USE OF THESES

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For the Degree of Master of Arts

March 1979

"Noble Warriors: The Military Elite and Henry VIII's Expeditions of 1513 and 1544"

by

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This thesis is all my own work and all sources used have been acknowledged,

[Signature]

Graham McLennan
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with identifying and understanding the typical behaviour of the early Tudor nobility, particularly in relation to military activity. It is also an attempt to describe that behaviour without following the usual practice of categorising it as declining chivalry and the emergence of modern attitudes. Instead, I suggest that insofar as there was a shared area of ideas and behaviour amongst the nobles, that behaviour was in large part an outcome of their position in society as a military elite. Because the nobles formed a military elite, the behaviour of individuals in both military and civilian life was, to a major degree, shaped by the expectation that their typical actions would be the same as those of the leaders of the army. Their peacetime behaviour was, therefore, often related to the position occupied in the army by nobles, and, at the same time, behavioural characteristics associated with the noble in his civilian life frequently intruded into war situations.

An outcome of the identity between the noble as a civilian and as a soldier was that the noble tended to regard the army as the proper sphere in which to display his select status, rather than seeing the army merely as an instrument of the nation or the government. Nobles were often concerned to be seen to be acting in a manner befitting their rank, even in times of great stress and danger. Because these typical activities associated with the noble might emphasise somewhat resource wasting actions, their presence helped make warfare seem even less efficient than it already was.

At the same time, there were numerous traditionally based types of behaviour associated with the military elite, which many writers have been content to label as chivalry. These were adopted by the nobles as aspects of the typical behaviour of their group. But it would be incorrect to claim that these characteristics alone made up the main influence on the ideas and actions of the early Tudor nobility.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Existing in the Archives and Collections of Milan ed. A.B. Hinds (London, 1912).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.P.</td>
<td>Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy ed. R. Brown (London, 1867-73).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.P.</td>
<td>State Papers of King Henry the Eighth (London, 1832-50).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almain rivet</td>
<td>A suit of armour made by Germans, usually of three-quarter length.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arquebus</td>
<td>A handgun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bard</td>
<td>Cloth or metal protection for horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>One of the three divisions of an army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>The basic infantry unit of varying size but usually around 100 men, commanded by a captain and deputy captain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corselet</td>
<td>Armour similar to Almain rivets, worn by demi-lances and front ranks of infantry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demi-lance</td>
<td>Cavalry which was not as heavily armed as men at arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harness</td>
<td>Armour, or equipment for horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack</td>
<td>Reinforced cloth coat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javelin</td>
<td>Lightly armoured cavalry equipped with the relatively light boar spear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joust</td>
<td>Individual combat between men at arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance</td>
<td>A cavalry weapon or a formation of cavalry containing heavy and light horsemen in varying numbers. Also known as a spear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man at arms</td>
<td>Fully armoured cavalryman, usually of noble birth, equipped with weapons such as heavy lance, sword and mace, and riding a charger which was often barded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern horse</td>
<td>Also known as Border horse or javelins. Light horsemen recruited from the northern marches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tournament</td>
<td>A mêlée of numerous men at arms. Also an occasion on which jousts and mêlées take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>One of the three divisions of an army: Vaward (vanguard), Midward (main battle or king's ward) and Rearward (rearguard).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I cannot, to prove my descent, bring forth the Images of my Ancestors, their Triumphs, their Consulships; but if need be, I can shew Launces, my Ensigne, Caparisons, and other such warlike implements, besides a number of scarres upon my breast: these are my Images, my Nobilitie... ¹

Les armes ennoblissent l'omme... ²

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INTRODUCTION

This is an examination of the ways in which the values and attitudes of a sixteenth century elite shaped and were shaped by contemporary warfare. It was inspired by a dissatisfaction with the usual characterizations of noble behaviour as it occurred in early sixteenth century England. Attempts to describe the military behaviour of nobles have generally begun from a single assumption. This is the idea that the concept of chivalry was not, for the sixteenth century, an appropriate way of representing noble behaviour, whereas chivalry had been a satisfactory means by which to describe noble behaviour of the previous half a millennium. Chivalry, according to this premise, was an aspect of noble behaviour which was unique to the medieval period. But it had no relevance to the military reality of the renaissance or early modern period.

Sixteenth century chivalry was, generally speaking, a luxurious game to charm the leisure of a courtly society, no longer troubled by the older military obligation of the order.1

Where some of its features did survive into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, therefore, they were anachronisms or isolated incidents without any significant effect on the actions of nobles or on society as a whole. The early sixteenth century was, rather, part of the period when nobles began to act according to modern tenets, which might be broadly typified as rationality, realism, ruthlessness and a kind of new middle class practicality. This was the image of Henry VIII and his era portrayed in A.F. Pollard's biography of the second Tudor monarch.

He ruled in a ruthless age with a ruthless hand, he dealt with a violent crisis by methods of blood and iron, and his measures were crowned with whatever sanction worldly success can give. He is Machiavelli's *Prince* in action.¹

There have been many variations on this theme of the decay of a chivalric style of life and its replacement in the early sixteenth century by a novel, more modern, ideal of noble behaviour. A number of historians have seen this new ideal as the outcome of the influence of humanists, whose emphasis on learning encouraged the creation of a Tudor nobility which was more learned in literature than in war. According to the only historian who has so far published an extensive study of the decline of English chivalry, A.B. Ferguson, the new humanist ideal was able to flourish and grow because decadent chivalry no longer had any connection with the real world, and was simply the romantic memory of a past age.²

All of these representations of the context of the early sixteenth century English nobility are thus based on the idea that there was something essentially new about the era. Most of them also subscribe to the proposition that the old way of life identified as chivalry, was decadent and all but extinct. This has been a longstanding tenet amongst historians, which probably had its most powerful formulation


from the pen of Johan Huizinga, whose ideas and language can be found informing virtually all subsequent discussions of chivalry.¹

But more recently there has been a minor reaction amongst historians, some of whom have begun to question the idea of a decline of chivalry during the late middle ages.² One of these, J.J. Scarisbrick, has argued that chivalry continued to be the significant influence on noble behaviour even during the reign of Henry VIII, and particularly on the king himself. Whereas Pollard attributed Henry's involvement in the 1544 war to the steady evolution of a rational and orderly royal foreign policy which was a reflection of the monarch's Machiavellian character, Scarisbrick saw Henry's


2. For example, J. Barnie, War in Medieval Society. Social Values and the Hundred Years War 1337-99 (London, 1974), pp. 56-8. Barnie is particularly critical of the assumption made by Huizinga that chivalry became merely a game or an illusion because it did not answer to the ideals formulated for it by the Church or courtly romances.
reasons for involvement in the wars of both 1513 and 1544 as remaining basically chivalric.

...in reality his sovereign concern remained what it had been at the beginning, namely, some "notable enterprise" against France.1

But there are major difficulties with either of these two ways of describing early sixteenth century noble military behaviour: that is, the replacement of decadent chivalry by a modern lifestyle, or, alternatively, of the continuation of chivalry as the predominant behavioural characteristic of the nobility.

In the former case, the proponents of the theory of decline admit that there was a continuation of many aspects of the way of life which they have identified as chivalric, although they explain this by arguing that the forms of chivalry survived while divorced from reality. Whether this was in fact the case is a matter for further discussion.

At the same time, however, the concept of chivalry, by itself, does not seem to be an entirely adequate means of depicting the way of life of the early sixteenth century nobility. Chivalry is, for one thing, an extremely indistinct idea which frustrates any attempt to use it in any precise way, although this has not deterred its frequent employment by historians as a convenient label for the actions and attitudes of groups of people during many centuries throughout widely differing societies in Europe and Asia.2 Barnie, in his recent attempt to define chivalry as it applied to a particular group of nobles during one era in medieval history, concluded that even at its simplest level it was a


2. It has even been used to describe events in China. See J.J.Y.Liu, *The Chinese Knight Errant* (London, 1967).
"...confusing and contradictory code which cannot be confined within a single coherent pattern." There have been numerous different and often conflicting definitions of chivalry, both from modern and contemporary theorists, none of which is completely satisfactory. Highly specific definitions, such as the idea that chivalry was a clearly formulated code of behaviour, do not encompass the widely varying types of distinctively noble behaviour manifested throughout the centuries. There simply never was a single recognised and observed European code of chivalry. But, on the other hand, the more general definitions of chivalry, such as the idea that it was the whole knightly system of the middle ages with its religious, moral and social codes and customs, or that it was both a historical movement and a poetic fiction, are too broad to cast much light on the recorded details of noble life.

It would appear that neither of the two theories outlined above - of the decline or the continuation of chivalry - is adequate as a means by which to understand noble behaviour during the early sixteenth century, particularly in the military sphere.

Instead, I would propose trying a different perspective, attempting to shed some light on the behaviour of nobles using models constructed by social scientists. The most relevant of these to this study concern themselves with the examination of elites, those groups which, in any society, dominate positions of influence and decision making.

1. Barnie, War in Medieval Society, p.70.

2. Barnie, for example, admits that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the nature and significance of chivalry in late medieval society, or how seriously it was taken as a basis for social and political behaviour. Ibid., p.56.
It has been suggested that such elites employ particular types of behavioural characteristics. These characteristics, which include ways of understanding the world, and certain expectations about the way things should be done, make up a kind of code of the elite, to which all its members are required to adhere. Adherence to such characteristics, and the sharing of powers and abilities possessed by the group, mark the members of the elite. They allow people, both inside and outside the elite, to determine who is a member of the group, and accord the person an appropriate degree of status. Such status is also known as honour, which has been defined as both a claim and a right to an estimation of worth by society.

The traits by which a member of the elite may be recognized include characteristics such as unflinching bravery, inevitably possessed even by the youngest and weakest members of the group.

They may also include the right to perform certain actions or to participate in certain institutions, rights that are possessed only by members of the elite.

---


It is as a result of this practice that members of the elite may act in a way in certain situations which may not always appear to be most rational and reasonable from the viewpoint of an observer. Depending on the degree to which the individual is influenced by the demands of his desire to be a member of the elite, he will perform actions which may place him and others in great jeopardy, or cost him a great deal of time, money and effort.¹

Each of these considerations would appear to correspond with elements of the behaviour of the Tudor nobility. It was an elite group, recognised by society through both formal and informal means as being above the common run. And it appears to have been of a particular kind of elite, as identified by the social sciences. This is the military elite, which controls the armed forces. And further than that, it was an aristocratic military elite, as defined by M. Janowitz. This differs from other types of military elites in a number of ways, particularly in that, because the leading soldiers are the same men who control government and head society, there is an identity of interest between aristocratic and military groups. This might be compared to the situation where, in a democratic military elite, there is a clear differentiation between those who control the army and those who lead society and run the government. In the democratic state, the soldier is a professional who fights out of a sense of professional duty rather than because he agrees with the goals of civilian men. In the aristocratic state, however, birth,

¹. Lasswell et al; The Comparative Study of Elites, p.11.
family connection and common ideology ensure that the motivations and aims of the military and civilian authorities are the same thing.¹ In other words, there is a continuity of thought, behaviour and attitudes in peace and war time activities of the elite, in this case the nobles of early Tudor England. This becomes of importance when an attempt is made to distinguish what were the main aspects of that code of the elite by which the members of the Tudor elite were defined. This, in turn, may also indicate why the nobles behaved as they did during war, for their actions did not always accord with those which one might expect to operate in Pollard's ruthless, Machiavellian world. It may also show why institutions such as orders of knighthood continued to exist, and how, in fact, they were very much a part of contemporary reality, directly influencing, for example, the conduct of war.

Tudor nobles were members of an elite. They lived in a world of fierce competition and inter-family rivalry, especially at court. As a result of both these considerations they frequently needed to demonstrate their status as members of the elite, or even to improve that status. They expressed this motivation as a concern for their honour. But they were also a special kind of elite, a military elite which also controlled other areas of society such as government and finance. As a military elite, a group supremely important in war as well as civilian life, it followed that the possession of military power, and the badges of military eminence, were marks of the nobility and status of an individual. The performance of particular military tasks, and the possession of high rank in the army, became

ways in which the individual made his claim to membership of the nobility, and by which society was able to recognise him as noble, both in civilian and military situations.

As it happened, many of these badges of military eminence were inherited from the previous age, such as the honour of knighthood, and many had been associated with the concept of chivalry. But, despite the claims by historians that such aspects of behaviour were by this time decadent and without contact with reality, the Tudor nobles adopted them as part of the code of their elite, aspects of the group of characteristics that identified the noble. Membership of an order of knighthood, or participation in a tournament, clearly marked members of the elite.

But those elements of the noble lifestyle which some may wish to categorise as chivalric were not the sole features of the lifestyle of the Tudor nobility. Numerous other aspects of society also made up the group of characteristics associated with the elite, and influenced their behaviour in war. The presence or absence of so-called chivalry does not by itself make clear the reasons for noble behaviour. Rather, to understand noble military lifestyles it is necessary to see them as an outcome of the participation of nobles in society in general. It is possible in the light of this to accept that nobles could have behaved in a wide variety of ways in both peace and war, including often in fashions that may seem, from an outside point of view, perhaps somewhat irrational.

It is also possible in this way to begin to understand the course taken by what have been labelled as chivalric institutions. They were not declining, or continuing unchanged from the previous centuries. Instead, they were being adapted to perform functions for society as aspects of the typical behaviour of the Tudor military elite.
Several considerations have prompted me to concentrate mainly on the records of military campaigns where possible in describing the Tudor nobility and its behaviour. Not least of these has been the desire to provide a balance, however limited, to the practice of many historians of the nobility of the late medieval period, who have often tended to focus their analysis on evidence from romances, treatises and other such sources which may perhaps be fairly represented as creative literature. The only two monographs in English entirely devoted to a study of the forms of aristocratic military behaviour during its so-called decline were deliberately confined to evidence supplied from such sources. Both authors assumed that there was a direct connection between the evidence of decline they found in these documents and the actual events and attitudes of the period.¹

I have tried to examine the military behaviour and attitudes of the early sixteenth century as far as possible from the records of participants in campaigns.² The documents in which nobles voiced their attitudes and recorded their practices fortunately survive in greater bulk than for previous centuries, although they are still quite sketchy.

At the same time, this study of the elite has been centred basically on the events surrounding two wars, that of 1513 and of 1544. This was partly to keep the survey

1. Ferguson, The Indian Summer of English Chivalry; Kilgour, Decline of Chivalry, especially p.313, where he uses a poem in which a fictional knight is outwrestled by a monk as proof that the nobility of fifteenth century France were physically decadent.

2. Because this thesis was researched solely in Australia, I have been limited mainly to printed sources, and in particular to the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, the arrangement of which has been criticised by historians such as G.Elton, The Practice of History (Sydney, 1967), pp.68-9.
within manageable bounds. But the selection of these two
dates was also founded on the consideration that the events
tained enough similarities and differences to allow
considerable comparison and contrast. The wars were widely
enough separated in time for two generations of Englishmen
to participate in them, and hence, to permit change to
manifest itself, especially as the dates straddle an event
which has been identified as of profound significance in
shaping English society, the Reformation. Yet although
separated by a generation, in an historical perspective they
present a relatively specific and unified appearance,
sufficient to permit an overall estimate of the nature of the
elite at a particular time, that is, the first half of the
sixteenth century.

The study has been confined to the English experience
for similar reasons: otherwise the field of examination
would become too large and too general.

The expeditions of 1513 and 1544 shared not only such
characteristics as their theatre of operation and involvement
of much the same countries in conflict. They were also the
only two overseas campaigns in which Henry VIII participated
personally. They are therefore the only opportunity to study
the behaviour of the chief amongst the elite at war against
a foreign backdrop. And, as an outcome of Henry's
participation overseas, there was a great deal of letter writing
between his person and the court, a matter of obvious benefit
to the historian.
CHAPTER ONE

HENRY VIII'S MILITARY EXPEDITIONS, 1513 AND 1544: AN OUTLINE

The chapters that follow involve a detailed consideration of events surrounding the wars with France and Scotland in 1513 and 1544. In order to avoid repetition and confusion, a chronology and description of the wars, their backgrounds, their similarities and differences are set out in this chapter.¹

The 1513 and 1544 campaigns involved actions on several fronts. These various actions were themselves the outcome of changing alliances and events throughout virtually the whole of Europe. During both campaigns England was simultaneously at war with France and Scotland and was at least nominally allied with Imperial German and Spanish armies. The invasion force of 1513 was landed at Calais and attacked several strong points in northern France, while at home another English force repulsed a Scottish invasion at Flodden. In 1544 there was an even larger two pronged attack by Imperial and English forces from eastern and northern France directed at Paris. Earlier in the same year an English army had ravaged southern Scotland, and subsequently a smaller expedition was sent to install one of Henry's Scottish adherents as ruler in the north.²

¹ It is perhaps also necessary to establish dates and movements correctly, as these are frequently stated incorrectly in both contemporary and modern resumes. Unless otherwise noted the description is based on either The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil A.D. 1485-1537 ed. D.Hay (Camden, Third Series LXXXIV) or E.Hall, Henry VIII ed. R.Grafton (1550), (2 vols, London, 1904), hereunder as Vergil, Anglica Historia and Hall, Henry VIII. These have been supplemented particularly by Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII ed. J.S.Brewer et al (37 vols, London, 1862-1932), Vols I and XIX parts i and ii, hereunder as L.P.

² See Map.
SITES OF HENRY'S OPERATIONS IN FRANCE, 1513 AND 1544
The immediate background to the 1513 expedition was a series of abortive attempts by Henry to launch an effective attack on a Continental adversary. In a wider perspective the expedition was a minor part of the continuing struggle for dominance of southern Europe by several northern powers, a contest renewed in 1494 when Charles VIII of France invaded Italy. Henry was merely one of a number of rulers who became involved in the constantly shifting alliances which were formed in the decades following this invasion, as the Holy Roman Emperor, France, Spain, the Papacy and numerous minor rulers fought for security or ascendancy. Intermingled with this was the current unease at incursions by the Ottomans, against whom a number of expeditions were launched, especially by Aragon. Henry's first major involvement with war was when he despatched an army to fight the Moors in north Africa in 1511. The force was to have joined with the strength of Ferdinand of Aragon, Henry's father-in-law. But as was usual with Henry's alliances with Ferdinand, nothing came of the venture, for after a long delay Ferdinand eventually made a truce with the Moors and Henry's men sailed home. Other minor military ventures of the early years included the sending of a small army to aid the Emperor in his continuing war with the Duke of Cleves. In December 1512 Henry became a Crusader when Pope Julius II granted a plenary indulgence to anyone who fought for six months against Louis of France.¹ The papal incitement to English involvement in war was itself the direct outcome of the League of Cambrai, which had been formed in the year before Henry's accession, in December 1508. Julius, the Emperor Maximilian, Maximilian's heir the Infant Charles, King Ferdinand and Louis XII had joined to dismember the territory of Venice, an objective achieved when the Venetians were defeated in May 1509.

¹. L.P. I, document number (3602).
After their victory the members broke up the League and realigned. By 1510 Rome, Venice and Aragon had joined against France. But by 1511 France began to get the better of the papacy, so a new Holy League was formed between Rome, England, Aragon, Venice and the Swiss. France was placed under a papal interdict, ostensibly because Louis called a Council at Pisa with his friends amongst the cardinals, who deposed Julius. Open war between Rome and France culminated in the siege of Bologna, where Julius was trapped. An expedition to divert French attention from the Pope and Italy sailed from England in May 1512. It was to have been an attack on Guienne in concert with Ferdinand, and was to have been under the leadership of the Marquis of Dorset, Thomas Grey. But after some minor skirmishes, the invasion came to a halt while Ferdinand used his army to invade Navarre. The soldiers felt that they had been duped by Aragon. Disgruntled and ill, they mutinied and forced their leaders to take them home, where Henry proved exceedingly angry.¹

During the years leading up to 1513 Ferdinand acquired a reputation amongst the English - and others - for untrustworthiness and self-seeking. He had failed to support papal forces during the siege of Bologna at a time when it appeared as if an equilibrium had been reached between the French and Italians. Instead of sending his army to aid Julius, he brought his men in Italy home. In 1512, having captured Navarre while the English waited around Bayonne, he proposed that instead of advancing into France, the English should join him on a campaign through Navarre to the Mediterranean.

Dorset refused this offer, saying that such a campaign was outside his instructions. It was probably no great surprise therefore when Ferdinand finally deserted the English altogether during the planning for the 1513 invasion. According to Vergil, Ferdinand reached a truce with France in order to secure his conquest of Navarre and to permit him to intervene in Italy if he saw the need or chance.¹

The English expedition of the following year, 1513, was planned to make up for the disasters of 1511 and 1512. All the organisational skill of the court was put into equipping a large army shipped to France by an unprecedented fleet. While this army was being raised Henry negotiated to enlist the lukewarm support of Maximilian and Ferdinand, while an English flotilla swept the Channel and ravaged Brittany. This fleet was under the command of Admiral Edward Howard, son of Thomas Earl of Surrey.

Henry tried to retain the Emperor by bribery, offering 125,000 gold crowns through the agency of Maximilian's daughter, Margaret of Savoy, Regent of the Netherlands during the minority of Maximilian's nephew, the Infant Charles.

Margaret gave the consistent appearance of sympathy with the English, but her father Maximilian had his interest centred elsewhere, on war with Cleves and Venice. But when Ferdinand signed his truce in April 1513 and when Julius was replaced by the more pacific Leo, Henry's need for allies seem more crucial than ever, so negotiations pressed on. Maximilian was finally secured by bribery, but his support remained largely moral. He was impoverished by a lifetime of war, and was able to serve only as a private soldier - albeit an experienced general - under Henry's banner.

¹ Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.205. 'Compare this with Ferdinand's own version, Sp.P. II,(70).
While the preparation continued, Edward Howard attacked the coast of Brittany and engaged the French navy. In August 1512, to the horror of both sides, the carrick The Cordeliere burned when grappling the English Regent, a ship captained by Sir Thomas Knyvet. There was great loss of noble life, and the French admiral, Rene de Clermont, was disgraced for fleeing from the fight, to be replaced by a prior of the Order of St. John, Pregent de Bidoux. The French fleet was then blockaded in Brest harbour during the early months of 1513. In March the English Admiral was killed during a vain attempt to board the blockaded fleet. The English fleet scattered for home, where Edward's brother Thomas - later Earl of Surrey and third Duke of Norfolk - took command. Thomas helped lead the 1544 expedition, together with his son Henry, Earl of Surrey and sometime favourite of Henry VIII.

England was not concerned merely with France at this time, however, as diplomats were nervously engaged with the Scottish problem. The English council was conscious that the Scots would almost certainly invade as soon as the English army sailed for France. James IV of Scotland and Henry were brothers-in-law, due to the Scottish king's marriage to Henry's sister Margaret. But the alliance was in itself a cause for hostility, as there was constant bickering over England's failure to pay Margaret's dowry. The English tried to use the long-delayed payment as a lever to ensure Scotland's quiescence, but it was obvious to all that the negotiations were of no avail. James had been expanding his armoury for years, building ships, buying harness and cannon, training his pikemen with the aid of French nobles, and toughening his own nobles in tournaments.

An additional cause of animosity was constant clashes between the ships of the two British kings, including the death of Scotland's Andrew Barton at the hands of Edward and Thomas Howard.
In Italy, warfare was already in progress by the time Henry's men were nearly ready to leave England. The Duke of Milan, Maximilian Sforza, the Emperor's ally, surprised and defeated the French at Novara on 6 June 1513, his Swiss exterminating the lansknechts under the command of the veteran leader Louis de la Tremouille. This victory left the Swiss free to threaten the southern approaches to France when the invasion began in earnest in July. During the summer, Henry crossed to France with the English army, slowly advancing towards the city of Therouanne, inland from Boulogne. By the time Henry arrived before its walls, the leaders of the vanguard, George Talbot Earl of Shrewsbury and Charles Somerset Lord Herbert, had already invested the town. After meeting the Emperor at Therouanne amidst lavish spectacle, Henry took part in the battle of 16 August at nearby Guinegate, where, in a skirmish known as the Battle of Spurs, his cavalry routed the French nobility.

Once Therouanne had been captured and razed, Henry turned north east towards Flanders, passing near Lille where he was royally entertained by Margaret of Savoy. Eventually he reached Tournai, an important mercantile centre which was regarded as the key to England's approach to eastern France.

Henry had received Scotland's declaration of war while still before Therouanne. The Scots had assembled a huge army on 13 August at Edinburgh, a few days before their allies were defeated. They then marched south to devastate the eastern Marches. James met with success at first, capturing the Bishop of Durham's castle of Norham before advancing to Flodden Edge, also known as Branxton Moor, where he encamped and awaited the English. The Earl of Surrey, Thomas Howard the elder, a veteran of Bosworth, had been marshalling the English reserve forces since 22 July. The armies met at Flodden on 8 September, complete victory going to Surrey. James and most of his nobles were killed.
Henry, rejoicing in the news of victory at Flodden, captured Tournai after a brief siege. Once he had set in motion the complicated business of occupying his prize and had taken part in numerous triumphal shows, he journeyed home from Calais on 21 October, promising to return with another army the following year. It was in fact 31 years before he once more led an army on the Continent.

Many of the elements that distinguished the campaign of 1513 were present during the summer of 1544, when Henry led his last overseas campaign. His enemies were much the same as in 1513, as were his allies. Once again an unusually large army sailed to France, accompanied, as in 1513, by Henry and the magnificence of his court. The background to the campaign was also just as complicated as in the previous war.

But much had changed during the intervening years, giving the 1544 war a less festive appearance than the previous invasion.

Henry was no longer the lively young prince ignoring the restraints of elderly councillors in order to lead his band of favourites to war. By 1544 neither he nor his first group of intimates were young men. Henry was an aged, chronically ill man regarded as a burden by his commanders, and he was served by captains who were frequently the sons of his old companions, or were newly elevated peers, or were, as with Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk and Thomas Howard third Duke of Norfolk, men who had grown old and cautious in his service. In 1513 Henry had been the wonder of Christendom, his appearance and ability described in glowing reports by ambassadors.

"...when he moves the ground shakes under him..." 1

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He had been the Defender of the Faith, his service in 1513 crowned by the pope sending him the Sword and Cap of Maintenance.

But by 1544, in contrast, Henry was merely yet another monarch who had defied Rome. Indeed, he had become the great heretic and enemy of the Church. His country had witnessed the deaths of queens, nobles, clergy and commoners because of the divorce question. England had become all but isolated from Europe and had, in the 1530's, been threatened by the combined forces of the Empire and France.

Henry was not only an old man ruling England. He was the senior monarch of Christendom. He had been leading armies in 1513 when Charles was little more than a child and when Francis I was merely the young Duc d'Angouleme, who remained in the French camp during the fighting at Spurs. Nevertheless, his chief ally and rival were by no means children whom he could overawe or dupe, as his father-in-law Ferdinand had once done to him. Charles and Francis were both experienced and somewhat disillusioned monarchs by the time of the 1544 invasion. Charles was unable to heal the divisions within the Church and his own dominions, while trying to control an empire too widely scattered and disparate in composition to allow effective government. Francis was ill in mind and body. His early promise as a dashing soldier, with the potential to cement France's claims in Italy, had been shattered by his capture at Pavia in 1525 by Charles' army. The French king's failure was compounded by his unthinkable behaviour in bringing the Moors into Western Europe when he concluded an alliance with the pirate Barbarossa which allowed the infidel harbour at Marseilles.

The threat posed by the Ottomans had been relatively remote in 1513, but they were of real and immediate concern to Charles and Italy in 1544. Not only was Barbarossa in France, but the bulwark against the Ottomans in the east,
Hungary, had been lost when the Hungarian nobility was decimated at Mohacs in 1526. The death of King Louis of Hungary in battle with Suleiman the Magnificent had thrown the Danube area into turmoil. The country was partitioned between John Zapolya and the brother of Charles, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. This led to civil wars which broke out once more in 1540. The Turks used such occasions to thrust more deeply into Europe, so that during the 1540's there were constant rumours of the invasion of Germany itself.

In Northern Europe, warfare was endemic between Charles and Francis, Europe's major powers. Charles attempted to invade France in 1543 with the aid of a small English force led by Sir John Wallop. This proved to be a prelude to a major enterprise in 1544, which was to involve the combination of the two largest armies seen in France for many years. The English force was perhaps the largest it had ever sent across the Channel.

The English excuse for joining in the war was its long standing claim to the French crown, as well as the non payment of a pension arranged by Henry's father.

In Britain itself there was the beginning of a major conflict with Scotland. Scottish strength had revived, and the country was now ruled by James V, another active soldier. Skirmishes were a way of life on the Marches, with relations worsened by the defeat of an English raiding party at Halidon in August 1542. The enraged English launched a full scale war which culminated in the overthrow of the Scots at Solway Moss, where many Scottish nobles were captured. James' death soon afterwards was attributed to grief and shame, as well as the cares of state. ¹ His death broke Scotland into

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factions centred on the possession of the successor to the throne, the child Mary. She was seized by the Earl of Arran, self styled governor of Scotland, and Cardinal Beaton, who had been appointed to execute a papal bull against Henry.

Meanwhile Henry extorted promises from his Scottish captives that they would arrange the marriage of Mary to his son Edward, and that in the meantime they would support his own rule in Scotland. But Henry's hold on the north was never secure. Some, such as Beaton, openly supported a French alliance, while others, such as the Douglas family, seemed to shift with every new offer. Henry's negotiators were never sure whom to trust.

While Henry's representatives tried to reach a settlement in Scotland, plans continued for the combined invasion of France. An official treaty was signed late in 1543, although Henry, Charles, and the Emperor's sister Mary, Regent of the Netherlands, continued to haggle over details, each wishing to involve the other side in ventures outside the specific scope of the original contract. Henry wanted Charles to declare war on Scotland, Charles wanted Henry to fight with him against Denmark. Eventually neither monarch was required to do more than he had originally agreed. Charles reached peace with Denmark during spring, while in the first months of 1544 a sea and land invasion was launched on Scotland by the Earl of Hertford, Edward Seymour, brother of the late queen. The fleet sailed from Newcastle to Leith while light horse moved from border garrisons to the rendezvous outside Edinburgh. The Cardinal and Arran were put to flight outside Leith before Hertford's men attacked Edinburgh, where they burned the suburbs but were unable to seize the castle. Hertford then marched home by a circuitous route burning the country as he went.

With Scotland apparently crushed, Henry continued his preparations for France. The frenzied operations involved in raising the huge armies proved a severe strain on
the already doubtful alliance, as well as on the finances of England and the Empire. Henry and Charles were to have 35,000 infantry and 7,000 horse each, the Emperor to supply Henry with 2,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and both countries to provide ships with an army of 2,000 men each to guard the Channel. Henry was to march on Paris from Calais, Charles to advance west through Champagne.¹

In the midst of the problems involved in raising these forces hostilities flared once more on the Marches, even as the triumphant English army returned home from Edinburgh. Typical of the skirmishes was a raid by the English against Jedworth on 12 June and a battle with 900 Scots horse and 100 foot. Hertford wrote to Henry soon afterwards that he expected a Scottish invasion.² A new attempt was made to control the Scots in the following month when the Earl of Lennox, Gavin Douglas, was sent to Scotland with an English fleet to establish him as ruler. The mission to make him governor failed because the Scots refused to surrender their castles as many of them had previously agreed to do. By August, severe damage was being done once more by Scots raids along the Marches.

The allies were more fortunate with operations in Italy, where Imperial forces were continually trying to outmanoeuvre the condottiere Piero Strozzi and his French army. He defeated the Spanish leader Marquis del Guasto at Ceresole in April, but the French were in turn defeated at Cremona in August.

Eventually the main armies began to move, the English crossing to France in June and July, while Charles advanced from the Diet of Spires, which he had called to raise money and men. The English vanguard, led by the rivals Thomas Howard and

¹ L.P. XVIII, ii (526).
² L.P. XIX, ii (684), (705).
John Russell, Lord Privy Seal, marched from Calais to the unsuccessful siege of Montreuil, a city inland from Boulogne. Charles Brandon meanwhile besieged Boulogne which was eventually captured. Henry arrived at Calais on 13 July and reached Boulogne on 26 July, which surrendered on 14 September, shortly before Henry sailed for home for the last time.

Charles' expedition was even more shortlived. He attacked several strongpoints, including St. Diziers, and his advance had the people of Paris erecting barricades. But he was eventually forced to halt because of a combination of shortage of provisions, bad weather, and lack of support from Henry. Despite his previous agreement, Charles concluded a peace with Francis.

This left Henry deserted once more by his allies. His borders were under threat from the Scots, his army in France was troubled by illness and rivalry, chronically short of provisions, and threatened by the advancing army of the Dauphin which was near the hastily repaired walls of Boulogne.

Negotiations for peace between France and England continued with Charles as mediator, but the results were not impressive. The Emperor had signed the Treaty of Crespi on 18 September, gaining advantages such as the promise of free trade, the restoration of land claimed by Henry, the reunion of Christendom against the Turk, as well as a marriage between his daughter and the Due D'Orleans, but the English could only arrange a shaky truce for the winter.¹

The French army was only kept out of Boulogne with great difficulty and luck. Some of the Dauphin's men actually entered the town during the night of 7 October in a raid known as the Camisade of Boulogne. Winter and lack of food eventually broke the impetus of the French attack, forcing

¹ L.P. XIX, ii (249).
them into winter quarters. Raids and skirmishes flickered around Boulogne and Calais during the next few years, the English led by the dashing Henry Howard Earl of Surrey and later Edward Earl of Hertford.

Once he had returned to England Henry busily prepared for the French invasion which was to come with summer. The French assembled their fleet and sailed along the south coast of England, where Henry waited at the head of an army of perhaps 100,000 men. But after blundering along the seaboard during July 1545 the French retreated, lucky not to have been trapped by the English army.

Henry's affairs in 1544 ended in stark contrast to the situation in 1513. His terrible raid into Scotland had failed to subdue the north, probably serving merely to harden resistance. The capture of Boulogne meant that another important harbour fortress had been gained in France, but its retention was at the cost of constant vigilance and a continual supply of men and money from a realm that was going bankrupt. The army of 1544 broke up at the end of the season, demonstrating the inability of English organisation to maintain such a large force abroad. In any case it had proved inadequate for the conquest of French territory, having to be hastily reinforced by shire levies during the siege of Boulogne.

His army in dire straits, his realm in financial difficulty, Henry was once more alone and besieged, without the comfort of the many triumphs of 1513.

This, briefly, was the framework of events in which occurred the noble behaviour described in the following chapters.
CHAPTER TWO

THE MILITARY ELITE

i. Numbers and Types of Nobles.

The nobility, England's military elite, was the mainstay of the English army during the early sixteenth century, not only in terms of filling the higher echelons of command, but also in supplying the bulk of the troops for the army, and making important personal contributions by joining in hand to hand combat.

The nobility was composed of families which were regarded by themselves, by their subordinates and by the king as being above the common run, or which were given some formal mark of recognition as noble. The latter category included people who were described merely as gentlemen (in itself a vague term not always confined to the lower nobles), but who had been given the right to a coat of arms by the College of Heralds, an institution revived by Henry. The former category was much less definite in its limits. People recognised as noble could be distinguished in a variety of ways, even amongst the highest levels of nobility, the peerage. It had not been clearly established at this time, for example, on what grounds a noble should be able to claim the rank of peer.¹ As during the past five centuries, not all the peers of England were accorded their position by a royal act, nor could nobles always be recognised as peers because they were separately summoned to parliament. People who were thought to be both noble and peers were frequently addressed as "lord",

as signifying a peer, even though they had never been summoned or created, such as the sons of the Earl of Surrey in 1513, Thomas, Edward and Edmund Howard, or their contemporary John Grey, brother of the Marquis of Dorset. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain a broad idea of who was noble and who held which rank from the examination of documents such as subsidy returns and lists of summonses to parliament. The peerage is somewhat more clearly defined than some other groups because the names of the same people tend to recur over lengthy periods in lists of summonses, and a general stability amongst the highest level of the nobility is shown by a comparison of numbers of peers from the beginning and end of the reign. Summonses were sent to one duke in 1511, as well as one marquis, nine earls and 25 barons, whereas in 1542, the chancellor, himself a baron, summoned to parliament two dukes, one marquis, 14 earls, one viscount and 26 barons.

Below the peers, or as they were known to contemporaries, the major nobles, were the minor nobles, a group now often described as the gentry. At the head of this body were the knights, and below them the squires. These two ranks, and the knights in particular, were distinguished from the mere gentlemen by their wealth in property and money, and, as will be shown below, by their military strength. A study of the gentry of the 1520's has shown a clear gap between the wealth of the knights, squires and armigerous gentlemen. At the same time, this study, by J. Cornwall, indicates that the nobles

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1. For the sake of simplicity, only those summoned or created have been recognised as peers for the purposes of this thesis.

2. W. Dugdale, *A Perfect Copy of All Summons of the Nobility to the Great Councils and Parliaments of this Realm from the xlix of King Henry IIIId Until These Present Times* (London, 1685), passim.
as a whole made up less than about 2 1/2 per cent of the population. Their group was even smaller, about 2 per cent, if wealthy merchants were not classed as nobles, as they were in some areas.¹

Contemporaries made an objective distinction between the nobles and the rest of the population according to the wealth, functions and appearance of the elite. Nobles were distinguished by sumptuary laws which tried to govern with precise detail the types of clothing and food to which each rank was entitled, as well as the place and form of entertainment permitted to each rank. That there was a need to pass such laws indicates that people who were considered to be other than noble may have been assuming the appearance of a noble, but this does not obviate the fact that a man who wore a certain costume, ate food of high quality and who amused himself at aristocratic pastimes would be recognised by a contemporary as a noble.²

Because they were a military as well as a civilian elite, nobles were also distinguished by their military attributes. During the early sixteenth century English society was still largely although not exclusively categorised according to the traditional functions of the three estates: praying, fighting and working. An Italian visitor noted that

There are three estates in England, the popular, the military and the ecclesiastical. The people are held


in little more esteem than if they were slaves.
The military branch is employed in time of war in mustering troops.¹

The military elite, the nobles, were also recognised by official documents, such as the laws which distinguished the graduations of society according to the individual's ability to provide warhorses, an estimate based on the economic standing displayed by the appearance of the noble or his family. A wife, for example, who wore a silk gown, a French hat, a velvet bonnet or golden ornaments obliged her husband, as a gentleman, to maintain one good horse for war service.²

Horses were a living symbol of the power of the military elite, and they indicated the status of the owner in the military elite, as people of the time were quite aware. The English ambassador, Nicholas Wotton, for instance, in his description of the arrival of German nobles at the Diet of Spires in 1544 assessed the lords according to the number and quality of their warhorses, particularly noting the Landgrave of Hesse, whose horsemen were "...warlike appointed with spears and guns at their saddlebows..."³

When Sir Nicholas Vaux went to take up his post as commander of the fortress of Guisnes, an essential aspect of his display of office was a train of 40 horses decorated with scarlet cloth.⁴ Holinshed's obituary of the old soldier and

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2. TRP. 33 H.VIII 5.

3. L.P. XIX, i (125).

Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, Sir Thomas Cheyne, gave mention before anything else to the maintenance by Cheyne during the last 20 years of his life 20 chargers and about 24 geldings, all with complete war harness, all kept ready about his stables and grounds for use by men at arms.¹

And when arrangements were being made for meeting Charles V in 1522, the organisers considered it necessary that King Henry should be

...in the most honorable maner appointed with horses, apparell and folowers, as to his estate and royall dignitie apperteyneth...²

The nobles were a body recognised by contemporaries as the dominant military group. This dominance was embodied in legislation and noted in descriptions of society. The terms in which legislation was framed, as in the case of providing warhorses, reflected the reality whereby the nobles were the group which was most likely to have such animals, partly because the nobles announced to all their rank and function by the possession of such animals.


ii. The Continuing Stability of the Noble Class.

It would appear that there was little substantial change in the structure of the nobility during the 1513-1544 period, at least amongst ranks above the armigerous gentlemen.

A thorough statistical analysis of the early Tudor nobility by H. Miller has shown that despite the effects of the civil wars and the Reformation there was a basic stability about the nobility at the more prestigious level of the group. The total number of peers did not vary greatly throughout the period from 1485 to 1547. There was a rapid turnover of titles, but this was no greater than for most other eras - less in fact than for some other times - and was due mainly to factors outside the control of any monarch bent on destroying the greater nobility. That is to say, the 33 per cent extinction rate of peers' families occurred largely because of their biological inability to provide a male heir. This was the most important reason for the failure of noble families. The use of attainder to extinguish such families was only of secondary importance, and was applied by Henry VIII at an intensive level for only a brief part of his reign, only to the more influential peers, and often, as in the case of Cromwell and Anne Boleyn's brother, to men newly recruited to the peerage. Almost without exception, elevation to the peerage for these new men was due to service to the Crown either in administration or military duties, and frequently in both. This will be shown to be a common pattern of reward for the nobility as a whole, for clerics as well as temporal lords. Wolsey, the most eminent spiritual peer of his time, came to prominence initially because of his work during the 1513 war.¹

The point should also be made that a great many of the new peers of the early Tudor era can be identified as members of Henry's intimate circle of courtiers, soldiers, servants and jousting partners. This circle included men such as Charles Brandon; William Fitzwilliam Earl of Southampton and Admiral of England; John Lord Russell, Lord Privy Seal and later Earl of Bedford; Henry Lord Marney; William Lord Eure; Nicholas Lord Vaux; Maurice Lord Barkley; and William Lord Sands. Numerous mentions will be made of such men and their importance in Tudor war.

Amongst the lower ranks of the nobility there does appear to have been some change, even amongst the knights and squires. There was a considerable increase in numbers, not only amongst the newly rich families who wanted to improve their status by acquiring arms, but also at the middle level, where many squires and important gentlemen became knights. There was a large increase in the absolute number of knights at this time as an accompaniment to the greater involvement in war during Henry's reign as compared to his father's. Before Henry's first venture into war in person there were 200 or more knights in England. About 200 knights were created during the years 1512-3, which would indicate that in 1513 and the years immediately afterward Henry would have had well over 400 knights in his realm, as the figure of 209 knights alive before 1513 is only a minimum, and does not include, for example, the peers, most of whom were knighted. Even if only the minimum figure is considered, the total is still larger than the estimated 375 knights of 1490 or the 250 knights counted for 1439.

1. Appendix A.
2. Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p.71. These figures also correspond with those of H.H. Leonard, "Knights and Knighthood in Tudor England", (Ph.D., London, 1970), pp.94-6, who estimates that there were between 220 and 258 knights in 1500, whereas by 1523 there were 336 and, by 1550, 539.
During the early sixteenth century, as in earlier times, there were considerable fluctuations in the size of the knightly group. The number of knights depended on factors such as the king's enthusiasm to wage war, for which he needed knights and where there was the greatest opportunity for knights to be created. Other influences were the frequency of ceremonial occasions such as royal births and marriages, or plagues and other events which could increase or decrease numbers.

The only factor which did remain constant was that the knights continued to play a role in warfare of an importance out of all proportion to their size as a group in society. The knights, as a body, were always an infinitesimal part of the populace, even during the earlier middle ages. In fact, the knights may have increased as a percentage of the population during the early sixteenth century as compared to the years immediately before 1349, when plague had not yet drastically reduced the population. This can only be a vague estimate, however, because of the unreliability of figures for population totals. The population of early sixteenth century England has been estimated at between two and three million. A knighthood of, at the outside, about 500 in 1513-4 would thus have represented .025 per cent of the minimum population. The fourteenth century population, in contrast, could have been between four and six million, while the knights living in 1324 were about 1,250, or .021 per cent of a population of six million. Even if the lower estimate of fourteenth century population is used, there is no substantial difference in the relative sizes of the knightly group as a proportion of society.¹

Considering the tiny size of their coterie in relation to the number of men that they raised for war, the numbers of their group who held high positions in the army, and the number of them who served personally as soldiers, their importance as a military body is remarkable, although it has been overlooked by most historians of the knights and the sixteenth century.¹

The recognised functions of the knights were not confined simply to wartime activities, however, as they also led the community in areas such as the administration of justice and, as will be examined in more detail later, other aspects of royal government.

This, in general terms, was the ruling elite of early sixteenth century England. To use the jargon which was employed by Janowitz in his definition of an aristocratic military elite, the civilian and military elites were socially and functionally integrated, and they shared a narrow base of recruitment, while the low specialisation of the military profession at the time - which will be described more fully in subsequent chapters - made it possible for the political or civilian elite to supply the bulk of the military establishment's leadership. This applied to the spiritual nobles as well as the lay nobles. English bishops, abbots and priests did not usually don armour and fight in the front ranks, as did their Scottish counterparts - although the Abbot of Vale Royal did lead 300 of his tenants to fight at Flodden - but they were nonetheless a major part of the military aristocracy. The more eminent spiritual peers were most likely to be the relatives of temporal lords, and

¹ Leonard, "Knights and Knighthood in Tudor England", for example, operates from the premise that the military duties of knights were moribund by the sixteenth century.
churchmen such as Wolsey aped the noble life style with large retinues of gentlemen, and lavish hospitality. Great men such as the Bishop of Durham held key fortresses in their possession and were responsible for the defence of their sees. Especially in 1513, and to a slightly lesser extent in 1544, they controlled many of the major court military posts, and when the king invaded France men such as the Bishop of Winchester raised retinues which they personally led overseas. James Stanley, a member of the Earl of Derby's family, and Bishop of Ely, despatched 1,800 liveried tenants to join Surrey's army at Flodden. The dominance of the nobility in war was made even more complete by such an identity of interest between the clergy and the noble laymen.

