

²Ibid, pp. xi-xii
³"State Department memorandum of April 18, 1945, to President Truman", *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, vol. VII, pp. 93-95
It should be pointed out that despite the fact that the views of these three schools are distinctively divergent and often in conflict, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The McCarthyist school shares the ground with the Cold War liberalists in the theme that Russia was behind the CCP and the United States should have been tougher with the communist threat. Again the Cold War liberalists could be well said to be "realists" themselves and are distinguished from the "Red China realists" perhaps only in the way that they define American interests. They are so named only because their outlook is typical of the academic main stream of the Cold War period. This division, furthermore, is tentative and unavoidably rough and only in the interest of analysis. Classifying ideas by agreement on major issues does not mean to overlook the differences within the separate domains of the three schools. Nor is it meant to belittle the consistency of the aims of any particular author such as Professor Fairbank who has been uncompromising with his judgements for at least forty years.
CHAPTER II: INTERPRETING THE COMMUNISTS

Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the United States manifested relatively little interest in Asia. It was instead preoccupied with events in Europe. Even less attention was given to the existence and gradual increase in strength and influence of the Chinese Communists. Except for a few books such as *Red Star Over China*¹, which most American readers treated as exotic adventure stories, the revolutionaries in Yenan were commonly depicted as a handful of outlaws or, at best, as agrarian reformers.

As Japan expanded her military actions from China to other parts of Asia and the Pacific, inflicting unbearable damage on both China and the United States, and as the Nationalist forces repeatedly failed to check the advance of the enemy, both the Chinese Communists and the Americans felt the necessity for mutual cooperation in their war efforts.

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the CCP issued a directive calling for an internationally united front against Japan in the Pacific. "The central task of the Party," the directive asserted, "was the formation and the development of an extensive anti-Japanese and anti-fascist united front of all nations around the Pacific Ocean."² Meeting American diplomats such as John Carter Vincent in Chungking, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao and other communist leaders expressed their willingness to fight under General Stilwell and extended an invitation to the United States Government to send official representatives to visit and stay in Yenan.

The deterioration of the Allied position in China and the alternative of exploiting the potential of the communist forces induced the American policy-makers to adopt a more flexible policy. The Dixie Mission initiated a three year connection between the Communists and the Americans.

The Communist theme has occupied a prominent position in the controversy over America's role in China. The contention arose almost spontaneously with the establishment of the fragile tie. The discord between Hurley, the President's special envoy and later the Ambassador to China, and his subordinate American officials foretold an unproductive initiative.

After he wrecked his chances as mediator at the end of 1944, Hurley allied himself with the Generalissimo and it became his "steadfast position that all armed warlords, armed partisans and the armed forces of the Chinese Communists must without exception submit to the control of the National Government before China can in fact have a unified military force or unified government."¹ In a Washington press conference held on April 2, 1945, Hurley declared that the Chinese Communists were "war lords" and that there could be no political unification in China as long as these "war lords" were strong enough to defy the national government. He further announced that the United States "steadfastly" supported Chiang's regime.²

In contrast, the American diplomats in Chungking refused to share Hurley's view. In a telegram to the Department of State on February 26,

1945, George Atcheson, the American Charge d'Affaires, urged that "the President inform Chiang Kai-shek in definite terms that we are required by military necessity to cooperate with and supply the communists", and that "we are taking direct steps."\(^1\) Another earlier proposal for extending American aid to the Chinese communist armies was made by John Service on August 29, 1944. He asserted that "[t]he impartial support of both Kuomintang and Communists will make effective at least one force, the Communists, which is really interested in fighting."\(^2\) Service further alleged that "the aid we give the Communists will almost certainly make it impossible for the Kuomintang to start a civil war."\(^3\) The only arbitrator was the President. However, Roosevelt was persuaded by Hurley to remove Stilwell from his post. Later, in the Amerasia Case, John Service was charged with disloyalty and forced out of the American Foreign Service.

The executors of American policy in China could not possibly foresee at this juncture that their political disagreements were about to initiate a debate which would capture the attention of politicians and scholars alike for the following forty years.

From March 8 to June 28, 1950, hearings were held before the Tydings' Subcommittee of the Committee of Foreign Relations to investigate Senator Joseph McCarthy's charge of subversive influence in the State Department, and during these the loyalty of John Service was questioned. McCarthy could not suppress his furor, "When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John S. Service ... He sent official reports back to the State

\(^1\) The China White Paper, (Standford, Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 87
\(^3\) Ibid, p. 324
Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that Communism was the best hope of China."¹

In quite similar manner, Kubek found in these Foreign Service officers the clue to the toppling of Kuomintang's regime: "... our tragic policy in that area can be mostly attributed to the opposition of U. S. foreign service officers and other American officials to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government. These Americans frustrated attainment of our traditional and announced aims in Asia--preservation of the 'territorial and administrative' integrity of China."²

The Cold War liberalist school of history accused American Foreign Service personnel of being naive. It required more trained professional minds, Professor Feis decided, to sustain an attitude of cold disbelief towards Communist statements and activities.³ Tang Tsou attributed the benign attitude of some of the American officials and scholars towards the Communists to a general ignorance.⁴ In the meantime, he seemed to feel called upon to draw a line between his stance and that of the McCarthyist school:

In order to put the views of Service and Davies in proper perspective, one must underscore the fact that their assumptions were widely shared by other American officials and men of affairs and that, in particular, their misunderstanding of the nature and intentions of the Chinese


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Communist party was simply a reflection of the climate of opinion at the time. Such a widespread misjudgment could not have been the product of a conspiracy.  

The Red China realist school, on the other hand, showed a high opinion of the young American diplomats. "These men", Professor John Fairbank commented, "were true China specialists and we have no one like them today. In our life-time, we shall never again get this much of a grasp of the Chinese scene." Eric Severeid believed that the Dixie Mission was carried out by "the ablest group of young diplomats" he had ever seen "in a single American mission abroad." In rebutting the alleged naivete of John Service, Michael Schaller asserted that Service had "an unusual insight into Chinese thought and politics" and "his reports provided a unique glimpse into the shattered dawn of American-Chinese Communist cooperation."

The interpretation of the nature of the CCP and its relationship respectively with the USSR and the USA was a basic criterion of the soundness of post-war American China policy. Debates about the Communist connection among adherents of the three schools of thought naturally centered on three substantial questions: What was the correct way to view the CCP? How was its relationship with the Soviet Union to be regarded? And was it in the interest of the United States to cooperate with the Communists?

