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**THE MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN PAKISTAN:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS 1947-1971**

**Thesis submitted
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University**

**Samina Ahmed
June 1988**

This thesis is my own original work

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PRECIS

The thesis is a study of the role of the Pakistan military in foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the linkages between defence and foreign policy, using relations with the Soviet Union to demonstrate the extent to which the military has dominated Pakistan's external directions from independence in 1947 to the country's dismemberment in 1971.

From the very start, Pakistan's political leadership, military and bureaucracy adopted an anti-Soviet and pro-Western foreign policy, with the military showing particular interest in establishing defence links with the West. Pakistan-Soviet relations were therefore tense as Pakistan ignored Soviet overtures, motivated by the Soviet desire to curb Western influence in a strategically placed country.

Pakistan-Soviet tensions reached their peak as Pakistan formally entered into anti-Soviet alliances with the West. Internal developments guided Pakistan's foreign policy, with the military dictating the country's domestic and external orientations. Internally, the Military High Command exercised power in partnership with the bureaucracy, as bureaucratic-controlled governments advanced the military's interests. Pakistan's uncertain external environment, particularly its conflictual relations with India, advanced the military's internal standing as it was used to justify ever-increasing defence spending. As the military's autonomy grew, it embarked on independent, although parallel, efforts with the bureaucracy to obtain Pakistan's entry into US-sponsored regional pacts, motivated by its desire to obtain Western arms assistance.

While Pakistan's entry into the pacts and rejection of Soviet overtures led the antagonised Soviets into supporting India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan, the main beneficiary of alignment was the military as US military aid poured into the country, further strengthening the Pakistan Armed Forces' internal position. Close links with the US in turn reinforced the anti-Soviet and pro-Western views of the Pakistan officer corps.

The military took over direct power in 1958 when its internal autonomy and Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy directions were threatened by domestic opposition. It then moved to consolidate its position by supporting Ayub's rule and in the external sphere continued to dictate a pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy. However, external determinants such as superpower detente and US partiality towards India downgraded Pakistan's importance in American regional strategies, forcing Ayub to readjust his foreign policy rhetoric. He then attempted to use the Chinese and Soviet cards, hoping to pressure the Americans to revise their policies vis-à-vis Pakistan, especially in the wake of the US arms embargo in 1965.

Although Pakistan-Soviet relations improved as the Soviet Union reacted positively, motivated by its desire to curb Chinese and Western influence in Pakistan, tensions remained due to Ayub's continued efforts to consolidate relations with the West.

Ayub's failure to persuade the Americans to resume arms assistance, combined with dissatisfaction arising from the conduct and aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, led the military to withdraw its support as internal opposition grew to Ayub's authoritarian rule. Army C-in-C Yahya Khan then took over power as Martial Law was imposed in 1969.

Under Yahya, the military once again kept its options open vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as long as the Americans downgraded Pakistan's importance as an ally, although Pakistan's primary foreign policy objective remained a strengthening of relations with the West, with an emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. Once US global interests, including Pakistan's role in helping the Americans to open relations with the PRC, led to the establishment of closer US-Pakistan relations, the Yahya regime downgraded relations with the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's foreign policy directions assumed a new significance in the wake of the East Pakistan crisis, as the Soviets supported India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, while Pakistan's American and Chinese allies only extended it limited support. Yahya's shortsighted internal and external directions ultimately led to the dismemberment of Pakistan.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

When I started work on my doctoral dissertation, I had intended to focus on Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union. Soon after I had begun researching the topic, it became evident that any examination of Pakistan's foreign policy was incomplete without a detailed understanding of the linkages between the external and internal variables of foreign policy making in Pakistan. The focus of my thesis increasingly shifted to the role of the military as a major actor not only in Pakistani politics but also in the realm of foreign policy.

Domestic politics in Pakistan are characterised by one constant factor, the influence and power demonstrated by the military, with the country experiencing direct military rule for over half of its existence. An examination of Pakistan's political history also reveals that the Pakistani military has been a powerful force even when it has not been in direct control. Given that the military has played a singularly important role in politics, it then seemed logical to inquire into the extent and significance of its role in influencing and determining the direction of Pakistan's foreign policy.

An assessment of the military's role in foreign policy in turn drew attention to the importance of its conception of security and defence concerns in shaping Pakistan's external relationships. During the course of the study the military emerged as a major domestic variable in determining not only Pakistan's foreign policy but also

the direction of its defence policy, with a stress on the need for 'security' through the acquisition of military assistance. It also became increasingly evident that Pakistan's foreign policy was to a considerable extent an offshoot of defence policy as perceived and formulated by the military establishment, with the institution's orientations, needs and requirements given precedence over all other concerns. The focus of this thesis is, therefore, on the role of the military in foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the linkages between defence and foreign policy, using Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union to demonstrate the manner in which the military has dominated the country's external directions.

The existing state of scholarship on the Pakistani military is somewhat uneven. While some books and articles have been written on the military's role in politics since independence,¹ very little work has been done on the military's role in foreign policy. The academic debate on Pakistan's foreign policy, especially since the breakup of the state in 1971, is increasingly recognising the necessity of examining domestic variables in influencing Pakistan's external directions. There is even acknowledgment of the need to determine the military's role in foreign policy.² Yet while most analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy and domestic politics conclude that the Pakistan military plays a "very influential role in shaping both the domestic and foreign policy" of Pakistan,³ and that the military has been a significant component in the decision-making apparatus, especially where decisions regarding foreign and defence policies are concerned, there has been no indepth effort to determine the military's influence and role in the field of foreign policy.

Similarly while there is general agreement that security has always been of prime concern to Pakistani policy makers;⁴ that the issue of arms assistance is of primary importance to foreign policy formulation;⁵ and that the military plays a predominant role in the assessment of strategic requirements and defence policy,⁶ no real effort has been made to ascertain the military's role in influencing the adoption of foreign and defence policy options, aimed at fulfilling, above all, the requirements of the Armed Forces for military assistance. Although some research has been undertaken on the military's role in determining and influencing Pakistan's relations with the West, with particular emphasis on Pakistan-US relations,⁷ no work has been conducted on the implications of the military's role in domestic, foreign and defence policy making for Pakistan-Soviet relations.

So far all major works written by both Pakistani and foreign observers on Pakistan-Soviet relations have tended to focus on either the interrelationship between the policies of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, towards Pakistan or on Pakistan's relations with the three major powers, the Soviet Union, the USA, and the People's Republic of China.⁸ Other works extend this emphasis on external variables in Pakistan-Soviet relations to regional factors, such as Indo-Pakistan and Pakistan-Afghan relations.⁹ The focus of a number of works, moreover, has largely been on the study of the relationship from the Soviet perspective, that is, Soviet policies towards, perceptions of and relations with Pakistan.¹⁰ Even when an attempt has been made

to identify the domestic components of Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union, the role of the Pakistan military has been touched upon only briefly or completely ignored.¹¹

The thesis will, therefore, seek to determine the extent to which the Pakistan military's orientation, interests and requirements, especially the need for arms, affect Pakistan's foreign policy directions, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations, with the objective of gaining a better understanding of the internal dynamics of Pakistan's foreign policy and to establish the linkage, missing in most analyses so far, between the internal and external determinants of foreign policy making, using the relationship with the Soviet Union as a tool to demonstrate the role of the Pakistan military in foreign policy.

A number of factors will be examined in order to ascertain the military's position in the domestic arena including an analysis of its history, organisation, character and the constitutional and extra-constitutional roles it has adopted in Pakistan's political history. This will help us to evaluate its influence on the course of domestic politics and foreign policy both under civilian leadership and during periods of direct military rule.

In any assessment of the military's internal political role, its relationship with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state is of special significance. The relative positions of the civil and military bureaucracies are helpful in determining not only the military's role in domestic politics but also the extent and nature of its

involvement in the foreign policy making processes.

Special stress will also be laid on the military's role in shaping defence policy and the impact of defence and security concerns on the course of Pakistan's foreign policy as a whole and Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular. The areas of defence policy which will be explored will centre on the military's perceptions of Pakistan's strategic environment and the influence of internal military expenditure and external arms assistance on both Pakistan's internal politics and foreign policy directions.

Since relations with the Soviet Union will be used to demonstrate the military's role in foreign policy, the thesis will attempt to determine the input of this powerful institution in shaping Pakistan-Soviet relations during the period under consideration. It should be emphasised that the study will examine Pakistan-Soviet relations from the Pakistani perspective, concentrating mainly on Pakistani perceptions, initiatives and reactions.

Some of the issues which will be addressed will include an analysis of the impact of the military's external orientation, interests and needs on Pakistan-Soviet relations and the implications of the military's emergence as a key domestic actor and decision making force on the relationship. The influence of defence and security concerns on Pakistan-Soviet relations will receive special attention. Aside from the military's determination of Pakistani strategic doctrines, its influence on the adoption of certain foreign and defence policy options and the linkages of defence and foreign

policies, the thesis will also look at how Pakistani domestic policies, especially the internal use of the 'communist' threat affects Pakistan-Soviet relations.

No indepth analysis of Pakistan-Soviet relations can afford to ignore the close interrelationship between internal and external variables. Thus the Pakistan military's role in Pakistan-Soviet relations cannot be looked at in isolation from external factors such as great power (the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China) interests, objectives and competition both at the global level and within the South Asian region.

Since Pakistan-Soviet relations are partly dependent on Soviet objectives, interests and goals, it will be important to identify Soviet stakes in South Asia and Pakistan's position in Soviet bilateral, regional and global strategies. It will also be necessary to assess the impact of great power relations at the global and regional levels on Pakistan-Soviet relations and the military's role in the acceptance or rejection of options available to Pakistan in the course of its relations with the Soviet Union. While Sino-Pakistani relations will be significant in the context of Chinese global and South Asian strategies and Sino-Pakistani bilateral relations, especially in the sphere of defence and diplomatic assistance, the US factor is vital to any understanding of the Pakistan military's role in foreign policy formulation, including policy towards the Soviet Union.

While US policy towards Pakistan has been dictated by its overall

global concerns, Pakistan's changing position in American regional strategies has its repercussions on Pakistan-Soviet relations. US-Pakistan military ties and the question of arms assistance¹² are of special significance because of their impact both on Pakistan's politics and on its overall foreign policy directions, including the shaping of Pakistan-Soviet relations. The thesis will, therefore, explore and analyse the military's role and influence in forging defence and security links with the West and the effect of these ties on Pakistan-Soviet relations as well as on the military's internal political standing. It will also assess the impact of Pakistan's participation in the Western-sponsored anti-Soviet alliances on the external orientation of succeeding generations of the Pakistani Officer Corps and the implications of these perceptions for Pakistan-Soviet relations.

Thus some of the key questions the thesis will attempt to answer will include a determination of how Pakistan's policy directions towards the Soviet Union have been influenced by changes in East-West relations and Pakistan's position in American global and regional strategies; and to what extent have Pakistani military or military-dominated governments attempted to use the Soviet card as a lever in their dealings with the West. Particular emphasis will be placed on the degree to which the requirements of the military, especially the need to acquire American military assistance, have influenced the adoption of certain policy options vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In the internal context, it would be relevant to explore whether the 'communist threat' has been used by Pakistani governments to gain domestic legitimacy and international support.

The thesis will also need to take into account Pakistan's regional relationships and policies, especially its territorial disputes with India and Afghanistan, and their repercussions on Pakistan-Soviet relations. Aside from Pakistan's differences with Afghanistan on the Pakhtunistan issue, the main focus of Pakistan's regional policies has been its troubled relationship with India, with the Kashmir dispute being the main bone of contention. Any analysis of this dispute once again cannot afford to ignore the significance of domestic constraints and imperatives of Pakistan's foreign policy and the military's role in influencing foreign policy. The dividing line between internal and external variables is a very thin one indeed.

It shall therefore be necessary to examine the impact of conflictual relations with India on the Pakistan military's internal political standing as well as its role in deciding the course of Indo-Pakistan relations. An attempt will especially be made to determine if the Indian 'threat' has been used by the Pakistan military to acquire political legitimacy, justify domestic defence expenditure and the adoption of certain foreign policy directions and alignments, and finally, to evaluate the impact of these internal and external directions on Pakistan-Soviet relations.

The focus of the thesis is on the years of united Pakistan, covering the period from independence to the country's dismemberment in 1971. So far as the structure and organisation of the thesis are concerned, a historical-cum-analytical approach has been adopted, with chapters divided into chronological periods. This methodology

has been used since the timeframe under examination covers distinct phases in Pakistani politics and foreign policy. The six substantive chapters of the thesis will, therefore, cover various stages in the Pakistan military's role in foreign policy and political history.

Chapter Two, entitled, "Pakistan-Soviet Relations: The Initial Years", covers the time period from 1947 to 1951. This chapter will examine the initial years of Pakistan's independence under the country's first Governor-General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan. It will look at the evolution of Pakistani foreign policy, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations. It will examine the emergence of the Pakistan military establishment and its roles in the internal and external spheres, including an assessment of its relationship with the political leadership and the civil bureaucracy with regard to their respective positions in the domestic arena and in the formulation and direction of Pakistan's foreign policy.

External factors, including the global and regional policies of the former colonial state, the United Kingdom, and the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, will be examined. Special emphasis will be placed on determining the influence of defence concerns, particularly the military's need for arms assistance, on Pakistan's foreign policy directions. The chapter will also look at Pakistan's hostile regional environment, examining the impact of Indo-Pakistan conflictual relations on the military's domestic position, its external orientation and strategic perceptions.

Chapter Three, "The Parliamentary Era, the Military and Foreign Policy", will cover the period from 1951 to 1955, following Prime Minister Liaquat's assassination, until Iskander Mirza's assumption of the post of Governor-General and later President of the new Republic of Pakistan. This chapter will examine the continuing links between internal and external variables in Pakistani foreign policy, focussing on the Pakistan military's role both in domestic politics and in the formulation and direction of foreign policy as the Cold War engulfed Asia.

In the domestic context, the relationship between the military and civil bureaucracies vis-à-vis other political forces in the state will be closely followed. In the external sphere, stress will be placed on the Pakistan military's role in forging defence and security links with the West. An attempt will therefore be made to ascertain how far the military's orientation, interests and requirements dictated Pakistan's entry into the Western sponsored security pacts. The chapter will then look at the impact of these developments on both the military's involvement in politics and on Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union. Finally, Soviet reactions to Pakistani alignment with the West will be examined.

Chapter Four, "The Iskander Mirza Years", covering the period from 1955 to 1958, will study the last years of parliamentary rule, under Governor-General and later President Iskander Mirza, until the first successful military coup d'état under the leadership of General Ayub Khan.

The chapter will look at the implications of Pakistan's entry into the alliances on both its foreign policy directions and internal politics. This will include an assessment of the Pakistan military's position in American regional strategies and the effect of US military assistance, links and contacts not only on the external orientation of the Pakistani officer corps but also on the position of the military in the internal political arena.

The chapter will examine the effect of Pakistan's participation in the Western pacts on Pakistan's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and on Soviet regional strategies concerning South Asia. It will also look at the repercussions of Pakistan's foreign policy directions on its relations with neighbouring India and Afghanistan.

Chapter Five, "Martial Law in Pakistan", covers the first period of direct military rule, under Army C-in-C and later Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, from 1958 to 1962. This chapter will evaluate the implications of the military takeover for Pakistan's internal politics and foreign policy. In the domestic context, an attempt will be made to analyse the various strategies employed by the military to legitimise and consolidate its hold over power. The position of the civil bureaucracy in the policy formulating processes will also be assessed.

In the external sphere, the chapter will examine the military's role in shaping foreign policy after emerging as the key decision making force, with special reference to the impact of US-Pakistan defence links on Pakistan-Soviet relations. The chapter will also look at the

implications of Pakistan's changing position in US regional and global strategies for Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union as well as evaluate the Soviet reaction to the Pakistani military government's internal and external directions during the period under study.

Chapter Six, "The Military in Mufti", covers the course of Pakistani politics and foreign policy, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations, from the formal withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962 till the replacement of Ayub Khan's government in 1969 by Pakistan's second military regime. The chapter will examine the nature of the new political order devised by Ayub in order to assess the military's position in both domestic and foreign policy making processes.

The linkages between defence and foreign policy will be analysed, with special emphasis on the influence of the military's strategic perceptions, interests and requirements on the adoption of certain foreign policy options and their impact on Pakistan-Soviet relations.

The interconnection between internal and external variables will also be examined for their effect on Pakistan's foreign policy in general and on Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular. These will include Pakistani attempts to play the Chinese and Soviet cards in their dealings with the United States; the emergence of American-Soviet detente; and the common desire of the two superpowers to contain China.

Regional developments assume a new significance in influencing the

course of Pakistani domestic politics and foreign policy in this period. Hence the chapter will assess the impact of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and its aftermath on Pakistani foreign policy directions and on the fate of the Ayub regime.

The final substantive chapter, "The Yahya Regime and the Dismemberment of Pakistan", will cover the period from the 1969 military takeover until the breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971, leading to President Yahya's downfall. It will look at the military's publicly acknowledged re-emergence as the dominant domestic actor and its roles in dictating the course of Pakistan's politics and foreign policy.

The chapter will focus on the influence of the military's orientation and requirements in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy and internal politics. In the internal context, it will examine the domestic repercussions of the military's attempts to perpetuate its control. It will then attempt to establish the linkages between internal and external variables, especially in the wake of the East Pakistan crisis, including the effect of the military's domestic policies on relations with India and the regional policies of the external powers, the United States, China and the Soviet Union, before and during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Finally, it will evaluate the role of the military regime's internal and external policies in determining the outcome of the crisis, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations.

Note on Sources: It is necessary, in view of the nature of the topic,

to explain the nature of some of the source material I have used.

During my fieldwork, both in Pakistan and in the national archives of the United States and Great Britain, I was able to consult a substantial body of primary source material, very little of which has been used by previous researchers on either Pakistan's foreign policy or domestic politics. This is especially true of the material I consulted in the Public Record Office in London, since the material, covering the initial years of Pakistan's independence, had only recently been made available for public use.

It was, however, difficult to obtain access to relevant primary sources since documents from the mid-1950s are still covered by the Official Secrets Act. Considerable problems were, in fact, posed by the sensitivity of the topic, which made access to material and information very difficult. This was especially true in Pakistan, where all relevant documentation remains secret since the Official Secrets Act does not appear in practice to be time-barred. I have, however, managed to fill in some of the gaps by using all available government sources, including Constituent Assembly and National Assembly debates, handouts and reports. I have also attempted to demonstrate some of the hypotheses under examination by making extensive reference to press clippings, especially from the Pakistani press. Similarly I have made frequent use of primary military sources, including books published by influential Pakistani military figures, publicly available Pakistani military journals, such as the Pakistan Army Journal, as well as inhouse military periodicals including Sarhang, (37 Division) and The Owl (Staff College, Quetta).

I have also interviewed a number of senior Pakistani military personnel and civil bureaucrats, who had served in sensitive posts during the days of united Pakistan. Similar interviews were conducted with senior serving and retired American officials, dealing with Pakistan during the period under consideration. The sensitivity of the topic did pose some problems. While a number of persons interviewed provided valuable insights derived from their experiences, others were not as forthcoming. Moreover, some of the interviewees did not give me permission to quote them directly. Hence the list of interviews attached to the bibliography will exclude a number of names; but no part of this thesis is wholly or primarily dependent upon evidence from sources who decline to be identified.

Apart from the available primary source material, I have also made extensive use of published secondary sources, such as books, journals and monographs, as well as unpublished material, including conference papers and reports.

Footnotes - Chapter One

- 1 The three major works on the military's role in politics are the following: Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963); Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Progressive Publishers, Lahore, Second Revised Edition, 1976); Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984).
- 2 See for example, Norman D. Palmer, "Pakistan: The Long Search for Foreign Policy", Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Br banti and W. Howard Wriggins (eds.), Pakistan: The Long View (Duke University Press, Durham, 1977); William J. Barnds, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Shifting Opportunities and Constraints", *ibid*; Norman D. Palmer, "Foreign Policy and Political Development: International and Comparative Dimensions", The Indian Journal of Political Science (Vol. XXX111, No. 3, July-September 1972).
- 3 Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", Jacques Van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays (Mouton and Company, The Hague, 1968), p.274. See also Mohammed Ayoob, "Pakistan's New Political Structure: Change and Continuity", International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 2, April-June 1973).
- 4 See for example Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980), p. 219 and G. W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (The Free Press, New York, 1975), p. 188.
- 5 Pakistan, it is observed, has "traditionally equated power with military power, military power with arms acquisitions and arms acquisitions with external political support", P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review", Asian Survey (Vol. X1X, No. 3, March 1979), p. 243.
- 6 See for example Stephen P. Cohen, "Pakistan: Coping with Regional Dominance, Multiple Crises, and Great Power Confrontations", Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), The Great Power

Triangle and Asian Security (Lexington Books, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983).

- 7 Stephen Cohen has especially explored the nature of the military dimension in US-Pakistan relations in his book, The Pakistan Army.
- 8 These include William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972) and G. W. Choudhury, op.cit.
- 9 Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 1, First Quarter 1961); Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union", Asian Survey (Vol. VI, No. 9, September 1966); S. P. Seth, "Russia's Role in Indo-Pak Politics", ibid, (Vol. IX, No. 8, August 1969).
- 10 Raghunath Ram, Soviet Policy towards Pakistan (S. Chand and Company Ltd., New Delhi, 1983) and J. P. Jain, Soviet Policy towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1974).
- 11 See for example Aswini K. Ray, Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy: Pakistan in Indo-Soviet Relations 1947-1958 (Manas Publications, New Delhi, 1975).
- 12 According to a former senior member of the Staff of the US National Security Council, Pakistan-US arms sales are the "touchstone" of the bilateral relationship, which especially gain importance under military regimes. Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools? : US Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration", Asian Survey, (Vol. XX11, No. 10, October 1982), p.963.

CHAPTER TWO

PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE INITIAL YEARS (1947-1951)

Pakistan-Soviet relations, in the initial years of Pakistan's independence, under the country's first Governor-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah and first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan were determined by a number of internal and external variables. Internally, the main domestic actors playing a role, directly or indirectly, in the formulation, implementation and direction of the relationship were the country's political leadership and the two inherited state institutions, the military and the bureaucracy.

The external orientations of these three power groups, along with their respective positions in the internal power structure were to influence the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations. There was, at the same time, a close interrelationship between domestic and external variables. Amongst the major external factors influencing Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union were the former's relations with the regional states, especially India, as well as the global and regional policies of the former colonial state, the United Kingdom and the two super powers, the USA and the Soviet Union.

The Traumas of Partition

The evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy in the initial years was greatly influenced by the problems confronting the state and its leadership, including the establishment of a viable governmental system, the aftermath of partition and the country's differences

with India. Communal rioting had increased tensions amongst the Muslims and Hindus of undivided India. With partition, communal violence rapidly accelerated, leading to a mass movement of refugees in both countries, creating problems of law-and-order and rehabilitation. Other issues contributed to India-Pakistan tensions, including differences over the division of economic and military assets as well as territorial disputes such as the Indian annexation of Junagarh and Hyderabad and clashes over Kashmir. Pakistan's western borders were also tense because of Afghan hostility, with the Afghan government questioning Pakistan's claim over the tribal territories.

The massive internal problems of restructuring and administration combined with mounting external tensions led to an increasing reliance of the Muslim League government on the country's civil and military bureaucracies. The ruling party, even under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was to find its tasks of governance and the establishment of a new administrative system a difficult one. Unlike its counterpart, the Indian Congress, the Muslim League had become a mass party only a few years prior to independence. Its organisational links with the areas that now constituted Pakistan were therefore weak. Even when the Muslim League assumed the role of a mass party in pre-partition India, its programme had focussed on the achievement of an independent country for India's Muslims, and no specific political or economic strategies had been worked out for the newly independent country. Not only did the Muslim League fail to move towards building up a mass base for itself within Pakistan, it soon began to crumble from within. A number of Muslim

League politicians in India had not been men "noted for total commitment to any cause" and once Pakistan had been achieved the "struggle for power within the League was pursued by all sorts of dubious means."¹

Jinnah, as Governor-General and President of the Muslim League, made no real attempt to institutionalise parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. Although the Pakistan Cabinet was meant to be responsible to a Constituent Assembly, which was both the constitution-making body and the Parliament, the Assembly had very little effective power.² While it is claimed that Governor-General Jinnah exercised unchallenged authority in the government,³ Jinnah's illness, combined with the enormous internal and external problems facing Pakistan, forced him to delegate more and more of the considerable powers he possessed. Instead of conferring those powers on his Cabinet and on Parliament, Jinnah chose to delegate his authority to the bureaucracy.

Unlike the inexperienced politicians, the bureaucracy in Pakistan was well versed in the tasks of administration. "The politicians", states an authoritative source, "lacking party and political programmes started depending on civil servants for guidance."⁴ Guidance had already been provided by bureaucrats, later to opt for Pakistan, in the pre-partition negotiations of questions such as the division of assets, and in independent Pakistan the dependence of the politicians on the bureaucracy grew even further.

The Pakistan bureaucracy had inherited its structure from its

predecessor, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), part of the "Steel Frame" of the British Indian Empire. The ICS, the small tightly-knit elite group at the very top of the Indian bureaucratic hierarchy, had been granted special privileges by the British and kept aloof from the native population and its aspirations. Serving a colonial power, the ICS was contemptuous of politicians,⁵ and exercised considerable administrative powers. But while the ICS was ultimately responsible to the British Secretary of State, under Jinnah the Muslim League Cabinets and political machinery "were handed over to the control of governors and bureaucrats."⁶ The autonomy of the bureaucracy grew as the administrative problems facing the new state multiplied, making it more and more difficult for the inexperienced politicians to cope, and thereby increasing their dependence on the bureaucrats.

The Muslim League politicians were even more inexperienced in the fields of defence and foreign policy, as these had remained the sole prerogative of the British colonial government until 1947. This inexperience was to have a particular significance for all aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy, including Pakistan-Soviet relations.

The events pertaining to partition were to have a considerable impact on the other half of the "Steel Frame" of the British Indian Empire, the Armed Forces. Despite British opposition to a division of the military in India, Muslim League and Congress pressure led to the decision to hand over operational control of the British Indian Army by 15 August 1947. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee was set up, under Field Marshal Auchinleck, to recommend an equitable

division of the personnel and assets of the British Indian Army.⁷ It was decided that the division of manpower would take place on a communal basis, while the division of assets was set at one-third of the joint stock for Pakistan and the remainder for India.

The disputes over the division of assets remained for the Pakistan military a source of major grievance against India. Most of undivided India's military depots, as well as all of the ordnance factories, were on what was now Indian soil. While the question of the division of stores remained unsettled, the Supreme Commander's Office, responsible for carrying out the inter-Dominion moves of personnel and stores closed down on 30 November 1947 (instead of April 1948) under Indian pressure.⁸ The Indian government promised to deliver Pakistan its just share of the assets, but the Pakistan military claim that ". . . very few of these warlike stores ever reached Pakistan."⁹

Although the division of manpower posed fewer difficulties, the Pakistan Army was confronted with serious problems of reconstitution and reorganisation. Most of the military's training establishments were in India, and the lack of all-Muslim combat units meant that Muslim elements had to be separated and reconstituted.¹⁰ Pakistan was also faced with an acute shortage of officers, especially in the higher and technical ranks since Hindus, particularly Bengalis and South Indians, had dominated the Indian component in the Officer Corps.

While the Pakistan Armed Forces were in the midst of reorganisation and reconstitution, the traumas of partition placed heavy responsibilities on them. The communal rioting in India and Pakistan

had led to the mass movement of refugees into both countries. When the Punjab Boundary Force, set up by the Partition Council, failed to provide adequate protection to the refugees, it was disbanded and its duties handed over to the Pakistan and Indian Armed Forces. Thus the Pakistan Armed Forces in their very earliest days not only escorted and protected Muslim refugees but also acquired administrative responsibilities, managing refugee camps in Sind and the Punjab and assisting the civil administration in restoring law and order in the disturbed areas.¹¹

Hence the circumstances attendant on the gaining of independence, including differences with India over the division of military and economic assets, combined with the disputes over territories, were to lead to the emergence of "perennial militarism" in Pakistan, that is, the predominance of military over civilian factors in its internal and external relations.¹²

Pakistan's Strategic Perceptions and the Soviet Union

The British had strongly opposed the division of the British Indian Army since it was felt that it would leave the Subcontinent vulnerable and defenceless against any threat from the North. Hence the British Prime Minister, Mr Attlee, instructed the last British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, to emphasise to the Indian leadership the necessity of ensuring that the transfer of power was effected with full regard to the defence requirements of India and the avoidance of any "break in the continuity of the Indian Army" and of maintaining the organisation of defence on an all Indian basis.¹³ The British

hopes for a united Indo-Pakistan defence force were unrealised; partition inevitably meant the division of the Armed Forces.

In undivided India, the areas which now constituted Pakistan were considered particularly important in British strategic perceptions. While British sea power had controlled the security of India's coastal approaches, the land frontiers in the north were, in British thinking, vulnerable to external intervention. Moreover, the North West Frontier had been considered "not only the frontier of India" but "an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole Empire".¹⁴ It was here that the British were involved in their Great Game with the Russian Empire. After the revolution in Russia, the British were equally concerned about communist penetration in India and the possibilities of Indian nationalists appealing to the USSR for help.¹⁵

As partition grew closer, the British emphasised the importance of an indivisible defence of the Subcontinent from "threats from the North".¹⁶ The British concept of joint defence in the Subcontinent had equal relevance to British policies in the Middle East and the Far East since the united Indian Army had "played a vital role in defending British interests" in these areas and had, in fact, been "the main instrument of power in the hands of the British in the Indian Ocean."¹⁷ The British continued to impress the same strategic perceptions upon the leadership of Pakistan even after the Armed Forces of united India had been divided and came under the autonomous control of the two Dominions.¹⁸

The Muslim League politicians, belonging to the Muslim elite of India, were largely conservative in their political outlook and a number of them had close links with the British colonial government.¹⁹ They were, therefore, predisposed towards the West and distrustful of the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union, an unknown entity, was perceived as a potential threat, the political leadership of Pakistan was equally antagonistic towards communism as an internal or external force. Before partition, the Muslim League leaders therefore accepted British perceptions of the need for the united defence of the Subcontinent against the threat from the North, with Jinnah envisaging an "alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan in the mutual interests of both and against any aggressive outsiders", at the same time referring to a potential Soviet threat to the proposed state of Pakistan.²⁰

The Pakistan military and civil bureaucracies, with their common British heritage, training and traditions, were even less ambiguous about their ideological affiliations and external orientations. The bureaucracy, descended from the colonial civil service, remained staunchly pro-Western. Key posts in the bureaucracy, including three of the four provincial Governorships, continued to be manned by British officials. Relations between the Pakistan bureaucrats and Britain remained cordial while the bureaucrats mistrusted the Soviet Union and looked towards the West for support. Internally too, the Pakistani bureaucrats clamped down on communist activities from the very beginning.

The Pakistan military, even more than the bureaucracy, remained

closely linked with its parent institution. The Pakistan Army was an "ex-colonial army",²¹ which retained its colonial ties. Due to the acute shortage of an indigenous Officer Corps and training institutions, a large number of British officers were retained in senior and technical positions, including the first Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force.²² After partition the Pakistani officers, like their predecessors in the British Indian Army, were sent to training institutions in the UK, USA and Commonwealth countries. Since the British had "ruled the subcontinent long enough to perpetuate at the higher level a particular military thinking"²³ and since the higher policy making levels were under direct British control, the military was inclined to accept British strategic perceptions of the Soviet Union.²⁴ It was perceived that Pakistan had inherited the traditional role of the defence of the north-western approaches of India.²⁵ It was also felt that immediately after partition, Pakistan was faced with a confrontationist India on the East, a hostile Afghanistan on the West while beyond Afghanistan lay Russia from where "the menace of Communism was staring" Pakistan "in the face."²⁶

Pakistan's strategic perceptions did, however, undergo a certain change in the initial years of independence. While British strategic perceptions of the Soviet Union were accepted, the increased hostility towards India in the aftermath of partition led to an increasing focus of Pakistan's foreign and defence policies on India, and an abandonment of the possibilities of joint defence. The hostility towards the Soviet Union remained, but Pakistani military strategists and defence experts considered the Soviets only a

potential and not an immediate threat.²⁷ Pakistan's downgrading of the threat from the North was obvious in the strategies adopted after independence. Despite the antagonism shown by neighbouring Afghanistan, advocating the cause of "Pathanistan",²⁸ the Pakistan government continued to centre its attention on events on the country's eastern and not western, frontiers.

Downplaying a potential Afghan and Soviet threat from the North, the Pakistan government abandoned the Forward Policy pursued by the British in the tribal areas. While the government continued the previous British policy of paying subsidies to the tribes and respecting tribal customs, it withdrew its troops from garrisons in North and South Waziristan,²⁹ and handed over control of the tribal belt to civil armed forces, under the guidance of regular Army personnel. The withdrawal was dictated by military concerns; it "made available the units so urgently needed for the reorganization of the army on an operational basis, and gave the army the operational flexibility it required."³⁰ The under-manned and under-equipped army prepared itself to meet what it regarded as its real foe, India, while it perceived no real threat on the northern approaches from either the Soviet Union or Afghanistan.

Soviet Perceptions of Pakistan

Pakistan-Soviet relations were bound to begin on a cool note as the country's pro-Western leadership was not inclined to make overtures to the nearby Soviet Union.³¹ The Muslim League leadership, even prior to independence, made clear future directions for the country's

foreign policy, which were quite different from those of India. In the Interim government, the then Foreign Minister Pandit Nehru decided to exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union on 14 April 1947.³² However not only did the Muslim League representative in the Interim government, Liaquat Ali Khan, oppose the move, but the Pakistan government after independence made no immediate attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

On their part, the Soviets were equally distrustful of the Muslim League leadership, had serious misgivings about the future regional role of the newly independent country, and adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards Pakistan. The Soviet attitude in fact reflected their analysis of the Indian freedom movement and demand for Pakistan. Before independence, the Soviets had attributed Hindu-Muslim tensions in India to the British imperialist policy of divide-and-rule, and denounced the Muslim League as a reactionary communal organisation, dependent on the British for survival.³³ Although the end of the Second World War saw the Soviets preoccupied with Eastern European affairs and problems of internal economic reconstruction, with little attention being paid to the Subcontinent, acceptance of the Mountbatten plan by the Muslim League and Congress and the subsequent partition of India led to increased Soviet criticism.

Soviet commentators denounced the Mountbatten plan as "a manoeuvre of British imperialism,"³⁴ designed to perpetuate their control over the Subcontinent, "inspired by the tried and tested maxim of British imperialism 'Divide and Rule'" and alleged that the

granting of Dominion status to Pakistan and India "was with the same old purpose - to perpetuate British rule."³⁵

Soviet analysts claimed that partition was bound to lead to a perpetuation of British political and economic interests in Pakistan, since its economy was dominated by British monopolies. The visible British presence there was considered as proof of Pakistan's continued military, political and economic dependence on Britain. "A large number of generals and higher officials in the Army were British nationals", pointed out one Soviet analyst, as were a majority of Provincial Governors and civil servants who played "a prominent part in the administration"³⁶ of Pakistan. It was also felt that in the Pakistani internal political environment, "reactionary elements" were "stronger than in Hindustan."³⁷

Despite misgivings about the nature of the Pakistani state and the political orientation of its leadership, the Soviets made a number of friendly overtures towards Pakistan. In September 1947, the Soviet Union voted in favour of Pakistan's admission to the UN, and in November 1947 it favoured Pakistan's inclusion in the list of countries to be consulted on the proposed peace treaty with Germany. Pakistan's response was, however, cool and indifferent. This was Pakistan's foreign policy outlook when it embarked upon its adventure in Kashmir in 1947-48, which was to influence both the country's internal and external policies.

The Kashmir Episode

On the eve of independence, uprisings began in Muslim majority areas in Kashmir, where the Hindu Maharajah was attempting to gain independence and to resist pressures to accede to India or Pakistan. The Muslim League government of Pakistan decided to force the Maharajah's hand by sending tribesmen from the Frontier Province into Kashmir.³⁸ Although the Pakistan government denied Indian accusations of complicity in the tribal invasion and of the involvement of regular Pakistani troops in Kashmir,³⁹ the invasion gave the Indian government the opportunity to obtain the Instrument of Accession from the Maharajah on 27 October and send its forces into Kashmir.

By April 1948, the Indian military strength in Kashmir had grown, while Pakistan had failed to find a favourable solution of the dispute in international forums and the invasion had come to a halt on the outskirts of Srinagar.

The government therefore openly sent regular troops into Kashmir in April and by July there were over three Pakistani brigades in the disputed territory. But Pakistan was not militarily in a position to make any substantive gains in Kashmir, as it had an Army of 55,000 against an Indian Army of 200,000, and faced serious deficiencies of equipment, since the ordnance factories and military stores of the British Indian Army lay in what was now Indian territory, and with the start of the Kashmir conflict the Indian government had halted the supply of Pakistan's share of military hardware.⁴⁰ Nor was the

Pakistan government able to augment its scarce military resources by acquiring equipment from abroad. The Treasury had "not yet taken full stock of our ready foreign exchange and we had little with which to go to the open world market to make cash purchases of arms and ammunition . . ." states one military source,⁴¹ while the UK threatened to withdraw British personnel in the Pakistan Armed Forces.⁴² An escalation of the conflict was therefore to be avoided at all costs, while the Pakistan government, at the same time, made desperate attempts to find a peaceful solution of the conflict. The negotiations finally proved fruitful and a ceasefire was ordered in Kashmir from 1 January 1949.⁴³

The Kashmir conflict was to have a considerable effect on the military's understanding of its internal and external roles in the state. Firstly, the Kashmir war increased the military's hostility towards India, and it was felt that the Indians, by seizing Kashmir, had taken the first step on a policy of dismembering Pakistan.⁴⁴ Secondly, the war greatly enhanced the military's position in the state as guardian of the country's borders against the Indian threat. It created greater awareness within the Administration and the military of the need to strengthen the Armed Forces by increasing defence spending. Finally and most importantly, the conduct of the entire operation increased the military's distrust of the ability of the country's politicians to run Pakistan's defence and foreign policies effectively.

The political leadership's decision to send in the tribesmen, with limited military support, had not produced the desired results of

forcing the Maharajah's hand or pressuring India, and the international community to accept the right of the Kashmiris to accede to Pakistan. It had, on the contrary, given India the opportunity to intervene militarily and obtain the accession of a state with a Muslim majority. The Pakistan government had not properly assessed the implications of its decision to intervene. The country was not in a position to confront India in the first year of its existence. The military was weak, disorganised and nowhere near the Indian military in strength and equipment.⁴⁵ The move had endangered not only Pakistan's stand on Kashmir but the country's security as a whole. Conduct of the war had proved disastrous. According to a senior Pakistani military official, there was "complete ignorance about the business of anything in the nature of military operations".⁴⁶ In the military's perceptions the troops in Kashmir were handicapped by "political considerations"⁴⁷ in every conceivable way. The military was poorly equipped, kept under-strength and denied the facilities it badly needed, including artillery and air support in the earlier stages.

There are differences in the military's interpretation of the conclusion of the conflict. Certain senior military commanders claim that the military's admirable performance in the field, especially in the first and only large-scale Pakistani offensive in December, would have led to a decisive victory, had not the government accepted a ceasefire in Kashmir.⁴⁸ Other military accounts, including the interview of an Air Commodore involved in the operation, state that the military was never on the brink of a breakthrough and that in the "absence of military supplies from

outside, our stocks of ammunition would have lasted our Army hardly a fortnight of open clash with India and that too on the Kashmir front only."⁴⁹ All military accounts, however, agree that the conduct of the government and civil administration let down not only the military but the entire country.⁵⁰ There were also factions within the military unhappy over the ceasefire and restrictions on offensive action. The military made its bitterness known to the Pakistan government⁵¹ but was repeatedly assured that justice would be obtained in international forums.⁵² When the hopes of a plebiscite in Kashmir came to naught, the military's feelings of being let down by the political leadership intensified.

The Beginnings of a Relationship

Jinnah's government also began to set the course of Pakistan's external policy outside the regional context. In their first foreign policy declarations the Pakistan leaders emphasised their decision not to take sides with either the Eastern or Western blocs, with Governor-General Jinnah declaring that "Our foreign policy is one of friendship and goodwill towards all the nations of the world"⁵³ ,and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stating that Pakistan had started "its career without any narrow or special commitments and without any prejudices in the international sphere. Whatever conflict of ideologies there may be between certain other nations, Pakistan is not concerned with them and will not take sides."⁵⁴ Yet the preferences of the Muslim League leaders were clear, nor were there any indications that Pakistan would opt for neutralism in the Cold War. Even before partition, Jinnah said that, "Naturally no nation

stands by herself. There will be an alliance with other nations whose interests are common."⁵⁵

Pakistan therefore embarked on a foreign policy which was hostile in tone and content to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The first overtures made by the Pakistani leadership in the international arena were to the West, calling on the UK and the USA for political, economic and military support, and trying to convince them that a weak Pakistan would lay open the entire Subcontinent to Soviet expansionism. A militarily strengthened Pakistan, they argued, would, on the other hand, be in a position to serve as a bastion of the Free World against the communist bloc. Thus, for example, in approaches to the US in 1947 and early 1948 for military and economic assistance, Pakistani officials claimed that the "burden of protecting India had been placed on Pakistan, at least the burden of protecting the Northwestern Frontier, which is the only possible source of danger", and that: "In its external and defence policy . . . the proximity and vulnerability of Western Pakistan to Russia is the most dominant factor . . . If Pakistan yielded to any external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility." They added that Islamic Pakistan, which was strongly opposed to communist Russia, "must be ready, decisively, to do what it could to bar the path should Russia decide to move South", but this would not be possible without the assistance of the UK and the USA.⁵⁶

The Pakistan government escalated its efforts to acquire Western diplomatic, defence and economic assistance with the outbreak of the Kashmir conflict, which exposed the glaring deficiencies of the

Pakistan military. The Pakistanis continued to stress the Soviet threat to the Subcontinent which only a strengthened Pakistan under a pro-Western leadership could effectively meet. While Jinnah informed US officials in Pakistan about the "activities" of Soviet agents in Kalat and Gilgit, the Pakistan UN representative, Zafrulla Khan, warned his British and American counterparts that a lack of Western support for Pakistan could possibly lead to the present pro-Western government being "swept away" with the new Ministers going "over to Russia". That would provide an opening to the Soviets which would "leave India defenceless if the Russians crossed the Khyber Pass into Kashmir."⁵⁷

Pakistan's overtures proved futile since the UK was not inclined to side with Pakistan against India.⁵⁸ Nor were the Americans interested in providing Pakistan's defence requirements, since South Asia was an area of low priority in US global policy and regarded as a British responsibility. Both USA and UK equally adopted a neutral approach to the Kashmir conflict. The UK curtailed the supply of military equipment to both India and Pakistan and threatened to withdraw its officers in both armies in the event of an all-out war between them, while the US imposed an informal arms embargo on both.

Frustrated in their attempts to convince the West of the need to provide Pakistan with diplomatic, military and economic assistance, the Pakistan Government now decided to resort to another pressure tactic, by moving to improve its relations with the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ Therefore, Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan on 13 April 1948 proposed

an exchange of Ambassadors to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York.

The Soviet Union was concerned about the policy directions of the Pakistan Government. In view of the overt bias of the Pakistani leadership towards the West and their continuing defence and economic links with Britain, the Soviets accused Pakistan of entering into secret pacts with the Anglo-American bloc. Soviet commentators claimed that the "leaders of the . . . Muslim League are becoming tools of the imperialists"⁶⁰ and that "Pakistan is being converted into a British bridgehead in the East, into a second Transjordan of enormous dimensions."⁶¹ Referring to the continued existence of British bases on Pakistani soil, the Soviets charged Pakistan with providing the bases in return for military equipment, claimed to be anxious about the militaristic policies of the Pakistan government, which they alleged were increasing regional tensions, and attributed Pakistani hostility towards India to a "ploy" by which the "ruling circles" in Pakistan retained "their influence on the masses with the help of Pan-Islamic and anti-Hindustan demagogy."⁶² The Soviets were, however, keen to establish cordial relations with Pakistan because of its strategic location and concern over the extension of American influence so near the Soviet southern borders. They were particularly apprehensive about the opportunities the Kashmir dispute presented the Western powers to intervene in the area. It was alleged that "Anglo-American strategists aimed to convert Kashmir into a link in the chain of military bases with which they are doing their best to surround the Soviet Union."⁶³ The Soviets therefore welcomed the Pakistani

overture and the two governments exchanged notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 May 1948. The Soviet Union expressed interest in the development of economic ties with Pakistan, offering liberal terms of trade, and in October 1948, accepted a Pakistani order for 30,000 tons of wheat to meet deficiencies arising from floods in West Punjab, Sind and East Bengal.⁶⁴ They also reportedly expressed their desire to open a Consulate in the NWFP capital of Peshawar.⁶⁵

Governor-General Jinnah died on 11 September 1948. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan decided to remain at his post and Khawaja Nazimuddin was appointed Governor-General. Liaquat continued Jinnah's policy of emphasising the acquisition of Western diplomatic, military and economic support, with little interest shown in improving the country's relations with the Soviet Union. The Liaquat government publicly and privately called on the Western powers to acknowledge Pakistan's strategic position and its desire to play a part in bolstering the Free World against Soviet expansionism. This policy was taken a step further by a highlighting of Pakistan's linkages with the Middle Eastern countries and a call on the Americans to strengthen "the Muslim countries between Cairo and Karachi", both economically and militarily, which Liaquat said had "an important part to play in the struggle against Communism."⁶⁶ The Pakistan Government also pointed out that it was in Western interests to strengthen Pakistan which "in a period of emergency . . . can form a base both for military and air operations."⁶⁷

Liaquat on the one hand complained of the "stepmotherly treatment"

given to Pakistan by the UK and the Commonwealth, warning that "should there be no reorientation of their policy towards Pakistan, Pakistan will necessarily have to reorient her policy towards them,"⁶⁸ but on the other linked Pakistan's urgent need for arms with "the communist threat in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia" and Pakistan's desire "to play our proper part in any general emergency."⁶⁹

There was some change in both UK policies and American thinking towards Pakistan, with Great Britain now calling upon the Americans to concentrate on the Muslim areas of the Middle East and to meet some of Pakistan's more acute military deficiencies,⁷⁰ while the American military establishment pointed out the possibility of the "Karachi-Lahore area in Pakistan" becoming "under certain conditions . . . a base for air operations against central USSR and . . . a staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil areas."⁷¹ But the British were still concerned about the need for neutrality on Indo-Pakistan issues⁷² and the Americans considered India "the natural political and economic centre of South Asia." Hence "aid given to the peripheral countries would have to be adapted to conditions in India."⁷³ The Americans therefore, issued an invitation to the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, to visit the US in October 1949.

British and American indifference, combined with the clear preference being shown to India by the Americans led the Pakistan government, once again, to attempt to pressure the West by turning towards the East. The Liaquat government began to react positively

to Soviet gestures of friendship, and a number of Soviet-Pakistan exchanges took place in 1949. In August, the Soviet Union sent a trade delegation to Karachi to negotiate a trade agreement with Pakistan. As "industrial and commercial circles in Pakistan" declared that "the sphere of Russo-Pakistan trade can be considerably widened",⁷⁴ the pro-Government daily Dawn commented: "The Russo-Pakistan trade agreement, now nearly accomplished, would mark a bright era of trade and commerce between the two countries."⁷⁵ In the cultural sphere, a delegation of Soviet writers attended the Conference of Pakistani Progressive Writers in Lahore in November, and, addressing a public meeting in Karachi said that their tour had removed some of the wrong impressions created by the "enemies of peace".⁷⁶

On 8 June 1949, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan, announced that Liaquat had accepted a Soviet invitation to visit Moscow. He would thus become the first Commonwealth Head of Government to visit the Soviet Union. Complaining of the lack of support from the West, Liaquat declared that his intended visit was "a friendly visit to a neighbouring country", expressed the hope that it would benefit both countries and added, "Pakistan cannot afford to wait. She must take her friends where she finds them."⁷⁷

There was great public support within Pakistan for the government's decision.⁷⁸ The news media highlighted the event, with the daily Dawn calling it "a personal triumph" for the Prime Minister, adding that: "This gesture by the leaders of Soviet Russia . . . is a recognition of the unique position which Pakistan has come to occupy

in the short span of less than two years."⁷⁹

Neither the US nor the UK believed that the invitation or its acceptance would lead to a change in Pakistani foreign policy orientations and both interpreted it as an attempt by Liaquat to pressure the West and to gain domestic support. There was growing opposition within the country to the Liaquat government's pro-Western foreign policy, which had failed to achieve any of its objectives, including support on the Kashmir issue.⁸⁰ Opposition to the domestic policy of the Muslim League government, from both within and without the ruling party, was also on the increase. "Abuses abound in the Muslim League", wrote a well known Muslim League worker, "They are the abuses of inaction and confusion. The best have no work to do, the worst have no check which restrains, no test which selects . . . Today . . . the League has become a thin veil behind which tribalism, personal factionalism and unprincipled groupings flourish without check . . ."⁸¹ The Soviet invitation gave the Prime Minister an opportunity to deflect the criticism of subservience to the West and focus attention away from the growing discontent at home.

The government's actions, following the announcement of the Soviet invitation, were to confirm the Western interpretation. For example, it delayed the exchange of ambassadors; ⁸² not until 31 December 1949 did Pakistan's first Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Shoaib Qureshi, present his credentials in Moscow. In November 1949, the Pakistan Foreign Office announced the appointment of Ivan Nikolaevich Bakulin, a former Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, as

Ambassador to Pakistan, but for undisclosed reasons Bakulin was not to take up his appointment and on 15 March 1950 Alexander Stetsenko was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan.⁸³

Pakistan was unlikely to change the direction of its foreign policy, not only because of the pro-Western leanings of its leadership but also because of the growing role of its bureaucracy in foreign policy making. The members of Pakistan's superior civil service, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), maintained close links with Britain after independence and had started making overtures to both the US and UK independently of the Muslim League government.⁸⁴ The concept of accountability of the bureaucracy to the Cabinet was not institutionalised under either Jinnah or Liaquat, and as the Muslim League's hold over the country weakened the influence of the bureaucrats grew even more pervasive. The CSP had "little patience with politicians" and "were quick to establish their presence at the head of the decision-making process when the politicians became bogged down in internecine conflict."⁸⁵ Amongst the most powerful of the serving and retired bureaucrats who exercised considerable influence in foreign policy making were the Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed, formerly from the Department of Finance and Audits and Accounts in united India, Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan, previously a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Secretary-General to the Government of Pakistan, who had held several posts, including the post of Financial Adviser, War and Supply, in the British Raj.⁸⁶

After the announcement of the Prime Minister's intention to visit the

Soviet Union, both the Pakistani political leadership and the bureaucracy continued to seek assurances of support from the West, with Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah and Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza visiting the US in 1949. Ghulam Mohammed also approached both the US and the UK, to probe the former for an invitation for the Pakistan Prime Minister to visit, and to call on the British to provide a Commonwealth guarantee of Pakistan's security against any potential threat from India.

While the British took the stand that the "Commonwealth was not built on the assumption that one member might conceivably fight against one another"⁸⁷ and hence the question of such a guarantee did not arise, the American response was more positive. In the wake of the communist victory in China and the first Soviet atomic explosion, the US had wanted to build up India, with its great size and potential, as a counter to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Prime Minister Nehru's visit in October 1949, however, proved a disappointment, due to his emphasis on non-alignment and reluctance to involve India in the Cold War. The Americans therefore decided to explore the Pakistani option and in December 1949 President Truman extended an invitation to Liaquat to visit the US in May 1950. The Pakistanis were convinced that their policy of using the Soviet card to pressure the West had succeeded. "Your acceptance of the invitation to visit Moscow was a masterpiece in strategy", wrote Pakistan's Ambassador in the United States, M.A.H. Ispahani, to Liaquat, "overnight Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and consideration of the US government."⁸⁸

During his visit to the US, Liaquat Ali Khan did not openly call for Pakistan's alignment with the West in the Cold War, but made several references to Pakistan's "strategic importance in relation to the oil-bearing areas of the Middle East", controlling the "mountain passes through which the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent had been invaded ninety times in the past centuries."⁸⁹ Liaquat drew attention to Pakistan's "commitment" to democracy and said that communism was unlikely to flourish in Islamic Pakistan. He called on American businessmen to invest in Pakistan, stating that "democracy" and the "right of private ownership" were "matters of faith" to Pakistanis.⁹⁰ His country, he said, had extended "her hand of friendship to the freedom-loving people of the world" and he expressed the hope that Pakistan and America would become comrades in the "noble task of maintaining peace and in translating the great constructive dreams of democracy into reality."⁹¹

The Prime Minister held talks with US Defence Secretary Johnson, in which he requested assistance for Pakistan's Armed Forces.⁹² Addressing a press conference, Liaquat said that defence spending was a heavy burden on Pakistan and the size of the Pakistan Army would depend "on this great country of yours", adding that: "If your country can guarantee our territorial integrity, I will not keep any army at all."⁹³ He also called for US support for a Commonwealth guarantee for both India and Pakistan.⁹⁴ Proceeding to Canada, he emphasised the fact that Pakistan was the guardian of the Khyber Pass, the traditional invasion route to India, and pointed out that he had no knowledge of the strength of the Soviet forces, stationed a few miles away from the Pass since "they (the Soviets) have not

given me any intimation," implying the presence of such forces in Afghanistan. ⁹⁵

While Liaquat tried his best to align his country with the West, the Americans, unsure of his domestic position, were more interested in first assessing the leanings of the future Pakistani Commander-in-Chief (since the British C-in-C General Gracey's term was coming to an end) before making any definite commitments to strengthen Pakistan militarily.⁹⁶

Developments Within the Military

The political scene in Pakistan was tense as the Muslim League Government under Liaquat made no attempts to institutionalise parliamentary democracy. The Constituent Assembly remained powerless and constitution making was ignored, as well as the principle of Cabinet responsibility to the Parliament.⁹⁷ As dissent grew both inside and outside the Muslim League, opposition parties such as the Awami Muslim League and the Azad Pakistan Party emerged. Liaquat's response was to depict all opposition to his government as treasonable and unpatriotic. Condemning the mushroom growth of political parties, Liaquat reminded the Pakistani people of their duty to strengthen the Muslim League as that would mean making Pakistan strong.⁹⁸ Denouncing opposition leaders as "dogs let loose by the enemies of Pakistan",⁹⁹ Liaquat tried to crush the growing opposition by the use of instruments such as the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act or PRODA.¹⁰⁰

While the political infighting preoccupying the government provided the bureaucracy the opportunity to strengthen its position within the central government, discontent was also on the increase within the Armed Forces. The heritage of the Pakistan military was that of the British Indian Army, which had been kept strictly apart from the nationalist movement in India till the years immediately preceding partition. Only when the decision for partition had been taken did the Muslim officers switch their allegiance to Pakistan.¹⁰¹ Since the newly established Pakistan Armed Forces had "no real knowledge of the personalities involved" in the political struggle, states one military authority, "the politicians were largely an unknown quantity to us as we were to them".¹⁰² That the military's loyalties to the country's political leadership had developed only very late in the day would have a significant impact on civil-military relations.

The Pakistan military also inherited the British concept of a division of responsibilities in the state into two separate spheres, the military and the civil, with the ultimate control of the military lying in responsible civil hands. Recruitment to the British Indian Army moreover, had been mainly from the most conservative segments of Indian society and the most politically backward areas of the country. This did not, however, mean that the military in India had no political role to play. In the early years of the British Indian Empire, military representatives had governed the country, and even at the time of independence the Commander-in-Chief was the executive head of the Armed Forces and a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council. The military in Pakistan was, therefore, both aware of the previous military roles in governance

and conscious of the responsibilities of civil and military leaders in fulfilling their respective roles in the state.¹⁰³

When the new state came into existence, ambitious military officers were anxious to provide guidance to the political leadership and assume a greater role than the political government desired. A senior military officer, on one occasion, complained to Governor-General Jinnah that, "instead of giving us the opportunity to serve our country in positions where our natural talents and native genius could be used to the greatest advantage, important posts are being entrusted to foreigners This was not our understanding of how Pakistan would be run". Jinnah retorted that the Armed Forces were "the servants of the people", they did "not make national policy. It is we, the civilians who decide these issues. . ."¹⁰⁴ Addressing the Staff College on another occasion, Jinnah expressed his concern over the attitude of "one or two very high-ranking officers", pointing out that the Officer Corps should ". . . study the Government of India Act (of 1935) as adopted for use in Pakistan, which is our present constitution, that the executive authority flows from the head of the Government of Pakistan who is the Governor-General, and therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the executive head."¹⁰⁵

Yet another British heritage which was to have serious implications for civil-military relations in Pakistan was the use of the military for 'aid-to-civil' operations. The British had frequently used the military in India to control internal disturbances. Their role in

aid-to-civil operations during the nationalist movement for independence created in the military a contempt for politicians, from both the Muslim League and the Congress.¹⁰⁶ Under the British, however, aid-to-civil operations were conducted under a strictly controlled procedure, whereby the military operated under the civilian control of the colonial government.

This distaste for politicians and political disorder was inherited by the Pakistan Army, and reinforced by the events following partition. The newly formed Pakistan Armed Forces were as averse as their parent body to the use of the military for aid-to-civil, particularly law-enforcing, duties. Yet the military was frequently called upon by the government in the early years to put down domestic unrest and opposition. In addition to its role in assisting the administration in the wake of the refugee crisis and communal violence,¹⁰⁷ the military was used in 1948 to force the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan and to prevent a police mutiny in Dacca, to maintain law and order during riots in Karachi in January and July 1949 and in Dacca in 1950.

The military deeply resented its increasing deployment in aid-to-civil duties.¹⁰⁸ This frequent use of the military by the civil government to maintain internal security increased the government's dependence on the military on the one hand, and on the other led the military to contrast its own strengths with the government's weaknesses. After the first couple of years of reconstruction and reorganisation the military was now a cohesive force, contrasting its professionalism, discipline and orderly outlook with the growing

divisiveness, corruption and nepotism within the ranks of the Muslim League government.¹⁰⁹

In September 1950, Lt. General Mohammad Ayub Khan was nominated the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army and took over on 17 January 1951. Ayub's appointment was unexpected, since he was neither the most senior Pakistani officer nor the most outstanding.¹¹⁰

The appointment seems to have been made on political grounds, since Prime Minister Liaquat and Defence Secretary Lt. Col. Iskander Mirza were aware of the growing unrest in the Armed Forces. Ayub was a friend and contemporary of Mirza's at Sandhurst,¹¹¹ and appeared to his sponsors a compliant and unambitious officer.¹¹²

Ayub Khan was, however, neither devoid of political ambitions nor the willing and compliant officer he appeared to the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary. His political ambitions and his distrust of politicians, which had been reinforced by the events of partition, were to play a crucial part in Pakistan's domestic politics. During his tenure as GOC East Pakistan, Ayub became even more convinced of the ineptitude of the politicians, expressing the opinion that the Pakistani provincial government was "politically weak and unstable" faced with "gigantic" problems which "pygmies" were trying to solve.¹¹³ When Ayub was appointed C-in-C, the promotion gave him the chance of advancing his ambitions. During September 1950, he visited the UK, where he told a fellow officer that: "This Army has a much greater and wider role to play than people realise. The C-in-C,

in fact, is a much more important man than the P.M. (Prime Minister) in our country as the situation stands today . . ."114 Ayub's interaction as C-in-C with the Muslim League government increased his contempt for the politicians. "The affairs of the Muslim League . . . were in a mess", said the C-in-C, "The Muslim League High Command and the Working Committee were controlled by a small coterie of men and the party had no organisational structure", while Karachi was "a hot bed of intrigues" and the "malaise in the political and administrative life of Pakistan was becoming painful."115

A few months after Ayub took over office, Prime Minister, Liaquat, announced an attempt by dissatisfied factions within the military to overthrow the civil government.

The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case

On 9 March 1951, Liaquat announced the discovery of a conspiracy involving military personnel and civilians to overthrow the government, including the Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army, Major General Akbar Khan, Brigadier Latif and the Pakistan Times Editor, Faiz Ahmed Faiz. The Prime Minister said that the "aim of the conspiracy was to create commotion in the country by violent means and, in furtherance of that purpose, to subvert the loyalty of Pakistan's defence forces."116 The initial arrests were followed by several others, including those of the Director of Personnel, Royal Pakistan Air Force, Air Commodore M.K. Janjua, and Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) Secretary-General, Sajjad Zaheer, with the government now claiming a "communist hand" in the unsuccessful

plot.¹¹⁷

On 21 March 1951, Liaquat Ali told the Constituent Assembly that the Rawalpindi conspirators had planned to bring the country "under a military dictatorship, when the existing authorities, both civil and military had been eliminated." The plan was to set up a government "patterned on the Communist model, but under military domination", with the assistance of "economic and constitution-making missions" which were "to be invited from a certain foreign country", implying the Soviet Union.¹¹⁸

Little evidence was produced by the government to prove a communist connection, or even the existence of a conspiracy. The trials of the accused were held in camera under the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (Special Tribunal) Act 1951.¹¹⁹ The "ringleader", Chief of General Staff, Major General Akbar Khan, had played a prominent role in the Kashmir operations of 1947, and had been dissatisfied with the government's policy on Kashmir. All of the other military personnel involved had also served on the Kashmir front. Akbar Khan was also reportedly unhappy about Ayub's appointment as C-in-C, though this motivation was strongly rejected by the Pakistan government.¹²⁰ Akbar Khan later disclosed that a meeting had been held at his residence in Rawalpindi on 23 February, where he had proposed that the government be dismissed and a caretaker government, under an "advisory military council", be set up, consisting of all the Generals, which would hold general elections on the basis of adult franchise, frame a constitution, and adopt a more positive policy on Kashmir. This plan was discussed with certain

members of the CPP, including Secretary-General Sajjad Zaheer. But the meeting decided that "nothing was to be done by us," and these tentative plans were never put into operation.¹²¹

The CPP, formed in March 1948, under Secretary-General Zaheer, was an independent offshoot of the Communist Party of India. It had made little headway in Pakistan, particularly in the western wing, although it did have linkages with a number of trade unions, including the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions, and had sympathisers in the news media, including Pakistan Times Editor Faiz Ahmed Faiz.¹²² The anti-communist government and bureaucracy in Pakistan had placed severe curbs on the operations of the CPP from the very beginning, including anti-communist drives in 1948 and 1949. The 'threat of communism', despite the weakness of the communists within the country, became a convenient rallying cry for the Pakistan government to gain both domestic legitimacy and international support. The "communist hand" and the external "link" of the conspirators were therefore played up by the Liaquat government. Internally the "communist connection" gave the government the opportunity of arresting a number of communists, their supporters and other political opponents in mid-1951, charging them with subversive and anti-state activities. The disclosure of the 'plot' also strengthened the hand of the Prime Minister on the eve of the most important provincial elections in the Punjab, the first to be held in Pakistan and thus the first trial of strength for the Muslim League,¹²³ with the government stressing that had the conspirators been successful they "would have struck at the very foundations of our national existence and disrupted the stability of Pakistan."¹²⁴

Externally the "Soviet" connection was used in an attempt to gain Western support for the tottering government. Providing information to the US Embassy, the Pakistan government said that the conspiracy involved military officers and civilians "most of them with Commie connections", who were "actively assisted by . . . Commie elements", and after the seizure of power, the Soviet government was to be asked for assistance in "drafting a Constitution along Commie lines."¹²⁵ The Pakistan government did succeed in persuading the Americans of Soviet complicity to some extent, as can be seen in American assessments of the political aftermath of the case.¹²⁶ In its policy statement on Pakistan in July 1951, the US State Department emphasised that the increasing feeling in Pakistan for "a greater rapprochement between the USSR and Pakistan" had been "sharply reversed" because Pakistani communists had been prevented from overthrowing the government, and that the Pakistan "central government is aware of the dangers of Communism and the Pakistan Communist Party" and has "used strong measures" to curb communist activities in the country.¹²⁷

The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case had equally significant repercussions within the military. The case provided Ayub Khan and Mirza the opportunity of proving their loyalty to the West and strengthening their position internally. The investigations into the proposed "military coup to overthrow the government" were given by Liaquat Ali to them, and they reported back to him that they had "enough evidence" and proof that "an uprising had been planned."¹²⁸ While Ayub strongly denounced the plot of the "Young Turk" element

in the Armed Forces and their communist supporters, Mirza informed the US that the officers concerned wanted Pakistan to turn to the Soviet Union, and that General Akbar Khan was a "one hundred per cent communist."¹²⁹

Internally Ayub Khan was given the chance of ridding himself of potential opponents in the Armed Forces, including Akbar Khan and Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmed, another officer senior to Ayub, who had been in the running for the post of C-in-C.¹³⁰ The "results of this incident", states one military authority, "started a witch hunt and surveillance of senior officers of the Army who had any kind of standing and following . . . brother officer was encouraged to spy on brother officer." This "allowed the Senior Officers to be smeared by those in authority senior to us while claiming to do so in the service of the state."¹³¹ Ayub Khan claimed, of course, that: "We examined the antecedents of officers and got rid of the doubtful ones. We tightened up on discipline . . . I knew the cancer had been removed."¹³² Ayub thus managed to eliminate any opposition within the institution which could have hindered the fulfilment of his ambitions.

The Military, Muslim League and Defence

While the Military High Command had little regard for the political leadership's ability to manage the domestic environment, it was also to soon become disillusioned with the guidance of the politicians in defence and strategic concerns. The British Indian Army had seen itself as the sword arm of India, ensuring internal security as well

as guarding the frontiers of the country.¹³³ The Pakistan military soon acquired similar self-perceptions of its role in the state.

The politicians' inexperience in defence and foreign policy, and ignorance of military concerns, were to have a deep impact on the Armed Forces' position in the country's internal power structure. Before independence the Muslim League leaders had had little knowledge of or exposure to the military as an institution, and after partition they became too involved in internal politicking to work out an effective and sure way of institutionalising civilian control over the military.¹³⁴ This was to encourage the Pakistan military to obtain as much autonomy as possible in the early years. At the same time, the military began increasingly to resent any intervention by the civil government in defence decision making and implementation.

The Muslim League governments of Jinnah and Liaquat began to give the Armed Forces and defence concerns more and more importance, due to Pakistan's uncertain internal and external environments. Despite the country's limited economic resources more and more expenditure was earmarked for defence, and strenuous efforts made to meet the demands of the military. Military expenditure was at times "half and . . . even more of the central budget", as the table below shows, and the "original plan for an army of 125,000 men was revised upward."¹³⁵

Year	Revenue (millions of Rs)	Defence Expenditure of government of Pakistan ¹³⁶ (millions of Rs)	Defence Expenditure as % of Revenue
1947-48	198.9	154.1	77.5
1948-49	667.6	577.6	86.5
1949-50	885.4	752.2	85.0
1950-51	1,273.2	703.0	55.22

Under both Jinnah and Liaquat, frequent references were made to the importance of strengthening the country militarily.¹³⁷ From 1947 onwards, the Muslim League government also made frequent attempts both to obtain military assistance and purchases for the Armed Forces from Western countries.

The military, however, remained unimpressed by either the rhetoric or the actual policies of the Jinnah and Liaquat governments. On the contrary, it felt that the politicians were hindering rather than advancing the interests of the infant Armed Forces. These were the years of reorganisation and reconstruction of the Pakistan military and this task, says a military historian, was adversely affected by the government "always looking for a chance to scale down its expenditure on the army", citing as an example an attempt to implement a release programme, which was abandoned when tensions with India increased. "Whenever the immediate threat to Pakistan's security had passed", commented General Fazal Mueqem, "the Government would again cut the army's budget." The Army's successful reconstitution "in the face of such odds was little short of a miracle."¹³⁸

The military was equally unimpressed with the performance of the political leadership in the management of foreign policy. The Kashmir episode had on the one hand enhanced the military's ambitions for an expanded role within the state,¹³⁹ and on the other made it contemptuous of the Muslim League government's understanding of military and strategic concerns. When Indo-Pakistan relations worsened in 1950 and 1951, the government's policies were regarded as highly irresponsible by the Pakistani Military High Command as Liaquat, who was fast losing control over his party, adopted a harsh anti-Indian rhetoric as one way of regaining popularity.¹⁴⁰ The increased militancy of the Pakistan government was one of the reasons cited by the Indian leadership for its border concentration.¹⁴¹

The playing up of the Indian "threat" by the Pakistan leadership did win it a measure of domestic support.¹⁴² In the Pakistan military's thinking, however, such a course could have forced Pakistan into a war when its Armed Forces were ill-organised and ill-equipped. According to Ayub Khan, the Prime Minister "seemed tempted by the prospect of war". He told Ayub Khan: "I am tired of these alarums (sic) and excursions. Let us fight it out." Whereupon Ayub warned him that Pakistan was in no position to confront India militarily. For example, the Pakistan army had "only thirteen tanks with about forty to fifty hours engine life in them to face the Indian Army."¹⁴³ The Military High Command was also apprehensive that the jingoism of the political leadership was affecting the troops. Not "only our politicians but our troops were itching to settle accounts with India", stated Ayub. "It was my job to hold them back, which, thank

Heavens, I did."¹⁴⁴

By 1950-51, the military was also aware that the political leadership had failed in its efforts to obtain adequate assurances of security or requirements of military hardware from external sources. Although there were reports of the Pakistan military purchasing arms from Czechoslovakia and exploring the possibilities of arms acquisitions from other Soviet bloc sources,¹⁴⁵ it was but natural for the Armed Forces to look towards the West for assistance.

The senior leadership of the Pakistan Army was British, the indigenous Officer Corps had received its training at British institutions, and the practice had been continued after partition of sending its officers for higher training to British military academies. It was also dependent on the British for ammunition and spare parts. So, when a procurement machinery was set up by the Pakistan military,¹⁴⁶ attention was at first focussed on Britain, which was considered "a natural friend and ally" .¹⁴⁷ The Pakistan military was also, from the very start, to play a role, in tandem with the pro-Western political leadership and bureaucracy, in advocating a policy of alignment with the West in the Cold War.¹⁴⁸

The Pakistan Officer Corps was loyal to its British heritage and the "senior Pakistan officers themselves" were "most conscious of the debt" they owed to the British officers who made "their army possible".¹⁴⁹ The directions of the British officers at the helm of affairs were therefore to influence the external orientations of the

Pakistan military. The British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, for instance, advised his Pakistani officers to study the world picture and be fully aware of the Cold War, emphasising that: "Pakistan has a vital role to play in the future and the army must be ready to play its part."¹⁵⁰

The military joined the political leadership and bureaucracy in appealing to the UK and US to provide Pakistan with a security guarantee, while, at the same time, pressing the Western bloc to meet Pakistan's defence requirements, since it faced not only Indo-Afghan hostility but also "the uncertainty created by the attitude of Russia."¹⁵¹ C-in-C General Gracey approached both the Americans and the British to provide support to Pakistan with the outbreak of the Kashmir conflict, warning them that if "Pakistan could not get support from the 'Anglo-American block' she would have to look elsewhere to Russia." The support General Gracey requested was "an unequivocal declaration" of assistance to "the victim of aggression" in Indo-Pakistan disputes, which should take "the form of a squadron or two of modern fighter aircraft and a sufficient naval force."¹⁵²

General Gracey's approach was followed by one by the Deputy Chief C-in-C, Major-General Cawthorn, on the possibilities of Pakistani defence talks with the UK, pointing out the "strategic value" of Pakistan "in relation to naval and air defence of the Indian Ocean area", particularly "as bases for the collection of intelligence by special means." Pointing out Pakistan's status as a Muslim state in the Persian Gulf possessing "considerable political potential in

relation to British interests in the Middle East", Cawthorn said that in the event of war, "Pakistan would join the allies", and, in any case in "intelligence matters the exchange of information on Russian activities in Afghanistan and on the spread of Communism in the Middle East or Far East would . . . be of much assistance to the UK."¹⁵³ This was reiterated by Gracey, who told the UK Secretary of State that, given "some form of guarantee against aggression" and the military assistance it required, "Pakistan would . . . be ready and willing and able to supply Forces for service in other parts of the Commonwealth", for example in ". . . the Persian oil-fields in case of emergency", unlike neutral India.¹⁵⁴

The UK government noted that in Pakistan's expressed desire for participation in Middle East defence, the "military authorities" were "well ahead" of the Pakistan government, asking in return for "some quid pro quo if only training and equipment" The offer of participation had not come formally from the Pakistan government but from "military leaders" and pro-West Ministers such as Zafrulla Khan.¹⁵⁵ The British government was unable to fulfil Pakistan's defence requirements or its requests for a security guarantee, partly because of its limited resources and partly because Britain was unwilling to side with Pakistan against India. The Pakistan military therefore began to explore other Western sources and from 1949 onwards attention was increasingly focussed on the Americans, with a number of purchasing missions, including a high level military delegation in June 1949, headed by Iskander Mirza, visiting the US. Mirza's mission was ostensibly to "acquaint Pakistan defence personnel with the organization and operations of the national

military establishment and to observe the US Army and Air Force organization, training and equipment".¹⁵⁶ But in his discussions with US officials, Mirza stated that the "principal objective of his Mission was to get for Pakistan an assured source of military supplies - the United States."¹⁵⁷

By the beginning of 1951, however, the Pakistan Army's demands were only partially met. "The requirements were many and Pakistan's balance of foreign exchange poor." Moreover, some "of these ad hoc purchases were not of the desired quality and standard."¹⁵⁸

South Asia did start receiving more attention from the US policy makers after the communist victory in China, combined with the developments in Indo-China and Korea, and the National Security Council's (NSC) Policy Statement on South Asia in January 1951 now stressed that: "The time has come to pursue our objectives in South Asia with more vigor" and that the "political, strategic, manpower and resource potential" of the "key" regional states, India and Pakistan, must be "marshalled on the side of the US", with the "minimum requirement for the fulfilment of US regional objectives" being the "continuation in power of non-communist governments", which were to be encouraged to join the US in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹ A cooperative regime in Pakistan, with full control over the internal political arena, would, therefore, be best suited to fulfil American regional objectives.

Liaquat's government was more than willing to cooperate and he was

keen to obtain US support in order to strengthen his own domestic position.¹⁶⁰ But the Americans were aware that the Pakistan military was fast emerging as a powerful institution internally, while Liaquat, who also held the portfolio of Defence Minister, had little knowledge of military matters and was in far from complete control over the affairs of even his own political party. Hence the cooperation of the Pakistani Armed Forces assumed even greater importance at a time when the Pakistan military was itself gaining greater significance in US regional strategy, with American policy planners reaching the conclusion that "Pakistan could provide important ground forces . . . for use in South Asia or on the western flank." So the "United States military authorities should consider on an urgent basis the desirability of the United States entering into an early understanding with Pakistan, which would provide for equipping and building up Pakistan's military forces and insure the availability of Pakistan's ground forces on the western flank at the outset of war."¹⁶¹

In January 1951, the new C-in-C, Ayub Khan, was aware that he "could not continue to make demands on an already over-burdened exchequer" for the military's needs. The "Pakistan Army had to learn to depend on itself and on its meagre resources."¹⁶² Another option for the new C-in-C was to try to succeed where the political leadership, the civil bureaucracy and his Army predecessors had failed, by obtaining a steady source of external supply and assistance from a reliable ally.

As Deputy C-in-C Ayub Khan had already approached British military

authorities, emphasising the necessity for "the UK to have friends in the East and the necessity for the UK to enable those friends to become effective." When the response was that the UK "had only a certain amount of equipment and that we naturally gave that equipment to those who had declared themselves openly on our side and had accepted commitments", Ayub replied that he had already discussed the subject with Secretary-General Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and that "it was his (Ayub's) intention to tell his Government that they must come out in the open and come clean (his exact words) and say which side they were on. He fully appreciated that without this it was not possible to get far on anything."¹⁶³

Ayub was convinced that the "answer to the problems" facing Pakistan, and the only way of meeting the requirements of the military, was to have "a strong and reliable friend."¹⁶⁴ Since the British government was as yet unforthcoming, by mid-1951, Ayub, had now begun "definitely thinking" of turning to the Americans for the assistance the Pakistan Armed Forces required.¹⁶⁵

Tensions in Pakistan-Soviet Relations

As Pakistan's political leadership, bureaucracy and military continued to focus their attention on forging ties with the West, proving their antipathy towards communism and ignoring Soviet overtures, Pakistan-Soviet relations, in all spheres of interaction, economic, cultural and political, began to come under strain. Although both Pakistani and Soviet sources said that trade negotiations were nearing completion and that the first

Pakistan-Soviet trade agreement would soon be concluded,¹⁶⁶ the Soviet team returned home as the talks failed due to Pakistani indifference.¹⁶⁷ In fact, Pakistani exports to the Soviet Union went down to Rs 14 million in 1950-51 from the 1949-50 and 1948-49 figures of Rs 45 million and Rs 71 million respectively.¹⁶⁸

Cultural relations also received a setback in 1950 when the Pakistan government refused to issue passports to Pakistan writers intending to visit the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet writers' delegation which had visited Pakistan in 1949. The Liaquat government even considered banning the sale of Soviet literature in Pakistan, demanding that "facilities available to Russian Information Service in Pakistan have to be based on reciprocal facilities for dissemination of Pakistan information in the USSR."¹⁶⁹ The Interior Minister, Khawaja Shahabuddin, told the Constituent Assembly that the government was aware of the increase in the distribution and supply of Soviet literature on communism, and had "taken necessary steps in the matter".¹⁷⁰

The Soviet government was particularly concerned about the Pakistan government's attempts to forge security links with the West. The unsuccessful attempt to bring about a Pan-Islamic bloc under Pakistani leadership came under severe Soviet attack. When sessions of the International Islamic Conference were held in Karachi in 1949 and in Tehran in 1950, the Soviets denounced the movement on the grounds that "these Moslem politicians" were preaching religion and socio-economic cooperation but were actually "plotting against the national liberation movement in Asia and the

Middle East and supporting the anti-Soviet military schemes of the US and British imperialists."¹⁷¹ The Karachi conference, they claimed, had been concerned mainly with "preparing the ground for the formation of a military and political bloc of the Islamic countries", which would be "anti-Soviet" in nature,¹⁷² while Soviet scholar A. Dyakov commented that ". . . in foreign policy, the task of Pan-Islamism is to mask the Pakistan Government's reactionary policy of scraping together an anti-Soviet bloc among the Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East. By Pan-Islamic slogans and by demagoguery about the common interests of all Muslims in the world, the Muslim League is trying to conceal the dependence of Pakistan's present policy on British and American dictats (sic) and to veil Pakistan's role as the bridgehead of the Anglo-American bloc . . ."¹⁷³

Soviet concern about American penetration in Pakistan centred on the country's strategic location. The Soviets were particularly perturbed by Anglo-American shows of interest in Pakistan's northern areas. In a report on a visit by four American Senators, accompanied by a team of experts, to the Khyber Pass, a Soviet writer noted that they "seemed to be particularly drawn to the northern areas, which are close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union." They "studied the country around" and "made photographs of the locality" indicating that the "American and British imperialists are interested in Pakistan, not only as a market and field of investment" but are "out to make it one of their military bases."¹⁷⁴

Prime Minister Liaquat had made clear his external orientation when he gave precedence to an invitation from Washington over the prior

invitation from Moscow. Although "well informed sources" in Karachi maintained that Liaquat's acceptance of the American invitation did not "in any way" affect his intention to visit Moscow,¹⁷⁵ the Soviet trip did not materialise. Some analysts claim that Liaquat "appeared willing to journey to Moscow after his trip to the USA, but the Soviet Union . . . assumed a sphinx-like silence about his visit"¹⁷⁶ and that the "default of Pakistani leaders in not responding positively to Soviet overtures hardened the Soviet attitude to Pakistan so much so that Liaquat Ali's visit to Moscow was postponed indefinitely . . ."¹⁷⁷ In fact, the Pakistan side, once it obtained the American invitation, did not seem interested in the Soviet offer.

