THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE MISSIONS TO THE
UNITED STATES (1919–1934)

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ABSTRACT

In 1916 the Filipinos received the promise of independence "as soon as a stable government can be established." The promise, contained in the preamble of the Jones Law, provided impetus to Filipino aspirations for independence. However, the Filipino leaders did not agitate for independence during the World War as a gesture of loyalty to the United States. But by the end of the War in 1913, the Filipinos felt that they had established the stable government required by the Jones Law and that it was time for the United States to redeem its promise of independence to the Philippines.

Encouraged by the Jones Law and a sympathetic Governor General in the Philippines, the Filipino leaders concluded that independence from the United States could be obtained through increased political pressure and an active campaign in favour of their cause. Before 1913 the demand for independence had been voiced by means of formal resolutions of the Philippine Assembly (and after 1916, of the Philippine Legislature) delivered to the American Congress through Filipino Resident Commissioners in Washington. After 1913, a more sustained effort to terminate American rule was undertaken, with the appeal for freedom taken directly by the Filipinos to Washington through parliamentary missions or legislative committees sent by the Philippine Legislature.
Independence Missions were sent to the United States almost yearly. The first one went in 1919, the last in 1933. The presence of these Missions in Washington had significant influence on the final independence act.

In the midst of the Great Depression, the United States finally decided to terminate her tutelage of the Filipinos and fulfill the promise of independence given by the Jones Act of 1916. The demand for independence by the "independence missions" to the United States, agitation by American farm and labour groups, and the persistence of an "anti-colonial conscience" culminated in the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in March 1934, which finally settled the Philippine issue.
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PREFACE

Barring the years of the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), the Philippine independence movement during the American period never became the bitter and sometimes bloody struggle that marked the experience of other colonial regimes in Asia, for the United States accommodated herself to Philippine nationalism. Indeed the United States consciously set about to foster the spirit of Philippine nationalism. The leaders of the independence movement were given the freedom and the means to articulate their nationalist feelings. The appeal for freedom was won through peaceful constitutional processes afforded the Filipinos by the sovereign power, which allowed them to move progressively towards autonomy and independence. The question of ultimate Philippine independence was an issue settled in principle almost from the beginning. The only matter to be resolved was the timing of the grant of that independence.

The major prerequisites set for independence were the establishment of good government and Filipino preparedness for independent statehood. With this in mind, the period from 1901 to 1913 saw the "political education" of the Filipinos, under Republican Administrations which saw this as a necessary step for independence in the future. This was followed by a period characterized by the "filipinization" of the insular government and the encouragement of nationalism, under a Democratic Administration (1913-1921).
When the independence campaign was taken up in earnest in 1918, the Filipinos did so with the conviction that they were then already politically mature enough to handle their own affairs. The leaders who involved themselves in this campaign had been on the Philippine political scene since 1907, all members of the educated elite and all products of American tutelage. After two decades of American direction, these politically active Filipinos felt confident that they were sufficiently advanced in experience and participation in public affairs to enable them to manage their country on their own.

The Filipino stand on independence was not always very clear — there was considerable confusion and vacillation on the matter — and American administration officials felt that much of the agitation was artificial and insincere and tied up with insular politics. Political leaders often vied with one another to demonstrate the intensity of their advocacy of independence, yet seemed to shrink from it when its attainment seemed imminent.

Though there was ambivalence in the Filipino approach to independence, perhaps part of the uncertainty was due to the fact that the United States also had no consistent answer to the Philippine request for independence — the only matter that was definite was the promise to grant independence. The Democrats, it was said, were afraid to do what they said they would do, while the Republicans were afraid to say what they would do.

This is a study of the circumstances which attended the sending of independence missions to the United States, despatched almost yearly from 1919 to 1934, and the reactions, or response of the
American Administration and the United States Congress to the petitions of the Filipinos. The independence missions had great significance for the Filipinos, as they dramatized the peaceful continuation of their struggle for freedom, begun in 1896 when they rose in revolt against Spanish colonialism and continued in 1899-1902 against the Americans.

The Filipino leaders who led these Missions have been portrayed as uncompromising nationalists of the "complete, absolute, and immediate independence" variety. The events and circumstances described in this study reveal that this was not always so. Hopefully, this study will result in a more realistic evaluation and appreciation of the complexities of their efforts to attain the goal of national freedom.

While independence was the primary objective of the Missions to the United States, other matters that needed threshing out with Washington also preoccupied the delegations. From 1923 to 1927, during the regime of Governor Wood, the Missions devoted themselves to easing the "crisis" with the Governor General. During the period from 1928 to 1933, the tariff question and racial discrimination as it affected immigration became Mission concerns. The Missions generally were concerned with protecting Philippine interests -- whether political or economic -- against discriminatory forces or legislation.

The approach has been primarily chronological, and the exposition has been limited as much as possible to the affairs of the Missions in the Philippines and in the United States. The
emphasis has been necessarily political, because independence is a political issue. The focus has been on the metropolitan level — on Filipino leadership on the national level; on relations between the leadership in Manila and the Washington officialdom; on colonialism and nationalism on the metropolitan level. I have not attempted to articulate what the average Filipino, especially outside the political centre (Manila), felt about the issue, for that belongs to an entirely different study. What is clearly evident in this study is only that the political leaders, who presented themselves for election periodically, were elected, or re-elected, because the issue of independence had a powerful appeal to the electorate. Whether the Filipino masses actually knew what independence really meant is another matter, and to find this out would mean research in a different direction, using entirely different materials than were used in this study.

There were many varied groups in the Philippines which expressed their stand on independence— non-political groups such as the Catholic Church and other religious denominations, labour organisations, peasant leaders, the Communist Party and other radical groups, the Moros and non-Christian groups. Indeed, there are files in the Bureau of Insular Affairs of letters and petitions for and against independence. In this study, I have focussed only on the more vocal and influential elements for or against independence— the Filipino political leaders, American business and economic groups in the Philippines and the United States, official Americans, and a number of prominent and influential private citizens from both countries.
Very little has been written on the independence missions, especially for the period from 1919 to 1929. The only materials available are sketchy and make only slight reference to the activities of the missions. As source materials, I have drawn on the huge file of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, the closest the United States had to a "Colonial Office."* These records are now stored in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Congress was very much involved in the final disposition of the Philippine problem, and I found the congressional records, both in the Archives and the Library of Congress invaluable in this study. I also consulted the personal and official papers of American officials and "old Philippine hands" in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, as well as in several university libraries in the United States.

The bulk of the research was undertaken in the United States. Many valuable public and personal records in the Philippines were destroyed during the last war; others were lost through degeneration in tropical conditions. Fortunately the Bureau of Insular Affairs Records are available to fill in the gaps.

In the Philippines I consulted the Quezon Papers in the National Library, the richest source for this period, which contains cables, memoranda, transcripts of press conferences, press

* For a study of the functions performed by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, see Romeo V. Cruz, America's Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898–1934 (Quezon City, 1974).
clippings, public documents, letters, and speeches of Quezon and other prominent figures of the Philippine political scene in the twenties and thirties.

This thesis would certainly not be possible were it not for the kind assistance extended to me while I was doing research in preparation for this manuscript. I am deeply grateful to the directors, librarians, and archives of the following institutions in the United States: the National Archives, Washington, D.C., especially the Social and Economic Branch and the Legislative Section; the Library of Congress, especially the Manuscript Division and the Orientalia Division; the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University; the Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan; the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Library, Hyde Park, New York; the Ohio Historical Society, Inc., Columbus, Ohio; the John M. Olin Library, Cornell University; the Houghton Library, Harvard University; and the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

In Manila, I would like to thank the staff of the Filipiniana Division of the National Library; the Filipiniana and Serials Sections of the University of the Philippines Library; and the Jose P. Laurel Memorial Foundation.
In Canberra, the staffs of the National Library and the Menzies Library, the Australian National University, have been most helpful.

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CHAPTER I

THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN ENCOUNTER: BUILDING A NATION

In 1898 when the decision was made by the United States to acquire the Philippines,(1) a Filipino nation was struggling for existence amidst a revolution against Spain.(2) The Filipino revolutionaries came close to achieving their goal of national freedom, but American intervention prevented its realization. While the Filipinos initially looked to the United States for aid in the struggle against Spain, basing their hopes upon the Teller Amendment


(2) For an account of the history of the nationalist movement in the Philippines, the following are useful: John N. Schumacher, The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1895 (Manila, 1973); Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan (Quezon City, 1956); Teodoro M. Kalaw, The Philippine Revolution (Manila, 1925; reprinted 1969).
(which promised independence to Cuba), the McKinley Administration opposed acknowledging any obligations to accede to the wishes of the Filipino revolutionists. Shattered hopes and misunderstanding between the two nations finally transformed the revolution against Spain into Filipino-American armed conflict.(3)

Despite American rhetoric of "benevolent assimilation," "tutelage," and "protection," the Filipino nationalists fought a bitter and costly war to regain their independence, proclaimed on June 12, 1898, by General Emilio F. Aguinaldo.

Confronted by insurmountable odds, Filipino armed resistance eventually yielded to superior American military forces. The Philippine revolution was eventually suppressed after the capture, in March 1901, of General Aguinaldo, who had been inaugurated president of the Philippine Republic, at Malolos, Bulacan Province, on January 23, 1899. On July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt officially proclaimed the existence of peace and order and the

(3) The Filipino revolutionists and the American military forces were nervous allies confronting a common enemy -- Spain. Initial friendly approaches to Aguinaldo by American consular officials in Singapore and Hong Kong encouraged him to cooperate with the Americans against the Spaniards in the Philippines. Aguinaldo and his revolutionary colleagues were wittingly (or unwittingly) made to believe that the United States would recognize Philippine independence upon the conclusion of peace.

As the McKinley Administration firmed its policy to acquire the Philippines from Spain, Filipino-American relations turned cold, and eventually, hostile, culminating in the outbreak of the Philippine-American War on February 4, 1899, when an American sentry shot a Filipino soldier. See James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912 (New York, 1913; reprinted 1968), Chapters I-XIII.
termination of the war in the Philippines. (4) By 1903 most Filipino revolutionary leaders of consequence had reconciled themselves to the reality of American sovereignty. The struggle for freedom from 1896 to 1902 had failed, but the emotional and political issue of independence remained dominant and widespread even in the face of initial American attempts to restrain nationalist sentiment. (5)


(5) During the first few years of American rule, until 1907, the Filipino struggle to regain their independence was discouraged by the American authorities. All attempts by patriotic Filipinos to organize political parties with independence platforms were suppressed. Nationalist literature critical of the imposition of American sovereignty on the Filipinos was subject to censorship and suppression. During this period of "suppressed nationalism" the American colonial administration sought to remove, through legislation, any real or imagined threat to American rule in the Philippines. See Dapen Liang, The Development of Philippine Political Parties (Hong Kong, 1939), pp. 66-70. (This book has been revised and republished as Philippine Parties and Politics, A Historical Study of National Experience in Democracy, San Francisco, 1970). See also Amelia Lapeña-Bonifacio, The "Seditious" Tagalog Playwrights: Early American Occupation (Manila, 1972).
Yet even while the United States was busy pacifying rebellious Filipinos, a colonial policy was being formulated that would demonstrate America's "benevolent imperialism" — a policy that would win the support of the Filipinos and at the same time extricate American leadership from an ideologically embarrassing situation stemming from anti-imperialist opposition to the American venture in the Philippines. The Republican Party, which was responsible for the acquisition of the Philippines, adopted a policy of attraction and conciliation to deal with Filipino demands to determine their own national destiny. This policy took the form of "filipinization," Filipino participation in the work of organizing and perfecting the new government, combined with a programme of social reform and economic and material development. And however much the Republicans and the Democrats disagreed as to the morality, the wisdom, or the necessity of acquiring the Philippines as an American responsibility, both parties agreed that the Filipinos needed a long (or longer) period of apprenticeship in the ways of general government. 

(6) America's expansionist programme in the late 1890's was not the unanimous decision of all segments of American society. The Democrats were a formidable opposition to the acquisition of the Philippines. Along with them was vehement opposition from some Eastern metropolitan newspapers, prominent liberal leaders, and a powerful minority within the Republican Party. For a while, the most organized opposition came from the Anti-Imperialist League formed in Boston late in 1898. See Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York, 1968); E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (Philadelphia, 1970); Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge, Mass., 1972); and Edelwina C. Legaspi, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, XXXIII, 3-4 (September-December 1968; published in 1973).
modern government.

Filipinization, it was thought, while insuring Filipino cooperation with American objectives, would also provide the Filipinos with "political education," crucial in preparing them for self-government. The American Administration, accordingly, took the view that as soon as practicable, a reasonable amount of autonomy should be allowed the Filipinos, under close supervision by Americans -- but without prematurely making a definite commitment to ultimate independence. Perhaps as the Filipinos learned more about America's good intentions as "bearers of good will, protection, and the richest blessings of liberation," they would be "warmly attached to the United States by a sense of self-interest and gratitude," and they would no longer wish for independence.(7)

It is probably safe to assume that this policy of accommodating some Filipino leaders in the management of colonial affairs had the immediate effect of moderating Filipino nationalist demands. There was a willingness to set aside independence for a while in order to

cooperate with the Americans to accomplish some immediate political and socio-economic goals, though there was not, however, a willingness to forgo independence altogether. It was probably not lost to the Filipinos that implicit in this programme of "political education" was graduation eventually to self-rule and independence.

By the time the Americans came in 1898, there already existed in the Philippines a small elite that was consciously "Filipino" — the ilustrados of the late Spanish period. This indigenous elite possessed education, social prominence, and a political sophistication which enabled them to define and articulate Filipino national aspirations and identity. Leadership in the political life of the Philippines came initially into the hands of these politically conservative, hispanized ilustrados, some of whom stepped forward to support the American authorities, convinced that the unequal struggle was futile. There is some reason to believe that this action was also probably motivated by their desire to assume the political status that collaboration with and allegiance to the new colonial regime had offered them.(8)

In 1900, Governor William Howard Taft permitted the establishment of the Partido Federal, composed largely of wealthy and educated ilustrados, who declared themselves for early autonomy and ultimate statehood in the American Union. Their collaboration

pleased the American authorities (and facilitated pacification in
the Philippine War), who rewarded them with almost complete monopoly
of the positions in the colonial government. However, their
programme for annexation was never taken seriously by the American
administration, and was severely attacked by the pro-independence
Filipino nationalists. So, in 1905, sensing the hopelessness of
their annexation platform, the Federalistas adopted a more radical
stance, and as the Partido Nacional Progresista (since January
1907), they announced a platform of ultimate independence "in due
time," after a period of economic and social progress.(9)

Once the Federalistas declared for independence, it was
inevitable that other independence parties previously banned would
arise with more radical platforms. By 1907 also, the United States
felt sufficiently secure in her authority in the Philippines to
adopt a more tolerant view towards political groups openly
proclaiming their demand for independence. Hence, in March 1907 the
Partido Nacionalista was allowed to be formed on a platform which
committed the party to the "attainment of the immediate independence
of the Philippine Islands to constitute it into a free and sovereign
nation under a democratic government."(10) In time, under the
pressure of partisan politics, it declared for "complete, immediate,
and absolute" independence for the Philippines. Having projected

(9) See Maximo M. Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics,
1872-1920 (Manila, 1926), pp. 292-304; Liang, op. cit.,
(1970 edition), pp. 49-59; 62-65; and Salamanca, op. cit.,
pp.156-159.

itself as the champion of immediate independence, a popular electoral issue in the Philippines, the Nacionalista Party (and its leaders) became virtually invincible at the polls from the time of its inception in 1907. Thus, the Federalistas were able to enjoy their favoured position only briefly.

During the first decade and a half of Republican rule (1898-1913 — often referred to also as the Taft era) in the Philippines, the filipinization policy was implemented through the established leaders — the Federalistas, and after 1907, the Nacionalistas — by the steady extension to the Filipinos of participation in local government. Qualified and competent Filipinos progressively moved into the civil service and the national (or insular) government.

The first significant step towards Philippine autonomy, the Organic Act of 1902, enacted by the United States Congress, paved the way for the establishment of an elected all-Filipino legislative body called the Philippine Assembly. The Assembly was inaugurated on October 16, 1907, and thereafter a new generation of younger Nacionalista leaders who were vocal for independence assumed a share in the responsibility of government.

By the end of the Republican regime in 1913, almost complete filipinization had been achieved at the municipal and provincial levels. The insular government, however, was top-heavy with Americans who held important policy-and-decision-making positions.(11) The emerging Filipino leadership probably perceived

(11) For the structure of colonial bureaucracy until 1913, see Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila,
that continued American tutelage implied an inferiority or incapacity which denied them the choice senior positions occupied by Americans. Increasingly they were dissatisfied with "political education," the mainstay of Taft's policy, and demanded less supervision and a larger role in government. After a decade and a half of American tutorship, the politically active Filipinos were restless and eager to assume complete domestic autonomy by the grant of more substantial powers to a Philippine government composed entirely of Filipinos. (12)

The ultimate political relation between the Philippines and the United States was also a matter of immediate relevance to the Filipinos. Independence was a sentiment of universal appeal among the Filipinos, although at times perhaps only vaguely understood and half-heartedly espoused.

With the introduction of the Assembly in 1907, composed almost always of a comfortable majority of Nacionalistas, Filipino nationalism focused on achieving its goal of independence through the elected leaders of that body, who voiced in an official way the Filipino desire for freedom. Through the Assembly, the Filipinos secured a greater say in the management of their government and a

1957), pp. 162, 191, 175-176, 193. See also Report of the Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Frank McIntyre, to the Secretary of War (Hereafter SecWar), March 1, 1913, in Bureau of Insular Affairs Records, Record Group 350, National Archives, Washington, D.C., File 119-72 (Hereafter BIA Records).

(12) Stanley, op. cit., pp. 139-176; May, op. cit., Chapter VIII, p. 322.
continuing opportunity to prove their competence for legislative conduct. More significantly, it provided the political leaders with a forum where they could cultivate political sentiment for independence.

Before 1913 Republican officials refused to discuss the political future of the Philippines. The Republican Administration regarded the Filipino desire for independence as commendable, but it consistently maintained the view that independence at that time, after only a brief period of American tutelage, was not in the best interests of the Filipinos because they had not as yet mastered the art of democratic self-government. Then, too, there had not been sufficient economic progress and material development in the country to warrant severing the ties with the United States. Far better, the Filipinos were advised, to channel their energies and aspirations towards the pursuit of political stability, social reform, and the general economic development of the country and to give up political agitation momentarily.(13)

Moreover, the demand for independence was not taken seriously by the Washington authorities because they laboured under the impression that the cry for independence was no more than a political slogan -- an electoral expediency -- which the politicians exploited to get themselves elected to public office. American

officials were sincerely convinced that the practitioners of party politics, especially Manuel L. Quezon (14) and Sergio Osmeña (15) were not urgently committed to "immediate independence," as their public declarations suggested. In fact, while immediate independence was called for publicly, the politicos did appear willing to settle for less—perhaps no more than an American recognition of the Filipinos' right to independence. In private conversations with ranking American officials, these Filipino leaders seemed to waver and hedge when actually confronted with the

(14) Manuel L. Quezon (1878-1944) started his political career as governor of Tayabas (new Quezon) Province in 1906. In 1907 he was elected to the Philippine Assembly where he became the majority floor leader. In 1909, he was chosen as one of two resident commissioners to the United States Congress. He served in that capacity until 1916, when he returned to Manila and was elected Senate President of the newly established Philippine Legislature, a position he held until 1934. In 1935, he became the first President of the Philippine Commonwealth and served in that capacity until his death in 1944.

There are several biographic works on Quezon, of varying scholarly quality: Isabelo P. Caballero and M. de Gracia Concepcion, Quezon (Manila, 1935); Sol H. Gwekoh, Manuel L. Quezon (Manila, 1935); Elinor Goettel, Eagle of the Philippines: President Manuel Quezon (New York, 1970); and Carlos Quirino, Quezon: Paladin of Philippine Freedom (Manila, 1971). Quezon also wrote an autobiography, The Good Fight, which was published posthumously. (New York, 1946).

(15) Sergio Osmeña (1877-1961), from Cebu Province, started his career as editor of the nationalistic paper El Nuevo Día in his native province. He was elected Governor of Cebu in 1906, and later became Speaker of the Philippine Assembly in 1907 and the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature in 1916. He held that position until 1922, when he was elected to the Senate. In 1935 he was elected Vice-President of the Philippine Commonwealth, and in 1944 he became President on the death of Quezon. For his biography, see Vicente Albano Pacis, President Sergio Osmeña, A Fully Documented Biography (Quezon City, 1971), 2 vols; and Epidio Valencia, Sergio Osmeña (Manila, 1977).
issue of early independence -- perhaps out of fear over the responsibilities of an independent nation.(16)

In view of this, what the Republican leadership sought was an indefinitely long period of political tutelage under American supervision (perhaps a generation or two), during which time they would give the Filipinos growing participation in the administration of government. They would thus ensure the establishment of an effective government on a reasonably stable basis.(17)

The Filipinos found this "go-slow-wait-and-see" policy of the Republican administrators exasperating. Dissatisfaction was also intensified by the failure or refusal of the United States to define its intentions as to the future status of the Philippines. It is true that the Filipinos did not urgently wish for immediate independence, but they wanted an immediate declaration that the United States definitely planned that someday independence would be given, and in the meantime, they wanted widened filipinization by prompt placement of Filipinos in policy-making positions hitherto occupied by Americans.(18)


(18) On September 1, 1910, a Memorial embodying these sentiments was presented to Secretary of War Jacob W. Dickinson, then visiting the Philippines. See ibid., pp. 160-163. For a copy of the Memorial see BIA Records 364-125/126.
It was this policy of evading a declaration of intention by the United States — what one American official called "indefinite retention with undeclared intention"(19)— which the Filipinos were getting weary of and which was causing anxiety over the sincerity of the United States as to independence in the future.

The Democratic victory in the presidential elections of 1912 changed the character of Filipino-American relations and specifically, of the independence movement. The Democrats were known to favour independence at the earliest possible moment, as declared consistently in their platforms, and the Filipinos immediately assumed that their independence aspirations would be fulfilled.

President Woodrow Wilson appointed Francis Burton Harrison,(20) Democratic Congressman from New York, as Governor General of the Philippines (1913-1921), the first to occupy that position without previous experience in Philippine affairs. To the Filipinos, this appointment was welcome news, for the new Governor was known for his liberal views and had expressed the desire to apply the Administration's policy of early self-government for the

(19) Blount, op. cit., p. 641.

(20) Harrison (1873-1957) was the scion of a prominent Virginia family and had represented a Tammany Hall district of New York City in the US House of Representatives. At the time of his appointment he was a ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee. His appointment was due mainly to the efforts of Democratic colleagues who had suggested his name to President Wilson. Quezon, then serving as Resident Commissioner in Washington, endorsed the choice of Harrison. See Pacis, op. cit., Chapter XII, Vol. I, exploding the "myth" that Quezon was responsible for the Harrison appointment.
From 1913 administrative autonomy in the Philippines came at a faster pace and embraced higher positions than in the previous Republican period. Harrison believed that rapid and complete filipinization was essential if the Filipinos were to learn to maintain a fully independent government. Therefore, he allowed the Filipinos to assume almost complete management of their political and economic affairs, even to the point of sacrificing efficiency and good government.

In 1916, a further step was taken towards the goal of self-government. The Democratic Congress passed the Philippine Autonomy Act, which replaced the Organic Act of 1902. It reproduced in its preamble the stand of the 1912 Democratic platform declaring that "it is, as it has always been the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognise their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; . . . for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them . . .".(21)

(21) Public Laws No. 240, 64th Congress, S. 381, see in Official Gazette (Philippines), Vol. XIV, No. 42, p. 2207. The enlargement of self-government in the Philippines (and in Puerto Rico) was part of a reform wave that had gathered force for over a decade and which reached its crest during the Wilson presidency.
This bill increased Philippine autonomy by granting the Filipinos complete control of the legislative branch of the government through a bicameral Philippine Legislature. The Jones Law, as it became popularly known, (22) established the American presidential system of government, composed of a strong executive (the American Governor General), assisted by a Cabinet appointed by him and responsible to him; an independent judiciary; and an elective bicameral legislature. On October 16, 1916 the new legislature was inaugurated, with Sergio Osmeña as Speaker of the House of Representatives and Manuel L. Quezon as President of the Senate. Their new roles, together with their positions as president and vice-president, respectively, of the majority Nacionalista Party, gave them tremendous legislative powers and virtual control over all branches of the government. (23)

(22) William Atkinson Jones (Democrat, Virginia) was Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs which concerned itself with Philippine matters. The Jones Law was not written by Representative Jones himself. It was the collective effort of Governor Harrison, the American commissioners in the Philippine Commission (in Manila), General Frank McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, Quezon, and Osmeña. See BIA Memorandum, March 27, 1930, BIA Records 364-740-J.

The Jones Act did not really meet their "immediate independence" demand, but the Filipinos considered it a significant advance in the achievement of self-government. The law, moreover, contained a promise of eventual independence, though somewhat vague, thus finally giving proof of America's real intent. To the Filipinos, the most significant part of the bill was the preamble. They attached much meaning to it as the first official promise of early American withdrawal — and then used it to the full by interpreting the law as they pleased solely on the authority of the preamble, or what they called the "spirit" of the Jones Law.

By the time of the passage of the Jones Law in 1916, the Filipino leaders were inclined to believe that a stable government had already been established in the Philippines. The task ahead as they saw it was therefore to continue the work of running that stable government so that Congress and the President of the United States would see fit the grant of independence as promised by the Jones Law. In this respect, they were fortunate to have had an American proconsul who believed in the prompt withdrawal of American sovereignty from the Philippines and therefore sought to do all in

(24) In 1916 the Filipinos came close to independence with the passage of the Clarke Amendment to the Jones Law which would have authorized the President of the United States to recognize the independence of the Philippines and to withdraw from the Philippines within two to four years. Quezon and Osmeña both publicly endorsed the amendment, but in reality both men agonized over the possibility of immediate independence. This is another one of the several instances showing the ambivalence of these two leaders on the issue of immediate Philippine independence. See Stanley, op. cit., pp. 221-225; Roy Watson Curry, "Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLI (1954), p. 448. See also Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 846, 14226; and McIntyre to Harrison, February 14, 1916, BIA Records 1239-135.
his power to give the Filipinos increasing opportunities to prove that they could govern themselves almost without American supervision. The official records support the contention that in the conduct of his office Governor Harrison did not follow his mandate from the Administration. The War Department had urged conservatism in all communications with the Governor General.

Most of the time Harrison exercised the powers of his office in accordance with the advice and wishes of Quezon and Osmena. Thus, by relaxing American guidance and supervision, he transferred the initiative and responsibility for good government from American to Filipino shoulders. By the end of his regime he had almost completely turned the government of the Philippines over to the Filipinos, though not always with satisfactory results, so his critics say. There were those who would declare that Harrison pushed filipinization to an extreme which hurt the government and diminished the Filipinos' qualifications for responsible conduct. (25) Harrison's freedom of action in the administration of

(25) For an account of some of the administrative innovations brought about by Harrison's rapid filipinization policy, see Corpuz, Bureaucracy, pp. 198-204. See also J. Ralston Hayden, "The Philippines: An Experiment in Democracy," Atlantic Monthly, 137 (March 1926), pp. 406-409.

the Philippines was almost total, especially after 1917 when American entry into World War I resulted in the Administration's absorption in more pressing matters than those of the far-away colonial government.

Though the promise of independence in the preamble of the Jones Act, not surprisingly, provided impetus to Filipino demands for immediate independence, the issue was momentarily set aside during the First World War, for it was deemed that such an action might embarrass the United States. During that period, with the acquiescence of Harrison, the Filipino leaders concentrated on conducting a creditable government, which progressively came under their control. By the end of the War, most responsible American officials in the Philippines felt that the "stable government" specified by the Jones Act as the single prerequisite for independence had been achieved.(26) In a letter to President Wilson

(26) The Jones Law did not specify any criteria for a stable government: the Filipino leadership generally assumed that their government during Harrison's administration was a stable one wherein they were substantially running the entire machinery of administration -- in other words, their control was almost absolute, thereby proving that they were capable of self-government. Besides, following the standard definition of stable government as one with the ability to maintain order, supported by the people, and capable of observing and fulfilling its international obligations, there was no question that the Philippine government qualified as a stable government, in the view of the Filipino leaders.
in November 1918, Governor General Harrison asserted that it was time America fulfilled its promise to the Filipino people. (27)

More importantly, the Filipinos themselves were convinced that they had established a government whose spirit and form was unmistakably Filipino, and so now they were prepared to welcome independence. The only remaining obstacle to independence was the matter of convincing Washington that a viable democratic state was indeed functioning successfully in the Philippines. In the face of this, the machinery for the independence campaign was set up, and the first independence mission went to Washington in 1919.

(27) Confidential letter, Harrison to Wilson, November 13, 1918, in Francis Burton Harrison Papers, Box 35, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. See also Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, 1918, p. 5; Frank Carpenter to McIntyre, November 13, 1918, Frank Carpenter, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records; Vice-Governor Charles Yeater to Chas. C. Walcutt, Jr., February 10, 1919, BIA Records 17073-188. Governor Harrison repeated his recommendation for independence in his reports to the Secretary of War for 1919 (pp. 3-4) and 1920 (p. 1).
CHAPTER II

THE FIRST INDEPENDENCE MISSION, 1919

Once the war in Europe was over in 1918, the Filipino leaders thought it auspicious, while Americans were still fired with a crusading fervour for freedom and democracy throughout the world, to press for immediate independence. The grant of Philippine independence, they thought, would be the logical consequence of the stand taken by the United States in the last war.

The two major political parties in the Philippines put forward two distinct plans for the solution of the Philippine independence issue. The opposition minority party, the Partido Democrata,(1) proposed to take the question directly to the World Peace Conference in Paris. The majority party, the Partido Nacionalista, however, was in favour of submitting the question first to the government in

(1) The Partido Democrata was formed in April 1917 by the fusion of the Progresistas (the former Federalistas) and the Partido Democrata Nacional, a small faction which seceded from the Nacionalista Party in 1914 in protest against what it termed the Osmeña "oligarchy." On the independence issue, both the Democratas and the Nacionalistas advocated independence for the Philippines. See Liang, op. cit., pp. 88-93.
With this objective in mind, on November 7, 1918, the Nacionalistas unanimously passed in the Legislature a concurrent resolution providing for the appointment of a Commission of Independence, "for the purpose of studying all matters related to the negotiation and organization of the independence of the Philippines". The Commission was empowered to make recommendations to the Legislature on the following matters:

(a) Ways and means of negotiating now for the granting and recognition of the independence of the Philippines;

(b) External guarantees of the stability and permanence of said independence as well as of territorial integrity; and

(c) Ways and means of organizing in a speedy, effectual and orderly manner a constitutional and democratic internal government.(3)

(2) M.M. Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, pp. 364-365. In February 1919, the Democratas were endeavouring to have the Legislature pass a resolution asking the United States and allied powers to grant the Philippines a seat at the Peace Conference in Paris. Quezon, who was already in the United States at that time, cautioned against taking this move without consulting President Wilson, who was quite touchy about any embarrassment the Philippine question might cause him in Europe. See Cables, Osmena to Quezon, Quezon to Osmena, both dated February 3, 1919, in Manuel L. Quezon Papers, The National Library, Manila, Box 42.

Governor Harrison also requested the Wilson Administration to allow a Filipino delegation to join the American Commission to negotiate the Peace Treaty in Paris, but he was turned down. See Stephen Bonsal to Harrison, May 5, 1919, in Harrison Papers, Box 44.

Later, on March 8, 1919, the Philippine Legislature, in a joint resolution, confirmed and ratified the creation of the Commission, "continuing said commission in existence until its purposes shall have been attained." The Commission was given "full power and jurisdiction to act for the Philippine Legislature and to represent it in all aspects during the recess of said Legislature." Also on March 8, a "declaration of purposes for the guidance of the Commission of Independence" was approved. It urged the Independence Commission to work for early Philippine independence, to relieve "the anxiety of our people which two decades of occupation have only served to accentuate."(4)

Originally the Commission was composed of eleven senators and forty congressmen, including Senate President Quezon and Speaker Osmeña, who were the presiding officers.(5) Its first session was held on November 8, 1918, when its general plan of operation was discussed. The work of the independence body was divided among five sub-committees, namely: the sub-committee on the negotiation of independence; on domestic affairs; on finance; on national


(5) For the list of members of the Commission, dated August 26, 1919, see Quezon Papers, Box 137.

The Independence Commission was later expanded to include all members of the Philippine Legislature regardless of party affiliation, but the leadership remained Nacionalista. In effect it was the Philippine Legislature under a different name for the purposes of the independence campaign.
defense; and on publicity.(6)

The Commission decided to send a mission to the United States, the main aim of which, so said the cable sent by Quezon and Osmeña to the Secretary of War, was "to secure from the United States the final adjustment of matters affecting our national independence." This mission could have been sent some time ago, they added, "but the war in which America was engaged and the noble issues to which we have given our most unqualified endorsement did not permit us to take such a step."(7)

On November 15, the Philippine Legislature passed a joint resolution "approving the action of the Commission of Independence in sending an extraordinary mission to the United States." The Mission was given the special duty, during its sojourn in the United States, "to endeavour by all means within its power to strengthen the bonds of good will and mutual confidence" that existed between the people of the United States and the Philippines and "to procure the full development, upon ample and durable foundations, of the commercial relations between both countries." To defray the expenses incident to the fulfillment of its duties, the Mission was authorized to use the money appropriated for the Philippine

(6) Manila Times, November 8, 1918. See also list of members of the various sub-committees in Quezon Papers, Box 136.

(7) Teodoro M. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom (Manila, 1965), p. 128.
It should be noted that, in organizing the Mission, independence was not expressly indicated. The Legislature so decided in order not to place the Mission in the position of having to make its purposes public before submitting them to the President of the United States. But the people who recommended this step took it for granted, in spite of the silence of official documents, that the primary object of the Mission was the final submittal of the question of independence.

Governor Harrison endorsed the action of the Philippine Legislature in sending a mission to the United States. On November 11, 1918, he addressed a cablegram to the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, suggesting that the Mission be accorded some special attention in Washington, "to show the Filipino people our appreciation of their loyalty" during the last war, and further, that the question of Philippine independence be taken up.(9)


In the regular appropriations bill approved on December 21, 1918 (Act No. 1785) there was included under the heading "Philippine Senate" this provision: "Expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of the duties imposed upon the extraordinary mission authorized by Joint Resolution No. 11, adopted on November 15, 1918 . . . 250,000 pesos," and under the heading "House of Representatives" there was included an identical item. See BIA Records 27668-35.

(9) Cablegram, Harrison to SecWar, November 11, 1918, BIA Records 26480-11; see also in Quezon Papers, Box 42.
Two days later, the Governor addressed a confidential letter to President Wilson, submitting the view that since the Philippine government was now stable and progressing very well, Congress should take action on the question of Philippine independence through the initiative of the President. He also suggested a plan similar to the Platt amendment for Cuba for the Philippine government. (10)

The original plan called for the departure of the Philippine Mission on November 16. Before then, the Commission prepared reports on the promotion and expansion of Philippine trade and the fostering of improved commercial relations between the Philippines and the United States. Data on Philippine conditions were collected to be used for the publicity campaign that the Mission planned to conduct when it reached the American capital. (11)

However, plans for the Mission to leave before the end of the year (1918) were abandoned in a meeting of the Independence Commission on November 19, 1918. (12) This decision came about following the receipt of a November 15 communication from the

(10) Confidential letter, Harrison to President Wilson, November 13, 1918, in Harrison Papers, Box 35; see also in BIA Records 364-342; draft of letter in Quezon Papers, Box 42.

(11) Manila Times, November 13 and 17, 1918.

(12) When informed by Governor Harrison of the impending departure of the Filipino Mission for the United States, the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Chas C. Walcutt, wrote back advising that the Mission defer sailing until he could confer with President Wilson. See BIA Records 26480-12.
Secretary of War, through Governor Harrison, suggesting indefinite postponement of the delegation's trip, in view of the fact that President Wilson would be occupied with the Peace Conference in Europe and would be unable to meet the Mission.(13)

This rebuff was received with disappointment and bitterness. The move for postponement disconcerted Quezon and Osmeña because of their concern at the possible effect on public opinion such a delay would cause. The Mission and its scheduled departure were of common knowledge, and public opinion had endorsed the project.

At first, a strong answer to the Secretary of War was seriously considered. Quezon's violent temper had exploded, and he spoke of breaking relations with Washington, even starting a revolution; the resignation of Governor Harrison or the entire Legislature was also considered. But a day later, he was more calm and conciliatory.(14) Thus, after some nervous days, the November 19 meeting took a more conservative course, and a temperate statement written by Osmeña was cabled to Washington: The Mission would be delayed as requested in the "firm conviction that the President already has a plan that will satisfy the national aspirations of the Filipino people ... and that the execution of such a plan in so far as the Government of the United States is concerned is assured during the present

(13) Cablegram, SecWar to Harrison, November 15, 1918, BIA Records 26480-13. See also Manila Times, November 20, 1918.

(14) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
administration."(15)

A confidential memorandum, elaborating on the Filipinos' feelings on the postponement of the Mission's trip, was presented to Governor Harrison by Osmeña and Quezon on the same day. The memorandum expressed with "absolute frankness" the hopes and yearnings of the Filipino people, and concluded:

... We respectfully submit that an indefinite postponement of independence would be as untenable for us as -- we are sure -- for the Governor General himself. It would be equivalent to frustrating the nearest and most vital hopes of the people, to reopening in their trusting minds the grave doubts and the dark pessimism of years gone by; doubts and pessimism that we only by the most zealous perseverance and faith have succeeded in dissipating.

... We would be deeply grateful to the Governor General -- who has interested himself so much and so generously in behalf of this country -- if he would consider the propriety of advising the authorities in Washington as to the delicate situation confronting the Filipino people. For them independence is a reality that is coming; it is an unquestionable fact. Firmly persuaded that the justice of God and man has decided that the hour of liberty has come, they await, with the greatest confidence that it is going to come and that they will be secure under the protecting shadow of the United States.(16)

Having sensed the feeling of depression on the part of the Filipinos at the inability of the President to devote attention to the Mission, Governor Harrison anxiously reminded the Washington authorities that the Filipinos expected a definite settlement of the independence problem at the end of the World War, encouraged as they

(15) Cablegram, Harrison to SecWar Baker, November 19, 1918, BIA Records 26480-14 and 364-339.

(16) Confidential memorandum for the Governor General, November 19, 1918, BIA Records 364-342-A; Spanish draft in Quezon Papers, Box 42. See also BIA Records 26480-14 1/2.
were by the President’s war messages, which they interpreted to mean that independence would come to the Philippines after America’s victory in the War. The Nacionalistas felt that they had conducted themselves with restraint during the war, when agitation for independence had been avoided since it might be construed as a lack of appreciation and loyalty to the United States at a time when the utmost support and cooperation were expected. Thus, he wrote:

... It is, of course, out of the question to think that these people, once disappointed, could present a serious military problem to the United States, but I respectfully submit that our position would be difficult, and the situation of the representative of our country in the Philippines most embarrassing, if the consideration of Philippine independence is now indefinitely postponed. The people here have become restless since the Republican congressional victory [in November 1918], and are really anxious to secure early action, settling definitely their future from a sympathetic and responsible Congress. Indecisive treatment of the question would be, in my opinion, an unfortunate culmination of our policy which has made the people of the islands so content and so prosperous during recent years.\(^{(17)}\)

A note of pessimism was editorialized in the American-owned newspaper, The Manila Times, which pointed out in clear terms the difficulties that awaited the Mission. The Philippine question, it said, was a pretty small affair, compared with the importance of so many problems occupying American attention. Hence, the members of the Mission must be prepared for a disappointment and must be prepared to tell the Filipinos frankly that it would be possible that the Mission might bring no immediate results.\(^{(18)}\)

\(^{(17)}\) Stanley, op. cit., pp. 124-125.

\(^{(18)}\) Manila Times, November 20, 1918.
In view of the temporary postponement of the departure of the Mission for the United States, the Commission of Independence, on December 7, 1918, decided to send Senate President Quezon to Washington to pave the way for the delegation. Officially, Quezon was sent "for the purpose of sounding there the economic needs which may be derived from the war just-ended and which more or less might interest the Philippines in her desire to cooperate, whenever it is possible, with the United States in the work of reconstruction of those countries ruined as a result of the war." (19)

Quezon and his party arrived in the American capital on January 24, 1919. While in Washington, Quezon sought counsel from Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra in order to acquaint himself with the general trend of affairs in the United States, so as to be able to advise the Independence Commission on the prospective trip of the Philippine Mission to the United States. (20)

In February 1919, he sent word for the delegation to sail for America. In the meantime, Governor Harrison arrived in Washington on home leave. While there, he ably assisted Quezon in connection with Philippine independence and conferred with high officials in the national capital about Philippine affairs.

(19) Ibid., December 7, 1918.
(20) Ibid., January 24, 1919.
The Philippine Mission finally left, on board the United States military transport Sherman, (21) on February 23, somewhat over three months later than originally scheduled. The official list of the members of the first Mission to the United States counted some forty leading men, representing both political parties (Democrata and Nacionalista) and the various elements of commercial, agricultural, industrial, and professional life in the Philippines. (22) (See Appendix A for list of members of the Mission).

On the eve of its departure, a banquet was tendered for the Mission by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce. Deliberately down-playing the independence aspect to avoid arousing unrealistic Filipino expectations or excessive American concern, the gathering was shorn of all political colour, and independence was not mentioned at all. The speeches were confined to describing the purpose of the Mission as promoting friendly relations and goodwill in the United States and pointing out the promising commercial and industrial possibilities of the Philippines as a result of the

(21) Cablegram, Quezon to Osmeña, January 31, 1919, BIA Records 26480-22.

(22) See Appendix A, Hearings, Joint House and Senate Committees, 1919, pp. 138-139.

The size of this Mission and of subsequent delegations was the subject of much criticism in Manila circles because of the obvious expense involved in sending a huge group.
termination of the war and the readjustment of world conditions.(23)

The Mission, temporarily headed by the Secretary of the Interior, Rafael Palma (who was relieved of his duty as head when the Mission reached the United States and Quezon took over as chairman), was given a royal send-off, on February 23, by thousands who assembled to bid it Godspeed.(24) The delegation left Manila uninstructed about independence, Quezon having been given ample power as head of the Mission to direct and manage it while in the United States.

(23) The Sunday Times, February 23, 1919. See also Cable, Vice-Governor Charles Yeater to SecWar/Walcutt, February 25, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 136 and BIA Records 26480-28.

Erving Winslow, Bostonian anti-imperialist, accused the Filipinos of executing a "volte-face" on independence because of the seeming emphasis on developing close and friendly commercial relations with possible American investors — rather than specifically calling for independence. He suspected that the independence question would be put "in cold storage," and hence he and his Anti-Imperialist League felt betrayed because Quezon and Osmeña were not keeping faith with the demand for independence. See letter to SecWar Baker, March 14, 1919, BIA Records 26480-48. See also communications in Quezon Papers, Box 136.

Apparently a letter with a similar tenor was sent by Fiske Warren of the League to Teodoro Sandiko (Democrata) on April 10, 1919, saying that the Nacionalista leaders of the Mission were in fact secretly against independence and were shouting for it only because they wished to be elected to the Legislature, to which Sandiko concurred. See copy of the letter of Sandiko to Warren, June 25, 1919, in William Howard Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Series 3, Reel 215.

(24) Manila Times, February 24, 1919.
Publicity concerning both the Mission and its political goal was kept at a minimum, so as not to unduly antagonize official feelings in Washington. Nevertheless, the goals of the Mission, as set forth in the Instructions to the Mission by the Commission of Independence, were clear:

The Philippine Mission will please convey to the Government of the United States the frankest assurance of the good will, friendship, and gratitude of the Filipino people and submit with as much respect as confidence the question of Philippine independence with a view to its final settlement.

The Mission came at a bad time -- the war had just ended and officials in Washington were concerned about problems of political and economic readjustments resulting from the war. Philippine independence was thus farthest from their minds. The Mission wisely decided to conduct its visit with sobriety. Instead of playing up their political demand for independence, they emphasized Filipino gratitude for America's accomplishments in the Philippines and hope for a future of mutually beneficial relations.

(25) See Appendix C, Hearings, Joint House and Senate Committees, 1919, pp. 143-144. See also Manila Times, April 4, 1919; and Congressional Record, 66th Cong, 1st sess, Vol. 58, pt. 9, p. 8861.

In a resolution adopted by the Commission of Independence on March 24, 1919, it was decided to communicate to the United States Government the contents of the Declaration of Purposes passed by the Legislature on March 8 in the form of instructions to the Independence Mission. The instructions were prepared by the subcommittee on the negotiation of Philippine independence, chaired by Representative Pablo Borbon (Nacionalista). See Manila Times, March 29, 1919.
There was every reason to be cautious and conciliatory in their attitude, for the Republicans had won control of Congress in the last elections. Nevertheless, there was still cause for optimism. Quezon had cabled that Secretary Baker had informed him privately that he and the President approved of the Mission and hoped for a definitive action to settle the question of Philippine independence. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, Senator William S. Kenyon (Republican, Iowa) gave Quezon to understand, privately, that a number of Republicans, including himself, might be able to get an independence bill through if the Filipinos could win enough Catholic Democrats to their cause. (26)

The Mission was received "warmly" by the authorities and Filipino residents in Honolulu (27) and San Francisco. Because of ill health, Quezon was unable to personally receive the Mission at San Francisco, as planned, and instead sent Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra to act in his place. (28) Speeches delivered by

(26) Cables, Quezon to Osmena, March 10 and 25, 1919, Quezon Papers 26480-27, Box 43. See also BIA Records. The Mission was apparently sent in the hope that something definite would be accomplished before the next session of Congress, which would by then be Republican-controlled. The Filipino leaders were a bit disturbed over the recent victory of the Republicans, who acquired a majority both in the House and in the Senate; hence the somewhat hurried departure of the Mission. See letter, Daniel R. Williams to Taft, November 15, 1918, Taft Papers, series 3, Reel 200.

(27) Manila Times, March 16, 1919.

(28) Ibid., March 26, 1919.
the Mission members both in Honolulu and in San Francisco revolved around the establishment of more cordial relations between Americans and Filipinos, with no mention of independence.\(29\)

The Mission arrived in Washington, D.C. on April 3 and took up quarters at the Willard Hotel. Upon their arrival in the capital, Quezon divided the delegation into two committees — one to consider the political labour of the Mission, headed by Palma, and the other, the commercial, headed by Secretary of Commerce and Communications, Dionisio Jakosalem.\(30\)

In the absence of President Wilson, who had sailed for Europe on March 5,\(31\) Secretary Baker officially received the Philippine delegation at 10:00 a.m. on April 4, "with signs of marked benevolence and sympathy," Quezon cabled Osmeña. Before the Secretary, the Philippine delegation laid the Declaration of Purposes and Instructions from the Commission of Independence to the Philippine Mission. In presenting them to the Secretary, Chairman Quezon remarked that

\[\text{Independence is the great national ideal of the Filipino people. The members of the Philippine Mission here representing all elements of Philippine life are one and all ready to testify to the absolute}\]

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\(\text{(29) Ibid., March 31, 1919.}\)

\(\text{(30) BIA Records 26480-62.}\)

\(\text{(31) Senate President Quezon and Governor Harrison sought an interview with President Wilson before the latter sailed again for Europe on March 5, 1919, but were unable to see him because of the pressure of more important business. See Manila Times, March 17, 1919.}\)
truth of this assertion. We believe that this is the proper time to present the question looking to a favorable and decisive action because of the declared and uniform policy of America to withdraw her sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize our independence as soon as a stable government can be established. That there is now a stable government in the Philippines managed and supported by the people themselves and that it can and will be maintained under an independent Philippine government, the testimony of your own official representatives, Governor-General Harrison and Acting Governor-General Yeater, will bear out. The fulfillment of this solemn promise you owe to yourselves, to us and humanity at large.

In conclusion, Quezon stated that

... when our national independence shall be granted us the world will know that the people of America are indeed bearers of good will, the protection and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation and it is our liberty not your power, our welfare not your gain you sought to enhance in the Philippines.(32)

In reply, Secretary Baker gave the Mission warm and reassuring encouragement. He said:

The Philippine Islands are almost independent now. Your legislature governs the Islands. The strongest tie between the Philippine Islands and the United States at the present time is this tie of affection of which I speak rather than the political. I know that I express the feeling of the President; I certainly express my own feeling -- I think I express the prevailing feeling in the United States -- when I say that we believe the time has substantially come, if not quite come, when the Philippine Islands can be allowed to sever the mere formal political tie remaining and become an independent people. ... (33)

(32) Quezon to SecWar, April 4, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 43. See also Manila Times, April 7, 1919.

(33) Ibid. See also BIA Records 364-348-B.
The Secretary also read a letter from President Wilson. The President's letter gave assurance that the Philippine problem was not foreign to the purpose of his trip to Europe, but there was no commitment to come to a final decision as to Philippine policy.(34)

It was all the Independence Mission could secure from President Wilson. Nevertheless, Quezon expressed satisfaction for the reception accorded them by the Secretary of War and thought it was well worth their trip to have received such a "memorable" response from President Wilson. In a cablegram sent to Osmeña in Manila, Quezon stated that from these messages it was evident that the Mission could rely upon the decided cooperation of the Administration in its efforts to secure independence for the Philippines. The cablegram also noted that Governor Harrison, who had come to Washington to be present on the occasion, had supported their plea for freedom with the declaration that his experience in the Philippines had convinced him that the obstacles to independence that appeared to exist a few years ago had been cleared away.(35)

The Commission of Independence in Manila was extremely pleased with the messages received from Quezon and naively interpreted them to mean that their goal of independence would soon be attained.(36)

(34) Ibid.
(35) Cablegram, Quezon to Osmeña, April 4, 1919, BIA Records 364-348; see also in Quezon Papers, Box 43.
(36) See Osmeña's remarks in Manila Times, April 7, 1919. See also Osmeña to Quezon, April 8, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 43.
As an act of gratitude of the Filipino people for his "reassuring statements" on the question of Philippine independence, a message of appreciation was sent on April 5 to President Wilson in Paris.(37)

The Mission took the opportunity of its presence in the United States to begin an intensive publicity campaign aimed at developing the necessary interest in Congress and the American public to compel consideration of the Philippine question. Its members delivered speeches in different social functions, in clubs and societies, urging the final adjustment of the political relations between the Philippines and the United States with a view to independence. They were well-received and were shown generous hospitality by all persons with whom they came into contact -- in San Francisco, New York, Washington, Philadelphia, and Boston.(38) In a cablegram to Osmena, the Mission noted that "in general the New York papers are showing a sympathetic attitude towards Philippine independence, giving the Mission wide publicity with the exception of the Hearst papers." There was also noted a wonderful change in American sentiment towards Philippine independence, and Quezon expressed the

(37) Cablegram, Philippine Mission to President Wilson, April 5, 1919, BIA Records 364-349-A; Quezon to President Wilson, April 5, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 43; Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Series 5 B, Reel 399.

(38) Cablegram, Quezon to Osmena, April 8, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 136; Quezon to Osmeña, April 8, 1919; Philippine Mission to Osmeña, April 12, 1919; Quezon to Osmeña April 27, 1919, in Box 43. See also BIA Records 26480-62 and 26480-after-66.
belief that independence "is near and sure to come," thanks to the favourable impression created by the Mission.(39)

On April 18, Chairman Quezon announced the Mission formally dissolved, and the delegates prepared for the return trip home. However, part of the Mission remained behind to continue the publicity campaign. A publicity office, the Philippine Press Bureau, was created in Washington, in April 1919, directed by Maximo M. Kalaw and Conrado Benitez, with Arsenio Luz serving as publicity agent in New York. The work of the bureau was placed under the over-all supervision of the Filipino Resident Commissioners in Washington.(40)

(39) Quezon to Osmeña, April 14, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 43; see also BIA Records 26480-after-66.

(40) Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, June 6, 1919, BIA Records 26480-90. See also Manila Times, April 27, 1919; BIA Records 364-with-350; and Arsenio Luz, Publicity Agent, Philippine Press Bureau, New York City to The Editor, NYC, June 17, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 136. The Philippine Press Bureau was successively headed as director by Maximo M. Kalaw, Conrado Benitez, Jose P. Melencio, Eulogio B. Rodriguez, and Vicente G. Bunuan. The Bureau was almost closed down in 1924 when the Insular Auditor refused to honour any more vouchers from the independence fund created in December 1920 by the Legislature for the Independence Commission. It did continue until August 1931, but was able to carry on its activities only under extreme financial difficulties. The Press Bulletin ceased publication in May 1924 after the Insular Auditor suspended the independence fund. See Quezon Papers, Boxes 136-139 for documents on the Independence Commission and the Press Bureau.
The Press Bureau published the Philippine Commission of Independence Press Bulletin, which came out in its maiden issue on August 14, 1919. The work of the Press Bureau consisted in the sending of articles on the Philippines to newspapers which might want to publish them; the printing of pamphlets and monthly bulletins; the supervision of "plate-matter" publicity, consisting of ready-to-print plates which were subscribed to, free of charge, by 4500 American papers in rural United States; and, in general, the dissemination of all sources of information on the Philippines and the Filipinos for the benefit of Congress and the American public.

The Press Bulletin, which came out monthly, and had a circulation of 15,000, published facts and figures about the Philippines; articles depicting Philippine progress and Filipino demands for independence; answers to criticisms of the Philippines and the Filipinos written by Americans in the United States and in the Philippines; and press comments and editorials in American newspapers on various issues affecting the Philippines. Some of its prominent contributors were Jose P. Melencio, Maximo M. Kalaw, Conrado Benitez, Leandro Fernandez, Austin Craig, Walter Robb, Governor Harrison, and members of the United States Congress who were sympathetic to Philippine independence. (41)

The aims and scope of the work of the Press Bureau were explained in more detail by Maximo M. Kalaw in a report to the Commission of Independence. He said:

The scope of the work is unique; we are seeking to advertise an entire people, not only for the furtherance of the Philippine independence question and the immediate fulfillment of the pledge of the American people to grant us independence, but also to make them better acquainted with our civilization, character and life.

This work is of supreme importance, especially in view of the past misrepresentation that the enemies of Philippine freedom has [sic] been making for years to the American nation. Editorials appearing in even the largest city newspapers in many instances reveal an almost unbelievable ignorance on the Philippine question. Ex-officials of the Philippines have long carried on a campaign of misrepresentation, picturing the Filipino people as a mere coterie of savage or semi-civilized tribes devoid of any sense of nationality and separate from one another by warring jealousies and hatred.(42)

The early solution of the Philippine independence question obviously depended in large part upon the Congress of the United States. As another aspect of the independence campaign, those members of the Mission remaining in the United States responded to an opportunity to appear on June 2 and 3, 1919, before a joint hearing of the Committee on the Philippines of the Senate and the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives. The hearing was presided over by Senator Warren G. Harding (Republican, Ohio) and Representative Horace M. Towner (Republican, Iowa), respectively. Before the joint committees, the Mission members presented three documents: the Declaration of Purposes for the

guidance of the Commission of Independence, the Instructions from the Commission of Independence to the Philippine Mission, and a Memorial asking in unmistakable terms for the granting of early independence to the Philippines. (43)

The request for independence presented by the Mission was noteworthy for the vigour and strength of its arguments, and for the attitude of respect for the United States and earnest appreciation for all that had already been done for the Philippines. There were no complaints of their treatment by the United States -- only a firm petition for independence and a willingness to accept all responsibilities accompanying that status. The appeal was "a triumph of self-restraint and an achievement in friendship." The Memorial to Congress noted that

For the first time in the history of colonial relations a subject and alien race comes to ask the severance of their political connection with the sovereign nation without recounting any act of injustice, but rather with a feeling of gratitude and affection. Our plea for independence is based not on the injustice which might be found in the forcible subjection of the Filipinos, but on the justice of our claim that the national sovereignty of our people be fully recognized, in order that we may freely fulfill our mission and contribute to the spread and establishment of democracy and Christian institutions in the Far East. (44)
Official statements made by the constitutional representatives of the American people, from President McKinley to President Wilson, were then quoted to define the purpose of the United States in the Philippines, as reiterated by these officials. A chapter was devoted to an account of the work done by the Filipinos in the years since they were allowed to take an active part in the affairs of their government, and particularly after the establishment of the autonomous government authorized by the Jones Law, with a view to showing that conditions in the Philippines were now ripe for the establishment of an independent government. Progress in the establishment of popular self-government, as in the reorganization of the insular government, the strengthening of local governments, the maintenance of public law and order, the establishment of public education, the improvement of sanitation, and general economic progress, was presented, complete with official figures and statistics.

Dwelling on the requisites for a stable government, the Memorial went on to say

... that the Filipinos now have a government of this sort, a government constituted by the people, able to preserve order and to comply with its international obligations, can not be denied by any fairminded man who knows the conditions of the country. Our present government is a government based on the peaceful suffrage of the people, representing the whole country, deriving their powers from the people and subject to the limitations and safeguards which the experience of constitutional government has shown to be essential to the maintenance and protection of individual rights.\(^{(45)}\)

\(^{(45)}\) Ibid., pp.129-130.
The last chapter of the Memorial was devoted to a treatment of the independence aspirations of the Filipinos. Declarations and resolutions for independence passed by the Philippine Assembly and the Philippine Legislature from 1908 to 1919 were quoted to prove beyond doubt the firm and unswerving determination of the Filipinos to obtain a full recognition of their national sovereignty. In conclusion, the Memorial reiterated that

In each and every one of these documents the sentiment of the Filipinos for their independence, a living sentiment, constant and ever growing, is reflected. Neither the years that have passed nor the benefits received from the American Government have in any manner changed this sentiment. The Filipinos today, more than ever, believe that the time has come when the political relations between the two countries should be settled and adjusted with a view to a final solution.\(^{(46)}\)

Before Congress, Quezon, who was among the Mission members remaining in the United States, made a vigorous plea for independence along the lines set forth in the Memorial. The Senators and Representatives present demonstrated much interest in the elucidation of various aspects of the Philippine case, and Quezon responded to numerous questions.\(^{(47)}\) On future relations between the United States and the Philippines, Quezon explained that they would be discussed between the two governments after independence had been granted to the Filipinos. He said, however, that the Philippines was prepared to have the independence of the country recognized by the United States with or without any

\(^{(46)}\) Ibid., pp.131-138.

\(^{(47)}\) Ibid., pp.5-8.
And as to the type of independence preferred, he said that

... the independence of the Philippines under the League (of Nations) is what at the present time appeals to everybody in the Philippines. But if there be no League the Filipinos would like to see the independence of the Philippines recognized and guaranteed by international agreement between the great powers; but if that should not be possible, they want independence anyway.

The Mission members must have felt the reluctance of Congress to act when Congressman Towner, acting as chairman of the hearings, set forth this position:

... the Philippine have been making — especially during the last few years — very remarkable progress. Now, that being true and present conditions in the Islands being so satisfactory, I suppose that it is not really imperative that immediate consideration of this matter should be given it, is it; that is as to the question of independence?

***

Supposing the members of the commission should say to your people as they very truthfully say — "The United States now are simply engrossed, overwhelmed with the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation; they are almost bankrupt; they can't get enough money to run the Government, and all of these pressing matters are before them. If we press this question of independence upon them, it is not a question that will receive their careful consideration at this time, perhaps; it would be better that the matter should be considered by the Congress at a time when it could receive careful consideration; ..."
** **

. . . Is it wise for you -- you know these conditions that exist in Congress; you can't just ask Congress for something and have it granted. You know these conditions that exist in Congress; is it best now, even from your standpoint, for you to ask immediate consideration by the Congress of this question when the probabilities are that in the first place they wouldn't consider it now; and if they did consider it, the probabilities are it would not receive such consideration as you ask and as the subject deserves? Would it be wise to present that matter and ask the Congress to do these things now?

. . . the difficulty really is that I don't believe we can get action at this time. This is the truth about it.(50)

One of the arguments against the granting of Philippine independence was the danger of outside aggression, especially from Japan, that an independent Philippine republic would encounter. In refutation of this argument, Quezon expressed the opinion that Japan had no desire to attack the Philippines. He said:

. . . no nation attacks another except with the expectation of gaining more than it loses in the attack. And Japan or any other nation will not profit as much as it would lose in conquering the Philippine Islands. Conquests are undertaken now either because of need of territory or for strategical reasons. Japan does not seem to be just now very anxious to get more land; she has plenty in Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa, and certainly she has not shown herself to be a good colonizer of tropical lands.

As far as strategical reasons are concerned, Japan does not need the Philippines except to get the Philippines out of the hands of other powers.

. . . But there is no European country that we

(50) Ibid., pp.9-10.
think would like to take the Philippines if the 
Philippines have their independence; therefore Japan 
for strategical reasons will not need the 
Philippines. For commercial reasons Japan need not 
conquer us because she could just as well trade with 
us if we were independent.(51)

Quezon concluded his testimony by explicitly reminding the 
joint committees that the Filipino people expected independence 
after the conclusion of the war in Europe. They would be "sorely 
disappointed," he said, if no immediate action was taken, unless 
they understood that action in the near future was contemplated.(52)

Quezon's testimony was followed by statements from other 
members of the Mission, who spoke on the various phases of 
Philippine progress -- political and economic developments, 
education -- which bore witness to a stable government.(53)


(52) George Fairchild, an American businessman with extensive sugar 
interests in the Philippines, wrote Congressman Towner on June 
23, 1919, reporting on what he felt were the Philippine 
Mission's thoughts on what would be the best political 
arrangement for the Philippines -- that is, internal 
independence to be granted in the next session of Congress, and 
in return, the Philippines would yield to the United States, 
preferably in perpetuity, or at least for an extended period of 
years, control of their foreign affairs with such military, 
naval, and coaling stations as the United States would need, 
these in exchange for free trade and protection. These 
impressions apparently were the result of Fairchild's 
conversations with the most influential members of the 
Philippine Mission travelling with him on the return trip to 
Manila. See in Harrison Papers, Box 25.

(53) Hearings, Joint House and Senate Committees, 1919, pp. 19-104.
Governor Harrison again did not fail to lend his unqualified support to the labours of the Mission, and accompanied its members on this important occasion. Strongly affirming the existence of a stable government, capable of maintaining law and order and of promoting progress, and earnestly recommending the earliest possible grant of independence to the Philippines, Governor Harrison provided the concluding testimony before the joint committees of Congress on June 3.

The Governor stated that the desire for independence had become so universal and deep-rooted that the heart of the Filipino had been unswervingly loyal to it, since the first day of American occupation. After citing the tremendous development made by the Filipinos along political, social, and economic lines, he said that independence would be justified not only by the high principles of American democracy, but also by the practical fitness of the Filipino people to maintain an efficient government. The members of the Mission, declared the Governor, were true representatives of the Filipino people, and their task in the United States had been the expression of the confidence of the people of the Philippines in the sense of justice of the American people in their high principles. The Governor also testified that, contrary to opinions entertained by some quarters, the people of the Philippines were a very homogeneous nation belonging to the same race, with general and universal feeling on questions of national importance. (54) As a form

(54) Ibid., pp.105-106. See also cable, Luz to Osmena, June 9, 1919 BIA Records 364-354.
of guarantee to the future independent Philippine Government, Governor Harrison again expressed his view that an arrangement similar to that of Cuba could be made "which restricts the ability of the new Republic in borrowing of foreign governments, and also permits the United States to interfere with the affairs of the new Republic in case conditions of disorder should be found to prevail."(55)

Chairman Towner, bringing the joint hearings to a close, expressed appreciation for the information given the members of the joint committees by the Mission and further stated that the Philippine question was a nonpartisan matter and would be settled according to its own merits and the best interests of the people. Thus:

... If Philippine independence should be granted it will be because we believe that it is the best thing for the islands; if it should be deferred, it is because we believe that it is best that it should be so. ... (56)

The session adjourned at 4:00 p.m. after Quezon had extended an invitation to the House and Senate committees to visit the Philippines.

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One wonders if Governor Harrison, by suggesting that the Platt Amendment (as applied to Cuba) be likewise applied to the Philippines, was actually not too sure, in 1919, as to the stability of the Philippine government.

(56) Ibid., pp. 110, 111.
From the general attitude of the members of the joint committees – an attitude of polite attention, but of little deep interest – and from the absence of any controversial questioning of the Filipino representatives, the Mission members must have come to the conclusion that nothing would be done for them by that Congress. Congress had to take up and pass upon the many matters that had arisen in connection with the Peace Treaty and the economic readjustment of the country after the war. Certainly, the new Republican majority in Congress would not consider for passage any measure giving independence to the Philippines until members of the Philippine committees of both the Senate and the House had investigated conditions in the Philippines. But the pressure of business in Congress would prevent either chairman of the Philippine committees from coming to the Philippines. By the spring of 1920, America would become preoccupied with the Republican convention for the nomination of a president. The issue of independence, therefore, would be shelved until 1921.

But there was some interest aroused by the Mission among a few members of Congress. In a letter to Secretary Baker on June 6, 1919, Representative Finis J. Garrett, the ranking Democratic member on the House Committee on Insular Affairs, broached the matter of introducing a measure on the Philippines. On June 8, Secretary Baker answered confidentially, suggesting that a resolution be introduced in Congress in response to the representations of the Philippine Mission. Personally, he replied, he favoured granting Philippine independence in 1925, provided the Filipinos had, in the meantime, formulated and adopted a
constitution acceptable to the President. Baker was expressing his own views, and not those of President Wilson, but he did recognize the urgency of the matter "which can not in any case be long delayed."(57)

On June 13, Representative William E. Mason (Republican, Illinois) introduced in the House Committee on Insular Affairs H.R. 5719 — a bill to declare the people of the Philippines free and independent.(58) The 66th Congress, first session, however, adjourned without taking any action on an independence bill.

On July 20 the Republican leaders in Congress announced an indefinite postponement of the question of Philippine independence. It was announced in the press that "few, if any of the Republican or Democratic members of [the congressional committees on Philippines affairs] had been sufficiently impressed by the representation of the delegates to take a stand in favour of freeing the islands at this time.

The general conclusion was that no step in this direction shall be taken until more convincing proof had been offered of the ability of the Filipinos to stand alone and continue to maintain institutions of government and education established by the United States which have wrought such beneficent changes in

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(58) Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 58, pt. 2, p. 1098. A draft of an independence bill was prepared by the Mission for inclusion as part of their Memorial to Congress. See Quezon to Osmeña, May 26, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 43.
the islands in twenty years. Moreover, it was deemed inadvisable to take a step of such great moment to those wards of the American Republic until the equilibrium of world conditions was restored. (59)

The remainder of the Mission, having finished its work in the United States, had by then also returned to the Philippines. Quezon arrived in Manila on July 2, 1919 and was welcomed lavishly by a water parade and a motorcade which gave Manila's streets a festive mood, in spite of dark skies, which did not dampen the enthusiasm for the returning Mission chairman. (60)

Quezon then prepared his report on the results of the Mission's work in the United States. With nothing tangible to offer as a result of the trip, the Mission publicized President Wilson's remarks and Secretary Baker's warm reception of them. The report consisted of two parts: the preliminary report dated April 27, 1919, which Quezon had cabled from Washington, and the final report, which Quezon read before the Legislature on July 26, 1919.

The preliminary report considered the work of the Mission "in every respect successful," and made the following observations:

The Mission was able to obtain such a frank and explicit declaration of the President of the United States in regard to the settlement of the question of independence as was never before made. The administration went further than merely to reaffirm the avowed policy of this country regarding ultimate independence for the Philippines, having expressed in addition the opinion that the time has come for the granting of independence. This fact alone would have justified the trip of the Mission for to obtain at


(60) Manila Times, July 2, 1919.
this time a formal expression on the part of the authorities in Washington, D.C., as to Philippine independence would have been impossible without the coming of this Mission in view of the many world wide pressing problems that the administration is dealing with, but great as this achievement is, it is not the only one promising substantial results. (61)

The final report dealt mostly with the congressional hearing given the Mission, stating that

... The United States Government has, therefore, for the first time in the history of American occupation of the islands, officially received a mission created and authorized by the Filipino people for the express purpose of discussing their future political status. This, in itself, is an accomplishment of which the Filipino people can very well be proud.

The report summarized the results of the Mission as follows:

1. The American administration has given its formal endorsement to our desire for immediate independence.

2. The American public opinion as far as we can ascertain has been won over in favor of our cause.

3. The message of friendship and goodwill to the American people has been warmly received and as warmly reciprocated.

4. A precedent new in the history of democracy has been set whereby the relationship between a dependent people and their sovereign nation may be settled, not by force and unconditional subjection, but by mutual understanding brought about by peaceful conference between the representatives of the two people.

5. The presence of a large number of distinguished Filipinos has erased the erroneous impression hitherto current among many Americans that the Philippines are inhabited by a backward race unaccustomed to the ways of civilization.

(61) Ibid., May 6, 1919. See report also in Quezon Papers, Box 43.
But great as these achievements were, the report stated that the work of the Mission had only begun and must be continued to its final conclusion.(62)

Despite Quezon's glowing reports, there appeared much skepticism as to the alleged "success" of the Mission. In fact, the Philippine press and the opposition Democrata politicians rapped the Nacionalista-led Mission for its failure to secure independence. The Democratas made capital of the failure of the Mission to bring home independence and implied that the Nacionalistas deceived the people when they held out that the United States Congress would decide favourably on the independence issue. No less than Pedro Gil, a Democrata candidate for election and himself a member of the Mission, attacked the work of the Mission in Washington.(63) But then, this was the year for Philippine congressional elections, and the Democratas, being the minority party, criticized the Nacionalistas to gain political mileage. Politics aside, the Philippine Legislature and the Independence Commission expressed satisfaction at the Mission's work and Quezon's leadership.(64)

(62) Manila Times, July 26, 1919. See also Quezon to Osmena, April 28, 1919, Quezon Papers, Box 43.

(63) Manila Times, May 22, 23, 1919. Crisanto Evangelista, also a member of the Mission, came to the defense of the Mission and pointed out that Gil, in fact, had approved of the Mission's work while in the United States. See Minutes of the Meeting of the Philippine Mission in New York, April 16, 1919, presided by Quezon for proof of Democrata endorsement of the Mission's work, in Quezon Papers, Box 136.

As a result of the Mission's trip, there had been a rousing of real and general interest in the Philippine question. In press comments in the United States, there seemed little desire to claim that the Filipinos were not intellectually equipped for running their own government, as had heretofore been alleged. Such opposition to independence as there was appeared to be based upon the contention that the Filipinos were not in a position to defend their independence and that the United States could not afford to stand guarantor for the Philippines after she relinquished all control over the country.

The question of independence was, however, held under advisement by the Congress. The time might have "substantially come" — "the end almost in sight" — for Philippine independence, but the United States was not yet prepared to define the end.

The enthusiasm engendered by the return of the first Mission caused the announcement of plans for the sending of another delegation in February 1920 for the purpose of enlisting the support of both Republicans and Democrats in Philippine independence during their conventions for the presidential nomination. The envoys were to work to make Philippine independence a factor in the campaign for the presidency in 1920 by having it included in the platform of the two contending parties. It was thought that if this were accomplished, independence would surely come during the next administration, if it did not come before the end of the Wilson regime. Quezon was again expected to head the mission.(65)

(65) Manila Times, September 3, 1919.
In October 1919, Speaker Osmeña publicly announced plans for sending the new mission abroad. The second mission, he stated, would work not only for immediate independence but also for bringing about "better understanding, greater confidence, and closer economic relations between the United States and the Philippines," continuing the work of the first mission.(66)

On November 17, 1919, Quezon announced that in all probability he would sail for the United States in February 1920.(67) On January 6, 1920, the Speaker again announced that the second mission would certainly leave for the United States, it being evident that it was necessary to send it in order to conduct a widespread publicity campaign for the Philippine cause.(68) Quezon, as chairman of the mission, planned to go ahead to pave the way for the delegation in the United States, and to sound out public opinion and sentiment in America before coming to a final decision on the sending of the mission.(69)

Plans to send the second mission did not, however, materialize. Instead, a delegation composed of Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de de Veyra, Jose P. Melencio, Arsenio Luz, and Felipe Buencamino, Sr., attended the party conventions in the United States, working


(67) Manila Times, November 17, 1919.

(68) Ibid., January 6, 1919.

(69) Ibid., March 7, 1920.
among the officers and delegates in the interest of Philippine independence. (70)

For the duration of the Wilson administration, the Filipino leaders and their supporters tried in various ways to focus attention on the independence issue, but always without success. Harrison and Quezon both tried to secure, at least, the appointment of a Filipino either as Governor General or Vice-Governor and for the creation of a Filipino majority on the Philippine Supreme Court. Secretary Baker was sympathetic to the proposal, but no action was taken. (71)

In November 1920, although fully aware that Representative Towner had publicly declared himself unwilling to consider legislation granting Philippine independence, the Filipino resident commissioners persuaded Joseph P. Tumulty, personal secretary of President Wilson, to ask the President to recommend such a bill anyway, in order to place on the record his certification that the Filipinos had met the stable government required by the Jones Act. (72) Wilson made the recommendation for independence, but it


(71) Cable, Harrison to McIntyre, November 13, 1920, BIA Records 3038-89; Harrison to McIntyre, September 5, 1920, Quezon Papers, Box 199; Harrison, op. cit., p. 287. Secretary of War Baker would only favour the choice of a Filipino as Vice-Governor if there was a vacancy.

(72) Letter, de Veyra and Isauro Gabaldon to President Wilson, November 30, 1920, in Wilson Papers, Reel 191. See also de Veyra to Osmena and Quezon, November 30 and December 3, 1920, Quezon Papers, Box 43.
was not acted upon by the Republican-controlled Congress. Wilson’s belated request for congressional action on Philippine independence a few months before he retired from the presidency gives the impression that he was not all that earnest in his desire for the independence of the Philippines.

With the election of Warren G. Harding as President of the United States, succeeding Woodrow Wilson, plans were again advanced by the Commission of Independence to send a Philippine Mission to Washington for the purpose of attending the inaugural ceremonies and extending to the new president the best wishes of the Filipino people. It was also planned to have the mission work for the selection of a new Governor General to succeed Harrison. (73)

A Nacionalista party caucus held on November 8, 1920, reached a contrary conclusion. Considering that the outgoing president had lost his prestige with the people and that the incoming Congress would have a Republican majority in both houses, they concluded that it would be inadvisable to take up the question of the Philippines at that time. (74) It was announced later in November that no mission would be sent to the United States that year.

It was also decided that no attempt in any way whatsoever would be made by the Filipinos to influence President-elect Harding in the appointment of a Governor General to succeed Harrison. If any mission were to be sent to the United States, it was planned that it

(74) Manila Times, November 9, 1920.
would not be sent until July or August 1921, after a new Governor General had been appointed. The mission to be sent then would work toward the establishment of closer commercial relations between the United States and the Philippines, and at the same time would work for Philippine independence.(75)

The next mission was actually sent in 1922, after the Republican regime had been well established.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILIPPINE PARLIAMENTARY MISSION, 1922

The Democratic Administration completed its eight years in office in March 1921 without fulfilling its long-standing commitment to Philippine independence. In December 1920, after nearly eight years as President and just after his party had been decisively defeated in the elections, Woodrow Wilson had made his only recommendation to Congress in favour of Philippine independence.(1) This Congress was, however, Republican-controlled, and as expected, it did not respond to the President's suggestion for independence legislation.(2)

(1) Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 60, pt. 1, p. 26. This statement on the Philippines in the President's message to Congress was inserted through the efforts of Resident Commissioners Jaime C. de Veyra and Isauro Gabaldon operating through Mr. Tumulty. See Letter of the Commissioners to President Wilson, November 30, 1920, in Wilson Papers; also Memorandum of General McIntyre, August 30, 1921, Manuel L. Quezon, Personnel "P" file, part III, BIA Records.

At the time of Wilson's recommendation, the Philippine government was in the midst of a financial crisis resulting from the irregular operations of the Philippine National Bank, thus somewhat weakening claims to stability. See Stanley, op. cit., pp. 237-248.

In an interview with President Harding in Washington in August 1921, Quezon explained that the financial situation in the Philippines was not as bad as it had been pictured and that the financial position of the government itself was sound. See Manila Times, August 29, 1921; Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, August 28, 1921, Quezon Papers, Box 44.

(2) The only other action taken in the 66th Congress on behalf of Philippine independence was the introduction on December 6, 1920, by Congressman Edward J. King (Republican, Illinois) of H.R. 14481. See Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 60, pt. 1, p. 10.
Filipino hopes for action on the Wilson recommendation had dimmed by the time of the inauguration, on March 4, 1921, of Warren G. Harding, a Republican, as President of the United States. Harding was not unfamiliar with Philippine affairs, and he did have specialized knowledge obtained as former chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines. But undoubtedly his views were largely shaped by his party's stand, and the Republicans were unsympathetic to any proposal involving America's withdrawal from the Philippines in the near future. It was believed that in all probability President Harding would appoint a Governor General for the Philippines whose outlook would reflect the Philippine policy of the Republican Party.

In fact, fear that a Republican Governor General might, with a stroke of a pen, eliminate from the Philippine appropriations bill for 1921 and succeeding years that item which provided expenses for the independence missions was manifested even before the Harding election. Concern over this possibility induced some prominent members of the Philippine Legislature to advocate the passage of a separate law making a permanent appropriation of one million pesos for the independence missions. A bill was sponsored by Representative Benigno S. Aquino (Democrat) and was introduced in the lower house on October 22, 1920.(3)

Representative King reintroduced the bill as H.R. 293 in the 67th Congress, 1st session, on April 11, 1921, during which session another bill, H.R. 112 — a bill to declare the people the Philippine Islands free and independent — was sponsored by William E. Mason (Republican, Illinois). Both bills died in the 67th Congress. See ibid., 67th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 61, pt. 1, pp. 93, 89.

(3) Manila Times, October 22, 1920.
There was lively discussion from both the Democrata and Nacionalista members of the Legislature on the merits and demerits of this legislation. A great deal of the opposition to the bill centered on its vague and indefinite provisions as to the exact disposition of the funds allotted and on the unnecessary haste attending its passage. (4) Nevertheless, in spite of this opposition, on October 29, 1920, the million peso bill was approved by the House by an overwhelming majority. On December 15 the independence fund bill became Act No. 2933 — an act providing for a standing appropriation of one million pesos per annum for the Independence Commission — the appropriation being to defray the expenses connected with the performance of its duties. The amount was to be considered automatically included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of Representatives. (5)

The annually recurring feature of the appropriations bill was to preclude the possibility of veto by a succeeding governor general who might not be as approving of the independence movement as Harrison was. The law also provided that "no part of this sum shall be set up on the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by this Act." This meant that expenses under this law were exempted from pre-audit required of other appropriations, the exemption enabling the fund to be spent without the knowledge of the public or of the minority.


members of the Legislature. The signature of the Speaker of the House or the Senate President, as the case might be, was the sole requisite to authorize payments from the fund. While vouchers for actual disbursements were presumably filed with the Insular Auditor, it was not within his prerogative to determine whether particular expenditures were for "propaganda" or for other purposes, nor could he give publicity to returns filed.(6)

The Filipino leaders did not expect that the Republicans, upon their coming into power, would propose to reverse the level of self-government they had achieved under the Harrison regime. At the outset of this new period of Republican Administration, they were therefore eager to know what their future would be.

After Harding took over as President (and while a mission of investigation was conducting its work in the Philippines), the Filipino leaders sent Senate President Quezon to Washington to find

(6) With the independence fund, trained American magazine and newspaper writers were employed. The Philippine Press Bureau in Washington circulated literature in behalf of Philippine independence. The Press Bulletin was sent to members of Congress, prominent citizens, and the editors of hundreds of newspapers in the United States. It offered to send any newspaper editor a free copy of either one of two books which were favourable to the Philippines: Francis Burton Harrison's The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence and Charles Edward Russell's The Outlook for the Philippines. The most expensive undertaking of the campaign for independence was the sending of almost yearly missions to the United States.
out the policy of the new president. (7) On August 25, 1921, President Harding granted Quezon an interview at the White House. Quezon informed the President that the people of the Philippines earnestly wanted independence and believed that it should be granted at an early date. (8)

President Harding answered that he could not discuss the question of independence as yet, because he desired to have the report of Commissioners Wood and Forbes, then still in the Philippines, before announcing a definite policy. He was quite emphatic, nevertheless, in assuring Quezon that in no case would a "backward policy" be pursued, that there would be no diminution of domestic autonomy, that no radical change of legislation was contemplated, and that it was his purpose and desire to make the administration of the Philippines entirely in harmony with the best interests of the Filipinos and with their desires as far as possible. He hoped, he said, that the harmonious relations which had hitherto existed with the United States would be continued and strengthened. The United States could and would help the Filipinos.

(7) Quezon sailed from Manila on July 12, arrived in Washington on August 15, and sailed back to Manila on September 15, 1921. See Quezon, "P" file, BIA Records; also Manila Times, July 10 and 11, 1921.

Quezon's trip was reportedly brought on, in part, by a long cablegram known to have been received from Resident Commissioner de Veyra, who urged him to come to Washington without delay. There were disturbing rumours that former Governor General and President William Howard Taft and other influential Americans had recommended the abolition of the Philippine Senate.

The Quezon trip was obviously also occasioned by the coming of the investigating mission and the fear that the new administration would adopt a policy diametrically opposed to that followed by the past Democratic regime. See ibid., November 26, 1921.

(8) Ibid., August 29, 1921; see also Cables, Quezon to Osmeña, August 28, 1921, in Quezon Papers, Box 44.
in matters which were to their mutual interest.(9)

It was apparent from Harding's comments that even if there was to be no diminution of domestic autonomy, there was no desire on the part of the new administration to advance Philippine independence on the basis of the Jones Act and on the strength of the existence of a stable government, as affirmed by President Wilson.

President Harding withheld formal announcement of his administration's policy on the Philippine question until after the return of his special investigating mission. The mission, composed of persons who had had extensive experience in connection with Philippine administration, had been directed to investigate and report on conditions there -- and specifically, to find out whether the assertions of President Wilson and Governor Harrison were true.

Wilson's message to Congress that the Filipinos had complied with all the conditions for independence and that it was now the duty of the United States to give them independence, being addressed to Congress after the election of his successor, when both houses had a strong Republican majority, seems clearly to have been politically motivated. His urging that the Republicans do something which he himself had not done in his eight years as President, during six years of which Democrats were in control of both houses, was directly calculated to embarrass his successor. President Harding did not hesitate to state that he felt that was the object

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(9) BIA Records 364-409-A; Manila Times, August 31, 1921; Quezon to Harrison, undated letter from Vancouver, 1921, Harrison Papers, Box 44.

The Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Philippine affairs also assured Quezon that Congress would not pass any law withdrawing any powers from the Filipinos.
of the message, and once having dealt with the Wilson recommendation by means of the mission, he no longer felt constrained by the Wilson manoeuvre.(10)

When the mission returned, the report which it submitted was generally felt to express the policy of the Administration. Although no public announcement was made to confirm it, it was tacitly understood that the President and the Secretary of War accepted the mission's findings.

President Harding selected Major General Leonard Wood (to whom he also offered the position of Governor General) and former Governor General W. Cameron Forbes to head the investigating mission to the Philippines. They were to conduct a personal survey of conditions there and to verify the facts and ascertain whether the people of the Philippines were qualified for independence.(11)


See also Leonard Wood to Henry L. Stimson, January 28, 1921, in Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 158; Warren G. Harding to Wood, February 14, 1921, ibid., Box 156.

On March 14, 1921, almost a month before the commissioners sailed from the United States, Resident Commissioners de Veyra and Gabaldon conferred with President Harding regarding the projected visit of the Wood-Forbes Mission and were reported to have urged that Governor Wood be instructed, if possible, to recommend a definite date for Philippine independence. See New York Times, March 15, 1921.
On March 23, 1921, Secretary of War John W. Weeks instructed the commissioners to study the probable effect of independence on the Philippines, with special attention to the financial situation of the people and of the government, the ability of the existing government to perform its functions efficiently, the results of filipinization, its treatment of the "backward people" of the Philippines (i.e., the non-Christian minority), and the ability of the Filipinos to defend their land and resources from the "less fortunate but probably stronger neighbors" which surrounded them, and thus to ascertain whether the Philippine government was in a position to warrant its "total separation" from the United States.\(^\text{(12)}\)

Wood and Forbes, and their nine attached members,\(^\text{(13)}\) sailed for the Philippines in April 1921 and arrived in Manila on May 4. The reception that was prepared for them was extremely cordial.

Four months were spent by the mission in the Philippines, in the course of which time every province but one (Batanes Island) was visited, besides many subprovinces. In all of them public sessions


\(^{\text{(13)}}\) They were Colonel Frank R. McCoy, Chief of Staff; Ray Atherton, Department of State, Secretary of the American Legation, Peking, China; Lieut. Col. Gordon Johnston, U.S. Army (Cavalry); Maj. Edward Bowditch, Jr., U.S. Army (Cavalry); Prof. H. Otley Beyer, University of the Philippines; Lieut. Commander Stewart F. Bryant, U.S. Navy; Maj. A.L.F. Johnson, U.S. Army; Capt. Robert C. Candee, Aide-de-camp; First Lieut. Osborne C. Wood, aide-de-camp to General Wood. See Report of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, p. 4.
were held. (14)

Ever since the announcement of the coming of the mission, speculation had mounted as to what the mission's stand would be on the independence issue. But the Filipino leaders realized that the mission came at a bad time, as the Philippines was in the midst of a financial crisis, responsibility for which would fall on them since they were managing almost completely Philippine affairs. They were worried, therefore. Having thoughtlessly worked the people up to believe that the assignment of General Wood was a "fore-shadowing of independence," "the first Republican step to bring independence about," and knowing this was not to be the case, Quezon and Osmeña requested Wood and Forbes to handle the independence issue discreetly "so that the people would appreciate and understand it without having their preconceived ideas and ambitions upset too suddenly." (15)


The following articles are also interesting: "General Wood's Philippine Mission," Literary Digest, 69 (June 4, 1921), p. 23; Gertrude Emerson, "The Philippines Inside Out," Asia, 21 (November 1921), pp. 903-910; 956; 958-959; and Eleanor F. Egan, "Do the Filipinos Want Independence?" Saturday Evening Post, 194 (October 15, 1921).

(15) See "General Wood's Philippine Mission," Literary Digest, 69 (June 4, 1921, p. 23); also Wood Diary, May 10, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 14.

The financial crisis involved the Philippine National Bank which had used large sums held for the conversion of currency to make unwise loans and improper speculation. As a result Philippine currency depreciated about 15 per cent. To rehabilitate the government's finances, the Philippines had to ask the United States Congress for a loan and authority to sell in the United States millions of dollars in bonds guaranteed by the United States.
The two commissioners steered clear of the independence question and announced that they came to the Philippines merely to render a full and impartial report of conditions to President Harding. They stated that Philippine independence rested exclusively with the United States Congress. During their stay, they did observe, however, that the desire for independence among the people seemed almost universal, though they concluded that this was undoubtedly because it had been "systematically fomented and encouraged by the Philippine leaders and by the American teachers and officials." They also concluded that there was some sober sentiment among a minority of politically conservative people who doubted their readiness.

Generally speaking, the Commission of Independence adopted an attitude of conciliation and prudence towards the mission. On May 6, 1921, it presented a petition to the commissioners which reiterated the plea of the Filipinos for freedom, stating that a stable government as stipulated in the Jones Law for the granting of that boon had already been established in the Philippines. The petition expressed the hope that President Harding's commissioners would note with satisfaction the progress of the Philippines.

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(17) Statement of the Commission of Independence to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Bulletin No. 3, Independence Commission, May 21, 1921 (Manila, 1921), pp. 3-6. See also Manila Times, May 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1921; Wood Diary, May 10, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 14.
The central committees of both the Nacionalista and Democrata parties felt the need for a united front on the independence question, and negotiations were conducted by a committee from both parties for a joint memorial. But no agreement was reached. Whilst both parties agreed on the question of independence, their views on the stability of the Philippine government were at variance.(18) The Nacionalistas held that the government was stable and that the Philippines therefore satisfied the conditions required for independence by the Jones Law. The Democratas argued that the existing stability, despite a few "so-called leaders in the government," was due to the "equanimity and peaceful spirit of the Filipinos." Accordingly, each party drafted its own independence petition, which was presented to the Wood-Forbes Mission.(19) The commissioners must have found this exercise interesting.

The findings reported by Wood and Forbes probably did not differ significantly from the views they had held before the investigation. In Wood's case, the findings also represented the views of the incoming Governor General, for shortly before the Mission's departure from the Philippines, Wood announced his acceptance of the position.

(18) Manila Times, September 7, 1921.
The mission judged the Filipinos from a standard of attainment well above anything yet achieved. It was thus not surprising that the mission should conclude that independence should be indefinitely deferred. Thus:

We find everywhere among the Christian Filipinos the desire for independence, generally under the protection of the United States. The non-Christians and Americans are for continuance of American control.

