The Development of the Chinese Empire in
the South: a discussion of the origins
of the state of Wu of the Three Kingdoms

by Richard Rafe Champion de Crespigny

a thesis presented for examination in the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The
Australian National University, 1966.
This thesis is the result of original research conducted by the author at The Australian National University, Canberra, from 1962 to 1966.
Acknowledgements.

My supervisors in the preparing of this thesis have been Dr Donald Leslie, Professor C.P. FitzGerald and Dr Noel Barnard of the Department of Far Eastern History, and I have also received great help and kindness from Professor N.G.D. Malmqvist and his successor Professor Liu Ts'ung-yan of the Department of Chinese, and from Associate Professor O.B. van der Sprenkel of the Department of Asian Civilisation. I am very fortunate to have been able to carry out my work in The Centre of Oriental Studies, and the members of the staff have never failed to give me help and courtesy.

The characters in the main body of the text and in the bibliography have been written by Miss Nakano Miyoko, Research Assistant in the Department of Far Eastern History, and the characters in the appendix have been written by Mrs. N. Gardiner. The maps have been drawn by Mr Hans Boltz, of the Bureau of Mineral Resources, Canberra.

I am very grateful for the help that has been given me.

Rafe de Crespigny.
Table of Contents:

List of Maps

Preface

A note on the use of geographic names
A note on chronology and dating
A note on the rendering of official titles

I. Introduction; the geography and the early history of South China

The Lands of the South

The Yangtse Delta
The Middle Yangtse
The Far South
The Southeast Coast

South China under the Later Han Dynasty

II. The Government of Later Han in the Second Century A.D.

The Accession of the Emperor, and the Family of the Empress-dowager

The Hegemony of the Imperial Relatives by Marriage

The Hegemony of the Eunuchs

The First Faction

The Failure of Tou Wu

The Second Faction

The Structure of Politics in the Reign of Emperor Ling

The Subjects of the Emperor
III. The Rise of the Sun Clan

The End of the Empire of Han 164

The Disorders in the Provinces;
the Yellow Turbans 164
the rebellion in the northwest and the troubles of the borders 174

The Collapse of the Central Government;
the eunuchs 179
the chaos in the capital 186
Tung Cho 191

Sun Chien;
his birth, his family and his early career (c.155-184 A.D.) 195
the rise to high command (184-189) 208
the war against Tung Cho (189-191) 222
the civil war and the last campaigns (191) 243

Sun Ts'e;
his early life and his service with Yuan Shu (175-195) 254
the lands across the Yangtse and the break with Yuan Shu (195-197) 264
the move west into Tan-yang, Lu-chiang and the middle Yangtse (198-199) 281
the last campaigns (200 A.D.) 292
the heritage of Sun Ts'e 301
IV. Appendix: San-kuo chih and the history of the
Three Kingdoms

Ch'en Shou and his San-kuo chih

P'ei Sung-chih and his commentary

The transmission of the history of the Three Kingdoms

San-kuo chih and the early history of Wu

List of Books and Writers quoted in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary to the San-kuo chih

A note on a Chin dynasty manuscript of San-kuo chih

Bibliography

List of Maps:

1 Sketch map of the provinces of the empire at the end of the Later Han dynasty following page 88

2 Map to illustrate the campaigns of Sun Ch'ien in central China (189-191) following page 253

3 Map of the lower Yangtse (195-200) following page 303

4 Map of the middle Yangtse (198-200) following page 303

5 South China; a sketch map of the major physical features at the end

6 The commanderies and kingdoms at the beginning of the sixth year of Chung-p'ing (189 A.D.) at the end
PREFACE
For more than fifty years of the third century A.D., from 229 to 280, the emperors of the state of Wu ruled over South China. Their territory comprised the area of the modern Chinese provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, the southern parts of Kiangsu, Anhwei and Hupeh, together with the coastal regions of present-day Vietnam. In this period, known as the 'Three Kingdoms', a Chinese imperial government was set up south of the Yangtse, enforcing a great expansion of Chinese culture and control among the barbarian peoples and marking the first of the southern dynasties which maintained their independence from the north during four centuries after the end of Han.

It is the purpose of the thesis to examine the origins of this first Chinese empire in the south, and in order to do this I have studied three major topics: the physical and historical geography of South China, the failure of the united dynasty of Later Han, and the course by which the Sun family of Wu took advantage of this time of civil war to rise to the government of an independent imperial state.

In an introductory section to the thesis, I have discussed the geography of South China, the mountains and the rivers, in order to show the physical features of the land which was occupied by Wu and the problems of government and communication which these entailed. Moreover, at the same time, I have treated of the earlier history of the lands of the south, up to the period of the Former Han dynasty, in order to show the spread of Chinese culture and conquest and to
indicate, by case histories, the geographical problems involved in this early expansion of civilisation. Therefore, in a chapter on South China under the Later Han dynasty, I present a survey of the great increase in colonisation from the north in the first centuries A.D., with a discussion of the imperial administration of the Chinese and barbarians and of the situation of the people themselves as the government lost its control of the provinces in the second century A.D.

This growing weakness of the central government had great effect both on the peace of the provinces and on the unity of the empire. It may be suggested that the early universal empires of China were to a large extent kept under control by the ultimate threat of force. So long as the emperor commanded the greatest military force in China he could arrange for taxes to be collected and for the people to remain under the supervision of their local administrators. Should trouble, banditry or rebellion occur, the imperial armies were sufficient to crush it, and in restoring peace they would be aided by the majority of the imperial subjects. No matter how serious the internal troubles or how great the initial military setbacks, the imperial government had the resources of the whole empire to draw upon and it could be confident of success so long as it controlled the imperial armies. The second section of this thesis is designed to show the breakdown of Later Han; how a succession of child-emperors put power into the hands of the imperial relatives by marriage; how the emperors allied themselves with the
eunuchs of their palace in order to rid themselves of these over-mighty subjects; how Emperors Huan and Ling supported the eunuchs against the outer bureaucracy and the great official families of the empire; and how, at the death of Emperor Ling, the destruction, first of the imperial relatives by marriage and then of the eunuchs, left no party at the capital strong enough to withstand the army of Tung Cho, who came to Lo-yang and usurped the imperial power.

In the provinces, the decline of the authority of the central government had been accentuated by great rebellions, the Yellow Turbans in the east and the rebels of Liang Province in the northwest, both breaking out in 184. The Yellow Turbans were crushed within a year, and the rebels of the northwest were driven back, although they were not suppressed; but these major military affairs meant that control over much of China was weakened, banditry broke out in the aftermath of the wars, and the whole empire gradually became an armed camp. When Tung Cho seized power, armies sprang up to oppose him, and for thirty years, although Emperor Hsien of the Han dynasty remained upon the throne, there was no recognised centre of authority in the empire, and military leaders fought for supremacy.

This breakup of a united empire gave opportunities for fighting men to come to power and for men with armies to establish independent states. The fortunes of the Sun family of Wu were made by Sun Chien, who rose from obscurity to generalship of an army by virtue of his ability as a military commander. Chien fought against the Yellow Turbans and the rebels of the northwest, and when Tung Cho
seized power in the capital Chien came to join the alliance against him. In 191 Chien died in the service of the warlord Yuan Shu, fighting in one of the civil quarrels which splintered the empire, and a few years later, Chien's son, Sun Ts'e, went to Yuan Shu and received command of soldiers who had served his father.

In 195, Sun Ts'e was sent by Yuan Shu to attack the lands south of the mouth of the Yangtse estuary, the commanderies of Tan-yang, Wu and K'uai-chi. Within five years, Ts'e had conquered the three commanderies, had declared himself independent of Shu, and had extended his power up the course of the Yangtse as far as the Poyang Lake and even Hankow. When he died in 200, at the age of 25, Ts'e had laid the foundations of the state which his younger brother, Ch'üan, was to proclaim as the kingdom and then the empire of Wu.

As an appendix to this thesis, I have discussed the San-kuo chih and the P'ei Sung-chih commentary. Of the two major sources for the history of the end of Later Han, the Hou Han shu has already been examined by Professor Hans Bielenstein, and in studying the San-kuo chih I have attempted to follow his work and to evaluate the book as a source for the history of the Three Kingdoms and in particular for the early history of the state of Wu. In order to trace the sources that were used by P'ei Sung-chih in the fifth century, I have prepared an index of the historical works which are quoted in his commentary. Further, as an indication of the reliability of the transmission of this early history, I attach a note of textual criticism on a Chin dynasty manuscript fragment of San-kuo chih, which
was found in Sinkiang about 1930 and of which I have studied a photographic reproduction from the library of the Research Institute of Humanistic Studies of Kyoto University.

While I have been working on this subject, I have prepared some papers which are being published about the same time as this thesis is presented. In the course of the thesis, I have made some references to these other works and I have made use of the conclusions and the research which they describe. I would be grateful if the examiners would take these into consideration:

1. *The Biography of Sun Chien*; Occasional Paper No. 5 of The Centre of Oriental Studies, Canberra 1966;

2. *Official Titles of the Former Han Dynasty*, as translated and transcribed by H.H. Dubs; an index compiled by Rafe de Crespigny (to be published as a monograph of The Centre of Oriental Studies, A.N.U., late in 1966);

3. 'The Recruitment System of the Imperial Bureaucracy of Later Han', (to be published in *Chung Chi Journal* 6, No.1, in November 1966);


With this thesis, I present copies of *The Biography of Sun Chien*, and I will send in copies of the other works as soon as I receive them from the publishers.
A note on the use of geographic names:

In this thesis, places and districts may be referred to in one of three ways: either as a geographic formation, such as a mountain or a river; or as a place with a name in modern China, such as Peking or Nanking; or as a place with a name in Han or Chin China, such as Chiang-hsia commandery or Hsu province.

In this paper, when I refer to a geographic formation or to a place-name of modern China, I follow the transcription system of the Chinese Post Office, as used in The Times Atlas of the World, Mid-century Edition, volume I, 1958; when I refer to a place-name of Han or Chin times, I follow the Wade-Giles transcription system. Thus the modern city of Siangyang is distinguished by spelling from the ancient city of Hsiang-yang, although the characters of the name are the same and the site has changed very little. This formula makes it clearer which period of history and which geographic fact is being referred to in any given part of the discussion.

A note on chronology and dating:

The Chinese year, which is arranged by lunar months, does not fit perfectly with the calendar used in the west, and the first day of a Chinese year falls in the months of January or February of Europe. The first year of the Chien-an period of the Later Han dynasty, for example, actually began on 17 February, 196, and the last day of that year was 4 February, 197.
In describing a Chinese year, I generally refer to it by the western year in which it began; thus the first year of Chien-an is cited as 196. However, where more precision is needed, I have given the Chinese dates in terms of the Julian calendar in contemporary use in the west, and for these equivalents I have used the tables of Hsueh Chung-sen and Ou-yang Yi in *A Sino-western Calendar for Two Thousand Years 1-2000 A.D.*

A note on the rendering of official titles:

Throughout this thesis, in giving translations of titles of the administration of the Later Han empire, I have followed the system of Professor H.H. Dubs, who was the first scholar to prepare translations and English equivalents for the majority of the titles of the Former Han dynasty. For titles not met with in Dubs's work, my new renderings follow his methods.¹

Official Titles of the Former Han Dynasty, as translated and transcribed by H.H. Dubs, an index which I have compiled, is to be published as a monograph of The Centre of Oriental Studies of the Australian National University at the end of this year. Elsewhere, in the study of *The Biography of Sun Chien* and in the article on recruitment, I have given details of the Chinese titles and of the functions of the offices. In this thesis I have generally indicated official titles only by Dubs's translations.

¹ There are two exceptions to this: Dubs has translated the title 受 mu as 'Shepherd' and the title 河南尹 Ho-nan yin as 'Governor of Ho-nan'; the translation 'Shepherd', although close to the basic meaning of the character mu, seems rather a clumsy description for the head of a provincial administration, and so I render it as 'Governor'. The title yin is rendered as 'Intendant'.
I. INTRODUCTION: the geography and
the early history of South China.
The Lands of the South:

Chinese civilisation, which had developed in the region of the Yellow River, spread gradually by cultural influence, by colonisation and by conquest, to the valley of the Yangtse River and beyond. This expansion was a gradual process, and the movement was influenced and controlled by the land and by climate, but it was possible for the people of the south to accept the Chinese style of living to suit their surroundings. Chinese civilisation depended on settled agriculture, and for an alien people to adopt Chinese culture, it was essential that they should be able to live in permanent settlements and farm the land. The peoples of the northern steppes had to base their economy on the grazing of animals, and the animals' needs for pasture in a land where grass seldom grows tall enough for harvest compelled the herders to travel from place to place in the search for food for their flocks and herds. It was impossible for people in these lands to adopt more than a few materialistic aspects of the Chinese way of life. However, in South China a different geographical situation existed, and in the course of time the barbarian peoples could be settled and educated and brought within the government of the empire.

A central belt of mountains, the spur which runs east from the Kunlun of Tibet to form the Chin Ling and the smaller Tapieh hills of eastern Hupeh, separates the valleys of the Yangtse and the Yellow River.
and divides China into two major geographical regions. In the north, the traditional heartland of Chinese civilisation, the climate is influenced by the cold dry air of the Mongolian deserts; in the south, the country obtains many of its natural characteristics from the tropical maritime air of the South China sea. While the staple grain of the north is wheat, supplemented in the drier areas by kao-liang and by millet, the main crop of the south is rice, although during the winter there is wheat grown in the Yangtse valley and some other districts. The climatic and topographical contrast between the two regions north and south of the dividing range of mountains is very great and immediately apparent; but these differences in geography, while they have influenced and modified the expansion of Chinese culture from the north to the south, have not prevented that expansion. The Chinese pattern of settled agriculture and irrigation work which had been established in the north could be transferred to the lands of the south, even though the main crop farmed was different and the purposes of water control had changed.

In geomorphological terms, the Yangtse exhibits the character of a 'young' river while the Yellow River appears 'mature' or 'old'. The great contrast between these two great streams is that the volume of the water and the gradient of the course of the Yangtse are generally sufficient to ensure that the river can carry all the sediment which it collects on its course and which is brought in by its tributaries. The Yellow River, restrained by its dykes, constantly loses surplus
sediment and raises its bed above the level of the surrounding plain. Left to itself, the Yellow River would vary its course over the whole extent of the North China plain, and would deposit the excess sediment which it obtains from its upper reaches evenly over the whole of this great delta. Dykes have been built for more than two thousand years in an attempt to keep the Yellow River to a single course and to allow human settlement along established banks, but the penalties for this unnatural containment of the river have been great and have involved disastrous floods and several changes of course. Therefore, in North China, since earliest times, water control has been planned to control the flow of the Yellow River and keep it in a determined track, and also to irrigate farmlands which have insufficient rainfall. The situation in the south is different.

In the Yangtse valley and in the further districts of South China, the establishment of a settled agricultural economy depended on the spread of rice cultivation, and this in turn depended to a large extent on the development of irrigation. In their movement from the north to the south, the Chinese colonists brought with them techniques of water control which had been learnt in the loess-lands and in the Yellow River plain, but which could be applied in somewhat different circumstances to the lands of the south. On the one hand, water was brought to fill the rice paddy-fields and to maintain their levels; on the other hand, in districts close to the Yangtse itself, flooded lands and swamps were gradually drained and reclaimed for agriculture. The Yangtse itself has a well-defined bed, and the
artificial control by dykes which was so necessary in the north for the Yellow River was not needed in the south. There is great seasonal variation in the river, and in this century, for example in 1931 and in 1954, the August level of the river has twice reached a point more than fifty feet above the low-water stage of March or April. As a result, the middle course of the Yangtse from the Tung Ting Lake to the Poyang Lake was a land of swamps which were flooded every year. From Bielenstein's examination of the early census records it appears that there was little Chinese settlement in the valley of the Yangtse in the region of eastern Hupei and northern Kiangsu. Nevertheless, further south of the Yangtse, in the river valleys of the Yuan and Siang above the Tung Ting Lake and of the Kan which flows into the Poyang Lake, a system of settled agriculture could be established and developed.

China south of the Yangtse valley is naturally divided into two parts by the range of mountains known as the Nan Ling, which extends from Tibet to the Pacific Ocean, and which forms the watershed separating the river-system of the Yangtse and its great tributaries from the drainage system of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. North of this chain, the South Yangtse hills and the highlands of Fukien divide the major river valleys from each other and cut the land into three drainage regions: the basin of the Siang River, the Tung Ting Lake and their tributaries; the Poyang Lake, the Kan River and its other tributaries; and the level ground south of the mouth of the

---

1 Bielenstein; 'The Census of China... p.139.
Yangtse about the Tai Lake. These river valleys and stretches of level ground gave favourable conditions for Chinese settlement, but they are separated by ranges of hills where the slopes are too steep for farming and where the non-Chinese people could resist both the influence of Chinese culture and the attentions of Chinese government. Thus Chinese colonisation followed the rivers towards the south, and the native peoples who did not accept the Chinese culture were driven into the hills.

The Yangtse Delta:

Of the three districts mentioned above, the country about the Tai Lake, south of the mouth of the Yangtse, became the heart-land of the Three Kingdoms state of Wu. This same region had been the territory of an earlier state, also called Wu, which had flourished in the time of Chou, but which had been destroyed by the rival state of Yueh in 473 B.C. According to tradition, the capital of the kingdom of Wu was near present-day Soochow, and the capital of Yueh was at Shaohing, southeast of Hangchow. After the conquest of Wu, the kingdom of Yueh controlled all the territory of the modern provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsu, but in 334 B.C. Yueh was destroyed by the state of Chu, which was based on the middle Yangtse.

There is evidence to suggest that in Chou times, and even during the Former Han dynasty, this region of level ground and lakes had been one great delta of the Yangtse, with the head of the delta in the area of present-day Wuhu. In the ti-li chih of Han shu,
which describes the geography of the empire of the year 2 A.D., Pan Ku refers to a Pei-chiang 北江, a Chung-chiang 中江, and a Nan-chiang 南江. 1 Besides these, the ti-li chih also mentions a Fen-chiang shui 分江水 'Branch Stream', which left the main river near present-day Tatung, upstream from Wuhu, and which entered the sea at Yü-yao 養桃, near present-day Hangchow. 2 There is a certain amount of disagreement on the identification of the courses of these rivers, and Yang Shou-ching and Worcester have presented maps which have some points of difference. 3 It is accepted that the Pei-chiang of Han times followed the present course of the Yangtse, and the Chung-chiang flowed eastwards from Wu-hu, joined the north of the Tai Lake, and then continued eastwards past Soochow and along the course of the present Woosung River to enter the sea near Shanghai. The Fen-chiang shui, which may have been the original stream, must have skirted the northern slopes of the Hwang Shan range of mountains, touched the south of the Tai Lake, and then turned southwards to enter the sea near Hangchow. However, while Yang Shou-ching suggests that Nan-chiang is another name for the Fen-chiang shui in its course south from the Tai

1 Han shu pu-chu 28A(3), pp.11a (sub P'i-ling 毗陵 and note the commentary of Ch'ien Ta-chao), 20a (sub Wu-hu 蘇湖) and 10a (sub Wu 吳).
2 Han-shu pu-chu 28A(3), p.19a (sub Shih-ch'eng 石城).
3 Li-tai yü-ti yen-ko hsien yao t'u, Ch'ien Han ti-li t'u, pp.47a to 48b; and Worcester, The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtse, volume II, p.268.
Lake, Worcester shows two rivers running south, one being the Fen-chiang shui and the other being the Nan-chiang, which he draws as a branch of the Chung-chiang flowing south from Soochow along the present course of the Grand Canal, and entering the sea in Hangchow Bay east of the mouth of the Fen-chiang shui. As Wang Hsien-ch'ien has written, there does not seem to be any way of deciding the exact courses of these two rivers, the Fen-chiang shui and the Nan-chiang.  

By Later Han it appears that the Fen-chiang shui and the Nan-chiang had ceased to flow, although the Chung-chiang still branched off the main stream at Wu-hu, and at the end of the second century A.D. it is probable that the waters of the Yangtse reached the sea only by way of the northern route and the present estuary. The silt which is brought down by the river had filled and stopped the southern branches, and the force of the current had enlarged the northern course. From that time the Yangtse has had only one route to the sea.

However, the evidence of the ti-li chih of Han shu shows that this country of southern Kiangsu and northern Chekiang, a delta land of streams and lakes which were steadily silting up, must have presented considerable opportunities for Chinese techniques of water control. In early times, the people of Wu had generally been regarded as semi-barbarians, although their rulers had claimed descent from the ancestors of the royal house of Chou. According to the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien,

1 Han-shu pu-chu 28A(3), p.19b, line 14b.

2 HHS treatise 22, p.39b.
T'ai-po 太伯 and Chung-yung 仲雍, two princes of the Chou, who were uncles of the future King Wen of Chou, fled from the north to the Man barbarians of Ching, and there adopted the local customs and founded a state.¹ No doubt the story itself is a legend, but the tradition that the ruling classes of this region of southeast China may have been immigrants from the north is supported by some archaeological evidence. This evidence is still fragmentary, but examples of bronze work of local origin found in a few diggings, surrounded by other sites of Neolithic culture, indicate an advanced and possibly immigrant ruling class which brought such techniques as metal-working from the north and which gradually influenced the local peoples.²

The inhabitants of the delta were only gradually brought into the sphere of Chinese civilisation, and it was not until the early years of the sixth century B.C. that the Chinese records have any details of the state of Wu. Ssu-ma Ch'ien remarks that it was in the reign of Shou-meng 王夢 that Wu first became prosperous and that the rulers of the state first took the title of king 王 wāng.³

¹ See Chavannes IV, pp. 1 ff. Chinese commentators to Shih chi identify these Man 蠻 people of Ching 荊 with the peoples of the lower Yangtse, although Ching more usually describes the region of the middle Yangtse about Hankow.

² See, for example, Chang Kwang-chih, Archaeology in Ancient China, pp. 253 ff.

³ Chavannes IV, p. 5.
Shou-meng is believed by tradition to have come to power in 585 B.C.; nineteen generations of rulers of Wu are recorded by Shih chi from T'ai-po to Shou-meng, but nothing more is told of them than their names. The history of Wu during the sixth century is a story of almost continual warfare, against the great neighbouring state of Ch'u and also against the southern kingdom of Yüeh. In 506 B.C. the army of Wu entered the capital of the state of Ch'u, and in 494, in the second year of the king Fu-ch'ai, the soldiers of Yüeh were completely defeated at the battle of Fu-ch'iao and were surrounded, with their king, on Huich'i Shan south of Shaohing. In an act of mistaken generosity, Fu-ch'ai made a treaty with his enemy and withdrew his troops. He turned his attentions to the north, raided the central states from the sea and by expeditions up the rivers, and in 482 Wu was recognised as the paramount military power in China. But while Wu had awed the north Yüeh had recovered from the earlier defeat and had renewed attacks from the south. In the very same year that Fu-ch'ai called the feudal lords together under his auspices for a convention at Huang-ch'i', the army of Yüeh defeated the forces which he had left to guard his own land, killed his Crown Prince, and

1 To aid in these campaigns against the north, Fu-ch'ai built a canal to link the Yangtse with the Huai River and the north (Tso chuan, ninth year of Duke Ai (487), translated in Legge V, p.819).

2 Huang-ch'i' is now southwest of Fengkiu in Honan.
raided his capital. Fu-ch'ai returned to the south, but his enemy had become too powerful, and in 473, Yueh inflicted a final defeat on Wu, captured the king and his capital, and destroyed the state.

These people of Yueh had made a still more recent appearance in the Chinese records. According to Shih chi, the rulers of Yueh claimed to be descended from the legendary Emperor Yu through the lineage of one of the younger sons of the fifth emperor of the Hsia dynasty who was granted the region of southeast China as a fief. He opened up the jungle and founded a city, but he adopted the customs of the barbarians by cutting his hair and by tattooing his body; the story is suspiciously similar to the legend of the founding of Wu. Shih chi, however, makes no attempt to trace the descent of this first ancestor, saying only that more than twenty generations later the ruler of Yueh was called Yun-ch'ang, and that he was the enemy of the king of Wu. In 496, when Yun-ch'ang died, his son Kou-chien became king of Yueh. In the first year of his reign, Kou-chien defeated the army of Wu in a battle at Tsui-li. Ho-lu, the king of Wu, was wounded and died, and Fu-ch'ai succeeded to the throne of Wu. The war which followed brought the defeat and surrender of Yueh at Huichi Shan, but ended with the final conquest of Wu by Kou-chien in 473.

---

1 Tsui-li is now identified with Kashing in Chekiang.
By his destruction of the state of Wu, Kou-chien took over the territory of that country on either side of the Yangtse, and he also took over the military hegemony of the rulers of China which had been won by Fu-ch'ai. However, after his death in 465, although the names of six succeeding kings are recorded, they have no great actions to their credit. The seventh, Wu-ch'iang, led an invasion of Ch'u in 334, but the armies of Ch'u defeated Yueh, killed Wu-ch'iang, and conquered all the former land of Wu. By this great defeat the kingdom of Yueh was driven back to its former territory in the hill country of southern Chekiang, its ruling house was divided by murderous feuds and individual princes rendered homage to Ch'u. In the final warfare of the last hundred years of the Chou dynasty, the people of Yueh played no part.

Both Wu and Yueh, as we have seen, were regarded by the Chinese people of the Chou dynasty as essentially barbarian states. The rulers of Wu claimed to trace their descent from a member of the royal house of Chou, but the kings of Yueh, with a nominal descent from the great Yu, made no such attempt, and not even a list of the traditional names of their ancestors has been preserved. Neither Wu nor Yueh played any part in Chinese history until the sixth century B.C. Wu makes its appearance at the beginning of that century as a political group of the peoples of the estuary engaged in raids and warfare against the Ch'u people of the middle Yangtse. The state of Yueh emerges even later, and does not take an interest in the politics of China until after the defeat of Wu in 473. Moreover, the period of activity of
both Wu and Yüeh lasted hardly more than a single generation, from the time of the successful raid by Wu against the Ch'ü capital in 506 to the death of Kou-chien of Yüeh in 465. The events of these years have been retold in romance, and the histories of the time relate the lives of two great ministers; Wu Tzu-hsü 伍子胥, whose father and brother had been wrongly put to death by the king of Ch'ü, who fled to Wu and became chief minister, and who brought the armies of Wu to capture Ch'ü's capital and desecrate the corpse of the former king his enemy; and Fan Li 范蠡, who was adviser to King Kou-chien of Yüeh, who guided him through the war with Wu from the defeat of Fu-chiao to the final destruction of the enemy, and who then, at the height of his glory, fled away to Ch'i in order to escape the future jealousy of his master. According to tradition, the great general Sun Wu 孙武, author of the Ping fa 《The Book of War》, served under King Ho-lu of Wu and led his armies to victory against Ch'ü. But the famous names and the great events should not conceal the fact that both Wu and Yüeh were short-lived kingdoms, on the outskirts of the Chinese world of that time, whose political influence was essentially temporary.

In fact, the formation of the state of Wu is the first historical evidence of the cultural development of the people in the region south of the mouth of the Yangtse. Archaeological sites which show appreciable evidence of Chinese culture, such as bronze work, do not appear to date from any time earlier than the Eastern Chou, and in terms of society and cultural changes, Eastern Chou may be
considered to be the period when these kingdoms, archaeologically speaking, were formed. The kingdom of Wu, appearing at the beginning of the sixth century B.C., represents the first political organisation of the people of the estuary sufficiently effective to unite a considerable area and to take part in offensive warfare. The conquest by Yueh appears to have brought the hills people of southern Chekiang into contact with the more Chinese people of the plain and also for a short time into communication with China proper. Nevertheless, it does not appear that this development lasted for more than a few years, and the historical records indicate a stagnation of politics in the southeast until the eventual conquest by Chu, which took over the government of the plain and left the hill tribes to return to their own devices. The independence of the peoples of the delta after they had entered the Chinese world lasted for little more than two centuries.

Between the delta country of the lower Yangtse and the basin of the middle Yangtse, there is a stretch of the river which flows northeast between two mountain ridges, the Tapieh Shan on the north and Hwang Shan on the south. The river plain is quite broad, but the two sets of hills, with peaks some four thousand feet high, separate the middle Yangtse from the lands to the north and east. The Tapieh Shan lies between the middle Yangtse and the valley of the Hwai, and the Hwang Shan, or Paitsi Shan, which is a northward extension of the high country of Fukien and southern Chekiang, divides the middle

---

Yangtse and the Poyang Lake from the lower Yangtse, the Tai Lake and
the Bay of Hangchow. Besides the Yangtse River itself, there are two
other routes from the south-west to the north-east of this hill country.
A road and a proposed railway line run from Kingtehchen near Lake Poyang
between ridges south and east of the peak of Hwang Shan and then north
to Nanking; and a road and present railway line lead from Shangjao up
the Sin River valley, across the watershed near the Fukien border and
down towards Hangchow. However, although the hills are no great
obstacle and can be crossed without great difficulty by these
established routes, they were not very suitable for Chinese settlement
and they were not quickly colonised. In the early centuries and during
the Han dynasty, they remained an obstacle to large-scale movement
between the middle Yangtse, the lands of Ch'u, and the lower Yangtse,
the lands of Wu and Yüeh.

The Middle Yangtse:

According to legend, the ancestors of the rulers of Ch'u were
descendants of the Yellow Emperor. At the time of the Chou conquest of
China, a certain Hsiung-yi was granted the title of viscount and
given as fief the land of the barbarian peoples of Ching province. As the Kingdom of Western Chou lost authority over its
vassals in the early years of the ninth century B.C., Hsiung-chü of Ch'u proclaimed himself a prince of barbarians, gave up the titles
that he held from the Chou, and named himself and his three sons as
kings; a few years later, in the reign of the tyrant King Li of
Chou, Hsiung-chü was afraid that he might be attacked and so he
renounced his new titles. By the time of the Ch'un-ch'iu, which begins its chronicle in the year 722, the territory of Ch'u stretched from the Yangtse gorges and the southern reaches of the Han River eastwards as far as the Poyang Lake and the head of the delta of the Yangtse near Wuhu. In 704, Hsiung-t'ung, ruler of Ch'u, again renounced the titles of the Chou and proclaimed himself king. In the seventh century, Ch'u began to expand northwards, dominating some states and conquering others. In 684, Ch'u defeated the Chinese state of Ts'ai, in the region of southern Honan, and made a prisoner of the marquis of that state; although the king of Ch'u later released his hostage, the other Chinese states recognised the threat from the south, and in 679 the first league of the states of northern China named the Duke of Ch'i as hegemon and formed an alliance which was primarily intended for defence against Ch'u.

Neither the traditional records nor the available archaeological evidence present a clear picture of the origins of the state of Ch'u. According to Shih chi, when Hsiung-ch'ü and Hsiung-t'ung took the title of King of Ch'u, they described themselves as barbarians man-yi, but on the other hand it is said that in the years before the enfeoffment by the Chou dynasty, the ancestors of the rulers of Ch'u had lived sometimes within the barbarian lands and sometimes among the Chinese. Hsiung-t'ung, when he took the title of king in 704, is supposed to have said: 'King Ch'eng (of Chou) appointed the duke my ancestor, granted him the territory of a viscount or a baron, and invited him to settle in the land of Ch'u'.

1 Shih chi 40, p.5a; and cf. Chavannes IV, p.344.
Thus there is a tradition that the rulers of Ch'u had at one time come from the north to rule the barbarians of the Yangtse valley early in Chou times, but the history also refers to their own barbarian background, and they themselves were prepared to accept the description of barbarian.

The archaeological exploration of south China is still only in its beginnings, but the evidence that has been discovered of the civilisation of the peoples of the lands of the middle Yangtse is already enough to show their differences from the culture of the north and to support the literary and historical tradition that Ch'u was in many respects an alien state. Although there is evidence that the technology of Chinese civilisation, bronze-working and later the use of iron, came into the south by contact with the north, there are clear indications that the people of the region of Ch'u had a religious and artistic tradition quite different from that of the Chinese of the Yellow River plain. From the evidence of the sites discovered in south China which are contemporary with Western Chou in the north, it appears that in the early centuries of the first millennium B.C. the middle Yangtse was inhabited by peoples still in the Neolithic stage of development. At Huang-p'í 蒼陂 in Hupeh, near the junction of the Han with the Yangtse, there have been found bronzes of the style of the Yin dynasty, but this appears to be an isolated point of development, and it is not until the time of Eastern Chou that there appear any considerable remains of an advanced
culture. For that period there are many sites with evidence of a homogeneous Ch'u culture which have been found throughout a wide area, from the valley of the Hwai in southeastern Honan and northern Anhwei to the region of the Tung Ting Lake in Hunan. The archaeological evidence of this unified culture tends to support the historical tradition that the expansion of the state of Ch'u and its active political development began in the early years of Eastern Chou, about the eighth century B.C.

At the present time, the majority of the sites of Ch'u which have been discovered have been tombs. Remains of Ch'u style have been found in great quantity in Changsha in Hunan, and major northern centres were Sinyang in southern Honan and Showhsien in Anhwei, both in the valley of the Hwai. The graves and the burial techniques were most elaborate, and they indicate a society with well-established class divisions and with an advanced economy. Moreover, there is evidence that the religious beliefs of the south differed considerably from those of the north. The tomb-ornaments of Ch'u included tomb-guardians with human faces, the horns of antlers and protruding tongues like the blades of swords, and decorations on other objects, such as musical instruments and the Ch'u Silk Manuscript, show creatures with horns and tails and triple-heads quite unlike anything drawn or designed in the north.

1 See, for example, Chang Kwang-chih, p.271.

2 See, for example, Jao Tsung-yi, Ch'ang-sha ch'u-t'u tseng-shu, and Barnard, 'A Preliminary Study of the Ch'u Silk Manuscript'.
It is clear that the religion of the Ch'u people, besides the worship of ancestors and of primitive nature deities, which was common to all of ancient China, also included several elements unknown in the north. In particular, the people of Ch'u attributed a particular importance to the activities of wu 'mediums', who were able to attract and influence the spirits of the gods and of men by their dancing and their singing. These beliefs influenced the whole style of Ch'u art and literature and music. The songs of Ch'u are preserved to this day in the Ch'u Tzu anthology, whose poetical rhythms suggest a musical technique and a system of wind instruments quite different from the percussive style of the northern songs preserved in the earlier Shih ching, and the poems themselves are evidence of the religious culture of the south.

This distinctive culture of Ch'u evidently gained its technological stimulus from the north; chiefly south along the Han River, though there may have been some influence up the Yangtse from Anhwei and the valley of the Hwai. Not only did the people of the south receive and adopt the techniques of bronzework from the north, but they also developed the use of iron, and the Yangtse valley became

---

1 The term wu is sometimes rendered by 'witch', 'wizard' or 'shaman': see, for example, Hawkes, Ch'u Tzu, The Songs of the South, p.9.

2 Hawkes, op. cit. pp.4 to 7, and Waley, The Nine Songs, A Study of Shamanism in Ancient China; it has been suggested that the Chiu Ko 'The Nine Songs', one part of the Ch'u Tzu collection, is a form of liturgy for a wu.
a secondary centre of development and expansion of iron technology. Similarly, the art of writing, first developed in the north, was adopted in the south, and the script of Ch'u, from the archaeological evidence which is preserved, is structurally identical with that of the contemporary north. It is generally more ornamental, and there are some texts discovered in the south for which no parallels have been found elsewhere; there is also literary evidence, from the Fang-yen dictionary of Han times, that the Ch'u dialect was for some time preserved in script. However, with these minor variations, the written language of Ch'u appears to be the same as that of the north. Technologically, Ch'u was based on China, and Ch'u civilisation evolved as a result of stimulus from the north.

Nevertheless, there are two unusual features in the development of the Ch'u state. Firstly, as we have seen, there were elements, particularly religious elements, which do not appear to have parallels in the culture of the north; secondly, in contrast to Wu and Yüeh near the lower Yangtse and Hangchow Bay, the middle Yangtse state was very quick to develop; where Wu and Yüeh do not appear as political entities either in archaeology nor in literary records until the fifth and sixth centuries B.C., Ch'u was clearly more advanced and is referred to by the

---

1 See Barnard and Sato, Metallurgical Remains of Ancient China (in its preparatory stages).

2 Serruys, The Chinese Dialects of Han Time according to Fang Yen.
histories as early as the eighth century. While Huang-p'i, near Hankow, is evidence of early influence from the north into the middle Yangtse, there have been sites excavated in Kiangsi and Anhwei which have yielded remains also dating back to the early centuries of the first millennium B.C., which show influence from the contemporary Western Chou culture. Western Chou bronzes have been found at several places on the lower Yangtse and the site at Pei-yin-yang-ying near Nanking, has produced pottery crucibles and fragments of bronze, which is evidence of local metal working. At Yüyao in Chekiang there have been excavated remains of stone ploughs very like the iron ploughs of contemporary north China. This cultural grouping, known as the Yangtse Mound Dwellers or the Hu-shu culture, is evidence of the penetration of northern development into the area of the later states of Wu and Yüeh, and indicates the route of culture-contacts from the north across the Hwai to the Yangtse. Evidently, both the lower Yangtse and the middle Yangtse were in contact with the north during the time of Western Chou, but the people of Ch'ü developed more quickly and created a more complex civilisation than did the people of Wu and Yüeh.

The problem which this situation presents has received various answers, although none of the theories advanced can be accepted with any certainty until more archaeological evidence is available. Cheng Te-kun, for example, suggests that the Yangtse valley was already within

1 Chang Kwang-chih, pp. 252f and 256f.
the domain of Chinese culture as early as the time of the Shang dynasty, and interprets the traditional hostility between the northern states and the kingdom of Ch'u as the result of an alliance between the deposed Shang dynasty and their border colonies of the south, who were inheritors of Shang culture and who continued the struggle against the Chou even after Shang had been destroyed in the north. On the other hand, Chang Kwang-chih notes that the archaeological discoveries so far made in the region of Ch'u, unlike those of the Wu-Yüeh area, show little cultural continuity between the Neolithic strata and the civilisation of Eastern Chou time. He suggests that a proto-Ch'u culture may have developed either in the valley of the Hwai or in the Yangtse itself, or else that the differences in the formation of the Ch'u and the Wu-Yüeh civilisations may be found in the different responses of the peoples of the two regions to the stimulus from the north.

It is very possible that the Hwai valley or the lower course of the Han River may produce evidence of the early development of the Ch'u culture and the increasing influence of northern technology. Shang influence appears in the Huang-p'i site in central Hupeh, and a comparison of the tomb objects found at Sinyang in Honan and those of

---


3 Chang Kwang-chih, *The Archaeology of Ancient China*, e.g. pp. 274 and 275.
Changsha indicates that by Eastern Chou times there was a continuous cultural flow from the north to the south of Ch'ū territory. But it is difficult at this time to accept Cheng Te-kun's characterisation of the Ch'ū people as colonists and allies of Shang, and although it is well established that the people of the south were under continual stimulus from the north during the Chou dynasty, the culture of Ch'ū appears to be more than a simple derivative of the Chinese north.

The literary and historical evidence which survives, both in Ch'ū Tz'ū and in the records of the development of the state, together with the objects which have been found in tombs, all suggest that the people of the south had developed a religious tradition of their own. Although they received the art of writing and such other practical skills as bronze-work and iron-founding from the north, they were able to use this technology in order to develop their own culture, a culture which, while advanced, remained for a long time essentially alien to the northern Chinese. It is possible that this basic pattern of Ch'ū civilisation came from lands further south, and even at the present day stylistic comparisons can be made between the art of ancient Ch'ū and that of some peoples of the Pacific.¹

¹ For example, Ling Shun-sheng, 'Human Figures with Protruding Tongue found in the T'aitung prefecture, Formosa, and their affinities found in other Pacific areas', in Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1956.
Although there is no proof, it seems most likely that the civilisation of Ch'u is the result of an advanced southern religious and artistic culture acted on by the technological stimulus of north China. If we accept this possibility of a proto-Ch'u culture, then it would help to explain the contrast between the active and rapid development of the middle Yangtse state with the relatively slow and passive response of Wu and Yüeh to the influence of the north. However, there is no way to decide this question until archaeological evidence is found to link the culture of Ch'u with its Neolithic predecessors and to demonstrate the intermediate stages of the development; that evidence may yet be found in the valleys of the Hwai or the Han, in the valley of the Yangtse, or in the south of China.

By the eighth century B.C., the political expansion of the Ch'u kingdom had already begun to threaten the small Chinese states which bordered Ch'u to the north, but it appears that this development of Ch'u power was held back for a considerable time by the rise of the lower Yangtse states, Wu and Yüeh. The rivalry between the people of the middle and the lower Yangtse was first seen in the wars between Wu and Ch'u in the sixth century, and the threat to Ch'u from these lower reaches of the river was not eliminated until the final defeat of Yüeh in 334. In the last century of the Chou dynasty, Ch'u controlled the whole of southeastern China, the modern provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and southern Honan. However, while Ch'u was fighting to conquer these lands to the east, the great western state of Ch'in had taken over the border kingdoms
of Pai and Shu in present-day Szechwan and so gained control of the upper reaches of the Yangtse and the Han, and in the confusion of wars and alliances which marked the end of the Warring States, Ch'ü suffered repeated defeats at the hands of Ch'in. In 278 B.C., the lower valley of the Han, which had been the site of the capital of Ch'ü at least since the seventh century, was lost to Ch'in; the capital was moved to the region of Chenchow (or Hwaiyang) in Honan, and in 241 the capital had to be moved again further east to present-day Shousien in Anhwei. In 223, Ch'ü was destroyed by Ch'in.

Without the interruption from Wu and Yueh, it is possible that Ch'ü might have been able to conquer the northern Chinese states before the appearance of Ch'in as a powerful rival. However, by the end of the fourth century, when Ch'in controlled the west of China and the upper reaches of the Yangtse, the situation of Ch'ü showed several points of difficulty. Although the territory of Wu and Yueh had been conquered and those enemies had been removed, the soldiers of the south were mainly experienced in sea or river-fighting, and had difficulty in operating against land forces of the north and west. Moreover, although the lands of Ch'ü itself were very broad, that great area was both an advantage and a disadvantage. The range of hills known as the Tapieh Shan in eastern Hupei and southern Anhwei and Honan divided the Hwai valley in the north from the Yangtse in the south and divided the Han River in the west from Anhwei and the delta lands of the lower Yangtse in the east. For the rulers of Ch'ü, the movements of troops through the kingdom to maintain control within the borders and to be on guard
against invasion must have been a constant problem. In contrast, the strategic position of Ch'in, in the land within the passes, gave that state a secure base and military initiative in campaigns against the east and the south. Despite the great extent of the kingdom of Ch'u, the distances and the changes of terrain may well have been too great for full and effective organisation against the enemy from the northwest.

By the last years of Ch'u, the southern lands of modern Hunan province had been fully incorporated into the Chinese world. After the conquest, the empire of Ch'in extended south of the Yangtse as far as the Nan Ling.

The lands between the middle Yangtse and the Nan Ling are dominated by two great river systems and the mountain ridge between them. On the east, about the Poyang Lake, is a network of rivers which flow into the lake from the hills and mountains on the east, south and west. Of these, the two major rivers are the Kan Kiang, which flows north from the Nan Ling and traverses the whole length of Kiangsi province to reach the lake, and the Fu Shui, which flows northwest from the Wuyi Shan on the borders of Fukien. West of Poyang Lake and south of the complex of lakes about the Yangtse at Wuhan is the mountain ridge of Mufu Shan, which runs northwards as a spur of the Nan Ling and divides the region of the Poyang Lake from the Siang River and the Tung Ting Lake. The Siang River rises in the Nan Ling, flows generally northeast to Hengyang, where it is joined by a major tributary, the Lei River, and then runs northward past Changsha into the Tung Ting Lake. On the west, the Yuan River flows into the Tung
Ting Lake from the Gorge Mountains.

Both the Tung Ting Lake and the Poyang Lake vary greatly in size with the flow of the Yangtse, and both may at different seasons be filled with the floodwaters of the river or be left so empty that marshland and sandbanks are exposed. Beyond the alluvial plains, the tributary rivers flow among hills, either through open valleys or through gorges, but always flanked by higher ground, with valleys never more than fifteen or twenty miles wide. The lower sections of the main rivers in this region are navigable to large boats, but only small craft can be used on the faster-flowing streams of the upper reaches. Only some fifteen per cent of the area of this region is approximately level, and to the present day only about twenty per cent of the land can be farmed. In this territory south of the Yangtse valley, the rivers were the lines of communication of the Chinese settlers and the valleys gave them the only available stretches of land which could be used for settled agriculture. Those of the original inhabitants who did not accept the Chinese techniques and who were driven out by the new-comers were able to take refuge in the hills; and the two peoples remained close neighbours, with the Chinese in the valleys and the barbarians in the hills about them.

This region of the southern tributaries of the middle Yangtse is bounded by high mountain ranges to the west, the east and the south. From the Yangtse Gorges, the Gorge Mountains stretch south to the limestone hills of Kweichow and form a rugged barrier on the west of the Tung Ting Lake and the Siang River valley. These mountains,
which have peaks of five or six thousand feet, still present a major obstacle to present-day communications and were generally impenetrable to colonists at this earlier time. Those Chinese settlers who did establish themselves in the territory of modern Kweichow province appear to have entered that land from the north, from Szechuan and the upper Yangtse, rather than from the basin of the middle Yangtse in the east.

East of the Poyang Lake and the Kan River valley, the Wuyi Shan, a mountain chain with elevations up to four thousand feet and more, runs southwest from Chekiang along the border between Kiangsi and Fukien. In the south, on the northern borders of Kwangsi and Kwangtung, the Nan Ling range runs as a spur from the main Tibetan massif eastwards through southern Kweichow. The easternmost extension of the Nan Ling, known as the Tayu Ling, joins with the south of the Wuyi range near the border of Kwangtung and Fukien. From the Yangtse River, the expansion of Chinese influence tended to move southwards up the river valleys from the Tung Ting Lake and the Poyang Lake rather than east or west into the mountain ranges of Fukien or Kweichow.

The Far South:

By the third century B.C., the Nan Ling range was the southern boundary of the Chinese world. There is some evidence of trade between the advanced cultures of north China and the lands of the far south, and some cultural influence and perhaps even some early colonists had
crossed to the south of the Nan Ling, but it does not seem that the
effective government of the state of Ch'u had been established south
of the main range. Some of the mountains of this zone reach more than
three thousand feet, but there are a number of passes by which they may
be crossed, and it is possible to move from navigable rivers of the

1 See, for example, the discussion of Jao Tsung-yi in his article on Hua-nan shih-ch'ien yi-ts'un yü Yin-hsü wen-hua in Ta-lu tsa-chih vol. VIII, 1954, pp. 65 to 67.

2 According to the biography of Wu Ch'i, the great general of the period of the Warring States, in Shih chi 65, Wu Ch'i held the post of Chancellor under King Tao of Ch'u. In the service of Ch'u, he attacked the south and pacified the 'Hundred Yueh' (po-Yueh). This would suggest that for some time in the beginning of the fourth century B.C. the power of Ch'u was effective south of the Nan Ling. There is, however, no mention of Wu Ch'i or of his southern campaign in the history of the royal house of Ch'u in Shih chi 40 (Chavannes IV, pp. 383 and 384), and it does not seem likely that this was anything more than a punitive expedition. In such early times, many of the functions of government were carried out only in the form of raids and expeditions, and although raiding armies as well as trading parties may have crossed the Nan Ling, there is no evidence that any firm administration was set up.
Yangtse basin to navigable rivers of the Yüeh system by a short portage, or even, at Kweilin, by canal.

The drainage system of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, the territory known generally as Ling-nan (south of the mountains), is dominated by the three main rivers which enter the sea at Canton and which are named by the directions from which they approach the common delta. The Tung Kiang, from the north-east, is the shortest of the three and is navigable for very little of its length. The Pei Kiang, however, with two main valleys in the north of Kwangtung province, provides two important routes of communication with the Yangtse basin. From Shiukwan in Kwangtung, where the river joins courses, it is possible to go up the stream of the Cheng River to the northeast, cross the Tayu Ling, and reach Kanchow on the Kan River. Northwest from Shiukwan, another route leads along the Wu River to Chenhsien on the Lei River and thence to Hengyang on the Siang. These two routes,

1 Shiukwan is also known as Ch'ü-kiang, or Kukong in southern pronunciation. Shiukwan is pronounced Shao-kuan in Mandarin.

2 This pass was called Heng-p'u during Ch'in and Han. It is now known as Mei-ling or as Ta-yü.

3 Under the Ch'in dynasty this pass was called Yang-shan; during Han it was known as Kuei-yang or as K'o-ling; under the Chin dynasty of the third and fourth centuries A.D. it was called La. It is now known as Ch'e-ling or as Ch'i-t'ien.
with a maximum elevation of some thousand feet, have remained the major highways which link Canton with the north through Kiangsi and through Hunan, and the Canton-Hankow-Peking railway passes through the Ch'ě-ling pass. Further to the west, a less important road through the Tu-p'ang pass connects the Lien-chou River, a tributary of the Pei Kiang, with the valley of the Ch'un River which flows north into the Siang.¹

The Si Kiang, or West River, is the longest river in China south of the Yangtse, and the route along the West River towards Canton is the main means of communication between Kwangsi province and the outside world. Two tributaries join the West River from the north near the border of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and their upper reaches, in the

¹ Tradition refers to Five Passes Wu-líng which connect Kwangtung and Kwangsi with the north, and the Tu-p'ang pass is generally listed as one of these. One ancient text, however, the Kuang-chou chi by P'eí Yüan of the fifth century A.D., does not mention the Tu-p'ang pass but lists instead a pass called Chieh-yang. This Chieh-yang (or Kityang in the southern pronunciation) is near Swatow in eastern Kwangtung and is on the coastal route from Fukien into Kwangtung. Thus there is evidence that in earlier times Chieh-yang was numbered among the five main passes and Tu-p'ang was not. See, in particular, the article by Aurousseau in BEFO XXIII, pp.142 to 149 and also below. Certainly the Tu-p'ang route is now of very minor importance.
mountain region of the Nan Ling, are close to the headwaters of the Siang River and its tributaries on the other side of the watershed. The Meng-chu pass connects the Ho River in Kwangsi with the Tao River of Hunan which joins the Siang at Lingling. Further west, the Kweilin canal connects the Kwei River of Kwangsi with the upper course of the Siang itself; for modern communications, this all-water route goes a roundabout way from Canton to the north, and the upper reaches of both the Siang and the Kwei have many rapids, so the canal is seldom used.

The lands of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces are irregular and hilly and no more than a tenth of the region is level ground. Even the delta of the three main rivers in the area of Canton has individual rocky peaks rising from the alluvial soil and the modern network of canals. Communications within the region are difficult. The West River is navigable for all its length as far as the high ground near the borders of Yunnan, and its tributary, the Yu Kiang, which joins the West River from the south at Kweiping, supplies a route towards Vietnam. But the Pei Kiang in Kwangtung is divided from the Kwei and the Ho Rivers in Kwangsi by a spur of the Nan Ling range which runs southwest from the border of the two provinces towards Kweiping; and the upper reaches of the West River are separated by another ridge

---

1 This Meng-chu pass is also called Lin-ho or Po-mang. Besides this, the name Meng-chu is sometimes given as Mang-chu或 as Meng-chu盂渚.
from the coastal lands of the south. Moreover, while the stream itself is navigable, the form of the land is so irregular that at the present time there is still no railway line nor a major road running from Canton up the valley of the West River. In such broken country as this, although the major lines of communication were suitable for armies, and although much of the land was suitable for Chinese settlement, nevertheless the mountains and hills gave a refuge for barbarians and rebels, and rough country could make military operations off the main routes a considerable problem. The land was not difficult to pacify and to settle, but it could be difficult to keep control.

In 221 B.C., when the First Emperor of Ch'in had established his conquest of all the rival states of China, he turned his armies against the barbarian territory of the southeastern and the southern coasts, the present-day provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. In his detailed and careful work on 'La premiere conquête chinoise des pays annamites', Aurousseau has shown from the evidence of the Huai-nan tzu and other early texts that the first invasion of the lands of Ling-nan began in the very year that the conquest of Chou China was complete. One army was brought together at Yü-han 魏汗, south of the Poyang Lake; from there, it is suggested that this army moved northwest up the valley of the Sin Kiang, crossed the watershed to the Fuchun River of Chekiang, and then from the region of Hangchow and Shaohing marched down the coast of southern Chekiang and Fukien to conquer the tribes of the southeastern coast and to enter Kwangtung from the east by the
Chieh-yang pass. By this one march, the authority of the Ch'in dynasty was established in Fukien, and the commandery of Min-chung was established in 221.

Four other armies were sent to invade the south by the direct routes over the passes from the river basins of the Kan and the Siang; one for each of the passes now called Mei-ling, Ch'ei-ling, Meng-chu and Kweilin. After some three years of fighting, the area of eastern Kwangtung and northern Kwangsi had been conquered and the Ch'in forces continued the campaign and moved against the barbarians of the West River, the southern coast, and the lands of present-day Vietnam. However, the first attack was completely defeated, and it was not until 214 that the authority of the Ch'in Emperor was established in the south and the region could be placed under civil government and administered by commanderies.

During this long war, convicts were sent to the south as exiles in order to establish a secure base for military operations,

1 Aurousseau, p. 174, note 1.

2 Shih chi 114, p. 1a and Han shu 95, p. 17a.

3 Huai-nan tsu 18, p. 24, translated by Aurousseau p. 176; and Shih chi 113, p. 1a, translated by Aurousseau p. 188.
and the routes across the passes of the Nan Ling were developed in order to maintain the lines of supply for the armies in the field. Thus it was at this time that the first Chinese colonists were brought in large numbers, by force, to occupy the far south of China, and it was at this time, too, that the communications from north to south were developed. It is recorded that the present-day Kweilin canal was constructed to transport supplies for the Ch'in armies.  

In 214, following the successful completion of the campaign, three commanderies were set up: Nan-hai 南海, with capital near present-day Canton; Kuei-lin 桂林, in the territory of present-day Kwangsi province; and Siang 象, which appears to have controlled the coastland from western Kwangtung as far south as Hue and perhaps to Cape Varella.  

---

1 The Kwei-lin 桂林 canal is also known by the names Hsing-an 興安 canal and Ling-ch'ü 濃渠. According to Huai-nan tzu 18 (quoted by Aurousseau p. 175) and to Shih-chi 112 (quoted by Aurousseau p. 187) and other texts, the canal was constructed by the chien Lu監錄 (i.e. the chien-yü-shih 監御史, Supervising Imperial Clerk whose surname is unknown and whose personal name was Lu). This canal connects the upper reaches of the Siang River with the upper course of the Kwei River of Kwangsi (the upper reaches of the Kwei River are also known as the Li River漓水), and as we have noticed above the canal is still in use at the present day.

2 In this identification I follow the argument of Aurousseau, pp. 153 ff and 237.
In 210 the First Emperor died and by the next year a crop of rebellions throughout China showed that the power of the Ch'in empire was ended. The Commandant (尉) of the commandery of Nan-hai, Jen Ao, on his deathbed, made Chao T'o his successor and arranged for Chao T'o to govern Nan-hai independently of the rest of the empire. As Commandant of Nan-hai, Chao T'o was able to order the closing of the passes of Mei-ling, Ch'e-ling and Tu-lung, and by 206 B.C., after the final collapse of the Ch'in in the north, Chao T'o had conquered the territory of the neighbouring commanderies of Kuei-lin and Siang and proclaimed himself King of the state of Nan-yüeh 南越. In the eleventh year of the Han dynasty (196 B.C.), Emperor Kao-tsu recognised Chao T'o's authority in the south and sent him a royal seal; Chao T'o formally acknowledged himself as a subject of the Han. During the reign of the Empress née Lü, there was a short war between Han and Nan-yüeh, and Chao T'o took the title of Emperor; although he again acknowledged the sizerainty of Han after the accession of Emperor Wen in 180 A.D., he did not renounce the title of Emperor in his own territory.

1 Chao T'o was a man from Chen-ting 真定, now Chengting 正定 in Hopeh. The Commandant was the military head of a commandery in the Ch'in administrative system and was appointed by the central government; by making his own appointment of his successor, Jen Ao had already committed an act of rebellion against the Ch'in.

2 Nan-yüeh is sometimes written 南粤.
Chao T'o died in 137, and his successors were less able men.

The state of Nan-yüeh was wealthy from its command of the trade between the Chinese empire and the southern seas, but the administration was made difficult by bad communications and by the rivalry between the indigenous southern peoples and the Chinese immigrants, such as Chao T'o himself, who ruled them. After the death of Chao T'o, the kingdom was divided among a number of lesser fiefs, and the royal house was troubled by internal feuds. Twenty-five years after the death of Chao T'o, in 112 B.C., Emperor Wu of Han sent his armies south through the passes against Nan-yüeh, and within a year the state had been destroyed and the lands were incorporated into the empire.

Under the Han, in the area which had formerly been governed by the three Ch'in commanderies of Nan-hai, Kuei-lin and Siang, there were now set up seven commanderies, of which the southern-most, Jih-nan日南, had its capital at Hsi-ch'üan西覇, in the area of present-day Hue. The passes through the Nan-ling range were set under the control of the commanderies of Ling-ling零陵 and Kuei-yang桂陽 (both in the south of present-day Hunan) and of Yü-chang豫章 (in present-day Kiangsi), and it was no longer possible for the government at Canton to do as Chao T'o had done and divide the south from the north by ordering the passes to be cut.

From this time on, for the rest of Former Han and through the Later Han dynasty, the lands of south China and this northern coast of Indo-china were administered by the same system of commanderies and

---

1 See, for example, Madrolle, 'Le Tonkin ancien', p.331.
prefectures as the settled lands of the Yangtse basin and the Yellow River. Unlike the northern frontiers where the Chinese empire faced the non-Chinese peoples of Korea, of the steppes and of the highlands of Tibet, there was no specific military government set up to control the Chinese settlers and their barbarian neighbours. Although garrisons and military colonies were maintained, there were no major military units needed to guard this territory and such rebellions or disturbances that occurred were generally handled by the troops of the provincial or commandery offices. Under the Chinese administration, the people of the south were shown the techniques of Chinese culture, and the Chinese government attempted a program of schooling and moral teaching, so that the political dominance of China in the south was paralleled by a general effort to impress Chinese culture on the barbarians. The process was slow, and some of the administrators were more influenced by the barbarians than they were effective as missionaries themselves, but throughout the Han dynasties this southern province remained a region of occasional disturbance, gradual civilisation, and exotic tribute.  

---

During the Former Han and most of the Later Han, the southern province was officially known as Chiao-chih, which was also the name of one of the commanderies within the province. The territory is sometimes described as Chiao-chou (Chiao province) in texts of the Han period, but it was not formally given that description until 203 A.D., when Chang Chin was appointed...
In 106 B.C., the whole empire had been divided into thirteen provinces, chou, each headed by an Inspector, tz'u-shih, who was appointed and controlled directly by the imperial secretariat and was responsible for supervision of the commandery administration. The rank of an Inspector was low, and in most provinces he was not entitled to take administrative action, but only to report to the throne. However, in his commentary to Han shu 28A, p.10b, Yen Shih-ku quoted Hu Kuang, a scholar of the Later Han dynasty (91 to 172 A.D.), who said that the Inspector of Chiao-chih was granted credentials which gave him the right to make executive and legal decisions and take action on his own initiative; in this way the administration of Chiao-chih differed from that of other provinces. For some periods at the end of Former Han and at the beginning and end of Later Han, governors were appointed to provinces instead of inspectors; governors held higher rank and had greater authority within their territories. Thus the appointment of 203 A.D. continued the southern province as a region where the administrative power lay more with the provincial government than with the commanderies.

The term chiao-chih can also be written, and in later texts it appears as. In the Wang-chih Wang chapter of Li chi (translated by Couvreur in his Mémoires sur les bienséances et les cérémonies, volume 1, p. 295) it is recorded that... and Couvreur translated this as 'Les habitants du midi, appelés Man, se tatouaient le front; (ils prenaient ensemble leur repos) les pieds (tournés en sens contraires et) se croisent...'
By the middle of the Former Han dynasty, the political control and the cultural influence of the Chinese people had extended by land and by river as far south as the territory of present-day Vietnam. The path of Chinese expansion had run from the Yangtse south along the valleys of the Siang and the Kan, across the Nan Ling towards Canton, then up the West River and its tributary the Ōu Kiang, and over the mountainous region of the modern international boundary into the level ground of the Red River delta and the coastlands stretching south and east between the mountains and the sea. Although the Chinese movement towards the south had followed an inland route along river valleys, there is evidence that the government of Han could carry out military operations by sea and was prepared to maintain communications between the north and the south of the empire by the coastal route past present-day Fukien. If the imperial government could obtain ships and sailors as it required them for its expeditions, there must have been a considerable private trade along the coasts of the empire and also among the non-Chinese peoples of the south-east.

1 In 111 B.C. the General Who Traverses the Seas (heng-hai chiang-chün 橫海將軍) Han Yüeh 謝氏 was one of the commanders of the forces sent against the King of Tung-yüeh (Dubs II, p.82 and see below). About 83 A.D., in the reign of Emperor Chang of the Later Han dynasty, the tribute from Chiao-chih was sent by sea to the north, and the Grand Minister of Agriculture (ta-ssu-nung 大司農) Cheng Hung 鄭弘 suggested in a memorial that in future the tribute should go by the over-land route (HHS 23, pp. 13a and 13b).
The South-east Coast:

In his great campaign in the south between 221 and 214 B.C., the First Emperor of Ch'in had sent one of his armies through the present-day province of Fukien and southwards along that coast into Kwangtung and this campaign was so successful that the commandery of Min-chung was already established in 221. However, as Bielenstein has noticed, there is no evidence of actual colonisation by Chinese people in Fukien either during Ch'in or during the Former Han dynasty. South of the level ground about Hangchow Bay, the territory of southern Chekiang and Fukien province is mountainous, with a narrow coastal plain, a multitude of offshore islands, and a great number of rivers running through gorges from the mountains straight to the sea. The direct approach to this region from China proper, southeast from Kiangsu province, leads across the Wuyi Shan range, with difficult country and few passes; within the region itself, less than a tenth of the land surface is level and suitable for agriculture, and although the route along the coast is militarily possible, Chinese control was to depend more on colonisation than on conquest.  

As the Ch'in empire collapsed, two kingdoms were founded in the territory of the former commandery of Min-chung. The state of Tung-ou 東瓯 had its capital near Wenchow in Chekiang, and the state of Min-yüeh 閩越 had its capital at Tung-yeh 東冶, on the Min River.

See, in particular, the article by Bielenstein on 'The Chinese Colonisation of Fukien until the end of T'ang' in Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata.
near Foochow; the rulers of both kingdoms claimed to be descended from the rulers of the fifth and fourth century kingdom of Yüeh. After the destruction of Ch'in, they were allies of Han Kao-tsu against Hsiang Yü. As a reward, in 202 B.C. the Han recognised the ruler of Min-yüeh as King and in 192 the ruler of Tung-ou was made King of Tung-hai.

When the Seven Kings rebelled against Han in 154 B.C., the King of Tung-ou joined the revolt, but when the rebels were defeated he was able to arrange the murder of the King of Wu, one of the leaders, and so made his peace with Han. However, the son of the King of Wu had fled to Min-yüeh, and he persuaded Min-yüeh to attack Tung-ou in order to avenge the death of his father. In 138 the armies of Min-yüeh besieged the capital of Tung-ou, Tung-ou asked help from Han, and when the imperial armies came up the Min-yüeh withdrew. Shih chi records that Tung-ou asked that their state should be transferred to China proper, and all the people were brought to settle in the territory.

