Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work.

Shum Kui-Kwong
ABSTRACT

In late 1934, the Chinese Communists were forced to evacuate the Kiangsi Soviet by the Nationalists' Fifth Encirclement Campaign. The defeat, as the Chinese Communists perceived, was not due to the failure of the land revolution in capturing the support of the peasant masses, but to their isolation from the bourgeois strata in the nation at large.

Consequently, in the summer of 1935 Ch'en Shao-yü put forward the anti-imperialist united front tactics at the Seventh Comintern Congress, shifting the relative emphasis of the Party from the land revolution to the anti-imperialist struggle. The new tactics called for a relaxation of the struggle against rich peasants, small landlords and the national bourgeoisie, so as to facilitate the united front "from above" with other political groups and armies against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. Ch'en's proposals were adopted by the CCP's Wayaopao Conference of December 1935.

From 1936 onwards, both the Comintern and the CCP gradually realized the desirability of bringing Chiang Kai-shek into the alliance, and repeated overtures were made to Chiang. The CCP's peace efforts, however, obtained no results until the Sian Incident of December 1936. In the ensuing negotiation with the KMT, the CCP agreed to cease confiscating the landlords' land as a condition for the formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front.

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Conflicts developed between Ch'en Shao-yü and Mao over the proper strategies for the expansion of the Party. Ch'en's approach was based on Lenin's formula of the united front, which stressed the utilization of legal and democratic channels for the expansion of the Party's influence amongst the masses. Mao's strategy was premised on the construction of rural guerrilla bases under the protection of the united front. For a brief period, Ch'en's strategy gained notable successes but the KMT reacted by clamping down the CCP's mass organizations in Wuhan. At the Sixth Plenum of October 1938, Mao privately discredited Ch'en's approach as inappropriate for China.
With the rapid deterioration in KMT-CCP relations and the changes in the international situation which demanded the CCP to rely exclusively on its own effort to sustain the Resistance, Mao's rural strategy gained ascendancy in the Party. Nevertheless, Mao retained the united front policy for the purposes of forestalling full-scale Nationalist attack on the CCP and of securing the cooperation of the landlord-capitalist elites, so as to stabilize the Communist base areas and isolate the KMT. This dualistic approach remained the CCP's policy even after the New Fourth Army Incident of 1941, and laid the foundation of the CCP's ultimate victory which was based on the support of the lower masses as well as the national and petty bourgeoisie.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  

PREFACE  

INTRODUCTION  

CHAPTER  

ONE  FROM LAND REVOLUTION TO THE UNITED FRONT: ORIGINS OF A NEW STRATEGY: (1935-36)  

TWO  FROM ANTI-CHIANG TO UNITE WITH CHIANG: THE FORMATION OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT (1936-37)  

THREE  THE UNITED FRONT AND THE RURAL STRATEGY: CH'EN SHAO-YÜ AND MAO TSE-TUNG IN CONFLICT (1937-38)  

FOUR  UNITY AND STRUGGLE: THE ASCENDANCY OF MAO'S LINE ON THE UNITED FRONT (1938-40)  

FIVE  NEW DEMOCRACY AND "MASS-LINE" POLITICS: TRIUMPH OF MAOISM (1941-45)  

EPILOGUE AND EVALUATION  

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BI  Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Justics, Taipei.
CCP  Chinese Communist Party
HI  Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.
IR  Institute of International Relations, Taipei.
KM  Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, Tokyo.
KMT  Kuomintang
MTTC  Mao Tse-tung chi (Hong Kong: I-shan t' u-shu, 1976), 10 vols. (Except for difference in pagination, this collection is identical with Takeuchi Minoru, ed., Mō Takuto shū [Tokyo: Hokubo sha, 1971-72], 10 vols.)
RRS  Russian Returned Students
TB  Tōyō Bunko, Tokyo.
PREFACE

This is a new interpretation of the intraparty politics of the CCP in the period 1935-45. For a long time, the study of the Chinese Communist movement in the pre-1949 period has been influenced by the official Chinese Communist version of Mao's relentless struggle against the erroneous tendencies of his former opponent Ch'en Shao-yü (alias Wang Ming), who was his principal rival in the Party between 1931-42. Ch'en's mistakes, it is asserted, were directly responsible for the defeat suffered by the Communists at the hands of the Nationalist forces in 1934. It was only after 1935, when Mao assumed control and direction of the Chinese Communist movement, that the CCP was able to gradually rid itself of the disastrous policies of Ch'en and advanced on the road to victory.

When I began my postgraduate study at the University of Hong Kong under the supervision of Dr. Lee Ngok in 1971, I had but the slightest notion that this official version of the intraparty politics of the CCP is a much exaggerated account devised by the Chinese Communist historians to uphold Mao's ideological infallibility. But I was intrigued by the wholesale re-writing of Party history vis-à-vis the then thoroughly discredited Party leader Liu Shao-ch'i in the aftermaths of the Cultural Revolution. Liu, an active promoter of the Maoist cult in the early forties and one-time Mao's heir-apparent, whose contribution to the Party's work in the "white areas" was formally recognized in official documents, was suddenly denounced as a follower of Ch'en Shao-yü and a consistent opponent of Mao's ideological line in the Party. The same process was soon repeated for Lin Piao, not long ago acclaimed Mao's "close comrade-in-arms", whose writings on military strategy were generally regarded as Mao's replica, who was suddenly accused of long-time opposition to Mao's policies following his unsuccessful coup against Mao. It occurred to me then, as it still occurs to me now, that if over a dispute of current issues the career of a disgraced opponent can be mercilessly distorted, then a similar fate might have been installed for Ch'en Shao-yü.

It was primarily out of this consideration that I proposed to undertake a full-scale investigation into the career of Ch'en Shao-yü in the Chinese Communist movement in the period 1931-45 with the intention of verifying the extent of truth in the official Chinese Communist accounts. I started with the notion that Ch'en, unlike other
leaders, was a follower of the much discredited Stalinist line in China, such that the Maoist retrospective criticism of Ch'en is by and large valid. But the more I consulted the primary documents the more I found it difficult to reconcile myself to the official assertions of Mao's consistent struggle against Ch'en's policies in the earlier period. Because of the complexities of the problem, I decided to limit myself to a discussion of the intraparty politics of the CCP in the Kiangsi Period (1931-34). (See the introduction for a brief recapitulation of my findings.)

This present thesis is basically a continuation of my previous line of research onto the Yenan Period (1935-45). Needless to say, a considerable amount of my insights and perception of the problems are derived from my earlier thesis; regrettably, the details cannot be reproduced here. I shall, therefore, ask the reader to be tolerant of the assertions I make in this thesis with regard to the development of the Chinese Communist movement in the Kiangsi Period. (All of which, I should add, can be fully documented.)

In the preparation of this doctoral dissertation, I benefited enormously from a scholarship and a generous travel grant provided by the Australian National University, which enabled me to conduct an exhaustive search for source materials in Canberra, Hong Kong, Taipei, Tokyo and the United States. I am grateful to those in or visiting the Australian National University who offered helpful comments and suggestions at the series of seminars I gave on the basis of draft copies of my thesis, principally my supervisors Professor Wang Gungwu, Dr. Stephen FitzGerald and Dr. John Fincher. I am particularly indebted to Professor Wang Gungwu for his valuable guidance and many hours of helpful discussion; Dr. Louis Sigel for his generous assistance with the language and style of all my Seminar papers; and Dr. Adrian Chan of the University of New South Wales for his interest and critical comments. Last but not the least, I wish to thank my friend and junior colleague from my Alma Mater Mr. Herbert Huey for his painstaking assistance in proof-reading the entire manuscript. It goes without saying that I am solely responsible for everything that is said in this thesis and that all possible faults and shortcomings are entirely my own.
Also, I wish to thank the library staff of the Bureau of Investigation and the Institute of International Relations of Taipei for their exceptional helpfulness and assistance in my quest for primary documentation. In addition, I wish to express my appreciation to my colleagues in the School of History, University of New South Wales, for reducing my work-load to the minimum so as to enable me to complete my dissertation during term-time. As always, the encouragement and support of my wife, Shui-har, is indispensable.

University of New South Wales

K. K. Shum

March 1979
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to re-examine the intraparty politics of the CCP in the period 1935-45 through a study of the respective roles of Ch'en Shao-yll and Mao Tse-tung in the formulation and development of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy. Through this analysis, it is hoped that the character and direction of the Chinese Communist movement in the Yenan Period can be determined and that a plausible answer can be provided to the often sought question: How did the Chinese Communist revolution succeed?

The "Bias" against Ch'en Shao-yll

Since the early fifties, when historians began to study the Chinese Communist movement in earnest, they were presented with a highly dramatised version of Mao's intensive struggle in the thirties against the erroneous policies of Ch'en Shao-yll, leader of a group of top functionaries in the CCP commonly known as the Russian Returned Students (RRS). Ch'en was described as a "dogmatist" who attempted to apply mechanically Marxism-Leninism to China; his errors consisted of "leftist opportunism" in the Kiangsi Period (1931-34) and "rightist opportunism" in the Yenan Period (1935-45). The history of the intraparty politics of the CCP, it is asserted, was a constant "struggle between two lines" with Mao upholding consistently the correct ideological line, as opposed to Ch'en's erroneous line, which laid the foundation for the victory of the Chinese Communist revolution.

In the early pioneer days of research on the Chinese Communist movement, basic materials on the Chinese Communist movement were scanty and difficult to access, so that historians were not provided with the necessary tools to question seriously the authenticity of the official accounts. (It was seldom realized, for example, that Mao's Selected Works is a highly selective presentation of Mao's writings, with evidence that contradict the official version completely expurgated from its texts or totally suppressed from our knowledge.) Moreover, in the Cold War atmosphere of the time, most western scholars working on communism were induced to succumb, rightly or wrongly, to the notion that Stalin was the evil-genius who subjugated all Communist parties to the dictates of Russian interests.
By the same token, Ch'en Shao-yü, being Stalin's proxy in China, was also regarded as the arch villain whose policies Mao had to resist. Above all, the historical development of the CCP itself seems to lend strong support to the credibility of the official accounts. During the Kiangsi Period, when Mao's authority in the military and Party machines was eroded by the RRS, the Chinese Communists suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Nationalist forces. At the start of the Long March, Mao reasserted his influence in the Party at the Tsunyi Conference and thenceforth the Party grew by leaps and bounds until victory was won. The fortunes of the Chinese Communist movement seemed to tie up closely with the ups and downs of Mao's power. The fact that all Party leaders rallied to Mao's leadership also bears witness to the correctness of his ideology.

Once the official version is sanctioned by eminent scholars, it gained general acceptance and few historians have attempted to look closer at the documentary evidence to verify the extent of accuracy of the official accounts. \(^2\) Worse still, certain historians, proceeding with preconceived notions of Ch'en Shao-yü's deviations from Mao, read into the documents what they conceive as logical explanation for the retrospective criticisms of Ch'en. Thus, for the Kiangsi Period, because of the Maoist charge of "leftist opportunism", every policy statement made by Ch'en is considered to be on the "left" of Mao and hence totally ineffective in developing the Party's forces. On the other hand, for the Yenan Period, because of the Maoist charge of "rightist opportunism", every policy statement made by Ch'en is considered to be on the "right" of Mao and thereby detrimental to the Party's interests. (Interestingly, in the process these writers contradict each other. Those who work on Kiangsi claim that Mao had all along favoured moderate treatment of landlords and capitalists, the united front from above [i.e., alliance with the national bourgeoisie], and moderation of the class struggle in the interests of the national struggle against Japanese imperialism, and was unable to carry these policies out until 1935 when his power was secure. Those who work on Yenan, however, assert that Mao wished to retain the harsh treatment of landlords, place emphasis on the united front from below [i.e., alliance with the lower masses], and retain the class struggle inspite of the emphasis on the national struggle after 1935! We are thus left uncertain as to Mao's actual stand on these issues in regard to the Chinese revolution.)
It is not my intention to argue that all Maoist retrospective criticisms of Ch'en are sheer fabrications manufactured in the aftermath of Mao's political victory; indeed, it would be absurd to assume that the two leaders did not have disagreement and conflict over policies. What I am proposing is simply that there is a considerable amount of revision and distortion of the historical facts inherent in the Maoist school of historiography designed to relegate his former opponents to a position of disgrace and insignificance for the sake of bolstering up Mao's ideological infallibility. For example, Ch'en Shao-yü's effective leadership in the anti-Li Li-san struggle was actually recognized as one of Ch'en's important contributions up to the early forties (see Chapter Five), but this has eluded the attention of historians because in the official Maoist accounts Ch'en is being accused of "reviving Li Li-san's errors" and Mao is described as the only opponent of Li Li-san. Similarly, Ch'en Shao-yü's initiation of the August First Declaration, a statement still being considered of great historical significance by the Chinese Communists, is blotted out from the official record (see Chapter One).

It is my observation, therefore, that the general credence given to the official Chinese Communist assertions has obscured our understanding of many important issues in the development of the Chinese Communist movement. Specifically, it has led to an oversimplified and over-polarized perception of the intraparty conflicts within the CCP, with Mao and Ch'en always being placed in open and irreconcilable positions, whereas the historical record might warrant a different interpretation. Secondly, it has led to an unduly exaggerated vision of Mao's ideological creativeness and consistency, with Mao being depicted as a prophet-like figure who already possessed the blueprint for the correct revolutionary strategies in the late twenties but was only prevented from implementing them until 1935, whereas presumably Mao, like other revolutionaries, acquired the proper techniques after repeated trials-and-errors. Above all, it has prevented us from making a proper assessment of the effectiveness of the CCP policy programmes in the Kiangsi and Yenan Periods. It is an unfortunate assumption, for example, to regard the land revolution as an ineffective means of capturing peasant support on the basis of the Maoist retrospective criticism of the RRS's "leftist" errors in
Kiangsi. Likewise, it is also an inept judgement to consider Communist victory in the Yenan Period as built on the foundation of a radical orientation of the land programme on account of the fact that Ch'en Shao-yü is being criticized for "rightist opportunism". (See below.)

The Maoist Historical Revisionism: the Kiangsi Period

According to the "Resolution on Some Historical Problems" adopted by the Maoist Party machine in 1945, in the period 1931-34 the Party leadership suffered from errors of "leftist opportunism" which were expressed in the following: failure to rectify the Li Li-san line and replacement of it by a more adventuristic programme of seizure of cities; underestimation of the importance of the construction of rural revolutionary bases and objection to the "peculiar revolutionary potentials" of the peasantry in China; radical orientation of land and economic policies and refusal to recognize the necessity to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie and intermediate groups in the struggle against Japan; and finally opposition to Mao's correct military strategy based on the application of guerrilla warfare. The result of my findings, however, contradicts the validity of the official version on many issues. Owing to the limited space here, only a summary can be provided.

After their return to China in late 1929, Ch'en Shao-yü and his associates began to perceive Li Li-san's deviation from the Comintern line and conduct a lone campaign against the Party leadership. Their principal objection to Li was the Comintern's insistence on the consolidation of the Soviet areas and the strengthening of the Red Army prior to the seizure of cities. Following their assumption of power at the Fourth Plenum of January 1931, therefore, the RRS proceeded with the task of unifying the various Soviet areas and creating a centralized Soviet Government. At the First National Soviet Congress of November 1931, they introduced a radical programme of land, labour and economic policies as well as the united front from below which were designed to give a clear class orientation to the Soviet regions for the purpose of drawing the populace into political activity. They also helped to set up a governmental and civil administrative apparatus in the Soviet regions which enabled the CCP to proclaim for the first
time a viable alternative to the Nationalist rule. In these respects, they received the support of Mao who at this stage did not yet possess a clear and definite ideology regarding the Chinese revolution.

The RRS, however, were still concerned with the advancing of the revolution in the urban centres. Yet in contrast to Li Li-san who attempted to carry out workers' insurrection in the major urban centres to be coordinated with Red Army's attacks, the RRS were far more prudent in their approach and never ventured beyond the actual taking of county seats or lesser cities by the Red Army along the periphery of the Soviet areas - a move supported by Mao who personally commanded the attack on Chang-chou in early 1932. But a dispute over the proper military tactics occurred between the RRS and Mao in August 1932 which resulted in Mao's loss of leadership in the military command. Amidst the progress in mass mobilization and expansion of the Red Army, the RRS's tactics of mobile-positional warfare successfully defended the Soviet region against the KMT's Fourth Encirclement Campaign.

Beginning in 1933, the existing economic difficulties in the Soviet areas forced the RRS to modify the excessively harsh policy towards the capitalists within the Soviet regions and adopt a more flexible approach to the united front. They failed, however, to effect a significant breakthrough in their policy owing to the desire to achieve maximum mobilization of the masses in the ongoing struggle against the KMT's Encirclement Campaigns. They thereby retained the radical orientation of the land programme and intensified the struggle against rich peasants and landlords by initiating the "Land Investigation Campaign". Consequently, they failed to secure a meaningful cooperation with the Fukien Rebels who revolted against the Nationalist Government in November 1933 because of their insistence that a united front from above was predicated on a solid united front from below.

Throughout the Kiangsi Period, Mao, in his capacity of Chairman of the Central Soviet Government, issued numerous directives and policy statements that were in consonance with the decisions of the RRS. His report to the Second National Soviet Congress of January 1934, for example, proclaimed general successes in the land investigation campaign and affirmed the correctness of the refusal to
cooperate with the Fukien Rebels. The extent to which Mao committed himself to the RRS's policies casts serious doubt on the proposition of some historians that Mao was speaking under duress and that his statements should not be taken as a reflection of his true opinions.

Nevertheless, Mao continued to clash with the RRS over the problem of military strategy in the counteroffensive against the KMT's Fifth Encirclement Campaign. The conflict was accentuated after the battle of Kuang-ch'ang in April 1934, when Mao withheld his collaboration from the Central Party leadership and went to the front to canvass support of dissident military commanders. With the final defeat and evacuation of the Kiangsi Soviet, Mao mustered enough backing from the military to take over control of the Red Army Command and gained access to the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935. Because the only area of major confrontation between Mao and the RRS had been over military strategy, and because the land revolution did achieve a remarkable degree of success in the mobilization of the masses, the Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference confirmed the correctness of the political line of the Party and directed the blunt of its attack on the mistaken military strategy.

Ten years later, following Mao's victory over Ch'en Shao-yü in the dispute of proper revolutionary strategies, and in reaction to the scathing attacks of the KMT's propagandists and the imminence of civil war, the Party leadership cultivated the Maoist cult to back up the Party's claim to national leadership. As a result, the Resolution depicted an unambiguous struggle between Mao's allegedly realistic policy of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie and a moderate land reform programme featuring non-violent struggle against rich peasants and ordinary landlords, and the "leftist" isolationist policy of the RRS who refused to allow class collaboration and insisted on an all-out struggle against rich peasants, landlords and capitalists. The motive was to consolidate Mao's position as the consistent upholder of the correct ideological line in the Party, in order to legitimize the CCP's policy of class collaboration as the established strategy of the Party and bolster up the confidence of the Party members. (See Chapter Five.)
The history of the CCP's internal politics during the Kiangsi Period, therefore, is far from being a simple, clear-cut "struggle between two lines" as the Chinese Communist historians would have us believe. It is reasonable to assume that in a communist system, the successful protagonist of a power struggle invariably seek to subordinate history to the political needs of the regime; the onus of past failures is conveniently bequeathed to the vanquished, whose contribution are totally written off the record or even appropriated by the surviving heroes. (History bears witness to numerous cases of this type of historical revisionism: Stalin on Trotsky; Mao on Kao Kang, P'eng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, Ch'en Po-ta, and the Gang of Four on Teng Hsiao-p'ing.) As historians, therefore, we must guard ourselves against superficial acceptance of official Party interpretation.

The Historical significance of the Anti-Japanese United Front

In accounting for the victory of the Chinese Communist revolution, Chalmers Johnson attributes it to the outburst of peasant nationalism in reaction to the Japanese aggression in North China which the CCP was able to exploit and harness through their leadership in the War of Resistance. His thesis has been challenged by a number of scholars, notably Mark Selden who points out that a more important factor was the ability of the Chinese Communists to champion the cause of social revolution by offering safeguards to the peasants against landlord exploitation, thus winning over their allegiance.

I have no intention to get embroiled in the debate; admittedly, peasants would respond to both sets of factors given the proper impetus and direction of the Communist Party. But the mobilization of the peasantry alone, whether by nationalism or social revolution or even both, is not, in my opinion, the whole answer to the rise of communism in China. An equally significant factor, which both historians seem to have neglected, is the success of the CCP in winning over the support or sympathy of the bourgeois strata in the Anti-Japanese United Front Period.
Before I elaborate on this proposition, an attempt must be made to sum up the development of the Chinese Communist strategy from its very inception. It is a well-known fact that the CCP, in line with Lenin's *Thesis on the Colonial and National Question* (1920) and under the direct instructions of the Comintern, entered into a united front with the KMT in 1924-27 for the common tasks of carrying out the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord struggle. The original objective behind the move, it is clear, was to entrench the CCP inside the KMT, expand its influence among the masses, capture the leadership of the national revolution and eventually attempt a coup de'etat. In 1927, however, the First United Front was abruptly terminated by Chiang Kai-shek who brutally suppressed the Communists. What the Communists learnt as a lesson, in my opinion, was that without their own army, their own territorial base and maximum mobilization of the masses they could not effectively challenge the KMT. The Sixth CCP Congress held in Moscow in 1928, therefore, called for the expansion of the Soviet movement, the strengthening of the Red Army and the adoption of united front from below. These policies were carried out in the Kiangsi Period (with minor modifications towards the end); but once again the Communists were disastrously defeated.

What the Communist leaders perceived as the cause of failure, I infer, was the alienation of the Party from the bourgeois strata in the nation resulting in their isolation. It should be realized that the radical orientation of the land revolution was in fact highly successful in mobilizing the peasant masses within the Kiangsi Soviet, as demonstrated by the large-scale recruitments into the Red Army, the maximum mobilization of human and economic resources to support the war, and the heroic defence of the Communist base against enemy far superior in number, armament and material resources for a number of years. Their ultimate defeat was due not so much to an inherent lack of appeal of the agrarian revolution but to the overwhelmingly superior forces of counterrevolution. From the Communists' point of view, in addition to their military superiority and the support of imperialist powers (which were factors beyond the Communists' control), the Nationalists also received the solid backing of the landlord-capitalist elites in the nation (factors which, however, could be manipulated).
It is well-known that the Nationalist regime derived its social and economic support primarily from the landlord class and the urban bourgeoisie. These classes, who were the traditional or newly emerging elites in society wielding strong economic power, was a powerful force in the nation. So long as their direct interests were threatened by the prospect of a communist revolution, however, they would tend to side with the Nationalists. This applies to not only the compradors (i.e., upper or big bourgeoisie) and the national bourgeoisie, but also the majority of the petty bourgeoisie who loathed such communist practices as class struggle and the confiscation of private property — such issues were skilfully exploited by the Nationalists in their propaganda against the Communists — even though they might be dissatisfied with the KMT's external policies towards Japan. Likewise, the landlords and rich peasants in the countryside, whose property rights were being threatened or violated by the Communists, were doing everything in their power to mobilize the rural populace to assist the Nationalists and warlords in their campaigns to suppress the Communists, such as the organization of the pao-chia system of mutual surveillance in the villages and the formation of the Peace Preservation Militia Corps. As a result, not only were the Communists confronted by a hostile intermediate section all over the country, they were severely isolated in their own territorial enclaves and unable to extend their influence outward to reach the worker-peasant populace at large.

Consequently, the experience in Kiangsi showed to the Chinese Communists that no matter how well organized were the Communist forces and no matter how successful was the land revolution in mobilizing the peasant masses, their strength was still insufficient to challenge the reactionary forces. Learning from this mistake, the CCP leaders worked out the Anti-Japanese United Front policy, which undercut the emphasis on the social revolution (i.e., the anti-feudal struggle) and directed the blunt of Communist attack on the external invaders (i.e., the anti-imperialist struggle). Through this approach, the opposition from the bourgeoisie and landlords was neutralized, the reactionary camp split up, and the deadliest enemy of the KMT isolated. Simultaneously, of course, the Communists retained a moderate social reform programme which catered to the basic interests of the worker-peasant masses, and continued the consolidation and expansion of the rural base areas under the protective cover of the united front. As a result, the
CCP was able to equip itself militarily and win over the support of the landlord-bourgeois classes at the exclusion of the KMT. These twin policies enabled the CCP to grow and expand dramatically during the Yenan Period. (In other words, it was a victory born out of the defeats of both 1927 and 1935.)

According to Johnson, however, the united front could scarcely be regarded as the vehicle by which the Communists came to power. It did not help, in the functional sense, to mobilize the peasants or promote acceptance of Communist Party leadership in the North China guerrilla bases. Neither did it prevent friction between the CCP and the KMT nor facilitate Communist expansion into KMT-controlled areas. When the KMT began to blockade the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region in 1939, the united front became clearly a facade; after the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941 it practically ceased to exist. This is to define the united front in the narrow sense of a bipartisan alliance between the CCP and the KMT, and is clearly a misconception. To the Chinese Communists, the Anti-Japanese United Front signified a much broader application of a "class policy" (chih-chi ch'eng-tes'e), which entailed collaboration of the Communist forces with the entire bourgeois strata with the exception of traitors, of which the KMT-CCP alliance (kuo-kung ho-tao) was only one aspect of it. Although Selden interprets the united front in this light, he shares Johnson's view, however, that after 1941 the policy of class collaboration gave way to the revival of class struggle in the countryside. According to my own understanding, the New Fourth Army Incident demonstrated to the Chinese Communists that certain section of the KMT, namely the "anti-Communist diehards", who represented the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, had turned "counter-revolutionary"; it did not affect the CCP's policy of cooperation with the remaining majority of the bourgeois strata, including the "enlightened" gentry, which continued into the Civil War Period (1945-49).

This is not to say, of course, that the CCP neglected the social aspect of the revolution and the importance of the politicization and mobilization of the masses. However, the CCP's attempt to activate the masses were never allowed to develop to the extent of directly threatening the existence of the united front. In this sense, therefore, class struggle was still subordinated to national struggle (i.e., the
Anti-Japanese War. It would not be an exaggeration to say, therefore, that the Anti-Japanese United Front was the guiding principle throughout the entire Yenan Period. Its paramount importance is undoubtedly the reason why official Chinese Communist chroniclers designate this period as the stage of the Anti-Japanese United Front (k'ang-jih min-tsu t'ung-i- chan-hsien shih-ch'i). Its function and interrelationship to other strategies are best summed up by Mao in 1939 (and again in 1949): "the united front, armed struggle and Party construction are the three magic weapons of the Chinese Communist Party to win victory over the enemy." (See Chapters Four and Five.)

Interestingly, in the People's Republic of China, the legacy of the Yenan Period is officially canonized as the "Yen-an tso-feng" (Yenan Work-style) but not "Yen-an tao-lu" (Yenan Way). The reason, I suggest, is that the term "tao-lu" implies a precise model which should be followed for the creation of a socialist society; whereas "tso-feng" refers to the behaviour of Party members and the masses. Since the Yenan stage of the revolution stressed class collaboration (which is best represented by Mao's formulae of "New Democracy" and the "three-thirds system"), it has long since become obsolescent if not obsolete in the days of the "Maoist era".

Mao's Signification of Marxism-Leninism

In contrast to Ch'en Shao-yü's "dogmatism," Mao's ability to undertake a "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" in China is generally understood to consist of the following: the strategy of "surrounding the cities with the countryside", the organization and mobilization of the peasantry as the "main force" of the revolution, the construction of rural revolutionary bases, the application of guerrilla warfare as the principal form of combat, the principle of "unity and struggle" in the United front, and the inclusion of the national bourgeoisie in the "New Democratic" and socialist stages of the revolution. In the early fifties, Chinese writers publicly acknowledge that the theoretical basis of these strategies came directly from Stalin. In later years, however, Mao was reported to have castigated Stalin as a source of "dogmatism" in the Party.
Students of Chinese Communism are familiar with the 'Karl A. Wittfogel versus Benjamin Schwartz' and 'Stuart R. Schram versus Arthur A. Cohen' debates on the validity of Mao's claim to originality in these areas. It would be impossible to attempt to summarize their elaborated arguments here; suffice it to note that while Wittfogel and Cohen contend that both Lenin and Stalin had preceded Mao by emphasizing the importance of organizing the peasantry in China and developing the concept of the "four-class alliance" (i.e., workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie) in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution, Schram and Schwartz note that Mao's emphasis on the "peculiar revolutionary character of the peasantry", his exclusive reliance on self-sustaining rural Soviets, his neglect for the organization of the proletariat in the cities, and his assigning a "long-term" role to the national bourgeoisie in the Chinese revolution do represent significant departures from Marxism-Leninism. Recently, Hsiao Tso-liang and Richard C. Thornton have added support to the Wittfogel-Cohen school by asserting that the strategy of fighting from the countryside to the cities was fully supported, if not actually inspired, by Stalin.

To assess the pros and cons of Mao's theoretical originality on the basis of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrines is beyond the scope of this thesis. I would, however, offer an alternative approach to the problem, i.e., by comparing the ideas and policies of Ch'en Shao-yü and Mao. On the assumption that Ch'en represented the Stalinist approach to the Chinese revolution, I would argue that the any point of concurrence between Ch'en and Mao (if any) would indicate that Mao inherited or received his ideas from Stalin, while any point of difference would substantiate Mao's originality. By the same token, we can pinpoint the meaning and scope of the much-publicized Maoist "Sinification of Marxism-Leninism".

At this point, an intriguing question will emerge: if Ch'en Shao-yü was a follower of Stalin and pursued policies that were diametrically opposite to Mao's, why are the official historians able to trace Mao's ideas back to Stalin and put them on the other side of Ch'en? Our answer can either be that Maoist historians are fabricating similarities between Mao and Stalin for certain reason - such as to appease Stalin or to legitimize Mao's ideological orthodoxy - or Ch'en Shao-yü was in fact not a follower of Stalin.
Yet every historian would agree that Ch'en Shao-yü, beyond reasonable doubt, was the follower and executor of Stalin's line in China. Not only did he receive his early training in Moscow in the late twenties where he earned a "reputation" for being a Stalinist or a "thorough Bolshevik", he and his associates were solidly backed by the Comintern to assume control of the CCP in 1930-31. Between 1931 and 1937, he worked closely with the Comintern leaders and in 1935 was made a member of the Presidium of the Comintern. In 1937, he was again dispatched back to China under explicit instructions from Stalin to supervise the Anti-Japanese United Front. Even after his downfall, when Soviet writers largely acknowledged Mao's unique contribution to the Chinese revolution, no analysis of the "errors" of Ch'en was ever drawn up in Moscow. At present, he is extolled as a fervent internationalist and a tested fighter of the Comintern line in China. (He is no longer linked to Stalin, naturally, because the latter has been posthumously disgraced.)

We are thus left with the alternative that Mao had contrived his indebtedness to Stalin. Yet this is clearly impossible if Mao's and Stalin's thought are not tangential at the very least. In fact, Maoist writers confidently cite from Stalin and the Comintern's resolutions to substantiate their arguments. What is more, several historians, on the basis of their own extensive research, confirm that Stalin endorsed if not guided the CCP to the rural strategy and imparted to the CCP the concept of the "four-class alliance". This shows that Ch'en Shao-yü could not have rejected the importance of the rural strategy, opposed the expansion of the peasant movement, and failed to recognize the necessity to unite with the national bourgeoisie.

By the sheer logic of the arguments presented so far, it can be seen that the problem is far more complicated than a simple dichotomy between two lines as Maoist historians would have us believe. On the basis of my research, I have come to the conclusion that Ch'en, in line with Stalin's instructions, did attach great importance to the development of the rural Soviet movement from the start of the Kiangsi Period; unlike Mao, however, he was unwilling to devote the Party's resources exclusively to the countryside and would seek every available opportunity to expand the Party's influence in the cities. Similarly, he recognized, like Stalin, that the peasantry constituted the "main force" of the revolution and that without their
active participation the Chinese revolution could not succeed; but unlike Mao who considered that the peasantry in China had a "peculiar revolutionary character" and so it would be quite harmless if the composition of the Party was predominately rural, Ch'en adhered to the basic Marxist tenet that the peasants were basically petty bourgeois in their mentality and the Party should seek to increase worker elements as far as possible. 16 (These predispositions of Ch'en were reinstated in the period of the Anti-Japanese United Front.) It is true that after the KMT-CCP split in 1927, Ch'en adhered to (and so did Mao) the Comintern's position of refusal to ally with the national bourgeoisie; but he soon realized the inadvisability of this approach and, as the present thesis will show, the re-introduction of the national bourgeoisie into the revolutionary camp was his effort, not Mao's. Subsequently, Mao did assign to the national bourgeoisie a more permanent role in his notion of the "New Democratic" revolution in the form of the "dictatorship of several revolutionary classes" under the leadership of the proletariat, which Ch'en Shao-yü vehemently opposed. (See Chapter Four.) In addition, Mao introduced the novel concept of "unity and struggle" in the united front, and raised the importance of guerrilla warfare to a strategic level (see Chapter Three) which is unprecedented.

Thus, it is my contention that as far as the broad theoretical concepts of the Chinese revolution such as its bourgeois-democratic nature, reliance on the peasantry and alliance with the national bourgeoisie, Mao was not original as these ideas were laid down by Lenin and Stalin (and upheld by Ch'en Shao-yü); but in the adjustment, modification and adaptation of these concepts to Chinese conditions Mao's ideas were seminal and departed significantly from Stalin (and opposed by Ch'en Shao-yü). This explains why Mao could justifiably acknowledge his debts to Stalin but could also unequivocally pronounce him a source of "dogmatism" in the Party as the situation demands. In this context, we can see that there were important differences between Ch'en Shao-yü and Mao, but such differences have been greatly exaggerated in official accounts. My tentative conclusion on the problem of the originality of Mao's ideas is that while Mao had received considerable inspiration from the Comintern especially at the earlier stage of his career, he had incorporated many new elements and concepts in the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution — the latter tendency becoming increasingly conspicuous towards the latter part of the Yenan Period.
As this thesis is primarily a study of the politics of the Anti-Japanese United Front, it is well beyond its scope to discuss the epistemology of Mao's ideas. Questions of whether his concepts are within the orthodox framework or Marxism-Leninism or heterodox, or whether they are contribution mainly in the realm of revolutionary theory or practice are also excluded. An attempt will be made, however, to relate ideological differences between Mao and Ch'en to Marxist-Leninist principles where deemed necessary.

Review of Interpretations of the Internal Politics of the CCP during the Anti-Japanese United Front Period

According to official Chinese Communist accounts, during the Long March the CCP issued the August First Declaration which, followed by the December 25 Wayaopao Resolution, rectified the "leftist opportunist" mistakes of the previous leadership which refused to fraternize and unite with other anti-Japanese forces, including the national bourgeoisie and the "patriotic" landlords. In May and August 1936, the Party further modified its position from hostility towards Chiang Kai-shek to willingness for an alliance, which was upheld consistently even during the Sian Incident, paving the way for the establishment of the formal alliance between the two parties. Between late 1937 and October 1938, however, Ch'en Shao-yü put forward a policy of total "capitulation" to the KMT, but his deviations were overcome at the Sixth Plenum. In 1942, Mao launched the Cheng Feng Campaign to eliminate Ch'en's erroneous tendencies in the Party.

The oversimplification of the official version has long been noted by many historians. One school of thought, of which Lyman Van Slyke and Tokuda Noriyuki are exponents, questions seriously the validity of the retrospective Maoist criticisms of Ch'en Shao-yü's "rightist opportunist" errors. According to Van Slyke, "a close examination of the available evidence provides no clear support for the official position .... [Ch'en Shao-yü's] statements supported the KMT and the united front; but so did those from Yenan, and Ch'en seems no slower than other comrades to affirm that the CCP 'frankly announces that it does not reject its unique struggle for Communism'." He concludes, therefore, that "Mao's move against Ch'en was more a matter of factionalism than of doctrinal disagreement." His opinion is basically supported by Tokuda, who, citing especially Mao's report
at the Sixth Plenum of October 1938 and the fact that as late as
1940 the CCP was still calling for precaution against "leftist opportunism",
asserts that "it is difficult to prove any fundamental difference
between the two leaders on the basis of documentary evidence." 18

Another school of thought, which is represented by Gregor
Benton and Kataoka Tetsuya, holds that there were fundamental differences
between Mao and Ch'en throughout the entire period. According to Benton,
"[w]estern historians have tended to miss the far-reaching political
implications of the Mao-[Ch'en] clash" and mistaken it for "factional
disagreement." The origin of the August First Declaration, he claims,
is being misrepresented by the Chinese Communists "to avoid the
humiliating impression that policy was made by proxy in Moscow", in spite
of the fact that its content had been basically refuted by Mao's Wayaopao
Resolution. Ch'en's purpose was to secure an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek,
for which he was prepared to offer such concessions as the cessation of
the confiscation of landlords' land and the termination of the expansion
of the Soviet Areas. At the beginning, Mao strenuously resisted these
policies but, under heavy pressure from Moscow and in response to the
rising tides of nationalism in the country, reluctantly agreed to the
alliance with the KMT on condition that the CCP would enjoy full
autonomy. He reversed his stand, however, during the Sian
Incident but was forced to release Chiang Kai-shek under explicit orders
from Stalin. To overcome Mao's recalcitrance, Ch'en Shao-yü was dis-
patched back to China. In Wuhan, Ch'en proposed to the KMT the
fusion of Communist forces with the Nationalist Army which was tantau-
ment to turning them over to the KMT. His scheme, however, was
thwarted by Mao, who corrected his "rightist opportunism" at the Sixth
Plenum by nuanced statements in spite of outward conformity to Ch'en.
Since Ch'en still enjoyed the backing of Moscow, Mao had to wait until
Moscow's influence dwindled as a result of the German invasion of the
Soviet Union to launch the Cheng Feng Campaign against Ch'en. According
to Benton's estimation, all retrospective criticisms of Ch'en are
confirmed by the documentary evidence; he adds, moreover, Ch'en was in
fact formulating his policies "with one eye on the Soviet Union's
foreign policy needs". 19
Kataoka's book is based on the premise that the united front was essentially an urban strategy which "relies on the forces generated in the cities" to support the revolution. Ch'en Shao-yü's proposal for the united front, accordingly, was an attempt to "restore the revolution to the cities". Because Mao's strategy was based exclusively "on the forces generated in the countryside", Mao consistently resisted the united front and sought to carry on the radical orientation of the land revolution of the Kiangsi period. The politics of the CCP's Anti-Japanese United Front, therefore, was an "uneasy juxtaposition of two distinct strategies", i.e., city versus countryside, with both leaders seeking to advance the Party's influence according to their respective blueprints. Ch'en, therefore, made extensive concessions to the KMT to preserve the united front; Mao, on the other hand, concentrated on the expansion of the rural base areas and disregarded the united front. Mao's speech at the Sixth Plenum, he infers, was co-authored by Ch'en; the warning against "leftist opportunism" was actually the RRS's attack on Mao's "On New Democracy", which envisaged full socialism at the end of the war. By 1943, the forces of the countryside had outgrown the forces of the cities - owing to Ch'en's policy which had neutralized the opposition of the urban bourgeoisie - and Mao therefore abruptly terminated the united front and made preparations for a civil war. To deny the importance of the urban strategy to the revolution, Mao obscured the origin of the August First Declaration.

My interpretation differs moderately from Van Slyke and Tokuda and substantially from Benton and Kataoka. In the early stages of the formulation of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy, there was no essential difference between Mao and Ch'en Shao-yü, both of whom realized the desirability of the united front and moved cautiously towards an alliance with the KMT. Although the initiative was from the Comintern, there is no evidence to suggest that it was a case of ignominious curtailment of the CCP's growth on the part of Moscow. With the formal establishment of the United front, however, conflicts arose between the two leaders over the question of how best to capitalize on the opportunity to expand the Party's influence and power. Ch'en's approach was based on orthodox Leninist-Stalinist principles of a united front with bourgeois-reformist parties and groups when the Party's strength was insufficient to carry out the revolution single-handedly; the purpose of which was to expand the Party's
control over the masses - tactics best expounded in Lenin's "Left-wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder and Stalin's The Foundations of Leninism. According to Ch'en's plan, the CCP was to work closely with the KMT for the Resistance, press for democratic and other reforms so as to secure better legal opportunities for the Party to conduct its work and expand its influence amongst the masses (in both cities and countryside); while at the same time infiltrate the Nationalist government and army organization to undermine the efficacy of the Nationalist regime preparing the way for a future coup d'etat. His tactics achieved notable successes in Wuhan and North China, but the KMT reacted immediately by clamping down on the CCP's activities.

The essential difference between Mao and Ch'en Shao-yü was that Mao saw the united front primarily as an instrument to secure an armistice with the KMT so as to facilitate the expansion of communist guerrilla base areas through leadership in the resistance against Japan, as well as to secure the cooperation of the landlord-capitalist elites inside and outside the Communist base areas so as to stabilize the regime and isolate the KMT from the nation at large. At the Sixth Plenum, therefore, Mao gave his support to both the united front and the rural strategy. His line gained ascendancy in the Party amidst the rapid deterioration in KMT-CCP relations after October 1938, and the changes in the international situation which demanded greater reliance on the CCP's own resources to sustain the resistance. Ch'en Shao-yü's line was thus discarded. Subsequently, Mao's policy of continued expansion of Communist base areas did bring about an escalation of tension between the two parties, but under Mao's adroit manoeuvering (i.e., "unity and struggle") the CCP was able to maintain the united front with the KMT and continue the rural strategy through persistent emphasis on resistance and class collaboration (which accounts for the warnings against "leftist opportunism" in 1940). This dualistic policy was maintained up to 1945; the successful experience of the Anti-Japanese United Front was re-applied in the Civil War Period.
This analysis may help explain the apparent inconsistency in existing interpretations of the Mao-Ch'en confrontation during this period. On the surface, we can see that both leaders were alike in their emphasis on the importance of the united front; underlying their apparent unity, however, two different strategies for the expansion of the Party's power were pursued. Their different approaches account for the fact that Ch'en tended towards a more conciliatory posture towards the Nationalist Government, but there is no evidence to suggest that he ever compromised the Party's independence or renounced the ultimate goal of achieving communism. What appear as a conflict between two strategies to power becomes, under the pen of Maoist historians, a struggle between two lines with one seeking to undermine or destroy the Communist movement and the other courageously protecting and advancing the Party's interests. (The situation is analogous to the Mao-Liu conflict in the prelude to the Cultural Revolution, when apparently a difference in opinion over the right approach to the achieving of socialism is presented, by the Maoist writers, as a struggle between two lines with one seeking to restore capitalism and the other moving ahead to socialism.)

Nevertheless, while difference between Mao and Ch'en have been overdrawn in official accounts, arguments that Ch'en relied excessively on legalized work and underestimated the importance of rural revolutionary base as well as guerrilla warfare appear justified. In retrospect, it would seem that Ch'en had erred in his mechanical application of Lenin's formula of the united front to China where the conditions were drastically different from the Soviet Union: the lack of democratic and parliamentary institutions, the strength of the KMT in the cities, and its uncompromising anti-Communist stand - the KMT would have initiated a policy of containing the Communists once they started to expand, whether legally or illegally. The only practical way for the CCP to build up its strength was to concentrate on the development of the rural guerrilla bases, even at the risk of open confrontation with the local Nationalist forces. So long as these actions were strictly kept within limits and not permitted to disrupt the united front alliance with the KMT on a national level, the CCP's security would be ensured. Ch'en's mechanical approach to the united front, together with his other variance with Mao's strategies, do confirm the general impression of Ch'en as a "dogmatist".
Before I present my analysis of the documents, it is pertinent to discuss certain historiographical problems in my approach to the politics of the Anti-Japanese United Front, which may help to explain why I arrive at a different conclusion from other historians.

One advantage which I had was the wide range of source materials which were made available to me during the course of my research. The difficulty of obtaining first-hand materials on the Chinese Communist movement has often been noted. But there exists in the archives in Taipei, Tokyo and the Stanford University a rich stock of primary materials on the history of the Chinese Communist revolution especially on the period under review, consisting of Party documents, KMT and Japanese war-time intelligence reports - many of these materials were secret and internal - and analyses and recollections of contemporaries. (See the Selected Bibliography.) Some of these materials fill important gaps in our knowledge, provide clues to hitherto unresolved problems, and raise questions about seemingly settled issues. In addition, I have consulted all standard primary and secondary materials currently available in Chinese, Japanese and English, as well as a few important sources in Russian and German. Needless to say, I benefited enormously from the accumulated wisdom and experience of many historians who have written on the subject.

In the utilization of these materials, I have, as a rule, used with discretion post-1949 publications in China and the Soviet Union, the authenticity of which I am skeptical. My reasons for doubting the Chinese materials have been amply explained earlier. Equally misleading are the recent Soviet writings, which seek to project Mao as "anti-Leninist, anti-Comintern, anti-internationalist, and anti-socialist" in his approach to the Chinese revolution. Since collaboration with the national bourgeoisie as represented by the KMT in an anti-imperialist struggle was an original thesis of Lenin, these works aspire to show that Mao was a consistent opponent to the united front and a saboteur of the War of Resistance against Japan. If one relies heavily on these materials without seeking to corroborate them with contemporary documentary evidence, then one would naturally
come up with a perfect picture of Ch'en Shao-yü's alleged "rightist opportunism" - since Mao is being charged, conversely, with "leftist opportunism" by the Soviet writers. To say that these materials are of dubious value is not to say, however, that they should be dismissed as sheer fabrications; on the contrary, they do provide useful insights if supported by documentary and circumstantial evidence.

A word of caution must also be said against the tendency of projecting the present into the past. Normally historians gain better perspective of historical problems with the benefit of hindsight, but sometimes it can just as well obfuscate rather than clarify the issues. For instance, present-day recollections of the Long March, complemented by the fact that the Communists did rapidly recoup their strength and gain power, may give the impression that the Communist leaders at the time were confident of the Red Army's capability and the unswerving support of the masses and would see no necessity to compromise with the reactionary forces; but from Chang Kuo-t'ao's memoir we learn that even Mao and Chu Teh had an acute sense of isolation from the people and were quite worried over the possibility of the Communist forces being annihilated. Again, we may easily be persuaded by Mao's open defiance of Moscow in the late fifties into thinking that he and his followers had long slighted Stalin and the Comintern leadership. But from the reports of Edgar Snow and other contemporaries we learn that Stalin was the most popular foreign leader among the leftist student youths and that Soviet assistance to China's war efforts was greatly appreciated in many quarters. If Mao was as openly critical of Stalin in the thirties as some historians suggest, then he would be alienating himself from the progressive elements in the country, as well as aiding the CCP's critics who were seeking to vilify both the CCP and the Soviet Union. Consequently, I do not see any reason for doubting Mao's acumen in eulogizing Stalin and defending the conduct of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Furthermore, in a private letter written by Liu Shao-ch'i to Chang Wen-t'ien in 1937, it was asserted that the CCP was still weak and inexperienced and that Soviet tutelage and guidance was still indispensable. Even the dramatic assertion of the Party's independence and its discovery of an unique approach to communism during the Cheng Feng Campaign, as this study will show, was not meant as an open defiance of Moscow's authority.
In analyzing the intraparty relations between Ch'en Shao-yü and Mao, certain historians isolate their study to a textual comparison of the policy statements of the two leaders. They overlook that the CCP, like other political parties, had to constantly address itself to the public opinion in the country in order to capture its support. In particular, the CCP was incessantly assailed during this period by Trotskyites as well as by pro-Nationalist writers for collaborating with the national bourgeoisie or subverting the Government. (One of the most prolific and influential anti-Communist critics was Jen Tso-hsüan, alias Yeh Ch'ing, with whom the CCP leaders had a running battle.) Many of Mao's and Ch'en Shao-yü's critical remarks were in fact directed against such external opponents; yet when read out of context, they appear altercations alluding to each other. In connection, it should be noted that the CCP's constant emphasis that it had received no direct material aid from the Soviet Union and that it was not a puppet of the Soviet Union were not criticism of the interference of Moscow but a refutation against charges of Russian manipulation behind the scene.

One final comment on the inclination among certain historians to regard policy formulations as based on factional interests. It would be injudicious to deny the existence of factionalism within the CCP leadership; indeed, with such diverse background and intellectual outlook among the CCP leaders, it is inevitable that rival groups tended to polarize themselves regarding policy formulations. But to say, however, that for factional reasons Mao should criticize Ch'en Shao-yü but not Chou En-lai for working in the cities, or advocate the abondonment of Wuhan to deprive the RRS of an urban base, is to assume the Communist leaders to be the worst type of opportunists. Similarly, it would be inconceivable that Ch'en Shao-yü, for the sake of advancing his own career in the Comintern, would wilfully or willingly sacrifice the interests of the CCP for the security of the Soviet Union. I am inclined to believe that each CCP leader is a dedicated revolutionary who would give support to certain policies because in each's judgement they appear best-suited to the interests of the Party and to the practical circumstances of the time. (This does not nullify, of course, the fact that some leaders would make better judgements than others.) This accounts for the phenomenon that
Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai and other leaders might give their support to one set of policies or the other at different stages in accordance with their own perception of the actual situation - this would be incomprehensible if factional considerations were paramount.

Owing to the controversial nature of the issues, I have been particularly indulgent in the presentation of the documentary evidence so as to render a more detailed picture to the reader. I have no desire, however, to punctuate my work with differences with other historians - save for a brief recapitulation of existing controversies in the introduction to each Chapter and where necessary. This thesis is primarily a presentation of my own interpretation of the events.
Notes:

1 The RRS are known by other names as the "28 Bolsheviks", the Comintern Faction, the Internationalists or "China's Stalinist Faction". Its composition has been discussed in my earlier study. For the purpose of our reference here, the RRS refers to such preeminent leaders among the group as Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu), Wang Chia-hsiang, Yang Shang-k'un and Ho K'o-ch'üan (K'ai Feng). I agree with the popular assumption that Chang Wen-t'ien since the Tsunyi Conference had gravitated towards Mao on a number of issues, but I do not think that he had ideologically completely moved away from the RRS.

2 E.g. Ishikawa Tadao suggests that Mao's stand on the united front policy was similar to the RRS during the Kiangsi Period, see Chūgoku kyōsantō shi kenkyū (A Study of the History of the Chinese Communist Party; Tokyo, 1962), pp. 198-217; F. Dorrill, "The Fukien Rebellion and the CCP: Case of Maoist Revisionism," China Quarterly, No. 37 (Mar. 1969), pp. 31-53, questions the validity of Maoist assumptions in regard to the Party's conduct during the Fukien Rebellion.


7 Johnson, pp. 13-4.

8 See e.g. Chieh-chi tou-cheng yü t'ung-i-chan-hsien ch'iang-shou t'i-kang (Lecture Outline of Class Struggle and the United Front; n. p. 1940?), 65 pages, passim. (IR). I shall elaborate on this problem in Chaps. Four and Five.

9 Selden, Chap. 5.

10 See e.g. "Yen-an tso-feng ku-wu che jen-men ch'ien-chin" (The Yenan Work-style Encourages People to March Forward), Jen-min jih-pao, May, 4, 1960; Ts'ao Ch'ing-yang, "Chi-ch'eng fa-chan Yen-an tso-feng" (Inheriting and Glorifying the Yenan Work-style), Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien, No. 3 (Peking, 1961), pp. 4-7. I have never come across any reference to "Yen-an tao-lu".


16 In 1929, Mao said: "In the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips of the forces of the workers." In 1932, this view was criticized by Ch'en Shao-yü who argued that the Party must seek to strengthen its workers' composition. See *WMHC* Vol. 3, pp. 118-24. In 1945, Ch'en's view was refuted by Mao. See Hsiao, *Power Relations*, II, p. 793.


22 See "Chào Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien) kuan-yü p'ai-ch'i kung-tso ti i-feng-hsin fa-piao shih 1üeh-ch'i ti i-tuan-hua" (A Paragraph Omitted from the Published Version of Liu Shao-ch'i's Letter to Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien) on the Work in the White Areas), Mar. 4 1967, *Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i ts'ao chuan-ch'i* (Collection of Materials on the Problem of Liu Shao-ch'i; Taipei, 1970; hereafter cited as *Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i*), p. 1.

23 For example, both Benton, p. 76 and Kataoka, p. 45, fn. 146, infer that Mao's denunciation of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution was an attempt to dissociate himself from Trotsky so as to ward off attack from internal critics because his own views were similar to Trotsky's. This overlooks that the CCP was currently engaged in a polemics with the Trotskyites. In fact, many CCP leaders attacked Trotsky's views on the Chinese revolution. See Chap. Two, sect. five. In 1958, Mao again criticizes Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. See Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 94.

24 S. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York, 1963), pp. 117-18, e.g., cites Mao's statement "We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow", given to Edgar Snow in 1936, as a manifestation of Chinese resentment against Soviet interference into China.

25 See Benton,"reply," p. 151

26 Kataoka, p. 78

27 Benton,"reply," p. 146
In official Chinese Communist accounts, the Kiangsi Period (1931-34) is designated as the stage of Land Revolution (t’u-ti ko-ming shih-ch’i) while the Yenan Period (1935-45) is designated as the stage of the Anti-Japanese United Front (k’ang-jih min-tsu t’ung-i-chan-hsien shih-ch’i). For a long time, historians have tried to identify the exact reasons behind the CCP's transition from the land revolution to the Anti-Japanese United Front, for it is axiomatic that the correct answer to the question holds the key to the understanding of the victory of Chinese communist revolution which failed in Kiangsi but succeeded in Yenan.

One theory holds that the failure of the Kiangsi Soviet movement shows that, ipso facto, the agrarian revolution was inadequate as a means to mobilize the peasants, and the CCP shifted its emphasis from land reforms to nationalism to recapture the support of the masses. Its success proved that, therefore, nationalism was a far more potent force than the land revolution in generating mass support. The oversimplification underlying this assumption has been challenged by several historians, who note that in both time and space, the areas where the Communists had their greatest strength did not always correspond to the areas where the resistance movement was at its height. Rather, it is asserted that the Communists were able to win the allegiance of the peasant masses through their positive and constructive attack on feudal exploitation and landlord oppression. Convincing as the latter proposition may appear, it is still unsatisfactory as it fails to explain why, if the agrarian revolution was so effective in mobilizing the peasantry, the CCP was obliged to moderate the land revolution and placed its emphasis on national resistance from 1935 onwards. Moreover, if the land revolution in Kiangsi had failed only because the counter-revolutionary forces of the KMT was superior, how did the same strategy, albeit better refined and more sophisticated, enable the Communists to outmanouvere both the KMT and the Japanese imperialists? It is clear, therefore, that the land revolution in itself is not a sufficient explanation for the success of the Chinese revolution.
To supplement the latter argument, a third proposition has been offered which holds that Communist victory was due to a combination of the land revolution and the urban strategy. The CCP's transition to the united front in 1935 was in fact Ch'en Shao-yü's attempt to restore the revolution to the cities. 6

I agree with the view that the land revolution was highly successful in mobilizing the peasant masses in the Kiangsi Soviet; but the success was at the same time its very cause of failure because the intensification of the class struggle had alienated the entire landlord-capitalist strata which gave their support to the Nationalist Government. Consequently, the experience of Kiangsi inspired the lesson that no matter how successful was the land revolution in mobilizing the peasant masses, the Communist forces were still insufficient to challenge the superior forces of the Nationalist camp. The adoption of the anti-imperialist united front in 1935 was an attempt to break the CCP's isolation from the nation by shifting the relative emphasis of the Party from the land revolution to the anti-imperialist struggle, so as to capture the support of the national and petty bourgeoisie as well as the small landlords and rich peasants. This would facilitate the securing of an alliance with other political and military forces in the country and weaken the anti-Communist forces in the reactionary camp. The wisdom and applicability of the new policy as proposed by Ch'en Shao-yü were agreed by Mao who fully endorsed the Comintern's proposals. 7

Lessons from the Experience of the Kiangsi Soviet Movement

In order to understand the motivation behind the CCP's transition to the united front policy in 1935, it is necessary first to briefly describe the orientation of the CCP's land policy in the Kiangsi Period. At the urging of the RRS leadership, the First National Soviet Congress opened at Juichin, capital of the Kiangsi (Central) Soviet, on November 7, 1931 and adopted a Land Law which established the policy of confiscating all landlords' land and property as well as the land and surplus farm implements of the rich peasants. After the confiscation, landlords were to receive no land in the redistribution, while rich peasants were to receive land of inferior quality to be cultivated by the rich peasant themselves. 8
The new land policies were put to test in the Communist attempt to organize mass mobilization against the KMT's Fourth Encirclement Campaign which began in May 1932. In response to a directive of the Central Committee of May 1932 urging for the stepping up of mass mobilization and Red Army expansion, the Central Soviet Government, under Mao's direction, started a full-scale political, military and economic mobilization of the masses to support the war effort between the three months from July to September. The initial results of the Red Army expansion, however, were not entirely satisfactory, as the land revolution was not systematically carried out. On December 28, 1932, the Central People's Commissariat of Land issued a directive "On Intensifying Land Struggle and Confiscating Completely the Property of the Landlord Class" which called for the detection of all "hidden or disguised landlords" whose property and farm implements should be redistributed among the poor peasants so as to push them to struggle against the landlords. Sometime in early 1933, the Central Soviet Government ordered the forcible collection of contribution from the rich peasants to support the war. It decreed stirring up the masses to oppose the rich peasants and those who pretended to be middle peasants and attempted to evade war levies. As a result, a large portion of the populace within the Soviet areas were activated into supporting the war, and general progress in mass mobilization work was reported in several Party organs in May and June 1933.

Amidst the general successes in mass mobilization and Red Army expansion, the KMT's Fourth Encirclement Campaign was defeated in May 1933. In accounting for the success of the counteroffensive, Mao stated in July:

On the basis of the correct offensive line of the Party, the active leadership of the Soviet [Government] and the courageous struggle of the Red Army, as well as the enthusiastic support of the masses ... we have smashed the enemy's Fourth Encirclement Campaign.
Thus, the evidence in the contemporary documents show that the land policies of the RRS was highly successful in motivating the masses in support of the Communist revolution, and Mao, as the executor of the policies, was duly impressed with the results.

Accordingly, to further harness the support of the peasants through the land revolution the CCP decided to launch a widespread Land Investigation Campaign (ch’a-t’ien y’lin-tung) in mid-1933 to intensify the class struggle within the Soviet areas as part of the process of total war mobilization in anticipation of the KMT's Fifth Encirclement Campaign. In an article "On the Class Struggle under the Soviet Regime", written on May 26, Chang Wen-t’ien asserted that it was only through the development of the class struggle that the Soviet organizations could be consolidated. In the land revolution of the past, he observed, many landlords and rich peasants had infiltrated the Soviet organizations, obtained the best land in the redistribution process, and hidden their real identity. It was not until recently that the activists among poor and tenant peasant organizations had begun to discover through land investigation those rich peasants and landlords who had disguised themselves. As a result, local Soviet organizations were improved upon by the elimination of undesirable class elements. He therefore called for an active promotion of the class struggle within the rural sector and proclaimed the correct class line for the Party as "to represent the tenant farmers, rely on the poor peasants, ally with the middle peasants, oppose the rich peasants and eliminate the landlords."15

In response to this call, on June 1, 1933 the Council of People's Commissars under Mao ordered a widespread and thorough Land Investigation Campaign. The order began by noting that the land problem had not been satisfactorily solved in almost eighteen percent of the Central Soviet which had a population of more than two millions. The purpose of the campaign was to step up the class struggle among the people and to administer the last fatal blow to the feudal remnants. The campaign was to investigate the landholdings and ferret out hidden landlords and rich peasants and to confiscate and redistribute their properties among the peasants. The poor and tenant farmers' unions were to play the leading role in the campaign, and the Soviet Government should absorb those active elements into its rank to improve the Soviet organization.
Under the direction of the Soviet Government, the Land Investigation Campaign was activated in the latter half of 1933. Between June 17 and July 1, a joint conference of local Soviet officials and poor-peasant unions representatives in eight counties was held to set the campaign in motion. At the conference, Mao delivered a series of speeches to set the guideline for the campaign. One entitled "The Land Investigation Campaign is the Central Task of Great Magnitude in Vast Areas" stated:

All past experience has proven that only through the correct solution of the land problem and only through the fanning up of the flames of class struggle in the rural districts ... can the broad masses be mobilized under the leadership of the proletariat to take part in the revolutionary war.

The conference also adopted Mao's "How to Analyse Classes" as the basis for the classification of the rural population in the land investigation. The document divided the peasants into five classes - landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants and farm labourers - and specified the policies to be adopted towards each class. As a rule, the policy to be adopted towards each class followed the Party line, i.e., annihilating the landlord class and giving inferior land to the rich peasants. It is worth noting that the criterion for differentiating landlords from other classes was not the amount of land they owned, but whether they depended on exploitation of others for their living.

In August 1933, Mao prepared his "Preliminary Conclusions of the Land Investigation Campaign" and reported a general success on the movement, in which a total of more than 2,000 landlords and rich peasants were identified and their properties confiscated. As a result of the campaign, Mao declared, the Soviet and party work had become more dynamic. The heightening of the spirit among the masses, he held, had led to other achievements such as the expansion of the Red Army, the raising of public funds, development of cooperatives, increased production in agricultural campaigns, and the enlistment of a large number of worker-peasant activists in local Soviet organizations. All these successes, Mao stressed, were a "Bolshevik answer to the call of the Party and the Central Government."
Speaking at the Second National Soviet Congress in January 1934, Mao also reported favourably on the achievements of the Land Investigation Campaign. He disclosed that, in the three months from July to September 1933, a total of 6,988 landlord families and 6,638 rich peasant families in possession of excessive amount of land were discovered and their confiscated properties amounted to no less than six hundred thousand dollars. He then related in detail the work of the Soviet Government in the past two years, and claimed great achievement made in the various fields of Soviet work, such as solving the land and economic problems, consolidating the Red Army, and achieving preliminary success in resisting the KMT's Encirclement Campaign. Thus, contemporary documentary evidence show that Mao was positively in favour of the RRS's land policies during the Kiangsi Period.

Some historians argue that since Mao's position in the CCP suffered a serious decline during the Kiangsi Period at the hands of the RRS, he was speaking only under duress and his stated views should not be taken as a true reflection of his real opinions. Such a view is rendered untenable by the fact that in the implementation of these policies, Mao went beyond verbal concessions in giving positive endorsement and support for the policies of the RRS. It would be difficult to imagine that Mao, purely for the sake of saving his own skin, would choose to put into effect what he considered to be the "erroneous" policies of the RRS, and disregard the prospect of the Communist revolution. Moreover, although Mao's authority in the Party and army apparatus had been severely curtailed, he was still the dominant figure in the Soviet Government. It would be more reasonable to assume that because of military exigencies Mao also found it necessary to activate the masses to the fullest extent. This did not, of course, prevent Mao from disagreeing with the RRS over the problem of military strategy.

At this point, it is necessary to consider another aspect of the CCP's policy which was closely related to the problem of the land revolution. Ever since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the CCP had never been slow to indulge itself in anti-imperialist propaganda. Apart from a host of proclamations advocating resistance against Japan, including a declaration of war on Japan in April 1932,
the Party also attempted to mobilize the masses in both coastal cities and Soviet areas by the formation of anti-imperialist leagues. However, the CCP was unable to make any significant headway in winning over the support of the students and intellectuals because nationalistic fervour in the country was still not incited to an explosive point, because Communist influence in the cities were weak, and because the CCP was seen to be unpatriotic by insisting that the Nationalist Government should be overthrown first before united resistance.

In 1933, however, a change occurred in the CCP's position. On January 17, 1933, the CCP issued a public statement announcing for the first time its willingness to come to an alliance with other armed forces on the basis of the following three conditions: 1. immediate cessation of offensive attacks on the Soviet areas; 2. immediate granting of civil liberties and democratic rights to the people; 3. immediate arming of the people for the defence of China's territorial integrity. This declaration, while reaffirming the CCP's basic stand for the overthrow of the KMT as the prerequisite for national resistance against Japan, allowed the conclusion of military alliance with other regional armies under certain specific conditions.

Although this document was issued by Mao and Chu Teh (N.B., all external statements were issued in the name of the Soviet Government and the Red Army Command), available evidence point to Moscow as the initiator. According to Otto Braun, the Comintern's military adviser to the CCP, the declaration was drafted by Chang Wen-t'ien in response to a directive from the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), pointing out the need to adjust the Party's policy in the face of the intensifying Japanese threat to the country. This is partly corroborated by the fact that Moscow was also making approaches in the same period to the Second International (composed mainly of Social-Democratic parties, i.e., bourgeois-reformist groups) in Europe for tactical alliances against the newly emerged fascist government in Germany; and by the fact that Ch'en Shao-yü and the Comintern leaders immediately sanctioned the policy. Furthermore, in an article published in January 1933, Ch'en gave the first indication that the CCP branch in Manchuria should form a united front from above with all anti-imperialist forces in Manchuria, including the "wavering" elements such as the national bourgeoisie, on condition that a solid united front from below had first been
established to ensure the Communist or proletarian leadership in the movement.27 This message was contained in a letter from the Central Committee to the Party units and members in Manchuria, dated January 26, 1933;28 but according to a contemporary Japanese source, the Manchurian Party units had already received instructions from Ch'en Shao-yü prior to the arrival of the Central Committee letter.29

Nevertheless, the CCP was apparently unable to adopt a more flexible approach to the united front owing to its dilemma of having to either relax its struggle against rich peasants and small landlords, or continue its struggle against the national bourgeoisie. This is because a change in the attitude towards an urban class, in Communist parlance, always involves a corresponding change in the attitude towards its rural counterpart, so that an alliance with the national bourgeoisie must entail a relaxation in the struggle against small landlords and rich peasants.30 This qualification must be understood in our evaluation of the CCP's reaction towards the Fukien Rebellion of the Nineteenth Route Army in November 1933, as well as in our subsequent evaluation of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy.

When the Fukien Rebellion occurred, the CCP was in the midst of a frantic struggle to intensify the land revolution against both landlords and rich peasants to mobilize the masses in the counteroffensive against the KMT's Fifth Encirclement Campaign. An agreement with the Fukien rebels who were the representative of the national bourgeoisie at this juncture would have undesirable repercussions within the Kiangsi Soviet as it would amount to a betrayal of the interests of the worker-peasants masses. Moreover, as the CCP's current stand was that a united front from above could only be established on the basis of a solid united front from below, the CCP had to insist that the Fukien leaders grant complete freedom to mass movements in their province. Unable to meet the CCP's demands, the Fukien leaders procrastinated and finally abandoned the movement, enabling Chiang Kai-shek to quickly re-establish control over Fukien and re-direct his forces against the Communists.31 As it turned out, the CCP's failure to procure the alliance with the Fukien rebel army proved to be a grave miscalculation.
When the Communists were finally forced to evacuate the Kiangsi Soviet, one of the most urgent problems was to find out the reasons for the defeat, not only for the sake of future policy-making, but also to maintain the morale and confidence of the troops during the Long March. As Ch'en Shao-yü was in Moscow, he was the earliest CCP leader able to reflect upon the Communist experience. Writing in November 1934, Ch'en attributed the difficulties confronted by the Red Army to the new strategy adopted by Chiang Kai-shek in the Fifth Campaign (i.e., the strategy of constructing "blockhouses") and to the superior military equipment of the Nationalist troops (including fighter planes and bombers). This did not mean that the Communists were foredoomed to failure: had rebellions or other forms of "gigantic" struggle in a major city or within the ranks of the Nationalist troops occurred, and a better coordination between the Red Army and guerrilla units inside and outside the Soviet been achieved, the Red Army might have won the war. Nevertheless, the partial evacuation of Communist territories, Ch'en asserted, should by no means be taken as a sign that the Red Army had been defeated; on the contrary, the Red Army after breaking through the KMT's encirclement and preserving intact its main fighting force, was on its way to creating new and extensive Soviet areas. In particular, Ch'en condemned the view that the temporary setback of the Red Army was an indication that the Soviet movement had failed.

In analysing the strength of Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary camp, Ch'en listed the following five factors: 1. the support of the imperialist powers; 2. the support of the landlord-capitalist classes (emphasis added), especially the financial cliques in Chekiang, who were the most powerful capitalist group in the nation; 3. the KMT's ruthless exploitation of the people; 4. the support of the warlords; and 5. the deceitful propaganda of the KMT, which had hoodwinked even certain section of the petty bourgeoisie (emphasis added). To overcome these difficulties, Ch'en asserted that the Party must exploit every conflict among the warlords and recognize only Chiang Kai-shek as the principal enemy of the people, and come to an alliance with all forces or factions which were opposed to Chiang Kai-shek. The failure to aid the Fukien rebels, he declared, was a grave military and political blunder; it stemmed from an underestimation of the possibility of other political and military forces, confronted with a national crisis, to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle. As
the imperialist powers backing Chiang Kai-shek's regime were not likely to be weakened as a result of the insufficient workers' movement in those countries, the CCP must pay the utmost attention to the problem of creating a united front composing of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and merchants for the anti-imperialist and anti-Chiang Kai-shek struggle.\\n
Aside from the fact that the CCP had failed to ally with forces potentially hostile to Chiang Kai-shek or exploit the nationalist movement against Japan to undermine the strength of the Nationalist camp, in Ch'en Shao-yü's evaluation nothing was fundamentally wrong with the Soviet movement and the capability of the Red Army. It is true that Ch'en expressed a desire to see a greater development of revolutionary movement in the cities which would handicap the KMT, but nowhere in his statement did he suggest that the CCP should abandon the creation of more Soviet bases. More significantly, he pinpointed the opposition of the landlord-capitalist and petty bourgeois classes as one of the major factor in the CCP's defeat and suggested, in a rudimentary form, the Anti-Japanese United Front policy.

In the meantime, the CCP was preoccupied with the problem of military operations during the Long March. As communication with Moscow had broken down, the CCP was unaware of Ch'en's views. Nevertheless, as soon as the Communist units were able to gain a respite at Tsunyi, the problem of reviewing the Party's political line and military strategy was immediately brought up for discussion on the agenda of an enlarged Politburo meeting (held at the instigation, no doubt, of Mao and his supportive military commanders). At the conference, Ch'in Pang-hsien, who was Secretary-General of the Party (subsequently replaced by Chang Wen-t'ien), insisted that there was nothing wrong with the political line or military strategy of the Party leadership in Kiangsi, and ascribed the failure to defend the Communist base areas to the overwhelmingly superior forces of the KMT, so much so that victory over the KMT's Fifth Encirclement Campaign was, in his view, almost an "objective impossibility". As Mao had long resented the Ch'in Pang-hsien - Otto Brown direction over military affairs, a heated debate ensued, with Mao and other military commanders advocating that the Party leadership had committed fundamental errors in military strategy. Mao won the battle (as both
Chou En-lai and Chang Wen-t'ien shifted to Mao's side) and a resolution was adopted, presumably drafted by Mao. 34

Contrary to the assertions of Maoist historians that the Tsunyi Conference had rectified the mistakes of "leftist opportunism" of the RRS, the resolution criticized the former Party leadership for its "rightist opportunism" which overestimated the strength of the counterrevolutionary forces and failed to recognize the possibility of victory, which could be secured by a correct military strategy. Specifically, the resolution pointed out that the "correctness of the political line of the Party Central" had "achieved unprecedented success in mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants in the revolutionary war", as demonstrated in the rapid expansion of the Red Army and the highly effective mobilization of the masses to support the war. Moreover, the "deepening of the class struggle" within the Soviet area had "greatly promoted the revolutionary zeal and enthusiasm of the broad masses". Admittedly, there were weaknesses in certain spheres of party work, such as its lack of progress in leading the worker-peasant struggle against imperialism and the KMT, its failure to divide the "white" (i.e., non-Communist) troops, and the lack of coordination between the Red Army forces of various Soviet areas. Finally, it pointed out that the failure to unite with the Fukien Nineteenth Route Army was also a serious political and military miscalculation. 35

Thus, both Ch'en Shao-ylü and Mao had independently reached certain similar conclusions about the Kiangsi movement. Mao recognized the mistake in military strategy as the basic reason for the failure of the counteroffensive against the KMT, but he also considered the inability to ally with other military or political groups in a common struggle against Japan and the KMT a mistake. Neither leaders, nor for that matter Ch' in Pang-hsien, considered that the Soviet movement was basically faulty and incapable of generating mass support. It can be argued, of course, that such assertions were made in order to boost the morale of the Party rank-and-file and were not the true conviction of the Party leaders. Such contention does not square with the evidence that even after 1935, when the policy shift had already been made, numerous references were made to certify the success in mass mobilization in the Kiangsi Soviet. Helen Snow, for example, was told
in 1937 that the people of the Kiangsi Soviet were more responsive to the Party's call for support than at present. Ch'en Yünn frankly admitted in 1939 that present-day achievement in mass mobilization fared poorly in comparison to Kiangsi. Mao's works are also replete with praises for the mass mobilization work in Kiangsi.

In 1942 P'eng Teh-huai commented that the political, military, mass and Party organizations in Kiangsi were all strong; and affirmed the possibility of overcoming the enemy's encirclement because of the strength of the Red Army. Even the 1945 "Resolution on Some Historical Problems", which criticized the mistake of the political line in Kiangsi, admitted that the land revolution was one of the factors that contributed to the success of war mobilization accounting for the heroic defence of the Soviet region.

There can be little doubt, therefore, that the CCP leaders genuinely believed in the viability of the land revolution in capturing the support of the peasantry, although at the same time they were aware of its deficiency. Chang Kuo-t'ao, however, did not concur with such views. Instead, at the Party meeting at Mao-kung (June 1935) he called for the complete abandonment of the Soviet movement on the grounds that the failure in the struggle against the KMT had proven that the land revolution could not thrive in China. His dissent induced Mao, Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t'ien to jointly defend the validity of the Soviet revolution, and Chang Kuo-t'ao's opposition was temporarily suppressed. To Chang Kuo-t'ao, the Party leadership displayed great reluctance in effecting any change in the political line because of its preoccupation with military problems.

The initiative for political changes was therefore left to Ch'en Shao-yü. Based on the successful application of the anti-imperialist united front by the Communist guerrilla units in Manchuria, where in mid-1935 the Northeast United Anti-Japanese Army was formed, Ch'en moved a step further in endorsing the new policy. In a secret dispatch to the Manchurian Party units in June 1935, Ch'en made an aboutface in pointing out that a united front from above did not have to be constructed on the basis of a solid united front from below, since the two were not mutually antagonistic to each other. On the contrary, the united front from above would help in the development of mass work in the lower strata, although he also warned
that a "direct" application of this tactic would involve certain
dangers. In response to the Ho-Umezu agreement signed on June 10
between General Ho Ying-ch'in of the Nationalist Government and the
Japanese military command, outlawing all anti-Japanese activities and
setting the stage for the formation of the puppet regime over the
"Eastern Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Region", an appeal was
issued in the name of the Chinese Soviet Government on June 15, 1935.
The appeal strongly excoriated Chiang Kai-shek and his Blue Shirts
for selling out northern China to the enemy, and declared that "the
Chinese Soviet Government ... has sentenced Chiang Kai-shek to death".
For the salvation of the nation, the appeal, for the first time,
called for the formation of a "united people's front" to embrace all
people who opposed Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek. The
fact that it narrowly defined the internal enemy as Chiang Kai-shek
and his Blue Shirts was not only unprecedented but also
foreshadowed the subsequent August First Declaration.