We find a general failure to appreciate the fact that independence under the protection of another nation is not true independence.

We find that the people are not organized economically or from the standpoint of national defence to maintain an independent government.

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States in relinquishing supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their Army and Navy, and leaving the Islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.

The report indicted the previous regime for many of the problems noticed in the investigation, and viewed the government as "not reasonably free from those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government." Therefore

... we are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty, were we to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.
The report recommended that "the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands." (20)

After President Harding and his Cabinet discussed the report in mid-November, it was announced that the Administration was opposed to independence at that time but that its policy would not be "reactionary."

The President never presented the mission's recommendations to Congress for it to take action, as he agreed with Wood's suggestion that it would be best if the Philippine Legislature and the Filipino leaders were themselves allowed to rectify the deficiencies of the government noted in the report. By not adopting any arbitrary action, and giving the Filipinos a chance to be heard, it was felt that the Filipinos would be afforded a face-saving device. (21)

An analysis of the Wood-Forbes Report shows that perhaps its greatest merit lay in its pointing out of some of the mistakes committed in the preceding seven years of the Harrison


The report of the mission was apparently purposely written in language that would not offend the Filipinos, because of two reasons, according to Forbes: "first: because we have instances of the same sort of graft and incompetence in our own government at home, not so much national but in cities and towns; and secondly: we want to save their faces and keep their good will and there is no need of rubbing it in too hard." See Letter, Forbes to SecWar Weeks, August 6, 1921, in Forbes Journals, Second Series, II, pp. 159-163. See also in Confidential letter file, in Forbes Papers.

(21) New York Times, November 16, 1921; Wood to Harding, November 2, 1921; Harding to Wood, December 15, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 156.
administration. Among the criticisms accepted as justified were: lack of a sufficient press which would insure a sound public opinion; mistakes in finances; delay in the administration of justice; the need for good teachers both in the lower schools and in the higher institutions of learning; and inadequate treatment and care of cultural minorities.

Nevertheless, despite some expressions gratifying to Filipino pride, there were some extremely unpalatable commentaries.

On the whole, as summed up by Maximo M. Kalaw following the release of the report in November, the report "does justice to some very salient and notable characteristics of the Filipino people but its compliments were always followed by 'but's' which go far deeper to prove the present incapacity of the Filipinos to support by themselves any decent constitutional government."(22)

Publication of the mission's report brought a flurry of criticisms from the Filipino leaders, who felt called upon to protest against its conclusions and recommendations. Privately, Osmena and Rafael Palma confessed that the conclusions were


generally fair, though certain criticisms were unduly severe. But the political implications drawn from the critical observations were more disturbing to the Filipino leaders than the critical observations themselves.(23)

There was no doubt that the recommendations of the Wood-Forbes Mission meant that independence would be deferred indefinitely. The choice of Leonard Wood as chief administrator of the Philippines demonstrated that President Harding very clearly accepted the mission's recommendations as to Philippine policy and that he looked to Wood to remedy the unfortunate conditions pointed out in the report.

(23) See Quezon to McIntyre, May 16, 1921, in Quezon Papers, Box 44; Cable, Wood to Weeks, December 7, 1921, in BIA Records 22639-A-37. See also Manila Times, December 2, 4, 1921.

Apparently irked by de Veyra and Gabaldon's comments on the report, especially in regard to the condition of the courts, Forbes sent a confidential cable to Wood in Manila on November 15, 1921, suggesting that Osmena and Quezon be advised to instruct the resident commissioners and the Press Bureau in Washington not to try to contest the report's statements "in order to avoid necessity of our publishing exhibits more damaging to Filipino administration than anything contained in the report which we made purposely moderate and conciliatory." See Cablegrams, Wood Papers, Box 189; also in Wood Diary, Box 14.

Actually, the more vehement condemnations of the record of the period under consideration were those concerning Harrison and his policies and less so the Filipinos, who were supposed to have been guided by Harrison. See for instance the following correspondence: Forbes to Rudyard Kipling, April 20, 1921; Forbes to General John J. Pershing, July 26, 1921; Forbes to Emilio Aguinaldo, December 20, 1921; Forbes to Luke E. Wright, all in Confidential letter file, Vol. 4, Forbes Papers; Wood to William Howard Taft, June 11, 1921, in Taft Papers, Series 3, Reel 227; Wood to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, July 28, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 157.
It is indeed unfortunate that Leonard Wood(24) became Governor General so soon after the completion of the mission, which situation undoubtedly coloured his relations with the Filipino politicos whose performance he had just judged unfavourably, a difficulty which he himself had foreseen.(25) After an initial relatively brief period of amicable relations and cooperation, the Wood administration was marked by vigorous political agitation -- the most intense in Philippine-American relations since the end of the Philippine-American War in 1902.

(24) Leonard Wood (1860-1927) was a national figure at the time of his appointment to the governorship, having campaigned for, and lost, the Republican national nomination in 1920, which went to Warren G. Harding. He had a distinguished military career, which included such activities as colonel of the Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War, military governor of Cuba, and his contribution to the war effort in 1916-1918. (He had trained the troops which went to France although President Wilson had chosen General John J. Pershing to lead the American Expeditionary Force.) His previous Philippine experience was as governor of the Moro Province and as a commander of the Philippine Department of the United States Army in the early years of the American occupation. At the time of his appointment as Governor General of the Philippines, he had been offered the position of Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, which post he fully intended to assume after a brief term in Manila. But he eventually gave up that position and chose to remain in Manila where he felt his services were most needed. See his biography, written by Hermann Hagedorn (New York, 1931).

(25) See Wood to Mrs. T. Roosevelt, July 14, 1922; Wood to Mrs. Douglas Robinson, August 19, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 162. Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, in 1926, wrote Henry L. Stimson that certain features of the Wood-Forbes Report ascribing a degree of incompetency to the Filipinos who had been most prominent in the government under Harrison, these being the same Filipinos who currently controlled the Filipino government, did not create a spirit for cooperation. See McIntyre to Stimson, June 16, 1926, in Henry L. Stimson, Personnel "P" file, pt. 1, BIA Records.
Governor General Leonard Wood laid down the policies of his administration in two messages to the Filipinos: in his inaugural address on October 15, 1921, and to the Philippine Legislature on October 17. In these speeches, he pointed out shortcomings that needed to be remedied in the Philippines; in many respects the speeches echoed the Wood-Forbes Report just completed. Wood dealt extensively with all the aspects of administration essential to a stable government. And he invited the Filipino leaders' "serious attention" to "the maintenance of a proper separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government." "In my opinion," he said, "it is most important -- indeed vital -- to a well-balanced government that each should function within its own limits."

Governor Wood took the position that the Jones Law could not be modified except by action of Congress itself, and that no subsequent legislation or executive action on the part of the Governor General or the President of the United States, working in conjunction with the Philippine Legislature, could operate to change this fundamental law. So he said:

It is my purpose, so far as lies in my power, so to conduct the government that it will be characterized by economy, efficiency, and true progress; a government of the people by their representatives to the extent provided in the Jones bill; a government characterized by honesty, morality, and an appreciation of the fact that public office is a public trust; that fitness is an absolute requirement for appointment to office. There must be no turning back, but steady progress on sound lines.(26)

With the Filipino leaders on guard against expected "encroachments" on their powers by the Governor General, immediate attention focused on how to deal with the Wood-Forbes Report. On December 1, 1921, a resolution was passed by the Philippine Legislature requesting President Harding not to take any action on the mission's report nor to send it to Congress or do anything with it otherwise, "without first hearing the Filipino people through their constituted representatives," because "the conclusions and recommendations of the mission are of such nature that their acceptance by the President and by Congress would seriously affect the political future and the vital interests of the country."(27) In response, President Harding advised the Filipino leaders, through the Resident Commissioners, that he was withholding any recommendation based on the Wood-Forbes Report until a delegation

(27) See copy of resolution in Official Gazette, Vol. XX, No. 67, p. 1197 (Concurrent Resolution No. 31, 5th Phil. Leg., 3rd sess.). See also Manila Times, December 2, 1921; Wood Diary, December 5, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 14.

The resolution drew the ire of Charles Edward Russell, a publicist (best remembered for his articles on the beef trust during the heyday of muckraker literature in the United States during the first decade of this century) who for some time had been writing sympathetically about Filipino aspirations for independence. In a letter to Quezon dated December 4, 1921, he objected to the action taken by the Filipino leaders requesting President Harding to withhold any action on the Wood-Forbes Mission's recommendations until he first heard the Filipino representatives. He saw this as an apparent acquiescence on the part of the Filipino leaders in the derogatory opinions of the report. The President, he wrote, could take no action on Philippine independence; only Congress could. Then he concluded bitterly that perhaps the Filipinos preferred the continuance of their status as a subject people and did not care for independence. See in Quezon Papers, Box 45.
from the Philippine Legislature could be heard.\(^{(28)}\)

On December 22, a concurrent resolution of the Philippine Legislature created a joint committee of both houses, to be composed of ten members, five from each chamber, to investigate and study all matters covered by the Wood-Forbes Report, and to submit appropriate recommendations to the Legislature.\(^{(29)}\)

The joint committee, presided over by Senator Rafael Palma and Representative Rafael Alunan decided, on February 7, 1922, to recommend to the Commission of Independence the sending of a mission, headed by Quezon and Osmena, to the United States. The mission would be instructed to work for Philippine independence, and, incidentally, to present the Filipino viewpoint on questions affecting the Philippines, like the Wood-Forbes Mission Report and

\(^{(28)}\) Manila Times, December 8, 1921. See also Harding to Wood, December 15, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 156.

See also Warren G. Harding to Jaime C. de Veyra, November 26, 1921, in Warren G. Harding Papers, The Ohio Historical Society, Inc., Columbus, Ohio, Collection 345, Box 654, Folder 639, File 400. De Veyra suggested that President Harding express a desire to see Osmena so the latter would come to Washington with the Mission. Harding thought it would not be proper for him to do this. See de Veyra to Harding, December 15, 1921; Harding to de Veyra, December 16, 1921, ibid.

\(^{(29)}\) Concurrent Resolution No. 33, 5th Phil. Leg., 3rd sess., Official Gazette, Vol. XX, No. 78, p. 1353.
the Coastwise Shipping Laws.(30)

Quezon and Osmeña were at that point engaged in a leadership struggle which had led Quezon to break off from the Nacionalista Party to form his own Partido Nacionalista Colectivista.(31) The

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(30) *Manila Times*, February 7, 19, 1922.

Proposals for the extension of the Coastwise Shipping Laws of the United States to the trade with the Philippines had been made as early as 1902, but Congress repeatedly moved the suspension of the shipping laws with regard to the Philippines. See Alfonso, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-123.

On June 5, 1920, the US Congress enacted the United States Merchant Marine Act which extended the Coastwise Shipping Laws to the Philippines but with the proviso that if adequate shipping service was not established by February 1922, the President might extend the period, the extension not to take effect until the President, by proclamation, declared that adequate service had been established. (Public 261, 66th Congress, 2nd sess.)

The Coastwise Shipping Laws would reduce the Philippines to greater economic dependence on the United States. The law gave the President of the United States the authority to require the carrying of all trade between the Philippines and the United States in American ships to the exclusion of any other vessel. See S. 2671, H.R. 7195, 66th Cong., 1st sess..

For Filipino reaction to this proposal, see Speaker Osmena's speech in *Manila Times*, July 21, 1920. See also letter of Governor Harrison telling of considerable ill-feeling felt by Quezon and other Filipino leaders against extension of these laws to the Philippines, in *BIA Records* 1239-150, dated July 20, 1920.

(31) Trouble was apparently brewing between Quezon and Osmeña as early as January 1921, but the investigation of the Wood-Forbes Mission prevented its coming to the fore, and while the mission was in the Philippines, both leaders gave the appearance of unity and cooperation. Late in 1921, after publication of the Wood-Forbes Report, Quezon finally launched his attack on Osmeña's supposedly "autocratic" leadership.

On December 22, 1921, Wood records in his diary that he had a talk with Quezon that morning, and Quezon explained that the real trouble was that Osmeña demanded to be consulted with reference to appointments and that he insisted on the Senate being entirely subordinated to the House. Furthermore, Osmeña apparently wanted Quezon to come out with a public written statement accepting a subordinate position to the Speaker. Quezon claimed the Senate would not agree to this. See Wood Diary, December 22, 1921, *Wood Papers*, Box 14.
instructions for the mission thus became entangled in the party
dispute. Quezon, in his new capacity as president of the
Colectivistas and also as Senate co-chairman of the Mission,
announced that unless the Philippine Mission was specifically
instructed to work for absolute and complete independence, he would
not go to the United States. (32)

Peace and understanding were eventually reestablished among the
members of the Commission, and party lines disappeared. On April
19, 1922, the Commission of Independence gave its final instructions
to the Parliamentary Mission, to "bring before the President and
Congress of the United States [the] just demand of the Filipino
people. The Filipino people have not only demonstrated their
capacity to establish a stable government, but, in fact, such a
government has already been well established and has been
functioning for a long time." (33)

For the events leading to the split between Quezon and
Osmena, see the following files: BIA Records 1239-151; BIA
Records 347-A-15. See also Manila Times, December 17-28, 1921;
La Vanguardia, December 23, 1921; January 27, February 18,
1922; El Ideal, December 20, 23, 1921. See also Quezon to
Osmena, December 23, 1921, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.

(32) Manila Times, April 18, 1922.
Quezon also wished that the Mission remain in the United
States as long as necessary. He was of the opinion that as the
Mission was organized, it was being sent to satisfy election
needs. Some of the Mission members would not be legislators
after June 1922 and some could not speak English. In fact, the
Legislature passed a special rule which permitted the recall of
the Mission or the adoption of new plans for independence. See
Quezon to Charles Edward Russell, confidential telegram, April
18, 1922, in Charles Edward Russell Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Vol. XII; see also in Quezon
Papers, Box 45.

(33) Manila Times, April 19, 1922. For "Instructions of the
Commission of Independence to the Philippine Parliamentary
Mission," see in Filipino Appeal for Freedom (House Document
The Second Parliamentary Mission hoped to accomplish many objectives. The Mission was supposed to counteract the adverse conclusions of the Wood-Forbes Mission Report and to justify the political autonomy granted the Filipinos by Governor Harrison. It was expected to find out whether President Harding was disposed to talk about Philippine independence or whether he would adopt a policy that would turn back the clock of Philippine autonomy. And with both Quezon and Osmeña as joint leaders, the Mission was expected to give them an opportunity to effect a political reconciliation after the split of the Nacionalista Party. Since local elections were fast approaching, it was believed best that these two leaders should stay some time in Washington to cool off the political climate in the Philippines.(34)

Altogether the Mission was composed of twenty-eight members, "altogether too large," according to Quezon himself, and including some persons who would be "harmful rather than helpful" to the cause.(35) (See Appendix A for list of members of the Mission.)

(34) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 164.

(35) Some Americans and Filipinos were unimpressed with some of the personnel of the Mission. Of the members, two were singled out as most undeserving of membership because of their notoriety—Pedro Guevara and Antero Soriano, both Senators. [And yet Pedro Guevara would later on be selected as Filipino Resident Commissioner in Washington.] See Wood Diary, April 27, May 5, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 16; Henry D. Wolfe (former Director of Prisons) dossier on Soriano and Guevara, March 9, 1922, sent to Governor Wood, in Wood Papers, Box 162; also sent to W.H. Taft, in Taft Papers, Series 3, Reel 239. The dossier was apparently forwarded by Taft to President Harding. See H.D. Wolfe to Wood, July 3, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 162. Forbes refers to them as "two arrant scalawags". See Forbes to SecWar Weeks, May 29, 1922, in Forbes Papers.
General Emilio Aguinaldo was invited to act as honorary chairman of the Mission, and he initially accepted the invitation to enable him also to attend the American veterans' reunion in Los Angeles to be held in August 1922. In accepting this honour, Aguinaldo indicated that he planned to go to the United States "to the end of laboring for the national cause without any time limits" since, "to obtain our independence a most intense propaganda is necessary."(36)

The Independence Commission informed Aguinaldo that he could not be authorized to stay in America for as long as he wanted since the Mission was empowered to remain in the United States only until its immediate work had been accomplished. In view of that answer, Aguinaldo decided not to join the Mission, convinced that it would not succeed in its goal during the short time it could give to its work in the United States.(37)

Teodoro M. Kalaw (honorary member) suspected that he and Dr. Justo Lukban (technical adviser) were made to join the Mission in order to avoid their exerting their influence in the forthcoming elections in the Philippines. See T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 164.

(36) Manila Times, March 10, 1922. See also BIA Records 27668-35.

Early in March 1922, Resident Commissioner de Veyra sent a confidential cablegram from Washington questioning the practicality of Aguinaldo coming with the proposed mission in view of the severe indictment against him contained in the just published Harrison book. His presence in the Mission, he wrote, could prove embarrassing. See de Veyra to Osmeña, March 8, 1922, Quezon Papers, Box 45.

(37) BIA Records 27668-35. For details of the Aguinaldo "episode" with the Mission, see Manila Times, April 24, July 5, 11, 14, 16, 1922. See also Quezon to Senator Francisco Enage, July 5, 11, 1922, in Quezon Papers, Box 45; Adriano Hernandez to Quezon, Osmeña, June 14, 1922, ibid.; see also file "La Verdad sobre el Viaje del General Aguinaldo."

Aguinaldo subsequently modified his proposition to remain in the United States indefinitely (in July 1922), but by then it was too late to bring him to the United States as the Mission had already been dissolved.
General Aguinaldo, so he declared, did not want to undertake things "fruitlessly" and was determined, if he went, to spend the rest of his life in the United States, should it be necessary, to bring about Philippine independence. He also felt that a committee or a part of the Mission should be detailed in the United States to work for immediate, absolute, and complete independence, with himself appointed resident commissioner in Washington. The Commission dismissed the suggestion and replied that he would be able to undertake his work better as a special delegate or representative of the Mission.(38)

The "troubles" of the Nacionalista Party and the proximity of the elections distracted public attention from the second independence mission. Its departure, therefore, was not as much publicized nor commented upon as was the first mission. To some small delegations, more partisan than popular in character, which

(38) Manila Times, April 7, 1922.

Clearly the Commission of Independence, probably under the leadership of Quezon, could not possibly imagine how the General could effectively carry on an independence campaign in the United States, except through his representatives, because of his very limited command of the English language. There is very little doubt that General Aguinaldo was invited as honorary chairman of the Mission primarily to lend his name to the body and that he was not expected to play an active role in the Mission's work in the United States.

Aguinaldo's role in Philippine political affairs during the years of the American period deserves commentary. The earlier recognition bestowed on him as revolutionary leader remained secure throughout his life, but for the remaining fifty years of that life, he, the "great leader", was relegated to the role of "living dead." He was pretty much ignored, or at best, tolerated by the political leaders of the time, although periodically he was summoned for some ceremonial occasion. It did not help that Aguinaldo occasionally found himself on the other side of the political fence from Quezon, who was not known to treat his "enemies" kindly. See David Joel Steinberg, "An Ambiguous Legacy: Years at War in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1972), pp. 176-178.
saw the Mission off, the joint chairmen of the delegation issued separate parting statements, which strongly indicated that both leaders were far from politically reconciled. Quezon and Osmeña appeared more concerned with their respective party's political fortunes in the coming elections than in the primary purpose for the sending of the Mission.(39)

Governor Wood deplored the sending of the Mission, recording in his diary that the despatch of the mission was "one of the most absurd performances ever undertaken, in view of the financial conditions of the Islands, the general confusion here, business depression, and the situation at home, not to mention the world situation of unrest and uncertainty."(40)

The Mission left, on April 30, with the premonition that it might not bring back any significant concessions on Philippine independence. There was very little encouragement for the Mission from the new administration; Washington was convinced that the Filipino leaders were not really interested in substantive discussions concerning immediate, absolute, and complete independence, or further extension of Philippine autonomy. The patriotism of the delegates was questioned with "journalistic finesse" because each of them was to receive a per diem of 60 pesos (US$30), and 200 pesos (US$100) for each of the chairmen of the

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(39) Manila Times, May 2, 1922.
(40) Wood Diary, April 24, 1922, Wood Papers, Box 16.
Mission. The best that the Mission could hope to do was perhaps
to neutralize hostile prejudices towards the Philippine cause
brought on by the Wood-Forbes Report.

There was also no question of an ambivalent feeling of the
Filipino leaders towards independence. As late as a month before
the departure of the Mission in March, attempts were made to
possibly stop the Mission from going to Washington. A small group
of Manila Americans with business interests in the Philippines (all
identified as in favour of permanent, or at least indefinite,
American sovereignty over the Philippines) met with the three top
Filipino leaders — Senate President Quezon, Speaker Osmeña, and
Senator Rafael Palma — to devise an alternative scheme to the
"complete, absolute, and immediate independence" plea of the
Mission. The group, in three meetings, drafted "a tentative plan of
an enabling act to establish the independent commonwealth of the
Philippines," later to be known as the "Pasay Plan." The presence of
the three Filipino leaders, and their approval of the plan, showed
that they were probably aware that independence would not be
seriously considered by the Harding Administration, and so were
prepared to accept continued American sovereignty under certain
conditions. The intention to submit the plan to Governor Wood fell
through only because of the appearance in the Filipino newspaper —
the Philippines Herald — on March 16, of a cartoon featuring Wood
stabbing Filipino autonomy (in the picture of a Filipina) with his

(41) Manila Times, April 28, 1922.
veto power. (42)

In the light of this incident, Governor Wood wrote the Secretary of War confidentially on March 31, explaining that

The Filipinos, like other peoples want to be free and independent as a matter of sentiment. This very natural sentiment has been played upon for years by political leaders, each demanding more than the other, as a means of gaining popular favor and support. The leaders know that the people are not organized either from the standpoint of financial resources or from that of defense to maintain an independent national existence. They know that secure independence would be dependent in the last analysis upon the support and protection of the United States.

A condition has been established which may be described as a struggle between the heart and the head. Sentimentally the people want independence, practically the well-informed people realize the difficulties and impracticability of the situation so far as real (complete) independence goes. Quezon and

(42) The meetings were held on March 9, 14, and 22, 1922. See BIA Records 364-539-B; also Memorandum from George Fairchild to Gordon Johnston, November 11, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 159.

The American members of the "Enabling Act Committee" were:

George H. Fairchild, former senator of the Hawaiian Legislature, publisher of The Manila Times, and sugar businessman resident in the Philippines since 1912;

Col. Henry B. McCoy, former Collector of Customs in the Philippine Government, Chairman, Republican Committee of the Philippines, and General Manager, Manila Railroad Company;

Charles M. Cotterman, former Director of Posts in the Philippine Government, President, American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, and director, Binalbagan sugar central (Filipino-owned);

John M. Switzer, President, Pacific Commercial Company, New York, and Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce in New York; he came to the Philippines with the first military expedition in 1898 and resided in the country for 20 years; he was a visitor in Manila at the time of the meeting mentioned above;

John H. Pardee, President of the Philippine Railway Company (with operations in Cebu and Panay Islands in central Philippines), the Manila Electric Company, and the J.G. White Management Corporation in New York; also a Manila visitor at that time.

Aside from the three Filipino leaders, General Emilio Aguinaldo and Col. Frank R. McCoy, first aide to Governor Wood, were also present.
Osmena both admitted this to me personally.(43)

It was this assumption — that independence was merely a matter of the heart — for which the Filipinos were not prepared to assume the practical responsibilities and dangers — that governed Washington authorities and Governor Wood in opposing the plea for independence of the Filipinos.

Governor Wood disapproved in principle of the sending of independence missions to the United States and tried to persuade the Filipino leaders to set Philippine affairs (especially government finances) in order first. All indications and advice pointed to the bad timing of the Mission's trip — and Quezon and Osmena both expressed doubt as to the wisdom of sending the Mission. But in the midst of the political storm brought on by the split of the Nacionalista Party, Quezon and Osmena were vying with each other, for purely political reasons, in demonstrating their devotion to the cause of independence. And so the mission went to Washington.(44)

(43) Confidential letter, Wood to SecWar Weeks, March 31, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 162.

(44) See Manila Times, January 13, April 18, 20, 1922; also Wood Diary, January 30, 31, April 27, 28, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 16; and the following letters: Wood to W.C. Forbes, April 14, 1922, Box 160; Wood to W.H. Taft, May 10, 1922, Box 162; and Wood to Mrs. Robinson, August 19, 1922, Box 162, all in Wood Papers.

As early as January 1922, Resident Commissioner J.C. de Veyra had communicated to Osmena the inadvisability of a mission coming to the United States and that he had it from Representative Towner that such a mission would be fruitless at that point since the recommendations contained in the Wood-Forbes Report were conditional, not requiring immediate action. See Confidential letter, de Veyra to Osmena, January 28, 1922, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.
On May 20, 1922, three weeks before the Mission's arrival in Washington, Secretary Weeks issued statements which clearly intimated his feelings towards the Parliamentary Mission. Mr. Weeks announced, "I am not in favor of granting immediate independence to the Philippines and the President is not." Moreover, he stressed, the report of the Wood-Forbes Mission and the manner in which General Wood was administering the country as Governor General had the complete endorsement of the Harding administration.

The unusual activity for independence in the Philippines, the Secretary averred, was due to the fact that a considerable fund for such purposes existed, and the leaders of the independence movement evidently were determined to spend it. While, it was true that the Mission represented the political elements now in power, he continued, and to that extent might be regarded as representing the Filipino people, it did not represent the Government, as the views of the Mission were diametrically opposed to those of Governor Wood.

Queried as to whether the Filipinos wanted independence, Secretary Weeks explained that it would be difficult to find a people who would not vote for independence if the opportunity were

In view of the recent "commotion" brought about by the split in the Nacionalista Party, and the resulting attitude towards that event among the Washington authorities, both resident commissioners in Washington, de Veyra and Gabaldon, felt that perhaps the best time to send the Mission would be after the June elections in the Philippines or later in the year after a new Congress reconvened in December. Hopefully, by then the incoming Congress would be more receptive to the Filipino mission's objective. See Confidential letter, Gabaldon to Quezon, April 15, 1922, Quezon Papers, Box 45.
offered them, and that it was therefore extremely likely that if the question were submitted to a referendum the vote would be in favor of independence. That did not prove, however, he pointed out, that independence would be good for the Philippines or that the really intelligent Filipinos believed complete independence would be best.\(^{(45)}\)

On the same day, the White House made a somewhat vague announcement that the Mission would, nevertheless, be welcomed by the President and would be sent home with something more definite than they had had for the last three or four years. This was interpreted to mean that the Administration would make a definite statement of its views to the Mission, perhaps sympathetic to the desires of the Mission, but not forecasting the granting of

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\(^{(45)}\) *New York Times*, May 21, 1922. See also de Veyra to Quezon, May 22, 1922, Quezon Papers, Box 45.

The Filipino leaders made a terrible impression in the eyes of official Americans by the way they spent the one-million peso fund, allowing themselves extravagant travelling expenses.

The independence fund had also been a major bone of contention between the Nacionalista and the opposition Democrata legislators ever since it was proposed in the Legislature late in 1920 because of the insistent refusal of the Nacionalista leaders to make public the expenditures of the missions.

I found itemized lists of expenditures of the Independence Commission in Quezon's financial accounts file, Quezon Papers, but they did not cover all the missions. I also checked the vouchers covering the disbursement of Philippine funds in the United States from the period 1901-1934, which were originally filed in the Bureau of Insular Affairs. I was informed that they were burned in the mid-fifties.
independence to the Philippines at that time.(46)

On June 13, 1922, the Parliamentary Mission arrived in Washington, D.C. The first official statement of the Mission announced that one of the "strongest demands yet made for immediate and absolute independence" would be presented to President Harding. "There are three things that we want made plain," Quezon remarked. "First, we want full independence; second, we are entirely capable of running our own Government; third, we appreciate what the United States has done for us, and will always want her friendship."(47)

Public utterances seem to differ, however, from private conversations with American officials. Frank McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs noted that

... When the Philippine Mission arrived in Washington in June, 1922, and until it left Washington, the views of the chairmen of the mission were that there should not be in the near future any change in the relations between the United States and the Philippines other than those which might be


While the Mission was on its way to the United States, the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila adopted a resolution, on May 24, 1922, declaring that the present status of the Philippines was unsatisfactory and that the institution of a territorial government under the sovereignty of the United States would be desirable. Congress was asked to adopt a resolution declaring its intention to decide the permanent status of the Philippines before the end of the year and giving authority for the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines to represent American interests there in all matters affecting the institution of a permanent status for the Philippines or a change in existing governmental institutions. The resolution was sent to the President, the Secretary of War, Congress and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Washington. See BIA Records 364-429.

The first such resolution stating that a territorial government was desirable was passed by the Chamber on August 14, 1920.

brought about under the existing organic law. They desired a strengthening of the Filipino control of the government.

They believed that the people of education and property in the Islands would be satisfied and would for some years discontinue the discussion of independence if the government were made in local matters purely Filipino with American control of foreign relations and relations between the United States and the Islands. If to the government so established some name could be given, using, if possible, the word "independence" this would for some time satisfy the mass of the people who have been fed up on independence talk and who will not be satisfied unless they get that, at least in name. They say that proposals looking to this have originated with Americans in Manila; that the Americans there seem perfectly willing to have a purely Filipino government in the Islands, provided it is not a government separated from and independent of the United States. They were not interested in having a definite date fixed for complete independence. They have in mind that if such a date were fixed and not in the very near future it would create a great deal of dissatisfaction in the Islands, and that it would be much better not to mention a date than a remote date, but, as indicated, the question of complete independence is not at this time seriously thought of.(48)

Yet despite these unpublicized sentiments on what they really wished for, the Parliamentary Mission, on June 16, presented to President Harding its appeal for "the fulfillment of their aspirations for national existence" in a well-edited memorial (prepared by Maximo M. Kalaw, chairman of technical advisers attached to the delegation), explaining the objectives of the Mission's trip to Washington. The memorial opened with the usual expressions of goodwill and loyalty of the Filipinos towards the United States. It then went on to recount the work of the Philippine Legislature, through the Commission of Independence, in

the cause of independence, especially in the sending of the first mission to the United States in 1919. It asserted that the establishment of a stable government in the Philippines had been fulfilled -- the only stipulation laid down by the United States for granting independence to the Philippines -- as ascertained by no less than President Wilson himself in 1920. "Immediately prior to the coming into power of the present administration the Philippine question was on the eve of solution," and "we beg to submit that the last fifteen months that have elapsed since the new administration has assumed office have not altered the situation. The same stable government exists." Not even the Wood-Forbes Report, it continued, which was "unwarrantably severe and critical," denied the stability of the Filipino government. The present Philippine government, therefore, satisfied all conditions required by the United States in the recognition of stable governments.

To re-enforce this claim, portions of the Wood-Forbes Report were quoted to picture Philippine stability and general progress. And to further strengthen claims to stability and independence, the memorial pointed out that the prevailing international situation was favourable to the granting of Philippine independence. Thus, the United States had no reason to withhold independence any longer.

Reminding the United States that the Mission represented all political parties in the Philippines and that it was dispatched by the Legislature "to ask for immediate, complete, and absolute independence" of the Philippines, the memorial continued:
... This desire is not born of ingratitude toward the United States nor does it show lack of appreciation of the risks and dangers of international life. It is the logical outcome of more than 20 years of patient labors jointly undertaken by the Americans and the Filipinos. The Filipino people firmly believe that the time has come when this question should be settled once for all. Further delay in the fulfillment of America's pledge contained in the Jones Law will only result in injury to the best interests of both peoples ... .

President Harding was reportedly visibly affected when the memorial was presented to him. In reply he said only that while he was very much interested to hear their petition, he felt that it would not be just to the Mission or fair to himself to make an immediate response. He assured them, however, that in a few days he would announce the probable Philippine policy of his administration, although he reminded the Mission that Congress actually had the full say on the matter.

Whilst awaiting the formal reply of the President to the Philippine Mission, the chairmen of the delegation had a private interview with General McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. On this occasion, Quezon and Osmeña expressed their opinions on what they thought should be done for the Philippine government. McIntyre noted that

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(49) Filipino Appeal for Freedom, pp. 2-8. See also in Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 63, pt. 9, pp. 9111-9112; and in Quezon Papers, Box 45.

(50) Manila Times, June 19, 1922; BIA Records 364-after-433; Jorge B. Vargas to Gabriel LaO, June 18, 1922, Quezon Papers, Box 45.
They were very nervous about the form of the President's address and were anxious that the President should say nothing which would put them in an awkward position, either here or at home. They reverted to their desire to secure an agreement on a permanent relationship with the United States in order to discontinue the continual agitation for independence. Mr. Quezon said that the Filipino people had a great deal of liberty and that their dissatisfaction with the present conditions was the dissatisfaction at being a subject people; that it did not result from any imposition but it was rather the name than any actual condition that was objectionable. The reason they were subject people was that they had never formed their own government, and he and Mr. Osmeña both expressed a desire that the Filipino people should be permitted to form a constitution and government of their own. The government thus formed would not be very different from what they had always had: the constitution guarantees, the bill of rights, etc. would necessarily be continued, but if the Filipino people once adopted this themselves, they would have the feeling that it was theirs and not one to which they were subjected by some other power.

They asked me if I would draw up a proposed act which would enable them to do this.(51)

The suggested act was prepared and handed to Quezon and Osmeña. The act would have authorized the Filipino people to form for themselves a constitution and government, subject to certain conditions set forth in the act. Among these were that the government to be formed must be republican in form and must be adequate to secure stable, orderly, and free government, and that all citizens of the government created should owe permanent allegiance to the United States. The act did not contemplate or authorize any government independent of the United States.(52)

(51) BIA Records 364-450.
(52) BIA Records 364-458 and 364-after-469 1/2.
Acceptance of this act by Quezon and Osmeña was conditioned upon its not putting them at a political disadvantage in the Philippines. And since nothing farther was done with this proposed measure, it appears that both the Filipino leaders and American authorities must have felt that it would not be in their interest to take any action on it.

On June 21 the Mission was received by the House of Representatives. The Mission perhaps entertained hopes that Congress might be more disposed to action on the Philippines than was the executive branch. For on March 30, 1922 two resolutions relative to Philippine independence had been submitted — by Senator William H. King (Democrat, Utah) to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and by Congressman R. Walton Moore (Democrat, Virginia) to the House Committee on Insular Affairs.(53)

In introducing the members of the Mission before Congress, Chairman Horace M. Towner (Republican, Iowa) of the Committee of Insular Affairs expressed gratification over the good feelings which had long prevailed between the United States and the Philippines. Representative Finis Garrett, the Democratic leader from Tennessee, received a round of applause from the visitors with his remark that, without hesitation, he would respond to the petition of the delegation and grant to the Philippines absolute and unqualified

An earlier resolution on independence was introduced on February 3, 1922, by Congressman John E. Rankin (Democrat, Mississippi) to the Committee on Insular Affairs. See H.J. Res. 266 in pp. 2145, 2153.
Unfortunately for the Mission, the majority in Congress did not share Garrett's enthusiasm for Philippine independence. Aside from inserting in the Congressional Record the memorial presented to President Harding, nothing more was done by Congress for the Mission. (54)

On June 22, President Harding sent his formal reply to the Mission's memorial. His answer was a finely composed piece, but it did no more than confirm what the Mission had anticipated.

Harding initiated his response by commenting that

No fixed intent, no thought of conquest, no individual government design to exploit, no desire to colonize brought us together. It was the revolution of the fates, wherein our assault against oppression at our very doors carried our warfare to yours, far away, and your liberty attended.

The President, in continuing, commended Filipino aspirations while suggesting they were misdirected:

I can only commend the Filipino aspirations to independence and complete self-sovereignty. None in America would wish you to be without national aspirations. You would be unfitted for the solemn duties of self-government without them. It is fair to assume that our only difference of opinion is relative to the time of independence. You crave it now and I do not believe the time has arrived for the final decision.

(54) Ibid., p.9112.

Apparently the Mission did not wish any hearing before the Committees of Congress. They preferred to confer with Administration officers and leaders of Congress. Ideally they really wanted President Harding to make some declaration on his Philippine policy first before making their demand. See Horace M. Towner, Chairman, House Committee on Insular Affairs, to President Harding, June 14, 1922, Harding Papers.
While admitting that the majority of Filipinos preferred severance of the ties with America, he also suggested that the fact that there were others of a different opinion was sufficient justification for the continuation of American sovereignty. Thus

Manifestly, so far as expression has been made, the majority of Philippine citizenship prefers severance and self-sovereignty. There are, however, many among you of differing opinion. There are petitions against independence.

Fate cast our relationship, and we assumed a responsibility not only to all the Philippine people but to all the world as well. We have a high respect for your majority, but no less obligation to your minority, and we cannot be unmindful of that word responsibility wherein your fortunes are involved in ours.

Paying tribute to Filipino progress under American sponsorship, he continued:

... Nothing apart from our achievement at home is more pleasing to the United States than the splendid advancement of the Philippine people. Your progress is without parallel anywhere in the world. From a people who began with little freedom and none of the responsibility, in a little more than half of one generation you have progressed notably toward self-reliance and self-government. And you have done it in spite of that lack of independence concerning which you petition.

The President spoke of the unique relationship between the United States and the Philippines, thus:

... I know of no parallel relationship. We have given substantially everything we had to bestow and have asked only mutuality and trust in return. We have extended to you control in government until little remains but the executive authority, without which we could not assume our responsibility.
It is not possible for me as executive definitely to proclaim an American policy, for the decision must ever be that of Congress, but I would be less than candid and fair if I did not tell you we can assume no responsibility without authority.

President Harding intimated finally that while he recognized and upheld his country's pledge of independence to the Philippines, he thought that the time might come when the Filipinos themselves might choose to remain under the American flag.

Frankly then, with every mindfulness for your aspirations, with shared pride in your achievements, with gratitude for your loyalty, with reiterated assurance that we mean to hold no people under the flag who do not rejoice in that relationship, I must say to you that the time is not yet for independence. I can imagine a continued progress which will make our bonds either easy to sever or rivet them more firmly because you will it to be so. We must await that development. The new order of the world, made secure, with conquest outlawed, and with peace made the covenant of all civilized peoples, may speed the day when you neither need nor wish our intimate relationship.

At this time it is not for me to suggest the day, distant or near. Meanwhile, I can only renew the proven assurances of our good intentions, our desire to be helpful without exacting from our private or public purse, or restricting the freedom under which men and people aspire and achieve. No backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is to be sought. Our relations to your domestic affairs is that of an unselfish devotion which is born of our fate in opening to you the way of liberty of which you dreamed. Our sponsorship in international affairs is reflected in the common flag which is unfurled for you as it is for us, and security is your seal of American relationship. (55)

(55) Ibid., pp. 9336-9337. See also in BIA Records 364-434 1/2; Quezon Papers, Box 45.

Governor Wood ordered the Executive Bureau to send copies of the memorial of the Parliamentary Mission and the President's reply to all provinces and municipalities and brought to the attention of the general public. See Manila Times, August 12, 1922.
Here, thus, in unmistakable terms, President Harding set forth the position that independence for the Philippines was certainly out of the question for a time to come, at least until America felt that all her obligations to the Filipinos had been discharged. The Mission received the utmost consideration, courtesy, and kindness, and nothing else.

Quezon and Osmena expected this, and in private spoke of the President's address in the "highest terms." But they were anxious to have something to take back with them to Manila, ostensibly to satisfy their followers. They talked about legislation providing for changes in the existing relations between the Philippines and the United States. If this was not possible, perhaps some concession could be made, like the appointment of a Filipino Vice-Governor, or a majority in the Supreme Court. Representative Towner brought the matter up with President Harding, but apparently nothing could be done at that time. (56)

The President's reply left indefinite the status of the Philippines, but nevertheless the political leaders felt, in the light of the conference in Washington and a reading in and between

In a memorandum for the Secretary of War dated June 21, 1922, BIA Chief McIntyre informed the Secretary that Quezon and Osmena were quite nervous about the President's address and that they were particularly anxious that Harding should not refer to the Wood-Forbes Report in terms of strong approval of those parts critical of the Philippine government. Quezon and Osmena submitted a draft of what they hoped the President might see fit to say along those lines. See BIA Records 27668-37 1/2.

(56) See Towner to Harding, June 23, 1922, Harding Papers.
the lines of the presidential message, that they were secure in the possession of the powers which they had obtained under the Jones Law and by subsequent developments during the Harrison administration. The "no backward step" in the President's communication, like the preamble of the Jones Law, became an integral part of their "charter of liberties," and thus encouraged, they felt they could move forward in their independence movement. The next step forward would involve the exercise of executive power, which to them meant that there was a need to define and delimit the executive power in the Philippines and to develop "complete self-control" by allowing the Filipinos to govern their domestic affairs within the framework of the Jones Law. Apparently most of the Filipino leaders were willing at this point to accept the President's denial of their petition for complete independence, if they could substantially eliminate the American executive from political control and they could have a free hand at governing their country, and at the same time be safe from outside interference and be under the protection of the United States.(57) President Harding gave the 1922 Mission an ambiguous statement which became a source of heated argument later.

Having failed in its primary purpose, the Mission briefly turned its attention to preventing the extension of the Coastwise Shipping Laws to the Philippines, a matter that was again under consideration by Congress. A letter dated June 28 was submitted by the Mission to the President reiterating the Filipino stand against the proposed extension of the laws to the Philippines -- a step

(57) See Vice-Governor Eugene Gilmore to Towner, September 26, 1922, ibid.
would be seriously detrimental to the interests of the Philippines. (58) Congress ultimately took no action on the proposed extension of the shipping laws.

As a final act, on June 30, Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra presented to the US House of Representatives a statement of the "actual conditions" of the Philippines, prepared by the Parliamentary Mission. It was intended to answer some of the charges made by the Wood-Forbes Mission against the Filipinos and the Harrison administration. It contained a general statement of the progress of the Philippines from 1914 to 1921, with a brief historical introduction and a summary of governmental reforms undertaken by the Philippine government under the Harrison regime. Important topics such as public order, the civil service, administration of public lands, education, sanitation, local administration, labour and social progress, economic conditions, the financial status of the government, elections, the non-Christian people, and the Filipino legislature and its record were all dealt with in the brief. (59)

(58) Manila Times, August 25, 1922. See BIA Records C-1584-with-110, for statements of Resident Commissioners de Veyra and Gabaldon registering their opposition to the coastwise laws being applied to the Philippines.

In an interview with Senator Osmeña, it was learned that the Administration in Washington, at least the Secretary of War, was opposed to the extension of the shipping laws to the Philippines, and that nothing in this direction would be done without consulting the Filipino people's representatives and obtaining their consent. See Manila Times, August 18, 1922.

With the work officially finished, the Mission then prepared for the trip home. It had been unable to obtain its immediate objective — independence — but, in the words of Quezon, "we have succeeded in making clear our position. We have made the people as well as the officials regard the desires of the Filipinos more closely."(60)

Before the Mission was formally dissolved, Quezon was designated by the delegation as a committee of one to organize a more active campaign for independence, and for that purpose, he remained in the United States a little longer. A new publicity campaign to hasten the granting of Philippine independence was worked out, with the Philippine Press Bureau reorganized to add to the efficiency of the campaign. Under this new plan, the Resident Commissioners, de Veyra and Gabaldon, became official directors of the bureau.(61)

(60) The Manila Times, June 29, 1922. See also in El Comercio, August 17, 1922, translation in BIA Records 364-A-537, entitled "Members of Mission Declare They Have Not Wasted Time".


Before he left the United States, Quezon apparently approved plans for a high-powered publicity campaign for Philippine independence. From correspondence found in the Quezon Papers between August and September 1922, it appears that George F. Parker, a New York public relations consultant, was hired for that purpose. Parker went to Manila and for his labours was apparently paid $25,000. But the correspondence do not spell out very clearly exactly what services Parker preformed for the Independence Commission. See Box 137, Independence Commission file, Quezon Papers.
The Mission officially ended its activities on July 15, and Quezon left Washington. Before departing, he called on the Secretary of War. In reply to a question of the latter as to what he proposed to do upon his return to the Philippines, Quezon replied that he intended to call a meeting of the leading men of the three parties in the country to explain to them that he had gathered the impression in the United States that the Administration preferred that the Filipinos should labour for some permanent, but more satisfactory, connection with the United States, rather than for total separation. He felt that a movement to achieve this should be nonpartisan if entered into seriously. (62)

On its way home, some members of the Mission visited New York, Boston, Buffalo, Denver, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu, where in every city they were received cordially by officials and private organizations. Every opportunity was taken advantage of to appear before the American people to explain clearly and firmly the petition for independence.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, preparations were underway for the return and reception of the Mission. The Colectivistas wished to stage a demonstration of protest upon the arrival of the delegation in order to make of record the dissatisfaction of the Filipino people with the reply of President Harding to the Mission. (63) The demonstration was to have been nonpartisan and

(62) Personal letter, McIntyre to Wood, July 17, 1923, in BIA Records 364-after 439; see also in Wood Papers, Box 161.

(63) Manila Times, July 5, 1922; see also Jose P. Melencio to de Veyra, July 19, 1922, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.
national, so both the Nacionalistas and the Democratas were invited to join. However, the Nacionalistas, while in favour of giving the Mission a warm home-coming, were opposed to any demonstration of protest against the President's reply to the Mission. The Democrata party also refused to accept the invitation for the demonstration, despite its declared dissatisfaction with the President's reply and the failure of the Mission to obtain independence.(64)

The Colectivista leadership revised its plan as a consequence, and the reception for the Mission members consisted merely of an automobile parade and a mass meeting at the Olympic Stadium on August 19. The Filipino leaders who addressed the meeting urged a unanimous stand and a solid front in the struggle for independence.(65)

As the next move in the independence campaign, a concurrent resolution was introduced in both houses of the Philippine Legislature in the October 1922 session. Addressed to the Congress of the United States, the resolution asked authority to elect delegates and hold a convention to adopt a constitution for a future independent republic.(66) The move was prompted by the recent

(64) Manila Times, July 29, 1922.
For the reaction of the Democratas blaming the Nacionalista for their conduct of the government, which obviously had failed to impress President Harding, see Gabriel LaO to Osmeña, June 27, 1922, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.

(65) Melencio to de Veyra, July 19, 1922, Quezon Papers, Box 45; Manila Times, August 20, 1922.

(66) The Sixth Philippine Legislature, 1st session, witnessed the introduction of several independence resolutions. See Manila Times, October 28, 29, 31, 1922.
elections in the United States which saw the advent of more progressive elements in Congress.

The Democrats in the House fought this resolution, declaring that the move would defer, rather than accelerate, the granting of independence. Representative Claro M. Recto stated that the resolution would be a step backward in the struggle for independence, since it departed from the traditional policy of pressing for immediate and complete freedom. He charged the majority with placing another barrier in the way of independence. (67) He offered an amendment to the proposed resolution which would ask the United States Congress to recognize the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines first. This step would be followed by the holding of the constitutional assembly and by an election of all the officials of the new republic. (68)

The Recto amendment was rejected, and Concurrent Resolution No. 5, asking the Congress of the United States for authority to call and hold a constitutional convention for the Philippines, was adopted by the House on November 21 and by the Senate on November 29, 1922. (69)

(67) Ibid., November 17, 1922.
(68) Ibid., November 14, 1922.
The resolution was transmitted to the government of the United States and resulted in the introduction, on February 6, 1923, by Senator William H. King (Democrat, Utah) of an amendment to the army appropriations bill — H.R. 13793 — which embodied the provisions contained in the Philippine resolution.(70) Senator King's amendment proposing Philippine independence was, however, lost through its failure on a viva voce vote to receive the necessary two-thirds to make it in order in the Senate.(71)

It should be noted that when the Mission returned to the Philippines, the Filipino leaders adopted a more radical stance than that which they had advocated privately when they were in Washington. There they were willing to go along with the proposed act prepared by General McIntyre, at their behest, which would have allowed them to form a completely autonomous government, though one not independent of the United States. The concurrent resolution


During the time that the resolution was pending in the Philippine Legislature, Judge Frederick Fisher and James Ross, old-timer Manila Americans, conceived of a plan to line up a substantial majority of prominent Americans in the Philippines in favour of the constitutional convention plan, and possibly to be able to render some assistance in getting the plan through the US Congress. The idea was to come to an understanding with the Filipino leaders as to certain things which should be written into the constitution for the protection of American and foreign interests in the Philippines. Quezon appeared to have approved this plan and to have assured the American group that most of their suggestions would meet with Filipino approval. The scheme was put in the form of a letter to Governor Wood who, however, was not at all receptive to it. This plan was similar to the "Pasay Plan" (of March 1922) but would go farther and would relinquish American sovereignty. See James Ross to F.B. Harrison, December 18, 1922; Letter to Wood, November 9, 1922, presenting the scheme, in Harrison Papers, Box 33. See also BIA Records 364-454-A.
that they passed in November departed from this in requesting Congress to authorize them to adopt their own constitution and to form a government independent of the United States.

The surprising shift of position after the return of the Second Mission is deserving of commentary. One reason for the shift appears to have been the changed political situation following Philippine elections in June. The elections were held after the departure of the Mission and resulted in a moral victory for the Democrata Party. The Democratas carried the City of Manila and showed surprising strength at many important points.

The Democrats had thus become a significant minority party. Indeed, there was a well-informed view in Manila that, given another election, the Democrats would control both houses of the Philippine Legislature. The Democrata Party was a party of widely divergent composition: while it contained extreme radicals advocating immediate independence, it also contained many members of the old Federal Party, thus, very conservative men. Quezon and Osmeña evidently concluded that it would not be wise to enable the radical Democrats to strengthen themselves by any show on their part of lukewarmness in advocating immediate independence.

Secondly, Quezon and Osmeña felt that they could not tone down their clamour for immediate independence in view of the support they had been getting from some Filipinos and Americans who had been actively supporting their independence demand and from whom they obviously derived political strength.
President Harding, in his reply to the Mission's Memorial, had hinted at the possibility of a reversal of the announced position of withdrawing from the Philippines, if the Filipino people wished it. Accommodation to President Harding's position would have called for a complete reversal of the positions so frequently and emphatically espoused by the Filipino leaders. This they were willing to do, but only if they could do so without sacrifice of their leadership roles and if they could save face by maintaining that gradual progress was all they could secure on the road which they had been urging their followers to take.(72)

Be that as it may, the resolution apparently was not meant to be anything more than another declaration of Filipino desire for independence. The Filipino politicos did not mean to push it through — nor did they expect anything to come of it.(73)

(72) Confidential memorandum for the SecWar on the Status of the Philippines, prepared by McIntyre, February 12, 1923, BIA Records 364-450.

Quezon and Roxas asked Governor Wood if he preferred a joint resolution or a concurrent resolution on the constitutional convention plan. A joint resolution would either have to be approved or vetoed, whereas a concurrent resolution could be forwarded to the United States Congress without remarks. They wanted to have a joint resolution approved by Wood, to which Wood refused compliance. Hence a concurrent resolution was adopted, for which they really did not expect any action. Wood thought that this was simply another effort on the part of the leaders to keep the people stirred up on the race question between Filipinos and Americans. See Wood Diary, November 2, 4, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 17.

(73) Ibid., November 16, 1922.
Evidence of the continued dominance of Quezon and Osmena was shown at the Commission meeting convened in December to consider the report of the Parliamentary Mission. When presented on December 5, 1922, the report was contested by the Democratas.

A heated discussion arose regarding disclosure of the expenses incurred by the second mission. The Democrata solons wanted the expenses of the mission published, while the coalition majority objected on the ground that "there is no nation in the world that gives publicity to its expenses for sending missions to other countries."(74) Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona, speaking for the Democratas, also wanted consideration of the report postponed until members of the opposition had had a chance to study thoroughly the recommendations embodied in the report.(75)

The Commission meeting was tempestuous. The joint majorities, headed by Osmena and Speaker Manuel A. Roxas, with Quezon presiding over the meeting, argued heatedly with Claro M. Recto, leader of the opposition in the lower house, in defence of the Mission Report. Strong words were exchanged, but in the end the report was

(74) As in the first mission in 1919, the question of the mission funds came up for investigation. Representative Gregorio Perfecto, a Democrata, proposed the presentation of a resolution to the Legislature asking for an investigation of the funds expended by the two independence missions -- the 1919 and the 1922 missions. See Manila Times, August 15, 1922.

(75) Philippines Herald, December 6, 1922.
The Mission Report contained the various documents pertinent to the Parliamentary Mission: a statement of the purpose for sending the Mission; the resolution of the Independence Commission with regard to the Mission; the instructions to the Mission and its organization; a report on the activities and the result of the Mission; and recommendations for future action. The recommendations submitted to the Independence Commission were intended to facilitate a more extensive and intensive campaign and publicity in the United States for the Philippine cause.

(76) To allay the suspicions of the Democratas on the manner the independence fund was spent by the missions, Senate President Quezon made public the expenditures of the first and the second missions to the United States. The first mission, according to him, spent approximately 260,000 pesos (US$130,000) while the second mission cost about 290,000 pesos (US$145,000). The second mission cost the government more money than the first because the cost of passage of the latter was relatively less, having left on an army transport, while the second mission went on trans-Pacific liners. See Manila Daily Bulletin, December 8, 1922; Manila Times, December 11, 1922. See also BIA Records 26480-146-C; and BIA Records 4325-284.

The Insular Auditor in his annual report gave the following expenditures from the independence fund:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>478,657.16 (US$239,328.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>247,251.90 (US$123,625.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>390,746.32 (US$195,373.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>732,664.18 (US$366,332.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures must include the expenses of the missions and all other expenditures incidental to the publicity campaign for independence. See BIA Records 4325-284.

(77) Philippines Herald, December 6, 1922. See also Quezon Papers, Box 45.
Following the recommendation of the Second Parliamentary Mission, Teodoro M. Kalaw, former Secretary of the Interior, was appointed, on December 20, 1922, Executive Secretary and Chief Adviser of the Independence Commission.(78)

In his new capacity Kalaw prepared an elaborate plan of activities for the Independence Commission, which included a tour of the United States, and even of Europe and other countries, by a corps of orators, lecturers, newspapermen, editors, etc., to be financed from the million peso fund appropriated by the Legislature for this kind of campaign. He tried all possible means to get Quezon to approve of his plan, but Quezon was apparently too busy to attend to such "details."

Kalaw recounted that once, while Quezon was on a trip to the provinces, he sent him an urgent wire requesting approval of his plan. Quezon answered back, also by wire, "We shall talk about it," but they never did. On another occasion, Kalaw recalled that Quezon had dismissed his plan in the following words: "Teodoro, your plan is very beautiful, but it is costly in both money and time. It needs a large and well-paid personnel. Independence will be granted us eventually, don't worry about it, but it will come by our taking advantage of some great opportunity by the hair when it comes. I assure you it will come. Notice how we obtained the Jones Law. I grabbed it from the American Congress by taking advantage of one such opportunity. The same thing will happen with independence,

(78) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 173-174. See also Kalaw to Secretary of the Interior, January 11, 1923, Quezon Papers, Box 138; and Manila Times, December 22, 1922.
Quezon's disinterest frustrated Kalaw, who wondered why his position was ever created at all. He did all that could be done under the circumstances, however, and his office produced articles, books, and all sorts of propaganda material, even without the plans.(79)

Despite the willingness of the Filipino leaders to "downplay" the demand for immediate independence while they were in Washington, the return of the second Filipino delegation from the United States was followed by vigorous political agitation and an unusual degree of activity in support of independence. Confrontation rather than cooperation came to characterize the relations between the Filipino leadership and Governor Wood. During the remaining four years of Wood's administration, the independence issue became emotionally entangled with a political deadlock between the Chief Executive and the legislative leaders. The Independence Commission thus successively sent independence missions to Washington in 1923, 1924, and 1925, urgently demanding a resolution of the Philippine problem.

(79) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
CHAPTER IV

THE CABINET CRISIS

On July 17, 1923, Manila's metropolitan dailies headlined the resignation of all the Filipino members of Governor Woods's Cabinet, thus precipitating the "Cabinet Crisis" which brought the Philippine problem to the focus of US government and public attention.

The open break between Wood and the Filipino leaders led by Senate President Quezon was not unexpected. Since assuming his position as Governor General of the Philippines, Wood had let it be known that unlike his predecessor, Francis Burton Harrison, he was bent on exercising the powers of his office after the manner of an American chief executive — definitely not as an impotent figurehead. He was determined to govern and to assume active leadership to remedy the maladministration which he had found in the country. His determination to truly govern was met by the Filipino leaders with counter-offensives, for they interpreted this as a threat to the autonomy they already enjoyed. Accustomed as they were to playing a dominant role during the previous Harrison Administration, they desired supremacy in insular affairs, and no interference from the Governor General except in matters directly affecting the interests of the United States in the Philippines.
Wood not only found himself unable to sympathize with the desire of the Filipino nationalists for an increasing measure of self-government, but he also opposed independence, except perhaps in the very distant future. The American Government, he explained, would not consider any extension of further autonomy until the weaknesses pointed out in the Wood-Forbes Mission Report had been corrected. Complete independence would not be opposed, he said, if the Filipinos were "industrially strong and could defend themselves and hold their country." He advised the Filipinos to cooperate wholeheartedly in making the government efficient, for in so doing they would strengthen their plea for independence. In the meantime, he insisted on attempting to persuade the Filipinos to postpone the issue of independence or to forget it altogether.(1)

Though a collision was perhaps inevitable, it did not ensue immediately. Between his inauguration in October 1921 and the resignation of his Cabinet in July 1923, relations between the Governor General and the Filipino leaders were for the most part cordial. The administration of the government proceeded satisfactorily as both elements worked to establish an efficient and well-coordinated government. But when growing friction between Wood and the Filipino politicos erupted in a bitter public fight in mid-1923, it continued unabated until Wood's death four years later.

The immediate issue was a fundamental one. The Jones Act of 1916 deliberately established an American presidential system of government, with the department secretaries responsible to the

(1) See Wood Diary, January 18 (?), 25, 30, 1922, Wood Papers, Box 16.
Governor General as representative of the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature, with the assent of Governor Harrison, subsequently adopted "conventions" which transformed the system into one on a parliamentary model, under which the departmental heads were responsible to the Legislature, and the authority of the Governor General was purely nominal. The executive authority was actually exercised by a Council of State, not recognised by law but created by executive order (in 1918), consisting of the two presiding officers of the Legislature and the Cabinet members. This arrangement worked in a manner satisfactory to the Filipino leaders and secured harmonious relations between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Governor Wood considered such legislative encroachments on his executive powers unconstitutional and had recommended that if the Philippine Legislature did not repeal them, the United States Congress should annul them. In the meantime, he did not feel himself bound by them.(2)

(2) Governor Wood counted some 80-odd encroachments on the power of the executive embodied in various insular laws and in the Administrative Code. See letter, Wood to James Williams, November 19, 1923, ibid., Box 168.

Frank McIntyre, who was quite conversant with Philippine affairs, thought that the break between Wood and the Filipino leaders was the immediate result of the efforts of the Governor General to regain the authority conferred by the Jones Law but which had been delegated by his predecessor in office to legislative committees or subordinate executive officers. The effort to reinstate the office of the Governor General to its legal position was the primary cause of the break. See his letter to Henry L. Stimson, June 16, 1926, in Stimson "P" file, pt. 1, BIA Records.
Prior to the July 1923 crisis, Wood undoubtedly tried to cooperate with the Legislature — he took no actions to reverse or override any of the Philippine statutes limiting his authority as Governor General. He nevertheless felt that it was incumbent upon him to assert the prerogatives given him by act of Congress in 1916. So he insisted that his Cabinet would be responsible to him alone, and not to the Legislature. (3) He exercised liberally his power to veto bills passed by the Legislature (Harrison vetoed only five measures in seven years in office), and even went to the extent of altering measures already passed by the Legislature, and then affixing his signature after the alteration was made. The Filipino legislators were annoyed that the Governor General should veto bills of local interest and insisted that before the Governor acted

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(3) See Wood Diary, November 9, 1922, in ibid., Box 17, for conference with Quezon and Roxas explaining Cabinet responsibility.

An early bone of contention between Wood and the Nacionalista leaders came over the selection of his Cabinet. Wood insisted in naming his Cabinet as he pleased and announced that he would have a Cabinet which reflected the results of the elections of 1922 — that is, representatives from the Nacionalista, Colectivista, and Democrata parties would be appointed. This would eliminated party responsibility in government, which the Nacionalista leaders opposed. They insisted that the Cabinet must be selected from the majority party controlling the Legislature (which was at that time an alliance of the Nacionalista and Colectivista parties) as had been the practice heretofore. Wood eventually yielded to the Nacionalista leaders and eliminated Democrata participation in his Cabinet, thus incurring in the process the ire of the Democratas, who thought him "hopelessly weak." See Maximo M. Kalaw, "The Filipinos' Side," The Nation, 117 (December 5, 1923), p. 628. This article presents the Filipino side of the controversy with Governor Wood, but some of its observations must be taken with caution.

See also James Ross to Harrison, March 3, 1923, Harrison Papers, Box 33; Rafael Palma to Harrison, April 24, 1924, ibid., Box 31; Isauro Gabaldon to Harrison, April 28, 1923, ibid., Box 26; and Ernest J. Westerhouse to Harrison, May 12, 1923, ibid., Box 35.
unfavourably on any bill, their views must first be heard.(4)

Shortly before the outbreak of the "Cabinet Crisis" in July 1923, a difference of opinion arose between the Governor General and the Filipino leaders on a petition from municipal and provincial governments, endorsed by the Department of the Interior, for the Governor to remit the penalty for delinquency in the payment of the land tax, which people were unable to pay at times because of crop failure. Wood denied the petition in the belief that the move was politically inspired.

In sending this petition, Quezon had called the attention of the Governor to the fact that the views of the Filipino leaders seemed to have very little weight with the Chief Executive. He warned that "If this feeling is allowed to stand, it would be very difficult to preserve the utmost cooperation of the Filipinos, when they become convinced that you have little confidence in their loyalty or ability."(5)

(4) The first big surprise which Wood gave the Legislature was his veto of sixteen bills passed during the first session of that body under his Administration.

Governor Wood's early exercise of the veto brought a cartoon in the Philippines Herald of March 26, 1922, showing a burly ruffian labeled "Wood" thrusting a two-edged sword marked "Veto Power" into the breast of a Filipina symbolizing "Philippine Autonomy."

Unknown to the legislators was the fact that Wood, at times, did consult Quezon before he vetoed the bills. See Wood Diary, March 10, 1922, Wood Papers, Box 16; March 23, 24, 1923, ibid., Box 18; Confidential letter, Wood to SecWar Weeks, March 31, 1922, ibid., Box 162.

See Wood's veto record in Report of the Governor General, for 1923, p. 31; for 1924, p. 24; for 1925, p. 27.

(5) Letter, Quezon to Wood, July 3, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 166; Manila Times, July 2, 1923.
The 1922 Parliamentary Mission had been lulled into believing that since President Harding had assured them that no backward step would be taken, they would be able, upon their return to Manila, to reverse the thrust of Wood's policies. They had left Washington with the disposition and intention of cooperating in the government of the Philippines, even as they had voiced certain complaints, principally as to the methods and manner of the Governor General. They had been willing to overlook these alleged grievances partly because they had understood that the stay of the Governor General in the Philippines would be temporary. But Wood, who had deferred for one year the assumption of a position as Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, decided to stay on as Governor General. When the Administration accepted that decision, it became clear to the Filipino leaders that Wood's policies and actions would, in all probability, have the continuing support of the Administration.

There was in addition to Wood's policy an equally significant circumstance which brought on the "crisis" — and that was the political situation confronting Quezon. Quezon was having troubles assuring his ascendancy among his own followers and political rivals. The Governor General was caught in the intricate web of

One of the areas requested for remission of penalty was Laguna, which province was politically hostile to Quezon. That was why Wood thought this move was no more than a political gesture. See James Ross, "Observations On the Present Political Situation in the Philippine Islands," September 19, 1923, in Harrison Papers, Box 33.

(6) Memorandum for SecWar Weeks, December 5, 1923, BIA Records 27668-49 1/2.

Wood thought Quezon's challenge to him on the issue of Cabinet responsibility stemmed from the Democratic landslide in the off-year elections in America. See Wood Diary, November 10, 16, 1922; also Wood to McIntyre, two cables, November 13 and 17, 1922, in Wood Papers, Box 17.
Filipino partisan politics which saw Quezon desperately reaching for power to replace Sergio Osmeña as the Filipino head of government.

Since becoming Senate President in 1916, Quezon had been uncomfortable about his subordinate position to Speaker Osmeña, recognized as the top Filipino leader since 1907. He thought that properly the Senate President should be the more important official.

In 1922, Quezon launched his bid for supremacy and broke away from Osmeña's Partido Nacionalista on the issue of party leadership in government. He then proceeded to form his own Partido Colectivista. The break with Osmeña destroyed Nacionalista dominance, but Quezon found his leadership none too secure. The elections of 1922 returned three substantial blocs of legislators of almost equal strength — the old guard Nacionalistas led by Osmeña, Quezon's Colectivista Party, and the minority Democratas, who had gained a substantial representation. The enhanced strength of the Democratas revealed a growing disenchantment with Nacionalista politics, which had been the dominant political force since 1907.

In order to dominate the Legislature, Quezon needed the support of one of the other two parties — and his choice fell on Osmeña's Nacionalistas. This Nacionalista-Colectivista coalition assured the continued dominance of the Nacionalista Party, except that it was Quezon, instead of Osmeña, who emerged as the supreme leader, with his protege, Manuel A. Roxas, elected as Speaker. But the hasty reunion alienated a large group of Quezon's supporters, who denounced the rapprochement with Osmeña as an "outrageous betrayal" of the people's trust. Faced with a rebellious segment of his own
party and a resurgent Democratic Party, Quezon needed an issue to strengthen his leadership and his party.(7)

Wood's action in a police matter known as the Conley Case provided Quezon with the issue, and he used it to bring on the "Cabinet Crisis." By engineering this crisis, Quezon succeeded in electrifying an electorate which promptly supported the Nacionalista-Colectivista leaders.(8)


James Ross, a long-time resident of the Philippines, a Democrat, and a friend of Quezon and Harrison, attributed the friction between Wood and the Filipino leaders to several factors: (1) the appointment of the Wood-Forbes Mission and the publication of its report, which was "a direct challenge to the Filipinos;" (2) the unfortunate selection of some of the Governor's staff and advisers, especially Peter Bowditch and Gordon Johnston, who offended the Filipino leaders by their manners; (3) the irritating meddling with the affairs of departments and bureaus, even of the most petty nature; and (4) the reckless use of the Governor's veto. Ross considered Wood totally incapable of dealing with a situation where for all practical purposes the Legislature had the last word. See his "Observations," September 19, 1923, in Harrison Papers, Box 33.

(8) Michael P. Onorato has written extensively on Governor Wood's Administration in the Philippines. He has given a broader interpretation of the troubled relations between Wood and the Filipino leaders, especially Quezon, than the traditional interpretation of the Governor General as a "military autocrat" who tried to turn the clock back on Philippine autonomy by his "retrogressive" policy. Onorato shares Governor Wood's definite bias against the Filipino politicians of the twenties and has a tendency to emphasize what he calls the "political exigencies of the moment" which confronted Quezon. He is a staunch defender of Governor Wood, who most definitely must be regarded as an honest and sincere administrator, but who was unable, or unwilling, to understand the psychology of the Filipino temperament and the force of the independence sentiment. See his "Leonard Wood and the Philippine Crisis of 1923," in the Journal of East Asiatic Studies (University of Manila), 2 (March 1967); and the various articles in his A Brief Review of American Interest in Philippine Development and other Essays (Manila, 1972).
The controversy arose over charges of misconduct in office filed against an American named Ray Conley, chief of the vice squad of the Secret Service Branch of the Manila Police Department. Charges had been made against Conley from time to time, apparently in retaliation for his efficient crusade against organized vice in Manila.

In 1922 charges including the keeping of a mistress and the making of certain false statements relating to her were presented by a local attorney to the Prosecuting Attorney of the City of Manila, who, after thorough investigation, found no grounds to proceed. The charges were then repeated to the Director of the Civil Service, who refused to take any action because of the manifest connection of Conley's accuser with gambling elements in Manila.

The charges were then sent to the office of the Governor General, on July 17, 1922, and the Governor General's office referred them the next day to the Mayor of Manila, Ramon J. Fernandez, for investigation. The papers were not returned by the Mayor until December 28. During this period, a most exhaustive investigation was conducted, under the Mayor's orders, by the Chief of Police, John Green, who reported, in effect, that the charges were instigated by gamblers in order to get rid of Conley, who was making the gambling business unprofitable. The Mayor in returning the papers to Governor Wood made no comment other than to invite attention to the findings of the Chief of Police. The Governor General accordingly dismissed the charges.(9)

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Subsequently, the Secretary of the Interior, Jose P. Laurel, who had confirmed Conley's appointment to the police force, received numerous complaints that Conley had received bribes from big gamblers in Manila. On March 8, 1923, Mayor Fernandez and Secretary Laurel, expressing the belief that they had conclusive proof that Conley had been taking bribes, secured the approval of the Governor General to suspend Conley and file charges against him if they had evidence. Though both Filipino officials were insistent upon an administrative investigation to be conducted in their own departments, Governor Wood insisted that the case be submitted to the Court of First Instance to give Conley a fair trial, as he felt both Filipinos had already prejudged Conley.

Charges were thus filed in court. After a prolonged trial the court found that the charges were not sustained and dismissed them. A little later, other similar charges were filed in the same court, but on the motion of the prosecuting attorney the court dismissed them. Though the court acquitted Conley, in its decision it had stated that the detective's record, with respect to the keeping of a mistress, was not free from doubts and suspicions. Secretary Laurel seized upon this statement to write to Governor Wood, on June 28, 1923, requesting again that a committee on investigation be appointed to investigate Conley administratively.

(10) Ibid., p. 38. See also May 25, 1923 endorsement of Jose P. Laurel to the Mayor of Manila, in Jose P. Laurel Papers, Jose P. Laurel Memorial Foundation, Manila, Box 2, Series 1.
At first the Governor objected to an administrative investigation on the ground that Conley had already been acquitted by the court. In a memorandum submitted to the Governor, Secretary Laurel explained: "We could have proceeded against him administratively, but deferring to your wishes we had the matter submitted to Court, resulting in the dismissal of the case upon reasonable doubts but with a judicial pronouncement that the evidence submitted gives ground to doubt the integrity of Conley as a peace officer." (11)

Finally, on July 6, 1923, Governor Wood appointed a Committee on Investigation, composed of the Director of the Civil Service (a Filipino), the Undersecretary of Justice (also a Filipino), and a colonel of the Constabulary (an American). Although no specific mention of Conley was made, the committee was instructed to investigate the Manila Police Department in general. (12)

Thereupon, Secretary Laurel, through the Mayor, formulated several charges against Conley, among which were (1) that he was living with a woman named Grace Connoly and had stated in his civil service application papers and application for passport, all under oath, that she was his legal wife, although in reality he was married to a Filipino woman, and (2) that he extended favours to

(11) Secretary Laurel also complained that the Conley matter was taken directly by the Chief of Police to the Governor General, when it should have been taken to the Mayor, and then to the Secretary of the Interior, the immediate superiors of Conley. See M.M. Kalaw, Philippine Government under the Jones Law, pp. 195-196.

(12) Leonard Wood to Secretary Laurel, July 6, 1923, Laurel Papers, Box 3, Series 1.
gamblers for monetary considerations.

Only six days later, on July 12, the Chairman of the investigating committee, in compliance with a request for a preliminary report, wrote to the Governor that in view of the fact that the majority of the charges had already been investigated, Ray Conley "may be reinstated to his position."(13)

The Secretary to the Governor General immediately endorsed the papers to Secretary Laurel, saying that the Governor desired the immediate reinstatement of Conley, with salary for the period of his suspension.

On July 14, Secretary Laurel transmitted the wish of the Governor General to the City Mayor, requesting compliance therewith. But on the same day, he tendered his resignation to the Governor, saying: "I cannot conscientiously continue as Secretary of the Interior and at the same time have under my Department a man, who, I am convinced, is dishonest. In view thereof, I hereby tender my resignation as Secretary of the Interior." Upon receipt of the endorsement of Secretary Laurel, the Mayor left his office without complying with the request, and then subsequently submitted his own resignation.(14)


(14) Jose P. Laurel to the Governor General, July 14, 1923, in Wood Diary entry for July 14, 1923, ibid., Box 18. See also Laurel's Memorandum on the Conley Case, May 25, 1923, in Laurel Papers, Box 2, Series 1. See also Manila Times, July 16, 1923.
As a result of the resignation of Secretary Laurel and Mayor Fernandez, there were no officers interposed between the Governor General and the Chief of Police. Therefore, on July 14, Conley was reinstated by the Chief of Police upon receipt of a copy of a letter of that date from the Governor's secretary, C.W. Franks, addressed to the absent Secretary Laurel, terminating Conley's suspension and directing his reinstatement. (15)

In view of the prominence the matter had assumed and the gravity of the charges of adultery and falsification of statements made against Conley, the Governor General directed the Committee on Investigation to look further into the case and report whether, in view of the facts and charges, Conley was a desirable man, not withstanding his efficiency, to continue service permanently. The


Eugene V. Gilmore, Vice-Governor during Wood's term, analyzed for Frank McCoy what he thought was Filipino thinking on the Conley Case, and the subsequent break with Governor Wood. The Filipino leaders, he wrote, insisted that under the Organic Act, the Governor General was required to exercise his functions through the duly constituted Secretaries and could not perform these functions directly. The power of supervision and control which was granted him, they said, did not extend to the doing of the executive act itself. For that reason, it was contended that his reinstatement of Conley was illegal. When the Secretary of the Interior and the Mayor of Manila refused to reinstate Conley, the proper course, according to the Filipino theory, was for the Governor General to have removed these executive officials and appointed other officials who would do the act. The Conley Case was merely an instance of what the Filipinos claimed was a general violation of the general principle of autonomy secured under the Organic Act. Another instance involved acts of the Governor General done directly on the advice of Ben. F. Wright, then Bank Examiner, and later, Insular Auditor. The Filipino Secretary of Finance, on several occasions, resented what he called the act of the Governor General in going over his head and dealing directly with the situation on Wright's recommendations. See Gilmore to McCoy, June 9, 1931, Frank R. McCoy Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 82.
Committee reported on July 14, that "upon due consideration of all the records and documents on the subject, it had come to the conclusion that the continuance in the service of Patrolman Ray Conley of the Manila Police Department is inadvisable."

The Director of the Civil Service stated that it was the practice of the civil service to dismiss men who were living with queridas. But because of his long and extraordinarily efficient service and the fact that no criminal charges had ever been established against him, the Committee had recommended that his prior (1920) application for retirement be approved. The Director endorsed this recommendation and forwarded it to Governor General Wood. The Governor approved the retirement recommendation.

By mid-July, the Conley affair had ceased to be merely a criminal case and had assumed the character of a complicated political issue. The Governor General appraised the situation thus:

"... The issue which they have raised really is the right of the Governor General to terminate the suspension after the man had been acquitted twice by the court, once by the board .... The reason for the strenuous movement against reinstatement was, first, the fact that their evidence had been thrown out of court and they had lost face, and secondly, they had lost face still further because of their failure to convict Conley either before the courts or the board."

(16) See Notes on a Conference held in the Office of the Governor General, July 12, 1923, in McCoy Papers, Box 83.

From all information that comes to me, I am convinced beyond doubt that both the secretary of the interior and the mayor in tendering their resignations acted under the lash of the political leaders, who thought that they had in this incident an opportunity to raise an issue for which they had been seeking a cause for some time.(18)

After Laurel resigned on July 14, Manila was filled with rumours that there would be a mass resignation of the Filipino members of the Cabinet, although Senator Osmeña and Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos assured the Governor General that no such action was contemplated.(19) However in meetings reportedly held in Quezon's house, a secret agreement had been entered into, whereby it had been decided that unless the Governor General reversed his action, there was no alternative left but for the Cabinet to resign.(20)

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(18) Ibid., pp.39-40; see also Wood Diary, July 14, 16, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 18.

Wood wrote that he thought Laurel "was imposed upon from the beginning to the end, and was simply a tool of others who never wanted him as Secretary of the Interior and were glad to see him make a break which would separate him from the service." The Mayor, he wrote, "had acted with a great deal less candor and has more deliberately tried to bring about trouble."

See also Manila Times, July 15, 1923, commenting that Laurel was the "victim of political intrigue."

See also The Saga of Jose P. Laurel, written by Téofilo and Jose del Castillo (Manila, 1949), pp. 76-80.

(19) Wood Diary, July 16, 1923, in Wood Papers, Box 18.

(20) The Manila Times, July 16, 1923, reported that the secret agreement was entered into two weeks before the actual resignation of the Cabinet on July 17.
In the afternoon of July 17 a committee composed of Senate President Quezon, Speaker Manuel Roxas, Senator Osmeña, and Secretary of Justice Abad Santos conferred with Wood, to attempt, though unsuccessfully as it turned out, to bring about an adjustment of the issue which would include non-acceptance of the resignations of Laurel and Fernandez.(21)

In that session, Quezon confronted the Governor General with a string of accusations that Wood had meddled with and dictated details of the Philippine government which should have been left entirely to the Filipino officials. Wood rebutted Quezon's charges point by point -- they were "without the slightest foundation in fact," -- and supported his rebuttal with testimony of two of the Filipino heads of departments -- Abad Santos of Justice and Rafael Corpus of Agriculture and Natural Resources -- who affirmed that the Governor General had not interfered in their exercise of authority within their respective departments.

Finally [Quezon] became so insistent and impertinent that I had to tell him that the great difficulty was that he was trying to exercise authority which was not vested in him; in other words, he was trying to assume control of the government; that he was constantly spurred on by men who were appealing to him, appealing to his vanity, asking for his assistance, and he was listening to unfounded complaints, making declarations of policy, and charges without investigation, and statements which were wholly untrue; that while he professed the utmost loyalty to me, his public speeches had not indicated such support as his private utterances had promised; that he had agreed repeatedly that in case of any difficulties he would come to me directly and thresh them out. After showing the absurdity and falsity of his statements with reference to my

(21) Wood had hoped that the two officials would reconsider their actions and withdraw their resignations. See Wood Diary, July 17, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 18.
overriding the secretaries, I told him very plainly without mincing matters that every day he had been clearly impolite and discourteous in sending for the heads of bureaus, chiefs of departments and even for the auditor, without reference to me; in other words, that he had gone around and reached these people and into the archives without reference to the Governor General. This he had to admit, although he did it with very ill grace.

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Mr. Osmeña kept out of the discussion. I think he has been pushing Quezon on more or less quietly, seeing that the little man was going to eventually blow up and burst in his efforts at aggrandizement and his reaching for power; all of which would be very agreeable to Osmeña. I have done everything possible to keep Quezon from making a fool of himself but it has been difficult and, in the end, as shown today, impossible.(22)

At half past ten in the evening of July 17, the final step was taken. The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and all the Filipino Secretaries tendered their resignations as members of the Council of State and as heads of Departments, under conditions which rendered acceptance by the Governor General possible.

(22) Ibid. The day before, on July 16, Osmeña saw Wood and assured the Governor General that he was doing all he could to quiet the situation. See Wood Diary, July 16, 1923, ibid., Box 18. See also his letters to Forbes, November 17, 1923 (Box 164) and February 4, 1924 (Box 170), ibid., for Osmeña's attitude on the whole affair.

On August 15, Secretary Corpus informed Wood that much of the "crisis" might have been avoided had there been a meeting of the Council of State where the Filipino leaders could have made clear their views before taking any final action. Secretary Abad Santos was apparently delegated to arrange this meeting with the Governor General (when he came to see him in the evening of July 16) but this he had failed to do. Abad Santos told the Governor that they were most anxious to avoid any resignations and that Quezon had promised that he would not make any statement that would further aggravate the situation. To this the Governor General expressed his doubts — so no Council meeting was set up. See Wood Diary, July 16, 1923 (Box 18), August 15, 1923 (Box 19), Wood Papers.
unavoidable. The letter of resignation read:

We have observed for some time past that it is your policy and desire, as Governor General, to intervene in and control even to the smallest details, the affairs of our government, both insular and local, in utter disregard of the authority and responsibility of the department heads and other officials concerned. This policy recently culminated in an unfortunate incident which shook to its foundations the public opinions of the country when you, by undue interference with the powers and jurisdiction of the secretary of the interior and the mayor of the city of Manila, reinstated a member of the secret service of the city who had been legally suspended from office, and subsequently, upon your own initiative, accepted his resignation; and to make matters worse, you took this action without hearing the proper officials. This series of acts constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental law of the land and other legal provisions, . . . and at the same time is a backward step and a curtailment of the Filipino autonomy guaranteed by the organic act and enjoyed by the Filipino people continuously since the operation of the Jones law.

Having followed this course of conduct in your relations with the executive departments and other offices of the insular and local governments, thereby violating the sacred pledge of the people and Government of the United States to guarantee to the Filipino people the exercise of the greatest possible measure of self-government pending the recognition of their independence, we beg, with the deepest regret, frankly to state that we are unable to assume responsibility with you in the execution of this policy, and therefore, we have decided to, and hereby do, tender our resignations jointly, the members of the Council of State, and individually, the secretaries of departments.

The Filipino officials who resigned were Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Jose P. Laurel, Secretary of the Interior; Alberto Barretto, Secretary of Finance; Rafael Corpus, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; Jose Abad Santos, Secretary of Justice; and Salvador Laguda, Secretary of Commerce
and Communications.(23)

The delivery of the letter of resignation to the Governor General was quite spectacular. Quezon himself handed it, accompanied by members of the Council of State and the Cabinet, all of them in formal dress. General Wood for the occasion also put on his glittering uniform as Commanding General of the Army in the Philippines.(24) The Governor General termed the action of the Filipino leaders a challenge to American sovereignty and "an organized preconcerted attack" against the authority of his office as the representative of the sovereign power of the United States, and accepted their resignations.(25)

(23) Report of the Governor General, 1923, p. 35.

The Manila Times, July 16, 1923, reported that the letters of resignation of the Filipino Cabinet members (except Laurel) and the Mayor of Manila were written in Quezon's house. See also Wood Diary, August 24, 1923, in Wood Papers, Box 19.

(24) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 178.

The Manila Times, July 19, 1923, reported that only Lt. Osborne Wood wore a mess jacket and that the other members of the Governor's staff wore civilian clothes. This is significant in view of the charges of "militarism" leveled against the Governor General's administration.


According to Filipino sources, the Filipinos suggested to Governor Wood at the afternoon meeting on July 17 that he withhold action on the resignations of Laurel and Fernandez until July 18 (the deadline for the withdrawal of the resignation was noon of July 17). The Governor was disposed to acquiesce, but was interrupted by his son, Lt. Wood, who said it would be impossible to wait another day because "the Americans in the community will be greatly disappointed, and you have assured the press that the matter would be disposed of tonight." Whereupon Governor Wood said that he would give them until 1:00 a.m. July 18 to decide on their action. Consequently the resignation at that unusual time -- 10:30 p.m. July 17. See Memorandum for the SecWar, December 14, 1923, in Records of the Office of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Record Group 126, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter Records of the US High Commissioner).
In his annual report to the Secretary of War, Governor Wood characterized the causes of the conflict as follows:

... Expressed in the simplest terms, the resignations came as the culmination of an attempt to break down the authority given the Governor General in the organic act entirely at variance with the text and clear intent thereof; to maintain a degree of autonomy which had been illegally assumed during the preceding administration by encroachment upon and curtailment of executive powers. These encroachments and curtailments were often embodied in legislative acts which were relied upon to sustain the position of the Filipino leaders. The organic act has given the Governor General power of supervision and control over all departments and bureaus and vests all executive authority in him or in the departments under his control and supervision. Those who were responsible for the so-called crisis claimed that the act of the department secretaries was final. This would destroy the power of supervision and control of the Governor General. Several of the leaders in this movement, among them the president of the senate and the speaker of the house, stated publicly that their purpose was to reduce the Governor General to a mere figurehead. It was an attempt to force by resignation and non-cooperation the recognition of more autonomy than is given by the organic act ... The whole movement was timed to serve a local political situation. It was predicated on serious misrepresentation of facts. Furthermore, it was made in a manner and voiced in phraseology which might have created serious unrest had the people been less contented and loyal; but thanks to their good sense and appreciation of what the United States has done for them, the effect of the efforts on the mass of the people was very little ... The several department secretaries in resigning yielded to strong pressure from the political leaders.(26)

In a cable to Secretary of War Weeks, Governor Wood underscored the "political and personal ambition on the part of one or two leaders," which had "temporarily over-balanced the better judgment

of the others", as the underlying motive behind the "Crisis."(27) Terming the Crisis a "great bluff," over and over again he pointed the finger of accusation at Quezon and his followers.(28)

Rafael Palma, former senator and considered the most level-headed of the Filipino leaders, also expressed the opinion that Quezon engineered the "Cabinet Crisis". In his letter to Francis Burton Harrison, dated April 22, 1924, he said that Quezon, who was concerned about his political future, "became impatient and provoked" the Cabinet Crisis."(29)

(27) Cable #492, July 17, 1923, Wood to SecWar Weeks; Cable #494, July 19, 1923, Wood to SecWar, in Report of the Governor General, 1923, pp. 36, 37. For more of Governor Wood's evaluation of the situation, see also Wood to McIntyre, August 3, 1923, BIA Records 3038-112-A. See also Confidential letter, McIntyre to Wood, September 17, 1923, BIA Records 3038-112; Letter, McIntyre to Wood, October 6, 1923, BIA Records 3038, part 2; Memorandum for the Governor General from Gordon Johnston, August 5, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 165.

(28) Wood to J.B.W. Gardiner, December 2, 1923, ibid., Box 164; Wood Diary, July 14, 1923, ibid., Box 18. At a meeting of the Board of Control, both Roxas and Quezon frankly admitted to Governor Wood that the statements they had been making in public were radical and that they had been compelled to do so to maintain their hold on their people. See Wood Diary, August 14, 1923, in ibid., Box 18.

(29) Rafael Palma to Harrison, April 22, 1924, Harrison Papers, Box 31. On August 8, Palma had a talk with the Governor General. He told the Chief Executive that he wished Wood had sent for him and that he thought he could have stopped the "crisis". The Governor told him that he "wished to God he had accepted the position which I had repeatedly offered him as Secretary of the Interior." See Wood Diary, August 8, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 19.
It must also be remembered, however, that Wood, while believing
Conley to be the victim of a frame-up, also accepted that the
Secretary of the Interior and the Mayor had been led unwittingly
into participating, and once in, felt they had to go through with it
to save their faces. (30) By his precipitate actions in the crucial
July 6-14 period, Wood displayed a total lack of understanding of
the essentiality of a face-saving way out if confrontation was to be
avoided. Thus, while Quezon seems to have consciously exploited the
opportunity, it was Wood who handed Quezon the issue.

With the resignations of the Department Secretaries, the
Undersecretaries promptly took over the positions, and administered
the Departments for the next four years, for the Senate refused to
confirm the Governor General's appointments to the vacancies in the
Cabinet.

In presenting the Filipino side of the case, a message cabled
by the Legislature to President Harding on July 18 explained that in
the resignation of members of the Council of State and the
Department Secretaries there was "no attack on the sovereign power
of the United States, nor a challenge to the authority of its
representative in the Philippine Islands." It was not even a protest
against the administration of President Harding, nor against
Governor Wood personally, but it was "a protest against the
encroachment by the Governor General on the constitutional rights
already enjoyed by the Filipinos and against the usurpation of power

(30) See Outline Memorandum on Conley Case, Report of the Governor
General, 1923, p. 39.
in direct violation of existing laws."(31)

In a personal and confidential letter to General McIntyre, Quezon also explained that the fight against the Governor General was not inspired "by any spirit or feeling of anti-Americanism." He wrote:

... It should be noted at the very outset that we have never gone to the extent of presuming to govern the Philippines in disregard of the authority of the Governor General. We have only contended that the Governor General should govern with the advice and in conformity with the wishes of the people here as expressed by their duly authorized representatives in the government. Concretely, this means that he should take the advice of the Council of State on matters affecting general policies of the government, and on matters affecting Executive departments he should give the secretaries of departments the amplyst authority to manage their respective departments. ...