---

1 Dubs I, pp. 103 and 181, but Shih chi 114 says that both rulers were given royal titles in 192. Although Tung-hai was the name of the kingdom conferred by Han, the state continued to be known by the name Tung-ou, which was also the name of its capital city. (Shih chi 114, p. 1b.)
between the Yangtse and the Hwai.\footnote{Shih chi 114, p. 2a. Shih chi 22 (table of great events and high officials for the first century of the Han dynasty), under the third year of the Chien-yüan period of Emperor Wu (138 B.C.) notes that the former king of Tung-ou (Tsou) Wang was made Marquis of Kuang-wu and brought more than forty thousand of his people to surrender; they lived in Lu-chiang commandery.}

After Tung-ou abandoned their territory in this way, the kingdom of Min-yüeh took it over. When Chao T'o had proclaimed himself independent of Han in the time of the Empress née Lü, Min-yüeh joined in alliance with Nan-yüeh, but in 135 B.C. the King of Min-yüeh made an attack on Nan-yüeh, although both states were now nominal subjects of the Han Emperor. Nan-yüeh reported the attack to the Han court, and armies were sent by Emperor Wu to attack Min-yüeh. The younger brother of the King of Min-yüeh, Tsou Yu-shan, persuaded the court to kill the King and so make peace with the Emperor. The Han court appointed another king, Tsou Ch'ou, from the members of the royal clan, but Yu-shan's position in the state was so strong that he too was acknowledged as a king, to share in the government, with Tung-yüeh as the title of his fief. From this time on the control of the state was effectively in the hands of Yu-shan.

In 112 B.C., when the imperial armies marched against Nan-yüeh, Yu-shan offered help, but when the campaign actually took place he made excuses for not sending troops and even entered into negotiations with
Nan-yüeh. After Nan-yüeh had been conquered, the imperial General of Towered Warships (lou-ch'uan ch'iän-ch'ün 樓船將軍) Yang P'u 迦薩 asked permission to attack Tung-yüeh. Yü-shan, for his part, blocked the passes, attacked the Han troops stationed on his borders in Yü-ch'ang commandery, and proclaimed himself Emperor. Then the Han sent a fleet from Hangchow Bay and armies from Yü-ch'ang to attack Tung-yüeh. In the next year, Yü-shan was killed by his own followers and the people of the state surrendered to Han. An imperial edict said: 'Tung-yüeh is an inaccessible and difficult region. It has been vacillating in its obedience and would be trouble in later reigns. Let its people be removed into the region between the Yangtse and the Hwai Rivers and thereupon let its land be emptied.'

1 Dubs II, pp. 84 and 85. Shih chi 20 (the table of marquises enfeoffed from the Chien-yüan era on) and Han shu 17 (the table of marquises enfeoffed in the reigns of Emperors Ching, Wu, Chao, Hsüan, Yüan and Ch'eng) both refer to marquises awarded to Tsou Ch'ou, the former King (Marquis of Tung-ch'eng in Chiu-chiang commandery) and three surrendered men from Tung-yüeh: the Marquises of Wu-hsi 無錫 in K'uai-chi 前秦, K'ai-ling 開陵 in Lin-huai 隨淮 and Wai-shih 外史 in Chi-nan. (According to Shih chi 20 and 114 the title of the fief was Pei-shih 北史, according to Han shu 17, the title was Wai-shih. The So-yin 索隠 commentary to Shih chi 20 by Ssu-ma Chen 司馬貞 of the T'ang dynasty notes that Han shu 17 writes the fief as Wai-shih, and says that Han shu 17 says that Wai-shih was in Chi-nan commandery. But the
present version of Han shu 17 says that Wai-shih was in Chi-yang commandery. There was no commandery called Chi-yang during the Han dynasty, so it appears that Ssu-ma Chen was correct and the modern versions of Han shu are wrong.) Of these four states, Tung-ch'eng was a prefecture near the border of Chiu-chiang and Lin-huai, and although the prefecture of K'ai-ling can no longer be identified, it seems likely that it was close to Tung-ch'eng; both places were between the Yangtse and the Hwai. The prefecture of Wu-hsi, however, lay south of the Yangtse just north of the Tai Lake; and the district of Wai-shih, which was not a prefecture, if it was in Chi-nan then it was situated well north of the Hwai valley in present-day Shantung province.
There were precedents for a forced move of this kind. The First Emperor of Ch'ìn had shifted the ruling families of the former feudal states and compelled them to live in his capital,¹ and during the Han dynasty it became the custom that powerful local families, who might become a threat to imperial control of their districts, were forced to move from their native places and brought to live near the imperial tombs at the capital. Both Ch'ìn and Han had used this technique of forced migration to deprive local communities of their natural leaders and to break up regional communities which might tend towards a fragmentation of the empire.²

¹ See, for example, Chavannes II, pp. 137 and 138.

² For example, in 127 B.C., braves and stalwarts (豪傑 hao-chieh) from the commanderies and kingdoms, together with those whose property was three million cash or more, were moved to Mou-ling, the planned mausoleum of Emperor Wu (Dubs II, p. 52). There were other such moves in 96 B.C. (Dubs II, p. 109) and in 65 B.C. (Dubs II, pp. 228 and 230). On the significance of this policy as a means of breaking up powerful local forces and maintaining imperial control in the provinces, see Hsü Cho-yün, 'The Changing Relationship between Local Society and the Central Power in Former Han: 206 B.C. - 8 A.D.' In 40 B.C. an edict of Emperor Yüan announced the abolition of this practice (Dubs II, pp. 327 and 328).
In his dealings with these southeastern states, Emperor Wu had already arranged for the transfer of the King of Tung-ou to a marquisate in Lu-chiang. Now, after the surrender of Tung-yüeh, the migration was made compulsory, although it is not likely that the solution to the Tung-yüeh question was so drastic as the edict would imply. It is, in fact, impossible that the whole of the aboriginal population of southern Chekiang and Fukien were forced to emigrate to the north of the Yangtse. The states themselves can never have controlled all the people of that territory, and most probably Tung-ou and Min-yüeh had ruled only the larger settlements, the river valleys and the routes of communication. Nevertheless, we may accept that the forced transfer of fiefs involved the movement of a considerable number of the settled and more civilised people of this more accessible ground, and such an emigration would leave the peoples remaining without any natural centre of political authority.

Besides this, the borders of the empire now extended into the south of Chekiang, and by 2 A.D. the southernmost prefecture in this region, Hui-p'u, which was near present-day Linhai, was the headquarters of the Chief Commandant of the southern region of K'uai-chi commandery.\(^1\) Chinese influence spread southward from that base,

\(^1\) _Han shu_ 28 A, p. 33a. It is most likely that this establishment was set up about the time of the conquest of Tung-yüeh.
and under the Later Han there was a hsiang region of Tung-ou, in the land of the old capital of the former state, which was established as the prefecture of Yung-ning in 138 A.D. The capital of Min-yüeh, Tung-yeh, had been made a prefecture in K'uai-chi commandery immediately after the conquest and it became a port of call for imperial ships between Chiao-chih and the north.

Thus, with the political leaders of the former states removed from their homeland, and with the two centres of political power occupied or closely watched by the Han government, it was most unlikely that any competent state could emerge again from among the scattered tribes of that region, speaking a multitude of dialects and divided from one another among mountains and valleys.

By the first century B.C., the Former Han dynasty had established its authority over an empire which stretched as far south as Vietnam. The lands of the Yangtse had been Chinese since the time of the Chou dynasty. South of the Nan Ling, the lines of approach were well defined, and the profits and advantages of trade and tribute from the countries of South-east Asia made the conquest and colonisation of the region a matter of interest to the court, while the existence of the

---

1 Hou Han shu treatise 22, p. 47a. The former prefecture of Hui-p'u was known as Chang-an under the Later Han, and the new prefecture was set up from the district of Tung-ou within the borders of Chang-an.
independent and powerful state of Nan-yüeh had presented problems which the Han rulers sought to guard against in the future. On the other hand, the lands of the south-east were difficult to control and produced little that was valued in the imperial capital in the north. So Ch'in had forced settlers into the south and Han had compelled people to leave the south-east. Nevertheless, although government policy and imperial conquest influenced the expansion of Chinese civilisation, the development of South China was largely a matter of peaceful colonisation. Throughout Former Han and Later Han, the migration of Chinese from the north, the intermarriage of Chinese and barbarians and the adoption by non-Chinese peoples of Chinese customs and government all tended to spread Chinese culture and imperial rule over more of the lands and the peoples of the south.
South China under the Later Han dynasty:

At the beginning of the first century A.D., although the Han government controlled the greater part of the lands of China south of the Yangtse, Chinese colonisation and development of this territory was still in its early stages. The conquests of Former Han had established imperial control over the settled parts of the south, and the destruction of the two main states of Nan-yüeh and Tung-yüeh had removed the possibility of any appreciable political force being formed as a rival to the government in the north. In the years of civil war which ended the short-lived Hsin dynasty of Wang Mang and which led to the establishment of the Later Han dynasty under Emperor Kuang-wu, the rulers of the southern commanderies and provinces had no influence on the course of events in the north and they were quickly brought under the control of Kuang-wu's government as soon as he had established dominance over his rivals in the lands of the Yellow River. ¹ Despite the disorganisation of the north in this period of civil war, there was no Chinese or barbarian ruler who was able to establish a viable and independent state; which is a tribute to the effectiveness of the military conquest and of the administrative control of the Former Han.

In 2 A.D., at the time of the imperial census which is recorded in the ti-li chih of Han shu, there were less than four million Chinese living in the lands south of the Yangtse and east of the Gorge Mountains

¹ See Bielenstein II, pp. 48 and 157 to 158.
and the Kweichow hills, while the population of the whole empire was over fifty-seven million. In 140 A.D., at the time of the census which is recorded in the chün-kuo chih of Hou Han shu, there were nearly seven and a half million Chinese in that area, out of a population of forty-eight million in the whole empire. In less than a hundred and fifty years, this region of south China had almost doubled its population.

It should be noted here that on questions of population in China in the first centuries A.D., I use the figures given in the geographical treatises of Han shu and Hou Han shu, as cited above, and I accept the interpretations and the amendments which Bielenstein has given in his article on 'The Census of China during the period 2 - 742 A.D.' Both treatises list the commanderies of the empire for one particular year, and figures are given for the population of each commandery, in households 'hu and in individuals k'ou. From the discussion in Bielenstein's article it seems clear that the figures in the two Han histories are straightforward census lists, although some of the data given for later dynasties in other histories are rather concerned with taxation figures than with full lists of population.

On the other hand, it must be appreciated that the Han censors only counted those who were registered as imperial subjects. There were many barbarians, both in the north and in the south, who might be living

---

1 pp. 129 to 131.
within the borders of the empire as neighbours of Chinese subjects but who were not considered Chinese; in the north, some tribes were given special status and allowed to settle on Chinese soil, and in the south the immense majority of the indigenous peoples kept away from the Chinese settlements and were not available for counting. Besides the natural increase of the earlier settlers, the great rise of the Chinese population in the south was due partly to immigration, partly to intermarriage, and partly to conversion of the non-Chinese peoples.

As Bielenstein has shown, the increase in the population of the south was stimulated to a great extent by the pressure of barbarians on the northern and western borders of China. During the reigns of Emperor Kuang-wu and his son Emperor Ming, some tribes of the Hsiung-nu and of the Ch'iang people of the west had surrendered to the Han court and had been given permission to settle within the borders of the Chinese empire. It was planned that they should give help to the imperial armies in protecting the Chinese subjects settled near the frontiers; but they proved difficult neighbours, they exerted constant pressure against the Chinese farmers, and they gradually forced them away to the south. In the last years of the Han, several commanderies had their headquarters moved south or east away from the area of disturbance, and by the end of the dynasty some had been abolished.

1 Bielenstein, 'The Census of China during the period 2-742 A.D.' and also his Emperor Kuang-wu (A.D.25-57) and the Northern Barbarians, p.20.

2 See, in particular, Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-wu (A.D.25-57) and the Northern Barbarians, p.23.
Some of the people who moved from the northwest crossed the Chin Ling into Szechwan, but others followed the lower course of the Han River and crossed the Yangtse into the region of the present-day provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. Although every part of south China gained in population, the immense majority of the new settlers came to live in Ch'ang-sha and Ling-ling commanderies, on the Siang River, and in Yü-chang commandery, on the Poyang Lake and its tributaries the Kan and the Fu. The population of the commandery of Ch'ang-sha under Former Han was 235,825 individuals; the population of the commandery under Later Han was 1,059,372. Similarly, the population of Ling-ling rose from 139,378 to 1,001,578; and the population of Yü-chang rose from 351,965 to 1,608,906. The increase in population in these three commanderies accounted for more than three million of the over-all rise of some three and a half million in the area as a whole; and while under the Former Han the population of these three commanderies had been less than a fifth of the population of the area, under the Later Han almost half of the population lived in these three commanderies.

This tremendous increase of population was not reflected to any great extent in the administrative arrangements of the commanderies. Ch'ang-sha and Ling-ling and Yü-chang occupied approximately the same territory in Later Han as they had in Former Han, and although their population was about five times as large as it was before, the commanderies were not subdivided and there were few new prefectures set up. As a result, in these three commanderies, the average population of each prefecture rose from some 15,000 or 20,000 in
Former Han to about 80,000 in the Later Han, which must have made for an increasingly loose administrative control over these developing territories. In Yü-chang, the growth of the Chinese population does not appear to have caused any major unrest, but in the commanderies along the more western route of migration, by Tung Ting Lake and the Siang River, there is a history of almost continual disturbance as the barbarians opposed the expansion of Chinese settlement.

In 47 A.D., an imperial army was raised in Nan commandery, Ch'ang-sha and Wu-ling and was sent against the Man barbarians of Wu-ling commandery; the army was defeated and destroyed in the difficult terrain of Wu-ch'î. After two more years of fighting, Kwang-wu's general Ma Yüan was able to defeat the barbarians and persuade their leader to surrender. However, this first disturbance was only the beginning of a series of wars and skirmishes with the Man people of Wu-ling and there are records of rebellions in the years 76, 78 to 80, 92 to 93, 96, 108 to 109, 136 to 137, 151 to 153, 160 and 186 A.D. We may imagine that there were also very many minor incidents, not sufficiently serious to be recorded by the court histories, but enough to make Wu-ling a scene of almost continual disturbance.

---

1 Wu-ch'i is a general term for the rugged country about the headwaters of the Yüan River on either side of the present-day Hunan-Kweichow border.
Wu-ling commandery increased its population from 185,758 to 250,913 individuals between the Former Han and Later Han census, an increase far below the average for the lands south of the Yangtse. The commandery occupied the territory between the Tung Ting Lake and the massif of the Gorge mountains on the west, and it seems a natural route of migration and a possible place of settlement for Chinese immigrants coming down the Han valley from the north. But the non-Chinese people were prepared to resist any new colonisation, and the mountains gave them a secure base against military attacks. On the east of the lake, Ch'ang-sha commandery stretched north as far as the Yangtse, and some of the immigrants travelled by that less dangerous route; the barbarians of the Gorge mountains managed to keep themselves outside Chinese control for all the period of Later Han.

Apart from this endemic warfare in Wu-ling, the major barbarian rebellion of this region in the Later Han dynasty began in 157. In that year, the Man barbarians of Ch'ang-sha ravaged the north of the commandery near the Tung Ting Lake. In 160, the Man of Ling-ling commandery also rebelled and invaded the south of Ch'ang-sha, and the barbarians of Wu-ling attacked Nan commandery and Chiang-hsia. Two imperial armies were sent against them, and the rebels in both Wu-ling and in Ch'ang-sha were pacified; but as soon as the armies went back, the rebellion broke out again. This time, in Wu-ling the barbarians were quickly defeated by commandery forces, but the rebels in the south turned against Kuei-yang and then plundered in Ts'ang-wu and Nan-hai; for a few years this mixed group of barbarians and Chinese bandits were
able to maintain their position among the southern hills, but they were defeated and pacified in 164, and although there was a brief revolt in Kuei-yang in 165, it was quickly suppressed.

Further south, in Chiao-chih, the one great rebellion of the non-Chinese people began in 40 A.D., under the leadership of two sisters, Cheng-tse and Cheng-erh, who are remembered by the Vietnamese of today as the Trung sisters. The first rising occurred in Chiao-chih commandery, and it was supported by the barbarians of Chiu-chen, Jih-nan and Ho-p'u; the imperial administrators were unable to put it down.

The Emperor ordered ships to be built and roads to be prepared, and in 42 A.D. an army was raised in Ch'ang-sha, Ling-ling, Kuei-yang and Ts'ang-wu, and was placed under the command of Ma Yuan, who was given the title of General Who Calms the Waves (伏波將軍fu-po chiang-chün). In the next year, Cheng-tse and Cheng-erh were destroyed, the other barbarians were pacified, and three hundred of their chieftains were compelled to move into Ling-ling commandery. From this time, Chiao-chih remained under the control of the Later Han.

The province of Chiao-chih was connected with the rest of the empire by the passes across the Nan Ling, but all the commanderies had borders with mountain regions which were occupied by barbarian peoples. The Chinese settlers had some trouble with these neighbours, and the garrison troops in this frontier province were not always reliable; in 115 and 116 the Man of Ts'ang-wu made a rebellion and kidnapped Chinese and non-Chinese people living in Ho-p'u; in 137 Man tribes
from outside the borders of Jih-nan made an attack on the commandery, and when troops were raised in Chiao-chih and Chiu-chen they staged a mutiny. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any great Chinese expansion in this area; both of the disturbances just mentioned, and others which are recorded in Hou Han shu, were ended by the surrender of the rebels, and in some cases this surrender was encouraged by an imperial amnesty. The Chinese interest in the far south was rather concerned with trade than with colonisation. Shih chi noted that Nan-hai commandery was a centre for trade in pearls and rhinoceros horns and tortoise shells and exotic fruits, and the Hou Han shu has frequent references to tribute received in the imperial court from beyond the borders of Jih-nan. We know that there was an established sea route from Chiao-chih along the coast of Fukien to the north, and it is clear that there was a prosperous trade between South China and the lands of South-east Asia. The imperial government was naturally concerned to maintain control of the entry-ports of this trade and to keep the peace along the route, but Chiao-chih was otherwise too far from the capital for any active policy of expansion.

1 Shih chi 129, translated in Swann, p. 448.

2 Up to the end of the reign of Emperor Ling, there is reference to only one new commandery in the region of Chiao province. HHS 76, p. 8b, says that in 170 A.D. seven prefectures under Kao-liang commandery were set up from the territory of surrendered barbarians. But it is not likely that this extended administration lasted very long; a commandery of the same name is mentioned under the state of Wu in the area south of Yü-lin commandery on the West River, but there is no further reference to Kao-liang in the last years of the Han dynasty. Probably, the commandery was abolished within a few years of 170 and was later restored about the same territory, by Wu.
In the years between 2 and 140 A.D., the registered population of Nan-hai increased from 94,253 to 250,282 individuals, and the population of Ts'ang-wu increased from 146,160 to 466,975; these two commanderies, which were on the main route by land from north to south, must have gained from the general southward migration, but the other commanderies, such as Ho-p'u (78,980 to 86,617 individuals) and Chiu-chen (166,013 to 209,894 individuals), seem to have been largely unaffected by this movement, and most of their increase in population can probably be attributed to natural increase and to the gradual conversion and registration of the non-Chinese peoples.\(^1\)

In a memorial to Sun Ch'üan written in 213 A.D., Hsüeh Tsung 薛綜 of the Wu state discussed the history of Chiao-chih since the conquests of Ch'in and Han.\(^2\) He described how the peoples were divided by mountains and rivers and had languages which were mutually unintelligible; their customs varied from one region to the next, but none were acceptable to the civilised Chinese. Both under Ch'in and under Han, the southern territories had been an area for exiles, and the example of these people and the procedures of the imperial administration itself had given the barbarians some picture of the Chinese way of life. Besides this, some dedicated administrators,

\(^1\) Under the Former Han, Yü-lin had 71,162 individuals, and Chiao-chih, in the Red River Basin, had the considerable population of 746,237. The Later Han census has no figures for these two commanderies.

\(^2\) SKWu 8, pp. 8b to 11a.
such as Hsi Kuang, the Grand Administrator of Chiao-chih, and Jen Yen, the Grand Administrator of Chiu-chen, both holding those positions during the early years of the Later Han, had attempted to teach the people Chinese customs and techniques. Jen Yen had the people abandon the custom of marriage by free choice in spring and introduced the Chinese procedures of matchmaking and parental control; both he and Hsi Kuang set up schools and taught the people ploughing and urged them to clothe themselves with caps and sandals.

This 'Confucianisation' does not seem to have been established imperial policy, but depended rather on the ideals and the whims of individual administrators, and although the works of Jen Yen and his colleagues were praised and recorded by the histories, it is not likely that they had any long-lasting and widespread influence; Hsüeh Tsung could write that in the four hundred years since the first surrender, the people had remained much the same. However, the policy of these early reformers showed the pattern of the techniques of conversion. Schools were established to teach the Chinese language and official texts, farm implements and Chinese dress were introduced, and the officials paid particular attention to the arrangement of marriage ceremonies, increasing the control of the elders and strengthening the authority of the family units. By these means, they tied the people to the land and made their society more stable. Such reforms may have been inspired by a missionary urge to spread Chinese culture, but they also made the barbarian peoples easier to control and more amenable to government.
Further north, in Ching and Yang provinces, there were similar moves to transform the customs of the barbarians. In Kuei-yang commandery, for example, the Grand Administrators Wei Sa and Tz'u Ch'ung, of the reign of Kuang-wu, encouraged the people to settle in established villages and introduced silk-farming; later, in the reigns of Emperors Ho and Shun, the Grand Administrators Hsü Ching and Luan Pa taught the ceremonies of marriage and mourning and set up schools.1

In some parts of the Yangtse basin, the administrators not only taught the people the ways of Chinese civilisation, but they also suppressed various superstitions and magical sects. In the reign of Kuang-wu, Sung Chün, the prefect of Chen-yang in Wu-ling,2 found that the people there believed in mediums and devils (wu-kuei); he set up schools for them and he prohibited immoral sacrifices (yin-chu). Later, Sung Chün was transferred to become Grand Administrator of Chiu-chiang commandery, on the north bank of the Yangtse. There was a sect of wu mediums who organised the worship of two mountains, and who compelled youths and girls to become bridegrooms and brides of the mountains and refused them permission to marry; Sung put an end to the custom.3 Similarly, when Luan Pa was Grand

---

1 HHS 66, pp.2b and 3a; HHS 66, p.10b; HHS 47, p.2a.
2 Now close to Chenki in Hunan.
3 HHS 31, p. 14a.
Administrator of Yū-chang commandery, he stopped the activities of a considerable cult of wu, who worshipped the spirits of mountains and rivers.¹

¹ HHS 47, p. 2b. This Luan Pa, whom we have noticed as a Grand Administrator both in Kuei-yang and in K'uai-chi, was a curious man. According to his biography in HHS, he came from Wei commandery, was an expert in Taoism, and used his Taoist powers to control the gods of Yū-chang and to destroy their cult. Earlier in his career, he had been a eunuch official in the imperial harem, but had left that office because his virility returned (yang-ch'i t'ung-ch'ang 陽氣通暢). He was put to death in the reign of Emperor Ling for his support of Ch'en Fan and Tou Wu.

In the primary commentary to Luan Pa's biography, extracts from the Shen-hsien chuan 神仙傳 by Ko Hung葛洪 of the Chin dynasty suggest that he came not from Wei commandery but from Shu, and a number of anecdotes describe his magical achievements. His record as a temporary eunuch, as a Taoist adept, and as a local administrator who founded (presumably) Confucian schools, is rather confusing, and it seems possible that there were actually two men of similar names living about the same time, and Fan Yeh confused the sources when he compiled this biography.

But no matter the means by which Luan Pa destroyed the cults of Yū-chang, his biography presents evidence for their existence.
As a general term, *wu* could be used to describe many varieties of superstitions or magical practices or techniques of communicating with the gods. The Chinese historians were not often concerned with the details of a non-Confucian philosophy or religion, so that the term *wu* need indicate no more than that the people so described held beliefs of organised cults which were not accepted as orthodox, and the history would not often refer to such sects unless they had been the concern of the imperial administration. Thus *wu* from Ch'i state are recorded among the Red Eyebrows rebels at the beginning of Later Han, and there were *wu* in Ho-nan commandery, in Ch'ing province, in Ts'ang-ko commandery, and in the Western Regions,¹ and the Empress née Yin of Emperor Ho was dismissed in 102 for being involved in practice of witchcraft and black magic (*wu-ku*巫).² The term was in common and widespread use throughout the empire during Later Han, and it must have described a variety of magical practices.³

It seems possible, nevertheless, that the cults of the Yangtse commanderies, which are described as *wu*, had some descent from the mediumistic or shaman religion of Ch'u. The archaeological evidence from the tombs of the ancient state indicates that there had been a religious system in the south which differed from the beliefs of the north, which had been widespread in the region of the Yangtse valley

¹ HHS 1, p.10b; HHS 8, p.14a; HHS 48, p.15a; HHS 76, p.13a; HHS 37, p.3a.
³ For a general discussion, see Feng & Shryock, 'The Black Magic in China Known as *Ku*'.

and which had been accepted by the nobility. It is very likely that some of this religious tradition remained among the people of the former state and could be preserved for centuries after the fall of Ch'u even despite the great immigrations from the north. It is impossible to trace the influence of this southern religion, for the written evidence is lacking; but Ch'u had been the centre of a civilisation which was essentially non-Chinese, and the beliefs of Ch'u must have influenced the Chinese of the north and also the barbarians of the Yangtse hills outside the Chinese domain. Thus the Chinese administrators of the Yangtse valley were dealing with a land which had had a religious culture of its own.

Under Later Han, the people of the lands south of the mouth of the Yangtse were particularly noted for their interest in divination and other forms of magic, and of the diviners and magicians recorded in the fang-shu 方術 chapters of Hou Han shu (72A and 72B), four came from K'uai-chi, one from Tan-yang, and one each from the neighbouring commanderies of Lu-chiang and Yü-chang. Of these, Hsü Teng 徐登 and Chao Ping 趙炳 were expert in yüeh-fang 越方 and were able to cure sickness. ¹ Yüeh-fang, or yüeh wu 越巫, was

¹ HHS 31, p.2b.

² Hsü Teng came from the prefecture of Min-chung 閩中 in Fukien, and Chao Ping is described as a man from Tung-yang 東陽. Primary commentary to HHS 72B, p.9a says that Tung-yang is the area of Wu-chou 越州 of T'ang, now Kin-hwa 金華 in Chekiang. There was, in fact, no Tung-yang prefecture in the Later Han commandery of K'uai-chi, but a Tung-yang commandery was set up in the reign of Sun Hao of Wu, and despite the anachronism, the Hou Han shu appears to refer to this region.
the art of putting spells on people, animals, plants and things, and either preventing them from moving or bringing them to life. Thus, in a test of their powers, Hsü Teng stopped a river from flowing and Chao Ping made a dead tree send forth shoots (HHS 72B, p. 9a). In K'uai-chi in 53 A.D., the Grand Administrator Ti-wu Lun put an end to a custom of sacrificing plough-oxen; the Wu who supervised this cult had taught the people that if they failed to kill their oxen, they themselves would bellow like an ox and die.¹

This general acceptance of superstitions and supernatural teachings was still apparent at the end of the Later Han and in the time of the Wu state. In 132, the Yao-tse heretic rebel Chang Ho ravaged forty-nine prefectures in Yang province, and between 172 and 174, the Yao-tse Hsü Shao was active in K'uai-chi.² About 200 A.D., the Taoist teacher Yü Chi, a man from Lang-yeh, travelled to the south of the Yangtse and gained a great popular following there. According to the Chiang-piao chuan, there was one occasion that Sun Ts'e held an assembly of his officers and Yü Chi happened to walk past the tower where they were gathered; two-thirds of Ts'e's company left his meeting to greet Yü Chi. Ts'e was naturally somewhat jealous, and he killed Yü Chi.³

Sun Chüan had a more successful encounter with a certain Wang Piao, who was a spiritual being (shen) of Lo-yang prefecture in eastern K'uai-chi, and who was invited to the court and

¹ HHS 31, p. 2b.
² HHS annals 6, p. 6b; and for example, HHS 48, p. 13b to 14a.
³ SKWu 1, p. 15a PC.
given a seal as a king in the year 251. This award may have been intended to encourage the people of that region by showing recognition of their beliefs, and it is evidence of a continuing tradition of wonderful men and magical signs, which seems to have affected Chinese and barbarians alike, in this region of the southeast.

Between 2 A.D. and 140 A.D., the territory south of the mouth of the Yangtse had gained in population, but not to such an extent as the commanderies of the middle Yangtse. The registered population of K'uai-chi and Tan-yang under the Former Han had been 1,437,775 individuals, under the Later Han, the same area had a population of 1,822,523. The Former Han commandery of K'uai-chi had been divided in 129 to form two commanderies, K'uai-chi in the south and Wu in the north, but the only new prefecture to be set up was Yung-ning, which was raised from a hsiang district to prefectural status in 138. In Tan-yang commandery, although the population had increased by a third, one prefecture was done away with and no new ones were set up.

These southeastern commanderies had not been greatly affected by the migrations from the northwest, and the new settlers that did move in from the north had not caused any great expansion of the borders between the Chinese and the barbarians. The region, in fact, remained relatively peaceful throughout the first century and a half of the Later Han. Pirate raids in K'uai-chi had been important enough

---

1 SKNu 2, p. 33b to 34a.
to be recorded in the imperial annals for 132 A.D., and there had been a rebellion in Tan-yang in 145, but the first sign of real trouble to come appeared in 169, when a people called shan-yüeh besieged the Grand Administrator of Tan-yang. This is the first record of the shan-yüeh, and on this occasion they were soon defeated and driven back. But in later years, when the Sun family ruled in Wu, these hills people became major enemies.

The commentary of Hu San-hsing to Tzu-chih t'ung-chien explains simply enough that these shan-yüeh were Yüeh tribes, who had retired to the hills to avoid the imperial government, who began at this time to attack the commanderies and prefectures, and who were later conquered by the Wu state and made into soldiers. However, although these non-Chinese people of the hills were called Yüeh, the description was a very loose one. Just as man was a general term for the non-Chinese people of the south, so it seems that yüeh referred to the people of the mountains and sea-board of the south and southeast coast. Aurousseau, in his article on 'Le première conquête chinoise des pays annamites', has suggested (pp. 245 to 264) that when the Warring States kingdom of Yüeh had been destroyed by Ch'ü, the people of that state made a great emigration to the south and became the founders of the

---

1 HHS annals 6, p.6a and p.15b.
2 HHS annals 8, p.2b.
3 TCTC p. 1817.
later states Tung-ou, Tung-yüeh, Nan-yüeh and the various petty tribal groups of the south which were known as the Hundred Yueh 百越. His suggestion, of a mass movement of a unified people, seems to postulate a greater degree of political and social coherence than we might expect to find from a semi-barbarian state on the outskirts of Chinese civilisation in the fourth century B.C. It seems easier to believe that the common nomenclature of the coastal peoples derives partly from the lack of precision in Chinese texts when dealing with non-Chinese peoples and partly from the natural affinity among the peoples of the southern seaboard. We know that in these times there was trade along the southeast coast and that ships sailed to Indo-China and to the islands of the south; some cultural similarity and some movement of people might be expected from this sea-faring life and from this common traffic. The concept of the Yueh people is based on Chinese terminology and it is doubtful if the tribes themselves were ever greatly influenced by a sense of racial identity.

During the end of Later Han and the first half of the third century, the shan-yüeh were active in the commanderies of K'uai-chi, Wu, Tan-yang and Yü-chang, and also in the region of present-day Fukien, south of the main territory of K'uai-chi commandery and east of Yü-chang, where new prefectures were being set up by the rulers of Wu. The shan-yüeh, in fact, were generally on the defensive against the armies of the Sun family, and expeditions were sent out by the Wu state to capture
fighting men as forced recruits for the army. It seems quite likely that the shan-yüeh were also on the defensive even in the earlier years, under the Later Han, and their raids were primarily attempts to drive back an increasing pressure of Chinese settlement. The description shan-yüeh (sometimes shan-min 山民 'hills people' or possibly shan-tse 山賊 'hills bandits') is at this time only a general term for the aboriginal people in the hill country of the southeast, from Hwang Shan south to the mountains of Fukien, and the warfare between the Chinese and the shan-yüeh does not appear to be an organised conflict with a non-Chinese people, but rather a series of skirmishes between the various barbarian tribes and the Chinese forces that were pressing into their land.

Within the Chinese community itself, there were local alliances and family groups. The importance of the clan relationships and of the great families in the time of the Later Han has been often discussed and described in other places, and the effect of the various personal and family connections on the politics of the imperial capital will be

1 See, for example, SKWu 13, p.1b, where Lu Hsün 魯迅 offered advice on such a program, and shortly afterwards led an attack against rebels and shan-yüeh in Tan-yang and gained several tens of thousands of good soldiers. This was some time before 220.

2 For example, Yang Lien-sheng's article 'Tung Han tê hao-tsu'; Bielenstein I, pp.93 to 96; Ho Ch'ang-ch'üan's article 'Kuan-yü tsung-tsü, tsung-pu tê shang-chüeh'.
discussed later. But we may notice first of all that the local administration of the empire was not designed to maintain a close and tight government of the people by means of officials appointed from the capital. Under the Later Han, the Prefects or Chiefs, Assistants and Commandants of each prefecture were appointed by the court, but all the lower officers of the civil and military administration were recruited from among the people of the prefecture itself, and all the chiefs of the districts hsiang and communes t'ing were appointed or recognised by the commandery or prefectural administrations.

Thus, in a commandery such as K'uai-chi in 140 A.D., the average population of the fourteen prefectures was a little under thirty-five thousand individuals, and it is clear that the three imperial officials appointed to be in charge of each of these prefectures must have been compelled to leave a great part of the day-to-day administration to the local leaders and to their own locally-recruited staff. So long as the administration ran smoothly, the imperial government would have no cause to make a detailed investigation of the local situation, and in this way, in normal times, the effective government of each prefecture was left largely to the established leaders of the people themselves. Within the loose framework of the imperial local administration, local groups and family alliances could be formed

---

1 See below, in the chapter: 'The Government of Later Han in the Second Century A.D.', pp.103 ff.

2 HHS treatise 28, p. 7bff.
without interference, so long as they did not cause a disturbance of the peace.

Leadership in local politics depended primarily on wealth. The great landed families in a subsistence economy could bind their tenants to their interests by rent and usury, they could hire retainers, and they could afford the luxury of education. The members of the most powerful families could expect to be recommended for the imperial service by the officials in charge of the commandery or of the province; those with less influence could take service among the police or clerical offices of the local administrations and could gain notice and recommendation there. Positions on the local staff gave an opportunity to influence the centrally-appointed officials, and service in the imperial bureaucracy itself gave prestige to the whole family and enabled it to deal on equal terms with the imperial magistrate in control of the district; any magistrate would be careful in his dealings with men whose relatives might at some time hold jurisdiction over his own native place and people. Thus the Lu clan of Wu prefecture in Wu commandery had been one of the leading families in the region for generations, and had produced several imperial officials. Members of the Hsü family of Yang-hsien prefecture in Wu commandery had been recommended for office since the time of Grand Administrator Ti-wu Lun in the reign of Kuang-wu,

1 SKWu 13, p. 1a and PC.
and Hsü Yu became Grand Commandant in 181; and in Lu-chiang, the Chou family of Shu prefecture had supplied many imperial officials, including two Grand Commandants.

Great official families such as these, and those clans which held authority in their own districts through wealth or groups of retainers or official positions in the local government, could all hope to maintain their position in time of disorder. With their forces of dependants and their alliances they could often establish their own petty governments, and although they could seldom withstand the attack of a professional army, they could expect to come to terms with any war-lord and to take part in any local administration that

1 HHS annals 8, p. 9b and HHS 66, pp. 9bff. When Sun Ts'e was south of the Yangtse, about 200, he killed a certain Hsü Kung, who had been Grand Administrator of Wu commandery, and later Ts'e was fatally wounded by Hsü's retainers (SKWu 1, p.15b and PC.). It seems possible that Hsü Kung was a member of this great clan of Yang-hsien.

2 HHS annals 7, p. 14a and HHS annals 9, p. 4a; SKWu 9, p. 1a and PC.
was set up. However, in the troubles at the end of the Later Han, when the Yellow Turbans disrupted communications and government, and when the chaos at the capital had isolated the court from the provinces, the poorest people also felt the need for protection. Some of them became dependants of the greater families, some of them formed associations for their own defence. In times such as these, many groups of Chinese took refuge from the dangers of the empire among the marsh-lands or the hill country of the borders. In Yü-chang commandery, about 198, the people living near the Poyang Lake threw off the imperial authority and set up chiefs of their own.

---

1 Thus the Chou family were friends and allies of the Sun, and the Lu clan joined them later; it seems that the Hsü family had attempted to take position as Grand Administrator in Wu commandery (see the earlier note). Besides these, in the years of disorder Chiao Chiao of K'uai-chi, a man of a powerful local family (hao-tsu 豪族), controlled a tract of country with his retainers (SKWu 7, 18b and PC), and about 198 T'ung Chih of Tan-yang was able to usurp power in Lu-ling in Yü-chang. (SKWu 4, p. 8a PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.)

2 SKWu 4, p. 8a PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.
In Tan-yang, the leader of clanspeople (tsung-shuai) Tsu Lang controlled a force in Ling-yang prefecture, near Shihtai, north of Hwang Shan, and he had the shan-yüeh for allies.  

During this time, at the end of the reign of Emperor Ling and the beginning of the reign of Emperor Hsien, the distinctions between barbarians and Chinese become very hard to determine. Many of the Chinese subjects of the empire were leaving settled territory to form communities for refuge in the hills, others collected in groups for mutual protection or became dependants of a major family; and amidst this confusion, the various tribes of shan-yüeh were simply other groups, enemies or allies, which had to be reckoned with. The barbarians and the different groups of Chinese could support one another in raids or disperse to protect their settlements, and whether these gangs were described as rebels or barbarians or clansmen depended almost as much on the political views of the chronicler as it

1 SKWu 6, p. 8a PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.

2 In Yen prefecture in K'uai-chi (near Chenghsien in Chekiang) the shan-yüeh were acknowledged supporters of the Ssu family (SKWu 15, p.1a), and when T'ai-shih Tz'u 太史慈 took the title of Grand Administrator of Tan-yang and fought Sun Ts'e from a base at Ching prefecture (south of Suancheng in Anhwei) the shan-yüeh were his major allies (SKWu 4, p.7a.).
did on the realities and the loyalties of the people who were fighting.

When Sun Ts'en crossed the Yangtse in 195, the lands he was entering had been cut off from the imperial government for some years, and the people had separated into groups for self-defence. There were refugees from the north, and there were barbarians and bandits in the hills, and there were rival administrators in the commanderies and prefectures. But the small army that he led was the most effective fighting force south of the mouth of the Yangtse, and Sun Ts'en was to show himself one of the most remarkable military commanders of his age.
SKETCH MAP OF THE PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE LATER HAN DYNASTY.
II.  THE GOVERNMENT OF LATER HAN IN THE
     SECOND CENTURY A.D.
The Accession of the Emperor, and the Family of the Empress-dowager:

Liu Hung 刘宏, Emperor Hsiao-ling 孝灵 of the Later Han, was born in 157 and came to the throne in 168. He was a great-great-grandson of Emperor Chang, who had reigned from 76 to 89. Chang's son Liu K'ai 開 had been made King of Ho-chien 河間, and Hung's family, descended from a younger son of K'ai, had been granted a petty fief as Marquis of Chieh-tu t'ing 解都亭. Emperor Huan, who reigned from 147 to 167, had left no children, and his widowed Empress née Tou 薇 took power with her family and arranged the succession of Liu Hung.

This appointment to the imperial throne of a child from a cadet line of the imperial Liu family had been decided by the imperial relatives by marriage within the private apartments of the palace. Such a method of determining the succession had been established by custom, but it was a major problem of the Later Han dynasty and it was one of the first causes of the eventual collapse of the central

1 Under the Han, it was customary for the emperors to be given the prefix hsiao 'filial' to their posthumous title. Emperor Kuang-wu, the founder of the Later Han dynasty, did not have this prefix, but it was given to his successors. Thus Hsiao-ling was the full posthumous name of the Emperor, but he is generally known as Emperor Ling.
government. The events which followed the accession of Emperor Ling were one more stage in a progress of precedent and political crisis which had been developing for generations earlier.

According to tradition received from the Former Han, each emperor, during his reign, named one of his sons as the heir-apparent 太子 t'ai-tzu, and appointed one of his harem ladies, frequently the mother of the heir-apparent, as empress 皇后 huang-hou. When the emperor died, the heir-apparent succeeded him and the former empress was given the title of empress-dowager 皇太后 huang-t'ai-hou. In a time of interregnum, the empress-dowager could hold court and take part in the government of the empire; and if the new emperor was under age, the empress-dowager held joint court with him and acted as regent.1

1 The authority of the empress-dowager at any time of interregnum had been recognised most clearly when Emperor Hsuan of Former Han was set on the throne in 74 B.C. by a decision of the Empress-dowager née Shang-kuan 上官, acting on a memorial of Ho Kuang 霍光. See, for example, Dubs II, pp.181 to 183 and 204.

According to the 蜃氏 of Ts'ai Yung 蔡邕 of the second century A.D., quoted in the commentary to TCTC p.1513, when an emperor came to the throne as a minor, the empress-dowager acted as a regent (she-cheng 摄政), which was the phrase used to describe the Duke of Chou, see Couvreur, Mémoires sur les bienséances et les cérémonies, I, p.475). The empress-dowager and the young emperor held court together, with the emperor facing east and the empress-dowager facing west, and when memorials were sent in, two copies were made, one for the emperor and one for the empress-dowager.
During Later Han, Emperor Ho came to the throne in 88 A.D. as Heir-apparent of Emperor Chang, and at that time he was 10 years old by Chinese reckoning. He was the son of the Honoured Lady (貴人 kuei-jen) née Liang 梁, but Chang's Empress née Tou 母 had eliminated the Lady Liang and had adopted the child as her own son and arranged for him to be named Heir-apparent. When Ho came to the throne, the Empress-dowager controlled the government with the aid of her own relatives; but in 92 the young Emperor destroyed the Tou clan and took the power for himself.

In 105, Emperor Ho died at the age of 27. A lady of the Teng 鄴 family had been established as his Empress, but no Heir-apparent had been named. Emperor Ho had several children, but many had died in infancy, and since it was feared that some evil threatened them in the palace, the last two sons to be born had been secretly sent from the court to be brought up in commoners' families. The Empress knew of this arrangement, but the ministers of the court did not. As a result, when the Emperor died, only his Empress could arrange for the succession. She brought the two children back to the palace, and set the younger one, three months old, on the throne. The elder

---

1 Future references to ages will all be given in Chinese terms unless indicated otherwise. By the Chinese system, a child is considered age one sui 岁 when he is born, and thereafter one sui is added to his age at each new year. Thus Emperor Ho was born in 79 A.D., and his age at the time of his accession would be either eight or nine years by western reckoning.
son, Liu Sheng, was announced to be suffering from an incurable disease and so was disqualified. In the next year, the young Emperor, Shang, died; Liu Sheng was again passed over, and Hu, the son of the King of Ch'ing-ho, Liu Ch'ing, was made Emperor. At that time Hu was 13.

Thus by the beginning of the second century A.D., the position of the imperial relatives by marriage in time of succession and minority of the emperor had been well established. The Tou family had controlled the government in the early years of Emperor Ho, and the Empress-dowager née Teng had chosen two emperors in succession and had then maintained an active interest in the government for fifteen years. The Lady Teng, in particular, had established a precedent in the arrangements for succession to the throne which was to stand without challenge for the next four generations. Firstly, it was she, and not the imperial ministers, who had known of the existence of the two legitimate children of Emperor Ho, it was she who had recovered them. Secondly, when the succession to the throne was decided after the death of Emperor Shang, the Empress-dowager took council within the harem apartments with her own relatives ting-t's'e chin-chung, and when Liu Hu was set upon the throne, it was the Empress-dowager who maintained the court and controlled the ceremony, while the officials only looked on p'ei-wei and took no initiative. ¹

¹ HHS annals 5, p.1b.
It must be acknowledged that the Lady Teng appears to have tried to carry out her responsibilities with honour. There was some suspicion that the illness of Liu Sheng was not really so serious as to justify his exclusion from the succession; but Sheng died as King of P'ing-yüan in 113, and he left no heirs. And once the two sons of Emperor Ho had been eliminated, the choice of Liu Hu had much to recommend it. His father Ch'ing was the son of Emperor Chang and the brother of Emperor Ho, and at one time Ch'ing had actually been named Chang's Heir-apparent until he had been degraded through the intrigues of the Empress née Tou. Ch'ing himself died in 106, and it is possible that his end was known to be near when the choice for the successor to the throne was made. By choosing his son, the Lady Teng was restoring a line of succession which had been accepted at least for a short time by Emperor Chang.

Although Liu Hu, Emperor An, attained his formal majority within three years of his accession, the Empress-dowager née Teng did not relinquish her interest in the government. It is said that she had been particularly impressed by the promise shown by the Emperor as a child, but as he grew older he proved a disappointment. At the time of her death in 121, the Lady Teng had invited the sons of other kings to visit the capital, and it was believed that she was planning to dethrone the Emperor. ¹

¹ HHS 6, p.14a, HHS annals 10A, p.21a.
Emperor An was told of this by his eunuchs and his palace women; he ordered his officials to draw up impeachments against the members of the Teng family, and within a few months of the death of the Lady Teng, the power of her clan had been destroyed. Although members of the Teng clan had taken high military posts and enfeoffments, they were expelled from power with little difficulty; which may be regarded as a tribute to their modesty in time of prosperity. The hegemony of the Teng clan had rested to a great extent on the personal authority of the Empress-dowager, and it does not seem that her relatives greatly abused their position. But the rule of the Teng clan was to form a precedent for the future.

In the same year that the Lady Teng died, Emperor An took as his Empress a woman of the Yen family. Four years later, in 125, Emperor An was dead, at the age of 32, leaving one son age 11. This boy, Liu Pao, had been Heir-apparent, but had been deprived of the title in the previous year, and now the Empress-dowager née Yen, with a party of eunuchs and members of her own family, was able to arrange the succession as she wished. There was no Heir-apparent at the time, and the Lady Yen chose Liu Yi, a son of the King of Chi-pei and a grandson of Emperor Chang, to succeed to the throne. Everything was arranged within the harem apartments, and the ministers of the court had no authority to intervene; members of the Yen family were granted high military posts at the capital.

In the tenth month of that year, the Emperor had been taken ill and was dead. The Yen party attempted to conceal his death and to
select another candidate; but at this moment a rival party was formed among the eunuchs of the palace. They killed the eunuch allies of the Lady Yen, they destroyed the Yen clan, and they set Liu Pao, Emperor Shun, on the throne. Once before, in the time of Emperor Ho, the eunuchs had taken part in a coup, as allies of the Emperor, but now they had determined who the Emperor was to be.

In 132 the Honoured Lady of the Liang 梁 clan was made the Empress of Emperor Shun. When she first entered the palace as a concubine, her father, Liang Shang 梁商, had been made colonel of one was of the five regiments of the Northern Army; he now made Bearer of the Golden Mace, a post with authority over the imperial police in the capital and which entailed occasional command of the whole Northern Army, and in 135, Shang became General-in-Chief. Emperor Shun showered the family with favours, but Liang Shang accepted them with a due show of reluctance, used his power with care, and urged his relatives to restraint. In 141, Shang died, and his son Chi 楚 succeeded as head of the family to the post of General-in-Chief and to the other particular honours. Three years later, Emperor Shun was dead.

The hegemony of the Liang clan, under the leadership of Liang Chi, represented the culmination of the development of the power of the imperial relatives by marriage. Emperor Shun was 30 when he died, and his only son, who had been named Heir-apparent, was 2 sui when he ascended the throne. In the first month of the next year the child died. It was now open to the Empress-dowager née Liang, continuing

---

1 On the Northern Army, see below p.111.
to act as regent, to choose an heir to the imperial line, and she took council with Liang Chi within the harem apartments. The Grand Commandant Li Ku 李固, the head of the imperial bureaucracy, who had been a protegé of Liang Shang, suggested to Chi that he should emulate Chou Po 周勃 and Ho Kuang of the Former Han dynasty, who had set Emperors Wen and Huan on the throne, and that he should avoid the example of the Teng clan and the Yen family, who had chosen to appoint minors in order to gain the advantages of a regency. In fact, Li Ku's candidate, the King of Ch'ing-ho, Liu Suan 刘 sonic , who was a great-great-grandson of Emperor Chang, was over twenty years old and was known as a man of good character.¹ But the Empress-dowager and Liang Chi chose Liu Tsuan 刘传 , the son of the King of Po-hai and another great-great-grandson of Emperor Chang; when Tsuan ascended the throne he was aged eight sui.

Less than a year later Liu Tsuan, Emperor Chih, was dead. It is said that Liang Chi over-heard the Emperor speak of him as an 'over-bearing general' (跋扈將軍 p'o-hu chiang-chün), and so he had poison put in the child's food.

For the third in their series of puppet emperors, the Liang family chose Liu Chih 刘志, a great-grandson of Emperor Chang and descended from Chang's son K'ai 偃, who had been enfeoffed as King of Ho-chien. The three dukes, the highest ministers of the court, had asked that Liu Suan should be chosen, but the Liang family ignored their request; the following year, in 147, there was a minor revolt in Ch'ing-ho whose leaders claimed to support Liu Suan. Liang

¹ HHS 45, p.6a.
² HHS 24, p.10b.
Chi took this excuse to have Li Ku arrested and die in prison, and he arranged for Liu Suan to commit suicide.

For the next twelve years the Liang family ruled in China. In 147, a woman of the Liang clan was named Empress, and although the Emperor took the cap of manhood in 148, the Empress-dowager née Liang continued to take part in the government until the last year of her life. When she died in 150, the new Empress held authority in the palace and Liang Chi had command of the troops outside. Against such a combination the young Emperor was virtually powerless, and the authority of the imperial relatives by marriage made the whole empire tremble.

The Liang clan, as we have seen, had appointed three emperors and had certainly killed one of them; and in 147 they had executed Li Ku and another former Grand Commandant, Tu Ch'iao. If the leaders of the officials could be treated like this, it was clear that the bureaucracy at the capital was also helpless against the Liang. Moreover, since that family was in effective control of the government, the imperial officials were compelled to work with it, to hold office under it, and to keep the administration going. There were many men prepared to accept office under these conditions.

---

1 HHS 68, p.9b
2 HHS 53, p.16a.
The Hegemony of the Imperial Relatives by Marriage:

It is sometimes suggested the imperial relatives by marriage were generally families who had only recently come to any wealth or power. But a discussion of their history may show that in fact these 'outside clans' (外戚 wai-ch'i) had very often obtained influence and prosperity many years before they obtained their imperial connection and their authority in the capital. In most cases, the strength of the position of the family of the empress or the empress-dowager lay in the combination of imperial favour and independent power.

The Empress nee Tou of Emperor Chang was a descendant of the powerful Tou Jung 螢, who had ruled the northwest as a war-lord in the beginning of the Later Han, and the family had been powerful in the lands about Ch'ang-an for generations before; during the Former Han, the Empress of Emperor Wen had been a woman of this clan. Tou Jung had allied himself with Emperor Kuang-wu in 29 A.D., he had become one of Kuang-wu's most valuable supporters, and he had risen to the post of Minister of Works, one of the three ducal offices.

---

1 See, for example, Balazs, 'La crise sociale et la philosophie politique à la fin des Han', p.84, where he describes these families as 'parvenu'; and also Yang Lien-sheng, who speaks of them as 偉進 (Tung Han te hao-tsu, p.1042).
The Tou family continued to hold high positions in the capital under Emperor Ming, and although the father and grand-father of Chang's Empress were later disgraced and ordered back to their own commandery, there were other members of the family who continued to hold office, and it had not proved difficult to restore the prestige and the authority of the clan.

Similarly, the Empress nee Teng of Emperor Ho was a grandson of Teng Yü, member of a great gentry clan of Nan-yang who had been one of Kuang-wu's earliest supporters, had been Grand Minister over the Masses under Kuang-wu and had later held the high honorary appointment of Grand Tutor to Emperor Ming. Another member of the clan, Teng Piao, was Grand Commandant under Emperor Chang and Grand Tutor to Emperor Ho; and the father of the Empress, Teng Hsün, had held high military command on the borders against the Ch'iang barbarians.

The Yen clan, which made a short-lived attempt to establish hegemony after the death of Emperor An, was less powerful and less illustrious than the Tou and the Teng. The Empress nee Yen was a woman of Ho-nan commandery, and her grandfather Chang had held an appointment in the imperial secretariat and had seen two of his sisters enter the harem as Honoured Ladies. On account of this,

---

1 HHS annals 10A, p.12b, HHS 13, pp.9aff and 11bff.

2 HHS annals 10A, p.14a; HHS 6 passim; HHS 34, pp.1a & 1b.
Chang had been given appointment as colonel of one of the regiments of the Northern Army, but had no further official career. His son, Ch'ang, also became a colonel and was enfeoffed as a marquis, but he owed his advancement to his daughter's position as Empress. After Ch'ang's death, his son Hsien, the brother of the Empress, became head of the family, and with the favour of Emperor An, the Empress's relatives were granted military and civil posts, marquisates and titles in the court and they allied themselves with a group of eunuchs in the harem. The Yen family also came to an understanding with Keng Pao, who was the maternal uncle of Emperor An, who became General-in-Chief in 124, who was the head of one of the great clans of the empire, and whose ancestors had been major supporters of Emperor Kuang-wu. Under Emperor An, this group of eunuchs and relatives were able to destroy the Grand Commandant Yang Chen and later persuade the Emperor to dismiss his own son from the inheritance. After the death of the Emperor, the Empress concealed his death until she was prepared to set her own nominee on the throne, and during the next year, the Yen family and their eunuch allies destroyed the Keng family, drove Keng Pao to commit suicide, and exiled his followers and dependants to the southern borders of the empire.

---

1 Bielenstein I, pp.33-35.
Throughout the hegemony of the Yen family, the imperial officials had played no great part. The court had mourned Yang Chen and some of the ministers had protested when the Heir-apparent was dismissed, but despite the lack of prestige of the Yen clan itself, their authority as imperial relatives by marriage had been effectively unchallenged. It was only when the Emperor that they appointed had died, and a rival group among the eunuchs was able to destroy the Empress's allies, that the Yen family was isolated and destroyed. The titles and posts held by Yen Hsien and his relatives proved worthless when they attempted to gain support against Emperor Shun and the eunuchs who had set him on the throne.  

Liang Chi, who controlled the government of Emperor Huan from the time of his accession, also came from a great family. His great-great-grandfather Liang T'ung had been a Grand Administrator of Wu-wei and an ally of Kuang-wu against the war-lord Wei Ao. The family had been established in the northwest since the time of the Former Han, and under the Later Han its members had continued to hold posts in the imperial government. In the time of Emperor Chang, an Honoured Lady of the Liang clan had given birth to the future Emperor Ho, but she had been driven out by the Empress née Tou; when Emperor Shun was to choose his Empress from among his four Honoured Ladies, he was urged to select the Lady Liang, both because of her predecessor, and also because she came from a great clan.  

---

1 HHS annals 10B, pp. 1a to 2b; HHS 68, pp. 6a and 6b.

2 HHS annals 10B, p. 3b and HHS 34, pp. 8a and 8b.
The power of the Liang clan lay both in their position as imperial relatives by marriage and also in their position as one of the great clans of the empire. The Tou and the Teng clans had established the precedents which gave Liang Chi the opportunity to appoint Emperors as he chose and to use the authority of the Empress-dowager to manage the affairs of the empire as a regent. Moreover, the traditional authority of the clan, both in the provinces and in the administration at the capital, made it possible to gather a retinue of followers, dependants, men who had served under members of the clan, and men who had been nominated for office by members of the clan. This network of authority and alliance and dependance had maintained the power of the Liang family before their connection with the imperial house, and now it also maintained their position in the bureaucracy outside the palace.

Yang Lien-sheng, in his article on the 'Great Families of Eastern Han', has described the relationships of alliance and patronage among the great clans, both in the capital and in the provinces. The formation of these alliances was given great political effect by the workings of the system of selecting officials for the imperial bureaucracy. In an earlier discussion, on the position of the powerful clans in the provinces,¹ it was noted that the junior officers of the provinces and commanderies and prefectures were chosen from members of the leading

¹ See above in 'South China under the Later Han dynasty,' p.83.
families in the local community, and that recommendations for official posts in the imperial bureaucracy were generally given to members of these leading families, sometimes after a period of duty as a local officer, sometimes without any such preliminary service. In every year, the commandery administrations were required to recommend one, two or more men for commission in the imperial bureaucracy, depending on the population of the commandery; each of the provincial offices was required to recommend one man each year. Certain officials of high rank were granted the right to have one or more of their junior relatives commissioned, and men who gained a post in the offices 貞 fu of the one of the three dukes or of the General-in-Chief at the capital might be promoted to commissioned rank. These were the chief accepted routes of entry into the civil service.

With the obvious exception of the inherited rights to commission, the other three routes of entry, commandery recommendation, provincial recommendation and promotion in the offices at the capital, were all arranged through personal nominations. As soon as a man was appointed by one of the three dukes or was recommended by the Inspector of a province, his entry into the civil service was effective and he could be appointed to substantive office. The commandery recommendation, called hsiao-lien 虔 'Filially Pious and Incorrupt', was responsible for the immense majority of candidates for office, some two hundred every year. This gave the candidate entry into the corps of Gentlemen 賢 at the imperial palace, and after a short
probationary period he was eligible for an administrative post. In fact, for most of the Later Han dynasty, the system of probation was a formality, and the recommendation as a hsiao-lien gave effective entry into the civil service.

As a result, although a hsiao-lien candidacy was designed in theory as a formal recognition of a broad consensus of opinion about a man's worth in his own country, and the post as a Gentleman was planned to give the Emperor and his administration the opportunity to judge the quality of the candidate on his performance of minor ceremonial duties at the court itself, in practice each official gained his appointment through the personal nomination of another. It was only natural that the successful candidate should feel himself in some way bound by a sense of gratitude and duty to his patron. In this way, any great officer would have men in the bureaucracy who were linked to him either because they had served under him at some time in the course of their careers (ku-li 'former officers') or had received recommendation from him.

---

1 See my article on Recruitment.

2 The traditional phrase was hsiang-chü li-hsüan 'recommended by his district and chosen in his hamlet'.

3 The term men-sheng 'student' referred originally to the disciples of a teacher; later, it could be a general term for those who had received some favour from a patron, such as recommendation for office, or it could even be used of those who were prepared to call themselves clients of a great man in the hope that he might grant them appointments in the future.
While the patron decided whom he would promote or nominate for office, his protégé also had to choose whether he would accept the favour and the personal responsibility that it entailed. A man who was recommended for office was always entitled to refuse, and a man who held an appointment could always leave his office and quit the service on convenient grounds of sickness or family affairs. By the second century of the Later Han, it was customary that if a man felt he did not want to become attached to the high official who nominated him for office, or if he felt that his superior in the service was unsuitable (fei ch'i-jen 非其人) he was bound by his honour to refuse the nomination or to leave the office.¹

The effect of this welter of personal loyalties and family relationships must have lessened the value of the bureaucracy to the emperor himself. If a man's acceptance or rejection of official posts depended on his opinion of his superiors and not on his ambitions for the service, then the bureaucracy was ceasing to be a machine for government and was becoming merely an extension of the power of the great families of the empire.

¹ In this way, for example, Chang Chien 張儉 of Shan-yang refused nomination by the Inspector of Yen province because the Inspector fei ch'i-jen (HHS 57, p.18b); and Tsung Tz'u 唐詠 of Nan-yang was recommended as hsiao-lien and offered appointment in the offices of the dukes again and again but he would not accept them. When he did become Prefect of Hsiu-wu 修武 in Ho-nei, he left his office because he disapproved of the Grand Administrator of the commandery. He was admired by all the gentlemen of Nan-yang for his sense of honour (HHS 57, p.14a).
Besides this, since the reign of Kuang-wu, the emperors of the Later Han dynasty had tended to keep power in their own hands, and they had used the imperial secretariat, shang-shu 尚書 or the Office of the Masters of Writing, to transmit their orders. This policy had begun in the time of Emperor Wu of the Former Han, but it was continued and encouraged under Emperor Kuang-wu and his successors. The three dukes became titular figureheads and the shang-shu became the effective source of imperial authority; a minister needed to have the right 'to take part in the affairs of the shang-shu' 錄尚書事 lu shang-shu shih in order to exercise any effective power in the government. 

As a result of this policy, the imperial bureaucracy was effectively deprived of its leadership, and the emperors cut themselves off from the imperial administration outside the palace. The Later Han commentator Chung-ch'ang T'ung explained that Kuang-wu had increased the centralisation of power in order to avoid the weakness shown by the last rulers of Former Han and to prevent his powerful ministers gaining independent power for themselves. 

---

1 See, for example, Dubs II, pp. 10 and 11.

2 See, for example, Li-tai chih-kuan piao 2, commentary.

3 Ch'ang-yen 評言 in Yü-han shan-fang chi-yi shu 66.
The system was continued under Emperors Ming and Chang, but the beginning of the reign of Emperor Ho first showed the danger; by emphasising the total authority of the emperor, the centralised system made it possible for the minister who controlled the emperor's person to take command of the whole of the imperial government.

From the time of Emperor Ho, not one of the successors to the imperial throne of the Later Han was more than fifteen years old at his accession, and not one of them lived to be older than thirty-six. Every reign, as we have seen, began with a regency under the control of the imperial relatives by marriage, and in every case the power of these relatives was finally overthrown by a coup d'état. This had, in fact, become a government by coup d'état; and the regular bureaucracy proved quite unable to influence the course of these major political changes.

This impotence of the formal leaders of the administration had arisen largely because of the impossibility of effective communication. Although the highest ministers at the beginning of each reign were given the title lu shang-shu shih 錄尚書事 and so had the right to take effective part in the government, the executive control of the state was administered through the shang-shu offices at the palace, and the young emperors had no natural way to seek the advice or the support of their ministers in the bureaucracy outside. By the end of the first century all authority was concentrated in the person of the emperor and in his seal and credentials; by their control of the person of the emperor, the imperial relatives by marriage were able to control
the empire, and because they had no direct access to the emperor, the outside ministers were powerless.

In manoeuvres for power in the capital, the members of the imperial family played a very passive role. It was the custom of the Later Han that those sons of an emperor who did not succeed to the throne were given fiefs and sent out to the provinces. The system removed rivals to the chosen emperor and kept the potential figureheads of rebellion at a safe distance from the capital. The kings and marquises of the Liu clan were practically powerless; their fiefs were administered for them, and they themselves were spied upon, by officials sent out by the central government. They were kept in exile in their states and separated from any group of supporters at the court. As a result of this system, the emperor seldom needed to fear the rivalry of his brothers or his cousins; but the scheme designed to make the emperor secure on his throne removed all power from the imperial clan as a whole. When any member of the imperial family played any part in politics, it was only as a pawn in the struggle for power between one faction or another. Thus the Empress-dowager née Teng had arranged for Liu Hu, the future Emperor An, to stay in lodgings at Lo-yang when she favoured him for the succession, and at the end of her life, when she appeared to be contemplating his removal from the throne, she had called other possible successors to Lo-yang in order that she might make her decision. In the same way, the Empress-dowager née Yen and the Empress-dowager née Liang were each able to take their pick of the available scions of the imperial line. At the beginning of the reign of Emperor Huan, when Liu Suan
was the candidate of Li Ku and the imperial bureaucracy, he could command no effective support in the capital, and when he was made the figurehead of a revolt in Ch'ing-ho he was eliminated without any difficulty. At this time, the available members of the imperial family could be used as a threat against the current emperor, but they were without any power of their own, and they could do nothing to re-establish the authority of their clan.

By 159, twelve years after the accession of Emperor Huan, the power and the prestige of the Liang clan was at its height. Three of the women of the family had been granted the title of Empress,¹ and seven marquisates had been awarded to the men, besides other titles and pensions. Liang Chi and his father had both held the position of General-in-Chief, and members of the family held high posts in the army and in the civil service. Such was their dominance of the government, that all officials coming to the capital first presented themselves to Liang Chi before they attended the court.²

---

¹ The Empress née Liang of Emperor Shun and the Empress née Liang of Emperor Huan held the title during their life-times; besides these, the Honoured Lady née Liang of Emperor Chang, who was the mother of Emperor Ho but had been destroyed by the Empress née Tou, was granted the title as a posthumous honour in 97 (HHS annals 10A, p.13b.).

² HHS 24, p.13b.
The Emperor, now aged twenty-eight, was effectively supervised within the palace by his Empress née Liang, who was able to watch over the interests of her family and maintain a party of supporters within the private apartments.