Although authoritative sources had disclosed that the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow would take place during the second half of November 1949,¹⁷⁸ after the extension of the American invitation in December 1949, Liaquat declared that no date had been fixed for his Soviet trip "although the invitation still holds".¹⁷⁹ After his visit to the United States, the Prime Minister was less ambiguous about his intentions to visit the Soviet Union. When asked if the invitation still stood and if he intended to avail himself of it, Liaquat "chuckled . . . 'Yes, I suppose it still stands but I am a humble man and never aspire to greater heights'."¹⁸⁰ The British and American governments appear to have been informed privately by Pakistani authorities that Liaquat had decided to "postpone" the visit "indefinitely".¹⁸¹

The Soviets strongly denounced the "reactionary policy" of the Pakistan government, which, they claimed, was "fully in line" with

Anglo-American plans "of turning the country into an imperialist stronghold in the East . . ."182 In an article entitled "Pakistan Model of Syngman Rhee", the Literaturnaya Gazeta alleged that Liaquat Ali Khan had "returned to Karachi after assuring his American bosses that he would assist their plans for enslavement of Pakistan and converting it into a political, economic and strategic base for Wall Street", turning it from a "British colony" to "an American colony." It added: "As regards Liaquat Ali Khan himself, he has been transformed into the Pakistan variety of Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee", an "agent of Anglo-American imperialism to promote its interests in the Middle East and Southeast Asia in return for arms and equipment."183

The Soviets were aware of the growing domestic opposition to the Liaquat government, and conscious of the use of anti-communist rhetoric by the Pakistani authorities to gain domestic legitimacy and Western support. They therefore claimed that the Muslim League Government's attempts to convert Pakistan into a military base corresponded "with the aspiration of the ruling circles of Pakistan" but that the people of Pakistan "were beginning to realize what the warmongers expected of their country - that it should be a vantage ground against the USSR and the national liberation movement in Asia."184

The Soviets also interpreted accusations of a Soviet-backed communist conspiracy to overthrow the government as dictated by the internal compulsions of the Liaquat government. They accused the "reactionary circles of Pakistan" of inventing the "communist

plot" so as to suppress domestic opposition and win support "on the eve of the elections in West Punjab province," and went on to accuse the Liaquat government of holding the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case trials in camera in order that "anti-British" Army officers and members of progressive political parties, including the CPP, who had "earned the displeasure of the reactionaries" could be "conveniently disposed of". They stressed that: "This is not a conspiracy by the Communist Party", adding that "communists do not believe in military conspiracies." It was claimed that the Muslim League was trying to "mislead the people of Pakistan" by "systematically" poisoning them with "reactionary propaganda dished out in religious jargon."¹⁸⁵ The Muslim League government did, in fact, use the Rawalpindi conspiracy to round up CPP members and sympathisers as well as other political opponents throughout the country.

While the Soviets continued to maintain a neutral posture on the Kashmir issue, they expressed their concern that it provided "US and British imperialists with opportunities to exert pressures" on both Pakistan and India.¹⁸⁶ While "Delhi and Karachi are engaged in their endless diplomatic duel over Kashmir", commented a Soviet analyst, "several Anglo-American military missions have visited the state on the lookout for convenient sites for military bases . . . for the furtherance of their own strategic designs."¹⁸⁷ At the same time the Soviets alleged that the continuing tensions between India and Pakistan were adversely affecting socio-economic development in the two countries, due to the priority given to defence expenditure.

The Soviets were particularly critical of the enormous Pakistani

appropriations for defence. Attacking the Pakistan government's domestic and foreign policies, the Soviets accused "the ruling circles of Pakistan" of "converting their country's economy for war."¹⁸⁸ Instead of solving the massive socio-economic problems facing the country, "the Moslem League is militarizing the country", said one Soviet commentator, with "military expenditure comprising 75 per cent of the entire budget."¹⁸⁹ But while there was "huge expenditure on armaments", there was very "little for social services."¹⁹⁰

The Soviets continued to stress the significance of the links between the Pakistan Armed Forces and the West. The "military secrets of Pakistan" said the Soviet news media "were well known to British generals" since "the armed forces were under British supervision and in the higher ranks more than fifty-five per cent of the posts were held by Englishmen."¹⁹¹ It was also claimed that the Pakistan government was following an "anti-people" and pro-imperialist policy by devoting most of the country's resources to "purchasing US-British armaments, constructing airfields, strategic roads and railways and maintaining a large army."¹⁹² These developments were militarising the country on the one hand, and on the other increasing the opportunities for "imperialist intervention" at a time when the Anglo-American powers were "out to make (Pakistan) one of their military bases", supplying it with "arms and handling the training of its army."¹⁹³

The Last Days of Liaquat Ali Khan

No efforts were made by the Liaquat government to assure the

Soviets that Pakistan would stay neutral in the Cold War. Even the previous claims of neutrality were abandoned for an openly pro-Western posture, with Pakistan extending diplomatic support to the West during the Korean crisis and over the question of the Japanese peace treaty.

With the outbreak of the Korean crisis, Prime Minister Liaquat declared that the North's action was a clear case of aggression. Pakistan, he said, had accepted the UN resolution on Korea and would provide the UN any help within its means, "knowing full well what its implications are."¹⁹⁴ When it came to the question of sending Pakistani troops to Korea, the Prime Minister's pre-conditions of American support to Pakistan against India and Afghanistan were considered too high a price by the US Administration.¹⁹⁵ All the same, it appreciated Pakistan's full and unconditional diplomatic support, which contrasted sharply with India's neutrality. The US also accepted the Pakistani explanation of inability to supply troops as due to the threats to its territorial integrity from India and Afghanistan.¹⁹⁶

While Pakistan's stand on Korea won it American support, it antagonised the Soviets even further. Liaquat was denounced for the "servile zeal with which he hastened to proclaim his solidarity with the ugly deeds of American imperialism" and warned of the "deplorable consequences" of following such a policy.¹⁹⁷ The Soviets were equally critical of Pakistan's participation in the San Francisco Conference on the Peace Treaty with Japan, which was signed by the Pakistan government.¹⁹⁸

Despite the Liaquat Government's policy of siding with the West, at the cost of the country's relations with the Soviet Union, the Prime Minister did not succeed in obtaining the diplomatic and military support or the assurances of security he was seeking. Within the country his position steadily weakened, as opposition grew to both the internal and external policies of his government.

The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Zafrulla, and the pro-Western bureaucrats including Foreign Secretary Ikramullah urged the US and the UK to extend assistance to the Muslim League government. Ikramullah, for instance, warned the Americans that should Liaquat's government fall, it could lead to "an extremist group, who would go to the Soviets for political support" coming into power, adding that "there was not much time left."¹⁹⁹ Similar appeals were made by Liaquat to the UK to help Pakistan reach "a state of preparedness to resist aggression from whatever source", adding that "Pakistan can play its part in defence of freedom"²⁰⁰ only if it had adequately equipped Armed Forces and a government committed to the defence of the Free World.

The position of the Muslim League government steadily declined. While the military and the bureaucracy were concentrating on strengthening their position in the internal power structure, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated at a public meeting in Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951.

Summary

In the initial years of Pakistan's existence, there was a consensus between the Muslim League government, the military and the bureaucracy to support the West in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. All three major Pakistani actors, with their pro-Western orientation, perceived the Soviets as a vaguely threatening entity. Hence Soviet overtures to Pakistan were ignored and efforts made to forge close links with the West.

The military in Pakistan rapidly consolidated its position within the state, transforming itself from a weak, disorganised body into a fairly formidable force. Internally its position was enhanced by the role it played in supporting and assisting the government in overcoming the problems arising from partition. Externally its role as the guardian of the country's frontiers was strengthened by the involvement in conflicts with India.

Conscious of the need to acquire external assistance in order to further strengthen the institution the Military High Command, especially under the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, began to explore the possibilities of establishing defence and security links with the West.

The internal and external orientations of the "ruling circles" in Pakistan were viewed with concern by the Soviet Union which became increasingly critical of the Pakistan government. The foreign

policy directions of Pakistan in the initial years set the stage for events to follow.

Footnotes - Chapter Two

- 1 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 4th ed., 1983), pp. 371-373.
- 2 The members of the Constituent Assembly, of which the Governor-General was the President, had been elected, by limited franchise, in the 1946 provincial assembly elections in united India.
- 3 Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (Faber and Faber, London, n.d.), pp. 92-93.
- 4 S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis (Book Centre, Lahore, 1970), pp. 46-47.
- 5 Brought up on the myth of guardianship, the Indian bureaucracy believed that it was its mission "to defend the interests of the people as against the supposed partisanship of and personal ambitions of 'professional' politicians." Hamza Alavi, "Class and State in Pakistan", Hassan Gardezi, Jamil Rashid (eds.), Pakistan: The Unstable State (Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1983), p. 66.
- 6 Khalid B. Sayeed, "Political Leadership and Institution-building Under Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto", Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti & W. Howard Wriggins (eds.), op.cit., p. 251.
- 7 The Committee worked under the Partition Council and later under the Joint Defence Council. See Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 28 February 1948, p. 33. See also Brig. J.O. Elliott, "The Army in India: The Reconstitution of the Army", The Army Quarterly (Vol. LV, No. 1, October 1947).
- 8 Field Marshal Auchinleck accused the Indians of launching a campaign to deprive Pakistan of its just share of military assets. "The authors (of this campaign) are too strongly imbued with the... determination," he said, "to remove anything which is likely to prevent their gaining their own ends, which are to prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed

- anything of the large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, stores etc. held in the arsenals and depots in India." John Connell, Auchinleck (Cassell and Co., London, 1959), pp. 920-921.
- 9 Lieutenant-General M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role (White Lion Publishers Ltd., London, 1976), p. 26. See also Maj. Mehr Khan Abbasi, "Balanced Economy for Pakistan", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. 1, No. 4, 1958), p. 27.
 - 10 Although Pakistan received thirty per cent of the approximately 450,000 strength Indian Army, its 508 units were underequipped and understaffed. At the time of partition, moreover, forty per cent of the units were in Indian territory and with the repatriation of the Hindu and Sikh elements more than half were left understrength. Raymond A. Moore Jr., Nation-Building and the Pakistan Army: 1947-1969 (Aziz Publishers, Lahore, 1979), p. 39.
 - 11 Dawn, 1 September 1947; 13 September 1947.
 - 12 C.B. Otley, "Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite", Jacques Van Doorn (ed.), op.cit., p. 85. Lawrence Ziring, "Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment - Pakistan under General Yahya Khan, 1969-1971", W. H. Wriggins (ed.), Pakistan in Transition (University of Islamabad Press, Islamabad, 1975).
 - 13 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (Robert Hale Ltd., London, Second Edition, 1952), p. 31.
 - 14 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, Vol. 11, p. 174, cited in Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan op.cit., p.18.
 - 15 Some assistance was given by the Soviet government to Indian revolutionaries who set up training centres at Tashkent and Samarkand. Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, op.cit., pp.36-37.
 - 16 The Chief of Staff, India, in a paper assessing the defence implications of a partition of India stated that Pakistan "lies

- as a buffer between Hindustan and any likely invasion It is impossible to consider the strategic defences of Pakistan and Hindustan separately. If partition is decided upon, there must be some central authority to coordinate and plan the strategic defences of the subcontinent" so "they can form a force for the defence of India as a whole." The paper pointed out that the "main threat" to Pakistan which "covers all the important land frontiers of India is to be feared from Russia." Text of Document, "Defence Implications of a Partition of India into Hindustan and Pakistan", Chief of Staff (India), (46) 743. Revised, April, 1946. JPC (46) 3 in British Conspiracy: Defence Implications of a Partition of India into Hindustan and Pakistan (East and West Publishing Company, Karachi, Second Edition, 1976).
- 17 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit., p. 117.
- 18 For example, addressing newsmen in Karachi, Field Marshal Sir William Slim emphasised the "need for cooperation between Pakistan and Bharat for the joint defence of the subcontinent." Dawn, 12 July 1950.
- 19 A.A. Kadeer, "Soviet-Pakistan Relations: The Ideological Context", Journal of European Studies (Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1985), pp. 5-6. See also Philip E. Jones, "The Changing Party Structures in Pakistan: From Muslim League to People's Party", Manzooruddin Ahmed (ed.), Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society (Royal Book Company, Karachi, Second Edition, 1982), pp. 118-120.
- 20 The Times, 28 May 1947. See also Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army op.cit., p. 6.
- 21 The Pakistan Army fell into the first category of Janowitz's classification of armies of new nations into either "ex-colonial" armed forces, "national liberation" armies or "post liberation" armed forces. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977), p. 89.
- 22 According to General Attiq, at the time of partition, there were very few Muslim officers who had commanded anything

- as high as a brigade. Lieutenant-General M. Attiqur Rahman, Leadership: Senior Commanders (Ferozsons Book Corporation Ltd, Lahore, 1973), p. 2. See also Lt. Col. M.C.A. Henniker, "The Early Days of Pakistan", Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (Vol. XCIII, No. 549, February 1948), p.120.
- 23 Official history of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, History of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-1982 (PAF Press, Masroor, Karachi, 1982), p.113.
- 24 The Army C-in-C, Sir Frank Messervy, for example, providing future guidelines in his Special Order of the Day to all ranks of the Army on independence day, stated that: "We have a real and honorable military task to fulfil: the holding of the Gates of the Continent which contains the territories of both the Dominions of Pakistan and India." Dawn, 16 August 1947.
- 25 In his history of the Pakistan Army, Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan wrote that the North West Frontier, "adjacent to the borders of China, Russia and Afghanistan and Iran ... has been subject to constant pressure and, in the recent past, large-scale forces of the British Empire were employed on its defence. The frontier lost none of its importance when the British left: if anything it became more important with the disappearance of that great stabilizing force." Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 153.
- 26 Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., p. 114. A senior Pakistan bureaucrat and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union remarked that the biggest upholder of anti-Soviet perceptions in Pakistan was the Army and had been since 1947. Interview with author.
- 27 This is borne out in several interviews held with senior military officials, including a former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army.
- 28 'Pathanistan' or 'Pakhtunistan' was the demand for independence or reunification with Afghanistan of the Pakistani Pakhtuns. See Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "The Relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan", Pakistan Horizon

(Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 1955), pp. 498-499.

- 29 This was called 'Operation Curzon'.
- 30 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 48.
- 31 Pakistan and the Soviet Union are separated at one point by only the 20 kilometre Wakhan strip.
- 32 Arthur Stein, India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969), p.10.
- 33 E. Zhukov, "K. polozheniiu v Indii", *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo*, July 1947, pp. 3-14, in Raghunath Ram, *op.cit.*, p. 8.
- 34 A. Dyakov, "The British Plan for India", New Times (No. 24, 13 June 1947), p.13.
- 35 "The Mountbatten Plan in Action", *ibid.* (No. 40, 10 October 1947), p. 16.
- 36 A. Dyakov, "Partitioned India", *ibid.* (No 3, 14 January 1948), p 9. According to South Asian specialists, Yuri Gankovsky and Moskalenko: "A noticeable influence on the development of Pakistan's statehood, especially in the early years was exerted by the metropolitan country", especially since "English army officers and civil servants continued to occupy key positions - governors of provinces, commander-in-chief of the army, police chiefs etc ..." Y.V. Gankovsky and V.N. Moskalenko, The Three Constitutions of Pakistan (People's Publishing House, Lahore, 1978), p. 2.
- 37 A. Dyakov, "Partitioned India", *op.cit.*, p. 8.
- 38 A number of Muslim League politicians and government officials have said that Governor-General Jinnah had not been in the know when the decision to send the tribals, accompanied by some regular Army personnel, was taken and implemented; that the scheme had the backing of Chief Minister Qayyum Khan and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan; and that Jinnah had then been presented with a fait accompli. See Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *op.cit.*, p. 292, and interview of Muslim League veteran K.H.

- Khursheed in Rajendra Sareen, Pakistan: The India Factor (Allied Publishers Ltd, New Delhi, 1984), pp. 221-223. See also Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "Of Pakistan's First War and Coup", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, Nos. 6-7, June-July 1985), pp.1-2.
- 39 For official Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) denials of the involvement of Pakistani troops in Kashmir see Dawn, 7 November 1947.
- 40 Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 28 February 1949, pp. 212-213.
- 41 Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., p. 35.
- 42 The British were determined not to let a situation develop whereby British officers deputed to the two Dominions would be fighting one another. Field Marshal Auchinleck therefore threatened to withdraw these seconded officers in the event of an open Indo-Pakistan war. See Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office (henceforth referred to as CRO) to UK High Commission Pakistan, 15 July 1948. No. 177. See also Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (John Murray, London, 1954), p. 207.
- 43 Dawn, 2 January 1949.
- 44 According to General Fazal Muqeem Khan, the Indian occupation of Kashmir took place when the "process of retrenchment in the Army was well underway", its units "were still being converted or reformed ... Pakistan had not received her share of the stores and equipment from the undivided Indian Army; this, allied with India's economic blockade, explains why the Pakistan Army was not in a fit state to take the field for a long time. India was now reaping the benefit of her far-sighted policy of keeping Pakistan weak." Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 100.
- 45 C-in-C Gracey disclosed that the Military High Command had,

- at least three times, "dissuaded the Government" from taking the offensive in Kashmir "on purely military arguments from a trial of strength with India." Telegram. From Reed, UK High Commission, Rawalpindi to UK High Commission, Lahore, 14 June 1948. Ref: PIN/19/48.
- 46 Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan was the commander of the tribal detachment sent to Kashmir in October 1947. Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1970), p.17.
- 47 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem, op.cit., pp.102-103.
- 48 These include Maj. Generals Akbar Khan and Fazal Muqeem Khan. Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp 115-116. See also General Akbar Khan's interview in Defence Journal (Vol. XI, Nos. 6-7, 1985), pp.19-20.
- 49 Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., p.35. Air Commodore M.K. Janjua's interview in Outlook (Vol. I, No. 4, 13 January 1972), p. 9.
- 50 C-in-C General Gracey in an interview with the US Consul-General in Lahore complained about the "corrupt and nepotic" civil administration, accusing bureaucrats of selling off quantities of arms intended for use in Kashmir. "Work for Azad Kashmir," he said, "has been an excuse to cover a lot of doubtful dealings." From UK High Commission, Rawalpindi to UK High Commission Lahore, 20 June 1948. Ref: PIN/20/48. See also Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, op.cit., p. 96.
- 51 Major-General Sher Ali Pataudi, The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan (Al-Kitab, Lahore, 2nd ed., 1983), p. 120.
- 52 Addressing troops in Kashmir in 1949, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said: "Perhaps some of you feel that but for the brakes on your activities there would have been a different story to tell today. The adoption of this stand was linked with our efforts to have it recognised that Kashmiris were allowed to exercise their inherent right to decide their fate and future." Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp.117-118.

- 53 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit., p. 378.
- 54 Dawn, 17 August 1947.
- 55 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Oxford University Press, London, 1973), pp.147-148.
- 56 Message of the Chargé D'Affaires in Karachi to Secretary of State, 2 September 1947, 845 F.51/9-247; Memorandum of the Government of Pakistan to US State Department on its requirements of financial and military assistance, October 1947. Text in K. Arif (ed.), America-Pakistan Relations: Documents (Vol. I, Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1984), pp. 5-6.
- 57 Telegram from UK Delegation, UN, New York to Foreign Office, 20 January 1948, No. 139. See also M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958 (Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1984), pp. 43-44.
- 58 The British Government did express concern in private that although the "Pakistan Government are inclined to raise the Russian bogey in order to get our help, the main basis of Zafrulla's contentions is correct." See Foreign Office Minute on Russo-Pakistan Relations. Note of 2 March 1948. Ref: F3831/2690/85/G.
- 59 Warner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXV, No. 3, Fall 1962), pp. 213-214.
- 60 A. Dyakov, "The Situation in India", New Times (No. 23, 2 June 1948), p. 23.
- 61 A. Dyakov, "Partitioned India", op.cit., p. 9.
- 62 Ibid., p. 8.
- 63 O. Orestov, "The War in Kashmir: A Correspondent's Note", New Times (No. 40, 29 September 1948), p. 24.
- 64 Dawn, 2 December 1948.

- 65 Aswini K. Ray, op.cit., p.18.
- 66 Dawn, 11 May 1949.
- 67 Letter of Pakistan Ambassador in Washington to US Secretary of State, 19 October 1948, 845 F.24/10-1948.
- 68 Dawn, 9 October 1948.
- 69 From Liaquat Ali Khan to A.V. Alexander, 3 February 1949. — Despatch No. 387 (1587).
- 70 The British military establishment's assessment of Pakistan in 1949 was that: "India and Pakistan are of strategic interest to both the Middle East and Far East Regional Headquarters as their manpower and material resources have considerable bearing on defence problems in both regions. The importance of Western Pakistan is enhanced by the fact that in a war against Russia, we may well wish to base strategic air forces there". Position of Indian Subcontinent. Views of the Chief of Staff. Chiefs of Staff Committee, 15 July 1949, JP(49)61. Final.
- In a request for permission to transfer ammunition to Pakistan, the UK Ambassador cautioned the US Administration that, "Pakistan should not have cause to turn to Soviet sources of supply for her military requirements. There have already been unconfirmed reports that she is buying in Czechoslovakia, but His Majesty's Government do not in fact consider that she is likely to apply to Soviet sources except as a last resort in the event of a refusal on the part of the United Kingdom or the United States to meet what she considers to be her legitimate requirements." British Ambassador to Secretary of State, 1 April 1949. Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, (Vol. VI, 1977), pp. 1696-1697.
- 71 Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 24 March 1949, *ibid.*, (Vol. 1), pp. 30-31.
- 72 While the British Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that "Pakistan and India could provide strategic air bases for attacking Russia," they also recognised the fact that "Even if India and

Pakistan are both friendly to us, we cannot hope to make full use of the above unless they are prepared to afford each other mutual support." "India's Future Relations With the Commonwealth", Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 March 1949, CP (49)58.

- 73 "Appraisal of US National Interests in South Asia", Report by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Co-ordinating Committee (SANACC) Subcommittee for Near and Middle East, 19 April 1949. 360/14.
- 74 Pakistan Times, 20 August 1949.
- 75 Dawn, 14 June 1949; 9 September 1949.
- 76 Pakistan Times, 29 November 1949. Describing the reception given to the Soviet delegation in Karachi, a Soviet commentator wrote that "... hundreds crowded around the Soviet delegates ... On all sides there were cries of 'Long Live friendship between the Pakistani and Soviet people' and 'Long Live the Soviet Union!'" N. Gladkov, "In Pakistan (Travel Impressions)", New Times (No. 21, 24 May 1950), pp. 23-23.
- 77 Dawn, 11 June 1949.
- 78 Altaf Husain, "The Foreign Relations of Pakistan", The Asiatic Review (Vol. XLVI, No. 166, Sixty-fifth Year, April 1950), pp. 944-945.
- 79 Dawn, 9 June 1949; 10 June 1949.
- 80 Amongst Liaquat Ali Khan's motives in accepting the Soviet invitation, analysed the British Commonwealth Relations Office, were a desire to pressure the West "that Pakistan support cannot be assumed and must be paid for"; to "steal his critics' thunder" of subservience to the US and UK; and "resentment that Nehru has been invited to visit Washington whereas no similar invitation has been given to Liaquat." The report added that, "We do not believe that proposed visit really represents move by Pakistan towards friendship with Communist bloc." Telegram from CRO to UK

Missions including India and Pakistan, 24 June 1949, No. 118. F.9713.

- 81 A Muslim Leaguer, "The Muslim League", Dawn, 30 October 1949.
- 82 The Government gave a number of excuses for the delay in the exchange of Ambassadors, with Foreign Minister Zafrulla citing a "shortage of personnel" as the reason and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali the problems of accommodation in Karachi. Dawn, 9 July 1949; 15 August 1949.
- 83 *Ibid.*, 22 November 1949; 23 March 1950.
- 84 For instance, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed had told the US Chargé D'Affaires that he was approaching the US for military and economic assistance without first discussing the issue with the Pakistan Cabinet since "he and his colleagues" were anxious to acquire US assistance and on another occasion Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan informed the British UN delegate, Mr Noel Baker that he "and his Pakistani colleagues were firmly convinced that it was in their overwhelming interest to remain within the British Commonwealth and to stand with the West against Russian aggression ..." See Message of the Charge d'Affaires in Karachi to Secretary of State, 2 September 1947, 845 F.51/9-247. Telegram from UK Delegation to UN, New York to Foreign Office, 20 January 1948, No. 139.
- 85 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development op.cit., p. 74.
- 86 The Secretary-General's post was an especially important one since this meant that a bureaucrat, and not the Cabinet, had complete control over all senior officials in every Ministry of the Pakistan Government. Both the British and the American governments acknowledged the influence of these powerful bureaucrats in guiding Pakistan along a pro-Western course. American assessments, for example of Secretary-General Mohammad Ali and Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed were that the former was pro-Western and "one of the most

- influential foreign affairs leaders in the government" and the latter "second only to Liaquat Ali Khan" and "friendly to the United States". See: Office Memo. US Government to Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), McGhee from SOA, 25 January 1950. Unnumbered; From Assistant Secretary NEA, Mr McGhee to Secretary of State, 10 January 1951. Unnumbered.
- 87 Record of conversation between Ghulam Mohammed and UK Secretary of State, 26 April 1950. From Pakistan High Commission to CRO. F4080/10.
- 88 G.W. Choudhury, *op.cit.*, p. 12.
- 89 Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia, (Speeches in the United States and Canada, May and June 1950), (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950), p.13; p. 82.
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 105.
- 91 S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 123-124.
- 92 Dawn, 21 May 1950.
- 93 New York Times, 5 May 1950; see also Dawn, 5 May 1950.
- 94 Prior to his departure for the US, the Prime Minister had called for "a Commonwealth guarantee for the frontiers of India and Pakistan" adding that if it was granted, the Pakistan Army "would then be at the service of the Commonwealth should the need arise." News Chronicle, 1 May 1950.
- 95 Dawn, 3 June 1950.
- 96 M.S. Venkataramani, *op.cit.*, p.127.
- 97 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan declared: "I have always considered myself as Prime Minister of the League. I never regarded myself as the Prime Minister chosen by members of the Constituent Assembly." Dawn, 9 October 1950.

- 98 Ibid., 13 September 1950.
- 99 Ibid.
- 100 PRODA disqualified persons found guilty of misconduct from holding Public Office for a period not exceeding ten years. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit., pp. 369-371.
- 101 According to one analyst, this was "hardly surprising when one considers the enormous opportunities opened up by the creation of a new Army." Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to Development of a Nation (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971), p.134.
- 102 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Oxford University Press, London, Second Edition, 1967), p. 19.
- 103 Stephen P. Cohen, "Arms and Politics in Pakistan", India Quarterly (Vol. XX, No. 4, October-December 1964) pp. 412-414.. See also P.R. Chari, "Civil-Military Relations in India", Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1977), p. 5 and Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, pp. 117-120.
- 104 Asghar Khan was present on the occasion. Air Marshal M. Ashgar Khan, Pakistan at the Crossroads (Ferozsons Ltd., Karachi, 1969), p. 33.
- 105 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, op.cit., p. 118.
- 106 The military was particularly concerned about political unrest penetrating the institution through exposure in aid-to-civil operations.
- 107 In his Special Order of the Day, the Pakistan Army C-in-C, General Sir Frank Messervy said: "Unfortunately, our main duty for the present in conjunction with the civil authorities and the police is the difficult and unpleasant one of maintaining law and order and of stopping bloodshed and murder, looting and arson ..." Dawn, 1 September 1947.
- 108 Advising the Joint Services Commanders' Committee on 31

July 1950, the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff said: "In a homogeneous country such as Pakistan, the use of troops, which it maintains for its defence against external aggression, to enforce law-and-order on the people is always resented and leads to antagonism between them. The army, therefore, rightly expects that the civil administration will take every means in its power, by wise government and maintenance of adequate and efficient police forces, to prevent this contingency from arising." Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 179.

- 109 For instance, Army officers interviewed by a US Embassy official in the NWFP expressed dislike for "the manner in which the League was attempting to smother opposition, while permitting political abuses in Sind" to exist. "These criticisms were prevalent," commented the US Cultural Officer, "and not isolated and were directed at the Centre under Liaquat's leadership and indicated that the seeds of opposition had been sown." From Cultural Officer, Lahore to State Department on his visit to NWFP and meeting with politicians, students and Army personnel, 3 November 1950. 790d. OO/11-350.
- 110 Ayub had himself not expected to rise above the rank of Major-General. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 38.
- 111 Lt. Colonel Iskander Mirza as Defence Secretary in the Jinnah and Liaquat governments had become a member of the powerful cabal of bureaucrats controlling the central government from within. Unlike his other colleagues, Mirza had the advantage of close links with the military establishment. The first Indian cadet to be gazetted to the Army from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1919, Mirza had been seconded to the Political Service in 1926, serving mainly in the NWFP. He had been appointed Joint Secretary to the Defence Department in 1946 and Defence Secretary to the Pakistan Government in October 1947. Mirza's experience in the administration and links within the military made him conscious of the importance of having his own man in charge of the military. As early as October 1949, Mirza held the opinion that "a time might even come when the Pakistan Army might have to be used politically." "Possible Developments in Pakistan", 31 October 1949. Ref. CRO. Pol.(S), 883/49. See

also Dawn, 2 August 1953.

- 112 Upon taking over charge, Ayub seemed to reaffirm his apolitical convictions, advising his troops, for example, to stay out of politics. "You must avoid ... taking any active part in party politics and propagation of any such views", said the new C-in-C, "... we are the servants of Pakistan and as such, servants of any party the people put into power." Dawn, 23 January 1951.
- 113 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 22; Khalid Ali, "Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan: Impressions of a Public Relations Officer", Pakistan Times, 24 July 1960.
- 114 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
- 115 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 39-41.
- 116 This was known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case since the alleged conspiracy was planned in Rawalpindi, the seat of the Army GHQ. Dawn, 10 March 1951; Pakistan Times, 10 March 1951.
- 117 Dawn, 11 March 1951.
- 118 Liaquat Ali's statements, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 21 March 1951, pp. 34-35. See also Dawn, 22 March 1951.
- 119 Liaquat Ali told the Constituent Assembly that the conspirators were not tried by a Court Martial since there were civilians involved and that the trials were held in camera due the requirements of national security. Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 16 April 1951, pp. 94-96.
- 120 Dawn, 15 March 1951.
- 121 Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, op.cit., p. 161, pp. 163-164.

- 122 Y.V. Gankovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan (1947-1958) (People's Publishing House, Lahore, n.d.), pp. 133-135.
- 123 Economist, London, 17 March 1951.
- 124 Dawn, 10 March 1951. Subsequent accounts by a number of military and civilian figures arrested by the Government in connection with the case emphasised that Liaquat had "staged" the conspiracy because "he wanted desperately to win the Punjab Assembly elections" scheduled for 10 March 1951; that a number of the military officers involved were "anti-imperialist" and opposed to the pro-West leanings of the Liaquat Government; that there was a feeling of being let down in Kashmir by the Government; and finally that there was "no plot" and no conspiracy and the 23 February meeting was "at worst ... a serious academic discussion ..." and no more. There is also complete agreement in all accounts that although some members of the CPP Central Committee, including Secretary-General Sajjad Zaheer and Sibte Hasan had met the disgruntled military officers "the army officers were informed" at the 23 February meeting that the CPP "would have nothing to do with (their) plans". Interviews with Maj. (retd.) Mohammed Ishaq, Syed Sibte Hasan, Air Commodore M.K. Janjua and Captain Zafrullah Poshni. See Outlook, 6 May 1972 (Vol. 1, No. 5), pp. 9-10; 11 November 1972 (Vol. 1, No. 32), pp. 9-12; 13 January 1973 (Vol. 1, No. 41), pp. 9-12; 3 February 1973 (Vol. 1, No. 44), pp. 8-10; 17 March 1973 (Vol. 1, No. 50), pp. 7-10.
- 125 Telegram. From US Ambassador, Karachi, to Secretary of State, 20 March 1951. Unnumbered.
- 126 The US Vice Consul, for example, informed the State Department that it was his and the Consul General's opinion that "the plot to overthrow the Government was actually the initial step in an endeavour, on the part of the Soviet Union, to seize control of South Asia." From Herman, US Vice Consul, Karachi, to State Department, 12 March 1951. 79 od.00/3-1251. The UK High Commissioner, on the other hand, reached the conclusion that "there is little real evidence" to

- connect the Soviet Embassy with the plot; the main political grievance of the army officers was Kashmir; and the "bulk of the Communist Party of Pakistan was not involved ...". High Commissioner's Conclusions. From UK High Commission, Karachi. Despatch No 210 of 14 July 1951. CRO G(P), 3501/15.
- 127 "Department of State Policy Statement," Pakistan, 1 July 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 (Vol. VI, 1977), p.2207, p. 2213.
- 128 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 36.
- 129 Telegram from US Ambassador, Karachi to Secretary of State, 10 March 1951. Unnumbered.
- 130 Gen. Ayub claimed that he had been doubtful of the loyalties of Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan from the very start and had therefore promoted him to the post of Chief of General Staff in order to deprive him of his command of troops and keep him under his eye. Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 38.
- 131 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 132.
- 132 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 39.
- 133 Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army, op.cit., p. 124.
- 134 Jinnah had little knowledge of the military nor did he make much of an effort to understand how the institution worked. The first C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, General Frank Messervy disclosed that, "Jinnah was not really interested in the army: he had no ideas on the subject, and said to me: 'I have no military experience: I leave that entirely to you and Liaquat'." Hector Bolitho, op.cit., p. 200.
- 135 Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, op.cit, p. 376.
- 136 Source: Kalim Siddiqui, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan (Macmillan, London, 1972), p. 95. See also Budget debates in the Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan for relevant years.

- 137 On various occasions Liaquat stated, for example that, "Defence will get top priority", and that, "I will not allow any slackening in strengthening Pakistan's defences..." Dawn, 1 December 1948; ibid., 15 August 1949.
- 138 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp. 59-60. With a British officer as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army and others in high ranking military posts, the British Government was kept well informed of developments within the Pakistan Armed Forces. A report from the UK High Commission in Rawalpindi, the Army GHQ, mentioned the "almost continuous battle between the Army and the Ministry of Defence", which it said was reaching "alarming proportions". According to the report, Pakistani military personnel felt that the fault was two-fold, "firstly, that of the Central government, who want a first class army on the cheap and secondly that of the existing system under which Ministry of Finance officials can criticize and cut detailed military expenditures ..." From UK High Commission, Rawalpindi to UK High Commission, Karachi, 25 July 1948, PIN/25/48.
- 139 The indigenous Officer Corps benefited from the Kashmir war since British officers were not allowed to take part in front-line operations. So the responsibility of conducting war was transferred into the hands of local officers. The Kashmir war also increased the political ambitions of the military. In a discussion on the conflict with General Sher Ali, the first C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, General Messervy said that, "politicians using soldiers and soldiers allowing themselves to be used ... was setting a bad example" for "those politically minded young officers, all under the garb of patriotism." Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., pp. 116-117. See also Richard Symonds, op.cit., p. 175.
- 140 Liaquat declared for example that India posed "a direct threat to the independence of Pakistan and as long as that threat was not eliminated any amount spent on defence was justified." Dawn, 28 February 1951. See also ibid., 18 March 1951, 16 July 1951.

- 141 Prime Minister Nehru said that the Pakistan Government had, during the last six months, conducted an "intensive and vicious propaganda for war in Pakistan." Ibid., 16 July 1951.
- 142 At a public meeting during Defence Day celebrations on 27 July 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat declared that: "From today onwards our symbol is this" and then raised a clenched fist, with the audience responding with anti-Indian slogans and clenched fists. Pakistan Times, 28 July 1951.
- 143 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 40.
- 144 Ibid.
- 145 US Ambassador (Karachi) to Secretary of State enclosing Report of the US Military Attache, Pakistan, 24 April 1948, 845-F-00/4-2448.
- 146 The Armed Forces Liaison and Procurement Organisation was created in the Office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan in the UK to look after the procurement of military stores for Pakistan. Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 20 December 1948, p. 183.
- 147 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 139.
- 148 The military had, in fact, obtained a voice within the bureaucracy when a number of former Indian Political Service officials, including Lt. Col. Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary, were retained in the Pakistan superior services. The military was also represented in the newly formed Pakistan Foreign Service, the institution responsible for the planning and implementation of foreign policy since the first group comprising the Pakistan Foreign Service included a number of lateral entrants from the Civil and Defence Services. Fazal Haque Kazi, "Foreign Policy", Sun, 23 June 1975.
- 149 Interviews with military officers. From Reed, Deputy High Commissioner, UK, Rawalpindi to UK High Commission, Lahore, 14 June 1948, Ref: PIN/19/48.

- 150 Dawn, 10 February 1948.
- 151 Meeting with Pakistan military delegation, 22 April 1948, UK Department of Defence, DEFE, No. 24, 7/155.
- 152 Interview in Rawalpindi with C-in-C Pakistan Army Gracey during 17-18 June visit. From Duke, Deputy High Commissioner, Peshawar, 21 June 1948 to UK High Commission, Karachi; From UK High Commission Rawalpindi, to UK High Commission, Lahore, 20 June 1948, Ref: PIN/20/48.
- 153 Note by Maj. Gen. Cawthorn, Deputy Chief of the Pakistan Army for Chief of Staff Committee. Staff Conference. Chiefs of Staff Committee. Extract from COS (48), 136th and 139th meetings held on 28 April 1948 and 24 September 1948, Ref: COS 410/18/3/9.
- 154 Conversation between C-in-C Sir Douglas Gracey and Secretary of State on 18 July 1949. From CRO to Foreign Office. DO 35/3002, No. 17.
- 155 Letter from UK High Commissioner, Karachi to Foreign Office, Eastern Department, London, 5 April 1950, Ref: P/203.
- 156 Dawn, 17 June 1949.
- 157 M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., p. 82.
- 158 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, op.cit., p. 58.
- 159 The NSC assessed that amongst the potential facilities of value in Pakistan were: "Air bases at such places as Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore which would be nearer a portion of Soviet territory including the industrialised east of the Urals than bases in any other available location in Asia or the Near East." "The Position of the US with Respect to South Asia", NSC Staff Study (98/1), January 1951. Documents of the National Security Council (approved by President Truman on 25 January 1951).
- 160 During a discussion with the US Charge d'Affaires, Prime Minister Liaquat said that: "... in each country, the Western

- powers as typified by the US and Great Britain should observe those individuals or groups in power able to deliver the goods and then back those people to the utmost." US Charge d'Affaires, Karachi to Secretary of State, 7 June 1949, 845F.00/6-749.
- 161 Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the South Asian Regional Conference of the United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers held at Numara, Eliya, Ceylon, 26 February-2 March 1951. Foreign Relations of the United States (Vol. VI, 1977), pp. 1666-1667.
- 162 Ayub Khan as Adjutant General had several disagreements with the Ministry of Finance on defence allocations. "The Pakistan Army," he said, "was truly being held together by precious little ... I kept reminding the government at Karachi that it was not a healthy state of affairs." Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 31-33; Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 139.
- 163 Conversation between Lt. Gen. Ayub Khan and General Scoones, 25 October 1950. No.75. JG 25/10 in DO35/3002.
- 164 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 154.
- 165 Ibid. See also George J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade", Asian Survey (Vol. VIII, No. 5, May 1968), pp. 402-403.
- 166 Dawn, 9 August 1949; 16 September 1949.
- 167 The Pakistan Commerce Minister, Fazlur Rahman strongly refuted rumours in the country that the failure of the negotiations was due to "whispering campaigns and hostile intrigues" countering every move for improved economic relations with the Soviet Union. Ibid., 10 November 1949.
- 168 Pakistan's exports to the Soviet Union had shown a balance of Rs 17.2 million in favour of Pakistan in the 1948-49 period. See Dawn, 28 July 1949. See also Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan (Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1971), p. 34.

- 169 Hindu, 2 April 1950 cited in Aswini K. Ray, op.cit., p. 21.
- 170 Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 29 March 1951, p. 571.
- 171 New Times (No. 8, 21 February 1951), pp. 20-21.
- 172 Summary of World Broadcasts, Part I. The Soviet Union, (henceforth referred to as SWB), (Part I, No. 60), 20 November 1949.
- 173 A.M. Dyakov, Indiya Vo Vremya i Posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Moscow, 1952), p. 169, cited in Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p. 39.
- 174 N. Gladkov, op.cit., p. 22.
- 175 Dawn, 11 December 1949.
- 176 S.M. Burke, op.cit., p. 100.
- 177 Rangunath Ram, op.cit., pp. 17-18.
- 178 Dawn, 3 August 1949.
- 179 Ibid., 22 February 1950. See also Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 4 January 1950, p. 275.
- 180 Dawn, 4 July 1950.
- 181 As early as November 1949, the UK Foreign Minister mentioned to the US Secretary of State that "there appeared to be some difficulty in the proposed visit by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to Russia." Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 (Vol. II, 1977), p. 1483. See also, Conversation of Counsellor of the Pakistan Embassy. From British Embassy, Washington to South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, Letter. 15 November 1949. 1266/22/49.
- 182 N. Gladkov, op.cit., p. 21.
- 183 Literaturnaya Gazeta, Moscow, 25 July 1950, cited in Rangunath

- Ram, op.cit., p. 18. See also Aswini K. Ray, op.cit., p. 22.
- 184 Aswini K. Ray, op.cit., p. 22; SWB (Part I, No. 102), 24 April 1950.
- 185 "Conspiracy - But Where!", New Times (No. 13, 28 March 1951), p. 22; "Secret Inquisition in Pakistan", ibid., (No. 33, 15 August 1951), pp. 29-30; "More on the So-called Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case", ibid., (No. 37, 12 September 1951), pp. 30-31.
- 186 A. Dyakov, "The Indian People in their Struggle Against Internal and External Reaction", SWB, (Part I, No. 111), 9 September 1950.
- 187 A. Alexeyev, "The Political Situation in Pakistan", New Times (No. 47, 21 November 1951), p. 10. See also T. Yershov, "The Truth about Kashmir", ibid., (No. 10, 3 March 1948), pp. 22-29.
- 188 Pravda, 5 January 1951, Current Digest of the Soviet Press (henceforth referred to as CDSP), (Vol. III, No. 1, 17 February 1951), p. 22.
- 189 Ulalov, "The All-Pakistan Moslem League: An Instrument of US-British Imperialism", SWB (Part I, No. 152), 17 October 1950.
- 190 SWB (Part I, No. 102), 24 April 1950.
- 191 Moscow Radio commentaries. SWB (Part I, No. 95) 27 March 1950.; (Part I, No. 102), 24 April 1950.
- 192 Ulalov, op.cit.,
- 193 N. Gladkov, op.cit., p. 22.
- 194 Dawn, 28 June 1950; 4 July 1950. See also Liaquat Ali Khan's speech before the Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 11 October 1950, p. 482.
- 195 M.A.H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-1964", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Third Quarter, 1964), pp.

- 236-237. Ispahani was then Pakistan's Ambassador to the US. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zafrulla demanded that the price for a Pakistani decision to send ground troops to Korea was "a positive American assurance to help equip a Pakistan army and increase its capacity for resistance not only against India" but also to meet "what they feel is the inevitable extension of Chinese Communism into Tibet, Ladakh and possibly Kashmir ..." Telegram from US Ambassador (Karachi) to Secretary of State, 30 August 1950. Unnumbered.
- 196 In the wake of the Korean crisis, the US State Department Policy Statement on Pakistan looked at the potential uses of the Pakistan military in US regional strategies. It was felt that if Pakistan was "relieved of threats to its territorial integrity" and the Pakistan Army "properly equipped", Pakistan could send troops to "help in assisting Middle Eastern countries", including Iran, "in blocking Russian aggression". "Department of State Policy Statement", Pakistan, 1 July 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States (Vol. VI, 1977), p. 2208; pp. 2214-2215.
- 197 "Liaquat Ali Khan Shows Servile Zeal", New Times (No. 28, 12 July 1950), pp. 19-20.
- 198 K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. IV, No. 4, December 1951), p. 187. Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p. 47.
- 199 The Americans assessed that the "purpose" behind Prime Minister Liaquat, Foreign Minister Zafrulla and Foreign Secretary Ikramullah taking this line was "to needle the US into more active political support of Pakistan from which Liaquat may draw some strength in meeting the growing political attacks against his regime." See "Conversation with Mr and Mrs Ikramullah", US Ambassador, Karachi, to State Department, 2 August 1950. 790d-00/8, 250; Telegram. From US Ambassador, Karachi, to Secretary to State, 18 November 1950. Unnumbered.
- 200 Prime Minister Liaquat's letter to Prime Minister Attlee, 25 August 1951. CRO Ref. G (P) 1306

CHAPTER THREE

THE PARLIAMENTARY ERA. THE MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY

(1951-1955)

In the years following Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to be determined by the relationship between internal and external variables, with the Pakistan military playing a particularly significant role in both domestic politics and the formulation and direction of foreign policy.

Internally, the military began openly to demonstrate its growing power, in partnership with the civil bureaucracy, with the two institutions now consolidating their control over all other political forces in the state. The importance of the military also grew in the external sphere as the Cold War slowly engulfed the South Asian region. Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union during this period were therefore to be determined by the changes in the global environment, combined with political developments at home.

Politics in Pakistan

Liaquat's assassination resulted in Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed taking over the post of Governor-General, succeeding Khawaja Nazimuddin who was now appointed Prime Minister. Nazimuddin's position was very weak. The Muslim League continued to be troubled by internal rifts. Political conditions in Pakistan steadily deteriorated, with no serious attempts being made by an ineffective Constituent Assembly to provide the country with a

constitution or to make the executive accountable to the legislature.¹

It was in these circumstances that the central government came under direct control of the higher bureaucracy. The composition of the executive after Liaquat's assassination was in itself the result of secret negotiations between a number of serving and retired bureaucrats, leading to the appointments of Ghulam Mohammed and Khawaja Nazimuddin as heads of state and government respectively, with the Secretary-General of the Pakistan Civil Service, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali being given the Finance portfolio in the Cabinet. This "fait accompli" was then presented to the majority party, the Muslim League, and both the party and the Constituent Assembly accepted it without any resistance.²

Following the legacy of Pakistan's first Governor-General, Jinnah, Ghulam Mohammed began to exercise his powers in a vice-regal manner, ignoring the concepts of Cabinet control or answerability to the legislature, and taking the stand that Pakistan "needed strong leadership from the top by a Head of State, who, because he was independent of all party ties and affiliations, could afford to ignore everything but the interests of the nation at large."³

A former CSP official claims that the ineptitude of the politicians and the deteriorating political situation after Liaquat's death "bestowed upon the civil servant a privilege which he had never demanded : the right to administer without really being answerable to the declared representatives of the people". The domination of the

bureaucracy was, however, the result of a number of factors. These included the internal cohesion of the higher bureaucracy, whether in service or in retirement and their monopolistic control of sensitive government posts. Another significant factor was the perpetuation of the Interim Constitution, the Government of India Act 1935, whereby senior bureaucrats were not answerable to their Ministers either at the Centre or in the provinces.⁴

While Ghulam Mohammed and his bureaucratic allies were now in control of the central government, they were conscious, from the very start, of the importance of gaining the active support of the Armed Forces. Hence an "important member of this power hierarchy" was the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, Ayub Khan.⁵ Ayub, a friend and former comrade-in-arms of Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza, was willing at this time, to cooperate with the new leadership. He had been aware of the growing impotence of the Muslim League government under Liaquat Ali Khan.⁶ With Liaquat's death, Ayub grew contemptuous not only of the political leadership but also of the senior bureaucrats.⁷

The C-in-C was equally conscious of the military's growing power in the country's internal power structure, as the post-Liaquat leadership grew increasingly dependent on it to assert their power and authority both at the Centre and in the provinces. The military found itself frequently called upon for aid-to-civil power duties as "hard pressed governments were forced to call for its assistance in times of grave natural and man-made calamities which became increasingly common . . ."⁸ Thus, for example, the military assisted

in combatting floods in both wings of the country in the early 1950s. More important duties were also entrusted to the Army, including anti-smuggling operations such as "Operation Jute" in East Pakistan in 1952-1953.

This was a specially significant operation since the military, although under overall civil control, was given far-ranging powers by a special ordinance "to arrest, detain or take into custody, any person engaged in smuggling" and authorised "to use whatever force they considered necessary to make their mission successful."⁹ "Operation Jute" ended successfully in January 1953. According to a senior military source, the Army "learnt many lessons" from it.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, one was that the Army had succeeded, where all previous civilian efforts had failed, in solving an essentially civil problem.

The military's growing confidence in its ability to run the civil administration was enhanced by its role in the anti-Ahmediya agitation in the West wing in 1953. Riots against the Ahmediyas or Qadianis, who differ from other Muslim sects on the finality of the prophethood of Mohammed, led to a serious deterioration of law-and-order, resulting in the imposition of Martial Law, for the first time since independence, in Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab, on 6 March 1953.¹¹

This had a significant impact on politics, and particularly on the military as an institution. As the anti-Ahmediya agitation intensified, the Military High Command grew even more convinced

that Pakistani politics was "a struggle of personalities rather than ideas, prompted by the personal ambitions of a few politicians who cared little for the welfare of the country or her people."¹² They were also convinced of the inability of the civil government to deal with a religious agitation which could potentially damage the cohesiveness of the Armed Forces, and decided to take the initiative independently, regardless of the wishes of the political leadership. Thus the decision to impose Martial Law in Lahore was not taken by the Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, but by C-in-C, Ayub Khan, at the urging of the Lahore Commander, Major General Azam Khan, and with the backing of the Defence Secretary, Iskander Mirza.¹³

With the imposition of Martial Law the military was given the first opportunity of directly running the civil administration. Within twenty-four hours the situation was brought under control, leading the military to contrast its success with the civil government's failure. Once law-and-order was restored the military did not withdraw to the barracks. The local Martial Law Administrator, Maj. Gen. Azam Khan, "with the blessings of the army chief, General Ayub and the Defence Secretary General Iskander Mirza went on to extend his tenure," despite the Prime Minister's appeals to the military authorities "to call it a day and go home."¹⁴

The military now began the "second phase" of Martial Law, aimed at improving the local civil administration by means such as anti-corruption measures.¹⁵ The "work of the army", says an Army historian, "and the way in which it was carried out made a tremendous impact on the minds of both the people and the

politicians", and there were demands from other towns and cities that the Army take over the country, but the Army "was not even prepared to discuss the subject."¹⁶ According to a senior officer, in charge of legal affairs in the Army at that time, however, the Army had been thoroughly politicised by its frequent participation in law-and-order duties and after the Lahore Martial Law in particular a number of officers in GHQ spent a "great deal of time" on "political discussions". A private conversation with Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan at this time convinced General Sher Ali that "it would not be long before political power would pass from the hands of the political leaders to that of the Civil-Military bureaucracy, headed by Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan."¹⁷

Even prior to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the Army Chief had told a US diplomat that if an attempt was made to overthrow the Ghulam Mohammed government, "the Pakistan Army would immediately declare Martial Law and take care of the situation." If the situation "was critical, the Army would declare a Military Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan."¹⁸

The military's growing power was demonstrated at the national level when Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, with the support of the civil and military bureaucracies, dismissed the Prime Minister in April 1953.¹⁹ He then appointed Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Mohammed Ali Bogra, as Prime Minister, and also nominated the new Cabinet, assigning the Ministers their various posts.²⁰

The dismissed Prime Minister had been the elected leader of the majority party, the Muslim League, but the weak Constituent Assembly not only failed to rally behind Nazimuddin but promptly ratified the new Prime Minister.²¹ The Muslim League proved equally powerless to resist, and accepted the new Prime Minister as its leader, although he had previously been neither a member of the party nor of the Constituent Assembly.

Mohammed Ali Bogra had been deliberately chosen by the Governor-General as a figurehead, since he had been abroad for five years and had no party affiliations or base of popular support. The real power now clearly lay with the Governor-General and his bureaucratic allies backed by the military, which was willing to work in partnership with the bureaucracy in controlling the central government.²²

With the Bengali Prime Minister, Nazimuddin's, departure, and the consolidation of power by the Western-dominated civil and military bureaucracies, Bengali participation in the central government became even more limited at a time when East-West tensions were on the increase. The more populous East wing was discriminated against in every sphere of the country's political and economic life. Thus, for example, approximately two-thirds of development and non-development expenditure, as well as foreign aid, was allocated to the West wing, agricultural and industrial development was promoted in the West and neglected in the East, while East Bengal's foreign exchange earnings were allocated to the West. East Pakistani demands for greater autonomy and for recognition of

Bengali as an official language led to clashes such as the language disturbances in Dacca in 1952, which were forcibly suppressed by the the Army.²³

The growing administrative and military expenditure of the state was to a considerable extent responsible for this disproportionate division of funds. Both central government and Armed Forces were mainly based in the West, while there was discrimination against Bengalis in appointments to senior posts in the civil bureaucracy and a glaring underrepresentation of them in the Armed Forces. The East Pakistanis realised that they were being deprived of the large amounts of expenditure earmarked for defence, as also of participation in a national organisation of increasing importance. East wing demands for greater representation within the institution therefore began to grow.

The dominance of West Pakistanis in the military was partly a heritage of the British Indian Army where recruitment on the basis of the concept of 'Martial Races' led to a predominance of Punjabi Muslims in the rank and file and Officer Corps, while there were no Bengali Muslim regiments or cantonments in East Bengal.²⁴ The Pakistan Armed Forces inherited this unequal structure, with Bengalis constituting only one per cent of their total strength ²⁵ and very little was done to remove regional disparities excepting the formation of an East Bengal Regiment (EBR) in January 1948.

The military justified the continuation of British Indian Army recruitment patterns by perpetuating the British myth of Martial

Races. More importantly, the Pakistan Military High Command, as their British predecessors before them, adopted a national defence strategy which concentrated on the land frontiers of the Western wing. Due to the British strategic perceptions of a Russian threat to the Indian Subcontinent from the northern approaches, attention was focussed more on the northern rather than the southern borders of India. Following the British strategic doctrines,²⁶ the first Pakistani C-in-C, Ayub Khan, adopted the stand that defence of the East lay in the West, and that East Pakistan could not be defended militarily unless the western wing was sufficiently strengthened. According to this strategic analysis, the western wing would be the main target of foreign attack, launched either from India or Afghanistan and the "battle for Pakistan, in the defence of Pakistan, would be fought in the West . . . the nerve centre" of the country. Even in the unlikely case of an attack on East Pakistan, the Pakistan military would adopt an offensive strategy in the West, thereby diverting Indian forces from the East. Thus a majority of forces must be recruited from the West and a maximum amount of military expenditure earmarked for the development of the defence infrastructure of West Pakistan.²⁷

As East Pakistani demands for greater representation and the development of the defence infrastructure in the East wing grew,²⁸ a Committee was formed by the Constituent Assembly to look into the matter, but its recommendations and findings came to naught. According to the Armed Forces Member of the Committee, the implementation of the report was in the hands of neither the legislature nor the executive, but with the C-in-C who "was fast

becoming a Warlord." Ayub was strongly opposed to greater East Pakistani representation, while the "excuse given, of course, was lack of funds and 'priorities'."²⁹

The growing East Pakistani unrest led to an increase in the popularity of East-based parties calling for greater provincial autonomy, such as the Awami League of Maulana Bhashani and the Khrishak Shramik Party of A.K. Fazlul Huq. As the first general elections for the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly drew near, the opposition parties formed a United Front in early 1954, demanding an autonomous East Pakistan, with the Centre controlling only defence, currency and foreign affairs, and also calling for military self-sufficiency for the East wing, including a shift of the naval headquarters from Karachi to Dacca, and the establishment of an ordnance factory in the province.³⁰

The March 1954 elections were a rout for the Muslim League, which won only nine seats in the 309-member House, and Fazlul Huq was sworn in as Chief Minister of East Pakistan. The United Front government's demands for greater autonomy, improved economic and cultural links with India, and the dissolution of the unrepresentative central Cabinet and Constituent Assembly alarmed the central government. The Centre embarked on a campaign to bring down the provincial government, and accused the United Front government of collaborating with communists and Indian agents, with Prime Minister Ali Bogra calling the East Pakistan disturbances a "foul conspiracy", and adding that "Communists and other elements inimical to Pakistan (both) within and from outside the country have

had a hand in instigating and organizing the disturbances."³¹

On 30 May 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed the United Front government on the grounds that it had proved incapable of ruling. Prime Minister Bogra on his part accused the East Pakistani Chief Minister of treason and working towards the disintegration of the country.³² General Iskander Mirza³³ was appointed Governor of East Pakistan, and began his tenure of office by arresting hundreds of political opponents of the central government, including Fazlul Huq and a number of his Cabinet Ministers, while at the same time playing up the issue of communist penetration of the East wing.³⁴ The bureaucrat-controlled central government, with the advice and assistance of the Armed Forces, therefore succeeded in putting down the first organised show of resistance to its authority.³⁵

The events in East Pakistan made the Centre determined to merge the provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit, so that the Bengali challenge could be effectively met. Realising that this would institutionalise the control of the Western-dominated Centre over the provinces, the Bengali representatives in the Constituent Assembly rejected the scheme when it was presented to the Parliament in September 1954. With the backing of Sindhi and Baluchi members, they then passed a Constitution Amendment Bill on 24 September, proposing that the Western wing be composed of six provinces. The bill deprived the head of state of the right to dismiss the Constituent Assembly and Cabinet, and made the executive dependent on the legislature. It also gave the Assembly complete

constitution-making powers and a drafting committee was given until January 1955 to prepare a constitution.³⁶ The Assembly managed to get the support of Prime Minister Bogra, who adjourned it sine die on 21 September before embarking on an official visit to the US, accompanied by C-in-C Ayub Khan, Foreign Minister Zafrulla and Finance Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali.³⁷

The success of the faction opposing the Governor-General was to a large extent dependent on the attitude of the Military High Command. While the Ghulam Mohammed coterie relied on the military's continued support for survival, the Army C-in-C's powers had increased enormously, and the institution was operating more or less autonomously. As Prime Minister Bogra anxiously probed senior military officials on the legislature's move, Ayub Khan decided to throw in his lot with the Governor-General and his bureaucratic allies. Ayub himself had strong views on how Pakistan should be run, which corresponded with those of the clique in power. While in London, en route to the US with Bogra in October 1954, Ayub "produced a document which contained my thinking and set out my approach to the problem facing the country." In the Appreciation, Ayub made clear his aversion to politicians and parliamentary democracy. He advocated a strong presidential system; an electoral college to check the "shortcomings" of universal suffrage; and the establishment of a "controlled form of democracy with checks and counter checks."³⁸ The C-in-C also favored the One Unit scheme, since it was clear by now that the more populous Eastern wing could threaten the interests of the Armed Forces should the future constitutional structure be dictated by the Bengalis.³⁹

The Governor-General, having obtained the support of the military and civil bureaucracies, recalled the Prime Minister from the US. Bogra returned home, accompanied by the C-in-C and Defence Secretary, Iskander Mirza.⁴⁰ While Army contingents made a show of strength in the capital, Karachi, Bogra, finding himself completely powerless, accepted the Governor-General's ultimatum of a reconstituted Cabinet and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Ghulam Mohammed proclaimed a state of General Emergency and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, on the grounds that it had "lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function."⁴¹ The Cabinet was dismissed, and a "Cabinet of Talent", headed by Bogra, was appointed by the Governor-General.

In the new Cabinet all sensitive portfolios were given to serving or former bureaucrats and military men, with Maj. Gen. Mirza as Minister of the Interior, former Secretary-General Chaudhri Mohammad Ali as Minister of Finance and C-in-C Ayub Khan as Minister of Defence.⁴² The civil servants, headed by the Governor-General, now ruled the country, with military backing, through decrees and ordinances. In November 1954, the completely powerless Prime Minister announced the central government's decision to establish a unified administrative unit in West Pakistan by 1955.

Ayub Khan emerged from this power tussle in a very comfortable position as both serving Army Chief and Defence Minister. He later claimed that Ghulam Mohammed had asked him to take over the

administration, and "to produce a constitution in three months," but that he had declined the offer, declaring, "I am engaged in building up the army" and "I can serve this country better in my profession."⁴³ The C-in-C was content with the state of affairs as it was. His appointment as Defence Minister "raised his prestige and that of the army still higher"⁴⁴ and helped him consolidate his position.⁴⁵

He used the opportunity to circulate his "draft constitution paper" to the Cabinet and senior civil and military officials.⁴⁶ But though the military had now openly emerged as a political force, it was still willing to work in partnership with the bureaucracy, so long as the latter continued to fulfil its demands. Hence, while "the strongest voice" in the Cabinet was that of the C-in-C "and there was nothing he could not have done if he wanted", Ayub Khan was willing to exercise patience, since he knew "that the prize was his for the asking."⁴⁷

Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Cold War

The post-Liaquat period in Pakistan-Soviet relations proved to be as turbulent as the internal political arena in Pakistan. Developments within both the Soviet Union and Pakistan were to dictate the unsteady course of the bilateral relationship. On the Soviet side, during the last days of the Stalinist era, the Soviets adopted a more flexible foreign policy, with a reduction on emphasis on the "Two Camps Theory" and stressed the possibilities of peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism.⁴⁸ The Soviets also claimed to be in a position to offer substantial cooperation to the developing

world.

The Soviet Union continued to make overtures to Pakistan, attempting to prevent an extension of Western influence there. Thus the Soviets, in 1951-52, made a number of attempts to improve economic and cultural relations. In April 1952 they offered to provide agricultural machinery and textiles, and when Pakistan was faced with a grave food shortage in September 1952 they agreed to supply 150,000 tons of wheat, in exchange for 22,000 tons of jute and 13,000 tons of cotton.⁴⁹ The Soviet gestures did not, however, lead to any real improvement in the economic linkages between the two countries. Although, for example, a team of Pakistani businessmen on their return from an International Economic Conference in Moscow concluded that "Russia could be an important source of capital goods and other essential commodities", no regular trade agreement was concluded, due to Pakistani hesitancy.⁵⁰

As the Cold War intensified, Soviet concern about the extension of US influence in Pakistan grew. The Soviets were deeply concerned about the possible exploitation of the Kashmir dispute by the West to penetrate the region and acquire bases on Pakistani soil. Anglo-American proposals for a plebiscite in Kashmir, to be supervised by UN forces, were therefore denounced by the Soviet media as "an obvious excuse to infiltrate British and American troops into the country, which will convert it into a base for attack on the Soviet Union and China".⁵¹ And when the Security Council took up the Graham report on Kashmir in January 1952, the Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, breaking the Soviet official silence on

the issue, strongly condemned the proposed UN-sponsored plebiscite as "an impossible demand by the US and Britain," and called the proposed introduction of UN forces to supervise it an Anglo-American excuse "to secure the entrance of their armed forces into Kashmir, so it might be turned into an armed Anglo-American colony" and a "military and strategic base." He also accused the Anglo-Americans of "interference in the internal affairs of Kashmir" and deliberately prolonging "the dispute between India and Pakistan," and added that his government "considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference", through their democratically elected Constituent Assembly.⁵² While Mr. Malik's reservations were reiterated by the Soviet delegate, Valerain Zorin, when the issue was brought up again during the same year, the Soviets continued to refrain from taking sides with either of the regional parties in the dispute, and abstained from voting on all UN resolutions on it.

Soviet internal developments continued to influence the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations, as the new Soviet leadership under Khrushchev emphasised the policy of peaceful coexistence. In a bid to counter the Western policy of containment, an increasingly flexible approach was adopted towards the newly-independent countries of Afro-Asia, with recognition of the existence of a "third force" in the international arena, that of a progressive national bourgeoisie, which followed an independent nonaligned course in foreign policy.⁵³ This reinforced the previous Soviet policy of

improving relations with Pakistan in order to counter Western influence in that country. In a statement in the Supreme Soviet in August 1953, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, G.M. Malenkov, declared that, "The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the successful development of relations with Pakistan and to strengthening of every kind of relations between the two countries."⁵⁴

The Soviet overtures and the more flexible Soviet policy were to bear no fruit in Pakistan-Soviet relations. The post-Liaquat Pakistani leadership, on the contrary, was even more inflexible towards the Soviets and pro-Western in orientation than either Jinnah or Liaquat. Liaquat's successor, Khawaja Nazimuddin, demonstrated his anti-Soviet bias when, in a major speech on foreign policy on 21 October 1951, he omitted any mention of the Eastern bloc, declaring that, "Besides the Moslem states we have friendly relations with other countries. I count among these states the countries of the Commonwealth. I include America and, in addition to these, other countries of the world."⁵⁵

The bureaucratic clique now in political power, which included Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, Secretary-General Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza, Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan and Foreign Secretary, M. Ikramullah, had demonstrated its loyalty to the West during the Liaquat years. Now with complete control over the "formulation and direction of foreign policy", they accelerated their efforts to align Pakistan formally with the West.⁵⁶

A few days after Liaquat's assassination, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah visited the US, where he approached Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee for military equipment "as a gift, under a loan arrangement, or by outright purchase." He implied that Pakistan, in return, "was prepared, when in a sound position, to take a greater part in promoting moderation throughout the Near East."⁵⁷ Later, in talks with the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, David Kennedy, Ikramullah reiterated that Pakistan was vitally interested in the defence of the Middle East. At the same time he warned that with "the establishment of the Embassy of the USSR" in Pakistan, "Russia has been encouraging dissatisfaction" against the Government, and added that if Pakistan "does not get assistance from the West, the Government's position will be grave" and "Pakistan may turn away from the West."⁵⁸

Ikramullah's views were reiterated by Foreign Minister Zafrulla during his visit to the US in November 1951, when he assured Dean Acheson that, "it was inconceivable that Pakistan could ever be on the Soviet side in the event of trouble." He however added that since Pakistan would become "a target of Russian animosity" if it openly sided with the West, it would first require assurances of support and assistance from the West.⁵⁹

Although the Truman Administration initiated a small-scale military programme for Pakistan, it was unwilling to hurry into any long-term agreements or pacts with it.⁶⁰ The new Eisenhower Administration, however, in 1953 began an accelerated effort to

implement the Truman Doctrine of containment of communism by establishing a ring of military bases around the perimeters of the Soviet Union and China. The Pakistanis were particularly pleased with the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, since he had close and cordial links with a number of key Pakistani figures, including Foreign Minister Zafrulla. It was therefore expected that Pakistan-US rapprochement would be "speeded up".⁶¹

The change of government in Pakistan was equally significant, as Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed replaced Prime Minister Nazimuddin in April 1953 with Mohammed Ali Bogra, thereby asserting increased bureaucratic control over all spheres of governmental activity. Bogra, a former Ambassador to the US, was merely a figurehead and more than willing to accept the pro-Western policy directions of the bureaucratic leadership.⁶² With the Ghulam Mohammed clique in control, Pakistan was, more than ever before, the logical choice for US bases and a partner in future US-backed alliances to contain communism in the Near East and Southeast Asia.

In May 1953 Dulles visited a number of Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, including India and Pakistan. During his visit, Pakistan showed willingness to comply with the US anti-Soviet regional strategies, with Bogra declaring that his country was willing to promote collective regional security, and adding that "Pakistan is both a Middle East and South Asian country. We have an abiding interest in the security of countries in the Middle East." Dulles stated that he had "high regard" for the contribution which Pakistan could make for the defence of South and Southeast Asia.⁶³

On his return home, Dulles said that the "strong spiritual faith and martial spirit" of the Pakistanis made them "a dependable bulwark against Communism." Assessing the prospects for a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), he observed that: "A Middle East Defence Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab countries are too engrossed with their quarrels, they pay little heed to the menace of Communism," adding that ". . . there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations show greater awareness of this danger."⁶⁴ Then again, during Senate hearings on a Pakistani request for wheat in June 1953, Dulles reiterated that the people of Pakistan were "strong in their Islamic faith which is absolutely opposed, as our faith is, to the view of Soviet Communism," adding that Pakistan and Turkey were the "two very strong bulwarks" of the free world in a region vulnerable to Soviet expansionism.⁶⁵

A number of developments led the US to accelerate formation of a Middle Eastern military alliance including strategically placed Pakistan. These included the successful Soviet test of a thermonuclear weapon in August 1953, which increased the importance of strategic bases around the Soviet Union from where the Strategic Air Command (SAC) could operate. Nasser's takeover in Egypt in June 1953 also increased Pakistan's importance, since the US' major ally, the UK, was now deprived of bases in the Suez area. Finally, the US-engineered overthrow of Mosaddeq and re-instatement of the Shah meant that Iran could be included in a "Northern-tier" arrangement with Pakistan and Turkey.⁶⁶

The visits to the USA of General Ayub Khan and Ghulam Mohammed in September/November 1953, led to speculation in US media that the two countries were "exploring the possibilities of a military alliance", involving "a sizeable military assistance programme to Pakistan similar to the aid given to Turkey."⁶⁷ Both governments, however, strongly denied the possibility either of a future bilateral military arrangement or of Pakistani provision of base facilities to the Americans in return for military assistance.⁶⁸

These developments heightened Soviet fears that Pakistan was about to join anti-Soviet regional alliances and provide facilities to the Western bloc. The Soviet media expressed concern over the plans "to include Pakistan in the Anglo-US imperialists' aggressive Middle East bloc" and warned the Pakistanis that their participation in the scheme would "mean the political enslavement of Pakistan and constitute a direct threat to its independence."⁶⁹

The changes within the Pakistan government, particularly the dismissal of Nazimuddin, led to a further deterioration in Pakistan-Soviet relations. The new Prime Minister Bogra declared that his country "would be prepared to do everything short of prejudicing its sovereignty to foster friendly relations with the USA", but where relations with the communist bloc were concerned, "the initiative would be left to them."⁷⁰

Ignoring Soviet warnings and protests, the Ghulam Mohammed regime concentrated its attention on formulating defence ties with the Western bloc. The Soviets viewed these developments with

increasing hostility. Following visits by senior Pakistani officials to the US and the Middle East in 1953, particularly that of Ayub and Ghulam Mohammed, the Soviets were convinced that Pakistan was negotiating a "bilateral military pact" with the US which was "closely connected with plans to create a wide-based military bloc of the countries of the Near and Middle East under Washington's control", that would be "a branch of the North Atlantic bloc." They expressed concern that the Pakistan-US negotiations also involved the setting up of "American military bases" on Pakistani territory, which would be used against the Soviet Union.⁷¹

On 30 November 1953 Soviet Ambassador Stetsenko delivered the first formal note of protest to the Pakistan government concerning US news media reports of Pakistani agreement to allow the establishment of US bases. In the note the Soviet government stated that it could not be "indifferent" to reports of negotiations for an agreement which would create "American military bases on the territory of Pakistan, that is, in areas which are near to the USSR borders." It added that Pakistan's joining of the proposed Middle East bloc was also "directly connected with the security of the USSR" and demanded clarification.⁷² While the Pakistan government denied any offer of bases or entry into a US-sponsored alliance, Soviet media continued to criticise Pakistani policy directions. Soviet commentators reiterated that the Pakistan-US negotiations would lead to the establishment of American "military bases" in "areas near to the Soviet frontier", adding that "military bases situated at a distance of several thousand kilometres from America" could not be "of defensive character; they can only have an aggressive purpose,

not only with regard to the Soviet Union, but also with regard to the countries of Asia . . ."73

In its official reply to the Soviet note on 19 December the Pakistan government once again denied the Soviet accusations of a deal, and assured them that Pakistan did not "contemplate taking any step in hostility or unfriendliness" to the USSR, but added that it was "the duty of the Government of Pakistan to take every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan and in the discharge of this paramount duty and all other duties that fell upon the Government, to adopt and take such measures as may appear appropriate and adequate."74

In December 1953, US Vice President Nixon visited Pakistan. While in Karachi, he pledged that the US "would continue to stand by Pakistan against the forces working for its destruction" and expressed his admiration for the "firm determination" of the government and people of Pakistan to thwart communist expansionism. On his return home Nixon urged both publicly and privately that the ring around the communist bloc be closed by the formation of a "military crescent", consisting of a number of friendly Middle Eastern nations, including Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and called for the extension of military assistance to Pakistan.75

These exchanges of visits and public pronouncements served to confirm Soviet suspicions that Pakistan was rushing headlong into a hostile alliance with the West. The year therefore ended with Pakistan-Soviet relations at a new low.

Pakistan's Entry into the Western Alliances

While Pakistan-Soviet relations steadily deteriorated, efforts by pro-Western Pakistani governments to convince the Americans of their country's strategic importance and willingness to serve Western regional interests finally bore fruit. On 19 February 1954, the National Security Council recommended that the Administration support the present Pakistani government "so long as it remains friendly to the United States and seek to insure that any successor government is not Communist-controlled and is friendly to the United States." The NSC called for the provision of military assistance to obtain Pakistan's "available manpower, resources and strategic facilities" and encourage Pakistani "participation in any defence association which is judged to serve the interests of the United States." As a first step to the formation of such a Middle East association, it stated that, "Priority should be given to the establishment of such an arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey."⁷⁶

This first step towards forging an anti-Soviet regional bloc was taken when Pakistan and Turkey announced, on 19 February, their decision to cooperate in the political, economic and cultural spheres and in ways "of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also that of all peace-loving nations."⁷⁷ It was followed, on 22 February 1954, by an official request by the Pakistani Prime Minister "for military assistance within the scope of the US Mutual Security Legislation." The US President responded favorably, stating that such assistance would help to secure

"stability and strength" in the Middle East. According to Eisenhower, Pakistan would use the US military assistance to strengthen its internal security and for self-defence as well as "to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part."⁷⁸

On 2 April 1954, Pakistan and Turkey entered into an "Agreement for Friendly Cooperation", Article Four of which dealt with "consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the field of defence", while Article Six provided for accession to the Agreement in future of "Any state, whose participation is considered by the contracting parties useful for achieving the purposes of the Agreement . . ."⁷⁹

The Pakistan government then concluded a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with the US on 19 May 1954. Under Article One, the US agreed to provide military "equipment, materials, services or other assistance", to be used by the Pakistan government for the maintenance of "its internal security, its legitimate self-defence or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area . . ." Under Article Six, the Pakistan government committed itself to "make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world."⁸⁰ Simultaneously, the two governments issued identical declarations that the MDAA did not establish either an offensive or defensive military alliance, nor did it invoke any obligation for Pakistan to provide military bases to the United States.⁸¹

The US and UK favored a defence alliance of cooperative regional states, willing to pledge their forces for the containment of communism in the Southern sector, which would help close the gap in the ring around the communist bloc. A conference was therefore held in Manila on 6 September 1954 to discuss the formation of such an alliance. Of the Colombo Plan countries, Pakistan was the only state willing to cooperate, while in Southeast Asia the Philippines and Thailand were interested.

The Manila Conference led to the signing of a South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty by Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the USA, UK and France.⁸² The Pakistan government ratified the Manila Pact and became a member of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) on 19 July 1955.

The next regional arrangement which Pakistan joined was the Baghdad Pact. In 1951-52, the US and UK had at first discussed the possibilities of forming a Middle East Command and then a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) to protect and advance Western interests in this strategic area. By 1953, however, in the aftermath of Nasser's takeover in Egypt, it became increasingly clear that a large number of Middle Eastern states, engrossed in inter-regional disputes or differences with Western powers, would either be indifferent or actively opposed to its formation. Dulles, for example, told the ANZUS Council meeting in September 1953 that, "MEDO is not practical as long as the sponsoring powers are not sure of the cooperation of the countries participating in the alliance."⁸³

Anglo-American attention, therefore, began to focus on a "Northern-tier" arrangement focussed on "two strong points", Pakistan and Turkey, with the possible inclusion of Iraq.

With US and UK encouragement, Iraq and Turkey signed a "Pact of Mutual Cooperation" in defence and security. Britain associated itself with the Pact on 5 April 1955, and on 1 July, the Pakistan Prime Minister announced his country's decision to join the arrangement.⁸⁴ Pakistan formally joined the Pact on 17 September, followed by Iran on 3 November 1955.⁸⁵ Pakistan thus became the only Asian country to join both the military alliances, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.⁸⁶ There was, however, to be no Joint Military Command on the lines of NATO, and the US declined to associate itself formally with the Baghdad Pact, fearing an adverse regional reaction.

The Pakistan Military and the Move Towards Alignment

The Pakistan military played a significant role in influencing Pakistan's foreign policy towards alignment with the West. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the military had rapidly consolidated its position in the internal power structure, particularly after the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government in 1953. The Armed Forces, represented by their C-in-C, were now consulted by the central government on every important issue, in any field, including foreign policy.⁸⁷

Ayub Khan had been convinced as early as 1951 of the need for a steady source of military assistance from a "strong and reliable friend,"⁸⁸ with the logical choice for the pro-Western military being the United States. The military therefore not only approved of the Ghulam Mohammed Administration's attempts to forge closer links with the West, but itself played a major role during the negotiations. Various channels of communication were used by the Pakistani Military High Command to convey their point of view to their counterparts in the Pentagon and to the American civil administration.

As the Cold War intensified in the last days of the Truman Administration, the Pakistan Army C-in-C briefed Maj. Gen. M.G. Jilani, on his way to the US in August 1952 as Pakistan's Senior Military Liaison Officer, "to negotiate with the authorities at the Pentagon and impress upon them the desirability of strengthening Pakistan militarily, for the regional security of the Middle East and South-East Asia" and to explore "the possibilities of Pakistan joining in a defence alliance." Ayub took this step without consulting the central government. General Jilani sent him "periodic reports" about "his progress with the authorities in Washington."⁸⁹

Ayub Khan then sent the Master-General of Ordnance, Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid, to initiate discussions with the Pentagon on possible military cooperation between the two countries. According to General Hamid: "I went in there to clear the ground, to see how the lay of the land lies, to see what is possible . . ."⁹⁰ The discussions proved very fruitful.⁹¹ At the conclusion of the talks, the Director of the Office

of Military Assistance in the Pentagon disclosed that "a very definite understanding . . . that a programme" of military cooperation "would be undertaken" had been reached, and that the Pakistanis had made clear their military requirements.⁹² He was convinced that a military alliance with Pakistan would be advantageous to American interests, due to the "fighting quality of Pakistani soldiers, the anti-communist outlook of the Pakistani people and the strategic location of Pakistan's Airfields which could offer a point of return to US planes after forays into Soviet territory."⁹³

Shahid Hamid's visit was followed by a visit of the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Radford, to Pakistan in November 1952. While in Karachi, Radford emphasised that Pakistan was strategically placed to play a significant role in preventing the expansion of global communism. During his visit he held talks with Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed and C-in-C Ayub Khan, was particularly impressed by Ayub, and continued to maintain contact with him.⁹⁴ Internally, the Pakistan Military High Command was in constant touch with American diplomats based in Pakistan, whom they reminded of the military's pro-Western orientation and also told of the Pakistan Armed Forces' desire to contribute to the policy of containment of communism through bilateral and regional arrangements.