But Governor Wood would not concede this, he continued, because of "his absolute lack of faith in the Filipinos either individually or as a race." Because of this attitude, he never took his Secretaries of Departments or the Council of State into his confidence. As a general policy, "he has always given more weight and consideration to what Americans say: he has considered the Filipinos secondary in


The Filipino side of the controversy with Governor Wood is expounded fully in the following two works: Jorge Bocobo, General Wood and the Law, A Discussion of the Legal Aspect of the Political Crisis in the Philippine Islands (Manila, 1923), 64 pp; and Manuel L. Quezon and Camilo Osias, General Wood and the Filipino Cause (Manila 1924), 228 pp.
the affairs of this Government." (32)

The resignation of the Filipino leaders caused great excitement. Wood's action in accepting the resignations delighted those Americans in Manila who had been critical of the conciliatory attitude of the Governor towards the politicians, but it startled the Filipinos. Many believed that Quezon had been bluffing, hoping to force Governor Wood into complying with his demands, and it came as something of a surprise when the Governor accepted the resignations. (33)

Aguinaldo came to Wood's office in great agitation, convinced that Quezon had done the Filipino cause great harm by his hot-headed action. A few days later he issued a public statement counseling equanimity and calm, saying that the conflict between the Governor General and the Filipino leaders could easily be settled at a conference table. (34)

(32) See Quezon to McIntyre, November 13, 1923, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.

(33) The Quezon Papers contain many resolutions of support from municipal councils, associations, clubs, and societies. The Wood Papers contain a number of letters of congratulations for his action from some Filipinos. See entries for July to September 1923. One American observer, however, noted that the vast majority of American residents in Manila stood aside and watched the contest in silence. He also contended that no American lawyer, even those most friendly to Governor Wood, was prepared to contest the legal questions raised by the Filipinos. See James Ross, "Observations" September 19, 1923, in Harrison Papers, Box 33.

Quezon himself came to see Wood two days after the resignations — "as suave and genteel as ever" — to present a letter, written confidentially, regarding rumours which he said were current to the effect that the military forces in the Philippines had been put on the alert for any eventuality. Quezon affirmed the loyalty of the Filipinos to the United States government and assured Governor Wood that no revolt against the sovereignty of the United States was contemplated, nor was the action of resignation of the Filipino leaders a challenge to the authority of the United States in the Philippines. Rather, the resignation of the Secretaries of the Departments resulted primarily from their belief that their right to govern had been violated by the Governor's exercise of what he thought were his constitutional powers.(35)

The rumours were nonsense, Wood answered. Everything was quiet, the only commotion being that of Quezon's. "I told him that I thought he had done the Filipino people a great harm and their cause a lasting one; that the whole thing was absolutely unnecessary and insincere." Quezon made protestations of his sincerity, to which Wood frankly expressed his doubts. "I finally ended by telling him that he was capable of raising more hell or doing more good than any other man in the Philippines. This seemed to please him greatly; he took it as an evidence of his power with his own people."(36)

(35) Confidential letter, Quezon to Osmeña, July 18 1923, BIA Records 3038-111-A.

Quezon soon afterwards called a meeting of the Commission of Independence, in reality, also the Philippine Legislature, to ask his colleagues to back up the action of the Cabinet. On July 23 the Commission adopted a resolution which applauded the action taken by the Council of State and the Filipino Secretaries. The Commission termed the controversy a "national issue" and resolved to take all necessary steps and adopt all legal means to defend the constitutional liberties of the Filipinos against the assault of the Governor. The Commission sought "to maintain our domestic autonomy guaranteed by the Jones Law," denouncing Governor Wood's policy of "continued interference with the powers and duties of Filipino officials" as "illegal, arbitrary, and undemocratic." It declared that the only satisfactory solution of the Philippine problem would be the immediate independence of the Philippines.(37)

On July 24 another resolution was adopted, this time demanding the immediate recall of Governor Wood by President Harding in order "to restore in the government the harmony which has been disturbed through the acts of the Governor." The continuation of Governor Wood in office, the resolution declared, was a detriment to public welfare. The resolution proposed that pending the concession of independence, "the post of Governor General of the Philippines be given to a Filipino, not as a new test of the political capacity of the Filipino people which has been amply demonstrated already, but simply to insure in the meantime the success of the administration of these islands, through a closer, continuous, and more cordial

(37) Manila Times, July 24, 1923.
The resignation of the members of the Council of State was also followed on July 24 by the resignation of the six appointive members of the Legislature, who quit supposedly to give Governor Wood a free hand in the selection of new appointees in sympathy with his policies. These resignations were generally considered either as another attempt to embarrass the Governor or as being due to pressure from the Quezon organization. The Governor undoubtedly would have difficulty finding appointees for the six vacancies. Friends of the Governor asserted that it was generally recognised that Quezon and his colleagues were forcing out all of the Wood appointees to make it appear that the people were solidly behind the recent Cabinet resignations. (39)

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(38) Telegram, C.W. Franks to Wood, July 24, 1923, in Samar, Wood Diary, Wood Papers, Box 18.

The resolution was sponsored originally by Representative Jose Padilla (Democrata, Bulacan) and amended by Osmeña in its final form.

This is not the first instance of a Filipino demand for the recall of the Governor General. During the administration of Governor W. Cameron Forbes, the Filipino legislators not only asked for his recall but for three years refused to vote on an appropriations bill. See New York Times, July 30, 1923.

Quezon and his colleagues continued their confrontation with Governor Wood, raising various issues to stir up public sentiment against the Governor's administration.\(^{(40)}\) One issue was the appointment by Governor Wood of Democrata Eulogio Rodriguez (on July 28) as Mayor of Manila, to replace the resigned Mayor Fernandez. Quezon charged that the Governor had appointed an ex-convict -- a charge which startled Manila's political circles. In a cable to Secretary Weeks in Washington, he asserted that Rodriguez was duly convicted and sentenced to one year in prison (between June 1900 to June 1901) and fined 1000 pesos (US$500) for having masterminded the forcible abduction, in 1899, of a woman against her will by a band of bandits.\(^{(41)}\) The Quezon disclosure against Rodriguez was generally considered to be another attempt by Quezon to create a

\(^{(40)}\) Quezon continued his attacks on the Governor General's exercise of power over the heads of the Departments, expanding these to include his objections to Wood's reliance on his "private advisers," referring to those army men serving as the Governor's Malacanang staff. Roxas took the Governor to task for his having established a government "not of popular expression, but of suppression of the popular will." Osmeña charged that Wood had sought to turn over to American interests the Manila Railroad and the sugar centrals financed by the Philippine National Bank. See New York Times, August 2, 1923; Manila Times, August 9, 1923.

Wood answered Osmeña charges with the publication of his message in February 1923 to the Legislature, which the Filipinos had presumably suppressed. The message dealt with the affairs of the Philippine National Bank, showing that it had been in a very unsound condition. See New York Times, August 19, 1923; Manila Times, August 19, 1923.

\(^{(41)}\) Quezon further declared that Rodriguez was convicted of being an accomplice to the murder of J.P. Barry of the 27th United States Infantry. Rodriguez was alleged to have led a detachment of American troops against a house in which he knew bandits were concealed. Barry was killed in the fight that followed. See The Washington Evening Star, August 21, 1923; Eulogio Rodriguez, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records.
sensation in political circles for his benefit.

Quezon in his fiery oratory preached non-cooperation, going, in Wood's opinion, as near as possible to the limit of disloyalty in lining up Filipinos against Americans. More than that, with neither Filipino nor resident-American public opinion unanimously in one camp or the other, Quezon resorted to a most emotional issue — racial solidarity — charging all Filipinos who did not stand against the American authority as unpatriotic. Wood wrote to

The Philippines Herald issued an extra edition demanding editorially that the Governor request Mayor Rodriguez' resignation.

See Manila Times, August 22, 1923, for Rodriguez' statement clarifying the case.

The War Department was said to be without any record of a conviction of Rodriguez resulting from the death of Barry. See New York Times, August 22, 1923.


Quezon repeated his oft-made statement that the Filipinos preferred a government run like hell to one run by Americans. Osmeña was quoted as saying that failure to settle the current trouble would result in revolution.


Wood apparently put Quezon on the defensive by stating publicly that anyone who talked non-cooperation and attempted to line up Filipinos against Americans was a traitor to the best interests of his people. This seemed to have silenced talk of non-cooperation. See Wood to SecWar Weeks, August 22, 1923, in Wood Diary, Wood Papers, Box 19.

Both the Manila Daily Bulletin and the Manila Times, American-owned newspapers, conducted a campaign filled with "unnecessary venom" and bitterness against the Filipinos and their independence aspirations. The Manila Times, especially, carried sarcastic editorials almost daily after the Cabinet Crisis. This was particularly so after Norbert Lyons (or Sargent Con) joined the staff of the newspaper. In November 1923, the Manila Daily Bulletin softened its editorial policy because advertising and circulation had both suffered since the crisis in July.
McIntyre: "It is very hard for the average Filipino to resist an appeal of this kind, and our little friend is quite willing to use this issue to keep himself temporarily to the front.(44)

"Stated in its simplest terms," the Governor said, "they made up their minds that they were going to break down the Organic Act."(45)

Quezon also lashed at the Democratas for taking advantage of the situation to occupy certain appointive positions. During the "crisis" the Democratas found themselves in a very difficult situation. Initially, they had not been opposed to Governor Wood's administration, and in fact, had declared that the Governor General had not exceeded his powers as charged. On the other hand, they had been bitterly critical of Quezon's "political bossism."

The Democratas' initial position in the controversy with the Governor was: first, that the Democrata Party, representing one third the political strength of the Philippines, did not consider the issue raised by the Quezon group through the enforced resignation of the Secretaries to be a national one, but purely an issue of the interpretation by the Quezon group of the Jones Act; second, that the movement for immediate independence advocated by the leaders of this group had been losing ground; and third, that the movement for a constitutional convention had not been received with the approbation that the Quezon group had expected. Therefore,

(44) Wood to McIntyre, August 11, 1923, BIA Records 3038-112.
(45) Wood to Mrs. Eleanor Egan, March 27, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 169.
the Quezon group was acting out of a need to do something to revive interest in the political situation. (46)

But Quezon succeeded in making the resignation episode a "national issue." The Democratas' apparent support of the Governor was a target of bitter criticism from the coalition Nacionalistas, with accusations of treachery and lack of patriotism. (47) Under the circumstances, the Democratas felt constrained to support in some degree the stand of the Coalition leaders or completely lose their following. On July 21 the leaders of the party in a resolution denounced the alleged policy of interference by the Governor with the functions and powers of the heads of Departments. But at the same time, they criticized the resigned Mayor of Manila for his "unenergetic action" on the Conley Case. (48)

Quezon played another political master stroke by causing a vacancy in the Senate through the resignation on July 21 of Senator Pedro Guevara, who had been elected Resident Commissioner to Washington in February of 1923. A special election to fill the

(46) Cable #496, Wood to McIntyre, July 20, 1923, BIA Records 3038-104.

Ruperto Montinola, President of the party, intimated that politics was at the bottom of the break with the Governor and censured Quezon and Osmeña for failing to negotiate with Governor Wood or to test the reinstatement of Conley by securing the opinion of the Attorney General. See Manila Times, July 26, 1923; New York Times, July 25, 1923.


vacancy thus became necessary. This election would have taken place in April, but because Washington had questioned Guevara's eligibility to be elected Resident Commissioner while he was serving as a Senator, the elections had been postponed by Wood, and Guevara had withdrawn his resignation as Senator. Pending the determination of Guevara's eligibility to serve as Resident Commissioner, Quezon had jockeyed for further postponement of elections, and Wood had once again postponed the date until the matter was settled. (49)

If the elections had been held as originally scheduled, the Democratas felt that their candidate, Juan Sumulong, one of the pillars of the party and a respected statesman, would have been a sure winner. The Democratas naturally enough resented Wood's postponement of the elections and thought that he had favoured the coalitionists by that action. They felt that Guevara's resignation as a senator was withdrawn and the elections suspended because the coalitionist candidate, Quintin Paredes, was sure to lose to Sumulong. After the Cabinet Crisis, Quezon found a perfect opponent for Sumulong. Guevara was finally allowed to resign as Senator and assume his post in Washington. (50)

The elections were finally set for October 2, 1923. The Fourth Senatorial District normally was Democrata, and it was strongly so in the last general elections of 1922. Now, however, popular

(49) Manila Times, February 25, 28, March 9, April 1, 1923.
(50) Ibid., July 21, September 17, 1923.
feeling had been raised to a high pitch over the resignation episode, and Quezon took advantage of this situation by nominating the resigned Mayor Fernandez, on a platform of "Fernandez vs. Wood." His idea was to bring the issue of Governor Wood's "despotism" directly to the electorate, with the coalitionist appearing before the people as the defenders of their "liberties" against "American encroachment" and Democrata apathy. The Democratas were branded as "enemies of national independence" because they had supported the Governor General.

It was an ugly fight, with a great deal of personal abuse, charge and countercharge. The election rhetoric centered on: the curtailment of autonomy by the Governor's policies; the intention to reduce American sovereignty to a mere figurehead; and the repeated declaration that the Filipinos would rather have a government run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by Americans. As Quezon dramatically declared: "the hour has come and it is God's will that the Filipinos shall govern their own land."

(51) Montinola called Quezon a "double-faced politician." See Quezon cartoon describing him as such in ibid., September 28, 1923. Handbills with the same message were apparently handed out during the campaign. See ibid., September 30, 1923. See also Recto speech at the University of the Philippines, in ibid., September 27, 1923.

(52) Wood Diary, October 4, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 19.

One of the most bitter fights in the campaign was waged over the question of expenditures from the million-peso independence fund, which was controlled by the coalition legislators. On September 3, 1923, Representatives Claro M. Recto (Batangas), Alfonso Mendoza (Manila), and Vicente Sotto (Cebu) requested Speaker Roxas to allow them to examine the vouchers or other evidence of disbursements made from the fund. Ignored by Speaker Roxas, they then appealed to Governor Wood to order the Insular Auditor to permit them to examine the accounts of the Independence Commission. Wood demurred, explaining that unless some responsible party preferred charges of fraud in connection with the expenditure of the independence fund, he could not allow anybody to look into the books of the Insular Auditor.

Feelings ran high. On September 23, several thousand Democrata followers gathered at the Luneta where fiery speeches were delivered charging that the independence fund was being squandered by the majority leaders. The Democratas claimed that, as representatives of the people, they had as much right as Quezon and Roxas to know how this "treasure" was being spent. In a resolution, they charged that the independence fund was not being used exclusively to the end for which it had been appropriated, but for electoral purposes to

(54) Manila Times, September 11, 1923.

(55) Wood to Sotto, September 13, 1923, in Wood Diary, September 15, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 19; Manila Times, September 12, 14, 1923.
benefit the coalition Nacionalista Party.\(^{(56)}\) Quezon and Roxas, through the Independence Commission, however, "tenaciously refused" to furnish the desired information and receipts, despite the serious charges made against them.\(^{(57)}\)

Having failed to secure administrative action on their complaints, Representatives Gregorio Perfecto and Alfonso E. Mendoza, on behalf of twenty-six Democrata representatives and four senators, filed, on September 27, 1923, a mandamus petition with the Philippine Supreme Court, asking that the Governor General, the Acting Insular Auditor; Senate President Quezon, Speaker Roxas, the Executive Officer (Teodoro M. Kalaw) and the Secretary of the Independence Commission (Fernando Ma. Guerrero) be ordered by peremptory writ of mandate to exhibit to plaintiffs all vouchers and other documents attesting to expenditures from the independence fund.\(^{(58)}\)

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\(^{(56)}\) Ibid., September 20, 23, 24, 25, 1923. See also letter, Mendoza, Recto, and Sotto to Wood, September 24, 1923, for specific charges filed with the Governor in line with the averred squandering of the independence fund, in Wood Diary, Wood Papers, Box 19.

Another Democrata resolution urged Wood to order the immediate filing of civil suits and criminal complaints against all those responsible for the financial debacle in the Philippine National Bank. Wood assured the Democratas that legal action would be taken against some former directors of the Philippine National Bank for illegal transactions and unauthorized loans resulting in considerable losses (US$50M) to the Bank. See Manila Times, September 23, 24, 1923.

Interestingly enough, the Democratas also wished that the Governor's discretionary funds be made public, too, a demand also made by the coalitionists. See ibid., September 15, 26, 1923.

\(^{(57)}\) Quezon to Emiliano Tria Tirona (Democrata), September 22, 1923, Quezon Papers, Box 45.

\(^{(58)}\) Manila Times, September 27, 1923; New York Times, October 1, 1923.
The writ of mandamus was refused by the Supreme Court, which held the question involved to be an administrative one and not within its jurisdiction. (59)

Their defeat in the court action was the signal for a fresh outbreak of bitterness among the Democratas. They turned their campaign on to the record of Quezon and Osmena and the Nacionalistas during the Harrison regime, when millions were lost through mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank, compelling the imposition of a heavy bonded indebtedness upon the country. (60) Quezon and Osmena had to answer attacks daily, many of them quite personal ones. (61)

Clearly, this was the hardest fought and bitterest political campaign since the American occupation. Teodoro Kalaw called it the "battle of this generation." For the first time, even the American public demonstrated considerable interest in a Philippine election. (62)

(59) Manila Times, October 12, November 12, 1923, January 15, 1924.

(60) Ibid., October 1, 1923; New York Times, October 2, 1923.

Ramon Fernandez was one of the directors of the Philippine National Bank when most of its unsound operations occurred, and his companies were among the chief beneficiaries of Bank transactions during this period. Though there appears to have been no evidence that Fernandez was involved in any wrongdoing, the Democrata naturally lost no opportunity to work this situation to their advantage.

(61) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 182.

(62) The tense situation as the elections neared caused General Rafael Crame of the Philippine Constabulary to direct that force to "shoot to kill" to preserve peace. See Manila Times, September 30, 1923.

Governor Wood also ordered American troops in the Philippines to keep peace during the elections. See ibid., October 1, 1923.
In the elections on October 2 what was normally the strongest Democrata district in the country was taken over by the coalition camp: Ramon Fernandez won by a safe majority. Fernandez' election was hailed by the victors as the "triumph of the cause of democracy and liberty." Roxas declared in his victory statement: "The election is over and the forces of freedom emerged victorious. We expect that our friends, the Democratas, will abide by the verdict of the people and will now join us in our national undertaking to overthrow the autocracy of Governor General Wood, and in the achievement of the earliest possible independence of our country." 

The Democratas after 1923 were unable to hold the gains of the year before. Within a few years they completely abdicated their role as the opposition party, and Nacionalista strength became even more solid.

During all this controversy between Wood and the Filipino leaders, there was never any question of Washington's support of the Governor General. On July 20, three days after the resignation


So bitter was the indignation of the Democratas over Fernandez' victory that on October 4, a Democrata mass meeting ended with the stoning of the Carambola Club where Quezon was dining and a Democrata mob attempted to assault various Quezonite leaders at the National University. The meeting was called to ratify the party's support of Juan Sumulong and to condemn the coalition's practices following the recent elections. See ibid., October 6, 1923.

(64) Ibid., October 4, 1923.

(65) See New York Times, August 21, 25, 1923; Manila Times, August 26, 1923, for statements of President Coolidge and Secretary Weeks supporting Governor Wood.
episode, Secretary of War Weeks had cabled the following message, to be transmitted to Quezon and Roxas:

I sympathize with you in your desire jealously to protect from encroachment those powers granted to you by the organic act. I advise you, however, to recall that these powers were granted to you on the conditions set forth in the act and to justify granting them nothing was set forth more clearly in that act than the authority and responsibility imposed on the Governor General. A rigid guardianship of the authority given and responsibility imposed on the Governor General is an essential part of that officer's duties. . . . (66)

And in a letter dated September 21, McIntyre (of the Bureau of Insular Affairs) had transmitted to Governor Wood his opinion thus:

It is essential that the leaders in the Philippines, if they are to win the good will of the people here, should appreciate that the Jones Bill was regarded as a most liberal Act for the Philippines and that the powers reserved in that Act to the United States and to the few American officials appointed by the President were to be jealously guarded until Congress should otherwise provide. There is no such thing as an amendment of the organic law by a legislature created by the organic law, and there is no such thing as losing, through non-use, a power given by the organic law to an executive. He can not relieve himself of responsibility by non-use, nor can he deprive the office of its authority by non-use.(67)

On October 11, just after the Fernandez election, Secretary Weeks cabled Washington's official full support of Wood's administration. The authoritative statement definitely laid down


(67) McIntyre to Wood, September 21, 1923, BIA Records 3038-115. Wood felt that General McIntyre was not disposed at all times to be as unconditional in his support of the Governor General as he ought to be. See James Williams to Wood, September 30, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 168.
the position of the American Government on the legal aspects of the controversy between Governor Wood and the Filipino majority leaders.
It said partly:

The personal sacrifice involved in your acceptance of your present office is proof of your desire to serve the Filipino people as you have served the United States. You are entitled to the support of the administration, and you have it.

The controversy with the legislative leaders and certain executive officers is at bottom a legal one. The Congress after full consideration vested the authority of control and supervision over all departments and bureaus in the Governor General, which makes these officials directly responsible to him and not to the legislature as in a parliamentary form of government.

The powers of the Governor General have not been exceeded or misused by you in any instance of which the War Department is advised. If the legislature has enacted legislation violative of the provisions of the organic law, such legislation is to that extent null and void, and in so far as it provides for encroachment on the authority of the Governor General is in no way binding on that official.(68)

(68) Report of the Governor General, 1923, pp. 41-42. There were several versions of the October 11 cablegram. The final form was sent to Wood after all his suggestions had been incorporated. See Cable #463, McIntyre to Wood, September 25, 1923; Cable #566, September 27, 1923, Wood to McIntyre, in Records of the US High Commissioner and BIA Records 3038-127 and BIA Records 3038-131. See also copy of proposed cablegram, September 27, 1923; Cable #571, Wood to McIntyre, October 3, 1923, in Wood Papers, Box 168.

Before the cablegram was sent to Wood, Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara called on the Bureau of Insular Affairs requesting that the cable rendering decisions in the pending controversies be delayed until the Filipinos could make a full statement of their troubles to Washington. The War Department wanted the cablegram sent before the opening of the Legislature on October 16 so that Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders could make some satisfactory adjustment prior to that date. Guevara intimated that he thought it would be almost impossible to reach an agreement. See Memorandum for the Record, October 10, 1923, BIA Records, 3038-135.
The first message of support for Wood in July was written while Harding was president; the September and October messages were written after Harding had been succeeded by Calvin Coolidge. There was every indication that Governor Wood at all times had the support of Secretary Weeks and both Presidents Harding and Coolidge.

Governor Wood read the Secretary's message confidentially on October 15 at a meeting of acting department heads, members of the Supreme Court, and a half a dozen other leading Filipinos of all political parties. To them he made an ardent appeal for cooperation and emphasized his desire to work in harmony with them in solving the problems confronting the American and Filipino people. Senator Quezon was conspicuously absent from the conference, giving as an excuse the illness of his children. He did, however, attend a conference of his party later in the day.

The Filipino leaders later expressed the view that an adjustment of differences would have been possible if the October 11 cablegram had been discussed by the Governor with only Quezon and one or two of the majority leaders. But Governor Wood invited to the meeting a larger group of Filipino leaders from all the

(69) Wood Diary, October 15, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 19.

(70) Cable #584, October 16, 1923, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 3038, part ii; Wood Diary, October 15, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 19.

As a result of the publication of the October 11 telegram, the Philippine Legislature in a resolution requested an authenticated copy of the telegram to confirm that such a message was indeed received from the Secretary of War. See BIA Records 3038-133.
political parties, and this made an understanding impossible. The impossibility was made definite by the publication of the confidential telegram on October 16 by the Manila Daily Bulletin, an American newspaper. An understanding would have required the Filipino leaders to back down in the controversy with Wood -- but this could only have been done if Quezon and his colleagues would not lose face. They were quite sure, however, that if their opposition found that they had softened their stance vis-a-vis the Governor General, the Democratas would make political capital of this. So no dialogue was initiated after this meeting.(71)

On October 18, Quezon and Roxas sent a memorandum to Commissioner Pedro Guevara in Washington requesting him to inform the Secretary of War of the displeasure of the Filipinos at the publication of the October 11 telegram without Wood having taken into consideration the views of the Filipinos as to the adjustment of differences. Guevara was asked to explain to the Secretary of War that in the present conflict with Governor Wood they were "only seeking to preserve the established practices of this government and to exercise the rights and prerogatives that Filipino officials have been enjoying since the enactment of the Jones Law until Governor General Wood began to reverse them. We feel the more justified in our stand since President Harding himself said to the Second Philippine Mission that 'no backward step is contemplated.'" They requested that the old status of domestic autonomy (under Harrison)

(71) Wood claimed that a copy of the telegram was secured from Filipino sources by the Manila newspaper. See Cable #586, Wood to McIntyre, October 17, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 189.
be respected and adhered to, and a number of propositions were presented which they suggested would furnish the basis for a compromise and for cooperation. These propositions encroached on the power and authority retained by the United States and vested in the Governor General by the Jones Law. They were aimed at obtaining the maximum of political control without loss of sovereign protection. It would have been unrealistic to expect the Governor General to have recognized these demands. (72)

Following the presentation of Secretary Weeks' October 11 statement of support for Governor Wood (and encouraged by their victory in the last elections), the coalition leaders decided on a policy of "diplomatic non-cooperation" for the next session of the Legislature, which would open on October 16, 1923. Coalition leaders announced that they would disregard or ignore General Wood's message to the Legislature insofar as its recommendations were concerned, on the ground that under the Jones Law Wood had no authority to submit anything except the budget. And even on the budget, they decided that the Legislature would deal with it "as it deems proper without regard to Governor General Wood's instructions." (73) It was further announced that legislation would

(72) Quezon, Roxas to Commissioner Guevara, October 18, 1923, BIA Records 3038, part 2; 3038-135 enclosure; also in Quezon Papers, Box 45.

In a memorandum prepared by General McIntyre for Secretary Weeks, dated October 22, the War Department answered point-by-point the issue raised by the Filipino leaders. See BIA records 3038-135.

(73) New York Times, September 14, October 9, and 19, 1923.

It was customary for the two houses of the Legislature to submit their budget estimates to the Governor General in addition to those of the department secretaries so that the Chief Executive might use them in preparing his final draft. That year the legislative heads refused to submit estimates. See Manila Times, September 13, 1923.
be enacted which, it was known, the Governor General would veto, as a means of making a test of the Jones Law.(74)

At the opening session of the Legislature on October 16, not a word of welcome or acknowledgement was heard when Governor Wood entered to read his annual message. It was a dramatic occasion -- profound silence prevailed from the moment he entered until he concluded a half hour later. His message to the Legislature was "courteously and attentively received" in respectful silence, but his plea for harmony and cooperation evoked no response.(75)

As a result of the emotionally-charged atmosphere in Manila, Governor Wood, who strongly opposed Philippine independence, unwittingly swung attention to the independence question. The

(75) Ibid., October 20, 1923.

An interesting manifestation of the "non-cooperation" policy was that an increasing number of Senators and Representatives started wearing the barong tagalog instead of the Western attire of coat and tie. See ibid., October 25, 1923.

But soon thereafter the Democratas broke with the policy of non-cooperation of the coalition party. They decided to cooperate with the Governor "for the good and progress of the public administration," because continued opposition to Wood would be fatal for the independence cause. See Manila Times, November 2, 3, 7, 1923.

One wonders if this change in stance by the Democratas was prompted by the rumour that the Governor General was disposed to appoint Democratas to posts that the coalitionists had refused to take. See New York Times, October 25, 1923.

One can also not disregard the fact that the Democrata decision may have been caused by the bitterness felt by the Democratas at the defeat of their candidate in the October elections.
Philippine question received unusual attention in America in 1923 and 1924 as Washington responded to the realization that there was a serious need to consider some practical programme to ease the situation in Manila. And Filipino sentiment for independence became more insistent and unified as confrontation between Wood and the Filipino leaders continued. So the Filipinos again decided to bring the issue to Washington.
CHAPTER V

THE ROXAS SPECIAL MISSION, 1923-1924

In view of the magnitude and importance that the "fight" with the Governor General had assumed, the coalitionists decided that the Legislature, or the Independence Commission, should send a Special Mission to Washington to present Filipino grievances against the alleged "illegal, arbitrary, and undemocratic" acts of Governor Wood, asking for Wood's recall and Philippine independence. (1)

This Mission had a hesitant beginning. Headed by Speaker Manuel A. Roxas, it left Manila on November 14, 1923, almost exactly four months after the resignation episode on July 17. (2)
(See Appendix A for members of the Mission.) The decision to send a


(2) The Mission went by way of Japan, where Roxas was cordially received by Japanese statesmen, who promised him their help in the work for independence. Roxas spoke to them, describing the political situation in the Philippines, and was reported to have made an excellent impression. See Grant K. Goodman, "The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan: The First Three Decades of American Colonial Rule," Southeast Asia, I, 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 183-185.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of War on December 5, 1923, General McIntyre reported that the Roxas delegation left the Philippines without consulting the Governor General or without announcing to him its objectives. It was not, therefore, a delegation representing the Philippine government; it probably purported to represent the Philippine Legislature. See BIA Records 27668-49 1/2.
Mission to Washington was made way back in July at the height of the political controversy with Governor Wood. Between July and mid-November when the Mission finally left, there were many changes of plans and delays in departure.(3)

The principal reasons for the seeming hesitance to dispatch the Mission immediately after the Cabinet Crisis were what appear to have been frantic attempts to cover up wranglings in the ranks of the coalition and the refusal of the Democratas to cooperate in the project. Part of the coalition's troubles stemmed from the oppositionists within the party, who were becoming disillusioned and discontented with Quezon's leadership, especially after the fusion of the Colectivistas and the Nacionalistas. They were said to be disgusted with Quezon's attitude in the controversy with Wood and with the inconsistencies of his policy, as well as with his stubborn insistence on keeping secret the expenditures from the independence fund. In this respect, they were more in tune with the Democratas. Because of this, it was rumoured that Quezon and Osmena were reluctant to leave the country for fear that their leadership might be usurped during their absence. Perhaps, it was said, there was indeed a "crisis," but in the ranks of the coalition, and hence the "competition for absence from the independence mission."(4) At any

(3) Quezon was originally supposed to go; then Roxas was picked to go as the Mission's advance guard. Then it was decided that Quezon and Osmena would follow Roxas at the close of the session of the Legislature. See Manila Times, July 19, August 2, October 25, 29, November 9, 12, 1923.

(4) Ibid., November 6, 11, 1923. See also BIA Records 364-A-557, clipping from the Baltimore Sun, November 9, 1923.

Among the "Young Turks" were Senator Vicente Vera and Representative Alejo Labrador.
rate, Quezon and Osmeña did not go.

The Democratas from the outset had opposed the plan to send another parliamentary mission to the United States and instead favoured giving the Filipino Resident Commissioners in Washington full power to lay the facts of the controversy before Washington officials. The Democratas even went so far as to propose that the Independence Commission be replaced by a Permanent Commission in the United States, with headquarters in Washington, to concentrate the fight for independence in the United States.(5) But the majority leaders insisted on the mission.

Roxas invited the Democratas to join him in the Mission in order to present a united Filipino front against Governor Wood, but not only did the Democrata leaders decline, they forbade anyone else from the opposition to go with the Mission. Ruperto Montinola, president of the party, declared: "Quezon has pushed his party into a quagmire. He now wants to get it out, but he cannot. He has drawn to it American hatred. Let him take care of his troubles himself. No Democrata should go with the Mission."(6) So Roxas went

(5) Manila Times, July 24, November 11, 1923.
   No doubt the Democratas were still smarting from the defeat they suffered in the special elections held in October 1923. But part of their hostility was also due to opposition to the idea of sending missions to the United States at tremendous public expense, and to annoyance that decisions seemed to have come almost entirely from the Nacionalistas, who decided matters by virtue of their majority. See ibid., October 28, 1923.

(6) T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 183.
   Shortly after the departure of the Roxas Mission, Maximo M. Kalaw, of the University of the Philippines, in a speech at the
alone, with only a few technical advisers.

While the Mission was on its way to the United States, Wood sent the Secretary of War an urgent word of counsel (on December 4, 1923). The Filipinos, he advised, should be promised no change in the status of the Philippines "until the leaders and the legislature have shown actual cooperation with the executive under the organic law." While the duty of hearty cooperation between the Executive and the Legislature was mutual, he insisted that, "the burden of maintaining and facilitating such cooperation with the representatives of American sovereignty here should be regarded as resting primarily and especially among the Filipinos."

When that cooperation had been expressed, then the Filipinos should be called upon to submit a definite programme setting forth "what in their opinion should be the future policy and relations" between the United States and the Philippines. This programme should cover the following points explicitly:

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University scored some members of former missions to the United States as men without training, eminence, or records suitable to become the nucleus of a diplomatic corps. He also declared that the directors of the independence movement (among whom was his brother, Teodoro M. Kalaw) were either asleep or did not act at critical times in American politics when independence could have made great headway. He lamented the fact that the composition of the former missions was influenced by favoritism. He said that this mistake was being corrected, thanks to Democrata opposition. See *Manila Times*, November 18, 1923.

For Quezon's defence, see his letter to Kalaw, November 19, 1923, in *Quezon Papers*, Box 45, calling the speech very "unjust to them."
How and when the present relations are to be changed; the form of government they propose to set up; their proposed organization and means for internal order and self-defense against foreign aggression; how they propose to raise the necessary revenue for current expenses and to meet their financial obligations, involving the moral guarantee of the United States; how they propose to meet the effects upon their economic and financial conditions resulting from the changed tariff relations, assuming that such relations will eventually be at best on the basis of those now existing between the United States and Cuba; their attitude toward the interests of nationals of other governments for which the United States became responsible under the treaty of Paris; what provisions they are willing to make to protect the special and vested interests of the citizens and government of the United States; how they propose to prevent the islands being flooded by Chinese and other Asians once protection of American immigration laws is withdrawn; what special provisions will be made for the protection of minorities such as Mohammedan and other non-Christian tribes whom the United States has considered as special wards, and towards whom we have assumed certain definite obligations. Certain other conditions found necessary by the mission of investigation should be insisted on, such as a common language, a certain percentage of voters and of literacy, and the development of a certain proportion of Filipinos handling their own commercial enterprises.

The submission of such a programme and a period of cooperation, however, were not to be taken as a basis for any implied promise of independence or of any change in the existing political status. The United States should reserve to herself the right and duty to decide upon the sufficiency of the programme and the time for its inauguration.(7)

(7) Strictly confidential, Cable # 629, December 4, 1923, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 364-469 1/2.

General McIntyre then prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated December 5, 1923, on what should be the Administration's attitude toward the Roxas Mission. See BIA Records 27668-49 1/2.
The submission of such a programme had been in the minds of both the Secretary of War and Governor Wood even before the July crisis occurred. Both officials felt that it was time for the United States to take stock of the Philippine situation and to determine definitely whether to continue "drifting," or to "aggressively" take a concrete stand on future relations. Whatever policy should be pursued, these officials felt it was necessary to determine the position of the Filipinos and to force them to face the real problems which would come with independence.\(^{(8)}\)

Governor Wood had tried several times to get the Filipino leaders to outline and discuss a general programme, but he found the leaders hesitant to do this. He felt that while "in their hearts they want independence as a matter of sentiment, they realize the country is not ready for it, and they haven't the frankness to commence to outline little by little to the people the true position of the country and to make clear the dependence of the Philippines for growth, prosperity, and stability upon their relations with the United States."\(^{(9)}\)

None of the leaders would prepare any general proposition which was other than radical. They feared that if they did, when it became known they would be politically vulnerable for having asked for something less than the absolute independence they had been


\(^{(9)}\) Letter, Wood to McIntyre, August 3, 1923, BIA Records 3038-112-A; see also Wood Diary, August 8, 11, 13, 1923, in Wood Papers, Box 19.
publicly advocating. The Filipino leaders instead wanted the proposition prepared confidentially by the United States and then taken up separately with prominent Filipino leaders. If the proposal were agreeable to them, they could then take the matter to the Filipino people and campaign in support of it.(10)

Wood was insistent, however, that the Filipinos themselves should formulate the proposition as to what they wanted, how and when -- not the American Government or the Governor General. Thus, no definite plan had been advanced or discussed by the time the Roxas Special Mission arrived in Washington on December 13, 1923, other than a lengthy memorandum sent to the Secretary of War on October 18, wherein Quezon and Roxas requested that the old status of domestic autonomy under Harrison be respected and adhered to. There were in the memorandum a number of propositions which constituted a formidable list of Filipino objections to Governor Wood's policy and exercise of powers. These would have been impossible for the Governor General to accept, for the Filipinos were insistent that the acts of the Philippine Legislature should be regarded as binding by Wood, even though they seriously encroached on his powers under the Jones Law.(11)

(10) Wood Diary, August 14, 26, 30, 1923; Wood to Weeks, August 22, 1923, ibid.


In Washington, Resident Commissioner Guevara was also requested to submit a plan looking towards the settlement of the Philippine problem. From his telegram to Quezon and Roxas, it appeared that there was a serious desire in Congress to come to a solution of the Philippine problem, although there was no agreement as to the kind of solution. See Guevara to Quezon, Roxas, October 25, 1923, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.
By the time of Roxas' arrival in Washington in December, Congress was already in session, and there was evident a strong sentiment for Philippine independence on Capitol Hill. Roxas' primary concern, however, was to acquaint the War Department and the President with the difficulties of the Philippine government, as well as with the expressed desire of the Philippine Legislature for immediate and complete independence. (12)

Roxas met on December 15 with the Secretary of War and the President. Explaining that the difficulties with Governor Wood could be resolved by the President and Secretary Weeks without necessarily resorting to congressional action, he promised to draw up in concrete form what he would like to have considered by the War Department and the President. Both the President and the Secretary of War emphasized that no plan would be acceptable to the American

From the American Chamber of Commerce came a proposal, adopted on November 14, 1923, calling for Congress to revoke the Jones Law and substitute in its stead an act establishing the Philippines as a permanently organized territory of the United States. This was a reiteration of a similar resolution adopted in August 1920. The Manila Daily Bulletin initially did not support this proposal for territorial government, but reconsidered and eventually endorsed it. See BIA Records 364-399; Wood Diary, Wood Papers, Box 19; Manila Times, November 14, 1923; New York Times, November 16, 1923.

Needless to say the proposal met with the opposition of many Filipino groups. In fact, a protest demonstration was held on December 30 by the Knights of Rizal. See BIA Records 364-486-C; Manila Times, December 16, 1923; New York Times December 16, 1923.

(12) Immediately upon arrival, Roxas and Resident Commissioner Guevara conferred with General McIntyre, and there Roxas presented a confidential letter of November 13 from Quezon describing the Filipino point-of-view on the difficulties with Wood. See letter in Quezon Papers, Box 45. See also Memorandum to SecWar Weeks, December 14, 1923, in Records of the US High Commissioner.
people or to Congress or to the Administration that did not carry
the approval of Governor Wood.(13)

On December 17, Roxas and Jaime C. de Veyra (technical adviser
to the Mission) came to the Bureau of Insular Affairs for an
extended conversation with its Chief. As a consequence of this
discussion, General McIntyre, with the approval of Roxas and de
Veyra, sent Wood the draft of an independence act. If acceptable
mutually to Wood and the Filipino leaders in Manila, it could then
be presented in Congress as a plan representing the Filipino view.

The draft of the bill was that prepared in 1922 by McIntyre, at
the request of Quezon and Osmeña, then chairman of the Parliamentary
Mission visiting Washington, with an additional section, at the
suggestion of Roxas, which would enable the Filipino people to vote
on the question of independence. Roxas felt quite confident that
the Philippine Legislature would promptly approve the bill.(14)

(13) Roxas suggested to the Secretary of War that if Governor Wood
were called back to Washington, with the leading members of the
Philippine Legislature, he was confident that they could agree
on the future status of the Philippines. The President felt
that it would be easier to draw up a plan in Manila, which
could then be sent with the parties' mutual approval to
Washington. See Memorandum for SecWar, December 14, 15, 1923,
BIA Records 364-469 1/2. See also New York Times, December 16,
1923; Manila Times December 17, 1923.

(14) See copy of 1922 draft of bill in BIA Records 364-568. See
also Personal and confidential, McIntyre to Wood, December 17,
1923, in BIA Records 364-after-469 1/2; Memorandum for the
Governor General from Gordon Johnston, January 28, 1924:
Preliminary analysis of General McIntyre's letter dated
December 17, 1923, in Wood Papers, Box 170.
Both Quezon and Osmena in Manila reacted unexpectedly. Though they had accepted the 1922 draft in 1922, in 1924 both leaders objected to its twenty-year probationary period and to a provision that would permit the President of the United States to take over the administration of any department under certain conditions. Wood also objected to the draft on the grounds that it would place the United States in a position of undiminished responsibility but with greatly diminished authority. (15)

Subsequent to the December meeting with McIntyre, Roxas and de Veyra conferred with their Democratic friends in Congress and found that the bill, with its twenty-year probationary period, probably would not receive their support. The legislators consulted were apparently disposed to favour complete and immediate independence and nothing else, "not with altruistic motives," McIntyre felt, but with the desire to relieve the United States of responsibility and

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The December 17 letter was apparently written at the request of Roxas in the hopes that it would bring about an adjustment of relations in Manila, thus avoiding controversy in Washington. See McIntyre to Wood, January 30, 1924, BIA Records 364-after-487.

The Manila Times, January 22, 1924, reported that Roxas, finding Coolidge unsympathetic to independence, had decided to submit to the Filipino leaders in Manila the recommendation of American officials that the Philippine question be discussed between the Legislature and Wood before any further move was made.

On January 23, the same paper charged that the dispatch from Roxas was deliberately withheld from publication in Manila because it was not in line with the propaganda activities of the local political bosses.

(15) Memorandum to SecWar Weeks, May 26, 1924, BIA Records 364-after-526.

Governor Wood discussed the proposed independence act with the Filipino leaders. See in Wood Diary, March 13, 1924, Box 20, Wood Papers.
liability connected with sovereignty in the Philippines.(16)

Perhaps it was the mood in Congress which prompted Roxas to present a memorial from the Mission to President Coolidge and Congress on January 8, 1924. In spite of having assumed a less radical stance in conferences with the President and the War Department, the memorial called for immediate independence and severely criticized Wood's administration, declaring that "the theories and principles underlying [his] actions are utterly repugnant to the policies which go to make up the cornerstone of a Philippine autonomous government." It also included a formidable list of complaints against the Governor General — sixty-one altogether.(17) Governor Wood, the memorial stated,

(16) Memorandum for SecWar Weeks, December 20, 1923, BIA Records 364-469 1/2; see also McIntyre to Wood, January 30, 1924, BIA Records 364-after-487.


For a point-by-point analysis of the Petition of the Philippine Mission, see Memorandum for SecWar Weeks, January 12, 1924, in BIA Records 364-484; also Memorandum Concerning the Petition of the Filipinos, or For a Modification in Existing Government of the Philippines, prepared by Vice-Governor Eugene Gilmore, April 1924, in BIA Records 364-679-C.

When the Third Parliamentary Mission arrived in Washington in May 1924, Quezon added one more grievance against Wood — that unlike Governor Forbes or Governor Harrison, Wood ignored those Filipinos prominent socially or officially in formal dinners for distinguished foreign visitors. They were invited to luncheons, but excluded from formal dinners, a slight the Filipino leaders resented. See Memorandum for SecWar Weeks, May 5, 1924, in Records of the US High Commissioner.
... has set at naught all understandings the Filipino people have had with the American Government and has ignored the assurance given them by the late President [Harding]. He has most decidedly taken a backward step by depriving our government of the key and the nerve center of the former autonomous administration, the counsel of the Filipinos. He has surrounded himself with a secret cabinet composed of military and other legal advisers, which has encroached upon the legitimate functions of the Filipino officials in the government. He has broken asunder the bonds of concord that united Americans and Filipinos after the bloody struggle of 1899, a concord that reached its highest expression in the first years of autonomous government. He has placed himself over and above the laws passed by the Philippine Legislature, laws that have never been declared null and void by the courts or by the Congress of the United States. He has claimed for himself an unlimited executive responsibility that neither the existing laws nor the practices already established recognized. He has deviated from the policy of the American Government to give the Filipino people an ever-increasing self-government, a policy announced by every President beginning with President McKinley and ratified by the Congress of the United States in the Jones Law. He has abused the veto power, exercising it on the slightest pretext on matters of purely local concern that did not affect the sovereignty of the United States or its international obligations. Thus he has attempted to control our legislature, a prerogative that has never been claimed by the elective executives of America, by the President of the United States or the governors of the several states. He has disregarded the rights of the Senate in his exercise of the appointing power. He has destroyed our budget system, the greatest achievement in the financial administration of our government. He has endeavored to defeat the economic policies duly laid down by the Philippine Legislature for the protection of the rights and interests of the Filipino people in the development of the resources of the islands.

The criticism of Wood was unexpected, for Roxas had promised the President that the Mission's presentation to Congress would be based entirely upon the Filipino desire for independence and that a statement of the difficulties with the Governor General would be presented either to the President or the Secretary of War and not to
Congress. Roxas, responding to subsequent public criticism by Secretary of War Weeks and to a generally unfavourable American reaction to the memorial, sought to defuse the reaction by suggesting that the reference to the Governor General in the memorial was incidental. (18)

Nonetheless, President Coolidge delivered his reply to the memorial in a strongly-worded letter dated February 21 which left no doubt concerning the official attitude of the executive branch towards Philippine independence and the Wood administration.

President Coolidge expressly restated the promise of independence whenever it was apparent that the Filipinos were fully prepared for it. He counselled them as to the way to prove their readiness -- not by bickerings or threats. The criteria for independence he set down were so high -- greater educational, cultural, economic and political advances, international and domestic concerns -- that it was doubtful if the Philippine government, or any government for that matter, could have met them. Thus he said:

The American Government has been most liberal in opening to the Filipino people the opportunities of the largest practicable participation in and control of their own administration. It has been a matter of pride and satisfaction to us, as I am sure it must also have been to your people, that this attitude has met with so fine a response. In education, in cultural advancement, in political conceptions, and


According to Maximo M. Kalaw, the memorial was actually drafted in Manila and transmitted to Roxas for presentation. See Philippines Herald, November 4, 1932.
institutional development, the Filipino people have demonstrated a capacity which can not but justify high hopes for their future. But it would be idle and insincere to suggest that they have yet proved their possession of the completely developed political capacity which is necessary to a minor nation assuming the full responsibility of maintaining itself in the family of nations. I am frankly convinced that the very mission upon which you have addressed me is itself an evidence that something is yet lacking in development of political consciousness and capability.

The President informed the Filipino leaders that the best argument against Philippine independence was the very fact that the Mission was in Washington. Their presence indicated that they did not understand the best interests of the Filipino people. The purpose of their coming — to protest against Governor Wood's exercise of his executive powers — showed that they did not appreciate "the fundamental ideals of democratic republican government," especially that of checks and balances, which aimed to prevent just such encroachment by the legislative branch upon the executive realm as the Filipino legislators had been attempting.

Coolidge rebuked the Mission especially for its complaints against Governor Wood and sustained the Governor General in all the points of his controversy with the Filipino leaders. He found no evidence that the Governor General had exceeded his authority or had acted other than to further the real interests of the Filipinos. Convinced that the lack of cooperation between the Executive and the Legislature was entirely the fault of the Filipino leaders, he emphasized the necessity for wholehearted cooperation with the Governor General and the efficient use of powers which had already been given them. "Looking at the whole situation fairly and
impartially, one cannot but feel that if the Filipino people can not cooperate in the support and encouragement of so good an administration as has been afforded under Governor General Wood, their failure will be rather a testimony of unpreparedness for the full obligations of citizenship than an evidence of patriotic eagerness to advance their country."

In conclusion, he said:

Frankly, it is not felt that that time [for independence] has come. It is felt that in the present state of world relationship the American Government owes an obligation to continue extending a protecting arm to the people of these Islands. . . . The American Government will assuredly cooperate in every way to encourage and inspire the full measure of progress which still seems a necessary preliminary to independence.(19)

President Coolidge's letter to Roxas, setting forth at length the Philippine policy of his administration, was the authoritative expression of the principal tenets of Republican policy on Philippine independence. It was a very clear indication that while Coolidge remained in office he would not deviate from this policy based on the orderly, steady promotion of Filipinos of proven ability, and opposed to the hurried filipinization which took place during the Democratic regime. The Filipino leaders were made to understand very definitely that it would be fruitless to hope to


The draft of Coolidge's reply to the Roxas Memorial was amended in compliance with suggestions from Secretary of War Weeks. See Calvin Coolidge Papers, Series 1, Case 400 ZA, Reel 127, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
reverse that stand. The Roxas Mission was thus rebuffed in its independence plea, and more specifically in its complaints against Governor Wood.(20)

The Special Mission submitted a memorandum to the President on behalf of the Philippine Legislature on another issue, on which the Filipinos were also rebuffed. On March 18, 1924, Roxas and Resident Commissioners Gabaldon and Guevara presented argumentation in favour of overriding the Governor General's veto of a bill entitled "An Act Remitting the Penalty on the Land Tax in the Philippine Islands for the Year 1923."(21) The Legislature had passed this bill, apparently, as a further test of the scope of Wood's powers in the affairs of the country. Wood vetoed it, on November 14, 1923, on the ground that the bill was "vicious in principle, in that it encourages a persistent tendency to the view that all onerous duties

(20) Upon being asked by newspapermen of his opinion of President Coolidge's letter, Roxas replied that he did not care about the President. "It is just another move to protect General Wood as he shields his Teapot Dome Cabinet. It is Congress after all that has to decide our case."

The repentant Speaker denied his statements upon reading many unpleasant comments in the newspapers, but reports reaffirmed the insulting statements and charged Roxas with lacking enough moral courage to stand by his word. Roxas' remarks were considered "impolite, childish, and improper" in American circles. See letter of Roxas to editor of the New York Times, March 8, 1924, in BIA Records 364-499-A; also Roxas to McIntyre, March 8, 1924, BIA Records 364-499. See also "Speaker Roxas Persona Non Grata in U.S.," In Manila Daily Bulletin, April 28, 1924.

Moorfield Storey, a friend of Philippine independence, sent President Coolidge a severely critical letter following the publication of the President's letter to Roxas. He accused President Coolidge of adopting an "insolent and very irritating tone" towards the Filipinos. See in Coolidge Papers, Reel 127.

(21) See supra, p. 116, for background on the matter.
of citizenship may be avoided by political action." The Governor's disapproval also reflected his judgement that such penalties should not be cancelled except when necessary, as in time of flood, drought, or epidemic. The Legislature repassed the bill, the Senate on November 26 and the House on November 27, both houses acting by the required two-thirds vote. The bill was returned to Wood on December 1, and as provided in the Jones Law, was submitted to the President for his determination as to whether Wood's veto should be overridden.(22)

In presenting its petition to the President, the Mission based its case upon the contention that a bill which "does not run counter to any provision of the organic act and is of mere domestic concern . . . the Governor General has no power to disapprove." Further, "even granting that such power resides in the Governor General, still the disapproval of this bill was unwarranted and unwise," for the Philippine Legislature was not inaugurating a new policy, but was only following what had been practiced as early as 1902, and the bill was intended only as a relief from failure of crops. The Mission suggested that final disapproval of the measure might diminish the confidence of the people in the ability of the government to give support in case of emergency.(23)

(22) Veto Message of the Governor General, November 24, 1923, and A Brief Statement of Facts, in Report of the Governor General, 1923, p. 57. See also Letter, Weeks to Coolidge, April 8, 1924, in Wood Papers, Box 173,

(23) Memorandum on Behalf of the Philippine Legislature for the President of the United States, March 18, 1924, in ibid., pp. 49-56.
The case was referred to the Judge Advocate General of the Army, the legal adviser of the Secretary of War, who went thoroughly into the matter and presented a lengthy memorandum setting forth the fact, the law, and his conclusions. The matter was then submitted to the President, who confirmed, on April 12, 1924, the action taken by the Governor General. He held, first, that there was no ground for the contention that there was a limit of the veto power to particular types of legislation. He stated: "By the organic act, it is made the duty of the Governor General either to approve or disapprove every bill which is passed by the Philippine Legislature." Secondly, he upheld the veto of this particular bill. In conclusion, he stated that

An appeal of the Philippine Legislature to the President when bills passed by that body are vetoed by the Governor General is entitled to the gravest consideration and will receive it. The powers of the Governor General were intentionally made greater than the powers ordinarily given to the executives in our system of Government because of the accepted theory that we were training in self-government people who had not experience therein and who were to be guided by an executive selected with a view to his ability to do so. As a check against the abuse of this power of veto accorded the Governor General, the legislature is given the right of appeal to the President.

(24) Memorandum from the Office of the Judge Advocate General, April 4, 1924, in ibid., pp. 61-681.

(25) Letter of President Calvin Coolidge to Governor General Wood, confirming his action on the bill, April 12, 1924, in ibid., p. 60.
The Administration thus reaffirmed its full support for Governor Wood, both in the Coolidge letter of February 21 to the Roxas Special Mission and in the President's message of April 12 upholding the Wood veto. The Filipino case, as far as President Coolidge was concerned, was an insupportable one. In each of these pronouncements, President Coolidge, in distinct and unmistakable terms, laid down what he saw as the only way Philippine-American relations should evolve.

In view of the new "crisis" created by President Coolidge's letter of February 21, the Commission of Independence had called a high-level meeting. An answer to President Coolidge's letter was prepared and forwarded. Several people prepared several drafts for this answer, among them Quezon, Osmena, Recto and others. It appears that Quezon's draft became the basis of the lengthy answer finally sent to President Coolidge.

The Commission of Independence expressed its "profound sorrow and great disenchantment" at the contents of the presidential message. It took issue particularly with the claim that the complaints against Governor Wood were the workings of a small group of irresponsible Filipinos and that a majority of the responsible citizens did not agree with the complaints and petition of the Mission. Thus:

The Government of the United States can deny listening to the respectful petition of the Filipino people. Our people are completely at the mercy of the American Government. But it does not seem just, when we present our complaints against their representative in the Philippines, and we ask that we be granted independence, that there be still alleged, to justify its negation, that this is based on the
fact that a good portion of the Filipinos themselves do not agree with our complaints and our petition. We know that the entire Filipino people now desire their independence, and the only basis of American sovereignty in the Philippines is the force of its army and navy, sufficient bases, undoubtedly, considering the present state of universal conscience. (26)

An even worse blow to the independence movement was the disallowance of the independence fund. All previous auditors had permitted these expenditures, but suddenly, in the heat of the crisis between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders, Insular Auditor Ben. F. Wright decided that the expenditure of government funds for an independence campaign was illegal. There was no new law on the matter — it was just a new decision in which he differed from his American predecessors. (27)


(27) Governor Wood began consulting auditing and legal officials in Manila and Washington as to the legality of the continuing annual appropriation of one million pesos for the Independence Commission as early as 1923. He was prompted as much by the fact that the Missions were going to Washington to denounce him as by a protest he had received from opposition politicians denouncing the fund. See his letter to the Insular Auditor, August 8, 1923, in Wood Diary, Wood Papers, Box 19.

The immediate cause of the suspension order was reportedly heavy drafts on the independence fund for per diem allowances for both the Independence Commission in Manila and the Special Mission in Washington. Roxas was drawing a per diem of US$100, in addition to his salary and expenses for representation purposes, amounting to a total of US$40,000 annually. Perhaps also the spectacle of legislators scrambling for places in the next mission scheduled to go to Washington (in May 1924) prompted the Insular Auditor to issue his suspension order. See Cable # 705, February 27, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 1998-184; also Cable # 727 Wood to McIntyre, March 15, 1924, *BIA Records* 1998-191; and letter, SecWar to Roxas, March 26, 1924, *BIA Records* 1998-194.
So on or about February 15, 1924, Wright, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2933 creating a standing annual appropriation of one million pesos to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, suspended further payments under the act, pending a full investigation of the questions involved. Further payments, for documented expenses, were allowed only up to March 1, 1924, on or about which date formal notice of suspension of payments was given to the authorities concerned. (28)

The Insular Auditor asserted as the basis for his decision that the following acts of the Legislature were unconstitutional: Joint Resolution No. 20 providing for the appointment of a Commission of Independence; Joint Resolution No. 13 confirming said Commission in existence until its purpose shall have been attained and for other purposes; Joint Resolution No. 11 approving the action of the Commission of Independence in sending an extraordinary mission to the United States; and Act No. 2933, an act to provide for a standing appropriation of one million pesos per annum for the Independence Commission. (29)

(28) Manila Times, February 26, 1924; also Confidential cable #707, February 28, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 1998-185.

(29) The validity of Act No. 2933 was first questioned by the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in September 1920 while the bill was under discussion in the Philippine Legislature. The matter was taken up with the Secretary of War in June 1922 in a memorandum which noted that "in providing for the sending of large missions composed of persons other than members of the Philippine Legislature and in providing for a campaign of publicity in the United States, the Legislature entered into a field not usually within the jurisdiction of legislatures . . . and in the case of the Philippine Legislature are specifically prohibited by the organic act." See BIA Records 27668-35.
Wright based his "bold" ruling on these grounds: that membership in the Commission of Independence, for which the appropriation was made, was outside the province of the Legislature, and that therefore, in accordance with the Jones Law, the funds could only be placed "directly under the supervision and control of the Governor General"; that the standing appropriation could not be considered as necessary for the support of the Legislature and therefore must be directly under the authority of the Governor General or an executive department under his control; and that since the appropriation was not made in accordance with the Jones Law, the Auditor could not pass in audit any further payment from the fund. Hence, said acts of the Legislature were void and of no effect. More compelling reasons were further presented by Wright, thus:

Every member of the legislature, before assuming the duties of his office, takes a solemn oath to the effect that he will maintain true faith and allegiance to the sovereignty of the United States in these islands. Under these circumstances it is not apparent how the legislature, in consonance with such oath, can enact legislation providing for the appointment of its members to a committee or commission and place large sums of money at its disposal annually for the express purpose of abrogating the existing form of government under which the sovereignty of the United States is exercised and to which sovereignty its members have sworn true faith and allegiance.

The sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands cannot be questioned. . . . The right of exercising this sovereignty is vested in

See also the following memoranda: BIA Memorandum to the Judge Advocate General, August 29, 1923; Memorandum from the Judge Advocate General to the SecWar, September 27, 1923, BIA Records 1998-202; BIA Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, October 30, 1923, BIA Records 1998-203. See also Wood Papers, Box 168.
Congress as the agent of the people of the United States, . . . It is, therefore, clearly not within the province of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws with reference to "independence" which by their very nature affect the sovereignty of the United States over the Islands. . . .(30)

Pending an investigation and decision (from the Attorney General of the United States) on the questions involved, the Auditor informed the Special Mission then in Washington that he would suspend payment of its per diem.(31) The Mission was allowed US$10,000 to settle its accounts in the United States up to March 1, and another US$10,000 for homecoming expenses. In lieu of the suspended per diem, the Auditor approved vouchers for actual expenses and for all proper and legitimate expenditures. Payments, however, were no longer made through the Mission's Washington disbursing office but directly through the Bureau of Insular Affairs.(32)

(30) See Insular Auditor's final suspension order, June 30, 1924, in Report of the Governor General, 1924, pp. 27-33; see also Manila Times, July 15, 1924.

(31) Governor Wood secured the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States as to the legality and constitutionality of Act No. 2933. See Cable # 701, February 20, 1924, Wood to SecWar, BIA Records 1998-183.

Quezon reportedly agreed to abide by the decision of the Attorney General in a conference with Wood on February 28. But on the following day, he denied this. See Manila Times, February 28, 29, 1924.


The Manila Times called Wright "a courageous official" and applauded his action. The Philippines Herald, Quezon's mouthpiece, called Wright's action "a beautiful revenge" for his having been legislatated out by the Philippine Legislature as Special Bank Examiner and Financial Adviser to the Governor General. The Legislature did this because of Wright's "feverish enthusiasm" to discredit the Philippine National Bank. Wright was subsequently appointed Insular Auditor and the disallowance of the independence fund was his first act in that capacity. See Manila Times, February 27, 1924.
The Insular Auditor's decision questioned the very existence of
the Independence Commission and the legality of sending independence
missions and maintaining the publicity campaign in the United
States。(33) It was "an act that hurts," for it had serious
consequences for the entire independence campaign, now threatened
with dissolution. To the Filipinos, it was another "act of
tyrannical interference," with its purpose being "to stifle the
voice of the Filipino people and prevent the exercise of their right
of petition before the President and the Congress of the United
States."(34) All Filipino circles united in protest against what
they saw as an attempt to cripple the independence campaign because
it was making too much headway, as the movement for independence in
the US Congress was gaining momentum, much to the discomfort of the
"retentionists."(35)

(33) Manila Times, November 3, 1924.
The legality of the Independence Commission continued to
be the subject of various BIA Memoranda until 1934. After
1924, the Independence Commission operated on a smaller budget,
and the independence missions sent after that date were
considerably smaller in number and confined to members of the
Philippine Legislature; hence they were officially designated
as legislative committees. See BIA Records 26480-149-C for a
table showing the appropriations for and expenses of the
Independence Commission from 1919 to 1932.

(34) See letter, Manuel A. Roxas to SecWar, March 25, 1924, BIA
Records 1998-194. For the Filipino position, see Roxas
Memorandum on the Constitutionality of Act No. 2933, March 22,
1924, in BIA Records 1998-194-A.

(35) The spending of large sums for independence propaganda and .for
defraying expenses of huge delegations of Filipino politicians
to Washington had been allegedly unpopular not only with
elements opposed to immediate Philippine independence, but also
with American business interests in the Philippines who
objected to being taxed for the independence fund when they
held that independence would jeopardize their investments in
the country. See New York Times, October 30, 1923; Manila
Times, December 6, 1923.
To meet the critical situation, a National Collection Committee was set up to raise funds by popular subscription. On March 3, a mammoth meeting, for which party lines were put aside, was held at the Manila Grand Opera House to protest the "violent decision" of the Auditor. The crowd approved a resolution authorizing the Independence Commission to take all administrative and legal measures necessary to obtain a revocation of the Auditor's ruling. An appeal was also made for voluntary contributions and for a boycott of American goods and newspapers.(36)

The response to the nationwide campaign for voluntary contributions was lukewarm.(37) However, through a systematic campaign managed by Arsenio N. Luz, a considerable sum was raised, enough to enable Roxas to remain in the United States and to send Messrs. Quezon, Osmena, and Recto to Washington as the Third Parliamentary Mission. But the publication of the Press Bulletin in

(36) Manila Times, March 3, 4, 1924.
   It was bruited about in Manila circles that fear that the full details of disbursements from the million-peso fund would be made public was the only thing which prevented the Commission of Independence from bringing the ruling of the Insular Auditor to court for legal decision. See ibid., March 21, 1924.

   There were unconfirmed reports that Quezon had given up a well-known brand of American cigarettes and was smoking the local La Insular cork tips instead. Also that he had announced his intention to ride in carretelas (horse-drawn carriages) instead of in his fleet of American cars. See ibid., March 2, 1924.

(37) Perhaps this was due to, among other things, the reported "bludgeon methods" of raising funds. The Manila Times on April 27, 1924 reported that secret circulars were being distributed coercing government clerks to contribute 20% of their monthly salary to the independence fund. This news was denied by the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington. See Washington Star, April 28, 1924.
Washington was discontinued. (38) By March 8, 1925, a total of US$317,982.77 was reported to have been promised. (39)

On April 30, 1924, the Attorney General of the United States rendered his opinion that the act creating the independence fund was indeed unconstitutional. Upon receiving this opinion, the Insular Auditor, on June 30, made final his suspension of payments under the act. (40) Governor Wood's legal and political position was further strengthened by the Attorney General's ruling, coming as it did less than three weeks after President Coolidge's strong support of the Governor's authority to veto acts of the Philippine Legislature on matters of purely domestic concern.

Governor Wood attached little significance to the repercussions of the Auditor's action. It was his belief that the steps taken to insure audit of disbursements with a view to protecting the interests of the taxpayers, once understood, met with general

(38) After the Press Bulletin ceased publication, publicity work in the United States for Philippine independence was undertaken by The Philippine Republic, a magazine published by former Representative Clyde Tavenner, and for a time partly supported by funds supplied by the Press Bureau in Washington. Tavenner had been with the staff of the Press Bureau when it was first set up in Washington in April 1919, having been invited to join by Quezon himself, at a salary of US$7,500 a year. He resigned from the Bureau in December 1923 to launch his magazine, which continued publication until 1928. See letter, Tavenner to Governor Harrison, October 5, 1928, Harrison Papers, Box 34.


(40) Ibid., pp. 27-33.
approval. He hoped that the incident would result in the Filipinos raising their own funds by direct subscription instead of freely using government funds.(41)

One of the sidelights of the controversy over the independence fund (and perhaps a contributory factor to the suspension order) was a call in the US Congress for an investigation of Philippine affairs relative to Governor General Wood. A resolution for an investigation (H. Res. 101) was introduced by Congressman James Frear (Republican, Wisconsin) on December 20, 1923. An identical resolution (S. Res. 128) was introduced on January 17, 1924 by Senator Edwin F. Ladd (Non-partisan Republican, North Dakota).(42)

These resolutions were set off by the announcement in May 1923 of Junius B. Wood, an American correspondent (not related to the Governor General), after an interview with Governor Wood, that several Americans, both in and out of government, and including US Congressmen, had been paid by the Philippine independence fund to interest themselves in Filipino freedom. George F. Parker, a New York publicist, in 1922 reportedly had been given US$25,000 for his services, as was the writer, Charles Edward Russell.(43) Though no

(41) Ibid., p. 2. See also letter, Wood to McIntyre, March 8, 1924, BIA Records 364-with-500.


Congressmen were named, Congressman Frear, who was quite supportive of the Philippine lobby, felt compelled to issue an open letter to his congressional colleagues challenging the Governor General's alleged statements. (44)

Governor Wood denied that he had information on members of Congress and prominent officials in Washington who had been receiving money from the independence fund and called assertions that he had a list of names of recipients "gratuitous and absolutely without foundation." (45) He called the charges made against him "libelous and untrue in fact and insinuations" and expressed his readiness to appear before Congress if an investigation were held. The Governor General received public expressions of confidence from President Coolidge and Secretary Weeks, and the efforts to embarrass him got nowhere. (46)

President Coolidge's negative response of February 21 to the Special Mission's Memorial (not published until March 5) and the concurrent set-back on the issues of the veto and the independence fund were not, at first, reflected in congressional developments, as

(44) See Memorandum, December 21, 1923: Allegation that Congressmen Have Received Payment from the Philippine Independence Commission for Espousing the Cause of Independence, in BIA Records 4325-284 and BIA Records 364-479.


(46) Cable # 659, Wood to Weeks, January 8, 1924, BIA Records 4325-286.
there was growing ardour for independence on Capitol Hill. (47) Bills and resolutions for independence had been introduced before in Congress but had seldom even received committee consideration, until this 68th Congress. In the 68th Congress, several measures were introduced authorizing the Filipino people to hold a general election of delegates for a constitutional convention for a Republic of the Philippines. Between December 10, 1923 and March 6, 1924, seven independence bills were introduced — four in the House and three in the Senate. And committee hearings were held thrice, once each in the House and the Senate on independence, followed by a hearing in the House on a bill to increase Philippine autonomy. (48)

Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs were held on February 17 and 25, 1924, to consider the Cooper Resolution, H.J. Res. 131. This was a joint resolution to allow the people of the Philippines to form a constitution and national government, and to provide for the recognition of their independence, introduced on January 9, 1923, by Henry Allen Cooper (Republican, Wisconsin). (49)

(47) The letter was published by the White House on March 5, 1924 and Roxas declared that although the letter was dated February 21, he did not receive it until the day it was made public. He surmised that the long delay in transmission and the publication of the President's reply was deliberate and timed to prevent imminent action by Congress to introduce proposals favourable to Philippine Independence. The publication of the President's letter was apparently intended to put a quietus upon the projected consideration by Congress of the Filipino claims to independence. See "President Coolidge's Statement on Filipino Independence," New York Times Current History Magazine, (April 1924), XX, 1 (April 1924) pp. 158-159.


(49) Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 65, pt. 1, p. 216.
During the House hearings, chaired by Louis W. Fairfield (Republican, Indiana), testimony was presented by Representative Edward J. King (Republican, Illinois), Henry A. Cooper, and Adolph J. Sabath (Democrat, Illinois); Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon; and Speaker Manuel Roxas representing the Special Mission, all urging that the independence of the Philippines be granted in fulfillment of the solemn pledge given by the United States in the Jones Act. General Frank McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs spoke in favour of ultimate independence for the Philippines. Only the Secretary of War expressed his outright opposition to Philippine independence. He believed "dangers to an independent Philippine government would arise from external aggression, internal dissension, the lack of Filipino participation in the commerce and industry of the islands, and from the financial condition of the government." He said:

Our justification before the world and to our own conscience for entering the Philippine Islands was the good that we might do to the people of those Islands. This has been our justification likewise for remaining . . . .

The petition for immediate independence is so manifestly against the material interests of the Filipino people that with the known protests of Filipinos against such action it brings up very seriously the question as to whether the present request for independence represents the mature view of the Filipino people advised as to the results thereof.

The desire for independence on the part of the Filipinos is natural and to be commended. To what extent the present demand is the result of a study and understanding of the results which would follow is a different question.

. . . The conclusion is unavoidable that the present demand for immediate, complete, and absolute independence is not the informed desire of the
Filipino people.

Secretary Weeks concluded with a declaration that in his belief the Filipinos should remain longer under the control of the United States, perhaps for twenty-five or thirty more years. (50)

Secretary Weeks' statements before the Committee drew a lengthy response from the Philippine Special Mission. The Special Mission's rejoinder, dated February 29, 1924, was submitted to the House Committee on Insular Affairs and took up point-by-point the testimony of Secretary Weeks. It discussed in detail Philippine finances, bonded indebtedness, currency, and economic development and used these as convincing arguments for independence. (51)

On March 3, 1924, the Committee on Insular Affairs decided to support a measure providing for immediate Philippine independence. The Committee instructed a sub-committee to draw up a bill adding to the Cooper Resolution amendments pertaining to military and naval bases, coaling stations, and bondholders. Several members of the Committee who favoured non-action supported the motion to prepare this bill, apparently fearing that the Committee would otherwise

(50) Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.J. Res. 131 (Henry Allen Cooper, Republican, Wisconsin), H.R. 3924 (Adolph J. Sabath, Democrat, Illinois), H.J. Res. 127 (John E. Rankin, Democrat, Mississippi), and H.R. 2817 (Edward J. King, Republican, Illinois), 68th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 4-80. See also additional statements of Secretary Weeks, BIA Records 4325-228; Manila Times, February 26, 1924.

give immediate support to the Cooper Resolution.(52)

The Committee chairman, Representative Fairfield, was among those who felt this way, and he believed that, given the opportunity, the House and the Senate would vote for an independence bill by a large majority (estimated to be about 260 to 160 in the House, and a similar proportion in the Senate.)(53)

The bill ultimately prepared by the sub-committee authorized the Philippines to hold a constitutional convention which, had the bill been adopted by the current session of Congress, due to end about June 30, would have led to the installation of a new Philippine government on July 4, 1926, assuming only normal delays.(54) But the sub-committee's report, on April 26, was not made until after the introduction of an autonomy bill, H.R. 8856, on April 23. The delay in the sub-committee's report was

(52) BIA Memorandum, March 6, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner; Manila Times, March 4, 1924.

(53) BIA Memorandum, March 6, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.

(54) Strictly confidential Memorandum for SecWar, April 2, 1924, BIA Records 4325-325, pt. 10 and BIA Records 4325-298 1/2.

The House sub-committee reported the Cooper Resolution with a number of amendments which included (1) an amendment to take care of the Philippine bond obligations in the United States; (2) an amendment whereby the United States would arrange with the world powers to consider an agreement insuring the continued independence of the Philippines; and (3) an amendment providing for the maintenance by the United States of a naval base and a coaling station in the Philippines. See New York Times, April 27, 1924.
deliberate, to prevent action on the independence bill.(55)

On February 11 and 16 and March 1, 3, and 6, virtually concurrently with the House hearings, the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions held hearings on the King independence bill — S. 912 — introduced on December 10, 1923 by William H. King (Democrat, Utah). This measure provided for the holding of a constitutional convention to prepare a constitution for an independent republican government for the Philippines. Upon satisfactory proof that the government provided for under said constitution was ready to function, the President of the United States would proclaim the independence of the Philippines. The withdrawal of American military forces from the Philippines would then take place within six months after the recognition of Philippine independence.(56)

(55) BIA Memorandum, March 15, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.

The War Department urged both chairmen of the House and Senate Committees to prevent, if possible, the reporting of an independence bill from their respective committees until the arrival of the Third Parliamentary Mission, expected early in May. See Cable # 626, April 11, 1924, McIntyre to Wood, BIA Records 364-after-513, BIA Records 4325-after-305, and BIA Records 1998-after-194.


Senator Frank B. Willis (Republican, Ohio), vice-chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, did not favour immediate Philippine independence and so introduced a bill granting Puerto Rico and the Philippines the right to elect a governor general. See Manila Times, February 29, 1924; Philippines Free Press, March 8, 1924, p. 6.
During the Senate hearings testimony from various persons connected with or with interests in the Philippines was again given. Among them were Senator King himself, who appeared as a spokesman for the Special Mission; Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara; Speaker Roxas; Jorge Bocobo, technical adviser to the Special Mission; Secretary of War Weeks; and Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones of the United States Navy.

In his testimony before the Committee, Speaker Roxas delivered a strong and eloquent plea in favour of Philippine freedom and pointed out very strongly that the Philippines could survive economically if independent. The statements made by Secretary Weeks and Speaker Roxas were substantially the same as those made before the House Committee hearings.(57)

Secretary Weeks' arguments against independence for the Philippines were bolstered by the views of the United States Navy, supplied by Admiral Jones, who felt that from the standpoint of the Navy S. 912 ought not be adopted. He maintained that the Philippines should be kept a permanent territory of the United States in the interests of America's commerce and military prestige. He said:

The navy considers that we must possess bases in the Philippines. They are vital to our operations in the western Pacific -- so vital that I consider their abandonment tantamount to abandonment of our ability to protect our interests in the Far East.

I think we ought to hold them [the Philippines] . . . until they are no longer of use to us from a military point of view in the Far East, or until such time as there is no possibility of our being called upon to exert any naval power in the Far East. (58)

The Committee intended to have an executive session on the Philippine bill, but Speaker Roxas asked to be allowed to reply to the Secretary of War and Admiral Jones' statements. He made an extended address which exhausted the time and the patience of the Committee. (59) He said that the testimony of Admiral Jones surprised the Philippine delegation, for the Admiral advocated retention of the Philippines in the interests of the United States and of the establishment of American power in the Far East, whereas the Filipinos had always been made to believe that the American occupation in the Philippines was a sacrifice on the part of the United States, for the benefit of the Filipinos. Speaker Roxas called attention to the incongruity of the testimony of Admiral Jones in the light of that of Secretary Weeks, who had testified before the same Committee that the Americans were in the Philippines neither for a selfish purpose nor for the military power of America in Asia. He cautioned the Committee not to give weight to the testimony of Jones, because Congress had already adopted a definite policy of promising the Filipinos their independence, stating at the time that it was not the intention of the United States to keep the

(58) Ibid., pp. 97-104.
(59) BIA Memorandum, March 6, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.
On March 6 Speaker Roxas provided the closing testimony with a statement which denied the assertion that the Muslim Filipinos were against independence and argued that from an economic point of view "this was the best time to determine the status of the Philippines by granting independence to the islands."(61)

After the conclusion of the five days of hearings the Senate Committee informed Secretary Weeks that it favoured withdrawal from the Philippines under certain conditions: a majority vote of the Filipinos in favour of independence; the cession in perpetuity of a naval base at Cavite and Corregidor; and the refunding of all Philippine government bonds in the United States. The Committee was, however, divided regarding the date of withdrawal and sought the Secretary's opinion. Most of the Committee inclined toward either 1930 or 1935, though one member favoured a date later than

(60) Hearings on S. 912, pp. 105-119.

(61) Ibid., pp. 109-112.

In a cablegram dated May 28, 1924 sent to the Secretary of War, Governor Wood stated that the statements made by Roxas before the Senate and House Committees were all "misleading and mostly based on fallacious statistics and interpretations." His testimonies on dialects spoken in the Philippines, literacy, and conflicts with the Muslims during Harrison's regime were "absolutely mistaken and misleading." His statements concerning government business operations and the status of the government companies were "entirely erroneous." As to the formal statement signed by him as president of the Mission and the Resident Commissioners [the January 8 Memorial], "it is misleading propaganda, absolutely untrue in fact and intimation," claimed the Governor General. See Cable # 807, May 28, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 4325-320; Letter, Wood to McIntyre, May 22, 1924, BIA Records 4325-329; and Letter, Wood to Weeks, June 20, 1924, BIA Records 4325-330.
In his written reply of April 1, Secretary Weeks put twenty years as the minimum time necessary to prepare for withdrawal, although ideally he would prefer at least a twenty-five year delay. In his letter he enclosed a memorandum and draft of a bill stipulating conditions for withdrawal from the Philippines.

The congressional hearings revealed a very strong feeling that the Filipinos should be given what they wanted -- immediate independence "at any cost." Those who favoured granting independence (including all of the farm bloc and many Republicans) were divided into three groups: (1) those who, as a matter of principle, believed that the Filipinos should have their independence; (2) those who desired to get rid of the Philippines because they had had enough of the clamour for independence and felt that the Filipinos had not been appreciative of what had been done for them; and (3) those who desired to discontinue the immigration of Filipinos to the

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McIntyre felt that if the Senate bill were reported out of Committee, the transition period of ten years would be materially cut down before its passage, and it was for that reason, in part, that the bill was prepared containing certain provisions which would require the full ten years to put in effect. See confidential letter, McIntyre to Wood, April 11, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-305.

(63) Letter, Weeks to Willis, April 1, 1924, BIA Records 4325-301. See also in Wood Papers, Box 173. This draft of a bill was supposedly drawn by the BIA at the request of Senator Willis. See remarks by Senator Hawes in February 1932, in BIA Records 364-with-473. See also BIA Memorandum, March 17, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-890.
United States and who opposed keeping open the American market to Philippine products. Of these, the second category was the largest group. (64)

McIntyre observed that it seemed that Congress would pass a Philippine bill as soon as it could get to it. Those traditionally and historically in favour of getting out of the Philippines had been strongly re-enforced by the element which had lost sympathy with the Filipinos due to their methods of propaganda and complaint. The desire to be rid of the Philippines was stronger in the Senate, McIntyre thought, with the House slightly more conservative. (65)

In the opinion of those opposed to independence, Congress did not seem to be able or willing to give the Philippine question a "calm and dispassionate consideration." In their view, Congress was overcome by "hysteria," with no one having any definite ideas except that independence was the course of least resistance. (66)

On March 11, 1924, McIntyre sent an urgent cablegram to Governor Wood requesting that he transmit his views on the "Philippine Plan" outlined in his December 17 letter. He said:

... it seems certain that both houses of Congress favor immediate independence of the Philippines this notwithstanding President's letter

(64) Cable # 620, Weeks to Wood, April 5, 1924, BIA Records 364-507; BIA Memorandum, March 17, 1924, BIA Records 364-506 1/2.

(65) See McIntyre to Wood, April 11, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-305; see also BIA Memorandum, March 1, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.

(66) Gilmore to Wood, April 16, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 170.
to Roxas. . . . Dominant sentiment seems to be desire to get rid of the Philippine Islands. Opposition to free admission of Philippine sugar, cigars and other products has great weight in determining attitude of many. (67)

Convinced that Congress was acting recklessly on the Philippine issue, Governor Wood sent his famous March 14 telegram in which he pleaded eloquently against Filipino freedom. In it, he expressed the conviction that Congress and the American People did not understand the true situation, having been misinformed and deceived by false and misleading propaganda. He sympathized with the desire of the Filipinos for independence, he wrote, but he knew that they were not prepared to assume its responsibility. "To grant immediate independence would be a heartless betrayal of our trust," and "it would ruin the sugar and tobacco industries, destroy confidence in investments, with resulting wrecking of the finances of the islands, with attendant idleness and disorder." He suggested that the present situation could be handled ideally by establishing firmly the government on the basis of the Jones Law, with certain amendments. (68)

Secretary Weeks cabled in reply that the Administration was entirely in accord with the Governor General's views, but that the majority of Congress insisted on immediate independence. (69) Wood

(67) Cable # 595, McIntyre to Wood, March 11, 1924, BIA Records 364-after-499. See also Roxas to Quezon, March 14, 1924, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(68) Cable # 724, March 14, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 364-503.

(69) Cable # 620, Weeks to Wood, April 5, 1924, BIA Records 364-507.
suggested publishing his March 14 cablegram if necessary and
calling the attention of the congressional committees to
confidential appendices and exhibits in the Wood-Forbes Report which
could be used to stem the tide of independence sentiment in
Congress.(70) But by then the Administration was confronted with a
situation in which both the House and Senate Committees had decided
to report bills providing for Philippine independence almost
immediately. To forestall this, it seemed advisable to propose a
compromise.

Governor Wood's statement, when it was finally released for
publication in Manila on April 16, was in the eyes of the Filipino
leaders the greatest blow that he had rendered the cause of
independence. Speaker Roxas and the Resident Commissioners in
Washington called the Governor's statement "a serious indictment of
12,000,000 people," prompted by "bias and rank prejudice."(71) In
Manila, a "Yo Protesto" meeting was held on April 27 to protest
against the "defamatory" cable. The Filipino press bitterly
denounced the Governor General for it and carried strongly-worded
editorials. The Independence Commission approved a resolution of
protest which affirmed the "national creed" to be immediate,
absolute, and complete independence for the Filipino people.(72)

(70) See Cable # 751, April 9, 1924, Wood to SecWar; also Cable #
752, April 10, 1924, in Wood Papers, Box 189.

(71) Manila Times, April 20, 1924.

(72) Ibid., April 27, 28, 1924; El Debate, April 27, 1924,
translated in BIA Records 364-A-636. See also Cable ,
PhilPress Manila to Washington, April 22, 1924, BIA Records
364-517-A; Cable PhilPress Manila to Washington, April 25,
1924, BIA Records 364-518-A; PhilPress Manila to Washington,
May 5, 1924, Quezon Papers, Box 46. See also samples of
resolutions of protest from various municipal councils in the
Meanwhile, the Administration strategy of compromise legislation had been progressing. The idea of compromise legislation had been suggested by a delegation of leading members of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce of New York, headed by John H. Pardee and John M. Switzer. There were five members of this delegation, representing the principal American investors in the Philippines. (73) Apparently realizing the critical situation in Congress, they were motivated by concern over the possible disruption of free trade between the Philippines and the United States should Congress act to set the Philippines free. (74)

(73) The New York delegation was composed of the following: John H. Pardee, President of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce in New York and President of the J.G. White Management Corporation, the holding company for the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company and the Philippine Railway Company.

John M. Switzer (twenty years in the Philippines; came with the first military expedition in 1898), President of the Pacific Commercial Company, considered the most important pre-war company in the Philippines, handling just about everything except liquor and jewellery;

Charles J. Welch, President of the Welch-Fairchild and Company, with investments in sugar and The Manila Times;

W.S. MacLeod, Vice-President of MacLeod and Company, the biggest abaca fiber dealer, with investments also in steamers, warehouses, and real estate; and

Newton W. Gilbert, eleven years in the Philippines, former Vice-Governor during the Forbes Administration and practicing New York lawyer.


(74) Letter, McIntyre to Wood, March 11, 1924, in BIA Records 364-after-290; Roxas to Quezon, March 14, 1924, Quezon Papers, Box 46.

Way back in 1919, after the first Philippine Mission left America, some of these businessmen were called to Washington, presumably by congressional committees concerned with Philippine affairs, to testify privately on the points touched upon by the Mission. At that time, they were ready to propose a plan for independence in ten years. See Vicente Villamin (Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce) to Quezon, May 31, 1922, ibid., Box 137.
In conferences with the War Department and congressional leaders, they let their views be known. They felt that while an independence bill would probably fail at this session of Congress, the reporting of a bill to the House would open the way for it to be discussed or voted on at the next session. Even if this should be inconclusive, the present agitation in the Philippines would continue, always with the likelihood of some sudden grant of independence to the Philippines.

They were sure that what the Filipinos really wanted was insular autonomy, with Filipinos in control of purely domestic affairs and the United States in control of foreign affairs. This arrangement, while far from ideal, would stop the immediate independence agitation and permit the economic development of the Philippines. The date for independence would be put off sufficiently in the future to protect American investors in the Philippines, and the delay hopefully would bring a change of mind in the Philippines on independence. They very much favoured drafting a bill which would establish a government more satisfactory to the Filipinos, under which a period of at least twenty years free from agitation might be secured. During this period the United States could attempt the completion of the work of preparing the Philippines for independence. (75)

(75) BIA Memorandum, March 14 and 15, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.
Picking up where matters had stood on December 17, the War Department, with the New York delegation, again sought to determine the Filipino position on a compromise measure. In conferences, on March 14, 26, and 29, the Filipino Mission was asked to lay down what the Filipinos really wanted — whether when they said they wanted independence they said it fully understanding the consequences of independence. Governor Wood was likewise invited to present his views on a compromise measure. (76)

Governor Wood was strongly opposed to any compromise plan, although if the Administration thought it necessary in view of the situation in Congress, he would cooperate in working out such a plan. The adoption of a compromise measure, he thought, "was a most dangerous and unsound procedure," for it would establish a government largely under Filipino control, but without any diminution whatsoever of the responsibility of the United States for the conduct of affairs. He thought it "a pathetic performance, founded on nothing more nor less than misinformation and entirely disregarding the actual conditions and accepting the statements of a lot of agitators." (77)

If legislation was necessary, Wood argued, it should provide for home rule under the definite sovereignty of the United States, with a Resident Commissioner and American technical advisers. The

(76) BIA Memorandum, March 8, 15, 27 and 29, 1924, ibid.; Cable # 595, McIntyre to Wood, March 11, 1924, BIA Records 364-after-499.

(77) Wood Diary, April 14, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 20.
Resident Commissioner should have control over United States military and naval forces under concessions to be granted to them, and he should have the right either to veto or suspend financial legislation or legislation affecting the United States, particularly as regards foreign relations. He would have power over the administration of the insular government or measures local in character in those instances where such measures were considered vital to the interests of the United States. (78)

Roxas in Washington was guarded in his reaction to the War Department approach. He referred approvingly to the "McIntyre Plan" (or the draft of 1922) without saying that he would advocate it, and he indicated a desire to receive it or a similar proposition from the Administration in Washington so that he could take it up with his people to see if they approved it. Confidentially, he told McIntyre that what he really desired was a letter from the Secretary of War enclosing a copy of the bill and asking him whether he thought that bill would be satisfactory to his people. (79)

The Resident Commissioners, Isauro Gabaldon and Pedro Guevara, were more positive in their response to the "McIntyre Plan" because of the very real fear that unless something was done, a radical independence bill would be approved. Unwilling to ask the House Committee to postpone action or to do something other than what they

(78) BIA Memorandum, May 26, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner; Letter, Horace B. Pond (Pacific Commercial Company, Manila) to John M. Switzer, April 11, 1924, ibid.
(79) Memorandum for SecWar, March 18, 1924, BIA Records 364-506 1/2.
had been advocating openly, they asked Pardee and Switzer to stop the surging tide for immediate independence in Congress.\(^{(80)}\)

The readiness with which Congress had responded to the Filipino demands for independence seemed to have produced a sobering effect on the Filipino leaders. McIntyre noted that the Special Mission was "greatly disturbed by the enthusiasm with which the plan for immediate and absolute independence has been received. They are finding out that the people who are most anxious to give them immediate independence are those interested in sugar, cigars, etc., in the American market and do not wish to continue the advantages to the Filipinos which they are now receiving in the American market."\(^{(81)}\)

Wood, in Manila, noted that Quezon and other leaders seemed desirous of re-establishing cordial relations with him and retreating from the previous posture of confrontation.\(^{(82)}\) Quezon, in fact, surprised Wood by saying that he was tired of fighting and wanted peace.\(^{(83)}\)

\(^{(80)}\) BIA Memorandum, March 15, 1924, *Records of the US High Commissioner*.


\(^{(83)}\) Wood Diary, March 13, April 6, 1924, *Wood Papers*, Box 20.
The determined efforts of both the New York delegation and the War Department resulted in a draft of a compromise bill to which Roxas apparently did not offer any objection. The bill was prepared largely by Switzer, with some suggestions perhaps from former Vice-Governor Newton Gilbert. They hoped to have this bill reported from the Committee on Insular Affairs in place of the Cooper independence bill, if the Administration agreed.\(^{(84)}\)

After a conference with President Coolidge, Secretary Weeks advised Roxas that if he had adequate assurances from the Filipino leaders that they would accept as satisfactory the proposed bill, he would cause the bill to be introduced with the understanding that it would be supported by the Administration. Under the proposed legislation the Filipinos would draft a constitution which would provide for internal self-government. After twenty-five years, the Filipinos would decide whether this government was to continue or whether they would establish a wholly independent government.