Outside the palace, Liang Chi, as General-in-Chief, held the highest military position and had command of the Northern Army (pei-chün 北軍), which was the central strategic reserve of the empire. The Northern Army could be sent to any part of the country or to the borders of the north and west, but it was usually stationed just outside the capital at Lo-yang. The army comprised five regiments, four of cavalry and one of archers, and some of the colonels of these regiments were also members of the Liang family.

Besides this regular military force, Liang Shu 檀, as Commandant of the Palace Guard, was in charge of the force known as the Southern Army (nan-chün 南軍), the guards of the palace gates and those stationed within the palace itself. The capital itself, and the commandery around it, was under the civil authority of the Intendant (yin 巿) of Ho-nan, a post which was held by Chi's son Yin 咸.

In the seventh Chinese month of the year 159, the Empress née Liang died. Her death disrupted the Liang party in the inner palace, and left the Emperor some freedom of movement for the first time in his reign. He took the opportunity to collect supporters of his own and to destroy the Liang clan completely. Eunuchs were the nucleus of his party, and the story has it that the Emperor pretended he was
going to the lavatory, and he spoke to one of the eunuch clerks, T'ang Heng, and asked him which of the attendants had some quarrel with the Liang family. T'ang gave him the names of Shan Ch'ao, Tso Kuan, Hsü Huang, and Chü Yuan. The Emperor called these to him and made a covenant with them against the Liang clan and sealed it by biting Shan Ch'ao's arm until the blood ran.¹

The Hegemony of the Eunuchs:

Certainly, the eunuchs were the only group from which the Emperor could hope for effective support. His potential allies in the civil service were effectively out of reach, and in any case the bureaucracy was dominated by members of the Liang clan and their sympathisers. The soldiers of the Northern Army under the command of Liang Chi and the civil populace of Lo-yang were equally inaccessible. It was true that imperial orders sealed with the imperial seal could cancel the authority of any minister, but there was a very present danger that if the Liang group could get hold of the person of the Emperor they would take the government under their

¹ HHS 24, p.15b and HHS 68, pp.9b and 10a. The sealing of an oath or covenant by the shedding of blood was traditional in ancient China. Li chi, for example, in chapter 1B (ch'ü-lí hsia曲禮下), translated by Couvreur, volume I, p.92, reads; 'Une convention faite entre les princes s'appelle pacte confirmé par le serment; si l'on immole une victime, elle s'appelle pacte solonnel et sacré (約信日誓, 殺牲曰盟).
complete control and they could dispose of him at their leisure. For his personal security, the Emperor could look to the eunuchs who relented on him for their fortune and did not follow the Liang clan, and they in turn were able to arrange the programme for the coup.

On the day ting-ch'ou of the eighth Chinese month (9 September, 159), Liang Chi had some suspicions, and he sent Chang Yün 張愼, one of the Emperor's eunuchs who belonged to his party, to go into the private apartments of the palace and find out what was going on. But although Chang Yün was a eunuch, he was not entitled to enter the imperial harem without permission, and Chü Yuán sent officers to arrest him as a traitor. Then the Emperor summoned the officers of the shang-shu. The Prefect, Yin Hsün 尹勤, armed the gentlemen of his staff and guarded the doors while imperial orders and commissions were drawn up; then the Emperor sent Chü Yuán in command of a force of a thousand men of the palace guards to accompany the Colonel Director of the Retainers, Chang Piao 張彪, and surround Liang Chi's residence. The Superintendant of the Imperial House, Yüan Hsü 袁時, was sent with credentials to take the seal of General-in-Chief from Chi. Liang Chi and his wife committed suicide, and their families were exterminated. The three dukes were dismissed from office for having supported Liang Chi and having failed to protect the Emperor, more than three hundred of the former officers and dependants of the Liang family were expelled from office; and it was said that the court was empty. ¹

¹ HHS 24, p.16a.
Shan Ch'ao died in 160, but Emperor Huan remembered his debt and during the rest of his reign there was a well-matched struggle for control of the imperial government between the eunuchs of the palace and the members of the outside bureaucracy.

As a reward for their help in freeing him from the Liang clan, the Emperor enfeoffed his five eunuch supporters as marquises, and he gave the same title, though with smaller fiefs, to Yin Hsün and others. Later, still more fiefs were granted to the eunuchs and to their relatives, and then a certain Li Yün 李雲 of Kan-ling, who was Prefect of Po-ma 白馬 in Tung commandery, sent in an open memorial to criticise the indiscriminate awards of honours and positions, and suggesting, in rather tactless fashion, that the Emperor was not interested in justice. The Emperor was furious; Li Yün was arrested and imprisoned, and all those who spoke for him were dismissed. One man asked to share whatever penalty was given Li Yün for his loyal words; he was granted his wish and he and Li Yün died in prison together.

1 In his memorial, Li Yün ascribed to Confucius the saying 'An Emperor, that means a Judge' (帝者諦也 ti-che, ti yeh), a phrase which is based on a passage in the apochryphal work Ch'un-ch'iu yün-tou shu 春秋運斗樞, which is quoted, with commentary by Cheng Hsüan 鄭玄 of Later Han, in the primary commentary to HHS 47, pp. 10a and 10b; the Ch'un-ch'iu yün-tou shu is now lost. At the end of his memorial, Li Yün suggested 'This shows that the Emperor does not want to act as a judge' (是帝欲不諦乎 shih ti yü pu ti hu).
The eunuchs, confident of the favour of the Emperor, abused their power. In the capital, they were given titles and wealth; in the provinces, they and their relatives gained an immunity from imperial control and plundered and oppressed their neighbours without restraint. Some relatives of the eunuchs were given posts as Inspectors or Grand Administrators, and they governed their territories with extortion and brutality. As private citizens, the eunuch relatives and their followers acted like robbers and bandits; they would seize other men's property and they would take other men's wives as their concubines. In Shan-yang commandery, the eunuch Hou Lan was able to appropriate more than five hundred and sixty acres and three hundred and eighty houses to make parks and pavilions.  

Hsü Hsüan, the nephew of Huang, became Prefect of Hsia-p'i, and before this he had asked to marry the daughter of Li Hao, a former Grand Administrator of Ju-nan, but he had been refused; now he led the officers and soldiers of the prefecture to Li's house, brought the girl back to the prefectural offices, and amused himself by shooting arrows at her until she was dead.  

Hou Lan's brother Ts'än was made Inspector of Yi province; he governed with cruelty and oppression, and he trumped up charges of treason against the wealthy men of the province in order that their goods would be forfeited to himself.  

---

1 HHS 68, p.12a.
2 HHS 68, pp.10b and 11a.
3 HHS 68, p.12a.
and the history contains other examples of such stupid acts of oppression.

But the power of the eunuchs in the country was opposed with some degree of success by the administrators appointed from the regular bureaucracy. In many of the cases which are recorded, when a eunuch relative went too far, we are told of some retaliatory action taken against him. Thus, of the examples above, Chang Chien, who was a commandery official of Shan-yang, reported to the court against Hou Lan, and when nothing was heard from the capital he destroyed Hou Lan's constructions and confiscated his property. The Chancellor of Tung-hai, Huang Fu, when he heard of the deeds of Hsü Hsüan, arrested Hsüan and his followers and put them to the torture and then publicly executed Hsüan. Hou Ts'an's actions in Yi province were reported to the throne by the Grand Commandant Yang Ping, and Ts'an was arrested and brought to the capital in a cage cart; he committed suicide on the way.

The eunuchs of the court seldom came from a prosperous family. It is doubtful if any group of accepted stature would consent to mutilate their children in this fashion in order to arrange a political career for them. But when the eunuchs rose to favour, their relatives could hope to benefit and the trouble in the provinces to some extent reflected the pressures of this new-rising group against the established privileges of the great local families. It is clear enough that the local officials and the local families were prepared to fight their enemies with or without the approval of the court and
certainly with considerable ferocity. Chang Chien and Huang Fu, cited above, took action without imperial authority. Similarly, T'eng Yen, as Chancellor of Chi-pei, executed more than twenty of Hou Lan's retainers for bullying the people; Ts'en Chih, as a commandery official in Nan-yang under the Grand Administrator Ch'eng Chin, executed a group of merchants who had oppressed the people but who had been connected with the eunuchs and the palace trade and had actually received a pardon from the Emperor. Other officials such as Tu Mi and Liu Yu were known to have kept eunuch relatives under control, whether they were dealing with private groups of retainers or with appointed officials. It may be suggested that although the fortunes of the eunuchs at the capital helped their relatives in their home country to gain wealth and power, this development was restrained to some extent by the opposition of the local families already established. And it might be suspected that, apart from the more spectacular crimes, the oppression and bullying of the new eunuch families differed not very much from the accepted powers and privileges of the great landed families.

In the capital, despite the unfortunate example of Li Yün and his supporters, the power of the eunuchs was opposed by the leaders of the imperial bureaucracy; and the records of misgovernment in the provinces by their relatives were used as a weapon against the eunuchs

---

1 HHS 68, p.11a; HHS 57, p.20a; HHS 57, p.11a; HHS 67, p.12a.
themselves. In 163, after a memorial submitted by the Grand Commandant Yang Ping and the Minister of Works Chou Ching 周景，more than fifty men, including the Inspector of Ch'ing province and the Grand Administrator of Liao-tung, were either executed or were dismissed; and there was a purge in the capital district to eliminate unworthy officials who were relatives of the eunuchs. Two years later, the campaign against the eunuchs gained its greatest success, when the impeachment and arrest and suicide of Hou Ts' an, the Inspector of Yi province, gave the opportunity for a full attack on the eunuchs of the palace themselves.

The success of any move against the eunuchs depended on the support of the Emperor, and this had proved difficult to obtain and hard to rely on. But by 165 three of the five assistants of the Emperor against Liang Chi had died, Tan Ch'ao in 160 and T'ang Heng and Hsü Huang in 164, and Emperor Huan himself may have been influenced by the mounting volume of reports and complaints which reached him concerning the conduct of his favourites' relatives. The disgrace of Hou Ts' an acted as a catalyst, and Yang Ping, the Grand Commandant, took the opportunity to send in a memorial criticising the system of eunuch influence and asking that Hou Lan be dismissed from his offices and sent back to his own commandery. When the memorial reached the imperial secretariat, the clerks of the shang-shu questioned his authority, as an official of the outside bureaucracy, to concern

1 HHS 44, pp.10a and 10b.
himself with affairs of the palace and the Emperor's personal attendants. Yang Ping replied that 'From the precedents of the Han dynasty, there is nothing that the three dukes may not deal with.' This assertion of right, perhaps questionable in view of the practices of recent generations, served its purpose. The memorial was allowed to proceed, the Emperor followed it, and Hou Lan was dismissed. The Colonel Director of the Retainers, Han Yin, was entitled by his office to act as an Inspector in the seven commanderies of the capital province and to report any wrong-doing by any person whether official or private citizen. Inspired by Yang Ping's success, Han Yin now impeached the eunuch Tso Kuan and his elder brother Ch'eng, the Grand Coachman; and both committed suicide. Yin again impeached Chü Yuan; and Yuan was sent to jail and was lowered in fief and then was sent to die in his own home. Those who had been enfeoffed as marquises since the destruction of Liang Chi had their fiefs lowered in value or taken away from them altogether.

At the end of this year, Li Ying became Colonel Director of the Retainers. Chang So, the younger brother of the eunuch Chang Jang, was Prefect of Yeh-wang in Ho-nei commandery. He had governed with cruelty and greed, and he was afraid that Li Ying would have him arrested and impeached, so he fled to the capital and

1 HHS 44, p.12a; TCTC p.1779.
2 HHS 68, p.11a and TCTC p.1779.
took refuge with his brother. But Li Ying brought the officers of his command to force their way into Jang's house, arrested So, had him examined in prison and then killed him. Chang Jang complained to the Emperor that Li Ying had exceeded his authority in entering his house and in killing So out of hand. But when the Emperor heard Li Ying's case, he turned to Chang Jang and said: 'Your brother was at fault, what did the Director of Retainers do wrong?' It is said that from this time the eunuchs did not dare to leave the palace, and when the Emperor asked them why they kowtowed and wept and said: 'We are afraid of Colonel Li.'

Obviously, the Emperor had lost some of his confidence in his eunuch servants and he was prepared to listen to his outside officials in any case that they brought. So the position of the eunuchs had become tenuous, and in the next year, 166, there was a series of attacks against the eunuch families and their allies and dependants in the provinces; and it was at this time that Chang Chien and Ts'en Chih made their reputations as junior officers who were prepared to defy the law in order to attack the eunuchs. The Grand Administrators who had employed Chang and Ts'en and others were imprisoned for disregarding imperial orders, but it appeared that the attacks were likely to continue throughout the empire. The Emperor was under pressure from the three dukes, led by the Grand Commandant Ch'en Fan.

---

1 HHS 57, p.9b: 此误杀之罪,同罪何论.
2 See above, pp.116 and 117.
and from lower officials of the bureaucracy who memorialised in their favour and were prepared to suffer dismissal and disgrace rather than be silent. At this time there was the first accusation of faction.

The First Faction:

Li Ying, the Colonel Director of the Retainers, was at the centre of the affair. It appears that a certain Chang Ch'eng of Ho-nei was able to tell the future, and he guessed that there would be an amnesty, and he had his son go out and kill a personal enemy of his. When the amnesty was published, the son escaped punishment for his crime. But Li Ying came to hear of this, and he arrested Chang Ch'eng and killed him. Chang Ch'eng had been a favourite of the eunuchs, and he had also shown his abilities to the Emperor; now the eunuchs arranged for Chang's nephew to send in a letter which accused Li Ying of seeking favour among the students of the Imperial University, making contacts with men in the provinces, forming a Faction (部黨 pu-tanq), and planning rebellion against the throne.¹ The Emperor accepted the report; he had the men of Faction arrested in the capital and in the provinces. Li Ying and his fellows were taken to the jail of the eunuchs, and the statements extracted from them implicated another two hundred scholars and officials.

¹ HHS 57, p.3b and TCTC p.1794.

² The prison, called 黃門北寺獄 Jail of the Northern Court of the Yellow Gates, had been set up about this time of the eunuch hegemony: TCTC p.1794 and PC.
The men remained in prison until the middle of the next year. At that time, Tou Wu, Colonel of the City Gates and brother of the Empress, together with the Prefect of the Masters of Writing, Ho Hsü, memorialised the Emperor to release them. Moreover, by this time Li Ying and the others had named some of the dependants of the eunuchs as members of their party, and the eunuchs were anxious and advised the Emperor to issue an amnesty. So the men of Faction were set free, but they were barred from holding any official post for the rest of their lives.

This first Faction incident of 166 and 167 had effectively re-established the position of the eunuchs and had discredited their enemies. To some extent, the accusations appear as a purely political move to brand the opponents of the eunuchs as traitors and conspirators; and the very idea of a political association was unacceptable to a Chinese imperial government. The ties of allegiance between ruler and minister should leave no scope for any other relationship in public life. A faction was immediately regarded as a conspiracy, and a conspiracy was inevitably treasonous. Thus the success of the eunuchs' accusations came in part from the fear and distrust which they aroused in the Emperor, quite apart from their accuracy in fact.

---

1 HHS 57, p.3b; HHS 59, p.2b; HHS 57, p.9b.
2 chin-ku chung-shen; HHS 57, p.3b notes that the names of the men of Faction were recorded on a list of proscription kept in the offices of the three dukes (see also TCTC p.1799 k'ao-yi).
There was, indeed, evidence to support the Emperor's actions. The opposition to the eunuchs and their relatives among the members of the bureaucracy had been so widespread that when ministers were punished for attacking the eunuchs many of their colleagues sent memorials of protest and were prepared for dismissal or imprisonment in their cause. Such united action, although essentially spontaneous, must have appeared suspicious to the Emperor. Moreover, outside the bureaucracy itself, there had been scholarly and personal factions formed both in the provinces and in the capital, and particularly at the Imperial University.

At the very beginning of the reign of Emperor Huan, Chou Fu of Kan-ling, who had been a tutor of the Emperor before he came to the throne, was appointed to the imperial secretariat. Another man of Kan-ling, Fang Chih, who was at that time Intendant of Honan, had a greater reputation. The disciples and supporters of Fang Chih made up rhyming slogans to praise him and to criticise the favouritism of Chou Fu's appointment, and the households and the clients of the two men abused each other. This feud between the so-called Northern and Southern parties in Kan-ling, while quite unconnected with the later Faction at the court, is described by Fan Yeh as the fore-runner of the political and academic groupings of the end of the reign of Emperor Huan. The division among the scholars, and particularly, the use of slogans to criticise imperial officials, were examples for the future.
These slogans, or 'pure judgements' (清議 ch'ing-yi) which had perhaps been first applied for personal praise or abuse, developed into a form of criticism which could be levied at any official or scholar. As the name implies, the 'pure judgments' were regarded as impartial and accurate summaries of character, and their most effective practitioners gained great prestige and a large following.

In Kan-ling, it had been said; 'A pattern for the empire, Fang Po-wu; grasping appointment from his tutoring, Chou Chung-chin'.

Later, when Ts'en Chih of Nan-yang was officer in the commandery under the Grand Administrator Ch'eng Chin, there was a saying among the people: 'The Grand Administrator of Nan-yang is Ts'en Kung-hsiao; Ch'eng Chin of Hung-nung does nothing but sit and sing'. And from the provinces the custom spread to the capital and was adopted by the students of the Imperial University, who made up couplets; 'A model for the empire, Li Yuan-li; unafraid of powerful enemies, Ch'en Chung-chü.'

1. Po-wu was the style of Fang Chih and Chung-chin was the style of Chou Fu.
2. Kung-hsiao was the style of Ts'en Chih. The characters hsiao (GSR 1168: xŭg/xau-/hiao) and hsiao (GSR 1028: siŏg/sieu-/siao) were rhymes.
3. Yüan-li was the style of Li Ying; Chung-chü was the style of Ch'en Fan. The characters k'ai (GSR 599: k'êr/k'âi/k'ie) and li (GSR 597: liér/liěi:/li) and yü (GSR 60: ng^0/ngiwo-/yü) and chü (GSR 75: kiô/kiwo/kü) were rhymes.
By the second century A.D., the Imperial University (天子大 t'ien-tzu t'ai-hsüeh) had gone through many changes since it was first established under the Former Han. Erudites (博士 po-shih) had been appointed as early as the Ch'in dynasty, being in attendance at the court to give advice on questions of history or scholarship. In the reign of Emperor Wu, fifty Disciples (弟子 ti-tzu) were appointed for the Erudites, and men recommended from the commanderies and kingdoms were sent to the capital to receive tuition and to take examinations which could lead to the civil service. By the time of Emperor Yüan, there were three thousand disciples, and a hundred candidates were passed by examination each year.

However, the position of the Imperial University does not seem to have been the same under the Later Han as it had been under the Former Han. To some extent, the decline of classical scholarship was a reflection of the political disorders of the interregnum of Wang Mang and the civil war which followed, and the authority and prestige of the New Text School of Confucianism declined as its teaching appeared less relevant to the realities of the empire. The end of the Former Han dynasty destroyed much of the almost supernatural authority of the emperors, which had been at the base of the theories of Tung-chung Shu and the New Text school and which had supported the teachings of the orthodox Confucianists. Although the Later Han consciously attempted to restore the traditions of their predecessors, the superstitions of the New Text school were challenged by the new tendencies to rationalist thinking shown by the interest in
the Old Text school and in the writings of Wang Ch'ung. The discussions in the White Tiger Hall (P'o-hu t'ung) in 79 A.D. re-affirmed the authority of the New Texts and their official patronage, but Emperor Chang himself was in sympathy with the Old Text teaching, and the greatest scholars of the empire belonged to the Old Text school. Although the New Text continued to be the official Confucian doctrine, and although positions as Erudit at the Imperial University were given to scholars of the New Text school, the vitality of the New Text was gone, and the Imperial University shared in the decline.¹

By the time of Emperor An, the professors and students of the university had come to neglect their studies and the buildings and grounds were in disrepair. Under Emperor Shun, the buildings were restored, and recommendations were called for scholars to be appointed as disciples or as students. After Shun's death, his Empress-dowager née Liang issued an edict that all officials from the General-in-Chief down to those ranking at Six Hundred Piculs salary should send their sons to the university; and in the third and the ninth month of every year there was a great assembly and ceremony and feast.² As a result of this patronage, men came from all over the empire, and the Hou Han shu says that the number of scholars (hsüeh-sheng) at the university was more than thirty thousand. But the quality of the

¹ On this, see Tjan Tjoe Som I, pp.149 to 165 and particularly p.164.

² HHS 69, pp. 2a and 2b.
scholarship became poorer, the discussions became more and more insignificant, and the tradition of Confucianism was in a pitiable state.  

This, then, was the situation of the university: it had fallen into disrepute, Emperor Shun had attempted to restore its prestige and the Liang clan had given it patronage, but it now contained more than thirty thousand students who were supposed to engage themselves in study which was intricate, artificial and discredited. A few of these students might hope to pass examinations for entry into the imperial civil service: during the hegemony of the Liang clan at the beginning of the reign of Emperor Huan, posts as Gentleman at the palace or below had been made available for competition. In 156 a new system was introduced, which allowed candidates to take examinations in an increasing number of classics over a period of years and to rise in rank with each success. But the edict of the early years of Emperor Huan had provided for an entry of sixty-five candidates, and while it is not possible to calculate the annual entry after the change of 156, it is not likely that many more students reached high positions under that system. The accepted route of entry to the civil service was by local recommendation, and while a career at the university might improve a man's chance of recommendation from his commandery or province, he could seldom hope to gain imperial appointment by examination.  

1 HHS 68, p.2b.  
2 T'ung-tien, p.75/2.  
3 See my article on Recruitment.
The students at the university, without immediate expectation of imperial office, and with a limited interest in the official scholarship of their time, showed instead an intense enthusiasm for current political affairs. To the officials of the capital, the interest and support of thirty thousand students appeared to be worth cultivation, and it might possibly be dangerous to ignore them. The technique of 'pure judgements' was taken up by the students, and their leaders, men such as Kuo T'ai and Chia Piao allied themselves with the officials Li Ying and Ch'en Fan and 'sang one another's praises'.

The Failure of Tou Wu:

So by the end of the reign of Emperor Huan, the officials of the bureaucracy, with the alliance of the university students, had challenged the power of the eunuch favourites of the Emperor. The arrest and proscription of Li Ying and the others was a considerable victory for the eunuchs; but the whole situation was changed when Emperor Huan died, without an heir, on 25 January, 168. According to custom, the Empress née Tou was given the title of Empress-dowager and held court. She and her brother Tou Wu settled the question of the succession within the private apartments of the palace, and on the advice of Liu Shu of Ho-chien they chose Liu Hung, the Marquis of Chieh-tu t'ing, to take the throne. Liu Shu was made Imperial Household Grandee and was sent with the eunuch

---

1 貌相裳重; HHS 57, p.3a.
Ts'ao Chieh, bearing credentials, with an escort of a thousand palace guards and eunuchs, to meet the future Emperor and bring him to the capital. In the first month of the next year, Tou Wu became General-in-Chief, Ch'en Fan became Grand Tutor, and the veteran minister Hu Kuang was Minister over the Masses. These three, as ts'an lu shang-shu shih, shared in the administration of the empire.  

As a member of a great family and the highest administrative officer of the empire, Ch'en Fan was a natural leader of the imperial bureaucracy, and Tou Wu, the leader of the clan of the imperial relatives by marriage, who had chosen to act as the patron of the scholars and officials, brought him to share in the government. In their joint administration, the two men planned to reform the bureaucracy, to restore the men who had been dismissed for Faction, and to destroy the power of the eunuchs of the palace. Li Ying, who had been at the centre of the Faction trouble in 166, and men such as Yin Hsun and Tu Mi, who had also been prominent in connection with that party, were brought back to the capital and were given high posts, as Grand Minister of Agriculture or Grand Coachman.

1 We have noted earlier that the title lu shang-shu shih gave a minister the right to take effective part in the government through control of the operations of the shang-shu, the imperial secretariat. The commentary of Hu San-hsing to TCTC p.1802 suggests that the character ts'an, which is sometimes used for the numeral san 'three', indicated that the post was shared.
The eunuchs were opposed to this alliance, and they were able to make their opposition effective and force a division among their enemies through the advantages of their position in the inner palace. They were in constant attendance on the Empress-dowager née Tou, and Ts'ao Chieh and Wang Fu 王甫, the leaders of the eunuchs, were able to persuade the Empress-dowager on several occasions to over-rule the plans and policies of Ch'en Fan and Tou Wu her brother. Ch'en and Tou decided that the eunuchs should be eliminated. They appointed their nominees to the posts of Colonel Director of the Retainers, Intendant of Ho-nan and Prefect of Lo-yang, and so they controlled the civil administration of the capital city, and the commandery and the province around it. Outside the city were the five camps of the Northern Army, under the supreme command of Tou Wu as General-in-Chief. But in order to be sure of success, they had to persuade the Empress-dowager to support them.

As in the past, the Empress-dowager was prepared to follow the counsels of the eunuchs on various matters of state. Tou Wu and Ch'en Fan and their party urged the Lady Tou in a series of memorials, that the influence of the eunuchs within the palace and their power in the empire as a whole was quite contrary to the traditions and good practice of the former emperors; and they were able to impeach and imprison and execute two of her eunuch attendants. However, they could not persuade her to consent to a wholesale slaughter nor to any real change in the eunuchs' position of influence.

In the eighth month of 168, Tou Wu sent in a memorial against
the Prefect of the Yellow Gate (黃門令 huang-men ling) Wei Piao
魏彪, and he was able to arrange his dismissal and secure the
appointment of his own supporter among the eunuchs, Shan Ping
山冰. As prefect, Shan Ping had authority over all the eunuchs of the
palace,¹ and Tou and Ch'en had him arrest Cheng Sa 鄭鳯, one of
the eunuch clerks of the Empress-dowager's household. Cheng Sa was
taken to the eunuch jail and tortured until he made a statement to
implicate Ts'ao Chieh and Wang Fu in a plot against the government,
and with the evidence which they had obtained in this way, Shan
Ping and Yin Hsün sent in a memorial to ask that Ts'ao and Wang
be arrested.

In the ninth month, on the day hsin-hai (25 October, 168),²
the memorial forwarded from Tou Wu's offices was intercepted by the
eunuchs. They claimed that it contained proposals for deposing the
young Emperor, and they formed a party of their own to destroy Tou
and Ch'en. Ts'ao Chieh brought the Emperor to the Northern Palace,
to play with
handed him a sword, and arranged for guards to the doors. The clerks
of the shang-shu were brought in and compelled to draw up imperial orders
appointing Wang Fu Prefect of the Yellow Gate. With imperial
credentials, Wang Fu went to the eunuch jail to free Cheng Sa, and

¹ HHS treatise 26, p.5b.

² HHS annals 8, p.2a, gives the day as ting-hai, but there was
no ting-hai day in the ninth month, and I accept the emendation of
Ssu-ma Kuang's kao-yi, TCTC p.1810.
he killed Shan Ping and Yin Hsün. Then he brought soldiers to arrest the Empress-dowager, to take away her seal and insignia of office, and to guard the entrances to the Southern Palace.¹

By these moves, the eunuchs had gained control of the Emperor and of the two palaces. They sent men to arrest Tou Wu and seize his seal of office, but Tou refused to be taken; he fled to the camp of his nephew Shao, the Colonel of Footsoldiers, and the pursuing force was driven off. Then Tou collected a few thousand men from the Northern Army and marched with them to camp at the place called Tu-t'ing. Inside the city, Ch'en Fan learnt of the coup and he led some eighty men of his own clients and of his subordinate

¹There were two imperial palaces in Lo-yang during the Later Han dynasty, the Southern Palace and the Northern Palace; the latter built by Emperor Ming in 60 A.D. (HHS annals 2, p.8a). These palaces were on either side of the city, and each was bounded on one side by the city wall and had one gate direct to the outside; the Northern palace outer gate was called Pei-kung men, and the Southern Palace outer gate was called P'ing-ch'eng men (HHS treatise 27, p.6a). The palaces were connected to each other by fu-tao, which were elevated passageways giving a private route from one palace to the other and removing the need for an imperial progress through the city (see, for example, TCTC pp.1810 and 1901). During the coup the gates and the entrances to the fu-tao were closed.
officials, armed with swords, against the palace. They were over­
powered by the guards and taken to the jail, and Ch'en Fan died that
night.

Tou Wu, however, remained a threat. The troops of the Northern
Army were trained soldiers, maintained at the capital ready for active
service in any part of the empire, and although the guards of the
palace and the police at the capital were adequate forces for
controlling such unruly behaviour as Ch'en Fan's gallant attempt
at armed rebellion, they would be no match for such drilled fighting
men. As General-in-Chief, Tou Wu had authority to command those
forces, and the eunuchs had no connection with the army. But at
this time Chang Huan of Tun-huang, who had been General of the
Gentlemen of the Household Emissary to the Hsiung-nu and who had
great prestige as the man responsible for all the defence of the
northern borders of the empire, had just been called to the capital.
The eunuchs sent him with imperial credentials to call up the
soldiers of the Northern Army who had not joined Tou Wu, and Wang
Fu led a force of about a thousand men of the imperial guards to
join him. The two armies faced one another, and Wang Fu issued
proclamations to call Tou Wu's soldiers from their rebellion;
Tou Wu's army dwindled away as his soldiers changed sides. He
and his nephew Shao committed suicide, and their heads were exposed
at Tu-t'ing.
Some of the chief supporters of Tou Wu and Ch'en Fan were implicated in the plan against the eunuchs and either committed suicide or suffered execution. Members of Tou's household were exiled to Jih-nan, and clients and former officers and men who had been recommended by Tou Wu or Ch'en Fan were dismissed from their posts and proscribed from holding office in the future. The Empress-dowager was kept in the Southern Palace, powerless now that her father Tou Wu had been destroyed. Hu Kuang, the Minister over the Masses, was made Grand Tutor in place of Ch'en Fan and acted as lu shang-shu shih.

The destruction of the Tou family and their allies had not removed all the enemies of the eunuchs, although it had removed from them the threat of massacre. There were members of the bureaucracy at the capital who were known to have been opponents of the eunuchs but who were not dismissed or punished in the coup of 168; it would have been dangerous and impossible to eliminate all the leaders of the outside administration at one blow, and several of the men who remained in office may have been prepared to change sides once the eunuchs' authority was shown to be established. So it was not until 169 that the purge took place which marked the beginning of the second and greatest proscription of the men described as Faction.

The Second Faction:

Tou Wu and Ch'en Fan, as we have seen, had recalled the chief figures of the first Faction incident to the capital and
and had given them high posts. During their short period of hegemony, the students of the university had maintained their enthusiasm for politics, had continued to express their opinions of ministers and officials, and had taken this interest another stage further. Now they classified their leaders and their heroes into groups, as exemplars of various virtues. The list which appears to have been most popular, and which was used by Fan Yeh as the basis for his list of members of the faction in the tang-ku chapter of Hou Han shu, contained three 'lords' (君 chün), eight 'heroes' (俊 chün), eight 'moral guides' (顧 ku), eight 'guides' (及 chi) and eight 'treasurers' (尉 ch'u). This system of classification gave excellent opportunities for political comment; in the main list referred to above, Tou Wu and Ch'en Fan were two of the three lords, and the third, Liu Shu, was implicated in their plot against the eunuchs and was compelled to commit suicide. Men such as Li Ying, Tu Mi and Yin Hsi and Yin Hsün were praised by the students and given high rank in their lists.

These moral categories had the same almost mystical authority for the people of that time as had the 'Pure Judgements'. Certainly there was nothing new about the idea of moral ranks: Pan Ku included

1 HHS 57, p.4a. The titles as translated are self-explanatory, though it may be noted that the 'treasurers' were described as 'those who can use their wealth to help others' 能以財救人者, which seems an interesting appeal to wealthy patrons of scholarly and moral ambitions.
a table called Ku-chin jen piao in his Han shu, and graded historical
and legendary figures on a nine-degree scale from high-upper (上 上
shang-shang) to low-lower (下 下 hsia-hsia). Now was there
anything very unusual about the use of numerology in this form; all
the Chinese schools of thought had made use of numerical formulae,
and the official New Text school of Confucianism had accepted such
concepts as the Five Elements (五行 wu-hsing) and the Eight Trigrams
of the Book of Changes (八卦 pa-kua). Stein, in his article on
political and religious Taoism of the second century, has suggested
some connection between the tang-ku and the Yellow Turbans of Chang
Chüeh, who rebelled in 184. He bases his argument in part on the
similarity of numbers used in the organisation of the Yellow Turbans
with the numbers of the virtuous men praised by the university students.
But is is difficult to accept the suggestion on these grounds alone,
and it does not seem that the apparent similarity in arrangement need
be anything more than an example of the popularity of numerological

1 Han shu 20: 古今人表

2 In the Tso-chuan record for the eighteenth year of Duke Wan,
translated in Legge V, p.282/2, there is a reference to the Eight
Harmonies 八 儀 pa-k'ai and the Eight Worthies 八 元 pa-yüan in the
time of Yao and Shun, so this system of classification had a long
tradition ascribed to it even in the Confucian school.

3 Stein, pp.14 and 15.
calculations in the thought of both Confucianism and Taoism at this
time. Primarily, the publication of these lists gave the leaders of
the students an opportunity to show their approval of men they
admired and also the chance to associate themselves with such great
and famous figures.

Not all the men listed were involved in the politics of the
capital, nor were they necessarily associated with the compilers or with
the men of their category. Tsung Tz'u of Nan-yang, whom we have
mentioned earlier, had a minimal official career and never held office
in the capital, and Hsia Fu of Ch'en-liu and T'an Fu of Shan-yang had the same record. Few of the men had attended the
university. Naturally enough, the majority came from a wealthy
family, and some, such as Hsün Yu, Yin Hsün, Wang Ch'ang and Yang Chih are known to have come from great families of
officials; wealth was almost essential for a scholarly or political
career. On the other hand, Hsia Fu, Tu Shang of Shan-yang,
and Kuo T'ai of T'ai-yüan, the leader of the students, are said to
have been men of humble origin. Those who had the opportunity to
express their beliefs by political action made a name for themselves
in local government as opponents of the eunuchs' relatives and also
of the great families of their administrative districts, but most of

---

1 Wei Lang and Ts'en Chih are said to have attended the imperial university, but T'an Fu, for example, was famous for his private studies.
them were in no position to take any stand when the Liang clan was destroyed in the coup at the capital in 159. Of the thirty-five men on the lists, only two, Li Ying and Tu Shang, had taken any part in a military campaign on the borders of the empire.

Other lists besides this major one are preserved in Hou Han shu 57 and it is evident that varying categories could be compiled and that records could differ. Liu Piao, for example, in the main list in Hou Han shu 57 is ranked as a 'guide'; but in the same chapter there is another list composed only of men from Shan-yang commandery, and here Liu Piao, in this more limited field, is ranked as a 'moral guide'. In Liu Piao's own biography in HHS 64B, he is again referred to as a 'moral guide'. But in his biography in San-kuo chih 6, the main text describes him as a 'hero', the primary commentary quotes the Han chi of Chang Fan which contains the list for Shan-yang commandery, which agrees with Hou Han shu 57 and classes Piao as a 'moral guide'; and the primary commentary also contains another list, 

1 Yin Hsun, the Prefect of the Masters of Writing at that time, had assisted Emperor Huan and the eunuchs. Of the other men on the lists, Liu Yu, as Inspector of Yang province, had reported the misgovernment of a cousin of Liang Chi who was Grand Administrator of K'uai-chi; Yang Chih had been a former officer of Li Ku, and had suffered proscription when Liang Chi had Li Ku destroyed; Ts'ai Yen, as Inspector of Chi province, had opposed eunuch influence and would have nothing to do with Liang Chi when he intervened on their behalf.
different from both the versions in Hou Han shu 57, which contains Piao's name and classes the men as 'friends' (友)\textsuperscript{1}.

In fact, therefore, the lists which were compiled and published at this time were not originally intended to be lists of members of a political association. They were a device of political propaganda like the 'pure judgements', and the membership and the qualifications for the categories varied from one compiler to another. Some men were included for their political position, some as the leaders of the students themselves, some for their reputation among the people who came from their district; many of them had no connection with other members of the list and no concern in the current events at the capital. Essentially, the university students were compiling lists of worthy contemporaries who might serve as ideal moral examples; the men were not expected to act as partisans.

However, in 169, at the instigation of the eunuch Hou Lan, a report was made to the throne that Chang Chien of Shan-yang and twenty-four others from the same district as he had formed themselves into an association. Chang Chien was their leader, and his followers were divided into three groups of eight, 'heroes', 'moral guides' and 'guides'. This was the list which included Liu Piao as a 'moral guide',\textsuperscript{2} but it was alleged in the memorial that the men listed had actually formed

\textsuperscript{1} HHS 57, pp.4a and 4b, HHS 64B, p.7b and SKWei 6, p.35a and PC.

\textsuperscript{2} HHS 57, p.4b and see above.
a political alliance, that they had inscribed stones, that they had set up a communal altar, and they were plotting against the state. It is very likely that these twenty-five men, who came from the same place and who held similar political views, had formed some semi-religious association; but there is no way to tell what plans for political action they may have entertained. In the event, this accusation of Faction inspired the second great persecution and proscription.

Ts'ao Chieh and the eunuchs took the opportunity to eliminate all their former enemies. More than a hundred men who had been involved in the proscription under Emperor Huan were now re-arrested and died in prison; other opponents of the eunuchs were hunted out and killed or banished or proscribed. It is said that altogether there were six or seven hundred people who died or were exiled or were dismissed or were barred from office, and the proscription remained in effect for the next fifteen years. From this time on, no matter what the cause or the justification, the accusation of tang or Faction was sufficient to endanger a man's life and damn his political career.

One final blow, in 172, consolidated the eunuchs' position and removed the university's interest in politics. In that year, Hou Lan was impeached and found guilty of abusing his authority and power, his seal of office was taken from him and he killed himself. In the next month, the Empress-dowager née Tou died, and the eunuchs attempted to have her buried in a tomb apart from Emperor Huan, on the grounds of her involvement in the plot of her father and Ch'en Fan.
After considerable discussion in the court, the Emperor accepted the advice of his ministers and buried the Lady Tou with her husband. But any weakening in the eunuchs' position or any slackening in the imperial favour was disregarded when treasonous writings appeared on a gate of the Northern Palace, saying that the empire was in chaos, that Ts'ao Chieh and Wang Fu had murdered the Empress-dowager, that the ministers did nothing, that no loyal words were spoken, and that Hou Lan had killed men of Faction.¹

An edict commanded Liu Meng, the Colonel Director of the Retainers, to find and arrest the ringleaders, but in a period of more than a month he had failed to do so and he was dismissed from his office and replaced by Tuan. Tuan sent out, and he arrested more than a thousand students of the university who had a reputation as troublemakers. Then, with the encouragement of Ts'ao Chieh, he impeached Liu Meng on other counts and had him sent to convict service.

For the rest of the reign of Emperor Ling, there were no rivals for the favour that the eunuchs enjoyed from the Emperor, and with his support the eunuchs controlled the imperial government as the families of the imperial relatives by marriage had before them.

The Structure of Politics in the Reign of Emperor Ling:

In the crisis of the coup of 168, the young Emperor had taken the part of the eunuchs. In the circumstances at that moment, he had little choice in the matter, for the eunuchs controlled the palace and

¹ HHS 68, p.13a.
he had no way to reach the party outside. In any case, it would be
a good deal to expect of a child of twelve that he should assess
advantages and disadvantages, opportunities and possibilities, and
then take the appropriate action to turn the palace guards against
the eunuchs and invite Ch'en and Tou into the palace to rescue him.
Emperor Ling played an essentially passive role, the eunuchs acted
in his name, and he was very likely unaware of the reason for the
coup and of the actions taken. The eunuchs gained his favour at this
time and in the future primarily because they were the one body of
advisers available to him and he had little opportunity to learn of
any others.

But it is doubtful, even if Emperor Ling had been more fully
informed of what was going on and had been in a better position to
do something about it, whether he would have intervened against the
eunuchs to rescue the Tou family and their party. As the leader of
the clan of the imperial relatives by marriage, Tou Wu was the first
of the hegemons to gain the enthusiastic support of a large part of
the imperial bureaucracy. Liang Chi, for example, his predecessor,
had destroyed respected leaders of the administration such as Li Ku
and had introduced members of his own clan and his own clients to
hold high office. But Tou Wu, even before the death of Emperor Huan,
had established good relations with the most respected scholars and
officials, and he had been a leading figure when representations
were made for the freeing of the prisoners of the first Faction in
167. Under his hegemony, it was hoped that the power of the eunuchs,
which had developed so greatly since the fall of Liang Chi, would be
curbed, and it was believed that Tou Wu himself would respect the position of the outer officials and would encourage them to take part in the government. The alliance of Tou Wu and Ch'en Fan was seen as the beginning of an age of reform.

However, from the point of view of the Emperor, Tou Wu was another over-mighty subject, another in the series of hegemons from the clans of the imperial relatives by marriage who had attempted to take over the government of the empire from the hands of its rightful ruler, and had sometimes succeeded. As the earlier Empress-dowagers had done, the Lady Tou had placed a child on the throne and so had secured a regency for herself and authority for her family, and the Tou clan took advantage of the opportunity. The Empress-dowager herself had taken an opportunity to satisfy her jealousy of the Lady T'ien Sheng, her favourite concubine of Emperor Huan in his last years, and had killed her. The male members of her family, following earlier examples, had appropriated titles and honours for themselves, and Tou Wu and his two nephews were enfeoffed as marquises. Though his power had not been established long, and although he had the approval of the scholars and officials, Tou Wu had already showed signs that he might follow some of the examples of Liang Chi.

To the Emperor, the eunuchs were valuable servants and allies. The eunuchs of the palace had helped Emperor Ho against Tou Hsien, and since that time they had taken part in every successful coup. The

---

1 HHS annals 10B, p.8b.
accession of Emperor Shun and the overthrow of Liang Chi had been achieved almost entirely by the intrigues and the actions of the eunuchs. And, from the Emperor's view, eunuchs had one great advantage over any other group of his servants and subjects: they could be dismissed and removed from power on his word alone. They depended entirely on the favour of the Emperor, they had no family with independent strength to support them, and once the imperial favour was lost their power in the capital and in the provinces was gone. Like the freedmen of the early Roman empire, the eunuchs of the Han dynasty were excellent servants for a ruler who needed ministers to assist his absolute rule and who wanted to avoid the interference of the established powerful families.

But when Emperor Ling acquiesced in the destruction of Tou Wu and Ch'en Fan, he destroyed the hopes of many of his best officials, and he tied himself very closely to the eunuchs. The two persecutions of 169 and 172, which were brought about partly by the eunuchs' anxiety for themselves and partly by the foolhardiness of their opponents, drove many of the imperial officials from office, and strengthened the eunuchs' position still further.

In fact, the number of officials who were destroyed or were barred from office on account of the persecutions was surprisingly small. The Hou Han shu states that at the time of the persecution of 169 six or seven hundred people were killed or banished or dismissed or barred from office, and this six or seven hundred includes those
people, more than a hundred, who had been proscribed at the time of the first persecution in 166 and who were re-arrested and died in prison. Moreover, this figure of six or seven hundred may also include the members of the families of the men of Faction, who could be subject to banishment when their relatives were accused. In 176, Ts'ao Luan, the Grand Administrator of Yung-ch'ang commandery, memorialised the throne in praise of the men of Faction and suggested their restoration. Ts'ao's suggestion did not find favour, and he was arrested and killed, and the proscription was made still tighter and extended to five degrees of relationship; three years later these more stringent regulations were relaxed a little. But it appears from this incident that the families of the proscribed men were involved in their fate; this was indeed established Han legal practice, and it is probable that close relatives of the men of Faction had been affected from the very beginning of the persecution. If this is so, then not all of the six or seven hundred people involved in the proscription had been active in politics, and of course many of those who had were students of the university or very junior.

---

1 HHS 57, p.5a.

2 HHS 57, pp.5a and 5b.

3 See, for example, Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, pp.112-122.
officials. It is not, in fact, likely that the proscriptions affected a very great proportion of the imperial bureaucracy.  

The proscription itself was maintained for fifteen years. In 184, after the rebellion of the Yellow Turbans in the east under Chang Chüeh, the eunuch Lü Ch'iang suggested to the Emperor that maintaining the persecution would entail the continuing presence of disaffected families throughout the provinces of the empire, and that these people might be tempted to join the rebels and trust their fortunes to Chang Chüeh. Regardless of any philosophical sympathy between the tang-ku and the Yellow Turbans, these powerful local clans, which were barred from the rewards of imperial office, and which now had the opportunity to give the benefits of their wealth and their education and their prestige to the forces of a rebel, were an obvious danger to the throne. In the third Chinese month of 184, the proscribed men were amnestied and those who were banished were allowed to return to their homes.  

The amnesty was effective; the son Tsan of Li Ying, for example, later became Chancellor of Tung-p'ing, and Ho Yung, who had himself been proscribed and hunted in 169, was given a position at the capital in 184.  

---

1 For purposes of comparison, we may note that each year some two hundred men were recommended as hsiao-lien candidates for entry into the bureaucracy by the commanderies and kingdoms.  

2 HHS annals 8, p.10b and HHS 68, pp.17b and 18a.  

3 HHS 57, p.11a and HHS 57, p.23a.
Even Chang Chien, who had been a reputed leader of rebels in 169, who had been pursued across the northern border and had brought imperial execution on all the families of those who aided him; he returned to his home when the amnesty was granted, and he was repeatedly offered imperial office.¹

It may be suggested that the proscription of the years 169 to 184 was only one incident in the period of hegemony of the eunuchs under Emperor Ling, and it did not disrupt the government or have any great effect on it. There were several families in the provinces connected with members of the proscribed party who must have been disaffected and who were perhaps a source of danger in time of rebellion; and there were some men who were prepared to defy the government, to come secretly into Lo-yang, and to give aid to the men in prison.² But officials had been excluded from office before,³ and proscription chin-ku appears to have been at this time a common method of dealing with defeated political opponents. The men who were proscribed by the eunuchs had claimed that they wished to reform the government of the empire, and their fine ambitions earned them the support of many

¹ HHS 57, p.19a.
² See, for example, the biography of Ho Yung, HHS 57, p.23a.
³ When Li Ku was destroyed by Liang Chi in 147, for example, Yang Chih was proscribed as one of Ku's former officers ku-li (HHS 57, p.18a). Yang Chih was later listed and praised by the university students.
scholars and officials. But in order to achieve their plans, they had allied themselves with the party of the Tou family, the imperial relatives by marriage, and they had determined to destroy the eunuchs. When the eunuchs overthrew the Tou clan instead, the pure men shared the fate of their patrons. Their fall was mourned, and their fine ambitions were recognised, but as the members of a defeated political party they were liable to the punishment that their failure had brought upon them, and there were others who were prepared to take their places and to carry on the imperial government under the hegemony of the eunuchs.

Many of the men who served in high positions in the reign of Emperor Ling were sycophants of the eunuchs. Among those who held the rank of duke, Ts'ao Sung 趙嵩 was the adopted son of the eunuch Ts'ao T'eng 趙騰, Fan Ling 樊陵 was a strong supporter of the eunuchs, and he and Chang Hao 張颢 and Kuo Fang 私防 and Feng Fang 鄔方 were all connected with the eunuchs by marriage. If such men as these could become the heads of the administration, it is obvious that the influence of the eunuchs must have affected many holders of lower ranks in the outside bureaucracy. The three ducal posts themselves, in the reign of Emperor Ling, became even more ineffectual than before, not from any particular decline in their functions or honours, but simply because more and more officials were appointed to these posts, and each appointee held office for

1 HHS 68, p.9b.
an increasingly short length of time. In such a situation, it became impossible for any coherent administration to be carried on at the top level of the outer bureaucracy, and few of the men who were appointed remained in office long enough even to formulate and advise on a program. From this, the outer bureaucracy was effectively decapitated, and the senior officials were rendered almost powerless by the speed with which they were shifted from one office to another.

In 178, two innovations were made which strengthened the position of the eunuchs and weakened the authority of the outer bureaucracy. The first was the formal establishment of the School within the Hung-tu gate (Hung-tu men hsüeh); the other

---

1 In the reign of Emperor Ming, for example, two men became Grand Commandants, seven became Minister over the Masses and three became Minister of Works in the space of eighteen years; in the reign of Emperor An, eight men were Grand Commandants, six were Minister over the Masses and eight were Minister of Works in nineteen years. But in the twenty-one years of Emperor Ling's reign, twenty-three different men held the position of Grand Commandant, twelve became Minister over the Masses, and nineteen became Minister of Works. Thus there was a new appointment to Grand Commandant every year, and any of the three posts was likely to change every six months. Some officials did hold more than one of these three posts at different times, but on the other hand there were several men who were appointed and dismissed and reappointed.
was the introduction of a system of purchase for all the imperial offices.

Hung-tu was the name of a gate of the imperial palace where a library was established, and the school was evidently set up in these buildings. According to the primary commentary to Hou Han shu annals and to surviving fragments of the Han shu of Hua Ch'iao, this Hung-tu school was developed as an academy for eunuchs and others, teaching them ornate styles of calligraphy and the composition of the prose poems fu. Emperor Ling himself was interested in fine writing and in fu, and in 178 he gave practical effect to his patronage of these unorthodox scholars. An edict to the three dukes commanded them to employ graduates of the Hung-tu school in their offices at the capital, and the heads of the administrations in the provinces and commanderies and kingdoms were ordered to include successful students among their nominations of candidates for imperial office. As a result, those who had been trained at this palace academy were entitled and encouraged to join

1 HHS annals 8, pp.7b and 8a. For a considerable discussion of these two developments, see Balazs, Le traité économique du 'Souei-chou', pp.184 to 186.

2 HHS 69A, p.3a.

3 The passages of Hua Ch'iao's book have been preserved in T'ai-p'ing yü-lan 201 and Wen-hsüan 9, and they are quoted by Wang Hsien-ch'ien's commentary to HHS annals 8, p.7a.

4 HHS 50B, p.9b.
the outer bureaucracy by the accepted routes of entry; but Hua Ch'iao adds that the most worthy of men were ashamed to be classed with them.

In this same year, the position of duke was sold for ten million cash, and a post as minister was sold for five million cash. According to the annals, a bureau for the sale of the offices had been established earlier to sell enfeoffments and positions at the court; the principle was later applied to all the ranks of the bureaucracy, and finally extended to the dukes and ministers. It is said that the Emperor was anxious to increase the resources of his private treasury and

1士君子皆懼與為列焉：HHS annals 8, p.7b chi-chieh.

2 HHS annals 8, p.8a says that before this time the West Lodge 西邸 hsi-ti had been opened to sell positions such as 'marquis within the passes'關內侯 kuan-nei hou, the second-highest noble rank, and posts among the Rapid as Tigers and Feathered Forest troops, the household guards of the Emperor. The primary commentary quotes the Shan-yang kung tsai-chi 山陽公載記 of Yüeh Tzu 裏資 which says that prices could be higher; offices were sold for ten thousand times as many cash as their nominal salary in piculs per annum. Thus a post ranking at four hundred piculs was sold for 4,000,000 cash. We may observe that the sale of noble ranks, which gave some privileges and immunity from the law, had been known even under the Former Han dynasty, but until this time there is no record of the sale of offices.

3 For example, TCTC p.1850.
he chose this method to obtain ready money. Some men, who were judged most worthy of their posts, were charged only a half or a third of the nominal fee.¹

Even where the full amount was charged, it may be suggested that the money was paid rather as a fine than as a purchase. The pattern of promotion, at least among the three dukes, does not seem to change greatly before and after 178. In the third month of the next year, Tuan Chung became Grand Commandant, Liu Ho became Minister over the Masses, and Chang Chi became Minister of Works; Tuan Chung had a successful military career in the northern provinces and held high rank as Grand Palace Grandee when he was promoted, and both the other two appointees had been ministers. These three new dukes must have paid for the privilege of promotion, but they had already held high office before they were appointed, and there was nothing out of the ordinary about their advancement except for the fine. Similarly, some years later, Ts'ui Lieh, member of a great family of An-p'ing commandery, became Minister over the Masses in 185 and Grand Commandant in 187. He had been a Grand Administrator, had held ministerial positions, and had a high reputation in the north. From his background and his career, he was apparently quite suited to the posts as duke, but he lost much of his good name when he paid for promotion.²

¹ Shan-yang kung tsai-chi as quoted above.
² HHS 42, p.18b.
But whether or not the imperial sale of offices was part of a deliberate policy to lower the prestige of the outer bureaucracy, as well as a means of raising money for the privy purse, such transactions must have lowered the authority of the imperial officials throughout the empire. And when the imperial patronage of the Hung-tu school encouraged people with non-Confucian and esoteric training to enter the official service, then it is clear that by the end of the first ten years of the eunuch hegemony the palace attendants had achieved considerable influence over the government of the empire without need for the constant protection of the Emperor himself. Through the graduates of the Hung-tu school and through their own allies among the officials, the eunuchs could take part in the work of the outer bureaucracy in much the same fashion as the Liang clan had before them; and at the same time, through the system of 'purchase' of offices, the prestige of the regular officials had fallen considerably.

Faced with such pressures, a party among the officials turned against the eunuchs. Portents were discovered to indicate the dangers of eunuch government: a chicken changed from hen to cock, there was a black mist and a dark rainbow within the palace. Yang Tz'ŭ 楊賜, a former duke, took this opportunity to send in a memorial and quote the texts of the apochryphal commentaries (緯 wei) of the New Text Confucianists and urged that the eunuchs and the favourites be dismissed from the court.¹ Others took more practical and fatal steps.

¹ HHS annals 8, p.8a and HHS 44, pp.15b f.
In 179, Yang Ch'iu was appointed from Prefect of the Masters of Writing, the head of the imperial secretariat, to Colonel Director of the Retainers. As officer with powers over all the people of the capital, he impeached the eunuch Wang Fu for corruption and the Grand Commandant Tuan Chung for giving him support. Both were sent to jail and died, and many of their followers were imprisoned and tortured and killed or exiled. But before Yang Ch'iu could continue his purge by attacking Ts'ao Chieh, he was promoted to be Commandant of the Palace Guard; the ministerial post was more honourable, but it lacked the arbitrary authority which Yang had used with such effect.

Emperor Ling had tolerated Yang Ch'iu for a short time, but after the destruction of Wang Fu and Tuan Chung, Yang Ch'iu's successors as Colonel made no further attacks on the eunuchs or their allies. With this accepted method of attack denied them, Yang Ch'iu and other officials planned against the government itself; in the tenth month of 179 Ts'ao Chieh reported to the Emperor that a conspiracy had been formed with Yang Ch'iu and Liu Ho, the Minister over the Masses, among the leaders. The conspirators were sent to prison and executed.¹

For the rest of the reign of Emperor Ling, there was no further threat to the eunuchs from any shift in the Emperor's affections. In 184, at the time of the Yellow Turban rebellion, the proscription against the men of Faction of 169 was lifted, and many of those who had been barred from office were given employment. At the time of the

¹ For example, HHS annals 8, p.8b and HHS 67, p.9b.
rebellion itself, many of the eunuchs were alleged to have supported the Yellow Turbans, and there was a search for traitors both in the capital and in the palace. But to the end of his life, the Emperor supported the eunuchs against their enemies; by using them as his agents and advisors, he kept final authority in his own hands, and it doubtful if any other political group would have been so suitable to his purposes. For Emperor Ling, the hegemony of the eunuchs, supported by his own authority, must have been preferable to the power of any clan of imperial relatives by marriage, which might grow to rival the throne. But this solution to the struggle for power in the capital lasted only as long as the Emperor himself, and it may have weakened the empire as a whole.

The Subjects of the Emperor:

In fact, how was the government of the empire? Who were the administrators? We have seen that the tang-ku persecution destroyed several senior officials and barred many able men from office for fifteen years; but it may not be correct to assume that all the good men of the empire were out of the government. There were many who were prepared to serve the Emperor, even during the hegemony of the eunuchs, and those who reached high office gained honour and prestige and clients and power.

In 172, the Grand Tutor Hu Kuang died. He was aged eighty-two at his death, but he was in full possession of his faculties even in his last years, and hundreds of scholars and officials mourned him.  

1 See, in particular, his biography, in HHS 34, p.11b.
He had been six times appointed to be one of the three dukes, a record equalled by no other minister of the Han dynasty, and his funeral was attended by marks of the highest honour. In his career, Hu Kuang had followed a practical political path. In the reign of Emperor Shun, he had been one of the ministers who urged the Emperor to choose a woman of good family as his Empress, and so aided the cause of the Liang clan. At the time of the hegemony of Liang Chi, Hu Kuang accepted appointment as Grand Commandant in place of Li Ku, who had been eliminated when he protested the way Liang Chi treated emperors as toys. In 159, after the destruction of Liang Chi, Hu Kuang and the other two dukes had been dismissed and degraded to commoners for their lack of loyalty to the Emperor. But in 166, Emperor Huan restored him to ducal rank, and in 168 he shared the authority of lu shang-shu shih with Ch'en Fan and Tou Wu at the accession of Emperor Ling. He resigned on grounds of ill health, but in that same year, when Tou and Ch'en had been destroyed, he succeeded Ch'en Fan as Grand Tutor and lu shang-shu shih. For thirty years, he had held the highest posts in the empire, serving five emperors, and working with both the Liang clan and with the eunuchs who succeeded them to power. His name was respected throughout the empire.

Hu Kuang came from an old official family; an ancestor in the sixth generation had held posts under Wang Mang, and his father had been an imperial official. But two other great clans, the Yang of Hung-nung and the Yuan of Ju-nan, both had successive generations of members who reached ducal office, and the prestige gained from
such a succession of power brought them followers and allies. They were held in the highest respect for the great offices that they had gained; but the policy of the family, and even of its individual members, was not always consistent. Yuan Feng and Yuan Wei both held office under Emperor Ling; but at the end of Ling's reign their younger relatives Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu were among the leaders of the party which wanted to exterminate the eunuchs. Yang Ts'e, as we have noticed, took the opportunity of an omen to protest against the eunuchs in 178; he was known for his straight speaking, and he was sometimes out of favour on that account; in 176 he had been dismissed from his position as Minister over the Masses for promoting one of the proscribed men of Faction. But he was still prepared to continue to serve in this government, and in 179, after the execution of Liu Ho for plotting against the eunuchs, he was prepared to take Liu Ho's place as Minister over the Masses. Both the Yang clan and the Yuan clan were respected throughout the empire for the high ranks and honours that they had gained.

It is true that there were men such as Ts'ao Sung or Fan Ling, who were allied to the eunuchs or who bribed their way into high office. But there were other administrators who were praised for their good work. Tuan Chung, who became Grand Commandant with a bribe, and who was destroyed by Yang Ch'iu as an ally of the eunuchs, had been a successful commander in the wars against the Ch'iang barbarians of the northwestern frontier. Liu Chü, who was Grand Commandant with Ch'en Fan and Tou Wu and who remained in office after their

---

1 HHS 44, p.14b.
destruction, has a biography as a 'good official' (循吏 hsün-li), and so also had Liu Ch'ung (劉寵), who was promoted from Minister of Works to Minister over the Masses after that coup. On the other hand, Yang Ch'iu, who as Colonel Director of the Retainers impeached and destroyed Wang Fu and Tuan Kung, has a biography as a 'cruel official' (酷吏 ku-li).2

It may be suggested that the men who held power under Emperor Ling were little different in calibre from those who had taken office under previous rulers. The officials of Emperor Ling had to work with the eunuchs, in much the same way as their predecessors had carried on the government in the capital under the hegemony of the Teng clan or the Liang. Some of them were related to the eunuchs' families or supported the eunuchs; others opposed them when they could; several suffered death for their opposition or for their conspiracies. But this had been a pattern of the central administration of Later Han for almost a hundred years, while emperors had come to the throne as minors, while the empire had been ruled by regents and hegemons, and while the major political decisions had been taken with conspiracies and violence. The hegemony of the eunuchs had been one more stage in this development, and the proscriptions and persecutions of opponents in the time of Emperor Ling had many precedents from earlier reigns. This had become part of the political life of the capital, and the men who held power in the outer bureaucracy coped with this situation,

1 HHS annals 8, p. 2b, and HHS 66, pp. 12b to 14b.

2 HHS 67.
accepted the realities of imperial power and favour, carried out their tasks as servants of the Emperor, and were generally honoured and respected for their achievements.

The struggle for power at the centre of the empire had not had great effect on the officials of the provinces. We have discussed already the position of the eunuchs' families in the settled provinces, and it has been suggested that many of their excesses were controlled by the established local families and the provincial officers, and also that such disturbances and oppression as they caused were often rather in imitation of established behaviour by wealthy and powerful local families rather than a new and unusual departure in extortion and cruelty. Tenant farmers and clients and armed retainers and private feuds had been known in the provinces under Later Han before eunuch relatives attempted to share in them. The country districts had their own balances of power, and it does not seem that the rule of the eunuchs at the capital and their influence over the bureaucracy made very much difference to the general situation in the empire.

On the other hand, the capital was beginning to lose some of its dominance over the provinces. The imperial service still attracted the great local families, but there were influential groups which had been barred from office by the tang-ku proscriptions, and the hegemony of the eunuchs and the policies of Emperor Ling weakened the authority of the local governments of the empire. The imperial university, which had attracted scholars from all of China, appears to have lost its interest both in politics and in scholarship after the purge of
students in 172, and ten years later, at the suggestion of the eunuch Lü Ch'iang, the Confucian classics were engraved on stone—because the scholars of the university were prepared to alter the texts in the library so they might prove some petty point of their own. Thus the position of the capital in relation to the provinces was in decline: confusion and proscription prevented many men from turning their political ambitions towards the imperial court, and the stagnation of academic Confucian thought and the disgrace of the university made scholars return to their own studies. The men of the provinces were gradually ceasing to look to the court or the capital for leadership and for knowledge.

On the borders of the empire, the men who commanded the defence of the frontiers had also been little affected by the politics of the capital. In the lists of men praised by the students of the university in the early days of the reign of Emperor Ling, only two, Li Ying and Tu Shang, had taken part in military campaigns on the borders. At the time of the proscriptions, the border general Huang-fu Kuei was sent in to say that he was a supporter of the men who were persecuted and asked to be considered as a member of their party. Many scholars admired him for this, but his intervention went unheeded and no action was taken against him by the government.  

\[1\] HHS 69A, p.2b.  

\[2\] HHS 55, p.6a.
Chang Huan, the man who commanded the eunuchs' forces of the Northern Army against Tou Wu at the moment of crisis in 168, had been General of the Gentlemen of the Household Emissary to the Hsiung-nu, and he had only lately returned to the capital, and he was persuaded to take the eunuchs' part because he did not understand all the implications of the coup. When he did realise that he had played into the eunuchs' hands, he refused any reward, and in 169 he was implicated in the tang-ku persecution, was for a short time imprisoned, and then retired home. Although both Huang-fu Kuei and Chang Huan were opposed to the eunuchs, yet neither of them suffered greatly for their opinions, and Chang Huan inadvertently helped them against Tou Wu. The third of the great border commanders of Emperor Ling's time, Tuan Chung, had willingly accepted the position of Grand Commandant, and there were other men appointed to the three ducal positions who had made a name for themselves in the northern wars.

The men of the borders were not greatly concerned with the politics of the capital, and the people of the provinces were becoming less influenced by the government and the court. The effects of these loosening ties were shown in two great provincial rebellions in the last years of the reign of Emperor Ling, the rebellion of the Yellow Turbans and the rebellion in the northwest; but it was the disorder in the capital itself that was the most serious danger to the survival of the dynasty. We have seen how the succession of child emperors

---

1 HHS 55, p.9a.
had brought regencies and succession disputes and the dominance of
the imperial relatives by marriage and lastly the hegemony of the
eunuchs. And we have seen how each phase of this political history
had been ended by a coup d'etat, and how each coup had been more
bloody and more dangerous than the last. When Tou Wu was defeated
in the palace, he had called the Northern Army to his aid, and although
he had been deserted and destroyed without actual fighting, the army
had gained a place in politics. From this time, military force had
come into the reckoning of the political struggle. And beneath all
the constitutional devices of Han government, it remained true that
the Emperor ruled the empire, in the last resort, only because his
armies obeyed him.
III. THE RISE OF THE SUN CLAN
The End of the Empire of Han;

The Disorders in the Provinces;

The Chinese year which began on 31 January, 184, was a chia-tzu 年, the first of a new series in the sexagenary calendar of years. This one year also saw the beginning of the end of the power of the Han dynasty, as rebellions in three parts of the empire disrupted the administration of the provinces and strained the resources of the weakened and divided imperial government in the capital. In the east, there was the rebellion of the Yellow Turbans of Chang Chüeh 張角; in the west there was the rebellion of the wu-tou-mi 五斗米 sect of Chang Hsiu 張修; in the northwest there was the rebellion in Liang province; and besides these major disruptions, there was trouble in the northeast and there was mutiny in the south. Under such pressures the armies of Emperor Ling were barely able to hold their own.