1Ibid. p. 219
3William P. Head, America's China Sojourn: America's Foreign Policy and Its Effects on Sino-American Relations, 1942-1948, (Lanham, University Press of America, 1983), p.120
1) The Conception of the CCP

The confusion in the American conception of the Chinese Communists was exemplified by Hurley's conviction that the Communist objectives appeared in general to be the same as those of the Kuomintang. For him the chief difference between the public statements of the two sides was over the procedure each proposed.\(^1\) He went so far as to say that "the only difference between the Chinese Communists and the Oklahoma Republicans was that the Oklahoma Republicans ... weren't armed."\(^2\)

It is not the concern of this paper to discuss whether the Ambassador's folly was due to an unsophisticated grasp of political realities or susceptibility to Soviet influence,\(^3\) for his view was not accepted by any of the three schools. The focus of this discussion is instead on the nature and the strength of the Communists.

The McCarthyist school, of course, was vitriolic in its denunciation of the CCP. It would gladly befriend Japan in order to strangle the Communist China:

The war against Japan upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East. The United States destroyed the only power--other than a U. S.-China

\(^2\)Klaus Mehenert, *Peking and Moscow*, (Bristol, Western Printing Services, 1963), p. 246
\(^3\)One month previous to Hurley's statement, Molotov told the Ambassador that Chinese Communists were not in fact Communists at all. *Dynamics of World Power*, p. 110
alliance—that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East.¹

In its degree, the Cold War liberalist school also held a critical opinion of the CCP. In their view, the Chinese Communists were "Thoroughly revolutionary, ruthless, and irreconcilably enemies of liberal Western civilization".² Professor Tsou considered the communist effort to generate popular support as no more than a means of survival, "The more hard-pressed the Communists were, the more assiduously they had to court the people."³

These assertions were almost monologic in 1950s and early 60s and the dissentient voice was hardly audible. In 1962, Chalmers A. Johnson brought up the subject of the nationalistic nature of the CCP which had been espoused by John Service and John Davies. Johnson found a close link between communist success in China and peasant nationalism aroused by Japanese occupation. In his discussion of the relationship between the communists and the peasants, Johnson pointed out:

These wartime governments were not democratic (there was virtually no opposition), but the masses did participate on an enormous scale in "governmental" activities via the so-called "mass movement". The feeling of belonging and of having a stake in government that grew up in this period was entirely novel to the Chinese masses; and it brought with it an exhilarating sense of self-determination.⁴

³ Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 206

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Mark Selden explored the development of the CCP from its socioeconomic aspect. He reasoned that the dynamics of wartime Chinese communism lay in its policy of activating peasants to overcome poverty and oppression:

The Chinese communists were not simply agrarian reformers. However, the ability of these revolutionaries to respond boldly and effectively to war-aggravated problems of rural society lies at the heart of their immense popular success in the Yenan period. Their appeal to the peasant was rooted in an effective program of administration and reform. The new nationalism in the countryside was linked to the revitalization of the social and economic life of the village.1

John Service's comment was perhaps the most assertive, "This widespread popular support enjoyed by the Communists must be considered a practical indication that the policies and methods of the Chinese Communists have a democratic character." 2 Similarly Schaller commented,

The peasants became convinced of two things. Not only were the Communists dedicated to the patriotic struggle against Japan, but the peasants themselves had a direct stake in the survival and victory of the CCP. The party became their representative, the voice of their demands for social and economic justice against the landlord class.3

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3 Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in Twentieth Century*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 94-95
Due to the kaleidoscopic development of events which is not uncharacteristic of a social upheaval, and to the inflated statements and involved activities of the political parties of the time, total objectivity would be almost impossible. It became apparent only years after that transition period in history, that Communist programmes and conduct were not comparable with Western norms and values. The concept of democracy, as well as other concepts, simply means different things to the Chinese Communists and to the American public.

In ideological terms, the Chinese revolutionary leaders were consistent and explicit about their ultimate goal of realizing the so-called proletarian dictatorship and overthrowing capitalism. As early as 1940 Mao Tse-tung reduced the types of social systems within different states to three basic kinds: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. "The second kind will be the dominant form throughout the world for a certain period." In another context, Mao scornfully commented that the CCP was indeed "dictatorial" because "[a]ll the experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have that right."

Why, it might be asked, did the Red China realists still argue for the communist option? There are probably three reasons for this. First, they tended to separate Communist doctrines from actions. In other words, they reckoned that the CCP was pragmatic. "The Chinese Communists,"

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2 Ibid, p. 351
3 Ibid, vol. VI, p. 417
John Davies said, "are back-sliders. They still proclaim the infallibility of Marxist dogma and call themselves communists, but they have become indulgent of human frailty and confess that China's Communist salvation can be attained only through prolonged evolutionary rather than immediate revolutionary conversion ... they have come to accept the inevitability of gradualness."¹ Johnson also viewed communist ideology in the light of its usefulness for unifying national communities:

What evidence do we have that Communism serves as a nationalist ideology? In addition to our study of the resistance movements, which indicates that the demands of national crisis rather than the logic of Communism brought the Chinese and Yugoslav Communist parties to power, there is a second form of evidence. This is the extensive revision and manipulation of Communist theory undertaken by the Chinese and Yugoslav Communists in order to bring it into line with various policies of a nationalist character...²

Second, they recognized that the Communists in Yenan was in comparison more egalitarian than the KMT central government. Thus, John Service stated, "Any new Chinese government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative with the United States and better able to mobilize the country."³ Third, they were cognizant of the need to establish closer relations with the Communists who held the key to China's future. Perceived national interests dictated that the United States could not afford to lose contact with China, even if the latter did not live up to the Western values.

Estimates of Communist strength were contradictory in 1945 due largely to the chaotic situation then. Both Hurley and Wedemeyer held the opinion that "the rebellion in China could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's central government."\(^1\)

The view from the field was diametrically different. "The possibility should not be overlooked," warned John Davies on November 7, 1944, "of the Communists emerging from a civil war swiftly and decisively victorious, in control of all China."\(^2\) Service was more confident that "a Communist victory [would] be inevitable," if the Nationalist government started a civil war.\(^3\) Professor Michael Lindsay even put the time of the Communist victory at four to five years as early as in March 1947,\(^4\) a prediction very close to the outcome of the actual events.

The outcome in the battlefield spared the later scholars the anguish of making wild surmises. Though he believed that "[t]he strength of the armed forces of the Chinese Communists has been exaggerated. The area of territory controlled by the Communists has been exaggerated. The number of Chinese people who adhere to the Chinese Communist Party has been exaggerated."\(^5\), Tsou admitted that the CCP would be "a

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formidable adversary", even without foreign support. It is perhaps not comprehensible in pure military terms, as Johnson said:

It is not possible to account for the Communist victory over the Nationalists on grounds of military prowess alone; the fact was that the Communists had won increasing recognition among the uncommitted as the party that spoke for China. This was the contest that counted, and when this contest was lost, the KMT (which never admitted that a contest could exist on these grounds) was finished.