Differing from the bill sent to Manila on December 17, the bill would provide for a Resident Commissioner in the Philippines who would be the representative of the President. He would have authority to suspend the effectivity of any law which might result

\(^{(84)}\) BIA Memoranda, March 15, 26, 27, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner; see also Memorandum for SecWar, March 17, 1924, BIA Records 364-506 1/2. Switzer's draft added two sections to the draft of December 17 to include provisions safeguarding the interests of American investors in the Philippines. This draft was subsequently modified in drafts of March 27 and April 1. The final draft was ready on April 4, 1924. See McIntyre Memorandum to SecWar, March 17, 1924, BIA Records 364-506 1/2; BIA Memorandum: Genesis of Fairfield Bill, April 5, 1924, BIA Records 364-507 1/2.
in a failure of the government to meet its financial obligations, until the decision of the President could be secured.

Roxas transmitted Secretary Week's message to Quezon, who decided to defer adoption of a Filipino stand on the matter until the arrival in Washington of the Third Parliamentary Mission.(85)

With time pressures building, the compromise measure was nevertheless introduced, despite the absence of a Filipino position, as H.R. 8856, on April 23, 1924.

(85) Cable # 617, April 3, 1924, McIntyre to Wood, BIA Records 364-after-506; Roxas to Quezon Alas, April 2, 1924, Quezon Papers, Box 46; Letter, Roxas to Weeks, BIA Records 364-529. See also Weeks to Coolidge, April 9, 1924, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 127.
CHAPTER VI

THE THIRD PARLIAMENTARY MISSION (1924) AND THE FAIRFIELD BILL: POLITICS OR PATRIOTISM?

Pledging loyalty to "the mandate of the people," Manuel L. Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, and Claro M. Recto sailed for the United States on April 6, 1924 to join Speaker Roxas and the Resident Commissioners as the Third Parliamentary Mission. The Mission purportedly would intensify the push for independence, while assuming needed responsibility over Roxas and his Mission.(1)

The departure of the Mission was preceded by almost two months of "tumultuous" meetings as the Independence Commission endeavoured to sort out the great number of legislators who were scrambling to join the trip to Washington. At one point, twenty-eight

(1) There were disturbing rumours that Speaker Roxas had not conducted himself well while in Washington and had caused some resentment even among his own colleagues in the Mission. The Resident Commissioners apparently resented his dictation and impositions on them as well as his lavish spending of public money while he withheld their entertainment allowance. One of his technical advisers, Jorge Bocobo, even tendered his resignation from the Mission because of differences with Roxas in the conduct of the Mission's work, but this embarrassing resignation was not accepted. Roxas was also faulted for his indiscretion (especially his tasteless remarks about President Coolidge) and his "exaggerated self-sufficiency not supported either by knowledge or expertise."

There were even rumours that there was a movement in the Legislature to recall the Speaker "for failure to comply worthily... with his delicate mission." Perhaps Quezon and Osmeña decided to go to Washington partly to see if the situation could be salvaged. See Jose T. Nueno, The Dilemma of the Fairfield Bill (Manila, 1925), pp. 65-67; Manila Daily Bulletin, April 28, 1924; Philippines Free Press, May 10, 1924, p. 30.
representatives were anxious to go. It seemed, crowed the Manila Times, that only a "big mission" would satisfy the "patriots." Even the Filipino newspaper, the Philippines Herald, decried the behaviour of those "motivated by nothing but personal interests in wanting to join the mission."(2) In the end the Independence Commission decided to send a representative each from the three political parties in the Legislature, along with a small group of members and aides.(3)

General Emilio Aguinaldo was again invited to join as honorary chairman of the Mission, but he did not go. As was the case in 1922, Aguinaldo felt that he could not accept the position if the Mission was not going to stay in the United States indefinitely.

(2) See Manila Times, February 1, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 24, 28, March 18, 19, 1924.
Governor Wood cabled Secretary of War Weeks that less than a thousand people saw the Mission off, although efforts were made in advance to assemble a large crowd. See Cable # 756, April 13, 1924, BIA Records 364-515.

(3) Accompanying the Mission leaders were the following members and aides: Benedicto Padilla, Francisco Zamora, Matias E. Gonzales, I.S. Reyes, Hadji Gulam Rasul, and Dr. Peregrino Paulino.
Rasul was undoubtedly included in the Mission as the token Muslim Filipino representative to belie the oft-repeated American assertion that the "Moros" preferred American rule and opposed Philippine independence.
Governor Wood was unimpressed with the choice of Rasul. In a letter to Secretary of War Weeks on April 6, 1924, he identified Rasul as the son of Muslim leader Hadji Butu. Wood regarded him as "one of the most despicable and undependable men in the Philippines, educated in part in the United States, employed by the Independence Commission, and is attempting to line up Moros against Americans." Apparently Quezon was unaware of Rasul's activities, and he expressed the sentiment that had he known earlier, he would not have had him with the Mission in any capacity. See letter in Wood Papers, Box 173; see also Wood Diary, April 6, 1924, Box 20, ibid. See also letter, Datu H. Tahil Jalkarnain to Wood, April 17, 1924, Box 172, ibid. protesting that Rasul was not a representative of the Moros.
until independence was obtained or "until it becomes clear that it is absolutely impossible to get it by diplomatic or persuasive means."(4)

On the eve of the Mission's sailing for the United States, Quezon and Osmeña formally reunited their respective parties as the Partido Nacionalista Consolidado, with Quezon as president and Osmeña as vice-president. Before the reunion became a reality, neither Quezon nor Osmeña had been willing to head any mission to Washington and leave the other behind. The platform adopted by the coalition party was primarily directed against the "despotic regime" and "tyrannical administration" of Governor Wood.(5)

Before his departure for Washington, Osmeña paid a call on the Governor General and Wood recorded in his diary that

Osmeña came in to say goodbye . . . Expressed great friendship. . . . and seemed very much disturbed when I told him that they were liable to get independence now without any conditions as to tariff concessions, . . . He seemed to be very much worried about it. He knows perfectly well they are not ready; is simply playing the cheap game of the average politicians, sacrificing public interests to personal popularity.

(4) See Quezon to Aguinaldo, March 20, 1924; Aguinaldo to Quezon, April 4, 1924, in Quezon Papers, Box 46. See also Manila Times, March 14, April 6, 1924.

Aguinaldo consulted Wood on the matter of his joining the Mission, and the Governor General advised him not to go. See Wood Diary, March 15, 1924, in Wood Papers, Box 20. See also Cable # 748, Wood to Weeks, April 7, 1924, in BIA Records 364-509 and BIA Records 4325-303.

(5) Manila Times, March 27, April 6, 1924.
Wood sought out Quezon to speak a farewell counsel.

. . . I strongly advised both of them to stop their campaign of abuse, and express some appreciation for what the American people had done; and I told him as I told Osmeña that they were liable to be dropped overboard very suddenly and left to shift for themselves. I also told him that I thought that the best thing that could happen to them would be to continue under the American flag; that millions of people were trying to get under it and they were the only ones I knew that were trying to get away from it.

Our conversation became very frank though without any disagreeable features. I finally told him that he, of course, appreciates that the real problem out here was biological and not political. He seemed rather emotionally stirred by this. His eyes filled up. He said, yes, that is the real trouble, biological and not political, that of different races. He said there would be no more campaign of mudslinging; that he would follow my advice as to expressing appreciation of what the United States has done. . . .(6)

Governor Wood cautioned the War Department in Washington against making any commitments to the Mission looking towards a radical change in policy. Ideally, he said, he preferred that Congress allow the political status quo in the Philippines to continue until after Congress adjourned in June, when the whole question could be taken up under conditions that would permit full consideration and deliberation. In any case, he emphasized the need for Washington to impress on the Mission leaders the necessity for "active cooperation" with the American Government in the Philippines in enacting constructive legislation "looking to the development of natural resources and to the improvement of their economic conditions." Then it would "be possible in the comparatively near

(6) Wood Diary, April 6, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 20.
future for Congress to grant further powers and shape their policy on sound lines toward the ultimate solution of the problem." (7)

Almost simultaneously with the departure of the Mission, the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines composed a committee to represent the American community of the Philippines in the United States during the following few months. The main object of this committee was ostensibly to inform the American people of the "true facts" of the Philippine situation, especially from a commercial standpoint. The committee was composed of Capt. H.L. Heath (president of the Manila Cordage Company), president of the Chamber; John W. Hausserman (principal owner of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company), vice-president of the Chamber; and C.M. Cotterman (director of the Filipino-owned Binalbagan sugar central), ex-president of the Chamber. (8)

The American Chamber of Commerce in Manila had watched with uneasiness the developments in Washington moving towards practically immediate Philippine independence. American business interests in the Philippines were generally strongly against any change in the

(7) See confidential cable # 747, April 6, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 364-508 and BIA Records 4325-302; Cable # 775, May 3, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 364-521.

(8) Manila Times, April 8, 1924.
These three Americans were among a group of pioneers who came with the American flag in 1898, stayed on and built up their business in the Philippines.
Quezon himself was reportedly anxious to have American representation from the Philippines in Washington in connection with the legislation pending in Congress. See Letter, H.B. Pond to J.M. Switzer, April 11, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.
political status of the country which would reduce American control, with resulting loss of business security and confidence. The tobacco and sugar people in the Philippines were especially disturbed over the prospects of a change which would do away with preferential tariffs, whose loss, they felt, would mean their prompt ruin. (9) There were also indications that Filipinos with substantial sugar interests were likewise very much afraid of immediate independence with its probable termination of free trade with the United States. (10)

(9) Confidential Cable # 756, Wood to McIntyre, April 13, 1924, BIA Records 364-515.
Tariff-free trade relations were established between the United States and the Philippines by two acts of Congress in 1909 and 1913.

(10) The two names mentioned were Rafael Alunan and Felipe Buencamino. At one point Alunan and Buencamino reportedly thought of going to the United States to see that Quezon did not weaken to the extent of accepting any plan which would affect the tariff relations between the United States and the Philippines. See Letter, H.B. Pond to J.M. Switzer, April 11, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.

George Fairchild told Governor Wood that he was present at an interview between Alunan and Quezon shortly before Quezon left for Washington, during which Alunan stated that unless the sugar people had the guarantee of a sufficient period before independence he (Alunan) would get out and fight Quezon. He further stated that unless Quezon and the Mission could get a period of delay of at least ten years, they should oppose the measure contemplated by Congress. Alunan finally agreed to aid in raising of money from the sugar planters if Quezon would guarantee them a respite of at least three years before action was taken for independence. See Wood Diary, May 22, 1924, in Wood Papers, Box 20.

In January 1925, Quezon, Roxas, and Osmena journeyed to Bacolod, Negros Occidental, where a banquet was given by the sugar planters in honour of the three leaders. Roxas and Osmena in their speeches acknowledged the contribution given by the sugar people to the independence fund, with Negros Occidental province as the biggest contributor. See Manila Times, January 18, 1925.
In the face of developments in Washington, an influential segment of the American Chamber advanced the theory, through George Fairchild (sugar businessman and Manila Times publisher), that Congress could not alienate the Philippines nor, in fact, any other American territory, except by constitutional amendment. Mr. Fairchild proposed a constitutional amendment which would read thus:

That Congress is hereby authorized to enact legislation for the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States from the Philippine Islands, providing that such legislation shall make adequate provision for the payment, upon a fair valuation, of the interests and investments in said Islands of citizens of the United States and for the fulfillment of such obligations as the United States assumed under the Treaty of Paris for the protection of the rights and property of subjects or citizens of other countries. (11)

(11) Fairchild's alienation theory was explained in a pamphlet entitled "The Philippine Problem Seen from a New Angle," BIA Records 364-516-A.

See George H. Fairchild to Governor Wood, April 5, 1924, in ibid., Box 170. See also cable from Heath and War Department, April 9, 1924, in Weeks to Heath, April 17, 1924, ibid., Box 173; Fairchild to McIntyre, May 31, 1924, BIA Records 364-539; and New York Times, April 11, 1924.

Wood thought Fairchild and his colleagues "were all rather going off half-cocked" in advocating their views. See Wood Diary, April 5, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 20.

Later, after discussions with some competent lawyers on the legal question raised by the Chamber, he thought there was much that could be said in support of the theory. See Wood to Coolidge, October 19, 1926, in BIA Records 364-623.

Jorge Bocobo prepared the Mission's rebuttal of the Fairchild theory. See Manila Times, April 28, 1924.

The Philippine case was apparently distinct in that it had never been incorporated into the United States; the Constitution of the United States had not been applied to the Philippines; and the Filipinos were not even citizens of the United States. Congress and the War Department were unimpressed with the legal argument presented by the American Chamber. See ibid., April 13, 1924.

The Department of Justice advised the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs that Congress had full authority to alienate or otherwise dispose of the Philippines. See Cable # 644, McIntyre to Wood, May 2, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-307; see also Manila Times, May 5, 1924; New York Times, May 3, 1924.
The *Manila Times* vociferously espoused Fairchild's theory, in reality a corollary to the territorial government stand previously advocated by this group of Manila Americans.

The Fairchild view, it appeared, was not shared by many "responsible members" of the American Chamber, who felt that those who advanced it did not appreciate the true strength in Congress of the sentiment in favour of Philippine independence. Obscuring the issue with this argument, they felt, would stimulate, rather than check, action by Congress. Thus, J.W. Hausserman of the Chamber Committee testified in favour of compromise legislation when the Committee arrived in the United States.(12)

The Parliamentary Mission arrived in Washington on May 3, 1924. Hearings were being held at the time on a compromise bill introduced by Chairman of the House Committee (on Insular Affairs) Fairfield. Fairfield introduced his bill to prevent his Committee from reporting the amended Cooper bill, which a majority of his Committee were disposed to do.(13)

(12) Some members of the American Chamber felt that while they were not in agreement with the Fairchild theory, advancing it at that time and opposing any compromise plan was essential to the adoption of a compromise plan. The American Chamber and the Manila Times had acquired such a reputation for their intemperate attitude, especially towards the Filipino demand for independence, that the Filipino political leaders were forced almost automatically to oppose their views. The support of the American Chamber for a compromise plan would cause the Filipinos to suspect such a plan. See letter, H.B. Pond to J.M. Switzer, April 11, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.

The bill, a precursor to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting (1933) and the Tydings-McDuffie (1934) bills, had been modified somewhat from its initial formulation in that it proposed a thirty-year instead of a twenty-five year period of autonomy. During this time the Philippines would have control of insular affairs, with an elective Filipino governor general, under a constitution drawn up by a constitutional convention, ratified by the Filipino people, and approved by the President of the United States.

To represent American sovereignty in the Commonwealth, there would be an American Resident Commissioner appointed by the President. The Resident Commissioner would have the power to suspend legislation concerning currency, bonded indebtedness, and foreign relations. Suspended legislation would be referred to the President of the United States, who would have an absolute veto.

The President could, at any time deemed necessary, take over and operate, at the expense of the Commonwealth, any executive or administrative function of the government. Trade relations would be regulated by the United States. A provision for a plebiscite at the end of the autonomy period on the question of independence was originally incorporated in the bill, though this proposition was dropped before it was reported to the House.(14)

Fairfield's measure, introduced on April 23, just ahead of the sub-committee's reporting of the amended Cooper resolution on April 26, was rushed through the Committee with unaccustomed speed. It was voted out of Committee on May 10 after several days of hearings

on April 30, May 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. (15)

Fairfield, in supporting his bill, spoke highly of the Filipinos and their progress, saying that "They have shown a marvelous adaptation and a keen, discriminating sense of the spirit and character of the institutions of the great Republic."

Emphasizing the unselfishness of United States policy towards the Philippines, he assured the Committee that the promises of ultimate independence "have not been empty words." But he felt that ultimately the Filipinos might see their best interests as lying in permanent association with the United States. And his bill was designed to preserve this option. So he said:

The Filipinos have developed a national life and are rapidly proving to the world that they are capable of self-government . . . . No other bill, so far as I know, has been introduced that gives to the Philippine people the opportunity to remain under the flag. It may be that they will choose to do so. After having had charge of their affairs for so many years, and having the assurances from them on every occasion that the Government of the United States has been a blessing to that people, it is but fair to assume that possibly with further study and larger experience in the end they would desire to remain a part of the great Republic. Personally, I am unwilling to report any legislation that would peremptorily divorce them from the possibility of remaining with us should they desire to do so.

... I firmly believe that twenty-five years is too short a period in which to have accomplished what we set out to accomplish, because I believe that the task is not yet done. I am constrained to urge further autonomy with large experience in self-government as a prerequisite to the granting to them of independence, or the exercise of the plebiscite to remain under the flag. (16)

(15) Hearings on H.R. 8856, 68th Cong., 1st sess.
The supporters of the Fairfield Bill in the hearings were mostly American financiers with business interests in the Philippines,(17) with the exception of one New York attorney, Newton W. Gilbert, who had been Vice-Governor in the Philippines during the Forbes Administration. (He was requested to testify by Congressman Fairfield). They were John H. Pardee, president of the J.G. White Management Corporation and of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce in New York, and a co-author behind the scenes of the Fairfield Bill; Charles M. Swift, president of the Manila Electric Company and also president of the Philippine Railway Company in the islands of Cebu and Panay; A.J. Quist, who represented Hallgarten and Company, a large banking firm in New York identified with the purchase and sale of securities, who had handled the majority of Philippine financing since 1920; John M. Switzer, president of the Pacific Commercial Company and co-author of the Fairfield Bill; and John W. Hausserman, of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines.(18)

(17) The unofficial figures on American investments in the Philippines were US$24 M in 6 American-owned sugar centrals and US$22,800,000 in lumber, coconut oil, gold mines, hemp, residential and similar properties. See Manila Times, May 19, 1924.

(18) Hearings on H.R. 8856, pp. 14-28; 23-41; 45-46; 83-124; 150-155. See also in Manila Times, May 2, 4, 5, 1924. Herewith are samples of their arguments:

Mr. Pardee declared that immediate independence would have a disruptive effect upon American and Filipino business in the Philippines. He asserted that the shock would be disastrous and advocated legislation to meet the existing unsatisfactory situation, suggesting "an adequate time" within which business could adjust itself and prepare for the separation.
When the Parliamentary Mission arrived in Washington, the choice which faced Quezon was whether to support the Cooper Bill, apparently sidetracked despite having been virtually approved by the Committee only two months before, or to support the Fairfield bill. To do the latter was politically risky, in view of the passions which had been aroused in the Philippines by Wood's recent actions and the emotional calls for immediate independence. But to support the former would in all likelihood cause the demise of the Fairfield Bill, probably leaving the Philippines with no legislation in this session of Congress. Quezon came down on the side of something rather than nothing; in his testimony before the Committee on the Fairfield Bill Quezon made only a pro-forma bow in the direction of the Cooper Bill.

Mr. Switzer urged "a non-political and non-prejudiced survey" of the Philippine problem and recommended that independence be postponed a few years. "We must not take the Filipinos seriously," he said, "as deep down in their hearts, they prefer a period of home rule under our sovereignty." He declared that the present conditions necessitated change, and thirty years of self-government would be the logical step prior to the granting of independence. He claimed that continuation of relations between the United States and the Philippine would benefit both countries and he opposed immediate independence as economically detrimental to the Filipinos. He also mentioned the Japanese menace as an argument against Philippine independence.

Mr. Hausserman said withdrawal of American sovereignty from the Philippines would mean the beginning of the end of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Far East.

Friends of Philippine independence in the Committee, such as Congressmen John C. Shaefer (Progressive Republican, Wisconsin) Heartstill Ragon (Democrat, Arkansas), and Guinn Williams (Democrat, Texas) were conspicuous in rebutting the arguments of the retentionists.
Quezon was the only Filipino representative to express officially the Filipino viewpoint on the Fairfield Bill. He informed the Committee that the Fairfield Bill in its original draft did not completely satisfy Filipino political aspirations. However, though the Filipinos were anxious for immediate independence and therefore would prefer the Cooper Bill, the Philippine Mission realized the hopelessness of this under the present Administration and would accede to some reasonable compromise such as the Fairfield Bill. In the course of the hearings, Quezon said:

I would rather go home with some law that will improve conditions there [in the Philippines].

And further:

I think I have plainly stated our position. If you can not get the Cooper Bill, as originally presented, or any other similar bill, enacted into law, and you can pass some other measure that would give us complete home rule, even the Fairfield Bill, with some amendments, I say, to use slang, go to it!

Quezon did, however, oppose the proposed thirty-year deferral of independence. He suggested that the question should be left open and independence granted after the Filipinos had demonstrated, under the proposed Fairfield Commonwealth, that they were capable of maintaining a stable government.

Continuing with his testimony, Quezon strongly objected also to the provision which gave the American Resident Commissioner power to annul laws and to use troops in case of an emergency. This, he said, would cause great friction, even more, in fact, than obtained under current conditions with Governor Wood. It would be more
reasonable, he suggested, if the President of the United States, and not the Resident Commissioner, should have sole power to annul laws passed by the Philippine Legislature and to call out troops in case of emergency. Concluding his testimony, Quezon stated that the Philippines, under the bill, could collect enough taxes to run the government and could provide capital to develop her resources.(19)

In view of their objections to provisions in the original Fairfield Bill, the Committee allowed the Filipino representatives to propose amendments. The Mission desired to shorten the Commonwealth period as much as possible, to ten years, or at most, fifteen years; as a compromise with the Administration's twenty-five years, the Committee reduced the term from thirty to twenty years.(20)

(19) Hearings on H.R. 8856, pp. 125-143; see also Manila Times, May 6, 7, 1924.

(20) The Filipino missioners were divided among themselves as to the length of the preparatory period and the provision for a plebiscite at the end of the period. Representative Recto, for instance, considered the plebiscite proviso unnecessary, but Speaker Roxas favoured it in order to give future generations of Filipinos the opportunity to express their preference either for independence or for a continued American connection. Quezon favoured Recto's view.

In discussing the length of the preparatory period, Quezon explained to General McIntyre that their difficulty was this: that if it were ten years they could go openly to their people and advocate the bill as the best thing for the Filipinos and the Philippines; if the period were longer, they would have to go before the people making excuses and explaining that they had gotten the best that they could; and if it was desired that they should openly advocate the Fairfield bill, he felt that ten years was about as long as they could agree on, particularly as the ten years really meant approximately fourteen years before American withdrawal.

Osmena explained that their difficulty in accepting a longer period resulted from the position of the Democrats and insurgents in Congress who would not stand for a longer period.

See BIA Memorandum, May 12, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner; see also Nueno, op. cit., pp. 32-36.
Apart from the term of the Commonwealth, the House Committee on Insular Affairs accepted each and every one of the Mission's other amendments. The important ones were: (1) that there would be no plebiscite on independence after the twenty-year Commonwealth period; (2) that all officials of the Philippine Commonwealth would support and defend the Constitution of the Commonwealth, instead of the Constitution of the United States; (3) that no person connected with the army or navy would be appointed Resident Commissioner to the Commonwealth; (4) that the general powers of the American Resident Commissioner to call out the armed forces of the United States and to suspend any law passed by the Commonwealth would be given to the President of the United States; and (5) that only the Supreme Court of the United States, instead of American courts in general, would have jurisdiction over the Philippines. A provision that the Philippine Legislature report all its acts to the Congress of the United States, which would have the power to disapprove and annul such acts, was stricken out. (21)

On May 10, the House Committee majority favourably reported the amended Fairfield Bill, providing for absolute independence for the Philippines in 1944. The chairman said:

In line with the gradual movement toward future independence we may enact a law granting further autonomy, but by its provisions removing the occasion which gives rise to friction between the administrative office and the legislature. In

conformity with the idea that the present status is neither wise nor profitable and possibly fraught with danger, the Committee has reported H.R. 8856.

A minority report (filed on May 17) dissented and favoured an outright grant of independence or a return to the status quo if the bill was rejected, calling the bill "a camouflage for a real independence bill." The minority report charged that the Fairfield measure would sacrifice Philippine interests for "the success of a commercial venture of American businessmen." (22)

The amended bill as reported on May 10 was at that point acceptable to the Philippine Mission, who thought it would likewise be acceptable to their people in Manila since it specifically provided for independence. Quezon then sought to ascertain the sentiment in Manila and to generate pressure for a shorter Commonwealth period by sending a telegram to the Independence Commission to the effect that the Mission had laboured to secure the reporting of the Cooper bill; that failing of success, they had then laboured to have the period in the Fairfield Bill reduced, and had succeeded in securing twenty years; that they were anxious to have it further reduced; that they desired to secure the views of their people in Manila on this, and that if deemed advisable, the cablegram might be published in Manila. (23)

(22) House Report 709, parts 1 and 2; see also Manila Times, May 13, 14, 19, 1924; New York Times, May 13, 18, 1924. Another minority report was submitted by Rep. Everett Kent (Democrat, Pennsylvania), who did not favour immediate independence and placed a period of at least ten years before it could be granted. (Part 3, May 30, 1924).

(23) BIA Memorandum, May 13, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner; Manila Times, May 13, 1924.
Much to their surprise the bill itself was not acceptable in Manila. The leaders in Manila advised that sentiment was against the bill, with practically the entire Filipino press (except for La Vanguardia and the Philippines Herald) opposed to the long preparatory period. Virtually the entire Filipino press had joined in the manifesto of El Comercio (oldest Manila daily, independent) declaring that the Fairfield Bill, while better than nothing, was unacceptable to the Filipinos and would only lead to continuous agitation. According to Antonio de las Alas (Nacionalista) and Ruperto Montinola (Democrata), as reported by the Philippines Herald, the Filipinos preferred to continue the present status, because acceptance of the Fairfield Bill would bar them from campaigning for independence at an earlier date. The most vocal opposition came from General Emilio Aguinaldo.(24) Under these circumstances, the Mission was somewhat in doubt as to what line of action to pursue, especially as the Administration had dug in its heels over the issue of the transition period. Secretary Weeks continued adamantly to support a twenty-five year provision (which President Coolidge also favoured), while Quezon felt misgivings at anything over fifteen years.(25)

The Mission was under tremendous pressure both from the Administration and the New York delegation to come to an understanding on the twenty-five year period, especially as time was running out to bring the Fairfield Bill to the floor for discussion.

(24) Ibid., May 27, June 2, 4, 1924; Letter, McIntyre to Wood, May 13, 1924, BIA Records 4325-311; Teodoro M. Kalaw to Quezon, cables, June 2, 4, 1924, and Quezon to T.M. Kalaw, cable, June 10, 1924, both in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(25) BIA Memorandum, May 15, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.
Quezon realized the impossible situation they were in; if they came out as the Secretary suggested and openly favoured a term of twenty-five years, and the bill did not pass, they would not be able to explain the situation to their people, and their careers would be finished. On the other hand, it would be politically provident to bring home some kind of legislation, if it represented an advance in Philippine autonomy.

The Mission discussed the following alternatives with General McIntyre: first, they would openly support an agreement on a transition period of fifteen years (the best thing for the Philippines and for their own particular interests) which, with the preliminaries, would make it approximately twenty years. If a bill with this transition period should pass, they anticipated no difficulty in getting it accepted in the Philippines. Second, if Secretary Weeks insisted on twenty-five years, they would like the Administration to urge the passage of the bill. On their part, they would do what they could to secure its passage, by inducing their friends in Congress to favour it, though limiting themselves to approaching those friends who were not rabid for immediate independence, reaching the others, if possible, through intermediaries. If the bill passed, they would openly commit themselves to it by urging that the President sign the bill. Third, they could support the bill for the longer period provided they could be assured that in the event the bill failed to pass, the President would convey his approval of Filipino autonomy by appointing a Filipino Governor General or some such concession. They would thus have something to show their people as an
accomplishment. In any case, the Mission indicated it was particularly anxious not to suggest anything to the Secretary of War which he would disapprove of.(26)

On May 17 Quezon, with Roxas and Osmena, set forth the following proposition to the Secretary of War: If the Secretary or the President could receive assurances from the leaders in Congress that they would pass a bill, appropriately phrased along the lines of the Fairfield Bill but not including the twenty-five year provision, the three of them would come out openly and support it in Washington and in Manila. If the leaders in Congress were of the opinion that the bill could not be passed, they would like to ask the Secretary to write a letter, addressed to Quezon and dated May 17, stating the Administration's position on the bill. Quezon would then take this letter to Manila and use it confidentially to secure, if possible, a resolution from the Legislature approving the bill and urging its passage. Quezon could then return to Washington and at the next session of Congress probably secure the passage of the bill with the assistance of the Administration.(27)

(26) BIA Memorandum, May 16, 1924, ibid. In all the discussions with the War Department, both Quezon and Osmena were always anxious to know the attitude of the Secretary of War and both were particularly eager to avoid bringing up anything that would be displeasing to him.

(27) BIA Memoranda, May 16 and 19, 1924, ibid., see also Letter, McIntyre to Wood, June 3, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-323 and Quezon Papers, Box 46.
Although Secretary Weeks thought this a reasonable proposition, and a letter from the Secretary was actually prepared, it was never used.\(^{(28)}\)

Quezon and Osmeña hoped for a while that they might be able to endorse the Fairfield Bill if their Democratic friends in Congress would declare that they favoured a delay in granting independence. But a declaration was not forthcoming, and the Administration would also not categorically state a preference for a Commonwealth period, even in excess of twenty years. Without an endorsement from the Mission (as well as one from the Administration), Fairfield would not bring his measure for discussion and a vote on the floor of Congress.\(^{(29)}\)

A final version of the compromise independence measure, in a form acceptable to Secretary Weeks, was S. 3373 — the Johnson Bill — introduced by Senator Hiram Johnson (Republican, California) on May 23, at the request of the Secretary of War, as a preferable alternative to the Fairfield Bill. The Senate bill provided that twenty-five years after the passage of the act, the Philippines should be recognized as an independent government. The President of the United States was authorized to take the necessary steps to protect the interests of the United States and of American citizens as well as those of other countries preliminary to withdrawing

\(^{(28)}\) Copy of letter to Quezon from SecWar, May 17, 1924, in BIA Records 4325-after-312 and Wood Papers, Box 173.

\(^{(29)}\) BIA Memorandum, May 24, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.
American sovereignty from the Philippines. The United States was further authorized to retain title to such property as might thereafter be useful for her purposes.

Secretary Weeks, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions on May 28, urged the passage of S. 3373, stating that it would remove the question of independence from insular politics and would give to the Filipino people a period which could be devoted to the development of the wealth of their country and the prosperity of their people.(30)

The Secretary of War had hoped that the Johnson Bill could at least be reported from the Senate Committee and perhaps pass the Senate, so as to facilitate adoption of the twenty-five year provision should a compromise bill eventually pass Congress (by then it had become evident that Congress would probably not complete action on the bill before adjournment).(31) As it turned, not only did the House not debate the Fairfield Bill, but the Johnson Bill was not reported out of its Senate Committee. Congress adjourned on June 7 in "an atmosphere of controversy" as members from Midwest and Western states fought and lost in a desperate fight for farm, reclamation, and railroad legislation. Congress was too preoccupied with the imminent national nominating conventions to spend any more time on the Philippine question.(32)

(30) Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 65, pt. 9, p. 9249; Memorandum on S. 3373, May 26, 1924, BIA Records 4325-319 1/2. See Statement of Secretary of War before Senate Committee on S. 3373, May 28, 1924, BIA Records 4325-322; also in Manila Times, June 3, 1924.

(31) BIA Memorandum, May 24, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner.

(32) Manila Times, June 9, 1924.
As matters stood when the Mission eventually left Washington in September, action along the lines of the Johnson-Fairfield bills would await the December session of Congress. Quezon and Osmena were apparently amenable to either bill, confident that if either passed, President Coolidge would sign it and the Philippine Legislature would approve it without reservation.

Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders could in the meantime discuss and agree on the Johnson-Fairfield plan, or some similar scheme. The War Department emphasized to the Filipino leaders the need to come to an understanding and cooperation with Governor Wood. The Governor General welcomed this step inasmuch as he had never approved of the push in Washington to change the status of the Philippines.(33)

The members of the Third Parliamentary Mission, except for Speaker Roxas, who had returned to the Philippines on June 11, decided before leaving the United States to appear before the national nominating conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties, there to "appeal with renewed vigor to the American nation for freedom and justice."(34) The Mission was in an "unhappy state of mind," Secretary Weeks told a news conference on June 4. They

(33) See Cable #775, Wood to SecWar, May 3, 1924, BIA Records 364-521; Cable # 800, Wood to McIntyre, May 22, 1924, BIA Records 4325-316; McIntyre to Wood, June 3, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-325; McIntyre to Wood, June 16, 1924, and July 8, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 173; BIA Memorandum, June 16, 1924 and Confidential letter, McIntyre to Frank R. McCoy, September 19, 1924, both in Records of the US High Commissioner; Memorandum for SecWar, November 3, 1924, BIA Records 4325-337.

(34) See Statement of the Philippine Mission, BIA Records 364-528; also Manila Times, June 5, 1924.
had come to the United States for the purpose of securing action from Congress but this they had not done. As a result, he said, their political future was in jeopardy, and they were endeavouring to divert attention from their failure by activity at the two conventions. (35)

The Republican Convention opened in Cleveland, Ohio, on June 10, and the Mission sought the inclusion of a Philippine independence plank in its platform. The Mission, through Senator Osmena, also voiced its opposition to the rumoured attempt of the Party to endorse the administration of Wood, which move would be "unjust" to both the party and the Filipinos. (36)

A formal petition for independence was filed with the Committee on Platform and Resolutions of the Party, requesting that body to include in its platform "a declaration that the time has come to grant Philippine independence." It cited official utterances of Republican Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft promising independence to the Filipinos, and the pledge contained in the Jones

(35) See Press Conference of Secretary of War, June 4, 1924, BIA Records 4325-A-8. These comments were off the record -- not for publication.

(36) The rumour brought about the publication of Osmena's criticisms of Governor Wood in Cleveland. See address by Sergio Osmena in Cleveland, June 10, 1924, in BIA Records 364-532; also Manila Times, June 13, 1924. Osmena was particularly anxious that General McIntyre write to Wood to explain the conditions under which his critical comments were made and his regrets at having been forced to criticize Wood in his absence. See BIA Memorandum, June 16, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner. See also Letters, McIntyre to Wood, June 20, 1924 and July 8, 1924, in Wood Papers, Box 173.

Osmena's address at the Democratic National Convention was entirely free of criticism of Governor Wood. See BIA Records 364-538-A.
Act, passed by Congress in 1916 by both Republican and Democratic vote, also promising the Philippines its freedom "as soon as a stable government can be established therein." The petition pointed out that the Filipinos had already organized a stable government, "one which is elected by the suffrages of the people, supported by the people, capable of maintaining peace and order and observing international relations. This, together with unparalleled progress in all lines makes the government so established more firm and secure." The petition ended with the statement that "the granting of independence should not be deferred any longer. The vital interests of the Filipinos demand it. The good name of America requires it."(37)

The Republican Party ignored the petition of the Mission, and instead inserted in its platform the following Philippine plank, credited to Secretary Weeks:

The Philippine policy of the Republican Party has been and is inspired by the belief that our duty toward the Filipino people is a national obligation which should remain entirely free from parties and politics.

In accepting the obligation which came to them with the control of the Philippine Islands, the American people has only the wish to serve, advance and improve the conditions of the Filipino people. That thought will continue to be the dominating factor in the American consideration of the many problems which must inevitably grow out of our relationship to the people.

If the time comes when it is evident to Congress that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines with respect to both their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and the Filipino people then desire complete independence, the American Government will gladly accord it. A

(37) See BIA Records 364-with-532 and BIA Records 364-538-A.
careful study of the conditions in the Philippine Islands has convinced us that the time for such action has not yet arrived. (38)

Clearly, this platform was nothing more than an endorsement of Republican policy as enunciated by President Coolidge and Governor Wood. On analysis, it consists of, first, the reiteration of the Republican platform of 1912, with the addition of certain statements taken from the letter of President Coolidge to Roxas on February 21, 1924. (39)

The Democratic Party convention held in New York from June 24 was more responsive to the requests of the Philippine Mission. A memorial on Philippine independence was likewise submitted by the Mission through Senator King to its Committee on Platform and Resolutions. The memorial reminded the Democratic Party of America's pledge of independence to the Filipinos and summarized

(38) See Radiogram, June 19, 1924, McIntyre to Wood, in Wood Papers, Box 20. See also Manila Times, June 19, 1924; New York Times, June 12, July 1 (editorial), August 5, 1924. Quezon reportedly found the platform satisfactory and as nearly as possible in accordance with Filipino hopes. See BIA Memorandum, June 16, 1924, Records of the US High Commissioner. The American Chamber of Commerce Mission also presented a platform on the Philippines along the lines of the territorial government theory that they had been advocating, but the Republican party did not adopt this. See copy in Wood Papers, Box 170.

(39) Personal and confidential letter, McIntyre to Wood, July 19, 1924, in BIA Records 4325-after-329. On July 4, 1924, the Mission also submitted a memorial on independence to the Committee on Resolutions of the Conference on Progressive Political Action, also requesting that a plank be included in its platform declaring itself unqualifiedly in favour of immediate and complete independence for the Philippines. See BIA Records 364-with-532 and BIA Records 364-532-A. The Philippine question did not become an issue in this presidential election campaign.
briefly the improvements and progress made by the Philippines under Filipino self-rule. It then requested the party to insert in its platform "an unequivocal declaration that the time has come for the American people to redeem their pledge and grant the Filipino people their independence."(40) Thus, the Philippine plank of the Democratic platform read:

The Filipino people have succeeded in maintaining a stable government and have thus fulfilled the only condition laid down by Congress as a prerequisite to the granting of independence. We declare it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them immediately the independence which they so honorably covet.

There was no date fixed for independence, but the party called for independence within the four years of a successful Democratic Administration.(41)

The Mission was particularly anxious to get something more to bring home. So Quezon and Osmeña decided to proceed to Europe. In Berne, Osmeña observed the proceedings of the Twenty-second Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, ostensibly to prepare the grounds for the admission of the Philippines as a national

(40) Memorial, June 24, 1924, BIA Records 27669-80.

(41) BIA Records 264-after-534; see also Manila Times, June 26, 29, 30, 1924.

The American Chamber of Commerce (Manila) delegation was also present in New York. Their purpose was to oppose an independence plank in the Democratic platform and to again propose a territorial government for the Philippines. See New York Times, June 23, 1924.
group.(42) In Geneva, Quezon made an official visit to the League of Nations, but no attempt was made to interest the League in the independence question.(43) On September 16 Quezon and Osmeña returned to the United States from Europe, and they sailed on the 29th for the Philippines, Recto remaining in Washington for some time.

The Third Parliamentary Mission easily qualifies as one of the most memorable in view of the dramatic developments attending its return to the Philippines. Shortly after its return, a bitter struggle broke out between the Nacionalista and Democrata leadership over the Fairfield Bill. The efforts by Quezon and Roxas to tailor their account of their activities in the United States to fit their perceived political needs resulted in a confrontation unprecedented in the history of the independence movement.

The leaders of the Mission returned from Washington separately — Roxas on July 11, Quezon and Osmeña on October 23, and Recto on November 11. The earlier arriving Nacionalista leaders, desirous of explaining why they came empty-handed, suggested that it was because they had withheld their support from the Fairfield Bill.

On October 24, Quezon, acting as spokesman for his colleagues, rendered an unofficial report on the Mission's activities at a banquet to welcome him and Osmeña. Though giving only the briefest

(42) Manila Times, August 24, 1924.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union is an organization composed of delegates from various legislative bodies the world over. It was founded before World War I, in the interests of peace.

(43) Ibid., September 14, 1924.
mention of the Fairfield Bill, Quezon did claim that when the Administration offered the Fairfield Bill as a compromise measure, the Mission, though recognizing that it represented real progress, had stated that they could not support it. Without Mission support, Administration support was withheld, thus dooming the bill. Quezon reported the conversation with Secretary Weeks and President Coolidge thusly:

... 'No. We cannot support the Fairfield Bill! If you can have it passed, go ahead. We will talk later as to whether we like it or not.' We were told that our approval was necessary before it could be approved by Congress. 'No, no!' we answered, 'we shall be very old after 25 years.' And because we refused to commit ourselves, the Administration refused to do anything in favour of the bill.

The Mission, according to Quezon, then did all it could for the King Bill in the Senate and the Cooper Bill minus its amendments in the House, both providing for immediate independence. Action was not taken, according to Quezon, because Congress adjourned.

Quezon paid tribute to minority leader Recto who, he said, acted in a non-partisan manner while with the Mission. "We never decided anything without his consent or approval. His vote decided our attitude on any question and I must say his vote was inspired always by patriotic and not partisan motives."(44)

Recto upon his return recounted the Mission's achievements in somewhat different terms. At a banquet in his honour on November 11, the day of his arrival, he recounted in straightforward fashion

(44) See Roxas' statement upon arrival in Manila, ibid., July 20, 1924; Quezon's speech, ibid., October 26, 1924 and Philippines Herald, October 25, 1924.
the dilemma which confronted the Mission upon presentation of the Fairfield Bill.

We found ourselves in a terrible alternative -- the Fairfield Bill or nothing. After a long deliberation, the Mission decided to accept the bill in view of the fact that the Republican Administration was not inclined to give more than what it was willing to concede in the Fairfield measure. The members of the Mission agreed to shoulder any responsibility that might be brought about by their acceptance of the bill and to abide by the opinion of the people regarding it.

Because the Secretary of War was adamant, Recto continued, the Mission had finally been forced to accept even the Commonwealth period of twenty-five years, though only on condition that the bill be passed during that session of Congress. The Secretary of War had promised to do everything he could for its approval, though no assurances were given that Congress would actually pass it. The next day the Secretary of War issued a statement that the Mission had accepted the Fairfield Bill.(45)

There was no question of Recto's support for the actions of the Mission in endorsing the Fairfield Bill. He believed that immediate and complete independence could not be expected while the Republicans were in power, and therefore the increased autonomy promised in the Fairfield measure was better than nothing.


That the Mission accepted the bill, albeit half-heartedly, was revealed by an eyewitness in Washington at that time -- Vicente Bunuan -- in January 1932. See Philippines Herald, January 22, 1932.
Recto displayed considerable courage and personal integrity in proceeding with such frankness, considering that it was generally assumed that popular sentiment in Manila was against the long preparatory period provided for in the bill. (46) Having arrived only that day, it is also likely that he had not studied Quezon's speech and thus did not know that he was out of step with the other Mission members.

Although Recto's banquet speech was non-accusatory, endorsing the Mission's actions, Quezon, Roxas, and Osmena reacted strongly. Apparently fearing that Recto's characterization of their actions as acceptance of the Fairfield Bill would leave them in an embarrassing position because of their claim that they had not accepted the bill, Quezon, Roxas, and Osmena issued a heated statement the next day, November 12. Describing Recto's account as "manifestly inexact assertions and unjust insinuations," they accused Recto of "partisan expediency." (47)

The resulting controversy came to a head in a November 18 meeting of the Independence Commission called to receive the report of the Mission. The meeting had been preceded by several days of behind-the-scenes negotiations, as a result of which it had been thought that a Mission report agreeable to all could be

(46) It was reported that legislative leaders were moving cautiously in relation to their attitude towards the Fairfield Bill, fearful of the effects which the endorsement of the bill might have on their chances at the coming general elections in June 1925. See Manila Times, November 11, 1924.

(47) Manila Times, November 12, 1924; Philippines Herald, November 15, 1924. See also in Quezon Papers, Box 77.
presented. (48) However, after hearing the report, Recto took strong exception to it, triggering a protracted six-hour debate. The lengthy Mission Report not only maintained that the Mission had declined to accept the Fairfield Bill but also asserted that it had protested against the approval by the American government of Governor Wood's administration in the Philippines. (49) Recto declared that what the Mission had actually done was just the opposite: they supported the bill and promised cooperation with Governor Wood. (50)

Recto also made the following interesting revelations: (1) that Roxas, who preceded the Mission in Washington, was already in understanding and negotiation with the Administration leaders about the Fairfield Bill when Quezon, Osmena, and Recto arrived; (2) that

(48) Philippines Herald, November 15, 1924; Manila Times, November 17, 18, 19, 1924.

It is interesting to note that before Recto's arrival in Manila on November 11, Representative Vicente Sotto (Democrata, Cebu) presented a resolution requesting a meeting of the Independence Commission to receive the report of the Mission. Quezon said he had no objection to this except that it would be unfair to Recto — it would show "lack of courtesy and attention" towards him — were the report made in his absence. See ibid., October 28, 1924.

(49) Philippines Free Press, November 22, 1924, p. 6.

(50) Manila Times, November 19, 1924; Philippines Herald, November 21, 1924.

In April 1925, while in the United States, Insular Auditor Ben. F. Wright wrote Governor Wood that Charles Swift of the New York group had the Philippine Mission on his houseboat at the time of their visit in the United States and "everyone of them promised by all that is holy he would support the Fairfield Bill before Congress as well as get the support of Weeks and McIntyre." Wright did not explain where he got this information. See his letter to Wood, April 19, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 179. See also Norbert Lyons' article in Manila Times, September 19, 1924. Manila Times, November 19, 1924; Philippines Herald, November 21, 1924.
the Mission accepted the Fairfield Bill in principle, and in fact had signified its readiness to receive the bill by presenting amendments to the bill; (3) that the Mission asked its friends in Congress to secure the passage of the bill; (4) that it requested the Democrats who were displeased with the compromising attitude of the Mission not to oppose the bill, if they could not support it; (5) that the Mission sent confidential instructions to the Independence Commission in Manila to work to get the support of leading Filipinos and the people for the bill; (6) that the newspapers were requested to be silent if they could not favour the bill and one of them, in fact, publicly supported the measure; (7) that Senator Enage, president pro-tempore of the Senate during Quezon's absence; Jaime C. de Veyra, technical adviser to the Roxas Mission; and Arsenio Luz, chairman of the Committee on independence funds, all political supporters of Quezon; gave declarations in the press in favour of the bill; and (8) that the Secretary of War, after the acceptance of the bill by the Mission, gave a statement to the American press claiming that the Mission not only accepted the bill but had abandoned the demand for immediate independence in favour of ultimate independence, and to these embarrassing declarations, the Mission had failed to respond.(51)

To document some of these charges, see the following: Quezon to T.M. Kalaw, June 10, 1924; Kalaw to Quezon, June 2, 1924, in Quezon Papers, Box 46; La Vanguardia, May 16, 1924, for Enage's statements; also May 31, 1924, for editorial. See New York Times, May 27, 1924, and Manila Times, August 11, 1924, for Weeks' statement.
Recto further charged that some of the cablegrams supposedly sent from Washington by the Mission regarding their attitude on the Fairfield Bill were in fact "manufactured" by the Independence Commission in Manila.\(^{(52)}\) And to top it all, Recto showed that Senator Osmeña, after attacking the administration of Wood at the Republican Convention in Cleveland, called at the Bureau of Insular Affairs and tendered an apology, stating that he was forced to do so by "uncontrollable circumstances."\(^{(53)}\)

Recto particularly took the majority leaders to task for their agreement to cooperate with the Governor General. The cooperation with Wood, he declared, had been agreed to during sessions with Secretary Weeks and General McIntyre from which he was excluded, and without consulting him.\(^{(54)}\)

\(^{(52)}\) Manila Times, November 16, 1924.

\(^{(53)}\) See supra, footnote # 36.

\(^{(54)}\) Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas specifically requested that discussions on matters relating to the adjustment of relations with Governor Wood be conducted without the presence of Recto, to which request the Secretary of War and McIntyre acquiesced. Recto was thus excluded from conferences held on May 10, 12, 15, and 17, 1924. See BIA Memoranda, May 5, 12, 15, 19, 1924, in Records of the US High Commissioner.
As cooperation with Governor Wood had indeed been discussed in Washington between the War Department and the majority leaders, Recto hit on a very sensitive nerve. Quezon had agreed to discuss terms of cooperation with Wood, though he had emphasized that it would be almost impossible to pass the laws to implement them. Quezon and Osmeña, in their final interview with the Secretary of War on September 18, had promised the Secretary that they would make every effort to agree with Governor Wood on pending questions and to bring about the functioning of the government without friction, even as they complained that it might be impossible to cooperate with Wood, for what the Governor General really desired was not cooperation but "subserviency." Quezon felt honest cooperation would really be difficult, because he was convinced Governor Wood desired to eliminate him and was striving to build up an opposition party centered around Aguinaldo and his revolutionary colleagues or the Democrata Party. Moreover, on October 23, shortly after their arrival in Manila but before Recto's return, Quezon and Osmeña had paid a call on Governor Wood, and both leaders had expressed themselves as anxious to cooperate and had requested an early conference on measures which were before the Legislature.

(55) See BIA Memorandum, May 5, 1924, ibid. See also BIA Records 4325-310 1/2 for a plan to bring about an end to the controversy with Wood, drawn up for Quezon by McIntyre on May 10, 1924; and McIntyre to Wood, July 8, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 173 and in BIA Records 4325-329.

(56) See Confidential letter, McIntyre to Frank R. McCoy, September 19, 1924, in Records of the US High Commissioner. Quezon felt honest cooperation would really be difficult, because he was convinced Governor Wood desired to eliminate him and was striving to build up an opposition party centered around Aguinaldo and his revolutionary colleagues or the Democrata Party.

(57) See Wood Diary, October 23, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 21; Cable # 969, October 29, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 4325-335.
In the immediate aftermath of his banquet speech Recto had heatedly stated that he had confidential documents which, if it were necessary to prove his honesty and the accuracy of his account, he would reveal. This he did in the Independence Commission meeting. The documents were from the Bureau of Insular Affairs files and included two letters from McIntyre to Wood on the Mission's stand on the Fairfield Bill and on cooperation with the Governor General. (58)

(58) The letters were written by McIntyre to Wood on June 3 and July 14, 1924. The June 3 letter related the May 17 conference between the Mission and the Secretary of War when Quezon, as spokesman for the Mission, agreed to support the Fairfield Bill. The July 14 letter said that Quezon and Osmena had assured the Secretary of War and McIntyre that they would cooperate with Governor Wood as soon as they returned to Manila "for the sake of the public good." See Philippines Free Press, November 22, 1924, p. 11.

These letters were shown by Recto to Governor Wood prior to making them public. He informed the Governor General that he got the documents in Washington. Wood advised Recto not to publish them, but Recto felt he would have to if he was attacked by the majority leaders. See Wood Diary, November 13, 14, 15, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 21; Confidential cable # 985, November 15, 1924, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 4325-388.

Recto may have obtained these confidential communications from a Filipino employee in the Records Room of the Bureau of Insular Affairs who returned to the Philippines on the same boat with Recto. The Filipino employed at about that time was J. Topacio Nueno who was a student in Washington, D.C.. See BIA Memorandum, March 17, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-890.

Nueno wrote The Dilemma of the Fairfield Bill (Manila, 1925) wherein he gave the definite impression that he knew what transpired in Washington and was in possession of pertinent documents, but he did not document his sources.

According to Wood's Diary, Recto's documents were secured from a Louis V. Carmack, a clerk in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, who secured them from McIntyre's office. This information came from a certain Mr. Dimayuga, who apparently "at times has brought up valuable information," to Wood's aide, Col. Duckworth-Ford. See Wood Diary, November 19, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 21.
Quezon's role in the controversy was markedly different from that of his young lieutenant, Roxas, who had already been the target of a great deal of criticism for his performance in the United States prior to Quezon and Osmeña's arrival. Quezon exerted efforts to bring Recto to subscribe to the majority report, even to the point of amending it to acknowledge that the Mission had promised to defend the Fairfield Bill if it was definitely made into law. He stated that the controversy hinged on mere "interpretation of facts," since the Mission did not accept the bill a priori but promised to support and defend it after its passage. In this way, he stated, the attitude of the Mission might have been interpreted as having accepted the bill.

He quoted extensively from his testimony during the House hearings on the Fairfield Bill, reading the following passages:

... I think I have plainly stated our position. If you can not get the Cooper bill, as originally presented, or any other similar bill, enacted into law, and you can pass some other measure that would give us complete home rule, even the Fairfield bill, with some amendments, I say, to use slang, go to it.

I would like 25 years better than 30, 20 better than 25, 15 years better than 20, 10 better than 15, 5, better than 10 and so on.

(59) In fact the Independence Commission meeting, originally scheduled for November 17, was postponed for a day as the four leaders conferred to settle amicably the controversy in connection with the Mission's attitude toward the Fairfield Bill. It was reported in political circles that Recto had agreed to join the majority leaders in reporting the Mission's work in the United States on condition that Recto did not have to subscribe to what Speaker Roxas had done before their arrival in Washington. It was also hinted that the report being prepared would show that the Mission did not oppose the Fairfield Bill but that it was forced upon its members. See Manila Times, November 17, 18, 1924.
I still maintain that we should be granted immediate independence; therefore, if you mean to ask me if I prefer the Fairfield bill to an immediate independence bill I would say 'no.' (60)

The commonly accepted verdict on Recto is that he was motivated by partisan political considerations in not subscribing to the majority report on the Mission. However, to fully evaluate Recto's actions, one must also consider the role of Roxas. For while Quezon differed with Recto primarily as to whether the Mission's actions should be characterized as "acceptance" or "non-acceptance," Roxas launched a personal and vitriolic attack on Recto.

Attacking Recto for presenting the confidential documents, he declared that "decency and ethics" required that they should not be disclosed in public and declaimed: "Blind partisanship, thou art a heartless beast!" Shouting that Recto's alleged declaration that the Mission had supported, accepted, and worked for the Fairfield Bill was an "absolute falsehood," the Speaker insisted that he and his colleagues had stood firmly for "immediate, complete, and absolute


The main defense offered by the majority members for their endorsement of the Fairfield Bill was a subsequent ingenious explanation that they wanted the bill debated on the floor of Congress and once there, they hoped that the Cooper Resolution would be substituted. See Manila Times, December 21, 22, 1924; March 1, 1925; see also Manila Daily Bulletin, May 11, 1925, in BIA Records 4325-A-24.

Quezon claimed later that he did not reply to Recto's charges (on cooperation with Wood) because the majority leaders were deliberately avoiding any new provocation for further misunderstanding with the Governor General. This was done apparently to show the Governor General that they were trying to deal fairly with him, hoping Wood would reciprocate in courtesy and ease the situation in Manila. See Quezon to Secretary of War, date missing, probably March 1925, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.
independence." He claimed they had refused a compromise because "we were then sure of a Democratic victory in the coming general elections."(61)

The upshot of the six hours of debate was that Recto adhered to his initial rejection of the report, and by a strictly party vote the Nacionalistas adopted the majority report in toto, praising the majority members of the Mission for their work in the United States and characterizing as "discreet and patriotic" their attitude in "declining to support the Fairfield Bill." By a unanimous vote, the Commission passed a resolution reiterating the aspirations of the Filipino people for immediate, absolute, and complete independence.(62)

Although Recto's report was rejected by the majority, considering the unprecedented embarrassment to the majority leaders, the document had, in considerable measure, increased the standing of Recto and the Democratas.

Because of the controversy, Quezon had gotten himself in a position where he was no longer willing to support the Fairfield Bill as he had agreed to before he left Washington. Expected


(62) Ibid., p. 6.

A third resolution asked the Mission to report as soon as possible on the expenditures of the Mission. Quezon explained that until the vouchers he requested from the Press Bureau in Washington were received, a complete financial report could not be rendered.

See report of the Mission's expenses, in Manila Times, January 7, 8, 1925. The statement of expenses was not accepted by the Democrat's members of the National Collection Committee, Representatives Gregorio Perfecto and Alfonso Mendoza, on the ground that it was incomplete and unaccompanied by vouchers.
discussions between Wood and the Filipino leaders on a satisfactory solution to the political relations between the two countries also never really materialized. (63) Quezon and the Nacionalistas resumed their policy of opposition to and non-cooperation with Governor Wood. (64)

The row over the Fairfield Bill and the performance of the returned Mission members, committed to an "insincere opposition" to the bill because of political expediency and partisan interests, pretty well killed the chances of future congressional and Administration action on independence or autonomy. The Filipino leaders had displayed a lack of anxiety to secure immediate independence, and members of Congress who had supported Filipino independence lost their keeness for the enterprise. (65) Legislation

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(63) See Cable # 800, Wood to McIntyre, May 22, 1924, BIA Records 4325-316; McIntyre to Wood, June 3, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-325; McIntyre to Wood, June 16, 1924 and July 8, 1924, in Wood Papers, Box 173; BIA Memorandum, June 16, 1924 and Confidential letter, McIntyre to Frank R. McCoy, September 19, 1924, both in Records of the US High Commissioner; Memorandum for Secretary of War, November 13, 1924, BIA Records 4325-337.

(64) See Report of the Governor General, 1925, pp. 3-4; see also Manila Daily Bulletin, in BIA Records 364-A-691, where Quezon defined the Nacionalista policy in their opposition to Governor Wood.

Governor Wood noted, however, that there had been a marked change in the tone of some Filipino newspapers. They seemed more rational and inclined to recognize evident defects in insular conditions and politicians. He named the Philippines Herald (now under Roces management), La Vanguardia, La Defensa, and El Debate. See Wood Diary, October 8, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 21.

for greater autonomy was unappealing without Filipino support, and when Congress met after the November elections for its short second session, no further action was taken on the Fairfield Bill. (66) Congressional interest in either independence or increased autonomy was gone.

On November 15, 1924, shortly after the elections were over, the Washington Administration shelved Philippine legislation with Secretary Weeks' declaration that

"The development of public opinion on the [independence] question in the islands has not reached a point, as understood here [in the United States], where it is believed the Philippine leaders are able to make any conclusive showing that the whole people favor the project." (67)

The election of President Coolidge conclusively ended all remaining prospects for independence legislation and confirmed Governor General Wood in his powers and prerogatives.


Apparently Guevara had not yet received his orders from Manila to "shut up" about the Fairfield Bill. See Manila Times, December 18, 22, 1924.

When Guevara returned to Manila on April 21, 1925, Quezon was among those who welcomed him at the pier, and he reportedly instructed Ramon Fernandez to inform Guevara to refrain from commenting on the Mission's work in the United States. Quezon was reportedly displeased with Guevara's earlier statement advising the Filipinos to exercise self-control and prudence in this most critical period of their political history. See ibid., April 21, 1925.

Guevara denied that Quezon had restrained him from commenting on the Mission's work in America. See Philippines Herald, April 22, 1925.

(67) Manila Times, November 17, 1924.
In retrospect, the Third Parliamentary Mission was a glaring failure. Yet it need not have been so. If the majority leaders had been less concerned with their own political fortunes and had been prepared to advocate what they really wanted -- increased autonomy -- and not what they professed -- immediate independence -- the Fairfield Bill could have been enacted.

It would not have been an insurmountable task to have switched goals and explained honestly to the people that the Filipinos could work out their destiny towards full independence under the terms of the Fairfield Bill. For after all, there is very little question that the Fairfield Bill was a major concession from a Republican Administration that was traditionally opposed to a grant of early independence. It was a considerable advance towards self-government -- Quezon, in fact, admitted it was better than the Jones Law -- and it fixed a date for independence, a step never before taken by the Administration.

Had the Filipino leadership supported a bill continuing American sovereignty for at least twenty-five years along the lines of the Fairfield-Johnson bills, and thereby gained Filipino public support, the Coolidge Administration would have gone along, and there seems little question but that there would have been no significant opposition to its passage.(68)

(68) See Cable, McIntyre to Wood, May 17, 1924, BIA Records 4325-after-312; also "Notes on the Philippine Islands" by Frank McIntyre, December 1925, BIA Records 7519-33 1/2; and BIA Records 4325-478.
Nobody really expected the Mission to come home with a law granting immediate independence. Thus, had the Mission returned with the Fairfield Bill, it could have sought popular endorsement by demonstrating that it was the best measure obtainable under the circumstances. The Fairfield Bill could have been presented as "a step forward" — another "political blessing" — on the way to ultimate independence.

Why did the Filipino leaders not seize the opportunity presented to them in 1924? In part, it may have been the rapid pace of events. When Roxas departed for Washington in November 1923, few would have supposed that self-government, let alone immediate independence, was within reach. Thus, when Roxas in late March sought Quezon's guidance on the possible introduction of Administration-supported compromise legislation, Quezon's decision to join Roxas was undoubtedly motivated in part by a desire to more accurately gauge the situation than was possible from telegraphic reports.

Had the Parliamentary Mission not been despatched, and had the leaders sought to develop a local consensus in favour of the compromise legislation, they might well have been able to announce Philippine support in time for passage of the Fairfield Bill that year.

To have achieved independence on the basis of the Fairfield Bill would have meant that all parties would have had to cease using Philippine independence as a political issue. Quezon, wanting credit for the passage of whatever legislation passed, was unwilling
in Washington to accord equal status to Recto, and equally unwilling in the Philippines to run the risk of abruptly abandoning his advocacy of immediate independence.

Quezon took what he calculated to be the safe course, gambling that the Filipino people would accept autonomy without his having to risk his position by too abrupt and forceful an advocacy. That the gamble failed seems attributable as much to wounded pride and intemperate language in the heat of argument as to deliberate intent.

So the opportunity was lost for an early solution to the Philippine issue. Congressional interest in Philippine independence would not be revived again until the Great Depression in 1929. And after the return of the Mission, the majority leaders would witness under the Governor General moves towards lesser, rather than more, autonomy. Unhappily for the Filipinos, Wood had the full support of Washington. Insular politics dictated that the independence campaign continue, but there was a marked change in tone -- the fiery independence rhetoric of before was gone -- and once Wood passed from the scene, an amicable and temperate attitude was assumed.

Viewed from an historical perspective, it was the Third Parliamentary Mission which ensured that there would be no Philippine autonomy or independence legislation during the period of Republican dominance of American politics. As it turned out, independence came to the Philippines no later, and no earlier, than it would have had the Fairfield Bill won Filipino approval, but when
it came, it came under quite different circumstances.

Thus, it was the failures of 1923-1924, not the near success, which made it the most memorable in the history of the Philippine independence movement.

The results of the immediately preceding events were reflected in the general elections of June 1925. The campaign began with the Fairfield Bill as a central issue. The point debated was not whether the Fairfield Bill ought to have been approved, but whether the majority leaders had actually favoured and worked for the measure during their stay in the United States in 1924. Both the Nacionalista Consolidado and the Democrata leaders went to the electorate armed with arguments — the Nacionalistas to prove that following the instructions of the Legislature to work for immediate, complete, and absolute independence, they did not accept the Fairfield Bill, and the Democratas to show that the Mission, disregarding the instructions, accepted and supported the Fairfield Bill which would have fixed a period before the granting of independence. The issue gained an initial advantage for the Democratas, who placed the Nacionalistas on the defensive.(69)

Broader issues of politics and government were also ventilated in the exciting campaign. The Democratas lashed at the Nacionalista leaders with a series of damaging accusations: that they had

(69) Manila Times, March 1, 1925; Philippines Herald, March 1, May 7, 10, 20, 29, 1925. See Recto vs. Guevara on the Fairfield Bill, in ibid., May 1, 1925; Manila Times, May 6, 1925. It is interesting to note that while the Democrata leaders were inclined to make the Fairfield Bill the election issue, the Nacionalists leaders preferred to focus the campaign on a sweeping view of the whole political situation.
promised to have Governor Wood removed but instead had turned their promised policy of non-cooperation into a policy of submission (citing the Osmeña apology to Wood); that the Nacionalistas, through undertaking business enterprises, had cost the country millions of pesos of irreparable loss through inefficiency and dishonesty in their management (citing the Philippine National Bank scandal); that Quezon, Roxas, and Osmeña had no effective plan for carrying on the independence campaign in the United States; that they had in fact delayed independence because they had failed to devote their attention to the welfare of the people.(70)

On the other hand, the Nacionalistas charged the Democratas with "cringing submission and illicit alliance with the almighty stranger" (Governor Wood) in an "imperialistic movement" to curtail Philippine autonomy and endanger the realization of an independent political existence. They declared that if the people voted for Democrata candidates they voted to disgrace their country.(71)

(70) Philippines Herald, May 9, 10, 20, 29, 1925.
Under the presidency of General Venancio Concepcion, a revolutionary general and a protege of Osmeña, the Philippine National Bank, created in February 1916 and acting as a fiscal agent of the Philippine government, nearly caused the total breakdown of the currency system and the bankruptcy of the government through excessive and questionable loans. Concepcion, who was president from March 1918 to November 1920, was subsequently sent to jail for misuse of bank funds. See Stanley, op. cit., pp. 232-248.

(71) Philippines Herald, April 29, May 10, 20, 29, 1925.
The Democratas had demanded that the Council of State be abolished and the doctrine of separation of governmental powers be more strictly adhered to, two issues also insisted on by Governor Wood. See Hayden, op. cit., pp. 343-344.
Probably the most significant campaign waged during the elections was that in the fourth senatorial district, comprising the City of Manila and the provinces of Rizal, Laguna, and Bataan. The Democrata candidate was Juan Sumulong, the same man who was defeated in 1923 by Ramon Fernandez following the Cabinet Crisis. The Nacionalista standard bearer was Ramon Diokno, a prominent Manila lawyer, backed by Quezon.

Sumulong ran on a platform of "more business and less politics." He frankly opposed the agitation for immediate independence and repeatedly asserted that economic independence must precede political independence, a stand which his opponent branded "a reactionary proposition, an obstructionist measure, and a step backward in the path of our immediate freedom." (72)

To the surprise of the Nacionalistas, Sumulong won a signal victory over Diokno, and the entire Democrata ticket in the fourth district was elected with him. Sumulong's victory was probably a reflection of dissatisfaction with Quezon's leadership and Nacionalista politics, although some saw it as an endorsement of the Wood Administration also, for it was openly claimed by his opponents that Sumulong was favoured by Governor Wood. (73)

(72) Manila Times, April 27, 1925; Philippines Herald, April 29, May 9, 10, 1925.

(73) Throughout the campaign, rumours circulated that Quezon was having pretty hard sledding to maintain his domination of the Senate. It was bruited about that Quezon's "downfall" was imminent and that Osmeña was "coming back". Osmeña denied this rumour. See ibid., March 13, 20; May 27, June 20, 1925; see also BIA Memorandum, January 30, 1925, Records of the US High Commissioner.
In general, the elections of 1925 gave the Nacionalista Consolidados a clean-cut victory, increasing their plurality in the House and keeping their control of the Senate, as well as giving them a majority of the gubernatorial posts. But the Democratas scored a remarkable gain in the Senate and also won in the Tagalog provinces around Manila, thus solidifying their position as a strong and effective opposition party. In a sense, Quezon was the only loser in the elections, for he failed to elect the candidates in the districts in which he was the chief campaign manager. Both Roxas and Osmena brought in the candidates in the districts assigned to them. (74)

The Nacionalista victory gave the party a new lease of power and granted to its leaders a ratification of popular confidence "to carry out [the party's] policies and to discharge its powers and

Quezon did retain his position as Senate President for the third consecutive term, probably largely because Osmena refused to challenge him for fear of splitting the party. He won by the closest vote since the organization of the Senate in 1916, defeating his rival, Democrata Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona by a vote of 12 to 8.

In the House, Manuel Roxas was re-elected Speaker over Democrata Claro M. Recto by a vote of 57 to 21, although the Speaker faced a rebellious House showing outright hostility against him. His critics thought Roxas lacked the maturity and attributes that go to make a good leader. The "insurrectionists" were led by Representatives Manuel C. Briones (Cebu), Quintin Paredes (Abra), and Benigno Aquino, Sr. (Tarlac). There were thus four formidable blocs in the House, antagonistic to each other, within the ranks of the majority party, all engaged in a keen rivalry for the speakership. Quezon denied dissensions within the Nacionalista Party and blamed the press for what seemed to be an impending split in the party. See Manila Times, July 17, October 6, 7, 9, December 8, 1925.

responsibilities in the government." Emboldened, both Quezon and Roxas issued statements after the elections which indicated that their controversy with Governor Wood had not been forgotten. Roxas expressed the hope that the Nacionalista Party would be able to carry out the mandate of the people "unchecked by undue executive interference and unhampered by destructive opposition" (referring to the Democratas). Quezon interpreted Nacionalista victory as a "command" on the part of the people not to yield "one inch in the stand we have taken in defense of the rights of our people."(75)

With the elections behind them and the Nacionalistas confirmed in power, the leaders took stock of the political situation and concluded that decisive action should be taken on two important matters: first, how to proceed in their controversy with Governor Wood; and second, what to do next with regards to the independence campaign apparently stalled since the return of the Parliamentary Mission in 1924.

(75) Philippines Herald, June 7, 1925. Speaker Roxas had been especially bitter in his attacks on Governor Wood during the election campaigns. See for example, Manila Times, April 13, 1925.

For the entire session of the Seventh Legislature (until November 1925), Quezon and Roxas found their leadership within their own party quite shaky, with their orders defied and disobeyed by their followers. The "rebellion" in the majority ranks was ostensibly caused by the fear of the rank and file that Quezon and Roxas were playing a double game with them and Governor Wood. Both leaders were defied in the choice of the resident commissioners to Washington. Isauro Gabaldon and Pedro Guevara were re-elected. Quezon did not want Guevara re-elected because he apparently had lost confidence in him. Some legislators accused Quezon of trying to assume their power and privilege to elect the commissioners. See ibid., October 27, November 2, 4, 9, 10, December 8, 1925.
CHAPTER VII

THE "CRISIS" CONTINUES: THE OSMÉÑA LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, 1925-1926

The chasm created by the Cabinet Crisis of 1923 was never really bridged during the remaining years of Governor Wood's administration.(1) The major issue remained the delineation of executive and legislative powers, or the autonomy of the Filipino people versus the powers of the Governor General as the representative of American sovereignty.(2)

Quezon complained to the Secretary of War that the Governor General had shown the same, if not increasing, disregard for the powers and prerogatives of the Legislature, even as, he claimed, the Legislature had ceased to interfere with the executive functions of the government. The Governor, he said, did not seem anxious to come together with the legislative leaders or to meet them halfway in spite of what they thought was a conciliatory and cooperative attitude on their part.(3)

(1) However, Governor Wood repeatedly noted in his diary and correspondence that personal relations between him and Quezon remained cordial in spite of their differences on public policy. See, for instance, Wood Diary, November 3, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 22; also Wood to Benjamin Strong, September 15, 1925, ibid., Box 178.

(2) Manila Times, August 12, 1925.

(3) Quezon referred to the intolerable situation in Manila and the "abuses" and "insults" the leaders had had to suffer from American officials. He pointed out that Governor Wood had assumed supreme direction and control of the administration of the government and had stopped consulting department heads prior to presentation of legislation. On top of that, Wood had used the powers of his office to support the opposition Democrata
The veto power of Governor Wood, in the eyes of the Filipino leaders, was being excessively exercised, "on the most flimsy motives."(4) Governor Wood's veto record showed the following: From October 16, 1923 to February 8, 1924, the Sixth Philippine Legislature passed 217 bills and concurrent resolutions, out of which 46 were vetoed, the bills not having been presented until after the adjournment of the Legislature so that, Wood commented, conference with a view to modification or correction of errors was impossible. In the first session of the Seventh Legislature in 1925, twenty-four out of seventy-two bills passed were vetoed; and in the second session in 1926, the Legislature passed 122 bills, out of which 44 were vetoed.

Nearly all vetoes, Wood reported, were due to serious defects or unconstitutional provisions. This unsatisfactory condition was largely due to the rushing through of a large number of bills during

Party. See Quezon's letters to McIntyre, March 14, 1925, in Quezon Papers, Box 46; letter dated March 28, 1925, in BIA Records 3038-137; and his letter to Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis (who succeeded John W. Weeks, who resigned due to ill health), June 16, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 174.

Quezon overstated their so-called conciliatory and cooperative attitude towards Wood. Quezon and Osmeña were indeed disposed to cooperate with Wood by the time they left Washington in September 1924, but the row over the Fairfield Bill nullified that. Certainly, after the June 1925 elections the policy was decidedly non-cooperation with the Governor General.

Governor Wood thought Quezon's statements in his letter to the Secretary of War were "unwarranted," "absurd," and "entirely misleading and not in accord with facts." See Personal and confidential letter, Wood to SecWar Davis, October 8, 1925, ibid.

(4) Manila Times, January 27, February 1, 1925. They resented particularly Wood's veto of several important items of the appropriations bill pertaining to the Legislature.
the last hours of the session, without opportunity being given for their careful consideration. This delay, Wood maintained, occurred every year and often prevented desirable legislation from being approved. In some instances, Wood was convinced that the Filipino leaders deliberately showered him with impracticable legislation to draw his vetoes and thus give them fresh opportunity to charge him with "despotism."(5)

The Filipino leaders were also severely distressed by the actions of the Insular Auditor, who was constantly trying to find unconstitutional laws affecting the disbursement of government funds. The Auditor, they felt, had acted deliberately to embarrass the Legislature rather than to enforce the law. Wright, they said, exercised an "extremely pernicious influence in this Government" and considered himself "bigger than the whole government of the Philippine Islands." Quezon hoped for a change in this state of affairs "that will permit us to loyally perform that duty with regards to the interests of our people and our self-respect."(6)


(6) Wright, it will be remembered, had disallowed expenditures on the one million peso independence fund and had even gone so far as to question the constitutionality or legality of the Independence Commission itself. Then he had proceeded to disallow the per diems and allowances of the legislators engaged in special committee work when the Legislature was in recess, and he had branded the practice of using them as "legalized robbery." See Manila Times, September 23, 1924; December 6, 11, 1925.
Another bone of contention was the appointment of Wood's Cabinet, which had to be confirmed by the Philippine Senate. It will be remembered that, after the resignation of the Cabinet in July 1923, the Governor had been unable to appoint a new Cabinet, except for the Secretary of the Interior, Felipe Agoncillo,(7) because the Senate had refused to confirm his recommendations. The undersecretaries had taken charge of the executive departments. This state of affairs continued as the confrontation persisted.

Quezon wrote General McIntyre that Wright, "with an exaggerated idea of the importance of his office, ... has abused his powers, has deliberately and without cause antagonized the Legislature and has even insulted the members of the Senate." See Quezon to McIntyre, March 14, 1925, in BIA Records 3038-136; Quezon to McIntyre, March 28, 1925, in BIA Records 3038-137; and Manila Times, September 29, 1925.

Secretary of War Davis in his letter to Wood of August 20, 1925, regretted that Wright had not exercised more tact and restraint in his relations with the Legislature and its leaders. See in Wood Papers Box 174.

(7) Felipe Agoncillo was the only Cabinet member confirmed by the Senate after the Cabinet Crisis and this only after having been interrogated by the entire body, during which he promised to respect the spirit and letter of the Jones Law as interpreted by the Filipino leaders, to obey the laws pertaining to Philippine autonomy, and to refuse to take any retrogressive step in national policy. See T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

Subsequently the relations between Agoncillo and the Legislature soured as Agoncillo appeared to run his Department (Interior) more in keeping with Wood's views than those of the Filipino leaders. The principal charges against him were that he had wilfully broken his solemn promise to the Senate to leave his post the moment the Governor General asked him to do anything contrary to the policy of Filipino participation in the government; that he had allowed the gradual change of administration in Mindanao from Filipino to American; and that he had counselled the Governor General that the latter's authority was supreme in the Philippines under the Jones Law. See Manila Times, August 9, 10, 11, September 29, 1925.

Wood considered Agoncillo "most unselfishly loyal." See Wood Diary, August 10, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 22.
between Wood and the Filipino leaders.(8)

Osmeña had offered, confidentially, a proposition to Wood to resolve the impasse on Cabinet appointments. He suggested that the Governor General accept both Senate President Quezon and Speaker Roxas as members of his Cabinet, leaving Osmeña to become Senate President. Osmeña expressed a desire to cooperate with Governor Wood, but in return he wanted to re-establish the old Council of State which had become inoperative after the Cabinet Crisis, and to bring about a junction of executive and legislative authority. Wood thought Osmeña's proposition one of "cool cheek," desiring the Governor to assume the burden of keeping the Nacionalista Party together by taking care of Quezon and thus leaving Osmeña free to carry out his policies. He thought the proposition preposterous and totally rejected it. Wood thought Osmeña too obsessed with the idea of establishing a parliamentary form of government, which he considered undesirable and unworkable.(9)

At times both sides tried to find a means to end the Legislature's conflict with Wood. In his message to the Legislature on June 16, 1925, Governor Wood had urged the necessity of


(9) See Wood Diary, July 8, 13, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 22. Osmeña apparently emphasized to Governor Wood his "strong dislike of Quezon." He also claimed he would not force his election as Senate President, so as not to divide his party. See Cable # 211, Wood to Coolidge, September 14, 1925, ibid., Box 174.
"maintaining the distinct line of demarcation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government." "This is absolutely necessary," he emphasized, "in order that the form of government we have here may function harmoniously and effectively and the rights of the people be preserved." He had then called for cooperation and said: "The problems which confronts us... can only be solved successfully by all branches of the Government working in harmony. To this end I again bespeak your cooperation in our mutual efforts for the welfare of the Filipino people, especially for the enactment of constructive legislation for the economic development of the country."(10)

Quezon, as spokesman for the Filipino leaders, assured Governor Wood of "complete and unconditional cooperation" in whatever was good for the Filipino people. But it was obvious the Filipino leaders wanted cooperation that would advance Filipino participation in the government, and among their conditions was the organization of a Cabinet based upon the choice of the Legislature, and restoration of the Council of State to give effect to a closer relation between the Executive and the Legislature.(11)

(10) Manila Times, July 17, 1925. Wood repeated his plea for "sincere cooperation" at a luncheon he gave for the members of the Philippine Legislature on August 2, 1925.

(11) Philippines Herald, June 21, 1925; Manila Times, August 2, 1925. See also Memorandum for BIA Chief from Pedro Guevara, received October 9, 1925, in BIA Records 3038-140-A.
Wood's offer of cooperation was not a surrender of any of his rights or prerogatives as Governor General -- he in fact maintained a firm insistence on his right to control and supervise the administration of the government, a right which the Filipino leaders were not willing to concede.

Wood wrote Secretary of War Davis that "the cooperation desired by the Legislature is a good deal like that demanded by the gentleman who holds you up at night and asks you to cooperate in the carrying out of his policy by holding up your hands. . . . What they really want is a degree of authority which the [Jones] law does not give them, and thus to secure all the authority they could at the expense of the executive authority."(12)

Rather than accept cooperation on the basis offered by Wood, the Legislature chose to again approach Washington when Washington took up the issue of the political status of the Philippines left undecided in 1924.(13)

(12) Wood to SecWar Davis, October 8, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 174.
(13) Philippines Herald, August 5, 1925, in BIA Records 27668-72; Manila Times, August 12, 1925.

Lest one gets the impression that the government was at a standstill because of the lack of cooperation between the American and Filipino elements in the administration, it should be pointed out that even Governor Wood himself reported that the Legislature had cooperated in the conduct of the government by enacting considerable legislation, confirming the great majority of appointments, passing the budget without substantial change, and making appropriations for public works and other improvements. See Report of the Governor General, 1925, pp. 3-4.
As for the campaign for independence, the struggle to advance the national cause and to keep the American people conscious of it had thus far produced scanty tangible results. What was probably most distressing for the Filipino leadership was the realization that the independence cause had suffered a setback because of their sorry performance in relation to the Fairfield Bill after the return of the last Mission to Manila. While the independence leaders obviously did not lose much ground at home (as the elections of 1925 had shown), the prospect for a favourable solution of the Philippine issue was probably seriously damaged in Washington, and not only with the Republicans, but perhaps also with their Democratic sympathizers. Hitherto, congressmen were inclined to take the claims of the missioners at face value. Now they had seen Quezon seemingly agreeing to one thing, then backing out, and still later explaining that the whole thing was merely a trick to substitute the Cooper Resolution for the Fairfield Bill once the latter got on the floor of Congress. By their actions, the Filipino leaders had bolstered the growing impression that they really did not want a solution to the Philippine problem, because they would then lose an issue with which they could win elections.(14)

The Filipino leaders were confronted, also, by a Republican Administration unalterably opposed to the granting of independence in the near future, as well as by a spirited campaign against their aspirations by American business interests working for permanent retention in order to have the opportunity to exploit their

(14) Manila Times, March 24, 1925.
country's natural resources for profit.

After the Fairfield Bill episode, the Republican Administration of President Coolidge reverted to its traditional Philippine policy, as expressed in Coolidge's letter to Manuel Roxas on February 21, 1924. Arguing that American rule was best for the Philippines because the Filipinos were not sufficiently educated in self-government and therefore were not to be trusted with the direction of their own affairs, the Coolidge Administration declared against immediate independence. The Administration contended that if independence were attempted at that time, it would result in economic ruin, political disaster, and a ruthless exploitation of twelve million people at the hands of either a comparatively small group of their own self-seeking politicians or of some other foreign nation (Japan was most frequently mentioned) that would promptly take over after the United States left. (15)

There was also an intensive campaign of anti-independence propaganda in the United States. Feeling that Congress could quite possibly still take action in its next session, the idea was to prevent a Fairfield Bill-type solution by presenting the "facts" of the matter to the American people — i.e., that the policy of drifting, which thus far had been American policy towards the Philippines, irritated the Filipinos, worked hardships on Americans

(15) See Letter, Judge L.R. Wilfley to Wood, February 17, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 179. See also in Wood Diary, July 9, September 27, 1925, ibid., Box 22; and Wood to Benjamin Strong, September 15, 1925, ibid., Box 178, for Wood's views. See also Edward Price Bell (Chicago Daily News) interview with Wood, July 12, 1925, in BIA Records 364-A-713 and Manila Times, October 11, 1925.
with interests in the Philippines, and greatly prejudiced the economic development of the country.

Behind this propaganda campaign was the American Chamber of Commerce (of the Philippines) Mission, which had set up a publicity office in New York City. The publicity work was aimed at generating special interest in the economic aspects of the Philippine situation, and propaganda was directed at various chambers of commerce in the big cities of the United States. Emphasizing the great resources of the Philippines and how important it was for the benefit of the Americans that the sovereignty of the United States should not terminate, the campaign asserted that what was needed was a positive declaration of American policy to stop the agitation of Filipino politicians for independence and to encourage American capital to develop the economic resources of the Philippines.

(16) The publicity office was directed by Norbert Lyons, former editor of the Cabelnews-American (A Manila newspaper), editor of the American Chamber of Commerce Journal, and editorial writer for the Manila Times. He wrote occasionally under the pseudonym of "Sergent Con."

The New York office was closed down on August 30, 1926, after it was decided that it had done all it could to bring Philippine economic and commercial resources to the attention of Washington. See Manila Times, September 1, 1926.

(17) See L.R. Wilfley to Wood, June 2, September 16, November 27, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 179.

As part of a two-pronged campaign in Manila and in the United States, Norbert Lyons suggested that Wood exercise initiative in Manila by way of patronage -- encouraging and rewarding those Filipinos who cooperated and thought with the majority of American opinion in the Philippines in favour of continued American sovereignty. In order to make this sort of thing effective, he felt that there must be the absolute, unqualified, and most thoroughgoing support of the Washington
alienate American sovereignty over the Philippines was the
legal argument with which the Chamber hoped to annul the efforts of
pro-independence advocates to have Congress grant the Filipinos
freedom to govern themselves.(18)

The propaganda campaign began with the publication of two
anti-independence tracts on the Philippines: Katherine Mayo, The
Isles of Fear (The Truth About the Philippines) and D.R. Williams,
The United States and the Philippines, supplemented by plenty of
newsprint in various magazines and newspaper in the United States.
Of the two tracts, Mayo's created a stronger impression in the
United States, and generally succeeded in arousing public antipathy
to withdrawal from the Philippines.(19)

Administration, without which the Filipinos who sympathized
with the American viewpoint would not have the courage to come
out with their inner convictions while in public office. Once,
however, the Washington and Manila Administrations were in
accord as to Philippine policy, it would not be long before the
great body of Filipino politicians would come into line. "They
would forget their independence agitation," he wrote, "and lose
their super-patriotism as the rising tide of ambition and greed
submerges their quasi-idealistic passions, which under the
present circumstances pay not considerable dividends in power,
prestige, pesos, and centavos." See Lyons to Wood, April 8,
1925, Wood Papers, Box 176.

(18) See Manila Times, December 1, 1925. This argument was
reportedly supported by, among others, Rep. Paul Lineberger
(Republican, California) and Senator Royal S. Copeland
(Democrat, New York).

(19) See Henry L. Stimson to Wood, March 12, 1925, Wood Papers, Box
178.

Some of the hostility against Governor Wood was also due
to the fact that the Filipinos felt that publications such as
Mayo's and Williams's were in part inspired by him and
represented his views.

The Mayo and Williams books received an answer from
Moorfield Storey and Marcial P. Lichauco, who wrote The
Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925
(New York, 1926).
Mayo had spent a few months in the Philippines, at the suggestion of Governor Wood, (20) at the end of which period she wrote the book for the purpose of presenting "accurate materials for the formation of opinion, not to influence judgment . . . as to the course that America should pursue toward the Philippines." The Mayo book was given wide publicity and was serialized both in the United States and in Manila. (21) The publication of the Mayo series was timed for the opening of Congress in December 1924, undoubtedly to prejudice the members of Congress against the consideration of an independence measure for the Philippines. (22)

(20) Wood to Katherine Mayo, January 29, February 12, 1923, Wood Papers, Box 165.

(21) The book was first serialized and syndicated in 32 of the leading newspapers in the United States, made possible by one of the largest corporations in the United States, with heavy foreign trade connections. See Ben. F. Wright to Wood, April 19, 1925, ibid., Box 175. Wright and Gardiner did not identify this corporation but referred to it only as "the real power" or "the number one man" in correspondence with Wood. The Manila Times ran the series from January to March 1925. This newspaper, as the organ of that segment of the American community in favour of retention, carried on the anti-independence campaign, often deriding the Filipinos for their love for freedom, ridiculing their ambitions as a nation, and representing their campaign for independence as an artificial agitation. Its editorials repeatedly charged the Filipino leaders not only with "brazen hypocrisy" but also with the serious crime of deceiving the American government and people and fooling their own on the question of Philippine independence. This newspaper "fuss and fury" began after the Cabinet Crisis in July 1923. Needless to say, the insulting comments on Filipino patriotism were extremely offensive to the Filipinos and probably contributed in no small measure to the continuing tension between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders. Oftentimes the antagonism and unfriendliness took on racial overtones.

(22) There were rumours that the Switzer-Pardee group (or the Fairfield "crowd") was resolved to attempt to put through another measure at the next session of Congress, similar to the Fairfield Bill of 1924. See L.R. Wilfley to Wood, February 17, June 2, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 179.
To the Filipinos, it was probably the most objectionable collection of "objective" observations written during that period, and they reacted bitterly to the Mayo articles. Not only did her observations reflect an anti-Harrison, pro-Wood, and anti-independence bias, but her language was provocative, as when she declared that Filipino politicians had indulged in "an orgy of destruction, decay, loot, bribery and graft" during the preceding Harrison administration. To the Filipinos, she was conducting "a malicious campaign of misrepresentation, exaggeration, and falsehood," designed to "blacken the character of the Filipino people and belittle their civilization, customs, culture, achievements, and progress."(23)

A more significant aspect of this publicity campaign was a quiet and carefully worked-out programme which had the knowledge and approval of Governor Wood. Using the facade of the publicity office of the American Chamber of Commerce in New York City, the programme


The Philippine Press Bureau in Washington was busy answering the Mayo articles. The Bureau reported to Manila that some American newspapers were not willing to print the Filipinos' answers to Mayo's charges, despite promises to do so. See Guevara to Quezon, Roxas, December 3, 1924; PhilPress Washington to PhilPress Manila, December 6, 1924, ibid., Box 138; PhilPress Manila, January 7, 9, 13, 1925; and Vicente Bunuan (PhilPress Washington) to Quezon, January 27, 1925, ibid., Box 46.

Some New York Filipinos held a protest meeting against the Mayo articles. See Manila Times, January 12, 1925.

Even Governor Wood later on expressed the view that the book might have been somewhat one-sided. See J. Ralston Hayden Notes, July 10, 1926, p. 17, in J. Ralston Hayden Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Box 33.
was backed by powerful corporate organizations with extensive business interests in Asia. The moving force behind this plan included Insular Auditor Ben. F. Wright, William Howard Gardiner (the "big navy" publicist), Judge L.R. Wilfley (former Attorney General of the Philippines under Governor William Howard Taft), and Benjamin F. Strong (Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank), all friends and/or sympathizers of Governor Wood who shared his views on Philippine policy.\(^{(24)}\)

The ultimate goal of this group was to bring Washington around to what they considered a more mature understanding of the Philippine situation, with a view to getting the necessary legislation from Congress to put the Philippine administration on a stable basis. They were convinced that the "Fairfield Bill crowd" was motivated by utterly selfish motives and was entirely deluded in thinking that the passage of a bill promising independence in twenty years or so would end, or even slow down, the political agitation in the Philippines for immediate independence.