The Yellow Turbans;

For some years before the outbreak of his rebellion, Chang Chüeh, a man from Chü-lu in Chi province, had used a form of Taoism to cure the sick by confession of sins and by faith-healing, and as people came to follow his teaching he and his brothers Pao 趟 and Liang 乘 made a plan for rebellion against the Han dynasty. The religion and the politics of the Chang brothers were based on belief in an apocalyptic change in the order of the physical world, and they told their followers that in the year chia-tzu the blue sky would
change and become yellow, and under this new heaven the rule of the Han
dynasty would end and a new era of government would begin. The two
characters chia-tzu became the symbol of this coming change, and later,
when the followers of Chang Chüeh went to battle, they wore a yellow
cloth on their heads as a badge; from this there came the name Yellow
Turbans (黄巾 huang-chin).

The years of the reign of Emperor Ling had seen the appearance
of a great number of superstitious sects of popular religion. The
primary commentary to SKWei 8, pp.23a and 23b quotes the Tien lüeh,
which says that in the Hsi-p'ing period (172 to 178) there were a
great number of heretic rebels (妖賊 yao-tse; i.e. non-Confucian
opponents of the dynasty), and besides Chang Chüeh and Chang Hsiu,
this text also refers to Lo Yao 豬耀, who was active in the
commanderies about Ch'ang-an. Earlier, there had been the yao-tse
Chang Ho 章河 in Yang province in 132 (HHS annals 6, p.6b), P'ei Yu
裴偽 in Yu-fu-feng in 150 (HHS annals 7, p.5b), Kai Teng 盖登 in
Po-hai in 165 (HHS annals 7, p.13b) and the Hsü 許 family in K'uai-
chi about 172.

We have noticed already the strange beliefs and practices in
the lands of the south and south-east of the empire during the Later
Han, and articles in European languages by Levy and Michaud, and in

1 HHS annals 8, p.4b, HHS 48, pp.13b to 14a and SKWu 1, p.1b.
And see also The Biography of Sun Chien.

2 South China under the Later Han dynasty, pp.77 to 79.
particular that of Stein, have described the currents of popular beliefs which formed the background to the religious movements of the last years of the Later Han. The teachings of Chang Chüeh and his brothers may have been based on the book T'ai-p'ing ching 太平經, a part of which is still ascribed to the teacher Yu Chi 于吉 of the second century A.D., but it can be sufficient to say here that the ideas and beliefs of sects of popular rebellion arose from a general ferment of superstitions, which were prevalent under the Later Han, and which affected all parts of society, from the most educated Confucianists to the most illiterate peasants.¹

By the second half of the second century A.D., the confusion of the imperial government at the capital and the fallen prestige of the administration in the provinces had produced a discontent among the people which found some solace in unorthodox religions, and which could be turned, with the aid of these religions, into political action against the dynasty. With its belief in a new order of nature, and its plan for a new beginning, the Yellow Turban sect of Chang Chüeh

¹ See, for example, Stein, pp. 14 and 15. While I cannot agree with Stein's suggestion that there was any close relationship between the men of Faction and the two groups of Yellow Turbans (see The Government of Later Han, p. 136), the point that he makes concerning the common background of numerological superstition to these two different organisations is very well taken.
was to prove the most dangerous of these religious rebellions.

In preparation for this revolt, Chang Chüeh had sent out disciples to gain support and to organise forces in the Yangtse valley, in the Yellow River plain, and in the provinces of the northeast. The rebels even had allies in the imperial court itself and among the eunuchs of the palace, and they were able to make their preparations while the officers of the local governments were either ignorant of their intentions or intimidated by their power.\(^1\) Chang Chüeh planned that his followers should rise up together on the fifth day of the third month of the chia-tzu year.

However, early in 184, the plan was betrayed, the rebel sympathisers in Lo-yang were arrested and executed, and the revolt in the provinces had to begin ahead of time, in the second month. Despite the premature call, tens of thousands of men rose in rebellion, the imperial armies were forced onto the defensive, and local government offices were destroyed and the magistrates were killed.

The Yellow Turban forces were concentrated in three main regions of east China. The group led by Chang Chüeh and his two brothers gained their support from the commanderies and kingdoms north of the Yellow River, near Chüeh's own commandery of Chü-liu.

---

\(^1\) See, for example, the memorial of Yang Tz'u 楊賜, written about 176 or 177, and the later memorial of Liu T'ao 劉陶 and others. Both are quoted in TCTC, pp.1864 and 1865, based on HHS 44, p.17b and HHS 47, p.7b.
The rising itself was called in Wei commandery, and it was joined by large numbers of people from Tung commandery and from the two kingdoms of Kan-ling and An-p'ing. A second large group of rebels appeared in the three commanderies of Ying-ch'uan, Ju-nan and Nan-yang; this group, in the lands just outside the imperial capital district to the southeast, had evidently been the force organised to co-operate with traitors within Lo-yang in the attempt to seize the capital. The third major group was in the northern commanderies, in Yu province, centred around Kuang-yang and Cho commanderies.

The rising itself took place, as we have seen, in the second month, and as soon as the court realised the danger they executed the Yellow Turban agents in Lo-yang and organised the defence of the capital. Ho Chin, the brother of the Empress née Ho of Emperor Ling, was appointed General-in-Chief and given command of the Northern Army, and the eight passes which surrounded the capital were put into

1 The people of Kan-ling and An-p'ing compelled their kings to join them in their rebellion (HHS annals 8, p.10b). Later, when the rebellion had been put down, the two rulers were examined on their actions, and the King of An-p'ing was found to have been insufficiently loyal and his state was abolished; the King of Kan-ling was allowed to return to his throne (HHS annals 8, p.11b).
repair and garrisoned by soldiers under a Chief Commandant. In the third month, when these preparations had been made, three armies were sent out to deal with the rebellion in the Yellow River plain. One army, commanded by Lu Chih, was sent east against Chang Chüeh himself; the other two armies, one commanded by Huang-fu Sung and the other by Chu Chün, were sent against the rebels in Ying-ch’uan.

However, although the Yellow Turbans had been kept from the capital, their uprising gathered strength in the spring and early summer, and the imperial forces could do little to contain them. In the third month, in Nan-yang, the Yellow Turban Chang Man-ch'eng defeated and killed the Grand Administrator of that commandery; in

---

1 These eight passes (八關 pa-kuan) were called Han-ku, 函谷, to the west of Lo-yang; Kuang-ch'eng, 關城, by marshy ground at the headwaters of the Ju River, west of Linju and south of Lo-yang; Yi-ch'üeh, 伊闕, also south of Lo-yang and on the main road from Ying-ch’uan or Ju-nan; Ta-ku, 太谷, about thirty miles south of Lo-yang; Huan-yüan, 韩原, southeast of Lo-yang near present-day Tengfeng; Hsüan-men, 旋門, east of Lo-yang on the Yellow River near present-day Szeshui; Hsiao-p'ing chín, 陜平津, east of Lo-yang on the north bank of the Yellow River by present-day Menghsien; and Meng-chín, 孟津, the Meng Ford, east of Lo-yang on the south bank of the Yellow River by the crossing of that name, by present-day Mengtsing.
In the middle of the year, the tide turned. In the fifth month, Huang-fu Sung and Chu Chun defeated Po Ts'ai, and in the sixth month they destroyed the Yellow Turban army in Ju-nan at the battle of Hsi-hua (now Sihwa in Honan). In the meantime, a new Grand Administrator of Nan-yang, Ch'in Hsieh, had defeated and killed Chang Man-ch'eng, and the remainder of those rebels, under a new leader Sun Hsia, took refuge in Wan, the chief city of the commandery. After their victory in Ying-ch'uan and Ju-nan, Huang-fu Sung and Chu Chun were separated; Sung was sent to attack the rebels in Tung commandery, and Chun was sent south against Sun Hsia. Also in the sixth month, Lu Chih defeated the main force of Yellow Turbans under Chang Chüeh himself and besieged the enemy in Kuang-tsung (now east of Weihsien in Hopeh). Before he could capture the city, he was slandered by a eunuch whom he had failed to bribe, and he was dismissed from his command. Tung Cho, who took his place, maintained the siege but had no success in his attacks.

In the eighth month, Huang-fu Sung defeated the Yellow Turbans of Tung commandery and moved north to join Tung Cho; in the tenth month, Kuang-tsung fell to the imperial armies, Chang Liang was
captured, the body of Chang Chüeh, who had died just before, was
defiled, and Huang-fu Sung was promoted to be General of Chariots
and Cavalry of the Left (左車騎將軍 tso chü-chi chiang-chün).
An-p'ing and Kan-ling had been settled by the ninth month, and the
Yellow Turbans in the northeast had also been put down about this
time. There remained only two main forces of the rebels, and they
were soon dealt with: in the eleventh month Huang-fu Sung defeated
and killed Chang Pao at Hsia-ch'ü-yang 下曲陽 (now west of Chinhshien
city in Hopeh), and Chu Chün, after a protracted siege, stormed Wan
city and beheaded Sun Hsia. In the twelfth month the reign-title
was changed to Chung-p'ing 中平.

In the seventh month, members of the sect called wu-tou-mi
五斗米, under the leadership of Chang Hsiu, had made a rising in
Pa commandery in Yi province. Chang Hsiu's family came originally
from P'ei commandery, in the east of the empire, and his father Ling
陵 (also known as Chang Tao-ling 張道陵), had founded the sect
and had moved west into Shu commandery.¹

¹ SKWei 8, p.22b, at the beginning of the biography of Chang Lu
張魯, says that Lu's grandfather Ling and his father Heng had
held the leadership of the sect in succession. Tien lueh, in the
primary commentary to pp.23a f, says that Chang Hsiu had been leader
of the wu-tou-mi in the Hsi-p'ing period. P'ei Sung-chih suggests
that Heng in the main text is the same man as Hsiu, and that either
Tien lueh or the main text is wrong. HHS annals 8, p.11b, also
mentions Chang Hsiu, and although there is room for doubt, Hsiu
is possibly the name of the man who was the father of Chang Lu and
the leader of the wu-tou-mi in the last years of the reign of
Emperor Ling. (But see also the alternative view of Fukui Kōchun,
pp.2 to 8).
But although this sect is sometimes described as Yellow Turbans, and although their doctrines were based on some of the same sources and contained some of the same elements as the teachings of Chang Chüeh, there is no reason to believe that they had any political connection with him, nor that their rebellion was designed to help his cause. In fact, Chang Hsiu and his sect were taking advantage of the disorder in the empire to establish an independent base of power for themselves. Their rebellion at this time had no great ambitions and it was not put down with any force: a few years later, about 190, Chang Lu, Hsiu's successor, was able to deal with the Governor of Yi province, Liu Yen 刘焉, and in 191 he took over Han-chung commandery and set up his own independent state. Politically, the religious movement headed by Chang Hsiu and later Chang Lu had nothing to do with the Yellow Turbans of Chang Chüeh and its history took quite a different course.

Even after the destruction of Chang Chüeh and his followers, there were other groups that called themselves Yellow Turbans and made their appearance in different places in the east and in the north for another twenty years. There were, for example, the bandits from a place called Po-po白波 in Hsi-ho commandery who called themselves Yellow Turbans in 188; and in 195 these rebels actually helped Emperor Hsien to escape from Ch'ang-an.

---

1 For example, HHS 65, p.2a, SKWei 8, p.23a.

2 HHS annals 8, p.14a and HHS annals 9, p.6b.
There were Yellow Turban rebels from Ch'ing and Hsü provinces who were defeated by Kung-sun Ts'an in Po-hai in 191, 1 there were Yellow Turbans from Ch'ing province who were defeated by Ts'ao Ts'ao and taken into his army in Chi-p'ai in 194, 2 and there were still Yellow Turbans in Chi-nan in 207. 3 It is not likely that these groups of Yellow Turbans shared Chang Chüeh's religion, but the fact that such numbers of rebels should be prepared to take the name of his party shows the influence of his rebellion.

Indeed, the imperial armies under Huang-fu Sung and Chu Chün had gained a remarkable achievement in removing so quickly the threat of Chang Chüeh's rebellion. But the victory left the east of the empire in ruins. Over wide areas, the offices of the local government had been destroyed, many of the magistrates had been killed and whole districts had been cut off from the writ of the central government. In this most populous part of the empire, where many people had been left homeless or destitute by the wars, unrest remained and bandits appeared in every district. The government, which had been fully extended in the struggle against Chang Chüeh, could not put down all the minor disturbances and was forced to patch up the situation as best it could. In dealing with the great number of bandit groups

1 HHS 63, p.5a.
2 SKWei 1, p.8a.
3 HHS annals 9, p.9b.
established in the hills called Hei-shan, the imperial government could only persuade the leaders of the rebels to accept official titles and to send in reports and make recommendations for office like a regular local government. With such a situation in the very heart of the empire, it is not surprising that the imperial government was also in difficulty on the borders.

The rebellion in the northwest and the troubles of the borders;

During 184, while the Yellow Turbans were still operating in the east of the empire, mutinies broke out among the garrison troops in Chiao-chih in the south and in Liang province in the northwest. The disturbance in Chiao-chih, which arose in the sixth Chinese month, was put down almost at once, but the rebellion in Liang province, which occurred in the eleventh month, was very much more serious.

The rebellion began with a mutiny among the Ch'iang mercenaries who were camped in Chin-ch'eng commandery. The rebels, from a force known as the Obedient Barbarians of Huang-chung, were led by a man called Pei-kung po-yü, they were joined by the Ch'iang tribes of the territory to the west, and their forces overwhelmed the local authorities and occupied the capital of the commandery. The Grand Administrator of Chin-ch'eng was captured and killed, and Pien Chang and Han Sui, two of his officers, joined the rebels.

---

1 Hei-shan is a ridge of the Taihang shan near present-day Hopi in Honan.

2 SKWei 1, p.21a and 21a PC quoting Chiu-chou ch'un-ch'iu.
In the third month of 185, Pei-kung Po-yü and Pien Chang attacked Ch'ang-an from the west. Huang-fu Sung, the conqueror of the Yellow Turbans, was put in command of the imperial army against them, but he was not able to defeat them and after four months he was replaced by Chang Wen. In the eleventh month, the rebels were defeated at Mei-yang, west of present-day Wukung in Shensi, and they turned back to the west. Chang Wen divided his army and sent a detachment under Tung Cho against the rebel Ch'iang while the main force besieged Pien Chang in Yü-chung (north of the present town in Kansu). However, neither attack was successful, both divisions were forced to retreat, and the rebels remained secure in Chin-ch'eng.

In 186, Pei-kung Po-yü and Pien Chang both died, and Wang Kuo became the new leader of the rebels. The provincial forces tried an attack in 187, but they were completely defeated and the rebels took over some of their army and gained further in strength. Now the whole province was in revolt, and towards the end of 188 Wang Kuo led another invasion east towards Ch'ang-an. In the first months of 189, Huang-fu Sung led an army against the rebels and defeated them near Ch'en-ts'ang (east of present-day Paoki). The rebels retired into Liang province, Wang Kuo was set aside by his own followers and these quarreled among themselves. From this time, there were a number of small groups of rebels in Liang province; the main party, based on Chin-ch'eng, was commanded by Han Sui, who came to leadership after the death of Wang Kuo; Sung Chien, who set up a

1 See Haloun, p.123.
state about present-day Sining西寧 in Tsinghai, and Ma T'eng馬騰, who had an army based on the prefecture of Huai-li槐里 in Yu-fu-feng (near present-day Hengping興平 in Shensi), both commanded considerable forces. But although the troubled region was not brought under control for another thirty years, the rebels remained divided. They were a threat in the northwest, and they sometimes intervened in the territories which bordered Liang province, but they never became a danger to the empire as a whole.

The disorder in Liang province at this time was another major incident in the history of the failing Chinese position on the northern frontier. Despite the great empire which generals such as Pan Ch'ao班超 had established among the oases and the deserts of Central Asia, the imperial control of the northern borders of China proper had been steadily lessened during a century and a half of Later Han. In the reign of the first emperor, Kuang-wu, a combination of famine and a succession dispute had brought a division of the Hsiung-nu匈奴 empire, which had controlled the greater part of the steppe-lands close to China. The Han had recognised one of the rival claimants as Southern Shan-yü单于, and had allowed part of the horde to settle on Chinese territory within the Ordos land, on either side of the south-flowing stretch of the Yellow River in the region of northern Shensi and Shansi. The Southern Shan-yü was under constant surveillance, and he had to give one of his sons as hostage every year, to keep peace on the borders, and to supply troops for the imperial armies. But the barbarian settlement among the Chinese
in Shensi was a continual source of disturbance, and while the Hsiung-nu maintained their own state within the empire, Chinese settlers were leaving the north throughout Later Han. Further west, in present-day Kansu, many of the people of the Ch'iang tribes, of Tibetan origin, were settled among the Chinese people of Liang province. They were often resentful of their treatment at the hands of the local government officers, and they sometimes rebelled or quarrelled with their Chinese neighbours, but they continued to move into the Chinese territory to settle. The Chinese settlers, in increasing numbers, left the troubled region and migrated south and east; under the influence of this pressure from the Hsiung-nu and the Ch'iang, and with the added effect of the eastward transfer of the imperial capital from Ch'ang-an to Lo-yang, the Chinese population of the northwest declined by more than six million individuals between the censuses of 2 A.D. and 140 A.D.¹

In 140 A.D., a great raid of the Hsiung-nu forced the Chinese to move the administrations of Shuo-fang, Shang and Hsi-ho commanderies, and although the main Hsiung-nu force surrendered at the end of the year, continual raids rendered An-ting and Pei-ti untenable, and their administrators were also moved away. Shuo-fang commandery headquarters were set up in the capital of Wu-yüan commandery, Shang and Pei-ti headquarters were set up in two prefectural cities of Tso-p'ing-yi, An-ting commandery headquarters were set up in a prefecture of Yu-fu-feng; the capital of Hsi-ho commandery was the only one of the

¹ Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-wu and the Northern Barbarians, and in particular pp.20 to 23.
five that remained in the territory it was to govern, being shifted across the Yellow River from the northwest to the southeast part of the commandery.

The pressure on the weakened imperial frontier became still greater in the reign of Emperor Ling. In 155 the Hsien-pi tribe, who had been established about the borders of Manchuria and Mongolia, attacked and conquered the Northern Hsiung-nu, who had occupied the area about Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia. By the beginning of Emperor Ling's reign, the leader of the Hsien-pi, T'an-shih-huai controlled an empire which the Chinese described as from Lake Balkash to Manchuria, and throughout that reign the border commanderies of Yu, Ping and Liang provinces were invaded yearly by the Hsien-pi forces and Ping province was almost completely ruined. In 177 a major Chinese counter-attack, supported by the Southern Hsiung-nu, was defeated and destroyed. Then, about 180, by good fortune for the Chinese, T'an-shih-huai died, his son Ho-lien, a less able man, was killed in a raid, and the Hsien-pi empire was divided in succession quarrels.

With the end of this unified enemy state, the Chinese defences recovered sufficiently so that they held the borders against the northern barbarians fairly stable during the last years of the reign of Emperor Ling. But raiding continued, and little of the territory that had been lost was regained. The rebellion in the northwest

removed a great part of Liang province from imperial control, and the
ground that had been lost to the Hsiung-nu in Ping province was
gradually abandoned. In the northeast, Yu province became the
scene of raids and warfare from the Wu-huan barbarians, who
occupied the region of southern Manchuria, who had caused trouble
in the past either independently or in alliance with the Hsien-pi,
and who now, under such leaders as Ch'iu-li Chü or the
renegade Chinese Chang Ch'un, continued their attacks. In
188 a large raiding party was driven back by the imperial commander
Kung-sun Tsan, and the newly-appointed Governor of the
province, Liu Yu, was able to arrange a peace, and the Wu-huan
sent Chang Ch'un's head to him as a sign of goodwill. But the
situation did not remain quiet for long, and the Wu-huan were not
effectively pacified for another twenty years.

The Collapse of the Central Government:

The eunuchs:

We have already discussed the means by which the eunuchs
came to political power in the reigns of Emperors Huan and Ling,
and how they were favoured by these Emperors after their successful
coups against the great Liang and Tou clans. They continued to be
favoured through all the reign of Emperor Ling. At the time of the
Yellow Turbans rebellion, the men of the proscribed faction were
pardoned, and many of them were given posts in the administration;
on the other hand, some of the eunuchs were found to be implicated
in the plot for a rising at the capital in support of Chang Chüeh, and dependants of the eunuchs were shown to have been in correspondence with the rebels in the provinces. But although the Emperor accused his attendants for this evidence of disloyalty among them, his anger was appeased and the eunuchs continued to hold his confidence. Two of their leaders, Chang Jang 張讓 and Chao Chung 趙忠, were spoken of by the Emperor as his father and mother, and his almost unquestioning support and his approval of their advice and plans gave them many opportunities for corruption, bribery and embezzlement.

It must be recognised that the eunuchs in Chinese history have had a bad press. The histories of the dynasties have generally been written by men of a Confucian persuasion, and to a true Confucian, the very concept of castration was abhorrent: firstly, and obviously, because such a creature could have thereafter no descendants to maintain his ancestral line; secondly, because Confucianism regarded any mutilation of the body as a mark of disrespect to a man's parents, who had entrusted him with that

---

1 HHS 68, pp.19a and 19b; HHS 56, p.10b.

2 HHS 68, p.20a.
vessel of life.

On the other hand, the practice of Chinese government had accepted the mutilating punishments, which, quite apart from the pain and disability, gained in severity from the shame which was attached to such disfigurements. To the Han Confucianists, castration was accepted as one of the Five Punishments, and it was actually inflicted under Later Han until the beginning of the second century A.D. Moreover, eunuchs were essential for the organisation of the imperial harem, or indeed for the control and protection of any group of private wives and concubines; and the

---

1 On this second point, see the Analects of Confucius, Book VIII, chapter 3, translated by Legge I, p.208. Waley, on pp.132 and 133 of his translation, gave an alternative rendering of the passage, but the interpretation of Legge follows the commentary of Cheng Hsüan, who lived in the second century A.D. Even if Waley is correct in his interpretation of the original meaning of this passage, it is clear that Legge's version was accepted at the time of the Later Han dynasty.

2 Po hu t'ung XXXVIII, translated by Tjan Tjoe Som II, pp.603 to 605.

3 See Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p.127.
institution of the harem was established by tradition and approved by Confucian theory.

In his article on 'The Rise of the Eunuchs in the T'ang Dynasty', Rideout discussed the sources of supply, and said that in the seventh century most of the eunuchs for the imperial harem came from among the non-Chinese people of present-day Kwangtung and Fukien provinces. However, he also quoted the merchant Soleyman, who travelled in T'ang China, and who said: '...il en est d'autres qui sont nés en Chine, et que les parents eux-mêmes ont mutiler pour

1 For example, *Li chi* 1B (chapter *ch'ü-li (hsia)*), translated by Couvreur, volume I, pp.86 and 87, says: 'Le fils du ciel a une femme du premier rang, (trois) du deuxième, (vingt-sept) du troisième rang, (neuf) du quatrième rang, (quatre-vingt-une) du cinquième rang (et un nombre illimité) du sixième rang.'

*Po hu t'ung* XL, translated by Tjan Tjoe Som I, says (p.251):

'Why is it that the Son of Heaven and the Feudal Lords marry nine wives at a time? It is to emphasise the importance of their states and to enlarge their progeny.' The same text also says (p.257):

'Why [is] a Minister or a great officer [entitled to take] one wife and three concubines? It is to honour his worthiness, and to emphasise the importance of his progeny.'; and also 'Why [is] a common officer [only entitled to] one wife and one concubine? [It is because his rank is] below a Minister or a great officer.'
Unlike those of the T'ang dynasty, it does not seem that any of the eunuchs who rose to great power under Later Han were of non-Chinese origin: those who have particular biographies in HHS 68 came from such commanderies and kingdoms as An-p'ing, Ying-ch'uan, Ho-nan, Nan-yang and P'eI, being the settled districts of the Yellow River plain and the lands about the capital itself. They had close relatives still living in their native lands, they seem to have held no grudge for the mutilation that they had suffered, and they were prepared to influence the emperors to give the members of their family a privileged position against the local administrators, or even to have them appointed to office in the capital or in the provinces. Indeed, the eunuchs proved to be as interested in their families as any scholar-official, and with their relatives, and by means of adoptions, they were able to set up clan groups of their own that were of considerable influence within the administration and of great importance in the provinces.  

---


2 As one example of the effect of the adoptions, Ts'ao Sung 曹嵩, who became Grand Commandant and who was the father of Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操, was an adopted son of the eunuch Ts'ao T'eng 曹騰, and was always a supporter of the eunuchs. (HHS 68, p.9b and SKWei 1, pp.1a and 1b.) The effect of the eunuch relatives on the power structure of the provinces has been discussed in The Government of Later Han, pp. 115 ff. above.
The eunuchs themselves are commonly regarded as unimpressive, flabby, mean-spirited and weak. This is not necessarily true. Sir Richard Burton, in describing the eunuchs of the Middle East, wrote: 'These epicenes are as curious and exceptional in character as in external conformation. Disconnected, after a fashion, with humanity, they are brave, fierce and capable of any villany or barbarity (as Agha Mohammed Khan in Persia 1795-98). The frame is unnaturally long and lean, especially the arms and legs; with high, flat, thin shoulders; big protruding joint and a face by contrast extraordinarily large, a veritable mask; the Castrato is expert in the use of weapons and sits his horse admirably, riding well "home" in the saddle for the best of reasons; and his hoarse thick voice, which apparently does not break, as in the European "Cappone", invests him with all the circumstance of command.'

This description may well have been relevant to many of the eunuchs of the court of Han, and one of them at least, Chien Shih, is said to have been strong and active and good at planning for war.

In 188 a special military formation was set up at the capital, commanded by eight 'Colonels of the Western Garden' (西園校尉hsi-yüan hsiao-wei).

---

1 Volume I, p. 283.
2 The eight Colonels were Chien Shih, Yuan Shao, Pao Hung, Ts'ao Ts'ao, Chao Yung, Feng Fang, Hsia Mou, and Ch'un-yü Ch'iung. The prefixes to the titles held by each of these officers is not certain, and there are different versions in Shan-yang kung tsai-chi, quoted in HHS annals 8, p. 14b PC, in the biography of Ho Chin, HHS 59, p. 6b, and in the biography of Yuan Shao, HHS 64A, p. 2a, which last is followed by HHS 48, p. 12a and HHS treatise 13, p. 4a. All the colonels except Chien Shih were full men.
This force, known as the Hsii-yüan army, was evidently planned as a training organisation, to increase the number of competent soldiers at the capital, and possibly to reinforce the five established regiments of the Northern Army. Manoeuvres were held in the Emperor's presence in the eleventh month of 188; but whatever plans had been made for this new arrangement became ineffective in the course of the events of the following year. The matter of immediate interest and importance was that Chien Shih, a eunuch, was appointed by the Emperor to take command of these troops and that even the General-in-Chief, Ho Chin, was under his orders.

As a result, by 189, the position of the eunuchs appeared very strong. They had the confidence of the Emperor, their relatives and their allies held many posts in the imperial administration, and one of their number had been given supreme command of all the troops at the capital. However, they had many enemies, and despite any efforts they might make they had no way to guard against their enemies without the Emperor's support. They could not fill the whole administration with their supporters, and they could not proscribe every man who might be opposed to their power. Indeed, any educated official, by his very nature, was opposed to the hegemony of the eunuchs. Ts'ao Ts'ao, who was no extremist in his opposition, said; 'The offices of eunuchs have been necessary from ancient times to the present day; the only thing is that the ruler should not grant them authority or favour, and so let it come to this.'

---

1 HHS 59, pp.6b and 7a.  
2 SKWei 1, p.3b PC quoting Wei shu.
But there were other men who were more bloodthirsty, and the position of the eunuchs, so strong on paper, collapsed like a pack of cards when the death of Emperor Ling deprived them of their chief support.

The chaos in the capital:

In 176 a concubine of the Ho 何 clan had given birth to an imperial son, Liu Pien 劉辨, and in 180 the Lady Ho had been made Empress. Her half-brother, Ho Chin 何進, rose in office through her influence and was made General-in-Chief in 184, at the time of the Yellow Turbans rebellion. In 181 the concubine née Wang 王 also gave birth to an imperial son, Liu Hsieh 劉協; the Empress née Ho had the Lady Wang poisoned. The Emperor was furious and was going to put her away, but the eunuchs spoke for her and she kept her place.¹

The child was brought up by the Empress née Tung 董。

The Empress née Tung was the mother of Emperor Ling and the widow of his father, the former Marquis of Chieh-tu t'ing. When Ling came to the throne his mother was brought to Lo-yang and given the title of Empress, and when the Empress-dowager née Tou died in 172, the Empress née Tung took part in the government. In 187 her nephew Tung Chung 重 had been promoted to be General of the Agile Cavalry (騶騎將軍 p'iao-chi chiang-chün) with a thousand soldiers under his command.

Emperor Ling died, at the age of thirty-four, in the fourth month of the sixth year of the Chung-p'ing period, on 13 May, 189.

¹ HHS annals 10B, p.10a.
At the time of his death he had not made any announcement of his Heir-apparent, and although his elder son by the Lady Ho, Liu Pien, was the obvious choice, it appears that the Emperor had his doubts over this choice and was inclined to favour Liu Hsieh, the son of the Lady Wang. Then, as he was dying, Emperor Ling did nominate Liu Hsieh as his successor and entrusted him to Chien Shih, who was with him at that time.¹

It is possible that the Emperor was poisoned, though there is no suggestion of it in the histories. The Ho clan must have been anxious at the possibility of the change in the succession, and there were many who were afraid of the growing power of the eunuchs and angry at the Emperor's support of them. Thirty-four years was a reasonable age for a man of that time, but certainly the death of the Emperor at this moment ended the delicate balance of power between the rival groups in the capital and marked the beginning of the palace warfare which destroyed the central government. Had the Emperor lived longer, his policies might have changed, the succession could have been securely established, and the dynasty could have survived another generation. Although he had ruled for twenty years, he had been a child for much of his reign, and had he been given another twenty years of power his maturity might even have seen the revival of the Later Han. As it was, he was the ninth emperor in succession to come to the throne as a child less than fifteen years old and the tenth emperor to die before he

¹ HHS 59, p.7a.
passed his mid-thirties. For more than a century, the Han empire had had no ruler of mature years, and regardless of the quality of the rulers themselves, this run of misfortune had brought the government to the final crisis.

As he left the Emperor's death-bed, Chien Shih's first action was to send messengers to summon Ho Chin and to station guards to arrest him and kill him. But Chin was given warning, and he went back to his camp and collected his soldiers. Backed by these trained men, he could outface Chien Shih, and once Shih realised that his plan had failed, there was nothing he could do to control the threat. He had not sufficient authority to bring troops against the Northern Army controlled by the General-in-Chief, and he was compelled to accept the decisions of the Ho family. The power of the Ho family depended on the succession of Liu Pien, and they forced that succession through in a matter of hours. Chien Shih plotted unsuccessfully with the palace eunuchs against Ho Chin, he was found out, and two weeks after Emperor Ling was dead, Chien Shih had been killed and Ho Chin had taken over his troops. Some ten days later, Tung Chung, the other military commander who supported Liu Hsieh, was stripped of his appointment and forced to commit suicide. The power of the Tung clan was broken and Tung Chung's aunt, the Empress-dowager née Tung, died in the sixth Chinese month and was buried in Ho-chien¹. The Ho clan controlled the army at the capital and the regency of the empire; but then Ho Chin, regardless of the wishes of his sister, the Lady Ho,

¹ HHS 59, pp.7a and 7b, HHS annals 10B, p.8b.
thought to turn against the eunuchs.

In fact, the Ho family had good reason to be grateful to the eunuchs. They had helped the Lady Ho on several occasions in her rise to power, and in particular they had saved her from disgrace when she murdered the Lady Wang. The Empress-dowager remembered her debt and supported the eunuchs. However, the Ho were not one of the great clans of the empire, and before they received imperial favour, some of their ancestors had been butchers by trade.¹

As a result, Ho Chin felt that he needed the acceptance and the support of the powerful clans of the empire in order to maintain his authority. The members of the great Yuan clan of Ju-nan, which had held the highest posts in the empire for four generations, were among Ho Chin's chief supporters; the Grand Tutor Yuan Wei was Ho Chin's partner in the administration, and Wei's nephews Shao and Shu were two of Ho Chin's chief military officers. These men, and others, demanded the destruction of the eunuchs as a reward for their alliance. Ho Chin, pressed in one direction by the Empress-dowager and his younger brother Miao, and in the other by his outside supporters, could not make up his mind.

The eunuchs' position was desperately weak. With the death of Chien Shih, they had lost any chance of direct control over part of the army, and with the death of Emperor Ling they had lost the backing which had given reality to their civil authority. Some of the eunuchs and their relatives and their dependants held posts in the civil service, but it was never possible for the palace attendants to control

¹ HHS annals 10B, p.9b.
the whole of the outer administration, and although they had
proscribed and destroyed their obvious opponents twenty years before,
now that the leaders of the civil service which they had permitted
were turning against them, many of their former allies changed sides.
In 168 they had been able to destroy Tou Wu by using the authority
of the Emperor to call in another army against him, but in 189 the
Emperor was completely under the control of the Ho clan.

Ho Chin, undecided, called in more troops to bolster up his
position and over-awe the Lady Ho and the eunuchs. Some of his
advisers protested that he himself had all the soldiers he could
manage and all the force that he needed to control the policy of
the government, but Yüan Shao and his party, with Ho Chin's approval,
continued to call in men with private bands of retainers. They came
from all parts of the empire to threaten the eunuchs in the streets
of the capital. Finally, in an effort to force the eunuchs to leave
the capital and to compel the Empress-dowager to abandon their cause,
Ho Chin called Tung Cho to bring down the army that he commanded in
the northwest and to camp outside Lo-yang. With great talk of justice,
and proclaiming vengeance against the eunuchs, Tung Cho obeyed.

In the eighth month of 189 the eunuchs waylaid Ho Chin and
killed him as he came from the palace. They tried to brand him a
rebel and bring his soldiers under their control, and they named
supporters of their own party to govern the capital as Colonel Director
of the Retainers and Intendant of Ho-nan. But their plan was hopeless
and it failed; Yüan Shao and his family took command of the armies,
they killed the officers that the eunuchs had nominated, they killed Ho Miao for his support of the eunuchs, and then they burnt the gates and stormed the palace and massacred every eunuch that they found.

Chao Chung died in the bloodbath in the imperial palace, but Chang Jang escaped from the capital and took the Young Emperor and Liu Hsieh with his party. They were chased, and Chang Jang and the eunuchs were killed, and the children were brought back. As they came home towards Lo-yang they met Tung Cho and his army.

Tung Cho: 董卓

Cho was a man from Lung-hsi commandery in the northwest of the empire; although he made the claim, it is most unlikely that he had any relationship to the family of the Empress-dowager née Tung. He began his career as a military officer, commanded troops for a short time against Chang Chüeh's Yellow Turbans, and served with success under Huang-fu Sung and Chang Wen when they attacked the rebels in Liang province. When the armies came back from that campaign he was enfeoffed as a marquis and made General of the Van (前將軍 ch'ien-chiang-chün). He served under Huang-fu Sung against the rebel Wang Kuo and was then appointed Governor of Ping province.

The Ling-ti chi, quoted in SKWei 6, p.1b PC, says that in the early months of 189 Cho had been recalled from the northwest to take up a high post at the capital. He wrote back to make excuses and apologies, and he managed to stay with his army until Ho Chin called him to Lo-yang, with his soldiers, to help him against the eunuchs. As a result, Tung Cho and his army were in camp outside Lo-yang as
the crisis between the eunuchs and their opponents came to a head. On the evening of 22 September, 189, Tung Cho saw flames in the sky over the capital. He realised that there was fighting, and he led his army forward to the city, and as he did so, the empire of Han was ended.

Before this time, the plots and the coups and the rebellions in the capital had been kept inside the city. The support or the possession of the emperor had swung the balance of power, and although each conflict had been more serious and more violent than the last, the authority of the emperor had been recognised by every rival group. But now the balance of power which had been maintained under Emperor Ling had been completely destroyed. The Tung clan was gone, the eunuchs had been killed, and the murder of Ho Chin had left the survivors of his party without acceptable leadership. Despite their influence, the Yuan family could not claim enough real support to oppose Tung Cho and his army. As he came into Lo-yang, Ho Chin's troops and the other forces of the capital turned to his command, and the Yuan family could only follow them.

Tung Cho did not hold his power for very long, but the way he gained and used that power meant the end of legitimate rule in the empire. He had control of the Emperor and the capital solely because he was the man in command of the army, and only another army could remove him. More than that, within a few weeks of his coming to Lo-yang, he removed the Young Emperor from the throne and set Liu Hsieh in his place, and at the same time he destroyed the remnants
of the Ho clan to avenge the death of the Empress-dowager née Tung. A few months later, Liu Pien too was dead. There had been no discussion of the rival claims of the two children, but Tung Cho, through military strength, removed the Emperor of the Ho clan and set his own nominee on the throne; the control of the empire was openly held by force and not by right.

Cho was master of Lo-yang, and he had no rival for the imperial authority in the provinces of the north and the northwest, Ping and Liang, but the situation in the rest of the empire was uncertain. Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu and a number of other leaders fled away from Lo-yang to the east and the south and joined with the local and provincial administrations to prepare armies for an attack on the capital. In the early days of 190, Yuan Shao was proclaimed leader of the alliance against Tung Cho, and they threatened Cho with a line of camps from the east in Ho-nei under Yuan Shao to the south in Nan-yang under Yuan Shu. On his side, Cho had a strong defensive position around Lo-yang, but he did not feel certain that he could hold the attacks of the eastern forces out of the city, and in April of 190 the Emperor and his court and the treasures of the capital were driven westwards to Ch'ang-an. The old capital of Former Han was in the 'lands within the passes' (關中 kuan-chung) of present-day Shensi, not such a good site to govern the east of the empire, but an excellent position for defence. Cho himself remained in Lo-yang, but by the spring of 191, when Sun Chien fought his way in, the former capital had been stripped of value, and Tung Cho retired to Ch'ang-an to wait and watch the changes of the times.
As Cho had expected, the alliance in the east did break up, and the leaders fought among themselves. In Ch'ang-an he was secure from their attacks, but before he could take advantage of their quarrels he was killed, on 22 May, 192, and his clan was destroyed in a coup led by the minister Wang Yün and Cho's trusted general Lü Pu. Wang Yün made some attempt to settle the empire and to patch up a peace with the east, but his government lasted little more than a month. There were many of Tung Cho's soldiers outside Ch'ang-an who were afraid that a settlement with the east would bring about their own destruction, and rather than wait to be attacked, they turned against the capital. Lü Pu fled to the east, Wang Yün was killed, and the control of the Emperor and the western capital was left in the hands of a party of generals from the west led by Li Chüeh and Kuo Ssu. Three years after Tung Cho had set him on the throne, the Emperor was a prisoner in his own capital, and his empire had become a gigantic battleground.
Sun Chien: his birth, his family and his early career — (c.155 to 184 A.D.)

Sun Chien was born, probably in 155, in the prefecture of Fu-ch'\un\footnote{According to Wu lu, which is quoted in the primary commentary to Sun Chien's biography in SKWu 1, p.7b, Chien was thirty-seven years old by Chinese reckoning at the time of his death. The date of his death is given as the third year of Ch'u-p'ing (i.e. 192/193) by the main text of the biography, and Ying-hsiung chi says the date was the fourth year of Ch'u-p'ing. However, Ssu-ma Kuang in his Tzu-chih t'ung-chien p. 1928 sets the date in the second year of Ch'u-p'ing, and in his k'ao-yi commentary he notes that a memorial of Sun Ts'e refers to the death of Chien when Ts'e himself was seventeen. Ts'e died in 200 at the age of twenty-six, and so Chien should have died nine years earlier. If Wu lu can be trusted, Chien was born thirty-six years before Ch'u-p'ing second year, and this would set the date of his birth in the first year of Yung-shou (155/156).} in Wu commandery, in the Later Han province called Yang-chou. The site of the former prefectural city of Fu-ch'\un\ is now Fuyang in Chekiang, southeast of Hangchow.

The evidence which we have of Chien's family background and of his early life is very slight and not very trustworthy. We have noticed elsewhere, in the discussion on the San-kuo chih and its value for the early history of Wu, that the early chroniclers of the state were in duty bound to recount something of the father of their
first Emperor, and it is not very surprising if those who came to
look for material were supplied with tales of an ancient lineage and
of wonderful portents, only appropriate to the head of an imperial
house.

According to Wu shu, the official history of Wu, Sun Chien
came from a family with a lineage over six hundred years old, descended
from Sun Wu 孫武, who had served as a general of the ancient state of
Wu at the end of the sixth century, and the descendants of Sun Wu, the
ancestors of Chien, had served as officials of Wu at least until the
destruction of that kingdom about 473. The Wu lu adds that the Sun
family had a burial ground to the east of the city of Fu-ch'un, that
wonderful signs appeared above the graves, and that mysterious dreams
appeared to Chien's mother when she was pregnant.

Some of this account may be true. The descent from such a
legendary figure as Sun Wu is difficult to prove, and the accounts of
portents and dreams are somewhat suspicious, but the extract from Wu lu
does present evidence of Sun Chien's origins which may be reliable. As
a first point, the fact that the only famous ancestor ascribed to this
family is the distant Sun Wu implies that no other relative had risen
to any high office during the whole of the six centuries since his time
and it is still more likely that no member of the clan had held any high
post under the Han dynasty. In biographies in San-kuo chih and in

1 Quoted in SKWu 1, p.1aPC.
2 There is a biography of Sun Wu in Shih chi 65.
other standard histories, it is common practice to mention the ancestry of the subject of the biography and to indicate the titles and careers of his relatives. In SKWu 9, p.1a, for example, we are told that members of the family of Chou Yū 周瑜 had held high posts under the Later Han dynasty. And where the main text of San-kuo chih fails to give this information, the P'ei Sung-chih commentary is often able to quote private clan and family records such as the Lu-shih shih-sung ¹ or other historical works such as the Chin shu of Yü Yü.² The fact that the chroniclers of Wu mentioned no other officials who could be related to Sun Chien strongly suggests that the Sun clan had played a very small part in the history of Han.

However, as a second point, the information in Chien's biography and the stories in the Wu shu extract may be taken to indicate that the family had some local importance. It is possible to accept the story that the family had been settled in Fu-ch'un for some time, and the recognised burial ground, whether or not it was a site of wonderful omens, is evidence of some stability and position. Moreover, the biography says that while Chien was still young, and before he had turned seventeen, he had been appointed a junior civil officer 里 in the prefecture. This, in itself, may show the position of his family. Had Chien belonged to one of the great families of the territory, he could have gained entry into the civil service by recommendation to

¹ SKWu 13, p.1aPC.
² SKWu 15, p.1aPC.
the throne. He might have served a short time in the local office of
the Grand Administrator of Wu commandery, but he could then have been
nominated as a Hsiao-lien 肇廉, 'Filially Pious and Incorrupt' candidate
from the commandery administration, or even as mou-ts'ai 茂才
'Flourishing Talent', a recommendation granted by the government of
the province. A young man of great family, with considerable local
influence and very likely with relatives already among the bureaucracy,
could treat the local administrators as respected equals, and generally
expect such favour and promotion almost as a right.

Sun Chien had no such position and no hope of such consideration,
but his family was at least sufficiently well-known for him to gain
appointment in the prefectural offices. If he had come from the
poorest classes he would probably not have had sufficient time free
from the daily struggle for subsistence to be able to offer his
services, and it is very unlikely that he would have been given any
employment. As it was, for a young man of some ambition and some
leisure, office in the local government could be the first step to
a political career, and even should he rise no higher, the contacts
that he made and the influence that he should gain through this
service might be some protection against the full effects of local
extortion and official oppression in the future. To a large extent,
in imperial China, office in the government at any level was as much
a means of personal and family insurance as it was an opportunity
for public service.

In Han times, the term li was a general description of any
junior officer in the civil administration. In the commanderies and prefectures, the holders of these low-ranking posts were appointed locally and the term 里 could refer to a clerk in the prefectural offices or to one of the yamen runners. There seems no particular reason to doubt the history when it says that Chien held office in the prefecture, but it is not likely that he held any very important post even in his own town of Fu-ch'un, and from his later career as a fighter it seems that Sun Chien probably held his first government position as a policeman or as a guard to the prefectural offices.

According to Chien's biography, he first gained effective notice at the age of seventeen, and if the date of his birth has been calculated correctly, the incident must have taken place in the year 171. At that time, he went with his father on a trip to Ch'ien-t'ang 錦唐, which lay northeast from Fu-ch'un, at the mouth of the Fuchun River, by the site of present-day Hangchow. As they travelled down

---

1 Ch'ien-t'ang had been a prefecture under the Former Han dynasty, but it had been abolished for most of Later Han. The town, of course, remained, but it was no longer the capital of a territory of local administration and it was under the government of the prefecture of Yü-hang 餘杭. The site of the ancient Yü-hang is now at the town of the same name, west of Hangchow. Towards the end of the Later Han dynasty, probably during the reign of Emperor Ling, Ch'ien-t'ang was re-established as a prefecture. In 185, Chu Chün 朱儁 was made Marquis of Ch'ien-t'ang, and it is very likely that it was a fief of prefectural value (HHS 61, p.9a).
the river, they learnt that the local pirate, Hu Yü, had established a camp close by, had robbed travellers of their goods, and was now dividing shares with his band. None of the boats on the river dared to go past. Chien asked permission of his father to attack them, and his father replied only that 'This is nothing to do with you'. Chien climbed up on the bank and went alone, carrying his sword, towards the bandits. When he came in sight of them, he waved his arms and pointed to one side and another, as if he was giving signals to soldiers already deployed for attack. The pirates thought that Chien was the commander of government troops come to capture them, and they scattered in flight. Then Chien chased after them, and he caught one man and cut off his head and came back with the evidence of his victory. His father was very startled.

This makes a fine story, but there is no way of checking it. The pirate Hu Yü was a very petty criminal, the defeat of his band was of no more than local significance and there is no reference to the skirmish anywhere else in the history of this time. However, according to the biography it was this deed that made Chien known to the local government office 府, and he received a summons and was appointed a temporary military commander 假尉 chia-wei. So whatever the details of the story, Chien had brought his name to the attention of the authorities outside his own prefecture and he

---

1 The Chinese text reads 非爾所圖也. (SKWu 1, p.1a.)
had gained a post as a military officer. It is possible that when
the chroniclers of Wu were searching for material on the life of the
founder of their imperial house they heard of this tale of Sun Chien,
and so the story was added, suitably written, to the records of the
state. Some part of it may be true.

This one anecdote contains the only reference to Sun Chien's
father in the histories of the time, and his personal name is not
recorded either in San-kuo chih itself nor in any text quoted by
P'ei Sung-chih's commentary. Moreover, his reaction to Chien's fine
ambition of attacking pirates was not enthusiastic. 'This is nothing
to do with you' is a curious speech from the father of such a hero.
The evidence for all these events is flimsy and unsupported, and any
passages of direct speech must be very doubtful, but nevertheless it
appears that at the time the history was written down there was at
least a tradition that Sun Chien's father was a man of these opinions,
and from the evidence it may be suggested that Chien's father himself
was a merchant. The trip to Ch'ien-t'ang need not have been the first

1 According to one tradition, the personal name of Sun Chien's
father was Chung. There is a tale of the supernatural, entitled
Sun Chung she kua, which is preserved in the Meng ch'iu chi-chu
蒙求集註 of Li Han of the tenth century. But it seems most
likely that this is a later invention, for if the contemporary records
used by Ch'en Shou and P'ei Sung-chih had referred to the name, one
of those historians would surely have mentioned it.
that he had made, and his disapproval of his son's proposed sortie and his preference for minding his own business seem to fit very well with the traditional picture of the Chinese trader. In the Confucian view, merchants were the least valuable members of society, and if the merchants were regarded with disapproval by officials, it is likely that they themselves would have few feelings of public spirit. On the other hand, if Sun Chien had hopes of an official career, as the son of a reasonably prosperous merchant family it would not be difficult for him to obtain appointment to a minor post in his own prefecture.

Sun Chien's appointment as a military commander came at a time when the commanderies of the southeast were fighting to put down the rebellion of Hsü Ch'ang, a man who pretended to have supernatural powers and who had made a rising at Chü-chang in K'uai-chi commandery. According to the annals of Emperor Ling in Hou Han shu, the rebellion broke out in 172 and was not put down until 174. According to Sun Chien's own biography, when the rebellion broke out, the commandery administration appointed him a ssu-ma major and had him raise troops in Wu commandery. He collected more than a thousand men and took part in the campaigns which destroyed the rebels.

---

1 For the personal name Ch'ang, I now follow the text in SKWu 1, but for a fuller discussion of the different texts on this rebellion, see note 8 to my translation of The Biography of Sun Chien. Chü-chang is now southwest of Tzeki in Chekiang.

2 HHS annals 8, pp. 4b and 5b.
Both the early military appointments that Chien held were unusual. When the biography says that the local government office, the fu 府, made him a chia-wei, it does not indicate whether it was the commandery or a prefectural administration that gave him the post. Since the biography refers a little further on to the commandery appointing him a major, it was probably a prefectural office, but again it is not certain whether that prefecture was Fu-ch'un, Yu-hang, or a re-established Ch'ien-t'ang. In each prefecture under the Han dynasty there was a wei 僉 commandant appointed by the central government. Sun Chien may have held a short-term appointment as Commandant in a prefecture in order to fill a vacancy until the new official arrived from the capital, or there may have no such vacancy, and the character chia 台 may imply that Chien was appointed a senior assistant to the regular Commandant of a prefecture. Although the Commandant was an officer of the civil administration, his duties required him to supervise the military security and the police of the prefecture.

From this experience of minor para-military command, Chien was soon called up by the commandery offices, given the rank of major, and sent to recruit troops against the rebels. This recruitment was actually a press system: in normal times there was a regular system of military service, and there were small guard units at commandery and prefectural headquarters composed largely of volunteers, as Chien himself had been, but in time of emergency extra troops had to be levied, and Chien was given a special commission and a small escort
and was sent out with authority to seize any man as a conscript for the army. With the thousand men that he had collected by this means, Chien did well enough in the campaign to attract the notice of the Inspector of Yang province, Tsang Min. Tsang Min recommended him to the capital, and an imperial letter appointed Chien Assistant Prefect of Yen-tu.

1 On the regular liability for military service, see Loewe, 'Military Operations in the Han period', p. 11; on the raising of troops in a time of civil war, see Bielenstein II, pp. 207 and 208. With certain privileged exemptions, all registered subjects of the Han empire were liable to serve in the armed forces for two periods of one year each, and after they had fulfilled this requirement they remained subject to call-up in time of emergency. The full-time military service was generally carried out from age twenty-three, and the military obligations were ended at fifty-six, but the details of the age-limits and the regulations for service naturally varied during the centuries of Han. In practice, these military arrangements must have meant that almost any male Chinese was liable to some military service, and he could be called up at any time by any officer who could claim imperial authority or who could produce sufficient force to effect the impressment.

2 Yen-tu was a prefecture in Kuang-ling commandery in Hsu province; the site is now northwest of Yencheng in Kiangsu.
We have noticed earlier that the accepted method of entry into the imperial civil service was through recommendation by the commandery or provincial governments as a hsiao-lien or mou-ts'ai candidate. A man recommended by his province could be employed at once, but since only one recommendation was allowed to each of the twelve provinces in any year, not many candidates gained entry by this means. The more common route of entry, as hsiao-lien candidate from a commandery, admitted the future official to a post among the gentlemen lan, who attended court as ceremonial attendants of the emperor. In theory, the period spent as a gentleman gave the emperor and the senior officials an opportunity to observe and judge the character of the candidate, but in fact, by the later years of Han, this probationary period was no more than a matter of form, and the recommendation from the local government was the effective means of entry into the imperial service.¹

The principle behind this procedure of recommendation and appointment was that any person who wished to enter the imperial civil service must receive the commission of the emperor. The lowest positions in the government, both in the capital and in the empire as a whole, could be filled by local recruitment, but those who held posts in this fashion were in much the same position as non-commissioned officers in an army: no matter how long they served they could not

¹ For a fuller discussion of this point, see my article on Recruitment.
rise above a certain rank. Those who received the imperial commission could be appointed from the capital to take charge of any local government in the empire, and they could rise through successive posts in the capital or in the provinces to reach the highest offices of the land. This gap between the locally appointed, non-commissioned officers and the officials with commissions appointed from the capital was generally bridged by the process of recommendation.

Up to this time, although Sun Chien had held posts in the lower ranks of the government, as li, chia-wei and as ssu-ma, all these appointments had been made by the local administrations and therefore entailed no imperial recognition or commission. Now, when Tsang Min sent in a report on his good conduct in the campaigns against Hsü Ch'ang,¹ Chien received an imperial letter chao-shu to grant him the post as Assistant Prefect. The Prefect, the Commandant and the Assistant Prefect of any prefecture in the Han empire were appointed by the central government, and so Tsang Min's recommendation, though not in the usual form of candidacy, had gained Chien imperial recognition and a post in the imperial service.

Chien was Assistant at three prefectures one after another; first at Yen-tu, then at Hsü-yi and then at Hsia-p'i. The site of Hsü-yi is now northwest of the town of the same name in Anhwei, and Hsia-p'i is now east of Pi in Kiangsu; both prefectures were in Hsia-p'i commandery in Hsü province under the Later Han,

¹ The Chinese text reads 别上功状.
and Hsia-p'i was the capital of the commandery. It was the practice of the Han administration that imperial officials should not take part in the government of their own native regions and Sun Chien served all his three tours of duty in the lands north of the Yangtse, more than two hundred miles from his home city. He was presumably given his recommendation and first appointment in 174, when the rebellion of Hsü Ch'ang had been crushed, and for the next ten years he remained an official of the local administration in Hsü province. Although Hsia-p'i, as the capital of a commandery, was a more important post than the two that had gone before, Chien had gained no real promotion in the service; he was still an Assistant Prefect, and he held no independent responsibility. However, we are told by Chiang-piao chuan, quoted in the commentary to Chien's biography, that '
wherever he was he had a good reputation and the officers and the people loved him and trusted him. There were always hundreds of his old friends from his own district and young adventurers who came visiting him; Chien looked after them and cared for them like his own family'.

In the year 184, Sun Chien was thirty years old by Chinese reckoning, he held a minor post in the imperial service at Hsia-p'i, he was experienced in war, and he had gathered a small group of friends and followers who might be prepared to support him in the future.

---

1 On this, see in particular the calculations of Yen Keng-wang in his article on 'The Institution of Local Administration in the Han Dynasty, p.228 and in his 'History', Part I, pp.351 ff.
The rise to high command (184 to 189):

When the rebellion of the Yellow Turbans broke out in the east of China in the first months of 184, one large group of the rebels was operating about Ying-ch'uan commandery, which lay between the imperial capital and the lands of the lower Yangtse. Huang-fu Sung and Chu Chun were sent out to attack them. Chu Chun was a man from K'uai-ch'i commandery, and according to Sun Chien's biography he memorialised (piao) that Chien should be appointed tso-chün ssu-ma 'Associate Major'.

The treatise of officials of Hou Han shu describes a chün ssu-ma as the second in command of a pu regiment, and on occasion a pieh-pu ssu-ma Major with a Separate Command could also be appointed, with a large or small force according to circumstances. But when Sun Chien was appointed Associate Major, he collected his own troops, and it is clear that this commission was of the same type as his earlier service as a Major of Wu commandery in the campaign against Hsü Ch'ang. With such a widespread rebellion to deal with, the imperial commanders would be anxious to gain any reinforcements that they could, and the territory of the lower Yangtse valley was not greatly affected by the teachings of the Yellow Turbans of Chang Chüeh and was close enough to be a convenient source of recruits for the imperial army. It is possible that Chu Chun had heard of Sun Chien as a fighting man from his own native region, and it is very likely that there were other imperial

---

1 HHS treatise 24, pp. 7b and 8a.
officials who were sent special commissions and authority to recruit soldiers for the emergency campaign. Sun Chien collected his own troops, and he marched to join Chu Chün's army with a thousand men under his command.

According to Chien's biography, some of his contingent was made up of the young people from his own district who had gathered to him at Hsia-p′i, and besides these he also called up travelling merchants (商人 shang-lü) and the trained soldiers of the region of the Hwai and Ssu rivers. So the force with which he went to war was made up partly of men who were prepared to accept him as a personal leader and partly of wanderers, men who were not settled on any particular piece of land and so had few rights to consideration in a subsistence economy. The rest of his band was made up of those men of military age who had served their regular term in the army but who remained liable to summons. All these men, whether personal followers, unplaced persons or citizen levies, were raised and commanded by one man, and as this impromptu method of imperial recruitment continued in the wars that followed, any military leader was considered to have some personal interest and rights in the men that he led, and the men themselves tended to look more to their immediate commander rather than to the general or the emperor that he served.

Sun Chien followed Chu Chün on his campaign against the rebels of Ying-ch'uan and Ju-nan 沙南 commanderies. His biography records that wherever he turned there was none that could withstand him, and it tells how he led the attack on Wan 府 city, the capital of Nan-yang
In the last months of 184, rebellion had broken out in Liang province, in the west of the empire. Early in 185, the rebel troops and their barbarian allies attacked Ch'ang-an, and although Huang-fu Sung was sent against them he gained no success and he was replaced in the eighth month of that year. His successor was Chang Wen, who had been appointed Minister of Works in the year before and who was now transferred from his high civil post to take command of an army in the field. Sun Chien was appointed a

1 Wan is now Nanyang in Honan.

2 HHS annals 8, p.12b. The eighth Chinese month of 185 was the period 12 September to 11 October western reckoning.
member of his staff. There is no record of what Chien had been doing in the few months since the defeat of the Yellow Turbans at Wan, but many troops were transferred from the Great Plain to deal with the threat from the west, and Chien may already have served against the Liang-chou rebels before he was noticed by Chang Wen. His biography says that Chang Wen went west in the third year of Chung-p'ing (186), and that he sent in a memorial with a request for Chien's services. The other sources for the history of the Liang-chou rebellion make it clear that Huang-fu Sung was replaced by Chang Wen in 185, and not in 186, and it is most likely, though not certain, that Sun Chien joined Wen's staff at the same time. Chien's own biography gives no details of the course of the campaign, but it does contain a curious story which shows Chien's early dislike for the future dictator Tung Cho.

1 The phrase in Sun Chien's biography is yü ts'än chün-shih 與參軍事; the title ts'än-chün or ts'än-chün-shih appears frequently towards the end of Han and during the Three Kingdoms, and the position is discussed in Chin shu 24, p.3b. HHS 62, p.2a refers to Chien as a ts'än-chün-shih, and Hu San-hsing's commentary to TICT p.1881 suggests that this is an early reference to the office, while it is clear that Ssu-ma Kuang interpreted it that way. But the phrase probably means only 'to take part in the affairs of the army' and is not the title of any particular military post.
The biography says that Chang Wen brought his army to Ch'ang-an, and from there he summoned Tung Cho by the imperial authority, but Cho was slow to come and when he did arrive he was discourteous and disobedient. Sun Chien, who was in attendance on Chang Wen, came forward and presented a long argument, illustrated with allusions and examples from the classics, urging that Cho should be executed for his lack of success against the enemy and for his refractory behaviour towards his superior officers. Since this speech is said to have been delivered in a whisper to Chang Wen alone, it is difficult to see how it could have been recorded at the time, and it is impossible to rely on the circumstantial account as it is presented in Chien's biography in San-kuo chih. However, it may be true that Chien did at some time propose Cho should be punished for some disobedience or discourtesy, and some later writer devised a speech suitable for the occasion.

The development of the Liang-chou rebellion has been discussed elsewhere, and from the annals of Emperor Ling and the biographies of Huang-fu Sung and Tung Cho it is possible to construct a coherent account of the course of events.\(^1\) After Chang Wen had taken command of the army at Ch'ang-an, he moved to the west, and in the eleventh month of 185 he defeated the rebels in a battle at Mei-yang, which is now west of Wukung in Shensi.\(^2\) The enemy retreated to

---

\(^1\) HHS annals 8; biography of Huang-fu Sung in HHS 60; biographies of Tung Cho in HHS 62 and SKWei 6.

\(^2\) HHS annals 8, p.12b.
the west in good order, and Chang Wen sent a detachment under Tung Cho to pursue the Ch'iang barbarian allies of the rebels, while the main army, under Chou Shen, was sent to besiege the rebel commander Pien Chang in Yü-chung. It was possibly at this time, after the battle of Mei-yang, that Tung Cho objected to his orders and then Sun Chien accused him of disloyalty and suggested that he be punished.

Actually, Tung Cho was Chang Wen's most successful commander. He had done well in the abortive campaign under Huang-fu Sung, and he had played a great part in the victory of Mei-yang. Moreover, in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary to SKWu 1, p. 6a, there is an extract from the book Shan-yang kung tsai-chi which contains a record of a discussion of this campaign between Tung Cho and Liu Ai. If this record is genuine, it gives Cho's version of the plan of campaign and tells something of the strategies proposed at that time. Like any version of direct speech in these histories, the passage must be suspect, but Liu Ai was an historian himself, the author of the Ling-ti chi (Annals of Emperor Ling), and if Tung Cho had spoken to him at Ch'ang-an, he might well have kept a note of the incident. The conversation is said to have taken place in Ch'ang-an in 191, and there is evidence that Liu Ai held an appointment at Ch'ang-an in 195 as an attendant

---

1 HHS 62, p. 2b; Yü-chung is now north of the city of the same name in Kansu.

2 HHS 62, pp. 1b and 2a.
of the Emperor, so it is quite possible that he had come to Ch'ang-an when Tung Cho shifted the capital in 191, and he could have had an opportunity to talk with him.

According to this record of Shan-yang kung tsai-chi, when Chang Wen proposed to send Chou Shen and Tung Cho in charge of separate columns to the west, Cho had proposed that only one army be sent out, and that he himself should stay behind to act as a support in the rear. His idea was that the rebels would be afraid to commit themselves to any major operation against Chou Shen as long as they were threatened with attack from this large reserve, and so the advance force would be able to move freely and maintain the initiative. If the two armies both went forward to enemy country, Cho was afraid that the rebels would be able to watch both columns, concentrate their forces where they wished, and attack them separately. In fact, this is what happened. The two parts of the imperial army were each caught by the rebels in unfamiliar territory with extended lines of communications; Tung Cho was besieged by the barbarians and had to fight his way out, while Chou Shen was also caught by a counter-attack of the rebels and had to abandon his baggage train as he fled.

In the same conversation, Cho said that Sun Chien had had the same idea, and that when he was a subordinate commander in Chou Shen's force he had suggested that Shen should use the majority of

---

1 e.g. HHS 62, p.12b.

2 HHS 62, pp.2b and 2a.
his troops to establish a secure base and send Chien himself out with a small independent command. The enemy would be tied down by the threat of the main attack, and Sun Chien and his detachment would be able to raid their strongpoints and their communications without interference. An army of rebels would be afraid to engage any part of the imperial forces in a major battle, because they could be held in that engagement and crushed when the main body came up.