Contrary to the assertion that this declaration reflected
the implacable hostility which Mao had for Chiang Kai-shek, there
are strong indications that this document was issued in Moscow, and not
by the CCP during the Long March. First of all, this declaration cannot
be found in any contemporary CCP publications apart from the Comintern
organs. Secondly, the term "united people's front" was alien to all
previous CCP declarations but was currently in popular usage in
Comintern publications. Thirdly, as Chang Kuo-t'ao affirms, at
Mao-kung there was no discussion of the problem of resistance against
Japan. It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that the declaration
was issued by the CCP.

On the basis of this analysis, it is clear that prior to the
Seventh Comintern Congress Moscow had been steadily encouraging the
development towards the united front from above in response to the
intensifying Japanese aggression in China. Seen in this light, the anti-
Japanese united front was the logical outcome of a policy that had
been evolving, through trial and error, and step by step, since 1933.
This explains why Dimitrov, General-Secretary of the ECCI, applauded
the "initiatives taken by our courageous brother Party of China in the
creation of a most extensive anti-Japanese united front against Japanese imperialism and its Chinese agents" in his speech to the Seventh Comintern Congress; and Ch'en Shao-yü stated: "In recent years the CP of China [sic] had applied and is applying the tactics of the anti-imperialist united front." Failure to see the changes in the Party's united front policy in the earlier period has induced many historians to think that there was no basis to support these statements or that they were simply distorting earlier CCP proclamations to make them conform to the new content of the anti-imperialist united front of the Seventh Comintern Congress. 48

**Ch'en Shao-yü and the Origins of the Anti-Japanese United Front**

It is presumably true that the united front tactics as proposed by the Seventh Comintern Congress, July-August 1935, were connected with Moscow's attempt to achieve protection from Germany and Japan through a system of alliances between Communists and non-Communists in Europe and Asia fighting against common enemies. It is debatable, however, whether one can on this basis conclude that the Soviet leadership "did not see the united front in terms of the domestic needs of the national Communist parties", or that it was even a case of "cynical manipulation and remote control of foreign Communist parties in its own narrow national interests". From the Comintern's point of view, more than half-a-decade of seclusionist policy since the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928 had forced various Communist parties into isolation; and by 1935, some of these parties were seriously threatened with extinction by the fascist onslaught (and in the case of China, by the KMT). The new united front policy, therefore, can also be seen as an attempt to provide a viable programme of action whereby the Communist parties could hope to survive and even expand their influence.

Prior to the convocation of the Seventh Comintern Congress, the Secretariat of the ECCI had met and reviewed the experience of the Soviet movement in China. Its lengthy report concluded that all the policies pursued during the Kiangsi Period had been correct, with the exception that there were weaknesses in the Party's work in the non-Soviet areas, especially in the establishment of a widespread anti-imperialist united front. 50
By far the most important item on the agenda of the Seventh Comintern Congress was the adoption of the anti-fascist united front. In his report to the Congress, Dimitrov pointed out that part of the reason for the triumph of fascism was due to the mistakes of the Communist parties in isolating themselves from potential allies. "Marxism-Leninism", he declared, "is not a dogma, but a guide for action"; in view of the new circumstances arising out of the emergence of fascism, the Communists must be prepared to adopt a more flexible programme to defend the interests of the working class. To this end, the Communist Party should relinquish the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as its immediate objective, and be prepared to defend "every inch of bourgeois-democratic liberties" and ally even with the Social Democrats in a common struggle against fascism. With regard to youth organizations he suggested that they should not copy the forms and methods of work of Communist parties, but instead should open themselves to and unite with all non-fascist youths. Furthermore, he declared that the Communists would be willing to "share the responsibility" of united front governments with other classes or parties, on the basis of a definite anti-fascist platform.

Nevertheless, he made it clear that this new programme did not in any way mean that the Comintern had given up its fundamental and ultimate objective of achieving communism. While participating in the united front, Communists, he stated, "cannot and must not for a moment abandon their own independent work of Communist education, organization and mobilization of the masses". "In general joint actions with the Social-Democratic parties", the Communists must still offer "serious and substantiated criticisms of Social Democracy as the ideology and practice of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and untiring, comradely explanation for the Social-Democratic workers of the programme and slogans of Communism". The purpose was to "draw increasingly wide [sic.] masses into the revolutionary class struggle and lead them to the proletarian revolution". Referring to the united front government as a "transitional form" of government "on the eve and before the victory of the proletariat", he insisted that such government should "in no way restrict the activity of the Communist Party and the mass organizations of the working class". He further declared: "Final salvation this government cannot bring .... Consequently it is necessary to prepare for the socialist revolution!"
Soviet power and only Soviet power can bring salvation!" (emphasis original). Finally, in calling for the elimination of "sectarianism", he also warned that the Communists must at the same time struggle against "rightist opportunism" which would increase in proportion as the united front developed, and manifest itself in reconciliation with Social-Democratic ideology of vacillation at the moment of decisive action.51

Thus, the Seventh Comitern Congress laid down a flexible programme of action for the Communists to seek potential allies in the fight against fascism without, however, giving up the Communist-parties' own autonomy and the ultimate goal of socialism. These important qualifications guided Ch'en Shao-yü's application of the anti-fascist united front in Europe to China, where the situation demanded the formation of the anti-imperialist united front.

In their passing remarks on China, the Comintern spokesmen at the Congress made no attempt to hide their hostility towards Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. Dimitrov in his speech continued to link the "treason of the Nanking Government" with the predatory attack of Japanese imperialism in China. The resolution on Ercoli's report further called for "active support to the Red Army of the Chinese Soviets in their struggle against Japanese and other imperialists and the KMT".52 Manuilsky also observed: "The successes of the Red Army demonstrate its indissoluble connection with the broadest masses of the working people in China, which have supported the Red Army in every possible way in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek".53 Thus, there is little doubt that in the eyes of the Comintern the KMT and especially Chiang Kai-shek remained an enemy of the Chinese revolution.

Furthermore, the Comintern continued to regard the Chinese Soviets as the focal point of the anti-imperialist struggle and to favour their continual expansion under the new policy. In his speech, Dimitrov asserted that "only the Chinese Soviets can act as a unifying centre in the struggle against the enslavement and partition of China by the imperialists, [and] as a unifying centre which will rally all anti-imperialist forces for the national defence of the Chinese people". On the basis of this assertion, the Congress on August 20 adopted a resolution which stipulated that "in China, the extension
of the Soviet movement and the strengthening of the fighting power of
the Red Army must be combined with the development of the people's
anti-imperialist movement all over the country." 54

On August 7, Ch'en Shao-yü delivered his speech on revolutionary
movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. In regard
to China, Ch'en stated that it would be a mistake to think that "since
the Soviet revolution has already triumphed over considerable
sections of the territory", the anti-imperialist people's front
"is no longer of any significance". On the contrary, he argued:
"in present-day China the question of the anti-imperialist united
front is not only of primary importance but ... of decisive importance".
This was because "China is passing through an unprecedented national
crisis" created by Japanese imperialist aggression and the "unexampled,
infamous national treachery of the KMT" which had already sold out
half of the country. Under such circumstances, Ch'en proclaimed:
"There is no other means for the general mobilization of the entire
Chinese nation for the sacred national revolutionary struggle against
imperialism than the tactics of the anti-imperialist united people's
front".

Ch'en claimed that the CCP's anti-imperialist activities
had helped to establish the CCP as the only force recognized in the
nation that could save the nation and the people. On the basis of
the successful completion of the "western expedition" (i.e., Long
March), Ch'en confidently declared: "The slogans put forward by the
CCP: expansion of the Red Army to 1 million men and expansion of
the Soviet areas to comprise a population of 100 million men will in
the nearest future become a slogan for practical action."

Nevertheless, he noted that because "many of our comrades
did not and do not understand the new situation which has arisen in
China in recent years", they had also committed errors in the
application of the new policy. He declared on behalf of the CCP Central
Committee:
Our tactics should consist in a joint appeal with the Soviet Government of China to all the people, to all parties, groups, troops, mass organizations and to all prominent political and social leaders to organize together with us an All-China United People's Government of National Defence and an All-China National Defence Army.

At the same time, Ch'en indicated that the CCP, in spite of all existing political differences, would welcome the participation in this national defence government of all "honest young members from the KMT and the Blue Shirt League who really love their people and their country", and that the Red Army would readily join hands with the KMT troops once offensives against the Soviet areas were terminated and an armed struggle against Japanese imperialism began.

To facilitate the mobilization of the broadest masses in the national revolutionary struggle, Ch'en further suggested that the CCP should revise and improve all fields of Party work. First of all, he called for the elimination of the "strong sectarian tradition" in Party organizations, especially in the trade union work in the "white" areas (i.e., non-unity with the reformist KMT "yellow" trade unions). Secondly, he called for the rectification of the former harsh policies towards rich peasants, small landowners and capitalists in the Soviet areas, so as to give land policy a clearly "popular and national" character. Thirdly, he called upon the Communist Youth Corps (CY) to transform themselves into "broad, mass organizations", and to work actively among all anti-imperialist youths so as to win them over.

To help overcome possible resistance from the Party members against the new policy, Ch'en dismissed the view that Communist participation in the anti-imperialist united front would weaken the "proletariat leadership" in the revolution. The failure of the CCP in the First United Front with the KMT, he asserted, was due not to the faults of the united front tactics but to the "opportunistic" errors of the Ch'en Tu-hsiu leadership. For the sake of preserving the alliance with the national bourgeoisie, Ch'en Tu-hsiu had sacrificed the interests of the working class and the peasantry and refrained from criticising the "wavering and treachery" of the KMT, thus abandoning the independent stand of the Party. A correct application of the united front tactics - manifested in the "ideological, political and organizational leadership" by the proletariat over its class allies -
would not weaken the proletariat leadership in the revolution, on the contrary it would strengthen it. Finally, Ch'en hinted at the fact that the KMT and the Blue Shirts had become a "fascist regime" in China and called for the strengthening of an ideological struggle against their reactionary Confucian and feudal doctrines.  

On the basis of his report, Ch'en Shao-yü had already issued, in the name of the Central Committee of the CCP, an "Appeal to the Whole Chinese People to Resist Japan and Save the Country" on August 1, which in later years became known as the famous August First Declaration. The declaration opened with a strong denunciation of the "traitorous" activities of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Chang Hsüeh-liang, "people human in form but with the hearts of beasts", who continued to sell out the country to the enemy. It cited the example of Abyssinia which had put up a heroic defence against the Italian imperialists and called upon the 400 million people of China to unite for armed defence of the motherland. "The fact that we have not yet achieved success ... in our struggle for national liberation", it proclaimed, "is due, on the one hand, to the anti-Japanese force being subjected to the united blows of Japanese imperialism and of the Chiang Kai-shek Nanking Government, and on the other hand, to the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek forces not being united for joint action". It reiterated the proposal for a national defence government and a united anti-Japanese army, and further called for the convocation of a national assembly composed of representatives from various anti-Japanese organizations elected on a democratic basis for the discussion of the problems of national defence. Finally, it put forward a ten-point programme which stressed, among others, the improvement of the people's livelihood as a basis of common action against Japan.  

Ch'en Shao-yü's pronouncements marked the formal establishment of the united front from above, which had been growing in its embryonic form since 1933. It envisaged a broad alliance with all potential anti-Japanese forces, but as yet not Chiang Kai-shek himself or other national traitors. (When both documents subsequently re-appeared in 1938, all hostile remarks about Chiang were deleted since by then the circumstances had changed.  

Failure to discern such discrepancies has induced some writers to believe that as early as the Seventh Comintern Congress, Ch'en had already suggested an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek.
Curiously, current Soviet writings also fabricate such a claim. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of concessions had been made, including acceptance of members of the KMT and the Blue Shirts who were willing to disobey Chiang Kai-shek's orders, willingness on the part of the Communist Party to participate in a government organization in which it was not the sole organizer, adjustment in the policy platform of the Soviet Government, distinction between Japan and other imperialist powers and nullification of the former stipulation that destruction of the KMT was a prerequisite for national resistance. All of these amounted to a de-escalation of the Soviet revolution and a recognition of the priority of the struggle against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek over other forms of struggle.

It should be noted, however, that Ch'en Shao-yü did not regard the anti-imperialist struggle as an end in itself, but the means whereby the CCP could bring back the Soviet revolution in full-fledged form at a later stage. As Ch'en stated in the concluding discussions of Dimitrov's report:

The participation of the CP in the anti-imperialist People's Front does not signify any weakening of its struggle for ... Soviet power. The Soviet power cannot, however, be founded without a suitable preparation of the great masses of the people ... in revolutionary struggles. It is precisely the correct and courageous application of the anti-imperialist united front tactics which render it easier for the Communist Parties to win the confidence of the masses, necessary for the development of the revolution to a higher phase, the Soviet phase.

It is clear that the anti-imperialist united front to Ch'en was only a "transitional" or "preparatory" stage for the establishment of Soviet power.
In organizational terms, Ch'en Shao-yü emerged from the Seventh Comintern Congress as a major figure in the international Communist movement, being elected a full member of the Presidium of the ECCI and an alternate of its Secretariat. At the same time, Mao, Chou En-lai and Chang Kuo-t'ao were elected full members of the ECCI, while K'ang Sheng and Ch'in Pang-hsien were elected alternates. Mao was highly praised by the Comintern leaders (including Ch'en Shao-yü) throughout the Congress. This indicates that Moscow did not object to the new leadership that emerged from the Tsunyi Conference (i.e., Mao's elevation to the Standing Committee of the Politburo). In February 1936, a biographical account of Mao published in the Comintern organs further acclaimed Mao a "brilliant strategist", an "ingenious political leader" and, above all, a "thorough Bolshevik" who "whole-heartedly executes the resolutions of the Party and the Comintern".61

Along with the Seventh Comintern Congress, Moscow also held the Sixth World Congress of the Young Communist International in September 1935. Acting in the spirit of the recommendations made by Dimitrov and Ch'en Shao-yü, the CCP delegate stated: "The present situation demands that the Young Communist League shall become a political mass organization, covering the whole of anti-imperialist youth, for which reason it must also call itself the 'League of Youth for the Salvation of the Fatherland!'"62 On November 1, a directive "On the Work among the Youth" was issued in the name of the Central Committee of the CCP. It called for the elimination of "sectarianism" and the secret work-style, which were declared no longer suitable for the existing circumstances. The primary task of the CY, it stated, were to utilize all legal and semi-legal activities to establish a common front among young people for national salvation.63 (Its similarities with the Comintern resolutions suggest that the directive was issued either by or under the instruction of the Comintern.) The impact of these policy changes will be discussed in the next section.
The earliest response to the August First Declaration came from the Manchurian guerrilla units which were composed of Communist and independent partisans. According to a recollection, the anti-Japanese forces were greatly encouraged by the August First Declaration, and resolved to further consolidate and expand their organizations to include all potential allies in the struggle against Japan. On October 11, the United Anti-Japanese Army of the Northeast (Manchuria), which was semi-independent of the CCP, issued a circular telegram addressed to all political and military leaders in the nation, including Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, appealing for united resistance against Japan and for the termination of civil war.

But the August First Declaration had a much greater impact on the Communist Party branches in the coastal cities. According to two Japanese intelligence reports, the decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress reached the Hopei Provincial Committee and the Tientsin Party Committee on September 4, 1935. On October 18, the representatives of all Party provincial and municipal committees in North China convened a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Peiping to discuss and adopt a new format for Party work. Another Communist account confirms that the August First Declaration reached Peiping's underground CCP organization at Tsinghua University and the Teachers College in early November. It immediately started to organize on November 18, under the direction of a CCP member Huang Ching, a secret "National Salvation Association of Peiping Students". On December 3 it decided to utilize all legal forms of struggles such as petitions and demonstrations to organize the "Resist Japan and Oppose Chiang" movement, and resolved that the united front should be broadened to include people from all walks of life who were in favour of national resistance and were opposed to the "puppet" regime set up in North China by the Japanese.
Present-day Chinese Communist historians, on the assumption that the August First Declaration was produced by the CCP during the Long March, have invariably attached great importance to its impact on the student patriotic movement. In the words of one writer, the declaration showed to the students the "seriousness of the national crisis and the correct path to national salvation". With the Party's leadership, the declaration became the "prime mover" of the famous "December 9 Movement". This account is probably exaggerated; non-communist writers generally agree that the massive student demonstrations in Peiping on December 9, which commenced with a petition at Ho Ying-Ch'in's headquarters by a group of students against the establishment of the "autonomous" regime, was more or less a spontaneous outburst of nationalism in which the Communists played only a minor part. Yet the August First Declaration did perform an extremely useful role in stimulating the student activities. According to the recollection of Helen Snow, who was personally involved with the leftist student movement in Peiping, there was a shared sense of hopelessness among the students with regard to the prospects of national resistance to the Japanese invasion. This was due to the fact although they wished to organize opposition to the KMT's policy of "non-resistance", they were not sure whether the Communist would even work with other patriotic armies. Not only was the memory of the Fukien Rebellion still fresh in people's mind, the CCP had been virtually silent during the Long March and no one was certain of its current stand in regard to the problem of national resistance. In this light, the timeliness of the August First Declaration in removing all suspicion of the CCP's attitude towards united resistance naturally generated hope and provided impetus for student activities. Both Edgar Snow and Ssu-ma Lu (an ex-Communist) confirm that the August First Declaration was circulated clandestinely and widely among the Party members and leftist students in Peiping around this time.

On December 20, 1935, the Central Committee of the CY issued a public statement calling for unity among all people "irrespective of party affiliations, ideological beliefs, differences in nationality and geographical location" to struggle together for national resistance. It renamed itself the "Resist Japan National Salvation Youth Corps" and declared solemnly:
The CY is not only willing to join in any anti-imperialist organization, and to struggle with all people who love the country, but is also willing to open up our organization and welcome all anti-Japanese and patriotic youths into our organization. In other words, whereas previously all young people joining our organization had to believe in communism, now that we have become a national salvation body, all patriotic youths, whether they believe in communism or not, are eligible to join so long as they are willing to fight against Japan and save the country."

On the basis of these new tactics, the Communists were able to assert greater influence over the student movements which began to expand. On February 1, 1936, the activists of the CY convened a congress composed of student representatives at the Teachers College in Peiping and formally established the "National Liberation Vanguard", which became the major Communist front organization within the student movement. At its inception it had a membership of 300, but it quickly expanded to 12,000 by September 1936. Its activities branched out to the nearby countryside and to other cities and played a major role in propagating the Party's aim of achieving the Anti-Japanese United Front among the youth in ensuing years."

Along with the growing influence of the Communists over the student movement, the decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress also had an impact upon the national salvation movement organized by left-wing intellectuals and political leaders. The effect of Ch'en Shao-yü's proclamations can best be seen in the periodical Chiu-kuo pao (National Salvation Press), founded by Ch'en Ming-shü, the former leader of the rebel Fukien government who was in exile in Hong Kong. Originally published in Paris, it readily found its way back to the country through Ch'en Ming-shü's connections."

In August or September 1935, the periodical published an editorial naming Ch'en Shao-yü as a responsible spokesman for the CCP. It commented upon the call for the formation of a national defence government and a united anti-Japanese army as follows: "We should for the present set aside the problem of what communism is and what it stands for. From the point of view of the present political circumstances, these proposals do in fact reflect the overall demands of the Chinese people, and are worth our serious attention and discussion". It quoted Ch'en's figures on the
strength of the Soviets and the Red Army (which undoubtedly were exaggerated), and stated that as a force for national resistance they could hardly be ignored. Hence, it earnestly called for the cessation of civil war and unity against Japan, stating that "anyone with a proper conscience" should do so accordingly. 75

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident on September 18, another editorial in the paper strongly criticized the Nanking Government for its "non-resistance" policy, and noted that political leaders, literary figures, military commanders, students, professors and people all over the country were in favour of active resistance. It cited Ch'en Shao-yü's speech at the Seventh Comintern Congress asserting Communist participation as strong proof that resistance against Japan was truly the "national opinion and the people's common wish". The author in another article published in the same issue further pointed out that the Communists should no longer be excluded from the national salvation movement. It refuted the (Nationalists') view that it was necessary to eliminate the Communists before national resistance could be organized. "Facts prove that the Communists are virtually standing in the forefront of the anti-Japanese movements", it asserted; and called upon all people in the nation to make a clear distinction between those "who favour resistance or capitulation, and those who are anti-Japanese or pro-Japanese. 76

Thus, Ch'en Shao-yü's proclamations helped to put an end to the year-long isolation of the CCP from the national salvation movement. More important, it also seems to have sparked off the organization of several radical national salvation bodies. In August or September, Ch'en Ming-shu and other former leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army organized the "Chinese National Revolutionary League", which in its programme of action called for common opposition to the Nanking Government and united resistance against Japan. 77 On September 18, the "National Salvation League of Shanghai", which reportedly was controlled by Communist elements, issued a declaration which condemned the "traitorous" Nanking Government and called for the cessation of civil war and immediate military mobilization against Japan. 78 On December 1, the "Action Committee for the National Liberation of China" was formed with the support of Madame Sun Yat-sen. Its declaration "On
the Present Political Situation" called for the immediate declaration of war on Japan and for the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government to conduct the national revolutionary war.79

The aims of these national salvation bodies were widely publicized by the leftist press. One of the most influential publications was Ta-chung sheng-huo (Life of the Masses), founded by Tsou T'ao-fen in November 1935 in Shanghai. Tsou had travelled to Europe following the ban on his earlier magazine Sheng-huo chou-k'an (Life Weekly) by the KMT, and in the summer of 1935 he was present in Moscow. There is little doubt that he was familiar with the proceedings of the Seventh Comitern Congress, and Nationalist sources suggest that he maintained direct contact with the Comintern. The magazine was dedicated to the achievement of national liberation, the eradication of feudal remnants, and the formation of a united front against Japan. To these ends "propaganda teams" were organized to conduct "national crisis education" among the masses in the city and the countryside. Soon after its publication, the magazine reached a circulation of over 120,000.80

Another popular journal, K'ang-jih hsien-feng (Anti-Japanese Vanguard) was founded on December 15, 1935. It blatantly carried the following motto on its front page: "Resisting Japan and opposing Chiang are our principal tasks; military self-defence of our country is our primary objective". Its founding issues strongly criticised Chiang Kai-shek's policy of "internal pacification before external resistance" and openly called for support for the CCP and the Red Army. Both KMT and Japanese sources claim that it was directly under the influence of the Communists. 81

To propagate the new policy of the CCP, Ch'en Shao-yü himself served as the editor of the Chiu-kuo shih-pao (National Salvation News), published in Paris, which commenced publication on December 15, 1935. Its importance in helping to promote the national salvationist movement is well noted in Nationalist and Japanese accounts.82
As a result of these activities, a great number of national salvation societies were formed in Shanghai by mid-December, including the associations of women, students, newspapermen, writers, educationalists, professionals, actors and workers. By far, the most influential group was the Shanghai Cultural Circles National Salvation Association formed on December 12, 1935. Among its well-known members were Ma Hsiang-po, Shen Chun-ju, Chang Nai-ch'i, Tsou T'ao-fen, Weng Tso-shih and T'ao Hsing-chih. The association issued two declarations, on December 12 and 27 respectively, calling for the cessation of civil war, unity against the external enemy, immediate declaration of war on Japan, the launching of a military expedition against the "autonomous" regime in North China, and the granting of liberties such as freedom of speech and association.In January 1936, the Peiping Cultural Circles National Salvation Association was also organized, and it echoed the demands of the Shanghai group.

Thus, in the several months following the August First Declaration, the national salvation movement developed into a formidable political force within the country. There is little doubt that Ch'en Shao-yü's statements were instrumental in bringing about this situation. Similar to its effect on the student movement, the August First Declaration forcefully imparted to the national salvation groups the belief that the CCP was not an obstacle to united resistance and that the KMT could no longer justify its policy of "internal pacification before external resistance" on the very pretext that the Communists were obstructing unity in the country. Moreover, the national salvationist and Communist sympathizers active in the movement clearly borrowed their ideas on the 'people's front' from Ch'en, including the call for the organization of the national defence government and united anti-Japanese army. Even the popular saying "Those who have money give money money and those who have strength render their strength" (yu-ch'ien ch'u-oh'ien, yu-li ch'u-ili) originated with Ch'en Shao-yü. The importance of Ch'en's statements is borne out by the fact that contemporary Chinese Communist and Japanese reports all traced the rise of these patriotic movements in the nation to the August First Declaration. For the same reason, however, present-day Chinese Communist writers recognize the importance of the August First Declaration but choose not to disclose the true source of the document. Ironically, in one source published in 1951, it was claimed that the Declaration helped to overcome the "close-doorism" of the "leftist sectarians".
After the Seventh Comintern Congress, Ch'en Shao-yü further elaborated the theoretical principles guiding the new united front policy and its function in the context of the Chinese revolution. These discussions were published in successive issues of the leading Comintern organ *International Press Correspondence*; and in February 1936, they were collectively published in Chinese under the title "Hsin hsing-shih yü hsin cheng-ts'e" (New Situation and New Policy). It is imperative that these documents be read in their originals because their popular version which appeared in 1938 has been substantially revised.

In his major discourse on the theoretical justification for the new united front policy, Ch'en set forth four factors that accounted for the changes in the Party's policy. The first factor was the shift in the alignment of class forces brought about by the Japanese aggression in North China and the "treachery" of Chiang Kai-shek. Faced with this national crisis, the patriotic elements in the country included not only the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, but also certain sections of the national bourgeoisie or even in the case of Manchuria landlords whose economic interests were directly or indirectly threatened by the Japanese imperialists. Hence, it was necessary for the CCP to devise a new tactic that would enlist the support of these people in the anti-imperialist struggle.

The second determinant which called into being the new policy, according to Ch'en, related to the special characteristics of the Chinese revolution. Firstly, the Chinese revolution was bourgeois-democratic because it was anti-fedual and anti-imperialist. In different stages of its development, however, the Party must correctly appraise the situation and coordinate the various revolutionary forces by a correct strategy so as to encompass the widest range of people in the struggle for social and national emancipation. The anti-imperialist struggle, Ch'en stated, "as experience shows" had a "wider driving force" than the land revolution. Secondly, the nature of the struggle between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces was indisputably "protracted" in character although it could be "changed
or shortened" as a result of domestic or international crisis. The Party, therefore, should adopt a policy that would ensure the broadest mass support for the prolonged struggle against the enemy. The CCP, Ch'en admitted, had made a mistake in propagating a "decisive battle" with the enemy during the KMT's Fifth Extermination Campaign, viewing it as a struggle for either a "Soviet China" or "colonial China". Thirdly, the development of the revolution in the country was "uneven", so it was possible for the CCP to achieve "initial victory in one or more provinces". In the past, however, the CCP had made the mistake of "mechanically" interpreting the "initial victory in one or more provinces" as meaning the seizure of provincial cities. This approach had caused great harm to the Party both politically and militarily. The absence of major cities in the Soviets, Ch'en reasoned, was undoubtedly a drawback in the revolution but at a certain stage of development it could also be regarded as an advantage in that it allowed the CCP more time to prepare and gather its armed forces and to avoid premature clashes with the overwhelming forces of the enemy. At the same time, the Party had also made the mistake of looking at the Soviets "as units completely isolated from the other and much larger part of China", rendering them "incapable of acting as the political leader on an all-Chinese scale". The new policy was, therefore, "calculated to make proper use of the initial victory of the revolution" in parts of China and "to bring the Soviets to the fore as the centre which unites the entire Chinese people" in the nation-wide struggle.

The third condition for the new policy, Ch'en explained, was not only the growing power of the Chinese Red Army and the Soviets but also their weaknesses. The success of the Red Army in breaking through the KMT's Fifth Extermination Campaign and the consistent leadership of the Soviets in the anti-imperialist struggle had greatly enhanced their prestige among the people making it possible for the CCP to assume the central role in the national resistance. On the other hand, however, Ch'en stated frankly that "from the point of view of effective military strength the Red Army alone is still insufficient to defeat Japanese imperialism and its agents, while from the point of view of political orientation, considerable sections of the population have not yet ... support the Soviets". The urgency of the national crisis, therefore, required the CCP to
adopt new tactics for uniting the entire Chinese people for the national liberation struggle.

Finally, Ch'en stated that the fourth consideration for the Party's new policy was "the necessity to correct the mistakes and shortcomings which have come to light in the theory and practice of our work in the Soviet and non-Soviet districts". These mistakes in the Party's work were "primarily of a 'leftist' sectarian character". "They hinder our party in acting as the leader of the whole people and as a national factor", and "unless these mistakes and shortcomings are eliminated, it will be impossible to carry forward the cause of the Chinese revolution".

Up to this point, it is my impression that Ch'en was giving a theoretical justification for a shift of the Party's emphasis from the land revolution of the Kiangsi Period to the anti-imperialist united front, on the grounds that the land revolution had alienated certain sections of the bourgeoisie and isolated the Soviets from the rest of the country. The new policy took into account the changes in class relations in the country following the intensification of Japanese aggression in North China in 1935, which had rendered a larger section of the bourgeoisie susceptible to anti-imperialist propaganda. Consequently, a shift in the Party's emphasis from a predominately anti-feudal to a predominately anti-imperialist struggle would enable the CCP to win over the national and petty bourgeoisie, the failure of which he had earlier seen as one of the main causes of the Communist defeat. To achieve such an objective, Ch'en was prepared to admit certain "leftist" errors in the Party leadership in the Kiangsi Period, inspite of his own obvious responsibility in promoting those tendencies. These included the failure to perceive the "protracted" nature of the Chinese revolution and the "unevenness" of the revolutionary development in the country; the unrealistic notion of a decisive and ultimate struggle with the KMT when the Party's strength and resources were still unprepared for the task; and the mistaken preoccupation with the strategic goal of seizure of provincial cities. Instead, he approved the conservation and accumulation of strength in the rural Soviets for a prolonged period of time before the final confrontation with the KMT. (All these, it will be seen, were echoed by Mao shortly afterwards. By 1945, however, they constituted part of Maoist retrospective criticism of Ch'en's errors in the Kiangsi Period.)
To shift the Party's emphasis from the anti-feudal to the anti-imperialist struggle did not mean for Ch'en Shao-yü, however, the complete abandonment of the agrarian revolution. On the contrary, Ch'en painstakingly explained in his treatise that for the sake of improving the livelihood of the peasant masses and for several other reasons, the Soviet Government could not but continue to fight for the complete destruction of the "feudal landlord ownership" of land and to struggle against the "parasitic" landlord class. Only when the peasants' basic demand for land was satisfied, he asserted, could the vast majority of the population be freed from starvation and participate fully in the national resistance.

In line with his proposal, Ch'en Shao-yü recommended the following changes in the CCP's land policy: 1. cessation of confiscation of the land of landowners - i.e., people such as craftsmen, artisans, teachers, small traders and workers who "although they do not cultivate the land themselves, nevertheless bought it previously with the money from their own earnings" and to allow them to rent out land on non-oppressive conditions; 2. cessation of the confiscation of land and surplus farm implements of the rich peasants, who were to receive land of equal quality in the event of a general redistribution of land as demanded by the peasant masses; 3. cessation of the confiscation of the land of "landlord soldiers" who actually participated in the anti-Japanese struggle; 4. the confiscation only of the land of merchants who were simultaneously big landlords, but not their business enterprises. At the same time, Ch'en also called for the promotion of private investment, free trade and industry; relaxation of workers' control of industrial enterprises; the granting of political and civil rights to all anti-Japanese youths and admitting the petty bourgeoisie in the Red Army (which previously accepted only workers and peasants).

It can be seen that for the purpose of the establishment of the anti-imperialist united front, Ch'en Shao-yü was prepared to make drastic alterations in the CCP's policies to relax the class struggle against small landlords, rich peasants and capitalists. There was, as yet, no provision for relaxing the struggle against big landlords, whose land were still subjected to confiscation as in the case of merchants who were simultaneously big landlords. It has been argued that Ch'en, in stipulating that "landlord soldiers" were to be exempted from
confiscation of their land, provided a loophole for the landlords to escape confiscation. Such a view, however, fails to take cognizance of the fact that sons of landlords were still barred from the Red Army, so that landlords were still subjected to expropriation within the Communist territories. (There is, however, an exception in the case of Manchuria, where anti-Japanese guerrilla units were already recruiting landlord elements.) It should be realized that in the Kiangsi Period, one of the major difficulties for the Communists to win over the support of non-Communist troops was due precisely to the fact that many officers in the KMT army were from landlord families. Ch'en's proposition, therefore, was only an attempt to allay the fear of Nationalist troops that a sympathetic response to the CCP's proposals for united resistance would only invite expropriation of their family properties.

Thus, there is no basis for asserting that Ch'en wished to terminate the struggle against landlords or the expansion of rural base territories. In fact, he still regarded the strategy of building up Soviet bases as the primary task of the Party. This is evident in a complementary article to his speech published in the Comintern organs entitled "The Heroic Trek", which summed up the "glorious" experience of the Long March. (According to Ch'en Shao-ylü, the author of this article was Ch'en Yün, who departed for Moscow in mid-1935 to report on the development of the Long March.) Referring to the Party's strategy in the past, the article stated:

The question of establishing a territorial base for the Soviet Revolution has been one of the most important questions confronting our Party in recent years. We realized that the Red Army needed a stable and permanent territorial base, that the absence of such a base was giving rise to tremendous difficulties hindering the further conduct of the civil war. Ever since 1930, the Communist Party had been exerting every effort to carry out this primary and most important task, which today still remains one of the most important tasks. [sic]

It admitted, however, that the Party had failed to understand the problem of the anti-imperialist united front in the past, preventing it from scoring greater victories. At present, the tactics of the anti-imperialist united front was not only an "absolute necessity", but also the "only correct path" for the party.
Nevertheless, it is valid to assume that part of the motivation behind the new policy was to enable the Communists to expand their influence in non-Soviet areas, including the KMT cities. This is revealed in a second article, published along Ch'en's treatise, which dealt with Party work in the "white" areas. The article began with the assertion that the KMT areas were "the most important centres of economic and political line" in China, where the basic masses of proletariat were concentrated. In line with the new anti-imperialist united front policy, it called for a re-orientation of Party work in these areas, such as elimination of "sectarianism", the utilization of all "legal and semi-legal" methods in the struggle against the reactionaries, and increased attention to the "individual daily demands" of the masses rather than propagation of "lofty" communist principles to win over their support. It concluded by saying that "today these regions ... are of decisive importance for the victory of the Soviet revolution in China". Thus, it can be seen that the Comintern maintained a symbiotic relationship between the rural and urban areas, with the priority given to the Soviet revolution while not neglecting the crucial importance of the cities.

Along with these important changes made in regard to the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution, Ch'en Shao-yü also made several qualifications to the new policy. At the beginning of his treatise Ch'en made it clear that although the national defence government and the united anti-Japanese army were the most desirable and the highest form of the anti-imperialist united front, the Communists "must not draw the conclusion that the Chinese Soviet will insist upon commencing to set up the united front in this form and would therefore underestimate or discard the various lower forms" of the anti-Japanese alliance. On the contrary, he urged the formation of such alliances even in the most "rudimentary" or "preliminary" forms. Furthermore, Ch'en made it clear that although the CCP would support wholeheartedly the fundamental programme of the national defence government as proposed in the August First Declaration, the Soviet Government, "the chief aim of which is to secure the complete national and social liberation of the entire Chinese people, cannot be limited in its actions only to the programme of the government of national defence". At the same time, he also stressed that the Red Army, in joining the united anti-Japanese army, must avoid weakening
its fighting powers; on the contrary, it had to strengthen and increase its forces to make it one of the most "militant, advanced and powerful" forces in the nation, capable of playing the leading role in the united army. These qualifications show that Ch'en did not give up the notion of generating splits in the KMT camp by concluding lower level alliance, or constrain the action of the Soviet government and the Red Army. As a contemporary Japanese report observes, the primary objective of the new policy as proposed by the Comintern was to ally only with the lower level of the KMT so as to isolate the KMT upper level, especially Chiang Kai-shek.

Nevertheless, in response to the mushrooming of national salvationist bodies and the growing demands for a truly united national resistance against Japan (which Ch'en noted with great satisfaction in the preface to the Chinese version of his treatise), a tentative proposal was made in November 1935 in regard to the possibility of including Chiang Kai-shek in the alliance under certain conditions. Ch'en stated:

As for Chiang Kai-shek personally, we declare openly that if he will really stop the war against the Red Army and turn his weapons against Japanese imperialists, then, in spite of his innumerable crimes against the people and the country, the CP of China and the Soviet Government will not only make it possible for him to atone for his crimes against the people and the country but are prepared to fight in a common front with him and his troops against Japanese imperialism.

It is necessary to interpret this passage with great caution. Taken out of context, it seems to suggest that Ch'en had opened the door for Chiang Kai-shek's participation in the united front. The original purpose of the statement, however, was made to countervail any conceivable arguments against the establishment of an Anti-Japanese United Front, including the view that the CCP "is willing to ally only with armies other than those of Chiang Kai-shek". Moreover, since many national salvationist groups were calling upon the KMT to reverse its stand against the Communist Party, it would appear unpatriotic of the CCP to insist publicly on the exclusion of Chiang Kai-shek from the proposed alliance. In this light, Ch'en was not so much advocating an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek as demonstrating the
sincerity of the CCP’s willingness to come to an alliance with all armed forces, including those of Chiang Kai-shek. In the same statement, Ch’en stated: "No soldier has the right to place his obedience to Chiang Kai-shek or to any other national traitor above the interests of the whole people and the whole country". Reminding the soldiers of their sacred duties to take up arms to protect the country, Ch’en called upon them to rebel against superiors who refused to fight Japan. He continued to excoriate Chiang as "a typical warlord and a greedy bandit", and stated: "all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang forces have no other way to save the country apart from joining hands with the ... Red Army and the Soviets".

However, it is possible that Moscow had began to entertain the possibility of including Chiang Kai-shek in the united front should he prove willing to terminate his campaign against the Communists and actively resist Japan. According to a recent Soviet source, the CCP delegation was instructed by the ECCI to draw up two declarations on November 25, one in the name of the Chinese Soviet Government and the other in that of the Red Army High Command. Both declarations, promulgated on November 28, reiterated the earlier proposals for the formation of the anti-imperialist united front but refrained from any overt criticism of Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, for the first time without any perjoratives, Chiang’s name was included in the appeal for unity against Japan in the declaration issued in the name of the Red Army commanders.

If Moscow had entertained such a notion, there was, however, no encouragement from Chiang Kai-shek to induce Comintern leaders to pursue further along the line. Not only did Chiang continue his campaign against the Communists in northern Shensi, he also steadfastly refused to reverse his appeasement policy towards the Japanese at the Fifth Congress of the KMT held in November 1935, at which Chiang explained his stand: "We shall not foresake peace until there is no hope for peace; we shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until the critical moment arrives." Under such circumstances, the Comintern could hardly afford to relinquish its hostility towards Chiang. In a statement published in December 1935, Voitinsky, the Comintern’s old China-hand, declared:
If I have spoken of Chinese resistance to Japan, I was speaking — I repeat — of the Chinese masses, of the working class under the guidance of the Communist Party, of the Soviets and the Red Army, of partisans and volunteers, of the revolutionary students. In no sense was I referring to Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek, the leaders of the Chinese counter-revolution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Comintern's acceptance of Chiang Kai-shek in the united front was predicated on Chiang's cessation of the offensive against the Communists and determination to adopt a policy of active resistance against Japan.

The CCP's Response to the New United Front Policy

At the time when the August First Declaration was being proclaimed in Moscow, the CCP's First and Fourth Front Army, under Mao and Chang Kuo-t'ao respectively, were stationed at Mao-erh-kai, and an emergency meeting was held to discuss counter-measures against the pursuing KMT forces. According to the testimony of Chang, there was no discussion at all of the problem of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy. After the two armies departed from Mao-erh-kai, radio communication was maintained between the two headquarters, but Chang was not informed of the change in the Party's united front policy until he received the message from Lin Yu-ying (alias Chang Hao) who returned from Moscow and arrived at Mao's base sometime in late 1935 or early 1936. Yet, curiously, Chang says in his interview with Robert North that "the Chinese leaders had also been considering the problem of opposing Japanese expansion more effectively and, independently, had reached several of the same conclusions concerning a broad united front".

Chang Kuo-t'ao's last statement has been taken by several historians to mean that the policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front was not devised unilaterally by Moscow but was worked out simultaneously by the CCP, with or without coordination from Moscow. The reason why Chang Kuo-t'ao was apparently kept in the dark by Mao during the latter part of the Long March about such developments, it is suggested, was probably due to the existing conflict between the two leaders, i.e., since Chang had been calling for the abandonment of the Soviet revolution, any change in the political line of the Party would have
given Chang an advantage. To support this interpretation, these historians point to the series of declarations issued by the CCP during the Long March on the question of united resistance against Japan, as well as Chiang Kai-shek's statement that as early as autumn 1935 Chou En-lai had already approached his subordinates in Hong Kong for a ceasefire agreement.

On the basis of my own investigation, I have come to the conclusion that this account is based on a series of unfortunate misunderstandings. In the first place, Chang Kuo-t'ao's position, as revealed in his memoir, was that he preceded by several years Stalin's decisions to scrap the Soviet revolution, abandon class struggle and unite with all classes of people to fight against Japanese imperialism. After Chang lost the Oyuwan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) Soviet to the Nationalists in late 1932, he had already urged the Party Central to adopt his suggestions but instead was rebuked. During the Long March, he again put forward his proposals but was strenuously opposed by Mao, Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t'ien. In anguish, he set up an independent Central Committee of his own. When news of the united front arrived from Lin Yü-ying, and Mao's acceptance of the new policy was confirmed, Chang promptly concurred, acting in the belief that the existing differences between himself and Mao had been bridged. His only regret was that the CCP leadership had hitherto refused to accept his opinions but readily succumbed to Stalin's, when they were virtually the same.

It is my observation that Chang Kuo-t'ao had deluded himself into thinking that the Comintern's proposals for the united front were identical with his own. For the Comintern, the Soviet revolution was not a failure, but a success, although it also had certain weaknesses which prevented it from winning nation-wide victory. The new united front policy was designed precisely to overcome such weaknesses but not as an indictment on the inapplicability of the Soviet revolution to China, much less an invalidation of the Marxian concept of class struggle; rather, the new tactics was seen as the very instrument to revive the Soviet revolution in its full-fledged form at a later stage. To Chang Kuo-t'ao, however, the overall defeat of the Communist forces by the Nationalists had proven that the Soviet revolution was a total failure, that the concept of class struggle was not applicable to Chinese conditions, and that the Communists should correct their former
errors and cooperate genuinely with all other forces in the present struggle against Japan. (He was soon to get further disillusioned with the CCP's orientation of the united front and finally defected to the Nationalist side in 1938.) This is why he told his interviewer that the CCP and Moscow had for some time considered the problem of the united front (the abandonment of the Soviet revolution) and had, independently, reached a similar conclusion.

In the second place, it seems rather unlikely that Mao would have, for factional reasons, kept Chang in the dark had he received early information about the Seventh Comintern Congress. Not only would Mao find it hard to justify his actions with his colleagues, he would also be in an embarrassing position should Chang Kuo-t'ao eventually find out and expose his "betrayal." In fact, Mao had nothing to fear in releasing the information to Chang (which he did immediately), since Moscow's position was that the Soviet revolution was not a failure, and Mao's own position was thus reinforced. As I have explained in the earlier section, all the declarations issued in the name of the CCP during the Long March were in all probability Comintern productions. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek had clearly misdated Chou En-lai's visit to Hong Kong by a year - not only do all recollections of the Long March confirm that Chou was with the Party Central throughout the Long March, the vicissitudes of the Long March would have rendered his trip to and from Hong Kong virtually impossible. (Further concrete evidence will be provided in the next Chapter.) It seems reasonable to conclude that the CCP had made no provision for a united front policy throughout the entire period of the Long March. This is further corroborated by Helen Snow's observation of the CCP's virtual silence during the Long March on the issue of united resistance, as well as official Chinese Communist accounts which disclose that, owing to the military exigencies of the Long March, the Party Central could not devote full attention to the problem until the Red Army settled down at Wayaopao.
In any case, it would seem certain that the CCP was unaware of the changes made in Moscow until Lin Yü-ying arrived at Mao's base. (According to Ch'en Shao-yü, Lin was dispatched at his personal behast.) This agrees with Otto Braun, who recalls that Lin was parachuted into Shensi either in late November of early December, and had spent several weeks searching for the Communists. He further recalls that Lin carried no documents with him for fear of being captured by local authorities and could only relate to the CCP leaders the new decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress verbally. For several days, the CCP leaders engaged in meetings and discussions, and on December 25 formally adopted the Wayaopao Resolution. Most historians assume that this resolution was drafted by Mao; in my opinion, it is probable (but only probable) that it was drafted by Chang Wen-t'ien, then Secretary-General of the CCP. The fact that this resolution is not included in Mao's Selected Works inspite of the importance official historians attach to it supports my observation; this does not mean, however, that the resolution was not fully endorsed, if not actually inspired, by Mao.

The resolution first pointed out that China was confronted with a new revolutionary situation created by the Japanese imperialists' invasion of North China and threat to colonize the whole of China. Faced with this national crisis, there was no other alternative to save the country except to conduct a "sacred" national revolutionary war against the Japanese imperialists and the national traitors. With the success of the Red Army in breaking through the KMT's Encirclement Campaigns and in creating new and extensive Soviet areas, the anti-Japanese revolutionary camp had widened to include not only the worker and peasant masses, but also the petty bourgeoisie. At the same time, the counterrevolutionary camp was infested with "vacillation and conflicts", as "certain sections of the national bourgeoisie, numerous rich peasants, small landlords" and even some warlords "have assumed an attitude of benevolent neutrality, if not outright participation, in the national revolutionary struggle". 
Commenting on the international situation, the resolution noted that Japan's attempt to colonize the entire country was bound to create dissension among the imperialist powers. This action, coupled with the Italian imperialist invasion of Abysinnia, had brought the world to a period of revolutionary wars. With the upsurge of revolutionary forces in many countries the isolation of the Chinese revolution was brought to an end; and with the support of the Soviet Union, which had just completed the Five Year Plan, the Chinese revolution was in an advantageous position. Nevertheless, the ferocious Japanese imperialists and the counterrevolutionary forces which were desperate to preserve their own positions, as set against the uneven development of the resolution in the country, had prescribed the "protracted" nature of the Chinese revolution. The task of the Party, therefore, was to "preserve and develop" its strength for the final showdown with the enemy.

Under such circumstances, the Party's strategic line was to "motivate, unite and organize" all revolutionary forces in the country to oppose the primary enemies of the Chinese revolution, i.e., the Japanese imperialists and the "national traitor" Chiang Kai-shek. Only a broad united front from above and from below, comprising all people, all parties and all armed forces, could perform the task. Consequently, although with the participation of the national bourgeoisie and warlords, "vacillation and betrayal" was likely to develop during the course of the revolution, it was necessary to enlist their support in the anti-Japanese struggle. Similarly, The Party should also exploit the disunity and the "internal contradictions and conflicts" within the camp of "landlords and compradors" to persuade certain sections to cease their active opposition to the anti-Japanese movement. The Party, of course, should strive to establish its leadership in the movement.

The highest form of the national united front, according to the resolution, was the "national defence government and the united anti-Japanese army". This was because the land revolution and the Soviet system were not supported by all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek elements, and the Soviet system had achieved victory only in certain parts of the country. It was essential that the Party organize and unite various national salvation associations, political parties, armed forces and forces in both "urban and rural" areas. For this purpose, a ten-point programme was put forward as the basis of a
national defence government. (Its content was identical with that of the August First Declaration.)

To facilitate the formation of the united front and to demonstrate the fact that the Soviets represented not only the interests of the workers and peasants but of all the people, the Chinese Soviet Government announced that henceforth its name "Worker-Peasant Soviet Republic" was to be changed to "People's Soviet Republic". At the same time, the Soviet Government would effect the following policy changes:

- extension of the franchise to the "anti-Japanese" petty bourgeoisie;
- extension of the Soviet privileges and rights to all soldiers including those from the KMT armies who were willing to resist Japan and oppose the national traitors;
- protection of small-scale commerce and industry;
- cessation of the confiscation of land and property of rich peasants apart from those sections of land which were rented out for feudal exploitation;
- equal and fair redistribution of land to the rich peasants in the event of a general demand for redistribution;
- promotion of private investment in the Soviet areas.

For the expansion of the Anti-Japanese United Front, the resolution called for the further strengthening of the Red Army and the greater expansion of the Soviet areas "at the expense of the territories occupied by Japan and Chiang Kai-shek". It further proclaimed that to "join together the civil war with the revolutionary war is the basic principle of the Party". With regard to the work of the Party in KMT areas, it called for the utilization of all "legal and semi-legal" channels to expand the mass organizations and lead the worker masses in their daily political and economic struggle. At the same time, it also stated that the Party's basic objective was "to unite the national revolution with the land revolution" in order to satisfy the basic demands of the peasant masses for land and an improvement of livelihood.
Finally, the resolution stated that "leftist close-doorism" was the main danger in the Party and that this defect was manifested in the inability to coordinate the Party's revolutionary programme with practical circumstances. "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism", it claimed, "is not a dogma" but should be creatively applied to concrete conditions. It was necessary, therefore, to boldly implement a broad united front policy so as to capture support of the masses and assert the Party's leadership of the revolution. At the same time, it warned against the dangers of "rightist opportunism" which, as examplified by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the period of the First United Front, betrayed itself in the failure to criticise allies for fear of driving them away from the revolutionary camp and in the sacrifice of the interests of the worker-peasant masses so as to placate the national bourgeoisie. For the new tasks, the resolution called for the opening up of the Party by admitting all people, regardless of their social status and background, who were willing to fight for the realization of the Communist Party's programme.

Apart from certain differences in style and semantics, the basic spirit and the policy programme as promulgated by the Wayaopao Resolution are, in my opinion, in complete harmony with Ch'en Shao-yü's speech at the Seventh Comintern Congress. One may wish to demur, however, that the call for the "joining together of the civil war with the revolutionary war" is absent in Ch'en's statements; but this does not contradict Ch'en since he also called for the struggle against both Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. Again, one may argue that the statement "to unite the national revolution with the land revolution is the basic objective of the Party" reveals Mao's desire to retain the land revolution, but this is not in conflict with Ch'en's position of advocating the continued confiscation of the land of big landlords. (In fact, when read in its proper context, I would suggest that Mao's statement carries implication that the land revolution should not be executed independent of the national revolution since it would hinder the latter's development.) It is true that Mao called for the confiscation of rich peasants' land in the "feudal exploitative sector", but Ch'en had also made it clear that the Party should strive for the complete eradication of "feudal landlord ownership" of land and permit small landlords to continue to rent out their land only under non-oppressive conditions. Finally, the statement that the CCP would strive to expand the Soviet areas "at the expense of the territories
occupied by Japan and Nanking" does not seem to have any practical meaning since these regions were far away from the Communist base in Shensi; moreover, the continued expansion of the Soviet areas had been explicitly approved by the Comintern.110

It would be naive to assume that the reference to Marxism-Leninism as a guide for action and the warning against "rightist opportunism" were an implicit criticism of Ch'en Shao-yü since they echoed Ch'en's and Dimitrov's statements at the Seventh Comintern Congress. Interestingly, the Wayaopao Resolution seems to be more "rightist" than Ch'en on two accounts: first, it stipulated that the CCP should open itself to all people irrespective of class origin and status; second, it went a step further in suggesting that part of the "landlord and comprador" class was also being transformed. In the former case, the CCP soon rectified its deviation, under explicit instruction from the Comintern, in a Politburo meeting held in September 1936. (See the next Chapter.) In the latter case, it may be that Lin Yü-ying transmitted the more up-to-date version of the Comintern's position (since in late November Moscow had tentatively agreed to accept Chiang Kai-shek, who represented the landlord and comprador class); or that Lin might have generalized the situation in Manchuria on the whole of China. It is also possible that the insertion was introduced by Mao who, realizing the CCP's present predicament, thought it advisable to adopt an even more flexible stand. (See below.) In any case, these minor differences, weighed against the overwhelming similarities between the two statements, hardly support the view that Mao contradicted the decisions of the the Seventh Comintern Congress in regard to the anti-imperialist united front. As a contemporary account written by an ex-Communist recalls, the Wayaopao Resolution was adopted on the basis of the new decisions reached in Moscow at the Seventh Comintern Congress.111

To transmit the Politburo's newly adopted united front policy, Mao convened a conference of Party activists on December 27 and delivered his report "On the Tactics of Fighting against Japanese Imperialism". In simple, rigorous and down-to-earth terms, Mao expounded on the theoretical foundations of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy as contained in the Wayaopao Resolution. To preempt the doubts and hesitation of Party members about the new policy, which required them to cooperate suddenly with the very people they had been
struggling against for many years, Mao sought to impress his audience with the following ridicule:

The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight. Nothing is correct except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch must be conceded to the rich peasants.

Mao argued: "Revolution always follows a tortuous road and never a straight one", and "the alignment of forces in the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary camps can change". At present, the Communist forces were still insufficient to overcome the joint forces of the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. "The united front tactics", he concluded, "are the only Marxist-Leninist tactics". As the commentator on Mao's Selected Works admits, the major import of this speech was to overcome the opposition in the Party against collaboration with the national bourgeoisie.112

In view of the fact that during the Long March the CCP leadership had not deliberated on the problem of the united front, one wonders why Mao should accept the Comintern's drastic re-orientation of the Party's policies so readily. To begin with, it should be realized that at the end of 1935 Mao had not assumed for himself the position of an ardent opponent to the Comintern's political direction. At the Tsunyi Conference, as we have seen, Mao concentrated his attack on the aspect of military strategy while reaffirming the correctness of the previous political line of the Party. It may be argued, of course, that Mao's authority in the Party was not yet unassailable, thus he was not able to challenge the Comintern. This does not explain, however, why at Tsunyi Mao was bold enough to castigate both the RRS and Otto Braun, proteges and military representative of the Comintern. Had he been aware of the existence of a grossly erroneous political line, it is difficult to understand why Mao would not have made an attempt to rectify it. The current Chinese Communist rationalization is that in 1935 the political errors of the RRS were not yet thoroughly exposed and Mao had to wait patiently another ten years to denounce them. This assertion, however, fails to square with Communist practices of thoroughly exposing the political errors of disgraced leaders. Furthermore, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao's recollection, in June 1935
Chu Teh told him personally not to attach too much importance to the Tsunyi Conference, which had merely "put Mao in charge of military affairs". In his detailed account of the Long March, Ch'en Yun merely stated that political work among the cadres was improved at Tsunyi. As late as mid-1936, in his version of Party history given to Edgar Snow, Mao himself failed even to mention the Tsunyi Conference. On the contrary, he cited the "extraordinary ability" of such Party leaders as Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t'ien and Wang Chia-hsiang among a list of eighteen (with Ch'en being placed second only to Chu Teh) as a factor accounting for the Party's "invincibility" and "future victory". Had there been a momentous change in Party line at the Tsunyi Conference as it is presently alleged, it is singularly odd indeed that none of the CCP leaders saw fit to mention it. Neither did any contemporary pro-Communist account of the Long March suggest anything to the effect that the Tsunyi Conference had rectified the "leftist opportunist" line of the earlier Party leadership.

On the basis of these evidence, we can assume that Mao had not perceived any necessity to openly challenge the Comintern's guidance. To say that Mao was not predisposed to question the Comintern is not to suggest that Mao would defer to Moscow on every issue. But the CCP at the end of the Long March was in a crippling state, as Mao recounted a year later:

All the revolutionary bases were lost except the Shensi-Kansu border area; the Red Army was reduced from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, the membership of the CCP was reduced from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, and the Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas were completely wiped out.

Thus, the Communist forces were badly decimated and dismally isolated. Moreover, the present Soviet base, situated in a remote corner of northwestern China, was a barren piece of land with a scanty population and a very backward economy. These material conditions made it very unlikely that the CCP could survive another large-scale KMT attack. (The sense of crisis and desperation among the CCP leaders is vividly described in Chang Kuo-t'ao's memoir.) The new united front policy, which called for unity with all anti-Japanese forces and a relaxation in the struggle against the rich peasants and lesser landlords, would
render it much easier for the CCP to secure the sympathy or support of
the surrounding armies and militia, making it more difficult for the
pursuing KMT forces to launch its final assault. Moreover, a tactical
alliance with the local troops would give the Red Army a period of
respite to enlarge its forces from among the local populace. From a
long-term perspective, the new Soviet area could hardly assert a strong
political influence over the country if it continue to divorce itself
from the main trend of nationalistic development in the country—knowledge of which began to filter to the Party. A shift of emphasis from
the anti-feudal to the anti-imperialist struggle, therefore, would enable
the CCP to reassert itself as a political force in the country and
establish its leadership in the patriotic movement. In short, the
advantages of the new policy was too obvious to be discounted.

Above all, the tactics of the anti-Japanese United Front were
seen as the means by which the CCP could hope to overcome the very
drawback in the Kiangsi revolution which had prevented the Party from
winning nation-wide victory. CCP leaders were unlikely to state this
explicitly in official documents; but Helen Snow, who visited the
Communist base in mid-1937, was able to elicit the following explanation
from Mao concerning the objective of the new policy:

In 1934 all provinces cooperated against the
Reds, so that they had to decide to get new
allies on the basis of resistance against
Japan.

Again, Ch'in Pang-hsien, with extraordinary candour, explained:

For nine years we have struggled under the Soviet
slogan and have had no success in the whole of
China. The petty bourgeois masses and others (the
peasantry with land) did not support the Soviet
slogan, but they can support the nationalist and
democratic slogan.
Finally, Chu Teh, in 1938, stated:

The guerrilla wars against internal [enemy] in the past did not enjoy the sympathy of all people in the nation... The present guerrilla wars against Japan, however, is enjoying the sympathy and support of every class.  

It is clear that the CCP leaders were hoping to overcome the isolation of the Soviet areas as experienced in the Kiangsi Period by winning over the sympathy and support of the landlord-capitalist classes through the CCP's leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle.

At the Wayaopao Conference, the CCP also undertook a restoration of the Central Party and government organizations. As a result, Mao, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t'ien, Chu Teh, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Chou En-lai made up the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Concurrently, Mao retained his position of Chairman of the Soviet Government and of the Revolutionary Military Committee, Chang Wen-t'ien remained Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Ch'in Pang-hsien became head of the Council of People's Commissars (the highest executive organization of the Soviet Government), Chou En-lai was assigned to lead the newly created Committee for Work Among the White Troops, while Liu Shao-ch'i was appointed Chairman of the Committee for Trade Union Movement. (The last two organizations reflected the CCP's new concern for united front work in KMT or non-Communist areas). To re-educate Party members at the grass-root level, the Political Department of the First Front Army prepared "Materials for Political Education" which was published in February 1936, intended for Red Army men and the Party rank-and-file. Written in the form of questions-and-answers, it explained the changes in the Party's policies in the most mundane terms. At the same time, attempts were made to contact other regional Party units. One regional organization, the Southwestern Fukien Military-Political Committee (headed by Teng Tzu-hui and others who were later staunch Maoist supporters), received news about the new united front policy in early 1936. In successive issues of Hung-ch'i (Red Flags, official organ of the Committee) between June and December 1936, the Fukien regional leaders responded positively to the united front policies as recommended by the Comintern and the Central Committee of the CCP. When the full text of Ch'en Shao-yü's speech at the Seventh Comintern Congress finally arrived in December, the Committee promptly adopted a "Resolution on the
Acceptance of Comrade Wang Ming's Thesis on the Tactics of the Anti-imperialist United Front", and Ch'en's speech was immediately put into circulation.  

Sometime in early 1936, Mao, in an interview with a correspondent of the liang-ao Chung-hua (Red China, official organ of the Chinese Soviet Government), criticized the KMT's Fifth Congress held in November 1935 for adhering to the "non-resistance" policy and praised the student movements in the country in struggling for the "cessation of civil war and unity against Japan". (Judging from the fact that Mao made no reference to the Shansi Campaign which took place in February 1936, the interview in all probability took place in January and not in March as is commonly assumed from its appearance in the March issue of the Comintern organization.) Referring to the KMT's Extermination Campaign against the Communists, Mao stated:

I solemnly declare ... in the name of the Chinese Soviet Government: If Chiang Kai-shek or any other army ceases hostilities against the Red Army, then the Chinese Soviet Government will immediately order the Red Army to stop military action against him or the army concerned .... If Chiang Kai-shek really means to take up the struggle against Japan, then obviously the Soviet government will extend to him the hand of friendship on the field of battle against Japan.... If Chiang Kai-shek intends to continue his role of traitor to the nation, [however], that fact will not prevent us from doing all in our power to carry on the anti-Japanese struggle to its conclusion.

Thus, similar to the position of the Comintern, Mao explicitly stated that the CCP would be willing to conclude an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek on condition that he cease his operations against the Communists and actively resist Japan.
Notes:

1 Johnson, esp. chap. 1.


3 Selden, pp. 92-93.

4 Selden does not address himself directly to this question. In his book, he attributes the shift to the rise of nationalism in the country. See chap. 3.

5 This is one of the arguments in Johnson's recent defence of his thesis, "Peasant Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book", *China Quarterly*, No. 72 (Dec., 1977), pp. 766-85.

6 Kataoka, p. 4, cites Johnson and claims that his own book is "another exercise in this method". He attempts to show how a one-sided orientation on the land revolution would not succeed.

7 See Kataoka, pp. 12-33; and Benton, pp. 65-7 & "reply", p.146, for different interpretations of the documentary evidence.


11 "Chung-yang t'u-t'i jen-min wei-yûn-pu hsîn-lîng ti-i-hao - wei shen-ju t'u-t'i tou-cheng, ch'e-ti mo-shou ti-chu chieh-chi ts'ai-ch'an", Hung-se Chung-hua (Red China), No. 47 (Jan. 14. 1933), pp. 5-6.


13 See the articles of Li Fu-Chun, Ch'en Shou-chang, Chang Wen-t'ien and others in *Tou-cheng* (Struggle), Nos. 12, 14, 17 & 19 (May-July, 1933).
14 Mao Tse-tung, "Hsin ti hsing-shih yu hsin ti jen-wu" (New Situation and New Tasks), Hung-se Chung-hua, No. 97 (July 29, 1933), p.3.

15 Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien), "Su-wei-ai cheng-ch'\ illustrates and hia ti chieh-chi tou-cheng", Tou-cheng, No. 15 (June 5, 1933).

16 "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng-fu jen-min wei-y\ illustrates n-hui hs\ illustrates n-ling, ti shih-i-hao - chih-hsing kuang-fan shen-ju ti ch'a-t'\ illustrates ien yun-tung" (Instruction No. 11 of the Council of People's Commissars of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic - Launching An Extensive and Intensive Land Investigation Campaign), Hung-se Chung-hua, No. 87 (June 20, 1933), p.2.

17 Mao Tse-tung, "Ch'a-t'\ illustrates ien yun-tung shih kuang-ta ch'\ illustrates iu -y\ illustrates l ti chung-hsin jen-wu", Hung-se Chung-hua, No. 86 (June 17, 1933), p.3.

18 Mao Tse-tung, "Ts'en-yang fen-hsi chieh-chi", Hung-se chung-hua, No. 89 (June 29, 1933), p. 8. In the revised version in Mao's Selected Works, the entire section dealing with the policies towards each class has been deleted, leaving only the portion dealing with the classification of the various classes. See MTTHC, Vol. 1. pp. 113-115.

19 Mao Tse-tung, "Ch'a-t'\ illustrates ien yun-tung ti ch'\ illustrates u-pu tsung-chieh", Tou-cheng, No. 24 (Aug. 29, 1933), pp. 4-12.


22 See my M. Phil thesis, pp. 107-113; Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo kung-ch'\ illustrates an-tang shih-kao, (Draft History of the Chinese Communist Party, revised edition; Hong Kong, 1974-75), Vol. 2, pp. 144-47; and Ts'ai Hsiao-ch'\ illustrates ien, Chi\ illustrates ang-hai su-ch\ illustrates, h\ illustrates ung-ch\ illustrates h\ illustrates n hs\ illustrates n-shu hui-i (Recollections of the Kiangsi Soviet and the Western Flight of the Red Army; Hong Kong, 1970), pp. 83-9.

23 "Chung-hua su-wei-ai lin-shih chung-yang cheng-fu kung-nung hung-ch\ illustrates n ko-ming ch\ illustrates h\ illustrates n-shih wei-y\ illustrates n-hui hs\ illustrates n-yan" (Declaration of the Provisional Central Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Worker-Peasant Red Army), Hung-se Chung-hua, No. 48 (Jan. 28, 1933), p. 1.


Nakayasu Yosaku, *Sekishoku Ajia ga bōkyō Ajia ga* (A Red Asia or An Anti-Communist Asia; Tokyo, 1937), pp. 183-84

For a standard definition of the various classes and their interrelationship, see "Chung-kuo she-hui ko chieh-chi ti fen-hsi" (Analysis of the Various Classes in China) *MTTHC*, Vol. 1, pp. 3-11.

See Dorrill, "The Fukien Rebellion ...", pp. 31-53; and my M. Phil. thesis, pp. 120-29.


See my M. Phil. thesis, p. 172; and note 35 below.


37 Ch'en Yün, "K'ai-ch' an ch' uèng kung-tso shih mu-ch'in ti-fang kung-tso ti chung-hsin" (The Opening Up of Mass Work Is the Central Tasks of Regional Work at Present), Kung-ch'an-tang jen (The Communists), No. 2 (Nov. 1939), p. 2.

38 See e.g. MTTC, Vol. 6, p. 257 & Vol. 7, p. 297.


41 Chang Kuo-t' ao, pp. 1134-48. Kataoka, pp. 18-20, however, claims that Ch'in Pang-hsien's position was similar to Chang Kuo-t' ao's.


45 The Chinese version of this declaration, "Wei Jih-pen ping-t'un Hua-peī ho Chiang Chieh-shih mai-kuo hsiian-yen", appears in K'ang-Jth chiu-kuo wen-hsien (Documents on the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement; Shanghai, 1936), pp. 45-9. But this is a latter-day collection. Wang Shih et al., Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti-shih chien-pien (Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party; Shanghai, 1958) p. 164, cites a document bearing the same title and claims that it was issued by the CCP on November 13, 1935. There is no evidence to support such assertion.

46 The term "people's front" was new to Chang Kuo-t' ao at the time, see p. 1199.

See McLane, pp. 63-4; Thomson, p. 108; Van Slyke, p. 56; and Kataoka, p. 24.

See Van Slyke, pp. 52-54; and Benton, pp. 64-65 respectively.

Dimitrov, pp. 9-93 & 124.


Wang Ming, The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries. This is the most detailed version of his report at the Seventh Comintern Congress. For the Chinese version, "Lun fan-ti t'ung-i-chan-hsien wen-t'i", see WMHC, Vol. 4, pp. 179-304.


See the revised version of the August First Declaration in e.g. Kuo-kung ho-tao k'ang-jih wen-hsien (Documents on the KMT-CCP Cooperation Against Japan; Hankow, 1938), pp. 1-7; and of Ch'en's speech at the Seventh Comintern Congress in WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 1-63.

E.g. Thomson, p. 111; Kataoka, pp. 24-27. Benton, pp. 62-3 and "reply", p. 146, further claims that Ch'en no longer coupled Chiang Kai-shek with Japan as the CCP's enemies in his Congress speech.
See G. Dimitrov, *An Outstanding Militant of the Comintern* (Sofia Press, 1972), p. 201; and Braun, p. 211. This distortion can probably be explained by the fact that Moscow wishes to show that Mao was a "sectarianist" who rejected an alliance with the KMT from the start. Moreover, since the inclusion of Chiang was eventually a reality Moscow probably wishes to claim that the Comintern already had the foresight at the Seventh Comintern Congress.


The original directive is not available. Its main content, however, is cited in Pao Tsun-p'eng, *Chung-kuo chin-tai ch'ing-nien yiln-tung shih lun* (A History of Recent Youth Movement in China; Nanking, 1946), p. 26; Ch'ing-hua ta-hsieh, Pei-ching ta-hsieh "i-erh-chiu yiln-tung shi" pien-hsiieh-tsu, *I-erh-chiu yiln-tung shih* (Peking, 1961), pp. 49-50; and Gaimushō chosakyoku *Chūkyō gairon* (Brief History of Chinese Communism; 1949), p. 98. Pao Tsun-p'eng, however, states that the directive was issued in November 1936. This is probably a mistake. Other references state that it was issued in 1935.


Ökubo Kōichi, *Sekishoku Shina* (Red China; Tokyo, 1938), pp. 75-7;


See e.g. Li Ch'ang et al., "*I-erh chiu* hui-i-lu* (Recollections of the December 9 Movement; Peking, 1961), pp. 40-41.


72 Chung-kuo kung-ch'an chu-i ch'ing-nien t'uan chung-yang wei-yilan-hui, 'Wei k'ang-Jih chiu-kuo kao ch'Ilan-kuok-hsiang sheng ho ko-chieh ch'ing-nien t'ung-pao hsilan-yen', (Declaration to All School Students and to All Youth Compatriots in the Nation on Resistance Against Japan and National Salvation), cited in *I-erh-chiu yih-tung* (The December 9 Movement; Peking, 1954), pp. 136-39; also in Pao Tsung-p'eng, p. 25

73 See *I-erh chiu yih-tung shih*, pp. 50-76; also Israel, p. 138.

74 See Wang Chien-min, Vol. 3, p. 70. Wang probably confuses the *Chiu-kuo shih-pao* with the *Chiu-kuo Pao*.


76 "'Chiu-i-pa' szu-chou-nien". (On the Fourth Anniversary of 'September 18'); Wang Li-hsi, "'Chiu-i-pa' szu-chou-nien Chiu-kuo Pao, No. 9, reprinted in *Chiu-kuo wen-hsilan*, pp. 91-3 & 281-82.


81 See *K'ang-Jih hsien-fang*. (TB) See also Wang Chien-min, p. 71; and *CGKSTS*, Vol. 6, pp. 279-82.

82 See Wang Chien-min, Vol. 3, p. 70; and *CGKSTS*, Vol. 6, pp. 273-74. See also Wang Ming, *Polveka KPK* (Fifty Years of the CCP; Moscow, 1975), p. 29.


87 Ting Hsing, *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti san-shih-nien helleh-hai to'an-k'ao ti-k'ang* (Thirty Years of the CCP: Outline for Study Reference; Shanghai, 1951), p. 15. (TB)

89 See Kataoka, pp. 25-6, for a completely different interpretation of Ch'en's statement.

90 In the Chinese text, Ch'en used the term "t'u-ti so-yu che" (landowners) which is clearly distinguishable from "ti-chu" (landlords), See WMBC, Vol. 4, p. 404. This provision is meant to rectify the previous indiscriminate classification of landlords irrespective of the amount of land owed and the means of acquisition. It is clear that the cessation of confiscation of land did not apply to landlords.

91 Benton, "reply," p. 146.


93 In his memoir, Ch'en Shao-yü expresses complete approval to this article. Polveka KPK, pp. 19-32


96 See Kataoka, pp. 26-27; and Benton, p. 66, for an opposite view.

97 Toa Kenkyujo, Komintern ni tai-shi seisaku no shi-teki kosatsu (An Investigation into the Comintern's Policy towards China; Tokyo, 1941), p. 83.

98 See WMHC, Vol. 4, pp. 308-12. In the 1938 version of this article, WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 82-7, all hostile remarks about Chiang Kai-shek have been deleted, and Chiang Kai-shek was also politely addressed as "Mr. Chiang Kai-shek".


101 Quoted from McLane, p. 70.

102 Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1197-99.

103 North, p. 176.

See Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1079 & 1198-1200.

Hu Chiao-mu, *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti san-shih nien* (Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party; Peking, 1951), p. 38, for example, states that the task of fighting for "the cessation of civil war and unity for resistance" was something that the Party Central could not achieve during the long march; he acknowledges that the August First Declaration was issued under the guidance of the Comintern, and it was only in December 1935 that the Party Central could fulfill the aspiration of the nation in its demand for national resistance. See also Liu Po-ch'eng, "Hui-i ch'ang-cheng" (Recollection of the Long March), in *Chi-nien ch'ang-cheng sheng-li suu-shih chou-nien* (Commemorate the Fortieth Anniversary of the Victory of the Long March; Peking, 1975), pp. 18-19, See also the commentary in *MTTHC*, Vol. 1, p. 129.

Polweka KPK, p. 71.

Braun, pp. 210-11.


Kataoka, pp. 30-3; and Benton, pp. 65-7, hold the opposite views on all these points.

Chou Feng-ling, *Yen-an chih-lei* (Tears of Yenan; n.p., 1943); p.5


Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1125. Chang comments that Mao regarded himself as a military genius; he does not recall that Mao in 1935 had considered himself an extraordinary political thinker or a theoretician. See pp. 1155-56.

Shee Pin, "A Heroic Trek". According to Ch'en Shao-yü, *Polweka KPK*, pp. 29-30, Ch'en Yün personally told him that it was not necessary to report on the Tsunyi Conference since no significant political change took place apart from a change of leadership positions.


117 "Chung-kuo ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-1ueh wen-t'i" (Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars), *MTTHC*, Vol. 1, p. 171.

118 See Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1123-24, 1128-29 & 1198.

119 N. Wales (Helen Snow), *My Yenan Notebooks* (mimeographed; Madison, Conn., 1961), p. 84.

120 Ibid., p. 121.


122 C. Johnson, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period and the Socialist Education Campaign Period", in Ho Ping-ti & Tsou Tang eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago, 1968); Vol. 1, pp. 410-11, however, cites Mao and Ch'in Pang-hsien's statements to support his view that the CCP sought to capture the support of the peasant masses through nationalism.

123 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 97-103.


Following the adoption of the anti-imperialist united front tactics as proposed by the Seventh Comintern Congress, the CCP took several concrete steps towards the establishment of a broad Anti-Japanese United Front in China. In addition to a constant barrage of party proclamations appealing for unity against Japan, the CCP also launched a military expedition into Shansi, made contacts with the Northeastern Army of Chang Hsüeh-liang, and gave support to the Liang-Kwang Revolt which opposed the KMT's "non-resistance" policy. Notwithstanding the evidence in the two CCP declarations of May and August appealing directly to the KMT for an alliance, certain historians claim that Mao was basically opposed to the Comintern's desire to include Chiang Kai-shek in the proposed united front alliance. They see the CCP's actions as a manifestation of a desire to ally only with local militarists, but not with Chiang Kai-shek. They also maintain that the objective of the CCP was to continue the struggle against landlords, an orientation diametrically opposite to Moscow's emphasis on the anti-imperialist struggle. The CCP's disagreement with the Comintern, they surmise, reached a climax during the Sian Incident of December 1936, when Mao apparently favoured a line of action contrary to Moscow's desire for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. These interpretations find ready support from recent Soviet publications which charge Mao with "leftist sectarianism" in sabotaging the rapprochement with the KMT.

It is the purpose of this Chapter to demonstrate that this dichotomy between Moscow and the CCP in the application of the united front policy is more apparent than real. It is true that the motives behind the Kremlin was fundamentally for the Soviet Union's national security vis-a-vis Japan; but this did not necessarily preclude the possibility for a convergence of interests between Moscow and the CCP. As far as the CCP was concerned, a ceasefire with the KMT would also ensure its own security and provide opportunities for expansion. Both centres, therefore, saw the necessity to gradually broaden the united front to include the Nationalist Government and to make further adjustments in the Party's policies to accommodate the bourgeois strata. Occasional divergence of opinions did occur, as Moscow wished to hasten
the rapprochement with the KMT while the CCP desired flexibility of action to maximize advantages obtainable in a given domestic situation. (As a result, Ch' en Shao-yü was caught in the middle and had to offer a compromise view on certain issues.) All in all, as the CCP was convinced that an alliance with the KMT would work to the greatest benefit of the Party, it collaborated with the Comintern in forging the Anti-Japanese United Front. During the Sian Incident, Mao temporarily contemplated the possibility of forming a consolidated alliance with the rebel forces in the Northwest to the exclusion of Chiang Kai-shek, but quickly gave up the idea when all odds were against the move.

