THE HISTORY OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN JAPAN 1877-1911

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to present a detailed history of the Chinese diplomatic mission to Japan between the years 1877-1911.

The first four chapters trace the development of Chinese knowledge and attitudes towards Japan, the establishment of treaty relations and the organization of the Chinese foreign missions. This is followed by three chapters devoted to the specific operation of the mission in Japan.

This study presents a survey of the work, of the Chinese mission to Japan and the contribution of the head of mission between 1877 and 1911, with special attention to the minister's views of and attitudes towards Japan, the nature of the mission's functions, and the importance of the information and advice they supplied in the formation of the home government's policy towards Japan.

From the very beginning the Chinese government considered the establishment of a mission in Japan to be a matter of importance. Its special purpose was to observe Japan as a possible force in Asia. Though the Chinese diplomats did manage to transmit a great deal of information about the Japanese scene as a whole, common cultural backgrounds and written language were far less helpful than expected. Because individual ministers were considerably influenced by personal pre-conceptions regarding Japan, Chinese missions were often
mistaken in their analysis and conclusions. Nevertheless the information they provided was of undoubted importance in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy, particularly in keeping Li Hung-chang informed of the situation in Japan. The mission developed and improved their methods of gathering information over the period of study, and underwent certain changes in function and organization which are examined in detail.

The Japanese victory in 1895 brought about the decline in importance of the diplomatic function of the Chinese mission in Japan. Most substantial negotiations were now carried out in Peking and the political role of the Chinese mission in Japan become routine and relatively unimportant. Instead the missions became more and more concerned with Chinese students, reformists and revolutionaries in Japan and with attempting to suppress revolutionary trends.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked a critical period in modern Chinese history. Domestic troubles within China were accompanied by new complications in the field of foreign affairs, as the forces of East Asian tradition were confronted with the expansion of the Western industrial nations and modern international politics. At the same time, Japan was emerging as the most important of China's neighbours in East Asia, and relations with her became one of the important concerns of Chinese foreign policy.

To the Chinese, the appearance of Japan as a force on the international scene was an entirely different question from the expansion of western powers, for the historical ties linking the two countries dated back for many centuries. In many ways it was to prove harder to change the established patterns of attitude and policy towards Japan than it was to cope with the advent of new forces from the west.

For many centuries China and Japan had been in close contact as neighbours, sharing a similar culture and subscribing to the same concept of international order. Tracing the record of this contact through the course of Chinese history, we can derive some idea of the process whereby China evolved a certain set of views concerning Japan which were to affect the two
countries' relations even in the period dealt with in this study.

Thus one of the main concerns to be kept in mind when one comes to examine modern relations between the two countries is the nature of these historically based attitudes. It must also be asked exactly how and to what extent they influenced the views and activities of Chinese diplomats in Japan, and of the home government.

A considerable change in Chinese attitudes to Japan might have been expected as a result of diplomatic relations between the two countries. With the appointment of the first minister to Japan in 1877, the Chinese government at last had a foothold in Japan which would certainly have influenced the policy-making process and led to a revision of the traditional views and policies. Yet in fact, even after this diplomatic link with Japan was established, the Chinese understanding of Japan in many cases still conflicted with reality, and it seems that the establishment of the mission was of only limited help in this matter.  

Several possible reasons for this situation will bear investigation: whether the mission conveyed a true picture of Japan, what importance the home government attached to the mission as a source of information, what was the nature of

1. CKCJ, no. 8, 12, 22.

2. For more complete details regarding the Chinese concept of Japan and Japanese society see Chapters 5 and 6.
the mission's functions and how effective were the ministers. The mission, though it had its limitations, was more than a mere formality, and certainly must have been able to influence government policy to some extent, particularly through its function as a supplier of information. It could be argued that Li Hung-chang's monopoly of power in the area of foreign policy would have nullified the influence of the mission, but in fact it was only through the mission that Li Hung-chang could gain any information on the situation in Japan.\(^3\)

The question then arises of whether the mission failed to provide a true picture of Japan, or whether the picture it provided, although correct, was not accepted by the home government. To determine why the mission apparently did not have much success in attaining its basic goal, that of providing accurate information about Japan, it is proposed to look at the question from the following angles. Firstly, the sending of the mission would undoubtedly in itself have had some influence on policy-making. How the home government reacted to the mission, to what extent they were dependent upon it for information, and how highly they regarded the mission as an important line of communication, must all be considered in our observation of the actual operation of the mission.

The attitudes of the home government were expressed in such matters as the selection of envoys and the regulation

\(^3\) This point is further illustrated in Chapter 3, Section VI; and Chapter 6, Section II.
of the mission's activities, as well as in its response to the mission's reports and advice. A look at these factors may contribute to our understanding of the particular nature of relations between China and Japan.

But it is not enough to evaluate the mission's effectiveness just on the basis of its relations with the home government. The personal ability of the minister, his professional skills, such as knowledge of languages and international law, the development of methods of gathering information, and the areas of responsibility of the various ministers, are all matters to be examined in respect of the mission's functions. Then we may be able to decide to what extent Li Hung-chang, the Yamen, and the other high-official of the Court depended on the mission, and what the relative importance of the minister's personal abilities and his relations with Li Hung-chang were: in effect, how independent the mission was. So to clarify the nature of the mission in Japan is the second intention of this study.

In addition, the activities and report of the ministers and other mission staff provide insight into the general Chinese attitude to Japan. This study will therefore treat in detail the missions' observations concerning Japan, the ministers' handling of specific incidents arising during their terms, their advice to the home government and how it was received.

The mission in Japan may have played an influential role in certain significant historical events, the most notable
being the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. An examination of the Chinese minister's reports and actions during the period leading up to this war provides a better understanding of his possible responsibility in the conflict.

After the Sino-Japanese war, however, both the attitude and concerns of the mission, its areas of responsibility, and even its effectiveness changed greatly. The functions of the mission, the clearer division of work within it, the limited influence of the minister in important diplomatic matters which were often not handled through the minister in Japan, and the increasing concern of the mission with economic, educational, financial and other matters which had been given little attention before the war, were all signs of decreasing political influence. On the other hand, the mission was more than a routine administrative organ. The great increase in the number of Chinese students in Japan and the presence of reformists and revolutionaries in Japan increasingly involved the mission. What measures were taken and how effective they were in dealing with these problems, became the important questions during this period.¹

I. Early Sino-Japanese Relations

Japan occupied a special place in China's foreign relations, for historical as well as geographical and cultural reasons.

¹. See Chapter 7.
Until contacts with Europe and America in the middle of the 19th century finally brought East Asian countries into the world community, there existed a unique international order in East Asia. Its origins lay in the nature of China's political ties with neighbouring states, following her establishment of a single-state authority and the expansion of her sphere of influence. Characteristic of this order were the notion and attitude summed up in the phrase, "Hua-i". This meant that, to the Chinese, the unified political world was "T'ien-hsia". The "T'ien-hsia" which literally means "(area) under Heaven", was ruled by the emperor, who claimed to be the Son of Heaven. It was also a culture area with established law and order. The T'ien-hsia was made up of various states, with China, the Middle Kingdom, as its core. (The areas surrounding the T'ien-hsia were called the "Four Seas", meaning underdeveloped regions without law and order). The people who lived in these regions were usually called the "Four Barbarians": they were the Man to the South, the I to the East, the Jung to the West and the Ti to the North.

China's relations with these barbarians varied according to country and time. In general, the formulae

which were followed by successive Chinese empires can be classified into four categories: 6

First, there was the system of investiture, in which neighbouring rulers were invested with offices and titles by China, thus forming a sovereign-subject relationship. The invested state became a dependent country. It accepted China's calendar and was obliged to pay tribute in return for protection by China.

The second was the peace covenant system, which enabled an alliance to be formed through marriage or some other form of personal diplomacy between the Chinese emperor and the ruler of a bordering state. Examples are the "brotherly" relationship between the T'ang and the Uighurs, 7 and the "father and son" relationship between the T'ang and the T'u-chüeh. 8


8. Ibid. 194A 15b.
The third was the "friendly exchange of gifts", whereby a "foreign" country voluntarily sent a mission to China. This in no way made the giving nation a subject of China but it did enable it to benefit from China's cultural heritage. An example of this is the relations between Japan and China during the Sui and T'ang dynasties.

The fourth took the form of a trade relationship, essentially outside the traditional structure where relationships were primarily or purely commercial. For example from the 10th to the 19th centuries Japan's relations with the Sung, Yuan and Ch'ing dynasties were only commercial relations. Diplomatic relations were not established.

Sino-Japanese relations within the East Asian international order changed in nature along with changes in dynasty and ruler both in China and Japan.

Japan came into contact with Chinese culture through Korea as early as the third century B.C. But the first direct contact did not occur until some four hundred years later, when early in the first century A.D., the Na, which emerged to become the strongest tribe in the Japanese islands, paid tribute to the Han Court. This was followed,

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9. Ibid., 199A 14a-b; Nishijima, op. cit. 249-253, 278; Reischauer, op. cit. 42-47.


in the third century, by Queen Himiko of Yamatai, who sent tribute to the Wei court, \(^{13}\) and in the fifth century by the Five Kings of Wa ("Wa-no-go-o"), who sent tribute to the Southern Dynasties. \(^{14}\) The relationship so far conformed to the "friendly tribute system" in China's international order. However, from the fourth century onwards, the Japanese for two reasons sought to obtain an investiture from the Chinese emperor to strengthen their internal rule and to gain China's recognition of Yamato's control of southern Korea.\(^ {15}\)

In 438 Japan asked the Liu-Sung ruler to recognise the Japanese Governor-general and other military officials in certain Korean states. Since states like Paekche were already paying tribute to China and had obtained investiture from the Liu-Sung emperor, the recognition would have meant that the south Korean state of Paekche would pay tribute to Japan as well as China. It would also have meant the recognition of Japan's controlling position in the southern Korean states (Paekche, Silla, Mimana). In the Chinese international order, this would have placed Japan on a level with Koguryo. The request was rejected and in 438 China invested the emperor of Japan only as General who pacified the East, and King of Wa (安東將軍 and 倭國王).

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\(^{14}\) Sung-shu (Po-na ed.) 97 23b-25a.

\(^{15}\) Nishijima, op. cit. 231-238.
Although in 451, thirteen years later, China approved the office and title which Japan had requested in the Korean states, Japan's claim over Paekche was never recognised.  

During the sixth century internal disturbances in Japan and changes in the situation in the Korean peninsula made it meaningless for Japan to seek offices and titles from the Chinese court or to join the Chinese international order. Therefore the frequent tributes to the southern dynasties of the previous century ceased. Thus, Korea which was the first venue of Sino-Japanese contacts as well as the main reason for the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-5) some twenty-two centuries later, became the main cause of the first diplomatic "rupture" between the two countries. This was to last for nearly a century until the founding of the Sui dynasty.

Japan took the initiative in renewing contact by sending a mission to the Sui court in 600. This was followed by another mission in 607 carrying tribute. It did not seek investiture, nor did it come as a mission from a subject state. The wording of the credentials of the

17. Nishijima, op. cit. 241
19. Ibid., 81,15.
Japanese envoy shows clearly that Japan intended to establish her own empire and authority outside the international order of the Chinese empire. The despatch of the mission was motivated by the desire better to exercise sovereignty over two of her tributary states in south Korea through a closer relationship with China, and also to facilitate the absorption of Chinese culture which the Japanese had increasingly come to admire.  

This relationship was continued and developed through the best part of the T'ang dynasty. When tension between the two countries was removed after the downfall of Paekche in the seventh century, Japan continued at intervals of ten years or more to send her missions to the T'ang court, where she was treated as a tributary state outside the Chinese investiture order, and her envoys were treated in a friendly manner much like the other foreign guests who flocked to Ch'ang-an from elsewhere. The influence of the Chinese culture which these missions transmitted to Heian Japan is too well-known to need comment.

20. Nishijima, op. cit. 252-253; Mori Katsumi, Kentōshi (Tokyo, 1955) 6-9; Reischauer, op. cit. 42-45.
During the period of decline of the T'ang dynasty, relations between the two countries became strained and were finally broken off in 838. A few years later, in 842, relations between Japan and Silla were also broken off because of raids by Korean pirates on the Japanese coast and because Japan leaned towards seclusion.

The Japanese government forbade all its people, except monks, to go abroad and Chinese ships which continued to sail to Japan were placed under severe restrictions. This situation did not improve until Taira no Kiyomori came to power in 1167 and contacts between China and Japan once more became frequent, although throughout the 12th century they were confined to the southern Sung. This was largely due to the fact that the Sung government, which had continued the T'ang policy of encouraging trade, viewed trade in the middle of the twelfth century as a source of national revenue. These contacts with Sung China, however, created repercussions in Japan beyond mere commercial gains. It was through these contacts that the Japanese became acquainted with Sung philosophy, the source of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, which had a far-reaching and undiminished influence on Japanese political and social life until the eve of her confrontation with the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century, and indeed beyond.

25. Ibid., 369-370.
After the complete subjugation of Korea, the Yuan emperor in 1266 began sending emissaries to Japan in an attempt to persuade her to send tributary missions to the Yuan court. These requests were met with rebuff by the Kamakura Bakufu, but the resulting hostility between the two countries did not altogether interrupt trading relations, and in the last years of the Mongol rule, Japanese trading ships, with the ostensible purpose of raising funds for temple construction, sailed to China with government recognition and protection.

Then, two new elements entered into the relations between Ming China and Japan: the raiding of the Chinese and Korean coasts by Japanese pirates from the latter part of the fourteenth century onwards, and China's establishment of an investiture relationship with the ruler of Japan at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The pirate raids pushed the Ming court further into a policy of seclusion. Chinese ships were forbidden to sail abroad, and only so-called tribute ships were allowed into certain Chinese ports, and even then were only permitted to sell merchandise on board their ships. Such a restrictive policy acted very much

26. For added details regarding Yuan dynasty's invasion of Japan see p.23.


29. Tanaka Takeo, Wako to kangō bōeki (Tokyo, 1961) 86; Wang Yi-t'ung, op. cit. 21-25.

against the then fairly well-developed merchandise economy, and could not be strictly maintained for long. Indeed, during the period of the ban of some two hundred years, smuggling was so frequent that it eventually took the place of open trade. Japanese piracy was, as it were a form of free trade.31

The investiture relationship, in which Yoshimitsu accepted the Ming as his suzerain, had seemed for a time to have succeeded in reducing Japanese pirate operations. Otherwise it had not altered in any material way the existing relationship between the two countries. With a brief break during the reign of Yoshimochi, (the son and successor of Yoshimitsu), in 1408-28, this relationship was maintained throughout the period of the Ashikaga Shōgunate.32 However, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi came to power, he rejected the credentials of a Ming envoy in which Japan was treated as a dependent nation. He went further and launched an expedition against Korea, and had it not been for his sudden death, would have attacked China too.33 After Hideyoshi's death, Tokugawa Ieyasu endeavoured, but without success, to

31. Ibid., Kobata, op. cit. 73.
32. Wang Yi-t'ung, op. cit. 35-36, 47-53, 60-81; Tanaka, Wakō, op. cit. 92.
re-establish relations with Ming China. But trade increased greatly in the absence of a governmental relationship during the period of the official ban and hostility. This situation did not change substantially after the introduction of the isolation policy by the Japanese authorities at the end of what is described as the "Christian century".\footnote{Numata Jirō, "Edojidai no bōeki to taigai kankei," in NR, XIII, 45.}

The Manchu government continued the Ming ban, although four foreign ports were opened in fact to foreign trade, and some merchant ships were allowed to sail to Japan to obtain the much needed copper. But apart from occasional communications from the local Ch'ing officials to the Japanese authorities, there were no official dealings between the two countries. Contact was confined to private selling by Chinese merchants until the middle of the nineteenth century.\footnote{Ibid., Chang Te-ch'ang, "Ch'ing-tai ya-p'ien chan-chen ch'ien chih Chung-hsi yen-hai t'ung-shang," in Pao Tsun-p'eng, Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung (Taipei, 1956) Series 1, III, 91.}

This somewhat brief and sketchy survey shows that, except during the Ming period when Japan agreed to become a tributary of China - an arrangement which was ephemeral, the relations between the two countries from the eleventh to the middle of the nineteenth century were limited to trade only. During the whole of this period, while China was able to bask in the contentment of her own international order, Japan alone
of the East Asian countries was able to establish contacts which were beneficial to herself within this order without being relegated, even during the investiture period of Ming times, to subject or dependent status. Gifts sent by Japan to China were voluntary, and were always a means to gain from China economic, cultural and political benefits.

Another factor closely connected with this one and very much worth noting is that, although politically Japan was able to remain outside the confines of China's international order, she had, through her long contacts with China, particularly since T'ang and Sung times, so absorbed Chinese culture as to allow it to dominate and transform her social and political institutions until some essential parts of Chinese cultural heritage became also her own. Knowledge of this background is important, not only for an understanding of Japan's attitude when she came to confront the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century, but also for an understanding of how Sino-Japanese relations differed from those China had with other countries.

II. Chinese Knowledge of and Traditional Attitudes towards Japan

What emerges from this brief account of the relations between the two countries before the mutual establishment of formal diplomatic relations is that the initiative in these contacts rested primarily with Japan, and that, although Japan was never treated as a subject nation within
the Chinese order but rather as a barbarian nation outside its pale. The relationship between the two was never strictly on an equal basis. Japanese authors of books on early Sino-Japanese relations published immediately before the second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), tended to stress the significance of the language used in the credentials of the Japanese envoy to the Sui court, in which the emperor of Japan was said to have addressed the Chinese emperor as follows: "From the emperor of the land of the rising sun to the emperor of the land of the setting sun". But this is no evidence of Japan's being treated on an equal footing, even if she was making some attempt to claim it. It would therefore be useful for a better understanding of subsequent events, to examine Chinese views on and knowledge of Japan in the successive periods of contact between the two countries and see what influence these had on Sino-Japanese relations.

Some writers have attempted to link a certain reference in the Shan-hai-ching, the earliest surviving Chinese geographical work, with Japan. But the general view is that the mention in the Ti-li-chih in the Han-shu is the first sign of Chinese knowledge of the existence of


Japan. The entry there was, however, very brief. The first detailed entry which shows how remarkable a degree of knowledge China had of her neighbour appears in the Wei-shu in the San-kuo-chih, which, though recording the history of a later period, was in fact compiled in the third century, thus before the Hou-Han-shu. This entry eventually became the source of all later official compilations, including the Hou-Han-shu, on Japan. Judging from the much briefer entries in the later dynastic histories on the subject, there seems to have been little intercourse between the two countries.

With the Sui re-unification of China, contacts were resumed when Japan sent her first batch of students to China. These contacts are mentioned in the Sui-shu. But the fact that the authors of Chiu T'ang-shu entered "Jih-pen" and "Wo-kuo" under separate headings shows that the knowledge of Japan was rather vague. This is indeed surprising, considering the unprecedentedly frequent contacts between the two countries during T'ang times. The confusion was corrected, however, in the Hsin T'ang-shu compiled during the Sung dynasty in the middle of the 11th century (1060). The compiler was able for the first time to state for certain that the country "Jih-pen" was in fact the "Wo-kuo" referred to in earlier histories. Like that of the San-kuo-chih and

the Sui-shu, it became in turn the main source for the later dynastic histories, including the Ming-shih, which was compiled as late as 1739. 39

Chinese knowledge of Japan, however, made great strides during the Ming period. For the first time monographs, as distinct from official accounts, made their appearance. This was the result of the Chinese trying to trace the origins of the pirates who now raided their coast. In 1523, Hsüeh Chün published Jih-pen-k'ao-lüeh. This turned out, however, to be based largely on existing official records. 40 The first account to have added genuinely new information about Japan was a work by Cheng Jo-tseng entitled Ch'ou-hai-t'u-pien that first appeared in 1562. Cheng had never been to Japan himself, but his book was based on the accounts of those who had. 41 By far the most comprehensive and up-to-date work, however, was the Jih-pen-i-chien by Cheng Shun-kung, which

39. Mori Katsumi Nissō bunka kōryū no shomondai (Tokyo, 1950) 12-23, 42-43. The only contact China had with Japan in the early Sung period was through the Japanese Buddhist pilgrims to China. Their contacts with officials and people of the Sung had greatly increased the knowledge of Sung about Japan's aristocratic society. Ibid., 34-60. 40. Wu Yu-nien, "Ming-tai Wo-k'ou shih-chi chih-mu," in Ming-tai pien-fang (Taipei, 1968), 245; Tanaka, Wako, op. cit. 214-216; Tanaka Takeo, Chüsei kaigai kōshōshi no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1959), 223. 41. Wang Yung, "Ming-tai Hai-fang t'u-chi lu," in Ch'ing-hua chou-k'an vol. 37, No. 90; also in Ming-tai pien-fang, op. cit. 205-208; Tanaka, Chuše, op. cit. 215-226.
appeared in 1565. Cheng had earlier been sent to Japan with instructions both to urge the Japanese government to put a stop to piracy and to find out something about the country and people for defence purposes. He stayed in Japan one year, and the book published upon his return to China was the result of his observations. In this book he discussed not only the geography and politics of the country but also its economics and social customs. It is indeed a reflection upon the inward-looking policy of the successive governments after that date that this book remained, for nearly three hundred and fifty years until the appearance of the Jih-pen kuo chih written in 1890 by the reformer and scholar, Huang Tsun-hsien, the most authoritative account of Japan. It is true that while Japan was mentioned in certain official compilations such as the Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih (1744) and the Huang-Ch'ing chih-kung t'u (1751) she appeared only as a tributary state of the empire which she had long ceased to be. It is also true that two works appeared after the 1868 Restoration, namely Jih-pen chin-shih-chi by Ch'en Ch'i-yuan in 1873, and Huan-yu-ti-ch'iu-hsin-lu by Li-Kuei in 1876, respectively four years and one year.

42. Kobata, op. cit. 73-74, 76; Akiyama, op. cit. 604-619.
43. Yano Jin'ichi, Kindai Shina shi (Tokyo, 1940) 127-128.
45. Li Kuei, Huan-yu ti-ch'iu hsin-lu, 4 vols. (1876).
before China sent her first mission to Japan. But neither showed any understanding of the new situation in Japan. The first advocated attacking Japan and making her a dependency of China. The author had interpreted the Restoration simply as a change of dynasty. The author of the second book had stopped in Japan on his way to the Exhibition in Philadelphia, but, besides mentioning that Japan had adopted some Western reforms, he had little understanding of what the Meiji Restoration was about. There is no evidence as to whether or not the future envoys to Japan consulted these books, but if they did, they probably would not have found much helpful material in them, except the fact that there had been a change of government in Japan. Some statesmen, as we shall see later, by this time already had a better idea of Japan than they could have gained from these books.

How did this state of knowledge, or lack of it, about Japan affect China's view of Japan and the contacts between the two countries?

China's view and treatment of Japan vary somewhat with time and expediency. On the whole, Japan was regarded as a barbarian country beyond the pale of Chinese civilization, and no great importance was attached to relations with her. This seemed quite natural, in view of the fact that the need and the initiative for these contacts, was always on the side of Japan. During the Wei dynasty in the 3rd century, China sent her first mission to Yamato, but this was done solely from a desire to prevent Yamato from allying with
Wu and Koguryo who were then at war with Wei. The fear of a possible Japanese alliance with their enemy caused the Wei rulers to overestimate the importance of Japan, but even then Japan was not treated on an equal footing.

As was mentioned earlier, emphasis has been laid by some Japanese historians on the implications of Sino-Japanese equality contained in the credentials of the Japanese envoy to the Sui court. While Japan may or may not have intended to make that assertion, its claim was refuted by the Sui court. This was shown not only in the number of missions exchanged, but also by the official ranks of the two countries' envoys. During the entire Sui period, China sent to Japan only one mission, and this was led by an official of very inferior rank, in contrast to three missions sent by Japan to China, each led by an important court official. Sui China, fully aware of Japan's admiration of Chinese culture, still treated her as a barbarian nation.

The T'ang attitude towards Japan was similar to that of the Sui. T'ang T'ai-tsung exempted Japan from paying annual tribute since she had not received investiture from China. However, because of Japan's absorption of

47. Nishijima, op. cit. 250-252.
T'ang culture, she was now treated as a country within the Chinese cultural orbit, although politically she remained outside China's international order. 48

During Sung times, there was little change in China's attitude towards Japan, and there were hardly any formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. China paid more attention to Korea at this time, having common enemies, the Khitan Liao and the Jurchen Chin. After the Sung court moved south, trade with Japan flourished, arousing in China a sudden and indeed exaggerated awareness of the wealth of her neighbour. In addition, cultural contacts were maintained by Japanese pilgrim priests whom the Chinese regarded as tributary envoys. 49

The Mongols, in an effort to ally with Japan and isolate the Sung, took the initiative by sending emissaries to Japan. 50 The wording of the credentials of these envoys, from the Mongols' point of view, was moderate. It merely requested Japan to remain a non-subject tributary country. 51 This approach, as had been noted, was rejected by the Kamakura Bakufu. The rejection led the Mongols to invade

48. Ibid., 271-272.
49. Mori, Nissō bunka kōryū op. cit. 73-74.
50. Nakamura, op. cit. 38.
51. Ibid., 29.
Japan, once they had overwhelmed the southern Sung. Although these attempts were not successful, the Yuan rulers did not give up the idea for nearly twenty years. In 1299 the last mission was sent to Japan. Its credentials, though mild in expression as compared with those of earlier missions, still did not treat Japan as an equal country. In the Sung-shih however, which was completed towards the end of the Yuan dynasty, Japan is entered under the general heading of "foreign nations" rather than under "Eastern barbarians" as in the previous dynastic compilations. This may indicate that Japan's stocks in China were somewhat higher. We know that the Yuan followed the Sung in entertaining an exaggerated idea of Japan's wealth, and it was this more than political reasons that was behind the Yuan attempts to subjugate Japan.

China's view of Japan underwent some radical changes during the Ming period. On the other hand, Japan, under Ashikaga Yoshimitsu at the beginning of the fifteenth century, accepted investiture from the Ming court, thus for the first time becoming at least nominally a dependent country of China.

52. Ibid., 42.

53. Hatada Takashi, Genkō (Tokyo, 1965), 147, 171-172.

54. See note No. 39.

55. Wang Yi-t'ung, op. cit. 20-45; Kimiya, op. cit. 529-532.
At the same time, through her pirates, Japan became for the first time a real and direct threat to China. In fact, the investiture status of Japan was only a formality, and the actual relations between the two countries hardly changed from what they had been before. However, the private raids forced China to send missions to discover their origins with a view to countering them. To the Chinese Japan was now not merely a country of wealth, as it had been for their ancestors, but also a country which caused China grave concern. It was these raids, combined with China's internal political conditions which pushed her towards an isolationist policy.  

The Manchus, continued this policy, they ignored the fact that the investiture status of Japan, even though nominal, had been forcefully refuted by Hideyoshi, and continued to regard Japan as a tributary state. This is evidenced in such works as Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih. Otherwise, there were no official contacts until after the first opium war, when China established treaty relations with various European and American powers.

56. Ch'en Wen-shih, Ming Hung-wu chia-ching chien ti hai chin cheng ts'e (Taipei, 1966), passim; Sakuma Shigeo, "Ming-chō no kaikin seisaku," in Tōhōgaku VI (July 1953), 42-51.

57. Chang Te-ch'ang, op. cit. 91-93.

58. Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung-chih (Shanghai, 1902) mu-ku 13-14; vol. 424 I.
Thus Japan, in the whole history of her contacts with China never become a dependent country. China however in her intercourse with Japan, assigned her an inferior position. This was the dominant factor in China's dealings with Japan when the new era of international relations in East Asia opened in the middle of the nineteenth century. Long after she was forced to accept Western nations into her domain on far from equal terms, China continued to resist dealing with Japan even on those same terms. She did eventually come around to sending a permanent mission to Japan, as she had already done with the Western countries, but this represented a very radical change in her traditional way of thinking, as well as in the relative positions of the two countries after their contact with the West.

Before we examine this new phase of Sino-Japanese relations it may, however, be instructive to review briefly the missions, official and semi-official, which Japan sent to China after the Treaties of Tientsin (1858) and Peking (1860), and before the establishment of a Chinese legation in Japan.

III. Pre-treaty Japanese Approaches to China

In June 1862, barely six years after Commodore Perry had forced the opening of Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate made its first attempt to establish some commercial and diplomatic ties with China. It sent to Shanghai an
official named Mahira Rokuro with 13 businessmen and their cargo. Through the Dutch consul in Shanghai they obtained an interview with Wu Hsü, the Grain Intendant of Su-Sung-Ch'ang-Chen prefectures. During the interview, Mahira Rokuro requested permission for the Japanese to trade in Shanghai.

After visiting the quarters of the Japanese and having further talks with them to find out their intentions, Wu Hsü wrote a report to his superior, Hsüeh Huan, Minister-Superintendent of Trade for Shanghai. In this report, Wu Hsü stated that, although Chinese merchants had in the past traded for copper with Japan, no Japanese merchant had ever come directly to China to trade. According to regulations, therefore, the Japanese merchants should not be allowed entrance. As an exceptional measure, however, the goods the Japanese brought were allowed to be treated as Dutch merchandise for customs purposes, but the Japanese were made to understand that they were under a restriction to sell the goods only in Shanghai and that they should return to their country upon the completion of their transactions. Wu Hsü added that the Japanese, as a result of China's disruption by the Taiping rebellion, and their ignorance of the local conditions, had suffered a big trading loss and would certainly go back to Japan as soon as they could get rid of the remainder of the merchandise they had brought with them. This report was forwarded to the
Tsungli Yamen by Hsüeh Huan who held the view that the Japanese request for permission to trade should not be granted or else a dangerous precedent might be created for other nations.  

Wu Hsü's statement was of course not at all correct, as the description of the earlier Sino-Japanese relations had shown, nor was it clear why Hsüeh Huan feared that the Japanese demand might create a precedent for "other countries". For by 1862 China had formal treaty relations with practically all the powerful nations in the world and the "most favoured nation" clause had already made an opening in China for non-treaty countries and their nationals on a footing equal to that which China had granted to other countries. Since the Treaty of Nanking Shanghai had become a treaty port, and what the Japanese asked for was much less than what the nationals of European and American nations had got away with.

There are two possibilities: Hsüeh Huan had in mind similar demands made by countries which China had once treated as inferiors or, despite his position as Superintendent of the southern Ports and his responsibility for foreign trade and matters arising out of it, he was in fact very ignorant of what had already transpired in this field.

Whatever the case, the Yamen expressed its satisfaction with

59. See report by Hsüeh Huan, to Yamen, July 27, 1862 in CFMA-I.

the way Wu Hsü and Hsüeh Huan had handled the matter and concurred with their view that the Japanese request should be refused. (Hsüeh and Wu were further instructed to be vigilant and to keep a close watch over the entry of foreign vessels into the ports under their jurisdiction.)

Two months later, however, the same Japanese officer again sought an interview with Wu and to the latter's great surprise, asked for permission not only to trade in Shanghai on the same terms as those granted to western countries not having trade agreements with China, but also to set up a consulate.

The Japanese (as Wu Hsü suggested previously to his superior) may not have been familiar with local conditions but they certainly knew the terms which China had granted to western nations. They pointed out that nationals of non-treaty nations were being allowed to trade on the same basis as the nationals of treaty nations, although they were forbidden to go to the capital or enter the Yangtze river without special permission. They also pointed out that Chinese merchants had been allowed to engage in copper trade in Japan in the past and Japanese should therefore be granted reciprocal treatment. They further expressed the view that both Eastern and Western

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61. CFMA-I, Yamen to Hsüeh Huan, July 30 1862.
merchants should be treated on an equal footing.  

As these demands differed considerably from those made by the Japanese in their previous interview, Wu Hsü questioned them as to the reasons behind their new requests. He was told that they had not wanted to make these requests in front of the Dutch consul, who was the intermediary in the first interview. A few days later, the Japanese elaborated upon the reasons for their requests. They said that after their country had been forced to open their ports to the Western countries the revenue from trade with these powers had not been of any benefit to their national economy since the Western merchants had monopolised the export trade to the great detriment of Japanese merchants. In order to break this monopoly, Japanese merchants had decided to sell their own products abroad, hence the request for permission to trade with China. Despite the unfavourable situation created by the Taiping rebellion, they believed and hoped that Sino-Japanese trade would work to the mutual benefit of both countries after the rebellion had been suppressed.

The argument that trade with the Western nations was not beneficial to Japan was obviously a double-edged one; it could have been a reason to deny the Japanese requests.

62. Ibid., report by Hsüeh Huan and Li Hung-chang to Yamen, August 28, 1862.

63. Ibid., Hsüeh Huan and Li Hung-chang to Yamen, August 28, 1862, Wu Hsü's report.
But it apparently made a deep impression on Wu Hsü. He completely reversed the views he had expressed two months earlier and recommended to his superiors that the Japanese requests be granted. His reasons were that the action would not only be viewed by the Japanese as a sign of goodwill, but it would help to reduce the advantages the Western merchants gained through their monopoly of the foreign trade. He further argued that the Japanese demand for trading in the open ports, unlike that of the other nations, had a reasonable basis since they had allowed Chinese merchants to trade in Japan.\(^6^4\) It is interesting to note that the combined efforts of China and Japan to resist the Western encroachment, a vision Wu Hsü seemed to have derived from the case put to him by Mahira Rokurō and his associates, and on which he based his volte-face attitude, were to play an important role in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Another fact which might have influenced the Chinese decision to reverse their earlier policy and ultimately to agree to the establishment of official relations between the two nations was made known to the Chinese during this second interview. The Japanese in support of their demand had mentioned that over a thousand Chinese refugees from Chekiang province were being allowed

\(^{64}\) Ibid.
by the Japanese authorities to reside in Nagasaki. They pointed out that, as there was no Chinese consul to take charge of them, any violation of the law would present to the Japanese government a very difficult problem. This was a hint that the Chinese government should send a consul to Japan in return for Japan's establishment of a consulate in China.

Wu Hsü, while expressing China's gratitude for the friendly gesture shown by the Japanese authorities, said that since these refugees were never given permission to leave the country, they should be repatriated and anyone violating the law in Japan should be sent back to China to be dealt with. Nevertheless this was the first inkling the Chinese government had of the problems of Chinese residents in Japan and it might well have indicated to them the need for permanent diplomatic and consular missions to Japan. 65

Hsüeh Huan and Li Hung-chang, then the Acting Governor of Kiangsu, to whom Wu Hsü submitted his recommendation, instructed him to check the records in order to verify the Japanese statements concerning the treatment of nationals of the non-treaty nations. Though the records had been lost in 1853 during the Taiping rebellion, Wu Hsü was able to quote article 8 of the Supplementary Treaty China

65. Ibid.
signed with Britain in 1843. This supported the Japanese contention. Wu Hsü's recommendation was then forwarded to the Tsungli Yamen by Hsueh and Li without comment, except for a very sketchy description of Japan which showed up the rather scanty knowledge of those who had to deal with the Japanese problem. Meanwhile the Japanese on the point of returning to Japan asked the Chinese government to inform them through the Dutch consul of their decision, and if the requests were not granted, to send a minister to China to take up the matter.

The Yamen expressed no view at all on the issue but referred it back to Hsueh and Li for further investigation. Hsueh and Li in turn referred it back to Wu Hsü for a reconsideration of his recommendation. In the resubmission, Wu Hsü persisted with his previous view and advocated the granting of the Japanese requests. He considered that Japan's desire to trade with China was an honourable one. This was shown, he argued, in the fact that the locality in which the trade was to take place was limited to Shanghai. There was no fear of other small eastern nations following Japan's example. China's refusal would be contrary to her

66. Ibid., Hsueh Huan and Li Hung-chang to Yamen, August 28, 1862.
67. Ibid., report by Hsueh Huan and Li Hung-chang to Yamen, September 26, 1862.
68. Ibid., Yamen to Hsueh Huan and Li Hung-chang, September 1, 1862.
69. Ibid., Hsueh Huan to Yamen, October 11, 1892.
traditional practice of showing magnanimity to foreigners. He could see no disadvantages arising if the requests were granted. 70

Hsueh and Li, however, expressed their disagreement in a covering report sent with Wu Hsu's re-submission. They considered that since foreigners were by nature cunning, they might try to extend their activities to other ports once permission to trade in Shanghai was granted. They feared that if the Japanese requests were granted, other small nations would be bound to follow the example, and unpredictable problems and difficulties would follow. In any case, they maintained, since Japan was likely to send a mission to China, the matter could be re-considered when it arrived. 71

The Yamen however, was concerned at the prospect of the impending mission, and so in their reply to the submission of Hsueh and Li, instructed them to deliberate "without being too bigoted or too lenient" the course China should adopt in such an event. Once more the matter was referred back to the local authorities in Shanghai where Huang Fang had now succeeded Wu Hsü as the Intendant of Su-Sung-Ch'ang-Chen Prefectures. Huang, in his report,

70. Ibid., report by Hsueh Huan and Li Hung-chang to Yamen, October 21, 1862.
71. Ibid.
fully supported Wu Hsü's recommendation.\textsuperscript{72}

But the Yamen did not give any ruling on the matter until 1864, when in March, a Japanese official named Yamaguchi Shakujirō arrived in Shanghai with a shipment of seaweed and other merchandise. He asked Harry S. Parkes, then British consul in Shanghai, to use his good offices to contact the Chinese authorities. In his report to the Yamen, Ying Pao-shih, the Customs Superintendent of Kiangnan, referred to the Japanese mission in 1862, and, having checked the regulations laid down in 1781 relating to trade matters of the merchants of eastern nations, arrived at the view that the merchants of the eastern nations had traded with China before the nationals of the Western countries and that their commercial activities were indeed not forbidden by the regulations. In view of the demands of the previous Japanese mission, Ying rather suspected that the aim of the present mission was not merely to trade. However, he found to his surprise and indeed relief that Yamaguchi had no other activity in view but trading.\textsuperscript{73}

Nothing happened for a further four years. In February, 1868, Kawazu Izunokami, the Governor of Nagasaki, asked the British consul in Shanghai to forward a letter to

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., report by Hsüeh Huan and Li Hung-chang to Yamen, January 8, 1863.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., Hsüeh Huan to Yamen, May 15, 1864; Yamen to Hsüeh Huan, May 18, 1864.
Ying Pao-shih, requesting permission for Japanese to trade and to study. It was stated that in future the Japanese coming to China would be issued with a passport by Japan so as to facilitate their control by the Chinese government. It thus invested Chinese authorities with the responsibility of looking after any Japanese who came with a passport from his government.

In addition to her earlier requests, which involved only merchants, Japan had now added a request on behalf of "scholars". To Ying this did not merely mean a question of a few more Japanese of another profession, but a different problem altogether. Unlike the merchants who would go home as soon as they had sold their wares, the permission sought for scholars would give them the right to reside without a time limit. There was no suggestion as to the measures to be adopted in the case of any law-breaking. But since many Westerners were allowed to live and trade in various ports in China, Ying argued that it would be difficult for China to make out a plausible case for rejecting the Japanese request. If China were to refuse the Japanese requests, such a move would be likely to prompt Japan to resort to the help of the Western powers to achieve her aims, as Italy and Spain had done. To prevent such a

74. JFO vol. 2-I d.68, 252-254.
contingency arising, it would be wiser for China to grant temporarily the entry of Japanese merchants with passports, and begin negotiations to effect a stringent supervision of passport bearers. This, in Ying's opinion would not only show China's magnanimity, but avoid the possibility of Japanese siding with the Western nations in making a demand for yet another treaty.  

Tseng Kuo-fan, now Viceroy of Kiangnan and the Superintendent of Southern Ports, to whom Ying submitted this proposal, went into the case in some detail. In his view, as the Tsungli Yamen had not actually opposed the suggestion - made by Wu Hsü in 1862 and endorsed by his successor - to allow the Japanese merchants to trade, he thought the request to trade in Shanghai should be granted. But as for the question of a consulate, though it had been raised in 1862, no decision had been arrived at, so this together with the question of passports, was a matter for which China found no precedent in her dealings with the Western countries. It had therefore to be referred to the Tsungli Yamen. True to his reputation as a scholar and thus a self-imposed guardian of Confucianism he was particularly concerned with Japan's request on behalf of scholars. Here, his concern was different from that of Ying. He was not

75. CFMA-I report by Tseng Kuo-fan to Yamen, March 26, 1868.
questioning the scholars' indefinite period of stay in China, but their aims in coming. He wanted to know whether they intended to learn or to teach. The Japanese letter uses the phrase "ch'uan-hsi hsüeh-shu" 傳教學術 which in Chinese could mean either "to learn from China" or "to teach China". It would be quite all right, in his opinion, if they were coming to study, but if they were coming to teach then the question had to be carefully considered. What at first sight appears to have been a question of national pride may more correctly be interpreted as a fear of complications, similar to those attendant on the admission of Christian missionaries to China.

The Yamen concurred with Tseng's recommendation that permission to trade in Shanghai be granted, but they thought that the pros and cons of requests involving permanent rights had to be carefully studied. The Yamen stressed the point that China would have to find out the regulations promulgated by the Japanese to control the Chinese residing there and the serious restrictions which, it had come to the knowledge of the Yamen, the Japanese authorities had imposed on the Chinese residents only then could serious negotiations on Japanese requests begin. No doubt the raiding and pillaging of the Chinese coasts by Japanese pirates during Ming times was in the Yamen's mind.

76. Ibid.
It emphasised that in all future negotiations with Japan, measures to prevent smuggling and control law-breaking should be stressed. It further agreed with Tseng Kuo-fan that the actual nature of what the Japanese understood to be "scholars" should be carefully investigated. While charging Ying with the responsibility of investigating and to dealing with these matters according to precedents set in China's dealings with western nations, it reprimanded him for suggesting the granting of temporary permits of entry to the Japanese pending negotiations as to the measures of control. Such a suggestion, in view of the Yamen, was a misinterpretation of the precedence of the cases of 1862 and 1864. 77

Following the instructions of the Yamen, Ying sent a reply through the British consul on April 6, 1868, to the letter from the Governor of Nagasaki. In it, Ying requested the Japanese authorities to clarify the term "scholar", and to indicate whether these people would be coming to China to learn or to teach. He rejected Japan's proposal about passports. He stated that so long as the Japanese had due respect for Chinese law and customs and were willing to live peacefully, they would be as well treated as if they were in their own home, as it had always

been China's policy, he said, to treat strangers from afar with magnanimity and courtesy.  

In Japan's reply, again transmitted through the British consul in Shanghai, Japan did not clarify China's query as to the meaning of "scholar" but it was taken by Ying Pao-shih to mean "those coming to learn from China". As to the passport issue, Japan asked Ying to refer it to higher authorities for their consideration. This letter however did not reach China until October 10th, 1868, by which time, as Ying duly reported to the Yamen, the Shogunate had been overthrown, and the Governor of Nagasaki, who had been conducting the negotiations with China on behalf of his government, was forced out of office. Thus the Sino-Japanese pre-treaty negotiations came to an inconclusive end.

78. Ibid., Tseng Kuo-fan to Yamen, May 5, 1868; JFO vol. 2-I d.68, 255-258.

79. JFO vol. 2-I, 259-260.

80. CFMA-I report by Tseng Kuo-fan to Yamen, June 4, 1868.
CHAPTER II

The Establishment of Treaty Relations

The Japanese missions of 1862 and 1868 not only brought to Chinese notice Japan's desire to establish a consulate in China but also indicated to China the need to have Chinese consular officials in Japan to take charge of Chinese residents there. Because of the unequal treaties they had been forced to sign with various western nations, the first reaction of the Chinese to the Japanese approaches was to shun the prospect of any definite arrangements. In this, as well as in the consular issue, the Chinese government, instead of attempting to devise some measure to regulate the relationship with Japan, resorted to the argument that any formal arrangements such as Japan was demanding were unnecessary because of the hitherto friendly relations between them and because of China's traditional policy of treating strangers with kindness and benevolence. These reasons may sound naive but were in fact not without foundation. They stemmed from the fear of yet another foreign consul in China exercising the undue powers, such as had indeed been the case with consuls of western nations.

China was, incidentally, not alone in being reluctant to allow foreign consuls on her soil. Japan was later to retract her earlier wishes to have Chinese consuls
in Japan and British government likewise fought hard against admitting Chinese consuls in the Straits Settlements, though in each case it was for a different reason. What was striking in the Chinese attitude was not so much the flimsy reasoning on which they based their case, but rather the very marked passiveness they adopted throughout the whole of the negotiations with Japan, from the time the issues were first raised by the Tokugawa Shogunate until later when they were taken up by the Meiji government. While dreading the prospects of Japan's demands, nothing was done about finding a way to cope with them. With the departure of each Japanese mission, matters were allowed to rest until the arrival of another mission with increasingly more and, what were to the Ch'ing government, trickier demands. One explanation was that the Manchu government, which had barely emerged from the crushing devastation wrought by the Taiping war and Anglo-French aggression, had simply no mind for anything other than those issues which were thrust upon it.

Another reason was that until Li Hung-chang, who succeeded Tseng Kuo-fan, assumed the viceroyalty of Chihli, there was nobody to co-ordinate foreign policy. In fact, there was no foreign policy at all, consistent or otherwise. It is true that the Tsungli Yamen existed; it had been established after the Treaties of Peking in 1860 specifically to deal with foreign affairs. But in effect its main function
since its creation had been to try to evade questions rather than to face up to them. If there was any policy to be spoken of, it was that issues were dealt with according to expediency rather than any well-conceived or well-considered plans.

With Li Hung-chang's appointment to Chihli a new era in China's foreign relations opened. What the Yamen had hitherto dealt with was now invariably referred and delegated to Li Hung-chang, making him for a quarter of a century virtually the foreign minister of China. For this reason it was very apt that the Tsungli Yamen should have appeared in the Collected Papers of Li Wen-chung-kung, as I-shu (Translation Bureau), a misnomer which became common usage. For the Yamen had from then on until the fall of Li Hung-chang on the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), become more like a bureau of transmission than the foreign ministry of China which function it had originally been intended to fulfil.

Li Hung-chang now became not only the implementor of policies but also their initiator and originator. This was particularly true with regard to China's policies towards Japan. The Tsungli Yamen (the full title of which literally means "The bureau to manage the affairs of all nations") had in fact never been set up with Japan in mind, and now left the onus of coping with the unknown and unfathomable, as Japan was now seen by Li Hung-chang.
I. China's response to Japan's approaches for a formal link

In September 1870 the Meiji government sent its first mission to China to take up the issue first raised by the representatives of the Tokugawa government. The mission was led by Yanagihara Sakimitsu, the Vice-Foreign Minister of Japan and included Hanabusa Yoshimoto and Tei Ei-nei, the last man of Chinese extraction who was later to play a prominent role in Sino-Japanese relations. The mission arrived in Shanghai on September 4th and called on T'u Tsung-ying, Intendant of Shanghai, on September 12th, intimating to him the intention of the mission to proceed to the Chinese capital. T'u tried without success to persuade Yanagihara to wait in Shanghai for a reply from the Yamen, but Yanagihara insisted on holding direct negotiations with the Yamen and left Shanghai on September 23rd. The mission duly arrived in Tientsin on the 27th.

On being informed of their coming, the Yamen immediately instructed Ch'eng Lin, the Superintendent of Trade for Northern Ports in Tientsin, to prevent the mission from proceeding to Peking, and to hold the negotiations

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1. JFO. vol. 3. 197-206
2. JFO. vol. 3. d124 207.
3. JFO. vol. 3. d125 208-209.
4. JFO. vol. 3. d127 214-215; also see CFMA-IV, Tseng Kuo-fan to Yamen, September 30, 1870.
with Ch'eng in Tientsin. But although Ch'eng Lin was forewarned about the intention of the Japanese, he had great difficulty in dissuading them when they called on him on 1st October. He did, however, manage to get them to agree to wait for the reply of the Yamen which he promised to receive by the 5th. In the meantime, he arranged for Yanagihara to meet Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, the out-going and the in-coming Viceroy's of Chihli, both of whom were then in Tientsin. The interview took place the following day.

After meeting the Japanese envoys, Li Hung-chang wrote to the Yamen on 4th October. In his report, Li went beyond reporting on what had taken place in the interview and gave the Yamen his assessment of Japan after her recent reforms. He was most enthusiastic about Japan's ability to dispose of Western adviser/employers and to restrict foreign missionary activities. Japan, he pointed out, had now learnt how to use Western machinery, ships and armaments and was liberal in her expenditure in these fields. She had set an example which China would do well to copy:

Japan is only three days away from China in distance, and is familiar with the Chinese language. Her weapons are the best and strongest in the East. China would do well to align herself with her for external purposes and in doing so, prevent Japan's becoming an outpost of the Western powers.

5. CFMA-IV, Yamen to Ch'eng Lin, September 30, 1870; Yamen to Tseng Kuo-fan, October 1, 1870.
6. Ibid. report by Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 2, 1870; JFO vol. 3 d132. 219-223.
He went on to make two important points. Firstly, that if trade with Japan were to be approved, China should send officials to Japan to control Chinese merchants in that country. The despatch of Chinese officials there would strengthen the links between the two countries and also enable the Chinese to keep an eye on Japan. Secondly, a treaty with Japan should be negotiated properly, and by this he meant that it should not follow the lines of treaties which China had been forced to sign with England, France and Russia.7

The Yamen was adamant in its refusal to allow the Japanese mission to go to Peking, in spite of Ch'eng Lin's plea that it would be hard to stop it and his suggestion that it might be better to yield to their desire in view of China's difficulties with the Western nations as a result of the so-called "Tientsin Massacre" of foreign missionaries.8 The reason the Yamen gave for their refusal was that there was no precedent.9 By this the Yamen could only have meant no precedent of any Japanese mission going to the Chinese capital, but not the mission of a foreign power. In a letter to Ch'eng Lin enclosing the reply to the Japanese communication, the Yamen said that "after

7. CFMA-IV, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, October 4, 1870.
8. Ibid., Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 2, 1870. A succinct account of this well known event may be found in Arthur W. Hummel, ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, (Washington, 1943), 209-210 or Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford, 1957), 295-299.
9. Ibid., Yamen to Tseng Kuo-fan, October 1, 1870; Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 7, 1870.
thorough deliberations, we have arrived at the conclusion that it is best to avoid concluding a treaty", and, in its communication to the Japanese envoy, it explained why no treaty was necessary:

"China and Japan have had friendly relations for a long time. Japan is a neighbour of China, so a close relationship is to be expected. Japanese come often to trade in Shanghai, so Japan and China can continue to trust each other. A treaty between the two countries is therefore quite unnecessary".

The Chinese government, while desiring to avoid another treaty, was obviously at a loss to find more convincing reasons for refusing the demand for one.

But Li Hung-chang's assessment of Japan and his arguments in support of the need for a formal relationship with her on a proper basis seem to have made a deep impression on the Yamen ministers. In reply to his report the Yamen expressed its agreement with Li Hung-chang, but instructed him to consult Tseng Kuo-fan as to ways of handling the Japanese demands. 11

The Japanese envoys were unmoved by the arguments in the Yamen's reply which Ch'eng Lin had conveyed to them on October 5th. 12 However, they yielded to Ch'eng Lin's

10. CFMA-IV, Yamen to Ch'eng Lin, October 13, 1870; JFO vol. 3, 238, 241.
11. CFMA-IV, Yamen to Li Hung-chang, October 4, 1870.
12. Ibid., Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 7, 1870.
persuasion and gave up their plan to go to Peking. They possibly did so after having found Li Hung-chang a suitable man with whom to negotiate. On 15th October, the day before his next interview with the Japanese delegate, Li Hung-chang wrote to the Yamen again, saying that the Japanese delegation was taking a firm stand and demanding a great deal in the treaty negotiations. At the same time, Li Hung-chang expressed his opinion to Ch'eng Lin, which Ch'eng Lin then conveyed to the Yamen on October 16, 1870.

He said that the ability of the Japanese to present a draft treaty in such a short time showed that they were familiar with China's treaties with Western countries. The draft treaty they presented also showed Japan's determination to conclude a treaty with China. Small Western countries had been able to have similar demands satisfied because of the support given to them by England and France. China would be showing weakness if she gave in to the Japanese demands after Japan had resorted to asking the support of the Western nations, as she was most likely to do should her demands be refused. And if China still refused her demands despite the intervention of the Western powers, Japan would then join forces with these powers and thus any influence China might otherwise have

13. Ibid., Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 8, 1870.
14. Ibid., Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 29, 1870.
exerted on Japan would be lost. It would therefore be better, Li Hung-chang argued, that China now agree to conclude a treaty with Japan, and establish a strong bond between the two nations.\textsuperscript{15}

As a result of Li Hung-chang's forceful plea, the Yamen finally arrived on a not unfamiliar course of action. In its reply to further communications from Li and Ch'eng Lin, it stated that the Yamen would memorialise the throne on their suggestion. They should, however, continue in their efforts to dissuade the Japanese from wanting to conclude a treaty with China. But if they failed, the Japanese should then be requested to leave their draft treaty with them, so that it could be discussed with an envoy of a higher rank in the following year.\textsuperscript{16}

Yanagihara replied that they would agree to the proposal, providing the Chinese government gave a written undertaking that negotiations on the proposed treaty would take place in the following year with the Japanese minister to be sent to China. This request was granted, and having thus gained China's commitment to the principle of a treaty,\textsuperscript{17} Yanagihara and his associates returned to Japan, leaving behind Shinagawa Daisuke as a liaison officer in Shanghai.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 16, 1870; \textit{IWSM} 77: 34-36.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{IWSM} 77: 34-36; \textit{CFMA-IV} Yamen to Ch'eng Lin, October 19, 1870.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{CFMA-IV}, Ch'eng Lin to Yamen, October 29, 1870; Yamen to Ch'eng Lin, October 31, 1870; Yamen to Japanese minister, October 31, 1870.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{JFO} vol. 3. d142. 244-248.
II. Two Views of Chinese Officials on the proposed Treaty with Japan

Having committed herself to concluding a treaty with Japan, China at once set about preparing for the eventual negotiations. The importance which the Chinese government attached to the coming negotiations can be seen in the fact that the matter was referred to provincial governors and viceroy for deliberation and suggestion. It is interesting to note that terms of reference concerned not merely how and on what basis China should negotiate with Japan for a treaty, but also the question of whether such a treaty was desirable. This attitude, which seems to have betrayed a desire on the part of the Chinese government to go back on its undertaking, was another indication of how China felt threatened by the treaty Japan was demanding and of the reluctance with which she had acquiesced to it.

The provincial governors were divided into two camps, and, in conformity with the now familiar pattern, this division of officialdom was later to become even more marked. Ying-han, the governor of Anhwei, typically Manchu, may be taken as representative of the inward-looking camp, the bulk of which was made up of Manchu officials, some in the provinces but most in the central government. Li Hung-chang, and Tseng Kuo-fan and most other provincial officials, most

19. CFMA-IV, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, January 19, 1871.
of them Chinese, had had contacts with foreigners and things Western and represented the most forward-looking section of the otherwise conservative officialdom.

In his memorial to the throne on the subject, Ying-han followed the traditional view of regarding Japan as a tributary country of China. Because of this historical past, he considered that it would be wrong to treat Japan on the same basis as that on which China treated the Western nations. China should therefore not conclude a treaty with Japan and should reject further requests from other foreign nations to trade with China. Foreign nations, he argued, were bent solely upon profit. They kept a close watch over China and were ready to take advantage of her weakness.

Japan was a case in point. Her current desire to negotiate a commercial treaty with China stemmed from her knowledge that China was involved in difficulties with England and France as a result of missionary affairs in Tientsin. In his view, foreign countries were always likely to cause trouble to China, and to illustrate this point, he compared the current Anglo-French action to that of Japanese piracy during the Ming times. On the excuse afforded them by events in Tientsin, England and France were then seeking as compensation the right for their nationals to penetrate further into the Chinese interior. Now if Japan, which was bound to demand them, were to be given the same rights as the Western nations, should be granted them, troubles for China would be greatly multiplied. Returning to his original
point, Ying-han concluded with the warning that if China gave in to the Japanese demand for a treaty, other tributary countries of China would be bound to follow Japan's example, leading China into unforeseen difficulties.  

Li Hung-chang and Tseng Kuo-fan were in favour of a treaty with Japan. They reiterated and reinforced the views they had earlier expressed when Japan's demand first became known. In his submission Li Hung-chang began by dismissing the principle premises on which Ying-han built his case. Japan, he said, had not paid tribute to China since Yuan times, and had never been a dependent country of China; it was therefore quite different from Korea, the Ryukyus or Annam. He then proceeded to argue his case in favour of a treaty on the grounds of Japan's threats to China. He said that, since she had established relations with the Western nations, Japan had bought machinery and battleships from them, built railways and inaugurated other innovations along Western lines, and had sent men to the West to learn Western technology. Her aim in adopting these measures was to enable her to resist foreign invasion. Unless China could win her over the advances she was likely to make in this direction would make her a dangerous enemy to China because of the geographical proximity of the two countries. China could not hope to avert this threat by

20. IWSM 79: 7-8, 14.
refusing to have any dealings with Japan but, rather, should put relationships on a properly negotiated treaty basis. China, in his view, should not merely agree passively to negotiating a treaty, but should take positive action to safeguard her security and other national interests. In this connection, Li Hung-chang argued:

Most important of all, China should send a high-ranking official to reside in the Japanese capital and send an official to reside in Nagasaki to act as consul for various ports. In this way, China would be able to ascertain what was happening in Japan and to keep in constant contact with the country. This mission would therefore serve as a "listening post" in the East. With the improvement of relations between the two nations, China could (through the mission in Japan) prevent an alliance between Japan and the West in the event of conflicts between China and the West.

He argued that the despatch of Chinese diplomatic and consular missions to Japan was more essential and of much greater importance than the despatch of similar missions to Western nations, although in principle he was also in favour of the latter. He said:

There are few Chinese in Western countries, so there would be little point in our sending resident officials to these countries for the time being. Furthermore, the West is far away from China. Japan, on the other hand, is close and there are many Chinese merchants there, so the situation is altogether different .... If a treaty is concluded with Japan, China and Japan will each be able to maintain jurisdiction over their own nationals in the other country.

The last point was made in reference to a matter Yanagihara had raised when the Japanese envoy, while seeking a treaty with China, laid particular emphasis on the need for China to send consular officials to Japan to take charge of her
nationals," thus preventing them falling under the virtual control of "Western consuls". As a practical step, Li Hung-chang suggested that the government should try to select consular officials from among the Chinese merchants in Japan who were familiar with local conditions.²¹

The arguments Tseng Kuo-fan put forward in his memorial to the Throne in favour of a treaty with Japan were in the main similar to those of Li Hung-chang. He re-evoked the fear that if China rejected Japan's request Japan would most likely turn to the Western countries for support and China would eventually be forced to acquiesce in her demands. It was a bad policy to reject a reasonable demand when the opponent was weak and to give in to an unreasonable demand when the opponent was strong. He supported Li Hung-chang's suggestion to send officials to Japan to control Chinese merchants there. As to the actual contents of the proposed treaty, Tseng clarified Li Hung-chang's earlier proposal that a treaty with Japan should be concluded but not on the lines of those concluded with Western nations. Tseng thought that it would be more convenient if certain items in the forthcoming treaty with Japan, such as customs tariff, were to follow those stipulations in the treaties China had signed with Western nations. What should not be admitted in the new treaty was the "most-favoured nation" clause which

²¹ CFMA-IV, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, January 19, 1871; Memorial by Li Hung-chang, January 23, 1871.
appeared in all treaties with Western nations and which had
given rise to some of the greatest difficulties in Sino-
Western relations.\textsuperscript{22}

The proposal of Tseng Kuo-fan, whose opinion was
held in high regard by the Ch'ing court, was referred to
Li Hung-chang as the basis on which the treaty with Japan
should be concluded.\textsuperscript{23} It should be mentioned here however,
that the Ch'ing government's finally coming down on the
side of a treaty with Japan was not so much a result of the
strength of argument in support of such a step as of China's
precarious international position which left her no alterna-
tive but to acquiesce in the Japanese demand.