This plan that Sun Chien proposed to Chou Shen is also mentioned in Hou Han shu, but that account is clearly based on the Shan-yang kung tsai-chi version. If the record of the conversation is accurate and if Tung Cho was correct, then he and Chien had certainly proposed similar plans, the chief difference being that Sun Chien had asked to lead the striking force in advance, and Tung Cho had proposed to remain in command of the soldiers at the base. In both cases the commanding officers refused to accept the plan.2

1 HHS 62, p.2a.

2 Although his plan had been rejected by Chang Wen, and he was compelled to lead his own forces to the west, Tung Cho made use of the strategy that he had recommended for his own operations. When he was besieged by the barbarians, he sent a detachment to a camp at An-ting commandery and give a show of strength. The barbarians did not know how large this force was, and the threat of unknown strength from an established base prevented them from concentrating their full power against Tung Cho's main army and made them reluctant to undertake a major engagement. Cho was able to fight his way out with a series of skirmishes, and he rescued his column and he was given a marquisate for his success. (Such is the story ascribed to Tung Cho in Shan-yang kung tsai-chi, SKWu 1, p.6aPC.)
In 186, after his expedition to the northwest had been turned back, Chang Wen brought the main body of his army back to Ch'ang-an. The threat to the capital district had been removed, and although the rebels still held much of Liang province, there was no opportunity for immediate military action against them. Despite the victory at Mei-yang, the later stages of the campaign had been quite unsuccessful. Tung Cho was honoured and was kept in command on the frontier, but few rewards were given to the other officers. Sun Chien returned to the capital with Chang Wen, and he was appointed yi-lang in the civil administration.¹

¹ According to Chien's biography, when the rebels heard that Chang Wen's great army was coming against them, they 'separated and scattered and they all begged to surrender. The army came home, but the imperial advisers held that they had not actually fought with the enemy, and so they did not decide to give rewards'. (SKWu 1, p.3a.) But in fact, as we have seen, the campaign took a different course. The imperial army had fought the enemy and had won a victory and the rebels had turned back to the west, but the rebels were not scattered and they did not surrender in any numbers. The account in Sun Chien's biography is contradicted by all the other records of the rebellion in Liang province. It may be that the biographer was concerned to explain why Chien received no immediate reward or promotion when he came back to the capital, but this is an interesting example of how very unreliable such a text can be when the hero of the story is a minor figure in the events it describes, and where those events took place at some distance of time and space. See also pp.341 ff. below.
A Gentleman-consultant, as the name implies, held a position as an adviser at the imperial court. With a salary ranked at six hundred piculs, the post was not a high one,\(^1\) and it may be that Chien actually lost rank when he made this transfer. The salary of a full Major in the army was assessed at one thousand piculs\(^2\) and although the salary of a Major with a Separate Command, which was Chien's substantive rank, may have varied with the importance of the appointment which was held, it is not likely that it was less than six hundred piculs.\(^3\)

\(^1\) HHS treatise 25, p.7a.
\(^2\) HHS treatise 24, p.7b.
\(^3\) Under the Han dynasty, official ranks in the army and in the civil service were expressed in terms of the nominal salary of the office. The highest posts, those of the three dukes, were described as receiving salaries of Ten Thousand Piculs (萬石 wan shih), next were those officers with Fully Two Thousand Piculs (中千石 chung erh-ch'ien shih), Two Thousand Piculs (二千石 erh-ch'ien shih), Equivalent to Two Thousand Piculs (四千石 pi erh-ch'ien shih), One Thousand Piculs (千石 ch'ien-shih) and so on downwards. The salary itself was paid part in grain and part in cash and the actual amounts varied from time to time; see, on this, HHS treatise 28, pp.14b and 15a, and Swann pp.47 to 49.
However, Chien did not remain long at the capital. By the next year, 187, he had been appointed Grand Administrator of Ch'ang-sha commandery, with a salary ranked at Two Thousand Piculs, and he was engaged in military campaigns against large groups of rebels who were operating in the mountainous regions of the Nan Ling, in the south of Ch'ang-sha and in the neighbouring commanderies of Ling-ling and Kuei-jiang.

According to Chien's biography, a rebel leader of Ch'ang-sha, Ou Hsing, had called himself a general and was attacking and besieging cities with an army of more than ten thousand men. Chien was sent to the commandery as Grand Administrator, and he worked out a plan of attack and destroyed Ou Hsing and his followers in Ch'ang-sha within a month of his arrival. He then turned against the rebel leaders Chou Ch'ao and Kuo Shih, who had made trouble in Ling-ling and in Kuei-jiang and who had been in alliance with Ou Hsing. Chien went outside his own commandery and chased them and destroyed their forces.

According to the annals of the reign of Emperor Ling in Hou Han shu, the rebel Kuan Ku, General who Pacifies Heaven, had called himself 官麄 平天將軍 平天將軍 and had ravaged Kuei-jiang commandery. In the tenth month of 187, he was attacked and beheaded by Sun Chien, the Grand Administrator of Ch'ang-sha.

---

1 HHS annals 8, p.14a.
There is some disagreement about the names of the rebel chieftains that Sun Chien defeated, but there seems no real problem about the course of events. Most likely, there had been groups of rebels and bandits active in Ch'ang-sha and the neighbouring territories for some time, probably since the troubles with the Yellow Turbans in 184. By 187, the disturbance had become sufficiently serious to attract the special attention of the court, and Sun Chien, as a man of known military experience, was sent out to take over the administration of Ch'ang-sha and to restore order. It is said that when he came to his commandery he issued orders saying; "Treat the good people carefully and mildly, keep the official documents according to the regulations; leave the robbers and the killers to me!"

The names of the rebel leaders are not of great importance; the organisation of such groups is seldom very permanent, and it is easy to imagine that Ou Hsing, Kuan Ku, Chou Ch'ao and Kuo Shih had all been in command of rebel forces about this time. It is possible that the rebels of the three commanderies Ch'ang-sha, Ling-ling and Kuei-yang had operated in some loose association, and Kuan Ku was one

1 The title p'ing-t'ien chiang-chün, said to have been taken by Kuan Ku, may have owed something to Chang Chüeh, who had, according to one source, styled himself the Great Peace of the Yellow Heaven (huang-t'ien t'ai-p'ing; SKWu 1, p.1b) and who had certainly used such phraseology.

2 SKWu 1, p.3b PC, quoting Wei shu.
of their leaders. When Sun Chien came to Ch'ang-sha, he first settled the local rebellion under Ou Hsing, and then he turned against the two other groups. By the time he did so, Kuan Ku had been replaced by Chou Ch'ao and Kuo Shih, and it was these men, the new commanders of the force originally under Kuan Ku, who were destroyed by Sun Chien. The records of the court, five hundred miles away from the scene of this varied action, could easily be confused over the names of these minor figures, but the essential point is that in the tenth month of 187 Sun Chien had crushed the rebellion in the south of the Yangtse, and according to his biography he was enfeoffed as Marquis of Wu-ch'eng for his good work.  

Under the Later Han, Ch'ang-sha commandery controlled the settled territory along the valley of the Siang River from the Tung Ting Lake south to the region of Hengyang, at the junction of the Lei with the Siang. The upper valley of the Siang was under Ling-ling commandery, and the course of the Lei south of Hengyang was under Kuei-yang. On the western borders of Ch'ang-sha commandery lay the barbarian hill-country of the Sueheng Shan, and on the east were the ridges of the Mufu and Wukung Shan, also without any real Chinese settlement. Thus Ch'ang-sha controlled the land route of communications between the Yangtse valley and the province of Chiao-chih south of the Nan Ling.

---

1 SKwu 1, p.36; Wu-ch'eng prefecture was in Wu commandery, it is now south of Wuiling (or Huchow) in Chekiang.
As Grand Administrator of Ch'ang-sha, Sun Chien was responsible for the civil administration of the commandery, and in normal times a Grand Administrator would be a civilian official and would have military officers appointed to assist him. However, Chien had been appointed on his military record and his administration was unusual. Once his position was established Chien was able to intervene in aid of the governments of Ling-ling and Kuei-yang against the rebels within their borders, and according to his biography, the three commanderies acknowledged him. In fact, without special authority, Chien had no right to take any action outside the borders of his own commandery, but he was able to claim that the exceptional disorder and spread of rebellion demanded exceptional measures. It was about this time that the Chief of Yi-ch'un 宜春 prefecture in Yü-chang 豫章 commandery asked for help when he was attacked by bandits, and when Chien made ready to go, one of his officials objected, saying that he was disobeying the regulations. Chien replied: 'I have none of the civil graces; warfare is my work. If I cross the boundaries to attack some rebels, that is giving help to a neighbour, and even if I commit a crime by doing this, why should I feel ashamed?' From the fact that he was enfeoffed as a marquis, we may judge that the court approved his policy.

1 SKWu 1, p.3b.

2 Yi-ch'un prefecture is now Ichun in Kiangsi, it lay close to the borders of Ch'ang-sha commandery on the other side of the ranges to the east.
Sun Chien remained as Grand Administrator in Ch'ang-sha for three years. By his successes against the rebels he had justified his remarkable promotion and his high civil appointment. When chaos came to the imperial capital in 189 Chien controlled the lands and people of his own commandery, he had established his influence with the administrators who were his neighbours, and he was prepared to bring an army north to aid the Emperor.

The war against Tung Cho (189 to 191):

In the eighth Chinese month of 189, Tung Cho gained control of Lo-yang, deposed the young Emperor, Liu Pien, and set up his own nominee, Pien's half-brother Liu Hsieh. Yuan Shao, who had been one of the leaders in the politics of the capital, resigned his offices and fled to the east, and he and his cousin Yuan Shu raised armies against Tung Cho, claiming that they were coming to the rescue of the Emperor. By the beginning of 190 the Yuan clan and their allies had collected their troops together, and the whole force, known as the soldiers from the east of the mountains (shan-tung 山東) advanced against the capital and established camps in an arc from the northeast to the south of Lo-yang. Yuan Shao had his headquarters in Ho-nei 河內 commandery, near present-day Wuchih 武陟 in Honan; Yuan Shu was based at Lu-yang 魯陽 prefecture in Nan-yang 南陽, now Lushan 鲁山 in Honan; and a third group was concentrated at Suan-tsao 酸棗 prefecture in Ch'en-liu 陳留, now north of Yentsing 延津 in Honan. Yuan Shao was elected the leader of the alliance.  

1 HHS 64A, p.3a.
Four generations of the Yuan family had risen to the highest ranks in the imperial civil service, and Shao and Shu, the descendants of this powerful and wealthy clan, had made contacts and alliances with high officials, prosperous families and leading local clans. The men who joined them in the attack on Tung Cho included administrators who had been appointed in the reign of Emperor Ling and also such leaders as Ts'ao Ts'ao, who had fled from the capital under a false name and raised troops in his native region; and there were other

---

1 The prestige of the Yuan family and the official positions of Shao and Shu themselves ensured that they would be treated with respect and friendship by the officials of the empire; on their policy of cultivating hao-chíeh, see HHS 59, pp.7b and 8b. On the term hao-chíeh 'local elite' as a description of important and wealthy local clans, not necessarily with members in the imperial civil service, but with influence and prestige in their own territory and often with bands of armed retainers, see Hsü Cho-yün, 'The Changing Relationship between Local Society and the Central Power in Former Han: 206 B.C. - 8 A.D.', p.361, note 21, and also my own discussion in 'South China under the Later Han dynasty', pp.84 f.

2 SKWei 1, p.4a: when Ts'ao came to Ch'en-liu, which bordered on the southeast with his own commandery of P'ei, he distributed his family property and raised soldiers to fight Tung Cho.
officials, such as Han Fu, Governor of Chi province, and Liu Tai, Inspector of Yen province, who had been appointed by Tung Cho himself, but who now turned against him. Sun Chien, down in Ch'ang-sha, also collected an army and came north to join the loyal rebels. On his way, he took the opportunity to kill two imperial officials, the Inspector (刺史 tz'u-shih) of Ching province and the Grand Administrator of Nan-yang.

---

1 HHS 62, p.6a says that Han Fu and Liu T'ai were appointed Inspectors of Chi and Yen provinces by Tung Cho; HHS 64A, p.3a refers to them as allies of Yuan Shao in the east of the mountains. Han Fu, however, is cited as a Governor (牧 mu) in HHS 64A, and he had either received a promotion or taken it for himself. The position of an Inspector in a province is discussed in more detail below, but we may note here that during the Later Han dynasty the provinces had been under the supervision of inspectors, who would report wrongdoing to the capital, but who were outranked by the rulers of the commanderies and kingdoms and had no direct authority over them. In 188 there had been governors appointed, with rank comparable to that of a minister (侍中 ch'ing) at the capital, and they were able to control the commanderies and kingdoms. From this time the provinces became the major political units of the empire (HHS 65, p.1b). But although the change had been made, inspectors could still be appointed, and a province was headed by an Inspector or a Governor, according to circumstances.
According to *Wu lu*, quoted in the commentary to Chien's biography, the Inspector of Ching province was a man called Wang Jui. Under the Later Han, the Inspector of a province was appointed to check the administration of the commanderies and kingdoms of his region and to report to the throne on any wrongdoing. His salary was only six hundred piculs, and so he was lower in rank than the Grand Administrators and Chancellors that he supervised, and he had no direct authority in local government. But the appointment of inspectors gave the imperial court a double check on the administration of the empire, and where there were sidespread rebellions or banditry, the Inspector was often empowered to raise troops from the province as a whole and take part in the campaign to suppress the disturbance.

Wang Jui had accompanied Sun Chien on the campaign against the rebels in Ling-ling and Kuei-yang two or three years earlier, and on that occasion he had made some slighting remark about Chien's military appointment. Since we have seen that Chien was appointed to Ch'ang-sha as a man to put down the bandits, and since his promotion from Gentleman-consultant to Grand Administrator was rather unusual, it is possible to imagine that Wang Jui was a little jealous. He may have allowed himself to make some unguarded remark to the effect that the government of a commandery was the work of a trained and experienced administrator and that fighting men should only act as his assistants. Sun Chien remembered the insult.

The headquarters of the Inspector of Ching province were at Han-shou, prefecture in Wu-ling commandery, now northeast of...
Changteh 常德 in Hunan. From Ch'ang-sha, Sun Chien passed the Tung Ting Lake on the east and his way led past Wang Jui. The story told in Wu lu says that Jui had also raised soldiers to attack Tung Cho, but that he had an old quarrel with Ts'ao Yin 曹寅, who was Grand Administrator of Wu-ling, and he had let it be known that he planned to use his troops to kill Yin before he led them away to the north. Yin, as Grand Administrator, had his capital at Lin-yüan 隔沅, which is now west of Changteh and was thus quite close to Han-shou. He was frightened of Wang Jui, and he thought to turn Sun Chien's arrival to his own advantage, and so he forged an imperial order and sent it to him. The document claimed to be a message from an imperial investigating officer, it accused Wang Jui of various crimes, and Chien was instructed to execute him. He accepted the order, brought his soldiers forward to Han-shou, and they gained entrance to the city by pretending that they had come for supplies. When Chien appeared and explained the real purpose of his visit, Wang Jui committed suicide.

There is no way to tell how much of the Wu lu story is true and how much is a later embellishment, but even if Sun Chien did receive a false dispatch, it is not likely that he was very concerned with the possibility of forgery. He could always explain that he had believed it to be genuine, and for his own purposes, the opportunity to eliminate Wang Jui was very useful. Not only did he satisfy a private grudge, but he also gained control of Wang Jui's soldiers and added them to his own army. If Wang Jui could threaten the Grand Administrator, he evidently held the majority of the soldiers in Wu-ling, and he may have
had levies from other parts of the province. Sun Chien had his own troops from Ch'ang-sha, and it is very likely that he had some detachments from Ling-ling and Kuei-yang. Now he combined Wang Jui's troops with his own, and he could collect more men as he marched. His biography suggests, perhaps with some exaggeration, that when he came to Nan-yang his army was numbered by the tens of thousands.

Nan-yang was the most northern commandery of Ching province, and with a population of almost two and a half million individuals it was one of the largest in the empire. The capital prefecture, Wan, now Nanyang in Honan, had been a centre of Yellow Turban activity and the scene of fierce fighting a few years before. The Grand Administrator, Chang Tzu, had been appointed by Tung Cho, and although Han Fu and Liu Tai had shown that the men that Cho appointed could be quite prepared to change sides and fight against him, it was natural for Sun Chien to be wary and suspicious as he entered this territory. Nan-yang stretched northeast from the valley of the Han River near Hsiang-yang, and Lu-yang, Yuan Shu's headquarters, lay within its borders. Sun Chien had to travel that way, and it would have been dangerous for the armies attacking Tung Cho if the ruler of such an important commandery had been in any way unsure of his commitment to their cause.

With his great army from the south, Sun Chien came forward to Wan, and there are two accounts of what took place between Chien and Chang Tzu. According to the Hsien-ti ch'un-ch'iu and Sun Chien's own biography, he had asked Chang Tzu for supplies for
his army, but when he arrived there was nothing prepared for him. It is possible that Chang Tzu was unwilling to recognise Chien as a military commander, and Chien, as Grand Administrator of one commandery, had no right to ask for provisions from another. When Chien came up, the two officials exchanged gifts and Chien paid his respects to Chang Tzu; on the second day, Chang Tzu repaid the visit and went to Chien's camp. While he was there, Chien's Master of Records (主簿 chü-pu), one of his senior clerical officers, came in and reported that although due notice had been sent ahead there had been nothing done in Nan-yang to receive the loyal troops. Chang Tzu was frightened and tried to escape, but Chien arrested him, and after a short further enquiry he was judged guilty of treason and was executed according to military law.

According to Hsien-ti ch'un-ch'iu, quoted in SKWu 1, p.4aPC, Chien had been given a provisional appointment (假 chia) as General of the Gentlemen of the Household 中郎將 chung-lang-chiang by Yuan Shu before he came to Nan-yang. Although the Generals of the Gentlemen of the Household were usually court appointments, officers with this rank had served in military campaigns in the past (see, for example, Bielenstein II, p.204 and note 5). Chang Tzu was not unreasonable if he denied Yuan Shu's authority to make such an appointment, and he was within his rights in refusing supplies to Chien as a Grand Administrator from Ch'ang-sha who had strayed outside his proper territory; but such lack of co-operation did not augur well for the future.
The version given by Wu li differs in some details: there it is said that Tzu would not visit Chien, but Chien pretended to be desperately ill and offered to turn his troops over to Chang Tzu's command, and when Tzu came to his tent to take advantage of the offer, Chien leaped from his bed, swore at his visitor, and cut his head off.

However the affair was managed, Chang Tzu was killed. It is very likely that Tzu had had reservations about the men of the east of the mountains, and he may have been reluctant to give his full support to Yüan Shu or to Sun Chien, his ally. Since any obstruction in Nan-yang would cut Chien off from his own sources of supply in the south, and since the commandery troops of Nan-yang would provide a useful reinforcement to his own army, Chien had good reason to look for some excuse to eliminate such a potential rival. When he had settled the government of Nan-yang, he went forward to Lu-yang and joined forces with Yüan Shu. Shu recommended him as acting General Who Routs the Caitiffs (破虜將軍 p'o-lu chiang-chün) and Inspector of Yü province.

The qualifying term 'acting' (行 hsing) to the posts which Yüan Shu granted to Sun Chien may reflect the idea that this promotion was still subject to imperial confirmation, and the expression piao 'memorialised' or 'recommended' indicates that he was reporting his actions to the Emperor. In fact, of course, any recommendation from Yüan Shu to the Emperor would be quite ineffective; Shu was the declared enemy of Tung Cho, and Tung Cho was in complete control of the actions and the published decisions of the young ruler. However,
the Yuan cousins and their allies had said that they were acting in the Emperor's name to save him from the oppression of the over-powerful minister, and so they went through the formalities of recording and announcing their recommendations of officers, and they could claim to believe that the Emperor would confirm their actions as soon as they had removed him from the clutches of Tung Cho and set him under their own guidance. When these loyal rebels began their campaign, some of them had taken titles for themselves, and although the situation soon got out of hand and the formality of recommendation and appointment became meaningless, few of the contending war-lords at the end of Han failed to pay this lip-service to the authority of the Emperor.  

---

1 Yuan Shao, for example, had called himself General of Chariots and Cavalry (車騎將軍 chu-chi chiang-chün), which was the second highest regular military post in the empire, and had also claimed to take command (總領 ling) as Colonel Director of the Retainers (HHS 64A, p.3a). Ts'ao Ts'ao had become acting General Displaying Firmness (奮武將軍 fen-wu chiang-chün) (SKWei 1, p.5a).

2 As we will see below, since the whole situation was completely non-legal, and since the Emperor's approval could seldom be obtained for any appointment and could generally be disregarded when it was, there was nothing to prevent more than one man being nominated for the same position by rival warlords. In this way, for example, Yuan Shao later had occasion to nominate one of his own officers as Inspector of Yu province and send him to attack Sun Chien (see below, p.243).

However, it is unlikely that Sun Chien's nomination by Yuan Shu at this time was made in despite of any existing Inspector of Yu province. A certain K'ung Chou 孔宙 had held that title and had joined Yuan Shao's rebellion (HHS 64A, p.3a), but no mention of him is made after that time, and it is probable that he had retired or died or changed his post by the time Sun Chien was appointed. It is not likely that Yuan Shu would needlessly antagonise one of the allies at this time by proposing one of his own men for a post which was already held.
The titles which Sun Chien now held gave him both military and civil authority. As Inspector of Yü province, he had authority in six commanderies, including Ying-ch'uan and Ju-nan, between the upper reaches of the Hwai and the Yellow River, and this wealthy province was the homeland of the Yüan family. We have noticed already that the rank of an Inspector was not very high, but the position conferred the right to raise troops from the province, and as Yüan Shu's lieutenant Chien could arrange much of the recruitment and reinforcement of his own army.

By his destruction of Wang Jui and Chang Tzu, Chien had left vacancies for the imperial positions of Inspector of Ching province and Grand Administrator of Nan-yang. He himself accepted the authority of Yüan Shu as one of the leaders of the loyal rebellion and Yüan Shu was

1 Yüan Shu had been given imperial appointment as General of the Rear (後將軍 hou-chiang-chün) when Tung Cho first came to the capital, and he had retained this rank as a leader of rebellion (HHS 65, p.6a). As General of the Rear, Shu held one of the eight highest regular military posts of the empire (HHS treatise 24, p.6b), and the holders of such established appointments, Yüan Shu and Yüan Shao (who was General of Chariots and Cavalry, see previous note), were senior to officers with more flowery titles (雜號 tsa-hao), such as Ts'ao Ts'a, the General Displaying Firmness, and Sun Chien, the General Who Routes the Caitiffs.
able to take over Nan-yang for his own. However, when news of Wang Jui's fall reached the capital, a new Inspector was appointed in his place. Liu Piao, who was a member of the imperial clan and who had at one time been involved in the factions of the early years of Emperor Ling but who had been called to the capital during the short hegemony of the Ho clan, was now appointed by the central government of Tung Cho and sent to restore order in Ching province. Yüan Shu was blockading the main road to the south, and the breakdown of government had led to banditry and clan fighting in the province itself, but Piao managed to make his way unaccompanied and established a headquarters at Yi-ch'eng prefecture in Nan commandery.¹ Tung Cho's government may have expected that his past history as a member of the old proscribed party and as one of Ho Chin's supporters would make it possible for him to arrange some form of co-existence with Yüan Shu and the east of the mountains. This did prove to be the case: Shu accepted Piao's occupation of the southern part of Ching province and Piao recommended Shu as Grand Administrator of Nan-yang; but Piao took no part, on either side, in the fighting between Tung Cho and the rebels.²

While Yüan Shu was thus disposing of Sun Chien's spoils, Chien himself had launched the main attack on Tung Cho's position in Lo-yang. He had first established his headquarters at Lu-yang, with Yüan Shu, and from there he made arrangements for lines of supply from Yü province.

¹ Now south of Icheng in Hupei.
² HHS 65, p.6a, and HHS 64B, p.8b.
Then he marched north against Liang 梁 prefecture in Ho-nan commandery, now east of Linju 临汝 in Honan. As the modern name of the place implies, the city of Liang lay on the upper reaches of the Ju River, and an advance north or west along this valley would bring Chien's army to the crest of a ridge of the Hsiungerh Shan. From there he could cross the watershed to the valley of the Yi Shui and then descend on Lo-yang from the south. Kuang-ch'eng 庢域, one of the eight passes which defended Lo-yang, was established west of Liang and guarded this route of attack, but a fortified post would not long delay so strong an army as Sun Chien commanded.

Tung Cho recognised the threat, and he sent out an army, under the command of his officer Hsü Jung 徐榮, which met with Chien near Liang. In a great battle, Sun Chien's troops were defeated and he was forced to flee for his life. One of the men of his personal body-guard took the red cap that Chien usually wore as a mark of distinction, and so attracted the enemy pursuit onto himself while Chien managed to break

1 At the end of the Later Han dynasty, Lo-yang was defended from the east and the south by eight passes 關 kuan. These were not only natural features, but well-fortified military posts, and they had been brought into good repair at the time of the anxiety over the Yellow Turbans rebellion in 184 (HHS annals 8, p.10b, and see The End of the Empire of Han, p.169.)
out of the lines that were encircling him and made his escape.¹

Some of Chien's companions were less fortunate. According to Tung Cho's biography in Hou Han shu 62, the Grand Administrator of Ying-ch'uan, Li Min 李旻, was captured by Hsü Jung's army and was executed by being boiled alive, and other soldiers of the rebel forces were killed with hot oil. It is some slight relief to find it recorded that Tsu Mao 祖茂, Chien's rescuer, managed to escape.

The last days of this Chinese year were successful ones for Tung Cho. Wang K'uang 王匡, the Grand Administrator of Ho-nei, had been sent by Yuan Shao to press an advance along the Yellow River towards Lo-yang, and he camped at the Meng Ford, northeast of the capital.² Tung Cho sent soldiers against him, and his army was completely destroyed. Thus Tung Cho's defence was successful on both fronts, and the main attack from the east of the mountains had completely broken down. Sun Chien in the south gained no more support or co-operation from the forces of Yuan Shao on the Yellow River.

¹ On the order of events for the campaign around Liang, I follow the account in HHS 62, p.7a, and TCTC p.1919. The arrangement of Chien's own biography is rather different; see my own work on The Biography of Sun Chien, pp.41 to 43 and note 60.

² HHS 62, p.7a and TCTC p.1917 both say that he camped at Ho-yang 河陽 Ford, but Hu San-hsing identifies Ho-yang with the Meng Ford, a crossing of the Yellow River by present-day Mengtsing 孟津.
However, Tung Cho's battle with Wang K'uang, and the enemy's temporary concentration on the Yellow River front, possibly supplied Sun Chien with the diversion which he needed after his defeat by Hsü Jung and gave him time to recover the ground which he had lost. Hsü Jung had probably achieved his success chiefly through the suddenness of his attack and by some element of surprise, and he had surrounded and destroyed only a part of Chien's force. Certainly, from the histories, it is clear that the pursuit was not pressed and that Chien was able to regain command of his soldiers and to re-organise them with surprisingly little difficulty. On the one side, Hsü Jung may have over-estimated the effects of his victory and have assumed that Sun Chien would be incapable of further operations for some time to come; but for his own part, in collecting and controlling his scattered soldiers after a considerable defeat, Chien's achievement was remarkable. By late February or early March of 191, the first days of the new Chinese year, Sun Chien had moved forward to the village of Yang-jen, to the west of Liang, further up the valley of the Ju River from the scene of his defeat, and there he had established a camp. Although the defeat of Wang K'uang had proved decisive on the eastern front, in the south, for Tung Cho, all was to be done again.

According to Ying-hsiung chi, which is quoted in the primary commentary to Sun Chien's biography, five thousand more troops, footsoldiers and horsemen, were sent south against Sun Chien. They were commanded by Tung Cho's officer Hu Chen, and the famous fighting man, Lü Pu, was in command of the cavalry. They attacked
Chien's fortified camp at Yang-jen, but they were completely routed. The story has it that Lü Pu and the other officers were contemptuous of Hu Chen, and they planned together to deceive their commander and their own men, to wear them out and to drive them into panic; but whatever the truth of the matter, Chien remained at Yang-jen, and Tung Cho sent no more expeditions against him.

At this time, as Chien prepared for his move on the capital, he was suddenly put in danger and difficulty through the suspicions of Yuan Shu. One of Shu's officers suggested that if Sun Chien succeeded in capturing Lo-yang, he might turn against Shu and threaten his position. Shu seems to have been influenced by this argument, and he cut off the supplies to Chien's army, perhaps only to demonstrate his power, although he may have intended to cause Chien to break off the campaign altogether. Whatever Shu's purpose, Chien was extremely anxious, and he rode more than thirty miles from Yang-jen to Lu-yang in a single night. He drew on the ground to show his military dispositions and his plans, and he assured Yuan Shu that he thought only of attacking Tung Cho for the good of the state and for the honour of the Yuan family. Shu was satisfied, the supplies were sent on as before, and Sun Chien went back to his army.

In fact, Yuan Shu may have had some reason for his anxiety, since it was also at this time that messengers came to Chien from Tung Cho. Two of Cho's senior officers visited the camp at Yang-jen and asked for peace and an alliance, promising that if Chien recommended any of his relatives for posts as Inspector or Grand Administrator they
would be given office. However, Chien replied: 'Cho has turned against Heaven and denies all law, and he has destroyed the imperial house and overturned its power. Until I have killed you and all your clans as a sign to the world, I will not be able to die in peace. How can there be peace and alliance with you?' In fact, he had little to gain from changing sides. He came from the south of the Yangtse and his military reputation had been made there also; his soldiers and his supplies were sent to him from Yü and Ching provinces by arrangements with Yuan Shu. If he did abandon Shu, he would hold no great position in Tung Cho's government, his soldiers might turn restive, and both he and his men would be cut off from their home territories. And the course of the rebellion east of the mountains had shown that the titles of local government which Tung Cho could offer would be of little use to Chien or to his family unless they had a strong army to back their claims. Suspicious though Yuan Shu might be, Chien would find him a more useful master than Tung Cho was likely to prove.

According to *Hou Han shu* 62, p.7a and to *SKWu* 1, p.6a, one of the officers sent to Chien by Tung Cho was Li Chüeh 李傕. Later, after Tung Cho was assassinated by Lü Pu in 192, a Li Chüeh, most probably the same man, took power in Ch'ang-an.² Despite Chien's

1 *SKWu* 1, p.6a.

² According to the Sung dynasty commentator Hu San-hsing, the character 杳 can be pronounced Chüeh or Ch'üeh and the 杳 who went to Sun Chien and the 杳 who succeeded Tung Cho were actually two different men, who wrote their names with the same characters, pronounced differently. This is possible, but unlikely. (See my note 65 to *The Biography of Sun Chien*).
brave and ferocious words, it appears that one of the envoys survived the meeting, and there is certainly no record that they were slain out of hand. We have already seen that Tung Cho himself did not treat prisoners leniently, and in this bloody war there had been similar missions of truce, containing men of very high rank, which had been massacred by both Yüan Shao and Yüan Shu.¹ So it is possible that Yüan Shu's suspicions of Chien were aroused when he heard that messengers had come to Chien's camp from Tung Cho and that they had been allowed to return to tell the tale. Such respect for the flag of truce might indicate disloyalty, and Shu may have felt that he needed reassurance from Chien.² When this misunderstanding had been cleared up, Chien brought his army forward from his advanced base at Yang-jen, crossed the watershed of the Hsiungerh Shan, and came down to the fortified pass of Ta-ku 大谷, twenty-five to thirty miles south of Lo-yang.

Tung Cho himself came out to face him, and as Chien advanced, the two armies fought one another among the tombs of the emperors of Later Han. The graves of the former rulers, with temples and funeral-

¹ HHS 64A, pp.3a and 3b.

² In Chien's biography, the story of Yüan Shu's doubts precedes the story of Tung Cho's embassy, but it is clear that the two incidents took place at about the same time, while Sun Chien was camped at Yang-jen early in 191, and the history gives no specific reason why the order should not have been reversed.
mounds, had been established outside the capital; in his time as ruler of Lo-yang, Tung Cho had arranged to pillage their treasures, and now Sun Chien's line of advance turned the sacred places of the dynasty into a battlefield. Tung Cho's army had the worst of it, and he retired to the east, along the road towards Ch'ang-an, and camped at Mien-ch'ih 澽池. ¹ His second army at Lo-yang, under the command of Lü Pu, waited for Chien under the walls of the city, and there was one more battle before Lü Pu led the last of Tung Cho's soldiers from Lo-yang and Sun Chien held possession of the city.

It was a glorious achievement, but it was an empty victory. Lo-yang had been plundered and burnt and ruined, and Tung Cho had driven the Emperor and his court away to Ch'ang-an almost a year earlier. Of the civilian population, those who had not been compelled to move to Ch'ang-an had made their escape to the surrounding country. The Chiang-piao chuan said that: 'The old capital was deserted and for several hundred li there was no smoke or fire (from a house that was lived in). Chien came forward into the city, and he was sad and wept.'²

Moreover, from a military point of view, Chien's position was very weak. After Wang K'uang had been destroyed near the Yellow River some months before, there had been no further advance on that line by the men of the east of the mountains. Chien had conquered by his own

¹ Mien-ch'ih prefecture of the Han dynasty is identical with the modern Mienchih.

² SKWu 1, p.6bPC:
efforts, and there was no allied army close enough to support his position or help him develop his advantage. He sent a detachment out to harass his enemies' retreat, but Tung Cho and Lü Pu had withdrawn their armies into the protection of fortified positions along the Ch'ang-an road, and they could choose any time to make a sortie against Chien's isolated force. Despite his victory, he could not remain long in Lo-yang.

Before he left the capital, Chien carried out the rites which his loyalty to the Han dynasty required of him. He cleared out the rubble and the debris from the imperial temples and he repaired the damaged tombs, and he held a great sacrifice, killing a bull and a ram and a pig, to the honour of the ancestors of the imperial clan. More than this, one of the soldiers of his command found the Great Seal of State (ch'uan-kuo-hsi) of the Han dynasty in a well of the imperial office of pottery.

According to Wu shu, quoted in the primary commentary to Chien's biography, the seal had been thrown away at the time of the massacre of the eunuchs in 189 and no one knew where to find it. Then, when Chien was in camp at the south of the city, a rainbow-coloured light appeared above the well, and everyone in the army was afraid and no one dared to draw water. Chien made one of his men go down into the well, and he discovered the seal and brought it up. According to the Shan-yang kung tsai-chi, Chien had first kept possession of the seal,

1 HHS 62, p.7b.
but Yuan Shu later compelled him to give it up, threatening to keep his wife under arrest unless he did so.

The commentary to Sun Chien's biography contains a variety of stories and discussions of this discovery. Stripped of the miraculous symbolism which must accompany the story of such a sacred object, the record is credible. It is quite possible that one of Chien's men found the seal among the ruins of the capital, and he may indeed have found it in the well of the pottery office. Such an important discovery would soon become known: Chien, as commander of the army, would take it into his keeping, and Yuan Shu, Chien's superior officer, would naturally expect to be given it as soon as possible. However, in the commentary to Chien's biography, the historian Yu Hsi and P'ei Sung-chih himself both appear to believe that Sun Chien managed to keep the seal, that it remained in the possession of his descendants, the emperors of Wu, and that it was never handed back. There is no evidence to support this theory, but on the contrary, after Yuan Shu was dead, his seal was sent to the imperial court of Han. There seems no reason to doubt that this was the Great Seal of State, and it is clear that Sun Chien had it in his possession for a very short time before he handed it to Yuan Shu.

1 HHS 38, p.17b and also TCTC p.2014.

2 The seal was carved from jade and ornamented with gold; it had been prepared for the First Emperor of Ch'in and had later come to the emperors of Han. According to Wu shu, the base-block of the seal
With this trophy of victory and heavenly favour, Chien abandoned the desolate and useless capital of the emperors of Later Han, and he returned to Yuan Shu in Lu-yang.

---

2 (contd.)

was about four inches in circumference, and at the top there was a ring, carved in the shape of five dragons, which was designed to take the tassel that bound the seal to the belt of the ruler. The inscription on the seal read: 'For the one who received the mandate from Heaven, may he live long and prosper forever 萬岁永昌 shou ming yu t'ien, chi-shou yung-ch'ang'. The commentator Yu Hsi (fl. 325) noted that there was some disagreement between the texts on the exact wording of the inscription (see The Biography of Sun Chien, in p.49); but since the seal was lost again/the disorders at the end of the Western Chin dynasty, there was no way to decide the question.

It is, of course, possible that the seal which Sun Chien brought back from Lo-yang was false, that it had been planted in the well, and that the discovery was a fake; but this does not seem very likely.
The civil war and the last campaigns (191):

Chien had captured Lo-yang in about the third month of the Chinese year, but even as he was fighting there the alliance against Tung Cho had come to an end and the allies had ended all pretence of co-operation. Yuan Shu, who regarded himself as the leader of his family, was jealous of the prestige enjoyed by Yuan Shao as leader of the alliance, and he spread stories against him, saying that 'Shao is not a true son of the Yuan clan' and 'Shao is our family slave'. When Shao heard of this he was furious.

For his own part, Shao was worried that he had no territorial base, and no real authority other than the nominal leadership of an alliance which was already showing signs of breaking up. In 191 he put pressure on Han Fu and took his place as Governor of Chi province, and about the same time he sent an army against Yuan Shu's possessions. Naming a certain Chou Yü of K'uai-chi as Inspector of Yü province, Shao sent him to make a surprise attack on Chien's territory while Chien was still away.

1 The third month of the second year of Ch'u-p'ing lasted from 12 April to 11 May of 191. The dating of this time is uncertain (we have already noticed the confusion over the year of Sun Chien's death), but HHS annals 9, p.3a, says that Tung Cho arrived in Ch'ang-an in the fourth month, and it seems plausible to suggest that he had abandoned Lo-yang in the third month and had waited a few days to arrange his defences against Sun Chien before he continued on his way to Ch'ang-an.

2 HHS 65, p.7a.
Three brothers from K'uai-chi, surname Chou and personal names Hsint, Ang and Yü, all came into the service of Yuan Shao at this time. According to K'uai-chi tien-lu, quoted in the commentary to Sun Chien's biography, when Ts'ao Ts'ao was collecting troops against Tung Cho in Ch'en-liu commandery, he had sent to Chou Yü and invited him to join him, and Yü collected two thousand men and went with Ts'ao Ts'ao to the north. It seems likely that the brothers went to the wars together. They evidently came from a powerful family, for Ts'ao Ts'ao had heard of them and invited Yü from a distance and they were able to collect a large number of soldiers for his command. Later, while the armies were grouped against Tung Cho, they changed to serve Yuan Shao, and while Chou Yü was fighting to confirm his appointment as Inspector of Yü province, his elder brother Ang was made Grand Administrator of Chiu-chiang.

On his march towards Lo-yang, Sun Chien had sent a detachment to occupy the city of Yang-ch'eng in Ying-ch'uan commandery, now

---

1 SKWu 1, p.7b PC.

2 There is complete disagreement between the various texts about which of the Chou brothers was sent against Sun Chien in Yü province. HHS 65, p.6a, says it was Chou Hsin, and HHS 63, p.5b, agrees, but the parallel text to HHS 63, in SKWei 8, p.4a, says that it was Chou Ang, and this has been followed by TCTC p.1926. Wu lu, quoted in SKWu 1, p.7a PC f., says that it was Chou Yü, and since this text is followed by a very circumstantial account of the three brothers' careers taken from the K'uai-chi tien-lu, I have accepted the version.
southeast of Tengfeng, in the valley of the Ying River, and when he moved back from Lo-yang, this outpost remained to watch over any action of Tung Cho. However, although the city was in Yü province and under Sun Chien's government as Inspector, it was also very close to the borders of Yüan Shao's sphere of influence in Chi province and the Yellow River valley, and so it was at this point that Chou Yü launched his attack, and Yang-ch'eng was taken by surprise.  

According to Wu lu, when Chien heard of Chou Yü's attack, he was sad and he sighed and said: 'Together we raised loyal troops, intending to bring help to the nation. The rebels and bandits are almost destroyed, and yet people can act like this. Whom shall I work with?' In fact, these opening moves in the struggle between the two cousins Yüan marked the beginning of a new stage in the confusion of wars which marked the end of the Later Han dynasty. As the alliance against Tung Cho broke up, the lines were drawn for battle in the whole area of the Great Plain of the Yellow River, and the warlords

1 SKWei 8, p.4a. This text suggests that Sun Chien was actually in Yang-ch'eng when the attack took place, and Hu San-hsing, in his commentary to TCTC p.1926, suggests that Chien had set his headquarters as Inspector of Yü province in this prefecture. But Chien's own biography says that Chien retired from Lo-yang to Lu-yang, and HHS 65, p.6a, says that the attack took place before Chien had got back. It seems rather more likely that Chien had in fact withdrawn the bulk of his forces from the region of the Yellow River when he retired from Lo-yang, and that he was some distance to the south, near Yüan Shu in Lu-yang, when the attack took place.
and their armies prepared for the fighting which would leave one man master of north China. Yuan Shao, leader of the alliance against Tung Cho, had already taken over Chi province, and he had also sent one of his lieutenants to occupy Ch'ing province. 

Liu Yu and Kung-sun Tsan held Yu province in the north with an uneasy co-operation, 

Yuan Shu claimed supremacy in Nan-yang and in Yu province, and Liu Piao, in the south, controlled the lower reaches of the Han River and had nominal command of the rest of Ching province south of the Yangtse. In the east of the empire, between the lower courses of the Yellow River and the Hwai, the established administrators had not yet been required to show their loyalties to one man or another; but that choice was soon to be forced upon them.

---

1 HHS 64A, p.5a, and HHS 48, p.15a, SKWei 7, p.13a.

2 Liu Yu, who was a member of the imperial clan and had held high posts at court, had been appointed Governor of Yu province in 188, and Kung-sun Tsan, a military officer, had been in charge of the operations against the Wu-huan in the last years of Emperor Ling and had held command of the military forces in the province since Liu Yu arrived. In theory, Liu Yu, as head of the civil administration, had authority over Tsan, but Tsan was a difficult man to keep under control, he controlled most of the fighting men of the province, and his policy and plans opposed Liu Yu at almost every point.
In the meantime, the great commanders had already taken sides, and when Sun Chien led his army against Chou Yu, he had also a thousand cavalry from Yu province, led by Kung-sun Tsan's nephew Yueh, under his command. The manoeuvres by which this co-operation had come about are summarised by Tzu-chih t'ung-chien and they are typical of the convoluted personal and political relationships of the time:

'Liu Yu's son Ho and was Palace Attendant (侍中 shih-chung), and when the Emperor was hoping to return (from Ch'ang-an) to the east, he sent Ho to steal away from Tung Cho, to go in secret through the Wu pass, go to Yu, and give orders that he should lead troops to come and receive him. Ho came to Nan-yang, but Yuan Shu thought to gain some advantage from Yu, and he kept Ho and would not send him on; he promised Ho that when the soldiers came they would all go west together, and he had him write a letter to Yu. Yu received the letter and sent several thousand cavalry to go to Ho. Kung-sun Tsan knew that Shu had ideas of rebellion, and he tried to prevent these soldiers from going, but Yu refused to listen. Tsan was afraid that Shu would hear about this and would be angry, and so he sent his cousin Yueh to lead another thousand cavalry to Shu, and he secretly told Shu that he should keep hold of Ho and take over the soldiers. From this, Yu and Tsan were

1 The Wu pass is now east of Shanghsien in Shensi, it lay southeast of Ch'ang-an and on the direct road to Nan-yang commandery.
So Yueh and his cavalrymen went with Chien to attack Chou Yu; and then Yueh was killed in one of the first skirmishes of the campaign. Kung-sun Tsan was furious for the death of his young relative, and he blamed everything on Yuan Shao, and he led his armies to attack Shao's northern borders.

Chou Yu had gained some success with his first attack, and it was some time before Sun Chien recovered the ground that he had lost. But after some initial set-backs, including the death of Kung-sun Yueh, he recovered control of the situation and defeated Yu in several battles. Then Yuan Shu himself led an attack on Chou Ang in Chiu-chiang, and Yu took his army away to the southeast to go to his brother's help. There, his army was defeated again, and he abandoned his campaigns and went back to his home country of K'uai-chi.

Yuan Shu had now engaged Yuan Shao's forces on two fronts and had gained considerable success. He had not yet conquered Chiu-chiang commandery, but Sun Chien had defeated Chou Yu and driven back the

---

1 TCTC, pp.1925 and 1926. The sources which Ssu-ma Kuang used for this passage are HHS 63, p.3a (in the biography of Liu Yu) and HHS 63, p.5b, and SKWei 8, p.3b (in the biographies of Kung-sun Tsan). We may note here that Ho soon made his escape to Yuan Shao, and for this and other reasons Liu Yu inclined to support Shao.

2 HHS 63, p.5b and SKWei 8, p.4a.

3 SKWu 1, p.7b PC quoting K'uai-chi tien-lu.
invasion from the north, and Chou Yü's army was effectively eliminated as a fighting force. For Yuan Shao, the situation was very difficult; besides this failure in the south, he was also under a considerable threat from Kung-sun Tsan in the north. Tsan had rejected all Shao's protestations of goodwill and disregarded all Liu Yü's attempts to make peace. Instead, he brought an army to the borders of Shao's territory, near present-day Tehping in Shantung, and from there he was encouraging the rulers of cities in Shao's territory to rebel in his favour, and he had named his own men as rival Inspectors of Chi, Yen and Ch'ing provinces.¹

Faced with such a combination of enemies, Yuan Shao made an alliance with Liu Piao, the Inspector of Ching province. From Shao's point of view, a diversion on Yuan Shu's southern front would gain him valuable time. For Liu Piao, Yuan Shu already controlled the wealthy commandery of Nan-yang, and there was always a possibility that he might wish at some time to expand further south. On the other hand, if Yuan Shu was defeated, Liu Piao might hope to occupy Nan-yang for himself. Since the time of his appointment, more than twelve months earlier, Piao had put down the banditry and the civil feuds which he had found when he arrived, and he had stationed troops near Hsiang-yang (present-day Siangyang), on the border between his own territory and that of Yuan Shu. They were commanded by his officer Huang Tzu.² Yuan Shu, for his part, was prepared to take advantage of his recent successes, and he sent Sun Chien to lead his army to the south.

¹ HHS 63, pp.6b and 7a; SKWei 8, pp.4a PC and f.
² HHS 64B, p.8b.
Liu Piao sent Huang Tsu to take up a position slightly north of Hsiang-yang, between the prefectural city of Teng and the town of Fan, both in Nan-yang commandery and on the north bank of the Han River, and he himself had moved from his headquarters at Yi-ch'eng to hold Hsiang-yang in support. Then Sun Chien came up. He completely defeated Tsu's formations and flung them back across the Han River, and then he surrounded Hsiang-yang to prevent Tsu taking his troops into the city. Some remnants of Tsu's forces fled to take refuge in the hills called Hsien-shan, a ridge south of Hsiang-yang city. Chien led a force of light-armed cavalry into the hills to search them out, and in that fighting in the wilderness, Sun Chien was killed.

The main text of Sun Chien's biography, and also Tien lüeh and Ying-hsiung chi, quoted in the primary commentary, all have accounts of the death of Sun Chien. Their descriptions of the general course of the operations can be reconciled, but Tien lüeh says that Huang Tsu made a sortie from Hsiang-yang by night and that the battle near Fan and the fatal pursuit all took place in darkness. Both the main text and Tien-lüeh say that Chien was shot, though Ying-hsiung-chi claims that he was struck on the head and killed by a rock thrown down from a height above. There is no way now to tell how Chien met his death, but the suggestion of a night attack seems very possible; in such confused fighting Sun Chien might well have found it necessary to lead the advance forces of his own army in pursuit of the enemy, and among that broken terrain in the night it would not have been difficult for him to become detached from his companions or struck down in their midst.
Sun Chien's death ended the fighting between Liu Piao and Yuan Shu's army. Piao remained in possession of Hsiang-yang but made no move further north. Sun Pen, who was the son of Chien's elder brother, took command of the army and went back to Yuan Shu, and Shu went through the formality of a recommendation that Pen should take Chien's place as Inspector of Yu province.

According to SKWu 6, p.6a, Sun Chien was the younger of twins, and Sun Pen was the son of his elder brother Ch'iang. Both Pen's parents died while he was still young, and he had served for a short time as a commandery officer before he joined Chien when he was raising soldiers in Ch'ang-sha against Tung Cho. His appointment as Inspector of Yu province did not carry a general's command with it, as Sun Chien's had done, and it was courteous appointment but not in itself an important post. With the death of Sun Chien, there was no other member of his family influential enough or trusted enough to take his place among Yuan Shu's officers. Chien had served Shu well, and in the years to come the members of his family could look for patronage and favour from Yuan Shu and could expect to hold command under him as proven allies, but for the time being, Chien's sudden death had put an end to the highest ambitions of his family.

Over such a distance of time, and with such sources as we have, it is difficult to assess the qualities of a man like Sun Chien. The people of his own time and historians who came after generally acknowledge
him as a loyal subject of Han, but he was pre-eminently a fighting man, and as he fought, the empire collapsed in ruins and he himself died fighting in one of the private quarrels that brought down the dynasty.

Chien rose to high command because the times of disturbance could use a man of his abilities. He was not uniformly successful in battle and he suffered some very considerable defeats, but it seems possible to suggest that one of his chief military virtues was his ability to discipline and control his troops. One anecdote, which tells how he was caught by the enemy outside the walls of Lu-yang and was able to order his soldiers and bring them back to safety, may illustrate this, but perhaps better proof is given by his recovery after the defeat at the hands of Hsü Jung near Liang. If Chien himself had been forced to flee for his life, it was no small achievement to regroup his forces and resume the advance. Indeed, the whole campaign to Lo-yang was a remarkable achievement for one isolated army, fighting its way through a series of battles and defence-works

1 See P'ei Sung-chih's remarks in discussing the incident of the Great Seal of State in SKWu 1, p.7a PC. We may note here that the novel San-kuo chih yen-yi 三國志通俗版 pictures Sun Chien as a man who was eager to seize the seal for his own purposes (chapter VI pp.163ff), but while this may have made for an interesting line of plot in the novel, it is not necessarily reliable historical fact.

2 SKWu 1, pp.4b f.
against a number of different enemy forces. Success in such fighting required a leader who had the ability to hold his force together, composed as it was of a mixture of regular soldiers, conscripts and personal followers, any of whom, for one reason or another, might be unreliable and willing to desert. The methods of raising armies in this civil war did not always produce good soldiers, and the men that were gathered required a leader who could make them fight for him. This, it would seem, was Sun Chien's quality as a military leader; he was a fighting man who gained the confidence and also the control of the men that he commanded. He himself died only in his mid-thirties, but his achievements as a general had gained his clan some position in the empire, and the memory of his name was of advantage to his sons.
Map to illustrate the campaigns of Sun Chien in central China (189-191)
Sun Ts'e: his early life and his service with Yuan Shu (175 to 195);

Sun Ts'e, the eldest son of Sun Chien, was born in 175, almost certainly at Yen-tu, where Chien held his first appointment as Assistant Prefect. With the Lady Wu (Wu fu-jen), his mother, he followed his father from one post to another, and in 184, when Sun Chien followed Chu Chün against the Yellow Turbans, his family stayed at Shou-ch'ün, a prefectural city and the headquarters of the Inspector of Yang province, now Showhsien in Anhwei. Ts'e at this time was no more than nine years old by western reckoning, his brother Ch'iüan had been born in 182, and a third brother Yi was born in 184.

1 SKWu 1, p.16b states that he died in 200 and that he was aged twenty-six by Chinese reckoning.

2 See the previous chapter, p.204.

3 Sun Chüan, who became the first emperor of Wu, died in 252 at the age of seventy-one Chinese count (SKWu 2, p.34b); Sun Yi died in 203 at the age of twenty (SKWu 6, p.8b). A fourth brother, K'uang, who was younger than Yi, died aged about twenty, but there are no reliable dates recorded either for his birth or his death (SKWu 6, p.9a); it seems most likely that he was born after Sun Chien had returned from the campaigns against the Yellow Turbans and the rebels in Liang province. Besides these four children by the Lady Wu, the Chih lin of Yü Hsi, quoted in SKWu 1, p.8a PC, says that Chien had another son by a concubine, and this son had two personal names, Lang or Jen. There is no way to tell whether this half-brother was older or younger than Sun Ts'e and the others. The Lady Wu also bore Sun Chien one daughter (SKWu 5, p.1a).
It is possible that Chien's family were with him at the capital during the short time that he held the post as Gentleman-consultant in 186, but it is certain that they joined him in Ch'ang-sha when he held office as Grand Administrator in that commandery. In 190, when Chien led his army from Ch'ang-sha to the north against Tung Cho, he left Sun Ts'e with his mother and younger brothers and Ts'e took the family to stay with his friend Chou Yu in Shu prefecture in Lu-chiang commandery; the city is now west of Lukiang in Anhwei.

The Chou family of Lu-chiang were one of the great clans of the empire. Chou Yu's grandfather and one of his paternal uncles had been Grand Commandant at the Han court, and the family had held official rank for generations. According to Sun Ts'e's biography, even while he was in Shou-ch'un in 184 and 185, Ts'e had already made a name for himself and had gained friends among the leading men of the district. It was at this time that he met Chou Yu, and the two boys were the same age and they became friends and Yu had asked Ts'e to come to visit him in Shu. Chou Yu's biography has nothing of this earlier meeting at Shou-ch'un and says rather that Sun Chien himself sent his family to stay at Shu in 190, and it was not until then that Ts'e and Yu met and became friends. In any event, they became very close, and Chou Yu gave a large house for the Sun family to live in and he went to present himself to Ts'e's mother the Lady Wu and he shared everything with Sun Ts'e.¹

¹ SKWu, pp. 1a and 1b.
It is not likely that Sun Ts'e had been very well-known at the time of his first visit to Shou-ch'un; his father did not hold a high post and he himself was only ten or twelve years old. However, by 190, Sun Chien had become a Grand Administrator and was in command of a powerful army. He was clearly a coming man, and even such a clan as the Chou could well afford to show courtesy to his wife and his children.

Towards the end of 191, Sun Chien was killed in battle near Hsiang-yang, and his body was brought back and he was buried in Ch'ü-a, a prefecture in his own commandery of Wu, now Tanyang in Kiangsu. Ts'e brought the family to Ch'ü-a to attend these ceremonies and they stayed there for a short time before shifting again to settle at Chiang-tu, north of Ch'ü-a on the other side of the Yangtse and now southwest of Kiangtu.

From the time that Sun Chien died, Yuan Shu's fortunes declined. Chien's death had ended Shu's attempts to expand his territory south into Liu Piao's Ching province, and by the beginning of 193 Shu himself had been compelled to shift his headquarters from Nan-yang northeast across the Yellow River to Feng-ch'iu in Ch'en-liu, now Fengku in Honan. In the first months of that year he was attacked from the north by Ts'ao Ts'ao, who was Governor of Yen province and allied with Yuan Shao, and in a series of battles and defeats Shu was driven southeast into present-day Anhwei. He still commanded a very large army, and his was the strongest power in the southeast, but this single campaign had lost Nan-yang to him forever, had removed almost all
his influence in the lands of the Yellow River, and compelled him to regroup his forces in the valley of the Hwai. He set his new headquarters at Shou-ch'un. ¹

The sudden arrival of his father's old commander made a great change to the situation of Sun Ts'e. According to his biography, Ts'e had already made a name for himself while he was still in Shu with the Chou family and 'all the people between the Yangtse and the Hwai looked up to him'. He had collected a few followers, including Lü Fan, a refugee from Ju-nan who had brought Ts'e a hundred retainers of his own, and Sun Ho, who had served under Sun Chien and at one time had commanded Chien's bodyguard. ²

Sun Ts'e's biography says that Ts'e first went to Yüan Shu in 194, but from the Chiang-piao chuan, which is quoted in the commentary to the biography, and from the related texts in the biographies of Wu Ching, Sun Ho and Lü Fan, it is clear that in 193 Ts'e was already in contact with Shou-ch'un. It is almost certainly this early period which is described in the Chiang-piao chuan story of Sun Ts' e's visit to Yüan Shu:

'Ts'e went straight to Shou-ch'un to see Yüan Shu, and he wept and said; "At a former time, when my late father came

¹ SKWei 6, p.32b.

² SKWu 6, p.10a FC. Sun Ho was related to Sun Chien on his mother's side and had originally had the surname Yü, but had changed it to Sun.
from Ch'ang-sha to attack Tung Cho, he met with you at Nan-yang and he made alliance with you and became your friend. By ill fortune he died and his loyal work could not be completed. Considering the favours that you gave to my father in the past, I would like to offer my services to you. Would Your Excellency give a test to the sincerity of my feelings?" \(^1\)

Although it is said that Yüan Shu was most impressed by Sun Ts'e's speech and bearing, he did not at first give him any substantial command. Nevertheless, Ts'e had established connection with Shou-ch'un, and some of Chien's old soldiers had come to join him. Soon after these first approaches had been made to Yüan Shu, Ts'e moved south across the Yangtse and joined his uncle, Wu Ching, who was Grand Administrator of Tan-yang commandery.

After Ts'e had advertised his connection with Yüan Shu in this way, Chiang-tu became dangerous for him. Shu, in Shou-ch'un, had taken over Yang province, but Kuang-ling commandery, which contained Chiang-tu, was under Hsu province. T'ao Ch'ien, the Governor of Hsu, had become anxious when Yüan Shu established himself at Shou-ch'un and was still more disturbed when he discovered that the son of one of Shu's former lieutenants was settled in the southern part of his territory with a band of followers. When Ts'e went to see Yüan Shu, he had left his mother and his brothers in the care of Chang Hung

\(^1\) SKWu 1, p.8b PC.
a scholar of Kuang-ling commandery, but after he had seen Yuan Shu he
sent his companion Lu Fan to bring the family to Chü-a. T'ao Ch'ien
had Lu Fan arrested as a spy, but some of Fan's own men rescued him
and all the party were brought safely to the south of the river.

T'ao Ch'ien had good reasons for his apprehensions about Yuan
Shu and the Sun family, for Shu once settled in Yang province, had
begun to take over the neighbouring commanderies, and he had sent
Wu Ching and Sun Pen to Tan-yang as Grand Administrator and Chief
Commandant to drive out the established Grand Administrator Chou
Hsin.1 Ts'e, for his part, went naturally to join his relatives,
and he stayed in Tan-yang for some months, gradually building up
the number of his followers and gaining military experience in the
petty warfare against bandits and barbarians. Chiang-piao chuan says
that he gained a force of several hundred men, but then he was
unexpectedly attacked and was almost killed in a skirmish with
Tsu Lang 祖郎, one of the chieftains of the hills people of the
commandery. After this setback he collected his followers and went
north once again to see Yuan Shu at Shou-ch'un.2

---

1 These three men have all appeared earlier. Wu Ching was the
elder brother of Sun Chien's wife the Lady Wu; Sun Pen was Chien's
nephew and the cousin of Sun Ts'e. Chou Hsin was the eldest of the
three Chou brothers from K'uai-chi, referred to above on p. 244.

2 SKWu 1, p. 8b PC.
Ts'e came to Shu's headquarters in 194, and on this occasion Shu transferred about a thousand men of Sun Chien's former troops to Ts'e's command, and kept him stationed at Shou-ch'un. It is said that Ts'e was admired by senior officials and high-ranking officers, and he was given the flowery title of Colonel Who Cherishes Righteousness (懷義將軍 huai-yi hsiao-wei). What he hoped for and expected, however, on the grounds of his father's earlier services of Yuan Shu, was an independent command to administer some territory of his own. Yuan Shu promised that he would appoint him Grand Administrator of Chiu-chiang commandery, but then he changed his mind and appointed someone else. Some time later the Grand Administrator of Lu-chiang, Lu K'ang, refused to send Shu some supplies that he asked for, and Shu prepared to attack him. Sun Ts'e for his own part held a grudge against Lu K'ang, because on some earlier occasion he had gone to visit K'ang and K'ang had refused to see him and had sent out one of his clerks to meet him instead, and so Yuan Shu chose Ts'e to make the attack on Lu K'ang, and promised him that if he captured Lu-chiang he should be made the new Grand Administrator. Ts'e did conquer the commandery and he captured Lu K'ang, but then Yuan Shu again forgot his promise and gave the post to another of his officers. Ts'e became more and more disillusioned.

The situation in the valley of the Hwai and the basin of the lower Yangtse had become increasingly confused. In 193, the same year that Yuan Shu had been driven into Yang province, T'ao Ch'ien in his turn suffered a devastating attack from Ts'ao Ts'ao. That summer,
Ts'ao Ts'ao had invited his father, Ts'ao Sung, to come from Lang-yeh to join him in Yen province. Lang-yeh was in Hsü province, and as Ts'ao Sung came west, with a great and valuable baggage-train, he was set upon, robbed and killed by some subordinate officers of T'ao Ch'ien's command. In a fury, Ts'ao Ts'ao turned his armies against Hsü. He drove T'ao Ch'ien to take refuge in T'an city, in the south of present-day Shantung, and he led a campaign of massacre in the north of present-day Kiangsu and Anhwei. Ts'ao returned to the attack in 194, and although a rebellion in his own province of Yen compelled him to turn back and abandon Hsü, T'ao Ch'ien died a few months later and for the next few years the government of Hsü remained unsettled and the whole of the province was a scene of warfare.

South of the Yangtse a rival for the control of Yang province had appeared. Liu Yao, a member of a distant branch of the imperial clan and son of a great official family of the Han dynasty, had held some posts in the imperial government and then had taken refuge in the southeast from the disorders of the civil war. In 194 an imperial letter from the military government at Ch'ang-an appointed him Inspector of Yang province. Shou-ch'un had formerly been the headquarters of the inspectors of Yang province, but Yüan Shu was established there, and Liu Yao did not wish to conflict with him at once. So he moved to the south of the Yangtse and came to terms with Wu Ching, and Ching set him up with headquarters in Ch'ü-a. From this base he was able to rally support against Yüan Shu, and by the end of the year he felt strong enough to oppose Wu Ching and drove him from Ch'ü-a and then occupied Tan-yang. Wu Ching asked for help
from his overlord Yuan Shu, and Shu sent an army to his support against Liu Yao. He gave Ching a military command and appointed Chou Shang of Lu-chiang, the uncle of Chou Yu, Grand Administrator of Tan-yang. The two armies faced each other across the Yangtse at Heng-chiang and Tang-li, now southeast of Hohsien in Anhwei, for almost a year. Yuan Shu had effectively lost control of the lands south of the Yangtse, and Liu Yao was gaining troops and becoming an increasing threat. A second imperial edict gave Yao the title of Governor of Yang province. Then, in 195, Sun Ts'e asked leave to join his uncle Wu Ching and his cousin Sun Pen on the southern front.

According to Chiang-piao chuan, Sun Ts'e spoke to Yuan Shu and said: 'My family has been popular in the past among the people of the east, and I would wish to help my uncle attack Heng-chiang. When Heng-chiang is taken, then I would go to my own district and call up soldiers and I could get thirty thousand men to help you give aid to the house of Han.' Since Liu Yao was successfully holding the banks of the Yangtse and appeared well established in Ch'ü-a, and since K'uai-chi commandery, further to the southeast, was firmly under the control of the Grand Administrator, Wang Lang, Yuan Shu did not believe that Ts'e had any great prospects of success. However, he gave him the title of Colonel Who Breaks the Enemy Lines (折衝校尉 che-ch'ung hsiao-wei), and although Ts'e was allotted only a thousand

---

1 SKWu 1, p.9b PC.
footsoldiers and some thirty or forty horsemen, he had a few hundred personal followers who were ready to go with him, and authority to recruit or impress soldiers as he marched. Li-yang, the prefecture in Chiu-chiang which was the headquarters of Yuan Shu's forces in the south, is now Hohsien in Anhwei and lay a little over one hundred miles from Shou-ch'un. Sun Ts'e left Shou-ch'un with about fifteen hundred men and he arrived at Li-yang with five or six thousand. There he joined the other leaders and they made plans to cross the Yangtse.