In private conversations with American officials, Ayub made it amply clear that if the military was given assurances of US support and assistance, it would force the politicians to align themselves formally with the Western bloc. At the same time, the Americans were warned that hesitancy in deciding to extend support to

Pakistan and include it in the proposed regional alliances would weaken the position of its pro-Western military and political leadership.

The Pakistan Army High Command emphasised that anti-American feeling was already on the increase due to America's non-committal attitude on sensitive regional issues such as Kashmir. Warning US Consul-General Gibson in September 1952 about this, Ayub stressed that "the US attitude towards Pakistan should be the same as it was towards Turkey, since Pakistan could be an effective strength against Communism," whereas India would remain neutral.⁹⁵

In continuing representations to the Americans to extend military assistance, Ayub argued that "Pakistan is basically pro-Western in its outlook" and a "deep friend" of the United States. He pointed out that he had discussed potential alignment with the West with the country's leading politicians and "had told them that they must make up their minds to go wholeheartedly with the West." He added that "the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand". The crux of the matter, he said, was that "the Pakistan Army was friendly to the US" but this "friendship will be consolidated by military aid and weakened without."⁹⁶

He urged the Americans to extend military aid to Pakistan and include it in the alliances, and argued that "failure to grant aid will inevitably be interpreted as a decision on the part of the US to allow its foreign policy to be directed by Nehru", which would damage "American prestige in this country"; and if the US followed a

"weak-kneed" policy its "name will be mud in Pakistan" as well as in the region. He warned that Pakistan had been "subjected to public official pressure from other countries, particularly India and the USSR" and that American indecision would, moreover, be "disastrous" not only for the US in Pakistan but also for Pakistan's present political and military leadership.⁹⁷

With the advent of the Eisenhower Administration, he was more hopeful of a favorable US response. In continued private conversations with US authorities in Pakistan, therefore, he called on the Americans to "invite Pakistan to participate in a regional defence organization immediately", like the proposed MEDO, adding that "if there were no such organization at present, we should have a bilateral agreement", and made it amply clear that in the event of a favorable American decision the military would dictate the Pakistani response. The Pakistan Cabinet, he said, "did not have enough internationally-minded people," but "they would do what he told them to do," and he repeatedly stated that "he would stand no nonsense from the politicians."⁹⁸

This stand was reassuring to the US Administration, which was aware of the considerable influence exercised by the Armed Forces High Command in the internal power structure and the increasing dependence of the Ghulam Mohammed Administration on it. The Americans were also interested in the outlook of the military, since the Pakistan Armed Forces would be required to play an important role in the proposed Western scheme to contain communism through regional alliances. That the Americans were impressed by their

potential can be seen in Secretary of State Dulles' testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations after his return from Pakistan in May 1953. Dulles remarked: "I was truly surprised by the carriage and demeanour of their people and the army", adding that, "They had an armed guard for my visit which was one of the finest I have ever seen in the world."⁹⁹ According to Ayub's biographer, Col. Ahmed, Dulles was "full of praise for the military potential of Pakistan" and referred to General Ayub Khan as "the most outstanding personality I met throughout my tour."¹⁰⁰

As the Americans concluded that the Pakistan military could play an important role in furthering US objectives in the region, Ayub continued to play a vital role in the negotiations on a future anti-Soviet alignment. In July 1953 the State Department received an official approach from the Pakistan Defence Secretary, Major General Mirza, seeking approval for a visit by Ayub to the US. Arriving in the US in late September, ostensibly to tour American military installations and explore the possibilities of increasing the numbers of Pakistani officers in American schools, Ayub used his visit to initiate discussions on a future US-Pakistan defence alliance, independent of any Pakistani Cabinet supervision, with the appearance of a "free agent" with full powers.¹⁰¹

He spoke with the "highest authorities" in the land, including Dulles, Under-Secretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Radford.¹⁰² During these talks he offered "complete cooperation," including the "use of Pakistan facilities" and the services of the Pakistan Army, if the US agreed

to enter into "bilateral military cooperation" with Pakistan.¹⁰³ Ayub was then joined by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, who also pressed for a military alliance. As the C-in-C and Governor-General toured the US, the American news media leaked information about the negotiations, emphasising the benefits which would accrue to the United States. It was pointed out that apart from the benefit of obtaining bases very near the Soviet Union, the proposed pact would also mean the cooperation of the Pakistan Army, an approximately 300,000 strong "friendly army" which was "admirably positioned to fill a possible gap to the immediate West."¹⁰⁴ As a result of the talks both the Pentagon and State Department agreed to extend military assistance to Pakistan, and this decision was conveyed to Ayub before he left for home.¹⁰⁵

Prior to his departure, Ayub said to Bedell Smith, " I trust that you will keep an eye from your angle and I will do the best I can from our side."¹⁰⁶ He and other high-ranking Army officials then continued to pressure the US for a "quick decision on the deal."¹⁰⁷

When Vice-President Nixon arrived in Pakistan in December 1953 to assess the possibilities of a military alliance, the C-in-C once again played an important role, stressing Pakistan's antipathy to communism and expressing his concern about the communist threat, both ideological and military, to the region.¹⁰⁸ On his return home, Nixon strongly advocated the extension of military assistance to Pakistan and the establishment of a "Northern-tier" arrangement, comprising Pakistan, Turkey and Iran.

On 19 February 1954, the NSC recommended that the Administration provide military assistance to Pakistan. According to the NSC study, a major US objective to be achieved by extending such aid was to "insure that in the event of general war, Pakistan will make available manpower, resources and strategic facilities" to the West, thereby acknowledging the significance of the Pakistan military.¹⁰⁹ During the same month President Eisenhower announced the US decision to extend military assistance. According to Ayub's biographer, the "decisive factor" responsible for this significant change in US policy were the "persuasive and untiring efforts of General Ayub."¹¹⁰

An American precondition for a formal US-Pakistan bilateral military arrangement was the conclusion of a defence pact between Pakistan and Turkey. Ayub was an active participant in the discussions which followed, and accompanied his Prime Minister to the United States and Turkey in both 1953 and in 1954. The negotiations led to the signing of the Turco-Pakistan agreement of 2 April 1954 and the US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of May 1954. Ayub's visit to Turkey in June 1955 led to Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact, which was described by Ayub as "the dawn of a new ushering in of stability and security for the Muslim world in the Middle East."¹¹¹

Pakistani Motivations and the Military

The true significance of the military's role in guiding Pakistan into anti-Soviet alliances can be seen in an assessment of Pakistani

motivations for alignment with the West. It was obvious that the main motivating factor for alignment was not the fear of Soviet or communist expansionism. The Pakistani leadership, both civil and military, was indeed hostile to the Soviet bloc. But, as has been discussed earlier in the thesis, the Soviets were not regarded as an immediate threat to Pakistan's security by the country's defence and foreign policy formulators.¹¹² The Pakistanis, therefore, during the period under examination, downplayed a potential Soviet threat from the North and this was obvious in the strategies adopted in the northwestern approaches of the country.¹¹³

The Pakistani leadership of the time justified the adoption of an aligned position during the height of the Cold War on a number of grounds. Firstly, it was claimed that Pakistan needed external diplomatic and material support against its threatening and hostile neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Secondly, entry into the pacts was justified on the grounds of Pakistan's desperate economic plight. Finally, it was argued that US military aid would help Pakistan to "build our defences to the requisite level" without imposing on it a "heavier financial burden than it has hitherto carried". It would then be in a position to "devote increasing sums" from its revenue to "the development of our country and the promotion of the welfare of the people".¹¹⁴

As far as the "threat" from Afghanistan was concerned, relations between the two countries had in fact been tense, due to Afghanistan's continued support of the Pakhtunistan issue. In the early 1950s, there were limited clashes along the border, with the

Pakistan military being deployed to subdue Afghan and local supporters of the Pakhtun cause. Yet Afghanistan had not at any point been considered either by the Pakistanis or their British predecessors as more than a minor irritant along the northwest frontiers. The Afghans were in no position to pose a credible threat to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity on their own. The only credible threat scenario would have been one in which the Afghans were supported by the neighbouring Soviets. The civil and military leadership in Pakistan did not, however, envisage the possibilities of such a regional alliance emerging. Hence the Afghan "threat" was an unlikely motivation for Pakistan's entry into the alliances.¹¹⁵

A large number of analysts, Pakistani and foreign, accept the Indian "threat", actual or perceived, as the main motivating factor behind Pakistan's alignment with the West.¹¹⁶ The relations between India and Pakistan had, indeed, been tense in the past, with the two countries engaging in a limited war in Kashmir. Hostility towards India was rife in Pakistan, with Pakistani governments frequently resorting to aggressive anti-Indian rhetoric. But Pakistan's hostility towards India did not imply "fear" of Indian aggression.¹¹⁷ Equally significant was the fact that Indo-Pakistan relations had been on the mend at the time of Pakistan's overtures to the West and negotiations leading to its entry into the pacts.

Moves for Indo-Pakistan rapprochement had begun soon after Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination. His successor Nazimuddin and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru began a correspondence on the

possibilities of direct talks to improve bilateral relations. The next Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, continued to follow this policy. The Pakistani leadership now spoke of the need for joint defence with India, with the two Prime Ministers meeting in London in June 1953 and Nehru visiting Pakistan in the next month.¹¹⁸

The main source of conflict between the two countries remained Kashmir. A breakthrough of sorts was achieved during Bogra's return visit to India in August 1953. In the joint communique issued at the end of the visit the two Prime Ministers declared that the Kashmir dispute "should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State", with the "most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people" being "a fair and impartial plebiscite."¹¹⁹ It was also decided to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator by the end of August 1954.

It is therefore clear that while Pakistan's suspicions of India had lingered, its policy of hostility towards its neighbour had slowly been replaced at least overtly by one of rapprochement. Hence Pakistan's opting for the Western-sponsored pacts could not have been motivated primarily by its perceptions of an Indian "threat" to its security and territorial integrity.

Yet another motivating factor put forward by the Pakistani leadership had been the decline in the country's economic position. This presents the pact as a means of gaining desperately needed economic assistance.

The Pakistani economy had deteriorated in 1953, but in that year Pakistan still had a trade surplus of Rs 295 million.¹²⁰ Even if the Pakistani leadership had still felt the need for external aid, the Western bloc had not made membership of defence pacts a precondition for the extension of such assistance, nor had the Pakistani leaders attempted to explore any alternative source of aid, such as the Soviet bloc.

The unfavorable economic situation in Pakistan was, in fact, closely linked with the high expenditure on defence. Justifying Pakistan's decision to approach the US for military assistance, Prime Minister Bogra had stated: "Hitherto we have been spending on an average two-thirds of our total income each year on our armed forces. Similarly a major part of our foreign exchange earnings has had to be set apart annually for the import of defence equipment We have thus been left with only a small part of our revenue and foreign exchange earnings with which to develop our country." Yet Pakistan had "despite the very large sums and resources . . . not been able to become as strong militarily as we should like." He added that: "The grant of military aid by America will help us to build our defences to the requisite level without imposing on our country a heavier financial burden than it has hitherto carried," thereby allowing the government to spend more on economic development.¹²¹ The Pakistani leadership therefore implied that a major motivation for alignment was the desire to reduce defence expenditure by acquiring external military assistance.

While it is possible that this emphasis on defence expenditure was

the consequence of a lack of belief in the possibility of long-term rapprochement with India, it must be stressed that political considerations played a significant role in defence and foreign policy formulation in Pakistan. It has been noted that the "idea that a country has a foreign enemy is easy for the people to understand. It can also provide a powerful stimulus to national unity. For Pakistan, this role was filled by India. The general public did not understand the intricate defence problems but they supported any effort which they thought would preserve and protect Pakistan and enable her to face the 'threat' from India and Afghanistan . . ."122 The Indian and Afghan 'threats' were used not only to stimulate "national unity," but also as a convenient whipping boy by the bureaucratic clique ruling Pakistan to obtain domestic support and suppress political opposition. Such strategies were resorted to in the dismissal of the United Front government in the East wing in 1954 and against supporters of provincial autonomy in the NWFP.

The use of the "threat" from a hostile India and Afghanistan for internal political considerations was particularly convenient for the Armed Forces. As the ambitious C-in-C vied for the largest share of the country's meagre economic resources, the strain on the economy was tremendous. It was, however, very difficult for the budding opposition, mainly from the East wing, which was underrepresented in the Armed Forces, to curb the continuously increasing defence expenditure. This was due to the fact that the expenditure was justified on the grounds of "threats" posed to the country's very existence by its hostile neighbours. The military benefitted not only financially; this emphasis on the ever-present external hostility also

enhanced its position as the guardian of Pakistan's territorial integrity. Thus the politically expedient use of the external threat had an impact both on domestic politics and on the orientation of foreign policy. Internally, the policy was resorted to in order to suppress political dissent, while externally it was used to justify the decision to opt for alignment with the West in the Cold War. For the Armed Forces, it was a useful internal tool to claim a disproportionately large share of annual governmental expenditure. Externally, a policy of alignment was in fact best suited to fulfil the requirements of the military.

**TOTAL REVENUE AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN¹²³**

Year	Revenue (millions of Rs)	Defence Expenditure (millions of Rs)	Defence Expenditure as % of Revenue
1951-52	1,448.4	907.9	62.69
1952-53	1,334.3	994.6	74.54
1953-54	1,110.5	802.3	72.24

The Mutual Defence Assistance Alliance with the US and the subsequent alliances to which Pakistan became party meant above all the provision of military funds, equipment and training for its Armed Forces. According to an authoritative source: "Before aid was forthcoming, the Pakistan Army, though first class in manpower, was ill-equipped" and the Army C-in-C "could not . . . ensure reliable sources of supply to meet present and future needs."¹²⁴ Pakistan had virtually no defence industry, and was desperate to acquire a constant supply of modern weaponry from reliable sources.¹²⁵ Not

only was sophisticated military hardware expensive to acquire, it was mainly released by the major arms suppliers only to politically reliable allies. Hence even if the "financial resources had been available, Pakistan did not have sufficient diplomatic status to purchase the arms and equipment needed to modernize her army."¹²⁶

As the Americans rewarded allies with military aid and equipment in the Cold War era, it was but natural for the pro-Western Pakistani Armed Forces to work actively in favor of alignment against the Soviet bloc.¹²⁷ A policy of rapprochement with neighbouring states might have reduced regional tensions, but would also have weakened the military's case. A policy of alignment, however, did not necessarily aim at armed confrontation with the Eastern bloc but was best suited to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. Thus, for instance, highranking Pakistan Army officers informed the Americans that, "such clearcut alignment of Pakistan with the West" was "the cheapest way for Pakistan to get modern military equipment without draining its own treasury".¹²⁸

The military had by now acquired considerable political influence, and was in a position to dictate the orientation of the country's foreign policy. The Ghulam Mohammed clique was heavily dependent on the support of the Armed Forces, as domestic unrest was on the increase. The military's support for a policy of alignment did not, however, lead to tensions with the bureaucracy because of both the latter's pro-Western orientation and the military's role in assisting the bureaucracy in controlling the central government.

For the Army Chief, General Ayub, apart from the acquisition of modern weaponry, a policy of alignment promised other equally important benefits. The addition of external defence funding to the substantial internal defence expenditure would mean a corresponding strengthening of the military's political influence in the country.¹²⁹ At the same time, the emphasis on the regional 'threats' would ensure continued acceptance of maximum domestic spending on defence and of the military's importance as guardian of Pakistan's territorial integrity. Entry into the pacts would also strengthen Ayub's own position within the Armed Forces. According to a former CIA official, Ayub "engaged in establishing his predominance in the Pakistani military, was attempting to deal directly with the United States on the amount and type of equipment and defence-support to be supplied" since the "larger the program and the greater his autonomy in acquiring and using aid, the greater impression he could make as the one who could get what the military wanted."¹³⁰

It can therefore be seen that Pakistan's entry into the Western-sponsored alliances and the bilateral military relationship with the US was not dictated by the necessity of bolstering a faltering economy or by defence and security concerns alone. The decision was to a considerable extent influenced by the orientation and interests of the Armed Forces, with the Military High Command playing an active role in formulating and influencing Pakistan's foreign policy directions.

The Soviet Union and Aligned Pakistan

Pakistan's entry into the alliances led to an intensification of governmental anti-Soviet and anti-communist rhetoric. Pakistan-Soviet relations had sharply deteriorated even while entry was being negotiated. Once Pakistan formally joined the Western bloc, according to a senior Pakistan official, it soon became "more anti-Communist than the United States itself."¹³¹ The Pakistani leadership used the "threat" of communism in the internal context as a means of suppressing internal dissent and opposition, while at the same time, condemning Soviet "expansionism" and "global communism" in international forums.

Internally, the Ghulam Mohammed clique used the communist "threat" to forcibly suppress domestic opposition just prior to and following Pakistan's entry into the alliances. This was the strategy deployed by the Centre during the language riots in Dacca in 1952. Then again, during the Karachi student demonstrations in January 1953, the Chief Commissioner, A.T. Naqi, stated that he had reliable information that the riots were communist-inspired, although he provided little evidence to support his claim.¹³²

The communist "threat" was also used by the government to neutralise the threat to central control posed by the pro-autonomy United Front alliance in East Pakistan. The East Pakistani provincial polls were held while the central government was negotiating the pacts with the West. Amongst the more prominent United Front personalities was the left-leaning leader of the Awami League,

Maulana Bhashani, who was staunchly opposed to the country's drift towards alignment. The United Front, therefore, mobilised opposition against the proposed alliance and, on 22 September 1953 observed a "Day for Struggle against Imperialism" throughout the Eastern wing.

After the United Front became the provincial government in March 1954, it continued to oppose the policy of alignment. Demonstrations and rallies were organised against the central government's foreign policy, and 162 members of the new Provincial Assembly issued a statement calling for abandonment of the alignment policy.

The Centre reacted by dismissing the provincial government and imposing Governor's rule in May 1954, soon after the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. Chief Minister Fazlul Huq was accused of treason, and communist forces blamed for the domestic turmoil in the province. While Prime Minister Bogra claimed that "Communists and other elements inimical to Pakistan . . . have had a hand in instigating and organising the disturbances",¹³³ the new Governor of East Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, alleged that "the worst among the subversive elements" in the East wing "were the communists." He added that the "spreading of disorder and anarchy" in the province was "done in furtherance of their (communist) designs of which the inspiration and guidance came from outside Pakistan", implying Soviet involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs.¹³⁴

The central government then banned the CPP, first in the East wing in June 1954 and in West Pakistan on 24 July, and embarked on large-scale arrests of political opponents, including members of the Pakistan-Soviet Friendship Association. A group of communists arrested in Lahore were accused of working as paid agents of the Soviet Embassy.¹³⁵ Prime Minister Bogra also justified the suppression of political opposition on the grounds that the government was taking every measure possible to fight international communism.¹³⁶

The United Front's victory in East Pakistan, on a pro-autonomy and anti-alignment platform, had been welcomed by the Soviet Union. Soviet analysts claimed that the 1954 election results were proof that "the people of Pakistan are categorically opposed to their country's participation in America's aggressive war plans", and that the "chief reason for the Muslim League's defeat" was "the unpopularity of its foreign policy."¹³⁷

The dismissal of the Fazlul Huq ministry and the subsequent ban on the CPP and repression of leftists in the country therefore added to the tensions between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The Soviets accused the Americans of involvement in the dismissal. "This reactionary regime", alleged one Soviet analyst, "has been established . . . as a direct consequence of US interference in the country's internal affairs" since the United Front government had been "dissolved on direct orders from Washington", eleven days after the signing of a US-Pakistan military deal.¹³⁸ The Pakistani government's actions, it was alleged, were part of "a plot of the

Pakistani reactionaries who are trying to suppress the popular resistance to Pakistan's conversion into an American colony and Pentagon air base" in accordance with the "anti-national policy of the Muslim League."¹³⁹

The bilateral relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated. Even before Pakistan entered formally into an alliance relationship with the West, Prime Minister Bogra declared that the country's relations with the communist countries would be left to the latter's initiative, implying that Pakistan was uninterested in actively pursuing closer ties with the Eastern bloc.¹⁴⁰ A month after signing the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the Pakistan government announced its intentions to impose "full and complete" reciprocal restrictions on the movement of Soviet diplomats in Pakistan. On 27 July 1954, restrictions were officially imposed on the movement of Soviet diplomatic personnel and their dependants in the capital within a 35-mile radius, with the Karachi General Post Office as the centre.¹⁴¹ Although these restrictions were reciprocal in nature, their importance lay in the fact that the Pakistan government had earlier raised no objections to restrictions on the movement of its diplomats in the Soviet Union.

Other measures designed to show the government's disinterest in cultivating closer relations with the Soviet Union included denial of visas to a Soviet delegation wanting to visit East Pakistan; cancellation of the license of a Soviet-owned insurance company operating in Pakistan, on the grounds that the Soviets did not allow foreign insurance companies on their soil; and in September 1954,

the Pakistan government asked for permission to distribute propaganda literature within the Soviet Union.¹⁴²

The Pakistanis also launched a virulent anti-Soviet campaign in international forums. At the Conference of South Asian Prime Ministers in Colombo in April 1954, for example, Prime Minister Bogra sponsored a resolution calling global communism "the biggest potential danger" to the region and warned that while the South Asian states "can rid ourselves of colonialism . . . any country overrun by communism would be lost forever."¹⁴³ Then again at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, the Pakistani delegation blamed the Cold War on the expansionist ambitions of the Soviets, called the Warsaw Pact an offensive military alliance, and warned the international community of the dangers posed by global communism to newly independent states.¹⁴⁴

The Soviets had been aware that Pakistani alignment with the West would lead to a further deterioration of the uneasy Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relationship. But they were particularly concerned that Pakistan's entry into the pacts would not only increase Western influence there, but would also involve a quid pro quo, namely the establishment of Western bases on Pakistani soil in return for military assistance. Hence, while the negotiations were still underway, the Soviets launched an aggressive propaganda campaign aimed not only at discrediting the pacts in the global and regional arenas but also at convincing a Pakistani audience of their government's "shortsightedness" in pursuing a policy which, the Soviets alleged, would undermine Pakistan's territorial integrity,

sovereignty and future well-being.

Thus, while Pakistan was negotiating the pacts, a Soviet analyst alleged that, "The supply of American arms must inevitably convert Pakistan into an American military base. And this is fraught with danger not only to Pakistan but to all the Asian countries."¹⁴⁵ As Pakistan entered into a socio-economic agreement with Turkey in February 1954, Soviet commentators claimed that the alliance would further the "aggressive plans" of the US in the Middle East and South East Asia and its "immediate purpose is to convert Pakistan into an American military base." The subsequent Turco-Pakistan agreement of April 1954 was condemned in even stronger language. The pact, it was alleged, bore "all the hallmarks of American imperialist aggression which threatens the security and independence of many countries." At the same time, it was claimed that this short-sighted policy on the part of Pakistani "ruling circles" would lead to the subservience of Pakistan's "domestic and foreign policy concerns to American interests."¹⁴⁶

In March 1954, the Soviet Union handed a second formal protest note to Pakistan, accusing it of intending to join anti-Soviet regional pacts and agreeing to provide military bases to the US. The Soviets warned that such a course was "not in her interests and cannot bring any good to the people of Pakistan, who like other people, are interested in peace, the protection of their independence and the improvement of their welfare."¹⁴⁷ Thus the Soviets made a careful distinction between the policies followed by the allegedly reactionary "ruling circles" in Pakistan, entering into alliances to

advance their self-interest, and the "peaceloving" Pakistani people. The Pakistani reply of 4 May 1954 denied the allegations, and stressed the defensive nature of the agreement.¹⁴⁸

Rejecting the Pakistani explanations, the Soviets continued to criticise Pakistan in sweeping and propagandistic terms. When Pakistan entered into the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the Soviets alleged that "Pakistan is being converted into an American base of war and is assigned a definite place in America's general strategic plan." In this way, Pakistan would "henceforth serve America's aggressive designs against the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and against the national liberation movements in the Near and Middle East and South Asia."¹⁴⁹

Similarly, the Soviets strongly condemned Pakistan's entry into the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. SEATO was denounced as a "military threat directed against the people of Asia", aimed at the "preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of national liberation movements and interference in the affairs of the Chinese People's Republic and other Asian countries." The Baghdad Pact came in for even more serious criticism. Soviet commentators stated that the Western-sponsored Middle East "military blocs", of which Pakistan was a member, were being set up "right on the Soviet frontiers", and were "directed against the USSR and the peoples' democracies." At the same time, it was claimed that these pacts placed "a new means . . . at the disposal of the colonial powers, America and Britain to bring pressure to bear on the member countries", adding that, "This in itself constitutes a serious threat to

the Soviet Union and security of the peoples of the Near and Middle East."¹⁵⁰ It was therefore obvious that Pakistan's entry into the pacts had seriously impaired its bilateral ties with the Soviets.

Summary

During the post-Liaquat period, tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to increase and reached a peak when Pakistan formally entered into anti-Soviet alliances with the West.

Political developments in Pakistan contributed significantly to the country's foreign policy directions. Although the bureaucracy had been a dominant force during the Jinnah and Liaquat years, it now came out in the open, as senior retired and serving bureaucrats consolidated their hold over the central government.

These internal political developments were closely interlinked with the global environment, as the Cold War intensified and the new Republican Administration in America upgraded Pakistan's potential role in its strategy of containing communism through regional military blocs. The Americans were aware of the internal political strength of the Pakistani bureaucracy, and the latter had already proved their loyalty to the US in the early years of Pakistan's existence. Their constant overtures to the West were finally rewarded, as Pakistan's strategic significance as a potential Western base of operations against the Soviet Union grew.

The bureaucracy in Pakistan could not, however, have either consolidated their internal position or achieved their major foreign policy objective - alignment with the West - without the active support and assistance of the military. The Military High Command found it expedient to exercise power in partnership with the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy in turn ensured that the interests of the Armed Forces, in particular a continuation of the enormous internal defence expenditure, were not endangered by the growing opposition in the East wing.

In foreign policy, the military was to play an even more prominent role. In fact, a major determining factor leading to Pakistan's entry into the alliances was the self-interest of the Armed Forces. Domestic defence expenditure was not sufficient for the military, and the need was felt to supplement it from external sources. An equally pressing requirement for the Armed Forces was the acquisition of sophisticated hardware from reliable as well as ideologically acceptable "friends". Moreover, the military decided not to leave the initiative in foreign policy to their bureaucratic partners, but embarked on independent, although parallel, efforts to woo the Western bloc. This course had already been initiated during the Jinnah and Liaquat years, but under Ghulam Mohammed the Armed Forces adopted a completely autonomous approach. C-in-C Ayub Khan, on his own accord, went so far as to offer not just military facilities on Pakistani soil to the US, but even the use of the Armed Forces to further Western regional objectives. These offers of assistance and active cooperation were to influence strongly the American decision to include Pakistan in its policy of containment of

communism through regional blocs ringing the Soviet and Chinese borders. The military's importance lay in the fact that the Americans were not only conscious of the dependence of the central government on the Armed Forces for survival, but were also eager to utilise the Pakistani Armed Forces in their regional strategies.

As the coordinated efforts of the military and bureaucracy in Pakistan led to the country's formal entry into bilateral and regional anti-communist alliances, Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union declined sharply. The bilateral relations between the two countries had suffered a series of setbacks as the Pakistani "ruling circles" followed a policy of using the communist "threat" to forcibly suppress domestic opposition.

The Pakistani rejection of Soviet overtures, and the adoption of an aggressively hostile anti-Soviet posture after Pakistan's entry into the alliances, led to a further deterioration of the relationship. The Soviets were now convinced that Pakistan's entry into the alliances involved a quid pro quo, that is, the offer of military facilities to the West, thereby posing a direct threat to Soviet security. Hence the interests and orientations of Pakistan's military and bureaucratic leadership led to the country's alignment with the West and the adoption of an openly confrontationist stand against the Soviet Union. The ambiguity of the foreign policies of Jinnah and Liaquat had been abandoned. Pakistan was now a member of the Western bloc in the Cold War.

Footnotes - Chapter Three

- 1 Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (Columbia University Press, New York, 1963), pp.169-170. Dawn, 18 October 1951.
- 2 H. Khuhro, "Pakistan's Experiments in Democracy", G.F. Hudson (ed.), Reform and Revolution in Asia (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1972), p. 94. Kamruddin Ahmad, The Social History of East Pakistan (Orient Longmans, Dacca, 1967), p. 94. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p.49.
- 3 L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan (Faber and Faber, London, 1962), p. 146.
- 4 Shahid J. Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Re-evaluation", Asian Survey (Vol. 1X, No. 4, April 1969), p. 243. See also Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Dawson, Kent, 1979), pp. 67-68 and Hamza Alavi, op.cit., pp.72-73.
- 5 Bilal Hashmi, "Dragon Seed: Military in the State", Hassan Gardezi, Jamil Rashid (eds.), op.cit., p. 102.
- 6 In the C-in-C's perceptions, "Towards the end, Liaquat was being challenged from several quarters. Politics became regionalized" while the "affairs of the Muslim League, the governing party, were in a mess." Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 40-41.
- 7 According to Ayub, "It seemed every one of them had got himself promoted in one way or another. The termination of the Prime Minister's life had come as the beginning of a new career for them".Ibid., p. 41.
- 8 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 161.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 167-168. See also Dawn, 25 August 1952.
- 10 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 170.
- 11 For details of the anti-Ahmediya agitation, see Chief Justice

- Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 2nd ed., 1980), pp. 41-73.
- 12 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp. 179-180.
- 13 This was later confirmed by Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan and by Iskander Mirza himself. Dawn, 20 May 1981; Morning News, 18 July 1962.
- 14 Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, "The Nation and the Armed Forces", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, Nos. 4-5, 1985), p. 3.
- 15 In conversation with US officials, C-in-C Ayub declared that he "would take no nonsense from the politicians", while Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza said that the Lahore Martial Law "should be continued for a considerable period, in order that the politicians would understand that they had a duty of patriotism towards the country and could not act for their own selfish purposes." Memo of conversation between C-in-C Ayub Khan and First Secretary, Charles Withers. From American Embassy, Karachi, to State Department, 15 March 1953, 790d. 00/1-1953. American Consul General, Lahore, to State Department, 19 March 1953, 790.d 00/3-1953. See also Dawn, 23 March 1953.
- 16 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp. 187-188.
- 17 Maj.Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p.146, pp. 147-148.
- 18 American Consul General, Lahore, to State Department, 13 February 1953, 790d. 00/2-1953.
- 19 A Pakistani analyst has described this move of the Governor-General as "the mechanism of the first successful coup d'etat" in the country. M.B. Naqvi, "Martial Laws in Pakistan: An Historical Survey", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, No. 12, 1985), pp. 19-20. See also Dawn, 18 April 1953 and Ahmed Husain, Politics and People's Representation in Pakistan (Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, 1972), p. 40.
- 20 Akmal Hussain, "Pakistan: The Crisis of the State", Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan

Experience (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1985), p. 209.

- 21 Challenging the legitimacy of the Governor-General's action, Khawaja Nazimuddin said that "constitutionally and legally he has no right to make such a demand because he is purely a constitutional Governor-General. I also told him that I command confidence of the Legislature and the country and, therefore, am entitled to remain in office." A spokesman for the Governor-General, however, responded that the "conventional office of the Prime Minister could not be read as a constitutional office." Dawn, 19 April 1953. See also I.A. Rahman, "Powers of President and Prime Minister: Lessons of Crises in Pakistan: 1953-69", Viewpoint (Vol. IV, No. 34, 1 April 1979), p. 8.
- 22 Commenting on the dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet in a conversation with US Consul General Gibson, C-in-C Ayub Khan stated that, "the change in the Centre was God-given and that he had worked hard to have something along this line accomplished." He added that Ghulam Mohammed had asked him "to remain in Karachi and that he could expect trouble from some of the politicians over the change in government", but the General "informed the Governor-General that there would be no trouble ..." Ayub ended the conversation by informing Gibson that "the Pakistan Government leaned on the Army too much for advice and support. It was essential that the Government stand on its own legs", but added that he and the Army "would see that nothing happened to Pakistan." Memorandum of Conversation on 21 April 1953 between C-in-C Ayub Khan and Consul General Gibson. American Consul General, Lahore, to State Department, 28 April 1953, 790d. 00/4-28 53.
- 23 Stanley Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, June 1955), pp. 133-134. See also Y.V. Gankovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, op.cit., pp. 188-191.
- 24 The theory of the Martial Races was first put forward by Indian Army C-in-C Lord Roberts (1885-1893), who argued that only the warlike inhabitants of the Northwestern regions of India were capable of facing a threat from the Russian Empire. Two other theories, the theory of the superiority of

the warrior races of the colder areas as compared to the docile ethnic groups of the warmer South and the theory of the historical superiority of the Aryan races contributed to the concept of military recruitment on the basis of Martial Races. It must also be noted that British recruitment was from the politically safer regions of India. The concept of the Martial Races and the consequent recruitment from the North was partly the result of the 1857 mutiny in which the Bengal Army had played a prominent role. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 35; Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, op.cit., pp. 45-52. See also A. Bopegamage, "Caste, Class and the Indian Military: A Study of the Social Origins of Indian Army Personnel", Jacques Van Doorn (ed.), Military Professions and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts, (Mouton and Company, The Hague, 1969), p. 139.

- 25 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 178.
- 26 The second C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, General Gracey told officers at the Staff College, Quetta, in September 1948 that, "East Pakistan had been told that the battle for East Pakistan would be fought in West Punjab." Minute, Brig. Walker, Military Adviser UK High Commission, 23 September 1948. UK High Commission - /1225.
- 27 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 136. See also Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 182-183.
- 28 In debates in the Constituent Assembly, East Pakistani representatives had, as early as 1948, called for an equitable representation of Bengalis in the Armed Forces, stating, for example, that "there is no dearth of suitable candidates from the millions of people in East Pakistan, for officer ranks in the Army." As no steps were taken to increase Bengali recruitment, the debate became more bitter, with East Bengalis now declaring that, "the people of East Bengal are willing to take part in the defence of their country But if proper facilities are not given to them,

proper training in the various arms - navy, army and air force, then ... it is a legitimate grievance of the people of East Bengal." The myth of the Martial Races was criticised as was the earmarking of a major proportion of defence spending for the West. In 1953, it was disclosed that Defence Services Expenditure for East Pakistan was Rs 50.72 million for the period March 1948 to January 1952, while the corresponding figure for West Pakistan was Rs 1961.8 million. An East Bengali member stated in Parliament that, "Now it is said that the people of East Bengal have no military traditions and they are not a martial race. The British used to make the same remarks Our men are willing, are determined, not only to take a share in the defence of the country, but also to have a return on the money spent on the defence of the country."

Criticisms were also made of the defence policy of the central government, with representatives pointing out that, "East Pakistan is surrounded on all sides by foreign territory" with an "1800 miles border that cannot be left unprotected and at the mercy of the centre" and demands were made to "make Eastern Pakistan self-sufficient in Defence." See Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 1 March 1948, p. 248; 5 March 1948, p. 60; 23 March 1951, p. 126, p. 139; 18 March 1952, pp. 177-178; 18 March 1953, pp. 296-297; 19 March 1953, p. 375, p. 358; 29 October 1953, p. 119.

- 29 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, *op.cit.*, pp. 137-138.
- 30 Point Nineteen of the United Front Twenty-One Point five-year programme stated, "In accordance with the historic Lahore Resolution, to secure full and complete autonomy and bring all subjects under the jurisdiction of East Pakistan, leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency under the jurisdiction of the Centre; even in the matter of defence, arrangements shall be such as to have the headquarters of Army in West Pakistan and the headquarters of Navy in East Pakistan and to establish ordnance factories in East Pakistan with a view to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in the matter of defence and also to convert the present Ansars into full-fledged militia." Dawn, 4 April 1954.

- 31 Only four members of the CPP had been elected out of a House of 309 in the 1954 elections. *Ibid.*, 5 April 1954; 18 May 1954.
- 32 In his statement before the Constituent Assembly on the dismissal of the Fazlul Huq Ministry, Bogra claimed that the unrest in the East wing had come about as a result of a secessionist and disruptive campaign "carried on by the members and the Leader of the United Front Party and actively supported by the Communists." Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 28 June 1954, pp. 1366-1367.
- 33 Secretary of Defence Lt. Col. Iskander Mirza had been promoted to the honorary rank of Major-General in the Pakistan Army in August 1953. Dawn, 2 August 1953.
- 34 Mirza declared that he would take the "most ruthless action to destroy the Communists" and warned of communist infiltration, drawing attention to the influx of Soviet literature into the country. *Ibid.*, 7 June 1954; 11 June 1954.
- 35 Even before the United Front government was dismissed, C-in-C Ayub Khan told American diplomats based in Pakistan that he had "recommended to the Government the institution of Governor's rule in East Bengal", adding that "the only alternative" to the chaos there was the imposition of central government control "under a strong individual, an Army officer." Conversation with General Ayub Khan. Participants, Col. Robert Ashworth, Col. Leslie Wyman, John K. Emmerson, Charge d'Affaires. Telegram. From American Embassy, Karachi, to State Department, 21 May 1954, 790d. 00/5/2254.
- 36 Dawn, 5 November 1953. See also Louis D. Hayes, Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984), pp. 63-64 .
- 37 The US Embassy learnt that the parliamentary opposition had promised Prime Minister Bogra "support ... in office until elections if he agreed (to) their action." The Prime Minister was said to have "agreed tacitly (to) approve it." Telegram. From Emmerson, Charge d'Affaires, Karachi, to State

Department, 29 September 1954. Unnumbered.

- 38 "A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan", 4 October 1954. Text in Mohammad Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, pp. 186-191.
- 39 While in the US, Ayub told General Sexton that, "he did not like present political situation, could not understand why Prime Minister had let himself be duped", and added that he could not allow the Bengalis to "dictate government for all of Pakistan ..." Telegram. From Emmerson, Charge d'Affaires, Karachi, to Secretary of State, 6 October 1954. Unnumbered.
- 40 Secretary of Defence, Iskander Mirza had informed US officials in London that if the "gang" who had engineered the amendment bill went too far, "we will stop them." When asked to specify who "we" comprised, he answered, "the army and the civil servants." Telegram. From American Embassy, London to Secretary of State, 1 October 1954. Unnumbered.
- 41 Dawn, 25 October 1954. See also Ian Stephens, Pakistan: Old Country/New Nation (Pelican Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1964), p. 294.
- 42 According to a newspaper report, on his return home Bogra was threatened by Ghulam Mohammed and the Army Generals with arrest and the demand to "Reorganise your Cabinet and bring in the army" or else "the army will take over." Mohammed Ali agreed not to resign and "reshuffled his Cabinet to let in the army, C-in-C Ayub Khan as Minister of Defence and Major-General Mirza as Minister of Internal Affairs. With the Governor-General, they now control the country." Russel Spurr, "One Man Coup at Gunpoint", Daily Express, 26 October 1954.
- 43 Mohammad Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 52.
- 44 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 189.
- 45 According to an authoritative military source, Ayub's assumption of the post of Defence Minister meant that, "All power in the Army and, indeed, all those powers that a

- Government wields over an Army were in the hands of one man." Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, p. 27. See also Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "In the Shadow of Martial Law - I", Dawn, 24 August 1985.
- 46 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 148; Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 192.
- 47 Mohammad Asghar Khan, "Pakistan's Geopolitical Imperatives", Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience, p. 263.
- 48 Joseph L. Nogee, Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (Pergamon Press, New York, 1981), p. 26-27.
- 49 The significance of the deal for Pakistan lay in the fact that it received badly needed food supplies and paid for them with its cotton and jute, at a time when these commodities were difficult to sell in the world market. "Trade between the USSR and Pakistan", Dawn, 7 November 1958.
- 50 Ibid., 29 April 1952. See also Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., pp. 34-35.
- 51 Radio Moscow, 11 May 1952 in SWB (Part I, No. 279), 21 January 1952, p. 5.
- 52 Dawn, 18 January 1952. Tass, 18 January 1952 in SWB (Part 1, No. 279), 21 January 1952, p. 7. See also F.M. Innis, "The Political Outlook in Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXVI, No. 4, December 1953), p. 311.
- 53 Arthur Stein, op.cit., pp. 36-38.
- 54 Pravda, 5 September 1953, in CDSP (Vol. V, No. 36, 1953), pp. 3-5, p. 26.
- 55 J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 17.
- 56 S.M. Burke, "The Management of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins

(eds.), op.cit., pp. 353-354.

- 57 "Memorandum of Conversation by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, (McGhee)" and Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, M. Ikramullah, 18 October 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States 1951 (Vol. VI, 1977), pp. 2220-2221.
- 58 "Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Thomas W. Simons of the Office of South Asian Affairs", 18 October 1951, *ibid.*, pp. 2222-2223.
- 59 "Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State", 17 November 1951. *Ibid.*, p. 2228.
- 60 M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., p. 195.
- 61 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 158.
- 62 When asked about the possibility of the establishment of Anglo-American bases in Pakistan, for example, Bogra replied: "If we feel that our security is threatened we certainly would be prepared to consider all questions of guaranteeing that security with the countries that also think democratically." New York Times, 19 April 1953.
- 63 Prior to his departure for Pakistan, Dulles told a Pakistani journalist that the US would favor Pakistan's inclusion in any future Middle Eastern regional defence alliance. Dawn, 25 May 1953.
- 64 Department of State Bulletin, 15 June 1953, p. 830. See also Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts (East Publications, Karachi, 1958), p. 95.
- 65 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 161-162.
- 66 M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., pp. 215-218.

- 67 New York Times, 5 November 1953; Newsweek, 30 November 1953.
- 68 Dawn, 5 November 1953; 14 November 1953.
- 69 Moscow Radio, 4 February 1953 in SWB (Part I, No. 388), 9 February 1953, p. 14. See also Raghunath Ram, op.cit., p. 30.
- 70 Dawn, 23 April 1953.
- 71 The Izvestia commentary added: "After involving Pakistan in the aggressive Middle East system, the US ruling circles hope to use it as its agent in South East Asia for the establishment of a further branch of the aggressive NATO." Izvestia, SWB (Part I, No. 479), 20 November 1953, pp. 6-7; Bochkarev, "US Imperialist Machinations in the Middle East", Tass, 19 November 1953 in SWB (Part I, No. 470), 23 November 1953, pp. 6-7; "US Intrigue in Pakistan", New Times (No. 46, November 1953), p. 18.
- 72 Text of Soviet Note in SWB (Part I, No. 473), 4 December 1953, p. 7. See also Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union", p. 493.
- 73 Dawn, 4 December 1953. Radio Moscow and Trud in SWB (Part I, No. 474), 7 December 1953, p. 11, p. 20.
- 74 Text of Pakistani Note in Dawn, 20 December 1953.
- 75 Ibid., 9 December 1953; S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 163.
- 76 National Security Council Document, "US Policy towards South Asia", NSC 5409, 19 February 1954.
- 77 Dawn, 20 February 1954.
- 78 Ibid., 23 February 1954; 26 February 1954.
- 79 Text of Agreement for Friendly Cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. VII, No. 3, September 1954), pp. 103-105.

- 80 Text of Pakistan-US Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in National Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Questions and Answers, 26 March 1956, pp. 48-51.
- 81 Announcing the US decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan, Prime Minister Bogra stated, "The US has not asked for any bases nor any undertakings or concessions at any time. Nor has Pakistan offered any", adding that, "We have accepted no limitation of any kind on our independence of action either in the international or in the domestic field." These views were reiterated by the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth who told newsmen that there was, "no agreement between Pakistan and America to the effect that Pakistan will join a war against the Russian bloc if she accepts military aid from the USA. Nor does Pakistan go into the Anglo-American bloc." Dawn, 26 February 1954; 1 April 1954. See also Mohammed Ali Bogra's address to Parliament, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 20 March 1954, p. 282.
- 82 Text of SEATO Treaty in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. VII, No. 3, September 1954), pp. 164-168.
- 83 Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan, India and The United States", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. VI, No. 4, December 1953), pp. 175-176.
- 84 Dawn, 2 July 1955.
- 85 Text of Instrument of Accession of Pakistan to the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey signed at Baghdad on 24 February 1955 in Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 26 March 1956, pp. 53-54.
- 86 Text of Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq in *ibid.*, pp. 51-53.
- 87 S.M. Burke, "The Management of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", pp.354- 355.

- 88 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, op.cit., p. 154.
- 89 Colonel Mohammad Ahmad, My Chief (Longmans Green and Co., Lahore, 1960), p. 74. See also Wayne Ayres Wilcox, "The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, Summer 1965), p. 146.
- 90 Interview with author.
- 91 According to General Hamid, he was told in his first meeting with the Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Pentagon, General Olmstead, that "there are forty nations in the queue (for American military assistance) and you'll be the forty-first." But after detailed discussions in which General Hamid put forward the external orientation and "world view" of the Pakistan military, "from forty-first, Pakistan was then brought to the first in the queue of countries wanting American arms." Ibid.
- 92 The UK High Commissioner in Karachi was also informed by the Pakistan Prime Minister that, "General Hamid had brought back very encouraging reports" of the possibilities of "greater availability of defence equipment ..." Telegram to CRO from UK High Commissioner, Pakistan, 7 November 1952, No. 1227. See also M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., p. 197.
- 93 Selig Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States: I: Case History of a Mistake", New Republic, 10 August 1959, p. 15-16.
- 94 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 152.
- 95 Memorandum of Conversation between Mohammad Ayub Khan, C-in-C, and Consul General Raleigh Gibson on 8 September 1952. American Consul General, Lahore, to State Department, 10 September 1952, 790d. 561/9-1052.
- 96 Memorandum of Conversation between C-in-C Ayub Khan and Consul General. American Consul General, Lahore, to State Department, 23 December 1952, 790d. 00/12-2352. Conversation between C-in-C Ayub Khan and Consul General officials in Summary, "On Political Developments For Week

Ending 6 January, 1953", 790d. 00/1-753.

- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Conversation between General Mohammad Ayub Khan and Consul General Gibson. From American Consul General, Lahore, to Department of State, 13 February 1953, 790d. 55/2-1353; Memorandum of Conversation between C-in-C Ayub Khan and US First Secretary Charles D. Withers. From American Embassy, Karachi, to State Department, 15 March 1953. Unnumbered.
- 99 M.S. Venkataramani, *op.cit.*, p. 203.
- 100 Col. Mohammad Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 74.
- 101 According to Col. Ahmad, the Pakistan government, engaged "as usual ... in disentangling internal chaos", had not corresponded with the US Administration about the real purpose behind Ayub's visit and even the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington "had not received any instructions", regarding the visit. But this did not deter Ayub from initiating negotiations on a defence deal with highranking US officials. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75. See also Wayne A. Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections", S.P. Varma, Virendra Narain (eds.), Pakistan: Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh (South Asian Studies Centre, Rajasthan University Press, Jaipur, 1972), p. 36.
- 102 Col. Mohammad Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 75.
- 103 Note on scheduled meeting with Ayub Khan. From Assistant Secretary, NEA, Henry Byroade to Secretary of State, 30 September 1953, 790d. 5811/9-3053. From UK High Commissioner, J. Bottomly, Karachi, to B.R. Carson, CRO, London, 25 November 1953. Unnumbered.
- 104 US News and World Report, 9 October 1953; 13 November 1953; New York Times, 16 November 1953; 17 November 1953.
- 105 The UK government was informed by the US State Department that the visiting Pakistan Army C-in-C had "presented a very strong argument for American military aid to Pakistan"; that

there was a "strong desire 'at a very high level'" to comply with the Pakistani request; and that General Ayub had been informed by the US Administration that they were "sympathetic to the idea." Telegram. From Sir R. Makins, Telegram to Commonwealth Posts from CRO, London, on US proposed military aid to Pakistan. Foreign Office, Southeast Asia Department, 29 October 1953, SA 6/231/1. See also Col. Mohammad Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

- 106 Letter from C-in-C Ayub Khan to General Walter Smith, Under-Secretary of State, 2 November 1953, 790d. 5811/11/253.
- 107 From US Army Military Attache (ARMA), Karachi, to SANA to G-2, Department, Army, Washington - NR Pakistan 190, 19 December 1953. From US ARMA, Karachi, to Department, Army, Washington, for G-2-NR Pakistan 192, 28 December 1953.
- 108 M.S. Venkataramani, *op.cit.*, p. 233.
- 109 "United States Policy Towards South Asia". NSC Document 5409, 19 February 1954. Extracts in K. Arif, Vol. 1, *op.cit.*, p.89.
- 110 Col. Mohammad Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 76.
- 111 M. S. Venkataramani, *op.cit.*, p. 264.
- 112 The staunchly pro-Western Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan himself admitted, when asked to comment on a potential Soviet 'threat' to Pakistan, that such a danger did not exist since "Pakistan is too small for Russia to bother about ..." Dawn, 21 October 1951.
- 113 According to a Pakistani defence analyst, during the period leading to Pakistan's entry into the pacts, the Soviet Union "never figured in Pakistan's threat perceptions ... We never for instance had any troops marked against a possible Russian or Sino-Soviet drive from the North." Interview with Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi.
- 114 See Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra's statements, Dawn,

- 23 February 1954; 2 May 1954. See also Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, pp.58-59.
- 115 Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem (F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968), p. 92.
- 116 See for example S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis; W. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Third Edition, 1972); G.W. Choudhury, op.cit.; Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Super Powers (Oxford University Press, New York, 1982).
- 117 The Kashmir war, for example, was not the result of Indian aggression and had been initiated by the Pakistanis themselves.
- 118 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 55-56. Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 126.
- 119 Text of Joint Communique in K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966) , p. 328. See also Dawn, 1 August 1953; 21 August 1953.
- 120 J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 22.
- 121 Dawn, 2 May 1954.
- 122 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 59.
- 123 Kalim Siddiqi, op.cit., p. 95.
- 124 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, op.cit., pp. 158-159.
- 125 C-in-C Ayub Khan later disclosed that, "We were so badly in need of ammunition, so much so that we could hardly allow our soldiers even five rounds for their general practice to keep their weapons in order." Dawn, 30 January 1957.

- 126 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 159.
- 127 According to a former senior instructor in the Staff College, Quetta, the Pakistan military "operates almost in isolation in terms of the self-interest of the organisation. Above all it needs weapons, armament. There is not an overall national policy whereby it will get these facilities. It first looks for these facilities and then formulates foreign policy accordingly. Foreign policy in Pakistan then adjusts itself to meet the needs of the military." Interview with author.
- 128 "Weekly Political and Economic Summary, January, 5-11, 1953", American Consul-General, Lahore, 19 January 1953, 790.00/1.1953. A Pakistani military official participating in the negotiations with the Americans in 1952 also stated: "There was no question of Pakistani forces invading Russia or anything like that ... We were just trying to equip ourselves as a fighting force. In the Kashmir operations, we had finished all our ammunition, all we had left over The material we had was ancient and we could ill afford to buy on the open market. We had very little money ... to reequip the forces". General Shahid Hamid's interview with author.
- 129 Wayne A. Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections", p. 35.
- 130 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers op.cit., p. 104.
- 131 M.A.H. Ispahani, "Pacts and Aid", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIX, No. 2, Second Quarter 1966), p. 118.
- 132 Dawn, 12 January 1953.
- 133 Ibid., 18 May 1954.
- 134 Ibid., 10 August 1954.
- 135 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p. 55.
- 136 Dawn, 15 October 1954.

- 137 "Cold Douche", New Times (No. 13, 27 March 1954), p. 23; A. Pronin, "Pakistan Affairs", *ibid.*, (No. 42, 16 October 1954), p. 15.
- 138 A. Pronin, *op.cit.*
- 139 Soviet analysts, Yuri Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya claim that the Pakistan government had also "tried to enlist American support" against the United Front in the pre-election period, requesting the US "to make public the decision to grant American military aid to Pakistan, in the hope that such an announcement might help the League to gain an election victory." Complying with this request, President Eisenhower announced his Administration's decision to grant Pakistan military assistance a week before the forthcoming polls. Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya's analysis is substantiated by American sources, with, for example, the US Military Attache in Pakistan noting that, "The US announcement has led to an immeasurable increase in Mohammed Ali's popularity and prestige...Coming on the propitious day prior to the Prime Minister's departure for Dacca, the US decision will enable the Muslim League to campaign on the basis of having solved both the nation's food and defence problems through US assistance." See Y.V. Gankovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 200-201; and Telegram. From US ARMA, Karachi, to Department of Army, NR, 5 March 1954. Unnumbered. See also "The Adamjee Tragedy", New Times (No. 22, 29 May 1954), p. 19, and A. Pronin, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
- 140 Dawn, 1 May 1954.
- 141 *Ibid.*, 19 June 1954; 27 July 1954.
- 142 Aswini K. Ray, *op.cit.*, p. 87.
- 143 Dawn, 1 May 1954.
- 144 In public pronouncements, the Pakistan government declared its antipathy to the Soviet bloc and its loyalty to its Western allies. The Pakistan Prime Minister, for example, stated that, "Today the world is divided into two blocs. Those of us who believe in the freedom of thought and action and feel that the

Government should cater to the welfare and well-being of individuals have come into conflict with those who want to make machines out of men and subordinate the interests of the individual to the state. Those of us who want to preserve our way of life must work together We must pool our resources to constitute a bulwark against foreign domination." Ibid., 12 June 1954.

- 145 "The US-Pakistan Talks", New Times (No. 2, 9 January 1954), p. 23.
- 146 "Devious Procedure", *ibid.* (No. 9, 27 February 1954), p. 18; "The Karachi Compact", *ibid.*, (No. 15, 10 April 1954), p. 22.
- 147 Times, 29 March 1954, in Aswini K. Ray, *op.cit.*, pp. 89- 90.
- 148 Dawn, 5 May 1954.
- 149 Observer, "America's Dangerous Game in the Middle East", New Times (No. 22, 22 May 1954), p. 3.
- 150 Commenting on the Baghdad Pact, a Soviet analyst stated, "One might have believed in the defensive nature of the pact had it come into being as a result of the efforts of the Middle East countries themselves without the participation and interference of the Great Powers located thousands of miles from this region. Indeed the really striking thing about this pact is that far from being local, it is alien born" and "Western in origin." Y. Bochkaryov, "Pact of Aggression", *ibid.* (No. 50, 8 December 1955), pp. 17-19. See Pravda article by Medvedev in SWB (Part I, No. 590), 24 January 1954, p. 20; Izvestia, 23 November 1955 in SWB (Part I, No. 679), 2 December 1955, p. 21. See also Dawn, 13 May 1954; 11 September 1954.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ISKANDER MIRZA YEARS (1955-1958)

In the aftermath of Pakistan's entry into the alliances, Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to be determined by a number of internal and external factors. In the domestic context, the country's foreign policy directions had a considerable impact on the military's standing in the internal power structure. In the external sphere, Pakistan's formal entry into the Cold War led to a deterioration of its relations with the Soviet Union as well as to an intensification of regional tensions. The political changes within the country combined with the developments in the regional environment were to determine the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations during the last years of parliamentary government in Pakistan.

The Republic of Pakistan

As Pakistan joined the alliances, the chief decision makers and formulators of domestic and foreign policies continued to be an unrepresentative coterie of bureaucrats-turned-politicians. Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed and his Cabinet of Talents, backed by the powerful military, ran the country through ordinances and decrees. Not even a pretext of parliamentary democracy remained since the Constituent Assembly had been dissolved.

Within the Cabinet of Talents, the two most important personalities, Minister of Interior, Maj. Gen. Mirza, and serving C-in-C, Ayub Khan, held common views on the future constitutional status of the

country. While Ayub, in his proposed constitutional draft of October 1954, advocated a strong presidential system based on indirect elections, Mirza called for a period of "controlled democracy". According to Mirza, the Pakistani masses were "overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not interested in politics" and are "bound to act foolishly sometimes." So there must be "somebody to rectify their blunders" and to save the country from "political scallywags."¹

Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed was equally sceptical about the applicability of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. He was especially determined to ensure that any future constitutional structure would follow the dictates of his coterie, with a minimal input from irresponsible politicians indulging in "parliamentary bickering".² On 27 March 1955, Ghulam Mohammed promulgated an "Emergency Powers" Ordinance, which gave him the sole authority to frame a constitution and unite the West Pakistani provinces into a single administrative unit, followed by an announcement of a new Constituent Assembly, to be composed of 80 deputies elected indirectly by less than 15 per cent of the electorate. This came into being after elections were held on 21 June 1955 and was to prove as powerless and ineffective as its predecessor. It was composed mainly of a Muslim League majority along with representatives of the more moderate Suhrawardy faction of the Awami League; none of the represented parties was strong enough to challenge the executive.

The increasingly powerful Interior Minister, Iskander Mirza, now forced the ailing Governor-General to retire, and on 19 September

1955 became Governor-General.³ He dismissed Prime Minister Bogra and appointed Finance Minister and former Secretary-General of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), Chaudhri Mohammad Ali as Prime Minister and leader of the Muslim League. Mohammad Ali was then given the task of integrating West Pakistan into one unit, a project strongly supported by the civil and military bureaucracies.⁴ On 30 September 1955, the Constituent Assembly officially accepted the West Pakistan Act of 1955, bringing into existence the One Unit scheme. In this way the Western-dominated central government succeeded in offsetting the numerical superiority of East Pakistan and institutionalising the control of the West wing over the East.

Mirza then turned his attention to formulating a constitution which would consolidate his power, and correspond with his notions of the need for "controlled democracy". In February 1956 the Constituent Assembly approved a Constitution Bill declaring Pakistan a federal republic. It provided for a government headed by a Prime Minister responsible to a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly, and a President as head of state. The President was provided with enormous powers, including the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and other senior officials; to convene, close or dissolve the National Assembly; to issue ordinances when the National Assembly was not in session; to return bills to the National Assembly and veto Provincial Assembly bills; to proclaim a state of emergency, and to suspend fundamental rights. The President was also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.⁵ On 23 March 1956 Iskander Mirza was sworn in as the first President

of Pakistan.

He exercised the viceregal powers granted to him by the 1956 Constitution to the fullest. Holding politicians in contempt, the new President continued to rely on the civil service to run the country. By the terms of the 1956 Constitution, the CSP, the country's 'higher bureaucracy' were granted immunity from dismissal by anyone other than the President who also had the power to appoint them. Bureaucratic control was also complete in the provinces, since there too the civil servants were appointed by and answerable only to the central government.⁶

Mirza made frequent use of his Presidential powers to dismiss and appoint Prime Ministers and Cabinets. He also resorted to the successful use of divide-and-rule tactics to neutralise political opposition both within the Centre and in the provinces.⁷ In April 1956, the Republican Party was formed, "encouraged and inspired by Iskander Mirza."⁸ This "official" party was used as one more instrument to control the politicians by encouraging defections from the existing parties and making and unmaking coalitions at the Centre.

The Military and Mirza

Mirza could not, however, have succeeded without the support of the military. The real power did not therefore lie with Mirza alone but was shared by the military, represented by C-in-C Ayub Khan. While Mirza removed Ayub Khan from the post of Defence Minister in June

1955 by granting the Defence portfolio to Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, the change made no real difference.⁹ According to an authoritative military source, there was "no control whatsoever from the top, the central government, of the Army machine. The Prime Minister was Defence Minister only on paper." The "civil-military bureaucracy was now all-powerful; the political Head had no real power, he had been by-passed completely" and there were "only two people who mattered now - Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan."¹⁰

Ayub now undertook the task of reorganising and reconstituting the Armed Forces, while at the same time consolidating his position within the institution. The C-in-C had succeeded in placing "all his 'trusted' men in key positions and important commands and no longer tolerated any criticism." Promotions were made on political grounds and not "on merit and acceptable principles, practices and tradition in the Army." Corruption began to seep into the Armed Forces as politics "penetrated" the institution.¹¹

The consolidation of Ayub's hold over the military was almost complete, while it was obvious that Mirza and his chosen Prime Ministers would remain in power only so long as they retained the loyalty of the Armed Forces. Ayub was now acknowledged as "the mediator in national affairs" by all political forces in the country.¹²

But while Iskander Mirza was "using the C-in-C for his own ends and the C-in-C was using Iskander Mirza for his own ends",¹³ Ayub Khan's contempt for the President and the political leadership grew

in direct proportion to the latter's dependence on the military. In 1956, the President replaced Prime Minister Mohammad Ali by Awami League leader, Hasan Shaheed Suhrawardy. Commenting on the development, Ayub stated, "No one knew any longer who belonged to which political party; it was all a question of swapping labels: a Muslim Leaguer today, a Republican tomorrow; and yesterday's 'traitors' were tomorrow's Chief Ministers, indistinguishable as tweedledum and tweedledee !", adding that the divided politicians were divided even further by the manipulations of the President and his Republican Party.¹⁴

This contempt for Mirza and the politicians did not mean that the C-in-C had equal disregard for the game of politics or had no political ambitions. He was using the Army "for political power", states a military source, "as his power base for a dictatorial position in the political field while still in uniform." Ayub justified his stand to fellow officers on the grounds that " 'the bloody politicians and the civilians' were so useless - corrupt and inefficient" that the Army was forced "to play the role of 'shaking up the country'."¹⁵ In Ayub's opinion, however, the time was not as yet ripe for an open military takeover. He was as yet content to consolidate his personal power and the influence of the institution, while manipulating political forces indirectly, as well as using his enormous powers to insure that Pakistan's internal and external directions were in accordance with the interests of the Armed Forces.¹⁶

The Western Alliances and the Pakistan Military

In the external sphere, the Military High Command's efforts to link Pakistan militarily with the West paid the expected dividends. The Armed Forces emerged as the major beneficiary of the policy of alignment.

The Americans had, from the very start, singled out the military as the target group for assistance mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the US realised that this elite group must be wooed if US regional objectives, including acquisition of bases, were to be fulfilled. Secondly, the Americans were impressed by the potential role a strengthened Pakistani military could play in promoting Western interests in the Cold War, especially in the sensitive Middle Eastern region.¹⁷ Thus the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of May 1954 aimed at providing military "equipment, materials, services and other assistance" to the Pakistan Armed Forces, which a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 1955 called "the largest and strongest military force allied with the Free World between Turkey and Taiwan."¹⁸

As the Pakistan military rapidly consolidated its internal position in the mid-1950s, the US extended appropriate support in order to ensure its continuing cooperation. Thus, for example, Prime Minister Bogra had expected American support when he attempted to confront Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed in the constitutional crisis of 1954. But when Ayub decided to back Ghulam Mohammed, the Eisenhower Administration signalled its support for the C-in-C by

an aid package of Rs 105 million, nearly four times as large as the preceding one, and a fifty per cent increase in arms deliveries.¹⁹ The US also expressed satisfaction at the inclusion of Ayub in the Cabinet of Talents. US officials informed the Pakistani media that they were "pleased with the selection of General Ayub Khan for the Defence portfolio".²⁰

For their part, General Ayub and Iskander Mirza used the bogey of the "communist threat" in times of domestic unrest, partly to strengthen their internal position and partly to convince the Americans of their pro-Western stand. Prior to the dismissal of the United Front government in East Pakistan, General Ayub had told American officials in the country that he hoped the US "would understand Pakistani action, if it became necessary and would be sympathetic in spite of the screams of protests which would come from some of Pakistan's neighbours". He added that, "Pakistan, having accepted US military aid was now the target of the Communists who were bent on proving that no Asian country would join forces with the US and survive".²¹

During the constitutional crisis of September 1954, both Ayub and Mirza warned the Americans that the pro-Western Pakistani civil and military leadership was under threat from leftist forces opposing the Governor-General. But once the crisis was resolved to the satisfaction of the civil and military bureaucracies, the future government "would be committed to military cooperation and close relations with the US".²² The American authorities on their part concluded that the Army, a "known Western-oriented stabilizing

force" remained "the only dependable effective instrument of government. It is efficiently organized and disciplined and under leadership friendly to West in general and to US in particular".²³

When Iskander Mirza replaced Ghulam Mohammed as Governor-General and then became President, American policy makers continued to believe that US assistance must be used to strengthen the Pakistan military, "the greatest stabilizing force in the country", which had "encouraged Pakistan to participate in collective defence agreements."²⁴

In line with that policy, the US began to extend military assistance to Pakistan. After the signing of MDAA, a US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), headed by Brigadier General Sexton, set up its Army element at the GHQ in Rawalpindi in July 1954.

The initial American assistance did not come up to Pakistani expectations. A military survey team sent to Pakistan in March 1954 assessed needs at a mere \$29 million. During his meetings with the US team Ayub attempted to obtain substantial military assistance, including support for a programme to expand the Pakistan Armed Forces to an approximate 400,000 men. In return Ayub promised the use of the Pakistani military in the Middle East declaring that his object in connection with American aid was "first to get this country up to standard militarily, so far as equipment went for its own defence, secondly thereafter to equip a force of sufficient size to take part in Middle East defence". In the wake of the US \$29 million offer, Ayub complained to a UK official that the

Americans "having encouraged expectations of general assistance and having exposed Pakistan to Russians, Indians, etc., now looked as though they were going to give something quite inconsiderable".²⁵

Even a US reassessed figure of \$171 million over a period of three years provided in October 1954 did not satisfy the military.²⁶ By mid-1956, however, American reassessments of Soviet capabilities, especially of the progress of the long-range ballistic missiles programme and of bomber force levels, led to an increase in the importance of Pakistan, linked to the potential use of its airfields and territory for surveillance of the Soviet Union, through U-2 flights²⁷ and other means.

To obtain the cooperation and support of the Pakistan military, the US decided, in January 1957, to fulfil its requirements of military hardware and other forms of assistance. In return, the US acquired a number of facilities in Pakistan, including the Badaber electronic surveillance and communications base near Peshawar, very near the Soviet southern borders. According to a Pakistani source, the base was used "for monitoring radar signals and tapping radio traffic in Russia and China."²⁸ Facilities were also provided for U-2 surveillance flights from an airfield in Peshawar. The U-2 flights surveyed Russian "defences, missile landing sites and military developments" and "put together a composite picture of military Russia, complete to airfields, atomic production sites, power plants, oil storage depots, submarine yards, arsenals, missile sites, railroads, industrial complexes, radar installations and launch sites."²⁹

Although the Pakistan military had been concerned about the piecemeal manner in which American arms had first arrived, causing both administrative and operational problems, the arms and equipment, "whatever their condition" were "most welcome".³⁰ Once the Americans decided to substantially increase the supply, large quantities of sophisticated equipment began to pour in. As approximately \$80 to \$90 million annually in US military aid was provided to Pakistan, the strength of the Armed Forces increased correspondingly. The Army, for example, received enough assistance to equip seven full strength infantry divisions, a full Armoured division and an independent Armoured brigade.³¹

New strategic roads, installations and airfields were built, and the Karachi naval base was expanded and modernized.³² The three services also acquired sophisticated military equipment including Patton tanks, new warships and jet aircraft, including the F-86.³³ Training was conducted along modern lines, as the new equipment was received and the Armed Forces exposed to the latest American techniques. The American assistance obviously had an impact on the self-perceptions of the Pakistan military. According to a military source, for example, the "introduction of the new equipment into the army" enhanced "its already high confidence in itself . . .".³⁴

While the Pakistan military's exposure to the latest American weaponry, technology and training had a significant impact on the institution, an even more important byproduct of the alliance, from the point of view of this study, was its exposure to American

doctrines and ideology. By the terms of the MDAA, the Pakistan government had agreed to receive US personnel ". . . who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished . . ." and granted "full diplomatic status."³⁵ The US MAAG set up its directorate at the GHQ in Rawalpindi in 1954, and was thus granted direct access to the highest ranks of the Pakistani Officer Corps. A senior Pakistani official disclosed that once the MAAG began its operations, "the army dealt directly with the Pentagon and the Karachi government had little idea of what was going on."³⁶

These personal contacts between US and Pakistani military officers were to affect the institution as a whole.³⁷ The initial "contacts with the American officers", states a military source, "were most interesting" and it did not take long for an "understanding" to develop between the Pakistanis and their American counterparts.³⁸ Of particular significance was the ideological indoctrination carried on by the United States Information Service (USIS) as a part of the military assistance scheme under the Motivation (later "Troop Information") Programme. A separate wing of the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate was set up which dealt solely with the distribution of American material, including publications and films, throughout the Pakistan Armed Forces. According to a Pakistan Army officer associated with the programme, the "so-called Motivation Programme was an elevation of normal PR to a higher sphere of intellectual education and indoctrination", adding that the highly visible American presence made it appear "as if there were two military establishments in one country: one national, the other

foreign."³⁹

Along with the internal infiltration of American doctrines and ideologies through the MAAG presence, American experts lecturing at military colleges, including the Staff College, Quetta, hundreds of Pakistani officers were sent for training in the US. These courses, study tours and visits were to have "a decisive influence over the ideas of the officer corps." They also made their "impact on the thinking of Pakistani commanders and staff" as these officers returned home and the lessons learnt in the US were spread throughout the Officer Corps. The "thinking and planning" of Pakistani officers was further "developed" by their involvement in the activities of the Western-sponsored pacts, SEATO and CENTO.⁴⁰ These contacts, links and indoctrination programmes meant, on the one hand, a substitution of American influence for British, and on the other further strengthened the Pakistan military's inherent pro-Western and anti-communist biases.⁴¹

Yet another consequence of Pakistan's entry into the alliances was to have a significant impact on the future defence and foreign policy directions of the country. This was the fact that the US-Pakistan Mutual Assistance programme did not in any way reduce the Pakistan Armed Forces' dependence on external sources for military hardware, as it did not provide for the development of an indigenous defence industry through the transfer of weapons technology or for US assistance in Pakistani production of weaponry.⁴² So Pakistan not only remained woefully inadequate in the sphere of defence production, according to an authoritative source, but also became

totally dependent "on one source for the supply of military hardware", which put it "in a very vulnerable position."⁴³ This meant that Pakistan had to maintain a high level of defence expenditure and ensure a continuing supply of US assistance, thereby providing the Americans with considerable leverage.

In the internal context, however, Pakistan's entry into the alliances modernized and reconstructed the Armed Forces, boosting the morale of the military.⁴⁴ The military's autonomy was further strengthened, as was its internal position relative to other political forces.⁴⁵ At the same time the military continued to claim a major share of the country's economy.

Although the government had justified entry into alliances on the grounds that the resultant decrease in domestic spending on defence would promote economic development, domestic defence expenditure continued to consistently absorb approximately half of the annual governmental expenditure, although US aid did make it possible to somewhat reduce the military's demands on Pakistan's revenues. This was partly due to the increases in costs of salaries, accommodation and the movement of troops following the expansion of the Armed Forces as a result of the MDAA.

The military was, moreover, strongly placed to continue to demand a large proportion of the annual budget, because its growing strength was accompanied by continued dependence of central governments on its support. As the policy of alignment was justified in terms of an ever-present external "threat", governments were not in a position to

oppose the military's demand for increasing expenditure. So heads of state, especially the vocal proponent for alignment, President Iskander Mirza, argued that it was the "foremost duty of every Pakistani to strengthen our armed forces so that the country can live in peace."⁴⁶ This increase in defence expenditure in turn further strengthened the Armed Forces as an internal political force.

**TOTAL REVENUE AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN⁴⁷**

Year	Revenue (millions of Rs)	Defence Expenditure (millions of Rs)	Defence Expenditure as % of Revenue
1954-55	1,172.7	713.4	60.8
1955-56	1,435.8	814.3	56.7
1956-57	1,298.3	820.0	63.2
1957-58	1,495.8	742.9	49.6
1958-59	2,070.2	1,044.2	50.4

The Soviets had been concerned from the very start that Pakistan's entry into bilateral and multilateral defence arrangements with the West would lead to an increase in US influence in strategically placed Pakistan. When the US media first leaked information of an impending US-Pakistan military deal, the Soviets intensified their propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the pacts. In the Pakistani context, the Soviet campaign placed special emphasis on considerably exaggerated and largely unsubstantiated allegations concerning the negative implications of the pacts on Pakistani sovereignty.

Soviet commentators not only stated that it was "well known that

any country which concludes a military alliance with the US must expect to see American military bases and American armed forces on its territory"⁴⁸ but in their protest note of 26 March 1954, the Soviets even alleged that the Pakistan Armed Forces would be placed under American command by the proposed US-Pakistan military deal. The Pakistan government rejected the suggestion, adding that it was merely "taking necessary measures to train its technical personnel, including members of the services, in the most efficient manner possible."⁴⁹

The Soviets, however, continued to claim, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the nature of the new Pakistan-US relationship meant that the Pakistan Army had been "placed under Washington's control" since American military personnel supervised "the utilization of the American 'aid'"; that US experts and advisers, including MAAP personnel in Pakistan were "interfering on a grand scale" in the country's domestic affairs; and that Pakistan "was unable to take any major decision without prior consultation with the USA."⁵⁰

As a part of their propaganda campaign against Pakistan's participation in the pacts, the Soviets also singled out what they claimed were other adverse domestic consequences of the policy of alignment for Pakistan. These included the alleged militarisation of the country and the deterioration of the economy. According to a Soviet analyst the "dislocation of the national economy and the poverty of the masses are primarily due to . . . the policy of militarizing the country, a policy which accords with the interests of the US aggressive circles" and not with Pakistan's national

interests. The Soviets pointed out that military expenditure in Pakistan had "swallowed up more than half the national revenue" in the past. This unproductive expenditure in 1954, was "four times as much" as "on industrial development, education, medical services and social insurance," showing that "when an underdeveloped country began to focus all its attention on arms, this was the first step to an economic crisis."⁵¹ Hence they claimed that Pakistan's entry into the pacts had not only meant that its "sovereignty" had been "seriously impaired" but it had also been "saddled with a burden of military obligations" far greater than its economy could "ever hope to carry."⁵²

The Soviets also claimed that the Pakistan Armed Forces were now, more or less, an instrument of American military power. Soviet analysts alleged that under the terms of the MDAA Pakistan had undertaken "not to use the armaments supplied by the US without the 'prior' agreement of the US government. An undertaking of this nature is tantamount to a promise that the Pakistan armed forces will be used only as the American government directs." The Soviets posed the question that since Pakistan had pledged not to use the arms that it received without the "preliminary consent" of the US, "What remains of the independence of the Pakistan armed forces, if they can be employed only as the Americans see fit?"⁵³

Other Soviet allegations included the claim that the armed forces of all countries participating in alliances such as the Baghdad Pact, were now "under the control of the Western powers" and were "being turned into instruments of Western aggressive policy." Hence the

Pakistan military "could at any moment be involved in military operations in Near and Middle East and South-East Asia." This, it was claimed, posed a danger to the Soviet Union and all peaceloving countries of the region. Moreover, the modernization and expansion under US direction of Pakistani military installations situated near the Soviet southern borders in itself posed "a serious threat to Soviet security."⁵⁴

Thus the Soviets on the one hand expressed concern about the internal effects of Pakistan's policy of alignment, a policy which would allegedly undermine Pakistani sovereignty . On the other hand, Soviet rhetoric centred on the dangers posed to Soviet and regional security and stability by the alleged American penetration of the Pakistan military and American intentions to establish military bases in Pakistan, close to Soviet southern borders.

Regional Tensions and Pakistan-Soviet Relations

As discussed in the previous chapter, Pakistan's entry into the Western-sponsored regional pacts and the adoption of an openly confrontationist approach towards the Soviet Union had led to a sharp deterioration in Pakistan-Soviet relations. Pakistan's formal alignment with the West was also to lead to a decline in its relations with neighbouring India and Afghanistan, whose reactions to the new directions in Pakistani foreign policy were in turn to influence the Soviet response.

Pakistan's relations with India had improved somewhat in mid-1953,

with the two countries ostensibly agreeing to settle the Kashmir dispute by means of an impartial plebiscite. US media leaks on negotiations for a Pakistan-US pact, however, once again led to an increase in Indo-Pakistan tensions. The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, declared that although this "was a matter on which constitutionally or otherwise it is none of our concern what Pakistan and the USA are doing . . . practically it is . . . of the most intense concern to us and something which will have very far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in South Asia and especially on India and Pakistan."⁵⁵ Both in official protest notes and in his personal correspondence with his Pakistani counterpart, Nehru pointed out that the "large-scale rearmament and military expansion" in Pakistan, with US assistance "must necessarily have repercussions in India"; that a US-Pakistan military deal would "bring the East-West Cold War to the subcontinent and upset the balance between India and Pakistan." The Indian Prime Minister added that, "No person in my knowledge imagines that Pakistan is in danger from the North."⁵⁶

Addressing the Kashmir problem specifically, Nehru said that US military assistance to Pakistan had "changed the whole context of the Kashmir issue" and that India could "take no more risks now as we were prepared to take previously . . ." Pakistan's entry into the pacts had, in fact, provided Nehru the excuse he needed to back down from his previous commitment to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, which could well have resulted in a vote in favour of Pakistan. The consequences of Kashmir withdrawing from India would have been unthinkable since it would set a precedent for a future Balkanisation

of the Indian Union. Nehru therefore declared that India was no longer willing to hold a Kashmir plebiscite since the situation had changed qualitatively with the extension of substantial US military assistance to Pakistan.⁵⁷

As Pakistan's relations with India and the Soviet Union deteriorated, Indo-Soviet relations steadily improved. Until now, the Soviets had consistently followed a policy of neutrality in Indo-Pakistan disputes. As the Pakistanis proceeded towards alignment with the West, regardless of Soviet protestations, the Soviets began to express sympathy with India.⁵⁸ Following Pakistan's entry into the pacts, the Soviet Union began to develop even closer political, economic and cultural links with India and a significant trade agreement was concluded in 1955. During the same year, the Soviet Union agreed to provide a steel mill to India on extremely favorable terms.⁵⁹

The Afghan reaction to the Pakistani policy was equally hostile. Pakistan-Afghan relations had continued to deteriorate in the mid-1950s, because of continuing Afghan support to the Pakhtunistan cause and Pakistani refusal to negotiate on an issue it regarded as its internal concern. Relations had become particularly tense when Sardar Daud, a hardliner on Pakhtunistan, became Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 1953. The Afghans therefore reacted to US media reports on a forthcoming Pakistan-US military deal by denouncing American military assistance to Pakistan, on the grounds that it would lead to further repression of the Pakhtun people. Once Pakistan entered the alliances, the Afghan Prime Minister called the

provision of Western military aid "a grave danger to the security and peace of Afghanistan."⁶⁰

The situation deteriorated further when Pakistan decided to include the NWFP in the One Unit scheme of West Pakistan in 1955. The Afghans strongly protested that this would further erode the autonomy of the Pakistani Pakhtuns. During the same year, Pakistan-Afghan tensions increased sharply, leading to a temporary severance of diplomatic relations and a closure of land-locked Afghanistan's border with Pakistan.⁶¹

The border closure faced the Afghans with considerable economic hardship. Earlier attempts by Daud to obtain US military and economic assistance had failed, since the Americans did not wish to annoy the Pakistanis, and Afghanistan therefore turned increasingly to its northern neighbour, the Soviet Union. As Pakistan-Afghan relations continued to deteriorate, Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union steadily improved, with the Soviets providing economic, technical and military assistance. During the Pakistani blockade, for example, the volume of Afghan-Soviet trade increased considerably, with the Soviets offering transit facilities and favorable trade terms.⁶²

The Soviets had, so far, maintained strict neutrality on Pakistan-Afghan differences. With Pakistan's entry into the alliances, however, Soviet policy on South-Southwest Asian regional disputes also underwent a radical change. The Soviets began to side openly with India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pakhtunistan

issues respectively.