III. The Negotiations and Conclusion to the Sino-Japanese
Treaty of 1871

China had been preparing carefully for the
negotiations for nearly a year when the special Japanese
envoys arrived in Tientsin in July 1871. The Japanese
mission was led by Date Munenari, the Finance
Minister, and supported by Yanagihara Sakimitsu. The
Chinese representative was Li Hung-chang, now formally
installed as Viceroy of Chihli. He was supported by Ying
Pao-shih, Judicial Commissioner of Kiangsu and Ch'en Ch'in

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial, March 10, 1871.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., Imperial Edict, March 10, 1871.
Superintendent of Customs at Tientsin, both nominated by him.\(^{24}\) The first meeting took place on July 29th.\(^{25}\)

China began by rejecting the Japanese draft treaty which she considered could not be the basis for the negotiations. The draft, the Chinese said, was nothing more than a copy of the treaties China had been forced to sign with the Western powers. Japan was so close to China, the Chinese argued, that there would be a great deal of intercourse between them after the treaty had been signed, and the relations between the two countries would therefore be quite different from China's relations with the Western nations. The Japanese, on the other hand, argued that if their treaty were to be drawn up differently from those which China had concluded with the Western nations, the suspicion of these powers would be aroused as to whether Japan and China were in league against them.\(^{26}\)

The two main issues about which the two countries were at odds were, firstly, the "most-favoured-nation" clause, and, secondly, the rights of Japanese to travel and trade in the interior of China. The Chinese went into the negotiations with their mind made up on both issues and refused absolutely to give way on them.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., Imperial Edict, July 9, 1871; Li Hung-chang's memorial April 17, 1871; Li Hung-chang to Yamen, July 8, 1871.

\(^{25}\) JFO Vol. 4, 191 and 239; CFMA-IV Yamen's memorial July 31, 1871; Li Hung-chang to Yamen, August 23, 1871.

\(^{26}\) JFO Vol. 4 d157, 239-243; CFMA-IV Li Hung-chang to Yamen, August 23, 1871.
If they found it hard to grant the Japanese the same rights as they had the Westerners, it was probably not for the reason which they gave, namely that they could not possibly grant the Japanese rights which the Japanese government itself denied foreigners, including Chinese, in Japan, but rather that the Chinese wished to avoid making any concessions which could be detrimental to their interests. There was probably an element of discrimination on China's part.

The right to trade in the interior was precisely the point in question, so on this point, the Chinese were on very firm ground. As to the "most-favoured-nation" clause, the Chinese considered that, should it be granted to the Japanese, the article restricting trade in the interior would become meaningless. There was another, what one might describe as a "real" reason why China could not grant the Japanese the same rights. This was the fear of Japanese swarming over China because of the proximity of the country and its physical similarity, a fear and warning which was in fact to prove prophetic. In a memorial he submitted to the Throne on 3rd September, 1871, reporting on the progress of the negotiation, Li Hung-chang argued that it had proved of very great disadvantage to China to have granted the Western nations trading rights in the interior, but the disadvantages would be multiplied if Japan were also given the same rights. He said:
"We cannot do anything about the Western nations, but we should not allow such treatment from Japan. The Japanese are poor, greedy and untrustworthy. Because the proximity of the two countries facilitates intercourse, and because both peoples are of the same stock and use the same script, it would be very much more disadvantageous for us to grant the Japanese permission to go into China's interior than it was to give such rights to the Westerners." 27

Because the Chinese were firm in their stand on these two issues, the Japanese finally gave way on both points and the negotiations were allowed to proceed smoothly, using as a base the Chinese draft which Li Hung-chang had earlier asked Ch'en Ch'in to draw up. An agreement was reached, to which the delegates attached their names on September 13, 1871; Li Hung-chang, Ying Pao-shih and Ch'en Ch'in for China and Date Munenari and Yanagihara Sakimitsu for Japan. 28

Apart from the two issues mentioned above, the Sino-Japanese treaty differed from those China had signed with Western nations in yet another important respect. In article VIII it was stipulated that each country would recognise the consular jurisdiction of the other over the nationals in their country; and that the consuls of both countries should be forbidden to engage in trade or to

27. CFMA-IV Li Hung-chang to Yamen, August 31, 1871; Li Hung-chang's memorial, September 3.
28. JFO Vol. 4 d157. 239-251; d154. 221-224; CFMA-IV Li Hung-chang to Yamen, September 16, 1871.
represent non-treaty countries as an additional office. Consuls may be recalled if charges against their misconduct were proven after investigation by the minister, so as to avoid frictions between the two neighbours.\textsuperscript{29} The consul, it is interesting to note, appeared under the term \textit{li-shih-kuan} 理專官 instead of \textit{ling-shih-kuan} 領事官 which was the usual term used in treaties with the Western nations. This was done because the Chinese did not want the treaty to follow those she had concluded with the West.\textsuperscript{30} It was also to meet the wishes of the Chinese who remembered the Japanese piracy of earlier times that an article (Art. 13) was inserted.\textsuperscript{31} There was also an article prohibiting the wearing of swords in the open ports.\textsuperscript{32}

The Japanese government was very dissatisfied with the treaty thus concluded, though to the Chinese it was the first equal treaty she had signed with any power since the first Opium War. The points to which the Japanese took exception were consular jurisdiction and article II which stipulated that "as our countries are friendly towards each other each should be concerned about the other. If any third

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} JFO Vol. 4 d153. 206.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} CFMA-IV, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, February 7, 1870; JFO Vol. 4 d153. 206.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} CFMA-I Li Hung-chang's memorial, September 3, 1871. An article allowing for the strict punishment of people of one of the contracting countries who, in groups of more than ten people engaged in incendiarism and murder in the other. For further detail, see H.F. MacNAIR, \textit{Modern Chinese History} (New York, 1967) 494-495.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} CFMA-I Li Hung-chang's memorial, September 3, 1871.
\end{itemize}
(other) country insults or unjustly treats either of us, the other will, as soon as it learns of such an event, help its partner or mediate so as to cement mutual friendship”. This, the Japanese feared, might be misinterpreted by Western nations as an alliance between China and Japan, and the Japanese liked neither the implications nor the likely suspicion. Concerning the lesser aspects, the Japanese government also did not like the article forbidding their nationals to wear swords in China, a practice which, incidentally, was formally prohibited in Japan five years later, in 1876.33

With the mission seeking the revision of the treaty, Japan again sent Yanagihara and Tei Ei-nei to China in March 1872.34 The Japanese argument for the revision was that article II implied an offensive and defensive alliance with China against Western powers. As to the consular jurisdiction, the need for its revision was that Japan was in the process of negotiating revisions of the unequal treaties she had signed with Western powers, and consular jurisdiction was the chief item which she sought to eliminate.35 She could not possibly do this, as was pointed out by the

33. JFO Vol. 4 d156. 238; d.160,161,163. 252-262; d.165, annex, pp. 264-266; Vol. 5 d107. 246-247.
34. JFO Vol. 5 d103. 243.
35. JFO Vol. 5 d102. 242-243.
Dutch Minister in Japan, if she allowed the stipulation on the subject in her treaty with China to remain as it stood. The Japanese requests met with angry rebuff from Li Hung-chang. Li absolutely refused to yield on article II. As to article VIII on consular jurisdiction he was willing to concede, but he said China would only revise that article when Japan had revised her treaties with the Western powers. Thus the Japanese mission failed in its object and the treaty was duly ratified by both governments on April 30, 1873. Since the Japanese government had likewise failed to get their treaties with Western powers revised as planned for May 1872, the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871 regulated the relations between the two countries until the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894.

IV. The Taiwan Incident and the Diplomatic and Consular Missions in Japan

The question of the exchange of diplomatic and consular missions between China and Japan was resolved by the 1871 treaty. In articles 4 and 8 it was stipulated that each would send a diplomatic mission to the other country and consular officers to its open ports as soon as the treaty

36. JFO S-I 53
37. LWCK-IS 1:28-30; 34-35; JFO Vol. 5 d125. 280-298.
38. JFO Vol. 5 d131. 300-301; Vol. 6 d88. 131.
was ratified. However, the government took no step whatsoever, even though Li Hung-chang brought up the subject repeatedly. The government was only compelled to realise the urgency of the issue after what is known as the Taiwan Incident.

On December 11, 1871, a ship from the Ryukyu Islands encountered a storm and was shipwrecked off the eastern coast of Taiwan. Of the sixty-six persons on board, fifty-four were killed by the aborigines near Feng-shan prefecture, the remaining twelve being rescued by the Taiwanese authorities and sent to Fukien to be looked after. The King of Ryukyu, in gratitude for the rescue by the Chinese officials, sent money to reward them and also an official to investigate the incident, and the matter seemed to have been closed. However, the expansionist military Satsuma clique was now in control of the Meiji government and sought to use the incident as an excuse to realise their plan for territorial aggrandisement. Claiming that Ryukyuans were Japanese subjects, a claim disputed by China, they demanded satisfaction from the Chinese government.

The question was first officially raised with the Chinese by Soejima Taneomi when he came to China to exchange

39. CFMA-IV, Li Heh-nien to Yamen, May 30, 1873; Yamen to Li Heh-nien, June 6, 1873. For important reference works dealing with the Ryukyu incident see Wang Yun-sheng, Liu-shih nien lai Chung-kuo yu Jih-pen; Saito Yoshie, Kinsei toyo gaiikōshi josetsu; Ueda Toshio "Ryukyu no kizoku o meguru Nisshin kōshō" Tōyōbunka kenkyūjo kiyo 2(September 1951), 151-201.
the instrument of ratification in 1873.\textsuperscript{40} Li Hung-chang, who was then more concerned about Japanese intention in Korea, thought Japan had little ground to institute action against China on account of the aborigine case in Taiwan, and told the Yamen so.\textsuperscript{41} The case was dismissed lightly by the Chinese ministers of the Yamen when raised by the deputies to Soejima, Yanagihara and Tei. Mao Ch'ang-hsi and Tung Hsün, the two Yamen ministers in question, appear to have said, in reply to the Japanese complaints on the subject, something to the effect that the aborigines in Taiwan were in a savage territory beyond the limits of governmental control.\textsuperscript{42} This casually expressed remark, which was not repeated in any written communication was, however, seized upon by the Japanese envoys to prove that China had denied her sovereignty over the aboriginal territory in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{43} In the meantime, the Chinese, quite unaware of the interpretation the Japanese had placed on these words and the action they contemplated as a result, set the Taiwan problem aside.\textsuperscript{44}

The situation in Japan was quite different. Long before the Chinese had, by the unguarded expressions of their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} JFO S-I 82-83; 104-120; JFO Vol. 6 d77. 123.
\item \textsuperscript{41} CFMA-IV, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, July 10, 1873; LWCK:IS 1:48-50.
\item \textsuperscript{42} JFO Vol. 6. 177-179; IWSM 93:26-28.
\item \textsuperscript{43} JFO Vol. 7 d13. 21; d.1.1.
\item \textsuperscript{44} CFMA-IV, Yamen's reply to Li Hung-chang, July 16, 1873; JFO Vol. 7 1-20; JFO S-I 122-128.
\end{itemize}
ministers, furnished them with an excuse, the Japanese government had planned military expeditions. That Japan had merely used the Taiwan incident as a pretext for action may be seen by the fact that Korea had been as much the objective of the expedition as Taiwan. The one finally directed at Taiwan was a result of the victory of one political clique over another rather than of the merits of the issues involved. Finally, had it not been for the fact that General Saigo Tsugumichi in defiance of the orders of the government, countermanded the expedition, the incident could still have been avoided.

Feeling the seriousness of the situation created by the force majeure of Saigo, the Japanese government hurriedly despatched Yanagihara to the Chinese capital to explain that the expedition had only one aim in view, namely to enquire into the conditions in which Japanese people had met their death from the aborigines and to prevent its recurrence. He wanted to assure the Chinese government that Japan had no desire to provoke hostilities against China.

But Yanagihara's request for an audience was refused until the question was settled. The Chinese argued that

45. JFO S-I 104-105, 82-83.
46. JFO S-I 122.
47. JFO Vol. 7 d34.50; d.26. 38-42; d.29.45; d.30,31.47; d.22. 32,34; d.50. 65; JFO S-I 131.
48. JFO S-I 142; Vol. 7 d.46. 62a.
49. CFMA-IV, Yamen to Japanese Minister Yanagihara, October 2, 1874.
since Ryukyu was one of China's tributary states, what happened to the inhabitants of that country concerned it alone. By sending a military expedition to Taiwan on such flimsy grounds, Japan had violated article I of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty.\(^5\) With this communication, the Chinese government appointed Shen Pao-ch'en, former director of the Foochow Arsenal, as Imperial Commissioner for the defence of Taiwan and for the administration of the island preparing for war.\(^51\)

Deeply impressed by the firmness and seriousness with which China had taken up the matter, Japan despatched Ōkubo Toshimichi to Peking. It was Ōkubo whose order cancelling the expedition Saigo had countermanded. The seriousness which the Japanese government attached to the matter may be seen from the fact that Ōkubo was furnished with full power to settle the case.\(^52\) After some protracted negotiations, with Sir Thomas Wade as a mediator, a compromise was finally reached on the last day of October.\(^53\) On that

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\(^{50}\) JFO S-I 142; IWSM 96:27-32. Article I of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty reads in essence as follows:... In all that regards the territorial possessions of either country the two governments shall treat each other with proper courtesy, without the slightest infringement or encroachment on either side.....

\(^{51}\) JFO Vol. 7 d68, 100-101.

\(^{52}\) JFO Vol. 7 d104. 171-172; S-I 137-143.

\(^{53}\) FOCP 2581 No. 11 Wade to Earl of Derby; FOCP 2581 Inclosure in No. 10 The Prince of Kung to Wade; JFO Vol. 7 d159. 267-270; d.174. 298-300; d.195. 325; d.186, 187; Ōkubo Toshimichi Ōkubo Toshimichi Nikki (Tokyo, 1927), B312-320, 328.
day Okubo wrote in his diary:

"I feel greatly relieved at the signing of this agreement. I congratulate our country on the accomplishment of this mission, I have wracked my brains over it more than words can say. I do not think I will have this sort of thing happen to me again. Today is the most unforgettable day in my life".54

Japan had indeed much to be satisfied with. By the implication of the first article in which China agreed to pay compensation for damage done to the "Japanese subjects", China had tacitly renounced her claim over Ryukyu and yielded to the Japanese claim which she had earlier disputed.55

Though the wording of the agreement was full of face-saving devices for the Chinese, the settlement was in essence an added humiliation to China, a fact which the government ministers fully realised. In a memorial to the Throne on October 31, 1874, reporting the settlement, the Yamen stated that, had China's coastal defence been adequate, there would have been no fear of a rupture and indeed no negotiations would have been necessary. But although this time Japan was clearly in the wrong, China, being unready for war, had had to show restraint.56


55. Article I of the agreement read as follows:
The present proceedings having been undertaken by the government of Japan for the humane object of affording security to its own subjects, the government of China will not therefore impute blame to it.
FOCP 2581 Inclosure in No. 10 The Prince Kung to Wade; JFO Vol. 7 d186, 187.

56. IWSM 98:11-16.
The Taiwan incident came as a great shock to the Chinese government. Japan's aggressiveness was glaringly contrasted to China's own unpreparedness. And, as so often happened after similar events, the Throne in a chastised mood, appealed to ministers and provincial governors and viceroys to suggest ways and means to prevent similar humiliations in the future. From among the choruses of usual platitudes, the voice of Li Hung-chang soared high and distinct. Of the many measures he suggested, he laid particular emphasis on the urgent need for despatching Chinese envoys to Japan. He said:

The defence of the borders against barbarians requires attention from both generals and envoys. Countries trading with each other often exchange diplomatic envoys with the objective of observing the movements of their opponents. But China has left even the country nearest to her without a resident envoy. In 1871, both Tseng Kuo-fan and I, hoping to strengthen contacts with Japan and to keep a check on her, proposed that China should send officials to Japan after the conclusion of the treaty in order to control Chinese merchants there and to watch Japan's movements. Last year (1872), Japan's expedition to Taiwan took place just after the exchange of ratifications, but before the proposal of envoys had been put into effect. If we had had an envoy stationed in Japan, he could have argued the case with the Japanese and prevented their action. He could secretly and swiftly have informed and consulted with the home government, so as to enable it to

57. Ibid.
58. IWSM 98:21.
59. IWSM 98:19-21, 40-42.
60. IWSM 99:32.
take appropriate measures. At least he could have negotiated with the Japanese Minister in person after the despatch of the expedition, and this would have been more effective than negotiations in Peking. Now that the Taiwan incident has been settled by force, the matter (the sending of an official to Japan) should not be further delayed.

Li then went into the details of the steps to be taken. He suggested that the Throne should at once instruct the Yamen to select an official familiar with foreign matters and border affairs as a resident minister to Japan. There were, he said, 10,000 Chinese merchants in Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hakodate. After the minister arrived in Japan, he should appoint consuls-general in these ports to handle matters relating to the Chinese residents. Now that the treaty had been concluded, these Chinese subjects should not be left or forgotten. 61 The governor of Fukien, Wang K'ai-t'ai, in his memorial to the Throne also emphasised the importance and urgency of sending the mission to Japan. 62

The matter was again allowed to drop once the crisis was over, and the death of the emperor T'ung-chih in January 1875 also helped to turn the court's mind away from the issue for a time. But in March, Li Hung-chang's memorial was presented. Hsüeh Fu-cheng, the future minister to England and France then on the staff of Tseng Kuo-fan, the Viceroy of Nanking, and Shen Pao-chen, the governor of the newly created

62. IWSM 99:48-49; 51-52.
province of Taiwan, also wrote on the same subject. Hsüeh and Shen suggested that examinations should be held to select envoys, while Li proposed that an institution be established to train diplomatic personnel. Both measures were, however, rejected by the court as being difficult to put into effect. The alternative proposal of selecting the envoys by recommendation was adopted instead. The final decision to send a mission abroad was based on the suggestion made by Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng who, in a long memorial replying to an appeal from the Throne for constructive suggestions on the subject, went into great detail regarding measures to be adopted both on coastal defence and on the question of diplomatic missions. His suggestions coincided with the views both of Li Hung-chang and Tseng Kuo-fan, who as the Superintendents of northern and southern ports had much to do with China's foreign relations. On May 30th, 1875, the imperial sanction was finally obtained to send envoys abroad, and, in June, the Yamen finally recommended nine persons from whom ministers were to be selected.

No specific provision, however, was made for the sending of a diplomatic mission to Japan, so, making use of

63. WCSL I:8-10; KCTHL May 1875. 56.
64. KCTHL May 1875. 56-57.
65. Liu Chin-tsao, Ch'ing ch'ao hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao Shanghai, 1936 II8780.
66. KCTHL I85 (June 17, 1875) I74-75 (May 1875).
an appeal by the Chinese merchants in Japan to despatch a mission there, Li Hung-chang raised the subject once more. In a letter to the Yamen on September 14, 1875, he said that the reason why the Japanese respected Westerners but looked down on Chinese was because the Chinese did not have a consul to guide and protect them, and were thus putting themselves in a disadvantageous position. The two reasons why China had not been able to send an envoy to Japan were, he thought, firstly the expense, and secondly, that China had no warships to protect the envoy so as to make his influence felt and his mission function more effectively. But the first issue could be easily resolved. He suggested that China could follow the practice of the Western powers of collecting fees from the merchants to provide for the salaries and other expenses of the consuls. The government could also grant a subsidy if the levy proved inadequate for the purpose. As to the second point, China could make two warships available and station them in Shanghai or Fukien. In conclusion, he once again stressed the difference between Japan and the Western powers in their relation to China. Japan was close to China and was an immediate source of anxiety and trouble for her, whereas the West was a long way away. He concluded his letter by saying that, although he had been repeatedly urging the government to send a mission to Japan since the treaty negotiations, nothing had so far been done and the matter had been allowed to slip; he earnestly prayed that China should make an effort not
to let the proposal remain a dead letter. The matter, he warned, could not be further delayed without perilous consequences for China. 67

Hardly two months later, on the occasion of the Japanese demand for a treaty revision, he again wrote to the Yamen on the subject 68 (November 11th, 1875). But all his appeals and warnings fell on deaf ears, and no action was taken to implement his proposal which had in principle been accepted. Nearly a year passed before the government named its envoys to Japan on 30th September, 1876, 69 and it was not until another fifteen months had passed that the first Chinese minister to Japan arrived in Tokyo to take up his post, in December 1877. 70

V. The Difficulties Preceding the Despatch of Missions to Japan

The delays were partly due to difficulties raised by the Japanese government about the eventual Chinese representation in Japan. It may be recalled that the very first question the Japanese raised with the Chinese government when the first attempt was made to seek a diplomatic

67. LWCK : IS 4:24-25.

68. LWCK : IS 4:25

69. On September 30, 1876, Hsü Ling-shen was appointed envoy to Japan and Ho Ju-chang was made associate envoy. But before leaving Tokyo Hsü was transferred to the directorship of the Foochow Dockyard, Ho Ju-chang became the envoy to Japan, and Chang Ssu-kuei was appointed associate envoy. CKCJ, no. 8, 12.

70. CKCJ, no. 22, 29.
link with China was the need for China to send consular officers to Japan to protect the interests of Chinese residents there. It was originally also Japan's suggestion that both countries should exercise consular jurisdiction over their nationals in the other country. But no sooner had this been written into the treaty (September 13, 1871) than the Japanese realised their mistake and sought to eradicate it by requesting revision from the Chinese government.

When this failed, the Japanese sought to dissuade the Chinese government from sending consuls to Japan, while efforts to get the commitment revised continued. In a communication addressed to the Yamen requesting an "amendment of trade regulations", Tei Ei-pei, the Japanese charge ad interim, anticipating the strong Chinese objection, played down the question of revising consular jurisdiction by relegating it to a postscript, as if it were a matter of small account. But the device did not deceive Li Hung-chang, to whom the Yamen delegated the responsibility of negotiation. When Mori Arinori was appointed Japanese minister to China

71. JFO S-I 169.

72. JFO S-I 170. Tei Ei-pei's communication mainly referred to the inconvenience to Japan of the article 28 of the Trade regulations and to the severe punishment for opium offenders. Only at the end of the communication were Chinese residents in Japan under the jurisdiction of Japanese local officials mentioned. For further details, see LWCK:IS 4:23-24.

73. LWCK:IS 4:24.
in 1876, he continued the discussion of the subject with Li. Li's stand on the matter appeared contradictory. On the one hand, he urged the immediate despatch of a consular mission to Japan to forestall the design implicit in "the last part of Tei's communication" and that an end be put to "Japanese local officials" exercising jurisdiction over Chinese nationals, a situation which would eventually create difficulties for China and expose her to ridicule.

He further agreed to the suggestion that the Japanese officials should be allowed, before the establishment of Chinese consular missions, to try dispute between Chinese and Japanese with the leaders of Chinese communities in Japan sitting as spectators, and that the Chinese tried in this manner should be allowed to appeal to higher Japanese authorities. Li Hung-chang otherwise stood firm on the issue of consular jurisdiction and refused the demand for revision. In his conversation with Li Hung-chang, Mori left no doubt that Chinese consuls would not be welcomed by Japan. "Chinese merchants and nationals", he argued, "have long lived in Japan and have been controlled by Japanese local officials. If China were to send consuls

74. JFO S-I 170.
75. LWCK:IS 4:24.
76. LWCK:IS 4:38-39; also see CFMA - Jih-pen huan-yüeh an, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, February 2, 1876. This material is referred as "Trade and Tarrifs" in Checklist of the CFMA Sino-Japanese Relations 1862-1927.
to Japan, they would not be recognised by the Japanese government because of their ignorance of local conditions."

Li Hung-chang had little difficulty in dismissing the reasons thus put forward. He pointed out that the system whereby Japanese officials took care of Chinese nationals living in Japan was merely a temporary one. Now that China was sending a mission to Japan, the Chinese nationals should naturally come under the jurisdiction of the Chinese consul. Any difficulties which the Japanese were to place in the way of Chinese officials carrying out their duty would be a direct violation of the stipulation laid down in the friendship treaty between the two countries. Li Hung-chang also recalled that, when he last passed through Tientsin, Okubo had expressed the wish that China would soon send consular officers to Japan. What Mori had said would thus not only go directly against the treaty stipulations but also contradict Okubo's words.

Upon this, Mori retracted somewhat. He denied having said that the Japanese would refuse to recognise the Chinese consuls. Rather, the newly arrived Chinese officials, not knowing the local conditions, might mishandle matters and thus hinder the good relations between the two countries. But Li Hung-chang, not wanting to let Mori off lightly, warned him that, since the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty, Japan had established consular missions in various Chinese ports and China had cordially accepted them. Should Japan refuse to recognise Chinese consuls, China would respond in
like manner and ask them to be withdrawn.

The Japanese envoy then tried to raise difficulties in another direction. He said that he must make an announcement in advance to the effect that Japan banned opium-smoking and, as many Chinese in Japan were opium-smokers, it would be the duty of the Chinese consuls to honour the ban. To this Li Hung-chang replied that China had no wish to interfere with Japanese domestic administration. On the other hand, China would want to see consular representatives treated on terms equal to those the Western nations enjoyed in Japan. So long as this was done, and so long as Japan did not try to intimidate China, no dispute need arise between the two countries.77

The Japanese objection to China's sending consuls to Japan seems to have achieved the opposite result. In reporting to the Yamen his negotiations with Tei and Mori, Li Hung-chang also proposed measures regarding the organisation of consular missions and the selection of consular officers.78 So, instead of leaving consular matters in abeyance which China might otherwise have done, consular missions were quickly established in such Japanese ports as Yokohama, Nagasaki and Kobe. The arrival of the first Chinese minister to Japan thus made it the only country in which Chinese consular officers exercised jurisdiction over

77. LWCK:IS 6:32-33.
78. LWCK:IS 6:31.
Whereas Li Hung-chang had attached great importance to the despatch of Chinese diplomatic and consular missions to Japan, he tried on the other hand to discourage the Japanese from sending missions to China. When Soejima Taneomi proposed Yanagihara as the first resident minister to China, Li Hung-chang tried to dissuade him by saying that the small amount of business pending for the minister to handle would not justify the large expense such an appointment would surely incur. But the reason behind Li's reluctance to see Japanese missions on Chinese soil was in fact a very different one. Plagued by the threatening presence of the diplomatic envoys of Western nations in China, who behaved more often like colonial governors than representatives of a friendly nation, Li naturally did not want the number to be increased, though he must surely have realised that this was a vain hope. He explained very clearly to Yanagihara, who negotiated the treaty with him, how China had come to regard the function of a foreign diplomatic representative on her soil, and naturally expressed the hope that Japan would not hasten to follow the example of the Western nations by sending missions to China to exert pressure on the Chinese government.

79. CKCJ, no. 22, 29.
80. LWCK:IS I:44.
81. JFO S-I 45.
CHAPTER III

The Selection of Personnel and the Organisation of Foreign Missions

The first regulation for the Chinese foreign service, promulgated on September 30, 1876, concerned only the salaries of the foreign service and their various gradings.¹ It was the 12 articles for the foreign service presented on October 28, 1876, these comprised the most important regulations concerning the organisation and finances of the Chinese foreign diplomatic service.² They illustrate some of the ways in which China's missions abroad differed from those of Western countries, although experience gradually brought them into conformity with Western usage.

I. The Structure of the Missions

According to the regulations each legations were to be composed of one envoy, one associate envoy, and a counsellor, and interpreters and attaches. The first three missions of 1876, each composed of one envoy and an associate envoy, were accredited to England, to Japan, and jointly to America, Peru and Spain. The office of associate envoy to

¹ TSYC 3:10-12.
² Ibid., 3:13-16.
England was abolished in 1877. In the case of the joint representation to America, Peru and Spain, the office continued until 1882, and in Japan until 1881.

The number of counsellors, interpreters and attaches was not fixed but was decided upon by the envoy himself, who had to submit a list to the Yamen. In his memorial to the Throne in 1876, Kuo Sung-t'ao recommended for approval the submission that two counsellors and four interpreters be included and that their various ranks be differentiated by salary. The Yamen, in agreement, classified the two counsellors as second and third counsellor and agreed that the number of interpreters, whether native or foreign, should remain limited, as in the present case, to four. It recommended that the correspondence secretary should also be considered as constituting an integral part of the staff of the mission.

This practice was reviewed after the presentation, on 16 January, 1889, of the minister Hung Chün's memorial. From that time until 1907 the number of counsellors was fixed at two, with two or three interpreters, two or three attaches, two clerks, a military attache and a medical officer for each legation. In the case of envoys accredited to and stationed in more than one country at a time, the

3. KCTHL I298-300 (October 31, 1876) 114-116.
legation was allowed an additional counsellor, interpreter, attache and clerk.\(^5\)

These limitations were mainly for the sake of economy. In February 1887 the Yamen had already, in a memorial about expenditure in the foreign service, asked all ministers to automatically reduce any unnecessary retinue. Before the establishment of the above rule, the only restraint on the staffing of legations was the request for an annual submission to the foreign office of a list of the number of counsellors, interpreters and attaches and their official employment, their rank, promotions and transfers and whether transfers to other countries had been requested by the minister in that country. This practice continued as late as 1896.\(^6\)

The term of office of envoys, assistant envoys and the members of the legation (secretaries, consuls, interpreters, and attaches) was three years. However those members showing competence could be retained in office by the new envoys. Although the term\(^7\) was three years, many envoys and assistant envoys retained office for six years. Some examples were Tseng Chi-tse and Lo Feng-lu in England and Ch'en Lan-pin, Yung Wing (Jung Hung) Wu T'ing-fang and

\(^{5}\) CTSKT 725.

\(^{6}\) Ibid., 959.

Liang Ch'eng in America; Hsü Ching-ch'eng, Yang Ju and Hu Wei-te in Russia, and Li Shu-ch'ang in Japan. They were reappointed to their posts after three years for an additional three year term.

Envoys accredited to more than one country could decide themselves in which country they would reside. The number of the ministers from 1876 to 1895 was no more than five, even though the number of countries to which envoys were accredited increased from four to twelve. Except for Japan, where there was never more than one country of accreditation consistently, all ministers were therefore accredited to more than one country. After the Sino-Japanese war, the number of ministers rose gradually and in 1902 increased sharply to 10, accredited to thirteen nations. This trend continued, with eleven envoys appointed in 1911, accredited to eighteen nations.

Envoys were divided into second and third class. All the envoys initially sent abroad were of the second class. During the Ch'ing dynasty only Ch'ung-hou was appointed as first class and invested with full powers. The Yamen, in a memorial pointed out the importance of the negotiations in which Ch'ung-hou's mission to Russia was involved, and suggested that a minister of the first rank should hold absolute powers but pointed out that Western

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8. Ibid., 28.
countries did not easily invest this rank. Therefore, unless ministers abroad who were of the first or second rank had important negotiations to conduct, full powers should not in future be conferred. Ch'ung-hou's was an exceptional case and the other ministers appointed all held the second class, although because of the differing ranks concurrently held they differed in salary.9

Envoys memorialized the throne directly on matters of particular importance, but in ordinary matters they had to communicate through the foreign office, which reported the information received to the emperor. This regulation, as it concerned the relationship of the envoy with the home government, will be dealt with later. The number of consuls was decided upon by the envoys as was the decision as to where to establish consulates. They then submitted memorials for sanction. The envoy could dismiss a consul at any time if he found that the consul did not fit the position. Consuls were recruited from among the ranks of those counsellors and clerks who were employed in the service of that particular mission.10

9. TSYC 3:15. Tseng Chi-tse, because of his position was regarded as holding the second or third rank, second class, and Ho Ju-chang and Liu Hsi-hung held fifth rank. Provisions for these cases were not laid down in the regulations and the Yamen memorialised for approval to employ them as fourth rank with second class salary.

10. Ibid., 3:20.
II. The recruitment of Ministers and Staff

The recruiting of ministers for the first Chinese missions was carried out at first by a process of recommendation, while the heads of missions had the right to appoint their own staff. During the early years the Yamen had no clear idea of the qualifications required. The personal qualities on which such recommendation should be based seem to have been only a broad set of educational and moral standards. As time passed, the idea of what could be expected of an applicant became more defined, but up to the close of the period under study, the Yamen was still averse to imposing too narrow a standard on the appointment of ministers and to placing any great restrictions on the right of the head of mission to appoint his own staff.

In 1875 imperial sanction was obtained for the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Forts and the Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports as well as the viceroy and governor of all provinces to recommend the names of persons whom they considered suitable for appointment by the emperor as envoys to foreign countries. In another imperial decree it was laid down that the members of the Yamen should recommend persons familiar with yang-wu (foreign affairs) and those who had a thorough understanding of frontier defence.11 The traditional qualification -

11. Liu Chin-tao hsü t'ung-k'ao op. cit. II8780a.
passing the examination for the literary degree - was not necessarily the guiding requirement in selecting the envoys. The basis of recruitment was recommendation by the government's ministers in the capital and in the provinces, regardless of whether the candidate had traditional qualifications or not.

In its recruitment of envoys, the ideal person in the view of the Yamen was one who, if sent anywhere on government business, would perform his mission with credit. They should be men of virtue and talent, persons who had a firm and determined purpose and who were also of a discerning and penetrating cast of mind. They should at the same time be familiar with foreign affairs and frontier defence. Li Hung-chang's suggestion to establish immediately a Bureau of yang-wu (foreign affairs) to train diplomats, and the proposal by Shen Pao-chen that a special examination should be held to select competent persons, were both rejected on the grounds that such proposals should only be introduced gradually as time went on, and could not be implemented in a hurry.

Throughout the Ch'ing dynasty, recommendation remained the only method of recruitment, until 1906, when the Preceptory (Ch'u-ts'ai Kuan) of the Ministry of Foreign

12. KCTHL I85. (June 17, 1875).
13. Ibid., I74, 75 (May 1875).
Affairs was established. The object of its establishment was to train officials to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both at home and in establishments abroad.

The device of recommendation facilitated selecting persons who had no traditional background (training). This was especially so in the early stages when persons who were interested in foreign affairs and were willing to learn about the West were very few in number. In selection, those who had gained a degree at the examination under the former system, but who could nevertheless adapt themselves to study new ideas and pay attention to foreign affairs were regarded as the best choice.

In 1875 the Yamen recommended nine persons from whom ministers might be selected. Ho Ju-chang, who was later selected as first minister to Japan, was among those recommended. Among the persons on the list, only Ch'en Lan-pin who had lived abroad for some years, was regarded by the Yamen as being suitable for immediate appointment as an envoy. 14

The Yamen disapproved of the immediate establishment of institutions to train diplomatic personnel and the idea of holding examinations. It suggested instead that if all ministers and officials alike were encouraged to take an interest in current foreign affairs, this would make them

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14. KCTHL (June 17, 1875) 185; (May 1875) 174; 75.
more familiar with the foreign and domestic situation, and competent envoys would naturally emerge from among them. Yet the Yamen also considered that persons who had ability and knowledge, but who were not very familiar with foreign affairs, could be sent to the Yamen for study after being recommended.15 After this the Yamen did not make any other recommendations. The system of recommendation inevitably had the defect that the wrong person might be recommended.

On October 13, 1888, the censor Chao Tseng-jung sent up a memorial which asked for careful selection of envoys. This was instrumental in the promulgation of the new regulation issued on January 25, 1889. The case was handed down to the Yamen, which was instructed to consider it and then memorialise the Throne. In a memorial of response the Yamen said that the recommendations were at that time sometimes unreliable. The person recommended often did not live up to his reputation; it even seemed that some persons recommended revealed themselves as different from what they had been before. It suggested that if a person recommended was not able to fulfil his responsibilities in the foreign service and if he had a bad reputation, then the minister who recommended him should also be punished.16

15. Ibid.
16. CTSKT 727-731.
In 1907, the emperor sanctioned a suggestion made by the Yamen in reply to a memorial from Liu Shih-hsün, Minister at Paris, about the method of recruitment for ministers of the Chinese foreign service. Liu Shih-hsün, in his letter, observed that most of the Western countries' ministerial appointees were chosen from those who had served as counsellors or in other high ranking positions in their countries' legations, and he suggested that Chinese ministers be chosen exclusively from among those who had had several years service as counsellors in the Chinese legations, and from those serving as senior or junior vice-presidents, counsellors or secretaries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Yamen therefore suggested that all ministers serving abroad should be classified in the second rank and that from among those serving abroad a list should be compiled of those qualified - by reason of facility in foreign languages and several years of experience in the position of counsellor in an overseas mission - for recommendation to ministerial appointment.\textsuperscript{17}

Regulations promulgated on October 18, 1876 stipulated that the term of office of a Chinese minister overseas should be three years. The Yamen was able to make

\textsuperscript{17} "Wai-wu-pu tsou-ch'en tiao-yung jen-yuan pan-fa ping she-li Ch'u-ts'ai-kuan che," \textit{Tung-fang tsa-chih} Vol. 3, no. 8, 1907. 72-76.
use of this to get rid of those persons considered unsuitable.

Liu Shih-hsün's proposal that the limitation of a single term of office to three years be abolished was rejected on the grounds that the regulation did not prevent the Yamen from extending a minister's appointment to a second and even a third term. In fact, there were many cases where envoys had been reappointed to their post after an absence or where their three years office had been renewed for additional terms, and the regulations seemed to have been functioning in this way long before Liu's memorial in 1907. 18

According to the Regulation for the Chinese Foreign Service of 1876, the recruitment of counsellors, consuls, interpreters and attaches in each legation was left to the decision of the envoys themselves. The foreign office maintained this policy until 1907.

In the early stages the recruitment of the legation staffs was a difficult task. Many people tried to avoid foreign service, and while recruits were sought after in many quarters, not enough persons could be found. The defect of this system of recruitment was that envoys might be excessively influenced by personal feeling in the appointment of their staff. However, in the early stages, the lack of recruits was a much greater problem. The Yamen's attitude

towards the appointment of legation staff was that, although it was best that the legation staff be men familiar with foreign affairs, it was more important that they should have long enjoyed the trust of the envoy, and be able to get on well with him. They could then be expected to help the envoy in fulfilling his responsibilities. It was for this reason that in 1877 the Yamen rejected the request of Liu Hsi-hung, Chinese minister in Germany, that the Yamen select for him two staff members for the legation, and asked Liu to select them himself.

Ten years later (1888) the Censor Chao Tseng-jung, asked that there should be a cautious attitude on the selection of the envoys' staff, and urged that envoys should not appoint their relatives, family or people who held no office. However, the Yamen still defended the principle that envoys should select their own staff. The reason given was that to go on a mission in a distant land was rather a different thing from work in China. Therefore, the members of the staff should be acquaintances of long standing of the envoys, so that they could work with him as a team and give him the maximum co-operation. The system was also a copy of the old system whereby officers selected their own colleagues; the practice of a minister taking with him one or two relatives was defended on the grounds that ministers journeying to

19. TSYC 3:38.
far-off countries might well need the assistance of their relatives, and as these relatives were selected by the minister on the basis of their competence, except in cases where the envoy caused harm to official business by acting out of personal feeling, the selection was not prohibited by the rule. 20

Ten years later (by 1898) the situation had changed greatly. Many people were seeking jobs in the foreign service and according to the description of Censor P'an Ch'ing-lan, "Once there was an announcement of the appointment of a new envoy, many people wishing to obtain the position would come running. Some used their connections to hunt for a job in the provinces, some even came to the capital to plant themselves down to wait for the job. There was much reliance on influence and personal recommendation. Ministers tended to be influenced by personal considerations and to leave out of account whether the person selected was competent or not". 21

P'an proposed to select the legation staff from among students of the T'ung-wen kuan and students in the newly established schools in various provinces, who were familiar with Chinese as well as Western scholarship and had been selected by the Viceroy of various provinces.

20. CTSKT 727-731.
21. Ibid.
They should be sent to the Yamen to be examined by the Yamen and the envoys jointly.

However, the Yamen was still opposed to setting limits on the minister's right to choose his own legation staff and thought this would make selection more difficult, because it would confine the minister within too narrow limits. The Yamen was of the opinion that within the previous twenty years the system had been gradually improved by fixing the salary rates, by setting restrictions on the system of automatically recommending diplomatic staff for rewards after they had served the three-year term, and by fixing the numbers of the legation staff. Their intention was tacitly to introduce restrictions while still encouraging recruitment. Again, the principle that envoys should select their own staff was defended by pointing out that governors-general of various provinces, whose problems in staff selection could not be compared with those of the ministers serving in various lands, were allowed to choose their own staff for the handling of foreign affairs. Hence the ministers should be allowed special consideration.

The Yamen asked the envoys, in their subsequent appointments, to select only those whose character and scholarship they really knew were adequate to render them the assistance they required. They should not be influenced by personal feeling into making hasty decisions to appoint persons to hold office who did not have the requisite skill, simply because they wanted a full staff. If a member of
his staff was not fit for his position the envoy should dismiss him forthwith. A minister could not be free from responsibility, if, through lack of proper supervision of his staff, a member took advantage of his position to make trouble. 22

It was not until 1907 that a new regulation was introduced, providing that envoys' staff should be selected from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and successful candidates in the Preceptory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From then on the minister abroad was unable to appoint or transfer his staff at his own discretion. 23

With recommendation as the only method of recruitment, Li Hung-chang was able to have a majority of the appointees his mu-yu or friends. Technically, Li left the final selection of personnel to the Yamen thus avoiding implicating himself. Suitable qualified persons were difficult to recruit because, partly, the diplomatic service was not regarded as an attractive appointment, secondly, few officials had the qualification and experience suited for such a profession (see pp. 83, 87). However through the skilful way Li communicated to the Yamen the many requirements for the "suitable" candidate, we find that in

22. Ibid., 1013-1020.

most cases Li was able to have his friends or mu-yu appointed.24

In examining the political background or correlation of the ministers to Japan to 1894, we may come to a clearer perception of Li's central position in diplomatic activities. The first minister Ho Ju-chang was recommended by Kuo Sung-t'ao who was a close friend of Li.25 Both Kuo and Li were ex-mu-yu of Tseng Kuo-fan and shared many common views on matters of foreign affairs. Li Shu-ch'ang, the second minister was recommended by Marquis Tseng Chi-tse so would not be expected to go against Li.26 The third minister Hsü Ch'eng-tsu had been a staff member of Ch'en Lan-pin, Li's ex-mu-yu in Tseng Kuo-fan's mu-fu.27 The fourth minister, Li Ching-fang was of course Li Hung-chang's adopted son.28 Finally Wang Feng-tsaо the fifth minister was a friend of Marquis Tseng.29

III. Background and training of diplomats:

Like other governments embarking on the establishment of a modern diplomatic service, the Chinese government

24. LWCK:IS 6:27
26. LWCKCT 510, CKCJ no. 793.
had no source of people specifically trained for diplomatic work. Before the establishment of the T'ung-wen kuan there was no institution in China which provided the training and education such diplomatic officers would need in foreign languages, international law. Hence the first ministerial appointees abroad had no professional training in diplomatic work. There were as yet no graduates from the T'ung-wen kuan eligible for appointment as ministers. Since there was no set course of training for diplomats and no proper precedent as to the qualities required, at first the selection had to be based on a personal assessment of what was required and of the suitability of particular candidates for the Chinese foreign service.

We have seen above how this situation was met by a reliance on recommendation. In view of the absence of a set of criteria it is interesting to see what kinds of men were in fact appointed to be ministers to foreign countries during the period of study.

The origins and educational background of ministers during the period of this study varied over time as did the reasons for their being appointed as ministers. In their background and training, however they do seem to have had certain things in common.

From 1875 to 1894 none had received any proper training in language or law. Three-quarters of 20 ministerial appointees before 1894 were the "foreign affairs experts" who served under Tseng Kuo-fan and later Li Hung-chang
(after 1870). They were friends or ex-mu-yu of Li Hung-chang, who devoted their energies to matters of self-strengthening. These posts usually provided more chance to contact Westerners and Western culture. Many of the later appointees were men with experience in handling modern facilities created by Li Hung-chang and other governors who supported the self-strengthening movement.

Although the greater part of the ministerial appointees had the aforementioned background and training about one-third of ministerial appointees came from a more orthodox background and training. They followed the traditional course, taking the official examinations, attaining the highest literary degree, and officiating in various posts.

30. For example see Kuo Sung-t'ao, Minister to England 1875-1878, Shen Yun-lung, in Chin-tai-wai-chiao jen-wu lun-p'in 1-65; Ch'en Lan-pin, Minister to U.S.A., Spain and Peru, Folsom Friends, Guests and Colleagues (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 68, 75-76; Yung Wing, Ch'en Lan-pin's associate, Arthur W. Hummel, ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (Washington, 1943) 402-404, and Yoshihiro Hatano, Chūgoku kindai kogyō shi no kenkyū 74, 204, Li Feng-pao, Minister to France, Germany, Italy, Holland and Austria, Rawlinson, John L., China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 70, 274; Tseng Chi-tse, Minister to England 1878-1885, Li En-han, Tseng Chi-tse ti wai-chiao (Taipei, 1966), 1-12; and finally Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng in Hummel, op. cit. 331-332, and Folsom, op. cit. 135-136.

31. These appointees included Cheng Tsao-ju, Minister to U.S.A., Spain, Peru 1881-1884, Liu Jui-fen, Minister to England 1885-1889, Kung Chao-yuan, Minister to England 1893-1896 and Chang Yin-huan, Minister to U.S.A., Peru and Spain 1885-1889. For biographies see Folsom, op. cit. 174-175, Hummel, op. cit. 60-63, 522, Yoshihiro Hatano, op. cit. 177 and Shen Yun-lung, op. cit. 66-100 respectively.
Then because of their attention to and keenness in studying statesmanship or current affairs they were recommended by the Yamen for diplomatic posts. For example Hsu Ching-ch'eng (Minister to France, Germany, Italy, Holland and Austria 1884-1896), Ho Ju-chang (Minister to Japan 1887-1891) and Hung Chun (Minister to Russia, Germany, Austria and Holland 1887-1889) were all chin-shih in 1868. Hsu was selected a member of Hanlin Academy, and Ho was a compiler in Hanlin Academy. Both were recommended by Wen-hsiang for diplomatic posts because of their concern for current affairs, and their enlightened outlooks. Hung Chun was not just chin-shih but also chuang-yüan, and served in various posts before his diplomatic assignment, such as Educational Commissioner of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Chief Examiner at provincial examinations in Shensi and Shantung, and Sub-Chancellor of the Grand Secretariat. There were also a few exceptional cases whose appointment was secured mainly through their personal connections with certain important officials in the court, and not by their experience or knowledge of foreign affairs.

The professional training of Chinese diplomats was begun in the years 1862, 1863 and 1864, following the

32. Hummel, op. cit. 312-313; 360-361; CYSWC:HSC 1-5.

33. See biography of Liu Hsi-hung (Associate Envoy to England 1875-1877) in Li Tz'u-ming, Yueh-man-t'ang jih-chi, (Peking, 1920) October 2, 1876.
opening of three schools to train interpreters and experts in foreign affairs - the Peking, Shanghai and Canton T'ung-wen kuan. These began as schools for the teaching of foreign languages and in the beginning their curricula were confined to foreign languages (mainly English) and traditional Chinese subjects. In 1867 the re-organization of the Peking T'ung-wen kuan broadened the curriculum of the school. Besides foreign languages - English, Russian, German (from 1871), or Japanese (from 1895) - and traditional Chinese subjects, Western mathematics, mechanics, theoretical navigation, physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology and mineralogy, international law and political economy were also taught from this year (1867) on.

Among the first teachers were W.A.P. Martin, an American ex-missionary who taught English, political economy, and international law, a Frenchman, Bellequim and a few Chinese teachers. Besides class room instruction, resident graduates were called to the Tsungli Yamen from time to time to serve as interpreters or translators. Members of the faculty, assisted by advanced students and resident graduates, translated more than a score of Western books into Chinese. These included books on international law, foreign laws, mathematics and the sciences. The training given was specifically related in each case to national defence, either diplomatic or military. Only the Peking T'ung-wen kuan after 1867 can be said to have provided the equivalent of a Western liberal arts education.
Although the innovations at Peking T'ung-wen kuan was considered as exceptional and advanced at that time, the training of T'ung-wen kuan graduates was in fact far from thorough. 34

General education remained the monopoly of the traditional schools until after 1895. Developments between 1895 and 1898 mark the beginning of a new stage in the history of Chinese education. The Imperial University of Peking was established by the central government in August, 1898, and became the leading educational institution of modern China. But this is beyond the scope of our study since 1911 was still too early for graduates from that institution to be appointed to ministerial positions.

The background and training of those appointed as ministers abroad after 1895 differed considerably from those selected as ministers before 1895. One of the most striking developments was that the T'ung-wen kuan graduates mentioned above, who had served in the retinue of the Chinese legations as interpreters or counsellors etc., came to comprise the majority of ministerial appointments. Out of 36 appointed to ministership after 1895, twelve persons were T'ung-wen kuan graduates, and of those ten had served on the staff of Chinese legations. Most of them worked as interpreters

and were then promoted to counsellor of a legation.\textsuperscript{35}

The other notable feature which illustrated the same trend was the considerable number of "returned students" - American or European university graduates - who were appointed as ministers. Thirty-six ministers were appointed between 1895 and 1911, and of these seven were returned students. Many joined Li Hung-chang's mu-fu or the mu-fu of other governors like Yuan Shih-k'ai engaged in work related to foreign affairs. Some served on the staff of the legation or as consul (among them one was also a T'ung-wen kuan graduate).\textsuperscript{36} Lo Feng-lu was translator to Giquel on his trip to France 1876. He had completed a navigation course. He was noted in 1878 as studying meteorology, chemistry and physics at King's College in London. He had also been a translator in a Li Feng-pao mission.

Another distinguishing feature was that out of 36 ministerial appointees nine came from Bannermen families, (six were in the Chinese banner Troops, two in the Manchrian, one in Mongolian) and of these five were also T'ung-wen kuan


\textsuperscript{36} Rawlinson, \textit{op. cit.} 279; Folsom, \textit{op. cit.} 140, also see biographies of Wu T'ing-fang, Liang Ch'eng, Liu Yü-lin in Folsom, \textit{op. cit.} 141, Chang Ts'un-wu, Chung-Mei kung-yüeh feng-ch'ao 29; Ts'ui Kuo-yin, "Ch'u-shih Mei Jih Pi Kuo Jih-chi" in Hsiao-fang -fu-chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao-tsai-pu-pi'en, Series 12.
graduates. Of the rest of the 15 appointees, four had had experience on the staff of Chinese legations abroad. Three Li Ching-mai, Li Ching-fang and Li Kuo-chieh were relatives of Li Hung-chang (Li's two sons and his grandson), and the rest of the other seven had had rather diverse backgrounds and training. Hsu Ching-ch'eng was an old appointment from before the war, Chang Ying-t'ang and Lei Fu-t'ung were officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lü Hai-huan was intendant of Ch'ang-chen, T'ung-hai, while Li Sheng-to, Wang Ta-hsien and Tsai Chun— all ministers to Japan, of which one was censor, one was student controller in Japan and one was the intendant of the Su-sung-t'ai Circuit. The background of Chinese ministers appointed to Japan is rather unique, and we shall further examine this in the next chapter.

Anhwei Kiangsu, Chekiang, Kwangtung were the native provinces of the majority of appointees between the

37. For example Ch'ing-ch'ang, Yin-ch'ang, Li Chia-chü, Yang Shu, Huang Kao, Yang Ju, Chang Te-i, Sa-yin-t'u. See Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 102, 90, Biggerstaff, op. cit. 151.

38. These four were Sun Pao-ch'i Hsü Chüeh, Ch'ien Hsün, Sheng Jui-lin. See Gaimushō Jōhōbu, Gendai Chukaminkoku Manshū Teikoku jinmeikan (Tokyo, 1932), 300-301, Hummel, op. cit. 61, Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Ch'u-shih Ying-Fa-I-Pi ssu-kuo jih-chi 1:1, Hsü Ching-ch'eng, op. cit. III han-tu 3:42.

years 1875-1911. Anhwei was the home province of Li Hung-chang, while Kiangsu, Chekiang and Kwangtung provinces were three coastal provinces which had first contact with Western civilization.

IV. Professional Skills for the diplomat

In assessing the diplomatic work of the Chinese missions abroad we should in addition to studying the backgrounds and previous careers of the various minister, attempt to ascertain the grasp the various ministers had of those professional skills desirable for the diplomat; knowledge of foreign languages and of international law. Of the twenty ministerial appointees before 1895 (with the exception of associate envoy to America Yung Wing, who was the first Chinese to graduate from Yale University), none of them could be said to have had a good command of the language of the countries to which they were accredited. It would appear that, although many realised the importance of studying foreign languages, in actual negotiations reliance on interpreters either foreign or Chinese continued to be

40. Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 100-102.

41. See biographies in Li En-han, op. cit. 18-29, Li Feng-pao, op. cit. 6, Ho Ping-ti, "Chang Yin-huan shih-chi" in CSLT Series 1, No. 7, 97-98, Hsü Ching-ch'eng, op. cit. preface: Lu Cheng-hsiang.
the general practice before 1895.\footnote{42} That Kuo relied on his English secretary Dr. Halliday Macartney, Li Feng-pao on the other hand relied on Ch'en Chi-t'ung for French and Lo Feng-lu for help in English. Hsü Ching-ch'eng depended on Ch'ing-ch'ang for help with the French language. This is enough to show how the actual negotiations were carried on. There are no records to suggest that others, like Liu Jui-fen, Ts'ui Kuo-yin, Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Kung Chao-yüan, made any attempt to learn a foreign language.

This situation changed after 1895. Many T'ung-wen kuan graduates and returned students had been appointed minister, and even those who did not belong to this category like Li Ching-fang, Li Ching-mai and Yü-keng were said to be adept in English. Out of 36 appointees 20 were proficient in the language of their country of accreditation, and could convey their ideas without the help of an interpreter. These included Wu T'ing-fang, Liang Ch'eng, Chang Te-i, Li Ching-fang, Liu Yü-lin, Liu Shih-hsün, Lu Cheng-hsiang and Yin-ch'ang.\footnote{43}

\footnote{42} Chang Te-i, "Sui-shih jih-chi: in Hsiao-fang-hu chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao, Series 11, 146-158; Li Feng-pao, op. cit. 1-6; Hsü Ching-ch'eng, op. cit. han-tu 1, tsou-shu II 6.

\footnote{43} Folsom, op. cit. 140-141, 129-130; Chang Ts'un-wu, op. cit. 29; Shih Chao-chi, Shih Chao-chi tsao nien hui-i-lu (Taipei, 1967) 19-36 Biggerstaff, op. cit. 107, 183; Gendai Chūkaminkoku Manshū Teikoku jinmeikan, op. cit. 5, 104, 394, 398, 389; Hsü Ching-ch'eng, op. cit. letters I 9, 17, III han-tu 2:13, V han-tu 5:22, I tsou-shu 2:6.
Although in some cases, as in Russia before 1902, the appointees' language capabilities remained as inadequate as before 1895, generally speaking the improvement in this respect was quite in contrast to the situation before 1895. Yet the situation of ministers to Japan remained the same, as we shall discuss in the next chapter.

Also important was the familiarity of Chinese diplomatic personnel with international law. Some idea of the state of the study of international law during this period can be obtained from the amount of material on international law translated from Western languages from courses given in institutions like the T'ung-wen kuan, and from references to concepts in international law and terms contained in diplomatic despatches, memorials to the Throne, and arguments used by Chinese diplomats in their negotiations.

The introduction of the knowledge of international law into China has been dated as far back as 1839, when Lin Tse-hsü was dealing with the opium situation in Canton and interesting himself in the geography and the sciences of the west. He employed a staff to collect and translate material from Western sources, and it was Yüan Teh-hui, interpreter in the Li-fan-yüan (Court of Colonial Affairs), who had been sent from Peking to Canton to buy foreign books and was temporarily placed on Lin's staff, who first called Lin's attention to Vattel's _Le droit des gens_ (Law of Nations). Lin asked an American medical missionary, Peter Parker, to translate three paragraphs of Vattel's books for
him. They were related to war, and its accompanying hostile measures, such as blockades, embargoes, etc. The translation appeared in Wei Yüan's Hai-kuo t'u-chih in 1852.  

During the negotiations in 1842 between Ch'i-ying and Pottinger which led up to the Treaty of Nanking, and those between Lord Elgin and T'ang T'ing-hsiang in the Tientsin negotiations of 1858, Elgin's insistence that Chinese representatives should have full power to negotiate on behalf of the Chinese government introduced a concept which was quite new to China. Although the Chinese government finally gave in to the demand that they give their representatives "full powers", it was not because they understood that principle, but because they were forced to do so. The Chinese still saw the emperor as having the final say, exercising the ultimate power. Threatened by the Powers, China complied with foreign demands for the issuance of full powers only as a formality and as a device to satisfy the "barbarians". Treaties between China and foreign powers also contained some terms found in international legal usage, e.g. exchange of envoys, credentials, exchange of ratifications.

44. Fan Wen-lan, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih (Peking, 19^9) A. 15; Immanuel Hsu, op. cit. 123-124.
Robert Hart succeeded in translating for the Tsungli Yamen twenty-four sections on the rights of legations from Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law*, and in 1862 Martin began his translation of this book. In 1863 Wen-hsiang asked the American minister Anson Burlingame to recommend an authoritative work on international law that was recognised by Western nations. Burlingame suggested Wheaton and promised to have portions of it translated. In 1864, through the support and finance of the Chinese government and its officials, the translation was completed and the work published. Three hundred copies were distributed to the provinces for the use of local officials.

The Peking T'ung-wen kuan began to teach international law in 1869 and more books about the subject were published in Chinese, e.g. *Introduction to the Study of International Law* by Theodore D. Woolsey in 1877; *Le Manuel des lois de la guerre* by the Institut de Droit International in 1881, de Marten's *Guide diplomatique* in 1877 and Johann Kaspar Bluntschili's *Das moderne Volkerrecht* in 1879. Moreover, several people went abroad to study international law.

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47. Immanuel Hsü, *op. cit.* 126-127.
Although *Elements of International Law* was published and distributed to government circles, the understanding by the Yamen and other officials of international law was still very superficial. For Prince Kung, who recommended to the court the publication of Wheaton's book, international law was the "practices and precedents" of foreign countries, a collection of the laws and regulations of Western nations. Although they often used the term "international law" and became familiar with certain technicalities, the general principles of international law and the fact that it consists of customary law and positive law, and is the law in force in modern international society, all seemed unfamiliar to them. They failed utterly to comprehend the connection of international law with the domestic legal system. At this time nobody in the foreign office really had the basic knowledge of modern jurisprudence required for a full understanding of international law.

Wheaton's book did not clearly state that consular jurisdiction was an infringement of sovereignty, and those Chinese officials who had no systematic understanding of international law and what it was based on, could not have known enough to seek treaty revision. Three basic items - consular jurisdiction, conventional tariff, and the most-favoured nation treatment, seen from the stand-point of

modern international law, made the treaties unequal. Yet China at that time did not fight over these three but over the audience problem, and over the problem of ministers of foreign countries insisting that they be given the right to reside in Peking.

Most of the Ch'ing officials disliked the treaties not on theoretical grounds but rather because they felt humiliated by the fact that under the pressure of gunboats they had to accept the foreign demands. Rather than being opposed on legal grounds the officials of that time were outraged at the infringement of China's sovereignty by the behaviour of the Powers in China. This foreign threat aroused nationalistic sentiments among these officials, who laid stress on the strengthening of China so that she could defy the Western nations' gunboat diplomacy. In all this there was no question of treaty revision.