They viewed the Philippine issue in terms of America's over-all interests in Asia, and in this were reminiscent of turn-of-the-century imperialists, arguing in terms of Far Eastern trade, "manifest destiny," maintenance of stability in Asia,

\(^{(24)}\) This group was not terribly impressed with the "lack of caliber" of Norbert Lyons and John W. Hausserman of the American Chamber of Commerce Mission, and so they were not privy to their important plans. See B.F. Wright to Wood, April 18, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 179; see also W.H. Gardiner to Wood, May 14, 1925, ibid., Box 175; Wright to Wood, Radio, May 15, 1925, ibid., Box 179; and Gardiner to Wood, January 2, 1926, ibid., Box 180.
strategic needs, and fear of a Japanese take-over were the United
States to free the Philippines from American control. In their
opinion, the United States had in the Philippines "a vantage ground
of great strategic value for safeguarding our future trade and
political relations with the Orient." The future of the United
States as a world power, they claimed, depended upon the solution of
the "Oriental" problem -- "this is the century of the Pacific" --
rather than European problems. The key to the whole situation, they
felt, depended on the United States holding the Philippines
permanently, thereby laying the groundwork for domination of the
Pacific commercially by the United States. Moreover, they argued,
under American protection and leadership the Philippines would be "a
tremendous force in Christianizing the Orient and in establishing a
western type of civilization."(25)

The group began by requesting Wood to transmit to them his
views on what should be done. They asked him to spell out his
outlook on the future and the steps that the Government should take.
Once Wood's views had been received, the group would then seek to
influence public opinion throughout the country to support the
ultimate views and immediate procedures that Wood had suggested.
They foresaw success in this venture because of the hardening of
public opinion on American withdrawal from the Philippines and an

(25) See Ben. F. Wright Memorandum for President Coolidge: Re:
The Philippine Problem, May 10, 1925, in ibid., Box 179 and in
Coolidge Papers, Reel 127. See also Wright to Wood, April 16,
1925, in Wood Papers, Box 179; Wood to Coolidge, September 16,
1925, ibid., Box 174; Wood to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord
(President, RCA, New York), August 10, 1925, ibid., Box 170;
Wood to B. Strong, September 15, 1925, ibid., Box 178; Wood
to Nicholas Roosevelt (New York Times), July 23, 1925, ibid.,
Box 178; Wood Diary, July 9, 1925, ibid., Box 22.
increasing public appreciation of Wood's difficulties in the administration of the Philippines. (26)

Wood provided his views on several essentials for a satisfactory Philippine policy. In his opinion, the Organic Act of 1916 (or the Jones Law), with certain amendments, was adequate to carry out "the altruistic and practical ideas of the American people as expressed by Congress." Amendments were needed, however, to minimize conflicts with the Legislature, especially in the matter of the confirmation of appointments. The most important, from the standpoint of strengthening the power of control and supervision of the Governor General were: (1) the appointment of the Secretaries of Departments without confirmation by the Philippine Senate; (2) the appointment of officers of the Constabulary (the military force for enforcement of law and order) and the governors of the non-Christian provinces without confirmation by the Senate; (3) the extension of the veto power over appropriation bills to include any item or items, section or sections, proviso or provisos, or parts of the same; and (4) a provision making American citizens eligible to appointment to any position or office under the Philippine government. (27)

(26) B. F. Wright to Wood, April 19, 1925, ibid., Box 179; W.H. Gardiner to Wood, May 14, 1925, ibid., Box 175; Wright to Wood, April 16, 1925, ibid., Box 179.

(27) Wood to B. Strong, September 15, 1925, ibid., Box 178; Wood to Coolidge, September 16, 1925, ibid., Box 174; Cable # 352, Wood to Sec War, March 2, 1926, ibid., Box 189; Wood to Coolidge, September 27, 1925, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 127.
Wood recommended the permanent continuation of American sovereignty, with the power of control and supervision in the hands of the Governor General, clearly defined. With this power clearly spelled out, insular autonomy could be as extensive as the progress and loyalty of the people would allow. (28) But there should be no further extension of autonomy, he insisted, until the Legislature and the people had accepted in good faith the provisions of the Organic Act and had shown capacity and fitness by constructive legislation and full cooperation.

World conditions, Wood pointed out, had rendered it absolutely impracticable for the United States to abandon the Philippines. Wood felt that the Filipino leaders realized this and would not object to a public declaration premised on this basis, not on the ground that independence was being withheld because they were

Wood expressed these views publicly in an interview with Edward Price Bell of the Chicago Daily News; see interview in Manila Times, October 11, 1925. In that interview, he declared that the United States should retain the Philippines indefinitely, as America's work had just begun. Although the Filipinos were potentially capable of self-government, he felt that it would take from 50 to 100 years to transform such potential into actuality. See also Wood Diary, August 10, September 27, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 22; and Wood to General Frank R. McCoy, August 4, 1925, in McCoy Papers, Box 20.

Wood sent the draft of a bill along the lines suggested by him to President Coolidge, through Representative Robert Bacon (Republican, New York), who had visited Manila. See Wood Diary, September 16, 1925, Wood Papers Box 22; also Manila Times, December 23, 1925.

(28) In case it was necessary to give some further extension of autonomy in the near future, Wood suggested that the next step should be the appointment of a sub-secretary of Public Health, with the intention, if performance and conditions warranted, that he eventually be made Secretary of Public Health, thus creating a new department with a Filipino Head.
impotent and weak. (29)

Believing that American public sentiment was not generally supportive of Philippine independence, the group hoped to influence President Coolidge and the Secretary of War to come out for affirmative action by Congress. Legislation could be introduced in Congress in the December (1925) session, looking to an amendment of the Jones Act to restore complete executive control of the Philippine government to the Governor General in Manila. (30)

(29) As early as August 1923, shortly after the Cabinet Crisis, Wood had offered some of the same changes to the Jones Law to the War Department. See Wood to McIntyre, August 3, 1923, BIA Records 3038-112-A; see also Cable # 775, May 3, 1924, Wood to Weeks, BIA Records 364-521.

Wood expressed his views on independence to Quezon and Osmena early in August 1925. To both of them, he said he thought the best policy of the United States would be to announce permanent retention and then proceed to give the Filipinos the largest degree of autonomy consistent with the maintenance of sovereignty and proper supervision over debt-making and foreign relations. Quezon apparently thought that if this was worded in the proper way, it would be accepted once understood. See Wood Diary, August 4, 10, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 22.

(30) L.R. Wilfrey to Wood, September 16, November 27, 1925, ibid., Box 179.

Up till now, Wood had withheld his ideas as to the proper solution of the Philippine problem and had hesitated to explain real conditions, as he saw them, through official channels because he felt that Secretary Weeks and General McIntyre did not share his views. Wood never gave his recommendations to perfect the Fairfield Bill, as he was requested to do in 1924. He had sensed an undercurrent of opposition in the mind of Secretary Weeks and therefore had been very cautious in his dealings with him. The Secretary's attitude, he felt, was largely attributed to the influence of McIntyre who, he felt, had minimized shortcomings and covered up many things in Washington which were his fault as well as the fault of the system of handling colonial affairs. See Cable # 617, April 3, 1924, McIntyre to Wood, BIA Records 364-after-506; Wood Diary, October 8, 1924, Wood Papers, Box 21; BIA Memorandum, January 30, 1925, in Records of the US High Commissioner; Norbert Lyons to Wood, April 18, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 176; and B.F. Wright to J.C. Welliver, White House, May 13, 1925, Confidential, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 127.
The Filipino leaders were fully aware that they faced a grave crisis in their struggle for independence. But they were somewhat uncertain as to the steps to take. There was very little doubt in their minds that there should be no let-up in the campaign for political freedom, despite seemingly adverse circumstances and formidable opponents, but sending another mission to the United States might be a futile move in view of the known stand of the Coolidge Administration. Moreover, the Democratas opposed the sending of a mission, and suggestions were made that perhaps it would be wiser to send as Resident Commissioners to Washington men of top caliber who could act and assume responsibility without having to consult Manila. Perhaps it would be best if Quezon or Osmena could go to Washington. Neither one, however, was enthusiastic for the post. (31)

Coolidge was apparently cognizant of the fact that Wood had not received the full and loyal support in Washington that he thought he merited, and he was going to see that Wood got it without undue delay. See B.F. Wright to Wood, April 16, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 179.

The group's plan also included retiring Frank McIntyre as BIA Chief and transferring colonial affairs from the War to the State Department. They also thought it would be good if Wood could return to the United States on home leave and confer unofficially with the President and some members of Congress. Wood felt, however, he could not return unless specifically invited by the President to do so. Secretary Weeks was reportedly against his return, unless he was retiring from his post in Manila, which Wood had no intention of doing. Wood's friends thought the Secretary's objection was due to his fear that the Governor's presentation of the situation in the Philippines would not reflect credit upon the Secretary's administration of Philippine affairs. See B.F. Wright to Wood, April 16, 1925, ibid., Box 179; Wright to Welliver, May 13, 1925, Coolidge Papers, Reel 127.

(31) Manila Times, July 2, 31, August 4, 5, 6, 7, 1925.
In the end, the Legislature decided to send another delegation to Washington. A Legislative Committee (32) was authorized, jointly with the Resident Commissioners, "to confer with the Washington government regarding Philippine questions and to work for the definite solution of the Philippine problem." Senator Sergio Osmeña, president pro-tempore of the Senate, was elected special envoy to the United States. (33)

Accompanied by a small staff, he left Manila on August 22, 1925, arriving in Washington on September 19, two months before the opening of Congress in December, to prepare the ground for the more

(32) Fearing "unwarranted obstruction" by the Insular Auditor in the payment of the expenses of the mission, the Nacionalista leaders decided to call it a "Committee of the Legislature." In that way, the Committee would be entitled to spend the US$50,000 item in the appropriations bill allowed the Legislature in presenting petitions to Congress. See ibid., August 6, 9, 1925; also Cable # 975, November 6, 1924, Wood to SecWar, in Wood Diary, Wood Papers, Box 21; also in Manila Times, December 8, 9, 1924, for information on the approval of this item in the appropriations bill.

(33) Sergio Osmeña was also delegated to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in Washington, D.C. and Ottawa, Canada, in October 1925, as the representative of the Philippines.

Governor Wood vetoed funds for Philippine membership in the Inter-Parliamentary Union and strongly recommended to Washington that Osmeña attend the conference as a member of the American delegation and not as a representative of the Philippine government. See ibid., December 8, 1925; Cable # 222, September 28, 1925, from Governor Wood, Sergio Osmeña, Personal "P" file, pt. 1 BIA Records; also in Wood Papers, Box 175.

The Philippines, for the first time, was represented in an international conference of this character. On October 3, 1925, during a discussion of the report on the codification of international law and on the subject of the rights and duties of nations, Osmeña had an opportunity to present the Philippine case. See PhilPress Washington to PhilPress Manila, September 31, October 2, 21, 1925 in Quezon Papers, Box 46; PhilPress Manila to PhilPress Washington, September 23, 1925, ibid.; "Osmeña Mission Report," September 3, 1926, in Manila Times, September 15, 1926.
intensive campaign to be launched with the opening of Congress. (34)
The Legislature sent Teodoro M. Kalaw, Executive Secretary of the
Independence Commission, with Osmeña, specifically to reorganize the
Press Bureau in Washington and possibly to open a publicity office
in Paris and elsewhere in Europe. There was felt the need to
strengthen the publicity campaign in the United States to counteract
the anti-independence propaganda there. (35)

(34) See Concurrent Resolutions No. 6 and No. 7, August 20, 1925,
in BIA Records 27668-75, and BIA Records 26480-97; Manila
Times, August 18, 20, 21, September 21, 1925; see also in
Official Gazette, XXIV, No. 28, p. 536; no. 29, p. 547.
    These resolutions were passed over the strong opposition
of Democrata solons Juan Sumulong and Teodoro Sandiko, who
declared that the sending of the Committee was untimely and an
unwarranted expenditure of public funds. See Manila Times,
August 20, 1925.
    The Osmeña Legislative Committee was also much criticized
by the American press in Manila which called for more work at
home rather than dispatching another mission again. See ibid.,
August 18, 20, 26, 1925.

(35) The staff of the Osmeña Legislative Committee consisted of
Francisco Zamora, secretary; Jose S. Reyes and Teodoro M.
Kalaw, Technical advisers; and Matias Gonzales, attache. See
ibid., August 21, 1925.
    The plan was to send Osmeña as the advance guard of the
Committee, and later Quezon and Roxas would join him in
Washington. But this did not take place, and so Osmeña stayed
alone in Washington for ten months. See Manila Daily Bulletin,
August 19, 1925, in BIA Records 27668-72-with; Manila Times,
September 14, 1925.
    Quezon's trip was called off and Jose Abad Santos was sent
instead in April 1926. Roxas's trip was postponed indefinitely
in March 1926. It was finally cancelled altogether due to
shortage of funds, although officially it was explained that
important matters in connection with the Board of Control
required Roxas' presence in Manila. Most likely the real
reason stemmed from the chaos that would presumably ensue with
his departure and the scramble for his post, which might
endanger the coalition that had been established in January.
See Manila Daily Bulletin, January 27, 1926; Manila Times,
March 3, 8, 1926. See also Quezon to Roxas, March 19, 1926, in
Eduardo de la Rosa Papers. (Eduardo de la Rosa was Sergio
Osmeña's secretary and whatever remains of his papers are now
in the hands of the family of Prof. Felipe de Leon, Jr. of
the Department of Humanities, University of the Philippines,
who graciously allowed me to examine them for this research.)
The Democratas did not join Osmeña, and were criticized for appearing opposed to the furtherance of the national cause. Explaining the minority party's decision, Senator Sumulong declared that the Democratas saw no justifiable reason for sending a committee to the United States at that time, believing that anything the proposed Committee could do in the United States could just as well be done by the Resident Commissioners in Washington. (36)

Aware that Washington was in a bad mood, the Nacionalista leaders decided on a change of tactics -- the Legislative Committee's orders were to work quietly and not to attract any attention. Thus, there were no specific instructions to work for "complete, absolute and immediate independence," and Osmeña was left with sufficient leeway to accept any concession that might be given the Filipinos by way of granting them a more autonomous government. (37)


The Democratas also tried to gain political mileage by bringing up again the unwarranted expenditure of funds which the Committee would entail and demanding explanations as to the "Liberty Fund" expenditures of the last Mission. See Manila Times, August 20, 27, 28, 30, 31, 1925.

Some Democratas suggested a novel idea -- that members of the Committee defray their own expenses from their own private fortunes. There was also talk that some Democratas would go to Washington as private citizens to work for independence.

(37) Ibid., August 21, 1925.

This time, the Democratas insisted that the instructions should be more specific, by inserting "complete, absolute and immediate independence." This attitude of the Democratas was obviously for political effect, for a month earlier, they were proclaiming that they would oppose the Mission if the object of the trip was to secure "complete, absolute and immediate independence," on the grounds that such an objective was futile at that time. They proclaimed that they would support the Mission if it were to go to fight for greater Philippine autonomy. See ibid., August 21, 1925.
In reality, Osmeña was not so much concerned with the independence issue as with the possibility of working out some arrangement which would resolve the controversy with Wood and confirm what the Filipino leaders claimed were certain commitments made by the Coolidge Administration in relation to the Fairfield Bill. Wood thought no commitments existed inasmuch as Washington did not receive assurances from the Filipino leadership that they would accept as satisfactory a bill along the lines of the Fairfield Bill. He strongly advised Washington against any commitments looking towards further autonomy or any change being made without his being able to present his opinions on the situation. (38)

Almost immediately after his arrival in the United States, Osmeña sought out an old friend, former Governor W. Cameron Forbes, to whom he conveyed what he thought should be the thrust of Philippine policy. What the Filipinos wanted, he said, was some new form of government, and also, support on the part of the Administration for a congressional resolution authorizing the Filipinos to call a constitutional convention, but avoiding any mention of a date for independence. This plan would give them further autonomy, as implied in the Osmeña-Quezon agreement with the War Department on the Fairfield Bill.

(38) Cable # 198, Wood to SecWar/McIntyre, August 31, 1925, BIA Records, 4325-345; Cable # 211, Wood to Coolidge, September 14, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 174; see also in BIA Records 364-561 and BIA Records 4325-346.
Osmena also put before the Administration, through Forbes, his earlier plan to harmonize the conflicting views of the Legislature and the Governor General concerning the powers of each so as to put an end to the constant friction between them. He advocated again the appointment of two or more heads of departments from the majority party in the Legislature. If this were done, the Board of Control could be abolished, and the Governor General could exercise executive powers connected with the government-owned corporations. (39) Forbes took it upon himself to bring Osmena's proposal to the attention of President Coolidge, Secretary of War Davis, and Governor Wood. However, the Administration felt it had no chance of being acted upon because aside from the fact that the Filipinos had failed to accept the Fairfield Bill, and therefore there was no existing agreement, the complexion of the House and the Senate had changed and there was no longer the same congressional mood in favour of independence. (40)

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(39) Osmena to Quezon, Roxas, November 6, 1925, in Quezon Papers, Box 46; Letter, McIntyre to Henry L. Stimson, June 16, 1926, in Stimson, "P" file, pt. 1, BIA Records.
Osmena also wanted Insular Auditor Wright replaced by some more tactful person. Wright had the habit of accompanying his rulings with somewhat of a "fanfare of trumpets and a good deal of publicity," which annoyed the Filipinos. See Forbes to Wood, December 21, 1925, January 28, 1926, in Forbes Papers.

Forbes urged that the Administration request the return of Governor Wood, and the Filipino leaders agreed that some kind of conference with Wood in the United States would help relieve the tense relations between him and the Filipinos. See Osmena to Quezon, Roxas, October 6, 1925; Quezon, Roxas to Osmena, October 27, 1925, both in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(40) Memorandum of interview, Forbes with President Coolidge, October 22, 1925, in Forbes Papers. See also Confidential cablegram, PhilPress Washington to PhilPress Manila, November 3, 1925, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.
However, Forbes felt the situation could still be turned to the advantage of Osmeña and to the benefit of the Administration. Forbes suggested to President Coolidge that Osmeña's hand could be strengthened in his struggle for political power with Quezon by allowing him to get some concession which he could then take home as an achievement which hopefully would assure his ascendancy. It was "good business and good politics," he said, to support Osmeña, who was a far more reasonable man to deal with than Quezon, and "in whose honesty of purpose and integrity we could rely."(41)

Osmeña's initial reports from Washington confirmed to the Filipino leaders what they had feared all along — that the work of the Legislative Committee would be difficult. Osmeña found that the Philippine cause was worse off than at any time since the beginning of the Republican Administration in 1921. There was no prospect, he advised, for consideration of any independence bill, while the introduction of what he considered reactionary legislation was imminent. The Administration and Congress, now controlled by a majority of Republicans in open and pronounced opposition to independence, had come to believe that the Philippines had retrogressed politically and economically. They were therefore thinking of restricting Philippine autonomy by withdrawing political

(41) Forbes thought Quezon "an unmitigated scoundrel, utterly devoid of any moral sense, personally a grafter and as unreliable as well could be conceived," as well as "financially unworthy." See Forbes interview with Coolidge, October 22, 1925, in Forbes Papers; also Forbes to Secretary of War Davis, December 14, 1925; Forbes to Coolidge, December 18, 1925, ibid.

Forbes urged both Secretary Davis and President Coolidge that some personal social attention be shown to Senator and Mrs. Osmeña. "An ounce of social recognition," he advised, "does more to please those people than a pound of political concession."
powers already exercised by the Filipinos, and thus strengthening the hand of the Governor General. Some felt it might be desirable to amend or repeal the Jones Act because the Filipinos had made it unworkable. But Osmeña thought that, while there was no prospect for independence, there could be sufficient support in Congress to prevent passage of any reactionary measure.(42)

Under these circumstances, Osmeña decided that a cautious attitude was essential instead of one of "provocation and antagonism." In fact, Osmeña urged the Legislature in Manila to reverse its position and line up for complete harmony and

(42) See Cable, Osmena to Quezon, Roxas, November 3, December 9, 1925, in Quezon Papers., Box 46. See also Manila Times, October 2, 1925. The Philippine Legislature passed a resolution asking Congress to leave the Jones Act alone. See ibid., November 10, 1925.

A movement was reportedly underway to support legislation to re-establish the Philippine government on a basis intended by the Jones Act, with the first step being to increase the powers of the Governor General. Representatives Robert L. Bacon (New York) and Charles Underhill (Massachusetts), both Republicans, were vocal in their support of this policy.

Congressman Underhill had expressed himself in favour of permanent retention of the Philippines for he felt, like Wood, that the United States needed the Philippines for industrial development and as a commercial outpost in Asia. He was reportedly planning to introduce an amendment to the Jones Law which would divest the Philippine Senate of its powers to confirm appointments made by the Governor General. See ibid., September 4, November 17, 24, 1925.

Underhill and Bacon had visited the Philippines in 1925 and both had been briefed by Governor Wood on the Philippine situation. Bacon had reportedly gone to the Philippines to look into the situation there in preparation for his duties as a member of the House Insular Affairs Committee (and there were unconfirmed reports that he had been asked by President Coolidge to make a confidential personal report of his trip to the Philippines). It was further reported that Bacon got himself on the committee from a desire to help Governor Wood in the Philippines. Bacon and Wood had known each other since childhood. See ibid., July 14, 1925; also Norbert Lyons to Wood, April 18, 1925, Wood Papers, Box 176; B.F. Wright to Wood, April 16, 1925, ibid., Box 179.
cooperation with Governor Wood.(43)

Whilst Osmeña felt that a cautious and conciliatory attitude should be followed, nevertheless, independence as a goal could not be abandoned. Following the suggestions of friends in Congress, and taking into account the delicate situation in Washington, the Legislative Committee presented a memorial in which Philippine independence was suggested with the utmost tact, without a direct demand, in order not to antagonize persons of influence in the Administration and in Congress not sympathetic to independence. On December 7, 1925, the memorial was submitted by Osmeña and Resident Commissioner Quevara. In a rather calm and restrained spirit, it reiterated Filipino aspirations for independence. It briefly reviewed the good faith of the United States with regards to the

(43) See Manila Times, November 8, 9, 1925. Osmeña's cable was supposedly read by Quezon before a majority caucus behind closed doors. When the news leaked to the press of the secret caucus, Quezon denied it on the Senate floor, but many legislators presumably confirmed it privately. Quezon declared publicly that no power on earth could make him change his policy of non-cooperation with Wood. As far as the Osmeña cablegram was concerned, Quezon did not tacitly admit nor deny that he got one from Osmeña. But he flayed at the Tribune (Filipino, independent) for revealing what he did not want publicly known.

Quezon was obviously unhappy with the conciliatory attitude being pursued by Osmeña in Washington. Instead of following Osmeña's advice to cooperate with Governor Wood, a legislative committee was created on November 9, 1925, to be presided over by Quezon and Roxas, to go to the United States to pursue a more vigorous campaign. On the same day, the Legislature passed a resolution asking Congress to grant the Philippines immediate, absolute and complete independence. See Concurrent Resolutions No. 16 and No. 24, November 9, 1925, in Official Gazette, Vol. XXIV, No. 32, p. 592; No. 35, p. 663. See also Manila Times, November 13, 25, 1925.

Neither leader actually went to the United States in 1925 or 1926, probably because of the shortage of funds as well as the shaky status of their leadership within the Legislature. See also Footnote 35.
Philippines and the progress made, with Filipino cooperation, concluding that the time had come for the United States to redeem its promise of self-government through the grant of immediate independence. After summarizing the achievements of the Filipino people since the inception of American rule, the memorial ended with the following almost "sweet" paragraph:

Twenty-seven years have elapsed since the American occupation, eighteen since the organization of our popular assembly; nine since the inauguration of our national congress and the establishment of autonomous government. During this whole period Filipinization of the public service ran hand in hand with the increase of political power granted to the people and the stability of the government was fully maintained. Would it not be only just to all elements collaborating in good faith in this enterprise that the American government now lend its attention to the Philippine problem and feel that the time has come to take the final step, redeeming thus a pledge so solemnly made? Only in this way may the interests of the two peoples who have undertaken a joint venture unequalled in our history be permanently secured.(44)

(44) Ibid., December 8, 1925; BIA Records 364-583 and BIA Records 364-565.

Osmena's measured tone in his memorial to Congress was criticized in some Manila quarters. But some Filipino newspapers defended Osmena's moderate and tactful appeal and praised him for his mature statesmanship. Interestingly enough, Osmena's prudence and caution were contrasted with Speaker Roxas' tactless and immature performance while in Washington in 1924, although Roxas was not specifically named. See editorials from The Tribune (Filipino, independent), La Vanguardia (Filipino, independent), and La Defensa (Catholic organ), in Manila Times, January 12, 13, April 11, 12, 1926.

When news was received in Manila of a "sudden affection" between Osmena and President Coolidge and their wives, a harsh note of censure arose, even contemplation of his recall for "betraying the Filipino cause in becoming too friendly with the 'enemy.'" Osmena was charged by an unnamed colleague in the Legislature with "purely selfish personal boasting" instead of campaigning for independence and with "bartering the Philippine cause for purely personal friendship" with President Coolidge. The Osmenas were invited to several social functions at the White House. This kind of social recognition was advice passed on to Coolidge and the Secretary of War by Forbes in October 1925. See Philippines Free Press, January 16, 1926, pp. 4, 32; Manila Times, January 11, 19, 1926.
Almost immediately, on December 8, President Coolidge delivered a message to Congress which confirmed Osmena's earlier judgement that the work ahead would be difficult. Coolidge recognized that the Administration had not adopted a very strong policy towards the Philippines -- undoubtedly one of the causes of the "disorderly spectacle" there between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders. So, following Wood's suggestions and in recognition of the drift in congressional attitude, President Coolidge recommended to Congress that the authority of the Governor General be increased, in order that he could carry out the programme of efficient government which the Legislature had sought to block with its non-cooperation policy. He said:

... Consideration should be given to the experience under the law which governs the Philippines. From such reports as reach me, there are indications that more authority should be given to the Governor General, so he will not be so dependent upon the local legislative body to render effective our efforts to set an example of the sound administration and good government which is so necessary for the preparation of the Philippine people for self-government under ultimate independence. If they are trained in these arts, it is our duty to provide for them the best there is. (45)

(45) See in Congressional Record., 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 1, p. 465; Manila Times, December 9, 1925.

The language used by the President in his message provoked doubts and comment as to its meaning and intent. Learning this, the President, in a subsequent interview with the press, explained that his intention was to propose that the Governor General, in the fulfillment of his administrative duties, should have more liberty to choose his own assistants, who should be civilians.
President Coolidge's recommendation constituted a serious reflection upon the efficiency of the Legislature and indirectly censured the Filipino leaders who had directed Filipino policy and activities with respect to participation in the government. The Nacionalista leaders had not only failed to advance the campaign for independence or to secure gains in political autonomy, but had invited a backward step because of their failure to cooperate "fully and effectively" with Governor Wood.\(^{(46)}\)

In order to secure Democratic support for Coolidge's recommendation, Representative Robert Bacon (Republican, New York) inserted in the \textit{Congressional Record} a letter which was written by then Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, to Governor Francis Burton Harrison, shortly after the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. The letter strongly urged Harrison to avoid relaxation of American authority in the Philippines and warned him in strong terms against

\begin{itemize}
  \item The Legislative Committee expressed to Administration officials in Washington the view that there was no need for assistants for the Governor General, whether military or civilian, for the Chief Executive should have full confidence in his department secretaries. Further, in case of special need, technical men could be temporarily employed to study and report, but not to exercise, administrative functions. See Osmeña, Guevara to Quezon, Roxas, cable, January 29, 1926; Osmeña to Quezon, cable, February 4, 1926, in de la Rose Papers.

\end{itemize}

\(^{(46)}\) The editorials in the Philippines Herald and the Tribune, both Filipino newspapers, for December 1925 were quite frank in denouncing the campaign performance in the past, which had not advanced the national cause due to several factors, among them irresponsible leadership, insincerity to the cause, the lack of an adequate and effective plan, and party squabbles and bickerings. Guevara in Washington was apparently often disgusted with the indecision and ambiguity which often came from Manila, especially from Quezon, and he conveyed his feelings to Teodoro Kalaw. See in T.M. Kalaw, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 210.
yielding to encroachments on his legal powers by the Legislature. These instructions were disregarded by Governor Harrison.(47)

The Coolidge recommendation contemplated action which would constitute the first backward step by the United States in its formal political relationship with the Philippines, reversing the traditional policy of gradual extension of governmental powers to the Filipinos. This certainly was not the solution to the Philippine problem desired by the Filipinos. Not surprisingly, the President's message was received very badly in Manila and created an outburst of protest there.(48)

Quezon was quite depressed by the Coolidge message and prospects for the future. He felt that the Administration, both in Manila and in Washington, had been dealing with the Filipinos not only unfairly, but worse, in bad faith. Governor Wood, he felt, could not be given any more powers than he already exercised, and if the Administration wanted to give him more powers, "they should be

(47) The letter had never before been published because the War Department would not authorize its publication. Bacon had hoped also that this letter from a Democratic Secretary of War might ward off any undesirable action by some of the Democrats in Congress. See Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 2, pp. 1381-1383; also W.H. Gardiner to Wood, January 2, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 180. The text of the letter was also published for the first time in the Philippines. See Manila Times, February 7, 1926.

(48) Some legislators urged the dissolution of the Legislature as a sign of protest against the Coolidge recommendation. Other leaders invited Filipinos to observe a two-minute silence during the Rizal Day celebrations on December 30, as a sign of protest. See ibid., December 16, 17, 1925.
frank and honest enough to do away with the Legislature altogether and establish here a military regime. This, at least, would have the merit of saving the money that is spent in maintaining the Legislature, and of squarely placing the responsibility of the government of the Philippine Islands exclusively in American hands. As it is, we are spending a lot of money for the expenses and salaries of the Legislature, and while we have no real power in the conduct of affairs of this government we are blamed for everything that is wrong and given no credit for whatever good there is." Quezon feared that the propaganda and publicity in the United States, intended to prejudice the American people and Congress against Filipino capacity and preparedness for independence, might have its effect on Congress.(49)

Consistent with his conciliatory attitude, Osmena recommended to the Independence Commission in Manila that action on the Coolidge message was not necessary immediately. This advice irritated the leaders in Manila, who felt that in view of the vigorous drive to have Congress approve the Coolidge recommendation and the persistent campaign waged by retentionists in the United States, a more aggressive plan of action was needed, this time directed at the American public. Osmena insisted, however, that in view of the delicate situation in the United States, a great deal of tact was required, for drastic steps would have the effect of lining up Republicans in Congress and precipitating undesirable action.(50)

(49) Quezon to General Douglas MacArthur, December 25, 1925, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(50) Osmena to Quezon, December 27, 1925; PhilPress Manila to PhilPress Washington, December 29, 1925; Philpress Washington to PhilPress Manila, December 31, 1925, all in ibid.
It was not until February 11, 1926, that the Commission of Independence answered the President's message and remonstrated against his proposal. It said:

... The measure proposed would be an unjustified reversal of America's policy toward the Philippines. It would take away rights already recognized and abridge autonomous powers already enjoyed. ... To concentrate the functions of government in the Governor General would suppress Filipino initiative and self-reliance and train them not for independence, but for perpetual dependence, not for popular government but for one-man rule.

The proposition, therefore, to further restrict the rights of our people to manage their own affairs will only serve to undermine their faith in what the future may bring to them. There is already among them a growing fear that mighty business interests may so mislead American public opinion as to result in the permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States. The Filipinos are thus beset with great anxiety and concern regarding the status of their aspirations for freedom. 

Quezon was extremely displeased with Osmeña's advice that he relax his hostile attitude towards Governor Wood. In a letter to Governor Harrison, he complained that Osmeña was far too conservative and was trying too much to please the Administration in Washington. He disagreed with Osmeña's thinking that the way to succeed was to bow to "our masters." Regretfully, he wrote that Osmeña should not have been sent to Washington but someone who would call a spade a spade should have been commissioned instead. See Quezon to Harrison, August 21, 1926, in Harrison Papers, Box 32; Harrison to Quezon, March 27, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(51) Manila Times, February 11, 1926.

Osmeña himself delivered an "indirect" reply to the President's message in a speech at the University of Michigan on December 14, 1925. The speech sought to trace the origins of increasing Filipino participation in their government, putting special emphasis on the impossibility of withdrawing steps already taken. See copy of speech, entitled "The Problem of Democratic Government in the Philippines." in Congressional Record., 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 1, pp. 1502-1512.
There was much congressional sentiment for strengthening American control and supervision in the Philippines. It was reported in Washington circles that Senator Frank Willis (Republican, Ohio), chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, and Representative Robert Bacon (Republican, New York), a member of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, were preparing a bill following Coolidge's recommendation. (52) However, neither Willis nor Bacon got around to introducing a Philippine measure following the presidential suggestion. (53) But Congress received a number of other bills which the Filipinos considered reactionary in character, as they would have meant increased American supervision of Philippine affairs and a lessening of Filipino participation in administration.

The Administration and Congress expressed the view that the intention of these bills was simply to organize the government of the Philippines to conform with the Jones Law as it had been intended to operate, as set forth in Secretary Baker's letter to Governor Harrison in 1916. (54)

(52) Manila Times, January 27, 28, 1926.

(53) Senator Willis later admitted that the only reason he was loath to prepare a bill granting the Governor General greater powers was because the latter already had ample powers under the Jones Act if he were allowed to use them. See ibid., February 23, 1926.

Bacon's failure to introduce his Philippine measure caused Nicholas Roosevelt to complain to Wood that Bacon was a "nice fellow and full of enthusiasm, but lacks weight, and has not sufficient importance of character or position in the House to enable him to put anything across." See Roosevelt to Wood, June 4, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 182.

(54) Manila Times, January 14, 1926.
The first of these bills was the Kiess Auditor Bill increasing the powers and salary of the Insular Auditor, who was, of course an American. It was introduced in April 1926. (55)

A statement given to the press said that this bill had no other object than to clarify certain existing legal provisions of the Jones Act. (56) To better create the impression that this was an innocent bill and that its sole object was to make uniform the system of auditing by making it conform to that of the United States, it was made to apply also to Puerto Rico. The supporters of the bill thought they could get by without holding hearings, believing that the bill could be passed unanimously in the committees.

(55) For H.R. 10940, introduced on April 6, 1926, by Edgar R. Kiess (Republican, Pennsylvania) -- a bill to amend and clarify existing laws relating to the powers and duties of the auditor for Porto Rico and the auditor for the Philippine Islands, see Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 6, p. 6791.

Senator Frank B. Willis (Republican, Ohio) introduced an identical bill in his Committee -- S. 3847. See ibid., p. 6840.

For H.R. 11617, introduced by Representative Kiess -- a bill to amend and clarify existing laws relating to the powers and duties of the auditor for the Philippine Islands, see ibid., pt. 8, p. 8261.

(56) Wood had urged strengthening the office of the Insular Auditor way back in 1924. See Cable # 738 to McIntyre, March 29, 1924, in BIA Records 4325-297.

There was speculation that this measure was proposed to counteract the earlier decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in which it was held in substance that in the interpretation of laws, the Auditor's rulings were subject to judicial review. See Manila Times, April 11, 1926; New York Times, September 23, 24, 1925.
To the Filipino leaders, the bill, however, was of great importance, and had it been passed, it would have radically increased the powers of the Insular Auditor, placing his decisions beyond the reach of the courts, and lodging in him a large degree of financial control over government finances.

The Legislative Committee immediately registered its strong opposition to the bill and asked for a hearing, which it was granted. (57) A Memorandum on the bill was presented by Senator Osmeña and Resident Commissioners Isauro Gabaldon and Pedro Guevara, on May 4, 1926, registering opposition to the bill and stating that, if enacted, it would provide additional sources of irritation between Filipinos and Americans and more obstacles to the establishment of harmony. (58)

(57) In the testimony during the hearings on May 10, the information was drawn that the original draft of the bill was that of Insular Auditor Ben. F. Wright. See Manila Times, June 7, 1926. See also BIA Records 4325-369 for record of hearings held in April and May, 1926.

The Philippine Legislature also passed an auditor bill, which was vetoed by Wood and subsequently repassed over his veto. The measure supported the Philippine Supreme Court ruling that the decisions of the Insular Auditor were binding only insofar as they affected the executive branch of the Government. It gave private parties the right to appeal to the courts when the Insular Auditor disapproved their claim or withheld action. See Manila Times, September 23, 1926.

(58) See Memorandum, May 4, 1926, on the Kiess Bill, submitted by Osmeña, Gabaldon and Guevara, in BIA Records 4325-376-A; and letter from Sergio Osmeña to Secretary of War Davies, May 4, 1926, BIA Records 4325-367. A memorial was submitted by Osmeña on April 20, 1926, opposing the increase of the salary of the Insular Auditor. See Manila Times, May 23, 1926.

See also Quezon to Osmeña, April 10, 1926; Osmeña to Quezon, Roxas, April 26, 1926; and Quezon to Osmeña, April 29, 1926, in de la Rosa Papers, for objections to the Kiess Bill.
When it was perceived that one of the Legislative Committee's principal objections was that the Auditor should not be above the judiciary, the supporters of the measure presented an amendment expressly granting to the Court of First Instance of Manila jurisdiction over matters which might be submitted to the Auditor, similar to the jurisdiction conferred by law on the Federal Court of Claims and the Customs Court of Appeals.(59)

Notwithstanding this amendment, the Mission maintained its opposition to the bill, first, because it tended to increase unnecessarily the powers of the Insular Auditor; second, because it did not assure adequate safeguards in the protection of the public funds; and above all, because it would curtail Philippine autonomy. For this reason, and probably as well because of solid Democratic opposition to the bill, in spite of the insistent efforts of its supporters, the bill, although favourably reported by the House Committee on Insular Affairs (on May 24) and the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions (on June 5), was not enacted into law.(60)

(59) See copy of bill bearing changes made at the Bureau of Insular Affairs, as prepared at the request of Senator Osmeña, in BIA Records 4325-w-363.

There was another bill introduced by Representative Kiess, on April 21, 1926, and sent to the House Ways and Means Committee -- the Internal Revenue Bill -- H.R. 11490 -- placing in the hands of the Governor General the disposition of the receipts from the internal revenue taxes collected in the United States on Philippine imports. The amount involved was approximately US$750,000 annually. This fund would be spent at the discretion of the Governor General for the improvement of public health and for the promotion of education and other general welfare work.

The arguments advanced in favour of this bill were, first, that the revenue referred to constituted a donation of the American people to the Filipino people, and therefore, it was only proper that the American Government should determine the manner in which it should be spent; second, that such disposal of the funds was necessary to meet public necessity, especially public health, leprosy treatment, education, and other emergency cases; and third, that such an arrangement would enable the Governor General to employ civilians instead of military assistants.


The idea for this was suggested by W. Cameron Forbes and Frank R. McCoy. See Memorandum of interview with President Coolidge, October 22, 1925; Forbes to Wood, December 21, 1925; January 28, 1926, all in Forbes Papers. The bill was reportedly endorsed by President Coolidge, who was anxious to rid the Administration of the Philippines of its military aspect, believing that army men were not as valuable as civilians in education, sanitation, and non-military activities. See Manila Times, June 6, 1926.

(62) See Osmeña to Quezon, Roxas, strictly confidential, May 22, 1926; Quezon, Roxas to Osmeña, May 23, 1926; Osmeña to Quezon, Roxas, June 6, 1926, all in de la Rosa Papers. See also Manila Times, June 6, 1926.
To the above arguments the Legislative Committee replied, first, that such funds were given at the outset as compensation for losses incurred by the Philippine government through the abolition of export duties which had been in force for many years; second, that the Philippine Legislature had been providing, to the limit of its capacity, funds for the promotion of education and public health; third, that the appropriation of funds was a legislative and not an executive prerogative; fourth, that the Legislature had granted the Governor General allotments greater than those given his predecessors; fifth, that up to that time the Philippine government had responded satisfactorily to all needs, including employment of expert services; and finally, that if Congress desired to consider such revenues as belonging to the American Government, the Philippines would prefer to renounce completely her rights to them, as the Filipinos could not permit that the powers and prerogatives they enjoyed be in any way curtailed.\(63\)

Governor Wood repeatedly recommended legislation along the lines of this Kiess Bill, as he had no funds for emergencies or for other constructive purposes. See ibid., May 27, 1926; Philippines Herald, June 29, 1926.

Wood wanted technical staff for his office and ample provision for a school for American children. Among the technical staff he wanted were a Department of Justice lawyer; an agriculture and natural resources expert; an expert in Banking and finance from Treasury or the Federal Reserve Bank; and an adviser on trade and commerce from the Department of Commerce. See Wood to Secretary of War Davis, November 20, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 184; also Wood Diary, November 10, 1926, ibid., Box 24.

(63) See Quezon, Roxas to Osmena, Guevara, Gabaldon, May 28, 1926, in de la Rosa Papers; see also Manila Times, May 30, June 7, 8, 1926.
The House Ways and Means Committee failed to report this Kiess bill, and the plan was not considered by that session of Congress. (64)

Senator Charles L. McNary (Republican, Oregon) and Representative Robert L. Bacon (Republican, New York) introduced bills in their respective chambers which would increase the salaries of the Chief Justice and members of the Philippine Supreme Court. (65) The bills were referred to the respective Committees on the Judiciary of Congress. The Legislative Committee notified both Committees of its objection to the proposed increases, not because of the increase themselves, but rather because they were being made without the previous approval of the Philippine Legislature. The proposed measures were never discussed in either of the Committees. (66)

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Quezon called on Wood on June 17 and on that occasion told the Governor General that the Legislature would be willing to provide funds to pay for such technical assistants as might be assigned to him and would prefer this rather than having funds made available in the Kiess Bill. Wood preferred that the matter be handled by Congress. See Wood Diary, June 17, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 24; Cable # 449, Wood to McIntyre, June 25, 1926, ibid., Box 189; Quezon to Wood, October 21, 1926, ibid., Box 181; Wood to Quezon, November 1, 1926, ibid., Box 181.

(64) Manila Times, June 16, 1926.

(65) Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 7, pp. 7279, 8019, for S. 3359, introduced on April 12, 1926, by Senator McNary and H.R. 11523, introduced on April 22, 1926, by Representative Bacon -- a bill to increase the salaries of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.

(66) "Osmena Mission Report", in Manila Times, September 15, 1926.
Shortly before the close of the main session of the 69th Congress, Representative Bacon presented his famous bill — H.R. 12772, introduced on June 11, 1926 — separating Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan from the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government and establishing for those regions a separate and distinct form of government directly under American sovereignty.(67)

Separation of the Muslim territory from the Philippine Government had actually been proposed as early as November 1923, when the American Chamber of Commerce of Mindanao and Sulu cabled the proposition to President Coolidge, proposing that the area be made an unorganized territory under the American flag.(68) But no action had been taken at that time.

Immediately after the presentation of the bill, the Legislative Committee expressed its determined opposition and requested a hearing. But the Bacon Bill was introduced too late to be


William Howard Gardiner claimed that the bill originated with him. See his letter to Frank R. McCoy, June 19, 1926, in McCoy Papers, Box 20.

Representative Bacon had requested David P. Barrows, former Director of Education in the Philippines and subsequently president of the University of California at Berkeley, to prepare a memorandum on the creation of a Moro territory. The memorandum was submitted on January 31, 1926. In his memorandum, the Governor of the Moro Province would be clearly under the jurisdiction of the Governor General in Manila. In the Bill that Bacon introduced, the Governor of the Moro Province would be appointed by the President of the United States and the territory would not be under the jurisdiction of the Manila government. See Barrows to Wood, February 7, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 180.

(68) See New York Times, November 19, 1923; also cable, November 14, 1923, Mindanao and Sulu American Chamber of Commerce to Calvin Coolidge, in BIA Records 364-469.
considered by the pre-election session of Congress, and serious
consideration was not thereafter given to it. (69) It was
re-introduced, with minor additions, as H.R. 15479, on December 10,
1926, during the succeeding rump session, which came after the
departure of the Osmeña Legislative Committee. (70)

Representative Bacon, in introducing the measure in Congress,
was supposedly motivated by several considerations, among which were
the following:

1. That the Moros are essentially a different
race from the Filipinos; that for hundreds of years
there has existed bitter racial and religious hatreds
between the two and that complete union of the
Filipinos under one government is distasteful to the
Moros, who would prefer a continuance of the American
sovereignty;

(69) It was generally known that Bacon introduced this bill even
after his Party had advised him to cancel his intentions. He
presumably introduced the measure at the close of the session
so that it might be studied before the next session of
Congress. He did so on his own, as Secretary Davis admitted
that neither Governor Wood nor the War Department had required
the bill's introduction. See Guevara speech, in Philippines
Herald, August 5, 1926; Cable # 226, June 19, 1926, McIntyre
to Wood, BIA Records 4325-371; and Manila Times, June 24,
1926.

(70) Governor Wood did not approve of the Bacon bill as introduced,
as it proposed to establish a completely separate government in
the Moro territory, responsible to the President and not to the
Governor General. He would much rather that the Moro territory
be under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government, with
the Governor General given a free hand in the appointment of
governors of the area without confirmation by the Philippine
Senate, as he had proposed earlier, bringing the Moros directly
under American control. See Wood Diary, June 17, 1926, in Wood
Papers, Box 24; also Wood to Nicholas Roosevelt, July 9, 1926,
ibid., Box 182.

President Coolidge did not categorically support the Bacon
Bill, although it was announced that he realized that friction
between the Christian Filipinos and the Moros might be
eliminated by such a measure. See Manila Times, June 16, 1926.

When Bacon re-introduced his bill on December 20, 1926, he
made the Governor General of the Philippines the immediate
superior of the Governor of the Moro Province. See
Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 68, pt. 1,
p. 794.
2. The terms of an agreement known as the Bates Treaty under which the Sultan of Sulu recognized for himself and his subjects the sovereignty of the United States and the protection of the American Government, in return for which recognition of certain rights was accorded to the Moro people;

3. The lack of true representation on the part of the Moros in the Philippine Legislature, their judges, prosecutors, and Constabulary being at the present time Filipinos, in contrast to conditions existing prior to 1913;

4. The claim that the public peace was duly preserved prior to 1913, but that subsequent to that time, and especially since 1916, ill feeling between Moros and Filipinos had increased leading to frequent conflicts and bloodshed.

In view of the long Muslim tradition of armed belligerence, it was difficult to give serious credence to the claim of the measure's proponents that their sole motive was "to protect these defenseless and unarmed, though proud and self-respecting Moros."

Against the Bacon bill the Filipinos registered their most vigorous opposition. A huge mass meeting of protest against the

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(71) Ibid., pt. 11, p. 12062. See Bacon's remarks, ibid., pt. 8, pp. 8830-8836. See also Manila Times, June 13, July 11, 1926.

(72) Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 11, p. 13089.

Resident Commissioner Guevara said that it was unfair for the advocates of the Bacon Bill to "imply that the Christian Filipinos deny their Moro brothers their rightful liberties." He suggested that Congress amend the Jones Law to allow the Moros to elect their own provincial governors and legislators.

(73) See remarks of Resident Commissioner Guevara, June 26, 1926, in ibid., pt. 11, pp. 12063-12066; see also his remarks, July 12, 1926, opposing the Bacon Bill and refuting Bacon's statements regarding the treatment of the Moros, in BIA Records 4325-A-42A.

For statements of Quezon and Democrata solons Emiliano Tria Tirona and Claro M. Recto, see Philippines Herald, June 13, 1926, in BIA Records 4325-A-34. See also editorials on the Bacon Bill, June 14, 1926, in several Philippine newspapers, ibid.
Bacon and the Kiess Bills, but particularly against the Bacon Bill, was held in Manila and elsewhere on June 27, 1926, the principal speakers denouncing the bills in the most bitter terms. (74) Even General Aguinaldo came out in opposition and sent a cable to President Coolidge requesting rejection of the measure "as a matter of justice" because it "hurts Filipino feelings." (75) And the Philippine Legislature, when it convened, expressed its "most decided opposition" to the enactment of the Bacon Bill and the other reactionary measures pending in Congress. (76)

Some segments of the Filipino population felt that the bill was inspired by the desire to effect a permanent occupation of the Philippines or a separation of one of the larger islands for rubber production. The sudden rise in the price of rubber had started a movement among rubber interests in America to have Congress open the Philippine public domain for the production of rubber in order to break up the British monopoly of this basic material. Bacon had


(75) BIA Records 4325-372-A; Washington Star, June 18, 1926.


At the time the Bacon Bill was presented to Congress, plans were made by some Moro leaders, led by the Sultan of Sulu, to send a Moro mission to the United States to work for the passage of the bill as well as to furnish information to Congress regarding conditions in the Moro area. The mission never went to the United States because it could not raise the necessary funds for the trip. See Manila Times, September 12, 14, 26, October 12, November 2, 4, December 9, 1926; February 11, 15, 1927.
offered his bill for the specific purpose of creating opportunities for American rubber interests to operate in Mindanao, which reportedly had more than three million hectares of land suitable for rubber cultivation.(77)

To create truly large-scale plantation rubber production, the Philippine Legislature would have had to repeal the restrictions on public landholdings in the Philippines which limited to 1024 hectares (2530 acres) of public land the acreage that might be acquired by any corporation. The policy of the United States had been to preserve and administer the public lands of the Philippines for the exclusive benefit of the Filipinos, hence the restriction on acreage. The Filipino leaders were naturally hesitant to liberalize the land laws for fear that the influence of large-scale capital investments in plantation projects would lessen the prospects of the United States ever surrendering control over the Philippines. They were also concerned that large plantations would result in corporate interference in Filipino political affairs and in the importation of foreign, most likely Chinese, labour. The rubber agitation served to bring the Philippine question before the American people more vividly than in the past, and the drift in some sectors of public

(77) See ibid., October 27, 1925. The United States reportedly consumed 75% of the world total output of rubber. See also Bacon's remarks in Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 11, pp. 11889-11897.

Bacon reportedly modified his bill in the subsequent session of Congress in December 1926 to show that there was no intention to dismember the Philippines, or to change the existing land laws. He announced that the sole purpose of the bill was to remove the constant friction between the two antagonistic "racial elements" and to provide the beginning of local self-government and home rule for the Moros. See Manila Times, December 22, 1926.
opinion appeared to encourage those in the Administration who might wish to announce in favour of permanent retention of the Philippines so as to encourage American capital to develop Philippine resources.(78)

The Filipinos did not oppose the cultivation of rubber, but they insisted that foreign capital operate within existing Philippine laws. They, in fact, expressed their willingness to aid the American rubber consumer by growing rubber on small plantations under Filipino ownership. But American rubber interests, represented by large corporations, rejected the possibility of operating small holdings within the conditions defined by the existing Philippine land and labour laws. In the end, the rubber industry never did develop in the Philippines because the strong force of Filipino nationalism perceived it as a threat to its national interest.(79)

(78) See ibid., September 17, 1925; February 24, 1926. See also L.R. Wilfley to Wood, November 27, 1925, in Wood Papers, Box 179; and Harvey N. Whitford, "Rubber and the Philippines," Foreign Affairs, IV, No. 4 (July 1926), pp. 677-679.

The Firestone Tire Company (Akron, Ohio) was reportedly interested in developing rubber in the Philippines, but only under favourable conditions. It proposed the lease of 1 million acres of land, in blocks of 20,000 acres each for 99 years at 10 cents per acre, with no change in the price to be made for the period of the lease. Under such onerous conditions, it was not surprising that the Filipinos were opposed to dealing with the company. Firestone subsequently gave up the rubber project in the Philippines and instead went to Liberia. See Manila Times, September 11, 13, October 8, 1925. See also another Firestone rubber programme proposing the lease of 2000,000 hectares for a 75-year period, in ibid., April 6, 7, 1926.

One of the strongest arguments advanced for the Bacon Bill's division of the Philippines into a Moro Province and a Christian North was that the Moros themselves were against independence and would prefer to remain under American sovereignty and protection. Governor Wood himself had attested to this fact, and, to be sure, Muslim leaders had, at one time or another, addressed petitions to the Governor and to Congress opposing independence for their territory and demanding continuation of American rule. However, it had been possible to secure from as many Muslims petitions proposing just the reverse — showing that they did not want to be separated from the Christian Filipinos, but to receive independence with them.

Fortunately for the Philippines, the Coolidge Administration did not commit itself to the Bacon bill, and Congress turned out to be not at all enthusiastic. The December 1926 version of the bill was never discussed. The main consequence of the Bacon Bill was to solidify Filipino unity against what it saw as American capitalist

See also Wood Diary, February 13, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 24; Wood to McIntyre, June 23, 1924, in BIA Records 364-541; Wood to McIntyre, September 24, 1924, BIA Records 364-544; Letter, Datu Plang to Representative Bacon, June 28, 1926, BIA Records 4325-390-B; and BIA Records 5828-42-A. For Sultan of Sulu's position opposing independence, see Manila Times, August 6, 1926; Philippines Herald, August 31, 1926.

(81) See Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 6, pp. 6200-6202, for documents signed by Muslim leaders advocating political independence from the United States, presented by Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara on March 24, 1926. See also statement of Sultan Sa Ramain of Lanao, in Philippines Herald, July 24, 1926, and Letter, McIntyre to Wood, July 30, 1924, in BIA Records 364-541, see also BIA Records 364-599.
enterprise interested solely in economic development and profit. (82)
The non-passage of these bills, despite the vigorous efforts made in
their behalf, was perhaps an indication that there was no majority
in Congress in favour of drastically reversing America's Philippine
policy of granting self-government and independence to the
Filipinos. (83)

The nearly unanimous Filipino opposition to these reactionary
measures in Congress was widely reported by the press in Manila. (84)
Filipino press reporting on the bills further incited feelings
against the Administration and Governor Wood and stimulated the cry
for independence.

(82) Members of the Philippine Legislative Committee in Washington
and Democratic quarters opposed to the Bacon Bill believed that
the bill was introduced as a gesture to frighten the Filipinos
into approving a modification of their land laws in favour of
American rubber interests. See Philippines Herald, June 29,
1926, in BIA Records 4325-A-42A.

(83) Wood, who had advocated enactment of at least the two Kiess
Bills, was not too happy that Washington had not pushed through
the measures which he thought were needed in the administration
of the Philippines. Wood commented that Washington's inaction
was apparently due to the desire to build up Osmeña's prestige
(following Forbes' suggestion) in his struggle for leadership
with Quezon. As a result, what Washington had done to build up
Osmeña's prestige had resulted in reducing American prestige by
so much. Wood felt this policy would be fine if the Filipino
concerned was absolutely loyal and friendly, which he thought
Osmeña was not. See Wood to Nicholas Roosevelt, July 9, 1926,
in Wood Papers, Box 182.

(84) It was reported that the drafts of practically all the
"reactionary" bills were prepared by Bacon, including those
sponsored by Representative Kiess. See Manila Times, March 29,
July 4, 1926.

The American newspapers in Manila, the Manila Times and
the Manila Daily Bulletin, like the Filipino press, were also
against the Bacon Bill, but for a different reason: both
papers were advocating permanent retention of the Philippines,
not just the Moro Territory.
There were also a few independence bills presented in this 69th Congress, but there was very little enthusiasm for them. Among the independence measures were the following: S. 657 — a bill providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines, upon the formulation, ratification, and promulgation of a constitution for an independent republican government, introduced on December 8, 1925, by Senator William H. King (Democrat, Utah); S. Res. 70, also submitted by Senator King, authorizing the President of the United States to conclude a treaty or treaties with powers having territorial interests in the Pacific, to recognize the Philippines as an independent state; H.J. Res. 69, expressing the intention of the United States to grant complete and absolute independence to the Philippines and requesting the President to consider the expediency of effecting a treaty of recognition for said republic, introduced by Representative John E. Rankin (Democrat, Mississippi) on December 12, 1925; H.R. 5569 — a bill directing the President of the United States to proclaim, within one year, a constitutional convocation in the Philippines preparatory to the independence of the Philippines, introduced on December 15, 1925, by Representative Edward J. King (Republican, Illinois); and H.J. Res. 225, providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines and providing for its neutralization, introduced on April 16, 1926, by Representative Adolph H. Sabath (Democrat, Illinois).(85)

(85) See Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 1, pp. 492-494; 760; 900; pt. 7, p. 7644. Senator Willis reportedly promised Senator King committee hearings on his independence bills, but the Philippine question did not come up at all. Congress had its hands full with domestic and international problems, among them farm relief, tax reform, prohibition, etc. See Manila Times, February 16, 1926.
Teodoro M. Kalaw had decided to return to the Philippines in December 1925. Upon his arrival, he had submitted to the Commission of Independence a report, on February 9, 1926, which analyzed the discouraging state of the independence campaign. He found the Philippine position in the United States "worse than at any other time previous with regards to the possibility of independence for the Philippines." This critical situation, he reported, was due to many causes:

\[\ldots\] The present administration does not favour Philippine independence. Some high responsible officials are even thinking of withdrawing some of the political powers already granted to our people. The American mind is getting used to the idea of possessing our Islands. Unless something happens to change their sentiments, the natural tendency will be to believe this more firmly each day.

In late January 1926 David P. Barrows prepared an independence bill with the intention of having it introduced in Congress. The bill would authorize the Philippine Legislature to provide for the election of a constituent convention empowered to frame and adopt a constitution for an independent Philippine state, and by a majority vote to determine upon separation from the United States. The bill further provided that independence would depend upon the liquidation of the financial obligation of the Philippine government to the United States. Barrows claimed that his proposed bill was designed to put the issue of independence squarely before the Filipino people, who should be allowed to make the decision only after mature reflection and a candid discussion of all the sacrifices that independence involved. See his letter to Wood, February 7, 1926, with a copy of the proposed bill, in Wood Papers, Box 180. See also Manila Times, January 24, 25, March 14, 1926.

The publication of the Barrows bill (which was never brought before Congress) was followed by resolutions of municipal and provincial councils in the Philippines announcing a desire to pay their part of the Philippine debt, and there was some suggestion that public officials should give part of their pay in order to pay off the debt. See McIntyre to Everett Sanders (Secretary to President Coolidge), April 23, 1926, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 127.
The elements whose designs over the Philippines predominate are the capitalists, and these place as a condition sine qua non of their investments the permanent retention of our country. The scarcity of rubber is now the obsession of the American consumer. Since he has been told that the Philippines can produce in a sufficient quantity, his eyes are now directed towards our country as a land of promise. The unprecedented prosperity now prevalent in the United States, in these days when Europe is in economic chaos due to the war, tempts him towards a more extended capitalistic imperialism, which, naturally, is very dangerous to our ideals of nationalism.

Unfortunately, "at the very moment that our enemies organized and launched a counter offensive, at the very moment we needed to redouble our activities, we had to retreat," because the funds for the Commission were suspended in 1924. "Our campaign is now limited to a weak defensive," he continued.

In the light of this gloomy situation, Kalaw made some recommendations:

An office should be maintained in the United States to function as a center of information regarding the policies of the Philippine Government and the aspirations of the Filipino people, to facilitate exact data on the Philippines, to foster friendly relations between the Americans and the Filipinos, and to maintain a permanent exhibit of our culture and industries. . . . The office should be headed by a well-known intellectual, or, it should be placed directly under the Resident Commissioners . . . .

The Commission on Independence should be free from local partisan squabbles. Its officers should enjoy the confidence of all political parties. Its men should be able to speak for the diverse elements in our community. Thus, they can prove we are a united people. There is nothing that can more sorrowfully retard the grant to us of independence than the allegation of disunity among us, an argument which, however, is a conclusion drawn by our enemies.
Kalaw caused quite a stir when he said that what was needed in the United States was "a select group of university professors and recognized authorities in specific branches of our culture" to disseminate information on the different aspects of Filipino civilization, not politicians and professional propagandists, who had failed to convince the American nation of the Filipinos' sincerity in their demand for independence. The fight, he stressed, was "a fight for the recognition of our national personality. Therefore, it is precise on our part to revise our evaluation and proceed to work out an integrated ideological reconstruction of ourselves as a people and to explain it as such to the American people, even in its smallest details. And politicians do not serve for this kind of work."(86)

Probably because of the Kalaw recommendations, and also probably because Quezon was unhappy with the temperate attitude being shown by Osmeña, in Washington and the considerable credit which was being given Osmeña by certain sectors of the Filipino press for his work in Washington, Jose Abad Santos was sent to the United States as a special adviser to the Legislative Committee.

He sailed from Manila on April 19, 1926, charged by the Philippine Legislature with going "for the purpose of enlightening public opinion there with respect to the capacity and preparedness

(86) See T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 197-201; also Manila Times, February 11, 1926.

This report by Kalaw was submitted together with a letter of resignation from his position as Executive Secretary of the Commission of Independence.
of the Filipino people." He was commissioned to organize a nation-wide campaign in the United States for Philippine independence, directed not so much at official Washington as at the American public.\(^{87}\)

Abad Santos's instructions were to enlist the support of American organizations on the side of Philippine independence, to establish more coordination and cooperation between the leaders of propaganda and publicity activities in the Philippines and in the United States, and to look into the workings of the Philippine Press Bureau.\(^{88}\) As will be seen, these instructions were attributable to

\(^{87}\) Concurrent Resolution No. 16, Official Gazette, XXIV, No. 32, p. 595.

Abad Santos was accompanied by a volunteer committee of independence workers consisting of Jose Escaler (of the Philippine Sugar Central), Dr. Paz Mendoza-Guazon (of the University of the Philippines), and Dr. Ariston Bautista Lim (noted physician and businessman). See Manila Times, April 15, 1926.

There were rumours that Osmena resented Abad Santos' mission which was given plenary powers in the direction of the campaign in the United States. See ibid., April 23, 1926.

\(^{88}\) BIA Records 36480-97.

Quezon instructed Abad Santos privately to consult with some congressional leaders to find out whether in their opinion the policy of trying to get together with the Administration in Washington and in Manila, in spite of their plain opposition to Philippine independence, was not giving the American people the impression that the Filipinos were not in earnest in their struggle for freedom. Quezon thought that that policy (which was, of course, what Osmena had been pursuing) should be revised. Appeal should be directed to the American people, totally ignoring the Administration. Quezon felt that while Osmena had succeeded in winning the personal friendship of the President by his moderate stand, he had not made any impression with the Administration as far as the Philippine cause was concerned, as witness the moves by Washington to reduce Philippine autonomy. See Quezon to Abad Santos, April 21, 1926, Quezon Papers, Box 46.
the Supreme National Council, whose creation had just been engineered by Quezon.

Upon his return in September 1926, roughly a month after Osmeña's return, Abad Santos submitted the following recommendations, which were subsequently approved:

(1) That steps be taken to carry out the plan of campaign in the United States as prepared by the Committee on Campaign and Publicity, as approved by the Advisory Board and the Supreme Council;

(2) That adequate provision be made for the offices of Resident Commissioners in the United States so as to insure the discharge of their duties and functions to the fullest possible advantage;

(3) That the Philippine Press Bureau be so reorganized and provided for as to enable it to render a more efficient and effective service. It is generally conceded that the name Press Bureau is unfortunate and its use should therefore be discontinued;

(4) That the leaders of our cause in the United States be induced to support the organization of an American association to work for Philippine independence; and

(5) That the necessary amount be raised to carry out the foregoing recommendations. It is estimated that around P500,000 (US$250,000) will be required to finance the movement for a period of one year. (89)

While prospects for independence or autonomy were little improved by Abad Santos' presence or by the Legislative Committee's efforts, by the conclusion of the congressional session in the summer of 1926 the danger that the reactionary bills pending in Congress might be enacted into law appeared to have passed. While it was true that they might be reconsidered during succeeding sessions of Congress, the possibilities of favourable action appeared remote in view of the state of opinion within Congress.

(89) See Manila Times, November 1, 5, 1926. See also in T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 209.
With those reactionary bills eliminated, a more effective and intense publicity campaign could be waged to counteract the retentionists.

Senator Osmeña, whose departure for Manila on July 9, 1926, preceded that of Abad Santos by over a month, in his report to the Legislature recommended that the campaign for independence in the United States be waged with increased vigour within and outside Congress. To do this, he advocated a programme along the lines suggested by Kalaw and, later by Abad Santos: first, maintenance of a policy which assured the Resident Commissioners in Washington an active part in the direction and execution of plans for the campaign; second, more coordination and systematization; and third, continuation of the policy of strict economy to an extent compatible with efficiency in the campaign.(90)

Following the acrimonious Philippine elections of June 1925, in which Quezon's political standing had been shaken due to the controversy over the Fairfield Bill, and following also President Coolidge's suggestion to Congress that the powers of the Governor General be strengthened, thus reducing Filipino autonomy, Quezon had conceived of the idea of uniting the two political parties in the Philippines to promote national solidarity. The idea was to

(90) "Osmeña Mission Report," Manila Times, September 15, 1926. The Tribune editorialized that the most striking detail of the Osmeña Report was the itemized account of the expenditures of the Mission, and for the first time in the history of the several missions, "the Filipino people are told how, to the last centavo, their money have been expended...." See in ibid., September 16, 1926.
establish a united front in order to push with more vigour and more
unity of action the independence campaign. Osmeña thus returned
from his year in America with the Legislative Committee to find a
changed political scene, and one that was not to his liking.

Quezon had characterized his proposal for unification as an
appeal to all the Filipino people to support their leaders in their
controversy with Governor Wood and in their campaign for immediate
and absolute independence. There were some, however, who felt that
Quezon's real motives were to strengthen his hold on local affairs.
Wood thought that the political coalition which was formed was made
principally to sidetrack Osmeña and leave Quezon in more or less
full control. (91)

Quezon had argued that a coalition of the Democrata Party with
the Nacionalista Consolidados would deprive Governor Wood of all
Filipino support and would remove the impression that some elements
of the population disagreed with the Filipino leaders' policy of
non-cooperation. To the Democratas he had pointed out the necessity
of presenting a united front against the "enemy," and he had

(91) The talk in political circles in Manila was that Quezon's
proposal was a well-concealed Quezon-Recto combine, thought out
by Quezon himself whereby the former sought to entrench himself
against Osmeña's ascendancy and the latter to bargain his
chances in the next senatorial elections in 1928 in Quezon's
district for an opportunity to preside over the House of
Representatives in place of Speaker Roxas. See Manila Daily
Bulletin and Manila Times, January 21, 1926.
Justo Lukban (former Mayor of Manila) informed Teodoro M.
Kalaw that Quezon had gathered together his partisans and had
spoken disparagingly of Osmeña's work in the United States
previous to the organization of the coalition. See T.M.
Kalaw, op. cit., p. 203.
See also Wood Diary, February 11, 1926, in Wood Papers,
Box 24.
lamented Aguinaldo's betrayal of his people's cause by openly supporting the Governor General.(92)

There is very little question that in the past the national cause had been sacrificed in the interests of party expediency, with one party denouncing the other as less patriotic and therefore as traitors to the cause. Such accusations overthrew their strongest argument for independence, that the Filipinos were united in desiring independence. It was therefore time, it was argued, for party prejudice and political bickerings which had engaged the interests of and divided the Filipinos to come to an end now that the national cause in the United States seemed to be approaching a critical turn.(93)

With the "national ideal" as the avowed and supreme purpose, the leaders of the two political parties, as a result of a joint committee conference, agreed on January 6, 1926, to form a coalition upon the following terms:

(92) See Quezon to F.B. Harrison, August 21, 1926, Harrison Papers, Box 32.

Major Luciano de la Rosa of the Association of Veterans of the Revolution wanted Aguinaldo to resign as president of the Association and to forfeit his pension on the grounds that he had made himself an ally of "imperialist enemies of Philippine independence" and had become a staunch defender of Governor Wood. See Manila Times, January 8, 1926.


The idea of a coalition was not the unanimous decision of all Democrata and Nacionalista legislators. Some Democratas viewed it merely as a "smokescreen" to shield Quezon and Osmeña's failure in the independence campaign from the public eye. Roxas thought any movement toward coalition was a violation of the people's will as expressed at the polls. See Manila Times, December 17, 22, 28, 1925, February 19, 1926.
To constitute a Supreme National Council which shall be composed of ten members, five Nacionalista Consolidados and five Democrats, eight of whom, at least, shall be members of the Legislature. This Council shall have the high command of Filipino policy in everything concerning the campaign for independence, in all matters that may affect the relations between the United States and the Philippines, and in the administration of the interests of the country at large. Its power shall be not merely deliberative or advisory, but also executive in its fullest sense. It shall prepare a program of its work and activities in connection with the independence campaign; organize and direct an intensive national campaign for the purpose of fomenting protective habits and stimulating native industries, and shall make recommendations to the legislative on matters of internal government. . . .(94)

The preamble to the constitution of the Supreme National Council explained the circumstances which prompted the organization of the coalition, thus:

For some time past it has been noted that an organized and systematic campaign is being waged here as well as in America, designed to induce the people of the United States to change their policy toward the Philippine Islands. The object is annexation. The activities shown by the American Chamber of Commerce, setting aside funds and sending men to the United States to carry out the campaign against independence; the extraordinary attention given to questions Philippine by important newspapers and magazines in America, and the series of publications concerned which have appeared recently, as well as the frequent visits of American writers and publishers who seem to be studying local conditions only to advocate retention of the islands — all this shows an organized attempt to frustrate the

(94) Philippines Press Press, January 16, 1926, p. 44.

From the Partido Nacionalista Consolidado, the following were chosen: Senate President Quezon, Speaker Roxas, Representative Benigno S. Aquino, Senator Herminegildo Villanueva, and ex-Mayor Justo Lukban. From the Democrata Party came ex-Governor Ruperto Montinola, Senator Juan Sumulong, Representative Claro M. Recto, ex-Representative Vicente Sotto (who, incidentally, was a bitter Osmeña critic), and Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona. See ibid., p. 13; Manila Times, January 8, 1926.
fulfillment of the sacred promise of independence made to the Filipino people.

President Coolidge's recommendation in his last message to Congress, aimed at strengthening the powers of the governor general, is the best proof that this anti-independence campaign may result in disaster to the cause of the country. Unless this campaign is checked immediately through the combined and united efforts of all elements which constitute Filipino nationality, especially of the political parties, the imperialist movement will gain ground gradually and we shall soon see blasted our hopes of nationality.(95)

The scheme of the Supreme National Council was theoretically quite impressive. Three objectives were advanced for the Supreme National Council: first, the attraction of substantial Filipinos not heretofore prominent in the independence campaign, with the seeming subordination of the politico element which thus far had dominated it; second, the decentralization of the campaign so that the provinces might take an active part, heretofore played only by Manila; and third, an attempt at the gradual and peaceful use of the political authority legally vested in the American Governor General and the Philippine Legislature.(96)

The organizational structure established by the Council paralleled that of the insular government. National, provincial, and municipal "solidarity committees" were set up throughout the

(95) Philippines Free Press, January 16, 1926, p. 12; see also Manila Times, January 6, 7, 1926.
As early as February 1924, Quezon had suggested that the Independence Commission seriously consider the proposition to dissolve all existing political parties and to form a single National League that might gather under its banner all who were striving for independence, so that they might work unitedly for it and combat those who were opposed. See in El Debate, February 15, 1924, in BIA Records 3427-A-40.

country, composed of all elective officials in each of these jurisdictions. The Council sought to spread independence propaganda to prepare local government for complete independence in every province, town, and village of the Philippines.

The National Solidarity Central Committee, a sort of general policies body, was composed of all the elected senators and representatives of the Legislature and all the elected provincial governors (thus, legislators and governors from the Muslim and non-Christian provinces, who were appointed by the Governor General, were automatically excluded). As the Nacionalistas dominated the Legislature, and also counted a healthy majority among the elected governors, the Council was comfortably controlled by them.

In addition to this comprehensive organization for stimulating public opinion on the independence issue, the Supreme National Council possessed a formidable executive arm. In Manila was set up a National Advisory Committee, composed of twenty-five members, all of whom were business or professional men not heretofore actively identified with politics and the independence campaign, to direct long-range plans in everything that concerned the campaign for independence and all affairs affecting relations with the United States, as well as the administration of the internal affairs of the country in general. Their plans were to be submitted to the Legislature for enactment into law after they had been approved by the Council. Fifteen sub-committees were attached to the National Advisory Committee, each composed of leading citizens of the country with responsibility for a whole range of activities, including
national defense, public works and communications, finance, agricultural development, public instruction and national language, health and public welfare, justice and law revision, immigration and industrial relations, independence campaign, development of national resources, government and civil service, economic strategy, protection of native industries, and women's organizations.

The Supreme National Council itself was composed of five Nacionalista Consolidados and five Democratas, and eight of those ten members were duly elected legislators. As among the ten were the presiding officers and the majority floor leaders as well as the minority leaders in both houses, there was no question of the control of the Council over the Legislature. (97)

A plan drafted for financing the work of the Supreme National Council provides one more illustration of the intent of the Council to operate as a "government within a government." A comprehensive taxation scheme, payments for which would nominally be called "voluntary contributions," was seriously considered as the best means for meeting all expenses, including the dispatch of special missions to Japan and other foreign countries to study the technology of Philippine development. The proposed taxation plan consisted of five different assessments, at least one of which would have touched virtually every Filipino, while many Filipinos would have been expected to contribute under two or three of those extra-legal taxes. It was hoped that under this scheme,

independence "drives" could be dispensed with. (98)

One of the biggest activities of the Supreme National Council was the proclamation of a National Prayer Day, held on February 22, 1926, Washington's birthday, during which a field mass was celebrated at the Luneta and the Almighty was asked "to stay the hand that threatens to annihilate our freedom" and to give the Filipino people the strength "to forgive those who seek the death of our liberty." (99) In Washington, Osmeña presided over the Washington Day celebration of the Filipino community, and the national prayer was read. (100)

A move aimed at certain American and foreign interests in the Philippines deemed inimical to the cause of the Filipino was reported to be under serious consideration by many members of the Council. It will be remembered that the American Chamber of

(99) See Manila Times, February 7, 9, 17, 23, 1926.
The pro-independence newspapers in Manila did their utmost to work up interest in the National Prayer Day. For days they published the prayer with tales of it as a movement expressive of the unanimous national feeling for freedom.

Wood thought praying against the purposes of the United States and asking God to correct America's bad faith "a deliberate insult," "a rank discourtesy to the United States," and a "disloyal and almost sacrilegious" effort. See Wood Diary, February 18, 22, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 24. See also Wood to W.H. Gardiner, February 20, 1926, ibid., Box 180; and Cable # 345, Wood to McIntyre, BIA Records 28286.

There was a small fuss over the military review held on the same day, after the mass was held, which the Filipinos considered a show of force. It was reported that the American authorities saw to it that there were squads of armed men in civilian dress in all the gatherings and larger armed forces within quick call to quiet any disturbance that might arise. See Manila Times, March 4, 1926.

(100) See BIA Records 364-587; Osmeña to Quezon, February 23, 1926, de la Rosa Papers; and Manila Times, February 24, 1926.
Commerce Mission was carrying on a spirited campaign in the United States against any congressional action on Philippine independence, on the contention that only the American people, not Congress alone, could alienate American sovereignty in the Philippines. In Manila there was talk of a general boycott of American business houses and American goods. This prompted some members of the American Chamber of Commerce to support a resolution prohibiting its members to participate in politics and calling on them to dedicate their time exclusively to business. Some American merchants, fearing the consequences of a boycott, were reportedly prepared to place this announcement conspicuously in their establishments: "Square deal for Filipinos. Money spent here will not be used against your aspirations. We are in business, not in politics," and thus dissociate themselves from the militant imperialists in the Chamber actively working against Philippine independence. (101)

The Council prepared for a new campaign in the United States, more or less along the lines proposed by Teodoro M. Kalaw after his return from the United States. It was for this that Jose Abad Santos was dispatched to the United States in April 1926. With the object of reaching Congress and the Americans people and persuading them to support the independence cause, the campaign would proceed along the following lines:

(101) See letter, Eulogio B. Rodriguez to Francis Burton Harrison, March 9, 1926, in Harrison Papers, Box 33; see also Manila Times, January 29, February 1, 9, 1926.

Claro M. Recto had advocated the boycott of American goods because Americans "have boycotted our cherished ideals." See ibid., February 12, 1926.
1. Filipino lecturers in the United States to be sent as members of an educational and cultural mission, with headquarters in four strategic locations to cover the entire United States.

2. Resident Commissioners to concentrate their work on the floor of Congress and the Washington Administration and to coordinate their work with the lecturers.

3. A central office in Washington, D.C. and the revival of the old Press Bureau, for the collection and distribution of data about the Philippines, under the chairman of the educational and commercial mission.

4. Utilization of a high-powered American public relations man, not necessarily as an employee, but as adviser in matters of publicity.

5. Organization of societies to be known as "Friends of Philippine Independence" all over the United States, with friendly Americans as leading members, to help the lecturers in getting a good audience in the various communities and to bring pressure to bear on the members of Congress in their respective districts.

6. Utilization of Filipino students in America under the direction of the chairman of the educational and commercial mission.

7. Offering annual prizes of US$200.00 for the best dissertation on the Philippine problem written by an American student in ten of the largest American universities.

8. Political missions headed by the political leaders from time to time.

9. Subsidizing of lecturers and publications.

It was hoped that special groups and organizations could be enlisted to further the Philippine cause.(102)

In the meanwhile, Quezon, Roxas, and Democrata leaders Sumulong and Tirona busied themselves touring the provinces in a campaign for popular acceptance of the Supreme National Council and to explain the current situation in the independence campaign. In the same campaign, they continued their attacks on Governor Wood's "autocratic" methods and severely criticized American imperialism,

with references to the United States as the symbol of "tyranny and oppression." It was at this time that Quezon reiterated what he had several times said on previous occasions -- the now famous statement

I would rather have the Legislature abolished and allow the Governor General to govern alone. There has been no party in power since he took over his post. Because he is The Power, the only power, I would prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by Americans, because no matter how bad a Filipino government might be, it can still be improved. (103)

This non-partisan political movement was intended to appeal to all the various elements in the Philippines. (104) That it was successful, for a while, was evidenced by the fact that it united the two political parties that had been fighting each other bitterly. It received the approval of various religious, professional, and industrial groups, and the support of men like Victorino Mapa, retired Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court; Francisco Ortigas, one of the prominent members of the Philippine Bar; and Gregorio Araneta, Attorney General under Governor General William Howard Taft and later Secretary of Justice — men who had always been decidedly pro-American and had avoided

(103) See Manila Times, January 20, 22, February 1, 24, March 1, 2, 29, April 15, 18, 1926. Wood noted that the speeches of Quezon and Roxas were full of the spirit of disloyalty and in many cases almost seditious. But he noted that Quezon was far more conservative in his speeches than Roxas. See Wood Diary, February 3, 7, 10, 18, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 24; and Wood to McIntyre, February 8, 1926, BIA Records 364-593.

(104) There was also planned a five-year literacy campaign to start on June 19, 1926. "The People's Reader," prepared by Camilo Osias, was to be used for the campaign. See Manila Times, May 23, 1926.
any extreme position in politics.\(^{(105)}\)

The outstanding exception was General Emilio Aguinaldo who, through personal friendship for Governor Wood, opposed the Supreme National Council.\(^{(106)}\) However, the Association of Veterans of the Revolution, of which Aguinaldo was president, passed a resolution endorsing the aspirations of the Filipino people for liberty and congratulating (though not outrightly supporting) the "Supreme National Council and all other organizations and elements of the country which loyally labor for the independence of the Filipinos on the occasion of their timely action towards bringing national unity."\(^{(107)}\)

Quezon was extremely annoyed with Aguinaldo for openly siding with Governor Wood and refusing to approve of the Supreme National Council. General Aguinaldo believed that by cooperating with Wood, the Filipinos would better realize their longing for freedom, and he thought the Council a "political contrivance" of the two political parties designed to divide political jobs equally between them.\(^{(108)}\)

\(^{(105)}\) BIA Records 28286, Supreme National Council file.

\(^{(106)}\) Aguinaldo explained that he did not want to be involved in politics, from which he had thus far managed to divorce himself. But Quezon thought Aguinaldo was in fact really dabbling in politics in openly supporting Governor Wood. See Manila Times, January 29, February 2, 7, 9, 10, April 27, September 13, 1926.

\(^{(107)}\) The constitution of the Veterans' Associations directly prohibited the participation of the Association in politics. Nevertheless, several units of the Association supported the Supreme National Council, disregarding Aguinaldo's stand. See ibid., February 9, 17, March 28, 29, 1926.

\(^{(108)}\) See ibid., April 18, 1926; New York Times, April 9, 1926.
Between Quezon and Aguinaldo, there arose a debate which took on an almost personal character and which attracted wide attention in the United States. The personal fight between Quezon and Aguinaldo almost succeeded in obscuring the Quezon-Wood controversy.(109)

Some sections of the Philippine press lamented Aguinaldo's stand in supporting and defending Governor Wood, an action which had harmed the Philippine cause. La Opinion (Filipino, independent), for instance, said that

Aguinaldo has done what the imperialists have tried to do: justify the administration of Governor General Wood, show that the Filipinos are not united

(109) For the Quezon-Aguinaldo polemics, see Manila Times, March 23, 26, April 8, 11, 13, May 11, July 20, August 27, September 30, October 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 21, 1926; Philippines Free Press, February 26, 1927, p. 49.

Quezon, in exasperation, even challenged Aguinaldo to run in the 5th senatorial district (Quezon's District) to decide the question of supremacy of leadership between them and to test if the policy of cooperation was supported by the people. Aguinaldo retaliated by challenging Quezon to resign as Senate President to be consistent with his policy of non-cooperation. Quezon finally declared that as far as he was concerned, Aguinaldo was simply "non-existent."

Some of Quezon's cohorts also tried to tarnish Aguinaldo's image as a revolutionary leader by bringing up Aguinaldo's conduct during the Revolution, including the execution of Andres Bonifacio, the assassination of General Antonio Luna, and the alleged misappropriation of revolutionary funds.

In February 1927 Aguinaldo caused the expulsion of Major Manuel L. Quezon from the Veterans' Association. Quezon called the expulsion a farce since he had never affiliated himself with the Association. Quezon also charged that the Association was misleading in that the majority of its members were not veterans but politicians aspiring to get jobs from Wood through Aguinaldo's influence.

Wood in his correspondence did write of such requests for appointment from Aguinaldo, most of which he supposedly rejected. See Quezon to Guevara, February 8, 1927 in Quezon Papers, Box 46; Wood to Clarence Edwards, March 3, 1927, in Wood Papers, Box 183; Wood to Gordon Johnston, April 11, 1927, and Wood to Frank McCoy, April 16, 1927, in ibid., Box 184.
in their demand for independence, and give greater incentive to the systematic campaign initiated here and in the United States against our freedom.

What a tragic ending has General Aguinaldo put to his history of yesterday.(110)

Not surprisingly, Governor Wood also disapproved of the Supreme National Council, because "it was not a movement toward representative government and the building up of well-balanced political parties," essential to a stable government. "It was quite the reverse, and created, if not one-man control, the control of a small oligarchy very largely under the influence of one man." By building a two-party system he thought the Filipinos would be making a much more plausible claim to political maturity.(111)

The Philippines Herald (a Quezon mouthpiece), however, contended that so long as the Philippines was not independent, a two-party system and its attendant "party conflicts might in theory be in accordance with the forms of democracy, but in practice they are destructive to the national welfare. When we shall have assured a government of our own, then political parties with their continual quarrels will have a proper role to play."(112)

(110) See editorial in Manila Times, April 20, 1926; see also in ibid., September 22, 1926. See Aguinaldo attacked by other leaders, in ibid., December 1, 1926. La Vanguardia and The Tribune both defended Aguinaldo in his controversy with Quezon. See for instance editorials in Manila Times, March 30, 1926.

(111) See Report of the Governor General, 1926, p. 3; also Wood Diary, February 5, 11, 20, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 24.

(112) See in Manila Times, January 8, 1926.
Defense of the "national ideal" was reportedly the principal end sought by those who created the Supreme National Council. Governor Wood felt, however, that the dominant purpose of this combination was really to "preserve the existing political leadership" by placing in the hands of the ten-man Supreme National Council "the direct control of all political affairs."(113) Be that as it may, Quezon's clever presentation of the threat to the ideal of independence was momentarily responsible for the rapid growth of the coalition.

Th Democrats may have thought it would be politically unwise for them, having in the past espoused cooperation with Governor Wood, to refuse to enter this "national patriotic movement." Their decision to join the Council was perhaps also influenced by the promise of certain concessions, including equal representation in the Council and one of the resident commissionerships in Washington.(114) Whatever their motives, by joining the Council the Democrats abdicated their role as the opposition party and in so doing, undoubtedly hastened their demise. A strong minority within the party, led by Manila Representative Alfonso Mendoza, strongly...

(113) See Report of the Governor General, 1926, p. 3.

(114) In the course of negotiations for the coalition, the Democrata Directorate proposed 19 points, in which the abolition of the Council of State and the Board of Control was mentioned, but the Nacionalista Consolidados sidestepped the issue. The Nacionalistas asserted "that the present movement is to better carry on the fight for independence and that only questions pertaining to this phase will be discussed while all others affecting the administration of the Philippine government are to be acted upon by the Legislature." See Manila Times, January 10, 1926. The January 6, 1926 covenant was ratified in February 1927. See Philippines Free Press, February 26, 1927, p. 40.
objected to the arrangement made by the leaders. Dissensions soon appeared, and when the promised offices did not materialize, party discipline and cohesion broke down and the coalition withered away.\(^{(115)}\)

Likewise, within the Nacionalista Party, the virtual disappearance of effective opposition resulted in the formation of warring blocs based upon personal loyalties and interests. The blocs were in reality factions of Quezon and Osmena men. Some Nacionalistas worried that the Council would absorb all the powers and duties of the Legislature and the Independence Commission.\(^{(116)}\)

There was also some reaction against the Democratas' "selfish" purposes of getting more power, positions, and prerogatives, which they could not possibly have gotten had they not joined the Council.\(^{(117)}\) By July 1926, signs of distress in the Council were beginning to display themselves.\(^{(118)}\) And by September, it was

\(^{(115)}\) See Manila Times, February 19, 21, March 7, April 30, June 17, 21, 25, 1926.

\(^{(116)}\) The "little revolution" within the Legislature between two factions of the Nacionalista Party (Soriano-Lacson vs. Aquino-Paredes groups) was over the reorganization of the House of Representatives and the chairmanship of the various House committees. Orthodox Nacionalistas saw in the proposed reorganization of the Legislature the intent to do away with the Osmena group, especially since the push for complete reorganization was being made before Osmena's return from the United States. See Manila Times, February 12, March 3, June 23, 25, July 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, August 4, 6, 10, 17, 1926. See also Philippines Herald, August 5, 7, 1926.

\(^{(117)}\) The Democratas wanted the floor leadership of the Legislature, one half of the chairmanships of committees, and one Resident Commissioner in Washington. Some Nacionalistas did not want Claro M. Recto in any capacity, either as floor leader or resident commissioner. See Manila Times, July 4, 1926.

\(^{(118)}\) There was wrangling over pork barrel funds in the public works appropriations bill. See ibid., October 8, 1926. For the problems of the coalition, see also ibid., November 7, 8, 1926.
evident that it was not receiving enthusiastic cooperation and support even from Quezon's followers.

Osmeña, having departed for Manila on July 9, 1926, arrived (on August 3) just in time to be caught up in the growing discord within the Council. He was never enthusiastic about the coalition, despite being a member. And upon his arrival in Manila from the Mission to the United States, a public banquet was tendered him, at which occasion his speech seemed to bespeak dislike for the Council, favouring in its place a unity of Nacionalistas alone. (119)

Various portions of his address (on August 4), especially his approving allusions to the vital part played by opposition parties in Canada and the United States, were interpreted by the Democrata leaders as "hidden criticism" directed at them for entering the coalition and abandoning their vital function as opposition to the Nacionalista majority. (120) The Democratas reacted bitterly to Osmeña's utterances, and although Osmeña denied any thought of disparaging the coalition, and Quezon vehemently expressed his party's loyalty to it, it was apparent that real unity had disappeared. (121)

(119) Osmeña, while in Washington, reportedly deliberately ignored the Council and communicated directly with Quezon. See ibid., July 4, 1926.

(120) Philippines Herald, August 5, 1926; Manila Times, August 5, 1926.

(121) See statements of Democrata leaders Tirona, Recto, and Sumulong in Philippines Herald, August 6, 7, 8, 1926; Manila Daily Bulletin, August 9, 1926, in BIA Records 3427-A-44. For Osmeña's denial, see Manila Times, August 9, 10, 22, 1926.
Even before Osmeña's return, Quezon found his leadership of the coalition and of the entire independence campaign under attack. (122) The Tribune and its affiliated newspapers (123) had not been too enthusiastic about Quezon's handling of affairs, and in an editorial on June 16, written by Carlos P. Romulo, it attributed the gloomy outlook for the country's political future to Quezon's leadership. It savagely upbraided Quezon's "exorbitances and exhibitions of temper, his lack of system and erratic ways, his fanaticism for partisan causes" which had "wrought penalty for himself and lasting harm for the country." A later editorial on July 7 contrasted Quezon's leadership with that of Osmeña -- the "tried and proved leader" -- whose "conservative conciliation devoid of theatricalism" had warded off the "menace" to the Philippine cause in the United States. (124)

(122) Early on after the establishment of the Council, Quezon resigned as president of the coalition, feeling that members of his own party were conspiring against him to secure his "downfall." He was prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation, and a vote of confidence was given him. Quezon would threaten to resign many times in his public career, and each time his resignation would be withdrawn when his bruised feelings had been assuaged. See ibid., February 9, 1926.