During their visit to India in November/December 1955, Soviet Prime Minister N.A. Bulganin and Communist Party Secretary-General, N.S. Khrushchev not only promised India substantial economic and technical assistance, but also extended support to the Indian stand on Kashmir. Addressing a reception in Srinagar, Khrushchev declared that, "The Soviet Union has always maintained that the political status of Kashmir is a matter to be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves That Kashmir is one of the states of the Republic of India has been decided by the people of Kashmir."⁶³

During their visit both Bulganin and Khrushchev strongly condemned "the policy of forming military blocs" and the "establishment . . . of foreign military bases and . . . the stationing of alien forces" in Asia, and called for "the liquidation of the blocs already formed."⁶⁴ In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of their visit, the Soviet leaders and the Indian Prime Minister denounced the Western military alliances for bringing the Cold War into South Asia and thereby increasing regional tensions.

The two Soviet leaders then visited Afghanistan in December 1955. In a speech in Kabul, Bulganin declared that the Soviet Union sympathised with Afghanistan's policy on the Pakhtunistan issue. "The Soviet Union", he said, "stands for a just settlement of the Pushtunistan problem, which can be properly solved only if the vital interests of the peoples inhabiting Pushtunistan are taken into account."⁶⁵ The Soviets also confirmed the 1931 Russo-Afghan

treaty and extended a loan of \$100 million to Afghanistan.⁶⁶

On their return home, Bulganin and Khrushchev reiterated Soviet support to India on Kashmir and to Afghanistan on Pakhtunistan. On the Kashmir dispute, Bulganin stated that "it had been provoked by countries which are pursuing definite military and political aims in this area . . ." He added that, "The people of Kashmir are emphatically opposed to this imperialist policy. The Kashmir question has already been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves; they regard themselves as an integral part of the Republic of India." On the Pakistan-Afghan dispute, the Soviet leaders stated that, "We regard as justified and well-founded the demand of Afghanistan that the inhabitants of the bordering region of Pushtunistan should be given the opportunity for a free expression of their will", emphasising that, "The people of this area have as much right to national self-determination as any other people."⁶⁷

The Alliances and Pakistan's Security Predicament

Pakistan's entry into the alliances had worsened the already hostile relations with India and Afghanistan, and antagonised the Soviet Union into abandoning its previous policy of neutrality on the Kashmir and Pakhtunistan issues. The Pakistani leadership, including the Military High Command, was fully aware that alignment with the West did not mean either an underwriting of the country's security by its Western allies or the latter's support for Pakistan in its regional disputes.⁶⁸

The basis of the bilateral military relationship with the USA, the MDAA of 19 May 1954 did not specify any US obligations to bolster Pakistan's security. Under Article One of the agreement, the US only agreed to provide "such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize . . ."⁶⁹

Although the Agreement did mean the fulfilment of some of the requirements of the Armed Forces, Pakistan was not entitled to specify the quantities or types of military hardware it required, or how and where this military aid would be utilised. Unwilling to provide Pakistan with an offensive capability, the US obtained the Pakistan government's assurance that this assistance would be used "exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence" or the "the defence of the area." The Pakistanis agreed that the American aid would not be used to "undertake any act of aggression against any other nation."⁷⁰ Once the aid programme was underway, the military assistance was directed at strengthening the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) forces and installations near the Soviet southern borders, in accordance with US regional strategies. Non-MAP Pakistani forces, including troops deployed on the Indian border or in Azad Kashmir, were given second place even in the utilisation of domestic Pakistani resources.⁷¹ The US, moreover, made it amply clear that the MDAA did not in any way oblige the US to provide Pakistan with assistance in case of an attack by a third party.

Pakistan's membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact did little more

to provide the country with tangible assurances of support against India and Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan tried his utmost to obtain Western guarantees of support against all, and not just communist, acts of aggression. During the Manila meeting of September 1954, Zafrulla argued that, "Aggression was evil" and there were "no varieties of aggression." It was therefore necessary "to resist it wherever it came from."⁷² Dulles, however, reiterated that his country would only act in the event of communist aggression. A separate declaration to that effect was then attached to the Treaty. In any case, signatories of the Manila pact were only to be provided with sufficient assistance to enable them to resist communist "expansionism" and to tackle internal subversion, with no Western obligation to pledge troops. Hence "Pakistan entered into an alliance to resist aggression", states an authoritative Pakistani source, "from a quarter, which despite its ideological differences, had posed no threat to its security."⁷³

Nor did the Baghdad Pact imply explicit Western guarantees of security to member states. The USA, in fact, did not even become a formal member of the Pact, and even after it joined the Economic and Military Committee of the alliance in 1957, it made it clear that US involvement was "related solely to the Communist menace and carries no connotations with respect to intra-area matters."⁷⁴

In the wake of the Soviet declarations of support to India and Afghanistan, the Pakistanis attempted to obtain the support of their SEATO and Baghdad Pact allies. The response was, however, disappointing. The communique signed at the SEATO Council meeting

in Karachi in March 1956 only "deplored statements and interventions by Soviet leaders" and recognised that "the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line . . ." On the Kashmir issue, the SEATO countries merely "affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiations". The Baghdad Pact Council meeting in May 1956 provided an even more guarded response, stating that, "Specific problems which were causing tension in the area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular the Council emphasised the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes."⁷⁵

The Americans were unwilling to antagonise either India or Afghanistan by extending to Pakistan the sort of unequivocal support the Soviets provided to those countries on Kashmir and Pakhtunistan. While the US government wanted to keep its options open vis-à-vis Afghanistan, it was particularly interested in maintaining good relations with India. Great care was therefore taken to reassure the Indians that US military assistance would be carefully monitored, so as to prevent the Pakistanis from using it in intra-regional disputes.⁷⁶

Even after the limited extension of support on the Kashmir issue at the SEATO meeting in March 1956, Dulles immediately visited India where he stated that if Pakistan were to use American arms for aggression against India, "Pakistan knows" that "there will be a quick ending of its good relations with the United States and that, under the UN Charter, the USA would support India if she became the victim

of any armed aggression."⁷⁷ The US also continued to extend considerable economic assistance to India despite the latter's adamant posture of neutrality, with Dulles declaring that, "We believe that India's great effort to achieve economic progress should be supported. We should remember that among free nations there is room for diversity of views It is essential that we continue to help (India) if for no reason than to serve our enlightened self-interest."⁷⁸ Pakistan's policy of alignment had therefore earned it the hostility of India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, without gaining it assurances of support from its Western allies.

The Ups and Downs of a Relationship

While the Soviet Union had now openly sided with Pakistan's regional rivals, it had not written off Pakistan altogether. The Soviets were still anxious to keep the door open for rapprochement, hoping that such a course would ultimately reduce Pakistan's dependence on the West and thereby curtail Western infiltration into the region. Hence, even while Bulganin and Khrushchev declared their support for India and Afghanistan in their differences with Pakistan, they also expressed their desire for an improvement of Pakistan-Soviet relations. For instance, during his speech in Srinagar on 10 December 1955, Khrushchev, referring to the Soviet Union's cordial ties with India and Afghanistan, declared, "We should very much like to have similar relations with Pakistan and it is not our fault that such relations have so far not developed." He added that, "we shall persistently strive to improve these relations in the interests of peace."⁷⁹ On their return home Bulganin reiterated that, "The Soviet

Union would like to have no less friendly relations with Pakistan than it has with India . . . and Afghanistan . . . and it is not our fault that this is so far not the case. However, the Soviet government had endeavoured and will endeavour to improve its relations with Pakistan", with Khrushchev adding that, "For our part, we are willing to meet Pakistan halfway in establishing friendly relations."⁸⁰

Despite the lack of reponse from the Pakistani leadership, the Soviets extended assistance to Pakistan on several occasions. In August 1955, for instance, the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Muslim Religious Board of Kazakhstan donated Rs 60,000 for the victims of the East Pakistan floods, while in May 1956 the Soviets provided 40,000 tons of food grains for East Pakistan.⁸¹

The Soviet leadership also offered Pakistan technical assistance and an expansion of trade ties. In response to questions from a Pakistani journalist in February 1956, Bulganin stated that Pakistan and the Soviet Union "could successfully cooperate economically, technically, culturally and in other ways," and declared that there were "real possibilities for the expansion of trade relations" between the two countries, since, "The Soviet Union could buy in Pakistan agriculture and livestock produce as well as other goods Pakistan needs to export. In its turn the Soviet Union is willing to sell to Pakistan complete industrial plants, agricultural and other machinery and manufactures and other goods which Pakistan may wish to buy." He added that the Soviet Union was willing to assist Pakistan in the study of peaceful applications of atomic energy.⁸²

When Pakistan was proclaimed a republic on 23 March 1956, Soviet commentators highlighted the event as "an important landmark in the history of the Pakistani people's national liberation movement" which would "undoubtedly exert a beneficial influence on the Republic of Pakistan's future development . . ." They added that the Soviet Union was willing to help Pakistan economically and technically, including cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy, since it wanted "a radical improvement in relations with Pakistan . . . on the basis of normal friendly cooperation and peaceful coexistence."⁸³

At Republic Day celebrations at the Pakistan Embassy in Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, stated that his country was willing to construct a steel mill for Pakistan, similar to the project in India.⁸⁴ A 40-member Soviet delegation, headed by the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Anastas Mikoyan, attended the celebrations in Karachi. During his visit, Mikoyan repeated the offer of technical assistance, especially in "the peaceful uses of atomic energy," and declared that the Soviet Union wanted to improve its relations with Pakistan, "pacts or no pacts." The offer was, however, bluntly turned down by the Pakistan government, an official spokesman declaring that, "Nobody wants aid from them and that is our policy."⁸⁵

The Soviets however persevered in their efforts and on 27 June 1957 the two countries entered into their first trade agreement. According to the joint communique, "all payments between the USSR

and Pakistan relating to the importation and exportation of goods and other payments of a commercial nature" would be made in Pakistani currency.⁸⁶ Although the Soviets favored a 5-year agreement, Pakistan insisted on annual reviews. The Soviets also indicated willingness to offer Pakistan economic aid as well as industrial machinery.⁸⁷

The Soviet offers and overtures to Pakistan did not, however, lead to an improvement of the bilateral relationship, since the Iskander Mirza regime followed a consistently anti-Soviet policy, and continued to side with the West in both domestic and international forums. During the Suez crisis, for example, the Pakistan government provided unconditional support to Britain and France, and criticised the Soviet invasion of Hungary, supporting anti-Soviet resolutions in the UN, and even sponsoring a resolution calling for international action against the "violent repression" of the Hungarians by the Soviet Union.⁸⁸ When the Soviets extended an informal invitation to Prime Minister Suhrawardy to visit the Soviet Union, the Pakistan government not only failed to explore the offer, but the Prime Minister visited the United States instead in July 1957. During his visit, Suhrawardy launched a strong attack on the communist bloc while reiterating Pakistan's loyalty to the West. "We have thrown our lot in with you", declared the Pakistan Prime Minister. "We are very gravely apprehensive of Communist domination, infiltration and aggression", he said, adding that he considered it a privilege for Pakistan to have the same ideals of freedom "as yourself."⁸⁹ In the joint communique issued on the visit, the two sides agreed that "international Communism continues

to pose the major threat to the security of the free world" and "reaffirmed their determination to support and strengthen the systems of collective security which have been forged in Asia."⁹⁰

Despite their overtures of friendship, the Soviets continued to criticise strongly Pakistan's membership of Western-sponsored military pacts. While visiting India and Afghanistan in late 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev denounced Pakistan's membership of "aggressive" anti-Soviet alliances, with Khrushchev stating that the Soviets were "alarmed at the policy" of the Pakistan government which had "sanctioned the establishment of American military bases on its territory - that is, in close proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union", adding that, "the establishment of American military bases in Pakistan cannot but arouse our alarm we have never supported and never shall support the parties of the Baghdad Pact or any other alliance directed against the Soviet Union . . ."⁹¹

Even though the Soviet leadership expressed its desire to improve bilateral relations with Pakistan and offered assistance, it emphasised that the Soviet Union could not "remain indifferent to the fact that some of the states bordering on it are, in conformity with foreign interests, entering military and political alignments endangering the security of the Soviet Union", and that the Soviets were "opponents of such military and political alignments as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact of which Pakistan is a party."⁹² At the same time, the Soviet media pointed out the disadvantages posed by the policy of alignment to Pakistan, claiming that Pakistan's participation in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact had "weakened" its

"position in foreign affairs" by "isolating the country from the international scene" and earning it the hostility of "nearly all the surrounding countries" including the Middle Eastern countries, India, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and China, and alleging that Pakistan had "received nothing" from its Western allies in return for its "political isolation".⁹³

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union adopted an ambivalent approach on the Kashmir issue. While Bulganin and Khrushchev had expressed complete support for India's stand, the visiting Deputy Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan had declared in Karachi, in March 1956 that, the future of Kashmir "is not for we (sic) to decide. That is for the people of Kashmir to decide."⁹⁴ In August of the same year, a visiting Pakistani parliamentary delegation was told that the Soviets did not oppose the Pakistani stand on the conflict.⁹⁵

Yet the Soviets could ignore neither the negative response of the Iskander Mirza government to Soviet offers, nor the dangers posed by the American military presence in Pakistan. Moreover, the Kashmir issue could be used to pressure the Pakistani leadership into abandoning or at least modifying its policy of complete alignment with the West, especially with regard to the granting of facilities to its allies.

In January 1957, Pakistan took the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council after the Indian government announced its decision formally to integrate the disputed territory into the Republic of India. At Pakistan's urging, an Anglo-US resolution was drafted calling for the

implementation of the UN decision to hold a plebiscite. The Soviet Union at first abstained on the draft resolution, but its attitude changed drastically when the Anglo-US draft resolution of February 1957 called for the holding of an impartial plebiscite and advocated "the use of a temporary United Nations force in connection with demilitarization" of the disputed area.⁹⁶

The Soviet representative, Sobolev proposed amendments, stating that "the situation in Kashmir has changed considerably" since 1948, and the Kashmiri people now considered "their territory an integral part of the Republic of India." He called for Indo-Pakistan bilateral negotiations on the issue "without outside interference of any sort," and asked for a deletion of the reference to the use of United Nations forces in the Kashmir region.⁹⁷ When the Soviet amendments were defeated, the Soviet Union vetoed the Western-sponsored resolution on the grounds that it favored Pakistan. Sobolev added that the situation in Kashmir had worsened because of increased regional tensions, which were the consequence of Pakistan's alignment with the Western bloc.⁹⁸ This was the first time that the Soviet Union had used its veto on the Kashmir issue.

An important reason for the Soviet veto was the Western proposal to introduce UN troops into the disputed territory since such forces would have been largely Western in origin, and, therefore, suspect in Soviet perceptions, with the UN peacekeeping forces operations in Korea providing an example of the use of the body by the West to protect and advance its interests. The Soviets claimed that the "ruling circles" in the US and UK were "intent on using Kashmir for

their military preparations" and the proposed UN forces would be used by them as a "pretext to get control of Kashmir so as to use it as a military base"⁹⁹ with the help of their regional ally, Pakistan.

By early 1957, the Americans had enlarged their military assistance programme to Pakistan, due to the increased importance of Pakistani territory for surveillance of the Soviet Union, through both ground facilities and U-2 flights. The Soviet news media therefore continued to put forward greatly exaggerated allegations of US military penetration, claiming for example, that "the American Department of the Army holds firmly in its hands the key of the command of the Pakistan Army. Representatives of this Department are today to be found occupying posts, as advisers and trainers, in the majority of units of the Pakistan Army."¹⁰⁰ One Soviet military analyst claimed that in view of Pakistan's position as one of America's "most important jumping-off grounds in the Middle East and South East Asia", extensive military construction was being carried out in the country "in compliance with the USA's demands".¹⁰¹ It was also alleged that the US had "imposed on Pakistan a burden of armaments which she cannot shoulder."¹⁰²

Soviet accusations of the provision of bases and other facilities to the Americans by the Pakistani "ruling circles" increased after the US joined the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact in June 1957. Commenting on the development, the Soviet media alleged that the Council had discussed the "expansion of military cooperation among member countries, under American supervision" as well as a programme for the "expansion of foreign bases on (the territories of)

Asian members of the Baghdad Pact and plans to create an extensive network of radar stations and military roads and airfields" near the Soviet Union's southern borders.¹⁰³

The Soviets made numerous allegations, as a continuation of their propaganda campaign to discredit the alliances, that Pakistan had agreed to the construction of US military bases, partly with the aim of dissuading the Pakistanis from granting such facilities. Despite the lack of any evidence to substantiate their claims, they alleged, for example, that US bases were to be located at Nowshera in West Pakistan, Gilgit in Kashmir and Chittagong and Chalna in East Pakistan.¹⁰⁴ A Soviet analyst claimed that missile sites were being constructed at Quetta, Gilgit and Peshawar, while airfields were "being reconstructed and new ones built at Karachi, Kohat, Peshawar, Gilgit, Quetta, Risalpur and Sargodha" under "American supervision." These "military preparations near the Soviet frontier", he added, were "certainly not evidence of the Pakistani leaders' peaceful intentions."¹⁰⁵

On 14 April 1958, the Soviet Union sent a formal protest note to Pakistan, accusing it of allowing the construction of American launching pads, military installations and modern airfields. The note threatened Pakistan that in view of the "geographical proximity of Pakistan to the Soviet borders . . . grave consequences will inevitably await Pakistan if its territory is allowed for the establishment of (foreign) military bases for the purposes of using them against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries." It added that, "In case of aggressive actions against the USSR, the latter will be

forced to use all the means at its disposal to launch a counterblow upon the aggressor as well as upon the aggressor's bases on foreign territories."¹⁰⁶

In an equally hardhitting and hostile reply, on 24 May 1958, the Pakistan government emphasised the "purely defensive . . . intent and character" of the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. Denying the existence of foreign bases and facilities in Pakistan, the note pointed out that "the USSR has all types of military bases and weapons on her territory, several of them in close proximity to Pakistan and the Soviet Union's note indicates clearly the danger which this can give rise to", adding that "Pakistan . . . reserves the right to take all steps on her territory necessary for her own safety". The Pakistan government also strongly criticised the Soviet veto on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council.¹⁰⁷ The Pakistani leadership therefore made it amply clear that it was unwilling either to succumb to Soviet pressure or even to meet the Soviets halfway and rejecting both Soviet overtures and warnings, continued its policy of alignment with the West.

The Closing Days of the Parliamentary Era

The central government's decision to opt for alignment had internal as well as external implications. Internal opposition, especially in the East wing, was steadily growing to both the domestic and foreign policy directions of the Mirza regime. In late 1955, the leader of the more moderate faction of the Awami League, H. S. Suhrawardy, had agreed to head an Awami League-Republican Party coalition

government at the Centre. This split the Awami League; Maulana Bhashani and other left-leaning politicians formed the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1957. The NAP stood for provincial autonomy, dismemberment of the One Unit scheme, withdrawal from the Western-sponsored alliances, and the improvement of relations with the Eastern bloc.¹⁰⁸

The Soviet Union welcomed the emergence of opposition within Pakistan which gave them the opportunity to denounce the pro-Western government, and to claim that their opposition to Pakistan's participation in the pacts was supported by Pakistani "progressive" forces. The Soviet news media pointed out that there was "Deep dissatisfaction with the country's foreign policy" which had now "broken into the open"; that "Broad circles of the Pakistani public consider a policy of membership in Western-sponsored pacts inflicts tremendous harm on the interests of the country" and was "fraught with dangerous consequences." The government was presented as "blindly following the aggressive policies of the Western powers" which were "directed towards subjugating Pakistan to the USA's aggressive plans."¹⁰⁹ The decision to form the NAP was welcomed, as a party which "united the democratic forces in both parts of the country." The Soviet media further commented that, despite Pakistan's membership of aggressive Western-sponsored pacts, there were still "progressive forces" working to free the country from the imperialist yoke and take it towards "freedom and true independence."¹¹⁰

The Soviet support to India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and

Pakhtunistan issues contrasted with the failure of Pakistan's Western allies to provide similar support to Pakistan's stand on these regional conflicts and therefore led to growing internal opposition to the foreign policy of the Mirza regime. Following the lukewarm expressions of support in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact Council meetings in March 1956, several members of the National Assembly severely attacked the government's policy of alignment as unproductive.¹¹¹ The Suez crisis gave a further impetus to the domestic discontent, with pro-Egyptian and anti-Western rallies held throughout the country. But while the West Pakistanis condemned the government's support to Great Britain and France in an attack against a brotherly Muslim country, the East Pakistani opposition focussed its attack on the dangers posed by Western imperialism, and demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO.¹¹²

The denunciation of the alliances by the opposition in the East wing had several causes. There was a pronounced lack of interest in the Middle East, an area far removed geographically from East Pakistan.¹¹³ And the East Pakistanis were aware that the benefits of Western sponsored alliances did not extend to the eastern wing.

American assistance under MDAA was allocated for the development of military installations in West Pakistan near the Soviet southern borders, and for the expansion of West Pakistani Military Assistance Programme forces which were to play a role in US regional strategies. According to the terms of the agreement, the Pakistan government had to give first priority to the MAP forces, even in

domestic defence spending, over the troops stationed elsewhere, including East Pakistan.¹¹⁴

The East Pakistanis were equally disgruntled with the continuing increase in domestic defence expenditure on the expanded and modernized military establishment based in the West wing. East Pakistan's representation in the military remained very low, nor was any attention paid to the development of its defence infrastructure. The High Command continued to justify the ethnic composition of the Armed Forces by perpetuating the British myth of the martial races. It also attempted to justify the neglect of East Pakistani defence on the grounds that the defence of the East lay in the West. In June 1956, for instance, C-in-C Ayub Khan declared that, "The defence of East Pakistan does not lie in that part of the country. So long as Western base (sic) is not strong, it remains indefensible."¹¹⁵

It was, however, quite obvious that the gross underrepresentation of Bengalis in the Armed Forces and the low priority given to East Pakistani defence worked to the advantage of the West-based military establishment. According to a Pakistani defence strategist, "The wing that manned the military would not only be more powerful but also more prosperous, monopolizing the nation's large reservoir of manpower and employment and its attendant benefits." Thus the policy meant that the West Pakistani Military High Command consolidated its internal position, while the Bengalis were "deprived of their due share in the use, enjoyment and application of state authority."¹¹⁶

MILITARY ELITE IN PAKISTAN IN 1955
(NO. OF OFFICERS)¹¹⁷

<u>Service</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>West</u>
Army	24	894
Navy	7	593
Air Force	60	640
	<u>91</u>	<u>2 127</u>

DEFENCE TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS IN PAKISTAN
IN FEBRUARY 1957¹¹⁸

<u>Service</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>West</u>
Army	1	12
Navy	Nil	3
Air Force	1	15
	<u>2</u>	<u>30</u>

The continued neglect of the East wing's defence, and of demands for equitable representation in the Services, increased resentment in East Pakistan, with Bengali politicians accusing the government of deliberately perpetuating the dependence of the East on the West. There was also increased criticism by East Pakistani delegates in the Parliament of the mounting internal defence expenditure.¹¹⁹

The East Pakistani opposition in the National Assembly was, however, in no position to challenge the central government's control over either domestic or foreign policy making. The more numerous Bengalis had only equal representation in the Assembly since elections were held on the basis of "parity" between East and West Pakistan. In any case, by the terms of the 1956 Constitution the President could convene, close or dissolve the National Assembly, send back bills to it, and issue ordinances when it was not in session.¹²⁰ Moreover, the members were indirectly elected by less

than 15 per cent of the electorate, so many of them were unsure of a popular base and willingly aligned themselves with the "official party".¹²¹ Real power therefore lay with the head of state and his close associates, with the backing of the civil-military bureaucracies.

President Mirza and his coterie controlled the political arena, bringing into power and ousting one coalition Ministry after another. There were four short-lived coalition Ministries during the Mirza years. The first Muslim League Ministry was replaced by a Republican Party-Awami League coalition in 1955, followed thirteen months later by a Muslim League-Republican Party coalition which lasted only thirty-five days, and was followed in turn by a Republican Party-Awami League coalition in December 1957. The situation in the provinces was no better as the Centre made and unmade Ministries.

The shifting political alignments within the National and Provincial Assemblies and the internal tussles for power as one Prime Minister replaced another brought the political parties and their leadership into public contempt. Yet this edifice of unrepresentative institutions was not of their making. It had been deliberately created and perpetuated by the head of state, with the support of the military and bureaucracy.

As the powerless factions in the legislature were manipulated by the executive, the military was steadily gaining in strength. The central government's use of the "external threat" to justify its internal and

external policies also legitimised the Armed Forces' demands for defence funding and enhanced the military's status in the "garrison state" mentality engulfing Pakistan.¹²² The policy of alignment had expanded and modernized the Armed Forces, raising their morale and strengthening their domestic power position.

The major aid donor, the US, was in fact aware that "Pakistan's main reason for devoting more than a quarter of its budget to defence, and seeking additional US arms is not to protect the country against a Soviet and Communist Chinese attack, for which Pakistan's resources will never be sufficient, nor to maintain internal security for which the present military establishment is excessive." The Americans assessed that although "every Pakistani move in military expenditure has been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian military development, it may also be true that the Pakistan army has developed as a pressure group to the point that regardless of Indian developments, it might continue to have priority over economic development for appropriations."¹²³

This enlarged military establishment became more and more important in the internal context, as President Mirza continued to depend heavily on the military to maintain internal security and to tackle domestic crises such as the anti-famine and anti-smuggling operations of 1956 and 1957.

In the anti-famine operation of 1956, "Operation Service First"; food distribution in the East wing was handed over to the Army, with near-famine conditions prevailing there.¹²⁴ The military set up a

Command and Control Centre in Dacca, and was given unprecedented civil powers by the provincial administration. The food situation was soon brought under control but, according to General Fazal Muqeem, the Army was "abruptly withdrawn" since its "efficiency in tackling this problem created political jealousies" and the situation once again deteriorated.¹²⁵

In "Operation Close Door", which commenced on 18 June 1957, the Army was called in to control the widespread smuggling from East Pakistan into India, and was, once again, given wide-ranging civil powers. A military source claims that the Army soon brought the situation under control but the central government terminated the operation under political pressure and so deprived the military of the opportunity of striking at the root of the problem.¹²⁶ According to a Pakistani political analyst, however, East Pakistani opponents of the military's intervention in politics tried to wind up Operation Close Door, but it went "on and on" and "because powerful interest groups were opposed to terminating it, its ending required a major political push from most east wing politicians."¹²⁷

In these operations the military not only acquired first-hand knowledge of running civil government, but also felt that it was more efficient and organised than the corrupt civil administration. As the civil government "de facto abrogated much of its responsibility to the military" states an authoritative source, the "Army mind - especially of those in appointments that mattered - had come to accept and expect that the Army as a whole could take on any and every problem of the State."¹²⁸ The Military High

Command now began to think of replacing the political chaos and indiscipline of civil administration by the "good government" of the Armed Forces.¹²⁹

As political conditions steadily deteriorated, by 1957 the military operated autonomously of central government control and all "major policy decisions made by the Commander-in-Chief" were "invariably accepted by the Government." Within the institution, Ayub had become the "final arbiter in all transfers, promotions, administration and logistics support" of the Army. The Military High Command was largely composed of "King's Men" as Ayub "placed innocuous officers in key positions" while his subordinates saw that "they had to be careful and conform. Those who did not conform left, or had to leave, the Army and others learned their lesson."¹³⁰

Having consolidated his position, Ayub now began to sound out his constituency, the Armed Forces, on the possibilities of a military takeover. From 1954 to 1957, the C-in-C undertook extended tours of both wings of the country, visiting Army units and conversing with senior military personnel, a "part of his showing the flag-and-himself programme."¹³¹

During his tour of the East wing in 1957, Ayub revealed his willingness to take over power, piously stating, "If the people want me, I shall not shirk my duty."¹³² He then held discussions with senior military commanders and bureaucrats in the West wing. At the Army's Divisional Commanders' Conference in Rawalpindi in April 1957, for example, Ayub was approached by a number of generals who

urged a military takeover in view of the "unsettled" political conditions in the country.¹³³

By early 1958, opposition to President Mirza's domestic and foreign policies assumed serious proportions, especially in the East wing. The criticism of the government's foreign policy directions was the result of several factors. These included the setback to Pakistan's Kashmir stand from the Soviet Security Council veto of 1957, the continued deterioration of relations with India and Afghanistan, the pronounced hostility of the Eastern bloc, and the isolation of Pakistan from the Middle Eastern Muslim countries because of its participation in the pacts and its pro-Western stance on the Suez crisis.

In a bid to stem the growing internal opposition both within and outside the national and provincial legislatures,¹³⁴ the central government tried to pressure the West into providing Pakistan with support against India. For example, Prime Minister Noon declared that, "Our people, if they find their freedom threatened by Bharat (India), will break all pacts and will shake hands with people whom we have made enemies because of others."¹³⁵

Dissatisfaction with the government's domestic policy also grew due to the steady decline in the country's economic position. The US aid received was insufficient to prop up the ailing economy.¹³⁶ Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves reached a new low and an agricultural slump led to acute food shortages. The Mirza government proved totally incapable of handling the chaotic

economic conditions in the country as industrial strife and urban and rural unrest became the order of the day.

Realising that elections were unavoidable in view of the hardening of the stance of the opposition, President Mirza finally scheduled national elections for 15 February 1959.¹³⁷ Yet Mirza was also aware that his chances of re-election were slim if general elections were held on the basis of a universal franchise, in view of his growing unpopularity and the lack of credibility of his Republican Party.¹³⁸ Mirza therefore began to explore the possibilities of joining hands with the military to formalise an authoritarian system of government.¹³⁹

The military was as disinclined as the President to see free and fair elections held at a time when domestic and foreign policy were being attacked by an increasingly popular political opposition; for the military they spelled a grave threat to the institution. Greater East Pakistani participation in government could have threatened the military's demands on the economy, led to an increase in Bengali representation in the Armed Forces and even to questioning of the national defence strategy, which gave priority to the West wing, and could have endangered the policy of alignment which had provided the military with material benefits and corresponded with their anti-Soviet and pro-Western orientations.

The Military High Command was, in any case, opposed to parliamentary democracy. Ayub observed that, "The politicians . . . are trying to get back in power by hook or by crook. And having got

there they know that they will have nothing to show for themselves except working for the disruption of the country further. In that case they will come face to face with the army and me they have all been tried and found wanting. I am now certain that if the country is left to them we should expect nothing but ruin It seems that we shall have to have a system of government for a generation or so which prepares the country for democracy and solves some of our major problems. Under the present Constitution, no one seems to have any power except to destroy discipline and to do harm."¹⁴⁰ He also had a personal stake in preventing the politicians from coming back into power. Ayub had been given a two-year extension in June 1958 and it was likely that an elected government would ask him to retire.¹⁴¹

The President and the C-in-C were therefore in agreement that general elections must not be held. When Ayub was approached by Mirza, in July 1958, to stage a military coup, he could see that Mirza was "desperate and cornered."¹⁴² As the Army grew in "strength and power" while the civil government began to lose its hold, the "tail started to wag the dog."¹⁴³ The initiative was now in the hands of the Armed Forces.

As tensions increased in the East wing, scuffles in the Provincial Assembly became the order of the day. In one such incident in September 1958, the Speaker of the Assembly was injured and the substitute Deputy Speaker, who was also attacked, died a few days later from his injuries. This episode provided the C-in-C with the opportunity to call upon the Military High Command to prepare a plan

for a military takeover. Under his instructions, the Chief of General Staff drew a tactical outline of the proposed military coup d'état, and Ayub approved it in the last week of September.¹⁴⁴

The outbreak of a "rebellion" in Kalat in early October 1958 provided the military with yet another opportunity to justify the proposed takeover, when the Army took action to suppress what the government claimed was an attempt by the Khan of Kalat to renounce his allegiance to Pakistan, calling upon Afghanistan for assistance.¹⁴⁵

At 9 pm, on 7 October, President Iskander Mirza, at the direction of the C-in-C, issued a proclamation declaring Martial Law throughout the country, abrogating the 1956 Constitution, dissolving the central and provincial Ministries and legislatures, banning political parties and appointing Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.¹⁴⁶

On the morning of 8 October 1958, military personnel took control of key positions in Karachi and the nation was informed about the coup d'état.¹⁴⁷ With the successful implementation of the coup and the abrogation of the Constitution, Iskander Mirza "was entirely at the mercy of the authority that mattered - the Commander of the Army." The military now held "supreme power in the country."¹⁴⁸

Summary

The final blow to parliamentary democracy in Pakistan was dealt by the government of Iskander Mirza, who institutionalised his control over the political arena by the 1956 Constitution, and controlled governments and the powerless legislature with the support of the civil and military bureaucracies. The nature of the partnership between the President and the Military High Command slowly changed as a result of both internal and external factors.

The main external factor was the country's membership of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the Western bloc. The Pakistan military's successful efforts to align Pakistan with the West now paid the expected dividends, as the main beneficiary of alignment was the Armed Forces. As US military aid began to pour into the country, the military rapidly grew in size and strength vis-a-vis all other political forces in the country. Another result of the policy was the development of close links between the US and Pakistan military establishments, a factor which was to play a major part in determining Pakistan's future foreign policy directions.

While the morale and might of the Armed Forces was boosted by Pakistan's participation in the pacts, Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate. Pakistan's membership of the pacts also led to an increase in regional tensions, with a noticeable decline in its relations with India and Afghanistan. There was now a shift in regional alignments as the hitherto neutral Soviets began to actively support India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan.

Pakistan was now faced with the security predicament of hostile neighbours along its borders, backed by an equally antagonised Soviet Union, while its Western allies were unwilling to extend similar support to it. The Pakistan civil and military leadership, however, continued to ignore both Soviet overtures of friendship and warnings, and opted instead for even closer ties with the West, which included the provision of military facilities to the US on Pakistani soil.

Pakistan's policy of alignment was not only condemned by its neighbours and the Soviet Union; there was also growing dissatisfaction within the country, especially in the East wing, with both the government's repressive internal policies and a foreign policy which had earned Pakistan external hostility but provided no tangible benefits in return.

As the opposition within Pakistan intensified and demands for general elections grew, an apprehensive President turned towards the military for support. Unwilling to accept a democratic change of government, the Military High Command decided to take action. The parliamentary era in Pakistan came to an abrupt close with the military coup d'etat in October 1958.

Footnotes - Chapter Four

- 1 Dawn, 31 October 1954.
- 2 Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, p. 179.
- 3 M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., pp. 288-290.
- 4 See for example "A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan" in Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 186-191.
- 5 Louis D. Hayes, op.cit., pp. 65-67. See also Y.V. Gankovsky, V.N. Moskalenko, op.cit., pp. 32-33.
- 6 Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXI, No. 2, June 1958), pp. 138-140.
- 7 H.S. Masud, "A Diary of Betrayals", Outlook (Vol. 2, No. 14, April 1973), p.10. See also L.F. Rushbrook Williams, op.cit., pp. 149-150.
- 8 Firoz Khan Noon, From Memory (Ferozsons, Lahore, 1966), p. 247.
- 9 "Ten months in the service of the Cabinet without having to surrender command of the Army", provided Ayub Khan "an invaluable political apprenticeship. It enabled him to manage government-army relations from both ends and to widen his political perspective." J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969), p. 184.
- 10 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 158, p. 163.
- 11 Ibid, p. 158, pp.160-161.
- 12 Maj.Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p.189.
- 13 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 134.

- 14 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 54-55.
- 15 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 157.
- 16 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Columbia University Press, New York, 1972), p. 53.
- 17 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, John Jernegen, for example, pointed out that Pakistan had "concrete assets to offer to the free world. She has a fine army which provided a large share of distinguished regiments to the Indian army before partition She has ample manpower to expand that army. Her military tradition and ability are proven. She occupies an important location covering the invasion routes into the Indian subcontinent and also one which would enable her, under conditions of strength, to support the defence of the Near East proper." But to "realize her potential", Pakistan would need substantial "outside assistance." Dawn, 8 March 1954.
- 18 Text of MDAA in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 26 March 1956, p. 49. See also J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 17.
- 19 M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., pp. 277- 278.
- 20 Dawn, 28 October 1954.
- 21 See Telegram. Message from US Military Attache to Department of Army for G-2 and State Department, 21 May 1954. Unnumbered; American Embassy, Karachi, to State Department, 22 May 1954, 790d. 00/5-2254.
- 22 "Political Situation in Pakistan", American Embassy, Karachi, to State Department, 3 September 1954, 790d. 00/9-354; Telegram. From Emmerson, Karachi, to State Department, 29 September 1954. Unnumbered.
- 23 Ibid. See also D. Shah Khan, "An Autopsy of the Left", Outlook (Vol. 2, No. 13, 30 June 1973), p. 8.
- 24 Document of Mutual Security Programme, Technical

Assistance: Final Report of Committee on Foreign Relations, 12 March 1957 in Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (William Morrow and Company, New York, 1970) p. 75.

- 25 See Telegram from Meyers re Message, US Military Attache, Karachi, 11-18 March, from Karachi to Secretary of State, 2 April 1954, unnumbered; Letter. Conversation between Military Attache, Archer Schee and Ayub Khan on 27 October 1954, from UK High Commission, Pakistan, to CRO, 28 October 1954, 1125/77/MA; Telegram. From UK High Commission, Pakistan, to CRO, 23 April 1954, No. 452.
- 26 While the Pakistan Army C-in-C accused the Americans of going back on their word, a senior Pakistan Air Force official, Air Commodore (and later C-in-C) Asghar Khan complained to his C-in-C that, "... the aid that we are likely to receive during this financial year is so meagre that it is likely to make little, if any difference, to our operational efficiency and to the fast deteriorating aircraft situation." Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., p. 97.
- 27 The U-2 was a newly-developed sophisticated aircraft, capable of providing accurate cartographic and target information.
- 28 This was confirmed in interviews with high-ranking military officials, who stated that, "We were not allowed, Pakistanis were more or less not allowed to enter the perimeters of the base. It was just an island It was a very hush hush organisation", adding that while the base "was completely autonomous in itself as far as I know our people, they had no interest in the tactical side of it." Author's interviews with Maj.Gen. Shahid Hamid and former Army C-in-C, Mohammad Musa. See also, A Staff Study, "CIA in Pakistan", Outlook (Vol. I, No. 49, 1975), p. 8.
- 29 "CIA in Pakistan", op.cit. See also Stephen P. Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", Pacific Affairs (Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 1976), p. 53.
- 30 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 159. See also Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit.,

pp.98-99.

- 31 Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security (Longmans, Green and Co., Lahore, 1960), p. 106. See also Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan op.cit., p. 87.
- 32 The extension and modernization of the air bases and military installations in Pakistan was carried out under the supervision of US Army engineers. Dawn, 11 July 1956.
- 33 The official history of the PAF notes that, "It could be rightly said that the PAF really got airborne with the new weapons system (the F-86)." Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., p. 63.
- 34 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 159.
- 35 Text of MDAA in National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 26 March 1956, p. 50.
- 36 Former Governor of the State Bank, Zahid Hussain, cited in Hamza Alavi, "The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan", International Socialist Journal (Year 3, No. 14, March-April 1966), p. 164.
- 37 Stephen Cohen has termed this generation of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps the "American generation". See Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army.
- 38 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp. 156-157.
- 39 Interview with Stephen Cohen in Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, pp. 67-68.
- 40 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 159, p. 229.
- 41 This is obvious in the analyses present in various articles by Pakistani officers in the Pakistan Army Journal during the period under examination. In a number of articles, it is argued that the Western bloc, through the policy of the containment of communism via pacts, was "constantly endeavouring to strengthen the free world morally, economically and

militarily" against the Soviet Union whose "policy aims at establishing a world-wide communist regime by any means - political manoeuvring, subversion, economic pressure or force ... directed against the anti-communist world, to upset their political and military situation." The Western pacts alone prevented "the communists from reverting to force to further their ideology." See, for example, Maj. Wasiuddin Ahmed, "What Prevents a Third World War", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. 1, No. 3, 1957); Maj. Mehr Khan Abbassi, op.cit.

- 42 According to the then Master-General of Ordnance, Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid, a basic requirement for indigenous defence production was the setting up of a steel mill in the country. Pakistan was promised one by the Americans who went back on their offer. Gen. Hamid disclosed that the Pakistanis turned down other offers, including one from Germany in 1953 because "there were influences on the politicians, American influences And that was one of the greatest mistakes." He added that later offers from Germany to set up even a jeep production factory were turned down due to American pressures. Interview with author.
- 43 M. A. H. Ispahani, "The Ire of Pakistan", Asian Review (Vol. I, No. 1, November 1967), p. 18. During a visit to Pakistan, the British Chief of Imperial General Staff, Sir John Harding, warned Ayub "about the possibilities of the Pakistan Army finding itself in a few years time with a lot of American equipment out of action for lack of spares and no dollars with which to buy them. He took the point but I had the impression that he had made up his mind to get all he can from the US now without much thought of the future." The British General added, after his visit to the Staff College and Military Academy, "I was surprised at the extent to which American influence has developed" Report by Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal John Harding, to the Middle East, Pakistan and India Desk, Foreign Office, November/December 1954, CIGS/BM/ 152/7476/4.
- 44 According to the PAF history, the US assistance meant that both the Army and the Air Force "developed into formidable fighting units"; they "possessed strength and courage" and their "morale was high." They were now "modern fighting

forces, well-organized and thoroughly professional." Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi op.cit., p. 120. In addition, they now perceived themselves an international force with international responsibilities. Ayub Khan, for example, declared that "Pakistan has taken on international obligations and that has put a great emphasis on the responsibilities of Army officers." Dawn, 13 March 1955.

- 45 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Spring 1964), p. 10. See also Stephen P. Cohen, "Pakistan: Coping with Regional Dominance, Multiple Crises and Great Power Confrontation", p. 50.
- 46 Dawn, 1 August 1957.
- 47 Source: Kalim Siddiqui, op.cit., p. 95.
- 48 "US Intrigue in Pakistan", New Times, op.cit., p. 26; "The US-Pakistan Talks", New Times, op.cit., p. 23.
- 49 Dawn, 28 May 1954.
- 50 Radio Moscow in SWB (Part I, No. 611), 8 April 1955, p. 17. See also Y.V. Gankovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, op.cit., p. 232.
- 51 A. Pronin, op.cit., p. 14. See also Commentary on the Pakistan Economy by Boris Leonov, Radio Moscow, 9 August 1955 in SWB (Part I, No. 648), 15 August 1955, p. 11.
- 52 I. Borisov, "The Political Situation in Pakistan", New Times, (No. 32, 25 August 1955), p. 7.
- 53 Observer, "America's Dangerous Game in the Middle East", op.cit., pp. 3-4; Y. Bochkaryov, "Pact of Aggression", New Times (No. 50, 8 December 1955), p. 18.
- 54 Y. Bochkaryov, op.cit.; Y.V. Gankovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, op.cit., p. 232.

- 55 Dawn, 16 November 1953. See also Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966), p. 278.
- 56 On the question of US bases in Pakistan, Nehru said that, "If free military aid is given, bases can come within a few days if need arises." Dawn, 25 December 1953. See also Correspondence between the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Mohammed Ali, regarding military pacts and the Kashmir question, December 1953-September 1954, K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, p. 353.
- 57 Ibid; Sisir Gupta, op.cit., pp. 281-282.
- 58 Pravda, for example, commented that, "The Indian people cannot but be alarmed seeing the attempts to set up an aggressive bloc right on India's borders, which will inevitably lead to the building up of foreign bases and airfields in the territories of India's neighbour and to militarisation of the countries with which it is attempting to maintain closer relations." Pravda, 27 September 1953, cited in Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p. 53.
- 59 Under the agreement, the Soviet Union extended India a loan to cover the cost of the project, to be repayable over twelve years at 2.5 per cent interest. The Soviets also agreed to supply most of the equipment as well as the technical supervision and training of Indian personnel. Text of agreement of 2 February 1955 in SWB (Part I, No. 594), 7 February 1955, p. 18. See also James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan", The American Political Science Review (Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, September 1954), pp. 740-741.
- 60 J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 21.
- 61 James W. Spain, "The Pathan Borderlands", The Middle East Journal (Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1961), pp. 172-173.
- 62 Leon B. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The

Crucial Years", *ibid.*, (Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 1981), pp. 186-190. See also Leon B. Poullada, "Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan", Ainslie T. Embree (ed.), Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order (Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1979), pp. 143-144.

- 63 Khrushchev also disclosed that the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan had been told by Pakistan Foreign Ministry officials that the two Soviet leaders should refuse to visit Kashmir. "This can only be taken", stated Khrushchev "as an unprecedented instance of interference in the affairs of others. Never before has a third state permitted itself to tell us where to go and why and what friends we should choose." Speech by N.S. Khrushchev at a reception given in Srinagar by G.M. Bakhshi, the Prime Minister of Kashmir in "Statements by N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev in India, Burma and Afghanistan: I", Documents, New Times (No. 52, 22 December 1955), pp. 27-28.

A Pakistan official spokesman however asserted that the Soviet Ambassador in Karachi had only been informed that, "as Russian attitude (sic) so far towards our disputes with India and Kabul has been that of neutrality, it was hoped that the Russian leaders would say or do nothing that would detract from that attitude." Pakistan Times, 13 December 1955.

- 64 Speech by N.A. Bulganin to the Indian Parliament on 21 November 1955, New Times (No. 52, 22 December 1955), p. 7. Speech by Bulganin in Madras, Tass, 29 November 1955 in SWB (Part I, No. 679, 2 December 1955), p. 9.
- 65 Speech by N.A. Bulganin at a dinner in Kabul on 16 December 1955. Text in "Statements by N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev in India, Burma and Afghanistan II: Soviet-Afghan Negotiations", Documents, New Times (No. 1, 1 January 1956), p. 21.
- 66 Text of Treaty in *ibid.*, pp. 23-24. See also Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan", Aussen Politik (Vol. 31, No. 3, 1980), pp. 286-287.

- 67 Report on the visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan by N.A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and N.S. Khrushchev, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Documents, New Times (No. 2, 5 January 1956), p. 10, pp. 16-20.
- 68 In a document circulated by C-in-C Ayub Khan to a high-level Armed Forces Committee in February 1954, formed to conduct negotiations on the military's requirements during the forthcoming US military team visit to Pakistan, the following assumptions were made: "(A) In the event of Communist aggression, initially Pakistan will be alone in both land as well as air defence of the country (D) Kashmir problem would still be unsolved, therefore holding of the ceasefire line, though thin, would be necessary. (E) Afghan attitude may still be hostile, thus denying us suitable positions beyond the Durand Line." Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., pp. 94-95.
- 69 Text of the MDAA, National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 26 March 1956.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Hamza Alavi, "The Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan", pp. 164-165. See also Hamza Alavi, Amir Khusro, Pakistan: The Burden of US Aid (Asian Book Centre, Karachi, 1965), pp. 14-15.
- 72 Pakistan Times, 7 September 1954; M. A. H. Ispahani, "Pacts and Aid", pp. 117-118.
- 73 M.A.H. Ispahani, "The Ire of Pakistan", p. 15.
- 74 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 171.
- 75 Final communique of the Second Meeting of the Council of SEATO, Karachi, 8 March 1956 and final communique of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact, Tehran, 16-19 April 1956 in K. Arif, Vol. 1, op.cit., pp.

116-117, p. 119.

- 76 Even before the official announcement of the extension of US military assistance to Pakistan, President Eisenhower sent a letter to the Indian Prime Minister on 24 February 1954 expressing his willingness to extend similar assistance to India, adding that, "I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country including Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately ... appropriate action, both within and without the UN, to thwart such aggression." Keesings Contemporary Archives (Vol. IX, 1952-1954), p. 13461.
- 77 *Ibid.*, (Vol. X, 1955-1956), p. 14840.
- 78 *Ibid.*, (Vol. IX, 1952-1954), p. 13744. See also Syed Adil Husain, "Politics of Alliance and Aid: A Case Study of Pakistan (1954-1966)", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXXII, Nos. 1 and 2, First and Second Quarters 1979), p. 13.
- 79 Speech by N.S. Khrushchev at a reception given in Srinagar on 10 December 1955 by Prime Minister G.M. Bakshi of Kashmir, Documents, New Times, (No. 1, 1 January 1956), p. 28.
- 80 Report on the visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan by Bulganin and Khrushchev, Documents, *ibid.*, 5 January 1956, *op.cit.*
- 81 Moscow Radio, 28 August 1955 in SWB (Part I, No. 655), 2 September 1955, p. 15; Pakistan Times, 24 May 1956.
- 82 Bulganin's interview with the editor of the United Press Agency of Pakistan, Kutubuddin Aziz, Tass, 6 February 1956 in SWB (Part I, No. 698), 10 February 1956, pp. 21-22. A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman however responded that, "The initiative lies with the Soviet Union. At the moment we are not thinking of making any approach to Moscow on the subject" of economic cooperation. Pakistan Times, 9 February 1956.
- 83 Articles by Orestov in Pravda, 24 March 1956 and Petrov in Izvestia, 24 March 1956, SWB (Part I, No. 712), 30 March 1956, pp. 14-15, p. 17.

- 84 This was the first time that senior Soviet leaders, including First Vice Premier, Kaganovich, Vice Premier Tevossain and Foreign Affairs Vice President Semenov had visited the Pakistan Embassy in Moscow. Pakistan Times, 25 March 1956.
- 85 During his visit, Mr. Mikoyan also disclosed that he had "told Pakistan leaders that if they desired and if they had time, they would be most welcome in the Soviet Union." *Ibid.*, 26 March 1956; 29 March 1956.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 28 June 1956. See also Dawn, 7 November 1958.
- 87 Pakistan Times, 29 June 1956.
- 88 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 178; J.P. Jain, *op.cit.*, pp. 48-49.
- 89 Dawn, 18 July 1957; 21 July 1957.
- 90 Text of joint communique in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. X, No. 3, September 1957), pp 174-175. In the internal context, President Mirza, addressing a military parade on the first anniversary of the Republic of Pakistan, declared that the "Armed Forces of Pakistan are an instrument of peace and we can be of some use in this direction only if we ... have good and reliable friends which we have." Pakistan Times, 24 March 1957.
- 91 Speech by N.S. Khrushchev at a reception given in Srinagar on 10 December 1955 by Prime Minister G.M. Bakshi of Kashmir, Documents, New Times, (No. 1, January 1956), p. 27.
- 92 Bulganin's press interview with the editor of the United Press Agency of Pakistan, Kutubuddin Aziz, Tass, 6 February 1956 in SWB, (Part 1, No. 698), February 1956, pp. 21-22. See also Radio Moscow, 4 January 1956, *ibid.*, (Part I, No. 690, 13 January 1956), p. 15.
- 93 Pravda, 30 January 1956 in *ibid.*, (Part I, No. 696), 3 February 1956, p. 20; "Sentiment in Pakistan", New Times (No. 3, 12 January 1956), p. 14; "The People of Asia Reject the Military Blocs of the Colonial Powers", Pravda in SWB (Part I, No. 706),

9 March 1956, p. 24.

- 94 Pakistan Times, 26 March 1956.
- 95 The leader of the Pakistan parliamentary delegation, M.A. Khuro disclosed that, "We also brought up the question of Kashmir and asked for the elucidation of the attitude of the Soviet Union regarding it" in discussions with senior Soviet leaders, including Marshal Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev. "The impression we got", he stated "was that the Soviet Union really wanted friendly relations with Pakistan." Addressing a press conference on his return home Khuro said that he did not think that the Soviet Union would "oppose" Pakistan "outright" on the issue in the United Nations. Dawn, 11 August 1956; 31 August 1956. See also M.A. Khuro, "Looking at the Soviet Union", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. IX, No. 3, September 1956), p. 152.
- 96 Draft Resolution submitted to the Security Council, 14 February 1957 (S/3787) in K. Sarwar Hasan, Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question, p. 361.
- 97 Statement by the Soviet representative, Sobolev in the Security Council, 18 February 1957. Extracts in R.K. Jain, Soviet-South Asian Relations 1947-1978: Vol. I (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979), pp. 22-23.
- 98 Statement by the Soviet representative in the Security Council on 5 November 1957. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- 99 Y. Popov, "Kashmir - Artificial Issue", New Times (No. 21, 7 March 1957), p. 10. See also Moscow Radio, 20 February 1957, SWB (Part I, No. 806), 25 February 1957, p. 21.
- 100 Radio Moscow, 26 February 1957, SWB (Part I, No. 807), 1 March 1957, p. 11.
- 101 Article by Lt. Col. Basitov in Krasnaya Zvezda, *ibid.*, (Part i, No. 821), 23 April 1957, p. 43.
- 102 Moscow Radio, 14 July 1957, SWB, (Part I, No. 846), 19 July 1957, p. 8.

- 103 Article by Kondrashev in Izvestia, 9 June 1957, *ibid.* (Part 1, No. 836), 14 June 1957, p. 14; Moscow Radio, 6 June 1957, *ibid.* (Part 1, No. 835), 10 June 1957, p. 13.
- 104 Moscow Radio, 21 August 1957 in Pakistan Times, 15 August 1957.
- 105 Dimitry Volsky, "Pakistan's Worries", New Times (No. 26, June 1958), pp. 11-12.
- 106 Text of Soviet Note in Dawn, 28 May 1958.
- 107 Text of Pakistan Note in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XI, No. 2, June 1958), pp. 124-128.
- 108 Hafeez Malik, "Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan", W. Howard Wriggins (ed.), Pakistan in Transition (University of Islamabad Press, Islamabad, 1975), p. 77.
- 109 "Sentiment in Pakistan", New Times, *op.cit.*, p. 14; Col. Basitov's article in Krasnaya Zvezda, SWB, (Part 1, No. 821), 23 April 1957, p. 43; Tass, 22 November 1955 in SWB (Part I, No. 677), 25 November 1955, p. 33.
- 110 "Ignoring the Will of the People", New Times (No. 30, 25 July 1957), p. 19. See also Warner Levi, *op.cit.*, p. 216.
- 111 A National Assembly delegate, for example, argued that Pakistan's foreign policy was neither based on "self-interest nor was it enlightened." The pacts, he said, "had lowered the prestige of the country" and had "taken away our sovereignty." He added, "Why should we attach our country to any of these blocs and become an instrument of provocation to either of these blocs it has been said that we are strengthening our defences. Against whom? Against India? I am sure that it is not so, because the treaties under which our Government is receiving foreign arms aid, are treaties which categorically forbid us to raise our hands against India From which quarter do we fear aggression? From Afghanistan? I am sure our army without the help of our foreign friends is capable enough to defend our country. So far as our Soviet

neighbour is concerned, I suppose any fear of their attack does not arise unless and until we quarrel with them the effect of these Pacts has been that we have not only antagonised our immediate neighbour: the result of entering into these pacts and unholy alliances is that we have antagonised our Muslim brothers ..." National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 26 March 1956, pp. 66-67.

- 112 S.M. Burke, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Historical Analysis, pp. 187-188. See also Sajjad Hyder, "Pakistan and the Suez Crisis: Reflections of an Ambassador", The Muslim, 28 February 1983.
- 113 Stanley Maron, op.cit., p. 143.
- 114 According to an East Pakistani analyst, the US military aid was "mostly utilized for West Pakistan and resulted in the expansion of the armed forces and the economy (of the West wing) in general. It provided increased employment opportunities to West Pakistani labor" in the Army, "whereas East Pakistan was completely deprived of such opportunities." Badruddin Umar, "Politics and Parties in Pakistan (1947-59): Part One", The Pakistan Observer, 19 December 1968. See also Hamza Alavi, "The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan", pp. 164-165.
- 115 Aslam Siddiqi, "Can Pakistan Stay Neutral?", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XI, No. 2, June 1958), p. 75.
- 116 Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, "The Nation and the Armed Forces", p. 2.
- 117 Source: Aminur Rahman, "Territorial Politics and National Development in Pakistan (1947-1969)", Asian Profile (Vol. 10, No. 3, June 1982), p. 237.
- 118 Source: National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Questions and Answers, 19 February 1957, p. 792.
- 119 East Pakistani representatives in the Constituent Assembly and the new National Assembly pointed out that entry into the alliances had been justified on the grounds that "we would be

able to save our money, which we are spending on Defence, by entering into these pacts and by getting these foreign aids we would improve the condition of our poor masses But what do we see today? Every year we find that we are giving more and more money for the Defence of our country. Then what is the necessity of entering into these pacts ...?"

The East Pakistani representatives also condemned the inequitable policy of the central government with regard to Bengali representation in the Armed Forces. It was emphasised that, "the army is spending two-thirds of the revenues of the entire country and ... the entire amount or rather ninety per cent of the amount is being spent on this (the western) part of the country" while revenue was being collected from East Pakistan. But "... in the ranks of the Army, there is not even two per cent Bengalis (sic.) There are only two battalions of East Bengal Regiment. It has taken nine years to recruit one thousand persons in East Pakistan." The five feet six inches height requirement was criticised since it ruled out East Pakistani recruitment in the services. The mistreatment of East Bengalis in military training centres was also discussed and Bengali representatives condemned the racist attitude of West Pakistani officers serving in the East wing. Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, 24 January 1956, p. 1998; *ibid.*, 18 March 1956, p.100; National Assembly of Pakistan.(starred questions and answers), 28 March 1956, p. 156; *ibid.*, Central Budget Debate, 12 February 1957, p. 193.

- 120 The executive's supremacy over the legislature and control over decision making can be seen by the fact that successive legislatures, from 1947 to 1958, were in session for no more than thirty days annually and passed 160 laws as compared to the 376 major ordinances promulgated by the Governor-General and later the President of Pakistan. Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965), pp. 93-94.
- 121 Iskander Mirza first relied on the Muslim League to play that role and later set up his own party, the Republican Party.
- 122 According to Laswell's definition, a "Garrison State" is one

where the "trend of time is away from the domination of the specialist on bargaining", that is the civilian leadership and "towards the specialist of violence, the soldier." Harold Laswell's description of the "Garrison State" in Raymond Aron, "Remarks on Laswell" 'The Garrison State', American Journal of Sociology (Vol. XLVI, January 1974).

- 123 "Pakistan's Current Economic and Intelligence Report 7706, Office of Intelligence, Research and Analysis, State Department, 5 May 1958. M.S. Venkataramani, op.cit., p. 390.
- 124 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 170.
- 125 Ibid., pp. 170-171. See also Raymond A. Moore Jr., op.cit., p. 109, p. 112.
- 126 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp. 175-176.
- 127 M. B. Naqvi, op.cit., p. 21.
- 128 Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Leadership: Senior Commanders, pp. 14-15.
- 129 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 189.
- 130 Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Leadership: Senior Commanders, op.cit., pp. 6-7; Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, p.27. See also Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 158, pp. 160-161.
- 131 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 150; Col. Mohammad Ahmad, op.cit., p. 48. See also Commander Maqbool Husain, "The Army Marches", Pakistan Times, 25 September 1957.
- 132 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 190.
- 133 Ibid. Interview with Shabbir Hussain. Syed Shabbir Hussain, Lengthening Shadows: The Story of Pakistan's Politics and Politicians: From Advent of Pakistan to Fall of Ayub (Mujahid Publications, Rawalpindi, 1970), p. 61. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation, p. 203.

- 134 The leader of the NAP, Maulana Bhashani continued to be one of the most pronounced critics of the government's foreign policy. Addressing a public meeting in Dacca in 1958, for example, the Maulana called upon the Pakistani masses to launch a "people's movement" to wipe out "Anglo-US imperialism from the soil of Pakistan." Demanding an independent foreign policy and a withdrawal from the pacts, he said that after five years of "our membership in these pacts we have realised what these pacts actually mean." Pakistan Times, 15 September 1958.
- 135 The Pakistan government's threats were not taken seriously by its Western allies. For instance, when a US Senator asked a State Department official in the wake of Prime Minister Noon's statement "How do we explain the recent Pakistan announcement that if she does not get aid from the United States she may turn to the Soviets for help? How are we going to explain that when we are arguing for the Pakistan aid part of this programme?" he was told that Noon's statement "did not represent his real intentions" and had been made with a domestic audience in mind. Dawn, 9 March 1958; 10 March 1958. Anwar Syed, "Foreign Aid: Case Studies in Recipient Independence", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIII, No. 1, First Quarter 1970), p. 22.
- 136 In March 1958, the Pakistan Finance Minister, Syed Amjad Ali, actually admitted that the US military aid to Pakistan was in fact proving to be a strain on the national economy, but added that, "We cannot dispense with it either because of India's mounting defence expenditure." Times of India, 26 March 1958.
- 137 A West Pakistani politician, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, for example, warned the government that yet another postponement of general elections could mean that "the Baghdad tragedy (the 1958 bloody coup in Iraq) could be enacted in this country." *Ibid.*, 20 July 1958.
- 138 According to the last Prime Minister of the Mirza years, Firoz Khan Noon, "Under the 1956 Constitution, every President had to continue until the next President was declared. No

- President could hold office for two consecutive terms (without standing for re-election). If elections were held, Iskander had either to resign and seek re-election, in which case some felt it was doubtful he would succeed ..." Firoz Khan Noon, *op.cit.*, p. 291.
- 139 Rounaq Jahan, *op.cit.*, p. 53; A Political Analyst, "Tortured Career of the Opposition: From Emergence to Dismemberment: Part One", Viewpoint (Vol. III, No. 1, 14 August 1977), p. vi. Firoz Khan Noon disclosed that Mirza had delayed appointing him as the next Prime Minister when the I.I. Chundrigarh Muslim League-Republican Party coalition Ministry collapsed in October 1957. That "hesitation on his part", states Noon, "made it obvious enough that he would have preferred to take over Government himself under a new form of Constitution, but he had obviously not prepared the ground with the Army sufficiently well." Firoz Khan Noon, *op.cit.*, pp. 271-272.
- 140 Emphasis added. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 61.
- 141 Ayub had already received an extension in 1953 since his term as C-in-C was due to terminate on 26 January 1955. Dawn, 18 August 1955. Wayne A. Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections", p. 37.
- 142 The then Defence Minister M.A. Khuro, recounts his daughter, was told by C-in-C Ayub Khan about President Mirza's approach. H. Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 209-210. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 59.
- 143 Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Leadership: Senior Commanders, p. 13.
- 144 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *op.cit.*, p. 194.
- 145 A.B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes (New Century Publishers, London, 1985), pp. 222-226. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, Inside Baluchistan, cited in Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow. Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1981), pp. 27-28. See also Rao Rashid, Jo Main Ne

Dekha (S.F. Publishers, Lahore, 1985), pp. 36-37 and H. Khuhro, op.cit., p. 210.

- 146 Mirza's takeover speech in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. X1, No. 1, December 1958), pp. 303-307.
- 147 In an interview, Ayub Khan disclosed that both he and Mirza had "come to the conclusion that the country had gone to the dogs." The C-in-C stated: "I said to the President, 'Are you going to act or are you not going to act? It is your responsibility to bring about change'", adding that, "The Army had the ultimate responsibility." Daily Mail, 16 October 1958.
- 148 Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi, op.cit., p. 134; Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 195.

CHAPTER FIVE

MARTIAL LAW IN PAKISTAN (1958-1962)

The Armed Forces of Pakistan had slowly consolidated their position throughout the turbulent years of parliamentary rule. With the coup of 8 October 1958, the military, represented by Army Commander-in-Chief Ayub Khan, was to assume complete control over all political power in the land.

The takeover was to have considerable implications for Pakistan's internal politics and foreign policy. In the internal context, the military, abandoning its "apolitical" claims, would institute measures aimed at legitimising and consolidating its hold over power. In the external sphere, the military, which had previously played a significant role in shaping foreign policy, had now emerged as the key decision making force in the country. Henceforth, the course of Pakistan's foreign policy in general, and Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular, was to be determined by the orientation, interests and requirements of the Armed Forces.

Coup in Pakistan

On 7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza imposed martial law, abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dismissed the Cabinet and dissolved the legislature. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Ayub Khan, was appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)

and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Justifying the promulgation of military rule, Mirza placed all blame squarely on the shoulders of the political leadership, accusing them of bringing Pakistan to the brink of disaster. Martial Law, he said, was the only option left to save the country.¹ In his proclamation of 8 October, Ayub stressed that the Armed Forces had been forced to step in because of the failure of the politicians to run the administration effectively and honestly. The military had taken over power "with great reluctance" and "with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country."²

The official justifications of the 1958 coup are echoed by Pakistani military sources who claim that "martial law's *raison d'être* and vindication arose largely from the inability of the leaders of the public opinion to direct and control public affairs effectively"³ and Ayub Khan was forced to take over to save the country from virtual destruction.⁴ Similar explanations are put forward by a large number of Pakistani and Western analysts who argue that the "infrastructure of democracy" was not properly developed in Pakistan and a "ruthless scramble for power among the politicians made the constitutional government a farce".⁵ This failure of the political leadership led to a "constitutional vacuum" and the apolitical military "was sucked . . . into the vacuum resulting from the country's political bankruptcy".⁶ Since the military had been "forced" to intervene to "prevent" a further worsening of the crisis of the state, the coup was an example of "reactive militarism", i.e. when the political behaviour of armies is "generated by the weakness

of civilian institutions and the direct pressure of civilian groups" seeking to co-opt the military, rather than "designed militarism", when armies possess "the positive and premeditated intent to intervene in domestic politics and to follow expansionist foreign policies".⁷

These analyses of the developments in Pakistan do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the role of the military in overthrowing the civil government. It is true that the leadership involved in the changing coalitions at the centre was unrepresentative, corrupt and greedy for the spoils of office. Yet the military had, for their own self-interest, worked hand-in-glove with the bureaucracy in supporting and perpetuating that entire facade of undemocratic institutions.

Moreover, Janowitz's description of "designed militarism" seems a fair description of the military's role in politics. The discussion in the earlier chapters shows that an ambitious High Command had, over a considerable period of time, adopted deliberate and "premeditated" policies aimed at expanding the strength and influence of the Armed Forces. Army Chief Ayub had even expressed his intention to usurp the civil leadership should the military's corporate interests be threatened in any way.⁸ While the Armed Forces had, on the one hand, played a vital role in directing the course of domestic politics, on the other the Military High Command had also helped shape a foreign policy aimed at serving the requirements of the forces.

As the military and the bureaucracy throttled the growth of democratic institutions, pursuing policies aimed at enhancing their internal influence, domestic dissatisfaction began to increase.⁹ This unrest became a real threat as elections approached in 1959, with a real possibility of leftist parties, opposed to both the internal and external policy directions of the civil and military bureaucracies, gaining power. Realising that drastic action was needed to neutralise this threat, the Military High Command opted to overthrow the civil government. Having taken over power, they then justified this divergence from the "apolitical" character of the forces by blaming selfish and corrupt politicians for their failure to run the country efficiently and effectively.¹⁰

In the aftermath of the coup, the immediate task for the Military High Command was to find grounds and take measures for legitimising and consolidating their internal position. One legitimising strategy was an emphasis on the popular acceptance of the coup. It was stressed that the change was not only bloodless and peaceful, but that it was given a seal of legitimacy by the large-scale support for the takeover and the dissolution of the decaying parliamentary system. According to military sources, "not even a shot was fired and not even a baton charge made" during the coup, and Ayub Khan was "hailed as a real Messiah . . ."¹¹ The Army itself was "sparingly used and the extensive deployment of troops was neither planned or carried out" since it was rightly anticipated that the people would welcome the change.¹²

It is true that there was no show of support in favour of the unpopular and unrepresentative politicians involved in the short-lived coalitions in the centre. But while there had been hopes of electing a popular leadership in the forthcoming polls, there was no organised resistance to the coup. This was, however, less due to the popularity and "benign"¹³ nature of martial law, and more the result of measures taken to suppress any outburst of opposition, including the arrest of a number of leading politicians and the issuing of a number of punitive Martial Law Regulations (MLRs).¹⁴

While the military consolidated its power through the use of force, at the same time it was claimed that the Armed Forces, which had reluctantly intervened in politics, remained an apolitical and professional force; that the coup was not an attempt to institutionalise military rule and that the new government fully intended to reintroduce democracy once political stability had been established. It was therefore argued that, "The army was popularly credited with bringing about the revolution. But it was not a revolution by the army: neither was it a conspiracy nor even a coup d'état, since the army never revolted nor raised the standard of rebellion. True to its training and its ideals it had stood firm and loyal. It was simply called in to save the country from further ruin."¹⁵

In order to ensure continuity with the existing administrative structure, the military regime promulgated the Continuance in Force Order, 1958, whereby Pakistan would continue to be governed, as far

as possible, in accordance with the abrogated Constitution of 1956. At the same time, however, the acts of Martial Law authorities could not be challenged in civil courts, and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution remained in abeyance. On 27 October 1958, the Supreme Court gave the regime legal sanction, declaring that "a successful coup d'état is an internationally recognised legal method of changing a Constitution."¹⁶

Differences, however, soon emerged within the ruling group as President Mirza attempted to challenge the control of CMLA Ayub Khan. According to an informed source, Mirza had been appointed President in the new set-up in order to provide the coup "a cloak of legality", while real power rested with the military authorities.¹⁷ Mirza was forced to resign and Ayub took over the post of President, while retaining the position of CMLA. He retained the Cabinet formed by Mirza on 27 October, which included Lt General Azam Khan as Minister for Rehabilitation and Lt Generals W.A. Burki and K.M. Sheikh as Health and Social Welfare and Interior Ministers respectively. Two former bureaucrats, M. Shoaib and F.M. Khan were given the portfolios of Finance and Communications and a number of other civilian figures were also included in the Cabinet.¹⁸

The inclusion of former bureaucrats in the new Cabinet was an indication of the importance of the civil servants in the martial law government. Bureaucrats had, in fact, been closely associated with the regime from the very start. A senior civil servant, Aziz Ahmed, had been made Secretary-General in the government and DMLA (Deputy Martial Law Administrator) and the Advisory Committee

formed on 8 October included Aziz Ahmed and Secretaries of ^{seven} central government Ministries.¹⁹

The cooperation of the bureaucrats was necessary for an efficient running of the civil administration, but their position was definitely that of junior partners. The military made policy, while the bureaucracy was given the task of implementing it.²⁰ Although a general withdrawal order was given on 10 and 11 November to all troops to resume peacetime posts and cease from "assisting civilian authorities", the military continued to be the supreme law of the land.²¹

Military officers were granted senior posts in the civil administration. The military authorities were willing to allow the bureaucracy a measure in power-sharing in return for complete cooperation, but at the same time the threat of dismissal was constantly held over the heads of the civil servants.²² Screening committees were set up in November 1958 to enquire into the past conduct of government servants and more than 16,000 were either summarily dismissed or retired on charges ranging from inefficiency to corruption.²³ The bureaucrats, therefore, had little choice but to cooperate.

It was clear that the military, represented by its Supreme Commander, was now in complete and absolute control over all political power in the state. "In assuming the presidency of Pakistan", Ayub Khan had become "its chief executive; by keeping the title of Martial Law Administrator, he also remained chief lawmaker

and chief justice; and by not giving up command of the armed forces, he performed his multifarious duties with the authority of the military arm."²⁴

Military Rule and Foreign Policy

The military government made it very clear that there would be no change in foreign policy. Pakistan would remain a Western ally and as strongly opposed to the Soviet bloc as in the past. In his takeover address on 7 October, President Mirza stated, "we shall continue to follow a policy which our interests and geography demand", adding that, "we shall honour all our international commitments which . . . we have undertaken to safeguard the security of Pakistan and, as a peace-loving nation, to play our part in averting the danger of war in this troubled world." Although he declared his intention "to have friendly relations with all nations", including the Soviet Union, accusing "political adventurers" for the "bad blood and misunderstanding" between Pakistan and the communist bloc, the emphasis of his speech was on a reiteration of Pakistan's need for security links with the West.²⁵ After Mirza's ouster, Ayub Khan also strongly expressed his desire to strengthen and consolidate Pakistan's ties with the Western bloc. In his first major public address on foreign policy on 25 December 1958, Ayub declared that, "We shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steady, reliable friends."²⁶

The decision of the Martial Law Administration to opt for continued alignment with the West was not unexpected. The officer corps was

strongly hostile to the communist bloc and inherently conservative in its orientation. The military, represented by the Army Chief, had played a major role in negotiating Pakistan's alignment with the West. Participation in the alliances had, in turn, reinforced the military's pro-Western and anti-Soviet views, as they were "exposed to the full weight of the American military", including training, military doctrines and indoctrination.²⁷ In the Pakistani military's perception, the Soviet Union's regional objective remained the acquisition of warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and to spread communist thought. "Her overall aim remains the spread of Communism by subversion and economic bribery. All her efforts are geared towards the achievement of that aim by encouraging neutralism and anti-West elements."²⁸ While "Communism's vanguard is busy feeling soft spots all over the world", the "main defence for countries like Pakistan is the protection offered by collective security schemes", since CENTO and SEATO alone can "prevent any further communist penetration either through subversion or direct aggression" and save Pakistan "from the mighty steamroller of Russia."²⁹

It must be stressed that the military had been the chief beneficiary of the policy of alignment, receiving substantial military assistance which had modernized and enlarged the establishment and strengthened its position in the internal arena. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance to ensure a continued supply of such assistance from the West. Hence the threat posed to a continuity of this foreign policy by leftist forces in the run up to elections was a major factor in the military's decision to take over power in October

1958.

In the aftermath of the coup, Ayub and his military colleagues were in an advantageous position to consolidate Pakistan's participation in the Western alliance system, since they were now in complete control of both the domestic and foreign policy making processes. Ayub's anti-Soviet and pro-American leanings were well known. It was therefore not surprising that in his first address to his Cabinet, he declared that, "there is only one embassy as far as I am concerned and that is the American embassy."³⁰

The Americans expressed little concern about the imposition of military rule in Pakistan, and soon after extended moral and material assistance to the new government. Some Pakistani analysts allege that the "primary reason for the coup was the overriding desire of the United States to protect its interests . . ." ³¹ threatened by anti-Western sentiments gaining strength on the verge of elections in Pakistan. Hence the coup was "inflicted on the people of Pakistan by a military-bureaucratic complex with the connivance of the Central Intelligence Agency."³² While it is difficult to assess the level of American involvement in the coup, it cannot be ruled out that the US government had been given some indication of the impending changeover by Ayub Khan.

The US State Department and Pentagon had close and cordial ties with Army Chief Ayub Khan, and the Military High Command had, on several occasions in the past, chosen to bypass the civil authorities in its negotiations with American authorities. Within Pakistan, the

US MAAG was in "close daily contact with the GHQ" and the Americans had "access to nearly everything worth knowing" about the Armed Forces.³³

In the fateful months preceding the coup, Ayub had remained in close touch with the American administration, assuring it, both publicly and privately, of his personal commitment to the policy of alignment. In April-May 1958, Ayub paid an official visit to the US, where he held lengthy informal discussions with senior Pentagon and State Department officials, including the Service Chiefs, "regarding our problems", warning them that "leftist forces" were gaining strength and if Pakistan went to the polls, "in that situation, the leftist forces would win."³⁴ On his return home, Ayub declared that he was "fully satisfied" with the outcome of his talks.³⁵

A few days before the coup, a high-powered American delegation, headed by Defence Secretary Neil McElroy, accompanied by the Chief of MAAG, Brigadier General Mercer Walters, and the Vice-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James N. Russell, arrived in Pakistan. During the trip, the Defence Secretary held several meetings with both President Mirza and Ayub and returned home on 26 October, a day before the coup took place. Commenting later on the developments in Pakistan to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he stated, "I am inclined to believe well of our friends."³⁶ The then Pakistani Air Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, later observed that, "Knowing Iskander Mirza's and Ayub Khan's strong leanings towards the United States and Great Britain, it is my belief that the coup . . . was carried out with the knowledge of, if not

encouragement from, the governments of these two countries."³⁷

When Ayub took over the Presidency from Mirza, the Americans did not withdraw their support, since Ayub had "good contacts with the people in the Pentagon" as well as with the Eisenhower Administration as a whole. According to Asghar, Ayub in fact enjoyed "the full confidence and increasing support of the United States", which increased its economic and military assistance to Pakistan to help "strengthen Ayub Khan's position at home."³⁸

The coup in Pakistan had come at an opportune time for the US, due to developments in the Middle East in 1958. The July 1958 coup, which had led to Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, had seriously undermined the future of US-sponsored regional collective security schemes. In the London Declaration issued on 28 July 1958 at the conclusion of a meeting of the remaining Baghdad Pact states, the US had stressed its determination to increase military assistance to its regional allies, and also declared its willingness to enter into agreements with Pact members aimed at shoring up their territorial integrity and sovereignty.³⁹

In a show of confidence in the stability of the Ayub regime, the Eisenhower Administration continued its negotiations with Pakistan in late 1958 and early 1959 on implementing the objectives of the London Declaration. Similar exchanges were held with Iran and Turkey, and as a result of these parleys the US entered into identical Bilateral Defence Agreements with the three countries on 5 March 1959.

Article One of the US-Pakistan Agreement stated that, "In the case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution" of the US "will take appropriate action, including the use of armed force, as may be mutually agreed upon, and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request." Article Two gave assurances of greater American economic and military assistance to Pakistan to assist it "in the preservation of its national independence and integrity . . ."40

The Ayub government was pleased with the agreement, presenting it as proof that the US regarded Pakistan as a valuable ally, and emphasising that the preamble of the Pact stated that the "Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan."⁴¹ What was of even more importance were American assurances of enhanced military aid, which were essential if the regime was to consolidate its internal position with the full backing of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the agreement was also used to obtain internal legitimacy. Since the text did not specify that American assistance would be provided for a communist threat alone, the military government was quick to imply that it had succeeded, as no other government in the past, in obtaining American pledges of assistance in the event of any type of aggression, including potential aggression from neighbouring India.⁴²

While the military coup had resulted in strengthening Pakistan's relations with the West, it was to have an adverse effect on Pakistan-Soviet relations. By 1958, the growing internal opposition to the unrepresentative political structure was accompanied by increasing criticism of the policy of siding with the West in the Cold War. As elections grew closer, criticism of Pakistan's participation in the Western-sponsored collective security schemes also grew, and leftist parties, such as the NAP, made repeated calls for an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.