Some of those who had studied abroad, like Ma Chien-chung and Wu T'ing-fang, worked under Li Hung-chang after their return and should have been able to make up for Li's deficiencies in this matter, and to improve China's knowledge of international law through their own knowledge and through contact and discussion with foreign representatives. However, partly because not much use was made of those who had received foreign legal training, partly because the Powers concentrated their pressure on China rather than Japan, and especially because those in power like Li Hung-chang and others still did not fully understand international law
and thought that if China's military strength were sufficient everything would be solved, China did not demand treaty revision.

But what of the knowledge of Chinese diplomats abroad in this respect?

None of the Chinese ministers abroad before 1895 had received any formal education in international law. Restricted by their language capacities, their knowledge of international law was acquired mainly through the Chinese translation of books on the subject. But like their colleagues in China, they failed to achieve a deep understanding of the modern legal principles underlying international law. Again, many of them mentioned the term 'international law' in memorials and discussions, but these references related rather to technicalities and procedural matters, than to fundamental questions.

The Chinese ministers' knowledge of the practical side of international law did prevent many diplomatic faux pas, but without a systematic understanding of the reasoning behind the practice, particularly in matters of sovereignty and the territorial principle of legal rights, it was unlikely that the idea of treaty revision and the establishment of a modern domestic legal order could arise. The few ministers who did suggest treaty revision, (Tseng Chi-tse, Ho Ju-chang, and Hsü Ch'eng-tsu), perhaps impressed by Japan's example, mentioned nothing about the establishment or reform of China's own legal system.
Unlike Japan which had completely adopted Western international law and adhered strictly to it for her own advantage, the Chinese were bound more tightly to their traditional culture and political background and sought instead for means of maintaining the established Chinese patterns of foreign intercourse within the framework of the new international law system. They saw international law as a set of rules to prevent mistakes in diplomacy, and as a means of restricting foreign powers by insisting on strict adherence to treaties. \[53\]

China's understanding of international law was closely connected with her understanding of the West. As Chinese ministers abroad learned more about Western political systems, they came to realise that a change was necessary in China's attitude to foreign countries: she should no longer regard them as inferior 'barbarians'. The dawning of this concept of the equality of nations in the international society was China's first step towards understanding the basis of modern international relations and international law.

One of the first to appreciate the need for this sort of understanding was Kuo Sung-t'ao, who wrote,

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"... the (contact with) the West is clearly different from the states of Liao and Chin .... (the West) came to China only for trade, and the competition among the various Western powers like England, France, Russia, and the United States, is not comparable to the contending nations of the Warring States period. They (the West) created international law in order to keep faith with each other, laying particular stress on diplomatic friendship, and even reasoning or arguing with each other before resorting to military force".54

Kuo's ideas were shared by other ministers like Tseng, Hsüeh, Li Shu-ch'ang and many others.55 Their opposition to the use of force, favouring reliance on international law to deal with Western powers, reflected a more complete understanding of the nature of international law as a force balancing the power of strong countries for the protection of weaker countries.

However, Chinese ministers before 1895, while advocating China's recognition of Western powers as equal, seem to have overlooked a factor which at the time prevented the Western powers' from regarding China as an equal: that is, China's own underdeveloped legal system. There was almost no mention of domestic legal reform for China. Thus their understanding of modern international relations or international law was crucial to this period because it was,


55. P'eng Tse-i, "Kuo Sung-t'ao chih ch'u-shih Ou-Hsi chi-ch'i kong-hsien" in CSLT Series 1, No. 7. 70.
after all, being used by Western powers in the successful penetration of China.

However, because of their foreign experience, the ministers abroad had a more advanced attitude than authorities in China. On other technical points there had been considerable improvement. When Kuo sung-tao's mission was sent for the first time, the credentials mentioned only the apology, without referring to Kuo's status as resident minister and Liu Hsi-hung's official status, and it took almost a year to correct this. The incidence of this type of mistake had been greatly reduced by 1895.

Of the ministerial appointees after 1895, some had been admitted to the Western bar, some had already had the experience of translations Western international law books into Chinese; and many T'ung-wen kuan graduates had a basic knowledge of international law from their training, and their later experience on mission staffs increased their understanding of foreign languages, helping them to absorb further knowledge of international law.

After 1905 the influence of Chinese translating of Japanese books, and of Japanese translations of Western books, made itself felt. The number of books translated


57. Wu T'ing-fang was the first Chinese to be admitted to the English bar.
Northern Telegraph Company of Denmark, without the approval of the Chinese government. In the same year the company laid another submarine cable between Shanghai and Nagasaki and one between Nagasaki and P'u-yen, and thus completed the northern circuit to Europe through the relay of land wires across Siberia. The Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Company also completed a submarine cable between Shanghai and Hong Kong and so completed the southern circuit to Europe.  

The telegraphic wire between Shanghai and Tientsin was completed in 1881, and in 1882, the line from Shanghai to Canton was constructed and extended to Hankow. In 1883 an extension was made from Tientsin to Tungchow and from Kiangning to Hankow, and a further one from Tungchow to Peking in 1884. This was the first time that Peking had telegraphic communication. The line was also extended from Pei-t'ang to Shanhaikwan to Yingkow, Lü-shun (Port Arthur); and the Korean domestic line was constructed from Inchon via Kumsong to Sinuiju to connect up with the Chinese line.

The establishment of telegraphic contact with foreign countries and the construction of a domestic line

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59. Toa Kenkyūjo, Sho gaikoku no taishi tōshi (Tokyo, 1942-43) B 752.

60. Ibid., 770.

between Shanghai and Tientsin made it possible for China to contact ministers abroad within a day or two.

The relevant documents give some indication of the time required for diplomatic correspondence or telegraph messages to travel between Peking and London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg and Tokyo, as shown in the following table. (see tables 1 and 2).

Generally the diplomatic correspondence between Peking and the capitals of Europe and America took approximately two months, while by telegraph it took one day, or in the case of St. Petersburg, sometimes two days. For the transmission of documents, ministers abroad all had at first relied on private arrangements with officials of the Shanghai China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, (Kuo and Ho) or asked the Shanghai Customs Commissioner to take care of the matter. But in accordance with the Yamen's desire to centralise the handling of official documents, the work was taken over by the Shanghai Document Office (Wen-pao chü) set up in 1876, and from that year onwards all papers passing between Peking and the missions abroad were handled by this office. Later on branches were established at various places in China, but these were abolished in 1914.62

TABLE 1

Time required for international diplomatic letters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of days</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London - Peking</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, &quot;Ch'ü-shih jih-chi hsü-ke&quot;, p. 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7, 1891 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 1891</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Paris</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Hsü-wen-su-kung i-shu letters I p. 17 (1886)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 17, 1885-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 13, 1886</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Berlin</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Li Feng-pao Shih-Te jih-chih (November 18, 1878) p. 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19, 1878-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 18, 1878</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Berlin</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Hsü-wen-su-kung i-shu letters I p. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29, 1886-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25, 1887</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Washington</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Foreign Relation of the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 4, 1878</td>
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<td>May 3, 1878</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 18, 1879-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 1879</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>- &quot; &quot; -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 22, 1880-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 17, 1881</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>- &quot; &quot; -</td>
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## TABLE 2

*Time required for international telegraphs*

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<th>Destination</th>
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<th>Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>Berlin - Peking</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Ref. LWCK: TD 5:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 27, 1885 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hsü-wen-su-kung i-shu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28, 1885</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London - Peking</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo - Peking</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
<td>LWCK: TD 5:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg - Peking</td>
<td>1 or 2 days</td>
<td>LWCK: TD vol. 14, v. 15, p. 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 1893 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hsü-Wen-su-kung i-shu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 1893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21, 1894 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>telegraph p. 7, 9, 10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 23, 1894</td>
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</table>
VI. The Missions in the Context of the Ch'ing Bureaucracy

The work of the Chinese envoys abroad must always be seen against the background of the conditions in the Ch'ing court governing the conduct of foreign relations. Some of the most important of these conditions were the absolute authority of the Ch'ing emperor - all decisions had to be referred to him - the position of missions abroad and their relations with other administrative organs, the peculiar position of Li Hung-chang, and the inner politics of the Ch'ing court, including for instance the checks and restraints placed upon Li by Ch'ing-liu tang. We shall see at certain times the influence of some of these factors, affecting in some cases quite radically - the course of Chinese relations with foreign countries.

Under the Ch'ing dynasty, the emperor was considered the sole source of authority. The Grand Council was the leading organization in the central government and the central administrative organs consisted of the six Ministries or Boards. The Censorate was the general supervisory organ. Viceroy and governors were the chief local administrators in the provinces. Each had the right to report directly to the Throne. Grand councillors had no right to send orders to ministries, to provincial governors-general, or to governors.

63. See p. 126, 127 for detailed explanation.
The emperor alone could issue decrees and instructions. The same principle also can be seen operating in the relationship of the legations abroad with the emperor and the Tsungli Yamen.

Legally, the Ch'ing emperor had ultimate control over the conduct of foreign relations, so the emperor himself could be regarded as the diplomatic authority, while the Tsungli Yamen (and later Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and missions abroad were parallel organizations whose opinions could be regarded only as suggestions, and had to be sanctioned by the emperor before they had any legal effect. The Tsungli Yamen and the missions abroad were in a parallel position; that is, Chinese foreign missions were not in a subordinate position to the Yamen, as envoys of Western countries were to their foreign offices. Chinese foreign missions were not subject to direct orders from the Yamen. The Yamen's requests to envoys abroad had to be submitted first in the form of a memorial to the Throne, and then an order would be sent to the envoys abroad in the form of an imperial edict. The envoys' suggestions too had to be in the form of a memorial to the Throne, and if the emperor considered further advice and discussions from the Yamen necessary, he would then refer it to the Yamen by imperial

order. This system was quite different from that operating in Western countries. The Western envoys were always under the direct command of the foreign office, the foreign office assumed responsibility for the envoys, and all the envoys' communications to the home government had to pass through the foreign office, as did the government's instruction to the envoys.  

Although, in practice the recommendations of the Yamen regarding the appointment or dismissal of envoys and the making of foreign policy were usually accepted by the emperor, the missions nevertheless enjoyed a considerable degree of independence, certainly by comparison with their Western counterparts.

This prompted the Yamen to try and strengthen its control of the missions abroad. The 1876 regulation provided that envoys might memorialise the Throne directly on matters of particular importance, but in ordinary matters they should communicate with the Yamen, which would report the information received to the emperor. This provision showed clearly that the envoys had the right to report directly to the Throne and were not subject to direct orders from the Yamen, while at the same time it showed the Yamen's intention

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66. Ibid., 21-22.
gradually to increase its power over missions abroad. The reports of the numbers and names of the legation staff and the requirement for monthly reports to the Yamen of the diary records of the situation or negotiations in each country, all seemed to follow this tendency. Yet the situation did not improve much during the Ch'ing dynasty, and the parallel position was still maintained. The envoys could appoint their own staff, and the establishment and appointment of consuls were completely in the hands of the envoys so there was no direct relationship between the consular missions and central government. The only improvement was the new regulation of 1907 (mentioned above) that the envoys' staff should be selected from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

When Li Hung-chang was appointed Viceroy of Chihli in 1870, there began the "government by Li Hung-chang", lasting nearly a quarter of a century until 1895. In the early 1870's two of the central political figures were Tso Tsung-t'ang and Li Hung-chang (Tseng Kuo-fan died in 1872). However, Tso's service was mostly concentrated in the northwest, while the position of Viceroy of Chihli in

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68. Ibid., 14, 20.
69. CTSKT 89-92.
70. For example, see CKCJ, no. 29.
the north, which Li held from 1870, was much more important than that of the other Viceroy.

Li was closer to the imperial court. After Tseng died, Li was the only senior statesmen trusted by the Empress Dowager. He was concurrently Superintendent of Trade in the Northern Ports with the additional title of Grand Secretary and was considered indispensable in the handling of diplomatic negotiations. Almost all important diplomatic negotiations passed through his hands. Moreover, on other important state affairs Tz'u-hsi frequently sought his opinion. There was no other senior statesman at that time who could match him because the size of his mu-fu, and the great power it wielded.

Many of those who had been together with him in Tseng Kuo-fan's mu-fu, and others he had chosen himself from his own mu-fu, were appointed by him as Chinese ministers abroad. As a result those ministers appointed by him were virtually under his control. Moreover, Li together with a few other central figures, was one of the main promoters of China's modernization, and his policy-making was coloured by his involvement in and attitude towards modernization. Needless to say the power and influence of Li Hung-chang was based on his possession of a large force of soldiers entirely at his disposal. 72

Li had therefore become the most influential man of his time, and because he was concurrently Superintendent of Trade in the Northern Port and also had the right to handle foreign affairs, in practice there existed two foreign offices: Li Hung-chang's and the Yamen. When he was appointed to his new office, Li Hung-chang became more dominant in foreign affairs and began acting as a powerful rival of the Yamen. The official reports of Chinese ministers abroad were often addressed to both the Tsungli Yamen and Li, who often prevailed over the Yamen, especially after 1884, when Prince Kung was dismissed from office. Li could directly issue orders to ministers abroad without the Yamen being informed and it often happened that the Yamen was by-passed. The operation of the "two foreign offices" showed the great trust Tz'u-hsi placed in Li Hung-chang, but it constituted an anomaly in the administration of China's foreign policy. Li's function in politics and influence on the policy-making process, was one of the prominent features of China's diplomacy before 1895. In actual practice therefore the Superintendents of Trade in


74. Tabohasi Kiyoshi, Kindai Nissen kankei no kenkyū (Keijo, 1940) B 565.

Northern ports were in charge of the Ch'ing court's diplomatic activity. The Chinese envoys abroad were directly under the command of the Superintendent of Trade in Northern Ports, and the court's orders prepared by the Grand Council were sent to Li Hung-chang for transmission to ministers abroad. This meant in effect that the Yamen was by-passed. Although the Yamen still had at their discretion the correspondence between the envoys and the Yamen, and memorials were tendered to the Throne by the Yamen on behalf of the envoys, yet if an envoy's memorial was an important one he could memorialise directly to the Throne from the place where he was stationed. Otherwise the envoy would ask the Yamen to present the memorial on his behalf.

It gradually came about that the telegrams were first sent to the Superintendent of Trade in Northern Ports, Li Hung-chang, and were then passed on by him to the Yamen. Likewise, most of the Yamen's orders to the envoys passed via the Superintendent of Trade in Northern ports. In the case of China's decision to send warships to Korea, the Yamen first notified the office of the Superintendent which then informed Li Shu-ch'ang in Japan. Many of the Chinese

76. KCTHL I 295 (November 1876) 45 I 319 (November 1876) 135, I 1037 (February 1881) 7; TSYC 3:23.

77. Tabohashi, Nisshin seneki, op. cit. 364-365.

78. C.M. Kim, ed., Nikkan gaikō shiryō shūsei (Tokyo, 1966) II 146.
envoys' official communications to foreign governments, for example Li Shu-ch'ang's letter to the Japanese acting foreign minister, quoted the Superintendent as their authority. Li's power was accepted without question, i.e. foreign governments regarded him as having power in foreign affairs. China's relations with Korea, for instance, were under the immediate command of the Superintendent of Trade in Northern Ports, Li Hung-chang. Yet the potential difficulties which could be caused by disagreement between Li Hung-chang and the Yamen did not occur in practice, because the head of the Yamen either co-operated with Li or was not powerful enough to oppose his views. The overall result was that Li overshadowed the Yamen and his policies prevailed. Though Li gained his pre-eminence through his greater access to information, it is well for us to remember that the intrinsic value of Li's expertise depended very much on the expertise and the accuracy in observation of the ministers abroad. As far as China's missions in Japan prior to the 1894-5 war was

79. Ibid., 151.

80. Tabohashi, Nissen kankei, op. cit. 564-565. The Ryukyu incident was a good example of how this worked in practice. In September of 1880, the Yamen had already agreed to the Japanese proposal of the settlement of the Ryukyu question by dividing the Ryukyu Islands into two distinct groups, the northern and the southern. The northern islands were to belong to Japan and the southern islands of Miyako and Yahejima were to be left to China. In exchange for this China would make treaty revisions and certain additions to the treaty allowing Japan to enjoy in China the same rights as Westerners. The Throne referred the agreement to Li Hung-chang. Li strongly opposed the agreement and finally Li's opinion was adopted: China refused to ratify the treaty and the matter remained unsettled. (CKCJ, no. 59; JFO Vol. 13 d.130. 379-380).
concerned, we should remember that the heads of all the various missions did not know the Japanese language. As these missions provided the only source of information on the political situation in Japan, whether officially to the Yamen or privately to Li, the importance of the missions in Sino-Japanese relations can be easily appreciated. Furthermore, as Li's influence in foreign affairs was due so much to his expertise, especially in comparison with the Yamen ministers, and much depended on his private sources of information, that is, the ministers in Japan, we may thus see the important role these legations had in Sino-Japanese relations. This point cannot be neglected in any discussion of the role of China's missions to Japan, especially when we know that the chiefs of all the legations ever sent to Japan during the Ch'ing period did not understand the Japanese language, though some spoke English.

That Li should gain such pre-eminence in foreign affairs matter was more than the result of his talents or personality, though they were undoubtedly substantial. There were institutional reasons as well. Firstly, the powers

81. See p. 96.
82. LWCKCT passim.
84. See p. 155.
of the position of the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, especially in relation to diplomacy had never been clearly delineated. Secondly, not only did the emperor and the Yamen trust Li, they were also less family with foreign affairs. This reliance on Li was even more notable after 1884 when the blame of the Franco-Chinese War was allotted to the Yamen. As a result new ministers were appointed to the Yamen and these men knew even less about foreign affairs than their predecessors.

Furthermore, Li's expertise on foreign affairs came not only from his long tenure in the position of Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, but also from a rather special and private channel. A study of the Li Wen-chung kung ch'ih-tu will provide us with a clear picture that over a long period of time, Li had frequent exchange of personal and private letters with all ministers posted in foreign capitals. Of this collection of letters close to 80% are in this category. In these letters, the correspondents not only included frank exchanges of views on political matters but, especially in the case of the Chinese ministers in Japan, there were many comments on the


88. *LWCKCT* passim.
Japanese political scene and many of such comments as well as advice and suggestions did not appear in these ministers' official reports to the Yamen. 89

Thus, Li not only have access to all the official reports which the Yamen had, but also had access to private information which the Yamen did not have. As a consequence, Li's expertise as well as his prestige in foreign affairs, especially when compared to those of the Yamen ministers became greater and more important.

Although, in the framework of political power at that time, Li Hung-chang was virtually the center of Chinese foreign policy formation, he did not have a completely free hand. One of the peculiarities of the Chinese political system was the phenomenon of "Censors and literati's opinion". There were certain influential groups who represented diehard conservatism in foreign policy, optimistic views of China's military strength, and an ignorance of foreign affairs. These groups inevitably influenced Li Hung-chang, who naturally tended towards moderation in foreign policy, to take a harder line. Every time there was a dispute with foreign countries they always cried out for war or for the taking of stronger measures. The activity of one group in particular composed of officials in Peking - which arose in the 1870's and was known as Ch'ing-liu tang, directly affected China's policy

89. Ibid., 621, 670, 672, 675; CKCJ passim.
towards Japan. This group was represented by Pao-t'ing
and other young politicians like Chang P'ei-lun, Chang Chih-
tung and Ch'en Pao-ch'en, who came to prominence in the mid
1870's and who were used by the Empress Dowager as a force
through which political checks and balances could be main­
tained. They were patriotic and anxious to strengthen the
country, yet they knew little of the international situation
or of conditions in Japan. Their severe criticism of
ineffectual diplomacy and their urging of the authorities
to take decisive action in foreign relations, brought most
of them greatly enhanced prestige and a series of promotions,
thereby increasing their influence.

This "pressure group" did not have access - as
Li Hung-chang did - to reports from Chinese missions abroad.
This meant its policies, which were not based on facts, were
dangerous for China. Li Hung-chang's responsibility to
devise correct policies, based on his mission reports, was
therefore heavy. When he was misled by false or careless
intelligence from the missions, it is no exaggeration to
say that China was making foreign policy "in the dark". 90

90. Other examples of the influence of this "pressure
group" may be seen in the case of China's repudiation
of the Ili Treaty and the threatened execution of
Ch'ung-hou, and in China's military action and more
positive policy towards Korea in 1882, Franco-Chinese
relations, and even the Sino-Japanese war.
(Hummel, op. cit. 48, 611; Tabohashi, Nissen kankei,
op. cit. B 564-566. Chang P'ei-lun Chien-yū-chi
(Hopec, 1918), tsou-i 2:2-12, 18-25, 28-38, 59-61,
63-66; 6:15-17) Li Tz'u-ming, Yüeh-man t'ang jih-chi
(Shanghai, 1920) passim.
The failure of China in the war shook Li's dictatorial power (of nearly 20 years) over the diplomats and the military. The Ch'ing again re-appointed Prince Kung to take charge of diplomatic and military leadership, and Li's political opponents Weng T'ung-ho and Li Hung-tsao were re-appointed to the Grand Council, making Li Hung-chang's position more difficult. On October 26, 1895 Li was dismissed from official rank, the Ch'ing army was put under the command of Liu K'un-i in December of the same year, and Wang Wen-shao was appointed Associate Superintendent of Trade in Northern Ports. When Li Hung-chang was appointed ambassador extraordinary for the peace negotiations, Wang was appointed as acting Superintendent of Trade in Northern Ports and as governor of Chihli, and even after Li Hung-chang concluded the peace negotiations Wang retained his post and Li was ordered to Peking. Li nevertheless, continued to participate in China's foreign relations. 91

He continued to play an important role in the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations. By inciting foreign intervention China tried to recover her lost territory and obtain more favourable terms from Japan. The triple intervention to force Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China seemed to be a success for Li Hung-chang's "pro-Russia" policy. The policy had led to the conclusion of the secret alliance

91. CKCJ, no. 2267, 2030, 3394, 3395.
between China and Russia, to the Russian occupation of
Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan and to her acquisition of the
lease; and finally, during the Boxer Uprising, it gave
Russia her opportunity to seize Manchuria. Li Hung-chang
continued to be the most important figure on the diplomatic
scene in this period, (1895-1901) until his death in 1901,
six years after the war. During this period ministers
abroad still kept in her direct contact with Li by wire
or letter, but the envoys appointed were not entirely Li
Hung-chang's men.

Governor and Viceroy were the highest civil
authorities in the provinces. They were not subject to
direct orders from the Grand Council or from the six
ministries, but only from the emperor. They too had the
right to express their ideas about the various diplomatic
problems. The Yamen had no control over their handling
of foreign affairs. Yet before the war their opinions
seemed not as strong as after the war. Two of the most
influential governors were Liu K'un-i, and Chang Chih-tung.
Their influence on policy decisions had gradually increased
because of their semi-independent power, based on their
respective personal armies and provincial treasuries. After

92. Shen Chien, "Chia-wu chan-hou chih Chung-0 kuan-hsi," in CSLT Series I, No. 6, 316.

93. Li Chien-nung, op. cit. 9; Ch'en T'i-ch'ang, op. cit. 98-99.
Li Hung-chang was dismissed the voices of Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i carried more weight. In the beginning they too supported the pro-Russian policy. When Russia was taking advantage of the German occupation of Kiachow wan to demand the lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien wan, the policy of two most important governors in southern China changed to one of favouring England and Japan and their opinions differed sharply from those of the central government; they even took initiatives in directly contacting Japan or England and by-passed the central government. In some cases the local governors overshadowed the Yamen's diplomatic powers and took upon themselves direct contact with missions abroad. Although this did not normally occur, a number of such cases can be found, particularly after 1895. During the time of the Boxer Affair, South China and Shantung, led by four provincial authorities (Liu K'un-i, Chang Chih-tung, Yüan Shih-k'ai, and Li Hung-chang) ignored the imperial court and refused to get involved in the Boxer movement. They negotiated with foreign consuls in Shanghai and also directly contacted Chinese envoys abroad. Among these the Chinese minister in Japan was one of the most important.

94. Shen Chien, op. cit. 316.

95. Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, op. cit. 35, 283.
In short, between 1895 and 1900 Chinese diplomacy could be regarded as controlled by Prince Kung, Li Hung-chang, Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung with the former two representing provincial government, and policies favouring England and Japan.

In the middle of 1898, soon after the beginning of the Hundred Days' Reform, the Empress Dowager sensed the danger from the emperor and the reform party and appointed Jung-lu, whom she trusted, as Viceroy of Chihli for the control of military force near Peking. After the failure of the reform Jung-lu's support for the Empress Dowager gained for him, in September of 1898, appointment as Grand Councillor and as Grand Secretary, and he retained full control of all the military and naval forces of North China. Yü-lu, who was also trusted by the Empress Dowager, took Jung-lu's place as the Viceroy of Chihli. 96

Yü-lu died in the Boxer movement and Li Hung-chang was made Viceroy of Chihli with the hope that he might make the best of the bad situation. Li died shortly after the signing of the peace treaty and on his death another prominent figure, Yuan Shih-k'ai, was given the position of Viceroy of Chihli. The central power of the government

was in the hands of I-k'uang and Jung-lu, and the important Viceroy's were Liu K'un-i, Chang Chih-tung and Yüan Shih-k'ai. Liu died in 1902 and Yüan and Chang remained the leading Viceroy's, Jung-lu died in 1903, leaving I-k'uang and Yüan the two most important figures of the nation, with Chang Chih-tung less powerful than Yüan. 97 Finally, about the time of the Russo-Japanese war, the central government was placed under the control of Yüan Shih-k'ai, until the death of the Empress Dowager and Kuang-hsü in November 1908.

Around the time of the Russo-Japanese war the Ch'ing government started many reforms in political, economic, and military unification and strengthening measures. 98 Yüan and Chang, two of the most powerful governors were in 1907 transferred to Peking as Grand Councillors, with the actual purpose of exerting more control over them, yet this ended in failure. Yüan was concurrently in charge of foreign affairs in 1907.

Yüan Shih-k'ai was dismissed shortly after the Emperor Hsuan-t'ung ascended to the Throne, and Tsai-feng, the younger brother of Emperor Kuang-hsü, became the central figure until the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty. 99

97. CKCJ no. 3834.
98. Ta Ch'ing li ch'ao shih lu, te-tsung ch'ao 562:8-1. (Tokyo, 1937).
From the Russo-Japanese war there were several new developments in Chinese diplomacy. We should mention here an important new factor which influenced policy decision. This was the rights-recovery movement, which was supported by the newly emerged trend of nationalism manifested in merchant guilds, provincial assemblies and the press, (all of which in some sense represented public opinion) and which influenced the government's diplomacy. Also, the revolutionary movement, and the confusion in domestic politics after 1908, finally led to the revolution of 1911; and Chinese diplomacy was profoundly influenced by these new developments.

Anti-Japanese feeling in China, and close at hand, the anti-Japanese feeling of Chinese students in Japan, influenced the stand of the Chinese ministers in their negotiations with the Japanese. However, the Japanese governments' increasing tendency to negotiate directly with government in Peking reduced the importance of the Chinese envoys.

VII. Finance of the missions

The loose control exerted by the Yamen over Chinese foreign missions was further reflected in its lenient policy towards the legations' expenditure. Before 1902 the only financial obligation of Chinese foreign missions was to send to the Yamen detailed annual reports of salaries, travelling expenses, rent and all other expenses
incurred in the operation of their missions. The amount of money they could spend was not fixed, and no restrictions on the sum were imposed. As there was no precedent in this matter, the Yamen had no basis on which to fix a budget.

The money to support the foreign service was to be derived from import duties collected by the Maritime Customs. The Shanghai Customs was assigned to keep the salary and expense accounts of all envoys and of the members of all legation and consular staff, and to remit annually the amounts necessary to meet these expenditures. The amount of revenue raised in this manner was actually enough for the legation expenses. (At the beginning six per cent of the total from import duties was allotted for the legation fund, later it was increased to nine per cent).

The fact that the fund was being used for other purposes was the main reason for the Yamen's considering measures to restrict the legations' spending. In 1886, because of the large amount of legation funds allotted for the expenses of commissioners on an observation tour abroad, the Yamen started to devise a plan of restrictions on finance

100. TSYC 3:15, 22-23.
101. Ibid., 11,12,15.
102. Ibid., 15; KCTHL I 296 (October 1876) 112.
of Chinese legation. As it proved difficult to decide where expenses should be cut back, in March 1887 it decided to reduce the amount of the salaries of legation members by 20 per cent. 104 The salaries formed fifty per cent of the total expenses. 105

Since ministers themselves could decide the numbers of the legation members, cases of ministers reducing the salaries of legation members by a certain percentage to cover the shortage of legation funds often occurred. There was no case of the legation staff raising any complaint about this. 106

On 30 March, 1897, the Yamen again sought imperial sanction to instruct various ministers to cut down their expenses. In this memorial, apart from mentioning the gradual increase of the legations' expenditure, the Yamen pointed out that borrowing by the Superintendent of Northern and Southern Ports and by the Naval Board were always treated as legations' expenditure, and that recently there had been many special missions despatched abroad for various ceremonial occasions. Furthermore there had been established new legations in France and Germany, and all of these factors had increased the amount of legation expenditure. 107

104. CTSKT 1023-1024.
105. Ch'en Wen-chin, op. cit. 294.
106. Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, op. cit. 300-301.
107. CTSKT 1021-1026.
Yet this remained in the form of a warning, and no effective measures were taken until 1902. In 1902 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the basis of past records worked out average requirements and restricted the amount of each legation's expenses (including salaries) to a certain amount. (United States 200,000 tael per annum, Japan 70,000, England 120,000, France, Germany and Russia 60,000 each). However, the amount and complexity of expenses in each country was not carefully considered. Therefore in May 1907 there was a further new regulation (of 20 articles). As the numbers of legation members had been fixed by this time, the amount of each legation's annual salaries could also be fixed. Other expenditures, like rent for the legation building, expenses on official banquets, documents, travel expenses, ..... (which were described as public expenditure) were also fixed by considering each legation's past expenditure. The date to remit the money to each legation, which was not fixed previously, was now fixed at four times a year, in January, April, July and October. The regulations regarding legations' funds were thus established, and the ministers' obligation to report annually the salaries and public expenditure to the Yamen was also abolished as a result. 108

108. Ch'en Wen-chin, op. cit. 283-287.
But what was the actual relation between the funds supplied to Chinese legations and their expenditure of Chinese legations? According to the statistics given by Ch'en Wen-chin, (pp. 295-298) (see chart), this relation displays certain noticeable characteristics.

The funds supplied to Chinese legations almost correspond to the expenditure of the legation. In most cases if the supply did not cover the expenditure, the difference was made up by the next year's fund supply. Before 1902 the expenditure of legations in major countries showed great uncertainty. The Chinese legation in U.S., Peru and Spain appeared to spend the largest amount of money, and the yearly variation was also the greatest, sometimes in excess of 100,000 taels. The legation in England too, though not particularly high in expenditure, showed great variation over the years. France and Germany showed considerable stability in their expenditure, with a gradual increase after 1895 to nearly twice the original amount. The legation in Russia was quite steady between the year 1882 to 1897, yet in the early period (1879 to 1881) and later between 1898 and 1892 it showed a great variation. The legation in Japan appeared to be the most stable of all in its expenditure throughout the period. Again, in Japan before 1894 there was usually a surplus of funds supplied, but after the war the situation was reversed, and almost always the expenditure could hardly ever be covered by the funds supplied.
Having discussed the regulations, composition and nature of Chinese foreign missions, it will now be helpful to concentrate on the mission to Japan, for in many ways - such as in the financial expenditure described above - it differed considerably from its counterparts.
EXPENDITURE OF CHINESE LEGATIONS IN JAPAN

![Chart showing the expenditure of Chinese legations in Japan from 1878 to 1911. The chart includes bars representing the amount of funds supplied and the amount of expenditure for each year. The expenditure ranges from 50,000 to 300,000 taels.](chart_image)
EXPENDITURE OF CHINESE LEGATIONS IN U.S., PERU, SPAIN

Year

Amount of funds supplied

Amount of expenditure

1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911

300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
CHAPTER IV

Distinctive Characteristics of the Chinese Mission to Japan 1877-1911

The organization of the mission to Japan, though governed by the same regulations as other Chinese legations abroad, had certain historically and geographically conditioned peculiarities.

For one thing, its legal basis rested on a treaty. It was established according to Articles 4 and 8 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce.¹ In this respect it differed from the missions to Russia and America, which were merely established on the basis of general principles of international law.²

For another thing, it differed from other Chinese missions based on treaties - those to France and England, for example - in that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce contained provisions not found in any other treaties concluded at this time. The treaty of 1871 with

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¹ For article 4 and 8 see JFO Vol. 4, d.153, 205, 206.
² In accordance with British Treaty of Tientsin 1858, China also could appoint representatives stationed in London. See article 2. (SKHT Ying-kuo tang B no. 755 p. 623, Fa-kuo tang no. 26, p. 29). On the other hand the American and Russian treaties only stipulated China's recognition of their envoys stationed in Peking yet have no mention about China's stationing envoys in America and Russia. (Ibid., Mei-kuo tang no. 93 p. 142, E-kuo tang no. 785 p. 52).
Japan was an "equal treaty", which possessed a bilateral (reciprocal) character, in contrast to the unequal treaties concluded by both countries with Western powers. Only the stipulation that the two countries would exchange representatives and establish consular missions in the open ports (articles 4 and 8) were identical with treaties with western countries. For example articles 8, 9, and 13 laid down that each would recognise the consular jurisdiction of the other.\(^3\) The Trading Regulations too, although providing for mutual treatment on the same level as that with Western countries, restricted the trading to the "treaty ports", and forbade Chinese and Japanese merchants to trade in the interior of each other's countries. (Trading Regulations Articles 14, 15).\(^4\)

There was no "most favoured nation clause" in the Treaty.

Because of these provisions, the functions of Chinese missions to Japan (especially the consular missions) were different from Chinese missions to other countries. The missions to Japan had the following special functions and features stipulated in the Treaty of Friendship and Trading Regulations of 1871. The consuls (of both countries) would enjoy consular jurisdiction and if there arose any case that concerned the subjects of both countries it would be tried by a joint tribunal presided over by local officers

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3. For article 8, 9, 13, see JFO Vol. 4, d.153. 206-208.
4. For article 14; 15 of the Trade Regulations of 1871 see Ibid., 216.
and a resident consul. The consuls (of both countries) were forbidden to engage in trade or to represent non-treaty countries as an additional office. If any consul's behaviour was unsatisfactory and there was concrete evidence to prove it, then each country could request the other country's minister to investigate the case and recall the said consul, thus avoiding the possibility that relations would be harmed by one person.\(^5\)

Since the mission to Japan possessed the special functions of consular jurisdiction, and could try Chinese residents in Japan by Chinese law, the special rule concerning consuls resident in Japan handling criminal cases was drafted by the mission to Japan and approved by the Yamen. The rule was aimed at solving the special situation of cases which occurred overseas. Though ordinary minor offences could be dealt with by the consul and settled in Japan, felony were sent back to Shanghai to be dealt with. It was found too difficult to bring all the witnesses involved in criminal cases back to China for trial and especially unsuitable to carry on executions in foreign ports. There were detailed provisions on how the consul should investigate the defendant and witnesses, and how to send the culprit back to Shanghai to be dealt with. The consul was required to send all

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5. CFMA-IV, Li Hung-chang to Yamen, July 2, 1871. See also p. 59.
judgements on criminal cases back to the minister to be rechecked. 6

The Chinese consuls in Japan were called "Li Shih kuan" indicated his function and consular jurisdiction. It should also be noted that the consul was directly appointed by the minister himself. 7 This was a further difference from the Western system, in which the consular and diplomatic arms were entirely separate, the consul being concerned only with commercial matters. In the Chinese system the consul and the envoy were not strictly differentiated and could be regarded as being part of a single system. 8 The consul was always appointed by the minister from his retinue. This interchange ability of function, and appointment by the minister, became an issue in the revision of the Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty after the war. The Japanese attacked the Chinese system as not in keeping with international usage, intending to use this as an excuse to deny the Chinese the right to station a consul in Japan. 9 But, although they had been deprived of consular

6. Special rule concerning consuls resident in Japan and the handling the criminal case in TSYC 4:12-14, seven articles for the handling the criminal cases are given in part in this source.

7. See the Regulation on the Chinese Foreign Service of 1876 in TSYC 3:13-16, also see Ch'en T'i-ch'ang, op. cit. 187-182; CKCJ no. 29.

8. Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, op. cit. 315.

jurisdiction in 1896, the Chinese did not change the system until 1907.10

Following China's defeat in the war of 1894-5, Japan was in a position to demand the same privileges as the Western countries enjoyed in their treaties with China. The negotiation of the new Commercial Treaty commenced on the 29th December, 1895, and concluded on 21st July, 1896. During the negotiations, Chinese representatives Li Hung-chang and later Chang Yin-huan argued strongly for the insertion of an article guaranteeing favourable treatment of Chinese subjects in Japan, the most favoured nation treatment of Chinese nationals in Japan, and the most favoured nation treatment for the Chinese consul in Japan; that is, the same privileges as that of the Japanese consul in China (enjoying consular jurisdiction).11 Chang Yin-huan was not successful as China signed a new treaty.

The position of the Chinese consul in Japan was stipulated in article three that as:

"His Majesty the Emperor of China may likewise appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents to reside at any or all of those places in Japan where consular officers of other nations are now or may hereafter be admitted, and saving in the matter of jurisdiction in respect of Chinese subjects and property in Japan which is reserved to the Japanese Judicial Courts, they shall enjoy the rights and privileges that are usually accorded to such officers".12

12. JFO Vol. 29, d.246. 473: S-I 617-618, see article three.
Chinese representative Chang Yin-huan made a last minute intended effort to insert the sentence:

"according to international law" under the wording "saving in the matter of jurisdiction in respect to the Japanese Judicial Courts", but he was unsuccessful. 13

This new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between China and Japan also provided most favoured nation treatment to Japanese subjects in China. 14 Yet despite repeated long drawn out discussions, Japan refused to allow reciprocal treatment to the Chinese subjects in Japan, and only agreed to exchange views with the Chinese government, 15 (concerning the question as to "In what way the Chinese subjects and vessels in Japan will be treated"). The Chinese wished to have it expressed by some means in the treaty and proposed a diplomatic note stipulating fair and equitable treatment to be granted to Chinese nationals in Japan. 16 The Japanese government at first instructed their delegates to reject it, because they feared that the Chinese government might attempt to construe the words "fair and equitable treatment" to confer


15. JFO Vol. 29, 401-403, notes concerning the sixth round of negotiations; 410, the seventh round of negotiations; 415-416, the eighth round of negotiations; 427-434, the tenth and eleventh round of negotiations; 449-453, the thirteenth round of negotiations; 458-462, the fourteenth round of negotiations.

16. JFO Vol. 29, d.252, 484a T. 163, Hayashi to Saionji, June 29, 1896.
upon Chinese subjects the right of admission into the interior of Japan. 17 Finally the Japanese delegate agreed that unless the protection of public peace and order demanded that it be otherwise his government would accord Chinese equitable treatment and deal with them in an amicable spirit. 18

The Chinese delegation demanded the alteration of the Japanese draft which stipulated the right of the Japanese Diplomatic Agent to reside with his family at the Chinese Capital, the appointment of Japanese consuls and the most favoured nation treatment of Japanese subjects, to make them reciprocal in accordance with the existing European treaties. 19

The Japanese government finally withdrew its objection to reciprocal provisions on the rights of Diplomatic Agents but ruled out Chinese consular jurisdiction and most favoured nation treatment to Chinese subjects. 20

"His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, may, if he sees fit, accredit a Diplomatic Agent to the court of Peking and His Majesty the Emperor of China may, if he sees fit accredit a Diplomatic Agent to the court of Tokyo.

The Diplomatic Agent thus accredited shall respectively enjoy all the prerogatives, privileges and immunities accorded by international law to such agents and they shall also in all respects be entitled to the treatment extended to similar agents of the most favoured nation.


18. JFO Vol. 29. 492-495.

19. JFO Vol. 29. 441.

20. JFO Vol. 29. 441-443; S-I, 616-617.
Their persons, families, suites, establishments, residences and correspondence shall be held inviolable. They shall be at liberty to select and appoint their own officers, courtiers, interpreters, servants, and attendants without any kind of molestation."\(^2\)

Therefore after the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1869, the rights of Chinese consuls in Japan and their Japanese counterparts in China were different. While Japanese consuls in China had consular jurisdiction and the most favoured nation treatment, this was not enjoyed by the Chinese consuls in Japan. Similarly the rights of Chinese nationals in Japan were different from those of Japanese nationals in China.

"His Majesty the Emperor of Japan may appoint Consuls-General, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents to reside at such of the ports, cities and towns of China, which are now, or may hereafter be opened to foreign residents and trade, as the interests of the Empire of Japan may require.

These offices shall be treated with due respect by the Chinese authorities, and they shall enjoy all the attributes, authority, jurisdiction, privileges and immunities which are, or may hereafter be extended to similar offices of the nation most favoured in these respects."\(^2\)

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I. Some Characteristic of Chinese Ministers to Japan

The method of selection of ministers to Japan was in accord with the methods governing the recruitment of missions to Europe and America. In the early period Li Hung-chang suggested to the Viceroy's that merchants and literati of Kiangsu and Chekiang, many of whom were engaged in active trade with Japan and familiar with the Japanese situation, be selected as consular officials. While the ministers to America at least before Ts'ui Kuo-yin, were all Cantonese there was no such clearly defined pattern in Japan, although it was in general dominated by persons from Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Canton, as in fact were most Chinese missions to other countries. Yet, as will be shown in the following examination of the background of ministerial appointees, few could be considered familiar with Japan's situation at the time of their appointment. During the period of this study, apart from Li Shu-ch'ang, none had served a second term and therefore continuity was poor. Perhaps in Li Shu-ch'ang's second term, and in the post-war period of Yang Shu, who had served on the legation

23. LWCK:IS 1:11.
24. Hummel, op. cit. 62.
staff in Japan, or Wang Ta-hsieh who had served as student controller before he was appointed, this condition of "familiarity with the Japanese situation" could be regarded as having been met to some extent. However, generally speaking there seemed no fixed standard of selection and as will be shown in the following section, appointees were quite diverse in their background and training.

If we look at the background and training of the men who were appointed ministers to Japan, we see that their training, qualifications and experience, their connection with the various authorities in China and their attitudes to the question of China's foreign relations and related questions of modernisation gave them common characteristics.

Most of those chosen as ministers between 1877 and 1890 had received no training in foreign language or law. They were all traditional scholars (particularly earlier appointees) and some of them had attained chin-shih degree. However there are two interesting trends noticeable in the intellectual scholastic background of the men under study.

First was the combination of traditional Chinese studies and an interest in foreign affairs. They were not just educated in the Chinese tradition of Confucian literati

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27. Sanetō keishū, Meiji Nisshi bunka kōshō, (Tokyo, 1943) 100-101; CKCJ no. 4826, 4829.
but they supplemented their traditional education with a knowledge of an interest in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{28}

Another interesting characteristic of the ministers is that most of them on attaining the first degree gave up traditional studies and either obtained positions in the mu-fu of Tseng Kuo-fan or Li Hung-chang or brought themselves to the attention of the emperor in some other way and thus obtained a position in the diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{29} Those appointed as ministers had various types of experience; for instance, one had had experience in introducing foreign technology into China.\textsuperscript{30} Many had experience as counsellors in other foreign countries.\textsuperscript{31} Some of the ministers were appointed directly from the mu-fu of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang to their ministerships in Japan.\textsuperscript{32} Considering

\textsuperscript{28} These appointees included Ho Ju-chang, Chang Ssu-kuei, Li Shu-ch'ang, Hsu Ch'eng-tsu, and Li Ching-fang. For biographies, see CYSWC:HSC 1; CKCJ no. 12; Yung Wing, Hsi-hsüeh tung-chien-chi (Taipei, 1961) 81-90; Ch'ing-shih kao 452 (lieh-chuan 233) 6; Shu-pao op. cit. 72, Hsu I-shih, op. cit. 1-4; Folsom op. cit. 129-130 respectively.

\textsuperscript{29} For example Li Shu-ch'ang, Hsü Ch'eng-tsu. See Li Shu-ch'ang, Cho-tsun yüan ts'ung-kao, Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng's preface; Shu-pao, op. cit. 72.

\textsuperscript{30} For example Chang Ssu-kuei, see Yung Wing, op. cit. 81-90.

\textsuperscript{31} These appointees included Li Shu-ch'ang, Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, Li Ching-fang. See Folsom, op. cit. 129-130, Ch'ing-shih kao 452 (lieh-chuan 233) 6; Shu-pao, op. cit. 72.

\textsuperscript{32} Yung Wing, op. cit. 81-90; Li Shu-ch'ang Cho-tsun yüan ts'ung-kao Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng's preface; Hsü I-shih op. cit. 1-4.
the importance of Tseng and Li in this period of foreign affairs, this tendency is understandable. Li Hung-chang's special position in foreign affairs after 1870 made the ministers' connections with him an important factor in Li's control over the conduct of Chinese policy towards Japan.

The majority of the appointees were natives of Chekiang, Kiangsu. This was in accordance with Li Hung-chang's proposal in the early stages to select diplomatic representatives from provinces which were close to Japan, as such people would be more familiar with the Japanese situation. The same consideration also governed the appointment of Chinese ministers to countries other than Japan.

All of the appointees were certainly more enlightened in attitudes than their contemporaries. For example, Chang Ssu-kuei assisted in the importation of Western machinery into China. He was also the first person to compare the European situation with that of the Spring and Autumn period in Chinese history. This attitude was indirectly different from the traditional Chinese attitude towards foreign nations. Both Li Shu-ch'ang and Hsü Ch'eng-tsu made proposals about reforms and brought themselves

33. Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 100-102.
34. LWCK:IS 1:11.
by doing so to the attention of the emperor. Many of them translated Western books or wrote books about foreign countries. Hsü Ch'eng-tsu translated American Treaties into Chinese and wrote a book entitled Mei-kuo feng-su-lūeh which was published by the Tsungli Yamen. Li Shu-ch'ang wrote many short accounts on the basis of his observations abroad among which was the Feng-shih Ying-lun-chi published in 1894. Ho Ju-chang was one of the few Hanlin scholars who studied current affairs assiduously when most of his peers still adhered to conventional studies. His familiarity with foreign affairs surprised Li Hung-chang. Li Ching-fang had even trained himself in a Western language before going abroad. However, it was not until the year 1891 that any graduate of the T'ung-wen kuan was appointed to the position of minister in Japan or any other place. From 1891 to 1894, Wang Feng-tsao, a T'ung-wen kuan graduate, served as Chinese minister to Japan.

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37. Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, T'iao-i ts'un-kao (Shanghai, 1885); Shu pao October 23, 1884. 72.


39. CYSWC:HSC 1-5.


41. Biggerstaff, op. cit. 149, 152.
graduate, was appointed minister to France in 1898, and between 1901 and 1911 eight other graduates were appointed as Chinese ministers in various countries of the world, including Yang Shu, minister to Japan from 1903 to 1907 and Hu Wei-te, minister to Japan from 1908 to 1910. Hu Wei-te was one of the comparatively small number of graduates of the Kuang fang-yen kuan who were sent to Peking for advanced study or an opportunity to take the special provincial civil examination given there between 1867 and 1890 at the T'ung-wen kuan. A surprisingly large number of these graduates rose to positions of importance later on.

But of the ministers to Japan between 1877 and 1911, only three out of the thirteen were graduates from the T'ung-wen kuan.

From the year 1877 onward, however, there were graduates of the T'ung-wen kuan on the staff of the mission in Japan. In 1879, out of the sixteen T'ung-wen kuan graduates stationed abroad, two served in Tokyo. In 1888,

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42. Ibid., 149-150.
43. Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 88; Yang-wu yün-tung, op. cit. II 88.
44. CFMA:E Hu Wei-te to Wai-wu-pu, October 8, 1908.
45. Biggerstaff, op. cit. 195.
46. These three were Wang Feng-tsao, Yang Shu, Hu Wei-te, see "T'ung-wen kuan t'i ming lu in Yang-wu yün-tung op. cit. II:87-89; CFMA:E Hu Wei-te to Wai-wu-pu, October 8, 1908."
out of twenty graduates abroad, there were two in Japan (one as vice-consul at Nagasaki). 47

After 1890 we see certain changes in the background of those selected as ministers to Japan. The principal new elements were:

Those appointed were better qualified with wider experience and training in diplomatic work; Wang Feng-tsao's appointment was a sign of this trend. He was followed by two more Tung-wen kuan graduates between 1891 and 1911. Out of the eight ministers appointed between 1891-1911, three came from Bannermen families and three had academic or educational connections. 48

The appointments of ministers after the war were influenced by a much greater range of people. This was due to the increasing diversity of opinion and the complexity of the political situation, particularly after the war. Before 1894 most appointments came through Li Hung-chang, but the post war appointments of Yü-keng and Li Sheng-to were due to the influence of Jung-lu. Ts'ai Chün's appointment was due to the influence of Liu K'un-i and the Japanese

47. Biggerstaff, op. cit. 149-150.

48. These appointees included Wang Feng-tsao, Yü-keng, Li Sheng-to, Ts'ai Chün, Yang Shu, Li Chia-chü, Hu Wei-te, Wang Ta-hsieh. For biographies, see ch., VI, section 5 and ch., VII.
II. Language Difficulties of Chinese Diplomats in Japan

In the year 1877 the Chinese court's attitude towards Japan was still one of estrangement. Among the leading members of the first mission, from the minister Ho Ju-chang down to senior members of the mission such as Chang Ssu-kuei and Huang Tsun-hsien, there was no one who could speak Japanese or any other foreign language. They had to rely on interpreters or to conduct conversation in writing. This latter was one of the unique features of the mission's method of communication in Japan. Some of the mission's staff had been engaged in trade in Nagasaki and Osaka, and P'an Jen-pang, for example, could speak some Japanese. There were few competent Japanese interpreters available in China, and the legation had at first to recruit them in Japan. Two interpreters in Japanese were hired at the legation. The consulates in Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki also each recruited a Chinese as a Japanese interpreter.

49. CKCJ no. 4627; kuo chia tang an chü, Ming ch'ing tan an kuan Wu-hsü pien-fa tang-an shih-liao (Peking, 1958), 167; Wen T'ung-ho, Weng Wen-kung kung jih-chi (Shanghai, 1925) December 12, 1894.

50. CKCJ no. 29.
This situation did not change significantly for a considerable period. In 1895 the Peking T'ung-wen kuan started a course in Japanese and engaged foreign professors to teach Japanese language from 1898. The Canton T'ung-wen kuan added a department of Japanese in 1897 and forty students enrolled in Japanese in that year.  

In an effort to solve the problem of the lack of interpreters of Japanese, the minister Li Shu-ch'ang, after obtaining imperial sanction, recruited students in Japan to study Japanese. The class was opened at the legation in October 1882. After three years' study the students who graduated from the class successfully were given a salary, but not until they had served three years and been found satisfactory were they given any official position or rank. Many of the graduates from this class became valuable interpreters for the legation.

Given that the source of supply of Japanese-speaking Chinese officers was so poor, it should not surprise us that none of the ministers to Japan during the period of our study could speak Japanese. But after the first mission, most of the ministerial appointees could speak English. Some of the legation staff who had long service in the mission in Japan gradually mastered the Japanese language and became interpreters.

51. Biggerstaff, op. cit. 42, 133, 139.
52. CKCJ no. 207, e.g. Lu Yung-ming.
There is no evidence that Li Shu-ch'ang could speak any foreign language before he accompanied Kuo Sung-t'ao abroad. Yet a few years' stay in the west seems to have enabled him to pick up some knowledge of English and perhaps a little French. According to the report of the Japanese consul in Tientsin, Takezoe Shinichirō, to the foreign minister Inouye Kaoru, Li could not understand even simple conversation in French and spoke the words of a toast in a very unfamiliar way. His English was probably not sufficient to enable him to have a thorough conversation with Westerners, and therefore Takezoe thought Li's English was not good enough to persuade a Westerner to his way of thinking over such cases as the Ryukyu incident. In negotiating with the Japanese, Li Shu-ch'ang preferred to communicate by writing. Once, in a letter to the acting foreign minister Yoshida Kiyonari, Li acknowledged that he should have called at Yoshida's office but explained that the interpreter Liang was on leave; he thought it better on this occasion to communicate by means of writing.

Li Shu-ch'ang's successor, Hsu Ch'eng-tsu, spoke better English than Li. He had lived six years in the West and had translated the Anglo-American Treaty into Chinese.

53. Record of conversation between Takezoe and Li Shu-ch'ang on Ryukyu incident December 4, 1881 in Sanjo monjo no. 273, National Diet Library, Kensei shiryo shitsu.

54. JFKC VII 348.
According to the Japanese acting foreign minister Yoshida, who met him in America, Hsü could speak fairly good English.\textsuperscript{55} We have also the evidence of the Japanese minister in China, Enomoto Takeaki, who mentioned to Li Hung-chang that Hsü had a rough understanding of English.\textsuperscript{56} However, there is no sign that he understood Japanese. Lu Yung-ming was the main Japanese interpreter at this time.

Li Ching-fang had learned English before he went abroad, and according to the description of the Tseng Chi-tse in October 1878, could understand it after only one year. Tseng thought that if Li Ching-fang continued to improve he would surely be able to read Western books and newspapers within a few years. His assiduous study of English had caught the attention of Tseng and Wu Ju-lun and later of Li Hung-chang himself.\textsuperscript{57} After a few years' stay in Europe (1886-1889) Li Ching-fang's English would presumably have greatly improved, and the records show that he acted as interpreter in an interview between Li Hung-chang and Ito Hirobumi when Li Hung-chang was in hospital after an attempt on his life during the Shimonoseki negotiations.\textsuperscript{58} As to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 368, 371.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} JFO S-I 378.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Hsü I-shih, \textit{op. cit.} 1-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Ito Hirobumi, ed. \textit{Kimitsu Nisshin sensō} (Tokyo, 1967) 194.
\end{itemize}
Li Ching-fang's Japanese, although Li Hung-chang stated in a memorial to the Throne requesting permission for Li Ching-fang to accompany him to Japan, that Li Ching-fang was familiar with "western and eastern languages (meaning Japanese)," it is doubtful to what extent his Japanese could be of use in actual negotiations. Apart from Li Hung-chang's testimony there is no definite proof that Li Ching-fang could speak Japanese before he went to Japan; when he travelled to Japan, the Japanese newspapers referred to his fluent English yet said not a word about his being able to speak Japanese.  

Wang Feng-tsao was the most eminent of the early graduates from the T'ung-wen kuan and was good at English. He translated five books from English into Chinese. This shows his familiarity with the English language, but Wang, too, was apparently unable to speak Japanese. The situation did not seem to improve after 1894-95 war. Yu-keng, the first minister appointed after the war, could speak good English (as could his wife and daughter). He was on good terms with the American minister Denby, yet it

59. LWCK:TK 79:55 and CKCJ no. 2746.
60. Asahi Shim bun Tokyo, January 7, 1912.
61. Biggerstaff, op. cit. 152; Tseng Chi-tse, Tseng-hui-min-kung i-chi (Taipei, 1964) ch. 3; Yang-wu yun-tung op. cit. II 87-89.
seems unlikely that he spoke Japanese. Yū-keng's successor, Li Sheng-to seemed to have spoken no foreign languages and had to rely on the interpreter Lo Ken-lin.

Ts'ai Chūn performed very well in his first year of office as Shanghai Taotai, and his capable handling of foreign affairs won for him the full support of the Japanese consul as well as that of the British and American consul in Shanghai. Yet there seems to be no evidence that he could speak Japanese or English.

Yang Shu was a graduate of the English course in the T'ung-wen kuan. He had, together with Ch'ang-hsiu, translated Tytler's *Universal History*. He served as an interpreter of Western languages in Ho Ju-chang's mission, and as counsellor and Western language interpreter in the mission of Hsü Ch'eng-tsü. He could speak English quite clearly. In one of his reports to the Yamen, he mentioned that because he still could not find a suitable interpreter in a Western language, and as he himself understood the language, he would do it himself. At that time negotiations

64. JFO:R "Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan: shina no bu", Odagiri Masunosuke to Tsutsuji Keiroku, Nov. 24, 1898, Conf. 61.
66. CKCJ, no. 29.
with the ministers of various countries in Japan were all handled by Yang himself until he found a competent person fully familiar with a western language. 68

Li Chia-chü, successor to Yang, could not speak any foreign languages. Both Hu Wei-te, graduate of the Kuang fang-yen kuan in Shanghai, and Wang Ta-hsieh, controller of Chinese students in Japan (1902-3) spoke no Japanese. 69

III. Knowledge of International Law of Chinese Diplomats

In general the Chinese ministers in Japan over the years developed some acquaintance with and understanding of international law and their grasp of international law seemed to be superior to that of officials in the home government. This lead to a divergence of views regarding such questions as political asylum after the 1894-95 war.

The Chinese ministers in Japan included some of the early Chinese experts in international law, as can be deduced from their translation of several works on international law and from the references to international law to be found in their correspondence.

Some of them had translated books concerning international law. For example Wang Feng-tsao had translated five books, including two on international law: Introduction

68. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Foreign Ministry, February 3, 1904.
69. Hu was a student translator in Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng's mission; see Hsü Ching-ch'eng, op. cit. Foreword.
to the Study of International Law by Theodore P. Woolsey and an article by Martin on "The Practice of International Law in Ancient China" and one on foreign law, The penal code of Singapore. Hsu Ch'eng-tsu translated Anglo-American Treaties into Chinese. Hu Wei-te had translated a Russian public law scholar's international law from French into Chinese. Beside this, Chang Ssu-kuei wrote a foreword to William Martin's translation of Wheaton's International Law in which he compared the European situation with that of the Warring States in Chinese history.

The arguments used in negotiation are further evidence of the diplomats' understanding of international law. It is obvious that Ho Ju-chang, in his negotiations with Japanese foreign minister Terashima Munenori over the Ryukyu question, had no idea of "sovereignty", which was the basis of the argument of his Japanese counterpart, even though "international law" was frequently mentioned by him in his argument. Moreover it was Ho's lack of knowledge of diplomatic usage that led him to send a note to the Japanese foreign minister worded so strongly that Japan used this as an excuse to refuse to discuss that particular question again.

70. Yang-wu yung-tung, op. cit. II 87-89, 91.
71. CFMA:E Hu Wei-te to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 29, 1909.
72. See Chang Ssu-kuei's foreword in Martin Wan-kuo kung-fa, op. cit.
73. See JFO:R-MC.
The successors of Ho, because they had a few years of foreign experience, were more used to diplomatic usage, and there was no repetition of this type of incident.

The ministers in Japan sometimes expressed in their correspondence ideas and opinions that suggest that they had advanced a fair way in their understanding of the relevance of international law to China's position. For example, Ho in his letter to Tseng Chi-tse and other important officials praised Japan's success in diplomacy and suggested that China should follow Japan's step to negotiate a treaty revision with the powers so as to have tariff autonomy and abolish consular jurisdiction. This suggestion was almost ten years earlier than Tseng Chi-tse's suggestion in 1889. Ho stressed that this sort of proposal would not cause any trouble or war with the Powers. The idea was quite progressive at that time when no one ever mentioned treaty revision in China. It was due mainly to his observation of Japan's experience in seeking treaty revision, yet it also shows that Ho's knowledge of international law had somewhat improved.

The development of Chinese knowledge of foreign countries also greatly contributed to the improvement of their knowledge of international law. Li Shu-ch'ang, for

instance, was strongly impressed with the functioning of English society - it seemed like the embodiment of the ideas of Lao Tzu and Mo Tzu on the one hand and of Mencius on the other - and its very complexity, with the combination of ideas that to Li seemed contradictory, was an introduction for him into the modern world\(^75\) and led to a better understanding of international law.