The Shansi Campaign and the Drive towards Unity for Resistance Against Japan

Following the adoption of the united front tactics by the CCP's Wayaopao Conference of December 1935, the CCP began to place emphasis on the anti-imperialist struggle against Japan. New placards and posters calling for resistance against Japan were put up everywhere in Wayaopao. New tactics were adopted towards the soldiers of Chang Hsüeh-liang's Northeastern Army, who had been dislodged from Manchuria and were eager to fight the Japanese and return to their homeland. As early as January 1936, the CCP issued an appeal to the "entire rank-and-file of the Northeastern Army", urging them to cease the war against the Red Army and undertake a joint resistance against Japan. At the same time, the Communists treated captives from the Northeastern Army well. They were re-educated with new ideas of national resistance and safely repatriated to propagate the idea amongst their fellow soldiers. Slogans such as "Chinese must not fight Chinese" and "Unite with us to fight back to Manchuria" were shouted to the enemy across the battle-fields. Sometime in early 1936, the CCP also gave notice to the effect that the Hsi-pēi k'ang-jih hung-chih ta-hsüeh (the Anti-Japanese Red Army Academy of the Northwest) would be established at Wayaopao on April 1, 1936. The aims of the school, as stated in the circular notice, were to propagate ideas of national resistance, opposition to traitors such as Chiang Kaishek, the recovery of lost territories and struggle for the liberation, independence and freedom of the Chinese nation.
In the meantime, preparations were made for an eastern expedition of the Red Army into the neighbouring Shansi province, the domain of the warlord Yen Hsi-shan. The expedition was preceded by an appeal to Yen for joint action against Japan, which was refused. Thereupon, the Red Army, numbering 6,000 strong, crossed the Yellow River and invaded southern Shansi. With relative ease, the Communists advanced to the outskirts of Taiyuan, the capital of the province, and by late March occupied twenty-seven hsien (counties) or approximately one-third of the province. Further advance of the Communist forces was checked, however, by reinforcements of Nationalist forces under the command of General Ch'en Cheng, and the Communists suffered heavy casualties. In early May, they withdrew into the Shensi base.

The purpose of the Shansi Campaign has so far been an intriguing issue for historians. It has been suggested, for example, that its publicized aim to fight through to the Japanese-controlled areas had hidden its real objectives to gain badly needed food supplies, to test Yen Hsi-shan's strength and to enlarge the Soviet areas. To those who perceive a gap between the CCP's and Moscow's united front policy, it was ostensibly a "military initiative" on the part of Mao to dampen Moscow's desire for a united front with the Nanking Government. In line with the latter assertion, it has also been asserted that the Red Army in Shansi carried out a policy of violent confiscation of landlords' land in defiance of the Comintern's instructions. That it was an action taken against Moscow's advice finds further support in the present-day Soviet denunciation of the campaign as an "unreal plan to widen the Soviet movement" which created the danger of civil war. A detailed study of the conduct of the CCP during the Shansi Campaign and of Moscow's contemporary response to the expedition, however, warrants a different interpretation.

From its inception, the campaign was closely linked with appeals for united resistance against Japan. On February 21, the CCP dispatched a circular telegram calling for the convocation of an "anti-Japanese national salvation representatives' conference", a proposal which had already appeared in the December 14, 1935 manifesto issued in Moscow in the name of the CCP. It reiterated the earlier call for the establishment of a national defence government and a united anti-Japanese army. Although it named the Soviet area as the venue of the proposed conference, there is nothing in the telegram to suggest that representatives from the KMT were to be excluded.
On March 1, the Red Army under the command of P'eng Teh-huai issued a formal declaration on the purpose of the "Eastern Expedition". It denounced Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan for their "traitorous" activities which had brought about the imminent ruination of the country and stated that the Red Army was marching east for the purpose of engaging the Japanese aggressors. "All patriots", it proclaimed, "irrespective of their party affiliations and origins, so long as they are sympathetic towards resistance against Japanese imperialism are welcome to ally with the Red Army for the common task of prosecuting the grand enterprise of national revolution". Furthermore, it declared that "wherever the Red Army goes, it will protect the patriotic movements, protect the revolutionary masses, protect the interests of the workers and peasants, protect the intelligentsia, and protect industry and commerce".13

In conjunction with the efforts of the CCP headquarters in Shensi, the Northern Bureau of the CCP in Tientsin under the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i issued another "Anti-Japanese Manifesto" on March 10, 1936. It reiterated the CCP's call for a "anti-Japanese national salvation representatives' conference", citing the Party's recent concessions to rich peasants to demonstrate the Party's sincerity. It addition, it maintained that "if Yen Hsi-shan would undertake resistance against Japan and cease his hostility towards the Red Army, the Red Army would immediately conclude an anti-Japanese and anti-traitor alliance pact with him".14 These proclamation show clearly that the emphasis of the CCP's propaganda was on the anti-imperialist rather than the anti-feudal struggle, although the struggle against landlords was implicitly maintained.

There are conflicting accounts of the actual conduct of the Red Army towards the landlords during the campaign. Some reports claim that the Red Army refrained from confiscating the land of the landlords.15 Others, however, assert that the Red Army struck at the local rich and distributed the confiscated properties among the lower peasants.16 The truth seems to be that the Red Army troops did strike at the local tyrants and large landlords, but left the ordinary landlords and rich peasants alone. According to eyewitness accounts the Red Army was too busy searching for food (and possibly too mobile in their movements) to carry out a systematic programme of land redistribution, so that to many the raid seemed like foraging.17 This probably explains why Nationalist
historians claim that the primary objective of the Communists in Shansi was to seize the badly needed food and other supplies. There are indications, however, that the Party leadership cautioned against attacks on rich peasants and small landlords. A recollection of a local officer states that sometime in early 1936 (i.e., prior to the Shansi expedition):

Chairman Mao came to us and spoke of the necessity for forming a united front. The Central Committee now stopped our activities against the landowners .... We had been far too strict, we were told. We were now to fight shoulder-to-shoulder even with the [patriotic] landlords.

Furthermore, on April 14, 1936 the Chinese Soviet Government issued a directive to all levels of Party and government organizations warning against excesses in dealing with rich peasants, and called for strict observation of the revised rich-peasant policy.

Although the Communists continued to agitate among the lower peasants toward revolutionary action, the primary activity of the Red Army during the expedition had been the propagation of resistance against Japan. According to several contemporary Japanese reports, the Red Army distributed pamphlets calling for "Resistance against Japan and Opposition to Chiang Kai-shek" wherever they went and carried out propaganda work among the troops of the Shansi and Central Armies. This is confirmed by a Red Army commander, Ho Ch'ang-kung, shortly after the Shansi Campaign to Helen Snow:

When we reached Shansi we still had the land redistribution programme, but the main slogan was against traitors. But we formed no Soviets, only Salvation Associations. Even the landlords welcomed us and sent contributions for the anti-Japanese struggle.

Another participant in the campaign also discloses to Snow that during the Campaign the Communists sought out local magistrates and KMT officials and explained the new anti-Japanese policy of the Party.
The Communists' anti-Japanese propaganda seemed to have evoked tremendous response. This is evident not only in the lack of resistance among the local Shansi troops, but also in anti-Japanese demonstrations staged in Taiyuan by students and intellectuals soon after the Communists entered Shansi. When the Red Army was finally forced to evacuate the province, they were reported to have taken with them a total of 8,000 new recruits for the Red Army. Subsequent evaluation by CCP leaders, including Chou En-lai and Yang Shang-k’un, traced the success of the Red Army in winning over the support of the local troops and populace to the anti-Japanese propaganda.

In analysing the activities of the Red Army and its relation to the decisions of the Comintern, it should be recalled that up to early 1936 Ch'en Shao-yü continued to call for the thorough liquidation of the "feudal landlord ownership" of land and struggle against the "parasitic" landlords. Hence, the actions of the Red Army against landlords should not be construed as a deliberate rebuttal of the Comintern's instructions. In addition, it should also be noted that the Seventh Comintern Congress resolved that "In China, the extension of the Soviet movement and the strengthening of the fighting power of the Red Army must be combined with the development of the people's anti-imperialist movement all over the country". The Shansi Campaign seems to be the very first attempt on the part of the Communists to test the effectiveness of the anti-imperialist programme to expand the Soviet areas. Several contemporary Japanese reports attribute the origins of the CCP's Shansi Campaign to the new decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress.

Furthermore, the contemporary Comintern organs contain explicit expressions of approval for the CCP's Shansi Campaign. The March issue of the Chiu-kuo shih-pao reported favourably on the Red Army's march to the east to fight the Japanese. In an article published in April 1936, Ch'en Shao-yü further stated: "The offensives of the Chinese Red Army on Shansi and its sincere call for a united struggle against Japanese imperialism have produced a tremendous impression on the masses ... who are still more convinced that the Red Army is the only, really anti-Japanese army". In May, an article by another CCP delegate in Moscow stated:
Under the personal command of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, sections of the Red Army marched into the province of Shansi in order to organize the army of the Anti-Japanese Alliance, and to develop the Chinese national-revolutionary war... These facts show that the chief provisions of the new policy of the C.P. of China are already in operation.

Finally, another article published in the Bolshevik proclaimed the Red Army to be the "vanguard" of the anti-Japanese struggle and stated that the victories of the Red Army in Shensi had proven the complete bankruptcy of the KMT's policy of "non-resistance" towards Japan and internal war against the Soviets. These successes were attributed to the "brilliant leadership" of Mao Tse-tung.

At the same time, it should be noted that neither the Comintern nor the CCP had ceased attacking Chiang Kai-shek for his "traitorous" activities. In the February issue of the Chiu-kuo shih-pao, an editorial condemned the Nanking Government for its suppression of the patriotic movement and called for the "elimination" of Chiang Kai-shek. In the May 1936 article cited above, the author also said: "... the Nanking Government, with Chiang Kai-shek as its head, has not changed its scandalously treacherous policy, and is now - acting on the orders of the Japanese imperialists - endeavouring to hinder the advance of the troops of the Anti-Japanese Alliance, to break the people's united front and to secure the annihilation of the troops whose object it is to liberate China". For its part, the CCP in a declaration issued in the name of Mao and Chu Teh on April 4 condemned both Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan for mobilizing their forces to obstruct the Red Army from marching head-on to engage the Japanese and called for the overthrow of both of them.

These explicit condemnations of Chiang Kai-shek, however, did not prevent either the Comintern or the CCP from adopting a more flexible stand towards the formation of a united front with the KMT. The Soviet Union was threatened by Germany when Hitler in March 1936 restored conscription in the country and reoccupied the Rhineland in defiance of the Versailles Pact. At the same time, friction occurred between Japan and the Soviet Union along the borders of Outer Mongolia. Faced with these threats on two fronts, Moscow was apparently desirous of the establishment of a solid Anti-Japanese United Front in China so as to build up a strong bulwark against Japan. Anticipating unfavourable
repercussions on China, Ch'en Shao-yü in his article published in April 1936 made it clear that it would be in the best interests of China to organize a solid united front against Japan. He stated: "The events which have arisen following the occupation by German troops of the demilitarized zone on the Rhine are exerting a great influence on the situation in China. China knows only too well that every new complication in the European situation is used by the Japanese to undertake a further offensive on China". Expressing his distrust of Chiang Kai-shek's intention to resist Japan, he denounced the "unexampled treachery of the Nanking Government" and stated the "Chiang Kai-shek is much more afraid of his own people than of Japanese imperialism!"

Ch'en then proceeded to review the CCP's united front movement since the August First Declaration of 1935. He listed three major achievements of the new policy: the intensification of the anti-Japanese activities in the country, the formation of various national salvation associations, and the growth of Communist "authority" among the people. He cited in particular Chang Nai-ch'i's article deploring that for every Red soldier killed, Nanking had spent about $80,000. He noted, however, that there were also weaknesses in the movement, which included the absence of a real organization that unified all the national salvation bodies, the absence of concrete agreements among various political parties, and the failure to draw the "majority of the KMT troops" into the movement. According to Ch'en, these weaknesses were the result of shortcomings within the Party, including the ineffectiveness of the Party organizations in the KMT urban areas, the failure of Party members to grasp the meaning of the new united front tactics, and the lack of sufficient re-orientation in Soviet policies concerning land, economy and democracy to convince outsiders of the CCP's sincerity in allying with other parties against Japan. Finally, Ch'en stated:

We must win over to the united anti-Japanese front the main military units of the KMT, including the troops subordinate to the Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek, ... even including the more influential military and political leaders of the KMT ... [since] the greater the number of KMT organizations drawn into this struggle, the easier will it be for us to drive back Japanese imperialism.
Thus, Ch'en expressed his desire to see the formation of a strong Anti-Japanese United Front with the participation of the KMT and the Nationalist forces. Although he did not specify that the CCP should appeal directly to Chiang Kai-shek in order to achieve this aim, it is clear that unless the CCP could find other ways of detaching the Nationalist troops from Chiang Kai-shek, the only alternative would be to enlist the support of Chiang himself for the Anti-Japanese United Front. For this purpose, another CCP delegate P'an Han-nien was dispatched back to China. (See below.)

It is not certain whether indirect channels of communication existed between Moscow and the CCP at this time, but the CCP was also moving in a similar direction regarding the KMT's participation in the Anti-Japanese United Front. One factor that strongly influenced the CCP's decision was undoubtedly the difficulties encountered by the Communists and pro-Communist elements in developing the national salvation movement. Owing to the fact that the KMT police exercised an effective surveillance over the major coastal cities, all activities directed against the Nanking government were ruthlessly suppressed and the Communists were prevented from making any significant headway in influencing the masses. Following the December 9 movement, for example, many leftist student leaders were arrested; and on February 20, the Government promulgated the "Emergency Law to Maintain Public Order" outlawing the most influential and radical Peiping-Tientsin Student Union. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek was shrewd enough to adopt a conciliatory posture towards the students. In January 1936, Chiang convened a conference of educators and student representatives at Nanking, at which he promised not to sign any treaty agreement detrimental to China's interests and also implored students to have faith in the Government. These tactics achieved results, and the student body in Nanking took steps to exclude left-wing leaders hostile to the Government. In February, a right-wing student groups in Peiping started to publish the famous Tsing-hua p'ing-lun (Tsinghua Critic), which denounced the Communists and called for support for the Government, albeit on condition that Nanking must actively resist Japan. The Communists were isolated to the extent that Helen Snow observed that "as soon as the left-wing elements began diluting the movement, it lost élan and vitality."36
A similar situation befell the national salvation associations. On February 11, the Propaganda Department of the Nationalist Government issued a public declaration to the nation calling upon the people not to be deceived by the Communist propaganda. In reply, the Ta-chung sheng-huo retorted by stating that the national salvation movement was not at all under the influence of the Communists. It also denied any attempt to oppose or overthrow the Central Government. Instead, it called for the concerted effort of the Government and the people and stated that the people were prepared to overlook the incorrect policy of the KMT in the past and cooperate with it wholeheartedly for national defence. The key to national salvation, it concluded, was the Government's willingness to join hands with the people. In spite of its peaceful intentions, the paper, together with several others, were banned by the KMT.

Thus, it was becoming increasingly clear to the leftist student and national salvation leaders that the development of patriotic movements would be extremely difficult if they simultaneously directed attacks against the Nanking Government. In April, the left-wing student leaders in Peiping began to adjust their stand vis-à-vis the Government. On April 26, the Peiping Student Union issued a declaration which was tantamount to a self-criticism of its past failures to bring about "unity and cohesion" among the students and resolved to fight for this objective in the future. It refrained from any criticism of the Nanking Government, and its purpose was clearly to placate the KMT.

The CCP was probably well-informed of these developments through its contact with Liu Shao-ch'i's Northern Bureau. (It is possible that Liu in fact made recommendations to the Central Committee to pacify the KMT: this corroborates the Red Guards' charges against Liu for certain "capitulationist" crimes committed during early 1936.) On April 25, 1936 the CCP Central Committee issued a declaration which, for the first time, formally included the KMT at the top of the list of national salvation bodies to whom the appeal was addressed. It called for unity against Japan among all groups "regardless of past differences and conflicts" and stated emphatically that all Chinese nationals must join together in the sacred struggle to save the country and resist Japan. It reiterated the call for the national conference and indicated that the CCP would be willing to come
to an agreement with the "central and regional" organs of all parties for the establishment of an anti-Japanese people's front.  

It seems that the final defeat of the Communist forces at the hands of the Central Army in Shansi convinced the CCP leaders that unless the Nationalist troops were won over to the anti-Japanese struggle, the Communists could not overcome the KMT's pressure. Moreover, since the Nationalist soldiers were still basically loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, the only practical way to re-direct their attack onto the external enemy was to secure the consent of Chiang for the united front. On May 5, 1936, the CCP dispatched a circular telegram bearing the signature of Mao and Chu Teh addressed directly to the Military Council of Nanking. After criticising Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan for obstructing the Red Army in its march to the east to fight the Japanese imperialists, it stated:

Inspite of its numerous victories in Shansi ... the Red Army has withdrawn ... to the west of the Yellow River in order to preserve China's strength for national defence and thereby expedite the War of Resistance against Japan, to carry out resolutely our repeated declaration to the nation for the cessation of civil war and unity against Japan, and to hasten the final awakening of Chiang Kai-shek and the patriotic officers and men in his army.

Asserting that this action was a demonstration of "good faith" on the part of the CCP, the telegram urged "the gentlemen of the Nanking Government" to stop the civil war and dispatch delegates to discuss the specific measures for resisting Japan and saving the nation. It concluded by citing an old Chinese maxim that "the butcher becomes a Buddha the moment he drops his cleaver".  

This declaration marked the first formal appeal addressed to Chiang Kai-shek for a ceasefire and for unity against Japan. Official Chinese Communist historians agree that with the issuance of this declaration, the CCP shifted its position from "fan-Chiang k'ang-jih" (Oppose Chiang and Resist Japan) to "pi-Chiang k'ang-Jih" (Put Pressure on Chiang and Resist Japan), which signified the end of the policy of excluding Chiang from the united front alliance. There is little doubt that the CCP's intention for peace negotiations with Nanking was authentic. According to the testimony of Chiang Kai-shek,
Chou En-lai and P'an Han-nien reached Shanghai sometime after the May 5 telegram and they conferred with Chang Ch'ung, a member of the KMT's Central Executive Committee. P'an, who presented himself as a Comintern representative, later went to Nanking to negotiate with Ch'en Li-fu, the head of the Organizational Department and Chiang's confident. The CCP's peace effort, however, did not seem to achieve any result at this stage. Towards the end of May, Chiang ordered his troops to converge on Wayaopao and the Communists were forced to evacuate to Pao-an.

Meanwhile, the National Salvation Association and the student unions were making active preparation for the formation of national federations in Shanghai to unify the movements for national defence. According to a Japanese intelligence report, the CCP Central Committee on May 27, 1936 dispatched a secret letter to the National Salvation Association pointing out that the changing circumstances required an adjustment towards cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. On May 29, the All-China Federation of Student Associations (FSA) was founded, and a "programme of action" was adopted which called for cooperation between the Government and the people for an all-out national mobilization against. On May 31, the All-China Federation of National Salvation Associations (FNSA) was formed, and it issued a comprehensive "Preliminary Programme of National Salvation and Resistance against Japan" similar to the CCP's earlier ten-point programme. It also issued an inaugural declaration calling for the cessation of civil war and negotiation among representatives of all parties for the establishment of the people's front against Japan. Reaffirming its support for the Central Government, it also specifically refuted the view that Communists should be excluded from the common organization. To propagate its aims, the FNSA published the *Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao* (Salvation News) which became the organ of the so-called "People's Front Faction" (*jen-min chan-hsten-p'ai*). Contemporary Chinese and Japanese reports observe that the FNSA clearly intended to play the role of mediator between the CCP and the KMT in order to bring about their cooperation. But before anything was achieved, a major event occurred which temporarily revived the CCP's opposition to Chiang Kai-shek.
Towards the end of May, 1936, the Southwest Political Council of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (Liang-Kwang) under Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi started to organize a campaign against the Nanking Government for the purpose of resisting Japan. In early June, the Southwest issued a circular telegram urging Nanking to take immediate actions to check the encroachment of Japanese forces in North China and declared its intention to dispatch an anti-Japanese army to march north to fight the Japanese. On June 9, the Southwest actually mobilized its troops, reported to be 190,000 strong, and its vanguard began to advance in the direction of Hunan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek forwarded dispatches urging the Southwest leaders to abandon the venture and to discuss the problem of resistance against Japan at the forthcoming KMT's Second Plenum on July 10. At the same time, he also mobilized 350,000 men to forestall any further advance of the Southwest army. War seemed imminent if neither side was prepared to back down.

In response to the crisis, Izvestiia, the Soviet official paper, published an article on June 10, 1936, which considered the uprising a Japanese attempt to provoke civil war in China in order to camouflage new aggression in the South, especially Fukien. It also suggested that the coup was merely an attempt to oppose the Central Government under the guise of resistance against Japan. It is undeniable that this is a strong indication that Moscow was ill-disposed towards the rebellion. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Southwest had a long history of animosity towards Nanking, and anti-Communist sentiment in the area was particularly strong. (One of the basic objectives urged upon his followers by the late Liang-Kwang leader Hu Han-min at his death in May 1936 was the annihilation of the Communists.) In view of the complicated nature of the movement, it is small wonder that the true intentions of the rebels were suspected in many circles. Even some Japanese analysts considered the uprising as an attempt to capitalize on the upsurge of the anti-Japanese movements in the country to struggle for control of the national government.
Nevertheless, the CCP could hardly afford to forsake any opportunity to promote an anti-Japanese movement in the country which would tie the hands of the Nationalist Government and perhaps force it to reverse its stand. On June 11, Mao and Chu Teh signed a declaration which proclaimed the CCP’s support for the anti-Japanese movement of the Southwest and offered to ally with the Liang-Kwang government for the purpose of resisting Japan. At the same time, however, it also urged the Nanking Government to "rectify its errors, comply with the demands of Liang-Kwang, and mobilize all sea, land and air forces to march north to resist Japan". It deplored that Chiang instead mobilized his forces for the purpose of obstructing the northern expedition of the Southwest and called upon all patriotic soldiers in Chiang's army to disobey the order. It appealed to all patriotic organizations to support the CCP's call for the national conference and to oppose the forthcoming Second Plenum of the KMT, but at the same time urged the patriotic leaders of the Southwest to promote mass activities in their territory. Finally, the declaration put forward these slogans: "Support the Southwest for Resistance against Japan", "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek for obstructing the Southwest Righteous Army from Marching North to Fight the Japanese" and "Cease the Civil War and Unite against Japan".  

This declaration, though extremely critical of Chiang Kai-shek, retained the option for Chiang to redeem his past "errors" and to participate in the united front by reversing his appeasement policy towards Japan. This clearly contradicts the recent Soviet charge that Mao turned the crisis into a struggle against Nanking instead of against Japanese imperialism; moreover, the accusation that Mao did not offer any criticism of the Liang-Kwang movement is also not borne out by documentary evidence. On June 12, the CCP issued another declaration which, though approvingly recognized the "progressive" nature of the Liang-Kwang movement, nonetheless pointed out that the Southwest leaders belonged to the "landlord-comprador-bourgeois" class, feared the masses and lacked a clear-cut "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" programme owing to its unwillingness to ally with other anti-Japanese forces.
According to an article in the *Inprecor* dated June 20, the Comintern received confirmation of the Southwest's anti-Japanese stance on June 9, when reports pertaining to the 'actual preparedness of the Kwang[si] army, which was ready for the inauguration of the northern expedition and would combat all traitors who might seek to bring this expedition to a standstill' arrived. On June 15, the *Chiu-kuo shih-pao* published an editorial "Support the Southwest in Resisting Japan" which began: "Some people think that the Southwest Incident has a complicated nature, but we are of the opinion that so long as it is anti-Japanese it is a correct movement .... Both the Japanese and Nanking are spreading rumours that the Southwest is merely interested in opposing Chiang: their purpose is to create disunity among the Chinese". It called for opposition to Chiang's attempt to start a civil war and for propagation of this belief among the troops of Nanking. At the same time, it also called upon the Southwest to be vigilant against Chiang's attempt to split the movement, to completely abandon its anti-Communist policy, and to unite with the Red Army against Japan. Finally, it declared that "there is no question that the people support the Southwest", but they would also support the Nationalist Army if it resist Japan. On June 20, it published an article entitled "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek for Concentrating his Troops to Obstruct the Anti-Japanese Army of the Southwest and for Employing Devious and Divisive Methods to Encourage Disunity in the Country". A subsequent editorial on June 25 reported that peaceful negotiations between the Southwest and Nanking (which started on June 16) had broken down because Chiang had refused to go along with the Southwest in resisting Japan.

Thereupon, Ch'en Shao-yü in an article published on July 12 unhesitatingly castigated Chiang as the instigator of the civil war as a means of continuing his policy of "domestic wars" and "external capitulation". He expressed the view that the Japanese were involved in the incident only to the extent that they insidiously encouraged civil war in China but denied emphatically that the Southwest leaders were under the influence of or controlled by the Japanese. Further, he called for a clear distinction between the "traitorous" Nanking regime and the anti-Japanese Southwest in spite of the fact that the Southwest had failed to grant democratic freedoms to the patriotic masses or to unite themselves with other anti-Japanese forces such as the Red Army. He then declared that the only
solution to the present crisis was the oft-quoted slogan "Cessation of Civil War and Unity for Resistance" and emphasized that the CCP, despite the favourable opportunity offered by the present conflict in its struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, would avoid turning the present crisis to its own "short-term" advantage. Deplorably, Chiang, ignoring the CCP's endeavours to prosecute the anti-Japanese struggle, chose to carry on his attacks against the Soviet regions and oppose the anti-Japanese struggle. Under such circumstances, Ch'en called upon all officers and soldiers of the Nationalist army to flout Chiang's orders and join the anti-Japanese camp, and in the event of an actual outbreak of civil war the whole nation must unite against Chiang.\(^6\)

On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that the Comintern, or Ch'en Shao-yü at the very least, did not side with Nanking in the dispute with Liang-Kwang. It may be true to say that statements from Moscow betrayed a greater concern for compromise and for the establishment of unity in the country, but Ch'en Shao-yü was clearly prepared to give full support to a nation-wide campaign against Chiang Kai-shek as long as Chiang remained uncommitted to resistance against Japan. (In fact, I would suggest that a distinction should be made between the opinions expressed in the official organs of the Soviet Government and that of the Comintern organs since the Soviet Government was chiefly concerned with the interests of the State while the Comintern was also saddled with the responsibility of helping Communist parties in other countries. The same divergence of views can again be discerned during the Sian Incident.)

Following Chiang Kai-shek's declaration at the Second Plenum of July 10-14 that he would not tolerate any further infringement of China's territorial integrity and his forcible dissolution of the Southwest Political Council, the Liang-Kwang movement disintegrated with the defection of an important section of its armed forces and the subsequent announcement of the Liang-Kwang leaders' uniformity with the views of the Nanking Government. Chiang apparently won his day. The outcome of the episode reinforced the belief among the national salvationists that Chiang's support for the anti-Japanese struggle was indispensable. On July 15, four prominent leaders of the FNSA, Shen Chün-ju, Chang Nai-ch'i, T'ao Hsing-chih and Tsou T'ao-fen issued a public declaration appealing to Nanking, Liang-Kwang and the CCP for a cessation of hostilities as well as unity against Japan.
It claimed that neither the people nor the Government could hope to achieve success for the "national salvation enterprise" single-handedly. Local militarists starting a campaign against Japan would also fail if it was directed at the same time against the Central Government. It called upon Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his campaign against the Chinese Communists and at the same time urged the CCP to adopt "concrete measures" to demonstrate its sincerity in uniting with other parties. Specifically, it called for relaxing the struggle against rich peasants, landlords and capitalists, rectifying the radical ideas of class struggle, and terminating all military actions against the Nationalist troops. Responding to these developments, both the Comintern and the CCP were probably convinced that an openly belligerent attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek was ill-advised, and the policy of "unite with Chiang to resist Japan" gained ascendancy.

The "Democratic Republic" and the Drive towards Rapprochement with the KMT

According to Otto Braun, in early June a second group of Chinese Communists from the Soviet Union arrived at Pao-an, the CCP's new capital, and radio communication was established between the CCP and Moscow. This is also confirmed by Chang Kuo-t'ao, who recalls that sometime in August 1936 he was informed that the CCP headquarters in Shensi had already re-established contact with Moscow. The existence of a direct line of communication ushered in a period of closer collaboration between the two centres in working out the Anti-Japanese United Front policy.

One of the first ostensible results of this contact was the adoption of a resolution by the Central Committee "On the Present Political Situation" on June 13, 1936, which was clearly based on the article published by Ch'en Shao-yü in April 1936. The resolution began with the assertion that the mushrooming of student and national salvation movements had borne witness to the achievements of the new policy, resulting in the enhancement of the Red Army's "authority" among the people. It denounced Chiang Kai-shek for continuing his policy of concessions to the Japanese and reiterated Ch'en's criticism of Chiang as being "much more afraid of his own people than of Japanese imperialism". Influenced by the development of the Liang-Kwang revolt, it added that so long as Chiang remained a "traitor", the conduct of the War of Resistance was inseparable from the anti-Chiang struggle. It reiterated the criticisms of Ch'en Shao-yü on the weaknesses of the
party work in the KMT areas, and cited all his statements concerning the Party's failure "to draw the majority of the KMT troops" into the anti-Japanese struggle and the cadres' lack of orientation to the new policy especially in the major cities. The primary task of the Party, according to the resolution, was Ch'en's call for the "winning over of important sections of the Nationalist troops".

According to a recent Soviet publication, the Secretariat of the ECCI held further discussions in June 1936 on the basis of information received from the CCP following the establishment of direct communication between the two centres. To judge from Pavel Mif's article published around this time, the Comintern was probably convinced that the anti-Japanese United Front was a practical policy which was fully in line with the domestic developments in the country. Referring to the international situation the ECCI concluded that Japan was planning to launch a full-scale attack on China as a prelude to war with the Soviet Union and conquest of the whole of Asia at the risk of direct confrontation with Great Britain and the United States. On the basis of this strategic thinking, Moscow probably regarded the establishment of an Anti-Japanese United Front between the CCP and the KMT as a matter of urgent priority. We can assume that recommendations to this effect were conveyed to the CCP.

The Comintern's position was fully reflected in an interview granted by Mao to Edgar Snow on July 16, 1936. In the interview, Mao first of all stated: "The fundamental issue before the Chinese people today is the struggle against Japanese imperialism. Our Soviet policy is decisively conditioned by this struggle". In analysing Japan's strategic goal, Mao expressed that Japan was aiming at the conquest not only of China, but the whole of Asia, and was prepared to confront countries such as America and Britain. The Soviet Union, according to Mao, would render full support to China because it could not ignore Japan's ultimate goal of turning China into a "strategic base from which to attack the USSR". Repeating Ch'en Shao-yü, Mao cited Chang Nai-ch'i's remark that for every Red soldier killed, Nanking had cost the Chinese people 80,000 dollars. Mao further elucidated the conditions necessary for victory over Japan:
First, the achievement of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the oppressed people at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves.

To these ends, Mao indicated that the CCP would submit "whole-heartedly" to the decisions of a joint military council "provided it really resisted Japan". In response to the question "Would the Red Army agree not to move its troops into or against any areas occupied by KMT armies?" Mao answered in the affirmative and added: "I emphasize again that the seizure of power is not our (immediate) aim. We want to stop civil war, create a people's democratic government with the KMT and other parties, and fight for our independence against Japan". In view of the fact that Mao was fully aware that the statement would soon be published, it is clear that Mao was making overtures to Nanking in order to bring about a rapprochement.

Earlier, the CCP's Wayaopao Resolution had responded to Ch'en's proposals for the relaxation in the struggle against rich peasants and small landlords. Owing largely to a lack of direct communication between the two centres, the CCP had presumably continued the expropriation of rich peasants' land in the "feudal exploitative sector" and had made no concession to anti-Japanese soldiers who were also landowners. On July 2, Tou-cheng (Struggle, the CCP's theoretical organ) acknowledged receipt of the full text of Ch'en Shao-yl's article "For a Change in All Spheres of Our Work" and reproduced it verbatim in the Party organ. Following discussion of Ch'en Shao-yl's suggestion, the Central Committee of the CCP adopted on July 22 a new land directive which fell completely in line with Ch'en's proposals, adding, in fact, further concessions to the landlords. The directive began with the assertion that to enable the Soviet to become the "unifying centre" of the nation, the policies implemented in the Soviet regions had to assume a "popular and national" character. It called for the continuation of the expropriation of landlords but stated that they were to receive a suitable amount of land for their own cultivation. With regard to rich peasants, it dropped the point regarding confiscation of their land in the "feudal exploitative section". Finally, it stipulated that "lands of all anti-Japanese soldiers and those involved in the anti-Japanese enterprise must not be confiscated". Thus, not only were landlords entitled to receive
a suitable amount of land after the confiscation, they could, if the last stipulation is interpreted liberally, immunize themselves from confiscation by actively participating in or contributing to an anti-Japanese organization, without having to join an anti-Japanese army.

Whether the Comintern played any part in encouraging the CCP to offer further concessions to landlords cannot be ascertained. It is clear, however, that Mao was responding to the demands of the national salvationists for a relaxation in the struggle against landlords. On August 10, Mao in an open letter replying to the four national salvation leaders delineated all the changes in the land policy as promulgated in the July 22 directive, adding the pledge that "We shall never attack the troops of the Central Government or any other armed forces unless they attack us or hinder the Chinese troops from fighting Japan". Mao's conciliatory posture is clearly manifested in the following statement:

We consider it a mistake to uphold slogans such as the exclusion of one class or another, of one party or another from the united front. We consider that there are still many leaders, rank-and-file members and functionaries in the KMT and national government who are capable of fighting against Japan, and we are quite ready to unite with such people. Consequently, opposition to the KMT and the various governments does not relate with the present state of affairs.

Finally, Mao expressed the CCP's willingness to attend a national conference of people's representatives elected on the basis of democratic principles, even if held outside the Soviet areas, in order to bring about unity among various parties in the nation.71

On the basis of these evidence, it can be seen that Mao clearly acted in line with the Comintern's instructions and went further in responding to the demands of the national salvationists for positive actions to demonstrate the Party's sincerity in uniting with all other parties. Interestingly, the CCP's concessions still did not meet with the approval of the national salvationists. Chang Nai-ch'i responded in a public letter with the criticism that the CCP's land programme was still "revolutionary" instead of reformist and urged the CCP to adopt peaceful and "democratic" methods to solve the land problem.72
According to the Soviet publication cited above, the Secretariat of the ECCI held another meeting on July 23 to discuss a concrete platform for the united front in China. At this meeting, Dimitrov proposed for the first time the adoption of the slogan calling for an "all-China democratic republic" for the purpose of bringing about "the unification of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people for resisting Japanese aggressors". To give effect to this new decision, a letter from the ECCI was dispatched to the CCP following the meeting. The letter also called for rectification of the Wayaopao's decision "to indiscriminately admit into the Party all applicants taking into consideration only their desire to join the anti-Japanese struggle" since it would "cause the Communist Party to dissolve into a sort of political coalition of anti-Japanese forces".  

This account seems to be well-supported by documentary evidence. In his article written on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the CCP, Dimitrov declared that the CCP was in favour of the establishment of an 'all-China democratic republic' as the best means of uniting all Chinese people against Japanese imperialism. Dimitrov's proposition was further expounded by Ch'en Shao-yü in his Chinese article written in commemoration of the "fifteenth anniversary of the CCP and the first anniversary of the new policy" (see below), which strongly suggests that it was written either on or before the end of July or early August. (It should be noted that the Comintern customarily dated the founding of the CCP late July, and not July 1 as the official CCP historians state. Furthermore, the Russian version of Ch'en article appeared in the August issue of the Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, whose editors acknowledged that the materials were ready on August 19, 1936. (Subsequently, this article was further translated into English and appeared in the September issue of Inprecor. Since the commemorative occasions were all but over, the English version uses the past tense in reference to them. This has given rise to the misunderstanding that Ch'en's statement was written in September, hence preceded by Mao's August 25 letter bearing the same proposal. All these confirm the Soviet claim that the slogan for the Democratic Republic originated with the Comintern.)
In his article, Ch'en reaffirmed, first of all, the need to preserve the Party's full political and organizational independence in the united front:

For us Communists, this means that while fighting for the establishment of a united national front, we not only must not allow the slightest weakening of our Party, and its organizations, but must strengthen it still further ideologically, politically and organizationally.

In addition, Ch'en warned that Communists must not regard the participation in the united front as "the abandonment of our Communist ideas and programme, as the abandonment of all criticisms of our allies and temporary followers ... and [as] the transformation of the working class and its Party into an obedient tool of the national bourgeoisie".

The same principles were to apply to the armies participating in the united anti-Japanese army. According to Ch'en:

While each body participating in this army will... subordinate itself to the general command in the carrying out of the general military plan, it will wholly and completely maintain its political and organizational system, its commanding and political officers. In the interests of the liberation struggle, the Chinese Communist Party cannot agree to dissolve the Red Army among the Nanking troops, for this would mean the liquidation of the most reliable armed force of the Chinese people.

Furthermore, Ch'en emphasized that "the Communist Party must not allow for one minute any weakening to take place in the fighting power of the Red Army, but on the contrary, it must strengthen and consolidate its power, its monolithic character and discipline to a greater extent than at any time before".

On the basis of these conditions, Ch'en advocated an alliance with the KMT:
The Communists should not place the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek in the same category as the Japanese invaders, since the Japanese fascist military clique are the main enemy of the Chinese people, and it is the struggle against them to which everything must be subordinated at the present stage.

This alliance was possible, because in the KMT "there are tremendous numbers of honest people and honest patriots who really love their people and their native land, who are really faithful to the best traditions of Sun Yat-sen".

As a concrete formula for the establishment of political and administrative unity in the country, Ch'en proposed the establishment of an "all-China democratic republic" and the convening of an "all-China parliament" for the purpose of organizing a real national defence government. The "all-China democratic republic", according to Ch'en, must be "a republic which really defends the interests of the people and not the interests of merchant-parasites", one in which "the people enjoy democratic rights and liberties" such as freedom of speech and associations. The "all-China parliament", elected on the basis of universal suffrage, in turn, was to discuss and adopt a common programme of action for China's defence. Ch'en called for a rejection of both the national assembly convened by the KMT for November 1936 and the proposed constitution to be adopted by the assembly on the basis that they were not truly representative of the people.

Finally, Ch'en declared that as soon as the democratic republic was established, the Soviet districts "will become part of the united democratic republic", and the Chinese Communists "will participate in the all-China parliament, and be ready to introduce the same kind of political and administrative" system in their own territory. Ch'en ended his article with a call for emulating the Spanish and French People's Front in their struggle against fascism.
The significance of the democratic republic has been noted by several historians. It has been suggested, for example, that it marked an important shift in the CCP's strategy in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Whereas previously the Party stressed the land revolution and the establishment of a worker-peasant dictatorship, it now emphasized democratic and civil rights, multi-class and multi-party representative government, and correspondingly moderation in land and economic policies. All these foreshadowed Mao's later concept of "New Democracy". It has further been suggested that the formula of the democratic republic "accorded with the widespread desire for unity, fended off Nanking's claims to sovereignty" over the Soviet areas and contrasted the KMT's one-party dictatorship with the emphasis on democracy. All these are presumably true (except that the credit should then be reserved for Ch'en Shao-yü). But the real significance of the proposal, in my opinion, lies in the application to China the united front policy adopted by the Seventh Comintern Congress for the European Communist parties, which required the Communists to participate in a joint government structure and parliament with bourgeois-reformist elements, in order to conduct a joint struggle against fascism and in the meantime enable the Communists to carry out open work through legal channels. By 1936, such tactics had won considerable success in France and Spain in the form of the People's Front. What Ch'en was seeking to do was to adopt the same tactics in China in the form of the democratic republic, so as to enable the CCP to gain legal opportunities to carry out party work. To work closely with the KMT, however, always entailed the inherent danger of repeating the same mistakes which befell the CCP in First United Front; Ch'en, therefore, stressed the maintenance of the political, ideological and organizational independence of the Party and absolute control over its armed forces. (Incidentally, it appears unlikely that Ch'en was calling for the exact replica of the people's front in China, since the people's front was also directed against the internal fascist enemy, which would easily be associated with the KMT. As a matter of fact, the slogan immediately incurred the denunciation of right-wing figures such as Wang Ching-wei, Hu Shih and Jen Tso-hsun who denied the applicability of the people's front in China as it tended to undermine national unity, and they proposed instead the "unified front" [lien-ho ohan-hsien] which required the total subjugation of the Communist Party and army to the Nationalist Government to bring about a real unified nation before resisting Japan.)
Whether Ch'en Shao-yü's intentions were transmitted in full to the CCP is unknown; but the advantages of the formula of the democratic republic in facilitating the development of the CCP's forces under legitimate conditions were too obvious to be missed. Without even having the proposal discussed in a Politburo meeting, Mao dispatched an open letter to the KMT on August 25, 1936. The letter, for the first time, addressed Chiang Kai-shek by his full title "generalissimo", and praised Chiang's speech at the Second Plenum regarding the "non-tolerance of any infringement of China's territorial integrity". It declared the CCP's opposition, however, to the KMT's proposed national assembly and constitution, and urged instead the convening of a national parliament elected on a popular basis and the establishment of a democratic republic. It announced that as soon as the united democratic republic was established the Soviet areas would become a composite part of the structure, dispatch representatives to the parliament and introduce the same democratic system in its territory as the rest of the country. Reminding the KMT members of the "glorious" period of collaboration in the First United Front, the letter appealed to all honest and patriotic members of the KMT to restore the "revolutionary spirit" of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles and organize themselves to prevail over the "pro-Japanese" and "traitorous" elements in the KMT. Finally, it declared the CCP's sincerity in coming to a concrete agreement with the KMT and its strict observation of the agreement, adding that "the key to KMT-Communist cooperation is at present in the hands of your honourable party." 83

The dispatch of this letter to the KMT marked the formal adoption of a policy of reconciliation with Chiang Kai-shek by openly inviting his participation in the Anti-Japanese United Front. Certain historians, believing that Mao had all along rejected the idea of an alliance with the KMT, find it hard to explain the shift in Mao's position. They attribute it to heavy pressure from the Comintern or to the public opinion in the country. 84 While both factors undoubtedly played a part in influencing Mao's decision, it is my observation that Mao himself favoured such a course of action. In the first instance, it is highly unlikely that Mao would have failed to see the necessity for unity of all Chinese forces in the face of imminent Japanese subjugation of China. Although the Nanking regime might not be an ideal partner, it still controlled the strongest and the best equipped military force in the country, as well as the richest economic base (i.e., the
Yangtze Valley), and Nanking's non-participation would seriously weaken any attempt to organize resistance against Japan. Secondly, Chiang Kai-shek's recurring stress that he would not tolerate further Japanese aggression had won the support of many national salvationists. Should the CCP persist in calling for a two-pronged attack on Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, it would isolate itself from the nationalist movement in the country and expose its hypocrisy in calling for national unity against Japan. Above all, the CCP's very existence was still seriously menaced by the Nationalist "bandit-suppression" forces under the command of General Ch'en Cheng, which numbered 500,000. A ceasefire agreement with the KMT, therefore, would not only remove the immediate threat, but also ensure its future security in the alliance.

On September 17, 1936, the CCP's views announced in the letter to the KMT were formally adopted as the Party's political line by a Politburo conference. Its resolution began with a confirmation of the possibility for the Nanking Government to participate in the anti-Japanese movement. To impel the Nanking Government and its troops to participate in the national resistance, it held, was the prerequisite for a full-scale war against Japan. Since the Nanking government was still "wavering", it emphasized that all Party members must not refrain from making constructive criticisms of the "wrong and anti-national policies" of the Nanking Government in order to help it overcome its vacillation. It then reiterated the slogan and platform of the democratic republic and further clarified its purpose: "The democratic republic will not only enable the broadest sections of the masses of the Chinese people to take part in the country's political life, thereby enhancing their political consciousness and increasing their organized strength; but will also set the stage for the Chinese proletariat and its leader, the Communist Party, in the struggle for the victory of socialism in the future". The fight for the establishment of the democratic republic, therefore, was to be the strategic goal of the Party until the accomplishment of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In this revolutionary struggle, it further stressed, the Party must strengthen its political leadership in the national united front, further consolidate the Soviets and the Red Army, strictly maintain its organizational independence in the national defence government and the united anti-Japanese army, continue to educate the masses in the doctrines of communism and to fight for their daily political and economic interests,
and never give up its control over the armed forces in the Soviet districts. Finally, the resolution rectified the Wayaopao Resolution which permitted the free admission of all classes of people into the Party.85

The documentary evidence presented so far show a complete acceptance by the CCP of the Comintern's proposals on the united front, including a self-criticism of its own failings. In fact, Edgar Snow, who believed that the CCP's dependence on Moscow was minimal, could not but conclude that the details of the proceedings of the Seventh Comintern Congress, which finally arrived at Pao-an in September 1936, guided the Chinese Communists "in their policy during the months ahead".86

Evidence of a definite shift in the CCP's position towards a renewed cooperation with the KMT is also contained in Mao's interview with Snow on September 23, 1936. In explaining the Party's new policy, Mao stated:

First of all, the seriousness of Japanese aggression: it is ... so formidable a menace that before it all the forces of China must unite. Besides the Communist Party there are other parties and forces in China, and the strongest of these is the KMT. Without its cooperation our strength at present is insufficient to resist Japan in war. Nanking must participate.

Mao further noted that the development of the national salvation movement and the desire of "many patriotic elements in the KMT" for alliance with the CCP had forced the Party to "reconsider in detail the concrete formula under which such cooperation" could take place; hence the CCP proposed the democratic republic. To facilitate the alliance with the KMT, the CCP would be prepared to offer additional concessions, such as the abrogation of Soviet laws, the redesignation of the Red Army, and the promotion of capitalism. On the question of whether the Soviet land laws would also be nullified, however, Mao equivocated (largely because, I surmise, neither the CCP nor the Comintern had worked out an appropriate method in solving the land problem). Nevertheless, according to Snow, Mao had assured him that the Communist Party would not "'promote' class struggle".87
At the same time, the land revolution in the countryside had been considerably relaxed. Wang Kuan-lan, Chairman of the Land Committee in the Northwestern Branch of the Central Soviet Government, told Snow on July 20, 1936:

With the change in communist policy in line with the aims of the United Front, the land policy has also changed. At present estates are still expropriated, but the landlords are allowed to retain for their own use land sufficient to provide them an average income. Secondly, the land of rich peasants is no longer divided. In other words, the government will not encourage confiscation of any land except large estates. We are experimenting to see whether the poor peasants' support can be won without large-scale redistribution.

Further, Snow's personal observations during his extensive travels in the Soviet areas seem even more revealing. He recounts:

Chinese communism as I found it in the North-West might more accurately be called rural equalitarianism than anything Marx would have found acceptable as a model child of his own ....[T]he land laws in force (promulgated by the North-West Soviet Government in December 1935) provided for the confiscation of all landlords' land and ... of rich peasants that was not cultivated by the owners themselves. However, both the landlords and the rich peasants were allowed as much land as they could till with their own labours. In districts where there was no land scarcity - and there were many such districts in the North-West - the land of resident landlords and rich peasants were in practice not confiscated at all.

(It should be noted that the land law of July 22, which terminated the confiscation of all rich-peasants' lands, was only newly established when Snow visited the Communist base and might not have been thoroughly executed. In his later interview with Bisson, Ch'in Pang-hsien, who was in charge of the administrative affairs of the Soviet areas, confirmed that the CCP's official policy up to the eve of the Sian Incident of December 1936 was to confiscate only the lands of large landlords.)

While the policy of re-distribution of land was still carried on in certain regions, the Communists had ceased all physical attacks on landlords. According to a recollection of a local officer, while the united front work was being carried on, "the class struggle in the villages and countryside had had to take second place, and we had stopped our attacks on the landowners".
At the same time, the Party also issued new instructions to the Red Army men to reduce hostile action against the enemy troops to a minimum. According to Snow, the soldiers were instructed not to "fire on" enemy troops which had been permitted to withdraw and to return captured weapons to the enemy. According to the same recollection of the local officer cited above, the Red Army also carried out propaganda work among the enemy troops, distributing brochures and leaflets in an effort to win them over to the cause of national resistance. The evidence in the organs published by the Political Department of the Red Army testify to the new spirit of united front work among the enemy troops. One organ, for example, declared that "winning over the white troops is more important than defeating them in battle" and recommended such methods as the dispatch of letters, "shouting slogans and speeches", delivery of food and other provisions to the "white" soldiers, so as to fraternize with instead of fighting them.

In the meantime, direct negotiations were conducted with the KMT officials at the highest level. It is my speculation that Chiang Kai-shek's account of Chou En-lai's contact with his subordinates, mistakenly dated autumn 1935, took place during this time. In Chiang's account, he claims that Chou, after meeting with his man in Hong Kong, forwarded a personal letter to Ch'en Li-fu on September 1 explaining the CCP's position for ceasefire and unity against Japan. The actual date of this letter, as confirmed by one historian in possession of a copy of it, is September 1, 1936. In addition, in his private conversation with Snow in late September, Mao disclosed that "at present, negotiations are being conducted" with the Nanking Government. This is confirmed by the explanatory note in Mao's Selected Works, which states that following the August 25 letter to the KMT the CCP had dispatched representatives to negotiate with the Nanking Government. During the negotiations, moreover, Chou was reported to have attached no other conditions apart from ceasefire and unity against Japan, a position which fell in line with the current stand of the CCP but totally incongruous with its position a year earlier. Finally, since Chou was already in Shanghai in May to conduct negotiations with the Nationalist officials, it is highly probable that he would have continued his journey to Hong Kong to seek out KMT representatives.
To facilitate Chou's diplomatic mission, Mao, on October 15, publicly declared that the Soviet Government and the Military Council of the Red Army had already issued orders to the Red Army troops to cease all offensive actions against the Nationalist troops except in self-defence. His plea for unity was such that the commentator of his speech in Hung-se Chung-hua, jointly published in the same organ, could not but observe that Mao was "sincere and earnest beyond description" in his proposal for the Anti-Japanese United Front with the KMT.

The new policy reorientation, however, seemed to have met some resistance among the Party's rank-and-file who could not see the wisdom of making all these concessions to bring about an alliance with their erstwhile class enemies. In an internal and secret document, the CCP explained that the new policy line was only a tactical change at the present stage of the revolution, while its basic tasks of achieving the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution remained unchanged. Whereas previously the Party launched the land revolution to eliminate feudalism and imperialism, it now sought to eliminate them through the anti-imperialist struggle. Similarly, the democratic republic was only a transitional stage to the establishment of worker-peasant dictatorship, replacing the former method of armed struggle to overthrow the KMT. In order to finally achieve socialism, it was necessary to go through the stage of "national and democratic" revolution. It further stated that the proletariat was not abandoning its class interests by participating in the united front; on the contrary, it would be able to win over more allies and establish its leadership in the national revolution. At the same time, the Party, representing the proletariat, would zealously safeguard its independence and would not permit itself to merge with other organizations. Admitting that adjustment in the land policy had been made, it denied that the Party was discarding the agrarian revolution: the Party would not permit excessive exploitation of the common peasants by landlords and would continue to oppose those landlords who capitulated to the enemy or participated half-heartedly in the War of Resistance. Finally, it reassured the Party members that the failure in the First United Front was due only to the opportunistic errors of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's leadership and not to the fact that the united front policy was a mistake; owing to the growing strength and the enriched experience of the Party, there should be no fear that it would fall into the same errors again.
Thus, the overwhelming evidence available points to the fact that in the summer and autumn of 1936, the CCP had adopted a policy of reconciliation with the Nanking Government. There is little doubt that Mao was personally in charge of this reorientation. In fact, according to both Otto Braun and Chang Ku-t’ao, Mao managed to monopolize the Party’s external policy through his control over communication with Moscow and with the outside world during this period. Mao’s acceptance of the proposed alliance was naturally predicated upon the complete independence of the Party and the retention of control of its armed forces. At this stage, however, Ch’en Shao-yü also publicly asserted the importance of safeguarding these prerogatives, and there did not seem to be any grounds for disagreement between the two leaders. As a matter of fact, Ch’en Shao-yü’s article written on the fifteenth anniversary of the CCP, re-published under the new title "Struggle for the Independence, Freedom and Happiness of the Chinese People", was reproduced verbatim in many Communist and leftist publications. According to a recollection written in 1946, student activists in Nanking, after obtaining a copy of Ch’en’s article from the National Liberation Vanguard in Peking in the spring of 1937, immediately circulated it among the students.

The Sian Incident

Much of the details of the Sian Incident are already known. It is the primary concern of this section to assess the respective attitudes of the Comintern and the CCP towards the crisis to determine the nature of Mao’s exasperation with Moscow’s order to release Chiang. For this purpose, it is necessary to examine more closely their relative positions towards Chiang Kai-shek on the eve of the Sian Incident.

According to several corroborative sources, sometime in July 1936 Chou En-lai met with Chang Hsüeh-liang, who by then had already agreed to cease hostilities towards the Communists, at Fushih (Yenan, which became the Communist capital in January 1937) for discussion of an alliance. At the meeting, Chang proposed the slogan "yung-Chiang k’ang-jih" (Support Chiang and Resist Japan) to replace the Communists’ "fan-Chiang k’ang-jih" (Oppose Chiang and Resist Japan; a stand still current with the CCP in July because of the Liang-Kwang movement) on the basis that "Support Chiang" was a prerequisite for a successful war against Japan. He also assured Chou of the Generalissimo’s determination
to resist. Chou was reported to be much impressed by the Young Marshal's argument, and settled for the slogan "lien-Chiang k'ang-Jih" (Unite Chiang and Resist Japan).

Chou En-lai's unwillingness to commit the CCP to the position of supporting Chiang Kai-shek might be due to Chiang's adamant opposition to the Communists in spite of his stiffening attitude towards Japan. Chiang's logic for excluding the Communists, as analysed by Chou and confided to Edgar Snow in July 1936, was simply:

... if the anti-Japanese movement develops he will almost certainly be deprived of his dictatorship ....
In the event of a Japanese conflict, the anti-Japanese forces (i.e., the Red Army) will detach important parts of his command. The first day of the anti-Japanese war, as Chiang well knows, will put a stamp of doom on his hegemony.  

Thus, we can infer that the CCP leaders did not entertain high hopes of Chiang reversing his stand towards the Communists. Even Ch'en Shao-yü, as late as September 1936, published an article in Chiu-kuo shih-pao accusing Chiang of being a "national traitor" for his reluctance to resist Japan and continued suppression of mass national salvation activities. Chiang's much-publicized military preparations, such as the construction of railways, according to Ch'en, were only meant to facilitate enemy aggression in China. The CCP's mistrust of Chiang was further enhanced by the fact that in November, seven well-known national salvation leaders (known as the "chi chih-tzu" - Seven Gentlemen), were arrested by the Nanking authorities for their involvement with workers' strike movements. Nevertheless, when General Fu Tso-yi attempted to repulse the Japanese-sponsored Mongol invasion of Suiyulan (Inner Mongolia) in late November, the CCP seized the opportunity to make a last urgent appeal to the Nanking Government requesting immediate reinforcements for the Suiyulan front and the organization of united resistance against Japan. The sense of urgency demonstrated in the appeal was accentuated by a personal letter addressed to Chiang Kai-shek from Mao and Chu Teh:

The nation is in crisis, and the key to salvation lies in your honourable hands .... We solemnly request again that you make up your mind and respond to our request for friendship and unity against Japan ...
Instead of responding to the CCP's proposals, however, Chiang Kai-shek pushed ahead with his final Encirclement Campaign against the Communists. (Chiang's motive was either to annihilate the Communists or to stall off the final showdown with the Japanese on the pretext that the internal enemy had not yet been destroyed. In either case, the Communists could only expect severe losses of their forces and perhaps another evacuation of their base, if not outright extinction). Chiang's actions undoubtedly sealed all the CCP's hope for a ceasefire arrangement with the Nanking Government. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the CCP's initial reaction to the Sian Incident was one of the wild jubilation and demand for strong action against Chiang.

Moscow, on the other hand, seemed favourably impressed with the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek's eventually taking up arms against Japan. In the fall of 1936, secret negotiations were started for a non-aggression pact between Moscow and Nanking. Prompted by the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936, understanding for an agreement was apparently reached on the eve of the Sian Incident. It can be expected that the Kremlin would react strongly against the coup which might destroy chances of strengthening Nanking's opposition to Japan.

It is a well-known fact that the Chinese Communists had nothing to do with the plot to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek; the Sian Incident, which occurred on December 12 with the forcible detention of Chiang by Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng of the Northwestern Army, therefore, caught the Communists leaders by surprise. Piecing together information from several sources, it appears that the opinions of the CCP leaders were greatly divided: Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-ying and Chang Wen-t'ien appeared to favour executing Chiang, but Chou En-lai cautioned against any such attempt. Mao, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao (whose account is well supported by the evidence presented below), was in favour of strong actions against Chiang but was politically astute enough to realize that the CCP had to avoid publicly assuming such a stand. Nevertheless, all leaders agreed that a telegram should be immediately dispatched to Moscow to seek out its opinion; and Chou En-lai, who set off for Sian in a private plane sent by Chang Hsüeh-liang, was instructed not to take any positive action before the Comintern's decision had arrived. In the meantime, the CCP declared its public support for the eight-point programme proposed by the rebels and indicated its willingness to participate in the Anti-Japanese Military Council set up by Chang Hsüeh-liang.
Moscow's official reaction towards the rebellion was unequivocally hostile. In an editorial published in Pravda on December 14, Wang Ching-wei was accused of being the instigator of the coup on behalf of the Japanese militarists, and Chang Hsueh-liang was considered a willing accomplice. On December 15, Izvestia denounced Chang Hsueh-liang's anti-Japanese demands as concealing his real opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, and attacked his action as injurious to the Anti-Japanese United Front movement which had been gaining momentum.

Snow was informed that at a rally in front of the Red Army Academy on the afternoon of December 13, Mao urged a "mass trial" of Chiang. (This did not mean, however, as he subsequently clarifies, that Mao favoured the execution of Chiang.) By the evening of December 13, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the Comintern's directive telegram had arrived. It began by asserting that the revolt was engineered by Japanese instigators and declared that the Soviet Union would not support the move. It pointed out that the only solution to China's national crisis was the establishment of a nation-wide Anti-Japanese United Front and expressed the view that Chiang Kai-shek was better qualified than anyone else to be the national leader for resistance against Japan, provided that he could be persuaded to change his stand. It urged the CCP to strive for a peaceful settlement to the crisis and to reach an agreement with Chiang.

According to a confidential informant of Snow's in 1938, Mao "flew into a rage when the order came from Moscow to release Chiang"; in reaction, he "swore and stamped his feet ..." (This is corroborated by Chang Kuo-t'ao, whose account will be given below.) Mao's wrath has been interpreted as due to his desire to deal harshly with Chiang, if not actually eliminate him, and this has been taken as sufficient proof that Mao had all along resented Moscow's directions for a united front with Chiang Kai-shek. A closer examination of Snow's and Chang Kuo-t'ao's very accounts reveals that Mao's reason for resenting Moscow's order has been misconstrued.
According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao's initial reaction to Moscow's telegram was that Moscow's untoward denunciation of Chang Hsüeh-liang had placed the CCP in a most embarrassing position, since Mao had consistently counted on Moscow's support for the alliance with Chang Hsüeh-liang and had informed Chang of this expectation. (This was due, according to Chang, to the fact that Moscow had never explicitly disapproved of the CCP's attempt to make a separate alliance with Chang.) Short of Moscow's support, Mao feared that Chang Hsüeh-liang might back out of the alliance and compromise with Chiang Kai-shek, and this would lead to the total isolation of the Communists who would be threatened with a wholesale Nationalist attack. Moreover, Moscow's insistence that the coup was staged and inspired by pro-Japanese elements was not only a totally inaccurate statement, but it also implicated the Communists who might be regarded as instigators of civil war in the country.

Chang Kuo-t'ao's account is corroborated by Edgar Snow's observations almost to the last detail. In full, Snow's summation of the episode reads:

The [CCP's] Politburo at first meant to exploit it as a means of setting up a national anti-Japanese government in Sian, isolating if not totally discrediting Chiang Kai-shek, their chief internal enemy. Moscow's sudden intervention undercut previous plans and left Mao momentarily without a clear line of support to offer Chang Hsüeh-liang. Pravda's shattering denunciation of Chang as a traitor and Japanese agent enormously weakened the Chinese Communists in their relations with him, and threw them into confusion. This vacillation and let-down in a quarter where Chang had expected help and understanding must have influenced the Young Marshal to make his independent decision to release the Generalissimo 'prematurely',... and before the Chinese Politburo could... reconcile Moscow's directive with their own prior expectations and their really desperate need for minimum guarantees of political and physical survival.

On the basis of these two highly informative and reliable sources, it can be seen that what Mao basically objected to was Moscow's unwarranted denunciation of Chang Hsüeh-liang, rather than the demand for the release of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao's basic concern was with the CCP's security, and his initial judgement was that it would be better for the CCP to preserve the alliance with the Northeastern Army rather than stake any hope on reaching an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek. (The situation, in fact, was reminiscent of the Fukien Rebellion of 1933, and Mao was obviously aware of the grievous consequences should the alliance collapse.) It is
probable that Mao entertained the hope that with Chiang Kai-shek in captivity or publicly discredited in a mass trial, the rest of the Nationalist forces would plunge into factionalism and the Communists could exploit the situation to ally with those who were actively anti-Japanese. It was, as Edgar Snow puts it, the "chance of a decade". But precisely because Mao's primary concern was with the CCP's security rather than the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek as such, it can be assumed that Mao would be open to other alternatives as well so long as the interests of the Party would be better served.

According to Kuo Hua-lun's informant, whose account is corroborated by Robert Payne's information obtained from the Communists, soon after the Sian mutiny Mao instructed all Party units to collect information concerning the reaction of other political and military leaders and organizations towards the crisis, and on December 15, he reviewed all the intelligence as well as radio reports. That being the case, it is almost certain that Mao found his previous line of thinking totally impractical. For between December 13 and 15, practically all military commanders, political leaders, national salvation associations, educationists, non-Communist labour and mass organizations as well as the press over the country forwarded circular telegrams stating their support for the Nationalist Government, denouncing Chang Hsiuh-liang's action and urging the immediate release of the Generalissimo. Unless the Party was prepared to go against public opinion (in which case it would find itself dismally isolated with allies only in the northwest), it seems that the Party had no alternative but to pose as the firm supporter of a peaceful settlement, especially since it had consistently been calling for a united front with Chiang Kai-shek and for national solidarity against Japan. To take advantage of the crisis to eliminate Chiang would discredit the Party and expose it as vindictive and hypocritical. Moreover, the emergence of a "radical" group in the Nanking Government under General Ho Ying-ch'in, who advocated the launching of a punitive expedition against the mutineers and the Communists, clearly indicated to the CCP leaders that the removal of Chiang would only give way to an even more undesirable opponent steadfastly anti-Communist and amenable to Japan. Under such circumstances, it was clear that moderation was the best line of action. On December 15, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the CCP held a senior cadres' meeting at which all Politburo members present expressed support for the release of Chiang.
Chou En-lai was accordingly instructed to pursue the Party's objectives by securing the release of Chiang and the establishment of a united front with Nanking. All parties concerned were impressed with Chou's presentation of the CCP's peaceful intent. Agnes Smedley, who met the CCP's delegates the day after their arrival at Sian, "felt that they had not come for vengeance, but to pave the way for a new era of unity". A similar account is given by James M. Bertram, who visited Sian towards the end of December and gathered valuable information on the spot. "The Communists", he concluded, "were the most resolute 'peace party' from the first". Even Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who arrived at Sian on December 22, later wrote that "quite contrary to outside beliefs, [the Communists] were not interested in detaining the Generalissimo".

To coordinate Chou En-lai's diplomatic efforts and to make public its stand on the Sian Incident, the CCP issued a circular telegram on December 19, 1936, which was addressed to both Nanking and Sian. It began by emphasizing the need to avert the danger of civil war which would benefit Japan and hasten national destruction. It expressed that "the Sian leaders acted from patriotic sincerity and zeal, wishing to formulate quickly a national policy of immediate resistance against Japan"; while the leaders in Nanking, apart from pro-Japanese elements, were also interested in national salvation and differed only in "pace" from the Sian leaders. As an immediate solution to the present crisis, it proposed a truce between Nanking and Sian and called for a national conference under the auspices of Nanking to discuss resistance and the "problem of reviewing the position of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek" (t'ao-lun Chiang Ch'ien-shih hsien-sheng ch'u-chih wen-t'i, a clause which has been mistakenly translated as "the problem of how to dispose of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek") on the basis of "national unity, cessation of civil war and resistance against Japan". Its civil tone and emphasis on national unity, together with the proposal to hold the national conference at Nanking, ruled out the possibility that the CCP was advocating the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek.
On December 20, the Comintern also made public its stand in an article published in the *Communist International*. (According to a Soviet source, the article was drafted by Ch'en Shao-yü and edited by Dimitrov.) It began: "As far as can be judged on information as yet to hand, the feeling current in the army of Chang Hsüeh-liang played a decisive role in these events". It quoted approvingly the view expressed earlier in the *China Weekly Review* that the Young Marshal "is primarily interested only in a real anti-Japanese movement, and sincerely hopes to influence Chiang Kai-shek to lead active resistance". It further stated that the immediate cause which led the Young Marshal to rebel was Chiang Kai-shek's decision to "carry on a new internal war against the Red Army" and accused the Japanese imperialists of setting in motion "all their connections with the Nanking Government in order to bring about an armed struggle between Nanking and Chang Hsüeh-liang". It can be seen that this article approximates the CCP's rather than Moscow's stand towards the Sian Mutiny.

Thus, it is clear that although initially Mao had favoured a strong line of action against Chiang, he had, out of his own accord, resolved to work for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Accordingly, Chou En-lai, in his interview with Chiang (December 24), pledged the CCP's sincere support for the Generalissimo as the national leader in a united resistance. After the crisis ended with the dramatic return of Chiang to Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsüeh-liang on December 25, Mao declared on December 28:

Chiang should remember that he owes his safe departure from Sian to the mediation of the Communist Party .... Throughout the incident, the Communist Party stood for a peaceful settlement and made every effort to that end, acting solely in the interests of national survival. Had the civil war spread and had Chang and Yang kept Chiang Kai-shek in custody for long, the incident could only have developed in favour of the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese 'punitive' group ...

Only when the CCP had betrayed no trace whatsoever to the public that it had once contemplated a stern policy towards Chiang Kai-shek could Mao have uttered such a statement without fear of being accused of deceitfulness. Similarly, only when the CCP itself had positively endorsed the policy of peaceful settlement could P'eng Teh-huai disclaim as sheer "nonsense" to Helen Snow the speculation that the CCP had acted on Moscow's order.
124

CCP-KMT Negotiations Towards the United Front

For the time being, the CCP was seriously concerned about the possibility of reprisals by the Nanking Government since Chiang Kai-shek was not signatory to any concrete agreement. This apprehension was enhanced by the return of Wang Ching-wei from Europe, the confinement of Chang Hasueh-liang, and the temporary "retirement" of Chiang Kai-shek to Fenghua. In a secret directive to the FNSA, dated January 6, 1937, the Central Committee of the CCP called for the exposure of the manoeuvres of the Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-ch'in group, which it identified as an "anti-Chiang and pro-Japanese" faction, and called upon the national salvationists to ally themselves with other KMT leaders to press for the anti-Japanese alliance. The CCP itself, in a circular telegram of January 9, called upon Chiang to come out of retirement and control the situation since pro-Japanese elements were still ordering the troops to advance on Sian and threatening to renew the civil war. Couched in an urgent but civil tone, it stated that the present situation constituted "a serious test of Mr. Chiang's political integrity and of his own dictum that 'works require fidelity, acts require determination'." 133

The CCP's peace efforts gradually bore results. In mid-January, through his personal representative Chang Ch'ung, the Generalissimo informed Chou En-lai that he would accept the CCP's proposal for cooperation provided that it sincerely subordinated itself to Nanking's command. 135 In early February, Chou conferred with Chiang at Fenghua and agreement was reached on the amount of stipend to be given to the Red Army as part of the National Army, with the first payment ($500,000) delivered shortly after. 136 Following this meeting the war between the CCP and the KMT reached an impasse.

At the same time, the Party Central Committee circulated internal documents to explain to the Party rank-and-file the new situation and clarify the Party leadership's position taken during the Sian Incident. One internal statement issued on February 15, 1937 stated that the Sian Incident could only lead to two possible courses of development: either civil war, which would benefit Japan and the traitors; or internal peace and unity, which would benefit the nation and facilitate the organization of united resistance against Japan. The Party, therefore, opted for the latter. 137 Another internal statement, entitled "The Detention and
Release of Chiang", further denounced as utterly fallacious the view that with the death of Chiang or his further detention Nanking would immediately collapse and a nation-wide united front could be established. It stated that the Party's primary objective was the establishment of the Anti-Japanese United Front and for this purpose the policy of peaceful solution had to be adopted in order to "push" Chiang into the anti-Japanese camp.\textsuperscript{138}

Upon securing peace with the KMT, the CCP had to change its decade-old insurrection policy to that of peaceful co-existence, if not outright cooperation. As the KMT was the chief representative of the big bourgeoisie as well as the landlords, the CCP had to make corresponding adjustments in its policy towards the landlords. As was previously the case, the initiative of the policy change came from Moscow. According to a Soviet publication,\textsuperscript{139} which is verified by a KMT intelligence report,\textsuperscript{140} the Secretariat of the ECCI dispatched a directive to the CCP on January 20, 1937, recommending further modification in the political and socio-economic structure of the Soviet areas for the purpose of facilitating the alliance with the KMT. While the independence and continued expansion of the Red Army was to be maintained, the CCP should henceforth agree to the changing of the names of the Soviet Government and the Red Army, the cessation of the expropriation of the landlords, and place its emphasis on the struggle for "democracy" and "unity for resistance" in all its political activities.

These recommendations were reflected in a telegram forwarded by the Central Committee of the CCP to the KMT's Third Plenum which met on February 15, 1937. In exchange for the guarantee of democratic freedoms, immediate preparations for armed resistance against Japan and the improvement of the livelihood of the people, the Chinese Communists agreed to carry out the following four conditions: 1. to cease all efforts at overthrowing the National Government; 2. to rename the Soviet Government as the government of the "Special Region" and to redesignate the Red Army as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army, both of which would accept direct supervision from the Central Government and the Military Council of Nanking respectively; 3. to enforce in the special region a democratic system based on universal suffrage; and 4. to abolish confiscation of landlords' land.\textsuperscript{141}
The KMT's indirect reply to the Communist proposals was contained in the "Resolution on the Complete Eradication of the Red Menace" adopted on February 21, 1937. In an overbearing tone, the KMT denounced the CCP's subversive activities as the main cause for China's disunity and laid down four conditions for alliance: 1. abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the united command of the nation's armed forces; 2. dissolution of Chinese Soviet Republic and centralization of government power in the hands of the Nationalist Government; 3. cessation of Communist propaganda and absolute acceptance of the Three People's Principles; and 4. termination of class struggle.

In his article entitled "The Key to the Salvation of the Chinese People" written shortly after the KMT's Third Plenum, Ch'en Shao-yü responded with a violent criticism of the resolution as a "slanderous attack" on the CCP, which had been the first and the most resolute supporter of national unity. In contrast to the CCP's sincere desire for national salvation, Ch'en claimed, the KMT's resolution reflected the "political shortsightedness" of a small group of landlords and capitalists who were willing to sacrifice national interests for their selfish ends. He proclaimed the Communists' understanding of the four conditions as follows: 1. abolition of the Red Army could not be the physical disintegration of the Red Army, and the CCP would continue to maintain all offices and political workers within the army; 2. abolition of the Soviet Government could not be the dissolution of the Soviet Government but the redesignation of its name and the conversion of Soviet power into democratic power; 3. Communist acceptance of the Three People's Principles was based on the fact that Communists shared with Sun Yat-sen's true disciples the struggle for national independence, democracy and improvement of the livelihood of the people, but it was not an abandonment of communism; 4. class struggle was not created by the Communist Party but rather the Communist Party was created out of the class struggle in society - implying that the Communists could neither be held responsible for the phenomenon of class struggle nor be requested to terminate it at will. Ch'en agreed that for the purpose of achieving unity in the country, the CCP should cease confiscating the land of landlords, but warned that such was the limit to its concessions. He further accused the KMT of attempting to delay negotiations by imposing harsh and unreasonable demands. Finally, to clarify the confusion following his earlier call for emulation of the French and Spanish People's fronts, he delineated the qualitative difference between the national and people's fronts as follows:
The people's front is mainly a front of working people directed first and foremost against the enemy of the people at home. The social composition of the national united front is far broader than the people's front and is directed against the foreign invader and his agents.

As contemporary Japanese analysts observe, Ch'en's article was unmistakably a "critique of the KMT's Third Plenum" and a declaration that there were limits to the CCP's concessions. In particular, it was noted that Ch'en's interpretation of the four conditions for alliance was "extremely advantageous to the CCP".

By contrast, the CCP's response to the KMT's Third Plenum was much milder in tone. In his interview with Agnes Smedley on March 1, 1937, Mao clarified, first of all, the differences between the people's front and national front in the same manner as Ch'en Shao-yi. He then reiterated the CCP's willingness to rename the Soviet Government and the Red Army and "accept the direction of the Nanking Government and the Military Council", introduce a thoroughly democratic system in the special regions, terminate the policy of insurrection against the Nationalist Government, and cease the confiscation of the landlords' land. The CCP, he also declared, would not bind itself to the interests of only one class, but would subordinate class interests to the national interests. To "suitably resolve the problem of class struggle", he continued, the CCP would require the landlord-capitalists to improve the living conditions of the worker-peasants, but on the other hand also discourage the worker-peasants from unreasonable demands. Finally, he declared that the Communists had "always been fervent disciples of the Three People's Principles", and equated their continued faith in communism with other people's belief in capitalism, anarchism, confucianism, buddhism and christianity.

Mao's reluctance to offer overt criticism of the KMT might be explained by several factors. As Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls, Mao was anxious to realize the KMT-CCP truce in order to prevent a renewal of the civil war. At the same time, the CCP was confronted with a vociferous demand from anti-Communist elements to dissolve itself to make way for national unity. As a result, it had to adopt a low-key position so as to avoid appearing provocative. Such consideration was further bolstered in March 1937 when the new Japanese cabinet adopted a moderate approach to China symbolized by the visit of a Japanese good-will
economic mission - the so-called "Sato diplomacy". All these added to Chou En-lai's difficulties in negotiating with the Nanking officials. In an internal statement issued by the Central Committee around this time it was asserted that the prospects for CCP-KMT cooperation were not entirely "optimistic", and the Party should still exercise vigilance against possible KMT attacks. Nevertheless, the situation gradually improved. On March 15, the CCP announced its willingness to "begin concrete negotiations for readjusting the relations of the KMT and the CCP on the basis of the four conditions put forth" by the KMT. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, sometime in early April the CCP leaders held an extended discussion and agreed to accept the terms laid down by the KMT as a basis for further negotiation. On April 3, the Propaganda Department of the CCP issued an internal "Propaganda Outline" which stated that the four conditions offered by the KMT's Third Plenum were "basically very close" to the CCP's earlier proposals and reiterated that "the principle of KMT-CCP cooperation has been firmly established".