The October coup put an end to this debate on foreign policy as the military government moved quickly to suppress all internal dissension and concentrated its attention on consolidation of ties with the West. Hence the Soviet reaction to the coup was, not surprisingly, hostile. A strong attack was launched, questioning the legitimacy of the new regime. Soviet analysts claimed that reactionary forces, headed by the military, had taken over power in an effort to crush the increasingly popular progressive forces, including NAP, fighting for "genuine independence and democratic liberties." It was also alleged that the coup had taken place with the active connivance of the US government. The coup "occurred with US approval and was specifically aimed at squashing growing political discontent" resulting both from "the deteriorating economic situation" and the opposition to participation in the pacts.⁴³ In his report to the Twenty-first CPSU Congress, Khrushchev claimed that the Pakistani military coup was a clear indicator that "an attack is developing against the democratic gains of peoples who have won national independence."⁴⁴

The Soviet leadership and media strongly condemned the Ayub administration's attempts to forge closer ties with the West, both in bilateral dealings and by continued participation in SEATO and CENTO. Soviet criticism became more severe as the Pakistanis began negotiations on a bilateral military pact with the US in late 1958. Soviet commentators claimed that the "projected new military agreement" created "a threat to India and Afghanistan, adding to the general tension in the Middle East." It was also alleged that the negotiations included provisions on the establishment of US bases in Pakistan. The Soviets pointed out that "concerned for the security of its southern borders . . . the Soviet Union cannot look with indifference on the military negotiations." At the same time, strong warnings were issued to the Pakistanis to refrain from "playing with fire."⁴⁵

The Soviets also linked their criticism of the Pakistani government's foreign policy with its domestic politics. Thus, for example, it was claimed that the proposed pact would harm, "above all, the vital interests" of the Pakistani people, since it would expose the country "to the danger of retaliatory blows", but the clique responsible for negotiating the pact had "little concern for the national interests" of the people, and hoped that "foreign policemen" would help them keep the population "under their heel."⁴⁶

On 26 December 1958, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires presented an *aide memoire* to Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, seeking clarifications on the US-Pakistani negotiations. The Soviet note emphasised that such

a pact would "complicate the situation in Southeast Asia and the Middle East", a region which lay "in the immediate proximity to the Soviet Union." Hence events there "affect - and are bound to affect - its security interests." The Pakistan government was strongly warned about the dangers inherent in its foreign policy directions, and in particular against allowing foreign powers, hostile to the Soviet Union, to set up bases on its soil.⁴⁷

In its reply to the Soviet note on 7 January 1959, the Pakistani government strongly rejected the contention that the proposed agreement "would involve Pakistan in military ventures of third powers which would adversely affect the interests of any country in the neighbourhood because the purpose of the agreement is purely defensive." It was stressed that the Soviets had themselves provided military assistance, and were helping in the construction of military installations, including airfields, on the territory of Pakistan's neighbour, Afghanistan. But the Pakistanis had not objected, since it was an inherent right of every independent state to take steps to strengthen its security. Finally, the Pakistani government urged the Soviets to use their "great influence" in helping to reduce regional tensions "by assisting in the solution of disputes which constitute a threat to international peace and security." This was a pointed reference to Soviet support to India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan on the Kashmir and Pakhtunistan issues respectively.⁴⁸

Rejecting the Pakistani reply, the Soviet government sent another *aide memoire* on 18 February 1959, once again strongly warning the

Ayub government of the consequences of its anti-Soviet policies. The note rejected the Pakistani attempts "to justify the aggressive nature" of the collective security pacts and also "the steps on the part of Pakistan which are being taken by her as a member of these blocs." It strongly disagreed with "the assertion that the . . . military blocs do not lead to aggravating the tension in these regions and do not endanger peace." It pointed out that Pakistani foreign policy had a bearing on Soviet security, and warned that "the entire responsibility for the consequences of the steps taken by Pakistan towards turning her territory into a foreign military base will rest with the Government of Pakistan."⁴⁹

The Pakistanis continued to deny Soviet allegations of the presence of foreign military bases, while at the same time implying that the Soviets themselves were partially responsible for tensions in the region. For instance, a Foreign Office spokesman declared that, "there is no foreign military base on the soil of Pakistan", accusing the Soviets of attempting to conduct "a deliberate . . . campaign to mislead international public opinion and the Soviet people themselves."⁵⁰ In its formal reply to the Soviet note on 27 February, the Ayub government once again stressed the defensive nature of the pacts and denied the presence of foreign bases, but added that it was its "duty to take suitable measures to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan" which was "too sacred . . . to be omitted on any account." The Pakistanis "noted with regret that the Soviet Government has thought it fit to adopt a threatening tone in its Aide Memoire . . ." Expressing a desire to maintain "the most cordial relations" with the Soviet Union, the Pakistanis pointed out

that, "The Soviet Government, although repeating their assertion that Collective Security Pacts aggravate tension in the regions, have remained silent on the request of the Government of Pakistan" for assistance "in the solution of disputes which constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region."⁵¹

When the Ayub government signed the bilateral agreement with the United States, the Soviets reacted by, once again, attacking both the foreign and internal policies of the Pakistanis. It was once again argued that the Pakistanis were willingly allowing the Americans to use their territory as a strategic and military base to conduct aggressive activities against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviets claimed that the Pakistani military regime had become a willing accomplice of American imperialist schemes, motivated by a desire to shore up its internal position by obtaining American assistance. A Soviet analyst, for instance, commented that the Ayub regime was continuing "to look for solutions to internal difficulties" by entering into such pacts, and "attempting once again" to justify its policy "by references to the 'threat of communism.'" ⁵²

In a statement issued on 25 March 1959, the Soviet Government described the American bilateral pacts with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as a hostile act against the Soviet Union, heightening tension in an area "stretching along or in close proximity to the southern borders of the Soviet Union." Not only were the pacts a "threat" to the Soviet Union, but they were also aimed at "peace-loving countries" such as India, Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China.

The Soviets accused the governments of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey of deliberately tying in their foreign and internal policies to the "strategic and colonialist plans of the aggressive military bloc whipped together under United States' aegis" with "little concern for the real security and independence of their states." The Soviets claimed that, "The United States' ruling circles, as the stronger partner in these agreements, have retained the possibility of interfering in the domestic affairs" of the three countries.

The Soviets further alleged that Pakistani entry into the military pact was rapidly leading to an enhanced "dependence of the Pakistani army and of Pakistan itself as a state, on the aggressive plans of the United States." This dependence, it was claimed, was obvious in the increased presence of American military advisers in Pakistan. Finally, the Soviets once again warned the Ayub regime of the "grave consequences" of a policy.⁵³

The Soviet warnings and threats did not result in any modification in Ayub Khan's foreign policy. Not only did the military regime continue its efforts to consolidate its alliance with the West, at the same time it made no attempt to soften its anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rhetoric.

The Trials and Tribulations of Alignment

Despite General Ayub's wholehearted support for a pro-Western foreign policy, tensions arose in US-Pakistan relations soon after the signing of the bilateral military pact. Although the Eisenhower Administration continued to provide moral and material assistance to Pakistan, there was growing opposition within the US Senate to the extension of military aid to Pakistan.

During the Mutual Security Committee hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April, May and June 1959, a number of Democrats called for radical changes in the military assistance programme, on the grounds that Pakistan was being granted arms aid far beyond its requirement, that in the event of conflict between the two superpowers the Pakistan Army would prove of little use to the Americans, and finally, that such assistance was both antagonising the Indians and promoting an arms race in the subcontinent.⁵⁴

During these hearings, it was also disclosed that the US government had been putting pressure on Pakistan to reduce the size of its Armed Forces, which the Americans felt were far beyond its external defence requirements. Testifying before the Senate, US Air Force Chief, General Thomas White, and Defence Secretary, Neil McElroy, said that they had so far been unsuccessful in persuading Pakistan to reduce its force levels which, "in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", were over and above those needed "to support US strategic objectives." But since Pakistan was a sovereign nation, it could not be forced to follow US dictates.⁵⁵

The Ayub regime was perturbed by this open criticism of its Armed Forces, and by the questioning of the rationale and quantum of arms aid to Pakistan. It was even more disturbed when the US Senate subsequently reduced the Eisenhower Administration's proposed foreign aid allocations in the 1959 budget by \$383 million.⁵⁶ Conscious of the need for continued American assistance to his main constituency, the Armed Forces, and hopeful of upgrading Pakistan's importance as a valuable ally, Ayub adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, he warned the Americans that his government would be hardpressed to resist internal and external pressures for change in its pro-Western foreign policy without assurances of adequate support. On the other, the Pakistani government continued to reiterate its determination to side with its Western allies, issuing frequent reminders of the constant communist threat from the North to Pakistani security.

On 22 June 1959, Ayub issued a statement, dismissing American criticisms of the excessive size of Pakistan's defence forces as "totally erroneous and based on an incorrect appreciation of the military requirements of Pakistan" which had 1,400 miles of frontiers to defend, including a "very sensitive frontier on our North-West." He added that, "I would like our friends to understand very clearly that they shall find us dependable and trustworthy but, at the same time, if they think they can lead us to confused thinking against the hard facts of life, then we just cannot oblige."⁵⁷ On another occasion, when asked if Pakistan would turn to "other powers" for assistance should American assistance prove

insufficient, Ayub responded that "the camp opposing the Americans attaches a great deal of importance to our country, from the military as well as political point of view and persistently makes advances to us." He added that there was also increasing internal dissatisfaction towards the policy of alignment, warning that "In the long run, the people would oblige us" to abandon that policy should the US fail Pakistan, "We hope that we will not reach that position but there is a question of the instinct of self-preservation."⁵⁸

At the same time, the government pledged its loyalty to its Western allies, and emphasised the ever-present threat of Soviet and Chinese expansionism. Thus Ayub declared that Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were "acting as a shield of security for the entire Middle East, South Asia and the African continent", but warned of the dangers posed to these bastions of the free world by the communist bloc;⁵⁹ while Foreign Minister Qadir declared that Pakistan attached great importance to pacts like SEATO which were "a guarantee of security which is badly needed in this area" due to the threats posed by the communist states.⁶⁰

As Sino-Indian differences emerged in March 1959, with the Dalai Lama escaping from Tibet and receiving shelter in India, the US began to seriously consider the possibilities of using India as a counterweight against China, while at the same time encouraging Indo-Pakistan rapprochement to prevent further Chinese regional "expansionism". Aware of these changes in American orientation, Ayub decided to extend a hand of friendship to India to assure the Americans that arms assistance to Pakistan would neither threaten

nor antagonise the Indians.

Indo-Pakistan relations had deteriorated sharply in the wake of the October coup. Prime Minister Pandit Nehru declared that with the imposition of Martial Law, Pakistan had "ceased to be, even in name or form, a free country" , adding that it was a development which his country deeply regretted.⁶¹ The Ayub Administration had also adopted a hardline posture on sensitive issues such as Kashmir in a bid to gain internal legitimacy and support. Hence Ayub declared that his government would "make all possible sacrifices if necessary to liberate Kashmir" and warned that if the Indians refused to solve their differences with Pakistan peacefully, his Government would know how to deal with them.⁶² This stand had further heightened Indo-Pakistan tensions.

As the US emphasis shifted to a united Indo-Pakistan front against the PRC, Ayub was also forced to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards India. With the intention of making a favourable impression on the US Administration, and thereby ensuring continued military assistance, Ayub began to make repeated offers of "joint defence" to India against the 'threat' from the North. At the same time, however, Ayub made the offer conditional on a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, knowing full well that the Indians would choose to reject such a precondition.

Thus, for instance, in April 1959, the Pakistani President declared that his country and India should defend the subcontinent jointly in the event of an external threat, adding that "the prerequisite for such

an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir Once these were resolved, the armies of the two countries could disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers." On another occasion, Ayub declared that India and Pakistan should jointly defend their territories against the threat from the North, stating that the "crux of the whole thing is that Indian and Pakistan forces are at the moment facing each other; if differences between them were resolved, these forces could be released to the job of defending their territories" against the Sino-Soviet threat. Once bilateral differences such as Kashmir were resolved, "both Pakistan and India should look outward instead of facing each other inward."⁶³

Distrustful of Pakistan's motives, and unwilling to negotiate the Kashmir issue, Prime Minister Nehru rejected the offer, declaring that, "I do not understand when people say 'let us have a joint defence' - against whom? Are we to become members of the Baghdad Pact or the SEATO or some other alliance? We do not want to have a common defence policy; the whole policy we have pursued is opposed to this conception." He added that "common defence was not the real issue at all but something else - the Kashmir issue."⁶⁴

Ayub, however, continued to reiterate his offers of joint defence to India, in the hope of obtaining American goodwill, and at the same time adopted an even harsher anti-Soviet rhetoric in his foreign policy pronouncements. It was claimed that the Chinese invasion of Tibet and expansion of Soviet influence in Afghanistan were part of a larger communist "plot to obtain complete control over the region." On 21 October 1959, Foreign Minister Qadir, referring to

Soviet-Afghan rapprochement, warned that, "If Russian influence increases somewhere, you cannot exclude the possibility of a threat"; while Ayub declared that, "In four or five years time, the development of communications that is taking place in Afghanistan by the Russians, and also of the bases being constructed by the Chinese in Tibet, will present us with a new situation. It is not inconceivable that one of the dangers is that the Communist world will have the power and facility to bring direct military pressure to bear. This is self-evident. They have the capacity. I do not say that is their intention . . ." ⁶⁵ On yet another occasion, Ayub warned that "a Russian-Chinese drive to the Indian Ocean is a major aim in the Communist drive for world domination."⁶⁶

Not only did the Pakistanis warn the Americans that the communist threat to the region remained "as dangerous, abhorrent and potentially violent as ever before"⁶⁷, but the US was also cautioned that, "If Pakistan's defences were not sufficiently developed, through our folly or through lack of assistance", then all that can be said is that "there is no alternative except falling into the vast sea of communism, which is a most terrible thought . . ."⁶⁸

Ayub's warnings and overtures did seem to succeed in persuading the Eisenhower Administration to provide assurances of moral and material support to a "military leadership" which had proved to be "even more outspoken in its support of existing military arrangements than its predecessor civil regimes."⁶⁹ Hence, in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of his visit to Pakistan in December 1959, President Eisenhower recognised "the heavy

financial burden placed upon Pakistan in its efforts to undertake substantial development projects and at the same time to maintain Armed Forces consonant with its national security" and both governments reiterated their "determination . . . to continue strongly to support these regional collective security organisations."⁷⁰

It was not surprising that Ayub's open hostility to the Soviet bloc and his constant pledges of loyalty to the West contributed to the further worsening of Pakistan-Soviet relations. The Soviets continued to accuse Pakistan of providing bases to third countries, which would be used for "aggression directed against the USSR, People's China, India and Afghanistan", while Ayub's references to a joint Sino-Soviet threat were dismissed as an attempt "to justify the policy of subordinating Pakistan to the United States and to get bigger American appropriations via CENTO." It was also alleged that Ayub's statements "were also prompted by domestic considerations" due to growing internal discontent. This was the result of a deteriorating economy as the Pakistani government spent "more money on military purposes than its predecessors" as "more than half the total budgetary expenditure was allocated for defence spending." Thus, the Soviets claimed, by "harping on the 'Communist menace' the leaders of the military regime wish to divert the attention of the people from Pakistan's vital economic and political problems."⁷¹

The Soviets retaliated by increased moral and material support to India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pakhtunistan disputes respectively, both as a part of a larger regional strategy aimed at consolidating ties with the two countries and in a bid to exert

pressure on the Ayub regime. The Pakhtunistan dispute came into prominence during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul in March 1960. By the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had forged close links with Afghanistan, which was the recipient of substantial economic and military assistance. While Afghanistan was drawing closer to the Soviet Union, its relations with Pakistan were even more strained than in the past.

During his visit to Kabul, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union "never deserted its good neighbour and friend in times of misfortune", adding that, "We understand Afghanistan's anxiety over the conduct of definite circles in certain states to whom the concept of respect of the lawful national rights of other peoples is apparently alien" in an indirect reference to Pakistani actions in deliberately interfering with the Afghan economy by periodic border closures.⁷² The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit stated that the two sides had "exchanged opinions regarding the fate of the Pushtus and concurred in stating that the reasonable way to allay tension and ensure peace in the Middle East is to apply the principle of self-determination on the basis of the United Nations Charter for resolving this issue . . ."⁷³

On his return home, Khrushchev once again declared that "Pushtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan" and that Soviet "sympathies in this matter lie with the Pushtu people" who were striving to obtain the "right of self-determination under conditions of freedom and non-intervention."⁷⁴ A few days after Khrushchev's endorsement of the Afghan stand on Pakhtunistan, the

newly-appointed Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Dr Mikhail Kapitsa, called for a plebiscite for the Pakistani Pakhtuns which would allow them to decide between an independent Pakhtun state, a merger with Afghanistan or continued union with Pakistan.⁷⁵

The Pakistani government strongly condemned the Soviet stand on Pakhtunistan, and Foreign Minister Qadir declared that Pakistan could not "ignore certain recent developments across our northern and northwestern borders", implying that Soviet-Afghan rapprochement bore ominous repercussions for Pakistan's security.⁷⁶ The Ayub regime also used the Soviet declaration on Pakhtunistan to justify Pakistan's need for continued participation in the Western alliances in view of the ever present "threat" from the North. Ayub warned that the object of Soviet support to Afghanistan on the issue was quite clearly "to aggravate problems in this part of the world" and "to pave the way for the age-old attempt of the North to dominate the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent and the areas surrounding it."⁷⁷ The Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Aziz Ahmed, not only condemned Soviet support to India on Kashmir and the "open incitement by it of Afghanistan to lay claim to Pakistani territory", but also, reiterating Pakistan's loyalty to the West, stated that if the Western sponsored pacts were of little value, then "the countries whose expansionist ambitions they are designed to thwart would not continue to denounce them so violently or work so assiduously for their undoing." Earlier, the Foreign Minister had called Pakistan's alliance with the West the "sheet anchor" of its foreign policy, adding, "If there are any implications arising from it . . . they are there. In the Western alliance is implicit the guarantee of our sovereignty and

independence."⁷⁸

The "implications" arising from the policy of alignment became glaringly obvious as the U-2 incident of May 1960 led to heightened tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations. On 1 May, an American Lockheed U-2 intelligence gathering aircraft was shot down in the Sverdlovsk region, some 2000 kilometres inside Soviet territory. While the State Department at first claimed that the plane was on a weather reconnaissance mission, the capture and subsequent interrogation of pilot Gary Powers revealed the true nature of the mission. On 7 May, the State Department admitted that the downed U-2 had "probably" flown over the Soviet Union in an attempt "to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain."⁷⁹ The plane had flown from the Turkish city of Adana to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan. It had then taken off from Peshawar on an espionage mission over Soviet territory and was due to terminate its flight at the Bodo airfield in Norway.

The Soviet reaction to the incident boded ill for Pakistan, as Khrushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet on 5 May, not only launched a strong attack on the US for violating Soviet state frontiers, but added that, "I believe it is also necessary to warn, from this lofty platform and in the sternest manner, those countries that make their territory available to aggressive forces and thereby make it easier for these forces to act against us. The governments of these countries should have understood a long time ago that they are playing with fire, since the retaliatory blows will shower on these countries as well. . ." In his concluding remarks on 8 May,

Khrushchev stated, "The governments of three countries - Turkey, Pakistan and Norway - must clearly realize that they were accomplices in this flight because they permitted use of their airfields against the Soviet Union . . . They must judge where the situation may lead when they open their territory to third countries that use it for aggressive purposes."⁸⁰

At the Czechoslovak Republic Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May, Khrushchev once again warned Pakistan, Turkey and Norway that if they continued to permit American flights "into our territory from their bases, then we will destroy these bases."⁸¹ On 11 May, addressing a press conference on the U-2 incident, Foreign Minister Gromyko issued identical protest notes to the three American allies, accusing them of willingly and consciously "allowing foreign military aircraft to use their airspace for the preparation and execution of intrusions into Soviet airspace." They were then warned that "should such provocational actions be continued . . . we will then strike at the bases from which the aggressors make their flights", adding that, "It is not necessary to say that the Soviet Union possesses all necessary means for this."⁸²

The Pakistanis had granted unlimited access to the airstrip in Peshawar for the operation of the U-2 flights conducted over Soviet territory, photographing military and industrial installations, communications networks, etc.⁸³ and the programme had been in operation for three years when the ill-fated May flight took place. According to Gary Powers, U-2 flights also took place from Lahore, and the Ayub government was fully conscious of the nature of the

operation.⁸⁴

In the wake of the U-2 incident, however, the Ayub regime refuted all Soviet allegations of Pakistani complicity, stating that Pakistan had played no part "in the preparation and execution of the flight of any aircraft for the purpose of military intelligence over the USSR." They admitted the existence of the Badaber base, but stressed that the base did not have an airstrip attached to it. Pakistani authorities also acknowledged that the US had sought and received facilities to refuel and service their aircraft in Pakistan, but emphasised that the Americans were not questioned about the onward destinations of such flights.⁸⁵ It was admitted that the U-2 plane shot down in the Soviet Union had taken off from Peshawar, but claimed that it had then "been diverted to USSR in the course of its flight without the knowledge of Pakistan." It was also stressed that Pakistan had no foreign military bases on its soil, "therefore, the question of their being put to aggressive purposes did not arise." Furthermore, in a counterattack on the Soviet Union, the Pakistanis alleged that their "own airspace had been violated several times in recent months" and the "type of aircraft used in these operations and their direction of flight indicate that these must have been Soviet planes."⁸⁶

Soon after the incident President Ayub expressed his desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union, and ordered a personal inquiry into the matter. An official protest note was also lodged with the US, calling for a cessation of any further U-2 flights, with Foreign Secretary Ikramullah declaring that if the Soviet allegations

were found correct, Pakistan would "ensure that such a thing does not happen again".⁸⁷ But at the same time Ayub emphasised that Pakistan was not defenceless, as its security was underwritten by its Western allies. Referring to Soviet threats of retaliatory action, Ayub said, "After all, Russian threats are not new to us. We are not afraid of such threats", adding that these "harsh things of life have to be faced." At the same time, he warned that in case of a Soviet attack on Pakistan, the West would retaliate in kind and this could lead to a world war.⁸⁸

The Pakistani response antagonised the Soviets even further. In June 1960, the Soviet Union sent a second protest note, accusing the Ayub regime of ignoring the consequences of its irresponsible behaviour. In the note, the Soviets stated that "instead of giving a clear answer that it would not allow Pakistan territory to be used by the American Air Force for aggression against the Soviet Union", the Pakistanis were attempting "to escape responsibility." Hence the Soviet Union could "only reach the conclusion that the government of Pakistan underrated all the seriousness of this question." The Pakistanis were once again warned about the "danger . . . resulting from the use by the USA of airfields of its alliances for military purposes."⁸⁹

The Search for New Directions

In the wake of the U-2 incident, there was no change in Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy directions. While Foreign Minister Qadir emphasised that the free world would have to be even more wary of the communist bloc, the Pakistani Air Chief told his counterparts in

SEATO that Pakistan was "convinced of the need to maintain its military strength at a level sufficient to deter those countries that have military designs in this area."⁹⁰ The regime also allowed the US to continue its electronic monitoring and intelligence-gathering operations at the Badaber base, with the facility becoming even more important after the suspension of the U-2 flights.⁹¹

General Ayub continued to harp on the interconnected themes of a need for continued alignment with the West, the ever-present Sino-Soviet threat, and the necessity of joint defence with India to guard the subcontinent's northwestern approaches against communist expansionism. In an article published in Foreign Affairs, Ayub wrote that, "Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West, and unlike several other countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost completely from the possibility of any major assistance from the Communist bloc. We do not believe in hunting with the hound and running with the hare." He added, "As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. If, on the other hand, we resolve our problems and disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a good chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, which was that whenever this subcontinent was divided . . . someone or other invited the outsider to step in."⁹²

Yet the U-2 affair could not be brushed aside so easily by the

military regime, due to both domestic and external compulsions. In the internal context, the incident and the subsequent international attention to the provision of facilities to the Americans proved a source of embarrassment, since the Ayub administration's previous denials of anti-Soviet operations from Pakistani soil lost credibility. Furthermore, the strong Soviet reaction, including threats of retaliatory action against American facilities in Pakistan, led to a renewed internal debate on the risks entailed in a policy of alignment with the West, which had exposed Pakistan to tremendous danger.⁹³

In the external context, the incident had taken place at a time when the Americans were reassessing their regional strategy, probing the possibilities of wooing neutral India as a counterweight to communist China. In line with this policy, the Eisenhower Administration had not only extended generous economic assistance to India,⁹⁴ but even provided it with assurances of security.⁹⁵ Ayub was particularly concerned that a continued decline in Pakistan's regional importance vis-à-vis India could result in a substantial reduction of American military and economic assistance, or a US decision to extend military aid to India, or both. If any of these scenarios became reality, it would have serious consequences for the regime, especially if it was unable to deliver the goods to the Armed Forces, where there was already growing dissatisfaction with the quantity of American assistance.⁹⁶

Taking internal and external factors into consideration, the Ayub regime opted for a change in tactics, aimed on the one hand at

assuaging domestic criticism and regaining internal credibility, and on the other at pressuring the Americans into reassessing their regional priorities. This strategy focussed mainly on the adoption of a new rhetoric in foreign policy. Although the military government had no intention of breaking away from the Western alliances which were a continual source of military assistance, equipment and training for the Armed Forces, it strongly cautioned the Americans not to take Pakistan's loyalty for granted while, at the same time, expressing its intention to explore new foreign policy alternatives to advance Pakistan's interests. Hence Ayub Khan not only criticised the US administrative machinery as "cumbersome, sluggish and a clumsy juggernaut", but also declared his intention to "do business" with the Soviet Union.⁹⁷

While the Ayub regime decided to use the Soviet card due to its own compulsions, the Soviet Union responded positively to the new Pakistani overtures. Although the Soviets had been antagonised by Ayub's pro-Western policies, they had, from the very start, attempted on the one hand to threaten and on the other to cajole Pakistan into changing its foreign policy directions. Hence Soviet threats and warnings had been accompanied by offers to improve political and especially economic relations. The Soviet Ambassador, for instance, declared in mid-1959 that, "Only 10 per cent of the problems" in their bilateral relations "are controversial in nature", while "on the remaining 90 per cent there is possibility of developing friendly relations", and offered Pakistan technical assistance, especially in the agricultural sector.⁹⁸ In November 1959, the two countries entered a barter agreement covering the exchange of

\$400,000 worth of manufactured goods, and in March of the following year, visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin offered every possible assistance to Pakistan in implementing its Second Five-Year Plan.

Even when tensions were highest during the U-2 affair, the Pakistani media reported that the Minister in the Soviet Embassy had extended offers of economic assistance. In the wake of the incident, the Ayub government announced its willingness to accept a Soviet offer of assistance, first made in November 1958, in the exploration of mineral resources, including oil.⁹⁹ In January 1961, Pakistan's Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, began negotiations on the offer in Moscow, following talks in Karachi in September 1960. On his return home, Bhutto disclosed that the Soviet Union was "willing to consider favourably proposals for economic collaboration with Pakistan without any conditions attached . . ."100

The Pakistanis were, however, careful to emphasise that the ongoing negotiations did not imply any change in foreign policy. While Bhutto refuted reports that the proposed deal could lead to a reassessment of ties with the West, Foreign Minister Qadir categorically stated that, "The agreement (under negotiation) is a realistic interpretation of the policy hitherto pursued and does not involve a change of attitude towards the alliances necessary for joint action in the event of aggression."¹⁰¹ The Administration, therefore, made it clear that it would stand by its international commitments, but much would depend on the response of its Western allies to Pakistani

needs and requirements.¹⁰²

The inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in January 1961 was viewed with apprehension in Pakistan. The Democrats had been sharply critical of the Eisenhower government's policy of showing clear preference to allied countries at the cost of ties with neutral and nonaligned states. During his election campaign, Senator Kennedy had pledged to reassess the Dullesian policy of collective security arrangements and had expressed a desire to establish closer relations with countries such as India.¹⁰³ After coming into office President Kennedy embarked on a policy of expanding economic and political relations with nonaligned states such as India, so as to include them in a loose alliance with the West for the containment of communism.¹⁰⁴

Perturbed by the policy directions of the new US government, the Ayub Administration continued with its overtures to the Soviet Union, in an attempt to put pressure on the Americans. The Soviets, on their part, seemed willing to show greater flexibility than in the past in their dealings with Pakistan. The Soviet Ambassador, Dr Kapitsa, not only expressed his country's willingness to share its "accumulated experience" in many fields of development with Pakistan, but added that, "We don't want that Pakistan should weaken her relations with her Western allies. On the other hand, we too want to be on good terms with Pakistan's friends" and with Pakistan itself. The Soviet Union wanted "to be neighbours psychologically and friends really", he stated.¹⁰⁵ On 4 March 1961, Pakistan signed an agreement for Soviet assistance in the exploration of its oil and

gas resources, the first of its kind with a communist country. The Soviets extended a loan of \$30 million, repayable over a period of twelve years in Pakistani rupees, which would then be used by the Soviets to purchase Pakistani goods.¹⁰⁶ The project and the oil and mineral sources when found would be owned entirely by Pakistan. The Soviet Ambassador expressed the hope that the two countries would develop even closer ties, calling the agreement "an evidence of Soviet intentions."¹⁰⁷

Soon after signing the oil contract, the Pakistan government also announced its intention to negotiate its border problems with China. The resolve of the Ayub Administration to use the China card as a further lever in its dealings with its Western allies was aided by the fact that Sino-Pakistan relations had remained correct, although cool, in the past.

Pakistan had been fairly prompt in extending recognition to the PRC in January 1950. Although its relations with the PRC were slow to develop, they were quite cordial, with Pakistan voting in favour of the PRC's representation in the UN. Once Pakistan became a member of the Western pacts, including SEATO which was specifically aimed at containing China, the bilateral relationship came under strain. But while the PRC condemned the pact as an "illegal" organisation pursuing "aggressive" American aims, its criticism of Pakistan was restrained. The Chinese were then pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with newly-independent Asian countries, and were keen to convince them of their peaceful intentions.¹⁰⁸

Criticism of Pakistan was also low key, because the Chinese realised that Pakistani participation was influenced more by its internal compulsions than by the adoption of a deliberate anti-Chinese posture. Premier Chou En-lai, for example, publicly accepted Prime Minister Bogra's assurances at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 that "although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty", it "was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against her". Through "these explanations, we (Chou and Bogra) achieved a mutual understanding . . ."109

Relations, however, deteriorated as Pakistani involvement in the pacts grew, and Pakistan began to side with its Western allies against the PRC in international forums. Relations were especially strained as the military regime under Ayub Khan constantly stressed the theme of a Sino-Soviet threat to the subcontinent, offering joint defence to India in the wake of Sino-Indian border tensions in 1959.¹¹⁰

But the onset of Sino-Indian tensions had also led to a rethinking of Pakistani policy towards China, since there were possibilities of exploiting the situation to Pakistan's advantage, both in its relations with neighbouring states and with the superpowers. Such a strategy, however, could not be adopted without first defusing sensitive issues such as its own unsettled border with China. In September 1959, Pakistan obtained Chinese maps showing parts of the Gilgit-Hunza-Baltistan areas as Chinese territories. The following month, Ayub declared his desire to peacefully demarcate the Sino-Pakistan border.¹¹¹

The inauguration of the Kennedy Administration introduced a new urgency in the Pakistani strategy of forging closer ties with China as a means of gaining leverage in its international dealings. As US-Pakistan relations came under strain due to the pro-Indian leanings of the new US government, the Pakistanis formally proposed border talks with China on 28 March 1961 and, during the same year, voted in favour of PRC admission to the UN.¹¹²

The Ayub Administration had been hopeful of upgrading Pakistan's position in US regional strategies through the use of the Soviet and China cards. But while the Americans were concerned about Pakistani overtures to the Sino-Soviet bloc, to Pakistan's disappointment there was no change in the Kennedy Administration's pro-Indian leanings. After a visit to South Asia in early 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, in fact, disclosed that he had delivered a message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru urging him "to extend his leadership to other areas in South East Asia."¹¹³ Similarly, US economic assistance to India continued to increase while aid allocations to Pakistan were reduced.¹¹⁴

The Ayub regime was concerned that this decline in economic assistance could also extend to the military sphere, and was disturbed by media reports that the US was contemplating the extension of military assistance to India. The Administration realised that such developments would not only provide opposition forces with greater opportunity to attack its foreign policy leanings but, more importantly, would threaten a withdrawal of essential

support by the American-equipped Armed Forces. Hence the regime, on the one hand, made an overt show of support for the alliances, offering, for example, facilities within Pakistan to its CENTO allies.¹¹⁵ At the same time, the Pakistanis urged their allies to strengthen pact members militarily, with Foreign Minister Qadir telling a CENTO Ministerial Committee Meeting that "CENTO has to concern itself with developing the military as well as the economic strength of the area."¹¹⁶

On the other hand, the Ayub government launched a series of bitter attacks on the Americans. The President declared that, "The American policy of encouraging neutrality in areas where we know it will operate in the long run against their interests and their friends' interests is incomprehensible." On another occasion, Ayub warned that Pakistan had joined the pacts "for the purpose of ensuring our security and it is only logical to judge our continued membership by the extent to which that is achieved."¹¹⁷

According to a former Pakistan Foreign Office official, Ayub was "so perturbed" over the changed American policy that his scheduled visit to the US "was brought forward by about six months to July 1961" at his request.¹¹⁸ On the eve of his visit Ayub warned the Americans that "unless an area of understanding between India and Pakistan is reached, this subcontinent remains vulnerable and indefensible" against the communist threat.¹¹⁹

During his trip, Ayub time and again stressed the need for continued American military and economic assistance to help Pakistan

withstand the internal and external pressures of communism. Ayub pointed out that, "If there is any trouble in Asia . . . the only country that will stand by you is Pakistan." On the question of aid, he said, "you have to give it to us because it involves the fate of the world and also your own destiny", adding that, "we are pressing against you today as friends If we do not make good and if, heaven forbid, we go under Communism, then we shall still press against you but not as friends." Ayub also cautioned the Americans against extending military assistance to India, warning that should the United States extend such aid , " it will put tremendous strain on our friendship." He called on the Kennedy Administration "not to compromise the situation of your friends", warning that the extension of US military assistance to India would lead to "a tremendous groundswell of public opinion in Pakistan" against the West.¹²⁰

While Kennedy reassured Ayub of constant US friendship, and pledged continued military assistance, including the delivery of F-104 fighters promised by the previous Administration, Ayub's visit had little impact on US regional strategies.¹²¹ The Kennedy Administration continued to focus on the strengthening of economic relations with neutral states such as India in a bid to form an informal front against the communist bloc. Moreover, Pakistan's importance in US global strategy had also fallen due to developments in nuclear technology, including ICBMs and missile carrying nuclear submarines such as Polaris, which had reduced the strategic value of military bases on the periphery of the communist bloc. The Americans were, therefore, disinclined to give in to Pakistani pressures for greater moral and material assistance.

The Pakistanis continued their attempts to acquire concessions from the West by threatening closer ties with the East. When, for example, the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium failed to fulfil Pakistan's demands for its Second Five-Year Plan, Minister of Industries Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared that help would be sought from other sources if Western assistance was withheld, adding that Pakistan would be willing to seriously consider any Soviet offers of assistance.¹²² While the Soviets did respond positively and cultural and economic ties improved, political relations remained strained.

The Soviets were aware that the Ayub government, despite its differences with its allies, was still deeply committed to a policy of alignment with the West. The Pakistanis, in fact, made it amply clear where their sympathies lay. On the one hand, Pakistani authorities continued to press the Americans to fulfil their needs, especially in military hardware. In August 1961, for example, visiting Defence Secretary Fida Hussain called upon Pentagon officials to help Pakistani forces attain their peak of modernized strength.¹²³ On the other, despite its threats of withdrawal from the alliances unless the US reconsidered its regional priorities, the Ayub Administration continued to reiterate its loyalty to its major Western ally at both domestic and international forums.

In July 1961, Pakistan's Permanent Representative at the UN, Said Hasan, declared that his country would stand by the United States in the event of a Soviet-American confrontation¹²⁴ while President Ayub, explaining the rationale of Pakistan's foreign policy, stressed

that, "Pakistan lies between three mighty powers of Asia. One is virtually hostile to us. The other two have an ideology which conflicts with us." In this situation, the "only way in which we can ensure our security . . . is to have friends, powerful friends" and that "is the reason why we are in military pacts, like CENTO and SEATO. That is the reason we are in military alliance with the United States."¹²⁵ Since Pakistan continued to identify so closely with the policy of alignment with the West, the Soviets also continued to criticise sharply the military regime's internal and foreign policy directions, and to extend support to India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan.

Pakistani-Afghan relations had deteriorated rapidly throughout 1960, resulting in the closure of consulates and commissions in each other's territory and a breakdown in diplomatic relations by mid-1961. The Soviets reponded to these developments by providing strong support to their Afghan allies. The Soviet media stressed the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent" to a conflict taking place in the "immediate vicinity" of its southern borders and accused Pakistan of deliberately "enacting measures" aimed at the "forcible suppression of the just national aspirations of the Pushtus." The Soviet government once again declared its support for a "just settlement of the Pushtu problem, through peaceful means" with the "most reasonable way" being the "application of the principle of self-determination."¹²⁶ The Soviet stand led to a deterioration in Pakistan-Soviet relations and the Ayub government accused the Soviets of providing arms to the Afghans for use against Pakistan.¹²⁷

Tensions grew even further as the Soviets, in an attempt to undermine the international credibility of the Western bloc and its Asian allies, claimed in mid-1961 that they were in possession of secret CENTO documents which not only proved that CENTO bases existed in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, but that these bases would be used to launch nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union and other neighbouring states, including Afghanistan. It was claimed that the documents also showed that CENTO had drawn up lists of targets in Pakistan and Iran, which would be turned into "nuclear death zones" to act as barriers in the event of open war between the West and the Soviet Union.¹²⁸ While the Soviets warned that their armed forces would "nip in the bud" any attempt at launching aggressive attacks from Pakistan and Iran,¹²⁹ CENTO and Pakistani officials strongly refuted the Soviet charges. Senior Pakistani diplomat Zafrulla Khan, for example, called the Soviet charge "as false as it is absurd."¹³⁰

The Pakistanis also retaliated by once again pledging their loyalty to their Western allies. On a number of occasions President Ayub declared that Pakistan's continued membership in the pacts was necessitated by the hostility of some of its powerful neighbours. "This makes it necessary that we should be always in search of dependable friends who are interested in the internal as well as external security of Pakistan." Calling for the strengthening of CENTO and SEATO, Ayub emphasised that in the event of an attack on member-states by a stronger power, "We are not entirely without hope" and that if "we are attacked, the attacker will also be attacked."¹³¹ The Pakistanis, therefore, continued to follow a

policy of alignment while at the same time pressing upon their Western allies to strengthen the pact members militarily in view of the ever present communist threat.

The Pakistani policy of siding with the West led to renewed Soviet criticism of the Ayub regime. In his report to the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961, Khrushchev declared that while his country "would like to live in peace and friendship with neighbours such as . . . Pakistan", the Pakistani "ruling circles" had "thus far been unable or unwilling to disengage themselves from the snares of the military blocs" and had deliberately "failed to avail themselves of the opportunities for business-like cooperation with our country." Khrushchev singled out Ayub's internal policies for attack, claiming that since the military government spent "two-thirds of its budget for military purposes" the "national industry is not developing and foreign capital rules as if it were in its own bailiwick. The sad fate of Pakistan . . . should set the public thinking in some other countries where influential forces are destroying national unity and persecuting progressive leaders . . ." ¹³²

Aside from these criticisms of the Ayub regime, ¹³³ the Soviets also expressed their displeasure by extending support to the Indian stand on Kashmir during the UN Security Council debate on the issue in 1962. When discussions were underway in the forum, Pakistani Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, called on the Soviet Union to refrain from using its veto on the Kashmir question if it really wanted, as it claimed, friendly

relations with Pakistan.¹³⁴ But when Ireland introduced a resolution calling for direct Indo-Pakistan negotiations on the basis of previous UN resolutions, the Soviet Union vetoed it.

During the debate, Soviet representative Morozov gave a clear indication of the Soviet stand, reiterating that, "The question of Kashmir, which is one of the States of the Republic of India and forms an integral part of India, has been decided by the people of Kashmir itself." On 22 June, Morozov vetoed the Irish resolution on the grounds that it presented only "a one-sided and hence incorrect view of the question of Kashmir." He claimed that the UN resolution about a plebiscite had been adopted "in quite a different set of practical circumstances", resting "on conditions which were prerequisites for carrying out this whole plan", with the most important condition being "withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the entire territory of Kashmir." According to the Soviet representative, since Pakistani forces continued "to occupy" approximately one-third of Kashmiri territory, his country could not support a resolution based on "the principle set forth in the now outdated resolutions . . ."

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Withdrawal of Martial Law

In the external sphere, the Ayub government worked consistently and at times against great odds to consolidate alignment with the West, a policy which created tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations but was tailored to suit the orientation of the military government and to

serve the interests of the Western-equipped and trained Armed Forces. In the internal context the Martial Law Administration worked with equal dedication to consolidate the military's hold over political power. The continued military dominance of the internal decision-making processes in turn enabled the regime to pursue a foreign policy of its dictate, and to quell any domestic opposition to its foreign policy directions.

The fundamental task facing most military regimes endeavouring to consolidate their internal position is to find ways of legitimising their political role. "As soon as they are in power, military officers will offer to regenerate the society in short order and to reconstitute the polity along more just lines. Once they have restored order, they claim, they will happily return to the barracks."¹³⁶ This legitimising strategy was adopted by the Pakistani military government, which instituted a number of reforms, claiming that these measures would set the country on the path to progress and stability, replacing the corruption and inefficiency of the old political order by the "good government" of the Armed Forces.¹³⁷

The military government also took a number of measures to strengthen its control over the outlawed politicians. On the one hand, it continued to base its legitimacy on the "failure" of selfish and dishonest politicians to provide efficient and honest government.¹³⁸ On the other, Martial Law Ordinances, such as the Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO), were used to prevent a

re-emergence of the political leadership.¹³⁹ Offices of political parties were sealed, their funds frozen, and a number of prominent political figures arrested.

Although the military government was successful in preventing any outburst of opposition in the West Wing through coercive means, aided by the fragmented nature of the opposition, the situation in East Pakistan was far more volatile. The East Pakistanis had been hopeful of gaining a voice in the central government as the first national elections had approached in 1959, but the October coup had shattered these hopes and placed all power in the hands of an overwhelmingly West Pakistani dominated military regime. East Pakistani unrest flared up in the shape of student demonstrations in 1960.

The Martial Law authorities were quick to respond. Instead of acknowledging and making attempts to rectify East Pakistani grievances, the Ayub Administration blamed the unrest on communist agitation. Ayub claimed that pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communist agents "operating out of Calcutta" were responsible for East Pakistani demands for "a weak federal structure, Parliamentary democracy, too many provinces and an ineffective government for Pakistan."¹⁴⁰ He declared that students playing into "undeserved hands" would not be allowed to undermine national security. Soon after the demonstrations were effectively quelled by the law-enforcing agencies.¹⁴¹

As earlier mentioned, an important vehicle for consolidating military

rule was the formation of an "alliance" with other civilian bureaucrats¹⁴² which enabled the military to withdraw troops to peacetime posts and ensured an efficient running of civil administration. The civil servants had been coerced and cajoled into supporting the military government. Martial Law Ordinances had been passed threatening the dismissal of bureaucrats charged with corruption, inefficiency, etc., and the permanent tenure of civil servants had been removed. Military officers had been appointed both to the bureaucracy and to civil posts. In the final analysis, however, this body of legislation was barely enforced. Very few high ranking bureaucrats were actually dismissed from service, the previous guarantees of permanent tenure were restored, the practice of inducting military officers into the bureaucracy stopped, and bureaucrats were allowed a share in power in return for their cooperation. Nor was any attempt made to bring about any real reform in the civil service, since such a move would have seriously undermined the working relationship between the military authorities and the civil administration.¹⁴³

According to Feit, the partnership that developed between the military and bureaucracy transformed Ayub's government into a "military-administrative state".¹⁴⁴ The complete cooperation of the civil servants did mean a smooth and efficient running of the Martial Law government and the bureaucrats did have a significant role to play in it.¹⁴⁵ Yet it must be emphasised that the military, represented by its Supreme Commander, was in complete control of all decision-making, whether in defence or foreign policy or in domestic politics.

Ayub's main base of support remained the military and he took several measures to ensure its continued backing. Defence expenditure was continuously increased and senior military officers were given lucrative posts, including diplomatic assignments.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, Ayub consolidated his own position within the institution. Promotions, transfers and retirements were used to reward or punish military personnel. For instance, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt General Habibullah, who had clashed with Ayub, was retired, and the post abolished. Announcing this decision, Ayub warned that every military officer had to be completely obedient to the Commander-in-Chief, and if anybody was found wanting, he would be dismissed. During the same month, Ayub was granted the rank of Field Marshal by the Presidential Cabinet.¹⁴⁷ Ayub also decided to shift the federal capital from Karachi to a new site named Islamabad, located near the outskirts of Rawalpindi, so as to be near the Army GHQ.¹⁴⁸

Despite his dominance over the central government, with the complete backing of the military and civil bureaucracies, Ayub realised the necessity of institutionalising that control by a political framework which would grant his government the legitimacy it required. As mentioned earlier, the Martial Law government had pledged a return to democratic rule, from the very start, but "of a kind that people can understand and work." Ayub continued to make such pledges, aimed at securing popular support and a measure of legitimacy, stating for example, "The revolution of October 7, 1958, was not aimed against the institution of democracy

as such. No, it was only against the manner in which its institutions were being worked," and affirming his intention to restore a suitable democratic order in the country.¹⁴⁹ Faced with the dilemma of offering a political alternative which would possess at least the trappings of representative government and yet perpetuate authoritarian rule, the military needed a system to serve its interests.

This was the scheme of Basic Democracies, promulgated on 26 October 1959. The scheme envisaged the setting up of a five-tier system of self-government. In the first tier, the Union or Town Council, units with a population of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 people would elect a representative to it by simple majority. One-third of the membership would be nominated and the Council would work in close co-ordination with the civil authorities of the area concerned. The Union Councils would elect Chairmen to represent them in the next tier, the Thana or Tehsil Council, which would include an equal proportion of nominated members from the bureaucracy, while the subdivisional officer of the Tehsil or Thana would be appointed Council Chairman. In the three higher tiers - that is, the District, Divisional and Provisional Development Councils - the principle of election was abandoned altogether and the official members, belonging to the civil service, would far exceed the appointed representatives in numbers as well as in power.¹⁵⁰

Elections to the Basic Democracies units were completed in January 1960. The ban on political activity remained in force, and the elections were held on a non-party basis. Candidates were not

allowed to present party manifestos, discuss sensitive issues such as defence or foreign affairs or criticise the Martial Law government. Moreover, a large number of candidates were disqualified by a liberal use of EBDO.¹⁵¹

After the approximately 80,000 candidates were elected to the first tier of the system, they were called upon to participate in a referendum on 14 February in which they were asked to express their confidence or otherwise in Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan. No other presidential candidate was put up, and polling took place under strictly controlled conditions.

The result of the ballot showed that Ayub had received 75,084 votes or approximately 95.6 per cent of the votes. On 17 February, the Field Marshal was sworn in as the first "elected" President for a five-year term.¹⁵²

The Basic Democracies referendum had also given the President the authority to formulate a future constitution for the country. Ayub now declared his intention to set up a Constitution Commission to help devise a future political structure. The President pressed for the establishment of a Presidential system, based on a strong executive, which, he stated, was the only way of ensuring effective government and political stability.¹⁵³ Ayub also reiterated his opposition to political parties, calling for indirect elections on non-party grounds for the executive and the legislature, with, preferably, the Basic Democrats acting as the electoral college.

The Constitution Commission set up in 1962 was given strict terms of reference by the Martial Law regime. Ayub declared that it was up to his Administration to accept or reject the proposals of the Commission. According to the President, the Commission was "not being appointed to tell us what we should do. We know what we should do. We are clear in our minds that we cannot accept the parliamentary system."¹⁵⁴ The Commission's report was presented to Ayub in May 1962.

In the meantime, elections were held in the central and provincial legislatures in April 1962, with 80,000 Basic Democrats acting as the electoral college. The newly elected National Assembly accepted the Constitution, which was promulgated on 2 June 1962. Martial Law was simultaneously withdrawn and power transferred to a "civilian" government headed by President Ayub.

Summary

The military's endeavours to obtain supreme power had culminated in the Martial Law of 1958. The takeover was followed soon after by measures to consolidate and legitimise the internal position of the military regime, including the promulgation of legislation aimed ostensibly at eradicating the ills of the past and replacing inept civilian governments by a stable and effective administration. Apart from these legitimising measures, Martial Law Regulations and Ordinances were issued to prevent a re-emergence of the political leadership. The use of the external, particularly the "communist" threat was also resorted to in order to justify the forcible

suppression of anti-Martial Law sentiments.

At the same time, an alliance was forged with the bureaucracy to enable a smooth functioning of civil administration. The bureaucrats, however, remained junior partners, and were given the task of implementing the policy directives issued by the military authorities. Thus the military, represented by its Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, remained in complete control of all decision-making, whether in the sphere of domestic politics or in the realm of foreign policy.

In the pursuance of both domestic and foreign policy goals, the Ayub regime was careful to ensure that the requirements of its main constituency, the Armed Forces, took precedence over all other national needs. In foreign policy, this meant a continuance of the policy of alignment with the West, a course dictated by the orientation and interests of the Armed Forces. The military's participation in the alliances had not only reinforced its pro-Western and anti-Soviet views, but had also made it the chief beneficiary of substantial assistance which had modernized and enlarged the establishment, thereby strengthening its internal position.

While the Americans supported the takeover, providing the new government with considerable economic and military assistance and consolidating their links with Pakistan through a bilateral pact, the coup had an adverse effect on Pakistan-Soviet relations. Aware of the orientation of the Pakistani High Command and its role in aligning Pakistan with the West, the Soviets strongly attacked the

regime's foreign policy directions and questioned its internal legitimacy.

The Ayub Administration, however, ignored Soviet threats and warnings and adopted an even harsher anti-Soviet rhetoric. Pakistani warnings of a Sino-Soviet threat to the Indian subcontinent and offers of joint assistance to India, in the wake of Sino-Indian tensions, in the hope of gaining greater Western assistance, further aggravated Pakistani relations with the Soviet Union. The latter retaliated by a continued extension of support to India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan.

Relations between the two countries reached an all-time low with the U-2 incident, which exposed the military regime's policy of extending facilities to the US to conduct anti-Soviet operations from Pakistani soil as part of a quid-pro-quo for military and economic assistance. While the Martial Law government did not renounce its alignment with the West in the wake of the U-2 incident, and allowed the Americans to continue using Pakistani facilities to monitor the Soviet Union, both internal and external determinants were to have their own influence in shaping the future course of Pakistani foreign policy.

Internally the U-2 incident led to a renewed internal debate on the risks involved in a policy of alignment with the West. Externally the Pakistanis were perturbed by the reassessment of American South Asian strategies, especially under the Kennedy Administration, which now began to focus on the potentialities of neutral India

acting as a counterweight to Chinese communism. This occurred at a time when the strategic value of land-based alliances ringing the communist bloc was declining, due to nuclear technological developments, such as the deployment of ICBMs and SLBNs. US interest in and assistance to Pakistan concomitantly declined.

The Ayub regime was therefore forced to adopt a change in foreign policy rhetoric, both to placate domestic criticism and to put pressure on its American allies to reconsider their policy directives towards Pakistan. The new Pakistani strategy included threats of withdrawal from the alliances if sufficient aid was not forthcoming, and moves to improve relations, especially in the economic sphere, with the Soviet Union. It also involved the use of the China card as a lever in Pakistan's dealings with regional and external powers.

The Martial Law Administration was particularly concerned about the internal consequences of a reduction in external military assistance for its West-trained, West-equipped Armed Forces. A decline in such aid could well mean a withdrawal of support from this vital institution. Efforts were therefore to be made to establish closer ties with Pakistan's major aid donor, the US, a policy which was in keeping with the regime's own ideological leanings. Hence, the Ayub Administration continued to emphasise the existence of the Soviet threat, calling upon its Western allies to help strengthen it against the internal and external pressures of communism.

The military regime's professions of loyalty to the West meant continuing tensions in relations with the Soviet Union which

consistently denounced the internal character of the Pakistani government while, at the same time, both cajoling and putting pressure on the latter to change its foreign policy directions. Thus the orientation of the Martial Law government and the needs of its main constituency, the Armed Forces, continued to dictate the course of Pakistan's pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy.

Footnotes - Chapter Five

- 1 In his takeover speech, the President stated that, "For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, corruption" and the "shameful exploitation of our ... masses." The "mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today." Text in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XI, No. 1, December 1958), pp. 303-307.
- 2 Pakistan Times, 9 October 1958.
- 3 Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "Martial Law: Need for a National Debate", Dawn, 9 June 1982.
- 4 Maj.Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., pp.192-193.
- 5 G.W. Choudhury, "Pakistan Under General Ayub", Current History (Vol. 40, No. 235, March 1961), pp. 160-161. See also Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan. The Enigma of Political Development (Dawson, Westview, 1980), esp. pp. 83-86 and Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army, p.178.
- 6 Syed Shabbir Hussain, op.cit., p.61. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 90-93.
- 7 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964), p. 16. See also Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army , p.178.
- 8 Thus , for instance, during the sectarian agitation in Lahore in early 1953, which threatened the military's internal cohesion, C-in-C Ayub warned that if the situation "was critical, the Army would declare a Military Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan". American Consul General, Lahore, to State Department, 13 February 1953, 790.d. 00/2-1953.

- 9 Mohammad Asghar Khan, General in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982 (Vikas Publishing House Ltd., New Delhi, 1984) pp. 4-6.
- 10 Ibid., p.6. According to a perceptive observer of Pakistani politics, "The Martial Law authorities justified their autocracy by referring to bickerings among ambitious politicians (in which their own leadership should have been included); fiscal recklessness (of which military expenditures were no small part); a lack of leadership (which might have been remedied by elections only three months away); and a loss of international prestige", while the unproductive pro-Western foreign policy had been dictated by the military itself. Wayne A. Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections", pp.37-38. See also Charles Burton Marshall, "Reflections on a Revolution in Pakistan", Foreign Affairs (Vol. 37, No. 2, January 1959), p. 249, p. 252.
- 11 Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "In the Shadow of Martial Law: II", Dawn, 25 August 1985.
- 12 Maj.Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p. 196.
- 13 In an interview with a British journalist, Ayub declared that, "Our martial law is benign martial law to assist civil power to clean up this mess as soon as possible." Pakistan Times, 20 October 1958.
- 14 These included MLR No. 3, which empowered military courts to impose a maximum death penalty to "recalcitrants" defined as, "Any external enemy of Pakistan and mutineers or rebels and rioters and any enemy agent." Stanley Wolpert, op.cit., p. 127.
- 15 Maj.Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, op.cit., p.199. According to Ayub, the military government's "ultimate aim" was "to restore democracy" but first "we have to put this mess right and put the country on an even keel". Ayub's inaugural address, Pakistan Times, 9 October 1958.
- 16 According to the Supreme Court judgement in the State vs. Dosso case, "If the attempt to break the Constitution fails, those who sponsor to organize it are judged by the existing

- Constitution as guilty of the crime of treason. But if the revolution is victorious, in the sense that the person assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law-making fact, because, thereafter, its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success." *The State vs. Dosso and Another*, Reported PLD, 1968, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Documents Section, Defence Journal (Vol. XI, Nos. 4-5, April-May 1985), pp. 72-73.
- 17 Ian Stephens held a post at GHQ, Rawalpindi, at the time of the coup. Ian Stephens, *op.cit.*, p. 301.
- 18 The Supreme Commander also issued an order appointing the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Air Force and Navy, General Musa, Air Vice Marshal Asghar Khan and Vice Admiral H.M. Siddiq Chaudri as Deputy Martial Law Administrators (DMLAs).
- 19 These were the permanent heads of the Ministries of Finance, Industries, Agriculture, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior.
- 20 For example, the Martial Law representative in Rawalpindi told senior provincial and central civil servants on 11 October that, "... we have decided to make as wide and broad-based use of the civil administration as possible", adding, "But you will appreciate that as long as Martial Law remains in force, the Martial Law authorities will retain supreme control over the administration of the country." Pakistan Times, 13 October 1958.
- 21 The troop withdrawal order declared that "military authorities will continue to assist and reinforce" the civil administration "whenever necessary". While standing military courts would cease to function, recourse to such courts would be taken "should necessity arise, to deal with smuggling, anti-State and anti-Martial Law activities." Dawn, 12 November 1958; 17 November 1958.
- 22 On 16 November, President Ayub stated that, "it was never the intention that the Armed Forces should replace the civil

- administration", but added, "I shall have no hesitation in getting rid of those (civil servants) who fail and entrusting their work in those who can do the job." Ibid., 17 November 1958.
- 23 Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan", Middle East Journal (Vol. 13, No. 4, Autumn 1959), p. 403.
- 24 J.C. Hurewitz, op.cit., p. 201.
- 25 Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XI, No. 1, December 1958), pp. 304-305.
- 26 Vladimir Moskalenko, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Asian Survey (Vol. XIV, No. 3, March 1974), p. 275.
- 27 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 63.
- 28 Brig. Syed Abed Ali Bilgrami, "Limited War and Likely Areas of Conflict", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. 1, No. 5, 1959), pp. 34-36.
- 29 Ibid. Maj. M. Shuaib, "The Russo-Afghan Dilemma, The Owl (Staff College, Quetta, Vol. XII, December 1960), p. 29, p. 33.
- 30 Ali's interview with former Cabinet Minister. Tariq Ali, op.cit, pp. 112-113.
- 31 Bilal Hashmi, op.cit., p. 110. See also Jamil Rashid, "Intellectual's Role in Pakistan's Crisis - II", Viewpoint (Vol. V, No. 2, 19 August 1979), p. 21.
- 32 Tariq Ali, op.cit., p. 88.
- 33 Staff Study, "CIA in Pakistan", op.cit., p. 9.
- 34 Interview with Ayub's Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar, The Muslim, 18 January 1985. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., p. 59.
- 35 Dawn, 24 May 1958.

- 36 M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Relationship", International Studies (Vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967 1967), p. 100.
- 37 Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1947-1982, p. 10.
- 38 Ibid., p. 12. Although informed CIA and State Department sources have denied any prior American knowledge of the coup, they acknowledge that the Eisenhower Administration had viewed the takeover favourably since Ayub's loyalties to the US were proven. It was also disclosed that the US Government believed that the coup was preferable to elections which might have led to unreliable politicians taking over power in Pakistan. Author's interviews with former CIA official, William Barnds and Officer-in-Charge of the US Embassy in Pakistan in 1958, and later Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Christopher Van Hollen.
- 39 The Eisenhower Doctrine had been adopted a year earlier, pledging greater economic and military assistance and even the use of American forces to underwrite the security of their Middle Eastern allies against "international communism". S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 193-194.
- 40 Text of Agreement in Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon, (Vol. XII, No. 1, March 1959), pp. 76-78.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Soon after the Agreement was announced, Foreign Secretary M.S.A. Baig claimed that it could be invoked "and we shall certainly invoke it - in the event of aggression from any quarter." Dawn, 6 March 1959.

This led the Indian Government to ask the Eisenhower Administration to explain the implications of the pact. In an address to the Indian Parliament on 6 March, Prime Minister

- Nehru disclosed that he had been specifically assured by the American Ambassador that the Agreement would be confined to aggression from communist states. Pakistan Times, 7 March 1959.
- 43 K. Ivanov, "The Middle Eastern Situation", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 1, January 1959), p. 78. V. Kudrayavtsev, "By the Back Door", Izvestia, 20 January 1959, CDSP (Vol. XI, No. 3, 25 February 1959), p. 24.
- 44 Pravda, 28 January 1959. *Ibid.* (Vol. XI, No. 4, 4 March 1959), p. 23.
- 45 K. Ivanov, *op.cit.*, p. 78. B. Tomilin, "Baghdad Pact: USA Holds Military Talks", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 1, January 1959), pp. 109-110.
- 46 B. Tomilin, *op.cit.*, pp. 109-110.
- 47 Pravda, 20 February 1959, CDSP (Vol. XI, No. 8, 25 March 1959), p. 32.
- 48 Text of Pakistan's Reply in R.K. Jain, Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978: Vol. II: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka (Documents) (Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1978), pp. 17-18.
- 49 Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XII, No. 1, March 1959), p. 75.
- 50 Dawn, 21 February 1959.
- 51 Text of Pakistan's reply in Pakistan Times, 3 March 1959.
- 52 N. Prozhogin, "Warlike Threats and Plaintive Requests", Pravda, 8 December 1959, CDSP (Vol. XI, No. 49, 6 January 1960), p. 17.
- 53 Text in Pravda, 26 March 1959, *ibid.*, (Vol XI, No. 12, 22 April 1959), pp. 16-18. See also Kh. Grigorynn, "More US Trouble-Making in the Middle East", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 6, June 1959), p. 44 and N. Prozhogin, *op.cit.*

- 54 A Democrat Senator asked if US military assistance to Pakistan had helped its leadership to impose "on the Pakistani people a form of government that is not consonant with our conception of a free society." Staff writer, "Pakistan's Doubts about 1959 Treaty with the US", Viewpoint (Vol V, No. 27, 10 February 1980), p. 8. Pakistan Times, 22 June 1959; Dawn, 15 July 1959.
- 55 In his testimony, General White said that what the Pakistanis "are given under our strategic objectives are those forces which in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are needed in Pakistan to support the US strategic objectives. Now, admittedly the Pakistanis, over and above that, have some more forces which we feel they don't need to have. But they are a sovereign nation. We are doing our best to urge them to cut them down but the forces that we are supporting are only those that we feel are necessary in our overall interest on a strategic basis." Times of India, 21 June 1959; Pakistan Times, 22 June 1959.
- 56 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (Praeger, New York, 1982), p. 8.
- 57 Text of Ayub's statement in Dawn, 23 June 1959.
- 58 Dawn, 2 August 1959. See also Staff Study, "Pakistan's Relations with the Commonwealth: Political and Strategic Aspects", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 2, Second Quarter 1961), p. 132.
- 59 J.P. Jain, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
- 60 Dawn, 8 April 1959.
- 61 Joseph Minattur, Martial Law in India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962), pp. 71-72.
- 62 Pakistan Times , 29 December 1959.

- 63 Mohammad Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp. 126-127; G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966 (Pall Mall Press, London, 1968), p. 253.
- 64 Ibid., p. 254; S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 233.
- 65 Dawn, 22 October 1959; 27 October 1959.
- 66 Daily Mail, 18 November 1959.
- 67 Interior Minister, Lt. Gen. Sheikh's address to a SEATO seminar in Lahore in February 1960, Dawn, 10 February 1960.
- 68 President Ayub's statement, Pakistan Times, 11 February 1960.
- 69 Report on "United States Foreign Policy in Asia", US Senate, 87th Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, November 1959. Extracts in K. Arif, Vol. 1, op.cit., p. 178.
- 70 Dawn, 9 December 1959.
- 71 L. Yasilyev, "Pakistan: Out of Step with the Times", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 1, January 1960), pp. 88-89. Red Star, 26 August 1959 in Pakistan Times, 27 August 1959.
- 72 Khrushchev's speech at a banquet in Kabul, Pravda, 3 March 1960, CDSP (Vol XII, No. 9, 3 March 1960), p. 9.
- 73 Text of joint communique in Izvestia, 6 March 1960, ibid., (No. 10, 6 April 1960), pp. 8-9.
- 74 Ibid., pp. 6-7. See also S.M.M. Qureshi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXIX, Nos. 1 and 2, Double Issue, Spring-Summer 1966), p. 106.
- 75 Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale (University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1974), p. 43.

- 76 Pakistan Times, 29 April 1960.
- 77 Ibid., 24 March 1960; Dawn, 25 March 1960.
- 78 J.P. Jain, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-58.
- 79 Keesings Contemporary Archives (Vol. X11, 1959-1960), p. 17425.
- 80 Pravda, 6 May, 8 May 1960, CDSP (Vol. XII, No. 18, 1 June 1960), p. 18. Izvestia, 8 May 1960, *ibid.*, (No. 19, 8 June 1960), p. 6.
- 81 Khrushchev added that, "We say to the governments of these countries: If you have leased your territory and are no longer masters of your own land, your country, then it follows that we must understand this in our own way. The one who leases your territory is operating against us from your territory. His land is far from us, but yours is near. Therefore, in the way of a warning to distant targets, we will find the range of close ones. Let the necessary conclusions be drawn from this." Izvestia, 10 May 1960. *Ibid.* (No. 19, 8 June 1960), p. 23. See also Dawn, 11 May 1960; 15 May 1960.
- 82 Pravda, 12 May 1960, CDSP (Vol. X11, No. 19, 8 June 1960), pp. 24-25.
- 83 As earlier mentioned, the Pakistanis had also leased the Badabar base near Peshawar to the United States, which was used for intelligence gathering and electronic monitoring of Soviet territory.
- 84 Staff Study, "CIA in Pakistan", p. 8.
- 85 Dawn, 10 May 1960; 18 May 1960.
- 86 Ibid., 8 May 1960; 25 May 1960.
- 87 This was mere cover since the US had stopped U-2 flights over the USSR after the incident. *Ibid.*, 9 May 1960; 15 May 1960.

- 88 The US, on its part, declared that it would stand by its allies being subjected to "intimidation" by Khrushchev. Ibid., 25 May 1960. See also S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 196-197.
- 89 Pakistan Times, 25 June 1960.
- 90 Dawn, 26 May 1960; 31 May 1960.
- 91 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 197.
- 92 Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective", Foreign Affairs (Vol. 38, No. 4, July 1960), pp. 555-556.
- 93 Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration (Oxford University Press, London, 1967), pp. 172-173.
- 94 Although Pakistan remained the only recipient of American military assistance, it was obvious that large-scale economic assistance could easily be converted for military usage. This was acknowledged by US Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, who stated that India was the best example "of a country using US economic aid to buy military equipment." S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 257-258.
- 95 During his visit to India in December 1959, President Eisenhower had told the Indian Parliament that American defence forces were there not only to defend their own territory but also "those of our friends and allies who, like us, have perceived the danger (of an alien philosophy backed by great military strength)." Ibid., p. 262.
- 96 According to the then Director of Weaponry and Equipment at the GHQ in 1960, Brig. Amjad Ali, the US Government was prepared to support "only a hard core of three and a half divisions", which they felt were sufficient for the defence of Pakistan's frontiers. "We repeatedly drew attention of the United States Military Aid Group to the acute shortages in our war reserves of weapons and ammunition supplied by them but

- we could not persuade them to see our point of view." Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhury, September '65: Before and After (Ferozsons, Ltd., Lahore, 1977), pp. 27-28.
- 97 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 267.
- 98 Pakistan Times, 13 June 1959. See also Mohammed Ayoob, "Pakistan's Trade with the Soviet Union", International Studies (Vol. II, No. 1, July 1969), pp.51- 53.
- 99 Explaining the rationale of the deal, Ayub said in November 1960 that, "Our need is great. We are in a hurry. If friendly aid comes in without strings, it would be wrong to refuse it." Dawn, 12 November 1960.
- 100 Ibid., 13 January 1961.
- 101 Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Space Publishers, Karachi, 1968), p. 128.
- 102 To prove Pakistan's loyalty to the West, Ayub emphasised that his country would stand by its commitments to SEATO during the Laotian crisis in December 1960, stating that "if Pakistan is called upon to shoulder its burden and responsibility, we will never hesitate to do so." Dawn, 15 February 1960.
- 103 Senator Kennedy had also criticised the extension of large-scale military assistance to Pakistan on the grounds that the policy antagonized India, a potentially valuable ally. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 100.
- 104 Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966), p. 33. See also Khurshid Hyder, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy", The World Today (November 1966), p. 19.
- 105 Dawn, 10 February 1961.
- 106 The credit, which was given at the low interest rate of two-and-a-half per cent, was to be utilised for the purchase

of machinery and equipment and to pay for the services of Soviet experts.

- 107 Pakistan Times, 5 March 1961; Izvestia, 7 March 1961, CDSP (Vol. XIII, No. 10, 5 April 1961), p. 27.
- 108 Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, p. 56, pp. 58-59.
- 109 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 216. K.B. Sayeed, "Southeast Asia in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XLI, No. 2, Summer 1968), pp. 232-233.
- 110 Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir now singled out China for attack, stating on one occasion that "expansionist tendencies were more noticeable in China than in Russia." S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 216.
- 111 Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (National Publishing House Ltd., Karachi, 1971), p. 169, pp. 171-172.
- 112 Since 1953, Pakistan had been consistently voting against PRC representation in the UN Security Council.
- 113 Syed Adil Husain, op.cit., p. 19. G.W. Choudhury questions the authenticity of the statement. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 103.
- 114 In June 1961, the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium pledged only \$320 million in response to a Pakistani request for \$900 million, while the Aid-to-India Consortium pledged more than \$2 billion for India's Third Five Year Plan. Syed Adil Hussain, op.cit., p. 20.
- 115 In May 1961, the Secretary, Ministry of Railways and Communications said that the question of developing a new seaport at Omara on the Makran coast was being examined by CENTO. Dawn, 16 May 1961.

- 116 Ibid., 28 April 1961.
- 117 Ibid., 7 July 1961. Syed Adil Hussain, op.cit., p. 19.
- 118 G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 102.
- 119 Dawn, 7 July 1961.
- 120 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 138. Dawn, 13 July 1961. Pakistan Times, 14 July 1961; 18 July 1961.
- 121 On his return home, Ayub claimed that he had been given assurances by President Kennedy that Pakistan would be informed beforehand if the US decided to extend military aid to India. Times of India, 20 July 1961.
- 122 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Soviet Moves in Asia (Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, n.d.), p. 26.
- 123 Dawn, 18 August 1961.
- 124 "We have stood by the United States everywhere", he said. Ibid., 29 July 1961.
- 125 According to Ayub, "We believe that Americans are interested in our security. We believe that they want to see us flourish and prosper." Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Essentials of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1961), pp. 266-267.
- 126 O. Skalkin, "The Pushtus and Politics", Pravda, 25 March 1961, CDSP (Vol. XIII, No. 12, 19 April 1961), p. 20; Pravda, 3 April, 1961, ibid. (No. 14, 3 May 1961), p. 30; K. Smirnov, "Evil Conspiracy Against Afghanistan", Izvestia, 9 September 1961, ibid. (No. 36, 4 October 1961), p. 21.
- 127 At the height of Pakistani-Afghan disturbances, President Ayub had claimed that the Soviets had "infiltrated deeply into Afghanistan and would like to intimidate us whenever possible. They want like us to be knocked out of CENTO and

- SEATO" in the hope that "the whole of the defence system in the Middle East and South-East Asia will crumble." Dawn, 6 May 1961.
- 128 Tass statement, 18 August 1961 in Pakistan Times, 19 August 1961. See also Dawn, 20 August 1961, 21 August 1961.
- 129 Pakistan Times, 19 August 1961.
- 130 Dawn, 24 August 1961.
- 131 *Ibid.*, 4 October 1961; Pakistan Times, 25 November 1961.
- 132 Khrushchev's Report to the 22nd CPSU Congress, Pravda, 18 October 1961, CDSP (Vol. XIII, No. 40, 1 November 1961), p. 9. *Ibid.*, (No. 41, 8 November 1961), p. 6.
- 133 Similar criticisms were made by analyst D. Katserikov who claimed that Pakistan's membership in the alliances had not only "increased the danger of Pakistan being involved in military adventures which the US imperialists are planning", but had also "imposed on Pakistan an enormous burden of military spending" which had "brought the country's economy to the brink of disaster." D. Katserikov, "Pakistan: Deplorable Results", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 10, October 1961), pp. 92-93.
- 134 Pakistan Times, 6 February 1962.
- 135 Morozov's statements on 4 May and 22 June 1962 in R.J. Jain, Vol I, *op.cit.*, p. 44, pp. 48-52.
- 136 Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development (Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1973), p. 18.
- 137 This "reformative" phase of Martial Law concentrated on the promulgation of MLRs to curb such anti-social activities as smuggling and tax evasion as well as the implementation of a new labour policy and a Family Laws Ordinance. No real changes were, however, instituted to bring about an actual transformation of Pakistan's socio-economic structure. Maj.

- Gen. Fazal Mueqem Khan, op.cit., p. 199. See also Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), pp. 67-68 and Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (Pall Mall Press, London, Second Revised Edition, 1967), p. 85.
- 138 "These people," declared President Ayub "had made politics a profession and democracy a toy to fondle with. Their only business was to misguide the people by making fine speeches and raising empty slogans from time to time and acquire personal power..." Dawn, 4 September 1959; 27 October 1959. David W. Chang, "The Military and Nation-Building in Korea, Burma and Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1969), p. 828.
- 139 By making liberal use of the two Ordinances, the Ayub government disqualified more than 6,000 politicians from contesting elections until 1966. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 112-113.
- 140 On another occasion, Ayub pointed to the dangers posed by communism to the Eastern wing, stating "Communism from the north is not very far but the Indian Communism is near and has been making persistent endeavours to reach East Pakistan." Dawn, 25 July 1960. Marcus F. Franda, "Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. 10, No. 7, July 1970), p. 599.
- 141 S.A. Saeed, President Without Precedent (Lahore Book Report, Lahore, n.d.), pp. 90-91; Herbert Feldman, op.cit., p. 161.
- 142 Edward Feit, op.cit., pp. 70-72.
- 143 Ibid. Herbert Feldman, op.cit., pp. 77-78.
- 144 Edward Feit, op.cit., pp. 77-78.
- 145 According to General Attiq, the civil service had "considerable power ... under Martial Law because of its undoubted experience in civil administration." Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, p. 31.

- 146 Military men held key posts in government and semi-autonomous corporations such as the Karachi Shipyard, Pakistan International Airlines, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, the Small Industries Corporation, etc.
- 147 Dawn, 24 October 1959; 27 October 1959.
- 148 Ayub later claimed that the capital was moved to Islamabad because Karachi was "humid and unhealthy" and because "it was dominated by business which had a corrupting influence on the services." Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 85.
- 149 Similar pronouncements were made by other members of the ruling junta. The Minister for Labour, Health and Social Welfare, Lt. General Burki, for example, told newsmen in July 1959 that the military, which had reluctantly intervened, would hand over power to the elected representatives of the people once a new, more suitable political framework was adopted. Dawn, 3 July 1959. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective", p. 551.
- 150 Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Basic Democracy", The Middle East Journal (Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1961), pp. 250-253. G.W. Choudhury, "Pakistan Under General Ayub", p. 162.
- 151 H.S. Masud, op.cit., p. 10.
- 152 Herbert Feldman, op.cit., p. 109. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 210.
- 153 As early as December 1958, Ayub had told foreign correspondents that, "... we shall appoint a Commission - a Constitutional Commission ... And maybe I will have to tell them that they must devise a constitution which suits the people of this country and the circumstances and conditions and which they can understand and work." Pakistan Times, 9 December 1958, Herbert Feldman, op.cit., pp. 194-195.

- 154 Explaining his preference for a Presidential form of government, Ayub claimed that Pakistan "had adopted a foreign system of parliamentary rule without understanding the requirements of the system or having the necessary conditions in which it would operate." Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 192. See also Hebert Feldman, *op.cit.*, pp.194-195.

CHAPTER SIX

THE MILITARY IN MUFTI (1962-1969)

In the post-Martial Law period, the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations was to be influenced by the very nature of the new political order devised by Ayub Khan, in which the military was to continue to operate as the dominant domestic actor. Since civilianization would not reduce Ayub's dependence on the military to perpetuate his rule, the orientation, needs and requirements of the Armed Forces were to determine the course of Pakistani politics and foreign policy. While defence policy would continue to dictate the directions of foreign policy, there was a close interconnection between internal and external variables and changes in the global and regional environments were to have their own impact on Pakistan-Soviet relations. Thus developments in the domestic and international arenas would influence the course of the relationship.

A New Political Order

Martial Law was formally withdrawn in June 1962 and a new government formed by Ayub. The key questions relevant to this study are whether the changeover represented a withdrawal of the military from politics and an abdication of its direct and indirect influence in the domestic and foreign policy formulation and decision making processes.

The end of direct military rule does not necessarily lead to the adoption of a non-political role by the Armed Forces, reluctant to

give up the enormous benefits of the power they have enjoyed. They therefore devise a political framework which allows them to retain a considerable measure of power, even after a formal withdrawal to the barracks. One of several strategies can be adopted. A nominal civilian government can be set up under direct military control or power can be handed over to a civilian leadership, which is not allowed to interfere with the special privileges of the military. Thirdly, the Armed Forces' political role can be institutionalised by means of a regulated process of "civilianizing" military rule.

In this last strategy, the military withdraws to the barracks but leaves behind "a soldier, perhaps, the original coup-leader, in the driving seat." Although this leads to a change in the nature of government, the military continues to play a dominant political role by helping to perpetuate the rule of the former military commander. This support continues only as long as the military is confident of his ability to advance its "corporate and professional interests." Finally, the new "civilian" ruler is willing to protect the military's interests and allow it a voice in decision making not only because he is dependent on it for survival, but also because he continues to identify with his parent institution.¹

This last option was adopted by the Ayub regime. At this stage, it may be helpful to recapitulate some of the steps leading to the transfer of power from military to "civilian" rule and to analyse Ayub's new political structure. Ayub had carefully monitored the process of civilianization to protect his own position as well as the military's corporate interests. He first devised the Basic

Democracies scheme, discussed in the previous chapter, and then set up a Constitution Commission. The Commission's report of 1 May 1961 called for the re-establishment of the parliamentary system and recommended direct elections, on the basis of limited franchise, for both the executive and legislature.² Rejecting the report, Ayub and his advisors took over the task of devising a constitutional framework to suit their own requirements, which was finally announced on 1 March 1962.³ National and Provincial Assembly elections were held soon after on non-party lines, with Ayub continuing to oppose the re-emergence of political parties.⁴ Not only were the elections held indirectly, with the handpicked Basic Democrats acting as the electoral college, but potential candidates were carefully screened and the actual polling monitored by both military and civil authorities.⁵ Following the ratification of the Constitution by the National Assembly and the swearing-in of Ayub's new Cabinet, Martial Law was finally withdrawn on 8 June 1962.⁶

The system introduced by the 1962 Constitution allowed the executive to dominate the legislature and judiciary.⁷ Elected indirectly by the Basic Democrats for a five-year term neither the President nor his Cabinet, which was solely an advisory body, were answerable to the National Assembly.

The President exercised considerable control over the Assembly. All bills required his consent and he possessed the right to propose expenditure and taxation while the Assembly could only control new expenditure in the national budget.⁸ He could promulgate certain legislation when the Assembly was not in session, and declare an

indefinite state of emergency, during which he could issue ordinances which could not be challenged by the legislature or the judiciary. The National Assembly could not easily amend the Constitution without the President's consent and it was virtually impossible to impeach the President, while he possessed the right to dissolve the Assembly.⁹

The judges of the Supreme and High Courts were appointed and dismissed by the President. The judiciary could not review legislation passed in Parliament nor challenge the legality of Presidential Ordinances.