Li Sheng-to, in his obstruction of the Empress Dowager's attempts to arrange the assassination of K'ang Yu-wei, showed that he had made some progress in understanding of international law, and was better informed on the legal aspects of this question than the Chinese authorities at home.\(^76\)

The minister Hsü Ch'eng-tsu showed an advanced understanding of the role and power of diplomatic representatives of foreign powers.

"Those foreign diplomats" he wrote, "are here for friendly relations and the protection of their nationals, and are not able to decide important questions like war and peace. Therefore China should not be influenced by their threatening words."\(^77\)

From his experience Hsü made the suggestion about diplomatic methods that if the foreign diplomats demanded something

\(^{75}\) Li Shu-ch'ang, _Cho-tsun yüan ts'ung-kao_ 6:1-2.

\(^{76}\) Notes on conversation of Li Sheng-to's calling on Count Ito in _Ito monjo_ no. 171 in National Diet Library, Kensei shiryo shitsu.

\(^{77}\) Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, _op. cit._ 23.
disadvantageous to China, China should not just find some reason to put off the request, but should reject it firmly as soon as possible so that this could not be made an excuse for foreign threats and the eventual accomplishment of their unreasonable aims.  

In the case of the status of Korea, it is clear that the various ministers understood that there was some inconsistency between maintaining - as the Chinese did up to the war - that it was a "dependent state" and yet allowing the Koreans to manage their own foreign affairs. Even the earliest minister in Japan, Ho, suggested the appointment of a resident minister in Korea to manage the diplomatic and international affairs of that country. The purpose of this move would be to modify the Chinese idea of a tribute-paying country to fit the Western idea of a dependent country.  

Along with a growth in the understanding of international law came a realization that among nations, despite international law, might meant right. For example Li Shu-ch'ang in his letter to a friend observed that

78. Ibid., 22.

79. CYSWC: HSC 3:91-94; in Martin, Wan-kuo kung-fa op. cit. See Chang Ssu-kuei's foreword. The first international law concept that made itself felt among the Chinese was the idea of "relations between states" see p. 161 above.
"In foreign relations might is right. The strength of the country decides which side is right and which side is wrong. In external appearance they use international law to maintain and regulate mutual relations; yet in reality they use tricks to harm each other, as was the situation in the Warring States period in ancient China."80

Again Hsü Ch'eng-tsu thought that the balance of power of the Western countries was the main reason why China could avoid being invaded by them and he thought that the legal viewpoint of allowing the victor only to ask compensation or concession and not allowing him to ruin the vanquished, was simply geared to maintaining the balance of power.81

IV. Mission's relations with Japanese Official and People

Different Chinese ministers in Japan had relations of different degrees of warmth with Japanese government officials. The first envoy Ho Ju-chang, displayed a highhanded manner in handling the Ryukyu negotiations, as illustrated in his strongly worded note to the Japanese foreign minister,82 and his talks with Terashima. This

81. Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, op. cit. 21.
82. In his description of how Japan had prohibited the payment of tribute to China by the Ryukyu's Ho stated: "I cannot believe that a great country like Japan would foreshow friendly relations with us, would oppress a small country, act so contrary to good faith and justice or be so cold-hearted and unreasonable in its attitude". Ho note to Japanese foreign minister, October 7, 1878.
was probably due to his underestimating Japanese strength. That is to say that Ho's mission did not have an ingratiatory attitude in its negotiations with the Japanese. Yet generally speaking the mission got on especially well with the old scholars and Japanese sinologists, and was highly respected by them. At the same time they continued to have some contact with influential Japanese politicians, among them Okubo Toshimichi. In general, Chinese ministers in Japan before the war had to engage in active diplomacy. They kept in frequent contact with Japanese foreign ministers and other officials, during a series of negotiations over several political questions.

83. For example in the interview of March 11, 1879, Ho warned Terashima that if Japan sent the detachment China might send troops, and this would cause great inconvenience to Japan.

84. Ryukyu Islands U.S. Civil Administration Okinawa-ken shi (1965), 89.

Sanetō Keishū, Nisshi bunka op. cit. 67-112; Sanetō Keishū, ed. Okochi monjo (Tokyo, 1964), passim.


87. During its years in Japan the mission was engaged in negotiations with the Japanese government over several important issues: like the Ryukyu question, the Korean incidents, some of which precipitated crisis and the first phase of which culminated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; an important part of subsequent negotiations was the Manchurian questions.
One noticeable point is that most of the Chinese ministers kept in touch with powerful men in the Meiji government. Since the Satsuma or Chōshu men occupied most of the important posts, they tended to be more friendly with them. Chinese ministers were more interested in the Chōshu men and others who were friendly to China, while the Satsuma group, which advocated invasion of Korea, conflicted with China's policy. In Ho's time Okubo Toshimichi, Ito Hirobumi, Enomoto Takeaki, Ōyama Iwao, and Soejima Taneomi were the most influential figures. The Chinese minister's contacts were not limited to Ito and his followers who were considered to be more friendly with China, but extended to officials who were especially interested in China, like Soejima and Enomoto. Frequent contacts with Japanese foreign ministers Terashima, Inouye, and Mutsu Munemitsu, took place as a matter of course. Li Ching-fang tried to extend his contacts to the members of the Japanese congress.

As to the contacts with other foreign ministers in Japan, they seemed to have more intimate contact with British and American ministers than with ministers from


89. CPMA:E Li Ching-fang to Yamen, August 5, 1891.
other countries. Most of them felt Japan treated China differently from Western countries. For instance Li Shu-ch'ang wrote in a report to the Yamen:

"In 1882, when I first arrived, Japan's spirit was very proud. Japan regarded China as backward, and China was given second-class treatment compared to Western countries ...."

Hsü Ch'eng-ts'u expressed similar views:

"In all matters they admire the West. From the national level down to every day matters, they all copy the West, feeling self-satisfied and proud of being out of the ordinary. In receiving western officials and merchants they resort to flattery in the hope of winning favours, an intolerably unseemly sight. On the other hand in negotiating with China, Japan tends to treat China with contempt and insults, and to make excessive demands..."

In Wang Feng-tsao's time there was some contact with Russian ministers in Japan and Hsü Ch'eng-ts'u had contact with the German minister, but in most cases their contact could not be regarded as very close. Ho and Li Shu-ch'ang were highly respected and had frequent contacts

90. LWCK:IS 9:40-41; 9:41-45 Young to Li Hung-chang September 7, 1879 and Li Hung-chang's secret criticism of Ho; 9:10; WSCL 15:12; Executive documents 2nd Session, 46th Congress 1879-80 I Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1879 No. 278; CFMA:E Ho to Yamen, August 11, 1879; JFO:R-MG Bingham to Inouye, April 20, 1880, No. 84; LWCK:TD 4:26; and CKCJ no. 242.

91. CKCJ no. 816 and CFMA:E Hsü Ch'eng-ts'u to Yamen, October 25, 1885. "For further detail regarding Li Shu-ch'ang and Hsü Ch'eng-ts'u's view, see pp. 268, 285.

92. Wang Feng-tsao to Li Hung-chang, June 29, 30, July 2, 4, 1894 in Mutsu Munemitsu Bunsho Shorui no bu 79, Nisshin senso II 2 National Diet Library, Kensei shiryo shitsu.
with Japanese sinologists and old scholars, while with Hsu and Li Ching-fang and Wang Feng-tsao, these contacts were fewer.

It is also interesting to relate Japanese impressions of Chinese ministers, since these naturally effected success or failure of the Chinese mission. Ho was perhaps less popular than Li Shu-ch'ang among official circles while Hsu Ch'eng-tsu was perhaps the best liked. Li Ching-fang as a relative of Li Hung-chang who did not take part in important negotiations was not highly regarded. Wang Feng-tsao's judgement of Japan's domestic situation and other factors did not win him high esteem in Japanese circles.

The relations of Chinese ministers with Japan after the war were quite different from those before the war. (Comparatively they were more in favour of Japan). The first minister after the war and his family were described by Japanese newspapers as "too western" in their attitude. This man Yű-keng on his return to China gave information to the Japanese minister there, and in 1904 he and his family

93. JFO S-I 378; JFKC VII 368-71 and Sanjō Sanetomi monjo no. 273.


95. Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, July 6, 1899.

96. JFO Vol. 32, d.206. 328 and d.211. 330.
had to ask the Japanese government for protection. 97

After Li Sheng-to, the Chinese ministers had frequent contact with Konoe Atsumaro, head of the Tōa Dōbun Kai or East Asian Common Culture Society. Although the contact with influential statesmen like Ito and Enomoto remained the same, there was more to contacts with such members of the Tōa Dōbun Kai as Konoe and Nagaoka Moriyoshi. Support of Tōa Dōbun Kai policy seemed to be one of the characteristics of ministers' relations with the Japanese after the war. 98

The Chinese ministers in general supported the advocates of Pan-Asianism, and frequent attempts through Konoe's Tōa Dōbun Kai to influence Japanese policy were especially clear in the ministers Li Sheng-to, Ts'ai Chun and Yang Shu. Ts'ai was recommended by the Japanese consul

97. In 1904 there were signs that Yū-keng's wife and daughter were not as high in favour of the Empress Dowager as they had been previously, and Yū-keng and his family took the precaution of asking the Japanese consul general in Shanghai for his protection. The request was granted, although the Japanese minister was not certain of exactly what Yū-keng feared, because the past record of Yū-keng and his family showed that they were sympathetic towards Japan. (Documents relating to the confidential request for the protection of Yū-keng, former Chinese minister to Japan. November 1904 in JFO:R 1.1.2.34.

in Shanghai, Odagiri, and he was the first minister whose appointment seemed to have been influenced by the Japanese. 99

While Yang Shu's relations with the Japanese were not much different from those of his predecessor, his successor, Li Chia-Chü, was accused of refusing to receive everyone who wanted to visit him. In his defence, Li maintained he was too busy seeing Japanese officials, influential persons in political parties, and various ministers in Japan. 100

After the war of 1894-95, the importance of the Chinese minister in Japan began to decline, as the Japanese government now preferred to negotiate directly with Peking, rather than through the minister in Japan. The Chinese ministers in Japan kept up their contacts with influential Japanese, but their efforts did not carry as much weight as before the war. The Japanese government no longer regarded Chinese ministers as important enough to be able to settle anything without direct negotiations with Peking. 101

99. CKCJ no. 4627, 4639, 4664.

100. CFMA:E Foreign Ministry to Li Chia-chü, Feb. 9, 1908. Li Chia-chü to Foreign Ministry, March 2, 1908.

101. JFO Vol. 42, I, d.251, 281; also see d.250. 288 and d.258. 294.
V. Relations with Home Government

Having examined Chinese ministers' relations with the Japanese, it is equally important to examine the relations of these ministers with their own government and influential figures in China.

The first minister, Ho Ju-chang, was recommended by the Yamen, and in this sense, he could not be regarded as Li Hung-chang's man. Kuo Sung-t'ao was the one who recommended Ho as minister abroad, but later disagreed with him over his attitude to Japan. Ho kept in close contact with Li Hung-chang and the Yamen and took the initiative in Sino-Japanese negotiations over Ryukyu, yet he was unable to convince the Yamen or Li on his policies towards the Ryukyu question. However his efforts in trying to promote China's cause were in general appreciated by Li and the Yamen, and although Li Hung-chang secretly criticised Ho, stating that

"although he is very clever, yet he lacks experience in negotiation, and his temperament is too keen", his handling of the Ryukyu question and even his strongly worded note to the Japanese Foreign Ministry was defended by the Yamen's minister to Japan.

102. KCTHL May 1875. 67.
104. LWCK:IS 9:44-45.
"... in our opinion his statement set out the issue reasonably. We do not think that it was discourteous." 105

Chang Shu-sheng, acting Superintendent of Trade for Northern Ports said in a letter to Ho, that he even considered Ho a possible choice for Commissioner to Korea. 106 The criticism by American official Young and consul Denny of Ho's leakage of secrets and their opinion that

"Longer stay by Ho in Japan would not be of any advantage" 107

seemed to have no influence on the home government; Li merely referred the matter to the Yamen, and no action was taken. 108

Li Shu-ch'ang's relations with the home government were better than Ho's. He was a one-time secretary of Tseng Kuo-fan and also a good friend of Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng. 109 He was on good terms with other influential men like Tseng Chi-tse, minister to England. 110 Because of the support of

105. LWCK:IS 10:2; Notes relating to the interview of Shishido with ministers of Yamen, December 3, 1879 in Shishido Bunsho, Chu-shin kōshi jidai shorui, no. 10, National Diet Library.


107. For details for the American criticism of Ho's leakage of secrets, see pp. 208-210.


109. Li Shu-ch'ang, op. cit. see foreword.

110. Ibid., 4:67-68.
his friend Hsüeh, his suggestion of immediately sending an army to Korea was carried out, and the success of the operation induced Li Hung-chang to place more trust in him. The confidence the home government had in Li Shu-ch'ang is evident from the three months' extension of his term so that he could help Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, and from his later appointment for a second term in Japan.  

Li Hung-chang completely trusted Li Shu-ch'ang but did not regard his successor Hsü Ch'eng-tsu as a properly qualified person. For example he felt from his conversation with Enomoto that Hsü had reported incompletely on his talks with Inouye. (Enomoto defended him saying that it was not an easy thing to catch the drift of such talks and he felt that Hsü was a better diplomat than Li Shu-ch'ang and better received in Japan).  

Li Hung-chang was said not to be on good terms with Wang Feng-tsao. But an examination of many letters from Li Hung-chang to Wang suggest that on the contrary they were on very close terms and there seems no sign of any friction.  

111. "Shang Chang Shang-shu lun yüan-hu Ch'ao-hsien chi-i shu" in Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Yung-an ch'üan-chi (Shanghai, 1897) wen-pien 2:56.
112. CKCJ no. 275, 282, 288, 793.
113. JFO S-I 377-378.
114. LWCKCT II 532, 621, 630, 646, 648, 653, 672.
We should note that though many of the ministers sent abroad were Li's old friends or well connected with Li we should not take such relations to suggest that their reports and suggestions on policies were necessarily decisive in Li's formulation of policies. In spite of old friendship, the lack of success in the field might adversely influence Li's opinion on the minister's reports, advocacies and even Li's trust in the minister concerned. Two cases in point were Ho's lack of success in the Ryukyu incident and Hsü's poor performance in the Nagasaki Affair. The later Affair lost Hsü an opportunity for commendation, while Ho's intransigent attitude towards the Japanese government officials, for all practical purposes, nullified Ho's suggestions on policies as far as Li Hung-chang was concerned. On the other hand, Li Shu-ch'ang's successful handling of the 1882 Korean incident had greatly increased Li Hung-chang's trust in his minister's suggestions.

Of course, there were many factors other than the minister's ability and personal relations that Li Hung-chang had to consider in making any policy decision, such as the internal political situation or the influence of any policy option with Japan might have on other foreign powers, just

115. LWCKCT I 99-100.
117. CKCJ no. 793; LWCKCT II 510.
to mention two. But then, the issue of Li Hung-chang's decision-making process is not the case in point in this study, nor are we dealing with Sino-Japanese relations as such. Rather this investigation concern itself with the role of the Chinese missions to Japan in Sino-Japanese relations.

Before the war of 1894 there was seldom any case of direct relations between local governments in China and the legation in Japan. But after the Boxer uprising the cases of direct contacts between influential local viceroys like Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i, and the mission in Japan, increased. When Russia's intentions towards China became clear after her demand for the lease of Port Arthur, these local viceroys changed to a pro-Japanese policy and took the initiative of contacting Japan directly. The relations of the Chinese ministers in Japan with Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i were quite close. Li Sheng-to's relation with them were quite good. His successor Ts'ai Chün was Liu K'un-i's trusted man, had long been on Liu's staff and because of Liu's recommendation had been appointed Chinese minister in Japan. On many occasions in the Boxer trouble, the Chinese minister in Japan, when sending messages from the Japanese government to Li Hung-chang

118. JFAMT 1.1.2.12,0036, Conf. 5 Reel 8.
119. CKCJ no. 4627.
or the Yamen, sent copies to these two governors as a matter of course. Chang and Liu both expressed their opinions direct to the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{120}

Of the Chinese ministers to Japan appointed after the war, Yü-keng and his successor Li Sheng-to were both recommended by Jung-lu and their relations with Li Hung-chang could not be described as good. In an interview with the Japanese foreign minister, when the Japanese minister said Prince Kung and Li Hung-chang seemed to regard Japan's advice unnecessary interference, Li Sheng-to replied that the telegram represented Li Hung-chang's personal opinion and not the Chinese government's opinion, and then he even went so far as to point out that in many previous cases Li Hung-chang had blindly followed a pro-Russian policy.\textsuperscript{121}

On October 15, 1903, Ts'ai Chun was recalled before his term expired, without any specific explanation from the Chinese government. It is likely that student disturbances were one of the factors involved, for although the government agreed with his suggestion that student political activities should be curtailed,\textsuperscript{122} his handling of the Wu Sun incident had made him most unpopular with the students who by now (1902)

\textsuperscript{120} JFO Vol. 33, separate volume 2 Hokushin jihen, d.1379. 444b.

\textsuperscript{121} JFAMT 1.1.1.2 Gaimu Daijin no kaidan yōryō zakken, March-May 1901, March 1 and 4 1901.

\textsuperscript{122} CFMA:E Foreign Ministry to Ts'ai Chun, May 19, 1902.
were the main concern of the mission in Japan. Ts'ai was the first Ch'ing envoy to be replaced in this way. He had no intimate relationship with Chang Chih-tung, who was at the time the great promoter of sending students to Japan; that Chang did not fully trust him might have been a factor contributing to his replacement.

Yang Shu, who was also mainly occupied by student affairs and the control of students, seemed to get cooperation from the home government, especially from Chang Chih-tung, and also from the Japanese government in handling student affairs. However, he was finally totally frustrated by the student disturbances. His successor, Li Chia-chü was better equipped to handle students because he came from a background of experience in education, but he served only a few months before being shifted to another post. Hu Wei-te and Wang Ta-hsieh's positions in the government were higher than those of their predecessors. Wang was a Junior Councillor at the Foreign Ministry from 1906-8 and Senior Councillor at the Ministry of Posts and Communications from 1908-11. Hu Wei-te was Junior Councillor at the Foreign Ministry (1910) before being appointed minister to Japan.

123. CKCJ no. 4784. For Wu Sun incident, see Chap. 7, p. 379.
124. JF01:R-S, Yamazaki to Komura, September 21, 1902, Conf. 25.
125. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Foreign Ministry, July 19, 1907.
126. CKCJ, no. 5257, 5442.
This would have made relations with the home government more convenient.¹²⁷ Most of these post-war envoys to Japan also had contact with influential Japanese such as heads of schools and military academies and employees of the Ministry of Education.

VI. Modern means of communication

During the term of the first envoy Ho Ju-chang only one telegram had been wired to Li Hung-chang from Nagasaki.¹²⁸ In all the Ryukyu negotiations, in which Ho had a leading role, communication was by letter and usually took 16 days (see tables 3 and 4). Ho's successor, Li Shu-ch'ang effectively used the newly established telegraphic links between Japan and China to give immediate information to the home government for appropriate action.¹²⁹ From minister Li on, these telegraphic facilities were important to the conduct of China's diplomacy. This is illustrated in the two following cases. Because of China's direct telegraph link with Korea (at the time no direct connection existed between Japan and the Korean capital) the Chinese government became aware of the events of December 4, 1884 in Korea up to ten days ahead of the Japanese government,

¹²⁸ LWCK:TD 1:3.
¹²⁹ For Li's telegram, see JFKC VII 83.
which had to rely on Chinese information about the development of the situation until their own sources of information arrived. On the other hand the fact that Japan obtained a copy of the Chinese secret telegraphic code and decoded it in June 1894, made virtually every message from Chinese missions to the home government known to the Japanese. Unaware of the leakage, Chinese diplomats in the peace negotiations must have been greatly affected by this.

For the transmission of documents the first Chinese minister Ho Ju-chang had relied on a private arrangement with an official of the Shanghai China Steam Navigation Company, Wang Sung-sen who received his salaries and expenses directly from Ho. Later when the work was taken over by the Shanghai Document Office set up in 1876, the same person was again appointed in the new office in charge of the letters from ministers from Japan and still received his salary directly from Ho.

In practice, as far as the relations with Japan was concerned, the evolution of the system of communication between any two of the following three, the mission, Li Hung-chang's office and the Yamen may be summarized thus:

130. Tabohashi, Nissen kankei op. cit., A 1014.
131. Kimitsu nisshin sensō op. cit. supplement 15-17.
133. TSYC 3:26-27.
In the early stage mainly during Ho Ju-chang's period as minister, the official reports to the Yamen on all important questions were always followed by letters to Li Hung-chang with almost identical contents. The Tsungli Yamen normally referred to Li Hung-chang such matters for his opinion before giving any instructions to the mission. Though the actual conduct of foreign affairs still seemed to have been in the hands of the Yamen, Li Hung-chang on the one hand gave his personal opinions direct to the head of mission, and on the other hand he made suggestions to the Yamen on how to reply to the mission and even informed the Yamen of his communications with the heads of missions. The Yamen received more official reports including many of the mission's administrative matters, yet in all important questions the mission would report to Li Hung-chang as well and would seek his advice.

From Li Shu-ch'ang's time the mission sent more telegraphic reports. There appeared more and more reports from the minister to Li Hung-chang asking for his instructions and even requested Li to confer with the Yamen

134. LWCK:IS 8:1-4.
135. CKCJ no. 25, 36, 43; LWCK:IS 8:1-6.
136. CKCJ no. 22, 28, 29, 379.
137. CKCJ no. 36, LWCK:IS 8:1-6.
138. CKCJ no. 113, 220, 230.
on the minister's behalf. The Yamen thus gradually came
to hand over political matters on diplomacy to Li's office. Li was appointed plenipotentiary to almost all the important
negotiations. The missions also tended to write officially
to Li's office for his instructions and often received
Li's instructions directly. The position of Li in the
minister's mind, could well be illustrated by Hsü Ch'eng-tsu's
remark that all important matters need to "get the approval
of the home government and Li Hung-chang." Sometimes
even the Grand Council would instruct Li Hung-chang to
handle diplomatic matters personally or to advise the
mission directly. When this happened the Yamen would
be completely by-passed. Indeed, sometimes even the Yamen
would send instructions to the ministers via Li Hung-chang.

Finally, we shall examine, briefly, two secondary
means of communication that might have been used between
the overseas missions and the home government: firstly,
communications between the ministers abroad and the men
under Li Hung-chang; and secondly, those between the staff

139. CKCJ no. 337, 338.
140. WCSL, 76:6, 93:3, 93:16; LWCK:IS 17:27; 17:57.
141. CKCJ no. 339, 340.
142. CKCJ no. 338 annex 2.
143. CKCJ no. 385 annex 1.
144. CKCJ no. 431, 435, 466, 467, 518, 519.
145. CKCJ no. 1001.
members of the legations other than the head of legation with the Yamen.

That the ministers were allowed, indeed also insisted upon by the Yamen, to select their own staff meant that there would be loyalty and teamwork. There was, however, one exception during our period of study with regard to the missions in Japan. During the mission of Li Shu-ch'ang, a member of his staff, Yao Wen-tung conveyed his complaints to the Yamen through his friends in the T'ung-wen kuan. However, the Yamen ignored his complaints and did not take any action. 146

As to communications between the ministers abroad and men serving under Li Hung-chang at home, the situation was quite different from the above situation and expectedly so. In one way or another, as we shall see the ministers abroad and some of the men at home serving with Li had been colleagues or serving in the same mu-fu.

As far as the various missions to Japan were concerned minister Li Shu-ch'ang who served in Japan twice had very close relations with Li Hung-chang's staff member. Li Shu-ch'ang was a close friend of Li Hung-chang's secretary, Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng. Indeed, Hsüeh, as we shall see in Chapter 6, had effectively helped to carry out some of Li Shu-chang's

146. CFCC IV, 1884, 2037-2038; 2079-2080. See p. 257. for further detail.
suggestions. This was quite exceptional.

Minister Ho Ju-chang had close relations with a number of Li Hung-chang's leading lieutenants. These included Chang Shu-sheng, one of the original commanders of the Huai-chun and was made Acting Chihli Governor-General in 1882 when Li was mourning his mother. Ho also had contacts with his fellow provincial from Anhwei Ting Ju-ch'ang, an admiral in Li's navy, as well as communications with Kuo Sung-t'ao and Tseng Chi-tse. However, while Ho's communications with these people discussed both private matters and general political issues, there is no evidence to show that Ho had tried to solicit any of their support to influence Li or the Yamen to implement Ho's political suggestions.

As for the others, Hsu Ch'eng-ts'u had been a staff member of Minister Ch'en Lan-pin's mission to U.S.A. The latter had been a member of Tseng Kuo-fan's mu-fu since 1869. Li Ching-fang was, of course, Li Hung-chang's

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147. See pp. 263-264 for further detail.
151. Shu pao op. cit. 72.
adopted son. Minister Wang Fen-tsaо was closely connected with Tseng Chi-tse. All these old friends maintained their friendship whilst abroad. In their private letters home they discussed Japanese politics and likely influence on China, but they did not try to use their friendship to exert their personal influence or to implement their personal suggestions, as Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng did. Such communications amongst friends should not be taken as suggestions that the men under Li were strong enough to have a great effect on the various mission's reports and advisory activities.

VII. Finance

The financial situation of the Chinese mission in Japan has been examined in chapter three. The expenditure in general could be balanced by the funds supplied, and if this was not enough (often the case after the war) the difference was always made up later by the government. The amount of expenditure which had been quite stable, increased suddenly in 1894, owing to the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the one hundred days reform in 1898, and the Boxer trouble in 1900-1901 in which the Chinese mission in Japan was

153. Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 78.
155. LWCKCT passim.
TABLE 3

Time required for diplomatic letters

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<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>No. of days</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo - Peking</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ho Ju-ch'ang to Yamen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 1881 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>in CFMA:R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 1881</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo - Peking</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Li Shu-ch'ang to Yamen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 1890 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>in CFMA:R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 25, 1890</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Tokyo</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Shishido to Inouye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 22, 1879-</td>
<td></td>
<td>in Okinawaken shi, p. 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10, 1879</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Tokyo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ibid., p. 168.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 31, 1880 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 1880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking - Tokyo</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Komura to Mutsu</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 16, 1894 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>in JFKC Vol. 4, p. 73</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 30, 1894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time required for telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shanghai - Tokyo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one day</td>
<td>Mori to Terashima</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okinawaken shi, p. 39</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Tokyo - Tientsin</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 31, 1882</strong></td>
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<td>August 1, 1882 2pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>one day</td>
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<tr>
<td>or</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>August 1, 1882</strong></td>
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<td>less than a day</td>
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<table>
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<th><strong>Tokyo - Tientsin</strong></th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>June 17, 1894 3.55pm</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 hours</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>June 17, 1894 9pm</strong></td>
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deeply involved. As shown in the following classified table of expenditure of Chinese legations in Japan, 1894 was the year showing the largest amount in travelling expenses and miscellaneous items. This was clearly because of the closure of the legation which had to travel back to China, and also because of the telegraphic fee increase owing to the war. The sharp increase of the banquet fees and servants in 1897, 1898 and 1899 showed that in these years the mission's social and other contacts became more active.

A few features of Ch'en Wen-chin's table (see table 5 on p. 192) of the mission's expenditure can be explained by organizational changes in the mission, particularly changes relating to staff.

Salaries decreased sharply from 1902, because in this year Wai-wu-pu for the first time fixed the total which the legation was allowed to spend, and also reduced the number of the legation staff. 156

Li Sheng-to had already reduced the number of legation staff in 1899 to seven. Minister Ts'ai Chun in his report of March 22, 1902 pointed out that the mission was busier now and that more staff were needed, and also that the increase in the telegraphic fee had forced reductions in the staff in order to keep expenses at the amount fixed. 157

156. Huang-ch'ao chang-ku hui-pien wai-pien 18:43.
At this time and until 1907, staff appointments remained at the discretion of the minister.¹⁵⁸

The miscellaneous items consisted principally of telegraphic fees, purchase of books and translations, and other expenses connected with students.¹⁵⁹ In the years 1878 to 1880, during Ho Ju-chang's term, there were very few telegraphic costs, as messages declined in number.¹⁶⁰ In 1882, after the Korean incident, the advantage of telegraphic communication had been realised and expenses increased accordingly. Comparing the pre-war period of 1894 and in the years after 1900, the great increase in the number of students and the various tasks carried out for the provincial governments had increased the telegraphic fee to ten times the previous total, which in view of the fixed amount of total expenditure, made the legation complain of insufficient funds.¹⁶¹ The drop in miscellaneous expenses in 1900 is due to the fact that during the Boxer incident the legation was not active diplomatically and communications with the home government was interrupted for some time.¹⁶² Also student funds sent from the various provinces were sometimes

¹⁵⁸. Tung-fang tsa-chih Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1907) 15; Ch'en Wen-chin, op. cit. 278.
¹⁵⁹. Ch'en Wen-chin, op. cit. 294.
¹⁶⁰. LWCK:TD 1:3.
¹⁶¹. CFMA:E Ts'ai Chun to Wai-wu-pu, March 22, 1902.
¹⁶². CFMA:E Li Sheng-to to Yamen, March 9, 1901.
delayed, and the legation had to pay advances to the students.  

The marked increase in consular expenses after 1902 would probably be ascribed to the increase in volume of trade between China and Japan, which had almost doubled since 1895. Furthermore, if necessary, a provision in the new regulations provided for the addition of one clerk to each consulate and appears to have been used to increase the staff of the legation itself.

With regard to rent, for legation buildings the sharp drops in 1880 and 1902 have no clearly discernible cause, comparable to that which existed in 1894 when the legation was abandoned because of the war. Possibly the materials used by Ch'en Wen-chin in the compilation of the table were insufficient, or the mission may have delayed payment until the next year.

In attempting to evaluate the qualities of the various Chinese missions, the abilities of the diplomats concerned are certainly relevant. Experience, mastery of languages and of international law, an understanding of foreign affairs, all contributed to a diplomat's chance of successfully discharging his duties.

163. CFMA:E Ts'ai Chūn to Wai-wu-pu, March 22, 1902.
164. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, May 25, 1907.
165. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, March 12, 1907.
Before the war of 1895, the situation in Chinese missions everywhere was more or less the same; there was little continuity in staff, few envoys had lengthy stays in any particular country and few had an adequate grasp of other languages or of the principles of Western diplomacy. After the war, however, there was a tendency for envoys in Europe and America to have more experience in one particular country and a better knowledge of the local language than their colleagues had in Japan.

Despite the similar cultural and ethnical background of the Chinese and Japanese, there is little evidence that the Chinese diplomats in Japan enjoyed better relations with the Japanese people than their colleagues in other countries did with the local people, and few Chinese envoys appear to have learned Japanese.
### TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE OF CHINESE LEGATIONS IN JAPAN (IN TAELS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Official entertainment</th>
<th>Travelling expenses</th>
<th>Foreign Servants</th>
<th>Consulate</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>51,276</td>
<td>9,931</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>11,019</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>76,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>58,415</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>1,831</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>68,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>49,493</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>57,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>37,726</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>5,773</td>
<td>3,957</td>
<td>51,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>38,758</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>4,911</td>
<td>4,684</td>
<td>55,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>41,160</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>4,776</td>
<td>5,104</td>
<td>58,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>41,680</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>4,659</td>
<td>7,531</td>
<td>59,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>45,521</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>4,039</td>
<td>7,739</td>
<td>62,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>46,530</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>6,025</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>12,034</td>
<td>71,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>44,265</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>15,555</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>3,615</td>
<td>70,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>51,619</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>10,758</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>4,280</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>79,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>33,187</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>5,396</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>4,380</td>
<td>14,051</td>
<td>60,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>44,949</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>17,638</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>4,848</td>
<td>16,547</td>
<td>82,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>34,144</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>43,109</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>3,909</td>
<td>34,215</td>
<td>117,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>41,120</td>
<td>2,269</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>4,258</td>
<td>29,456</td>
<td>87,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>47,053</td>
<td>3,787</td>
<td>5,755</td>
<td>16,846</td>
<td>4,096</td>
<td>5,581</td>
<td>36,024</td>
<td>119,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>34,628</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>5,436</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>4,801</td>
<td>19,856</td>
<td>75,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>35,640</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,807</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>71,851(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>43,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,621</td>
<td>24,115</td>
<td>103,164(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>29,080</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>19,308</td>
<td>17,955</td>
<td>77,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>19,736</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>21,340</td>
<td>22,831</td>
<td>84,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>24,725</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>6,192</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>18,683</td>
<td>23,093</td>
<td>78,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>23,898</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>2,720</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>18,361</td>
<td>28,787</td>
<td>81,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>25,435</td>
<td>4,177</td>
<td>4,939</td>
<td>12,979</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>19,956</td>
<td>26,960</td>
<td>85,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>13,520</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>9,786</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>12,590</td>
<td>17,264</td>
<td>59,211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken from Ch'en Wen-chin pp. 305-307

See pp. 185-191 above for an explanation of this table.

(1) Including the expenditure of 24976 taels which had not been classified.

(2) Including the expenditure of 24468 taels which had not been classified.
CHAPTER V

The Foundation of the Mission and China's First Minister Ho Ju-chang

During the thirty years of Chinese diplomatic relations with Japan covered in this study (1877-1911), China was represented by thirteen ministers. Since there existed no precedent for these missions to follow, the personality of the minister-in-charge stamped the character of the whole mission. The first minister Ho Ju-chang (1877-1881) is of sufficient importance to require separate and somewhat detailed consideration. The greater portion of this chapter is devoted to the study of this very important minister.

Within the Chinese diplomatic system, the minister chose all his staff himself and was personally responsible for directing every aspect of the mission's activities. The views of any one minister were thus entirely representative of the mission as a whole. The study of the mission, therefore, can best be approached through a study of the individual ministers: their educational background, previous experiences, their relations with the home government, how much they knew about Japan, their personal views, as well as the manner in which they handled diplomatic incidents.

Although the four ministers who held office immediately preceding the war of 1894-5 came from different backgrounds, they held one feature in common: they had all
been recruited from the two most common training-grounds for diplomats at the time. Either they had served as counsellors in Chinese legations to America or Europe before being appointed minister in Tokyo, or else they had been language students in Peking's T'ung-wen kuan. All four of these ministers were faced to a greater or lesser extent with the problem of Japan's threat to Korea. Each of these ministers, again with the emphasis in their personal background and experience, are considered in chapter six. How they viewed Japan, how they assessed Japan foreign policy, all gave direction to their decisions and therefore affected the overall character of the Chinese mission.

Seven ministers represented China in Japan between 1896 and 1911. In general, more professional figures were appointed to the post. Diplomatic negotiations in this period, shifted to Peking and the office of minister became once more closely involved with consular duties and questions. After 1896 we can clearly see a general change in the character of the mission. This latter period is considered in chapter seven.

Ho Ju-chang, (Tzu-o, 1838-1891) the first Chinese minister to Japan, was a native of Ta-p'u, Kwangtung. He was born into a poor peasant family, and at 13 years of age was driven by poverty to give up schooling and tend cattle. However, before turning twenty, he had, with the help of relatives, worked his way through to the hsiu-ts'ai degree. In 1861, at the age of twenty-four, he became a chü-jen and
in 1868 a chin-shih. He was then appointed a pien-hsiu
(compiler of the second class) in the Hanlin Academy.¹

At this time the Taiping rebellion had just been
suppressed, and China was in the period of the so-called
"T'ung-chih Restoration".² Most of the gentry officials
were still infatuated with classical Chinese studies, even
though their country was threatened by the Western powers
and disputes over religious missions and foreign trade
occurred frequently. There were also members of the Ch'ing-
liu tang who, in spite of their high sounding phrases, were
ignorant and unaware of the foreign situation. If anyone
mentioned yang-wu (foreign affairs) they would cover their
ears or speak of the person as a "traitor to China".

Ho Ju-chang was different. While praised Tseng
Kuo-fan as the foremost classical writer of the Ch'ing
dynasty, Ho realised that the world had changed and that
those who stuck to tradition could not save the country.
He travelled frequently to Tientsin and Shanghai to maintain
contact not only with the gentry, officers and the merchants
of China, but also with representatives of the Western powers.
He sometimes visited British and American missionaries to
acquire some knowledge of their countries and politics.³ He

¹. Ch'ing-shih kao (Hsinching; [Chang-chun] 1937) 450.
². Mary C. Wright. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism.
The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford, 1957)
passim.
³. CYSWC:HSC 1.
studied current affairs assiduously, and his interest in them grew stronger after he had entered the national academy. Ho once visited Li Hung-chang, and surprised him by his familiarity with yang-wu. After the interview Li was heard to say that he had not expected any other Hanlin scholar to be familiar with foreign affairs. Ho was also recommended by Kuo Sung-t'ao as:

"one who became conspicuous among scholars of the calibre of the Hanlin Academy, yet who was not afraid to go abroad, and indeed his ideas on foreign affairs were more enlightened than others. He was suitable to be appointed as an envoy abroad".

But apart from his more enlightened attitude towards foreign affairs, a fact which led to his name being placed among the list of nine persons recommended as candidates for envoy, there is no evidence that he formed any specific views on the handling of foreign negotiations or that he had any special attitude towards or any special knowledge of Japan. At the time of his appointment as minister to Japan, Ho was forty years old and a shih-chiang, sub-expositor in the Hanlin Academy. Prior to this he had enjoyed no important political past.

The associate envoy appointed was Chang Ssu-kuei (H.Lu-sheng), a prefecture candidate at the time. Chang

4. Ibid.
5. WCSL 8:20-21.
6. CKCJ, no. 8, 12.
7. CKCJ, no. 12.
had formerly been in Tseng Kuo-fan's office as secretary. Together with Li Shan-lan he had invited Yung Wing to present a plan to Tseng for the importation of Western machinery into China. Yung was subsequently commissioned by Tseng to go to America to purchase machinery for what became the Kiangnan Arsenal.  

In his early years around 1859, Chang had been keenly interested in studying Western learning and was interested in books on astronomy and mathematics written by Li Jen-shu of the Hanlin Academy. He had written a foreword to William Martin's translation of Wheaton's *International Law*.  

Since Martin's translation of Wheaton was introduced into Japan in 1864 and reprinted in 1865 by Kaiseisho, the predecessor of the present Tokyo University, it held almost scriptural authority and had become a most important reference work. When the policy of opening up the country was being decided in the early Restoration days, Chang's name was therefore known also to Japanese of the last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate.  

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9. Martin, *Wan-kuo kung-fa*, *op. cit.* Chang's foreword. Wang T'ao, "Fu-sang yü-chi", in *Hsiao-fang-hu-chai-yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao*, Series 10. 313b. In which he gave a very clear description of the European situation and compared it with that of the Spring and Autumn period in Chinese history. According to Wang T'ao, Chang was the first to propound this theory. One of the implications of the comparison was that China should change her traditional attitude towards foreign nations.

I. The Mission's First Contact with Japan

Ho was appointed in January 5, 1877, but his departure for Japan was delayed until late 1877 due to the domestic disturbances in Japan where the rebellion of the Satsuma clan had not yet subsided. Shortly before his departure the Governor of Fukien sent his memorial to the Throne reporting Japan's prohibition of the Ryukyu tribute to China, the Throne therefore instructed Ho that, after his arrival in Japan, to investigate Japan's motives for this action. Li Hung-chang who held discussions with Ho in Tientsin, instructed him to handle the establishment of the consulate in Japan carefully and to avoid any disputes or rupture of diplomatic relations. This was because Mori Arinori had again urged China not to establish consular missions at various ports in Japan immediately, since this might damage the friendship between the two countries. Though Li Hung-chang disagreed with Mori, he felt that it might not be wise to act too quickly in the matter.

On November 27, 1887 Ho left Shanghai for Japan, his retinue comprising, among others, the following men: associate envoy Chang Ssu-kuei; counsellor Huang Tsun-hsien

12. CKCJ, no. 20.
13. CKCJ, no. 21.
(T.Kung-tu, 1848-1905), a distant relative of Ho, who had become a chû-jen in 1876. He had offered his services to the legation and been appointed counsellor; Yang Shu, who later became minister to Japan (1903-1907); and Yang Shou-ching (T.Hsing-wu, H.Lin-su, 1839-1915), who was well qualified as a calligrapher, epigrapher, geographer and bibliographer and who later collaborated with minister Li Shu-ch'ang in publishing a collection entitled Ku-i ts'ung-shu on Chinese rare books in Japan; and Dr. Marcartee, an American attached to the Chinese legation (at Tokyo) as an interpreter.

The mission boarded the Chinese warship "Hai-an", which was sent by the Ch'ing government to help exert pressure and to protect the envoys, according to the earlier suggestion of Li Hung-chang. While the despatch of a Chinese warship in order to display Chinese strength was unusual (and never occurred in Chinese missions to Europe and America), the scene of the mission's arrival at Yokohama on the afternoon of December 18, 1877 was even more significant.

16. CKCJ, no. 38.
18. CKCJ, no. 29.
On arrival Ho Ju-chang and Chang Ssu-kuei boarded a small steamship, and landed accompanied by fifty soldiers. The fifty soldiers immediately lined up on the wharf in two groups to lead the mission. The procession was headed by two banners with the Chinese characters "金鼓" (drum and cymbal). This was followed by four persons carrying gongs, followed in turn by two national flags and then half a company of soldiers, each with a rifle on his shoulder, and in front of this were two men with a diadem. Eight patrol signboards followed after the soldiers and then came the minister and his associate, each in a Chinese palanquin carried by four men, with two men at their side, each holding a long umbrella. They were followed by four men on horseback, two men with a diadem and another half-company of soldiers. Twenty or more Chinese merchants followed the procession. They made a round of the Chinese district, worshipped at the Kuan-ti temple, and were feted by the Chinese merchants. The same night the Chinese settlement in Yokohama was decorated with lanterns painted with national symbols, and was thronged with people.  

The warship "Hai-an" was open to visitors. All the processional instruments such as sedan chairs and banner were brought from China and the drill of the procession was

held repeatedly on board the "Hai-an". This behaviour, unlike any which occurred in Chinese missions to Europe and America, was clearly intended to display China's strength to Japan. The attitude taken by Ho's mission towards Japan at the very beginning, was still that she was a small, militarily weak and culturally inferior country compared to China.

The brilliant costumes and quaint customs of Ho and his staff might have dazzled the Japanese, and attracted many people from a great distance to see the procession of the mission, but a Japanese newspaper in Yokohama viewed it cynically as the "procession of a wheat-gluten vendor", and those who visited the warship were impressed more by its dirtiness and disorder. As the Yokohama newspaper put it, it was:

"ill smelling, and the scene of soldiers by the side of cannons eating, having their hair cut, gambling, taking a nap etc., was beyond discription".

Ho presented his credentials to the Japanese emperor on December 28, 1877. An office of the Japanese foreign ministry in Yokohama was offered to the mission as temporary quarters.

On January 15, 1878, Counsellor Huang was sent to Tokyo to acquire permanent premises. The mission settled
first in a Buddhist temple called Gekkaiin in Shibasandai, and later in November 1878 moved to the Peers Club, a two storey brick building, close to the Japanese Prime Minister's residence in Kojimachiku Nagatacho. Until the place was destroyed in the Great Earthquake of 1923 and the legation moved to Azabu, it remained the residence of the Chinese legation in Tokyo. It was repaired in minister Li Shu-ch'ang's time and completely rebuilt during the term of minister Li Ching-fang. (While it was being rebuilt, the legation was housed temporarily in the French legation).

Ho Ju-chang and Chang Ssu-kuei started to quarrel with each other from the very beginning of 1878. Disagreement over the appointment of staff seemed to be the main reason. All communications to the Japanese government or foreign ministers in Japan were signed both by Ho and Chang, but the actual negotiations were carried out by Ho Ju-chang. Chang, at the age of sixty, was rather overshadowed by Ho.

The discord came to Li Hung-chang's attention in the same year and Li hoped that the Yamen would make an early

26. CFMA:E Li Shu-ch'ang to Yamen, December 25, 1888, Li Ching-fang to Yamen, August 22, 1892; Sanetō, Nisshi bunka, op. cit. 67-70.
27. LWCK:PL 18:18.
transfer of Chang Ssu-kuei. However Li refused to become involved in the quarrel, saying in a letter to a friend that:

"this sort of thing comes under the jurisdiction of the Yamen, I am usually not involved in the detailed discussions". 29

The American consul Denny, who had accompanied Grant to Japan, confided to Li Hung-chang after he had returned from Tokyo that everyone knew that the minister Ho and his associate minister Chang were not on good terms. Li secretly intimated to the Yamen that Chang had not been on friendly terms with Ho for a long time and he had had to write to Chang to give him encouragement. Yet Li did not suggest that any measures be taken to remedy the situation. 30 Chang's discord with Ho did not, however, develop into open rivalry, such as instigating the staff to turn away from Ho or sending home malicious news about each other, as happened with Kuo Sung-t'ao and Liu Hsi-hung in England. 31 It remained on a level of personal displeasure with each other over internal matters 32 and the actual operation of the mission was hardly affected. The discord of Ho and Chang did not result from a difference of attitude towards foreign countries, in the way that Liu's anti-foreign sentiment contradicted Kuo's

admiration of the Western nations. Although the quarrel was widely known in Japan the matter was not as serious as the conflict between Liu and Kuo, and Chang remained at his post until 1881 when the three year terms of both Ho and his expired.

The peculiar Chinese system of envoy and associate envoy, who were the only members of the mission staff appointed directly by the home government, and whose position differed in virtually nothing except name, lent itself easily to disagreements. The envoy and associate envoy had to act jointly in many matters, including all communications with Japan or with the home government. In the case of the mission to Japan, the disagreements were only over minor internal administrative matters, and not over policy, and therefore had no great effect on the operation of the mission, but the example of the mission to England shows that the situation could become serious when ideological differences between envoy and associate envoy affected policy decisions. Personal disputes may have been a factor, but the system itself which put two heads in the same office was chiefly at fault. It was not surprising that the system was soon changed, and in the mission to Japan the post of associate envoy was abolished in 1882, when second minister Li Shu-ch'ang was appointed.

33. Immanuel Hsü, op. cit. 187-188.
34. LWCK:IS 9:44-45.
II. Contacts with the Japanese and Western Diplomats

The external relations of the Chinese legation in Tokyo under Ho were marked by close associations with the old-style scholars, writers and calligraphers of Japan. Envoys Ho and Chang were scholars themselves and so were many of their staff, and they were highly esteemed by Japanese scholars who frequently entertained them. Okochi Teruna, a former daimyō who visited the legation almost every other day and communicated with the legation staff in writing, left records of these contacts which filled a hundred volumes. Since many of the leading personages in early Meiji Japan were familiar with Chinese script and had a knowledge of the classics, the Chinese diplomats were able to form close friendships with Japanese politicians. For example, Soejima Taneomi, one time special minister to China had intimate contacts with Ho during his three year term in Tokyo, used to write Chinese compositions which he sent to Ho for comment and he also used to discuss with him the doctrine of the Book of Changes. This surprised Ho who said that:

"I did not expect that the scholarship of the sage, which had died out in China, would still exist in Japan."  

36. Sanetō, Nisshi bunka, op. cit. 71-78.
37. Sanetō, Okochi op. cit. 12, 229-242, Cheng and Saneto, op. cit.
Ho Ju-chang and Huang Tsun-hsien had commented also on the writings of cabinet secretary Inouye Kowashi, who had previously accompanied Ōkubo to China. Thus many Japanese used to ask the legation staff to correct or comment on their Chinese poetry compositions, or Chinese calligraphy.

There are records of other Japanese who had contacts with Chinese missions, such as Miyamoto Koichi, a secretary at the Japanese foreign office who understood some Chinese. Ordinary negotiations were in most cases discussed between him and the Chinese counsellor. Inouye Kowashi was secretary of the Dajokan (Cabinet) and most of the communications of the Japanese minister to China, Shishido, were said to have been drafted by him. Apart from Soejima and Ōkubo Toshimichi, ministers of the interior also visited the legation.

Itō Hirobumi and Enomoto Takeaki (minister to Russia, under-secretary, foreign office, minister of the Navy) and Ōyama Iwao (minister of the Army), were also on the record of contacts. The Japanese minister to China, Shishido, told Yamen ministers that Ho had frequent contacts with leading Japanese personages. Ho's mission's contacts were thus not

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40. CFMA:R Ho Ju-chang and Chang Ssu-kuei to Yamen, February 15, 1881.
41. Ōkubo Toshimichi kankei bunsho op. cit. I January 7, 1878, 365; Saneto, Okochi op. cit. 39.
43. Okinawa-kenshi op. cit. 89.
limited to the foreign minister Terashima and Inouye Kaoru, whom the mission frequently contacted over the Ryukyu negotiations, but also extended to influential personages such as Ministers of State, state councillors, and cabinet councillors. In this aspect Chinese ministers in Japan seemed to have had wider contacts than did their colleagues in Europe and America at the time. The minister also joined the Köakai, (Rise Asia Society) formed in 1880, whose organizer Sone Toshitora was a naval officer who had accompanied Soejima to China. He spoke Chinese and also had frequent contacts with the legation. One of the activities of this organization was to establish a Chinese language school.\textsuperscript{44}

In the Tokyo diplomatic circle, Ho Ju-chang saw British minister Harry S. Parkes and American minister John A. Bingham especially frequently.\textsuperscript{45} These contacts were facilitated by the interpreter Dr. Marcartee. The reason for the good relations with the American minister stemmed from Ho Ju-chang's belief that America was friendly to China, as well as being one of the countries which could have most influence on Japan. This had led Ho to write to Bingham, shortly after commencing his negotiations with Japan over the Ryukyu question,

\textsuperscript{44} Sanetō, Okochi op. cit. 69-70.

\textsuperscript{45} LWCK:IS 9:40-41; 9:41-45; 9:10; WCSL 15:12; Foreign relations of the U.S. 1879 no. 278; CFMA:R Ho to Yamen, August 11, 1879; JFO:R-MC no. 84, Bingham to Inouye, April 20, 1880.
to seek the good offices of the United States government, a move which did not produce any result. On May 27, 1879, in his letter to Li Hung-chang, Ho suggested asking America to undertake mediation of the Ryukyu question. Both the Yamen and Li Hung-chang repeatedly urged Ho to obtain the mediation of various foreign envoys in Tokyo, and Li also urged Ho to maintain constant contact with Bingham about the Ryukyu case.

Ho's intimate contact with the British minister Parkes has, on the other hand been the target of much criticism. Pro-American though Ho was, it is interesting to note that he was criticised unfavourably by the Americans, General Grant, Young and Consul Denny who accompanied Grant to Japan. Ho was unable to obtain an interview with General Grant, who refused to see Ho because he thought that he was too close to Parkes. In his letter to Li Hung-chang, John Russell Young,

46. WCSL 15:12; Executive documents 2nd Session, 46th Congress 1879-80 I and Foreign relations of the U.S. 1879 No. 278.

47. CFMA; R Li Hung-chang's reply to Ho Ju-chang, June 14, 1879; LWCK:IS 8:40.

48. CKCJ, no. 25, 32 and LWCK:IS 8:2.

49. LWCK:IS 8:49.

50. LWCK:IS 8:48-49. General Grant, Ex-President of America, arrived in China at this time, and Li Hung-chang, bearing in mind Grant's high reputation in America and the possibility that he might be re-elected again after going home, endeavoured to interest Grant in China's cause. Grant declined the request to act as Arbitrator but promised to use his good offices with Japan.

51. LWCK:IS 9:40-41.
who accompanied Grant throughout his eastern tour in the
capacity of private secretary, criticised the way Ho seemed
to confide everything to Parkes, who, in turn, appeared to
Young to be the person most active in stirring up the dispute.
While Parkes was still in Tokyo, Young felt that this would
certainly hamper the success of any negotiations. However,
Young was impressed by Ho's politeness and his modest attitude
and was reluctant to criticise him to his face.\textsuperscript{52}

Another of Ho's critics, Consul Denny, stated in
a letter to W.N. Petherick, vice-consul of the United States'
Service in Tientsin, that he thought Ho was not quite familiar
with the forms of diplomatic negotiation for, although Ho had
always regarded Parkes as a good man, every word he spoke in
secret to him was reported to the Japanese foreign ministry.
This brought about a dead-lock in the negotiations. A longer
stay by Ho in Japan then, Denny thought would be of no advan-
tage to China.\textsuperscript{53} After he had returned from Tokyo, Denny
confided to Li that the ministers of various countries and
the Japanese foreign ministry knew of all the confidential
and important matters in Ho's legation. It seems that there
may have been someone in the legation who secretly furnished
the information.\textsuperscript{54} Modern Chinese historian Wang Yun-sheng

\textsuperscript{52} LWCK: IS 9:41-45, "Young to Li Hung-chang", September 7,
1879 and "Li Hung-chang's secret criticism of Ho".

\textsuperscript{53} LWCK: IS 9:10.

\textsuperscript{54} LWCK: IS 9:44-45 Li Hung-chang's secret criticism of
Ho Ju-chang.
comments that Parkes was a famous China-hater and took every occasion to instigate trouble between China and Japan, in the hope that they would go to war with each other and he believes that Ho's too strongly worded note to Japan about the Ryukyu issue was the result of his having fallen into a trap set by Parkes.  

Ho's letters and reports to the home government and Parkes' reports to the British government however, show no trace of Ho's close relationship with Parkes. It is quite possible that Ho may have confided the developments in the negotiations to Parkes because the home government kept urging him to obtain the mediation of foreign envoys in Tokyo.

Although Li Hung-chang believed these accusations to be true, the rather high-handed manner adopted by Ho in the Ryukyu negotiations could be attributed to Ho's desire for China to take a more positive stand, especially in view of his opinion on the relative strength of Japan and China. There is little evidence to support the view that Ho had fallen into a trap set by Parkes. The tone of Parkes' secret report on the Ryukyu incident in which he declared that war between China and Japan is unlikely, that there are no war preparations in Japan, and that he considers such a war would be disadvantageous to British commercial interests in China, supports this view.

56.  FOCP 4718 Inclosure 2 in No. 16 H. Parkes to T. Wade Yedo, Sept. 3, 1879; No. 16 Parkes to Salisbury, Sept. 12, 1879; No. 11 Wade to Salisbury Peking August 18, 1879.
III. Ho Ju-chang and Li Hung-chang

Ho Ju-chang was not a particular friend or ex-mu-fu member of Li Hung-chang. Yet he sent frequent letters to Li, the tone of which, though not comparable to the intimacy which existed between Li and Kuo Sung-t'ao, were certainly cordial. Ho's missions made many suggestions and reports on the Ryukyu and Korean questions to Li and the Yamen, although most of his suggestions were rejected. Ho's endeavour to argue with Japan for a settlement of the Ryukyu question was appreciated by Li, even though it yielded no results. Li however, secretly criticised Ho, stating that

"although he is very clever, he still lacks experience in negotiation, and his temperament is too keen. His first communication to the Japanese foreign ministry was worded too sharply and consequently made the situation change for the worse."

Yet Li opposed his being recalled and he and the Yamen regarded the aforementioned criticism by the American as of little account, which could well show they did not regard Ho's behaviour as seriously wrong.
The home government's great trust in Ho's reports is well illustrated in the dispute over the alleged American proposal for a three-way division of the Ryukyu contained in Ho's report of August 11, 1879. When Japan later checked and concluded that there had been no such proposal, Li and the Yamen only suspected that Ho had been cheated by Bingham and that Japan and the U.S. had in fact secretly discussed division as a solution although the nature of such a division had not been specifically agreed upon; it never occurred to Li or the Yamen that Ho might deceive his own government.

Li Hung-chang felt that Ho and the Japanese government were at odds with each other (and that Ho was unable to negotiate with Japan), yet Ho's request to be recalled was opposed by the Yamen, and Li was also against any suggestion to recall Ho immediately.

61. See CFMA:R Ho Ju-chang and Chang Ssu-kuei to Yamen August 11, 1879 and CKCJ, no. 35.

62. LWCK:IS 9:44-45; 10:35, 37-38; CKCJ 36; JFO:R-MC 83 Inouye Kaoru to Bingham April 19, 1880; Notes of a conversation between Inouye and Ho Ju-chang on June 28, 1880 in Shishido Bunsho, 56-21 National Diet Library, JFO:R-MC 89 Inouye to Yoshida May 12, 1880; 84 Bingham to Inouye, April 20, 1880; Shishido Bunsho 56-20 record of conversation between Bingham and Ho made by Marcartee, May 1, 1880; JFO:R-MC 93 Grant to Yoshida June 19, 1880.

63. LWCK:PL 19:2.

64. See CKCJ, no. 32; LWCK:IS 8:25-26.
Ho's relation with Li Hung-chang's were made only through the discussion of Ho's reports and suggestions on official matters, and were seldom of a personal nature as were his relations with Kuo. Only once did Li secretly give any intimations of American criticism or his own opinion on Ho to the Yamen, and even then he did not suggest that any measures should be taken. In fact, he refused to become involved in the dispute between Ho and his associate Chang.  

Apart from his relations with Li and the Yamen, Ho also had contacts with Ting Jih-ch'ang, Liu K'un-i, Shen Pao-chen, Chang Shu-sheng, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Li Hung-tsao, and Chinese ministers to England Tseng Chi-tse and Kuo Sung-t'ao. It is worth pointing out that many of these men were connected with the defence of the south coast, or were governors of Fukien and Liang-kiang, and Tso and Li Hung-tsao were even political opponents of Li Hung-chang. Li Hung-tsao was the man who had recommended Ho as superintendent of Foochow Dockyard. Ho's attitude towards Japan was strongly criticised by Kuo, who wrote to him warning him that his attitude of contempt towards Japan would do harm to China.

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IV. The Mission as an Information Gathering Agency

The mission in Japan was the main source of information for the Chinese government on developments in Japan. The sources and reliability of this information and the suggestions which accompanied it doubtless had some effect on the policies of the home government. The methods pursued by Ho's mission in obtaining their information were varied. Their primary sources were newspapers, gazettes, and personal contacts with Japanese scholars, officials, ministers of state, councillors of state or cabinet councillors. With each of these Ho expected to maintain the most intimate relations possible. Other diplomatic colleagues were also prime sources. For example, Ho once visited the commander of a Russian warship to observe the naval situation, and information on Korea was obtained directly from a Korean good-will mission in Japan.


70. CYSWC:HSC 2:11; CFMA:E Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, November 12, 1881.


73. CFMA:E Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, August 27, 1878.

74. KH 538; CFMA:E Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, November 12, 1881, CFMA:R Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, April 21, 1881.
Ho's mission was not interested only in information bearing on political or diplomatic events. From Ho Ju-chang's writing and Huang Tsun-hsien's comment on aspects of Japan we can see that their principal concern was with trying to understand all aspects of Japan as they found it. Ho Ju-chang sent home his diary entitled "A Brief Description of My Mission to Japan" (Shih-tung shu-lüeh). In that work he described the information he had gained from various places in Japan during the time he was proceeding to his new post. For example, Chinese residents in Nagasaki, Kobe and Yokohama gave him some idea of the training situation of Japan and of overseas Chinese there, the names of trading goods, the amount of customs duties received, the mining management of engineering works and other such information. He also took note of Japanese manners and customs. He visited places of historical interest and gave a short description of his knowledge of Japanese historical figures such as Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Kusunogi Masashige, and the home of the famous historian Raisanyō whose works on Japanese history Ho had read earlier. This record of his travels also contained a great deal of geographical description, and, more important, short descriptions (one or two pages each) on many other aspects of Japan with brief comments by Ho. These included Japanese history, the new systems of Meiji Japan (including the political system, both central and local, the military system, the school system and the annual budget), Japanese geographical features, conditions in Japan, and
relations between China and Japan.  

While all this showed Ho's principal concerns in the few months after his first arrival and covered a wide range of topics, it did not go into anything deeply. Again in Ho's official reports to the Ch'ing government, Ho had more than once reported on the current Japanese situation. His principal interest was in Japanese financial, military and political affairs. He reported on the state of her finances, her military strength, the number of troops, warships, the state of their equipment, their condition, the state of fortresses; and on the movements of troops or warships. They dealt also with Japan's internal political condition, political unrest, the opening of the Diet, Japan's treaty revision, and especially the increase in import duty to achieve tariff autonomy.