The nobility of which the great churchmen formed a part was a flourishing group within Tudor society, their ranks tending to swell rather than to shrink under the rule of Henry. They were a military body which was recognised and defined as such, and which dominated decision making and administrative positions at both a national and a regional level through their prerogatives of wealth, both landed and monetary, and of government. They dominated the military world for similar reasons, as will be shown.

There was thus a continuity between the two areas in which the nobles moved, that is, in civilian life and military life. The following sections indicate some of the ways in which the civilian and military lifestyles of the nobility impinged on one another.

The education of the nobility seems to have fostered, or at least not to have discouraged, an interest in military careers and in acquiring honour through war service.

The quality and effect of the education of the English nobility of the sixteenth century has been fervently debated by recent historians, just as it was by sixteenth century theorists. The argument largely revolves around whether the influence of humanism helped create a new ideal for the nobility in which a literary career was seen to be as much a characteristic of a member of the elite as was a military life. The humanists were themselves quite forceful about the need for England to create a populace which was more educated, as it was only in this way, they believed, that a moral resurgence could be created in the community. They were highly critical of the time spent by nobles on their traditional peacetime pursuits such as hunting, gambling and brawling, and they also attacked the emphasis currently placed on skill at arms in noble education.

This view was shared by people outside the humanist circle, such as the king's minister, Edmund Dudley, who warned that the children of poor and ignoble men were gaining office at court because "...the noble men and gentlemen of England be the worst brough up for the moste parte of any realme...".

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It is difficult to discern whether the urging of reformers had a significant effect at this time on broadening the horizons of nobles, and hence of turning them away from military pursuits. The reformers certainly claimed that they were successful. Erasmus praised More in 1521 as the man who had done more than any other to make nobles think their children unfit for their rank unless they were well educated. But according to Hexter's analysis, nobles did not begin to attend places of higher education in larger numbers until the second half of the century, and then the increase was mainly during Elizabeth's reign. Of a sample of 50 old Etonian M.P.'s of the period 1444 to 1600, only 10 were educated before 1544.

Perhaps of greatest significance was the dismal failure of the main aim of the humanists in encouraging noble education. As Erasmus claimed, the first and principal task of educating a prince was to render the arts of war forever unnecessary by teaching him wise government. If this was the great ambition of the humanists for king and nobles then it was markedly unsuccessful, because there was not a decade of Henry's reign which was not affected by war, and the elite as a whole showed no signs of abandoning its military lifestyle.

1. L.P. III, ii (1527).

2. Hexter, "The Education of the Aristocracy", p.6. As Hexter points out, criticism of the illiteracy of the nobility was a centuries old custom. The influence of the humanists may have been exaggerated also, as it may actually have been the involvement in war which fostered some interest in education. Thomas Howard claimed as early as 1513 that he was improving his writing skills so that he could write his own reports as Admiral. L.P.I (4076).

There are also reasons for believing that even though some people may have observed the form of the humanist aim for better education, in practice a classically based education did little to divert the interest of the rising generation from hunting, the main noble peacetime interest - known as "little war" because it was considered good practice for warriors - or from an interest in war in general. Even though a young noble might be from a family sufficiently impressed by More and his fellows to give him an education according to humanist precepts, this did not necessarily mean that the inculcation of classical learning was the main outcome of that education, or that learning as such was pursued with any seriousness. This was the experience of Henry's own son, the Duke of Richmond. He was heir to the throne, he was the son of a ruler who prided himself on his own learning and who kept humanists at court, and his education was under the supervision of Thomas Wolsey, whose first step in public life had been his successful education at Oxford of three sons of the Marquis of Dorset. But Fitzroy's education, at least during the time of his progress to take up a post as Lieutenant of the North, was one blighted by idleness, poor supervision, and extra-curricula activities. His tutor, Richard Croke, recorded a long battle to ensure a satisfactory education for the heir. Croke complained to Wolsey that although Fitzroy had progressed satisfactorily until the age of eight - when he could freely translate Caesar - his studies were now disturbed by the boy's usher, George Cotton. Cotton was said to deliberately show enmity to the boy's studies, particularly Latin, and constantly cancelled lessons so that the boy could go outdoors with his companions, mainly to hunt. Cotton would not let Fitzroy rise at six o'clock, nor allow him to learn anything at all before mass. He put aside virtually the whole schedule of

lessons throughout summer, and opposed the Cardinal's will by protecting the boy and his fellows from punishment and by letting them have fools, players and bawdy ballad singers in their bedrooms. The only time when Cotton allowed the boy to do his lessons was when it was late or the child was tired. One of the reasons why the boy was tired was that Croke frequently interrupted his regimen to make him practice archery. If Croke tried to correct Fitzroy by admonishing him, Cotton interfered and abused the tutor.

This catalogue of complaints accords with the criticisms of humanists rather than with their highest precepts, and, in its emphasis on outdoor, military activity seems to have foreshadowed a soldier's life for the heir, who was at the time on his way to assume one of the most important military offices in the kingdom, if only nominally. As it happened, Cotton eventually won control of the heir's education, so there was no likelihood of much change.¹

A youthful companion of Fitzroy was Henry Howard, son of Thomas Howard. Henry was educated by scholars such as John Leland and John Skelton. He wrote poetry and built a classically styled mansion. But he grew up to be a brawler and a hawkish courtier. His poems in themselves often reflect an interest in life which was widely separated from the desires of humanists. The vision of childhood in one of his

poems did not dwell on schoooroom Latin, but on dalliance, dancing, sport and the tilting ground, which he claimed as the main interests of his youth.

The Gravel-Ground, with sleeves tyde on the helm, On foaming horse, with swords and friendly hearts, With chere as though one should another whelm, Where we have fought, and chased oft with darts.  

The influence of humanists and other advocates of reform in turning the nobles from war should not be over-emphasised, as Ferguson admits. Even the humanists themselves were not averse to sharing in the fruits of war. Sir Richard Pace, for example, was a humanist, but he was also Henry's representative in negotiations for continental mercenaries, and even took part in Maximilian's invasion of Italy. Humanists were the friends and servants of military men such as Lord Mountjoy, governor of Tournai, and Thomas More himself wrote an epistle in praise of Henry's capture of that city in 1513.

Humanist education thus does not seem to have had a pacifying effect on the young Tudor nobles. In fact, their youth, with its emphasis on hunting, archery and tilting, seems to have been largely a preparation for a life of war. This emphasis was also reflected in the literary tastes of the adult nobles. The only two books recorded amongst the personal property of Edward Seymour Earl of Hertford in the late 1530's, for example, were a copy of Froissart's Chronicles, and the Bible.

1. Inventory of Fitzroy, p.lxiv.
There were few avenues of public employment open to a noble apart from the army, or, if he did go to court, in royal offices that were frequently connected with war.

The major nobles in particular tended to congregate at court, where they served as privy councillors, lords of the privy seal, chancellors, treasurers, ambassadors, tournament marshals (a duty performed by the Earl of Northumberland at the Field of Cloth of Gold), regional commanders such as Wardens of the Marches, castellans and as administrators of the king's properties. As well as the posts that had a recognised and formalised degree of influence attached to them, as in the case of a chancellorship, there was also a network of important but ostensibly unofficial places at the court, as favourites of the king. These nobles can often be identified because they held sinecures during peacetime and important military offices during war, as in the case of William Compton, who was given the wages and profits of a groom of the counting house during the early years of the reign, and became a leading figure during the 1513 war.¹ Men such as Compton were the constant companions of the king in both peace and war, wielding power far above their rank and origins. One of them, Charles Brandon, who had only recently risen from relative obscurity to the status of Viscount Lisle, was described as a "second king" during the 1513 war, and Margaret of Savoy was advised to establish good relations with him because it was he who did and undid everything in the English army.²

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2. L.P. I (4386), (4405).
The coincidence between nobility, the holding of court office, and control of the army, was perhaps never closer than during Henry's reign. For the secular nobles, this was particularly the case during the 1544 war when clerics such as Wolsey had been largely displaced from the highest offices. It was through such official channels, as well as through favourites, that royal authority was put into practice. The same men who advised the king in peace-time about the advantages or disadvantages of going to war were the commanders who led his armies when his mind was made up. Successive lords of the privy seal, for example, were William Fitzwilliam, Admiral of England (1540-42) and John Lord Russell, who helped lead the vanguard in 1544 (1542-55). Russell's fellow leader of the 1544 vanguard was the Treasurer, Thomas Duke of Norfolk (1522-47), a post he took over from his father, while the Chancellor in 1544 was Thomas Lord Wriothesley, who had helped negotiate the terms of the 1544 war. Sir John Gage, who had been promoted to captain of the castle of Calais for bravery at Therouanne, was Comptroller of the Household in 1544, and the Lord Chamberlain of the Household, William Paulet Lord St. John, led a retinue of 400 men to France in that year.

The supremacy of the nobles was thus all but unchallenged in the military sphere. As is shown below, they not only supplied most of the soldiers for the wars, but they also had exclusive control of the highest echelons of command in the army, and, to a large extent, at court.

Despite the influence of some favourites, the rank which a noble held in the army was mainly, although not exclusively, dependent on his civilian rank. There were exceptions to the practice of allotting posts according to the social rank of the recipient. Brandon's power in 1513 was out of proportion to his title, although, when he was again supreme commander under the king in 1544, his rank and title - Duke of Suffolk - were evenly matched. Amongst the middle
ranks of officers the system was less clearly manifested. Many officers, such as Arthur Plantagenet (later Lord Lisle) and William Fitzwilliam, had not even been knighted when they took command of ships during the 1513 Channel war. And in 1543 a mere knight was given command of an English army in the war with France, although it was a small army and he was one of the most experienced soldiers in the kingdom and former ambassador to Paris, Sir John Wallop. In 1511 Sir Edward Poynings had led a similarly small army of 1,500 archers to serve in the Netherlands. But in 1521, when an army of 6,000 archers and many gentlemen was to be sent to France, Henry ruled that Sir William Sandys— one of his favourites and soon afterwards made Lord Sandys— was not an appropriate leader. Honour demanded, said the king, that no less than an earl should command such an army, and besides, no other knights would serve under a knight commander, even though he had the Garter, the highest English order of knighthood. Sandys was replaced as leader by Henry Bourchier Earl of Essex. Peers and the members of peers' families thus dominated the highest military positions. The same Earl of Essex had commanded the King's Spears in 1513, while members of the Howard family had variously held many of the key military posts in 1513 where the king was not personally present. The father of the family, Thomas Earl of Surrey, had led the army against the Scots, having been left in charge of the defence of the realm. His sons Thomas and Edmund led divisions of the army under him, Thomas having charge of the vanguard. Before the battle of Flodden, Thomas had succeeded his late brother Edward as Admiral of the royal fleet. Members of the family had therefore been in immediate command of English forces in two out of the three main areas of conflict in 1513.

Nobles, whether they were men of military background through family tradition or personal inclination, were advanced in their careers and in apparent royal favour by their services in war, or else they were penalised if they did not perform their military obligations to the king's satisfaction. Some 24 knights are recorded to have personally led their retinues to France in 1513 as part of the King's Ward. All were at that time servants of the Crown in some capacity, even though some of their offices may have been mere sinecures. Of these 24 knights, more than half were rewarded during the expedition by being elevated to the rank of knight banneret. And of 27 gentlemen who led their retinues in the King's Ward, 18 were knighted and one, Wolsey, was made Bishop of Tournai and Lincoln. At least 12 of the 27 held court office when they went on the expedition.¹

Such figures indicate that there was a direct connection between a career at court, participation in warfare, and worldly success. The effect of this nexus was most impressive when the careers of great nobles and intimate favourites were involved. The Earl of Surrey became Duke of Norfolk with an augmentation to his crest of the arms of Scotland as a reward for victory at Flodden; Charles Brandon became Duke of Suffolk at the end of the 1513 expedition; the younger Thomas Howard succeeded his father as Earl of Surrey; Charles Somerset, one of the divisional commanders in France in 1513, became Earl of Worcester; and Sir Edward Stanley, whom some credit with deciding the outcome at Flodden with his personal daring and leadership, was made Lord Montegle.

Those outside the most fortunate circle of the elite were not forgotten, however, as the king took the trouble to reward all the nobles who had fought at Flodden by writing them individual letters "...wyth suche thankes and favorable words that everye man thought him selfe wel rewarded."²

1. Appendix B.
But refusal to help with war by personal participation, money, men, or an apparent lack of ardour brought anger, suspicion and sometimes much worse on the recalcitrant. One of the few men to refuse war service, a London alderman, Richard Reed, discovered that in 1544 when he would not give financial aid. He was punished by being compelled to raise a band of men at his own cost which he had to lead to the Scottish Marches, where he was to be given the most onerous and dangerous tasks to perform. Henry mercifully took steps to arrange for Reed’s ransom back from the Scots shortly after the alderman began his tour of duty.¹

When punishment was so harsh it is perhaps not remarkable that there were few recorded cases of people refusing military service, and that Reed’s case was a matter of some comment in contemporary chronicles.

Even a great noble’s loyalty was measured by his readiness to supply men for the army and to serve in his own person. A letter was sent to the Earl of Shrewsbury from Brandon in 1544. Earl Francis Talbot was the son of the commander of the 1513 vanguard, but was in semi-retirement because he had failed as a soldier. Yet although he was out of the court round, he was required to supply men for the Scottish invasion. There can be no mistaking the threat barely concealed beneath the official language of the message that ordered him to supply a certain number of men of specified quality, "...and will avoid the contrary thereof at your peril".²


2. Ibid., (xxiii).
The loyalty of the Earls of Cumberland and Westmoreland, two northern nobles who were also currently out of favour at court, was also carefully assessed by Henry's northern deputies during the 1544 campaign against Scotland according to their willingness to serve personally and to send retinues.¹

Personal service when the king went to war was a duty only to be avoided by a royal exemption. The nobles, and especially the peers, flocked to his banner in 1513 and 1544. At least 40 peers went to war in 1513 - 33 to France, 7 to Flodden - while in 1544 a total of 41 are known to have joined the army. Of these peers, 30 went to France and 14 went to Scotland. In addition, a number of children and close relatives of these peers, whom contemporaries could well have regarded as being of the same rank, also served in the wars. Three peers, Hertford, Lisle and Clinton, served both in Scotland and France in 1544. Some 85 per cent of the approximately 47 peers alive in 1513 were therefore involved in war, 70 per cent of them in France. There were about 54 peers in 1544, of whom 76 per cent were soldiers, 55 per cent of them in France. A higher percentage of peers fought in the Scottish expedition in 1544 than were present at Flodden: 25 per cent of the peers went to war in the north in 1544 as compared to 15 per cent who were with Surrey in 1513.²

A high proportion of the peers were apparently willing and able to accompany the king to war.

It is not so easy to be certain about the amount of participation amongst the lesser nobles because of the incompleteness of the records, although it would seem that there was a high involvement in particular categories of the gentry.

1. L.P. XIX, i (283).
2. Appendix F (a) and (b).
A major international event such as the Field of Cloth of Gold could attract 131 knights, over one third of the knights then alive. More than have been recorded were probably present in the followings of the great nobles. Wolsey, for example, had a following of 50 "gentlemen" which could well have included knights.¹

The knights were the most "visible" category amongst the minor nobles, yet even they tend to be obscure in the records of major events such as wars. They often served in the retinues of peers, rather than in their own right, so their names would not always be individually listed. Only 24 knights appear in the surviving details of the King's Ward of 1513, and a further 9 in the vanguard, including one member of Sir Rhys ap Thomas' retinue who happens to be mentioned separately. But is is probable that a number of others were present in either the vanguard, the mid ward or the rearguard.² The elite cavalry body, the King's Spears, for example, would have had knights amongst its members: Sir John Pechy, who has not been counted as a member of the knights of Mid Ward because he was with the Spears, was deputy commander of the elite cavalry.

The army at Flodden had at least another 35 knights in its ranks. The 69 knights known to have been in the 1513 war thus represented about one third of England's approximately 200 knights living in 1513.³


² Appendix B, L.P. I (4253)

The records for the 1544 expedition are slightly more complete. The vanguard is recorded to have had 52 knighted captains of retinues, and about 30 in each of the other two divisions of the army. These figures include the members of the elite cavalry, which was now called the Gentlemen Pensioners. A further 41 knights sent men to join the Scottish invasion, which presumably they led in person. This would make the total number of knights who had some direct form of participation in the 1544 war about 150, or, once again, about one third of a knighthood of between 4-500 men, the usual estimate for the number of living knights at the end of Henry's reign.

Even if only these minimum figures are accepted, the usual rate of participation of one in three by the knights indicates the extent to which they were a group with a high degree of involvement in war.

The interest in war shared by the knights applied not only to men who had founded their careers on military service, but also to those knights whose service had been in administration rather than arms. Cromwell, for example, displayed an interest in war and in the trappings of the military elite's lifestyle. Not only did he make plans to strengthen England's army but he also surrounded himself with his own army and encouraged his son to participate in the military pastimes of the old nobility. He displayed his status as a royal minister and a new noble by parading his army during the 1539 London musters. His gentlemen retainers led 1,000 liveries footmen - gunners, pikemen and bowmen - past the king. And, during the 1544 war, the carpet knight,

1. L.P., XIX i (274), (275), (276).
2. There is no proof that Cromwell was ever a mercenary in Italy before taking up court service.
Sir Richard Riche, who had risen to power through other than military service, not only personally led a large retinue to France, but was active in negotiations with the enemy, and acted as treasurer of the army.

There was no clear distinction at this time between civil servant, soldier and courtier. An educated diplomat could be found leading a charge against the enemy, a hardened warrior might be ambassador to France, and a courtier might be commanding a garrison on the frontiers. In 1513, for example, Thomas Howard the elder, Earl of Surrey, was appointed to conclude leagues of alliance with the ambassadors of Ferdinand. Sir Richard Wingfield, who commanded English expeditionary forces, was also one of Henry's most experienced diplomats on the Continent. Wolsey, who presided over the bureaucratic details of the 1513 war, on one occasion advised Henry on the best tactics when large numbers of archers were on the battlefield.

Warfare was thus very much a noble profession, on which the fortunes of many old families grew, and which was the starting point for the rise of a large number of the new nobles. Some of these have already been mentioned, including the most outstanding of all the new nobles, Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk. Others who were nearly as fortunate were numerous, however, including William Fitzwilliam. He was the son of a Yorkshire knight and the grandson of a marquis, a genealogy which was of sound but clearly second rate status. Fitzwilliam's fortunes really began when he was made a court page - a common form of education for the nobles - and spent his boyhood as one of the heir's companions, or henchmen. He first gained prominence when he served as a King's Spear in the 1513 war, his name frequently occurring in court records. He was wounded while serving with the fleet, and was afterwards granted the office of Squire of the Body, together with grants of land such as a manor forfeited by Lord Lovell. Fitzwilliam was knighted at Tournai, and on his return home became a sheriff. After this initial rise through the court ranks he continued in

2. S.P. I (xxii).
long service to the Crown, holding many important posts in later years, culminating in the offices of Admiral of England and Lord Privy Seal, as well as the title of Earl of Southampton. He was one of England's wealthiest men at the time of his death.¹

A nearly parallel life was that of William Compton, who had beginnings which were more humble than those of Fitzwilliam. Compton was a ward of Henry VII. He also became a page at court, and a friend of the heir. When Henry VIII was crowned, Compton became in rapid succession groom of the bedchamber, chief gentleman of the bedchamber, and castellan of a number of fortresses. He was given an honourable augmentation in 1512, and, having taken a leading part in the 1513 expedition, was knighted in France. He briefly held the post of Chancellor of Ireland after his return to England, he attended the celebrations at the Field of Cloth of Gold, he fought in the 1523 Scottish campaign, and died a wealthy man in 1528. Compton was one of the prominent tourneymen of Henry's court as well as a successful soldier, as was the greatest of this type of noble, Brandon.²

Brandon's origins were better than either Compton's or Fitzwilliam's, yet still relatively minor. His father William, Henry VII's standard bearer, had been killed at Bosworth by Richard III. The fatherless child was raised with the new king's children. He achieved early prominence at court as a jouster, and, as mentioned, was a "second king" by 1513. His rise to power may also have been helped by the network of family alliances which were common at court. Not only did the Tudor dynasty have much to thank his father for, but his uncle, Sir Thomas Brandon, was Marshal of the King's Bench. When Sir Thomas died in 1510, Charles took over the perquisites of his office. Brandon became Marshal of the

Household in 1511, and in 1512 became both a Knight of the Body and Viscount Lisle. The latter was a title obtained by one of several quasi-marriages which he went through. These marriages were sufficient to gain him a title or a dowry, but were easily annulled because of their irregular form. Charles received his dukedom on his return from the 1513 expedition for his service as commander of the army under Henry and for his negotiations with the Regent of the Netherlands for a new invasion in 1514. The new war did not eventuate: instead Brandon once more distinguished himself by leading 15 other nobles in a jousting team at the celebrations of the wedding of Henry's sister Mary to King Louis. Brandon shortly afterwards took advantage of the king's death to marry the widowed French queen, a bold step which capped him comet-like career, and which demonstrated that the warrior duke had obtained a position from which he could weather the outrage of the established nobility and the displeasure of the king.

The remainder of his life was relatively subdued. He continued as one of the kingdom's greatest men and as the king's trusted servant. He led many other military ventures, arranging the defence against Scotland in the 1540's and leading the army to France and the victory at Boulogne in 1544.¹

The careers of many other such courtiers consistently demonstrate the intimate connection between military service and success at court, though rarely in such an outstanding manner.

As mentioned, military service and royal service was a family matter for the nobles. Sons accompanied their fathers to war or court, and sometimes succeeded them in their offices, or even mounted to higher positions from the groundwork.

¹ D.N.B., entry for Brandon, II, pp.1126-30.
prepared by their fathers. In the case of some of the older families, war service was a family tradition. The Earls of Shrewsbury, for example, were amongst the most prominent members of the military elite. Their family name, Talbot, had become familiar to the French during the Hundred Years War. As the Venetian ambassador noted in 1512, Shrewsbury, the leader of the vanguard, was a man of ancient and noble family whose name was used until this day by French mothers to frighten their children. The hereditary right to command the vanguard was lost by Shrewsbury's son because of his lack of martial qualities.¹

A son who mounted higher on the services performed by his father for the Crown was Thomas Lord Poynings. Thomas was the illegitimate issue of one of the most experienced soldiers and diplomats of the reign, Sir Edward Poynings. Thomas was raised at court, where he held minor posts while his father served in Henry's wars. When he was an adult, Thomas distinguished himself as a soldier, particularly during the 1544 campaign. A grudging contemporary critic, and an experienced soldier, Ellis Gruffydd, praised him as the best English soldier, saving the king.² Poynings commanded Boulogne for a time after its fall, and received a title as a reward for his service shortly before his death in early 1545.

Family ties such as these were an important element in court life, another of those informal networks which cemented the elite as a group, and through which its members could exert influence. At the same time, it could be a source of disruption,

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1. V.P. II (185).

2. E.Gruffydd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne. A Contemporary Narrative", ed.M.B.Davies Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I University XI (May 1949), pp.10-11. Hereunder as Gruffydd, ii. Gruffydd participated in a number of Tudor military ventures. He later wrote a chronicle which is the most extensive contemporary account surviving.
however, because of the faction fighting between the great families, as is shown in subsequent chapters.

The gentlemen who supplied the backbone of the army were joined by a tangle of family alliances. Nicholas Lord Vaux, for instance, was related not only to the family of the Lord Warden, the Cheynes, but to another prominent military and diplomatic family, the Guildfords.¹ These kinds of alliances are also shown in the records of the 1513 army. At least 12 of the 46 captains of companies in the vanguards had sons or brothers as their deputies, and a number had close relatives serving elsewhere in the army. One of the captains, Sir Gilbert Talbot, was the son of the Governor of Calais.² The Earl of Northumberland, who served in France, had a brother, Sir William Percy who commanded a division of the Flodden army. In another section of Surrey’s army the commander was Sir Marmaduke Constable, who led a retinue that included his sons and kinsmen. One of these sons was knighted after the battle.³

There are also instances where sons succeeded fathers in some military post. Sir Thomas Wyndham, treasurer of the 1513 army, privy councillor and vice-admiral, was succeeded by his son as vice-admiral. Sir Thomas’s own father, Sir John, had been knighted in 1487 for bravery at the battle of Stoke.⁴

Apart from this type of family tradition, there were numerous other families where members were virtually all soldiers. One of Henry’s prominent soldiers was Sir Edward Hungerford. He was the son of Lord Hungerford, who, together

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1. Anstruther, Vaux of Harrowden, pp.3-37, passim.
2. L.P. I (4253).
with Edward's brothers Sir Thomas and Sir Walter, had fought in the civil wars, Sir Walter having been knighted on the battlefield by Henry VII.\(^1\) The Carew family was similarly active in Henry's wars. Sir Edmund, Lord Carew, was killed during the siege of Therouanne. His father was Lord Carew of Devon, whose barony and castle of Carew happened to be leased to one of the greatest of Henry's soldiers, Sir Rhys ap Thomas. Sir Edmund had been knighted at Bosworth: he is said to have appeared at the funeral of the Earl of Devon in 1511 in full armour, riding his charger up the nave of Exeter cathedral to present the dead earl's battle axe to the bishop. A cousin of Sir Edmund, Sir Richard Carew, also served on the 1513 expedition, together with Sir Richard's son Sir Nicholas.\(^2\)

The nobles were aware of and indeed proud of such family involvement in war, as was shown by William Fitzwilliam, who enjoyed a complex and extensive set of family relationships. His widowed mother had married Sir Anthony Browne, Master of the Horse and standard bearer to Henry VIII. Amongst his relatives through the Browne connection was Thomas Cheyne, Lord Warden and treasurer to Norfolk in 1544. Fitzwilliam was apparently very conscious of these military family connections. His manor at Cowdray - destroyed in the eighteenth century - was decorated with large paintings of his relatives and ancestors, many of whom were shown in martial costume, as well as his own exploits in the wars such as the raid on Treport in the 1520's. Many of these paintings carried Fitzwilliam's own descriptions of the people and events. One picture was of his brothers John and Thomas Fitzwilliam, who were killed at Flodden. Both were painted in armour, one killed by a spear, the other by a sword, and underneath Fitzwilliam had written: "In doing their duty against the Scots".\(^3\)

2. Ibid., III, pp.958-9, 965-8.
3. Gentleman's Magazine LXIII, ii, pp.996-9. The paintings were said to have been by Holbein, and included depictions of the death of Edward Howard, at which Fitzwilliam was present, fighting at Spurs and Tournai, meetings with Francis and Charles which Fitzwilliam attended, and Suffolk's expeditions to France.
These family histories and the biographies of some eminent soldiers have been quoted in some detail in order to show the similarities between the careers of many nobles who were in the forefront of court and military activities in 1513 and 1544. Men such as Fitzwilliam, Sir John Wallop, Sir John Russell, Sir Richard Pace, Sir Thomas Wriothesley, Sir Thomas Cheyne, Sir John Gage, Sir Anthony Denny, Sir John Audley, and Fitzwilliam's step-brother Sir Anthony Browne, combined many abilities in order to rise through court ranks, but most frequently their success was due to three main factors. These were that they were often favourites; they assisted in the king's divorce and its aftermath; and they were servants, as soldiers, diplomats and administrators. Often, as in the case of Brandon, there was a combination of all three elements in their rise to power and the maintenance of their eminence.

The nobles were a group which shared an interest in the military profession. Service to the king in war was a major avenue to advancement, and was something which was expected of them as nobles. This service was often a matter of family tradition amongst the nobles, and was something in which they took pride. At the same time, a particular group within the elite took an especially heavy responsibility in warfare, particularly in providing troops, a responsibility which was out of all proportions to their numbers. This was the knights, as a group distinct from the knighted peers.

The common histories of traditional family military service, of a rise to power through soldiering, and of the network of alliances that ran through the upper echelons of the army, suggests several things about the nobility. The primary implication is that for such men participation in war was likely to be a personal or a family matter, as much as it was service to their country. Not only was the warfare between nations whose armies were led by elite family groups still likely to be seen in personal terms, but such warfare was also often a field of action in which individuals could be seen to search for personal honour for themselves, or for renown to add to the prestige of their families. The ramifications of both these considerations will be considered more fully in the final chapter.
v. Rewards.

The courtier noble could hope to build a substantial public career through service in the king’s wars. For such a man, the great expenditure involved in performing such duties could be recouped through wages and other sources of financial reward. But a number of nobles were never greatly involved with court life and public careers, including great peers such as the Percies of Northumberland, yet they too participated in the wars. What could such nobles hope to gain by their huge outlays of time and money on the wars?

Not only did a noble have to provide lodgings for himself and his servants in a style suitable to his status, but he also often had to equip his men, not to mention provide himself with elaborate suits of armour. And at the same time, he was sometimes presented with peremptory demands for war subsidies when other revenue sources were used up. The records of a sheriff of Norfolk, Sir Thomas Lestrange of Hunstanton, for example, indicates the demands on time and finances that could result from a royal expedition. Sir Thomas, husband of the daughter of Lord Vaux, was by no means prominent in court records. His accounts indicate that he divided his time between hunting, entertaining his social equals, and attending assizes. But his normal round was interrupted in 1520 when he was required to make several trips to London, apparently in preparation for the forthcoming journey to the Field of Cloth of Gold. He spent a total of five weeks in London at an average weekly accommodation bill of £1/2/2, during which time he made many purchases. These centred mainly on buying materials to enhance the appearance of himself and his entourage, including items such as cloth of gold, crimson velvet for horse harness, saddles, bridles and ornaments. These cost him at least £11, or more than a year’s wages for a common soldier.¹

It was rumoured that some peers, including the Percies, bankrupted themselves and placed their estates in pledge in order to attend this meeting of Henry and Francis, although this belief has recently been questioned by Bean's analysis of the Percy accounts.¹

The Field of Cloth of Gold involved heavy expenditure on the trappings of rank by the nobles, but, as shown in Chapter Six, it was by no means untypical of the costs placed on the nobles by the style of their behaviour in such expeditions.

Except for a select few who might be fortunate enough to collect a substantial ransom through war service, to gather substantial plunder or be remunerated by a practical sign of royal gratitude, official wages from military ventures are unlikely to have been large. The Admiral of England, Edward Howard, for example, was paid the substantial bonus of £66/13/4 for his participation in the sea battles of 1512. But most of the money would probably have passed through his hands, as the usual practice with bonuses, or regards, paid to a noble was to divide them up amongst his subordinates.²

The regular salary of officers was by no means generous in the majority of cases. The governor of Tournai, Sir Edward Poynings, was paid a comparatively large wage of £6/13/4 per day - about £2,400 a year - when he was appointed in 1513, but as a senior officer he was expected to entertain his fellow officers lavishly, and supplement the rations of his soldiers. And in the case of financial stringency, such wages could be cut arbitrarily, as his successor, Lord Mountjoy, discovered when his wage was cut to £1/16/6½ per day.


2. N.R.S. (42); cf. indentures which contain provision for the passing on of regards by officers, L.P. I (4635).
A noble who was simply the captain of a retinue received a standard wage which does not seem to have been sufficient in itself to justify his going to war. Sir Robert Willoughby, Lord Broke, for example, was paid only 6/8d per day in 1513, scarcely a handsome remuneration compared to 4/- per day for his captains, or even 2/- per day for his petty captains. This wage represented a monthly income to Lord Broke of only £8/8/-, at a time when the mean income from land revenue alone for a peer would have been over £100 per month.

Participation in war must have had other attractions than the hope of a steady wage for the noble, considering the costs and effort involved. Two such attractions suggest themselves. These incentives may seem, at first sight, antithetical, as one is the sense of duty, honour and family tradition which has already been mentioned, while the other is the opportunity which the army presented for large scale peculation. But although these motives may seem contradictory, it is not necessarily the case that they would have appeared to be so to the nobles. After all, for many of them, military service was a career from which they might gain riches, wealth which it was obvious would not be forthcoming from mere salaries. And, as nobles, the perquisites of office were theirs by right, even if it meant somewhat irregular dealings. This was the kind of mixture of attitudes voiced by Viscount Lisle, John Dudley, when replying to the offer of a post at Boulogne in 1544. He appears to have regarded the office as a sinecure appropriate to his rank in the army. He demanded that he should retain the appurtenances of his existing duty as Admiral, "...for it is an office of honor, of estimation and profit...", and that as a sign of his rank he should be allowed to keep 50 horsemen and 50 footmen in his service, in addition to the 400 footmen actually necessary for his post.

1. L.P. I (4070).
2. Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p.762, has calculated the mid-century monthly land revenue for a peer at £177.
Apart from these privileges, he wished to have arable land, pasture, mead and woods to provide for his household, as well as his choice of captured sporting lodges for gentlemen, as sites for his recreation. He also wanted to be appointed steward and master of the game, and to have provisions for his household shipped from Calais custom free. 1

Gruffydd was highly critical of the English nobles such as Dudley who garrisoned Boulogne during the 1540's because they blatantly profiteered from their offices. Goods shipped custom free, for example, could be resold to the troops at a handsome profit. 2

The former attitude, the sense of honour and duty, is perhaps best embodied in a letter from Fitzwilliam written when he was Admiral. He wrote to court in 1522 that he would serve the king in the current strife with France for no wages at all, or for whatever the king wished to pay him, apparently considering the honour accorded by the post sufficient. 3

It is all but impossible to ascertain which of these two motivations might have been the dominant one for nobles. But in either case, the encouragement to the nobles to serve in war came from their being members of the elite, whose reward for participation was an outcome of their status giving them opportunities for acquiring either monetary or social benefits.

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1. L.P. XIX, ii (337), September (?), 1544.
2. E. Gruffydd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550", Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts XII, i (May 1950), pp. 21-8. Hereunder as Gruffydd, iii.
3. Original Letters Illustrative of English History: Including Numerous Royal Letters: From Autographs in the British Museum ed. H. Ellis (4 vols, London, 1828), I, (lxvi); cf. Sir Gilbert Talbot to Wolsey wishing to excuse himself from war service on account of illness: "...I have minded so sore and purposed to have served the King's grace now in this journey, that I almost forgot God, and set my mind on none other thing but only how I might best serve his grace at this time". L.P. I (4021). Talbot apparently recovered in time to serve in the war.
vi. Knighthood.

It may be impossible to discern whether greed for honour or money was a greater incentive to the noble to go to war. But there was one kind of reward for military service which was not only purely honorary in the benefits it conferred, but was also somewhat onerous in that it placed obligations on its recipient to take greater responsibility in the community and in warfare. This was the honour of knighthood, which was probably the single most commonly conferred reward for war service for which records survive. It was an honour that was extended throughout the ranks of the nobility from the greatest peers to the minor gentlemen, such as the London spinner, John Jennings, who was knighted during the 1544 attack on Edinburgh. Whereas the greatest of the nobility were rewarded with titles in addition to being knighted, the distinction of knighthood remained the most frequent form of reward for the minor nobles. If a noble was already a knight, but not considered worthy of a peerage, he might be promoted to a higher grade of knighthood, such as knight banneret or the Order of the Garter.

Henry's creations of knights occurred at the average of 17 per year, about twice the normal rate. They usually consisted of the relatively simple dubbing ceremony at or near the field of battle. The other main occasion on which he created knights was at a major court ceremony, such as a royal birth or marriage, at which time the ritual of dubbing was much more elaborate.¹

About 393 knights, or more than half the 740 knights bachelor made during his reign, were created near the battlefield, during a campaign, or in the immediate aftermath of an expedition. When there was no war current the number

¹. The effect of distraint of knighthood, which applied in the latter category, is rather complicated and sheds little light on the practice of knightling nobles in battle. See the discussion by Leonard, "Knights and Knighthood in Tudor England", especially p.80.
of creations was negligible, except for the rare great ceremonial events. The number of knights which might be classified as military creations could be expanded if a looser categorisation is used. Some 48 knights were created after the suppression of the Pilgrimage of Grace, for example, which might well be classed as a military event. If the knights who were made on these occasions were classified as military creations, the total knighthoods conferred in return for military service would represent a proportion of about 60 per cent.¹

The eras of the 1513 and 1544 wars were the periods when the greatest number of new knights were made. Between 1511 and 1513, 183 knights bachelor and 28 knights banneret were made, 154 of them at the sieges of Tournai and Therouanne and the battles of Spurs and Flodden. Some 94 new knights originated in the war of 1544.

As well as the military creations at the lowest rank of knighthood, there were many similar creations of members of the Order of the Garter. Of the 52 knights who were invested with the Garter during Henry's reign, 41 were nobles who were prominent in the wars, and frequently, only recently returned from military duty. These included Arthur Plantagenet, a Spear and Governor of Calais, Edward Howard, who was killed before he could be installed, and Sir John Wallop, who was elected to the Garter shortly after his return from leading the army against France in 1543.

¹Calculations are based on the lists in W.A. Shaw, The Knights of England. A Complete Record From the Earliest Time to the Present Day of the Knights of All the Orders of Chivalry in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and of Knights Bachelors (2 vols, London, 1971), II. Shaw does not always give precise accounts. For example he lists "ten or more" anonymous knights who were created at the siege of Morlaix. But he has employed a wide range of manuscripts, wider, for instance, than that used by C.G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-1519 (Oxford, 1971), p. 11, who relied on only one document, L.P. I (4468), when calculating the number of knights made at Tournai, and, as a result, came to a different total than did Shaw. See also N. Williams, Henry VIII and His Court (London, 1971), p. 212, and Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p. 71.
The honour of knighthood, and the paraphernalia which accompanied it, would seem to have been taken seriously by the nobles. Henry himself completed the erection of the Garter Chapel at Windsor which had begun during the fifteenth century. When Henry's old comrade Brandon made his will before leaving for France in 1544, the duke requested that in the event of his death his last gift to the king should be his Garter collar, melted down and made into a cup.¹ During the early years of the reign, four courtiers risked their lives and the wrath of the king when, at the end of the disastrous 1511 expedition, they left the English army and went to court of Ferdinand to seek knighthood from his hands.² And Gruffydd claimed that 60 gentlemen were on board the Mary Rose when it sank in the Channel in 1545, having gone on board to win their knighthoods in action against the French.³ Their eagerness to win the title in such a way may well have been prompted by the difficulty of obtaining it when England was at peace. Apart from the few royal occasions, knighthood was basically an honour accompanying war, the number of knights tending to shrink during lengthy periods of peace. Knighthood was thus one of the hallmarks of having performed satisfactory military service, and, hence, marked its bearer as a prominent member of the military elite.

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2. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.33. When it came to the point, one of the squires, William Sydney, refused the honour. The other three were redubbed by Henry when they returned home.

vii. **Memorials.**

The last opportunity which the nobles had to make a statement about themselves and their function in society was in their funerary monuments, the instrument through which they transmitted the image in which they wished to be remembered by posterity.¹

The nobles had an image of themselves as a group of noble warriors, and so the most common type of memorial which they erected to themselves was that of the gentleman soldier.

The common form of memorial adopted by the military elite since at least the sixteenth century had been the incised brass or stone slab, or the three dimensional effigy, showing an armoured figure. The brass slab in particular had come into use at almost the same time as the knights emerged as a relatively clearly defined social class, during the thirteenth century.² Because this group was considered to be a military force its brass memorials depicted warriors. But the brass effigy of the soldier was gradually adopted by superior and inferior grades of society who also considered that they were noble warriors. By the next century, peers as well as knights, squires and gentlemen had similar brass memorials, their splendour varying according to their rank. The earliest surviving brass effigy of an armed peer is that of Maurice Lord Berkeley (d.1392), and was laid down just over a century after the first recorded English military brass of 1277.

1. This same desire was voiced a century later at a time when similar funeral monuments were still popular: "...sepulchres should be made according to the quality and degree of the persons deceased, that by the tomb everyone might be discerned of what rank he was living". J. Weever, *Antient Funeral Monuments of Great-Britain, Ireland, And the Islands Adjacent* (1631) (London, 1767), p.xi.

The nobility continued to use military memorials, and the brass in particular, until beyond the end of Henry's reign. Most military brasses actually date from the period 1485-1547. The 220 surviving brasses of warriors from the largest single category of Tudor brass memorials. It may be that the relative frequency of such brasses from the Tudor era has been due to the vagaries of time destroying a higher proportion of earlier brasses. But in the corresponding period only 100 years before the Tudors the rate of laying down brasses was not significantly smaller. A total of 80 military brasses survive from the 24 years of Henry VII's reign, representing an average of 3 new brasses per year, the same as for his son's era. This was approximately the same as for the years 1409-1447, from which period 132 military brasses are recorded.1

A number of the brasses from Henry's era were erected by members of his household and court circle, such as that of a former Usher of the Chamber, John Leventhorpe (d.1510), William Thynne (d.1546) Master of the Household, and Sir Humphrey Stafford (d.1548) a Squire of the Body. Amongst the peers who erected military effigies of themselves were Thomas, father of Anne Boleyn (d.1538), Sir John Touchett Lord Audley (d.1525) and John Lord Marney (d.1549).


It has not been possible to compile figures for the other major types of memorial such as the three dimensional effigy, but several of these, including those of Thomas, third Duke of Norfolk, the Earl of Rutland, the first Lord Marney and the Hoby brothers, are pictured in L.Stone, Sculpture in Britain: The Middle Ages second ed. (Harmondsworth, 1972), plate 191 (A) and M.Whinney, Sculpture in Britain 1530-1830 (Harmondsworth, 1964), plates 2 (B), 3(A) and (B), 4, 7.
The funerals which occasioned these effigies were in themselves an affirmation of the affinity between the noble lifestyle in general and the imagery of war. Descriptions of most of the major noble funerals that occurred during the middle of the century are recorded in the diary of a London merchant, Henry Machyn. Entirely typical of these funerals was that of Gregory Lord Cromwell in 1551. His funeral procession was embellished by the presence of a herald, a standard, a banner of arms, a coat of arms, a helmet, sword, shield and numerous escutcheons. The martial ornaments were presented at the altar and then hung around the church.

There were differences in the splendour of such funerals and monuments, depending on the wealth and personal inclination of the individual. Some wealthy nobles chose to have no memorial whatsoever, while others, such as Sir Anthony Browne, whose magnificent three dimensional military effigy is in his chapel at Battle, chose elaborate monuments.

But the great similarity of such military monuments which were chosen as the memorials of the nobility indicates the extent to which they considered themselves to be a military group, and shows how a common iconography was shared amongst peers, knights, squires and armigerous gentlemen.

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It is not always easy to establish clearly who was a noble, and a member of the military elite, and what rank he held within the nobility. But it does appear that contemporaries had some quite definite ideas about the kind of behaviour which was appropriate to a noble, by which they could identify the eminent members of society. These categories of behaviour encompassed such things as dress, eating habits, and recreation, and placed considerable emphasis on the military nature of the noble.

At the same time, the nobility, as a group, was a thriving division of society, with no signs of decadence under the jealous and vindictive rule of the early Tudor. In fact, the opposite was perhaps the case, with Henry actually actively encouraging the influx of fresh recruits into various ranks of the nobility.

There was a great importance placed on the military qualities of the nobles in a number of key areas of its activity. These areas included the education of nobles, an emphasis which was completely against the desires and aims of the humanists, for whom some historians have claimed such a great influence on the education of Tudor nobles. The nobles continued to seek employment in offices which were frequently connected with warfare, often as a matter of family tradition. The rewards which they gained from such service could be substantial. Sometimes these rewards were somewhat intangible, such as the fulfilling of a sense of honour and duty. But there were also more tangible rewards which their rank could gain them, such as the benefits of large scale corruption. But knighthood remained the most frequently dispensed tangible reward for war service.

And at their death, the military nature of the nobles was acknowledged finally by the military effigies which were often placed on their tombs.
A general picture of the nobility as a warrior caste emerges from considerations of their composition, their education, their careers, the rewards which they sought and obtained for their service in war, the titles which were conferred on them, and the memorials which they built for themselves. Those nobles who left traces of themselves in the records usually conform to this pattern of the military elite. Unfortunately only a small proportion of the nobles make any consistent mark in the records. Others who presumably shared their attitudes and their life style often leave no trace at all of their thoughts and behaviour, except by occasional accident. One of these, for instance, is Sir John Clerk, who died in 1539. Sir John's name does not appear in connection with the 1513 war, and he was not even knighted until the parliament of 1529. Yet on his brass memorial, underneath his portrait as a kneeling knight, he recorded what he apparently considered the most significant event of his life. This was the day on which he captured the Duc de Longueville, deputy commander of the French cavalry, at the battle of Spurs, some 26 years before his death.¹ There were probably many other such minor nobles who were on the fringe of court life whose interest in the military life has not been recorded.

This in itself suggests the major difficulty involved in depicting the main features of the noble lifestyle during the early sixteenth century. The type of evidence which survives tends to record the more obvious aspects of noble life, behaviour which may on occasions have been obvious merely because it was somewhat abnormal, and hence worthy of note. It should be borne in mind when considering the nobility as a military elite that they were also civilians. As well as being

courtiers and soldiers, they were also fathers, husbands, and the owners and administrators of large properties. There were many areas of social activity in which the noble moved, each demanding a different role from its participants. There were long periods of official peace on occasion, and the expeditions of 1513 and 1544 stand out partly because there was such a concentrated involvement in war by the nobility as a whole.

But it can also be argued that aspects of noble life such as wars, tournaments, knighthoods and memorials were indicative of large portion of their social activity, both in terms of their money and their energy. The wars and tournaments were, at this time, not clearly differentiated from peacetime activities, as is shown in Chapters Six and Seven. And they were not isolated occurrences. A war was not confined merely to the few months spent on expeditions. It also spanned the time, albeit unofficially, during which the nobles planned and negotiated treaties of peace and hostility, and the months and even years during which navies were built and armouries filled, as well as decades of border skirmishes and raids, and, when war was ended by a truce, the seasons spent garrisoning fortresses in newly conquered territory. There were few years during Henry's reign free from war or rumours of wars.