(123) The Tribune was the English newspaper of the T-V-T group (Tribune-Vanguardie-Taliba), one of two major newspaper chains in Manila owned by Alejandro Roces. La Vanguardia and Taliba were afternoon editions in Spanish and Tagalog respectively. The other major newspaper chain was the D-M-H-M (Debate-Mabuhay-Herald-Monday Mail), whose owner frequently consisted of Quezon supporters. See bibliographical information in Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires, The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946 (New Haven, 1965), p. 285.

(124) See also open letters attacking Quezon's leadership in Manila Times, June 17, August 11, 1926. The Quezon sallies were replied to in part by the Philippines Herald, generally more friendly to Quezon.
After Osmeña's return from the United States, Quezon found his leadership position within his party even more uncertain. It will be recalled that Osmeña in Washington had advised Quezon to abandon his non-cooperation policy with Governor Wood. Upon his return, he again preached moderation and tact in all the actions of the Filipinos and their representatives in their fight for independence. He declared that since there no longer existed any real threat to the independence cause, cooperation with Governor Wood should be revived, for it would be "futile and ridiculous to challenge America's power or to antagonize the highest representative of the United States in the [Philippines] in the struggle for the Filipino cause." Osmeña's call for cooperation and moderation may have been intended in part as a manoeuvre to undercut Quezon's leadership, Quezon having tried to do the same to him in setting up the Council while he was away.

Osmeña tried to gain political mileage by underlining the merit of his conservative stance in an unqualified assertion that great changes in the status and administration of the Philippines were being planned in Washington and might soon come if the Filipinos

(125) There were also reports that the new year would see another political party — the Gran Partido Nacionalista — to be formed under the leadership of Sergio Osmeña and entirely independent of the Nacionalista Consolidado of Quezon. The new party was reportedly being organized by Ramon Diokno, the Manila lawyer who was defeated by Senator Sumulong in 1925. Following Osmeña's lead, the new party declared for cooperation and conciliation with American authority, probably hoping Osmeña would endorse it and subsequently agree to head it. But Osmeña did not. See Manila Daily Bulletin, August 9, 1926, in BIA Records 3427-A-44; Manila Times, November 23, December 6, 1926.

(126) Philippines Herald, August 4, 1926; Manila Times, August 17, 1926. Osmeña was accused of "exaggerated Americanism" for his stand. See editorials in ibid., August 22, 1926.
maintained an attitude of sympathy and cooperation with the American people. He revealed that President Coolidge, in the final interview before Osmena left Washington in June, had promised that the United States would withdraw from the Philippines as soon as the Filipinos established their country on a firm, self-sufficient basis. This remark drew a denial from President Coolidge (that his views on the question of Philippine independence had not changed), and Osmena had to clarify the so-called promise by explaining that what the President had said was that the United States would help the Filipinos to promote their economic development to prepare them for independence. (127)

Osmena's lack of enthusiastic support (coupled with Aguinaldo's attitude and the critical stance of some sectors of the Filipino press) depressed Quezon. He wrote a rather emotional letter to Governor Harrison deploring that his generation was obviously "destined to be slave" and that he had lost faith in his people and was sick of politics. (128) Quezon countered Osmena's indifference by a public avowal that the political situation was still most critical, and the coalition should continue. In a statement interpreted as a challenge to Osmena, he declared: "I created the coalition with the support of my party, and I will fight anyone who


(128) Quezon to Harrison, August 21, 1926, in Harrison Papers, Box 32.
opposes it whoever he may be. I do not believe that Senator Osmena could have meant to assail the coalition, but if he did, then I am against him."(129) In further defence, he emphasized, "I shall consider the creation of the coalition the greatest achievement of my public career."(130)

The Osmeña "utterances" contributed in no small measure to the gradual fading away of the Council. By June 1927 the general impression was that it had little vitality left. The absence of any later mention of the organization in Manila newspapers indicated its complete disruption shortly before the elections of 1928.

During the turmoil caused by Senator Osmeña's critical references to the coalition, Dr. Jose S. Reyes, a political scientist who was Osmeña's secretary in America, explained in very succinct terms why the coalition fared as badly as it did. He declared:

Although the Philippine question had never been in more unfavourable position than it was last year, still the situation was not of a character which warranted a step that other nations have taken, if at all, usually only in the midst of war.

On the part of the majority party it was a faint-hearted abdication of responsibility.

On the part of the minority party it was suicide without sufficient cause.

It has erased party lines and substituted for them purely personal quarrels and government by blocs.


(130) Ibid., August 20, 1926.
It has left the country without the possibility of an alternative government.

In the United States, intelligent opinion regards it as proof of lack of understanding of the essential principles of democratic government.

It has not succeeded in truly uniting the country. Whatever unity seems to have been attained is artificial, and like most delusions, had better not exist.

If it succeeds it will be the greatest single backward step in the political field we have taken in a generation because we would have to begin over again the establishment of political parties with definite programs and platforms.(131)

From 1926 to 1927, concurrently with the formation and period of major activity of the Supreme National Council, fresh controversies arose. The "crisis" with Governor Wood entered a new phase.

(131) The Sunday Tribune, August 7, 1926.
CHAPTER VIII

THE "CRISIS" COMES TO AN END

The concluding crises in Wood's administration of the Philippines were preceded by a fresh American review of the Philippine situation. The continuing friction between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders was a matter of concern for the Administration. Congress could have resolved the dispute by responding to the Filipino demand for increased autonomy, but failing this, neither Governor Wood nor the Filipino politicos found the occasion to compromise and settle their differences. Washington had felt it necessary, during the early stages of the controversy, to support Governor Wood unreservedly on the question of his powers and responsibilities. But with the dispute continuing, President Coolidge proposed a study of the Philippine situation.

Thus, in April 1926 Coolidge selected Carmi A. Thompson of Ohio (1) as a special commissioner to make a survey of the economic and internal conditions of the Philippines, and "to report to me on what I might possibly do to secure a better administration of affairs in the islands and a further development of their economic conditions."(2) President Coolidge later told Henry L. Stimson that

(1) Carmi A. Thompson was an Ohio politician in his early public career. He also served as Assistant Secretary of the Interior under President Taft and was briefly Treasurer of the United States. After leaving public office in 1923, he engaged in various business activities, especially in iron ore and coal mining. See Manila Times, April 4, 1926.

(2) See Cable, McIntyre to Wood, April 3, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 189. See also Thompson's statement upon arrival in Manila, in Manila Times, July 9, 1926; also in Coolidge Papers, Reel 178.
public pressure had forced the Thompson Mission, as the American press was increasingly becoming critical of United States neglect and lack of information on the Philippines. So he wanted Thompson's fresh and independent views of the situation in the Philippines, on which he could base a Philippine policy.

Speculation flew fast and thick as to the real purpose of the Thompson Mission, especially since the appointment was unexpected and was made without congressional advice or assent, and also without the prior knowledge of the Secretary of War, who was himself planning on an inspection trip in the Philippines. Some construed the appointment as indicating lack of confidence in Governor Wood's reports and recommendations, and a change of administration in the Philippines was hinted. Others viewed the action as a move to check the independence agitation in the Philippines by holding out the prospect of action by the United States. And still others speculated that the Mission's object was to open the Philippines to the exploitation of American business interests, especially

J. Ralston Hayden of the University of Michigan, who went as technical adviser to Thompson, recorded a conversation with him on board ship on the way to Manila wherein Thompson confidentially told him that the purpose of his mission was really political, although it had been announced as economic. President Coolidge reportedly wanted to know what should be done about the government of the Philippines, especially about independence. See Hayden letter to his wife, Betty, on board S.S. President Grant, June 17, 1926, pp. 3-4, in Hayden Papers, Box 33.

(3) See Stimson to Wood, December 24, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 182. Coolidge's appointment of Thompson led the Democrats in Congress to demand a bipartisan investigating commission.

(4) McIntyre to Frank McCoy, October 5, 1926, in McCoy Papers, Box 21. See also Hayden letter to his wife, June 20, 1926, p. 5, in Hayden Papers, Box 33.
Governor Wood understandably had mixed feelings about the Thompson Mission. This was in spite of Thompson's being a friend and his having advised Wood that his survey was designed primarily to assist President Coolidge in promoting the development of the Philippines, and in no respect was intended as a reflection upon the Governor's Administration or to indicate a desire to investigate his activities. Despite statements of Wood to the contrary, there was no question that Wood resented Thompson's "intrusion" into his affairs in the Philippines, and from the beginning was dubious of the results of the mission. (6) His attitude towards the mission was

(5) See Osmeña to Quezon, April 5, 1926, in de la Rosa Papers; William Howard Taft to William Dinwiddie (St. Louis Post Dispatch), April 10, 1926, in Taft Papers, Reel 281; and McCoy to Wood, April 21, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 181. See also Manila Times, May 5, 9, 1926.

Hayden noted that in the course of their conversation on board ship, Thompson had said that rubber was one of his primary interests, although he was not putting that conspicuously forward. See Hayden letter to his wife, June 20, 1926, p. 5, in Hayden Papers, Box 33; see also Manila Times, April 5, 9, May 21, 1926.

In an interview with President Coolidge on December 22, 1926, Henry L. Stimson had expressed the thought that the Thompson Mission had been a "dangerous mission" because to the "Oriental mind" it was assumed to reflect on Governor Wood. See Stimson to Wood, December 24, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 182. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, December 22, 1926, in Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.

(6) Manila Times, May 9, 1926.

Wood recorded his dissatisfaction in his diary. For instance, he complained of the persistent effort by "some" to build up friction between him and Thompson through intimating that the Mission was having difficulties in getting information, and yet he had supposedly generously made his staff and office available to Thompson. He also noted that Thompson had seen very little of economic conditions of the Philippines (to make a meaningful report) because most of his time was being spent in banquets and receptions. See Wood Diary, July 26, August 8, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 24.
not improved any by Thompson's decision to decline Wood's offer to accompany him on his trips to the provinces.(7)

The Filipino leaders' attitude towards the mission was initially one of mistrust and suspicion, coming as it did on the heels of the reactionary bills in Congress and the announcement that the mission would be completely economic. To them it was part of the concerted assault upon their national interest and seemed an ominous threat to the cause of independence. In time Filipino skepticism gave way to confidence and cordial cooperation as Thompson proved himself a tactful and diplomatic envoy, convincing everyone of his open-mindedness and impartiality in the discharge of his mission.(8)

Thompson spent almost three months in the Philippines (from July 9 to October 4, 1926), travelling throughout and interviewing "representative" Americans and Filipinos in Manila and elsewhere.(9) Everywhere he was received with "due courtesy and unbounded

(7) See Manila Times, July 12, 1926; also letter, Quezon to Harrison, August 21, 1926, in Harrison Papers, Box 32.

(8) See J.R. Hayden, "Thompson Visit to Philippines Pleases Native," Christian Science Monitor, September 2, 1926, clippings in Hayden Papers, Box 34. Hayden reported that Americans in Manila were not overly sanguine as to the results of the Thompson survey. Their attitude was one of hopeful, but not enthusiastic, cooperation.

(9) The Thompson Mission was accompanied by a crew of high-powered journalists from the New York Herald Tribune (Thomas Steep), the New York Times (Russell B. Porter), the Chicago Tribune (Parks Brown), the Chicago Daily News (Paul R. Wright), and the Christian Science Monitor (J. Ralston Hayden). In Manila several correspondents, both American and Filipino, joined the Mission during its tour of the Philippines. The presence of representatives of the press in the Mission gave rise to the belief that President Coolidge desired to stimulate a keener interest in the Philippines among the American people. See
hospitality."

Although the Thompson survey in itself produced no adverse consequences, the arrival of Thompson in the Philippines brought into sharper focus the political controversy between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders. Quezon declared that there was a deadlock between the Governor General and the Legislature, "because of the difficulty in getting the Legislature to pass any remedial legislation as long as Governor Wood is here."(10) Quezon's attacks on Wood seem to have been intended to show Thompson that the Governor was unpopular.

The desire for independence was also brought to the attention of the distinguished visitor, although initially propaganda focused only on grievances against Wood's administration and the economic situation and outlook.(11) After passage of a plebiscite bill in


Wood complained that the presence of a large number of newspaper correspondents and a following of Filipinos made it very difficult for Thompson to get a real expression of opinion from both Americans and Filipinos. Americans, he was convinced, would not talk frankly in the presence of Filipino reporters. See Wood to William Howard Gardiner, August 9, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 180; Wood Diary, August 2, 1926, ibid., Box 24.

(10) New York Times, August 1, 1926.

As delicate as the situation was in the Philippines, only two unpleasant incidents occurred during the Thompson visit. One was the threatened conflict between Moro and Christian Filipinos at Zamboanga (Mindanao Island); the other was a bitter denunciation of Governor Wood by a Filipino speaker at a public meeting in Legaspi, Albay Province (Luzon Island). See Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1926; also Manila Times, August 26, 27, 31, September 1, 2, 13, 1926; New York Times, August 27, September 8, 1926.

(11) Ibid., July 11, 14, 15, 1926.
late July and the Governor's veto of it on August 14, the agitation became more intense.(12)

In addition to the plebiscite bill, there were independence resolutions directed specifically at the Thompson Mission. On July 16, 1926, a concurrent resolution was passed by the Legislature "reiterating the petition of the Filipino people for immediate, absolute, and complete independence," and asking Thompson to convey to President Coolidge this "constant and intense" desire of the Filipinos.(13) A similar resolution, authored by Quezon, was considered on September 29, 1926, "setting forth the firm desire of the Philippine people for immediate, absolute and complete independence and its opposition to any measure that might render such independence impossible or retard its advent." Quezon submitted this "new profession of faith" to the Supreme National Council for the purpose, he said, of rectifying conflicting information which might have been sent by American correspondents (attached to the Thompson Mission) to the United States in connection with the stand of the Filipinos on the independence question. The "rectifying" was probably directed at recurring reports in the United States that the Filipinos had changed their attitude towards independence and were amenable to a compromise on their independence demand. The American press was reporting that a moderate view appeared to be growing, led presumably by Senator Osmeña, who had returned from his mission to

(12) Ibid., July 21, 23, 1926.

(13) Concurrent Resolution No. 29, 7th Phil. Leg., 2nd sess., Official Gazette, Vol. XXV, No. 30, p. 711. See also in Manila Times, July 18, 1926.
the United States early in August.(14)

On October 4, an independence memorial was presented to Thompson by the Legislature, for presentation to President Coolidge. The memorial declared that the current relations between the Governor General and the Legislature were "unsatisfactory" and "so long as the causes which have created these difficulties remain, it is not expected that the situation [in the Philippines] will improve." The memorial added that it would only aggravate the situation to enlarge the powers of the Governor General, as contemplated by Congress.(15)

Outside Manila, Thompson was greeted in most places by independence demonstrations which, the press reported, bore all the earmarks of "poli tico organization."(16) The speeches and banners all demanded independence and were presumably inspired from Manila, with detailed instructions coming from the Supreme National Council. Hayden commented that the fact that those activities were successfully directed from Manila was indicative of the Filipino "genius" for political organization and the almost universal sentiment among Christian Filipinos for independence.(17)

(14) See Cable, Vicente Bunuan (Press Bureau, Washington, D.C.) to Quezon, September 21, 1926; Quezon to Bunuan, September 22, 1926, in Quezon Papers, Box 46. See also New York Times, July 15, 30, August 6, 12, 24, September 14, 1926; Manila Times, September 28, 29, 30, 1926.

(15) Ibid., October 3, 4, 1926.

(16) Wood Diary, September 15, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24.

(17) See his article in Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1926; also Manila Times, July 28, August 5, 1926.
Nonetheless, as his report later showed, Thompson was not convinced that independence was what the Filipinos really wanted.

On December 4, 1926, Thompson presented his report, which was based, according to him, upon "information gathered from personal observations; from conferences with representative Americans and Filipinos; from speeches, memorials, petitions, and various other written documents; and from reports and statistical data prepared by the executive departments of the Philippine government and the American trade commissioners in Manila."(18)

On December 22, President Coolidge transmitted the report to Congress, with the comment that it was an excellent report although he disagreed with some of the views and recommendations expressed therein. He also again expressed commendation of Wood's administration, as he had in his annual message to Congress on December 7 (this by way of protecting Governor Wood). He did not indicate the parts of the report which did not receive his approval.(19)

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(18) Senate Document 180, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., 1926. Not all of the Thompson Report was published. Thompson was understood to have gone into the possibilities for developing the production of camphor, coffee, hemp, and other products required by the United States. He apparently also included detailed technical data concerning the economic value of the Philippines in the unpublished portion of his report. See Manila Times, March 10, 1927.

(19) Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 68, pt. 1, p. 912. See also Coolidge Papers, Reel 178. See also Stimson to Wood, December 24, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 182; and Manila Times, December 8, 1926. President Coolidge disagreed with Thompson's report on the military aspect of the government and administration in the Philippines. See Memorandum of interview with President Coolidge and Secretary of War, May 2, 1927, in Forbes Papers.
The Thompson survey and report dealt with much the same subject matter as the Wood-Forbes Mission in 1921, except that in this instance a Republican President had initiated the investigation of a Republican-appointed administration in the Philippines. Thompson expressed the hope that his report would result in successful action in relation to the Philippine problem. In general, the report was a fair and sympathetic presentation of the administration and economic situation of the Philippines.

In the report, Thompson said that the political problem was the fundamental problem in the Philippines. "The fundamental need in the Philippines is [therefore] the solution of the political problem in such a way as to assure the existence for a considerable period of time of a government which will be reasonably favorable to economic development and financial investment." "The political and economic elements of the situation in the islands are so inextricably bound together," he added, "that it will be impossible to bring about any economic development there before the political status of the archipelago has been settled finally, or for a long time to come." This political problem had two principle elements: "a wide-spread and insistent agitation for immediate, absolute, and complete independence," and "a deadlock between the Governor General and the legislature."

On the first element, Thompson reported that in his judgement complete independence was out of the question then and for a long time to come. And the reasons he advanced echoed standard

(20) See Hayden letter to his wife, June 25, 1926, p. 10, in Hayden Papers, Box 33.
Republican arguments against Philippine independence. They were:

1. The Philippines lack the financial resources necessary to maintain an independent government . . . .

2. Because they lack a common language . . . the Filipinos do not have the homogeneity and solidarity which are prime requisites of a strong, democratic nation . . . .

3. The controlling public opinion which is necessary for the support of a democracy does not now exist in the Philippines, nor can it until the daily press and other vital organs of public opinion are very much more widely circulated and read than they are at present.

4. From the standpoint of American commercial interests in the Far East, it would be unwise to relinquish control of the Philippines at the present time. Our trade with the Orient has been expanding year by year and all indications point to an increased volume of business for the future. We need the Philippines as a commercial base, and the retention of the Philippines will otherwise be of great benefit to our eastern situation.

5. Abandonment of the Philippines at this time might complicate international relations in the Orient.

6. The granting of complete and immediate independence would end the free-trade relationship between the United States and the Philippines. This and other resulting conditions would bring about economic disaster for the Philippines.

The report indicated a tendency to view the Philippine question in the broader context of Far Eastern policy and the implications for American trade in Asia (a view which also had been expressed by Governor Wood).

Despite the independence propaganda, Thompson reported that no Filipino leader, either in politics or business, expected independence in the near future. He maintained that the majority
opinion among the Filipinos favoured a political settlement which would eventually give them complete autonomy in internal affairs, with the United States directing foreign relations.

Regarding the second aspect of the political problem, Thompson attacked Wood indirectly by stressing the deadlock between him and the Legislature which had resulted in mutual loss of faith and confidence. He assigned responsibility to both branches of the government. (21) The legislative leaders, he observed, had consistently sought to exercise power vested in the Governor General by the Jones Law but largely relinquished to the Filipinos by Governor Harrison. However, Wood was criticized for his use of military advisers and the military atmosphere of his administration, which had caused adverse reactions among the Filipino leaders. His military advisers, known as Wood's "Cavalry (or Khaki) Cabinet," lacking experience and training in civil government, had antagonized the Filipinos and had provided them with excuses to avoid cooperation. A more purely civil administration would be preferable, he advised. (22)

(21) Thompson found resentment among the Filipino leaders against Governor Wood on the score of interference by the executive in purely local issues, refusal to accept advice from the Filipino leaders, reduction of much of the internal autonomy enjoyed by the Filipinos during the Harrison regime, and a tendency to adopt an imperialistic attitude toward the Philippine problem. See New York Times, November 20, 1926.

Thompson then laid down the course of action required of the United States, thus:

... America must not abandon these islands to the risks of an independent existence without reasonable preparation to meet the economic competition or the political aggression of stronger nations. We must not drop the task which we assumed a quarter of a century ago until we have satisfied ourselves that the Filipinos are fully prepared for complete self-government. Nor should we take from the Filipino people their aspiration to govern themselves whenever they are able to stand erect as an independent people, a condition of which the United States must be the final judge. The United States should not be swerved from these purposes either by Americans who may desire to exploit the Philippines or by Filipinos who are demanding a premature relinquishment of American sovereignty over the islands.

Frank McIntyre noted in a memorandum to the Secretary of War (on December 9, 1926) that Thompson failed to observe that the most unpopular of Wood's advisers was the one civilian who had never had any connection with the military service—Insular Auditor Ben. F. Wright. The military men with Wood did not become unpopular until Governor Wood had his controversy with the Legislature in 1923. Thereafter the Filipinos discovered that attributing a militaristic policy to Governor Wood had an appeal to the American and Filipino public and they capitalized on that. Governor Wood had had no greater number of army officers subject to his order than had other Governors General. See Memorandum in BIA Records 1239-180. See also Secretary of War Davis to President Coolidge, personal and confidential, December 20, 1926, in BIA Records 1239-after-180.

Thompson himself had occasion to observe personally in several instances the "tactless and arbitrary conduct" of Governor Wood's so-called "Cavalry Cabinet" during his mission in the Philippines. This, he felt, was the chief cause of friction between the Governor General and the Legislature. He further observed that even among Americans in business and official life in Manila there was found not only resentment but ridicule over the Cavalry Cabinet. In fact, some Americans in Manila attributed the break between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders in 1923 to the Governor's lack of suitable advisers, as the law did not permit him to obtain American advisers elsewhere than from the War Department. Some of Wood's friends contended that he was compelled to rely on his military advisers because he felt he could not trust the Filipino leaders. See New York Times, November 20, 1926, February 2, 1927.
He cautioned the United States not to reduce the internal autonomy which had already been granted to the Filipinos, unless their conduct should make this step necessary. He said: "Our policy should be gradually to extend autonomy in internal affairs in accordance with the capacity of the Filipinos to shoulder these responsibilities. We should convince the Filipinos by our conduct that we will not exploit the natural resources of the country, but will facilitate and expedite the growth of a strong, united nation with sufficient development of its natural wealth to insure a revenue great enough to provide for the proper functions of government." With this end in view, he urged that steps should be taken at once to restore the confidence of the Filipinos in America's good faith in order that there would be complete cooperation between the two peoples and the two Governments.

Finally, Thompson proposed a specific programme of action for the more effective administration of the Philippines and a further development of its economy. His principal recommendations were

(1) Postponement of independence but granting of further autonomy in internal affairs as the situation would warrant;
(2) Establishment of a Colonial Department;
(3) Replacement of Wood's "Cavalry Cabinet" by civilian advisers;
(4) Retention of Mindanao and Sulu and replacement of Filipino officials in Mindanao by Americans and Moros;
(5) Extension of the Federal Reserve banking system to the Philippines;
(6) Establishment of federal land banks and agricultural experimental stations;
(7) No change or amendment in the Jones Law;
(8) Amendment of current land laws by the Philippine Legislature;
As Carmi Thompson was a friend of Governor Wood (and like him, was also at one time a military man), the popular expectation had been that his report of conditions in the Philippines would convey a complimentary view of the current American regime, and probably would be unfavourable to the Filipinos, like the Wood-Forbes Report was in 1921. Although the report did comment unfavourably on Filipino preparedness for independence, its criticism of certain aspects of Wood's administration, especially his so-called "Cavalry Cabinet," came as something of a surprise. While Thompson did

(23) The American business community in Manila was reportedly not greatly impressed with Thompson's recommendations because the Report did not really recommend action, one way or the other, that would definitely settle the Philippine question. They felt that the only solution lay in either one of two options: absolute control of the Philippines by the United States, or complete and absolute independence. See Manila Times, December 23, 1926.

(24) Thompson's criticisms of Wood and his military assistants provoked indignant comments from some of the Governor's friends.

Former Governor Taft thought that Thompson had made a fool of himself in his criticisms of Wood and his military assistants and suspected that he (Thompson) did that for the purpose of giving an appearance of independence of Wood. He also thought that his head had been swelled by the publicity he had acquired through the President's appointment. See Taft to Stimson, December 28, 1926, Stimson Papers, Box 93; Taft to Stimson, January 22, 1927, Taft Papers, Reel 288; and Taft to D.R. Williams, March 21, 1927, ibid., Reel 290.

Frank W. Carpenter (former Governor of Mindanao and Sulu) wrote McIntyre that Thompson's recommendation that the Governor General be provided with necessary civil advisers in order to relieve him of the necessity of selecting advisers from the US Army was indicative of how superficial his investigation really was. See letter dated February 15, 1927, in Carpenter, "P" file, BIA Records.
not wholly condemn the Wood administration and in fact commended Wood's efficient conduct of affairs in the Philippines, he emphasized that cooperation must be re-established immediately between the American executive and the Filipino legislative branches. His suggestion that President Coolidge act at once to restore cooperation between the Governor General and the Legislature was interpreted in some quarters to imply a possibility of Governor Wood's withdrawal as Chief Executive. (25)

Governor Wood was more than annoyed at the criticisms of his administration in the Thompson Report, particularly because he had received repeated assurances from Thompson that there would be nothing in his report which would be unfavourable or disagreeable to him. He resented deeply the "contemptible" attack on the army officers attached to his office, for these were the very same people

D.R. Williams wrote Taft on March 11, 1927, that the Thompson Report "will hurt rather than help the situation" in the Philippines. The whole report was a "scarcely veiled attack!" on Wood, and on every question where there was controversy between the administration and the politicos, Thompson sided with the latter. It is possible, he speculated, that Thompson had hoped to win favour with the politicians in the hope of succeeding Wood when he was forced into retirement. See Taft Papers, Reel 289.

Stimson himself thought that Thompson's Report, except for one or two injustices to Wood, was actually pretty good. Stimson to Taft, December 27, 1926, in ibid., Reel 287.

(25) Rumours of Wood's resignation or withdrawal were fanned, first, by the appointment of the Thompson Mission in April 1926, and later, by the critical stance adopted by the Report. There were discreet leaks to the press about Wood's health and mention of possible candidates to the position (among them Henry L. Stimson, Senator James A. Wadsworth of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and Thompson himself). President Coolidge repeatedly denied rumours of Wood's sacking, but it was obvious the President recognized the need for urgent action on the Philippine problem. See New York Times, May 22, July 23, December 6, 25, 26, 1926.
who had helped Thompson when he was in the Philippines. On top of that, Governor Wood could not understand how Thompson could have urged any more autonomy than the Filipinos already enjoyed, for in his opinion they held all of the offices and carried on almost all the government.(26)

The War Department, responsible for the conduct of Philippine affairs, hit straight and hard at the Thompson Report with an officially authorized statement objecting to Thompson's "super-critical" comments on Governor Wood's staff in Manila. It defended Governor Wood's dependence on his military assistants on the grounds that appropriations were not available with which to pay civilians.(27)

It is interesting to note that three weeks after the Thompson Report was made public, President Coolidge transmitted Governor Wood's annual report for 1925 to Congress for publication and

(26) Wood thought Thompson deserved to be "thoroughly castigated" and he would have burned him up in public except for Stimson's caution. See Wood Diary, September 15, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24; Wood to SecWar Davis, December 29, 1926, Box 180; Wood to McIntyre, February 25, 1927, Box 184; Wood to Stimson, February 26, 1927, Box 185; Wood to Clarence Edwards (former BIA Chief), March 3, 1927, Box 183, all in Wood Papers.

Thompson's criticisms of Wood were reportedly much toned down because of Hayden's part in preparing the report. See Hayden to A.V.H. Hartendorp, April 8, 1927, in Hayden Papers, Box 2.

(27) The War Department was also opposed to the creation of a separate colonial department as recommended by Thompson, but it would not object to any plan for removing the Philippines from its jurisdiction. See Manila Times, December 24, 27, 1926.

Frank McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs advised that the Thompson Report should not be published because of the undeserved criticism of Governor Wood. See Stimson to Wood, December 24, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 182. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, December 22, 1926, Stimson Papers.
distribution. The report, which first had been made public in mid-1926, received considerable attention because of the many sharp divergencies between Thompson's viewpoint and that of the Governor General as reflected in their respective reports. Perhaps the transmittal to Congress was done to enable Governor Wood to recapture some of his lost prestige in Congress as a result of the Thompson Report.(28)

While the Thompson report was equally unsupportive of immediate independence, there was nevertheless no strong Filipino reaction to the Thompson Report— a decided contrast to the reaction to the Wood-Forbes Report in 1921. Quezon took issue with Thompson's Report by affirming that the majority of the Filipinos were for absolute and immediate independence, and he challenged President Coolidge to approve the independence plebiscite bill recently passed by the Legislature.(29) But he found some comfort in Thompson's recommendations of further autonomy and his criticisms of the exercise of "dictatorial powers by the military rulers in Malacañang," (the Governor's official residence in Manila). "The reign of the sword over the people of the Philippine Islands is doomed," Quezon gloated.(30)

(28) Manila Times, January 5, 1927.


(30) Quezon was also pleased with the recommendation on the land laws, but took issue with the recommendation to strengthen American control over Mindanao and Sulu. See Manila Times, December 24, 27, 1926.
The immediate results of the Thompson Report were nil. Although much discussed, it did not receive widespread official approval. President Coolidge (who probably did not agree altogether with Wood's policies in the Philippines and had been restrained in his praise of the Governor General), made no new recommendations on the basis of the report, and Congress paid scant attention to it. The President might have wished that Governor Wood had administered Philippine affairs with a minimum of controversy, but he could not very well repudiate him along the lines suggested by the report, for this would have undermined completely not only Governor Wood's authority but American sovereignty in general. (31)

The Thompson Report was seen as critical of Wood. Therefore, to balance the account, President Coolidge asked Henry L. Stimson (32) to report on conditions in the Philippines as he had found them

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(31) *New York Times*, December 24, 1926; *Manila Times*, December 28, 1926. See also SecWar Davis to Coolidge, personal and confidential, December 20, 1926, in BIA Records 1239-after-180. The President discovered after the publication of the Thompson Report that a considerable faction within his own party were good friends of Governor Wood and that they resented the unexpressed, but obvious, efforts of the Administration to bring him back to the United States. See *Manila Times*, April 24, 1927.

(32) Henry L. Stimson, (1867-1950) one of America's leading public servants during the first half of this century, was not unfamiliar with Philippine affairs. He served as Secretary of War from 1911 to 1913 during the Taft Presidency, and in such capacity he had specific responsibility for Philippine affairs. His attitude toward Philippine colonial affairs was largely influenced by a senior predecessor in the War Department -- Elihu Root -- who had administered the new colonial empire acquired by the United States in 1898. At the time of his visit to the Philippines in 1926, he was a practicing New York lawyer. See Michael J.J. Smith, "Henry L. Stimson and the Philippines," (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1970).
on his unofficial visit there in the summer of 1926. (33) Though his report to the President had limited immediate impact, in that it was never made public, it may, nevertheless, have been influential subsequently in persuading Coolidge to appoint Stimson as the next Governor General after Wood.

Stimson's visit was actually one that Wood, a close personal friend, had requested Stimson to make. On March 2, 1926, Wood had written Stimson for help in finding someone to visit the Philippines who could give him legal advice regarding his administration. After consultations with General Frank R. McCoy, chief assistant to Governor Wood in Manila for four years, Stimson decided to make the trip to the Philippines himself. (34)

Stimson went out to Manila on the same ship with Osmena, who was then returning from his mission in Washington. Osmena impressed him favourably with his conservative conciliatory attitude as against Quezon's radical anti-Americanism. Between Osmena and

(33) President Coolidge had an interview with Stimson on December 22, 1926, after what seemed a long period of inattention since Stimson returned from his Philippine trip. Coolidge did not send for Stimson until after he had gotten the Thompson Report out of the way. In that interview, Stimson strongly praised Wood's administration in Manila and urged President Coolidge to protect the Governor General from the criticisms of Thompson's Report. See Stimson to Wood, December 24, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 182. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, December 22, 1926, Stimson Papers.

(34) See Wood to Stimson, March 2, 1926, ibid.; see also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6A, Stimson Papers. See also Manila Times, August 3, 1926.

Way after Stimson had left the Philippines, Quezon wrote Governor Harrison that he thought Stimson came for the sole purpose of anticipating the defense of the administration of Governor Wood in the face of a possible adverse report by Thompson. See Quezon to Harrison, December 11, 1926, in Harrison Papers, Box 32.
Stimson there developed a friendship. It was through the initiative of both men that conferences between Governor Wood and Quezon were brought about, looking towards a policy of cooperation.

Stimson and his wife arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1926, and stayed for six weeks, during which time Governor Wood accompanied them on trips through the islands. Stimson also met with prominent Filipino politicians and Americans, with whom he discussed the situation in the country.

Desirous of healing the rift between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders, especially Quezon and Roxas, Stimson began talks with Osmena and Quezon in August in hopes of resolving the impasse in administration in Manila. Following public utterances by Osmena in which he came out openly for an end to the policy of non-cooperation with the American Government and Governor Wood, Stimson convinced Wood to meet with Osmena and talk over a reconciliation plan. The final conference, on September 9, included all three Filipino leaders — Osmena, Quezon, and Roxas. Stimson presented a "Memorandum on Suggested Cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Departments" which contained what to him

(35) Wood took Stimson to Mindanao at the same time that the Thompson Mission was visiting the southern island. See Manila Times, August 12, 1926.

(36) See Wood Diary, August 7, 10, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24; see also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6A, August 10, 19, 1926, Stimson Papers.

(37) See supra, pp. 323-324.

(38) See Wood Diary, September 1, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24; see also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6A, September 1, 1926, Stimson Papers.
seemed a realistic compromise — the establishment of a quasi-parliamentary government with the American Governor General retaining powers through inspection of administrative departments. (39)

Stimson sympathized with the Filipino desire for a greater share in administration and so, like Osmeña, he felt that the solution to the current deadlock might be in the adoption of a responsible cabinet government buttressed by effective executive authority. He thought it reasonable that the Filipino leaders should ask that the American Governor General turn over to Filipino political control, subject to restrictions and limitations (such as inspection of departments, supervision of Secretaries, the executive veto), the work of the administrative departments, appointing as heads of those departments men from the party gaining the majority at the general elections and men in sympathy with the leaders of that party.

As a quid pro quo for the adoption of such a policy, Stimson suggested that the Filipino leaders should agree to two safeguards: first, that the Governor General should be provided with a team of experts in the important lines of government (such as sanitation, agriculture, and law), to act as an inspection force not subject to confirmation by the Philippine Legislature, and directly and solely responsible to the Governor General; and, second, that there should be restored American supervision of the Moros and non-Christian

(39) See Wood Diary, September 9, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24; see also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6A, September 9, 1926, Stimson Papers; and Stimson, "P" file, BIA Records.
provinces, including uncontrolled power of appointment of the governors of those areas. (40)

The solution offered by Stimson required concessions from Wood, who was unwilling to grant them. Wood was bitterly opposed to selecting his Cabinet from the Legislature, for that would be tantamount to turning over administration to that body. (He even opposed the confirmation of department secretaries by the Legislature.) He reluctantly agreed to select his Cabinet from among members of the party which had the majority in the Legislature, provided there was a dominant party with a definite platform, or what Stimson referred to as "successful party government." Clearly, a quasi-parliamentary form of government had no appeal for him — it was alien to the American system. He felt strongly that the Jones Law was a good law and the Filipinos must cooperate under that Organic Act. (41)

After Stimson's departure, there was little hope that the compromise he had offered could be made to work. But perhaps it really had no chance for success from the beginning. Wood entered the conference convinced that nothing of significance would come from it. He thought his friend had not been in the Philippines long

(40) Stimson to Wood, October 11, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 182; Stimson to McIntyre, October 27, 1926, Stimson Papers, Box 92; See also in BIA Records 3038-166. For more of Stimson's views on the Philippine problem, see his articles "Future Philippine Policy under the Jones Act," Foreign Affairs, V, 3 (April 1927), pp. 459-471; "First Hand Impression of the Philippine Problem," Saturday Evening Post, March 19, 1927 (BIA Records 1239-187); and in the New York Times, March 14, 1927.

(41) Wood to Stimson, December 28, 1926, Stimson Papers, Box 93; Wood Diary, September 9, 1926, Wood Diary, Box 24.
enough to realize how large a gap there was between "promise and performance" on the part of the Filipino leaders. (42)

Stimson thought that the prospects were hopeful for better cooperation as a result of his "mission." But he actually left on a controversial note. On the eve of his departure from the Philippines, on September 9, Stimson stirred up a row in a statement to the press defending Wood's policy and popularity. He urged Filipino cooperation with Wood, at the same time criticizing Filipino exercise of power not legally vested in the Filipinos by the Jones Law. His statement was made necessary, he explained, by the manner in which the more radical Filipino leaders were using the Thompson Mission as an occasion to attack Governor Wood and the American Government. Inasmuch as Thompson did not seem to feel free to protect Governor Wood from such attacks, Stimson issued the statement defending the Governor General. (43)

(42) Ibid.

(43) For Stimson's press statement, see Wood Diary, ibid., and in Manila Times, September 9, 1926.

For Quezon's criticisms of Wood's "military dictatorship," see Manila Times, September 6, 1926. See also speech attacking Wood made by Bienvenido de la Paz, editor of the Bicol Herald, in ibid., September 8, 1926. There were also press dispatches from the Philippines to the United States hinting at trouble between Wood and Thompson. See Wood Diary, July 26, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24.
The Filipino press (and some members of the Legislature, except Quezon and Osmena), pitched into Stimson's final statement rather vigorously.\(^{(44)}\) Quezon, though angered by Stimson's statement, did not take issue with him until September 19, and even then, his much-delayed rebuttal showed careful preparation and restraint. Faulting Stimson's statement for not being wholly disinterested, he doubted Stimson's claim as to the popularity of Governor Wood among some groups of Filipinos and noted that the great majority of the people were not in accord with his policies and methods. He then proceeded to list Filipino objections to Wood's policies and denied that the Filipino attitude towards the administration of Wood was a defiance of the sovereignty of the United States. Stimson himself thought Quezon's remarks "courteous and temperate in tone."\(^{(45)}\) Perhaps Quezon did not wish to quarrel with Stimson or to break up the negotiations begun with Governor Wood. Wood, however, thought Quezon's statements unwarranted and a misrepresentation.\(^{(46)}\)

After Stimson left, no conference with the Filipino leaders took place and the attempted efforts at reconciliation proved futile.\(^{(47)}\)

\(^{(44)}\) See "Stimson Taken to Task By Members of the Legislature", in Manila Times, September 12, 1926. See also in Wood Diary, September 11, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24.

\(^{(45)}\) See Quezon's statement taking issue with Stimson in Manila Times and Philippines Herald, September 19, 1926. See also Manila Times editorial, September 20, 1926, noting Quezon's restrained statement. For Stimson's comments, see Stimson to Quezon, October 12, 1926, in Quezon Papers.

\(^{(46)}\) See Wood Diary, September 11, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 24.

\(^{(47)}\) See Quezon to Stimson, December 11, 1926, in Stimson Papers, Box 93.
In fact, Stimson's departure and the Thompson Mission were shortly followed by a major controversy over the Board of Control.

By early 1926, Governor Wood had reached the end of his patience with the "perfectly impossible" Board of Control and was eager to be rid of the dominating control in it of Quezon and Roxas.(48) The Board had been created by the Philippine Legislature in January 1921, during Governor Harrison's term, and consisted of the Governor General, the President of the Philippine Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature. The Board's sole function was to vote stocks in order to select the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank and of the various government corporations owned and controlled by the Philippine Government.(49)

(48) Wood to Stimson, March 2, 1926, Wood Papers, Box 182.

After the establishment of the Supreme National Council in January 1926, Wood was disgusted that all the votes on the Boards of Directors of the various government companies were purely on racial lines — Filipinos versus Americans. See in Wood Diary, February 6, 1926, ibid., Box 24.

Wood thought the Board of Control a most dangerous institution which was being used by Quezon and Roxas largely to carry out political policies and to help political friends. See Wood to McIntyre, December 16, 1926, ibid., Box 181.

(49) During Harrison's tenure in office, the Philippine Government had embarked on a number of economic ventures: the Philippine Legislature created the Philippine National Bank, purchased the Manila Railroad, created a Sugar Central Board and a National Development Corporation with investments in coal and cement. The Government undertook most of its business enterprises because, ostensibly, private capital would not. Substantially all of the business enterprises were failures — the Bank nearly became insolvent, the insular currency dropped to 15% below par, and the insular government came to the verge of bankruptcy. Governor Wood was concerned, during the early years of his term, with the rehabilitation of the financial situation.
Governor Wood did not at first intend to abolish the Board, although he was convinced that it was illegal in that it was a violation of the Organic Act, which placed supreme executive control in the hands of the Governor General. But his minority position on the Board seriously impaired his policy as Governor General, for he could never obtain the consent of the two Filipino members to the policy of getting the government out of business, which he was determined to do.

There were two fundamental reasons advanced by Wood for getting the government out of business: first, that the Insular Treasury needed the money invested in the business enterprises to spend it for the greater benefit of the public; and second, that governments were not qualified, in any nation of the world, to conduct business or engage in any industries which would compete with private initiative. (50) Wood was unhappy with the graft and mismanagement

(50) In a letter to Speaker Osmeña and Senate President Quezon, dated December 6, 1926, Wood had urged the disposal of government-owned business as soon as possible. In the absence of adequate private capital, he had suggested that the government encourage and attract foreign capital to develop the resources of the Philippines. See Report of the Governor General, 1921, pp. 1-2. See also Horace M. Towner to President Harding, January 21, 1923, in Harding Papers, File 400, Box 654; and Confidential Memorandum for the Governor General on Local Political Situation, prepared by Gordon Johnston, August 5, 1923, in Wood Papers, Box 165. For Wood's attempted actions on the railroads, the Philippine National Bank, and the sugar centrals, see E.W. Wilson (General Manager, PNB) to Harrison, May 20, 1924, in Harrison Papers, Box 35.

After two years of bickering on the matter, Secretary of War Weeks settled the controversy by telling Wood that it was his duty to manage efficiently the business enterprises established by the Philippine Legislature even though he "believed these investments unwise." As long as the Philippine Legislature appropriated money for their operation, Wood was to operate them, he was told. See Report of the Governor General, 1923, pp. 41-42.
which he saw and felt that the only hope for the enterprises was to put them in the hands of experienced American businessmen.

The Filipino leaders, on the other hand, wished the continuance of the companies and a share in their management through the Board of Control, for to them acceptance of the Governor's policy would have meant domination by American capital, a situation which might prejudice their campaign for independence. All efforts toward amicable settlement proved futile.

In March 1926, Wood had requested an opinion from Washington on the legality of the Board of Control after he had found it impossible to obtain "unanimity of opinion" with reference to his programme of getting the government out of business.(51) Acting upon opinions received from the Attorney General and the Judge Advocate General of the Army in Washington, he then issued, on November 9, 1926, Executive Order No. 37, abolishing the Board of Control, thus removing what he saw as the most serious encroachment on the executive power in the Philippines. The order provided that thereafter all the duties of the Board of Control would be exercised solely by the Governor General.(52)

Wood's chief justification for the order was the argument that by creating the Board of Control and making the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House members of it, the Legislature had created offices and then filled them with members of the

(51) See Cable # 352, Wood to SecWar, March 2, 1926, in Wood Papers, Box 189.

(52) Report of the Governor General, 1926, p. 36. For the opinions of the Judge Advocate General, April 16, 1926, and the Attorney General, Department of Justice, September 22, 1926, see ibid., pp. 27-35.
Legislature. This, it was alleged, was in contravention of the Jones Act, which provided that "no senator or representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office the election to which is vested in the legislature." In explaining his executive order, Governor Wood said:

In the opinion of the Judge Advocate General it is held that "The action of the Philippine Legislature in creating the various boards and committees involved in the statutes under examination and definitely naming the personnel of which such boards and committees shall be composed is in effect creating an office and at the same time filling it." Such action encroaches on the powers of the executive department, destroys the fundamental principle of the separation of powers in government and violates the doctrine that the legislature has the power and authority to make the laws, but the duty of executing them is on the executive department.(53)

There was considerable excitement over Wood's action. In Washington, it produced a profound sensation among political circles and brought the Philippine issue momentarily to the forefront in Congress. Needless to say, leading Philippine commercial concerns in New York heartily applauded the decision, which in effect placed control of all Philippine government enterprises in the hands of Governor Wood. Critics of Wood saw in his action an Administration plan to decrease the current measure of Filipino self-government and to concentrate power in the Governor General in preparation for large-scale commercial exploitation by "Wall Street capitalists."

(53) Manila Times, November 20, 1926.

Wood was annoyed at the seeming delay of the decision from Washington and suspected McIntyre was holding it up. See Cable no 484, August 4, 1926, Wood requesting Secretary of War to expedite decision, in Wood Papers, Box 189. See also Wood Diary, September 13, 15, 1926, ibid., Box 24.
especially American rubber interests. (54)

As was expected, the order met with opposition on the part of Senate President Quezon and Speaker Roxas, the Filipino members of the Board. The Filipino leaders were bitter and felt that they had been deceived. They claimed they were never given a chance to present their side of the case and that the episode was an "enormous injustice." (55) They deeply resented the secrecy which surrounded the Governor's request for legal opinions and the granting of them. They were especially resentful of the act of holding the order until the Legislature had adjourned, thus "preventing any move to create another board of control except by calling a special session." The ruling of the Attorney General suggested that the Philippine Legislature might resolve the question by creating another board of control to conform with law. But the publication of the order was delayed until it was impossible for the Legislature to act. (56)


(55) Quezon was quoted as saying that "the laws creating the Board of Control are valid, and should be so regarded until declared unconstitutional by the courts." Roxas went further and called Wood's action "an abuse of power, a curtailment of autonomy, and a usurpation on his part of the judicial functions, and an unjust provocation." See Manila Times, November 11, 12, 1926.

(56) The Attorney General's opinion was dated September 22, 1926. Wood received the opinion on October 2, with plenty of time to communicate with the Legislature before adjournment, but he did not, and saw fit to transmit the opinion and issue the executive order immediately after adjournment. The legislative session ended at 7:05 a.m. on November 10. The executive order, dated November 9, was released on November 10. See Cable # 303, October 2, 1926, McIntyre to Wood, in Wood Papers, Box 189; see also Manila Times, November 10, 11, 12, 14, 1926.
At first stunned by the suddenness of the order which took the management of government corporations out of legislative hands, the Filipino leaders then determined to make the Board of Control issue the supreme test case of the Wood Administration. On November 13 Quezon and Roxas sent a letter of protest to the Governor in their capacity as members of the Board, which read in part:

Our duty constrains us to inform you that we dissent from and protest against the action taken by you. The Board of Control has been created by and its legal existence recognized by numerous acts of the Legislature, and we are at a loss to understand how by a mere executive order it can be abolished. It is a well-established fundamental principle of constitutional government and one which is essential to the maintenance of the separation of powers, which seems to be the basis of your executive order, that the determination of the constitutionality of a law falls exclusively within the province of the judicial department of the government.

The assumption by you of the powers of the Board of Control would place in your hands as Chief Executive the control and disposition of many millions of the Filipinos' money. Needless to say, this has never been the intention of the Legislature. (57)

They then notified the Governor General that they would ignore his executive order and that they would continue to act as members of the Board of Control, until the law under which it was created was repealed by the Philippine Legislature, annulled by Congress, or voided by the courts. (58)

(57) See ibid., November 14, 1926. See letter also in Wood Papers, Box 181.

On November 17, 1926, the members of the Legislature, assembled as the Commission of Independence, unanimously approved a protest to Executive Order No. 37, enumerating besides a list of grievances against the Governor General's administration. Charging that his conduct of the government had been characterized by a train of usurpations and arbitrary acts, resulting in the curtailment of Filipino autonomy, the destruction of the Philippines' constitutional system, and the reversal of America's Philippine policy, they listed a series of usurpations heretofore committed by the Governor General (citing twenty-three instances).(59)

Seeking leverage, Quezon and Roxas decided to use an impending meeting of the National Coal Company directorate to force court action upon the Governor General. The meeting, scheduled for November 20, 1926, was postponed by Governor Wood. On December 6 Quezon and Roxas then met as the majority of the Board of Control and elected a Board of Directors for the coal company. In the absence of Wood, who did not attend the meeting, Quezon acted as chairman of the Board of Control and in that capacity refused to

A more vigorous protest which was presented earlier was not adopted and the above cited less emphatic one was approved. The original protest condemned Governor Wood's abolition of the Board of Control as the "most odious tyranny" that a strong ruler can inflict upon a populace. It denounced the Governor's action to President Coolidge, Congress, the American people, and the entire world! See Manila Times, November 17, 18, 1926.
The resolution adopted was in large part the work of Jose Abad Santos and Jorge Bocobo (Dean, College of Law, University of the Philippines). Osmeña was reportedly responsible for the milder protest.
A special committee of the Supreme National Council, headed by Quezon, was formed to tour the country and appeal to the people against Executive Order No. 37. See Manila Times, November 18, 1926.
recognize Governor Wood's men among the Board of Directors of the company. As a result, the Governor started *quo warranto* proceedings in the Philippine Supreme Court against the elected directors of the company. Quezon and Roxas, in turn, filed a demurrer to the *quo warranto* complaint, claiming that Executive Order No. 37 abolishing the Board of Control was illegal on the grounds that the Governor General could not abolish the Board by sole action and that the legislative act creating the Board remained valid until declared void by the United States Congress.(60)

During all this controversy, General Aguinaldo again supported Governor Wood. Aguinaldo called the list of grievances against Wood "purely empty literature without foundation whatsoever." He added that "if all what is said there is true, all Filipinos in the government have no reason whatsoever to remain a day longer in the public service." To the Governor he sent a letter of congratulations for his Executive Order, declaring that the abolition of the Board of Control would tend to the better conduct of government business. Quezon was quite naturally infuriated by the open support Aguinaldo had given Governor Wood. But Aguinaldo did not withdraw his support.(61)

(60) See *ibid.*, November 16, 18, 19, 20, December 3, 6, 7, 21, 1926; January 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 21, 25, 1927. See also Cable # 593, Wood to Sec War, December 22, 1926, in *Wood Papers*, Box 189.

*Quo warranto* proceedings were also initiated against some directors of the Philippine National Bank. See *Manila Times*, February 28, 1927.

(61) See *ibid.*, November 19, 21, December 7, 1926. See also Wood Diary, November 10, 11, 1926, in *Wood Papers*, Box 24.

The Democrata Party favoured non-interference of government in business, at the same time censuring Governor Wood's manner of action in relation to the Board of Control issue. See *Manila Times*, November 18, 1926.
On April 1, 1927, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the legality of the action of the Governor General. The five American justices in the high court voted in the majority with Justice Norberto Romualdez (Filipino), while the remaining three Filipinos justices dissented, holding that the government corporations were in a way private companies, and therefore, the Legislature could make what provisions it wished as to how the government stocks should be voted.

The majority opinion, written by Justice George Malcolm, contended that the Governor General's power should be commensurate with his responsibility. Congress never intended that the Governor General should be saddled with the responsibility of administering the government and executing the law but should be shorn of the power to do so. The decision set forth the principle that "The legislature cannot lawfully exercise powers which are in their nature essentially executive or judicial. The legislature cannot make a law and then take part in its execution or construction."(62)


The Supreme Court, by a vote of 4 to 3, denied the appeal of Quezon and Roxas for a stay of execution until the decision was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court and instructed the Governor General to take over the administration of the Philippine enterprises at once. See Manila Times, April 4, 1927.

Filipino officialdom regarded the Philippine Supreme Court decision as "the worst beating the Filipino participation in the government ever had." See ibid., April 1, 1927.

Senator Sumulong proposed the creation of a new body to take the place of the defunct Board of Control believing that it was neither wise nor expedient to have the Governor General exercise the powers formerly executed by the Board. See ibid., April 3, 1927.
Finally, the case came before the Supreme Court of the United States, which early in 1928 sustained the Philippine tribunal's decision. (63) Defeat in this legal battle proved the final blow to the Supreme National Council, which by then had already been seriously weakened.

Governor Wood's precipitate action abolishing the Board of Control necessarily widened the rift between him and the Filipino leaders. But he acted in character, pursued a line of action that he sincerely believed was the most adequate to the problem at hand. However, had he so desired, he could have consulted the Filipino leaders and recommended that the act creating the Board of Control be amended to conform with law — thus avoiding the criticism that the Executive Order constituted a political attack on the Filipino leaders.

Wood probably would have assumed that he had nothing to gain, as the Filipino leaders would not have heeded his recommendation. After all, the leaders had known that the statute debated might be declared illegal — yet had done nothing. And then dramatically


On July 25, 1927, the Philippine Legislature, by Con. Res. No. 46, protested against the alienation of government-owned companies without the approval and concurrence of the Philippine Legislature. See Manila Times, July 18, 19, 1927.

Although Wood had intended to sell the government-owned businesses after he abolished the Board of Control, he was not able to do so during his term. Quezon denounced the Governor's plan to sell the companies to private interests "without lawful authorization from the Legislature" as "the most absolute despotism." See ibid., December 2, 28, 1926, May 11, 1927; New York Times, May 11, 1927; and Philippines Herald, May 12, 1927. See also strictly confidential, Guevara to Quezon, July 14, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.
they had appeared before the public with "gestures of despair and chagrin," as if they had come face to face with a fact never thought of before.

If blame needed to be found, a sober editorial from an independent Filipino daily, The Tribune, is probably the most apt. If Governor Wood had unnecessarily antagonized the Filipinos, it declared, Filipino leadership, premised on personal ambition, had also unnecessarily antagonized the Governor General. (64)

Another disagreement between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders concerned an independence plebiscite bill. The Philippine Legislature initially passed the bill (Senate Bill 198), providing for a plebiscite on immediate independence, in early November 1925. Its purpose was to counteract the anti-independence campaign in the United States premised on the assumption that, except for a small group of self-interested politicians, the Filipino people did not desire independence. The plebiscite was intended to show opponents of Philippine independence in the United States that the struggle for national freedom was not confined to a few but was supported by the mass of the Filipino people. (65)

(64) See Tribune editorial in Manila Times, November 12, 1926.

(65) See Quezon to Osmena, cable, November 4, 1925, in Quezon Papers, Box 46. See also Manila Times, November 6, 8, 9, 10, 1925. The plebiscite plan had an "independence in six years" clause in its original form. In its final form, it had the "immediate and absolute independence" provision inserted.

The idea for a plebiscite was supposedly inspired by Charles Edward Russell, an American socialist and publicist, author of the book, The Outlook for the Philippines (1922), a pro-Filipino, pro-independence tract commissioned by the Filipino leaders. Russell urged an independence petition with a million signatures as a good means to bring the question before the American people. See Manila Times, November 5, 1925.
The plebiscite was not to be held. The Governor vetoed the bill for the first time on December 1, 1925, for the following reasons:

The calling of a plebiscite and providing for the holding of the same to determine the attitude of the people of the Philippines Islands with respect to their political relations to the United States is not a matter within the scope of the legislative power granted under the organic act. (66)

The bill (later known as Senate Bill 214) was re-introduced in the next session of the Legislature and was approved by the Senate on July 20 and by the House on July 27, 1926, shortly after the arrival of the Thompson Mission. Wood again vetoed the bill, on August 14, but the Legislature reconsidered and repassed the measure with the concurrence of more than two-thirds of the members of both houses. It then went to President Coolidge for final decision. (67)

The bill provided for a national plebiscite whereby citizens of the Philippines, twenty-one years of age, would signify their preferences by giving a categorical "Yes" or "No" to the question,

The idea was also reportedly mentioned to Quezon by Senator William E. Borah (Republican, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See ibid., November 17, 1925.

The Manila Times called the plebiscite plan another one of Quezon's expedients "to keep his head above water" at a time when his leadership was somewhat shaky. See ibid., November 8, 1925.

(66) See ibid., December 9, 10, 1925. See also BIA Records 364-580. For the legislative history of the plebiscite bill, see BIA Records 364-with-613.

Quezon considered holding an "unofficial" plebiscite on independence after Wood vetoed the plebiscite bill. See Manila Times, December 21, 1925.

(67) The Senate reconsidered the veto on August 18, the House on August 30, 1926. See letter from Roxas to Wood, September 6, 1926, in BIA Records 364-623-B. See also Manila Times, August 31, 1926, and BIA Records 364-623-C and BIA Records 364-623-D.
"Do you desire the immediate, absolute, and complete independence of the Philippines?" (68)

In his veto message of August 14, 1926 to the Senate President, Wood explained again his veto of the bill. He wrote:

... Not only does this act not expressly grant to the legislature such a power [the calling of a plebiscite and the holding of the same], but the provisions of the act are opposed to and inconsistent with such a grant. Even assuming that a power to hold a plebiscite could be implied from a grant of general legislative power, the subject matter of the plebiscite would properly extend only to matters on which the legislature itself is authorized to act.

The initiation of a plebiscite on the question of the political relations between the United States and the Filipino people, he continued, rested with the sovereign power -- the Government of the United States. There is the further objection to the bill, he concluded,

... that it limits the voters in the expression of their wishes to the single question of whether there should be an immediate and complete severance of all political relations with the United States, the withdrawal of sovereignty, and the alienation of its territory. Such a limitation seems to me to tend to exclude consideration of many elements (particularly elements of preparedness, of ways and means, cost, responsibilities, and dangers) which will necessarily enter into such a momentous problem, as to which the Filipino people are now largely uninformed and as to which they must be thoroughly informed before an intelligent or dispassionate opinion could be obtained. Even, therefore, if the calling of a plebiscite properly lay within the powers of the Philippine Legislature, the present bill is not well adapted to secure the expression of an opinion which would be helpful. (69)

(68) See BIA Records 364-623-A.

(69) See BIA Records 364-623-C; also Report of the Governor General, pp. 72-73; and Manila Times, August 17, 1926.
The Governor, on October 19, 1926, submitted to President Coolidge for his consideration additional reasons for his veto of the plebiscite bill, recommending that his veto be sustained by the President. Wood expressed doubts that a fair consideration and result were likely to be obtained from a situation where those immediately in charge of the holding of the plebiscite were already committed to the one side of the proposition to be voted on -- in this case, in favour of independence. Experience had shown, he claimed, that emotional appeals based on "racial and national feelings," such as in the matter under consideration, inevitably took precedence over "considerations of economic policy and international relations requiring calm and dispassionate judgment."

A most serious objection, he continued, was that the holding of the proposed plebiscite would create the impression that the United States believed that the time was ripe for the consideration of the question of independence. This situation would inevitably raise expectations on the part of the Filipinos that if the vote turned out to be favourable to complete and immediate independence, appropriate steps would be taken to grant it. He could not help but feel that the agitation for complete and immediate independence involved in the proposed legislation was being sought more "for the purpose of advancing local political interests than for the attainment of the complete and immediate severance of the political

Wood thought he had to veto the plebiscite act on legal grounds to protect the President. See Wood conversations with J. Ralston Hayden, July 10, 1926, in Hayden Notes, Hayden Papers, Box 33. Stimson, who was visiting Wood in Manila at the time, had a hand in drafting the memorandum on Wood's veto of the plebiscite bill. See Stimson Diaries, Vol 6A, August 10, 1926, Stimson Papers.
relations with the United States." A plebiscite on the question of immediate independence, he believed, would divert further the attention of the Filipino people from the consideration of "the essential preliminaries for a stable, well-governed, community." And finally, he pointed out that appropriating public funds for holding such a plebiscite was clearly illegal. (70)


Perhaps anticipating that President Coolidge would uphold Governor Wood's veto of the plebiscite bill, Claro M. Recto, House minority floor leader, presented a resolution providing that the 7th Philippine Legislature, in its session beginning in July 1927, act as a constitutional assembly for the purpose of preparing, discussing, and approving a constitutional plan for a Philippine Republic. The primary purpose of this resolution being to definitely sound out the opinion of the American Congress on the question of Philippine independence, the proposed constitutional plan was to be submitted to the President and Congress of the United States. See BIA Records 364-A-858 and Manila Times, October 27, 28, 1926, April 8, 1927.

Jose Abad Santos, chairman of the Committee on Campaign and Publicity of the Supreme National Council, was not enthusiastic about the Recto proposal because the methods proposed therein were "at variance with modern democratic practice" and further, because the Legislature had not been elected for the purpose of drafting a constitution. See Abad Santos to Supreme National Council, November 1, 1926, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

On the American side, Representative Ralph Gilbert (Democrat, Kentucky) presented, on December 8, 1926, H. Con. Res 40 providing that a referendum be held to determine the sentiment in the Philippines in regard to independence. Gilbert, anticipating the President's veto of the Philippine plebicite bill on the grounds that it was a prerogative of Congress to initiate such action, offered his resolution. See Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 68, pt. 1, p. 97. See also Manila Times, December 9, 1926.

The Filipino leaders felt that approval of this Gilbert Bill would test the sincerity of American leaders in their attitude towards Philippine independence. See ibid., for Philippines Herald editorial.
On April 6, 1927, President Coolidge sustained the Governor's veto of the plebiscite bill in a long message (which lifted substantial portions of Wood's October 19th letter) in which he stressed the need for greater economic and political progress before such matters as the holding of an independence plebiscite should be attended to. In his letter to Governor Wood explaining his reasons for his veto, President Coolidge reviewed the various advantages, especially economic, accruing to the Philippines as a result of the current relationship with the United States, at the same time pointing out the difficulties and problems which would be encountered by an independent Philippine government.

The result of the vote by the Filipino people would be unconvincing, he advised, for it would not reflect the opinion of those Filipinos who wanted independence under American protection, or who wanted independence after a further period of training and development. He said:

Independence is a very appealing word. Few people will vote against independence for themselves or against independence for anybody else. To submit to a man a question whether he desires to be independent or not is really trifling with the sacred feelings innate in human kind, and to submit it in a way which would forbid the possibility of other than a "yes" or "no" answer, obviously is not the way to secure a convincing reply.

He then set down his firm conviction that the people of the Philippines had not as yet attained the capability of full self-government and that that was the ultimate goal which must be attained -- not constant agitation and opposition. He went on to lecture that
The ability of a people to govern themselves is not easily attained. History is filled with failures of popular government. It can not be learned from books; it is not a matter of eloquent phrases. Liberty, freedom, independence, are not mere words the repetition of which brings fulfillment. They demand long, arduous, self-sacrificing preparation. Education, knowledge, experience, sound public opinion, intelligent participation by the great body of the people, high ideals -- these things are essential. The degree in which they are possessed determines the capacity of a people to govern themselves. In frankness and with the utmost friendliness, I must state my sincere conviction that the people of the Philippine Islands have not as yet attained the capability of full self-government.

He then concluded by reprimanding the politicians, saying that

The people should realize that political activity is not the end of life, but rather a means to attain those economic, industrial, and social conditions essential to a stable existence. A plebiscite on the question of immediate independence would tend to divert attention of the people toward the pursuit of mere political power rather than to the consideration of the essential steps necessary for the maintenance of a stable, prosperous, well-governed community.(71)

The message constituted a painful defeat for the Filipino politicians, for it dismissed their campaign for independence as mere agitation unworthy of serious attention. Further, it denied them the one effective means of proving that all Filipinos were united in their demand for independence. Once again, President Coolidge stated clearly the attitude of the American Government towards immediate independence, at the same time inviting the Filipinos to appreciate what American withdrawal from the

(71) See Report of the Governor General, 1927, pp. 64-69; also in Manila Times, April 7, May 4, 1927 and New York Times, April 7, 1927.
Philippines would involve. Insofar as Governor Wood was concerned, the Administration once again supported his action in Manila, and the Filipino leaders' attempt to discredit the Governor General had failed again.

This setback came at a time of confusion and controversy with respect to another proposed mission to the United States.

It will be recalled that Osmeña returned from his mission to Washington after the end of the 69th Congress in June 1926 convinced that the reactionary measures which had been contemplated by Congress would not be acted upon. Matters were under control, he concluded, even though there was the strong possibility that those measures would be re-introduced in the next session of Congress to convene in December 1926. But despite Osmeña's recommendation that there was no need for another mission, Quezon announced in

(72) Congressional sentiment among Republican partisans in the succeeding session was indeed still inclined to consider what they thought were necessary corrective measures for the Philippines. President Coolidge had boosted this sentiment in his annual message to Congress, delivered on December 7, 1926, when he dwelt extensively on the Philippine situation and urged Congress to pass some of the remedial measures introduced in the last session.

Indeed, some of these measures were re-introduced in the second session of the 69th Congress, and strong efforts were exerted to pass at least the revised Kiess Auditor and Internal Revenue bill, but no decisive action on the Philippine situation was made. Capitol Hill was disposed to string out and avoid any final commitments until sentiment towards a Philippine policy had taken a definite form in the United States. The non-action in Congress may be largely attributed to Democratic gains in the 1926 by-elections and the weakened position of the Republican majority in both houses of Congress. In the opinion of most political observers, no Philippine legislation of any kind was likely to be passed until after the presidential elections in 1928. See Manila Times, October 25, November 4, 8, December 9, 1926.
mid-September that a small legislative mission would almost definitely be sent to the United States in December for the opening of Congress.(73)

It is probably not far-fetched to conclude, from the sequence of events which followed Osmeña's return to Manila, that Quezon's decision was motivated by the desire to undercut what he might have perceived as Osmeña's manoeuvre to "return" to power.(74) Quezon's leadership within the coalition, shaky from the start, was even more threatened by Osmeña's apparent dislike for the coalition that Quezon had set up in his absence.

On November 9, 1926, the Legislature created a small legislative committee to go to the United States to work for the final solution of the Philippine problem and to oppose the passage by Congress of any measures curtailing Philippine autonomy. After the abolition of the Board of Control, revealed the following day, the mission was specifically instructed to present to Congress and President Coolidge the protest of the Filipino people against the alleged arbitrary acts of Governor Wood, especially against Executive Order No. 37.(75)

(73) Ibid., September 8, 13, 15, 1926.
(74) See supra, pp. 321-325.
It was hoped that the planned parliamentary mission, to be headed by Quezon and Recto, (76) could leave for the United States in November. But the departure was postponed because of insufficient funds, and Quezon was accordingly designated as a special envoy to go to the United States immediately as the advance guard of the legislative mission. (77) Not even Wood's action abolishing the Board of Control helped in resolving the funds problem, (78) and there was

(76) The relation between Quzeon and Recto deserves some comment. After the "furore" of the Fairfield Bill episode in November 1924 had died down, Recto and Quezon seemed to be drawing closer together rather than apart, especially after the formation of the Supreme National Council early in 1926. There were even rumours that Recto had resigned from the Democrata Party to join the Nacionalista Party, but the resignation never took place. The Recto-Quezon alliance may have been an anti-Osmeña manoeuvre. The supposed Recto resignation was perhaps someone's idea to prop up the withering coalition. See Manila Times, December 12, 1926, April 19, 22, 1927.

(77) See ibid., November 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 23, December 13, 1926, January 7, 12, 1927.

Quezon's partisans within the coalition opposed the sending of Quezon to the United States for fear that his departure would cause the final collapse of the coalition. In any case, they named Roxas as his substitute in the coalition when he did leave for the United States, because they felt that Osmeña could not save the coalition from breaking up in case of a crisis because of his hostile attitude towards it. See ibid., November 16, 18, 1926.

(78) There were various plans devised to raise the needed funds, not only to finance this planned legislative mission, but also to continue the Press Bureau in Washington, which was in dire financial straits. (The Press Bureau had not been enthusiastically supported in Manila because of the feeling that it had been "a perfect failure and a mere refuge for certain favorites of politicians in power." ) For instance, another "liberty drive" was planned, then scrapped; then it was announced that wealthy Filipinos would be asked to contribute to the independence fund, but their response was quite lukewarm. A bill was even introduced in the Legislature to permit government employees to solicit money and valuables for the fund (thus amending the Administrative Code which prohibited such soliciting). Members of the Legislature were supposedly required to contribute to the fund P1,000 (US $500) each from the heads of both houses; P300 (US $150) from each senator; and P250 (US $125) from each congressman.
a noticeable lack of unity and enthusiastic support (which Quezon deplored) among the Filipino leaders. (79)

Aguinaldo continued with his contentious attitude and assailed the practice of raising "liberty funds" and sending missions to the United States. Some Democratas strongly objected to the proposed mission because the Filipinos could not afford the expenses involved. And even Resident Commissioner Guevara in Washington advised against the Mission's coming, because not only was Congress against Philippine independence, but the Administration was pressing passage of the Kiess bill which, if accomplished while Quezon was in Washington, he thought would be disastrous to Quezon's leadership. (80)

In mid-January, Quezon deferred his trip to the United States, amidst speculation as to whether his absence would improve the political situation in Manila (both with regards to the relations with Governor Wood and the seemingly endless bickerings among partisan groups), and barbed comments that national unity could be attained by sending the fiery Senate President on "exile" to the

But the legislators' contributions came very slowly. See ibid., September 13, October 20, 30, November 24, December 12, 13, 20, 28, 1926; January 9, 14, 20, 26, 27, February 3, 8, March 30, June 28, 1927.

(79) Quezon had hoped that he could generate some enthusiasm for the independence campaign with information on the situation in the United States with respect to the Philippine cause after his return from America. See Quezon to Bunuan, January 20, 1927 and Quezon to Clyde H. Tavenner, January 20, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(80) See Manila Times, September 8, 24, October 20, November 9, 16, December 19, 24, 29, 1926, January 4, 9, 1927. See also Guevara to Quezon, December 28, 1926, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.
United States with the mission. Reacting to what his "enemies" planned to do to him, and with a view to retaining the political supremacy he had been enjoying for years, he postponed the mission's trip till March or April and declared that he would, in the meantime, embark on an intensive campaign in the provinces in support of the coalition. Obviously, Quezon wished to maintain himself in power at least until the general elections of 1928.

The political air in Manila was rife with rumours and speculation as to a possible change in Filipino leadership. Aguinaldo's veterans' group reportedly was engaged in a campaign to displace Quezon and to return Osmeña to national leadership to put an end to the troubles and difficulties with Governor Wood.

Wood (although distrustful of Osmeña) privately wished that Osmeña would join forces with Aguinaldo and aggressively challenge Quezon's leadership. But Osmeña remained silent (too timid, Wood thought, and by his silence abetting Quezon's activities). Perhaps Osmeña felt that serious dissension within the majority party would

(81) See Manila Times, January 10, 1927; also Tribune editorial on Quezon's leadership, in ibid., February 8, 1927.

(82) Ibid., January 12, 30, 1927.

There were several reasons advanced for the postponement of the Mission's trip: first, that Quezon wished to be present in Manila when the tangle on the Board of Control of the National Coal Company would be decided by the court; second, that Quezon was waiting for warm weather in the United States; and third, that there was really no immediate danger of Congress passing any legislation inimical to the independence aspirations of the Filipinos. See ibid., January 14, 24, 30, 1927; also Quezon to Bunuan, January 20, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(83) Manila Times, January 26, 1927.
weaken the Legislature's position in the fight for Philippine autonomy. Or, not wishing to strengthen the minority Democrata Party, perhaps Osmeña, in his usual quiet way, was working to destroy the coalition he never did like from the beginning. (84)

No legislative mission went to the United States until much later in 1927. Quezon was too busy shoring up his faltering leadership position to engage in the independence fight in America. (85)

The tensions and embarrassments brought on by the setbacks suffered by the Filipino leadership (the latest being in connection with the Board of Control and the plebiscite bill) were eased when Governor Wood finally consented to return to the United States on home leave, the first he had taken since becoming Governor General in 1921. He left Manila late in May 1927, fully intending to return after a brief rest and consultations in the United States, if his health permitted. But he arrived in America a very sick man, once again promoting rumours of his resignation. (86) Then on August 7,

(84) Wood to Stimson, December 28, 1926, in Stimson Papers, Box 93; Wood to Gordon Johnston, April 11, 1927, in Wood Papers, Box 184; and Wood to McCoy, April 16, 1927, in McCoy Papers, Box 21. See also Manila Times, February 28, March 2, 1927.

(85) Ibid., March 7, 1927.

Late in May there was talk again of the mission going to America. That did not take place, either. Then in July it was definitely decided that a permanent committee would be sent to the United States to work for the Philippine cause until the next presidential elections in 1928. But nothing happened until October. See ibid., May 25, 26, 1927; Philippines Herald, July 7, 8, 1927 in BIA Records 27668-78.

1927, Governor Wood died during an operation on a brain tumour he had been suffering from for seventeen years. His death brought to a close this turbulent period of Philippine-American relations. (87)

Leonard Wood's tenure as Governor General of the Philippines was marked by deadlock and political strife, with the Filipino political leaders, led by Quezon, openly challenging the authority of the American representative in Manila. The friction grew out of the Governor's programme to restore American supervision and control, particularly with respect to the functions of the Legislature. (88) But there were some who thought it was greatly

President Coolidge invited Governor Wood to return to the United States. Wood did not want to ask to go home and give the impression that he was quitting under fire.

President Coolidge told Stimson in December 1926 that Secretary of War Weeks had opposed Wood coming to the United States on home leave because he thought Wood had bitter enemies who would attack him if he came. See Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, December 22, 1926, Stimson Papers.

(87) In official circles in the United States, there was surprise and sorrow, mingled with indignation, that the facts regarding the Governor's true condition were concealed from the general public during the previous year. Wood himself was responsible for this. In fact, after he entered the hospital in Boston for the operation, every effort was made, at his own request, to prevent his medical case from reaching the public. See Manila Times, August 8, 1927.

(88) See Ben. F. Wright's Memorandum to President Coolidge, May 10, 1925, wherein Wright wrote that Governor Wood himself admitted that he had been quietly and firmly gathering into his hands some of the authority of which the Chief Executive had been unlawfully deprived during his predecessor's term. See in Wood Papers, Box 179.

Wood also admitted to J. Ralston Hayden that his hand had been in every department of the government. The touch is light, he said, but it was necessary. See in Hayden Notes, July 20, 1926, in Hayden Papers, Box 33.
exacerbated by the clash between the personal ambitions of the Filipino political leaders and Wood's desire to exercise what he saw as "the inherent rights of the Governor General." And because the contest was hopelessly enmeshed in the consuming emotional issue of independence, the political rancour was fanned by distrust and prejudice.

Any Governor General who was sent to the Philippines after Governor Harrison probably would have found the Filipino leaders peculiarly difficult to handle, unless he went as far as Harrison in allowing the Filipinos a generous share in the direction of their affairs. Wood was of a different mind — he was convinced that the Filipinos had taken an enormous stride backward during the Harrison Administration. He found the Philippine government bogged down in a major financial crisis and riddled with inefficiency, graft, and nepotism. He therefore saw it as his responsibility to reform the "critical situation" and restore the country to an efficient and orderly government worthy of American sponsorship. He probably had the right prescription for the Philippines — honesty in government and a tight administration — but his approach was hardly the most effective one. Contentious and imperial, he showed little

Another observation was made by Geo. H. Fairchild, a Manila old-timer businessman and former publisher of the Manila Times. He noted that during the six years that Governor Wood was in the Philippines, he had succeeded in recovering much of the authority which under the Jones Law belonged to the Chief Executive and had brought the administration of the Philippines back to the limits prescribed by that Act. He had also instituted certain policies with regards to the conduct of the government and to the withdrawal of the government from the numerous business activities undertaken in the previous regime. See Fairchild to F.R. Coudert, August 17, 1927, in Stimson Papers, Box 95.
consideration for the sensitive feelings of the Filipinos, for whom self-esteem, personal honour, and that incomprehensible (to the Westerner) worship of "face" were important matters. Governor Wood's experience all his life had been that of an administrator with absolute authority, concerned with results. As Quezon once said: "The trouble was he (Governor Wood) had been a commander too long. He wanted everyone else to be sergeants and corporals or privates. Didn't want anyone around so high as a first lieutenant." Had he thought more of methods and aimed somewhat lower in results, he might have gotten on better in the Philippines. But so forceful a personality, so powerful a will, such devotion to results produced compelling power. And the Filipino leaders reacted against that power of intervention in their affairs。(89)

Wood's political philosophy and economic views, his military background (thirty years in the military), his personality, as well as his physical condition, all contributed to his troubles in the


The Filipino leaders in Washington professed a willingness to place themselves in agreement with Governor Wood, provided it could be brought about in a way not unnecessarily humiliating to them. See McCoy to Stimson, June 16, 1926, in Stimson "P" file, pt. 1., BIA Records; and Record of Luncheon for Quezon at Army and Navy Club, Manila, January 18, 1929, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

In fact, for some time before Wood left Manila, the Filipino leaders were reportedly trying to bring about peace and re-establish cooperation without losing face. See H.B. Pond to J.G. Harbord (RCA), August 13, 1927, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 128.
Philippines. It would not be fair and accurate, however, to speak as if the only responsibility was Wood's. The Filipino leaders, especially Quezon, must share the burden for the state of affairs during Wood's tenure in the Philippines.

Partisan politics undoubtedly had much to do with the "crisis" which clouded most of Governor Wood's term. Quezon's lust for power (in the struggle to win supremacy over Osmeña for leadership) and his various manoeuvres to shore up his sometimes faltering leadership made him difficult to deal with. After 1923 Quezon exaggerated his dissatisfaction with many aspects of the administration of Governor Wood for his own political needs.

Perhaps the situation in Manila would not have been what it was had Wood faced a man unlike Quezon. Quezon was a proud, volatile, charismatic personality, with a tremendous capacity to manipulate people and events and to mobilize them to serve his needs. In 1923 he found the "supreme moment" he needed to establish his leadership. So he turned an otherwise trivial matter into a national issue and

(90) In a letter to Frank Carpenter on September 12, 1927, after Wood's death, Quezon summarized why he thought Governor Wood's administration had been a "monumental failure." He wrote that "his lack of knowledge and experience in running a civil government," "his unsympathetic attitude towards democracy and self-government as a military man," and the "wrecked condition of his health," all contributed to the "deplorable state of affairs" in the Philippines. See in Quezon Papers, Box 46.

(91) After Wood's death, Resident Commissioner Guevara intimated to Secretary of War Davis that the talk about militarism and a cavalry cabinet was taken up as a political slogan in opposition to Wood and was not taken as seriously in the Philippines as it was in the United States. See Davis to Coolidge, August 30, 1927, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 128.
succeeded in setting himself up as the heroic champion of Filipino nationalism. Having launched the attack on Wood, he found it politically useful to disagree with the Governor General on almost every fundamental issue affecting the Philippines. The Governor General unwittingly helped him by stubbornly resisting him and insisting on his rights.

It also did not help that to the Filipinos, Governor Wood's was not an endearing personality. He was not "simpatico." Except to his close friends, he was a very frigid personality who for the most part wore a look of seriousness, if not severity.\(^{(92)}\)

Though at bottom there was indeed much politics in the confrontations between Wood and the Filipino leaders, that was certainly not all of it.

A serious bone of contention between Wood and the Filipino leaders was, of course, the issue of independence. Wood opposed Philippine independence and bitterly resented the agitation for it by the nationalistic politicos. It was impossible, he said, to even think of independence when conditions were so unsatisfactory and the Filipino leaders were totally lacking in qualities for leadership. He believed that America undertook a responsibility towards the Philippines, and it was futile for the Filipinos to wish for independence until America's "noble task" had been completed. He possessed an exalted vision of the future of the Philippines and was

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\(^{(92)}\) See Ernest J. Westerhouse to Harrison, May 20, 1922, Box 35; Rafael Palma to Harrison, April 22, 1924, Box 31, both in Harrison Papers. After the Cabinet Crisis, the Filipino leaders noticed that Wood had become unreasonably arrogant in his ways and autocratic in his behaviour.
baffled that the Filipino leaders did not have the same consuming passion as he had for devotion to duty, service to the country, and the highest ideals of political morality.

By consistently arguing against Filipino capacity and character, Wood offended Filipino pride, for the argument implied (unintended perhaps) a natural white superiority unacceptable to the Filipinos. As an ardent nationalist himself, Wood failed to understand the aspirations of "backward peoples" for self-government, for to him the greatest blessing such peoples could receive was American rule over them.(93)

Wood failed to realize that after over two decades of progressive autonomy, it was unrealistic to expect the Filipinos to agree to a prolonged postponement of independence, unless there was a definite declaration from the United States that independence would come, say in 25 or 50 years, while in the meantime steps were taken to assure that they were progressing towards independence. It was even more unreal to expect that the Filipinos would elect self-government under foreign tutelage in preference to complete independence. For the United States had consciously set about to encourage Philippine nationalism and through political, economic, and educational devices, had advanced the desires as well as the means for its expression.(94)

Interestingly enough, Wood reserved high compliments for the Filipino woman, who was, he said, "the best man" in the Philippines.

(94) See Memorandum for the Secwar from Felix Frankfurter, April 11, 1913, BIA Records 141-76.
No doubt Wood's opposition to independence was due also to what he sincerely believed was the Filipino position. He accepted that the Filipinos all wanted independence, but believed they were willing to trust the good faith of America so long as America did not seek to take a backward step (in relation to insular autonomy) and did not seek to turn the Philippines over to interests which would exploit them and keep them permanently.

Unhappily, by 1927 there was in the Philippines a growing suspicion that the United States, whatever her intentions may have been in the past, was making up her mind never to grant the Filipinos independence. (The rubber propaganda to retain the Philippines alarmed the Filipinos.) This was fostered partly by the intemperate attitude of the American newspapers in Manila (especially the Manila Times) and partly by articles which appeared in the American press. So the Filipino leaders felt they had to press their cause, so America would not forget her promise when the time came to fulfill it.(95)

It is unfortunate that Quezon and his colleagues felt themselves forced to maintain a false and insincere position when they insisted on complete, immediate, and absolute independence, despite being aware that their country was not ready for independence politically and financially (this is probably symptomatic of the indirection which often characterizes Philippine

(95) See Wood Diary, June 6, 1921, July 14, 1923, August 10, 1925; and Wood to SecWar Weeks, March 31, 1922, all in Wood Papers; also Wood to McIntyre, December 4, 1923, in BIA Records 364-469 1/2. See also Forbes to SecWar Davis, September 23, 1927, in Forbes Papers and BIA Records 141-107A.
society). But they were compelled to take that position because no declaration of definite policy was forthcoming from Washington, and party politics dictated that they espouse the independence cause to enable them to keep their hold on the people.

Wood as a consequence dismissed the independence movement as the agitation of a handful of self-interested political leaders, and this apparent distaste for the current generation of politicians did not go well with the Filipino leaders. It was Wood's wish that the United States would hold the Philippines until a younger and clearer-visioned class of leaders had succeeded to power. Perhaps it would have made for more constructive relations had Wood accepted the force of the independence sentiment, however unreasonable it might have seemed to him, and then tried to work out the problems with the Filipino leaders in a manner that would not have been embarrassing for the politicos.(96)

In addition to opposing movement towards independence, Wood also opposed any further concessions with regards to autonomy. In his diary and correspondence, Wood recorded that in his various talks with Quezon, Osmeña and other Filipino leaders, he repeatedly told them that so long as the irregularities that had been pointed out by the Wood-Forbes Report remained uncorrected, it would be useless to talk of progressive autonomy for the Philippines. Yet it would be unfair to say that Governor Wood reversed the movement towards autonomy. He could not have done so — for while he wanted a modification of the Jones law, he could only recommend such

action. Congress had the prerogative of taking action, and did not do so. So Wood in running the government was also limited by the Jones Law.

Besides political matters, the Filipino leaders disagreed with Wood on another fundamental issue — on economic policy affecting the disposition of the public domain and the administration of government-owned companies. Governor Wood stressed the need for economic development as a prerequisite to a stable government (which in turn was a prerequisite to independence) and favoured attracting foreign, or specifically American, capital to develop the country. The Filipinos were afraid that foreign capital would mean exploitation by foreigners and would nullify the economic policy established by the Legislature "for the protection of the rights and interests of the Filipino people in the development of the resources of the islands." So they opposed the liberalization of land laws to accommodate tropical plantations (which would be foreign-financed and owned) and the sale of government-owned business to foreign interests.(97)

At this point, it is perhaps appropriate to present an interesting commentary on Wood's racial views. A reading of the Wood Papers cannot fail to reveal an insight into the Governor's mind on the matter — full of the imperial pretentions and prejudices of the turn of the century. Both in his diary and in his extensive correspondence, Governor Wood repeatedly wrote that the problem in the Philippines was not political — but "biological" —

that of different races. (At one point he expressed this opinion directly to Quezon.) For example, he wrote that

... we are confronted by a problem to solve which involves almost a setting aside of the plans of the Almighty, at least their modification, and that we are trying to bring a Malay people with all their traits and defects into a condition where they will have the attributes, ideas, and methods of thinking of the Anglo-Saxon or Western European.

Wood found the personal character of the Filipino leaders devoid of the "great fundamental qualities" of his own Protestant ethics, which called for public spirit, civic courage, individualism and self-reliance. Again and again he wrote his friends that the only deadlock there was in the Philippines was a "deadlock of character," not a deadlock in government -- between obedience to law and determination to avoid the law.

The injection of racial overtones contributed to the intolerance and acrimony which marked the relations between Governor Wood and the Filipino leaders. Wood failed to appreciate the racial sensitivities and their relation to political issues. Perhaps Quezon's words aptly describe why the politicos and Wood could not relate to one another. He wrote to McIntyre that

Governor General Wood's main fault, which makes him absolutely unfit for the position is his absolute lack of faith in the Filipinos either individually or as a race. Because of this he never took his secretaries of departments or the Council of State into his confidence; he has always given more weight and consideration to what Americans say; he has

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(98) See Wood Diary, December 4, 1923, April 6, 1924, Wood Papers. See also entry for August 22, 1926, in Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6A, Stimson Papers.

considered the Filipinos secondary in the affairs of this Government. (100)

Wood's difficulties also had to do with the men who surrounded him. The charges of militarism against them were probably exaggerated after the break with the Filipino leaders in 1923, but there were legitimate grievances. As far as the Filipinos were concerned, the Governor relied too much on these subordinates for decision or policy. Of these assistants, or his so-called "Cavalry Cabinet," Gen. Frank R. McCoy was the only one who made a favourable impression on the Filipinos (he was called the "balance wheel"), and he at one time was even talked about as a possible Governor General. The others had offended the Filipino leaders, either because of personal rudeness and imperious behaviour, or because they advised the Governor General badly. (101)

(100) See Quezon to McIntyre, November 13, 1923, in Quezon Papers, Box 45.

Ironically, some old-timer American residents in Manila also faulted Wood for failing to consult them.

There is need to thoroughly examine the implications of Governor Wood's economic and racial views. In the political atmosphere generated by the conflict between Quezon and Wood unmistakable were the racial, economic, and political overtones. See Peter W. Stanley, "The Forgotten Philippines, 1709-1946," in American-East Asian Relations: A Survey, edited by Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 308.

(101) Gordon Johnston was regarded as a pest because of his meddling with matters that he knew nothing about. See James Ross to Harrison, March 3, 1923, in Harrison Papers, Box 33. See also his rude behaviour towards Jose P. Laurel at the time of the Cabinet Crisis in 1923, in del Castillo and del Castillo, op. cit., p. 79.

For other instances of slights committed by Wood's assistants, see E.B. Rodriguez to Harrison, March 6, 1924, Box 33; C.M. Hoskins to Harrison, March 15, 1924, Box 28; and Rafael Palma to Harrison, April 22, 1924, Box 31, all in Harrison Papers. See also Forbes' observations of Langhorne's rudeness to Quezon during Forbes' visit to Manila in December 1926, in Forbes Journals, Second Series, pp. 402-403.
Wood's physical condition was also a major, though not easily evaluated, factor in his stormy administration.