(2) Relations with the Soviets

A considerable number of American scholars viewed post-war Soviet international politics as aiming at a world-wide expansion and American politics as the global containment of that expansion. Although the Soviets were not ostensibly involved in China's civil war, their shadowy and evasive connections with Communist Chinese were enough to cause a major concern to American policy makers. In fact, some prominent opposition to America's cooperation with the CCP was based on the fear of international communism headed by the Soviet Union. American Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman warned, on May 14, 1945, that if the United States made the error of supporting Communist armies in China against Chiang Kai-shek, it would have to face the likelihood that "two or three hundred millions of people in China would march when the Kremlin ordered."

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1 Ibid. p. 194
William Bullitt, Harriman's predecessor, was even more sensational.

If China falls into the hands of Stalin, all Asia, including Japan, sooner or latter will fall into his hands. The man power and resources of Asia will be mobilized against us. The independence of the U.S. will not live a generation longer than the independence of China.¹

Following the intensification of US-Soviet confrontation in Europe after V-J Day and especially after the failure of Marshall's efforts to mediate in China in mid-1946, the American government became increasingly suspicious of the relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Russians:

It may be assumed that a Communist China would be closely aligned, politically, economically, and militarily, with the USSR. ... The development of a Chinese Communist state would tend to enhance the power of the Communist political movement in Asia and thereby contribute to the extension of Soviet influence in the world.²

A 1947 study warned that,

It is believed, ... that the Chinese Communists as all others, are Moscow inspired and thus motivated by the same basic totalitarian and anti-democratic policies as are the communist parties in other countries of the world. Accordingly, they should be regarded as tools of Soviet policy.³

¹*Life*, October, 1947
²*Foreign Relations of the United States 1947*, vol. VII, p. 287
³SM-8388, June 9, 1947, ibid, p. 840
Different opinions existed as the prospect of Sino-soviet military collaboration was far from apparent at the time. Neither Hurley nor the Foreign Service officers were disposed to believe that the verbal endorsement of an identical ideology by the two communist parties would inevitably bring them together and their opinions differed only in the practical means of separating China and the Soviet Union. Even as late as November 1949, one month before Mao arrived in Moscow to sign an agreement of alliance, a U.S. State Department memorandum had stated:

With regard to Communist China, we anticipate the possibility that great strains will develop between Peiping and Moscow. These strains would not only work to our advantage but would contribute to the desired end of permitting China to develop its own life independently rather than as a Russian satellite.\(^1\)

For the key issue of the nature of a Sino-Soviet alliance, i.e., whether the Chinese communists were nationalistic or totally and irretrievably pro-Soviet, the McCarthyist school and the Cold War liberalist school seemed to arrive at parallel conclusions. Anthony Kubek called it an "illusion" to believe that the Chinese Communists were somehow not quite communists.

The choice for the United States was between Chiang's government, which was friendly, and Mao Tse-tung's Red revolutionary army, which was a puppet of Stalin.

\(^1\)Charlton Ogburn, Jr., Memorandum, "Decisions Reached by Consensus at the Meetings with the Secretary and the consultants on the Far East", November 2, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 160-61
Every interest of Stalin was wrapped up in Red China and the project of forcing Chiang to take Reds into his government.¹

The Cold War liberalists believed that the Chinese Communists were "inseparably welded or even closely allied to Moscow."² For Tsou the "practice of following the twists and turns in Soviet policy, the espousal of the theory of the two camps, the adherence to the cause of advancing communism throughout the world, and the glorification of the role of the Soviet Union the Chinese revolution -- all reflected the Chinese Communist Party's ideological and organizational ties with the Soviet Union and its hope for eventual Soviet support."³ They viewed the cause of America's failure in China as lack of determination of checking the expansion of the CCP at an early stage and by all means.

The Red China realists, while making no efforts to deny the doctrinal affinity of the two communist states, put more emphasis on the nationalistic aspect of the CCP and its tendency to be independent of foreign states. Chalmers Johnson repeatedly came back to the term "national communism" in his book:

Indeed, one of the main lessons to be derived from this study is the extent to which nationalism and Communism have become synonymous.⁴

... ...


The spread of nationalism among the Chinese and Yugoslav peoples placed limitations on the extent to which the Chinese and Yugoslav leaders could follow the dictates of Moscow, or for that matter of any other external authority.¹

The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 likewise "was not proof of CCP subservience," but rather "a marriage of convenience ... abetted the United States."²

Ironically, nearly everyone attacked American policy for allegedly bringing the two communist giants together. The Cold War liberalists asserted that the concessions made at Yalta not only failed to detach the USSR from the CCP but also sowed the seeds of future Sino-Soviet military cooperation by legalizing the Soviet seizure of Manchuria. Kubek agreed to this view,

There is little doubt that Yalta marked the greatest diplomatic defeat in American history. With a naval base at Port Arthur, commercial preponderance in Dairen, and control over the South Manchuria railway, Soviet Russia could dominate North China.³

The blame of a different kind was made by the Red China realists. They decided that the United States policy of containing the growth of the CCP by committing American support wholly to the decadent KMT regime had pushed China towards the Soviet Union.

¹Ibid, p. 177
The question subsequently raised was whether, in the hypothetical situation of the United States having supported the CCP, it was likely that China's new regime would have been more pro-American, or at least neutral in the global Soviet-American confrontation.

It is essential to inquire into the two major fronts of the CCP diplomatic engagement: its relations with the Soviet Union and with the United States.

The Chinese Communists made no effort to conceal their intrinsic attachment to the USSR. Mao Tse-tung declared, in 1939, that he "held absolutely beyond doubt" that "[t]he interests of the Soviet Union will always conform and never conflict with the interests of China's national liberation."¹ A year later, Mao advocated an alliance with the soviets, "As things are today, it is perfectly clear that unless there is the policy of alliance with Russia, with the land of socialism, there will inevitably be a policy of alliance with imperialism, with the imperialist powers."² From late 1946 on, the Communist Party repeatedly asserted that the world was divided between the "imperialist anti-democratic camp" and the "democratic anti-imperialist camp headed by the soviet Union" and that China's only choice was to align with the latter. And in 1949, Mao finally declared:

The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these

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²Ibid, p. 364
forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.¹

The reiteration of a pro-Soviet line make it clear that Sino-Soviet Alliance was no coincidence but the logical destination of a long journey.

It would be imprudent, however, to jump to the conclusion that China was irrevocably to become a mere satrapy of the Soviet Union. Even in the first half of 1950s when the Sino-Soviet "fraternal solidarity" was at its apex, neither country sincerely defined its security interests in ideological terms. For the Russians, the interpretations of national interests postulated the necessity of preventing any foreign domination of the territories adjacent to its borders. A united and strong China, even with Communists in power, would constitute a potential threat to the USSR. For the Chinese, on the other hand, being drawn into the Soviet orbit ran counter to the traditional Sino-centrism and they would be very reluctant to aggrandize the country's dependence on the historically untrustworthy Russians. In other words, it is predetermined that a pro-soviet line in China would cause strains which would ultimately split the two Communist parties apart. Inherent in these points is the suggestion that the CCP had to join hands with its ideological companion as an unavoidable step towards its maturity but the internal contradictions of the alliance would lead to an inevitable separation.