75. Ho Ju-chang, "Shih-tung shu-lüeh" op. cit. passim.
76. CYSWC:HSC 2:13-14, 1-2, 7, 8, 12; 3:7 and 10.
77. CYSWC:HSC 2:2, 6, 7, 13.
78. CFMA:R Ho Ju-chang and Chang Ssu-kuei to Yamen, February 25, 1881; CFMA:E Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, August 27, 1878; Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, June 8, 1880.
80. CFMA:E Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, November 12, 1881.
There were few experts in this early mission trained in specific regions, like Japan, or in any specific field, military or otherwise. Ho and his staff worked as general practitioners of the diplomatic profession. Although to observe actual conditions in Japan carefully was one of the most important functions of Ho's mission, there seemed to be no expert observers among the legation members.

Counsellor Huang Tsun-hsien was an exception. During his term in Japan he was the busiest person in the legation, and all the official communications in the legation were first drafted by him. Huang wrote a detailed description of Japan in verse during his stay there. The book covered all aspects of Japan, the state of the country, manners and customs, dress and ornaments, arts, products, and his opinions on the new systems which Japan had adopted from the West. Another work, the Jih-pen kuo chih dealt with national history, relations with neighbouring states, astronomy, geography, government posts, organization of offices, population, taxes, public finance (national debt and expenses, currency and commercial affairs), military system, criminal law, learning and study, products and technology.

82. Sanetō, Okochi op. cit. 64.
83. In 1879 his "Peoms About Japan" entitled Jih-pen tsa shih-shih 2 chūan were printed by the Tsung-li Yamen.
84. Huang Tsun-hsien, Jih-pen tsa-shih-shih paseim.
The state of military preparedness was also reported on by Ho: since types of weapons were few and their design simple, he only reported the numbers in the army and the tonnage of ships in the navy, where ships were made, how many guns they carried, and what new ships had been bought. 86 A Japanese geographer, Kimura, was gaoled by the Japanese government for drawing up a map of Japan at Ho's request. 87 Economic and commercial questions in the sense of growing international trade and commercial rivalries did not have much space in Ho's report, his main concerns were the ability of Japan's treasury to meet the demands of military operations and the value of her paper money. 88 He did in a few reports mention figures on Japanese exports to China, and China's exports to Japan, 89 but while he noted Japan's demand for tariff autonomy and her balance of payments in international trade, he failed to see the importance of these two factors to the home country's economy. There was certainly no regular report of statistical tables of Japanese foreign trade or of any new machines. The main reason for this was that trade between China and Japan at the time was not very important. During the term of the first mission (1877-1881) the growth of trade between Japan and China was still very limited.

86. CYSWC:HSC 2:2, 6, 7, 13.


Taking 1880 as an example, Japan only accounted for 3 percent (600 million taels) of China's foreign trade, while England accounted for 77 percent (America 7 percent, Russia 2 percent). On the other hand, China's trade accounted for 17 percent of Japan's total trade in 1880. Even the types of goods traded were few. During the year 1879–1881 Chinese merchandise imported into Japan included rice, unshelled rice, soya beans, oil cakes, and seed cotton. Japanese exports to China included marine products, matches, wood, coal, ceramic ware (china and porcelain) and paper. The amount traded was also very small. This serves to explain why the reports of Chinese missions in Japan concerning commerce were so few. Reports on new machines and inventions, improvements in the accuracy of firearms for rapid firing like those which the minister to Germany, Li Feng-pao, often produced, or which Hung Chūh frequently discussed with Li Hung-chang, never appeared in Ho's mission's reports, mainly because Japan was not yet as industrially advanced as other countries. In general, the attitude of this first mission in their information-gathering activities was to survey Japan from as many angles as possible.

We now come to the question of the effects and usefulness to the home government of the mission's intelligence and

90. Nikka jitsugyō kyōkai, Shina kindai no seiji keizai (Tokyo, 1931) 207-209; Nihon kokusei jiten (Tokyo, 1953-58) I 878.
91. Asahi Shimbunsha, Nihon keizai tōkei sōkan (Osaka, 1930) 278-292 and 298.
93. LNCKCT 199-200 and 267.
advisory activities. There is plenty of evidence that the reports of Ho's mission were read by Li Hung-chang and the Yamen or by many influential statesmen with whom Ho had personal contacts. For example, in his important memorial to the throne suggesting that the settlement of the Ryukyu question should be delayed until the Ili question had been settled, Li Hung-chang clearly stated that, when he was considering the case, Ho's letter had just arrived and, feeling that the suggestions made in it were very sound, he had used Ho's arguments to support his own. Ho's reports were often summarised in memorials to the throne and Ho always got an answer, which indicates that his reports were rarely just buried in the files.

94. A succinct account of this well known event may be found in Hummel, op. cit. 746-747.

95. LWCK:TK 39:1-5.

96. CKCJ, no. 25, 32, 35, 36. Shortly before Grant left Japan, Ho on August 11, 1879 reported that he had interviewed the American minister Bingham and that Bingham has told him that he and General Grant had considered a proposal that the Ryukyu be divided three ways - between China, the Ryukyu, and Japan. The report from Grant to Li Hung-chang and the Yamen contained no mention of such a proposal and the Chinese government expressed some surprise at this. In March, 1880 Takezoe was sent to China to enquire privately from Li Hung-chang the opinion of the Chinese government on the question of the Ryukyus. At the second meeting between Li and Takezoe, Li showed Takezoe Ho's report of August 11, 1879 which described the alleged American proposal for a three-way division of the Ryukyu. The Japanese were concerned by these developments, and tried to ascertain the truth of the matter from Ho and from the Americans. Negotiations in Peking were brought to a standstill. Japan checked and concluded that there was no such proposal. The Chinese government suspected that Ho had been cheated by Bingham and that Japan and the U.S. had in fact secretly discussed division as a solution; that the nature of such a division had not been specifically agreed on; CFMA-R Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, August 11, 1879; JF0:R-MC no. 78, Takezoe Shinichiro to Inouye Kaoru April 5, 1880; no. 80, Shishido Tamaki to Inouye Kaoru, April 14, 1880; no. 83, Inouye Kaoru to A. Bingham, April 19, 1880; no. 84, A. Bingham to Inouye Kaoru, April 20, 1880; no. 89 Inouye Kaoru to Yoshida Jirō Japanese Minister to America, May 12, 1880; General Grant to Yoshida, June 19, 1880; Notes relating to the interview of Inouye Kaoru with Chinese minister Ho Ju-chang in Chu-shin koši jidai shorui, no. 10, Shishido Bunsho, National Diet Library.
In general the mission's reports were regarded as accurate by the home government. The dispute over Ho's report of August 11, 1879 was one illustration of the home government's and Li Hung-chang's trust in Ho's reports.  

However, Ho often attempted to weigh the consequences of a possible change in China's policy, or to assess Japan's future performance assuming there was no change in China's policy, for instance, the likely reaction of Japan if China took a firm stand on the Ryukyu question. Ho's reports tended not to be confined to factual information but rather offered suggestions for China's future policy. These always failed to win the full support of the home government, and this hampered the effectiveness of the mission's advisory activity as a source of information.

Before examining the mission's views on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, it will be useful to look at the kinds of information on which these preliminary assessments were based.

Ho Ju-chang's mission entered Japan at Nagasaki on November 30, 1877, then travelled by the same ship to Kobe, after which it visited Osaka, Kyoto, and returned to Kobe by

97. CKCJ, no. 35, 36.

98. LWCK:IS 8:2-4; Ho Ju-chang's letter to Li Hung-cahng May 29, 1878; CKCJ, no. 25; CYSWC:HSC 2:3-4, Ho to Tsungli Yamen, May 29, 1878; 2:6 Ho to Tsungli Yamen; 1:11-14; LWCK:IS 11:42-43.

99. LWCK:IS 11:43; 8:1-2, 5; CKCJ, no. 25.
train arriving then by the same ship in Yokohama on December 16. Their travel in the interior of Japan lasted about half a month. Then the mission spent some time acquiring permanent premises and settling down. During these few months the minister and his staff were able to make personal observations of Japan and the Japanese. Ho's "Brief Records of My Mission to Japan" was based upon his personal experience. The book was a travel record but it was also written to fulfil the official requirements of a diary and record of observations of foreign countries to be sent home. Apart from this book, Ho had made many observations on Japanese financial, military and political affairs in his official reports and private letters to the Ch'ing government and officials. 100

Among the staff of Ho Ju-chang's mission, Counsellor Huang Tsun-hsien managed to acquire some knowledge of Japanese. He tried to read Japanese books, engage in social contacts with Japanese literary men and begin a full-scale study of Japan. 101 In 1880 he started compiling a history of Japan which was to cover all aspects of Japan, and comparing Japan with China throughout. The work was interrupted when he was transferred to San Francisco as consul-general in 1882. When his mother

100. Ho Ju-chang, "Shih-Tung shu-lüeh" op. cit. passim
died three years later he returned home for the mourning period and found time to continue his work which was completed in 1887 under the title Jih-pen kuo chih.\textsuperscript{102} The book dealt briefly with the past and in detail with the present giving special attention to Western influences. It was an analysis of the current Japanese political situation in the early Meiji period based on past history and referring to new reforms.\textsuperscript{103} Realizing that the completion of the work would take a long time, Huang first wrote a very broad outline of Japan entitled Poems about Japan (Jih-pen tsa-shih-shih) which was printed by the Yamen in 1879. This book is almost the same in structure as the later Jih-pen kuo chih, while devoting a great deal of space to the social customs of the common people and to literature. This book can be regarded as a literary geography book, in contrast to the scholarly approach including many statistical tables, and exhaustive detail adopted in the Jih-pen kuo chih. In many places the Poems about Japan refers to Jih-pen kuo chih for detail. The Poems about Japan represented Huang's opinions on early Meiji Japan, especially the many new reform systems introduced during his two year stay in Japan. Many opinions he expressed in the kuo chih were different from those in the Poems.\textsuperscript{104}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid., fan-li 2.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Huang Tsun-hsien, Jih-pen tsa-shih-shih op. cit., see Huang's foreword in 1885 and 1890.
\end{itemize}
V. Evaluation of the Missions' Reports on Japan

In their task of discovering the "business" of Japan, both Ho and Huang tried to study Japan from all angles. What were their views on Japan? As their writings were the first survey of modern Japan by Chinese officials, we should here point out some of the characteristics of these preliminary assessments of Japan. Based on their official reports and private letters let us examine how Chinese envoys saw Japan and Japanese society.

Ho's letters to the Yamen and Li Hung-chang of May 29, 1878 showed clearly the view of Japan which he repeatedly presented to the home government. He said:

"The territory of Japan is not more than Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces, while their treasure is far behind Soochow, Changchow and Huchow. Japanese people are small, simple and gentle, only the people of Satsuma and Chôshu can claim to possess both ability and military genius. Even in extreme poverty and distress China is still better off and much larger than Japan. The Japanese minister of state, realizing the difficulty of the situation and wanting to turn to China for help, feels however that it might not be able to depend upon China, so Japan is obliged to follow Western systems, so as to check her strong neighbour. After abolishing the feudal clan system Japan introduced many reforms. The National debt exceeds 100,000,000 yen. Last year, because of the Satsuma rebellion, restlessness prevailed among the people, so the government again lightened taxes, and the country suffered more from the depletion of her Treasury. They therefore tried to raise a loan of 10,000,000 for their finance, but few would grant a loan. In recent years it has been covered by paper money only and, if Japan were to wage war, then all the arms and warships she bought from foreign countries would have to be paid for in actual money. The Japanese may have talent, but without rice how can they cook? Recently Japan has reorganized her military system, quartering troops on the peasants. Regular army troops
total 32,000, the navy not more than 4,000. There are fifteen warships, most of them old and unseaworthy, and several tens of cannon (guns), not all of them newly made. Of three British-made warships ordered, only one has arrived in Yokohama because of the shortage of funds. Though said to be iron-armoured, it actually has only one iron plate (a sheet of iron). Each warship costs only about 30,000 yen and is not very large. Moreover, the Japanese are still unskilled in the art of navigation and tactics and are no match for the Chinese navy. Her coast and ports are widely dispersed. She is busy with self-defence and has no time to think of invading other countries.

At the time the feudal clans were abolished, the Japanese government took over their paddy fields, repaying them by means of a hereditary stipend for fifteen years. This period is now nearly over, which means that those who have lost their income will become more impoverished and bitter against the government. This has been the cause of many rebellions in the past ten years. I believe that there will be internal rebellion if Japan goes to war with another country. Since the standing army is insufficient, Japan will have to muster reserves in case of war, and this might also incur the hostility of the people. Those in the government are not "light-headed men", and have carefully considered the conditions just mentioned. The poverty and weakness of Japan is known to everyone and cannot be hidden, therefore in recent years Japan has endeavoured to present a fine outward appearance though its internal situation is quite otherwise". 105

This view had been stated briefly more than once by Ho and also by Huang Tsun-hsien in his booklet "Strategy for Korea". There he had written:

"Although Japan presents a fine outward appearance there are in fact estrangement and discord between those in government and out of it, they do not move with one accord and the treasury is empty". 106


106. JFO Vol. 13, d.136. 389-398, annex 1, "Strategy for Korea" by Huang Tsun-hsien; LWCK:IS 8:3-5.
The description became an almost universally acknowledged truth to Chinese statesmen at the time and, in discussing Sino-Japanese relations, many of them based their opinions on and quoted from this description of the Japanese domestic situation. 107 Some of the noteworthy features of Ho's observations were as follows:

Firstly, he thought that those who held government offices were disinclined to act hastily and tended to be doves, while the men of the Satsuma clan were regarded as hawks. There was friction between the Satsuma and Choshu clans among those who held government offices. 108 In this case Ho only pointed out the external difference and did not analyse the reasons why they existed within the new Meiji government.

Secondly, he saw that Japan was in great financial difficulties over her modernisation programme, 109 and that her military forces, while sufficient to defend Japanese ports, were not strong enough to attack those of other countries. Ho pointed out that the number of Japan's regular troops and the strength of her warships were no match for the Chinese army. The old spectre of Japanese strength, stemming as it did from the time of Japanese coastal piracy

108. CYSWC:HSC 2:1-3, 6,8.
109. Ibid., 2:1-2, 7,8,12,13, 3:7, 10.
and expeditions to Taiwan, could, he felt, easily be exorcised by the present strength of China's own warships. Ho believed, moreover, that there were signs of internal rebellion stemming from the recent reforms and abolition of the Han (baronies).

The frequent occurrence of disturbances was regarded as a sign of deep-rooted dissatisfaction and there would be a possibility of internal rebellion if Japan went to war with another country.

The most interesting of his observations was on the new Japanese system of reform. The Chinese mission arrived in Japan in the early days of the Meiji Restoration. The system had just been set up and its organization was not yet complete. Ho commented on Japan's all-out westernization which extended even to clothes and houses; these Ho regarded as unnecessary. Some examples of his observation of the new and old system are given here:

"During the time of seclusion, Japan's customs were simple and frugal. But after the Meiji Restoration, there was an excess of imports and a great deal of money was spent on foreign clothes. Paper money was in use and, although Japanese people had confidence in it, their trust was not shared by Westerners... Recently they have adopted Western customs and from the offices down to the schools, in all the systems, tools, language, writing, they follow Western ways. But those statesmen or ministers of the previous dynasty, and those cultivated persons living in retirement, still live in the old style, talk about Sinology and are proud to retain old manners (customs)."

110. Ibid., 2:2, 6, 7, 13.

111. The Han had to be abolished and a prefectual system established in order to place administrative control in the hands of the central government.

112. Ibid., 2:2, 7, 8, 13.

Japan, a small country, has exerted itself to follow in the footsteps of England, intending to compete with England. Yet Japan's territory is poor and her people have no foresight. Once they learn Western ways, then they go along with all the customs, even those which are not necessary, or should not be adopted. Even today they copy in every detail, yet the disadvantages are apparent. The phrase 'outwardly flourishing, inwardly dried up' describes Japan exactly.\(^{114}\)

A popular petition to open the Diet was considered by Ho as evidence that the people and the emperor were not in accord.\(^{115}\) This observation shows how Ho's understanding of the political system and situation in Japan was coloured by traditional Chinese Confucian concepts and limited by Chinese political thinking at that time. He judged the situation from the Confucian point of view that the relation of the emperor and the people should be as parts of one body and hence in accord.

Ho appreciated the significance of Japanese moves for treaty revision, and commended this example to the home government. He stressed that Japan showed herself to be familiar with the key points of diplomacy in trying to seek treaty revision.\(^{116}\) Ho notices two main points. One was Japan's increase of import duty to achieve tariff autonomy, the other her control of foreign residents in Japan. Ho

\(^{114}\) CYSWC:HSC 3:7.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., 2:8, 3:6, 7.

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 3:7-9.
thought that consular jurisdiction might not be easy to change, yet he thought that control of trade and tariff autonomy were urgently needed. He suggested that China should avail herself of the opportunity presented by Japan's negotiation for treaty revision to make a similar move, and felt that this was safe because it was not Western practice to initiate war because of disputes over customs duties. \(^{117}\) Later, Ho also commented favourably on Japanese military achievements. He pointed out that the Japanese army of 34,000 and navy of 4,200, were said to make full use of every soldier, so that this number was sufficient. He emphasized that Japan, despite her domestic problems, had achieved some success in consolidating the army and navy which had already reached high standards. \(^{118}\)

Ho's understanding of the Meiji reform was still limited to the introduction of modern techniques to strengthen the navy and army, while his counsellor Huang was already aware of the civil rights movement. Ho's observation was not as deep as Huang's analysis, as will be shown later.

Huang's attitude towards Japan's reforms in the early part of his office wavered between doubt and belief, as we can see from his Poems about Japan. \(^{119}\) The special attention

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 3:9-11.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., 2:16-20.

\(^{119}\) Huang Tsun-hsien, Jih-pen tsa-shih-shih op. cit. See Huang's preface (1890).
he paid to the people's rights, and the democratic movement is worth noting. For example, he wrote:

"In the first year of the Meiji the Tokugawa Shogunate was abolished and the restoration of monarchical rule began ... Yet recently Western scholarship has been in vogue and there are some who advocate people's rights (democracy) like those found in the United States." 120

"Since 1878 the people in the prefectures have begun electing members to an assembly to confer on local matters. In general this follows the system of Upper and Lower Houses in Western countries. Yet this is not to say that the elections have reflected the people's demands, and the organization is not yet completely established." 121

Huang held many of the new systems in high esteem. Examples that could be cited include the postal stamp and police system, 122 which he regarded as the best among the Western systems 123 and the manner of using statistical tables, which he thought copied the best of Western methods. He was surprised by the quality of the new school system, but his view was that the schools concentrated only on Western scholarship and tended to regard traditional scholarship as of little use. 124 Many of the new systems he described but did not comment upon in Poems about Japan.

120. Ibid., 23.
121. Ibid., 57.
122. Ibid., 63-64.
123. Ibid., 76.
124. Ibid., 86-89.
Huang paid special attention to the civil rights movement and topics which related to Western methods. In the Kuo-chih, where he explained his ideas in greater detail, his doubts about Western systems disappear and he suggests that China should also adopt these systems. For instance, he believed that the reason for the popular petition to open the Diet was that the people had long received high-handed treatment under the old regime, and they naturally wanted to change the situation. Huang wrote:

"Since the Restoration Western ways had been adopted in everything, yet the establishment of Parliament, which was regarded as of the utmost importance in the West, had been delayed. The excuse of Japan's different national structure and uneducated public no longer satisfied the people. The government promulgated many regulations to control the people and when complaints followed the government claimed that this was the Western method. So now the people too were choosing what was the most convenient to them — using Western methods as an excuse to demand the opening of the Diet. All these things were interrelated and formed a natural trend which would not be stopped."

"Moreover, people who were bitter about the swindling activities of foreign merchants, the impoverished ex-Samurai class and high officials who had lost their jobs, and the writers of fiery newspaper articles and speeches on the subject, all added their voices to the petition for immediate opening of the Diet. For ten years, opinion was divided on this question, with even those who advocated opening the Diet disagreeing over how soon it should be opened, and whether to follow the system of England or Germany. The Japanese court had already given an edict providing for the establishment of a constitutional government but where Japan would go from there, Huang was not sure."125

125. Huang Tsun-hsien, Jih-pen Kuo chih op. cit. 3:10.
There was a marked difference between Huang's and Ho's handling of the problem and Huang clearly went more deeply into the subject. But Huang's *History of Japan* was published in later years, and its actual influence was not felt until after the war of 1895. Ho did not examine the political system deeply but only the army and navy reforms and as a result his suggestions did not go beyond strengthening the navy and army for a better foreign policy.126

The proclamation of the edict to open the Diet in 1890 was simply reported by Ho as follows:

"...After the proclamation to open the Diet, there was on October 21, another great change in various department heads, and five new vice-ministers were appointed. Moreover, there was a newly established House of Councillors to draft regulations following the instructions of the cabinet, probably for future drafting of the constitution of the Diet. Recently the punishment for political slander has become more severe than before".127

Ho's disapproval of Japan's new reforms undoubtedly affected the mission's activities. As has been indicated above, Ho's mission underestimated Japan's strength, and were confused and doubtful regarding the great changes Meiji Japan was undergoing at the time. The thousands of reports and suggestions to the home government were prejudiced above all by a feeling of cultural superiority because of Japan's past historical

127. CFMA Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, November 12, 1881.
cultural connections with China, of which the mission was reminded at every turn by the signboards on Tokyo streets and the Japanese who surrounded them seeking advice or samples of calligraphy, poems and so forth. The mission also reflected the angry mood in China over Japan's action in Ryukyu.

The first Chinese envoys saw only the power struggles, factional strife, and deep discord of opinions among the leaders of early Meiji times. They therefore placed too much stress on the confusion in Japan, feeling quite certain that China was far superior to Japan both in size and military might. This attitude was reflected in their many reports and suggestions which were full of attempted assessments of Japan's likely future performance, or conjectures of the possible consequences should China take a firmer attitude towards Japan.

Because the mission took such a superior attitude, they failed to see some important points upon which Meiji leaders were in fact agreed; namely the awareness that the political and economic modernization was essential to the strengthening of the country. The Chinese envoys' observation and appraisal of their information were limited by the development of Chinese political thinking at the time which saw only armaments as important and failed to appreciate the other factors necessary to make a country strong. The mission naturally made no attempt to assess the merits of Japan's political reforms and did not even think them worthwhile reporting. This was in a sharp contrast to the attitude of the missions in Europe and America, which reported their admiration of the Western political
system. In addition, new warships, armaments and other military developments were frequently reported on by the missions to Europe, while the mission in Japan rarely mentioned such matters and regarded the warships bought by Japan as inferior.

Of course Japan was not industrially advanced enough to produce her own warships, which, like China, she bought from the West. It is not surprising therefore that the mission in Japan was not concerned with this. However, on matters such as the spread of education, industrial development encouraged by the government, the political involvement of the public, and other reforms based on patterns in Europe and America, there were very few reports, Huang was the only exception, as he had already recorded these developments in his Poems about Japan, but, as mentioned earlier real influence was not felt until after the war of 1894-1895, when his other detailed work Jih-pen kuo chih attracted much attention. The other members of the mission seemed to concentrate only on reporting Japan's military strength and preparations. By contrast, Kuo Sung-t'ao and the early missions to Europe and America soon realised that there was something other than military strength which made the Western countries strong, and were favourably impressed by everything from political, legal and economic systems to technical and mechanical progress.

Reports from Japan on economic and commercial questions were therefore few, and were overshadowed by political questions. The few economic reports which were made seemed mainly concerned
with the deficiency of Japan's treasury and state of the balance of payments. Another feature of the mission's reports were the extensive knowledge of Japanese history they revealed. Many of their reports contained references to past events, such as the Taiwan incident, on the basis of which they predicted how Japan would act in a similar situation in the future. 128

The missions in the West attempted no such observations of patterns of behaviour of the countries where they were posted. Reports from the mission to Japan often contained information about coastal defences and other military intelligence, 129 showing that they always bore the possibility of an attack on Japan in mind. The missions to the "West, on the other hand, took for granted that Western countries were far stronger than China and rarely provided military information. They concentrated, instead, on the political system and other factors which accounted for Western strength.

VI. The Mission's influence on the Home Government

Ho's advice to the Chinese government on policy towards Japan was thus largely affected by his own attitude towards Japan. His mission's advice to the home government on the Ryukyu and Korean controversies with which they were largely preoccupied, are a good illustration of this.


129. Ibid., 2:2-3, 6-7, 13.
In discussing the Ryukyu question, Ho based his arguments on conclusions drawn from his observations of conditions in Japan. He concluded that Japan would not dare to engage in open conflict with China, and therefore urged the Ch'ing government to take a firm stand. He saw that the Ryukyu controversy could not be settled by pure diplomatic negotiations and that diplomacy would have to be backed by real military capacity. He hoped that war preparations by China might induce Japan to settle the Ryukyu question, which he saw as related to the wider problem of how China could maintain her hold on her dependent countries.

On the other hand Ho Ju-chang's advice to the goodwill mission from Korea, in which he urged Korea to conclude treaties with America, England, Germany, and France was also affected by the mission's attitude towards Japan. The booklet by Huang Tsun-hsien "Strategy for Korea" was handed to Kim Hong-jip, head of the Korean goodwill mission. In this booklet he suggested among other things, that Korea ally herself with Japan. The booklet underestimated Japan's strength and

130. CFMA:R Ho to Liu K'un-i, September 21, 1880; CYSWC:HSC 2:3, 6, 7, 13, 14.

131. CYSWC:HSC 2:3, 6, 12, 13; CKCJ no. 25, and CFMA:R Ho Ju-chang to Yamen, April 21, 1881.

132. A typical message from this booklet clearly shows that China had low respect of Japanese cf. "If the steamships of both countries can move freely in the Japanese sea, foreign invasion will have no chance of success; therefore Korea should be linked with Japan."
considered that Japan had no intention of invading Korea at this time. Russia was seen as the main threat. Ho's behaviour in his negotiations with the Japanese over the Ryukyu question also showed how he was influenced by his attitude towards Japan. Especially in the early stages of his negotiation with Terashima, the threatening tone of his diplomatic notes and the arguments used by Ho in the interview with Terashima illustrate this very clearly. Ho had endeavoured for some months to discuss the Ryukyu question with the Japanese government. Following two unsuccessful interviews with Terashima, he sent a note to the Japanese foreign minister on October 7, 1878. In his description of how Japan had prohibited the payment of tribute to China by the Ryukyus, Ho stated:

"I cannot believe that a great country like Japan would forswear friendly relations with us, would oppress a small country, act so contrary to good faith and justice or be so cold-hearted and unreasonable in its attitude."

Later in the note he seemed to imply that Japan had oppressed and insulted the people of the Ryukyus and presumed arbitrarily to change established practices. He hinted that Japan had ignored treaty obligations and crushed a small country. Other countries would be sure to condemn Japan's action. The Japanese foreign minister considered that this note was worded in objectionable terms and, on this and other grounds, refused

133. JFO Vol. 13, d.136. 389-394, annex 1, "Strategy for Korea" by Huang Tsun-hsien.

134. JFO Vol. 11, d.125. 271a-272a. Ho Ju-chang to Terashima.
to discuss the question with the Chinese minister. This showed Ho's lack of knowledge of international politics and his unfamiliarity with contemporary international diplomatic practice. Yet Ho's strongly worded letter could also be attributed to his belief that Japan would not dare to engage in open conflict with China.

The Chinese government's attitude towards Japan in the Ryukyus differed from its attitude towards France in Annam, and England in Burma. Annam, Burma and the Ryukyus were all dependencies of China, and the controversies all symbolized a foreign threat to China's traditional dependency system. Yet the different attitude of the Chinese government towards the Ryukyus as expressed in the Yamen's memorial was that the Ryukyus were beyond the seas and completely cut off from all places .... its loss or gain did not carry much weight, while Annam protected China's southern frontier so that its continuation or destruction was connected with China's security.

That China thought Ryukyu of little account, and from the very beginning regarded the Ryukyu's tribute as too insignificant for China to risk war over, was also clearly expressed by Li Hung-chang in his letter to Ho Ju-chang:

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135. JFO Vol. 11d. 126. 272a-272b, Terashima to Ho Ju-chang; d.128. 273a-b, Terashima to Ho Ju-chang.

136. JFO:R-MC no. 19 and 26, Notes of a conversation between Ho Ju-chang and Terashima on September 27, 1878 and March 11, 1879.

137. CFSL 2:16-17.
"Ryukyu is a small place, beyond the seas and completely cut off from all places .... near to Japan and far away from China .... Even if China wished to assist and rescue her neighbours, the geographical situation prevents it. China receives no great benefit from the Ryukyu tribute. Moreover if China accepted tribute from the Ryukyus but could not protect it, then China would be looked down on by all countries. Japan would not listen to arguments. It would not only be a waste of time but also absurd for China to use force to fight for a small tribute from a small country and for the sake of an empty name". 136

Li also seemed to stress the possibility that China's protest and Japan's fear of foreign intervention would restrain Japan from taking further action. 139 Even after Japan proclaimed its annexation of the Ryukyus on April 4, 1879, the Chinese government still misconstrued Japan's sending a new minister to Peking at that time as showing willingness on Japan's part to negotiate with the Yamen directly, and ordered Ho to stay and persist in trying to reason with the Japanese government, and to seek the help of the other ministers of the various foreign countries in Japan. 140

The good offices of General Grant was the only result of all the hopes of foreign mediation, and Grant's intervention did not produce any practical result. It was in June 1880 that the Japanese, having decided to take advantage of the Sino-Russian dispute over Ili, conceded that they

138. **LWCK:IS** 8:5.
140. **CKCJ**, no. 32.
would no longer insist on China's withdrawing the note of October 1878 and appointed Shishido Tamaki as minister with powers to negotiate the matter in Peking. China, fearing that Russia and Japan were in league - the impression Japan was in fact trying to create - appointed ministers of the Yamen to negotiate the matter with Shishido. An agreement was reached on October 21, 1880, but because of strong opposition from Li Hung-chang, the Chinese government announced that it would not ratify the agreement. Japan therefore refused further Chinese attempts to reopen the negotiations, and the Ryukyu question remained unsettled from that time. (China in fact never formally ceded the Ryukyus to Japan).

In the case of Annam, despite her slow action and cautious consideration of the consequences that might follow China's intervention, the Chinese attitude after April 25, 1882, showed that she intended to use force to deal with France, she sent an army to Annam and used Liu Yung-fu's army as the forefront to counter French military action. In Ryukyu, although

141. CKCJ, no. 43, 53; JFO Vol. 13d. 128. 375b-376a, Yamen to Inouye; d.126. 374a-375b, Inouye to Shishido, Private Letter April 20, 1880; JFO:R-MC no. 105, Inouye Kaoru to Shishido, August 31, 1880; no. 106, Inouye Kaoru to Tekezoe Shinichi, August 31, 1880; no. 107, Inouye Kaoru to Yoshida Jiro, Sept. 2, 1880; no. 114, Inouye Kaoru to Shinagawa Daisuke, September 29, 1880.


143. JFO Vol. 14d. 113. 272 and d.118. 275.

144. Li En-han, op. cit. 193.
China thought their army could well match Japan, she also believed that only by protest, supported by foreign countries would she be able to restrain Japan.\textsuperscript{145} Basically her attitude was still one of contempt for Japan's weakness while on the other hand, regarding France in Annam, China never considered for a moment that mere protest could stop the French.\textsuperscript{146} Ch'ing's policy changed to employing force to encounter France, taking the attitude of hoping that French action could be restrained by China's use of force. It was a defensive action and China was perhaps actually afraid to engage in war.\textsuperscript{147}

In his attitude to Annam, Li Hung-chang basically tried to avoid Chinese involvement and war with France, and when the prospect of war was great, he even suggested giving up Annam, regarding it as not worth fighting for and considering that even if China won,

"past experience shows that when Asian countries engage in war with the West, they may win at first, but eventually they will be defeated".\textsuperscript{148}

This is quite different from his attitude towards Japan in the Ryukyus in which he opposed the use of force, but never wanted to give up his argument of the strategic importance of

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\textsuperscript{145} LWCK:IS 8:1-2; CKCJ, no. 25.
\textsuperscript{146} LWCK:IS 12:43-44.
\textsuperscript{147} CFSL 3:17-20; Li En-han, \textit{op. cit.} 193.
\textsuperscript{148} LWCK:IS 14:9-10; CFSL 6:20.
\end{flushleft}
China's dependencies. Even when the Yamen, fearing a Russo-Japanese alliance, conceded to Japan, Li still used his influence to break the agreement and delay a settlement. Actually, during the negotiations with France over Annam, Li already agreed not to discuss the question of dependences, but China never made a similar agreement with Japan.

The Chinese government did not seem to consider Japan's presence in the Ryukyus as a great threat to China's security, while they considered France in Annam as a threat to the western frontier. This seemed to be connected with China's underestimation of Japanese strength, while they thought that in a war with France, China would eventually be defeated. In the end China was forced to agree to give up her suzerainty over Annam.

One year after the settlement of the Annam question, England began taking steps toward the annexation of Burma. In this case, the Chinese attitude was cautious, aimed at avoiding direct conflict with England. When England agreed to allow Burma to continue paying tribute to China, which was China's main objective, a settlement was reached peacefully. In a convention signed on July 24, 1886, the position of England in Burma was recognised by China while England permitted the tribute missions of former times

149. Li En-han, op. cit. 194.
The Chinese government's reserved attitude to the British in Burma contrasts with the strong protest in the Ryukyu or use of force in Annam in trying to maintain the system of dependencies, though the result was the same.

The fact that the Ch'ing government's attitude to Japan was different from that towards other countries is apparent from incidents like those described above. Let us now examine the extent to which the Chinese mission in Japan influenced the formation of this attitude.

Before the despatch of the first Chinese mission, China had no definite policy towards Japan. The mission's report of Japan's domestic situation, as described above, was able to persuade the home government of its authenticity. One of Ho's suggestions on the Ryukyu question, that of gradually reasoning Japan into compliance, or of inviting the ministers of various countries to arbitrate, was regarded by Li Hung-chang as the only practical solution and was adopted by the Ch'ing government. Yet this was not the solution to the Ryukyu problem which Ho preferred. He thought that if Japan would not listen to reason on this matter, China should use force in order to prevent further acts of aggression towards other

150. Chang Feng-ch'i, Yün-nan wai-chiao wen-t'i (Shanghai, 1937), 53-56.
151. CKCJ, no. 21, 25.
152. LWCK:IS 8:1-2; CKCJ, no. 25.
Chinese territories. He felt that unless China was willing to risk war, it would be impossible to stop Japan from annexing the Ryukyu, while if she took a firm attitude towards the annexation there would be no fear of war. Though the policies Ho considered best were not adopted and the policy which he thought second best was adopted, Li Hung-chang must have been largely influenced in his decision to break up the agreement between the Yamen and Japan by Ho's report about Japan's domestic situation and the policy he advocated towards Japan.

VII. The Establishment of Chinese Consulates and other Achievements

Although the Japanese government tried to delay China's establishment of a consulate (see chapter II), when Ho informed the Japanese government of China's intention of setting one up, it was acknowledged by the Japanese foreign ministry not more than a week after it received notification. The consulate in Yokohama and Chikuji was first set up on February 5, 1878, and Fan Hsi-ming was appointed consul. In June of the same year, the Kobe (Osaka) and Nagasaki consulates were established and Liu Shou-k'eng and Yu Shou were appointed

153. CYSWC:HSC 2:3-5.
154. CKCJ, no. 25; LWCK:TK 39:1-5. During Ho Ju-chang's term of office, the main areas of diplomatic activity were the establishment of the consulate, the Ryukyu dispute and the opening of Korea.
consuls respectively. In November the Yokohama consul was placed concurrently in charge of Hakodate. Each consulate had a western language interpreter and one staff member who were appointed from Ho's staff. Because nobody was familiar with the Japanese language in the first mission, Ho had to find interpreters in Japan itself, two in the Tokyo legation and one each in the consulates.¹⁵⁵

The setting up of the consulates improved the treatment of Chinese nationals in Japan considerably for they could now enjoy the same extra-territoriality as other foreign nationals in Japan. The Japanese government now found difficulty in controlling criminal offences of Chinese nationals, such as opium smuggling and gambling. In Yokohama, for example, the Japanese government at the Chinese consul's request, granted a special burial place and a hospital exclusively for Chinese nationals in Japan. On the other hand the request of Ho and the consul that Chinese be allowed to travel in the interior of Japan was rejected by the Japanese government, which intended to use this question as a bargaining point to get China to give most favoured nation treatment to Japan. In legal cases in which a Chinese and a Japanese were involved, the official from the plaintiff's country would sit on the tribunal of the court of the defendant's country. For

¹⁵⁵. CKCJ no. 29; Ho Ju-chang, op. cit. 5.
example, if a Chinese criminal case opened in the Chinese consulate, the Yokohama district judge would come to the consulate, or, on the other hand, if a Japanese were the defendant in a criminal case, the Chinese consulate would send men to the Japanese court.  

However, the Ryukyu question was undoubtedly the most important issue during Ho's term of office. On September 3, 1878, Ho began discussions with Terashima on the problem. Ho based his arguments on historical records and the old tribute theory, while Terashima laid greater emphasis on the idea of sovereignty in international law. As discussed earlier, Ho's strongly worded note to Terashima furnished Japan with a reason to refuse to continue the discussions and Ho's further attempts to deal with the question were unsuccessful, as were his attempts to secure foreign mediation. However, Li and the home government paid some attention to Ho's reports, especially those dealing with the proposed division of the

156. Yokohama, Japan (City) Yokohama-shi shi (Yokohama, 1958) IIIB 890-904.

157. JFO:R-MC no. 19, Notes of a conversation between Terashima and Ho Ju-chang, September 27, 1878.

158. JFO Vol. 11, d.125. 271a-272a, Ho to Terashima; d.126. 272 Terashima to Ho; d.128. 273, Terashima to Ho d.127, 272b-273a. JFO:R-MC no. 25 and 26, notes of a conversation between Ho Ju-chang and Terashima on March 3, 1879 and March 11, 1879.

159. Executive documents 2nd Session, 46th Congress, 1879-80 Vol. 1, Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1879 no. 278; no. 673, inclosure no. 2; no. 886.
Ryukyu territory, and the arguments for delaying settlement of this question until the Ili question had been settled. 160

Ho's mission was certainly active in international diplomacy, and attempted to improve China's international status through active diplomacy, yet inexperience in international affairs and Ho's attitude to Japan rendered the negotiations with Terashima fruitless, and Ho was unable to persuade the home government to adopt the policy he wanted. Thus, even though Ho was in active diplomacy his influence on the formation of Chinese foreign policy towards Japan was almost negligible.

Yet, Ho's mission was both active and effective in implementing China's policy of inducing Korea to open herself up.

Aware that it would be dangerous if China were to seek to continue its tradition of non-interference in the diplomacy of a tribute state, which might become a second Ryukyu, the Chinese government adopted the policy of trying to induce Korea to conclude treaties with the Western powers and to open trade with them. As there were direct exchanges of personal letters between Li Hung-chang and Yi Yu-won, a counsellor to the Korean king, Kojong, discussing diplomacy as the occasion demanded, the policy was to be implemented

160. CKCJ, no. 35, 36; LWCK:TK 39:1-5.
by Li's writing a letter to Yi to persuade Korea to adopt this policy. Ho Ju-chang had a more positive attitude and advocated that China establish a resident minister in Korea to manage the domestic affairs of Korea and her treaties with other countries.

The Yamen, however, considered that Ho's suggestion might cause doubt and misgivings to the countries involved, and only wanted to give secret support and protection. Although Ho's policy was not adopted, the policy of inducing Korea to conclude treaties with Western powers was more effectively pursued by Ho than by Li Hung-chang, who had implemented the Yamen's policy through the agency of Yi Yu-won. Although Li endorsed the plan it seemed ineffective. As Li himself pointed out, Yi himself was not entirely convinced, and in any case he later resigned his post. Li's practice of advising individual Korean officers as they appeared in Tientsin and thus seeking to influence or change Korean policy, seemed to produce no results, but he felt that this was the only possible course of action. The Chinese mission in Japan, however, had taken the initiative in certain matters, as we shall see, with more positive results.

161. CKCJ, no. 33, annex 1, and 34, August 21, 1879. Yi Yu-won had been secretly ordered by the king Kojong to seek instructions from Li Hung-chang about the future course of diplomacy.


163. LWCK: IS 11:43.

164. LWCK: IS 10:23 March 17, 1880; 10:15-16.
The Chinese mission achieved the aim of influencing the Korean court to accept Chinese policy. This was done firstly through contact with Kim Hong-jip, head of the Korean goodwill mission to Japan which arrived at Yokohama on August 11, 1880, and also through the impact of Huang's booklet, "Strategy for Korea" which was handed to Kim when he left Japan.

The first aspect in which the influence could be seen was in the change in Korea's attitude towards concluding a treaty with America. Apart from this her policy towards Japan became more favourable in view of the advice in the booklet that she should form an alliance with Japan.

Although the Yamen and Li did not adopt Ho's suggestion, that China take control of Korea's diplomacy, it did at least cause the Chinese government to make some changes in the old practice whereby dependent countries sent and received officials despatched through the Board of Rites. The Yamen sent a memorial to the throne stating that the old practice was not only time-consuming but also facilitated leakages of official secrets. All important and urgent matters concerning foreign relations should from now on be directly


166. LWCK:TD 1:3; CKCJ, no. 71, 72, 101 and annex 1-3, 102 and annex 1; LWCK:IS 13:7-8; LWCK:TK 43:34-36.

addressed to Korea by the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports and by the Chinese minister in Japan, who should watch for an appropriate time to guide Korea into enlightenment, and inform the Yamen at all times of the state of negotiations in order to avoid any delay. 168

Ho Ju-chang remained in Japan until the end of his three years term, when he succeeded Chang Meng-yuan as Superintendent of the Foochow Dockyard in October 9, 1883. 169 After China's defeat in the battle of Ma-wei on August 23, 1884, Ho was one of those who was banished to the northern frontier through Peking's punitive mood of the time. 170 After Ho's return, he was invited in 1888 by Li Hung-tsao, a leader of the Ch'ing-liu tang, to become principal of the Han-shen Academy. 171 However, according to Japanese records, one of Ho's pupils had said that Ho was doing financial business at Hong Kong. 172 In any case it is certain that Ho had left the government service. Ho Ju-chang might not have been advanced in his thinking compared with Kuo Sung-t'ao, who already could see the merit of western civilization and its political system, and his understanding was limited by China's traditional attitude of superiority towards Japan. Yet there

168. CKCJ, no. 71.
169. Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 72.
171. CYSWC:HSC 3.
172. Sanetō, Nisshi bunka op. cit. 214.
had been a great deal of improvement in Ho's thinking, particularly in his reports of good points of Japan, such as their success in consolidating the army and navy, familiarity with the key points of diplomacy in trying to seek treaty revision, especially increasing import duty to achieve tariff autonomy and so on. These were mostly observations he made when he was leaving the post. In general, however, Ho was still limited by the political thinking of the time.

But at least Ho had engaged in active diplomacy in the Ryukyu and Korean questions, though without success. Most of Ho's contemporaries felt that his failure was not his own fault, but was due rather to Japan's uncooperative attitude; and what Ho had done in Japan did not come under criticism from his contemporaries in China.

173. CYSWC; HSC 3:7-11.

174. LWCK: IS 10:2-3; JFO Vol. 12, d.104. 187b-188a Yamen to Japanese foreign ministry; Notes relating to the interview of Shishido with ministers of Yamen, December 9, 1879 in Shishido Bunsho Chu-shin koshi jidai shorui, 賞 賞 助 堂 和 式 代 書 輯 no. 10, National Diet Library.
CHAPTER VI

The Era of Active Diplomacy - Japan in the
Eyes of Chinese Envoys 1882-1894

During the period between Li Shu-ch'ang's first term and the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, relations between China and Japan were extremely active. The continuing conflict between Japan and China over Korea and other former dependencies of China, which eventually led to the Sino-Japanese war, required the two countries to engage in active diplomacy. The mission in Japan was always involved in negotiation of various important matters, and this was a feature which was peculiar to the Chinese mission in Japan during this period.

One of the most significant functions of the mission during the period was to assess Japan and the possible directions of Japanese foreign policy. The various ministers in Japan obtained different views of that country. It is interesting to observe and compare the impressions each gained of Japan, to assess how accurate these were and to examine the policy and approach each recommended. It is important to see how the views of the various ministers compared with those of the significant people in the Chinese government and to try to discern what influence the ministers' recommendations exercised on the formation of Chinese policy towards Japan.

While Chinese missions to Europe and America had no previous connections on which to base their knowledge of these
countries, her experience since 1840 had already made China aware of the military superiority of the West. They were concerned with trying to find out what made the Western countries so strong. Some of these ministers abroad saw that the reason was more than mechanical and military superiority, and reported their admiration of Western institutional progressiveness. On the other hand, the missions to Japan, although rather ignorant of the country where they were residing, were still influenced by historical connections and traditional views. They were largely concerned with finding out whether Japan's new national strength posed a threat to China.

I. Li Shu-ch'ang's First term of Office: 1881-1884

In October 1881, when the three-year term of Ho's mission expired the imperial court appointed Li Shu-ch'ang (T.Ch'un-chai; 1837-1897) as his successor. ¹ This change in ministers brought about several other changes in the operation of the mission. The staff of the mission was almost completely replaced, and the associate envoy system was abolished. In general, the new minister was more often criticized by his own staff than Ho had been, but he was also more highly regarded by the Japanese. Compared with Ho, Li left very few writings on Japan, and his methods of information gathering

¹ CKCJ, no. 82.
were not much improved, yet he seemed to be better at pre-
dicting Japan's moves and his reports were highly regarded
by the home government.

Li Shu-ch'ang was a mu-yu of Li Hung-chang and
closely connected with Li Hung-chang's advisers. There were
two noteworthy factors in his early career. One was his
study of politics (statesmanship) under Cheng Chen, and the
other was the presentation of a letter to the throne expressing
his opinion on the politics of the time. This was the first
occasion in modern history on which a person of the status
of senior licentiate had directly memorialized the throne.
His petition resulted in his appointment as a country magis-
trate under Tseng Kuo-fan and also led him to join Tseng's
mu-fu secretariat. He became Tseng's principal mu-yu secretary
and one of his principal writers. (Li Hung-chang was also one
of Tseng's mu-yu and Tseng relied on him for strategy). In
1876, as a third counsellor, he accompanied Kuo Sung-t'ao to
England and spent four years in Britain, France, Germany and
Spain. On the basis of his observations, he wrote many short
accounts, among which was the Feng-shih Ying-lun chi, published
in 1894 in the second series of Chen-ch'i t'ang ts'ung-shu. 2
At the time of his appointment as minister to Japan he was
Charge d'Affaires in Madrid. 3

2. Ch'ing-shih kao 452 (lieh-chuan 233) 6.
3. LWCK:PL 20:15.
On January 21, 1882, Li Shu-ch'ang left Shanghai for Japan. He brought with him an almost completely new staff, with the exception of Yang Shou-ch'ing and Yu Shou, consuls at Nagasaki. Yang was strongly recommended by his old friend Chang Yu-chao, who was related to Li Shu-ch'ang, to remain in the post. Also on Li's staff was Yao Wen-tung, who later wrote many books on Japan and whose position in the legation resembled that of Huang Tsun-hsien in Ho's mission.

The Chinese government sent the warship "Yu-yuan" to carry the mission to Japan. Unlike Ho Ju-chang, Li Shu-ch'ang later complained to Li Hung-chang about the sailors' lack of skill and unfamiliarity with the route, and suggested that more practical experience be introduced into their training. The subsequent report of Li Shu-ch'ang, giving special attention to Japanese naval expansion, may have arisen from this complaint.

Although the mission arrived by warship, there was no procession when Li's mission arrived at Yokohama on February 9, 1882. Ho's mission remained the only mission to hold such a procession.

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4. TNS February 15, 1882.
5. Yang Shou-ch'ing, op. cit. 22-23.
7. TNS February 10, 1882.
9. TYMS March 17, 1882.
10. TNS February 10, 1882.
The arrival of the new minister was reported several times by Japanese newspapers with brief notes on Li Shu-ch'ang and his staff as well as mention of the war vessel "Yü-yuan" on which Li arrived. Li Shu-ch'ang appeared to them to be around fifty years of age, dark in complexion, and a man of dignified appearance. His background and reputation as an able man and excellent scholar suggested to them that he was a carefully selected appointee. But the impression made by the warship "Yü-yuan" was quite different from that made by the Hai-an which had brought Ho's mission. This time the peculiar uniform of the Chinese crew attracted attention, and the rigid discipline of the Chinese seamen was praised by the Tokyo newspapers as:

"vastly different from those Western seamen who perpetrate outrages".

The warship was open to visitors in Yokohama and many even came from Tokyo to visit it. This second mission seemed more successful in impressing Japan with China's strength, as displayed by the accompanying warship, although Ho's arrival had been more spectacular.

Because the post of associate envoy had been abolished, conditions within the legation presented no problems of leadership, yet Li Shu-ch'ang's relations with his staff seemed not as good

11. TNS March 13, 1882.
12. TNS February 15, 1882.
as Ho's had been. While Ho had enjoyed the absolute confidence of his legation members, among them many brilliant men like Huang Tsun-hsien, Li Shu-ch'ang's staff did not seem to hold him in the same respect. For example, Yang Shou-ch'ing reported that Li's treatment of his staff always lacked politeness, and that he later had to apologise to them for his rudeness. All the staff members were required to stand up when talking with him. Yang considered him a straight-forward man, who spoke forthrightly to his staff but who could be manipulated by those who knew his weak points. Yang's own relations with Li Shu-ch'ang were never very happy. Yang was rebuked by him for inviting the son of a friend to the legation. Yang did not think he had done anything wrong, and when he was reprimanded by Li in his first interview, he immediately prepared to leave. Ho Ju-chang then advised Li to apologise personally to Yang, and Li complied. 13

Yao Wen-tung, another important member of Li's mission, criticized him for spending too much time shut up in his room reading books. He was, he said, "concerned only to enjoy a long life." Yao made this criticism in a letter to a friend who was studying at the T'ung-wen kuan, asking the friend to convey the complaint to the Yamen, as he considered it useless to approach Li Shu-ch'ang personally. Yao also complained that most of the legation members were concerned

merely about their clothes and food, and were unable to discuss important matters. This clearly shows that the relations between Li Shu-ch'ang and Yao Wen-tung were cold, and that Li Shu-ch'ang did not seem to pay much attention to his staff's advice. He thus behaved very differently from Ho Ju-chang who seemed to have always listened to the advice of his staff, particularly to that of Huang. Many of the drafts of the legation's communications which were drafted by Huang were endorsed by Ho, and their mutual relations were very harmonious.

Although this happy situation changed under Li, the mission's work does not seem to have suffered because of the deterioration of personal relations between the minister and his staffs. Yang's conflict with Li remained entirely personal, and although Yao's criticism reached the Yamen, no action was taken. This was probably due to the fact that the Chinese system gave the minister absolute power over his staff, and since there was no associate envoy in Li's mission, the Yamen took Li's word above any complaints from his staff.

Li had had four years' experience in Western countries, and this made the Japanese diplomatic circles cautious of him. They considered him familiar with the situation in Western countries, and felt that he was clever enough to base his negotiations on firmer ground than the Chinese arguments.

15. Saneto, Okochi, op. cit. 64.
regarding dependencies, as Ho Ju-chang had done in his negotiations with Terashima. His firm character was apparent in negotiations and this made an impression in Japan. One Japanese newspaper reported that Li had frequently negotiated with the Japanese foreign ministry and sometimes spoken with a threatening attitude, while Japanese officials in the foreign ministry had also laughingly described him as behaving exactly the same in this respect as did the British minister Parkes.

During his four years' stay in the West, Li had already met some Japanese officials, such as Inouye, the foreign minister, and Aoki Shūzo, though he admitted that he did not know them very well. Like Ho Ju-chang, Li Shu-ch'ang had frequent negotiations with Japanese officials over the Ryukyu and Korean questions. Li also seems to have kept up constant correspondence with certain Japanese, such as Miyajima Seiichirō and he came to know Cabinet Counsellor Matsugata Masayoshi through an introduction from a university graduate who was in constant correspondence with him. Li Shu-ch'ang was able through these contacts to sound out Japanese opinion on his proposals as for instance, when he suggested the restoration of the Han kingdom of the Ryukyus, as a possible solution to the Ryukyu dispute. The Japanese foreign minister also


17. TYMS February 22, 1883.
approved of these contacts as beneficial from Japan's point of view.  

Li's mission sought to ingratiate itself with those whose opinions carried weight in determining Japan's national policy, such as Itō Hirobumi, Mutsugata Masayoshi and Enomoto Takeaki. One of the letters from Li to Itō shows a friendly and informal tone:

"Last night at minister Enomoto’s place we had a drink and a pleasant talk in a very congenial atmosphere ...."  

In general, Li seemed more highly esteemed in Japanese official circles than Ho Ju-chang had been and his relations with the Japanese were marked by more tact and more familiarity with international diplomatic usage. This resulted largely from his four years' stay in Europe, as well as from his much better relations with the Chinese government following his reporting of the Korean incident of 1882. This made Japan wary of him. In his letter to Yamagata Aritomo, Inouye Kowashi reported having suggested to the minister of the navy that it


19. Li Shu-ch'ang to Itō Hirobumi in Itō Bunsho, March 22, 1882, National Diet Library, Kensei shiryō shitsu. That Li Shu-ch'ang could write to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi in such friendly and personal terms substantiates my point that Li Shu-ch'ang was highly esteemed in Japanese official circles. If this had not been the case, there would have been no occasion for such a personal letter.

20. On July 23, 1882, a mutiny occurred in the Korean army at Seoul. Involving many civilians it turned into an anti-Japanese riot and the Japanese legation was attacked. See p.272 for further detail.
was the worst policy to say honeyed words to Li Shu-ch'ang, since this would only make Japan look weak to him. 21

Like his predecessor, Li Shu-ch'ang was held in high esteem in Tokyo by the old style sinologists, writers and calligraphers of Japan. The only difference was that, in Li Shu-ch'ang's time, sessions for writing poems were held on a larger scale and occurred at fixed times. The Japanese literary men who joined the poem-writing sessions were almost the same as in Ho's time, the list of names including many leading personages in Meiji Japan who were familiar with Chinese script and had a knowledge of the Classics, such as Ōtori Keisuke, Terashima Munenori, Hanabusa Yoshimoto (minister to Korea), Sanjō Sanetomi, (Dajōdaijin; Prime Minister), Kawamura Sumiyoshi and Enomoto Takeaki. 22 Li Shu-ch'ang spoke no Japanese and had to rely on interpreters or written messages to communicate during the talks, just as Ho had done. Japanese officials at first heard from Li's staff that the minister was familiar with English and French, yet later they found out that his command of French was negligible and his English not good enough to converse in a persuasive manner with Western envoys in actual negotiations. 23 Due to this language problem, his relations with other foreign representatives in Japan could

21. Itō Bunsho, no. 358.
not be regarded as intimate. The records show that Li had discussed certain aspects of negotiations over the Ryukyu question with the British minister, but there was no sign of any contact with the other foreign ministers in the incident of 1882. Unlike Ho Ju-chang, who had always sought to use the mediation of the other foreign ministers, Li seemed to distrust the West and did not encourage foreign diplomats to become too involved in the Korean dispute, which he felt was basically a Sino-Japanese affair. There was, however, one exception. In the Korean incident of 1884 he took the initiative and asked for the mediation of the British and American ministers in Japan without having first referred the matter to the home government.

If Japan held Li Shu-ch'ang in higher regard than Ho, his much better relations with the home government might have been one of the main reasons.

In contrast to Ho Ju-chang, whose connection with Li Hung-chang was not very close, Li Shu-ch'ang had been one of Li Hung-ch'ang's men since the time when the two were together as members of Tseng's mu-fu. It was during this period that Li Shu-ch'ang became intimate with many important members of

24. FOCP 4718 no. 57, Kennedy to Granville, January 23, 1882; Inclosure in no. 58, Parkes to Wade, March 7, 1882.

25. On December 4, 1884, member of Independent party, Kim Ok kyun and others in competing for political power from Queen Min's party, took advantage of the opening ceremony of the Kyojo post office to plot a coup d'tat and kill all the high ranking officials attending the gathering. For further detail, see p. 275.

Tseng's and Li Hung-chang's mu-fu. He was especially friendly with Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng a one-time secretary of Li Hung-chang, and was also on friendly terms with others like Tseng Chi-tse, son of Tseng Kuo-fan and minister to England, with whom he had warm relations for almost twenty-five years as friend and colleague.  

Li Shu-ch'ang's friendship with Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng turned out to be a great advantage in his later career. The best example of this was the Korean incident of 1882, when Li Shu-ch'ang sent timely reports and suggestions that China should despatch warships to Korea. During the inner conference, Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, as an important member in Li Hung-chang's staff, urged Chang Shu-sheng (acting Viceroy of Tientsin in the absence of Li Hung-chang), that immediate action be taken, and as a result, Chang acted on Hsüeh's suggestion without waiting for a reply from the Yamen and set in motion preparations for the despatch of a ship. The result was that, when permission from the Yamen arrived on August 4, preparations had already been under way for a few days. Apart from Hsüeh's high respect for Li Shu-ch'ang, Li Hung-chang himself and Tseng Chi-tse both had a high regard for Li Shu-ch'ang's opinion.

27. Li Shu-ch'ang, Cho-tsun yüan ts'ung-kao, see Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng's preface; Ibid., 4:67-68.
Li Hung-chang always remembered Li Shu-ch'ang's action in the Korean incident of 1882 and he remained a strong supporter of Li Shu-ch'ang's second appointment. When Li Shu-ch'ang's name did not appear among the names of those who were commended for their service in the incident, Li Hung-chang sent a special memorial to the throne praising the role Li Shu-ch'ang had played. Li Shu-ch'ang's relations with the home government were marked by the strong tie with Li Hung-chang's group and by his friendship with Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, whose advice on foreign policy carried great weight in China's policy making. This is also evident from the fact that Li sent his telegrams directly to the headquarters of the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports showing that his mission had the complete trust of Li Hung-chang.

Although Li Shu-ch'ang's mission's techniques of gathering information did not in general seem to be much of an advance on Ho's some improvements can be seen. The Yokohama consulate decided to translate all the information concerning China which appeared in Japanese newspapers and to dismiss all the Japanese hired by the legation. Also more care was

30. LWCKCT II 510.
31. CKCJ, no. 793.
32. CKCJ, no. 113.
33. TYMS, February 19, 1882.
taken to keep correspondence and telegraphic messages secret, even from the staff. However, Li Shu-ch'ang took a somewhat unsophisticated approach. For instance, he made frequent inquiries with Kawamura, the navy minister, about the Japanese navy with reference to the development of the Chinese navy.  

He asked the Japanese foreign minister directly whether Japan had supported France, and judged his sincerity from the tone of the Japanese foreign minister's reply. He never did more than ask consuls in important ports to investigate a matter.  

One of the main critics of his method of gathering information was a member of his own staff, Yao Wen-tung. Yao considered that Li Shu-ch'ang's investigations were insufficient and that his efforts to stop Japan from supporting France were unsophisticated. Japanese secrets he felt would not be easily uncovered by Li's methods. Yao felt especially that the mission was too stringent with money. He even asked the Yamen to send their own men to spy upon Japanese movements, and thought that instructions to the legation would be useless. Although the Yamen took no action on Yao's criticisms, they were of some value in pointing out the weak spots of this mission.