While he was Military Governor of Cuba in 1898, Wood hit his head violently on a lamp as he rose suddenly from his desk. This injury caused a tumour to grow in his skull (for which he was operated on in 1909), which caused him to have periodic seizures somewhat akin to epilepsy. The tumour grew again after the operation, and Wood was subject to those seizures while he was Governor General of the Philippines. Probably because of this injury, Wood also suffered from lapses of memory. While in Manila, he almost always had somebody with him when meeting with the Filipino leaders, which seemed to indicate to them a lack of trust. The Filipinos did not realize that it was a protection to himself on account of his health and uncertain memory. A good deal of Wood's unpopularity with the Filipino leaders was probably due to this misunderstanding.(102)

Geo. Fairchild told J. Ralston Hayden (when the latter came with the Thompson Mission in 1926) that the Wood-Quezon break was due in part to Wood's impaired memory of recent events. Wood, he said, remembered details of events years past, but often lost recollection of what he had said within a month, a week, or a day.

Quezon thought that perhaps the rupture between Wood and his Filipino Cabinet, as well as with the Legislature, might not have taken place had Frank-McCoy not left for the United States. See Quezon, op. cit., p. 139.


Wood also saw to it that one of his assistants was always around when he met with the Filipino leaders to make sure he was not misquoted or misrepresented by them.
In 1923 Wood apparently had come to an agreement with Quezon with regard to the remission of taxes and forgot that he had done so. Quezon went ahead on the basis of their agreement, and Wood failed him and refused to do his part because he forgot that he had done so. Quezon thought Wood had double-crossed him and so fought him.(103)

By 1926, Wood had failed miserably in health, but his physical deterioration was known only to his family and close aides.(104) He had noticeable difficulty with his left leg and left arm. He had to be helped to his feet, and he staggered rather than walked.(105) Worse, he was almost blind. Nevertheless, the true nature of Wood's condition was carefully guarded, not only while he was in the Philippines, but even after his death.(106)

Ronald F. Chapman, in a recently completed doctoral dissertation which, unfortunately is not being made generally available,(107) would even go so far as to claim that Leonard Wood

(103) See Hayden Notes, August 7, 1926, Hayden Papers, Box 33; supra, p. 116.
(104) Amazingly, nothing is hinted in his diary or correspondence about any serious illness. One in fact gets the impression he was an extraordinarily vigorous man in his sixties, going for long walks to keep himself fit and constantly hopping around on inspection trips around the country.
(105) At the opening of the Legislature in June 1926, he had to be assisted to the rostrum, where he did not read his annual message himself but remained seated while his secretary read it. See New York Times, November 20, 1926.
(106) Wood's health was the subject of a lot of talk, and although the extent of his illness was a carefully guarded secret, President Coolidge was aware that he was failing in health.
(107) "Leonard Wood and the Culion Leper Colony, 1921-1927: A Study in American Character" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii,
was physically unfit to be Governor General of the Philippines.

Despite his shortcomings, of body and mind, few would deny that Governor Wood was an able and devoted administrator. He worked hard and he knew the Philippines as few knew the country. Few would doubt that he was sincerely interested in the welfare and the interests of the Philippines and the Filipinos, while, understandably enough, he also sought to work for American interests. Though Filipino leaders resented his unbending refusal to accede to their many efforts to undermine American control of the executive branch as Harrison had allowed them to, they recognized sincerity and honesty and had a high respect for his administrative ability. Many conceded that in spite of controversy, in spite of a very serious illness, he had given the Filipinos a tradition of service in government and a loyalty to duty which were unmatched. (108)

Despite the problems of his administration, especially after 1923, there was sufficient cooperation between the Filipino and American elements to allow for some advances in government -- such as in the rehabilitation of finances, advances in health and sanitation, efforts at infrastructure, and general economic prosperity. Wood governed the Philippines after 1923 without any

1979), cited in Philippine Studies Newsletter (Philippine Studies Committee, Southeast Asia Council, Association for Asian Studies), Vol. 7, No. 3 (June 1979), p. 10. I ordered a copy of the dissertation from the University of Hawaii Library but I was told that the author did not want copies of his dissertation to be made. So I have not read the dissertation at all.

serious disruptions to governmental functions, in spite of the publicly-avowed Filipino policy of non-cooperation.(109)

But at the end, engaged in a hopeless controversy with the Filipino politicos, Governor Wood presented a rather pathetic figure. Harassed by ill health and family misfortune,(110) he stuck grimly to his job in Manila. He had wanted to make his Philippine assignment the culminating achievement of his public career, but in this as well as in his earlier service he was deeply disappointed.(111) Death perhaps saved him from what would have been a most bitter fate, for in view of the strained relations in Manila, President Coolidge was hoping to find the occasion to have someone else take Governor Wood's place.(112)

(109) Ironically, many Americans, especially from the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila, criticized Wood for being too patient with the politicos and complacent to their demands and seemingly willing to compromise, especially in relation to the political status of the Philippines. These Americans were pushing for Congress to declare in favour of territorial government for the Philippines so the country could be developed into the "richest tropical area on this earth."

(110) His wife was also not in good health; his daughter had suffered a nervous breakdown; and his two sons were involved in scandalous business deals. See New York Times, January 1, 3, 4, 6, February 22, March 7, 1924.

(111) Wood was disappointed that President Wilson had not chosen him to lead the American Expeditionary Forces in France in 1917-1918. He chose a junior officer instead — John Pershing — because he believed Wood unable to submit his judgement to his superior in command. Wood also failed to win the Republican presidential nomination in 1920.

(112) See The Nation, August 17, 1927, in Manila Times, September 12, 1927. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, December 22, 1926, in Stimson Papers.
Unhappily for the Filipinos, the independence cause was not advanced during Wood's term in office, for by indulging in open and bitter opposition to him, they caused the predominant opinion in the United States to be that they had demonstrated their unpreparedness for responsible self-government. As a consequence, there was growing sentiment in the United States for retaining possession of the Philippines for a while longer.

Had Osmeña been the top Filipino leader in government, instead of Quezon, would there have a clash with the Governor General? Perhaps not, for Osmeña, unlike Quezon, was of a different temperament. He was less dramatic and less mercurial than his friend and rival. Because he was more introspective and restrained in manner, he might have reacted differently to the Conley affair—and the consequences and ramifications of that incident for the Philippine-American relationship might have been far different.
CHAPTER IX

THE QUEZON–OSMEÑA MISSION (1927) PROMISES COOPERATION

The succeeding period (1928–1934) saw the development of a reasonably amicable relationship between Filipinos and Americans in the management of insular administration. No one — Filipinos and Americans alike — wished the bitterness and friction which characterized the preceding period to recur. Wood's successors all 'got along quite well with the Filipino politicos.

After the death of Governor Wood in August 1927, the Filipino leaders sought to re-establish cooperation and harmony with American authority, because they realized that non-cooperation had been detrimental to the independence cause. The general congressional attitude had changed from sympathy in 1924 to one of disgust and a willingness to restrict Philippine autonomy by 1927. Even among the leaders of the Democratic Party, traditionally more sympathetic to Philippine independence, there had been a shift in sentiment against immediate and absolute independence. (1) A survey of Democratic Party opinion had shown that an overwhelming majority considered it unwise and untimely for the Filipinos to lose American protection, and further, that vital American interests and world peace would be placed in jeopardy by the withdrawal of America from the

(1) See Vicente Villamin, "Hold the Philippines — Democratic Leaders Revise their Opinion," American Review of Reviews (August 1927), in BIA Records 1239-A-67; see also in Manila Times, August 26, 1926.
Philippines. (2)

Shortly after the death of Governor Wood, Resident Commissioner Guevara in Washington informed the Manila leaders that the American Government was considering the appointment of a governor general, (3) and he suggested that a round table conference be held to discuss the Philippine question. (4) Quezon approved the round table conference suggestion, or if that was not possible, he thought that President Coolidge could call the Filipino leaders to Washington to give them the opportunity to express their views as to how to improve the administration of affairs in the Philippines. Guevara transmitted this message to President Coolidge, and after a

(2) Of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia, the Dutch in Indonesia expressed the greatest uneasiness at the prospect of American withdrawal from the Philippines. The Dutch press had regarded the "vigorous" administration of Governor Wood as a bulwark against the spread of unrest in the Philippines, and his disappearance from the scene had given rise to the fear that nationalist movements everywhere would be strengthened. There was genuine fear of the Japanese policy of imperialistic conquest should the United States disappear as an Asiatic power. See Consular Report, Richard M. Tobin, American Legation, The Hague, August 13, 1927, in State Department Files, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 7719.

(3) Quezon considered the appointment of General Frank McIntyre, of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, as Governor General, in recognition of his long, efficient, and faithful service to the Philippines. McIntyre had been Chief of the Bureau since August 1912. He retired in January 1929 and then was given the title of Resident Trade Commissioner for the Philippines in Washington. Quezon was viciously attacked by some sectors of the Manila press for inconsistency in supporting another military man after the big fuss the Filipinos had made in connection with Governor Wood's "Cavalry Cabinet." As a consequence, Quezon advised Guevara in Washington not to commit himself or make commitments on his behalf publicly in favour of McIntyre. See Quezon to Guevara, August 12, 1927; August 30, 1927; and September 15, 1927, all in Quezon Papers, Box 46; also Manila Times, September 12, 14, 15, 1927.

(4) The idea for a conference of representative groups of Americans and Filipinos to reach understanding on the Philippine question was floated around as early as the fall of 1926. See ibid., October 8, 1926; February 1, 1927.
conference with the Filipino representative, the President agreed to confer with Quezon and/or Osmeña. Because the public announcement was somewhat twisted around, President Coolidge subsequently clarified that he had agreed to receive the Filipino leaders because they had asked to see him, and not because he had sent for them.(5)

Quezon lost no time preparing to depart for the United States as a one-man mission, but at the last minute, Osmeña was asked by the Senate to go with Quezon. The two leaders left for Washington together on October 1, 1927.(6)

Much to Quezon's annoyance, the Democratas (and General Aguinaldo) opposed the proposed trip to America.(7) The minority

(5) See Quezon to Guevara, September 9, 1927; Quezon to Frank Carpenter, September 12, 1927; Guevara to Quezon, September 22, 1927, all in Quezon Papers, Box 46; Guevara Memorandum to President Coolidge, September 20, 1927, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 128; Memorandum for SecWar on Quezon-Osmeña Visit, October 29, 1927, in Quezon "P" file, BIA Records. See also Manila Times, September 21, 22, 1927.

(6) Ibid., September 25, 30, October 2, 1927; Philippines Free Press, October 8, 1927.

According to Kalaw's memoirs, Quezon was reluctant to go to Washington so soon after the death of Governor Wood for he feared the kind of reception any Filipino mission would receive in view of the controversies they had had with the late Governor General. The documents in the Quezon Papers for this period do not give this impression. Quezon was quite ready to go to Washington to confer with the Administration there. See T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

(7) The campaign for independence had in fact gone somewhat stale at this time, and there were voices critical of the conduct of the campaign. For instance, on August 30, 1927, the Manila Daily Bulletin published a letter from Dean Maximo M. Kalaw, of the University of the Philippines, severely criticizing the management of the independence campaign and complaining that since Quezon ceased to be Resident Commissioner in Washington way back in 1916, there had been a tendency to appoint resident commissioners who lacked standing and authority and that this had been used to justify the frequent and unnecessary sending of missions to the United States. See Memorandum for SecWar on
party was disgruntled because they were not allowed to have a representative at the projected conference with President Coolidge. In spite of suggestions to include representation from the minority party, Quezon issued no invitation to the Democratas because, he said, President Coolidge had extended the invitation only to him and Osmeña. (8)

The Mission left Manila quietly, without any statements as to its nature, except that it was to confer with the President, the Secretary of War, and other executive and legislative officials in Washington concerning the status of the Philippines. (9) Acting Governor General Eugene V. Gilmore cabled Washington that the Filipino missioners expected to discuss with President Coolidge

Quezon-Osmeña Visit, October 29, 1927, in Quezon "P" file, BIA Records; see Quezon's answer to Kalaw's letter, September 20, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46; and Kalaw to Quezon, September 26, 1927, ibid.

In December 1927 there was talk that Quezon would be named to the post in Washington to stiffen the independence campaign, but this did not take place. Quezon tossed the plan out in mid-1928. See Quezon to Roxas, January 13, 1928, ibid., Box 47; Manila Times, December 19, 1927; July 12, 1928.

(8) See ibid., September 25, 26 (editorial), 27, 28, 1927.

Aguinaldo called the mission's trip a "nice paseo" but a futile exercise. Representative Alfonso Mendoza (Democrata) accused the Nacionalista leaders of deceiving the people by claiming that the purpose of the mission was to discuss the appointment of a new Governor General. The real purpose, he claimed, was really to give a boost to the independence fund drive which was failing because of the lack of response from the people. See his cable to President Coolidge, September 23, 1927, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 128.

(9) Aside from Quezon and Osmeña, the other members of the Mission were Arsenio Luz, Dr. Miguel Camízaré, Rafael Trias, and Severiano Concepción. See BIA Records 26480-97. Quezon requested Rafael Palma (President of the University of the Philippines), who was then in Europe, to join him in Washington. See Quezon to Palma, September 23, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46.
relations between the executive and legislative departments, and to arrive at some understanding concerning a method which would enable these two branches of government to function harmoniously. It was his impression, he wrote, that they would ask as a condition precedent to their cooperation with the executive agreement upon more local autonomy, and that the Filipino leaders were likely to request some form of parliamentary government to be set up in Manila. (10) He also indicated that they desired to discuss the matter of advisers for the Governor General and the question of policy with respect to government-owned corporations. (11)

Funding for this Mission was disapproved by Insular Auditor Ben. F. Wright on the following grounds: first, that the Mission had not been designated by the Legislature as a committee; and second, that they were not transmitting any petition of the Legislature to the President or Government of the United States. He felt besides that the per diem of US$40 each to Quezon and Osmena was excessive. (12) Therefore, public contributions were solicited from "patriotic" Filipinos. A number of senators and representatives contributed out of their salaries (as required of

(10) The parliamentary plan was allegedly sponsored by Frank W. Carpenter, an old Philippine hand. See Manila Daily Bulletin, September 3, 1927, concerning the supposed campaign being conducted by Quezon and Osmena to obtain a parliamentary form of government in the Philippines, along the lines discussed with Stimson in 1926. Democrata leader Sumulong opposed the plan and dismissed it as "an empty illusion." See ibid., September 3, 1927.

(11) See Cable # 842, Gilmore to McIntyre, October 4, 1927, in BIA Records 3038-178; also New York Times, October 30, 1927.

(12) See Manila Times, October 3, 1927; Philippines Free Press, October 8, 1927; Wright to Disbursing Agent, Philippine Revenues, Washington, D.C., Cable #861, October 21, 1927, in BIA Records 27668-81.
them) but the collections were poor, and there was little response from the provinces or from rich Filipinos. And there were an equal number of Democratas and Nacionalistas who did not contribute to the fund — they were called "morosos" or slackers. In fact, Speaker Roxas, in an effort to get the congressmen to come across with their donations, published a "blacklist" of slackers, thus incurring the ire of his colleagues.(13)

The Mission was received by the Secretary of War, Dwight F. Davis, on November 1, 1927, and by the President on November 3. These conferences covered most aspects of Philippine-American relations, although not directly touching upon the matter of Philippine independence, or a specific candidate for Governor General. When the question of cooperation came up, Quezon expressed the view that it was the duty both of the Governor General and the Legislature to respect the powers and prerogatives of each other and to seek, through a frank and full interchange of views, a common ground for action. Cooperation should never imply the right of the executive to command and the duty of the legislature to obey. The President assured the Filipino leaders that he would do his best to send to the Philippines as Governor General a man of ability disposed to work harmoniously with the Filipinos. Quezon and Osmeña then pledged themselves ready to cooperate with the new Chief Executive.(14)

(13) See Manila Times, October 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 1927. During the time that Quezon and Osmeña were in the United States with the Mission, Roxas, who was left in charge in Manila, had considerable trouble maintaining his leadership within the Nacionalista Party. See ibid., November 15, 1927; January 27, 1928.

(14) See Quezon to Roxas, November 3, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 46. See also Manila Times, November 2, 3, 4, 1927.
As Gilmore had reported to Washington, the Filipino leaders did display indications of willingness to drop the issue of immediate independence momentarily and to enter upon a conservative programme of reconciliation and cooperation in order to gain further autonomy. In America, Quezon indicated he was disposed to accept a solution of the Philippine problem on terms of less than immediate independence.

It was quite obvious that Americans both in Manila and in Washington were also concerned that ill-feelings generated during the Wood regime not continue under the new administration. The subject of a new governor general was therefore much discussed. Gilmore reported that there was talk that so-called conservative elements in Manila (both Filipino and American) had expressed their preference for a new executive who would look with favour on Osmeña as leader instead of Quezon. Osmeña was generally understood to desire to come back to power on a platform of conciliation and cooperation, postponed independence and more insular autonomy, and he was reportedly willing to support such a programme in return for recognition of his leadership. However, Gilmore advised the War Department against cultivating Osmeña at the expense of Quezon, who would definitely adopt a radical posture in his desire to stay in

(15) See Gilmore to McIntyre, Cable #369, October 31, 1927, in BIA Records, 364-635 1/2; also Manila Times, October 25, 1927. In fact, Roxas had suggested that the Nacionalista Party change its independence plank from "immediate, absolute, and complete independence" to "independence at an early date," a less radical stance. The Filipino leaders had hoped to adopt a more cooperative posture in exchange for a sympathetic insular policy from the incoming Governor General. See ibid., November 21, December 4, 1927.

(16) See ibid., December 12, 1927.
power. He recommended that the United States maintain a strict neutrality in relations with the two leaders, avoiding doing anything to make it politically advantageous for either to oppose a conservative programme.(17)

Subsequent events gave no indication that Osmena, ever the statesman, had truly been desirous of undermining Quezon's leadership or jeopardizing the independence cause for personal gain. The challenge to Quezon's leadership actually came from other quarters.(18)

At about this time, it was rumoured that a so-called Philippine plan of government had been agreed to by the Administration (the War Department and McIntyre were supposedly in on this plan) in negotiations with Quezon and Osmena. This was reportedly a Commonwealth scheme patterned after the British system of colonial government. President Coolidge was compelled to clarify his Philippine policy by announcing that there had been no change in policy and that he intended to deal with the Philippines under the terms of the Jones Law. He then reminded the Filipinos that their ability to comply with the Jones Law was the only measure of their fitness for independence. Whatever had been behind the rumour, Quezon also denied that the reported plan was in the works.(19)

(17) See Gilmore to McIntyre, Cable #869, October 31, 1927, in BIA Records 364-635 1/2; also Gilmore to Stimson, November 4, 1927, in Stimson Papers, Box 96.

(18) See infra, pp. 419-422.

For the governor general's position, the name of Henry L. Stimson was being prominently mentioned. Though lacking in extensive background on the Philippines, his six-week unofficial visit to the Philippines in the summer of 1926, despite being undertaken at Governor Wood's request, had produced a considerable degree of rapport with the Filipino leaders. This had begun on shipboard, when Osmeña fortuitously returned from Washington on the same ship as Stimson. The resulting friendship between Stimson and Osmeña had been followed by efforts to heal the rift between Wood and the Filipino leaders, particularly Quezon and Roxas. During the course of these efforts, Stimson not only had extensive discussions with the Filipino leaders, but he also indicated sympathy with certain of their views including, in particular, the desire for a greater share in administration.

President Coolidge had also looked to Stimson in 1926 for advice and views on the Philippines, to balance the Thompson Report which had generated such controversy with its criticisms of Wood. Thus, despite his lack of Philippine experience, Stimson was

W. Cameron Forbes was reportedly in on this plan, too. The only connection, if any, I can find between Forbes and this so-called plan was a lengthy letter Forbes had written to Secretary of War Davis outlining a Commonwealth plan similar to that provided for by the Fairfield Bill of 1924. The letter was written by Forbes in response to a request from the Secretary of War for an outline of a proposed solution of the Philippine problem. See letter dated September 23, 1927, in BR Records 141-107; also in Forbes Papers.

(20) Forbes was also seriously considered by Quezon and Osmeña. See Quezon to Carpenter, December 28, 1927, in Frank Carpenter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

Among the other names mentioned were Frank R. McCoy, Senator James Wadsworth (of the Senate Military Affairs Committee), and Carmi Thompson. See Manila Times, November 18, 20, 25, 1927.
favourably known to both Filipinos and Americans involved in Philippine affairs.

The Quezon-Osmena Mission supported Stimson's appointment. To those unfamiliar with the importance of personal relationships in the Philippines, this would appear a remarkable position indeed, for Stimson had strong convictions on the subject of Philippine independence and Filipino racial limitations, and he had made them known. For instance, Stimson had expressed the view that because of the "Malay tendency to backslide," the Filipinos were racially unfit to govern themselves, and it was therefore necessary that final authority be retained by the United States. Further, he had written that the Malay race was generally characterized by "a lack of the power of cooperation in governmental functions and by a lack of initiative." He also did not believe that the "comparatively small element of mestizo politicians" in the Philippines could be expected to govern their people democratically and unselfishly once the United States left them free. Therefore, he believed, the Philippines should remain a colony under the American flag.(21)

In spite of these views, Stimson was acceptable to the Filipinos. In addition to the likelihood that Quezon and Osmena accepted Stimson's assurances that he was genuinely concerned with the promotion of the interests of the Filipino people, Stimson

(21) See Stimson's article, "Future Philippine Policy under the Jones Act," Foreign Affairs (April 1927), pp. 450-471. Stimson also articulated his views on how Philippine policy should evolve in conferences he had with President Coolidge and Secretary of War Davis after his return from Manila. See in Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6. December 22, 1926, Stimson Papers.
during his 1926 visit had defended the theory of Cabinet responsibility and departmental autonomy. This the Filipino leaders interpreted to mean that in their main contention with Governor Wood, Stimson was substantially in accord with their views. Besides, in 1926 Stimson had called for the past to be forgotten and a fresh start made, and this the Filipino leaders were willing to do.(22)

Quezon and Osmeña had personal interviews with Stimson to encourage him to accept the position. Through the good offices of Chief Justice William Howard Taft (formerly Governor General of the Philippines and President of the United States), Stimson reluctantly agreed to accept if the position were offered to him.(23) Thus, President Coolidge nominated Henry L. Stimson for the office of Governor General of the Philippines. The Mission cabled the happy news to Speaker Roxas in Manila, who replied that the appointment was well received in the Philippines. Quezon and Osmeña at once promised that they would cooperate with the new Governor General, and they really did.(24)

(22) See Quezon to Roxas, January 13, 1928, in Quezon Papers, Box 47. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), pp. 127-128.

(23) See Quezon to Stimson, November 7, 1927; Stimson to SecWar Davis, November 22, 1927, Stimson Papers, Box 96; Quezon to Taft, December 13, 1927; Taft Papers, Reel 297. See also Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York, 1946), pp. 143-145; also Manila Times, November 10, 1927; and T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

(24) See Quezon to Roxas, December 13, 1927; Quezon to Stimson, December 13 and 15, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 47. See also Manila Times, December 14, 1927. Roxas reportedly was not overly enthusiastic over the Stimson appointment. Stimson himself was supposedly unimpressed with Roxas. See Marcial P. Lichauco, Roxas (Manila, 1952), p. 55.
Unfortunately, while general feeling was steadily advancing toward cooperation and harmony, intense emotions were aroused by the introduction in the United States Congress of certain bills affecting the Philippines, which the Filipinos considered retrogressive. Following President Coolidge's recommendations in his annual message to Congress (on December 6, 1927) and at the personal request of the new Governor General and the War Department, Senator Frank B. Willis, (Republican, Ohio), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, on January 5, 1928, introduced S. 2292—proposing an increase in the salaries of thirteen officers of the Philippine Government appointed by the President of the United States and further providing that the sum of US$125,000 per annum from the United States internal revenue tax collected on Philippine products be appropriated for the appointment of such assistants and technical advisers as the Governor General might see fit to employ. A similar bill—H.R. 8567—was introduced by Congressman Edgar R. Kiess (Republican, Pennsylvania) and referred to the House Committee on Insular Affairs on the same day.(25) Another bill—S. 2787 (and its twin bill H.R. 10074)—

(25) For Coolidge's message to Congress, see Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol 69, pt. 1, p. 105. See Stimson to Edgar R. Kiess, February 4, 1928, Stimson Papers, Box 93; Guevara to Quezon, January 7, 1928; Frank B. Willis to Quezon, February 13, 1928, both in Quezon Papers, Box 47.

For S. 2292, see Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 1, p. 1000. It was reported with amendments on February 27, 1928, as Senate Report 414, and debated in the Senate on April 6, 19, May 29, 1928. See ibid., pt. 4, p. 3580; pt. 6, pp.6008-6009; 6738-6749; pt. 9, p. 9866; pt. 10, p. 10650.

For H.R. 8567, see ibid., pt. 1, p. 1085. It was reported with amendments as House Report 711 on February 27, 1928, and minority views were submitted by Congressman Ralph Gilbert on March 6, 1928 as House Report 771, pt. 2. See ibid., pt. 4, pp. 3655; pt. 4, p. 4220. For original versions of these bills, see supra, pp. 284-288; footnote #72, Chapter VIII.
also introduced by Willis and Kiess, proposed the appointment of governors for the Muslim and non-Christian provinces of the Philippines without the consent of the Philippine Senate. This bill was introduced in view of the fact that the Philippine Senate did not readily confirm the appointment of American governors for these provinces.

The question of assistants and technical advisers for the Philippine Government was discussed by the Mission with the Secretary of War, the Mission informing him that the Legislature would favourably consider the matter. Quezon had, in fact, instructed Roxas in Manila to appropriate 150,000 pesos (US $75,000) for such advisers, but the item was vetoed by Acting Governor General Gilmore, who believed the appropriation should come from Congress, following Governor Wood's preference when he was still Governor General.

(26) S. 2787 was introduced on January 24, 1928 by Senator Willis and referred to the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions. See Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 2, p. 1919. It was reported with amendments as Senate Report 224, on February 2, 1928, and debated. See ibid., pt. 3, p. 2356; pt. 9, p. 9866. H.R. 10074 as introduced by Congressman Kiess on January 26, 1928. See ibid., pt. 2, p. 2210.

See supra, p.266, for Wood's recommendations on this matter.

(27) See McIntyre to Gilmore, November 3, 1927; Quezon to Roxas, November 7, 1927, both in Quezon Papers, Box 46. See also Cable to Roxas, December 4, 1927; Roxas to Quezon, December 5, 1927, ibid., Box 47. Roxas thought that Gilmore vetoed the item for technical advisers because he was made to believe that it was a scheme intended to facilitate the coming of another Governor General, particularly Forbes. Gilmore was secretly hoping he would be appointed as Governor General, at least until the end of the Coolidge term.
The Secretary of War and newly appointed Governor Stimson testified in favour of the two Kiess-Willis bills, an action which almost instantly dampened the Filipinos leaders' enthusiasm for the latter's appointment. In a cablegram sent to the Secretary of War in May, after he had already been installed in Manila, Stimson urged Secretary Davis to use his influence to get the bills passed. He impressed on the War Department the necessity for such non-political inspectors and assistants as provided for by S. 2292, in view of the greater autonomy which he proposed to pursue during his administration of the Philippines. Progress towards self-government could only be accomplished, he explained, if the supervisory powers of the Governor General were enhanced, through these assistants and technical advisers, as more power was taken over by the Filipinos. (28)

Filipino opposition to the bills was bitter. They characterized them as bearing all the earmarks of "unrestrained imperialism." Congressional intention was branded as "pernicious...designed to curtail autonomy and set up the Governor General as an absolute czar." Resident Commissioner Guevara took issue with the implication that corruption in the Philippines was sufficiently serious to make it necessary that the Governor General be provided with special inspectors. Guevara argued that if the Governor

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(28) See Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 8, pp. 8493-8494. See Stimson's statement for the press, March 24, 1928, in Report of the Governor General, 1928, pp. 31-33; New York Times, March 10, 25, 1928; Cable #137 from Stimson to SecWar, May 2, 1928, in BIA Records 4325-442; Radio # 141, May 6, 1928, Stimson to SecWar, Stimson Papers, Box 100. See also Osmena to Stimson, February 10, 1928, ibid., Box 99.
General needed assistants, the Filipinos themselves could supply the necessary personnel.(29)

Quezon was particularly bitter at the support given by Governor Stimson and Secretary of War Davis to the first Kiess-Willis bill, for he had initiated the action to appropriate funds for technical advisers, in the appropriations bill which Gilmore had vetoed.(30)

From his sick bed in California,(31) Quezon directed the campaign against the two Kiess-Willis bills.(32) He enlisted the aid of friends, Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Thomas J. Walsh (both Democrats, Montana) and other legislators, to whom he wrote


(30) Quezon to McIntyre, January 19, 1928, in Stimson "P" file, pt. 1, BIA Records; also Quezon to Stimson, May 27, 1928, Stimson Papers, Box 100.

At the December 16, 1927 hearing on the Senate bill, Quezon was extremely riled by the presence of Insular Auditor Wright and his testimony in favour of the increase of the salary of his office. See Manila Times, December 18, 1927; also Quezon to Stimson, December 17, 1927, in Quezon Papers, Box 47. See also Washington Herald, December 17, 1927 in BIA Records 4325-A-57.

(31) Senator Osmeña sailed for the Philippines on January 16, 1928, and the Mission officially ended on that date. Quezon remained in the United States, for a thorough physical check-up had revealed that he was suffering from tuberculosis, and in December 1927 he entered the Pottenger Sanatorium in Monrovia, California, for treatment. He did not return to the Philippines until August 1928. See New York Times, December 25, 1927; Manila Times, January 3, February 8, 1928.

(32) See series of communications between California and Washington, D.C.: Bunuan to Quezon, December 24, 1927; January 11, 14, 27; February 3, 18; March 10, 30; May 5, 1928; Guevara to Quezon, January 7, 12, 20, 30; February 24, 27; March 20; April 17, 20, 1928; Quezon to Bunuan, January 19, 1928; Quezon to Guevara, January 19, 24, 1928; Quezon to Guevara and Gabaldon, February 23, 1928, all in Quezon Papers, Box 47.
requesting them to use their influence to prevent passage of the two bills. (33) To Senator William H. King, who had introduced an independence bill on December 5, 1927, Quezon suggested bringing the question of Philippine independence squarely before the Senate, the strategy being to have his bill substituted for the Kiess-Willis bills, to which King agreed. To Representative Ralph Gilbert (Democrat, Kentucky) he suggested amending the Jones Law so that it would grant independence to the Philippines. (34)

To Congress, Quezon sent a memorandum explaining that his objection to the measures stemmed from the fact that both bills were contrary to the official pledge of the United States to grant the Filipinos ever-increasing measures of self-government. With reference to S. 2292, Quezon objected because already established agencies of the Philippine Government were sufficient to assist the Governor General, besides which the Philippine Legislature was itself ready to appropriate the funds needed for technical advisers. With respect to S. 2787, Quezon objected to the diminution of the long-standing authority of the Philippine Senate to confirm all executive officials appointed by the Governor General. Furthermore, he claimed that the Philippine Legislature had done and was doing everything possible for the Muslim and non-Christian Filipinos. He warned that the passage of the two bills would be unfair to the

(33) See Quezon to Wheeler, February 3, 1928, and letters to other legislator friends, in ibid. See also Quezon to Walsh, February 10, May 1, 1928, in Thomas J. Walsh Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

(34) See Quezon to Senator King, February 6, 1928; King to Quezon, February 11, 1928; Quezon to Representative Gilbert, February 23, 1928; Quezon to Guevara and Gabaldon, February 23, 1928, all in Quezon Papers, Box 47.
Filipinos and would cause great resentment on their part.(35) During a hearing held on February 1, 1928 on S. 2787 Resident Commissioner Guevara, in a two-hour speech (after which he was taken ill from exhaustion), denounced that bill and S. 2292, likewise, as contrary to the fundamental rights of the Filipino people and as nullifying "inherent functions of the Philippine government departments and bureaus."(36)

S. 2292, although favourably reported from Committee in both houses of Congress, did not reach a floor vote, and eventually became superfluous when the Philippine Legislature, stimulated by Congress' serious consideration of the measure and Stimson's insistence that he wanted and needed those assistants, passed the Belo Act, against very strong Democrata opposition, in August 1928.(37) The Belo Act authorized the Governor General to spend

(35) See in Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 9 p. 9866. See Memorandum also in BIA Records 4325-449 and in Quezon Papers, Box 47; also Manila Times, March 22, 1928. See also letter, McIntyre to Quezon, January 25, 1928; letter, Quezon to McIntyre, February 7, 1928, in Quezon, "P" file, pt. 3, BIA Records. See also Quezon's memorandum presented to Senator Frank B. Willis, in opposition to S. 2787, February 15, 1928, in Walsh Papers.

(36) Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, United States Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 2787, 1928, p. 6. See also BIA Records 4325-433 and Manila Times, February 1, 3, March 4, 9, 20, 21, April 20, 29, 1928. See also statements of Isauro Gabaldon before Committee hearing on February 1, 1928, in Walsh Papers.

(37) See Manila Times, February 2, 19, 1928; also editorial, Philippines Free Press, August 11, 1928, p. 30, objecting to the Belo Act because it would place a huge amount of money in the hands of one person -- the Governor General -- with practically no check or even supervision. This, the editorial said, was a radical departure from a democratic form of government.
US$125,000 in the employment of expert advisers and civilian assistants, presumably for the most part Americans. These would help perform the supervisory duty placed on him by the Jones Act and enable him to permit the exercise of increased discretion and autonomy in the departments and bureaus without himself losing command of the situation in case of emergency or dereliction. (38)

To attempt to set at rest Filipino suspicions, Stimson assured them that he had no intention of interfering with the exercise of administrative duties by his Filipino officials. He said:

The true purpose of the statute is just the opposite, namely, to develop the autonomy of the heads of the departments by placing the Governor General in a position where he can safely intrust ever widening powers of discretion to those departments heads with the assurance that he will, nevertheless, be kept in touch with the progress of government and so provided with the information necessary for his action, under the organic law, in cases of dereliction of duty on their part. . . . (39)

Stimson thought this a necessary step toward the development of responsible government in the Philippines. And despite the temporary arousing of tempers at Stimson's support of the two bills,

The Belo Act was also opposed by the Democratas headed by Representative Pedro Gil of Manila on the ground that it would give the Governor General the power to erect a "super-cabinet" of appointees not subject to confirmation by the Philippine Senate, which could take over the duties of the Filipino department secretaries and thus invite friction. See ibid., p. 25; also Manila Times, August 3, 1928.

See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, June 11, July 3, 27, 30, August 3, 6, 7, 8, 1928, in Stimson Papers.

(38) Act # 3492, Official Gazette, Vol. XXVI, No. 103, p. 2605. See also Report of the Governor General, 1928, p. 7; and Manila Times, July 27, August 1, 3, 8, 9, 1928.

(39) See Memorandum on the Kiess Bill and the Belo Bill, August 8, 1928, in Report of the Governor General, 1928, pp. 33-34.
Stimson's relations with the Filipino leaders were not permanently damaged.

As to S. 2787, hearings were held and it was favourably reported (Senate Report 224) on February 1, 1928, but the bill failed of passage.

Another measure which aroused much concern among the Filipino leaders was House Joint Resolution 214, introduced by Representative Charles B. Timberlake (Republican), Colorado beet sugar congressman, on February 23, 1928, and sent to the Committee on Ways and Means. It limited the duty-free importation of Philippine sugar to the United States to 500,000 long tons. (40) In explaining his resolution, Timberlake did not camouflage his purpose. He said that the limitation was necessary because the constant increase in shipments of sugar from the Philippines constituted a menace to the sugar industry in the United States. He asserted that the proposed limitation would do no harm to the Philippines because it would encourage crop diversification. (41)

The Filipino leaders registered vigorous opposition to the Timberlake Resolution. Resident Commissioner Guevara, in a brief, called the resolution unfair because it would restrict sugar imports from the Philippines while the United States was free to export to the Philippines any amount of products from America. It was, he

(40) See in Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 3, p. 3490. Mutual free trade was established between the Philippines and the United States in 1913, and sugar exports to the United States had been vital to the Philippine economy.

(41) See ibid., pt. 5, pp. 5209-5212; also Manila Times, February 23, March 23, April 22, 1928.
claimed, "a clear manifestation of a policy of economic slavery" for the Philippines. "The best remedy," he suggested, "was to get rid of the Philippine Islands, and we are now ready to be gotten rid of by the United States." In a joint statement by Quevara and Gabaldon, they pointed out that Philippine sugar posed no threat to the American sugar industry, because less than one-half of the sugar consumed in the United States was produced under the American flag, so that the proposed limitation would not really profit American sugar producers.(42)

Governor Stimson in Manila cabled a protest to the Secretary of War in Washington and told the Manila press that the Timberlake resolution threatened his plans for economic rehabilitation in the Philippines.(43)

Senate President Quezon, recovering in California, was much troubled over the psychological effect which such legislation would have on the Filipinos. He attacked the bill, calling it "sheer injustice" to put a limit on the amount of Philippine sugar imported into the United States while the Philippines was kept under the American flag and American goods were admitted free of restriction to the Philippines. He said: "We are ready to lose the protection of the American tariff in exchange for our freedom. . . . If we are

(42) Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 5, pp. 5212-5213; also Manila Times, February 27, March 7, 23, April 19, 1928.

(43) Stimson to SecWar Davis, February 3, 1928, in Stimson "P" file, BIA Records. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, September 28, 1928, Stimson Papers; Manila Times, March 1, September 21, 1928; New York Times, March 6, May 13, August 16, September 22, 1928.
kept under American control and if American products are to continue entering the Philippines duty free, then in fairness, let us at least have free access to American markets. He worried that the legislation would reverse America's hitherto unselfish policy towards the Philippines. (44)

In April 1928 it appeared to Quezon that there was a move afoot to "railroad" the legislation affecting the Philippines. (45) Despite his illness, he made plans to go to Washington. Informed of nightly meetings by both the House and the Senate to dispose of pending measures, including those connected with the Philippines, he could not be persuaded to give up the idea of the trip to Washington. But Quezon only reached Kansas City, where the party informed Vicente Bunuan of the Press Bureau in Washington that Quezon was too weak to continue the trip to Washington. (46) Nevertheless, Quezon won out in the end. The bills were shelved, although the Timberlake measure and a vigorous agitation against other Philippine products and

(44) Quezon thought the Timberlake Resolution the "most serious menace to the economic development of the Philippines outside of the indefinite political status." See Manila Times, February 27, September 20, 1928. See also Stimson to SecWar Davis, February 3, 1928, Stimson "P" file, BIA Records. See also Manila Times, November 13, 1928, editorial.

(45) After Resident Commissioner Quevara was stricken ill in early February, the Filipino representatives in Washington requested that hearings on the bills be postponed, but this request was turned down. See Bunuan to Quezon, February 3, 1928, in Quezon Papers, Box 46; see also Manila Times, February 1, April 20, 29, 1928.

After Willis died in April, Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut took up the cause to get the Willis bill through. See ibid., April 12, 1928.

(46) See ibid., May 3, June 3, 1928.
Filipino labour were revived in subsequent sessions of Congress.(47)

A minor victory for the Philippine cause came shortly thereafter at the national conventions of the Republican (at Kansas City) and Democratic (at Houston) parties. Congress had adjourned for the conventions, and both Resident Commissioner Guevara and Quezon, who had improved considerably by this time, attended the conventions to lobby for the inclusion of a favourable Philippine plank in the platforms of the two contending parties.(48)

When it was rumoured that the Republicans would propose in their platform the curtailment of certain powers enjoyed by the Filipinos, Guevara and Quezon immediately began lobbying against this. They campaigned for no Philippine plank whatsoever in preference to a reactionary platform statement. The Republican Party acceded to Guevara and Quezon entreaties and "played safe" by ignoring the Philippine question, giving the impression that the

(47) President Coolidge assured Resident Commissioner Guevara that nothing would be done by the next Congress (the lame-duck session of December 1928) to impair any Philippine industry. And Senator Charles L. McNary (Republican, Oregon) would not permit insertion of a Timberlake "rider" to his farm relief bill. See ibid., November 15, 16, 1928.

Before Congress adjourned in June 1928, Representative Richard J. Welch (Republican, California) introduced in the House a bill which would classify Filipinos as aliens under the immigration laws of the United States. The introduction of this bill reflected the agitation of Pacific Coast labour organizations against Filipino labour.

In opposing the Welch Bill, as well as the Timberlake measure, Guevara made a tactical "acceptance" of proposals adverse to the Philippines, upon condition that the United States would fulfill her independence promise to the Filipinos. See ibid., May 22, 25, June 27, 1928; also McIntyre to Stimson, June 1, 1928, in Stimson Papers, Box 100.

Republicans desired to escape a troublesome issue by silence. (49)

The Democrats, against the wishes of the American delegation from the Philippines, which had wanted the Philippine question eliminated from politics, inserted an independence plank in their platform similar to that of 1924 (largely due to the efforts of Senator King of Utah).

This was done not because of popular clamour, but partly from habit and partly in deference to the fundamental theories of democracy. (50) A comparison and examination of the Republican and Democratic platforms would reveal that the political leaders of the United States from both parties were unprepared to consider the final adjustment of America's relations with the Philippines. The presidential elections of 1928 were dominated overwhelmingly by domestic issues — prohibition, water power, the agricultural depression, and the like. (51)

With his job finished and his health much improved, Quezon then returned to Manila in August 1928 and there worked out with Governor Stimson the details of the cooperation programme he had promised while he was still in Washington.

(49) Ibid., June 14, 1928; Manila Times, June 13, 14, 15, 1928.
Henry L. Stimson had been inaugurated Governor General of the Philippines on March 1, 1928. Fully cognizant of the controversies his predecessor had gotten himself involved in, Stimson had determined to re-establish a working relationship with the Filipino leaders to remove the ill-feelings left over from the Wood Administration. Stimson never publicly expressed reservations about Wood's policies and, in fact, had publicly supported his friend on certain issues, but it was evident that he consciously followed a different path. He seemed better able to understand the uses of power in dealing with dependent peoples. Thus, he was willing to compromise to win the confidence of the leaders. At the same time, he was firm in asserting his rights as Chief Executive. (52)

(52) Before he arrived in Manila, there had grown some signs of misgivings as to the policies he intended to pursue, because of his support of the Kiess-Willis bills and the news that he would be accompanied by several army officers who would act as his technical assistants. Stimson brought along Maj. Arthur Hitchens as sanitary adviser; Brig. Gen. Halstead Dorey as liaison officer (both officers had worked with Governor Wood); and Col. Blanton Winship as legal adviser, and the talk was that he intended to reconstitute Wood's former Cavalry Cabinet. For one brief moment it seemed that the good feelings towards Stimson might be endangered. Quezon had suggested to Stimson that Insular Auditor Wright, probably the most objectionable (to the Filipino leaders at least) American official in Manila at that time, might be relieved if Dorey were to go to Manila as Stimson planned. But Stimson kept these officers, and the Filipino leaders accepted Stimson's explanation of his need for them. It must be an indication of how Stimson used these men that they gave no offense to Filipino sensitivities, and there were no complaints hurled against them by the Filipino leaders. See Osmeña to Stimson, February 10, 1928, Stimson Papers, Box 99; Quezon to Stimson, January 11, May 27, 1928, Quezon Papers, Box 47; Quezon to McIntyre, May 29, 1928, ibid., Box 48. See also Manila Times, January 15, 27, 1928; New York Times, January 14, 22, March 3, 1928.
In his inaugural address, he made a good beginning by addressing the Filipinos as "my fellow countrymen," a gesture much appreciated by his listeners. Speaking in modulated tone on the theme of "what we have to accomplish together," the new Governor General urged harmony and pledged a policy of "sympathetic and patient cooperation" involving "no surrender of American principles." Though he had no enthusiasm for Philippine independence (and in fact, prescribed continued American tutelage in the interest of Filipino welfare), he conveyed these views in conciliatory form. He said:

It is not within the province of the Governor General to determine the future relations of the inhabitants of these islands to the United States; the duty rests with the Government of the United States. But it is his duty, so long as the present connection remains, to endeavor to make that union a happy and fruitful one, and to carry on the government of these islands, so far as it rests in his hands, in full conformity with the noble and unselfish purpose of the American leaders who in past years have devised, created, and administered it.(53)

With such words, Stimson steered away from the emotional independence issue and concentrated on political or administrative cooperation, while forthrightly expressing his view that only that would "save the Islands from the danger of immediate independence." In the meantime, he favoured a greater degree of autonomy, for he

(53) See ibid., March 2, 1928 for his inaugural address. See also "Stimson's New Plan to Make the Filipinos Like Us," Literary Digest, March 24, 1928, p. 16; Quezon to Roxas, February 1, 1928, Quezon Papers, Box 47; Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, February 20, March 2, 1928; Vol. 9, January 7, 1929, Stimson Papers.
sympathized with the Filipino demand for more responsibility.(54)

The shift in emphasis of the Stimson Administration away from the independence issue and toward political cooperation and economic reform(55) resulted in independence agitation being momentarily set aside in 1928 and 1929. In fact, the impression was gained in America that Filipino cooperation with a Republican Governor General who was against independence meant that the Filipinos had given up their demand for immediate independence, or at least were soft-pedalling it. The Filipino position was this: were it in their power to decide the Philippine question, they would be independent tomorrow. But inasmuch as the policy of the Administration was indefinite postponement of independence, all that they could do was to wait and, in the meantime, cooperate in promoting the economic welfare of their country, while at the same time continuing to work quietly for independence.(56)

Stimson had only one year in the Philippines, but this year was generally characterized by very cordial relations between the Filipino and American elements in government and society. In fact, the first complete Cabinet since July 1923 was named.

The Democratas (and Aguinaldo) occasionally sniped at the majority leaders (not at Stimson himself) but were themselves not averse to pursuing a cooperation policy. They were generally

(54) Stimson obviously did agree that "in his great solicitude for justice and abhorrence of wrong (Wood) had tended to get far too much detail into his own hands." See Stimson to SecWar Davis, May 3, 1928, Stimson "P" file, BIA Records.

(55) See infra, pp. 418-419.

(56) See Bunuan to Quezon, December 20, 1928, in Quezon Papers, Box 47.
pleased with Stimson's administration, though not terribly enthusiastic about the Nacionalistas getting all the credit for cooperation.(57)

Perhaps it was not without significance that even the American-owned newspapers in Manila, especially the Manila Times, had followed the Governor's lead in "sympathetic cooperation" by discarding the vitriolic and sometimes unreasonably critical tone (to the Filipinos at least) of its editorials. This in no small measure had contributed to the tension between the Filipino and American elements during the Wood period. A reading of the editorials of this influential newspaper during Stimson's term would reveal that it was itself willing to concede that an "era of good feeling" had been established in the Philippines, not just because of American efforts but also because of Filipino initiative.(58)

(57) See Manila Times, January 9, 12, February 5, March 21, November 11, 1928; also New York Times, March 18, May 13, 1928; and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, March 16, 1928, Stimson Papaers.

Some members of the American community in Manila who had admired Wood's stern policies detested Stimson's conciliatory methods. See George Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist (Boston, 1957), Chapter I.

David P. Barrows thought Stimson had shown "dreadful weakness" as Governor General and that he had thrown aside the accomplishments Wood had patiently won. See Barrows to C.W. Hodgson (World Book Company), February 12, 1929, in David P. Barrows Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California (Berkeley).

(58) It obviously helped that the Manila Times changed ownership and management in October 1926, and since then more objective (and less racist) editorials were written.

In the United States, Stimson's short but significant administration was generally favourably received by the American press.
Stimson proceeded with the necessary steps for the creation of machinery for the restoration of "regular and responsible cooperation" between the legislative and executive branches of the Philippine Government. The machinery consisted of four steps: first, the passage by the Legislature of the Belo Act, which provided the Governor General with the technical advisors and investigating assistants he desired; second, the appointment of a Cabinet nominated by the Governor General, after conference with the leaders of the majority party in the Legislature; third, the amendment of the rules of procedure of the two houses of the Legislature to give members of the Cabinet the privileges of the floor, including the right to speak on subjects relating to their departments, and the duty, subject to the consent of the Governor General, of submitting to interpolation thereon; and fourth, the revival of the Council of State, with purely advisory powers, consisting of the Governor General, the Cabinet, the presiding officers and the majority floor leaders of both houses of the Legislature (this at the suggestion of Osmeña, whom Stimson wanted in the Council).(59)

Stimson also established a "new era" for the Philippines by a change of emphasis as to the prerequisites for independence -- from the previous stress upon fitting the Filipinos for independence and sovereignty through training and responsibility in the political

(59) See supra, pp. 406-408 for the Belo Act; radiogram from the Governor General on Executive Order creating Council of State, August 30, 1928, in Coolidge Papers, Reel 28 and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, March 3, 13, 20, June 7, 11, July 9, August 6, 7, 8, 21, 1928, Stimson Papers; and New York Times, August 31, 1928. See also Report of the Governor General, 1928, pp. 6-9; 34-35.
sphere, to an emphasis upon economic and industrial development of the Philippines' natural resources as a sound basis for her independence.

Stimson's programme for economic development relied on attracting "imperatively needed" foreign capital to the Philippines. He felt that it was necessary to "interest big, high class American business to go into the Islands" and engage in "sharing profits with the Filipinos." In order to bring this about, he urged extensive modification of the land laws (to allow for large landholdings), corporation statutes (to remove some of the restrictions heretofore imposed upon the activities of corporations and thus facilitate the entry of American capital), and banking regulations (to reorganize the system of bank inspection and establish banking along modern lines) and the improvement of communication facilities.(60)

In defending his economic programme (which was received with some suspicion and fear by many Filipino leaders), Stimson insisted that outside capital and economic development, if intelligently handled, would not mean permanent economic slavery for the country, as some had feared. Rather, he explained, with the development of agriculture and industry the Philippines would become economically strong and could make her voice heard in the political field to greater effect. In this Quezon had concurred, and to a considerable degree had defended the Governor's programme to push through the

(60) See Manila Times, April 15, 1928; see also his inaugural address, New York Times, March 2, 1928; his annual address to the Philippine Legislature, ibid., July 17, 1928. See also ibid., April 23, May 13, 1928; and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, February 8, June 11, 15, 27, July 27, 31, September 23, 26, 1928, Stimson Papers.
needed legislation. (61)

Stimson was nevertheless able to implement only a portion of his economic programme because of the genuine and natural fear of Filipinos of exploitation by foreign capital. The Filipinos, for instance, were skeptical about changing their current land laws until the future political status of the Philippines had been determined by the United States. He was unable to make much headway in the amendment of the land laws, but he had some moderate gains in the programme to improve communications and interisland shipping, as well as amendments to the corporation and banking laws. (62)

Nonetheless, at the end of his year's experience in the Philippines, Stimson was pleased at the "general mental change" he had discerned among the Filipino leaders, who had begun to consider the "economic foundations of their political problems" and had come to realize that economic development could actually aid their aspirations for self-government. (63)

There was indeed very little talk of "political problems" during this period. Because Stimson had refused to discuss the independence issue, Quezon and Osmena, eager to give the Governor General no cause to fault them for non-cooperation, did not bring up

(61) Manila Times, September 16, 1928.

(62) See New York Times, August 23, September 18, 1923; Manila Times, September 18, 23, October 15, November 5, 1928; and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, August 9, 21, September 28, 1928, Stimson Papers, on land laws. On Corporation law, see Manila Times, October 9, 28, 30, November 2, 4, 7, 1928; New York Times, November 9, 1928; and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, October 13, 29, 30, November 3, 5, 6, 8, 1928, Stimson Papers.

the issue at all. The person who raised the independence cry was former Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon, who resigned his post in Washington in April 1928 to run for the Legislature representing his province of Nueva Ecija in central Luzon.(64) Convinced that Quezon had changed his stand on independence, he jolted his fellow Nacionalistas by calling for complete and absolute independence and denouncing as traitors the enemies of Philippine freedom who would favour autonomy.(65)

In the general elections of June 1928, Gabaldon ran on a platform which demanded that there should be no cooperation with the Stimson Administration (and in the process also criticized Stimson's economic policy). He attacked the leaders who had promised cooperation with Stimson (and in this he was joined by the Democratas) and demanded that the policies of non-cooperation and deadlock in government which were adopted during the previous administration should be continued against Governor Stimson. The same issues, in a less determined way, were presented by other

(64) Manila Times, April 12, 1928.

(65) See ibid., December 11, 1927, March 6, 7, 1928. See also Bunuan to Quezon, February 27, 1928, and Roxas to Quezon, April 14, 1928, in Quezon Papers, Box 47. For Gabaldon's farewell address to the House of Representatives in Washington, March 5, 1928, see BIA Records 4325-after-438. The speech apparently caused quite a stir in Congress because of the rather "violent" nature of his remarks.

Quezon thought Gabaldon's remarks were made more for the benefit of the Nueva Ecija electorate than as "a courageous protest of a disappointed patriot." He noted that as resident commissioner, Gabaldon had done little to promote the independence cause. See Quezon to Bunuan, April 1, 1928, in Quezon Papers, Box 47.

The Nacionalistas took pains to answer Gabaldon on the independence charge and assured their followers that the cause of immediate independence had not been abandoned. See Manila Times, April 16, 1928.
candidates for election in other parts of the country, notably in Cebu, Osmena's bailwick, by anti-Osmena partisans. All of the candidates who raised non-cooperation were defeated, including Gabaldon. (66)

All opinions expressed on the Gabaldon episode, almost unanimously negative, pointed to the lure of political ambition as the motivating factor for the former resident commissioner, who apparently made his bid because he thought the Nacionalista Party ready for new leadership due to Quezon's illness. There were also those who felt that Gabaldon had allowed himself to be used by the Democrata opposition in their fight against the Roxas-Osmena group. But in the past a "revolutionary" policy had been quite successful in rallying the electorate to the Filipino independence cause. So Gabaldon gambled -- and lost. (67)

Speaker Roxas was also suspected of aspiring for leadership beyond that of Speaker of the House. Because of illness, Quezon had wanted to resign both his positions as President of the Nacionalista

(66) See New York Times, April 17, June 7, 8, 10, 1928; Manila Times, April 12, June 8, 1928. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, May 14, June 8, 1928, Stimson Papers; and Report of the Governor General, 1928, p. 5. See Gabaldon to Harrison, July 2, 1928, in Harrison Papers, Box 26.

(67) Aguinaldo defended Gabaldon's courage in defying Quezon, but he did not approve of non-cooperation.

See Manila Times, April 16, 23, May 2, 1928 editorials, calling Gabaldon's non-cooperation stand "asinine" and "despicable in conception."

After he lost his election bid, Gabaldon went to the United States reportedly to conduct his own personal campaign for independence in the United States. He did make a few critical comments, but he did not make much of an impression on anyone, except on Governor Harrison, then living in Scotland. See ibid., July 31, September 3, 16, 1923. See also Harrison to Senator Jose A. Clarin, February 21, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.
Party and Senate President, but this was refused. (68) Like Gabaldon, Roxas openly assailed the economic programme of Stimson, which Quezon had frankly supported and defended. He especially opposed changes in the land law, the corporation law, and shipping. (69) Roxas briefly tried to resurrect the independence issue in connection with his opposition to Stimson's economic programme (by claiming that the land law amendments which had been suggested by Stimson threatened independence), and partly also to test the waters for advancing his political ambitions. But the political scene was not ready for a change of leadership. Even Osmeña publicly deferred to Quezon as leader, and Roxas was forced to deny he aspired for leadership. So Quezon remained on top. (70)

Probably the most significant achievement of Stimson's year in the Philippines was "the cessation of the period of acrimonious deadlock" and the substitution of cooperation and friendly feelings between the American authority and Filipino leadership. This Stimson was able to accomplish because he understood what was necessary in order that the sensitive Filipinos would not be "provoked into fanatical outbursts."

(68) Manila Times, February 10, 1928.


(70) See Manila Times, November 19, 1928.
He was willing to accept the Filipino leaders as colleagues, rather than as subordinates or colonials to be ruled. At the stage of political progress the Filipinos had attained it would have been most unproductive to have adopted the posture of a superior alien executive, as Wood's Administration had very clearly shown. So Stimson used persuasion and not command. He consulted frequently with the Filipino leaders and solicited Filipino counsel "in the same manner and upon the same terms as I would confer with political leaders of my own country." And he did this alone, without aides to witness, as Wood had been wont to do. Stimson wrote the Secretary of War that he preferred to trust and "be betrayed than to make mutual confidence impossible." He pulled no surprises on the Filipino officials, always solicitous that the impression would be gained that any executive decision of consequence was the result of cooperative effort. (71)

Stimson came to realize that opposition to American Administration in the Philippines was not an "almost wholly artificial result of selfish agitation by comparatively few native leaders" (a change from his position after his Philippine visit in 1926). Instead he found a "racial sensitiveness between the brown and the white race in the islands" that entered into almost every problem of administration, "which can be handled only by the exercise of the utmost consideration on the part of those Americans who are vested with executive authority." Thus, he worked ever so carefully to avoid giving any semblance of racial snobbery or

(71) Stimson to SecWar, May 3, 1928, Stimson "P" file, BIA Records; also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, March 20, 21, June 11, 1928; Vol. 9, November 3, 5, 6, 1928, February 13, 21, 1929, Stimson Papers.
superiority. He diffused this racial sensitiveness by mastering the appropriate gestures (72) and treating the Filipino leaders with consideration and courtesy.

To Quezon it was quite significant that Stimson had made him feel that he gave him his entire confidence "exactly as he would have done it if I had been an American sitting at his council table as the senior member of his official family." In a conference between Stimson and Quezon, the latter confided that the greatest and underlying cause of Filipino opposition to Wood was precisely based upon the fact that Wood gave no evidence of his confidence in the Filipinos. The Filipinos, he said, could only cooperate with the Administration upon the basis of mutual confidence. (73)

Stimson hoped that his successors, who like himself, might be "without previous experience in the Orient" would take his experience to heart. He felt that the precautions which he took, though seemingly trivial, were nevertheless vital in the Philippine

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(72) For instance, the Stimsions invited high-ranking Filipino leaders and their wives to Malacañang receptions and thus succeeded in removing the social barriers which the Filipinos had hitherto been made to feel. The Filipinos also appreciated that the Stimsions had painstakingly learned the steps of the "rigodon de honor," traditionally danced on formal occasions in Malacañang and had danced it with the leaders and their wives. The crowning touch was Mrs. Stimson's appearance in the traditional Filipino evening dress — the terno — at Malacañang receptions. See Manila Times, February 8, 1929. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, February 21, 1929, Stimson Papers.

Another important gesture: when he heard that his own church had refused membership to Filipinos, Stimson started to worship at a nearby Episcopal Church. See Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, March 15, 1928, ibid.

(73) See Quezon, op. cit., p. 147; also Memorandum of conference between Stimson and Quezon, January 28, 1928, Quezon Papers, Box 47.
setting, and unless they were constantly borne in mind, misunderstandings and suspicions would be inevitable. (74)

Perhaps Stimson's "success" may also be attributed to the timing of his administration. Stimson assumed the executive position in the Philippines under auspicious circumstances. He was in an advantageous position, for the office had sought him, with the Filipino leaders sincerely wanting him, although they knew full well that he differed with them on the vital issue of independence. He also enjoyed the advantage of taking over from Governor Wood without falling heir to the natural disadvantage which comes to a man who has beaten his opponent. (75)

Probably a very good indication of the empathy which existed between Stimson and the Filipino leaders was the number of times these leaders took him into their confidence. This was particularly true of Quezon and Osmeña, as Stimson repeatedly recorded in his diaries. In one of his low moments when Quezon was deeply worried about his health and the future, he confided to the Governor General "in a very earnest and dramatic way" that he shuddered to think how very close he came to being an anti-American and advocating forcible resistance because of Governor Wood's attitude toward him. This, in spite of his real liking for the American viewpoint and his


(75) See Malcolm, op. cit., Chapter I; Victor Heiser to McCoy, November 1, 1928, in McCoy Papers, Box 21.
"antagonism towards Spanish culture."(76) This was an unusual confession from a proud and sensitive man like Quezon, but he knew Stimson would understand, and would not betray this confidence.

Stimson's policy was rich in understanding and so had "satisfied the natural Filipino anxiety that the promised development of Filipino autonomy had not been forgotten but was going ahead." This, of itself, he reported, had operated "to allay antagonism, restore confidence in America, and terminate, for the present at least, the previous agitation for an immediate determination of the future political status of the islands."(77)

Stimson had wished to stay through another legislative session, or at least another year, to really complete the job he had started, but he was recalled to Washington to serve as Secretary of State in President Herbert C. Hoover's Cabinet. In that position, he continued his interest in Philippine affairs.(78)

(76) See Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, October 29, 1928, Stimson Papers. The Manila Times had called the break with Governor Wood the "worst tactical mistake" of the Quezon leadership. See ibid., August 25, 1929.


CHAPTER X

FREE TRADE AND INDEPENDENCE: 
THE TARIFF AND PARLIAMENTARY MISSIONS, 1929-1930

The period of the thirties saw the fulfillment of America's promise of independence made in 1916. It was effected by a combination of a revived independence movement in the Philippines and a strong independence drive in the United States, pushed along by powerful special interest groups.

Agricultural distress brought about by the Depression caused various economic interests in the United States, specifically the sugar and farm bloc, to marshall their forces. They sought, first, to effect tariff revision in their favour, and failing in that, to induce Congress to set the Philippines free and thereby end the alleged competition offered by Philippine products and labour. After the defeat of the agriculturists' attempt to impose tariffs on Philippine products, they were joined by other interest groups: labour and extreme "patriotic" groups opposed to Filipino immigration; isolationists anxious about the Japanese menace in Asia; and anti-imperialists who felt America's mission in the Philippines had been accomplished.(1)

(1) For a discussion of America's economic policy towards the Philippines and those economic and other interests and forces behind Philippine independence, see Grayson V. Kirk, Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems, and Prospects (New York, 1936); Garel Grunder and William Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman, Oklahoma, 1951); Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment (New York, 1950); George Fischer, Un Cas de Decolonisation: Les Etats-Unis et les Philippines (Paris, 1960); Jose S. Reyes, Legislative History
Economic-commercial relations between the Philippines and the United States were based on free trade, "the only development policy" implemented in the Philippines during the American colonial period. (2) The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 established two-way free trade except for generous quotas on sugar and tobacco. In 1913, under the Underwood-Simmons Act, the Wilson Administration removed all quota limitations on Philippine products and complete free trade was established (except for a proviso that Philippine manufactured articles exported to the United States free of duty should not contain foreign materials to a value of more than 20%).

The natural result of the free trade policy was to bind the Philippines closer to the United States economically while it gave a great stimulus to the production of export commodities that found a

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Friend provides new evidence and new perspectives in appraising those "conflicting interests and convictions" in the United States -- economic and social, military and political -- that lay at the heart of the Philippine independence question. From the Philippine side, he also explored the political and economic motivations behind the Filipino campaign for the best possible arrangement before complete independence. He noted that the Filipino leadership was least sensitive to the strategic factors involved in the independence question.

profitable market in the United States, like sugar, copra and coconut oil, abaca or hemp, and tobacco. This trade growth supported modest economic development in the Philippines.(3)

Initially, many leading Filipinos in the Philippine Assembly (the Philippines' legislative body) had protested vigorously against free trade, suggesting that the reduction in revenues from the elimination of customs duties would make it "impossible to sustain the burdens and services of the Insular Government." They had also voiced opposition to the long-term implications of Philippine-American trade relations, which "would be highly prejudicial to the economic interests of the Philippine people and would create a situation which might delay the obtaining of its independence."(4)

There is considerable evidence to suggest, however, that in private Filipino leaders actually welcomed free trade, convinced that they had much to gain from such an economic arrangement. The main reason for their public opposition, it was recently alleged by a Filipino historian, was to ensure that Americans understood that they would not welcome significant investments of American capital, especially in agriculture, which they hoped to keep to themselves.(5)

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(3) During the 1920's, sugar exports to the United States increased 450%; coconut oil 223%; and cordage more than 500%. See Friend, "American Interests and Philippine Independence," p. 510.

(4) See Assembly Joint Resolution No. 36, March 27, 1909.

American agricultural interests from the beginning found free trade undesirable, for they viewed the unlimited free entry of Philippine products into the United States as a menace to their own products. During the 1920's Philippine agriculture enjoyed unprecedented expansion due to the stimulation provided by the post-war boom and even more favourable tariff preferences resulting from increased duties on non-Philippine sugar and copra imports after 1922.(6)

Unhappily, however, Philippine agricultural prosperity was not shared by American farmers. Depression had hit American farmers in 1921 and again in 1926. The world sugar market had been slumping since 1925.

The conviction that Philippine imports constituted a "menace" resulted in aggressive agitation for tariff revision in favour of American farmers, particularly with the onset of the Depression in 1929.(7) Hard-pressed agricultural groups demanded that Congress

(6) Supported by strong international demand during World War I and the elimination of the US duty on Philippine products, the value of Philippine exports increased five-fold from US$35M in 1909 to US$164M in 1929, with shipments to the United States increasing eight-fold from US$15 M to US$125 M. Over this period Philippine imports grew in value from US$32 M to US$147 M, with imports from the United States increasing fourteen-fold to US$93 M. Figures cited in Golay's paper, from data taken from Annual Report of the Insular Collector of Customs for fiscal year ended June 30, 1940. See also Abelarde, op. cit., pp. 140-143; Kirk, op. cit., Chapters IV and V.

(7) During the hearings on Philippine independence in 1924, there were already anti-immigration and anti-free trade forces in Congress favouring Philippine independence. See supra, pp. 136-137; 142.
alleviate their desperate situation by relieving them of the burden of Philippine competition. If their problem could not be solved on a tariff basis, the farmers wanted Philippine independence. The Filipino leadership responded to the tariff-independence agitation in the United States with a stronger push of their own for independence, despite their realization that independence could be inimical to the economic interests of their country, which by that time had become dependent upon the American duty-free market and American capital. From 1929 to 1934, Filipino representatives were almost continuously present in Washington to steer the independence campaign.

It will be recalled that Governor Stimson in his short tenure in the Philippines had won the Filipino leaders over to the more concrete goals of economic development and greater political autonomy in place of continued agitation for immediate independence. He had likewise won the Filipinos over to accept economic development with American capital by diminishing their suspicion of foreign investment.

However the Depression saw a change in America's perception of Philippine independence. Whereas before 1929 opposition in the United States to Philippine independence was motivated somewhat by the belief that continued retention of the Philippines was in the economic interest of the United States, after 1929 American opinion shifted towards a view that the special economic relationship with the Philippines was a disadvantage to the United States. Congress,
under heavy pressure from the sugar and farm states, took the initiative for Philippine policy from the Executive. As agitation grew in the United States for a drastic change in the economic relationship, anxiety over their economic status stimulated the Filipino desire for a change in the political relationship. (8)

The first manifestation of the shifting American attitude came in 1928, when a proposal to limit the amount of duty-free Philippine sugar was advanced in Congress by Representative Timberlake, responding to the powerful sugar lobby. A similar attempt to restrict unlimited Filipino immigration was undertaken by Representative Welch. Both attempts failed. (9)

The Timberlake Resolution having failed, sugar and other agricultural interests seized upon general tariff revision as their best chance to achieve their goal. President Herbert Hoover called Congress into session to revise the United States tariff to relieve the distressed situation of American farmers.

The House Ways and Means Committee began its hearings on tariff readjustments in January 1929. Later in the year, the Senate Committee on Finance conducted similar hearings on the House bill, which became known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill (H.R. 2667). (10)

During the consideration of the tariff bill, the question of

(8) See Manila Times, April 22, August 3, 1928.
(9) See supra, pp. 280-291; footnote # 47, Chapter IX.
(10) H.R. 2667 - A bill to provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, to protect American labor and for other purposes. See in Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 71, pt. 1, pp. 977, 1064.
Philippine independence, which had previously received only intermittent attention, again came into prominence.

The House tariff hearings in January and February witnessed strong lobbying efforts for reducing Philippine access to the American market. The lobbying effort centered largely on sugar (which by then represented 60% of total export shipments from the Philippines).(11) American sugar interests felt it was imperative to protect the beet and cane sugar industries from sugar produced in the Philippines.(12)

Another Philippine product which was the object of lobbying was coconut oil. It was alleged that its importation competed with American dairy products from the Midwest and the South. This was notwithstanding the fact that the Philippines, despite a cheap and abundant supply of coconut oil, was a large importer of American


(12) The arguments in support of the sugar restrictions may be summed up as follows: (1) the Philippines had unlimited capacity for sugar production and thereby constituted a menace to the American beet and sugar cane industry; (2) the continental beet and sugar industry could not compete with the Philippines due to low wages paid Filipino labourers; (3) the Philippine sugar industry was controlled by foreign interests, especially Spanish; and (4) it was undesirable for the Philippines to rely on a single crop. See hearings reported in Manila Times, January 10, 22, 23, 24, February 20, 25, 26, 1929.

In the previous 25 years, little effort had been made to claim that Philippine sugar had been produced and imported in quantities and under conditions that had injured the American producer. Cuban imports supplied the greater bulk of sugar used in the United States and determined the price of that sugar to the American consumer. See BIA Memorandum, March 26, 1929, in BIA Records C-1250-170.
dairy products.(13)

The cottonseed oil crushers' association and dairy, cane and beet sugar interests, supported behind the scenes by the powerful Cuban sugar lobby (many Cuban sugar producers were Americans), all appeared before the congressional committees holding hearings on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill.(14) These farm groups constituted a formidable anti-Philippine bloc. They took the view that since the primary purpose of tariff revision was to help the farmers, and since the chief products of the Philippines, as well as Puerto Rico and Cuba, competed directly with products raised in the United States, protection of the American farmers demanded abolition of any free trade or preferential tariff for the Philippines. They urged either the imposition of duties on all Philippine imports into the United States, or limitations as to the quantities to be admitted free of duty. Strangely enough, there was no talk of limiting duty-free American exports to the Philippines.(15)

(13) See BIA Memorandum, March 26, 1929, in BIA Records C-1250-170. In 1929 the United States imported 99% of Philippine coconut oil (used for the making of margarine and soap). By the end of the twenties, 80% of Philippine exports went to the United States and Philippine imports of American goods amounted to 60% of its imports. See Friend, dissertation, pp. 18-20; Kirk, op. cit., pp. 55-72.

(14) Senators from 23 beet sugar states were interested in the restriction of sugar importation from the Philippines. The most important beet sugar states were Michigan, Colorado, Nebraska, California and Utah. Cane sugar was produced in the South.

(15) It is interesting to note that the Democrats, who had heretofore been entirely partisan on Philippine matters, broke ranks over the issue of free trade. See Manila Times, February 25, 1929.
The tariff agitation in Congress, particularly with its zeroing in on Philippine products entering the United States under preferential trade arrangements, produced a sobering effect on the Philippine leaders. As the thought began to sink in that perhaps, due to the economic situation in the United States, tariffs might be restored on Philippine products even while the country remained under American sovereignty, and conceivably, immediate independence might suddenly be granted (without a necessary period of gradual economic readjustment), the Filipinos showed increasing concern. Although it was displayed only privately, the leaders evidenced a notable cooling off of their enthusiasm for immediate independence. The tariff agitation brought home to them for the first time the value of the American market and the fact that independence would mean the loss of that market.

Quezon and Osmeña were extremely disconcerted by the trend of events in the United States. Quezon thought the tariff issue was probably the greatest crisis that the Philippines had met with since the American occupation. Their concern led Osmeña and Quezon to engage Stimson in a number of frank discussions as well as to rethink the matter of future political relations with the United States.(16)

Governor Stimson, when Quezon and Osmeña expressed their concern, told them that there was indeed "a very serious danger that Congress would take them at their word and give them immediate

(16) Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, January 6, 7, 17, 1929, Stimson Papers.
independence" as a means of satisfying American domestic interests, disregarding the "real harm and cruelty" which independence would do to them. Stimson noted that "they (the Filipino leaders) are now clinging to my coat tails begging me to go to Washington and try to save them from disaster." Stimson insisted that he could do so only if the Legislature changed its attitude as to immediate independence.(17)

There followed intimate private discussions on the issue of Philippine independence, with both Quezon and Osmeña willing to temper their demand for immediate independence, if it were politically possible.

In a depressed state of mind, Quezon told Governor Stimson that if it should prove true that the United States would continue to hold the Philippines and at the same time try to deprive them of their market and tax their products, it would so destroy his faith in the American people and government that it would break his heart. In that eventuality, he would quit politics, he said, and would go home and teach his son to be a rebel. And if the United States forced the Filipinos to choose between free trade and independence, they would vote for independence with all its attendant dangers.

Quezon admitted to Stimson that independence actually had been viewed by the Filipinos wholly in terms of "internal domestic freedom," and not, as Stimson had known all along, in terms of a

(17) See ibid.; also Stimson to SecWar Davis, January 12, 1929, in Stimson "P" file, part 2, BIA Records; and Stimson to Frank McCoy, January 19, 1929, in McCoy Papers, Box 24.
desire for a severance of external relations with the United States. What they really wanted was further progress in internal autonomy. Osmeña confided that he had always been against "immediate" independence and that his own desire and feeling was that there should be a long period of evolution in the government of the Philippines. Quezon thought that if they could get complete autonomy under a dominion government, with free trade advantages, they would give up all agitation for independence for thirty years. But, he insisted, the United States must declare its intention to give independence after a reasonable period of time, which should be fixed then.(18)

While Quezon and Osmeña were willing to backtrack on their previous demand for immediate independence, the Legislature and Filipino businessmen presented a problem. In attempting to gain their support, Quezon even proposed the Fairfield bill of 1924 as an alternative to the immediate independence resolution which the Legislature wanted to stand by. The concession of internal autonomy provided for by the bill, including the appointment of a Filipino Governor General, Quezon thought, would diffuse the immediate independence radicals within the Legislature, who were quite upset by the tariff movement in the United States. Stimson felt the Fairfield Bill to be a very weak measure, and he refused to

(18) Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, January 6, 7, 1929, Stimson Papers; also Quezon to Horace B. Pond, February 29, 1929, in Quezon Papers, Box 47; Quezon to Roxas, March 21, 1929, ibid., Box 43; and Stimson to McCoy, January 19, 1929, McCoy Papers, Box 24.
Quezon was unable to hold to his moderate position. The Legislature and the general public reacted with angry pride to the tariff agitation in the United States, and faced with the loss of free trade, publicly declared for independence. The Filipino attitude was fatalistic — while admitting that it would be better to delay independence, if possible, to enable the Philippines to readjust economically to the closure of the American market, the Filipinos nevertheless felt that no serious business crisis would immediately follow a declaration of independence. A way out would be found.

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The Manila Times, in its editorial on February 18, 1929, entitled "The Reign of Reason" paid tribute to the "new" Quezon, no longer imbued with the "fire and vehemence" of former years, but with the "intelligent patriotism" which makes him the "greatest force in these islands for sanity in political affairs."

Perceptive observers among the more "radical" elements were quick to notice the change in the tone of the independence leaders. An interesting debate in verse (called balagtasan) was serialized in two Tagalog newspapers, Taliba and Pagkakaisa between Jose Corazon de Jesus and Amado V. Hernandez, foremost Tagalog poets of their day, between February 15 and March 21, 1929.

Jose Corazon de Jesus, popularly called "Huseng Batute", accused the Filipino leaders of only half-heartedly seeking independence, for indeed what they really wanted was only autonomy and the privileges of free trade. He also criticized the missions to the United States, sent at tremendous expense by the Filipino leaders. Hernandez took the view that the Filipinos had not given up the ideal of independence.

Editorials charging Quezon and Osmeña with "betrayal" of the Philippine cause continued to be printed during this period. See, for example, Philippine Magazine editorial, November 1929.

(20) See independence resolution submitted to the Philippine Legislature, in Manila Times, February 7, 8, 1929.
Business elements thought they might just as well get immediate independence and build a separate economic system, rather than be constantly threatened by congressional action on free trade.

In the end, Quezon cabled Washington that the proposed tariff "has convinced us more than ever that immediate independence will not only be politically beneficial to us, but in the long run, would have less injurious effect than the indefinite continuation of the present situation." (21)

Stimson lamented the effect of the tariff agitation in the United States on the political situation in the Philippines. It had caused, he noted, a "withering" of that political and business confidence he had laboured so hard to establish, and reopened for urgent consideration the nearly dormant issue of independence. There was a "recrudescence of distrust" of America, he observed. (22)

Stimson's disapproval of Congress' contemplated action also stemmed from his belief that the final goal for the Philippines should be, not complete independence, but complete self-government, with American support and protection. He favoured a policy of long duration, along consistent and conciliatory lines, free from the exigencies of American party politics, with Congress taking some action which would place a moratorium on political agitation and the

(21) See Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, January 16, 1929, Stimson Papers; Manila Times, April 17, 1929.

The American business community in Manila, save for a few nervous businessmen, generally felt that American business in the Philippines would find a way out of its difficulties even with immediate independence. See ibid., October 18, November 19, 1928.

(22) Stimson Diaries, Vol. 9, January 6, 17, 1929, Stimson Papers.
danger of sudden change, in order to encourage capital to enter the Philippines and give the needed economic development. He disapproved of "debate and ill-digested action on the floor of Congress" such as Congress was engaging in. (23)

Stimson would be unable to see the realization of his hopes for Philippine policy, as conditions beyond his control would bring about the final solution of the Philippine problem.

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From Manila, the situation in Washington in February 1929 appeared critical. Certain that the Philippine issue would continue to figure prominently in tariff hearings in Washington, the Philippine Legislature, on February 8, 1929, passed a resolution designating a committee of that body "to submit the views of the Legislature on Philippine matters to the Government in Washington and present to the same petitions or memorials as may in their judgment be proper." (24)

The special mission had the unofficial endorsement of Governor Stimson, who himself felt that it should be sent.

(23) See Stimson to President Coolidge, December 10, 1928, Stimson "P" file, part 2, BIA Records; also in Coolidge Papers, Reel 128; Stimson to SecWar Davis, January 12, 1929, in Stimson "P" file, part 2, BIA Records; and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 6, December 22, 1926; Vol. 8, August 21, 1928, Stimson Papers.

(24) Concurrent Resolution No. 19, 8th Phil. Leg., special sess., 1929, Official Gazette, Vol. XXVII, No. 89, p. 2407; see also Radio # 502, February 10, 1929, BIA Records 17073.
The legislative committee left for America on March 16, 1929. (25) By that time the hearings on the Tariff Bill in the House Committee had closed.

The opinions expressed during the House hearings suggested to the Filipinos that, faced with a conflict of interests, even American "benevolent" colonialism could become diluted. One is reminded of the ringing words of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts who, early in the American occupation, said that, "while we regard the welfare of the Filipino people as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first." (26) That was the thrust of the sentiments voiced during the hearings -- the welfare of the American people demanded a change in policy and so it must be done. (27)

Not every member of Congress was unconcerned about Philippine economic well-being. There were those who worried that American good faith was being put to the test. They talked about "decency" and "propriety." But they were nevertheless more concerned about the

(25) The Philippine Sugar Association, composed of both Filipino and American sugar men, initially planned to send a mission to the United States, and had even urged that Governor Stimson go with the Legislative Mission. Instead, Rafael Alunan, president of the Association and subsequently appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, went, designated by the Governor General to assist particularly in the presentation of questions relating to the tariff situation. See Manila Times, January 11, 23, 25, February 12, March 15, 1929. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 8, March 16, 1928, Stimson Papers.


(27) Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of House of Representatives on Tariff Readjustment, 1929, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Hereafter, House Tariff Hearings, 1929).
plight of the farmers, and so they proposed to accede to the Filipino demand for independence. (28)

During the House hearings, the Philippines was represented and defended by Frank McIntyre, newly appointed Trade Commissioner for the Philippines, (29) Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara, and John M. Switzer, a New York businessman who had figured prominently in connection with the Fairfield Bill in 1924. Former Governor Stimson, newly appointed Secretary of State in Hoover's Cabinet, arrived in America in time to add his testimony on behalf of the Philippines. Their testimony served to counter a great amount of misinformation which had been advanced by adverse interests in relation to Philippine sugar, particularly as to the alleged possibility of unlimited expansion of Philippine sugar production.

Frank McIntyre energetically opposed limitations upon Philippine imports, on moral and economic grounds, calling such a move "the worst possible backward step that could be taken in insular policy." He declared that since the Philippines had no remedy against unfair treatment, Congress ought to be considerate and benevolent, for the alleged potential competition from the Philippines had really been exaggerated. (30)

Quezon, in Manila, had instructed Guevara to oppose abolition of free trade but to take care not to give the impression that the Filipinos were ready to sacrifice independence to maintain free trade. (28) See for instance, comments made by Rep. James W. Collier (Miss.), in Manila Times, January 22, 1929.

(29) See ibid., January 2, 8, 1929.

(30) Ibid., January 23, February 26, April 17, 1929; House Tariff Hearings, 1929, pp. 9914-9930.
trade. Any proposition to grant independence in lieu of free trade must be accepted. (31)

The Filipino position, as articulated by Guevara, was expressed thus: America must be fair and just. As long as the American flag flew over the Philippines, all Philippine products should be admitted unrestricted to the United States. If the United States considered Philippine products a menace to American industries, then it should grant independence to the Philippines so that the Filipinos might enter into commercial treaties with other countries. (32)

Secretary Stimson condemned congressional initiatives to limit Philippine imports. In a statement to the House Committee, he pointed out that "the damaging effect which would be done to American credit throughout the Orient by such a sense of betrayal on the part of the Filipinos would be incalculable." He worried that the Filipinos would lose confidence in the American people because of the sense of wrong which they would inevitably feel, knowing that their entire economic system was in danger and could be broken successfully by the efforts of powerful protected industries in the

(31) See Quezon to Guevara, January 4, February 27, 28, 1929, in Quezon Papers, Box 47.

(32) See brief presented by Guevara, House Tariff Hearing, 1929, pp. 9905-9911; see also Manila Times, February 20, 1929. Osmeña reported, upon his return to Manila, that at one point supporters of limitation tried to negotiate with the Tariff Mission by fixing the exportation of Philippine sugar to America at 600,000 or 700,000 tons, a quantity greater than the current production. But the Mission declined, for their objection to limitation was a question of principle, and not that of quantity. See Osmeña's speech, in Manila Times, September 6, 1929.
United States. The congressional situation had regrettably led to active resumption of the agitation for independence.(33)

The War Department also spoke for the Administration. It supported what it viewed as the "just" claims of the Filipinos not to be deprived of the principal market for their products or to be restricted in access to it. The Department's stand on tariff revision was succinctly expressed in the following memorandum:

Broad considerations of national morality and political expediency would appear to be alone sufficient to justify the rejection of such proposals. A disloyal dependency cannot, in the end, prove a valuable dependency. To tell the people of the Philippines, on the one hand, that they are not sufficiently developed, socially, economically, or politically, for complete self-government and to legislate, on the other hand, so as to deprive them of their principal market (in the case of sugar, their almost sole market) for their products, thus retarding their healthy development, would certainly not conduce to an attitude of loyalty toward our Government or confidence in the logic or justice of our purpose. . . . the people of those Islands are entitled to a just and generous treatment at our hands.(34)

The Tariff Bill as reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on May 7 left unchanged the free trade relations between the United States and the Philippines. This was largely due to the efforts of Secretary Stimson. Representative Timberlake failed in his efforts to have his proposed restrictive resolution against Philippine sugar inserted in the measure, and other interests failed

(33) See Stimson Statement in House Tariff Hearings, 1929, p. 10636; also Stimson to Quezon, April 16, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48; New York Times, March 26, April 18, 19, 21, 1929; Manila Times, April 16, 22, 1929.

(34) See BIA Memorandum, March 26, 1929 in BIA Records C-1250-170; and BIA Memorandum for SecWar Davis, April 17, 1929, BIA Records 26480-100.
to get restrictions included against coconut oil and copra. (35)

On May 28, the House passed the Tariff Bill by a vote of 264 to 147. The measure then was referred to the Senate, and extensive hearings were held by the Senate Finance Committee. The danger for Philippine products continued in the Senate hearings. (36)

The Tariff Mission had arrived in Washington on April 12. The Mission was composed of Speaker Roxas, newly-elected Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias, and Rafael Alunan. Senator Osmeña was to join the Mission in Washington from Europe, and he arrived in Washington on April 13. It was hoped that Senate President Quezon would also be able to join the delegation shortly afterwards. (He never did, because of illness.) (37)

The Mission's principal goals were two; to work for the appointment of a suitable Governor General to replace Stimson; and to work for the defeat of bills in Congress inimical to Philippine

(35) Timberlake was chairman of the House Ways and Means Sub-committee to draft sugar schedules, and in that capacity he intended to make the strongest kind of effort to limit Philippine sugar. In place of his unsuccessful resolution, he planned to insert a "rider" in the proposed sugar schedule of the revised tariff, which would have the same disastrous effect on the Philippine sugar industry. See Manila Times, December 30, 1928, January 2, 11, 1929.


(37) There were some quarters in Manila who disapproved of the inclusion of Roxas in the Mission, recalling how he was completely discredited in the United States by the Coolidge letter of 1924. At that point in his career, Roxas gave the impression of being an impatiently ambitious and opportunistic politician. See ibid., February 8, 1929.
trade and commerce.(38)

The Mission adopted a conciliatory attitude, directly appealing to America's sense of justice and fair play, and not aggressively pushing the independence issue.(39)

Accompanied by Resident Commissioner Guevara, the delegation was received by the Secretary of War on the morning of April 13th. On the 17th, accompanied by Secretary of War Davis and Francis LeJ. Parker, the new Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Mission was received by President Hoover. Through Speaker Roxas, they expressed to the President their earnest hope that the Mission be heard on the tariff question and on the appointment of a Governor General to succeed Stimson. They also wanted the Administration to consult Stimson on the tariff matter.(40)

On the issue of free entry of Philippine products to the United States, the Mission expressed the firm and determined opposition of the Filipinos to all measures which, while the Philippines remained under the American flag, would in any manner discriminate against

(38) See Memorandum for SecWar Davis, April 17, 1929, BIA Records 26480-100; see also Manila Times, February 7, 22, March 17, 1929.

When Quezon's plan to join the Mission were definitely abandoned because of his illness, it was alleged that he had to remain in Manila to receive the new Governor General, former Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, and because he did not think the threatening measures would be acted upon because of the sympathetic attitude of the Hoover Administration. See Quezon to Roxas, April 12, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48; Manila Times, March 1, 14, 17, 22, 1929.

(39) See ibid., March 1, 1929.

(40) See BIA Memoranda on Philippine Mission, April 13, 14, 1929, Records of the US High Commissioner; Radio # 141, Parker to Gilmore, April 17, 1929, BIA Records 26480-102.
their products or deny to such products the right of free entry into the United States. The delegation also pointed out that the current agitation against Philippine products was producing alarm and apprehension in the Philippines and was necessarily slowing economic progress.

The President and the War Department advised them to take the matter up with congressional leaders and assured them of the Administration's support and assistance.(41)

On the matter of the appointment of the new Governor General, the Philippine Mission expressed the hope that the Administration would consider for the post a man of proven ability and character, who was conversant with Philippine conditions and who would look with sympathetic understanding upon the problems confronting the Philippines. He must as well be able to work along with the Legislature.

In the eventual selection of Secretary of War Dwight Davis as the new Governor General, Secretary of State Stimson played a very important role. With the Mission's approval, President Hoover appointed Davis the Philippines' Chief Executive in May 1929, and he assumed office in Manila in July 1929. Governor Davis, following Stimson's programme, proposed to make economic development the keystone of his administration and openly accepted the principle of responsibility re-established by his predecessor. Thus, he worked

(41) See BIA Memorandum, April 17, 1929, BIA Records 26480-100; BIA Memorandum on Philippine Mission, April 19, 1929, Records of the US High Commissioner.
It was approximately two months after the Mission's arrival that Senate hearings were held on the Tariff Bill. They were accompanied by renewed agitation against Philippine imports, particularly sugar. Witnesses representing numerous organizations of American producers appeared before the Senate Committee and Sub-committee on Finance, which held hearings between June and July, 1929. The witnesses reiterated their demand for limitation or a duty on Philippine products. They had the support of Senator Smoot of Utah, chairman of the sub-committee on sugar, who led the forces against Philippine products. (43)


Among the candidates for the post were Vice-Governor Eugene Gilmore, General Frank McCoy (former assistant to Governor Wood), Carmi Thompson, and Nicholas Roosevelt (New York Times editorial writer). See Manila Times, February 7, March 19, 1929.

General Douglas MacArthur, then Commanding General of the US Army, Philippine Department, offered himself to Quezon for the position. See personal and confidential letter to Quezon, March 29, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48.

Dwight F. Davis (1879-1945) served as Secretary of War from 1923 to 1929, after a brief stint as Assistant Secretary in 1923. Davis is also remembered as the donor of the Davis Cup in tennis (in 1900) and the national doubles tennis champion from 1899-1901.