Closely connected with this interpretation, as another aspect of the same issue, was the CCP's relationship with the United States.

¹Ibid, vol. IV, p. 415
3) The Relationship between the CCP and the USA

Both the McCarthyist school and the Cold War liberalist school put their stress on those elements of the Chinese Communists which were irreconcilable with the Western ideals and social system while the Red China realist school contradicted this view by alleging the inevitability of a Communist victory in China and the possibility of a reversed cause of history.

Around late 1944 and early 1945, the rapprochement between the CCP and the United States approached its peak. Mao asserted that "[w]e Chinese consider you Americans the ideal of democracy."1 This remark represented the highest appraisal of its kind ever uttered by the paramount leader of the Chinese Communists. The Chairman endeavored to convince the United States of his sincerity,

The United States would find us more cooperative than the Kuomintang. We will not be afraid of democratic American influence -- we will welcome it.

America does not need to fear that we will not be cooperative. We must cooperate and we must have American help. This is why it is so important to us Communists to know what you Americans are thinking and planning. We cannot risk crossing you -- cannot risk any conflict with you.2

To cap the gestures of good will, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai approached the American Observers Group with a proposal that they visit

2 Ibid, p. 173
Washington for talks with Roosevelt. Though the message was transmitted to Chungking on January 9, 1945, it was never forwarded to the President, due either to negligence or to the arrogance of Hurley and Wedemeyer.¹

The episode gave rise to numerous interesting surmises. To some Red China realists, had the trip been made, the whole of contemporary international history would have been rewritten. Essentially its effect would have been comparable to the trip made by President Nixon twenty-seven years later. In her article "If Mao Had Come to Washington: an Essay in Alternatives", Barbara Tuchman indulged herself in the speculation about the prospect:

With prestige and power enhanced by an American connection, the Communists' rise and the Kuomintang's demise, both by then inevitable, would have been accelerated. Three years of civil war in a country desperately weary of war and misgovernment might have been, if not entirely averted, certainly curtailed. The United States, guiltless of prolonging the civil war by consistently aiding the certain loser, would not then have aroused the profound antagonism of the ultimate winner. This antagonism would not then have been expressed in the arrest, beating and in some cases imprisonment and deportation of American consular officials, the seizure of our consulate in Mukden, and other harassments, and these acts in turn might not then have decided us in anger against recognition of the Communist government. If, in the absence of ill-feeling, we had established relations on some level with the People's Republic, permitting communication in a crisis, and if the Chinese had not been moved by hate and suspicion of us to

¹Barbara W. Tuchman: "If Mao Had Come to Washington: an Essay in Alternatives", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 51, No. 1, October 1972, p. 45
make common cause with the Soviet Union, it is conceivable that there might have been no Korean War with all its evil consequences. From that war rose the twin specters of an expansionist Chinese communism and an indivisible Sino-Soviet partnership. Without those two concepts to addle statesmen and nourish demagogues, our history, our present and our future, would have been different. We might not have come to Vietnam.1

All of these speculations are admirably stimulating. The problem is that they proceed from a counter-factual premise. Regardless of whether Mao could have gone to Washington even if Hurley had passed on the proposal to President Roosevelt, the fact is that he did not, and it is impossible to know how such events might in fact have turned out. Indeed the available documents and events since then all point to the opposite direction from Tuchman's optimism.

In probing into the post-war relationship between the CCP and the USA, as with the discussion of that between the CCP and the USSR, it is essential to understand the CCP’s basic assumptions regarding the nature of world politics; the parts played by each of the major actors; and the appropriate policy alternatives for the Party and China. In other words, the intellectual framework of the party leaders determined the directions in which the country was led.

From the 1920s through to the 1960s the CCP was preoccupied with the so-called "two camps" theory. As early as 1926, Mao Tse-tung began to subscribe to this theory which postulated that

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1Ibid, pp. 45-46
... the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle. ... The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution; there is no room for them to remain "independent".1

From then on this line was adopted. The Chinese revolution in theory aimed not only at imperialism in China but also at imperialism as a world social system. It was axiomatic that the CCP was bound together in close unity with other communist parties and states in struggling for the ultimate goal. Dedication to the revolutionary cause forbade any major reconciliation with either Western values and conceptions or the Western social system.

Admittedly, the espousal of radical communist theories did not exclude the possibility of temporary cooperation with certain capitalist countries to augment the force of revolution. To ally with them, however, on any but a temporary basis would endanger the resolve of the Chinese revolution. This pragmatism existed alongside revolutionary idealism and served as a useful instrument to achieve the intended purpose.

The hope of an alliance between the CCP and the USA was primarily constructed in the context of a common war effort against Japan. It gained momentum from the necessity of increasing contacts and reached the point, in 1944-45, when any further benefits would require considerable risks. In view of the lack of shared values, a common purpose and a sense of mutual reliance, it was unlikely either that the

CCP would compromise its conviction in exchange for American aid or that the Americans would abandon the legitimate and pro-American government of China, however unpopular it was, in the hope of deriving advantages from a future communist government. The prospect was even less likely when the CCP's triumph was uncertain and the ensuing losses with Chiang's expulsion doubtful.

Under such circumstances, it was almost certain that Roosevelt would have turned down Mao's proposal. Even if the trip had been made, Mao would have had little chance of successfully persuading the President to abandon Chiang in 1945. Only twenty-seven years later did the leaders of both countries come to the realization that their mutual interests were vital and could transcend divergent political convictions. If a journey of human understanding does need twenty-seven years to cover, there is perhaps no way to cut it short.
CHAPTER III: INTERPRETING THE NATIONALISTS

When Secretary of State Dean Acheson ordered the release of *The China White Paper* in August 1949, the People's Liberation Army had already crossed the Yangtze River and the Nationalist capital of Nanking had already fallen. The tedious 1054-page document was meant to justify the past policy of the United States and cushion public criticism of America's role in the collapse of Nationalist China. In his covering letter to the President, Secretary Acheson asserted:

> The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.1

Acheson's statement was made in the face of mounting attacks on American China policy during the period 1944-50. Walter Judd, leader of the pro-Nationalist members of Congress stated: "I don't think we'd have lost China and very possibly the rest of Asia, if we'd given China as much help as we gave to Western Europe."2 In a mournful 1949 editorial The New York Times condemned the American administration for having morally retreated from its responsibilities to Nationalist China. It asserted that the lack of aid to the Nationalist Chinese had assisted the Communist

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conquest of China.\footnote{The New York Times, 28 April 1949, p. 1} William D. Pawley, one-time special assistant to Secretary Acheson, put it more bluntly.