As a result, the noble lifestyle tended to be dominated by the demands of war, and the court life with its politics, tournaments and pageants both mirrored and fostered an interest in martial pursuits. Wartime roles were continued in peacetime as lavish displays and large entourages remained part of the conscious demonstration of nobility.
CHAPTER THREE

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ARMY: PART I

One of the reasons why historians have been so persistent in trying to identify a new lifestyle amongst the nobles is the common belief that early sixteenth century warfare was substantially different to that of previous centuries. Sixteenth century warfare has been portrayed by military historians as more rational, more egalitarian, and as a result, less the preserve of the nobility than it had been previously. Perhaps the most respected English military historian, C.W.C. Oman, concluded his study of medieval war with the comment that during the sixteenth century

...the modern world was working a transformation in military matters which was to make the methods of mediaeval war seem even further removed from the strategy of our own century than are the operations of the ancients...1

Because of such pre-conceptions about the nature of sixteenth century war, it has been thought that military activity was a less important element of the noble lifestyle, and that a more literary emphasis arose in the typical patterns of their behaviour.

But, as is shown in the following three chapters, early sixteenth century was was still far from highly rational in its administration or practice, and the nobles remained of paramount importance in nearly all its aspects. There continued to be a profound influence by traditional procedures and attitudes not only in the ways in which battles were fought, but in the equipment used, strategies, recruitment, finance, regulations, fortification, logistics and many other important elements of Tudor warfare.

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There has been a tendency to date back to Henry's reign the effect of significant change in military practice which did begin to make itself felt by the reign of Elizabeth and which had brought about a change in English military practice by the end of the seventeenth century. J.W. Fortescue, for example, included Henry's armies in what he considered to be a time of innovation, conditioned in manoeuvre and organisation by revived classical models. He wrote that

> Every soldier steeped himself in ancient military lore, and quoted the Hipparchicus of Xenophon... In a word Europe for two centuries, went forth to war with the newest pattern of musket in hand, and a brain stocked with maxims from Frontinus and Vegetius.¹

There was indeed innovation, such as the development of firearms. Men with the knowledge of new methods of war came to England as soldiers, architects and technicians. An Italian craftsman wrote to Henry in 1544 offering his own services and the skills of several other "artists" in making new weapons such as silent gunpowder, suitable for ambushes.²

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1. J.W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army. First Part - To the Close of the Seven Years War* (3 vols, London, 1899), I, p.106. It is perhaps because of the influence of such assumptions that so little attention has been paid to Tudor military history. The only extensive studies of early sixteenth century English war yet published are those by C.G. Cruickshank. H. Belloc, *Warfare in England* (London, 1912), for instance, passes over Henry's army altogether. It is perhaps fair to say that the military history of the early Tudors has been regarded as something of a backwater.

2. L.P. XIX, i (219).
But Fortescue was forced to express amazement because, given the wealth of technical innovation available, Henry seemed reluctant to press ahead with the military reforms which Fortescue considered would have obviated the need for change in the army for 150 years. To Fortescue's apparent annoyance, Henry neglected his infantry, except for the archers who would be obsolete by the end of the century, and paid more attention to increasing the heavy cavalry by taking steps to improve the breed of warhorses.¹

Henry's reign was in fact quite conservative in its approach to the organisation of the army, tending to trust to past usages rather than unproven methods and equipment. The administration of the army was mainly on the basis of tradition and experience, rather than any scientific or regulated basis. What was apparently the first manual of instructions for the English army only appeared in the 1540's and covered the regulation of both the army and navy in a score of small pages.²

The earliest printing of a Continental treatise on war was not until the second half of the century.³

Despite some qualifications, historians have usually regarded the warfare of the early Tudor period as being a kind


2. T. Audley, A Book of Orders in the Warres by See and Land (British Museum, Harley 309). This manuscript must have been prepared between the end of the 1544 expedition, to which Audley refers, and Audley's death in 1547. Audley was lieutenant of the Lower Town of Boulogne in 1544. Hereunder as Audley, A Book of Orders. A revised version was published in 1550 and is quoted extensively in H.C.B. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army 1066-1945, second ed. (London, 1967).

of modern war. One of the essential characteristics of this new war was that there was said to be an almost total eclipse of the heavily armoured noble cavalryman, who, theoretically, dominated medieval warfare but who ceased to do so in the sixteenth century. He was said to have been displaced by more highly disciplined, non-noble infantrymen armed with pike and musket.

The records of Henry's military expeditions, however, indicates that the replacement of the heavy cavalryman was neither so extensive nor as novel as has generally been assumed. It may be that the writings of theorists such as Machiavelli rather than the records of actual practice have influenced modern views of Tudor war. The theory of the decline of the noble cavalryman often seems to take its language and its assumptions from writers such as Machiavelli. He wrote that infantry was superior to cavalry, which was a force to be retained only as the second strength of the army. Cavalry, he believed, was useful for raiding, scouting and harassment, but of little use on the battlefield, apart from pursuing a routed army, and a knot of infantrymen was unconquerable by horsemen.¹

As will be shown, Henry's era was relatively traditional in most areas of military activity, including the use of cavalry.

i. Cavalry in Henry VIII’s Army.

Several types of troops were available to Henry, but clearly the most prestigious was the noble, mounted and in complete armour. The noble cavalryman was still accorded the greatest prestige during the reign of Elizabeth, when a serving soldier, Sir Roger Williams, wrote that to serve as a man at arms was the most honourable charge that a person might have in war.¹ Because the equipment of a man at arms was expensive only the more wealthy, and hence noble, members of the community could afford to serve in such a position. Those who did serve as men at arms included peers, as well as lesser nobles who wished to make a mark at court. These nobles were often formed into exclusive bands based on branches of the royal household, such as the King’s Spears (1513), the Gentlemen Pensioners (1544), or the Knights and Squires of the Body. Such cavalrymen constituted an insignificant proportion of the army in terms of sheer numbers, but their scarcity belied the services which they performed. There were perhaps no more than 200 of them attached to the household at any one time. The Spears, for example, consisted of 50 nobles attended by an archer (who might well have been a medium cavalryman), a groom and a page.² The number of Knights and Squires of the Body is somewhat vaguer, but was more than 100 in 1516.³

Apart from the extremely heavily armed men at arms, who were protected from head to foot, there were many more demi-lances available for the army. These were similar to the men at arms in appearance and function, but were usually without heavy defences for the limbs. Nobles would also have been found amongst their ranks, although in what proportions is not clear.

³ Brock,"The Courtier In Early Tudor Society","pp.39-40 discusses the difficulty of defining and identifying these men.
The rest of the army was made up of light cavalry, pike and billmen, archers, arquebusiers, gunners and pioneers, as well as non combatants such as cooks, hunters and other common soldiers who were not members of the elite group, although they were commanded by noble captains.

Such was the poor state of the contemporary organisation for war that the men who raised the armies actually had little idea of the amount and quality of troops available. But they did have definite ideas of what should have been the composition of an army, as a note in Wolsey's hand indicates. He expected the English army of 1513 would have 1,000 barded horse - the nobles - each with a page and groom, who would both be fighters, a further 1,000 nobles on unbarded horses, each with a page and groom, 3,000 demi-lances, each with light armour except for the legs, and an infantry force of 10,000 archers, 4,500 bills and pikes from England and Wales, 5,000 German pikes, 500 cannoneers and 1,000 pioneers.¹ Wolsey's planning probably did not correspond to the army that actually assembled, although it is not possible to be certain because of the nature of the records. The English always had trouble getting enough horsemen. Sir Edward Poynings complained in 1513 that there were few trained demi-lances to be found in Kent, and seven nobles who raised 1,119 men in the same year could only supply 19 men at arms and 25 demi-lances.²

This, however, was not new or unusual for the English, nor did it mean that the cavalry were insignificant on the battlefield. The continuing importance of the horseman is described in Chapter Five. There had been a continual shortage of heavy cavalry since at least the twelfth century,

¹ L.P. I (3876).
² Ibid., (3750), (3886), (3890), (3891), (3942), (3950).
and for over two hundred years the largest and, some consider, most effective portion of the army had been the archers and billmen. One recent historian, J. Schlight, has even argued that mercenary infantry were as important and much more numerous than the heavy cavalry as early as the late eleventh century.¹ Henry V appears to have taken 2,300 men at arms to France in 1416, or about one heavy cavalryman in seven soldiers.² Depending on the circumstances, the heavy cavalry may have been a major or miniscule segment of the army, both in the medieval period and during Henry's reign. One army raised in 1306 contained 40 light cavalry, 8 constables of foot, and 826 infantry, a force which joined in a Scottish campaign to which the king brought only 88 paid heavy cavalry. At the battle of Falkirk, in contrast, perhaps as many as 3,000 heavy cavalrymen were present, together with an infantry force reckoned at 25,700.³ Henry VIII had similarly varying forces of cavalry in his army. He left 5,000 horsemen and 6,000 infantrymen to guard Tournai in 1514, although not all the horse would have been heavy cavalry. If he actually managed to assemble 2,000 men at arms for his 1513 army - which would seem unlikely - it was by no means an inconsiderable cavalry force compared to previous centuries.⁴ It would appear

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² The First English Life of King Henry the Fifth Written in 1513 by an Anonymous Author Commonly Known as the Translator of Livius ed. C.L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1911), pp. 79-80.
⁴ N. Denholm Young, "Feudal Society in the Thirteenth Century", calculates that fewer than 300 knights were capable of and willing to serve as heavy cavalry by the end of the thirteenth century.
that Henry actually managed to put 700 cavalry into the field at the battle of Spurs, or at least enough heavy cavalry to overthrow 2,000 French men at arms. ¹

The noble heavy cavalryman was equally as evident in the early sixteenth century army as he had been in previous centuries. Although he had not been absolutely predominant in the field either numerically or tactically for several centuries, his equipment and rank still made him extremely important. ² At the same time, the methods of recruiting heavy cavalry in particular and troops in general remained essentially traditional. The general recruitment of troops is discussed in the next chapter. The identity between the nobility, the court, and their role as soldiers is shown by the way in which much of the heavy cavalry was raised and regulated directly by the royal household, through the creation by Henry of bodies such as the Spears and the Gentlemen Pensioners. The formation by Henry of groups of nobles each supported by several attendants and possessing three warhorses was in itself a copy of the fifteenth century French system of compagnies d'ordonnance. As with most aspects of contemporary war, it does not seem to have become particularly systematic. The composition of the bodies of horsemen, for example, was never fixed. Audley wrote in the 1540's that he thought a spear or lance should have up to five men as well as a man at arms, as was current practice in France, but not in England. ³

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.86.
² It is difficult to obtain accurate figures for the army of either 1513 or 1544. Estimates of the composition of the 1544 army vary between 3,684 horsemen and 31,955 footmen, and 4,078 horsemen and 28,313 footmen, exclusive of Imperial mercenary troops: L.P. XIX, i (273), (274), (275), (276). Types of troops are listed indiscriminately in contemporary records, so that men at arms, demi-lances, javelins and mounted archers may all be counted together as horse.
³ Audley, A Book of Orders.
Centuries before Henry came to the throne, Edward I had been forced to augment his own scarce heavy cavalry by retaining nobles in his household, largely relying on them for most of his wars. The traditions which he and other English warrior monarchs had fostered were followed by Henry in his military ventures, particularly as far as heavy cavalry was concerned.
ii. Weapons.

The weapons of early sixteenth century armies also indicate the predominantly traditional nature of war, while at the same time showing that new methods and implements were fitted into already existing practices.

Armaments, with one or two notable exceptions, were much the same as they had been for several hundred years. Cavalry was armed with lance, sword, axe and mace, and, more frequently by the middle of the century, a handgun. The heavy cavalry had lances that weighed as much as 20 pounds, whereas a lighter, but still sturdy, boar spear was used by the javelins and demi-lances.¹

The sword and mace were virtually unchanged from those of previous centuries, as was the axe. The English were conservative in their choice of weapons, and this sometimes caused difficulties when dealing with Continental allies, some of whom had adopted other implements of war. In 1544 some Imperial mercenaries were delayed in joining the English army because the English insisted that they buy heavy lances for horsemen presently equipped with boar spears and saddle guns, and pikes and halberds for men armed with arquebuses.²

Infantrymen were classified according to their weapons. These arms were of two main categories: missile weapons and hand combat weapons. One type of footsoldier would carry a pike, bill, halberd, glaive, partisan, sword or axe, the other a bow, crossbow, or gun.

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². L.P. XIX, i (419).
The pike and bill were probably used in approximately equal proportions by the English at this time, although the bill was more evident at Flodden, where it was shown to be more wieldy than the long pikes of the Scots. An inventory of weapons supplies for the 1544 army shows that equal reserves of both these major kinds of hand combat weapons were held.  

The weapon which at this time was considered to be traditionally English was the longbow. Its rapid rate of fire, its ability to pierce armour, and its lightness had made it an excellent weapon against the French, who relied more heavily on armoured cavalry than had the English. The longbow was still seen as the weapon of the English at this time. A proclamation by Henry repeating the Statute of Westminster urged men to practice with the bow because it "...ever hath been the most sure and natural feat of war for his said subjects in and for the defense of their persons and of this his realm..." Archery practice was compulsory, although the need for the reiteration of this in many proclamations indicates that it had to compete with gambling and other games, as well as with guns and crossbows, as a national pastime.  

Despite anxiety about a decline in English ability with the longbow - and perhaps its effectiveness against improved sixteenth century armour - the bow continued to be a major element of sixteenth century armies, at least until the

1. L.P. XIX, i (272).

reign of Elizabeth. The 10,000 infantry archers provided for in Wolsey's note exceeded the projected combined strength of the English and German pike that was to be raised for the 1513 expedition. Only gradual adoption of the handgun as an alternative occurred during Henry's reign, although the king and some other nobles showed some interest in the gunpowder weapon. During the later years of his reign, for example, Henry ordered Sir Peter Meawtes to raise a force of 100 gunmen for use in the 1544 war. But although arquebusiers saw some service during 1544, they were only to be found in equal proportions to longbowmen in the king's personal guard. There were 75 of each type of missile armed soldier about the royal person during his march to Boulogne.

The arquebus did not in itself mark any major change in tactics at this time. Except under exceptional circumstances it was too crude a weapon to influence the outcome of battles. Its development as a major weapon of war, bringing about changes in tactics, occurred much later, and particularly during the seventeenth century when it forced the cavalry to wear armour which was too ponderous to be endured.


2. *L.P. XIX, i* (272).

3. See the discussion of the reasons for the replacement of the longbow by the handgun in:
   
iii. Armour.

The role of armour in early sixteenth century war indicates several things about the noble lifestyle, as well as current military practice. It indicates the importance placed by contemporaries on the noble in war, and, conversely, the significance which the trappings of war held for the noble. At the same time, it shows how the military practice of the time built and improved on past examples, rather than looking to the future when, by the end of the seventeenth century, armour had largely been abandoned.

Rather than being regarded as obsolete, armour was being used more extensively than ever during Henry's wars. The higher ranks had used armour for centuries. But during this period it became more commonly used amongst the less exalted soldiers rather than merely for the nobility. No army of the time ever completely adapted itself to the use of armour by all its soldiers. But by the mid-sixteenth century a large proportion of the common soldiers would have had at least the basic harness of a metal hat, a breastplate and defences for the arms and legs. The 1544 muster book shows that about a quarter of 30,261 men reviewed in three counties had harnesses. Audley recommended an increased use of armour. He wrote that out of every 100 men, 20 should have white corselets (unpainted polished breastplates) worn by the front ranks in order to strike fear into the enemy when seen from afar. This was not to say, he added, that other men should be without armour - except for missile troops - but rather that armour should go to the men with the greatest strength and experience, and not to those men chosen by their captains out of favour. This distribution of armour by favouritism would appear to have been the current method of allocating defences.

1. L.P. XIX, ii (273).
Audley also warned that the English would never be strong in the field until this ceased, and that if his suggestions were ignored the army could be in grave danger one day. In the opinion of this serving soldier, therefore, armour was of great importance.

Henry's reign in fact saw a vigorous policy of purchasing armour, an activity which was shared by his fellow monarchs. Richard Jerningham wrote to Henry in January 1513 from Milan, a major armour producing centre, that countries such as Spain had bought all the available Almain rivets (suits of armour), but he had managed to contract for 5,000 rivets. 1 A month later, Henry managed to buy 2,000 Almain rivets, consisting of breast and backplate, arm and neckguards and helmets, for his footmen from a Florentine merchant. 2

This purchasing policy continued into the 1540's, when rising prices for locally made armour forced the English to once again buy European harness. English stocks of armour were probably made expensive at this time because of its sudden scarcity after a decade of relative peace. Purchases of Continental harness continued even as the invasion force sailed. Thomas Lok reported purchases in the Netherlands in June, while two weeks before he wrote his letter, Venice granted an export licence for 1,050 suits of cavalry and infantry armour made for Henry in Brescia. 3

1. L.P. I (3658).
2. Ibid., (3732), (4131).
3. L.P. XIX, i (764) 23 June 1544; V.P. V (308) 14 June 1544. For the cost of armour and government attempts to prevent forestalling see T.R.P. 18 H.VIII 108 and 36 H.VIII 308. See also Audley's suggestion that armour should be provided for poor men by government appropriation of private stocks.
While attempts were made to provide better protection for the infantry as well as the cavalry, armour continued to become more elaborate, and hence more effective, for the higher ranks. The heavy cavalry of this time in particular had more complete armour than ever before, so that the weighty bards of the horses began to hamper freedom of movement. During the flight from Guinegate in 1513, the French hacked off their bards in order to increase the speed of their flight. It is a mark of the conservatism of Henry and his administrators that the English were disappointed during the later war by the poor results of their attempts to hire barded horse in Europe, as the practice by mid century was generally towards an abandonment of horse defences. Henry's commissioners reported in 1544 that none of the 1,200 horse brought to the muster by one German commander had bards. The Germans told the commissioners that they had ceased to use bards because they were considered too heavy and only for show. The English had expected that 200 of the band of horse would have been barded.  

After the war, Audley recommended an increased use of barded horse - one in every four - because he considered it was the barded steed that frequently meant the difference between safety and disaster for its master.  

Nevertheless, the most elaborately equipped men at arms remained hard to recruit, Wotton reporting in 1544 that the emperor expected not 50 in 1,000.  

Although the use of horse bards had not proved successful, armour for the nobleman did prove effective. The weight of a complete armour was not significantly greater than

1. L.P. XIX, i (713).
3. L.P. XIX, i (312).
for previous periods, at between 40 and 100 pounds, yet continuing refinements made it more adaptable and efficient. Armour could now be obtained for most of the varying kinds of combat in which a noble could expect to participate. There were armours for field and tilt, for foot or horseback contests, and for all the sophisticated variations of war and tournament fighting which were recognised by contemporaries, as well as armour for parades and pageants.

It was only during the last decades of the century that many amongst the senior ranks of the army began to dispense with complete armour, and even then the horseman continued to be well protected with helmet, collar, breast and backplate, as well as various kinds of arm and leg defences. Henry and his fellow nobles continued to employ armour, both during peacetime and wartime, not only as an efficient protection for their persons, but as a mark of their rank in the army, and, more generally, in society. The complete armour of the early sixteenth century provided great physical protection. The Scots nobles at Flodden were impervious to English archery in their fine new German armours, and had to be killed with bills which were used to crack open their harness. At the same time, the nobles were clearly marked on the battlefield by their magnificent armour, which was gilded and decorated without regard to cost. As a result their enemies were usually more careful to preserve the lives of wearers of such armour in the hope of obtaining a large ransom by capturing the noble alive.

1. Exactly why armour was eventually abandoned was a matter of contemporary debate: see the discussion in Bow Versus Gun. It may have been because more efficient fire power called for armour which was unreasonably heavy. But see the extensive defences recommended for the demi-lance of the seventeenth century in J. Cruso, Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (1632) (New York, 1968), figure 1, and compare the weight of harnesses listed in C. Blair, European Armour, Circa 1066 to Circa 1700 (London, 1972), Appendix. One historian has suggested that armour was abandoned because of a scarcity of metal caused by the increased use of cannon and iron shot during the seventeenth century: see J. U. Nef, War and Human Progress c. 1494-1640. An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization (London, 1950), p. 239.
These two functions of armour were assumed, for example, by a soldier who reported on the battle of Pinkie which was fought between the English and the Scots in 1547. In writing down his memories of this battle, the soldier claimed that there were three reasons why there was a mass slaughter of the Scots after the battle. These were: the vow by Scottish soldiers to kill any Englishman they captured; their cruel killing of Lord Eures and others who they could have spared after the battle of Ancrum Moor in 1545; and because...their armour among them so little differing, all clade alike in jacks covered with white leather, doublets of the same, or fustian, and most commonlie all white hosen, not one with either chaine, brooch, ring, or garment of silke...

This lacke of difference in apparell was the chiefest cause that so manie of their great men and gentlemen were killed, and so few saved. The outward shew, the resemblance of signs, whereby a stranger might discerne a poore man from a gentleman, was not among them to be seene.

The English nobles, in contrast, were clearly marked with their magnificently decorated armour.¹

The important role played by armour was recognised by the nobles, who took the trouble to obtain armour which was not only increasingly efficient, but perhaps more lavishly decorated than ever before. Henry set up his own armoury in Greenwich which he staffed with foreign craftsmen. It became a mark of his favour for a noble to be allowed to purchase the extremely costly armour produced by the workshop.² For over two hundred years armour continued to be a badge of nobility. Kings, princes, commanders of armies and gentlemen soldiers had their portraits painted showing them in armour, as well as having military effigies placed on their tombs. One of the

Titian portraits of Charles V, for example, shows him on horseback armed as a demi-lance, and there are numerous portraits of Francis I in similar poses.

As will be shown in Chapter Six, the use of military equipment as a mark of nobility was a practice which the noble continued even during ostensibly peacetime occasions, especially at court events.
iv. Cannon.

One of the most confusing aspects of sixteenth century war is the way in which new skills and instruments of war were introduced without an apparent immediate revolution in the art of war. Such a new instrument was the cannon, a weapon of unprecedented firepower. Despite its dramatically novel nature, evidence of its influence on the strategies and tactics of war at this time is equivocal. Opinions on the use to which cannons should be put were still varied, as no systematic means of employing the weapon had yet been devised. The first treatise on gunnery was not written until an Italian publication appeared in 1537, and England did not receive a translation of the book until 1588. The manufacture and use of cannon continued to be haphazard, especially in England, throughout Henry's reign. Current methods of making cannons were still crude, and there was as yet no standardization of calibres. The first attempt to set some standard calibres was actually made in 1544 by Charles V. But meanwhile cannons in Henry's armies were of many arbitrarily decided shapes and sizes. His mortars for the 1544 army had a shot capacity of anywhere between 30 and 200 pounds. This meant that a great many weapons had to have their shot made for them individually. It probably meant also that gunners had to re-learn the characteristics of any weapon other than the one which they customarily used.

England was also in a vulnerable position as far as supplies for its heavy armaments were concerned. As late as Elizabeth's reign virtually all its gunpowder had to be imported from Spain, and the first cannon made in England was not cast until 1521.

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2. L.P. XIX, i (272).
The current state of technological development of cannons meant that by the early sixteenth century the skill of fortification makers had surpassed that of attackers. The larger cannons had a very slow rate of fire, owing to the danger of them bursting. Bombards which could fire as much as 260 pounds of shot could only fire 5 times a day, whereas the smaller 8 pound pot guns, ineffective against thick walls, could fire almost continuously. The result was that even the large siege trains of the 1513 and 1544 armies still had great difficulty in battering the walls of even minor castles and cities. It was estimated, for example, that the city of Boulogne received about 100,000 shots from Henry's cannon in 1544 before being reduced. The city held out for two weeks longer than had been required of it by Francis. Hertford made only a token effort to besiege Edinburgh castle in the same year because he knew he had not the means or the time to breach its walls. The same conditions had also applied in 1513, when Henry's siege train could not breach the walls of the minor provincial centre Therouanne even after a six week siege, a matter of some comment at the time.

The poor administration of the army also limited the effectiveness of cannon because there was usually a shortage of powder and shot. In 1513, Henry only had enough powder for 16 days of continuous firing, and there were constant complaints of shortages in 1544.

1. L.P. I (4633).
2. L.P. XIX, ii (236).
3. V.P. II (274).
Despite such limitations, cannons had probably had their most significant effect in the area of siege warfare, the dominant form of war at the time as is shown in Chapter Five. But this effect was largely in the area of forcing military architects to take account of cannon fire when designing their defences, rather than shortening sieges or causing warfare to be more a matter of field operations.

Cannons were probably less significant in the field than in siege warfare, although contemporary opinion seems to have varied. The rather doubtful theory of Machiavelli held that 10 cannons were sufficient for a siege and that in the field cannons should be used to guard the encampment, and if they were used in a battle, one salvo was sufficient.\(^1\) A similar opinion was shared by the soldier Audley, who recommended only that the cannon should be kept charged during the course of a battle in case any misfortune should befall the cavalry or infantry.\(^2\) But Henry himself seems to have regarded cannon as an essential component of a field operation. In 1523 he altered his tactics in order to allow for the requirements of his cannon. He abandoned manoeuvres around Boulogne during the winter because of the difficulty of transporting siege and field artillery over wet roads. He claimed that he was afraid that his men would be left vulnerable to attack from larger forces if they could not take their guns with them.\(^3\) Henry had also taken great pains to ensure the safety of one of his twelve apostles during the 1513 expedition. The apostles were giant cannon forged specially for the invasion, and each was given the name of an apostle, a common practice of the time when cannons were still rare enough to be named individually. Henry's rage and

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anxiety when the apostle was overturned in a ditch and in
danger of capture might also indicate that cannons were as
much a status symbol for the king as an instrument of war.
Henry had taken great pains during the prelude to the war
to build up a siege train worthy of a monarch, as had his
rival James of Scotland, whose artillery was a matter for
admiration amongst the English. But the limited development
of the cannon, and the generally unscientific handling of
the weapon meant that cannons were generally of no great
significance during the battles fought by the English at
this time. At the battle of Flodden, for example, the poor
placement of the Scots guns meant that they were unable to
depress their muzzles sufficiently to fire on the English,
while the English guns, more fortunately firing uphill,
caused some initial losses amongst the Scots, but fell silent
when the serious fighting began.¹

Despite its imposing presence, the cannon was
therefore only of limited effectiveness during the early
part of the sixteenth century, and was perhaps a symbol of
the prestige of its owner as much as a key weapon of war.

¹. A Source Book of Scottish History Volume Two 1424-1567
   ed. W.C.Dickinson, G.Donaldson and I.A.Milne (London,
   1953), p.61; J.Leslie, The Historie of Scotland Wrytten
   First in Latin by the Most Reverend and Worthy Jhone
   Leslie Bishop of Rosse and Translated in Scottish by
   Father James Dalrymple Religious in the Scottis Cloister
   of Regensburg The Yeare of God, 1596 ed. E.G.Cody and
v. The Navy.

The navy was no more systematic or more efficient than was the army of the time. The navy was actually regarded more as an adjunct to the land forces than as a separate force, and as a result was manned and commanded by men who were soldiers rather than marines. Admiral Thomas Howard, for example, came ashore in 1513 in order to lead his men against the invading Scots, and in the same year the French vice-admiral was captured amongst the French cavalry at Spurs. Tactically, the ships were thought of as mobile platforms for seaborne soldiers. Ships would grapple at the first opportunity, even though heavily laden with cannon, in order to allow their companies of soldiers to come to blows. One of the most tragic aspects of the sinking of the Cordeliere in 1513 was that it had contained so many nobles who had gone to sea in order to seek such hand to hand combat. In contemporary documents the navy was still referred to as the army by the sea, rather than as a maritime power which called for a different style of war.¹

As with cannon, it would appear that the navy was as much a matter of prestige as a key weapon of war. Henry's programme to expand the fleet paralleled the English king's rivalry with James in other areas, at least according to some contemporaries. James had greatly expanded his fleet during the early years of the century. He denuded the forests of Fife and spent £30,000 in building the Great Michael, the pride of his fleet.² According to Buchanan, both Louis of France and Henry VIII "...stimulated by emulation, endeavoured to outvie her...". Henry also expanded his fleet, and commissioned the even larger Henry Grace a Dieu.³

1. N.R.S. (62).
2. A Source Book of Scottish History, p.79.
Despite such rivalry, the fleets of the time remained small. The English fleet in February 1513 consisted of 23 ships owned by the king and 5 hired ships. James had 13 large ships, 10 small ships, plus the three vessels which were counted the pride of his navy, the Michael, the Margaret and the James, plus a ship of Lynn captured from the English.¹

The handling characteristics of these vessels had to be learned once war began, as the usual practice was to neglect the use of the navy during peacetime, and in addition there were many new ships. One of the first duties of Admiral Edward Howard was to stage a race between the vessels under his command, the details of which were minutely reported to Henry.² Once the fleet was tested in this manner, it was employed in semi-piratical forays in the Channel. The fighting between English and Scottish ships in 1512 was, as mentioned, a further cause of friction between the British kingdoms. The only relatively systematic use of the navy was to raid the Breton coast in 1512 and 1513, which actually only achieved the burning of a few coastal villages. The fleet also skirmished with the French navy, resulting in the blockade of Brest and eventually the disastrous attack by Howard.

One of the main reasons why the fleet was unsystematic in its operations was that it continually suffered from a shortage of victuals which meant that it could not keep at sea for long periods. Henry took an occasional interest in improving the navy. He sometimes boarded his vessels in order to personally test their cannons. But when there was no immediate danger of war, his fleet was neglected. A statute

2. N.R.S. (23).
of 1531-2 claimed that the navy was greatly decayed, apparently because it was not much used at the time, and that many sailors had lost their jobs, so that in a few years not many English would be expert sailors, to the great peril of the realm. In order to correct the situation, English vessels were to have a monopoly of the Gascon wine trade. After another lengthy period, the statute was repeated, so there was apparently not much improvement in the meantime.¹ Henry was only able to send 11 of his own ships to transport the army to Scotland in 1544, the rest of the fleet being made up of some 50 hired vessels. The king's navy was never adequate to transport the entirety of his army to France. In both 1513 and in 1544 hundreds of small private vessels had to be hired to transport the king and his minions.

¹ Statutes of the Realm, III, 23 H.VIII c.7; 32 H.VIII c.14.
Contrary to the impression that is often given by historians - sometimes simply because they pass over Henry's wars - Tudor war was not basically the same kind of warfare which was waged during the next century, when artillery and the scientific handling of infantry troops armed with firearms became predominant. There was much that was traditional about warfare during Henry's reign. Troop types, weapons and armour were all much as they had been for centuries, although there were changes in details. The elite cavalry was scarce numerically, but it always had been, and proportions of infantry to cavalry showed no marked signs of change. Weapons types were much as they had always been, although the pike was more common than in the past, and gunmen were becoming more frequent by the end of the century. Armour was just as important as ever, and perhaps more efficient than in previous centuries, and its more elaborate forms continued as a badge of nobility, giving special privileges to its bearer. Artillery was considered by some to be a key weapon, but its effectiveness was limited by its crudity, as well as lack of theory for its use.

At the same time, early sixteenth century war presented a somewhat chaotic appearance, at least viewed in retrospect. War tended to be unsystematic, haphazard, and, from a modern viewpoint, somewhat irrational.

There were two main reasons for this. One was the inadequate systems by which the army had to be administered. These did not allow for long term planning or flexible handling of an army. The other reason was the attitude shared by the elite that war was very much their preserve, a theatre in which they could demonstrate to all their station in society.

The first of these aspects of war is described in the next two chapters, although the influence of the noble attitude to war can also be found in administrative documents. But the most detailed consideration of the influence of the noble attitude is reserved for the last two chapters.
Warfare during Henry's reign rarely involved much detailed long term planning, or close adherence to the strategies and tactics which were worked out. Planning often appeared to be on the basis of a matter of weeks or even days once the army was in the field, rather than planning for a period of military activity covering a season of campaigning extending over six months or more. Such short term warfare could not achieve much against a country such as France, where a campaign of three months would do no more than allow an advance of a few days' march towards Paris. An invading army would have needed several seasons of steady advance to penetrate French countryside which was protected by a plethora of fortifications which had to be subdued in some way by an army passing nearby.

Henry's armies were not capable of such progress, one of the main reasons being the paucity of the systems of military administration, the means by which armies were raised, equipped, and kept in the field. Military administration was amongst the major impediments to any efficient war effort during Henry's reign. Inefficiency caused by corruption, poor organisation of the bureaucracy, and lack of foresight by administrators and most commanders extended into almost every aspect of sixteenth century campaigns. The systems of organisation showed no improvement until the last years of the reign, when Henry began to institute some reforms, such as the setting up of a Navy Board to supervise provisioning of the navy. For most of his reign the organisation of war depended on the energy and foresight, or lack thereof, of those in some position of power. In 1513 it was fortunate for Henry that his Almoner, Wolsey, was an energetic man, who gave the army at least some small degree of coherence and organisation, an achievement testified to by the number of war documents which passed through Wolsey's hands. This was largely a unique occurrence, due to Wolsey's personality. He took some trouble to ensure that ships were victualled and soldiers equipped. But the
administration of the army was centred on the king and his household staff, a practice which continued longer than for perhaps any other aspect of government. As a result, even G.R. Elton was compelled to admit that

...the administration of naval and military matters remained very incomplete, occasional, and unbureaucratic, until the era of wars and imperial government after 1660 forced government to attend to it.  

This also meant that much of the burden of administration fell on the nobles, who were appointed to posts such as Master of Ordnance, where they were responsible for supplying the army with its munitions. The presence of the nobles can be seen in all the areas of administration which are described in the following sections.

(a). MONEY, MEN AND FOOD.

i. Finance.

Providing finance for the king's many military operations proved both difficult for the king's servants and ruinous for his country. The eagerness of the king to wring more money for his wars is a mark of his enthusiasm for war, as it is also a sign of how limited was his sense of the effects of his actions. Henry and his advisers seem to have had no concept of the amounts of money which they poured into war, or else they did not particularly care. Henry may have actually been demanding more money at some periods than there was coin in circulation.¹

The early years of Henry's reign saw a rapid growth in military expenditure which had become an explosion by the 1513 period, when expenditure on war increased by more than 1,000 per cent compared to the first years of his rule. This growth is shown in records of income and expenditure from Exchequer rolls. In the first complete six monthly period of records for Henry's reign, income was £2,658/5/3½ and

¹ F.C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485-1641, second ed. (2 vols, London, 1964), I, p.97. Dietz's work is the most extensive study of Tudor finances available, although some writers consider his figures occasionally inadequate. He argues at length that the two main activities of English governments from 1485 to 1641 were their own preservation and war, but that their capacity to finance these activities was always outstripped by their ambitions. The net result was the neglect of widely desired social reforms, and, particularly during Henry's reign, exhaustion of traditional means of raising money. This, claimed Dietz, led to social upheavals, including the Reformation. See his Introduction, Volume I.
expenditure was £2,247/17/4. By the time of the occupation of Tournai in 1514 - which involved not only keeping a garrison but also building a massive castle - income was £44,845/19/7½ and expenditure £35,004/0/10½. As indicated by these figures, income was keeping slightly ahead of expenditure, but money had to be extorted from the country by continual subsidies.¹ England may even have been raising more money for war from its small population than was its larger enemy, France, during the 1513 war. A Florentine ambassador calculated that Henry was spending 50 per cent more per month on war than was Louis.²

Profligate expenditure on war was not the particular vice of the English king, however, as his rival, James, was said to have been forced to sell all his plate and gold chains in 1513 to finance the war, eventually being forced to eat off pewter, a mark of some ignominy for a king. The nobles of the time were quite aware of the meaning of conspicuous consumption, and that the possession of certain qualities of household goods indicated the status of the owner. The Earl of Moray in later years deliberately destroyed a fine dinner service in order to impress his guests by producing an even better set of plates for their dinner.³ James' willingness to forgo such a mark of honour in order to finance his wars indicates the value such an involvement as war with England held for him.⁴ But whereas this type of expenditure ceased in Scotland for a time after the disaster of Flodden, it continued almost uninterrupted in

¹ L.P. I, p.cxxiii.
² V.P. II (290), August 1513.
³ Leslie's History of Scotland, p.276.
⁴ V.P. II (297).
England until the 1520's, despite occasional moves at court to control expenditure more closely. It began once more in the 1540's, by which time inflation had made war an even more expensive pastime. Wolsey had estimated that the total cost of the 1513 invasion was about £372,000. This included the cost of the main army, the wages of the Calais garrison for six months, the cost of Surrey's army against Scotland, the fleet and victuals. Increased costs, the debasement of the coinage, and the sheer magnitude of the operations involved made the 1544 invasion much more costly, at around £2,200,000.

Such huge expenditure was beyond the country's resources, and was not even comprehensible to the king's economists, Wriostheley and Paget, who dealt in figures a fraction of the size of Dietz's estimate. They thought the war would cost only £250,000, of which, however, they believed only £134,000 was readily available. The English knew what this meant. A similar problem in the 1520's had resulted in the imposition of heavy taxes, which led to the rebellion that threatened the security of the kingdom. The king's means of raising money was basically limited to loans and grants from the parliament. Although these grants were formulated in all embracing terms and couched in severe language, they were usually evaded, even during the early years of the reign when the populace had not become inured to demands for money. When Henry returned from the 1513 expedition the parliament granted a supplementary subsidy to one which had been given in November 1511. The original grant had taxed everybody

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1. L.P. I (4309). This was probably a conservative estimate. Dietz, English Government Finance, I, p.90, calculates a cost of 700,000.
2. Ibid., p.147.
3. Ibid., pp.152-3.
over the age of 15 years. But it had proved inadequate to meet the costs of the war, so the supplementary subsidy was granted in 1513. But according to the terms of a further grant made in 1514, less than £50,000 of this grant was in fact collected, so another grant of £100,000 had to be made. This subsidy was also avoided, so that finally another subsidy to raise over £60,000 had to be made.1

The continuation of similar subsidies into the 1520's lead to the rebellions mentioned above.

After the Dissolution, Henry had more avenues from which to raise revenue. He could sell his new properties and the valuables of the church, and he could also raise loans against the security of his recently acquired land. Much of this new property was used by Henry on his wars and court occasions which were commonly connected with war. In 1540, for example, he seized the property of the Knights of St.John in order to distribute it amongst the nobles who had participated in a court tournament, an event discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Henry's inability to capitalise to the full extent on his seizure of church land, as well as the inefficiency of financial administration, was demonstrated during the 1544 war. One of the ways in which the government tried to make up for the anticipated shortfall in finance was by selling church lead. This project was begun in the very middle of the expedition itself, in July 1544. Huge quantities of lead were assembled. There were 5,000 cart loads at Hull, 184 at Whitby, 245 at Scarborough, 687 at Hartlepool, 100 at Brisow, 1,500 at Lynn, 2,000 at Boston, 1,519 at Grimsby and 360 at Newcastle.2 Apparently Henry and his men had not realised that such a huge

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1. Wriothesley's Chronicle, II, p.8; Statutes of the Realm, III, 5 H.VIII c.17; 6 H.VIII c.26; 7 H.VIII c.9.

2. L.P. XIX, i (927).
influx of lead into the Lowland markets would force down prices, especially at a time when there was a shortage of ready cash because of the costs involved in the Netherlands supporting Charles, and when Henry was already having difficulty in raising loans from the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{1} A glut was precisely what happened, as one of Henry's commissioners informed him in August.\textsuperscript{2} Henry was thus faced not only with the prospect of a low price for his lead, but also the costs involved in assembling and carting it. The result was, having already gone to a considerable amount of cost and expenditure in preparing the lead for sale, Henry decided not to sell it after all.

Administrative inefficiency did not come merely from short sighted economic planning, however, as the raising and spending of finances was also hampered by corruption. Office meant an opportunity for graft, as indicated in Chapter Two. Only occasionally, when the graft of officials became too obvious, was the king's interest in making better use of his money manifested. The Treasurer of the army, Sir Richard Riche, discovered this in 1544. He was apparently making money out of his post by making false estimates of the costs of transporting the army. He claimed that the cost of transporting the king's section of the army, exclusive of horses, was £6,000. But the king proved too alert for Riche. He wrote pointing out that the cost of transporting 8,000 men was only £800 at 2/- per man. He brusquely asked for more details. Riche tried to excuse himself by claiming that he had calculated the transport rate at 5/- per man. Even this excuse did not clear him, and Henry ordered a more detailed examination of his behaviour.\textsuperscript{3}

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\item \textit{L.P.} XIX, i (578), (604), (630), (867), (887).
\item \textit{L.P.} XIX, ii (119).
\item \textit{Ibid.} (366), (384), (419), (506).
\end{enumerate}
Riche had tried to take advantage of an unusually lucrative opportunity for embezzlement. The other nobles had positions which were frequently less gainful, but they pursued their chances with an enthusiasm that earned them a reputation for notable corruption.¹ Funds which were meant to pay soldiers' wages and living allowances frequently became diverted into the pockets of nobles. As a result soldiers were often ill fed, ill clothed and broken in health, as well as close to mutiny on any campaign that lasted more than a few months. This happened in the first expeditions to France, the naval war of 1512-3, and during the overseas operations from 1544 to 1547.

Inefficient handling of finances thus hampered military ventures. This was due, in the first war, to the limited resources of the already established means of raising cash, and in the later war to the inability of Henry and his government to administer the greatly expanded avenues of raising revenue in a manner that took full advantage of their potential. It was as a consequence of this that many of the financial advantages gained by the Reformation for the Crown had already been lost by the time Edward VI took the throne.

¹ Gruffydd, iii, pp.1-90 and especially p.28.
Financial shortcomings were ruinous for the kingdom and crippling for any prolonged military venture. But the recruiting of men for the army was perhaps equally as devastating for the mounting of an invasion, especially when it came to hiring foreign mercenaries: recruitment of men by the nobility was perhaps marginally less harmful. Recruitment by the nobles also clearly demonstrated their weight as a military elite.

Perhaps nowhere else is the state of early sixteenth century warfare more obviously manifested than in recruitment methods. They were both haphazard and essentially traditional, based on forms and customs dating back at least to the Conquest. There were some signs of the beginnings of a militia system which could be used overseas, of the type which was dominant by the end of Elizabeth's reign. But the militia came to prominence only in the last years of Henry's reign, and then only to a limited extent. There remained the four traditional avenues of recruitment for the greater part of this era.¹ These were: the shire levies; the dependents of magnates; the king's personal army; and foreign mercenaries.

Everyone aged between 16 and 60 was obliged to serve at the king's command, and, depending on wealth and rank, to possess certain arms. These obligations were stated at strategic intervals by means such as the restatement of the Statute of Westminster in 1511, and a proclamation of 1509 which ordered the muster and review of troops.² The latter

¹ J.J.Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English People 1511-1558", (Ph.D., London, 1955), was the first historian to recognise that these forms of recruitment, rather than the militia system, were still dominant during Henry's reign.

² T.R.P., 3 H.VIII 63; 1 H.VIII 61.
muster was one of the intermittent occasions when Henry authorised his commissioners to take musters throughout the kingdom to assess his military strength and to make sure that everyone was armed. Amongst the common people, in contrast to the nobles, there does not seem to have been much enthusiasm to prepare for war. Not only did they rebel at war taxes, but surveys sometimes found that they were not well armed. This was the case in 1541, when Hertford had some of his tenants surveyed. Out of 1,400 households, 183 guns, 433 bows and 317 crossbows were found, less than one per home, and those that were found usually needed repairs.

The proclamations ordering musters commanded that each man should prepare for war according to his means and rank. The burden of providing men for the shire levies was graded according to status, the higher ranks to provide the most. A commoner, for example, worth less than £100 could be required to send one horseman, while a baron worth 1,000 marks was to have three horsemen prepared. This may not appear to be much in comparison, but a baron would probably also have other men serving simultaneously as part of his personal retinue in other theatres of war.

This system formed the basis of the shire levy, from which Henry's commissioners of array could raise an army for use only within the boundaries of England. This was a custom which had applied since the reign of John. Henry broke this tradition in 1544, when he ordered that 4,000 men of the shire levy be sent to Boulogne. This was a matter of desperation rather than policy, as the combined means provided by the other

1. Seymour Papers, pp.79-80.
three systems of recruitment had already been exhausted. Gruffydd's description of the levies who arrived in Boulogne suggests that the more warlike and able bodied men had probably already gone to serve in lords' retinues or with the king, as the levies consisted of

...many a flatfooted crooked ankled, squint-eyed crooked shoulder, skewheaded, unshapely man, unfit to carry arms in fact many admitted they had never carried any. Over them were the captains, the dregs, short in body shorter in sense, vulgar, ignorant and young, who like the soldiers wandered about the streets chewing berries as if they were children... which is one of the most objectionable and filthy spectacles in a man who intends to pursue righteousness and honour.\(^1\)

In future reigns the importance of levies raised directly by the king grew steadily. But during Henry's reign it was almost purely for national, and usually regional, defence.

The single most important means of raising troops was through the agency of the military elite. This was one of the main ways in which the nobility retained their rank and strength in society, a visible demonstration of their individual status and the position of their group.