Such seemingly enormous concessions to the KMT created disillusionment and discontent among certain Party rank-and-file. The situation was further affected by the Trotskyites' criticism of the CCP's betrayal of the faith of the masses and of communist principles. As Helen Snow recalls:

It was not an easy task to bring all the Communists into line, and there was some trouble about deciding to give up the Soviets in the beginning. Even when I was in the Soviet district in the summer of 1937, there was a big campaign against potential Leftists and Trotskyists, who did not want to cooperate with the KMT.

(Basically, the Chinese Trotskyites accused the CCP leaders of being "Stalinists" who abandoned the principle of class struggle, gave up the Party's independence and sold out the interests of the proletariat class. They advocated opposition not only to Japan but all imperialist powers, the overthrow of warlords, bureaucrats and landlords before organizing resistance to imperialism, and the immediate implementation of socialism without going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. For his part in bringing about the united front, Ch'en Shao-yü was vilified by the Trotskyites as an "abominable Red comprador".)
To educate the Party members in the new united front principles and to ward off the attack from the Trotskyites, the Central Party leadership published a barrage of internal documents which refuted all external criticisms directed against the Party's new policy and reaffirmed the correctness of the united front with the KMT. These included articles by Wu Liang-p'ing (head of the Propaganda Department and unofficially Mao's secretary), Ho K'o-ch'üan and Chang Wen-t'ien, as well as the "Explanatory Outline" issued by the Central Committee dated February 15, 1937 - these writings were compiled as a party tract "On the Various Problems of the United Front", which was circulated as educational material for the cadres. Basically, it was asserted that the political circumstances had changed drastically since the Sian Incident and the Party had to act in accordance with the new conditions. The struggle for Soviet power and the land revolution, it was further explained, "had been correctly upheld in the past and correctly abandoned at the present". Another open letter from the Central Committee to Party members, dated April 15, enunciated that the Sian Incident had helped to realize the Party's aim of achieving the "cessation of civil war", and the new objectives of the Party were the "struggle for the consolidation of internal peace, the implementation of democratic rights and the realization of national resistance against Japan." But by far the most detailed revelation of the Party's new tactics were contained in a series of lectures given by Lin Yü-ying at the newly established K'ang-ta (Anti-Japanese Red Army Academy), entitled "The Tactical Line of the CCP". In this treatise Lin explained that the Party had given up its former policies of armed insurrection and land revolution because "they had proven to be impractical" in winning nation-wide victory. The new united front policy, he claimed, had the following advantages:

All classes in China including some warlords are willing to stop civil wars and to join the anti-Japanese national salvation movement .... When we appeal to the whole nation by the tactics and slogans of resisting Japan and national salvation, no one can oppose them .... Under the pretence of stopping all civil wars in favour of the whole nation's war against Japanese, not only can we stop and eliminate Chiang Kai-shek's attack on our Red army, but our Red army in the Soviet area will be able to regroup, tidy up, re-supply ourselves and thus expand. If we can stop Chiang's attack one day, we can gain one day to strengthen ourselves .... In the name of
resisting Japan we can control and utilize the contradictions among various parties, factions and armies so as to divide them, neutralize them, entice them and win them over to the side of revolution. While pretending to appeal to the people's sentiments of resisting Japan and national salvation, we can divide, weaken and eliminate counterrevolutionary forces. One day when the revolutionary sentiments reach its high pitch, we with speedy measures will realize the proletarian dictatorship and proceed to the socialist revolution.

In regard to the slogan of the democratic republic, Lin elucidated:

Only through the principle of the democratic republic can we overthrow the one-party dictatorship of the KMT .... With the realization of the democratic republic, our Party can operate overtly or semi-overtly ... to organize, influence and win over the broad masses and strengthen the rank of the proletariat and its army .... With the establishment of a true national parliament, the CCP can openly participate and conduct activities inside and outside the parliament ... and propagate our ideals.

From this treatise, we can see the rationale behind the CCP's transition from the land revolution to the united front.

In May 1937, Mao convened the Soviet Party Representatives' Conference at Yenan, which was attended by delegates from Central and regional Party units, to give the official sanction to the new political line which was established since 1935. At the beginning of his speech delivered on May 3, Mao acknowledged that "the contradiction between China and Japan has become the principal one", while "China's internal contradictions have dropped into a secondary and subordinate place". This was mainly due to the fact that the KMT, following its third plenary meeting, had begun to transform itself (though not yet thoroughly) and had accepted the Anti-Japanese United Front. Although Mao did not regard the internal contradiction between classes as having "diminished or disappeared", he emphasized that the Party had to make necessary adjustments in dealing with this contradiction, so as to fit in with the general task of unity against Japan. These adjustments called for the abandonment of the Soviet slogan and of the confiscation of land of landlords by violent methods, the latter to be replaced by "legislative and other appropriate methods" in dealing with the agrarian problem.
To substantiate the new policy, Mao affirmed that the four conditions offered to the KMT were "necessary and permissible", for only thus could the CCP "transform the state of antagonism between the two different regimes within the country and achieve unity for common action against the enemy". He stressed, however, that these concessions were "principled and conditional", "made with the aim of obtaining in return what is necessary for the whole nation - peace, democracy and armed resistance". At the same time, he stressed that the maintenance of the CCP's control over the Special Region and the Red Army and the preservation of the CCP's independence and freedom to criticize its allies were "the limits of the concessions beyond which it is impermissible to go".

The CCP would whole-heartedly support the Three People's Principles on the grounds that "it is completely in keeping with the historical requirements of the Chinese revolution", but the Communists "will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism" and would continue to struggle for these goals. For this purpose, Mao exhorted the Party not to surrender its leadership of the revolution to the bourgeoisie. "To debase the class stand of the Party, to obscure its distinctive features, to sacrifice the interests of the workers and peasants to suit the needs of bourgeois reformism", Mao stated, "is sure to lead the revolution to defeat".

These warnings, however, were by no means a discouragement to the policy of cooperation with the KMT. In his concluding speech of May 7, Mao specifically denounced the view of certain comrades that since "Japan is retreating [i.e., the "Sato diplomacy"] and Nanking is wavering", the situation "has reverted to its former state". Mao dismissed such a "pessimistic" appraisal of the political situation as unsound and stated emphatically that the KMT "has begun to change" though the change was far from being complete, making it more necessary for the CCP and the people to "push" the KMT to further transform itself. Finally, Mao called for the winning over of millions of the masses to the national revolutionary struggle and expressed confidence in the Party's ability to bring about the national and social liberation of the country.
It is important to note that throughout his speech Mao struck a strong note on the question of struggling for democracy. At the outset, he stated: "If the principal task in the previous period was the fight for peace, then the principal task in the present one is the fight for democracy". This was to be achieved, under the slogan of the democratic republic, by such reforms as the abolition of one-party dictatorship, the convocation of a national assembly elected on the basis of democratic principles, the granting of a constitution and election of government, as well as the granting of freedom of speech, assembly and association to the people. All these, Mao proclaimed, were necessary for the development of the present "democratic revolution", the completion of which would lead to the next stage of socialism. This emphasis on democracy rather than socialism at the present stage of the Chinese revolution led Mao to a strong attack on the Trotskyites:

We believe in revolutionary transformation and maintain that the democratic revolution [will] transform [itself] in the direction of socialism ... but not in the Trotskyite permanent revolution .... We maintain that socialism should be reached through all the necessary stages of the democratic republic .... To maintain that the bourgeoisie should be eliminated because of its transitional nature and to accuse collaboration with the bourgeoisie revolutionary groups in semi-colonial areas of defeatism are Trotskyite words with which we cannot concur. The present alliance between the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary group is a necessary bridge to socialism.

Mao stressed, nevertheless, that it was necessary for the proletariat to assume leadership of the democratic revolution since the bourgeoisie were incapable of doing so. Mao's denunciation of the Trotskyites was further propounded by Wu Liang-p'ing, who specifically condemned Jen Tso-hsüan and several others for their "anti-resistance, anti-democratic, anti-CCP and anti-united front" activities which were tantamount to "national treason".

It would be a gross error to assume that Mao's statements betrayed Trotskyite inclinations since the emphasis on the proletarian leadership in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution had always been stressed by the Comintern. Proletarian leadership is the prerequisite for the successful transformation of the bourgeois-democratic into the socialist revolution; it is not meant for the implementation of socialism in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution.
In this regard, therefore, Mao is an orthodox Stalinist.) In fact, Mao's criticism of Trotskyism seemed to be in perfect harmony with the Comintern's current stand on the necessity to cooperate with the bourgeoisie as represented by the KMT and struggle for democracy rather than the land revolution. Neither could Mao's emphasis on the maintenance of the Party's political and military independence, the retention of the Communist programme, and the warning against sacrificing the interests of the worker-peasant masses be regarded as an implicit attack on the Comintern for they had been stressed by Ch'en Shao-yü earlier. (It is true, however, that Ch'en in 1936 had not explicitly stated that the CCP must secure the leadership of the revolution, but he had stressed that the proletariat must not be the "tail" of the bourgeoisie. In any case, this difference between Ch'en and Mao did not transcend the theoretical level until after the actual formation of the KMT-CCP alliance – see the next Chapter.) In fact, Mao's statements were soon reproduced in full in the Chiu-kuo shih-pao, indicating that the Comintern did not find Mao's assertions inappropriate.

One interesting episode illustrates the nature of the existing relationship between Mao and the RRS. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, whose account is confirmed by Kuo Hua-lun's informant, in April 1936 Liu Shao-ch'i forwarded a letter to the Central Committee on his own initiative, expressing the view that the CCP's overall policies in the past suffered from a "leftist-adventurist" orientation. These errors should be carefully examined so that they could be avoided, especially since the Party had now decided on a policy of cooperation with the KMT. Liu's letter caused consternation among the CCP leadership, as it amounted to a denial of the validity of the overall political line of the Party in the Kiangsi Period. (Mao, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao, actually suspected that Liu, who was known to be on friendly terms with Chang because of their former association dating back to the early twenties, was conspiring with Chang to challenge the Central Party leadership. It was only after Chang's non-involvement was assured that Mao permitted Liu to speak his mind at the conference.) Liu's views were condemned by the RRS, especially Chang Wen-t'ien, who strenuously asserted that the political line of the Kiangsi Period was beyond reproach and that the policies implemented then were all suited to the political circumstances of the time. As a result, Liu was obliged to withdraw his report. Subsequently, the CCP published several party tracts postulating that the Soviet movement had been a great success, and that it was its
Evidence suggest that Mao assented to the RRS in the dispute with Liu Shao-ch'i. In his speech to the conference, Mao answered in the affirmative to the question whether the Soviet slogan in the past had been correct. The Soviet slogan, he explained, was necessitated on the grounds that in 1927 the national bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution, leaving the workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie as the only revolutionary classes, and the CCP as the only revolutionary party. Hence, the CCP practised such policies as the confiscation of the land of landlords and the eight-hour work-day. Nevertheless, Mao asserted that such policies were strictly within the framework of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and had not trespassed into the socialist stage (and hence they could not be regarded as "leftist-adventurist"). This shows that up to mid-1937, Mao was either unwilling (because he himself was still not convinced) or unable (because of the united opposition of the RRS) to censure the political line of the Party in the Kiangsi Period. Lin Po-ch'U, chairman of the Northwest Office of the Soviet Government and Mao's associate, also affirmed in his article "From the Soviet to the Democratic Republic" the correctness of the Soviet revolution and attributed the new policies of the democratic republic to the new conditions in the country created by the Japanese aggression.

In the meantime, negotiations were being actively conducted between Chou En-lai and the Nationalist representatives. As a result of these negotiations, according to the report of Edgar Snow, "a number of important changes took place" between April and June. The economic blockade was lifted, trade relations were established between the Communist region and the KMT areas, and communications were also restored. To mark the new alliance with the KMT, Snow further recounts, the Communist Red Star and the KMT insignia were "crossed in symbolic union" on the frontier regions; and in Party gatherings the portraits of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek appeared together with those of world Communist leaders. Towards the end of May, a semi-official KMT delegation visited Yenan; at the reception, Mao expressed the CCP's sincere desire for cooperation with the KMT on a long-term basis to achieve national independence, democracy and the improvement of the people's livelihood.
The KMT-CCP negotiations seem to have culminated in June when Chiang Kai-shek sent his private plane for Chou En-lai for a summit meeting. On his return to Yenan, Chou disclosed to a group of foreign visitors, including Bisson, Owen Lattimore and Helen Snow, that a detailed set of agreements had been reached. The terms concluded provided for Communist representation in the People's National Congress scheduled for November 1937, nationalization of the Communist forces which would be numbered in relation to other units, and possible Communist participation in the National Defence Council. In return, the CCP agreed to submit formally to the Central Government but refused to surrender its administrative power to the Nationalist authorities or to accept the appointment of Nationalist commanders over its troops which would continue to be officered by its own cadets. (These were in line with Ch'en Shao-yü's position.) Although Nanking did not comply with the CCP's demands for a democratic constitution and the release of political prisoners, the two sides agreed to issue public announcements on the agreement on or about July 15, 1937.175

According to Chinese Communist sources, the CCP had officially terminated the policy of confiscation of the land of landlords in March 1937.176 In its place, a policy known as chien-tou chien-hsi (rent and interest reduction . . . ) was adopted, whereby rent was to be lowered by a maximum of twenty-five percent and interest rate for loans was affixed at one-and-a-half (or two) percent per month.177 Its moderate nature permitted Ch'in Pang-hsien to inform Bisson that in the Anti-Japanese United Front "the landlords too have their place", provided that they would abide by the new regulations.178 According to Edgar Snow, the CCP had earlier in May granted equal rights and voting franchise to all inhabitants of the Communist region regardless of their class origin.179

Thus, on the eve of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, basic agreement had been reached between the CCP and the KMT for the establishment of the Anti-Japanese United Front. For the Communists, their security was at long last assured, and the Party could from now on turn its attention to expanding its power. It was a time of great relief and expectations, as Bisson observes:
In the pre-war Yenan of June 1937 the words and demeanor of the Communist leaders reflected an extraordinary optimism .... The long-standing objective of joint action with Nanking against Japanese aggression ... was now taking positive form.180

This impression is reinforced by Chang Kuo-t'ao, who adds that the influx of students and youths from all over the country to enrol in K'ang-ta and other academies heightened the atmosphere of liveliness, activity and optimism in the area.181

Above all, what struck the visitors as the most baffling development of Chinese communism was its non-revolutionary orientation and its distance from the socialist goal. As Bisson recounts:

Almost, it would seem, the revolutionary cause had taken second place. Except, [sic] that the people's lot was bettered in the Border Region and was being championed for all China in the program advanced in the united front negotiations; and that, further ahead, the socialist revolution was still the ultimate goal. Actually, it lay quite far ahead, as their strong efforts to further the creation of a democratic republic most clearly demonstrated.182

Lattimore, intrigued by the enormous concessions made by the CCP to the landlords, actually asked himself the following question: "Does this mean the abandonment of the Revolution?" and answered: " ... the Communists must have felt that the United Front as a rallying cry against Japan would have a wider popular appeal than the demand for revolution".183

Even Edgar Snow, who had known only too well the recent changes in the CCP's policies, was caught by surprise. In his private letter to his wife from Peiping dated June 9, 1936, he wrote:

I've had to rewrite the last four chapter of my opus [Red Star Over China] to fit in with developments. The obvious historical meaning of the 12/12 [Sian Incident] is now very clear: direct transfer of leadership and upgiving of it to the national movement and the bourgeois revolution for possibly many years to come; that, and nothing more. CKS [Chiang Kai-shek's] ... victory of his position is now abundantly manifest. Perhaps unavoidable, anyway the Xians [Marxians] could not do much to alter it; only no use not recognizing what's happened. [sic]184
Indeed, it would be totally unrealistic not to recognize the changes in the CCP's policy from its former radical land revolutionary strategy to the new united front tactics.
Notes:

1 See Benton, pp. 67-75 & "reply," pp. 146-50; and Kataoka, pp. 35-47.

2 Ho Ch'ing-hua, "Ken-sui Mao chu-hsi ch'ü Yen-an" (Following Chairman Mao to Yenan), Hsing-huo liao-yi lan, Vol. 4, pp. 34-9.

3 Wang Shih et al., p. 170.

4 Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1202; and Snow, Red Star, pp. 62-63.

5 "Hsi-pei k'ang-Jih hung-chüen ta-hsüeh chao-sheng", in Mu-ch'üen hsing-shih ti fen-hsi (Analyses of Current Situation; n. p., 1936), pp. 62-4; (HI) also in Gaiji keisatsu ho (Journal of Surveillance of Foreign Affairs), No. 167 (May 1936), pp. 112-14. (TB)


7 Van Slyke, p. 62.

8 Benton, p. 67.

9 Kataoka, p. 36.

10 Comintern i Vostok, p. 359.

11 This appeal was published in Inprecor, Vol. 16, No. 6 (Jan. 25, 1936), p. 150. It did not appear in any contemporary CCP publication.

12 "Kuan-yü chao-chi chüan-kuo k'ang-Jih chiu-kuo tai-piao tung-tien" (Circular Telegram on the Assembly of Anti-Japanese National Salvation Representatives in the Nation), in Mu-chüen hsing-shih ti fen-hsi, pp. 54-5.


14 Chung-kung Chung-yang pei-fang chü, "Wei k'ang-Jih chiu-kuo hsüan-yen (Declaration on Resisting Japan and National Salvation), in Mu-chüen hsing-shih ti fen-hsi, pp. 55-60.


19 Account given by Pai Yu-teh, the Soviet Chairman for Fushih hsien to
Myrdal, p. 56. Since this is a retrospective account, it is possible
that Pai either generalizes the CCP's policy towards landlords or
deliberately distorts the facts to make them conform to the CCP's
later policy.

20 Chung-hua su-wei-ai jen-min kung-ho-kuo chung-yang cheng-fu hsi-pei
pan-shih-ch'u, "Kuan-yü chih-hsing k'ai-pien fu-nung ts'e-lüeh
chi ko-chi kung-ch'an-tang yü su-wei-ai chih-shih" (Directive
to All Levels of Party and Soviet Organizations on the Execution
of the Revised Rich-Peasant Policy), manuscript, Apr. 4, 1936. (HI)

21 Nakanishi Tsutomu & Nishisato Tatsuo, pp. 83-5; and Gaimushō Toa-
kyoku dainika, Sansёishō nī okeru kōgun oyobi nōhi jyōkyō (The
Conditions of the Red Army and the Suppression of Bandits in the
Shansi Province; 1936), p. 3.


24 Gillin, Warlord, p. 224.

21, 1936), p. 430.

26 For Chou En-lai's remark, see E. Snow, Random Notes, p. 58;
for Yang Shang-k'un's, see Tou-cheng, No. 106 (July 22, 1936), p. 5

27 See Naikaku jōhōbu, Shina ni sukuu Kokuesi kyōsanto no inbō (The
Comintern's Conspiracy to Eat Away China; Tokyo, 1937), p. 10.
Tōa (East Asia; May, 1936), Vol. 5, pp. 26-7, Shina ni okeru
kōnichi ..., p. 44-5; Rikugunshō shinbunhan, Kyōsangun no Sansёi
shinmyō ni tsuite (On the Communist Army's Invasion into Shansi;
1936), p. 33; and Otsuka Reizo, pp. 48-9.

28 "Hung-chūn ch'u-tung k'ang-Jih t'ao-ni" (The Red Army Marches to
Resist Japan and Eliminate Traitors), Chiu-kuo shih-pao, No. 16

29 Wang Ming, "The Struggle for the Anti-Japanese People's Front in
Original text of this article appears in Kommunisticheskiy Intern-
natsional (April 25, 1936), pp. 27-34.

30 Tan Shin She (sic), "The Policy of the C.P. of China and the Chinese

31 See Japanese translation of this article in CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 600-27.

32 "Ch'u san-hai" (Eliminate the Three Evils), Chiu-kuo shih-pao,

33 Tan Shin She, p. 631.


36 For details, see Israel, pp. 138-47.

37 See Wang Chien-min, Vol. 3, p. 73.


39 "Pei-p'ing shih hsüeh-chiu-lien hsüan-yan" (Declaration of the National Salvation Students' Union of Peiping), Japanese translation in CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 596-600.

40 See Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i, p. 477.


42 "T'ing-chan i-ho i-ch'ü k'ang-Jih tung-tien" (Circular Telegram on Cessation of Civil War and Unity to Resist Japan), MTTC, Vol. 3, pp. 47-9.

43 See Wang Shūh et al., p. 170; and the explanatory note in MTHC, Vol. 1, p. 149.

44 Chiang Kai-shek, p. 73


46 For details, see CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 308-24.

47 For details, see CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 329-36.

48 See Ch'iu-wang ch'ing-pao, Nos. 1-15; and CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 395-99, 421-32 & 441-42 for activities of the "People's Front Faction".

50 "Smoke Screen or Provocation?" Izvestia (June 10, 1936), cited in McLane, p. 75.

51 For an analysis of the historical conflicts between Nanking and Liang Kwang, see "Nanking, Seinan ryōha kakushitsu no rekishi-teki kōsatsu" (A Historical Study of the Struggle for Power between Nanking and the Southwest Factions), Toa, Vol. 9, Nos. 10, 11 & 12 (Oct. to Dec., 1936).

52 It was generally believed that Ch'en Chi-t'ang, governor of Kwangtung, was merely using anti-Japanese propaganda against Nanking, while Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi of Kwangsi were sincerely anti-Japanese. See L.K. Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, (Princeton, N.J., 1944), p. 17.

53 See e.g. "Seinanha no tai chuō taido to Eikoku no inyaku" (The Attitude of the Southwest towards the Central [Government] and Great Britain's Overt Activities), Toa, Vol. 9, No. 6 (June 1936), pp. 21-25.


55 See Comintern i Vostok, pp. 360-61; and Braun, pp. 232-33.

56 The content of this declaration is disclosed in Lo Fu "Liang-Kwang shih-pien ti chiao-hsün" (Lessons of the Southwest Incident), Tou-cheng, No. 107 (Aug. 2, 1936). See also (Wu) Liang-p'ing, "Huan-ying Liang-Kwang ch'u-ping k'ang-Jih" (Welcome the Southwest Anti-Japanese Expedition), Tou-cheng, No. 104 (July 2, 1936), for similar views.


61 "Mu-chien Chung-kuo cheng-chû ti ch'u-lu" (Solution to the Present Political Conditions), in WMHC, Vol. 4, pp. 433-41.
62 Shen Chün-ju et al., "T'uan-chieh yü-wu ti ch'i-ko ch'i-pen t'iao-chien yü tsui-ti yao-ch'iù", (Several Basic Conditions and Minimum Requirements for Unity Against the External Enemy; Shanghai, 1936). (H)

63 Braun, p. 230.

64 Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1213.


67 Mif, Ying-yung fen-tou ti shih-wu nien (trans. of Heroic China n.p., 1936), chap. 7.

68 See note 66.


70 "Kuan-yü t'u-t'i cheng-ts'e ti chih-shih" (Directive on Land Policy), in MTTC, Vol. 5, pp. 63-5.


73 Dimitrov, An Outstanding Militant, pp. 204-5.


76 See Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, No. 14 (August 1936), p. 128, bottom of the page.

77 Benton, pp. 69-70. In "reply", p. 149, Benton argues that "to judge from internal evidence (?) and from the very late appearance of the English translation", the Russian edition must have been published at the end of August.

See Van Slyke, pp. 63-4, fn.

See note 77.

See Beloff, pp. 20-1 & 30; Seton-Watson, pp. 178-85; and Mckenzie, pp. 154-59. Both the Spanish and French Popular Fronts ultimately ended in failure.


"Chung-kuo kung-ch' an-tang chih Chung-kuo kuo-ming-tang shu" (Letter of the CCP to the KMT), in MTTC, Vol. 5, pp. 67-76.

Benton, p. 69; Kataoka, p. 40; and Thomson, p. 125.

"Kuan-yü k'ang-Jih chiu-wang yün-tung ti hsin hsing-shih yü min-chu kung-ho kuo ti chüeh-i" (Resolution on the New Situation of the Resisting Japan and National Salvation Movement and the Democratic Republic), reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 31-35.


Snow, Random Notes, p. 37.

Snow, Red Star, pp. 253 & 258.


See Myrdal, p. 60.

Snow, Red Star, p. 379

Myrdal, p. 58

See Chan-shih (Warrior) No. 226 (Sept. 5, 1936); and K'ang-Jih chan-hsien (Anti-Japanese Front; Sept. 4, 1936), mimeo. (HI)

Kataoka, p. 41, fn. 130.


MTTHC, Vol. 1, p. 149.
"She-lun - Mao chu-hsi t'an-hua" (Editorial - Speech of Chairman Mao), in MTTC, Vol. 5, pp. 81-2.


"Min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien ti chi-pen yulan-tse" (Basic Principles of the National United Front), in Kuan-yil k'ang-jih t'ung-i-chan-hsien ti chi-ko wen-t'i. (Several Problems on the Anti-Japanese United Front; n. p., 1937), pp. 5-12. Since it failed to mention the Sian Incident, it was probably issued before Dec. 1936.

Braun, p. 235; and Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1253.

E.g. Hung-ch'i, No. 14 (Feb. 30, 1937); Min-tsu ko-ming chih lu (The Road to National Revolution; n. p., 1938), second article.

Li Keng, Hui-i "I-erh-chiu" shih-ch'i Nan-ching ti hsileh-sheng yulan-tung (Recollection on the Student Movement in Nanking During the December 9 Movement; n. p., 1946), section 5. (HI)


Ch'en Shao-yii, "Ju-ho chun-pei k'ang-Jih" (How to Prepare for Resistance against Japan), Japanese translation in CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 150-69.

"Kuan-yil Sui-yulan k'ang-chan ti t'ung-t'ien", (Circular telegram on the Resistance War at Suyllan) in Kuan-yil t'ung-i-chan-hsien, pp. 22-4.

"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh teng ch'ih Chiang Chieh-shih shu" (Letter of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and others to Chiang Kai-shek), ibid, pp. 24-6.

See McLane, p. 98.


See McLane, pp. 82-3.

Ibid., p. 86.

Snow, Random Notes, p. 1.


Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1240. According to Snow, Random Notes, pp. 1-2, however, Moscow's telegram was dispatched to Shanghai before it was transmitted to Yenan, and it was worded in a peremptory manner stating that Moscow would denounce the Communists if they did not free Chiang. I infer that this is a separate telegram dispatched by Moscow after December 13, when the CCP had still not professed its stand.
117 See Chang Kuo-t' ao, pp. 1241-57.
118 Snow, Random Notes, preface, p. x.
119 Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, p. 171.
120 R. Payne, Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China (London, 1951), p. 163.
121 Shih-shih wen-t'i yen-chiu hui, Hsi-an shih-pien shih-liao, (Historical Materials on the Sian Incident; Shanghai, 1937), passim. See also Gaimusho, chosakyoku daisanga, Chō Gaku-ryō heihen to kakuchi hankyo. (Chang Hsieh-liang's Mutiny and Response of Various Quarters; Dec. 22, 1936), pp. 3-20; and Kokusai jijo (International Events), No. 504 (Jan. 18, 1937), pp. 54-81.
122 Chang Kuo-t' ao, p. 1243.
123 A. Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943), pp. 140-47.
126 Benton, pp. 71-2, translates the term "oh 'u-chih"as "dispose of". I suggest that the term means "to settle". In "reply", p. 148, he cites a Taiwanese source to support his assertion that the term carries a malicious intent. In Mao Tse-tung et al., China, March toward Unity (New York, 1937), p. 123, the translation reads: "In this conference ... the problem of resisting Japan ... should be discussed, as well as the future fate of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek".
130 Chang Kuo-t' ao, pp. 1244-45.
131 "Kuan-yü Chiang Chieh-shih sheng-ming ti sheng-ming" (Statement in Response to Chiang Kai-shek's Statement), MTHC, Vol. 1, p. 228.
132 H. Snow, My Yenan Notebook, p. 29
"Chung-kung chung-yang fa-piao hao-chao ho-p'ing t'ing-chih nei-chan t'ung-tien" (CCP Central Committee Circular Telegram on Peace and Cessation of Civil War), in *Kuan-yil t'ung-i chan-hsien*, p. 26.

Chang Kuot'ao, p. 1258; See also Tanaka Tadao, *Shina genka no seiji dōkō* (Present Developments of Chinese Politics; Tokyo, 1937), p. 279.


"Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yil Hsi-an shih-pien ho-p'ing chieh-chüeh chih i-i chi chung-yang chih Kuo-min-tang san-chung ch'üan-hui tien chieh-shih ta-kang" (Explanatory Outline of the CCP Central Committee on the Meaning of the Peaceful Settlement of the Sian Incident and the Letter to the Third Plenum of the KMT), mimeo. (BI)

*Kou-Chiang yil shih-Chiang*, mimeo, (BI).


See the memoir of Hsü En-tseng, chief of KMT intelligence Bureau, *Wo ho kung-tang tou-cheng ti hui-i* (Recollections of My Struggle with the Communist Party), mimeo, p. 51. (BI) Ts'ao Po-i, *Chung-kung Yen-an chih cheng-chih ching-yen* (The Political Experience of the CCP during the Yenan Period; Taipei, 1973), p. 6, confirms that such instructions were given to CCP in January 1937, but states that they were carried by Ch'en Shao-yü with another Comintern agent back to China.


The same distinction was made in the documents cited in notes 157 & 158 below. Kataoka, p. 46, and Benton, pp. 73-4, however, claim that Mao dissented from Ch'en Shao-yl's formula of the people's front.


Chang Kuot'ao, pp. 1255-58. Chang suggests that the alliance with the KMT was a matter of "life and death" to Mao.

149 See T.A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York, 1938), p. 258; and the commentary in MTTHC, Vol. 1 p. 257.


151 Chung-kung chung-yang, "San-chung ch'Uan-hui hou ti hsin hsing-shih t'ao-lun ta-kang" (Discussion Outline of the New Situation After the Third Plenum), mimeo. (BI) Judging from the title, this statement was in all probability issued in March 1937.

152 This was announced by radio broadcast. See China Weekly Review (Mar. 27, 1937), p. 130.

153 Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1276-79.

154 For a Japanese translation of this document, see CGKSTS, Vol. 7 pp. 45-52.

155 H. Snow, My Yenan Notebook, P. 211.

156 See the translation of Trotskyite organs Tou-cheng and Wen-hua chien-she (Cultural Construction) in CGKSTS, Vol. 6, pp. 566-75; Vol. 7, pp. 955-60 & 980-1025. As early as July 1936, Chang Wen-t'ien had offered a systematic critique of Trotskyism to Edgar Snow, see Random Notes, pp. 82-6. For further discussion of the polemics between the CCP and the Trotskyites, see the next Chapter.

157 Lun K'ang-Jih min-teu t'ung-i-chan-hsian chu wen-t'i, passim, esp. "Explanatory Outline" (identical with note 137).

158 "Chung-kung chung-yang kao t'ung-chih shu" (Letter of the CCP Central Committee to Party Members), KMTCC, Vol. 1 pp. 82-106.

159 Chang Hao (Lin Yü-ying), Chung-kung tang ti ts'e-lüeh lu-hsien, re-printed by the Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi chu (Bureau of Investigation and Statistics), Chungking, 1941. (BI) This work was widely circulated in Hankow in the spring of 1938, ostensibly by Nationalist authorities. It was so damaging to the CCP's public image that Chou En-lai officially denounced the work as a forgery, see "Kuan-yü so-wei 'Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti ts'e-lüeh lu-hsien' i-shu wen-t'i kung-k'ai-hsin" (An open Letter concerning the so-called "Tactical Line of the CCP"), Chieh-fang (Liberation). No. 36 (Apr. 29, 1938), pp. 11-2. But the work is probably authentic. In his article, Chou admitted that Lin had delivered a series of lectures that contained similar "errors" to those in the book: "Comrade Chang Hao's error at that time was to consider the Anti-Japanese United front to be a temporary tactical change, whereas the CC of the Party definitely views it as a revolutionary strategic change during a certain historical stage". Chou also disclosed that Ch'in Pang-hsien had administered an official rebuke. But in the spring of 1937 the Party did regard the united front as basically a tactical change. It was not until after the KMT-CCP alliance was formally established that Ch'en Shao-yü (and other CCP leaders) began to express the view that the change was strategic in nature.
Kataoka, p. 40, infers that by "legislative and appropriate means" Mao hinted at harsh treatment of landlords. He further claims that "the landlord class was never included in the second united front".


(Wu) Liang-p'ing, "Ch'i'h Yen Ch'ing, Chang Ti-fei, Jen I-li, Cheng Hsüeh-chia chu T'o-lo-ssu-ch'i p'ai" (Rebuttal against Yeh Ch'ing, Chang Ti-fei, Jen I-li, Cheng Hsüeh-chia and other Trotskyites), Chieh-fang, No. 3 (May 11, 1937), pp. 7-15.

Kataoka, p. 45, however, claims that Mao, by asserting the proletarian leadership in the democratic republic, "fell just short of saying that the Chinese Communists would seek to establish socialism in the course of the war or at the end of it". Benton, p. 76, also states that Mao's statement "The leadership of the proletariat makes it possible to transform war into socialist revolution" is closer to Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution than to Stalin's views. In point of fact, however, Mao never advocated the establishment of socialism either during or after the War. (See Chaps. Four and Five.) For a basic definition of a socialist revolution and the bourgeois-democratic revolution, See Hsiao Tso-liang, Chinese Communism in 1927, pp. 157-60.


Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1282-83; for further details, see Chang's Introduction to Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i (Hong Kong, 1969), pp. 6-8.


175 Bisson, Talks with Communist Leaders, pp. 43-8.


178 Bisson, Talks with Communist Leaders, p. 32.


180 Bisson, Talks with Communist Leaders, p. 66. Benton, "reply," p. 148, however, claims that the important thing about Chou's statement to Bisson in June 1936 was his "pessimism" in regard to the prospect of the KMT-CCP alliance.

181 Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1280-1283.

182 Bisson, Talks with Communist Leaders, p. 67.


184 H. Snow, My Yenan Notebook, p. 25.
Prior to July 1937, formal differences did not exist between the Comintern and the CCP on the united front question because both centres saw the necessity and the advisability of an alliance with the KMT against Japan. With the inauguration of the alliance in September 1937, however, a divergence in policy orientation began to develop between Moscow and the CCP as well as within the CCP leadership. The basic issues of contention were twofold: first, to what extent should the Party, under the terms of collaboration with the KMT, maintain its own independence and freedom of action to expand its influence among the masses; and second, in what way and in what areas should the Party develop and expand its strength by capitalizing on the War of Resistance. It is generally assumed that both Chang Kuo-t'ao and Ch'en Shao-yü were exponents of "rightist" deviations within the Party, advocating whole-hearted cooperation with the KMT without any regard for the CCP's independence and expansion. It has also been suggested that the main conflict between Ch'en Shao-yü and Mao can be reduced to a "city versus countryside" dichotomy, with the former concentrating on party work in the urban centres and the latter focusing on the expansion of the rural guerrilla bases, and that this accounts for their respective support and disregard for the united front. While I agree that conflicts did emerge among the CCP leaders during this period, my interpretation of the intraparty politics differs substantially from the above.

Contrary to the view that Ch'en Shao-yü's position was similar to Chang Kuo-t'ao, it is my contention that Ch'en differed significantly from Chang who favoured genuine and unselfish cooperation with the KMT for the launching of a sacred War of Resistance to save the nation. Ch'en's formula was based on the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist united front tactics which sought to develop and expand the Party's influence among the masses through parliamentary and democratic institutions. His efforts to improve bilateral relations with the KMT were based on the assumption that they would provide legal opportunities for party expansion. He disputed with Mao, however, over the proper strategy to make optimal use of the united front. Mao's position followed from the premise that the construction of guerrilla bases in the countryside was the only
viable approach for building up the strength of the Communists. Ch'en, on the other hand, saw the united front as an unique opportunity to extricate the Party from the legacy of limiting its areas of operation to the countryside and to strengthen the Party's composition of proletarian elements. These two strategies, however, were not totally incompatible - Ch'en did not basically oppose the consolidation of the Communist bases in the rural areas, and Mao recognized the importance of the united front as a tactic to minimize KMT opposition to the Communists and to secure the collaboration of the landlord-capitalist classes in order to stabilise and consolidate the Communist base areas.

The Loch 'uan Conference

Prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, the CCP had clearly forseen opportunities for expansion under the conditions of a full-scale war against Japan. In early July, Chang Wen-t'ien began to work out a new set of principles for party work in the "white" areas. The major objective of the Party in the Anti-Japanese United Front, according to Chang, was to win over the broad middle strata (i.e., the bourgeoisie) and bring them into the united front, even though they did not support communism. The Party should rely, however, only on the workers, peasants, soldiers and petty bourgeoisie. While the Communists should continue to struggle against their allies through exhortation and criticism, as well as fight for the betterment of the economic and political interests of the people, they should avoid extreme measures and slogans which might disrupt the united front.

On the Party's attitude towards the KMT, Chang Wen-t'ien formally introduced the view that the KMT was composed essentially of three groups: the left, the centre and the right. During the process of national resistance, internal conflicts were bound to develop among these groups, and the Party's strategy was to "unite with the left, win over the centre, and struggle against the right" so as to expel the pro-Japanese elements from its ranks. The CCP should press the KMT for democratic and organizational reforms, and either join the KMT openly or infiltrate its lower echelons so as to compel the upper levels to make changes and permit the CCP's mobilization of the masses. The three blocs in the KMT were personified by Ch'in Pang-hsien in his interview with Helen Snow sometime in the summer of 1937: the left was represented by Feng Yü-hsiang, the centre
by Chiang Kai-shek, T.V. Soong and H.H. Kung, while Wang Ching-wei was understandably classified as the leader of the right-wing.

In the conduct of party work, Chang Wen-t'ien called for the utilization of every legal opportunity to mobilize the masses, which meant that the CCP had to adjust itself to a rapid expansion of overt operations. In this regard, Chang emphasized that the cadres engaging in legal activities should conceal their communist affiliation and cease being "dogmatists" who lectured the masses on empty Marxist-Leninist principles. At the same time, the Party was to maintain its covert activities, and the two lines of operation were to be strictly separated from one another to the extent that neither would have knowledge of the other. According to varying circumstances, secret party work should be converted into overt party work or vice versa. The basic principle was to lead and organize the masses without exposing themselves as Communists, thus rendering themselves easy targets for KMT reprisals. It can be seen that these guiding principles of united front work were very much in line with the proposals Dimitrov and Ch'en Shao-yü put forward earlier at the Seventh Comintern Congress.

With the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, the Chinese Communists immediately seized the opportunity to launch a vigorous campaign for an all-out War of Resistance against Japan. This objective was clearly endorsed by the Comintern. In a secret directive dispatched to the CCP within a week following the July 7 Incident, the Comintern instructed the CCP to oppose strenuously any attempt on the part of the Nanking Government to settle the dispute on the basis of a local peace agreement. This may be interpreted as a reflection of Moscow's desire to tie down the Japanese in China in a full-scale war, but it should not be overlooked that the directive literally urged the CCP to step up its mass mobilization work, win over the lower stratum of cadres and soldiers in the KMT, and generally outdo the KMT in asserting its influence over the broad masses in the nation. It also called upon the CCP to wage widespread guerrilla activities to assist other allied armies in the Resistance.
Accordingly, the Organization Department of the CCP, under the direction of Ch‘in Pang-hsien, issued a directive to all regional units on August 12 giving concrete instructions on party work in the "white" areas under the conditions of War of Resistance. The CCP, it declared, was to support all governments and armies that were anti-Japanese, but at the same time it had to continue to criticize their shortcomings and mistakes in the conduct of the war and to put forward its own correct slogans and platform so as to rally the people behind the Party. It should win over all parties to the united front, set up new legal mass organizations, and infiltrate all existing ones so as to secure the leadership positions in these organs. Similarly, the Communists should also join regional governments and armies and secure the leadership of these organizations. Only when the Central Government showed definite signs of allowing the Communists to operate independently and openly invited Communist participation should they join the Government and operate from above. The struggle for democracy was to be vigorously pursued, but the Party should avoid making excessive demands for the improvement of the livelihood of the masses which might affect war mobilization, as in the case of workers' strikes which might affect production. In enemy territories and in neighbouring areas, the Party should develop widespread guerrilla movements for the purpose of harassing the enemy and mobilizing the masses. In sum, the Party and the Red Army were to establish themselves as models of resistance in order to win over the respect and confidence of the people as well as the allied armies.\(^8\)

Thus, both Chang Wen-t‘ien and Ch‘in Pang-hsien were anxious to exploit the opportunities provided by the Anti-Japanese War for expansion of Communist influence among the masses. The new tactics they recommended were designed to rid the CCP of its former approach of agitating among the masses on strictly communist principles and programme, so as to enable the Communists to achieve greater flexibility in action. It proved to be a success. According to a former director of the KMT Investigation Bureau, the new method created tremendous difficulties for the KMT intelligence operatives in identifying the Communists or locating the Party cells, and this accounted for the meagre results in breaking up Communist underground activities in the Yenan Period as compared to the earlier periods.\(^9\)
In the meantime, the CCP-KMT negotiations for alliance were brought to a logical conclusion as the Sino-Japanese hostility spread through North China. On August 22 the Nationalist Government formally reorganized the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army and appointed Chu Teh as commander and P'eng Teh-huai as his deputy. On September 6, the Communist region was renamed the "Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government". The KMT-CCP alliance was formally announced on September 22 with the issuance of separate statements from the two parties. Sometime in November, following protracted negotiations, the remnants of the Communist guerrilla units in Central China were regrouped into the New Fourth Army under the command of Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying.

With the formal subordination of its troops to the Nanking Command, the CCP received orders to march into Shansi and assist Yen Hsi-shan in defending the front lines in North China. This immediately brought forth the question, hitherto hypothetical, regarding the extent to which Communist forces should abide by the orders of Nanking and the methods in which cooperation with other armies should be undertaken. To discuss the problem, the CCP Central Committee convened an enlarged meeting on August 21-25 at Loch'uan. At the meeting, a fierce debate ensued. The details of the controversy are not available from any documentary source, but Chang Kuo-t'ao, Otto Braun and Kuo Hua-lun's informant have given vivid accounts of the debate which are in substantial agreement with each other.

On the question of the organization of the Eighth Route Army, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai maintained that it should conform to the Nationalist system of military organization and accept representatives from the KMT General Staff. Mao and Jen Pi-shih opposed this proposal, advocating the retention of the existing military organization of the Red Army and sternly opposing the presence of any military advisers from the KMT. The only concessions they were willing to make were the changing of the name of the Red Army to the Eighth Route Army and its reorganization into three divisions according to Nanking's order. It was Chang Wen-t'ien who proposed a compromise by which the Communist troops would retain their system of political commissars but rename them deputy commanders or directors of political departments in accordance with the system in the Nationalist Army, and accept a token number of liaison officers from Nanking to be stationed only at Yenan and not at the front.
As to the military strategy and tactics which the Eighth Route Army were to adopt in Shansi, Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai favoured co-ordinated operations with Yen Hsi-shan's forces employing a combination of mobile and guerrilla warfare in fighting the Japanese. Mao asserted, however, that the small 20,000 man Communist forces, inferiorly armed, would make no significant impact on the war. He argued instead that the Communists should disperse their troops behind enemy lines, fight an "independent guerrilla" warfare, expand their operations beyond the Second War Zone (i.e., Shansi), and concentrate on building up new bases. Chou En-lai opposed such a strategy on the grounds that avoidance of frontal combat with the Japanese troops would discredit the CCP's anti-Japanese propaganda, and asserted that Communist troops should also fight mobile warfare even though heavy casualties might be incurred. Again Chang Wen-t'ien offered a compromise whereby the Communist forces would act under Nationalist orders at the initial stage and engage the Japanese for the sake of bolstering up the CCP's image; when the Japanese began to move in, however, they would disperse to launch independent guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear and re-establish bases.

For an understanding of the problems at stake, it should be briefly mentioned that the basic difference between mobile and guerrilla warfare is that the former employs a large contingent of troops to destroy the enemy in battle, while the latter employs smaller units to harass and wear down the enemy through attrition. Mao's principal concern, it can be seen, was to avoid engaging the Japanese in frontal engagements or large-scale operations which would likely cause heavy casualties. In line with his long-cherished military thinking, he sought to preserve the strength of the Communist forces and concentrate on the construction of rural bases. After a prolonged period of guerrilla operations and consolidation of rural bases, the Communist forces would be able to launch a counteroffensive against the Japanese (and the KMT). This approach, however, would temporarily minimize the effect of the CCP's anti-Japanese propaganda and invite opposition from its critics.
Mao defended his position by offering the following estimate of the political situation. The KMT, he believed, would not change its basically reactionary character. It would continue to oppose democratization of the political system and the mobilization of the people. He doubted Chiang Kai-shek's determination to stay in the war and surmised that there was a possibility that Chiang would compromise with Japan at any stage and turn against the Communists. In any case, the KMT would not be able to win victory on the basis of "partial" resistance, i.e., the adoption of "purely defensive military actions" and non-involvement of the masses. With defeats and setbacks at the front, the KMT ranks would split and disintegrate in the course of the war. The CCP, therefore, must maintain "independence and initiative in our own hands" (tu-li tsu-chu) so that it could freely mobilize the masses and strengthen its armed forces to sustain the War of Resistance. In such a way, both Japan and the KMT would suffer defeat in the end, and victory would belong to the CCP and the worker-peasant masses.

This analysis invoked the bitter opposition of Chang Kuo-t'ao, who argued that Chiang Kai-shek would persist in the war against Japan since circumstances would not permit his withdrawal in the midst of the Resistance. Rather than a possible split, he claimed that the KMT would strengthen and consolidate its position through its leadership in the war. If the CCP did not earnestly cooperate with the KMT, it would tarnish its public image and isolate itself from the patriotic movements all over the country. Furthermore, he alerted other leaders to the dangers of forcing Chiang Kai-shek into a compromise with Japan if the CCP adopted an independent line of action that frightened the KMT away from the alliance. This would result in defeat for China and victory to the Japanese. He advocated, therefore, that the CCP should for the time being set aside the problem of struggling for leadership in the war and cooperate whole-heartedly with the KMT. Inspite of its deficiencies, the KMT would be able to reform and improve its policies in the course of the Resistance.
Chang Kuo-t'ao's views received the support of Chou En-lai, though Chou's primary concern was the Party's image as a fervent champion of national resistance. Mao, on the other hand, received the support of both Chang Wen-t'ien and Ch'in Pang-hsien—the latter's support for Mao is confirmed by both Chang Kuo-t'ao and Otto Braun. (In his memoir, Braun recalls that Ch'in explained to him that he rendered support to Mao because the KMT was still reactionary in its policies and had shown no signs of reform or improvement since the outbreak of the war. To cooperate with the lower regional organs of the Nationalist Government was permissible and desirable since it would enable the CCP to infiltrate these organs and take over the leadership; but to participate in and compromise with the KMT at the highest level would discredit the Party and weaken its influence among the people.) This shows that the RRS disagreed with Chang Kuo-t'ao who failed to stress the importance of the Party's independence and expansion.

Nevertheless, because of the division in the Party leadership, Mao had to adjourn the meeting for three days. On August 25, he presented a draft resolution for discussion. The resolution recognized that the Nanking Government had begun to make a determined effort at resistance. The existing difference between the CCP and the KMT was "not whether resistance should be conducted", but "how victory should be won". The key to victory was the unfolding of a "total" resistance which involved mobilization of the entire people. The KMT, however, was still unwilling to open up mass activities and reform its political organizations. There was, therefore, the danger of temporary setbacks, vacillation and attempts to compromise with the enemy. The resolution expressed confidence that these dangers would be overcome with the progress of the war and warned against despair and pessimism. All members of the CCP were instructed to step up mass mobilization work and participate actively "in the forefront" of national resistance. It made no reference to the need to maintain "independence and initiative in our own hands", and was evidently a compromise. It was adopted without opposition, but existing differences among the Party leaders were by no means resolved.
The Loch'uan Conference also issued a "Ten-point Programme of National Resistance" which embodied the CCP's earlier proposals for active resistance and national unity against Japan. In addition, it recommended to the Government sweeping reforms in the political, administrative, military, fiscal and cultural spheres so as to consolidate the united front. According to Otto Braun, the ten-point programme was drafted by Ch'en Shao-yu and dispatched to the CCP prior to the Loch'uan Conference; whether this is connected to its earlier appearance in a directive issued by the Propaganda Department under Ho K'o-ch'uan on August 10 is not known. In any case, Ch'en Shao-yu in a contemporary article reiterated a parallel programme. (See below.)

In the preface and postscript to the programme, Mao added that such reforms were essential for achieving a "nation-wide" and "total" resistance against Japan, and he criticized the view held by certain KMT officials (which was ostensibly aimed at Chang Kuo-t'ao) that political reforms had to await the final victory of the war.

It is not known whether the Loch'uan controversy was reported to the Comintern by the CCP, but an article written by Ch'en Shao-yu in September 1937 suggests that he was informed. To the extent that his position straddled that of Mao and Chang Kuo-t'ao, it is clear that he was attempting to resolve the existing differences in the Party.

In his article, Ch'en, first of all, refuted the view that China's technological and military weaknesses would lead to certain defeat. Asserting that "it is the living people that in the long run decide the outcome of war", he cited the example of Spain and pointed out that China, with its immense human and material resources, was in a even more advantageous position. To prevent any further loss of manpower and resources to the enemy, he called for a vigorous defence of Shanghai, the loss of which would mean that the rich Yangtze Valley would fall into Japanese hands.

To offset the military and technological weaknesses, Ch'en noted that the crucial factor was the consolidation of unity within the country. In this regard, Ch'en deplored the fact that KMT "has only now partially set about the fulfilment of the tasks of national defence". Ch'en welcomed the prospect of the KMT transforming itself into a national defence government, but added that it could only become such a government on the conditions that it would conduct a resolute struggle for national
independence, democratize its regime, improve the material conditions of the masses, remove pro-Japanese elements from the government and enlist into the government truly "capable, authoritative and anti-Japanese figures" from the respective parties. Ch'en denied that the CCP was interested in overthrowing the Nanking Government or that the creation of the national defence government meant the replacement of the existing government by a new one, but at the same time he also declared that "certain leaders of the KMT should be frankly advised to break resolutely with their erroneous attempt to convert collaboration between the KMT and the Communist Party into a political and organizational subordination of the Communist Party to the KMT". Similarly, Ch'en welcomed the transformation of the Nationalist and other armies into a united anti-Japanese army but warned against any attempt to "make use of the slogan of the establishment of a united national army to weaken and lessen the fighting power of the anti-Japanese People's Red Army", such as the demand for the removal and replacement of its divisional chiefs-of-staff. On the contrary, Ch'en stated that the CCP would not only continue to "consolidate and increase the forces of the Red Army but also preserve its best traditions and fighting qualities as the most advanced, disciplined, [and] solid component of the all-Chinese army". In addition, the CCP would not only continue to improve its work in the Soviet areas in order to convert them into a bulwark of anti-Japanese struggle, but "relying on the growing revolutionary strength and might of millions of the toiling people through the whole of China", it would "fight to transform the other regions of the country into a strong base of the all-Chinese democratic republic". (This appears to be an explicit sanction for the continual expansion of the Communist territories.)

The present tasks of the Party, according to Ch'en, were first of all to organize and educate the working class in the cities since they were the most resolute force in the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle. Secondly, the Party was to organize and absorb the peasantry, which constituted the majority of the Chinese population, into the national liberation movement without whose support victory would be impossible. (It can be seen that although Ch'en gave priority to the organization of the workers he did not overlook the importance of organizing the peasants.) Thirdly, the Party was to strengthen and expand its work among the youths, especially students who were highly-motivated in the anti-Japanese struggle. Finally, the Party was to "organize its members and honest
revolutionary elements in all units of the national revolutionary armies" so as to strengthen their revolutionary spirit and improve their discipline. (This is equivalent to the infiltration of other armies by the Communists, but for obvious reasons Ch'en could not say so openly.)

Ch'en then pointed out the internal and external difficulties which confronted the Party in the Anti-Japanese United Front. Externally, he noted that certain sections of the bourgeoisie, placing their class interests above the nation, would easily commit treason. Internally, the Party had to overcome opposition from the "sectarians" who objected to the united front and from the "capitulationists" who were prepared to sacrifice the Party's political and organizational independence. The correct ideological stand of the CCP, Ch'en explained, should be as follows: while recognizing that "between the bourgeois nationalists and the Communists there is and always will be an impassable boundary", the Communists, being "in the front rank in defence of the national existence and independence of China" would "under definite historical conditions" support whole-heartedly the revolutionary traditions and slogans of Sun Yat-sen. This did not mean, however, that the Communists would cease being the true disciples of Marxism-Leninism or give up the struggle for Soviet political power and socialism. Communists, in his opinion, were both fighters for the national movement as well as for the proletarian dictatorship.

Thus, Ch'en Shao-yü advocated both close collaboration with the KMT and the retention of the Party's independence and ultimate goal of socialism. His suggestions fell just short of Mao's principles of "independence and initiative in our own hands", but also departed significantly from Chang Kuo-t'ao's.

Whether Mao was responding directly to Ch'en Shao-yü cannot be ascertained; in any case, his statement of September 29, following the formal establishment of the two-party alliance, expressed views akin to those of Ch'en. Mao declared that the formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front had opened up a "new historical stage" in the development of the Chinese revolution which was definitely not a "mere makeshift devised under the pressure of circumstances". He refuted the view held by certain critics of the CCP that communism and the Three People's Principles were incompatible:
This is a purely formal approach. Communism will be put into practice at a future stage of development of the revolution; at the present stage the Communists harbour no illusions about being able to realize it but will carry out the national and democratic revolution as required by the historical circumstances.

Asserting that the Three People's Principles and the ten-point programme of the CCP could be the common programme of the two parties, he conceded that the implementation of the joint programme needed the "consent of the KMT, since the KMT is still the largest party in power in China". He emphasized, however, that the Nationalist Government and the Nationalist Army had to reform themselves and unite with the masses before they could fulfill the task of national resistance. Citing the example of the Spanish Civil War, he noted that conditions in China were more favourable than those in Spain, but unfortunately, China lacked a thorough-going and powerful united front. In another article published around this time Mao warned that the loss of Shanghai would mean that the KMT would be cut off from its financial and economic base of the Kiangsi-Chekiang regions, which would cause grave difficulties to China's Resistance.

On the question of Communist participation in the Nationalist Government, the CCP Central Committee adopted a resolution on September 25 affirming that China needed a united anti-Japanese government and expressing the CCP's willingness to participate in such a government; but it also declared that so long as the KMT remained in its present one-party dictatorship the CCP would not participate in the higher levels of Government. In his interview with Bertram on October 25, Mao rescinded the earlier call for popular elections of the government (as contained in the ten-point programme) on the grounds that conditions for popular elections did not exist under the present national crisis. Instead, he proposed the convocation of a national assembly attended by delegates from the various anti-Japanese political parties which would then elect the government. It should be noted, however, that Mao added that this proposal had to be approved by Chiang Kai-shek himself.
While Mao was apparently compromising his political stand in the face of opposition from various quarters, his military tactics also seem to have met with resistance from commanders at the front. Towards the end of September, Lin Piao, probably with the approval of P'eng Teh-huai, led a division of the Eighth Route Army into a surprise attack on a crack Japanese unit at P'inghsingkuan. The battle was definitely a case of mobile warfare, employing all the advantages of ambush and superior concentration of force. It was a notable victory, won at the expense of heavy casualties owing to the superior armament of the enemy and the tenacity of the Japanese soldiers. The battle was immediately given wide publicity in the Communist press as a glorious example of Communist resistance against Japan; but it appears that the Communist leaders themselves had mixed feeling towards the outcome of the battle. One group of leaders, including P'eng Teh-huai, Chu Teh and Yeh Chien-ying, advocated that the experience of P'inghsingkuan had proven the applicability of mobile warfare. Another group of leaders, including Mao and Lin Piao, cautioned against further application of mobile warfare on the grounds that "the enemy soldiers have enormous fighting ability" and consequently the sacrifices in these kinds of battle would be too great. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, after the battle Mao immediately wired to the front advising against further large-scale battles of a similar nature.

In early November, both Taiyuan and Shanghai fell to the Japanese, thus confirming Mao's views that the Nationalist troops were incapable of defending their positions. At the same time, frictions developed between the CCP and KMT Party branches in Shensi as well as in the New Fourth Army regions in Central China. (In the latter, a group of over one thousand Communist guerrillas were surrounded by local Nationalist troops, and all their weapons were confiscated.) Convinced that his own estimate of the situation and of the KMT was correct, Mao attempted to re-assert his line in a conference of Party activists in Yenan on November 12, 1937. In his speech, Mao declared that the Nationalist Government was incapable of leading the war beyond a partial basis and that it would not involve the masses in the Resistance. "If Communists forget these differences in principle" between the CCP and the KMT, he warned, "they will incorrectly guide the War of Resistance [and] ... debase themselves to the ... level of the KMT". "The chief danger in the Party", he claimed, "was no longer leftist closed-doorism but rightist opportunism", and he pointedly posed the following questions:
Will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie in the united front, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the KMT draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the KMT?

Mao asserted that "we must closely adhere to the principle of independence and initiative in our own hands" and secure the leadership in the Resistance in order to win final victory. He maintained that there were three blocs of participants in the united front: the left wing composed of the communist-led masses, the intermediate section of national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and the right wing of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. The task of the Party, accordingly, was to "expand and consolidate the left, help the intermediate to move forward and change its stand, and combat the tendency of capitulation from the right". Mao concluded his speech by saying that "class capitulation is actually the reserve force of national capitulation", and warned against any tendency to compromise with the right-wing group.

Thus, Mao categorically espoused the principles of "proletarian leadership" in the War of Resistance and the struggle against the right-wing elements in the united front. This did not mean, however, that Mao advocated the abandonment of the united front, as he also stated that "no views disruptive of the KMT-CCP alliance will be tolerated". It is extremely unlikely that at this stage Mao regarded Chiang Kai-shek as being in the right-wing group since Ch'in Pang-hsien had earlier identified Chiang as leader of the centre bloc and Mao himself had repeatedly called upon Chiang to adopt reforms and move forward to strengthen China's resistance. What Mao was advocating, therefore, was an independent course of action without fear of antagonizing the extreme reactionary elements in the KMT. Although Mao remained positive with regard to the alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, his line was radical enough to invite opposition from other CCP leaders. According to the editors of Mao's Selected Works, his statement met with strong objection from the "rightists" in the Party, which probably accounts for the fact that it did not appear in any published form at the time. We do not know whether Mao's speech was communicated to Moscow. (If it was, then it must have caused a momentus consternation amongst the Moscow leaders.) In any case, Ch'en Shao-yu was dispatched back to China to supervise the operation of the Anti-Japanese United Front.
The Return of Ch'en Shao-yü

On November 29, Ch'en Shao-yü, accompanied by Ch'en Yün, K'ang Sheng and Tseng Shan, returned to Yenan by plane via Sinkiang. He was given an effusive welcome by over a hundred leading members of the CCP. At the reception, Mao was reported to have likened his arrival to "a blessing from heaven" and praised him for having initiated the August First Declaration which had brought about the Party's achievement of the Anti-Japanese United Front. To mark the occasion, there were banners and placards in the street to welcome his return. News of Ch'en's return were soon transmitted to the front; at the headquarters of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, Ho Lung announced excitedly to his visitor Bertram of the return of Ch'en Shao-yü, whom Bertram understood as the CCP's delegate to Moscow, "long-regarded as one of the best theorists among the Chinese Communists".

Ch'en Shao-yü returned to China with specific instructions from Stalin. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'en disclosed to other Party leaders that prior to his return, he had a personal interview with Stalin, who indicated that the CCP should henceforth act on its own according to the concrete situation in China and could disregard former Comintern instructions regarding the question of leadership in the united front and independent development of the Party. The task facing the CCP, according to Stalin, was both arduous and trying, but he expressed confidence in the CCP's ability to surmount the difficulties. Otto Braun, in the confidence of Ch'in Pang-hsien, claims that Stalin considered a broad united front as essential for the victory of the Chinese resistance and that it was the duty of the "Marxists" (i.e., loyal followers of the Comintern) to help overcome the sectarian insistence on struggling for leadership vis-à-vis the KMT.

It is clear that Stalin desired a solid alliance between the CCP and the KMT to forestall Japan's advance on the eastern flank of the Soviet Union. Following the conclusion of the Non-Agression Pact with the Nationalist Government on 22 August, Stalin conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek's representative Chang Ch'ung that the Soviet Union would firmly support China's resistance. In the next few years, the Soviet Union extended huge amounts of financial and military support to the Nationalist Government. The fact that none of the war supplies were forwarded directly to the CCP has often been construed as evidence that Stalin had forsaken the
CCP. It should be noted, however, that direct supply of military equipment to the CCP would have immediately aroused opposition to the Soviet Union from many quarters (including the Western Powers). Already anti-Communist elements had been charging the Soviet Union with conspiracy to "sovietize" China, which accounted for the repeated emphasis of CCP leaders and Communist sympathizers that the CCP had received no direct material aid from Moscow; any direct military aid to the CCP, in the words of Agnes Smedley, "would split China wide open". According to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, governor of Sinkiang, the Soviet Union did forward small quantities of supplies to the CCP through a clandestine line of communication via Sinkiang. Sheng also understood from Stalin that "during the war and after the victory, the Nationalists will be materially superior to the Communists but victory of the Chinese Communists is ultimately almost a certainty".

Acting under Stalin's instructions, Ch'en Shao-yü made a fateful decision on relinquishing the struggle for leadership in the united front. Part of the reason for supporting Stalin's position may be attributed to his Marxist internationalist stand, i.e., the idea that the Chinese revolution was a part of the world revolution and the security of the Motherland of socialism was essential for the success of the revolutions elsewhere. He was probably also convinced that a consolidated united front was the prerequisite for a successful defence of the Chinese nation. Yet his strongest motive in attempting to achieve cordial relations with the KMT, I believe, was to secure legal channels through which the Party could expand its influence among the masses and accumulate strength. It should be recalled that Stalin, in his earlier treatise *The Foundations of Leninism*, made a distinction between the "strategic leadership" and the "tactical leadership", and defined the latter as subordinated to the former, to be employed at a time of revolutionary "low-tide". The aim was to enable the Communist Party to utilize "forms of struggle and organization" that would educate and mobilize the masses, so as to gain time and accumulate strength before assuming the offensive again. These tactics had been applied briefly in the period of the Wuhan Government following the split with Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927, when the Comintern recommended the retention of the "hegemony" of the proletariat but conceded that the proletariat was not to insist on the sole "leadership" of the revolution. Ch'en Shao-yü probably thought that under his correct guidance the CCP could apply successfully the same tactics.
Prior to his return, Ch'en Shao-yü had rationalized closer cooperation with the KMT in an article published in November 1937 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He expressed general satisfaction with the fact that the KMT had begun to make noticeable progress since the beginning of the war, such as the transformation of the Nationalist Government into an all-China government with other parties recognizing its leadership in the Resistance, the subordination of all local military units to the Central Command, and the release of political prisoners (e.g., the "Seven Gentlemen" were released in late July following the revision of the National Security Law by the Nanking Government) as well as the granting of legal status to the CCP and other national salvation bodies (e.g., in November 1937 a National Salvation Youth Corps was established in Wuhan). Finally, he observed that excepting pro-Japanese and reactionary elements, a considerable number of commanders and soldiers in the Nationalist Army had realized the importance of drawing the masses into the national defence.

After his return, he attempted to justify a policy of active cooperation with the KMT in his report to the Politburo Conference held from 9 to 13 December. In the published version of his report, Ch'en claimed that initial military setbacks were inevitable in view of China's military and economic weaknesses, the lack of unity between the army and people, as well as inadequate mass mobilization. However, the most critical problem that confronted China was not the military setback, but the "vacillations within the united front,... inclinations towards disunity and mutual complaints and friction" which weakened China's strength to resist. To overcome these difficulties, Ch'en called for the following understanding of the united front: firstly, "Resist Japan is above everything and everything must be subordinated to resistance against Japan; everything is subordinated to the united front and everything must be channelled through the united front". Under these principles, the leading role of the Nationalist Government was to be recognized, and its leadership was not to be contested while cooperation was to be based on the principles of "joint programme, joint responsibility, mutual discussion and mutual assistance". Secondly, the Nationalist Government was to be strengthened, without need of reorganizations, through the adoption of political reforms at the upper levels and the achieving of unity with the masses at the lower levels. The struggle for the improvement of the livelihood of the people and for democratic rights was not to impede the development of the united front. Thirdly, a united anti-Japanese army was to be formed on the basis of the existing
forces which were to be brought together under the principles of "unified command, unified armament, unified discipline, unified supplies and unified operations". Fourthly, the mobilization and organization of the millions of masses into the united front was to be achieved through legislation and the opening up of mass activities. 41

It is clear that Ch'en Shao-yü's proposals were an implicit criticism of Mao's mistrust of the KMT and emphasis on the struggle for leadership expressed after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan. Curiously, Mao, according to both Chang Kuo-t'ao and Otto Braun, voted in favour of Ch'en's report along with other leaders. 42 There are three possible explanations of Mao's behaviour. Firstly, as Ch'en's opinion implied the wishes of Stalin, any dissenting vote would amount to an open defiance of the authority of Stalin, and Mao did not wish to assume such a stand. Secondly, as Ch'en's views received the support of other Party leaders, Mao would find himself isolated if he acted otherwise. Thirdly, there was at the time a danger of compromise between the Nationalist Government and Japan, as Chiang Kai-shek had indicated his approval of the peace mediation efforts from the office of the German ambassador, O.P. Trautmann. 43 Although a total capitulation on the part of Chiang was unlikely, a swing to the left on the part of the CCP might encourage the KMT to accept moderate terms offered by Japan, and this would mean that the CCP would be confronted with the forces of both the KMT and Japan. Under such circumstances, Ch'en's call for conciliation appeared a sensible and expedient approach, and Mao thereby gave his support to Ch'en.

To Otto Braun's knowledge, Stalin had instructed Ch'en Shao-yü to establish a collective leadership in the Party without directly attacking Mao's authority. 44 This agrees with Kuo Hau-lun's informant who states that Ch'en conveyed the message that Mao's candidacy as leader of the Party had been confirmed by Stalin because he had proven his mettle in the revolution. Yet Stalin was of the opinion that Mao's ignorance of Marxism-Leninism and his narrow empiricist approach to solving problems were handicaps which were to be overcome with the help of Russian-trained leaders. In addition, Stalin thought that the intraparty struggle against Chang Kuo-t'ao during the Long March had been excessive; and Chang Wen-t'ien was considered no longer suitable as Secretary-General because of his previous connection with a Trotskyite party cell in Moscow although he himself was not implicated. 45 This is also consistent
with Chang Kuo-t'ao's account that Ch'en Shao-yü "arbitrarily" drew up a list of sixteen Politburo members and alternates, with Mao at the top, himself second, followed by Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t'ao and others, whilst Chang Wen-t'ien was demoted to the seventh position. In addition, Ch'en Yünn and K'ang Sheng were added to the list.  

While conceding to Mao's leadership position, Ch'en obviously hoped to balance Mao's predominating influence by stressing the principle of collective leadership and strengthening the presence of Russian-trained leaders in the Politburo. The retention of Chang Kuo-t'ao in an important position and the demotion of Chang Wen-t'ien—the position of Secretary-General was also abolished at the Politburo meeting—were probably calculated moves to weaken Mao's influence, especially when Chang Wen-t'ien had been moving closer to Mao since the Tsunyi Conference. (Nevertheless, Ch'en apparently did not court Chang Kuo-t'ao's support against Mao; privately, he reproved Chang for having fallen under the influence of Trotskyite subordinates during the Long March.  

By transmitting Stalin's opinion of Mao's ideological weaknesses, Ch'en apparently aimed at securing the unique and important position of the upholder of the correct ideological line. Thus, both organizationally and ideologically, Ch'en attempted to constrain Mao's authority. It is only logical that Mao was both resentful and apprehensive of Ch'en's actions. We can assume that a clandestine struggle commenced between the two leaders, both for power and for dominance in the determination of policy. To succeed, Mao also had to cultivate his own image as a Marxist-Leninist theoretician.

At the Politburo Conference, a number of important changes were made in the central and regional organs, presumably on the recommendation of Ch'en Shao-yü: (1) the reorganization of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (which probably assumed the function of the Politburo's Standing Committee) comprised of Mao, Ch'en Shao-yü, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Chang Wen-t'ien, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Ch'en Yünn, and K'ang Sheng; (2) the subordination to the Secretariat of the following departments under the respective directors: Li Fu-ch'un (shortly afterwards replaced by Ch'en Yünn) of the Organizational Department, Ho K'o-ch'üan of the Propaganda Department, Liu Shao-ch'i of the Cadre Training Department, Chou En-lai of the United Front Department, K'ang Sheng of the Political Security Department, and Mao (chairman) of the Central Military Committee; (3) the reorganization of the Northern Bureau with
Yang Shang-k'un as secretary (replacing Liu Shao-ch'i) and Chu Jui (an associate of the RRS) as director of the organizational department; (4) the creation of the Central Yangtze Bureau at Hankow to direct party work in Central China, with Ch'en Shao-yü as secretary, Ch'in Pang-hsien as director of the organizational department and Yeh Chien-ying as director of the military department; (5) the establishment of a Central Sub-bureau of Southeast China at Nanchang to direct the New Fourth Army, with Hsiang Ying as secretary, Tseng Shan as director of the military department; (6) the dispatch of a CCP delegation to Wuhan, the new Nationalist capital, headed by Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai, to function as a liaison office with the KMT; (7) the founding of a new paper Hsin-hua jih-pao (New China Daily) at Hankow to propagate the Party's aims and policies; (8) the appointment of a twenty-five-man committee, with Mao as chairman and Ch'en Shao-yü as secretary, to direct preparations for the Party's Seventh National Congress scheduled to be held within the shortest possible time.

In reshuffling the Central and regional Party leadership, Ch'en Shao-yü apparently won for himself a dominant position in the Party. In the Politburo, he appeared to command the majority of votes; in the regional bureaus, power was allocated entirely to people whose loyalty clearly resided with the Comintern. (The replacement of Liu Shao-ch'i by Yang Shang-k'un is an obvious example, while Hsiang Ying had since the earlier period closely allied himself with the RRS.) To all intents and purposes, Ch'en was aiming at securing control of all the front organizations which came into direct contact with the KMT authorities so as to put his united front orientation into full-swing. In so doing, he made the mistake of diffusing his influence too broadly, leaving Mao in complete control at the centre through which he could consolidate his position by cultivating the support of Party activists and senior cadres, especially of the Eighth Route Army. Ch'en's own absence from Yanan also meant that his followers or potential followers were left without stable and firm leadership, a vacuum which Mao could easily exploit by converting them to his side. (Both Ch'en Yün and K'ang Sheng, for example, later became firm Maoist supporters.) Furthermore, Mao was able to utilize his position at the centre to postpone the convocation of the Seventh National Congress which, if convened at this stage, would probably be dominated by Ch'en Shao-yü, whose policies would also be sanctioned as the Party line. Thus, although organizationally Ch'en seemed
to have outmanoeuvered Mao, his victory was built on a shaky foundation and proved only ephemeral.

Ch'en Shao-yü's return also brought forth an intensified attack on the Trotskyites. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao had earlier displaced a willingness to accept the re-entry to the Party of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, whom the KMT had released from prison in September 1937, on condition that he and other associates publicly confessed their errors, renounced their affiliation with the Trotskyite group, and sincerely supported the Anti-Japanese United Front. (The harshness of these conditions precluded a willingness on the part of Mao to reconcile with active Trotskyites: in October 1937 he had denounced the Trotskyites as Japanese spies and agents.) When the subject was brought up for discussion at the Politburo Conference, however, Ch'en Shao-yü vehemently opposed any dealings with Ch'en Tu-hsiu on the grounds that, first, Stalin would not countenance such a move and, second, Trotskyism, unlike the ideology of the bourgeoisie which had nothing in common with communism, would easily corrupt the ideology of the CCP and its organization. Ch'en's opinion prevailed, and the CCP renewed its attacks on Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Trotskyites.

Having gained the Politburo's support for his policy of sincere cooperation with the KMT, Ch'en Shao-yü, together with Chou En-lai and Ch'in Pang-hsien, set out for Hankow on a diplomatic mission to promote better relation between the two parties. Shortly after his arrival at Hankow, he and Chou En-lai were received by Chiang Kai-shek, to whom they probably pledged the CCP's sincere support for the Nationalist Government. Nevertheless, in spite of his avowed intention to bring about closer collaboration between the two parties, Ch'en did not neglect to say in his interview with Belden on December 25:

The CCP's principal task at the present stage is to resist Japan and save the nation; this is why we are implementing the policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front. But this does not mean that we are giving up communism; we are Marxist disciples and we do not seek to hide the fact that our final goal is communism. We know, however, that communism cannot be achieved overnight .... It is necessary to go through certain transitional historical stages before it can be realized.
Ch'en admitted that the CCP was generally satisfied with the progress of the Government's war effort, but stated that further political and administrative reforms were necessary. He denied that the CCP wished to participate in the National Government, "not only because the Nationalist Government had not invited the CCP to do so, but also because the international and domestic situations have not yet matured to that stage".\(^{53}\) (Ch'en's reluctance was probably based on his understanding of Lenin's \textbf{postulate} that Communists would only participate in a bourgeois-reformist government if they were allowed "complete freedom" of agitation.\(^{54}\) Finally, Ch'en stressed the "independent existence and development of the CCP" as necessary conditions for the victory of the Anti-Japanese War and that any attempt to dissolve the Party would be contrary to the wishes and interests of the working class and the people of the whole nation.\(^{55}\)

On December 27, Ch'en published his article "The Key to the Salvation of the Nation" which has often been cited as a classic example of Ch'en's "capitulationism" to the KMT. While the statement undoubtedly manifested a very conciliatory posture towards the KMT, I do not think, however, that it was a one-sided offer of concessions from the CCP. The purpose of his treatise, as stated at the beginning, was to rectify the "incorrect understanding" among members of both parties towards the Anti-Japanese United Front so that they could adopt the proper attitude.

In his article, Ch'en stated that the proper distinction between "friends and enemies" should be "all those who are anti-Japanese are our friends, and all those who capitulate to Japan are our enemies". (In this, he repudiated Mao's three-blocs formula since until the right-wing elements actually turned traitor they should still be regarded as "friends" of the united front.) Since "to weaken a friendly party is equal to ... aiding the enemy", both parties should assist each other to develop and expand. To disclaim the view that the CCP's united front policy was merely a "tactical manoeuvre", he stated that the CCP's new policy was a fundamental change in strategy which entailed long-term cooperation with the "best elements" of the KMT and the "true disciples" of Sun Yat-sen for national reconstruction after the war. He described as slanderous the accusation that the Communists "will establish soviets everywhere after the war", since the CCP's aim was to establish a democratic republic composed of all forces that had participated in the Anti-Japanese War. Should the KMT leaders persevere in leading the war, they would become "national heroes"; likewise, the CCP would become one of the important
parties "beloved by the people", so that no one would dare to overthrow either party and the two parties would cooperate even after the war. Finally, Ch'en called for broadening the scope of the united front to include other parties and organizations and for mobilization of the masses to consolidate the united front. This article was greeted by a national salvationist as the most "thorough exposition" on how to consolidate national unity for the Resistance.