It is my judgement, ... that this whole fiasco, the loss of China and the subsequent difficulties with which the United States has been faced, was the result of mistaken policy of Dean Acheson, Phil Jessup, Lattimore, John Carter Vincent, John Service, John Davies, [O.E. ] Clubb, and others.\footnote{Anthony Kubek, The Red China Papers: What Americans Deserve to Know about U.S.-Chinese Relations, (New York, Arlington House Publishers, 1975), p. 143}

The question of "who lost China" became an important issue in the American domestic politics in late 1940s and early 1950s. The reappraisal of American policy in China took place in an atmosphere of dissension and recrimination. The agitation over the Communist victory in China found expression in venting spite and anger upon the American government. The bitterness exhibited by some American political literature towards the frustration of American policy in China was clearly discernible.

To McCarthyists, the defeat of the KMT was merely a successful story of communist conspiracy. Anthony Kubek believed that the communists were so entrenched in American government at the close of World War II that in many cases "they were in positions to influence or even control the information and advice given to the President and Secretary of State."\footnote{Anthony Kubek, How the Far East was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949, (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1963), p. 444} Such a communist influence over the civil war in China, according to this school of view, embodied the American embargo on munitions and equipment for the Kuomintang troops. Another cited communist fraud was the truce talks between the CCP and the KMT.
conducted under the mediation of American government. These supposedly contrived efforts by the infiltrated communists were held as devastatingly effective for turning "imminent Nationalist victory into eventual communist conquest."\(^1\)

Anthony Kubek not only showed a strong sympathy for the lost cause of the Nationalist China but also a personal attachment to Generalissimo, dedicating one of his works, *The Red China Papers*, to Chiang Kai-shek. He stated, "The Generalissimo was the only top-flight Asiatic leader who was a Christian and anti-communist."\(^2\)

The Cold War liberalist school was at odds with this view. The attempt to hunt out American conspirators in China and in the United States was considered by Tang Tsou as "a most hazardous, fruitless, and harmful endeavor."\(^3\) Though he regretted the America's failure of adopting "a quid pro quo policy and a tactic of pressure toward the Nationalist government to bring about sweeping reforms",\(^4\) he conceded that it was likely "that no matter what the United States might have done, she could only have postponed but could not have averted the final outcome".\(^5\) He made it clear, "More than any other person, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was responsible for what happened in China."\(^6\)

\(^1\)Ibid, p. 445  
\(^2\)Ibid. p. 261  
\(^4\)Ibid, P. 47  
\(^5\)Ibid, p. 56  
\(^6\)Ibid, p. ix
The conversion to Christianity by China's Nationalist leader, in Tsou's eyes, did not constitute the solid basis for a dependable ally. "In contrast to many Chinese intellectuals and officials of that time," Tsou pointed out, "he was anti-Western in his general outlook."\(^1\) Chiang was depicted as a master of political maneuvers "who turned his very weakness into a position of diplomatic strength and whose diplomatic adroitness imposed an obstacle to all American endeavors in China."\(^2\) Another scholar shared this opinion, "Even if Chiang Kai-shek had retained power on the mainland, it is unlikely that he would have remained allied with the United States for long. He might, in fact, have 'reverted to type' and become its bitter enemy."\(^3\)

Regarding Nationalists' debacle, the Red China realist school was positive about its inconvertibility. It considered the act of attributing the colossal event of Kuomintang's failure to the alleged treason of a handful of American diplomats as "spy-mania" and "political paranoia" by "wildly irresponsible demagogues"\(^4\). In its opinion, the fate of the KMT had been sealed even before the civil war was fought, for the opposite manner in which the CCP had responded to the challenge of the Japanese invasion won the support of the Chinese people and therefore the future of China.

Chiang's flawed strategy was no simple oversight, but directly connected to the nature of the KMT regime. Successful guerrilla warfare required mobilizing and arming the rural masses. A guerrilla army would threaten not only

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1 Ibid, p. 103
the Japanese but the landlords and gentry, the social classes which comprised Chiang's staunchest supporters. Thus Chiang faces an insoluble dilemma: to win the peasants he must lose the landholders. By this refusal-or inability-to move against his traditional allies, Chiang became their hostage, doomed by the very people who had kept him in power.¹

The Generalissimo was perceived as being "far more successful in wooing the favor of Americans" than understanding "the plight of or assist China's poor"². Theodore White made the following observation after years' experience in China:

As a politician Chiang dealt in force rather than ideas. Any concept of China that differed from his own was treated with as much hostility as any enemy division. In both Party and government, above honest experience or ability, he insisted on the one qualification of complete, unconditional loyalty to himself.³

It is hardly necessary to note that the inaccessibility of information once made analysis very difficult.Quite apart from it, however, three factors have frequently affected a balanced study of the causes of enmity between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

First was the effects of factional prejudice. It is generally agreed now that China was very much a partisan topic in American politics particularly in late 1940s and early 1950s. The so-called "China Lobby", an interest group in the American Congress closely associated with the Nationalist Chinese, mounted campaigns of considerable magnitude to

¹Ibid. p. 93
³White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, p. 126
abstract aid for Generalissimo Chiang prior to KMT's defeat and promote "the loss of China" theme in the United States after it. Some observers believed that the Truman Administration had been forced to make concessions to the China bloc in order to avert opposition to its European program. The major sources of pro-Nationalist propaganda in the United States included Senators Owen Brewster, Styles Bridges, Hover Ferguson, Kenneth Wherry, William F. Knowland, Pat McCarran (a Democrat), Joseph R. MaCarthy, H. Alexander Smith, and Representatives Walter H. Judd, Richard Nixon, George Dendero, Lawrence H. Smith, and John M. Vorys. Most of them are Republican. Through these ardent congressional supporters, Chiang Kai-shek exploited the public fear of communism and successfully instilled in the American people a conviction that their administration had failed to give Nationalist China sufficient support. Thus it had to bear some of the blame for the Communist takeover.

Second there was the influence of the Cold War concept. It should be noted that the biting criticism of American policy was absent before 1947. On the contrary, those members of Congress including Walter Judd1, who later showed tremendous indignation at America's "betrayal", were lavish in their praise of Marshall's efforts when the mediation policy was being carried out. The distortion of opinions culminated in vehement accusations of McCarthyists. The climate of opinion in the United States in the height of Cold War was bitterly hostile to communist China and it was not until some of the passions of earlier years gradually dissipated before a degree of objectivity was allowed.