This means of raising troops meant that the king had no direct control over the recruitment of large bodies of men. Unlike the shire levy system, where soldiers were raised directly by his commissioners, the raising of the retinues of magnates was carried out through the agency of the nobles. Official letters were sent to men who were presumed by court officials to have local prominence. These included peers, both spiritual and temporal, knights, squires,

gentlemen and clerics, as well as institutions such as colleges and monasteries. The letters ordered the recipients to provide a specified number of men equipped in a certain fashion. In 1513 the government appears to have merely guessed at who could provide a given number of soldiers, but in 1544 there was an estimate provided by each of the nobles before numbers were decided upon.\(^1\) On occasion these demands were sent out on the authority of one of the king's regional commanders, such as Brandon or Hertford when they were defending the Marches. More usually, they were on the authority of the king himself.\(^2\)

A typical order of 1513 was the command from Henry issued at Greenwich requiring Sir David Owen to provide 100 men for war before April, as the king intended to pass into France with an army royal. The letter was issued on 22 February, so it allowed 5 weeks for the receipt of the letter and the mustering and equipping of troops. This was shown to be over optimistic for most of the army, as it was not finally assembled until the beginning of June.\(^3\)

Local lords such as Owen were able to raise men from their manors, as part of the customs of the manor, or because of tenancy agreements to that effect. Some people still received their leases in return for promises of military service.\(^4\)

Another controversial means of raising troops was by the noble bringing with him his personal retinue, men who wore his badge and livery. This was a system which the Tudors had been trying to stamp out for 50 years by the time of the

\[1\] L.P. XIX, i (273).
\[2\] Lodge, Illustrations of British History, I (xxiii), (xlv).
\[3\] L.P. I (3749).
1544 war, but which showed no signs of dying. Royal armies could not have operated without the nobles and their retinues, and when necessary, the practice was given royal sanction. This was the case, for example, on 24 July 1513, when George Talbot Earl of Shrewsbury, as commander of the vanguard, was instructed by Henry to retain as many people as possible under the rank of baron for the war from Derby, Staffordshire and Shropshire. It is perhaps a sign of Henry's eagerness to exert some control over such retinues that he ordered Talbot to send him the names of the people he retained as well as descriptions of the badges, tokens and liveries they would wear.¹

This system of licencing of retainers continued during the 1540's. John Lord Russell, at the time Admiral of the fleet, for example, was licenced in September 1542 to retain 70 men in his livery.²

The result of relying on the nobles to raise men for the army was that there were huge sections of Henry's army composed of soldiers who were primarily in the service of his powerful subjects, rather than directly in the service of the king. These soldiers wore the uniforms and carried the banners of nobles, and received the wages paid by the crown through the hands of their lords. They often, though not always, actually fought under the direct command of the nobles who recruited them. Virtually the entire navy for the 1512 Channel skirmishes, for instance, was in the personal service of the Admiral, Edward Howard. Under the terms of his three monthly contract with the king, he was to provide 3,000 men for the fleet, 18 of them to be captains, 1,750 soldiers and 1,233 sailors and gunners. The king was to provide a further 700 sailors and gunners in his ship the Regent, as well as 17 other ships, wages, and money for a surcoat for each man.³

¹ T.Rymer, Foedera (10 vols,Hagae Comitis, 1739-45),VI,p.35.
² Syllabus (In English) of the Documents Relating to England and Other Kingdoms Contained in the Collection Known as 'Rymer's Foedera' (3 vols, London, 1873), II,p.780.
³ Rymer, Foedera, VI, p.31.
Large retinues were typical of the 1513 war. One of Henry's favourites, Sir Henry Marney, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and commander of the left wing of the king's ward, brought with him 25 demi-lances, 200 archers, 200 bills and 75 pikes.\(^1\) Thomas Percy Earl of Northumberland brought 500 men who were either his own tenants and servants, or men who had come to serve under his banner, to fight in France, and meanwhile had 1,500 men from his estates in Cumberland fighting for Surrey at Flodden.\(^2\)

Others to provide huge bodies of tenants and servants for the wars included the Earl of Wiltshire (1,500), Lord Bergavenny (984), the Duke of Buckingham (550), and, most outstanding of all perhaps, the Stanley family, including the Earl of Derby, who had about 6,000 men from their estates at Flodden, as well as others in France. These were matched by the followings brought by the nobles to the 1544 war, such as the 100 horsemen and 1,200 infantry who served under John Lord Russell.\(^3\)

These groups formed the bulk of the manpower, and brought with them a great deal of equipment from the private arsenals of the nobles. The vanguard of 1513, for example, had at least 5,000 men in the service of nobles, according to a document in Wolsey's writing. A notable exception from the list was the following of the Earl of Shrewsbury, who would almost certainly have had some hundreds of his own men with him. Other nobles in the vanguard, such as Sir Sampson Norton, Master of the Ordnance, had 1,079 men, while the veteran soldier, Sir Rhys ap Thomas, had 2,993 men. If Shrewsbury had

\(^{1}\) L.P. I (3886).
\(^{3}\) Appendix F (a) and (b).
a following commensurate with his status, the vanguard may have had over 6,000 men who wore the badges of nobles, nearly double the total amount formed by the other type of troops in the advance force, the mercenary soldiers consisting of 1,050 Burgundian horse and 2,500 lansknechts.  

As mentioned, troops often brought their own equipment with them. Most of the nobles appear to have kept substantial private arsenals with armour and weapons, and if they were not able or anxious to send men, they could apparently substitute equipment. Sir Edward Poynings found himself only able to send 6 men at arms and 9 barded horse in 1513, instead of the 100 men ordered by the king. He pointed out in excuse that he had provided 100 sheafs of arrows, 100 bills, as well as various kinds of tents. The more normal practice with equipment, however, was to draw it from the vast stocks built up by the king.

A remarkable aspect of this system of recruiting is the light which it sheds on the function and military strength of the knights. It shows that the knights - here a distinction should be made between the knights as the upper rank of the minor nobility, and knights in general, including peers - had an important role to play in war. This role was apparently linked to their status in society. Several instances of knights bringing large retinues have already been mentioned, although some of these were of unusual wealth and influence. Sir Rhys ap Thomas, for example, was virtually a Welsh baron without a title. Others were important and wealthy courtiers, such as Sir Henry Marney, the king's favourite. But at a shire level, away from the distorting influences of court life, the knights still remained a major force in raising armies.

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1. L.P.I(4070).
2. Ibid. (3950).
The knights in fact usually occupied an importance disproportionate to their numbers amongst the minor nobles who supplied troops. They were 14 out of the 34 gentry who sent troops to France from Norfolk in 1544; 13 out of 34 in Suffolk; 8 out of 23 in Bedfordshire, and 2 out of 15 in Sussex. There were similar figures for the supply of troops from the north for the invasion of Scotland. In Yorkshire, the knights mustered more than either the lords or the other minor nobles. Between them 35 Yorkshire knights and squires raised nearly 2,000 out of the Yorkshire contingent of 4,500 men. The overall tendency was for the knights to be able to raise bodies of troops which were between those available to the peers and to the squires and gentlemen. The largest body of troops available to a Yorkshire knight in the 1544 muster was 300 men, the largest available to a lord 400; the smallest following available to a knight was 20 men, the smallest for a gentleman was 10 men. There was a considerable variation amongst the size of the knight's retinues, which probably reflects differing levels of wealth and influence. Eight of the retinues were of 20 men, 1 was of 30, 1 of 40, 2 of 50, 1 of 60, 5 of 100, 1 of 200 and 1 of 300. These followings were significantly above those of the gentlemen, of whom 43 out of 55 supplied bodies of 10 men each.

That these followings often related to the wealth of the individual knight, squire or gentleman is also indicated by the returns of musters. The largest retinue to be sent to Scotland by a gentleman belonged to John Tempest, a member of an old and eminent Yorkshire family. He was elevated to the rank of knight during another expedition in the following year.

1. L.P. XIX, i (273).
as were several other gentlemen, both during the 1544 and 1545 expeditions, who also brought the largest retinues with them. These included men such as William Calverley, who brought 20 men, and Christopher Metcalf, who brought 30 soldiers. The squires with the largest retinues were also more likely to be knighted during the ensuing campaigns than were their fellows with smaller followings. Two squires with larger than normal retinues in 1544 who were knighted during the subsequent wars were William Englebe, who brought 50 men, and William St. Quentin, who was accompanied by 20 men.

This would suggest that there was a link between the size of a gentleman's retinue, his wealth, and the prospects of his being knighted during an expedition in which he served. It might also suggest that men anxious to become knights would have taken the trouble to gather large retinues for their war service, as they could bring more men to war than was demanded of them from the king if they so wished. What it does indicate clearly is that the institution of knighthood was, at this time, by no means completely divorced from the reality of war, at least in this aspect.  

1. Figures for the discussion above are taken from Appendices D and E. They should be compared to the figures for the supply of troops in Appendices B and C. It was necessary to juggle somewhat when classifying the suppliers of retinues listed in Appendix E. Sir Ralph and Lady Bulmer supplied troops which were actually led by their son Ralph. This retinue has therefore been listed as a knight's retinue. John Tempest, however, has been listed as a mere gentleman, even though he was of high rank. One of his relatives who also supplied troops, for instance, was Sir Thomas Tempest. Some gentlemen, such as Richard Clyderowe and Marmaduke Wyvell, were discharged from the obligation to raise troops so that they could accompany their own lords to war, but have nevertheless been included in the ranks of gentlemen because they were assessed as having a potential retinue.
The third source of men for the wars was from Henry's own household and army, which has already been mentioned. This was extremely limited, as, apart from elite bodies such as the Gentlemen Pensioners, who numbered 75 plus their attendants in 1544, there were only the Yeomen of the Guard and the permanent garrisons in various castles such as Berwick and Calais, amounting altogether to only a few thousand men.

The fourth and more important source of men was through the hiring of continental mercenaries. The procedures adopted in hiring these men is worth examining in some detail because it demonstrates the limited ability, perspectives and training of those involved in operating this particularly inefficient system.

Henry sent his commissioners to scour the Empire in 1544 for high quality horse and foot. The enterprise was characterised by greed, bungling and ill will. Henry's original agreement with the Emperor was that Charles would provide England with 2,000 horse and 2,000 foot to be led by the Dutch admiral, Maximilian d'Egmont Count de Buren. But almost immediately that the agreement had been struck, Henry began to negotiate for an extra body of horse and 2,00 foot. It should have been apparent that this would make the already shaky relations which Henry enjoyed with his ally even more fragile, as he was trying to raise a large body of troops from the same area in which Charles was also trying to raise an army which was by contemporary standards of huge proportions. Besides the Count de Buren, Henry began to treat for 1,000 horse from a mercenary captain, Christian van Landenbergh, and 1,000 troops from a Baron Hadecke, who had become one of Henry's pensioners several years before.

1. L.P. XIX, i (6) 4 January 1544, Henry's instructions to his ambassador to Charles, Nicholas Wotton.
2. Ibid., (168), March 1544.
Henry was thus trying to raise 4,000 horse and 8,000 foot from the pool of Continental mercenaries. But there were several difficulties which proved insurmountable, apart from the sheer ambition of Henry's project. The primary trouble was that Henry's agents had no idea of how to go about raising the men, where to fix muster dates, and what rates of pay to offer, or even where the money was to come from. Apart from this, both sides tried from the beginning to cheat each other, and Henry kept interfering to change his instructions. The final factor which continually intervened was the intransigence and frequently open hostility of the Regent of the Netherlands and her officials.

The English were almost completely ignorant about how they should go about raising mercenary troops in 1544, as the last major occasion on which foreign troops had been recruited was in 1513. They did not know who was the best intermediary to approach, or even what type of men were available. Henry had to send them instructions that they should begin by getting a manual on rates of pay translated from German. He also described to them a step by step system for negotiation.¹ This included the advice that they should offer different rates of pay to the various leaders in order to win them over. The result of this was that the captains began to compare the offers amongst themselves, and the commissioners soon reported that the English offers were being scoffed at.²

Bungling, crossed intentions and mistrust were becoming apparent by the middle of April. Wotton wrote to Henry that he had interviewed Hans von Sickengen, whose father had served Henry in 1513. The mercenary demanded a higher than normal pay and a surety from Henry. He claimed that since his father had once been cheated of pay, he now always asked

¹ L.P. XIX, i (208).
² Ibid., (215), (245), (246), March 1544.
for the security of a town, such as Frankfurt, or a company, such as the Fuggers. Wotton was of the opinion that von Sickengen was unsuitable for service because his face was garnished with "rubies" as if his mother had never taught him to water his wine. He noticed, however, that the Imperial Chancellor, Granvelle, was most courteous towards him, uncovering his head and bidding him leave on his own hat. The arrogance and intransigence of mercenaries such as von Sickengen eventually led to a complete breakdown in negotiations. Charles intervened because recruitment was taking too long, and ordered Wotton to hire von Sickengen's 1,000 horse without Henry's leave.  

This brought a reprimand for Wotton - one of many for the commissioners - because Henry considered the German "unmeet" to serve. Henry displayed his wishful thinking by ordering Wotton to recover the money already paid.  

The friction caused by this misunderstanding between Charles and Henry was compounded when German captains began to revoke contracts to serve Charles because they wished to enter Henry's service, on the grounds that he would compensate them for the loss of horse and harness.  

Negotiations and the details of administering the musters, where men and weapons were inspected and hiring fees paid, continued into June, when dissatisfaction on both sides came to a head. The commissioners were displeased with de Buren because he was apparently deliberately delaying mustering his men and was collecting insufficient numbers. But Henry was

1. L.P. XIX, i (312), 9 April 1544.
2. Ibid., (322), 12 April 1544.
3. Ibid., (360), 19 April 1544.
4. Ibid., (555), 22 May 1544.
5. Ibid., (622), 3 June 1544.
himself plotting against other mercenary captains. He planned to separate van Landenbergh from his men even though van Landenbergh claimed his musters were well in hand. Henry had gradually become aware that the German was swindling both his own men and the English. The mercenary was short on musters, but still asked for bonus payments in the form of double pays, which he did not pass on to his followers. His disgruntled men blamed the English agents, and threatened to hack them to death, so that the commissioners fled. By this time the negotiations had deteriorated so much that Norfolk believed it would be impossible to fit the Germans into the army amicably, even if they were split into small groups.

The privy council ordered the commissioners to dismiss van Landenbergh, if necessary with his infantrymen as well, but to secretly retain his horsemen. But a week later Henry changed his mind, countermanding the order and instructing Norfolk to retain Landenbergh if he seemed sorry for the insulting remarks he had made about the king. His horse were definitely to be retained, but the foot were to be dismissed if they were not already on the march.

By mid-June the war already in progress, and the planned muster dates of May were well past, yet no significant mercenary forces had yet been assembled. The forces brought by de Burens were found to be inadequate because 200 of his horsemen were pages, which the count refused to rectify, and the commissioner was doubtful of the quality of those yet to come.

1. L.P.XIX i (623), 3 June 1544.
2. Ibid., (648), 8 June 1544.
3. Ibid., (674), 11 June 1544.
4. Ibid., (682), 12 June 1544.
5. Ibid., (703), 15 June 1544.
6. Ibid., (710), 15 June 1544.
Van Landenbergh, despite his reprieve, continued to bargain for more money. The commissioners discovered that not only did he not have the specified barded horse, but he was asking for bonus payments at an exorbitant rate, that is, 1,700 more per 3,000 men than the Emperor paid. This was despite Henry's already having raised the bonus payments from 60 per ensign to 100 per ensign.¹

Once more rumours became rife of the imminent dismissal of van Landenbergh for his arrogance and greed.² These stories horrified the Regent of the Netherlands, who had long complained of the damage being done by van Landenbergh's mutinous infantrymen around Liege. She feared that her country would be wasted if they were dismissed altogether.³ Granvelle and Charles were both writing to Henry urging him to retain van Landenbergh lest he defect to the French. Granvelle suggested that if he was retained he could then be executed, while Charles suggested he might be punished in some other way.⁴ The king's agents shared the fears of the Regent and the Emperor, as they had already experienced some skirmishes.⁵ The English were in a quandary, however, as they were now faced with the difficulty of getting two months back pay for van Landenbergh's men, as he had embezzled all their wages.⁶ Henry turned on his commissioners, blaming them for the bungling of payments, and started direct negotiations for more horse from another mercenary. This man was later described the Imperial ambassador, Chapuys, as a bankrupt merchant by the name of Lightmaker who now dabbled in war.⁷ But Henry's own negotiations

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1. L.P. XIX, i (728), 18 June 1544.
2. Ibid., (730), 18 June 1544.
3. Ibid., (767), 24 June 1544.
4. Ibid., (770), 24 June 1544.
5. Ibid., (838), 4 July 1544.
6. Ibid., (839), 4 July 1544.
7. Ibid. (866), 7 July 1544.
also went astray, and throughout July there was a flurry of correspondence as the court and commissioners tried to get mercenaries to join the army in time for the war, and to make arrangements for payments. ¹

Lightmaker eventually joined the king at Boulogne with 100 horsemen, at the same time as some 500 Flemish infantry and three ensigns, or between 3 and 500 horsemen, whom the commissioners had managed to raise elsewhere. This was on 21 August, only weeks before the end of the campaign. ²

Van Landenbergh's horse joined the army at about the same time. But instead of going to Montreuil, where he was told to go, and where there was thought to be more provisions for his horses, he insisted on going to join the king at Boulogne, who in any case wanted his horse for a bodyguard. ³

Months of frustrating and often bitter negotiations had brought the English a mercenary cavalry force of slightly more than 3,000 men, the bulk of whom arrived too late to be of any use. They were deployed inefficiently, and much of the money used to raise them would appear to have been diverted into the treasuries of their leaders. A major section of Henry's army of 1544 was thus perhaps more a hindrance than an asset because of the chaotic recruitment methods which were employed.

The drawbacks involved in recruiting mercenary forces indicates, at the same time, the great importance assumed by the nobles as suppliers of men for the army. Not only were they the chief agents in assembling the major body of troops, but they were also a relatively reliable source of men.

¹. L.P.XIX,i(925),(935), (952), (1006).
². Ibid., ii, (424).
³. Ibid., (105), 18 August 1544.
iii. Provisions.

It was only with the greatest difficulty that an army could be financed, and the recruitment of men, particularly of mercenaries, could be an irksome task with poor results. But once the army had been assembled and financed, lack of provisions was almost certain to cripple any extended campaign, especially on overseas expeditions.

Neither administrative practice nor the quality of materials were adequate for the supply of food, munitions or clothing. When the Earl of Surrey, for example, marched towards Flodden on the day of battle in 1513, his troops had been hungry and thirsty for a day because there were no provisions available.¹

The supply situation might be slightly better if the king was with the army, because his presence demanded abundant food supplies. Even so, provisioning remained chaotic in France, particularly in 1544. Wolsey had struggled to impose some order in 1513, but was hindered by poor communications, inefficiency and theft. Bishop Fox reported a critical shortage of beer barrels at the Southampton embarkation point. He believed that this was due to pilfering, and recommended that the pursers be hanged.² In addition, victuals were being sent to the wrong place, apparently because of poor communication between court and the cocks, "...and noon knoweth what another doth, nor what yche of them sendeth hidder..."³

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.107.
³ Ibid., (46), 8 June 1513.
He recommended that the distribution of supplies should be put in the hands of the Admiral, Thomas Howard, but he too was having major problems at this time reorganising the remnants of the fleet which had straggled home from Brest. He described it as the worst ordered and most unruly army he had ever seen, half of which had deserted.¹

Detailed records of the disorder of 1544 are even more apparent. They include the records of the feud which developed between Hertford, in command of the invasion fleet for Scotland, and court officials. Hertford was delayed for crucial weeks in the northern ports while waiting for his supplies to arrive. When they did come, they proved inadequate, due to the gross negligence, or worse, of Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, and his subordinates.²

The administration of provisions for the French invasion proved even more disastrous, being virtually sufficient by itself to cripple the whole invasion. One example of this, and of the limited nature of contemporary concepts of the scale of operations involved, was the attempt to hire carts from the Netherlands for the transport of victuals. The king despatched one man at arms from Calais to the Regent of the Netherlands to negotiate for the raising of a body of horses and carts. This amazed the Regent, as well as annoying her, as she considered that one man was insufficient for such a task, not to mention that Henry was asking for too many vehicles.³ Not only did the man at arms have to raise and conduct 1,100 draught horses, 500 carts and their drivers singlehandedly, but when he came to her he...

¹ N.R.S. (77), May 1513.
² L.P. XIX, i (290), (366), (411).
³ Ibid. (647), 8 June 1544.
was acting in complete ignorance of his mission because his instructions were in sealed orders to be opened only at her court.¹

Mary's complaints and hard bargaining caused Henry to threaten that he would call off the expedition because he would not have enough vehicles for the number of troops he had agreed to send.²

Such misgivings over provisioning proved correct, because from the opening days of the campaign provisioning proved inadequate, as is shown by the misadventures which befell Norfolk and the vanguard. At first, and somewhat unusually, there appears to have been a concern amongst the nobles to make sure that their men were well fed. The vanguard was issued with a new invention, carts containing ovens and a geared device for grinding grain. The theory was that flour could be made and bread baked while the army was on the march. But Norfolk had to report almost immediately that the machinery fell to pieces soon after the journey began.³ After this initial setback, Norfolk and his fellow officers seem to have lost their enthusiasm for safeguarding the men's welfare, and soon virtually left them to fend for themselves, especially as there was a crucial shortage of provisions almost from the outset. Within two days of the failure of the wagons, Norfolk found that he would have to venture into enemy territory during his march because of a shortage of hay and grass for the cavalry in English occupied areas. He was also short of armour and weapons for his soldiers, apart from the shortage of provender.⁴ The

¹ L.P., XIX, i. (284).
² Ibid., (318), 12 April 1544.
³ Ibid., (654), 9 June 1544.
⁴ Ibid., (675), 11 June 1544.
infantry was forced to live on its wages because there were insufficient provisions accompanying the army. The locals made the best of this by charging outrageous prices.\(^1\) One of the reasons why there was not enough food with the army was that the wagons were found to be too small to carry enough goods.\(^2\) Norfolk complained several days later that not a loaf of bread had been made by the army's cooks, and that without help from their Flemish allies his men would have died at the rate of 2,000 a day. He himself was running short of cash for the army, as he had already spent £50,000 of his ready money on coats, conduct money - an allowance paid for soldiers to get to the army from home - carriages and wages. He only had £9,000 left with him to pay the mercenaries when they arrived on the scheduled date of 8 July. If the king had not joined him by then he would have to be sent £40,000 more.\(^3\)

Norfolk's letters indicate that he was leading an army that was on the point of disintegration through lack of provisions only a few days after it had assembled. This picture was supported by the account of Ellis Gruffydd, who was present in the van.\(^4\) He wrote that when the army began to march, bread sold for a common soldier's daily wage. Gruffydd blamed this on the officers. He claimed that they would not buy bread from towns where there was ample, and that large supplies of food were being transported separately to the main body of the army, being kept some 20 miles distant. This may have been merely a camp rumour, but it was consistent with other behaviour by the nobles later reported by Gruffydd.\(^5\)

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1. L.P., (694), 13 June 1544.
2. Ibid., (709), 15 June 1544.
3. Ibid., (738), 19 June 1544.
5. Ibid., p.53.
When Norfolk's army reach Montreuil, it had become almost completely undisciplined because of the lack of provisions. Food was being sent from St.Omer's, but not much was arriving because of transport difficulties, including theft by hauliers. In order to feed themselves, the soldiers were wandering around the countryside in small groups and unarmed, and were eating green fruit which did not assist their health. The risk of illness was also heightened by dead horses being left to rot where they fell in the camp.¹

There were some other half-hearted and poorly organised attempts to get food to the men, but all proved failures. An attempt to victual the army via the port of Etaples failed, for example, because of poor liaison between the court and hired Dutch ships. After this mishap, it was left to the English officers at Montreuil to arrange for the transport of food from Boulogne. This apparently resulted in a monopoly situation in which the captains were able to sell the goods to their men at greatly inflated prices.²

The poor provisioning of the army meant that by the time the English were about to depart, the horses were dying in large numbers, and the Burgundian mercenaries falling at the rate of 20 a day from hunger and disease.³ Count de Burens complained on 19 September that he had lost 700 men, and Norfolk wrote that nearly all of his men had been without bread for the last three days. Even the nobles were feeling the effects of shortages and unhealthy conditions, as John Lord Russell, joint commander of the force, and a number of other nobles fell ill.⁴

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¹Gruffydd ii, pp.59-60. Illness caused by soldiers eating unsuitable local food was a common difficulty of the period. See Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.31.
²Gruffydd, ii, p.68.
³L.P.XIX, ii (204), 8 September 1544, (244) 17 September 1544.
⁴Ibid., (259), 19 September 1544.
Disorder broke out during the withdrawal because heavy articles were left behind, such as barrels of wine. Many soldiers seized the opportunity for a carouse, and were left behind to be killed by the advancing French.

Once in Calais, the men suffered even worse outbreaks of disease, and provisions were as scarce as ever. Dozens were left to die in the streets from a combination of hunger and illness. Gruffydd later recalled the picture presented by the army as it straggled home.

...the soldiers coming from Calais and Boulogne were dying along the road from Dover to London, and along the roads from London to every quarter of the kingdom, while trying to go to their homes. After they had come home those who were well fell sick and those who were sick got worse.¹

A combination of neglect, inefficiency and corruption had together done more than any enemy action to destroy Norfolk's vanguard, a portion of the largest army yet sent to invade France by England. His misfortune was shared by Henry and his army during the siege of Boulogne, which was continually troubled by shortages, especially of gunpowder, and by the Emperor and his army during the Imperial advance on Paris, a march halted by shortages of provisions.²

This was not only because of the inefficiency of the administration of provisions, but, as is shown in the next section, also because the attention and energy of the nobles was directed more towards maintaining their own comfort while on expedition.

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1. Gruffydd, ii, pp.82-94.
2. L.P. XIX, ii (177), 2 September 1544; S.P. X, v (MII), (MVIII), July 1544.
iv. **Comfort.**

Armies of the early sixteenth century campaigned on the principle that it was necessary to provide the nobles with accommodation answering as closely as possible to the comfort of their homes, but that the comfort of the common soldier mattered hardly at all. The result was that the armies were burdened down with vast amounts of material for the ease of nobles. This meant that there was correspondingly less room for essential supplies for the men. Money that was spent on the infantryman was directed rather towards his appearance than to ensuring he had eaten well or had a dry bed.

Henry's army of 1513, for example, was loaded down with tons of tents for the nobles, and a small palace for the king. The treasurer, who was typical of the greater nobles, had a mobile home consisting of two large tents - the main one 15 feet wide and 30 feet long - joined together by an 18 feet long passageway. The other nobles had larger or smaller encampments, depending on their wealth and rank, decorated with their coats of arms and badges of offices. The most magnificent of all was that of the king, its tents and prefabricated walls forming a vast, glittering maze. A visitor entered the palace through an entrance porch which led him into a pavilion 18 feet wide. A long passage then ushered him into the First Chamber, which was 40 feet long. Another passage went from this to the King's Great Chamber, which might be compared with the great hall of a castle. This was 15 feet wide and 50 feet long. The more private areas of the palace were joined to the Great Chamber by another lengthy passage, which led to the king's prefabricated wooden house, which had its own chimneys. A double set of passages each 40 feet long connected this to two more pavilions, both 30 feet in length, while on either side of the house, at right angles, were more pavilions. In addition, there were other quarters connected to the tent palace for his officers, such as the Provost Marshal,
the Knight Harbingers, and the Master Cook. Even such lavish accommodation proved inadequate, as the king had extra tents made for his use during the course of the expedition. He also brought with him a tent used for special occasions, as is described in Chapter Six.¹

These tents and houses once assembled in a camp made an impressive sight, as Hall showed in his description of the scene before Therouanne, where Henry

...planted his sege in most warlike-wise, his camp was environed with artilerie, as Fawcones, serpentynes, caste hagbushes and trycle harowes, spien trestyls, and other warlike defence for the saugarde of the campe. The kyng for hym self had a howse of tymber with a chymney of yron, and for his other lodgynges he had great and goodly tentes of blewe water worke garnyshed with yelowe, and white, diverse romes within the same for all offices necessary, on the toppe of the pavilions stode the kynges bestes holdynge fanes, as the Lion, the Dragon, the Greyhounde, the Antelope, the Donne Kowe: within all the lodgynge was poyncted ful of the sunnes risynge, the lodgynge was C xxv. foot in length.²

Nothing could contrast more with this description than the usual conditions borne by the common men. They slept wherever they could find shelter - often under hedges - and the only allowance towards their comfort was the payment of conduct money. The nobles' attitude to the need for comfort for the common soldier is perhaps typified by the action of the Regent of the Netherlands. She noticed that men under the command of Sir Edward Poynings had spoiled their coats through sleeping on the ground. She therefore provided each soldier with a new coat of yellow, red, white and green wool, for which she was greatly praised.³

¹ L.P. I (4629).
² Hall, Henry VIII. I, p.72.
³ Ibid., p.37.
(b) THE RULES OF WAR.

Administrative efficiency does not appear to have been a primary concern of the warrior noble. But the weight of tradition, and the current style of waging war, meant that a great deal of time, money, manpower and effort was spent in making sure that war conformed to the accepted sets of rules shared by all sides in the conflict. These rules were an essential element of war at the time. They included formalised regulations governing behaviour in war, as well as the jumble of rules, written and unwritten, which had grown up around warfare over the centuries, including the paraphenalia of war such as heralds, the ceremonial of sieges, and the code of ransoms.

i. Regulations.

Regulations to govern the behaviour of troops had been introduced as early as the reign of Richard II, and continued to be issued at the start of each campaign during Henry's time. These rules governed aspects of war such as the morals of soldiers, including their behaviour during battles. War had a moral dimension during the sixteenth century, and victory in battle was considered to be at least partially dependent on pious actions. Many of the 32 clauses of the 1513 regulations, and the long preamble in particular, dwelt on these moral themes. Second only to the order to obey the king and his officers was the requirement that English soldiers should respect the sacrament, as well as the Church and its members.¹

Yet, at the same time, the regulations had a practical application, in terms of the current style of waging war. This practical application was evident in the same rules that governed the moral dimension of warfare. Children, for example,

¹ T.R.P. 5 H.VIII 106.
were to be protected from the ravages of war. But this pious outlook was tempered by the proviso that where there was the prospect of a substantial ransom, the rule might be overlooked: any child under the age of 14 could be held to ransom if he was the son of a lord, a gentleman, a rich man or a captain.
ii. **Ransoms.**

Lengthy clauses were devoted to the system of ransoming in the 1513 regulations. This was because it was one of the more important aspects of war to soldiers of the early sixteenth century. The rights and conduct appropriate to the system were jealously guarded both by official regulations and by the nobles, and, to some extent, by the common soldiers, as ransoming was a system under which all could hope to benefit, and the nobles in particular. Lord Herbert recalled that his family's fortune had been made at about this time by his grandfather, who had secured some substantial ransoms while fighting in the mid-century wars. And as well as furthering the fortunes of rising families such as the Herberths, the ransoming system helped to ensure that war was relatively safe and pleasant for the warrior noble.

The regulations covered ransoming in great detail, outlining, for instance, the methods by which paroles could be obtained, and trying to settle in advance the kinds of disputes that arose over the question of the ownership of prisoners. Any noble who was captured was to be surrendered to the king, but if any other rank was captured in battle or deed of arms, the captor could take from him a weapon as token of his word, and did not need to guard him from then until the end of the "adventure". The prisoner was therefore safeguarded from being captured twice, unless it could be shown that he had a weapon with him, in which case the ransom was to be shared, and the last captor had to take responsibility for guarding the prisoner.

Not only were such details of the effecting of a ransom covered specifically, but the monetary aspects of ransoms

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were also carefully established by both sides before conflict began. When the Dauphin was advancing towards Boulogne in 1544, he let it be known that the ransom for the commander of the king's forces would be 1,000 crowns, and between a month and a week's pay for specified officers. Gentlemen of the household of the Crown were to be ransomed for a quarter's pay, and other gentlemen for "honest" ransoms. No prisoners were to be kept for more than 8 days.¹

The forms of ransoms were seriously observed. Norfolk refused to pay the ransom of men who were captured before the details of the system for the 1544 was worked out.² He also hanged soldiers who attacked Frenchmen who were travelling under safe conduct following their release from captivity at Boulogne.³

The ransoming system performed a number of important functions for the nobility and the army. For the army it meant that there was no need to concern itself with the guarding of large numbers of prisoners, which in any case its weak administrative system could not cope with. Wheneve large numbers of prisoners were taken, it caused great problems, which usually resulted in the common soldiers being released, and the nobles being billeted in the homes of their English counterparts.⁴

The ransom system thus meant that nobles could usually hope to be returned to their army within days, or even hours, of their capture, or, if they were kept prisoner, the likelihood was that they would be treated as an honoured guest. Wallop negotiated the release of three men at arms the day after they were captured in skirmishes between his garrison at Guisnes and the Dauphin's army while it was passing to Boulogne.

¹ L.P. XIX, ii (415).
² Gruffydd, ii, p.51.
³ L.P. XIX, ii (270).
⁴ Ibid. XIX, i (943).
⁵ Ibid., ii (380).
The Chevalier Bayard, captured at the battle of Spurs, was sent on a tour through the Netherlands.

The comfort with which the nobles captured by the English were treated was also partially an outcome of Henry's desire to display to all his nobility and generosity. He appears to have always been extremely generous to his noble prisoners, even during the bitter wars of the 1540's. The Scottish nobles who happened to be brought to London after the battle of Solway Moss, for example, were lodged in comfort at Lambeth Palace at the king's expense, and were even given money for their journey home when they were released. Perhaps his most conspicuously honourable behaviour towards his prisoners was after Spurs, when he acted with expansive, and expensive, generosity. He was presented with the leading French nobles after the battle. Henry gave them a warm welcome, and clad their leader, the Duc de Longueville, in a cloak of cloth of gold. He then invited the duke to dine with him, and personally made sure that the French deputy commander had water for washing. The Duke tried to refuse the honours extended to him - as was the polite thing to do - but Henry insisted, pointing out that the Frenchman was constrained to accept because he was a prisoner.

The Venetian ambassador who observed these proceedings took all of these courtesies as signs of great graciousness on Henry's part. Henry's generosity was not confined merely to dining his most exalted captive, however, as he also proclaimed that he would reduce the ransoms of nobles. If any noble was assessed at a ransom of 4,000 crowns, he would pay half the cost himself.¹

The Duke continued in his honourable and comfortable captivity until released the following year.

¹ V.P. II (288).
Prisoners were sometimes mistreated. Francis was not averse to selling some of his prisoners to the infidel. But breaches of the rules usually brought loud protests from the nobles in particular, and for the common men it was unwise to mistreat the source of a potential fortune. Ransoms were shrewdly assessed, and sharp practice was indulged in by both captive and captor to make the most of their opportunities. Within a short time of the battle of Spurs, for example, Henry’s ambassador in the Netherlands was shrewdly assessing the value of Frenchman brought there (illegally) by Burgundian horsemen who had been present at Guinegate. The Burgundians had held aloof from the battle until the last moment, and had then rushed in to capture as many nobles as possible.

Another practical purpose of the ransoming system was that it allowed both sides to spy out camps when they sent their heralds to negotiate for the release of prisoners. Everyone involved in war was aware of this, and played upon it. One Italian mercenary captured by the English in 1544 was persuaded to turn his coat: he was sent back to the French camp ostensibly to fetch his ransom, but actually to spy for his captors.

The ransoming system thus performed numerous functions in contemporary war. Its relatively efficient operation was largely an outcome of it serving the desires of many ranks of society, and in particular that of the nobles. For the nobility, ransoms were an insurance that war would be a less dangerous theatre of activity. In their expensive suits of armour and mounted on warhorses, they were clearly marked as

1. L.P. I (4429), (4418).
2. L.P. XIX ii (414), (415); cf. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Existing in the Archives and Collections of Milan ed. A.B.Hinds (London, 1912), I (652), September, 1513. Hereunder as M.P.
potential ransoms whom it was unwise to kill, as Audley pointed out in his pamphlet. He recommended that if, when boarding a ship, an English captain caught sight of an enemy sail, he should commit every captive to the sea floor except for the captain and men of quality.¹

Ransoming was a major aspect of contemporary war, as well as a constant reminder to all of the elite status of the warrior noble.

¹ Audley, A Book of Orders.
iii. Heralds.

The use of such things as the system of ransoming indicates one of the major characteristics of early sixteenth century war. This was its formal, almost ceremonial appearance. At the same time, however, there was often a coldly practical application of the formal rules and styles of behaviour to the reality of war. These two aspects of war - its theatricality and its pragmatism - seem to have co-existed without causing much concern to contemporaries.

The pageant-like nature of war, and its coincident pragmatism, is also demonstrated by the use of heralds. Heralds had a wide range of functions at this time, and obtain great prominence in the records of the 1513 and 1544 wars because of the many important tasks which they performed, apart from the colour and ceremonial quality which they added to war.

Henry took 8 heralds with him on the 1544 expedition: Garter and Clarenceux kings of arms, Windsor and Somerset heralds, and Portcullis, Bluemantle, Risbancke, Hammes and Guisnes pursuivants. These men were themselves drawn from the ranks of the nobility whom they served, and whose attitudes they shared. Charles Wriothesley, Windsor Herald, was the brother of Thomas Lord Wriothesley and the son of William, York Herald. Thomas's godfathers had been the Duke of Buckingham and the fifth Earl of Northumberland. Employing heralds was yet another badge of the status of a noble, who would take as many heralds with him on an expedition as his rank, office and wealth allowed. The Earl of Northumberland took several of his own heralds with him to France in 1513, while the Earl of Shrewsbury was allowed the use of Lancaster herald by Henry in that year, in addition to any heralds of his own who may have accompanied him.

1. L.P. XIX, i (651).
2. D.N.B., entry for Wriothesley, LXIII, p.140.
As with the other formalised aspects of war, the use of heralds was taken very seriously by Henry. He had Lancaster herald beheaded after the Pilgrimage of Grace because the herald had knelt to the rebel leader Aske while wearing Henry's coat of arms. The herald had been carrying out one of the normal wartime tasks of heralds, delivering a proclamation to the rebels. Henry's concern over the prestige and safety of heralds was shared by other nobles, including his Scottish enemies. Many Scots nobles protested when Somerset herald was murdered by some Scots while on a mission to James V in 1542, and wrote to James expressing the hope that his killers would be punished.

As mentioned, heralds had a wide variety of ceremonial and official duties, both in peace and wartime. Heralds were responsible during peacetime for establishing the pedigrees and right to a coat of arms of the many people anxious to acquire recognition of nobility, especially during the 1530's when there a scramble to achieve gentility. They also helped to conduct tournaments and royal events such as weddings and funerals. And they played crucial roles in the conduct of campaigns. They sometimes took the place of the posts, helping to give armies better liaison than they could otherwise have hoped for. They took messages between field commanders and the court, and they conveyed most of the important messages that went between enemy forces. The Scottish threat to invade England unless Henry withdrew from France in 1513 was delivered to Henry outside the walls of Therouanne by Scotland's Lion Herald. Heralds also performed an important function as spies, as mentioned above. Surrey kept sending heralds into the Scottish camp at Flodden on the day before battle, both to convey challenges and to spy. The challenges themselves were strategic as much as a matter of honour, as they were an incitement to James to keep his

1. Wriothesley's Chronicle, I, p.84.
2. Seymour Papers, p.50.
promise to fight the English, as Surrey was always faced with the danger that James would withdraw to temporary safety in Scotland. This would have forced the English to disband their army because they could not keep it provisioned for long in the Marches.¹

Heralds gave a ceremonial appearance to war. But they also performed important functions in early sixteenth century war, with their colourful duties as much as their more mundane roles such as delivering letters and arranging ransoms.

¹. Hall, Henry VIII. i, p.105.
iv. Sieges.

Early sixteenth century warfare thus had a colourful, pageant like appearance which was an outcome of the more or less formalised rules and systems of behaviour that permeated war. At the same time, the ceremonial and pageantry was very much a part of the reality of war, helping to shape the nature of war, as well as being shaped in turn by the practice of war.

This was shown by the formal behaviour which surrounded sieges. The pomp and ceremony which accompanied a siege was itself an indication of the prominence which sieges had in contemporary war. They were probably the most common theatre of war in which Henry and his men had experience, and were the central element in contemporary strategy, apart from the considerations of honour.

The progress of a siege was clearly marked by regulated conduct which it would have been unthinkable to ignore. A siege began with an official proclamation from the besieger that set out the terms of the attack, such as the claims to territory made by the invaders, the justification of their attack, and the conditions for surrender. Brandon wrote to the king from Boulogne in 1544 seeking instructions on the terms of such a proclamation before beginning the assault:

...besechyng (you Highnes) to commaunde the wordes of the sommons to be brought to us, for (I the Duke) of Suff. never did s(ee sie)ge layed without summons.

Suffolk and Henry worked out carefully the details of the summons, concerned to see that it was appropriate and

1. L.P. XIX, i (932).
precise. They quibbled, for example, over the extent of the territory which it was reasonable for Henry to claim in the summons.\textsuperscript{1}

While the elaborate and complicated business of the siege continued, both sides would be busily working out the means of surrender, the besieged in order to preserve their own lives in the event of defeat, the attackers to cut short the lengthy business of a siege. Much attention was paid to the details of evacuating the fortress and to the problems of assuming control by the besiegers. This was in order to augment the honour of the victor, as well as preserving the prestige of the defeated, as much as to safeguard the safety of everyone concerned. Typical of this aspect of the siege were the terms of surrender for Thérouanne in 1513. The garrison was allowed to march out with bags and baggage, colours flying, the men at arms helmeted and lances at their thighs.\textsuperscript{2} This contributed to the splendour of the occasion for Henry, as he reviewed the departing French garrison accompanied by the Emperor Maximilian. Henry always turned such surrenders into splendid processions when he was present. On this occasion he marched into the city at the head of his army dressed in gilded and engraved armour, followed by his henchmen (youths educated at court) carrying other pieces of his armour such as the helmet.

\ldots thus with great glory this goodly prince entered and took possession of the towne of Tirwin and was received at the Cathedral church with procession, and they heard masse and dyned in the bishoppes palice\ldots\textsuperscript{3}

The ceremonial associated with the surrender of Tournai, at the conclusion of the campaign, was even more magnificent, with tournaments, masques and banquets.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] L.P. XIX, i (933), (940).
\item[2.] L.P. I (4410); Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.88-9.
\item[3.] Ibid., pp. 89-90.
\item[4.] Ibid., pp.114-8.
\end{itemize}
Henry's triumph at Boulogne was rather hurried because of the deteriorating military situation, but he still contrived to turn it into an occasion of splendour and gallantry. He again reviewed the French garrison as it marched out, the last to come being the commander, M.de Vervins, who dismounted before the king.

And after he had talked with hym a space, the kyng toke him by the hand, and he reverently kneling upon his knees, kyssed hys hande... 1

Soon after this honourable interchange, Henry rode into his new possession, his naked sword borne before him, "...like a noble and valyaunt conqueror...", his trumpeters playing on the walls of the city. 2

Henry concluded the most important event of his last venture into war as he had marked the end of the first venture, with the pomp and ceremony which was an integral part of siege warfare.

2. Ibid., p.350.
(c) CONCLUSION.

The administrative systems of early sixteenth century warfare were, by almost any standards, inefficient. They prevented large armies from being held together long enough or from moving rapidly enough to achieve any major gains in an invasion of France.

But at the same time that little care or attention was paid to improving the administrative efficiency of armies, a great deal of attention was paid to what might be classified as the ceremonial aspects of war. This was because, to the nobles of the time, those ceremonial aspects were important elements of war in their own right, serving the particular needs which the nobles had in war, of the kind discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. It should be remembered, at the same time, that what might be considered as ceremonial aspects of war, such as heralds, and to some extent ransoms, also performed recognised functions in contemporary warfare. No matter that from a modern point of view they may seem unnecessary appendages which tended to increase the inefficiency of war. To contemporary minds, they appeared as aspects of the reality of war.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ARMY: PART III. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

It is perhaps not surprising, given the poor state of the administrative system of the early Tudor army, and the importance placed on ceremonial aspects of war, that strategy and tactics would appear to have been rather haphazard and crude. In fact, as with other areas of war, strategy and tactics were often conditioned by the concept of warfare held by the noble military elite. The prestige of a noble was a major determinant of the movement and deployment of an army, together with other factors including the already mentioned paucity of organisation and the crucial importance of fortresses.

i. The Influence of Fortification.

Siege warfare was probably the main military activity of the early sixteenth century, both in terms of the seasonal campaigns involving the capture of fortresses such as Boulogne, and in the cold wars which continued along the frontiers for decades. Fortifications helped to shape the main aspects of early sixteenth century war.

The architecture of the castle builder had reasserted itself over the skill of the artilleryman after the period during the fifteenth century when fortresses were often captured after a siege of days rather than months. The elaboration of already existing defences meant that the besieged were once again at an advantage over besiegers.

The importance of fortification for Henry and his nobles is indicated in several ways. Not only did Henry continue to build up his siege weapons and try to improve their firepower, but he also embarked on the largest campaign of castle building ever undertaken by an English king, using the
latest techniques. This programme began in the 1530's in response to threats of attack from the Continent along the southern coast, but he also repaired and extended his castles and forts along the Marches and in the Calais Pale during the wars of the 1540's, as he had also done during the wars of the early years of his reign.¹ As with most other aspects of the military machine, castles were ignored when not actually in use, and were allowed to decay during periods of peace, to be hurriedly repaired when war threatened once more.

The effect of the importance of the fortress as far as strategy was concerned was that it meant that Henry's major wars consisted of either rapid incursions into enemy territory or seasonal campaigns centred on a few sieges which would gain only limited country for the English. There could be no long term gains of foreign land, either in France or in Scotland. And there was less likelihood of battles in the open field, and little of the marching and countermarching typical of war in other eras, such as the wars of Edward III. In the early sixteenth century there were few large scale encounters fought by the English. The strategy of war was in this sense very similar to that which Oman has identified as typical of England in the twelfth century, when siege war also predominated and there were only a handful of battles.²

The main feature of sixteenth century strategy, the possession of fortresses, was therefore much the same as had applied for centuries with only brief periods of fluctuation.