The President exercised control over the provinces as he could appoint or dismiss Provincial Governors, who controlled the provincial legislatures but were answerable to him alone. The Provincial Cabinets in turn were responsible to the Governors and not to the Assemblies. The Constitution gave the Military High Command autonomy in defence matters and prevented any future civilian interference in military matters. According to Article 238, the Defence portfolio would be held for at least twenty years after promulgation of the Constitution by persons with the military rank or equivalent of Lieutenant-General. The Constitution therefore "guaranteed that the military's voice would be 'heard' in the highest levels of government officially as well as unofficially in the next decade." ¹⁰

Ayub took measures to maintain close links with and a measure of control over his parent institution. He continued to hold the rank of

Field Marshal and assumed the positions of Defence Minister and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, responsible for appointing Service Chiefs and determining the terms of office of military personnel. ¹¹

Continued emphasis was placed on fulfilling the requirements of the forces and defence and foreign policies were geared to ensure that the military's needs would be given priority over all other internal demands. Financial benefits were extended to military officers, many of whom were appointed to lucrative posts in public and private sector enterprises. To neutralise any potential threats from within the institution, Ayub's fellow coup-makers Burki and Sheikh were, for example, sent abroad on diplomatic assignments, while other officers of doubtful loyalty were retired or moved to less sensitive posts. ¹² These actions did not, however, reduce the military's influence in the new political set-up; as the government's most important base of support, it continued to exercise its influence on all aspects of policy making, both through the President himself and through its own High Command.

The bureaucracy also maintained its importance in the new system since its continued cooperation was essential for smooth running of the administration. The CSP was allowed to maintain its privileged position and continued to man some of the most sensitive posts in the Administration. ¹³ According to a former bureaucrat, Ayub's new political order was, in fact a system "in which the real decision-making body was composed of the top bureaucrats and army generals" and all important decisions were taken with the help of

this "inner cabinet."¹⁴

The Basic Democrats remained an integral part of Ayub's political system, their most important role being that of a safe electoral college. The regime was also hopeful that they would provide a loyal political leadership, influential enough to prevent the re-emergence of the old politicians.

Ayub's political order had been specifically designed to exclude politicians from an active role in decision making. Political parties remained banned and the Assembly was elected on non-party grounds.¹⁵ Soon after it started functioning, however, informal alignments began to emerge. The Administration realised they could be put to good use as most legislators were proven allies. Hence the leader of the House, External Affairs Minister, Bogra was allowed to form a "democratic group" followed soon after by the formation of two small "opposition groups" which posed no threat to the Administration.¹⁶

The re-emergence of political opposition outside the legislature was a more threatening development. Ayub quickly passed the Political Parties Act of 1962 and accepted an "invitation" to join the Muslim League. His party then formed the majority grouping in the National and Provincial Assemblies.¹⁷ Ayub was now secure in the knowledge that, with a system of his own devising and the backing of the military and civilian bureaucracies, he was in complete and effective control.

The Sino-Indian Conflict and Pakistani Foreign Policy.

There was no change in Pakistan's foreign policy directions in the post - Martial Law period. The ideological orientation of Ayub and his Military High Command meant the continuation of a pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, the interests of the Western-equipped military demanded a consolidation of links with the US, the major donor of military and economic assistance. In the regional context, it was politically expedient to adopt an anti-Indian stand so as to acquire internal support and to justify the need to strengthen Pakistan's defences, both through increased domestic expenditure and through alignment with the West. Yet the American interest in building up India as a counterweight to China forced Pakistan to ostensibly adopt a policy of rapprochement with India.

Ayub therefore continued to offer joint defence to India against the Sino-Soviet threat, while at the same time, warning his American allies that their regional strategy of befriending neutrals at the cost of allies was subjecting his Administration to "tremendous political propaganda" from internal opponents.¹⁸

Ayub's delicate diplomatic manoeuvrings were threatened by the eruption of the Sino-Indian conflict in late 1962. As Chinese troops inflicted a military defeat on India and then unilaterally withdrew, a humiliated Indian leadership sought to strengthen its Armed Forces with assistance from both the Western and Eastern blocs.¹⁹ Since the US and UK had extended military aid to India both during and after the hostilities, Ayub was concerned that a continued influx of

Western arms could lead to a shift in the regional balance of power in favour of India.²⁰ He was equally concerned that a consolidation of Indo-American ties could also result in a decline in similar Western assistance to Pakistan.²¹

Western arms aid to India also had serious internal repercussions since it undermined the entire structure of Ayub's foreign policy, which was based on the need for alignment with the West to strengthen Pakistan against India. Protest meetings were held throughout Pakistan, calling for an abandonment of the policy of alignment.²² Forced to respond, the government strongly attacked the regional policies of its Western allies, claiming that their arms assistance to India would threaten Pakistani security.²³ Addressing an emergency session of the National Assembly, Foreign Minister Bogra also warned the West that, "in international relations, there can be no eternal friends, nor can there be eternal enemies . . ." ²⁴ At the same time, an attempt was made to obtain Western backing on the Kashmir issue to boost the government's internal standing.²⁵

Although the Western countries did persuade India to re-open negotiations on Kashmir, the talks ended inconclusively. While the Americans continued to assure Pakistan that arms provided to India would not be used against it, they were unwilling to make arms supply to India conditional on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.²⁶ As domestic criticism once again mounted after the failure of the Kashmir talks, the Ayub regime continued to warn its Western allies that it might be forced to withdraw from the pacts unless the US reassessed its policy.²⁷

Ayub also embarked in earnest on a policy of using China as a lever in his dealings with the US, adopting a sympathetic attitude towards the Chinese role in the Sino-Indian conflict. The Pakistanis claimed that the war had resulted from Indian provocations and that India was using the Chinese "threat" to obtain external military aid for use against Pakistan. Ayub warned the West that if it continued arming India, the smaller regional countries would be forced to turn to China for help. ²⁸

After Bogra's sudden death in January 1963, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was appointed Foreign Minister. ²⁹ Bhutto was to play an important role in Ayub's policy of playing the China "card": While Ayub kept his criticism of his Western allies low-key, Bhutto adopted an anti-imperialist and pro-Chinese rhetoric, which appealed to the anti-Western sentiments sweeping Pakistan. ³⁰ Under Bhutto's "guidance" Sino-Pakistani political, economic and cultural relations grew apace. In March 1963, their long-drawn negotiations on a border agreement were concluded. ³¹ During the same year, an air agreement and their first trade agreement were signed.

Political relations reached their peak during Premier Chou En-lai's visit in February 1964, during which the Chinese abandoned their neutrality on the Kashmir issue. ³² In an attempt to gain domestic support and to put pressure on India, Bhutto even implied the existence of a defence agreement with China, informing the National Assembly in July 1963 that, "An attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the security and territorial integrity of

Pakistan" but would also "involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia ." ³³

The Ayub regime had, however, no intention of abandoning its pro-Western orientation or withdrawing from the anti-communist pacts in view of its dependence on the West for military and economic assistance. During his July 1963 speech, Bhutto had added that it was for the West "to act in such a manner as to assure the security of Pakistan and the inviolability of its political, economic and social systems," ³⁴ while Ayub also dismissed fears that Pakistan was growing more tolerant of Communism. "I told . . . my American friends" he said "that nothing could be more absurd."³⁵

Both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, however, reacted with hostility to Pakistani attempts to use China as a lever in dealings with the West. Moreover, the growing Sino-Pakistani ties, combined with the increase in Indo-Pakistan tensions, undermined the US bid to forge a joint Indo-Pakistani shield against China. The Americans retaliated by strongly criticising the moves towards Sino-Pakistani rapprochement and put pressure on the Ayub regime to abandon its China policy.³⁶ A \$4.3 million credit for the development of Dacca airport was cancelled and the delivery of F-104 aircraft suspended.³⁷ In April 1965, Ayub's visit to the US was suddenly postponed. The Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium's meeting, to discuss in July the Pakistani request for a \$500 million grant, was also postponed for two months. ³⁸

The Pakistani government had also attempted to establish closer relations with the Soviets, both as a bargaining counter in its dealings with the West and to appease internal anti-alignment sentiments. The Soviets were willing to react positively. Pakistan-Soviet relations at this juncture can be best understood by examining Soviet South Asian strategies during and after the Sino-Indian conflict. The conflict had erupted at a time when Sino-Soviet differences were on the increase. The Soviets, therefore, for the first time, extended support to a non-Communist state in a dispute with a Communist country.³⁹ Soviet support was also extended to prevent India from growing too close to the West, which had provided considerable assistance to it during the crisis.

India's defeat, however, led to a further rethinking of Soviet policy towards the region. The Soviets now felt that India could withstand Chinese "expansionism" only if it joined hands with Pakistan. Hence an improvement of relations with Pakistan was necessary to acquire the influence needed to promote a unified Indo-Pakistani front against China. Moreover, Indo-Pakistani rapprochement would promote regional stability and decrease the possibilities of external intervention in South Asia.⁴⁰ The rise of anti-American feeling in Pakistan strengthened the Soviet resolve to encourage the Ayub government to move away from the alliances. The Soviets also felt it necessary to improve relations with Pakistan so as to arrest the expansion of Chinese influence in that country.⁴¹ Finally, the climate was ripe for improved Pakistan-Soviet relations as detente gradually replaced the Cold War in the wake of the Cuban crisis, allowing the two countries to adopt a more flexible stance in their bilateral

dealings. Moreover, the Soviets and Americans now had a common purpose, to resist the growth of Chinese influence. The imperatives of this, which resulted in greater US patronage of India and Soviet wooing of Pakistan, was however to result in exacerbating Indo-Pakistan relations, as well as relations of each with its super power patron, combined with attempts by them to use whatever leverage they possessed in the international arena to regain the patronage which they perceived was being withdrawn. In the Pakistani case, this, of course, resulted in the Ayub regime attempting to use the Soviet card in its dealings with the West.

In June 1963, Pakistan's UN representative, Zafrulla Khan, returning from a visit to the Soviet Union, observed that Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Gromyko had given him the impression that they would be "very responsive" to any Pakistani overtures for improved relations, especially in the economic sphere.⁴² The Pakistani response was characteristically cautious, since the pro-Western Administration did want to use the relationship as a lever in its dealings with its Western allies and yet had no real desire to come too close to the Soviets.

Talks were therefore initiated on an expansion of trade links, but the Pakistani side kept on delaying a successful conclusion of the negotiations.⁴³ In view of Pakistan's hesitancy no general trade agreement was reached, although barter trade pacts were signed in August and September 1963, providing for an exchange of Rs 10 million annually. By the end of the year, Pakistan's trade with the Eastern bloc constituted only 2.5 percent of its total trade volume.⁴⁴

In October 1963, a civil aviation agreement was signed giving Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) its first transit rights in the Soviet Union. The oil and gas exploration agreement of 1961 was extended and a Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association was formed in 1963.⁴⁵ The Pakistan government declared that their "main consideration" in improving such bilateral links was to obtain Soviet assistance to "help us resolve the disputes confronting this region."⁴⁶

The Soviets did make an important concession on the Kashmir question during the Security Council debate in May 1964.⁴⁷ Although he reiterated the stand that the Kashmiri people had settled "the question of Kashmir's belonging to India," themselves, the Soviet delegate also recognised the existence of the conflict, declaring that "the India-Pakistan dispute should be settled directly by the parties concerned . . . exclusively by peaceful means."⁴⁸

The new Soviet neutrality on Indo-Pakistan issues was demonstrated during President Mikoyan's visit to India in June 1964 during which he asked the Indian Prime Minister to improve relations with Pakistan, while Deputy Premier Mazurov declared that his country's bilateral relations with Pakistan would not be dictated by Indo-Pakistani differences.⁴⁹ During Indian President Radhakrishnan's visit to Moscow in September 1964, the Soviets called on the Indians to peacefully resolve their disputes with Pakistan.⁵⁰

After Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, new Soviet leaders, Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin adopted an even more flexible policy towards Pakistan, hoping to wean it away from the West and China. Welcoming the internal changes in the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Bhutto called on the new Soviet leadership to adopt "a correct and objective position" on Indo-Pakistan differences, "a position . . . commensurate" with the Soviet position "as a great power seeking to establish international peace and goodwill." 51

Continuing with their policy of using the Soviet card as a bargaining counter in their dealings with the West, the Pakistanis ostensibly distanced themselves from SEATO and CENTO, claiming that their membership of the Western security pacts should not affect Pakistan-Soviet relations since the pacts themselves were now of little value. During Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Lapin's visit in November 1964, for example, Bhutto claimed that Pakistan was for all practical purposes a non-aligned state, since it had serious differences of opinion with the United States on a number of issues, including Vietnam.⁵²

The new Soviet leadership renewed an invitation extended to President Ayub by Khrushchev and the visit was scheduled for April 1965. In a preparatory visit in January, Bhutto declared that Pakistan and the Soviet Union had overcome most of their past differences. "Now our countries" he said, "see each other face to face. In the past they had their backs to each other." 53

Yet differences did continue to divide the two sides. The Soviets

were not reconciled to Pakistan's continued membership of the Western pacts. So when Bhutto claimed that Pakistan was "practically non-aligned"; that it was "playing a moderate role inside SEATO in preventing escalation of war" ; and that its foreign policy was "more independent than that of India," he was "bluntly " told by Kosygin that the Soviet leadership "did not share Bhutto's opinion on the relative independence of Pakistan's and India's foreign policies."⁵⁴

Ayub's visit in April 1965, the highest level visit by a Pakistan dignitary , was described by Kosygin as "a momentous event" in Pakistan-Soviet relations. He added that, "It is our conviction that different views on public systems should not prevent our peoples from becoming good neighbours and even friends, and our Governments from cooperating with each other."⁵⁵ Yet Pakistan's membership of the pacts and the issue of Soviet arms supplies to India left a jarring note to these pronouncements of goodwill.

According to a former Pakistan Foreign Office official, one of the objectives of Ayub's visit was to assess the possibility of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan.⁵⁶ If the move was successful, it would be both an internal propoganda victory and a means of persuading the Americans to meet Pakistan's defence requirements.

In the past, the Ayub government had consistently opposed the extension of Soviet arms aid to India. For instance, reacting to a Soviet \$140 million military aid grant offer to India in October 1964, Ayub said that the future course of Pakistan-Soviet relations

would depend "on whether or not Russia will continue to arm India against us or not." ⁵⁷ During his visit, Ayub continued to argue that the "security of the subcontinent was not served by the massive supply of arms to India, whether the arms came from the Western countries or from the Soviet Union." Accusing India of harbouring aggressive designs towards Pakistan, Ayub also claimed that Soviet arms aid to India was helping it "to pursue her aggressive and expansionist policies." ⁵⁸

The Soviet leaders, however, dismissed Ayub's objections and at the same time made it clear that Pakistan's membership of the Western pacts had been responsible for the extension of Soviet military support to India. Kosygin also directly criticised Pakistan's alliance with the West. When Ayub claimed that Pakistan's presence in the alliances was serving as a moderating influence and "in any case, the Pacts were not hurting the USSR", Kosygin responded that "they may not be hurting us, but they give us no pleasure either." He made it clear to Ayub that only non-aligned countries like India "who were fighting colonialism and imperialism" were eligible for Soviet arms assistance. ⁵⁹

Some progress was made during the visit, especially in the economic sphere. A trade pact was signed and a \$150 million credit extended to Pakistan for the provision of "machinery and equipment necessary for the development" of its "industry and agriculture." It was also estimated that bilateral trade would "double or treble" by 1967 in comparison with 1964. ⁶⁰

The Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with the progress made during the trip, with Ayub stating that "there was general recognition on both sides that the meeting might prove a turning point in our relations . . ." ⁶¹ Although no support had been extended to the Pakistani stand on Kashmir, Ayub attempted to get some domestic leverage out of the statement in the joint communique in which both sides expressed their "resolute support for peoples who are engaged in a struggle for their national liberation and independence and for peoples fighting for the right to determine their own future in accordance with their own will," ⁶² implying that this statement augured a changed Soviet posture which had "a direct relevance to many problems of this area." ⁶³

On his return home, Ayub admitted that substantial political differences existed between their two countries, stressing that it was not possible to achieve "radical results overnight."⁶⁴ The Pakistanis were in fact satisfied with the limited progress made thus far and "radical" results were seen as neither necessary nor desirable. Pakistan remained committed to alignment with the West and a limited opening to the East served the purpose of acquiring internal legitimacy and warning its Western allies not to take it for granted.

Conflict in the Subcontinent

While external factors such as regional strife and changes in the global environment influenced the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations, internal constraints played an equally important role in

determining the direction of Pakistani foreign policy. This was clearly demonstrated by the events of the mid-1960's.

In the post-1962 period, the Ayub government took every measure to ensure the continued support of the civil and military bureaucracies, including pay increases in 1964 and the grant of agricultural land under central government control to military personnel and civil servants.⁶⁵ While this policy reinforced the feudal nature of the state, building up linkages between the civil and military bureaucracies and the landowning classes, there was increasing resentment amongst the rural landless masses. Unrest was also rife in the cities as the government's economic policies benefited only a small emerging entrepreneurial class and further enlarged the gap between the rich and the poor.⁶⁶

Any opposition was however effectively suppressed by the use of repressive legislation and resort to force. Hence Ayub was confident that his domestic position was secure as he prepared for elections to the Basic Democracies in October and November 1964, followed by Presidential polls in January 1965, with the aim of gaining internal legitimacy.⁶⁷

Contrary to his expectations, the weak and divided opposition parties aligned themselves on a joint electoral platform, the Combined Opposition Party (COP) with a nine-point programme, calling for the restoration of parliamentary democracy, based on direct elections.⁶⁸ A major propaganda victory was achieved by them as Mohammed Ali Jinnah's sister, Fatima Jinnah, agreed to stand as their Presidential

candidate.⁶⁹

The most important factor working in favour of the President was the system of indirect elections in which the Basic Democrats acted as the electoral college. In the elections to the Basic Democracies, which preceded the legislative and presidential polls, the government machinery was fully utilised to ensure that suitable candidates were elected.⁷⁰ In the Presidential elections, Ayub received 49,951 votes as compared to Miss Jinnah's 28,691. The Basic Democrats had decided to side with Ayub as many realised that an opposition victory threatened the continuance of the Basic Democracies system itself, while others were coerced into supporting the President. Ayub's party, the Convention Muslim League, also emerged as the clear winner in the National Assembly elections.⁷¹

Although Ayub thanked his countrymen for having granted him "a clear mandate" to pursue his "internal and external policies," he was shaken by the election results.⁷² Despite the inbuilt constraints of his "controlled" democracy, the opposition had acquired thirty percent of the vote, reflecting growing internal unrest. Dissatisfaction with election irregularities, combined with the knowledge that the system was responsible for Ayub's victory, led to violent clashes in major cities like Karachi. Realising the necessity of containing the unrest, Ayub resorted to a tried and proven method of achieving domestic unity, i.e., the use of the Indian threat.⁷³

Pakistan had been following events within Indian-held Kashmir with great interest as unrest there had grown after successive measures to gradually amalgamate the territory into the Indian Union in 1963 and 1964.⁷⁴ Ayub's response to the developments in Kashmir was dictated by both internal and external factors.

In the external context, Ayub's foreign policy manoeuvres had proved unsuccessful in achieving their major goal of consolidating ties with the US so as to gain maximum military and economic assistance. American military aid to Pakistan had, in fact, begun to decline as it was downgraded in US global and regional strategies. By 1965, the Americans had slowed down their deliveries and no new commitments were made.⁷⁵ India, on the other hand, continued to receive substantial military and economic assistance from both blocs. It also possessed a far superior indigenous arms manufacturing capability, and had modernized and expanded its Armed Forces through greatly enhanced domestic expenditure.⁷⁶

Ayub had continued to increase domestic military spending, but he was aware that without sufficient external assistance, there would soon be no possibility of matching, let alone surpassing India's military might. He therefore had the option of either adopting a policy of rapprochement with India or challenging it militarily before the regional balance of power moved further to Pakistan's disadvantage. Rapprochement was unacceptable, as Ayub needed the Indian "threat" as a means of gaining internal support and was dependent for his very survival on a military establishment which had been indoctrinated over the years to view India as an implacable

foe.⁷⁷ Moreover, Ayub desperately needed a foreign policy victory in view of the unrest resulting from the 1965 elections and to halt the growing dissatisfaction within the military, especially as external arms assistance began to decline.⁷⁸ There could be no better way of countering these developments than successful action against India.⁷⁹

In early 1965, the Ayub government stepped up its military activity along the Kashmir ceasefire line and in April-May, resorted to armed action, albeit on a limited scale, in the disputed territory of the Rann of Kutch, on the Rajasthan-Sind borders.⁸⁰ The Rann conflict, which ended on 30 June, was used by the Pakistanis to test their military strength against India and also to determine Indian reaction to the localised use of force.⁸¹

The Pakistanis had been careful to ensure that the skirmishes in the Rann had remained limited. The Air Forces, for instance, were kept out of the battle by mutual agreement between the Pakistani and Indian Air Chiefs.⁸² The Indian willingness to keep the conflict localised led the Pakistani Military High Command to believe that it could successfully resort to force to further its strategic objectives without the danger of a full-scale war.⁸³

An equally important outcome of the Rann conflict was the performance of the respective forces. India's defeat in its war with China had convinced the Pakistanis that its Armed Forces were militarily inferior⁸⁴ and that conviction was reinforced by their performance in the Rann encounter. According to senior military

sources, the performance of the Pakistani forces "reinforced Ayub Khan's faith . . . in our inherent strength" ⁸⁵ and gave the Pakistan Army "a new confidence", making them "very much bolder in formulating their contingency plans".⁸⁶ Thus the Rann dispute proved to be "a curtain raiser" as the Pakistan military prepared to meet the enemy. ⁸⁷

As Indian and Pakistani troops faced each other across the ceasefire line in Kashmir, when tensions within the Valley were on the increase, a number of senior Army Generals believed that the "political climate" there "had become so unstable that a mere spark was needed to engulf the whole region in an anti-Indian armed insurgency." ⁸⁸ These influential Army hawks, supported by Foreign Minister Bhutto, began to press Ayub to take action before India, supported militarily by the Western and Eastern blocs, became too formidable to challenge successfully. ⁸⁹

Ayub was of the same opinion himself.⁹⁰ So it was decided to infiltrate trained military and civilian personnel into the Valley to assist local dissidents in stirring up massive internal unrest, which would force the Indian authorities to negotiate a settlement favourable to Pakistan. Ayub and his military advisors assumed that "wide-spread support existed within occupied Kashmir to make such a guerrilla campaign a success"; they were confident that "as a consequence of this action" India would be unlikely "to attempt a large-scale military offensive against Azad Kashmiri territory"; and they also "ruled out" altogether "the possibility of India crossing the international frontier either in East or West Pakistan . . ." ⁹¹

On 1 August 1965 specially trained units were sent into the Valley. The force, however, soon ran into serious difficulties as the expected support failed to materialise, and was driven back by the Indians "without having made much headway on the political or military situation."⁹² As the Indians retaliated by occupying a number of strategic posts in Azad Kashmir, Ayub was forced to escalate hostilities and on 31 August launched a counter-offensive, sending regular Army units across the ceasefire line in Kashmir. The Indians then moved to reduce the pressure on Kashmir by launching a three-pronged attack into West Pakistan on 6 September.⁹³

Since Ayub and his Military High Command had not expected the Indians to extend hostilities beyond the international frontier, they were ill-prepared to meet the offensive.⁹⁴ Adequate preparations had not been made along the ceasefire line, and there was no plan "for a joint, overall higher conduct of the war."⁹⁵

While the Indian forces halted the Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, at first a stalemate emerged as both sides were "inclined to conserve their forces" and reluctant to pay the human and material costs of an all-out offensive.⁹⁶ As the hostilities continued, Pakistan's position grew steadily weaker. Its ability to carry on fighting was heavily dependent on a steady replacement of its war losses and a continuing supply of spares, tank ammunition and even fuel by the Americans.⁹⁷

This assistance was, however, not forthcoming. Not only was the US preoccupied with Vietnam but, according to a former CIA official, the conflict was seen "as an important failure of US policy in the subcontinent" since India and Pakistan's "willingness to fight raised fundamental questions about the seriousness of their interest in development and defence of the subcontinent" against the communist threat.⁹⁸ The US therefore imposed an arms embargo on both countries,⁹⁹ accompanied by a freeze in economic assistance,¹⁰⁰ brushing aside Pakistani protests that the arms embargo had far more serious repercussions for Pakistan which was almost totally dependent on the US for arms.

Pakistan's attempts to obtain military assistance from SEATO and CENTO proved equally unsuccessful.¹⁰¹ Turkey and Iran turned down Pakistani requests, on the grounds that they could not transfer their US-supplied hardware.¹⁰² All Pakistani appeals for direct US mediation were also turned down, although the Americans did press both parties to reach an immediate ceasefire for fear of escalation of the dispute and, in particular, the potential involvement of China.¹⁰³

The Chinese did see the conflict as an opportunity to play an active role in the subcontinent, demonstrate their loyalty to Pakistan and undermine Indian security. During both the Rann dispute and the 1965 war, China sided completely with Pakistan. On 7 and 8 September, the Chinese issued official statements, condemning India for its "naked aggression" against Pakistan. India was also accused of engaging in "acts of aggression and provocation against China" and

asked to "dismantle all the aggressive military structures it has illegally built beyond or on the China-Sikkim border" or "bear responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom."¹⁰⁴ On 16 September, the Chinese government issued a three-day ultimatum to India to dismantle its "aggressive military works" along the Sino-Indian border, to return captured Chinese citizens and livestock and to halt all future "harassing raids across the border."¹⁰⁵

The Chinese threats caused concern not only in India but also in the United States and the Soviet Union; both super powers issued public and private warnings to the Chinese to refrain from intervening.¹⁰⁶ The Soviets were especially apprehensive about the regional implications of the conflict. By the mid-1960s, they had adopted a policy of equidistance on Indo-Pakistani disputes, in a bid to promote rapprochement between the two South Asian rivals and to counter the growth of Western and Chinese influence in the region. The Rann conflict was therefore viewed with dismay in Moscow. Adopting a strictly impartial stand, the Soviets called on both sides to resolve their differences peacefully "through direct negotiations, taking into account" their mutual interests. At the same time, it was claimed that while a continuation of the conflict threatened regional peace, it was "grist for the mill of the imperialists and the reactionaries ..."¹⁰⁷

During Prime Minister Shastri's visit, which took place during the hostilities in the Rann, the Soviets maintained their impartial posture. There was no mention of either the Rann conflict or the Kashmir dispute in the joint communique, except for a Soviet

comment that disputes "must be solved by way of peaceful talks
... "108

The Soviets also continued their attempts to improve bilateral ties with Pakistan in the hope of gaining a measure of influence, and, in particular, tried to exploit the growing differences between Pakistan and the United States. For instance, when the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium postponed its meeting under US pressure in July 1965, the Soviets came forward with offers of economic assistance. They also agreed to provide a grant of \$150 million for the expansion of Dacca airport after the withdrawal of the US offer.¹⁰⁹

As the Pakistanis mounted their guerrilla offensive in Kashmir, the Soviets continued to strive for close relations with both Pakistan and India, while at the same time, urging them to reach a peaceful settlement. Commenting on events in Kashmir the Soviet media stressed that, "People in the Soviet Union are concerned about the bloodshed in Kashmir. The Soviet Union is concerned for the immediate cessation of the conflict." Such a settlement "would be an important contribution to the preservation of peace in Asia." It was also emphasised that the Soviet Union was "striving" for "the further development of its relations with Pakistan", proceeding "from the fact that neighbourliness between our states does not contradict our friendship with any third country," adding that, "We would like Soviet-Pakistan relations, like our traditional friendship with India, to be a stabilizing factor in . . . Asia and to contribute to the normalization of relations between Pakistan and India."¹¹⁰

As the conflict erupted into open fighting within Kashmir, the Soviets were concerned about further escalation of the crisis in an area near their southern borders. They therefore considered it of the utmost importance to work for a cessation of hostilities and, hence continued to adopt a strictly impartial attitude towards the dispute.¹¹¹

On 4 September, Premier Kosygin sent identical letters to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub in which he expressed concern over the outbreak of fighting "in an area directly adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union," adding that "in the present situation one should hardly put to the fore the question of causes behind the conflict or seek who is right and who is wrong. The main efforts should be concentrated on the immediate discontinuance of military operations . . ." Kosygin then offered his government's "good offices" to help mediate a peaceful settlement.¹¹²

The Soviets also promoted and supported UN initiatives to end the dispute. Warning that "any further exacerbation of the conflict . . . might further aggravate tension on the Asian continent", the Soviet delegate hoped that India and Pakistan would "themselves find a way to put an immediate end to the bloodshed . . . and halt this conflict."¹¹³ The Soviet Union then supported the 6 September Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and a mutual troop withdrawal to 5 August 1965 positions.

In a statement on 7 September, the Soviet Union once again offered "its good offices" to help resolve the conflict.¹¹⁴ The Soviets also

began to attack the Chinese stand on the dispute, claiming that there were certain "forces" which sought "to derive advantages for themselves from the exacerbation of Indian-Pakistani relations" and by their "inflammatory statements" sought "a further heating up of the military conflict" in an attempt "to bring under their influence these two big Asian Powers." ¹¹⁵ Indirect warnings were issued to the Chinese, with the Soviets emphasising that "those who through their inflammatory statements and their policies are promoting the heating up" of the conflict "must be warned" that "they are thereby taking upon themselves the grave responsibility for such policies and such actions." ¹¹⁶

When the Chinese government issued its three-day ultimatum to India on 16 September, the Soviets were alarmed, as was the West, at the increased prospects of Chinese intervention. The Soviets and Americans therefore accelerated their efforts to find a peaceful solution.¹¹⁷ On 17 September, Kosygin sent messages to Ayub and Shastri once again offering assistance in mediating the dispute and inviting them to meet on Soviet soil, "for instance" at Tashkent, "to establish a direct contact in order to achieve agreement on the re-establishment of peace . . ." ¹¹⁸ Within the Security Council, the Soviet delegate once again condemned the Chinese role, claiming that it was "all too evident that the continuation of this conflict benefits only the forces which are pursuing the criminal policy of dividing people so as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims."¹¹⁹ At the same time, in a show of support to India, the Soviets resumed the supply of arms suspended since the outbreak of war. ¹²⁰

As the Chinese extended their ultimatum for another three days, the Soviet Union and the United States joined hands to end the dispute. On 20 September, they approved a Security Council resolution demanding the imposition of a ceasefire on 22 September, and a withdrawal of all armed personnel to 5 August 1965 positions. This would be followed by UN measures to ascertain "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problems underlying the present conflict."¹²¹ In an indirect warning to China, the resolution called on "all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area".¹²² The ceasefire was accepted by India on 20 September and by Pakistan on 22 September, bringing the undeclared war to a close.

Aftermath of War

As the ceasefire came into operation, each side claimed to have achieved its strategic objectives and outfought the other. The Pakistan C-in-C, General Musa, claimed that his forces had prevented India from capturing vital territory in Azad Kashmir and West Pakistan and had inflicted heavy losses on the Indians. "For every Shaheed (Muslim Martyr)" he said "ten Indians fell."¹²³ His Indian counterpart, J.N. Chaudhri, declared that his country had achieved its strategic goal of diverting Pakistani forces from Kashmir by means of a limited drive across the international border.¹²⁴

Some Pakistani analysts accept official claims that despite India's "fourfold numerical advantage," Pakistani forces had put up a credible fight against the enemy and had successfully prevented the

Indians from achieving substantial gains in Kashmir and across the international border.¹²⁵ It is important, however, to identify the party responsible for initiating the conflict, its objectives in doing so and the relative strategic gains made by both sides during the hostilities.

The 1965 war was the direct result of the policies of President Ayub and his military and civilian advisers. The decision to resort to armed action had been based on the assumptions that the guerrilla campaign in Kashmir would lead to a massive internal uprising, forcing India to reach a settlement of the dispute with Pakistan; that Pakistani forces were far superior to their Indian counterpart and would quickly achieve their strategic objectives in Kashmir ; and that "no matter what happened in Kashmir, India would not be in a position . . . to react against the international borders."¹²⁶

These assumptions, however, proved ill-founded. There was no widespread revolt in Kashmir. Pakistani forces only achieved some limited gains in the fighting and the Indian forces not only halted their offensive but also won a number of strategic victories at their expense, especially in the closing stages of the war.¹²⁷ Finally, the Indian decision to extend hostilities prolonged what was meant to be a limited war, putting a heavy strain on Pakistan's military resources. This factor was ultimately to decide the outcome of the conflict for Pakistan once the US and its other Western allies refused to replace its war losses and provide it with a continual supply of spare parts, ammunition and fuel.

Pakistan did receive some valuable assistance from China, but not enough to make a decisive impact on its military position. The Chinese had provided Pakistan with diplomatic support and even threatened to intervene in the conflict. Yet it was unlikely that this threat would have been carried out since Chinese security interests were not at stake and also because of American and Soviet warnings. Nor were the Pakistanis keen on direct Chinese intervention since it would have led to extension of American and Soviet support to India.¹²⁸

When the USA and Soviet Union passed the 20 September ceasefire resolution, the Ayub Administration was more than willing to comply. It was diplomatically isolated, the Indian forces were proving far superior to their Pakistani counterparts, who were fighting with their backs to the wall, and shortages of military supplies were reaching alarming proportions. Acceptance of the ceasefire, however, proved costly for Ayub. As a result of the propaganda campaign conducted during the war it was generally believed within Pakistan that India had launched an unprovoked attack in a bid to dismember Pakistan, but had been beaten by Pakistani forces. The American and Soviet pressures for ceasefire were interpreted within Pakistan as a conspiracy by India's allies to prevent Pakistan from defeating India militarily.¹²⁹

When Ayub accepted the ceasefire, there were large scale demonstrations in West Pakistan. Accusing him of succumbing to American pressure, enraged mobs attacked the US embassy and consulates, burning down the USIS Library in Karachi.¹³⁰ Ayub

imposed a curfew in both wings of the country.

In an attempt to allay domestic unrest, Bhutto was sent to the UN with instructions to adopt a hardline stand on Kashmir. Addressing the Security Council on 25 October, Bhutto emotionally declared, "We will wage war for a thousand years, a war of defiance . . ." He warned that Pakistan would withdraw from the UN unless the Security Council initiated measures to find a just solution of the Kashmir conflict. While his speeches won him enormous personal popularity in West Pakistan, they did not lend any internal credibility to the Ayub government.¹³¹

Apart from domestic unrest, Ayub was also confronted with other problems arising from the conflict, including the return of captured territories and the danger of resumption of war as troops continued to clash periodically along the border. His Western allies were disinclined to help resolve these problems, but the Soviets continued to extend offers to help mediate a just and viable peace.

The Soviets had welcomed the ceasefire, with Premier Kosygin stating, in messages to Ayub and Shastri, that it was "an important step to general settlement of the disputes existing between India and Pakistan."¹³² Yet the Soviets were also aware of the fragile nature of the peace, and their continued offers of mediation were prompted by a desire to prevent the Chinese from exploiting Indo-Pakistani tensions. Active Soviet participation in the conclusion of a peace settlement would also help to consolidate and expand bilateral ties with both countries.¹³³

The Soviet media therefore emphasised that while the ceasefire was "warmly welcomed by all peace lovers", it did not mean "the elimination of the causes of the conflict" and as long as troops remained stationed on battle positions, there was always a "possibility of war breaking out again." The Soviet Union, it was stressed, was interested in promoting Indo-Pakistani rapprochement since regional instability directly affected Soviet security interests. In an indirect reference to China, it was also alleged that while Indian and Pakistanis would suffer should war resume, "certain third parties would be delighted to see them sinking deeper into mutual enmity, for that would weaken them both and smooth the way for foreign interference and dictation."¹³⁴

The Ayub Government was reluctant to accept Soviet mediation, preferring to rely on its Western allies to help it achieve even limited gains on Kashmir within the UN. Hence Ayub declared that while he accepted the Soviet offer "in principle," he felt that "such a meeting would not at present be useful," until the Security Council first prepared the groundwork for mediating Indo-Pakistani differences. He then called upon the Soviets to use their influence in the Security Council to propose "a meaningful resolution that can lead to an honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute."¹³⁵

The Soviet offer, however, had the full support of the United States which wanted Indo-Pakistani rapprochement but had no desire to play a direct role in the mediating process. According to authoritative Pakistani and American sources, the US Administration had decided

to "wash their hands" of the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Yet, like the Soviets, they were "worried about Pakistan's growing friendship with China" and so they welcomed any Soviet attempt to create a rift between Pakistan and China.¹³⁶ Hence they exerted pressure on the Pakistanis,¹³⁷ forcing a reluctant Ayub to accept the Soviet offer of mediation on 11 November. This was followed by Indian acceptance on 23 November.

Ayub and Shastri met on 4 January 1966 at Tashkent, where the Soviets were represented by a high powered contingent, including Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defence Minister Malinovsky. During the talks, the Soviets remained completely neutral, while at the same time playing an active role in encouraging the two sides to reach a settlement.

The talks soon ran into difficulties, with the Pakistanis insisting on the inclusion of the Kashmir issue on the conference agenda, while the Indians not only wanted its exclusion, but also insisted on Pakistani acceptance of a "no war pact" as a pre-condition to Indian troop withdrawal, a demand which was politically unacceptable to the Pakistanis.¹³⁸ The talks seemed to be heading for a total breakdown when the Pakistani delegation threatened to leave Tashkent. At this point, Kosygin played a vital role as intermediary, holding intensive discussions with both sides and finally succeeding in convincing them to accept a compromise draft resolution.¹³⁹

On 10 January Ayub and Shastri signed the nine-point Tashkent Declaration, in which they expressed their "firm resolve" to settle

"their disputes through peaceful means" and to restore "normal and peaceful relations" between their two countries. But as the accord was based on the minimum concessions the two sides were willing to make, it merely led to the restoration of the status quo, without solving any of their outstanding bilateral disputes. ¹⁴⁰

The accord was as warmly welcomed by the Western bloc as it was denounced by the Chinese. While Rusk declared that, "we are very much encouraged by the results at Tashkent and have congratulated all three parties on what seems to have been a most constructive step taken there",¹⁴¹ the Chinese alleged that the conference was the "product of joint US-Soviet plotting," accusing the Soviets of using the talks to promote their policy of "peaceful coexistence in order to weaken the united struggle against imperialism in Asia and Africa." ¹⁴²

The Soviets were satisfied with the results of the conference. Although the accord did not offer any long-term solution to Indo-Pakistani differences, it had succeeded in re-establishing regional stability by a restoration of the status quo. Kosygin expressed the hope that it would lay down "the real foundations for the creation of peace in this highly important area of Asia" and would help the Indians and Pakistanis "find solutions that answer the fundamental interests of their people."¹⁴³

Similar sentiments were expressed by the Soviet media and analysts, hailing the Declaration as "an unqualified success" and a "historic document." The Soviet role in negotiating the accord was highlighted

and the conference used to legitimise the Soviet Union's position as an "Asian power."¹⁴⁴ One Soviet analyst, for example, claimed that this meeting of the "leaders of two Asian countries", which had taken place "on Asian soil in the Soviet Union" showed that "the time had passed when the destinies and affairs of Asian countries could only be settled under the guidance of and on instructions from Western quarters."¹⁴⁵

A number of Western and Pakistani analysts have also described the Declaration as a "triumph for the Soviet Union and for Kosygin personally"¹⁴⁶ since it created "a new Soviet image - that of guarantor of peace in the subcontinent,"¹⁴⁷ and Soviet diplomacy quite conclusively "proved itself as a major factor in the power politics of South Asia."¹⁴⁸ A dissenting voice, however, holds that the American decision to allow the Soviets to act as mediators was a "distinctly shrewd" move. While the conference may have "underlined the Soviet presence in the subcontinent" it also "placed upon the Soviet Union a kind of responsibility which, in all probability, it could never discharge satisfactorily", and that was complete impartiality in all future dealings with India and Pakistan.¹⁴⁹ It was indeed the Pakistani demand for impartiality which was to cause serious stresses and strains in future Pakistan-Soviet relations.¹⁵⁰

The Tashkent Declaration was met with great hostility within West Pakistan, which had borne the brunt of the 1965 conflict, and where anti-Indian hysteria was at its height. When the accord merely called for a restoration of the status quo on Kashmir, it was

violently rejected and riots broke out in nearly all the major West Pakistani cities.¹⁵¹

Although the Administration succeeded in suppressing all dissent,¹⁵² there was concern about its political consequences. Ayub therefore emphasised that the Kashmir issue had not been compromised in any way.¹⁵³ Aware of the necessity of cooling anti-Indian sentiments, since a consolidation of the gains of Tashkent meant a return of occupied territories as well as a withdrawal of troops from the volatile border, Ayub called for peace with India and warned the public that, "There may be some amongst you who will take advantage of your feelings and will try to mislead you. They are no more patriotic . . . than you or me. The ordeal is not yet over."¹⁵⁴

Left-wing opponents of the Ayub regime including parties such as the NAP, had, in fact, extended support to the accord since it had been endorsed by the Soviets. They believed that the Declaration would lead to improved relations with the Soviet bloc and furthermore, that rapprochement with India would halt the regional arms race, thereby reducing Pakistan's dependence on the West.¹⁵⁵ Right wing parties, on the other hand, had strongly denounced the Declaration, appealing to the anti-Indian sentiments of the West Pakistanis. The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Council Muslim League, for instance, held a conference in Lahore in February 1966, where they issued calls for the abrogation of the accord.

Of particular importance, from the point of view of this study, is the dissatisfaction within the Armed Forces which resulted from the ceasefire and Tashkent Declaration. Ayub's war propaganda had not only influenced the perceptions of the West Pakistani masses but also those of a large segment of the military. Very few within the Armed Forces, barring the High Command, knew that Pakistan could not have continued fighting because of its fast-depleting supplies. Nor was it commonly known that many of the so-called victories were insignificant.¹⁵⁶

There was also little understanding amongst a large section of the officer corps of Pakistan's diplomatic isolation. In view of this isolation combined with military deficiencies, the High Command had concurred with the Administration's decision to accept a ceasefire.¹⁵⁷ The ceasefire, however, came as a shock for many misinformed middle-ranking officers and rank-and-file who believed that Pakistan was in a position to press home its advantage and force India to reach a settlement on Kashmir.¹⁵⁸

When Ayub agreed to enter into negotiations at Tashkent, there was still hope amongst sections of the military that he would succeed in obtaining some diplomatic gains in a future over-all peace settlement. These expectations were shattered by the Tashkent Declaration which "came to be looked at as a betrayal of the nation and the armed forces", driving a "wedge. . . between the armed forces and the supreme commander."¹⁵⁹

According to a source close to the President, Ayub was deeply concerned about the anti-Tashkent feelings amongst the Armed Forces.¹⁶⁰ Measures were taken to silence anti-Tashkent elements. It was reported that fourteen officers were sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of spreading dissatisfaction against the agreement.¹⁶¹

Ayub also reorganised the command structure of the Armed Forces to eliminate any threat from within. A protege of his, General Yahya Khan, was appointed C-in-C in place of General Musa, who was appointed to the sensitive post of Governor of West Pakistan.¹⁶² Ayub had, however, lost the unquestioning support of the military as many officers continued to believe that the government had deprived them of victory in response to external pressure.

The Declaration also led to the first serious signs of dissent within the Administration itself, as Foreign Minister Bhutto emerged as a vocal opponent of the agreement. Bhutto's anti-imperialist and anti-Indian rhetoric had won him considerable support in the West wing,¹⁶³ and he was aware of the unpopularity of the ceasefire in West Pakistan. He must also have assessed the political liabilities of accepting a domestically unpopular peace settlement. During the conference, Bhutto insisted on the inclusion of a machinery to solve the Kashmir dispute and distanced himself from the peace accord both during the negotiations and after the signing of the Declaration.¹⁶⁴ Bhutto's rejection of the Declaration and his subsequent disassociation from the Ayub government in June 1966 won him even greater support in West Pakistan, and he was soon to

emerge as one of Ayub's major political rivals.

Anti-Tashkent sentiments were confined mainly to West Pakistan. Most East wing politicians supported the accord in the hope that it would lead to rapprochement with India and reduce the heavy burden of defence. East Pakistani opposition, however, centered on the Ayub regime's decision to opt for war in 1965.

Although the Bengalis had rallied behind the government in 1965, the Eastern wing had been totally isolated from the West during the course of the war, and left to defend itself with inadequate forces.¹⁶⁵ In the aftermath of the crisis, East Pakistani politicians bitterly criticised the government for having opted for war without consideration for the security predicament of the East Wing.¹⁶⁶

East Pakistanis were enraged when Bhutto told the National Assembly that, "The defence of East Pakistan was the subject-matter of consideration and debate between the United States' representatives and those of the People's Republic of China at Warsaw", where it was decided that "East Pakistan would be insulated and quarantined from the war."¹⁶⁷ Responding to the Foreign Minister's statement, Bengali members of Parliament declared that it was "an insult to the patriotism of this country that a foreign country saved the freedom of East Pakistan and not the Government of Pakistan" and "If we really owe the salvation of East Pakistan during the war not to the military strength West Pakistan always boasted about, but only to the fortuitous circumstances of Chinese hostility to India, what need have we of West Pakistan?"¹⁶⁸

The East Pakistanis also voiced their opposition to the strategic doctrine that the defence of the East lay with the West, and renewed demands for self-reliance in defence matters.¹⁶⁹ Pointing to the vulnerability of the East wing in the 1965 conflict, one legislator called for "an equal amount on arrangements for defence" for East Pakistan, including the establishment of a Naval Headquarters. "Fifty-six per cent of the population is living in the Eastern wing", he said, "and you cannot keep them unprotected."¹⁷⁰ This increased resentment of the West-dominated government led to an intensification of tensions between the two wings and enhanced support for regional autonomy in East Pakistan.

The Quest for Arms

Indo-Pakistani relations assumed a facade of normalcy following the Tashkent Declaration as troop withdrawals took place, prisoners of war and captured equipment were exchanged, and diplomatic relations resumed. No real progress was, however, made towards rapprochement, and tensions between the two countries in fact increased in the aftermath of the crisis. India accused Pakistan of attempting to set up an anti-Indian front with China while a majority of West Pakistanis continued to believe that India was still hoping to dismember Pakistan.

As the situation stabilised along the international borders, the Ayub government was compelled to adopt a hardline stand in view of the prevalent anti-Indian sentiments, both among the Armed Forces and

amongst the West Pakistani population at large. India was therefore once again identified as the major threat to Pakistani security.

While the acceptance of the ceasefire and Tashkent Declaration had led to a perceptible increase in anti-government feeling, the military's prestige had soared both during and after the conflict. During the war, government propaganda had highlighted the vital role played by the Armed Forces. The military continued to be glorified as the saviours of the country in the aftermath of the conflict, due to the unpopularity of the peace agreement. According to a defence analyst, "The nation discovered both its heroes and martyrs in the armed forces. Outside, there were only weak and vacillating leaders ready to make a compromise at the first available opportunity."¹⁷¹ The playing up of the Indian "threat" in the wake of the peace settlement further strengthened the internal power and prestige of the military.

Domestic opposition to the Ayub government continued to grow while economic conditions deteriorated as a result of the costly war. The Administration therefore grew even more dependent on the military for survival and attempted to win back the support of the forces by perpetuating the myth of Pakistani victories in the 1965 conflict.¹⁷²

Yet the Administration realised that the military's demands would have to be met if its vital support were to be retained. This was especially important since influential sections of the Armed Forces had implied that the government's failure to fulfill their demands for

expansion and modernization had adversely effected their ability to counter the Indian advances into Kashmir and dangerously close to Lahore.¹⁷³ The Military High Command also pointed out that the massive expansion of the Indian military in the wake of the 1965 conflict would mean a continuous shift of the regional balance of power in India's favor unless remedial action was taken.

The Ayub government responded by giving defence policy and military expenditure precedence over all other domestic demands, citing the ever-present Indian threat as a justification. The President declared that, "There are . . . many lessons which we have learnt during the war. The most important of which is that the defence of the country comes first", while his Foreign Minister pointed out that "We cannot lower our defences while India is building up her arms."¹⁷⁴ As all attention was focussed on meeting the military's needs, including replacing war losses and training additional forces, defence spending reached unprecedented heights.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE: 1963-1966¹⁷⁵
(millions of Rs)

Year	Defence Expenditure	Defence Expenditure as % of Total Expenditure
1963-64	1,156.5	49.48
1964-65	1,262.3	46.13
1965-66	2,855.0	63.47
1966-67	2,293.5	60.09

There was, however, a limit to what could be diverted from domestic resources, and external assistance was essential to meet the

objectives of expansion and modernization. According to Ayub, "What we can spare from our own resources may not be adequate for all our defence requirements. We have, therefore, to seek assistance from others to supplement our efforts."¹⁷⁶ and the most desirable source of assistance in the opinion of Ayub and his Military High Command remained the United States.

Although anti-American sentiment had increased following the US embargo on military and economic assistance, the President and his military allies were unwilling to abandon their pro-Western posture. Alignment with the West had rewarded Pakistan with some \$3 billion in economic aid from 1954 till the imposition of the embargo in 1965, along with nearly \$630 million in direct grant military aid and some \$670 million in defence support and concessional sales assistance.¹⁷⁷ The US had trained, expanded, equipped and modernized all the Pakistani service arms.¹⁷⁸ The long-standing relationship with the Americans had, in turn, continued to shape the external orientation of Pakistani military personnel, reinforcing their pro-Western and anti-Communist views.¹⁷⁹

Even though the US had gradually reduced its military assistance, it was still Pakistan's main suppliers of arms at the time the embargo was imposed. Removal of the ban was therefore a major objective, especially since the Pakistani forces were badly in need of spare parts and replacement of war losses. According to a senior military source, the "strict and severe" nature of the embargo, particularly on the sale of spare parts, meant that it "was only a matter of time before most weapons systems would become ineffective. This

created a very serious situation as Pakistan's military equipment was predominantly of American manufacture and, therefore, dependent on the US government's goodwill for its continued supply support."¹⁸⁰

Under pressure from the military, Ayub was desperate to obtain a resumption of arms aid. Equally important was a renewal of economic assistance, especially since the demands of defence had already put an intolerable strain on the national economy. Ayub, therefore visited the United States in December 1965, in the hope of persuading the Americans to lift the ban.

During his talks, Ayub assured the Americans that Pakistan had not entered into a secret military alliance with the Chinese and asked the US to "lend its full support towards a resolution of the problems" facing his country.¹⁸¹ While President Johnson expressed his "sympathetic understanding of the special position of Pakistan", he reportedly told Ayub that the embargo would only be lifted when Pakistan's stand on contentious issues such as China and Vietnam coincided with that of the US. At the conclusion of the visit, US authorities declared that the discussions had been "most helpful, direct and free riding" and that the misunderstandings between the two sides had been cleared up.¹⁸² Ayub claimed that he had been assured that the US was "deeply interested in the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan."¹⁸³ Yet he was unsuccessful in obtaining American assurances of a resumption of military and economic assistance.

South Asia remained low in US global priorities. Americans also felt that India and Pakistan were unreliable allies in the fight against Chinese communism because of their preoccupation with their bilateral disputes. The US resented the fact that the two sides had used American weapons against each other in 1965. The Americans therefore adopted the stand that military and economic assistance would be resumed only when the two countries proved their desire to resolve their differences, joined hands against the communist threat, and provided active support to US policies in Southeast Asia.¹⁸⁴

In view of the US embargo, the Pakistanis turned in "desperation" to the Chinese for help, and by late 1965 negotiations on arms assistance produced results.¹⁸⁵ The Chinese agreed to help Pakistan recoup some of its war losses by supplying aircraft and training facilities for the PAF and military hardware for the army,¹⁸⁶ with Premier Chou En-lai pledging the supply of spare parts for all equipment.¹⁸⁷

During 1965 and 1966, the Chinese provided planes, tanks, heavy guns and other equipment "in large numbers, either totally free or at nominal cost".¹⁸⁸ When Bhutto was questioned about the apparent contradiction in Pakistan's membership of anti-Communist alliances and acceptance of Chinese military assistance, he responded, "If Communist and Western arms can marry in India, why can't they marry in Pakistan?"¹⁸⁹

Pakistan's leaders were, however, wary of the risks involved in coming too close to a Communist state. Nor did they want to antagonise the US to the point of jeopardising resumption of military and economic aid. They therefore made it clear that rapprochement with China would not be at the cost of relations with the West. During President Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi's visit in March 1966, Bhutto declared that Pakistan "will do nothing to endanger our relations with the United States in our relations with other countries, including China."¹⁹⁰ He also stressed that Chinese arms had been acquired due to the stoppage of US supplies and that this was "not a preconceived policy."¹⁹¹

Although China became Pakistan's major external arms donor by 1966, the very nature of its arms assistance was a limiting factor in the relationship. Chinese weaponry was quantitatively and qualitatively far inferior to the previously supplied American equipment. Nor could Chinese arms fulfill the US-equipped forces' needs for spare parts and replacements. According to a Pakistani military source, although the Chinese had provided military assistance "with very good grace", China was itself "a poor country", with "relatively limited resources in the technical and industrial spheres". Hence its assistance was provided "within the limitations of their own capability" and there were "major differences in operational procedures and systems", including "poor channels of communication with the sources of supply . . ."¹⁹² The problems of long-term Chinese assistance became glaringly obvious as China became preoccupied with internal affairs during the Cultural Revolution and the flow of military supplies came to a halt by

1967.¹⁹³

Chinese assistance had not changed the American nature of Pakistan's military infrastructure. Hence the "principal aim" of the Pakistani military remained "the resumption of military ties with the US, which alone could supply the vital spare parts and equipment needed to help Pakistan's military machine functioning."¹⁹⁴

The US Administration partially relaxed its arms embargo in 1966 by allowing Pakistan and India to purchase non-lethal weapons, including communications, medical and transport equipment, on a case-by-case basis. According to State Department and Pentagon sources, this relaxation was motivated by a desire to renew "military contacts" with Pakistan, as well as to bring about a "possible reduction of the pressures on Pakistan to seek supplies and equipment from other foreign sources, particularly from Communist China."¹⁹⁵ The US also announced the resumption of economic assistance to India and Pakistan on 15 July 1966 and two days later the Ayub Administration disclosed that Bhutto had been given permission to proceed on long leave for "medical treatment." His dismissal was perceived by some as a sign of Pakistan's willingness to abandon its flirtation with China. ¹⁹⁶

As the US decided against lifting the ban on the sale of lethal weapons and spares, Pakistan continued its efforts to fill the gaps in its military machine. American hardware was purchased from third countries, including Iran and Turkey and equipment was acquired for cash or on credit from a number of European sources, including

France, West Germany and Belgium. ¹⁹⁷ Yet domestic resources were limited, and it was essential to find alternative sources of supplies and funding.

One potential source was the Soviet Union, a major supplier of arms to India. Since the Soviets had adopted an impartial posture in Indo-Pakistani disputes, Ayub felt that if sufficiently pressured, they could also possibly adopt an equitable stand on arms supply. Any Pakistan success in acquiring Soviet arms could in turn be used to persuade the US to revise its arms embargo and could also lead to an expansion of defence links with China.

The Soviets showed even greater interest in improving relations with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Tashkent Declaration, and continued to maintain impartiality in Indo-Pakistan disputes in the hope of reducing Chinese and American influence in Pakistan and promoting regional stability. Addressing the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, Kosygin declared that Pakistan-Soviet relations were improving satisfactorily, adding that, "The Soviet Union for its part, intends to take further steps" to expand the relationship. ¹⁹⁸

Cultural relations grew rapidly after the signing of a bilateral pact in April 1966 as did economic ties, and a number of trade agreements were signed in 1966 and 1967. ¹⁹⁹ The Soviets also pledged considerable economic and technological assistance to Pakistan. By late 1966, the Soviet Union had become the second largest donor of economic assistance to Pakistan. ²⁰⁰

While the Ayub Administration welcomed Soviet economic assistance, especially in view of the decline in US aid, cooperation in defence matters was a much more sensitive issue. The Soviet Union was one of the major arms suppliers to India, having provided the latter with more than \$300 million in military assistance from 1961 to 1965.²⁰¹

The Pakistanis had consistently opposed the provision of Soviet arms to India. In the wake of the US arms embargo, however, they combined that opposition with calls for the extension of similar supplies to Pakistan, expressing great interest in establishing defence links with the Soviets. In May 1966, Mazarov, the head of a Soviet parliamentary delegation, was specifically questioned about Soviet arms supplies to India. He reportedly responded that the Soviets would have no objections to the provision of weaponry to Pakistan on the same terms.²⁰²

In June 1966, a high-level military delegation headed by PAF Chief Air Marshal Nur Khan was sent to the Soviet Union to initiate discussions on the issue, though officially it was on a "goodwill mission-cum-educational tour."²⁰³ Although there was a spate of news reports that a deal had been concluded, the Soviets decided against providing arms to Pakistan.²⁰⁴

The reluctance was partly due to their awareness of the Ayub government's continuous efforts to resume close ties with the US and partly dictated by their concern over an adverse reaction in India. During Mrs Gandhi's visit in July 1966, she was categorically assured

that Soviet arms would not be supplied to Pakistan.²⁰⁵

The Pakistanis, however, persevered with their efforts. During the visits of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, N.P. Firyubin to Pakistan in September 1966 and Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada to the Soviet Union in May 1967, there was speculation amongst diplomatic circles that the issue of arms supplies had been raised.²⁰⁶

The Soviets continued to display reluctance to enter into an arms deal with Pakistan but were concerned about the arms race in the subcontinent and the increase in regional tensions. They therefore urged both countries to peacefully resolve their bilateral differences. During Mrs Gandhi's visit in July 1966, Kosygin acknowledged that "certain difficulties" had arisen "on the path toward the realization of the Tashkent Declaration" and expressed the hope that the Indian and Pakistani leaderships would be "guided by the fact that the setting to of rights of Indian-Pakistani relations without any kind of outside interference" was in their countries' interests and in "the interests of strengthening peace in Asia."²⁰⁷

In September 1967, Ayub paid a visit to the Soviet Union. On the eve of the visit, Kosygin reportedly expressed concern over the arms race in the subcontinent and, recalling the Tashkent precedent, offered Soviet good offices to help resolve Indo-Pakistani differences. Ayub, however, was more concerned about the worsening arms imbalance between Pakistan and India and interested in exploring the possibilities of acquiring Soviet weaponry. During his visit, he expressed his appreciation of the "continuing interest of the Soviet

Government in the establishment of good relations between Pakistan and India," but also pointed out that while moves for peace were desirable, at the same time "the indiscriminate increase in armaments and the growing military imbalance in the Subcontinent" was a "danger to (regional) peace."²⁰⁸

The Soviet leadership, in response, continued to stress the need for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement through bilateral negotiations. Kosygin, for example, stated that "we are deeply convinced that Pakistani-Indian relations can be improved without any foreign interference and that this met the interests of both India and Pakistan, the interests of consolidating peace in Asia." He added that, "on our part, we will facilitate this in every way."²⁰⁹

When Ayub brought up the issue of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan, the Soviets were still unwilling to make any immediate commitment without first assessing the regional consequences. They also realised that the issue could be used as a lever to put pressure on Pakistan to move away from the Western alliances and withdraw US facilities on its soil, as the Badaber monitoring base was still in operation. So when Ayub called for help to redress the regional arms imbalance, Kosygin responded, "Does Pakistan believe that it could stay in the pacts and yet ask for the assistance of the Soviet Union for the solution of its problems with India?". According to a Pakistani Foreign Office source, Ayub gave the Soviets an assurance that the lease of the Badaber base would not be renewed. He was then assured that the Pakistani request for arms would be given serious consideration, but that some more time was needed before a

final decision.²¹⁰

On his return, Ayub continued to call on the Soviets to demonstrate practically their claims of neutrality on Indo-Pakistani issues. On one occasion, he declared "when world powers say that they desire to establish peace and security in the subcontinent, it is their duty to remove the imbalance that is being created by the Indian arms buildup."²¹¹ Strains in the relationship began to build up as the Soviets continued to provide arms to India. In early 1968, there were reports that the Soviets had agreed to provide 100 SU-7 bombers, 100 MiG-21s and some 500 tanks to India. Commenting on the deal, Foreign Minister Pirzada pointed out that it would "further widen the military imbalance between India and Pakistan and thereby contribute to the threatening arms race between them to the detriment of their economic development." He cautioned the Soviets that these tensions in fact worked against their desire for Indo-Pakistan rapprochement.²¹²

Concerned about the deteriorating relationship, Kosygin decided to pay a visit to Pakistan in April 1968. During the visit he emphasised the Soviet desire to promote Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, urging Pakistan to adopt a "step-by step" approach in negotiating its bilateral differences with India "and by this way lay the foundation of good relations between both countries . . ." At the same time, he warned the Pakistanis about the dangers implicit in a policy of establishing close relations with China, claiming that while the Soviets had "good normal relations" with all South Asian and Middle Eastern countries and sought that "our cooperation with them would

promote the strengthening of principles of peace and security", there were "other forces in Asia which would like to establish here their own hegemony and . . . put under their influence many countries . . .".²¹³

The Pakistanis continued to refer to the need to redress the regional balance of power, which, they claimed was tilting dangerously in favour of India. During the visit, the issue of Soviet military supplies to Pakistan was once again brought up.²¹⁴

In a conciliatory gesture to the Soviet Union, the Pakistani government had given notice to the US on 7 April that the Badaber lease would not be renewed for another ten-year period except on an annual basis.²¹⁵ Since the facility had become largely redundant due to the development of more sophisticated methods of intelligence gathering, the Pakistanis calculated that this move would not endanger their relations with the US, while it could be used as a demonstration of good faith to the Soviet Union.

In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit, the two sides expressed satisfaction at the expansion of bilateral ties, and the Soviet Union pledged further economic and technological assistance aimed at strengthening Pakistan's industrial infrastructure and economy and thereby reducing its dependence on the West.²¹⁶

The Soviets expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would resolve their "outstanding disputes in the spirit of the Tashkent

Declaration."²¹⁷ Although there was no mention of the issue of defence cooperation, a Pakistan Foreign Office source discloses that Kosygin had, during the visit, agreed to the sale of arms to Pakistan.²¹⁸

In May 1968 Foreign Minister Mian Arshad Husain formally announced that Pakistan had given the US notice for the termination of the Badaber base lease and that the installation would be closed before 1 July 1969.²¹⁹ On 22 June, it was disclosed that the Army C-in-C, General Yahya Khan would lead a military mission to Moscow. The same morning, the Foreign Minister told the National Assembly that the question of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan was "under our consideration", adding that there seemed to be a "better appreciation" of Pakistan's position in Moscow.²²⁰ At the conclusion of General Yahya's visit to the Soviet Union, it was formally announced on 9 July that the two sides had reached agreement on the sale of Soviet arms to Pakistan.²²¹

The Indian reaction to this change in Soviet policy was immediate, as Mrs Gandhi expressed concern about the potential danger to Indian security and warned the Soviets about the adverse impact of this development on Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviet leadership reassured Mrs Gandhi that "Nothing would be done to undermine Soviet-Indian friendship"; that only a limited quantity of weapons would be supplied to Pakistan; and that these arms would not be used against India.²²²

President Ayub responded to the Indian protest by pointing out that the limited quantity of Soviet arms would "fill a few gaps in Pakistan's defence requirements."²²³ The Soviets had, in fact, agreed only to the sale of a small quantity of weapons, including tanks, helicopters, field guns, trucks and some aircraft spare parts. This supply of hardware was aimed on the one hand at convincing the Pakistanis of Soviet intentions to maintain a strictly neutral posture on Indo-Pakistan issues. On the other hand, the Soviets hoped to weaken Pakistani links with the West, as well as to counter the growth of Chinese influence. Moreover, the Soviets realised that defence concerns had always dictated the course of Pakistan's foreign policy in view of the dominant role of the military. Hence the promise of future arms supplies could also be used to woo the Pakistani Armed Forces.²²⁴

Soviet-Pakistan defence links appeared to expand as high-level visits were exchanged. In May 1968, a Soviet naval squadron made its first appearance at Karachi. During the visit, the Soviet Deputy Naval Commander-in-Chief reportedly stated that a strong Pakistani Navy would be a positive factor in promoting stability in the Indian Ocean.²²⁵

In March 1969, Marshal Andrei Grechko paid an official visit to Pakistan, the first ever by a Soviet Defence Minister. During the visit, his Pakistani counterpart, Admiral A. R. Khan, stressed that it was essential that the subcontinental balance which already "weighs heavily against us is not allowed to tilt any further to our disadvantage", while Army Chief Yahya Khan declared that, ". . . we do

not want war but this should not prevent us from arming ourselves for the defence of our country . . ." and expressed the hope that Grechko's visit would further strengthen relations between the Armed Forces of both countries.²²⁶

The Soviet Minister's response was gratifying, for it seemed to endorse Pakistani views on the need for a stable military balance in the subcontinent as he stated that the Soviet Union "believed that Pakistan . . . wanted to live in peace with all its neighbours" but "to maintain peace, one must be strong so that the enemies may not get any pretext to reach one's borders." He concluded with the hope that Pakistan's borders "remain quiet so that the people of Pakistan could work peacefully for the progress and prosperity of their homeland."²²⁷ The Pakistan Ministry of Defence's statement, issued at the conclusion of Grechko's visit, expressed satisfaction that bilateral cooperation was "developing satisfactorily" in "numerous fields", adding that "mutual contacts between the state and military leaders of Pakistan and the USSR will help further improve Pakistan-Soviet relations."²²⁸

Yet defence cooperation remained confined to pledges for the sale of a limited quantity of weaponry as Soviet strategy towards Pakistan continued to focus on an improvement of bilateral ties through the extension of economic and technological assistance, which would help build up Pakistan's economy and increase Soviet influence there.²²⁹ The Soviets' decision to focus on the consolidation of economic rather than defence links continued to be influenced by their concern that large-scale Pakistan-Soviet military ties would

seriously endanger their links with India, and increase the chances of Indian dependence on the West. It also resulted from the realisation that even an expansion of defence ties was unlikely to persuade the Pakistani leadership to sever its links with its Western allies.

The US government was equally disinclined to drastically change its arms policy towards Pakistan, as the subcontinent in general and Pakistan in particular continued to have a low priority in American global and regional strategies. The Johnson Administration did, however, want to retain a measure of influence in South Asia. A revised version of its arms policy was therefore announced in April 1967. Although it was decided not to resume grant military aid, the restrictions on the sale of spares for previously supplied military equipment were removed. Requests would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and credit would be advanced only for non-lethal end items. The US MAAG and the Military Supply Mission in Pakistan would be withdrawn and replaced by a smaller grant military training programme.²³⁰

The Pakistani government protested strongly against the US decision not to resume military assistance. While Ayub dismissed the lifting of the embargo on spare parts for lethal equipment as "no concession to any country like us that has been and still is in alliance with the United States", his Foreign Minister declared that the American decision was "fraught with serious effects on Pakistan's security" since it "had emboldened India to become even more intransigent in her attitude towards Pakistan." Pirzada added that Pakistan would "have to do whatever is possible under the present circumstances" to

safeguard its security.²³¹

The Pakistanis also claimed that they had "reduced the level of our participation in SEATO and CENTO" since the pacts had "lost a good deal of their importance" with "the change in the world situation." Pakistan, it was stressed, was "no longer taking part in the military side of the Pacts . . . Our interest is confined only to their cultural and economic activities".²³²

Yet the Administration remained as deeply committed to its pro-Western policy aimed, above all, at consolidating military and economic links with the US. Not only did Pakistan remain heavily dependent on American economic assistance,²³³ but the revised US policy on arms was in fact greeted with relief since its military was badly in need of spare parts. The US remained the most desirable potential source of arms. According to a Pakistani analyst, Pakistan had "so standardized its military characteristics" by 1965 that "its entire orientation had become 'Americanized'. She could not have demolished her painstakingly developed defence structure . . . without radical changes in the makeup and orientation of her armed forces" and without "disturbing the standardized equipment of the weapons they were used to." So the Ayub government had no alternative but to find ways of maintaining the existing structure "and wait for a change of heart in Washington."²³⁴

Chinese military assistance had been welcome but the quantity and quality of their weapons were found wanting, and there were qualms about the reliability of supply. The Soviets were unwilling to

assume the role of major supplier, nor could their weaponry fulfill the needs of Pakistan's US-equipped forces. Although the Administration continued to increase domestic expenditure on defence and attempted to obtain US equipment on the open market, its failure to persuade the Americans to renew arms assistance was viewed with disappointment by the Military High Command.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (1967-1968) ²³⁵			
Millions of Rupees			
Year	Defence Expenditure	Total Expenditure met from Revenue	Percentage of Total
1967-68	2,186.5	4,077.1	53.52
1968-69	2,426.8	4,371.0	55.52

The Ayub regime was most concerned about the growing restlessness among influential sections of the military. Its apprehensions about the potentially serious consequences of dissatisfaction within the ranks of the Armed Forces were to prove justified as anti-government agitation intensified by the late 1960's.

The Downfall of Ayub Khan

In October 1967, the government launched the "Decade of Development" celebrations to mark ten years of Ayub's rule. Meant to serve as the main thrust of Ayub's electoral strategy as general elections approached in late 1969 and early 1970, the continual barrage of official propaganda highlighted the economic and political

achievements of the regime. But the campaign was to have quite the opposite effect to that intended.

Spectacular economic growth had in fact been achieved in quantitative terms as industry developed rapidly and the GNP grew at a steady pace.²³⁶ Ayub's economic strategy focussed mainly on expansion of the private sector, and no measures were taken to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of development and growth.²³⁷ This policy led to the concentration of capital in the hands of a few entrepreneurial families, which served as a base of support for the government,²³⁸ but the gap between the rich and the poor continued to widen, resulting in increasing urban unrest.

Conditions in the countryside were no better, as government policies aimed at achieving maximum agricultural growth through the extension of subsidies and other benefits to large landowning families and middle farmers, while the interests of millions of landless peasants and tenant farmers were ignored. The comparative neglect of the agricultural sector in favor of industrial growth further worsened the lot of the rural poor.²³⁹

Domestic opposition also grew, as Ayub increasingly resorted to the use of corruption and bribery to reward his supporters, while repressive methods were used to silence all opposition.²⁴⁰ The State of Emergency imposed during the 1965 war was retained, and liberal use was made of the security legislation provided by it. Even the Constitution was manipulated at will by the President to perpetuate his rule.²⁴¹

The "Decade of Development" celebrations reached their peak in October 1968, at a time of deteriorating economic conditions, which led to further urban unrest. The ranks of the opposition were strengthened by the re-entry into politics of former Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto had left the government in June 1966 and formed his own political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 1967, on a platform, amongst other issues, of land reform, nationalisation of industry and an anti-imperialist and anti-Indian foreign policy. In his campaign against Ayub, Bhutto claimed that a secret clause existed in the Tashkent agreement on the Kashmir issue, and called for a withdrawal from the Western pacts, since the US had stopped arms aid and no longer guaranteed Pakistan's security.²⁴²

In mid-1968, Bhutto toured the West wing, leading to an intensification of anti-Ayub feeling, especially amongst students. In the first week of November, clashes between students and police resulted in massive anti-government demonstrations, leading to the deployment of the Army and an imposition of curfew in Rawalpindi.²⁴³ Despite large-scale arrests, rallies led by students and supported by dissatisfied workers and other sections of the urban population took place in most West Pakistani cities. As Bhutto and NAP Chief Wali Khan were arrested, along with hundreds of their party workers, anti-government agitation spread further.²⁴⁴ The opposition was strengthened further as prominent former members of the regime, including Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Justice Murshid, joined their ranks.

By late-1968, the movement spread to East Pakistan, where anti-government sentiments had intensified due to the increasing disparities in East-West representation in the Central government and military and civil bureaucracies.²⁴⁵ Not only were the East Pakistanis denied participation in policy-making but the economic policies of the West-dominated centre also worked to their detriment. Although East Pakistan was the major earner of foreign exchange, that revenue as well as foreign economic aid was used to promote West Pakistani industrial development. Deprived of industry, East Pakistan was then used as a market for goods produced in the West. Economic disparities between the two wings therefore became more and more glaring.²⁴⁶

East Pakistani alienation led to the growing popularity of Sheikh Mujib's six-point programme, which called for the establishment of a federation, with central government control limited to defence and foreign affairs. The two provinces would have complete control over their financial resources, and East Pakistan would be given the right to form para-military forces.²⁴⁷ Denouncing the programme as a disguise for secession, the Administration arrested Sheikh Mujib and hundreds of members of his party.

In December 1967 and January 1968, some 46 East Pakistanis, including a number of military personnel, were charged with conspiring with India for the secession of the East wing, in what was known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case.²⁴⁸ Sheikh Mujib, who was already in prison, was charged with complicity. The flimsy evidence

on which the case was based further reinforced his popularity, and increased Bengali distrust of the Centre.²⁴⁹

In December 1968 there was an outburst of agitation during a visit by President Ayub to Dacca. Soon after, a mass movement engulfed not only the urban centres but also large tracts of the countryside in East Pakistan, with Maulana Bhashani's NAP²⁵⁰ playing a pivotal role.

The anti-Ayub movement rapidly assumed massive proportions in both wings. As the resistance intensified, even those parties which had stayed outside the struggle decided to participate. Foremost amongst these was an alliance of conservative parties, the Democratic Action Committee (DAC), which was supported by Mujib's Awami League and Wali Khan's NAP.²⁵¹

Since the two parties spearheading the movement, Bhutto's PPP and Bhashani's NAP, stayed outside the alliance, the DAC realised that its only chance of benefitting from the struggle would be through negotiations on power-sharing. Ayub had also come to realise that repression alone would not curb the unrest. The leaders were invited to enter negotiations, and on 18 February the DAC pre-conditions, including withdrawal of the State of Emergency and release of all political prisoners, were accepted.

Yet agitation continued unabated, with calls for Ayub's removal. In a bid to halt the momentum of the movement, on 21 February, Ayub announced his decision to retire from politics at the conclusion of

his term of office.²⁵² The following day, the Agartala case was dropped. These developments were perceived as political victories by the demonstrators, and the DAC leadership took the opportunity of entering into negotiations with the government.

The talks, known as the Round Table Conference (RTC), began in February. Ayub accepted the DAC demands for restoration of parliamentary democracy and direct elections, but declared that only a new parliament could decide on the issues of provincial autonomy and One Unit.²⁵³ Mujib insisted on a resolution of the issue of provincial autonomy and disassociated himself from the talks, which ended inconclusively.

Also refusing to negotiate with the government, Bhutto and Bhashani had issued joint calls for the establishment of a socialist, anti-imperialist order to replace the existing system. This radical rhetoric provided an added impetus to the mass movement. The Government was particularly concerned about the intensity of the struggle in East Pakistan, where a demoralised bureaucracy and police force began to desert their posts and general strikes paralyzed the civil administration.²⁵⁴

By late March, the options available to Ayub were dependent on the stand taken by the Military High Command. As earlier mentioned, there were serious misgivings in influential military circles about Ayub's ability to provide the necessary means to modernize and expand the Armed Forces, while others were antagonised by his acceptance of the ceasefire and the Tashkent Declaration. At a time

when the military was reconsidering its policy of supporting the President, his dependence on the Armed Forces increased as internal tensions continued to mount.

When his protege, General Musa, retired in 1966, Ayub had appointed Yahya Khan to the post of Army C-in-C, superseding a number of senior officers, since Yahya was considered professionally competent but apolitical. Yahya, however, proved to be as politically ambitious as his Supreme Commander.²⁵⁵ He proceeded to strengthen his internal position, promoting and transferring hand-picked officers to key positions.²⁵⁶

In January 1968, Ayub fell ill, and a battle for succession ensued amongst key military figures, including Yahya, Defence Minister A. R. Khan, and PAF Chief, Nur Khan. Heading the strongest service arm, Yahya quickly took the initiative. The Presidency was cordoned off and the C-in-C "set up a private command-post there in order to stay in touch with developments". By February, Yahya was claiming that he would become the next President, but Ayub recovered and Yahya and his colleagues returned to the barracks. Although Ayub's recovery upset the plans of the ambitious generals, they "did not quite forget the taste of power they had briefly savoured," and awaited the opportunity to seize ultimate control.²⁵⁷

This opportunity came in the form of the mass agitation in West Pakistan in late 1968. While the Military High Command began to think more concretely of exploiting the situation to their advantage, anti-Ayub feeling within the military intensified as respected

figures such as former PAF Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, entered the ranks of the opposition. Charging the Administration with nepotism and corruption, Asghar issued an indirect appeal to his former comrades-in-arms to withdraw their support from Ayub, warning that the military's involvement in the "people's upsurge" against the government would bear serious consequences.²⁵⁸ According to Ayub's Law Minister, S. M. Zafar, the entry of Asghar and like-minded officers, including the popular former East Pakistan Governor, Lt. Gen. Azam Khan, "created the impression that Army was not going to act on behalf of the regime."²⁵⁹

As the situation deteriorated, the Army was called out in aid-to civil operations in both wings. The deployment of Punjabi and Pakhtun troops in their home provinces increased unrest in the officer corps and the ranks. In some instances officers even disobeyed orders to fire on demonstrators.²⁶⁰ The regime's increased dependence on the Armed Forces also served to strengthen further the hands of the Military High Command.

By early 1969, the government had also lost the backing of its other pillar of support, the bureaucracy, since the civil servants were reluctant to be identified with an authoritarian regime on the verge of collapse. Yet Ayub could have retained control of the situation had the military continued to back him.

By February 1969, however, the senior military commanders had decided to go ahead with their plans to seize complete power, influenced by both foreign policy and domestic concerns. A major

factor was the government's failure to persuade the Americans to resume arms aid. According to Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar, the Generals had by now begun to feel that "so long as Ayub remained in power, the Americans would not change their policy towards Pakistan."²⁶¹

Internally, the growing popularity of Bhashani's NAP and Bhutto's PPP, with their anti-Western, pro-Socialist slogans disturbed the inherently conservative and pro-Western Armed Forces.²⁶² There was also uneasiness about Mujib's six-point programme, which would weaken central government control over defence funding and which called for the establishment of East Pakistani para-military forces. The Military High Command was equally concerned about the unrest within the ranks, as the military grew more and more involved in aid-to-civil operations. There was also the "realization that Ayub had become a liability to the Army because of the mounting unrest against him." If the military continued to prop up his discredited regime, it would jeopardise its internal standing.²⁶³

Yahya Khan knew that the tottering government and divided opposition could not challenge a military bid for supreme power. He therefore adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, he made it clear to Ayub that the military had withdrawn its support, and that its deployment in the ongoing crisis would henceforth be kept to a minimum. On the other hand, he began to put pressure on Ayub to permit a smooth transfer of power into military hands.