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34. TYMS, March 17, 1882.
35. CFCC, no. 729 III 1571; no. 1228, IV 2276.
36. CFCC, no. 1884 IV 2080.
In looking on reporting as their main function, the Chinese minister and his staff had, with a few changes, continued the policy of Ho's mission. Their sources continued to be newspapers, gazettes, confidential talks with Japanese government ministers, contacts with foreign office officials, and exchange of facts, speculation or gossip with Japanese government ministers or diplomatic colleagues during diplomatic functions. They did not gather as much information as they could have, because they still tended to keep to themselves too much. On the other hand, when they did make contact with Japanese intellectuals, they had an advantage not shared by Chinese missions in other countries, in that they could communicate through Chinese characters.

In one respect a more profound change had taken place. In contrast to Ho's habit of reporting on the Japanese situation in general terms, Li Shu-ch'ang's reports consisted of detailed accounts of particular incidents. Li Shu-ch'ang continued from time to time to give his views on the future and his recommendations on possible changes of policy, but most of his comments were confined to policy relating to specific incidents as they occurred. Rarely did he send lengthy despatches which included speculations or conclusions based on his observation of general conditions in Japan. In his first term he left few writings on Japan.

The notes of Li's conversation with Miyajima Seiichirō concerning the death of Iwakura (in the course of which he correctly predicted that political stability in
Japan would not be affected by Iwakura's death\(^\text{37}\) give some
cue as to the perspicacity of his observations. In his
memorial of 1884 Li answered a call from the throne to present
his opinions, by giving some comments based on his eight years'
experience as emissary to the West and to Japan. He wrote:

\["... the Annam question has now been settled,
and the Ryukyu dispute, though still unsettled,
will not be worth going to war over. What we
urgently need today is domestic reform".\]

He then went on to advocate building up the navy, establishing
a railway, and repairing and constructing roads in Peking.
These matters, he believed, reflected the degree of law, order
and control in a civilized state. He further advocated the
institution of a national budget, the protection of commerce
and the sending of the Grand Council and Yamen ministers for
tours abroad.

The memorial cited many examples from Western
countries as support for his argument. Yet the only aspect
of Japanese reform he mentioned was the establishment of the
Rokumeikan, cited as an example to China of how to treat
foreign envoys better; Japan was also quoted as a contrast
with China in having a budget system and better financial
management. Although Li advocated building up the navy and
establishing railways, he did not quote Japan as an example.\(^\text{38}\)

\(^{37}\) "Miyajima Seiichido, Ho shin-koho Li Ko-sho hitsu
dan" Inouye Kaoru Bunsho 60-2-21, July 1883.

\(^{38}\) Li Shu-ch'ang, Cho-tsun yüan ts'ung-kao op.cit.5:1-7.
This seems to indicate that he did not place much importance on Japan's reforms. However, he was keen on investigating the Japanese navy, and frequently questioned Kawamura, Minister for the navy, about it. Even Japanese war songs interested him and he sent several musical scores back to China. 39

Japan's attitude towards China was an important point which captured Li Shu-ch'ang's attention. He observed that there had been certain changes in the Japanese attitude during his term in Japan. He wrote:

"In 1882, when I first arrived, Japan's spirit was very proud. Japan regarded China as backward, and China was given second-class treatment compared to Western countries. Furthermore, because of the Ryukyu incident there was constant talk of taking precautions against China's appeal to arms. In 1882 when the Korean incident occurred and the Ch'ing court sent troops, Japan learned that China was not just staid and grave, and the situation suddenly changed. Later during the Franco-Annam war, Japan assisted France, although pretending to be neutral. At that time, the Japanese government sent the minister for the army, Oyama, to Europe, but he went through Annam to observe the strength of the Chinese military forces there. Afterwards, during the Ma Chiang and Taiwan incidents, 40 Japan also sent warships to observe what was going on. Ever since China had gone to war with France, Japan had been less and less able to look down on China." 41

39. TYMS, March 17, 1882.

40. A succinct account of this event may be found in Hummel, op. cit. 48, 527.

41. CKCJ, no. 816.
In general, Li Shu-ch'ang's observations of Japan were not as broad in extent as those of his predecessor Ho, but his more limited range of subjects was observed in greater depth.

Like his predecessor, Li Shu-ch'ang apparently had no specific attitude towards Japan at first. However, he seems to have been influenced by a book which he encountered while in London, a volume on foreign affairs by Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng. In one section of this book, Hsüeh suggested the imminent threat of a Japanese invasion, and advised that China should build herself up and take a tough line towards Japan. This hard-line approach was probably an important factor in Li's thinking when he urged the immediate sending of warships in the Korean incidents of 1882 and 1884.  

During his stay in Japan, Li's assessment of Japanese domestic politics differed somewhat from Ho's. Li was impressed by Japan's political stability and thought the Japanese were united under Meiji rule. As we have mentioned before, he felt that Iwakura's death would not have any serious effect on political stability.  

Although there is little information to be found on Li's evaluation of Japan's reforms, his comments on Japan's

42. Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, op. cit. Series III Ch'ou-yang ch'u-i, see preface and 5.
attitude towards China indicate that he was perhaps more concerned with this aspect, rather than with Japan as a model for Chinese reform.

The non-diplomatic achievements of the mission included the reprinting of a number of rare Chinese books brought to Li's attention by Yang Shou-ching, secretary to the legation. A collection entitled Ku-i-ts'ung shu was printed in Tokyo in 1882-84, containing 30 items, including Nihon koku genzai sho mokuroku, a catalogue of Chinese books existing in Japan before 891 A.D., compiled by Fujiwara no Sukeyo (d.897). Yang also found many other rare books, and his notes on them were printed in 1901 under the title Jih-pen-fang-shu-chih.

While Li did not leave many general reports and discussions on Japan itself, a member of his staff, Yao Wen-tung, wrote nearly 22 published and unpublished works on the subject. Like Huang Tsun-hsien in Ho's mission, Yao was keenly interested in studying Japan, his main interests being practical studies on Japanese geography and topography. Yao remained in Japan on the staff of Li Shu-ch'ang's successor Hsu for three more years. Typical of his publications was Jih-pen ti-li ping-yao

44. CFMA:E Li Shu-ch'ang to Yamen, March 15, 1883; Yang Shou-ching, op. cit. 24-26.
47. CFCC no. 1084, 1113, IV 2037, 2079.
published in 1884 by the Tsungli Yamen. Earlier, Yao had published Liu-ch'iu ti-li-chih which was the first Chinese translation of a Japanese book on the subject.

Like his book on the Ryukyus, the Jih-pen ti-li-p'ing-yao was also a translation based on a publication by the Japanese ministry of the army. It was the first book on Japanese geography in modern China. Yao had the idea of editing a whole Japanese geography, but since this would have taken a long time, he first published a book which dealt mainly with the Japanese coast. The book itself was of little importance, but Yao's motive in translating it was significant. He intended to familiarize Ch'ing military men with features of the Japanese coast in case of a war with Japan.48

Yao Wen-tung went a step further, and formed the conviction that the idea of attacking Japan was not completely misguided. This opinion was shared by many Chinese literati at the time, although it originated in a deficient understanding of Japan.

Yao's concern with Japanese geography and topography was mainly for political rather than scholastic purposes, and it seemed that this concern had something to do with Japan's attitude toward China to which Li Shu-ch'ang gave much attention.

48. Satō Saburō, "Meiji ishin igo nisshin senso izen ni okeru shinajin no Nippon kenkyū" in Rekishigaku kenkyū 10, 11, whole number 83, November 1940, 1147-1187.
China was becoming concerned by the changing attitude of Japan, which appeared increasingly unfriendly.

Li was probably more accurate in his evaluation of the Japanese situation than Yao, who favoured making Japan a Chinese province, and whose attitude was generally more emotional.\(^ {49}\)

One example of Li's capability in supplying the home government with sound information and correct predictions on Japan's attitude and moves, is illustrated by the Korean incident of 1882. On July 23, 1882 a mutiny occurred in the Korean army at Seoul because of a ten-month delay in the payment of rice to the troops. This quickly turned into an anti-Japanese riot, and the Japanese legation was attacked. Several Japanese officials serving in the legation were killed. The Japanese minister and his staff escaped on board a British survey ship and were landed at Nagasaki on the evening of July 29, 1882.\(^ {50}\) The Japanese government received its own information of the incident on July 30, and had decided to use force by the following day. Subsequently, however, they decided to send an emissary to negotiate, to try to settle the matter without open conflict.\(^ {51}\) Li Shu-ch'ang reported

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the incident to the Chinese government on July 31, wiring the information to Chang Shu-sheng, acting viceroy of Tientsin in the absence of Li Hung-chang. This was the first information the Peking authorities received about the incident.52

In a second report on August 1, Li Shu-ch'ang wired briefly that:

"the Japanese warships are leaving for Korea immediately and China should despatch warships to watch developments".

In a further telegram on August 3, Li reported that the Japanese ships had left for Korea on July 31 and August 1 successively with 700 or more seamen and 700 foot soldiers. He also wired that the foreign minister Inouye had departed the previous day to take personal command of the matter. Li said that although Japan had not yet decided to go to war, public opinion was loud against the incident and she was actually making war preparations, therefore China should despatch warships as quickly as possible.53

Li Shu-ch'ang's reporting of the incident, and of Japan's reaction to it and his recommendation to the Peking authorities on the appropriate course of action for China reflected on the whole an accurate assessment of the situation


53. For Li Shu-ch'ang's telegram see Ōki Takatō Bunsho 36-4, 36-6 in National Diet Library, Kensei shiryo shitsu; also see JFKC VII 83.
and of Japan's attitude. He correctly reported to the home government on Japan's motive in not going to war and on the sending of troops to Korea. In suggesting that China should immediately send ships to watch the situation, he had hit exactly upon the point that Inouye brought up in his secret instructions to Hanabusa, saying that the success of the venture depended on who entered Kyojo (Seoul) first.\(^5^4\)

In handling the incident the Chinese government paid great attention to Li's report and acted as he had suggested. On receiving Li's telegram, Chang immediately set in motion preparations for despatching a ship, and when the Yamen's instructions arrived, preparations were already under way.\(^5^5\)

Li's prompt reporting of the situation was largely responsible for China's quick action, and his further report of August 4 influenced the decision to send Ch'ing troops.\(^5^6\) At Li's suggestion, the Yamen immediately obtained imperial sanction on August 7 to despatch ground and sea forces.\(^5^7\) In fact Li had support within the government circles, which may have influenced their quick action, but without his own prompt reports, nothing could have been accomplished. Thus Li's

\(^{54}\) JFKC II 124-127; 198.  
\(^{56}\) CJCC, II 216; CKCJ, no. 113.  
\(^{57}\) CKCJ, no. 113.
report was a decisive factor in forcing the Chinese government to decide to despatch troops, and this proved to be a turning point in China's policy.  

The information supplied by Li during the Korean incident of 1884 was another example of the home government's regard for his information and its effect on policy.

The Korean incident of 1884 took place on December 4, 1884. A member of the Independent Party in Korea Kim Ok kyun and others took advantage of China's difficulties in the Sino-French war to recover lost power by plotting a coup d' état during the opening ceremony of the Kyojo post office. The Japanese minister in Korea Takezoe and the legation troops were involved in the incident. With the help of legation troops, Kim Ok kyun and others occupied the palace for a short time and established their new regime on 5 December. The following day, however, they were suppressed by Chinese troops and independent party sought refuge in Japan. The coup d' état had failed.

The Chinese government vacillated for some time before reaching a decision to send Wu Ta-ch'eng, accompanied by 400 soldiers to Korea. This indecisiveness was in sharp

58. The role played by Li Shu-ch'ang in the incident was praised by Li Hung-chang: "If Li Shu-ch'ang had not wired first so that China could prepare herself in such a short time, the Japanese army would have arrived first or at the same time. It is difficult to judge how the incident would then have ended". CKCJ, no. 793.

59. Yamabe kentarō, "Koshin jihen ni tsuite" Rekishigaku kenkyū 244 (1960).
contrast to the prompt action taken in the 1882 incident. Although the Annam dispute was an important factor, the main influence on the Chinese government's action might have come from the reports of the Chinese mission in Japan.

At first, Li Shu-ch'ang reported that the Japanese situation seemed to be quiet and that there was no sign of trouble.\(^6\) Li Hung-chang was somewhat worried, but the Ch'ing government decided to send only two small ships to Tientsin.\(^6\) However, soon after this, Li Shu-ch'ang again wired Li Hung-chang stating this time that the Koreans had burnt down the Japanese legation and that Takazoe had returned to Nagasaki. He asked that warships be sent immediately to help. Although puzzled by the abrupt change in Li Shu-ch'ang's report, Li Hung-chang hastened to fulfil the request.\(^6\)

Li Shu-ch'ang continued to report by telegram on Japan's movements and increases of troops in Korea.\(^6\) The Chinese government decided to send 400 soldiers, enough troops to quell the rebellion but not to enter into open conflict with Japan.\(^6\)

From an examination of the above we can see that the reports of the mission in Japan were the chief reason for

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60. CKCJ, no. 220, 227.
63. LWCK:TD 4:26-27; CKCJ, no. 242, 243, 250.
64. CKCJ, no. 257, 258.
the several changes that occurred in China's policy, even though Li Shu-ch'ang was not always very accurate in his reports. Li had reported that Japan already intended to send troops, and for this reason he advised China to do likewise. But in fact, Japan had not decided to send troops until Inouye received a report from Korea informing him that Wu was setting out for Korea with 400 or 500 troops. 65

It is clear that the Japanese sent an army because of the information regarding the despatch of Chinese troops under Wu's command. China's policy at this time has been criticised for its passivity 66 in despatching troops in response to an action by Japan; yet China acted first in this case and its action was a direct result of the Chinese minister's advice.

In addition to their reliance upon Li's reports, the Chinese government was strongly influenced in forming its policy on the Korean incident by its attitude towards Japan. Reports both from Ho and Li had supported the traditional idea that Japan was a secondary power and not a force to be feared by China. Furthermore, Korea was both geographically closer and historically more important to China, and thus the Chinese government considered the Korean question a greater threat

65. JFKC III 103-115.

66. See Frederick Chien Foo, The Opening of Korea (Hamden, Conn. 1967), 163.
to her security than either the Annam or Burma issues. Thus the Chinese government was fully prepared to accept Li's suggestion that immediate and decisive action should be taken in Korea. 67

II. The Mission of Hsü Ch'eng-tsu: 1884-1887

Li was forced to abandon his post shortly before the Korean incident of 1884 because of the death of his mother. The incident however, occurred before the newly appointed minister, Hsü Ch'eng-tsu took up his post, and Li Shu-ch'ang was instructed to stay three more months after handing over the post on December 27, 1884. 68

Hsü Ch'eng-tsu was a native of Liu-ho, Kiangsu. His father, Hsü Tzu was a famous Hanlin scholar and author of several books, who was appointed magistrate of Fu-ning hsien in Fukien province. His elder brother was also a successful hsien magistrate. Hsü himself had always paid attention to Western scholarship. When he accompanied Ch'en Lan-pin to America, he translated Anglo-American treaties into Chinese and wrote a book called Mei-kuo feng shu lüeh, (An Outline of American Customs), which was published by the Tsungli Yamen after his return to China. In the summer of 1884, he twice memorialized

67. The policy which China had pursued over Korean question until 1882, see FOCP 4695.

68. CKCJ, no. 275.
the throne and presented his political opinions in detail. He received and accepted an invitation to court and was commissioned to Fukien where he remained until his appointment as minister to Japan. 69

He arrived in Yokohama on December 25, 1884, not on a warship, as his predecessors had done, but rather on the Japanese steamship "Nagoya-Maru". 70 Accompanying him were fifteen staff members, including Yang Shu, who had been the western languages interpreter in Ho Ju-chang's mission; Hsü Ch'eng-li, Hsü Ch'eng-tsu's own younger brother who later served as consul at Kobe from 1884-1887; 71 and counsellor Ch'en Ming-yuan who also continued to serve as counsellor in Li Shu-ch'ang's second term. 72 A few members of Li Shu-ch'ang's staff remained in the legation, including Yao Wen-tung and Shen To, a T'ung-wen kuan graduate who, together with Chang Te-i, had once taught English to emperor Tsai-t'ien. 73

Hsü's entry into Japan although less impressive than Li Shu-ch'ang's, resulted in better relations with the Japanese. 74 Shortly after Hsü presented his credentials, he called on the acting Japanese foreign minister Yoshida Kiyonari, whom he

69. Shu pao op. cit. 72.
70. TYMS, December 26, 1884.
71. Hummel, op. cit. 326.
72. TYMS, December 2, 1884.
74. Some Japanese now considered the Chinese legation as institution geared to their commercial interest. (Mainichi Shimbun May 1, 1887).
had met in America. Yoshida later recalled in a letter to Enomoto Takeaki, the Japanese minister in China, that he completely agreed with Enomoto's earlier report on Hsü, saying that he was more candid and more perspicacious than either of his predecessors. Hsü's frankness had won Yoshida's confidence and Yoshida regarded him as broadminded and worthy of the trust of the Chinese government. Yoshida predicted good relations between the legation and the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{75}

Hsü's knowledge of English seems to have helped him in his relations with the Japanese. Yoshida was impressed by his command of English, while Enomoto even defended Hsü, saying that he was a better diplomat than Li Shu-ch'ang, because he spoke English and was better received in Japan.\textsuperscript{76} His ability with English also seemed to help him in his relations with the ministers of other countries in Japan.\textsuperscript{77}

During Hsü's term of office, he had some difficulty in getting accurate information through the mission staff left by his predecessor. Their reports were often inaccurate or obsolete.\textsuperscript{78}

Hsü therefore went out of his way to improve the information gathering methods of the mission. He hired as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} JFKC VII 368-371.
\item \textsuperscript{76} JFO S-I 378.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1887.
\item \textsuperscript{78} CFMA:E Hsü Ch'eng-tsu to Yamen, October 25, 1885.
\end{itemize}
legal advisor to the mission a Japanese named Asahina. This man helped overseas Chinese in legal disputes with Japanese. His success in winning many cases for Chinese pleased Hsu, who turned to him for information in cases of trouble with Japan and found him a more reliable source than any previous mission had been able to get. Hsu used Asahina as an agent only when a critical situation arose, and kept him as legal advisor the rest of the time. 79

Asahina furnished Hsu with reports of secret Japanese conferences and decisions well in advance. He had been a vice-minister of foreign affairs and Yokohama district judge. According to Hsu, Asahina had retired from politics because he did not get along very well with people in government positions. However, because he had many acquaintances and colleagues in the government, he was able to collect information from high circles. 80

Because of Asahina's past experience in foreign affairs and politics, he was of greater help to Hsu than any ordinary secret agent could have been. One of his reports on the Japanese government reshuffle of 1885 shows by its information that he was very familiar with the domestic situation. 81

It is extremely detailed and accurate and, surprisingly enough,

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. CKCJ, no. 452, annex 1, 2.
most of the material it contains cannot be found in ordinary newspapers and documents. The only place I have been able to find the material, other than in Asahina's report, is in a document written by an advisor to the emperor. There the content is the same and even the figures tally. From this example we can probably conclude that Hsu's decision to have Asahina helped him greatly in the compilation of his reports on the political situation; moreover, Asahina's assistance almost certainly made Hsu's information more reliable.83

82. Ibid., also see Shumpo-kō Tsuishōkai Itō Hirobumi den (Tokyo, 1939), B 450-451, 462-479, 1005-1006.

83. The name Asahina does not appear in the lists of judges or vice-ministers of foreign affairs, so presumably it was an alias. Among the twelve vice-foreign ministers between 1868 and 1885, the major figures like Okuma Shigenobu, Terashima Munenori, Mori Arinori, Enomoto Takeaki, Aoki Shūzo or Yoshida Kiyonari were very unlikely to be a spy for China. Of the other six, Date Munenari Higashikuze Michiyoshi, Nabeshima Naohiro, Samejima Hisanobu, Ueno Kagenori, Komatsu Kiyokado, the only one who had been a judge in Yokohama was Nabeshima Naohiro. It seems likely that Nabeshima was helping Hsu out of a belief that he could foster peace and friendship in this way. Hsu refers to him as an agent; however he refused to accept payment and probably did not consider himself an agent for China. Nabeshima had a strong interest in China. He believed that European powers were able to exploit the lack of unity and cooperation among Asian countries, and that it was therefore essential to build a spirit of co-prosperity among the Asian people. Later when the Tōa Dōbun Kai was established, Nabeshima immediately expressed his approval, and succeeded Aoki president of the society in 1907. He contributed greatly to the development of this society, until his death. Inoshiri Jōkichi, Rekidai kenkan roku (Tokyo, 1967) 61; DJMJ V 24-25; Tai-Shi kōrōsha, Denki Hensankai, Tai-Shi kaikoroku (Tokyo, 1936) B 1230-1232.
Hsü was the first and only minister in Japan to report in official communications his use of a Japanese agent. It seems odd that he would report this, considering the danger of his communications being intercepted, and the fact that envoys generally tended to avoid becoming personally involved in such matters, preferring instead to leave them to the mission staff. Hsü was aware of the danger of his secret leaking out, as he explained in a letter, but he continued to refer to Asahina. Perhaps he felt the use of the false name was protection enough, and he was probably eager to point out to the home government his success in getting such a high ranking official to act as an agent.

Were these reports merely an incidence of carelessness on Hsü's part? There are no reports from earlier envoys concerning Japanese spies, but perhaps they were just more careful about reporting such secret matters. In Ho Ju-chang's period there had been considerable anxiety over leakage of secrets, but in the following mission there was a gradual improvement in security: all interpreters were Chinese, and even the staff had difficulty in gaining access to communications to the consul. Perhaps these improvements gave Hsü more confidence.

Again this was an indication that the division of the mission's responsibility was not very clear. The later

84. CKCJ, no. 356, annex 8; no. 452, annex 1.
85. TYMS, January 6, 1882.
ministers did not mention this sort of thing, possibly because from then on the ministers themselves avoided direct involvement in such matters and left them to the staff. As the staff gained experience and spent more time in Japan, they were able to deal with matters such as interpreting, legal problems, etc. - which had previously been left to local people hired by the mission.  

Besides improving the intelligence work of the mission Hsü also wrote more detailed reports on Japanese and English-language newspapers. This led the Japanese minister in China, Shioda Saburō, to complain about leakages of information from Japanese newspaper sources. Shioda's apparent embarrassment shows that Hsü's reports must have given quite extensive coverage.  

Hsü had fairly close relations with Itō Hirobumi. In fact, a letter from Hsü to Itō shows that Itō was still enquiring after Hsü ten years after Hsü had left the post.  

Hsü's other intimate contacts included Count Inouye and he even once interviewed the French minister to China, Francois Georges Cogordan, when he passed through Japan on his way to China. His report to the Tsungli Yamen included his own  

86. CKCJ, no. 922.  
87. JFO, Vol. 19, d.43.153b, d.49. 180a.  
88. Letter of Hsü Ch'eng-tsu to Itō Hirobumi in 1897 in 'Itō Hirobumi Bunsho'. These are original documents kept in the National Diet Library, Kensei shiryo shitsu, Tokyo. Many of these documents have not yet been arranged and the relevant document carries no reference number. That Hsü should in 1897 - ten years after leaving Japan and so shortly after the 1894-5 war - ask Itō to use his influence to ask Li Hung-chang to give him employment substantiates my point that Hsü and Itō were on good personal terms.
conversation with Cogordan, his evaluation of the Frenchman's personality and character and that of his staff and information on the sort of attitude Cogordan would take in his negotiations with China.  

In his reports to the home government, Hsu's principal concern was with political and diplomatic events. He also gave some attention to Japan's naval and military preparations. However, he reported very little concerning economic affairs, and appears to have made no reference to Japan's reforms. Some of Hsu's general observations on Japan are presented in a report made to the Yamen one year after his arrival, in which he commented as follows:

"The Japanese are snobbish in nature, narrow-minded, and easily provoked. In all matters they admire the West. From the national level down to everyday matters, they all copy the West, feeling self-satisfied and proud of being out of the ordinary. In receiving Western officials and merchants they resort to flattery in the hope of winning favours, an intolerably unseemly sight.

On the other hand, in negotiating with China, Japan tends to treat China with contempt and insults, and to make excessive demands. Therefore during negotiations and lawsuits, I have been very careful. In both conversation and official communication, I carefully consider wording and base my reasoning on the treaty in order to have a firm basis for argument with them. Therefore, since I have been here, I have not been deceived ...."

89. CFMA:E Hsü Ch'eng-tsu to Yamen, October 25, 1885.

90. LWCKCT I 99-100.

91. Chinese importation of copper from Japan was perhaps the only economic item in which Hsü displayed interest. (CKCJ, no. 495) Possible discussion on a Japanese spinning factory in Shanghai came to nothing. See Hatano Yoshihiro, Chugoku kindai kogyoshi no kenkyu op. cit. 389-390.

92. CFMA:E Hsü Ch'eng-tsu to Yamen, October 25, 1885.
Hsü seemed bitter about Japan's wholesale copying of the West, and criticised Japanese discrimination between Chinese and Westerners in their treatment of foreigners. This was not a new complaint, but Hsü seems to have displayed more caution and distrust towards Japan than his predecessors, and not to have looked down on Japan for her weakness. In his political observations, Hsü included his opinions of a number of Japanese statesmen. Ito Hirobumi, according to him was a man who understood perfectly that the policies and actions of China and Japan were closely related to the strength or weakness of the whole Asian region. According to Hsü's personal impressions and the comments of others, Ito always wanted Japan to be at peace with China. From his ordinary tone of argument, Hsü said, Kuroda Kiyotaka always tried to make things difficult for China, and certainly felt illwill towards China. The newly appointed minister Shioda was far inferior to his predecessor Enomoto. Hsü's reports on Japanese political developments usually referred simply to "party intrigue or strife". He noticed differences of opinion between civilians and the military, and observed that many military men advocated war with China, while civilian officials knew that their own domestic situation

93. CKCJ, no. 356, annex 7.
94. CKCJ, no. 356, annex 8.
95. CKCJ, no. 438.
96. Ibid.
made it impossible for Japan to go to war. However, Hsü provided little insight into the structure of the governing class or into internal matters. He also over-estimated the role of political factions (so significant in Chinese history) in Japanese political development, and tended to interpret Japanese politics in Chinese terms.

While Hsü made no reference to Japan's reforms, one of his staff, Ch'en Chia-lin, described certain aspects of the programme in his book, Tung ch'a wen chien lu, published in 1887. This work was a general study of Japanese history, culture and science, but it also analyzed the advantages and defects of the Meiji reforms. Ch'en corrected a number of historical errors and also drew attention to Japan's progressive spirit and to her stress on education.

Although Ch'en did not feel that China need fear Japan, his suggestion that a peaceful Japan could establish herself firmly and even expand to the West is interesting, since it points to a further step in Chinese understanding of Japan. He still had some reservations as to the advantages of Japan's reforms, and her general domestic situation, but in general he gave a much more favourable picture of Japan than

97. CKCJ, no. 356, annex 7.
had the earlier writers.\footnote{For Ch'en Chia-lin' views on Japan's progressive spirit and education reforms, see Ch'en chia-lin, \textit{Tung-ch'a wen chien lu} general remarks. He was also aware of the possibility of future conflict between China and Japan: "On the other hand, if Japan should engage in schemes to extend her territory into China, then China, being a large and wealthy country would be able to fight or to defend herself against Japan, and in any case China should have no need to worry about Japan." \textit{Ibid.}, also see Hsiao-fang-hu-ch'ai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao. Series 10, 372.}

Hsü himself produced far more official correspondence and made far more use of the telegraph than Li Shu-ch'ang. His correspondence with Li Hung-ch'ang was also more voluminous. His reports contained more detail and deeper political analysis than those of his predecessors. Although he still over-estimated the role of conflicting factions in Japanese political developments, his reports were on the whole accurate and reliable.

The accuracy of his observations is well illustrated by his report on the Tientsin convention of 1884. The Tientsin Conference which opened on April 3, 1885 was called to settle the Korea Incident of 1884 (see p. 275). Li Hung-ch'ang led the Chinese team while Councillor of State, Ito Hirobumi led the Japanese team, which included the Japanese minister in China, Enomoto Takeaki, Gikan Inouye Kowashi as secretary, and Councillor of State, Saigo Tsugumichi as advisor.\footnote{CKCJ, no. 339, 357, annex 7; JFKC III 220-223; JFO S-I 318, 321-326.} The presence of Saigo was to satisfy the Japanese army and navy which were demanding a hard line approach.\footnote{JFKC III 222-223.}
The major issues were: withdrawal of troops by both China and Japan from Korea, compensation for damages, and a Japanese demand for the punishment of the Chinese commander. At the beginning of the Conference the Japanese were very vocal on the last mentioned demand.\textsuperscript{101} While Li Hung-chang was willing to agree to the simultaneous withdrawal of troops, he was unwilling to give in to the demand for the punishment of the Chinese commander. In his tactics, Li was assisted by the report from Hsü, which said that actually the Japanese court felt that Takezoe Shinichirō, the Japanese minister in Korea, was wrong; that if it did not wish to take the matter further; that it certainly did not want to rupture Sino-Japanese relations; that it was because of the aroused state of the Japanese army and navy that the government had chosen Itō and Saigo to negotiate; that Itō was an advocate for peace while Saigo, pretending to want war, was in fact also for peace.\textsuperscript{102}

We can see how accurately the Japanese situation had been analysed by the Chinese minister in Japan, by comparing this report with Inouye's telegram to Enomoto. This explained that Saigo was:

"not officially connected with the mission, but was sent in order to quiet the excitement among the military as well as the public."\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} JFKC III 217-218. Inouye to Enomoto, February 8, 1885.
\textsuperscript{102} CKCJ, no. 331; also see CKCJ, no. 356, appendix 7.
\textsuperscript{103} JFKC III, 222-223.
As a result, the Conference decided that both sides would withdraw their forces from Korea within four months; each would be free to send troops again in an emergency, but must give prior notice to the other side. As a face-saving gesture, Li agreed to investigate the matter to see if anyone deserved punishment.  

Hsü's apparently sound observations in the Tientsin Conference, his generally favourable reception in Japan, his diligence in collecting information and his diplomatic career to date would lead one to expect Li Hung-chang to be impressed by him. Certainly Li does not seem to have been biased against him at least at first. Yet as time went by Li began to distrust Hsü's reports - not so much for their factual content as for their interpretation of the facts.

Evidence that Li had come to expect reliable information from Hsü is provided by his surprise when, during the Tientsin negotiations the Japanese came up with demands in excess of those which Hsü, through a conversation with Inouye, had been able to predict.

The turning point in his assessment of Hsü's diplomatic capability seems to have come after the Tientsin treaty, when Inouye presented, through Hsü, an eight point proposal to the Chinese government.

104. CKCJ, no. 371, 374, annex 3; JFO S-I 346-349.
105. JFO S-I 340-342.
106. Ibid., 352-387.
By this time, Japan and China had agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their forces from Korea. (April 18, 1885)\textsuperscript{107} The substance of Inouye's proposal which represented a new Japanese strategy towards Korea, was that Japan would recognize China's de facto supervision of Korean domestic administration, but that China should always confer with Japan first, and take action only after discussions with Japan.\textsuperscript{108}

Inouye first presented the proposal in an interview with Hsü on June 5, 1885, and asked Hsü to forward the proposal to Li Hung-chang.\textsuperscript{109} At the same time he instructed Enomoto on June 27 to hold negotiations with Li (July 1).\textsuperscript{110} From his conversation with Enomoto, Li felt dissatisfied with Hsü's report, which he criticised as "rough and in some places he seemed to have added his own opinions; because he is not familiar with foreign affairs he could not quite understand the drift of Inouye's argument."\textsuperscript{111}

Inouye's proposal was ultimately rejected by Li Hung-chang, who told the Japanese minister in Peking: "Your country regards Korea as an equal, so there is no reason for you to interfere in her domestic administration. But if I have

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} CKCJ, no. 374, annex 3; JFO S-I 346-349.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} JFO S-I 352-356; CKCJ 381.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} JFO S-I 356.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 356-361.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 378.
\end{itemize}
to consult your foreign minister every time I want to recommend a man of ability to the Korean king, then it would be as if I were in the position of receiving instructions from Inouye."  

Li was not dissatisfied with the substance of Hsu's report. He told Enomoto: "The substance is the same, but it did not stress the main points like the draft you read to me. Hsu is not a good diplomat." What Li disagreed with was Hsu's suggestion that China accept Inouye's proposal for the supervision of Korean administration (court). In this case Li rightly saw that to adopt Inouye's or Hsu's suggestion would be tantamount to allowing Japan a demand which China had so far managed to deny her: joint protection of Korea by China and Japan. After Li's rejection, Inouye said in his instruction to Enomoto, "from now on, we shall have to change our policy towards Korea, and let the matter take its own course." This remark perhaps shows that Li was right to reject the demand. Yet from this point on, Li started to suspect that Hsu was too easily persuaded by the Japanese, and although he continued to use Hsu's information, he did not

112. Ibid., 382.
113. Ibid., 378; That Li Hung-chang should have complaint to an official of a foreign nation, Enomoto, about the inappropriate of Hsu showed Li's low regard for Hsu. But in defending Hsu, Enomoto's action shows that at least some Japanese high officials held a higher opinion of Hsu.
114. LWCK:IS 17:57-58.
115. JFO S-1 384.
necessarily follow his advice. This shows both the importance and the limitations of the mission's effect on policy decision.

Another example of Li's mistrust of Hsü's political judgement occurred in the Nagasaki incident, when Hsü's proposal to agree on paper that each side should punish its offenders without compensation for the dead was rejected by Li as an attempt to settle the matter with empty words. Events such as these persuaded Li that Hsü's advice was sometimes of dubious value. Li's suspicious that Hsü gave in too easily to Japanese proposals may have been justified.

Hsü's own ideas and opinions on foreign affairs are presented in a pamphlet written in 1884, and published the following year. He advocated a policy of compromise and avoidance of conflict in negotiations, and the exercise of caution in all foreign matters, at the same time suggesting that China should build up her own strength in case of a possible future disruption in the balance of power in East Asia. Concerning the individual envoy's behaviour, he again stressed discretion and a friendly manner, as well as the importance of having well-educated persons as interpreters. Hsü compared China's foreign relations to a man with a chronic disease requiring constant treatment. In most negotiations China had to compromise and

116. LWCK:IS 17:58; LWCK:TC 1 99-100.
117. See p. 296 for further detail.
118. CKCJ, no. 500, 501, 502.
make concessions. To an onlooker this might seem an expression of weakness. He advocated caution because China was not strong enough to engage in a conflict which she might not win and which would result in a forfeiture of territory and the paying of an indemnity. Moreover, China's domestic situation was uncertain and any conflict with the West could spark off rebellion at home. To avoid war at this stage was not to show fear but to exercise caution. 119

Hsü's views on diplomacy as described above, were characterized by a willingness to come to terms, and seemed to exercise considerable influence on his diplomatic activities. This type of thinking is illustrated by the 1884 Korean incident, when instead of supporting Li Shu-ch'ang's proposal to send an army to Korea, Hsü suggested the despatch of an envoy to negotiate. After arriving in Japan he continued to urge this proposal. 120

His diplomacy and fairmindedness can also be seen in the Nagasaki affair. Hsü was willing to reach an early settlement, even agreeing on paper that each side should punish its offenders without compensation for the dead. 121

Hsü's advice that China

119. "In negotiations, China should clarify her stand instead of putting the question off, because this would only give the foreigner an excuse to use force to accomplish his ends. China should try to reason time and again over those demands which were unacceptable and if she stood firm and make known her determination, then others might become acquainted with the circumstances and come to her aid." Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, T'iao-i ts'ung kao 20-25.

120. CKCU, no. 222, 235, 264, 269.

121. JFO, Vol. 20.
should accept Inouye's proposal for joint supervision of Korean administration, in spite of the traditional Chinese policy of preserving her suzerainty over Korea, seems to have stemmed from his basic idea of mutual concessions and co-operation without resort to arms.

The main diplomatic incidents which confronted Hsü during his term in Japan were the Tientsin convention after the settlement of the 1884 Korean incident; the problem of the extradition of the Korean exile, Kim Ok kyun; treaty revision; and the case of the Chinese soldiers killed by Japanese police in Nagasaki.

During the Tientsin conference Hsü kept the Chinese government well informed, accurately anticipating the demands which Japan intended to present at the conference. The extent to which Li Hung-chang relied on Hsü's information is evidenced by his surprise when, during the negotiations, the Japanese put forward a proposal which had not been mentioned by Inouye in his conversation with Hsü.

In the matter of Kim Ok kyun, a leading figure in the incident of 1884, the Chinese government were annoyed that he was still at large in Japan and were apprehensive that he might cause more trouble in Korea. Hsü discussed the matter with

122. LWCK:IS 17:58.
123. JFO S-I 340-342.
124. CKCJ, no. 419, 425; JFA MT 1.1.2.4. 7, 14, 15, 18, 72, 335, 362.
Inouye on February 9, 1886, suggesting possible ways of removing Kim to some other territory where the Chinese could gain access to him. However, nothing came of these discussions. On the other hand, Hsü managed to make some progress in the negotiations over revision of the treaty between China and Japan. China used Inouye's talk reported by Hsü, (concerning changes in tariff regulations which would also apply to China) as an excuse to wait until the result of Japan's negotiations with other countries had become clear before revising the Sino-Japanese treaty. Japan's success in the treaty revision of July 1886 had convinced Inouye of the effectiveness of treaty revision with European countries. In order to advance treaty revision negotiations with China, Inouye informed Hsü on July 13th that from then on Japan would allow Chinese to travel into the interior of Japan for the purpose of recuperation or scientific research.

Hsü was also the chief negotiator in the Nagasaki affair which exacerbated the bad relations between China and Japan and caused China great humiliation. On August 13 and 15 of 1886 some Chinese soldiers from three ships which had entered Nagasaki for repairs became involved in a riot between Japanese police and citizens and Chinese nationals. The ensuing investigation was further complicated by the conflicting reports of the

125. CKCJ, no. 446, 452, appendix 1.
126. JFO, Vol. 19, 152.
127. JFO S-I 433, 419.
Chinese consul at Nagasaki and the mayor of that city.

The matter was settled through the mediation of the German minister Helleben, with each side agreeing privately to compensate each other for the lives lost. Both governments agreed to leave further investigation and punishment entirely to the discretion of the departments concerned. Apart from the Ryukyu incident, this was the only matter which was directly negotiated by the mission in Japan. However, the Chinese government was displeased at the length of time taken to settle the case, and felt that Hsü had not been very effective in the negotiations. 128

Like Li Shu-ch'ang's mission, Hsü also found a rare Chinese book. Yao Wen-tung discovered in the Ashikaga Library in Japan a copy of the Confucian Analects, annotated by Huang K'an of the Liang dynasty. Yao informed Hsü of the find and was given permission to copy and collate it. Because the work was not completed in Hsü's term it was turned over to his successor Li Shu-ch'ang in February 1888. 129 There are no records of frequent contacts between Hsü's mission and Japanese sinologists, like those which earlier missions had enjoyed.

128. JFO Vol. 19d. 52. 184-185.
129. CFMA:E Yao Wen-tung to Yamen, July 9, 1887; Yamen to Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, July 13, 1887; Hsü Ch'eng-tsu to Yamen, June 16, 1888; Li Shu-ch'ang to Yamen, June 26, 1888; Yamen to Li Shu-ch'ang, October 9, 1888.
Hsu was not particularly fortunate in his later life. Shortly after his return he was charged with corrupt practices over buying copper from Japan. Though it was afterwards found that he had committed no crime, he had to pay a large compensation and was never again appointed to office. Ten years later, when he heard that Itō Hirobumi was asking about him, he wrote a letter to Itō asking him to speak to Li Hung-chang about appointing him again. It is not known whether Itō did anything about this.

III. Li Shu-ch'ang's Second Term of Office: 1887-1890.

When the first choice, Li Hsing-jui, failed to recover from an illness, the ministership again fell on Li Shu-ch'ang. In his second term no incidents of importance occurred between China and Japan, and Li Shu-ch'ang was not as busy as in his first term. His activities were mostly confined to observation and reporting. While, in Li's first term, we found that his reports confined themselves to accounts of particular incidents, in his second term his reports to the Yamen and private letters exchanged with Li Hung-chang contain many of his observations and opinions on Japan in general. A change had taken place in Li Shu-ch'ang's sphere of interest.

130. LWCKCT I 217, 242-243.
131. Hsu Ch'eng-tsu to Itō Hirobumi in Itō Bunsho.
132. LWCKCT I 118.
Firstly, economic and commercial questions began to catch his attention. He reported Japan's monthly trade figures to the home government, was impressed by the new Japanese bank note system, and suggested that China copy the Japanese bank notes. Some technical advances, new machines and the invention of an open-well machine caught his notice and he tried to introduce them in to China. He sent men to investigate Japanese coal-mines and railways, sent books to China about copper factories, silver and information about Japanese railway development. Copper and copper prices became of special concern to the mission because of China's serious need for copper.

Apart from such economic matters, Li Shu-ch'ang often reported on Japanese ceremonies such as the promulgation of the Japanese constitution and the funeral procession of Mori Arinori. The reports contained detailed descriptions, without any comment on the significance of the ceremonies themselves. However, Li Hung-chang seems to have enjoyed these reports on

133. Ibid., 197, 215, 217.
134. Ibid., 187.
135. Ibid., 190.
136. Ibid., 180, 353.
137. Ibid., 195-196, 289, 353.
139. CFMA:E Li Shu-ch'ang to Yamen, March 5, 1889.
Japanese etiquette and ceremonial functions, and to have considered them picturesque. 140

The mission was also concerned with providing continuous and detailed reporting of political developments in Japan. The frequent changes in cabinet portfolios held by Itō Hirobumi, Kuroda Kiyotaka, Sanjo Sanetomi (Naidaijin; the Great Minister of the Center), Inouye Kaoru and Ōkuma Shigenobu (Foreign Minister) were always recorded concisely. Sometimes he gave reasons for such changes, but more often he contented himself with simply reporting the changes and rarely gave his own opinions on these political figures as his predecessor Hsu had frequently done. 141

The mission also sent other political information, such as the "Revised Directory of Government Officials" a translation of the Constitution and rules of parliamentary procedures and even the documents of the opposition parties' attacks on the government, which Li Hung-chang read carefully and with interest. He always referred to the directory for titles and positions of Japanese officials, and commented that the head of the army did not seem to occupy a very high position. 142

140. LWCKCT I 263-264.


142. Ibid., I 187, 282, 190, 170-171, 186.
About the copy of the Japanese constitution which Li Shu-ch'ang sent him, Li Hung-chang commented:

"The constitution's emphasis on respect for the sovereign, suppression of the people, concentration on authority in the central government appears disordered and confused. It is like the law of the Ch'in period (a repressive period in Chinese history). The repeated mention of the emperor makes it read like a Chinese book on Imperial history. This type of document has not been used in China since the Han Dynasty".\(^{143}\)

Li Shu-ch'ang also reported on the situation in the Japanese Diet, describing the organization of the two houses and the newly elected members.\(^{144}\) He gave his views on the future, and his recommendations on possible changes in policy, for instance the importance of an alliance between China and Japan.\(^{145}\) He provided some military information mentioning for example that Japanese naval defences were concentrated in the area near Nagasaki and the Ryukyus, which he considered as a sign of hostility to China.\(^{146}\) He frequently mentioned developments in Japan's revision of her treaties.\(^{147}\)

Li states his opinions of Japan's reforms in his preface to a book by his friend Ku Hou-hun entitled Jih-pen

\(^{143}\) Ibid., I 282.

\(^{144}\) For his description, see CFMA:E Li Shu-ch'ang to Yamen, August 7, 1890.

\(^{145}\) LWCKCT I 215.

\(^{146}\) Ibid., I 187.

\(^{147}\) Ibid., I 186, 215, 312.
hsin-cheng-k'ao. He commented on Meiji reforms as follows:

"After the Meiji restoration they abolished all Chinese systems and completely copied western methods. They are doing what is suitable to the occasion and they are surely adaptable. It is wise to observe other countries and select their good points for imitation".  

Li Shu-ch'ang's reports during his second term of office seem to indicate a better understanding of Japan, especially in the area of economic reform. For example, he reported that Japanese railways had gradually been extended and now reached three-fifths of the entire country. Except for the section between Tokyo and Kobe, all others were the product of Japanese investment. In the construction of those facilities Japan had to rely on the West at first, but now, apart from iron rails, they could make everything themselves. He felt that the scale and the cost of the Japanese railways system would make it an ideally suitable one for China. Li Hung-chang thought this was a very acute observation.  

Li Shu-ch'ang's factual account of Japanese politics was not a penetrating study of the Japanese political structure; like his predecessor, Li tended to read the Chinese historical experience into Japan and over-estimated the influence of political factions.  

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149. LWCKCT I 353.  
150. Ibid., 291-292, 197.
from those on the copper problem, no reports indicating concern about the lack of international trade of either country.

The lack was principally because this trade was not very important to China during the period between 1800 and 1894, although it was quite important to Japan. The total amount of trade between China and Japan only occupied 3.6 per cent to 6.4 per cent of China's total foreign trade, while it constituted 10.2 per cent to 21.9 per cent of the total foreign trade of Japan.  

It is apparent that Li Hung-chang thought very highly of Li Shu-ch'ang's reports. In examining the personal correspondence from Li Hung-chang to Li Shu-ch'ang we find that Li Hung-chang not only paid a great deal of attention to the minister's reports, but that he seemed to enjoy reading them; they formed the basis of a number of his opinions concerning Japanese politics, for example his high regard for Ito, and his alarm over many changes in the Japanese leadership. Li tended to see Itō Hirobumi as the most influential man, followed by Inouye and others, with Ōkuma Shigenobu and Kuroda as his opposition. Itō was seen as a man who had a good grasp of the general situation in Asia, advocating peace between China and Japan, while Kuroda and Okuma were considered conservative.

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151. Although admittedly trade with Japan was not of much importance to China at the time, the mission had overlooked the importance to Japan of the Chinese market.
When there was any change in the leading figures, Li Hung-chang always enquired whether the new leader was agreeable to Ito. The frequent changes in Japanese leadership were considered by Li Hung-chang as one of the obstacles to Tseng Chi-tse's suggested policy of a Sino-Japanese alliance.152

Li Hung-chang's letters to Li Shu-ch'ang indicate that he read the reports carefully including even the monthly trading figures.153 In his replies he often quoted examples from Chinese history, comparing them with the Japanese situation.154 He showed interest in the mission's observations on Japanese technology, and commented that Japan had caught on quickly to Western methods and no longer had to rely on Western technicians.155

In 1890, on relinquishing his post, Li Shu-ch'ang addressed a memorial to the throne on the situation in Japan. At the time he had already had six years' experience in Japan, longer than any other envoy. The memorial began with a mention of the growing strength of Japan and a warning that China should not look down on Japan. He said:

"... With a population of forty million Japan has lost no opportunity of expanding her armaments on land and sea. Her commerce and industry are developing daily and she is rich in products. With a territory equal to only three provinces of China, Japan has an annual revenue and expenditure of eighty million. Her strength is almost the same as that of the second-rate countries of the West".

152. LWCKCT I 197-198.
153. LWCKCT I 144.
155. Ibid., 180, 195-196, 353.
Yet he also considered it wrong to fear Japan.

"Nevertheless owing to her excessive activities of the last twenty years, Japan's resources have become exhausted. All over the country paper money is being circulated. Silver coins have flowed to other countries, and there is much wastage. If there should be a national emergency, Japan would not be able to sustain herself."

He felt that Japan despised China as a second-rate country, but Japan's attitude towards China had improved because of China's strong stand on Korea and Annam. He saw Japan's failure to gain its treaty revisions as an opportunity for China to join in an alliance with Japan. 156

Li Shu-ch'ang's warning against over or under-estimating Japan, his advocacy of a Sino-Japanese alliance, his assessment of Japan's strength as equivalent to that of a second-class Western power, and his estimate that China's navy, with the exception of two superior Chinese warships, was about equal to Japan's, indicated a perspective entirely different from that of the earlier Chinese envoys to Japan.

On his return to China, Li Shu-ch'ang was appointed Intendant of Chuan-tung circuit. He endeavoured to develop industry and education in the newly opened port of Chungking. When the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 broke out he memorialized the throne suggesting that China should appeal to various countries to protect her interests, and offered to go to Japan himself to negotiate, but his proposals were not accepted.

156. For details, see CKCJ, no. 816.
Shortly after the anti-missionary riot in spring 1895, he resigned on the grounds of illness. 157

IV. The Mission of Li Ching-fang: 1890-1892

In 1890 soon after Li Shu-ch'ang wrote the memorial containing his warning about the growing power of Japan, Li Ching-fang, Li Hung-chang's nephew and adopted son, was appointed as Li Shu-ch'ang's successor. Li Ching-fang was born in 1860 and in 1878 had attended Li Hung-chang in Li's Yamen in Tientsin, where he prepared for the examinations. He became chü-jen in 1882 and chin-shih in 1885. At the same time he learnt English and prepared for a diplomatic career.

Li Hung-chang considered that although Li Ching-fang had a rough knowledge of English he did not have any experience in handling diplomatic negotiations, and wanted to send him abroad for further training. In 1886 he was sent to Europe as a secretary of the legation under Liu Jui-fen, the Chinese minister to England. Li Ching-fang served as secretary of the legation both in London and Paris. He returned to China in 1889 and in the next year he was given the official position of Intendant (Tao-tai) and was appointed as Chinese minister to Japan. 158

157. Ch'ing-shih kao 452 (lieh-chuan 233) 6; Min Erh-ch'ang, Pei chuan chi pu (Peking, 1923) 19:13-17.
158. Hsü I-shih, op. cit. 1-4; Folsom, op. cit. 129-130.
Li Hung-chang's motive for sending Li Ching-fang as envoy to Japan is interesting in that he considered the mission in Japan as a suitable training-ground, since it was both closer to China and unique compared with the missions in Europe and America.\(^{159}\) Naturally, Li Hung-chang was specially concerned about Li Ching-fang and wrote a letter asking Enomoto Takeaki to take care of him.\(^{160}\)

During Li Ching-fang's short stay in Japan, no major crisis occurred between China and Japan, and he confined himself to reports of a general nature - the visits of Chinese warships to Japan, the situation in the Japanese Diet, the treaty between Korea and Japan, and the construction of a building for the Chinese legation.\(^{161}\)

In his contacts with the Japanese, Li Ching-fang endeavoured to cultivate the members of the Diet as well as the cabinet ministers. He invited them to a tea party on a Chinese warship, Ting-yuan, for the dual purpose of impressing them with the strength of China, and cultivating their friendship.\(^{162}\)

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159. See letter of Li Hung-chang to Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng in LWCKCT I 510; Ibid, 526, Li Hung-chang to Kuo Sung-t'aoc.

160. LWCKCT I 469.

161. CFMA Letters of Li Ching-fang to Yamen.

During this time, the third session of the Japanese Diet was convened. Li Ching-fang, after a fairly detailed report on the situation of the third session of the Diet, added some background information on the first and second sessions. He then commented upon the events in the Japanese Diet as follows:

"The power of the country is in the hands both of his majesty and of the ordinary people. The sharing of power by the emperor and people has many disadvantages. Japan changed suddenly from a feudal state to a monarchy, and because the government was, for the time being, not strong enough to check the people, they had to allow the establishment of the Diet. Moreover, the government needed money to carry out many reform projects, and this money would be extracted from the people, which was against public opinion. Therefore, the dispute between the court and the will of the people will continue. This is a sign of confusion, and domestic peace cannot last forever". 163

This comment is another illustration of the way in which Chinese diplomats often judged Japan's internal politics from the Confucian point of view: namely that the relation of the king and the people should be as parts of one body and hence in accord. Because of this basic idea, Li Ching-fang seems to have concluded that the confrontation between the Diet and the government was a sign that the country was not united and might be rent by rebellion.

163. CFMA Li Ching-fang to Yamen, June 9, 1892, Recess of the Japanese Diet.
In Li Ching-fang's opinion the visit of the Chinese warship was highly successful. He considered its reception by the Japanese even more favourable than their reception of Western ships. He thought that this was due firstly to China's effective and successful construction of a navy which had raised its military prestige in the east and posed a threat to Japan; and secondly because Japan, after many years of contact with the West, had finally realised that China was in the same continent and that her friendship was reliable.  

From this we can see that Li Ching-fang misinterpreted Japan's attitude towards the Chinese navy, and also that his estimation of China's naval strength differed markedly from the opinion of Li Shu-ch'ang, who had stated that Japan's ships were approximately equal to China's. Li Ching-fang's stay in Japan was abruptly terminated by the mourning period for his mother which lasted from September 4, 1891, until January 14, 1892. When he returned to China, Wang Feng-tsao replaced him as acting head of the mission for four months.  

V. Wang Feng-tsao: The Period Leading to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War

The early career of Wang Feng-tsao differed from those of his predecessors. While the diplomats of the 1880's

164. CFMA:E Li Ching-fang to Yamen, July 27, 1891.
165. CKCJ, no. 827, 828.
166. Ibid., no. 1348.
had received no special training in language and legal knowledge, Wang was the most eminent of the early graduates of the T'ung-wen kuan. He had a knowledge of English and was also well grounded in Chinese scholarship. However, he had had no previous experience abroad.

Wang Feng-tsao served as acting head of the mission for some time before he was formally appointed to the position of minister. This was the source of some embarrassment to the Chinese government because, although he fulfilled all the functions of a full minister, his status, according to Western practice, was below that of the other ministers. As a result, on diplomatic occasions he came lower in the order of precedence than the ministers from countries which China considered inferior.

Wang was urged by Li Hung-chang to take up his post quickly. Li also suggested to Wang that, since most of the legation staff were still serving their initial period, it would be better to keep them and reject new recommendations.

167. Biggerstaff, op. cit. 125, 133; also see Martin, A Cycle of Cathy (New York, 1901), 311.
168. For more information on Wang Feng-tsao, see "Wen-fa chü-yü hsu" in Tseng Chi-tse, Tseng Hui-min kung ch'uan-chi, wen-chi 2: "T'ung-wen kuan t'i ming lu" in Yang-wu yün-tung op. cit. II:87-89.
169. LWCKCT II 532.
170. Ibid., 621.
Likewise, when Li Ching-fang succeeded Li Shu-ch'ang, those staff members whose term had not yet expired had all remained. ¹⁷¹

Wang Feng-tsao's relations with Li Hung-chang seemed to have been quite good. From an examination of the letters exchanged between Wang and Li, the opinion of one scholar, Wang Hsin-ch'ung that Wang was a follower of Li's opponent Weng T'ung-ho and not on good terms with Li, seems incorrect.

The sophistication of the mission's intelligence activities and the secrecy of its communications with the home government seem to have improved greatly compared with the work of previous missions in these respects. Hsü Ch'eng-tsu had taken an important step in obtaining secret information through Asahina. ¹⁷² There is no evidence that this had been done by Ho Ju-chang or Li Shu-ch'ang, who hired Japanese only as interpreters, and even for this they preferred overseas Chinese like Wei Li-men in Ho's period. ¹⁷³ By the time of Wang's mission, secrecy was so well maintained that even today scholars find it well-high impossible to unravel the role played by the mission in such affair as, for example, the

171. Ibid.
172. CFMA:E Hsü Ch'eng-tsu to Yamen, October 25, 1885.
173. CKCJ, no. 29.
assassination of the Korean Kim Ok kyun in Shanghai, March 1894.\textsuperscript{174}

During the two years before the war, Wang Feng-tsao extended his reports to recount the debates in the Diet, including the budget cuts in the fourth session. Like Li Ching-fang, he interpreted these in terms of a conflict between the government, representing the officials, and the Diet, representing the people.\textsuperscript{175} In fact the Diet never had a decisive influence on the government. Even the allocation of funds for the army and navy, which was perhaps their only real power, could be vetoed by imperial edict. Wang's interpretation of the Diet as representing the people against the government, shows that he did not understand its true nature, and in fact over-estimated the importance of the Diet in the whole structure of the government.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{174} Kim Ok Kyun had been the leading figure in the events of 1884, and had fled to Tokyo, where the Japanese government refused to have him extradited. The Chinese government was anxious for his arrest, particularly as rumours of his activities continued to come from Japan. Finally the Korean king sent a mission to assassinate Kim, as it seemed impossible to get him out of Japan by legal means. Kim sought Japanese help, but by this time he had become an embarrassment to the Japanese government, and was sent to a distant island. However, after he returned to Tokyo, another assassin from the Korean government succeeded in enticing him to Shanghai and assassinated him there in March 1894. (JFA MT 1.1.2.4. 7, 14, 15, 18, 72, 335, 362; CKCIJ, no. 446, 452, annex 1; Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Nisshin sen'eki gaikōshi no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1951) Chapter 1, also see p. 316, 317.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 630, 670, 735.

\textsuperscript{176} Uesugi Jūjirō, Teikoku gikai no rekishi to hōshitsu (Tokyo, 1953), 73-83.
His reports on the domestic situation show his confusion about these matters. In one report he stated:

"As the dispute between the Japanese government and the people becomes more and more serious, Japan will finally be (weakened to the point where she is) unable to send a large army to another country."\(^{177}\)

But later, in reply to a question on the Japanese situation, he said:

"Japan has increased her army and dispersed it to various quarters to prepare to face a Chinese army, but now, due to the turmoil of political factions, she could not withdraw it even if she wished to"\(^{178}\)

Furthermore, Wang over-estimated China's military capacity vis-a-vis Japan.

Wang's misinterpretation of Japan's domestic situation, including his failure to grasp the role of the Diet and his over-estimation of China's military strength in relation to Japan, affected to some extent both the opinions of Li Hung-chang and the actions of the Chinese government in the pre-war period.

Letters from Li Hung-chang to Wang give some indication of the extent to which Wang's reports influenced Li's opinions.

\(^{177}\) Mutsu Munemitsu, *Hakushaku Mutsu Munemitsu iko* (Tokyo, 1929), 297.

\(^{178}\) Wang Feng-tsao to Chang Chih-tung, July 24, 1894 in *Mutsu Bunsho*. For further details on Wang's reports became known to the Japanese, see p. 180. Ito Hirobumi *Kimitsu Nisshin senso* (Tokyo, 1967), Shiryō kaisetsu to zoho.

\(^{179}\) Wang thought that although Japan had large forces, they could not fight and that they had taken flight when they had heard that the Chinese army was coming. (Wang Feng-tsao to Li Hung-chang, June 26, 1894 in *Mutsu Bunsho*).
Li Hung-chang showed a good appreciation of Japan's armed strength. He was also convinced that the Diet represented the will of the people, as against the government, but he felt that the government would prevail for the sake of unity against foreign threats. He continued to regard Ito as his favourite Japanese political figure, commenting on one occasion that "... this man is sensible, and familiar with the situation at home and abroad".

In the economic field Wang noted that Japan might be able to use iron from Hupeh in the construction of her railways. In another letter, Li Hung-chang pointed out that Japan already had over thirty cotton spinning factories, supported by Japanese capital alone. He considered it important for China to develop her own spinning industry.

While Li Hung-chang showed a good appreciation of Japan's armed strength as well as some understanding of Japan's economic tendencies, he had to rely on Wang's on the spot interpretation of the rapidly changing Japanese domestic political conditions from the 4th Diet onwards.

180. In his letter of reply to Wang, Li showed admiration for Japan's naval construction. See LWCKCT II 708.
181. See LWCKCT II 670. With reference to the debates in the Diet, Li commented "The Japanese government, although attacked by the Diet, must rely on its support in confronting enemies. The government must remain united, as has always happened in China." See LWCKCT II 735-736.
182. LWCKCT II 653.
183. Ibid., 709.
184. Ibid., 731.
Actually, in the fourth session of the Diet, the government had succeeded in gaining the approval of the Diet on the expansion of naval expenditure by using the emperor's authority on the one hand and accepting some reduction of administrative expenditure. After the fourth Diet, the Jiyuto, the largest party in the House of Representatives, changed their attitude and ceased their attack on the government. At the same time the other parties changed their point of attack on foreign policy to a demand for a harder policy vis-a-vis China as well as the west. This meant that though there was very strong conflict between the government and the Diet, it became easier for the government to pursue her stand towards China. Therefore the situation grew more tense for China after the fourth Diet.