1See the Marshall testimony, Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1900-09, 2060ff., 2092-99 and 2237-39
Third, there was the lack of comprehension of and insight into Chinese society. Apart from Machiavellian power-political considerations, US foreign policy claimed the promotion of democracy and freedom as one of its basic aims. The contending parties in China were inclined to be classified into democratic forces on the one side and anti-democratic on the other. The illusion that the Nationalist government bore the burden of fighting against communist totalitarianism for the whole free world was purposely created. Viewed in a historical perspective, neither Communists nor Nationalists were democratic in the pluralist sense, and there is ample evidence that the CCP was more interested in promoting the welfare of its people, more receptive of critical opinions and less affected by corruption and power abuses than the KMT prior to 1949.

These three elements have combined to create much conceptual confusion about the history of 1944-50 period. The evidence from this period supports Secretary Acheson's assertion that Kuomintang's debacle of 1949 "was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."1 The fundamental cause of the Kuomintang's failure in China was its internal disintegration. A syndrome of economic, military and political crisis irrevocably dragged the Nationalist government to its eventual downfall.

Economically, due to the two-decade concentration of the nation's energies and resources on maintaining the Kuomintang position by means of military and political power, national development programmes had been neglected. The Kuomintang was unable to take any effective steps to check inflation. The increasing official corruption was one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. The

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government could not effectively mobilize national resources to reduce the budgetary deficit and increase revenue. It lost the unequivocal support of China's industrialists and the rural gentry by relying on the narrow base of the most conservative sector of the economy which had intimate connections with government bureaucracy.

On the military front, in spite of advantages in numbers and equipment over the Communist troops, the KMT armies suffered from corruption, lack of discipline and low morale.

In a sense, the KMT was paralyzed by its own political machinery. It was not a constitutional government with a parliament, responsible cabinet, freedom of the press or freedom of association. Corruption was rampant and sycophants overrode all other considerations in order to perpetuate their own power. They showed no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls on which the whole structure of government depended.

It is clear that when Chiang Kai-shek subverted the negotiation for a coalition government with his stubborn stand, he was embarking on the road of self-destruction.

The prospect of total failure in a military showdown with the Communists was probably the last thing Chiang anticipated in 1945-47. When the civil war broke out, the Nationalist government enjoyed a five to one superiority in armed forces vis-a-vis the Communists. Even in

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1. In the negotiation, the Nationalist government insisted that the integration of the Communist forces into a national army be a precondition to a coalition.
2. Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China 1941-50*, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 401. Several other resources show different ratio. However, it was beyond doubt that the statistical strength was decisively in favour of the KMT.
June 1947, when the situation in the battlefields began to turn against the National forces, Chiang continued to declare confidently:

Regardless of what aspect we discuss, we hold an absolute superiority; in terms of the troops' equipment, battle techniques, and experience, the Communists are not our equal. ... We are also ten times richer than the Communist army in terms of military-supply replacements, such as food, fodder, and ammunition.1

The Generalissimo even put the timetable for exterminating the Communists at from eight to ten months.2

Together with military factors, political and cultural ones also had a role. Chiang was a shrewd politician who had been schooled in the imperial system of war lords. He certainly understood the menace to his monopoly of power posed by an expanding political opponent. Deep in his mind, he did not cherish any illusions about the possibility of reconciliation with the Communists and resolved to get rid of them once and for all. Given this, any American mediation was doomed to fail.

Once they were locked in battle with the Communists in the field, the KMT forces were in difficulty. Almost from the start, the initiative was in the hands of the Communist troops. The incompetence of the KMT officers was appalling and war-weariness spread fast among the soldiers.

An even more disastrous factor, which exerted an important role on the development of the civil war, was that the KMT was losing public support. For years, its indifference to the needs of the masses was

1Chiang Kai-shek, *Chiang Tsung-t'ung*, vol. 19, pp. 241, 261
astonishing. The lack of resolve or drive to promote the well-being of the populace, the heavy taxation and absence of justice in local village government alienated the bulk of the population in the countryside.

An effective reform was advocated by both Chinese officials and the American government as the only remedy. The regime's frailties, however, were such that reform was beyond its capacity. Chiang was aware of the problem he faced, "If we get rid of all those people who are at fault, who will there be left?" The Nationalist government was caught in a dilemma. The regime could not survive without reform but reform would provoke a flare-up of the impending crisis.

Chiang Kai-shek eventually came to the realization that was long overdue:

To tell the truth, never, in China or abroad, has there been a revolutionary party as decrepit and degenerate as we (the Kuomintang) are today; nor has there been one as lacking in spirit, in discipline, and even more in standards of right and wrong as we are today. This kind of party should long ago have been destroyed and swept away!1

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2 Ibid, p.291
CHAPTER IV: UNITED STATES POLICY

In Chapters II and III it was shown that the domestic conditions in China prevented US policy from working. The Kuomintang government could neither tolerate sharing power with the armed Communists in a coalition, nor check the internal situation from deteriorating by implementing effective reforms. The Chinese Communists, in a diametrically opposite way, refused to either give up their forces in exchange for a place in government or to be intimidated by the majority KMT armies backed by the United States. This situation was exacerbated by historical, cultural and political factors in China and was simply beyond the capacity of American diplomatic or military capability to alter.

It was, in fact, even beyond the comprehension of some of the most distinguished American scholars. Refusing to accept the inevitability of what had happened, their argument was worded as though the course of events could have been both fundamentally different and advantageous to American interests. It is therefore necessary to examine how events unfolded to show why it was not possible for American policy to achieve a different result.

Before the American policies concerning China during the 1944-50 period can be intelligently discussed, it is necessary to note that there was no consensus about such policies at that time. Contradictory interpretations directed actions toward antithetical goals.

Ambassador Hurley's understanding of the policy of the United states toward China was:

(1) To prevent the collapse of the national government.
(2) To sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies.
(3) To harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander.
(4) To promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse and
(5) To unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.1

One month after Hurley articulated these aims, another equally authoritative source revealed American-China policy in a different light. The Division of Chinese Affairs furnished guidance on China policy in a memorandum which was approved by the Department of State and endorsed by Secretary of War Stimson. On this document flexibility was stressed:

It does not necessarily follow that China should be unified under Chiang Kai-shek. ... With regard to our long-term objective, it is our purpose to maintain a degree of flexibility which would permit cooperation with any leadership in China that would offer the greatest likelihood of fostering a united, democratic, and friendly China.2

The historical literature on this period is also confusingly divergent. According to Professor Anthony Kubek, the basic American wartime policy towards China was originally "to uphold in all possible ways the central government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to support his armies in the field against Japan", but that by late 1945 it had shifted away from this position.3 Other authors suggested a different purpose in US

1Foreign Relations of the United States 1944, vol. VI, p. 745
policies. When asked by Edgar Snow about the possibility of supporting two governments in China, President Roosevelt replied that he had "been working with two governments there" and intended to go on doing so until he could get them together.1