Sun Ts'e's own biography in San-kuo chih indicates that Ts'e took charge of these operations against Liu Yao from the time that he arrived, and there is no indication to the contrary in the parallel texts of the biographies of Wu Ching and Sun Pen. Shu had transferred Ching from Grand Administrator of Tan-yang to General of the Gentleman of the Household Controller of the Army (tu-chün chung-lang-chiang), and as a former Grand Administrator it might be expected that Ching would be the senior officer in charge of the operations.¹

¹ According to the system recorded in the treatise of officials of Hou Han shu, a colonel had a salary Equivalent to Two Thousand Piculs (pi erh-ch'ien shih), the same as that of a general of the gentlemen of the household (HHS treatise 24, p. 7b and HHS treatise 25, pp. 4b ff). However, there is no way of telling whether Yuan Shu's forces at this time followed the traditional system of Han, and in any case there is no provision for a tu-chün chung-lang-chiang in the Han list. It is impossible to say whether the prefix awarded Wu Ching was a flowery epithet of no military significance or whether it indicated that he was commander-in-chief of the army in the south.
However, in the operations that followed, it was evidently Sun Ts'e who took the lead, and by the time the campaign against Liu Yao was over he had established his authority over his relatives and comrades. In part this may have been due to the memory of his father Chien, who had commanded both Wu Ching and Sun Pen, but in great measure it was due to the military ability of Sun Ts'e himself.

The lands across the Yangtse and the break with Yuan Shu (195-197):

The eastern bank of the Yangtse at Heng-chiang and Tang-li was guarded by soldiers of Liu Yao under his officers Fan Neng, Yü Mi, and Chang Ying, with a large store-camp near a mountain called Niu-chu, now northwest of Tangtu in Anhwei, and there were other forces in the prefectures behind them. According to SKWu 6, Hsü K'un, a cousin of Sun Ts'e, had served with Sun Chien and had now joined Ts'e for the campaign against Liu Yao. The army faced Chang Yin at Tang-li, but there were very few boats available and there was a delay in the attacks while detachments were sent out to look for some more. Hsü K'un's mother, who was a younger sister of Sun Chien, was with the army at that time, and she said to K'un: 'I am afraid that Liu Yao's people may bring out a great fleet to attack our men, and this would be dangerous. How can we afford to stop here? We should cut the rushes and reeds to make rafts and those will supplement the ships that we already have to ferry the army across.' K'un told this to Ts'e, and
Ts'e followed his aunt's suggestion, and all the army got across and Chang Yin and the others were defeated. 1

As soon as he had crossed the Yangtse, Ts'e attacked and stormed Liu Yao's great camp at Niu-chu, and he captured all the grain and military equipment that had been stored there. Then he moved against two further armies of Liu Yao, commanded by Hsüeh Li, the Chancellor of P'eng-ch'eng, who was stationed at Mo-ling city, now Nanking, and by Chai Jung, the Chancellor of Hsia-p'i, who was camped some miles to the south; although both territories were nominally under Hsü province, Liu Yao had been able to bring these allies to his support. 2

Ts'e first attacked Chai Jung, defeated his forces and drove him into the safety of his camp. He turned north against Hsüeh Li and Li ran away. However, before he could follow up these quick successes, Liu Yao's military commanders, Fan Neng and Yü Mi, who had collected their forces after the defeat on the banks of the Yangtse, came with a counter-attack against the camp at Niu-chu. Sun Ts'e went back to protect this base, and he attacked Fan Neng and the others and defeated them, and it is said that he captured 'more than ten thousand' men and women. 3 He went again to attack Chai Jung, but he was wounded in the thigh by an arrow in the fighting outside the walls of Jung's camp, and since he could no longer ride his horse he went back to Niu-chu in a carriage. Chai Jung heard from a deserter that Ts'e had been wounded

---

1 SKWu 6, p.3a.
2 A Chancellor (相 hsiang) ruled a kingdom in the same way as a Grand Administrator ruled a commandery.
3 SKWu 1, p.10a PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.
and was dead, and so he sent a detachment out to make a sortie against Niu-chu. Ts'e sent a few hundred men to face the enemy and prepared an ambush in the rear. The first line of battle, under instructions, gave ground and pretended to run away before Jung's forces' attack, but when Jung's men charged in pursuit they were taken by surprise in the ambush and were heavily defeated and lost more than a thousand men. Ts'e went forward with his army to the walls of Jung's camp and he had his attendants call out together to the people inside: 'Young Gentleman Sun, what do you say of him now?' When Jung realised that Ts'e was still alive, he dug his moat deeper and raised his walls higher and made all possible preparations for defence. Since the terrain was difficult for an attack, Sun Ts'e left him there and went further east. In a series of battles at Mei-ling, Hu-shu, and Chiang-ch'eng, he moved north towards Mo-ling and then southeast against Ch'ü-a. As he marched, Liu Yao and Chai Jung abandoned their positions and fled to Yü-chang commandery. Sun Ts'e entered Ch'ü-a and set up his headquarters in the city.

Sun Ts'e had reached Ch'ü-a by the twelfth month of the Chinese year, actually February of the western year 196, and at this time Yuan Shu sent him a commission as acting General Who Destroys the Criminals (t'ien-k'ou chiang-chün) as an acknowledgement of his victory. 

1 行 hsing
2 For the dating of this promotion I follow the memorial written by Sun Ts'e in 197 and preserved in Wu lu, quoted in SKWu 1, p.13a PC, and translated below, p.279.
At this point, Ts'e paused to consolidate his position and to establish his administration. According to Chiang-piao chuan, "Ts'e was still young, and although he had his rank and had become well-known, all the soldiers and the people called him "Young Gentleman Sun (Sun lang 童郎). When the people heard that Young Gentleman Sun had come, they all lost heart, and the prefects and other officers left the cities and fled to hide in the hills and the open country. Then he arrived, and the men of his army obeyed their orders, and they did not dare to rob or plunder, and no chickens or dogs or vegetables were stolen. So the people were extremely pleased, and they all came to bring cattle and wine as rewards for the army."

By his victories over Liu Yao and his officers, Sun Ts'e had immediately gained great numbers of soldiers. After the second battle at Niu-chu, for example, it is said that he had taken over many men and women who had formerly served Fan Neng or Yü Mi, and it is clear that on many occasions the captured soldiers of a defeated army were able to change allegiance in the aftermath of a battle. Moreover, Liu Yao's flight had left his troops without a leader, and many of them were scattered throughout the countryside waiting only for an opportunity to join the new government. From Ch'ü-a, Sun Ts'e sent proclamations to all the prefectures under his control, saying that: 'No questions will be asked of any local followers of Liu Yao or Chai Jung who come to surrender. For those who are prepared to join my army, one man that comes will be regarded as fulfilling (the government levy on) his household. Those..."
that do not want to will not be forced to. It is said that within a few weeks he had gained twenty thousand footsoldiers and more than a thousand horsemen, and they came like clouds from every direction.

At this time Ts'e brought his mother and brothers back to Ch'ü-a. When Liu Yao drove Wu Ching across the Yangtse, Ts'e's family had also moved west to the safety of Li-yang, but they now returned, and Ts'e appointed his younger brother, Ch'üan, who was aged fourteen, to a position on his staff. Ts'e held Ch'üan in great admiration, and in the next year he appointed him Chief of a prefecture.

However, although Sun Ts'e had supplanted Liu Yao in the government of the settled Chinese lands of Tan-yang commandery and the region about Ch'ü-a in Wu commandery, many of the people of this hills and the private groups in the countryside had taken the opportunity of the fighting to extend their power and re-establish their armies. In Wu commandery east of Ch'ü-a, at one place or another, Yen Po-hu and other leaders had collected their forces. In the west, about Ching prefecture in Tan-yang (now Kinghsien in Anhwei) T'ai-shih Tz'u, an officer loyal to Liu Yao, was attempting to organise a rival administration and had made an alliance with the hills people nearby on the northern slopes of the Hwangshan range.

---

1 Both this and the preceding quotation are from SKWu 1, p.10b PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.

2 SKWu 2, p.1a and PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.

3 SKWu 4, p.7a.
Sun Ts'e's first concern was to establish his rule among the settled Chinese of Tan-yang, Wu and K'uai-chi, and he did not at first turn to deal with these minor groups. His main objective was Wang Lang, the Grand Administrator of K'uai-chi, and in 196 he moved to the attack, marching south through Wu commandery. The Grand Administrator of Wu commandery, Hsü Kung, attempted to oppose this advance, but he did not control a powerful army, and he was defeated by the Chief Commandant (都尉 tu-wei) of Wu commandery, Chu Chih. As Chief Commandant, Chih was responsible for the military organisation of the commandery and was theoretically under Hsü Kung's orders, but he was an old ally of the Sun family and had served under Sun Chien, and when he learnt that Sun Ts'e had come to the commandery he raised an army to attack Hsü Kung. Kung was defeated and took refuge with Yen Po-hu, and Sun Ts'e was able to approach K'uai-chi unmolested. As he advanced, Wang Lang came forward to defend his territory on the line of the Ch'ien-t'ang estuary at the head of Hangchow Bay.

Sun Ts'e had taken the opportunity of his march through Wu commandery to call up support from his relatives in that region, and his uncle, Sun Ching, who was the youngest brother of Sun Chien, came to join him at Ch'ien-t'ang. Wang Lang's army was at Ku-ling prefecture, west of present-day Siaoshan, and although Ts'e tried several times to force his way across the river, he had no

---
1 SKWu 11, p.11b.
success. According to Sun Ching's biography, Ching made plans with Ts'e and arranged that he should lead a detachment of the army a few miles south to a river crossing at Cha-tu and then turn north to take Wang Lang's forces in the rear at Kao-ch'ien. Ts'e had the men of his army light the usual number of fires so that the enemy would not see that any troops were missing, and then he sent Ching and his detachment off by night. Wang Lang was taken completely by surprise, and he sent his lieutenant Chou Hsin, the former Grand Administrator of Tan-yang, to lead an advance guard and give him time to regroup his main force. But Ts'e defeated Hsin and killed him, and Wang Lang took to flight. He abandoned his main territory of K'uai-chi, and he went by ship south along the coast to Tung-yeh, a prefecture which was administered by K'uai-chi commandery and which was situated on the mouth of the Min River in Fukien, the only part of the modern province

---

1 Cha-tu is now identified with Cha-p'u, a crossing of the Fuchun River in the borders of present-day Siaoshan county. In his commentary to SKWu 6, p.1b, P'ei Sung-chih notes that there was a Kao-ch'ien bridge in the Yung-hsing prefecture of his own Liu Sung dynasty; Yung-hsing was the Han prefecture of Yü-chi, and the name had been changed by Sun Ch'üan of Wu early in the third century; Yü-chi is now west of Siaoshan.
which was settled by Chinese at the time of the Han dynasty. Leaving part of his army in K'uai-chi proper, Sun Ts'e followed Wang Lang, captured Tung-yeh and received Lang's surrender.

Shang Sheng, Chief of Hou-kuan, which was neighbour to Tung-yeh, had supported Wang Lang when he came to the south, and although Lang had surrendered, Sheng allied himself with some of the hills people of the region and continued to oppose Sun Ts'e.

---

1 On the identification of Tung-yeh, I follow Bielenstein's article on 'The Chinese Colonisation of Fukien until the end of T'ang', pp. 121 and 122. There he notes that Tung-yeh had been established in Former Han, that the reference in HHS treatise 22 has been partially lost, but that the prefecture remained in existence until the second half of the third century. Its exact site is now unknown, but from the connection with Hou-kuan which is referred to at this time, it seems likely that the two places were close together, and since Hou-kuan is now west of Minhow, Tung-yeh was probably also close to the mouth of the Min River. In the chapter on The Lands of the South, page 62 there is a discussion of the maintenance of these isolated prefectures in Fukien as ports for the north-south coastal trade.

2 Wang Lang was later able to leave the south and join Ts'ao Ts'ao, and he had a successful career in the Wei state; his biography is in SKWei 13.
When Ts'e returned to the north he appointed a certain Han Yen as Chief Commandant of the Southern Region of K'uai-chi and gave him soldiers to attack Sheng, but Yen had no success, and was soon replaced by Ho Ch'i, member of a powerful family in K'uai-chi, who had joined Sun Ts'e after his arrival in the commandery. Sheng offered to surrender, but he was killed by the bandits with whom he had joined forces, and it was some time before Ho Ch'i was able to win over some barbarian allies and take advantage of disagreements among his enemies to attack and defeat them. For several years to come, Ch'i remained in charge of operations for the Sun family on this southeastern border, and he steadily extended their influence and power.

With Wang Lang defeated and K'uai-chi secure, Ts'e now moved north into Wu commandery to attack and defeat Yen Po-hu and the other groups who opposed him. Many of the leaders were killed, but Yen Po-hu and Hsü Kung were able to escape to the hills and later regroup their forces.

Two stories are told of Sun Ts'e in this time of civil war in his native commandery. A certain Wang Sheng, who had at one time been Grand Administrator of Ho-p'u commandery in Chiao Province, had fought against Sun Ts'e, but when he was to be executed, Ts'e's mother the Lady Wu said: "Sheng and your father used to court me, and now all his sons and his brothers are dead and this old man remains alone. Why should you be afraid of him?" So Ts'e let him live. Similarly, it is told that Yen Po-hu had fled to take refuge with a certain Hsü Chao of Yü-hang, (now Yuhang in Chekiang), and
Ts'e admired Hsü Chao's loyalty to his old friends and so did not attack him. Nevertheless, although Yen Po-hu made his escape and was able to cause trouble in the future, Wu commandery was now under the control of Sun Ts'e.

Ts'e named himself Grand Administrator of K'uai-chi, and he restored his uncle Wu Ching to the title of Grand Administrator of Tan-yang. Chu Chih was made Grand Administrator of Wu commandery. Ts'e's cousins, Sun Pen and his younger brother Fu, were also named Grand Administrators, Sun Pen to Yü-chang commandery and Sun Fu to Lu-ling, although at this time no part of Yü-chang or Lu-ling was yet under the control of Sun Ts'e.

At this time, towards the end of 196, Wu Ching and Sun Pen went back to Yuan Shu to report. Shu was then engaged in a campaign to take Hsü province from Liu Pei, the successor to T'ao Ch'ien, and he named Wu Ching as his Grand Administrator of Kuang-ling commandery. Sun Pen was given command of troops at Shou-ch'un, and a third cousin of Ts'e, Sun Hsiang, was appointed Grand Administrator of Ju-nan. Chou Shang and Chou Yü had joined Ts'e in the first campaign against Liu Yao, but after Ts'e was established in Chü-a he left them to look after Tan-yang while he moved against Wu and K'uai-chi. Soon afterwards, Yuan Shu recalled Shang and Yü and offered Yü a military post, but Yü

---

1 SKWu 1, p.10b PC quoting Wu lu.

2 SKWu 6, p.6b PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.
asked to be made Chief of Chū-ch’ao, prefecture in Lu-chiang commandery (now northeast of Chaohsien in Anhwei). Yu was evidently suspicious of Yuan Shu's ambitions, and was afraid that Shu would fail, and he wanted to be stationed close to the Yangtse so that he might rejoin Sun Ts'e without great difficulty.

By 196 and 197, Yuan Shu had decided to proclaim himself as Emperor of a new dynasty. In 191, when Sun Chien found the Great Seal of State of Han in the ruins of Lo-yang, he had handed it over to Shu, and the histories say that even in these early years Shu was thinking of claiming the imperial title. By 196, Shu had broached the matter in open council with his officers, and although he had not gone further with the plan at that time, Sun Ts'e heard of the proposal and wrote to protest. Wu lu preserves a letter which Sun Ts'e had composed by his counsellor Chang Hung and which he then sent to Shu, saying that 'Last winter there was a rumour that you had made a great plan (to claim the empire), and everyone was afraid. Then we found out that tribute was being prepared (for the Han court), and everyone was relieved of their anxiety. I have just heard that the discussion has started again, and

1 SKWu 9, p.1b.
2 Shan-yang kung tsai-chi, quoted in SKWu 1, p.6b PC, and also, for example, Wu shu, quoted in SKWei 6, p.32a PC.
3 SKWu 6, p.33b.
that some want to revive the earlier plan... This makes me even more disconcerted, and I think it must be some absurd rumour'. The letter continues, at length, to persuade Shu against his plan of empire,¹ but despite this and other protests, Yüan Shu proclaimed himself Emperor of the Chung dynasty in 197. Sun Ts'e at once disclaimed all allegiance to him.

Yüan Shu appears to have been possessed of an inordinate idea of his own importance and an infinite capacity for self-delusion. Admittedly, he controlled most of Yang province, and he was fighting for Hsü province, and Sun Ts'e, who was officially under his orders, was acquiring more territory in the southeast. On paper, he dominated the Hwai and the lower Yangtse; but this was not a great part of the whole empire. Besides his territorial possessions, Shu was very conscious that he came from a great official family and that he was senior in the clan to his cousin Shao; on the other hand, as Sun Ts'e pointed out in his letter, the honours that the Yüan family had received from the Han dynasty should rather encourage him to support the young Emperor, not to attempt to take his place. Shu had also convinced himself by means of prophecies and wordplay with the characters of his name that he was the man destined to succeed the Liu family in the government of the empire; but Sun Ts'e and Chang Hung, in rational Confucianist fashion, pointed out that 'Many people of this time follow prophecies and join in superstitions. They compare words and fit them

¹ SKWu 1, pp.11a ff PC.
to current events, and they use them to delude their masters and to
deceive the people... You must examine them carefully and think hard
about them.\footnote{SK\textit{wu} 1, p.12a PC. One of the prophecies which influenced}

In the event, Shu's proclamation as an emperor proved extraor-
dinarily ill-timed and disastrous to himself. By this premature move
he broke the rules of the civil war and made himself an outlaw. It was
not for twenty more years that another such claim was made. Shu had
powerful enemies, Ts'ao Ts'ao and Yüan Shao, in the north, and his
position in the southeast depended in the last resort very much on
his family prestige and his personal influence. He offered a marriage
connection to the warlord Lü Pu, his ally in Hsü province, but Pu was
persuaded that it would be unwise to have dealings with a rebel emperor,
and he broke off relations with Shu and then attacked him in Yang
province. Faced with the need to defend his claims and his territories

\footnote{SK\textit{wu} 1, p.12a PC. One of the prophecies which influenced Yüan Shu read: 'The one who shall replace the Han will be "The road
will be elevated" (\
\texttt{蔭高} t'u-k\texttt{ao}).' Since the character of Shu's
personal name and the second character of his style Kung-lu 公路
can both mean 'road' or 'path', Shu considered that this was a
reference to himself. The prophecy is cited in Shu's biography in
\textit{HHS} 65, p.7a, and there the primary commentary points out that the
character Wei 魏, the name of the dynasty later established by the
Ts'ao family, can mean 'high', and this also fits the prophecy.}
by fighting, Shu was quite unsuccessful, and by the end of 197, under attacks from Lü Pu and from Ts'ao Ts'ao, he had been driven south of the Hwai.¹ From this time on, Shu was under constant pressure, and the resources of his diminished territory dwindled as the result of bad harvests and his own extravagance. His power steadily declined.²

In the south, Sun Ts'e put guards to hold the crossings over the Yangtse, and he wrote to his relations and his friends who were serving Yuan Shu and invited them to join him. Wu Ching and Sun Pen and Chou Yü all came to him, and Chou Yü brought with him Lu Su, one of the great commanders for the Sun family in the years that followed.³ Ts'e had no difficulty in holding his territory against Yuan Shu, who was far too pre-occupied with Lü Pu and Ts'ao Ts'ao to be able to spare any attention for him, and he was immediately recognised in his position and urged to join the alliance against Shu.

---

¹ SKWei 7, p.7b PC quoting Ying-hsiung chi, and SKWei 1, p.12b.
² HHS 65, p.9a and SKWei 6, p.34a.
³ SKWu 5, p.1b; SKWu 6, p.6b; SKWu 9, p.1b; SKWu 9, p.9b.

Chiang-piao chuan, quoted in SKWu 6, p.6b PC, says that Sun Pen had some difficulty in getting away to join Ts'e, and that Ts'e's other cousin, Sun Hsiang, was the only one that did not come, because it was too far for him to travel from Ju-nan to the south of the Yangtse, and he died at Shou-ch'un.
In 192, Tung Cho had been assassinated by his trusted lieutenant Lü Pu at Ch'ang-an. Within a few weeks, Pu had been forced to flee from the capital to the east, and had then established a position for himself in Hsü province. The young Emperor Hsien, however, had remained at Ch'ang-an as a pawn to be played with by a group of generals, headed by Li Chüeh, who had come from the west to succeed to Tung Cho's power. At the end of 195 the Emperor was at last able to take advantage of the quarrels among these guardians and made his own escape to the east. There he fell into the hands of Ts'ao Ts'ao, and from this time on Ts'ao was able to issue orders and conduct his policy in the name of the Emperor. In 197 an edict was sent to Sun Ts'e, recognising him as Grand Administrator of K'uai-chi, recalling the deeds of his father in the service of Han against Tung Cho, and commanding him to join with Lü Pu and a newly appointed Grand Administrator of Wu commandery, Ch'en Yü, in order to attack Shu. According to Chiang-piao chuan, this edict was conveyed to Ts'e by a certain Wang P'u, and besides confirming him as Grand Administrator, it granted him the succession to the marquisate of Wu-ch'eng, formerly held by his father Chien, and also appointed him Chief Commandant of Cavalry (騎都尉 ch'i-tu-wei). Ts'e felt that a post as Chief Commandant of Cavalry was not high enough to satisfy him, and he wanted to be given the title of general. In order to appease him, Wang P'u gave him the temporary title of General Who Glorifies Han (明漢將軍 ming-Han chiang-chün).
Wu lu contained the memorial of thanks sent to the capital by Ts'e at the time of this visit from Wang P'u, and the memorial reads in part:

'Your subject is uninformed and uncultivated, and does no more than guard the frontiers. Your Majesty extends his great favour far and wide, not leaving out even a minor contribution; you have given me the honour of noble rank and you have also set me in charge of a famous commandery. I respect the honour and I appreciate the favour; they are more than I am worthy of.

In the second year of Hsing-p'ing, in the twelfth month, on the twentieth day, at Ch'ü-a in Wu commandery I received a recommendation from Shu appointing me acting General Who Destroys the Criminals. Now I have received your imperial letter and I realise that the appointment was false and made without true authority. Although I have at once renounced the title, I am still trembling and perturbed.

When I was aged seventeen, I lost my support (my father)....I first held command of soldiers when I was not yet old enough to be capped, and although I am weak and timid and not able in war, I have paid the utmost attention to my orders. However, Shu is wild and deluded and his wrongdoings

---

1 The section of the Wu lu containing the memorial is preserved in SKWu 1, p.13a PC.

2 6 February, 196.
are great and serious. I trust to Your spiritual authority, I receive Your commands to carry out the punishment, and I shall send him in as a prisoner to be a recompense for those things which have been conferred upon me.'

Sun Ts'e collected his forces in K'uai-chi and marched to Ch'ien-t'ang on his way north through Wu commandery. Ch'en Yü, the new Grand Administrator of Wu commandery appointed by Ts'ao Ts'ao, had remained at Hai-hsi prefecture in Kuang-ling (now south of Tunghai in Kiangsu), well north of the Hwai valley. From there, instead of co-operating with Sun Ts'e, he sent secret messengers to make contact with Yen Po-hu and other potential rebels, to have them act as agents against Ts'e within his own territory. Ts'e found this out. He himself led a punitive expedition against Yen Po-hu and the others, and at the same time he sent an army under the command of Lü Fan to surprise Ch'en Yü, who no doubt felt that he was safe from attack so far north of the Yangtse. Fan and his forces completely defeated Yü and captured a great number of prisoners, and Yü himself fled away to the north.

Once Ts'e had defeated Ch'en Yü and shown Ts'ao Ts'ao that he was not going to be taken over easily, he was still prepared to continue relations with the north. In the next year he made a point of sending up large tribute of the local products of K'uai-chi commandery, and in recognition of his loyalty to the Emperor he was given the substantive rank of General Who Exterminates the Rebels (討逆將軍 t'ao-ni chiang-chün) and was given a new fief as Marquis of Wu. From 197 to 199 the
alliance against Yuan Shu continued, and Sun Ts'e sent his cousin Fu, the younger brother of Pen, to cross the Yangtse and camp at Li-yang as a guard against Shu's attacks. However, although there may have been some preparations, no large attack was launched against Yuan Shu from either the south or the north, and Shu remained for some time, restricted but unmolested, in his diminished territory.

The move west into Tan-yang, Lu-chiang and the middle Yangtse (198-199):

By the beginning of 198, Sun Ts'e was in recognised control of the commanderies of Wu and K'uai-chi, and he held half of Tan-yang commandery, the territory from Hsüan-ch'eng eastwards; but the lands further south, from Ching prefecture west, had never submitted to him. After his defeat in 196, Liu Yao had fled to Yu-chang, and T'ai-shih Tz'u, one of his officers, had returned to Ching to set up a new government as Grand Administrator of Tan-yang in Liu Yao's service. Ching is close to the hills, Tz'u had gained the support of the non-Chinese tribes, and from that base he could watch the valley of the Yangtse between the two mountain ranges of Tapieh Shan and

1 SKWu 6, p.8a.

2 Hsüan-ch'eng in Tan-yang had been listed as a prefecture under the Former Han dynasty, but lost that status during Later Han. Chin shu 15, p.6b, describes it as a prefecture and it seems likely that the city was again appointed a prefecture towards the end of Later Han. The site is now west of Suancheng in Anhwei.

3 Ching prefecture is now Kinghsien in Anhwei.
Hwang Shan. Any move by Sun Ts'e southwest up the river towards the lands of the middle Yangtse basin required him first to deal with T'ai-shih Tz'u.

In 198, Yuan Shu sent agents across the Yangtse to make contact with Tsu Lang and the other leaders in Tan-yang and to encourage them to rebel against Sun Ts'e. At the news of these disturbances, Ts'e led his army up the Yangtse, turned inland to attack Tsu Lang, and defeated and captured him at Ling-yang, now northeast of Shihtai in Anhwei. From there Ts'e turned to Ching prefecture, and he defeated and captured T'ai-shih Tz'u.

According to Chiang-piao chuan, when Ts'e had captured Lang, he said to him: 'Once before you made an attack on me, and you chopped the saddle of my horse. But now I have raised an army and I am creating an affair (to influence all the empire) and I have forgotten all my old enmities. I only take men that I can use, and with anyone in the empire it would be just the same. You have nothing to fear.' Then Lang made the kowtow and apologised for his wrongdoing, and his fetters were broken and he was given clothing and was appointed to a post in the camp.

In the same way, when Ts'e had captured T'ai-shih Tz'u, he at once released his bonds and took him by the hand, saying: 'Do you still remember the time at Shen-t'ing? If you had caught me

---

1 Quoted in SK Wu 6, p. 8a PC.
2 This refers, no doubt, to the incident in 193 or 194, when Ts'e was serving in Tan-yang under Wu Ching.
then, what would have happened? Then, what would have happened? Tz'u replied: 'I cannot imagine.'

Ts'e gave a great laugh and said: 'Everything that I am doing now, I will share with you.' When the army went back, Tsu Lang and T'ai-shih rode together in the lead, and everyone noticed the honour.

There is an interesting contrast between Sun Ts'e's generous treatment of Wang Lang and T'ai-shih in western Tan-yang in 198 and his firm repression of opposition when he was in Wu commandery in 196. There, with the known exceptions of Wang Sheng, whom he pardoned for pity, and Yen Po-hu, who was allowed to escape, the local leaders who opposed Sun Ts'e were killed. On the one hand, it is likely that Ts'e felt a lenient policy in Tan-yang could help to settle the various Chinese and barbarian groups who had given their support to Lang and Tz'u and would keep them quiet even when his army had left the hills, but on the other hand, his pardon and his offer of friendship were genuine, and T'ai-shih Tz'u, in particular, became one of his most able officers. More probably, Ts'e felt that he could trust these two men, and he did not feel the same about his fellow-countrymen in Wu commandery.

1 Shen-t'ing was a place to the west of Ch'ü-a, and when T'ai-shih Tz'u was with Liu Yao at Ch'ü-a there was one occasion that he was acting as a scout and came by chance on Sun Ts'e with a group of his officers. Tz'u charged Ts'e at once, and they fought hand to hand for a few moments, with honours about even, until some more troops came up from either side and they were compelled to break off the duel. (SKWu 4, p.8a)

2 SKWu 4, p.7a.

3 SKWu 6, p.8a PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.
There is no definite pattern by which one may assess the chances of a man who changes sides in time of civil war, but as a rule of thumb we may consider a distinction between the 'professional soldiers' and the 'men of family'. Men such as Tsu Lang and T'ai-shih Tz'u, and Sun Ts'e himself, although they might come from the gentry and possess family connections and influence, held their positions of command essentially through their personal authority and ability. However, when Ts'e entered Wu commandery, it seems most likely that the majority of his opponents in this more settled region were the leaders of clans and family groups, together with their armed retainers. The Sun family itself came from Wu commandery, and there were many people who came to join Sun Ts'e when he arrived in the southeast.¹ Those who were not prepared to join him, but insisted in fighting him, may have disapproved of Ts'e himself or may have had some quarrel with his family, or may simply have wished to maintain their independent positions of local power. In any case, Ts'e could not trust these people to remain quiet, and he could not use such personal and local groups of retainers in his army; all he could do was eliminate the leaders and hope that the people would accept his own established government in their place. From this comparison, it may be suggested that the leader of a local clan, who commanded forces by reason of his

¹ For example, Ch'üan Jou of Ch'ien-t'ang (SKWu 15, p.5a), Tung Hsi from K'uai-chi (SKWu 10, p.9b) and Ho Ch'i from K'uai-chi. There were also, of course, Ts'e's own relatives, such as his uncle Sun Ching.
family relationships, had little chance when he opposed a competent general such as Sun Ts'e. The men that Ts'e was prepared to accept were those who commanded forces through their own abilities and who were prepared to serve a master loyally. When the great armies fought the civil war in China, a man had to be more than the local leader of family retainers if he was to survive, for family position might give him a start, but he needed to be a fighting man as well.

At this time, just after Sun Ts'e had conquered all of Tan-yang, he learnt that Liu Yao had died in Yü-chang commandery. Hua Hsin, who was Yao's Grand Administrator of Yü-chang, was the senior official available, and he was urged to take command of Yao's forces. Hsin, however, was a modest fellow, and he refused to accept supreme command, and although he kept control of Yü-chang the other parts of Liu Yao's territory were left to fend for themselves. When Sun Ts'e heard of this, he called T'ai-shih Tz'u to him and asked him to take a party to reconnoitre the situation to the west and see what chance he had of persuading his former companions to join Sun Ts'e. According to Chiang-piao chuan, Ts'e explained his position to Tz'u, saying: 'In the past, Governor Liu resented the fact that I had attacked Lu-chiang commandery for Yüan... (But) my late father had had several thousand soldiers under his command, and they were all in (Yüan) Kung-lu's control. It was my ambition to set up a place for myself, but how could I avoid joining Kung-lu if I was to ask for those soldiers? When he ordered me to attack Lu-chiang, the way things were at that time what could I do but go? It was only later, when he did not
respect the conduct of a minister, and when he forgot himself and did evil and planned to usurp the imperial title, then I objected but he would not follow... (and) I was compelled to leave him. Now Liu Yao is dead, and I am sad that I could have explained things to him while he was alive...

Tz'u went off to the west with a small party and came back within two months. He reported to Ts'e that:

"Hua Tzu-yü" is a man of virtue, but he has no ability in planning and no ideas of his own. He holds his own position and does nothing more. In Lu-ling, T'ung Chih of Tan-yang has seized the place for himself and pretends that he has an imperial commission as Grand Administrator. The leaders of the people of Po-yang have set up their own clan groups and have collected soldiers to defend their territory, and they refuse to accept the officials sent by Tzu-yü, saying: "We have already set up an independent commandery, and the Han will soon send a proper Grand Administrator to come, and we will accept him." And not only does Tzu-yü fail to control Lu-ling and Po-yang, but there are also five or six thousand families at Hai-hun and by the cliffs at Shang-

---

1 SKWu 4, p. 7b to 8a PC.
2 Tzu-yü 了鱼 was the style of Hua Hsin.
3 A prefecture in the marshy country about the Poyang Lake, now east of Poyang in Kiangsi.
Vons who have banded themselves into clan forces; these people will send in the tax cloth to the commandery, but not a single man will respond to any official summons. To all this, Tzu-yü does no more than look on. " Ts'ē clapped his hands together and laughed aloud, and it was then that he decided he could take over Yū-chang.  

By the following year, 199, Sun Ts'ē had made his preparations and was ready to move up the course of the Yangtse towards the west. However, by this time, besides the remaining soldiers of Liu Yao, now commanded by Hua Hsin and T'ung Chih, and the independent groups at Po-yang and Hai-hun, Ts'ē's main objective was the army of Huang Tsu. Tsu was the man who had led the force which killed Sun Chien near Hsiang-yang in 191, and now, still in the service of Liu Piao, he commanded an army and a fleet which controlled the course of the middle Yangtse from headquarters near the mouth of the Han River. Since the death of Liu Yao, it appears that Huang Tsu had naturally taken advantage of the power-vacuum in the region of the Poyang Lake and had extended his patrols to the east until his sphere of influence reached the territory of Sun Ts'e in Tan-yang commandery. Ts'e's move towards the west now gained the added incentive of revenge for his father's death.

---

1 Hai-hun prefecture was also in Yū-chang commandery, now Yung-hsiu to the west of the Poyang Lake (The Times Atlas has this place as Yungsin). Shui-ching chu 29, p.17b, remarks that the Liao River (also written Shang-liao River) was called Shang-liao where it flows near Hai-hun prefecture.

2 SKWu 4, p.8b PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.
However, even as his army began its march towards the west, Ts'e learnt of changes on his northern frontier. That year, Yuan Shu had died at Shou-ch'un. Many of his soldiers had scattered to serve other masters, but a great number of his troops and the members of his court had gone to join Shu's Grand Administrator of Lu-chiang, Liu Hsün. When Ts'e heard of this, he was anxious about the danger from such a powerful combined force on his flank, and he made plans to deal with the situation before he went further up-river.¹

Liu Hsün was short of food for his new followers, and he sent messengers to Hua Hsin in Yü-chang to ask for supplies. Hsin himself had nothing to spare, but he sent to ask the leaders of Hai-hun and Shang-liao for rice. They gave very little, and after more than a month of travelling Liu Hsün's messengers returned almost empty-handed. Then Hsün planned to attack Hai-hun and take the supplies by force. At the same time, Sun Ts'e was writing encouraging letters of friendship to him, and Hsün was led to feel confident that he could move west on his

¹ According to Ts'e's biography (SKWu 1, p.13a), Yuan Shu's people had originally planned to take refuge with Ts'e, but Liu Hsün had waylaid them and captured them. Chiang-piao chuan, which is quoted by the primary commentary to this passage, makes no reference to this intention, and Ssu-ma Kuang, in TCTC pp.2019 and 2020 also disregards this version. For Yuan Shu's people, Liu Hsün was a more logical choice for refuge than Sun Ts'e, a declared enemy of Shu.
own account without any danger from his neighbours. So Hsun led his army out of his commandery.

As soon as he realised that his plan had worked, Sun Ts'e divided his army: a detachment under Sun Pen and Sun Fu was sent to P'eng-tse prefecture in Yü-chang to cut Liu Hsun off from his commandery, and he himself, with Chou Yu, led his main force to capture Wan, the capital of Lu-chiang commandery. They captured Hsun's family and followers and also the wife and children of Yuan Shu and the former artisans and musicians and attendants of his imperial court. Ts'e appointed one of his officers, a certain Li Shu, Grand Administrator of Lu-chiang, and then he returned to the west to join his cousins.

1 According to the biography of Liu Yeh, who was an adviser to Liu Hsun at this time, Sun Ts'e sent messengers to Hsun with presents and a humble letter, suggesting that Shang-liao was wealthy and could easily be taken by Hsun's forces, and that he himself would bring his troops to act as support from the outside. Hsun believed all this. (SKWei 14, p.21b and 22a.)

2 P'eng-tse is now east of Hukow in Kiangsi, at the junction of the Poyang Lake with the Yangtse.

3 Wan is now Tsienshan in Anhwei.
In the meantime, Liu Hsün had attempted to take Hai-hun by surprise, but the people there were forewarned and Hsün had no success. When he learnt of the attack on his capital, he attempted to return east, but he was cut off by the army of P'eng-tse and driven west up the Yangtse. He halted to prepare defensive positions near Hsi-sai hill, east of present-day Tayeh in Hupeh, and from there he asked Liu Piao and Huang Tsu for help. Huang Tsu's eldest son, She, with a fleet and five thousand men, came to help Hsün; but Sun Ts'e defeated the allies and drove them back to the mouth of the Han. He captured two thousand of Hsün's soldiers and more than a thousand ships, and Liu Hsün abandoned the struggle and fled to Ts'ao Ts'ao with a handful of his remaining followers. Huang She went back to join his father, and Sun Ts'e followed his successes by an advance and an attack on Huang Tsu's headquarters at Sha-hsien prefecture in Chiang-hsia, now southwest of Wuchang in Hupeh.

In a memorial to the throne, Sun Ts'e described the action that followed:

"When I attacked Huang Tsu, I came to Sha-hsien prefecture, where Tsu was camped, on the eighth day of the twelfth month. Liu Piao had sent officers to help Tsu, and they came against me together. At dawn on the eleventh I sent forward detachments and they all advanced at the same time. I myself rode on a horse to order the battle lines and I beat a fast drum to

---

1 This was 11 January, 200, by western reckoning.
prepare them for the fight. The officers and soldiers were roused to the effort and their spirits were raised a thousand times; their hearts were keen and their minds were determined, each vied with the other to carry out my orders. We crossed the rings of moats so fast that it seemed we were flying. Fire spread with a favourable wind and the soldiers charged through the smoke. Bows and cross bows shot together and the arrows poured down like the rain. As the sun rose to the early morning, Tsu was broken and destroyed. Cut down by sharp swords or burnt by the raging flames, there was no enemy alive before us and only Tsu fled away. We captured his wife and his sons and daughters, seven people. We cut off more than twenty thousand heads ....more than ten thousand fled to the river and were drowned. (We captured) more than six thousand boats and a treasure piled up like mountains... Truly all is due to the far-reaching influence of the spiritual warfare (神戦 shen-wu) of Your sage-like government, that I have attacked the criminals and been able to put forth my feeble efforts.¹

¹ The text of this memorial is preserved in the primary commentary to SKWu 1, p.14a, where it is quoted from Wu lu.
Sun Ts'e: the last campaigns (200 A.D.):

The victory over Huang Tsu in the last month of the Chinese year, while it may not have been quite so complete as Sun Ts'e himself described it, certainly removed Tsu's ability to intervene in any part of the Yangtse downstream from Hankow. Tsu, driven onto the defensive, collected some of his scattered soldiers and received further reinforcements from Liu Piao in order to face the next attack. Sun Ts'e, for his part, withdrew to the region of the Poyang Lake and prepared to invade Yü-chang and Lu-ling. Since he had no wish to receive the treatment that he had given to Liu Hsün, he could not afford to extend his communications over-long towards the west until he was sure that the territory south of the Poyang Lake was secure.

Early in the new year Sun Ts'e was in camp at Chiao-ch'iu, now north of Sinkien, on the Kan River near the Poyang Lake. The city of Nan-ch'ang, chief prefecture of Yü-chang commandery, was east of present-day Nanchang and a few miles away, across the Kan. According to Chiang-piao chuan, Sun Ts'e held considerable respect for Hua Hsin, and he sent Yu Fan, a former follower of Wang Lang the Grand Administrator of K'uai-chi, to persuade Hsin to surrender without a fight. Yu Fan, with truth, pointed out the strength of Sun Ts'e's army and the weakness of Hsin's own, and so Hua Hsin came out and surrendered Yü-chang to Ts'e.

Once Hua Hsin had surrendered, Sun Ts'e had nothing more to fear from Yü-chang. T'ung Chih, self-styled Grand Administrator of Lu-ling,
still held out, but Ts'e left Sun Fu and Chou Yü at Nan-ch'ang to wait for an opportunity to attack him. Within a few months, they learnt that T'ung Chih had been taken ill, and they took advantage of this opportunity to go forward and occupy his territory.

1SKWu 6, p.6b PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan. This passage and the main text immediately preceding it refer to the appointment of Sun Pen and Sun Fu as Grand Administrators of Yü-chang and Lu-ling respectively at this time (i.e. in 200). However, the main text of Sun Ts'e's biography, SKWu 1, p.11a, says that they were appointed to these posts after the first defeat of Liu Yao and the campaign in Wu and K'uai-chi, in 196. TCTC p.2022 accepts the later version of the appointments, and certainly this makes more sense, for it was not until 200 that the Sun family actually occupied Yü-chang and Lu-ling. However, it is possible that Sun Pen and Sun Fu were given these titles in 196, and that they were confirmed in them when the territory became available. Since Liu Yao had fled to Yü-chang after his defeat at Ch'ü-a, it is possible that Sun Ts'e made these appointments as a threat, and although he did not yet control the two districts, he was giving early notice that he intended to come and take them. In the same way, it is said that even before Ts'e had taken Lu-chiang in 199, he had already announced his intention to attack Ching province and had named Chou Yü his Grand Administrator of Chiang-hsia commandery (SKWu 9, p.2a).
Historians and commentators have compared the dealings of Wang Lang and Hua Hsin with Sun Ts'e. Hsin and Lang were both famous scholars of that time, they both lost their territories to Ts'e and they both later went north and held high office in the state of Wei.¹ P'ei Sung-chih adds his own comment to this story from Chiang-piao chuan, in which he remarks with justice that 'Lord Wang stood and fought with Hua turned away (from his duty) and asked to surrender. The fact is that when Sun Ts'e first appeared, he had little fame and his followers were few, and so Wang could raise soldiers against him... Later on, Ts'e's power and authority had grown great and his strength could not be matched... If the situation had been different, then Hua would have fought and Wang would have surrendered.'² In fact, by 200, Sun Ts'e commanded the most powerful army in south China and one of the strongest in the empire.

At this time, in the north, the two warlords Ts'ao Ts'ao and Yuan Shao had finally come to grips. Ts'ao Ts'ao, holding the Emperor in his custody in Hsü city and borrowing the Emperor's authority to justify his actions, had steadily increased his power, and Yuan Shao, who still commanded greater lands and more soldiers, felt that Ts'ao was becoming a threat and resolved to destroy him. From the spring to

¹ In 220, when Ts'ao P'i succeeded Ts'ao Ts'ao as King of Wei, Hua Hsin and Wang Lang held two of his three highest offices. (See, for example, TCTC p.2177). Hua Hsin's biography, with that of Wang Lang, is in SKWei 13. For Sun Sheng's comment against Hua Hsin, see SKWei 13, p.9b and TCTC p.2022.

² SKWu 12, p.2b PC.
the winter of 200, the two armies were in contact in a long-drawn campaign about the city of Kuan-tu, now northeast of Chungmow by the Yellow River in Honan. By the end of the year, Ts'ao Ts'ao had won a complete victory and Yüan Shao's power was in decline, but for many months Ts'ao had had little time to take thought for the south.

In order to keep the peace with Sun Ts'ë, Ts'ao Ts'ao arranged a marriage alliance, which was set up soon after Ts'ë had captured Yü-chang. A daughter of a younger brother of Ts'ao was given in marriage to Ts'ë's brother K'uang, and Ts'ao's own son Chang married a daughter of Sun Pen. Ts'ao made a point of showing courtesy towards Ts'ë and his brothers, although according to Wu lu he had heard of Ts'ë's conquests with some anxiety and had several times exclaimed: 'That mastiff of a young man will be difficult to fight.'

Nevertheless, despite the alliance, it is said that when Sun Ts'ë heard of Ts'ao's pre-occupations with Yüan Shao at Kuan-tu, he had some plans for a raid across the Hwai to capture Hsü city behind Ts'ao's back and to carry off the Emperor to the south. In the early months of 200 such an enterprise was almost feasible, and according to the Sou-shen chi, not a very reliable work, Ts'ë actually set out on such a raid but was compelled to turn back on account of a drought. Since the Sou-shen chi is largely concerned with the story of the miracle-working sage Yü

---

1 SKWu 1, p.14a PG quoting Wu lu.

2 SKWu 1, p.14b.
Chi, how he brought rain to break the drought when Sun Ts'e demanded it and how he was then killed by Ts'e because of his excessive popularity among the soldiers, there is some room for doubt that this northern campaign ever took place.¹

There is clearly a tradition that Yü Chi was killed by Sun Ts'e, but there are two versions of how this came to pass. One is that of the Sou-shen chi, the other, from Chiang-piao chuan, says that Yü Chi interrupted a council that Sun Ts'e was holding with his officers because he walked below the tower where the meeting was taking place and the officers left Sun Ts'e to pay their respects to Yü Chi.² Of the two stories, the Chiang-piao chuan is a little more straightforward, and it is quite possible that the author of the Sou-shen chi, knowing that Yü Chi was supposed to have been killed by Sun Ts'e, developed the story and set it at the time Sun Ts'e was planning the northern expedition against Hsü. Although it is very likely that Ts'e did consider such a project, there is no other source to say that he actually embarked on it.

In fact, in the summer of 200 A.D., Sun Ts'e rode to his last campaign. When he was in the west to fight Huang Tsu and to capture Lu-chiang and Yü-chang, his old enemy Yen Po-hu had made another rebellion in Wu commandery. Yen Po-hu had been encouraged by Ch'en Teng, who had succeeded his cousin Ch'en Yü as Grand Administrator

¹ Sou-shen chi is quoted in SKWu 1, p.15b PC.
² Chiang-piao chuan is quoted in SKWu 1, p.15a PC.
of Kuang-ling, and he had been joined by the former Grand Administrator of Wu commandery, Hsü Kung. To put down this disturbance, Sun Ts'e brought his army back from the west.

In 196, when Ts'e defeated Liu Yao south of the Yangtse but before he had come east to attack Hsü Kung in Wu commandery, Kung had sent a letter to the court to urge that Ts'e should be summoned to hold office in the capital in order that he might be kept under control. Soon afterwards, Kung had been defeated by Chu Chih and had taken refuge with Yen Po-hu, and it seems that he was able to keep away from Sun Ts'e until the time of this rebellion in 200. Then, in one of the early engagements against the rebels, Ts'e captured Hsü Kung, taxed him with this letter to the court, and then had him executed by strangling.

After this first success, Ts'e brought his army forward to camp at Tan-t'u, now southeast of Tantu in Kiangsu. There, by the southern shore of the Yangtse, he planned to wait a few days for supplies. In the meantime he went hunting. However, although Kung had been killed and his followers had scattered, a few of them had taken refuge in the country nearby. Ts'e loved to hunt deer, and the horse that he rode was a very good one, and none of his guards or attendants could keep up with the chase. For a little while, he was alone, and he came upon three of Kung's retainers, and they took their bows and shot at him, and one of the arrows struck him on the jaw. Then Ts'e's attendants rode up and the three men were killed, but

---

1 SKWu 1, p.16a PC quoting Chiang-piao chuan.
Sun Ts'e was brought back to his camp with a serious wound.

There are two stories of how Sun Ts'e died. According to Sou-shen chi, he was haunted by the spirit of Yü Chi; but Wu li has a more natural story and a touching one.

"When Ts'e was wounded, the doctors said that he could be cured, but that he should take care of himself and keep quiet for a hundred days. Ts'e got hold of a mirror and saw his own reflection, and then he said to his attendants: "With a face like this, how shall I ever achieve anything again, and how shall I set up my power?" He pushed away his armrest, and he became very upset, and all his wounds broke open, and he died that night."

The date of his death was 5 May, 200.

Ts'e was twenty-six years old by Chinese reckoning when he died. He had been in command of an independent army for five years, and in that time he had made himself one of the most powerful men in China. After the first experiences under Wu Ching in Tan-yang, from the time that he took service with Yuan Shu he never lost a battle. He conquered Lu-chiang for Shu, and then he crossed the Yangtse and defeated Liu Yao and Wang Lang and Yen Po-hu and T'ai-shih Ts'u and Liu Hsün and Huang Tsu, and he conquered all the territory of the Yangtse basin from Hankow to the estuary. It was once said of the hero Liu Pei that he should be kept under close control, because if he ever gained the chance to fight for himself he would be like a dragon that had escaped from a pond and had found the clouds and the rain.¹

¹ SKWu 9, p.6a, recording the advice of Chou Yü to Sun Ch'üan about 210 A.D.
When Sun Ts'e came to the south of the Yangtse, he could well have been described as a dragon that had found its element. According to his biography, 'wherever he faced he was always victorious and there were none who could withstand his attacks; moreover, his control of his army maintained order and respect, and all the people loved him'.

Ts'e gained a great deal from his father's reputation and from his family relationships. He obtained some of Sun Chien's old soldiers from Yuan Shu and many of those who came to serve him had earlier fought under Chien. His uncle Wu Ching and his cousin Sun Pen were both prepared to accept his commands when they began the campaign against Liu Yao, and in part at least this must have been due to their respect for Sun Chien as the past leader of the clan. However, without Ts'e's brilliant success as a commander, these men would not have continued to obey him for long, and they would either have chosen another leader from among themselves or would have gone to join another band.

In this time of civil war, nothing succeeded like success. Ts'e's first victory over Liu Yao gave him stores with which to feed and equip his men, and this at a time when many of Yuan Shu's troops were desperately short of food. Prisoners became new recruits and

1 SkWu 1, p.10a.
2 See, for example, Yang Lien-sheng's translation of 'The Economic History of the Chin Dynasty': 'At that time, all the troops under Yuan Shao were fed with mulberries and jujubes; those under Yuan Shu with oysters and clams.' (p.158, and see TCTC p.1990).
then, when he had driven Liu Yao away to the west, Ts'e was able to gain the support of the people as the head of the only established government in the district. The majority were prepared to accept the rule of the most powerful lord, and when Ts'e had defeated Wang Lang there was no person strong enough to contest that position with him in the lands south of the Yangtse estuary. So long as he won his battles, the mandate of the people followed him, and the weakness of Yüan Shu and the disorder in Ts'u province provided him with a buffer and a protection to the north. The more powerful rulers in the Yellow River plain, such as Ts'ao Ts'ao and Yüan Shao, could not make a direct attack on Sun Ts'e in the southeast during these early years, and even after Yüan Shu was gone, Ts'ao's preoccupation with Yüan Shao prevented him from any active moves towards the Yangtse, while the Sun armies had no difficulty in suppressing the secondary threats from the Ch'en family in Kuang-ling.

In dealing with his enemies and his rivals, Ts'e had an eclectic policy. Some, such as T'ai-shih Tz'u or Tsu Lang, he believed to be of use to him, and he invited them to join his service. Others, such as Wang Lang or Hua Hsin or Wang Sheng, he respected or pitied, and they were allowed to escape. Very many, whom he felt to be no use, and who might be a danger, were killed out of hand.

Ts'e was, with reason, sensitive of his dignity: Wu lu says that on one occasion he invited a certain Kao Tai, an expert scholar of the Tso-chuan, to call on him and discuss that history with him. Ts'e himself took an amateur's interest in the work, and was
genuinely interested in meeting Kao Tai. However, the party came to a miserable end, for some evil-wisher advised Tai to be excessively courteous and to reply to all Ts'e's questions by saying that he did not know the answer and that he expected Ts'e would instruct him. Ts'e, not unnaturally, felt that Tai was making fun of him, and he sent Tai to be executed. There are also the stories of the killing of Yü Chi, who is known as the discoverer of the Taoist book T'ai-p'ing ching 太平經, which had been presented to the Han court of Emperor Shun some fifty or sixty years earlier. Yü Chi should have been almost a hundred years old when he was executed by Sun Ts'e, but the stories contain some unusual elements and are confused as to place and time, and they may not be true. The stories of Kao Tai and Yü Chi and Hsu Kung and others, which have been added to Ts'e's biography by P'ei Sung-chih's commentary, show him as a man who was very ready to kill. On the other hand, as a military ruler, execution was a natural part of his policy, and there is no evidence that he killed for pleasure. Death was the tool of his trade and the source of his authority.

The heritage of Sun Ts'e:

When Sun Ts'e captured Lu-chiang in 199, he had also obtained possession of the two beautiful daughters of a gentleman named Ch'iao 桂. Ts'e took the elder for himself and his friend Chou Yü married the younger. It is said that Ts'e joked with his new brother-in-law, saying that: 'Though the two Ch'iao girls may be exiles, getting us as their husbands is enough to make them happy'. Ts'e had one son, Shao 翟, but at the time Ts'e died his newly-founded state could not afford the risks involved by the rule of a minor. Ts'e himself
realised this, and he handed over his seal and tassel to his younger brother Sun Ch'üan, who at that time was nineteen years old by Chinese reckoning, and Ch'üan succeeded to command of his army and his government.

The territory which Sun Ch'üan controlled in 200 A.D. comprised the lands of the Han commanderies of Wu, K'uai-chi, Tan-yang, Lu-chiang and Yü-chang, being the basin of the lower Yangtse and of the Poyang Lake and its tributaries. In 140, the Chinese population of this region had been assessed at nearly four million individuals, and great numbers of settlers and refugees had come from the north since then. There was no organised opposition to Ch'üan's control and all rebellious bands or clan groups in the settled Chinese regions had either turned to submit or had been destroyed by Sun Ts'e.

However, although he had no rival, Sun Ch'üan had still to establish full authority over the territory that his brother had conquered. The people of the mountains, barbarians and renegade Chinese, were prepared to fight against the expanding colonising and military pressure of any Chinese administration, and every part of Ch'üan's possession was liable to raiding across these ill-defined frontiers. Moreover, even in the settled territories, although the government could command respect, it could not be sure of controlling the shifting population. There were great numbers of newly displaced people, refugees from the north and local fugitives from troubles, and unless the administration could offer them some security and settlement they would form fighting bands for their own protection and might well abandon Sun Ch'üan's rule either to seek another lord or to take refuge
in the hills. For the new government to prosper, it had not only to maintain its success in war, but it had also to offer its people a good chance of peace.

In this Sun Ch'üan succeeded. For more than fifty years he ruled the south, as general, king and emperor, and he united the people in the state of Wu. When Sun Ts'e was lying on his deathbed, he had said to his brother: 'To raise the forces east of the Chiang, to decide the opportunities between two battle-lines and to fight for supremacy in the empire; in that you are not so good as I am. To raise the worthy and give office to the able men, so that each man gives all his efforts to keep the east of the Chiang; in that I am not equal to you.' Although the speech may be the invention of a historian, it is a fair description of the role of the two brothers. Their father, Sun Chien, raised the family to hold military authority, Sun Ts'e carved out a domain in the lands of the lower Yangtse, and Sun Ch'üan took the foundations that had been handed on to him and raised up an empire in South China.

1 SKWu 1, p.16b.
Map of the lower Yangtse (195-200)
The ancient course of the Hwai cannot be determined.
Map of the middle Yangtze (198-200)
IV. APPENDIX: San-kuo chih and the history of the Three Kingdoms.
Ch'en Shou and his San-kuo chih:

The San-kuo chih 三國志, the History of the Three Kingdoms, was written by Ch'en Shou 陳壽, who came from the commandery of Pa-hsi 巴西 in present-day Szechwan, and who was born a subject of the state of Shu 蜀 in the year 233. Shu was destroyed by Wei 魏 in 263 and Wei was taken over by the Ssu-ma 司馬 clan in 265. Ch'en Shou had held some minor posts in Shu, and he took service again under the new Chin 晋 dynasty. When the state of Wu 吳 was brought to surrender in 280, Ch'en Shou collected the documents of Wei and Shu and Wu, and from these he composed the San-kuo chih. Besides this major work, Shou had written a number of other books, some dealing with the history of the western provinces. He was admired for his work as a writer and a historian and he was favoured by the great minister Chang Hua 張華 and gained promotion with his support. Later he fell into disgrace and was out of office for some years, and when he died he had no official post.

There are two main sources for the life of Ch'en Shou: his biography in chapter 11 of the Hua-yang kuo chih 華陽國志 by Ch'ang Ch'ü 常璩 of the Chin dynasty and his biography in Chapter 82 of the Chin shu 晉書 which was compiled under the T'ang dynasty by Fang Hsüan-ling 方玄齡 and others. The two accounts agree in the general outline of his career, but there are a number of differences on points of detail. The Hua-yang kuo chih, 'Record of the Country to the south of Mount Hua', is a history of the western provinces.
for the first three centuries A.D., and the Chin shu is the official history of the Chin dynasty (265 to 420). Of the two, the Hua-yang kuo chih is rather inclined to speak well of the men from the west, and the Chin shu is more objective and less flattering. According to the Chin shu, Ch'en Shou held only low positions in the Shu service, partly because he had made an enemy of the powerful eunuch Huang Hao and partly because he was accused of a lack of filial respect in mourning for his father. From this,

1 The Chin shu which is included in the standard histories was compiled by Fang Hsuan-ling and his fellow-scholars in the reign of the T'ang Emperor T'ai-tsung, who issued a decree commanding the work in 644. This work was essentially an editing of the material contained in some eighteen histories of the Chin dynasty which had been preserved to this time. (Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Economic History of the Chin Dynasty', pp.119 to 120). Thus, although the history was not compiled until more than two centuries after the end of the dynasty, the T'ang historians had a great deal of early and reliable material available to them.

2 According to Chin shu, Ch'en Shou was ill at some time during the period of mourning for the death of his father, and when he was ill he was seen to ask a maid-servant to prepare him a pill. The people of his district criticised him for this, presumably both for his unfilial concern with his own comfort and also for his casual relationship with the woman.
the Chin shu says that he had no advancement under Shu and he stayed for some time without office under Chin; on the other hand Hua-yang kuo chih says that he held posts under the Shu and that he was recommended for office under the Chin dynasty and there is no mention of any disgrace or hindrance to his career.

In the same way, the two biographies disagree on the date of Shou's death. According to Chin shu, he was appointed t'ai-tzu chung-shu-tzu 太子中庶子 but died of illness before he could take the post; this was in the year 297. According to Hua-yang kuo chih, Ch'en Shou did become t'ai-tzu chung-shu-tzu and also san-ch'i ch'ang-shih 散騎常侍, both of which were high positions; his patron Chang Hua wanted to make Shou a minister, but Shou lost his position when Hua was executed in 300, and he died without office in Lo-yang. So the Hua-yang kuo chih says that Ch'en Shou held at least two more posts and lived some years longer than the Chin shu story has it. It is generally accepted that the Chin shu is correct, that Ch'en Shou died in 297, that he was aged sixty-five by Chinese reckoning, and that he was born in 233.

Ch'en Shou wrote his San-kuo chih in 65 p'ien 篇, and there is no doubt that the 65 chüan 章 chapters of the present day correspond to the original p'ien.¹ The history is divided into three books

¹ The character p'ien, written with the bamboo radical, is used to indicate chapters in the classical books of the Chou period, such as the Book of Poetry 詩經 Shih-ching and the Analects 論語 Lun-yü. By the time of the Former Han dynasty, the Shih chi 史記
of Ssu-ma Ch'ien 司馬遷 was already divided into chüan, a word which originally meant a 'roll' or 'scroll'. In the Treatise of Bibliography 藝文志 yi-wen chih of Han shu, books are listed either with divisions of p'ien or of chüan, and it is believed that this distinction indicates whether they were written on bamboo or on silk.

With the development of the use of paper in the early years of the second century A.D., the use of writing silk became unnecessarily expensive. By the beginning of the fourth century, silk had been completely ousted by paper; but bamboo, which was cheap and easy to prepare, continued in use until the development of printing in T'ang and Sung.

At the end of the third century, when Ch'en Shou was writing the San-kuo chih, silk and paper and bamboo were all available to him. Of the three materials, it is most likely that he used paper, and the fragment of the San-kuo chih which has survived from the time of the Chin dynasty is written on paper. However, Ch'en Shou's biographies in both Hua-yang kuo chih and Chin shu refer to his writings by numbers of p'ien. It seems very likely that at this time the words p'ien and chüan could be used without distinction to indicate the chapter divisions of a work. By the time of the T'ang dynasty, all books are described in terms of chüan.

On the identity of p'ien and chüan, see in particular Yeh Te-hui, Shu-lin ch'ing-hua, p.12, and T.H. Tsien, Written on Bamboo and Silk, pp.109 to 110 and 153 to 157.
of these chapters, the Wei shu 魏書 has 30, the Shu shu 蜀書 has 15, and the Wu shu 吳書 has 20. All 65 chapters are in the form of lieh-chuan 列傳 biographies; there is no distinct section of annals 本紀 pen-chi and there are no treatises 志 chih or tables 表 piao. However, the biographies of the rulers of the states are given in the early chapters of each section; the second, third and fourth chapters of Wei shu, the second and third chapters of Shu shu, and the second and third chapters of Wu shu each contain the biographies of emperors. All these early biographies have the same form as the imperial annals of other dynastic histories, and they were prepared from the same type of source material. Each imperial court had an official department of records and history, and throughout each reign and dynasty the departments of history were preparing a continuous chronicle of the events of their courts. In his discussion of the historiography of the Hou Han shu, Bielenstein has described how the Diaries of Activity and Repose 起居注 ch'i-chü-chu were written to describe the daily acts of the emperors. 1

1 On the development of the system of Diaries of Activity and Repose about the beginning of the Later Han, see Bielenstein I, pp.21-22; Hulsewé, 'Notes on the Historiography of the Han Period'; and Chu Hsi-tsu's two articles, 'Han shih-erh shih chu-chi k'ao' and 'Han T'ang Sung ch'i-chü-chu k'ao', in Kuo-hsueh chi-k'an II, pp.379-410 and 629-640. It seems clear that the system of Diaries of Activity and Repose arose from the compilation of 'Recorded Notes' 著紀 chu-chi of astrological and other portents. The importance of the Emperor in the cosmological theories of the Han meant that a continual record of his daily activities had to be kept for the use of the official diviners; and the functions of the astrologers and the historians were very close. The recording of historical events and the observation of supernatural phenomena were both carried out in the office under the Prefect Grand Clerk 太史令 t'ai-shih ling. These detailed notes of the lives of the emperors and the actions of the court were collated at the end of each reign.
Besides the preservation of this basic historical material in the imperial archives, the Later Han rulers also arranged for the publication of the history of their own dynasty, and in this way the Tung-kuan Han-chi (The Han Record of the Tung-kuan Library) was composed at different times throughout the Later Han dynasty. As Hulsewé has remarked, this development of official interest in historical compilation was a major change in the development of Chinese historical writing. In the past, although Ssu-ma Ch'ien had compiled the Shih chi when he held the post of Prefect Grand Clerk, that work was not part of his duties and it was never formally commissioned by the throne. Similarly, Pan Piao and his son Pan Ku had worked on the history of the Former Han dynasty as private citizens, but the official compilation of the Tung-kuan

1 'Notes on the Historiography of the Han period', p.43.

2 When Pan Ku began to work on the history of the Former Han dynasty which had been begun by his father, he was accused of 'privately rewriting the history of the state' (ssu kai-tso kuo-shih; HHS 30A, p.7b). But when Emperor Ming read his work, he was so impressed that he had Pan Ku appointed to a secretarial post at the Fragrant Terrace (lan-t'ai), which was the office of archives kept within the palace. In his career as an official historian, Pan Ku shared in the compilation of the first part of the Tung-kuan Han-chi and also worked on the record of the discussions of the conference at the White Tiger Hall (Po hu t'ung). But although he continued his work on the Han shu this was not of the responsibilities of his official position.
Han-chi by order of the Emperors of the Later Han was the first time that official patronage had been given to the work of historians as opposed to the records of astrologers and diviners.¹

From the time of this innovation under the Later Han, the dynasties which followed set up offices of history not only to keep chronicles and archives and genealogical tables of the ruling house, but also to prepare and compile an official history of the dynasty. Moreover, during the centuries between Han and T'ang, works on the history of former dynasties began to be commissioned

¹ Pan Ku had been ordered by Emperor Ming to take part in the compilation of annals and biographies of the reign of Emperor Kuang-wu. This initial work was continued four times; in the reigns of Emperors An, Huan and Ling there were orders given for the extension of the work, and at the end of the dynasty, Yang Piao (142 to 225) wrote the final chapters. After the second continuation under Emperor Huan, the work was known as 漢紀 Han-chi 'The Record of Han'; it was not given the title of Tung-kuan Han-chi until the time of Emperor Ling. See Bielenstein I, pp.10 to 11.
and approved by imperial edicts.¹

The offices of history in the three states of Wei, Shu and Wu followed the example of the Later Han; Ch'en Shou himself had worked in the imperial library of Shu, which was responsible for the records of that state. We are told that the History of the Wu Dynasty, the *Wu shu*, was compiled twice; the first work was unsatisfactory and so a second and more competent production was made. It is clear that this official history was based on the archives of the state and

¹ Thus, although Ch'en Shou had written his *San-kuo chih* as a private compilation, the commentary was prepared in response to an imperial edict. The *Sung shu*, the history of the Liu Sung dynasty, was privately compiled by Shen Yüeh, but on imperial orders it was presented to the throne of Emperor Wu of the Southern Ch'i in 488. The *Wei shu*, the history of the Northern and Eastern Wei Dynasties, was compiled by Wei Shou by an imperial order of 551 and was presented to the throne in 554. The tendency for imperial interest and inspiration of the dynastic histories which was developing during this period came to full expression in the reign of Emperor T'ai-tsung of T'ang, when the histories of the dynasties of Chin, Liang, Ch'en, Northern Ch'i, Chou and Sui were all commissioned and compiled by command of imperial edicts. See, for example, Balazs, 'Le Traité éconumique du "Souei-chou"', pp. 116 and 117; Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Organisation of Chinese Official Historiography', pp. 44 and 45.
was prepared in the same way as the Tung-kuan Han-chi. The history officers of the states were not only concerned with the collection of raw material for the archives, edicts and memorials and letters, but they were also responsible for the drafting of the official history. In doing this, they were often describing scenes which they themselves had witnessed, and in every case they were writing within a very few years of the events.