However this political scene was reported by Wang to Li thus:

"Japanese government and the Diet are continually in conflict and as this has recently become more serious, Japan will be unable to send a large army to another country."  

With this cable report, it is easy to appreciate why Li came to believe that Japan would not take any military

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action. It is one thing to come to some appreciation of the Japanese military strength per se, but based on such information on the political situation in Japan it is entirely a different matter if Li concluded that Japanese military action of any significant strength would be unlikely. Indeed, Li's conclusion based on Wang's reports of Japan's political situation seems rather natural.

In the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1894, the Chinese mission to Japan played an important role. Some of its activities are shrouded in mystery; others are clear to the historian. As an example of the former type, the case of Kim Ok kyun is important. Professor Tabohashi denies that there is any evidence of a connection between the Chinese mission and the assassination of Kim.\(^{188}\) Wang Hsin-chung, on the other hand, stated that Wang's predecessor, Li Ching-fang, was intimate with Kim and that the mission knew of his situation and persuaded him to go to Shanghai, and sent Wu Pao-jen (a member of the legation staff) to accompany him. According to Wang Hsin-chung, Chinese government knew of the plan to assassinate him and even though they were not involved and did not give instructions, they at least implicitly agreed to it.\(^{189}\) Chinese and Japanese scholars reach almost opposite conclusions on the matter.

\(^{188}\) Tabohashi, Nisshin Seneki op. cit. 21-26.

\(^{189}\) Wang Hsin-chung, Chung-\(j\)h chia-wu chan-cheng chih wai-chiao pei-ching (Taipei, 1964) 138-140.
Yu Shih-mei, who served on the staff of Li Hung-chang from 1885-1889 composed all the drafts of Li's letters. A careful examination of those letters reveals that in a letter of reply to Wang Feng-tsao, the Chinese minister in Japan, there are a few lines about Kim's assassination. Significantly, Li crossed out the two lines in the draft which referred to the role of the mission. (I have underlined these in the following passage):

"Immediately after Kim's arrival in Shanghai, he was assassinated by the Korean Hong Cheong-wu. Kim was originally of the Korean rebel party and had taken refuge in Japan. He had long been hated by the Korean. His journey to China posed a difficulty problem for us. His murder has now provided a timely solution. I have received a letter from Yüan Shih-k'ai saying that the Korean court was dancing for joy and saying also that he was deeply obliged to you for your assistance in alluring him to China. The assassin has already been repatriated and naturally Japan does not wish to interfere."\(^{190}\)

This letter clearly shows the mission's connection with the assassination. In writing the draft of the letter, Yu, his secretary, must have had access to Yüan's letter and so would naturally have written the above passage (as underlined). Li Hung-chang probably regarded the passage as improper and a potential leakage of secrets and therefore left out the sentence. This supposition is not inconsistent with Yüan's appeal to Li Hung-chang to destroy all documents found on Kim's person.\(^{191}\)

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190. *LWCKCT* II 739.
191. *CJCC* II 269.
This case was certainly not the chief or only cause of the Sino-Japanese war, but it definitely aggravated the situation between China and Japan.

The immediate cause of the war of 1894 was the Korean crisis and here the Chinese mission in Japan played an important part in determining the course of action taken by the Chinese government. China and Japan had previously agreed in the Tientsin convention that if either country planned to send troops to Korea, they must inform the other of this intention. In 1894, when the Chinese government decided to send troops to Korea to quell a disturbance caused by the Tong Haks party, they must have considered the possibility that Japan would follow suit.

At the time when Li Hung-chang was confronted with the question of sending troops to Korea, he was influenced in part by the report of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the Chinese representative in Korea. Yüan asked that Chinese troops be sent, and felt there was little possibility that Japan would do likewise. At the same time, Li was perhaps more strongly influenced by the reports from Wang in Japan. 192

192. Yüan's report is available in Chinese sources and his views on Japan can be found among the documents called the "Foreign Office Confidential Printing of Great Britain". Yet there is no trace there of Wang Feng-tsao's report. The only source from which most scholars have quoted is Mutsu's Ken ken roku. Mutsu had access to many secret telegrams between the Chinese minister in Japan and Li Hung-chang. This can be demonstrated from the section of his book which deals with communications between Wang Feng-tsao and the home government on the mediation of the Russian ministry before the Sino-Japanese disputes and the reports on Japanese movements. In some places his account can be checked and corresponds closely with actual telegrams in Mutsu Bunsho in the National Diet Library, Tokyo. Some credence can therefore be given to what he says, even when the relevant documents are missing. See JFO S-I 678; Kenkenroku 296-297 (Iwami edition); Wang Hsin-chung, Chung-jih chia-wu chan-cheng chih wai-chiao pei-ching (Taipei, 1964) 159.
The whole picture which Wang had built up of domestic conflicts in Japan, troubles between the government and Diet, and a general lack of military preparedness, made it appear extremely unlikely that Japan would despatch troops on a large scale to Korea. Even though Li was impressed by Japanese naval preparations, he seems to have regarded them as purely routine, and not as preparations for a war with China. In fact, the Japanese government gave no prior warning of the events which ensued.

Based on these information Li Hung-chang finally decided to send the army to Korea and informed Japan likewise. Should Wang had correctly conveyed to Li some warning of the danger to China of the Japanese domestic political situation, Li might have had a more cautious attitude towards the decision to send an army to Korea, a move giving Japan the legal excuse of sending armed forces to Korea which eventually led to war.

However, it rapidly became clear that Japan had been preparing for war for some time, and the incident in Korea simply provided the excuse they had been looking for. Thus, Japanese troops were able to set out for Korea just one day after Wang had informed the Japanese government of China's intention. 193

193. JFKC IV 3-4, 6-12.
When Japanese and Chinese troops arrived in Korea, early in 1894, it was found that the domestic disturbance had already died down, and China accordingly proposed that both armies withdraw and allow the situation to return to normal. At this point, Japan's intention in introducing a strong force into Korea became clear. Using its military presence as a powerful bargaining lever, the Japanese government now presented China with a series of demands. Wang added to his government's confusion by reporting that there was a difference of opinion between Mutsu and Itô. His impression was as follows:

"Japan intended to station troops in Korea in order to support her in the negotiations. After a strong argument, Itô stated that he had no objection to withdrawing these troops, but the foreign minister Mutsu rejected this idea ...." 194

Clearly he felt that Itô would favour withdrawal if Japan's terms were accepted, while he believed that Mutsu and Inouye favoured war. In fact he was wrong, for Itô basically supported the same policies as Mutsu. When China, as Japan was expecting, rejected these demands, Japan proceeded with her plans to take over Korea, with the result that she and China went to war. 195

Before this came about, however, there was a delay of a few days brought about by Wang's last-minute efforts to avoid a war. Even after he had received instructions from

194. Wang Feng-tsao to Li Hung-chang, June 17, 1894 in Mutsu Bunsho, op. cit.

195. JFKC IV 65-66.
the Yamen to reject the Japanese demands, Wang delayed notifying the Japanese government in an attempt to gain time for Chinese reinforcements to arrive, or to persuade the home government to seek a compromise. His efforts met with failure when Japan, becoming suspicious over the delay, contacted the Yamen directly. But it appears that Wang had at last grasped the true intention of Mutsu's proposal as a casus belli, even though his realisation came too late to affect the situation.

When it became apparent that war was inevitable, Wang advised the immediate sending of more reinforcements, but the Ch'ing government still seemed unaware of the gravity of the situation and continued to seek foreign intervention, particularly from Russia. Despite Wang's counsel that this policy was dangerous, the home government took no further military action until July. Perhaps the ultimate misfortune was that all the communications between Wang and Li Hung-chang

196. The Japanese scholar Tabohashi believed that the reply was delayed because Wang felt that if it were given, all paths to compromise would be blocked. Moreover, from the beginning, the minister Wang took a very conservative attitude on Mutsu's proposal and even hesitated to report it in detail. Although urged by the Japanese foreign ministry, he still held back the reply asking Li to amend it. Li does not seem to have understood his motive in doing this. This conjecture appears not quite correct. The documents shows that Wang had given his reasons for suggesting a delay to Li several times, even though Li did not accept them. (Wang Feng-tsaо to Li Hung-chang, June 18, 20, 1894, in Mutsu Bunsho, Li Hung-chang to Wang Feng-tsaо, June 21, 1894, in Mutsu Bunsho, Tabohashi, Nisshin Seneki op. cit. 140).

197. Wang Feng-tsaо to Yamen, June 21, 1894, in Mutsu Bunsho.

198. Wang Feng-tsaо to Li Hung-chao, June 26, 1894 in Mutsu Bunsho.
had been decoded by the Japanese and all the intentions of the Ch'ing government were known to them. 199

From the foregoing examination we can see that in the eyes of Chinese diplomats from Ho Ju-chang to Wang Feng-tsao, Japan had undergone a number of changes. Besides providing information on events of a diplomatic nature, Chinese diplomatic reports from Meiji Japan attempted to bring about a better understanding between their conservative countrymen and the Japanese.

In addition to reporting on a number of subjects of interest to China, namely developments in Japan's revision of her treaties with Western countries, Japan's military and naval construction, the circulation of paper money, political situation, and, in the later period, railway management and construction, the Chinese ministers reported on the Meiji reforms, mainly in political institutions such as the opening of the Diet and how it worked, and the other aspects of Western practice which Japan copied. Generally, the Chinese ministers were puzzled by the lack of agreement between the opposition and the government, which they viewed as a strong sign of discord between the people and the government which would lead to internal disturbances. They also considered that this situation would prevent the Japanese government from engaging in any overseas adventures.

199. Itō Hirobumi Kimitsu Nisshin senso Shiryo kaisetsu to zoho 15-17.
There was considerable interest in the personalities and character of the Japanese political figures. Ito continued to be regarded as one who favoured peace with China.

There was also continual interest in Japan's attitude towards China and its approach to foreign affairs. The Japanese did not seem to have much respect for China, which angered the members of the Chinese mission and caused them to look for some way to alter this situation.

The opinions of the members of the mission in Japan changed in certain respects under each of the successive ministers. In Ho's term it is clear that Japan's strength was under-estimated, and doubt was cast on the value of her reforms. But under Li Shu-ch'ang, the reforms were viewed with approval and the mission's estimation of Japanese strength was much higher. Despite Li's warnings about the growing strength of Japan, however, the last two ministers, Li Ching-fang and Wang, over-estimated Chinese military superiority. Not until after the war of 1895 was the extent of Japan's strength fully realised.

In the early Meiji period, the picture which people in China had of Japan was little different from the traditional view of Japan as a culturally and politically inferior dependency of China. They had little idea of the way the country was run. They thought that the Meiji restoration was merely a change of dynasty and did not clearly understand the difference between the institution of the Tenno and that of the Shogunate. Although the Taiwan incident had drawn attention to Japan, it
brought about little improvement in China's understanding of the situation. The Chinese mission's prime contribution was to change these ideas and attitudes gradually by conveying to their countrymen a more accurate picture of Meiji Japan through their personal observations. During the period following the reopening of diplomatic relations, many of the ministers and their staff were brilliant scholars who enthusiastically engaged in the study of Japan and so advanced China's understanding of its neighbour.

However, although they observed superficial changes in various institutions and in the numbers of troops and ships, the Chinese failed completely to grasp the underlying significance of these changes: the awakening of the progressive spirit which was to lead Japan onward to achievements undreamt of by the traditionally minded Chinese.

In general, Li Hung-chang had recognised even before the establishment of the first Chinese mission in Japan, that Japan constituted a potential threat to China. He had more than once expressed this view, and after the establishment of the mission still maintained it. In 1885 he wrote a secret report to the Yamen, saying, among other things,

"...In about ten years, Japan's wealth and power will be considerable. Though not at present a source of anxiety for China she will be so in the future".

The mission's efforts to improve their own country's knowledge of Japan therefore were of mixed success. The
traditional Chinese attitudes, plus the oversights of the envoys themselves, contributed to the deficiencies in understanding which were not overcome until war actually broke out. Had this understanding been better or more complete, the events which were to follow might have been prevented.
CHAPTER VII

Changes in the Functions of the Mission after 1895

I. Introduction

The period between 1895 and the 1911 was one of unusually rapid change. Their victory in 1895 gave the Japanese much financial reward in the form of a large indemnity from China, the acquisition of Formosa, and China's acknowledgement of the independence of Korea.\(^1\) With new markets and the continuous expansion of military preparedness, Japanese capitalism aided by the indemnity developed greatly;\(^2\) and the more its productive ability grew the more Japan needed foreign markets, so that demand\(^3\) became much stronger than before the war. From the point of view of commerce and industry, China was the main focal point of its endeavours.\(^4\)

Nevertheless, China's situation was not such that Japan could have a free hand. After interfering in Japan's

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1. JF0:S-1 575-580.


3. The demands here refer to the post-war Japanese demands for foreign market and territory, etc.

cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, the major European powers now threatened to dismember China. One by one, they demanded that certain ports be leased to them and that large sections of the Empire be recognized as their sphere of interest. The more Japan wanted to expand her influence in China, the more notice she had to take of the opposition of the major European powers. Until 1905, therefore, Japan sought the support of the Western powers in trying to establish her own sphere of influence in China.5 Sino-Japanese affairs now involved the interests of the Western powers, and, since Japan was reluctant to take any steps without being assured of Western support, decisions affecting the relations between China and Japan were often influenced by outside powers.6 As Japan was unwilling to arouse Western suspicions, so she was not prepared to have any kind of special relation with China.7 This contributed to the decline in importance of the Chinese mission in Japan, especially the political roles of the Chinese diplomats.

5. JFO 36 I/d.229 .255-257, Uchida Yasuya to Komura Jutarō; JFO 36 I/d.1 .1-4; JFO 37 38 bessatsu R-J war V d.55.59-63.
6. JFO vol.30d.356.517-520; d.365.528; d.370.534-537; d.384.546-649.
7. Yamagata Aritomo's opinion concerning the Chinese special envoy in kensei shiryō shitsu Yamagata Aritomo Bunsho May 27, 1899.
The increasing importance of China to Japan during this period made the Japanese government prefer to negotiate in Peking. The following example shows clearly that the Japanese government did not consider the Chinese minister in Japan important enough to negotiate the Manchurian question. In 1909, when the Manchurian issue was being discussed in Peking, a rumour arose that the Chinese government wished to shift the negotiations to Tokyo. Komura Jutarō, the Japanese foreign minister protested saying that if even the high-ranking Chinese officials in Peking with whom the Japanese had been negotiating could not act fully on their own responsibility then to negotiate through the Chinese minister in Tokyo would provide even less chance of achieving any result. Japanese advances into Manchuria after 1905 made direct negotiations with the Peking government more convenient for Japan, and the Chinese mission in Japan easier to by-pass, hence the mission declined in importance.

An examination of the terms of the post-war Chinese ministers in Tokyo shows that they did not engage in any important negotiations with Japan on specific issues. This reflects a

8. JFO vol.42 I d.258. 288.
9. JFO vol.42 I d.251. 289
10. Masuda Jun, Manshū mondai to kokubō hōshin (Tokyo, 1967) 339-340; Hayashi Tadasu to Ito, October 10, 1907 in Ito monjo.
11. See Chapter VII section 2.
substantial change in the role of the resident minister and his mission after the war of 1895.

On the other hand the role and concern of the mission also underwent a great change. As shown on ministers' reports to the home government, they were concerned about the Japanese school system and about the regulations concerning economics and finance.12 This sort of report had seldom been received from the mission before the war. The primary post-war concern of the mission was to further the reform of Chinese educational, economic and military circles.13

After the war the Chinese missions were no longer mainly interested in gauging the strength of Japan as a threat to China but rather in finding out how Japan had become strong and how China could do the same by copying the West. On the other hand the Chinese government paid particular attention to the ministers' suggestions regarding student affairs. Their memorials were immediately referred to Sun Chia-nai, Commissioner of education in charge of the Metropolitan University, with instructions that he dealt with it appropriately.14

One result of the Japanese victory of 1895 was that many in China came to view Japan rather uncritically as the example for Chinese political reform. They either tried to copy

12. See CKCJ, no. 3561, 3709, annex 1.
13. CKCJ, no. 3508, 3598.
14. CKCJ, no. 3710.
Japan in their own political life or criticised what they regarded as shortcomings in China, using Japan as the norm or standard.15

The personal views of the ministers regarding Japan also contrasted with the situation before the war, when they had tended to be full of suspicion and distrust. Many of the post-war appointee, such as Yü-keng and Ts'ai Chūn, were favourably disposed towards Japan. This can also be seen from the secret reports written by Japanese envoys to the Japanese government.16

The Chinese government took a lively interest in its ministers' reports on Japanese education, while many of their reports on diplomatic events aroused almost no attention. So, in this sense their political influence was lessened, compared to the pre-war days. This was true despite the fact that the ministers appointed after the war were better qualified and with wider experience and training in diplomatic work than those before the war.17


16. JFO vol.32 Uchida Yasuya to Komura Jutarō October 20, 1904, 1.1.2.34. CKCI, no.4627.

17. See Chapter IV section 2 and 3.
China's defeat in 1895 had resulted in Li Hung-chang's fall in influence and this decline marks an important change. The role of the mission in determining Japan's relations with the home government had changed considerably. While most of the ministers before the war had had strong ties with Li Hung-chang, this connection was severed in the post-war period. It was no more a customary procedure to by-pass the Tsungli Yamen; telegrams were now directly sent to the Yamen. In the same way, most of the Yamen's orders were sent directly to the minister in Japan, and not through Li Hung-chang. Although the ministers still maintained some sort of contact with Li - Yü-keng still wrote personal letters to Li - it was much less frequent. Li might inform the minister briefly what he was doing at the time, such as a few words on the difficulty of negotiating a commercial treaty or his trip to Russia, but no further discussions were held with him on Japanese domestic politics.

The Yamen, however, remained unchanged for a while except for some efforts in trying to limit the size of the legation staffs. In general, relations with the mission remained the same as they had been earlier. This situation

18. See Chapter IV section 5.
19. LWCKCT 788.
20. Ibid, 793.
21. CTSKT 959-961.
lasted till the next war and defeat. After the Boxer Incident, the victorious Powers demanded changes in the Yamen. By the imperial edict of 24 July 1901, the Yamen became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were certain improvements in its organisation. It came under the general management and supervision of a board of 5 officials. The Chinese government establishment abroad also became more complete. But before 1906, the functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were still the same as that of the Yamen, that is to say, it still included the sending of students abroad, the management of the postal service, telegraph, railroads, mining and a few minor items.

Only in 1906 did the new establishments of Ministry of Education, Ministry of Posts and Communications, and Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, shift many normally non-diplomatic affairs to other ministries.

Another significant change was in the staff reductions and cuts in expenditure that were imposed after the war.

22. CKCJ no.4570,4671,4685 annex 1.
23. KCTHL V 5634-5635 (February 1907) 8-9.
25. Ch'en Wen-chin op. cit. 277-278.
While the missions became routinized in many ways there were also several new developments which caused difficulty for the mission. After the failure of the "Hundred Days' Reform" in 1898, many reformists took refuge in Japan and the mission was confronted with the problem of Chinese political refugees in Japan. A secret order was issued by the Empress Dowager to the missions for the capture of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, dead or alive. A special mission was even sent to Japan to carry out this order. That K'ang was persuaded to leave Japan and move further afield was the work of the normal diplomatic mission acting behind the scene and was not due to any action taken on the order of the Empress Dowager. The diplomatic mission in fact prevented the special mission of Ch'ing Kuan from taking action. 26

Apart from the problem of political refugees, hundreds and then thousands of Chinese students went to Japan after the Boxer Uprising. As the number of students continued to rise, political activity also increased. The mission was brought gradually into direct and serious contact with Chinese students studying in Japan, who became greatly influenced by the presence and activities of Chinese reformists and revolutionaries resident in Japan. The student's growing political agitation made the management of the Chinese students an important aspect of the control of the revolution. The mission regarded the suppression

26. This point is further illustrated in Chapter VII section 3.
of the student revolutionary activities and trend as its main goal. Through the Japanese government's co-operation, successive Chinese missions took measures to restrain the students and this resulted in many dispute with the students.  

The function of curtailing the activities of Chinese reformists and revolutionaries resident in Japan, and supervising students studying in Japan differed from the normal diplomatic business of the pre-war days. These new activities, and the new activists, were really extensions of domestic Chinese matters into a foreign land. Yet nonetheless they occupied much of the time and energy of the Chinese missions in Japan. Therefore, although the Chinese missions in Japan was rarely involved in diplomacy of any consequence as far as substantive Sino-Japanese relations were concerned, the presence of the students and exiled revolutionaries and reformists gave the mission in Japan an important new task, and dragged it into taking very complicated responsibilities, one which Chinese legations in other countries were not called upon to perform.

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27. See Chapter VII section 4.
29. See Chapter VII section 2.
II. Routine functions of the mission

Since most substantive negotiations between Japan and China after 1895 were carried out in Peking, the political role of the Chinese mission in Japan became routine and declined in importance. The routine functions of the mission are to be seen in the long and detailed report of how to train Chinese students in Japan, of the Japanese schools. The mission also sent back detailed descriptions of Japan's bonds and stamp duty systems as well as translations of the Japanese regulations on these systems. These are signs that the mission now had more time to engage in this sort of time-consuming study of the new Japan.

Secondly, the mission continued to report on the Japanese political scene to the home government. Their reports on the situation in the Japanese Diet were supplemented by summary translations of Japanese newspapers. Reports on personnel changes in the Japanese cabinet, the national budget, foreign policy speeches, became very regular, while there was much less policy advice for the home government. 

30. CKCJ, no.3709.
31. CKCJ, no.3561, 3709, annex 1.
32. CKCJ, no.3508, 3598.
33. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu December 30, 1903; January 20, 1904.
34. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu December 30, 1903; December 17, 1904. Hu Wei-te to Wai-wu-pu March 3, 1909, August 16, 1908.
exception was Li Sheng-to's acting as a middleman in contacts between Li Hung-chang and the Japanese government during the Boxer uprising.  

Many of the disputes with the Japanese government over taxation and business management in Japan which would usually require negotiations between the ministers and the Japanese government came under the jurisdiction of the Japanese government and the mission no longer had to negotiate over such matters. This was because the friendship treaty lapsed after the Sino-Japanese war.  

Diplomatic matters were now passed through the Wai-wu-pu first and then transferred to other ministries. In matters such as the Manchurian question, which was the most important issue of the period, we can see a typical case of the now reduced operational role that the mission in Japan occupied. The regional government in Manchuria sent its complaints to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking asking the latter to take up the case with the Japanese government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then instructed the mission to lodge a complaint. However, subsequent negotiation was held in Peking, thus reducing the mission's role to little more than a

37. CFMA-XV Wai-wu-pu to Yang Shu April 5, 1906.
channel of communications. In most such cases, telegrams with identical content were sent to the Japanese minister in China. This kind of telegram was frequent but rather routine. The actual negotiations and the settlement did not always involve the mission in Japan. 38

In the commercial sphere, too, the mission in Japan made detailed reports, but was not involved in negotiation. The trade mark issue is a case in point. The mission had reported about the agreement between Japan and America over their trade marks in China, but all the negotiations were held in China between the Wai-wu-pu, the Japanese minister in China and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 39

In short, the function of the Chinese mission in Japan became much less important compared to the period before the war.

The routinization of the mission's function was characterized by a decrease in open involvement in plots and intrigues such as Hsu Ch'eng-tsu's and Wang Feng-tsa's activities. 40 The ministers appeared reluctant to involve themselves personally in spying and plots. In the case of the special mission sent to Japan in 1899 to assassinate


39. CFMA:I-T passim.

40. See Chapter VI.
K'ang Yu-wei, for instance, the minister Li Sheng-to opposed this plan, informed Itō Hirobumi of the plot, and took an active part in persuading K'ang to leave Japan.\(^{41}\)

The post-war ministers, compared to their pre-war colleagues, had a better training and understanding of the Japanese language as well as international laws and practices.\(^{42}\) In this respect, they were not inclined to take certain types of actions as their pre-war colleagues would.

\* Li Sheng-to was a native of Kiangsi. He was placed second in order of merit at the Court examination and received the title of pang-yen in 1899. He was also appointed Pien-hsiu in the Hanlin Academy. In December 1894 on the recommendation of Jung-lu, he was made Secretary in the Superintendent's office. In 1895 he was provincial Censor and together with K'ang Yu-wei in 1898 planned to gather those chu-ien who had come to Peking for the examination. After 1898 Li switched his loyalty from the reform party to the anti-reform group. His sudden change of attitude might not seem so strange when we consider his relationship with Jung-lu. It is not surprising that when K'ang Yu-wei heard that Li Sheng-to was going to be appointed as Minister to Japan he felt very apprehensive. Weng T'ung-ho, op. cit., XXXIII 125b (Dec. 11, 1894); XXXIV 33 (April 26, 1895); Yeh Ch'ang-chih Yuan tu lu jih-chi 220 (Sept. 27, 1894); Ajia rekishi jiten (Tokyo, 1959) VIII 299; Ch'ien Shih-p'u op. cit., 78; Chang Shih-yü, tr. Chung-kuo pien-fa wei hsin yün-tung ho K'ang Yu-wei 152, 161, 181, 215, 218, 231, Chung-kuo Shih hsüeh hui, Wu-hsiu pien-fa (Shanghai, 1953) IV 383.

\(^{41}\) See p. 351.

\(^{42}\) See Chapter IV section 2 and 3 for further detail.
There was a tendency in the post-war period toward a clearer division of work within the mission. The list of the Chinese establishments abroad in 1907 contrasted notably with the comparatively simple one of 1876. Li Sheng-to had asked for a special officer to be sent to deal with students and by 1907 a Commercial Attaché and a Military Attaché were also present, directly subordinate to the General Staff Council.

(Chūn-tze-ch'u)

On the other hand there were new responsibilities for the post-war missions to fulfil. Firstly missions were kept busy with the frequent tours of inspection from the central and local Chinese government to observe Japanese political and education systems and invitations of Japanese teachers to China, and with other information and matters such as gaining information entrusted to them by the various provinces.

Secondly as we have mentioned, in the mission's increased attention to commercial regulations, school systems, financial and economic matters we may infer that their political influence had decreased. Most importantly, the rapid increase in the number of Chinese students studying in Japan had made the

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43. KCTHL I 295-296 (October 1876) 111-112. V 5634-5635 (February 1907) 8-9.

44. CKCJ, no. 3735 annex 1.

45. KCTHL V 5634-5635 (February 1907) 8-9.

46. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu July 19, 1907.
supervision of Chinese students an important concern of the mission. This we shall discuss later.

All these new developments in the post-war period show a decrease in the mission's importance in conducting important negotiations and in political influence, changing towards more purely administrative functions.

For the purpose of illustrating this I would like to examine some important events which occurred during 1895-1911 to see what kind of special function the mission in Japan had, who were responsible for handling this kind of unexpected situations, and how.

The Boxer uprising in 1900 caught the mission by surprise, and their communications with the Yamen were almost totally cut off. The legation received only one telegram from the Yamen in May ordering the withdrawal of the mission. Later Li Hung-chang and the Superintendent of Southern Ports (Liu Kûn-i) wired again to postpone the withdrawal. Then Li Sheng-to received telegraphed instructions to carry on his work as usual. 47 Li Sheng-to in his letter of March 9 1901 to the Yamen reported the general attitude of Japan's public reaction to the uprising:

"At that time rumour was going round in Tokyo that Japanese mobs were going to surround and attack the Chinese legation. There were instances of stones being thrown at the legation and at Chinese nationals walking in the street. I had to ask my staff and the Chinese merchants to take no notice of it, as if it were just a small matter, I kept up my usual contact with the Japanese foreign minister and the situation gradually calmed down after July." 48

47. CFMA:E Li Sheng-to to Yamen March 9, 1901.
48. Ibid.
Japan; although still economically weak compared with the Western Powers, had two advantages: her army and her closeness to China. She was therefore eager to send an army to China to take advantage of the situation. Li Sheng-to hearing about this tried to persuade the Japanese government that it was not necessary to send large numbers of troops, and reported that he felt he was successful in persuading Japan just to send small number of troops for the protection of legation. However, there is no evidence that his influence was significant.

He then observed Japanese government attitude towards the Boxers as follows:

"Now the outline of the condition of peace negotiations had already been decided and soon peace negotiation will begin .... Fortunately the present Japanese foreign minister Katō Takaaki has been to China and he is very understanding, and seemed willing to negotiate peacefully. When other countries made excessive demands in the negotiations, Katō tried to persuade them to be more moderate."

During the peace negotiations the Tsungli Yamen had virtually dropped out of existence as an active government office, while the mission continued to play a part in the negotiations.
During this time Li Sheng-to was particularly busy acting as a middleman in contacts between Li Hung-chang and the Japanese government. Li Hung-chang seemed to want to consult with Japan about the peace negotiations, but he was still strongly influenced by his pro-Russian policy, which led him to attach more importance to reports from the Chinese Minister in Russia, Yang Ju, than to those from Li Sheng-to.

Li Hung-chang at the time was being urged by the Chinese government to travel to Peking to participate in the peace negotiations. Concerned for his personal safety, he delayed as long as possible, while closely observing the situation, and consulting both Li Sheng-to and Yang Ju about Japanese and Russian opinion respectively. Li Sheng-to reported that the Japanese wished Li Hung-chang to go to Peking as soon as possible, and on a German ship. Li Sheng-to expressed the opinion that Li Hung-chang's activities would influence the attitude of the Western Powers. He urged Li Hung-chang to decide quickly on his date of departure. However Li Hung-chang did not take this advice and, despite Japan's disapproval, eventually followed the suggestion of the Minister in Russia.

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54. CKCJ, no. 3846, 3881, 3893, 2913; LWCK:TD 22:26, 28, 31, 35.
55. LWCK:TD 22:37.
56. Ibid., 25:15-16.
Li Hung-chang began his long and protracted journey to take up his appointment as the Governor of Chihli and Chief Negotiator. He left Hongkong on the 18th July 1900. He arrived at Shanghai on the 21st July and did not continue his journey to Peking till the 14th September. It was during his protracted stay in Shanghai that he expressed to Japanese Consul-General Odagiri Masunosuke his warm approval of the Russian policy.  

It seems from the above examination that although the mission played a special role in these negotiations, they had no significant influence in determining the outcome.

Also it appears that the mission's relations with Li Hung-chang had changed.

In 1901, during Yang Ju's negotiations with Russia on the Sino-Russian treaty, Li Sheng-to had frequent talks in Japan with Kato Takaaki, the Foreign Minister, over the matter. Li Sheng-to openly and repeatedly expressed his animosity towards Li Hung-chang. In an interview with Uchida Yasuya, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, he revealed that Yang Ju had been instructed by Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-chang to consult and co-operate with Li Sheng-to. Li Sheng-to found this very strange. He jokingly said that Li Hung-chang probably suspected him of obstructing the conclusion of the treaty, and had therefore cabled Yang Ju. If the treaty was

57. *JFO* Vol. 33 Bessatsu II d. 1224, 1246, 1249; *LWCK:TD* 26:5.
not concluded Li Sheng-to would then bear the responsibility; this would put him the same boat as Prince Tuan (Tsai-i), or Kang-i, and Russia might ask that he be beheaded. This remark expressed not only his feelings towards Li Hung-chang but also his attitude towards the Sino-Russian treaty.\(^{58}\)

On another occasion, Kato after reading a telegram from Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-chang, complained that it seemed to imply that the matter was none of Japan's business. Li Sheng-to replied that the telegram represented only Li Hung-chang's personal opinion and not the opinion of the Ch'ing government, and then went on to criticise Li Hung-chang's pro-Russian policy.\(^ {59}\)

Another matter concerned the failure of Japan to occupy Amoy, owing to the strong protest of the Powers.\(^ {60}\) Japan was once again made to realize the impossibility of invading China alone. The difficulty of advancing to the south and the confrontation with Russia in the north encouraged Japan to ally with England for support. England, too, wished to ally with Japan against Russia. This resulted in the conclusion of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.\(^ {61}\)

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58. JFA MT 1.1.1.2 Gaimu Daijin no kaidan yōryō zakken March 13, 1901.
59. Ibid., March 1 and 4, 1901.
On this Anglo-Japanese Alliance the minister Ts'ai Chün at the time observed that:

"... the purpose of the Alliance in general was to protect both Japanese and British interests in China and also to stop the other countries from having a finger in the pie .... Thus the Alliance is of some advantage to China. But China must use this chance for self-strengthening and then there will be peace in Asia .... When the establishment of the Alliance was proclaimed the Diet members and officials all clapped and cheered .... The Japanese government's thoughtfulness and foresight in bringing all classes of people into a perfect unison, were enviable but frightening. I think if China does not plan self-sufficiency without delay, we shall not be able to compete with Japan for long ...."62

After the conclusion of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, there was the establishment of the Russo-Chinese Convention in April 8, 1902 and Russia on October 1 carried out its first withdrawal of troops from Manchuria as laid down in the Convention. But in April 8, 1903, the second withdrawal date, Russia did not carry out the withdrawal. On the contrary, it strengthened the Army and demanded seven new conditions of withdrawal.63 This developed into negotiations between Russia and Japan and eventually the negotiation was held in Tokyo on October 5, 1903 between Russian minister in Japan, Roman Rosen and foreign minister Komura Jutaro.64

62. CFMA:E Ts'ai Chün to Wai-wu-pu March 22, 1902.
Minister Yang Shu in November 1903 reported that:

"Various Japanese ministers are all busy. I have no way to make enquiries. According to Japanese newspapers many said that Russia and Japan, though they have a lot of disputes, would not go to war, because Russia's reserve of coal (for the navy) in Far East is actually not enough, and it would be difficult to proclaim war with Japan. Therefore Russia would have to concede. This argument seemed to quite hit the point ...."

On December 20, 1903 Yang Shu again reported that:

"... In the Japanese government's view, we have two options. If we take side against the Russians, then Japan would help us regain political and military rights, and would help to prevent Russia's eastward encroachment. If we do not take side against the Russians, then in the Japanese view, the Russians would not try to accommodate us but would still insist on their rights ...."

In January 20, 1904 he reported rumours that Russian and Japan were going to war with each other, the Japanese army and navy Ministers forbade the reporting of the movement of warships and troops and the Chinese consul at Kobe reported much naval activity.

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65. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu November 19, 1903.
66. Ibid., Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu December 20, 1903.
67. Ibid., Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu January 20, 1904.
It is clear that Yang knew very little about the development in the Russo-Japanese negotiations and based his reports mainly on Japanese newspapers. Important negotiations between China and Japan, such as China's eventual decision to remain neutral during the war, her intention to become a mediator in the conflict, and her intention to send a delegation to the peace negotiation, were all carried out by Japanese ministers in China, Uchida Yasuya, and the Wai-wu-pu. The mission in Japan had no part in it. In fact the mission's reports on this though frequent were merely giving greater detail concerned with student affairs.

Another example of the decline in the mission's influence involved Yang Shu's successor, Li Chia-chü. The one incident of diplomatic importance in which Li was involved was the Dai-ni Tatsu Maru incident in early 1908.

The incident arose when the Chinese government arrested the Japanese arms smuggling vessel the "Dai-ni Tatsu Maru". Japan haughtily demanded an apology, which the Chinese government agreed to make, but the Chinese people, furious

68. JFO 37, 38 Bessatu R-J war, V d. 85.89, 90-92; d. 164, 168-174, d. 153 162, d. 154 163; JFO:R 1.1.2.12.
69. CFMA:E Yang Shu passim.
70. CFMA IX Hayashi Gonsuke to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs February 14, 1908.
71. CFMA IX Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Governor of Kwangtung Chang Jen-chün March 5, 1908.
at this treatment, initiated an anti-Japanese boycott with Canton as its centre.\textsuperscript{72}

Li Chia-chū took a strong stand and urged the Chinese government to use its authority and act firmly to appease its own people. His stand was quite different from the conciliatory line of the Wai-wu-pu. It is clear however that Li's role in the incident was unimportant, as he only sent one telegram to the Wai-wu-pu. Further negotiations took place directly between the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Japanese Minister in China, Hayashi Gonsuke.\textsuperscript{73}

The three example above give some indication of the insignificance of the mission's role in this period. The lack of material makes it difficult to generalize, but my impression is that the mission had very little contribution to make. Even in such an important event as the Chinese revolution of 1911, there is no material to indicate any communication on the subject between the Ch'ing government and Japan, or any contribution on the part of the mission.\textsuperscript{74}

Therefore we can say that the mission in Japan became and less influential and its principal functions were

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., Governor of Kwangtung Chang Jen-chūn to Wai-wu-pu, March 15, 1908 and March 19, 1908; Japanese legation to Wai-wu-pu March 20, 1908; Wai-wu-pu to Governor of Kwangtung, Chang Jen-chūn.

\textsuperscript{73} CFMA IX Li Chia-chū to Wai-wu-pu March 2, 1908; March 16, 1908; Wai-wu-pu to Li Chia-chū March 18, 1908.

\textsuperscript{74} All we know is that the mission reported that Japanese public opinion was in favour of China becoming a republic and mentioned the danger of Japan's interference if the country were not unified without delay. (Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, January 28, 1912, January 29, 1912).
in the area of routine administrative work. It was such administrative work as student control and detection of the presence and activities of Chinese reformists and revolutionaries which gradually gained momentum, and although not strictly diplomatic work, became the most important concern of the mission in Japan.

III. New Responsibilities for the Mission

After his release by the Chinese mission in London, Sun Yat-sen sailed for Japan arriving on August 10, 1897.75 There, Sun continued his revolutionary activities especially amongst the expatriat Chinese.76 Next year, with the failure of the reform movement in 1898, saw K'ang and Liang living in exile in Japan.77 These new developments had posed new problems and responsibilities for the post-war mission.

Confronted with this, the mission apparently took a different attitude from that of the pre-war missions, which had become involved in plots and assassinations, as in the matter of Kim Ok Kyun.78 The post-war missions, by contrast, confined themselves to close observation of revolutionary

75. JFO:R-KB 1. Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture Nakano Kenmei to Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu August 1897.
76. JFO:R-KB Vol. 1-5 passim.
77. JFO Vol. 31 I d. 555, 661.
78. See pp. 316, 317.
leaders, trying to persuade them to go abroad, asking the Japanese government to deport them, and even rejecting the secret instructions from the home government to arrest or murder such persons. There is no evidence in the records that the mission in Japan took any direct action, as the mission in London had done in kidnapping Sun. However their indirect activities were probably more time-consuming in the long run. In addition, the fact that Sun, K'ang and Liang all had highly-placed friends in Japan made the mission's work more delicate and indirectly connected with diplomacy.

When Sun first arrived in Japan in 1897 he was apparently more concerned about the possibility of the mission's action and consequently sought police protection in Japan. The legation in Japan identified him on arrival, but no further

79. JFO:R-KB 1. Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture Nakano Kenmei to Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, August 21, 1897.
80. JFO:R-KB 1. Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture Asada Tokunori to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō, December 23, 1898, confidential 856.
81. JFO:R-KB 3. Gaimushō to Chinese Minister Hu Wei-te, 25 December, 1908; also see accompanying sheet Waiwu-pu to Hu Wei-te, 24 November, 1908.
82. See notes on conversation of Li Sheng-to's calling on Count Ito in Ito bunsho Kensei shiryo shitsu, National Library.
83. JFO:R-KB Vol. 1-5 passim.
84. JFO:R-KB 1. Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture Nakano Kenmei to Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, August 21, 1897.
action was taken. The following year when the failure of the reform movement brought K'ang and Liang into exile in Japan, the secret instructions of the Empress Dowager for their arrest or murder were apparently not acted upon by the mission. The mission's handling of the political refugees was aimed at avoiding the scandal of possible assassination.

The special mission to Japan of Liu Hsüeh-hsun and Ch'ing-k'uan in June 1899 ostensibly went to investigate commercial affairs. In reality, it had secret orders from the Ch'ing court to collaborate with Japan in the arrest or murder of K'ang and his party. Li Sheng-to, in his handling of the special mission showed clearly that the attitude of the mission in Japan towards the reformists differed from that of the Ch'ing Court. Li Sheng-to not only successfully convinced Ch'ing-k'uan of the impossibility of carrying out the plan to arrest or murder K'ang and his party, but even informed Itō Hirobumi of the plan.

Li Sheng-to was in favour of K'ang's going to the West and he acted behind the scenes through Narahara Nobumasa to persuade K'ang to leave Japan. Both the Chinese

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85. Ibid.

86. Notes on conversation of Li Sheng-to's calling on Count Itō in Itō Hirobumi Bunsho Kensei shiryo shitsu National Library.

legation and the Japanese foreign ministry requested Konoe Atsumaro to persuade K'ang to go to America or Europe. Atsumaro to persuade K'ang to go to America or Europe.\footnote{Ibid. Konoe Atsumaro nikki kanokokai, Konoe Atsumaro nikki (Tokyo, 1968) II 248, 237, 240, 246, 272, 293.}

Kashihabara Fumitarō representing K'ang side had frequent contact with Konoe. Konoe advised Liang to persuade K'ang to travel to Europe and America and offered to lend money for the trip. K'ang finally agreed to go and accepted the money. Arrangements were also made between Konoe and Tsutsuji, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. All this complicated process and initiated by the Chinese minister acting behind scenes in the manner favoured by the post-war missions.

The Ch'ing court had published many new regulations to suppress the revolutionaries following the establishment of the T'ung-meng Hui. The measures taken by the mission

\footnote{Konoe nikki op.cit. II 246, 247, 254, 260, 266, 272, 292, 294, 297, 298.}

\footnote{Ibid., 247-248, 251-252, 254, 255, 294.}

\footnote{Ibid., 239, 292-294, 299, 300.}

\footnote{(Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, II, 23 August, 20 November and 25 December, 1907). For further details, see footnote 212.}
reflected their reaction to the establishment of the T'ung-meng Hui and the growth of the revolutionary movement. After 1905, supervision of revolutionary leaders became more intense. Sun's addresses to the students began to be interrupted by the Japanese police; in 1907 the Chinese Minister, (Hu Wei-te) through Itō Hirobumi, asked the Japanese government for the first time to force Sun to leave the country.

Upon the death of the Empress Dowager and Emperor Kuang-hsü in 1908, we also see at this time the first use of official communications to ask the Japanese Foreign Minister to investigate the rumour that Sun had entered Tokyo and to request his repatriation if the report was true. From that time forward, both Sun and K'ang were prevented from staying in Japan.

Between the revolutionaries and reformists the chief concern of the mission was with the reformists and not with Sun's party. Revolutionaries were seen by the mission as a greater threat only after 1905. This also reflected the attitude of the Ch'ing court and the Chinese public in general.

93. JFO:R-KB 2. Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture Subu Kōhei to Foreign Minister Katsura, 2 September, 1905, Confidential no. 2047.
94. JFO:R-KB 3. Gaimushō to Chinese Minister Hu Wei-te, 25 December, 1908; also see accompanying sheet Wai-wu-pu to Hu Wei-te, 24 November, 1908.
95. JFO:R-KB 2. Hu Wei-te to Japanese Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarō, 17 December, 1908.
97. CWHK 104 (Kung-tu 19), 1-13; 51 (memorial). 24-26, 9-17. See also JFO 33 bessatsu 1 d. 156-172, 169-190.
Not only were frequent edicts issued concerning the reformists but the Empress Dowager also issued secret instructions to the Chinese minister in Japan for the curtailment of K'ang's activities.\(^98\) Again when Konoe Atsumaro, an important Japanese official and leader of Töa Dobun kai, visited China in 1899, he recorded in his diary some interesting comments on the Ch'ing government's attitude. For instance, when he asked Chang Chih-tung, an important Chinese official, what he thought of Sun's revolutionaries, Chang replied:

"They are just small-tiny bandits of insufficient importance for us to talk about."\(^99\)

The tendency of reformist activity to overshadow that of revolutionaries continued until 1903. After 1903, the mission seems to have considered that reformist movement was diminishing in importance.\(^100\) Between the years 1903 and 1905 Liang moved from his radical train of thought to a more conservative one.\(^101\) The attitude of the mission

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98. CKCJ, no. 3720.


towards the reformists had also been modified somewhat; in incidents such as the Wu-Sun incident\(^{102}\) in 1902, they attributed the influence to the reformists.\(^{103}\) Subsequently they began to attach more importance to the influence of Sun amongst the students.\(^{104}\)

IV. Student Control and the Mission

In addition to this presence of revolutionaries and reformists, the mission faced a growing new responsibility over taking care of Chinese students in Japan. Initially the control of Chinese students studying in Japan had nothing to do with the movements of revolutionaries and reformists. The mission in fact took a positive attitude in encouraging the students to come.\(^{105}\) The Japanese took initiative in suggesting that Chinese students come to Japan, though in

\(^{102}\) Ts'ai Chun, the minister from 1901-1902, refused to recommend 9 students to enrol at Seijo Military School, resulting in violent student demonstrations in which the Japanese police had to intervene.


\(^{104}\) CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, December 12, 1905, January 22, 1906. During the celebrations for the Empress Dowagers anniversary in June 1904 the home government proclaimed a general amnesty for all those who had taken part in 1898 reform, whether they were prisoners or still wanted by the law. K'ang, Liang and Sun were the only exceptions. This established that the significance of Sun's movement had also grown in the eyes of the home government. (Kuo T'ing-i Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih II 1205.

\(^{105}\) CKCJ, no. 3561, 3709, annex 1.
fact for more selfish reasons. 106

The system was to China's advantage: it was easier, quicker and less expensive for Chinese to learn the Japanese language, and through Japanese to acquire western learning. Moreover, China's situation and customs were similar to Japan's and to emulate Japan would produce quick results. 107 The idea was overwhelmingly accepted by the Governor-General and the Ch'ing Court itself, and this was one of the important responses of Ch'ing official to the outcome of the war. 108

The "Hundred Days of Reform," (1898) caused a break in the negotiations; but, after the political upheaval had subsided,

106. JF0:R-S 1. Ōkuma to Hayashi Gonsuke, no. 106, 13 August 1898, see also Hayashi to Ōkuma Shigenobu, no. 149, 17 August 1898, Nishi Tokujirō to Yano Fumio, 6 June, 1898, Hayashi Gonsuke to Ōkuma, 23 July, 1898, Confidential no. 72. Yano's offer to bear the entire expense of 200 Chinese students was not anticipated by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aoki Shūzō who had doubts about the effectiveness of the offer. But because Yano had already made it, Aoki did not feel he could withdraw and instructed Yano that since China's response was not as enthusiastic as expected, Japan should not press the matter again. Yano's successor, Hayashi, raised it with Li Hung-chang; they both agreed that China should bear the expense.


108. Ibid.
government of Hunan-Hupeh. However, there were many students from provinces which had not sent student controllers. In addition there were many private students who came at their own expenses, some with references from local officials who had investigated their background, and others who had just been sent by the Governor-General without any investigation. 

From 1898 to 1905 there was a rapid increase in the number of Chinese students studying in Japan. In 1896 the first students ever to go to Japan numbered only 13. In 1898 there were still only 18. This figure swelled to no less than 8,000 by 1905. 

However, in 1907 the number of students began to decline. This was due to restrictions imposed by the Ch'ing government: from 1906 onwards, students were required to

114. CFMA: Ts'ai Chün to Wai-wu-pu October 16, 1902.

115. There are many estimates of the exact number of the Chinese students studying in Japan. There is no general consensus among scholars. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that many students wanted more than one diploma and enrolled in more than one place. Professor Sanetō Keishū is the leading authority in this field and I have tentatively followed the estimate made by him. Sanetō Keishū, Chugokujin Nihon ryugakushi, 47-61 and table. There were various reasons for the sudden increases: the rise from 18 in 1898 to 202 in 1899 followed the "Hundred Days Reform," the rapid increase from 1,300 in 1904 to 8,000 in 1905 was due to the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war and to the abolition of the old examination system (Ibid. 56).
a number of students from various provinces were selected and sent to Japan by government edict. 109

Before the establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1905 the Ministry of Rites supervised national education. But following the resolution in 1903 to make gradual changes in educational affairs there was the establishment of the Hsüeh-wu-ch’u (Committee of Educational Affairs) which in 1905 was expanded into the Ministry of Education. 110 Therefore before 1905 the Yamen (or after 1901, the Wai-wu-pu) was still handling all those students studying abroad as one of its functions. 111 In some cases they might refer to the related provincial governors, such as Chang Chih-tung, Governor-General of Hukuang. 112

The students could be classified into two groups, students with official scholarships, who were sent by various provinces, and private students. 113 With the increase in number of students certain provincial governments had sent officers to look after their own students, especially the


110. H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, tr. A. Beltchenko and E.E. Moran, Present Day Political Organization of China (Shanghai, 1912) 124, 131, 211, 212.

111. WCSL 133:10-11.


have already reached high school standard and to be familiar with the Japanese language, and to attend school for longer than a short term stay. By 1909 the number had fallen to 5,000.116

This rapid increase in the number of Chinese students in Japan made student control a matter of more than ordinary significance. This is reflected in the reports of successive ministers, and a few example will suffice to show how pre-occupied the ministers were with student questions.

Ts'ai Ch'ün reported that:

"The number of students sent by various provinces to Japan has increased to more than 300; it continues to grow and shows no signs of stopping. Furthermore, although not all provinces have sent student controllers, they have all asked the minister to look after their own students. The legation is hard pressed with looking after student affairs, and hardly any time to attend to other matters."117

Ts'ai's successor Yang Shu was even more emphatic. He wrote:

"Before there were only a few hundred students, and they were relatively easy to control, but now their number exceeds 20,000 and their background and class vary greatly so they are very difficult to control."119

116. CKCJ, no. 3709.
117. CFMA:E Ts'ai Ch'ün to Wai-wu-pu, March 22, 1902.
118. See footnote No. 115 above.
119. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, July 19, 1907.
"I have been in this office for four years and found it has exhausted me. I am afraid that if I stay in the position any longer I shall make mistakes."  

He then proposed that the Ministry of Education appoint somebody to take charge of the students and allow the minister to concentrate on diplomacy. According to a letter which Li Chia-chu, Yang Shu's successor, wrote to the Chinese foreign ministry he spent from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. every day for nearly five months in the student controller's office in the legation, and the attempt to handle student questions completely exhausted him.

Up till 1902 there was no special organization in the Chinese mission in Japan for dealing with student affairs. They were dealt with through the ordinary channels, with the minister taking responsibility. To meet these problems, the government increased the number of staff specifically devoted to student affairs and set up a special organization called the Office of Controllers-General.

120. Ibid., Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 4 June, 1907, Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 10 July, 1907; Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 13 July, 1906.  

121. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 4 June, 1907, Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 10 July, 1907.  

122. Ibid., Li Chia-chu to Wai-wu-pu, March 13, 1908.  

123. CFMA:E Ts'ai Ch'unto Wai-wu-pu, October 16, 1902; Ibid., Wai-wu-pu's memorial, October 31, 1902; CKCJ no. 4826, 4827, 4829.
Li Sheng-to had to ask for a full-time officer to take care of students so that they would not need to be render the supervision of the general legation staff.\footnote{124}

Minister Ts'ai's refusal to give guarantees to 9 students who wanted to enrol at the Seijo military school resulted in student demonstrations\footnote{125} which made the Ch'ing government realize that to send student controllers and subordinates to the minister just from provincial government was an inadequate system. It was because of this that the Office of Controller-General of Chinese students in Japan was created. Wang Ta-hsieh being the man appointed to the post. He took up the position on January 1, 1903. The office of Controller-General had the same rank as minister, and the various provincial controllers were subordinate to the Controller-General.\footnote{126} Wang, however, was recalled after less than a year to take up a senior position in the Foreign Ministry. The new minister was ordered to take charge concurrently of the office of Controller-General. All student affairs were placed under the supervision of the legation and all the provincial controllers were withdrawn.\footnote{127} The new system lasted until the revolution

\footnote{124} CKC:\textit{J no. 3735 anr 2.}

\footnote{125} Referred to as the Wu-Sun incident, July 1902.

\footnote{126} Wai-wu-pu memorial, 31 October, 1902, in CFMA:E Ts'ai Chun to Wai-wu-pu, 26 June, 1903.

\footnote{127} CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 9 March, 1907, JFO:R-S Yang Shu to Hayashi Tadasu, 10 January, 1907, in no. 308.
When the new regulation limited the staff to seven, Yang Shu asked that this number be increased. His reason was the difficulty caused by student problems:

"The situation in Japan is somewhat different from that in other countries, because recently the number of students studying in Japan has been so enormous, and there are also many problems in student affairs related to diplomacy. Therefore seven staff members are not enough. I ask that two clerks be added until the minister no longer has to take on the duties of Controller-General concurrently." 126

Limitations on enrolment was one of the most serious problem in the student disputes. Private student who wished to enrol in military schools, such as Seijo military school, there was a regulation laid down that the recommendation of the Chinese minister in Japan was necessary. 129 This limitation on the private students wishing to study in the military schools later became the direct cause of disputes between students and the missions. 130

Another problem was posed by the fact that the students were providing increasingly expensive for the mission. Minister Ts'ai Chun had already requested more funds from the home government in order to pay advances to the students

128. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, March 12, 1907.
129. Ibid., Ts'ai Chun to Wai-wu-pu, October 10, 1902; "Yüeh-shu yu-hsiū-hsheng-chang-ch'eng," Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 2 December, 1903.
130. See pp. 378-380.
when their funds from the provinces were delayed. In addition to school expenses, many students asked to borrow money from the legation, ostensibly to buy books or for travel expenses. If the legation compiled, they would be accused by the provincial governments of being too lenient with students, while if they refused, the students reacted angrily. To telegraph to the provinces for permission to make individual loans would also prove too expensive. Efforts were made to shift this responsibility entirely onto the student controller's office, but from Yang Shu's term onward the legation continued to be in charge of student funds.

An edict of September 1, 1905, ordered the mission to offer relief to students who were facing illness or shortage of funds. However the mission's own funds were not increased and they found they were unable to provide any extra money for the students.

In 1906 the legation even had to ask for help from the Japanese Police in removing students who were

131. CFMAE Ts'ai Chun to Wai-wu-pu, April 12, 1902; August 22, 1902.
132. Ibid., Ts'ai Chun to Wai-wu-pu, October 10, 1902.
133. Ibid., Ts'ai Chun to Wai-wu-pu, January 26, 1903.
134. Ibid., Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, February 3, 1906.
demanding money. However the legation reported in 1911 that the students had held a protest meeting at which they had managed even from their small school allowances, to collect money for their political expenses.

When the revolution broke out in China in 1911 the legation was deluged with students demanding relief or money to return home. Provinces in the centre of the revolutionary trouble, Hupeh, Hunan and Szechuan, were unable to continue sending funds to their students. The Japanese were also reluctant to finance any Chinese students without knowing what was happening on the domestic scene. The legation decided to treat the events as a natural disaster and to provide ¥30, the usual amount alloted in such cases.

It was suggested by Japanese newspapers, and feared by the legation, that the students wanted money in order to go home and join in the revolution. It was reported that the Minister Wang disappeared for some time to escape the trouble with the students, who had practically overrun the legation.

135. JFO:R-S Vol. 8 Confidential 296 Anraku Kanemichi, Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police to Hayashi Tadasu, May 31, 1906.

136. JFO:R-S Vol. 8 Confidential 979 annex no. 1 and 2 March 23, 1911.

137. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun October 28, 1911.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid., November 11, 1911, November 16, 1911.
On the other hand, the mission held close contacts with the Japanese Ministry of Education in promulgating the regulations to control Chinese student in Japan. A notable example is the Japanese regulation for control of Chinese student in 1905, over which the mission had apparently been consulted beforehand. Another instance was when Li Chia-ch'ü negotiated with the Japanese Ministry of Education for an agreement to allow Chinese students to enrol in five Japanese public schools.

The control of the students and the surveillance of reformists and revolutionaries, although separate at first, gradually merged into the same problem for the mission. This was because both the reformist and revolutionary movement sought a following among these students.

Before 1898, students studying in Japan presented no problem. However, after the "Hundred Days Reform" the K'ang-Liang party had a strong influence on the students, through such channels as the newspaper, Ch'ing-i pao. The Chinese government was shocked to find so many students participating in political activities. Chinese who had studied in Japan were closely associated with T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's Hankow

141. CKCJ, no. 5404 and annex 1.
plot, engineered by the reformists.\textsuperscript{142} As yet Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionaries had little influence on the students.\textsuperscript{143}

After the Boxer Uprising, hundreds and then thousands of Chinese students went to Japan. The nationalism and the western political thought which they learned there aroused them not only to reject Confucian officialdom but also to be sceptical of the reformism advocated by K'ang and Liang. Sun was able to adjust to this new group of disaffected intellectual elite, and by 1905 had been able to form a new revolutionary organization based on the overseas students in Japan, thus deepening the rift between Chinese intellectuals and the traditional government.\textsuperscript{144} Between 1900 and 1905,

\textsuperscript{142} This influence is evident from the fact that over twenty of the Hunan-Hupeh students joined in T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's Hankow plot after returning to China.

\textsuperscript{143} For example, Wu Chih-hui later testified that all the students laughed at Sun at that time and thought Liang was right. Wu also said that when he had first heard about Sun, he believed the latter to be just an illiterate Chinese. The prevailing opinion of Sun was that he was an uncultured outlaw. Wu Ching-heng, "Wei-i chiang Sun Chung-shan"

\textsuperscript{144} Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-hua min-kuo, I, 54-58; Chi Ping feng Ch'ing-mo ke-ming yü ch'un-hsien ti lun-tseng (Taipei, 1966), 154-157.
as the number of students continued to rise, political activity also increased. Many radical publications appeared and revolutionary demonstrations took place. Although Sun left Japan in 1903 and Liang took a more conservative stand, student activity continued, becoming increasingly revolutionary under the influence of the Min-pao newspapers. When, in 1905, Sun returned to Japan and formed the T'ung-meng Hui he received much support from the students. The Ch'ing government reacted strongly by restricting student political activity and tightening control over revolutionary activities. Faced with problems caused by such matters as the publicity of the revolutionaries and student political activities, the mission felt itself bound to take counter-measures. In the propaganda field the mission made it easier for students to obtain interviews. It arranged gathering in the student halls, at which loyalty was enjoined on the listeners. The minister would accompany staff members to visit the various schools and would receive students on the spot to listen to some urgent appeal and also distributed the new regulations on students.