In accounting for Ch'en Shao-yü's conciliatory posture, it should be realized that Ch'en was subject to two kinds of pressure in Hankow. On the one hand, the sense of national crisis was such that all national salvation bodies and political and literary figures were pressing for national solidarity and genuine cooperation between the two parties. Under such circumstances, the CCP would be unwise to make any statement pertaining to factional interests. On the other hand, the Nationalist authorities were still enforcing a stringent press censorship which prohibited the circulation of Communist publication on the slightest pretext. (Several of Ch'en's earlier articles were also blacklisted, which accounted for the fact that Ch'en had to revise his writings for publication.) In order that the CCP could disseminate its ideas, it was necessary to write with restraint and avoid provocation. This explained why not only Ch'en, but all CCP leaders (including Mao), assumed similar conciliatory tone in calling for closer KMT-CCP collaboration.

Along with the call for closer collaboration, all the statements and articles from the CCP, without exception, emphasized that the KMT had to expand mobilization of the masses to consolidate the united front and support the war. It appears that the CCP, with Ch'en Shao-yü in the leading role, was trying to instill and inculcate a spirit of mutual collaboration that would prevail upon the KMT functionaries, so that they would cease opposing the CCP's activities in organizing the masses. This was made explicit in an open letter addressed to KMT members issued by the Central Committee in late January 1938. The statement reiterated the CCP's understanding of the proper attitude towards the united front along lines suggested by Ch'en Shao-yü. It offered a self-criticism by saying that there were "leftist elements" among the CCP rank-and-file who failed to see the necessity for sincere cooperation with the KMT, but stated that the Party was doing its best to overcome such tendencies. In return, it called upon the radical elements in the KMT, who opposed the
development of mass movements out of fear of communism to rectify their incorrect inclinations and stop suppressing the Communist activities.61

Following the termination of the Trautmann mediation in January 1938, Chiang Kai-shek's determination to carry on the Resistance became evident. In the same month, Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai went to Loyang to confer on war strategy with Chiang Kai-shek, who was then on an inspection tour of the northern front. In Shansi, Yen Hsi-shan also entered into active cooperation with the Communists against Japan and released a number of political prisoners, such as Wang Jo-fei. On January 9, *Hsin-hua jih-pao* began publication in Hankow with the authorization of the Nationalist Government. (According to a non-Communist source, it received financial aid from the Government.62) At its inauguration, Ch'en Shao-yü was reported by Israel Epstein to have said:

The national United Front of the Chinese people already exists. It would be false to deny that some friction between the various groups forming it also continues to exist [*stc*]. By frank discussion, our newspaper will help to remove misunderstandings and to strengthen the unity of all parties.

As Epstein observes, the establishment of the *Hsin-hua jih-pao* was an event of great importance, for it allowed the Communists for the first time in many years the opportunity to voice its opinion in KMT areas.63 On January 30, Chiang Kai-shek further approved the formation of another Communist base, the Chin-Ch'a-Chi (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei) Border Region Government. On February 1, Chou En-lai was formally appointed deputy director of the Political Department of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government, with Kuo Mo-jo placed in charge of its propaganda section. (According to Kuo Mo-jo's own recollections written in 1948, he was at first reluctant to take up the position but was prevailed upon by Ch'en Shao-yü and Chou En-lai on the grounds that it would help the CCP to propagate its programme; Ch'en specifically told him that the Communists were not seeking "official posts", but only "opportunities to work [through the Government]".64) These developments probably convinced Ch'en Shao-yü that his conciliatory policy had begun to bear results.
In a speech delivered at Wuhan University sometime in early 1938, Ch'en exhibited a more outspoken attitude in favour of closer collaboration. He claimed that all doubts on the KMT's determination to resist Japan had proven incorrect. In the united front, he asserted, priority should be given to resistance against Japan, and it would be wrong to insist on the implementation for democracy and the improvement of people's livelihood as a prerequisite of the united front. This did not mean that democracy and people's livelihood were not important issues; but they should be subordinated to the united front though improvement should be sought during the course of the War of Resistance. The opening up of legal activities, Ch'en claimed, were clear indications that the greater the unity in resistance was attained, the broader democratic freedom for the masses would be realized. In addition, Ch'en attacked the view that guerrilla warfare was the "panacea" for China's military problems. The defence of the country depended on the regular armies, and guerrilla activities could not have a decisive effect on the war unless they were coordinated with regular warfare. All these, there is little doubt, were an indirect attack on Mao's orientation of the united front.

Yet surprisingly, Mao more or less toed the line of Ch'en Shao-yi. Apart from the fact that he was in the minority and had to follow the decisions reached by the Politburo (i.e., as required by the principle of "democratic centralism" operating in the Party), Mao also found it necessary to appeal to the public sentiments in the country. Furthermore, he had to refute the fervent critics of the CCP who had since late 1937 denounced the CCP's united front policy as a subversive tactics to undermine the KMT. In particular, Jen Tso-hsuan demanded the CCP dissolve itself and abandon communism in order to demonstrate its sincerity in supporting the Government, and argued that the KMT had a perfect right to maintain a one-party dictatorship. In three separate interviews given in February and April 1938, Mao offered the following views on the united front.
The KMT's one-party dictatorship, Mao asserted, was permissible if it meant that the KMT was the only party in the nation holding supreme political power; but if it meant that other parties could not enjoy legal status it would be erroneous since experience had shown it could only lead to disunity and civil war in the country. The KMT would also be wrong if it refused to adopt appropriate democratic reforms for the purpose of "concentrating the talents in the country in order to resist Japan". This did not mean, however, that the CCP wished to participate in the Government, and Mao cited Ch'en Shao-yü for having "frankly and sincerely" expressed the CCP's stand on the issue. The CCP, unlike the Trotskyites, harboured no intention of overthrowing the KMT; on the contrary, it would sincerely and earnestly cooperate with it not only for the Anti-Japanese War but also for national reconstruction after the war. Communism had nothing incompatible with the aims of the Three People's Principles; on the contrary, the two ideologies were "good friends" and Communists could support wholeheartedly the Three People's Principles without having to give up communism. Nevertheless, the CCP naturally had different views from the KMT concerning certain problems, but in resolving these conflicts the CCP would not resort to the "use of arms" but would confine itself to "friendly criticism". This was because the CCP and the KMT should not attempt to weaken each other, since they were "partners". In the end, both parties would become so strong that after victory neither side would want to engage in civil war and would cooperate with each other.

On the question of military strategy, Mao also conceded (superficially) to Ch'en Shao-yü by stating that "we do not advocate only guerrilla warfare, but a combination of mobile, positional and guerrilla warfare, with mobile warfare as the principal form of combat, and the other two as subsidiary". He added, however, that "guerrilla warfare, in semi-colonial countries, especially in countries with a vast geographical extent, occupies a position of strategic importance in the prosecution of a national war". This hypothesis was later developed and expounded in his treatise "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan", the significance of which will be discussed below.
Ch'en Shao-yü's principles of the united front were also observed in the Communist base-areas. According to a Communist account, in February 1938 P'eng Chen, a leading member of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region Government, transmitted the decisions of the December (1937) Politburo Conference as guidelines for administration in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base. More conspicuously, Liu Shao-ch'i published an article on February 5 which substantially revised his earlier one published on October 16 (1937) dealing with the problem of Party policies in North China. A comparison of these two articles show that while the earlier one adhered basically to the spirit of the Loch'uan Conference, the latter tallied closely to that of the December (1937) Politburo conference. For instance, whereas previously Liu had called for the establishment of anti-Japanese guerrilla units and organizations "under the leadership of the Central Government", he now urged their immediate registration with the local Nationalist authorities and acceptance of their direction. Again, while earlier he had stated that local governments should promulgate their own laws and orders to suit local conditions, he now stressed that all local administration should conform to the Central administrative system and report all variations to superior authorities. Finally, while he formerly called for the improvement of people's livelihood by enforcing maximum rent reduction, shortening work-hours, increasing wages, and protecting "permanent tenancy" (yung-t'ien-ch' t'lan), he now announced that these measures "could not be strictly implemented at present". (Both P'eng Chen and Liu Shao-ch'i were attacked during the Cultural Revolution for having following Ch'en Shao-yü's line on the basis of this evidence.)

Having achieved initial successes in promoting the two-party cooperation, Ch'en Shao-yü returned to Yenan to attend (convene?) another Politburo conference in early March 1938. The conference clearly endorsed his line on the united front, and Ch'en was able to claim, in his summary of the deliberations, that the CCP had unanimously agreed on the following: 1. in the three months following the last Politburo conference, significant political and military achievement had been made in the nation, although progress was far from adequate; 2. on military matters, the CCP would adopt mobile warfare as its main form of combat, but this would be coordinated with positional warfare and assisted by guerrilla activities; 3. on political matters, the CCP would consolidate the united front in the form of a "national revolutionary alliance" either by emulating the First United Front or by adopting other new methods such as a federation
of representatives from various parties, with all parties participating in the union retaining their political and organizational independence; 4. the KMT ought to reform and strengthen its organization by abandoning its one-party dictatorship along the lines suggested by Mao earlier in his interview of February, enlisting the participation of progressive elements in its administration, establishing a national assembly for consulting with other parties and ascertaining public opinion in the nation; 5. the Government ought to directly sponsor an expanded mobilization and organization of the masses according to occupations, and these mass associations ought to register with the Government and operate through legal channels in assisting the war mobilization; 6. in the interest of attaining victory, the CCP ought to strengthen and consolidate itself by expanding its party membership, especially recruiting from the urban proletariat.

On the basis of the resolutions of the Politburo Conference, the CCP Central Committee issued a "Decision of the Rapid Expansion of Party Membership" on March 15, 1938, which decreed that in the interest of the national resistance the Party had to expand its membership and absorb active elements in the Resistance into its rank. This directive, in all probability, was issued at the instigation of Ch'en Shao-yü, who attempted to capitalize on the opportunity of open work to undertake a massive expansion of the Party.

For the time being, Ch'en Shao-yü's approach seemed to have scored notable successes. One example was the communist-led National Liberation Vanguard founded earlier in the aftermath of the December 9 (1935) Incident, which had greatly increased in strength and number following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. On April 1, 1938, it publicly convened its Second National Congress at Sian, and resolved to expand its influence and to attract greater support by means of legal activities. Another example was the Sacrifice League (i.e., Hsi-sheng chiu-kuo t'ung-men-hui, the League for National Salvation through Sacrifice) in Shansi founded by Po I-po in September 1936. Working covertly under the direction of the CCP's North China Bureau, Po outwardly worked under Yen Hsi-shan. Towards the end of 1937, the League greatly expanded and organized a sizeable military force known as the "Dare-to-Die Corps" (Chüeh-szu tuü) which was secretly controlled by the Communists. In early 1938 Po I-po also secured control over the local administration in southeast Shansi on the pretext of assisting
The successes which the Communists enjoyed through authorized activities in the name of resistance in North China prompted Liu Shao-ch'i to voice strong support for Ch'en Shao-yü's line in a speech delivered at K'ang-ta in late March 1938. In summing up the party work in North China, Liu called for the minimization of conflicts in the united front, resolute support for the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan in the Resistance, unity in military command and operation, subordination of the improvement of people's livelihood to the Resistance, winning over of reactionary landlords and "unwilling" collaborators of the Japanese, and avoidance of a mechanical application of the theory of "unity and contradiction" in united front work.

(Whether this last point was an implicit criticism of Mao, who had earlier delivered a series of lectures at K'ang-ta entitled "Dialectical Materialism", is open to speculation.)

Thus, in the several months following his return to China, Ch'en Shao-yü's line gained ascendancy in the Party. His propositions on the united front were adopted in numerous internal party tracts as the cornerstone of the Party's policy. Indeed, if the two slogans "Everything Subordinates to the United Front" and "Everything Through the United Front" can be taken as representing the basic spirit of Ch'en's overall orientation of the united front, then they were visible everywhere: they appeared at the southern gate leading to Yenan, at K'ang-ta, in the CCP's theoretical treatise on the united front, in internal directives on mass mobilization work, in textbooks in the schools operated in the Communist base areas, and were adopted by pro-Communist elements in both Manchuria and Sinkiang.

Notwithstanding Ch'en Shao-yü's conciliatory posture towards the KMT, Chang Kuo-t'ao remained disillusioned with the CCP's policy. In April 1938, he defected to the KMT and published an open confession to the nation in which he disclosed Mao's insistence on "struggle for leadership" with the KMT, which he considered harmful to the national interests and contrary to the spirit of the united front. At the same time, he also denounced the principles of "joint leadership and joint development" (which everyone understood to be Ch'en Shao-yü's formula) as concealing the Party's secret intention to advance its narrow partisan interests. It is clear that neither Mao's nor Ch'en's orientation of the united front satisfied Chang Kuo-t'ao's demand for genuine cooperation with the KMT. The CCP immediately
expelled Chang from the Party and denounced him as a "consistent opportunist" who sought to undermine the united front and "separate the Party's interests from the national interests". The Comintern firmly endorsed this decision in a resolution of July 1938 and unreservedly approved the political line of the CCP.

For his part in championing national unity and cooperation against Japan, Ch'en Shao-yü apparently became an extremely popular figure both inside and outside the Party. According to Ssu-ma Lu, Ch'en was a highly respected leader among the younger members of the Party because of his prominent position in the Comintern despite his young age (33), his leading role in championing the united front, and his eloquence and urbaneity. Having attended several public meetings addressed by Ch'en, he was also impressed with his modesty - when Ch'en was praised by other leaders, such as K'ang Sheng and Lin Piao, as "a leader not only of the CCP but also of the world revolutionary movement", Ch'en always replied by saying that he was just an ordinary Party member. Ch'en's popularity with the younger generation of Party members is also confirmed by another ex-Communist account written in 1947.

More importantly, Ch'en Shao-yü's leading role in the formulation of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy was generally recognized as his greatest theoretical contribution. Hatano Ken'ichi in 1937 described Ch'en as "the highest authority on the theory of the Anti-Japanese Movement" and the "commander-in-chief of the Anti-Japanese front". Another Japanese biographical account written in the same year also recorded that Ch'en was the "highest theoretician of the CCP", whose writings "attract huge followings among the Chinese youths and assert a strong influence on the development of the people's front". "It would not be an exaggeration to say", its author continued, "that [Ch'en] provided the theoretical foundation of the Anti-Japanese United Front] in China". A Chinese biographical account written by a non-Communist in 1938 saluted Ch'en as a "statesman of genius". Above all, the postscript of an edition of the collected works of Ch'en published in 1938 - the same editor also compiled a collection of Mao's writings - read:
Mr. Ch'en is a most talented leader of the CCP and a member of the Presidium of the Comintern .... His writings provide us with answers to many difficult problems confronting us ... in the struggle for victory in the national liberation.

In Hankow, Ch'en actively engaged in giving speeches and addressing public meetings to propagate his ideas on the Anti-Japanese United Front. He seemed to have projected such a favourable image on people outside the Party that Wang Chien-min, who had lived through the experience of the time, recounts that Ch'en stood out conspicuously amongst national salvationists and had acquired a reputation as a conscientious patriot. Even Carlson, the United States military observer, who met Ch'en in Hankow, was impressed by Ch'en as "essentially a theoretician", having "a pleasing and disarming manner" and being "exceptionally articulate".

The Problem of Military Strategy and the Defence of Wuhan

On March 29, 1938, the Nationalist Government convened an extraordinary National Congress at Wuchang which adopted a "Programme for National Resistance and National Reconstruction" stating the KMT's policies and objectives in the War of Resistance. In response, the Hsin-hua jih-pao published several articles in early April declaring its basic support for the Programme while noting that the Government should make further efforts to improve the livelihood of the masses and implement democracy. Simultaneously, Chieh-fang (Liberation) of Yenan gave a much more critical assessment of the KMT's Programme, stating that it had fallen short of the ten-point programme of the CCP. (This review was probably written by Mao, and there is indication that Ch'en Shao-yü declined to publish it in Hankow.) Ch'en's conciliatory posture seemed to pay off. In reaction to Yenan's cool response, Chang Kuo-t'ao in April publicly denounced the CCP for its lack of sincerity in supporting the Government's Programme. In response, Ch'en Shao-yü, Chou En-lai and Ch'in Pang-hsien were able to declare in an open letter that the Hsin-hua jih-pao, official external organ of the CCP, had already given its support to the KMT's Programme. (Subsequently, in July 1938, Mao also acknowledged the KMT's Programme as the common programme for all parties.)
In spite of Ch'en Shao-yü's efforts in winning over the KMT's good-will, signs of discord between the two parties were perceptible. Apart from the press censorship, Nationalist authorities in February and June outlawed Communist-led mass movements in Sian and Hunan respectively. In response, *Hsìn-hua jih-pao* protested to no avail. In April, Nationalist authorities revealed to the public Lin Yü-ying's "On the Tactical Line of the Party" which, together with Chang Kuo-t'ao's open letter, caused great embarrassment to the CCP. Immediately, both Trotskyites and pro-Nationalist writers, such as Jen Tso-hsüan, intensified their attacks on the CCP. To demolish their respective arguments that the CCP had abandoned the proletariat dictatorship or was aiming at the overthrow of the Nationalist Government, Ch'en Shao-yü led another campaign to clarify and reaffirm the Party's stand on the united front.

In his article of late April 1938, Ch'in Pang-hsien enunciated the Communists' support for the bourgeoisie in the national revolutionary struggle. Citing Lenin to support his arguments, Ch'in pointed out that in countries oppressed by feudalism and imperialism (as opposed to capitalist countries) the bourgeois national revolution was a progressive movement. Therefore, the Communists would positively support the struggle for national independence, although they were at the same time internationalists and fighters for socialism. This explanation was elaborated by Ch'en Shao-yü in an article written on June 15 in anticipation of the seventeenth anniversary of the CCP. Ch'en affirmed that in spite of the CCP's ultimate objective of achieving communism, the struggle against imperialism was the primary task of the Party at the present stage because of Japan's threat to China's independence. This was because Communists, he claimed, "do not decide their strategy and tactics from their subjective point of view but according to the special national characteristics and the concrete political class relationships in the country". In the past, the CCP had launched the land revolution against both imperialism and feudalism because the bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution and allied themselves with foreign imperialists. At present, however, it firmly supported the Anti-Japanese United Front and allied with other classes against the external enemy.
From both Yenan and the New Fourth Army base, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Po-ta, Lin Po-ch'ü and Hsiang Ying propounded similar themes on the occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the CCP. (It is worth noting that in explaining the CCP's support for the united front policy, Chang Wen-t'ien also stated that "Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma but a guide for action", and that Communists took into consideration the national characteristics of each country and the concrete conditions at each stage of development in deciding their policies. At the CCP's Sixth Plenum shortly afterwards, Mao further expounded on this axiom. To contemporaries, therefore, it was unlikely that they would perceive any difference in the CCP leadership.) On June 24, the CCP Central Committee issued a Propaganda Outline which declared that the CCP was the "Marxist-Leninist Party of the Chinese people". Its mission was to achieve the "liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people" and the ultimate realization of communism. At the present stage in this struggle, the primary task of the Party was to establish a democratic republic based on national independence, democratic liberty and people's welfare. In the past seventeen years of its development, the CCP had been pursuing these goals, and its policy had proven correct. The Party, it declared, would "stand firm in the Anti-Japanese United Front, steadfastly maintain its political and organizational independence, expand and reinforce its forces" as these were the best guarantees for the final liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people. It is clear that the CCP's propaganda was aimed at discrediting both the Trotskyite charge that it had betrayed communism as well as the accusation from its critics that it did not support the KMT wholeheartedly.

Interestingly, Mao's name was conspicuously absent in the above publication to celebrate the anniversary of the Party. Instead he published his speech entitled "On Protracted War", delivered earlier to the Yenan Study Group on the War of Resistance against Japan (Yen-an K'ang-jih ch'eng yen-chiu hui) in May 1938. According to the recollection of Mao's personal attendant, Mao had spent many days writing up the treatise, and as soon as it was completed he presented it to Chang Wen-t'ien, Liu Shao-ch'i, K'ang Sheng and other Politburo members for comments. Its final publication suggests that Mao had won their support for his views expressed in the article.
In his article, Mao paid homage to the heroic efforts of all parties and classes in the War of Resistance, including the KMT and the bourgeoisie. He affirmed the correctness of the call for the greater development and consolidation of the alliance with the KMT, admitting that "the KMT, judging by its history, its leaders and its majority, would persist in the war". He condemned the view that now that the situation had changed for the better, it was time to create or intensify "friction" between the two parties. He also recognized the progressive role of the capitalist class in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country struggling against imperialistic invasion, claiming that the existence of a bourgeois political party with its strong armed forces was China's advantage over Abyssinia, which had easily fallen under foreign domination. In what appeared to be a direct rebuke of the Chinese Trotskyites' "war-revolution" thesis (i.e., Communists should turn against the ruling class even in a war against external aggression and transform the war into a socialist revolution), he stated that there were two types of wars: the progressive and reactionary, or "righteous" and "non-righteous", and that Communists resolutely supported the former. "In China" he asserted, "from the Government to the people, from the KMT to the CCP ... [all] are participating in an anti-aggression national revolutionary war. Our war is sacred, progressive and righteous". Thus, in line with the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist position, Mao renounced the Trotskyite view to overthrow a bourgeois government in the midst of an anti-imperialist war.

However, Mao's support for the united front was geared towards the construction and development of rural guerrilla base areas as the principal strategy of the Chinese revolution. Mao clearly saw that the Japanese troops, because of their shortage of man-power, could not penetrate and establish effective control in the vast hinterland, and that it was most advisable to concentrate Communist activities on filling the vacuum created by the Japanese in the rural areas. From these base areas, the Communists could harass the enemy, wear down their military strength, and eventually defeat them through a protracted war of attrition. In May 1938, Mao had already defined his strategy in "Problem of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan":
In order to confine the enemy invaders to a few strongholds, that is, to the big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas must do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widely as possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. In "On Protracted War", Mao further expounded the importance of guerrilla warfare. He envisaged a three-stage development of the war: 1. the stage of strategic defence in which the main form of combat would be mobile warfare in coordination with guerrilla and positional warfare; 2. the stage of stalemate in which the main form of combat would be guerrilla warfare in coordination with mobile warfare; 3. the stage of counteroffensive in which the main form of combat would be mobile warfare in coordination with positional and guerrilla warfare. It is clear, however, that the logic implied in Mao's position was that mobile warfare should be reserved largely for the Nationalist troops, while the Communists forces should concentrate on guerrilla warfare. He stated: "with regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary". (In an internal report delivered in November 1938, Mao was even more explicit: "The KMT and the CCP should adopt a policy of division of labour ... with the KMT shouldering responsibility for regular warfare and the CCP shouldering responsibility for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear".

Accordingly, Mao asserted that the tactics of the Eighth Route Army should be based on"guerrilla warfare, but not giving up any chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions". In practice, this meant that the Communist forces should preserve their strength and avoid any large-scale and decisive confrontation with the enemy, even to the extent of abandoning the territory which the enemy wished to take. Mao defended his position by saying:
Are we not afraid of being denounced as 'non-resisters'? No, we are not. Not to fight at all but to compromise with the enemy is non-resistance and should not only be denounced but must never be tolerated .... But in order to avoid the enemy's deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we should not allow our main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it difficult to continue the War of Resistance.

To constrain the anxiety among Communist troops eager to fight the Japanese, Mao dismissed the view that the guerrilla units "should regard their status as lower because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes". Citing a common Chinese saying that "a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a man's heart" as an analogy, he explained that "guerrilla warfare does not bring quick results or great renown as regular warfare", but in the long run it "will demonstrate its immense power". Thus, to Mao, avoidance of frontal combat with the Japanese and conservation of the strength of the Communist forces were not only compatible with but also necessary for the successful prosecution of the War of Resistance.

Apart from harassing and partially destroying the enemy, the basic function of the guerrilla units was, of course, to mobilize the masses. Mao advocated that "out of the millions of China's regular troops, it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse throughout all enemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm themselves and together wage guerrilla warfare". This was because the mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and fulfill the prerequisites for winning the war".

Nevertheless, Mao did not neglect the importance of the Anti-Japanese United Front. In calling for greater attention to guerrilla warfare, Mao also warned that "without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail". Specifically, he explained:
War is the continuation of politics .... The Anti-Japanese War is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the political aim of the war - to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality - [and] inseparable from ... the effective application of united front policy .... Any tendency among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittle politics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea that 'war is everything' is wrong and should be corrected.

What Mao was saying, in effect, was that military preparation (or, in Communist parlance, armed struggle) alone would not be sufficient to build up the strength of the Communists; it had to be supplemented by the united front whose political objective was to liberate China from Japanese imperialism and build a new China based on the principles of the democratic republic. In the same treatise, Mao stressed that the "economic policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front" (i.e., concessions to landlord and capitalist elements) had to be strictly observed, and that "to win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war".105)

To facilitate the construction of guerrilla bases in the countryside, Mao argued that local guerrilla forces had to be given considerable freedom in dealing with the problems in local areas.106 What he meant, as Otto Bruan observes, was that the Eighth Route Army should carry out the strategy of "filling the vacuum in the Japanese rear by decentralized occupation, political mobilization and de facto seizure of power".107 Subsequently, Mao's policy of unauthorized territorial expansion did create tension between the two parties. To Mao, however, the expansion was not only justified by the strategic requirements of the war, but also by the fact that the CCP had not violated the united front agreement with the KMT, i.e., the Communist had terminated all activities aimed at the direct overthrow of the Nationalist Government. (From the Nationalists' point of view, of course, Mao's guerrilla tactics appear as evading responsibility for the war and his policy of constructing guerrilla bases was clearly for self-aggrandizement.)
According to Otto Braun, the Yenan Study Group on the War of Resistance Against Japan constituted a "secret core" of military personnel who subsequently helped Mao to defeat Ch'en Shao-yü and "torpedoed the Comintern line". This is partly corroborated by Chang Kuo-t'ao who recalls that prior to his own departure from Yenan in April 1938, Mao had been busy coordinating the work of the activists of the Eighth Route Army at the front. A brief survey of the writings of military leaders and the Yenan Study Group shows that Mao's support came mainly from Lin Piao and junior commanders such as Hsiao K'o, P'eng Hsieh-feng, Wang Shou-tao, Kuo Hua-jo, Hsiao Ching-kuang and Ch'en Po-chün, who advocated the extensive application of guerrilla warfare and the construction of guerrilla bases as the basic task of the Communist forces. In contrast, Chu Teh and Yeh Chien-ying continued to favour the application of mobile warfare "under favourable conditions" although they by no means neglected the importance of guerrilla warfare. Liu Shao-ch'i firmly endorsed the strategy of building guerrilla bases in North China, although he also stressed that in pursuing such an objective the Communist forces had to avoid creating conflicts with other allied armies. As far as the highest level of Party leadership was concerned, it seems that Ch'en Shao-yü's cooperative approach was still the order of the day.

In June 1938, the KMT-CCP collaboration was given a tremendous boost by the creation of the People's Political Consultative Assembly by the Nationalist Government. It comprised one hundred and fifty delegates, most of whom were KMT members. At the same time, representatives from other parties such as the Chinese Youth Party headed by Tso Shun-sheng, the National Socialist Party headed by Chang Ch'un-mai (Carsun Chang) as well as noted educationists and national salvationists were also appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. From the CCP, seven members - Mao, Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Lin Po-ch'i, Wu Yu-chang, Tung Pi-wu and Teng Ying-ch'ao (Madame Chou En-lai) - were given representation in the Assembly. Although the Assembly was invested only with advisory power, it was greeted over the nation as an unprecedented and progressive step, symbolizing unity and respect for public opinion. Ch'en Shao-yü (in line with Lenin and Stalin who approved Communist participation in bourgeois-reformist parliaments) evidently considered the Assembly as fulfilling to a certain degree the function of an all-China parliament and the CCP should utilize the opportunity to propagate its political platform and expand its influence among the masses. Mao, apparently lacking interest in a KMT-sponsored organ and primarily con-
cerned with the construction of rural guerrilla bases, personally declined to attend.

At the first session of the Assembly which met between July 6 and 15, the Nationalist Government acknowledged that the CCP had faithfully observed the conditions for unity laid down by the KMT. In response, Ch'en Shao-yü proposed a resolution, which bore the signatures of sixth-seven delegates, calling for support for the KMT's Programme of National Resistance and National Construction. Nevertheless, he did not neglect to declare that while the CCP firmly supported the Programme, it retained its own programme for the realization of communism. Towards the end of the session, Ch'en also vehemently opposed Wang Ching-wei's recommendations for improved relations with Germany and Italy on the grounds that they were allies of Japan; the Soviet Union, he declared, was the natural ally of China. Inspite of his outspokenness, he was able to impress many delegates with his earnest attitude in support of unity and cooperation. Both Tso Shun-sheng and the Nationalist educationist T'ao Hsi-sheng spoke favourably of Ch'en in their memoirs.

Since early 1938, various national salvationist bodies and military commanders, including Yeh Chien-ying, had been calling for the active defence of Wuhan because of its obvious strategic importance. With the fall of Hsü-chou in May 1938, Wuhan was directly exposed to Japanese attack; the urgency of the situation generated immense enthusiasm amongst the populace who contributed their efforts towards the defence of the city. On June 15, Ch'en Shao-yü, Chou En-lai and Ch'in Pang-hsien issued a public statement to express the CCP's views on the question of the defence. The statement began with the assertion that should Wuhan fall to the enemy, China would still be able to carry on resistance until final victory was won. Citing the example of the Spanish (Republican) defence of Madrid, it asserted that the possibility of a successful defence of Wuhan did exist, provided the Government adopted the following measures: militarily, the creation of large contingent of crack troops drawn from the various armies, including the Eighth Route Army, to be equipped with modern artillery and staffed by existing political cadres or highly politically-motivated youths; politically, the setting up of a headquarters in Wuhan to lead and assist the mobilization of the masses and the granting of legal status to these mass organizations; economically, the accumulation of provisions and the promotion of production in factories by properly adjusting capitalist-labour relations. The best
method to defend Wuhan, it proclaimed, was to strengthen China's resistance in the neighbouring provinces and to defeat the enemy troops before they reached the gates of the city. For this purpose the Government had to adopt mobile warfare as the principal form of combat to be coordinated with positional and guerrilla warfare, bring about unity between the army and the people, and lead and assist the widespread development of guerrilla activities in the northern and central provinces. The experience of the Communist guerrilla forces in Manchuria and North China had demonstrated the importance of guerrilla movements in harassing the enemy and in building up guerrilla bases in a protracted war against Japan. The Government, therefore, should increase its supplies to the Eighth Route Army and other troops operating in the enemy's rear, so that they could destroy the enemy's supply lines and retake strategic points. At the same time, the Government was urged to create new and extensive areas for guerrilla operations and open up the mobilization of the masses. The future of China's Resistance did not depend, it asserted, on military prowess but on the strength of the masses and on political matters. As a concrete way of assembling the talents in the country for national resistance, it called for the enlistment of able people from all parties into the Government administration. According to one contemporary source, this article was so popular that hundreds of copies were immediately sold out by the Hsin-hua jih-pao soon after its appearance.

To those historians who are inclined to believe that Ch'en Shao-yü was a "capitulationist", this article is taken as a concrete example of Ch'en's willingness to sacrifice the Party's independence for the sake of a close alliance with the KMT. His proposals for the integration of Communist and Nationalist forces, for example, are seen as measures tantamount to removing the Eighth Route Army from its base and subjugating it to the Nationalist Command, while his proposals for participation in Government and formal registration of mass organizations are seen as destroying the organizational coherence of the CCP and weakening its control over the mass organizations. It is also suggested that Ch'en was trying to induce the KMT to undertake a resolute defence of the last urban bastion remaining in Chinese hands so as to sustain his "urban line". These interpretations, however, overlook the fact that Ch'en also called for the promotion of guerrilla movements in the northern and central provinces and the strengthening of the Eighth Route Army. Moreover, it appears incomprehensible that other CCP leaders such as Yeh Chien-ying, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Teh and especially Chou En-lai (who attached his name to the statement)
should also call for the active defence of the city. A group of junior commanders also put forward similar proposals to local governments in northwestern China to forestall the enemy's advance towards Wuhan. More significantly, if such were the intentions of Ch'en Shao-ylü, one wonders why the KMT rejected his proposals and outlawed the Communist-led mass organizations. (See below.)

A wide range of contemporary Japanese intelligence reports - some based directly on materials taken from KMT archives following the Nationalist evacuation of the city - gave a totally different analysis of the motives behind the CCP's proposals. They were regarded as measures that would enable the Communists to infiltrate the Nationalist Government and Army, dislocate and disintegrate its organization, win over the lower stratum of soldiers and cadres, and undermine the KMT. Even the call for a resolute defence of Wuhan was construed as a means of discrediting the Nationalist Government for its lack of determination to resist the enemy so as to enhance the Communist prestige. These materials also contain a detailed account of Ch'en Shao-ylü's role in organizing the mass movements in Wuhan, which is summarized below: Following his appointment as secretary to the Wuhan Defence Committee (headed by General Ch'en Cheng) in June 1936, Ch'en, with the aid of Chou En-lai, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Tung Pi-wu, P'an Han-nien, Teng Ying-chao, Liu Chün-hsien (Madame Ch'in Pang-hsien) and Meng Ch'ing-shu (Madame Ch'en Shao-ylü) and other members of the CCP's liaison office in Hankow, directed the formation of numerous mass organizations among the workers, coolies, students, youths and women in the city as well as the peasantry in the neighbouring provinces. Their activities consisted of organizing the masses into various war mobilization teams; indoctrinating them in the theories of the Anti-Japanese United Front, social and political problems of the Chinese national liberation war, and guerrilla warfare; as well as improving their literacy. To promote the expansion of these mass movements, a large contingent of the National Liberation Vanguard from Sian (possibly under Liu Shao-ch'i's direction) and students from academies in Shensi were dispatched to Wuhan. All these were undertaken in spite of the regulation imposed by the Wuhan Defence Committee in June stating that all mass organizations, unless they were actually sending people to the front to assist the army, had to cease operation in the interest of public order. Ch'en had apparently defied the Government instructions. By August, the Communists reportedly controlled some six hundred mass organizations, with a total membership of over 80,000.
On August 5, the Wuhan Defence Committee decreed that the number of armed civilians could not exceed a total of 6,000. Ch'en apparently continued to press the Government for recognition of their legal status. On August 20, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dissolution of sixteen Communist-led mass organizations such as the National Liberation Vanguard, the Ant Society, the Youth Salvation Corps and the Wuhan Women's Defence Corps. The Hsin-hua jih-pao immediately protested against such actions on August 21 but was suspended (temporarily). The KMT's Blue Shirts began to harass Communist mass activities in Wuhan, and the CCP's mass organizations were all broken up.

On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that Ch'en Shao-yü and company were aiming at a massive mobilization of the masses in Wuhan and expansion of guerrilla base areas in other regions on the pretext of assisting the Government in the defence. The urgency of the military situation and the tremendous upsurge of mass enthusiasm for war mobilization furnished a unique opportunity to build up a solid base of mass support for the CCP among the urban populace and to infiltrate the KMT's government and army. This would enable the CCP to establish its leadership in the Resistance and bring pressure to bear upon the KMT. (As a contemporary Japanese analyst observes, the defence of Wuhan was an excellent opportunity for the CCP to subject the KMT to its control.)

Although it is certain that none of the CCP leaders conceived a coup d'état, the situation was considered in some quarters to be analogous to the Bolsheviks vis-à-vis the Kerenksy Government on the eve of the October Revolution of 1917. In the months between May and August, according to both Nationalist and Japanese intelligence, CCP leaders in Central China were secretly re-emphasizing in speeches and pamphlets the struggle for proletariat leadership in the revolution and expansion of Communist influence over the masses so as to facilitate the ultimate seizure of power. This is confirmed by Edgar Snow's report of Ch'in Pang-hsien's speech at a confidential interview of July 1938 in Hankow:

We must struggle for leadership everywhere and at all times. We do not deny that. A political party that does not lead has no reason for existence. Of course, right now we cannot talk about the struggle for proletariat leadership. Every KMT leader knows that Stalin said, 'The struggle for proletariat leadership is the first stage in the struggle for proletariat dictatorship'. We don't want to frighten people by
discussing such questions, but it is of course a fact that we compete for leadership and that we must do so. Only under the hegemony of the workers and peasants can the bourgeois-democratic revolution succeed.\textsuperscript{132}

As it turned out, Ch'en Shao-yü's bold attempt to assert Communist leadership in the Resistance ended in a fiasco. He had clearly miscalculated the KMT's receptivity to the CCP's agitation for political reforms and mass mobilization and mistakenly believed that the recognition of the KMT's legitimate rule would facilitate Communist expansion through legal channels.

Throughout the episode, Mao remained aloof to the defence to Wuhan. To cater to public opinion, he publicly advocated that the defence of Wuhan had to be seriously undertaken on the basis of the political mobilization of the entire army and populace, but he was adroit enough to note immediately that whether Wuhan would become China's Madrid would depend on the concrete developments of the war.\textsuperscript{133} According to a recent Communist source, following the fall of Hsü-chou in May 1938 Mao had issued a directive to Party branches in Central China calling for the transfer of all Communist-led workers, students and other forces from the city to the countryside to found guerrilla bases in the enemy's rear, even though it meant a substantial loss to the Party's work in the cities.\textsuperscript{134} It was apparently disregarded by Ch'en Shao-yü, who did exactly the opposite.

Contrary to the latter-day assumption that Ch'en Shao-yü in Wuhan betrayed a totally subservient stand in relation to the KMT and appeared conciliatory on every issue, contemporary Nationalist and Japanese analysts considered Ch'en to be a hard-headed Communist whose advocacy of sincere collaboration did not entail the abandonment of communism, and whose ulterior motives of subverting the Government were put under the guise of participation in Government.\textsuperscript{135} For this, Ch'en Shao-yü bore the brunt of attack from anti-Communist critics, who pieced together his writings as well as Mao's in late 1938 to demonstrate the CCP's perfidy in the alliance.\textsuperscript{136} In fact, Ch'en seemed to be regarded as even more dangerous than Mao, as the Nationalists were prepared to tolerate the establishment of the Communist border regions, but clamped down immediately on Ch'en Shao-yü's activities in Wuhan. (This is understandable as Ch'en's activities aimed at undermining the KMT's power at the very centre of its
strength; whereas Mao's consolidation of the rural bases posed no direct threat to the Nationalist Government.)

The Sixth Plenum

While Ch'en Shao-yü was preoccupied with work in Wuhan, Mao made preparations for the convocation of the enlarged Sixth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, which was held over an extended period between September 28 and November 6, 1938. There are indications that the conference was convened by Mao in place of the Seventh Party Congress on the grounds that the development of the war and difficulties in communication prevented the Party from calling a full Party Congress. Since many top-ranking leaders including Ch'en Shao-yü, Chou En-lai and Hsiang Ying could not attend the conference throughout its long session, Mao dominated the entire conference and he seemed to have skillfully manipulated the meeting to uphold his political line over the Party. Even the timing of the plenum was inauspicious for Ch'en Shao-yü: the Nationalist Government was making preparations to evacuate Wuhan, Canton had come under threat since August, and the fall of both cities was imminent. Thus, all key cities and major communications lines would soon fall into the hands of the Japanese, and the situation clearly demonstrated the validity of Mao's rural strategy. Moreover, the KMT had suppressed Communist activities in Wuhan, and Ch'en's policy of relying on the goodwill of the KMT to open up mass movements for the expansion of the Party had proven impracticable.

Between October 12 and 14, Mao presented his lengthy report, entitled "On the New Stage", at the conference. In his report, Mao affirmed the correctness of the Party's Anti-Japanese United Front policy, noting, in particular, that the Comintern in its recent resolution had expressed complete approval to the CCP's orientation of the policy. The experience in the past fifteen months, he stated, had proven that China was capable of winning victory in spite of its military weaknesses because national unity had been achieved and its further development would guarantee China's success. With the imminent collapse of Wuhan, Mao envisaged that China would enter the second stage of stalemate and preparation for the counteroffensive. Consequently, Mao asserted that it was necessary to preserve and concentrate on developing resistance forces in the countryside. This was because in a vast country like China, the Japanese could not establish effective control over the nation.
through occupying the major communication lines and the urban centres. Only the extensive development of guerrilla bases in the rural hinterland, therefore, could isolate and wear down the enemy in a protracted struggle.

With respect to the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, Mao uttered the most profuse praise given by any of the CCP leaders. "It is unimaginable", he stated, "that the War of Resistance could be launched and carried on without the KMT". The CCP "occupies a second place in the Resistance", and the KMT "is playing the leading role". Under the "brilliant" leadership of Generalissimo Chiang, the KMT had made significant progress towards national resistance and the implementation of democracy, and its continued participation and progress in the war was a matter of certainty. On this basis, Mao predicted a "glorious future" for the KMT although conservative elements might obstruct progress. The same "glorious future" applied to other parties participating in the Anti-Japanese United Front. To strengthen China's resistance, Mao advocated the avoidance of interparty conflicts, sincere and unanimous support for Chiang's "supreme leadership" in the Resistance, further democratization of the local administrative regimes under the centralized authority of the Nationalist Government, suitable improvement in the living conditions of workers and peasants, promotion of the national economy, and alliance with the Soviet Union. But steadfast opposition to friendly relations with Germany or Italy.

On the organizational aspect of the united front, Mao proposed that the KMT transform itself into a "national revolutionary alliance" by recruiting Communist members and youths into the KMT and the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, and stated that the CCP was prepared to furnish a complete list of such members to the Nationalist Government. This was the "best organizational form" for the united front; the next alternative would be to bring together representatives from the various parties into joint committees at the Central and local levels, so that the country would be like a federal union under the leadership of the KMT. Mao then called for mutual assistance and mutual development between the two parties and suggested that the KMT should be expanded to a membership of over five million, while the CCP to over one million. Mao also repeated Ch'en Shao-yü's slogan for the establishment of an "independent, free and happy" new democratic republic based not on socialism, but on the Three People's Principles.
With regard to the CCP's role in the Anti-Japanese United Front, Mao reconciled the Communists' support for the struggle of national independence with the spirit of internationalism on the basis that only when the national liberation was achieved could the working class be liberated; and he categorically denied the accusation that the CCP had abandoned internationalism. Because of this, the CCP would support resolutely the united front, establish itself as the pioneer of the struggle for unity and cooperation with other parties and armies, expand its organization and maintain its organizational, political and ideological independence. This independence, however, Mao carefully noted, "is relative and not absolute" and should not "overshadow the spirit of unity but must be subordinated to it". Similarly, although the existence of class conflicts should not be overlooked, class struggle "must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the national resistance". In concrete terms, this meant that the CCP would safeguard the political and material interests of the labouring class without neglecting the interests of the upper classes or formulating policies that were detrimental to national solidarity.

Mao then reviewed the Party's history and asserted that the CCP had been greatly consolidated through ridding itself of "opportunism", namely the rightist errors of Chang Kuo-t'ao and "the leftist errors in tactics and in military principles" as well as organizational matters in the latter part of the Soviet (Kiangsi) Period. He added, however, that the mistakes in Kiangsi "had nothing to do with general political line". These deviations, according to Mao, had been rectified by the Tsunyi Conference and by the adoption of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy. At present, the Party had to wage a resolute struggle against "leftist sectarianism" which hampered long-term cooperation with other parties and "rightist opportunism" which advocated "unconditional cooperation" and non-development of the Party and mass movement. Finally, Mao called for a correct approach to Marxism-Leninism by applying its theories to the concrete conditions in China under the principle of "Sinification of Marxism-Leninism", i.e., the avoidance of a "dogmatic" interpretation of Marxist-Leninist precepts divorced from the national and historical characteristics of China. 

Mao's report at the Sixth Plenum has hitherto presented itself as an enigma. Present-day Chinese Communist writers invariably claim that at the Sixth Plenum Mao successfully overcame the "rightist
opportunist" errors of Ch'en Shao-yü, yet his similarities with the latter's views on the united front are only too obvious. This paradoxical picture induces some historians to conclude that there were no formal differences between the two leaders. Other writers, however, suggest that Mao was merely making verbal concessions to Ch'en without giving up his own strategy, and had actually chosen some cleverly-nuanced lines to expose Ch'en's errors. In my opinion, it is extremely unlikely that Mao would have made verbal concessions to Ch'en by voicing enthusiastic support for the KMT, for his positive endorsement— even though nuanced— could hardly been interpreted otherwise. If that were a mistaken line, Mao's ambivalence would be causing great harm to the Party. Moreover, his support for the organizational form of the united front clearly exceeded mere verbal concessions: shortly after the Sixth Plenum had begun, Mao instructed Chou En-lai to start negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, on the basis of a personal letter drafted by Mao himself, for the re-entry of CCP members into the KMT.

A more plausible explanation for Mao's behaviour is premised on the understanding that there is an organic link between the united front and the rural strategy as Mao himself perceived. As noted earlier, Mao realized that the successful operation of the rural strategy was contingent upon the enforcement of the united front since it would help to neutralize the opposition from the bourgeois-reactionary elements towards the Communists and facilitate the consolidation and development of the Communist base areas. By October 1938, when the Nationalist Government had suffered a severe setback in the loss of Wuhan and become extremely suspicious of the CCP, it was particularly important for the CCP to re-emphasize its sincere support for the Nationalist Government, so as to prevent any attempt on the part of anti-Communist elements (who were likely to compromise with Japan) to step up their activities against the Communists. For the purpose of cementing the alliance with the KMT, Mao reiterated Ch'en Shao-yü's earlier proposals regarding the organizational form of the united front, including the re-entry of CCP members into the KMT. (Such a move would at the same time enable the CCP to infiltrate and control the lower echelons of cadres and soldiers in the Nationalist Government and Army.) In Mao's logic, so long as the CCP's strength in the countryside was still insufficient to challenge the KMT, the united front was still essential as a tactic to isolate the KMT from the nation at large and to delay the final showdown with the
KMT. Mao's policy won the support of the Party leadership. On November 6, the Plenum passed a resolution which gave equal priority to the development of guerrilla bases and the consolidation of the united front.

On principle, Ch'en Shao-yü did not object to the strategy of consolidating the guerrilla bases, and the evidence available indicate that he voiced no objection to Mao's thesis. First of all, Ch'en Shao-yü, in his memoir, claims that he drafted the resolution of the Sixth Plenum before leaving for Hankow towards the end of October. Secondly, a recent Chinese Communist source accuses Ch'en of "double-dealing" at Sixth Plenum for having given a verbal agreement to Mao but clung to his erroneous line afterwards. Thirdly, in "On the New Stage", Mao concluded that the Central Committee was in unanimous agreement with regard to the political and strategic line of the Party. Finally, Hsiang Ying, in his report on the Sixth Plenum delivered at the New Fourth Army headquarters on October 31, echoed Mao's proposals. All these suggest that there was no disagreement over Mao's report in the CCP leadership.

In the middle of the conference, Ch'en Shao-yü and other delegates left for Chungking to attend the People's Political Consultative Assembly which met from October 28 to November 6 (while Hsiang Ying returned to the New Fourth Army base). At the Assembly, Ch'en proposed two resolutions, one calling for support to Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and further consolidation of national unity against Japan, and the other proposing the adoption of concrete measures to overcome the existing difficulties in the prosecution of the protracted war against Japan, such as the greater development of guerrilla movements in North and Central China and the inclusion of Communist members in the KMT's Youth Corps. Chiang Kai-shek, however, flatly rejected the CCP's proposals for re-entry into the KMT and displayed his suspicion of the CCP's intention to infiltrate and subvert the KMT. The situation was so embarrassing for the CCP that Ch'in Pang-hsien publicly declared to a press correspondent on November 7 that the Communists had no intention to participate in Government and would support the Government only as private citizens.
In the absence of Ch'en Shao-yü and his associates, Mao, at the concluding session of the Sixth Plenum on November 5, declared Ch'en Shao-yü's slogans for the united front inappropriate. (He apparently received the firm support of Liu Shao-ch'i, who learning from the experience of Wuhan was probably convinced that Ch'en Shao-yü's conciliatory line could not work.) Mao stated:

The KMT is the party in power, and so far has not allowed the united front to assume an organizational form .... Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i has rightly said that if 'everything through' were simply to mean through Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, it would mean unilateral submission, and not 'through the united front' at all. Behind the enemy lines, the idea of 'everything through' is impossible, for there we have to act independently and with the initiative in our own hands while keeping to the agreements which the KMT has approved .... We must not split the united front, but neither should we allow ourselves to be bound hand-to-foot, and hence the slogan of 'Everything Through the United Front' should not be put forward .... If 'Everything Subordinates to the United Front' is interpreted as 'everything subordinates to Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan', then that slogan, too, is wrong.

Henceforth, the CCP, according to Mao, should act without prior consent of the Nationalist Government with regard to matters which the KMT would not likely approve, so long as these actions would not "jeopardize the whole situation". In such a way, Mao discredited Ch'en Shao-yü's position by associating his slogans with a policy of total submission to the KMT. Mao's concluding report, however, was not published at the time and it appears that his opinions were restricted to the top-ranking Party leaders remaining at the conference. This observation is supported by the fact that Ch'en's slogans for the united front continued to appear in full in internal directives issued by lower regional organs up to early 1942. According to Ssu-ma Lu, the lower Party members were quite unaware of the fact that there were conflicts between Mao and Ch'en Shao-yü at the Sixth Plenum.

On November 6, Mao dealt another blow to Ch'en Shao-yü in his final conference speech entitled "Problems of War and Strategy" which also did not appear in print at the time. To appreciate its full significance, it should be noted that earlier in the year, probably under the aegis of Ch'en or his associates, the CCP had circulated the Chinese version of Stalin's History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Short Course. In his speech, Mao categorically dismissed the
applicability of the experience of the Bolshevik Revolution to China, (He did not, however, dismiss the *Short Course* as entirely irrelevant. It was still used as a text for cadre education.) He asserted:

In capitalist countries ... where conditions are such that within the country there is no feudal regime, but bourgeois-democratic regime, and that there is no colonial exploitation from without ... it is the task of the party of the proletariat to educate the workers and to build up strength through a long period of legal struggle .... In this long period of struggle there is the possibility of using parliamentary platforms, of engaging in economic and political strikes, of organizing trade unions .... When the time comes to launch an insurrection, the first step will be to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside .... All these have been proven correct by the October Revolution in Russia.

He then contrasted this with the situation in China:

In China it is different. Her characteristics are that she is not independent and democratic but semi-colonial and semi-feudal: internally she has no democracy but is under feudal oppression; externally, she has no national independence but is oppressed by imperialism. It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Basically the task of the Communist Party is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrections and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse ...

Mao then cited Stalin's own dictum (expressed in 1926) referring to the Chinese revolution as an armed revolution to support his view that the main task of the Party was to "organize armed struggle for national and social liberation against armed counterrevolution, whether internal or external. Without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party would have no standing at all in China, and it would be impossible to accomplish any revolutionary task". "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao concluded,"having guns, we can create Party organizations ... create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements" as the Eighth Route Army had done in North China.
Thus, Mao ridiculed Ch'en Shao-yü's entire experience in Wuhan as a failure to perceive the differences in the concrete conditions of the Soviet Union and China, where the absence of truly democratic and parliamentary institutions precluded any chance for Party expansion through legal means. The only viable alternative was to concentrate on the expansion of guerrilla bases in the countryside. Mao probably won the support of all remaining participants at the conference to his line, which explains the present-day claim that at the Sixth Plenum Mao had overcome the "rightist opportunism" of Ch'en Shao-yü. It should be noted, however, that neither the allegedly mistaken political line of the RRS in the Kiangsi Period nor Ch'en Shao-yü's ill-devised orientation of the united front in Wuhan had been openly criticized in the Party. Mao had still not won his battle against Ch'en.
Notes:

1 Historians generally regard Chang Kuo-t'ao and Ch'en Shao-yü to be in a similar position, see e.g. McLane, p. 120; Thornton, p. 91, and J.P. Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (London, 1973), p. 289. Benton, pp. 75-100 and "reply," pp. 150-53 gives a detailed analysis of Ch'en's "rightist opportunist" errors.

2 Kataoka, pp. 48-83.

3 See Lenin, "Left-wing" Communism, esp. pp. 44, 54 & 59; and Stalin, The Foundation of Leninism, esp. pp. 82-100.

4 See H. Snow, My Yenan Notebooks, p. 190; and a pro-Communist publication by Yü Ch'i, Shih-lun hsüan-eh (Collection of Current Views; Shanghai, 1937), pp. 303-13. (HI)

5 Lo Fu, Pai-oh'll tang mu-ch'ien ti chung-hsin jen-wu (The Central Tasks of the Party in the White Areas), mimeo., "top secret". (BI)

6 Between July 8 and 23, the CCP issued a series of declarations to this effect. See KMTCC, Vol. 2, pp. 3-26.

7 See Gaimusho jōhōbu, Sekishoku shina shi (A History of Red China; 1940), p. 117; and Koain seisubu, Komintern narabi ni Sōren-ō no tai-Shi setsaku ni kansuru kishon shiryō (Basic Materials on the Comintern and the Soviet Union's Policy Towards China; Oct, 1939), pp. 90-91. (KM)

8 "Kuan-yūl k'ang-chan chung ti-fang kung-tso ti yūan-tse chih-shih" (Guiding Principles for Regional Work During the War of Resistance), reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 241-43. That this document was issued by Ch'in as head of the Organizational Department is confirmed by Braun, p. 305, and Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, p. 172.

9 See Hsü En-tseng, pp. 59-60.


12 Braun, p. 304.


15 "Wei tung-yûlan i-ch'ieh li-liang cheng-ch'ûl k'ang-chan sheng-li erh tou-cheng" (Struggle for the Mobilization of All Forces and Victory in the War of Resistance), MTHC, Vol. 2, pp. 341-44.


See "K'ang-chan shih-ch'i i ts'ai-cheng ching-chi wen-t'i" (Financial and Economic Problems During the War of Resistance), in Ch'en Po-ta ed., Mao Tse-tung lun (Discourses of Mao Tse-tung; Sian, 1939), pp. 172-73. Overlooking this source, Kataoka, p. 73, cites Ch'en Shao-yü's earlier call for the defence of Shanghai as an indication of his "urban strategy".


"Yü Ying-kuo chi-que Pei-te-lan chih t'an-hua" (Interview with British Reporter Bertram), MTTC, Vol. 5, pp. 301-2.

Contemporary sources state that the battle of P'inghsingkuan was a case of mobile warfare, see "Kuan-yü yu-chi chan-cheng" (On Guerrilla Warfare), Hsin-hua jih-pao (Jan. 26, 1938), p.1; and Ti shih-pa chi-t'uan chu'n, tsung-cheng-chih pu, hs'lan-ch'uan pu, K'ang-chan pa-nien lai ti Pa-lu chu'n yu hs'in-ssu-chu'n (The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army During the Eight Years of War of Resistance; Yenan, 1946), p. 21. See also Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1318. Kataoka, p. 65, however, claims that the battle was launched by Lin Piao at Mao's instigation to demonstrate the applicability of guerrilla warfare.

See the articles of various military and political leaders in Tan Ling, ed., Pa-lu-chu'n ti chan-cheng ching-yen (Combat Experience of the Eighth Route Army; n. p., 1938), pp. 18-70; and Huang Feng, pp. 47-80 & 206-8. (Both items in MMCP Reel 7).

24 See Lin Piao, "P'inghsingkuan chan-tou ti ching-yen" (Experience of the Battle of P'inghsingkuan) dated October 17, in KMTCC, Vol. 2, pp. 187-190. Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1318. A KMT war-time report also claims that Mao was of the opinion that the battle of P'inghsingkuan was "one of the biggest sacrifices as a result of an unwise move". Cited in United States Senate, Committee of the Judiciary, The Amerasia Papers (Washington, 1970), Vol. 1, p. 365.

25 In early November, the KMT party organ in Shensi charged the CCP counterpart with instigating conflicts by criticizing the Nationalist authorities; in reply, the CCP stood by its criticisms and accused the KMT local organs for suppressing mass activities. See "Chung-kung Shan-hsi sheng-wei yu Kuo-min-tang Shan-hsi sheng tang-pu cheng-lun ti chen-hsiang" (The Truth About the Dispute between the CCP Shan-hsi Provincial Committee and the KMT Shensi Party Branch), Chieh-fang, No. 24 (Nov. 11, 1939), pp. 9-10.

26 I.e., the "Ho-ming Incident", see SK (pseud.), "Kuan-yü Ho-ming shih-chien ti chiao-hsin" (Lessons of the Ho-ming Incident), Hung-oh', No. 19 (Aug. 1937), pp. 5-8; and K'ai-feng, "Fan-tui wei-hai ho-p'ing t'ung-i ti yin-mou" (Oppose the Conspiracy against Peace and Unity), Chieh-fang, Nos. 13, 14, 15, (Sept. 6 1937), pp. 4-10. See also MTTHC, Vol. 2, p. 363.


28 Ibid., p. 377.

29 Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 247-48; Braun, p. 301; Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1326.

30 Yüeh Ch'ien, Hung-choo wai-shih (Anecdotes of the Communist Regime; Hong Kong, 1968), pp. 192; and Ssu-ma Lu, Tou-cheng shih-pa nien, p. 124.

31 J.M. Bertram, Unconquered: Journal of a Year's Adventures Among the Fighting Peasants of North China (New York, 1939), pp. 280-82.

32 Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1329.

33 Braun, p. 305

34 Chiang Kai-shek, p. 87.

35 Soviet aid to China during the entire war period has been estimated to be within the range of US$250 million to US$450 million. See Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (Camb., Mass., 1963), p. 441.
36 Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, p. 258. See also Snow, Red Star, p. 410; and Bertram, Unconquered, p. 281, both of whom deny that the CCP had received any military aid from the Soviet Union. For an interesting and informative discussion of the problem, see K. Sheymaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945: A Persuading Encounter, (London, 1971), chap. 15, "Are they Moscow's Minions?"


38 Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism, pp. 82-95.


41 "Mu-ch'ien k'ang-chan hsing-shih yü jen-wu" (The Present Situation and Tasks of the War of Resistance), reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 278-81. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1327-28, for additional information on Ch'en's speech at the Politburo Conference.

42 Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1330; Braun, p. 308.


44 Braun, p. 301.


46 Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1333.

47 Ibid., pp. 1334-35.


49 Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1330-31.

50 Mao Tse-tung, "Lu Hsün lun" (On Lu Hsün), MTTC, Vol. 5, p. 280.

51 Chang Kuo-t'ao, pp. 1331-32.

52 See K'ang Sheng, "Ch'an-hsü Jih-k'ou ch'eng-t'an min-tsü kung-t'i ti T'o-lo-ssü-ch'i fei-t'u" (Eliminate the Japanese Spies and National Public Enemy Trotskyite Bandits), Chieh-fang, Nos. 29 & 30, pp. 7-11 & 9-14 resp; and P'eng Chen, Chin-Ch'a-Ch'i pien-ch'i T'o-p'ai ti mai-kuo taui-hsing (The Treacherous Conduct of the Trotskyites in the Chin-Ch'a-Ch'i Border Region; n. p., 1938).
In Belden’s report, this sentence reads: "I want the CCP to perform actual government functions ...." See Japanese translation in CGKSTS, Vol. 7, p. 472. Ch’en Shao-yü, however, corrected this statement in WMHC, Vol. 1, p. 284, stating in the preface that Belden had misrepresented him. Benton, "reply", p. 149, however, claims that Belden’s version should be more reliable.

Lenin, "Left-wing" Communism, pp. 77-92, esp. 88.


See e.g. Sung (Soong) Ching-ling, "Tui Kuo-Kung t'ung-i yün-tung kan-yen" (Affectionate Statement on the United Movement of the KMT and CCP), in Sung Ch'ing-ling tsu-chuan. chi ch'i yen-lun (Autobiography and Writings of Sung Ch'ing-ling; Hong Kong, 1967), pp. 29-31; Feng Chieh, Kuo-Kung ho-tso ti wet-lai' (The Future of KMT-CCP Collaboration; Shanghai, Nov. 1937), passim; and articles in Chiu-wang jih-pao (Salvation Daily, edited by Kuo Mo-jo), No. 1 (Dec. 28, 1937); Wen-i yiel-k' an (Literary Monthly), No. 9; Wen-i chan-ti (Literary Front, edited by Mao Tun), No. 1 (Apr. 1938); all three reproduced in Chang Ching-lu, Vol. 3, pp. 5-6, 12-3 & 14-7. See also Tsou T'ao-fen's articles in Hsileh-lu (Blood Path), Nos. 3 & 4 (1938), reproduced in, K'ang-cho chung ti Chung-kuo cheng-chih, pp. 220-1.

Teng Ch'u-min, Tui-Jih k'ang-chan ti chi-pen wen-t'i (Basic Problems in the Resistance War against Japan; Hankow, 1938), pp. 12-26.


See e.g. Chou En-lai, "Ts'en-yang chin-hsing chih-chiu k'ang-chan" (How to Prosecute the Protracted War of Resistance), Jan. 7, 1937. Chin-chung (Masses), Vol. 1, No. 51; Chou En-lai & Wang Ming, K'ang-chan ti hein hsing-shih yü hein ts'e-lyeh (The New Situation in the War of Resistance and the New Strategy; Hankow, 1939).


Lu Ting-i, "Kuo-Kung ho-tso ti ch'ang-ch'i hsing" (The Enduring Nature of the KMT-CCP Cooperation), CH'ien-hsien (Front Line), No. 2, Jan. 20, 1938.

Jen Pi-shih, "Ts'en-yang tu-kuo k'ang-chan ti k'un-nan shih-ch'i" (How to Survive Times of Difficulties During the War of Resistance) CH'ien-hsien, Nos. 3 & 4.


61 "Chugoku kokuminto-in ni tsuguru no sho (Letter to the KMT Party Members), in Gaimusho Toakyoku dainika, Saikin no Chugoku kyosanto, jyuyo bunkenshu (Recent Important Documents of the CCP; 1938), pp. 8-21. (TB)

62 Rosinger, p. 29.


65 Wang Ming, "Lun K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'un-g-i-chan-hsien" (On the Anti-Japanese United Front), CH'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming) k'ang-ch'an yen-lun chi (Collected Works of CH'en Shao-yü on the Resistance War; Hankow, 1938) pp. 85-96. (BI) CH'en seemed to have purposely relegated guerrilla to an auxiliary role to ward off attacks on the CCP's concentration on guerrilla tactics. See CH'en Tso-hsdlan p'ing-chuan hell-chi, pp. 20-1.

66 The principle of "democratic centralism" requires the minority group to obey the decisions made by the majority at all levels of the Party organs. In 1944, Mao told Gunther Stein that in the past he had been in the minority and that his own ideas on a subject had not been carried out. "The only thing for me to do at such times", he stated, "was to wait". See G. Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945), p. 92.

67 See Yeh-Ch'ing (Jen Tso-hsdlan), "K'ai-fang cheng-chih tang-p'ai" (Open up the Political Parties), in Shih-shih hsin-wen pien-i she, T'un-g-i-chan-hsien hsia ti tang p'ai wen-t'i (The Problem of Parties and Factions Under the United Front; n. p., 1938), pp. 66-75; and "Kung-ch'an-tang ts'un-tsai wen-ti" (The Problem of the Existence of the CCP), cited in CH'en Tso-hsdlan p'ing-chuan hell-chi, pp. 22-4.

Ch'i Wu, pp. 198-203.


See Pao Tsun-p'eng p. 45. Ho K'o-ch'üan, who was in charge of the CY, also wrote an article in support of the adoption of legal methods in promoting youth work. See Khi Feng, "Lun mu-ch'ien Chung-kuo chu-i-yüan yü-hun-tung ti jen-wu (On the Tasks of the Chinese Youth at the Present Stage), in KMTCC, Vol. 4, pp. 93-107.


See e.g. K'ai Feng, K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien chiao-ch'eng (Curriculum of the Anti-Japanese United Front; n.p., 1938); Chung-kung chung-yang tung-nan fen-chü hsüan-chüan-pu, ed., Tang ti hsiao-chung-ts'e t'ao-lun ta-kang (Discussion Outline of the Party's New Policy; 1938); Chung-kung chung-yang wei-yüan-hui, ed., K'ang-Jih li-lun (Theories of Resistance Against Japan; n.d. 1938?); (BI) P'ing-hsin (Chao I-hua), Min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien lun (On the National United Front; Canton, 1938); and Hou Wai-lu, K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien lun (On the Anti-Japanese United Front; Hankow, 1938).

78 "Chang Kuo-t'ao ching-kao kuo-jen shu" (Earnest Address of Chang Kuot'ao to the People of the Nation), Sao-t'ang Pao (Hankow, May 2, 1938), reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 319-25.

79 Chung-kung chung-yang hsüan-ch'uan pu, "Fen-sui Chang Kuo-t'ao fan-k'o-ming huo-tung pao-kao ta-kang" (Outline Report on Smashing Chang Kuo-t'ao's Counterrevolutionary Activities), reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 325-30.

80 "Decisions of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I."


82 Liu P'ei-ch'u, Min-chu sheng-t'i t'ou-shih (Perspectives on the Sacred Democratic Land; n.p., 1947), p. 6. (BI)

83 Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no seiji to jinbutsu, pp. 408-9 and (P'ing Ming trans.) Yen-an shui-hu-ch'uan (The Water Margin of Yenan; n.p., 1940), p. 7. (TB)


85 Lin I-ch'ing, Chung-kuo ti hung-hsing (Red Stars of China; Shanghai, 1938), p. 158.

86 Yeh Ch'ing (pseud. of Chang Chien-p'ing?), Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming) K'ang-ch'an yen-lun chi (n.p., 1938), p. 100; and, Mao Tse-tung k'ang-ch'an yen-lun chi (n.p., 1938). (BI)


88 E.F. Carlson, Twin Stars of China (New York, 1940), p. 279.

89 See Hsin-hua jih-pao, Apr. 2-9, 1938.

According to Liu Pei-chü, p. 6, Ch'en refused to publish Mao's "ten-point programme" in Hsin-hua jih-pao. I infer he was referring to Mao's article above.


See MTTC, Vol. 5, p. 159.


In April 1938, Jen Tso-hsÜan founded the K'ang-chan hsiang-tao (Guide on the War of Resistance), which included many articles denouncing the CCP. See Jen Tso-hsÜan p'inging-chuan hsü-ch'i, pp. 26-7.


Chung-kung chung-yang, "Kuan-yû shih-ch'i chou-nien chi-nien hsünan-ch'üan kang-yao" (Propaganda Outline of the CCP's Seventeenth Anniversary) in K'ang-chan i-lai, pp. 55-7.

Chai Tso-chüsn, Ts'ai Mao-chü-hsi shen-pien (By the Side of Chairman Mao); cited in Huang Yü-ch'üan, Mao Tse-tung sheng-p'ing ts'ai-hsing-shao (Introduction to Materials on Mao Tse-tung's Life; Hong Kong, 1970), p. 180.

The "war-revolution" thesis is generally regarded by Trotskyites as Trotsky's unique contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory. For his role during the Sino-Japanese War, Mao is being attacked by active Trotskyites for having followed Stalin's line and sacrificed the interests of the worker-peasant masses. See e.g. K'o Ch'ülan (pseud.), ed., Chung-kou ko-ming wen-t'ü (Problems of the Chinese Revolution; Hong Kong, 1947), preface, pp. 11-4. For the CCP's denunciation of Trotsky's permanent revolution and other related theories during the Sino-Japanese War, see Wei Mu (pseud.), K'ang-ch'an i-lai t'o-p'ai ts'ai-hsing ti ts'ung-chieh (A Comprehensive Discussion of the Crimes of the Trotskyites During the War of Resistance; Kwéilín, 1939); & Ch'en Shao-yü et al., T'o-p'ai ts'ai Chung-kuo (The Trotskyite Faction in China; n. p., 1939). A neutral publication, Chang Chih-i, K'ang-ch'an chung ti cheng-tang ho p'ai-pieh (Political Parties and Factions During the War of Resistance; Chungking, 1939), pp. 116-35, also distinguishes the CCP's policies from the Trotskyites. Benton, p. 67 and "reply", p. 150, however,
insists that Mao's views were similar to Trotsky's "war-revolution" thesis.


104 See note 151, p. 518.


106 See note 103, esp. pp. 45-6.

107 Braun, pp. 308-17. Braun also observes that Mao superficially kept to the united front policy along with rural expansion, and "through deceitfulness" represented two lines in one person. I believe, however, Mao genuinely supported the united front along with the rural strategy for reasons discussed below.

108 Ibid.

109 Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 1338.


111 Chu Teh, "Pa-lu-chun k'ang-chan ti i-nien" (One Year of Resistance by the Eighth Route Army), July 1, 1938, in KMTCC, Vol. 5, pp. 25-38; Yeh Chien-ying, "Mu-chien k'ang-chan chung ti chi-ko chung-yao wen-t'i (Several Important Questions in the Present War of Resistance), in Yeh Chien-ying k'ang-chan yen-lun chi, pp. 52-3.

112 Liu Shao-ch'i, "Chien-ch'i'h Hua-peii k'ang-chan chung ti wu-chuang pu-tui" (The Armed Forces Sustaining the Resistance War in Northern China), Chieh-fang, Nos. 43 & 44 (July 1, 1938), pp. 49-53.

113 See e.g. the greetings to the Assembly from Lin Tsu-han (Po-ch'u) "Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui chih kuan-kan " (Impressions and Observations on the People's Political Consultative Assembly), KMTCC, Vol. 6, pp. 20-29; the comments in Rosinger, p. 50; and the recollection of Kuo Mo-jo, p. 85.

114 Polveka KPK, p. 78.

115 China Year Book (Tientsin, 1939), cited in Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 187.

116 "Ch'en Shao-yil t'ung-chih kuan-yii yung-hu kuo-min cheng-fu shih-shih k'ang-chan chien-kuo kang-ling t'i-an ti shuo-ming (Comrade Ch'en Shao-yil's Elucidation on the Draft Resolution in Support of the Execution of the Programme of National Resistance and National Reconstruction by the Nationalist Government); WM11C, Vol. 5, pp. 185-88. See also L.P. Van Slyke, The Chinese
Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford, 1968), p. 65, for an interesting account of the altercation between Ch'en Shao-yü and the Nationalist delegates on the issue of foreign policy.


119 See e.g. Kuo Mo-jo, pp. 111-15; Bertram, *Unconquered*, p. 293.

120 "Wo-men tui-yü pao-wei Wu-han yu ti-san-chi k'ang-chan wen-t'i ti i-chien" (Our Views on the Problem of the Defence of Wuhan and the Third Stage of the War of Resistance), *WMHC*, Vol. 1, pp. 327-58. This statement was generally taken to represent the CCP's views on the defence of Wuhan, see Bertram, *Unconquered*, p. 293.


123 Kataoka, pp. 72-5.

124 See *Yeh Chien-ying k'ang-chan yen-lun chi*, pp. 25-9; *Chihe-fang*, Nos. 42, 45, 50 & 53; and *Ch'ülan-chung*, Vol. 2, Nos. 5, 8 & 9.


126 Japanese Consulate-General, Shanghai, *Bukan kanraku choku-sen ni okeru kōhichi sensen no dōkō* (Activities of the Anti-Japanese Front Shortly Before the Fall of Wuhan; Oct. 1938), pp. 3-10; *Shina*, Vol. 29, Nos. 9 & 10 (Sept. & Oct. 1938) and Vol. 30, No. 7 (July 1939); Hatano Ken'ichi, *Sekishoku Shina no Kyumei* (Revelation of Red China; Tokyo, 1941), pp. 355-60; Himori Tarao, *Chūkō ni jyū nenahi* (Twenty Years of the History of the CCP; Shanghai, 1942), pp. 311-13; *Gajjít keisatsu hō*, No. 199 (Feb. 1939), pp. 63-90. Gaimushō To'yōkyoku dainika, *Shina oyobi Man' shu ni okeru kyōsan undo gaisetsu* (A Short Tract on the Communist Movement in China and Manchuria; 1938), pp. 9-10; *Tōyō kō* (Intelligence Reports on East Asia), No. 306 (Oct. 5, 1938), pp. 3-26; Kōain seisimbu, *Chūgoku kyōdanro naikin no katsudō jyōkyō* (Recent Developments of
CCP Activities; 1939), pp. 20-44; Nakayasu Yosaku, Saikin Shina kyōsan tō shi (A Recent History of the CCP: Tokyo, 1940), pp. 106-111.

127 Shina oyobi Manshū ni okeru kyōsan undo gaisetsu, p. 9; Li Ch'ang, et al., I-erh-chiu hui-i lu, pp. 29-31.

128 See also Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, p. 163.


130 This probably explains why Ch'en Shao-yü and company had to emphatically deny the allegation, see WMHC, Vol. 1, pp. 362-63.

131 See Hatano Ken'ichi, Sekigahoku Shina no kyumei, pp. 358-59; Saikin no Chūgoku kyōsantō jūyō bunkenshu, pp. 84-104; and Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 285-86.

132 E. Snow, Randon Notes, p. 22.

133 See MTTC, Vol. 6, pp. 140-41.

134 Shih Feng, Fan-tui Wang Ming t'ou-hsiang chu-i ti tou-cheng (Struggle to Oppose the Capitulationism of Wang Ming; Shanghai, 1976), p. 44.


136 k'uo-ch'ing ssu-hsiang chieh ti mi-wu (To Dispel the Illusions Amongst the Intellectual Circles; n. p., 1938). (HI) See also Ch'en Yūn-chung.

137 See Hu Hua, Chung-kuo ko-ming shih ch'iang-i, p. 382; Hsiang Ying, Liu-chung ch'i-lan-hut ... p. 1; and MTTC, Vol. 6, p. 164.


139 Kataoka, pp. 79-83 & 143. Benton, pp. 84 & 91 & "reply" pp. 152-53, suggests that Mao's prediction of a "brilliant future" for other parties besides the KMT was the crucial distinction from Ch'en.


142 Polveka KPK, p. 76.

143 Shih Feng, pp. 45-6.
144 Hsiang Ying, *Liu-chung oh'llan-hui*....


146 Chiang Kai-shek, p. 89. In early 1939, Chiang told Nehru, then visiting China, that the KMT refused Communist participation in Government because the CCP was not sincerely supporting the Government but were acting under orders from Moscow to sabotage the Government. See Gaimushō jōhōbu daisanka, *Shina Kō Nichi jiu ei ni okeru hankyō seiryoku* (The Anti-Communist Forces Within the Chinese Anti-Japanese Camp; 1941), p. 82.

147 See *Sekishoku Shina shi*, p. 134.


150 Interview with author.

CHAPTER FOUR  UNITY AND STRUGGLE: THE ASCENDANCY OF MAO'S LINE ON THE UNITED FRONT (1938-1940)

Following the Sixth Plenum of October 1938, developments both inside and outside the country further vindicated Mao's strategy of building up rural guerrilla bases. Domestically, the defection of Wang Ching-wei to the Japanese and the escalation of conflicts between the KMT and the CCP demonstrated the KMT's basic anti-Communist stance and the bankruptcy of Ch'en Shao-yü's approach of party expansion through legal channels. In the international arena, the Soviet Union's attempts to reconcile with Germany and Japan imparted a sense of isolation to the Communists in their efforts to sustain the Resistance. As a result, the CCP realized the increasing importance of relying on its own forces to overcome the existing difficulties, and Mao's strategic line gained ascendancy in the Party.