The postmortem and most cited policy statement was presented by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on July 30, 1949, only two months before the proclamation of the Communist victory in China:

When peace came the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China. (1) it could have pulled out, lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists; (3) It could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.2

There were, in speculation as well as in practice, two further unmentioned alternatives: (4) it could press Chiang Kai-shek to undergo a major reform using American aid as a lever; and (5) "it could have sought to avoid civil war by working for a compromise, but to keep the United States in a flexible position, basically uncommitted to the extension of Nationalist, or any other power in China, and ready to adjust itself to the further evolution of China."3

These five alternatives were not equally significant so far as their applicability was concerned. The first two were commonly agreed to be

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3This alternative was observed by John S. Service. The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations, (Berkeley, University of California, 1971), p. 133
impractical. Shrinking back into isolationism was out of the question at the
time when the United States had just emerged from the Second World
War as the most powerful state in the world. Out of the question also was
the prospect of plunging the war-weary country into another large-scale
military involvement in the Far East when its perceived vital interests lay
far away in Europe.

The other policy alternatives were either actively pursued or
fervently recommended. However, the constraints on policy making were
such that the choice which appears to be sound now was not possible at
the time. More pitiful was the fact that even the adopted policies would
have yielded something less disastrous had there been a certain degree of
determination accompanied by tact. The result was that the US actions in
China from 1944 to 1950 were not rationally directed but rather
purposelessly drifted along with the development of the situation in China
and crumbled when the Nationalist regime fell.

1) The Adoption of Policy Alternative (3)

To reiterate United States-China policy during 1944-46 fitted
Acheson's policy alternative (3) which consisted of two parts: promoting
a peaceful unification of China and assisting Chiang Kai-shek to take over
the country with his troops.

William Johnson, a former American missionary to China attacked
the coalition policy, "To force a coalition government upon China is worse
than folly. It is betrayal."¹

¹"The United States Sells China Down the Amur", The China Monthly, VIII, December
1947, p. 426
As a member of the American China Policy Association, the most active of the organizations which were established for the specific purpose of promoting aid to Nationalist China, Johnson's statement was indicative of the frustration felt by some Americans at the failure of U.S. efforts to unify China through peaceful means.

It is imperative, however, to investigate the origin and causes of the setbacks in the policy before any objective judgement can be made. How did the policy come into being? Could other options have been adopted thereby avoiding similar failures? Apart from the internal causes, was the policy itself sensible?

While the flaws in the policy have now become almost self-evident, it appeared to be sound and feasible for the American government to adopt a policy of promoting a CCP-KMT coalition.

First, the peaceful unification of China was a long-term post-war strategy in the Far East. During World War II, the United States had two major objectives with respect to China. It wanted to defeat Japan and to create a powerful and friendly China in her place. Underlying this was the belief that the Pacific conflict was secondary in importance to the war against Germany and that Japan had to be tied down in China so that she could not transfer soldiers to other combat zones. Furthermore, it was hoped that a strong and democratic China would play a leading role in protecting the post-war peace in the Far East.

By mid-1944, though the bloodshed in the pacific region showed no sign of abating, the U.S. triumph over Japan had become only a matter of time. The avowed aim of making China a great power was on the agenda. President Roosevelt had by then taken several actions to confer great
power status upon China. He renounced extraterritorial rights for the United States in China, repealed the Chinese exclusion laws, and pressed the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union into accepting China on an equal footing as one of the Four Policemen projected for keeping order in the post-war world.

However, China would remain weak as long as she was split by her internal political factions. Both Roosevelt's enthusiasm for bolstering China's great power status and Truman's determination to contain Soviet expansion required that China arrive at a peaceful solution to her domestic instability.

Secondly, a coalition government could hopefully introduce some democratic features into the existing government. In the face of the Kuomintang's decadence and unpopularity, the accommodation of another political party could be expected to defuse the vicious nature of the regime and enhance the vitality and credibility of the government. As President Truman stated on December 15, 1945:

The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government.1

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Thirdly, the alternative of sending American troops to China to force unification upon the country would have imposed an unbearable burden on the United States. Popular pressure to "get the boys home" was matched by demobilization riots and near mutinies at bases abroad after V-J Day.

Professor Tsou's charge that "Marshall's decision not to undertake armed intervention ... was a decisive factor in the failure to sustain the Nationalist government" obviously overlooked other policy constraints besides military capability.

In reality, even if military intervention had been an option, the chance of controlling the situation would have been very slim. The fact that several million Japanese soldiers had failed to conquer China might have been in his mind when President Truman remarked:

> I knew that peace in the world would not be achieved by fighting more wars. Most of all, I was always aware that there were two enormous land masses that no Western army of modern times had ever been able to conquer: Russia and China. It would have been folly, and it would be folly today, to attempt to impose our way of life on these huge areas by force!\(^2\)

Lastly, since the CCP and the KMT had coexisted without major and general conflicts for the duration of the war against Japan, there were reasons to believe that the two parties might

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compromise once again given time and patience. Even years later the President still held to this belief:

There is no doubt in my mind that if Chiang Kai-shek had been only a little more conciliatory an understanding could have been reached. I am not one to believe in the value of hindsight. Whether or not I was right in sending General Marshall to China does not depend on what some think they know today. It depends only on what we were able to know in 1945. At that time the belief was general that the various elements in China could be persuaded to unify the country.\(^1\)

Further, American policy-makers expected Russia's cooperation in their efforts to create a coalition government in China headed by Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, American and Soviet objectives were congruent in the desire to avert a Chinese civil war. In August 1945, when Hurley was taking pains to mend the shattered political fence of China, Stalin, under a pseudonym, cabled the CCP leaders to the effect that the Chinese comrades should preserve domestic peace, otherwise the very survival of the Chinese nation would be endangered.\(^2\)

It was based on these considerations that the United States strove to unite the Nationalists and the Communists. It expected both to make compromises, with the former giving up its monopoly on national government and the latter its military activities against the central regime.

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1Ibid, P. 90
The peace design, however, was contradictory. While promoting a peace solution between two antagonists, the U. S. government took sides with the KMT in its preparations for civil war.

In his "General Order No.1" to General MacArthur immediately following the defeat of Japan, President Truman ordered all Japanese and puppet forces in China to surrender only to Chiang Kai-shek or his representatives.¹ This first post-war statement put American support directly and openly behind the KMT. Both American and KMT forces cooperated with the "surrendered" Japanese in resisting Communist efforts to seize cities and railway lines. The U.S. Navy and Air Force were kept busy transporting hundreds of thousands of KMT soldiers from south to north China.