145. Ibid., Feng, 194-200; Chi, 158-166.
147. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, February 2, 1904.
Although there were over twenty student magazines for revolutionary publicity or on radical ideas, there was only one published by the Office of the Student Controller-General. It was a monthly named *Kuan Pao* and was published in 1906. It concerned mainly the regulations and expense of the Chinese students studying abroad, and contained translations on Japanese educational theory. This was the only official magazine on Chinese students studying overseas and lasted until the end of the Ch'ing dynasty.\(^{148}\) Proclamations and warnings to students were also issued very frequently.\(^{149}\)

We can see from the above that in this field the legation was no match for the student revolutionaries, and it was forced to think of some other way to counter them. The first move was to advise the home government to make more careful selections of the students before they came, such as checks on their background by local officials.\(^{150}\)

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149. JFO:R-S 8 Ōura Kanetake, the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police to Komura Jutaro January 20, 1903 Confidential 18; Ibid., Kamei Eisaburō, the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police, to Komura Jutaro March 18, 1911 Confidential 944; March 23, 1911 Confidential 979; March 24, 1911, Confidential 1000.

or later the demand that they should studied Japanese for at least two years. 151 New regulations to control students after they came to Japan were issued. For instance, students were strictly forbidden to engage in political activities. All the students required the recommendation of the minister before they could enrol. Once their conduct was found to be at fault (for instance, if they took part in political activities), the Japanese government was informed and they were expelled. This rule applied especially to private students wishing to enrol in military schools. If students were expelled, their records were kept and the relevant authorities informed. 152

The legation efforts to stem the tide of revolution extended also to overseas Chinese merchants in Japan. A good example of this can be found in a secret letter by Minister Ts'ai Chih to the Wai-wu-pu in which he mentioned having tried to influence Chinese merchants in Yokohama to dissolve the party of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. 153 Ts'ai tried to impede their plan to rent the Chinese assembly-


hall to establish the Ta T'ung school. The minister therefore rented the hall himself for a banquet. He invited the merchants to dinner and, with much moralistic flourish, tried to persuade them to purchase official titles and to get them to have their children educated at the hall's own school. After much persuasion, they finally agreed to get back the hall's classroom to re-establish the Shang Min Kung Hsuêh (Merchant people public school). Ts'ai considered that once the freedom and revolutionary parties had lost the financial support of the merchants they would have no financial basis for their unity and gatherings and would gradually have to dissolve. 154

For the suppression moves, the mission acted in concert with the Japanese government and established contacts with universities, army circles, and the police.

The mission maintained links with the presidents and instructors of the educational institutions with a view to keep a watch over the deportment of the students and their scholarly attainments. The new regulations to control students studying abroad laid down that once a student was discovered involving himself in political activities, the minister or Controller-General should inform the university and have student expelled, and the Japanese school was required to carry out the expulsion. 155 This particularly concerned the

154. Ibid.

155. See footnote No. 152 above.
19 designated schools, many of them were specially founded to cater for the Chinese students. The existing method of control, involving irregular inspection visits to schools with large Chinese attendance was deemed inadequate. Thus, in 1906, the Chinese mission invited 19 school secretaries for a meeting and decided to designate these 19 schools as the "Officially listed schools" to which the mission would recommend students. From then on recommendations were not issued to those schools which had not been so designated.  

Another measure for the strengthening of control was taken in January 1907. The mission abolished the system of student-elected representatives who had functioned hitherto as students' spokesmen vis-a-vis the mission. And in their place, the mission appointed observers who would visit the various schools two or three times per months to keep a watch over student activities. However, there were so many disputes flaring up between the students and observers that the system was soon abolished. Instead, an observer might be appointed at a school by, and at the discretion of the president of the school concerned.  

156. JFO:R-S 8. Anraku Kanemichi, the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police to Hayashi Tadasu, June 6, 1907 Confidential 570.  

157. Ibid., Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, February 27, 1907, Confidential 21.  

158. Ibid., Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, May 20, 1907, Confidential 95.
Most of the schools attended by Chinese students had been either especially founded for training Chinese students or provided special classes for the Chinese students. It is consequently not surprising that the mission had good connections in them and that they acted in concert with the mission.\(^\text{159}\)

The mission's best liaison was with the Japanese military authorities. This is illustrated by the fact that Major-General Fukushima Yasumasa, President of Seijo military school automatically expelled the students who had participated in the "memorial meeting to mourn the 242 anniversary of the death of the last Ming Emperor" and severely punished the organizers.\(^\text{160}\)

With the increase of direct confrontation between the students and the mission, the latter appealed more and more to the Japanese police for protection. Then two Japanese police were hired by the mission and stationed in the legation to avoid having to call in the Japanese police in emergencies.\(^\text{161}\)

As it happened they were dismissed for trying to avoid

\(^{159}\) See footnote No. 156 above.

\(^{160}\) CFMA:E Wai-wu-pu to Ts'ai Chun, May 19, 1902.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, April 24, 1906; July 22, 1906.
antagonizing the students. The mission's efforts to control the students in this respect can be seen from the fact that on December 21, 1906 the minister asked the Japanese government to make investigations on the names, addresses and occupations of the Chinese students studying in Tokyo and the Japanese Foreign Ministry asked the Police Department to comply with the request.

The mission's efforts to control the revolutionary trends among the students were made under the fairly favourable conditions of the Japanese government's full co-operation.

Before the Russo-Japanese war, Japanese policy towards China had been one of co-operation with the Western powers in trying to extend their spheres of influence in China. It took little or no account of China's internal political situation. After the Russo-Japanese war, however, Japanese policy, faced by such changing factors as the growth of Chinese nationalism, became much less confident.

Japanese attitudes to Chinese nationalism were divided. One group felt that policy towards China should continue to be one of co-operation with Western powers,

162. Ibid., Li Chia-chü to Wai-wu-pu, May 10, 1908.
164. JFO 36. I/d. 229, 255-257; Uchida Yasuya to Komura Jutarö, JFO 36. I/d. 1.14; JFO 37 38 bessatsu R-J war V d. 55. 59-63.
ignoring Chinese nationalism while trying to establish exclusive Japanese interests in Manchuria. A second group advocated a more sympathetic attitude towards Chinese nationalism in order to win China's friendship and thus persuade her to acknowledge Japan's interests in Manchuria. Both attitudes led naturally to Japanese co-operation with the Chinese government in controlling students and revolutionaries in Japan, in order to win China's friendship and encourage Chinese political stability.

Before 1905, the Japanese government was reluctant to regulate student activities formally. The effects of Japanese co-operation with the Ch'ing government were felt increasingly after 1905. The regulations concerning students and the action taken against Min-pao reflected this attitude. Especially after the deaths of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor in 1908, it was in Japan's interests to encourage Chinese stability by acting against the revolutionaries,

165. JFO 39. I/d. 192, 237-245; JFO 40 I/d. 280. 289, Hayashi Tadasu to Hayashi Gonsuke; JFO 40 I/d. 281, 290-291, Hayashi Gonsuke to Hayashi Tadasu; JFO 40 III/d. 2200. 800-803, Hayashi Tadasu to the Cabinet Ministers, annex 2; JFO 41 I/d. 15. 76, Komura to Takahira Kogoro, Ambassador to America; JFO 42 I/d. 759, 728-729, Ijuin to Komura; JFO 43 I/d. 113. 193-195, Ijuin to Komura; JFO 45 II/d. 1181. 785-789, Ijuin to Uchida Yasuya, Foreign Minister.

and the Japanese therefore assisted the Chinese mission in these matters.

It will be logical to ask why the Chinese government did not completely stop all students going to study in Japan, and so avoided the risk of their being revolutionized. The main reason was modernization. The Ch'ing government, after the war of 1895, had been very hard pressed, and needed the persons with new knowledge to help support the regime and counter Western imperialistic invasion. Therefore complete stoppage was impossible. 167 This apparently forced the mission in Japan into a dilemma, the more control they exert, the stronger the repercussion from the students. 168 The mission might be able to reduce the number but complete stoppage was impossible. The problem remain till the collapse of the Dynasty.

Successive ministers had their own policy of controlling student revolutionary activities: Ts'ai Ch'ün's stricter selection of students, 169 Yang Shu's unifying the disposition of students, 170 or Li Chia-chû's concurrent use of the soft

168. CFMA:E Ts'ai Ch'ün to Wai-wu-pu, October 16, 1902, Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, July 6, 1907.
JPO:R-S Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, May 31, 1906, Confidential 296; July 2, 1906, February 27, 1907, Confidential 21, 24; March 10, 1907, Confidential 328; March 11, 1907, Confidential 33; May 20, 1907 Confidential 95.
169. CFMA:E Ts'ai Ch'ün to Wai-wu-pu, May 19, 1902.
Although their policies were effective in decreasing the number of students after 1907, they failed utterly in their prime objective. Student encounters with the minister become more and more serious everyday, and the strengthening of control through the mission increased rather than decreased the anti-Manchu movement among the students.

Between 1898 and 1900, a number of events occurred which made the Chinese government take a very serious view towards the student problem in Japan. The first concerned K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. After the defeat of the "Hundred Days Reform" they took refuge in Japan. Secondly, there was the T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's Hankow plot in which a number of students who studied in Japan were implicated. To the Ch'ing government, this was the result of the influence of K'ang and


173. CPMA:E Grand Council to Wai-wu-pu, Ts'ai-ch'eng memorial, September 22, 1902, Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, January 29, 1905; December 6, 1905; December 10, 1905; January 22, 1906; February 3, 1906; JFO:R-S Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, May 21, 1906, Confidential 296, July 2, 1906, February 27, 1907, Confidential 21, 24; March 10, 1907, Confidential 328; March 11, 1907, Confidential 23.

174. JFO Vol. 31 I T. 555. 661, Hayashi Gonsuke to Okuma Shigenobu No. 171, September 23, 1898.
Liang. Furthermore, there was a rapid increase in the number of Chinese students going to study in Japan. All these three things, coming together, was regarded with great seriousness by the Ch'ing government. This led to changes of attitude on the part of the mission towards the students. From 1900 onwards, the student question was always considered with the reformist movement, and after 1905, with the revolutionary movement.

During the period 1901-1902, which corresponded almost exactly with Ts'ai Ch'un's term, the constant...
antagonism between Peking and the students deepened, and relations between the students and the K'ang-Liang and Sun parties grew closer. These developments were aggravated by the increase in the number of students from 280 in 1901 to 500 in 1902 to 1000 in 1903. Ts'ai's secret letter at the beginning of 1902 and his refusal to recommend private students to military schools in July the same year were the first measures taken to meet the new situation. Ts'ai suggested that the selection of students studying abroad be given more careful consideration. The purpose was to prevent students from being influenced by the ideas of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-ch'ao, shouting about freedom and equality, and violating regulations instead of studying.

The secret letter was dispatched on January 1, 1902. The influence of the letter on the home government's approval of Ts'ai's view was clearly shown in the transfer of the letter to Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung with instructions to limit student

178. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, December 12, 1905.
179. Saneto Ryugakushi op. cit. 47-55 and table.
181. JFO:R-S See Acting Consul-General at Shanghai Iwasaki Mitsuo to Komuro Jutarō, 25 February, 1902, annexed paper ko and otsu.
182. Ibid.
numbers and to be stricter in selecting the students.\textsuperscript{183}

Ts'ai's refusal to recommend nine students to enrol at Seijo Military School resulted in violent demonstrations in July 1902 (referred to as the Wu-Sun incident), in which the Japanese police took action.\textsuperscript{184}

The Wu-Sun incident was a direct result of Ts'ai's policy of exercising increasing control over private students in Japan. It does not seem to have succeeded in suppressing the student revolutionary trend. Nevertheless in the mission's handling of student problems, the office of Controller-General of Chinese students in Japan was created,\textsuperscript{185} and after the incident Ts'ai suggested that China negotiate with Japan on the most appropriate way to control Chinese students in Japan. In October 1902, he also submitted a draft of regulations concerning the sending of students to Japan.\textsuperscript{186} Of the twelve articles, ten concerned private students. It was intended that they should be restricted by requiring that they be both investigated and guaranteed by the local officials who should clearly designate the school they would attend. If a student was not

\textsuperscript{183} CFMA:E Wai-wu-pu to Ts'ai Chûn, May 19, 1902.

\textsuperscript{184} CKCJ nos. 4784-4787.

\textsuperscript{185} Wai-wu-pu memorial, 31 October, 1902 in CFMA:E Ts'ai Chûn to Wai-wu-pu, 26 June, 1903.

\textsuperscript{186} CFMA:E Ts'ai Chûn to Wai-wu-pu, 31 July, 1902 and 8 August, 1902.
recommended by a province he could ask a merchant in Japan to
give a pledge for him, but this was not to apply to the case
of private students who wished to enter the Seijo military
school, for entry into which the local officials' recommendation
was necessary.\footnote{187}

While the mission in Japan and the Ch'ing government
were considering measures to meet the circumstances, the student
movement in 1903 reached a turning-point in which the students
made use of a diplomatic crisis at the time to express their
anger over foreign humiliation.\footnote{188}

In 1903, students protested strongly against the
continued Russian presence in Manchuria. This action was seen
by the Ch'ing government as a possible means to incite revolution.
There were three reasons for this suspicion: firstly, the
student participation in the Hankow plot had made a strong
impression on the government. Secondly, anti-Manchu sentiment
among the students was regarded with mistrust. Thirdly, the
government was still not used to the idea of student partici­
pation in politics, and felt that the students should study with
a view to strengthening the \textit{status quo} in China.\footnote{189}

\footnote{187}{Ibid.}

\footnote{188}{Feng Tzu-yu, \textit{Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo ch'ien ke-ming shih}
(Taipei, 1954), I 55-57.}

\footnote{189}{CFMA:E Chang Chih-tung, "Yüeh-shu yu-hsüeh-sheng
chang-ch'eng" 2 December 1903; Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu;
HCH 2.134.}
The government reacted by increasingly strict controls on students.\textsuperscript{190} Ts'ai was recalled in 1903 due to general dissatisfaction over his handling of the matter.\textsuperscript{191} The new minister, Yang Shu, who took office in October 1903, was ordered to take charge concurrently of the office of Controller-General.\textsuperscript{192}

Yang Shu attempted to deal with the problem by correcting the ideas of the students and by strengthening his personal contacts with the students. On the one hand, he made speeches to them and visited the schools to listen to the complaints.\textsuperscript{193} On the other, he acted behind the scenes of negotiation between China and Japan over the long-standing efforts by the Chinese government to solicit the co-operation of the Japanese government in controlling the revolutionary trends among the Chinese students in Japan.\textsuperscript{194} It would clearly have been difficult to exercise effective control over the students without the active co-operation of the Japanese government.

\textsuperscript{190} Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, 21 June, 1903; 6 October 1903; 9 December 1904.

\textsuperscript{191} The Japanese consul in Hankow had observed that there was dissatisfaction on the part of Hunan officials with Ts'ai's handling of the details of student matters and the officials had decided to withhold their full quotas until such time as a successor was appointed. JFO:R-S 8. Yamazaki kei to Komura, 21 September, 1902, Confidential 25.

\textsuperscript{192} CKCJ, no. 4909.

\textsuperscript{193} CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, February 3, 1904.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, December 2, 1903; Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, February 3, 1906.
As a result, a series of regulations was promulgated in November 1905 by the Japanese government restricting the choice of schools and lodgings and requiring for Chinese students a letter of recommendation from the Chinese minister in Japan.

In the middle of December the Japanese Education Department gave an official explanation of the regulations, that their object was merely to protect the students themselves against attending inferior schools and to ensure that they lived in respectable surroundings.

The regulations aroused much animosity among the students. They were seen not as the result of a Japanese whim, but of deliberate consultation between the Chinese and Japanese governments. They reflected in fact the wishes of the Chinese government. Their main purpose was to halt the revolutionary trend among the 8,000 overseas students.

The students held a protest meeting against the regulations, followed by a forty-day strike. After this, many packed their bags and returned to China. Yang had apparently


196. Yomiuri shimbun, 15 December, 1905; Asahi shimbun, 16 December, 1905; see also Saneto, Ryūgakushi, pp. 463-467.


199. Sanetō, Ryūgakushi, 461-494.
heard that the Japanese government intended to frame legislation
to control those Japanese schools admitting Chinese students.
He sought further information from the Japanese Ministry of
Education, asking to see a draft of the proposed regulations.
He obtained it and found it entirely satisfactory, since it
concerned the control of schools and indirectly the control
of students. 200

While there does not seem to be any direct evidence
that the Japanese government promulgated the regulation in order
to persuade the Chinese government to recognise Japan's interests
over what she had won from Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, 201
it is certainly true that the Chinese minister in Japan had
conferred with the Monbusho (the Ministry of Education) about
the regulations before they were promulgated. 202

The Ch'ing government tried to reduce the number of
students going to Japan to study, and to restrict the students'
chances of undertaking military studies; it tried to strengthen
surveillance of student activities by sending supervisors into
schools, 203 and it once again stressed loyalty to the emperor

200. JFO:R-S: Uchida Yasuya to Komura Jutarō, 6 May, 1905
Confidential 82, CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu,
3 February, 1906.

201. See Nagai Kazumi, "Iwayuru Shinkoku" pp. 28-29, where
the possible connection between the two is suggested.


203. JFO:R-S 8. Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu,
Confidential 21, 27 February, 1907.
and respect for Confucius as the principles of education.\textsuperscript{204} 

Minister Yang felt that the student disturbances had been instigated by the Sun party revolutionaries, and not by the reformists.\textsuperscript{205} He suggested greater restrictions on the qualifications of students going abroad, five years study in China and two years preparation in Japanese. If they showed a radical trend when they arrived, the selection committee or referee was to assume responsibility. The student moreover was required to remain at his pre-selected Japanese school.\textsuperscript{206}

In the growing revolutionary movement, the mission seemed to regard further control or severe punishment as the only remedy. Just how effective this was can be seen in Minister Yang's own words.

"The students now exceed 20,000 in number and the variety of tasks is not easy to control. They come to the legation and ask for what they like, and moreover shout revolution. The legation has no way of punishing them since it had no extraterritorial jurisdiction. Japan's revisions and reforms through the Ministry of Education in the matter of student regulations had suddenly caused trouble. The Chinese Ministry of Education's new regulations are also opposed by the students. If dismissed, the students rely on foreigners for protection and the legation becomes the focus of blame."\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{204} Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, 25 March, 1906.

\textsuperscript{205} CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, 12 December, 1905, 22 January, 1906.

\textsuperscript{206} CFMA:E Yang Shu's memorial Grand Council to Wai-wu-pu, 24 February, 1906.

\textsuperscript{207} CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, July 19, 1907.
Three times Yang wrote to the foreign ministry asking to be replaced.

"Since my three years' term expired last year, I have been anticipating return home every day, because student affairs have become more difficult day by day and my energy is declining. I am actually not strong enough to shoulder this burden. I have already presented two letters asking to be released from this post so as to avoid damaging the situation, yet I have still heard no reply. I am very worried."^208

The approach of Yang's successor, Li Chia-chü^209 was to use the soft and hard line together. ^210 He removed the Japanese police whom Yang had hired, from the legation. In practice, his method was to try to establish contact with moderate students. Those private students who behaved well were to be allowed to study at public expense. Those studying on public money would have their scholarship stopped if they were found to have favoured revolutionary trends.^211

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208. CFMA:E Yang Shu to Wai-wu-pu, June 4, 1907.

209. Li Chia-chü was of the Chinese Banner Troops, plain yellow division. He graduated in 1894 as Bachelor and in 1906 he was Director of the Ta-hsueh-t'ang and Junior Councillor to the Ministry of Education. He was appointed as Minister to Japan in 1907, and the following year was made special Minister to study the Japanese system of government (CKCJ, no. 5257 and annex 1-3). Ch'ien Shih-p'u, op. cit. 78.

210. CFMA:E Li Chia-chü to Wai-wu-pu, 10 May, 1908.

211. Shun-t'ien shih-pao, no. 1741; Nagai Kazumi, "Köcho matsunen ni okeru ryûnichi gakuseikai no susei", in Rekishigaku kenkyû 206 (April, 1957).
We can see a connection between Li Chia-chü’s and the Ch'ing government’s attitude towards the revolutionaries at this time. The Ch'ing court had published many new regulations to suppress the revolutionaries following the establishment of the T'ung-meng Hui, and the many assassinations and revolutionary activities.\(^{212}\)

The ineffectiveness of the oppressive legislation led to the adoption of some conciliatory measures.\(^{213}\) Among these was the withdrawal of Chinese inspectors from the Japanese schools.\(^{214}\) In 1907 the minister sent observers into the

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212. In October 1905, there was a regulation for the control of revolution which declared revolutionaries to be harmful to the peace and also a hindrance to reform. Its promulgation followed the assassination of a Ch'ing observer overseas by Wu Yüeh. From July 1907 onwards, many edicts of this type were promulgated attempting to disband the revolutionaries, such as the Hui-tang in the Yangtse. Governors-General were instructed to control bandits and, in November, students were forbidden to interfere in politics. Regulations controlling gatherings, organization and the censorship of newspapers etc., followed the Hsü Hsi-lin incident. (Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, II, 23 August, 20 November and 25 December 1907).

213. JFO:R-KB 2. Abe Moritarō, to Hayashi Tadasu, 19 August, 1907, Confidential 98.

214. JFO:R-S 8. Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, 20 May, 1907, Confidential 95.
schools whose task was to keep watch over student revolutionary activities and report back to the mission. This practice was the cause of many disputes with the students and finally the headmaster of Kö bun school requested that observers no longer be sent. The important school negotiated on this matter with the minister. Finally the vice-controller returned to Peking and had discussion with the Peking authorities and, as a result, the practice of sending observers into the schools was abolished.

The student movement, which had been slowly gravitating towards the revolutionary party since 1903, finally proved too much for the mission, which, despite the expenditure of most of its energy in an attempt to halt the revolutionary trend, found itself powerless to do much. The fact that students frequently heat up the observers sent by the mission; the agitation of the students and action connected with matters such as right recovery movement showed the growing politicisation of the students. Some example may illustrate this.

215. JFO:R-S 8, Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, February 27, 1907, Confidential 21.

216. Ibid., Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, February 27, 1907, Confidential 24; March 30, 1907 Confidential 328; March 11, 1907, Confidential 33.

217. Ibid., Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, May 20, 1907.

218. Ibid., Anraku Kanemichi to Hayashi Tadasu, February 27, 1907, Confidential 21, March 30, 1907, Confidential 328.

219. Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo ch'ien ke-ming shih op. cit. 55-57.
In 1908 meetings on the subject of rights recovery were held, and an organisation for the protection of the rights of the Chinese people was established. In 1909 many students attacked the minister's conduct of his duties, alleging that his reports were too slow and that as a consequence China was suffering losses over railway problem. In 1911, there was a meeting to protest against the Ch'ing government's handling of the Yunnan and Ili incidents and requesting that the minister Hu Wei-te send a telegram conveying the students' protest. This telegram was intercepted at Shanghai or Peking. The student had demanded to see the minister, but he had agree only to meet a small delegation and had later fled to Yokohama to avoid the confrontation. Hu later criticised them for their behaviour and tried to persuade them to dissolve their organisation. However, it is said that Hu was reprimanded by the home government for his handling of the incident.


221. Ibid., Kamei Eisaburō, the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police to Komura Jutarō, August 12, 1909, Confidential 1893.

222. Ibid., Kamei Eisaburō to Komura Jutarō, February 26, 1911, Confidential 738; March 5, 1911, Confidential 827.

223. Ibid., Kamei Eisaburō to Komura Jutarō, March 17, 1911, Confidential 944; March 20, 1911, Confidential 967; March 21, 1911, Confidential 979.

224. Ibid., Kamei Eisaburō to Komura Jutarō, March 24, 1911, Confidential 1000.
Despite the different and gradually strengthened suppressive measures of the successive ministers, the student revolutionary trend seems not have been affected. They did succeed in reducing the number of students studying in Japan but proved ineffective against the trend in favour of revolution.

The success of the revolution and the return of most students to China ended the mission's problems with students and revolutionaries. The republican period saw the growth of Chinese nationalism, and the student movement, which had been directed mainly at the overthrow of the Manchus, was now characterised by anti-Japanese sentiment, following on Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. This presented an entirely different problem for the Chinese mission in Japan.

Thus, in retrospect, from the first mission of Ho Ju-chang to the last one of Wang Ta-hsieh, two aspects may be discerned.

In the period before the 1894-5 war, the ministers in Japan had tried to play active roles in Sino-Japanese relations.

While the ministers did take such an active role, they were generally less well equipped as compared to the post-war ministers in their understanding of Japan. The post-war

225. Sanetō Ryugakushi 104-110.
226. Tōkyō Asahi Shimbun, 8 December 1911.
ministers were also better trained in diplomatic knowledge. We may even say that the difficulties they experienced in the pre-war period were not unlike the general problems China had in that period in her dealings with other nations. From our study of the missions in Japan which is really a small part of the history of Chinese diplomatic affairs, we may see the magnitude of the external problems confronting China in her efforts at establishing modern state.

The second aspect we may discern from this study is that in the post-war period, the missions were very much concerned with a new problem, that of the Chinese students in Japan. This problem may be regarded as an expression of the tension or gap between the generations that is to portend a major issue in the subsequent history of China.
APPENDIX I

A Comparison of the Chinese Mission in Japan with the Chinese Missions in Europe and America

It will be easier to see the Chinese mission to Japan in perspective if we briefly compare its operation with that of Chinese missions in Europe and America.

Chinese missions to the west rarely engaged in such active diplomacy or important negotiations as the mission to Japan. Their daily routine consisted principally of sightseeing and diary-writing, inspecting shipyards and munitions factories, and purchasing warships, guns and new machines on behalf of the home government. As a result, their reports dealt almost exclusively with these topics, and seldom attempted any kind of analysis of the domestic situation or of leading figures in the countries in which they were posted.¹

Missions to England and Germany spent a great deal of time describing technical advances in weapons manufacture and the industrial revolution. Reports from Hung Chūn and other Ministers were full of the latest inventions and techniques in everything from railway systems and hydraulic engineering to clothing manufacture.² During Hung Chūn's stay in Germany

¹ See LWCKCT, CTSKT, and Hsū Ching-ch'eng, op. cit. passim.
² LWCKCT 430, 427, 401, 383, 328.
he was received by Bismarch only a few times and rarely mentioned him or any other European leaders. 3

The missions to Russia and America - although they had particular problems which occupied much of their time, such as in Russia the Sino-Russian border issue or in America the question of Chinese labourers - nevertheless were principally interested in Western technical development. 4

In general the reports and other writings produced by these missions in the West reflect rather a reaction of surprise and wonder at the wealth and strength of the Western countries, than any penetrating study of Western civilization and political systems. A number of the envoys in the West did in fact show some inclination to seek out the underlying reasons for Western strength, but the home government discouraged reports of this nature and further attempts at deeper analysis were relegated to the envoy's personal diaries. 5

By contrast, the missions to Japan displayed distinctive and highly interesting characteristics in their observation and reporting. For one thing, they were always conscious of the need to evaluate Japan's military strength, even though in practice, they reported little more than the numbers of troops

3. Ibid., 159, 400-401.
4. Ibid., 676, 414, 409-411, 390, 373.
5. Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Ch'u-shih Ying-Fa-I-Pi op. cit., 2:5-6; Kuo Sung-t'ao, Shih-Hsi chi-ch'eng, op. cit. B. 3a-4a 24a-25b WCSL 12:29.
and warships. For another thing, they paid a great deal of attention to the domestic situation in Japan, providing detailed descriptions of political institutions such as the Diet, and showing continual interest in the character and conduct of various outstanding figures on the Japanese political scene. Although their analysis of these matters may at times have been faulty, the area of their attention and concern clearly differed from that of their colleagues in the West.

Each mission China sent abroad faced different issues, but some problems of a similar nature came up in several countries. The most outstanding examples were the three disputes over territory and tribute: with Japan over Korea and the Ryukyus, with France over Annam, and with England over Burma. In these cases the Chinese government's reaction was not always the same. As I have already indicated in the discussion in Chapter V, basic differences in the Chinese government's attitude toward Japan, France and England strongly influenced its actions.

The dispute with France over Annam provides a startling contrast to the events in Korea. Although the Chinese Minister in France advocated a course of action very similar to that which Li Shu-ch'ang had suggested from Japan - asking the home government to take a hard line and prepare its army - China's respect for France's superior strength led it to delay sending troops and to pursue a more cautious policy. Eventually troops were sent to Annam which indicated that the Chinese government's previous impressions outweighed the Counsel of
its Minister in France. The action was taken only after negotiations with France had broken down, and the affair ended in defeat for China. 6 In the conflict with England over Burma, the Chinese government realized that fighting with England would be pointless, and confined itself to peaceful negotiations. The Chinese Minister in France who was concurrently accredited to England, counselled caution in this case, and agreement was reached without conflict. 7

Another pair of similar incidents which occurred after the Sino-Japanese war is particularly illuminating in that it shows the change in Chinese attitude towards Japan after the war. The anti-American boycott in 1905 and the boycott against Japan in 1908 took the same form; and the action of the Chinese government in suppressing the boycott and taking a conciliatory line towards the country involved, was the same in each case; while the Chinese Ministers in Japan and America disagreed with the home government's action. 8 This is a clear indication that, whereas China had not considered Japan a power deserving of a conciliatory line in incidents before the war, now after the war she was accorded the same treatment as a Western Power.

8. Chang Ts'un-wu, Chung-Mei kung-yüeh feng-ch'ao op. cit. 28-33, 65, 209, 63-72; CFMA:E Li Chia-chü to Wai-wu-pu, March 2, 1908; Ibid., Wai-wu-pu to Governor of Kwangtung Chang Jen-chun, March 5, 1908.
Was the mission in Japan typical of Chinese missions abroad? Almost certainly not; in background, organizational features, and functions it differed in many respects from its counterparts in Western countries. Our examination has shown that from the very beginning the Chinese government considered the establishment of a mission in Japan to be a matter of importance, for the special purposes of observing Japan as a possible future force in the East Asian situation, and of protecting the many Chinese nationals in Japan.

The mission to Japan was unique. Before the war of 1895, it was more often involved in important negotiations than missions in other countries. After the war, the situation was reversed; it was the missions in the West which became increasingly involved in diplomatic activity while the mission in Japan turned almost exclusively to other concerns.
APPENDIX II

A Comparison of the Chinese Mission to Japan with the Japanese Mission to China

The Japanese missions to Peking between 1873 and 1879 differed from the mission of Ho Ju-chang to Japan (1877-1881) in that four out of the five Ministers sent to China had already had some experience in foreign countries and in diplomatic negotiations. This gave them a distinct advantage over a traditional Chinese scholar like Ho Ju-chang.¹

This was evident even before Ho's term. Yanagihara, for instance, showed considerable diplomatic skill in leading the Yamen to admit that the aboriginals of Taiwan were beyond the reach of Chinese authority.² And Mori Arinori, in his discussions with the Yamen's Ministers about the status of Korea during the Kanghwa incident,³ obtained from them statement to the effect that Korea was not Chinese Territory, that

1. See biographies of Yamada Akiyoshi, Mori Arinori, Tei Ei-nei, Shishido Tamaki in Daijinmei jiten (Tokyo, 1953-55) III 226, IV 338, VI 338, VI 317-18, 374, 419. Before taking up his appointment Yamada Akiyoshi was replaced by Yanagihara Sakimitsu.

2. JFO S-I 101.

3. In August 1875, the Japanese warship, Un'yō was bombarded while sailing off Kanghwa from a Korean fortress on the island. The ship withdrew, but then attacked and occupied another Korean fortress. Japan dispatched a delegation headed by Kuroda Kiyotaka and Inoue Kaoru to Korea in February the next year, and the eleven articles on the Treaty of Amity were concluded at Kanghwa. One clause stated that Korea was an independent country equal to Japan. (Tabohashi, Nissen Kankei, op. cit. 3-14; Wang Yün-sheng, op. cit. I 85).
China would not interfere in Korea's domestic administration, and that Korea was free to decide her own diplomacy; Mori then appealed to international law to say that this actually meant that Korea was an independent country. From a conversation which Mori held with Li Hung-chang on 24 January, 1876, we get the impression that Japan's envoys were skilful in their understanding and application of international politics. This was especially clear in the arguments about the status of the Ryukyus and Korea. China's statesmen and her envoys in Japan tended to be defensive and always explained their position in terms of China's old tributary system, while Japan's envoys used their newly acquired knowledge of international law to exact admissions from the Chinese and then used these as justification for Japan's advance. In 1876 China refused permission to southern Ryukyuans to travel to China, and subsequent admitted them after they had obtained Japanese passports. Mori used this as evidence that China recognised that the Ryukyus belonged to Japan. In this way Japan used every possible opportunity to establish legal justification for her seizure of the Ryukyus.

A direct comparison of Ho's mission with that of his Japanese counterpart shows that, at least for the first year

4. JFO S-I 191-197.
5. Ibid., 206-212. For further information, see Wang Yūn-sheng, op. cit. I 94-99.
6. JFO Vol. 9, d.157. 472-473b, Mori to Terashima, March 3, 1876.
or so, the Chinese were far behind the Japanese in their knowledge of diplomatic practice and international law. In the discussions over the Ryukyu question, Japanese Foreign Minister Terashima based his arguments on international law, while Ho, though he probably inwardly agreed with Terashima, nevertheless pursued the traditional Chinese line on the nature of tributary states. Later, when most of the Chinese Ministers had gradually realised that the tributary state, as traditionally conceived by the Chinese, could not be regarded as a dependent country by Western standards of international law, the Ch'ing court remained reluctant to acknowledge the validity of the western concept of suzerainty. This was one of the main reasons why China and Japan continued to argue along parallel lines instead of reaching agreement on the basis of assumptions held in common.

After Ho's term, the Japanese retained their diplomatic advantage. For example, Enomoto Takeaki's appointment as Minister to China at the time of the 1882 Korean incident helped to forestall any counter move that China could take to prevent a Japanese initiative. Enomoto came from the upper echelons of the Tokugawa navy and had resisted the Meiji government to the last; yet because of his expertise in

8. Iguro Yatarō, Enomoto Takeaki den (Sapporo, 1968) 386.
maritime and international law and in Western science, and because he could read Western books fluently owing to four years' study in Holland, he was appointed the main negotiator on the Russo-Japanese treaty over the exchange of Sakharin and Chishima. Subsequently he was appointed Minister to Russia and Minister of the Navy. His experience was far richer than that of his Chinese counterpart, Li Shu-ch'ang, whose career consisted only of four years as a counsellor in a Chinese legation in Europe.

Another example is Komura Jūtarō's appointment as Charge d'Affaires in the Peking legation a year before the war. Since his predecessor had been stationed mainly in Korea, Komura's initiatives in Peking during the pre-war period were important, and made a sharp contrast with the performance of the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, Wang Feng-tsao, in the pre-war period. Komura was a Harvard Law Graduate. He served as a Judge for several years before entering the foreign service. Although his excellent command of English was well recognized and he was promoted to head the Bureau of Translation in the Foreign Office, he lived inconspicuously for nearly ten years until 1893, when he was finally sent to the Peking post as Charge d'Affaires. Although Foreign Minister Mutsu was

said to be rather sorry about the appointment to the "second class post", Komura was very happy about the appointment. 11 As soon as Komura took up his duties, he increased the mission's contacts with other diplomatic representatives in Peking. He took a deeper interest in China than the so-called China experts in the legation, who actually knew nothing about China at all. He read many Western books on China which he considered much better than the few and inadequate Japanese books. At the same time, he engaged in a practical study of China. By actual investigation he improved the Japanese mission's study of China, extending it far beyond the mere examination of the size and composition of the Chinese army, its lines of supplies and so on. In comparing the relative strengths of the Chinese and Japanese armies and navies, he concluded that since China had neither political nor military unity no army could successfully fight for her defence. He therefore advocated that an early war with China would be in Japan's interests: his observations in the pre-war period made him urge the home government to take swift and decisive action in the crisis to forestall European interference and Ch'ing military preparations. His closure of the legation and rupture of diplomatic relations with China - even before receiving instructions from his home government - came as no surprise.

His performance in the pre-war period won the praise of the Japanese government. His astute observations allowed him to use his own initiative and take timely measures, which were always in complete accord with his government's intentions. His accurate reports helped keep Japan ahead in the pre-war diplomatic manoeuvrings. Compared with his performance, Wang Feng-tsao's reports to the Chinese government were at best confusing.

Komura was the first diplomat from either side to have a real feeling for the situation in the host country. Before his time, even though the Japanese capitalised on their superior knowledge of international law, neither they nor the Chinese envoys to Japan knew a great deal about their respective countries. Despite the social and geographical bond between China and Japan, neither side achieved fluency in the other's spoken language or was able to appreciate the other's political complexities.

Before the war, in fact, Japanese diplomats even seem to have considered Peking as something of a second-rate appointment. The Japanese mission in China did not have the right of consular jurisdiction enjoyed by Western Ministers, nor did Japanese nationals have the same privilege as Europeans.

Even in Peking diplomatic circles, the status of the Japanese Minister was not considered high. For example, Otori Keisuke, Japanese Minister to China from 1889 to 1895 held concurrently the office of Minister to Korea. He spent most of the time in Korea, because;

"it made no difference whether he stayed there or not."  

Shioda Saburō (Minister 1886-1889) who died at his office in Peking complained on many occasions to Foreign Minister Inouye that he should inform him in more detail of the talks he had had with the Chinese Minister in Japan so as to avoid embarrassment during his negotiations with the Chinese government.  

Again on July 13, 1884, Inouye without prior consultation with Shioda, allowed Chinese nationals to enter the Japanese interior for scientific research. Shioda regretted this sudden concession, and felt that it was only bargaining point Japan held in treaty revisions with China, especially when Japan was making demands from China. These examples indicate that the Japanese Ministry in China was not considered very important as a channel for diplomatic activity.

One reason for the low status of the post of Japanese Minister to China might have been the fact that there were few

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15. JFO Vol. 19, d.43. 153.
16. Ibid., d.52. 184-185.
important negotiations between the two countries between the Treaty of Tientsin in 1885 and the war of 1894-5. The Chinese attitude to her Minister in Japan, however, does not bear out this argument. Far from looking on this post as a second-rate one, the Chinese considered it to have a very special importance. Japan, being one of China's closest neighbours and sharing not only her cultural heritage but also the problems created by the international situation, naturally occupied a larger place in the Chinese diplomatic mind than countries culturally or geographically further removed from China. This principle was even taken to extremes, with China imagining that Japan, being similar in every way to herself, would automatically respond to events in a thoroughly predictable way.

After the war, the diplomatic role of the Chinese mission to Japan was gradually overshadowed by other pressing tasks, such as the need to control Chinese students studying in Japan. By contrast, the post-war Japanese mission to China increased in importance. China was now considered a major factor in Japan's plans for the future.

Accordingly the criteria for the selection of Japanese envoys to China changed, with even more experienced men being appointed. The background of Hayashi Tadasu (1895-1896) in some way resembles that of Otori Keisuke (1889-1895); he

participated in Enomoto's last ditch resistance to the Meiji government, he joined Iwakura's mission to Europe and America, served in the Ministry of Industry, and later as Governor and under-secretary of the Foreign Office. 18 Nishi Tokujirō (1899-1900) showed even more clearly the importance attached to the Peking position. He studies in Russia from 1871 to 1876; then, after two years as secretary of the legation in Paris, he moved to Russia and served there until 1880. Out of his experience he wrote a book on Central Asia, which was considered important enough to be published by the Japanese Army General Staff Office. In 1886 he was appointed Minister to Russia and his gathering of information there contributed greatly to Japan's success in the Sino-Japanese war. He was made a Baron and in 1897 became Foreign Minister. He was appointed Minister to China the following year. 19

After 1900, the Japanese Ministers to China were Uchida Yasuya, Hayashi Gonsuke and Ijuin Hikokichi. They were all graduates of Tokyo University, who joined the Foreign office as diplomatic reserves after 1887. 20 The selection of foreign

18. NRD XV 167-168. His successor Yano Fumio was an exception among the appointees of this period. An associate editor of a newspaper, author of a political nove, and secretary in the Cabinet, he then engaged in the organization of a political party, the Kaiseitō, until he retired from the politics, when he became a Ceremonial Officer in the Department of the Imperial Household in 1899.

19. DJMJ V68; III 207.

20. GNH A 198, 205-264.
service personal by examination also started early in 1895.\(^\text{21}\) China on the other hand did not institute such a selection system until after 1907. During this period many Japanese envoys to China had already obtained high positions or gone on to obtain prominent posts on their return to Japan.\(^\text{22}\) On the other hand, many Chinese envoys to Japan were rarely heard of again after their terms of office.

It was characteristic of Japanese Ministers to China of this period that they had spent much time in China or Korea before their appointment as Minister in China. Hayashi was consul in Inchon from 1888 to 1897, first secretary in Peking and then Minister to Korea before his appointment as Minister to China.\(^\text{23}\) Uchida served in the Peking legation from immediately after the war until 1897.\(^\text{24}\) The last one, Ijuin, started as consul in Chefoo before the war. In 1898 he served in Inchon and from 1901 was consul in Tientsin before promotion to consul-general after the Russo-Japanese war. During this period he became a good friend of Yüan Shih-k'ai and was well received both in China and Japan. Japan considered him more familiar with the Chinese situation than any other appointee.

\(^{21}\) GNH A 214, 228.

\(^{22}\) GNH A 399-414, 545-546, 548-555.

\(^{23}\) NRD XV 166.

\(^{24}\) GNH A 550.
He became the first Minister to China to hold a post in the same country for nearly ten years.25

China, on the other hand, still lacked this continuity and familiarity with Japanese affairs. Ministers like Yang Shu had had experience in Japan on the legation staff, and Wang Ta-hsien had been a student controller for a year before his appointment. Before appointed Minister to Russia, Hu Wei-te had had long diplomatic experience, and seemed to be the most eminent of the appointees.

During this period, the Japanese legation contained many members who could speak Chinese and were familiar with the Chinese situation. Some had acquired high-ranking friends in the Chinese government and often exercised considerable influence through them; for instance, Ijuin's friendship with Yüan Shih-k'ai,26 Military Attache Aoki Norizumi's friendship both with Yüan and the Yamen,27 and Odagiri's widespread contacts in China,28 certainly assisted the Japanese mission in carrying out its functions.

Although the Japanese on the whole made better use of their opportunities than the Chinese, this did not mean that their observations were always more accurate than those of western diplomats in China. For instance, the Japanese legation

25. GNH A 552-555.
26. GNH A 553-555.
27. Konoe nikki op. cit. III 201; V 66.
was severely criticised by historian Tabohashi Kiyoshi for the unsatisfactory quality of its reporting during the Boxer Uprising. Most of its information, it appears, was obtained at second hand from the British legation. This mission included many men who could be regarded as experts on China: apart from Nishi Tokujirō, an able diplomat and Russian expert, there was Narahara Nobumasa, who accompanied the first Chinese Minister Ho Ju-chang back to China and wrote from his six years experience in China an excellent book on the Chinese political system entitled *Uiki tsusan* (地域通算). There was also Fukube Unokichi, a student sent by the Ministry of Education to study in China, who later became an eminent sinologist. Tabohashi wrote:

"It was the first time the Japanese legation in China had gathered so many Chinese experts and able envoys, yet their observation on the nature of the Boxers and the actual situation of the Ch'ing court was no better than that of the Western missions. Even though they were conveniently placed to collect information, they did not use their opportunity and were satisfied with second-hand information obtained from the British and French Ministers."  

This role was to change considerably after 1911 when the Japanese Minister to China assumed increased importance, a

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29. Tabohashi Kiyoshi, "Giwaken hiran to Nichiro" in Tōsei Kōshō shiron B 1082-1083; also see Kawamura Kazuo, "Hokusei jihen to Nihon" Kokusai Seiji (Autumn 1957) 93-114.


31. See Note 29.
significance which increased in inverse proportion to the decline in the role of the Western diplomatic mission in the Far East.
## Chinese Diplomatic Representatives in Japan, 1877-1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of App't. or Notification</th>
<th>Entry on Duties (or arrival)</th>
<th>Date of Resignation or Retirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>何如璋 (T. Tzu-o 子娥 1838-1891)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chang Ssu-kuei</td>
<td>October 19, 1877 (n)</td>
<td>December 28, 1877 (December 16, 1877)</td>
<td>December 2, 1880.</td>
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<tr>
<td>張昕柱 (H. Lu-sheng 蓬生 Assoicate Envoy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Hsü Ching-ch'eng</td>
<td>December 6, 1880 (n)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>许景澄 (T. Chu-yün 竹筠 1845-1900)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li Shu-ch'ang</td>
<td>April 5, 1881 (April 8, 1881)n.</td>
<td>February 22, 1882</td>
<td>October 5, 1884.</td>
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<tr>
<td>黎樹昌 (T. Chu-un-chai 竹齊 1837-1897)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Hsü Ch'eng-tsu</td>
<td>October 5, 1884 (October 18, 1884)n.</td>
<td>November 27, 1884</td>
<td>January 4, 1888.</td>
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<tr>
<td>徐永祖 (T. Sun-lin 孫麟)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Li Shu-chang</td>
<td>September 13, 1887</td>
<td>January 4, 1888</td>
<td>January 29, 1891</td>
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<td>5. Li Ching-fang</td>
<td>September 9, 1890</td>
<td>January 29, 1891</td>
<td>September 4, 1891</td>
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<td>李經方 (T. Pe-hsing 伯行 1860-1934)</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of App't. or notification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wang Feng-tsao</td>
<td>July 29, 1891</td>
<td>September 4, 1891</td>
<td>January 14, 1892</td>
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<td>(T. Yun-chang 雲章)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(H. Chih-fang 芝房)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li Ching-fang</td>
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<td>October 11, 1892</td>
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<td>6. Wang Feng-tsao</td>
<td>(July 14, 1892) n.</td>
<td>October 11, 1892</td>
<td>August 4, 1894.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Yün-keng</td>
<td>July 10, 1895</td>
<td>(September 13, 1895)</td>
<td>October 3, 1898.</td>
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<td>(T. Lang-hsi 朗西</td>
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<td>d. 1905</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huang Tsun-hsien</td>
<td>August 11, 1898</td>
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<td>October 6, 1898.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(T. Kung-tu 1848-1905)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Li Sheng-to</td>
<td>September 18, 1898</td>
<td>October 3, 1898</td>
<td>January 26, 1902</td>
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<td>(Acting)</td>
<td>October 6, 1898</td>
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<td>(T. Mu-ch'ai 1860-1937)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Ts'ai Chün</td>
<td>July 4, 1901</td>
<td>January 26, 1902</td>
<td>October 15, 1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>鈞 (H. Ho-fu 和甫)</td>
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<td>(January 21, 1902)</td>
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**Chinese Diplomatic Representatives in Japan, 1877-1911**

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<th>Entry on Duties (or arrival)</th>
<th>Date of Resignation or Retirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Yang Shu (T. Hsing-yüan 星垣)</td>
<td>June 15, 1903</td>
<td>October 15, 1903</td>
<td>October 7, 1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Li Chia-chü (T. Liu-ch'i 柳溪)</td>
<td>July 12, 1907</td>
<td>October 7, 1907</td>
<td>August 1, 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hu Wei-te (T. Hsing-wu 蕭吾 1869-)</td>
<td>March 23, 1908</td>
<td>August 1, 1908</td>
<td>June 7, 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Wang Ta-hsieh (T. Pe-t'ang 伯唐 1864-)</td>
<td>May 26, 1910</td>
<td>August 6, 1910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

The unpublished Chinese materials that I consulted in Taipei were the archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to relations with Japan from 1862 to 1911, now housed in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taiwan. They are arranged in chronological order under subject headings, and divided into original papers and clean files (copies). The most useful part of this collection was the Shih Ling tang 使領檔 which is divided according to the relevant ministers and is mostly in clean file. It has comparatively little to say about the period before Ts'ai Chun, but thereafter gives complete coverage from his time on.

The unpublished Japanese materials that I consulted in Tokyo were the Gaimusho kiroku 外務省機録 in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although some of the material overlaps with that found in the Library of Congress Microfilm on Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, some of the documents read cannot be found elsewhere. Another set of unpublished documents found in Tokyo was the Kensei Shiryo Shitsu Collection of the Japanese National Diet Library. Many of the manuscripts and papers found there provided illuminating material on certain specific interviews between Chinese and Japanese ministers and it was thus possible to gain some insight into the views of these officials on question of mutual concern.
The published documents were also major primary sources. Works such as Nihon gaikō bunsho 日本外交文書 Foreign Ministry Archives (Library of Congress Microfilm), Kuang-hsü-ch'ao Chung-Jih chiao-she shih-liao 光緒朝中日交涉史料 Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao 清季外交史料 Ch'ou-pan i-wu 策辦夷務始末 and British Foreign Office Confidential Prints were extensively used in every chapter. Memoirs, autobiographies and works of the period, including collections of books on Japan by Chinese at the time (consulted in Hibiya Library, Tokyo and Tōyō Bunko) were important sources throughout.

The published and unpublished sources used in individual chapters can be summarised as follows:

Chapter 1. For the sketch of Sino-Japanese relations the main sources were the Dynastic Histories; five English works: Tsunoda and Goodrich, Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories; Sansom, A History of Japan; Reischauer, Ennin's Travel in China; Wang Yit-t'ung, Official relations between China and Japan 1368-1549; Fairbank, The Chinese World Order and a few articles in Iwanami Koza 岩波講座 Nihon rekishi 日本歴史 such as Nakamura Hidetaka 中村榮考 "Jusan-yon seiki no Toa josei to Mongol no shurai" 十三世紀東亞情勢とモンゴルの襲来. For the Pre-treaty Japanese approaches to China I consulted the unpublished T'ung-shang Shui-wu tang 遠邦涉務務檔 in Taipei and compared it with Nihon gaikō bunsho 日本外交文書.

Chapter 2. Chung-Jih hsiu-hao t'ao-yüeh-teng 中日修好條約 and Li Wen-chung kung ch'uan-chi 李文忠公全集 were the most important sources for this chapter.
Chapter 3. T'ung-shang yüeh-chang lei-ch'uan (TSYC) 通商約章類纂, and Chu-Te shih-kuan tang an-ch'ao (CTSKT) 駐德使館檔案 are the most useful published documents. Both include many regulations and memorials on the Chinese missions abroad. CTSKT covers not merely the Chinese mission in Germany but the mission in general, while TSYC gives excellent coverage of the regulations and important memorials on the administration of the Chinese missions. Two secondary books, Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues; Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government School in China were a great help for the background information of the various Chinese ministers abroad.

Chapter 4. Nihon gaiko bunsho was the important source for the first part. The materials on finance was drawn from the unpublished documents in Shih Ling tang 使領館, Kuang-hsü-ch'ao Chung-Jih chiao-she shih-liao, 光緒朝中日交涉史料 Li Wen-chung kung ch'uan-chi 李文忠公全集 and the works of the missions member in Japan provided the information for the final section.

Chapter 5. The primary sources used in writing this chapter were (i) the published documents: Ho Sao-chan wen-ch'ao 何少詹文釈; Li Wen-chung kung ch'uan-chi 李文忠公全集 and Nihon gaiko Bunsho 日本外交文書, Kuang-hsü-ch'ao Chung-Jih chiao-she shih-liao 光緒朝中日交涉史料 (ii) The unpublished material in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Matsumoto Collection and Liu-ch'iu tang琉球檔 in Taipei together with a few documents on Ho's mission in Shih Ling tang.
(iii) secondary sources included Saneto Keishu, 
Meiji Nisshi bunka kōshō 治日支文化交涉 and 
Okochi monjo 大河内文書 and
(iv) contemporary newspapers in Tokyo University, which were useful sources for the arrival of Ho's mission.

Chapter 6. Li Wen-chung kung ch'ih-tu 李文忠公奏讀 was extensively used for the later part of this chapter starting from Hsü Ch'eng-tsu's term. This published source is rich in correspondence between Chinese ministers and Li Hung-chang, giving much insight into the problem. Moreover, it had rarely been used elsewhere. Many of the views of ministers to Japan were quoted from unpublished materials in the Shih Ling tang and documents in Kenseishiryo shitsu as well as contemporary newspaper. The works of the ministers themselves, like Li Shu-ch'ang's Cho-tsun yūan ts'ung-kao 拣fonn_叢稿 and Hsü Ch'eng-tsu, T'iao-i ts'un-kao 傅毅存稿 had also been consulted.

Chapter 7. For the control of the student revolutionaries my main sources in Chinese were Shih Ling tang which gives fairly detailed coverage from Ts'ai Chun's term on, although for Li Sheng-tō and Yu-keng the material is very scarce. Japanese sources consulted were unpublished materials like the three files of document on Chinese student studying in Japan found in the Japanese Foreign Office.

The first part (the changing role of the mission) was again based mainly on the Shih Ling tang but supported by published records such as Kuang-hsu ch'ao Chung-Jih chiao she shih-liao, Nihon gaikō bunsho and some Microfilm (JFA). The
last materials has some interesting records of conversations between Li Sheng-to and Foreign Minister Kato. Contemporary newspapers were also used.

Several works with regard to the activities of Chinese revolutionary student in Japan had been consulted: Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen; Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution; Sanetō Keishū, Chūkoku jin Nihon ryugaku shi 中国留学生日本留学史; Nagai Kazumi, 永井算己 "Iwayuru shinkoku ryugakusei torishimari kisoku jiken no seikaku". 所謂清國留學生取締事件の性格
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Azabu 麻生
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Chang Jen-chün 張人駿
Chang Meng-yuan 張夢元
Chang P'ei-lun 張佩綸
Chang Shu-sheng 張樹聲
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Chang Te-i 張德彝
Chang Yin-huan 張蓮桓
Chang Ying-t'ang 張蔭棠
Chang Yü-chao 張裕釗
Ch'ang-an 長安
Ch'ang-hsiu 長秀
Ch'ang-sha 長沙
Ch'ang-chen 長鎮
Chao Tseng-yung 趙增棠
Chekiang 浙江
Ch'en Chi-t'ung 陳季同
Ch'en Chia-lin 陳家麟
Ch'en Ch'in 陳欽
Ch'en Lan-pin 陳蘭彬
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Ch'en Wen-chin 陳文進
Cheng Chen 鄭珍
Cheng Tsao-ju 鄭藻如
Ch'eng Lin 成林
Ch'i-yung 蔣英
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Chōshū 長洲
chu-jen 堅人
Ch'u-ts'ai Kuan 儒才館
Kuo Sung-t'ao 郭嵩焘
Kuroda Kiyotaka 黑田清隆
Kusunogi Masashige 柿本人成
Kwangtung 廣東
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Li Feng-pao 李鳳苞
Li Heh-nien 李楹年
Li Hsing-jui 李興銳
Li Hung-chang 李鴻章
Li Hung-tsao 李鴻藻
Li Jen-shu 李仁叔
Li Kuo-chieh 李國傑
Li Shan-lan 李善蘭
Li Sheng-to 李盛錚
Li Shih kuan 理事官
Li Shu-ch'ang 李樹昌
Li Wen-chung kung 李文忠公
Liang 梁
Liang Ch'eng 梁誠
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啟超
Liang-kiang 两江
Liao-tung 遼東
Lin-an 臨安
Lin Tse-hsü 林則徐
Liu-ch'iu ti-li-chih 琉球地理志
Liu-ho 六合
Liu Hsi-hung 劉錦鴻
Liu Hsüeh-hsün 劉學詢
Liu Jui-fen 劉瑞芬
Liu K'un-i 劉坤一
Liu Shih-hsün 劉式訓
Liu Shou-k'eng 劉壽鏗
Liu Sung 劉景
Liu Yung-fu 劉永福
Liu Yü-lin 劉玉麟
Lo Feng-lu 羅豐祿
Lo Ken-lin 羅康齡
Lu Cheng-hsiang 陸增祥
Lü Hai-huan 吕海寰
Lu Yung-ming 吕永銘
Lü-shun 旅順
Ma Chiang 馬江
Ma Chien-chung 马建中
Ma-wei 馬尾
Mahira Rokurō 關平六郎
Shanhaikwan 山海關
Shantung 山東
Shao Yu-lien 郭友濂
Shen Pao-chen 沈薌檳
Shen To 沈鐸
Sheng Hsuan-huai 盛宣懷
Sheng Jui-lin 沈瑞麟
Shensi 陝西
Shibasandai 芝山內
shih-chiang 侍講
Shimonoseki 下關
Shinagawa Daisuke 品川大佑
Shioda Saburō 塩田三郎
Shishido Tamaki 宮戶誠
Shu-chi-shih 庾吉士
Silla 新羅
Sinuiju 新義州
Snejima Taneomi 副島常臣
Sone Toshitora 曾根俊慶
Soochow 蘇州
Su-Sung-Ch'ang-Chen-t'ai 蘇松常鎮太
Sui 隋
Sun Chia-nai 孫家鼐
Sun Pac-ch'i 孫璧琦
Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
Szechuan 四川
Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih 大清一統志
Ta-lien wan 大連灣
Ta-p'u 大埔
Ta T'ung 大同
Taira no Kiyomori 平清盛
Takezoe Shinichirō 竹添進一郎
T'ang Shao-i 唐紹載
T'ang T'ai-tsun 唐太宗
T'ang T'ing-hsiang 譚廷襄
T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang 唐才常
Taotai 道台
Tei Ei-nei 郭永孚
Tenno 天皇
Terashima Munenori 寺島宗則
Ti 狄
Ti-li-chih 地理志
T'ien-hsia 天下
Ting Jih-ch'ang 丁日昌
Ting-yuan 定遠
Tōa Dōbun Kai 東華同文會
Tokugawa Ieyasu 德川家康
Tong Haks 東學
Toyotomi Hideyoshi
Tsai-chen 車振
Tsai-feng 車澄
Tsai-t’ien 車池
Ts’ai Chun 蔡勳
Tseng Chi-tse 曾紀澤
Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩
Tso Tsung-t’ang 左宗棠
Ts’ui Kuo-yin 崔國因
Tsungli Yamen 總理衙門
Tsutsuji Keiroku 都筑馨六
T‘u-chüeh 突厥
T‘u Tsung-ying 涂宗瀛
Tuan, Prince 端親王
Tung Hsün 蹇恂
T‘ung-ch‘eng 樑城
T‘ung Hsing-Hui 同盟會
T‘ung-chih 同治
T‘ung-hai 通海
T‘ung-wen kuan 同文館
Tungchow 通州
Tz‘u-hsi 贊禧
Uchida Yasuya 内田康哉
Ueno Kagenori 上野景範
Wa 倭
Wa-no-go-ō 倭の五王
Wai-wu-pu 外務部
Wang Feng-tsao 汪鳳藻
Wang Hsin-chung 王信忠
Wang K‘ai-t‘ai 王凱泰
Wang K‘e-min 王克敏
Wang Sung-sen 王松森
Wang Ta-hsien 汪大燮
Wang Wen-shao 王文韶
Wei 魏
Wei-Yüan 程源
Weihaiwei 成海衛
Wen-hsiang 文祥
Wen-pao ch‘ü 文報局
Wen T‘ing-shih 文廷式
Weng T‘ung-ho 翁同龢
Wo-kuo 倭國
Wu Hsü 吳煦
Wu Ju-lun 吳汝倫
Wu Pao-jen 吳葆仁
Wu Sun 吳榕
Wu Ta-ch‘eng 吳大澂
Wu T‘ing-fang 伍廷芳
Wu Tsung-lien 吳宗濂
Wu Yüeh 吳樾
Yahejima 八雲山
Yamada Akiyoshi 山田顯義
Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋
Yamaguchi Shakujiro 山口錦次郎
JFO Nihon gaiko bunsho

JFO:S Nihon gaiko bunsho, Meiji nenkan tsuiho
   (Documents on Japanese Foreign relations - supplement on the Meiji period)

JFO:R Gaimushō kiroku

JFO:R-MC Matsumoto collections - The dispute between China and Japan about the ownership of Ryukyu's

JFO:R-KB Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan Kakumeitō kankei, Bomei-sha o fuku (Miscellaneous documents relating to the Revolutionary party, including political exiles)

JFO:R-S Zai honpō shina ryūgakusei kankei zakken (Miscellaneous documents relating to the Chinese student studying in Japan)

JFKC Nikkan gaiko shiryō shusei

KCTHL Kuang-hsü-ch'ao tung-hua-lu

KH Chosenshi 6hen 4kan

LWCK:IS Li wen-chung-kung ch'uan-ch'i:i-shu han-kao

LWCK:TD :tien-kao

LWCK:TK :tsou-kao

LWCK:PL :p'eng-liao han-kao

LWCKCT Li Wen-chung kung ch'ih-tu

NR Nihon rekishi

NRD Nihon rekishi daijiten

SKHT Ssu-kuo hsin-tang

TNS Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun

TSYC T'ung-shang yüeh-chang lei-ch'uan

TYMS Tokyo Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun

WCSL Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao

For example JFO Vol. 2-1 refers to the 2nd volume, part 1; d. refers to despatch; T. refers to telegram followed by the number of the telegram; S-I refers to Supplement, part I.