Certain historians believe that the ascendancy of the rural strategy meant that the united front was losing in importance or gradually being abandoned. In response to the KMT's anti-Communist activities, Mao countered with a retaliatory policy pressing for uncompromising struggle. The rapid deterioration of KMT-CCP relations also brought forth an intensification of class struggle in the form of a more radical orientation of the land programme. Accordingly, Mao's theoretical treatise "On New Democracy" is regarded as a "radical" statement upholding the proletariat leadership of the revolution and pressing for the realization of socialism. In so doing, Mao was confronted by Ch'en Shao-yü and his associates who wished to continue the alliance with the KMT and retain the moderate land policies of the Party. In this light, Chang Wen-t'ien's warning against "leftist opportunism" in 1940 is regarded as a direct challenge to Mao's radicalism.

Such a picture, in my view, fails to take account of the organic link between the rural strategy and the united front. In spite of his emphasis on the construction of guerrilla bases, Mao did not overlook the importance of the united front. On the contrary, with the increase in local skirmishes between the KMT and CCP, he recognized greater necessity than before to preserve the united front and the policy of class collaboration. This was because Mao's basic objective was to isolate the anti-Communist diehards in the KMT and to win over the support and sympathy of as wide a sector of the bourgeoisie as possible,
so as to stabilize the Communist regime and to forstall large-scale attack from the KMT. The real meaning of Mao's formula of "New Democracy", I submit, was to institutionalize the collaboration with the landlord-capitalist elites, excepting the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist elements. Consequently, the campaign against "leftist" deviation was launched under the personal direction of Mao himself. This remained the basic orientation of the CCP's policy up to the end of 1940.

The Defection of Wang Ching-wei and the Deterioration in KMT-CCP Relations

Following the collapse of Wuhan in October 1938, tangible signs of friction between the two parties began to appear. At the highest level, Chiang Kai-shek was alarmed by the growth of Communist base areas and began to adopt a policy of containment. At the regional level, local Nationalist governors, such as Lu Ch'ing-lin of Hopei, began to keep a close surveillance over the CCP's activities. In early December 1938, a Communist under Lu Cheng-ts'ao, charged with attempting to "swallow up" the local militias, was attacked by Nationalist forces under Cheng Yin-wu, whom Mao later dubbed a "friction specialist".2 On December 30, Chiang Kai-shek summoned P'eng Teh-huai and exhorted the Communists to respect the administrative power of the Nationalist authorities in Hopei. At the same time, Chang Chün-mai published an open letter to Mao demanding that the CCP give up its territorial independence and the maintenance of a separate army.3 It appeared that non-Communist elements in the country were adopting a hard-line on the CCP's expansionist activities. Chinese Communist analysts (including Mao) generally regard October 1938 as a turning-point in KMT-CCP relations.4

Events took a dramatic turn when Wang Ching-wei, the deputy leader in the KMT, lured by the Japanese peace-terms as laid down in Konoe's New Order of November 1938, left Chungking for Japanese-occupied territories. On January 1, Chiang Kai-shek expelled Wang from the KMT. The CCP immediately responded with a major campaign to denounce Wang in an apparent effort to isolate the "peace" movement. On January 2, Mao published an article in the newly founded organ of the Eighth Route Army voicing support for Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and for the upholding of the united front, while condemning Wang and other traitors for their opposition to the Communists.5 On January 15, Ch'en Shao-yiL
addressed a mass rally in Yenan and delivered his speech entitled "New Intrigues in Old Clothings", which offered strong support for Chiang Kai-shek's firm action against Wang and for his determination to continue the Resistance. Wang Ching-wei's treachery, he claimed, was deep-rooted and was connected to all anti-Communist activities, because the Communists were the most resolute participants in the Resistance. To oppose the Communists, therefore, was equivalent to supporting Wang Ching-wei. Moreover, he condemned Chang Chün-mai's letter as a slander against the CCP. It can be seen that both leaders attempted to prevent anti-Communist elements from siding with Wang Ching-wei, well-known for his anti-Communist stance.

On January 21, 1939, Chiang Kai-shek convened the KMT's Fifth Plenum to reaffirm China's determination to carry on the Resistance. It seemed clear that Chiang Kai-shek would not be induced to come to a modus vivendi with Japan, but Chiang's stance was ambivalent: he declared that China would fight to restore the conditions prior to the July 7 (1937) Incident, which could be interpreted as a willingness to compromise with Japan should the latter be willing to withdraw into Manchuria. At the same time, the Fifth Plenum also secretly adopted a resolution known as "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties", designed to curb the CCP's expansionist activities. Nevertheless, the CCP leaders, such as Wang Chia-hsiang, Chang Wen-t'ien and Ho K'o-ch'uan continued to declare support for Chiang Kai-shek, while stressing that any attempt to oppose the Communists was equivalent to pro-Wang Ching-wei and pro-Japanese activities.

According to Japanese intelligence sources, the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau in early January held a conference at Chita during which two separate decisions were taken. The first was a proposal to the KMT reiterating the Soviet Union's support for China's Resistance, but expressing regret that the KMT had not treated the Eighth Route Army on an equal basis as Nationalist troops. It called upon the KMT to respond to the appeals of the Eighth Route Army and to grant greater freedom of action to the Communists. The second was the dispatch of a directive to the CCP urging the Chinese Communists to strengthen themselves by consolidating the base areas and winning over the support of the broad masses to overcome the existing difficulties. It firmly endorsed the united front policy of collaborating with the KMT and of relaxing the class struggle which had achieved great success.
in securing legal opportunities to conduct party work and in broadening the Anti-Japanese war zones. Accordingly, the CCP was directed to respond enthusiastically to the KMT's call for continuation of Resistance and to expand to five northwestern provinces, namely, Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Ch'inghai and Sinkiang so as to open up an "international route" with direct access to the Soviet Union, laying the foundation for the future "sovietization" of China. Thus, while it is clear that the Comintern was desirous of active KMT-CCP collaboration against Japan, it did not require the CCP to terminate its expansion or relinquish its aim of achieving ultimate power in China.

Between February 12 and 20, the KMT convened the Third session of the People's Political Consultative Assembly which put forward the programme of "National Spiritual Mobilization" (kuo-min ching-shen tsung-tung yilan) to counteract the tendency towards capitulation. In response, the CCP's Central Committee immediately declared its support for the programme and for the slogans "First Priority to the Nation and the People" (min-teu chih-shang, kuo-chia chih-shang) and "First Priority to Military Victories" (chih-shih ti-i, sheng-li ti-i) put forth by the KMT. In an article published in March 1939, however, Chang Wen-t'ien qualified the CCP's support for the slogans on the basis that they be given the following understanding: the majority of the Chinese people, namely, workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie should not be asked to sacrifice their interests for the numerically inferior exploiting class while the upper classes had to grant democratic rights to the people and improve their living conditions for the Resistance. In other words, both strata should adopt a policy of "mutual concession and mutual cooperation", with neither oppressing or opposing the other. This was the meaning of the CCP's slogans "The Anti-Japanese United Front is Above Everything and Everything Subordinates to the Anti-Japanese United Front", and Chang claimed that if the KMT's slogans were interpreted in this spirit they would be identical with the CCP's.

Chang Wen-t'ien's article offers interesting insights into the political relationship between Mao and Ch'en Shao-yü during this period. As noted previously, at the Sixth Plenum Mao had privately criticized Ch'en Shao-yü slogans "Everything Subordinates to the United Front and Everything through the United Front". According to Ch'en's memoir, he had sought clarification from Mao, after his return from Chungking in
January 1939, regarding Mao's misrepresentation of the meaning of his slogans. It appears that Chang Wen-t'ien, who had consistently played the role of mediator in policy disputes within the Party leadership, was again attempting to mediate between the two leaders. By restructuring and defining Ch'en Shao-yü's slogans, he demonstrated that it was not erroneous to give overriding importance to the Anti-Japanese United Front, while conceding that Ch'en's slogans were problematic. It appears that Chang's mediation helped to preserve Ch'en Shao-yü's prestige among the Party leadership, and Ch'en continued to participate actively in political meetings and Party functions. On March 8, for example, Ch'en took part in the campaign for the liberation of women launched in Yenan in which both his wife and Madame Chou En-lai were actively involved. On March 12, he appeared along with Mao to address a rally commemorating the death of Sun Yat-sen; both leaders were warmly welcomed by the audience. More importantly, in April 1939, he was appointed director of the Marxism-Leninism Research Association, one of several Marxist study groups established in early 1939 in response to Mao's call at the Sixth Plenum to improve the Party's level of Marxism-Leninism. (See the next Chapter.) There is no indication, therefore, that Ch'en had suffered a drastic decline in authority following the Sixth Plenum.

On May 1, in another public rally in Yenan in support of the Nationalist Programme for Spiritual Mobilization, Mao delivered a speech condemning Wang Ching-wei and other traitorous elements, including Trotskyites, for their betrayal of the national interests and for their "anti-Chiang and anti-Communist" activities. He reaffirmed the affinity between the KMT's slogans and the CCP's slogans of "Resist Japan is Above Everything and Everything Subordinates to Resistance against Japan". (In reiterating the first half of Ch'en's slogans, Mao appeared to have conceded to Ch'en without giving up his own position: he remained convinced that the second half of Ch'en's slogans were misleading and inappropriate.) He declared, however, that the aim of the national resistance was to recover all lost territories south of the Yalu River, thus in effect pronouncing the CCP's opposition to any Nationalist attempt to compromise with Japan.
Although Mao averred support for the Nationalist Government and for the maintenance of the united front, he did not refrain from carrying out the decisions of the Sixth Plenum to expand the base areas. In the winter of 1938-1939, the 120th division, under Ho Lung, moved out of northwest Shansi eastward into Hupeh to assist the Third Column, led by Lu Cheng-ts'ao, and incorporated the area as part of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. In early 1939, part of the 115th division, commanded by Nieh Jung-chen, crossed Hopei and moved into Shantung and established a new base. At the same time, foundation was laid for the subsequent establishment of the Chin-Chi-Yü (Shansi-Hopei-Honan) Border Region by expanding the Communist base founded earlier by the 129th Division under Liu Po-ch'eng in the T'aihang and T'aiytian mountains of southeastern Shansi. These operations received strong support from Wang Chia-hsiang, who published an article in Chieh-fang on January 15, 1939, echoing Mao's thesis of sustaining the Resistance in the countryside to counter the Japanese strategy of occupying cities and major communication lines in the country. (Interestingly, this article was reprinted in the Comintern organ World News and Views - formerly Inprecor - in June 1939, thus indicating that Moscow was not opposed to Mao's rural strategy, as it had demonstrated its viability to sustain the Resistance. This is further supported by Manuilsky's speech, given in March 1939 to the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CPSU, which commended the "brilliant leadership" of Mao and Chu Teh and the CCP's correct application of their experience in the Soviet movement and guerrilla operation to the Anti-Japanese War.)

Wang's support for Mao, in part, was prompted by the attacks on Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare by the CCP's critics - one of whom was Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who declared that it was more important to defend the cities than the countryside.

Mao's boldness in action was clearly manifested in his decision to transfer the bulk of the New Fourth Army from the southern bank of the Yangtze River to northern Kiangsu across the river - a decision undoubtedly taken in line with his strategic thinking of building up guerrilla bases behind the enemy lines. Earlier, in January 1939, Mao had made use of the opportunity offered by the transfer of the Yangtze Bureau to Chungking to effect a reorganization of the regional bureaux. Under the new arrangement, the Yangtze Bureau was transformed into the Southern Bureau, which was still under Ch'en Shao-yü, but the lower Yangtze region was taken out of its jurisdiction. Hsiang Ying's Southern Bureau, hitherto subordinated to the Yangtze Bureau, was upgraded to a full Southeastern
Bureau, taking charge of Chekiang and Fukien. The new arrangement was undoubtedly designed to limit Ch'en Shao-yl's control over the regional organs in Central China. According to Mao's plan, the expansion of the CCP into Central China was to be carried out by two regional bureaus, i.e., Hsiang Ying's Southeastern Bureau and the newly established Central Plain Bureau - which had Honan under its jurisdiction - headed by Liu Shao-ch'i. Prior to Liu Shao-ch'i's arrival in November 1939, the Central Plain Bureau, which was formally established in April, had already dispatched two Communist guerrilla units into Central China, one under P'eng Hsüeh-feng to the Kiangsu-Anhwei border areas north of the Huai River, and the other under Li Hsien-nien to the Taihung Range northwest of Wuhan in an effort to establish new guerrilla bases.

To win over Hsiang Ying to the new decision, Chou En-lai was dispatched to the New Fourth Army sometime in March 1939. According to Kuo Hua-lun's informant, Ch'en Jan, who accompanied Chou En-lai on the trip, Hsiang Ying queried the wisdom of the decision on the basis that it would mean operating in areas beyond the Third War Zone assigned by the Nationalist Government and would likely create conflicts with the local Nationalist authorities. Hsiang Ying's caution against the move rested on the premise that Central China was traditionally the stronghold of KMT power and pro-Nationalist landlords and local militia were far better organized and more effective in guarding against Communist expansion than those in North China. Moreover, the Third War Zone was under the command of Ku Ch'u-tung, who was flanked by the KMT guerrillas in the Yangtze delta under Tai Li, and the strong KMT regular forces of Han Teh-ch'in operating in northern Kiangsu. All three generals were noted for their strong anti-Communist stance. Hsiang Ying's scrupulous approach could not fail to be regarded by Mao as capitulation vis-a-vis the KMT. Nevertheless, the New Fourth Army did subsequently expand eastward and northward. (Present-day Communist writers invariably claim that the expansion was undertaken by junior commanders in spite of opposition from Hsiang Ying; we have no way of verifying this. In his contemporary writings Hsiang Ying also emphasized the necessity to expand the Communist guerrilla movements into neighbouring provinces. But it is possible that he was more conservative in taking action than Mao would have wanted.)
Along with the strategy of building up guerrilla bases behind enemy line, the CCP military commanders also switched over overwhelmingly to guerrilla tactics as the principal form of combat in the early and middle months of 1939. In the articles written by Chou En-lai, Yen Chien-ying, P'eng Teh-huai, Wang Chia-hsiang and Liu Po-ch'eng, guerrilla warfare was given first priority in the stage of stalemate and preparation for counteroffensive, not only for harassing the enemy but also for the political mobilization of the masses against the Japanese "political offensive" - the inducement to collaborate with the "puppet" regimes. Nevertheless, the above leaders (with the exception of Wang Chia-hsiang), continued to urge the transformation of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare under favourable conditions.

The CCP's expansion, however, transgressed the legal and territorial boundaries delineated by united front agreements and naturally created friction with the local Nationalist forces. In April, the KMT forces clashed with the Shantung column of the Eighth Route Army (the Po-shan Incident). In May, fighting also occurred between the Eighth Route Army and the local Nationalist forces near Shen-Kan-Ning (the Hsün-i Incident). In June, Chiang Kai-shek summoned Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-Ying and exhorted the Communists to obey the Central Government and refrain from unlawful expansion. Yet later in the month one of the worst confrontations occurred between the New Fourth Army and the Nationalist troops at P'ing-chiang, which costed the lives of several leading CCP regional cadres. At the same time, the KMT imposed further restrictions on Communist activities in the cities and many leftist bookstores were closed. In reaction, Ch'en Shao-yü published an article on June 30 labelling all anti-Communist activities as the conspiracy of pro-Japanese and traitorous elements. These incidents marked a rapid dissipation of the euphoric atmosphere of the earlier united front period.

Nevertheless, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Resistance in July 1939 the CCP renewed its effort to promote greater unity in the country. In a mass rally held in Yenan attended by over ten thousand people, Mao delivered his speech entitled "The Greatest Danger in the Current Situation". In this speech, Mao alluded to the presence of "Li Ching-weis" and "Chang Ching-weis" (euphemisms for collaborators of Wang Ching-wei) within the anti-Japanese camp.
Specifically, he denounced those treacherous elements who spread vicious lies about the CCP's intention to subvert the Government or the Soviet Union's conspiracy to invade China. At the rally, Ch'en Shao-yü also delivered a speech calling for persistence in the execution of the national resistance programme and the overcoming of the danger of capitulation. In particular, he demanded a determined struggle against Wang Ching-wei and other traitors, as well as the recovery of all lost territories south of the Yalu River. All Party leaders reaffirmed their support for Chiang Kai-shek in their statements marking the occasion. It is clear that the CCP did not wish to escalate the tension between the two parties to a breaking point.

Privately, the CCP began to change its evaluation of the KMT and its role in the national resistance. According to a KMT intelligence report, the CCP in June 1939 called a senior cadres' conference which diagnosed that the landlord-bourgeois camp had begun to waver in its anti-Japanese stance, and regarded the anti-Communist activities as preparation for capitulation to the enemy. It envisaged two possible developments in the united front: the first would be that the majority of the national bourgeoisie would stay in the war and the united front would be sustained; the second would be that the majority of the national bourgeoisie would compromise with the enemy and the united front would split. The task of the Party at present was to win over as large a sector of the landlord-bourgeois class as possible and to oppose firmly the anti-Communist activities of the reactionary elements. At the same time, the increase in KMT's harassment necessitated a change in the CCP's mode of operation. Chou En-lai, who apparently detected Chiang Kai-shek's determined opposition towards the Communists vis-a-vis his demands for punishing the culprits of the P'ing-chiang Incident, instructed the Southern Bureau to issue a secret directive in late July calling upon the local Party units in the region to shift their attention to underground activities. To avoid exposing themselves to attacks by the traitorous and pro-Wang Ching-wei elements, the directive stated, the Party should shift its basic operation from semi-legal to secret activities by streamlining its organization, transferring personnel to secret operations, and training Party members in secret party work. Those remaining in open work should heighten their vigilance against reprisals, seek legal status as far as possible, abandon their work when placed under surveillance, and defend themselves individually without seeking the aid of the Party when under arrest.
Upon Chou En-lai's return to Yenan, the CCP held a mass rally on August 1, 1939, at which Mao launched a strong protest against the indifference of the Nationalist Government in regard to the P'ing-chiang Incident. This was echoed by Ch'en Shao-yü, who published an article in Chieh-fang demanding action to "avenge" the victims in the incident. Later in the month, Ch'en approached Chiang Kai-shek in person and queried the Generalissimo on the "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties". Chiang replied that he had not ratified them. Thereupon, Mao, in an interview given on September 16, expressed satisfaction with the fact that the Generalissimo had not ratified the "Measures" and stated that he understood that "in the KMT many people do not approve of them". He took the occasion, however, to warn the local Nationalist authorities that if the Communists were attacked, they would not hesitate to act in self-defence. "Our attitude", he stated, was that "we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack".

On August 25, the CCP's Politburo formally adopted a resolution on "Party Consolidation" which terminated the so-called "storm membership drives" which the Party had launched since the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War. It noted that the recruitment of new Party members, which had been highly successful in the past, suffered from certain shortcomings in that many new members had been accepted without careful screening. Consequently, many "mediocre anti-Japanese elements or temporary fellow-travellers have joined the Party" and "chances arose for adversaries, speculators and subversive agents to sneak into the Party". Henceforth membership recruitment should in general be suspended, and retrenchment and consolidation of Party organizations were to be carried out by the weeding out of undesirable elements. There is little doubt that this directive was connected with the overall precaution against possible KMT reprisals.

The Politburo's decisions to suspend Party expansion and tighten up the Party's organization were elaborated by many CCP leaders in the following months. In mid-September, Ch'en Shao-yü also personally convened an enlarged meeting of the Southern Bureau and conveyed the Politburo's decision concerning party consolidation. According to Ch'en Jan, who attended the meeting, Ch'en Shao-yü stated that the purpose of the new orientation was to enable the Party "to
undertake a long period of secret preparation in order to accumulate strength and await favourable opportunities to reassert itself". 39

Although Ch'en Shao-yü appeared as firm as everyone else in resisting the Nationalist anti-Communist activities, it can be assumed that the deterioration in KMT-CCP relations undercut Ch'en's position vis-a-vis Mao. As the KMT was not prepared to tolerate any degree of Communist expansion in spite of the CCP's repeated pledges of support for the Nationalist Government, Ch'en Shao-yü's attempt to seek CCP expansion through legal channels and through earnest cooperation with the KMT was shown to be impracticable and ill-advised. At the same time, Mao's earlier suspicion of the Nationalists' intention to grant political and democratic reforms was verified, and it became clear that the only means whereby the CCP could expand its organization and influence was to act independently without concerning itself with the legal limits imposed by the KMT. Admittedly, such an approach would inevitably lead to friction with the KMT, but to Mao such frictions were not only unavoidable but necessary, since only through such frictions could the undesirable elements in the united front be exposed and eradicated. This approach, now vindicated by the domestic developments in the country, apparently received strong support in the Party. On July 7, Chang Wen-t'ien proudly declared that the CCP had as early as the October 1937 (Loch'uan) Resolution foreseen the "dangers of retreat, disintegration and treachery" within the anti-Japanese camp. 40 On August 7, he further proclaimed that since different classes had different "standpoints", conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was inevitable even in a common struggle against the external enemy. The present "frictions" (mo-ts'a) in the united front, he claimed, were a concrete manifestation of class interests in conflict. "We naturally oppose all unnecessary frictions", he asserted, "but the danger of split in the united front ... can only be overcome by incessant struggle". 41 According to latter-day accounts, in November 1939 Liu Shao-ch'i also pointed out to Party members of the Central Plain Bureau that during an "anti-Communist high-tide", struggles, not concessions, must be emphasized. The Communists need not be afraid of mo-ts'a, because they were unavoidable in the united front, and must confront them with determined fan-mo-ts'a (anti-friction). Such actions, he asserted, would not weaken the united front; on the contrary, they would strengthen it. 42 Statements to this effect are available from an internal directive issued by the Party branch in Shanxi in August, but the directive also stated that because of the overriding importance of the national contradiction
over the class contradiction within the country, the majority of the bourgeoisie would stay in the war and the task of the Party was to win over the progressive elements and isolate the minority diehards.  

With the ascendancy of Mao's line, Ch'en Shao-yü's position suffered a decline. Sometime in July 1939, he was recalled to head the newly established Women's University, a move that might be construed by Party personnel as an indication of his declining prestige. But his influence in the Party was by no means extinct. In September, he returned to Chungking to represent the CCP at the People's Political Consultative Assembly. KMT reports in 1940 still referred to him as the chief of the CCP's United Front Department, but there are sources stating that he was relieved of the position in early 1940. If that was so, it was probably not made public, and Nationalist elements failed to perceive any drastic reduction of his authority.

**The Soviet-German Pact and Its Impact on China**

On August 23, the Soviet Union suddenly reached a Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler's Germany. The stage was set for the Second World War when Germany (and shortly after the Soviet Union) invaded Poland on September 1, and Britain and France declared war on Germany. The outbreak of conflagration in Europe could not but encourage Japan to advance further into China; the Soviet Union's conduct was therefore considered inimical to China's interests in many quarters.

As the CCP had steadfastly opposed any attempt to establish relations with Germany, the Soviet Union's action naturally caused considerable embarrassment to the CCP. Moreover, since the CCP had consistently championed the closest ties with the Soviet Union, its own public image would suffer if it allowed the Soviet Union's position to be disparaged in China. In fact, Jen Tao-hsun immediately seized upon the opportunity to denounce the Soviet Union. In an interview given on September 1, Mao took pains to explain the CCP's interpretation of the situation. The Soviet-German pact, he declared, represented a triumph of the Soviet Union's "peace policy" and its socialist development which had forced Germany to succumb to its might and abandon its anti-Soviet policy. The Soviet Union signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany because of the insincerity of the British and French Governments in participating in the "peace front" with the Soviet Union. With the
termination of the "appeasement" and "non-intervention" policies, the British and French Governments were now actively preparing for predatory wars against Germany for the acquisition of more colonies. This brought the situation in Europe to a new stage of imperialistic wars, and the Soviet Union was the only power which championed the rights of the broad masses of the world. Mao's commitment to the cause of the Soviet Union took him so far as to suggest that "should Germany and Italy cease aiding the enemy, we might consider improving our relations with them to weaken Japan". 48

Mao's analysis of the international situation received the strong support of Chang Wen-t'ien and, naturally, Ch'en Shao-yü, both of whom denounced Britain and France and defended the Soviet Union's foreign policy in a similar fashion. All three proclaimed the Soviet invasion of Poland as the liberation of the Polish people. 49 On account of the fact that the Soviet Union and Japan had just ended the border clash at Nomonhan with an armistice, both Mao and Ch'en hinted at the possibility of a Russian rapprochement with Japan. 50 They assured the Chinese public, however, that the Soviet Union would continue its support to China, both spiritually and materially. On September 20, Mao further asserted that the interests of the Soviet Union were identical with the interests of all people in the world. 51 On the occasion of Stalin's birthday in December 1939, Mao, along with Chu Teh and other leaders who offered eulogistic remarks about Stalin, declared Stalin to be China's greatest friend and condemned the Western Powers for their lack of material support for China. 52 The outpouring of these materials could hardly have created doubts in anyone's mind about the sincerity of Mao's statements. This is confirmed by the observations of contemporaries, such as Freda Utley, who publicly expressed her disillusionment with the CCP for its "blind devotion" to the Soviet Union; and Edgar Snow, who cited the CCP's loyal support for the Soviet Union as proof that the Chinese Communists were dedicated "internationalists". 53 As Mao personally explained to Snow, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was a "strategic military necessity" to safeguard the Soviet Union from a possible Anglo-German attack. The advantage was definitely on the side of the Soviet Union, and Mao believed Stalin had "Hitler in his pocket". 54 It would be unrealistic to assume that Mao's statement contained implicit criticism of Stalin. 55
However, there was one area of disagreement between Mao and the RRS. Probably because Roosevelt declared America to be in a state of "Limited Emergency" which committed the United States to the Allies, Mao on September 14 opened an attack on the United States for "reaping profit" from the imperialist war, just as she had taken advantage of the Sino-Japanese conflict. At the same time, Mao also denounced Britain as the number-one reactionary government in the world. In his speech on the international situation published on September 20 in Chungking, however, Ch'en Shao-yü did not criticize the United States. According to Edgar Snow, who interviewed Ch'in Pang-hsien in Chungking on October 9, Ch'in told him that Mao had attacked Britain too strongly, neglecting the possibility that Britain and the Soviet Union might yet get together against Germany. (Subsequent events show that Ch'in was correct.) He further disclosed to Snow that the Communist Party office had wired Mao to "leave America out" of his attack on "imperialist warmongers". The issue may have been connected with the fact that the Chungking Government was still positively on the side of Britain and American, and Ch'en and his associates in Chungking did not wish to carry the attack on these two Powers too far, thus embarrassing the Nationalist Government. The CCP Central Committee's resolution of October 10, drafted by Mao, subsequently dropped all criticisms against the United States and softened its attitude towards Britain. This incident shows that Mao's views could still be successfully challenged by the RRS. With their differences resolved, the editorial in Chieh-fang was able to declare on December 11 that the developments in the international situation had proven the correctness of the analyses of Mao, Ch'en and Chang Wen-t'ien.

Just as expected, the Japanese Command regrouped its forces and renewed its offensive against the Chinese resistance forces in Central and North China. Since neither the Soviet Union nor the Western Powers were likely to render support to China because of their pre-occupation with Europe, China was virtually isolated in its struggle against Japanese aggression. The sense of isolation was doubly felt by the Communists who feared that the intensified Japanese attack might induce the landlord-capitalist classes to waver and compromise with Japan, giving rise to a relative increase in anti-Communist activities. All in all, this explains why the CCP (especially Mao), in all its statements, stressed "relying primarily on our own efforts" in order
to win final victory, although the necessity to secure help from abroad should be no means be ignored. To overcome the existing difficulties, the CCP had but two workable lines of action: to prevail upon the KMT to reverse its anti-Communist policy and to build up the guerrilla bases in the countryside to sustain China's resistance.

It appears that all CCP leaders agreed on the above solutions. Anticipating the Fourth Session of the People's Political Consultative Assembly scheduled for September 1939, Mao, Ch'en and other delegates forwarded an open letter to the Assembly. Politically, it called for greater efforts to overcome the anti-Communist elements, and urged the granting of legal and democratic rights to all anti-Japanese groups and associations. In the sphere of military strategy, it called for widespread guerrilla activities behind enemy lines to build up China's strength in preparation for the counteroffensive. These proposals became the basis of Ch'en Shao-yü and Ch'in Pang-hsien's activities at the Assembly.

In the Assembly, which met between September 9 and 18, Ch'en Shao-yü moved a motion for the cancellation of all measures of the Nationalist Government restricting the activities of alien parties, the proper execution of the Three People's Principles and the granting of a constitution safeguarding the liberty and democratic rights of the people. Ch'in Pang-hsien, in turn, proposed the adoption of widespread guerrilla activities behind enemy lines and urged the Nationalist Government to assist the development of the guerrilla forces, assign to the guerrilla leaders political and military power, and punish those who opposed the guerrilla movement and created tensions in the country. Outside the Assembly, Ch'en Shao-yü, Tung Pi-wu and Lin Po-ch'ü also debated with KMT officials on the necessity to terminate the KMT's one-party dictatorship. Chiang Kai-shek, however, declined to consider the CCP's proposals. Ch'en Shao-yü then attempted to circulate a lengthy report of the Assembly in the Hsin-hua jih-pao, listing the CCP's and other parties' proposals for reforms. Inspite of its conciliatory tone, the paper was banned from circulation by the Nationalist authorities.
Ch'en Shao-yü's demand for political reforms and implicit criticism of the Nationalist Government's condoning of anti-Communist activities invited immediate retribution from the CCP's critics. In a secret KMT's intelligence report of November 1939, Ch'en Shao-yü was named as the chief culprit of a Communist conspiracy against the KMT. Ch'en's proclamation that the CCP would not abandon communism and his slogans for the united front were regarded as a cloak for the CCP's aim at seizing the leadership of mass organizations and aggrandizing the CCP and other pro-Communist organizations. In early 1940, a pro-Nationalist publisher in Chungking circulated a booklet entitled "An Overall Review of the Recent Statements of Mao Tse-tung and Ch'en Shao-yü". Of the ten articles assembled, six were directed exclusively at Ch'en, while two were directed at Mao. Specifically, Ch'en was attacked for having distorted the Three People's Principles, having adhered to communism as the CCP's ultimate programme, having criticized the Government's lack of concern for the livelihood of the people in its project for developing the provinces of Szechwan and Sik'ang, and having insisted on the complete independence of the Red Army and the Soviets. One critic wrote: "Ch'en Shao-yü is truly an expert in creating friction between the two parties, and has a talent for disrupting national unity and solidarity". Another concluded: "although Ch'en Shao-yü raised high the call for support of the Government, in reality he has not ceased the conspiracy [against the Government]". In an anti-Communist tract published in 1941, Ch'en Shao-yü was named the most extreme critic of the Three People's Principles.

If Ch'en Shao-yü had entertained hopes of improving KMT-CCP relations, his attempt had completely failed. In a speech of October 1939 commemorating Lu Hsun, he alluded to the presence of "Li Ching-weis" and "Chang Ching-weis" in the anti-Japanese camp who were bent on creating friction and splitting the united front. The only alternative left for the CCP to develop its strength was to expand independently the guerrilla base areas.

It is small wonder that Mao at this particular juncture produced a sophisticated treatise on the nature of the Party's policies in the Anti-Japanese United Front entitled "Introducing The Communists", published on October 4, 1939 in the newly founded CCP organ Kung-chao tang-jen (The Communists). Since the journal was strictly reserved for internal circulation there can be little doubt that Mao was giving his
true opinions. At the outset, Mao stated: "the united front, armed struggle and Party construction" were the "three magic weapons" of the CCP to win victory over the enemy. He then reviewed the Party's united front policy and reaffirmed the correctness and the necessity to ally with the national bourgeoisie, failure to do so would be "leftist opportunism". But because of the vacillations within the bourgeois camp, especially the big bourgeoisie, who would attempt to suppress or eliminate the proletarian party, the CCP must strengthen itself and avoid the mistakes of "rightist opportunism". The proper line for the united front was "unity and struggle", i.e., to maintain the united front with the bourgeoisie but at the same time conduct a "peaceful" and "bloodless" struggle against them. At the time when the proletarian party was forced to break with the bourgeoisie, the form of struggle would be armed struggle.

Secondly, Mao asserted that the history of the CCP in the past eighteen years was the history of armed struggle. Citing Stalin to support his assertion, he claimed that armed struggle was, in essence, peasant wars. The Party, according to Mao, had a rich experience in organizing peasant warfare, and its most valuable asset was in guerrilla warfare. Without armed struggle and without guerrilla warfare, Mao declared, the CCP and the proletariat "would have no standing at all in China".

Thirdly, Mao maintained that the Party must pay attention to the Bolshevization of the Communist Party, strengthen its discipline and organization, and improve the level of Marxism-Leninism by integrating theory with the concrete practice of the revolution. In particular, Mao called for a resolute struggle against the past mistakes of "leftist" and "rightist opportunism". (Further discussion on this point is reserved for the next Chapter.) Mao then explained the interrelations between the three strategies as such:

Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's position.

Mao ended his article by calling for a proper coordination of the three.
The real significance of this article, in my opinion, lies in the fact Mao remained firmly committed to the united front strategy despite the rapid deterioration in the KMT-CCP relations. While the Party was to build up its military strength in the countryside, it must not forego prematurely the united front lest the counterrevolutionary forces would converge on the CCP. Conversely, the united front must not interfere with the CCP’s independent development, lest the Party would be ill-prepared for the final showdown. Hence, the CCP was to unite with and "struggle" against its allies in the united front. This explains why Mao regarded the united front and armed struggle as the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy, and the Party should properly coordinate these two strategies. In executing this dualistic policy, the CCP was to steadily push for expansion in the countryside without fear of confronting the local Nationalist troops, but such actions must not endanger the very existence of the alliance with the KMT on the national level.

Mao’s line received the firm support of the CCP leadership. On October 10, 1939, the CCP Central Committee adopted a resolution, drafted by Mao, on "The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party" which, while calling for support for Chiang Kai-shek and the maintenance of the united front, stressed that the critical military situation necessitated the persistence in guerrilla warfare and the consolidation of the guerrilla bases. On October 24, Chang Wen-t’ien declared that the current situation demanded a reversal of the formal strategy of relying on regular warfare at the front as the main form of combat and on guerrilla warfare in the rear as auxilliary. Henceforth the function of guerrilla units was not to confront the enemy but to consolidate the guerrilla bases. This strategy was also backed up solidly by P’eng Teh-huai, who declared that past experience in the War of Resistance in North China had proven the correctness of Mao’s "On Protracted War" and the strategy of sustaining the resistance in the countryside. By far the most interesting example of support given to Mao was the article written by Ai Ssu-ch’i, the Party’s theoretician, entitled "Unity and Struggle" published on October 30, 1939 in Chieh-fang. The article was the first public statement which elaborated the concept of "unity and struggle" as two aspects of a contradiction that are at once opposite to and identical with each other - based on the principle of dialectical materialism. It was ostensibly a theoretical justification of the CCP’s dualistic policy of both unity and struggle vis-a-vis the KMT.
On November 1, 1939, the CCP Central Committee complemented the new orientation by adopting a resolution "On the Work of Penetrating the Masses", which obviously bore the imprint of Mao's strategic thinking. The decision began with the assertion that "the CCP must further rely on the masses, and must penetrate and work among the masses in order to overcome any possible danger of capitulation or of anti-Communism". It criticized the past tendency of stressing united front activities among the upper strata and neglecting activities among the lower strata of the masses - a likely criticism of Ch'en Shao-yü, who had laid excessive emphasis on united front among the upper strata - and the incorrect and inadequate coordination between open and secret work as in the days of Kiangsi. Nevertheless, it advocated: "In the KMT areas the mass activities of the Party must be carried on by using every possibility for public and legal activity .... At the same time, the organizational work of the Party should be kept strictly secret, for only thus can it be preserved and consolidated". In the Communist base areas, enforcement of the rent and interest reduction as well as improvement in workers' welfare should be carried out in order to win the support of the masses. At the same time, the united front "from above" with landlords and capitalists who "do not oppose the mass movements" and who "can still be helpful to us in the Anti-Japanese War" should still be preserved. The importance of this directive is that it called for a greater effort to mobilize the lower masses, but not at the expense of the united front with the bourgeois strata. (See below for further explanation.)

It is interesting to note that while several CCP leaders and military commanders, such as Ch'en Yün, Li Fu-ch'un, Chang Wen-t'ien and Kuan Feng were referring to the mobilization of the masses in the countryside. Yang Shang-k'un and Wang Chia-hsiang emphatically stated that the Party must strengthen the workers' composition in the Party organization (in line with Ch'en Shao-yü's March Politburo deliberations). In his article of September 1939, Wang stressed that although the Party had shifted its centre of activities to the countryside, it should not give up its effort to increase proletarian elements. He specified that the ratio of peasant elements to the peasant population must not exceed the ratio of worker elements to the worker population. In November, Yang Shang-k'un referred to a recent survey of the composition of Party members in North China, which showed that between sixty and eighty percent of Party members were of peasant origin, while less than five to ten percent were workers. He concluded, therefore, that the Party must
strive to increase worker elements. These articles show that the RRS continued to attach great importance to the actual composition of the workers element whereas other leaders such as Ch'en Yûn and Liu Shao-ch'i gave only a perfunctory recognition to the leading role of the proletariat, stressing that to be a good Communist largely depended on self-discipline and self-cultivation, and not on social or economic background. There is little doubt that Ch'en Yûn and Liu in particular were writing in support of Mao's thesis that the Chinese revolution could be launched successfully with minimal participation from workers.

Another group which Mao especially wanted to win over was the intellectuals. In a Central decision on "The Absorption of Intellectual Elements" drafted by Mao on December 1, 1939, it was stressed that "in its protracted and cruel war of national liberation,... the CCP must know well how to attract the intellectual elements before it will be able ... to organize the tens of millions of the peasant masses". To this effect, the directive stated: "All Party units ... should strive to induce large numbers of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals to join our army, enter our schools, and work in our government ... As for those who are unable or unwilling to join the Party, we should establish smooth working relations with them and induce them to cooperate with us". Several articles by leading members of the Party expounding the proper relations between the Party and the intellectuals called for the removal of the suspicion of the old cadres and army professionals towards the new cadres of intellectual origin, and the wooing of the intellectuals' support for the revolution. Thus, Mao clearly recognized the importance of maintaining the united front with the intellectual elements.

Sometime towards the end of 1939, the CCP Central Committee also issued a directive on the "Tactics of work among Allied Troops" which called for efforts to win over the army officers and rank-and-file of other armies including the Nationalist troops to the Communist camp. More importantly, the Communists should infiltrate the Nationalist armies, especially the local armies which were dissatisfied with the Nationalist Government. As the KMT-CCP relations had deteriorated rapidly since the fall of Wuhan, it concluded, this work had assumed a proportion of great importance. This directive was a typical manifestation of Mao's policy of "unity and struggle" vis-a-vis the KMT.
Mao's new orientation toward the United front naturally invited KMT reaction. According to KMT intelligence reports, the discovery of Mao's "Introducing The Communists" calling for "unity and struggle" against the KMT caused consternation among the Nationalist authorities. At the same time, regional Nationalist organs reported on the unlawful activities of the Communist troops. The KMT began to impose a military blockade on the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, carried out by Ch'eng Ch'ien, the commander of the T'ienshui Headquarters (in charge of overall operations north of the Yangtze River), while units in other areas were probably also alerted to the same effect. The result was continual, increasingly serious, armed clashes between the local Nationalist and Communist troops. In November 1939, the "Chu-kou Incident" broke out in the New Fourth Army base which involved over a hundred CCP casualties. In December, military clashes took place in several places, including southeastern and northwestern Shansi, the Lung-tung area of Shen-Kan-Ning, and the Sui-ti area in northeastern Shen-Kan-Ning. At the same time, the "New Army and Old Shensi Army Incident" broke out in Shansi, where troops loyal to Yen Hsi-shan attacked the Communist-inspired Dare-to-die corps under Po I-po. These incidents marked the beginning of the so-called the "first anti-Communist high-tide". Both sides accused each other of aggressive actions. In early January, General Ch'en Ch'eng made a broadcast in Shao-kuan accusing the Communists of "roaming without striking" (yu-erh pu-chi, a stinging pun on the Communist guerrilla warfare) and claimed that in Yenan there was not a single wounded soldier. This was the first occasion in which a top-ranking KMT general laid charges against the Communists. In reply, Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai immediately circulated a telegram protesting that Ch'en Ch'eng's allegations were totally spurious. In March 1940, Ch'eng Ch'ien prepared a pamphlet entitled Summary of Facts about Illegal Activities and Sabotage of the War of Resistance by the Chinese Communists. The Political Department of the Eighteenth Route Army counteracted by issuing a pamphlet of its own entitled From Where Does Friction Come? Both sides listed what they considered as concrete proof of the other parties' guilt.
In spite of these mounting tensions, both the KMT and the CCP were apparently unwilling to split the united front. Besides the realization that a civil war in the midst of Resistance was suicidal for China, both sides were apparently courting public support by appearing as conciliatory. Earlier in November 1939, the various political parties including the China Youth Party, the National Socialist Party, the Third Party, the Vocational Education Group, and the Rural Constructionists (headed by Liang Sou-ming) organized themselves into a United National Construction League (T'ung-i chien-kuo t'ung-chih hui) principally for the purpose of agitating for constitutional rule. (See below.) In March, when a conflict occurred between the Eighth Route Army and Nationalist troops in southwestern Hopei, the League offered to mediate and submitted a plan for the reconciliation of the difference between the two parties. Chiang Kai-shek, on his part, ordered the withdrawal of Ch'eng Ch'ien's pamphlet. The CCP, on the other hand, continued to hold that friction was local and laid charges against only the reactionaries and pro-Japanese elements.

**New Democracy**

With the defection of Wang Ching-wei and the increase in anti-Communist activities, the united front composition had changed and the Party needed to redefine its class policies and set out its objectives in a clear-cut manner. In early December, Mao and several leaders of the CCP composed a treatise entitled "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" as the guideline for the Party in the present stage of the revolution. This article, published unsigned in Kung-ch'an-tang jen, provided the theoretical foundation for Mao's "On New Democracy" written shortly afterwards.

In the article, Mao reaffirmed that the contradiction between Japan and China was still the principal one in the country, although the contradictions between feudalism and the masses and between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat still existed. The main target of the revolution, therefore, was to overthrow imperialism and the semi-feudal forces which collaborated with the enemy or were prepared to surrender to the enemy. Since the forces of the enemy were so formidable, the revolutionary struggle had to be protracted and the revolutionary forces had to build up and accumulate their strength for a long time before they could crush the enemy. These conditions, as Stalin had pointed out, determined that
the form of revolutionary struggle had to be armed struggle. Since the imperialists and their reactionary allies had long occupied the cities, it was necessary to develop the revolution in the countryside through peasant guerrilla warfare. This did not mean, however, that the Party would afford to ignore the work in the cities, since the final objective of the revolution was the capture of the cities and this could not be achieved without adequate work in the cities. (This statement shows that Mao was of the opinion that urban work was also important although it was supplementary to work in the countryside.)

Mao then elaborated on the attitudes of the different classes in the present stage of the Chinese revolution. The landlord class, naturally, was the target of the revolution, but during the anti-Japanese struggle sections of the landlord class, especially small and middle landlords as well as enlightened gentry, could participate in the united front. While a section of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie had already capitulated to the enemy (i.e., the Wang Ching-wei group), another section of diehards, who were pro-American and pro-British, though waverings, were still in the anti-Japanese camp. The Party's policy towards the latter section, therefore, was unity and struggle, i.e., unite with them against Japan but struggle against their tendency to compromise with Japan and to oppose the Communists. The Party should firmly ally with the national bourgeoisie because of their useful role in the national resistance and the rich peasants who could still perform a useful function in promoting the rural economy. Needless to say, the leading role of the revolution belonged to the proletariat and its reliable allies were the peasants and petty bourgeoisie.

Mao then asked himself the question "What is the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage? Is it a bourgeois-democratic or a proletarian-socialist revolution"? and answered: "Obviously, not the latter but the former". (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, Mao proclaimed that China was in an unique stage of development, which was different from the old type of bourgeois-democratic revolution in Europe and America as well as from the new type of socialist revolution of the Soviet Union, and should be called a "new democratic revolution". "During the Anti-Japanese War", he wrote "the Anti-Japanese democratic regime that ought to be established is a regime of the Anti-Japanese United Front', comprising all those who
stand for resistance against Japan and for democracy." It was neither a "one-class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" nor a "one-class dictatorship of the proletariat", but a "joint dictatorship of several classes". This did not mean, however, that the Communists would give up the socialist revolution: but before they could achieve socialism, they had to pass through the stage of "new democratic revolution". This "new democratic revolution" had to be achieved under the leadership of the proletariat which would safeguard its future transformation of the revolution to the socialist phase. It would be naive, Mao emphatically concluded, to regard the present revolution or the land revolution as a socialist revolution.92

The key point of this article is to delineate the changing composition of the united front as a result of the changes in the domestic conditions. A section of the upper bourgeoisie, i.e., the pro-Japanese section, had become the target of the revolution and was excluded from the united front. Another section of the upper bourgeoisie, i.e., the pro-American and pro-British one (Chiang Kai-shek and his followers), had begun to waver and turned anti-Communists while remaining in the united front. The tactics of the Party towards the latter group was "unity and struggle". The national bourgeoisie, which included the majority of the KMT and other parties, were still bona fide members of the united front but they were incapable of providing leadership in the Resistance, which had to be assumed by the proletariat and the Communist Party. All these undoubtedly brought about a certain "radicalization" of the united front, in the sense that they were given greater freedom to mobilize the lower masses on account of the fact that the former fear of unduly antagonizing the big bourgeoisie and big landlords had been removed, and the lower strata had to be fortified to withstand the pressure of the upper strata. But the inherent danger of the situation required the CCP to further consolidate its alliance with the national bourgeoisie, and retain the united front with the wavering elements until they actually turned pro-Japanese. This new analysis of the class composition of the united front was applied by Li Wei-han to the economic policy of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. He called for the reduction of feudal exploitation by the landlords but reaffirmed the capitalist structure of the economy,93 thus suggesting that the Party should undertake further mobilization of the peasant masses by reducing (but not eliminating) feudal exploitation and retain the cooperation with the national bourgeoisie.
Before we turn to Mao's treatise "On New Democracy", it is necessary first of all to look at its proper historical background. As noted earlier, the CCP's united front policy had come under attack from Trotskyites and anti-Communist writers. In late 1938, Jen Tso-hsüan, who had hitherto criticized the CCP's policies from a "Marxist" viewpoint, began to embrace the Three People's Principles and assumed, with the patronage of the Nationalist Government, the role of guardian and genuine interpreter of Sun Yat-sen's teachings. In several pieces of writing widely circulated in Sian, Chungking and Kweilin, Jen launched a frontal attack on Marxism-Leninism, declaring it unsuitable for Chinese conditions and urging the Chinese Communists to give up their erroneous "foreign" doctrine. The Three People's Principles, he proclaimed, was the only indigenous and sublime ideology that was appropriate for China. Hence, what China needed was a "one-stage" revolution (i.e., the execution of the Three People's Principles) and not a "two-stage" one as expounded by Mao in "On the New Stage". At the same time, Chang Kuo-t'ao's open letter and Liu Ning's (Chu Ch'i-hua, an ex-Communist) exposé of the CCP's "treachery" were widely circulated. Concrete evidence is not available, but there are signs indicating that towards the end of 1939 the CCP's prestige had suffered a eclipse. According to several non-Communist sources, a considerable number of young Party members, disillusioned with the austere life in the Communist region and its lack of sincerity in the support for the Nationalist resistance programme, departed Yenan. This phenomenon is attested to by the recollections of a number of defectors on their experience in Yenan (notably Ssu-ma Lu's memoirs). The CCP thus faced the threat of losing the confidence of its sympathizers.

In mid-1939, the CCP began to respond seriously to the charges of Jen Tso-hsüan and other critics. In a series of articles, the CCP's theoreticians Ai Ssu-ch'i and Ch'en Po-ta strenuously defended the applicability of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions and stressed that Marxism-Leninism was adaptable to the national characteristics of each country. Earlier, in September 1938, Ai Ssu-ch'i and Ch'en Po-ta had founded the Society of New Philosophy dedicated to the popularization of Marxist philosophy; in early 1940 the Society published Chung-kuo wen-hua (Chinese Culture). Its inaugural issue featured Ai's article "On the Particular Character of China", which explicitly attacked and systematically refuted Jen Tso-hsüan's assertion that Marxism did not fit in with the Chinese society. At the same time, CCP leaders such as Chang Wen-t'ien,
Wang Chia-hsiang and others also composed a series of articles to reject the view that communism was incompatible with the Three People’s Principles, though admitting that there were certain basic differences between the two sets of ideology. Denouncing Jen Tso-hsüan’s interpretation of the Three People’s Principles as a distortion of Sun Yat-sen’s true teachings, they claimed that the Communists would support the true programme of Sun whole-heartedly during the present stage of the revolution. Nevertheless, since Jen’s ideas had considerable influence among the intellectuals - the CCP’s serious efforts to denounce him is a good testimony to this fact - and the Nationalist authorities were apparently making available all their facilities to promote Jen’s writings, the CCP had to launch a full-scale campaign to defend itself. The urgency of the situation was clearly reflected in Mao’s writing of March 1940:

In our struggle to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate and diehard forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals, whom the diehards are doing their utmost to win over; therefore it is an important and indeed an essential policy to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring them under the influence of the Party.

Accordingly, the Central Secretariat of the CCP issued a directive in early 1940 "On the Unfolding of the Cultural Movement" which called upon all Party units to campaign for the "anti-Japanese cultural movement" in the KMT-controlled areas, a task which it decreed to be of "primary importance" at the present stage. The purpose of the campaign was "to unite with all liberal bourgeois (national bourgeois) intellectuals who do not oppose the Communists and all petty bourgeois intellectuals", so as to avoid being isolated from the entire bourgeois strata.

Between January 4 and 12, 1940, the CCP held a Conference of Representatives of the Cultural Association of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, at which leading political and theoretical leaders of the CCP, including Mao, Ch’en Shao-yü, Chang Wen-t’ien, Ai Ssu-ch’i and Chou Yang delivered important speeches. Since the sections on politics and culture of Mao’s "On New Democracy" appeared in Chung-kuo Wen-hua and Ch’ih-chung as the formal declaration of the conference, it is my inference that Mao’s "On New Democracy", either in part or in whole, was originally a speech delivered at the conference.
At the very beginning of his treatise, Mao addressed himself to the problem of culture at a time when anti-Communist allegations were mounting. Since culture was a reflection of the politics and economics of society, Mao proposed to discuss first of all the characteristics of the Chinese revolution at the present stage. On the basis of China's historical development and its inseparable relationship with the world revolutionary movement, Mao asserted that China was in a stage of new democratic revolution. In the political sphere, the new democratic republic was to be based on a "dictatorship of several revolutionary classes" and political power was to be exercised on the principle of "democratic centralism", in the form of a hierarchy of local assemblies up to a national congress, all elected on the basis of universal and equal rights. In economics, Mao asserted that since the Chinese economy was still backward, it was necessary to permit the existence of private property and capitalist production, so long as they did not "dominate the livelihood of the people on a national scale". In regard to land policies, certain measures would be adopted to confiscate the holdings of big landlords and re-distribute them to the peasants; but the rich-peasant economy was not to be affected. This economic programme, Mao added, was in complete harmony with Sun Yat-sen's aim of "regulation of capital" and "land to the tillers".

Mao then dismissed as "leftist empty-talk" the idea of implementing socialism before the completion of the new democratic revolution, since the latter "will take quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight". The Communists, Mao explained, distinguished between the Three People's Principles as the basic or present programme and communism as the higher or future programme, and supported whole-heartedly the true or new Three People's Principles based on the welfare of the workers and peasants. Mao explicitly attacked Jen Tso-hsiian and Chang Chun-mai for the theory of the "one-stage" revolution and the demand for the dissolution of the CCP. At the same time, Mao also ridiculed other advocates of a "one-stage" revolution (i.e., the Trotskyites), who attempted to incorporate the tasks of the socialist revolution in the stage of the democratic revolution, as utopians.
Mao concluded by saying that the new culture should serve and reflect the interests of the "awakened" bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat - which were represented by both the KMT and the CCP. Nevertheless, since only the proletariat was capable of leading the revolution, the new cultural movement, which was to be "scientific, democratic and based on the masses", had to be led by the proletariat.

It is clear that "On New Democracy" is a direct response to the charges of the Trotskyites and the anti-Communist critics that the CCP had either given up socialism or was insincere in its united front programme. Since the latter group posed a far more potent challenge at this stage, and Mao therefore devoted a major portion of his treatise to refuting their allegations. This involved a confirmation of the CCP's sincere support for the Three People's Principles, a positive endorsement of a long-term collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, a de-emphasis on such themes as socialism and the agrarian revolution, a guarantee of the property rights of rich peasants and the national bourgeoisie, and finally an expression of a desire for peaceful coexistence with the KMT in a political system based on free elections.

It would be unjustified, therefore, to assume that "On New Democracy" was a radical statement written for the purpose of pressing for the realization of socialism, or as a declaration of war against both the KMT and the Soviet Union by rejecting bourgeois-democracy in China. Such an interpretation is not only divorced from the spirit of the document, but also fails to take into account the current dispute between the CCP and its critics, and the need to retain public trust in the CCP's united front programme. Nevertheless, Mao did introduce a more radical policy towards the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, whose property would be confiscated in the new democratic republic. (These measures were still far from socialism, under which all private wealth would be expropriated.)

According to several Japanese intelligence reports, the CCP Central Committee convened a meeting on February 20, 1940 to deliberate on Mao's "On New Democracy". At the meeting, severe opposition and criticism were raised by some leaders against certain portions of Mao's thesis, and Mao was obliged to make amendments and revisions before the work finally appeared in full in June 1940. Several years later, the Nationalist Minister of Information disclosed to the American diplomatic corps in Chungking that Mao's view on "New Democracy" was not unchallenged.
within the Party, and he identified Ch'en Shao-yü as the leader of the opposition. Ch'en Shao-yü himself, in his memoir, affirms this and claims that the amendments Mao made in response to his criticism were insubstantial and did not change Mao's own basic stand on the issue. Yet, curiously, in spite of the massive literature on Ch'en Shao-yü's alleged opposition to Mao's policies, Maoist historians fail to mention that Ch'en had voiced objection to Mao's thesis "On New Democracy".

On what grounds did Ch'en Shao-yü oppose Mao's thesis? The contemporary Japanese and Chinese reports offer no clues to the question. According to Ch'en himself, he objected to Mao's thesis because it was anti-Leninist and anti-socialist: it denied the possibility of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution based on socialist politics, economics and culture; instead it sought to establish a new democratic republic under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie based on bourgeois politics, economics and culture. To those who are accustomed to the belief that Ch'en was a "rightist opportunist" who was prepared to abandon socialism for the sake of the united front with the KMT, this account would appear totally fictitious. But when stripped of its blatant anti-Mao bias, Ch'en's retrospective version does offer an unique angle for assessing the existing ideological confrontation between the two leaders, as well as Mao's theoretical contribution to Marxism-Leninism.

The issue at stake is fundamentally doctrinal. It is true that Lenin and Stalin had advanced the "four-class bloc" to justify the First United Front, but to both leaders the inclusion of the national bourgeoisie was only an expedient measure, i.e., their participation was useful, and indeed essential, for the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But inasmuch as the victory of the proletariat, according to orthodox Marxist reasoning, presupposes the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, one can speak of, in the case of China, a "worker-peasant" dictatorship but not a dictatorship of several classes. Nevertheless, since the official position of the CCP during the Anti-Japanese United Front was to continue collaboration with the KMT after the war, certain provisions had to be made for the continual collaboration with the bourgeoisie. It is seldom realized that Ch'en Shao-yü had already attempted to tackle the problem in December 1937. Along with his proclamation of a fundamental strategic change in the application of the united front strategy, Ch'en wrote:
The nature of the democratic republic cannot but differ from the old European-American type of democratic republic which is formed as a result of a bourgeois revolution; at the same time, it is not yet the Soviet type or non-capitalistic type of democratic republic .... It is a new type of democratic republic composed of all forces taking part in the War of Resistance.

However, Ch'en did not specify the form or the duration of the alliance with the bourgeoisie after the war. To include the national bourgeoisie in a joint dictatorship with the proletariat, from Ch'en's point of view, would impede the ultimate establishment of the proletariat dictatorship. Similar to the Menshevik platform of long-term participation in a bourgeois-democratic government, Mao's scheme thus appears subversive to socialism. A Marxist-Leninist, therefore, would not put forward the idea of a dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. (Interestingly, Mao's concept of New Democracy was taken up by Jen Tso-hsüan as an attempt to graft Marxism-Leninism to China, which was bound to fail.)

That Ch'en Shao-yü was opposed to the idea of the dictatorship of several revolutionary classes is also supported by "negative" evidence. In his speech given to the Shen-Kan-Ning Cultural Conference, Ch'en repeated most of the points put forward by Mao on the importance of creating a new culture suited to the task of national resistance and national reconstruction: the establishment of a "new democratic republic", unity with non-Communist elements in the "cultural united front", creation of a unique Chinese culture which was "scientific, democratic and based on the masses", and "unity and struggle" in both the cultural and national united fronts. He made no reference, however, to the establishment of a "new democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary forces".

To Mao, however, the idea of the dictatorship of several revolutionary classes was not a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, since the concept of the "four-class bloc" originated with Lenin and Stalin. On the contrary, it could rightfully be regarded as a further development of Marxism-Leninism which, after all, is not a dogma but a guide for action. There were practical reasons for Mao to put forward such a proposition. The CCP was still inferior in numerical and military strength to the KMT and it was being subjected to physical and ideological harassment from the
KMT. The sympathy and support of the bourgeois strata had become a crucial factor in arresting the KMT's attempt to attack the Communists. Under such circumstances, the promise that the CCP would not eliminate capitalism and would cooperate with the national bourgeoisie, including lesser landlords, would allay their fear of communism and effectively isolate the KMT. Mao, therefore, sought to institutionalize the collaboration with the national bourgeoisie in the state political structure of the new democratic republic. (As P'eng Chen admits in 1951, Mao retained the alliance with the national bourgeoisie for the simple purpose of isolating the comprador and the imperialists.)

This is not to say, however, that Mao was simply motivated by Machiavellian realism. There were also good historical reasons for Mao to insist on a regulated "capitalist" phase of economic development for China: her backward and impoverished state of economy required the expertise and collaboration of the national bourgeoisie for a rapid modernization. As Mao stated in June 1949:

The national bourgeoisie at the present stage is of great importance. Imperialism, a most ferocious enemy, is still standing alongside us. China's modern industry still forms a very small proportion of the national economy .... To counter imperialist oppression and to raise her backward economy to a higher level, China must utilize all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood; and we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle.

In the same statement, Mao went a step further in suggesting that the national bourgeoisie would be included in the category of "people" throughout the entire period of socialist revolution until all class differences disappear. Thus, to Mao, the national bourgeoisie could play a positive role not only in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution but also in the transition to communism. To assign to them such an importance clearly exceeded the limits conceded by Lenin and Stalin to the national bourgeoisie in the Chinese revolution, and Mao therefore thought it perfectly justifiable to include the national bourgeoisie in a dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. Such an innovation would also demonstrate the CCP's ability to adapt Marxism-Leninism to China.
If Mao did envisage a gradual approach to China's socialist revolution, one wonders why Mao quickly pushed for the realization of socialism after the Communist victory of 1949. One immediate answer is that in the early forties, Mao and his comrades foresaw a long period of struggle before the Communists could come to power. This can be discerned from Liu Shao-ch'i's secret speech delivered to the security personnel of Yen-ch'eng in April 1941, in which Liu predicted that the Party would need between thirty to fifty years of struggle before it could defeat and overthrow the "enemy". Further, as late as April 1945, when victory over the Japanese was in sight, Mao declared in his speech "On Coalition government" that the new democratic programme would remain unchanged for "several decades". This explain why Mao thought it necessary to retain the cooperation of the national bourgeoisie for an extended period. However, after the victory Mao soon discovered that the continual presence, which very often means dominance, of the national bourgeoisie in the Chinese economy would hinder the rapid communization and socialization of the rural and industrial enterprises. Consequently, he found it necessary to eliminate the influence of the national bourgeoisie. Since New Democracy soon became obsolescent if not obsolete by the mid-fifties, and there were certain validity in Ch'en Shao-yü's criticism, Maoist historians choose not to publicize Ch'en's debate with Mao on the issue. (Moreover, it would contradict the official verdict of Ch'en's "rightist opportunism" in the period of the Anti-Japanese United Front.)

The Struggle against "Left" Deviation, 1940

In January 1940, the secret agreement between Wang Ching-wei and Japan for the establishment of a "New National (Kuomin) Government" was made public. China was confronted with a new crisis as Japan was wooing Nationalist leaders, including Chiang Kai-shek, to participate in the new government. (Only in March when the move received no response did Japan recognize the new regime under Wang Ching-wei.) There is little doubt that the CCP was seriously worried that the KMT might reach some form of settlement with Japan, as it made a strenuous effort to forestall the move. On January 28, shortly after Chiang Kai-shek had publicly denounced Wang Ching-wei's dealings with Japan and reaffirmed the Nationalist Government's uncompromising stand in the Resistance, Mao issued a directive on behalf of the Central Committee to Party members clarifying the Party's position. He gave qualified praise to Chiang's declaration, criticizing
him for his lack of emphasis on national unity but commending him on his avowed determination to resist. He expressed the view that in spite of the increase in anti-Communist activities in the country, the whole of the KMT, because of various internal and external factors, was unlikely to surrender to the enemy. Under such circumstances, the tasks of the Party were to struggle against the anti-Communist diehards but at the same time fight for the greater development of the united front with the KMT majority. On the basis of this directive, the Central Committee adopted a resolution on February 1, warning that the "danger of capitulation and retrogression" was still the main danger in the current situation, and calling for efforts to "overcome the danger of capitulation and retrogression and strive for a turn for the better". The ten-point programme it proposed for achieving this objective included the principle of the union of several revolutionary classes under a "democratic dictatorship". On the same day, a mass rally was held in Yenan to "Support Chiang and Denounce Wang", at which Mao reiterated his earlier prediction at the Sixth Plenum that "the majority of the KMT" would persist in the war and would have a "glorious future" ahead of them, and categorically denounced any attempt to break up the Anti-Japanese United Front as "contrary to the Party's policy". At the rally, Ch'en Shao-yi appeared as a member of the Presidium for the campaign to "Support Chiang and Denounce Wang".

Earlier, the KMT at its Sixth Plenum of November 1939 had promised to establish a constitutional government within a year. Since then, various political parties and national salvationist associations had been agitating for a truly democratic constitution and the extension of civil rights. (The United National Construction League, mentioned earlier, was formed specifically for this purpose.) The CCP naturally participated actively in the movement. On December 9, 1939, Ch'en published an article calling for the promotion of the constitutional movement and elaborating the proper guidelines for the constitution, including the granting of freedom of speech, publication and association to the people, formal recognition of the legal status of all anti-Japanese parties, associations and organizations, and regular election of local and national assemblies. In several Communist publications of the time, Ch'en Shao-yi's enunciation on the proper orientation of the constitution was cited. On February 20, he was further appointed next to Mao in the Yenan Committee for the Promotion of Constitutional Rule. (All these indicate that Ch'en was far from being a publicly disgraced leader in the early months of 1940.)
In an article published on February 29, Ch'en echoed Mao's earlier ten-point programme for the purpose of "overcoming the danger of retrogression and strive for a turn for the better", including the adoption of the principle "if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack", the opening up of mass movements and the improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants by the reduction of rent and interest, the consolidation and establishment of anti-Japanese bases, and the military and ideological strengthening of the Party to prepare for sudden outbreak of local incidents directed against the Communists. On the surface, there were still no signs of disagreement between Mao and Ch'en concerning the united front.

It is clear, however, that Mao was less enthusiastic about the constitutional movement than Ch'en. On February 20, 1940, Mao published an article calling for the promotion of the movement, but his lukewarm support is evident in his warning that the diehards in the Nationalist Government would only grant a constitution "designed to deceive the people". In March, Ch'en Shao-yü again represented the CCP at the People's Political Consultative Assembly and proposed a resolution urging the Nationalist Government to adopt concrete measure to prosecute the War of Resistance, including the call for an early realization of constitutional rule. His proposals were ignored and it appeared that his actions were again construed as a subversive tactic. In late February, Jen Tso-hsiian published a special rejoinder to Ch'en Shao-yü's article to denounce his views on democracy. There is little doubt that the embarrassing demands from the CCP and other political associations discouraged the KMT from calling the scheduled National Assembly. In March 1941, following the New Fourth Army Incident, the Nationalist Government announced the postponement of the National Assembly until after the war. (In the long run, the KMT's failure to grant constitutional government was one of the reasons for the other political parties, which organized themselves into the Chinese Democratic League in March 1941, to shift its allegiance to the CCP and eventually aided the CCP in its struggle against the KMT. Ch'en Shao-yü's efforts, therefore, were not entirely fruitless in so far as discrediting the KMT was concerned.)
As noted previously, the formal establishment of the united front with the KMT had since its very start created discontent among certain Party members who were dissatisfied with the enormous concessions which the Party had to make to the reactionary classes. Such a sentiment naturally resurrected itself in late 1939 and early 1940 with the upsurge of KMT-CCP conflicts. According to Chinese Communist sources, this tendency encouraged the belief that the united front policy was no longer applicable to the situation and the desire to revive the radical land policies of the earlier period. If allowed to develop unchecked, it would undermine the CCP's policy of class collaboration with the national bourgeoisie and the progressive section of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. Accordingly, on March 11, Mao gave the following instructions at a senior cadres' meeting:

The KMT is a heterogeneous party which includes diehards, middle elements, and progressives; taken as a whole, it must not be equated with the diehards. Some people regard the KMT as consisting entirely of diehards, but this is a mistaken view. The diehards in the KMT are numerically in the minority, while the majority of the membership are not necessarily diehards. This point must be clearly recognized if we are to take advantage of the contradictions within the KMT, follow a policy of differentiating between its different sections, and do our utmost to unite with its middle and progressive sections.

In line with this objective, Mao declared that Party members had to observe the following three principles in carrying out "struggle" against the anti-Communist elements: first, "self-defence" which meant that the Communists must never attack unless directly provoked; second, "victory" which meant that the Communists must not attack too many at any one time but should concentrate their attack on the most reactionary elements first, thus ensuring victory; third, "truce" which meant that the Communists, after successfully repulsing one attack from the diehards, should make peace with them so as to avoid continual confrontation. These three principles were characterized as fighting "on just grounds", "to our advantage" and "with restraint". Thus, it is clear that for Mao the struggle against the reactionary elements should not be carried to an extreme, lest it would cause the united front to split.
As a concrete measure to institutionalize the collaboration with progressive landlord-capitalist elements, Mao promulgated the three-thirds system as the appropriate form of political power in all governmental and legislative organs in the anti-Japanese base areas on March 6, 1940. The principal feature of the three-thirds system was that in the political organs of the Communist base areas the Communists formally restricted themselves to a maximum of one-third of all positions, while one-third of the positions were allocated to non-Party leftist progressives and another one-third was reserved for the intermediate group including the KMT members. The reduction of the Communists to one-third of the positions, however, was to be compensated by the selection of Communist representatives of the "highest calibre", so as to ensure the CCP leadership in these organs. Nevertheless, Mao stressed that the allotment of two-thirds of the position to other non-Communist elements must be strictly observed, with only minor adjustment to local conditions. The basic purpose of the system was to "win over the petty bourgeoisie, the middle [i.e., national] bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry" so as to isolate the diehards. Mao warned that "at the moment, the 'leftist' tendency of neglecting the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the most serious danger".

It is not necessary for us to discuss here the question of to what extent the three-thirds system was implemented in the Communist base areas; suffice it to note that there can be no question that this system represented the highwater mark of the Communist attempts to court the support of the landlord-capitalist elites. The advantages of permitting their participation in the CCP's governmental organs were threefold. Firstly, these non-Communist elements, being cemented to a stable political relation with the Party, were precluded from seeking outside help to sabotage the border governments. Secondly, the CCP was able to display to the nation its unswerving loyalty to the principle of cooperation with other classes, as proclaimed in "On New Democracy". Thirdly, the security thus obtained enabled the Communists to conduct mass mobilization work in an orderly and undisrupted manner. To argue that the system was a sham device to give a multi-class appearance while retaining hegemony in Communists' hands, or that it was designed to activate the masses from below rather than to effect a genuine cooperation with the upper classes from above, is to overlook the calculated appeal of the system to the landlord-capitalist elites as a corollary to facilitating the stabilization and consolidation of the base areas.
In accordance with Mao's directives, the CCP's regional bureaux took steps to prevent the emergence of "leftist" tendencies in the struggle against the reactionary and traitorous elements. In April 1940, the Northern Bureau held a conference in Li-ch'eng to re-define tasks of rent and interest reduction and mass organization at the local level. It called for the continuation of the rent reduction policy, but warned against excesses committed against landlords in the process. At the same time, it discouraged radical orientation of mass movements in general. Around this time, the Party branch of Northwestern Shansi also held an administrative conference warning against the "leftist" errors of treating diehards and traitors as the same, imposing excessive financial burdens on landlords and rich peasants, and conducting excessive struggle against counterrevolutionaries without adequate education to reform and win them over. Such excesses, it warned, would cause the landlords and rich peasants to flee from Communist territories and alienate the Party from the middle peasants. The call for the rectification of "leftist" deviation was also upheld by the Communist guerrilla units in Kwangtung. Such a party-wide movement was undoubtedly sponsored by the Central Committee, with Mao personally in command.

Nevertheless, the warning against "leftist opportunism" did not mean that the Party was to abandon altogether its policy of territorial expansion. On May 4, 1940, in a directive addressed to Hsiang Ying's Southeast Bureau, Mao called for the "free expansion of the anti-Japanese forces and resistance against the onslaughts of the anti-Communist diehards". According to Mao's Selected Works, Mao instructed Hsiang Ying:

... in all cases we can and should expand. The Central Committee has pointed out this policy of expansion to you time and again. To expand means to reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the KMT's restrictions, but to go beyond the limits allowed by the KMT .... At a time when the anti-Communist diehards in the KMT are obstinately persisting in their policy of containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party in preparation for capitulation to Japan, we must stress struggle and not unity; to do otherwise would be a gross error.
Mao nonetheless added that "every concrete struggle is defensive, limited and temporary in nature", and that the purpose of this struggle was to "make the diehards somewhat afraid of repressing us ... [and] to make them think twice before causing a split". Similar instructions were given to other units in Shantung and Central China in a military directive of September 10, 1939, calling for steady expansion but warning against unnecessary provocation of Nationalist forces, including the most reactionary and anti-Communist elements.

In the meantime, the KMT and the CCP were engaged in a series of negotiations for the settlement of all outstanding issues. The parleys were apparently concerned with the boundary line of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and the specific spheres of Communist military operation. In May, Chu Teh ordered the Eighth Route Army to withdraw from a number of districts and accepted the demarcation of the areas of operation for the Communist troops in Shansi. According to Nationalist reports, in the same month the CCP resolved at a Party conference that the twenty-three hsien (counties) of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region must remain intact as a basis for further negotiations. This "June proposal", as the CCP's demand came to be called, was partially rejected by the KMT which, at its Seventh Plenum held in early July, put forward the "July counter-proposals", recognizing CCP's jurisdiction in only eighteen hsien and demanding the redeployment of Communist forces to the appropriate war zones. The CCP delegates Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying gave their tentative agreement to the Nationalist Government and returned to Yenan for the final ratification.

Since the anti-Communist high-tide had temporarily subsided, and KMT-CCP relations were restored to normal, the CCP on the occasion of the third anniversary of the War of Resistance in July 1940 renewed its former pledges to the nation: "We always carry out our own promises; we have never once deviated from the September 22 declaration to struggle for the complete realization of the Three People's Principles, to stop the land revolution, and to liquidate the insurrectionary policy". It promised to restrain the Communist forces from operating beyond the designated war zones and strictly forbade them from provoking allied troops, but insisted that the administrative integrity of the twenty-three hsien of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region be respected. At the same time, it also called upon the KMT to rectify its anti-Communist policy and to consolidate the Anti-Japanese United Front. This declaration
was supplemented by Mao's internal statement "Unity to the Very End" calling for struggle against "leftist" opportunism which failed to realize the necessity of allying with non-Communist elements, and against "rightist" opportunism which tended to compromise with the diehards. It ended with the appeal to carry on the Resistance under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.  

That the desire to uphold the united front was not merely a propaganda device but a genuine policy of the CCP is corroborated by the Central Committee resolution of July 7. It stated that the struggle against diehards in the previous months had been necessary, but now that the anti-Communist high-tide had subsided, the Party should emphasize unity again. It noted that the contradiction within the big landlords and big bourgeoisie together with the progressive nature of the intermediate strata had prevented the reactionaries from launching a concerted attack on the Communists. It therefore called for greater emphasis on collaboration with the bourgeois strata and warned against a repetition of the "leftist" errors committed previously. Another Central Committee directive of August 15 was even more explicit in criticizing past mistakes. "Especially since the KMT began carrying out its anti-Communist policy", it stated, "many cadres - even including some leading cadres - have come to feel that the KMT and the Central Armies are all diehards, and that our line is one of opposition, struggle, and preparation for a split .... Some people regard directives of the Central Committee calling for the strengthening of the united front as prattle and gobbledygook that makes little sense".

It was against this background that Chang Wen-t'ien published his article "On the Danger of 'Leftist' Deviation in the Anti-Japanese United Front" on August 10, 1940. Chang made it clear at the outset that the Party had to struggle against both "rightist" and "leftist" opportunism, but that his article would deal only with the aspect of "leftist" deviation. According to Chang, the "leftist" danger expressed itself in the belief among certain comrades that the united front was no longer applicable under adverse circumstances and that continual struggle against the diehards would soon mean the collapse of the united front. This was utterly erroneous since it overlooked the necessity of uniting with all possible allies against the sole enemy of Japanese imperialism and its running dogs at the present stage. The Chinese revolution, Chang
explained, did not necessarily have to pass through the two distinct stages of the united front and land revolution. On the contrary, the new circumstances and new practices had demonstrated that the land problem could be resolved by gradual, reformist methods carried out through the stage of the united front. It would be a mistake, therefore, to abandon the united front and attempt to bring back the radical land policies of the earlier civil war period. Such a policy would only lead to the isolation of the Party from the whole nation. At the end, Chang reiterated Mao's maxim of "fighting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint" in the struggle against the diehards. There can be little doubt that Chang's article was written in direct support of Mao's stand. (As later evidence will show, Mao himself also warned against the restoration of the radical land policies of the Kiangsi Period.)

The CCP's desire to preserve the united front was clearly reflected in the policies adopted by the Border Region Governments. On August 30, the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, hailed as a model base by the Communists during this period, adopted a "Current Administrative Programme" - known as the "Double Ten Programme" because it consisted of twenty points - including the enforcement of the three-thirds system, the rent and interest reduction policy, an "eight-hour" work-day (which was subsequently modified to "ten-hour" in other documents) confiscation of the land of big landlords who had committed "criminal offences" against the people but non-confiscation of the property of diehards, soldiers and officers in puppet governments. As can be seen, the CCP did not wish to antagonize even the anti-Communist and pro-Japanese elements unless they were outright traitors and steadfast opponents of the Communists.