In such warfare, Henry's large armies were a liability, because of the difficulty of provisioning so many men during the months of a siege, and because, as is shown

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below, the mixture of nationalities caused by the use of mercenaries brought problems of discipline. In any case, pike and English archers were suited for battle in the open field rather than in a siege.

The importance of siege warfare to strategy also had great importance for the nobles as a distinct group. As the elite cavalry, and as members of the cavalry in general, they had a crucial part to play in such war. The infantry was more use for the mundane details of a siege, such as digging mines, which were, incidentally, at least as important as cannon during a siege. But the cavalry, because of its mobility, was very useful in the skirmishes which accompanied a siege. They guarded supply routes and scoured for enemy bands infiltrating the district, or they penetrated deep into enemy territory to attack their supply routes. These were amongst the types of operations performed by the King's Spears in 1513, and which Surrey and other nobles performed during the 1544 war and its aftermath.

The prevalence of siege warfare therefore resulted in considerable prominence for the cavalry, and hence for the nobility, in early sixteenth century war.

At the same time as the fortress dominated the strategic thinking of the nobility, it was also a part of their group identity, a symbol of their place in society as a military elite. Castles were still held by many nobles at this time, both as residences and as sites of military importance. The Crown realized the power that this gave the nobles, and it continually tried to seize more privately held fortresses into its control, although rather than razing them, Henry usually handed them back to his courtier nobles. After the seizure of 12 castles from the Duke of Buckingham in the 1520's most were soon given to faithful servants and favourites such as Sir William Compton and Sir Richard Wingfield.1

In the north, where threat of attack was always more imminent, nobles strengthened old castles and built new ones during the reign of Henry. Lord Dacre (1509-25), for example, built two new castles to repel Scots invasions and strengthened his castle at Naworth.¹

The Earl of Northumberland, as Warden of the Northern Marches in 1528, took the possession of his family castles so seriously that he would not let visiting Scots inside his castle at Warkworth lest its secrets should be betrayed.²

The castle as a symbol of the power of the military elite had become ingrained into the minds of the nobility, who not only lived in these fortresses, but also spent long periods of their military service as the commanders and members of garrisons in the Pale and on the Marches.

The symbol of the castle was to be found in their domestic architecture, such as Henry Howard Earl of Surrey's mansion which was built while he was waiting to participate in one of Henry's wars. It was the first classically influenced palace built in England, but its banqueting halls were built in the shape and style of castles.³

Castles were, therefore, both crucial in determining strategy, and also a major aspect of the concept that the nobles had of the nature of their group, as the body in society that drew its lifestyle and its power in part from the fortress.

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² Brenan, House of Percy, I, p.201.
Mention was made at the beginning of this chapter of the influence of considerations of noble prestige on campaign strategies, a factor which appears to have been equally important as the predominance of siege warfare in determining the planning of military manoeuvres. This meant that when executing a campaign, it was necessary to carry out movements of the army with the greatest possible honour for the king in particular and his nobles in general. Indeed, the need to behave in an honourable manner frequently took precedence over even the planning of sieges. This contributed in its own way to making sixteenth century war, from a modern point of view, still more chaotic and inefficient. The army of 1513, for instance, has been criticised by Cruickshank as a force lacking any consistent co-ordination and without the characteristics of a modern army which single-mindedly seeks its objective with the least waste of time, materials and men. As he noted at some length, the army straggled across the Channel in a piecemeal fashion and once ashore wandered seemingly aimlessly across the countryside, pausing for the two main sieges. The Earl of Shrewsbury landed with the first men of the vanguard on 6 June 1513, but it was not until the end of the month that the main section of the army arrived with the king. The time during which Shrewsbury waited for the king, who was making a royal progress from London, was spent in ineffectual activity. The vanguard made an initial thrust at Boulogne, a day's march south from Calais along the coast. This may have been a feint, or it was perhaps merely that Shrewsbury was looking for a suitable place to lay siege, as he eventually doubled back on his route, followed the river Lys 40 miles inland and sat down before Therouanne. But the numbers of men he had with him were insufficient to win the city, as he could not completely surround its walls to cut off movements of troops and supplies. Apart from that, the best part of the siege train was accompanying Henry on his slow journey.

As for the English nobles waiting at Therouanne:

While the siege laye thus before Tyrwyn as you have hard, the Frenchmen diverse times issued out on horseback and many a staffe was broken and manye a proper feat of armes done.¹

The king eventually left Calais on 21 July, having despatched Brandon several days before to prepare his way with an army of 7,000 men. The effect of splitting his forces was that the French continually harried the smaller groups into which the King's Ward had now resolved itself, slowing Henry's progress even more. There were constant delays as Henry formed his army to meet a full scale French attack which never eventuated. Henry does not appear to have been particularly concerned at the slowness of his progress, however, and even halted his march for an entire weekend. This may have been because he wished to rest, or, as Hall suggests, so that he could display himself to the local people who flocked to his camp or meet local dignitaries.²

More time was taken up with ceremony at Therouanne, where he had a formal meeting with the emperor which was celebrated with the lavish display described in the following chapter. Once Therouanne had fallen, and its conquest marked with more formalities, Henry again moved across country at a leisurely pace. There had been considerable delay before the march began, for a number of reasons, including Henry's apparent lack of any strategy. The siege of Therouanne had something of the appearance of an accident, but the advance on Tournai seems to have definitely been the outcome of the persuasiveness of the Emperor. He apparently persuaded Henry over dinner that it would be best to continue east. According to the ambassador from Milan, who watched the persuasion of

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¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.66.
² Ibid., p.72.
Henry, Maximilian wanted to capture Tournai because he thought the French were going to reinforce Tournai with 500 men at arms, making it a threat to the land of his heir, Prince Charles.¹

Henry began to march towards Tournai. But one day, when an attack was expected from the French at any moment, messengers arrived from the Regent of the Netherlands, who ..., most hartely desired him for his pastime after hys long travayle to come and repose in his toune of Lisle and to see hys brother and prince and the ladies of the court of Burgoyne, saiynge that it became not ladies to visite him in his marciall campe whyche to them was terrible.²

"Gently" granting the request, Henry appointed his council - including men such as the Bishop of Winchester - to take over the army, and galloped off to Lille in his richest costume surrounded by most of the senior commanders of his army, including Brandon, Dorset, the Duke of Buckingham, and Essex, commander of the Spears. Henry was welcomed in splendid style, and spent three days carousing with Margaret, Maximilian and Charles. He participated in masques, watched plays, banqueted and danced.

War was a pastime for Henry and his nobles, a counterpart to their lavish lifestyle at court, and they disregarded its dangers and the need for efficiency. This is perhaps no more clearly shown than when it came time to depart. Henry and most of the high command of his army set off towards evening. But when they had gone a short way ...

...he asked wher his campe lay? and no man there could tel the way, and guyde had they none, the night was darcke and mistie: thus the king taried a long while and wist not whither to go... ³

1. M.P. I (651), (658).
3. Ibid., p.93.
The senior officers of the English army were eventually rescued when they chanced to meet a carter who guided them to camp.

Henry enjoyed his visit to Lille so much that he made a second visit during the brief progress of the siege of Tournai.

The invasion of France in 1544 was scarcely more efficient in its planning or execution, although there were fewer opportunities for exchanging visits and holding elaborate ceremonies because on this occasion Henry was unable to meet the Emperor, and he was on poor terms with the new Regent. But, as in 1513, the planning and execution of strategy was weak. The commander of the vanguard, Norfolk, apparently had no idea of precisely what he was meant to do in France. He tried to resolve this dilemma by asking Count de Burens and Lord Cobham, the Deputy of Calais, and by writing to Henry begging instructions. Henry gave him two choices, either to attack Montreuil or to attack Ardres.\(^1\) Norfolk took another six days to make up his mind to attack Montreuil.\(^2\) But once he had decided this, he realised he would not have enough men to surround the city, so he decided instead to simply ravage the countryside while he waited for Henry to join him. Norfolk appears to have been labouring under the misapprehension that Henry intended to attack Paris. One of the three most senior commanders of the English army did not know that Henry really planned to besiege Boulogne.\(^3\)

Norfolk's co-commander and rival was John Lord Russell. It was never clearly established who should be regarded as the more senior, and the presence of two men claiming the leadership of the vanguard made the planning of

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1. *L.P. XIX, i* (741), 20 June 1544.
strategy even more limited. Russell was very critical of Norfolk's leadership. He charged that Norfolk was wandering across with countryside without apparent aim, making "wild war". Russell offered instead to attack Boulogne, or else Ardres with only 8,000 men, a somewhat foolhardy boast considering the difficulty of sieges.¹

What was actually happening was that Norfolk had become lost, and, at the same time, the army had split into fragments which were racing each other so that their commanders could take the front place, the post of greatest honour.

Norfolk was relying on Flemish guides. As he wrote to the countil on 4 July, his allies were not to be trusted. The guides were leading him, as he put it, through hedges, woods and marshes and over hills in order to keep him in French territory so that their friends' property would be spared from his army.²

The difficulties faced by Norfolk were compounded by his race with Russell. Norfolk had arrived in France with Russell nominally as his subordinate. But from the beginning the enmity of the two divided the English. Russell camped on one side of Fiennes, a township outside Calais, Norfolk on the other, while rumours circulated amongst their troops about who was actually in command. Gruffydd wrote that he spent considerable time unsuccessfully questioning officials such as the Master of the Ordnance trying to find out if it was in fact true that Russell had been appointed over Norfolk.

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¹L.P.XIX,1,(816), 1 July 1544.
²Ibid., (836), (876).
Norfolk was determined to keep his post. When he began his advance, he did so with great suddeness, striking his camp during the night to catch Russell by surprise. He stretched out a six mile lead over his adversary, who did his best to overtake Norfolk during the wandering progress that ensued. Meanwhile the Count de Burens arrived with about 3,500 men. He was apparently unable to decide which camp to join, so he held aloof. Three separate armies thus advanced towards Montreuil.

Eventually Russell managed to outmanoeuvre Norfolk, pitching his tents ahead of him on the line of march, and taking the place of honour. He also managed to ford a river before Norfolk, which meant that he continued to lead on the march to Montreuil. Not to be outdone, Norfolk determined to be the first to pitch his camp at Montreuil, or at least to prevent Russell from so doing. He ordered Count de Burens to ride ahead and pre-empt Russell. But the mercenary leader was unable to do so because his baggage train had become out of control and so he was forced to turn back to a previous night's camp, against orders,

...which displeased the Duke very much. The Duke wanted to be the first to plant his artillery against the town and Lord Russell wanted the same. This made him decide to pitch his tents and his artillery in a great hollow to the east of the town, and on top of the hill to the north of the host men were set to work to make a place to plant three cannon to announce their arrival to the people of the city. The Duke heard this and ordered the Master of the Ordnance to send his heavy artillery to the camp of the Lord of Privy Seal and place them on the breast of the hill to shoot first, which was done. But the Lord would not allow one of the guns which came from the Duke's camp to shoot, on account of which there was some dissension between them, and the Duke's artillery and the gunners and the men who were guarding or pulling them, among whom I was one, lay there for three nights.1

Gruffydd's account shows the importance of noble concepts of their own prestige as warriors in determining the strategy of early sixteenth century war, as well as the way in which noble rivalry over status could further help to make campaigns seem far from rational and efficient.

As is shown in the following section, such considerations of rank and honour could also help to determine the actual tactics adopted once there was a chance of battle being joined.
iii. Tactics.

There are two main areas to consider when examining early sixteenth century tactics. The first includes the kinds of tactical formations adopted by armies while on the march. The second encompasses the ways in which armies were deployed during the actual business of fighting.

In both areas it is apparent that military tactics tended to be as haphazard and as traditional as other aspects of war. It also appears that considerations of noble prestige, and especially the honour and comfort of the king when he was with the army, were at least as important as achieving strategic objectives. There was actually considerable variation in the types of tactics used, but chance, tradition and prestige provided relatively strict limits to that variation.

Armies had been most usually divided into three tactical formations during the wars of the previous several hundred years, and Henry and his men did little to break with tradition. They continued to organize their armies, however large or small, generally into a vanguard, a mid ward, and a rearguard. The size of Henry's armies, up to four times as large as before, proved no great hindrance to this practice, even though each division of the army might be large enough to form an army by itself. The result of this was that the three main tactical formations were usually subdivided into three more units each. In both 1513 and 1544 the vanguards were large enough to operate as independent units of the army with their own internal tripartite divisions.

When the king was with his Ward, the division of that tactical formation was determined by two desires: anxiety to safeguard the king, and the wish to make his army and his presence seem as magnificent as possible. The king's
march from Calais to Boulogne was perhaps even more splendid than the progress from Calais to Therouanne.\textsuperscript{1}

In 1544 his Ward was led out of Calais by drums, fifers and trumpeters conducted by heralds and many peers. Garter herald bore the king's unfurled banner before the king himself, who rode cap-a-pied on a charger, followed by a servant bearing his headpiece and spear. Henry was also surrounded by well armed and mounted henchmen. Outside the gates he was joined by the Duke of Alberquerque with 100 men at arms, some of them on horses barded in clock of gold, and Essex and Sir Thomas Darcy with more men at arms. The formation of the army was thus based around the splendour of the king, his nobles and his musicians. The glittering court at the centre of the formation was protected by the light horse and demi-lances who headed the march, and the pikemen, gunners and archers who flanked the king on either side, while at the rear protection was offered by the men at arms and the yeomen of the guard interspersed with other horsemen.\textsuperscript{2} Such a sight could be expected to impress ambassadors and locals with its splendour, as was the case in 1513 when the Milanese ambassador commented on the fine sight made by Henry and his men in their glittering armour as they traversed the countryside.\textsuperscript{3}

But although the formation of the army was worked out in a way to impress the observer, the organisation of the units within that formation was extremely casual. Infantry bodies were often raised and employed in bodies of about 100 men with a captain and a deputy captain. But, as in the case of the 900 pike brought by Brandon in 1513, they might also serve in an undifferentiated mass, depending on the circumstances.\textsuperscript{4} The horse was no better organized, and the size of units could be equally as nominal. The largest recognized unit was a standard.

\textsuperscript{1} L.P. I (4360).
\textsuperscript{2} L.P. XIX, ii (424).
\textsuperscript{3} M.P. I (652).
\textsuperscript{4} L.P. I (4360).
This might consist of anywhere between 100 and 1,000 horsemen. The smaller units, known either as cornets, pennons, or guidons, could be from 60 to 120 horsemen. And, as mentioned, the smallest of all, the lance or spear, might be only one man at arms, or five men at arms, or a variety of different kinds of cavalrymen in differing amounts.¹

Honour, tradition, and the chance effect of circumstances, were therefore all major influences on the creation of tactical formations.

These same factors also applied in battle, because the organisation of armies prevented much scientific deployment and manipulation of troops during fighting. This situation was also contributed to by the presence of mercenary troops in Henry's armies, and the unreliability of many of his common soldiers. These two factors in themselves helped ensure the prominence of nobles in war.

Some infantry bodies were of high reputation. Ferdinand told Henry to always have 2 or 3,000 lansknechts in his service, because no "parfayte war" could be made where they were absent, although it is curious that Ferdinand considered that the German pikemen were most useful for guarding cannon during battle.²

Swiss and Spanish infantry were also of high reputation, and played major roles in the Continental wars of the period. But European infantry in general had a bad reputation for unreliability and lack of discipline in battle, an infamy that occasionally extended to the Swiss and German pike as well. Henry claimed he would not employ the Swiss in

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2. L.P. I (3607); Sp.P. II (86); cf. Audley, A Book of Orders, who accounted the Germans as the flower of all footmen.
1544 because he thought them "...men of small service and little courage when it cometh to the brunt...", and suggested to Charles that they would be more valuable if the French employed them.\(^1\)

Henry's own infantry enjoyed a somewhat variable reputation. Ferdinand openly scorned them in his letters to Henry because of their lack of endurance and discipline.\(^2\) The Italians thought they compared well to their own infantry, however, because they were not barefoot, nor were they men who went to rob, but rather to gain honour. One Italian observer was surprised to find that they did not take wenches with them, nor were they profane swearers.\(^3\)

These opinions were not shared by the soldier Audley, who commented that men were chosen for infantry companies by their captains out of favouritism rather than worth. He said that men could go to war for up to five years and at the end have no more knowledge of how to fight than they had at first, because their captains were as ignorant as they were.\(^4\) Indeed, there was some evidence of poor discipline and something of a lack of willingness to fight amongst Henry's infantry, both mercenary and national, in both 1513 and 1544. The result was that the cavalry, and the

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1. L.P. XIX, i (6).
2. Sp.P. II (68), (70).
nobles, often performed more valuable service in battle than did the common infantry, as was continually demonstrated during the war around Therouanne in 1513.¹

As mentioned in the preceding section of strategy, Henry and his men were subjected to continual harassment from the French after the English forces were divided during the march to Therouanne. It was in these intermittent clashes that Henry's cavalry performed much of its service during 1513. One such incident occurred on 27 July near the town of Dornham, when a large French army approached Henry's ward. The French may have numbered around 4,000 horse and about 11,000 infantry. They were apparently unable to approach closer than two miles because the French foot refused to advance any further. The French cavalry was therefore forced to continue on alone after pausing for a time. Henry, adopting the usual English tactics, deployed his infantry and cannon to await the charge. The ensuing events are unclear, but the English sources suggest that the confrontation turned into a series of cavalry clashes akin to the mêlées of tournaments, with horsemen from either side engaging in jousts, to the apparent entertainment of Henry and the watching infantry.

"...a pleasant sight if a man's skin had not been in hazard..."²

¹. Compare the following discussion with a letter from the commander of English forces in France in 1543, Sir John Wallop, criticising the quality of Flemish infantry and promising great achievements if he was reinforced with 500 demi-lances. S.P. IX,v (DCCLXII).

The French also lacked reliable infantry during this period, having to rely on their cavalry, still drawn from the ranks of the nobility, supplemented by mercenary infantry: Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p.106.

². L.P. I (4284).
While these individual engagements continued, with lives being lost and prisoners taken by both sides, Essex with the King's Spears and 200 mounted archers set up an ambush. The French failed to enter the trap, however, and when Sir Rhys ap Thomas joined Essex at noon with a force of demi-lances and Sir Thomas Guildford's following of more mounted archers, the English cavalry circled behind the French cavalry, causing the enemy horse to retreat onto their infantry and eventually depart. The threat of attack gone, Henry spread his cavalry out behind his army as a protective screen, and continued his interrupted march.1

The infantry had been unable to join in the engagement. In fact, many had died of thirst as they waited for hours in their armour in the July sun while the cavalry manoeuvred.

The events of the following day demonstrated once more the relative flexibility and discipline of the cavalry, as compared to the recalcitrance of the German mercanaries in particular.

The French seemed likely to capture one of the twelve apostles, which had fallen into a ditch. They also threatened the master carpenter and 100 labourers who had left the army without leave to attempt to right it. The king, in a rage, ordered the Germans to go to the aid of the workers. But the lansknechts refused to do so, as a French force had assembled nearby.

Meanwhile Sir Rhys and his horse were scouting in the area and saw what was happening, so they sent to the Spears for help. The Spears happened to be nearby guarding another

1. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.68.
overturned gun. While Lord Berners completed the rescue of that weapon, Essex and his nobles joined with Thomas, at the same time sending for help to a Flemish cavalry commander, Lord Walon, who had only just then joined Henry's army. But the Flemish mercenaries proved no more willing to risk themselves than did the lansknechts. Walon sent back word that he would not fight 10,000 French because he had contracted to serve the king for more than one day. Essex and his cavalry were "sore discontent" with this answer, as they were apparently anxious to join with the enemy whatever the odds. Once more the French and English horse skirmished as the French army moved forward in a solid block, cavalry in front, "...with standardes, penons and banners wavering, and sumptuous bardes, and riche harnys glyteryng...".

At this point the English cavalry seems to have realised that was vastly outnumbered. Hall says that Sir Rhys, a veteran of the Wars of the Roses, advised Essex that it was foolhardy for 700 men to charge so many, and that it would be best to follow orders and simply reclaim the gun. Essex was persuaded, so he ordered a withdrawal.

"...and so softly and not in flyeing maner retreted..." The French sensed victory, and their men at arms charged at the backs of the English. But suddenly, crying to St. George, the English faced about again and returned the charge, at which the French cavalry broke and their whole army retreated in disorder.¹

Willingness to come to grips with the enemy - unlike the mercenaries - and relative self-discipline had won the English cavalry its second minor victory in two days.

The same applied during the battle of Spurs, the only large scale engagement with the enemy in the open field during

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.70-2.
Henry's wars on the Continent. It was almost purely a cavalry battle, largely because the control of early sixteenth century armies during a battle was so poor, prohibiting the use of the full potential of the various forces under Henry's command.

Henry and his army were camped outside Therouanne. The French planned to relieve the city by approaching it from two directions. One group of horsemen was to occupy Shrewsbury and the van on the west side of the city, while the rest were to break through to the walls on the opposite, unbesieged, side with provisions.

But Henry learned of the French approach from the south, partly because the northern horse under Sir John Neville found the French at Guinegate. The Spears subsequently ventured out of the English camp to joust with their rivals. These skirmishes continued until the French cavalry left their former hiding place, at which time they split into two groups. A group of light horsemen tried to reach Therouanne's walls, while the men at arms made a slower and more direct approach. Meanwhile, other forces attacked Shrewsbury to keep him occupied.

Henry assembled his army to meet the heavy cavalry, deploying it in order of battle, and causing some delay while he argued with his advisers over whether or not his tents should be left up, an argument which he won:

...the king sayde I will this day that my felde be made and sette in as royall wise as maye bee, and all my ryche tentes sette up, whyche was done...

The army eventually sorted itself into marching order, with about 1,100 cavalry in front of about 10,000 infantry.  

2. Oman, Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p.293.
No record of the disposition survives, although from Hall's account it would appear that the lansknechts were supposed to have gone in front of Henry and his archers, but they refused to do so, and halted on his left. Henry had experienced difficulty with the Germans during the siege. At one point they had seized his cannon during an altercation with his infantry and turned the weapons on the king and his camp. Now, for some unknown reason, they refused to march any further, so the king was forced to halt his infantry while his elite cavalry continued on unsupported, to the chagrin of the king who had to be restrained from joining them. The French horse numbered perhaps 2,000 men, and the odds were further increased when 400 mercenary cavalry under Walon broke off from the English. They held aloof during most of the battle, only joining it when victory was certain for their allies. Despite this, the 700 English heavy cavalry, banners displayed, advanced up a hill to meet the French, joined at the last moment by Sir Joyn Guildford and 100 mounted archers, and Clarenceux king of arms, who rode up crying that victory belonged to the English and that he would fight with them in just his surcoat, without armour.

When the English reached the top of the hill, they found themselves on a plateau bordered by a field on one side and a forest on the other. Here the archers dismounted and fired at the French, who were then charged by the cavalry. The initial impact brought down the front rows and some French standards. Perhaps because the French had orders not to engage the English - although it is strange that they should have continued to advance under such circumstances - perhaps because they were feigning a retreat but failed to bring off

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1. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.84
the manoeuvre, perhaps because they were already returning when the charge came, or perhaps, as Hall suggests, because they were disordered by the sudden return of their light horse, who poured onto their unsecured flanks, the French were disordered and put to flight.\footnote{Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.86, is quite adamant that the French "well perceived" the English advancing. He also indicates that the French flight was caused by panic spreading once the front ranks were overthrown. Compare his account with that of Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p.294; V.P. II (308); and Giles, "Account of Henry the Eighth's Expedition into France, A.D. 1513", Archæologia XXVI (1836), p.476. It is unlikely, as Cruickshank suggests, that Henry's cannon caused the initial panic in concert with archery fire. Henry's cannon were at least a mile from the battle, and it would have been risky to fire so close to his own men. See Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.115. Holinshed's Chronicles, III, p.585, however, makes a similar claim.}

The brief encounter had turned into a rout as the English, now joined by the Burgundians, pursued the French to Guinegate, capturing about 120 nobles and 9 standards.

As with so many other combats of the era, the tactics of the battle were determined by the chance effect of which section of the army could get to the enemy first, and also by the recalcitrance of hired troops, especially the infantry, rather than any carefully weighed employment of various combinations of troops.\footnote{During the following season of war Henry complained to the Regent that she had not retained the number of men he had desired to protect Tournai, that is 4,000 horse and 6,000 infantry. She replied that she had retained only gentlemen of the heavy cavalry, a force of 3,500 horse. This was because she could not control the light horse, which was devastating the country, and because the infantry was too costly and insubordinate. Presumably the heavy cavalry was easier to manage. L.P. I (4622).}
At home, the limited and largely traditional variation of tactics which was used was demonstrated at the battle of Flodden, which had most of the characteristics of the usual confrontation between English and Scots. The Scots were always weak in cavalry, relying on their massed spearmen, on this occasion armed and trained according to the precepts of Continental pike. And the English, as often was the case, dismounted their men at arms to disperse them amongst formations of bill, pike, and archers.

The 1544 expedition produced no large scale engagements, either in Britain or on the Continent. There were some considerable combats in the years immediately after 1544, however, including the battle of St.Etienne. This encounter once more demonstrated the unreliability of the infantry, the importance of the nobles in battle, and their relative steadiness and discipline in combat, as well as the continuing role of the cavalry.

Henry Howard Earl of Surrey was commander of Boulogne in January 1546. He learned that the French were to relieve the castle of Chatillon, some 10 miles away, with a wagon train guarded by horse and foot. Surrey sent out a scouting party composed of several hundred horsemen from Boulogne and Guisnes under Sir George Pollard. Once Pollard had located the enemy, Howard marched out with most of the garrison of Boulogne, some 2,000 footmen accompanied by a number of knights and gentlemen, including Sir Thomas Wyatt the younger. Surrey discovered that the French had nearly double the number of his men, about 500 horse and 4,000 foot, but decided to risk battle anyway, spurred on, he later claimed, by the hope of winning Chatillon during the confusion of battle. He deployed his forces with a mass of pike and bill in the centre, flanked by gunmen and bowmen, and with the cavalry on the right flank, a typical battle formation of the period.
The tactical importance of the nobles' sense of honour was demonstrated when they asked to be placed in the front row of the infantry, trusting to the strength of their armour.

The battle was begun by Surrey's horse charging and disordering the French gunmen and cavalry before moving on to destroy the baggage train. Meanwhile, in the centre the German lansknechts, who were the French infantry, grappled with the English pike, which broke and fled, leaving the nobles to be killed "...who were very hardy and could have had good success if they were followed...". Despite the efforts of the nobles to rally them the foot would not stop until they reached the safety of their trenches. Unlike the infantry, the cavalry retained its discipline, claiming a hollow victory for the English by occupying the field before marching back to safety by a circuitous route to avoid the remnants of enemy forces.

The cavalry, due to its relative cohesion, and perhaps to the extra training its members received in tournaments, outweighed the value of the masses of infantry in this engagement. The only members of the infantry to show similar cohesion and courage were the gentlemen captains, as Surrey remarked to Henry.

...if any disorder ther were, we assure Your Majesty ther was no defaulte in the rulers, nor lacke of courage to be geven them, but a humour that sometyme raigneth in Englisshemen.

The poor quality of the bulk of the troops used in early sixteenth century armies meant that tactics were often a matter of chance and the sense of honour shared by the nobles. This picture is qualified by the fact that the noble cavalrymen

were often more steady than the infantry, and were able to manoeuvre more rapidly than infantry during the skirmishes and ambushes which were the main type of fighting in which Henry's armies engaged in the field. These were the usual areas of field combat because the main part of the army's activity was often devoted to the less dramatic business of siege warfare.

Early sixteenth century tactics present a contrast to those of later in the century, and particularly to the style of fighting which emerged during the Thirty Years War. Henry's field operations were not struggles between disciplined masses of scientifically deployed and closely co-ordinated pikemen and arquebusiers, supported by accurate and rapid firing artillery, and occasionally by light armed cavalry. The deployment of troops remained relatively simple and traditional, and the cavalry, in addition to its duties of scouting and raiding, often played a leading role in combat engagements, while the infantry, although it physically dominated the field, was often too poorly disciplined to be of any use in battle.
iv. Conclusion.

The nature of early Tudor strategy and tactics is a reflection of the state of early sixteenth century warfare in general. As indicated in examinations of aspects of the army such as troop types, weapons, administration and other important areas of the military sphere, this era would not appear to have undergone that "...transformation in military matters..." claimed for sixteenth century warfare by Oman. It remained a period which was, despite innovations such as gunpowder weapons and the use of huge bodies of prestigious infantry, inefficient in the extreme in military practice compared to modern standards, or even to the level of efficiency reached by the Swedes during the following century.

Several reasons for this have been suggested. These include the fact that warfare remained relatively crude and limited because its practitioners still largely relied on traditional means of waging war, and that the bureaucracy of royal government had not yet been organised to cope properly with the demands of warfare.

It has also been briefly suggested that the nobles helped give war an appearance of inefficiency because of their attitudes to war. These attitudes had a significant effect on the practice of war because the nobles were of major importance in almost all aspects of warfare.

The following two chapters will show how the nobles considered other aspects of war besides mere efficiency to be of crucial concern, and how these considerations governed their behaviour in war. War was not an activity that the nobles always distinguished clearly from their peacetime activities. It was, rather, an attribute of the lifestyle of their group as a whole,
and, as a result, their behaviour in war tended to continue many qualities of their life in peace. War was, as far as they were concerned, like jousts or the banquet, the place where a noble could demonstrate to all his status as a noble, and where he could gain even more honour to himself, his family, his caste, or his country.
The lifestyle of the Tudor nobility is supposed to have undergone a great change which distinguished the typical behaviour of Henry VIII and his contemporaries from that of nobles of previous eras, particularly in the area of military behaviour. Rather than being typically "chivalric", noble attitudes and activities of the early sixteenth century could be described by terms such as "realistic", "rational" and "ruthless", and by other somewhat vague appellations which might be generally classified as "modern".

This change in the usual modes of noble behaviour is thought to have accompanied, and even to have helped bring about, a similar revolution in methods of waging war. Kilgour summed up the transformation in this way:

War was no longer a game for gentlemen but a terrible and bloody business, in which there was no place for clemency.  

But, as has been indicated in the previous brief examination of early Tudor warfare, the nobility was still dominant in many of the key areas of war, despite the advent of reputable infantry and new weapons.

And, as will be shown in the following two chapters, warfare still often had the appearance of a game for the nobility.

Several reasons why warfare should have presented the sight of an exclusive sport can be suggested, including

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the influence of the way of life that was embodied in the
tournament. This was one of the manifestations of the
attitude shared by the nobles that the fact that they were
part of an elite obligated them to behave in certain ways,
both on and off the battlefield, to retain and improve their
status within the noble group. And, as will be shown, because
the military role of the nobles was so much a part of their
code, there was often little distinction between their actions
in civilian and military situations.

Other ways in which this attitude was embodied,
apart from tournaments and pageants, included the style with
which the noble displayed the heedless courage expected of
his caste by undertaking individual feats of arms out of a
sense of honour. And in addition to this, to some extent the
behaviour of nobles during wartime was also governed by a
shared understanding that, as an elite, certain religious and
sexual types of behaviour were incumbent on them, even in the
face of great danger. Each of these will be considered in
more detail in the final chapter.

The cumulative effect of such attitudes was that
the behaviour of nobles in war was often quite different to the
rational behaviour that might be expected of men who saw war
solely as a ruthless and bloody business. As a result, the
question arises as to whether or not the presence of attitudes
which, for want of a better term, might be called modern,
precluded the nobles from conducting war as something of a
noble sport.
Historians have generally attributed the new noble lifestyle of the sixteenth century to what they have identified as the emergence of a more business-like, pragmatic approach to warfare. This "new" approach has usually been assumed by historians to have inevitably ended the more idealistic type of behaviour that they have associated with a chivalric nobility of the medieval period.

Such a claim would, however, appear to call for an arbitrary division in human motivations which rarely appears in the documents of any era. There is no reason why the more inefficient, less obviously rational forms of noble behaviour could not have existed in concert with pragmatic and ruthless activity. This would, in fact, appear to have been the case in the previous era, for medieval warfare was rarely less bloody than war at any other time, and medieval nobles could be just as ruthless as their sixteenth century descendants when the occasion was appropriate. Some historians have even attributed the same ruthlessness and practicality to medieval nobles as has often been claimed for Tudor captains. K.B. MacFarlane, for example, wrote of fourteenth century nobles that they "...made no pretence of fighting for love of king or lord, still less for glory, but for gain."¹

Johan Huizinga recognized that what might be called "realism" - ruthlessness, rationality, an interest in efficiency for its own sake - may well exist harmoniously in the minds and actions of people who are also impelled to act by motives which, from the viewpoint of another culture, might seem "unrealistic", that is, irrational, idealistic and inefficient. Huizinga classified most of the typical kinds of noble behaviour

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identified in this thesis - ceremonies, sports, titles of honour, rash or careless conduct in battle - as composing the "game" element in the behaviour of a group. This element he saw as accompanying a more serious type of behaviour, but not necessarily supplanting it.

...in every archaic civilization the sharp line between the serious and the posed eludes our view. In chivalric life an element of grave and solemn play is constantly intermingled with reason and calculation. It will never be possible to understand all the aspects of medieval politics if one neglects this play element.¹

Huizinga, who was one of the great proponents of a change in noble lifestyles during the sixteenth century, thus admits that what might be called realism or modernity could exist in men's minds along with what he chooses to call the play element.

It would appear that this applies to the nobles of Tudor England as well as to those of earlier periods. It may be, in fact, that "realism" is a necessary and universal accompaniment to the "play" aspects of culture. A degree of pragmatism or realism was necessary for the Tudor noble in order that the play, or in other words, the acquiring of honour, might take place. The noble had to display some practicality in order to raise his army and to carry out his duties as an officer, however clumsily. Ideals of honour came into force once his use of practicality had put him into a position to acquire prestige through feat of arms, and when

honour conflicted with pragmatism, the former often took prior claim on a noble's behaviour, as is shown in Chapter Seven.

Henry VIII himself recognised that this dualism existed in the behaviour of nobles, but he apparently saw no great contradiction in the co-existence of idealism and ruthlessness. One of the reasons why he did not go to the north immediately after the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1537 was that he feared his presence would incite the Scots to attack in the hope of gaining both riches and honour, for it was in the nature of men of war that they were "...desirous both of spoil and glory..."\(^1\).

Apart from the co-existence of seemingly contradictory attitudes to war being possible, it would also appear from anthropological evidence that it is possible for more than one kind of warfare to be practiced by society. That is, at one level, warfare may be ruthless, practical and bloody, while at another it may be invested with irrational and idealistic behaviour. The type of war that is waged depends on the needs of the society that wages that war. Two major types of war at least have been identified in Melanesia, for example. One is what the observer has called a "chivalrous" type characterised by formal challenges and pitched battles, in which the display of force (and perhaps of status) rather than the effective use of strength is aimed at. The other type is a treacherous, ambush warfare where there are few rules and more bloodshed. Each type of warfare has its own function. The community both recognises and values the distinct functions of the two types.\(^2\)

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Warfare, therefore, is not necessarily a universally consistent aspect of society, but may operate at many levels and perform many functions. This seems to shed a great deal of light on the conduct of warfare during the early sixteenth century. Warfare at that time often did appear to be a ruthless and bloody business. But it also displayed those qualities of ceremonial, sport and idealism which have been mentioned. It may be possible to argue, therefore, that sixteenth century war operated at a number of distinct but coincident levels, answering to the particular needs perceived for warfare by society. The particular need of the sixteenth century military elite was for a type of warfare that justified their status and which allowed them both to demonstrate and to acquire more of that status. At the same time, however, they were not so bound up with the need for honour that they were completely irrational and uninterested in pursuing victory by using their strength. They also practiced the kind of "foul war" for which Henry once apologised to France after a raid by Thomas Howard, when they saw the need.¹

It is not always clear how the nobles distinguished between what they knew as "foul" and "honourable" war, although a French contemporary, Blaise de Monluc, who fought in the 1544 war, in explaining why no ransoms were taken during the Wars of Religion made a distinction between the kinds of motivations that applied to nobles in different kinds of wars.

It was not like a foreign war, when one fights for love or honor; in civil war one has to be either master or servant...²


² The Huguenot Wars ed. Coudy, p.127.
Amongst the English, the invasions of France in 1513 and 1544 seem to have been of the former type, as compared to the ruthless, cruel war practiced against the Scots by Hertford in 1544, when he tricked Scottish women and children into staying in their cottages so he could burn them alive. The Scots, because of their perfidy in breaking treaties, were considered to have forfeited the right to clemency.¹

As will be shown in the following chapters, the honourable, ceremonial type of war took up much of the time of nobles during campaigns, and occupied their attention even during the heat of battle, sometimes with the loss of strategic and tactical advantages, and sometimes even at the cost of their own lives.

The question of whether the early sixteenth century was more ruthless in war than previous centuries, and hence more realistic and modern, is therefore not a crucial issue, because realism did not necessarily exclude what are, from the modern viewpoint, the idealistic and ceremonial aspects of war.

The more important feature of war was the way in which nobles regarded it as a place where they could obtain prestige by acting according to the more or less recognised standards of the military behaviour of their group, a consideration that was often of supreme importance to them.

¹ L.P. XIX, i (533).
ii. The Tournament: More Than a Game?

Perhaps no other single institution did more to give early Tudor warfare the appearance of a ceremonial or the kind of activities associated with the tournament.

Often there was no clear distinction made between the behaviour typical of a noble at peace or a noble at war, and some of the characteristics of warfare situations were recreated at court. At the same time, some of the typical aspects of court and domestic life were continued during a campaign, as a mark of the status of the noble warrior.

The result of this was that the inclusion of such things as tournaments in campaigns often prevented the efficient conduct of a campaign, and diverted a great deal of time, money and effort into maintaining the more showy aspects of the noble lifestyle during wartime.

But although the presence of these elements in war may seem from a twentieth century viewpoint to give military ventures the appearance of a game, an examination of the tournament from the perspective of the Tudor people themselves indicates that there were sound reasons, in their terms, for their presence.

For one thing, participation in tournaments was a way in which nobles could establish their status in the nobility in general and the military elite in particular. And in other ways, an examination of the many functions of the early Tudor tournament indicates that it was far from being merely a luxurious game to charm the leisure of a courtly society, divorced from war's reality. It was, rather, a crucial aspect of the reality of early sixteenth century warfare, serving a multiplicity of functions.  

The tournament was a highly complex institution, which was capable of being adapted to a wide range of situations. This is shown at even the most basic level of its operation, as an arena for mock combat. The tournament was more than a clash between mounted riders armed with lances. It could actually reproduce most of the varying situations in which a noble could expect to find himself in wartime, as is shown by a challenge to a tournament issued early in Henry's reign. The challenge included in the list of events to be held during several days contests such as running 8 horseback courses with lances; archery competitions; striking 8 blows with blunted swords; wrestling; fighting on foot with spear or sword; and casting of the bar.\(^1\) Other tournaments reproduced different situations, as is indicated below.

The terms tournament and joust themselves suggest the varying types of functions of tournaments. They are often applied with a great deal of latitude to almost any mock combat, but in the sixteenth century they had quite specific meanings of their own. The tournament was a battle between two or more parties of horsemen armed with lances and other weapons. A joust was an individual horseback course of lance against lance. Within these two general categories, various other more particularised kinds of combats were further defined. Mêlées - the combats that took place during tournaments - might be identified as a particular type, depending on whether they allowed a limited number of strokes, or unlimited strokes, or battles with particular weapons. Jousts could be with sharp or blunt lances, and combats could generally be à plaisance or à l'outrance, for pleasure or to the death.

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This brief outline of the numerous kinds of tournament combats - here tournament is used in the general sense - hints at the way that tournaments as an institution could also fill a number of functions for the participants, apart from simply being an armed contest. Some of these other functions were deliberately fostered, some appear to have arisen as an offshoot of the tournament. They were used, amongst other things, for the diplomatic, dynastic and personal activities of the monarch and the court.

The breadth of these functions was first recognised by S. Anglo, who depicted the tournament during the reign of Henry VIII as a many faceted, functional institution, instead of as a mere formalised contest in arms. Rather than declining or rigidifying during the reign of Henry and his father, according to Anglo, the tournament had grafted onto it novel characteristics which made it more vital than ever before. He believed that tournaments had always been made up of a number of diverse elements: combat, politics, music, pageantry and feasting. The achievement of tournament holders at this time, and the Tudors in particular, was to synthesise enduring qualities that had previously been distinct.¹

Fifteenth century tournaments at courts such as those of Philip the Good were welded into a coherent amalgam of fighting, feasting, music, dancing, graphic display, poetry and speech. ² These largely theatrical tournaments were adapted by the Tudors as instruments of royal policy. They became propaganda.


2. Ibid., p.27.
The tournaments of Henry VIII, for example, are explained by Anglo as marking through their increasing magnificence a change in his policy towards ambition and belligerency. Henry intended to impress Europe by court ostentation, while Wolsey, on the other hand, used display as a political instrument to proclaim every triumph of English diplomacy during his attempts to make England the arbiter of Europe. Changes in the tournament marked changes in political circumstances. After England's foreign policy became introverted during the Reformation, for example, tournaments became fewer and less spectacular. International spectacle gave way to religious controversy and pageants as doctrinal propaganda. The tournaments once more became spectacular as Henry returned to foreign ventures after the fall of Cromwell.¹

Anglo's interpretation perhaps somewhat over emphasises the importance of dynastic policy in shaping the tournament. But he has opened the way to a consideration of the tournament as being more than merely a luxurious game, and allows, rather, the examination of the tournament as an important aspect of the lifestyle of the Tudor military elite.

iii. Pageantry and Propaganda.

The tournament performed a number of functions for the royal family in particular, both in peace and in war. The major function, propaganda, as identified by Anglo, has already been mentioned.

More generally, however, it could be said that the tournament acted as a kind of stage for the significant events of the monarch's life, and as a reflection of his personality. Henry was the main inspiration of English involvement in warfare in both 1513 and 1544. Because Henry was a belligerent personality, because he seems to have been driven by a need to establish in wars his prestige as a monarch, and because he was the head of a military nobility, frequently eager for war themselves, the festivities and institutions which were part of the court life were often organised around the main arena of mock warfare, the tournament. Henry and the members of his court - nobles and officials in general - manipulated pageants and tournaments so that they emphasised a desire for riches and honour in war, specifically against France. Henry had made his own interest in such goals clear at the very moment of the beginning of his reign, when, as he journeyed in his coronation procession, coats of arms were borne before him signifying his claim to English territory in France lost by his ancestors. The early years of his reign appear to have been largely a whirl of tournaments and pageants repeating these claims, interrupted only by the occasional war.

But tournaments were more than simply military propaganda. They were also publicity for the royal family as a dynasty, the lately arrived rulers of a quarrelsome and sometimes rebellious nobility. As such, the money lavished on tournaments by the king, and his personal participation in them, helped develop a spirit of unity between Henry and his nobles, associations which often began in the early years of
the reign and continued until the king's death. Apart from this, the tournaments continued to be combative events that hardened and trained the nobles for war, and instruments to establish diplomatic links, a refinement reached long before the Field of Cloth of Gold.

But no absolute distinction should be drawn between the various kinds of tournaments, or the ways in which they performed various functions. Elements of each of these kinds of tournaments might be found intermingled in any single event, and the functions largely associated with one kind of tournament might be found originating in the most unlikely place.

The intermingling of various elements and functions can be found in the tournaments of 1510 described to Ferdinand by his ambassador. The ambassador wrote that Henry was rejoicing in the news of Spanish success against the Moors, and was celebrating by running at the ring (a jousting exercise), as well as jousts and tournaments on foot. At the same time, in imitation of the ancient knights such as Amadis of Gaul and Lancelot, two days a week were permanently devoted to single combat. Ferdinand's representative described the English courtiers as using lances 14 feet long with blunted heads which they threw at each other, before joining in combat for 12 strokes each with two handed swords. This event took place behind waist high barriers erected to stop the knights, as the ambassador described the courtiers, from wrestling. He commented that there were many young men who excelled in this king of war, but the most conspicuous, assiduous and interested was the king, who was never absent.¹

Several elements and functions were joined in the contests described by the ambassador. There was serious

¹. Sp.P. II (45).
training for war with swords and lances, with barriers to prevent fighting getting out of hand, there was fantasy provided by the imitation of Arthurian knights, there was diplomacy evidenced by the presence of the ambassador and his reports, and there was the overwhelming presence of Henry's own enthusiasm for war and of the need for him to display his own worth as a warrior.

Henry sometimes went out of his way to impress ambassadors with the dazzling splendour of his feats in the lists, and hence, of his own status as a warrior noble. This status was established not only by his dexterous use of the lance, but also by the magnificence of his costumes and his ostentatious generosity. When the Spanish diplomats first arrived at Henry's court they expressed the desire to see him joust. They soon had an opportunity when the nobles made a wager - perhaps at the king's instigation - to see who excelled at running at the ring. The nobles formed into parties, with the king as a participant.