Ch'en Shou's biography in Hua-yang kuo-chih says that he compiled his San-kuo chih with the help of these court records of Wei and Shu and Wu. He could use both the official histories and the archives themselves and so great parts of his history came direct from the records of the three imperial courts. Shou himself had been thirty-two years old when his native state of Shu was destroyed, and he was aged forty-seven when the empire of Wu surrendered and China was united under the Chin dynasty. Most of his life was lived in the period that he described, and although he was writing as a private historian he had the records of the archives of the Three Kingdoms to guide him. In dealing with their history, he had the same advantages as the Han compilers of the Tung-kuan Han-chi or the writers of the official histories of the states themselves.

1 SKWu 8, p.14b. We must note the distinction between the book called Wu shu, the official and contemporary history of the Wu state which survives only in fragments, and the Wu shu section of the San-kuo chih, which are the 20 chapters relating the history of that state, as prepared by Ch'en Shou.
On the other hand, his very closeness to the events that he was describing made his position as a historian uncertain and potentially dangerous. He had been the servant of the enemies and rivals of Chin and his loyalty could be questioned if he wrote too well of his former masters. Chin was a new dynasty, its rulers of the Ssu-ma family had subverted the throne of Wei and had then taken over the rest of China by conquest; they would wish their historians to show that they held the mandate of Heaven by a legitimate succession from the Han dynasty and they would expect their historians to speak well of their ancestors who had held power as ministers of Wei. Ch'en Shou had to be careful what he wrote.

It is true that the arguments over the 'legitimate succession' cheng-t'ung are "not of the sort in which modern historians are likely to take much interest", but it is equally true that in the time of Ch'en Shou the question was of vital interest to a historian of the Three Kingdoms. The Chin emperors claimed that the last emperor of Han had acknowledged that he was incapable of ruling the empire and had abdicated his throne in favour of the Ts'ao family of Wei; when the rulers of Wei in their turn lost the mandate of Heaven, they transferred the empire to the new dynasty of Chin. Thus Chin claimed a legitimate succession of the empire from the Han through the Wei. But when Ts'ao P'i took the throne from Emperor Hsien of Han, Liu Pei, the founder of Shu-Han, had claimed that he himself belonged to the imperial clan of Han and that his own dynasty was the true custodian of the empire and held the mandate to continue

1 Baxter, in his Editor's Preface to Fang I, p. xiii.
the line. As a result, from the year 220 until the year 264 there were two rival dynasties which claimed the right to rule all the empire, and each dynasty had a different calendar and a different set of reign-titles. However, for a writer of that time, there was no real choice.

1 The proclamation of a new reign-title 改年 kai-nien or 改元 kai-yüan was the sign of an independent ruler. The twenty-fifth year of the Chien-an 蓬安 period of the Han dynasty began on 22 February, 220 A.D.; early in that year the reign-title was changed and the year became the first year of Yen-k'ang 延康; in the tenth Chinese month of the same year (on 11 December, 220 by western reckoning) Ts'ao P'i received the abdication of Emperor Hsien of Han and changed the reign-title so that the year was now the first year of the Huang-ch'u 黄初 period of the Wei dynasty. However, in the fourth Chinese month of the next year (on 15 May, 221 by western reckoning), Liu Pei was proclaimed Emperor of Shu-Han and changed the reign-title to Chang-wu 章武 .

As a result, there were two rival chronologies for the years after 219. According to the Wei dynasty, the twenty-fourth year of Chien-an of Han was followed by the first year of Huang-ch'u and then by the second year of Huang-ch'u. According to the Shu dynasty, the twenty-fourth year of Chien-an of Han was followed by the first year of Yen-k'ang of Han and then by the first year of Chang-wu. Any historian who compiled a chronological narrative of the history of the dynasties had to choose one of these two systems; whichever he
chose, he implied that he accepted that dynasty as the legitimate successor to the Han empire. In this way Ssu-ma Kuang wrote his *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* and followed the chronology of the Wei dynasty, but Chu Hsi in his *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu* chose to follow the system of Shu. The decision depended a great deal on the time and the place and the dynasty of the historian, but the choice had to be made.

In contrast to Wei and Shu, the Wu empire could not offer a chronology which carried on from the Han. For Sun Ch'üan had accepted the title of King of Wu from the new Wei dynasty, and he followed the Wei chronology until the third year of Huang-ch'ü; in the tenth Chinese month of that year (November-December 222) he proclaimed his independence and changed his reign-title to Huang-wu, but it was not until the year 229 that he named himself Emperor. The Wu claimed the empire of China, but they did not claim to be the direct successors of Han.
As a subject of the Chin dynasty, Ch'en Shou accepted the legitimacy of Wei. In the San-kuo chih, the rulers of Wei are referred to as Emperor ti, while the rulers of Shu, Liu Pei and his son Shan, are referred to as 'First Sovereign' hsien-chu and 'Second Sovereign' hou-chu, and the rulers of Wu are mentioned merely by their personal names. But besides this obvious courtesy, it does not seem that Ch'en Shou distorted his texts to support a political opinion.

In the hands of a Chinese historian, facts could be presented in several ways. The formulas with which they were presented and the very words that were used to describe an event could indicate the judgement or at least the point of view of the historian. Bielenstein has shown how the abdication of Emperor Hsien of Han in favour of Ts'ao P'i has been described in two different ways by the Wei shu of the San-kuo chih and by the Hou Han shu. As he points out, the events 'appear dressed in different conventional stereotype formulas only because they are described from the view of two different dynasties. No personal judgement of the authors is involved.'

But Ch'en Shou was writing one book about three rival dynasties, he had three separate collections of historical material to work with, and each of his sources, whether from Wei or Shu or Wu, would tend to present the formulas of its own dynasty. All three dynasties described their rulers as Emperors. We know that Ch'en Shou used

---

1 Bielenstein I, pp.47 to 48; and see also pp.41 and 42.
the title of Emperor only for the rulers of Wei, and in doing so he
discounted the claim of Shu to the legitimate succession. Did he
express his judgement in other ways?

In describing battle and war, there were a number of words
which could be used, and some of them implied judgement. Thus, the
character chen has the basic meaning of a campaign against rebels;
t'ao 討 means to punish, and hence to attack rebels; k'ou 豪, when
used as a verb, has the meaning 'to plunder, to raid, to act like a
bandit'. Words such as these imply that the enemy are bandits or
rebels, and when the historian used them, we may suspect that he
implied some opinion of the right and the wrong. On the other hand,
while this technique of 'rectification of names' has been recognised
in Chinese historical writing ever since the time of the Ch'un-ch'iu,
it is unreasonable to be too strict in searching for this verbal
evidence, and it is equally unreasonable to expect the historian to
be completely consistent. In fact, Ch'en Shou does not use these
words of judgement very often.

---

It is important to distinguish between the words with which
the historian describes events and the words which he quotes from
documents or from reports of speech. As the Han dynasty lost power
and as the civil wars began, almost every soldier in China could be
described as a rebel at one time or another. It was quite natural for
a man to speak of his enemy as tse 'rebel' or 'bandit' and to describe
him as a brigand; in the speeches and writings of the time, tse meant no
more than 'enemy', and the words of judgement become little more than
insults. When Ch'en Shou wrote his history, much of the original moral
significance of the words had been eroded by popular misuse.
In the biographies of the rulers of the three dynasties, the word k'ou is sometimes used to describe a border raid by one state against another, but it does not seem to have any particular sense of judgement; otherwise, the words cheng and t'ao are used to describe attacks on bandits within the states themselves. When Shu and Wei attack one another, they are described as ch'u 出 'coming out', or kung 攻 'making an attack', or chi 施 'striking at'. Rebels or bandits within the states themselves were attacked cheng or t'ao, and when they had been put down they were described as p'ing 平 'pacified', but Ch'en Shou does not usually use the terms for rebels when describing the fighting between the three states. Although he makes distinction between the rival claims to the Mandate of Heaven, Ch'en Shou does not insert his opinion into the details of his text. Rebels against any one of the three established dynasties are described as outlaws and the authority of each state is accepted inside its own borders.

1 There are exceptions to this rule. For example, SKShu 5, p.16a, at the end of the biography of Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮, refers to the conquest of Shu by Wei as cheng, but this expression is not used in the biography of Liu Shan. Besides this, the Wei shu sometimes refers to Wu in the terms used for rebels; this is not unreasonable, since Sun Ch'üan 孫權 of Wu did at first claim to be a subject of Wei and only broke off relations later.
From this discussion, it seems that although Ch'en Shou was compelled to support the claim of the Wei dynasty to the legitimate rule of the empire, it is not likely that this caused any great distortion of his history. However, besides his respect for the Wei dynasty, Ch'en Shou had to show respect for the Ssu-ma family as well, and this presented other problems. The Ssu-ma family had come to power through the career of Ssu-ma Yi, who had been an officer under Ts'ao Ts'ao since the year 208; he had been appointed to the household of Ts'ao P'i while P'i was still Heir-apparent to the kingdom of Wei and had been favoured by Ts'ao P'i when he became Emperor, he had commanded the armies of Wei in the wars against Chu-ko Liang of Shu and his successes in the field had gained him power and influence in the court. When Ts'ao Jui, who had been Emperor Ming of Wei, died in 239, the new Emperor, Ts'ao Fang, was aged eight. Ssu-ma Yi and Ts'ao Shuang were appointed regents. In 249, Ssu-ma Yi killed Ts'ao Shuang and took power for himself, and from that time on the Ssu-ma clan held power in the state. Two more young emperors of the Ts'ao family were set upon the throne, but Ssu-ma Yi and his two sons Shih and Chao controlled the government one after the other. In 265, Chao's son Yen finally accepted the abdication of the Wei emperor and took the throne for himself.

---
1 Ts'ao Shuang was the son of Ts'ao Chen, who was a cousin of Ts'ao Ts'ao and had originally had the surname Ch'in. Ts'ao Ts'ao adopted Chen into his own clan (see Chen's and Shuang's biographies in SKWei 9).
The Ssu-ma clan had played a leading part in the whole of the period of the Wei dynasty, and Ch'en Shou was writing his history under the rule of Ssu-ma Yen himself. It is not surprising, then, if in his commentary p'ing at the end of the ninth chapter of the Wei shu he describes Ts'ao Shuang as a man who was not worthy of his high post. We may expect that some things could be left out and some things will be treated very carefully.

Ch'en Shou's biography in Chin shu says that the people of his own time praised him as a good historian liang-shih, but that there were some curious stories about him. One tale said that Shou's father had held a post in Shu under the general Ma Su 马謖, but Chu-ko Liang had executed Su in 228 and had made Shou's father a convict. Besides this, Chu-ko Liang's son Chan 檞 had treated Shou with contempt; and so now Ch'en Shou criticised Liang and Chan. It was felt that he was insulting them from spite. The other story claimed that Shou asked a bribe from the Ting family to persuade him to include a biography of their ancestors Ting Yi and his younger brother Yi. The basis of the stories is true; there is no biography of any man with the surname Ting in the Wei shu, and at the end of SKShu 5 Shou does criticise Chu-ko Liang in the same terms that the Chin shu uses. But the reasons for this may not be only those of personal spite and greed for gain. Both Hua-yang kuo chih and Chin shu and also Ch'en Shou's own biography of Chu-ko Liang in San-kuo chih say that Ch'en Shou worked on the preparation of Chu-ko Liang's Collected Works chi, and if he did this, he surely had no
particular personal feeling against the man. But it is certain that Chu-ko Liang was the great military rival of Ssu-ma Yi, and perhaps it would not have been politic for Ch'en Shou to speak too well of him when he wrote his history. And in the case of the Ting family the situation was possibly even more dangerous.

The two brothers Ting Yi had been members of the household of Ts'ao Chih, the younger brother of Ts'ao P'i and P'i's rival for the inheritance of Ts'ao Ts'ao. In this struggle for favour, Ssu-ma Yi was one of the leaders of Ts'ao P'i's party. When Ts'ao P'i came to the throne, he had Ting Yi and his brother executed together with all the male members of their families. These two brothers came from P'ei, and they were fellow-countrymen of the Ts'ao family. Nearly thirty years later, when Ssu-ma Yi eliminated Ts'ao Shuang, he also executed Ting Mi, who came from Ch'iao and who had been a supporter of Ts'ao Shuang. Ch'iao commandery had been set up from part of P'ei in the last years of Han; and so the Ting clan from that region had opposed Ssu-ma Yi's interests on two great occasions, with fatal results to themselves. Under the first emperors of the Chin dynasty, there was no member of the family in high office. Thus,

1 There are three men with the surname Ting who have biographies in Chin shu; Ting T'an (Chin shu 78) was a descendant of Ting Ku who had been a subject of the Wu state, Ting Mu (Chin shu 89) and Ting Shao (Chin shu 90) both came from Ch'iao. Mu was a loyal servant of Chin who died in the late fourth century, and Shao's biography was included because of his good government in the provinces about the year 310.
it is not very surprising if Ch'en Shou was careful in his treatment of a family which had opposed the Ssu-ma and which was still out of favour. But although no members of the Ting family have a biography in the San-kuo chih, their careers are mentioned in other places in the history and the story of their fates is described in an essentially straightforward fashion.

It seems that Ch'en Shou arranged his history not to offend his masters the rulers of Chin. From this policy, he described some events by formulas which expressed a judgement, he used his critical notes p'ing at the end of each chapter to express an acceptable opinion, and he arranged his book as a whole to agree with the politics of his own time. But Ch'en Shou's expressed opinion, about the legitimate succession to the empire, or the importance of one minister or another, or the justifications of a political coup, need not indicate that he altered the facts of his story. He was in a delicate position and he sometimes arranged his history to suit his own situation, but so far as he could be, so close to the time, Ch'en Shou was an objective Chinese historian.
P'ei Sung-chih and his commentary:

Nearly 150 years after Ch'en Shou wrote the *San-kuo chih*, P'ei Sung-chih 裴松之 presented his commentary 注 to the imperial throne. P'ei was born in Ho-tung 河東 in present-day Shansi in the year 372. He served the Chin during the last years of that dynasty and he held office under the general Liu Yü 劉裕, who took the throne from the last emperor of Chin in 420. Under the new Sung 梁 dynasty, P'ei held high positions as inspector and administrator in the provinces and he was recognised for his scholarship in the court and at the capital. In 428 he was commissioned to compile a commentary to the *San-kuo chih* of Ch'en Shou. The commentary and the book were presented to the throne in the next year, and it was at this time that the imperial recognition set the *San-kuo chih* and its commentary among the 'standard histories', to rank with the *Shih-chi* 史記 and the *Han shu* 漢書. After this work, P'ei held further posts in the capital and in the provinces; he retired in 437 and received titles of honour, and he continued his work as a historian until he died in 451.

P'ei Sung-chih's commentary to the *San-kuo chih* is a historical work in its own right, and the result of his work is unlike any other commentary or any other dynastic history. As he himself wrote in the memorial which accompanied the presentation of his work to the throne:

---

1 There are two biographies of P'ei Sung-chih, one in *Sung shu* 64 and the other in *Nan-shih* 33. The biography in *Nan-shih* is a shorter version of the biography in *Sung shu*. 
'The argument and design of Shou's work is admirable, in most things it is well judged; indeed it is a garden of knowledge and the finest historical work of recent times. But it is rather too short and sometimes there are omissions. I have the imperial decree to search into the detail and to devote my efforts to discover every source; I have looked out old traditions from the past, and at the same time I have recovered records which have been neglected.'

The compilers of the Han shu and the Hou Han shu made great use of documents and written records, but they did not usually indicate their sources. As Bielenstein has shown (Bielenstein I, pp. 46 and 47), the Hou Han shu is based upon documents, but these documents may be given in direct quotation or indirectly and without acknowledgement. Where sources contradicted one another, the historian tended to select one likely version and disregard the others. The major commentaries to these histories, such as that of Yen Shih-ku for the Han shu or that of Li Hsien for the Hou Han shu, both written in T'ang times, did frequently quote from an earlier text to support an explanation or an opinion, but they used quotation as part of their commentary, not as the commentary itself. Except for a few passages of discussion, P'ei Sung-chih's commentary to the San-kuo chih is a series of quotations taken from a multitude of other sources: documents, histories and essays of opinion. In some cases his quotation explains the main text, very often it fills out the history, sometimes a completely different story that it gives will contradict Ch'en Shou's version. When he gives his
own opinion of the source of the text, P'ei usually begins his note with the phrase ch'en Sung-chih 臣松之 'Your servant, (P'ei) Sung-chih...'; when he quotes the opinion of another man or the tradition of another book, he gives the name of the man and the book.

This compilation, in patchwork form, gives a summary of the material which survived two hundred years after the time of the Three Kingdoms. Ch'en Shou's history was considered the best of his own time, but there were many other books in existence, and still more were written during the next century of the Chin dynasty. Besides the classics and the older histories which he quoted to explain some point in Ch'en Shou's text, P'ei referred to some two hundred works of biography or history or commentary which had been written since the end of the second century A.D. An index attached to this section lists the works quoted by P'ei Sung-chih which dealt with the Three Kingdoms, and the list itself shows the variety of the material which was available to him.

When he explained literary or historical references in Ch'en Shou's text, P'ei could quote from the classics and the early histories. On different occasions, he quoted passages from the Shu ching and from Li chi, from the Tso-chuan 左傳 and from the Han shu, and from such reference works as the Fang-yen 方言 dictionary and the Hsiang-shu 'Book of Physiognomy'. When he added to Ch'en Shou's text or compared it to another history, he could quote from official histories, private histories, local histories of different parts of the empire, biographies of individual men, registers and family records
of the great clans, essays, commentaries and collected works. Of the works from official sources, the Wu shu was compiled by the official historians of the Wu court under orders from the Emperor, the Diaries of Activity and Repose ch'i-chü-chu were prepared by the history offices of each dynasty, there were collections of imperial edicts and of the memorials of great ministers. Of the histories which had been written privately, there was the San-kuo chih itself and there was the Hsü Han shu of Ssu-ma Piao and the Tien lüeh of Yü Huan. Of the local histories, there was the Hua-yang kuo chih which told the history of the west, there was the Chiang-piao chuan, the history of the lands beyond the Yangtse, there were the histories of the individual states such as the Shu chi or the Wu li or the Wei shu, and there were the collections of biographies of local men such as the ch'i-chiu chuan or the hsien-hsien chuan for the province of Yi or the commandery of Ling-ling. Individual men had their private biographies pieh-chuan, there were obituaries or funeral inscriptions such as the Lu Hsün ming, and there

1 The treatises of the Hsü Han shu of Ssu-ma Piao are now included in the Hou Han shu of Fan Yeh. The first imperial edition to include the treatises of the Hsü Han shu, with commentary by Liu Chao of the Liang dynasty, as a supplement to the annals and biographies of the Hou Han shu, was prepared by order of an edict of 1022. See Bielenstein I, p.17.
were editions of collected works (集, chi; many of the great families published genealogical registers 世譜, shih-p'u and family histories 家譜, chia-chuan. Besides these sources, P'ei made use of the comments and criticism of essayists such as Sun Sheng, Hsi Tso-ch'ih and Yü Hsi.

Many of the works that P'ei quoted survive only in the fragments of his commentary; not all the works that he cited were reliable, some were no more than propaganda and libel, some were collections of folk tales, some were legends of spirits and superstitions. The Shen-hsien chuan of Ko Hung and the Sou-shen chi of Kan Pao, which are several times quoted by P'ei's commentary, are collections of stories of the supernatural. The editors of the Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu complained with good reason that P'ei was too fond of strange stories, that he often included irrelevant material, and that his arrangement was too haphazard. In the biography of Sun Chien, for example, a long description of the life of Chu Chun is quoted from the Hsü Han shu, and it completely distorts the pattern of the history; and in much the same way a speech of Tung Cho to Liu Ai which is quoted from the Shan-yang kung tsai-chi discusses the campaign in the northwest several pages after Ch'en Shou's text has done so. The first passage of commentary in the biography, quoted from the Wu shu, describes the portents of Sun Chien's birth; the tale has some incidental points of interest, but the story itself is unreliable.

The editors of the Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu complained that P'ei was inconsistent and erratic, but they acknowledged the value of the
material which he preserved. In his memorial of presentation, P'ei set out his intentions: 'If there is something that Shou did not mention, and if it is something that should be remembered, then I collect all these records to fill in the gaps that are left. Sometimes there are two accounts of the same thing, but there may be errors or irrelevancies in the text; sometimes an incident is described in two quite different ways and I do not feel able to decide between them. In all such cases I have put in one version to show the different traditions. If one account is clearly wrong and what it says is not logically sound, then I note which is right in order to correct the mistake. On occasion, I argue with Ch'en Shou in his judgement of events or on minor points of fact.' Sometimes Pei Sung-chih's work is detailed and sometimes it is summary; he did not always carry out his intentions. Nevertheless he did account for his sources and he was prepared to discuss them. His ambitions were fine, and his commentary is remarkable and useful work of history.

The transmission of the history of the Three Kingdoms:

We have been told that Ch'en Shou wrote his San-kuo chih in 65 p'ien. Although the work was not presented to the throne for official imperial endorsement, Ch'en Shou's biography in Chin shu says that when Shou died his writings were collected and copied by imperial command. Thus the San-kuo chih received imperial patronage very soon after it was written, and later, when the commentary of P'ei Sung-chih had been added to it, the work was edited and copied as one of the major possessions of the imperial library.
On the other hand, there were not many books written in the Chin dynasty which survived the next centuries without the imperial support. Ch'en Shou himself is said to have written a Ku-kuo chih 古國志 in 50 p'ien, an Yi-tu ch'i-chiu chuan 宜都著舊傳 in 10 p'ien, a Kuan-ssu lun 官司論 (on the administrative system) in 7 p'ien, and two essays called Shih-hui 稟詮 (explanation of taboos) and Kuang-kuo lun 廣國論 (discussion on enlarging the state). Of all these works, there remains at the present time only a single chüan of the Yi-tu ch'i-chiu chuan; the rest of Ch'en Shou's writings have disappeared.

It was not easy for a book to survive. At the end of a dynasty which fell by conquest, the imperial library and the archives were in danger of destruction. The archives of the Han dynasty were scattered and lost when Tung Cho moved the capital from Lo-yang to Ch'ang-an in 191, a great many more books and records were lost when the Chin dynasty was driven from the north in the years after the sack of Lo-yang in 311; throughout the disorders of the period of division, there was destruction of documents and books, and before the invention of printing, much of what had been destroyed could never be recovered.

This was another reason for the loss of books. The Chinese had developed paper and were using it for a great part of their written work by the time of the Later Han, but printing was not used for official or scholarly works until the eleventh century. As a result, for eight hundred years the books of China existed in single copies on sheets of paper. Each book was reproduced by hand, and unless it
was copied again, each book survived only as long as the paper it was written on. There were never many copies in existence, and paper is an easy material to destroy. Without special protection and special patronage, none of Ch'en Shou's other works survived to be printed, and most of the books that were written at that time shared their fate.

The bibliographical chapters of the Sui shu, compiled in 622, record the books of the imperial library which had been taken over by T'ang from Sui. In that year, the library contained the San-kuo chih in 65 chüan with the commentary by P'ei Sung-chih (Sui shu 33, p.2a). In the bibliographical chapters of the two T'ang histories, the San-kuo chih is treated in a different way. Although Ch'en Shou wrote his history as a single book, it appears that it was sometimes regarded as three separate works, and in the Chiu T'ang shu bibliography the Wei shu, in 30 chüan with commentary, is listed among the standard histories 正史類 cheng-shih lei (Chiu T'ang shu 46, p.15b), while Shu shu and Wu shu, in 15 and 21 chüan also with commentary, are listed among the chronicles 編年類 pien-nien lei (Chiu T'ang shu 46, p.17b). In the Hsin T'ang shu, the Wei-kuo chih and the Shu-kuo chih and the Wu-kuo chih, in 30 chüan and in 15 chüan and in 21 chüan, written by Ch'en Shou and with commentary by P'ei Sung-chih, are listed one after the other among the standard histories (Hsin T'ang shu 58, p.1b). The Sui shu catalogue referred to a table of contents 銓録 hsü-lu in one chüan, and this may be the extra chapter included in the Wu section by the T'ang listing.

The San-kuo chih was first printed during the Hsien-p'ing
reign period (998 to 1003) of Emperor Chen-tsung (真宗 'The True Exemplar') of the Sung dynasty.\footnote{1}{The encyclopaedia \textit{Yu hai} compiled by Wang Ying-lin 王應麟 of the Southern Sung dynasty, ch. 43, p.16b, says that the collation (chiao 校) of the \textit{San-kuo chih} was ordered in the third year of Hsien-p'ing (1000) and the work was finished in the fifth year (1002). In the Seikadō 静嘉堂 library of Tokyo there is a copy of the \textit{Wu shu} of \textit{San-kuo chih}; at the end of this book a colophon refers to an edict of the tenth month of the third year of Hsien-p'ing giving orders for the \textit{San-kuo chih} to be collated and then engraved and printed (chiao-ting tiao-yin 校定雕印); at the beginning of the book a preface dated in the tenth month of the sixth year of Hsien-p'ing (1003) records an edict which says that now the work has been collated the printing and publishing should be carried out. It seems that the order for collating and printing was first given in 1000, that the work of collating was done by 1002 and the blocks were cut by 1003; then another edict of authority was obtained to be included in the printed edition, and the actual printing took place in 1003.}

The \textit{Wu shu} in the Seikadō library came from the \textit{Mi-Sung lou} 翁素樓 collection of Lu Hsin-yüan 陸心源 (1834 to 1894), and in Yeh Te-hui's \textit{Shu-lin ch'ing-hua}, p.60, the date of this edition is given as 1000. On the other hand, the Japanese scholar Nagasawa Kikuya 長澤規庸, in his \textit{Kan-seki kai-satsu} 漢籍解說
(a manuscript in the Seikadō library) has noted that this particular copy of Wu shu in chapter 19, p.7b, line 4, has the character 棝 kou written in the form 棝. This change would avoid the personal name of the first Emperor of the Southern Sung dynasty, and from this evidence Nagasawa suggests that the Seikadō copy was printed during the Southern Sung from blocks which had been cut in the Northern Sung, and that some of the blocks were revised.
The Po-na 百衲 edition is based on the edition of the Shao-hsi 紹熙 period (1190 to 1194) with some supplement from the earlier Shao-
hsing 紹興 (1131 to 1162) edition, both compiled during the Southern Sung. Of the other major editions of the present day, the Palace edition of Ch'ing (Wu-ying-tien 武英殿) is based on the edition of the National University at the Northern Capital (Pei-ching kuo-tzu chien 北京國子監) of 1600 of Ming, the Chin-ling金陵 moveable type edition follows the edition of the National University at the Southern Capital (Nan-ching 南京 kuo-tzu chien) of Ming, first printed in 1596 and edited by Feng Meng-chen 馮夢禎 (1548 to 1595), and the Chiang-
nan shu-chü 江南書局 edition is based on the Chi-ku ko 古閣 edition of Mao Chin 毛晋 (1599 to 1659) of Ming. There were other editions throughout the Sung, Yuan and Ming dynasties, notably the Yuan editions of 1299 (of Ch'ih-chou 池州 in present-day Anhwei) and 1306 (by Chu T'ien-hsi 朱天錫) and the Chia-ching 嘉靖 (1522 to 1567) edition of Ts'ai Chou 蔡濬 and others of the Ming dynasty. 1

1 In some early editions, the Shu shu 論語 and the Wu shu 五經 were printed differently, either in separate editions or with different arrangement of columns and pages; this was a reflection of the T'ang time separation. The Wu shu in the Seikadō collection has its own table of contents.
The transmission of the San-kuo chih has been recorded in the entries of titles and numbers of chapters in the bibliographical sections of the dynastic histories and the evidence appears clear and straightforward. However, besides this, we have the opportunity to compare a part of the present text with a very much earlier edition. About 1924, two pieces of a Chin dynasty copy of the San-kuo chih were discovered in Pichan (i.e. Shan-shan hsien 防善縣) in Sinkiang. This fragment, containing only the main text of the San-kuo chih by Ch'en Shou, has some 1250 characters. A Sung version of this passage is printed in the Po-na edition, chüan 12 of SKWu, pages 3b to 12a and in the 'Note on a Chin dynasty manuscript of San-kuo chih' there is a table listing the places where the Chin manuscript version differs from the text of the Po-na and other modern editions.

There seems no good reason to doubt that the manuscript is genuine, and it is probably a fragment of a copy made in the fourth century, perhaps even as early as the Western Chin. However, although there are some forty places where the Chin manuscript and the Sung text of the Po-na edition vary, the comparison is a tribute to the reliability of traditional Chinese historiography. We have noted already the difficulties which were presented by the weakness and easy destruction of paper, and the possibility of irremediable loss of a manuscript before the development of printing gave opportunity for many copies to be made of one book. But from this evidence, despite the risks of damage and the problems of accurate copying, the differences between the ancient and modern texts seldom
alter the basic story of the history. The Chin manuscript has many copyists' errors, but in only two places does it appear that the present-day version is wrong and the old version is correct. Otherwise, either the modern text is right or else the meaning of the two versions is essentially the same. It is obvious that there were several copies of the San-kuo chih in circulation during the Chin dynasty, and it is clear that the texts must have been carefully compared time after time; from the evidence of this early fragment, the San-kuo chih of the present day is essentially the same as the history written by Ch'en Shou.

Many scholars of the Ch'ing dynasty or of the Republic have worked on the history of the Three Kingdoms. Of those who have studied the San-kuo chih itself, Liang Chang-chü 莊長儒 (1775 to 1849) who compiled the San-kuo chih p'ang-cheng 傳經, and Lu Pi 廣弼 (Republic) who published his San-kuo chih chi-chieh 集解 in 1936, are two of the most important; other major commentators were:

Ho Cho 何焯 (1661 to 1722)
Hang Shih-chün 桑世績 (1696 to 1773)
Chao Yi-ch'ing 趙一清 (c.1710 to c.1764)
Chao Yi 趙翼 (1727 to 1814)
Ch'ien Ta-hsin 錢大昕 (1728 to 1804)
Chou Shou-ch'ang 周壽昌 (1814 to 1884)
P'an Mei 潘眉 (Ch'ing)

We have already noticed that the San-kuo chih is designed as a collection of biographies. Although the biographies of the rulers
of the three states are written in the form of imperial annals, the
history itself has no tables piao or treatises chih. Scholars of recent
times have used the San-kuo chih and other parallel works to compile
tables and treatises to make up this omission. On particular subjects,
there are:

San-kuo chün-hsien piao fu k'ao cheng 三國郡縣表附錄 by Wu Tseng-
chin (Ch'ing) and Yang Shou-ching (1839 to 1915).
San-kuo ch'iang-yü chih 三國疆域志 by Hsieh Chung-ying 謝鍾英 (Ch'ing);
Pu San-kuo ch'iang-yü chih by Hung Liang-chi 洪亮吉 (1746-1809),
(all on historical and administrative geography);
San-kuo chih shih-hsi piao 三國志世系表 by Chou Ming-t'ai 周明泰
(tables of genealogy);
San-kuo chih-kuan piao 三國職官表 by Hung Yi-sun 洪懿孫 (1773-1816),
(on official titles).

Besides these, there are the more general compilations, San-kuo hsin-chih
三國新志 by Liu Kung-jen 劉公任 (Republic) and San-kuo hui-yao
三國會要 by Yang Ch'en 楊晨 (chin shih 1877).

The economic treatise of the Chin shu (shih-huo chih Ch'ing shu
26) contains a discussion of the Later Han and the Three Kingdoms periods;
this treatise has been translated and annotated by Yang Lien-sheng.¹

¹ 'Notes on the Economic History of the Chin Dynasty', in
Studies in Chinese Institutional History, pp. 119 to 197, reprinted
from Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, volume 9, pp. 107 to 185.
Similarly, the treatises on geography in *Hou Han shu* and in *Chin shu* can be used as a source of information on the administrative divisions of local government in the second and third centuries A.D. The *chün-kuo chih* 郡國志 of *Hou Han shu* (treatises 19 to 233) gives the results of a census taken in the year 140 A.D., and the *ti-li chih* 地理志 of *Chin shu* (ch. 14 and 15) describes the administrative geography of 282. Both treatises have been studied by scholars of the Ch'ing dynasty and of the Republic, and in particular the work of the great commentator Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙 (1842 to 1918) in his *Hou Han shu chi-chih* 後漢書集解 has made it possible to examine and trace the territorial arrangements and reforms of the Three Kingdoms.

Of the earlier standard histories, only the *Han shu* has a treatise of bibliography (*yi-wen chih* 藝文志, *Han shu* ch. 30). For the first six hundred years A.D., until the publication of the catalogue of the imperial library of the Sui dynasty in the *Sui shu* compiled by historians of T'ang (*ching-chi chih* 續籍志, *Sui shu* ch. 32 to 35), there is no comprehensive list of even the titles of books which were written. A great number of works were quoted by the early encyclopaedias or in such compilations as the commentary of P'ei Sung-chih to *San-kuo chih*; and in this way the titles of some books are recorded and some fragments of them survive. But many works must have disappeared without trace. In later times, scholars have assembled lists of the books known to have been written during Later Han, the Three Kingdoms, Chin and the Northern and Southern Dynasties. From such works as the
Pu San-kuo yi-wen chih 補三國藝文志 of Hou K'ang 侯康 (1798 to 1837),
Pu Chin-shu yi-wen chih 補晉書藝文志 of Wen T'ing-shih 文遠式 (1856 to 1904),
Pu Sung-shu yi-wen chih 補宋書藝文志 of Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i 齊榮岐 (1903 to c. 1959)

we can see some of the material that was available to P'ei Sung-chih when he compiled his commentary to San-kuo chih at the beginning of the Liu Sung dynasty. There is presented below a list of the books and writers which were quoted by P'ei Sung-chih as sources of information on the history of the Three Kingdoms.

San-kuo chih and the early history of Wu;

The San-kuo chih does not deal only with the period of the Three Kingdoms. Traditionally, that period lasted from the end of the Han dynasty in 221 to the beginning of Chin in 265, but Ch'en Shou's history ranges further than that. While his histories of Wei and Shu both end about 265, he continued his history of Wu until the end of that state in 280. At the other end of the scale, he traced the origins of the three dynasties back to the time of the Later Han, and in each section of his history the first biographies describe the lives of the founders of the states. In this way, the first chapter of the Wei shu has the biography of Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操, who dominated the empire of Han and founded the Kingdom of Wei, which his son Ts'ao P'i 丕 proclaimed as an empire; the first chapter of the Shu shu tells
of the two Governors of Yi province, Liu Yen, who was appointed by the Han court in 188 and then made himself practically independent in the west, and his son Liu Chang, who succeeded to his father's position but was deposed by Liu Pei, founder of Shu, in 214. In the Wu shu the first chapter contains the biography of Sun Chien and that of his eldest son Sun Ts'e.  

As a result of this quite natural arrangement, a large part of the San-kuo chih is describing, from a different point of view, the same period as some part of the Hou Han shu of Fan Yeh. It is obvious that the emphasis must be different. The career of Sun Chien, from the point of view of a historian of the Han dynasty, would not be important enough to warrant a biography; though his rise was remarkable in itself, he died when he was only a subordinate general of the warlord Yuan Shu, he did not hold an exceptionally high position and there was not very much recorded of his career. But for the historians of the

1 The editors of the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu objected to this, and said that since Ts'ao Ts'ao was a subject of the Later Han, his biography should not have been included in the history of the Three Kingdoms. But the Chin shu contains the biographies of Ssu-ma Yi and his two sons, who were always subjects of the Wei dynasty. It seems likely that work on the biographies of the ancestors of the Chin emperors was reserved to the official office of Chin, and they were not supposed to be treated by a private history. On the other hand, such men as Ts'ao Ts'ao and Sun Chien and Sun Ts'e were far more important as founders of dynasties than as subjects of the Later Han.
Wu state, Sun Chien was the father of the first Emperor, and it was Chien's career that prepared the ground for Sun Ts'e to collect an army and to lay the foundations of the empire. So the histories of Wu must contain the biography of Sun Chien.

However, there cannot have been a great deal of solid information about Chien's life. There were a few military men, such as Huang Kai or Han Tang (biographies in SKWu 10), who served under Chien and who lived to hold office under his son Chüan and their memories would have helped to fill out the records. But the data available would be far less than that for men like Ts'ao Ts'ao, who had served as high officers of the Han court; unlike the Wei, and to a lesser extent the Shu, the history of the early years of the Wu dynasty can never have been well recorded.

The question is, how much of the early history of the Wu dynasty, as told by the San-kuo chih, is reliable? Once the state was established, we may note that several people of the time of the end of the Later Han have biographies in both the San-kuo chih and the Hou Han shu; such men as Yuan Shao, Tung Cho, Hsün Yu and Liu Yen were important to the history of both periods. Similarly, Ts'ao Ts'ao could have had a biography in Hou Han shu; we may assume that when Fan Yeh wrote his history in the middle of the fifty century, since the San-kuo chih and the P'ei commentary had already been accepted by the throne and included a most detailed account of the life of Ts'ao Ts'ao, he did not find it necessary to duplicate that work.
there were also established archives and an organised office of history, but until the Sun clan had gained a position of some security the records would have been hard to collect. Some types of documents were easy to find: the P'ei Sung-chih commentary to the biography of Sun Ts'e is able to quote a number of long letters and memorials which were written by Ts'e or his officers to the imperial court or to Yuan Shu and it is quite possible that these letters are genuine, for copies of such important correspondence would be kept and could survive to be included in the archives of the new state. However, they are not a great deal of use, since they are largely designed as pieces of special pleading or as propaganda and they cannot often give a good picture of the history of Sun Ts'e nor of the country where he was fighting. Thus although the letters which P'ei's commentary have preserved do have some interest of their own, they do not add very much to the biography of Sun Ts'e.

The biography of Sun Chien is still more difficult, for Chien did not hold a high position in the empire, and none of his letters or writings were preserved. He had died as a servant of Yuan Shu in 191 and it was not until 194 that his son Ts'e joined Shu and was granted some of his father's former soldiers. When Ts'e broke with Yuan Shu a year or so later he had no more connection with the record of his father's career. As a result, the historians of Wu had very little information of the life of Sun Chien. The biography that appears in the San-kuo chih describes his career and decorates that chronicle with a selection of anecdotes, and the primary commentary adds some more stories from other books.
Taken by itself, the biography of Sun Chien does present an account of the history of the end of the Later Han; a number of the incidents that are described have no more than a personal interest, but Sun Chien fought with the Yellow Turbans and with other groups of rebels in the south and he also took part in the great campaigns against the rebels in Liang province and later against Tung Cho, and his biography can be regarded as a source for the history of these great events. As a source, it must be set against the Hou Han shu of Fan Yeh.

The Hou Han shu was based upon the annals of the imperial court of Han and describes the history of the time as it was seen from the capital. Ch'en Shou's biography of Sun Chien, together with the books quoted in the primary commentary, tells the story from the viewpoint of the southern provinces. There are one or two occasions where the Wu shu of the San-kuo chih may have more information than the Hou Han shu, on such minor points as the identity of the rebels in the south when Chien was Grand Administrator of Ch'ang-sha (SKWu 1, p.3b); but there are some passages where the San-kuo chih must be corrected by the Hou Han shu. In the description of the Yellow Turbans, the Wu shu says that the rising took place on the chia-tzu day of the third month; the Hou Han shu describes the rebellion in several places (particularly HHS annals 8 and HHS 61) and it is clear that the rising was planned for the fifth day of the third month but was actually called in the
second month; here, the biography has a shorter report and so appears to have made a mistake. On the other hand, the San-kuo chih has a long story of the campaign against the rebels of the northwest, it quotes a speech of Chien (SKWu 1, p.3a), and in that speech Chien discusses Tung Cho's failure in the campaign. But compared to the passages in the Hou Han shu, both in the annals and in the biographies, this description of the campaign cannot have been correct; it is possible that Chien spoke against Tung Cho, but it is not likely that he used these words and it must be assumed that the speech recorded here was actually made up to round out a good story and was not very closely related to the facts.¹

From these examples, the early chapters of the San-kuo chih appear a more doubtful source than the Hou Han shu for the history of the years which are described by both works. The historians of Wu had fewer records, and they filled out their gaps with legends; and on occasion, Ch'en Shou's book has abbreviated the facts and distorted them. The San-kuo chih is a collection of biographies rather than a dynastic history, and the primary commentary of P'ei Sung-chih does not break this pattern. Almost all the works quoted in the primary commentary are biographies or local histories or similar material; and on the other hand the Tung-kuan Han-chi is never referred to at all. In general, Ch'en Shou and P'ei Sung-chih seem to have preferred to use

¹ For a more detailed discussion of such points as these, see my translation of 'The Biography of Sun Chien'.
the sources of the Three Kingdoms themselves, and they left aside the histories which had already been written for the great Han dynasty.¹

The *San-kuo chih* is a collection of biographies compiled from the records of states in different parts of China. This is essentially local history and individual history, and as a result, it is sometimes biased, sometimes too limited in outlook, and sometimes based on records or stories which may not be reliable. But it is a remarkable story that the history has to tell, for in the *San-kuo chih* we can read of the lives and the works of men who saw the fall of the first great dynasty of the Chinese world and who struggled to find power and security for themselves in an age of chaos. If the period of the Three Kingdoms has become the legendary age of chivalry and heroism in China, and if the men and the deeds of the Three Kingdoms have been celebrated in novels and poems and plays for all the centuries since their time, then that speaks well for the skill and the technique of the man who first composed their history. The story of the Three Kingdoms is one of the great tales of romance in Chinese history; it appears that the *San-kuo chih* was worthy of its theme.

¹ Bielenstein I, p.13, lists twenty-two histories of the Later Han which were in existence at the beginning of the Sung dynasty in the fifth century and were therefore available to P'ei Sung-chih; the primary commentary to the *San-kuo chih* refers to only eleven of these books.
List of Books and Writers quoted in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary to the San-kuo chih

Introduction:

This list contains references only to those books and writers which were quoted by P'ei Sung-chih as sources for the history of the end of the Later Han dynasty and the period of the Three Kingdoms. On occasion, to explain the main text, the commentary quotes from the classics or from the earlier histories, such as Li chi Shu-ching and Tso-chuan and the Han shu of Pan Ku. This list does not mention those earlier books, but only works which described the history of the second and third centuries A.D.

Several Chinese scholars have prepared lists of books quoted by the P'ei Sung-chih commentary and some have added notes on doubtful points of bibliography. Of these lists, the most useful is that of Shen Chia-pen, whose San-kuo chih chu so-yin shu-mu comprises the two parts of the first chapter of his Ku-shu mu. His index is arranged in traditional Chinese four-part order, which makes it less convenient to use, and although I have found his work of very great value, I do not always agree with his conclusions and I have attempted to add further information on the writers and the transmission of the historical works that were used by P'ei Sung-chih.

If possible, with the name of each writer in this list, there are given his dates of birth and death, his dynasty or the chapter of a dynastic history which has his biography, and then the work connected with his name.
For each book, the title of the work is mentioned, and then, where possible, the name of the author, the number of chapters (chüan or p'ien) which the book contained when it was first written, the number of chapters ascribed to it in the bibliographical section of Sui shu (chüan 32 to 35) and the number of chapters which are preserved at the present time.

The number of chapters of a work in the Sui shu list gives an indication of the material which survived the three centuries of the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The ching-chi chih of Sui shu was compiled under the T'ang dynasty in 622 and was a list of the holdings of the Imperial Library which had been taken over from the Sui dynasty; in the commentary to this list there are references to books which had been in the Imperial Library of the Liang dynasty. Many of the books of that library had been lost when being transferred to the north after the conquest of Liang by Sui; but in later years some copies of works which had not been included in the Sui list were recovered from other sources, and there are several books which the Sui shu bibliography had described as lost but which are listed in the bibliographies of Chiu T'ang shu or Hsin T'ang shu, compiled from the holdings of the Imperial Library in the eighth century.

Although the numbers of chapters recorded in these bibliographies afford some information about the preservation of the book during Sui and T'ang, this cannot be used as anything more than a guide. There are few cases where the original number of chapters of a book is known, and in many works the divisions were quite arbitrary; a change of
number may indicate no more than a rearrangement of the text. Moreover, unfortunately, the same title may not always describe the same book.

There are several cases where a number of chapters of a book survive even to the present day, but the work itself is no longer coherent. Such scholars as Wang Jen-chün 王仁俊 of the Ch'ing dynasty collected fragments from quotations in encyclopaedias and from the P'ei Sung-chih commentary and partially re-established the pattern of the original book; the Ō-han shan fang chih yi shu 王涵山房輯佚書 of Ma Kuo-han 馬國翰 of Ch'ing contains a series of these restored works, but although they are valuable and interesting examples of scholarship, and although it is convenient to be able to refer to all the surviving fragments of a single book, the continuity of the work has been lost.

Similarly, since one chapter is the minimum quantity of book generally listed in a bibliography, many fragments, lumped together or single, are dignified by description as a chapter. For example, the Chung-kuo ts'ung-shu tsung-lu 中國叢書総錄 says that the Ku-chin shuo-pu ts'ung-shu 蘇林州說部叢書 contains the Hsien-ti ch'un-ch'iu in 1 chüan; in fact, the ts'ung-shu contains only one double page of Hsien-ti ch'un-ch'iu by an unknown author. It is possible that this fragment is indeed part of the work by Yuan Yeh, but the description chüan is misleading.

Besides this, some of the pieces which were quoted in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary, such as prefaces 序 hsü, or inscriptions 銘 ming, and even some of the private biographies 別傳 pieh-chuan, were never
as long as an accepted chüan, and there are several places where it seems that P'ei quoted material direct from the archives of the states, individual edicts and official records which were never published separately. Unless such pieces survived within a collection of the author's writings or in some official publication, we have no way of tracing them.

Thus, on the question of the numbers of chapters, and often also on the question of the actual identification of the book and its author, the evidence is vague and sketchy and sometimes contradictory. Where there is differing evidence and varying opinions, I have added notes to the entries on the list.

errata and corrigenda

The book Chüeh-yi yao-chu 決疑要注 by Chih Yu 詹虞 has been wrongly indexed as Chieh-yi yao-chu．

The surname of Hsüeh Ying 蘇穎 has been wrongly indexed as Hsieh.
List of books and writers quoted in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary to the San-kuo chih:

Chan lüeh 戰略 by Ssu-ma Piao:
   not in Sui, now 1 chüan.

CHANG Ch'ao 張超; fl. 190 A.D.;
   Chang Ch'ao chi 張超集; the collected works of Chang Ch'ao;
   Sui has 5 chüan, now none.

CHANG Chih 張鴻; (Chin);
   Wen-shih chuan 時史志

CHANG Fan 張璠; (Chin);
   Han chi 管志

CHANG Fang 張方; (Chin);
   Ch'u-kuo hsien-hsien chuan 趙國先賢志

CHANG Hua 張華; 232 to 300, Chin shu 36;
   Lieh-yi chuan 歷記志
   Po-wu chih 政野志

CHANG Min 張敏; fl. 317;
   T'ou-tse tzu-yü 頜太子傳

CHANG Po 張勃; (Chin);
   Wu lu 武墓
CHANG Yen 張燁 f. 266 (SKWu);

Mo chi

CHANG Yin 張隱 (Chin);

? Wen-shih chuan (cf. Chang Chih)

CH'ANG Ch'ü 常璩; f. 347;

Hua-yang kuo chih

CHAO Ch'i 趙岐; d. 201, HHS 54;

San-fu chüeh-lu

Chao Yun pieh-chuan 趙雲別傳;

not in Sui, now none.

Ch'en-liu ch'i-chiu chuan 陳留著舊傳;

Sui has 2 chüan and 1 chüan, now 1 chüan.

The Hou Han chi of Yuan Hung, ch. 21, p. 8b, says that in 153 A.D.
Yuan T'ang 袁湯 became Grand Administrator of Ch'en-liu and
commissioned a Ch'en-liu ch'i-chiu chuan. Sui has two books
called Ch'en-liu ch'i-chiu chuan, one in 2 chüan by Ch'üan
Ch'eng of Han and the other in 1 chüan by Su Lin 蘇林 of SKWei;
there is also a Ch'en-liu feng-su chuan 風俗傳 in 3 chüan by
Ch'üan Ch'eng 蘇林. Chiu T'ang shu has a Ch'en-liu feng-su
chuan in 3 chüan by Ch'ueh Ch'eng (the character Ch'üeh
should be Ch'üan); Hsin T'ang shu has the Ch'en-liu ch'i-chiu
chuan of Su Lin and the Ch'en-liu feng-su chuan of Ch'üan Ch'eng,
each with the same number of chapters as in Sui. It is clear that the work which was commissioned by Yuan T'ang did not deal with the period of the end of the Later Han, but Su Lin and Ch'üan Ch'eng wrote continuations of the original; there is no way to decide which of the two continuations has been quoted in the commentary.

Ch'en shih p'u 陳氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.

CH'EN Shou 陳壽; 233 to 297, Chin shu 82;
    San-kuo chih
    Wei ming-ch'en tsou
    Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan

CH'EN Shu 陳術; (SKShu);
    Yi-pu ch'i-chiu ts'a-chi

Ch'en-ssu wang (Ts'ao) Chih shih 陳思王曹植詩;
    i.e. a poem by Ts'ao Chih, King of Ch'en-ssu (q.v.)

Ch'eng Hsuan pieh-chuan 甄玄列傳;
    not in Sui, now 1 chüan.

Ch'eng Hsiao pieh-chuan 程曉列傳;
    not in Sui, now none.
Chi-chou chi 齊州記;
see Chiu-chou chi.

Chi Han fu-ch'en tsan 季漢輔臣贊; by Yang Hsi;
not in Sui, now none.

CHI Hsi 葛喜; fl. 265 (SKWei);
Chi K'ang chuan

CHI K'ang 桂康; 223 to 262, SKWei 21;
Chi K'ang chi

Chi K'ang chi 桂康集; the collected works of Chi K'ang;
Sui has 13 chüan, now 10 chüan.

Chi K'ang chuan 桂康傳; by Chi Hsi;
not in Sui, now none.

Chi K'ang pieh-chuan 桂康別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

Chi shih p'u 桂氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.

Chi-Yün pieh-chuan 機雲別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

i.e. the unofficial biographies of Lu Chi 陸機 and Lu Yün 陸雲.
Ch'i-meng chu 敏蒙注; by Ku K'ai-chih:

Sui has 3 chüan, now 1 chüan.

chu should be written 記 chi. Sui has Ch'i-meng chi in 3 chüan and also a Ch'i-yi 疑 chi in 3 chüan. Both T'ang lists have the Ch'i-yi chi in 3 chüan; it seems very likely that the one book by Ku K'ai-chih had alternative titles and that Ch'i-meng chi and Ch'i-yi chi refer to the same work.

Chia-chiah 家戒; by Tu Shu:

not in Sui, now none.

SKWei 11, p.22a main text has the characters 杜恕著家戒 'Tu Shu wrote a chia-chiah'; Li Tz'u-ming 宋慈銘 suggests that these and the following passage should actually be in the P'ei Sung-chih commentary, and this seems correct.

Chia-chiah 家誠; by Wang Ch'ang:

not in Sui, now none.

CHIANG Chi 蒋濟; d. 249, SKWei 14;

Wan-chi lun

Chiang-piao chuan 江表傳; by Yü P'u:

not in Sui, now none.

Chiu T'ang shu has the book in 5 chüan; Hsin T'ang shu mentions it twice, in ch.48, p.5a with 5 chüan and in ch.48, p.10b with 3 chüan, but the second reference is surely an error.
Chiao-Kuang chi 交廣記;

see Chiao-Kuang erh-chou ch'un-ch'iu.

Chiao-Kuang erh-chou ch'un-chiu 交廣二州春秋; by Wang Fan;

not in Sui, now none.

In SKWu 1, p. 15b, PC refers to the Chiao-Kuang erh-chou ch'un-ch'iu which was presented to the throne by Wang Fan in 287; in SKWu 15, p. 9b, PC quoted the Chiao-Kuang chi of Wang Yin 陰. It seems likely that Yin is miswritten for Fan and these references are both to the same book. Hsin T'ang shu has Chiao-Kuang erh-chou chi by Wang Fan in 1 chüan.

CH'IAO Chou 譙周; 199 to 270, SKShu 12;

Shu pen-chi

Yi-wu chih

Chieh-yi yao-chu 決疑要注; by Chih Yü;

Sui has 1 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Chih lin 耕林; by Yü Hsi;

originally 30 chüan, Sui has 30 chüan, now 1 chüan.

CHIH Yü 楚虞; d. about 312, Chin shu 51;

Chüeh-yi yao-chu

San-fu chüeh-lu chu

Wen-chang chih
Chin chi 晋紀 (also called Chin shu 書); by Kan Pao;
   originally 20 chüan, Sui has 23 chüan, now 2 chüan.

Chin chu-kung tsan 晋諸公贊; compiled by Fu Ch'ang;
   originally 22 chüan, Sui has 21 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Chin Hui-ti ch'i-chü-chu 晋惠帝起居注; by Lu Chi;
   now 1 chüan.

Emperor Hui of the Chin dynasty reigned from 290 to 306.
Sui and T'ang do not list this book, but the Liang collection
had it in 2 chüan which were lost by Sui time. Sui does have
a Yuan-k'ang ch'i-chü-chu in 1 chüan and Chiu T'ang shu has a
Yung-p'ing ch'i-chü-chu in 8 chüan by Li Kuei 李軌 and Hsin
T'ang shu agrees with Chiu T'ang shu but does not mention a
compiler. Yuan-k'ang 元康 and Yung-p'ing 永平 are reign-
periods of Emperor Hui of Chin; it appears that Li Kuei was
associated with Lu Chi in the compilation of these official
diaries of activity and repose, though we cannot tell how the
books were divided or how the chapters were arranged.

Chin po-kuan ming 晋百官名;
   see Po-kuan ming.

Chin po-kuan piao 晋百官表;
   now 1 chüan.

Sui shu 33, p. 11b mentions a Chin po-kuan piao with commentary chu by Hsün Ch'ō which was in the Liang dynasty collection
in 16 chüan; there is now a Chin po-kuan piao chu in 1 chüan.
See also Po-kuan ming.
Chin shu 晋書; by Kan Pao:
   i.e. Chin chi (q.v.)

Chin shu 晋書; by Wang Yin:
   originally 93 chüan, Sui has 86 chüan, now 11 chüan.

Chin shu 晋書; by Yü Yü:
   originally 44 chüan, Sui has 26 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Chin shu 晋書;
   In SKWei 8, p.25a, and other places, PC quotes from a Chin shu
   without giving any further details of the author, whether Kan
   Pao, Wang Yin, Yü Yü or some other historian.

Chin T'ai-shih ch'i-chü-chu 晋泰始起居注; by Li Kuei:
   Sui has 20 chüan, now 1 chüan.

The T'ai-shih reign-period of Emperor Wen of Chin lasted
from 265 to 274 A.D.

Chin yang-ch'iu 晋陽秋; by Sun Sheng:
   Sui has 32 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Sui has 32 chüan with a Hsü 縱 of the Liu Sung dynasty, Chiu T'ang shu mentions
Chin yang-ch'iu in 20 chüan, but ascribes the authorship of
the whole work to T'an Tao-luan, Hsin T'ang shu has the Chin
yang-ch'iu in 22 chüan and ascribes it to Sun Sheng.
Yang-ch'iu is an alternative form of Ch'un-ch'iu 春秋 'Spring and Autumn Annals'; the character ch'un was part of the childhood name of the Empress née Cheng of the Chin Emperor Chien-wen 簡文 (reigned 371 to 373) and yang was substituted to avoid the tabu. In later times, the titles of some books, such as this one by Sun Sheng, kept the change, but others, such as the Han-Wei ch'un-ch'iu of K'ung Yen, have returned to their original names.

**Chiu-chou chi 九州記**; by Hsün Ch'o: 九
not in Sui, now none.

The Chiu-chou chi was divided into sections on the various provinces, as Chi-chou chi or Yen-chou chi qv. 九州

**Chiu-chou ch'un-ch'iu 九州春秋**; by Ssu-ma Piao: 九州
Sui has 10 ch'üan, now 1 ch'üan.

**Chiu shih 舊事**; 旧
now none.

Sui and T'ang have Han-Wei-Wu-Shu chiu-shih 漢魏吳蜀舊事 in 8 ch'üan by an unknown author.

**CHOU Chao 周昭**; d. about 261 (SKWu);

**Wu shu**

**CHOU Fei 周斐**; (Chin);

**Ju-nan hsien-hsien chuan**
Chu-ko K'o pieh-chuan 諸葛恪別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

CHU-KO LIANG 諸葛亮; 181 to 234, SKShu 5;

Chu-ko Liang chi 諸葛亮集; the collected works of Chu-ko Liang;
originally 24 chüan, Sui has 25 chüan, now various.

Chu-ko shih-p'u 諸葛世譜;
not in Sui, now none.

Ch'u-kuo hsien-hsien chuan 楚國先賢傳; by Chang Fang;
Sui has 12 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Sui has Ch'u-kuo hsien-hsien chuan tsan 賛 in 12 chüan by Chang Fang, Hsin T'ang shu has Ch'u-kuo hsien-hsien chuan in 12 chüan by Chang Fang, Chiu T'ang shu has Ch'u-kuo hsien-hsien chih 志 in 12 chüan by Yang Fang; Yi-wen lei-chü quotes from the Ch'u-kuo hsien-hsien chuan by Chang Fang. Although the title may have varied slightly, the work was surely by Chang Fang.

Chung-ch'ang T'ung Ch'ang-yen piao 仲長統昌言表; by Miao Hsi;
i.e. the preface to the Ch'ang-yen of Chung-ch'ang T'ung.

CHUNG Hui 鍾會; 225 to 264, SKWei 28;

Chung Hui mu chuan
Chung Hui mu (Chang Fu-jen) chuan  鍾會母張夫人傳; by Chung Hui;  
in his collected works.

CH’ÜAN Ch’eng 圆稱; (Later Han);  
Ch’en-liu ch‘i-chiu chuan

Fei Wei pieh-chuan 費緒別傳;  
not in Sui, now none.

Feng-su t’ung (yi) 風俗通義; by Ying Shao;  
Sui has 31 chüan, now 10 chüan.  
Feng-su t’ung and Feng-su t’ung-yi were different names for  
the same book.

FU Ch’ang 傅暢; d. 330;  
Chin chu-kung tsan  
P‘ei-shih chia chi

Fu-ch‘en tsan  輔臣贊;  
see Chi Han fu-ch‘en tsan

FU Hsien  傅咸; 239 to 294, Chin shu 47;  
Fu Hsien chi

Fu Hsien chi 傅咸集; the collected works of Fu Hsien;  
Sui has 17 chüan + 1 lu 錄 index, now 1 chüan.  

FU Hsüan  傅玄; 217 to 278, Chin shu 47;  
Fu-tzu

Ma hsien-sheng hsü
Fu-tzu 傅子; by Fu Hsüan:
Sui has 120 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Han chi 漢紀; by Chang Fan:
originally 30 chüan, Sui has 30 chüan, now 1 chüan.
This book is also called Hou Han chi or Hou Han shu 書.

Han chi 漢紀; by Yuan Hung:
originally 30 chüan, Sui has 30 chüan, now 30 chüan.
This book is also called Hou Han chi.

Han-Chin ch'un-ch'iu 漢晉春秋; by Hsi Tso-ch'ih:
originally 54 chüan, Sui has 47 chüan, now 3 chüan.
Also written Han-Chin yang-ch'iu, cf. Chin yang-ch'iu.

Han hou-shu 漢後書;
see Han shu by Hua Ch'iao.

Han Hsien-ti ch'i-chü-chu 漢獻帝起居注;
originally 5 chüan, Sui has 5 chüan, now none.
Emperor Hsien of Han reigned from 189 to 220 A.D.

Han-mo ming-shih lu 漢末名士錄;
not in Sui, now none.

Han-mo ying-hsiung chi 漢末英雄記;
see Ying-hsiung chi
Han shu 漢書; by Hua Ch'iao;
originally 97 chüan, Sui has 17 chüan, now 2 chüan.
This book is also called Hou Han shu 後漢書 and
Han hou-shu 漢後書.

Han-Wei ch'un-ch'iu 漢魏春秋; by K'ung Yen;
Sui has 9 chüan, now none.
Sui has Han-Wei ch'un-ch'iu in 9 chüan by K'ung Shu-yüan 孔融元. Shu-yüan was the style of K'ung Yen. The two T'ang lists have Han ch'un-ch'iu in 10 chüan, Hou Han ch'un-ch'iu in 6 chüan and Hou-Wei ch'un-ch'iu in 9 chüan, all by K'ung Yen. Shen Chia-pen suggests that the chapter divisions are arbitrary and that Sui and T'ang list the same book in different arrangement.

HO Shao 何劭; d. 301;
Hsün Ts'an (pieh-)chuan
Wang Pi chuan

Hou Han chi 後漢紀;
see Han chi of Chang Fan or of Yüan Hung.

Hou Han shu 後漢書;
see Han chi of Chang Fan, or Han shu of Hua Ch'iao.

Hou Han shu 後漢書; by Hsieh Ch'eng;
originally 130 chüan, Sui has 130 chüan, now 8 chüan.

HSI Tso-ch'ih 習鑒齒; d. about 383, Chin shu 82;
Han-Chin ch'un-ch'iu
Hsiang-yang chi.
also quoted by PC without reference to a particular book.
HSIA-HOU Chan 夏侯湛; 243 to 291, Chin shu 55;

Hsin Hsien-ying chuan

Hsiang-yang chi 襄陽記; by Hsi Tso-ch'ih;
Sui has 5 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Sui has Hsiang-yang ch'i-chiu 襄陽志 in 5 chüan by
Hsi Tso-ch'ih, probably this book.

HSIEH Ch'eng 謝承; fl. 222 (SKWu);

Hou Han shu

HSIEH Tz'u謝慈; (Chin);

Li lun

HSIEH Ying薛莹; d. 282, SKWu 8;

Wu shu

Hsien-hsi yüan-nien po-kuan ming 咸熙元年百官名;
see Po-kuan ming

The first year of the Hsien-hsi period was 264, the last year of Wei.

Hsien-hsien hsing-chuang 先賢行狀;

There were a number of books with this or a similar title;
e.g. Sui shu 33, p.16a has Hai-nei 海內 Hsien-hsien chuan 傳,
Chiu T'ang shu and Hsin T'ang shu have Hai-nei hsien-hsien chuan
and also Hai-nei hsien-hsien hsing-chuang; Shih-shuo hsin-yü 世説新言
mentions the Hsien-hsien hsing-chuang, the Hai-nei hsien-hsien chuan and also a Ying-ch'uan hsien-hsien hsing-chuang. No certain identification can be made.

Hsien-ti chi 献帝纪;

now none.

Sui shu 33, p.6a, has a Han Ling-Hsien erh-ti chi 漢靈獻二帝紀 in 3 chüan by Liu Fang 劉芳, and the commentary notes that the Liang dynasty collection had 6 chüan of this work. The same book is listed in Chiu T'ang shu 46, p.16b and in Hsin T'ang shu 58, p.3a, and both lists mention 6 chüan and give the author's name as Liu Ai; it is known that Liu Ai wrote the Ling-ti chi (e.g. SKWei 1, p.40b) and so the name Fang in Sui shu must be a mistake for Ai. Besides this, Ch'u-hsüeh chi 30, section 8, (p.737) quotes a Han-ti chuan 漢帝傳 by Liu Ai and refers to the year 194.