It was largely owing to this general desire to buttress the united front and to combat the tendency toward capitulation within the country that the CCP military commanders launched the so-called Hundred Regiment Offensives in late August. According to Red Guard publications during the Cultural Revolution, the campaign was launched without the prior knowledge of Mao; and Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai have been accused of engaging Communist forces in a risky adventure without Mao's approval. The true story may never be known, but the battle was widely acclaimed in the Communist press. Chu Teh, in particular, called for the enlargement of the Hundred Regiments Offensive in order to secure greater victories.
But the offensive soon brought about a reversal of the situation as the Japanese troops quickly redirected a "mopping-up" campaign against the Communists, with the result that the latter suffered heavy casualties. It appears that the outcome of the campaign confirmed the validity of Mao's many hesitations about mobile warfare, and guerrilla operations became the order of the day.  

In the meantime, the Central Committee issued a series of directives, all demanding improvement in united front work at the lower levels. A directive of September 11, 1940, for example, stated that the possibility of Communists obtaining lower governmental posts within the Nationalist political organs still existed, and CCP members should make full use of such opportunities. It warned against "leftist" mistakes and exhorted the Party members not to criticize the Government unscrupulously or to persist in Communist work-styles, thus isolating themselves from KMT personnel. Another directive issued in mid-September called for expansion of party work in the cities, with Yenan and Chungking serving as the bases for operations in North and South China respectively. It stated that the retreat into the countryside had been correct in the past, but it was time for the Communists to work their way back to the cities. A further directive of October 30 called for emphasis on the wooing of intellectuals, especially the civic and educational groups in the country. On November 2, instructions were given regarding the establishment of united front departments at every level of Party organization wherever this had not already been done. The amount of attention paid to the consolidation and expansion of the united front is ample testimony to the importance which the Party continued to attach to the united front strategy.

Corresponding to the attempt to expand united front work, the Party also reaffirmed its basic strategy of consolidating the rural base areas as the backbone of Communist power. An editorial of the *Hsin Chung-hua pao (New China)* of September 12, 1940 stated that the consolidation of the anti-Japanese bases was essential to the continuation of the Anti-Japanese War. To this end, an enlarged conference of the Northern Bureau was held between September 25 and October 10, at which P'eng Teh-huai delivered a speech elaborating on the principles for strengthening the anti-Japanese base areas. In his speech, P'eng asserted that the consolidation of the base areas did not mean that the united front with the KMT and friendly relations with other armies could be ignored.
The same principles were reiterated by Yang Shang-k'un in his speech to the senior cadres' conference of the Northern Bureau. While continuing to uphold united front practices in the base areas, he asserted that the consolidation of the rural bases was the most important task of the Party. Thus, for the Communists, the united front and the rural strategy were perfectly compatible and necessarily interconnected.

The desire to preserve the united front was further reinforced by developments in the international situation. On September 27, Germany, Italy and Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, which threatened not only the Soviet Union but also the interests of the United States. On September 28, the CCP Central Committee diagnosed that there was a possibility of American intervention in the war, bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. This would encourage the national bourgeoisie, represented by such people as Sun Fo, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Chi-shen, Yu Yu-jen and Chang Nai-ch'i, to come to the fore and press the Nationalist Government to make reforms. The anti-Communist diehards, it concluded, would be forced to concede and temporarily relax their high-handed policy. Under such circumstances, the CCP's task was to unite firmly with the intermediate groups and win over certain section of the diehards, so as to isolate the capitulationists and the other section of the diehards who wished to organize a "Pétain regime". On November 7, in response to the German attempt to mediate between China and Japan through the office of Trautmann, the CCP Central Committee further admonished:

Do not revile X [Chiang], do not revile the KMT, do not revile the central army, do not revile the non-Nationalist armies..., do not revile Britain, the United States, and the pro-British pro-American factions .... All efforts must be concentrated on reviling the pro-Japanese faction, the plotters and the provocateurs .... We must not lose one opportunity to win over all possible allies.

The directive went so far as to identify General Ho Ying-ch'in as the leader of the pro-Japanese faction, but considered Chiang to be indecisive and called for the retention of the alliance with Chiang for as long a time as possible.
Thus, up to the end of 1940, the CCP carefully avoided taking any action that might provoke Chiang Kai-shek and disrupt the alliance with the KMT. This approach is best illustrated in Mao's directive issued on December 25, 1940 in the name of the Central Committee, which stated:

Confronted with the upsurge of anti-Communist activities, the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But many of our cadres fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be very different from its policy in the civil war [i.e., Kiangsi] period. It has to be understood that under no circumstances will the Party change its united front policy for the entire period of the War of Resistance against Japan [emphasis added], and that many of the policies adopted during the Soviet stage cannot be duplicated today. In particular, many ultra-leftist policies of the latter period of the Soviet stage ... such as the elimination of the capitalist class [and] of the rich peasants, ... the physical elimination of the landlords, ... the monopoly of power by the Communists in political organs ... etc., are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then.

The directive denounced Ch'en Tu-hsiu's mistakes in the First United Front as "all unity and no struggle", and the mistakes in the latter period of the Kiangsi Soviet as "all struggle and no unity". The proper approach, it asserted, was a combination of both. (This criticism was the first signal of Mao's campaign to criticize Ch'en Shao-yü - see the next Chapter.) The correct policies of the Party should be: 1. resolute implementation of the three-thirds system; 2. improvement of workers' living conditions but strict avoidance of "ultra-leftist" policies such as demands for excessive increase in wages and reduction of work-hours; 3. enforcement of rent and interest reduction but non-encouragement of excessive demands, and strict abstinence from the policies adopted in the Land Revolution Period; and 4. promotion of private enterprises and encouragement of capitalistic investment from outside. The directive concluded that the diehards also had a "dualistic policy" in their opposition to the Communists and resistance against Japan. Hence in the past six months, it stated, KMT-CCP relations had been strained, but at present even Chiang Kai-shek needed "to relax the confrontation between the two parties". 168
Such were the basic policies Mao envisaged for the CCP during the entire period of the War of Resistance against Japan. In comparison with Ch'en Shao-yü's earlier approach, it represented, of course, a certain radical reorientation of the united front policy in that it stressed both unity and struggle against the diehards. But what seems remarkable about Mao's approach, however, lies precisely in the fact that in spite of the greater emphasis on "struggle", Mao still adhered to the united front policy as the overall political line of the Party. It was this dualistic approach that enabled the CCP to carry on its policy of expansion while at the same time win over non-Communist elements to the Party's programme of resistance. By a show of restrain and moderation, it prevented the strong-minded anti-Communist diehards from mobilizing popular support for their anti-Communist activities; by emphasizing unity against the external enemy, it forestalled the escalation of limited and localized conflict into open and full-scale civil war; by calling for a truce after periods of strained relationship, it enabled the CCP to consolidate and win formal recognition of the gains it had obtained in the course of the struggle; finally, by postponing the likelihood of a civil war in the country, it enabled the CCP to gain time and accumulate strength by consolidating the Communist base areas. It is evident that by 1940 Mao did not abandon the united front, turn his attention one-sidedly to the expansion of rural bases, and attempt to revive the radical land policies of the Kiangsi Period.
Notes:

1 See Kataoka, pp. 143-220.


5 "'Pa-lu-chihh chünn-cheng ts'a-chih' fa-k'an t'zu" (Speech on the Inauguration of the Military-Political Journal of the Eighth Route Army), MTTC, Vol. 6, pp. 307-10.


8 Wang Chia-hsiang, "Hui-ta p'o-huai t'ung-i t'uan-chieh ti yin-mou" (An Answer to the Conspiracy to Sabotage Unity and Solidarity) Feb. 7, 1939, KMTCC, Vol. 6, pp. 147-55; Lo Fu, "Kung-t'ung fang-kung chêh shih-mieh-wang Chung-kuo" (To Jointly Oppose the Communist Party is to Destroy China), Feb. 16, KMTCC, Vol. 6, pp. 126-46; K'ai Feng, "Liang-ko ch'üan-hui ti kung-míng" (Resonance of Two Plenary Conferences), Apr. 4, K'ang-ti pao (Resistance Journal), pp. 1-2. (KM)

9 "Kominterun kyokutō-kyoku kaigi to Chūkyō Yenan shigatsu kaigi" (Conference of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau and the CCP's April Conference in Yenan), Jōhó, No. 9 (Jan. 1, 1940), pp. 97-105.


12 Polveka KPK, p. 79. According to Ch'en, Mao replied by saying that there was no basic differences in their views.


14 See Hsin chung-hua pao, (March 16, 1939).
15 "Kuo-min ching-shen tsung tung-yüan ti cheng-chih fang-hsiang" (The Political Direction of the National Spiritual Mobilization), MTTC, Vol. 6, pp. 313-20.


17 See Ch'en Po-ta, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu ti wang-kuo-lun" (Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Theory of National Destruction), Chieh-fang, Nos. 60/1, pp. 23-9.

18 See Ch'en Po-ta, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu ti wang-kuo-lun" (Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Theory of National Destruction), Chieh-fang, Nos. 60/1, pp. 23-9.

19 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, pp. 393-96.

20 Ibid, pp. 399-402.

21 For an account of the difficulties confronting the New Fourth Army, see Minami manshū tetsudo kabushiki kaisha chōsabu, Seiji-hen (Political Analyses; 1939), II, pp. 97-105. (TB) See also Hsiang Ying, "K'ang-chan i-lai ti Hsin szu-ch'un" (The New Fourth Army since the War of Resistance), Chieh-fang, No. 104 (Apr. 20, 1940).


"P'eng Teh-huai t'an pi-hsü chien-ch'ih Hua-p'ai k'ang-chan" (Talks by P'eng Teh-huai on the Necessity to Persist in the War of Resistance in Northern China), Wen-hsien, Vol. 7 (Apr. 10, 1939), pp. 13-6.


25 "Fan-kung shih Jih-k'ou han-chien ho t'ou-hsiang-p'ai ti yin-mou" (To Oppose the Communists Is the Conspiracy of Japanese Robbers and Capitulationists), WMHC, Vol. 5, pp. 233-235;


29 See Chieh-fang, Nos. 75/6 and 77; and Ch'in-chung, Vol. 3, Nos. 8/9.


31 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 3, p. 409.

32 Chung-kung chung-yang nan-fang chü, Tung-chiang kung-ch' an-t'ang chin-chi t'ung-kao (Urgent Circular of the Tung-chiang Branch), mimeo. (BI)

33 "Yung kuo-fa chih-ts'ai fan-tung fen-tzu" (To punish the Reactionaries in Accordance to the State Law), MTTC, Vol. 6, pp. 349-55.


36 "Mao Tse-tung hsien-sheng yü Chung-yang she chi-che Liu hsien-sheng, Sao-tang pao chi-che Ti hsien-sheng, Hsin-wen-pao chi-che Chang hsien-sheng ti t'an-hua" (Mr. Mao Tse-tung's Talks with Mr. Liu, reporter of Chung-yang she, Mr. Ti, reporter of Sao-tang-pao, and Mr. Chang of Hsin-wen-pao), MTTC, Vol. 7, pp. 49-55.


39 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 92-6.

40 Lo Fu, "Tsai min-tsü tzu-wei chan-cheng tsui chüen-hsien ti kang-wei shang" (Standing at the Forefront of the National War for Self-defence), July 7, 1939, KMTCC, Vol. 8, pp. 1-9.

41 Lo Fu, "Wei wan-ch' eng Chung-hua min-kuo ti chen t'ung-i erh fen-tou" (Struggle for the Fulfillment of Real Unity of the Chinese Republic), KMTCC, Vol. 8, pp. 50-58.
261


43 Ch'ın-tang-wei hsüan-ch'uan pu,"Ch'ü-lü-hui chüeh-i"(Resolution of the Regional Committee), mimeo. (BI)

44 Ssu-ma Lu, pp. 124-25. Nevertheless, to outsiders Ch'en Shao-yü's decline was not apparent. In fact, Ch'en's appointment was believed to be a move to upgrade the importance of women movements. See Gaimushō jōhōbu, Chūgoku kyōsanto no tainei seisaku to sono kosaku no gensō (The Internal Politics of the CCP and the Actual State of its Work; 1940), pp. 76-9.

45 See K'ang-ch'an san-nien, pp. 38-9; T'ung-i chu-pa she, Chung-kung hsien-shih chi-ch'i ts'e-lüeh fen-hsi (Analysis of the Present Situation of the CCP and its Strategy; 1941), p. 20; and Chung-kuo k'ung-ch'an-t'ang chūwen-t'ì chūt'ou-hsi (Diagnosis of the Problem of the CCP; n.p., 1940), p. 45. (BI)

46 Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, p. 118.

47 Jen Tso-hüan's article,"Su-Te t'iao-yüeh yü kuo-ch'i hsing-shih chi pien-hua" (On the Soviet-German Pact and the Changes in the International Situation), is cited in Jen Tso-hüan hsüeh-shu ssu-hsiang tun (On the Academic Thoughts of Jen Tso-hüan; Taipei, 1964); appendix, p. 638; I do not, however, have access to his article.


49 Lo Fu, "Fan-tui ti-erh-t'zu shih-chieh ti-kuo chu-i ta-chan" (Oppose the Second World Imperialist War), Sept. 11, 1939, KMTCC, Vol. 9, pp. 38-42; Ch'en Shao-yü, "Mu-ch'ên kuo-nei-wai hsing-shih yü t'san-cheng-hui ti-szu-t'zu ta-hui ti ch'eng-ch'i" (The Present Domestic and International Situation and the Achievement of the Fourth Session of the People's Political Consultative Assembly), Sept. 20, 1939, WMHC, Vol. 5, pp. 257-82.


51 "Su-lien li-i ho jen-lei li-i ti i-chih" (The Interests of the Soviet Union Is Identical with the Interests of Mankind), MTTC, Vol. 7, pp. 57-68.


53 See Shewmaker, pp. 252-53.

54 Snow, Random Notes, pp. 70-1; and Battle for Asia (n. p., 1941), pp. 285-86.
55 Kataoka, pp. 167 & 188-89, suggests that Mao alluded to Stalin as Li Lin-fu, premier of the T'ang Dynasty, a man "with honey on his lips and murder in his heart". In his article of Sept. 28, 1939, Mao actually identified the British Prime Minister Chamberlain as the man "with honey on his lips and murder in his heart". See MTTC, Vol. 7, p. 60.


58 Snow, Random Notes, pp. 24-5

59 See Snow, Battle for Asia, p. 286.

60 See MTTC, Vol. 7, p. 87.


64 See Kuo-min t'san-cheng-hui shih-liao, pp. 138-39.

65 See Tsou T'ao-fen, K'ang-ch'ü i-lai (Since the War of Resistance; Shanghai, 1941), pp. 129-30.


67 Shina kōNichigai okeru hankyō seiryoku, p. 82.

68 Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi chü, K'ang-ch'üan hou Chung-kuo kung-ch'üan-t'ung huo-tung kai-huang (The General Conditions of the CCP Since the War of Resistance; n. p., Nov. 1939), pp. 104. (BI)

69 Min-i chou-k' an she, Mao Tse-tung Ch'en Shao-yü lâu-ching yen-lun ti ts'ung chien-t'ao (: n. p., 1940): passim. The preface of this booklet is dated November 1939. (BI)

70 Hsü Yu-lai, Chung-kuo kung-ch'üan-t'ang nei-mu (Inside Story of the CCP; Chuchiang, 1941), p. 11.


Lo Fu, "Lun k'ang-chan hsiang-chih chieh-tuan ti hsing-shih yul jen-wu" (On the Situation and Tasks in the Stage of Stalemate in the War of Resistance), KMTCC, Vol. 9, pp. 124-43.


See Ch'en Yeh, "Kung-ku tang yul chan-ch'il ti ch'ih-chung kung-tso" (Consolidate the Party and Mass Work in the War Zones), Kung-chih-tang jen, No. 1 (Oct. 1939); "K'ai-chan ch'ih-chung kung-tso shih mu-ch'ien ti-fang kung-tso ti chung-hsin" (Opening up Mass Work is the Principal Focus of Regional Work at the Present); Li Fu-ch'un, "Pa-lu-chih tso-chan-ch'il ti ch'ih-chung kung-tso" (Mass Work in the Combat Areas of the Eighth Route Army); Chang Wen-t'ien, "Ldeh-t'an tang yul fei-tang-yuan ti ch'ih-chung kuan-hsi" (A Brief Discussion on the Relations between the Party and Non-party Members with the Masses) Kung-chih-tang jen No. 2 (Nov. 1939); and Kuan Feng, "Lun wo hou-fang ti ch'ih-chung yun-tung" (On the Mass Movements in Our Rear), Chieh-fang, No. 93 (Nov. 15, 1939), pp. 13-9.

Wang Chia-hsiang, "Wei Chun-kung kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti kung-ku ho chien-ch'ilang erh tou-cheng" (Struggle for the Consolidation and Strengthening of the CCP), Sept. 29, 1939, Kung-chih-tang jen, No. 1. On the basis of Wang Chia-hsiang's formula, there should be at least eight percent Party members from worker background, since according to Ch'en Shao-yul China had 25 million worker population including handicraft workers and tenant farmers - see WMHC, Vol. 5, p. 143 - and assuming peasant population was roughly 360 million.

Yang Shang-k'un, "Hua-p'ei tang chien-shih ti chi-ko wen-t'i" (Several Problems in the Construction of Northern China), pp. 230-31. (MMCP reel 3).

Ch'en Yeh, "Ts'en-yang tsou i-ko kung-ch'an-tang yulan" (How to be a Communist), Chieh-fang, No. 72 (May 30, 1939); Liu Shao-ch'i "Lun kung-ch'ih-tang yulan ti hsiu-yang" (On the Cultivation of a Communist Party Member), in Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'ie, pp. 55-68. See the commentary on these two articles in C. Brandt, al., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (New York, 1971) pp. 318-21.


Hsu En tseng, p. 65.

Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi chü, Tiao-ch'a chuan-pao (Special Investigative Report, 1940), No. 23; Chang Pao-shu, Chung-kung t'ai Ho-pei huo-tung chi-shih (A True Account of CCP Activities in Hopei; 1940); Chiang-hsi sheng te-chung kung-tso pan-shih-chu erh-shih-chiu nien tu kung-tso tsung pao-kao (General Report of the Work of the Kiangsi Special Work Section in the Year 1940). (BI)

87 See Chieh-fang, No. 97 (Jan 30, 1940), pp. 1-2.

Kung-t'ang p'ou-huai k'ang-chan yü pu-fa huo-tung shih-shih chi-yao. (TB)

88 Kuo-min ko-ming ch'un, ti shih-pa chi-t'uan ch'ünn, cheng-chih pu, Mo-ts'a ts'ung ho erh lai (Yenan, 1940).

89 See Van Slyke, pp. 170-71.


91 Lo Mai, (Li Wei-han), "Shen-Kan-Ning pien-chu'ü nei-pu ti t'ung-i-chan-hsien, chieh-chi cheng-ts'e yü Kung-ch'an-tang" (The CPC and the United Front and Class Policy within the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), Kung-ch'an-tang jen, No. 3 (Dec. 1939).

92 See Jen Tso-hsüan p'ing-chuan hsü-chi, pp. 29-31; see also Hu Hua, Chung-kuo ko-ming shih ch'ang-t'i, p. 398.

93 See Chang Kuo-t'ao, et al., I-ko kung-jen ti kung-chuang chi ch'i-ta (The Confession of a Worker and Others; n. p., n. d), passim. This work includes a speech given by Chang Kuo-t'ao in October 1940 and Chu Ch'i-hua's earlier articles.

94 See Chuan-pien (Transformation; Chungking, 1941), passim. (BI) This publication lists forty cases of Communist defection involving over 10,000 people in the period between July 1937 and the summer of 1941. These figures are probably exaggerated, but the circulation of these materials were demaging enough to the CCP. See also P. Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diaries, Yenan, China: 1942-1945 (New York, 1975), pp. 48-9.

95 See Ssu-ma Lu, Tou-cheng, Chou Feng-ling, Hsü Shu-huai, Ch'en Chien-hua, K'ang-ta yü ch'ing-nien (K'ang-ta and the Youths; n. p., 1940); and Meng Po-ch'ien, Hui-hsiang gen-tao (Return to Humanity; Hong Kong, 1952).

96 See Kuan-yü Ma-k'o-ssu hsüeh-shuo ti jo-kan pien-cheng (Several Clarification of Marxist Thinking), Chieh-fang, No. 70 (May 1, 1939), pp. 16-25; "Shih-yüeh she-huí chu-i ko-ming yü Ma-k'o-ssu Lieh-nung chu-i" (The October Socialist Revolution and Marxism-Leninism), Chieh-fang, No. 89 (Nov. 7, 1939), pp. 15-25. Ai Ssu-ch'i, "Ts'en-yang yen-chiu pien-cheng-fa wei-wu-lun" (How to


Chang Wen-t'ien, "Yung-hu chen san-min-chu-i fan-tui chia san-min-chu-i" (Support the True Three People's Principles and Oppose the False Three People's Principles), July 29, 1939; Wang Chia-hsiang, "Kuan-yü san-min-chu-i yü kung-chan-chu-i" (On the Three People's Principles and Communism), Sept. 25, 1939; Li P'ing, "Yeh Ch'ing ti chia san-min-chu-i chiu-shih ch'ü-hsiao san-min-chu-i" (Yeh Ch'ing's False Three People's Principles Is to Cancel the Three People's Principles), Sept. 30, 1939; Ch'en Po-ta, "Lun Kung-ch'an-chu-i che tui san-min-chu-i kuan-hsi ti chi-ko wen-t'i" (On Several Problems in Relation between the Communists and the Three People's Principles), Oct. 30, 1939; Chieh-fang, Nos. 81, 85, 86 & 87/8 resp.


"Hsin min-chu chu-i lun", MTTC, Vol. 7, pp. 147-205. Several revisions in the current version of the article in Mao's Selected Works attest to his moderation of the time. In the original version, Mao includes among the classes which should participate in the new democratic structure not the "national bourgeoisie", as in the current version, but simply the bourgeoisie. In other words, he includes certain section of the big bourgeoisie as well. Similarly, the original stipulation that only land of big landlords were to be confiscated has been revised to read that all landlord holdings were to be redistributed. (It should be noted that the CCP defined a "big landlord" as one who monopolized huge stretches of land causing great agony to the people. See Kung-fei huo-kuo, p. 412.) In addition, Mao's friendly reference to Chiang Kai-shek and his statement that the proletariat would assume leadership by default have been deleted.


Sekishoku Shina shi pp. 147, 149 & 153; Kusano Fumio, pp. 345, 348 & 352.

110 *Polweka KPK*, pp. 16-7.


113 See Lenin, "Left-wing" *Communism*, pp. 14-5 & 23-5; and Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism*, pp. 44-5, for their criticism of the Mensheviks collaboration with the bourgeoisie.

114 See Jen Tso-hsilan hsileh-shu ssu-hsiang lun, p. 584.


118 See *Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i*, p. 85

119 *MTTC*, Vol. 9, p. 228


125 See Yen-an ts'u-chin hsien-cheng hui, *Hsien-cheng wen-t'i ts'ao-t'ao tsu-liao* (Reference Materials on the Problems of Constitutional Rule; Yenan, 1940), passim. (NNCP reel 17)


129 "Li-cheng shih-chü hao-chuan k'o-fu shih-chü ni-chuan" (Struggle for a Turn for the Better and Overcome Retrogression in the Current Situation), WMHC, Vol. 5, pp. 301-9.


132 See Jen Tso-hsihlan p'ing-chuan hsü-chi, p. 31; & Jen Tso-hsihlan hsüeh-shu ssu-hsiang lun, p. 639.

133 P'eng Chen, Chung-kung Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-chü chih ko-chung cheng-ts'e (The Various Policies of the CCP in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region; n.p., 1942), pp. 3a-3b. (HI) See also Ch'i Wu, pp. 116-17.

134 "Mu-chien k'ang-Jih t'ung-i-chan-hsien chung ti ts'e-1leh wen-t'i" (The Problem of Tactics at the Present Stage of the Anti-Japanese United Front), MTTHC, Vol. 2, pp. 702-10.


136 See Van Slyke, pp. 142-53; and Selden, pp. 161-71 for discussions on the system.


138 Ch'i Wu, pp. 117-18.

139 "Chin-hsi-pei hsing-cheng hui-i chih chüeh-i-an" (Resolution of the Administrative Conference of Northwestern Shansi), in T'iao-ch'a chuan-pao, No. 32 (1940?), pp. 2-3.

140 Kuang-tung-sheng tiao-ch'a shih, Tung-chiang kung-tang mi-chien (Secret Document of the Communist Party of Tung-chiang), Apr. 20, 1940 (BI)

141 See e.g. Miao Ch'u-huang, Chung-kuo kung-ch' an-tang chien-yao li-shih (A Concise History of the CCP; Peking, 1956), p. 127; and Chieh-shao Mao Tse-tung chu-tso (Introducing Mao Tse-tung's Works; Peking, 1962), p. 206. Kataoka, pp. 193-94, however, suggests that there is a cleavage between Mao and the Northern Bureau and infers that it was connected with the RRS's opposition to Mao.

142 "Fang-shou fa-chan k'ang-Jih li-liang, ti-k'ang fan-kung wan-ku-p'ai ti chin-kung" (Freely Develop the Anti-Japanese Forces, Resist the Offensive of the Anti-Communist Diehards), MTTHC, Vol. 2, pp. 711-16.

See *Amerasia Papers*, p. 362.

See *Chin-jih chih mo-ts' a wen-t 'i* (The Question of Current Friction; n. p., 1940), pp. 5-12.


Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, p. 179.


"Kuan-yü mu-ch'ien hsing-shih yü tang ti cheng-ts'e ti chüeh-ting" (Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party), in *K'ang-chan t' i-lai* pp. 133-37.


"Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'ü mu-ch'ien shih-cheng kang-ling" (The Current Administrative Programme of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region), in *K'ang-chan t' i-lai*, pp. 141-43.

See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 12-3; & Li Hsin-kung, p. 13.

Kuo-min ko-ming chü hsi, ti shih-pa chi-t' uan chü hsi, cheng-chü pu, *Pa lu-chü hsi pai-t' uan ta-chan t' e-chi* (Special Issue on the Eighth Route Army's Hundred Regiment Offensives; 1941), passim. It is important to note that Mao did not contribute any article to this volume.


See Vladimirov, p. 419; and further discussion in the next Chapter.


Yang Shang-k'un, "Ken-chü-ti chien-she chung ti chi-ko wen-t'i -- Yang t'ung-chih tsai pei-fang kao-kan-hui shang pao-kao" (Several Problems in the Construction of the Base Areas - Comrade Yang's Report to the Senior Cadres' Conference of the Northern Bureau; Oct. 3 [1940]. (HI)


Both common sense and circumstantial evidence suggest that "X" is Chiang Kai-shek.

"Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yü fan-tui t'ou-hsiang fen-lich wan-chiu shih-chü wei-chi ti chih-shih" (CCP Central Committee Directive concerning Opposition to Capitulation and Split and Saving the Dangerous Situation), Kung-fei huo-kuo, pp. 223-27.


Kataoka, p. 245, cites Mao's Rural Surveys and infers that its publication suggests that Mao was of the opinion that although the radical policy was not applicable to the Resistance as "a tactical line", he was implying that it was "strategically" applicable. I would suggest, however, that while tactics can be flexible, its subordination to strategy is a basic Communist precept.
CHAPTER FIVE  NEW DEMOCRACY AND "MASS-LINE" POLITICS: TRIUMPH OF MAOISM (1941-45)

Several historians hold that the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941 marked the end of the hitherto tenuous alliance between the CCP and the KMT, and with it the collapse of the CCP's policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie. The united front, it is argued, had been emptied of its content and its abandonment shows that it was irrelevant to the CCP's eventual victory, which was based on peasant support. This view is also buttressed, coincidentally, by the assertion that from 1941 onwards the foundations upon which New Democracy was built had begun to erode, so that the CCP shifted its emphasis from soliciting the bourgeoisie to mobilizing the peasantry. Under Mao's personal direction, the CCP reinvigorated the politicization of the masses within the Communist base areas through an intensification of the rural revolution (albeit in a disguised form) against landlords and feudal elements. This "mass-line" politics, it is claimed, was the unique feature of Yenan communism which laid the foundation of the eventual victory of the Communist revolution. Since the united front had been abandoned and Mao concentrated on the expansion of rural guerrilla bases, it is further suggested that 1941 witnessed the beginning of Communist preparation for civil war.

While recognizing that Mao's primary concern in the CCP's struggle for power had always been the maximum mobilization of the peasant masses and the building up of rural base areas, it is my assertion that the united front was also an integral part of Mao's overall strategy and that the Communists still based their policy on the Anti-Japanese United Front after the New Fourth Army Incident. To the Chinese Communists, the united front was not merely a bi-partisan alliance with the KMT, but a much broader class policy which entailed collaboration with the bourgeoisie in a common task - be it resistance against Japan or the struggle against the KMT for democracy and improvement in people's livelihood. Thus, while the KMT had become counterrevolutionary, it was still a useful ally in the War of Resistance as long as it remained committed to the struggle against Japan. Hence, the Communists still made an effort to preserve the alliance, if only for the sake of maintaining a state of armed neutrality between the two parties and to forestall Nationalist attacks on the Communist base areas. Correspondingly, in terms of class alignment in the
country, the Incident demonstrated to the Communists that a larger section of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, as represented by the anti-Communist diehards in the KMT, had wavered and was ready to compromise with Japan. The imminent expulsion of this sector from the united front meant that the Communists had to activate the lower masses to a greater extent than before in order to build up its strength and prepare for the eventual confrontation. This did not mean, however, that the Communists could afford to lose the support of the middle strata of the ordinary landlords, rich peasants, national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, as well as the "enlighted gentry" all of whom were still anti-Japanese and not actively anti-Communist. Because of the impending struggle with the KMT, the Communists' concern for winning the sympathy and support of this strata had assumed a degree of importance greater than ever before. For this reason, the politics of mass mobilization went hand-in-hand with the politics of class collaboration. Since the mobilization of the peasant masses was still restrained by such considerations as the maintenance of cordial relations with the intermediate strata, the unique feature of Yenan communism was not its radicalism, but its moderation.

One of the major purposes of the Cheng Feng Campaign (1942-44) was to denounce Ch'en Shao-yü for his failure to ally with the national bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. This alliance, symbolized by and embodied in "On New Democracy", was regarded by friends and foes of the CCP alike as one of the most unique characteristics of Mao Tse-tung's Thought as it emerged in 1945, and remained the CCP's ideological tool in the Civil War Period (1945-49).

The New Fourth Army Incident and Its Effect on the Anti-Japanese United Front

In January 1941 one of the most tragic incidents in the history of KMT-CCP cooperation occurred in the New Fourth Army base, which remains in both Nationalist and Communist historiography as the most glaring example of treachery and subversion of the opposite camp. It is not my concern here to try reconstruct the events leading to the outbreak of the Incident or ascertain the amount of responsibility that each should shoulder; rather, the primary purpose of this section is to analyse the changing nature of the CCP's Anti-Japanese United Front policy as affected by the New Fourth Army Incident.
As noted previously, Mao had been dissatisfied with Hsiang Ying's reluctance to expand the Communist base areas beyond the war zone assigned by the Nationalist Government. To facilitate the implementation of his policy, Mao in mid-1939 dispatched Liu Shao-ch'i to the Central Plains Bureau. Upon his arrival in November, Liu proposed to the Party Centre the division of the New Fourth Army into the North Yangtze Command and the South Yangtze Command, with the former subordinated to the Central Plains Bureau, thus limiting Hsiang Ying's control to the south of the Yangtze. In addition, he also requested the dispatch of a unit of the Eighth Route Army and the transfer of two units of the New Fourth Army from southern Kiangsi to northern Kiangsu to dislodge the forces under the Kiangsu governor Han Te-ch'in, whom he considered the "greatest stumbling-block" to Communist expansion. This policy was subsequently carried out, with units of the New Fourth Army's North Yangtze Command and other units under Ch'en Yi gradually pushing into northern Kiangsu, until by mid-1940 Han Te-ch'in's troops were greatly reduced in size and confined only to a small area.

As expected, the CCP's "unlawful" expansion into northern Kiangsu greatly alarmed the Nationalist authorities, especially as Central China had traditionally been the stronghold of KMT power. In September 1940 the Nationalist Government drew up the plan of relocating the entire New Fourth Army north of the Yellow River - in return the Communists would receive complete freedom of action in all territories north of the Yellow River with the exception of Yen Hsi-shan's domain in southwestern Shansi. The decision was communicated to the Communists by General Ho Ying-ch'in on September 19, 1940. The Communist Command was naturally reluctant to accept the order, but after some deliberations Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying replied that the CCP would accept the transfer of the regular troops in northern Kiangsu but not the irregulars in southern Kiangsi, on the grounds that they were largely composed of self-defence corps organized by the local inhabitants. The Nationalist Government firmly rejected the proposal as an evasive tactic and set December 31, 1940 as the deadline for the New Fourth Army to move north of the Yangtze River and the Eighth Route Army to move north of the Yellow River, after which the New Fourth Army would be given another month to reach the Yellow River. In retrospect, it seems that the Nationalist Government had resolved to remove the Communist threat to Central China by any means available.
Presented with this ultimatum, the CCP had no alternative but to comply. In a Central Committee directive drafted by Mao on December 25, 1940, the New Fourth Army was ordered to move north as a gesture of concession to the Nationalists. But the CCP was not to concede without a protest. The directive called for a vigorous campaign to denounce the Government’s decision as arbitrary as it failed to take cognizance of the fact that the Communists were the most resolute forces in the anti-Japanese struggle and their transfer would amount to a weakening of China’s resistance in Central China. Nevertheless, the Party headquarters did agree to the transfer of the New Fourth Army to the north, as Ch’en Yi’s units had already moved north of the Yangtze some time earlier. This shows clearly that even to Mao there was a limit to the CCP’s independence and that he was not willing to jeopardize the very existence of the alliance with the KMT.

Details of subsequent events are not clear. On January 3, 1941, the headquarters forces of the New Fourth Army, numbering approximately 9,000 men, were surrounded by Nationalist troops under the command of Ku Chu-t’ung at Mao-lin and after ten bitter days of fighting the bulk of the Communist forces was destroyed, with Yeh T’ing himself taken prisoner and Hsiang Ying eventually killed. On January 17, 1941, the Central Government announced the dissolution of the New Fourth Army on the grounds that it had repeatedly violated military discipline. On January 22, the Central Military Committee of the CCP openly defied the Nationalist Government’s order and announced the reorganization of the New Fourth Army, with Ch’en Yi as acting commander and Liu Shao-ch’i political commissar. A further twelve-point programme was presented to the Nationalist Government, demanding the abolition of the "one-party dictatorship" of the KMT, the introduction of "democracy and freedom", and the punishment of the culprits of the coup - Ho Ying-ch’in and Ku Chu-t’ung. The KMT-CCP alliance was strained to the point of open rupture, and fears of the imminent outbreak of civil war was felt.

Yet, neither the Nationalist Government nor the CCP seemed willing to take the initiative in terminating the alliance. Part of the explanation was probably that cool-heads on both sides realized the disastrous effects of a civil war on China’s Resistance; but a more important factor was probably that both sides saw the necessity of vying for public support and neither wished to appear as the aggressor. For his part, Chiang Kai-shek in his January 27 announcement skillfully diverted the attention of
the nation to the maintenance of military discipline, stressing its crucial role in the winning of victory in the Resistance. His opinion was reflected in the *Ta-kung pao*, noted for its neutralist stand, which declared support for the Government's action on the grounds that the Communist troops had illegally transgressed into regions not designated by the Government. Other Nationalist and pro-Nationalist papers immediately launched a campaign against the Communists, focusing on the issue of military discipline. To counter these accusations, the CCP also had to assume a non-belligerant posture.

The CCP's analysis of the present situation was clearly revealed in a secret telegram from Chou En-lai to the Kiangsi Provincial Committee, dated February 15, 1941. In it, Chou predicted two possible developments: one, an open rupture between the two parties which was what the pro-Japanese and extremist anti-Communist elements wanted; the other, a period of stalemate in which Chiang Kai-shek and the diehards would attempt to "buy time" and win public support before attacking the Communists. The CCP's tactics, therefore, were to launch a political offensive against the diehards and pro-Japanese elements in order to expose their treachery, while militarily to guard against any further Nationalist attempts to attack Communist forces. It is clear that Chou did not recommend any large-scale confrontation with the KMT; instead, the CCP was to concentrate on a political offensive to win public support.

On February 15, 1941, the CCP attempted to win public support by boycotting the National People's Consultative Assembly due to meet on March 1, 1941. As conditions for the CCP's continued participation, the CCP delegates reiterated and requested the Government to accept its twelve demands. Outside the Assembly, Chou En-lai, Teng Ying-ch'ao, and Tung Pi-wu made strenuous efforts to win the sympathy of other delegates to the Communists' cause. These efforts were to no avail. On March 6, Chiang Kai-shek made a personal appearance at the Assembly and defended the Government's action as purely a concern for military discipline, denouncing at the same time the CCP's demands as an untoward action which undermined national unity. On the same day, Wang Yün-wu, the famous educationist and publisher, proposed a resolution in support of the Government's action, urging the CCP to honour its former pledges and withdraw its conditions for attending the Assembly. It was adopted unanimously by all delegates showing that the CCP had failed even to win the support of the leftist national salvationists. On March 22,
the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce published in a Hong Kong paper its open letter to the CCP expressing regrets over the CCP's conduct and declaring that its proximity to the New Fourth Army base had entitled itself to confirm the Nationalist Government's charges. On March 25, the newly formed Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties (Chung-kuo min-chu cheng-t'uan-ta-t'ung-meng), comprising the same membership parties as the former United National Construction League but with a more effective organization, resolved on the following:

To insist that the army belongs to the nation, and that military men must owe loyalty to the nation alone. To oppose all party organizations in the army, and to oppose the use of the army as a weapon in party strife.

To capitalize on public support, Nationalist authorities charged the Communists for their conspiracy against the Nationalist Government in a phethora of Nationalist and pro-Nationalist publications. The CCP was clearly on the defence as it vigorously reaffirmed its basic support for the Nationalist Government and its strict adherence to the principle of the united front. Interestingly, to underline the argument, Ch'en Shao-yü's earlier statements regarding the CCP's sincere intentions to cooperate with the KMT during and after the war were cited by several Communist and pro-Communist writers.

It must have dawned upon Mao's mind that the CCP was still a long way from winning the support of the bourgeois strata in the country. On March 19, 1941, Mao terminated the political offensive and concluded that the KMT's "second anti-Communist high-tide" had subsided. The December 25 directive issued earlier (1940), Mao declared, was still applicable to the situation, and he particularly warned against the "leftist" danger of thinking that the KMT-CCP alliance had already been or was soon to be broken up. On May 18, Mao further issued an internal directive which asserted that the Sino-Japanese contradiction was still the main contradiction in the country and that class contradiction was still in a subordinate position. He identified the Nationalist Government as a pro-American and pro-British regime which was anti-Communist but not yet pro-Japanese and stressed that the present situation should not be compared to the April 1927 coup when the entire bourgeoisie turned against the Communists. He admonished:
In the struggle against the KMT diehards, the big comprador bourgeoisie must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie ... and the most reactionary big landlords must be distinguished from the enlightened gentry and the general run of landlords .... Many of our comrades, however, still lump the different landlords and bourgeois groups together, as though the entire landlord class and bourgeoisie had turned traitors after the Southern Anhwei [i.e., the New Fourth Army] Incident; this is an oversimplification of China's complex politics. Were we to adopt this view and identify all the landlords and the bourgeoisie with the KMT diehards, we would isolate ourselves.

According to Mao, the firm action taken by the CCP towards the KMT was necessary to "educate" the intermediate elements and win over their support. Thus Mao still distinguished the reactionary big bourgeoisie and big landlords from the ordinary landlords and national bourgeoisie and called for the preservation of the united front with the latter sector.

Parallel to Mao's analysis, Teng Tzu-hui in an internal article written shortly after the Incident asserted that the coup was launched jointed by the pro-Japanese faction of Ho Ying-ch'ìn and the diehard faction of Chiang Kai-shek as a prelude to capitulation to Japan. Nevertheless, Teng warned that this situation must not be equated with the disintegration of the united front; on the contrary, with the treachery and vacillation of the wavering elements thoroughly exposed, the united front had become narrower in scope but more consolidated and homogeneous than before. Hence the Party should not be frightened away from the united front despite the Incident. In mid-1941, several internal regional Party directives confirmed the de-escalation of anti-Communist activities and the removal of the immediate danger of capitulation, and called for the overcoming of "leftist" danger of abandoning the united front.

Internally, the Incident brought changes in the power structure of the CCP leadership. The death of Hsiang Ying meant that Ch'en was deprived of his last vestige of military support. In early February 1941, Mao took the opportunity to undertake a reorganization of the regional bureaus. The Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region was converted into the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, with Kao Kang, a veteran leader in the northwest Communist base, as director to supervise the North China operations. The Central China operation was placed in the hands of Liu Shao-ch'i, who was
to head the Central China Bureau which took over the jurisdiction of both the former Central Plains Bureau and the Southeast Bureau of the New Fourth Army. Finally, a secret South Committee was established in Chungking, headed by Chou En-lai, to take charge of operations in Southwest China in case the official Southern Bureau came under attack. In all these major regional bureaux, Ch'en Shao-yü's influence came to a halt although both the Northern Bureau and the Shantung Sub-bureau were still under the control of Ch'en's associates, Yang Shang-k'un and Chu Jui respectively. (In late 1941, however, Yang Shan-k'un was replaced by P'eng Teh-huai, and in 1943, Chu Jui was replaced by Lo Jung-huan; by then, Ch'en Shao-yü's influence in the Party had been totally eclipsed.)

There was, however, no change in the CCP's political platform. On February 22, Lin Po-ch'i delivered a report calling for persistence in the united front policies to cater for the interests of all classes. Regardless of the attitude of the big bourgeoisie, the CCP was to steadfastly hold on to the Anti-Japanese United Front with other bourgeois classes. On this basis, the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government promulgated on May 1, 1941 another "Administrative Guideline" which reaffirmed the former policies of union with all anti-Japanese parties and groups, the three-thirds system, protection of the landlords' right to land, enforcement of rent and interest reduction, encouragement of private enterprise, a ten-hour work-day, and the granting of civil liberties and democratic rights to all people except traitors. CCP spokesmen, in commenting on the new administrative guideline, emphasized that at the present stage the struggle against Japan was still the dominating factor, while improvement in the livelihood of the masses, though essential, was still subordinated to resistance against Japan. The CCP's programme, it was held, demonstrated concretely the Party's consistent stand in the Anti-Japanese United Front and its concern for national unity for the Resistance, and thoroughly exposed the treacherous slanders spread against the CCP by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist elements.

At the New Fourth Army base in northern Kiangsu, Liu Shao-ch'i convened an enlarged conference of the Central China Bureau to rectify Hsiang Ying's "rightist deviation" of failing to guard against the attack from the anti-Communist diehards, but at the same time pointed out that Hsiang had also committed "leftist" errors in failing to win allies resulting in the total isolation of the Communist troops under attack.
In a secret speech to security personnel at Yen-ch'eng on April 29, 1941, he called for greater vigilance against the KMT agents and a tougher policy against counterrevolutionaries, but declared that the united front policy remained unchanged. This was further elaborated by him in a public speech to the Consultative Assembly of Yen-ch'eng on June 3, 1941, in which he affirmed the Party's desire to cooperate with all strata of people in a joint struggle against Japan. Hence, the CCP would only adopt reformist and non-violent methods in solving the land problem, disapprove further reduction in rent in excess of the existing twenty-five percent, safeguard the land rights of the landlords, and discourage excessive increase in workers' wages or reduction of work-hours. He retained the notion that the Party's primary objectives were to fight for the continuation of the Resistance and the implementation of democracy, declaring that New Democracy and the three-thirds system would cater to the interests of all classes, including landlords and capitalist.

The overwhelming evidence thus points to the fact that the New Fourth Army Incident did not bring about a drastic reorientation of the CCP's united front policy. In fact, the crumbling KMT-CCP relations propelled the CCP to strive more assiduously for collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. This is no better illustrated than by Mao's speech to the Second Consultative Assembly of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region of November 1941, a conference attended by a large contingent of landlord-gentry elements. In his speech, Mao provides the following rationalization of the CCP's united-front policy:

Chinese society is small at both ends and big in the middle, i.e., the proletariat at one end and the landlord class and big bourgeoisie at the other, each constituting only a small minority, while the great majority of the people consists of the intermediate class. No political party that wants to run China's affairs properly can do so unless its policy gives consideration to the interests of this class .... The three-thirds system and other policies put forward by the CCP seek to unite all the people who oppose Japan and take into account the interests of every class that does so, especially the intermediate class [emphasis added].

Hence, the CCP would continue the three-thirds system to "give all sections of the people the opportunity to voice their views", implement rent and interest reduction and enforce payment of rent and interest by the peasants
to guarantee both the peasants and landlords their means of livelihood, and improve the conditions for the workers while promoting private enterprise to "enable the capitalists to make profits". These policies would unite various classes in a common struggle against Japan and in the construction of a new nation in the future. In other words, they were the very basis of New Democracy and of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, Mao concluded by saying that the "principle of democratic cooperation with non-Party people" would "remain fixed and forever unalterable". 

Mao's speech at the conference was echoed by Kao Kang, who asserted that the CCP would persist in the KMT-CCP alliance though certain anti-Communist diehards insisted on splitting the united front. The CCP would guarantee the landlords' rights of land and its members would automatically withdraw from office if more than one-third were elected to the governmental organs. Mao's analogy of an egg-shaped society became a favourite Communist jargon. In a secret speech of 1941, Liu Shao-ch'i reiterated the concept and further explained: "Whichever side the intermediate class decides to side with, that side will be able to win victory. Even the big bourgeoisie is trying to win them over."

Mao's speech at the Consultative Assembly, together with other internal documents of the CCP, came as a surprise to the KMT intelligence. It was concluded that the previous diagnosis of an imminent Communist insurrection was wrong; the CCP would not attempt to split the united front in the immediate future as long as it realized its inferior strength. Its present policy, accordingly, was still one of "external unity and internal expansion" and of winning over the support of landlord and gentry elements. The KMT was apparently finding it very difficult to reverse the situation.

To categorically define the CCP's land policy for the present situation, the CCP Politburo issued the "Decision of the Central Committee on Land Policy in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas" on January 28, 1942. Certain scholars suggest that this directive actually represented a radical reorientation of the CCP's land policy as it pointed to a more thorough-going campaign to enforce rent and interest reduction on behalf of the peasants. While I agree that the changing composition of the united front and the increasingly difficult military, economic and political circumstances in 1941-42 (see later sections) called into being
greater efforts to mobilize the lower peasant masses, it is my contention that the directive did not amount to a drastic reversal of the moderate land policy established since the beginning of the War of Resistance. Because of the controversial nature of this directive, it is worth quoting it at length:

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, the land policy carried out by our Party in various anti-Japanese bases has been a land policy based on the Anti-Japanese United Front, i.e., a land policy involving reduction of rent and interest rates on the one hand, and the guarantee of rent and interest collections on the other. Since its implementation in various base areas, this policy has secured the support of the broad masses, rallied people of different classes, and sustained the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear.

From the beginning, it is clear that the Party's concern was not only to mobilize the "broad masses", but also to rally the support of "different classes", both having sustained the Resistance against Japan in the Communist base areas. True, the directive continued:

In the areas where rent and interest reductions have been carried out more extensively, more rigorously, and more thoroughly, ... the enthusiasm with which the local people have participated in the anti-people struggle and in democratic reconstruction has been higher than elsewhere.

But this was only a call for the thorough implementation rather than a revision of the existing policy. The directive then stressed the following three basic tenets regarding the CCP's land and economic policies:

(1) Recognize that peasants constitute the basic force in the Anti-Japanese War and in production. Accordingly, it is the policy of the Party to ... guarantee the civil liberties, political rights, land rights, and economic rights of the peasants in order to improve their living conditions and enhance their enthusiasm for the Anti-Japanese War and for production.

(2) Recognize that most of the landlords are anti-Japanese, that some of the enlightened gentry also favour democratic reforms. Accordingly, the policy of the Party is only to help the peasants in reducing feudal exploitation, but not to completely liquidate feudal exploitation .... Therefore ..., we must guarantee the landlords their civil liberties, political, land and economic rights.
(3) Recognize that the capitalist mode of production is the more progressive method in present-day China and that the bourgeoisie, particularly the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, represent the comparatively more progressive social elements and political forces in China. ... The policy of the Party is not to weaken capitalism ... but to encourage production ... on the condition that proper improvements are made in the living conditions of the workers.

Thus, it is clear that the Party gave equal emphasis to improving the living conditions of peasants and workers on the one hand and to protecting the economic interests of the landlords and the capitalists on the other. Of particular importance was the Party's behest only to reduce, but not eliminate, feudal exploitation. In fact, the policy of class reconciliation was still pursued:

In the rural united front, contradictions between the landlord and the peasant ... must be settled appropriately .... Both sides should bow to the overall interests of national resistance. In settling disputes, the working members of the Party and government should base themselves on the above principles and follow a policy of adjusting to the interests of both sides. They should not take a one-sided stand either for the landlord or for the peasants.

Consequently, I cannot see any fundamental change in the CCP's land policy apart from the fact that the masses were to be mobilized thoroughly in the rent and interest reduction drive. In fact, seen in the context of the CCP's emerging mass campaign, the directive, issued one week prior to the official launching of the Cheng Feng Campaign, was probably meant to forestall any excess that might be committed by Party members responding over-enthusiastically to the cause of mass mobilization.

That this was the case is concretely supported by a strictly secret internal Party directive issued to Party members explaining the Politburo's January 28 land directive. It stated:

The Central Politburo has recently passed a new resolution in regard to the land policy in the anti-Japanese base areas .... Its basic spirit was to activate the broad peasant masses, for nothing could be achieved without the mobilization of the masses. But after the masses have been aroused, it must be ensured that the landlords can continue to survive .... Economically, the present policy of our Party is to encourage capitalistic production
and to preserve certain rights of the landlords; it can be summarized as a policy of seventy percent capitalism and thirty percent feudalism. Politically, the three-thirds system is to be implemented so as to enable the landlord-capitalist classes to feel that there is a future for them. All these are aimed at preventing the landlord-capitalist classes from allying with the enemy and the diehards, and to win over the majority of the landlord-capitalist classes to the anti-Japanese democratic regime .... Even those who have gone over [to the side of the enemy and the diehards] can still be won over to our side.

A similar exposition of the Party's stand towards landlords was offered by P'eng Chen in his report on the policies of the Chin-Ch'a-chi Border Region published on January 28, 1942. He asserted that although the landlords were basically reactionary and vacillating in their stand towards Resistance, they still supported the united front since they feared a split between the KMT and the CCP, in which case the CCP might strike at the landlords again. It is imperative, therefore, that the Party should persist in the Anti-Japanese United Front policy so as to prevent the landlord class from siding with the KMT against the masses. Nevertheless, he asserted that while landlords were allies on the issue of Resistance, they were the targets in the struggle for "democracy and livelihood".

Externally, the CCP launched a vigorous campaign to propagate the January 28 directive as a fine example of the Party's consistent stand on the Anti-Japanese United Front, one that was in line with Mao's new democratic principles and also with Sun Yat-sen's land policy. It was particularly stressed that the reduction of rent by twenty-five percent (which amounted to a rent ceiling of 37.5 percent of the crop) was originally a proposal from the KMT. The CCP was clearly trying to project the image that it was in favour of a moderate rather than radical solution to the land question. Nationalist reports rightly observed that the CCP's land policy was aimed at neutralizing the opposition from the upper strata of society, and KMT propagandists attempted to undermine its effectiveness by arguing that it was only a temporary expediency designed to "deceive the people".

Along with the retention of the united front policy, the CCP in late 1941-early 1942 began to launch a series of mass campaigns to promote the agrarian economy and encourage mass participation in the political and military structures of the Communist regime. As Mark Selden has undertaken a detailed and extensive study of these campaigns, namely, the Rent and
Interest Reduction Campaign (which Selden regards, but I disagree, as a guise for the rural revolution), the Crack Troops and Simple Administration Movement (1941-43), the "To the Village" Movement (1941-42), the Cooperative Movement (1942-44), the Campaign for the Strengthening of the Militia (1941-44), the Production Movement (1943), the Campaign for Supporting the Government and Protecting the People (1943), and the Education Movement (1944), it is not necessary to repeat them here.

What Selden has not given sufficient attention to is that along with these mass movements, the CCP also made a serious effort to implement the three-thirds system in the Communist base areas. The newly founded Chieh-fang jih-pao (Liberation Daily) began to promote the system in several articles between December 1941 and May 1942. In March 1942, both the Chieh-fang jih-pao and the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government urged enforcement of the system up to the district level. The idea that the three-thirds system need not be carried out at the village level was also subject to scathing criticism. It is true that Hsieh Chieh-tsai, who was in charge of the implementation of the system, rationalized the preponderance of Party members in the governmental organs of the old districts by saying that "if people want to elect many Party members, there is nothing to be done". (It should be noted that in the old districts the landlord-gentry elements were comparatively fewer.) He also observed with satisfaction that the system was well established in the new districts, notwithstanding that the KMT electees occasionally outnumbered those of the CCP, and nowhere in his article did he suggest that the system could be compromised or ignored.

Even at the height of the Cheng Feng Movement, when the Party leadership was calling for the strengthening of the CCP leadership in the local Party, government and mass organs under the principle of "unified Party leadership" (ling-tao i-yuan-hua), the Politburo did not neglect to warn Party cadres that the basic principle of the three-thirds system could not be discarded, although the quality of Party members holding administrative positions had to be improved. To make certain that Party members understood that "unified Party leadership" did not mean "mono-Party dictatorship", the Central Committee in May 1943 urged admission of intermediate elements into the CCP's government. It called for struggle against both the "leftist" tendency of rejecting "democratic" elements in Communist organs and the "rightist" tendency of conniving in the participation of reactionaries or traitors. In summing up the experience of
the system in 1944, Lin Po-ch'ü declared that on the whole it had succeeded in winning over the landlords and gentry, although it had given rise to a recrudescence of landlord-gentry control in certain areas. One KMT intelligence report lamented the effectiveness of the "policy correction meetings" (chêng-tsa'ê ch'iü-chêng hui) held in connection with the three-thirds system whereby landlords and gentry were invited to voice their views:

These conferences were very effective. Gentry who in the past had been dissatisfied, after participating in such conferences, filled the skies with praise, feeling that the [CCP] government wasn't so bad after all, that it could recognize its own mistakes and could ask for criticism. [sic]

It was presumably because of these successes that Mao, in reviewing past Party policies in April 1944, included the three-thirds system as one of several correct policies—the other being the mass campaigns—implemented by the Party in the latter part of the Anti-Japanese United Front Period.

It would be a one-sided view, therefore, to assume that with the emergence of the "mass-line" politics after 1941, the united front policy of class collaboration was brushed aside or submerged in the interests of promoting the class struggle. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Communists, while actively safeguarding the welfare and interests of the peasant masses, were anxious at the same time to avoid antagonizing the landlords, rich peasants and capitalists.

That this moderate approach towards landlords and capitalists was maintained by the CCP up to the end of the Yenan Period is attested by the numerous reports filed by Chinese and foreign visitors to the Communist base areas in 1944-45. One such group was a twenty-one men delegation of Chinese and foreign journalists—the so-called "Press Party to the Northwest"—which entered Yenan in May-July 1944. Another group, the United States Army Observation Corp, headed by Colonel David D. Barrett and accompanied by John S. Service and others, reached Yenan in July 1944. In addition, there were a large number of individual observers who journeyed to Yenan and made on-the-spot observations, including Harrison Forman, Stuart Gelder, Gunther Stein, Maurice Volaw, Claire and William Band, Michael Lindsay, Brooks Atkinson and Theodore H. White. Their reports unanimously point to the fact that landlords and capitalists in the Communist regions enjoyed full civil and political rights, that there
was no confiscation of the land of landlords, and that free enterprise was allowed. This gave rise to the well-known belief among foreign observers that the Chinese Communists were mere "agrarian reformers" and "democrats" rather than "genuine communists". True, the misconception was largely rooted in a lack of familiarity with Communist theories and practice of the Chinese revolution, and other psychological and environmental factors which predisposed the foreign visitors towards presenting the Chinese Communists in the most "favourable" light; but the fact remains that in the areas they visited neither the landlords nor the capitalists were the targets of persecution. Moreover, they were deliberately led to believe by the CCP leaders, including Mao, that the Communists would retain their moderate programme for "a very long time to come" since conditions in China were still not ripe for socialism.58

In retrospect, when in May 1946, barely a year after war had ended, the CCP modified its war-time moderate policy by stripping the landlords of their surplus land, one may conclude that the "agrarian reformer" myth was a stratagem devised by Chinese Communists to mislead others into believing that they were reformers rather than revolutionaries, so as to weaken their will to resist. But if we can accept the view that the Chinese Communists formulated their policy according to the concrete conditions of each historical stage, then we may understand why they felt so confident that the moderate land programme would last for a considerable period of time (especially when they expected a prolonged period of struggle before wresting power from the KMT). The situation, however, changed drastically in mid-1946, when KMT-CCP negotiations broke down and civil war was imminent, thus making it necessary for the Communists to achieve greater mobilization of the masses. In any case, true to their original promises, the CCP had not changed their land policies throughout the entire period of the Anti-Japanese United Front.


On April 13, 1941, Russia concluded the Neutrality Pact with Japan by which the Soviet Union pledged itself to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the puppet state of Manchukuo, and Japan pledged to do likewise in regard to the Mongolian People's Republic. This treaty was commonly taken to be a violation of the territorial integrity of China and a positive encouragement to Japan's aggression in China, since the removal of the fear of attack by Russia would facilitate Japan's
further advance in China. The Nationalist Government filed a protest against the Soviet Government, declaring that both Outer Mongolia and Manchuria were Chinese territory and interference by a third power was a violation of China's rights. Public opinion was resentful of the Soviet Union: the Ta-kung pao attacked the Soviet Union for indirectly aiding Japan; "pro-Soviet" Nationalist leaders, including Sun K'o, the president of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, declared the Soviet Union "unreliable"; national salvationists Shen Chü-n-ju and Wang T'sao-shih protested at the Soviet Embassy; and one Shanghai student body issued a public statement demanding the CCP clarify its stand.

Similar to the case of the Soviet-German Pact, the CCP was obliged to defend vigorously the action of the Soviet Union and to ward off the attack from anti-Communist critics. On April 15, Hsin-hua jih-pao published an editorial which denied any validity in the argument that the Soviet Union had violated China's territorial integrity, saying that the Soviet Union had merely agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Manchukuo but not recognized it as an independent country, and this would by no means constitute a check upon China's effort to recover it. In the case of Outer Mongolia, the editorial claimed that the arrangement was in fact advantageous to China as it would ensure its safety from Japanese attack. A public statement was further issued by the Central Committee of the CCP on April 16, declaring that the Neutrality Pact marked another triumph of the Soviet Union's peace policy. It denied the charge that the Soviet Union had in any way compromised its support for China's war effort, but stressed that China must rely on its own resources to recover all territories south of the Yalu River. On April 27, the Chieh-fang jih-pao further denounced the pro-Japanese elements and anti-Communist diehards in the KMT for exploiting the issue to promote anti-Soviet Union and anti-CCP activities.

On May 18, 1941, Mao denounced both Great Britain and the United States for encouraging Japan to attack the Soviet Union and advance further into China, in order to forestall a Japanese southward advance. Such a devious policy, he claimed, had been thwarted by the Soviet Union's "peace policy". Stalin, he asserted, would continue to support China and his support was "thoroughly reliable". On May 25, he drafted a Central Committee statement which denounced the United States, Japan and the KMT for "hatching a plot" to bring about a "Far Eastern Munich" against the
CCP, the Soviet Union and Germany. On June 17, he came out with a strong criticism of the KMT's over-reliance on America as lacking in "national self-confidence", and took the opportunity to rebuke the KMT for its anti-Communist activities.

But before the Soviet-Japanese Pact brought a further rift in KMT-CCP relations, the international situation again changed dramatically with Hitler's Germany suddenly invading the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The irreconcilable differences in foreign policy between the two parties were removed. On June 25, the CCP's Politburo resolved to establish an international anti-fascist front. It stressed the defence of the Soviet Union as the primary duty of all socialist parties in the world, and warned against any attempt to carry out the socialist revolution at the present stage as it would hinder the anti-fascist struggle. It called for the strengthening of the Anti-Japanese United Front, consolidation of the KMT-CCP alliance, suppression of anti-Communist activities, and unity with the United States, Britain and other nations in the common struggle against fascism. In early July, P'eng Teh-huai approached Chiang Kai-shek and reached an understanding with him regarding the size and area of operations of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and the deadlock of the New Fourth Army problem was finally resolved.

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the War of Resistance, the CCP renewed its former pledges to the nation and stressed that its Anti-Japanese United Front remained unchanged. Chou En-lai further declared that "what we oppose is only an extremely small section of wavering elements and anti-Communist diehards within the KMT, not the KMT as a whole". When both the United States and Great Britain agreed to ally with the Soviet Union against Germany, Mao declared the international situation extremely favourable to China's resistance and called upon the United States to render greater military and economic support to the Soviet Union and China. (This was probably due to the fact that the Soviet Union had announced in October 1941 that owing to her war with Germany she would henceforth reduce her military aid to China.)
With the appointment of General Okamura as the commander of the North China Army, a large-scale operation known as the "million offensive" was launched from August to October along the Chih-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. The campaign was highlighted by the notorious "three-all" policy (i.e., kill all, burn all, loot all), with the objective of annihilating the local populace leaving the Communists no chance for recovery in the region. Confronted with this devastating enemy offensive, the Communist forces had to decentralize and withdraw from the plains to the Shansi plateau and the mountainous areas of Shantung. There is little doubt that this tactical retreat was taken in line with Mao's strategy of preserving the Communist forces. Such actions immediately incurred Nationalist charges that the Communist troops "withdraw and retreat" in the fact of enemy advances, especially when the Nationalist troops had been engaging in heavy fighting with the Japanese in southern Shansi since May 1941. The Ta-kung-pao, for example, echoed the Nationalist accusation and urged the Communist forces in northern Shansi to coordinate its operation with the Nationalist troops.

It appears that once again the CCP was confronted with the dilemma of pursuing its own military strategy at the risk of appearing uncooperative, or of coordinating its forces with the Nationalist troops at the risk of heavy casualties. According to several pro-Nationalist reports, the CCP Command was split into two factions. One, headed by Chu Teh, wished to carry out a policy of active resistance against Japan in cooperation with the Nationalist Army; the other, headed by Mao, wished to "avoid resistance" and concentrate on the internal consolidation of Communist base territories. At the same time, the Soviet Union, wishing to forstall Japanese advance to the North, in late 1941 urgently appealed to the CCP to step up resistance against Japan to ensure the safety of its eastern flank. Such a situation afforded Ch'en Shao-yü another opportunity to muster support among the military leaders to challenge Mao's policy. According to several corroborative accounts, sometime before 1942 Ch'en went to the front to canvass Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai and other military leaders for support of the policy of active resistance in cooperation with the Nationalist forces.

Evidence suggest that Ch'en's last opposition to Mao ended in ignominious defeat. On December 7, 1941, Chieh-fang jih-pao publicly announced that there should be a major change in military tactics of the Communist forces. Under the present extraordinary difficult military
circumstances created by the Japanese "mopping-up" campaigns, guerrilla warfare was proclaimed more suitable than mobile warfare. It specified that the various units should avoid unnecessary sacrifices by dispersing the troops for guerrilla operations. It also declared that the task of the Communist troops had correspondingly changed: formerly it was to expand the anti-Japanese guerrilla bases; at present, it was to consolidate the guerrilla bases already established. In January 1942, the Central Committee issued a directive on the military strategy of the Communist base areas, which extolled the principles of "decentralized guerrilla warfare", preservation and consolidation of the Communist forces, avoidance of the "leftist empty-cry" for mobile warfare, expansion of localized armies and people's militia at the expense of regular main units, all of which were geared towards the consolidation of the Communist guerrilla bases. At the same time, the effectiveness of small guerrilla units in mobilizing the masses and in developing the guerrilla bases was expounded in a series of articles published in the CCP's organ in North China, Chien-ch'ih (Persistence). Reflecting the opinion of the New Fourth Army, Wang Jo-fei in January 1942 also declared support for decentralized guerrilla operation and avoidance of frontal combats with the Japanese forces. All these marked the total triumph of Mao's military strategy.

Mao's emphasis on the adoption of decentralized operation for the construction of guerrilla bases probably received further justification following the outbreak of the Pacific War. With the entry of the United States in the war, the defeat of Japan had become only a matter of time. Both the KMT and the CCP began to make preparations for the eventual confrontation that was likely to take place after the war. In addition, the CCP by late 1941 was confronted with unprecedented military and economic problems caused by the Japanese military campaigns and natural disasters - which severely constricted the Communist territories and drastically reduced the size of the population. Under such circumstances, the internal consolidation of the Communist base areas became a task of utmost importance. In a Central Committee directive issued on January 7, 1943, all Party members and rank-and-file of the Communist troops were reminded that "victory is in sight" and the Party must further strengthen itself. What it stressed, however, was the retention of the conciliatory policies to the landlords and rich peasants lest they would be induced by outside forces to engage in anti-Communist activities.
and undermine the stability of the base areas. It ended with an urgent call to strengthen the Anti-Japanese United Front. 

Hence, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War, the CCP reaffirmed its adherence to the Anti-Japanese United Front in a public statement. It declared that post-war China would not be a Soviet China or a socialist China, but a democratic and economically prosperous China, in which the properties of landlords and capitalists would not be confiscated. It also conceded to Chiang Kai-shek the leadership not only in the War of Resistance, but also in the national reconstruction after the war. (This statement was personally cited by Mao to a delegation of landlord-gentry elements from Shansi in September 1942 as the stated policy of the Party.) At the same time, the CCP propagated the idea that the Communists were establishing a political system in the Communist base areas premised upon New Democracy and the cooperation of all classes. In October 1942, Lin Piao further approached Chiang Kai-shek to reassure the Generalissimo of the CCP's sincere desire for unity and for cooperation to build the new China after the war. In November 1942, the CCP expressed complete agreement with Chiang Kai-shek's speech at the KMT's Tenth Plenum declaring his intention to carry on the resistance and to treat the Communists impartially. As an internal directive of February 26, 1943 discloses, the CCP's conciliatory posture towards the KMT's Tenth Plenum was part and parcel of its overall policy to "make more friends" including the landlords and gentry, a policy designated as one of the principal tasks of the Party to be implemented at all levels of the Border Region Government.

Thus, to the CCP leaders, especially Mao, the united front did not lapse into oblivion even though all forms of cooperation with the KMT had practically ceased to exist. By this time too, it should be remembered, Ch'en Shao-yû had been removed from power and the "mass-line" politics were already in full-swing. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the concessions to the landlords-gentry-capitalists were Mao's policy. In spite of the emphasis on peasant mobilization, the united front, as the tactic to win over the intermediate strata and isolate the KMT, was still indispensable. Its interrelation with the rural strategy is perhaps best summed up by P'eng Teh-huai's report below.
In his report "On the Work of the Revolutionary Base Areas in North China" delivered at a cadre conference in the Taihang Mountain district on December 18, 1942, P'eng Teh-huai asserted that the construction of the revolutionary base areas was the primary task of the Communists. This was because China did not have a democratic tradition, and it was impossible for the Party to expand its influence amongst the masses through legal and open work. The only way to expand Communist power was to mobilize the masses, build up rural base areas, and carry out armed struggle against the enemy. (This was clearly a direct rebuttal of Ch'en Shao-yü's line and a vindication of Mao's rural strategy.)

But armed struggle, P'eng argued, should not be regarded as the only form of struggle; it had to be complemented with the struggle for democracy and improvement of the people's livelihood. In other words, the Party must also pay attention to its political strategy. The application of the Anti-Japanese United Front, P'eng observed, had helped to consolidate the political leadership of the Party in the country, and had repeatedly frustrated the anti-Communist schemes of the reactionary forces. The Party had learnt that it could accumulate strength and consolidate the revolutionary bases through alliance with other groups.

P'eng therefore set as the most urgent tasks of the Party for 1943 the implementation of democracy and the mobilization of the masses. Specifically, this meant the strict implementation of the three-thirds system, which he claimed was the most effective weapon in isolating the diehards and winning over the support of the intermediate strata. At the same time, the broad masses must be thoroughly mobilized, principally through the rent and interest reduction campaign, so as to enable them to participate actively in the war. Nevertheless, since the national contradiction was still the main contradiction, class struggle must be subordinated to the national struggle; and reduction must not exceed the reasonable limit or else it would polarize the classes and undermine unity. Overall, the Party's policy was to "arouse the class consciousness of the masses", and "paralyse the class enemies, neutralize them, split them up and isolate them". To all intents and purposes, P'eng was giving his full support to Mao's policy based on a combination of the mass mobilization and the united front.
Relations with the KMT, however, continued to deteriorate in 1943. In March, Chiang Kai-shek flatly rejected Chou En-lai and Lin Piao's proposals for the recognition of the expanded Communist forces and re-organization of its military units. In May, Chiang Kai-shek amassed a large force to tighten the blockade of northern Shensi - the so-called "third anti-Communist high-tide". The danger of an imminent attack on the Communist base was sounded by Jen Tso-hsian who equated the dissolution of the Comintern - a move taken by Stalin to facilitate cooperation amongst the Allied Powers - with an admission of the inapplicability of Marxism-Leninism to other countries. Stating that the "final moment of awakening" had arrived, he called upon the CCP to abandon a bankrupt foreign dogma and disband itself. His demands were echoed in an anti-Communist journal *K'ang-chan yü wen-hua* (Resistance and Culture) published in Sian. To counter these charges, Mao declared that the Comintern had rendered valuable services to the Chinese Revolution from the Northern Expedition (1926-27) to the Anti-Japanese War. Nevertheless, in spite of the support of the Comintern, the CCP was a fully indigenous organization which derived its strength from the working people. The dissolution of the Comintern, he explained, was due to the concrete needs of the anti-fascist struggle, and to the fact that each individual Communist Party had by now acquired strength and maturity. Moreover, Mao asserted that since 1935 the Comintern had not interfered in the internal organization matters of the CCP. The dissolution of the Comintern, therefore, logically demanded not the weakening but the further strengthening of the CCP. In July, he further condemned the KMT for abetting the anti-Communist activities and demanded Chiang Kai-shek withdraw his forces and punish the saboteurs. The tension between the two parties reached its climax when Chiang Kai-shek at the KMT's Eleventh Plenum of September 1943 openly reprimanded the Communists for their regional independence and attacks on the Nationalist troops and Mao publicly blasted Chiang Kai-shek for instigating civil war in the country.

Yet when in late 1943 the anti-Communist high-tide subsided (largely owing to American involvement which exerted a moderating influence on the KMT), the CCP mitigated its stern posture. In January 1944, Teng Tzu-hui offered a secret updated interpretation of the situation: Chiang Kai-shek was the most reactionary representative of the big landlord and big bourgeois class, but should be distinguished from Wang Ching-wei on account of the fact that he was still anti-Japanese and should be won over. The Three People's Principles and the programme of New Democracy
were the political platform of the Party at the present stage, although Party members should understand that they were a transition to socialism. In June 1944, Mao declared to the Chinese and foreign journalists' delegation the CCP's continued support for Chiang Kai-shek in the Resistance and the post-war cooperation in the nation reconstruction. Finally, on April 24, 1945, at the CCP's Seventh Party Congress, Mao put forward his lengthy discourse "On Coalition Government" stating the CCP's preference for a united democratic republic to be composed of all parties including the KMT, on condition that it reformed and reorganized itself on democratic principles. The statement contained many overt criticisms of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT's failings, but Mao's aim to attract support from the intermediate strata was also made explicit by his reiteration of the enduring nature of New Democracy.

Thus, up to the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the CCP, under Mao's leadership, retained the policy of the united front both as a means of keeping the KMT in the war against Japan and as an instrument to win over the support of the national bourgeois strata. One apparent reason was Mao's own estimation (1947): the Nationalists had a total military strength of over four million and control over a population of more than 300 million, including the major urban centres with better resources; the Communists had under their rule a population of approximately 100 million in the liberated base areas, and their total military strength, including guerrillas, was way under the million mark. Should the landlords and bourgeoisie decide to mobilize popular support for the Nationalist side, the Communists would be seriously disadvantaged by their numerical and military inferiority to the Nationalists. This explains why in the same document Mao, while calling for the re-introduction of direct confiscation of landlords' land to generate mass energies, also insisted on the formation of the broadest New Democratic United Front similar in composition to the Anti-Japanese United Front, and warned against the "leftist adventurist" policies of the Kiangsi Period (i.e., the refusal to allot land to landlords and the allotment of inferior land to rich peasants, as well as excessive struggle against the capitalists and intellectuals). As Mao himself admitted, the Party's objective were to win over the neutral elements amongst the landlords and bourgeoisie in order to isolate the KMT in the Civil War.
Since his return to China in November 1937, Ch'en Shao-yü had posed a direct challenge to Mao's authority in several ways. Politically, he had espoused a line of action which stressed expansion of the Party's influence through legal channels in contrast to Mao's emphasis on the expansion of rural guerrilla base areas through independent action. Organizationally, he had attempted to take over control of the regional bureaus of the CCP by placing them under the charge of his own followers and supporters. Ideologically, he had openly transmitted Stalin's opinion of Mao as lacking in theoretical training and assumed for himself the position of the Party's foremost theoretician. By 1940, however, Mao had managed to gain the upper hand over Ch'en when his political line gained ascendancy in the Party and the regional bureaus reverted back to his control. His victory was by and large assured following the New Fourth Army Incident. But ideologically there were still obstacles to his supremacy.

Ch'en Shao-yü had a long-standing reputation as the Party's most eminent theoretician, a claim dating back to his leadership in the anti-Li Li-san struggle of 1930-31 and substantiated by his lengthy theoretical treatise written in 1932 following the downfall of Li Li-san, entitled "For the Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party". For a long time, this document existed in the Party as standing testimony to Ch'en Shao-yü's profound understanding of Marxist-Leninist theories and the problems of the Chinese revolution. As Mao himself admitted in 1945, this treatise "was taken by people then and for the next ten years to have played a correct guiding role" in the Party.\(^\text{102}\) According to P'eng Teh-huai (1944), it was generally believed in the past that the "Bolshevization" of the Party began only with the Fourth Plenum of January 1931. This is well illustrated by the fact that when Chu Teh spoke to Agnes Smedley in 1937, he praised the Fourth Plenum leadership and said that it "had repudiated the Li Li-san line and affirmed ours".\(^\text{104}\) At the reception given for Ch'en Shao-yü upon his return to China, Chang Wen-t'ien stressed his contribution to the Party in the struggle against Li Li-san.\(^\text{105}\) Contemporary Chinese and Japanese sources also referred to him as the leader of the anti-Li Li-san struggle.\(^\text{106}\) Even Mao in "Introducing The Communists" (October 1939) still admitted that the "leftist opportunism" of Li Li-san was
overcome by the Fourth Plenum.\(^{107}\) (In fact, when Ch'en Shao-yü was under explicit criticism in the forties, he was still acknowledged as the principal instigator of the anti-Li Li-san struggle, although he was then charged with having failed to correct the mistakes of Li Li-san.)\(^{108}\)

In contrast, Mao had little claim as a Marxist theorist. His major writings on the Chinese revolution had been chiefly concerned with practical political, economic and military problems. It is well-known that he only began to study Marxist philosophy in earnest in 1936.\(^{109}\) And what emerged out of this intensive study—a series of lectures at K'ang-ta entitled "On Dialectical Materialism"—was so closely modelled on translations (by Ai Ssu-ch'i) from Soviet philosophical writings\(^{110}\) that Mao made no appreciable effort to promote it. ("On Practice" and "On Contradiction", it should be noted, were never published until the early fifties.) It would appear that Mao at this time was far less well versed than Ch'en Shao-yü in the subtleties of Marxist philosophy. His first major effort to deal with the problems of the Chinese revolution on a theoretical basis, "On New Democracy", was, as we have seen, strongly opposed by Ch'en Shao-yü on dogmatic grounds and had to be revised (though slightly) before publication. Thus, in spite of his political victory, ideologically Mao still paled beside Ch'en Shao-yü.