As the situation worsened, Ayub held a series of meetings with the three service chiefs, attempting to convince them of the necessity of supporting the government. According to high-ranking military and civilian sources, some of whom were participants, the most crucial meeting was called on 20 February, while Ayub's negotiations with the DAC were still going on. Ayub "explained that since the political situation was getting out of hand, he intended to impose martial law" in some East and West Pakistani towns. The service chiefs, however, refused to impose a "penny-packet" martial law, which, they said would bring the forces into "disrepute."²⁶⁴

Speaking on behalf of his colleagues, Yahya stated categorically that "if the army was to be used and martial law imposed, he, as the head of the army, must be in effective control of national affairs. As Chief Martial Law Administrator he must . . . direct and control the entire government machinery."²⁶⁵ Until then the military would be used "to the minimum extent needed to keep the administration functioning and prevent the situation from being exploited by any foreign country . . ."²⁶⁶ The following day it was decided that although the "promulgation of martial law throughout the country was unavoidable, it was still necessary to make another effort to have a dialogue with the opposition."²⁶⁷

In a final attempt to retain power, Ayub announced his retirement from politics and dropped the Agartala case. These moves succeeded in dividing the opposition. Since the main aim of the agitation in the West wing had been the removal of the President, tensions eased. In East Pakistan, however, while the announcement was seen as a

political victory, it was also felt that conditions were finally ripe for a thrust for real political change. Hence the militancy of the movement increased.²⁶⁸

By March, Yahya began to press Ayub to step down. At one stage, when the regime was hopeful of containing the situation, Ayub's representatives including Altaf Gauhar and Admiral A. R. Khan, tried to persuade Yahya that there was no longer any need for a military takeover. Yahya, however, responded that the military could no longer avoid the imposition of martial law to save the country from disintegration, warning that any further delay could mean that "some mad-cap in the Army" could decide to take action himself.²⁶⁹ On 25 March, Ayub announced his resignation from the Presidency and transferred power to the military, represented by Yahya Khan.

Till the very last, the Field Marshal remained loyal to his parent institution and firm in his belief that the military was the only dependable institution in the country. Accusing the political leadership of leading the country on the path of destruction in their selfish search for power, Ayub declared in his last address to the nation that Pakistan was faced by a "fast deteriorating" situation in which the "administrative institutions are being paralyzed. Self-aggrandizement is the order of the day" and the "economy of the country has been crippled." This situation was "no longer under the control of the Government. All Government institutions have become victims of coercion, fear and intimidation." He concluded that, "Except for the Armed Forces, there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation" and the "security of the country

demands that no impediment be placed in the way of the defence forces . . ."270 In a separate letter to Yahya on 24 March, Ayub informed the C-in-C that the Armed Forces "alone can restore sanity and put the country back on the road to progress in a civil and constitutional manner."271

CMLA General Mohammed Yahya Khan imposed martial law throughout the country, abrogating the 1962 Constitution, dissolving the National and Provincial Assemblies, and dismissing the President, his Cabinet and the Provincial Ministries. The C-in-C declared that it was his intention to restore "sanity" by re-establishing internal stability and putting the Administration "back on the rails".272 The military had, once again, assumed supreme power in Pakistan.

Summary

The withdrawal of martial law had not meant an end to the military's role in directly or indirectly influencing the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations as well as all other aspects of the country's foreign policy. In the domestic sphere, Ayub's new political order had ensured that the military's needs would take precedence over all other national demands as Ayub remained dependent on the continued backing and support of the Armed Forces for survival. Hence the military's corporate interests were not only protected by such measures as constitutional safeguards but defence and foreign policy were also geared to suit the orientation and to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces.

While these factors dictated the continuation of a pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy, external determinants proved a stumbling block as the Western powers shifted their attention from Pakistan to India, especially in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Developments in nuclear and missile technology also reduced the strategic value of land-based pacts, thereby downgrading Pakistan's importance as an ally. When its Western allies began to extend arms assistance to India, while at the same time reducing similar aid to Pakistan, the Ayub regime attempted to put pressure on them to revise their regional strategy by improving relations with China and making overtures to the Soviets.

Although Pakistan-Soviet relations began to expand substantially in the economic and cultural fields, political tensions remained, due to Pakistan's continued membership of the US-sponsored pacts and the pro-Western orientation of its leadership. Relations with the West were equally strained as the US, reacting strongly to Sino-Pakistan rapprochement, warned the Ayub government to refrain from establishing closer ties with China and, in a bid to pressure Pakistan, not only suspended economic assistance, but also further reduced military aid to that country.

The decline of US military aid to Pakistan, accompanied by continued Western assistance to India, created dissatisfaction within Pakistani military circles with the performance of the government. When this unrest was linked with increased domestic opposition, the regime attempted to regain lost ground by resorting to what was perceived as a calculated risk, that is, a limited war with India. The

escalation of the conflict, Pakistan's inability to achieve its strategic goals, and the failure of its Western allies to come to its rescue, forced the Ayub government to accept a ceasefire and a Soviet-sponsored peace settlement which were unacceptable to both the West Pakistani people and large segments of a disillusioned military.

In the aftermath of the conflict, the government attempted to win back the support of the Armed Forces by increasing domestic expenditure on defence. But it was aware that substantial external assistance was required to fulfill the military's demands for expansion, modernization and a replacement of war losses. When the regime failed to persuade the US to withdraw its arms embargo and resume military assistance, it embarked on a military aid programme with China. Ayub also made persistent attempts to acquire arms supplies from the Soviet Union, in the hope of putting pressure on the US to revise its stand.

The Soviets had played an active role in restoring the status quo in the subcontinent both during and after the 1965 war, with the objective of promoting regional stability. They had also continued in their efforts to improve bilateral ties with Pakistan by extending economic and technological assistance and demonstrating impartiality in Indo-Pakistani disputes. The Soviets even agreed to supply a limited quantity of arms in the hope of consolidating bilateral ties, drawing Pakistan away from the West and China, and acquiring some influence with the powerful Pakistani military. Pakistan-Soviet defence links, however, remained limited, due to

Pakistan's reluctance to distance itself from the West, and also because the Soviets did not want to endanger their ties with India.

The Ayub regime's attempts to meet the military's needs through enhanced defence spending and by acquiring arms from the Communist bloc failed to satisfy its American-equipped and trained Armed Forces, which viewed the government's failure to obtain a revision of the US arms policy with disapproval. When internal opposition to Ayub's authoritarian rule swept the country in the late-1960's, an ambitious Military High Command decided to withdraw its support from a government which had proved incapable of protecting and advancing the military's corporate interests, and which was fast becoming a political liability. The withdrawal of the military's support led to the downfall of Ayub, and the Armed Forces, represented by Army C-in-C, Yahya Khan, once again emerged as the sole custodians of political power in Pakistan.

Footnotes - Chapter 6

- 1 S.E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power", Third World Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985), pp. 18-19. See also Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Civilianization: A Transition from Rule to Role", Defence Journal (Vol. X1, No. 12, 1985), p. 3 and Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 144-145.
- 2 Karl von Vorys, op.cit., pp. 213-214.
- 3 According to Ayub's Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar, as early as March 1959, Ayub had presented an outline of his future Constitution to his Cabinet and senior bureaucrats, emphasising that it was "highly dangerous to talk about people's representatives formulating the Constitution ... Realism dictates that we formulate and start the Constitution with as little controversy as possible." Altaf Gauhar, "Pakistan: Ayub Khan's Abdication", Third World Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985), pp. 106-108.
- 4 Explaining the rationale behind the continued ban on political parties, Ayub claimed that their re-emergence would increase the possibility of a "bloody" revolution in Pakistan. Dawn, 8 April 1962.
- 5 Herbert Feldman, op.cit., p. 4. H.S. Masud, op.cit., p.10.
- 6 Pakistan Times, 9 June 1962.
- 7 The 1962 Constitution was in fact "to legalise those forms of government which were established during the tenure of the military regime of which the omnipotence of the executive headed by the President was the main feature." Y.V. Gankovsky, V.N. Moskalenko, p. 84.
- 8 Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64), p. 370. See also D.P. Singhal, "The New Constitution of Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. 2, No. 6, August 1962), p. 18.

- 9 To impeach the President, one-third of the Assembly had to give advance notice of its intention to begin proceedings. The resolution would be carried through if it received the support of three-fourths of the House. If the resolution was defeated, the members responsible for sponsoring it would be dismissed. Karl von Vorys, *op.cit.*, p. 225.
- 10 Raymond A. Moore, *op.cit.*, p. 86.
- 11 According to a military source, Field Marshal Ayub "continued to associate himself actively with the affairs of the army and it was under his direction that all the major changes in the doctrine and the organisation of the army took place." Brig. Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry, *op.cit.*, p. 20.
- 12 Raymond A. Moore, *op.cit.*, pp. 313-314.
- 13 The CSP continued to hold 75 per cent of the highest posts in the Administration. Karl von Vorys, *op.cit.*, p. 112. See also Shahid Javed Burki, *op.cit.*, pp. 250-252.
- 14 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (University of Western Australia Press, Western Australia, 1974), pp. 17-18.
- 15 Inaugurating the first session of the Assembly, Ayub reminded the members that they had not been elected on party manifestos and reiterated his opposition to the functioning of the legislature on party lines. He added, however, that he wanted "determined and patriotic men", who shared his views "to come forward and collaborate with me in my difficult task." Pakistan Times, 9 June 1962; Times of India, 9 June 1962.
- 16 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969 (Oxford University Press, London, 1972), pp. 17-18.
- 17 According to Ayub, "The simple reason as to why I have joined a political party is that I have failed to get people to play the game in accordance with my rules." Wayne Ayres Wilcox, "The

- Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958", p. 161. See also Pakistan Times, 21 July 1962. Ayub's decision to use the Muslim League for his own political ends resulted in splitting the party. The pro-Ayub faction was called the "Convention" Muslim League and the opposing faction the "Council" Muslim League.
- 18 Ayub stated that there was a growing feeling in Pakistan "that by taking on added commitments, we are enlarging our own political and military commitments" at a time when the US "seems to favour neutralism." Dawn, 2 July 1962.
 - 19 For details of the Sino-Indian conflict see Neville Maxwell, India's China War, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1972), especially pp. 313-486.
 - 20 Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan, India and the West", Asian Studies (Vol III, No. 3, December 1965), p. 529.
 - 21 Rasul Bux Rais, China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual Relations (Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1977), p. 24.
 - 22 Khalida Qureshi, "Pakistan and the Sino-Indian Dispute-II", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVI, No. 1, First Quarter 1963), pp. 67-68.
 - 23 Ayub warned that the "large amounts of military equipment being rushed to India from the United States and Britain ... may add to the serious concern already existing in the minds of our people... that these (weapons) may well be used against them..." Times, 6 November 1962.
 - 24 Bogra's address, National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 22 November 1962, p. 10.
 - 25 On 2 January 1963, Ayub wrote to President Kennedy that, "Only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the contemplated increase of India's military power is not likely to be deployed against Pakistan in future." Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 150.

- 26 The US Ambassador to India, Galbraith, categorically stated that American military assistance to India was "in no way contingent on an India-Pakistan agreement on the Kashmir problem.... When our friends are in trouble, we are not doing business that way." S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 286. See also Zubeida Hasan, "Western Arms Aid to India", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1963), p. 338.
- 27 Dawn, 7 January 1963.
- 28 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, pp.135- 136. See also Dawn, 9 July 1963.
- 29 Bhutto had held several Ministerial posts under Ayub, including the portfolios of Commerce, Industry, National Resources, Information and Broadcasting and Kashmir Affairs.
- 30 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969, (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1971) , pp. 48-49.
- 31 According to the terms of the agreement, China agreed to hand over 750 square miles of disputed territory under its control while Pakistan accepted Chinese control over the remaining two-thirds of the area. The agreement was provisional pending a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. W.M. Dobell, "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, Fall 1964), pp. 288-290.
- 32 The joint communique issued at the conclusion of Chou En-lai's visit expressed the hope that "the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan." S.M. Burke, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Historical Analysis, p. 294.
- 33 Speech before the National Assembly on 17 July 1963. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium of Speeches made in the National Assembly of Pakistan 1962-1964 (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs,

- Karachi, 1964), p. 75.
- 34 Ibid., p. 76.
- 35 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, pp. 165-166.
- 36 For example, the Sino-Pakistan border treaty was denounced by the State Department as "an unfortunate breach of free world solidarity", while Kennedy's special representative, Under Secretary of State George Ball, told Ayub that Pakistan's ties with China "vitiating the sense of the alliances." Pakistan Times, 6 September 1963; 8 September 1963. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 311-312.
- 37 Ibid. See also Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1969), pp. 69-71.
- 38 After 1960, most American economic assistance to Pakistan was delivered through the World Bank's Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium in which the US was the major donor country.
- 39 Harish Kapur, "The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani Relations", International Studies (Vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967), pp. 154-155.
- 40 Zubeida Hasan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the 1960s", The World Today (Vol. 25, No. 1, January 1969), p. 27. R. Vaidyanath, "Some Recent Trends in Soviet Policies Towards India and Pakistan", International Studies (Vol. VII, No. 3, January 1966), pp. 433-434.
- 41 It was observed, for example, that there was a new "mood" in Pakistan towards the Western pacts, resulting from "a jealous attitude" towards improved Indo-American relations, and that in "recent times, the situation had been heated up still more in connection with an American promise to intensify military aid to India on the pretext of the conflict in the Himalayas. In its turn the USA has expressed dissatisfaction that Pakistan has improved relations with the CPR..." V. Kudryavtsev, "Convention of Aggression in Paris", Pravda, 4 April 1963,

CDSP (Vol. XV, No. 14, 1 May 1963), p. 27.

- 42 Earlier in the year, Foreign Minister Bogra told newsmen that the Soviets had made concrete offers of economic assistance that were under the "active consideration" of his Government. Dawn, 16 January 1963; 26 June 1963.
- 43 Justifying the Pakistani stand, Commerce Minister Wahid-uz-Zaman said that, "All offers cannot readily be accepted unless they are suited to the interests of the country", while the Soviet Embassy in Pakistan accused the Pakistani authorities of adopting an "uncooperative attitude". Pakistan Times, 4 April 1963; Times of India, 15 April 1963.
- 44 Prior to the military takeover, in 1958 Pakistan's exports to the Soviet Union accounted for two per cent of its total exports. Dawn, 31 August 1963; Pakistan Times, 6 September 1963. Mohammed Ayoub, op.cit., p. 50, p. 58.
- 45 Pakistan Times, 18 October 1963. J.P.Jain, op.cit., pp.60-61.
- 46 Pakistan Times, 18 October 1963.
- 47 The Soviet UN representative had reportedly told Pakistani newsmen in March that his country would "reexamine" its position on the Kashmir issue if "developments justified it". D.C. Jha, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analytical Study", The Indian Journal of Political Science (Vol. XXXI, No. 2, April-June 1970), p. 132.
- 48 Statement by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, 14 February 1964. Excerpts, R.K. Jain, Vol. 11, op.cit., p. 56.
- 49 S.P. Seth, op.cit., p. 616.
- 50 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 136.
- 51 Dawn, 13 November 1964.

- 52 Ibid., 22 November 1964. See also G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 39.
- 53 Dawn, 11 January 1965; 19 January 1965. Pakistan Times, 14 January 1965.
- 54 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, pp. 40-42.
- 55 Pakistan Times, 5 April 1965.
- 56 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 43.
- 57 Dawn, 2 October 1964; 6 October 1964. See also Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Foreign Relations", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 1, First Quarter 1965), p. 18.
- 58 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, pp. 170-171.
- 59 Ibid., p. 171. See also G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 44.
- 60 Pakistan Times, 8 April 1965. Pravda, 8 April 1965, CDSP (Vol. XVII, No. 14, 28 April 1965), p. 18.
- 61 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 173.
- 62 Text of joint communique, Pravda, 11 April 1965, CDSP (Vol. XVII, No. 15, 5 May 1965), pp. 21-22.
- 63 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 301-302. See also Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, p. 107.
- 64 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, op.cit., p. 302.

- 65 Land acquired by the land reforms, as well as other agricultural land under central government control, such as evacuee land and land reclaimed through agricultural development schemes, was sold at low prices or even granted outright to the Armed Forces and the bureaucracy. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, pp. 118-119.
- 66 Ibid., p. 97; pp.121-122.
- 67 Khalid B. Sayeed, "1965 - An Epoch-Making Year in Pakistan - General Elections and War with India", Asian Survey (Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1966), p. 76.
- 68 The COP consisted of the Council Muslim League, Sheikh Mujib's Awami League, the Nizam-i-Islam Party, Nasrullah Khan's Awami League, the Jamaat-i-Islami and Maulana Bhashani's National Awami Party.
- 69 During the election campaign, Miss Jinnah attacked the Ayub Administration for "widespread corruption, maladministration, suppression, oppression and repression ...". Ayub, for his part, claimed that his government had provided Pakistan with stability and economic progress. He also resorted to the use of the external threat, warning that an opposition victory would make Pakistan vulnerable to India's aggressive designs. Dawn, 9 November 1964; Times, 9 November 1964.
- 70 H. Khuro, op.cit., p. 216.
- 71 Louis D. Hayes, op.cit., pp. 97-98.
- 72 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, p. 80.
- 73 Ibid., pp.79-81; p.83.
- 74 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 319-320.
- 75 Pakistan Times, 13 August 1965.

- 76 While the Pakistan Armed Forces had remained stable at around 225,000 between 1960 and 1965, the Indian military had expanded from 532,000 to 869,000 during the same period. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 187.
- 77 The Pakistani military's perceptions of India can be seen in articles published in military journals of the time. These military accounts, for example, state that India "believes that no people on the subcontinent have a right to live independently of Delhi's authority ... Pakistan is her proclaimed Enemy Number One. Ever since its emergence, she has employed every conceivable tactic to destroy Pakistan and coerce her into subjugation." Hence the "size and shape" of Pakistan's defence forces are "mainly based against a threat from India ..." Lt. Col. Shamsul Haq Qazi, "A Case for Citizen Army", Pakistan Army Journal, (Vol. VI, No. 1, June 1964), p. 19; Col. Bashir Ahmad, "Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", *ibid.* (Vol. VII, No. 1, June 1965), p. 59.
- 78 PAF C-in-C, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, for instance, discloses that he had told Ayub in a Cabinet meeting in 1963 that Pakistan "must of necessity ... curtail our expenditure and thus find the money for defence" in view of the Indian arms buildup and the ageing state of Pakistan's military equipment. Ayub, however, responded that "the people would not accept any further sacrifices. The level of taxation was already high and there would be a 'revolt' if it were raised any more." Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (Taabeer Publishing House, Lahore, n.d.), pp. 13-14.
- 79 Wayne Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections", p. 39. See also Wayne Wilcox, "The Kashmir Problem and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965", Masuma Hasan (ed.), Pakistan in a Changing World (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1978), pp. 166-168.
- 80 Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict (Pall Mall Press, London, 1968), pp. 287-290.

- 81 For details of the Rann dispute, see Lawrence Ziring, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration", Masuma Hasan (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 140-146.
- 82 The Pakistani Commander, Maj. Gen. Tikka Khan, also had instructions not to proceed beyond the twenty-fourth parallel, the limit recognised by Pakistan as the international boundary. Brigadier Gulzar Ahmed, Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge (Al-Mukhtar Publishers, Rawalpindi, n.d.), p. 47. See also Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 131.
- 83 Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, "South Asian Armed Conflict - 1965", Defence Journal (Vol. III, No.s 9-10, 1977), p. 3.
- 84 Ayub commented, for instance, that India had been defeated in the Sino-Indian conflict due to "poor leadership and inadequate training"; that the Indian forces lacked "skill and experience"; and that their "military thinking had not advanced with the times ..." Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, p. 161.
- 85 Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, p. 76.
- 86 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, Mosaic of Memory (Rahber Printers, Lahore, 1985), p. 49.
- 87 Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Rule, p. 36.
- 88 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, *op.cit.*, pp. 50-51.
- 89 The President was informed that the "arms ratio between India and Pakistan was 3 to 1 in India's favour. But in the next four to five years, it would be 5 to 1 and therefore now was the time to strike in Kashmir." Interview with Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar, Muslim, 18 January 1985.
- 90 Ayub believed that Pakistan had to take action to "finish the Kashmir problem" once and for all before the ordnance

factories in India went into full production. Interview with President Bhutto. Kuldip Nayar, "Pakistan Provoked the 1965 War", Sunday (10-16 January 1983), p. 7.

- 91 Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, pp. 77-78.
- 92 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., p.51. See also General Mohammed Musa, My Version: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (Wajidalis, Lahore, 1983), pp. 36-37.
- 93 The Indian attack was directed towards Lahore and Sialkot in the Punjab sector and Rajasthan in the Sind sector.
- 94 According to General Attiq, the country "stumbled" into war with India, while Air Marshal Asghar Khan discloses that he had met President Ayub on 4 September and had been told that "aggression by India against Pakistani territory was unlikely." Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, p. 15; Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, p. 12.
- 95 Interview with PAF Chief, Air Marshal Nur Khan, Defence Journal (Vol. V, Nos. 3-4, 1979), p. 11. See also Lt. Col. Irshad Rashid, "State of Alert", Defence Journal (Vol. X1, No. 9, 1985), p. 5.
- 96 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 52. See also Leo Heiman, "Lessons from the War in Kashmir", Military Review (Vol. XLVI, No. 2, February 1966), p. 22.
- 97 PAF Chief Nur Khan was of the opinion that "unless losses were replaced, a stage would be reached when the air force would perforce be grounded", while, he felt, the Indian Air Force could outlast the Pakistanis "by sheer weight of numbers". Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, p. 100.
- 98 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 205.

- 99 The embargo included the "commercial sales of items on the Munitions List, all undelivered grant equipment and services, and government-to-government military sales." Report on Arms Assistance to Pakistan, Comptroller-General of the United States to Senator Kennedy (B-173651, Washington, n.d.), p. 7.
- 100 Commenting on the economic aid embargo, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated "...we cannot be in a position of financing a war of these countries against each other. Nor can we be in a position of using aid under circumstances where the purpose of the aid is frustrated by the fighting itself." William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 205.
- 101 Although Foreign Minister Bhutto appealed to the alliances for help, asking whether it was "unfair to expect that these countries will come to our assistance in conformity with their legal and moral obligations when we have been subjected to aggression by India", both SEATO and CENTO took the stand that the Kashmir conflict was outside their terms of reference which applied to communist aggression alone. Guardian, 8 September 1965. See also Mujtaba Razvi, op.cit., p. 127, pp.130-131.
- 102 Air Marshal Asghar visited both Iran and Turkey as Ayub's envoy in search of arms assistance since Pakistan's weapons were of American origin and the "only countries that had similar weapons and could be expected to help were Iran and Turkey." But Pakistani requests were turned down under US pressure. Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, pp. 56-61.
- 103 Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Capabilities of Pakistan's Political System", Asian Survey (Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1967), p. 103. See also Staff Study, "The India-Pakistan War: A Summary Account", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965), pp. 352-353.
- 104 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 346-347. See also Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, pp.110-111 and Khalida

- Qureshi, "Diplomacy of the India-Pakistan War", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. VIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965), pp. 371-372.
- 105 Text of note in Peking Review, (Vol. VIII, No. 39, 24 September 1965), pp. 8-9.
- 106 Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, p. 120.
- 107 A Tass statement claimed that Western powers "either directly instigate military conflicts or act through third parties. Their purpose is to make tensions in one or another area in order to hamper the development of newly-independent states and suppress the national liberation movements." Pravda, 20 April 1965, CDSP (Vol. XVII, No. 13, 1 May 1965), p. 12. See also New Times (No. 23, 9 June 1965), p. 28.
- 108 In his talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Kosygin stressed that "ways must be found leading to a political settlement" of Indo-Pakistan differences. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective", Asian Survey (Vol. V11, No. 3, March 1967), pp. 177-178.
- 109 J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 72.
- 110 Commentator, "Urgent Necessity - Stop Bloodshed in Kashmir", Pravda, 24 August 1965, CDSP (Vol. XVII, No. 34, 15 September 1965), pp. 15-16.
- 111 William J. Barnds, Pakistan, India and the Great Power, pp. 206-207, pp. 349-350.
- 112 Text of letter to Ayub Khan, Dawn, 13 September 1965.
- 113 Text of statement of Soviet representative in the Security Council, 4 September 1965, R.K. Jain, Vol. 1, op.cit., pp. 69-70.
- 114 Tass statement of 7 September, Pravda, 8 September 1965; Izvestia, 9 September 1965, CDSP (Vol. XVII, No. 36, 29 September 1965), p. 12. See also D. Volsky, "The India-Pakistani Conflict", New Times (No. 38, 22 September

- 1965), p. 7.
- 115 According to the Soviets, an escalation of the conflict would "cause the present developments to develop into an even bigger conflagration" drawing "many states ... into the conflict, one by one." Pravda, 14 September 1965, CDSP (Vol. XVII, No. 36, 29 September 1965), pp. 27-28.
- 116 Ibid., p.28.
- 117 While Secretary of State Rusk warned China not "to fish in troubled waters", he observed that, "I think the Soviet attitude has been helpful so far." Staff Study, "The India-Pakistan War: A Summary Account", p. 353. See also M.A. Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union", p. 498.
- 118 Kosygin's messages to Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan on 17 September 1965. Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. VIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965), pp. 430-431.
- 119 A Soviet analyst alleged that the conflict provided "fertile ground for all manner of manoeuvres and intrigues by aggressive elements in Hindustan and throughout the Afro-Asian world", implying that the Chinese were deliberately fuelling the war. D. Volsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 7-8. Statement by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, 18 September 1965. Text in R.K. Jain, Vol. 1, *op.cit.*, pp. 81-82.
- 120 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Soviet Moves in Asia, p. 40.
- 121 This was known as the Demand Resolution since this was the first occasion when the Security Council had "demanded" a certain course of action in the subcontinent. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 340.
- 122 Text of Resolution, Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965), pp. 397-398.
- 123 General Mohammad Musa, "Some Aspects of the War". Address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 18

- December 1965. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-330.
- 124 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 334.
- 125 *Ibid.*, p. 335. See also Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 166.
- 126 Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, "South Asian Armed Conflict - 1965", p. 7. See also Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, pp. 77-78.
- 127 While Pakistani troops captured some 1,616 square miles of Indian territory, most of it was in the wastelands of Indian Rajasthan. The Indians, on the other hand, captured 740 square miles of valuable Pakistani real estate, including some 320 square miles in the Punjab sector and 270 square miles in Azad Kashmir, including the strategic Haji Pir Pass. Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, p. 144.
- 128 The American Ambassador in Washington had informed his Chinese counterpart that the US would retaliate in the event of a Chinese attack on India. William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965", The China Quarterly (No. 25, January-March 1966), p. 115.
- 129 General Attiq states that, "The public ... was not to know that, strategically, the Army was beaten from the very onset of the war." Fed "on a bland diet of half-truths", it was "led to believe we had actually beaten the Indian Army." Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, pp. 15-16.
- 130 Times, 22 September 1965.
- 131 Salman Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography (Ithaca Press, London, 1979), pp. 63-64. See also Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969, p. 65.
- 132 Pakistan Times, 26 September 1965.

- 133 Thomas Perry Thornton, "The Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Soviet Mediation at Tashkent, 1966". Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.), International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Conflict Management Studies, Westview Press, Boulder, 1981), p.p 145-146. See also Zubeida Hasan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the 1960s", pp. 29-30.
- 134 Pravda, 24 September 1965, CDSP (VOL. XV11, NO. 38, 13 October 1965), p. 20. Text on Kashmir dispute released by Soviet Embassy in Pakistan on 12 November 1965, Morning News, 13 November 1965; commentary by A. Markov released by Soviet Embassy in Pakistan on 13 November, ibid.; 27 November 1965. I. Andronov, "Kashmir Conflict: Some Antecedents", New Times (No. 41, 13 October 1965), p. 18.
- 135 Foreign Minister Bhutto also urged his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, at a meeting at the UN, to help in the creation of a UN machinery to bring about a lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan Times, 26 September 1965; Dawn, 20 October 1965.
- 136 Thornton is presently a senior State Department official and previously dealt with South Asia on the National Security Staff. Thomas Perry Thornton, "The Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Soviet Mediation at Tashkent, 1966", p. 146.
- 137 Former Foreign Office official, G.W. Choudhury's account of the events leading to Tashkent and the conference itself is based on consultations of the minutes of the conference and interviews with all senior Pakistani participants. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 47, p. 306.
- 138 According to Choudhury, there were sharp differences between Foreign Ministers Bhutto and Swaran Singh on the Kashmir issue as the former insisted on measures "to finalizing a solution". Bhutto also clashed with Gromyko who bluntly told him that he could not expect the Soviet Union to win Kashmir for Pakistan at the conference table since the Pakistanis had failed to capture it on the battle field. Gromyko also told Bhutto that it was in Pakistan's greater interest to reach a

- settlement on issues such as troop withdrawals since India still occupied strategic Pakistani territory in Kashmir and in the Punjab. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, pp. 51-54. See also Thomas Perry Thornton, "The Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Soviet Mediation at Tashkent, 1966", p.148 and Staff Study, "The Tashkent Story", Outlook (Vol. 2, No. 4, 12 January 1974), p. 13.
- 139 Thomas Perry Thornton, "The Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Soviet Mediation at Tashkent, 1966", pp. 154-155.
- 140 In its only reference to the Kashmir dispute, the Declaration stated that Shastri and Ayub had "considered that the continuation of tension between the two countries does not serve the interests of peace in this region, particularly in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan. With precisely this in mind, Jammu and Kashmir were discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective position." Text of Tashkent Declaration, Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIX, No. 1, First Quarter 1966), pp. 99-100.
- 141 Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the Tashkent Agreement, 21 January 1966. Extract in K. Arif, Vol. 11, op.cit., p. 127.
- 142 S.M.Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 353. See also William J. Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity", The China Quarterly (No. 63, September 1975), p. 477.
- 143 Pravda, 11 January 1966, CDSP (Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 2 February 1966), p. 5. Pakistan Times, 11 January 1966.
- 144 "Path to Peace in Hindustan", Pravda, 16 January 1966, CDSP (Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 9 February 1966), p. 2. Editorial, New Times (No. 3, 19 January 1966), p. 1. Editorial, "For Peace and Progress", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 12, December 1966), pp. 3.-4. Lev Stepanov, "The Indo-Pakistan Accord", New Times (No. 3, 19 January 1966), p. 1.

- 145 Lev Stepanov, "After Tashkent", New Times (No. 4, 26 January 1966), p. 7.
- 146 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, p. 212.
- 147 Zubeida Hasan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the 1960s", op.cit., p. 30. See also Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union", p. 499.
- 148 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 352.
- 149 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, p. 156.
- 150 Impartiality was the theme stressed by Pakistani officials welcoming the Tashkent Declaration. For example, commenting on the Soviet role at Tashkent, Pakistan's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Iqbal Akhtar, expressed the hope that the Soviets would continue to demonstrate impartiality on all Indo-Pakistani "political matters" in the future. Pakistan Times, 4 February 1966.
- 151 Staff Study, "Bhutto and Tashkent", Outlook (Vol. 2, No. 42, 19 January 1974), p. 6. Mizanur Rahman Shelley, Pakistan: The Second Republic: Politics and Parties (Concept Publications, Dacca, 1970), pp. 103-105.
- 152 Several demonstrators had been killed or wounded during the riots and hundreds were arrested. Staff Study, "Bhutto and Tashkent", op.cit.
- 153 A Pakistani Correspondent, "Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with Tashkent", Round Table (No. 223, July 1966), p. 312. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 191. See also President's Address to the National Assembly, National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 8 March 1966, p. 63.
- 154 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan.

- 1958-1969, p. 70.
- 155 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
- 156 Lt. General M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, pp. 15-16.
- 157 Ibid., p.16.
- 158 This can be seen in various accounts of the war by such officers who argue that by the third week of the war, "our morale was very high. We had broken the back of the Indian threat and we felt that they had become quite exhausted and had suffered heavy casualties". While the "Indian offensive had been successfully contained everywhere and its momentum had petered out", the Pakistani forces prepared for a major counter-offensive to be launched on 22 September. By "late evening, we received orders to cancel all preparations as the offensive had been called off in anticipation of a ceasefire agreement." This "unexpected development left us aghast" because "we were absolutely certain of achieving complete success in our mission." Brig. Ch. Muzaffar Ali Khan Zahid, "Supported and Supporting", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. XVIII, No. 3, June 1977), p. 44. Brig. Gulzar Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 152-153. Brig. Amjad Ali Khan Choudhry, op.cit., pp. 78-80. See also Brig. Riazul Karim Khan, "Higher Conduct of 1965 Indo-Pak War", Defence Journal (Vol. X, Nos. 1 and 2, 1984), p. 13.
- 159 Brig. A. R. Siddiqi, "1971: Causes and Conduct", Defence Journal (Vol. II, No. 12, 1976), pp. 2-3. An Army officer remarked that the Indian officers had suffered heavy losses in the war and it was "only after Tashkent that they heaved a sigh of relief." Maj. Gen. K.M. Azhar Khan, "Battle Lore: Offensive in the Desert - II", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. XI, No. 2, December 1969), p. 12.
- 160 In an interview with Shabbir Hussain, Ayub expressed his concern about the impact of anti-Tashkent demonstrations on the military and justifying the acceptance of the status quo on Kashmir, declared "We could not win Kashmir on the

battlefield; how could we do that on the conference table?" Shabbir Hussain, op.cit., p. 105, p. 108.

- 161 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, p. 158.
- 162 Wayne Wilcox, "The Kashmir Problem and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965", p. 171.
- 163 According to Taseer, "For the Pakistanis, Bhutto became an overnight hero ... The Security Council speeches confirmed that hawkishness which was already serving to set him apart from other Ministers around Ayub Khan. His popularity grew and he alone among his colleagues emerged from the war of 1965 with enhanced status." Salman Taseer, op.cit., pp. 64-65.
- 164 Staff Study, "Bhutto and Tashkent", pp. 6-8. See also Ibnul Hasan, "Full Circle Tashkent", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, No. 8, 1985), pp. 37-38.
- 165 East Pakistan was to be defended by one lightly armed infantry division and the approximately 10,000 strong East Bengal Rifles. General Mohammad Musa, My Version: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, p. 17, p. 73.
- 166 For example, an East Pakistani parliamentarian stated, "During the seventeen days of war we, East Pakistanis, were completely isolated ... We had an apprehension that our province would also be attacked. It was difficult to imagine as to what would have been the condition in that case. We did not know what arms we had. Even under such moment of crisis, the Government did not call and consult the representatives of the people from East Pakistan." National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 19 November 1965, p. 238.
- 167 Ibid., 15 March 1966, p. 499.
- 168 Ibid., 7 June 1966, p. 534. See also S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 337-338.
- 169 Admitting that the East wing had been poorly armed, General

Musa argued that, "In view of our assessment of India's intention to seek a decision in the West", particularly in the Punjab and in Kashmir, "we wanted to frustrate her designs by facing her with maximum possible strength from the Western wing and, by doing so, also prevent her from concentrating sufficient troops against East Pakistan to launch an attack there." General Mohammad Musa, My Version: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, , p. 21, p. 17.

- 170 National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 23 November 1965, p. 447.
- 171 Brig. A. R. Siddiqi, "1971: Causes and Conduct", p. 2.
- 172 The government-controlled media gave maximum coverage to the "glorious feats" of the military during the war and special anniversaries were designated to commemorate those achievements. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p.169.
- 173 General Musa, for example, claimed that the GHO had "proposed that the Army be augmented by two infantry divisions to improve the unfavourable military equation between the opposing land forces" but the Ministry of Finance "spurned our proposal". The lack of these additional divisions, he alleged, hampered the Army's performance in the conflict since it did not have even a "ratio of one-to-two with India". General Mohammad Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, p. 4, pp. 14-15.
- 174 National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 15 November 1965; Morning News, 31 March 1966.
- 175 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defence Policy," Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXXX1, No. 1. First Quarter 1983), p.56.
- 176 National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 15 November 1965, p. 35.
- 177 Stephen P. Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", p. 51. See also Norman D. Palmer, op.cit., p. 32.

- 178 The key beneficiaries were the Army and the Air Force, which were provided with sufficient hardware to equip five army divisions as well as six air wings. The equipment included B-57 fighters, F-86 Sabre jets, F-104 Star fighters, helicopters, Sidewinder missiles, M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks, as well as communications, transport and engineering facilities. Stephen P. Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", p. 52. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defence Policy", p. 83. See also B.K. Shrivastava, "US Military Assistance to Pakistan: A Reappraisal", India Quarterly (Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January-March 1976), p. 30.
- 179 Under the Ayub Administration, more than twenty-five per cent of the entire officer corps was trained by American instructors either within Pakistan or in the US. The US MAAG in Pakistan also continued to maintain close links with Army GHQ. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", p. 286. See also Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, p. 94.
- 180 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 59. See also Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., p. 176.
- 181 Dawn, 15 December 1965.
- 182 President Johnson expressed the hope that "the bonds that unite us are ... stronger than any temporary disagreements". Ibid. Times, 16 December 1965, Pakistan Times, 17 December 1965, Morning News, 20 December 1965. See also US-Pakistan joint communique, 15 December 1965, Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIX, No. 1, First Quarter 1966), p. 94.
- 183 Morning News, 20 December 1965.
- 184 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp. 223-224.
- 185 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 59. As early as September 1963, Ayub had warned his allies that Pakistan

- might be forced to establish military links with China if India continued to grow "menacingly strong" with American help and if the US failed to modernize Pakistani forces. Pakistan Times, 13 September 1963.
- 186 General Musa disclosed that the delivery "of Chinese arms, ammunition, vehicles and other stores under their military aid programme started after the (1965) ceasefire." General Mohammad Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, p. 27.
- 187 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 193.
- 188 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 59.
- 189 Morning News, 31 March 1966; Pakistan Times, 26 April 1966.
- 190 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp.214-215.
- 191 Morning News, 31 March 1966.
- 192 Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., pp. 67-68.
- 193 The Chinese did continue to pledge assistance in developing Pakistan's defence infrastructure, including the construction of a heavy mechanical industrial complex at Taxila in West Pakistan and the construction of an ordnance factory in East Pakistan. Rasul Bux Rais, op.cit., p. 104.
- 194 According to PAF Chief Nur Khan, this need became more and more pressing as "our problems and abilities to maintain our armed forces in top operational gear became increasingly difficult ..." Interview with Nur Khan, Defence Journal (Vol. V, Nos. 3-4, 1979), p. 12. See also Bilal Hashmi, op.cit., p. 108.
- 195 Report of US Comptroller-General to Senator Kennedy, op.cit., p. 8.
- 196 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 362.

- 197 It acquired, for example, F-86 Sabre jets from Iran and placed orders for Mirage aircraft and Daphne class submarines from France. Pakistan also purchased arms from less reputable sources. According to Mr Bhutto, in the wake of the US embargo, the government "had to run from pillar to post in search of armaments and spare parts, from blackmarket centres and notorious arms peddlers." Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan and the Alliances (Pakistan Peoples Party, Political Series, Lahore, 1969), p. 50.
- 198 In his report, Brezhnev stated that the Soviet government had given "and continued to give much attention to improving relations with major Asian states such as India and Pakistan, which can to all intents and purposes be considered our neighbours." Pravda, 30 March 1966, CDSR (Vol. XVIII, No. 12, 13 April 1966); G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 55.
- 199 Raghunath Ram, op.cit., pp. 180-181. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, pp. 365-356.
- 200 J.P. Jain, op.cit., pp. 84-85.
- 201 Apart from China (prior to the Sino-Soviet split) and Korea, India was the only country which had been granted Soviet licences for the manufacture of MiG aircraft. Joachim Krause, "Soviet Military Aid to the Third World", Aussen Politik (Vol. 34, No. 4, 1983), p. 394. See also D. Som Dutt, "Foreign Military Aid and the Defence Strength and Policies of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study", International Studies (Vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967), p. 70.
- 202 Pakistan Times, 27 May 1966.
- 203 Morning News, 26 June 1966.
- 204 Morning News, 30 June 1966. See also Zubeida Hasan, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1968), p. 350 and Khalida Qureshi, "Arms Aid to India and Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XX, No. 2, Second

- Quarter 1967), p.149.
- 205 Raghunath Ram, op.cit., p. 149.
- 206 Dawn, 27 September 1966; 11 May 1967.
- 207 Pravda, 15 July 1966, CDSP (Vol. XVIII, No. 28, 3 August 1966), p. 17.
- 208 Dawn, 27 September 1967.
- 209 Pravda, 25 September 1967, CDSP (Vol. XIX, No. 39, 19 October 1967), p. 18.
- 210 Choudhury adds that when Ayub pressed for a quick response, Brezhnev told him that "Pakistan has already waited for two years, now that period may be reduced by one-fourth, i.e., wait for another six months." G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, pp. 56-57.
- 211 Raghunath Ram, op.cit., p. 184.
- 212 Dawn, 11 February 1968.
- 213 Pakistan Times, 18 April 1968; Pakistan Observer, 19 April 1968.
- 214 G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 57.
- 215 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Soviet Moves in Asia, pp. 44-45.
- 216 Pakistan Observer, 22 April 1968. See also Special Correspondents, V. Mayevsky and A. Filippov's report in Pravda, 23 April 1968, CDSP (Vol. XX, No. 17, 15 May 1968), p. 19.
- 217 New Times (No. 17, 28 April 1968). B. Pyadyshev, "New Developments in Pakistan", International Affairs, Moscow (No. 6, June 1968), pp. 77-79. Pakistan Observer, 22 April 1968.

- 218 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 57.
- 219 Pakistan Times, 21 May 1968.
- 220 National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 28 June 1968, p. 3194. Pakistan Times, 23 June 1968.
- 221 Morning News, 12 July 1968.
- 222 Ibid. See also J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 100, p. 102.
- 223 The Pakistani Foreign Minister also pointed out that while India was raising the bogey of Soviet arms to Pakistan, it had been acquiring huge quantities of modern arms since 1962. According to his estimates, India's military budget had increased from Rs 3000 million in 1961/62 to Rs 1,6000 million in 1968/69 and it had also greatly increased its indigenous manufacturing capability. Pakistan Times, 14 July 1968; 23 July 1968.
- 224 S.P. Seth, op.cit., p. 623.
- 225 Ibid., p. 619.
- 226 Pakistan Times, 11 March 1969; 12 March 1969; Dawn, 12 March 1969.
- 227 It is claimed that Grechko did attempt to pressure the Pakistanis to revise their China policy. He reportedly stated that, "you cannot have simultaneous friendship with the Soviet Union and China" and when questioned about the Soviet policy of rapprochement with both India and Pakistan, responded that, "What is permissible for a super power is not possible for a country like Pakistan." Mushahid Husain, "Pakistan-Soviet Relations: Breaking the Ice", Muslim, 14 September 1978. Morning News, 12 March 1969; Pakistan Times, 12 March 1969.
- 228 Text of statement of Ministry of Defence, Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon, (Vol. XXII, No. 2, Second Quarter 1969), pp. 184-185.

- 229 For instance, agreements were finalized on the proposed construction of a steel mill at Kalabagh and a power plant at Roopur. The Soviets also entered into a trade agreement with Pakistan covering the period from 1968 to 1970 and the volume of their bilateral trade rose to Rs 521.43 million from July 1967 to February 1968. National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 13 June 1968, p. 2022; pp. 2026-2027.
- 230 Explaining the rationale behind the resumption of the sale of spare parts of US-supplied lethal weapons, US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas de Katzenbach, said that since the US could not prevent India and Pakistan from buying such equipment, if "we refuse to provide spare parts for such equipment we have furnished them ... in the past, they have two choices open to them: to buy these spare parts through unofficial channels" such as the blackmarket "or to scrap the United States equipment altogether and buy new equipment from some other source - ... Communist China or the Soviet Union." Extracts of Katzenbach's address in K. Arif, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 132-134. See also Times, 14 April 1967 and Zubeida Hasan, "United States Arms Policy in South Asia: 1965-1967", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XX, No. 2, Second Quarter 1967), pp. 132-133.
- 231 Dawn, 14 April 1967; 18 April 1967. Times, 18 April 1967.
- 232 Foreign Minister's statements, National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 6 June 1968, p. 1809; 28 June 1968, p. 3192.
- 233 In 1967 and 1968, the US had provided Pakistan with \$320 million and \$350 million respectively in foreign aid. Its external indebtedness in 1969 was \$3.528 billion of which nearly \$1.389 billion had been granted by the US, more than nine times the combined Sino-Soviet contribution. Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, pp. 116-117.
- 234 Ibnul Hasan, op.cit., pp. 36-37.
- 235 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defence Policy", p. 56.

- 236 World Bank President Robert McNamara called Pakistan "one of the greatest successes in development in the world." W.M. Dobell, "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XLII, No. 3, Fall 1969), p. 297. See also Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan: New Challenges to the Political System", Asian Survey, (Vol V111, No. 2, January 1968) p. 102.
- 237 According to some analysts, Pakistan's decision to opt for a capitalist economy was influenced by its major aid donor, the United States. During the Ayub era, American experts were actively involved in Pakistani economic planning, as can be seen by their presence in the country's Planning Commission. Bilal Hashmi, "United States Influence in the Development of the Civil Elite in Pakistan", South Asia Papers (Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1977), p. 7. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, p. 223.
- 238 In April 1966, Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, Dr Mahbubul Haq, disclosed that approximately twenty families in Pakistan controlled over 66 per cent of industry, 80 per cent of banking and 97 per cent of insurance, while more than half of the remaining 34 per cent of industrial capital was controlled by foreign companies. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, p. 152.
- 239 Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, pp. 67-68.
- 240 Ayub and his family had themselves acquired large landholdings, while his son, Capt. Gohar Ayub, also became the owner of an industrial corporation in partnership with his father-in-law, General Habibullah. By one estimate, their industrial and agricultural holdings were worth some Rs 250 million by 1965. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, p. 149.
- 241 A number of amendments were introduced into the Constitution by means of Presidential ordinances, including the Fifth Amendment which empowered the President to retire and prolong the terms of office of civil servants, thereby

strengthening his hold over the bureaucracy.

- 242 Pakistan Times, 25 February 1967; 13 May 1967. See also Staff Study, "Bhutto and Tashkent", p. 8.
- 243 The clash was provoked when a group of students from Rawalpindi was charged with the possession of smuggled goods.
- 244 On 10 November, a young student attempted to assassinate Ayub at a public meeting in Peshawar.
- 245 According to official figures, East Pakistan constituted less than five per cent of the officer corps of the Army. Statement by Parliamentary Secretary of Defence, National Assembly of Pakistan (Debates), 29 June 1968, p. 3266. More than 75 per cent of all posts above the rank of Deputy Secretary in the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economic Affairs were held by West Pakistanis. Rehman Sobhan, "East Pakistan's Revolt Against Ayub: Old Resentments and New Needs", The Round Table (No. 235, July 1969), p. 303. See also Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, p. 169.
- 246 Rounaq Jahan, op.cit., pp. 79-81.
- 247 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, "6-Point Formula - Our Right to Live", 23 March 1966, The Bangladesh Papers: The recorded statements and speeches of Z.A. Bhutto, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman, Gen.Yahya Khan and other Politicians of United Pakistan 1969-1971 (referred to hereafter as The Bangladesh Papers) (Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, n.d.), pp. 24-30.
- 248 The First Secretary of the Indian High Commission in Dacca was accused of acting as the contact with the conspirators and was expelled from the country. Hebert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969, pp.184-185. For the government's version of the case, see S.M. Zafar, op.cit., pp. 81-82.
- 249 M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political

Development of Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. X, No. 7, July 1970), pp. 583-584.

- 250 The NAP was not only divided into the East-based party of Maulana Bhashani and the West-based NAP headed by Wali Khan, but after the Sino-Soviet split the East wing NAP itself split into the pro-Moscow faction headed by Prof. Muzaffar and the pro-Peking faction of Maulana Bhashani.
- 251 The other component parties were the Council Muslim League, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam and the National Democratic Front.
- 252 Ayub declared, "I have decided to announce today that I shall not be a candidate in the next elections. This decision is final and irrevocable." Pakistan Times, 22 February 1968.
- 253 Opposition to the "One Unit" scheme was especially strong in Sind and Baluchistan since it strengthened the position of the Punjab, which dominated the civil and military bureaucracies and received the lion's share of the national development budget. The intensity of this opposition can be judged by the fact that the Centre had to use the Armed Forces to suppress Baluchi unrest in 1967 and 1968.
- 254 Low-ranking government employees, including teachers, clerks and postal workers, had joined hands with the demonstrators in both wings, observing strikes to press for their demands. Muneer Ahmed, Political Sociology: Perspectives on Pakistan (Punjab Adab Markaz, Lahore, 1978), pp. 20-24, pp. 34-38.
- 255 General Musa claims that he strongly advised Ayub against Yahya's selection since he was suspicious of his political ambitions. Interview with author.
- 256 According to General Attiq, when Yahya promoted "certain general officers against the ... consensus of opinion" of the Army Selection Board "and for reasons which were plainly not to do with merit, but of affiliations and loyalty, it became obvious that one had to toe the line and accept the changes ..." Lt. General M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis

of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role, p. 42.

- 257 Information Secretary Gauhar's account of this "unofficial coup d'etat" in Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p. 115. This is substantiated by Yahya's close confidant, G.W. Choudhury. See G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, op.cit., pp. 28-29. See also Wayne Wilcox, "Pakistan: A Decade of Ayub", Asian Survey (Vol. 1X, No. 2, February 1969), p. 88.
- 258 Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Pakistan at the Crossroads, op.cit., pp. 97-99. Times, 19 November 1968; 20 November 1968; Pakistan Observer, 28 November 1968. Asghar Khan's standing amongst the forces can be judged by the fact that Defence Minister, Admiral A.R. Khan, was forced to publicly retract his allegations that Asghar's opposition could have been inspired by "external influences". Dawn, 12 March 1969; Pakistan Times, 13 March 1969.
- 259 S.M. Zafar, op.cit., p. 187.
- 260 Ayub himself admitted that, "Our soldiers are asking: why should we shoot our own brothers?". Ibid., p. 184.
- 261 Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p. 128.
- 262 While Bhashani's NAP did have a socialist platform, Bhutto's "socialism" was mainly rhetoric. Yet the PPP did attract many leftists since it was perceived as a potentially useful platform from which to disseminate socialist ideas. Salman Taseer, op.cit., p. 91. See also Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? Death of a State, p. 78.
- 263 Air Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan, "Anatomy of Military Rule: The Challenge and Response: I", Muslim, 20 August 1985.
- 264 Interview with PAF Chief Nur Khan, Defence Journal (Vol. V, Nos. 3-4, 1979), op.cit., pp. 13-14. According to Yahya, "I told him (Ayub) that Martial Law had a tendency to spread like wild fire and that it could not be kept within certain limits." Urdu Digest, January 1979 in Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "How Yahya Khan Took Over", Morning News, 19 April 1979.

- 265 Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982, p. 15.
- 266 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 35.
- 267 Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p. 119.
- 268 M. Rashiduzzaman, op.cit., pp. 584-585.
- 269 Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p. 123.
- 270 Text of Ayub Khan's announcement, Dawn, 26 March 1969. The 1962 Constitution, in fact, provided that the Speaker of the National Assembly would assume executive control in the event of the President's incapacity to perform his functions.
- 271 Pakistan Times, 26 March 1969.
- 272 Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVENTHE YAHYA JUNTA AND THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN(1969-1971)

The course of Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy was to assume a new significance under its second military government, headed by General Yahya Khan. As the Armed Forces once again openly adopted the role of the dominant political actor, all policy-making was to be determined by the military's corporate interests.

In this most eventful phase of Pakistan's history, internal and external variables were to be more closely interlinked than ever before. Thus the internal policies of the new military rulers combined with regional and global alignments were ultimately to determine not only the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations but the continued existence of the state of Pakistan itself.

Pakistan Under Yahya Khan

With the imposition of martial law in March 1969, the military, represented by Army Commander-in-Chief Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, once again emerged as the supreme custodian of political power in Pakistan. The departing President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, had justified transferring power to military rather than civilian hands on the grounds that a divided self-serving political leadership had brought Pakistan to the brink of disaster.

Ayub's justifications were echoed by Yahya Khan, who stressed that the military had reluctantly intervened when Ayub failed to solve the political impasse, and the law-and-order situation continued to deteriorate. "The Armed Forces," he declared in his takeover address on 26 March, "could not remain idle spectators of this state of near anarchy. They have to do their duty and save the country from utter disaster." According to Yahya, the main objectives of his regime were "to bring back sanity" and "to put the Administration back on the rails".¹

These justifications seem to have been accepted at face value by a number of civil and military analysts who claim that the coup was also an example of "reactive" as opposed to "designed" militarism, since an apolitical military was forced to intervene due to the failure of the politicians to provide a viable alternative leadership. Military sources argue that the "military intervened" in the wake of "repeated political failure"² as irresponsible politicians, failing to reach agreement on a future constitutional structure, created "the inevitable setting for martial law."³ Similar arguments are put forward by a number of political analysts who claim that the coup was "a reaction to the weakness of civilian institutions."⁴ Martial Law came "hesitantly" since there was "no alternative . . . in sight"⁵ and Yahya "reluctantly accepted the responsibility for cleaning up the mess Pakistan was in . . ."⁶

As already discussed in Chapter Six, the notion of the military leadership being forced to take over power bears little resemblance to the events leading to Ayub's downfall. Having taken over power,

the Yahya regime moved quickly to counter any potential resistance to the coup. Special military courts were set up, and a large number of arrests were made. The Military High Command was, however, aware that the mass movement of 1968/69 had highly politicised the Pakistani masses and created widespread resentment against authoritarian rule. Yahya therefore categorically declared that he had no political ambitions, and that his main aim was "the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional Government" and "the smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise."⁷

Yahya's initial moves seemed, however, to aim at consolidating his own position as well as that of the Armed Forces. The CMLA took over the post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, while retaining the position of Army Commander-in-Chief, and on 31 March 1969 assumed the position of President. The Chiefs of Staff of the three service arms, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Air Marshal Nur Khan and Admiral S.M. Ahsan, were appointed Deputy Martial Law Administrators (DMLAs) and they, together with Yahya and his Principal Staff Officer (PSO), Lt. Gen. S.G.M. Peerzada, composed a Council of Administration heading the new government. The Ministries were divided amongst the CMLA and three DMLAs, with Yahya heading Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Unlike the Ayub government, the Yahya regime personified the dominance of the military, and the days of civil-military partnership seemed over. Headquarters CMLA (HQCMLA), composed entirely of

military personnel, was formed soon after the imposition of martial law and "placed supreme over the entire existing machinery of the Government."⁸ The Government Secretariat functioned under its control, and military officers were appointed to oversee their civilian counterparts at all levels of government. Two zonal Martial Law Administrators (MLAs) performed the functions of Governor in the provinces, with the civil bureaucracy operating under their control. Senior civil servants "lost all direct approach to the President," and all decisions, both in the centre and in the provinces, were made by the martial law authorities.⁹

The foreign policy making processes, as in the case of internal policy, were the sole prerogative of the military. Yahya and his military colleagues, especially General Peerzada, determined the country's external directions. It was therefore quite natural for the new military rulers to focus on the needs of the Armed Forces while formulating foreign policy. This did not entail any major departure from the previous government's external policies, since Ayub had also given the highest priority to the requirements of the military.

The Yahya regime did adopt a harsher stance on Indo-Pakistani relations so as to gain internal legitimacy and support, especially from those sections of the Armed Forces and the Punjabi population who had been strongly opposed to the signing of the Tashkent Declaration. The use of the Indian "threat" and anti-Indian rhetoric continued to be useful in justifying both the need for a military government and for increased defence expenditure. In his first press conference, Yahya therefore referred specifically to the need for a

just solution of Indo-Pakistan differences, implying that future bilateral relations would be determined by the Kashmir question.¹⁰

The Yahya regime, once again following the guidelines of its predecessor's foreign policy, ostensibly adopted a policy of "bilateralism" in its dealings with the major powers, "which means conducting our relations with other countries on the basis of mutuality of interests independently of our or their relations with other countries . . . We, therefore, try to have balanced relations with the major Powers and do not solicit the friendship of one at the expense or to the exclusion of the other."¹¹ Yet like Ayub, a primary objective of Yahya's foreign policy was a consolidation of ties with the US, which were given precedence over improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.

Yahya, like his former Supreme Commander, "was a staunch believer in the wisdom of remaining allied with the West."¹² He was particularly aware that a major factor in the withdrawal of military support from Ayub had been the Field Marshal's failure to obtain renewed American military assistance, accompanied by the feeling that the US would not change its arms policy towards Pakistan so long as Ayub remained in power. For the new military government, it was therefore imperative to prove that it would succeed in meeting the military's needs. Yahya was also keen on consolidating his hold within the Armed Forces by embarking on a new military buildup, both to replace the losses of the 1965 war and to expand and modernize the military even further. Since internal defence spending could not be increased any further without damaging the economy,

already strained by the anti-Ayub agitation, beyond repair, the pro-Western military turned to the US for assistance, hoping to receive a positive response from the Nixon Administration.¹³

Yahya was no stranger to the Americans. As Ayub's Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief, he had had several dealings with Pentagon and State Department officials. According to Ayub's Information Secretary, Yahya had attempted to curry favour with the Americans, including an attempt "to win US goodwill by obstructing the completion of the Sinkiang Road" linking Pakistan and China, which Army units were helping to build.¹⁴ The 1969 military coup was welcomed by the US, since it had prevented political forces demanding radical socio-economic change and an anti-imperialist foreign policy from taking over.

But while the Americans found in Yahya a "congenial . . . associate",¹⁵ heading a pro-Western group of generals, his initial overtures bore little fruit. During Secretary of State William Rogers' visit to Pakistan in May 1969, Yahya requested a resumption of military assistance, or at least softer terms for weapons purchases to Pakistan.¹⁶ Although the Americans were on the whole favourably inclined towards the Yahya regime, they did not respond positively since Pakistan was still an area of low priority to the US, which was gradually decreasing its involvement in Asia.

Once again in line with Ayub's foreign policy tactics, the Yahya regime's stress on a policy of "bilateralism"¹⁷ was partly aimed at keeping its options open vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the hope of

upgrading Pakistan's position in US regional strategies. Another important consideration for the Pakistanis was the continued implementation of the 1968 arms agreement with the Soviet Union and the hope of obtaining greater Soviet military assistance, which could also be used as a lever in their dealings with the Chinese and Americans.

The Soviets, on their part, had their own reasons for responding favourably to the change of government in Pakistan. Although relations with Ayub had been far from satisfactory, the Soviets were disturbed by the nature of the mass movement against his government. While a modicum of understanding had been reached with Ayub, the anti-government forces were led by politicians such as the pro-Peking Bhashani in the East and the anti-Indian chauvinist, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the West wing.¹⁸ The Soviets leadership was therefore relieved when the agitation resulted in a reimposition of military rule and was quick in officially extending its support to the Yahya government. In his reply to Yahya's letter, for instance, Kosygin declared that Pakistan could "always count on the friendly understanding and support of the Soviet Union," and expressed his belief that "the friendly relations existing between the Soviet Union and Pakistan will be not only preserved but will grow further."¹⁹ As a concrete signal of confidence in and approval of the military regime the Soviets continued to implement the 1968 arms agreement with Pakistan.

The Soviet moves to consolidate relations with Pakistan continued to be motivated by their desire to reduce Chinese influence in that

country in particular and in the region at large. As Sino-Soviet relations reached a new low in 1969, following clashes along the Ussuri River, the Soviets also began to explore the possibilities of establishing regional security schemes aimed at containing China.²⁰ Hence Pakistan's importance increased in Soviet regional strategies.

In May 1969 Kosygin paid a visit to Pakistan, where he proceeded to caution the new leadership on the dangers of rapprochement with China. He warned Yahya that China, unlike the Soviet Union, was "not interested in peace in this region," and alleged Chinese interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. According to a former Pakistani Foreign Office official, Kosygin also told Yahya that "simultaneous friendship with Moscow and Peking would not be tolerated." When Yahya asked how the Soviets could justify friendly relations with both India and Pakistan, he was told that "What is possible for a superpower is not possible for a smaller power."²¹

During his visit Kosygin proposed the formation of a regional economic grouping, consisting of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could also include Iran and Turkey, aimed at promoting the wellbeing of its member states as well as regional stability. "For its part," he added "the Soviet Union would do everything in its power to encourage this." He also proposed a conference between Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union "to discuss the question of transit trade."²² While the latter proposal would have strengthened Soviet economic ties with member states and hence its regional influence, the former was proposed with the objective of establishing some sort of loosely grouped alliance to contain China.

At the conclusion of the visit, Yahya expressed the hope that Pakistan-Soviet relations would "continue to grow in strength," while Kosygin emphasised the Soviet desire to "continue to work for the consolidation of friendly ties with Pakistan." Both leaders also stressed their determination "to expand areas of cooperation between the two countries in the economic, cultural and other fields."²³

The Pakistani reaction to the Soviet proposals for a regional economic grouping was, however, ambiguous. The Yahya regime had no intention of joining a Soviet-sponsored scheme which would endanger future ties with the West and limit Pakistan's options vis-à-vis China. Some willingness was however indicated on exploring the possibilities of a conference on transit trade.²⁴ It was therefore clear that the Yahya regime intended to maintain the Soviet option, while at the same time pursuing its primary objective of strengthening relations with the West as also its ties with China which could, in turn, serve as a lever in its dealings with both the US and neighbouring India.

The Politics of Confrontation

Internal developments rather than foreign policy concerns were, however, to preoccupy the Yahya regime in the first months of its existence. Soon after the imposition of martial law, divisions appeared within the junta. DMLAs Admiral Ahsan and Air Marshal Nur Khan were soon at odds with the Army generals, the former because

he favoured a speedy return to civilian rule, the latter because he was perceived as ambitious and a potential threat to Yahya Khan.

The President soon neutralised the threat posed by Ahsen and Nur Khan by appointing them as Governors of East and West Pakistan respectively, and retiring them from active service.²⁵ The key decision makers now consisted of the CMLA, Army Chief Hamid, PSO Peerzada and two other Army colleagues, National Security Council (NSC) Chairman, Major-General Ghulam Omar, and Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Major-General Akbar Khan.

Yahya then moved to consolidate his control and in September 1969 appointed a "civilian" cabinet composed of nominated ministers to replace the Council of Administration. Real power remained with the inner military cabinet. The bureaucracy also remained deprived of any major role in decision making, with the regime ensuring the continued cooperation of the civil servants by intimidation tactics. These included the enforcement of Martial Law Regulations (MLRs) such as MLR No. 58, under which some 303 Class 1 bureaucrats were dismissed, demoted or retired on charges ranging from corruption to inefficiency.²⁶

The regime also issued a number of MLRs aimed at curbing anti-social activities such as smuggling and blackmarketeering, and also announced its intention to enunciate socio-economic reforms.²⁷ These attempts, aimed at defusing the domestic demand for reform did not, however, succeed in acquiring the regime the legitimacy it was seeking. Feelings against it ran especially high in the East Wing,

which perceived the coup as yet another attempt to deprive the Bengalis of their rightful share in political power and economic resources.

By November 1969 there were open shows of defiance in East Pakistan. The regime therefore embarked on a carefully monitored process of transferring power to "civilian" hands in a strictly regulated manner which would perpetuate the military's control and at the same time defuse internal opposition.²⁸ Yahya announced on 28 November 1969 that National Assembly polls would be held on 5 October 1970, and conceded the demands of East Pakistan and the minority West Pakistani provinces for a dissolution of One Unit and elections to a unicameral legislature on the basis of "one man, one vote".²⁹ Realising that differences amongst the political leadership could be exploited, especially in view of the East-West divide, Yahya deliberately left the contentious East Pakistani demand for maximum provincial autonomy unresolved.

On 30 March 1970, a "provisional" Legal Framework Order (LFO) was promulgated, which laid down the regime's guidelines for a future constitutional framework. The most significant clauses of the LFO were sections 24, 25 and 27, which gave the Assembly a period of 120 days in which to draft a constitution; provided that the Assembly's Constitutional Bill would need the President's authentication, without which the Assembly would stand dissolved; and declared that the interpretation of the provisions of the LFO "shall be resolved by . . . the President" alone.³⁰ It was therefore clear that Yahya and his military colleagues were leaving nothing to

chance.

The ban on political activities was lifted on 1 January 1970, and National and Provincial Assembly polls were held on 17 and 19 December respectively, with over 25 parties participating. Some analysts claim that Yahya's decision to hold the polls was determined by his desire "to return the country to unfettered democracy"³¹ and that he was "committed to the re-establishment of a parliamentary form of government."³² It is far more likely that the Yahya regime went ahead with the elections since it was confident that no party would emerge with an absolute majority. The military would then be in a position to manipulate the divided political leadership at will.³³

The election results, however, disproved the military's calculations. In the West Wing, the government had patronised a number of right wing parties, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Qayyum Muslim League, in a bid to obtain a fragmented vote. It was assessed that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP would win approximately 30 National Assembly seats, with the remainder going to the right wing parties.³⁴ The PPP, however, managed to capture 81 out of the 138 seats. Its calls for socio-economic reforms and an anti-imperialist foreign policy appealed to the masses while a hawkish and anti-Indian stance won Bhutto the support of the Punjabis in particular.³⁵

The pre-election estimates of the regime concerning East Pakistan proved even more unfounded, since it was calculated that Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman's Awami League would obtain at best some 60 to 70 seats in the National Assembly. The League, however, campaigning on its six-point programme for maximum provincial autonomy, swept the polls, obtaining 160 out of East Pakistan's 162 National Assembly and 288 out of the 300 Provincial Assembly seats.³⁶

Although Yahya declared that he would step down, adding "I have a perfectly good job waiting for me back in the barracks",³⁷ the regime was unprepared to hand over power to a civilian government which would have an absolute majority in the National Assembly. It was especially unwilling to transfer power to the Awami League, since its six-point programme threatened the interests of the West Pakistani dominated centre and military. In the realm of foreign policy, for instance, the programme called for withdrawal from the Western alignments and an improvement of relations with India.³⁸ Its domestic content was even more significant, since it was perceived that an Awami League government would threaten the military's autonomy, drastically curtail defence spending and reduce the size of the Armed Forces.³⁹

Faced with the task of evolving a new strategy to prevent a transfer of power without eroding its own legitimacy, the Yahya regime was given support from an unexpected quarter, the dominant West Pakistani party, the Pakistan People's Party. Zulfikar Bhutto, who had also not anticipated an Awami League majority, was now unwilling to assume the role of the opposition leader in the National Assembly.

His trump card lay in the fact that the Awami League had not won even a single seat in the West Wing, while his party had obtained an absolute majority of National Assembly seats in the politically dominant province of Punjab.⁴⁰ Playing on the sympathies of his Punjabi electorate, Bhutto now claimed that the Awami League could not speak for the West Pakistani people, in the hope that a future settlement between the Awami League, the Yahya regime and his party would grant him a share of the federal government.

While Bhutto's refusal to acknowledge the Awami League's majority in the National Assembly increased tensions between the two wings, it served the purposes of the military regime, which decided "to play Bhutto and Mujib against each other."⁴¹ Instead of calling the National Assembly session, Yahya began talks with the Awami League and PPP leadership on a future constitutional framework. After holding talks with Mujib in January, Yahya acknowledged publicly that "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is going to be our next Prime Minister"⁴² but he then proceeded to Bhutto's home town, Larkana, accompanied by some influential members of his inner cabinet. There, according to civil and military sources close to the CMLA, "a new and most sinister alliance seems to have developed between the military junta and Bhutto . . ." ⁴³ and the two "decided not to hand over power to Mujibur Rahman."⁴⁴

Bhutto's refusal to acknowledge the Awami League's majority in the National Assembly was satisfying to the regime which required his cooperation to legitimise its refusal to implement election results. Taking full advantage of Bhutto's stand, Yahya announced on 1 March

an indefinite postponement of the National Assembly session due to be held on 3 March, on the grounds that the West Pakistani majority party was unwilling to participate.⁴⁵

Civil War in Pakistan

Perceiving Yahya's decision to postpone indefinitely the National Assembly session as an attempt to prevent his party from taking over power, Mujib attempted to pressure the regime to reverse its decision by launching a large scale civil disobedience movement which included province-wide strikes. Yahya, however, responded by using force to suppress all dissent. This resulted on the one hand in strengthening the radical forces within the Awami League, especially amongst the student body, leaving Mujib with little room to compromise with the central government. On the other hand, the centre's actions further alienated the Bengalis, resulting in a corresponding increase in the Awami League's popularity and the party by March 1971 virtually controlled all political and administrative life in the province.⁴⁶

On 6 March, Yahya declared that the National Assembly session would be held on 25 March, while at the same time strongly criticising the Awami League's stance.⁴⁷ The following month Yahya began a series of talks with Mujib in Dacca, which were joined at a later stage by Bhutto. Little progress was made, as the regime appeared to have no intention of meeting the Awami League's preconditions. According to one analyst, these negotiations were, in fact, conducted since the Army "needed more time in order to dispatch extra troops" before

taking more drastic action.⁴⁸ This is borne out by military sources as well.

The regime was at first divided on an ultimate solution of the East Pakistan crisis between the military doves and hawks. The former included East Pakistan Governor, Admiral Ahsan, who, after repeatedly calling for a political settlement with Mujib, finally submitted his resignation. His successor as Governor and MLA was Commander, Eastern Command, Lt. General Yaqub Khan, who was also forced to resign when his calls for a peaceful solution were ignored. Yaqub's replacement by Lt. General Tikka Khan, a hardliner, was a clear indicator that the regime had no intention of reaching a political settlement.⁴⁹

While Yahya was ostensibly conducting negotiations with Mujib in Dacca, as early as 16 March he told General Tikka Khan to prepare for action. On 24 March, the plan for military action was approved by the President.⁵⁰ The following day, Yahya held his last meeting with Mujib and then departed for West Pakistan. On 25/26 March, the Army took action in the East Wing. On 26 March, Yahya accused Mujib and the Awami League of treason.⁵¹ Mujib was arrested, his party banned and West Pakistani troops moved in to crush all those suspected of supporting Bengali nationalism, including politicians, students and intellectuals, resulting in large scale casualties.

Yahya and his inner cabinet had calculated that a "punitive" crackdown would effectively reassert central government control within no time.⁵² They had, however, underestimated the level of popular

support for the nationalistic cause and the intensity of resistance which accompanied it. The atrocities which accompanied military action in Dacca and elsewhere in the province further fuelled a widespread uprising against the centre, which rapidly took the shape of a civil war.

The East Pakistan crisis assumed an external dimension as Bengali military personnel, political leaders and hundreds of thousands of civilians fled across the border into India. Indo-Pakistan relations, which had deteriorated after the 1969 coup and incidents such as the hijacking of an Indian airliner by two dissident Kashmiris in January 1970,⁵³ reached a new low with the exodus of the East Pakistani refugees, since India's financial and administrative resources were strained and the refugee presence created serious political tensions in the bordering Indian states. India also saw in the East Pakistan crisis an opportunity of embarrassing an unfriendly neighbour. Soon after the Pakistani military action, the Indian government and the Indian parliament extended their "profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people of East Bengal"⁵⁴ and the Awami League leadership-in-exile was allowed to form a Provisional Government of Bangladesh headed by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed.

By spring 1971, India decided to back the Bangladeshi cause as the Pakistan military continued its operations in the East Wing with the resultant increase in the numbers of refugees crossing the border as well as an almost complete alienation of the population within the province, who were by now fully supportive of the struggle for independence. The Indian decision was partly due to the realisation

that the crisis could be used to render a crippling blow to Pakistan, putting an end, once and for all, to a Pakistani two-border threat. Moreover, the refugees were unlikely to return home until the Pakistani forces were ousted, but the Bangladeshi resistance was equally unlikely to succeed without a prolonged struggle unless an external power decided to intervene. The Indian government also expected that an Indian-backed and supported liberation struggle would bring into power an independent Bangladesh government which would be ideologically suitable as well as politically sympathetic to its benefactor.⁵⁵

The Yahya regime, however, appeared oblivious of the internal and external implications of the crisis, still focussing its attention on a forcible suppression of Bengali dissent. The regime also continued to strive for political legitimacy in the West Wing. Yahya, for example, declared his intention to nominate a 'Council of Experts' to draft a future constitutional framework and reiterated his intentions to transfer power once the East Pakistan crisis was resolved.

The regime also attempted to gain West Pakistani support for the military action in the East Wing, claiming that the crisis was the product of a conspiracy between Awami League secessionists and India. Hence limited amnesties were announced in mid-1971 for refugees and rebels who had been "mised" by Indian-supported "anti-state elements and miscreants."⁵⁶

As Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated even further, the Indians continued to prepare for military action, moving troops to East

Pakistan's borders, increasing their moral and material support to the Bangladeshi resistance and escalating their campaign to internationalise the issue in a bid to gain external acceptance for their stand on the crisis. Mrs Gandhi, for example, both in public pronouncements and in messages to a number of heads of government, accused the Pakistani military of perpetuating the crisis which had resulted in a large scale refugee presence, and warned that India might be forced to take action to protect its national interests if the situation deteriorated even further.⁵⁷ It was becoming increasingly clear that a future Indian decision to take military action against Pakistan would be partly dependent on Mrs Gandhi's success in mustering sufficient international support, as also on the ability of the Yahya regime to neutralise a potential Indian thrust by acquiring sufficient assistance from its allies.

The escalation of the Bangladesh crisis was viewed with particular concern by the Soviets, fearing that an exacerbation of Indo-Pakistan tensions would threaten regional stability and increase the chances of external intervention in South Asia. The Soviets had thus far consistently followed a policy of attempting to establish cordial relations with both Pakistan and India in the hope of promoting Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, and also with the objective of reducing Pakistan's dependence on the West and China.

As Sino-Soviet relations reached a new low in 1969, the Soviets were even more interested in reducing Chinese regional influence and promoting a joint Indo-Pakistan front against China. As mentioned earlier, Kosygin had proposed a regional economic grouping to the

Pakistanis during his March 1969 visit. From mid-1969 onwards, the Soviets began to actively promote the notion of an Asian collective security system. Introducing the scheme at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969, Brezhnev declared that such "a system of collective security in Asia" would be "the best replacement for the existing military groupings", helping to protect Asian countries from "the danger of another world war, of armed conflicts" in the region.⁵⁸

The enunciation of this proposal was an indicator that the Soviets were interested in adopting a more active role in Asia at a time when the British were withdrawing from East of Suez and the US was beginning to reconsider its involvement in Vietnam. The Soviets were especially interested in exploring the possibilities of setting up collective security groupings to contain the expansion of Chinese influence in the region.⁵⁹

Both the Soviet proposals were met with coolness by the Pakistanis. On 10 June 1969, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman declared Pakistan's unwillingness to enter into any such economic arrangement with India until Indo-Pakistani bilateral differences were resolved.⁶⁰ Yahya also turned down the collective security proposal as he was warned by his military and civilian advisers about the "grave implications" of participation in "a Soviet-built political grouping on China's southwestern flank" which would be nothing but "the Russian version of SEATO."⁶¹ Rejecting the proposal, a Pakistani official spokesman stated on 10 July that Pakistan did not intend to enter any arrangement which would "cast

doubts on Sino-Pakistan relations."⁶²

The pro-Western military regime had indeed no intention of participating in Soviet-sponsored schemes which would endanger Pakistan's relations with the West or China. The Pakistanis did decide to use the leverage gained by the issue to consolidate their ties with China. The Yahya regime not only wanted to use China as a counter to India, but was also keen on a resumption of military assistance which had come to a halt due to the Cultural Revolution.

The Pakistanis were therefore quick to reassure the Chinese that they had no intentions of participating in any Soviet-sponsored regional scheme. On 3 July 1969, the Pakistan Foreign Office informed the Chinese Ambassador that "Pakistan will not be a party to any arrangement, economic or military, which will be aimed against China."⁶³ The following month Yahya sent his representative, Air Marshal Nur Khan, to Peking where, according to an authoritative source, he told the Chinese leadership that Pakistan would not "collaborate, no matter what the Soviet pressure, in any scheme that would be directed against China . . . "⁶⁴

As Sino-Pakistani relations improved even further, this relationship was in turn to lead to a consolidation of US-Pakistan ties as President Nixon, who had already established a good personal equation with Yahya, had reached the conclusion that the Pakistanis could help the US in opening direct relations with China. The Yahya regime was first approached on the subject by Secretary of State Rogers during his visit to Pakistan in May 1969. During his trip to

Pakistan the following August, President Nixon called on Yahya to act as an intermediary between the US and China. Realising the strong bargaining position this would give his government vis-à-vis both Washington and Peking, Yahya was more than willing to oblige. According to one of Yahya's close associates, the Pakistani President then fulfilled this assignment "most faithfully and with strict secrecy."⁶⁵

As a result of Yahya's cooperation, US-Pakistan relations received a tremendous boost. Yahya was particularly hopeful of using this improved relationship to obtain US arms assistance. Although he had consistently increased domestic defence expenditure from Rs 2,187 million in 1968 to Rs 2,761 in 1970,⁶⁶ it was still insufficient to meet the military's requirements. Moreover, the Pakistani forces, especially the Air Force, were badly in need of spares for their American supplied hardware.

Pakistan's cooperation in helping to establish Sino-American relations was indeed rewarded as the Nixon Administration announced its decision in October 1970 to sell Pakistan "several items of military equipment to replace equipment previously supplied", including B-57 bombers, F-104 Starfighters, armoured personnel carriers and spare parts as "an exception to the general policy" on arms supplies to South Asia.⁶⁷

During Yahya's visit to China in November 1970, the Chinese also rewarded him for services rendered by agreeing not only to an additional \$200 million in economic aid but also to a resumption in

the supply of defence equipment. Pakistan's role in bringing the US and China together culminated in Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971, with both sides agreeing to normalise relations.

The improvement in Pakistan's relations with China and the US was to assume a new significance as the situation in East Pakistan continued to deteriorate. The Chinese were disturbed by the nature of the crisis in the East Wing. Yet they felt compelled to support their Pakistani allies in a struggle which was being assisted by the Indians. In their response to the events in East Pakistan, they were, therefore, careful not to condone the Pakistani military operations, but emphasised instead the role being played by India. Thus a Chinese note of 6 April accused India of "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan"⁶⁸ and in a letter to Yahya on 11 April, Premier Chou declared that "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence."⁶⁹

The Chinese Premier's letter, however, significantly omitted any pledges of support for Pakistan's "territorial integrity", and private warnings were issued to the Yahya regime to reach a political solution. A Bengali source, for instance, claims that Chou had added in his letter that, "The question of East Pakistan should be settled according to the wishes of the people of East Pakistan."⁷⁰ The Pakistanis were also told to beware of the "grave consequences" of

Indian involvement.⁷¹ Nor did the Chinese, apart from cautiously worded declarations of support, commit themselves to any course of action in support of the Yahya regime, wanting first to assess the implications of the situation.