At the day appointed, the kyng was mounted on a goodly Courser, trapped in purpul velvet cutte, the inner syde whereof was wrought with flatte golde of Damaske in the stoole, and the velvet on the other syde cutte in letters: so that the gold appered as though it had bene embroudered with certayne reasons or poyses. And on the Velvet betwene the letters were fastened, castels and shefes of arrowes of doket gold, with a garment, the sleves compased over hys harneys, and his bases of the same worke, with a greate plume of fethers on his head pece, that came doune to the arson of his sadell, and a great company of fresh gentlemen came in with his grace rychely armed and decked, with many other right gorgeously appareiled, the trompettes before them, goodly to behold, wherof many strangers, but specially the Spaniaredes much rejoysing, for they had never sene the king before that tyme armed.¹

¹. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.18.
This account is typical of the magnificence of tournaments, and of the appearance of nobles, both in peace and war. It also contains the constant themes of Henry's tournaments, and his use of the institutions of the court. The richness of the noble warriors in their armour was used constantly by Henry to overawe ambassadors, and to demonstrate his nobility. On this occasion he further contrived to impress the foreigners by allowing them to strip his gold badges and devices from him, once he had demonstrated his martial prowess by winning the prize at the ring running contest. The combination in tournaments of diplomacy, and the delight of the king in displaying his skill, continued into war. In 1513, for example, splendid jousts were held in Tournai at the conclusion of the siege before ambassadors from many European courts, as well as Henry's newly conquered subjects and Imperial nobles whom he hoped would join in new ventures against France. Accounts of the tournament do not make it clear which element was predominant, whether Henry hoped to overawe his subjects, to cement his alliance with the Emperor, sound a warning to Louis, to spread rumours of his ability through the courts of Europe, or simply to participate in a sport in which he exulted.

The tournaments so far described appear, however, to have inclined more towards being occasions of celebration and pleasure, rather than being serious training of the knights for war. There were, coincident with the former general type of tournament, the contests which were more obviously training for combat, although these too combined more than one element.

1. Compare this to the occasion in 1515 when he exerted himself in jousting before Venetian ambassadors so that they could report on his prowess to Francis I: see S.Giustinian, Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. Selection of Despatches Written by the Venetian Ambassador, Sebastian Giustinian, and Addressed to the Signory of Venice, January 12th 1515, to July 26th 1519 trans R.Brown (2 vols, London, 1854), I, 3 May 1515.  
The "serious" combats - serious in the sense that the actual fighting tended to be given more emphasis - often gave an appearance of spontaneity, with the nobles fighting in rough and tumble manner on the nearest playing field. Such an event was the first public joust in which Henry participated, when, in January 1510, he heard that some of his nobles were going to joust in Richmond Park. Despite the earliness of the season, Henry ventured out of the warmth of court in disguise, accompanied by a favourite, William Compton. The tourney was a great success for Henry, because he and Compton broke many spears and won a great deal of acclaim for their ability. The day was unfortunately marred when Compton was wounded all but fatally by Sir Edward Neville, brother of Lord Bergavenny.¹

These jousts were part of an almost continuous programme of training in which Henry and his nobles engaged at this time in preparation for a major war. They occurred at the same time as steps were being taken to improve the general military preparedness of the country. These steps included the re-issue of the Statute of Westminster, which required war training for all his male adults, and ordinances to organise the strengthening and refurbishing of fortresses. Henry's northern rival, James, was also encouraging the fitness of his nobles by fostering similar tournaments.²

The jousting programme for 1510 indicates the continuity of such training, as it also shows the way in which martial pursuits were combined with the generality of court life, almost without distinction. Jousting began at the feast of Pentecost at Greenwich, the traditional date for the beginning of chivalric enterprises in Arthurian romances.

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.14-5.
Henry and other nobles challenged all comers to fight at the barriers with targets and casting spears 8 feet long, as well as 12 strokes of the sword. After these contests were over, the court moved to Windsor, which became the starting point of a royal progress during which time Henry and his men amused themselves at shooting, singing, dancing, wrestling, casting the bar, and music. There were jousts and tourneys, and generally much hunting, hawking and shooting. When the progress was completed, Henry returned once more to Greenwich, where, says Hall, he was still desirous to see his nobles expert in the martial arts. He therefore set up a place in Greenwich park where the queen and her ladies could watch the men battle with two handed axes. These weapons were probably more deadly in tournaments than swords because they were more clumsy, and hence less easy to control. The king himself fought in the combats, exchanging blows with a German noble named Guyot, whom Henry later knighted, and who continued as a prominent soldier in the king's wars. Hall notes that Edward Howard managed to knock this noble over during the fighting. Such incidents could, and often did, make tournaments a deadly affair, and Henry often saw the need to take steps to preserve the safety of his nobles by cooling their malice. After this particular fight he sought to pacify his courtiers by giving them 200 marks in gold so that they could banquet together in the city, after which they went in procession by torchlight to show themselves in amity to the king, "...who toke pleasure to behold them..."  

Henry travelled to Richmond when the Greenwich tournaments had concluded, where he once more took part in two day contests with the support of Charles Brandon and Will Compton. After these were over, it was time to go to

Westminster, where the birth of his first child was celebrated at the magnificent "solemn" jousts of Westminster.¹

These "solemn" jousts were another, distinct kind of tournament, differing from the diplomatic and the training contests, although, as is shown in the following section, combining elements of both, and perhaps setting the standards of magnificence for noble behaviour in general and military lifestyles in particular.

According to Anglo, such tournaments represented a Tudor innovation in the staging of tournaments. They enlarged and embellished the acting out of legends that had long been an accompaniment to tournaments, and created out of those legends coherent symbolic representations of contemporary occurrences.²

The early court or pageant tournaments were devoted largely to felicitous matters, such as the coronation tournament in Westminster. The splendour of this event is rendered in great detail by chronicle sources such as Hall. The tournament arena was decorated with gilded devices in which the Spanish pomegranate and the English rose were entwined, and where the royal patron of humanists was confronted with a woman bearing a crystal shield, a symbol of learning, leading a band of jousters disguised as scholars. The tournament to celebrate the royal birth in 1511 was also concerned with elaborate disguises, processions, imitation forests, and castles as scenery for jousting. The fights were themselves often part of a story, usually based on an Arthurian legend, but referring

to the occasion of the joust. In 1511, the story of the
tournament was a reflection of the joyousness of the royal
family, and Henry entered in the appropriate disguise of
Loyal Heart.¹

As mentioned, the splendour and the symbolism of
court tournaments was continued in other events, including
those apparently concerned with the more "serious" aspects
of the kingdom's affairs. Pageantry and symbolism was used
by Henry as part of his encouragement of the nobles in their
enthusiasm for war. This occurred, for example, during the
long court festival of Maying in 1511. Henry went out Maying
in the woods around Greenwich with a coterie of his future
war leaders. These included men such as Admiral Edward Howard;
the commander of the Spears, Essex; the Earl of Devon, whose
son commanded a ship in the Channel fighting of 1513; the
Marquis of Dorset; and another Lord Howard, probably the
Admiral's brother Thomas. All of these men were prominent in
the events of 1513, except Devon who died just before the
expedition began.

On their return journey from the woods, the nobles
met a ship (actually a pageant wagon), whose master hailed
Henry with the news that he was a mariner who had visited many
ports and who had now come hither "...to se if any dedes of
armes were to be done in the countrey, of the which he might
make report in other countreis...".

A herald with the party asked the mariner what was
the name of his ship, and was told that it was Fame, a vessel
laden with Renown. The herald then informed the captain that
in order to bring his ship into the bay of Hardiness, he must

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.10 and 22.
double the point of Gentleness, and there he would see a company that would meddle with his merchandise. This was the kind of allegorical story which characterised the major court tournaments. But there was an undercurrent to the play acting which was revealed in a comment said to have been uttered by Henry at this point:

Then sayed the kyng, syth Renowne is their marchaundyse, let us bye it and we can.

Henry already had an army fighting in southern France, and the next few years saw even more strenuous efforts to buy his renown on the Continent.

With a peal of guns, the ship, displaying its flags and banners, sailed before the company to the tilt yards, where the training for war continued for three days.¹

The flavour of fantasy and Arthurian romance with which such events were invested continued even into the immediate preparations for war. When Henry mustered his army on Blackheath in preparation for the 1512 naval war, he had to break off from his jousting in order to do so. From the muster he went to Portsmouth accompanied by his nobles. There he appointed captains for the royal ship the Regent. These were, as usual, his courtiers and favourites, such as the commander of the Royal Horse, Sir Thomas Knyvet, Sir John Carew, of the prominent Devonshire family, as well as Brandon and Sir Henry Guildord. The departure of the fleet was the occasion of a great banquet given by the captains, during which:

...every one sware to another ever to defend, aide and comfort one an other without failing, and this they promised before the Kyng, which committed them to God, and so with great noyse of minstrelsie thei toke their shippes...²

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.29.
² Ibid., p.55.
The behaviour and the scenes which accompanied the departure of the fleet could have come directly from the pages of Malory. The noble life in general was largely embellished with the language and symbols of Arthurian romance, because the romances of chivalry were as popular as ever amongst the English, despite the efforts of humanists such as Vergil to debunk them because of their questionable authenticity. Lord Berners spent his time as deputy governor of Calais translating French romances into English, and Arthurian legend was used by Henry during the Reformation to establish that he came of a line of independent rules, dating from Arthur's reign as Emperor.

And in addition to being a characteristic of the preparation of the noble for war by Henry, and one of the ways in which the solemn tournaments were given form, Arthurian type motifs were used by Henry as part of his diplomatic propaganda. At the New Year celebration in the same year as the beginning of the Channel war, a feast was held during which a castle named The Dangerous Fortress - a common occurrence in romances - was drawn in. The pageant was "...garnished with artilerie and weapon after the most warlike fashion...", but the attack on it was purely symbolic. Inside the castle were six women in red and gold costumes, who were besieged by the king and five nobles dressed in identical colours. The symbolism was plain: Henry intended to reclaim his rightful property.

These then were some of the many elements and functions of the tournament, insofar as they directly affected the king himself and were manipulated by him to suit his needs. The king in 1513 was a gallant knight, eager to lead

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1. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.354-7; cf. R.S.Crane, The Vogue of Medieval Chivalric Romance During the English Renaissance (Wisconsin, 1919), passim.

his nobles to war sword in hand. The tournament was the instrument that he used to channel the desires of those nobles and to incite them, lighting their enthusiasm with the glitter of pageants, and toughening them in the lists for the coming encounter. From this point of view, the tournaments were a necessary appendage to war, and were very much a part of the reality of the military life, as perceived by Henry and his court. This was not only Henry's point of view, however, but was something shared by senior advisers. The cost of tournaments was enormous, and they could not have been mounted without the co-operation of his council members, who were not above discouraging the king in some of his ventures. And it is notable that a man such as Wolsey should have used the tournaments during the 1520's as part of his policy as arbiter of Europe.

But the tournaments were not merely the instrument of the king. They involved a large number of courtiers who helped to stage and arrange them, and who apparently enjoyed and benefited them, as shown in the following section.
iv. The Tournament and Nobles.

The tournament was an important aspect of noble life because, as with the king, it performed many necessary functions for thenobles. These functions often arose from the position that the nobles occupied in society, and especially the fact that for the greater nobles in particular, a public career meant attendance at court.

The court was a minute, faction ridden and dangerous world, where rivalries and irritations between groups, families and individuals naturally arose. But physical measures against an enemy within the precincts of the court were strictly discouraged by harsh sanctions. Thomas Duke of Norfolk was banished for a time for drawing a knife on a rival, and his son Henry was imprisoned under threat of the loss of his hand after one of his numerous altercations.

The tournament provided a defined area where the nobles could settle their grievances with violence, working off their aggressiveness in the heat of a mêlée.

At the same time, because the court was a world of ambition and rivalry, the tournament was also an opportunity to increase the status of oneself or one's family. Nobility could be flaunted by elaborate displays of wealth and prowess.

The heat engendered at tournaments by such considerations helped to ensure that the nobles had plenty of practice in relatively realistic combat situations before they went on campaign.

The elements of aggression and of status seeking through display were both present at the great midsummer tournament of 1540, an event held nominally to celebrate the
wedding of Henry and Anne of Cleves. It was possibly the largest tournament of Henry's last years, attracting over 40 noble participants after its challenges were proclaimed throughout Europe. Henry marked the success of the tournament by seizing the land of the Knights of St. John. This he distributed amongst the tourneyers, giving each of them land worth over 100 marks per annum for life, as well as a house each.¹

But although the tournament was ostensibly called to mark the wedding, it was probably also staged to celebrate the immediate good fortune of the Cromwell family, and possibly, at the same time, to reinforce their position at court, which had been shaken by the unfortunate marriage. Apart from that, it was in keeping with Cromwell's practice of demonstrating his newly acquired status through military activities, as in his parade of his large private army in his livery at the London musters three years before. The occasion of celebration for Cromwell was that only a fortnight before he had assumed the office of Chamberlain, the traditional prerogative of the Earls of Oxford, and had been created Earl of Essex, thus apparently entrenching himself amongst the peerage.

Cromwell was too old to fight in the lists, but his son Gregory substituted for him, demonstrating by tourneying that he had the qualities of a great noble, as did a nephew who was one of the most successful fighters during the contest. This man, whose name was Richard Williams, changed his name to Cromwell in order to align himself more closely with the rising branch of the family. His outstanding deeds in the

¹ Wriothesley's Chronicle, I, p.118.
tournament furthered his advancement, as he was knighted immediately afterwards. He survived the fall of his uncle to become a prominent figure in the 1544 invasion.

Cromwell and his faction called the tournament, jousts and barrier combats which made up the programme of events, and kept open house at Durham House, where they feasted the newlyweds, the lords, the House of Commons, and the aldermen with great ceremony. The guests were served...

...everie meale with their owne servantes after the manner of warr, their drume warning all the officers of household against everie meale which was donne, to the great honor of this realme.

Cornwell's circle contained an anti-Howard group composed of John Dudley, Viscount Lisle; Sir Thomas Seymour; Sir George Carew; Sir Thomas Poynings; and Anthony Kingston. All were prominent soldiers in the 1544 expedition, and all were bitterly opposed to the Howards. The challenge was answered by a team led by Henry Howard, who seized the opportunity to seek revenge on his enemies. So intense was the fighting that he and his particularly bitter enemy, Lisle, had their armour partially shattered by sword blows, not easily accomplished considering the sophistication of contemporary tournament armour.¹

¹ Wriothesley's Chronicle, I, pp.116-7; Hall, Henry VIII, II, p.305.

Noble rivalry at tournaments was not confined only to the English. During 1543 there were tournaments at the Scottish court in which the Earl of Lennox competed with his rival the Earl of Bothwell. "...when Bothwell, who was upon an equality with him in every other respect, found himself inferior at tilts, and in the sportive strife of arms, he left the court and returned home". Buchanan, History of Scotland, II, p.336.
The bitterness and violence which underlay court ceremonial had also appeared thirty years before, at the coronation tournament of 1509, ostensibly a pacific and joyous occasion. During the second day of tourneying, the jousters asked that the combat should be to the utterance. This may not actually have meant a fight to the death, but rather that it was to be a contest with no limits to the tactics employed. Henry, however, was unwilling to let the contest go ahead uncontrolled:

...his grace conceyving, that there was some grudge and displeasure between theim, thynkying if suche request wer to theim graunted, some inconvenience might ensue, would not there unto agree.¹

But even limiting the number of strokes allowed in the melee could not prevent uncontrolled violence from flaring:

...then was pesis of harneyes hewyn In to the ffyeld & swordys brokyn & bowyd that wondyrffull It was & ffereful to behold The which contynuyd wyth such egyrnes that theyr numbyr of strokis passid, and that the powar of the marshallys Sufficid not to depart theym tyll the kyng Cryed to hys Gard to help to dyssevir theym, which was not doon wtouth grete payn, And how well that everych of them quy theym ffull manfully yit Charles Brandon that daye was gretly avauncid & ffortherid by his hors the which that day ffawgth wyth his teth and fete lyke a serpent and therunto was soo pleasaunt & lygth of hede that he hadd his aduersary evyr at grete avauntage.²

The violent outcome of this tournament which had begun as an elaborate celebration pageant, and in which the participating nobles dressed in rich costumes, demonstrates the numerous levels of activity which were covered by the

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general form of the tournament, and also indicates how closely the tournament still answered to the needs of a military nobility by providing them with combat training. In fact, it was probably the only adequate and relatively organised military college for the English high command, in which the nobles were confronted with virtually all the conditions that they were liable to meet in war. Not only could they test their skills with all the noble weapons - the lance, sword, mace and axe - but Henry's tournaments also adopted relatively new weapons such as the cannon and handguns. Several people were wounded by gunpowder weapons during Henry's tournaments. In addition, there were waterborne tournaments on the Thames, and tournaments in which the nobles had to attack realistic fortresses enthusiastically defended by the besieged, during one of which Sir Francis Bryan had an eye knocked out.¹

The behaviour of the noble during wartime was duplicated in such events, a duplication that went beyond merely reproducing the conditions of combat, as is shown in the next section.

1. Russell, The Field of Cloth of Gold, p.108: in 1518 French tourneyers built a complete town at Cognac which they besieged with cannon, during which assault a number of people were killed.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there was often no clear distinction between the behaviour of a noble at court and that of a noble on campaign. This was partially because peacetime institutions such as the tournament were continued on into the campaigns themselves, as were the styles of behaviour appropriate to the tournament. This had the effect of diverting much of the energy and efficiency of the military into maintaining such institutions during wartime. One of the reasons why this took so much of the resources of the army was that lavish expenditure was an essential part of the tournament, just as it was of the noble lifestyle in general, both during peace and war. Ostentatious generosity was one of the marks of the noble, and as such marked noble participation in tournaments and in war.

Henry was one of the main instigators of such display by the nobles. He provided the physical arena for conspicuous consumption by the nobles, both in terms of creating court pageants and leading his men to war, and he also personally set an example for their display. Henry's father had been generous in staging tournaments and pageants, but he had not been keen to participate in them himself. But Henry not only opened his coffers to provide for tournaments, pageants and wars, he was seen to revel in the expenditure, joyously distributing his inherited treasures amongst his subjects. When the nobles strove to imitate him in increasingly lavish costumes, Henry responded by providing them with suitable backgrounds against which to disport themselves. At the coronation tournament, for example, he erected costly items such as a tapestry covered house, and an elaborate fountain and castle surmounted by an imperial...
crown to serve as the stage for jousting. The castle was elaborately decorated with gilded vines, contestants' shields, and gargoyles that spouted wine.

The nobles did their best to live up to the expectations created by such scenery by wearing splendid costumes and armour. Brandon, for instance, wore armour that was completely gilded. The jousters were accompanied by bands of horsemen in cloth of gold and silver, and hundreds of sumptuously dressed footmen.¹

The cost of such events was enormous, and together with the cost of war must have dominated Crown expenditure for two decades. The 1511 tournament in celebration of the birth of Henry's child, for example, was estimated to have cost £20,000, or about six months income to the exchequer.² Although this was a particularly magnificent tournament, it was not unparalleled. And the tendency was for the cost of these events to increase as the nobles strove to be even more outstanding in their costumes, seeking new ways to spend their money on their appearance. A new style of cloth was adopted by them for the 1511 tournament. Made out of gold, it cost £10 a yard as compared to £5 a yard for the material previously used. All the nobles who participated in the event wore the cloth, but two were singled out for special notice by the chronicler as being especially magnificent, and hence praiseworthy. These were the lords Bergavenny and Fitzwater, who, besides their rich trappings of cloth of gold, wore collars of gold chain estimated to be worth 1,000 marks each.³

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.10-11.
³ This was probably not an exaggerated estimate: see the portrait of a Gentleman Pensioner of 1560, A.L.Poole (ed.) Medieval England new ed. (2 vols, Oxford, 1958), I, Plate 61 (a) which shows a gold chain with at least four layers around his neck.
This elaborate display was highly valued by the nobles and their contemporaries. Richard Grafton commented that this tournament was

...holden a more excellent iustes, not for the more valiaunt actes yt daye done of armis, but for ye inestimable richesse and costely apparell whiche that daye was wore...1

The common people valued tournaments for their richness as did the nobles, but perhaps for a different reason. The commons were allowed to participate in the tournaments not only as onlookers and assistants, but also frequently they received benefits from the events as the result of generous gift giving by the nobles. At the end of the 1511 tournament, for instance, the common people were allowed to enter the banquet and strip the ornaments and cloth of gold from the nobles. One of the ornaments that was given away "...but for honoure, and larges..." was later valued by a goldsmith at £3/14/8.2

The profligacy of this court life, its ceremony, the bands of retainers, and the richness of the nobles, was merely an amplification and intensification of their domestic lifestyle, rather than an aberration. In their homes the nobles also kept large numbers of servants and retainers, according to their wealth and rank, and carried on the magnificence of court life in miniature.

And, because elaboration and lavish expenditure was such a basic part of the noble lifestyle, and because it was an essential element of the institutions of court life,


2. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.27.
including quasi-military events such as tournaments, it was perhaps inevitable that pageantry and display was continued into war, so that the noble in war was almost indistinguishable from the noble at court or at home.

When war broke out in 1513, the elaborate costumes and profligate expenditure of pageants and tournaments were transferred to the theatre of war. The splendour and pomposity of Henry's arrival at Calais has already been mentioned in general terms, but a specific instance of his royal progress illuminates the parallels between court life and campaigns even more clearly. The meeting between Henry and Maximilian outside the walls of Therouanne, with its extravagant costumery, could as easily have occurred within the walls of Westminster palace. The very tent in which they sheltered from the rain, made of purple and gold cloth, had been part of the scenery in the court tournaments at home. Now it saw service on the battlefield. The nobles were themselves paraded in brilliant costumes, their chargers barded with cloth of gold, damasc and embroidery, the latter more expensive than cloth of gold. The Duke of Buckingham was especially resplendent in purple satin, a cloth confined by statute to royalty. His horse's bard was covered with golden bells and embroidered antelopes, swans and spangles, decorations that were designed to drop off as the horse moved so they could be distributed as largesse.

The king was naturally most splendid of all, his armour covered with a costume embroidered with pearls and gems. He was accompanied by the Master of the Horse, who led his spare charger, and by henchmen who bore more pieces of the royal armour.
It was greatly to the satisfaction of some of the English that the emperor and his nobles were overshadowed by Henry and his court, as they wore dull black. The emperor was in mourning for his wife, and was also impoverished by a lifetime of warfare.¹

Every opportunity was taken during the 1513 expedition to display the nobles in their richest clothes. They paraded not only at the meeting with the emperor, but also at the surrenders of Therouanne and Tournai, and at the entry into Lille. Banquets and tournaments at the end of the campaign in Tournai consumed money in such a rapid manner that it drew an unheeded warning from the Clerk of Parliament, John Taylor. At the great banquet of Tournai, for example, specially made costumes of damasc and satin in the Tudor colours were distributed indiscriminately to local people at the end of the feast.²

Such profligacy gave rise to wild rumours about Henry's wealth, one Italian merchant in London writing that the king had taken two million pounds in gold and four wagons loaded with silver on campaign.³

Although such rumours may have been wild exaggerations, Henry was in fact extremely lavish with gifts during this campaign, as Paolo de Laude noted. The Milanese ambassador described how Henry, during the dinner to discuss strategy, began to discuss rings and jewellery with the emperor, showing his treasures to Maximilian, and eventually giving him a large eagle holding a ruby in its claws, a cluster of diamonds in its beak, and a large pearl at its

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2. L.P. I (4284), (4642).
3. V.P. II (283).
throat. The jewel was estimated to be worth about 30,000 florins. The exchange would appear to have been a largely formalised event to show both monarchs to their advantage. Henry was either being particularly extravagant with a fortuitously handy gift - the eagle had belonged to Maximilian's predecessor Charles the Bold - or it was a gift that was suitable as a bonus payment for Maximilian, a well publicised honourable gesture on Henry's part, and an augmentation of Henry's pride. Paolo noted that the emperor played his part, acting like a good physician who will not take money from a sick friend, but who eventually allows himself to be persuaded in order not to be surpassed in courtesy or nobility.¹

Such display was continued during the 1544 war, although on a more limited scale, perhaps because there was a suspicious spirit prevailing both at court and in Henry's alliances with Continental nobles. Despite this mood, Henry had not completely dispensed with ostentation as part of his military ventures. The court was just as magnificent on its journey to overawe the north in 1541 as it had been in France in 1513, and when he sailed to France in 1544, Henry travelled on a ship with sails of cloth of gold.²

Gruffydd, half impressed, half disdainful, commented that the royal host at Boulogne was

...a fine array of gallant people, in rainment of silk and velvet and gold cloth, and the harness also very gallant, some carved and gilded, some painted with splendid figures, by gilt enamelling of the bridles, the body harness and the headpieces... There were also new-fangled weapons made in Italy called pardisans which were gallantly carved and engraved, with gilded halberds so brittle that not one of them could stand up to a blow from the hand of a woman.³

¹ M.P. I (651).
² Lodge, Illustrations of British History, I, p.65.
³ Gruffydd, ii, p.57.
The nobles surrounded themselves with glittering entourages and bankrupted themselves in order to present an honourable appearance in wartime. But whereas for the king, display was perhaps mostly an aspect of foreign policy, for the nobles it was an attribute encumbent on them as members of the elite. The style with which a noble went to war matched his habits at home. Domestic households made the great nobles virtually minor monarchs, and their retinues gave them miniature armies. The Duke of Buckingham, for example, was accustomed to have 63 followers in his household throughout the year, and on special occasions such as a Christmas feast as many as 97 gentlemen, 107 yeomen and 97 servants.  

Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, was known as the Magnificent because of the splendour in which he lived, even when away from court. His simplest domestic meals saw him served by a chaplain, a carver, a server, a cupbearer each for himself and his lady, a gentleman waiter, a yeoman usher, a yeoman of the chamber for each of the four courses of supper, an officer as butler and cellarer, and a groom of the chamber to keep the door.  

This lifestyle did not change when the noble was on campaign. Percy in 1513 was served during the expedition to France by a treasurer, a herald, a pursuivant, a chamberlain, kitcheners, yeomen of the tent and yeomen of the wardrobe, apart from the 300 tenants and about 200 volunteers who served under his banner. Besides the entourage of servants and retainers, he also took along 23 thoroughbred

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horses for his own use as well as others to give to the Dukes of Burgundy and Brittany, plus 20 sumpter horses to bear his luggage. This luggage included the usual extravagant wardrobe of a campaigning noble, such as several suits of the latest style armour, different sets of harness for his horses for each day of the week, and a special set of harness for meetings with the king's allies. His coat of arms were displayed around his tents, and inside the tents were heavy items of furniture, such as a cupboard that doubled as an altar on which his priests could say mass.¹

Percy's appearance in 1513 might be compared with that of Hertford during his journey north in 1544, when he appears to have used his huge entourage and splendid appearance to impress on the northerners both his own status and the might of the king whom he served. Hertford made an official entry into Newcastle. He was led through the gates by 3,000 horsemen, 160 gentlemen in black velvet coats covered with gold chains, and Hertford himself was accompanied by three trumpeters, three clarions, three heralds in their coats of arms, and a gentleman bearing a naked sword. The servants who immediately surrounded the richly dressed earl were three sumptuously costumed pages of honour. Hertford also had with his 160 retainers in his livery, and, bringing up the rear, 5,000 footmen.²

The nobles surrounded themselves with entourages appropriate to their rank and office, each striving to be more magnificent than the other. But there was one noble who excelled in taking with him the paraphernalia of a noble on campaign. This was, of course, the king, who not only took with him a palace of canvas and prefabricated walls, but also his household bureaucracy and most of the court.

¹ Brenan and Lindsay, A History of the House of Percy, I, p.147.
² L.P. XIX, i (534), March 1544.
Besides the chief officers such as the commander of his Ward, the Masters of Ordnance and the marshals, he had as part of his retinue the Spears or Pensioners, with their own furniture and retinues, his bodyguard, the yeomen gunners, the 115 members of his chapel, his five Latin secretaries, the clerk of his council, the members of his wardrobe, the grooms and pages of the Privy Chamber, the wardrobe of the king's beds, the clerks of the signet with their retinues, the master of the posts with his 13 messengers, the clerk of the Privy Seal, with his retinue, the auditor and his servants, the sergeants of arms with their servants, the Chamber, with the Knights and Squires of the Body, gentlemen ushers, grooms and pages, the king's luter, his henchmen, his trumpeter, his minstrel and nine players, his hunters, his armourers, his household, his stable, the petty captains, the king of arms, herald and pursuivants, his bowyer and fletcher with their retinues, his medical attendants, and his artillery adviser.¹

The swarming mass of servants both of the monarch and his nobles formed a movable court which made a campaign as comfortable as possible and a counterpart to the glamour of life in England. Because they were so much a part of the lifestyle of the nobles, the vast bodies of followers were an essential adjunct to campaigns, helping to recreate in wartime the glitter of the tournament and the pageant.

Their presence also indicates the kind of war which was valued by the noble. With such a huge body of followers, many of them non-combatants, and trains of horses and wagons laden with clothes and furniture, the royal army could not be mobile or flexible in the field, even if weak administration

¹ L.P. I (4314).
and crude planning had allowed it to be. War was, for Henry and his nobles, an activity in which their appearance and behaviour was no less important than winning new territory from the French.

This noble attitude was one of the major ways in which the military elite helped shape the characteristics of sixteenth century warfare, by making it an arena in which they could display their nobility, rather than the theatre of efficiently conducted operations that gained specified objectives with the least waste of men, resources and time.
CHAPTER SEVEN

A GAME FOR GENTLEMEN: PART II.

The preceding examination of the way in which the tournament and its associated activities were very much a part of the reality of warfare indicates that there is an alternative way to understand the feats and deeds of honour which are analysed in this final chapter. As mentioned, the usual practice of historians has been to label those deeds as eccentric anachronisms, the last dance of withering medieval leaves before the blast of modernity. Cruickshank, speaking of the feats performed by Henry and his nobles during their wars, wrote:

There were isolated examples of this sort of thing during the whole of the century, but they were of no great importance. Victory by fair means or foul was becoming the order of the day. Science and cunning were taking the place of nobility and the lance.¹

But it is also possible to understand the apparently irrational deeds of the nobles as being part of a generally recognised and understood set of social expectations that was possessed by the nobility, and to see these expectations as conditioning the behaviour of nobles in war.

The usual historical practice, of attempting to classify such aspects of noble behaviour as mere aberrations, with no connection with reality, is to dismiss the motivations that sent men to their death, and to ignore the implications of individual actions that were of national and international significance in both their immediate and long term ramifications. It is, rather, perhaps more conducive to an understanding of the history of the early Tudor period to attempt a comprehension

¹ Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.200.
of noble behaviour as being the outcome of contemporary society's structure and institutions.

One of the areas in which this applied has already been examined in the previous chapter. It now remains to consider several other aspects of noble behaviour which have been identified as being significant elements of warfare. These are the ideas that the noble had particular religious and sexual conduct in warfare incumbent on him, and, finally, that his membership of the elite required him to seek honour on the battlefield.
i. Religious Obligations of the Warrior Noble.

The nobles were not only an elect group because they were so important in the temporal aspects of warfare. As they were an elite body, it was assumed that their military activities were of special concern to the deity. This in turn placed obligations on the nobles to act in a certain way in war, not that they always lived up to those expectations of course. Ellis Gruffydd considered that the continual setbacks of the English army during the 1540's was due in large part to the failure of its noble leaders to be suitably pious in their actions.¹

Even so, the belief that the warrior noble had obligations to his God still helped to condition the details of war. During the 1513 naval war one of the King's Spears in command of a ship of the fleet was Arthur Plantagenet. The illegitimate son of Edward IV, he was later made Viscount Lisle and Governor of Calais. Arthur left his post as commander of the ship in the midst of the war because, during the heat of battle, he made a vow to Our Lady of Walsingham that he would not eat fish or flesh until he saw her. As a result, at the height of the naval war, he was sent home by the admiral to carry out his oath. Edward Howard, the admiral, wrote to Henry explaining the circumstances of Arthur's departure. There is no surviving evidence that either the monarch or the admiral thought the behaviour odd or reprehensible, and Plantagenet received a knighthood at the conclusion of the expedition.²

Plantagenet's case was not an isolated incident. Howard had made his own elaborate vow during the course of

¹ Gruffydd, iii, pp.12-5.
² N.R.S. (69), 17 April 1513.
the naval war, as the outcome of the death of Sir Thomas Knyvet. This oath also indicates the way in which war was still seen in terms of personal conflict between individual nobles or family groups, apart from its demonstration of the religious elements of noble behaviour. Wolsey - again without any expression of surprise or displeasure - wrote to the Bishop of Worcester to announce that as a result of the death of Sir Thomas Knyvet in the sinking of the Regent (the other 700 men who burned with him are not mentioned):

Sir Edward (Howard) hath made hys vowe to God that he wyl never se the Kyng in the face tyl he hath revenged the deth of the nobyll and valyant knygth sir Th. Knyvet.¹

Mystique surrounded their persons and their actions, a quality that was illuminated when Howard drowned at Brest. The English and French ceased their fighting so that his body could be recovered, and the French admiral, Pregent de Bidoux - a prior of the Order of St. John recently returned from fighting the Turks - could arrange for the funeral. Before the funeral arrangements were completed, however, he wrote to his King and Queen asking that he be allowed to keep Howard's heart for himself. The body of the dead admiral had been invested with the aura of a holy relic.²

War was thus made into a religious duty, and those who were most prominent in it - the nobles - shared in the mystique. It was no coincidence that the conclusion to the 1513 war was a large scale religious ceremony in which all the nobles participated, because the invasion of France was officially a Crusade, to protect the Pope and to punish France for making use of heretic cardinals. The concluding ceremony was centred around the arrival in England of Henry's reward

¹ N.R.S. (30); Letters of Richard Fox (37), 26 August 1512. Ellis, Letters Illustrative of English History, I (lxv), surmises that Howard's determination to carry out this oath may have led him into the adventure that cost him his life.

² N.R.S. (72), 28 April 1513.
from the Pope, the Sword and Cap of Maintenance. Its arrival was celebrated with the same glittering display that was a necessary accompaniment to other great court occasions, and military campaigns. This included the usual demonstration of the dominance of the nobles, such as the over 400 peers and gentlemen who formed an escort for the gifts during their journey from the coast to London. Thousands of people thronged the streets of the capital to watch the presents arrive. The emblems were carried by the Florentine ambassador through the crowded laneways to St. Paul's, where Henry waited before the altar with members of his court and ambassadors. After an exchange of orations by English and Italian representatives, the king was girded with the sword and crowned with the hat before the high altar. Then the procession paraded around the inside of the church, the nobles costumed in rich clothes topped with gold chains, before celebrating high mass. At the conclusion of the ceremony, the nobles moved outside to show themselves to the waiting throngs. The whole ceremony was brought to a close by a banquet, from which the Spanish ambassador was absent, it was rumoured, because of his shame that his country had withdrawn from the Crusade.

As in other areas of warfare, the nobles spent much of their time and resources in elaborate recognition of the special relationship that the warrior nobility enjoyed with the deity.

It may be argued, of course, that they were cynical and that the ceremonies were an elaborate farce. But, on the other hand, the nobles went to considerable trouble to mount

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1. V.P. II (445), 15 June 1514.
these ceremonies, and occasionally, as in the case of Arthur Plantagenet, religious duties were of overriding concern to the noble even in times of great stress and danger. In later years, after the Reformation, English nobles were often forced to sacrifice family ties, careers, wealth and safety in order to carry out what they regarded as the special religious duty of their caste, fighting in God's service against the infidel. There were 87 English nobles who became knights of the Order of St. John during the sixteenth century, most of them before 1550, 25 of whom fought in the siege of Malta.¹ Sometimes several members of the one family persisted as members of the religious military orders. Such a family was the Shelleys, who also managed to retain a prominent place at court. One of the family, Sir Richard (1513-89) was the last Turcopolier or cavalry commander of the Order, while his brother, Sir Edward, who is mentioned below, became Master of the Household, captain of Berwick, treasurer of the Council of the North, and was killed fighting at the battle of Pinkie.²

Sir John Wallop was another prominent noble who seems to have been compelled by his sense of religious duty to risk himself in battle, not only at considerable danger, but also at financial cost. After distinguished service in 1511 and 1513 - for which presumably he could have expected a sinecure - he offered his services to Emmanuel of Portugal. He fought at his own expense under the Portuguese flag against the Moors of North Africa, his only reward being membership of the Portuguese Order of Christ. Wallop was not regarded as an anachronistic eccentric. After his return he was


2. D.N.B. entry for Shelley, XVIII, p.41.
offered the post of ambassador to France, although he turned this offer down so that he could take up the office of captain of Guisnes, where there was the greatest opportunity to fight.¹

In the same year as Wallop went to Africa, three gentlemen - one of them the son of the king's shipbuilder - led a retinue of 100 men aboard a pilgrimage vessel to seek adventure in the East.²

The warfare in which men such as the Shelleys, Wallop, and the three venturesome gentlemen participated was conducted in an atmosphere of religious fervour. The arrival of the papal gifts in 1514 was not the only large scale religious ceremony associated with the 1513 war. When news of victory at Flodden arrived in the king's camp before Tournai, the tent of cloth of gold was set up and a Te Deum sung by the nobles. When Henry entered captured cities, he immediately marched to the main church of his new possession and celebrated mass, and throughout his realm special religious observances were held. When news of victory in France arrived in Rome in September, Henry's ambassador, Cardinal Bainbridge, and four other cardinals celebrated the news with a high mass.³ Henry's first queen, Catherine, was certain that her husband was personally sincere in his actions as a soldier of the Church in 1513, as she assured Cardinal Bainbridge.⁴ And in official documents there were constant references to God's interest in the affairs of the nobles. Vergil, for example, claimed that Janes of Scotland was killed by God because he had attacked England while Henry was on Crusade.⁵

¹ D.N.B. entry for Wallop, XX, pp.610-11.
² Lodge, Illustrations of British History, I (v).
³ V.P. II (315).
⁴ Ibid., (203), 2 November 1512.
Even in 1544, when Henry was an outcast from the rest of Christendom, he continued to colour his wars with a sense of special religious obligation. The Privy Council ordered prayers and processions throughout the kingdom for the safety of the king and his nobles in France, and for victory over the Turks by the Christians. Henry often promised aid for the Emperor in his wars against the infidel, although the promises of his later years were rarely fulfilled.1

Virtually every army before and since the sixteenth century has claimed divine approval for its actions. But for the sixteenth century noble, there was a special feeling that he was obligated to perform duties for God in wartime, because he was one of the military elite. This placed unique privileges and duties upon his shoulders, such as Plantagenet's freedom to go on pilgrimage in the middle of a campaign, and Howard's obligation to revenge the death of a fellow noble according to an oath sworn to God.

1. A.P.C., I, 27 June 1544; L.P. XIX, i (66); ii (421).
ii. Sexual Behaviour of the Warrior Noble.

Perhaps even more obvious in the wars of Henry VIII than the characteristic religious practices of the nobles were examples of their highly formalised sexual behaviour. As well as being a place where the noble could acquire honour through deeds of arms, war was also a place where the sexual display which formed such a large part of court life could be continued. In fact, the wars of Henry VIII and his nobles often appear to be an elaborate sexual game.

This was because the sexual behaviour permitted to nobles tended to be tightly restricted by social conventions and dynastic needs. Marriage depended on property and dynastic questions, rather than on emotion or sexual preference. One example of this amongst the peers was the unfortunate career of Henry Percy. As a young man at court, he fell in love with Anne Boleyn. But he was forced to marry elsewhere, due to a combination of court intrigue and family pressure. The unlucky future Earl of Northumberland was required to marry a daughter of the Earl of Shrewsbury, even though he detested her. The marriage was a misery for both, and ended with her insanity, but it was politically expedient for Percy's father, it was advantageous for the Shrewsburies to ally themselves with the more powerful Northumberlands, and Wolsey saw that there was a royal interest in the object of Percy's devotion.

As a result of such constrictions on their sexual preferences, the nobles, and perhaps especially those at court, had to find other avenues through which to form liaisons. These frequently took the form of elaborate, public and highly ritualised courtships. These were included in the great occasions of court life, such as tournaments and pageants, which, as has been shown, were also very much a part of the military life of the nobility.

Henry himself provided the lead in many such formalised games, particularly in the early years of his reign. The relative absence of such games in the records of 1544 may have been due to his advanced age, apart from the general absence of women from the events of 1544. One such formalised sexual ritual of the early years at court was the occasion in 1510, when Henry and other nobles such as the Earls of Essex and Wiltshire disguised themselves as Robin Hood and his band. They burst into the Queen's apartments, to the surprise and delight of the ladies, whom they joined in dances and other pastimes.¹

Such games made women part of those aspects of court life which were continuations of military ventures. Ladies were often the focus around which the activity of an event such as a tournament revolved, and sometimes they actually participated in the tournaments. One of the protagonists in the drama of the coronation tournament was a woman disguised as Dame Pallas, and it was also on this occasion that the ladies of the court came to beg the king to let the combats be to the utterance. The ladies often attended tournaments which were largely devoted to serious training for war, and occasionally they might have tournaments devoted purely to themselves, as in 1511 when the queen was the centre of thematic development of the solemn tournament to celebrate the birth of her child. The disguises of the nobles all paid tribute to her as the object of their devotion. Henry was costumed as Loyal Heart, William Earl of Devonshire was Good Wishes, Sir Thomas Knyvet was Good Hope, and Sir Edward Neville was Valiant Desire. Brandon entered disguised as a recluse, and sought the queen's intercession to permit him to join in the combats.²

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.15.
² Ibid., p.22.
In these ways women were an integral part of the larger pattern of the noble military life, creating a style of behaviour which perhaps reached the summit of its ostentation at the Field of Cloth of Gold, but which had clear precedents in 1513, and also continued on into the last years of the reign. At the Field of Cloth of Gold the women were key participants in the cementing of peace. The celebrations involved an elaborate formal exchange of visits between the monarchs and their spouses. And similarly, in 1513 the women also played a major part in the course of the war.

The sexual games played by the nobles and their ladies began in the long series of tournaments, pageants and banquets that preceded the war, and continued in similar pastimes during the course of the war itself. Relations between the English nobles and the court of the Regent of the Netherlands, Margaret of Savoy, were most cordial. Henry and his nobles took advantage of this to enjoy the hospitality of the Regent and her ladies on at least two occasions during the campaign. As with life at the English court, the visits to Margaret at Lille were accompanied by glittering pageantry and courtly recreations, and also the emblems of the noble warrior. Henry arrived before Lille's gates as a triumphant warrior, surrounded by his nobles and 200 of his elite cavalry, as well as his personal bodyguard. His sword and mace were borne into the city before him, and the beauty of his gold encrusted armour was emphasised by the simple white tunic that he wore over it. The horses which were an essential part of this display were also elaborately costumed in cloth of gold, solid silver ornaments, black velvet and designs of the fleur de lys.

Margaret responded by welcoming him appropriately with rich displays of wealth and pageants which lined the road into the city.

1. M.P. I (654); Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.92.
The days spent with the ladies of the Netherlands gave Henry in particular and the nobles in general the opportunity to demonstrate to the women their nobility, through their athletic prowess, their courtly graces, and their generosity. Henry played cards with the ladies and danced until dawn "...leaping like a stag...". He demonstrated his skill as an archer before the ladies when he made a second visit to the court a few days later, during the time his army was besieging Tournai. Once more he danced, and gambled, and at his departure showed off his horsemanship, of which he was extremely proud, by performing acrobatic feats while his steed was at full gallop.¹

Henry and his nobles were also lavishly generous in their gifts of jewels and money to the ladies. This was, additionally, perhaps an attempt to further enhance the diplomatic ties between the two countries at a time when Henry was negotiating with the Empire to join him in a new invasion of France in the coming year. Henry gave each of Margaret's ladies a valuable diamond during his entry into the city, and other jewels at his departure, as did his nobles. The king also distributed 3,000 crowns amongst the officials of Margaret's household.²

But these visits were not merely for archery practice and gambling. The nobles also used them to form sexual liaisons with the ladies of the court, the most famous of which became a scandal. That it did become a scandal indicates that even such highly formalised public wooings as the one about to be recounted had great significance for the nobles. This liaison was the attachement formed between

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¹. M.P. I (657).
². Ibid., (654), (656).
Margaret herself and Brandon, who had just gone through a rather questionable form of marriage before the expedition in order to acquire his title of Viscount Lisle. Margaret was beautiful and rich, one of Europe's most eligible widows, and Brandon appears to have pursued her enthusiastically. In fact, Brandon was so intent in his purpose that the king intervened and spent a considerable amount of his time at Lille trying to persuade Margaret to accept. Although Margaret refused, the king's persistence wrung a promise from her not to marry until the following year, when Henry was to bring the court back to the Netherlands. The alliance was to have been a secret, but rumours of it were spread, perhaps by Brandon to force Margaret to declare herself. One of the sources of these rumours was a ring taken from Margaret by Brandon. The account of how the ring came to be taken gives an unusually intimate description of the style of public flirtation in which the nobles engaged during the expedition, as Margaret wrote down her memories of how Brandon had wooed her:

...one night at Tournay, being at the banquet, after the banquet he put himself upon his knees before me, and in speaking and him playing, he drew from my finger the ring, and put it upon his, and since shewed it me; and I took to laugh, and to him said that he was a thief, and that I thought not that the King had with him led thieves out of his country. This word laron he could not understand; wherefore I was constrained to ask how one said in Flemish laron. And afterwards I said to him in Flemish dieffe, and I prayed him many times to give it me again, for that it was too much known. But he understood me not well, and kept it on unto the next day that I spake to the King, him requiring to make him to give it me, because it was too much known - I promising him one of my bracelets which I wore, the which I gave him. And then he gave me the said ring; the which one other tyme at Lylle, being set nigh my Lady of Hornes, and he before upon his knees, it took again from my finger. I spake to the King to have it again; but it was not possible, for he said unto me that he would give me others better, and that I should leave him that. I
said unto him, that it was not for the value but for that it was too much known. He would not understand it, and departed from me. The morrow after he brought me one fair point of diamond, and one table of ruby, and shewed me that it was for the other ring; wherefore I durst no more speak of it, if not to beseech him that it should not be shewed to any person; the which hath not all been to me done.¹

Margaret's account of her wooing emphasises the formalised and public nature of such exploits, as well as the somewhat laboured emphasis that was placed on the appropriate exchange of gifts. The second occasion on which Brandon took the ring, at the feast of Tournai, was the time when Margaret returned the compliments of Henry's visits to Lille. She and her ladies were the focal point for the pageantry and jousting which marked the conclusion to the war. They entered the city in processions, escorted by richly dressed nobles, and were entertained by the tournament held in their honour, as well as the banquet which was accompanied by a masque and the distribution of gifts.²

Noble sexual practice both at court and on campaign was thus both well publicised and highly formalised, with great importance being placed on the display of martial qualities by the men, and the generous giving of gifts. These prescribed styles of sexual conduct continued to impinge on the behaviour of the noble in wartime, leaving proportionately less time and money for the actual business of fighting and for the welfare of the men. As Gruffydd grumbled about the captains and their women friends at Boulogne in the 1540's, they preferred

...cards and dice and mistresses and ungodly whores to giving a penny or a groat out of charity for a man enfeebled by sickness. Indeed the captains spent on vain banquets of food and drink more in one week than would have kept many a strong man alive.