The policy of supporting Chiang in any case was decided before Marshall's Mission began. In a discussion between Truman, Byrnes and Marshall on December 11, 1945, it was confirmed that "the government would have to swallow its pride and much of its policy" for a coalition and continue to assist the generalissimo, should the negotiation break down, for "the tragic consequences of a divided China and of a probable reassumption of Russian power in Manchuria, the combined effect of this resulting in the defeat or loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific" was intolerable.²

However sincere the Americans might be in their intentions to stop the hostilities between the CCP and the KMT, the implications of the decision to back Chiang were grave. As John Carter Vincent, then the

¹Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, vol. VII, p. 530
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, pointed out at the end of 1945,

Chiang Kai-shek has in the past shown a decided preference for military methods, rather than political methods, in seeking a solution of internal difficulties in China and his methods have fallen short of success. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that American military assistance on the scale contemplated might encourage Chiang to continue along this line without promise of success, and discourage attempts at unity by peaceful methods.¹

Concurrently, Ambassador Leighton Stuart suggested that Chiang be told outright that if he persisted in following a policy of force, American aid would be totally withdrawn.²

Secretary Acheson admitted later that it had not been clear to him that "the military support of Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists while sponsoring an attempt to work out a political agreement between them" was apparently "a duality of policy".³

2) The Acceptance of Policy Alternative (4)

In his suggestion made on December 5, 1946, Dr. Stuart felt that the Generalissimo should be told that if he reformed the Kuomintang and

¹Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of States, Ibid, pp. 616-617
broadened the Government on a democratic basis, he could expect American aid in military and economic matters.¹

One month later when General Marshall abandoned his mediation efforts in China, the United States was forced into Dr. Stuart's suggestion, or the above-mentioned policy alternative (4). By 1947, the United States confronted the Chinese situation unable to pursue any rational course.

A policy of strict impartiality posed serious problems. Given the strong stance of the pro-Chiang members in the Congress, such a policy would surely be met with strong political opposition.

Another consideration carried more weight. The superfluity of incompetence among officials of the Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang's inability to gird itself to gain public support, meant that a completely neutral United States policy would amount abandoning China to Communism. Since the CCP's triumph in China would be viewed as the domination of the country by the Soviet Union, the possibility of adopting a policy likely leading to such a fatal outcome was naturally ruled out.

The decision to provide all-out military assistance to the Nationalists was as unsound as it had been two years before. Total extinction of the Communist forces appeared to be an optimistic fallacy, even with unreserved American involvement.

The prospect that such involvement might run into a possible conflict with the Soviet Union, when the Cold War was already creating

undesired tension among the two rival powers, inhibited bold decision making.

This was the predicament confronting the U. S. administration when the policy of negotiation fell apart. The challenge from communism had to be dealt with seriously, but radical intervention in China would overtax America's capability and call its perceived interests into question.

The vision was narrowed and the proposed course was eventually followed. Hence the Wedemeyer Mission of July 16 to September 18, 1947. As he specified in his report to the president:

China is suffering increasingly from disintegration. Her requirements for rehabilitation are large. Her most urgent needs include governmental reorganization and reform, reduction of the military budget and external assistance.

A program of aid, if effectively employed, would bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and would contribute to gradual development of stability in China.

Due to excessive and oppressions by government police agencies basic freedoms of the people are being jeopardized. Maladministration and corruption cause a loss of confidence in the government. Until drastic political and economic reforms are undertaken United States aid cannot accomplish its purpose.¹

The aid was lavishly granted but the reform was not implemented. Policy alternative (4) met with the same fate of that of (3).

In discussion of the rationale of the American policy towards China in the period of 1944 to 1949, it is perhaps important to bear in mind that though American China policy did fail, it did not cause the failure of the Nationalist China. The unsuccessful mediation during 1944-46 and unwise military aid to the KMT during 1947-49 were not the most important factor affecting the development in China. The United States did not lose China in 1949 and could not have retained her then had the policy been different.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, America's failure in China was inevitable. Such a conclusion is not meant to be fatalistic. A price has to be paid for erroneous conceptions.

Historically, a tension between American ideals and self-interests existed in the United States China policy which has manifested itself as a varying mixture of democratic idealism and selfish imperialism. Now converging and now competing, this basic dichotomy has traditionally provided a policy formula imbued with ambivalence and inconsistency.

Being militarily strong and economically successful, the United States emerged from the war with a sense of pride and moral righteousness, enormous faith in the uniqueness of American ideals, Christian values, the frontier spirit, democracy, republicanism and a belief that the dynamic force behind American social and economic progress could work universally. Communism was considered as heresy and the antithesis of all American faiths and Chinese communism was no exception.

The pursuit of national interests, on the other hand, dictated that the United States had high stakes in China. This realization brought merchants, missionaries and politicians to the Orient for commerce, salvation and political alliance. The dualities frequently presented the American policy-makers with a need to make choices.

The outward thrust of the United States since the end of World War II marked the suspension of isolationism and the commencement of expansion of American influence worldwide. Many Americans were
convinced that their victorious status imparted to them a concomitant responsibility for the post-war world. In China as well as in other parts of the world, the U. S. government assumed the duty of international policeman.

The role of arbitration, however, was not always complementary, it posed problems as well. When the American efforts at unifying China through peaceful means failed, the ambiguity of purposes, the Cold War consciousness and the pro-Chiang sentiments in the U. S. Congress all prompted the country into deeper involvement in China.

The admission that the United States did fail in China in the 1944-49 period by no means justifies the "loss-of-China" theory. The conceptual confusion of the theory lies in that its two basic presuppositions, i. e., China being owned by one power and lost to another, are ill-founded.

Professor Fairbank proved to be a most far-seeing expert in the field when he asserted in 1948:

It is incredible that Modern China, the greatest and oldest single mass of humanity, could be brought into the orbit of any foreign power—Russian, American, or any other—except in so far as China's own inner development itself conduced to such an orientation.1

The implication that China had not been owned by the United States and therefore could not be lost to the Soviet Union did not sink in until reality drove it home decades later.

1John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 3-4
The argument about "the loss of China" suggests at least two lessons for policy makers. First, no country should make an effort to get entangled with the internal affairs of another before making sure that such entanglement will not overtax the country's economic, political and military capacities. The case of China as well as those of Korea and Vietnam left enough grounds for doubting the wisdom of America's involvement. The United States might have been much better off and exerted much greater influence over events, if more detached stances had been assumed.

Second, different cultures, value standards and ideological beliefs should not be an obstacle to normal relations between nations. In our present world, diversification rather than uniformity characterizes human relations. Hostility and confrontation hurt all while mutual understanding and interdependence are not only possible but have almost become a precondition of the very existence of human beings.

It is gratifying that China and the United States have bridged over profound suspicion and enmity today. The lessons of the past should always be kept in mind. In our present delicately balanced world, the very survival of mankind requires mutual understanding and collaboration.
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