The American response to the crisis was to be shaped by both domestic and external compulsions. There was, however, conflict within the Administration on the course to be followed. As the Pakistani forces continued their operations within East Pakistan, State Department officials dealing with the crisis, but ignorant of Pakistan's role in the ongoing Sino-American negotiations, advised Nixon to condemn the Yahya regime and force the Pakistanis to reach a political solution of the crisis by cutting off economic and military aid.⁷²

Nixon, however, adopted a pro-Pakistani "tilt", since the Yahya regime was still playing a vital mediatory role between the Chinese and American top leadership. Moreover, West Pakistan was perceived as far more vital to the US than East Bengal and the West Pakistani military regime a more conducive instrument, as opposed to the Bangladeshi resistance, for the promotion of American regional interests.⁷³

Despite his sympathy for the Yahya regime, Nixon had to be circumspect in supporting the Pakistanis in view of public and Congressional condemnation of the military operations in East Pakistan.⁷⁴ He therefore accepted a State Department decision to impose "a 'hold' on military equipment" to Pakistan in April. At the

same time, however, State Department officials dealing with the crisis were "cautioned" by Kissinger "to keep in mind President Nixon's 'special relationship' with Yahya."⁷⁵ Humanitarian assistance was provided to East Pakistani refugees in India so as to divert attention away from the continuing and, in fact, increased economic aid to Pakistan. Above all, the Nixon Administration emphasised that the East Pakistan crisis was "basically an internal matter within Pakistan" to be resolved by the Pakistanis alone, and that no external power could justify interfering in the matter.⁷⁶

While the Yahya regime received the limited but welcome support of its American and Chinese allies, its indifference toward Soviet overtures of friendship was to prove a costly mistake. Despite the pro-Western orientation of the Pakistani military government, the Soviets had continued with their efforts to improve relations with Pakistan, placing special emphasis on the consolidation of economic and technological links. Thus, for instance, agreements were signed during 1970 for the expansion of bilateral trade and the construction of electrical complexes in Pakistan. In May 1970, the Soviet and Pakistani governments entered into a 10-year agreement for technical collaboration in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.⁷⁷

The Pakistanis for their part, wanting to use the relationship in their dealings with the West and China, did not forego the Soviet option altogether, and Yahya visited the Soviet Union in June 1970. During the visit, the two sides signed a long-term trade agreement for 1971-1975. The Soviets offered assistance for Pakistan's Fourth Five-Year Plan and the Pakistanis accepted a Soviet offer of

assistance in setting up a steel mill in Karachi.⁷⁸

By the terms of the 1968 arms agreement, the Soviets had provided Pakistan with a number of T-54/55 tanks, spare parts for Chinese supplied MiGs and IL-28 aircraft, and 130 mm guns.⁷⁹ The Yahya regime was interested in exploring the possibilities of acquiring further Soviet hardware. The Soviets had by now realised that the extension of military supplies had not led to any change in the orientation of the Pakistani military leadership. Yet they were interested in linking the issue of arms supplies with their new regional security proposal. Hence when Yahya raised the question of continued Soviet arms shipments, Kosygin told the Pakistani leader, "You cannot expect Soviet arms when you are unwilling to endorse our Asian Security System", adding that the scheme would be "the best guarantor for her (Pakistan's) territorial integrity."⁸⁰

The Soviets were particularly concerned about the deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations since the takeover of the Pakistani military hawks. When Yahya stated that ". . . we deeply regret that our hopes and expectations for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistani disputes through negotiations have not yet been realised", Kosygin urged Yahya to solve Indo-Pakistani differences through bilateral negotiations "in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration."⁸¹

The Soviets also followed internal developments in Pakistan with great interest as elections approached towards the end of the year, hoping for the emergence of a more sympathetic civilian government to replace the military regime. They welcomed Mujib's electoral

victory since the Awami League called for Pakistan's withdrawal from the Western security pacts, and emphasised the need for cordial relations between India and Pakistan. Mujib's majority was also welcome since it was at the cost of pro-Chinese and anti-Indian political forces, such as Bhashani's NAP and Bhutto's PPP.⁸²

The Soviet leaders were disturbed by the post-election events in Pakistan. They were apprehensive that an escalation of the crisis could lead to an Indo-Pakistan conflict, increasing the chances of Western and Chinese intervention, and equally concerned that the short sighted domestic policies of the ruling Pakistani military clique could ultimately lead to the dismemberment of united Pakistan, thereby destabilising the region.⁸³

Soviet efforts were therefore focussed on pressuring the military regime to reach a political settlement of the crisis within the framework of a united Pakistan, and above all to prevent the outbreak of war on the subcontinent. Soon after the military action in East Pakistan the Soviet Consul-General in Karachi expressed Premier Kosygin's concern about the crisis in a meeting with Yahya on 28 March. This was followed by Podgorny's letter to President Yahya Khan on 2 April, in which the Soviet leader expressed his concern at "the arrest and persecution of M. Rahman and other political figures who received such convincing support from the overwhelming majority of East Pakistan's population in the recent general elections," and called on Yahya "to adopt the most immediate measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the populace of East Pakistan", adopting instead "methods of a peaceful political

settlement."

The Soviet President was careful not to express any support for the Bangladeshi movement for independence, and demonstrated total support for a united Pakistan, warning Yahya that a continuation of force in the East Wing "may be highly detrimental to the vital interests of all the Pakistani people." He also expressed his concern that an escalation of the crisis could lead to war in the region, stressing that his friendly advice was meant to promote "the interests of all the Pakistani people and the cause of preserving peace in this area."⁸⁴

The Soviet leadership and media continued to press on the Pakistani military government to seek a political solution in Pakistan, while acknowledging that it was an internal problem and implicitly stressing Soviet support for Pakistan's territorial integrity. Kosygin, for instance, reportedly told the Pakistan Ambassador, Jamshed Marker, that the Soviet Union considered the developments in East Pakistan were "Pakistan's internal matter."⁸⁵ Similarly, a Soviet commentator in Pravda, analysing the "acute domestic crisis" in East Pakistan, pointed out that the "continuing bloodshed in East Pakistan is doing serious harm not only to the vital interests of the Pakistani people but also to the cause of peace in Asia and throughout the world", adding that it was "precisely a political settlement and not a military solution that would correspond to the interests of the entire Pakistan people and to the cause of maintaining peace in this region and throughout the world."⁸⁶

As the continuing Pakistani military action and resultant influx of refugees into India increased Indo-Pakistan tensions, leading to greater Indian support for the Bangladeshi resistance forces, the Soviet calls for a political solution of the crisis and a peaceful resolution of Indo-Pakistani differences correspondingly grew. In an election meeting in June, Kosygin urged the Yahya regime to take immediate measures to reach a political solution of the crisis and a "peaceful solution" of Indo-Pakistani differences "with the cause of preserving peace on the Hindustan Peninsula." Soviet concern about potential Chinese and Western involvement was evident in the Soviet Premier's warning that an exacerbation of tensions "would play into the hands of those . . . foreign forces that, in pursuing their selfish goals, are acting to the detriment of the interests of both India and Pakistan."⁸⁷

The Pakistani leadership reacted with great hostility to the Soviet calls for a peaceful settlement of the Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pakistani differences. In his reply on 6 April to Podgorny's letter, General Yahya Khan declared that "no country, including the Soviet Union, can allow - or has allowed - anti-national and unpatriotic elements to destroy it or to countenance subversion." The CMLA also stressed that it was "of paramount importance that all efforts should be made to ensure that no interference takes place in a matter which is strictly Pakistan's own internal affair."⁸⁸

In subsequent exchanges with the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan, President Yahya pointed out that the Soviets were in no position to criticise Pakistan's military action within its borders, when they

themselves had violated the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the grounds of national interests. He also accused the Soviets of conducting atrocities in Czechoslovakia and within the Soviet Central Asian Republics.⁸⁹

While Pakistan-Soviet relations took a turn for the worse under the Yahya government, Indo-Soviet relations were, in contrast, progressively improving. At the time of the outbreak of the East Pakistan crisis, India and the Soviet Union had come even closer together in view of their common antipathy towards China. Indo-Soviet rapprochement was given an added impetus as the US and China moved closer together, with the active connivance of Pakistan.

Since Nixon's announcement of the opening with China on 16 July had come at a time when the Indians had begun to seriously consider the possibilities of taking military advantage of the East Pakistan crisis, the Indira government was particularly concerned that Sino-US rapprochement could lead to American neutrality in the event of Chinese interference in a future Indo-Pakistan war. This concern was heightened when Kissinger, on his return home from Peking via Pakistan, warned the Indian Ambassador in Washington that the US "would be unable to help you against China" should such a conflict erupt.⁹⁰

To neutralise such a Chinese threat, and to ensure Soviet diplomatic and material support, the Indians decided to go ahead with a bilateral treaty of friendship which had been under negotiation with the Soviet Union for the past two years. On 9 August 1971, India

therefore entered into a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.

A major motivating factor for consolidating ties with India from the Soviet point of view was their desire to form a joint front against China, especially in view of Sino-American rapprochement. An equally important consideration was the Soviet desire to prevent an outbreak of war in South Asia. The Treaty could, therefore, be used to put pressure on Pakistan to resolve the East Pakistan crisis and its differences with India peacefully, since it would now be clear that the Soviet Union would side with India in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war. Yet should the Pakistanis continue to follow a confrontationist policy towards India, combined with a refusal to seek a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis, the Treaty could then be used to ensure an Indian victory in any potential Indo-Pakistan conflict, by the provision of Soviet support for India and the neutralisation of American and Chinese support for Pakistan.⁹¹

Indo-Pakistan War of 1971

The Indo-Soviet treaty was to have far reaching implications for Pakistan. Although the Indians had been considering, as early as April, the possibilities of taking advantage of the East Pakistan crisis to neutralise their regional rival, they had been hesitant to escalate hostilities until the ground had first been prepared both diplomatically and militarily. The former precondition was partially fulfilled as India managed to convince the international community

of the justness of its stand on the Bangladesh issue. It was, in Indian perceptions, totally fulfilled with the signing of the Indo-Soviet accord.⁹²

India's military preparations were also complete by late 1971. The Indians were aware that the Bangladeshi resistance forces, would be ultimately capable of defeating the Pakistan Army on their own, but only after a prolonged war of national liberation. Such a development was not desirable from the Indian point of view, since it would mean not only the continued presence of the Bangladeshi refugees on Indian soil but also the possibility of radical nationalist forces emerging triumphant. The Indians therefore opted for direct intervention with the approval of the Awami League leadership in exile, which was also aware that a protracted national liberation war could deprive them of the chances of assuming political power in an independent Bangladesh.⁹³

The Pakistani military regime, on its part, appeared oblivious of the deteriorating conditions within East Pakistan, and continued to focus its attention on legitimising and consolidating its internal hold.⁹⁴ Nor did Pakistan's military leadership appear to be perturbed at the prospects of waging war with India⁹⁵ at a time when a civil war was under way within its own territory. Although the ruling generals were well aware of the prospects of war with India, they took no steps to defuse regional tensions and instead adopted a hostile and confrontational attitude. Yahya, in fact, threatened to take military action against India if that country played an overt role in supporting the "secessionist" movement within East Pakistan.⁹⁶

According to one of Yahya's former associates, the regime "professed 'confidence' in facing simultaneously both the Indian threat and the secessionist challenge from East Bengal", believing that the Pakistani forces would be able to achieve their objectives both within East Pakistan and against India in an all-out war of limited duration.⁹⁷

This confidence was to prove ill-founded as war broke out in the subcontinent in December 1971. On the Western front, following the Pakistani attacks across the international border on 3 December, aimed at diverting Indian pressure on East Pakistan, the poorly led and disorganised Pakistani forces soon found their offensive blunted on the sea, air and land.⁹⁸ In the East Wing the Pakistani forces soon found themselves in a state of virtual siege. In their all-out offensive, the superior Indian naval and air forces soon managed to impose a sea and air blockade around East Pakistan.⁹⁹ Nor was the isolated Pakistan Army, separated by some 3,000 miles of territory from its home base, any match for its Indian counterpart on the ground. A Pakistani force of only three weak infantry divisions¹⁰⁰ and some 73,000 paramilitary personnel faced an Indian Army comprising eight infantry divisions, accompanied by superior armour and artillery, along with twenty-nine battalions of the Border Security Force and the Indian trained Mukti Bahini of some 100,000 men.¹⁰¹ Above all, the Indians had the advantage of fighting the war with the active support of the vast majority of the local population. As early as 3 December, the fighting in East Pakistan was clearly to the disadvantage of the Pakistani forces, and Eastern Command "seemed to have lost control over the operations."¹⁰²

It was therefore obvious that Pakistan could not afford to wage a protracted war in either the East or the West Wing. The poorly led and outnumbered Pakistani forces were no match against an Indian military following well defined war aims, with a superiority of "eight to one in aircraft, four to one in troops, three to one in armour and five to one in naval vessels" over Pakistan.¹⁰³ India also possessed the advantage of a substantial indigenous arms manufacturing capability, and had a reliable external supplier of military hardware in the Soviet Union.

Unlike the 1965 war, when hostilities had been terminated by mutual agreement before any conclusive result was reached, the Indians in 1971 intended to fight a quick and decisive war to victory in the East Wing while neutralising Pakistani forces in the West. Hence they were faced with the task of resisting external pressures to put an end to fighting until East Pakistan surrendered. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, wanted to continue resistance in the East Wing long enough for their allies to bring pressure on India to halt the hostilities. The outcome of the conflict would therefore depend, to some extent, on the nature and extent of external support the two warring parties would be able to muster.

The military atrocities committed in East Pakistan and India's successful international campaign largely isolated the Pakistanis in the international arena. Moreover, the Yahya regime, with its "lack of understanding of international affairs", states an influential source, "did not and could not fully realise the international

implications of the crisis, particularly the . . . indirect involvement of the Soviet Union".¹⁰⁴ Concentrating on consolidating its relations with the West and China, the military government failed to understand the significance of the Indo-Soviet accord which was, to some extent, the result of Yahya's foreign policy manoeuvrings.

While a Pakistani analyst claims that the Russians "were all along backing the Bangladesh movement by proxy by extending full support to India in her policy vis-à-vis East Bengal",¹⁰⁵ the Soviets had, from the onset of the crisis, consistently called on the Yahya regime to reach a peaceful settlement of the East Pakistan problem, which had the potential of destabilising the region by increasing the chances of Indo-Pakistan strife and the intervention of external powers. At the same time, the Soviets had also continued to call for a resolution of Pakistan's internal crisis within the framework of a united Pakistan. Moreover, the Soviets also tried to restrain India from adopting a confrontationist course in the hope of defusing regional tensions.¹⁰⁶ Thus, for instance, the Indo-Soviet joint statement issued after the signing of the treaty by Gromyko in New Delhi not only stressed that a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis alone would serve "the interests of the entire people of Pakistan and the cause of the maintenance of peace in the area", but also emphasised that "all international problems . . . must be settled by peaceful negotiations and that the use of force . . . is not permissible."¹⁰⁷

In September 1971 Pakistan Foreign Secretary Sultan Mohammed Khan paid a visit to the Soviet Union. Prior to his departure, the

Foreign Secretary claimed that the Indo-Soviet treaty did not have negative repercussions for the region, stating, "We believe that the Soviets will exercise their influence in India to restrain it from attacking Pakistan." On his return home, Sultan commented that he had received Soviet assurances of their "deep interest in the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan."¹⁰⁸

While the Soviets were interested in keeping their options open vis-à-vis Pakistan, they had entered the Indo-Soviet treaty not only with the aim of warning Pakistan and its Chinese and American allies to refrain from opting for a confrontationist as opposed to a peaceful resolution of the subcontinental crisis but also to ensure that India would be in a favourable position should the existing tensions result in an outbreak of war. Moreover, by September 1971, the Soviets were, in fact, irked by the Pakistani military regime's refusal to accept a peaceful solution of the East Pakistan crisis, since the continued use of force was heightening regional tensions. They were equally displeased by the "anti-Indian chauvinism" and the adoption of what was interpreted as a "war psychosis" by the Pakistanis, since it was further increasing the chances of war.¹⁰⁹ Hence the Soviet leadership became more openly critical of the Yahya regime's domestic and external policies, while, at the same time, continuing to call on both Pakistan and India to negotiate their differences peacefully.

During Mrs Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union on 27 September, Kosygin expressed strong support for the Indian stand on the East Pakistan crisis and equally strident criticism of the Pakistani

policies in the East Wing, stating, for instance, that "It is impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities The mass flight of the population from East Pakistan . . . can be explained only by the fact that unbearable living conditions have been created there." Kosygin, however, was careful to add that, "an early political settlement in East Pakistan" should "take the legitimate interests of its population into account", thereby implying Soviet support for a settlement within a united Pakistan. The Soviet leader also emphasised that his country "is doing and will continue to do everything possible on its part to maintain peace in this region and to prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict."¹¹⁰

These sentiments were reiterated by President Podgorny during a stopover in New Delhi on 1 October, when he stressed that the Indo-Soviet treaty was "not directed against any state", adding that it was essential "to prevent further slippage toward a military conflict and that the tension that has arisen here must be eliminated by a just political settlement that takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of the peoples of this region."¹¹¹ The Soviet-Algerian joint communique of 8 October also referred to the need for a peaceful solution of the East Pakistan crisis, and the Soviet Union declared its "respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and India . . ."¹¹²

The Soviet stand on the East Pakistan crisis began to move slowly away from an overt position of neutrality as the military hawks in the Pakistani cabinet continued to ignore Soviet calls for a peaceful settlement of the civil war and Pakistan's relations with India and

remained strongly critical of Soviet regional policies. For instance, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman, justifying continuing military action in the East Wing on the grounds that it was "taken against anti-national elements . . . who had organised armed revolution against established authority and attempted to dismember the country", criticised the Soviet calls for a political settlement, and alleged that the Indo-Soviet treaty had "encouraged India to step up provocative activities against Pakistan."¹¹³ The Yahya regime also protested to Soviet authorities against what they claimed was anti-Pakistani propaganda concerning the East Pakistan issue.¹¹⁴

While the Pakistanis rejected Soviet calls for a peaceful solution of their internal crisis and bilateral relations with India, tensions continued to mount in the region, and India prepared in earnest to mount an offensive in East Pakistan. By September the Indians had also begun consultations with the Soviets on their security needs should the situation deteriorate further. During her visit to the Soviet Union in September, Mrs Gandhi had emphasised that the East Pakistan crisis had created "difficulties of immense scope" for her country, adding that her government was "fully determined to take all necessary steps" to safeguard Indian national interests.¹¹⁵ According to a Pakistani military source, Mrs Gandhi had also called on the Soviets to recognise "the urgency of providing additional sophisticated hardware," and succeeded in obtaining "a promise of help . . . for any action India might have to take to tackle the situation in Bangladesh."¹¹⁶

The Soviets were by now aware that the danger of an outbreak of hostilities was real, in view of the refusal of the Yahya regime to reach a political settlement and the Indian determination to take full advantage of the vulnerability of the Pakistanis. Since Pakistan's American and Chinese allies could pose a threat to Indian security in the event of such a crisis, the Soviets decided to ensure that their regional ally would be in a position to offset such threats and emerge victorious should military confrontation become inevitable. A number of high level delegations were therefore exchanged to ascertain Indian defence requirements.¹¹⁷

In late October Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N.P. Firyubin visited India for "consultations" under Article X of the Indo-Soviet treaty on the crisis in the subcontinent. At the conclusion of the visit, both sides expressed their complete agreement on "their assessment of the situation. . ." ¹¹⁸ Firyubin's visit was followed by that of the Soviet Air Force Chief, Marshal P.S. Kutakhov, who held discussions with his Indian counterpart as well as Defence Minister P.C. Lai. In the wake of these exchanges the Soviets increased the flow of military hardware, including surface-to-air missiles, communications equipment and tanks, to India.

By November the Soviet media and political analysts were more pointedly critical of the Pakistani military junta for failing to reach a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis, and for heightening regional tensions by waging an anti-Indian campaign. Warnings were issued to the Pakistani military government to "find the path leading to the establishment of good neighbourly relations with India" for

"the sake of international security as well as for its own national interests" At the same time, however, the Soviets also called for a "peaceful settlement of the existing complications on the basis of the solution . . . of the problem of East Pakistan. . .",¹¹⁹ implying continued Soviet support for a solution within the framework of a united Pakistan.

The Soviets also continued to call for a peaceful resolution of Indo-Pakistan differences. Even after the Indian incursions into East Pakistani territory towards the end of November it was stressed, for instance, that while the East Pakistan crisis had become "a source of tension on the entire subcontinent", leading to "a dangerous exacerbation of relations" between India and Pakistan, the two South Asian neighbours should refrain from war, as the "existing complications on the Indian subcontinent can be solved on the basis of a peaceful political settlement of the East Pakistan crisis."¹²⁰

Once all out war broke out, following the Pakistani attacks across the Western borders on 3 December, the Soviets abandoned this overt posture of neutrality for one of total support for the Indian cause. This decision was influenced by the realisation that India had not only the intention but also the capability of fighting the war in the Eastern front to a decisive end. It was also clear that a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis within the framework of a united Pakistan was no longer feasible. Since the dismemberment of Pakistan was inevitable, it would serve Soviet interests to extend military and diplomatic support to help India achieve the independence of Bangladesh. This would not only result in a

consolidation of relations with India, but would also ensure Soviet prestige and influence in an independent Bangladesh.¹²¹

The Soviets also realised that the Pakistani military government would be supported by both the US and China. Hence all out Soviet support was necessary, both to deter the Americans and Chinese from intervening in the crisis to the detriment of India and to prevent an escalation of the dispute as far as possible. As hostilities ensued, the Soviets made their loyalties amply clear. Kosygin emphatically stated that the Soviets would not help to mediate in the war, as they had done during the 1965 crisis, since the Indo-Soviet treaty placed them under certain obligations vis-à-vis India.¹²² Once again, in a marked departure from the 1965 war, in which they had called for an immediate unconditional ceasefire, the Kremlin leaders now emphasised the need for ending hostilities but by means of a peaceful settlement of the East Pakistan crisis, which was identified as the root cause of the war.

Addressing the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on 6 December, Brezhnev stressed that while the Soviet Union stood "firmly for an end to bloodshed", that was dependent on "a peaceful political settlement of the problems, at issue, with due consideration for the legitimate rights of the people without any interference from without and for the creation of conditions for a just and lasting peace in this area."¹²³ The Tass statement of 5 December also singled out Pakistani actions in East Pakistan, including "mass repressions and persecutions", as the "main cause of the tension" in the subcontinent, and the Yahya regime was warned of

"the grave responsibility that they assume, following this dangerous course of aggression" against India.¹²⁴

A major Soviet concern was to prevent external intervention, particularly on the part of China, which could threaten India militarily and lead to an escalation of the conflict. Warnings were therefore issued to all external powers to desist from adopting such a course. It was stressed, for instance, that since the conflict in South Asia was "occurring in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR", it involved "its security interests." Hence all external powers were advised to "refrain" from taking "steps that would in one way or another signify their involvement in the conflict and would lead to the complication of the situation on the Hindustan Peninsula."¹²⁵

Soviet commentators claimed that the Chinese had deliberately "played an instigator's role in the exacerbation of the situation on the Hindustan peninsula" in pursuance of "their own selfish, chauvinistic aims", with the objective of "using any means in the attempt to strengthen their position in Asia." It was also alleged that there was collusion between the Chinese and Americans, and that both countries had encouraged and assisted Pakistan in attacking India and militarily suppressing the legitimate rights of the people of East Bengal.¹²⁶

There was little substance in the Soviet attacks on China, since the Chinese leadership had extended only limited support to Pakistan both before and after the outbreak of war. Since the Chinese could not, on the one hand, condone the military's actions in the East Wing

and, on the other, support an Indo-Soviet backed movement for independence, they had publicly adopted a policy of condemning Indian and Soviet interference in the crisis, while privately urging the Pakistani authorities to find a political solution of the problem.

By late 1971, however, the Pakistani regime, aware that conflict with India was inevitable, was keen on obtaining more tangible pledges of Chinese support. Yahya therefore sent Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, heading a high powered military delegation, including all three service chiefs, as his special envoy to China in November. Bhutto's mission was to obtain a Chinese pledge that in the event of an Indo-Pakistan conflict China would resort to diversionary action, to prevent India from moving its forces from the Sino-Indian frontier for use against Pakistan. Bhutto reportedly also expressed Pakistan's interest in entering into a defence pact with China. The Chinese, however, were unwilling to extend any such assurances of support, or to enter into a security treaty with the Yahya regime. The Pakistani delegation was, in fact, advised to seek a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis, and to work towards the prevention of war with India.¹²⁷

Although Yahya claimed, on Bhutto's return, that "if India attacked Pakistan, China will, of course, intervene",¹²⁸ once the Indo-Pakistan war broke out, Chinese support remained confined to strong condemnation of India and the Soviet Union, combined with limited military assistance. The Chinese were aware that the continued existence of "united" Pakistan was an unlikely prospect, in view of Yahya's refusal to seek a political solution of the East

Pakistan crisis. Hence China, unlike the Soviet Union, had even refrained, from the onset of the crisis, from issuing any pledges to support Pakistan's territorial integrity.¹²⁹ Moreover, even if China had decided to prop up the Yahya regime after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war, it could not risk intervening militarily not only because of the unfavourable weather conditions along the Sino-Indian border but especially in view of the all out Soviet support for India. As Sino-Soviet tensions had escalated, especially in the wake of their border clashes in 1969, the Soviets had resorted to a massive military build up on the Sino-Soviet border. This factor, combined with Soviet assurances of support to India contained in their Friendship pact, was enough to deter the Chinese from intervening in the conflict on the side of Pakistan.¹³⁰

While the Chinese were effectively neutralised by the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Yahya regime's hopes that "they would be bailed out by the United States"¹³¹ were to prove equally unfounded, as Nixon's hands were to a considerable degree tied by the strong opposition within and outside Congress to the Pakistan military's operations in East Pakistan. Prior to the outbreak of all-out war between India and Pakistan, the Nixon Administration had sought ways to circumvent this opposition. Hence while the government officially suspended military supplies to Pakistan in April 1971 to mollify the prevailing anti-Pakistani feeling, the flow of arms continued. Although no new licenses were issued or previous ones renewed, the supply of items in the pipeline, including spare parts for US aircraft supplied under earlier licenses, continued until as late as November 1971.¹³²

Nixon also tried to help the Yahya regime in resolving the impasse by initiating negotiations with the pro-American faction within the Bangladesh government-in-exile in Calcutta, headed by Foreign Minister Khondakar Mushtaque. Once Prime Minister Tajuddin and other senior Awami League leaders came to know of the talks, which were interpreted as an American-Pakistani bid to split the Awami League from within, the parleys came to a halt and Mushtaque was dismissed.¹³³ Nixon then attempted to persuade Mrs Gandhi to reach accommodation with the Pakistanis, but with little success.

The US extended strong support to Pakistan as the December war broke out. Although it was officially acknowledged that Pakistan was responsible for initiating hostilities, a State Department spokesman added that "We believe since the beginning of the crisis that Indian policy in a systematic way has led to perpetuation of the crisis, a deepening of the crisis and that India bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities which have ensued."¹³⁴

The US government proceeded to impose an arms embargo on India on 1 December, halting the supply of ammunition worth over \$ 3 million and President Nixon called on officials responsible for formulating American policies on the crisis to adopt a pro-Pakistani posture. Nixon was, however, constrained to limit his support for the Yahya regime to the diplomatic sphere, due to Congressional opposition to the extension of any form of military assistance to the Pakistanis. Yahya's attempts to obtain US assistance by invoking the 1959 US-Pakistan bilateral agreement were therefore turned down, and he was informed by the Americans that "the commitment would become

operative only in the event of Communist aggression."¹³⁵

While the Americans and Chinese failed to provide much more than diplomatic support to Pakistan, the Soviets were taking every step possible to ensure an Indian victory. As the tide of the war began to rapidly turn against it, Pakistan's position became even more precarious.

The Disintegration of Pakistan

The 1971 conflict was to prove conclusively the military superiority of the Indian forces over their Pakistani counterparts. The Pakistani High Command, far more involved in the country's politics than in planning its territorial defence, failed to provide the leadership and direction needed to make the counter-offensive in the West a success.¹³⁶ The ill-planned offensives of the poorly led Pakistani forces conducting the Western campaign were therefore easily countered by the Indians. Not only did the Indian forces succeed in neutralising the Pakistani offensive, but they also managed to capture strategic real estate both in Azad Kashmir and within West Pakistani borders, forcing the Pakistanis to adopt defensive tactics.

The Indian forces, supported by the Bangladeshi guerrillas and a vast majority of the local population, were to prove equally successful in attaining their war aims in the Eastern theatre. On 6 December, Mrs Gandhi announced India's recognition of the Bangladesh government-in-exile, on the grounds that the Yahya regime had proved itself "totally incapable of regaining control of the

territory."¹³⁷

This was an accurate description of the situation in East Bengal. As the Indian forces, bypassing the scattered Pakistani pockets of resistance, began their advance towards Dacca, it was clear that "the fall of East Pakistan was a foregone conclusion."¹³⁸ The Yahya regime, however, encouraged its Eastern Command to continue fighting until the Americans and Chinese succeeded in pushing through a ceasefire resolution in the UN.¹³⁹ While the Pakistanis were hopeful that fighting would be terminated before the fall of Dacca, the Indians were equally optimistic of Soviet support to help them resist external pressure to end the conflict until victory was achieved in East Pakistan. The role played by the major powers in the UN was therefore to influence the outcome of the 1971 war.

In view of the Pakistani dilemma, the US and China had decided to join hands in the UN in a bid to bring about an immediate end to the fighting. The Soviets, on their part, closely coordinating their stance with India, were determined to prevent the passage of a ceasefire resolution until the Indians had achieved their objectives in East Pakistan. Hence while US representative Ambassador Bush called for an immediate ceasefire, his Soviet counterpart, Malik, declared that the Security Council did not have the right "to close its eyes to the cause of the emergence and the deterioration of the situation", emphasising that any discussion of ceasefire must simultaneously take into consideration a "speedy attainment of a political settlement in East Pakistan that would take into account the will and the inalienable rights and lawful interests of its

population."¹⁴⁰

In line with this policy, the Soviets vetoed a US-sponsored and Chinese backed Security Council draft resolution on 4 December, calling for the implementation of an immediate ceasefire, mutual withdrawal of troops and stationing of UN observers along the Indo-Pakistan borders, on the grounds that it ignored the vital question of a political settlement of the crisis. The Soviets then introduced a draft resolution which called upon the Pakistan government to "take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan" and implement a political settlement which would lead to a cessation of hostilities.¹⁴¹ The Soviet-sponsored resolution was vetoed by China, exercising its first veto in the Security Council.

In bilateral negotiations with the Americans, the Soviets made it equally clear that they would not compromise on "a political solution in East Pakistan as a precondition for a ceasefire."¹⁴² When another US-sponsored draft resolution was introduced on 5 December, which once again called for an immediate ceasefire, without proposing the simultaneous implementation of a political solution, the Soviets vetoed it. The Soviet draft resolution, calling for a ceasefire to be accompanied by "effective action" by the Pakistan government "towards a political settlement in East Pakistan" was in turn vetoed by China.¹⁴³

The US then attempted to pressure India into ending the war, by supporting the transfer of the issue to the General Assembly, where

a resolution was passed calling for an "immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and . . . a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders."¹⁴⁴ The Soviet representative opposed the resolution on the grounds that the crisis could not be resolved without "the elimination of the main cause of the conflict" by reaching a political settlement in East Pakistan. The Indians, on their part, refused to abide by the resolution until after a withdrawal of the Pakistani military from East Bengal.¹⁴⁵

As the debate on a ceasefire was deliberately prolonged by the Soviets, Indian troops were gaining on Dacca. By 10 December, Lt. General Niazi acknowledged the futility of any further struggle, and Governor Malik urged the Yahya regime to accept a UN-sponsored transfer of power to the Awami League, to be accompanied by an immediate ceasefire and repatriation of West Pakistani civilian and military personnel to their home base.¹⁴⁶

These requests were, however, overruled by Yahya, who was still hopeful that the Americans would succeed in pushing through a ceasefire resolution in the UN before Dacca fell. It is now known that Yahya's decision was also influenced by American perceptions of the situation. According to senior State Department officials, Nixon and Kissinger were convinced that a success in the East Wing would encourage India "to dismember West Pakistan and convert it into a 'vassal state'." Hence Kissinger urged Yahya to reject the option of a ceasefire accompanied by the transfer of power to Bangladeshi hands, although it would have led to the repatriation of Pakistani

military and civilian personnel under UN auspices.¹⁴⁷

Despite Soviet assurances on 12 December that India had "no aggressive designs in the West"¹⁴⁸ and similar pledges by Mrs Gandhi, Nixon and the NSC Chief decided to take immediate action to demonstrate their commitment to West Pakistan's territorial integrity. On 12 December, the Seventh Fleet nuclear powered aircraft carrier, *Enterprise*, accompanied by nine destroyers, was sent towards the region. According to Henry Kissinger, the Task Force movement was meant "to scare off an attack on West Pakistan . . ."¹⁴⁹ The despatch of the Seventh Fleet was also meant "to demonstrate to Beijing that the United States stood by its 'ally' in time of need."¹⁵⁰

The US decision to show the flag in the Bay of Bengal did not result in any major change in the Soviet regional strategy. While the Soviets retaliated by strengthening their naval presence in the area¹⁵¹ as a show of support for India, they had no intention of encouraging the Indians to dismember West Pakistan since such an action would have escalated the conflict. The Soviets, in fact, advised the Indira government not to continue the war in the West Wing once victory was achieved in the East.¹⁵² Nor did the Indians intend to subjugate West Pakistan; such a move would have had a detrimental effect on Indian security as it would have destabilised the subcontinent.

Although the Soviets and the Indians were unimpressed by the American threats to intervene militarily, the Seventh Fleet

movement did raise the hopes of the Yahya regime. This partly explains Pakistan's reluctance to accept the Soviet-supported Polish draft resolution, introduced in the Security Council on 15 December, which called for a transfer of power "to the elected representatives of the people, headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman" and the "repatriation of Pakistan armed and civilian personnel" from East Bengal.¹⁵³

Although Indian troops were poised to strike on the outskirts of Dacca, the Pakistanis did not take the opportunity offered by the resolution to prevent a surrender of their forces to India, in the hope that the Americans would intervene in time.¹⁵⁴ As the hoped-for US intervention failed to materialise, the Pakistani Eastern Command surrendered in Dacca on 16 December. India then informed the Security Council of its intentions of observing a unilateral ceasefire on the Western front, effective from 17 December. In an address to the nation on 16 December, Yahya declared Pakistan's resolution to carry on the struggle but the war came to a close as his government accepted the Indian ceasefire offer the next day.¹⁵⁵

While the Americans and Chinese had failed to prevent the dismemberment of their beleaguered ally, the Indians had succeeded, with Soviet assistance, in fulfilling their objective of helping to create an independent state of Bangladesh and crippling the military might of their main South Asian adversary. The Soviets had reason to be satisfied with the outcome as they had emerged on the side of the victor in a conflict where international sympathy lay with the people of Bangladesh. The war between the two South Asian neighbours was now blamed on the "aggressive and expansionist"

ambitions of the Chinese and Americans, and the Soviets welcomed the cessation of hostilities as serving "the fundamental interests of the peoples of that area" and removing "a seat of serious tension in the world."¹⁵⁶

The war had ended in a humiliating surrender for the Pakistani forces in the East, the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of the independent state of Bangladesh. The West Pakistani people, kept in total ignorance about the war by the government-controlled news media, were enraged at the outcome of the conflict. Mass demonstrations following the fall of Dacca called for the arrest and trial of Yahya and members of his military government. While Yahya was hopeful of retaining power with the backing of the military, that support was however withdrawn in the wake of the defeat.¹⁵⁷ Certain influential factions within the Military High Command, including Air Force Chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan and Army Deputy Chief of Staff Gul Hasan were anxious to replace a regime which had discredited the Armed Forces internally. Realising that the "disenchantment of the people with the military establishment was universal",¹⁵⁸ they opted to look for a civilian figurehead, to replace Yahya Khan, who could be counted on to advance and protect the interests of the parent institution.

Their favoured candidate was PPP leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had established close links with certain military circles, serving as Deputy Prime Minister with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the interim government formed on 7 December. Bhutto had negotiated with the Chinese on behalf of Yahya prior to the outbreak of the 1971

war and had also represented Pakistan's case in the UN during the conflict, where his emotional anti-Indian rhetoric won him even greater support in West Pakistan. Bhutto was also considered the ideal candidate to replace Yahya as his party had the overwhelming support of the Punjab, the main recruiting ground for the Pakistan Armed Forces.¹⁵⁹

Yahya and his allies did attempt to resist a transfer of power to civilian hands. After the fall of Dacca, however, Gul Hasan and Rahim warned the ruling group of generals that they had no choice but to step down.¹⁶⁰ Yahya then handed over power to Bhutto, who took over as President and Pakistan's first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator on 20 December 1971.

Summary

The 1969 takeover had resulted in the military once again emerging as the supreme custodian of political power in Pakistan. The military government then quickly moved to consolidate its internal hold under General Yahya Khan. Unlike Ayub's working partnership with the bureaucracy, the Yahya regime personified the dominance of the military, and both internal and external policy-making processes became the sole domain of the ruling generals.

Since the military's needs and orientation were to determine the regime's foreign policy directions, concerted efforts were made from the very start to consolidate ties with the West, with special emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. In view of

Pakistan's low priority in American global strategies, the Yahya regime, like its predecessor, also kept its options open vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets responded positively, motivated by their desire to contain Western and Chinese influence in Pakistan, the Yahya regime was careful to keep a certain distance from the Soviet Union, and continued to focus on its primary objective of strengthening ties with the United States.

Pakistan's foreign policy directions assumed a new significance as internal tensions rapidly increased in the wake of the general elections of December 1970. While the generals had hoped to use the elections to consolidate their internal hold, anticipating that a divided legislature would allow them to manipulate the elected representatives at will, the West Pakistani dominated regime was unwilling to hand over power to the East Pakistan based Awami League which had emerged as the majority party, since its six-point programme threatened its political and economic interests.

Yahya's refusal to hand over power, with the support of the leader of the major West Pakistani party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, further exacerbated East-West tensions. The regime then made the fatal error of attempting to forcibly deny the Awami League its right to form government by resorting to military action in the East wing, leading to widespread resistance, which soon took the shape of civil war.

The crisis in the East wing also assumed an external dimension due to the large-scale influx of East Pakistani refugees into neighbouring

India. Seeing in the crisis an opportunity to render a crippling blow to Pakistan, the Indians decided not only to back the Bangladeshi movement for independence, but also to intervene directly so as to influence the course of events within East Pakistan. Pakistan's military rulers, oblivious of the internal and external dimensions of the crisis, responded by continued army action within East Pakistan and the adoption of a confrontationalist posture towards India.

It was at this point that the Pakistan military's policy of consistently downgrading relations with the Soviets and concentrating on consolidating ties with the West became particularly significant. While the Soviets had so far followed a neutral policy towards quarrels between the two South Asian rivals, hoping to wean Pakistan away from the West and China, their overtures had been met with Pakistani indifference. Soviet attempts to include Pakistan in collective security schemes, which would have endangered Pakistan's relations with the US and China, had been rejected by the Yahya regime. Equally important was the role played by the military government in helping the US establish direct relations with China.

Although this policy helped the Yahya regime to fulfill some of the needs of the Armed Forces as the Americans and Chinese began to extend limited arms assistance, the Pakistani mediatory role was to have major repercussions as the Soviets and Indians, perceiving the move as the emergence of a Washington-Peking alliance, came even closer together at a time when Indo-Pakistan relations were under strain and Pakistan-Soviet relations were correct at best.

Since the Indians saw Sino-Indian rapprochement as a potential threat to their plans to intervene militarily in East Pakistan, they entered into a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, on their part, disturbed by the nature of Pakistan's internal crisis and growing Indo-Pakistan tensions, on the one hand unsuccessfully pressed the Yahya regime to reach a political settlement in East Pakistan and on the other formalised ties with India, not only in the hope that the treaty would serve as a warning to the Yahya regime to resolve its internal problems and differences with India peacefully and discourage Pakistan's allies, especially China, from intervening in regional affairs, but also to ensure that the Indians would emerge victorious should war erupt in the subcontinent.

Since the Indians saw the treaty as an insurance of Soviet diplomatic and material support, they increased their involvement in East Pakistan, leading to the outbreak of war on the subcontinent in December 1971. The Pakistani military regime had taken no steps either to settle its internal problems or to prepare militarily or diplomatically for the coming war. The Indians soon put the ill-prepared Pakistani troops on the defensive in the West and assumed the upper hand in the East wing, with the active support of the Soviet Union. Pakistan's only hope to avert defeat therefore lay in its American and Chinese allies forcing India to agree to a ceasefire prior to the surrender of its East Pakistan garrison. The Indians, for their part, were relying on the Soviets to help them to resist such pressures until victory was achieved in East Pakistan.

The Soviets were therefore to play a major role in determining the outcome of the 1971 war. Although after the signing of the Indo-Soviet accord, the Soviets had made every effort to prevent an outbreak of hostilities in South Asia, warning the Yahya regime time and again to reach a peaceful settlement of the East Pakistan issue and of its differences with India, the Pakistanis not only ignored their advise but also reacted with great hostility to the their stand on the crisis. The negative Pakistani response, combined with the realisation that India was determined to resort to armed action and fear of Chinese and American intervention in such a future conflict led the Soviets to help the Indians to prepare militarily should armed conflict become inevitable. Once war broke out the Soviets extended all-out support to the Indian cause, providing India every possible diplomatic and material support to ensure its victory against Pakistan, and to prevent Sino-American intervention on the side of Pakistan.

While India's friendship with and Pakistan's indifference to the Soviet Union had led the Soviets to side with India in the crisis, Pakistan's American and Chinese allies were incapable of and disinclined to extend more than limited diplomatic support to the Yahya regime on the Bangladesh issue. The Americans and Chinese did attempt to force India to accept a ceasefire in the UN before the fall of East Pakistan, but were prevented from doing so by the Soviets.

The shortcomings of the Yahya regime's internal and external policies were to prove disastrous for Pakistan. The widespread support for independence in the East wing had greatly facilitated India's victory over the Pakistani forces, while Yahya's pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy had antagonised the Soviets to the point of abandoning their prior stance of neutrality on Indo-Pakistani disputes. Pakistan's existence as a united state came to an end as its American and Chinese allies failed to prevent its dismemberment, and India succeeded, with Soviet assistance, in helping to create the independent state of Bangladesh.

Footnotes - Chapter 7

- 1 Dawn, 27 March 1969.
- 2 Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "How Yahya Khan Took Over", op.cit.
- 3 Lieutenant General M. Habibullah Khan Khattak, "Martial Law: An Appraisal", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, Nos. 4-5, 1985), p. 48.
- 4 Raymond A. Moore, p. 31.
- 5 M.A. Akhyar, "Pakistan: The Way Ahead from Martial Law", South Asian Review (Vol. 3, No. 1, October 1969), p. 23.
- 6 Louis D. Hayes, op.cit., p. 88.
- 7 According to Yahya, it would then be "the task of the elected representatives of the people to give the country a workable constitution and find a solution to all other political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people." Dawn, 27 March 1969.
- 8 Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership (National Book Foundation, Islamabad, Second Edition, 1973), p.16
- 9 According to General Muqeem, the procedure adopted at HQCMLA was that "files would come to the President's Secretariat after the summary for the President had been prepared and vetted by the appropriate Ministries. The Secretary of the Public Staff at the President's House would sort out the files and deliver them to the ML (Martial Law) Sections concerned. G-Is would process the files and put them to their Brigadiers who would pass them on to the PSO. After the President's decision, they would go back by the same route till they arrived in the Ministries concerned." Ibid., p.16, pp. 18-19.
- 10 Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971 (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1976), pp. 22-23.

- 11 Lieutenant-General Nawabzada Mohammad Sher Ali Khan, "Some Aspects of Foreign Policy", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIII, No. 1, First Quarter 1970), p. 11.
- 12 Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982, p. 21.
- 13 Lawrence Ziring, "Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment - Pakistan Under General Yahya Khan, 1969-1971", p. 203.
- 14 Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., p. 128.
- 15 Ibid., p. 128.
- 16 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 59.
- 17 Lieutenant General Nawabzada Mohammad Sher Ali Khan, op.cit., pp. 10-12.
- 18 During the anti-government movement, the Soviets publicly expressed support for Ayub. Tass, for example, strongly denied Bhutto's allegations that there was a "secret protocol" on the Kashmir question in the Tashkent Declaration and denounced the opposition leaders as reactionaries. Pravda, 6 March 1969, CDSP (Vol. XXI, No. 10, 26 March 1969), p. 22.
- 19 Text of Kosygin's message in Pakistan Times, 9 April 1969.
- 20 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, op.cit., pp.62-63.
- 21 Ibid., p.64. See also G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 69.
- 22 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p.124. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, op.cit., p. 63.
- 23 Text of Pakistan-Soviet joint communique in R.K. Jain, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 79-80.

- 24 G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 63.
- 25 Governor Ahsan and Nur Khan were not only placed below the newly appointed Chiefs of the Navy and Air Force but also under the Army Chief and the zonal MLAs of East and West Pakistan.
- 26 Bureaucrats, such as Ayub's personal adviser, Fida Hasan, who had held positions of power in the previous government, were special targets of the new government and were either removed from office or demoted. Times, 1 April 1969.
- 27 Robert LaPorte Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan (University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1975), p. 78.
- 28 Hamza Alavi, "Class and State in Pakistan", pp. 70-71.
- 29 Dawn, 29 November 1969.
- 30 Text of Legal Framework Order in The Bangladesh Papers, op.cit., pp. 49-65.
- 31 Shahid Javed Burki, State and Society in Pakistan 1971-1977 (The MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1980), p. 49.
- 32 Lawrence Ziring, "Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment - Pakistan Under General Yahya Khan 1969-1971", p. 204.
- 33 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, pp. 40-41.
- 34 Ibid., p.36, p. 40.
- 35 During the election campaign for instance, Bhutto declared that, "Pakistan without Kashmir is like a body without a head The people of Kashmir cannot be held in bondage forever." Ahmed Husain, op.cit., pp. 145-146. See also Iftikhar Ahmad, Pakistan General Elections: 1970 (South Asian Institute, Punjab University, Lahore, 1976), pp. 49-50.

- 36 Rounaq Jahan, op.cit., p. 90; Maj.Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, pp. 40-41.
- 37 Times, 28 April 1970.
- 38 The Awami League's election manifesto, based on the party's six-point programme, declared that, "We believe that continued participation in SEATO, CENTO and other military pacts is against our national interest and therefore favour the immediate withdrawal of Pakistan from SEATO, CENTO and other military pacts." It also stated, "... we wish to live in peaceful coexistence with all countries, including our neighbours..." Text of Election Manifesto in The Bangladesh Papers, op.cit., especially pp. 69-70, 80-82.
- 39 Stephen Cohen, Arms and Politics in Bangladesh. India and Pakistan (Council of International Studies, Buffalo, Special Study No. 49, November 1972), pp. 34-35.
- 40 The Awami League had put up only eight candidates in West Pakistan and did not win any seats, while the PPP had not put up even a single candidate in the East Wing.
- 41 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, pp. 47-48.
- 42 Dawn, 15 January 1971.
- 43 G.W. Choudhury was Yahya's Information Minister and adviser on constitutional affairs. G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 152.
- 44 Author's interview with Brig. Siddiqi, Director, Inter-Services Press under Yahya.
- 45 Pakistan Times, 2 March 1971.
- 46 Rounaq Jahan, op.cit., p. 194.
- 47 Announcing the new date for the National Assembly session, Yahya declared: "... let me make it absolutely clear that no

matter what happens ... I will ensure complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan I will not allow a handful of people to destroy the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis. It is the duty of the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan - a duty in which they have never failed." Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Second Quarter 1971), p.106.

- 48 Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, p. 90.
- 49 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, pp. 60-61.
- 50 Text of "Operation Searchlight" in Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Oxford University Press, Karachi, Second Edition, 1978), pp. 228-234.
- 51 Justifying the military action, Yahya claimed that Mujib and the Awami League were "enemies of Pakistan and they want East Pakistan to break away from the country. He has attacked the solidarity and integrity of this country - this crime shall not go unpunished." Pakistan Times, 27 March 1971.
- 52 The military hawks had, in fact, expressed their confidence "in 'fixing' the whole situation" within 72 hours. G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 165.
- 53 Louis D. Hayes, op.cit., pp. 116-118.
- 54 Resolution adopted by a joint session of the Indian Parliament, Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, op.cit., p. 248.
- 55 Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (Zed Press, London, 1979), pp. 25-26. See also S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear: A Study of Indo-Soviet Relations (Mansell Publishing Ltd., London, 1986), p. 84.
- 56 Yahya issued a number of statements to the effect that "India is playing up this question not only to threaten Pakistan but also to justify India's continuing interference in Pakistan's internal affairs." Pakistan Times, 23 May 1971; Dawn, 25 May

1971.

- 57 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 246-247. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided (Ferozsons Ltd., 1984), p.140.
- 58 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p. 124. See also International Affairs, Moscow (No. 7, July 1969), p. 210.
- 59 Robert H. Donaldson, "India: The Soviet Stake in Indian Stability", Asian Survey (Vol. XI, No. 6, June 1972), pp. 480-482. Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia", ibid. (Vol. XII, No. 12, December 1973), p. 1072, p. 1076.
- 60 Dawn, 11 June 1969.
- 61 G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, pp. 63-65.
- 62 The spokesman added that Pakistan was unwilling to enter into any economic cooperation arrangement with India "so long as relations ... remain bedevilled by major disputes." Dawn, 11 July 1969.
- 63 G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 194.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Ibid., p. 142.
- 66 William J. Barnds, India. Pakistan and the Major Powers, p. 306.
- 67 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 370.
- 68 Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordial, p. 145.

- 69 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Major Powers, p. 244.
- 70 Lawrence Lifschultz, op.cit., p. 24. This was later confirmed in an interview held by the author with a Pakistan Foreign Office source in which he disclosed that Chou had issued a statement in which he categorically refused to assist Pakistan. This statement was removed from the Foreign Office files by the Yahya regime.
- 71 Lawrence Lifschultz, op.cit., p. 24.
- 72 Even the US Secretary of State was kept in ignorance of the negotiations between Nixon and the senior Chinese leadership. Author's interview with the then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Christopher Van Hollen.
- 73 Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, p. 93.
- 74 For example, the Chairman of the Asian Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee commented, after a visit to Bangladeshi refugee camps in India in June 1971, that, "I am now convinced that terrorism, barbarities and genocide of no small magnitude have been committed in East Bengal." In July 1971, both Houses of Congress recommended a cut-off in economic and military aid to the Yahya regime. Stanley Wolpert, op.cit., p. 137.
- 75 Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia", Asian Survey (Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980), pp. 343-344. Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (Summit Books, New York, 1983), p.448.
- 76 State Department spokesman on the East Pakistan situation, Dawn, 27 May 1971.
- 77 Pakistan Times, 17 February 1970; Dawn, 21 May 1970.
- 78 Joint communique issued at the conclusion of General Yahya Khan's visit. Pravda, 26 June 1970, CDSP (Vol. XXII, No. 26, 28

July 1970), pp. 28-29.

- 79 Zubeida Hasan, "Russian Pressures on Pakistan", Outlook (19 August 1972), p. 12.
- 80 G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, pp. 67-68.
- 81 Pravda, 24 June 1970; Izvestia, 25 June 1970, CDSP (Vol. XXII, No. 26, 28 July 1970), p. 28.
- 82 Commenting on the parties contesting the Pakistani elections, a Soviet analyst singled out Mujib's Awami League and Wali Khan's NAP as the only two parties with "any concrete platforms." A. Turanov, "Pakistan on the Eve of Elections", New Times (No. 49, 9 December 1970), p. 26.
- 83 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Soviet Moves in Asia, p. 190. See also Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Major Dimensions of Indo-Soviet Relations", India Quarterly (Vol. XXX1, No. 1, January-March 1975), pp. 16-17.
- 84 Emphasis Added. Message from N.V. Podgorny to the President of Pakistan. Text in Pravda, 4 April 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 14, 4 May 1971), pp. 35-36.
- 85 Dawn, 25 June 1971.
- 86 Emphasis Added. I. Ratnikov, "Crisis and its Consequences", Pravda, 1 May 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 18, 1 June 1971), p. 28.
- 87 Izvestia, 10 June 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 24, 13 July 1971), p. 4.
- 88 Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Second Quarter 1971), pp. 151-152. See also Mehrunnissa Ali, "East Pakistan Crisis: International Reactions", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Second Quarter 1971), pp. 54-55.
- 89 G.W. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, p. 205. See also

- Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Soviet Moves in Asia, p. 51.
- 90 Seymour M. Hersh, op.cit., pp. 451-452.
- 91 Text of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, Pravda, 10 August 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 32, 7 September 1971), p. 5. See also Maharaj K. Chopra, "India and the Asian Security System", Aussen Politik (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1976), pp. 50-51 and Robert H. Donaldson, "Soviet Security Interests in South Asia," Lawrence Ziring (ed.), The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbours and the Great Powers (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982), p. 191.
- 92 Special Correspondent, "India's Moscow Connection: No. 1 - The Treaty Relationship", Pacific Defence Reporter (May 1984), p. 37.
- 93 The Indian decision to intervene was opposed at the time by some of the more radical Bangladeshi military commanders who "estimated ... that without Indian involvement, Pakistan's forces could be defeated within three years." Lawrence Lifschultz, op.cit., p. 25, pp. 33-35. See also Tariq Ali "Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects", Robin Blackburn (ed.), Explosion in a Subcontinent: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ceylon (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), pp. 307-309.
- 94 Yahya, for instance, set up a "civilian" government in the East Wing under Governor Malik and declared that elections would be held for National Assembly seats held by Awami League rebels. He also announced that a constitution formulated by his nominated 'Council of Experts' would be announced on 20 December and the National Assembly would meet on 27 December.
- 95 While Mrs Gandhi had issued warnings as early as May 1971 that India was "fully prepared to fight if the situation is forced on us", the Pakistani ISI Chief, Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan had also warned the government that India was preparing for war. Lawrence Ziring, "Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment - Pakistan Under General Yahya Khan, 1969-1971", pp. 211-212. Special Correspondent,

- "India's Moscow Connection: No. 1 - The Treaty Relationship", p. 37.
- 96 In a number of interviews, Yahya declared that he could not tell his army to stop firing and "take it" as India shelled the East Pakistan border. According to General Yahya, "We do not come from a creed that believes if somebody slaps you on one cheek, turn the other" and he warned that Pakistan would resort to all-out war if India infiltrated East Pakistani territory. Morning News, 5 August 1971; Dawn, 20 October 1971.
- 97 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 191. See also Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 145.
- 98 Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan, "The East Pakistan Crisis-An Analysis", pp. 34-35, p. 37. Maj. Tariq Saeed, "Why Our Attacks Failed", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. XX, No. 10, December 1979), p. 31. Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry, op.cit., p. 58.
- 99 Pakistan did not have even a single major naval craft in East Pakistan as opposed to the Indian force of an aircraft carrier and accompanying craft. Similarly, the PAF was put out of action on 6 December once its sole base at Dacca was destroyed by the IAF. Deploying 10 squadrons of sophisticated aircraft in the Eastern theatre, the IAF soon dominated East Pakistan's airspace. Syed Shabbir Hussain, Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi, op.cit., pp. 188-190. See also Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, "1971: Causes and Conflict", p.78 and Lt.Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Roles, p.49.
- 100 The two infantry divisions which had been brought in to reinforce the existing infantry division had, according to an eye witness account, been "pushed into operations as we were - understrength, half equipped, without fire power and heavy weapons, without transport, unacclimatized, with no acquaintance with the area and its population and what was worse - with no training for the tasks in which we were going to be engaged." Brig. Muhammed Akhtar Khan, "We Learn From

- History", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. XXI, No. 3, September 1980), p. 12.
- 101 Siddiq Saliq, *op.cit.*, pp. 122-123.
- 102 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, p. 169.
- 103 Onkar Marwah, "National Security and Military Policy in India", Lawrence Ziring (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 75.
- 104 G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 119.
- 105 Zubeida Hasan, "Russian Pressures on Pakistan", p. 13.
- 106 A US intelligence report, for instance, categorically stated that the Soviet Union was concentrating its efforts to prevent conflict in the subcontinent. Dan Haedel, The Process of Priority Formulation: US Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977), p.266.
- 107 Emphasis added. Text of joint Soviet-Indian statement, Pravda, 12 August 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 32, 7 September 1971), p. 9.
- 108 Dawn, 20 September 1971. See also Zubeida Mustafa, "USSR and Indian Action in East Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1971), p. 65.
- 109 George Kudin, "The Situation on the Indian Subcontinent", New Times (No. 43, October 1971), p. 15.
- 110 Emphasis added. Kosygin's speech in Pravda, 29 September 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 39, 26 October 1971), p. 9.
- 111 Pravda, 2 October 1971. *Ibid.* (No. 40, 2 November 1971), p. 2.
- 112 Izvestia, 10 October 1971. *Ibid.* (No. 41, 9 November 1971), p. 12.
- 113 J.P. Jain, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

- 114 Dawn, 22 October 1971.
- 115 Mrs Gandhi's speech in Moscow and Indo-Soviet joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit. Pravda, 28 September 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 39, 26 October 1971), pp. 10-11.
- 116 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, p. 139.
- 117 Robert H. Donaldson, "Soviet Security Interests in South Asia", p. 191. See also S. Nihal Singh, *op.cit.*, p. 94.
- 118 Shaheen Dil, "The Extent and Nature of Soviet Involvement in the Bangladesh Crisis", Asia Quarterly (No. 37, 1973), p. 250.
- 119 Emphasis Added. Oleg Orestov, "Hindustan Needs Peace", Pravda, 9 November 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 45, 7 December 1971), p. 17; V. Kondrashov, "Hindustan Needs Peace", Izvestia, 16 November 1971. *Ibid.* (No. 46, 14 December 1971), pp. 20-21.
- 120 P. Mezensev, Pravda, 23 November 1971. *Ibid.* (No. 47, 21 December 1971), p. 26.
- 121 M. Baidul Alam, "Soviet Perception and Behaviour in the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971", Asian Profile (Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1978), pp. 173-174.
- 122 Zubeida Mustafa, "USSR and Indian Action in East Pakistan", p. 69.
- 123 D. Volsky, "The India-Pakistan Conflict and American-Chinese Collusion", New Times (No. 51, December 1971), p. 7.
- 124 Text of Tass statement. Pravda, 6 December 1971, CDSP (Vol. XXIII, No. 49, 4 January 1972), pp. 1-2.
- 125 *Ibid.*
- 126 Victor Mayevsky, "Clash in Hindustan", Pravda, 9 December 1971. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

- 127 Chou En-lai reportedly told Bhutto that, "You cannot solve this problem in Peking. Go to Dacca and solve it." Lawrence Lifschultz, *op.cit.*, pp. 23-24. See also Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, p. 152 and G.W.Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan , p.119.
- 128 Pakistan Observer, 7 November 1971; Pakistan Times, 9 November 1971.
- 129 As earlier mentioned, Chou En-lai , in his letter to Yahya on 11 April had not pledged support for Pakistan's territorial integrity.
- 130 While the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi is reported to have assured the Indians of Soviet action on the Sino-Soviet border if the Chinese intervened, a Pakistan Foreign Office source claims that the Soviets had even made arrangements for the landing of a Warsaw Pact force, based in East Germany, in Bangladesh should the need arise. Author's interview with Khalid Ahmed, former Foreign Office official on the Eastern European desk. See also Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh", Asian Survey, (Vol. XI11, No. 5, May 1973), p. 493.
- 131 Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1962, p. 41.
- 132 Report of the Comptroller General of the US on American military assistance and arms sales to Pakistan. Prepared for Senator Kennedy, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
- 133 Lawrence Lifschultz, *op.cit.*, pp. 114-116.
- 134 State Department spokesman on Indo-Pakistan hostilities, 4 December 1971. K. Arif, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 169.
- 135 Safdar Mahmood, *op.cit.*, p. 174.
- 136 Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Leadership: Senior Commanders, pp. 15-16.

- 137 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 249.
- 138 Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Roles, p. 54. According to one eye-witness account of the conditions in the Eastern theatre of war, a Pakistani officer states that, "The enemy" had "the skies to themselves Our troops were obviously inadequate. There were no reserves. We had few anti-tank mines ... very little explosive" and only "thirty days ammunition." Maj. Abdul Razaq, "My Memories of 1971 War: The Battle of Laksham", Sarhang (Thirty-first Division, 1982), p. 22, p. 25. See also Brig. Muhammed Akhtar Khan, op.cit.
- 139 On 7 December, East Pakistan Governor, Dr. Malik sent a message to Yahya urging negotiations for a peaceful transfer of power so as to save the lives of both West Pakistani personnel and Bengali civilians. But Commander, Eastern Command, Lt. General Niazi was informed by the government that a ceasefire resolution was imminent in the UN and that the Chinese had given Pakistan assurances of intervention. Maj. Gen. Fazal Mugeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, pp.174-176, p. 182.
- 140 Text of Malik's statement before the UN Security Council, 4 December 1977. R.K. Jain, Vol. I, op.cit., pp. 132-133.
- 141 Security Council Draft Resolutions S/10416 and S/10418, 4 December 1971. Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol.XXV, No. 1, First Quarter 1972), pp. 149-150.
- 142 Conversation between Kissinger and Soviet Charge d'Affaires on Nixon's correspondence with Brezhnev. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1985), p. 269.
- 143 Soviet Draft Resolution of 6 December in R.K. Jain, Vol. 11, op.cit., p. 145. UN Security Council Draft Resolution S/10423. Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXV, No. 1, First Quarter 1972), p. 150.

- 144 UN General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI). *Ibid.*, p. 152.
- 145 Malik's statement before UN General Assembly on 7 December. R.K. Jain, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, pp.145-146. See also Kamal A. Faruki, "The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 and the United Nations", Pakistan Horizon, (Vol. XXV, No. 1, First Quarter 1972), p. 11.
- 146 In his note which was sent by the Governor's Military Advisor, Maj.Gen. Rao Farman Ali to the UN Assistant Secretary General, then in Dacca, Dr Malik called for a transfer of power to the Awami League leadership, arguing that since "the conflict arose as a result of political causes, it must end with a political solution." He called on the UN "to arrange for a peaceful transfer of power" and requested an immediate ceasefire, repatriation with honour of the Pakistan Armed Forces to West Pakistan as well as of all West Pakistan civilian personnel. He also called for the safety of persons settled in East Pakistan since 1947 and guarantees of non-reprisals against pro-Pakistani Bengalis. Siddiq Saliq, *op.cit.*, pp. 197-198.
- 147 Christopher Van Hollen, *op.cit.*, pp. 350-351. Raymond L. Garthoff, *op.cit.*, p. 271.
- 148 Raymond L. Garthoff, *op.cit.*, p. 272.
- 149 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1979), pp. 905-906.
- 150 Christopher Van Hollen, *op.cit.*, p. 353.
- 151 James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, "Super Power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 1971", Survival (Vol. XV, No.6, November/December 1973), pp. 289-290.
- 152 Syed Anwar Husain, "Soviet Diplomacy and the Emergence of Bangladesh", Asian Affairs (Vol. 2, No. 2, 1982), p. 270.
- 153 Earlier on 13 December, the Soviet Union had exercised its third veto against a US-sponsored resolution calling on the Indian government "forthwith to accept a ceasefire and

withdrawal of armed forces as set forth in the UN General Assembly resolution 2739 (XXVI)." See UN Security Council Draft Resolutions S/10446 Rev. 1 and S/10453 Rev. 1, 13 and 15 December 1971. Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXV, No. 1, First Quarter 1972), pp. 152-153.

- 154 A Staff Study, "The War Commission and the Surrender", Outlook (Vol. 3, No. 8, 25 May 1974), p. 7, p. 10.
- 155 In the 16 December broadcast, Yahya did not refer directly to the surrender of Dacca but stated that "... a temporary setback in one theatre of war does not by any means signify the end of the struggle. We may lose a battle but final victory in this war of survival shall ... be ours." He stressed that, "This is not the end. We shall fight for our country relentlessly." Dawn, 17 December 1971.
- 156 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the USSR, Pravda, 18 December 1971. Documents Section, Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXV, No. 1, First Quarter 1972), p. 163.
- 157 In his 16 December address, for instance, Yahya declared that the constitution would be announced on 20 December as scheduled. Dawn, 17 December 1971.
- 158 Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan's Leadership in Crisis, p. 251.
- 159 Salman Taseer, op.cit., p. 128-129.
- 160 Air Marshal Rahim Khan made his threats obvious by ordering PAF planes to buzz the President's House in Rawalpindi. Safdar Mahmood, op.cit., p. 208.

CHAPTER EIGHTCONCLUSION

This thesis sought to determine the role of the Pakistan military in influencing and determining the directions of Pakistan's foreign policy, using Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union to demonstrate the extent to which the military dominated the country's external directions during the period under examination. The thesis argued that Pakistan's foreign policy was, to a considerable extent, the offshoot of defence policy, as perceived and formulated by its military establishment. Thus, in assessing the military's role in foreign policy, special emphasis was placed on ascertaining the importance of defence concerns, with their emphasis on "security" through the acquisition of arms assistance, in shaping Pakistan's external relationships.

In its efforts to understand why Pakistani governments had, during the period under study, adopted cool to hostile postures towards the Soviet Union, the thesis attempted to answer questions which had been inadequately addressed in previous research, examining, as it has mainly done, the relationship in isolation from internal factors, including an identification of domestic actors and decision-makers in the realm of foreign policy, as well as the effect of the domestic environment on Pakistan's foreign policy. The thesis not only established the close interrelationship between domestic and external variables in Pakistan's foreign policy in general and Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular but also demonstrated the vital role played by the Pakistan military in directly or indirectly

influencing the country's external orientation.

In determining the extent to which the Pakistan military's strategic perceptions, interests and requirements, especially its needs for arms, affected the course of Pakistan's foreign policy, it was necessary to analyse the military's internal role. Only then was it possible to assess its influence on both domestic politics and foreign policy.

This assessment of the military's role in politics reached three major conclusions, all of which are useful in understanding Pakistani foreign policy directions. Firstly, the thesis rejected previous analyses that the Pakistan military's behaviour in assuming direct control of political power could be defined as an example of Janowitz's "reactive militarism" , when a reluctant apolitical force intervenes due to the inability of civilian institutions to function effectively. The Pakistan military's political role seems far more in line with his definition of "designed" militarism, in which a military takes over power in a premeditated fashion so as to consolidate its internal standing and to pursue a foreign policy designed to advance its interests.

During both Ayub's and Yahya's coups d'état, the Military High Command willingly and deliberately assumed complete control of political power, motivated by the desire to protect and advance the institution's corporate interests. This finding is especially relevant in understanding the importance given to foreign policy by the Pakistan military, since one of the major factors for Ayub's takeover

was the possibility of leftist forces, calling for change in a foreign policy which had advanced the military's interests, gaining power in the approaching elections of 1959. Similarly, the failure of Ayub's foreign policy in advancing and protecting the military's interests was partly responsible for Yahya's coup d'état.

Secondly, the thesis demonstrated that the military played a dominant role and remained an effective force, even during those periods of time when Pakistan was under civilian (1947-1958) or supposedly civilian (1962-1968) rule. Not only did the military influence the course of domestic politics by supporting the continued existence of unrepresentative governments which willingly protected and advanced its interests, but it also played an equally significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy directions, acting independently of civilian control.

Finally, once the military did take over power (the 1958 and 1969 coups), its behavior did not demonstrate any aversion to involvement in politics. On the contrary, having assumed power, the military took every possible step, in collaboration with a civilian bureaucracy cajoled or coerced into cooperation, to legitimise and consolidate its internal hold. The formal withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962, for example, did not lead to the adoption of a non-political role by the military but was in fact a legitimising strategy employed to perpetuate its influence. The Armed Forces therefore supported Ayub Khan in devising and implementing a political framework which not only protected his own position but also the military's corporate interests. Ayub's new political order ensured that the military's

autonomy would be protected by constitutional safeguards and foreign and defence policies were also geared to fulfil the Armed Forces's requirements. Thus, throughout the period under examination, it was clear that the final "veto" on questions of vital importance in Pakistan's foreign or domestic policies lay with the High Command, regardless of whether or not the military was in direct control of the state.

Since the Pakistan military played a key role in shaping Pakistani politics and foreign policy, it ensured, from the very start, that defence and security concerns, as defined by its High Command, dictated the course of foreign policy, including relations with the Soviet Union. Hence the military's strategic perceptions influenced the adoption of Pakistani foreign policy options. It is important to stress that the policy options adopted were determined by the military's political leanings and requirements, especially its need for external arms assistance.

The external perceptions of the Pakistani Officer Corps, were, in turn, greatly influenced by its close links with the British establishment in the early years of Pakistan's independence. This led the military to adopt anti-Soviet attitudes and support the political leadership and civilian bureaucracy's decision to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy. Moreover, conscious of the need for arms assistance, the Military High Command also began to explore the possibilities of establishing defence and security links with the West, both in collaboration with and independently of the civilian leadership. The military and bureaucracy's efforts succeeded in aligning Pakistan

formally with the West as Pakistan entered the Western-sponsored collective security pacts. These developments not only led to a deterioration of Pakistan-Soviet relations but also to the establishment of close links between the Pakistani and American military establishments, which reinforced the pro-Western and anti-Soviet views of the Pakistani Officer Corps.

There was, moreover, a close interaction between internal and external variables in Pakistan's foreign policy. For instance, the military made liberal use of the "threat" of communist expansionism to Pakistan's security to justify alignment with the West. While Pakistan's foreign policy leanings in the external context earned it the hostility of the Soviet Union, alignment with the West led to substantial US military assistance and was thus a policy best suited to the interests of the Pakistan Armed Forces. In the internal context, Pakistani governments used the 'communist threat' in their attempts to justify domestic policies, achieve political benefits and legitimise unrepresentative rule, regardless of the adverse consequences on Pakistan-Soviet relations.

Since the policy of alignment with the West resulted in the extension of large-scale American military assistance to Pakistan, it quite obviously had its own internal dynamism. This massive influx of US aid resulted in further strengthening and expanding the Pakistani military establishment. By 1958, the military was powerful enough to oust the civilian government and assume direct control.

Since the military's role in foreign policy could not be looked at in isolation from external variables, the thesis examined the nature of regional constraints and imperatives on Pakistan's foreign policy as a whole and on Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular. Indo-Pakistan relations were of special significance since they dominated Pakistan's regional relationships. Troubled from the very start and resulting thrice in armed conflict during the period under consideration, Indo-Pakistan relations once again demonstrated the close linkages between internal and external variables. The deliberate perpetuation of hostilities with India and the resultant "garrison state" mentality in Pakistan in view of the constant Indian "threat" served the interests of the Pakistan military. The Indian threat was used to legitimise and consolidate the military's dominant political position as the main guarantor of Pakistan's territorial integrity as well as to justify a constant increase in domestic defence spending. It was also a convenient tool in justifying foreign policy decisions, such as entry into the Western-sponsored pacts on the grounds of the necessity of acquiring "reliable friends" who would underwrite Pakistan's security.

While Pakistan's confrontationist attitude resulted in antagonising the Indians even further, its entry into the pacts not only led to the deterioration of Pakistan-Soviet relations in the mid-1950s, but also resulted in the Soviets providing support to India on such sensitive issues as the Kashmir dispute.

Pakistani governments continued to follow hostile policies towards India dictated, in part, by domestic compulsions. The Ayub government, for instance, resorted to war with India in 1965 in an unsuccessful bid to acquire internal legitimacy and regain the support of the Armed Forces, dissatisfied with the government's performance. The Soviets, on their part, did adopt a policy of neutrality on Indo-Pakistan disputes and supported Indo-Pakistani rapprochement in the hope of reducing instability and decreasing the chances of external intervention in an area of strategic significance. The pro-Western orientation of Pakistani military rulers such as Yahya Khan and their refusal to reach peaceful accommodation of their differences with India once again led the Soviets to side with India in the 1971 conflict.

There was an equally close linkage between domestic and external imperatives in Pakistan's hostile relations with Afghanistan, focussing on the Pakhtunistan dispute. Although the Pakistan military did not perceive Afghanistan as an actual threat, the tense relations with that country were used to justify the need for external assistance from the West to protect Pakistan's territorial integrity. Pakistan's siding with the West in the Cold War led in turn to both deteriorating Pakistan-Soviet relations and the consolidation of Soviet-Afghan ties as an antagonised Soviet Union extended moral and material support to the Afghans.

Great power (the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the United States) interests, objectives and competition, both at the global level and within the South Asian region, had their own impact

on the course of Pakistan's foreign policy, including Pakistan-Soviet relations. Pakistan's decline or increase in importance to the three great powers, as well as their policies towards the other regional states, especially India, offered the Pakistan military opportunities or placed constraints in the formulation of foreign policy directions which would further its interests.

Hence Pakistan-Soviet relations were dependent on Soviet objectives, interests and goals in Pakistan in terms of both the bilateral relationship and Soviet regional and global policies. Throughout most of the period under study, for instance, Soviet policy towards Pakistan aimed at cultivating closer ties in the hope of preventing and curbing the expansion at first of American, and following the Sino-Soviet split, of both US and PRC influence in Pakistan.

At the same time, however, the Pakistani military played an influential role in determining the acceptance or rejection of options available in relations with the Soviet Union. It was, for example, Pakistani policies adopted with the military's active support, such as membership in the pacts and the provision of facilities for anti-Soviet operations to the US as a quid-pro-quo for military and economic assistance, which resulted in tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations.

The thesis confirmed that the most important external relationship in the Pakistan military's perceptions was that with the United States. US-Pakistan military ties and the question of arms

assistance assumed a special significance in shaping Pakistan's overall foreign policy, including relations with the Soviet Union.

The issue of Western arms assistance was in turn closely linked with Pakistan's position in US regional and global strategies. Hence while one of the major motivating factors for the Pakistan military's consistent support for a pro-Western foreign policy was the acquisition of American arms, this assistance was only forthcoming in substantial terms during those periods when East-West tensions were at their height, accompanied by an increased strategic importance of the South Asian region. For instance, during the peak years of the Cold War, Pakistan's strategic location led the Americans to establish close bilateral security ties and to include it in alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. The main beneficiary of the policy of alignment was the Pakistan military, as US military assistance expanded and modernized it, greatly strengthening its internal political standing. Pakistan's alignment with the West and the extension of facilities on its soil to the US were accompanied by a decline in Pakistan-Soviet relations, which almost reached breaking point with the U-2 incident of 1960.

When, however, US interests were at a low in South Asia and/or accompanied by policies which were more sympathetic to neutral India, there was also a loosening of American ties with Pakistan, resulting in a decline of military assistance to that country. This led the Pakistan military to adopt different strategies in the hope of pressuring the Americans to reconsider their policy directives towards Pakistan, especially with regard to the issue of arms

assistance. These strategies included, as they did in the period directly following the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 when the attention of the Western powers shifted to India, the adoption of an overtly neutral foreign policy, including threats of withdrawal from the alliances, and the establishment of closer diplomatic and military links with the PRC .

In the context of this thesis, it is especially important to note the extent to which Pakistan-Soviet relations were dependent on Pakistan-US ties and the issue of American arms aid to Pakistan. Thus, when American interest in Pakistan was at its peak, leading to the extension of substantial military assistance, the Pakistanis not only distanced themselves from the Soviet Union, but even, as in the mid-1950s and early 1960s, adopted hostile policies towards it. When, on the contrary, US-Pakistan relations were strained due to a decline in Pakistan's importance in American global and regional strategies, resulting in a decline in US arms aid, Pakistani military or military-dominated governments not only adopted a more neutral stance in their foreign policy rhetoric but also attempted to use the Soviet card in their dealings with the West.

Pakistan's willingness to accept Soviet overtures of friendship when it was facing problems in its relations with the US did lead to some improvement in Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations. Tensions, however, continued due to the pro-Western orientation of Pakistan's leaders and their stress on a consolidation of ties with their allies. For instance, Pakistan-Soviet relations took a turn for the better under the Ayub regime in the mid to late 1960s, when the Pakistani

government attempted to use the threat of closer ties with the Soviets to obtain a reversal of the US arms embargo, imposed during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Yet Pakistan's relations with the Soviets did remain strained as the Ayub Administration made every effort to ensure that closer ties with the Soviets did not actually endanger links with the West and no real effort was made to disengage Pakistan from the alliances.

Similarly, the Yahya regime kept its options open vis-a-vis the Soviet Union only so long as the Americans downgraded Pakistan's importance as an ally. The Yahya regime's primary foreign policy objective, however, remained a strengthening of relations with the West, with an emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. Hence when the Nixon Administration established closer ties with the Pakistanis, due to the latter's mediatory role in helping the US to open direct relations with China, the Pakistani military government downgraded relations with the Soviet Union. Yahya's pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy, combined with his inability to settle his internal problems and his differences with India peacefully in the wake of the East Pakistan crisis contributed to the Soviet decision to align with India during the 1971 war, which was to lead to the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Thus the pattern of Pakistan-Soviet relations remained constant throughout the years of united Pakistan's existence. The relationship remained a peripheral one for the Pakistan military, whose main concern in foreign policy consistently centred on the consolidation of ties, especially in the spheres of defence and security, with the

West. The military, however, had no objections to using the Soviet card when its main Western ally, the United States, withdrew its active support. Pakistan-Soviet relations therefore ran an uneasy course as the Pakistani military dictated the directions of Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy.

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ADDITIONAL NOTE TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

The importance of this archival material cannot be underestimated. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic concerned it was very difficult to obtain the evidence necessary to substantiate my arguments (see Note on Sources). The substantial body of primary source material I was able to consult in the national archives of Great Britain and the United States was therefore invaluable for my work.

Very little of this material has been previously used by researchers of either Pakistan's foreign policy or domestic politics. This is especially true of the material consulted in the PRO, London, since the material, covering the initial years of Pakistan's independence, has only recently been made available for public use.

While I had to be fairly selective, due to time - constraints, in selecting relevant files at the National Archives, the excellent reference system there made my task fairly easy. The cooperation extended to me by the research staff of the PRO made it possible for me to consult every file in the Archives, containing any reference to Pakistan. In writing the thesis, I sifted through the hundreds of documents consulted to find the evidence I needed to strengthen my arguments and provide the evidence necessary for my thesis.

As earlier mentioned, each individual archival source will not be cited in the bibliography. It will not, however, be difficult for

researchers to locate any of the documents referred to even though Record Groups have not been cited in the complete reference.

For example, as far the archival material from the US is concerned, the record group for State Department Records is Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State. All of the documents with Decimal File numbers are in Record Group 59. The Decimal File is a record series that is arranged by decimal file number.

Also in Record Group 59 are office files of the State Department such as the following reference. "Office Memo, US Government to Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) McGhee From SOA, 25 January 1950".

Documents without Decimal File numbers are from the Office File or Lot File. Another Office File is the Office of Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch (example: "Pakistan's Current Economic and Intelligence, Research and Analysis, State Department, 5 May 1958).

The following reference, "Us Ambassador, Karachi, to Secretary of State enclosing report of the US Military Attache, Pakistan, 24 April 1948. Ref. 845-F-00/4-2448" is in Record Group 353, Records of the Inter-and-Intra-Departmental Committees (State Department) while the following reference "The position of the US with Respect to South Asia. NSC Staff Study (98/1) January 1951. NSC (Approved by President Truman

on 25 January 1951" is from the Records of the National Security Council, Record Group 273.