One of Ch'en Shao-yü's principal sources of strength was the fact that he and his associates controlled most of the Party's propaganda machine: Ch'in Pang-hsien, for example, was the chief editor of the Chieh-fang jih-pao and the director of the New China News Agency; Chang Wen-t'ien (who had since 1935 sided with Mao on many issues, yet was still ideologically a supporter of Ch'en—see below) was secretary of the Central Committee's Press Committee; Ho K'o-ch'üan was director of the Propaganda Department, while Ch'en Shao-yü headed the Committee for the Compilation of Party History.\(^{111}\) Thus, together they controlled most of the Party publications as well as the composition and distribution of cadre-training materials. (According to Ch'en Shao-yü's memoir, however, Mao had exclusive control over the Military and Political Affairs Magazine of the Eighth Route Army,\(^{112}\) ) This state of affairs enabled the RRS to perpetuate the existing belief in the correctness of the Fourth Plenum, as both the Tang-ti chien-she (Party Construction), a handbook for cadres,\(^{113}\) and a Party history compiled by the Central Committee\(^{114}\) asserted.
The RRS's continued control of the Party's propaganda machine and the upholding of their prestige naturally placed Mao in a disadvantageous position in his current dispute with Ch'en Shao-yü. When in 1939 the Party began to conduct a series of ideological study sessions in Yenan among the cadres to overcome the undesirable consequences of the huge increase in party membership since the beginning of the war (such as an influx of petty bourgeois ideas and disharmony between old and new cadres), the RRS, by virtue of their mastery of Marxist-Leninist theories, took over the direction of the movement. Thus, four of the five major research associations established in Yenan in the spring of 1939 to train selected cadres were under the direct supervision of the RRS: the Research Association on Marxism-Leninism was chaired by Ch'en Shao-yü; the one on Problems of the Chinese Revolution was under Chang Wen-t'ien, who also assumed the directorship of two others on Party Construction and on Philosophical Problems, with Ch'en Yün and Ai Ssu-ch'i (both Maoist supporters) as co-directors respectively. Furthermore, the basic texts for study and discussion among the cadres included the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, *the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*, articles and press reports of Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chang Wen-t'ien and Ch'en Shao-yü.

Ch'en Shao-yü's potential threat to Mao was reinforced by the fact that most youth members of urban origin were principally attracted to the Party because of its nationalistic rather than its distant socialistic programme; granted that Ch'en Shao-yü had been particularly articulate on issues concerning national solidarity and unity for Resistance, it is understandable that he easily captured their support and commanded their respect. According to Ssu-ma Lu, by late 1939 certain younger members of the Party began to identify Ch'en as the "leader of the opposition", and they would seek Ch'en's support when they had a grievance. Kuo Hua-lun's informant further confirms that most Party writers who felt discontented with the existing conditions in Yenan looked up to Ch'en as the leader. (This is also indirectly corroborated by a contemporary Nationalist report.) Thus, paradoxically, Ch'en came to be identified as the source of schism within the Party.
Matters were brought to a head in late 1939 and 1940 when preparations were made for the election of representatives from the various local Party organs to the Seventh Party Congress. Since the Party was composed overwhelmingly of petty bourgeois elements — according to latter-day Communist sources, they account for ninety percent of the Party members, including intellectuals, middle and poor peasants — the results of the preliminary election probably indicated that the Congress, if convened around this time, would have been teemed with petty-bourgeois elements, mostly from the urban sector. Such a composition would present Ch'en Shao-yü another opportunity to attract support for his policy line, and further consolidate the RRS's leadership position in the Party. Mao, therefore, decided to postpone the Seventh Party Congress until after the Party's programme for the education of cadres (i.e., the *Cheng Feng* Campaign) had been completed.

For all these reasons, Mao found it necessary to link up the campaign to re-educate Party members and to eliminate petty bourgeois ideas in the Party with a movement to discredit Ch'en Shao-yü. Since Ch'en's prestige rested largely on the anti-Li Li-san struggle, Mao's logical move would be to repudiate the view than Ch'en had successfully overcome Li Li-san's errors. It is principally for this reason, I suggest, that the campaign to criticize Ch'en started with a review of Party history in the Kiangsi Period.

As far as I can trace, the earliest sign indicating that Mao had conceived such an idea was his reference in *Introducing The Communists* to the existence of "leftist opportunism" in the conduct of the "revolutionary war" and Party work in the "white" areas in the Kiangsi period, which had been overcome by the Tsunyi Conference. (The qualification that the general political line was still unquestionably correct was no longer present, as was previously the case with Mao's report at the Sixth Plenum.) It appears that Mao, learning from the successful experience of the moderate land and economic policies in the several years after the formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front, finally came to the conclusion that the mistakes of Kiangsi could be attributed to an erroneous political line. In this, Mao was probably assisted by Liu Shao-ch'i, who also published an article criticizing the erroneous "leftist" approach to Party work in the "white" areas in the Kiangsi Period, which had caused severe damage to the Party.
Proceeding on this assumption, Mao compiled, in December 1939, a new internal educational tract "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" which systematically contrasted the radical policies towards landlords, rich peasants and national bourgeoisie during the Kiangsi Period with the moderate policies towards these classes in the Anti-Japanese United Front Period. It was Mao's intention to include a last section on "Party Construction", but, according to the editors of Mao's *Selected Works*, the work was left unfinished because "the comrades responsible did not complete the job". I suggest that Mao wished to compile a new tract covering the intraparty struggles in the Party to replace the existing version of *Party Construction* written by the RRS, but was unable to carry it through because of the resistance from certain quarters, notably the RRS. Mao probably realized that in order to overcome the RRS's opposition, he must provide a justification on a theoretical level for the moderate land and economic policies and the collaboration with the national bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. This was yet another part of his motives in writing "On New Democracy" in early 1940. According to Ch'en Shao-yü, Mao intended to establish his personal cult in the form of "Maoism" to replace Leninism as the guiding ideology of the Party when he wrote "On New Democracy". Hyperbole apart, it does seem credible that Mao looked upon "On New Democracy" as marking his own unique approach to the Chinese revolution which would establish his ideological orthodoxy. This may explain why Mao's "On Dialectical Materialism" was published, synchronously, in March 1940.

Obviously aware of Mao's intention to utilize past Party history to discredit the RRS, Ch'en Shao-yü republished his earlier treatise "Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party" in March 1940. (That the republication of this treatise was a direct response to Mao's "On New Democracy" is confirmed by a recent Chinese Communist account.) Ch'en's objective was clearly stated in the preface:

The anti-Li Li-san ... struggle is now almost ten years removed, and there is presumably no need to republish this book. But in recent years our Party has grown by the thousands, and many new members are not familiar with many historical facts in the Party's development. This book records the events of a very important stage in the Party's development ... and is thus important material for the study of Party construction and Party history in the various schools in Yenan.
He continues:

All human thoughts or historical facts are progressing forward, and are a part of the overall process of development. It is relatively easier for people to comment on facts and theories that have occurred in the past with the benefit of hindsight, than for those people who were living at the time. All real dialectical materialists cannot, therefore, look at matters in isolation from their time and place [such as] to brand what was considered as correct in the past as mistakes by present standards or vice versa .... All things ... must be judged by the concrete conditions and circumstances according to their time and place. I do not consider it necessary, therefore, to revise any portion of this historical writing to suit present-day standpoints.

It is clear that Ch'en capitalized on this past historical document to vindicate his position as leader of the anti-Li Li-san struggle and defend the policies implemented in the Kiangsi Period on the grounds that they were necessitated by the concrete conditions of the time. (i.e., the fact that the entire bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution had made it necessary to struggle against landlords, rich peasants and capitalists). In other words, these policies might be considered ill-devised by present standards, but they had played a positive role in the Party's development. It was an attempt to forestall Mao's re-interpretation of past Party history against the RRS.

Ch'en naturally was able to do this because he had direct access to the Party publication facilities; but unlike on previous occasions, he was assisted this time by the solid unity of the RRS. In January 1940, Wang Chia-hsiang affirmed that the errors of Li Li-san were overcome by the Fourth Plenum, despite his unqualified support to Mao's rural strategy. According to Mao's internal speech of August 1959, Chang Wen-t'ien had refused to admit that the political line of the Kiangsi Period was mistaken until the Seventh Party Congress of 1945. Recent Soviet sources confirm that Chang Wen-t'ien was still ideologically a follower of Ch'en Shao-yü during this period. Thus, it seems that the RRS were making a concerted attempt to uphold their ideological orthodoxy. Between 1940 to 1942, many internal educational materials, published by the Central and regional Party organs, continued to adhere to the view that the political line established by the Fourth Plenum was indisputably correct, although there were "leftist" errors in military strategy at the later stage of the Kiangsi Soviet which had been corrected at Tsunyi. (The existence of these materials indicates that the RRS were still entrenched in the Party and that the polemics had not filtered down to the regional levels.)
Nevertheless, Ch'en Shao-yü was soon obliged to yield to Mao's authority on other issues. In his speech of May 1940 at the opening ceremony of a new youth cadre training school named after Mao, Ch'en exhorted Party members to "learn from Mao Tse-tung" and listed five major areas which might be regarded as Mao's unique contributions to the Chinese revolution. They were: (1) Mao had successfully applied the Comintern's instructions regarding Soviet political power in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; (2) Mao had skilfully utilized Russian experience in building up a worker-peasant Red Army; (3) Mao had correctly stressed the strategic importance of guerrilla warfare in China — his writings "On Protracted War" and "On Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan" were further developments of Marxism-Leninism on the problem of warfare; (4) Mao had correctly asserted the principle of "unity and struggle" in the application of the united front; (5) Mao had further developed Marx's, Lenin's, and Stalin's theses on state political power and put forward the principle of New Democracy which was applicable to all revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. (Ch'en made no reference, however, to the "dictatorship of several revolutionary classes". It should be noted that when this speech was being delivered, Mao had not yet formally published his "On New Democracy", which appeared in full only in June. In any case, Ch'en's omission shows that he still declined to commit himself to the concept.)

In conclusion, Ch'en praised Mao for being a great leader of peasant work, a brilliant strategist, an ingenious politician, and acknowledged him as the leader of the Party.

In the light of Ch'en Shao-yü's current predicament, one is tempted to associate this statement with a public confession, so as to mitigate Maoist criticisms. In my view, however, Ch'en was not capitulating to Mao. Rather, while giving credit to Mao's strategies which had made him superior in the Party, he attempted denying Mao access to the mantle of a Marxist theoretician capable of originating new ideas. It is noticeable that the credit he gave to Mao were largely within the realm of revolutionary practice, and all theoretical concepts were carefully traced back to Lenin, Stalin or the Comintern. In fact, Ch'en specifically mentioned that Mao had not "received any proper theoretical training in any school", although he conceded that through practical experience Mao had "learnt more about Marxism-Leninism" and integrating theory and practice in the revolutionary struggle than other leaders.
A comparison of Ch'en's article with the one written by Chang Ju-hsin, an active promoter of the Maoist cult, in April 1941 under the title "Advance Under the Banner of Comrade Mao Tse-tung" would serve to illustrate my point. While listing in a more detailed fashion all the points mentioned by Ch'en Shao-yü, Chang asserted that the reason why Mao was able to work out these correct policies was because he had correctly and thoroughly grasped the essence of Marxian dialectics and mastered Marxist-Leninist theories. This was demonstrated in his unfinished discourse "On Dialectical Materialism". Mao's approach, he concluded, represented the best synthesis of solving concrete Chinese revolutionary problems on the basis of dialectical materialism, as compared to the "empty and formalistic" approach of some "dogmatists".136

There is little doubt that Chang Ju-hsin was refuting Ch'en Shao-yü's point that Mao did not qualify as a theoretician because he had received no formal training on theoretical matters. What Chang sought to prove was that what characterized a theoretician was not an abstract understanding of theories but the ability to integrate theory with revolutionary practice - a criterion that would definitely place Mao above Ch'en as a theoretician, since many of his policies had been proven correct and successful. To illustrate this point further, Ch'en Po-ta, following a complete review of Party history in 1944, concludes:

It is completely contrary to historical fact to recognize Comrade Mao Tse-tung only as a practical activist of the revolution or to say that he became a theoretician only after the Resistance period and not before that.137

It appears that one of the stumbling blocks to Mao's advancement to the status of a Party theoretician was Ch'en Shao-yü's insistence that Mao was only a revolutionary pragmatist.

In November 1940, Ch'en Shao-yü took another opportunity to demonstrate his "superior" knowledge of Marxism-Leninism in a lengthy article "On Several Basic Principles Concerning Tactics Based on Marxism-Leninism". In the article, Ch'en quoted extensively from Lenin and Stalin (especially "Left-wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder and The Foundations of Leninism) regarding the formulation of policies. The major characteristics of the Chinese revolution were as follows: the peculiar conditions in China necessitated special attention to armed struggle; the changing conditions in
China brought about by Japanese aggression since 1931 and especially since 1935 had enabled the national bourgeoisie and certain sections of the comprador class to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle; the national bourgeoisie were "wavering" elements and the proletariat must struggle for leadership in the revolution so as to ensure its future transition to socialism; the proletariat must rely on the peasants as the main force of the revolution and maintain an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie; and the Party must retain its political and organizational independence and not become the "tail" of the bourgeoisie in the united front. To historians who perceive Ch'en Shao-yü's policies during the Anti-Japanese United Front as lacking in these qualities because he advocated capitulation to the KMT, this article seems to represent a self-criticism on the part of Ch'en. But if my assertion to the contrary is accepted, i.e., Ch'en had not neglected these points, then the article is to be seen in a different light.

The essential difference between Ch'en and Mao, as I have argued, was the proper strategy in utilizing the united front for Party expansion, and this is further supported by the evidence in Ch'en's article. In addition to the points raised above, Ch'en also discussed the problem of deciding on the proper tactics of the Party in accordance with the revolutionary situation. Citing Stalin's precepts on the distinction between strategy and tactics, he asserted that while the overall strategy remained constant, the Party's tactics would have to vary according to different circumstances. In times of revolutionary high-tide, the Party's tactic should be "forward and offensive"; but in times of revolutionary low-tide, the Party should avoid large-scale mass struggles and adopt defensive tactics by converting mass organizations into decentralized, secretive organizations, while seeking every legal opportunity to carry on its work so that it could reassert itself when favourable opportunity arose. This was why, he concluded, Mao and the Central Committee had correctly stressed the "long period of secretive operation for the accumulation of strength".

What Ch'en was advocating, it seems to me, was that the present stage of the Anti-Japanese United Front was a stage of revolutionary low-tide (in the sense that the Party's strength was insufficient to challenge the KMT); consequently it should make full use of the opportunities for legal and covert work provided by the united front to accumulate and conserve strength in both cities and countryside for the eventual confrontation
with the KMT (as opposed to Mao who sought to accumulate and conserve strength by rural expansion). Implicit in Ch'en's argument was that the CCP should avoid taking drastic action — as Mao had done with the "reckless" expansion of the rural base areas — which would provoke the KMT into repressive measures and thereby destroy all chances for legal expansion. (It is probably not a coincidence that this article was written in the period before the New Fourth Army Incident, thus suggesting Ch'en's cautionary intent..) Seen in this light, the article was either a self-defence or another overt criticism of Mao's policy.

As it turned out, Ch'en's action brought swift retribution. On December 25, 1940, Mao finalized his total criticism of the erroneous political line in the Kiangsi Period in "On Policy"., condemning the radical land and economic policies of the earlier period as "ultra-leftist" and attributed the mistake to a lack of understanding of the basic characteristics of the Chinese revolution. As a Nationalist report observes, this directive marked the first formal criticism of the Party's political line of the Fourth Plenum. According to a post-1949 Communist account, this directive signalled the start of the preparatory stage of the Cheng Feng Campaign. It is also disclosed that the directive was approved by the Central Committee but was still opposed by certain comrades (presumably the RRS), and Mao had to instruct the Party Centre to prepare a pamphlet known as "On the Two Lines" to educate Party cadres about the history of the Party. The existence of this document is confirmed by both Ch'en Shao-yü's memoir and the Vladimirov Diaries, stating that it was an arbitrary selection of documents which strove to contrast the "correct line" of Mao and the "erroneous line" of the RRS.

In February 1941, Mao mimeographed and circulated his speech given to the Red Army Academy in 1936, stating in a new preface that the work was the result of "a struggle between two lines". (Since the treatise was in the main a critique of the mistakes in military strategy of the Kiangsi Period, and since prior to this time no internal document had identified the mistakes of the Kiangsi Period as of a political nature, it is my inference that the latter criticism was inserted into the 1941 version of the speech.) In March and April 1941, Mao republished Rural Surveys, a collection of rural investigations written by himself during 1927-1934, which were designed to serve Mao's point — raised in the preface and postcript — that owing to the RRS's failure to investigate the actual
local conditions, they had worked out radical land and economic policies in the Kiangsi Period which were all "tactically wrong".145

The circulation of all these materials for organized study among the Party cadres sealed the fate of Ch'en Shao-yü, who was being exposed as a doctrinaire theoretician, unable to relate Marxian learning to the concrete conditions in China and actually hampering the Party's growth by advocating an erroneous line of policy. In September 1941, Mao convened an enlarged Politburo conference, which formally adopted a resolution condemning the political line which dominated the Party during the period from September 18th Incident to the Tsunyi Conference as a mistake, thus marking his total triumph over Ch'en. Decision was also made to discontinue the journals managed by the RRS, including The Communist, Chinese Youth, Chinese Culture, Chinese Women and the Hsin Chung-hua'pao.147 In late 1940, the existing academies and cadre-training schools were either closed (e.g., the Women University and the Youth Cadre Training School, both under Ch'en Shao-yü's direction) or completely reorganized (e.g., the Central Party School). All schools were placed under direct Central control, with new staff and new curricula introduced to teach Party history, Marxism-Leninism and the Problems of the Chinese Revolution.148 The stage was set for the official launching of the Cheng Feng Campaign.

Much of the details of the ensuing Cheng Feng Campaign (1942-44) have been discussed by many historians, and it is not necessary to reproduce them here.149 Suffice it to note that, under the personal direction of Mao and other leaders such as Liu Shao-ch'i, K'ang Sheng and Kao Kang, huge study sessions were held among cadres for the purpose of discussion and examining the twenty-two principal Cheng Feng documents, comprising Central Committee directives, the writings of Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, K'ang Sheng, Lu Ting-i, P'eng Ch'en, Stalin and Dimitrov, in addition to the Short Course.150 These writings were designed to expose and rectify Ch'en's errors of "subjectivism", "sectarianism" and "formalism", which were labelled the "three erroneous styles". Towards the latter part of the campaign, discussions among senior cadres shifted to a review of Party history; and in April 1945 the Central Committee formally adopted the "Resolution on Some Historical Problems" which served as the standard interpretation of the CCP's history of intraparty struggles.
As the main body of the Resolution deals with the period of the Kiangsi Soviet, it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze its content and verify its assumptions. Nevertheless, since I have advanced the view that the Resolution was based on a substantial amount of misrepresentation of the historical facts for the purpose of upholding Mao's ideological supremacy, it may be pertinent here to discuss the problem why the CCP leadership as a whole deemed it necessary and desirable to accept and produce such a document.

Part of the answer, of course, was due to the fact that the policies implemented in the Yenan Period under Mao's leadership had proven correct and effective. Just as Mao had predicted, the KMT was likely to "waver" and turn counterrevolutionary; the only viable alternative to build up the Party's strength was the construction of rural guerrilla bases. Mao's theories on the strategic importance of guerrilla warfare and his judgement on the three-stage development of the war proved astoundingly prophetic. Above all, his principles of New Democracy had won for the Party support from a wide sector of the population and greatly consolidated Communist power. Ch'en Shao-yü, in contrast, not only appeared as a doctrinaire totally unable to relate Marxist theories to practice, but his readiness to invoke Comintern authority and oppose Mao on many occasions naturally invited resentment and contempt from other Party leaders. Thus, few leaders would be prepared to defend him or found the charges against him inadmissible. Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the early stage of the movement, the consolidation of Mao's leadership position did not yet call into being a personal cult of Mao, as Liu Shao-ch'i wrote in the latter half of 1941:

Although Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the leader of the entire Party, even he is subordinate to the Party .... No matter who the individual may be, his value is not so great as to command the obedience of everybody. The reason why we obey Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung is precisely because they have an accurate understanding of things, because they represent the truth. 151

By 1943, however, the CCP was threatened with the Nationalist attempt to mobilize public support for an eventual showdown with the Communists. In March, Chiang Kai-shek published China's Destiny as his own personal testimonial of the KMT's manifest role in the Chinese revolution, in which the CCP was denied any legitimate position. At the same time, anti-Communist critics rallied behind Chiang in demanding
the CCP's dissolution and asserting the bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism. The CCP was prompted by such challenges to activate a campaign to assert its unquestioned leadership in the Chinese revolution and to project Mao as the symbol of the Party's heroic struggle to rival Chiang Kai-shek. For this purpose, voluminous writings by many Party leaders were produced. For example, Liu Shao-ch'i, revised his earlier stand:

The history of the Chinese Party must be the history of the development of Marxism-Leninism in China. It also means a history of the struggle of the Chinese Marxist-Leninists with the various groups of opportunists. Such history objectively is formed with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its centre.

The urgency of the situation induced even Ch'in Pang-hsien, already under criticism, to submit his article entitled "Struggle to Defend the CCP under the Banner of Mao Tse-tung":

In the twenty-two years of our Party's existence, we have never achieved a degree of solidarity and unity as of today .... We have our leader Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the helmsman of the Chinese revolution. His direction is the direction of our Party, [and] his direction is the direction of the whole nation.

At the same time, the applicability of Marxism-Leninism to China was strongly asserted in the following remarks:

We can tell the anti-Communist elements openly that Communism not only fits China but, owing to the achievements of our party leader Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has closely united with the Chinese national emancipation and the actual interests of the Chinese people, and become rooted in Chinese soil.

Thus, both the personal glorification of Mao and the proclamation of Mao's creative application of Marxism-Leninism were a direct response to an external challenge.

To further substantiate the Party's claims, the CCP leaders probably came to the conclusion that a systematic comparison between Mao's approach to the Chinese revolution and those of previous Party leaderships would render the Party's assertions more forceful and credible. With this objective in mind, Party ideologues (notably Ch'en Po-ta) collated...
materials on the Chinese Communist movement and undertook to re-interpret the entire history of the CCP. The end product, while containing certain grains of historical truth, cannot but be an arbitrary selection of evidence designed to juxtapose the totally "incorrect" lines of previous leaderships with Mao's. To absolve Mao of all responsibility for the Party's past failures, it was also necessary to depict Mao as the consistent opponent to these erroneous tendencies. As applied to Kiangsi, this meant that the RRS were to shoulder the blame for the failure and Mao was to be placed "in opposition" to the Party leadership. As early as 1942, Chang Ju-hsin wrote:

Prior to the Tsunyi Conference the sectarian leadership of a small group of Party leaders expressed itself in blind opposition to everything external to the Party. They practised a 'leftist close-doorism' and abandoned alliance with all possible allies of the Party, thus isolating the Party and the revolutionary forces from all sources of help and support and causing great harm to the Soviet movement.  

Thus, the inability of the RRS to ally with other classes was identified (quite justifiably) as the cause of the Party's failure in Kiangsi. To categorically assert that the present Party leadership had renounced this policy, the CCP disclosed to the outside that the RRS were subject to criticisms because they deviated from the basic principle of class collaboration and antagonized the non-Communist intermediate elements.

Consequently, the bulk of the criticisms contained in the 1945 Resolution was directed against the RRS for their failure to perceive the changes in class relations in the country following the September 1931 Manchurian Incident and their resultant "sectarian" policy of struggle against all intermediate groups. Specifically, the RRS were charged with such "ultra-leftist" policy as physical extermination of landlords, elimination of the rich-peasant economy, an extremist labour policy, refusal to grant political rights to all exploiters, and a radical policy towards intellectuals. All these "rendered the revolutionary forces isolated, causing great damage to the Red Army forces". Ideologically, these errors were attributed to their failure to perceive the protracted nature of the Chinese revolution and the uneven development of the revolutionary situation in the country, as manifested in their adventurist attempt to seize the major cities for the "winning of initial victory in one or more provinces" and unrealistic call for a "decisive battle" with the KMT during the Fifth Extermination Campaign.
On the other hand, a claim was made for Mao in having discovered New Democracy as early as the late twenties:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung ... pointed out that after the big bourgeoisie's betrayal of the revolution [in 1927], there was still ... a broad strata of people who demanded democracy and especially demanded a fight against imperialism. It was therefore necessary to treat the various intermediate classes correctly and do everything possible to make an alliance with them or neutralize them. In the countryside it was necessary to protect the well-to-do middle peasants, provide certain economic opportunities for the rich peasants, and also enable the ordinary landlords to make a living. These are all basic ideas of New Democracy, yet they were not understood and were opposed by the exponents of the 'leftist' line.

Thus, one of the major objectives of the Resolution was in fact to project Mao as the consistent advocate for moderate land and economic policies and for class collaboration. (For this reason, it was necessary to obliterate the role played by Ch'en Shao-yü in the Anti-Japanese United Front. The Resolution therefore avoided any detailed assessment of the Anti-Japanese United Front Period on the grounds that "it was not yet over". It did, however, mention that the August First Declaration was one of the "correct" measures adopted by the Party to rectify the mistakes of the earlier period.)

It is my contention, therefore, that the "Resolution on some Historical Problems" should be seen in the context of 1945 and not 1935. Its primary purpose was to forcefully assert Mao's ideological infallibility so as to invalidate all adverse criticisms from the outside against the CCP and to instill in the Party members a sense of confidence in the Party's invincibility. Concomitantly, it was used to serve the function of legitimizing the policy of class collaboration which had won victories for the Party in recent years. This would help to discard any notion that the united front was not the established policy of the Party but one contingent upon the Anti-Japanese War. Seen in this light, the Resolution was not so much an attempt to set right the historical record or even to settle old scores, but a document born out of the political necessities of its time.
In fact, what emerged from the Cheng Feng Campaign was the affirmation of Mao's principles of New Democracy as his most distinctive contribution to the theories of the Chinese revolution. This is confirmed by a Chinese member of the press delegation to the Communist base in 1944, who observed that Mao's "On New Democracy" was universally regarded in the Communist region as the "supreme political guideline" of the CCP and the "concrete manifestation of the CCP's revolutionary theories". Mao himself told Gunther Stein: "On all basic points our policies have proved correct from the very beginning. This is true first of all of our fundamental policies under the New Democracy". Furthermore, Agnes Smedley, who visited the Communist base in 1946, proclaimed:

'New Democracy' marks a turning-point in the Chinese revolutionary thought .... To the CCP, it is the foundation of all its policies from 1940 to the present as well as for the future ....

Officially, Liu Shao-ch'i in his "Report on the Revision of Party Constitution" delivered to the Seventh Party Congress in May 1945, proclaimed Mao Tse-tung's Thought as the guiding ideology of the CCP in the creation of a New Democratic Republic in China, and placed Mao's theories on New Democracy squarely at the head of the list of Mao's unique contributions to the Chinese revolution.

Indeed, throughout the entire Civil War Period (1946-49), New Democracy still provided the basis for the Party's policies and ideological pronouncements. Its effectiveness in helping the CCP's cause is well attested by Lin Yu-tang's The Vigil of a Nation published in 1946, in which he declared New Democracy to be an expedient policy and forewarned his fellow countrymen that the Chinese Communists would very rapidly revert to communism. Furthermore, in the spring of 1948, the KMT's Department of National Defence found it necessary to re-circulate Jen Tsosihshan's "A Critique of Mao Tse-tung's New Democracy". There is little doubt that the weakening of the determination to resist among the non-Communist elements contributed enormously to the Communist victory. Small wonder that in 1949 Mao reiterated the functional value of the Party, army and the united front and reaffirmed the principle of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie for the tasks ahead. According to Liu Shao-ch'i, New Democracy was still the basic programme of the Party for the foreseeable future.
Notes:

1 Johnson, pp. 13-4; and "Chinese Communist Leadership", p. 415.
2 Selden, esp. pp. 175, 197, 207 & 209.
3 Kataoka, p. 228.
5 Chin-jih mo-ts'a chih wen-t'i, p. 21.
6 Ibid., pp. 26-33. The reply is dated Nov. 9, 1940.
7 The ultimatum, issued on December 8, is reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 205-10.
9 Communist sources naturally claimed that the New Fourth Army had obeyed the Government's order but was ambushed by the Nationalist; Nationalist sources, however, charged the Communist troops with atrocity and expansion into other directions. Latter-day Communists denounce Hsiang Ying for his "rightist opportunism" for failing to take positive actions against the KMT's attack. Interestingly, during the Cultural Revolution Hsiang Ying was accused of attempting to set up another Communist base in the south to rival that of Mao, see Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 191-92.
10 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 197-98.
12 Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, p. 257.
13 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 200-3.
15 See the editorials of Chung-yang jih-pao, Sao-tang pao, Hsin-min pao, and Kung-shang jih-pao (Hong Kong), reproduced in Fan Ying, ed., Hsin szu-chünn shih-chien chen-hsiang (The Truth about the New Fourth Army Incident; n. p., n. d.), pp. 35-52. (MMCP reel 3)
17 "Kung-ch'ran-tang ch'i ts'an-i-yüan chih Kuo-min-ts'an-cheng-hui kung-han" (An Open Letter from the Seven CCP Delegates to the People's Political Consultative Assembly), MTTC, Vol. 7,
18 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 230-32.
19 See Kuo-min ts'an-cheng-hui mi-shu ch'u, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng-hui ti erh-ch'ieh ti i-t'su ta-hui chi-lu (Records of the First Session of the Second People's Political Consultative Assembly, 1941), p. 243. (TB)


21 See Van Slyke, p. 175.

22 See Ou Chiang-tung, K'ang-chien kuo-te's'e hsia ti Chung-kuo kung-och'an-tang (The CCP in the Policy of National Resistance and Construction; Kweilin, 1940); Ch'en Chung, Szu-nien lai ti Chung-kuo kung-och'an-tang (The CCP in the Past Four Years; n.p., 1941); Chung-kung ts'ai k'ang-chuan ch'i-chien chih cheng-ko yin-mou (The Entire Conspiracy of the CCP during the Period of the Resistance War; n.p., 1941); Kung-tang p'o-huai k'ang-chut'ieh yin-mou ti tsung-pao-tu (A Complete Exploration of the CCP's Conspiracy to Sabotage the War of Resistance; n.p., 1941); T'ung-i ch'u-pan she, Chung-kung hsin ts'e-t'ieh yl pen-tang tut-ts'e (The CCP's New Policy and Our Party's Counter-strategy; n.p., 1941). (BI)


24 "Ta-tao ti-erh-t'zu fan-kung kao-chao hou ti shih-ch'ü" (The Situation after the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist High-tide), MTTHC, Vol. 2, 736-77.


26 Teng Tzu-hui, "Tui Huan-nan shih-pien ti chi-pen jen-shih" (Basic Understandings on the South Anhwei Incident) Tang ti sheng-huo (Life of the Party), No. 2 [Feb. 1941], pp. 1-8.


28 See Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 224-27.

Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'u shih-cheng kang-ling (Administrative Programme of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), K'ang-ch'an-i-lai, pp. 158-60.

Kao Kang, "Wei shih-hsien Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'u hsìn ti shih-cheng kang-ning eh tou-cheng" (Struggle for the Realization of the New Administrative Programme of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), Chieh-fong, No. 129 (May 26, 1941), pp. 5-11; Wu K'o-chien, "Lun Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'u shih-cheng kang-ling" (On the Administrative Programme of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), in Tao tsu-yu hsing-fu chih lu (The Road to Freedom and Happiness, n. p., 1941), pp. 1-5; Wen An, Udleh lun pien-ch'u shih-cheng kang-ling (Brief Discussion on the Administrative Programme of the Border Region; Shanghai, 1941), pp. 1-9.

"Kachukyoku daiichi kakudai kaigi no daiyonshi oyobi YoGen sohenku to'i no hammasatsu jiei tōso chū ni okeru sakugo ni kansuru kettei" (Resolution of the First Enlarged Conference of the Central China Bureau on the Mistakes of the Fourth Army and the Yu-Huan Soviet Border Region Party Committee in the Anti-friction and Self-defence Struggle), in Japanese Consulate-General, Shanghai, Chung-kuo kung-ch 'an-t'ang Hua-chung-ch'i ti-i t.'zu k r u o-t'a hui-i chileh-i (Resolution of the First Enlarged Conference of the Central China Bureau of the CCP; 1942), appendix, pp. 95-100. (KM) The fact that Hsiang Ying was also criticized for "leftist" errors is not mentioned in subsequent Chinese Communist accounts.

"Tui Yen-ch'eng pao-wei jen-yllan hsUn-lien pan ti chiang-hua" (Speech to the Training Class of Security Personnel of Yen-ch'eng), Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t' i, pp. 85-8.

"Wo-men tsai ti-hou kan-hsieh shen-mo" (What Are We Doing Behind Enemy Line?), Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t' i, pp. 88-97.

"Tsai Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'u ts'an-i-hui ti yen-shuo" (Speech at the Consultative Assembly of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), MTTC, Vol. 8, pp. 35-9. It is interesting to note that in the revised version of Mao's Selected Works, the phrase "peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie" is inserted before the "intermediate class", see MTTHC, Vol. 3, p. 766. Its omission in the original text, I suggest, shows how carefully Mao tried to placate the landlord-gentry elements. According to Erh-shih cheng-chih pu, "Tang ti cheng-ts'e pao-kao ta-kang" (Outline Report on Party Policy), Apr. 1943, the intermediate strata which Mao wished to win over referred to the middle and small landlords, national and petty bourgeoisie, and the "enlightened" gentry. (MMCP reel 11)


"Fan-tui tang-nei ko-chung pu-liang ch'ing-hsiang" (Oppose unhealthy Tendencies within the Party); 1941, Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t' i, p. 118.

39 Selden, pp. 232-33. Kataoka, p. 249, further suggests that the CCP introduced "a whole constellation of measures" to "squeeze landlord out of existence".


42 P'eng Chen, "Chung-kung Chin-Ch'a-Ch'ü pien-ch'ü chih ko-chung cheng-ts'e" (The Various Policies of the CCP's Chin-Ch'a-Ch'ü Border Region; n. p., 1942), pp. 1-38. (HI) Originally a report to the Northern Bureau of October 1941, it was published on Jan. 28, 1942 to coincide with the Politburo's directive.


45 Selden does not include the three-thirds system in his discussion of major policies pursued by the Party in the period 1941-45. See chap. 5.

46 See 'Chia-ch'i chang hsien-ch'ü hsing-cheng ling-tao (Editorial)" (Strengthen the Administrative Leadership in the Districts and Counties) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 12, 1941; Huan-nan (pseud.), "San-san-chih yü t'ien-hsia wei-kung" (The Three-thirds System and Equal Participation), Chieh-fang jih-pao (Dec. 22, 1941) and "San-san-chih ti yün-yung (Editorial)" (The Application of the Three-thirds System), Chieh-fang jih-pao (May 25, 1942).


314


52 Lin Po-chü, "Shen-Kan-Ning pien-chü san-san chih ti ching-yen chi-ch'i ying-k'ai chiu-ch'eng ti pien-hsiang" (Experience of the Three-thirds System in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and Tendencies which Should be Corrected), cited in Van Slyke, pp. 146-49.

53 Ibid., pp. 152-53.

54 See MTTHC, Vol. 3, p. 897.

55 For their reports, see Ch'i Wen, Wai-kuo chi-che yen-chung ti Yenan chieh-fang ch'ü' (Yenan and the Liberated Areas in the Eyes of Foreign Reports; Shan Shou, 1946), Chang Wen-po, Shen-pei kuei-lai ta-k'o wen (Reply to Enquiry after the Return from Yenan; Chungking, 1945), Chin Tung-p'ing, Yen-an Kuei-lai (Return from Yenan; Chungking, 1944); and Wang Chung-ming, Shen-pei chih hsing (Journey to Northern Shensi; Chungking, 1944).


58 E.g., Mao told G. Stein: "What China needs most is democracy - not socialism" and "we are still very far from socialism". He also explained candidly: "Land confiscation would drive landlords to enemy camp, 'rent reduction' makes it possible for the landlords to remain". To M. Votaw, Mao recommended: "It might be more appropriate to call ourselves a Democratic Party". See Amerasia Papers, pp. 692-93 & 699. Further, in response to the question of whether the CCP would confiscate the land of landlords after the war, a CCP spokesman said:

If the landlords hold two swords in both hands and kill people day after day, then it is impossible not to confiscate their land. But if their relations with the peasants are cordial, then their land would definitely not be confiscated.

See Kung-fei huo-kuo, pp. 410.


68 "Kuo-min-tang chüeh-shao le shen-mo" (What Does the KMT Lack?), MTTC, Vol. 7, pp. 329-32.

69 "Kuan-yü fan-fa-hsü ssu kuo-chi t'ung-i-chan-hsien ti chüeh-ting" (Resolution on the International Anti-Fascist United Front), MTTC, Vol. 7, pp. 333-34.

70 Kusano Fumio, p. 250.


72 Chou En-lai [et al.], Ch'i-ch'i szu-nien (The Fourth Anniversary of 'July 7'; Chungking, 1941), p. 19.


74 See the editorials of May 21 and July 21, 1941, reproduced in Kyög-fei huo-kuo, pp. 274-76 & 283-86.

75 See Wang Chien-min, "Yen-an ti k'u-men" (Frustrations of Yenan), Chung-yang chou-k'an (Central Weekly), Vol. 3, No. 47 (June 26, 1940); and Ou Yang-tsung, Vol. 2, pp. 35-6.

76 This information is based on Radio Moscow, Chinese language broadcast, May 10, 1970, reproduced in Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, p. 343.


T'ao Hsi-chin, "Mu-chien chan-ch'ü yu-chi hsiao-tsu ti hsiao-neng chi-ch'i ling-tao wen-t'i" (The Effectiveness of Small Guerrilla Units in the Present War Areas and Problem of Leadership); Kao Feng, "Lun tui-yü ti-fang wu-chuang ti ling-tao wen-t'i" (On the Problem of Leadership over Local Armed Forces), both in Chien-ch'ih, No. 4 (Jan. 1942); reproduced in Kung-fei huo-kuo, pp. 198-205 & 209-17.


Between 1940-41, the Communist territories contracted by approximately one-sixth and its population was reduced from about 100 to 50 million. See Chu Teh, Lun chieh-fang ch'ü h'an-chang (On the Battlefield of the Liberated Areas; Peking, 1964), p. 12; and K'ang-jih shih-chü ti Pa-lu-chün yi hsün-szu-chün, p. 142.


Su-chung ch'ü-pan-she, Ch'i-ch'i wen-hsien (Documents of July 7; n. p., 1942), p. 50.

Wang Jo-fei, "Wo-men ts'en-yang ts'ai ti-hou ken-chü-ti chien-she hsün-min-chu chu-i cheng-chih" (How We Establish New Democratic Rule in the Bases Behind the Enemy Lines), Chieh-fang jih-pao, (July 7, 1942); also in K'ang-chan wu-chou-nien chi-nien tse, pp. 78-85.

Chiang Kai-shek, p. 97; Wang Chien-min, p. 660.

"Tui Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang shih-chung ch'üan-hui Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang fa-piao i-chien" (Opinion of the CCP on the KMT's Tenth Plenum), MTTC, Vol. 8, pp. 181-82.

During the Cultural Revolution, it was revealed that Mao had in May 1943 criticized P'eng's speech "On Democratic Education" on the grounds that he spoke from the standpoint of "democracy, liberty, equality and fraternity, rather than from the political needs of the current anti-Japanese struggle". See MTTC, Vol. 9, pp. 13-4. It is quite possible that P'eng had failed to make a distinction between the CCP's short term and long-term objectives, but it does not alter the fact that P'eng was giving his support to the Party's policies as they existed at the time.

See Jen Tso-hsilan p'ing-chuan hsi-l'i, p. 33.

See MTTC, vol. 9, p. 44.


"Chih-wen Kuo-min-tang" (To Query the KMT), MTTC, Vol. 9, pp. 41-9.

"P'ing Kuo-min-tang shih-i-chung ch'il'an-hui chi san-chieh erh-t'zu kuo-min ts'an-cheng-hui" (Comment on the KMT's Eleventh Plenum and the Second Session of the Third People's Political Consultative Assembly), MTTC, Vol. 9, pp. 59-74.

Teng Tzu-hui, "Cheng-feng shu-hsü-tui shih-shih t'ao-lun tsung-chieh pao-kao" (Report of the Overall Discussion on the Current Situation by the Mobile Rectification Indoctrination Unit), Fu-hsiao (The Dawn), Vol. 1, No. 7 (Jan. 1944), pp. 6-34. How Kataoka comes to regard this article as a "signal to get ready for a general armed insurrection" is beyond my comprehension. See Kataoka, pp. 304-5, fn. 6.

"Yü Chung-wai chi-che t'uan t'an-hua" (Talk with the Chinese and Foreign Press Delegation), MTTC, Vol. 9, pp. 99-103.

"Lun lien-ho cheng-fu", MTTC, Vol. 9, pp. 183-275

See MTTHC, Vol. 4, p. 1142; and Harrison, p. 294.


See P'eng Teh-huai, "Kuan-yü Ssu- ta-lin lun tang ti pu-erh-se-wei-k'lo hua shih-erh tiao" (On Stalin's Twelve Points concerning the Bolshevization of the Party), June 15, 1944, p. 5 (HI)

Smedley, The Great Road, p. 294.

See Lin I-ch'ing, 161; CGKSTS, Vol. 1, pp. 513 & 537; and Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no seiji to jinbutei, pp. 355 & 360.

See MTTC, Vol. 7, p. 80.


See "Pien-cheng-fa wei-wu-lun (chiang-shou ti-kang)" ([Outline of Lectures] on Dialectical Materialism), MTTC, Vol. 6, pp. 265-303. It is generally believed that Mao's work is based on Ai Ssu-ch'i's Hsin che-hsuleh ta-kana (Outline of New Philosophy; Peiping 1936; At the library of the Hoover Institution, I have located an even closer version which Mao produced almost verbatim: Ai Ssu-ch'i, Che-hsuleh yen-ohiu kang-yao (K'ang-ta che-hsuleh chiang-shou ti-kang) (Outline of the Study of Philosophy [Basic Content of Lectures at K'ang-ta]; Kweilin, 1939). Even "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" bear resemblance to this work.


Polveka KPK, p. 4


Published under the Central Committee, Yldh-yung t'ung-i-chien hsien i-chien Chung-kung chiin chien-shih (A Brief History of the CCP before the Application of the United Front; n. p., 1942), pp. 71-2. (MMCP reel 13)

See Hsulle-hsi sheng-huo (Study Life, n. p., 1941), pp. 15-8 (HI)

Ibid., appendix, p. 141.

Interview with author.


That actual preparation were made for the Congress is confirmed by Kuo Hua-lun's informant, Vol. 4, p. 364; and MTTC, Vol. 7, p. 289.
E.g. Hu Hua, *Chung-kuo ko-ming shih chiang-i*, p. 422.

See Kuo Hua-lun, *Vol. 4*, pp. 373-75.

MTTC, *Vol. 7*, p. 80.

"Lun kung-k'ai kung-tso yíl mi-mi kung-tso" (On Open and Secret Work), Oct. 20 1940, *Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i*, pp. 69-76, esp. 75-6.

See *MTTHC*, *Vol. 2*, p. 584.

*Polveka KPK*, p. 16.


Shih Fang, p. 85.

See *WMHC*, *Vol. 3*, pp. 173-75.


E.g. Vladimirov, p. 107.


"Hsüeh-hsi Mao Tse-tung" (Learn from Mao Tse-tung), *WMHC*, *Vol. 5*, pp. 319-24.


Ch'en Po-ta, "Nei-chan shih-ch'i ti fan-ko-ming yíl ko-ming" (Counter-revolution and Revolution in the Period of the Civil War), May 1, 1944; p. 65. (*MMCP* reel 12)

Kataoka, p. 228, fn. 184.


*Kung-fei huo-kuo*, pp. 228-29.


Ibid., Kuo Hua-lun, Vol. 4, pp. 379-80; Gaimusho, Chugoku kyōsanto saikin ni okeru shitsu teki henka to tomai kyōka no genjō (Present Conditions of the Recent Changing Character and Party Strengthening of the CCP; 1942), p. 22; and Ch'en Yi, "Ch'i-yûeh cheng-tun san-feng ti ch'u-pu tsung-chieh" (Preliminary Conclusion of the Rectification of Three Styles in the Past Seven Months), in Cheng Feng, No. 1, p. 1.

See e.g. Selden, pp. 188-207; Harrison, pp. 321-47; and B. Compton, Mao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944 (Seattle, 1952), introduction.

Most of these documents have been translated in Compton. See also MTTHC, Vol. 4, pp. 460-1.

Liu Shao-ch'i, "Tsü-chihs'huang ho chi-1u shang ti hsiu-yang" (Self-cultivation in Organization and Discipline), cited in N. Tokuda, "Yenan Rectification Movement: Mao Tse-tung's Big Push toward Charismatic Leadership During 1941-1942", The Developing Economies, Vol. 9 (Mar. 1971), No. 1, pp. 81-99, esp. 93. I am indebted to this article for many inspirational ideas.

One volume, Chung-kuo kung-ch'ı'an-tang yü Chung-kuo min-tsu chieh-fang ti tao-lu (The CCP and the Road to Chinese National Liberation; n. p. 1943), is a refutation of the arguments for the dissolution of the CCP; another, Chung-kuo kung-ch'ı'an-tang yü Chung-hua min-tsu (The CCP and the Chinese Nation; Shangtung, 1943), is a rebuttal of Chiang Kai-shek's China Destiny.

"Ch'ing-suan tang-nei ti Meng-sewei chu-i ssu-hsiang" (Liquidate All Thoughts of Menshevism within the Party), Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'ı, p. 133.

Po Ku, "Ts'ai Mao Tse-tung ti ch'i-chih hsia wei pao-wei Chung-kuo kung-ch'ı'an-tang erh chan" Chieh-fang jih-pao, (July 13, 1943).

Gelder, p. 178; the same statement is contained in Chou En-lai's speech of August 2, 1943, see Chieh-fang jih-pao (Aug. 6, 1943).
See note 137.


See "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang yu Chung-hua min-tsu (Editorial)", Chieh-fang jih-pao (July 1, 1943); and Amerasia Papers, p. 1169.

See Hsiao, Power Relations II, pp. 786-803.


Kung Chao-k'ai, "Chung-kung, shih-pa chi-t'uan yu Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ii" (The CCP, the Eighteen Army Corps and the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), Kung-fei huo-kuo, p. 411.

Stein, p. 92.

A. Smedley (trans. by Meng Chan), Mao Tse-tung ti Ssu-hsiang (The Thought of Mao Tse-tung; n. p., 1947), p. 25.

"Kuan-yu hsiu-k'ai tang-chang ti pao-kao", Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i, pp. 145 & 152.


See Jen Tso-hsikan p'ing-chuan hsii-oh, p. 42.

MTTC, Vol. 10, pp. 303-5.

See Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i, p. 221.
EPILOGUE AND EVALUATION

At the Bureau of Investigation in Taipei, I discovered a number of political resolutions adopted by a "Extraordinary Central Committee of the CCP" (ECC) between May 1944 and April 1947. I have subsequently failed to trace the origin or identify the composition of this organization, but judging from the contents of the resolutions the ECC appears to be composed of pro-Ch'en Shao-yü elements. (The possibility of its being a bogus organization set up by the Trotskyites or the KMT is ruled out by the severe criticisms of the KMT and the open support given to the RRS. Moreover, these resolutions seemed to present such a well-informed picture of the intraparty conflicts of the CCP and the criticisms they raised against Mao were so real from the RRS's perspectives that they could hardly have been forgeries.) As such, they deserve our close attention.

Its first resolution, adopted on May 1, 1944 at the first plenary session of the ECC, consisted of the following points:

(1) The Chinese revolution is basically anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, but in the War of Resistance the following changes have occurred in the class relations within the country: the national bourgeoisie and many landlords have become less reactionary and more nationalistic; the petty bourgeoisie have become firm supporters of the Resistance; peasants have become the "main army" of the Resistance although they brought with them "peasant consciousness" into the Party; the industrial workers of the hinterland have been rapidly gaining "proletarian consciousness" through the "baptism" of the Resistance.

(2) The KMT is a representative of the bourgeois class, and this determines its reactionary character: during the Resistance it has attempted to restrict democracy and preserved its one-party dictatorship. But it still possesses certain revolutionary character and has improved its policies since the start of the war. Our Party's policy is to struggle against its reactionary measures and promote its progressive character, so as to strengthen the force of Resistance and consolidate the united front.

(3) It is true that the minority of diehards in the KMT are trying to instigate a civil war, but the pressure of democratic forces inside and outside the nation and the strength of the CCP would forestall the diehards' scheme. Our Party's policy is to apply pressure on the KMT to implement constitutional rule rather than force the KMT into civil war.
(4) Our Party is at present in a crisis. The Central Committee headed by Mao Tse-tung is suffering from a grave "leftist opportunist" error: Politically, it underestimates the progressive developments since the War of Resistance, wrongly regards the constitutional movement as the KMT's trickery rather than the people's genuine demands, treats the capitulationist tendency among certain individuals as the capitulationist tendency of the entire KMT. All these are likely to jeopardize our Party's struggle for democracy, constitutional rule and legal works. Militarily, it suffers from "pure militarism" in overrelying on the armed forces to the neglect of the expansion of the Party, concentrating on the development of the Border Regions to the neglect of party work in other areas, thus repeating the same error committed ten years ago of "work only in the Soviet areas and not the white areas". Organizationally, it employs "patriarchalism" and "terrorism", forcing the Party members to deny the services rendered by the "Bolshevized" Fourth Plenum leadership and vilify its correct political line which is based on the Comintern line. Using the pretext of "rectifying erroneous tendencies", it eliminates all dissenting Party cadres, attacks the leaders of the anti-Li Li-san struggle - the truly fine comrades of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks - and oppresses new comrades especially those from intellectual backgrounds.

(5) It is clear that Maoism is completely contrary to Marxism-Leninism. It derived its social basis from the long tradition of militarist rule in the nation and its patriarchal system, the weak foundation of the proletariat class in society, the preponderant composition of peasant elements in the Party, and the long period of guerrilla warfare in the countryside.

(6) The ECC thereby calls upon all Party members to struggle against the erroneous Mao Tse-tung line, organize their own extraordinary committees at all levels and accept the direction of ECC until such time as a national Party congress is convened to elect a new central committee and adopt a new Party constitution.

Between 1945 to 1947, the ECC further adopted several resolutions calling for the elimination of sectarianism and CCP participation in the KMT's National Consultative Councils, declaring that it would be much easier for the Party to win the support of the people by peaceful and legal struggle rather than by armed struggle. When Yenan fell to the Nationalist forces in March 1947, the Committee declared Mao's line to be totally bankrupt and urged a complete shift to legal struggle so as to reassert the Party's influence amongst the masses.
These resolutions show that there was indeed a "struggle of two lines" between Ch'en Shao-yü and Mao in the period of the Anti-Japanese United Front. To the supporters of Ch'en, Mao's approach was a "leftist" adventurist line which was causing great harm to the Party by overrelying on armed expansion and neglecting the importance of legal work in the united front. To Mao's followers, Ch'en's line suffered from "rightist opportunism" which was undermining the Party's own strength by adhering to legal work and underestimating the importance of the rural strategy. Their fundamental conflict lies in a different conceptualization of the function of the united front: to the former group, the united front was to facilitate the Party's expansion through legal channels; to the latter, it was to facilitate the construction of rural guerrilla bases. Both sides were genuinely seeking to advance the interests of the Party and both believed in the efficacy of their own strategy and the harmful effects of the other. History has vindicated the correctness of Mao's approach. (Whether Ch'en Shao-yü's line was sure to lead the Party to defeat is a moot point.)

The earliest sign of Maoist criticism of Ch'en Shao-yü's "incorrect" handling of the united front appeared in December 1943, when the Research Association on the United Front published a collection of excerpts from the reports of Dimitrov, Manuilsky and other Comintern leaders at the Seventh Comintern Congress. Its preface added that these writings clearly demonstrated that the united front was a "forward policy" and not a "defensive" one, and claimed that Mao, through "applying the same Marxist-Leninist revolutionary standpoints in solving problems", had reached similar conclusions as the Comintern leaders. It ridiculed "certain other comrades" for having reached different conclusions by adopting different standpoints. (This was clearly a refutation of Ch'en Shao-yü's views expressed in "On Several Problems Concerning Tactics Based on Marxism-Leninism"; for reasons discussed earlier, the Maoist Party machine did not follow up its criticism of Ch'en's "errors" in the united front.)

By 1947, the situation had permitted Mao to offer an assessment of Ch'en's deviations since the CCP had begun to call for a more radical orientation of mass mobilization work. In his directive issued in July, Mao denounced the "capitulationist" tendency within the Party during the Anti-Japanese United Front Period which conceded to the anti-people policy of the KMT, trusted the KMT more than the people, feared full-scale mobilization of the masses, refrained from expanding the Communist base areas and
the Communist armed forces, and surrendered the leadership of the Anti-Japanese War to the KMT.⁴

In the fifties, a considerable degree of overstatement and embellishment of the historical facts were incorporated into the official account of Ch'en Shao-yü's "errors". According to Hu Hua:

(1) Ch'en played down the differences in class nature of the CCP and the KMT and failed to differentiate the left, centre and right wings of the KMT. Hence he mistakenly asserted that "all those who resist Japan are our friends" and acclaimed Chiang Kai-shek a "national hero". Moreover, he denied the existence of fascism in the KMT and overestimated the KMT's improvements.

(2) Ch'en opposed the principle of maintaining "independence and initiative in our hands" in the united front and advocated instead "Everything Subordinates to the United Front" and "Everything through the United Front" - meaning he insisted on getting the KMT's approval for all Party activities.

(3) Ch'en underestimated the importance of the people's army, guerrilla warfare and the construction of rural guerrilla bases. He overrated the importance of cities and relied on the regular KMT troops to win victory in the War of Resistance. In Wuhan, he concentrated on upper-level and legal work to the neglect of organizing the masses, and called for military unification which in practice meant the merging of the Communist army with the Nationalist army.

(4) Ch'en failed to perceive that the Anti-Japanese United Front was only a strategic change in the stage of the democratic revolution and not an overall change in the Party's revolutionary strategy. Thus, he failed to see that the struggle for democracy could not be separated from the Resistance, and that the national liberation could not be separated from the people's liberation.

During the Cultural Revolution, when the Maoist cult reached its zenith, Ch'en Shao-yü's "errors" were converted into heinous crimes against the Party. According to Lin Piao, Ch'en Shao-yü wilfully and willingly handled over all Communist forces and mass organizations to Chiang Kai-shek, cut off the Eighth Route Army from their base areas and subjugated them to the Nationalist Command, and "decked himself out and presented himself to Chiang Kai-shek for an official post in the Government".⁶ The same scathing criticisms of P'eng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Ch'en Po-ta and Lin Piao as followers of Ch'en Shao-yü are also contained in a detailed
critique written in the days of the "Gang of Four".\(^7\) The blatant inconsistency and distortion of the historical facts underlying these accusations hardly needs comment.

Conversely, Ch'en Shao-yü, when given the opportunity to speak his case, wrote from Moscow that Mao's "petty bourgeois" mentality had led him to the anti-internationalist and anti-socialist path. Mao's objectives in launching the \textit{Cheng Feng} Campaign, Ch'en claims, were simply to deny the validity of Leninism to China, vilify the valuable services rendered by the Comintern to the Chinese revolution, and falsify history so as to establish his own personal cult above that of the Central Committee and the entire Party. In particular, Mao wilfully distorted the roles played by Ch'en and other loyal followers of the Comintern to deny their achievements in the anti-Li Li-san struggle and the formulation of the Anti-Japanese United Front. Mao's treachery, according to Ch'en, took him so far as attempting to poison Ch'en during the \textit{Cheng Feng} Campaign.\(^8\)

It can be seen that while the mutual invective from both sides had their historical roots, exaggeration and revision of historical facts are inherent in these retrospective accounts. It would be unwise, therefore, to accept their views literally.

On the basis of our understanding of the intraparty politics of the CCP during the Yenan Period, we may ponder whether Mao's triumph over Ch'en Shao-yü revealed significant weaknesses as well as strength in Mao's leadership. One of the apparent weaknesses was Mao's attempt to tamper with the historical record in order to assert his own ideological supremacy. Such an attempt had been largely accepted or promoted by other Party leaders because of a common realization of the ineptitude of Ch'en Shao-yü's leadership and because of the exigencies of the time demanding an elevation of Mao's prestige and authority. But when the same process was repeated for such popular and respected leaders as P'eng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the late fifties and sixties, one may assume that both the credibility and integrity of Mao as a leader were open to question, at least amongst the top level of Party leaders who knew well the nature and intricacies of the intraparty struggle. Moreover, since the Maoist cult was originally conceived as a direct response to an external challenge - although Mao's own correct strategies were undoubtedly the rationale behind the cult - once the regime was stabilized we might expect that a substantial number of the Party leaders would find the personality cult
incongruous with the "proper" functioning of the Communist political
system, which is based on the principle of "democratic centralism". In
addition, since Mao had achieved his supremacy on the basis of tactical
alliance with other Party leaders such as Kao Kang and Liu Shao-ch'i
(and in the case of the Cultural Revolution Lin Piao), he had to
delegate to these leaders substantial authority which might in the long-
run prove inimical to his own.

Above all, the overwhelming support given to Mao by Party leaders,
rank-and-file and non-Party elements alike in the forties was based pri-
marily on Mao's principles of New Democracy. It was generally believed
at the time that Mao's Sinification of Marxism-Leninism had created an
indigenous approach to communism whereby China would adopt moderate and
non-violent methods in the creation of a socialist society. As Mao him-
self had repeatedly declared, China needed to go through first of all
the stage of the New Democratic revolution, which would last at least for
several decades, before she could move onto the next stage of socialism.
In this New Democratic revolution, China would permit a regulated capital-
istic phase of development which would permit the existence of non-
monopolistic private enterprises and the rich-peasant economy, so that
the knowledge and expertise of the bourgeois elements would be fully
utilized to transform China's backward economy into a modern industrial
nation.

The extent of the popularity of these concepts is amply illustrated
by the numerous reference to the New Democratic revolution by Party leaders
and writers up to the early fifties. Their enthusiasm for the cause of New
Democracy was not due so much to a desire to adjure such Marxian dogmas of
class struggle and the proletarian dictatorship, but to rapidly realize
China's modernization. Mao, however, thought otherwise. Either because
he did not see any real value in the New Democratic system (which was
only applicable to the stage prior to the Communist seizure of power), or
because the immense revolutionary zeal of the masses convinced him of
the possibility of achieving socialism within the shortest possible span
of time, he quickly pushed for the establishment of proletariat dictator-
ship and the elimination of bourgeois influences in the society. Mao's de-
parture from the other leaders' adherence to the New Democratic model,
I believe, was the key to the intraparty struggle in the post-1949 period,
especially between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i. The following are useful hints.
Firstly, in 1961, Li Wei-han, a Liuist, singled out the united front as the "magic weapon" of the Party in the stage of the New Democratic revolution, which was also applicable in the stage of socialist revolution since China needed to unite and "transform" the national bourgeoisie for the stupendous task of socialist construction and struggle against imperialism. Secondly, both Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in disgrace, were accused of lagging behind in the stage of New Democracy when the stage of socialist construction had already set in, and of attempting to revive capitalism and protect "bourgeois rights" under the pretext of "consolidating the New Democratic order". Finally, in November 1978, following Teng Hsiao-p'ing's second come-back, Hung-ch' i republished Chou En-lai's 1949 article extolling Mao's policy of "uniting the majority" and calling for the reconstruction of China along the "Way of New Democracy" (Hsin-min-chu chu-i ti tao-lu).

Nevertheless, these weaknesses in Mao's leadership did not outweigh his strength - based on the unshakeable foundation that his correct and effective revolutionary strategies had brought about the speedy victory of the Chinese Communists. For this reason, Mao would be remembered by the Party and the people as the greatest leader who had contributed enormously to the Chinese revolution (although minor criticisms might be levelled against his role in the later years).
Notes:


2. Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang fei-ch'ang wei-yüan-hui, "Wei mu-ch'ien shih-chih ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu" (Letter to All Party Members on the Current Situation), 1946; "Wei Yen-an shih-hsien kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu" (Letter to All Party Members Following the Downfall of Yenan), April 1947. (BI)

3. "Fan-tui t'ung-i-chan-hsien chung ti chi-hui chu-i" (Oppose Opportunism in the United Front), in Chieh-fang wen-hsien (Liberation Documents, n. p., 1943), No. 2. (BI)


7. Shih Feng, passim.

8. Wang Ming, China: Cultural Revolution or Counterrevolutionary Coup? (Moscow, 1969), pp. 46-50. Incidentally, Ch'en's accusation of Mao's attempt to poison him is not totally Ch'en's invention. Liu P'ei-chu, p. 12, recalls a struggle session against Wang Ming during the Cheng Feng Campaign in which Madame Ch'en, who attended on Ch'en's behalf, disclosed to the participants that poison had been found in Ch'en's medication. The whole incident, however was probably a hoax.

9. Li Wei-han, "T'ung-i-chan-hsien shih Chung-kuo jen-min ch'eng-ch'ü sheng-li ti i-ko fa-pao" (The United Front is a Magic Weapon in the Chinese People's Struggle for Victory), Hung-ch'i (Nov. 1961), No. 11, pp. 1-11.

10. See Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i, p. 364; and Hung-ch'i, No. 6 (June 1976), p. 5.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the course of preparing this thesis, I have accumulated an enormous holding of relevant materials on the Chinese Communist revolution in the Yenan Period, exceeding one thousand items in toto. To attempt reproducing them in full would be a laborious and cumbersome task, and is technically beyond the scope of this thesis. A logical alternative would be to present a selected bibliography of the conventional type, listing all the items cited in the Notes. But for several reasons, I have decided to modify the format of this selected bibliography. Firstly, a reproduction of all individual items is considered duplicative, especially as the careful and interested readers would be able to follow through the Notes to each Chapter without difficulty. Secondly, as most of the secondary materials and some of the primary sources are well-known and easily available, it would be superfluous to refer to them in the bibliography. Thirdly, since mimeographed single-item documents seldom appear in more than one place, their full citation in the Notes would suffice. I find it more rational, therefore, to present in this Selected Bibliography only the rare and significant Chinese and Japanese primary materials, and otherwise let this thesis stand on the merits of the Notes.

It is necessary, however, to briefly describe the different nature of these materials and explain my usage of them. The bulk of these materials are culled from the Bureau of Investigation and the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, the Toyo Bunko and the Kokusai Mondai Kenkyüjo in Tokyo, and the Hoover Institution of the Stanford University. (All rare items are marked by their location in the Notes, including those available in MMCP.) The Chinese materials consist of CCP documents, KMT intelligence reports (many from both categories are secret and internal), contemporary publications on or relating to the Chinese Communist movement, as well as memoirs and recollections of ex-Communists and other personages directly involved in the happenings of the time. The usefulness and reliability of these materials require no elaboration - there is no evidence that the Taiwanese authorities had made any attempt to doctor the CCP documents - except that care must be taken against the obvious anti-Communist bias in the KMT intelligence reports.
Equally important are the Japanese war-time intelligence reports collected by the Foreign Ministry, the Army Ministry, the South Manchurian Railway Company and other institutes involved in collecting information on China. Since most of these materials were classified information for the policy-makers in Tokyo, it is reasonable to assume that they were realistic appraisals of the current developments in China by the Japanese analysts. Nevertheless, caution must be exercised against their tendency to exaggerate the Communist potential in "sovietizing" the whole of China in order to justify the expansionist China Policy, and their inclination to view the Communist "threat" in purely militarist terms. Because of their "elitist" tendency and their lack of intimate knowledge of Chinese rural conditions, these writers tended to underestimate the Communist ability to integrate with and help improve the living conditions of the peasant masses, or the importance and effectiveness of the CCP's united front in winning over the support and cooperation of the bourgeoisie - which was dismissed as a marriage of convenience. It is imperative, therefore, to supplement these materials by Chinese sources.

Since the transliteration of Chinese and Japanese materials are provided in the notes, they are omitted here:

A. **Chinese Sources**


Chang Kuo-p'ing, *K'ang-Jih ti ti Pa-lu-chih* 抗日第八路軍 (Shanghai: K'ang-ch'an ch'u-pan-she, 1938).


Chao I-hua (P'ing Nsin), *Lun Hsin Chung-kuo* 論新中國 (Shanghai: Ch'un-chung ch'u-pan-she, 1941).
Min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien lun 民族統一戰線論 (Canton: Ch'an-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Ch'en Chung 陳琮, Ssu-nien-lai ti Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang 四年來的中國民族
(Chungking: Ta-kung ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Ch'en Po-ta 陳伯達, Mao Tse-tung Lun 毛澤東論 (Sian: Hsi-an ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Ch'en Shao-yi 陳少益, Ch'en Shao-yi (Wang Ming) k'ang-chan yen-lun-ohi 陳少益(王明)抗戰論叢 (Hankow: Min-tsu chieh-fang-she, 1938).

Wang Ming tsui-chin yen-lun hsilan-chi 王明最近論述選集 (Shanghai: Shao-nien chen-li pao-she, 1936).

Ying-yung fen-tou shih-ch'i-nien 英勇奮鬥十七年 (Hong Kong: Chen-li ch'u-pan-she, 1940).

Ch'en Yih-chung, Kang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien ti chen mien-mu 抗日民族統一戰線的真面目 (N. p.: Chiu-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1939).

Cheng Feng 整風. No. 1.

Ch'i Wen 齊文, Hai-kuo chi-che yen-chung ti Yen-an chi chieh-fang-oh'll 外國記者眼中的延安及解放區 (Shanghai: Li-shih tsu-liao kung-ying she, 1946).

Chieh-chi tou-cheng yll t'ung-i-chan-hsien chiang-shou t'i-kang 領導鬥爭統一戰線譜發展 (N. p., 1940?).

Ch'ien Ch'un-chu 錢俊初, Chung-kuo ko-ming ti chan-Ulah yll ts'e-Uleh 中國革命的戰果及策略 (N. p.: Chung-kuo ch'u-pan-she, 1941).


Chiu-kuo wen-hsiian 數國文選 (Paris?: n. pub., 1936?).

Chou Li-po 周立波, Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-oh'll yin-hsiang chi 華北戰時
印像記 (Hankow: Tu-shu sheng-huo ch'u-pan-shen, 1938).

Chu Li-fu 朱立夫, Erh-wan wu-ch'ien li ch'ang-cheng chi 二萬五千里長 征記 (Shanghai: K'ang-ch'an ch'u-pan-she, 1938).

Ch'ih-chung kung-tso chih-nan 羣眾工作指南 (N. p.: Ch'an hsien ch'u-pan-she, 1945).

Chung Kung鍾錕, T'uan-chieh k'ang-ch'an yll Chung-kung 團結抗戰與中共
(Shanghai: Pai-hsing ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chihwen-t'i chi'h p'ou-hsi 中国共產黨之問題之剖析
(N. p.: n. p., 1940).

Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang, chung-yang shu-chi ch'u k'ang-ch'an-i-lai chung-yao wen-chien hui-chi 中國共產黨中央書記處 抗戰以來重要文件彙集
(N. p.: n. pub., 1942).
Chung-kuo wen-hua 中国文化 (Yenan, 1940).

Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi-chu 中央調查統計局, K'ang-ch'an san-nien lai chih Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang 抗戰三年來的中國共產黨 (N. p.: 1940).

Tiao-ch'a chuan-pao 條 Chew 報 (N. p.: 1940).

Fudiao 拂 journals (1943-44).

Ho K'o-ch'lan 何克全 (K'ai Feng 堅 Manga K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsi fen 抗日民族統一戰線教條 (N. p.: Min-ts'ieh-fang ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she, 1938).

Hou Wai-lu 後外, K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i-chan-hsien lun 抗日民族統一戰論 (Hankow: Sheng-huo ch'u-pan-she, 1938).


Hsiao Chung-hua pao 新華報


Hsin wen-hua 新文化 (N. p.: Hsin-wen-hua she, 1936).


Hsü Yu-lai 徐友來, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang nei-mu 中國共產黨內奮 (Chuchiang: Chung-hsin ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Hsüeh-hsi sheng-huo 學生活 (N. p.: Wen-hua chiaoyu yen-chiu-hui, 1941).

Huang Feng 黃鳳, Ti-pa-lu-chih hsing-chih chi, ch'ang-cheng shih-tai 第五路軍行軍記長征時代 (N. p.: n. pub., 1938).

Hsiung-ch'i 背旗 (1936-37).

K'ang-Jih hsien-feng 抗日先鋒 (Shanghai: 1935).

K'ang-Jih chiu-kuo wen-hsien 抗日救國文章 (Shanghai: Shao-nien chen-li pao-she, 1935).

K'ang-ti pao 抗戰報 (1938-40).


Tang ti sheng-huo (1941).

Teng Ch'u-min 鄧初民, T'ai-jih k'ang-chan ti chi-pen wen-t'i 对日抗戰的基本問題 (Hankow: Ta-chung ch'u-pan-she, 1938).

Ti shih-pa chi-t'uan chih, tsung cheng-chih pu, hsüan-ch'uan pu 第十八集 整理政治部宣言部。K'ang-ch'uan pa-nien lai ti Pa-lu-chih yil (Yenan: n. pub., 1946).


Chung-kung hsien ts'e-lüeh yil pen-tang tui-ts'e 中共新策略與本黨對策 (N. p.: 1941).

Chung-kung tsui-chin tang-nei tou-cheng nei-mu 中共最近黨內鬥爭内幕 (N. p.: 1944).

Chung-kung tsui-chin chih t' u-ti cheng-t's'e 中共最近之土地政策 (N. p.: n. d.).

Min-kuo san-shih-nien tu chih Chung-kung 民國三十年度:中共 (N. p.: n. d.).


T'ung Meng-sheng 中國史, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng-hui 国民政府 (Chungking: Tu-li ch'u-pan-she, 1938).

Tzu Ch'iang (pseud.) 孫強, Lun Chung-kuo ch'ien-t' u 論中國前途 (Shanghai: Ch'iu-chih ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Lun T'ung-i-chao-hsien論統一戰線 (Shanghai: Ch'iu-chih ch'u-pan-she, 1941).

Yeh Chien-ying 葉劍英, Yeh Chien-ying k'ang-ch'uan yen-lun-chi 葉劍英抗戰言論集 (Chungking: Hsin-hua jih-pao kuan, 1940).


Yeh Chien-ying t'ung-i-chao-hsien i-ch'ien Chung-kung chih chien-shih 葉劍英統一戰線以前中共之簡史 (N. p.: n. pub., 1942).

Yul-O pien-ch'i' l sel-ch'eng khang-ling 中共邊區施政綱領 (N. p.: n. pub., 1942).

B. 日本文獻

Gaiji keisatsu ho 外事警察報
Gaimushō外務省，Chūgoku kyōsantō saikin ni okeru shitsu teki henka to tōmai kyoka no genjō 中国共産党最近における質的变化と党の動態 (Tokyo: 1942).


____，jōhōbu情報部，Chūgoku kyōsantō no tainei sesaku to sono kōsaku no genjō 中国共産党の対内政策とその労働の動態 (Tokyo: 1940).

____，____，daisanka第三課，Sekishoku Shina shi赤色地誌 (Tokyo: 1940).

____，____，Saikin ni okeru Chūgoku kyōsan undō 最近に於ける中


____，____，Saikin no Chūgoku kyōsantō jyūyō bunkenshū 最近の

中国共産党重要文献集 (Tokyo: 1938).


____，____，Shina oyobi Manshū ni okeru kyōsan undō 支那及満州

に於ける共産運動 (Tokyo: 1938).

Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no seiji to jinbutsu 現代支那の


Sekishoku Shina no kyumei 赤色支那の流明 (Tokyo: Daito shuppansha, 1941).

Himori Tora6目森虎雄，Chūkyō nijyu nenshi 中共二十年史 (Shanghai: Himori

kenkyūjo, 1942).

Japanese Consulate-General, Shanghai, Bukan kanraku chōhusen ni okeru 日本関係者白書に於ける

KōNichi sensen no dōkō 武漢臨海前における抗日戦線の動向 (1938).

Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang Hua-chung-ch'il t'i-t'u k'uo-ta hui-i 中国共産党華中局第二次擴大會議決議 (1942).

Jōhō情報

Kōain seimubu 青天院政務部，Kominternnarrabi ni Sōren-pō no tai-Shi sei-

saku ni kansuru kihiō shiryo コミンテルン並に赤聨邦の対支政策に関する

基本資料 (Tokyo: 1939).

Kusano Fumio 草野文男，KōNichi Shina sōkoku no gensei 抗日支那相剋の現勢

(Tokyo: Jinbunkaku, 1942).

Matsumoto Tadao 松本登雄，Kyōsantō ni ri-do saneru Shina no KōNichi 支那に於っては

jimmin sensen 共産党ニリートされ支那の抗日人民戦線 (Tokyo: Daihyaku

shobō, 1936).
マンシュ国憲政部関門部 "マンシュ革命史の研究" (1937; reprint by Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969).

南満州鉄道株式会社 調査部 "政治編 II" (Dairen: 1939).

Minami manshū tetsudo kabushihī kaisha, chōsabu, 南満州鉄道株式会社 調査部 "政治編 II" (Dairen: 1939).

支那赤色勢力の問題 (Dairen: 1936).

Seiji-hen II 支那赤色勢力の問題 (Dairen: 1936).

Nakanishi Tsutomu & Nishisato Tatsuo, Chūgoku kyōsantō to minzoku toitsu sensen (Kyoto: Taigado, 1946).

Nakanishi Tsutomu & Nishisato Tatsuo, 支那赤色勢力の問題 (Kyoto: Taigado, 1946).

Takayanagi Torao, KōNichi jimmin sensen undō no tenbō (Shanghai: Chugoku shiryō geppo sha, 1936).

田中忠夫, "支那民族統一戦線の展望" (Tokyo: Gakugeisha, 1938).

Tōa 情報

Tōa kenkyūjo, "支那情報 総合研究部 国際対支政策の史的考察" (Tokyo: 1941).

KōNichi minzoku tōitsu sensen no shiteki kōsatsu (Tokyo: 1941).