1. L.P. I (4851).
Aspects of the noble lifestyle such as the tournament, display, and their religious and sexual codes, were all important elements in shaping noble behaviour in battle. But perhaps most important of all was the noble sense of honour, the feeling that, as members of a group, they were required to demonstrate their courage and individual prowess. The nobles of early Tudor England had inherited the concept that such courage and skill could be associated with the supposed qualities of a particular social group, the knights, and they continued to express those desired characteristics in the language of chivalry. They spoke of valour, prowess, and the other features that were supposed to be shared by the knights. And when a noble combined all the recognised characteristics of the military elite, he was accorded the honour of being recognised as a knight. Thomas Howard, when assessing the qualities of Lord Dacre during a campaign to burn Jedworth in 1523, wrote of his fellow noble that

"...there is noo herdyer ner bettir knyght...".  

The motivation to improve prestige, or in other words to win honour, through the deeds associated by the Tudor nobles with knightliness thus continued to be a profound influence on the noble at war.

As a result of the importance of this influence, it remained irrelevant to the nobles that they formed only a tiny proportion of the army, and it was also irrelevant to them that other groups than their own might possess the power to dominate battlefields. In any case, both of these

situations had applied to European warfare since about the thirteenth century.

What remained more relevant to them was that war - its armies, its technology, and its various forms - comprised an admirable background against which to act out their roles as nobles, and to acquire prestige as a result. The nobles, from their point of view, were the centre of this world, and everything else, no matter how potentially dangerous, could be a prop. New forms of war were simply adapted by the nobles to serve their needs in an arena where they could show off the attributes of their group. The most potent weapons that the world had yet seen were turned into demonstrations of the wealth and power of the military elite. Cannon barrels and gunstocks, armour and swords, ships and pikes, were embellished and decorated with the same lavish detail that applied to the noble lifestyle in general. Even newly revived classical images were adapted to show the status of the owners of these weapons, as arms were inlaid with gilt and ivory representations of classical heroes, side by side with images of knightly romances. New weapons, rather than immediately transforming the behaviour of nobles, were therefore accommodated into existing conceptions of the proper methods of waging war. They became yet another way in which the noble could acquire honour. A most striking example of this was reported by the Venetian ambassador while on his way to Henry's court. He paused during his voyage to visit a Genoese noble who had been wounded by gunfire during a battle:

...condoling him on his indisposition, and congratulating him on the advantage he really derived from it; for, although detrimental and mischievous, yet on the other hand, had it procured extreme glory for him, both through the valour he had displayed, and the honourable position of his wounds, and I said that the shield which was shot through at the same time with his hand, bore testimony to his prowess, so that he was renowned all over Italy. He appeared extremely pleased at this, mentioning how he had been wounded, and that the result of the affair had

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done him honour, affording him greater comfort than the annoyance caused him by the said hurt, and that he should therefore soon recover, vowing that he was anxious, if the opportunity should be afforded him, to effect greater things for your Highness with the wounded member, and also with his right hand, and whilst uttering these words he raised each arm aloft.¹

The behaviour of the Genoese captain indicates how the noble managed to accommodate new weapons into his view of the purpose and meaning of noble participation in war, as gunshot wounds became attributes of honour.

At the same time, his speech also shows the same characteristics as did the behaviour of nobles generally when they were engaged in the business of acquiring honour. This was, primarily, that acquiring honour was an activity that required a great deal of publicity. In order to be of value, honour had to be seen to be acquired. The honour of the individual noble only had meaning when it was recognised by the public in general and his group in particular, hence the emphasis on display of honour in tournaments, in religious and sexual areas of behaviour, and, as will be shown below, in deeds on the battlefield.

...both words and actions are significant within the code of honour because they are expressions of attitudes which claim, accord or deny honour. Honour...is only irrevocably committed by attitudes expressed in the presence of witnesses, the representatives of public opinion.²

The speech of the wounded Genoese also emphasises that early sixteenth century nobles understood war through a different framework of language and concepts than that of the modern world, and that this shaped their actions. The

¹ Giustinian, Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII, I, p.38.
² Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status", p.27.
military language and concepts of the nobles were drawn from the past practice of their society, and were all but entirely lacking modern terminology. Henry's invasions of France would be in modern terms, a campaign. But to the king's followers, it was a "journey", an "adventure", or an "enterprise", expressions that could also be used to describe any of the subordinate activities of a campaign, such as a battle, an ambush, a raid, or individual combat. There was no distinction between the categories of warfare that might be employed by a modern soldier, and there was no discrimination in the language between actions of thousands of men or the deeds of a single noble. It was through such language, for example, that the English ambassador to Charles, Nicholas Wotton, sought to justify a continued English siege of Montreuil in 1544. Wotton was determined that the attack should go on, even though it would mean extreme hardship for those involved, because if

...the French menne shuld be compelled to retourne, having neither succourid the towne, nor done enye other notable acte, it wer a deede of excellent prayse and glorye; no less then the siege of Calais was to King Edward the Thirde. And, yn cace we break up the siege from Monstreul, I feare leaste thEmperours menne will saye that the unprofitable siege of Monstreul hathe ben caweise, that neither they, nor we, have done that exploict against thennemy that elis right wel mighte have ben done. 1

This was the kind of language employed by the nobles in contemplating their activities in war, indicating not only the limited perspectives that they shared, but also the way in which war was an area where they could perform "notable acts" and "deeds of excellent praise and glory".

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1. S.P. X v (MXXXVIII).
Henry's conduct in both 1513 and 1544 appears to have been largely governed by considerations of his own honour as a noble warrior and a conquering monarch. If need be, he was prepared to enhance his status by achieving notable acts with his own hand. The mere fact that Henry participated in the 1513 war in person was in itself a deed worthy of honour, as it was undertaken in the face of disapproval from his senior councillors, who tended to be cautious in advising the king on his personal conduct. The 1513 venture seems to have been the inevitable outcome of a growing belief by Henry that the only way to maintain his honour intact was to invade France in person, especially after the series of disappointments during the first few military ventures undertaken in his reign. The war against France had opened with a reverse when Dorset's army mutinied in 1512, and returned home against the king's express orders. Henry was outraged, and the unfortunate leaders of the army had to kneel before him beg his forgiveness. An inquiry by the council publicly condemned the nobles for compromising both their honour and the honour of their country by their failure to control their men.

Such mishaps apparently convinced the king that he had to take the leadership of the army into his own hands, as he thought that the English fought most willingly and successfully only under the direct command of their king. As a result, he announced his intention to lead the coming invasion of France in his own person. The council was naturally enough opposed to risking the king's life at the beginning of a new reign and at a time when there was no heir. But Henry overruled them, arguing that

...it behoved him to enter upon his first military experience in so important and difficult a war in order that he might, by a signal start to his martial knowledge, create such a fine opinion about

his valour among all men that they would clearly understand that his ambition was not merely to equal but indeed to exceed the glorious deeds of his ancestors.¹

Henry was highly conscious, as were his nobles, of the military heritage they had from noble warrior kings such as Edward III and Henry V. As the king reminded his council, there were many instances in the past where great victories were won by armies led in person by his ancestors, but many losses where they were absent.

This consciousness of the examples set by previous military rulers, together with Henry's desire to establish his own prestige as a warrior king, can be seen in his management of the war, his interference in all the minor details of a campaign, and his behaviour when the prospect of battle loomed. And this was not solely his conception of his situation, for other citizens also saw the need for him to establish his status by an emulation of his ancestors. The person (or persons) who translated the history of Henry V in time for its publication to coincide with the 1513 war announced that they had done so in order that Henry would both model himself on the behaviour and wisdom of his ancestor, and also

that our Soveraigne Lord by the knowledge and sight of this pamphile should partlie be prouoked in his saide warr to ensue the noble and chiualrous actes of this so noble, so uertuous, and so excellent a Prince, wch so followed, he might the rather attaine to like honnour, fame and uictorie.²

Eager to show to all that he was skilled in warfare, Henry involved himself at every level of organising the campaign, personally selecting men for the Channel war, and

¹ Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.197.
² The First English Life of Henry the Fifth, p.4.
supervising their embarkation "...so that everyone marvelled...". He received first hand reports in minute detail from Admiral Howard about the handling of the fleet, as "...ye commanded me to send Your Gras word how every shipp dyd sail...". And in his enthusiasm for war, Henry even took a hand in the mundane details of war, as shown, for example, in the letters he wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury, the leader of the vanguard. Henry complained that the earl had taken munitions that had been appointed for the rearguard, and had then tried to disguise his misappropriation by blaming the discrepancy on the Master of Ordnance, Sir Sampson Norton. Henry ordered Shrewsbury to hand back the supplies.3

Despite his apparent interest in making sure that his army was well organised, at least before departure, once on campaign, Henry never allowed the considerations of military efficiency or the safety of his men to interfere with his gaining of honour. Each significant event of the campaign was made into an occasion of pageantry, celebration and gallant gestures, as Henry thrust himself into the forefront of events in order to exact the maximum of self display from the war. Even though he was accompanied by men who were veterans of many campaigns, he took the running of the campaigning army into his own hands, for example supervising the pitching of camp and the deployment of his forces.4 One night during the march to Therouanne when the rain was exceptionally heavy, Henry refused to disarm, but rode around the camp until three in the morning comforting his soldiers with promises of future deeds.5 He also felt it was incumbent

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2. N.R.S. (58).
3. L.P. I (4318), July 1513.
5. Ibid.
on him to guard the morals of his troops personally, hanging three Germans for not respecting churches and disobeying orders.¹

And when some of his nobles showed signs of reluctance to ford a river, Henry was the first to dismount and wade across.²

Just as Henry was irrepressible in such matters, he was also the most eager when danger threatened. Whenever the French seemed likely to attack, he flew to arms, supervised the siting of his troops, advanced his personal standard, and waited for the fight, his thirst for prestige and his concept of the proper conduct of war interfering in the battle itself. It was Henry, for instance, who deployed the cannons at the battle of Spurs, and, as mentioned, it was because of his stubborness that an argument ensued over whether or not his magnificent tents should be struck or left up during the battle, a point of honour in which he prevailed.³

Rejoicing in the victory over the French nobles, Henry rode up to the walls of Therouanne to offer mercy if the garrison surrendered. And once the details of occupation were concluded with the usual splendid ceremonials, Henry disported himself in his camp for a lengthy period before moving on to another achievement. As mentioned, some people considered that the delay was caused because Henry had no definite plans, but others apparently believed that the pause was actually because the king wished to act with the dignity befitting the role of conquering knight:

...and as the xxvi day of the same moneth the Kings Highnes remoeved his feld again unto Gyngate, wher he contynueth as yit, according to lawe of armes,

¹ L.P. I (4284).
² Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.68.
for in caas any man wold bid bataill for the
beseging and getting of any Citie or Towne, than
the wynner to give bataill & to abide for the
same certain dayes...

Having delayed the course of the campaign by this
feat, as well as his visit to Lille, Henry marked his re-entry
into the war by yet another feat while he was personally
deploying the army and pitching the ordnance before the walls
of Tournai.

Then the king him selfe with a few persones rode
betwene hys ordynaunce and the towne, and rode in
great adventure so nere the walles that he might
vewe the walles and the toures very wel: they
shote out of their toures peces of ordinaunce
and hurt such as came within their level.

Those who were discomforted during Henry's
exhibition of coolness included John Grey, the brother of the
Marquis of Dorset, who had his horse shot from beneath him.

Henry, having managed to involve himself in war,
appears to have been determined to exploit the situation to
the utmost in order to increase his prestige as leader of
the nation and also as a warrior, even if it meant hampering
the efficient management of his army, and endangering the
lives of his nobles. Despite a number of changes in his
condition, the same motivations still seem to have been of
profound influence on the king's actions in 1544.

The young king of 1513 had been a dashing warrior,
whereas the old king of 1544 was a feared and ruthless
politician. But despite the years of intrigue and brutality,
Henry was still a warrior king, ready to lead his army
personally, even with his physical handicaps, in order to
maintain his honour. As in 1513, considerations of the
conduct befitting a member of the military elite could override
all other factors.

2. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.94.
Henry's person had a symbolic quality for his fellow countrymen. Gruffydd credited his presence with inspiring the English to victory at Boulogne, and Morison saw him as the figurehead of the nation in war. But, as in 1513, there was considerable opposition to him venturing his person in war, largely because of his apparent ill health. Henry brushed this aside in his eagerness to once again involve himself in conflict with France. He even had to contend with quite intense efforts by the Empire to get him to stay home. He had been ill throughout the opening months of preparation for war, and, because of his insistence that he be closely involved in the details of war, he seriously hampered the progress of readying the army. Charles tried a number of diplomatic ploys to persuade Henry to stay home, even promising that he would remain out of the war if Henry would. But, as Chapuys told Charles, despite his age and weight and bad legs, nobody dared to tell the king to stay home because of his zeal to go in person.

Henry eventually surprised everybody by making a rapid recovery, and continued to supervise the war effort in intimate detail: amongst other things he experimented with a new kind of pontoon bridge. Nothing was going to prevent the king making what was probably his last invasion of France, for his sense of honour continued to impell him, as is shown in two major incidents of the wars of the 1540's. The first, which will be mentioned briefly, involved the incident which brought about the beginning of the 1544 war with Scotland. This was the ambush and defeat of Sir Robert

2. L.P. XIX, i (529), 18 May 1544.
3. Ibid., (206), 16 March 1544; ii (21), 3 August 1544.
Bowes and an English raiding party at Halidon Ridge, an event which culminated in Hertford's terrible raid of 1544. Bowes' defeat, in late 1542, came at a time when Scotland and England already enjoyed uneasy relations, and when both monarchs were slowly preparing for war. Henry was spurred on by the disgrace of Bowes - as contemporaries saw it - to immediately plunge into war in order to revenge his honour. He ordered his northern deputy, Brandon, not to desist from war with the Scots until some notable exploit had been achieved to purge the dishonour which the Scots were voicing about England, namely that Bowes and his men had not dared to abide an encounter with a smaller number of Scots. He was adamant that there would be no further negotiations with the Scots until such a notable exploit was accomplished. As Leslie wrote later, Henry was so touched by the defeat at Halidon Ridge that "...he wist nocht quhat to do for angre...".

Henry's anxiety to revenge his lost honour in 1542 was consistent with his behaviour during the 1544 expedition. At the end of the invasion of France, Pollard's Machievallian prince was prepared to sacrifice an entire army in order to maintain his honour.

As the campaigning season drew to an end in 1544, the Dauphin threatened Norfolk and his men at Montreuil with a huge, freshly recruited French army. With the successful end to the siege of Boulogne, the end of the campaigning season, and no chance of winning Montreuil, Norfolk quite reasonably planned to withdraw to Calais. But withdrawal was not so simple for a sixteenth century noble as simply moving by the shortest, safest route available. The withdrawal

1. L.P. XVII (925), 8 October 1542.
had to be performed in as honourable as possible a way, even if it meant some danger and inefficiency. Norfolk and his council drew up a suitable itinerary, writing to advise Henry that the most honourable and practicable means would be to go inland through St. Omer's, as the enemy would not then be able to say that the English were afraid to meet them and had taken the safer route through Boulogne.¹

Henry appears to have been satisfied with this proposal, although he made some recommendations qualifying it. He ordered Norfolk to take his guns with him - an impediment to rapid movement - rather than sending them to safety at Boulogne, because it would be more honourable to have the guns with the army. And, in addition, when Norfolk was ready to depart, he was to send a herald to the commander of the French garrison in Montreuil, Marshal du Biez, to inform him of the circumstances of the withdrawal. Norfolk was to tell him that the Emperor had made peace with Francis: in this way Henry could claim a different reason for withdrawing his army than the danger posed by the Dauphin. The duke was also to offer a safe conduct to the French commander so that he could visit Norfolk in his camp for the sake of old acquaintance.²

According to Imperial ambassadors at Boulogne, Henry felt he could not honourably withdraw his army without first offering battle, but, apparently because of his weakened army, he was disappointed that the emperor had not obtained a truce for him. This would have meant that he could have honourably avoided the burden of having to give battle if the French wished it. The ambassadors reported that they found

¹ L.P. XIX, ii (297), 25 September 1544.
² Ibid., (303), 26 September 1544.
the king silent and pensive, with none of his usual boastful manner. They believed this was due to his fear that shame or harm might come to his army during the retreat. ¹

But Henry was apparently determined to give battle if he had to, even against the advice of his councillors, and he delayed his departure for a short time while he awaited the outcome of events. Paget tried to get the ambassadors to persuade Henry that he might withdraw with honour, as he had achieved the enterprise of Boulogne and because Francis had not come to face him in person. ²

The retreat from Montreuil proved to be a frenzy of tragic disorganisation and panic as the English army straggled to safety. As a result, Henry was not satisfied that his honour had been preserved as he wished, especially because Norfolk eventually chose the safer route through Boulogne, taking with him Brandon and the army with Brandon which was to have fought the French. There were sound reasons for Norfolk to take these measures. He had only 13,000 able men and thousands more who were disabled by illness, he lacked horses to draw his guns quickly, or even any food for the draught animals, and he believed that the Dauphin had with him about 10,000 cavalrymen and 40,000 foot. ³

¹ L.P.XIXii(304), 26 September 1544.
² Ibid., (318).
³ The point of honour about withdrawal from a siege appears to have had a significant effect on strategy. Henry advised Charles in 1521 not to besiege Tournai as planned, but rather to stay in the field and offer battle to Francis. For, if he refused to fight once the French proffered combat, he would suffer eternal shame and lose help "...in othre parties...". In 1543 Charles broke off the siege of Landrecy to offer battle when the French king was in the vicinity, thus allowing the besieged town to be victualled. S.P. I (XLV); Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.342.
³ L.P. XIX, ii (278), (285), (297), (319).
Henry had returned to England while the retreat took place. When he found out the circumstances, he fell into a raging temper which can still be sensed in the letters he wrote to his officers, telling Norfolk that there was no excuse for his conduct, as he had been ordered to remain in a position to give battle if need be, and commands had been given to supply more victuals and finance for his army. Henry singled out individual leaders for odium. Suffolk and the Privy Seal, Lord Russell, were told that they should have gone to Guisnes if it had appeared that the Dauphin was marching towards it, and there to have forced a battle or caused him to retreat so that he would lose his guns.

The commanders were then ordered to leave the safety of Calais for Boulogne, there to keep their camp and to refurbish the fortress in the face of enemy raids. A further letter added that the king thought his honour would be touched if his army should now retire at his enemy coming into the field, so that unless the commanders had certain knowledge of the Dauphin going to Guisnes, they were to go back to Boulogne, and there, by their diligence, "partly redub" what was past, not leaving there until they knew the king's pleasure. This was effective exile.¹

Henry's somewhat contradictory orders proved impossible to fulfil because the ground between Boulogne and Calais was by this time occupied by the French, and because the mercenary horse had left for home.² This did not excuse the nobles in Henry's eyes, however, and he continued to abuse them for leaving Boulogne on the grounds of an uncertain report about the enemy's strength, and he wondered in his letters why they could not keep the field without victuals

¹ L.P. XIX, ii (347), (380).
² Ibid., (377).
when the French did so under similar difficulties? And if
the Germans had left, why was the wages bill for the army
unchanged? Henry ordered them to seek

...no more indirect excuses to cloak your ill-favoured
retreat but rather study and be as vigilant to see our
honour, herein somewhat touched, redubbed.

Meanwhile, they could consider how little it
reflected on their honour to be left out of the peace
negotiations until they returned to Boulogne.¹

The Dauphin was eventually weakened when he
divided his forces and the English won some minor skirmishes.
But the small successes only drew another stinging letter for
the nobles because they had not launched a large scale attack
on the French.² Henry began to regain his temper as the
French forces were dissolved by the effects of winter. The
king contrived to interpret English raids against the
scattering French as reassertions of his honour,

...which enterprise we thinke shall not only be
moche to our honour (thennemies being put to worst
in all places, and We last in the feld), but also
a great quiet for our subjectes there this winter,
a continuance of our possession Bullonoyes, and no
small honour to you.³

Throughout the affair of the retreat from Montreuil,
Henry's mien had been that of a man dominated by a desire to
preserve what he perceived as his honour as a military leader
and a king - virtually the same thing - even if this meant
risking a battle, which he did not wish to fight, with an
outnumbered and diseased army.

¹ L.P. XIX, ii (383).
² Ibid., (399).
³ S.P. X, v (ML), 14 October 1544.
This was a particularly clear and detailed instance of a case where Henry's concept of the proper behaviour of a noble warrior was the dominant factor in his military strategy, rather than considerations of efficiency and expediency. But, in more general perspective, the 1544 was as a whole may also be interpreted in the same terms. Henry's invasion of France in 1544 has much of the appearance of the quest for personal honour and for the reputation of his kingdom as a military force as was apparently the situation in 1513. Scarisbrick's recognition of this has already been remarked upon. This differs from Pollard's suggestion that Henry's involvement with France in 1544 was part of a politically pragmatic plan to prevent the French from assisting Scotland, where his main interest actually lay and where he was engaged in a long term plan to establish his direct control.¹

Several aspects of Henry's behaviour, and the circumstances of 1544, would seem to discount Pollard's interpretation. The costs of the 1544 expedition in terms of men, money, and time were scarcely indicative of a practical plan to divert French aid from Scotland. A fraction of the same amount of energy expended in France should have been enough to subdue all the lowlands of Scotland. And rather than being characterized by a single rapid thrusting attack on French territory, Henry's last venture in France was, by the standards of the time, relatively long term in strategy. He persisted in seizing, holding and enlarging his French possessions, which would not seem to be the actions of a monarch trying merely to divert attention from a main intention to unify Scotland and England. Henry's French venture was of prime importance throughout 1544, as he diverted most of his resources to France, taking unprecedented measures such as sending shire levies to protect his new possessions.

In any case, the punitive raid into Scotland was a reprimand for the lack of honour of their nobles, who had broken their oaths to secure the marriage of Prince Edward and Princess Mary, rather than something which was planned as another step towards unification, at least from Henry's point of view. Hertford and other nobles advised the king that a fierce attack would further alienate the Scots, but Henry was adamant. The raid was to be a perpetual memory to the renown of its leader, Hertford, and forever a reproach to the perfidy of the Scots. Not one stone was to be left standing on another. It was in this spirit that Hertford carried out the cruelties which occurred during the expedition.¹

Henry's venture into France in 1544, and the Scottish raid which was a prelude to it, would appear, therefore, to have had little of the practical planning attributed to the king by Pollard. It was, rather, an enterprise in keeping with Henry's notions about the need to maintain or increase his prestige as a warrior monarch.

There were continuities between 1513 and 1544 in the behaviour of the king, and his perception of his twin roles of monarch and noble warrior affected the conduct of both wars. Similarities in his behaviour tended to outweigh the differences brought about by radically changed circumstances. Henry had been an active young man in 1513, eager to involve himself in war in imitation of his ancestors, which he managed to do by persuading his advisors to let him lead the army not merely as

a figurehead, but also as a soldier and administrator. Henry was thus in a position to impose his ideas on the conduct of the campaign. The result was that he severely limited its effectiveness by acting in a manner befitting his status, using the army to form a background to the magnificent display that was simultaneously an encouragement to and an essential component of war. In 1544, however, Henry was an old, sick man. But he nevertheless continued to personally administer the army and lead it into enemy territory, even though his age and illness might hinder operations. Henry, in 1544, was no longer the creator of glittering tournaments in war and peace, perhaps because he could no longer personally participate in them. The last tournament in which he fought, in the 1530's, had nearly resulted in his death. But he was still governed in old age by his perception of what was fitting behaviour for himself and his nobles. As in 1513, this concept hindered rational, efficient planning during the expedition, making the 1544 campaign an exercise in arms akin to the first war.*

1. Henry's behaviour was paralleled by most contemporary monarchs, and particularly by James IV of Scotland, whose style of leadership attracted many accounts of behaviour according with the typical actions of the noble warrior. His behaviour is considered in more detail in the next section, but it is appropriate to mention here that it was claimed that he was at first unwilling to attack England in 1513 because he did not wish to be seen to break his vow of peace; that he was challenged by his paramour, Queen Anne of France, to advance but one step into England for her sake, and that he sent her the Scottish fleet as a present; and once he had invaded England, he ignored all advice to return to Scotland for strategic reasons, as he was adamant that he should clear himself of English charges that he had broken his vow by offering battle. It was also said that he neglected details of strategy during the campaign because he was conducting a love affair with a woman prisoner. During this time of neglect his men were idle and many deserted. James was also claimed to have rejected advice to capture Berwick, wishing to wait in open country in order to give battle. He refused advice that his honour had been satisfied because the English had not arrived by an appointed date to give battle, and he swore that he would fight the English if there were 100,000 of them and he was alone. He also refused to break bridges over the river Till, a move which
would have stopped the English advance to a position that was tactically disadvantageous to the Scots. Perhaps many of these accounts of his behaviour are apocryphal, but they accord with reports of his actions from other sources, and are similar to the actions of fellow kings such as Francis I and Charles V.

b). The Nobles.

The king had a major effect on the course of a war not only because he was a symbol and an inspiration to his subjects, but also because he was England's supreme strategist and commander. As mentioned, the nobles also had a far reaching influence on war, because, as well as being courtiers and figures of display, army commanders, administrators and diplomats, they were also fighting soldiers who took their places in the front ranks of battle formations. As a result, their attitudes usually had a more immediate impact on the course of war than did those of the king. Unlike his contemporaries, Charles and Francis, Henry never participated personally in a battle at close quarters, and so his sword never helped determine a fight. He was perhaps the only monarch of his era who was restrained from striking a blow in anger, although it is thought that he did on occasion fire his cannon personally against the French. His nobles made up for this omission by the king, and there would have been few amongst them, especially in the early years of the reign, who had not exchanged blows with the enemy. This was, indeed, expected of them by their contemporaries. It was assumed that a noble would not only have the ability and training to command an army as an officer. He was also expected to have the skill and courage - the prowess and valour as it was known - to lead his retinue into battle. If such duties, or military posts with inherent danger, were avoided, it brought contempt from all levels of society. Scorn was heaped on the impoverished fifth Earl of Northumberland when he was unable to bear the burden of his family post as Warden of the Marches, an office that meant frequent encounters with the Scots. He was spurned both by his tenants and his family for this lapse, "...and al men estemed hym without hart or love of honour and chivalry".

Gruffydd similarly decried the cowardice of English nobles during the occupation of Boulogne when they refused to lead their underlings against a French fleet that had anchored near the fortress.¹

On the other hand, the common soldiers rejoiced in a keen fighter like Hertford, who was ready for battle, the men joyfully receiving him when he came to Calais in 1545, and the nobles feasting him in welcome.²

Nobles customarily fought at the head of their retinues, and often bore the brunt of fighting because their relative invulnerability made them a focus of action in a melee. There were some slight signs of change in this by 1544, and even in 1513 the English commander Thomas Howard the elder placed himself behind the front lines. But the signs of change were almost imperceptible, and there had been good reason for Howard not to be too prominent in fighting, as he was 70 years old when he went to Flodden. And in any case, he was not so far from the fighting that James IV was not able to get to him. The Scots king cut his way to within a spear's length of Surrey during the mêlée before being killed. It was during this battle that almost the entire Scots peerage died in the front ranks of the army. Some 4 spiritual peers, 12 earls and 18 barons were lost by the Scottish. And many English nobles were in danger during the fighting, such as Edmund Howard, third son of the English commander, who was knocked to his knees three times and had to be rescued by cavalry when his men deserted him to leave him fighting on alone.³

Edmund's nephew, Henry Howard, fell into disfavour in 1545 because he allowed a score of nobles to be killed in the battle of St.Etienne, indicating that there may have been a more cautious attitude in later years to the

¹ Gruffydd, iii, p.22.
² Ibid., p.10.
³ L.P. I (4441); V.P.II (316).
employment of noble soldiers. But even at this time nobles still figured prominently in hand to hand fighting, and Henry's disgrace may simply have been an outcome of the fact that although it was expected that nobles should fight in battles, it was not expected that many of them would be killed. Howard himself on several occasions placed himself in dangerous positions during the siege of Montreuil, until on one venture he was cut off from his allies and had to be rescued by his squire, Thomas Clere, at the cost of Clere's life. Henry commemorated this deed in his poem "A Tribute to Thomas Clere".

At the assault on Edinburgh in 1544, it was the nobles who assaulted the Cannongate in order to encourage their soldiers, attacking the obstacle so fervently that they beat back the Scots from the embrasures and manhandled the Scottish guns out through a loophole.1

And even the commander of the main English army in 1544, the elderly Duke of Suffolk, advanced further into the trenches than any of his men, shaming them to braver deeds and earning the admiration of Viscount Lisle.

He passeth so little upon shot of artillery that he enforceth others to be hardy whether they will or not. 2

The nobles were thus placed at the very centre of war by the demands of their rank and the practice of military leadership. Here, their actions were of deep and immediate importance to the course which war took. At the same time, the ideal of the noble military elite which was fostered by the ceremonies, the pageantry and brave displays that accompanied war did not cease to influence the nobles when they were in such situations. It continued to shape the

1. R.Wolf, The Late Expedition in Scotland Made by the King's Higness' Army, Under the Conduct of the Right Honourable the Earl of Hertford, the Year of Our Lord God 1544 in Tudor Tracts 1532-1588 ed. A.F.Pollard (Westminster, 1903).

2. L.P. XIX, i (932).
behaviour of nobles even while blows were being struck. As a result, the deeds of arms and honourable actions which they performed were not isolated incidents nor events distinct from reality, but were essential and influential aspects of contemporary war.

There was both a display of the continuity between the behaviour of nobles in both war and peace, and, coincidentally, demonstrations of the far reaching impact of their ideas about honour in two incidents from the 1513 war in particular. Both events happen to have involved members of the Howard family.

The first deed saw Edward Howard lose an almost certain naval victory because of rashness when he abrogated his responsibilities as admiral in order to win honour. It should perhaps be emphasised that in this his behaviour was entirely in keeping with his previous actions over a considerable period. As mentioned before, he was one of the keenest participants in the great court occasions that led up to the war, taking a major part in jousts and pageants. He continued to act in a similar spirit on the battlefield. During his first voyage to Brittany, in June 1512, Howard landed a small army near Brest, at a place named Crozon Bay. Here he was met with a formal challenge to battle. He suitably rewarded the messenger who brought the challenge and announced that he would await the French army all day at a certain place. While waiting for the French, in order to encourage his nobles, he knighted several of them, and exhorted his 1,500 Englishmen to stand against about 10,000 French he could see approaching,

"...bidding them remembre the honor and renoune that should come to them, if thei gained the jorney, and yet if thei were slain, their valiauntnes was to be praised, and their true diligence to do their master service much to be allowed."¹

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.52-3. The names of the 8 men knighted have not all been correctly listed by Shaw.
But, unlike Howard, the French were apparently not spoiling for a fight, and they allowed the English to retire to their ships without offering battle. They then sent an embassy to Edward asking him to desist from his cruel war - he was burning villages - or at least to allow a six day truce. Howard's reply was what might be expected from a bellicose noble. He answered that he had been sent to make war, not peace, and that he considered gentlemen ought to defend their country by force rather than sue for peace. He was so bent on war that he even refused a Breton offer to surrender Brest castle to him in return for a truce. Having banqueted his enemies in an honourable fashion, he sent the embassy home and continued with his war.¹

It was during the subsequent engagements at sea that Howard made the oath to revenge the death of Sir Thomas Knyvet, an oath that may have helped spur him to his own death.

The following year saw the French driven into blockade in Brest harbour, the English fleet hovering outside the heavily defended sanctuary. Howard seems momentarily to have been reluctant to press home the attack. The reasons for his hesitation are not clear. Perhaps he expected the French to come out to meet him, or perhaps he thought their position impregnable. He may also have wished to avoid the responsibility of leading his fleet into great danger, as the French fleet was guarded by shore batteries, although he does not appear to have been so considerate in other cases. He also wrote to Henry, requesting that he come to join the venture, promising that the victory would be an easy one, and advising the king to take the opportunity to share in the glory. A report sent to Milan from England claimed that the king was eager to go to Brest, but was opposed by the council which feared for his safety.² Hall has a similar account,

¹ Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.53-3.
² M.P. I (635).
saying that because of his advisers' displeasure with the delay, Henry wrote to the admiral ordering him to carry out his duty. It was this, according to Hall, that prompted Howard to launch his final rash attack. And Howard's brother Thomas was of the opinion shortly afterwards that the late admiral had felt himself exposed to rumour and lies, many men putting his inaction down to fear, which he proved untrue by his death.

Such rumours may have been the spur to Howard, leading him to act upon the advice of a Spanish knight serving in the fleet that he should risk a personal adventure rather than waiting for a planned large scale assault by land and sea in which the whole navy would participate. He was to venture all in the interest of gaining personal honour.

Hall's interpretation agrees with a report sent from the fleet by one of Wolsey's spies, William Sabin, who had been sent to offer certain secret advice to Howard. Sabin reported shortly after the fatal engagement that he had warned against the assault but had been ignored by the admiral, who was acting on the advice of a Spanish knight. Sabin wrote that it had been agreed to assault the galleys in Brest simultaneously by land and sea. Lord Ferrers was to attack the bulwarks that guarded the harbour, while Howard was to enter with the rest of the army by barge. But, on the prompting of the Spaniard, Howard called together his best friends, including William Fitzwilliam, William Cook, John Colley and Sir Wistan Browne, all courtiers, to join him in a surprise sea assault by only a few boats. The admiral incited his colleagues by advising them that

...the matter was little, and the honor greate, if they only tooke on them that enterprice, and let none other know of it. Thei like men of haute courage and desiring honour gladly assented...

2. L.P. I (4169), 5 June 1513.
4. N.R.S. (74); Hall, ibid.
The admiral was rowed into the harbour with 95 men in four boats. Not surprisingly, there was heavy loss of life when the assault began. All but 56 of the men were casualties, according to Thomas Howard, including 25 killed and 20 hurt in the boat commanded by Lord Ferrers alone. Howard himself was killed when he led an attack on a galley and was left stranded as his boat was swept away by the tide. According to Sir Edward Echingham, when Howard saw that there was no chance of rescue, he took his admiral's whistle, the symbol of his rank, from his neck and threw it into the sea. The French then pushed him overboard, his armour carrying him to his death.

The admiral of the English fleet had thus perished in his quest for personal prestige, a venture in which he was assisted by a number of nobles. His death became the occasion of mourning for the loss of a brave knight rather than for regret at the loss of a strategic advantage. A halt was called to the fighting in order to arrange for his recovery and funeral, and expressions of regret came to England from friends and enemies. Sabin's pithy comment seem to have voiced a common attitude to the significance of his death:

"More pyty yt was, howbeit he dyed lyke a vallyent (knyght)."

The venture, albeit unsuccessful as a military exercise, conferred great honour on the dead admiral and his confederates. Thomas Howard wrote to Wolsey praising the feats of the nobles who had been present in the fighting, including prominent courtiers such as Wallop, Cheyney and Sir William Sydney.

As far as the writer can understand by report, it was the most dangerous enterprise he ever heard of, and the most manly handled.
James IV voiced similar sentiments in a letter to Henry, in which he used the instance of Howard's death to persuade Henry against invading France. James had a personal interest in Edward's death, as he mentioned in the letter, for it was Edward's father Thomas who had escorted James' bride to Scotland. The Scottish king wrote to Henry that Howard had died in a way that had brought him great honour and praise, but that his death was a greater loss than the winning of the French galleys would have been a victory. He reminded Henry that not only this valiant knight would die if the war continued, but that other noble men would be lost who would be better set to fighting Christ's enemies.

The sentiments expressed by the nobles generally overlooked the fact that Admiral Edward Howard had risked not only his own life but also the safety of the fleet on the counsel of a foreign knight to undertake a dangerous adventure. In so doing he ignored the advice of his government, and won over to his side, without apparent difficulty, at least 8 other nobles who likewise risked their lives to gain honour.

The result of his actions was not only his own death and loss of many of his men, but also the demoralisation and disbandment of the English fleet at a time when it had recently established mastery of the Channel after months of fighting, and when victory seemed in its grasp. The venture was not the escapade of one man acting in an isolated and unimportant situation, but, rather, a major event stemming from the actions of one man, whose deeds were given such influence by his rank and status. It was an event in which hundreds of other men participated either through direct or indirect intervention and approval or

1. Ellis, Original Letters Illustrative of British History, I (XXVII).
disapproval, as well as through the effects of Howard's death on the course of the war, or else through the effects on people far from the immediate scene whose lives were marked by the death of Howard and the breaking up of the English navy as a result. The implications of Howard's death during the course of a deed of honour thus made the feat more than an isolated incident, even though it was originally a noble's personal reaction to a particular war situation.

The personal nature of Howard's feat, at the same time, indicates how the nobles did not see themselves simply as mere cogs in a huge impersonal war machine. Instead, they tended to regard their place in war in more intimate terms, at a level of individual or family involvement, or the obligation of a noble and his family to the Crown. This perception is also indicated by the second instance of the ways in which noble concepts of their roles influenced their behaviour on the battlefield. The situation in which these actions arose was in itself partly an outcome of Edward's death, for after his death his brother Thomas was appointed as admiral in order to avenge him. As mentioned, Thomas was very concerned to uphold the reputation of his brother when he took over the post, and, as a result, prosecuted the war against England's enemies with great fervour.¹

This sense of the personal and family responsibility of the noble in war was shared by the head of the family, Thomas Howard the elder, Earl of Surrey. He was forestalled from participating in the war with France in 1513, possibly because he was outmanoeuvered politically by his rival, the Earl of Derby, or perhaps because it was felt necessary for

¹. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.60.
him to remain to defend England against Scotland. In the light of Surrey's later actions, the latter case would seem the more likely. His anger at being left behind made him all but speechless as he watched Henry departing with the court:

...beyinge redy in suche an honorable jorney. And when he was somewhat settelled in hys mode, he sayde to some that were about hym: Sory may I se hym or I dye, that is cause of my abydinge behynde, and yf ever he and I mete, I shal do,that in me lyeth to make hym as sory yf I can...  

Surrey's reported speech indicates the way in which war, as the place of acquiring honour, was seen in personal terms by the nobles. His behaviour, and the behaviour of his fellow nobles, throughout the rest of the Flodden campaign, was entirely consistent with this attitude. King James himself, as mentioned, had felt that he was unable to invade England with honour while Henry was absent without making formal moves to clear himself of criticism. As a result he sent his herald to France with a public declaration that he would cross the border unless Henry returned home.  

Surrey was equally formal in his attitude. He despatched a herald to James when both armies were in the field offering the king the opportunity to try the justice of their dispute on a set date

...yf he of hys noble courage wyll geve hym tarienge, and abode, within this the Kynges Realme so long tyme: And the same the sayde Earle promiseth, as he is true knyghte to God and the Kynge of England hys Master.

The challenge from the commander of an army was couched in the personal terms that one noble, or one knight, might have used to another.

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Surrey's son Thomas behaved in a similar manner. Before Surrey's herald departed to James, Admiral Howard gave him a token to show James to prove that Thomas and his men had come ashore from the fleet, after being unable to catch the Scots for battle, in order to offer his own personal challenge to James to settle their long standing dispute.

...and in as much as the sayde Kynge hadde diverse and many tymes caused the sayde Lorde too be called at dayes of true, to make redresse for Andrew Barton, a Pirate of the sea, long before that vanquyshed by the same Lorde Admirall, he was now come in hys awne proper persone too be in the Vantgarde of the felde to Justifiye the deathe of the sayde Andrewe, agaynste hym and all hys people, and woulde se what could be layed to hys charge the sayde daye, and that he nor none of hys campaignye should take no Scottish noble man prysoner, nor any other, but they shoulde dye yf they came in hys daunger, oneles it were the kynges awne persone, for he sayde he trusted to none other curtesye at the handes of the Scottes.

And in thys maner he should fynde hym in the Vauntgarde of the felde by the grace of GOD and Sayncte George as he was a trew knyghte.¹

¹ Hall, Henry VIII I, p.102. Hall's account is generally supported by a contemporary account by a clerk, Brian Tuke, except that Tuke believed that Howard joined his father to answer claims by James that Thomas was afraid to meet him. V.P. II (316). Grace, "The Life and Career of Thomas Howard", p.48, suggests that Thomas was spurred on by accusations of cowardice by James and a lack of success at sea. Kightly, Flodden, pp.10-11, speculates that the challenges were a planned and successful appeal to the king's sense of honour to make him fight rather than withdrawing over the border and waiting for the English army to disband. Possibly all these motivations played a part in determining the Scots and English on battle.
Thomas Howard, Admiral of England, had therefore left the fleet, taking with him 1,200 hardened soldiers in his retinue, in order to answer a charge of murder and cowardice by placing himself and his men in the most dangerous position of the army, and foreswearing his right to safety in the case of defeat.

The Howards did not monopolise the exchange of challenges with the Scots, however, as another formal document of challenge from Surrey to James, arranging for the place and time of battle, had appended to it the names of some 18 nobles altogether. The exchanges of challenges and oratory between the nobles continued until moments before the battle itself. Surrey vowed that he would fight, or if he did not he would hold himself openly perjured. He addressed his troops and told them that if they did not do their best he would fight James in person to die honourably at the king's hand, rather than live in shame and reproach.

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1. As with other aspects of these events, the motivations are complex. Howard's desire to clear his name may not have been the sole reason for his choice as leader of the vanguard, for there were rumours of family rivalry amongst the English. An apparent partisan of the Stanley family wrote a poem published as An Exact and Circumstantial History of the Battle of Flodden in Verse. Written About the Time of Elizabeth ed. R. Lambe (London, 1774). The author claimed that Surrey would not appoint Sir Edward Stanley, who had with him a retinue of over 6,000 men, to command of the van because of hatred between Surrey and Stanley's father, the Earl of Derby. Stanley revenged himself by a brilliant tactical manoeuvre during the battle, and may have killed James with his own hand. See especially Stanza CCLXXIX. Details of the poem usually correspond with other accounts, so it may be an accurate account based on family knowledge. An earlier stanza is interesting because it too indicates the influence of noble perceptions of honour. The poet claimed that Thomas became angry when other lords counselled Surrey to avoid battle because the Scots outnumbered the English, and he reminded his father of the feats of the ancestors. If the English withdrew, said Howard according to the poem,

Your father's fame would soon be lost,
And all his worthy acts no more,
Your honour, flitting like a ghost,
Nor yet your sons could ever restore.

CCIV-CCXIC

2. L.P. I (4439); Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.104-7.
And, if Tuke is correct in his version, the considerations of personal reputation which had brought Thomas Howard to the field of Flodden also governed tactical considerations on the day. Except for Dacre's 1,500 border horsemen, everyone dismounted to fight. This may have been due to the slipperiness of the field, and it was not uncommon practice for the English to fight the Scots on foot. But, according to Tuke, Thomas Howard dismounted to lead the van lest it be supposed that he was a coward and a runaway. If this was the case, then it was in keeping with other reported aspects of his behaviour and that of his fellows. Having incited his nobles with speeches encouraging them to glory, James also dismounted when he saw his men winning some initial successes. He rushed on foot to join in the victory, forcing his court to follow him, and leaving his army without a general or further orders.¹

The initial charge by the division led by the Scottish Chamberlain, Lord Hume, drove back the wing commanded by Edmund Howard. Squire Brian Tunstall, an experienced border fighter, who was with Howard, tried to encourage his faltering men with his own courage. He scooped up a handful of earth which he ate as a sign of Communion, and then charged alone into the ranks of the enemy, where he was surrounded and killed.² At this, his wavering followers fled, leaving Edmund to face the enemy alone, except for his standard bearer and a few personal servants. All except Edmund were killed, and he was himself beaten to the ground repeatedly, probably being saved only by his armour. At this, the Bastard John Heron - another doughty border fighter - and 10 horsemen from Dacre's troop spurred to

¹ Kightly, Flodden, p.42; cf. Holinshed's Chronicles, III, p.596.
² An Exact History of Flodden, DI-DXVI; Kightly, Flodden,p.42.
his rescue. Heron had already been wounded, but proclaimed that

...there was never noble mans sone so lyke to be loste as you be thys daye, for all my hurtes I shall here lyve and dye wyth you...