It seems possible that Liu Ai wrote the Ling-ti chi and then continued the chronicle of the reign of Emperor Hsien, calling this second part Han-ti chuan. Liu Ai was living in 216 A.D. (SKWei 1, p.42b PC) but he may not have lived to complete the biography of the deposed emperor. Emperor Hsien died in 234 with the title Duke of Shan-yang, and after his death he was given the posthumous title of Emperor Hsien of Han. Thus the book could not have been completed nor given the name Hsien-ti chi or Hsien-ti chuan until 234.
T'ai-p'ing yü-lan 773, p.1b, quotes a speech by Ts'ai Yung to Tung Cho from Hsien-ti chuan, and this quotation is identical with the same speech quoted from Hsien-ti chi in SKWei 6, p.6a PC; Shen Chia-p'en suggests that Hsien-ti chi and Hsien-ti chuan were two names for the same book.

It seems, then, that there were two books, the Ling-ti chi by Liu Ai and the Hsien-ti chi (which was originally called Han-ti chi and was sometimes called Hsien-ti chuan) by Liu Ai and a possible continuator. Later, the Ling-ti chi and the Hsien-ti chi were combined and the authorship was attributed to Liu Ai.

Hsien-ti ch'i-chü-chu; see Han Hsien-ti ch'i-chü-chu

Hsien-ti chuan; see Hsien-ti chi.

Hsien-ti ch'un-ch'iu; by Yuan Yeh:
originally 10 chüan, Sui has 10 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Hsin Hsien-ying chuan; by Hsia-hou Chan:
in his collected works.
Hsin Hsien-ying was the grandmother of Hsia-hou Chan.

Hsü chuan; by Ssu-ma Piao:
i.e. the preface to the Hsü Han shu of Ssu-ma Piao q.v.
HSÜ Chung; 394 to 475, Sung shu 94 and Nan shih 77;
P'ing

Hsü Han shu; by Ssu-ma Piao:
originally 83 chüan, Sui has 83 chüan, now 13 chüan.
8 chüan of this Hsü Han shu of Ssu-ma Piao, with primary commentary by Liu Chao, now comprise the treatises of the 'standard' Hou Han shu, of which the annals and the biographies were written by Fan Yeh. In the Hou Han shu, these treatises are divided into 30 chüan, but in the Hsü Han shu they are counted as 8 chüan. 5 chüan remain of the rest of the work.
(See Bielenstein I, p. 13.)

HSÜN Ch'o; (Chin);

Chiu-chou chi

HSÜN Hsü; d. 289, Chin shu 39;

Wen-chang hsü-lu

Hsun Hsu pieh-chuan; not in Sui, now none.

HSÜN Po-tzu; 378 to 438, Sung shu 60 and Nan shih 33;

Hsün-shih chia-chuan

Hsün-shih chia-chuan; by Hsün Po-tzu; not in Sui, now none.

The book is not in Sui shu, but both T'ang lists have it, with 10 chüan, and the Chiu T'ang shu mentions Hsün Po-tzu as the author.
Hsün Ts'än (pieh-)chuan 荀粲別傳; by Ho Shao;
   not in Sui, now none.

Hsün Yu pieh-chuan 荀彧別傳;
   not in Sui, now none.

HU Ch'ung 胡沖; (Chin);
   Ta-wen
   Wu li

Hu shih p'u 胡氏譜;
   not in Sui, now none.

HUA Ch'iao 華嶠; d. 292, Chin shu 44;
   Han shu
   P'u-hsü

HUA Ho 華覈; SKWu 20;
   Wu shu

Hua T'o pieh-chuan 華佗別傳;
   not in Sui, now none.

Hua-yang kuo chih 華陽國志; by Ch'ang Ch'ü and others;
   Sui has 12 chüan, now 12 chüan.

HUAN Chi 環濟; (SKWu);
   Wu chi
HUANG-FU Mi 皇甫謐; 215 to 282, Chin shu 51;

Kao-shih chuan
Lieh-nü chuan
Ti-wang shih chi
Yi-shih chuan

Hui-ti ch'i-chü-chü 惠帝起居注;
see Chin Hui-ti ch'i-chü-chü.

Jen Ku pieh-chuan 任嘏別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

Ju-nan hsien-hsien chuan 汝南先賢傳; by Chou Fei:
Sui has 5 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Juan shih p'u 阮氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.

KAN Pao 干寶; fl. 317, Chin shu 82;
Chin chi
Sou-shen chi

Kao-kuei hsiang kung chi 高貴鄉公集; the collected works of Ts'ao Mao, Duke of Kao-kuei district;
not in Sui, now none.

Sui shu says that the Liang collection included 4 chüan of this work, but it had been lost; the two T'ang lists both mention the book in 2 chüan.
Ts'ao Mao reigned as Emperor of Wei from 254 to his murder and deposition in 260; the book is sometimes referred to as Ti chi 帝集, the collected works of the Emperor.

Kao-shih chuan 高士傳; by Huang-fu Mi:
Sui has 6 chüan, now 3 chüan.

KAO-T'ANG Lung 高堂隆; d. 237, SKWei 25;
? Wei t'ai-fang yì

KO Hung 葛洪; c.250 to c.330, Chin shu 72;
Pao-p'u-tzu
Shen-hsien chuan

KU K'ai-chih 顧愷之; Chin shu 92;
Ch'i-meng chi

Ku T'an chuan 顧諧傳; by Lu Chi;
in Lu Chi's collected works.

K'uai-chi Shao shih chia chuan 會稽邵氏家傳;
not in Sui, now none.
This book is not mentioned in Sui, but both T'ang lists have a Shao shih chia chuan in 10 chüan.

K'uai-chi tien-lu 會稽典錄; by Yü Yü:
originally 20 p'ien, Sui has 24 chüan, now 1 chüan.
KUAN Ch'en 管辰; (SKWei);

Kuan Lu pieh-chuan

Kuan Lu pieh-chuan 管軰別傳; by Kuan Ch'en;
now none.

Sui has a Kuan Lu chuan by Kuan Ch'en in 3 chüan, both T'ang lists have the same book in 2 chüan.
Kuan Ch'en was a younger brother of Lu.

K'UNG Jung 孔融; 153 to 208, HHS 60 and SKWei 12;

K'ung Jung chi 孔融集; the collected works of K'ung Jung;
Sui has 9 chüan, now 1 chüan.

K'ung shih p'u 孔氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.

K'UNG Yen 孔衍; 268 to 320, Chin shu 91;
Han-Wei ch'un-ch'iu

KUO Chung 郭沖; (Chin);

Wu shih

Kuo Lin-tsung chuan 郭林宗傳;
not in Sui, now none.
Kuo shih p'u 郭氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.

Kuo Sung 郭頤 (Chin);
Wei-Chin shih-yü

Li Kuei 李軌; fl. 317;
Chin Hui-ti ch'i-chü-chu

Li lun 禮論; by Hsieh Tz'u;
not in Sui, now none.
The book is not listed by Sui, but Chiu T'ang shu has a
Li-chi yin 禮記音 in 2 chüan by Hsieh Tz'u 謝摑, and
Hsin T'ang shu has a Hsiao-tai 載 Li-chi yin in 2 chüan;
the author's surname miswritten as Yeh 葉, his personal
name remains Tz'u.

Lieh-nü chuan 列女傳; by Huang-fu Mi;
Sui has 6 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Lieh 列 is sometimes mistakenly written 列.

Lieh-shu 列書;
miswritten for Wei shu 魏書 q.v.

Lieh-yi chuan 列異傳; by Emperor Wen of Wei (Ts'ao P'i) and Chang Hua;
Sui has 3 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Sui has the Lieh-yi chuan in 3 chüan ascribed to Emperor Wen,
but Chiu T'ang shu has the book in 3 chüan by Chang Hua,
and Hsin T'ang shu has the book in 1 chüan, also by Chang Hua. Probably the book is by the two men; some passages describe events after Ts'ao P'i's death, so if the work was begun by him, it was completed or added to by Chang Hua.

Ling-ling hsien-hsien chuan 零陵先賢傳; by Ssu-ma Piao;
Sui has 1 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Ling-ti chi 靈帝紀; by Liu Ai;
now none.

See Hsien-ti chi.

LIU Ai 劉艾; fl. 200;
Hsien-ti chi
Ling-ti chi

Liu shih p'u 劉氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.

Liu Yi pieh-chuan 劉瘀別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

Lu Tsan pieh-chuan 盧詡別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

LU Chi 隆機; 261 to 303, Chin shu 54;
Chin Hui-ti ch'i-chü-chu
Ku T'an chuan
Lu Hsün ming
Pien-wang lun
Lu Chi Lu Yun pieh-chuan 陸機陸雲別傳；
see Chi-Yün pieh-chuan.

Lu-chiang Ho shih chia chuan 廈江何氏家傳；
Sui has 3 chüan, now none.
Sui has 3 chüan, and the two T'ang lists have 2 chüan, of a Ho Shih chia chuan.

LU Hsia 隆夏；(Chin);
? Yi-lin

Lu Hsun ming 隆遜銘；by Lu Chi;
was in Lu Chi's collected works, but is not there now.

Lu shih shih-sung 陸氏世頌;
not in Sui, now none.

Lu-shih tz'u-t'ang hsiang tsan 陸氏祠堂像贊;
not in Sui, now none.

Lu-shih yi-lin 陸氏異林;
see Yi-lin.

LU Wei 陸蔚；(Chin);
? Yi-lin

Ma hsien-sheng hsü 馬先生序；by Fu Hsüan;
i.e. the preface to Ma Chün pieh-chuan 馬鈞別傳, which is in the collected works of Fu Hsüan.

Mi Heng(pieh-)chuan 福衡別傳;
not in Sui, now none.
MIAO Hsi 繆襲; 186 to 245, SKWei 21; Chung-ch'ang T'ung Ch'ang-yen piao

Ming-t'ang lun 明堂論; by Ts'ai Yung; not in Sui, now 1 chiuan.
The present-day ts'ung-shu Huang-shih yi-shu k'ao has a Ming-t'ang yueh ling 月令 lun in 1 chiuan.

Mo chi 默記; by Chang Yen; Sui has 3 chiuan, now 1 chiuan.

P'an Ni pieh-chuan 潘尼別傳; not in Sui, now none.

P'AN Yüeh 潘岳; d. 300, Chin shu 55; P'an Yüeh chi.

P'an Yüeh chi 潘岳集; the collected works of P'an Yüeh; Sui has 10 chiuan, now 5 chiuan.

P'an Yüeh pieh-chuan 潘岳別傳; not in Sui, now none.

Pao-p'u-tzu 泡朴子; by Ko Hung; Sui has nei-pien 内篇 in 21 chiuan and wai-pien 外篇 in 30 chiuan, now nei-pien has 24 chiuan and wai-pien has 50 chiuan. Ko Hung of the Chin dynasty was both a scholar and a Taoist.
priest; hence his Pao-p'u-tzu is divided into two parts, the wai-pien is devoted to literary criticism and the nei-pien has writings on the inner cultivation of the Taoists.

**Pao-shang ling** 賞賜令；

i.e. the collection of imperial orders of honour and eulogy from the archives of Wei (see SKWei 1, p.20aPC).

**P'ei shih chia chi** 賬代家紀 by Fu Ch'ang;

not in Sui, now none.

**P'ei Sung-chih** 裴松之; 372 to 451, Sung shu 64 and Nan shih 33;

**Pien-wang lun** 辯亡論; by Lu Chi;

in Lu Chi's collected works, now in two parts.

**Ping Yuan pieh-chuan** 鄭原別傳;

not in Sui, now none.

**P'ing** 評; by Hsü Chung:

Sui has 3 chüan, now none.

Sui has this book as **San-kuo p'ing chih** 三國評, but writes Hsü's personal name as **Yüan**. The two T'ang lists also have the book in 3 chüan, but write the name as **Chung**, and this agrees with PC. This book is also known as **San-kuo p'ing** 三國評, ...
P'ing 評; by Hsün Ch' o:

i.e. from Chiu-chou chi q.v.

P'ing 評; by Sun Sheng:

see Tsa-chi.

Po-kuan chih 百官志;

see Po-kuan ming.

Po-kuan ming 百官名;

Po-kuan ming was the list of names of officials, a register which was presumably kept continuously; it could be arranged in sections by years or by reign-periods or by reigns or by dynasties. Thus PC refers to the Chin po-kuan ming, to the Po-kuan ming of Emperor Wu of Chin, or to the Po-kuan ming of the first year of the Hsien-hsi period of Wei (264 A.D.).

In SKWei 12, p.24bPC mentions a Po-kuan chih 志 and SKWei 15, p.7aPC refers to a Po-kuan ming chih; both these are errors for Po-kuan ming. But there is also a Chin po-kuan piao 表, which appears to be a separate work q.v.

Po-wu chih 博物記;

i.e. Po-wu chih q.v.

Po-wu chih 博物志; by Chang Hua;

originally 400 chüan, Sui has 10 chüan, now 10 chüan.

It seems possible that the chapter arrangements have changed
between the time the book was first written and its listing in *Sui shu*. This book is also known as *Po-wu chi* 請記.

*P'u hsü* 諳序; by Hua Ch'iao;

i.e. the preface to the *Hua shih p'u* 華氏譜 of Hua Ch'iao.

*San-ch'ao lu* 三朝錄;

not in Sui, now none.

*San-fu chüeh-lu chu* 三輔決錄注; by Chih Yü;

i.e. the commentary of Chih Yü to the *San-fu chüeh-lu* by Chao Ch'i; Sui has 7 chüan, now 1 chüan.

*San-kuo chih* 三國志; by Ch'en Shou;

i.e. the main text, sometimes quoted in PC for comparison or discussion.

*San-kuo p'ing* 三國評; by Hsu Chung:

see *P'ing*.

*SHAN T'ao* 山濤; 205 to 283, *Chin shu* 43;

*Shan T'ao ch'i-shih*

*Shan T'ao ch'i-shih* 山濤啟事; by Shan T'ao;

Sui has 3 chüan, now 1 chüan.

This book is sometimes called *Shan-kung* 山公 ch'i-shih; *Shan T'ao* was one of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove *chu-lin ch'i-hsien* of the Chin dynasty.
Shan T'ao hsing-chuang 山濤行狀;
not in Sui, now none.

Shan-yang kung tsai chi 山陽公載記; by Yüeh Tzu;
originally 10 chüan, Sui has 10 chüan, now none.

When Liu Hsieh, Emperor Hsien of Han, was deposed by Ts'ao P'i of Wei in 220, he was given the title of Duke of Shan-yang; the tsai-chi, or 'Parallel Annals', was a history of the life and reign of the former Emperor.

Shen-hsien chuan 神仙傳; by Ko Hung;
Sui has 10 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Sui shu lists this book as Lieh 列 -hsien chuan.

Shih chi 世紀;
see Ti-wang shih chi.

Shih-yü 世語;
see Wei-Chin shih-yü.

Shu chi 蜀記; by Wang Yin;
not in Sui, now none.

Shu chi is not mentioned in Sui shu, but both T'ang lists have a Shan-pu (i.e. revised) Shu chi in 7 chüan; this is now lost.
Shu lin 蜀林; by Ying Ch'ü;
not in Sui, now none.
Sui has a Shu lin in 10 chüan but names no author; both
T'ang lists have a Shu lin in 6 chüan by Hsia Chih-sung 夏赤松
and this is probably the book listed by Sui; a different
work with the same title.

Shu pen-chi 蜀本紀; by Ch'iao Chou and others;
not in Sui, now none.
These basic annals of the Shu state were compiled regularly
by the Shu history offices, and Ch'iao Chou was one of the
editors (SKShu 8, p.13aPC).

Shu shih-p'ú 蜀世譜; by Sun Sheng;
not in Sui, now none.

Shu-tu fu 蜀都賦; by Tso Ssu;
in the collected works of Tso Ssu.

Sou-shen chi 撷神記; by Kan Pao;
originally 30 chüan, Sui has 30 chüan, now various.
Several present-day ts'ung-shu have the Sou-shen chi, but
the number of chapters varies from one to twenty.

SSU-MA Piao 司馬彪; 240 to 306, Chin shu 82;
Chan lüeh
Chiu-chou ch'un-ch'iu
**Hsu Han shu**

(Hsu Han shu) hsü-chuan

**Ling-ling hsien- hsien chuan**

Ssu-t'i shu shih hsü 四體書勢序; by Wei Heng;
i.e. the preface to Ssu-t'i shu shih, which survives in fragments.

SU Lin 蘇林; fl. 220, SKWei 21;

Ch'en-liu ch'i-chiu chuan

SUN Cho 孫绰; c. 301 to 380, Chin shu 56;
quoted by PC without reference to a particular book.

Sun Hui pieh-chuan 孫惠別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

SUN Sheng 孫盛; c. 302 to c. 375, Chin shu 82;

Chin yang-ch'iu

Shu shih-p'u

Tsa-chi

Wei shih ch'un-chiu

Wei shih-p'u
also quoted by PC without reference to a particular book; in such cases it is probably the Tsa-chi that is quoted.

Sun shih p'u 孫氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.
Both T'ang lists have a Sun shih p'u chi in 15 chüan, Hsin T'ang shu has a Sun shih chia p'u in 1 chüan; no books of these titles survive.

Sun Tzu pieh-chuan; 
not in Sui, now none.

Ta-wen; by Hu Chung;
not in Sui, now none.

T'ai-k'ang san-nien ti chi; 大庚三年地記;
Sui has 6 chüan, now 1 chüan.
The third year of the T'ai-k'ang period of Chin was 282/283 A.D. This geographical record of the empire two or three years after the conquest of Wu and the reunification of China is probably an official compilation of the Chin administration. Sui shu 33, p. 22a has a 元庚 Yuan-k'ang san-nien ti chi in 6 chüan, and yüan is surely a mistake for t'ai. Chiu T'ang shu 26, p. 29a lists a ti chi compiled in the third year of T'ai-k'ang with 5 chüan and Hsin T'ang shu 48, p. 18a has a T'ai-k'ang t' u 土 -ti chi in 10 chüan.

Ti chi;
see Kao-kuei hsiang kung chi.

Ti-wang shih chi; 帝王世紀; by Huang-fu Mi;
Sui has 10 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Tien-lun 輿論; by Ts'ao P'i, Emperor Wen of Wei;
Sui has 5 chüan, now 1 chüan.

Tien lüeh 兼略; by Yu Huan;
Sui has 89 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Sui has Tien lüeh in 89 chüan, Chiu T'ang shu has Tien lüeh
in 50 chüan and Wei lüeh 魏略 in 38 chüan, Hsin T'ang shu has only Wei lüeh in 50 chüan. The commentator Hang Shih-chün
杭世骏 suggests that the Wei lüeh of Hsin T'ang shu has the
same number of chapters as the Tien lüeh of Chiu T'ang shu
and therefore Wei lüeh and Tien lüeh are two titles for the
same book. Chavannes, in his article 'Les Pays d'Occident
d'après le Wei liu' in T'oung Pao VI, 1905, p. 519, agrees.
But the commentator Yao Chen-tsung 姚振宗 notes that the
combined number of chüan of Tien lüeh + Wei lüeh in Chiu T'ang
shu is 88, and Sui shu mentions 89 chüan for Tien lüeh. It is
possible that these 89 chapters of Tien lüeh in Sui represent
Chiu T'ang shu's Tien lüeh + Wei lüeh + one introductory
chapter. Shen Chia-pen notes further that the quotations in
San-kuo chih PC which are taken from Tien lüeh deal with men
who did not live under Wei; Lü Pu and Yuan Shao and Kung-sun
Tsan. He concludes that Tien lüeh and Wei lüeh were two
distinct works, one on the history of the end of Han and the
other on the history of Wei state; they could later be combined
under the title Tien lüeh, but they retained their identity as
parts of the whole and they could be listed separately. Besides this, it may be noted that the Tien lüeh is listed among the tsa-shih Miscellaneous Histories in Chiu T'ang shu, and the Wei lüeh is in the cheng-shih Standard Histories section; in Hsin T'ang shu, Wei lüeh is in the tsa-shih category. Since Chiu T'ang shu's Tien lüeh and Hsin T'ang shu's Wei lüeh are listed with the same number of chapters and with the same classification, it is possible that Wei lüeh in Hsin T'ang shu is a mistake for Tien lüeh, and it was actually the Wei lüeh which was missing from that list.

T'ou-tse tzu-yü 头子羽; by Chang Min:
Chang's collected works contained a T'ou-tse Ch'in tzu-yü and this was probably the work quoted in PC (Shen Chia-pen, Ku-shu mu ch.2, p.28b). No work of Chang Min now survives.

Tsa-chi 雜記; by Sun Sheng:
not in Sui, now none.
This work is also known as Tsa-yü or Yi-t'ung 或同 tsa-yü or Yi-t'ung p'ing 評 or Sun Sheng p'ing.

Tsa-yü 雜語; by Sun Sheng:
See Tsa-chi.

TS'AI Yung 蒙巖; 133 to 192, HHS 50;
Ming-t'ang lun
TS'AO Chih 192 to 232, SKWei 19;

Tung-a wang pien-tao lun

Ch'en-ssu wang (Ts'ao) Chih shih

and other pieces quoted in the commentary to his biography.

Ts'ao Chih pieh-chuan 不在 Sui, now none.

Ts'ao-kung chi 曹公集; the collected works of Ts'ao Ts'ao;

Sui has 26 chüan, now various.

This book is also called Wei-wu chi 魏武集.

Ts'ao Man chuan 曹瞒傳; by an unknown writer of SKWu;

not in Sui, now none.

The two T'ang lists have this book in 1 chüan. No author is recorded for the book, but it appears to be a piece of hostile propaganda and it was written by a subject of Wu (SKWei 1, p.1lb PC). Yao Chen-tsung says that the author of the Ts'ao Man chuan was a certain Pei Shan 被山; as support of this, he cites Yi-wen lei-chü ch. 85, p.1lb, where the characters Pei Shan appear directly before the characters Ts'ao Man chuan. But it is most unlikely that this is correct. The characters pei shan are the last two characters of the final sentence of a passage quoted from the Feng-su t'ung-yi of Ying Shao, which Yi-wen lei-chü sets just before the piece from Ts'ao Man chuan. It seems that Yao Chen-tsung misinterpreted the punctuation.
TS'AO Mao; 241 to 260, SKWei 4;
Kao-kuei hsiang kung chi

TS'AO P'i; 187 to 226, SKWei 2;
Lieh-yi chuan
Tien lun

TS'AO Ts'ao; 155 to 220, SKWei 1;
Ts'ao-kung chi

TSO Ssu; d. about 306, Chin shu 92;
Shu-tu fu

Ts'ui shih p'u; not in Sui, now none.

Tu-shih hsin-shu; probably by Tu Shu; not in Sui, now none.

TU Shu; 198 to 252, SKWei 16;
Chia-chieh
Tu-shih hsin-shu

Tung-a wang pien-tao lun; by Ts'ao Chih, King of Tung-a, in his collected works.

T'ung-yü; by Yin Chi:
Sui has 10 chuān, now 1 chuān.
Sui notes that the book was hsu, i.e. edited and completed by Yin Hsing of Chin.
Wan-chi lun 萬機論; by Chiang Chi:
Sui has 8 chüan, now 1 chüan.

WANG Ch'ang 王和; d. 259, SKWei 27;
Chia-chieh

WANG Fan 王範; (Chin);
Chiao-Kuang erh-chou ch'un-ch'iu

WANG Lang 王朗; d. 288 (SKWei);
Wang Lang chi

Wang Lang chi 王朗集; the collected works of Wang Lang;
Sui has 34 chüan, now 1 chüan.
Of all Wang Lang's writings, one chapter of his Lun-yü Wang-shih
shuo 論語王氏說 still remains in Yü-han shan fang chi yi shu.

Wang Lang chia chuan 王朗家傳;
Sui has 1 chüan, now none.
Sui has a Wang Lang Wang Su 王肅 chia chuan in 1 chüan.

Wang Pi chuan 王弼傳; by Ho Shao;
not in Sui, now none.

WANG Shen 王沈 or 沈; d. 266, Chin shu 39;
Wei shu

Wang shih p'u 王氏譜;
not in Sui, now none.
WANG Su 王 肃; 195 to 256, SKWei 13;
  ? Wei t'â-fang yi

WANG Ts' an 王 琮; 177 to 217, SKWei 21;
  Ying-hsiung chi
  and also a poem quoted in SKWei 1, p.41bPC.

WANG Yin 王 隱; fl. 317, Chin shu 82;
  ? Chiao-Kuang chi cf. Wang Fan
  Chin shu
  Shu chi

Wei chi 魏 纪; by Yin Tan;
  Sui has 12 chüan, now none.

Wei chiao-ssu tsou 魏 郊 祭 虞;
  not in Sui, now none.

Wei-Chin shih-yu 魏 晋 世 語; by Kuo Sung;
  Sui has 10 chüan, now 1 chüan.

WEI Heng 衛 恆; Chin shu 36;
  Ssu-t'i shu shih hsü

Wei lüeh 魏 略; by Yü Huan;
  see Tien lüeh.

Wei ming-ch'en tsou 魏 名 臣 愚; by Ch'en Shou and others;
  not in Sui, now none.
SKWei 22, p.9aPC, mentions the imperial order for the compilation of the *Ming-ch'en tsou-yi* in the Cheng-shih reign-period (240 to 249). Sui lists a *Wei ming-ch'en tsou shih*, in 40 chüan with 1 chüan index, compiled by Ch'en Shou; but Sui also mentions the book *Wei ming-ch'en tsou* by Ch'en Ch'ang-shou as being in the Liang catalogue in 30 chüan but already lost. Chiu T'ang shu ascribes a Han *Hsien T'ang shu*, has the *Wei ming-ch'en tsou* in 30 chüan to Ch'en Shou and Hsin T'ang shu has the *Wei ming-ch'en tsou* in 30 chüan. Neither T'ang list has the *Wei ming-ch'en tsou shih*. It is possible that the character ch'ang in the Liang reference and the character Han in Chiu T'ang shu are mistakes. It is possible that there were originally two books, that Ch'en Shou took part in some stage of their compilation, that the *Wei ming-ch'en tsou* existed in Liang and was recovered in T'ang, and the *Wei minq-ch'en tsou shih* existed in Sui and was lost during T'ang. Ch'en Shou may have used Ch'ang-shou as a literary name.

**Wei-mo chuan** 魏末傳;
Sui has 2 chüan, now none.

**Wei shih-chi** 魏世籍;
see *Wei shih-p'u*.

**Wei shih ch'un-ch'iu** 魏世春秋; by Sun Sheng;
Sui has 20 chüan, now 1 chüan.

**Wei shih-p'u** 魏世家; by Sun Sheng;
not in Sui, now none.
This work is also called Wei shih-chi 經籍.

Wei shu 魏書; by Wang Shen;
originally 48 chuān, Sui has 48 chuān, now none.

Wei t'ai-fang yi 魏臺訪議; by Kao-t'ang Lung or Wang Su;
Sui has 3 chuān, now 1 chuān.

Sui shu and Hsin T'ang shu have the author as Kao-t'ang Lung,
Chiu T'ang shu has Kao Ch'ung 瞻, which is probably a mistake;
but the present-day fragment is ascribed to Wang Su.

Wei-Wu chi 魏武集; the collected works of Ts'ao Ts'ao, posthumously
titled Emperor Wu of Wei;
see Ts'ao-kung chi.

Wei-Wu ku-shih 魏武故事;
not in Sui, now none.

WEI Yao 魏曜; 204 to 273, SKWu 20;
Wu shu
Wei's personal name was originally written Chao 照.

Wen-chang chih 文章志; by Chih Yü;
originally 4 chuān, Sui has 4 chuān, now none.

Wen-chang hsü-lu 文章敘錄; by Hsün Hsü;
Sui has 10 chuān, now none.

Sui has a Wen-chang chia chi 家集 hsü in 10 chuān, Chiu T'ang shu has a Hsin-tsuan 新撰 wen-chang chia chi in 5 chuān,
Hsin T'ang shu has a Hsin-tsuan wen-chang chia hsü in 5 chüan. All these books are ascribed to Hsun Hsu, and they are probably different titles for this Wen-chang hsü-lu.

Wen-shih chuan文士傳; by Chang Chih:
Sui has 50 chüan, now 1 chüan.

The authorship of the Wen-shih chuan is uncertain. SKWei 9, p.15aPC ascribes it to Chang Yin隠, and this is supported by Sui shu; SKWei 21, p.2aPC has Chang Chih陽 and this is supported by the two T'ang lists; SKWei 10, p.5bPC has the personal name as Heng衡. But the primary commentary to HHS 50B, p.27b and the primary commentary to the Wen-hsüan ch.16, p.15b also credit the work to Chang Chih, and so it seems Chih may be correct.

Wu chi吳紀; by Huan Chi:
Sui has 9 chüan, now none.

Wu Chih pieh-chuan吳質別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

Wu li吳錄; by Hu Chung:
not in Sui, now none.

Both T'ang lists have this work in 6 chüan.

Wu lu吳錄; by Chang Po:
not in Sui, now 1 chüan.

Both T'ang lists have this work in 30 chüan.
Wu-shih 五事; by Kuo Chung:

The Wu-shih is an essay of criticism on Chu-ko Liang, in five sections. PC to SKShu 5 quotes extensively from the piece, which was written shortly after the conquest of Shu by Chin and was quoted in the Shu chi of Wang Yin. There is no mention of this book in Sui shu, but both T'ang lists have a Chu-ko Liang yin-mei wu-shih 諸葛亮隱没五事 in 1 chüan by Kuo Chung. This is probably no more than a collection of the material already quoted in PC.

Wu-shu 吳書; by Chou Chao, Wei Yao, Hsüeh Ying, Hua Ho and others; originally 55 chüan, Sui has 25 chüan, now none.

Wu-ti po-kuan ming 武帝百官名; see Po-kuan ming.

Yang Hsi 楊戲; SKShu 15;

Chi Han fu-ch'en tsan

Yang-tu fu chu 楊都賦注; by Yü Ch'an; in Yü Ch'an's collected works. Yü Ch'an wrote the fu and possibly the commentary as well; his collected works chi 集 were listed in Sui in 9 chüan, but nothing now survives.

Yao Hsin 姚信; fl. 250 (SKWu);

Yao Hsin chi
Yao Hsin chi; the collected works of Yao Hsin:
not in Sui, now none.
Sui does not have this book, but the commentary says that
Liang had 2 chüan; both T'ang lists have 10 chüan.

Yen-chou chi; 其州記;
see Chiu-chou chi.

Yi-chou ch'i-chiu chuan 益州耆舊傳;
see Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan.

Yi-lin 異林;
not in Sui, now none.

SKWei 15, p.5b PC refers to the author only as Lu-shih 隆氏
Mr. Lu. However, the writer refers to his uncle shu-fu
the Grand Administrator of Ch'ing-ho 清河太守. PC notes
that this refers to Lu Yün 雲, and thus the author may be
Lu Wei 蕤 or Lu Hsia 夏, who were the sons of Lu Chi 機,
Yün's elder brother.

Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan 盛部耆舊傳; by Ch'en Shou;
originally 10 p'ien, Sui has 14 chüan, now 1 chüan.
On the Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan and its allied works there is
the following evidence:
SKShu 1, p.1b PC quotes from Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan and says
that the author was Ch'en Shou.
SKShu 1, p.2b PC quotes from Yi-pu ch'i-chiu tsa-chi and
mentions no author.
Hua-yang kuo chih 11, p. 10a says that Ch'en Shu 陈術 (style Shen-po 申伯) and others wrote Pa-Shu 巴蜀 ch'i-chiu chuan and that Ch'en Shou used this work as a base for his Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan, written in 10 p'ien.

Sui shu and the two T'ang lists have Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan in 14 chüan by Ch'en Shou, though Sui writes the name Ch'en Ch'ang 長-shou. Hsin T'ang shu has also 2 chüan of Yi-pu ch'i-chiu tsa-chuan-chi with no author mentioned (chüan 傳 is presumably a mistaken addition).

At the present time there is a book by Ch'en Shou called Yi-tu 都 ch'i-chiu chuan.

From this, it seems clear that Ch'en Shou wrote the book called Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan and this book can also be called Yi-tu ch'i-chiu chuan. Shen Chia-pen also suggests that the Yi-pu ch'i-chiu tsa-chi may be a different title for the earlier book Pa-Shu ch'i-chiu chuan by Ch'en Shu and the others.

The Yi-chou ch'i-chiu chuan which is cited in SKShu 8, p. 4b PC and elsewhere should be written Yi-pu or Yi-tu ch'i-chiu chuan.

Yi-pu ch'i-chiu tsa-chi 金部耆舊雜記; possibly by Ch'en Shu; not in Sui, now none.

And see Yi-pu ch'i-chiu chuan.

Yi-shih chuan 逸士 lesions; by Huang-fu Mi; Sui has 1 chüan, now 3 chüan.

Yi-t'ung p'ing 異同評; by Sun Sheng; see Tsa-chi.
Yi-t'ung tsa-yü 异同杂语 by Sun Sheng:
see Tsa-chi.

Yi-wu chih 异物志:
There were a number of books of this title: Sui lists an Yi-wu chih by Yang Fu 杨笃 in 1 chüan and this work still exists. But Sui has also a Chiao-chou 交州 yi-wu chih by Yang Fu, a Nan-chou 南州 yi-wu chih by Wan Chen 萬震 of SK Wu and a Fu-nan 扶南 yi-wu chih by Chu Ying 朱應. Wen-hsüan ch. 4, p. 21b quotes an Yi-wu chih by Ch'iao Chou. There seems no way to determine which of these books is quoted in PC.

YIN Chi 殷基; (SK Wu);
T'ung-yü

YIN Tan 陰澹;
Wei chi

YING Ch'ü 应璩; 190 to 252, SK Wei 21;
Shu lin

Ying-hsiung chi 英雄记; by Wang Ts'an;
originally 10 chüan, Sui has 8 chüan, now 1 chüan.
This book was first called Ying-hsiung chiao-cheng 交争 chi and is quoted under that title in the primary commentary of Liu Chao to HHS treatise 22, p. 45a. In Sui shu it is called Han-mo 漢末 ying-hsiung chi and is ascribed to Wang Ts'an; in Chiu T'ang shu and Hsin T'ang shu it is called Han-shu 漢書.
ying-hsiung chi and is ascribed to Wang Ts'an and others.

(shu in the T'ang lists is a mistake for mò.)

YING Shao 領助; fl. 190, HHS 33;
Feng-su t'ung (yi)

Yü Ch' an 儀闇; fl. 317, Chin shu 92;
Yang-tu fu chu

Yü Fan pieh-chuan 廣翻別傳;
not in Sui, now none.

Yü Hsi 廣喜; Chin shu 91;
Chih lin

Yü Huan 魚養; (SKWei);
Tien lüeh
Wei lüeh

Yü P' u 廣溥; fl. 256, Chin shu 82;
Chiang-piao chuan

Yü shih p' u 廣代譜;
not in Sui, now none.

Yü Yü 廣預; fl. 317, Chin shu 82;
Chin shu
K'uai-chi tien-lu
YÜAN Chun袁準; c. 237 to c. 316, Chin shu 83;  
Yüan-tzu

YÜAN Hung袁宏; 320 to 376, Chin shu 92;  
Han chi

Yüan shih shih-chi袁氏世紀;  
not in Sui, now none.

Yüan-tzu袁子; by Yuan Chun;  
Sui has 19 chüan, now none.  
Sui shu has a Yüan-tzu cheng-lun正論 by Yuan Chun in  
19 chüan and notes that the Liang collection also had a  
Yüan-tzu cheng-shu正書 in 25 chüan; Chiu T'ang shu and  
Hsin T'ang shu have the Yüan-tzu cheng-lun and the Yüan-tzu  
cheng-shu in 20 chüan and 25 chüan, both by Yuan Chun. No  
work of Yuan Chun has survived to the present.

YÜAN Yeh袁暉 or 暝;  
Hsien-ti ch'un-ch'iu

YÜEH Tzu樂資; (Chin);  
Shan-yang kung tsai chi
A note on a Chin dynasty manuscript of San-kuo chih:

In the library of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies of Kyoto University there is a scroll of photographic copies of two pieces of a manuscript of San-kuo chih which is claimed to date from the time of the Chin dynasty (Kyōto daigaku jimbun-kaqaku kenkyūjo kanseki bunrui mokuroku 京都大學人文科學研究所 漢籍分類目錄 vol. I, 1963, p. 154/3). The second of these pieces is also reproduced in the first pages of the 1959 edition of San-kuo chih published by Chung-hua shu-chü 中華書局 of Peking. I am most grateful to both the Institute for Humanistic Studies and to Chung-hua shu-chü for the opportunity to study this manuscript.

Together, the two pieces contain ninety columns of the main text of San-kuo chih. The outside ends of the pieces are torn and the two sections do not fit together, and there are some places where the manuscript has been torn or rotted away. As a result, parts of some columns are missing and several characters which are partly visible are so mutilated that they cannot be recognised for certain. Nevertheless, the whole fragment contains some 1250 characters which correspond to the main text of the twelfth chapter of the Wu section of San-kuo chih (i.e. p. 3b, line 9 to p. 12a, line 5 of chapter 57 (SKWu 12) in the Po-na edition of San-kuo chih). These characters can be compared to the text of the present-day editions.

Although there is no direct evidence of its discovery, there seems little doubt that the manuscript is genuine. It appears that
the second, larger piece, of eighty columns, was discovered in the
ground at Shan-shan (or Pichan) near Turfan in Sinkiang in
1924 and was brought to Peking in the autumn of that year. In Peking,
a certain Pai Chien 胡堅 obtained the piece, probably as a friend of
the Japanese collector Takei Aizo 武居綾藏. Before the manuscript
left China, Pai had some hundred copies photographed and distributed
them among people he knew; the 1959 Chung-hua shu-chü reproduction is
taken from one of these copies. Pai also arranged that the scholar
and official Wang Shu-nan 王樹楠 should write an appendix to the
manuscript and he himself wrote a short essay. Although neither Pai
Chien nor Wang Shu-nan say so directly, it is very likely that the
manuscript had been in Wang's possession and he had sold it to Pai.
Before the manuscript left China, it was shown to the great scholar
Lo Chen-yü 羅振玉, and he added an inscription.

In 1931 Takei Aizo allowed this piece to be photographed and
placed one copy in the library of the Institute of Humanistic Science
in Kyoto. It was at this time that the smaller piece of the fragment
was photographed with the larger. This smaller piece had also been
found in Sinkiang and had come to the possession of Nakamura Fusetsu
中村不折 of Tokyo, also through the agency of Pai Chien. The
smaller piece of ten columns joins the beginning of the larger section,
and the two were photographed side by side. With the manuscript,
there were also photographed the appendix of Wang Shu-nan, the
inscription of Lo Chen-yü, a short discussion of the fragment written
by Takei and an essay by the famous Japanese scholar Naitō Torajirō
After the fragment and the covering essays had been photographed, Takei kept his piece and the other was returned to Nakamura.

Despite the early lack of provenance, there is no reason why the piece should not be genuine. There are a great number of early texts of Buddhism and administrative documents of Han which are known to have been found in the dry lands of Inner Asia, although there has been very little discovered of classical literature or histories. It is quite possible that such a fragment as this could survive, be discovered accidentally, and then be brought to the capital by a scholar or a collector. On the other hand, while the manuscript could be a fake, such a forgery as this would be difficult to prepare, and it would be still more difficult for a forgery to deceive such scholars as Wang Shu-nan, Naitō Torajirō and Lo Chen-yü.

The manuscript is generally said to date from the Chin dynasty (265 to 420) and possibly from the Western Chin (265 to 316). It cannot have been copied many years before 290, for Ch'en Shou did not begin to write the San-kuo chih until after the surrender of Wu in 280. On the other hand, it is not very likely that a copy would be made only of the main text after P'ei Sung-chih had presented his commentary to the throne in 429. The writing is in the li-shu 隸書 script, and the style is one which was common under the Chin dynasty; the characters are written with heavy strokes to the right. The thick ch'i 漆 lacquer ink which was used for writing on bamboo slips gave this effect, and at
this time there was a style of calligraphy which imitated this in ink on paper; the style fell from common use/the time of the Northern Wei dynasty (began 386). In four places yellow ochre has been used to correct mistakes of the copyist. Considered by style and material and content, the manuscript appears to be genuine and it probably dates from the fourth century A.D.

In the table below are listed the instances where the manuscript differs from present-day texts. References by line and page are to SKWu 12 in the Po-na edition.

Table of differences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Po-na reference</th>
<th>Chin version</th>
<th>Modern version</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>p.4a 1.3</td>
<td>後於樓船</td>
<td>後權於樓船</td>
<td>modern correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>p.4a 1.4</td>
<td>為</td>
<td>僞</td>
<td>modern correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(these two points of difference are in the first piece of the manuscript)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>p.4a 1.10</td>
<td>大農</td>
<td>大司農</td>
<td>Chin correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Liu Chi is described as ta-nung in SKWu 4, p.4a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.1</td>
<td>殺</td>
<td>手殺</td>
<td>same meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.1</td>
<td>誰不知</td>
<td>誰知</td>
<td>modern correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.3</td>
<td>殺</td>
<td>尚殺</td>
<td>modern preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.3</td>
<td>何哉</td>
<td>何有哉</td>
<td>modern preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.4</td>
<td>仁</td>
<td>人</td>
<td>modern correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(note that the two characters have the same sound; GSR 388 篤/篤/jen)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.5</td>
<td>得</td>
<td>得</td>
<td>Chin preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>p.4b 1.9</td>
<td>遠而</td>
<td>遠而</td>
<td>modern correct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
same meaning
Chin preferable
modern preferable
either
modern preferable
either
modern correct

(K'uai-chi tien-lu in PC to this passage gives the personal name as 忠; note that the two characters have the same sound t'ong/t'ung/chung GSR 1007)

alternate characters
Chin preferable

(In his Nien-erh shih k'ao-yi vol.I, ch.17, p.356, Ch'ien Ta-hsin has noted that the commandery of Ho-chien was not in Wu territory, and therefore Yü Sung 虞末 (or 虞) must have held the post of Grand Administrator there after the conquest by Chin; since Ch'en Shou wrote soon after that conquest, it is possible that these ten characters have been added to the original text.)

modern correct
Chin preferable
(Ch'ien Ta-hsin again notes that Chi-yin commandery was not in Wu territory and therefore Yu Ping must have held the post there after the conquest (cf. 20 above). Note that Ch'ien's Nien-erh shih k'ao-yi was written before the discovery of this fragment; the scholar had doubted the established text even before/variant manuscript was found.)

23. p.9b 1.4 吳郡吳人也 吳人也 Chin correct
(Only the Palace and National University editions leave out these two characters; Po-na and others have the full version.)

24. p.9b 1.10 唯 Chin preferable
25. p.10a 1.2 文德 modern correct
26. p.10a 1.5 成名 either
27. p.10a 1.8 存術 either
28. p.10a 1.9 民 either
29. p.10a 1.10 民逼厄 either
30. p.10b 1.1 須 Chin preferable
31. p.10b 1.2 修文德 Chin preferable
32. p.11a 1.3 名盛 Chin correct
(Only the Palace and National University editions leave out this character; Po-na and others have the full version.)

33. p.11a 1.5 誰為比也 same meaning
34. p.11a 1.5 大司農 Chin correct
(see 3. above)
35. p.11a 1.10 甲二 same meaning
From the table above, it can be seen that there are forty-two places where the version of the Chin manuscript differs from the version of the editions of the present day. In two cases (numbers 23 and 32) the Palace and National University texts omit characters which the Chin manuscript and the Po-na and other modern editions contain. Apart from these two instances, of the remaining forty points of difference, the Chin version is clearly correct in three places and is preferable in seven places; the modern version is clearly correct in nine places and is preferable in four places. There are seven places where either version makes equally good sense and seven places where the meaning is exactly the same; there are three places where the two versions use different writings for the same character. ¹

¹ It must be acknowledged that judgments between the texts must sometimes be subjective, based rather on style and interpretation than on fact. But in most cases the two texts, set side by side, speak for themselves.
In general terms, the present-day versions are more reliable than the Chin manuscript. Of the three places where the manuscript is correct, two (numbers 3 and 34) relate to the same point: the use of the title ta-nung instead of ta-ssu-nung. On this point, and on the substitution of the proper name (Ts'ao) P'i for the name Shu (number 37) it is possible to argue that the present-day version is correct, but the evidence is strongly in favour of the manuscript.

Except for these two points, the modern versions are either correct or else have very slight variations in meaning. In two places (numbers 20 and 22) the modern editions contain a total of sixteen characters more than the manuscript; but this, if it is an error, is giving too much information rather than too little.¹

¹ In fact, although I have noted these instances as 'Chin preferable', it is possible that the characters should indeed be in the text. Ch'ien Ta-hsin's remarks, which were written before the manuscript was discovered, probably mean that SKC text is describing events and positions of the Chin period, and this is a mistake in the arrangement of a 'dynastic history'. However, Ch'en Shou often refers to the careers of men under the Chin dynasty (e.g. SKWu 3, p.27b, where he refers to the death of Sun Hao in 284). We know that Shou wrote his history after the fall of Wu, and he was certainly in a position to record events in the first years after the Chin conquest. If Yü Sung and Yü Ping held posts under the Chin dynasty during the third century, there is no reason why Ch'en Shou should not have mentioned them.
In other places the Chin text is obviously defective ¹ and occasionally the Chin text has written a character with the same sound as the one in the modern version.² These are copyists' errors, but they do not often affect the meaning of the history, and the whole passage of 1250 characters actually differs little from the present-day version. Obviously there were other copies of the San-kuo chih in circulation during the Chin dynasty, and the texts in the imperial library which were used by P'ei Sung-chih would be carefully compared and checked to avoid mistakes. It seems clear, from the evidence of this early fragment, that the San-kuo chih of the present day is telling the same story as the San-kuo chih told when it was first written. If we consider the labours of copying and the weakness of paper, this is a great tribute to the reliability of traditional Chinese historiography.

¹ e.g. number 5, where Chin has pu chih 知 and Po-na has chih 知; in the context, the Sung reading must be correct; and number 25, where Chin omits the characters tse hsiu from the series tse hsiu wen te 則修文德; which makes the phrase meaningless.

² e.g. numbers 8 and 18.
Bibliography:

Anhwei t'ung-chih 安徽通志; 20 volumes, 1878.


Balazs, E., Le Traité économique du "Souei-chou" (Etudes sur la société et l'économie de la Chine médiévale I), Leiden 1953.


Bielenstein, Hans, The Restoration of the Han Dynasty; with prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu, Göteborg and Stockholm 1953; cited as Bielenstein I.


Chang Tsung-yüan, Sui ching-chi chih k'ao-cheng 隋經籍志 (Wu-han) 1877.

Ch'ang Ch'ü 常璩 (f1. 347) and others, Hua-yang kuo chih 華陽國志 in Ku-chin yi-shih 古今逸史, Shanghai 1937.

Chao Yi 錢翼 (1727-1814), Nien-erh shih cha-chi 傾二史劄記, in Ssu-pu pei-yao 四部備要

Chavannes, Edouard, Les mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien (traduits et annotés), 5 volumes, Paris 1895-1905.

Chavannes, Edouard, 'Les pays d'Occident d'après le Wei lio', in T'oung Pao VI, 1905, pp. 519-571.

Chekiang t'ung-chih 浙江通志; 4 volumes, Shanghai 1934 (reproduced from 1899 edition).

Ch'en Shou 陳壽 (233-297), San-kuo chih 三國志, with primary commentary compiled by P'ei Sung-chih 裴松之 (372-451), 65 chüan, Po-na 百衲 edition; cited as SKWei, SKShu and SKWu and references are made to chapters within these sections; PC indicates a passage in the primary commentary;
other editions of particular notice are


Chi Yün (1724-1805) and Lu Hsi-hsiung (1734-1792), Li-tai chih-kuan piao, Peking 1784.

Ch'ien Ta-chao (1744-1813), Hou Han shu pu-piao, in ESWSP II, pp. 1847-1904.

Ch'ien Ta-chao, San-kuo chih pien-yi in Shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu.

Ch'ien Ta-hsin, Nien-erh shih k'ao-yi, 2 volumes, Peking 1958.
Chin Chao-feng, *Chung-kuo t'ung-shih* 中国通史, Shanghai 1941.


Chou Shou-ch'ang (1814-1884), *San-kuo chih chu cheng-yi* 三國志注證遺, in *Shih-hsueh ts'ung-shu*.

Chu Hsi-tsu (1130-1200), (Yu-pi) *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien k'ao* 御批資治通鑑綱目, Shanghai 1887.


Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien 中国经济大辞典, compiled by Tsang Li-ho and others, Shanghai 1931.


Dubs, H.H., The History of the Former Han Dynasty by Pan Ku, 3 volumes of translation, Baltimore 1938, 1944 and 1955.

Fan Yeh, 杜撰 (398-446), Hou Han shu 舊漢書: annals 10 chüan and biographies 80 chüan by Fan Yeh, treatises 30 chüan by Ssu-ma Piao 司馬彪 (d. 305), with primary commentary to the annals and the biographies by Li Hsien 李賢 (651 to 684, who was Heir-apparent to the T'ang empire and was given the posthumous title of Chang-huai t'ai-tzu 嘉懐太子) and others, and with primary commentary to the treatises by Liu Chao 劉昭 (6th century), 120 chüan, Hou Han shu chi-chieh 集解 edition of Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙, Changsha 1923; cited as HHS annals, HHS (i.e. HHS biographies) and HHS treatises, and references are made to chapters within these sections; PC indicates a passage in a primary commentary.


Fang Hsüan-ling (578-648) and others, Chin shu 賢書, 130 chüan, Po-na edition.

Fu Lo-ch'eng, Sun Wu yü shan-yüeh chih k'ai-fa ('The conquest and the civilizing of the Shan-yüeh (Mountain Tribes) by the kingdom of Wu during the Three Kingdoms period'), in Wen-shih che-hsüeh pao (Bulletin of the College of Arts, National Taiwan University), Taipei 1951, pp.119-128.

Fukien t'ung-chih, 24 volumes, 1868-1871.

Fukui Kōjun, Dōkyō no kiso teki kenyū, Tokyo 1963.


Hang Shih-chün, San-kuo chih pu-chu, in Yüeh-ya t'ang ts'ung-shu, 1875.

Hawkes, David, Ch'ü Tz'u, the Songs of the South; an Ancient Chinese Anthology, Oxford 1959.


Hoang, Le Rev. Père P., *Concordance des Chronologies néomaniques, chinoise et européenne* (Variétés sinologiques No. 29), Shanghai 1910.


Hou K'ang (1798-1837), *San-kuo chih pu-chu hsü 三國志補續*, in *Shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu*.

Hou K'ang, Pu *San-kuo yi-wen chih 三國志篡文志*, in *ESWSPP III*, pp. 3165-3188.

Hsiao T'ung (501-531), (compiler) *Wen hsuan 文選*, in *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an 四部叢刊*.

Hsiung Te-chi熊德基

Hsu Chien徐堅 (659-729), (compiler) Ch'u-hsueh chi初學記, Shanghai 1962.


Hsü T'ien-lin徐天麟 (Sung), Tung-Han hui-yao東漢會要, Peking 1955.

Hsueh Chung-sen and Ou-yang Yi, A Sino-Western Calendar for Two Thousand Years 1-2000 A.D., Changsha 1940.

Huai-nan tzu: see Liu Wen-tien.

Huang Shih黃氏 (Ch'ing), (compiler) Huang-shih yi-shu k'ao黃氏逸書考, (originally called Han-hsüeh t'ang ts'ung-shu漢學叢書); 1934.

Hulsewé, A.F.P., Remnants of Han Law; volume 1, introductory studies and an annotated translation of chapter 22 and 23 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty, Leiden 1955.

Hunan t'ung-chih; 5 volumes, Shanghai 1934 (reproduced from 1885 edition).

Hung Liang-chi (1746-1809), Pu San-kuo ch'iang-yü chih, in ESWSPP III, pp.2997-3160.

Hung Yi-sun (1773-1816), San-kuo chih-kuan piao, in ESWSPP, pp.2731-2819.

Hupeh t'ung-chih; 3 volumes, Shanghai 1934 (reproduced from 1921 edition).


Jao Tsung-yi, Ch'ang-sha ch'u-t'u Chan-kuo tseng-shu (hsin shih) 新釋 ("A Study of the Ch'u Silk Manuscript, with a new reconstruction of the text"), (Hsüan-t'ang ts'ung-shu 選集叢書 no.4) Hong Kong 1958.

Kamada Shigeo, Shin Kan seiji seido no Kenkyū, 政治制度の研究, Tokyo 1962.

**Kiangsi t'ung-chih** 江西通志; 16 volumes, 1880.

**Ku-chin shuo-pu ts'ung-shu** 古今說部叢書, Shanghai 1910-1913.

**Kwangsi t'ung-chih** 廣西通志; 12 volumes, 1800.

**Kwongtung t'ung-chih** 廣東通志; 120 volumes, 1864.

**Kweichow t'ung-chih** 貴州通志; 6 volumes, 1741.


Lao Kan 劳斡, *Liang Han hu-chi yu ti-li chih kuan-hsi* 魯漢水利與地理之關係 ('Population and Geography of the Two Han Dynasties'), in *CYYY* V, 1935, pp.179-214; this article is translated in Sun and de Francis, *Chinese Social History*, pp.82-102.

Lao Kan, *Lun Han-tai chih lu-yün chi shui-yün* 論漢代之陸運及水運 ('The Land and Water Transportation of the Han Dynasty'), in *CYYY* XVI, pp.69-91.

Lao Kan, *Ch' in Han shih* 秦漢史, Taipei 1952.
Legge, James, (editor and translator) *The Chinese Classics, with a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copious indexes*, 5 volumes, Hong Kong 1960.

The five volumes are:
The Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean (cited as Legge I);
The Works of Mencius (cited as Legge II);
The Shoo King, or The Book of Historical Documents (cited as Legge III);
The She king, or The Book of Poetry (cited as Legge IV);
The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen (cited as Legge V).


Li Fang (925-996) and others, (compilers) *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan* 太平御覽, 1000 chüan, 1807-1812.

Li Shi-yi, 'Growth of the Chinese empire; the Nan Yüeh kingdom', in *Orient* 5, 1955, pp.80-88.

Li shih 隋書, 7 volumes, (Anhwei) 1871.

Li Tz'u-ming 李慈銘 (1830-1894), *San-kuo chih cha-chi* 三國志札記, in *Yüeh-man t'ang tu-shih cha-chi* 越繡堂讀史札記, 1931.

Liang Chang-chü 梁章鉅 (1775-1849), *San-kuo chih p'ang-cheng 三国志* 旁證, in *Shih-hsueh ts'ung-shu*.

Lien Shu 玖訥 (Ch'ing), *Hou Han shu kung-ch'ing piao 后漢書公卿表* in *ESWSPP* II, pp. 1975-1996.

Ling Shun-sheng 麦紳聲 (Ling Ch'un-sheng), *T'aitung te t'u-shek jen-hsian q chi ch'i ts'ai T'ai-p'ing yang ch'ü te lei-yüan 臺東的吐舍人像及其在太平洋區的類緣 ('Human Figures with Protruding Tongue found in the Taitung prefecture, Formosa, and their affinities found in other Pacific areas'), in *Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan min-tsu hsüeh yen-chiu so chi-k'an 中央研究院民族學研究所集刊 (Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica)*, 2, 1956, pp. 137-152.


Loewe, Michael, *Military Operations in the Han Period*; China Society

Lu Hsun 鲁迅, (compiler) *Ku hsiao-shuo kou-ch'en 古小説鈔沈*
Peking 1951.

Lü Ssu-mien 呂思勉, *Ch'in Han shih 秦漢史*, Shanghai 1947.

Ma Kuo-han 馬國翰 (1794-1857), (compiler) *Yü-han shan-fang chi yi shu 玉函山房輯佚書*, 1884.

Madrolle, C., 'Le Tonkin ancien', in *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française
d'Extrême-Orient* XXXVII, 1937, pp.263-332.

Masubuchi Tatsuo 増渕龍夫, *Go Kan tōko jiken no shihyō ni tsuite 后漢竪鍾事件の史評について ('Some Problems on "Tang-Ku" of the Later Han Dynasty in China'), in Hitotsubashi Ronsō - 青島論叢, 44, no.6, December 1960, pp.53-72.


Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, *Kyūhin kanjin hō no kenkyū: Kakyo zenshi* 九品官人法の研究：科舉前史, Kyoto 1956.


Nieh Ch'ung-ch'i 聶崇岐, *Pu Sung-shu yi-wen chih* 補宋書藝文志, in *ESWSPP III*, pp.4299 to 4308.


Ou-yang Hsiu 欧陽修, Sung Ch'i 素郊 and others, Hsin T'ang shu 新唐書, 225 chüan (completed 1060), Po-na edition.


Pan Ku 班固 (32-92 A.D.) and others, Han shu 漢書, with primary commentary by Yen Shih-ku 颜師古 (541-645), 100 chüan, Po-na edition;
other editions of particular notice are
Han-shu pu-chu 補註 edition and commentary of Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙, Changsha 1900,
and also English translation of Dubs.

P'an Mei 潘眉, San-kuo chih k'ao-cheng 三國志考證, in Shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu.


San-kuo chih yen-yi 三國志演義; see Ricaud and Nghiem.

Reinaud, J.T., *Relation des Voyages faits par les Arabes et les Persans dans l'Inde et à la Chine dans le IXᵉ siècle de l'ère Chrétienne* (texte arabe imprimé en 1811 par les soins de Feu Langlès, publié avec des corrections et additions et accompagné d'une traduction française et d'éclaircissements par M. Reinaud (Membre de l'Institut)), 2 volumes, Paris 1845.


Shao Yi-ch'en 鄒繼之 (1810-1861) and others, (Tseng-ting) Ssu-k'u chien-ming mu-lu piao-chu 增訂四庫簡明目錄標注, Shanghai 1959.
Shen Chia-pen, *Ku-shu mu* 古書目, in *Shen Chi-yi hsien-sheng yi-shu yi-pien* 沈寄簃先生遺書乙編 (date unknown).

Shen Chia-pen, *San-kuo chih so-yen 三國志疆言*, in *Shen Chi-yi hsien-sheng yi-shu yi-pien*.


Shen Yueh 沈約 (441-513), *Sung shu* 宋書, 100 chüan, Po-na edition.

*Shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu* 史學叢書 (compiled at Kuang-ya shu-chü 廣雅書局), Shanghai 1899.

*Shui-ching chu* 水經注, by Li Tao-yüan 郭璞 (d. 527), in *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* 四部叢刊;
other edition of particular notice;

*Ssu-ma Ch'ien* 司馬遷 (145-86 B.C.), *Shih chi* 史記 with commentaries:
chi-chieh 集解 by P'ei Yin 裴駰 (5th century); so-yin 索隱 by Ssu-ma Chen 司馬貞 (8th century); cheng-yi 正義 by Chang Shou-chieh 張守節 (8th century), 130 chüan, Po-na edition;
and also French translation by Chavannes,
English translation by Watson.
Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086), Tzu-chih t'ung-chien 資治通鑑 with commentary by Hu San-hsing 胡三省 (1230-1302) and k'ao-yi 考異 by Ssu-ma Kuang, 294 chüan, (Ku-ch'i ch'u-pan-she 古籍出版社) Peking 1956; cited as TCTC.


Sun, E-tu Zen and de Francis, John, Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies, Washington 1956.

Sun Yü-t'ang 孫毓棠, Han-tai te chiao-t'ung 漢代的交通 ('The Communications in Han'), in Chung-kuo she-hui ching-chi shih chi-k'ān 中國社會經濟史集刊 (Chinese Social and Economic History Review), 7, no.1, 1944, pp.23-50.

Swann, Nancy Lee, Food and Money in Ancient China; the earliest economic history of China to A.D. 25, Han Shu 24, with related texts Han Shu 91 and Shih Chi 129 (translated and annotated), Princeton 1950.

T'ang Chang-ju, San chih liu shih-chi Chiang-nan ta t'u-ti so-yu chih te fa-chan 三至六世紀江南大土地所有制的發展, Shanghai 1957.


Ting Wen-chiang, Chung-hua min-kuo hsin ti-t'u 中華民國新地圖, Shanghai 1934.

Tjan Tjoe Som, Po hu t'ung: the comprehensive discussions in the White Tiger Hall, 2 volumes, Leiden 1949 and 1952; cited as Tjan Tjoe Som I and II.


Tu Yu (735-812), T'ung-tien (通典) edition by the Commercial Press (商務印書館) Shanghai 1935.

T'ung-kuan Han-chi (東觀漢記) by various authors, 1st and 2nd centuries A.D., originally 143 chüan, now 24 chüan, in Ssu-pu pei-yao (四部備要).


Wan Ssu-t'ung (1638-1702), Tung-Han chu-ti t'ung-hsi t'u (東漢諸帝統系圖), in ESWSP II, pp. 1905-1908.

Wan Ssu-t'ung, Tung-Han chu-wang shih piao (東漢諸王世表), in ESWSP II, pp. 1909-1911.

Wan Ssu-t'ung, Tung-Han wai-ch'i hou piao (東漢外戚侯表), in ESWSP II, pp. 1917-1919.

Wan Ssu-t'ung, Tung-Han huan-che hou piao (東漢宦者侯表), in ESWSP II, pp. 1921-1922.

Wu Tseng-chin 吳騰 alm (Ch'ing), San-kuo chün-hsien piao 三國郡縣表, with additional commentary (fu) k'ao-cheng 附考證 by Yang Shou-ching, in ESWPP III, pp.2821-2968.

Yang Ch'en 楊震 (Ch'ing), San-kuo hui-yao 三國會要, Peking 1956.

Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞, Tung-Han te hao-tsu 東漢的豪族, ('Landed Nobility of the Eastern Han Dynasty'), in Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao 清華學報 (The Tsing-hua Journal) 11, 1936, pp.1007-1063; this article is translated in Sun and de Francis, Chinese Social History, pp.103-134.


Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Organisation of Chinese Official Historiography; Principles and Methods of the Standard Histories from the T'ang through the Ming Dynasty', in Beaseley and Pulleyblank, Historians of China and Japan, pp.44-49.

Yang Shou-ching 楊守敬 (1839-1915), Li-tai yü-ti yen-ko hsien-yao t'u 历代輿地沿革要覈圖, Ochêng (Hubei) 1906-1911.

Yang Tien-hsun 楊愷均, Shih-k'o t'i-pa so-yin 石刻題跋索引, Shanghai 1957.
Yao Chen-tsung, (Ch'ing), San-kuo yi-wen chih, in ESWSPP III, pp. 3189-3300.

Yeh Te-hui, 葉德輝 (1864-1927), Shu-lin ch'ing-hua, 書林清詔, Peking 1957.

Yen Keng-wang, 嚴耕望, Liang-Han t'ai-shou ts'u-shih piao, 西漢太守刺史表, Shanghai 1948.

Yen Keng-wang, Ch'in Han lang li chih-tu k'ao, 秦漢郎吏制度考, ('On the 'Lang' and 'Li' Institution of the Ch'in and Han Dynasties'), in CYYY XXIII, 1951, pp. 89-143.

Yen Keng-wang, Han-tai ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu, 漢代地方行政制度, ('The Institution of Local Administration in the Han Dynasty'), in CYYY XXV, 1954, pp. 135-236.

Yen Keng-wang, Chung-kuо ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih, 中國地方行政制度史, History of the Regional and Local Administration in China (Academia Sinica, Special Publications no. 45); Part I, The Ch'in and Han Dynasties (2 volumes), Taipei 1961; Part II, The Wei Tsin, Southern and Northern Dynasties (2 volumes), Taipei 1963; cited as History.

Yuán Hung, 袁宏 (320-376), Hou Han chi, 後漢紀, in Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an, 四部叢刊.
South China: a sketch map of the major physical features
THE COMMANDERIES AND KINGDOMS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH YEAR OF CHUNG-P'ING (189. A.D.)
(THE NAMES OF KINGDOMS ARE UNDERLINED)