Heron joined Howard and together they cut their way through the Scottish ranks to safety, Edmund killing Sir David Hume, son of the Chamberlain, on the way.¹

And, finally, when the tide of battle had clearly gone against the Scots, James chose to die like a noble. Encouraging his men not to shame their ancestors, he gathered the remnants of his household about him, and pressed into the thickest part of the fighting, attempting a last vain effort to fight his way through to Surrey.²

At Flodden, as at Brest, the attitudes of the nobles to their proper conduct in war affected the lives of many people in situations of extreme personal danger and of grave national significance. Thomas Howard, for example, was prepared to risk not only his own life but the lives of his retainers in order to preserve his reputation as a noble warrior, and James of Scotland sacrificed everything to his own sense of honour, and the thirst for renown.

Perhaps the most striking example of the influence of such considerations in the 1544 war has already been outlined in the discussion of Henry's actions during the withdrawal from Montreuil. Other details of individual deeds of honour from the 1544 war are relatively scarce, partly

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1. Hall, Henry VIII, I, p.108; cf. the account of Heron's character and behaviour in An Exact History of Flodden, CCCCXIII-CCCCXXXIII.

because there were few actual encounters with the enemy, and also because the most prolific source of details of such deeds, Hall, is very sketchy on the later years, a matter also regretted by Holinshed. Hall conscientiously recorded noble feats, as he regarded it as the duty of the chronicler to do so. He was highly critical of clerics who devoted their time to hunting and hawking rather than preserving in writing

...the noble triumphes, chivalrous feates, valiant actes, victorious battailes, and other noble jestes of this realme, and in especiall, of our tyme and knowlege, of this most valiant and goodly prince.

These tales, he considered, "...should appere muche more honorable, then any other stories...". Perhaps due to advancing age or illness, Hall did not record the later years of Henry's reign in the detail accorded to the earlier decades, and, as a result, fewer deeds by nobles survive in the records.

There may be other reasons for a scarcity of accounts of deeds, as Ellis Gruffydd suggests. He complained that the nobles in 1544 were unwilling to risk their lives in sieges as their fathers had.

... (no)...diligence was shown during this siege, during which if the truth be told, there was no effort to perform one praise-worthy deed.

It is possible, however, that this was merely the jaundiced view of an old soldier who was comparing the soldiers of the present with the heroes of the past when men were "...ready early and late to serve and achieve honour and glory for the king and his realm as the captains of old...".

2. Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.9-10. Despite his emphasis on collecting together the colourful acts of the nobles, Hall appears to have been a relatively accurate chronicler. The details of events often appear to be taken from first hand accounts, and his facts often correspond with independent records.
4. Gruffydd, iii, p.27; cf. ii, p.45.
In fact, there were nobles, like Henry Howard, ready to risk their lives for fame. A young baron, Lord Mountjoy, placed his life in jeopardy during the siege of Montreuil to lead 14 of his men in the storming of a French countertrench. This was despite Norfolk's protests that the venture was too dangerous.\(^1\) And during the campaign that followed the withdrawal of the main army, Henry Howard and his men took the opportunity to perform feats of arms, such as the secret despatch of gentlemen to the Dauphin's camp for jousting. At least one of the English nobles, Edward Shelley, is believed to have killed an opponent in such a contest.\(^2\)

Henry Howard appears to have seen such skirmishes between French and English nobles in terms of acquiring honour. His letter recounting the clash between English and French during an attempt to victual the fortress of Chatillon, for example, placed great emphasis on the prowess of nobles in individual clashes with enemy horse. He told how Mr. Marshall broke his mace "handily" on a Frenchman, how Edward Shelley broke his lance and captured a French gentleman, and, indeed, how all the gentlemen broke their lances. Surrey asked Henry to write letters of thanks to the gentlemen for these deeds, especially mentioning for praise "...Francis Aslebye, that hurt Mons. Doumaylle, brake his staff very honestly".\(^3\)

It may well have been the desire to win honour which prompted Howard to fight the battle of St. Etienne. According to Gruffydd, Howard went against the advice of some of his officers, who told him that battle was undesirable because

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2. Chapman, Two Tudor Portraits, p.92.
3. L.P. XX, ii (929), 4 December 1545. Chapman, Two Tudor Portraits, pp.94-5, claims that Howard was being consciously anachronistic in crediting Marshall with the use of a mace. But maces were still standard equipment for a heavy cavalryman.
of the poor state of the infantry. But his head and heart "...were swollen with pride, arrogance and empty confidence in his own unreasoning bravery...". And so he persuaded his captains to lead the infantry into battle, with the result that 22 gentlemen were killed in the first round of fire, more than in either of the two major battles of 1513.¹ According to Gruffydd, therefore, Surrey's pride and eagerness for glory appears to have resulted in a disaster that cost the lives of an unprecedented number of nobles, threw his army into chaos, nearly sacrificed Boulogne, and failed to prevent the enemy from reaching the castle that they had been sent to reinforce. Perhaps Howard's greatest mistake was that, unlike his uncle, he did not die at the head of his troops.

A noble who was more fortunate with his feats of arms during the wars of the 1540's was Sir John Wallop, who was given the Order of the Garter for his leadership of the English contingent in the invasion of France by Charles in 1543.

This expedition had the usual appearance of a venture conducted largely for the benefit of the nobles, according to the report by Ralph Eure, who was a warden of the Marches during the following year. Eure wrote home that, while under constant and immediate threat from the French, the English and their allies amused themselves by running at the ring, a jousting exercise. Eure was able to report that the English gained the prize. The day after this feat, a Burgundian captain set out to win his spurs. He led a force of 400 Burgundian horse, 50 horse led by Sir Ralph Bulmer, and 600 foot against a village in which was quartered 100 noble Italians. The English were eager to get the Italians'

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¹ Gruffydd, ii, pp.39-41.
horsemarchd horses, and made off with them during the
attack, only to be chased back to the village by a force
of 60 French cavalry. The Imperial horse fled, disordering
their own footmen. But, as Eure proudly wrote, Bulmer and
his men remained to fight it out, and although all but 4
were hurt, none were lost dishonourably, and all deserved
great praise.¹

This was the atmosphere which seems to have
prevailed during this expedition. When Wallop led a force
of horsemen, archers, and arquebusiers to scour around
Therouanne there were skirmishes but no decisive battle
outside the walls of the refortified town.

The same night, after our camp was lodged, for
tholde aquaynetance I had with the Captaine of
Therwaine, I sent him a letter of visitacion,
the copie wherof, and likewise his answerre
therunto, I send your Lordshippes herewith. And
theffect of my said letter was, that seyng he
wold send owt no greter nombre to skymoche with
us, if he had any gentlemen under his charge that
wold breke any stave for their ladis sake, I
wold the next morning apoint 6 gentlemen to mete
with them. Wherunto ereley in the morning he
sent me a letter, that he had appointed 6 gentlemen
to mete me by the waye, at 9 of the clocke, with
certen condicions, as doth appere by hys said
letter; which hower I kept, and observed the
condicions accordingly. And those, I sent to
runne against them by their own requestes (saving
2 of myn own men), was Mr. Howard, Peter Carowe,
Markeham, Chelley of Callais, with my 2 men
Cawverley and Hall. And, by the reaport of those
that did behold them, aswell strangers as others,
they dyd runne well, and made very fayre courses.
As for Mr.Howard, at his furst course, brake hys
staff in the myddes of the Frenchmens curayse,
gallierydly; Markeham strake an other upon the
hedpece, like to have overthowen him; Peter Carow
also brake his staff very well, and had another
broken on hym. Cawverley, my man, was praeased to
make the fairest courses of them all; yet by the

¹. Seymour Papers (88).
yvill running out of a Frenchman's horse, that fled owt, strake hym under the arme pitt throughe the body, and persed his harnes in the backe, so as he is sooer hurte and in grete danger, not hable to be brought backe to our camp, but carried to Thurwanne, where is he is well entreated; this morning haveing hard from thens, have some hope of his life; and the thing shall put hym most in danger is the gusset that is stryken into his body. I wold wische to God the next kynesman I have (not being my brother) had excused hym.¹

This is a remarkable document in a number of ways, not least in that it is perhaps the earliest account written in English of the setting up of a feat of arms by the man who was responsible for the deed. And within it are contained the intimate records of the state of mind and the motivations of a man who was not only one of the most experienced soldiers and diplomats of the era, but also at this time the leader of an army. From his own account, he was concerned with the appearance of the actions of his men, anxious to be able to recount their deeds as being worthy of admiration. His letter also shows the closeness of the caste of ruling warriors on either side during these wars, who were able to deal with each other in terms of their "...old acquaintance...". This particular aspect of Wallop's conduct might be compared with Henry's orders to Norfolk in the following year, ordering him to deal honourably with the commander of Montreuil because of their old acquaintance in arms.

And, above all, it indicates the way in which what might be classed as the realistic considerations of war could be suddenly laid aside to pursue the more theatrical aspects of war. Wallop was able to break off in the middle of a campaign - or perhaps, it might be said, began to act

¹ S.P. IX (DCCCLXXXVIII). The Howard mentioned may have been Henry Howard, who was at the siege of Landrecy, or Charles, son of Lord William Howard. Shelley was the brother of the Turcopolier mentioned before.
according to a different set of precepts - in order that he and his men could enjoy the kind of hazardous sport in which they engaged at court, and in which they could demonstrate their prowess. The day before the joust had seen the participants trying to kill each other outside the gates of Therouanne. On the day of the joust, the French were willing to extend their medical facilities to aid the wounded Englishman.

Wallop also apparently believed that the joust had considerable interest for his superiors at home, as it was reported in unusually lengthy detail, and his promotion to the Garter would indicate that his standing had not been damaged at court by his conduct.

The courtesy that surrounded the setting up of the jousts, the creation of an agreed set of rules that were carefully observed, the hospitality accorded to Calverley, is not the behaviour of men wanting victory by fair means or fould, but is, rather, the conduct of men who were governed by the consideration that certain types of behaviour in war were appropriate for the noble.

This instance, together with the death of Edward Howard, the challenge to James IV by Thomas Howard, and Surrey's rashness on the walls of Montreuil, can be comprehended if they are regarded as the results of a pattern of belief that was shared by the military elite. They are consistent and make sense within the code of the elite. But if they are seen merely as isolated incidents that were the hangover of decadent and outdated chivalry, then they appear as the actions of a group of eccentrics and romantics who were holding on to an outmoded tradition that had no contact with reality.
But, as has been indicated, such actions did have a significant effect on the contemporary world, even though the deeds were performed by only small groups of nobles. Because the noble was so important in warfare, and because he held the idea that his prestige as a warrior noble could be enhanced by certain behaviour, the lives of countless men and women were effected by the particular style with which war was conducted.
CONCLUSION

The concepts of the types of behaviour appropriate to their group which were held by the nobles had a profound significance for the way war was waged by the English during the early sixteenth century. The nobles were a military elite, and were recognised as such. As a military elite, certain types of behaviour became associated with the nobles. These were considered to be characteristic of members of their group. As well as such practices as elaborate displays of wealth and office while on expedition, these included traits such as extreme bravery in battle, a consciousness that as members of the elite, the nobles had special religious obligations during wartime, and particular rituals of sexual behaviour unique to the elite.

The kind of war in which all this took place was, by the standards of a later age, relatively crude, unscientific and traditionally minded. The typical kinds of noble behaviour contributed to this situation because nobles had other interests in war than simply in ensuring that campaigns were conducted efficiently. War was, from their point of view, the proper place to display their status and to improve or defend that status through honourable deeds in what was a fiercely competitive society where power and position was continually under challenge. It was of relatively minor concern that the forms that their displays took might often interfere with military efficiency.

The behaviour of nobles in war had widespread ramifications for military affairs in particular and for the condition of society as a whole. This was despite the nobles forming only a relatively insignificant proportion of the population, or, indeed, of the army. Their position as the main suppliers of troops, the key posts in royal administration and in the armed forces shared amongst noble
families, their roles as heavy cavalry and as front line troops, and continual training for war in tournaments, meant that their importance in the army belied their small numbers. As a result of this dominance, their deeds of arms and their attitudes could affect the outcome of battles and even of entire campaigns, while their expenditure of large amounts of time, money and energy on the more elaborate forms of noble participation in war had a major influence on war because it diverted many of the resources of the armed forces to other than ends that the modern age might regard as practical.

At the same time, parts of the typical behaviour of members of the elite were concerned with those categories of activity that many writers, both contemporary and modern, have identified as chivalry. Most historians have claimed that what they have seen as chivalry was in a state of decadence at this time, without influence on reality, and hence, on the behaviour of nobles. They have arrived at this conclusion partly because they have been able to identify changes in noble behaviour over a lengthy period, and have categorised those changes as being signs of decline. But change is not necessarily the same as decay, and in any case, changes in institutions such as the tournament were continual from their inception. And, as has been indicated in considerations of aspects of the noble life such as the tournament and orders of knighthood, continually altering but traditionally derived institutions continued to perform important functions in Tudor society. This was because they helped to make up the forms of the typical behaviour of the military elite. And as essential aspects of noble behaviour they also helped to determine the nature of early Tudor warfare.
But it was membership of the military elite, and conformity to the many facets of its lifestyle, rather than a rigid adherence to a code of chivalry, which was of most importance in shaping the usual behaviour of nobles. Those attributes and attitudes which might be called chivalric were merely a part - and not a particularly well defined part - of the noble lifestyle. If those kinds of behaviour that have often been labelled as chivalry are considered in this way, it is possible to avoid the rather limiting practice of having to understand noble attitudes and actions in terms of the decadence or continuity of chivalry as the main influence on noble life.
A NOTE ON THE APPENDICES

Appendices B-F have been constructed for three main purposes:

a) To demonstrate that there was a social hierarchy in the methods of raising troops from the retinues of the nobility, with the peers tending to raise the largest bodies of soldiers, followed by the knights and then the squires-gentlemen. Usually there have been insufficient details to distinguish between the ranks of the latter category except in Appendix E. One aspect of the social structuring of troop recruitment which does emerge is the relative importance of the knights as a military group. Appendix C, for example, shows the knights - comprising only 10.56% of all suppliers - providing 42.7% of the horsemen for the King's Ward in 1544.

b) To establish that the peers were a military aristocracy by showing that an overwhelming majority took part in army activities in both 1513 and 1544.

c) To show that there appears to have been a link between court office, military service, and reward: see Appendix B. Section (a), for example, shows that a gentleman was more likely to be knighted during the 1513 expedition if he was also an office holder: section (b) shows that it was generally the gentlemen of the court who supplied the largest bodies of troops who were knighted in 1544. Unfortunately, I have been unable to establish any correlation between such rewards and actual deeds performed during the war, except in the case of the knights in section (a), who were rewarded for their fighting at the battle of Spurs.
APPENDIX A

KNIGHTED SUBSIDY COLLECTORS. 1512, 1514.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County or Town</th>
<th>1512</th>
<th>1514</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbyshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorsetshire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln (includes Holland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Kesteven, listed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separately in 1512)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsey in Lincolnshire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfordshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa Salop.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County or town</td>
<td>1512</td>
<td>1514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire West Riding</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire East Riding</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire North Riding</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not available.

The overall decrease from 1512 to 1514 results from absence of figures from three areas, and the lack of any tendency to an increase over a period when mass knightings took place is probably due to the use of some kind of formula to decide how many knights should officiate in each shire.

There are some inaccuracies in the lists because of the omission of titles for some knights, such as Arthur Plantagenet, who was listed merely as a gentleman: my practice has been to count only those listed as knights, and to exclude peers, who are sometimes listed as knights. Both returns omit a number of regions such as Westmoreland, Cumberland, Northumberland and Cheshire, which had 16 knights in 1544.

The degree of accuracy of the returns is indicated, however, by Cornwall's study of several counties during the next decade. He shows that in 1524-5 Suffolk had 12 knights, Sussex 8 and Buckinghamshire 3 in residence: the subsidy lists show 11, 9 and 2 in 1512 and 15, 8 and 3 in 1514 in the respective counties. Although a knight did not necessarily have to be a resident to collect subsidies, common sense would probably mean that there was frequent appointment of local knights to collect money.

Sources:
Cornwall, "Early Tudor Gentry", p.462; L.P. XIX ii(Appendix 8).
**APPENDIX B**

(a)

**RETNUES FOR KING'S WARD 1513.**

**PEERS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>number supplied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earls</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arundel (Maltravers)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Viscount</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisle</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audeley</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'acre of South</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergavenny</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curzon</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darcy</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daubenev</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willoughby</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bishops</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 peers 6,153 men

Smallest retinue 100 men, largest retinue 1,067.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Office held by Crown in 1513</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Fortescue</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Berkeley</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Sands</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Carew</td>
<td>100b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Guilford</td>
<td>100b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Poynings</td>
<td>500b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Windsor</td>
<td>100b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hussey</td>
<td>340b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Willoughby</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Worbleton</td>
<td>201b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randolph Brereton</td>
<td>204b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Savage (sen.?)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Carew</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Wentworth</td>
<td>104b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Owen</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Baynham</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Dymok</td>
<td>54b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Vaux</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Parr</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Wyatt</td>
<td>100b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Boleyn</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Seymour</td>
<td>100b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Rainsford</td>
<td>100b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lucy</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Clifford</td>
<td>60b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 knights, 3,314 men

Smallest retinue 54 men, largest retinue 500.
b = created knight banneret after Spurs (52%).

All these knights held some office from the Crown in 1513. Henry Guilford, for example, was bailiff of Sutton Coldfield, Henry Willoughby was Master of the Hunt at Sutton Park, Henry Wyatt was a privy councillor, and John Rainsford was a Knight of the Body.

1. Sir Adrian's son John accompanied him on the expedition with his own retinue of 50 men. L.P.I (3890).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number Supplied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward Ferrers</td>
<td>100xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Vere (later Earl of Oxford)</td>
<td>100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Goghe and T. ap Glinn</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Wolsey</td>
<td>200x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Compton</td>
<td>400xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John (son of Lord Zouche)</td>
<td>102k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John (son of Lord Dudley)</td>
<td>200k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas West (son of Lord de la Warre)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Morgan</td>
<td>103xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Bray</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Hopton</td>
<td>103k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. St. Leger</td>
<td>100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Philips</td>
<td>100xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Egerton</td>
<td>100xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Belknap</td>
<td>200xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Hungerford</td>
<td>100xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Mainwaring</td>
<td>100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Ascue and W. Hansard</td>
<td>100xk (both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Neville</td>
<td>30k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Fuljambe</td>
<td>100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Fortescue</td>
<td>50x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Smythe</td>
<td>50xk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Barington</td>
<td>12k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leynham</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walleden</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 gentlemen 2,649 men

Smallest retinue 7 men, largest retinue 400.

x = known office holder. Philips and Fuljambe for example were Squires of the Body. 69% of these were knighted.

K = knighted 1513 (66.6%).

John Marney is listed as having led a retinue of 800 men in the King's Ward. But his father, Sir Henry, was also appointed to the ward with 500 men. Presumably he was the actual leader of the retinue with John as his deputy, but because the records do not make this explicit they have both been omitted. John was a Squire of the Body and was knighted during the expedition.

Sources:
L.P.I (3886), (3890), (4306), (4307).
### APPENDIX B

(b)

**RETINUES FOR KING'S WARD 1544.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>number supplied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquis</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arundel</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wriotheley</td>
<td>... .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.John</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>... .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wriotheley</td>
<td>... .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.John</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>... .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>... .. .. .. ..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 peers

1,944 men

Smallest retinue 40 men, largest 550.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knight</th>
<th>Number supplied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Riche</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Browne</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gage</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Wingfield</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Henege</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Paget</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Long</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Bryan</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Knevitt</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Herbert</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Cromwell</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Speke</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Darcy</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Manners</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percival Hart</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Willoughby</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Musgrave</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Kingston</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William West</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Jones</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Williams</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Peckham</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Penyson</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Acton</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Page</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Carew</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey Ratcliffe</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gervase Clifton</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Paulet</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Baynton</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement Harleston</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bridges</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Paston</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Southwell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bird</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Hopton</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John St Clo(?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Smallest retinue 6 men, largest retinue 531. All except nine are listed in the returns as holding office at court, and of these at least one, Southwell, did hold office at the time.
In addition to this there were another 233 gentlemen of the court who brought with them retinues of less than 20 men, usually about 10, a total of about 3,500 men.

k = knighted 1544. Other gentlemen of the main battle who were knighted at the same time, but who are not recorded to have brought 20 or more men were: William Blount (5), Edward Grey (3? and Robert Stafford (15?).

Largest retinue 251 men, smallest 1 man.

Sources:
L.P. XIX, i (273), (275); DNB.
APPENDIX C

HORSEMEN PROVIDED FOR KING'S WARD, 1544

Arranged according to

a) rank, i.e. peer, knight, gentleman,
b) whether supplier considered as a member of the court or as a shire supplier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number supplied</th>
<th>Number of suppliers</th>
<th>Range in retinue sizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>673 (24.7%)</td>
<td>9 (3.28%)</td>
<td>21-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes bishops)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>1,052 (38.8%)</td>
<td>24 (8.76%)</td>
<td>6-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others¹</td>
<td>866 (27.4%)</td>
<td>234 (85.4%)</td>
<td>1-51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COURT

| Knighth | 107 ( 3.9%) | 5 (1.8%) | 6-121 |
| Others  | 16 ( 0.6%)  | 2 (0.7%) | 6 and 10 |

SHIRES

1. Includes two sons of a peer, Lords Thomas and Edward Grey. Five members of the Privy Chamber and three Gentleman Pensioners, including Edward Grey, who have been counted amongst the other rank were amongst the 29 gentlemen knighted in France. Of these, several were amongst the largest suppliers of horsemen, including Philip Hoby (20), Denny (41), Barkeley (21), Cawarden (51), Vane (31) and Paston (11), who in fact provided the six largest contingents of horsemen sent to the King's Ward by gentlemen.

2. A total of 3,159 horsemen were to be supplied for the Ward, leaving a discrepancy of 445 men. Some 323 court grooms and yeomen were to serve as horsemen; the 122 remaining cavalrymen possibly represents the retinue of Lord Herbert, who is recorded to have sent men, the number of which is unspecified.

Source:

L.P. XIX i (275).
### APPENDIX D

**SOURCES OF VANGUARD 1544: MEN RAISED OUTSIDE THE COURT CIRCLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank of supplier</th>
<th>Men supplied</th>
<th>Number of suppliers</th>
<th>Range in retinue sizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BERKSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OXFORDSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIDDLESEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUSSEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHANTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STAFFORDSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHROPSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WILTSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESSEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank of supplier</td>
<td>Men supplied</td>
<td>Number of suppliers</td>
<td>Range in retinue sizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>111</td>
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<td>4-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10-40</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gentlemen</td>
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<td>23</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Knights</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6-40</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentlemen</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Gentlemen</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-110 (average 29.5)</td>
<td>1-31 (average 6.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are made up from the returns of men available from gentry in the shires rather than at court. The rest of the Vanguard was made up of men supplied by the King, clerics and courtiers, such as 200 men supplied by Sir Richard Riche. See Appendix B. Retinues available from knights were larger than those available from squires and other gentlemen in 60 per cent of the shires.

Figures for Lincolnshire and Leicestershire have been omitted because of lack of details. Additionally, returns from three towns, one bishop and one peer have been excluded, as they totalled only 170 men altogether.

Source:
L.P. XIX i (274).
## RETINUES FOR SCOTTISH WAR, 1544.
(Returns of Musters from northern counties March 1544).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier of Men</th>
<th>Number supplied</th>
<th>Number of suppliers</th>
<th>Range in size of retinues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YORKSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40-400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20 &amp; 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladies</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 &amp; 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squires</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BISHOPRIC OF DURHAM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STAFFORDSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NOTTINGHAMSHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LANCASHIRE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36 names missing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number Sent</td>
<td>Range of Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40-400 (average 138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20-300 (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladies</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squires</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10-100 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10-200 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yorkshire gentlemen knighted 1544: John and Robert Constable (? men supplied); Richard Chomley (100 men); Thomas Waterton (50 men); Thomas Malveray (40 men); Ralf Bulmer (100 with parents' aid); Francis Hotham (? men).

Source:
Seymour Papers, pp.58-60.
APPENDIX F

(a)

PEERS IN FRENCH AND SCOTTISH EXPEDITIONS, 1513
(with retinues where available)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Retinue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward of Buckingham</td>
<td>550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marquis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas of Dorset</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earls</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry of Northumberland</td>
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<td>Thomas of Arundel</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td>Richard of Kent</td>
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<td>Henry of Essex</td>
<td>400(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas of Derby</td>
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<td>George of Shrewsbury</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry of Wiltshire</td>
<td>1,519</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viscount</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Lord Lisle</td>
<td>900</td>
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<td>Barons</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Willoughby</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Lord Bergavenny</td>
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<td>Henry Lord Daubeney</td>
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<td>Thomas Lord Ros</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Lord Herbert</td>
<td>1,067</td>
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<td>John Lord Berners</td>
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<td>Thomas Lord Darcy</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>Thomas Fines Lord Dacre</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Lord Curzon</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Cobham</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Lord Dudley</td>
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<td>Thomas Lord Burford</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Edmund Lord Carew</td>
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<td>John Lord Audeley</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Lord Zouche</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>John Lord Fitzwarren</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Fitzwater</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Lord Hastings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Mountjoy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Lord Broke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Dowcra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de la Warr</td>
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33 peers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas of Surrey</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barons</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1,500 (?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Dacre of Nth.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Lord Latimer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Lord Scrope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randulph Lord Ogle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Lumley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Lord Clifford</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

7 peers

Total: 40 peers

9,124

1. Includes Henry Earl of Devon who served only as a naval officer. Excludes John Earl of Oxford who had apparently not been created when the expedition began.

2. Excludes 1,500 men sent to Flodden by Northumberland and 6,000 sent by Derby, as well as doubtful figures for Essex and Dacre.

Sources:
L.P. I (4070), (4237), (4306), (4307), (4360); Chronicle of Calais; Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.61 and 100; R. Reid, The King's Council in the North (Longmans, London, 1921), p.20; Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p.203; Kightly, Flodden, p.34.
## APPENDIX F

### (b)

**PEERS IN FRENCH AND SCOTTISH EXPEDITIONS, 1544**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Retinue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas of Norfolk</td>
<td>650¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles of Suffolk</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Dorset</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John of Oxford</td>
<td>500(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Sussex</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Arundel</td>
<td>1,300(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William of Essex</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Rutland</td>
<td>121(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Worcester</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George of Huntingdon</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John of Bath</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Surrey¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward of Hertford²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viscount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lisle²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lord Ferrers</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Lord Mountjoy</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Wentworth</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Latimer</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Russell</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Burghe</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Lord Neville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Lord Grey of Powys</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Grey of Wilton</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Windsor</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Lord Cobham</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Fitzwalter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Bray</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Lord Clinton²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Barons
William Lord St.John ................. 402
William Lord Herbert .......

30 peers
Piers Lord Power, an Irish peer, also served in France.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward of Hertford $^2$ .... 330 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randolph of Westmoreland $^3$ .... 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Cumberland $^3$ .... 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis of Shrewsbury .... 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viscount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lisle $^2$ ................ ............................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Conyers ................ 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Lord Clinton $^2$ .................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Wharton ................. ............................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Eure ................ ............................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Stourton .......... 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lord Scrope .......... 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lord Mounteagle .......... 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Lord Ogle .......... 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lord Dacre .......... 100</td>
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14 peers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41 peers ................. 8,255 men $^4$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Men supplied in concert with his son Henry Earl of Surrey.
2. Served in both Scotland and France.
3. Supervised border defences during invasion of Scotland.
4. Excludes doubtful figures such as Hertford's retinue. Retinues were also sent by the Earl of Essex (100) and John Lord Latimer (50) for the Scottish invasion.

There would appear to have been a slight proportional decline in the numbers of peers engaged in war. In 1513, there were about 47 peers and in 1544 there were about 54. But this may be accounted for in two ways: the increased number of peers unable
to serve in 1544 due to age or infirmity; and gaps in the
records. Thomas Lord de la Warr was once a keen soldier but
was 78 in 1544. Other aged peers in 1544 were Richard Lord
Lumley, John Lord Mordaunt and Henry Lord Morley, who was
one of the few peers who did not engage in a military career.
Thomas Lord Wriotheley, who was another non-military noble,
remained in England to advise the Regent. Henry Lord Berkeley
was aged ten in 1544, and Thomas Lord Sandys was also young.
Records for the other peers are scanty. Some may have been
in the field but unrecorded, such as Edward Earl of Derby,
who had fought in Scotland in 1542 and who was asked for a
loan for the 1544 war. Robert Lord Ogle, who was killed at
the battle of Ancrum Moor in February 1545, is not recorded
to have gone to Scotland, but he did lead raids against the
Scots in mid-1544, so he has been included amongst the nobles
at war. Gregory Lord Cromwell, for some unknown reason,
was granted an exemption from war service. There are no
details for John Touchett Lord Audley apart from a notice of
assessment for soldiers to be supplied, or for John Lord Zouche,
apart from a note suggesting that he was still in England in
June: the same applies to Henry Earl of Bridgewater, and
Nicholas Lord Vaux.

Sources:
Seymour Papers, p.58; Lodge, *Illustrations of History*, I,
(xxiii); Pollard, *Tudor Tracts*, pp.39-47; W.H.Dunham, "Lord
Hasting's Indentured Retainers 1461-1483", *Connecticut Academy
of Arts and Sciences* XXXIX (1955), p.108; L.P. XIX i (273),
(274), (275), (276), (532), (534), (1032), ii (340 grant 58),
(625), (688) (Appendix 6).
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Anstruther, G. Vaux of Harrowden, A Recusant Family second ed. (R.H.Johns, Newport, 1953)

Detailed account of Nicholas Lord Vaux and his family.

Bainton, R.H. Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1961)

Extensive detail on humanist ideas about war.

Baldwin Smith, L. Henry VIII. The Mask of Royalty (Jonathan Cape, London, 1971)

Barber, R. The Knight and Chivalry (Cardinal, London, 1974)

Attempts a new interpretation which distinguishes between the knights as a social class and chivalry as an ideal.
Barnie, J. War in Medieval Society. Social Values and the Hundred Years War 1337-99 (Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1974)

Studies the mind and outlook of the English during the fourteenth century from literary sources. Refutes the idea of a chivalric decline.


Examines honour in several historical contexts.

Bayley, C.C. War and Society in Renaissance Florence (University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1961)

Bean, J.M.W. The Decline of English Feudalism 1215-1540 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1968)

Sees the feudal system as essentially legal-economic rather than military.

Bean The Estates of the Percy Family 1416-1537 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958)

Questions accepted ideas about the fluctuation of Percy fortunes.

Beeler, J.H. Warfare in Feudal Europe 730-1200 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1971)

A revisionist treatment of military history.


Does not mention the sixteenth century.


Posits the idea of a divorce between modern man and institutions with the consequent decline of the concept of honour.

Blair, C.

European Armour. Circa 1066 to Circa 1700 (Batsford, London, 1972)

Bottomore, T.B.

Elites and Society (C.A.Watts, London, 1964)

Shares similar limitations with other studies of elites listed hereunder, as well as studies of sex roles: it is confined mainly to twentieth century societies, and particularly to the American middle class.

Boynton, L.


Bramson, L. and G.W.Goethals (eds)

War Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology (Basic Books, New York, 1964)

Brenan, G. and W.A.Lindsay


Brock, R.E.


Detailed.

Brockman, E.

The Two Sieges of Rhodes. 1480-1522 (John Murray, London, 1969)

Considerable information on sixteenth century siege tactics.

Bruce, J.


Burckhardt, J.


Burke, B.


Burke, P.(ed.)

Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe. Essays from Annales (Harper and Row, New York, 1972)

Burke


Employs two models of elites.


Dominated by Huizinga's thesis.


Discusses the replacement of chivalry but has no clear formulation of what chivalry was when it was replaced.


Treats Surrey as an anachronism.

Cipolla, C.M. Before the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 1000-1700 (Methuen, London, 1976)


Cliffe, J.T. The Yorkshire Gentry from the Reformation to the Civil War (Athlone Press, London, 1969)

Mainly seventeenth century.


Provides an essential critique of Huizinga's work.


Questions the efficiency of sixteenth century gunpowder weapons.

Claims that the Tudors had a policy of deliberate neglect of castles.

Cooper King, C. The Story of The British Army (Methuen, London, 1897)

Does not mention wars of Henry VIII.


Surveys gentry in five counties to identify who they were and their circumstances.

Crane, R.S. The Vogue of Medieval Chivalric Romance During the English Renaissance (Collegiate Press, Wisconsin, 1919)

Demonstrates the popularity of romances into the seventeenth century.

Cripps-Day, F.H. The History of the Tournament in England and in France (Bernard Quaritch London, 1918)

The most extensive history of tournaments yet published.


With the work listed below, the only detailed examination of early Tudor war. Contains a narrative account of the war with chapters on administration, organization, field operations and supply. Details not always accurate.

Cruickshank The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-19 (Clarendon, Oxford, 1971)

A continuation of the previous book.


Critical of the lack of quantification in most studies of elites.
Davenport Adams, W.H.  
**Battle Stories from British and European History** (Swann Sonnenschein, London, 1882)

Davies, C.S.L.  

Notes the indifference to common soldiers shown in victualling methods.

Denholm Young, N.  
"Feudal Society in the Thirteenth Century: The Knights", *History* XXVIII (Sep.1943), pp.107-19

Denholm Young  
"The Tournament in the Thirteenth Century" in *Studies in Medieval History*, ed. Hunt, Pantin and Southern

Department of Environment  
*Pendennis and St.Mawes Castles* (H.M.S.O., London, 1975)

Dietz, F.C.  

Digby, K.H.  

A confusing work which equates chivalry with medieval Roman Catholicism.

Dugdale, W.  
*A Perfect Copy of All Summons of the Nobility to the Great Councils and Parliaments of This Realm from the xlix of King Henry IIId Until These Present Times* (Robert Clavell, London, 1685)

Dunham, W.H.  

Sees retaining as an improvement on feudal practice.

Elton, G.R.  
*England Under the Tudors* third ed. (Methuen, London, 1971)
Elton Esper, T.

The Practice of History (University Press, Sydney, 1967)

Evans, J. (ed.)


Esper, T.

"The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Army", Technology and Culture VI, iii (1965), pp.382-94

Evans, J. (ed.)

The Flowering of the Middle Ages (Thames and Hudson, London, 1966)

Fasteau, M.F.


Male psychology and sex roles: sees war as part of the male sexual ideal.

Febvre, L.P.V.


Ferguson, A.B.


Essays on chivalric ideology rather than practice.

Ferguson, W.K.

The Renaissance in Historical Thought. Five Centuries of Interpretation (Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1948)

Contains a critique of Huizinga.

Ffoulkes, C.

The Armourer and His Craft From the XIth to the XVIth Century (1912) (Benjamin Blom, New York, 1967)

Essential for a study of medieval armour.

Fortescue, J.W.

A History of the British Army. First Part - To the Close of the Seven Years War (3 vols, MacMillan, London, 1899)

Comparatively superficial on Henry VIII.

Foss, M.

Fowler, K. (ed.)  
*The Hundred Years War* (MacMillan, London, 1971)

Friedman, R.C., R.M.Richart and R.L.Vandewiele (eds.)  
*Sex Differences in Behaviour* (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974)

Froude, J.A.  
*History of England From the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada* (12 vols, Longmans, London, 1892)

Gautier, L.  
*La Chevalrie* (Victor Palme, Paris, 1884)

The most extensive examination yet of chivalry but limited by Gautier's belief that chivalry was the lifestyle of the Christian soldier.

Giono, J.  
*The Battle of Pavia 24th February 1525* trans. A.E.Murch (Peter Owen, London, 1965)

Emphasises the importance of concepts such as honour in early sixteenth century war.

Gombrich E.  
*In Search of Cultural History* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1969)

Contains critiques of Burckhardt, Hegel and Huizinga.

Goring, J.J.  

Goring  

Establishes the conservative nature of recruiting methods.

Goring  
"Social Change and Military Decline in Mid-Tudor England", *History* LX (1975), pp.185-97

Grace, F.R.  
"The Life and Career of Thomas Howard (1473-1554)", (M.A., University of Nottingham, 1962)

Sees the Howards as representative of the "new men" of the Tudor age.

Greenhill, F.A.  

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Not a scholarly work but contains the most comprehensive survey of Renaissance armies available in English.

Hale, J.R. The Art of War in Renaissance England (Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, 1961)

Brief.

Hale Renaissance Fortification. Art or Engineering? (Thames and Hudson, Norwich, 1977)

Reaches no clear decision.


Hale "War and Public Opinion in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", Past and Present XXII (1962), pp.18-32

Hale Renaissance Europe 1480-1520 (Collins, London, 1971)

Hare, C. Charles de Bourbon. High Constable of France. "The Great Condottiere" (Bodley Head, London, 1911)

Popular.

Hare Maximilian the Dreamer. Holy Roman Emperor 1459-1519 (Stanley, Paul and Co., London, 1913)

Popular.

Harvey, S. "The Knight and the Knight's Fee in England", Past and Present XLIX (1970), pp.3-44

Revisionist.

Hearnshaw, P.J.C. "Chivalry and Its Place in History", in Chivalry ed. Prestage, pp.1-33

Cliched.


Contains a section on chivalry.
Herbert, Edward
Lord of Cherbury

Hewitt, H.J.
"The Organisation of the War", in The Hundred Years War ed. K. Fowler
Contains details of the social composition of armies.

Hexter, J.H.
"The Education of the Aristocracy in the Renaissance", Journal of Modern History XXII, i (1950), pp.1-20

Hexter
"Storm Over the Gentry", in Reappraisals in History (Longmans, London, 1961)

Higham, R.(ed.)
A Guide to the Sources of British Military History (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971)
The only bibliography of military history in English but should be used in conjunction with general bibliographies.

Hindley, G.
Medieval Warfare (Wayland, London, 1971)

Hinton, D.A.
Alfred's Kingdom, Wessex and the South 800-1500 (Book Club Associates, London, 1977)
An archeological study of architectural remains.

Hogrefe, P.
The Life and Times of Sir Thomas Elyot, Englishman (Iowa University Press, Ames, 1967)
Some information on rural gentry.

Huizinga, J.
Indirectly attacks some of his own work.

Huizinga
"The Political and Military Significance of Chivalric Ideas in the Late Middle Ages", (1921) in Men and Ideas

Huizinga
The Waning of the Middle Ages. A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (1919) trans. F. Hopman (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972)
Hunt, R.W., W.A. Pantin and R.W.Southern (eds.)

Studies in Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke (Clarendon, Oxford, 1948)

Hunter Blair, C.H. and H.L.Honeyman

Norham Castle, Northumberland (H.M.S.O., London, 1972)

Hunter Blair and Honeyman


Hurd, R.


Hurstfield, J.

"The Revival of Feudalism in Early Tudor England", History XXXVII (1952), pp.131-45

Concerned with the revival of claims to wardship by the Tudors.

Innes, A.D.

Ten Tudor Statesmen (Eveleigh Nash, London, 1906)

Has a section on Somerset.

James, M.E.


James


Janowitz, M.

"Military Elites and the Study of War", in War Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology ed. L.Bramson and G.W.Goethals, pp.337-51

Contains an introduction to theories of military elites.

Jones, T.


History of Ellis Gruffydd.

Keen, M.H.

"Chivalry, Nobility and the Man-at-Arms in War, Literature, and Politics ed. C.T.Allmand, pp.32-45

Suggests that one of the reasons for the medieval failure to control war was the idealism to war and the soldier contained in the ethic of chivalry.
Keen  The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965)

Demonstrates the need to comprehend noble war from a contemporary viewpoint.


Most recent account available. Lacks scholarly apparatus.


One of only two works in English devoted to a study of the decline of chivalry. It is dominated by Huizinga's thesis, and is frequently weak in logic.


Includes the seventeenth century.


Revisionist.


An exhaustive statistical analysis of the composition of Tudor knighthood but almost completely ignores their military role.


Contains comparisons between Chinese soldiers of fortune and European knights.


Questions many of the cliches of Renaissance warfare of the kind propagated by Machiavelli.

Mathew, D.  
The Courtiers of Henry VIII  (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1970)

Too brief to permit extensive analysis of character or career.

Mattingly, G.  
Catherine of Aragon  (Jonathan Cape, London, 1971)

Some detail on the 1513 war.

Merton, R.  
"Manifest and Latent Function", in Social Theory and Social Structure revised ed. (Free Press, Glencoe, 1957) pp.19-84

A lengthy critique of functionalist interpretation.

Miller, H.  

Emphasises the essential stability of the nobility, as compared to other eras.

Miller  

Summary of thesis.
Miller  "Subsidy Assessments of the Peerage in the Sixteenth Century", Institute of Historical Research Bulletin XXVIII (1955), pp.15-34

Indicates some difficulties of measuring incomes of nobles.


Moyer, K.E.  "Sex Differences in Aggression", in Sex Differences in Behaviour ed. Friedman et al, pp.335-72

Mainly concerned with biological determinants of sexual behaviour rather than social influences.


Tries to explain the northward shift of European economic power as due to the influence of military operations.

Nichols, F.M.  "On Feudal and Obligatory Knighthood", Archaeologia XXXIX (1863), pp.189-224

Still a standard article.


The essay from which the two following works originated.

Oman  A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages revised ed. (2 vols, Burt Franklin, New York, 1924)

Somewhat dated but still the most extensive study of its kind.

Oman  A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (Methuen, London, 1937)

An attempt to identify the fundamental alterations in war 1494-1600. Mainly concerned with Continent.

O'Neill


Painter, S.


An essay rather than a closely documented study.

Painter

Studies in the History of the English Feudal Barony (John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1943)

Palmer, J.J.N.

"The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in England (1385)", English Historical Review LXXXIII (1968), pp.771-75

Pareto, V.

The Rise and Fall of the Elites. An Application of Theoretical Sociology (1901) (Beminster Press, New Jersey, 1968)

One of the initial attempts to formulate a theory of elites.

Pease, H.

The Lord Wardens of the Marches of England and Scotland (Constable, London, 1913)

Peristiany, J.G.

Honour and Shame. The Values of Mediterranean Society (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1965)

Pinkerton, J.

The History of Scotland from the Accession of the House of Stuart to that of Mary (2 vols, Dilly, London, 1797)

Pitt-Rivers, J.

"Honour and Social Status", in Honour and Shame ed. J.G.Peristiany, pp.19-78

Discusses theories of honour as they existed in various eras.

Pollard, A.F.

Henry VIII new ed. (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1905)

Poole, A.L. (ed.)


Powicke, F.M.

"The English Aristocracy and the War", in The Hundred Years War ed. K.Fowler, pp.122-55

Prestage, E.(ed.)


Contains a sampling of early twentieth century concepts of chivalry.
Prestwich, M.  
War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I (Faber and Faber, London, 1972)

A new look at the composition of medieval armies.

Pugh, R.B. and A.D. Saunders  
Old Wardour Castle, Wiltshire (H.M.S.O., London, 1975)

Reid, R.R.  
The King's Council in the North (Longmans, Green, London, 1921)

Robertson, W.  
The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V. With a View of the Progress of Society in Europe, from the Subversion of the Roman Empire, to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century (3 vols, W.A.W. Strahan, London, 1769)

Rogers, H.C.B.  

Considerable detail on sixteenth century cavalry.

Rudorff, R.  
The Knights and Their World (Cassell, London, 1974)

Contains most of the cliches about chivalry.

Russell, J.G.  

Detailed.

Sainte-Palaye, La Curne de  
Memoires sur L'Ancienne Chevalerie (2 vols, Girard, Paris, 1826)

Saunders, A.D.  

Saunders  
Dartmouth Castle (H.M.S.O., London, 1965)

Saunders  
Upnor Castle Kent (H.M.S.O., London, 1967)

Scarisbrick, J.J.  
Henry VIII (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1968)

Schofield, W.H.  

Attributes the influence of chivalry to the power of literature.

This iconoclastic essay emphasises the importance of mercenaries in Medieval war, and contains numerous implications for the study of war and chivalry.


Attributes the decline of Germany's warrior nobility to economic change.

Scott, W. "An Essay on Chivalry" (1818), in *The Prose Works of Sir Walter Scott, Bart* (Robert Cadell, Edinburgh, 1834)


Shellabarger, S. *The Chevalier Bayard: A Study in Fading Chivalry* (Skeffington and Son, London, 1929)


A study of early modern European weapons in a foreign environment.


Attributes change in castle design to alterations in society.


Many similarities to Schlight's work.

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Overturns assumptions such as the idea that the court was moribund during the sixteenth century.

Stone, L. The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641 (Clarendon, Oxford, 1965)

Stone Sculpture in Britain: The Middle Ages second ed. (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972)


Demonstrates the influence of Iberian romances in sixteenth century England.


Begins with the sixteenth century.


Usherwood, S. "Honi Soit Qui Mal Y Pense, 1585", History Today XXVIII (1978), pp.53-8

Attitudes to chivalric orders, late sixteenth century.
Concludes that guns had no significant effect on chivalric idealism during the fifteenth century.


Walford, E.  Spotless and Fearless. The Story of the Chevalier Bayard From the French of the Loyal Servant, M.de Berville and others (Sampson et al. London, 1868)


Incomplete.


Whinney, M.  Sculpture in Britain 1530-1830 (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964)

Williams, N.  Henry VIII and His Court (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971)

Winthrop, W.  "The English, Irish and Scotch Knights of the Order of St.John of Jerusalem", Notes and Queries CC (1853), pp.189-93


An isolated and belated attempt to study late sixteenth century chivalry.
ADDITIONAL NOTE

A monograph that arrived too late to be included in the argument of the thesis is M. Keen's "Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry", *Medievalia et Humanistica* 8 (1977), pp.1-20.