(43) See BIA Confidential Memorandum on Sugar Hearings before Sub-committee of Senate Committee on Finance, BIA Records C-1250-191A.
The Tariff Mission appeared before the Senate Committee and there made impassioned pleas against the imposition of duties or restrictions on Philippine imports, and for independence. (44)

Answering allegations that the Filipino demand for independence was merely "perfunctory" and that the Filipinos sought independence but were praying that they would not get it, Speaker Roxas declared that the Filipino aspiration for independence was "real and sincere." With "tears rolling down his cheeks," Roxas declared that the Filipinos wanted independence "because we sincerely believe that only in freedom shall we be able to work out our own destiny." (45)

Because Congress was meeting in special session to revise the tariff and to approve a measure for farm relief, the delegation found no occasion to further press consideration of the independence question. To push too hard on the independence issue might incur the resentment of those members of Congress who were known to be

(44) Manila Times, June 22, 1929; Roxas to Quezon, June 28, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48.

Newly-appointed Governor General Davis outlined his attitude toward trade relations in a letter sent to Senator Hiram Bingham on June 11, 1929. In it he expressed himself as earnestly in favour of continuance of free trade, explaining that the extreme adherents of tariff restrictions could not really claim that Philippine sugar had been imported to the United States in injurious quantities. See letter in BIA Records C-1250-188.

(45) Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Finance on the Tariff Act (H.R. 2667), 1929, 71st Cong., 1st sess., (Hereafter Senate Hearings on H.R. 2667), pp. 226-242; see also Manila Times, July 16, 1929.

The Manila Times editorial for July 28, 1929 called Roxas' "tear-shedding performance" and "impassioned oratory" "schoolboy tactics," "in the best tradition of the cinema" "but hardly of the statesman." These, it said, certainly were not the proper methods to be employed against hard-boiled American politicians nor the American people.
advocates of free trade with the Philippines, as well as the Administration. At this point their main concern was to defeat the drive towards restrictions on Philippine imports. (46)

In defending Philippine products against the proposed restrictions, the Mission relied more on arguments of ethical and moral significance than on economics, emphasizing the obligation of the United States to deal fairly and justly with the Philippines while it remained under American sovereignty. They argued that the approval of limitations would be a betrayal of America's commitment to the Philippines and would constitute a grave injustice to the Filipino people. They made it clear that in the event that the United States adopted the proposed limitations on Philippine imports, the Filipinos would be ready to see the complete ending of free trade with the United States, along with getting independence. But as long as the Philippines remained under the American flag, their country was entitled to be free from discriminatory treatment from the United States in trade relations and had as much right to American protection as any state in the Union or any other American possession or territory. They also argued that free trade was mutually beneficial. (47)

(46) See ibid., April 15, 1929; also Quezon to Roxas, April 12, 1929; Quezon to Osmena, Roxas, April 13, 1929; Quezon to Osmena, April 13, 1929, and Quezon to Camilo Osias, April 13, 1929, all in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(47) See Brief of Philippine Delegation, in Senate Hearings on H.R. 2667, pp. 243-253; Osmena's brief, pp. 252-255; Alunan, pp. 255-260; Guevara, pp. 260-262; Camilo Osias, pp. 262-279. See also Quezon to Bunuan, March 8, 1929; Quezon to Roxas, draft of letter, March 16, 1929; Quezon to New York Herald Tribune, March 16, 1929, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.
Soon after the close of the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, the delegation was assured by the Administration and by members of Congress that no changes in the current trade relations would be made -- there would be no restrictions or duties on Philippine products entering the United States. This was perhaps not surprising, as Congress had too many other important things to consider to permit it to tackle the complicated matter of restriction of Philippine imports to the United States, which inevitably would be tied up with the question of the political status of the Philippines.

The Mission gave full credit for this successful outcome to Secretary of State Stimson, who had not only secured the wholehearted support of the Administration, but had also appeared before the House Committee on behalf of the Philippines. (48)

Having assured themselves that the report of the Senate Committee would not contain unfavourable recommendations, the Mission terminated its stay in Washington on August 1st, and returned to the Philippines to report to the Legislature. (49)

However, as Congress continued its consideration of the Tariff Bill, immediate independence for the Philippines began to be given serious consideration.

(48) See Manila Times, July 9, 19, 1929; also Rafael Alunan to Governor Davis, July 18, 1929; Roxas, Osmena to Quezon, July 19, 1929, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(49) Manila Times, August 12, 1929; Roxas to Quezon, August 2, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48. See Report of the Tariff Mission, October 16, 1929, in Diario de Sesiones, Legislatura Filipina, Vol. IV, Numero 74, pp. 1207-1209.
From the summer of 1929 (June) to the spring of 1930 (May), while the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill was still in process of enactment, farm bloc members of Congress, especially those from the sugar, dairy, and cotton states, began to say indirectly, and openly, that the Philippines must be freed.\(^{(50)}\)

In September 1929, Senator Edwin Broussard (Democrat, Louisiana), whose state's sugar came in direct competition with Philippine sugar, offered two amendments to the pending Tariff Bill. The first would make all American tariff rates applicable to Philippine products. Under his plan, all duties thus collected would be returned to the Philippine government to defray its expenses, as long as independence was denied the Philippines. The other amendment would authorize the President of the United States to invite Great Britain, Japan, Italy and France to a conference looking to an agreement to guarantee the independence of the Philippines.\(^{(51)}\)

Contending that Philippine independence and a continuing right of the Philippines to ship sugar and other products to the United States duty-free were not compatible, he declared that "we must either turn the Filipinos loose or confront most dangerous competition from their imports, to the detriment of American producers."


\(^{(51)}\) Manila Times, September 10, October 1, 1929.
Both amendments were decisively rejected, although Broussard announced his intention to offer them again. There were those who objected vociferously to the Broussard proposals. It was a "raw deal," Senator Hiram Bingham said, because American products would all be permitted to enter the Philippines duty-free.

On October 9, Senator William H. King (Democrat, Utah) offered an amendment to the Tariff Bill as a substitute for the Broussard independence amendment. The King amendment provided for absolute independence after a constitutional convention in the Philippines had decided upon the form of government to be set up. It also provided for the withdrawal of American military forces within six months after the establishment of independence. The King measure proposed that independence be granted first, and that the matter of protecting the country's sovereignty be taken up with the other powers later (and in this respect differed from the Broussard amendment). The amendment would have made Philippine products subject after independence to the payment of duties upon entering the United States. Admittedly there was idealism in King's amendment.

(52) He did, but the Senate on March 5, 1939, rejected his proposal again. Manila Times, March 6, 1930.

(53) Ibid., October 10, 11, 1929; Guevara, Osias to Quezon, October 11, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(54) Manila Times, October 10, 1929; Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 71, pt. 4, p. 4377.

William H. King had long been a proponent of Philippine independence, perhaps out of conviction that the United States had a moral obligation to the Philippines, and in line with the traditional Democratic platform on Philippine policy. As such, he had been known as a "friend of the Filipinos," having introduced on many previous occasions independence resolutions. But he also represented beet sugar interests, whose profits supposedly were seriously cut into by duty-free Philippine sugar. See Manila Times, November 22, 23, 1928, February 22, 1929.
stand, but there was also much self-interest.

Senator King had prepared, way back in January 1929, his amendment granting Philippine independence, in case the bill was reported with restrictions on Philippine sugar and coconut oil. (Quezon had instructed Guevara to support it.) In April, he had introduced to the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions his long-pending bill providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines.

There had been some kind of an agreement between King and the Tariff Mission that, should the Finance Committee report the Tariff Bill with a clause restricting Philippine imports, it would be amended so as to provide for independence, immediately or at a fixed future date. The amendment would be submitted either in the Committee or on the floor. The Tariff Bill was reported without any restrictions on Philippine products, and King's introduction of the independence amendment was obviously intended to get some action on his independence bill, which up till then he had failed to get out of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions.(55)

The King amendment caused something of a flurry in the Senate because of the fear that the amendment would increase the chances of a filibuster on the Tariff Bill. However, during the debates Senator Hiram Bingham (Republican, Connecticut), chairman of the

(55) Guevara to Quezon, January 14, 1929; Quezon to Guevara, January 14, 1929, in Quezon Papers, Box 47; Roxas to Quezon, June 4, 1929; Guevara, Osias to Quezon, 2 cables, October 6, 1929, in ibid., Box 48. See also Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 71, pt. 1, p. 105; and Manila Times, October 10, 1929.
Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, sidetracked the independence issue by stating that he would not object to bringing it up at the next regular session to open in December 1929, and that he would use his influence to obtain action on the King resolution, which had been pending for some time in his Committee. (56)

After this announcement the King amendment was defeated by a vote of 45 to 36, not necessarily because of opposition to Philippine independence, but because it was thought it would lead to an indefinite delay in the enactment of the Tariff Bill. The question of independence, Senator Claude A. Swanson (Democrat, Virginia) argued, should be discussed in a "broad and statesmanlike way and not in connection with the tariff on sugar and oil . . . under the shadow of a few little interests that want to be protected from Philippine products". The closeness of the vote, however, indicated to some observers that there was powerful support in the Senate for Philippine independence. Senator Joseph T. Robinson (Democrat, Arkansas) and Senator William E. Borah (Republican, Idaho), who had voted against the King amendment, announced that the outcome of the vote could not be taken as a test of the sentiment on the independence question in the Senate. (57)

(56) Guevara, Osias to Quezon, October 11, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48; also Manila Times, October 10, 1929.

Opponents of Philippine products, having been defeated again in their attempt to apply direct tariff restrictions, renewed their attack in a new form by proposing in the Senate, through the Vandenberg Resolution (S. Res. 130), to extend American coastwise shipping laws to the Philippines. This was an old issue, the proposal to extend the shipping laws to the Philippines having been rejected by three Administrations beginning with President Wilson's. This resolution, if approved, would have resulted in higher freight rates between the United States and the Philippines, and to that extent would have imposed a hardship on Philippine imports to the United States. It would likewise have excluded Filipinos from ship work; Americans would have continued to monopolize Philippine interisland trade, however.(58)

Once again Secretary of State Stimson appeared, this time before the Senate Commerce Committee. He testified against the Vandenberg proposal, which consequently was not acted upon.(59)

(58) Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 71, pt. 4, p. 4411. See also BIA Records 364-852, Arthur H. Vandenberg's Memorandum to the Secretary of War: Comments on the Tentative Plan for Congressional Legislation re the Philippine Question; Cable #404, October 12, 1929, Parker to Davis, BIA Records C-1250-after-197; Stimson Diaries, Vol. 10, August 28, 1930, Stimson Papers.

(59) See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. Res. 130, US Senate, 71st Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 22, 24, 1930. Statements and briefs of Camilo Osias, pp. 28-44; Pedro Guevara, pp. 25-83; Stimson, pp. 89-106. See also record of hearings in BIA Records C-1177-267. For Concurrent Resolution No. 35, 8th Phil. Leg., 2nd sess., November 8, 1929, protesting against S. Res. 130, see in Official Gazette, Vol. XVIII, No. 20, pp. 609-610.
Despite the pressure from the farm lobby, the Hoover Administration remained firm in its opposition to restricting Philippine exports to the United States. When the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill was finally approved by President Hoover on June 17, 1930, it contained no limitations on Philippine products.

Having failed in this matter of tariff revision, there remained only the alternative of Philippine independence to secure the goals of the anti-Philippine coalition.(60)

By 1930 it was beginning to look as if the Philippines might get its independence soon. The tariff issue might do the trick. Bruce Catton, an American commentator who regularly contributed to the Manila Times, wrote a rather "sharp commentary on (the American) national character." When it was a matter of honour, he said, a simple matter of keeping a promise — the United States could not see its way clear to do anything about Philippine independence. Now it had become a "matter of dollars and cents." So maybe the United States would keep its promise to give independence.(61)

(60) After the defeat of the independence amendments, Senator Millard Tydings (Democrat, Maryland) of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions instructed the Filipino Resident Commissioners to have a draft of an independence bill ready for submission at the forthcoming session of Congress. Guevara, Osias to Quezon, October 11, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48.

Guevara reported that a statehood proposal had been put forth seriously by members of Congress who were reluctant to grant full independence to the Philippines but were anxious to extend a greater measure of autonomy to the Filipinos. See Philippines Herald, October 23, 1929.

(61) See his column entitled "Creed — And A Promise" in Manila Times, February 2, 1930.
In the Philippines the narrowness of the final vote on the King
independence amendment brought on some interesting developments. When Osmeña returned to Manila from Washington in September 1929, he reported that in his opinion the American people were in favour of independence, and that he thought Congress would approve it, if asked. In a prepared speech later, wherein he reviewed the work of the Tariff Mission, he said that the defeat of the Timberlake Resolution and other measures inimical to Philippine interests reaffirmed the altruistic policy of the United States. While never giving up the idea of independence as the final solution, he talked as though it were far off. In the meantime constitutional "conquests" could be made under the Jones Law, which would be sufficient until the final grant of independence.(62)

However, Senator Sumulong charged that the Nacionalista Party had abandoned the goal of independence in its eagerness to maintain cordial relations with Governor Davis and that it had also made a pact with former Governor Stimson to cease the agitation for independence.(63) The Democrata leaders even assailed the Resident

(62) Ibid., September 6, 1929.

(63) Philippines Herald, October 12, 1929; Manila Times, October 13, 1929. See also attack by Pedro Gil, House minority floor leader, claiming that the majority had deserted the people's cause, in ibid., October 8, 1929. See also articles of Maximo M. Kalaw of the University of the Philippines, and Arsenio N. Luz, along the same lines, in Philippines Herald, September 29, October 6, 1929.

Senator Sumulong also introduced a resolution asking for power for the Philippines to regulate its own tariff (a prerogative reserved for the US Congress by the Jones Law), stating that free trade was incompatible with the desire of the Filipino people to attain political and economic independence. See ibid., October 9, 1929.
Commissioners in Washington for having failed to inform the Manila chiefs that votes on independence were impending, so that a concerted campaign might have been put together in support of the bills.\(^{64}\)

Senator Osmeña as a consequence called for the resumption of a vigorous independence drive, asking all forces to unite in the fight for freedom. The impetus for independence was revived. The "zero hour" had arrived, it was declared.

Initially, there was elation at the belief that independence was just around the corner. Subsequently, that elation receded as the feeling grew that the King independence bill, even if considered in committee, would not pass Congress in the next session. In addition, there developed a growing belief on the part of many people, and particularly those who owned property, that immediate independence would be a disaster which would take many years to repair. Many informed Filipinos believed that the sugar industry would be ruined and the coconut and hemp industry seriously crippled, that real estate values would be cut at least by half, that wages would decline, that the standard of living would fall, and that the results would be chaotic for a few years.

Their public posture was still that no matter what the cost, they were willing to make the sacrifice. But privately many were saying that it would be only fair if the actual date of independence were postponed, though with the question definitely settled, for the

\(^{64}\) See Manila Times, October 15, 1929; Philippines Herald, October 15, 16, 1929; Cable # 901, Governor Davis to SecWar, October 19, 1929, in BIA Records 364-654.
uncertainty was decidedly injurious to Philippine interests.

Philippine prosperity, built upon free trade, was seen as resting upon a very unstable foundation, since its continuation depended not upon Filipino will, but upon American decisions. Informed Filipino opinion was convinced that, in the long run, the conflict between American and Filipino interests would result in victory for the American side. The only solution, therefore, was independence, but with a distant, though definite date, fixed for its granting. Filipino sentiment became steadily more favourable to the idea of a five to twenty-year interval of preparation, with additional autonomy during the intermediate period and independence at the end of that time. (65)

This change in thinking was also seen in Filipino political circles, though in a muted fashion. Some of the Filipino newspapers which had previously urged complete and immediate independence switched to favouring continuance of the existing status. As the likelihood of immediate independence being rushed through Congress began to recede, for the first time editorials and business elements, and even political leaders in Manila, began to advance the idea that it would be wise to accept some reasonable compromise as a step towards ultimate independence — perhaps a twenty-to-thirty-year transition.

(65) See letters of Governor Davis to Secretary of War James W. Good, October 23, November 1, and 13, 1929; also letter to General Parker, November 23, 1929, all in Dwight F. Davis, Personnel "P" file, part 2, BIA Records; also Davis to Parker, October 26, 1929, in BIA Records 364-655; and Manila Times November 15, December 8, 1929.
Publicly, however, most leaders were very cautious about any revised opinions on independence, and the demand was essentially still for "immediate, absolute, and complete independence." The great mass, Governor Davis reported, was still swayed by the idea of freedom, with no understanding of the economic situation. (66)

Roxas had returned to Manila from the Mission to the U.S. on October 24, 1929, by which time the Filipino leaders, at Osmena's initiative, had already laid out plans for another mission to the United States. This was brought about by the expectation that the independence issue would be discussed in the December session of Congress. (67) A Junta Consultiva, or Advisory Council, was organized, headed by Osmena, to be made up of "economic and social elements" to advise on matters relative to the task entrusted to the new mission, which was to work for the immediate, absolute and complete independence of the Philippines. (68)

At the same time, the independence campaign was reorganized. An elaborate plan for the independence campaign was submitted to the Legislature by Speaker Roxas upon his return. The "Roxas plan" was as follows: besides the Commission of Independence, composed of all

(66) See Roxas speech upon arrival in Manila, in ibid., October 27, 1929; see also letter, Governor Davis to General Parker, April 1, 1930 in Davis "P" file, part 2, BIA Records; Cable # 108, Davis to Parker, April 1, 1930, BIA Records 364-708.

(67) Manila Times, October 13, 15, 16, 21, 27, 1929; See also Osmena to Quezon (In Shanghai, where Quezon had gone to regain his health), October 11, 1929; Quezon to Osmena, October 12, 1929; Quezon to Guevara, Osias, October 12, 1929; Guevara, Osias to Quezon, October 13, 1929; Osmena, Quintin Paredes to Quezon, October 14, 1929, all in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(68) Manila Times, October 13, 27, November 10, 18, 1929.
members of the Legislature except those appointed by the Governor General, there would be, on the same level, a Citizens' Council, which would act as an advisory body. The Council would have an initial membership of seven, to be selected from among the most prominent citizens of the Philippines not in active politics. These seven would elect four other members, to make the membership eleven in all. The eleven would then elect their chairman. As other Filipinos came into national prominence, the Council would elect them to membership, provided the total number of members did not at any time exceed twenty-five. Great care would be exercised in the election of the members, as it would be considered the greatest distinction to be in the Citizens' Council.

Below the Commission of Independence and the Citizens' Council would be the Executive Committee, which would be directly in charge of the independence campaign. It would be composed of the presiding officers of both houses of the Legislature, the majority floor leaders in the Senate and the House, and the minority floor leaders in both houses. The Citizens' Council would elect three of its members to the Executive Committee. In this way, elements in active politics would be given participation in the campaign.

Under the Executive Committee would be the Secretariat, to be headed by an outstanding Filipino well known for his organizing and executive ability, without consideration of his party affiliation. Below the Secretariat would be three main divisions: the Independence Drive Division; the Finance Division; and the Preparedness and Research Division. The Independence Drive Division
would take care of independence fund drives and the establishment of an auditing system to check all disbursements and accounts in connection with the independence fund. The Research and Preparedness Division would study and formulate policies to be recommended to the Executive Committee. It would study problems of taxation, tariff, military preparedness, and all other issues that were bound to confront an independent Philippines. It would recommend policies to be adopted by the Filipino people on issues such as the educational system, the economic programme, immigration, conservation of resources, food and population, and others that might come up from time to time. (69)

This elaborate plan, which bears a striking similarity to the Supreme National Council established in 1926 (See supra, pp. 305-314) was ratified on December 6, 1929.

A National Independence Congress was proposed under this plan. (70)

On February 22, 1930, Washington's Birthday, (71) the Independence Congress took place in Manila, while congressional hearings on independence were being held in Washington. The Independence Congress was thought up as a new manner of petitioning for independence, a "fresh demonstration of national consciousness

(69) Ibid., December 5, 6, 1929.

(70) See plan for the Independence Congress in Quezon Papers, Box 60. See also Quezon to Maximo M. Kalaw suggesting the date for the congress, January 4, 1930, in Quezon Papers Box 48.

(71) This seems a favourite date. The National Prayer Day in 1926 was also held on Washington's birthday, a public holiday in the United States as well as in the Philippines. See supra, p. 312.
and solidarity so our leaders who are directing the struggle for our freedom may "drink from the fountain of popular inspiration."(72) A citizens' Congress, without political coloration, explained Executive Secretary Maximo M. Kalaw, would prove, that the agitation for independence was not a concern of political parties alone but of the entire Filipino people.(73)

The Congress lasted several days, and some 2,000 delegates, both men and women, representing their home provinces, filled the Manila Grand Opera House to overflowing. There were two plenary sessions, one presided over by Felipe Agoncillo and the other by Rafael Palma. Executive secretary Maximo M. Kalaw was the moving spirit behind the Congress.(74)

Senate President Quezon, who had been sick, could not attend the Congress, but he sent a message of support, at the same time counselling the Congress to continue its faith in American altruism and to follow a policy of peace. In his place Senator Osmeña addressed the Congress, declaring that "determination, constancy,

(72) See Congress Manifesto, January 22, 1930.

(73) The Manila Times thought the Independence Congress was called to secure the unanimous endorsement of the King Independence Resolution. See ibid., January 19, February 17, 1930.

The Manila Times, in characteristic fashion, called the Independence Congress "a carefully staged play, in which the realities of life are relegated to the background while the mouth-filling lines of strutting players are emphasized." See editorial, February 24, 1930.

(74) Aguinaldo's Veterans' Association refused to participate. Aguinaldo thought the Independence Congress accomplished nothing except "a lot of high and sentimental prattle." Philippines Herald, April 15, 1930. See also Cable # 104, Davis to SecWar, January 20, 1930, in BIA Records 364-690; also Kalaw to Quezon, January 4, 22, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 60; and Manila Times, February 12, 19, 1930.
firmness, disinterestedness, the sentiment of solidarity, spirit of
discipline are qualities which if gathered together in our cause
will defeat all obstacles to independence."

The Congress sessions were devoted to reading papers on various
topics relating to independence -- economics, finance, political
aspects, education, international relations, national defense and
communications, Mindanao and the Mountain Province, and Filipino
women. No inflammatory speeches were delivered, and the programme
was rather academic.

One of the discussions centered on trade arrangements with the
United States in the event of independence. The discussion showed
marked differences of opinion among the delegates, although there
was almost unanimous agreement that the Philippine economy could
successfully withstand the shock incident to the sudden abolition of
free trade. But the delegates were not able to agree as to whether
immediate abolition of mutual trade concessions or gradual
abolition, admittedly less painful, would be most advisable. It was
generally conceded that a preferential trade arrangement, for a
period of ten years or so, would be the most advantageous
economically, but the majority of those present rejected this as an
unwise political move, in view of the fact that it would be
inconsistent for the Filipinos to seek trade favours from the United

(75) Ibid., February 23, 1930; Philippines Herald, February 27, 1930.
States while urging freedom from political control.(76)

At its closing session on February 26, the Congress unanimously approved a lengthy independence resolution, conciliatory in tone, which stated that the Congress, after considering all questions which would be faced by an independent Philippines, concluded that it had fulfilled the only condition in the Jones Law - "stable government." The Philippines, it continued, was now better equipped politically and economically than many independent nations and was willing to assume the risks and responsibilities of independence. "The longer we remain under America, the harder will it be for us to be freed from our political and economic dependence on her." No matter what may be the temporary advantages of free trade with the United States, "we are ready to forego them for the sake of freedom." While acknowledging the debt of gratitude owed America, the Congress was "convinced that immediate independence is the only solution "in consonance both with "America's history and traditions" and with the "unalterable desires of the Filipino people."(77)


The Resolution was transmitted to the US Congress through the Resident Commissioners. See Manila Times, March 6, 1930.
On the whole, the Congress probably had the good effect of promoting discussion and consideration of the practical difficulties that might accompany independence. (78)

In the meantime, the advance guard of the Parliamentary Mission (approved by the Philippine Legislature on October 29, 1929) (79) had left for the United States on December 7, 1929. The Mission was composed of Speaker Manuel Roxas and Democrata House leader Pedro Gil. Representative Manuel C. Briones, House Majority Floor Leader, joined the Mission later, arriving in Washington on February 25, 1930. Senator Sumulong arrived in Washington on May 4th. Quezon (80) and Osmeña had remained in the Philippines to direct the campaign on the home front, thus causing rumours to the effect that independence would not be forthcoming, despite the apparently favourable atmosphere shown during the special session of the Senate.

(78) In 1930 there also gathered in Paris representatives of various Filipino groups residing in Europe "to respectfully request the people and government of the United States to grant the Philippines immediate, complete and absolute independence." This first Philippine Independence World Congress was held in May 1930. See resolution in Proceedings of the First Independence Congress., pp. 361-363; also in T.M. Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 231-232.

Also in May of that year, the Freemasons of the Philippines held their own Congress in Manila and approved an independence resolution. See ibid., pp. 364-365; see also in Kalaw "Memoirs," pp. 301-304; and Philippines Herald, May 30, 1930.

(79) Concurrent Resolution No. 29, 8th Phil. Leg., 2nd sess., in Official Gazette, Vol. XXVIII, no. 19, p. 576; see also BIA Records 26480-105; 26480-106; 26480-110; 26480-111; 26480-114.

(80) Quezon was originally designated to head the Mission but he had stayed behind for health reasons. Both Senators King and Wheeler in Washington were anxious to have Quezon come as the authorized spokesman of the Filipinos. See Bunuan to Quezon, October 15, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48.
by the vote on the King amendment. It was felt that if independence legislation was sure of enactment, both Quezon and Osmeña would be in on the "kill." (81)

As a matter of fact, both Speaker Roxas and Senate President Quezon had publicly and privately warned the people against undue optimism. The October 29, 1929 legislative resolution which authorized the sending of the Mission had in fact instructed the delegation to petition the Government and Congress of the United States for the "early granting of independence," not the "complete, immediate, and absolute" independence demand that was usual in such declarations. The hope was expressed that some new concession of autonomy might be granted, perhaps a Filipino Vice-Governor, and that the Mission might secure a plank on independence in the platform of both American parties in the coming mid-term elections in November 1930. (82)

Before the departure of the Mission, a meeting of Nacionalista leaders and prominent citizens had been held at the Philippine Columbian Clubhouse in Manila. Among those attending were Secretary

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(81) Representative Recto had proposed a mission to be headed by Jorge Bocobo, Maximo Kalaw and Roxas, representing the militant independistas. Quezon and Osmeña, the old leadership, he thought were too conservative. Manila Times, October 14, 1929.

There were also suggestions for a mission of representative businessmen, not necessarily Filipinos, but perhaps American and foreign, to go to the United States to concern itself with the economic/commercial interests of the Philippines, to work alongside the political mission, for the purpose of securing the adoption of a programme to lessen the shock to business of independence. See Ibid., October 16, 17, 18, 1929.

(82) Ibid., November 15, December 8, 16, 1929; see also Radio # 982, December 7, 1929, Davis to SecWar, in Manuel A. Roxas, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records.
of Justice Jose Abad Santos, and Deans Jorge Bocobo, Maximo M. Kalaw, and Francisco Benitez of the University of the Philippines. The main topic of discussion was whether or not the Mission should unqualifiedly support the move in the US Congress to grant immediate independence, as the King Bill proposed to do.

After Quezon heard those who urged the Mission to insist on "immediate, absolute, and complete independence," he arose and explained the disastrous effects of such a grant because the Filipinos were inadequately prepared for the responsibilities of independence.

He said: "The only ones who sincerely want immediate independence are those members of our masses who do not know any better, or who are too ignorant to understand the consequences that would follow. Among our intellectuals, the only ones I know who believe in immediate independence are theoretical people like university professors" — and he pointed to the three deans present — "who are strong on theory but weak in understanding of the realities of life. I agree with you all that we must not say that we are not in favour of immediate independence. We must support Senator King, but we must be receptive to a proposal that may come from other friends in the American Congress who may advocate independence after a period of preparation of, say, 10, 15, or 20 years."

To keep the results of the meeting off the record, he afterwards instructed Marcial P. Lichauco, Secretary of the Mission, to give him the written notes, and then he proceeded to
tear them up. Eventually, news of the meeting was bruited around coffee shops in Manila, and references to it were made in the press. (83)

This cautiousness of Quezon and other leaders was the subject of much comment in the Manila press, and there were subtle attempts made to attack Quezon's moderate or changed stand on independence. (84)

The leaders clearly desired independence — but immediate independence no longer seemed attractive. They preferred an independence which provided for preparation, protection, and tariff preference, which they recognized they might not get from the United States. Without these conditions, they realized that independence in the near future could bring disaster, and they did not want it. (85)

The leaders' revised aspirations were not reflected in their public statements, as they did not really expect to secure what they had been demanding. They did hope to secure, perhaps by compromise, the goal they really sought.

(83) See Quirino, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108; also Manila Times, December 4, 8, 1929.

(84) Early in December, typewritten copies were circulated of an article which appeared in *The Scranton Times*, November 23, 1927, hinting that Quezon had made a compromise proposal on the Philippine independence question and had withdrawn from the "absolute, complete, and immediate" independence stand. See *ibid.*, December 5, 1929.

The Manila Times condemned the "perpetuation of the policy of bluff." Strangely enough, Roxas, "alone of the triumvirate which rules Philippine politics," said the newspaper, seemed willing "to risk the danger of unpopularity in order not to continue the reign of half-truths which the independence campaign has encouraged." The Mission departed in a situation best described as "confused."(86)

Secretary of State Stimson, who had used his influence to oppose the movement for tariffs on Philippine products and other restrictions, advised against the coming of the Mission. He foresaw harm to the "vital economic interests of the Filipino people whose enemies would take advantage to keep alive the movement for tariff restrictions." The same interests who were defeated decisively in connection with the tariff and the coastwise shipping laws were now united in an attempt to accomplish the same end through an independence resolution. And with the Mission asking for "early independence," they might succeed this time. Stimson would be in London and would be unable either to help or advise the Mission. But his advice came too late to change plans.(87)

(86) See Manila Times, November 18, December 8, 16, 1929.
Probably as a reaction to the trend of events in Manila, an organization called the "Philippine Independence League" was organized, under the initiative of ex-Representative Vicente Sotto (Cebu). The membership included General Aguinaldo, Jorge Bocobo, Maximo Kalaw, and Isauro Gabaldon, those most critical of the Nacionalistas' slack or lukewarm conduct of the independence campaign. See Philippines Herald, November 6, 1929; Manila Times, December 23, 1929. See also letter, Davis to Parker, January 6, 1930, in Davis "p" file, part 2, BIA Records.

(87) See Cable, Stimson to Davis, November 11, 1929; Davis to Stimson, November 13, 1929, in BIA Records 26480-110; Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas to Quevarra, Osias, November 16, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 48; letter, Stimson to Quezon, December 30, 1929, in Stimson Papers, Box 105.
In view of the passions aroused by the prospect of serious consideration of the independence issue in Washington, Governor Davis thought it would be useful if Washington were made to realize how best to deal with the Mission. Repeatedly he reminded the War Department of the importance of the psychological element in dealing with the Filipino leaders and in working for a friendly solution to the problem. The Filipinos, he said, were "exceedingly sensitive to sentimental considerations, particularly where racial matters are concerned. If they feel that the people are sympathetic with them and with their problems and have no assumed superiority, the Filipinos will respond very readily even though their ideas are not concurred in." All political leaders were publicly committed to the cry of "immediate, absolute and complete independence" regardless of their private sentiments as to the effect. They therefore could not be expected to advocate publicly in Washington any compromise -- for that would mean their political suicide. So it would only be fair for the Administration to realize their situation and not expect any proposition to come from them. "The whole racial complex . . . is bound up with the independence agitation and if that is once settled one way or the other, I think the feeling will disappear. The uncertain situation which has existed for so many years naturally

Informed opinion in Washington believed that as long as Stimson was Secretary of State in the Hoover Cabinet, no independence measure would be approved by the American Government. With all the former Governor General's friendship for the Filipino people and interest in their welfare, he did not believe that independence would be a blessing for them, and he saw the current state of affairs in the Far East in such a light as to bar an American grant of full liberty to the Philippines. He looked upon the Philippine situation, not as a political problem, but an economic one for the Filipinos and an international one for Americans. See Manila Times, November 17, 1929.
tends to accelerate this racial feeling." The important thing was not to offend Filipino sensibilities. If Roxas in particular, an upcoming leader, were properly handled, he advised, it might have a powerful influence on his reactions in the future towards America.(88)

Davis made the extra effort to understand Filipino psychology and temperament, as his predecessor did, and herein lies the reason for the good relations which continued during his administration. He was always solicitous that Washington should deal with the Filipino leaders in the most proper way so as not to jeopardize the cooperation which he knew was vital to the success of his administration in the Philippines.

It will be recalled that incident to the tariff question Philippine independence seemed to emerge as the only possibility left to US farm groups to effect the limitation of Philippine imports which they had been fighting for. However, responsible officials in the Hoover Administration, especially Secretary of State Stimson, were openly hostile to any plans for early Philippine independence. The Administration was not only opposed to independence, but it did not even consider a change in the political status of the Philippines necessary or advisable, believing that extension of the powers already granted was perfectly possible under the Jones Law. The Administration believed that the Organic Act should be left essentially as it was while uncertainty was

(88) Davis to Parker, December 7, 1929, BIA Records 364-with-741; Davis to SecWar Patrick J. Hurley, December 14, 1929, BIA Records 364-671 1/2; Davis to Parker, January 23, 1930, Davis "P" file, BIA Records; Davis to Hurley, March 28, 1930, ibid.
eliminated by a declaration of intention not to withdraw American control before some future date or before certain specified conditions were fulfilled.\(^{(89)}\)

But with farm organizations becoming increasingly critical at the inability of the Administration to relieve the depression of the farm sector, Republican leaders in Congress abandoned their traditional refusal to consider the question of Philippine independence. In the session that opened in December 1929 they were willing to at least give some attention to the numerous independence bills which had been regularly deposited in the legislative chambers. Carrying out Senator Bingham's promise to conduct hearings on Philippine independence, the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs began extensive hearings on January 15, 1930, and continued them intermittently until May 22. By this time the Parliamentary Mission of Speaker Roxas and Representative Gil had arrived in Washington (on January 3). Roxas and Gil were joined in presenting Filipino views by Resident Commissioners Guevara and Osias.

Among the numerous bills and resolutions that had been introduced in the Senate, covering every possible aspect of the independence question, some providing for immediate independence and others for the establishment of a probationary period, were: S.204 -- a bill providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines, introduced by Senator King; S. 3108 -- a bill to enable the people of the Philippines to adopt a constitution, and to

\(^{(89)}\) See BIA Memorandum, December 30, 1929, BIA Records 364-661.
form a free and independent government, and for other purposes, also
introduced by Senator King; S.J. Res 114 — a joint resolution
requesting the President to call a conference on the Philippine
question, introduced by Senator Bingham; S. Res, 199 — a
resolution to investigate the possibility of tariff autonomy for the
Philippines, introduced by Senator Vandenberg; S. 3379 — a bill
to enable the people of the Philippines to adopt a constitution,
introduced also by Senator Vandenberg; and S. 3822 — a bill to
provide for the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States
over the Philippines and for the recognition of their independence,
introduced by Senators Harry B. Hawes (Democrat, Missouri) and
Bronson M. Cutting (Republican, New Mexico).(90)

Upon their arrival in Washington, Roxas and Gil of the
Parliamentary Mission began conferences with congressional and
Administration leaders relative to the forthcoming independence
hearings. In a conference with Senator Bingham, the Mission

(90) Hearings on Philippine Independence, Senate Committee on
Territories and Insular Affairs, 71st Congress, 2nd sess. (Hereafter Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence).

A comparison of the bills on their provisions for the time
of withdrawal of American sovereignty shows the following: S.
3108 provided for withdrawal within thirteen months from the
passage of the bill; S. 3379 provided for withdrawal after
eleven years and one month; S. 3822 provided for withdrawal
after six years and two months. Both S. 3822 and S. 3379
were outgrowths of the Fairfield and Johnson Bills which were
discussed in 1924. See BIA Records 364-712; BIA Memorandum,
March 29, 1930, BIA Records 364-713. See also Radio # 600,
February 5, 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records 364-after-678.

Congress had given the Filipinos no reason to think it
would approve trade favours following independence. It is
significant that of the many bills introduced in Congress
providing for independence immediately or at some future date,
not one contained a provision continuing the current trade
relations or, in fact, continuing any trade relations. Under
all these bills, the Philippines would become as other foreign
countries to the US market. See BIA Memorandum, March 29,
1930, BIA Records 364-713.
expressed its "determined opposition" to immediate independence but asserted that Congress should provide the means to bring about a definite solution of the Philippine problem. For this purpose, Bingham introduced his bill, which would call a conference in Manila in September 1930 to make a complete study of the Philippine problem.(91)

The Mission also conferred with Secretary of State Stimson, who intimated to them that he was worried about the situation in the Senate, which might approve an independence bill, although he was sure the House would take no action, and President Hoover would veto any independence bill passed. The Administration was desirous of sidetracking the current pro-independence activities in Congress and seemed ready to consider the Bingham plan for a round table conference of authorized Americans and Filipinos.(92)

In Manila the Filipino leaders were non-committal in relation to the proposed conference. If it were not for their belief that Bingham was opposed to independence and their fear that his resolution might be merely an attempt to delay matters, the majority leaders would have been glad to accept it. But it was difficult for them to take any public stand which did not appear to support

(91) Roxas to Osmeña, Alas, January 7, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.

In some quarters the Bingham Resolution was regarded as an attempt on the part of the Senator to evade his pledge to report the King Bill or to smother the full effect of the same. See Manila Times, January 10, 1930.

(92) Roxas to Osmeña, Alas, January 5, 1930; Roxas to Osmeña, Alas, January 7, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.
immediate independence.(93)

S. 3822, the Hawes-Cutting Bill, was not introduced until March 5, 1930, following six weeks of extensive hearings. It was introduced at that stage in an effort to produce a measure which would, at least in part, reconcile the conflicting views which had emerged from the hearings. Once it had been introduced, it became the only serious contender for committee approval, although the Filipinos had up to then publicly supported S. 3108, the King Bill.(94)

Senator Harry Hawes had been recently appointed to the Senate Committee.(95) Shortly after the opening of the Senate Hearings on Philippine independence (on January 15), he had invited the Philippine Mission to his office and offered his help — if indeed they and the Filipino people "honestly and truly want independence." Roxas and his colleagues "almost stumbled over each other" in their

(93) See Cable # 41, January 22, 1930, Davis to SecWar, BIA Records 364-570; Davis to Parker, January 23, 1930, in Francis LeJ. Parker, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records. See also Osmena to Roxas, January 12, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(94) Philippines Herald, March 6, 7, 8, 1930.

Another interesting bill on Philippine independence was introduced by Senator Royal S. Copeland (Democrat, New York), although it was not seriously considered at this session. It was a joint resolution, introduced on May 8, providing for Philippine independence by constitutional amendment. Philippine independence would be given within ten years after the ratification of the proposed amendment by 2/3 of the states. The assumption was Congress had no right to give independence to the Philippines. The Philippine Mission opposed Copeland's plan, because while apparently favouring independence, it would actually kill it because it would be very difficult to secure the 2/3 vote required for amendment. See ibid., May 9, 10, 1930.

(95) Manila Times, January 10, 1930.
haste to assure Senator Hawes that they genuinely desired independence.

A few days later, Hawes had again summoned the Mission to another conference in his office. Then he advised them to abandon all hopes for an immediate independence bill and to concentrate their efforts on a bill providing for independence after a reasonable period of preparation. The best strategy, he explained, was to put forward a non-partisan Philippine bill. So he then had tapped Bronson Cutting of New Mexico, whom he described as a liberal Republican. Taking up Hawes's suggestion, Roxas had lost no time in preparing the proposed measure. (96)

The bill provided in effect for autonomy for a period of five years, followed by a plebiscite of the Filipinos to determine whether they desired complete independence. During the five-year transition period, the United States would remain in control of foreign affairs and would retain the right to intervene for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace, order, and stability. To enable the Philippines to gradually adjust to the abolition of free trade which would come with complete independence, the bill provided for the free exchange of goods between the two countries during the first year of the transition government, the tariffs then to be increased gradually until full rates were applied in the fifth year. (97)

(97) Cable # 652, SecWar to Davis, March 6, 1930, BIA Records 364-after-703.
During the protracted Senate Committee hearings, scores of witnesses — members of the Philippine Parliamentary Mission, Filipino students in the United States, representatives of American farm, labour, and industrial groups, American businessmen with interests in the Philippine, and Administration officials — filed their briefs and presented a mass of testimony on almost every conceivable aspect of the Philippine question. (98)

Once again, representatives of agricultural interests and labour organizations in the United States expressed themselves vigorously in favour of immediate independence and the consequent termination of the free trade status for Philippine products and of Filipino immigration. They attempted to present their case in terms of America's obligations toward the Philippines — or "the humanitarian point of view." They thus favoured the King Bill. (99)

Those who opposed independence also declared themselves mindful of America's obligations which, they stated, would be shamefully ignored by the premature withdrawal of American sovereignty.

Interests opposed to independence were unanimous in affirming that the existing indeterminate situation was harmful to the general interests of the Philippines "politically, economically and every other way" and that, therefore, something should be done to end such uncertainty. Almost all of them suggested as a solution the


(99) See their testimony in Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, pp. 67-118; also in Manila Times, January 21, 1930.
granting of greater autonomy, and they were not wholly opposed to the concession of independence after a period of twenty or thirty years. This was the position they had held in 1924, and they favoured the Fairfield Bill, presented then, to the King Bill. (100)

These advocates of prolonged transition, or the anti-independence group, roughly fell into five classes: (1) Americans with business interests in the Philippines, such as RCA, Standard Oil, and California Packing Company; (2) importers and processors of tax-free Philippine products; (3) manufacturers and exporters of products to the duty-free Philippine market; (4) "Manila Americans," American residents who lived in the Philippines and carried on business there; and (5) an element of propertied Filipinos with land and capital devoted to export produce.

Along with the Manila Times (until March 1930) and the Manila Daily Bulletin, the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines spoke for the interests of Manila Americans. It had actively campaigned against independence and had even advocated a territorial government for the Philippines. (101) The Manila Americans opposed Philippine independence on the grounds that America had neither


(101) See supra, p. 89.
fulfilled her trust in the Philippines nor yet realized her trade potential in Asia. (102)

Recognising that the anti-Philippine forces, represented by the farm and labour lobby, were a powerful group prepared to push their cause to its successful conclusion, the Parliamentary Mission solicited their support in a joint effort in behalf of the King, and then the Hawes-Cutting, bill. This was a campaign strategy that Quezon had suggested earlier, and that Roxas pursued in Washington. (103)

- The Parliamentary Mission presented the Filipino viewpoint on the matter of tariffs and independence. At an early stage in the Senate Committee hearings, in an impassioned plea for withdrawal of

(102) See Friend, "American Interests and Philippine Independence, 1929-1933," pp. 507-510; Friend, book, pp. 81-82; 86. See also Horace B. Pond (Pacific Commercial Company) to Quezon, January 5, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 47; Manila Times, January 16, April 21, 1929. Late in 1929, when it appeared that independence might be seriously considered, the Manila Times had expressed the wish that the Filipino leadership would consider an independence plan that it felt would be the most beneficial to the Filipinos -- one that would stress the economic duty of the United States as well as its political obligations, one based on "common sense rather than political ambition and national hysteria." It favoured the Fairfield Bill, with a transition period of thirty years of economic and political preparation, thus lightening the blow to business that any independence plan must cause. See editorials, October 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, November 19, 1929; January 24, 1930.

(103) Quezon to Guevara, February 28, 1929, Quezon Papers, Box 47; Roxas to Quezon, June 28, 1929; Vicente Bunuan (Press Bureau) to A.M. Loomis (National Dairy Union), November 13, 1929; Bunuan to Quezon, October 20, 1930, all in ibid., Box 48. This group included the American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation, National Dairy Union, and American Federation of Labor, all of which were represented in the congressional hearings.
American sovereignty, Speaker Roxas had reiterated to the Senate Committee that his people had decided that whatever the consequences, they wanted independence. He assured the Committee of the goodwill of Filipinos towards America, declaring that "whatever the outcome of our efforts the Filipino people would feel that the United States flag over them was a symbol of democracy," and the granting of independence would be consonant with a policy always magnanimous. It would be an example that "would find a reflection in the spread of democracy to the other colonial peoples of Asia," and further, "it would allay all suspicion as to the United States purpose."

Asked whether he realized that the withdrawal of the United States, with the elimination of the Philippine market there, would prostrate the sugar and coconut industries, Roxas had insisted "no matter what the consequence we are prepared for independence now." He said the Filipinos felt that it was better to make the change now, when they could stand the shock, than later, when their output would be more firmly rooted in protected crops.

On proposals for tariff autonomy with continued American sovereignty, Speaker Roxas had declared that the Filipinos were absolutely opposed to it, both on political and economic grounds. Replying to a query from Senator Vandenberg, he said:

... if tariff autonomy is proposed with a view to independence, say, in two years, probably that would be considered acceptable ... We would prefer to have our independence first ... With the granting of tariff autonomy serious difficulties may arise ... If the Philippine Legislature proposed to tax certain American imports, which tax would injure the business of Americans in the Islands, that
would create such a tense situation between Americans and Filipinos that no Governor General would approve such a measure, even were it to protect important Philippine industries.

Responding to further questioning, Roxas had expressed the belief that tariff autonomy preceding Philippine independence would not likely be accompanied by the freedom to negotiate tariff concessions with foreign countries, and even if granted that privilege,

... we believe it is not necessary for us to undergo that stage, for this reason ... The same dire and disastrous results which independence will bring upon our industries will be the outcome of tariff autonomy. They will be just the same, and I submit that we shall be in a better position to stand those disturbing consequences if we are absolutely independent than if we continued under the American flag.

It was clear that the Filipinos wanted progressive tariff autonomy following independence. Roxas further had said:

It is improbable that such a situation (the sudden disruption of current trade arrangements with the United States) will be forced on the Philippines. Transfers of sovereignty have always provided for a fixed reasonable period to allow readjustment to conditions...

However, the Filipinos feel they are not at liberty to request its concession. Whether it should be approved or not is a matter which should address itself to the sense of justice of the American people and to their earnest desire nobly to complete their task in the Philippines.

Speaker Roxas had ended his testimony by urging approval of the King Bill as the one which best answered the aspirations of the Filipinos and best accommodated the ideals and interests of both the
United States and the Philippines. In Manila, the Filipino leaders maintained the same position. (104)

Before the hearings commenced in January, it had seemed likely that the Senate would "scuttle" the Philippines for the benefit of American farm and labour interests. By the time the hearings recessed on March 10, there was noted an "awakening of conscience" among members of the Senate. Initiative had been taken from "selfish" interests, and the debate on Philippine independence had moved onto the "loftier" plane of the duty of America and the welfare of the Filipino people. It was in this setting that certain of the members of the Senate Committee, both Republican and Democrat, had sought a compromise solution. S.3822 — the Hawes-Cutting Bill — had been seen as answering some of the objections of those opposed to independence while at the same time conciliating the so-called radicals (demanding immediate independence) and those who, notwithstanding their sympathy with Filipino aspirations, believed a gradual process of political organization and economic readjustment should precede the separation of the two peoples.

(104) See Roxas testimony in Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, pp. 6-30; also Manila Times, January 16, 1930; BIA Records 364-713. See also Brief of the Philippine Delegation for Independence for the Philippines, in Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, pp. 226-244; Supplementary Statement of the Philippine Delegation Relating to the Bills Pending Before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, ibid., pp. 539-540. For the testimony of other members of the Mission, see pp. 458-534 for Osias; pp. 534-548 for Briones; pp. 40-44 for Gil. See also Philippines Herald, March 19, 1930; Tribune, March 20, 1930.
When Senator Hawes had offered his bill in full session on March 5, 1930, he had stated clearly and unequivocally that it did not fully satisfy the desires of the Filipinos and their representatives in Washington, but that, despite that fact, he hoped that the Filipinos would support the bill in the belief that it would hasten more than others the realization of their freedom. (105)

Senator Bingham, together with a majority of the Republican Senators on his Committee, was against Philippine independence and probably wished Congress to take no action. But a majority of his Committee favoured an independence bill, and the testimony of the Mission had countered in practically every respect the arguments advanced against independence. Bingham as a consequence adopted a strategy of stalling, while seeking weighty testimony opposed to independence. He expected that Secretary of State Stimson or Secretary of War Hurley would furnish him with what he was after.

Informed sources in the Capital alleged that President Hoover's Administration, in addition, did not desire to take any step regarding the future of the Philippines which might add a new or variable factor to the navy equation, then being discussed in London. President Hoover thought the success of the whole disarmament programme depended upon the United States staying in the Philippines; he therefore urged congressional leaders to ease up on the Philippine question during the London Naval Conference. (106)

(105) See Report of the Parliamentary Mission, in BIA Records 26480-120. See also Manila Times, February 16, 1930.

(106) See Philippines Herald, April 7, 1930; also March 1930 session between W. Cameron Forbes and President Hoover, in Forbes Journals, Second Series, III, pp. 14, 68.
Between the end of the public hearings on March 10 and May 16, when the testimonies of Stimson and Hurley were heard, the majority leaders in Manila still publicly supported the King independence bill.

To project to Washington the people's feeling about independence, and to answer the allegation that the popular demand for immediate independence was not an expression of intelligent and informed public opinion, the Philippines Herald in April conducted a nationwide straw vote, the first of its kind ever undertaken in the Philippines. This was in lieu of a plebiscite, which the American Government had never allowed. For a period of two weeks, the Philippines Herald printed a daily coupon, to a total of 150,000, requesting readers to indicate their sentiment on the independence question. The conclusion reached by the Herald after this vote was that the people's aspirations for independence were as warm and as strong as they had been at the time of the American occupation in 1898. Of the more than 10,000 valid votes cast (some inadvertently voted more than once), 82% favoured immediate independence, 17%...
favoured eventual independence, and less than 1% favoured permanent retention.\(^{(107)}\)

As for the minority leaders, they seemed befuddled by the whole situation, not really knowing what stand to take to best suit the political situation in the Philippines. In late March, they reportedly instructed their representative on the Mission, Pedro Gil, to support the Hawes-Cutting measure which had been introduced earlier that month. But in April, Sumulong, who was then on his way to Washington to join the Mission, was instructed to insist on complete and immediate freedom. It must be politics again, crowed the Tribune.\(^{(108)}\)

The Secretaries of War and State both submitted testimony to the Senate Committee in executive session starting on May 16. Dramatically and controversially, they presented an Administration position of strong opposition to any independence measure.\(^{(109)}\)

\(^{(107)}\) Philippines Herald, April 10, 11, May 17, 1930.

\(^{(108)}\) The Tribune, March 20, 1930; Philippines Herald, April 17, 1930.

\(^{(109)}\) As Senator Bingham prepared to conduct hearings in executive session on Philippine independence, a new drive was started against duty-free entry of Philippine products. American butter interests, mostly in the Western states, launched an insidious advertising campaign on a large-scale describing alleged unsanitary conditions existing in the preparation of copra and coconut oil in the Philippines. See Cable from Parker to Davis, April 7, 1930, in Philippines Herald, April 8, 1930.

Representative Timberlake re-introduced on May 3, 1930, to the House Committee on Ways and Means, H.J. Res. 330 limiting importation not only of sugar but also of copra and coconut oil. See Radio #754, May 6, 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records C-1250-204. See also in Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 72, pt. 8, p. 8325.
A letter dated May 15, 1930, from the Secretary of War to Senator Bingham, put forward the views of the War Department. The letter was read to the Committee on May 16 by Acting Secretary of War Davison for Secretary Hurley, who was sick. It listed four principal courses of action as regards Philippine policy: (1) to continue in effect the present Organic Act without substantial modification of its basic provisions; (2) to enact new legislation granting increased autonomy to the government of the Philippines; (3) to grant immediate and complete independence; and (4) to announce that independence would be granted at the expiration of an indicated term of years.

The Secretary stated his conclusion favouring continuance of the current Organic Act, the Jones Law, without substantial modification of its basic provisions. He wrote:

It is believed... that the granting of complete independence at this time would be disastrous, alike, to the ultimate interests of both the Filipino and American people; that no diminution of American control in the Islands, below that which may properly be effected under the present organic act, should be brought about while the responsibility incident to American sovereignty in the Philippines continues, and that it would be inexpedient and hazardous to attempt to anticipate future developments by fixing any future date for ultimate independence.

Certain concrete objectives should, he stated, be substantially achieved by the Filipinos before further consideration could be given to proposals for granting them complete independence. They should include

... both the definite relief of the public debt of the Philippine Government and the presentation of
satisfactory evidence that an independent Philippine Government would be able to meet the necessary costs of government under the conditions which an independent status would presumably entail. They should also include satisfactory evidence that advances in public education among the masses of the people, in the establishment of a common language, and in the means for the general dissemination of information on public questions shall have reached a point reasonably indicative of an understanding and informed public opinion and should include similar evidence that an independent government would be reasonably prepared to maintain itself against undermining influences, domestic or foreign.

The most reactionary portion of Secretary Hurley's letter, which greatly worried the Filipino leaders, was that which showed a tendency to disavow the promise of independence contained in the Jones Act or, at least, to make its fulfillment very difficult, if not impossible. Thus:

An examination of the record leads to the conclusion that no commitment, legal or moral, exists as regards immediate independence or independence within any specific period of years; and no commitment as regards ultimate independence has been found which appears to be more binding than the correlative obligation for the continuation of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands until the trust which has been assumed, in behalf of the Philippine people as a whole, can honorably be terminated when they are adequately prepared "to fully assume the responsibilities . . . of complete independence."(110)

(110) Senate Document 150, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., 6 pp.. The Secretary of War's letter was based on several BIA Memoranda prepared by General Parker -- December 30, 1929, February 18, April 26, and May 5, 1930 -- as well as a lengthy memorandum prepared by Vice-Governor Gilmore on April 16, 1930. See BIA Records 364-661, 364-722, and 364-736. See also McCoy Papers, Box 83; and BIA Memorandum for the Record, May 6-19, 1930, in BIA Records 364-734. See also Cable # 782, May 17, 1930, Parker to Davis; Radio # 783, May 18, 1930, in BIA Records 364-aft-720; Personal and confidential letter, Parker to Davis, May 21, 1930, in BIA Records 364-aft-720; Roxas to Quezon, May 21, 1930; Quezon to Roxas, May 23, 1930, draft, in Quezon Papers Box 48.
Secretary of State Stimson, appearing before the Committee in person, hastened to concur with Hurley's opinion and argued at length against the Hawes-Cutting Bill and against any other bill providing for the granting of independence within a predetermined period. He opposed immediate independence on three grounds. He thought, in the first place, it would be "disastrous to the Philippine people." They were both politically and economically unprepared for independence. Political independence would destroy self-government and either anarchy or oligarchy would follow, with a comparatively small class of Filipinos exercising economic and political tyranny over the mass of the people. Stimson feared that Philippine self-government might be impaired, also, because an independent government would be unable to prevent the "penetration of alien races," specifically the Chinese and the Japanese.

Stimson thought immediate independence would also be "disastrous to the interests of the United States, both in the Islands and in the Far East." He was "immensely impressed" by the development of American trans-Pacific trade in the twenties and

Hurley's letter was dissected by Dean Maximo M. Kalaw of the University of the Philippines who called it "illogical, unfortunate, untimely, and unclear." See The Tribune, May 20, 1930.

The portion of the Secretary's letter which supposedly disavowed the promise of independence was published in the Manila press and caused quite a stir. The War Department had to explain that the alleged portion (mistakenly printed in Manila) did not mean that the United States disavowed any promise of independence. What it implied was that reasonably adequate preparation should precede ultimate independence, and that such a degree of preparation did not yet obtain in the Philippines. The Filipinos were reluctant to accept this explanation. See Cable # 968, September 3, 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records 364-738; BIA Memorandum, September 22, 1930, BIA Records 364-with-739; Cable # 1008, September 27, 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records 364-with-739. For corrected version, see Philippines Herald, September 30, 1930.
believed that American trade with Asia would continue to increase, if America remained in possession of the Philippines. He feared, moreover, "the general unsettlement" which "hasty and premature independence" would cause in the Far East. If America withdrew her influence, a void would be created and general unrest would follow. He proposed that the question of independence be shelved for thirty years so the Philippines could have the opportunity for economic development, relieved of the uncertainty caused by continuous political agitation. He hoped, moreover, that when the Filipinos were prepared for independence, they would nevertheless decide to retain their current status under the American flag. (111)

The most damaging part of Stimson's testimony was a suggestion of duplicity in the Filipino attitude towards independence. He said that the Filipinos and their leaders did not favour immediate and absolute independence, citing despatches from Manila intimating the weakening of independence sentiment. He also added that Congress was to blame for the current independence agitation, rather than the Filipinos themselves. He remarked that his appearance before the Committee was partly at the request of the Philippine Mission, although he reluctantly admitted that they did not request him to oppose independence (but intimated that he could, if permitted, lay before the Committee information from the Mission, which he hesitated to do because it might subject them to criticism from their own people).

(111) See in Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, pp. 657-694; also Philippines Herald, May 23, 1930.
Roxas and the Mission protested against this part of the Secretary's testimony. In a brief statement Roxas declared that the Philippine delegation was voicing the sentiments of the entire Filipino people and the Philippine Mission, who were "officially, privately, and sincerely for the independence of our country." Roxas submitted a statement signed by the Mission and the Resident Commissioners disputing Stimson's claim that the Mission had requested him to appear before the Committee. Confirming that they had indeed had a conference with Stimson the week before (on May 15), they explained that they had merely stressed the necessity of ending the present uncertainty and inquired of the Administration's policy on the matter. (112)

Once again Roxas declared that the Filipino leaders realized that Philippine economic interests would suffer difficulties with the sudden disruption of current trade with America upon the advent of independence. If America wished to avoid such difficulties, it could grant the Philippines a reasonable period after independence to permit readjustment of economic conditions. However, if the United States was not disposed to grant this concession, the Filipinos just the same desired independence at the earliest date, with all its consequences, believing they would better stand the

(112) See Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, p. 682. See also Roxas, Sumulong, Briones, Güevara, Osías to Osmeña, Alas, May 23, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48; Philippines Herald, May 22, 1930.

"Mysteriously," the statement was dated May 21, 1930, the day before Stimson's testimony. See Friend, dissertation, II-11.

Pedro Gil's story was that the Filipino commissioners visited Secretary Stimson and the Secretary declared his desire to testify. Upon his return to Manila, Gil called Stimson as one of the "most rabid enemies" of Philippine independence. See Manila Times, August 22, 1930; Manila Daily Bulletin, September 18, 1930.
shock of change now than later.(113)

The points of view set forth by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State were widely publicized in the press and commented upon by the Filipino leaders. Hurley's letter came as a considerable surprise and created anxiety over the degree to which it would influence congressional action on independence. Stimson's testimony caused even deeper concern in view of the great weight which his opinion on Philippine matters carried within the Hoover Administration.(114)

But the Mission was not discouraged, for the final word must come from Congress, not the Executive. And the Committee was already committed by a large majority to Philippine independence.(115)

Quezon responded to the Administration spokesmen's enunciation of their position by publicly proposing that the Administration and Congress get together and agree on enacting a law that would do one of three things: (1) state that no matter what had been promised in the past, the United States did not intend now to grant Philippine independence; (2) reiterate the promise made to grant independence, but, not believing that the time has arrived for the granting of it, set the date in the future when independence shall be granted; or (3) set a date when independence shall be granted. Besides

(113) See Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, p. 682.
(114) See Roxas, et. al., to Quezon, Osmeña, Alas, May 24, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.
(115) See Quezon's statement to the press, in Philippines Herald, May 24, 1930; also Cable # 277, Davis to Parker, May 28, 1930, in BIA Records 364-727; and Stimson Diaries, Vol. 10, August 28, 1930, Stimson Papers.
constituting a challenge to the Administration, perhaps this was also Quezon's subtle way of announcing that the Filipino leaders were prepared to accept a compromise. Filipino-owned newspapers were showing an inclination to abandon the old cry of immediate independence and to see wisdom in the policy of "independence eventually, but not now."(116)

At the same time, as if to answer Stimson's allegations of duplicity, the Philippine Legislature, on May 31, 1930, adopted a Declaration of Political Faith, affirming "with the same determination and conviction as on other occasions, that the Filipino People has [sic] no other aspiration than the immediate attainment of its independence and any statement to the contrary is false and absurd."(117)

Despite this Declaration, the Legislature had only a few days before revised its stance in favour of the King Bill and had instructed the Mission in Washington to concentrate all its efforts on securing favourable and early action on the Hawes-Cutting measure.(118)

(116) See Quezon to Editor, Tribune, May 28, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48; also Philippines Herald, May 5, 1930.

There were noises made to recall the Philippine Mission on the grounds that independence now was a hopeless case. A change of front was in fact suggested -- self-government under dominion status instead of immediate and absolute independence (Tribune, May 21, 1930). There were also recriminations heard -- had they accepted the Fairfield Bill, the Philippines would today be only 19 years from the goal. See Philippines Herald, May 31, 1930.


(118) Ibid., May 27, 1930.
Roxas in Washington had insisted that there should be no wavering in the stand in favour of immediate independence, but that instead there should be an even more vigorous determination to continue to struggle for it. Their wavering, he said, was discouraging independence supporters in Congress and making it impossible to prosecute the independence campaign successfully. (119)

But the leadership in Manila decided otherwise. (120)

The majority of the Senate Committee, most of whom were from agrarian states, felt that the Hawes-Cutting bill should be put before the Senate, and on June 2, 1930, the Committee reported the bill. (121) Quite extensive reports were submitted by Senators Hawes and Cutting for the Committee majority. Senator Bingham submitted for the minority. (122)

The majority report of the Committee included an analysis, in considerable detail, of the merits of Philippine independence, and its relation to (1)

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(119) Roxas to Quezon, May 21, 1930; Roxas, et al., to Osmeña, Alas, May 22, 1930, May 24, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(120) The American Anti-Imperialist League criticized the Filipino leaders and envoys in the United States for insincerity in their demands for Philippine independence, a charge they repeatedly hurled at the Filipinos. They wanted the Filipinos to continue with their demand for complete, immediate, and absolute independence. Philippines Herald, June 19, 1930.


(122) The majority report was signed by 6 Democratic members who represented Nevada, Georgia, Louisiana, Arizona, Maryland, and Missouri. The 8 Republicans were divided equally, the senators from California, Michigan, North Dakota and New Mexico signing the majority report, while the minority report was signed by Republican senators from Connecticut, Rhode Island, Indiana, and West Virginia.
to Japan; (2) the problem of Philippine defense (in the event of war with Japan); (3) economic nationalism in the United States; and (4) Filipino exclusion.

The Committee majority, composed of Democrats and Progressive Republicans, argued that in view of American promises and in the light of politico-economic developments and the needs of the United States, the time had arrived to grant independence. Early and absolute independence was unanimously demanded by the Filipino people, the report stated, and it was the duty of the United States to declare its intention in regard to retention or release of the Philippines. The Committee report held that

The United States owes a solemn duty to the Philippine people — a duty of an honest declaration of our future intent. If we have decided to retain these islands under some form of colonial government, we should be frank enough to proclaim it. We should not further encourage national aspirations to ultimate independence on the part of the Philippine people if we are ourselves opposed to their independence.

If the delay of independence for thirty years is for the purpose of defeating independence, we should say so frankly.

The general view in legislative circles in Washington was that the majority report was one of the best documents written on the Philippine problem, and wide publicity was given to the report all over the United States. Nevertheless, in presenting the case for early independence, it gave little consideration to its complications or consequences for the Philippines. One authority described it as "a curious mixture of idealism, sound common sense,
and complete naivete."(123)

The minority of the Committee declared that five years was too short a period to prepare the Philippines for independence. They agreed with Secretary Stimson's views and quoted extensively from his statement to support their position. They were "not prepared to place in grave jeopardy the well-being and economic and political prosperity of 13,000,000 people who have been wards of the United States for a generation and for whom we have undertaken an altruistic experiment," now only half completed. The minority report summed up their arguments against the pending plan under the following headings.

1. Immediate, or early independence, would be disastrous to the Filipinos themselves.

2. It would be harmful to the interests of the United States both in the Philippines and in the Far East.

3. It would inevitably create an unsettled condition in the Far East in connection with the present stabilization of affairs in the different countries having interests in the Far East and exercising sovereignty there.

For immediate or early independence we are convinced that Filipinos are not yet prepared. To grant it we believe would very seriously jeopardize their welfare and bring to naught many of the steps already taken for their advancement and prosperity during a generation of our beneficent guardianship.

The report stated that the greatest difficulties would be of a financial nature; that internal development must have the benefit of capital from outside the Philippines; that the period of five years before granting independence was too short; that the Philippines would lose the benefit of capital from the outside, which could not be obtained unless political stability were assured for a long time; that the five-year period did not give the Filipinos sufficient time to prepare themselves for economic freedom; that the minimum period in which amortization of investments could be hoped for was thirty years; that most of the Muslims desired to remain under the American flag; that the people would not have sufficient education to know their civil rights to safely exercise the political franchise; that the withdrawal of the protection of the United States might readily upset the balance of Far Eastern relations to such an extent as to cause other governments to intervene; and, that the Philippines' bonded debt was backed by the credit of the United States.

The minority report, emphasizing points brought out in the Secretary of War's letter, further stated that "adequate preparation -- political, economic, or social, -- does not exist, the hazard of attempting to anticipate future developments to the extent of indicating a definite date at which it can safely be assumed that adequate preparedness will have been achieved appears to be unnecessary and inadvisable. The period to elapse before complete independence shall be granted should be outlined, if at all, in terms of objectives in the nature of conditions precedent to
independence rather than in terms of years."(124)

The House Committee on Insular Affairs also held hearings on an independence bill — H.R. 5182 — a bill to provide for the independence of the Philippines, introduced by Harold Knutson (Republican, Minnesota). The hearings were called at the insistence of the Philippine Mission and of certain members of the Committee who favoured independence. Owing to lack of time, these sessions lasted only for two days, May 5 and 6, 1930.(125)

Representative Knutson, from a dairy state, offered his independence bill because he believed that free trade with the Philippines was hurting American agriculturists. To abolish free trade it was necessary to give the Filipinos their freedom first.

(124) Senate Report 781, part II, 71st Congress., 2nd sess., See also Cable # 812, June 4, 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records 364-after-729; Philippines Herald, July 7, 1930.

Senator Vandenberg filed an additional minority report in which he explained that while he concurred with the minority report that the five year probation period was "wholly and dangerously inadequate to the safe development of Philippine independence," he otherwise agreed with the general programme embraced in the bill, because he knew no method whereby either the United States or the Philippines could ever know whether the Philippines were self-sufficient "except as an autonomous probationary interval provided the proofs."

(125) Rep. Edgar R. Kiess (Republican, Pennsylvania), known opponent of Filipino freedom and chairman of the House Committee, was determined not to conduct hearings on Philippine independence measures until after action had been taken by the Senate. Philippines Herald, March 28, 1930.

This stand was reversed, and late in April (21st), Kiess agreed to start hearings in his committee on May 5. Roxas argued that with no less than six independence bills referred to the House Committee, hearings should be conducted, in fairness to the authors of the bills and to the Filipino people, who had maintained an Independence Mission in Washington since January. See Ibid., April 22, 1930.
The Knutson Bill provided for the holding of a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a constitution for the Filipino people. Transfer of sovereignty from the United States would become complete and absolute within one year after the establishment of the government authorized by the constitution. Thus, within about two years after the enactment of the law, complete independence would come to the Philippines.(126)

Chairman Kiess and Speaker Roxas opened the Committee hearings with a heated debate as to the meaning of the promise of independence in the preamble of the Jones Law. Kiess maintained that the preamble was not binding upon Congress. Knutson then made a plea for independence on behalf of the American farmer, explaining that because of the importation of Philippine products, particularly sugar and coconut oil, the Philippines was becoming a serious competitor to beet sugar and other American farm products. He suggested that perhaps his bill would be improved by an amendment stating a definite time for withdrawal instead of leaving that matter to the President. He expressed his belief that the Philippines was ready for independence and that the House, if given an opportunity that session, would pass an independence measure by a substantial majority.(127)

All the members of the Parliamentary Mission, including Senator Sumulong, Democratic leader, who had just arrived in Washington (on May 4th), appeared at these hearings. Speaker Roxas testified

(126) Hearings on H.R. 5182, House Committee on Insular Affairs, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 1-2. See also Philippines Herald, April 24, 1930.

(127) Hearings on H.R. 5182, pp. 2-5; see also Cable #752, Parker to Davis, May 6, 1930, BIA Records 364-after-713.
before the House Committee, and in his statement said: First, that the Filipino people had accepted the preamble of the Jones Law as a solemn covenant with America, which preamble was in harmony with various statements of American public officials. The statements of these officials, as well as extracts from past Republican and Democratic platforms, were inserted in his testimony. Second, the people of the Philippines afforded the only instance of a people addressing a sovereign power for freedom, through their representatives, in a peaceful, orderly, constitutional manner. Third, it was necessary to end the current uncertainty, as the agitation and delay were injurious to business and the development of capital.

At the May 6th hearing Roxas indicated he would insert in the record of the hearings "A Statement Made by the Secretary of Finance of the Philippine Government, An Official Appointed by the Governor General, By and With the Consent of the Senate, On the Probable Budget of the Philippine Independent Government." His accompanying remarks were understood as indicating that the statement would demonstrate the ability of an independent government of the Philippines to balance a suitable budget.(128)

Senator Sumulong made a statement in which he reviewed the organization and proceedings of the Independence Congress held in Manila in February 1930 and described Muslim participation in that Congress. He likewise emphasized the importance, from an economic

(128) Hearings on H.R. 5182, pp. 5-19; 21-22. See also Cable # 760, Parker to Davis, May 8, 1930, in BIA Records 364-after-716.

Messrs. Briones and Gil each submitted a written statement. See Hearings on H.R. 5182, pp. 22-28; 28-34.
point of view, of terminating the uncertainty arising from the current political status of the Philippines. His statements were frequently interrupted by questions from members of the Committee, who evidenced interest in the probable economic situation of the people and government of the Philippines in case independence should come, in the attitude of the Muslim population, in the results that would follow if free access to the United States were lost to the Philippines, and in the question as to whether Filipinos desired independence immediately or after a preparatory period for adjustment to new conditions. The Senator's replies were to the general effect that anticipated economic conditions which independence might entail could be met, that participation by Muslims in the Independence Congress had been at the request of certain Muslim leaders, and that those engaged in the sugar industry desired five or six years of favoured access to the American market in order to adjust themselves. He apparently preferred that this period of favourable relations should follow independence.(129)

The House hearings were marked by somewhat acrimonious exchanges between members of the Committee. Chairman Kiess expressed the view that American elements pressing the independence issue were actuated by their own interests and were giving little or no thought to what was best for the Filipinos. Representative Knutson acknowledged that his primary interest in the matter was the elimination of competition unfavourable to the American farmer. He insisted on the early continuance of the hearings with a view to a report on his bill, and he gave notice of his intention, in case

(129) Ibid., pp. 34-49; See also Cable # 759, Parker to Davis, May 8, 1930, BIA Records 364-after-716.
progress was not satisfactory to him, to endeavour to have the bill taken from the Committee and considered on the floor of the House, where he claimed a majority would favour early independence. (130)

The bill was not reported out, and the witnesses were largely confined to the sponsor of the bill and the members of the Parliamentary Mission. No representative of the War Department was heard by the Committee, although on May 19, 1930, the Secretary of War addressed to Chairman Kiess a letter similar to the one addressed to Senator Bingham on May 15th, giving the official view of the Department on the proposed legislation. (131)

Concurrently with the renewed attention to possible Philippine independence, Filipino immigration in the United States became a contentious issue. The steady influx of Filipino labourers to the Pacific Coast States, principally California, (132) where from time to time riots had occurred over labour troubles, had led the American Federation of Labor and other more extreme "patriotic" societies to propose that the exclusion laws applicable to other Asians be applied to the Filipinos, who were free to enter the

(130) Cable # 761, Parker to Davis, May 8, 1930, BIA Records 364-after-716. General Parker thought the House Committee was possibly more conservative in attitude than the House itself would be should a bill get on the floor. Parker to Davis, May 21, 1930, BIA Records 364-with-720.


(132) Between 1928 and 1929, the best estimates obtainable indicated that the number of Filipinos in the United States did not exceed 50,000, perhaps over 40,000 in the Pacific Coast states of California, Washington, and Oregon. See Memorandum for General Parker, January 25, 1930, in BIA Records 25051-113; Philippines Herald, May 7, 1930.
The AFL had been opposed to the retention of the Philippines, having denounced it as a policy of imperialism departing from the time-honoured traditions of the United States. After 1926, when heavy Filipino immigration began, the AFL became chiefly concerned with the problem of Filipino immigrant labour competition, and the race problem it would create. It urged support for a policy of complete and immediate exclusion. In 1929 the AFL argued that exclusion was also highly desirable on the grounds of public health, since "upon the authority of health officials it is declared that the mode and conditions of life in the Philippines tend to destroy the vitality and stamina of these people, making them easy victims of various contagious diseases, as evidenced by the recent epidemic of spinal meningitis, pneumonia, and tuberculosis."(134)

(133) Some of these societies were the American Defense Society, the Daughters of the Defenders of the Republic, the Minute Men of America, the National Patriotic Association, the R.O.T.C., and the American Legion, all members of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, which had more than 40 member societies. They were all supporters of "racial purity" and "national homogeneity." See Kirk, op. cit., p. 99; also Manila Times, May 9, 21, 1929.

(134) See Senate Hearings on Philippine Independence, pp. 113-118. See also Memorial of the City Council of Seattle, Washington, urging restriction of immigration of Filipinos to continental United States, in Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 71, pt. 1, p. 699; and Communication from the Acting Director of Health relative to the Filipinos as a factor in connection with the existence of spinal meningitis in the United States, ibid., 71st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 72, pt. 7, p. 7534.

For the best study of Filipino immigration, see Bruno Lasker, Filipino Immigration to Continental United States and to Hawaii (Chicago, 1931). See also Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin (Boston, 1934); Josefa M. Saniel, ed., The Filipino Exclusion Movement, 1927-1935 (University of the Philippines, Insitute of Asian Studies, 1967); and Letters in Exile, An introductory Reader on the History of Filipinos in America (UCLA, 1976), Part II.
It will be recalled that at the time of the tariff agitation brought on by the Timberlake Resolution early in 1928, a bill for Filipino exclusion was also introduced, in May 1928, by Congressman Richard J. Welch (Republican, California). (see supra, p. 411) on the ground that the Filipinos were the least assimilable or least desirable as additions to the racial composition of the American population, predominantly of Caucasian stock. Implied in this non-assimilability assertion was a racism that treated American national character like a "prized recipe," to be preserved in its exact ethnic components. Filipino immigrants, it was advanced, would not only endanger the economic status of American workers, but would also destroy the cultural traditions of the country and the character of its people.

No action was taken on the Welch Bill in 1928, nor on another exclusion bill presented by Representative Albert Johnson (Republican, California) on January 18, 1929. (135)

Welch re-introduced his exclusion bill on January 16, 1930, as H.R. 8708. (136) The attention given in Congress to exclusion coincided with the opening of the hearings on Philippine independence in the Senate, and the Watsonville riot in California (January 23) which resulted in a Filipino being shot to death. (137)

(135) See Manila Times, January 20, 21, 1929.


(137) See ibid., January 26, 29, 1930. Other disturbances and attacks on Filipinos continued that year. See Philippines Herald, March 2, 1930.
These outbursts against Filipinos were precipitated by fear of competition from Filipino labourers entering the United States from Hawaii, and by the fact that white girls were being employed as entertainers in Filipino dance halls.\(^{(138)}\)

Hawaii representatives opposed the exclusion measure, which would also apply to that territory, for Hawaii's very economic life depended upon its importation of Filipino labour.

The exclusion plans offended the Filipinos. To be denied independence was bad enough, they felt, but to be excluded also was to have insult added to injury. Some sectors of the population responded to the California disturbances by celebrating a "National Humiliation Day," observed on February 2, to protest against attacks on Filipinos in California.\(^{(139)}\) Governor Davis reported some manifestations of anti-American feelings, as in a strike of high school students at the Manila North High School over some tactless remarks by an American teacher, and a flurry of "red" activities.\(^{(140)}\)

\(^{(138)}\) Manila Times, January 24, 30, 1930.

\(^{(139)}\) Ibid., February 3, 1930.

\(^{(140)}\) Ibid., February 19, 1930; Davis to Hurley, March 28, 1930, Davis, "P" file, BIA Records.

The Communist Party of the Philippines was formally launched on November 7, 1930. Its constitution was adopted on August 26, 1930, almost at the same time that Roxas was launching his Bagong Katipunan movement (see infra, pp. 521-525). "Red" activities in the Philippines probably started as early as 1924. See Liang, op. cit., p. 200.
Governor Davis strongly opposed the Welch measure, fearful that its political effect in the Philippines would be most harmful and might cause serious embarrassment to his administration, destroying the spirit of cooperation then existing.\(^{(141)}\)

Responding to strong pressure from labour groups, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization held hearings during the months of April and May 1930 on the Welch Exclusion Bill (before Bingham held executive sessions in his Committee). Testifying in support of his bill, Welch declared that the immigration of 10,000 Filipinos into the United States during the previous year constituted the "third Asiatic invasion" with which California had had to contend over a period of years. He then described the long and finally victorious fight of California to bar Chinese, and then Japanese.\(^{(142)}\)

The exclusion of Filipinos was urged on socio-economic grounds: first, it was alleged that increasing numbers of Filipinos worked for relatively low wages, thus displacing whites and adding to the unemployment situation, which in turn encouraged disturbances of public order; and, second, it was alleged that racial incompatibility tended to produce conflicts and that Filipinos were

\(^{(141)}\) See Cable # 54, Davis to SecWar, January 27, 1930, BIA Records 25051-114; see also BIA Memorandum, January 25, 1930, BIA Records 25051-113.

\(^{(142)}\) Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 8708, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 2-8. (Hereafter Hearings on H.R. 8708) See also Philippines Herald, April 11, 1930.
not assimilable with whites. (143)

As with the tariff restriction proposals, the Philippine Mission vigorously opposed the exclusion bill on a question of principle: so long as American sovereignty remained in the Philippines, it would be an injustice and a crime to deprive the Filipinos of the right to reside freely in the territories of the sovereign nation. "You cannot justify discrimination against the Filipino people," Roxas declared, until the Filipinos themselves were free to adopt a similar course as regards Americans, if they so desired. It was "unprecedented in the history of colonization" of even the most imperialistic nations, which permitted free access to their territory to citizens of the colonies. If America desired to stop Filipino immigration because she considered it prejudicial to her interests, the remedy lay not in arbitrary and unjust legislation, but in the concession of independence. (144)

Opposition to the Welch measure also came from the War Department. BIA Chief Parker placed the Department's objections before the Committee, based first upon considerations of just and fair treatment for those owing allegiance to, and under the protection of, the United States, and second, upon the relatively unimportant factor in United States immigration which Filipino

(143) Radio # 715, April 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records 25051-after-120.

(144) See Hearings on H.R. 8708, p. 101, pp. 225-234; Philippines Herald, April 7, T2, 1930; Briones, Gil, Quevara, Osias to PhilPress Manila, April 12, 1930; Roxas to PhilPress Manila, April 13, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48; and BIA Memorandum, April 16, 1930, BIA Records w-364-741.
arrivals had constituted.\(^{(145)}\)

The Filipino leaders themselves were anxious to discourage extensive immigration of their labourers, who could be harnessed for economic development at home. Prominent political leaders in Manila strongly favoured passage of a measure regulating Filipino emigration from the Philippines to the United States.\(^{(146)}\)

With the House Immigration Committee already considering the Welch Exclusion bill, a similar measure was introduced in the Senate by Senator Samuel Shortridge (Republican, California) on April 16 — S. 4183.\(^{(147)}\)

The Shortridge bill, converted into a rider to another immigration measure, met with strong opposition from Senators Bingham and Hawes. Bingham, sharing the Administration's opposition to any plan to cut the Philippines adrift, opposed exclusion on moral grounds. Senator Hawes led the fight on behalf of independence proponents, maintaining during the debates that the


\(^{(146)}\) See Cable # 212, April 24, 1930, Davis to SecWar, BIA Records 364-741.

\(^{(147)}\) Philippines Herald, April 17, 1930; Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 72, pt. 7, p. 7104; see pp. 7510-7530 for the Senator's remarks.

Senator Shortridge subsequently allowed his proposal to ride as an amendment to the Harris immigration bill then under consideration (William Harris, Democrat, Georgia), which provided for restriction, through a quota, of Mexican and Latin American immigrants. The Shortridge amendment would exclude Filipino immigrants from continental American ports, but it would not interfere with the practice of Hawaii of importing labourers for the sugar plantations of that territory. It would allow only Filipino students, officials, tourists, and similar classes to enter the continental United States. Philippines Herald, April 22, 23, 1930.
only just solution to the Philippine immigration problem was the grant of independence to the Philippines.(148) The Shortridge amendment was rejected by a vote of 41 to 23.

House Committee debate on the Welch Bill had been temporarily recessed prior to consideration of the Shortridge amendment. In an effort to encourage continued deferral, Hawes introduced on May 7, 1930, an amendment to his independence bill (S. 3822) adding a new section on immigration, providing for the exclusion of Filipinos, except for certain categories.(149) That same day the House postponed hearings on the Welch Bill indefinitely.(150) Then it was, too, that Senator Bingham promised to report a Philippine bill after the testimony of Hurley and Stimson was concluded.

The reporting out of the Hawes-Cutting Bill in June ended for the time being all independence activities in Congress. Administration hostility and the usual pressure of business during the closing weeks of the session made it impossible for the sponsors of the Hawes-Cutting Bill to have it considered by the full Senate.(151) It was felt that the Philippine question would

(148) Ibid., April 25, 1930.
(149) Cable # 769, Parker to Davis, May 13, 1930, BIA Records 364-after-718.
(150) Philippines Herald, April 23, 24, May 9, 1930.
The House Immigration Committee published a 300-page report incorporating all views of opposing sides on the exclusion issue. The report was viewed as the groundwork for a further campaign directed at Filipino exclusion. See ibid., June 20, 1930.
(151) Important matters under congressional consideration were the tariff appropriations, public utilities, Muscle Shoals project, and the London Naval Treaty.
undoubtedly be prominently featured in the next session of Congress, however. (152)

The Parliamentary Mission officially ended its work in Washington in June 1930, and Gil and Briones returned to Manila. Roxas and Sumulong decided to stay in Washington because of the impending special session of the Senate and the possibility that the Philippines would figure in the debates on the London Naval Treaty, then up for ratification. (153) Roxas did eventually return to Manila, in September, while Sumulong remained in the United States.

In the meanwhile, Nicholas Roosevelt, a cousin of President Theodore Roosevelt and editorial writer of the New York Times, had been recommended, early in July, as Vice-Governor of the Philippines, to replace Eugene Gilmore. The Roosevelt appointment, recommended by Secretary Hurley (without previous consultation with the Filipino leaders, as had been the practice with some important appointments) had the endorsement also of Secretary Stimson and Senator Bingham, the three most influential Republicans in the Hoover administration on matters of Philippine policy. (154)


(153) Philippines Herald, June 17, 18, July 8, 1930. The Philippines was mentioned in connection with the treaty because critics of the treaty contended that the terms of the agreement menaced America's position in the Philippines and made the Philippines subject to attack by Japan.

(154) Cable # 886, July 18, 1930, Parker to Davis, Nicholas Roosevelt, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records; also Roxas to Quezon, July 18, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.
To the Filipinos the appointment of Roosevelt conveyed serious implications. Coming almost immediately after the failure of the last session of Congress to take action on an independence bill, and with the Administration's hostility towards independence having been clearly expressed by Secretary Hurley's letter, the appointment to them seemed to reflect a move towards a policy of retention. Roosevelt had consistently and publicly opposed independence and had advocated a "treat 'em rough" policy in relation to the Filipinos.(155)

Roosevelt's appointment as Vice-Governor was submitted to the Senate by President Hoover just before that body adjourned in July. As a formal protest was made against it by the Philippine Legislature, consideration of the appointment was put over so that the Filipino representatives might be heard when the Senate convened in December.(156)

Ignoring unanimous Filipino protests, President Hoover tendered Roosevelt a recess appointment pending consideration of his nomination by the Senate in December.(157)

(155) Philippines Herald, July 26, 31, 1930; see also Davis to Hurley, July 31, 1930, Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records.


(157) Cable # 889, Parker to Davis, July 24, 1930; BIA Memorandum for the Record, July 25, 1930, in Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records; see also Philippines Herald, July 22, 24, 1930. Roxas and Sumulong in Washington thought that the Administration probably stood firm on the Roosevelt appointment because of the Filipinos' uncompromising stand on independence, contrary to the Administration's desires. See their cable to Quezon, Osmeña, Alas, July 20, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.
Roosevelt accepted the interim appointment, much to Davis' disappointment, as he had hoped that Roosevelt would have the good sense to turn it down in view of the strong opposition to his nomination in Manila. He hoped that Roosevelt, once having accepted the appointment, would at least postpone his arrival in Manila until after the Legislature adjourned in November, to give time for the matter to simmer down. Davis feared that the outrage felt in the Philippines because of the Roosevelt appointment would increase in intensity and would cause a break in the cooperation between the Legislature and the American executive. To Davis it was perfectly understandable that the Filipinos should react so strongly to Roosevelt's nomination, and he hoped that Washington would understand as well. (158)

Roosevelt hoped when he accepted the interim appointment that conferences between American and Filipino leaders (Quezon was expected to arrive in the United States on August 22) could be held prior to his arrival in Manila (hopefully in late September) to smooth his way. Hoover himself admonished the Filipinos to cooperate by keeping an open mind until they had had an opportunity to clear up all questions with reference to Roosevelt's appointment. (159)

(158) See Cable # 397, July 28, 1930, Davis to Hurley; Cable # 471, September 6, 1930, both in Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records; and Davis to Hurley, August 7, 1930, in Davis "P" file, ibid.

(159) See Cable # 907, July 29, 1930, Parker to Davis; Cable # 910, July 30, 1930, Parker to Davis; Cable # 408, July 31, 1930, Davis to Parker; Radio # 911, July 30, 1930, Parker to Davis, all in Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records. See also Philippines Herald, July 26, 31, 1930. Osmeña, Alas to Roxas, August 1, 1930, Quezon Papers # 48.
The Filipino protest against the Roosevelt appointment kept the War Department busy. The Filipinos characterized the appointment as a "ruthless affront to their national honor and dignity" and declared themselves offended by Hoover's action, especially his insistence on the recess appointment. Quezon and Osmeña acknowledged the President's plea for cooperation but repeated their firm opposition to the appointment. There were rumors of a boycott of all American firms if President Hoover insisted on the appointment, as well as talk of non-cooperation, which Governor Davis was extremely apprehensive about.

There were meetings of protest in Manila which included a book-tossing (into Manila Bay) and a book-burning (at the Bonifacio Monument in Balintawak). One Narciso Lapus challenged Roosevelt to a duel! Resolutions of protest came from various municipalities, and newspaper editorials condemned the appointment. Altogether, the Filipinos felt agitated and indignant at the appointment. (160)

But what concerned Governor Davis most was Quezon's reaction. Quezon raised a threat, communicated cautiously through the Governor General, to resign and refrain from "further public service on behalf of cooperation," because his cooperation had failed to get

(160) See July 31, 1930 report, in Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records; Cable # 455, August 28, 1930, Davis to Hurley; Press comments on Roosevelt appointment, BIA Memorandum, August 29, 1930, ibid.; and Philippines Herald, September 1, 25, 1930. Quezon issued orders before his departure for the United States directing discontinuance of discussions on the Roosevelt appointment until he had conferred with Washington. See Cable # 461, Davis to Parker, August 30, 1930, Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records.
Davis transmitted his concern to Secretary Hurley in Washington. Once again, he reminded his superior in Washington of how best to deal with the Filipino leaders. Quezon, he wrote, was still the most powerful figure in the Philippines, and he enjoyed enormous influence throughout the country. To antagonize him would be most unfortunate. He wrote:

... One thing to be remembered in connection with Philippine affairs is that it is far easier to accomplish a thing if the way is properly smoothed than if the leaders are caught unaware. Face is a very important thing in the Far East and it is always necessary to keep that in mind when dealing with affairs here. It is far easier to get things done and infinitely better for our relations with the Philippines if matters are handled quietly and tactfully behind the scenes than to put them over by main force, as the latter course inevitably leaves resentment behind, and does not insure cooperation. ... (162)

Filipino opposition to Roosevelt included the following points:
(1) The attitude of Roosevelt towards the Filipinos had been one of antagonism rather than sympathy. (2) In his criticisms of the Filipino people, he was actuated by prejudice against the Filipino people as a race. (3) He had expressed himself as out of sympathy with American policy in the Philippines, declaring that "our first quarter of a century in the Philippines had been an experiment in mis-applied altruism." (4) In his writings on the Philippines, he had most unjustly criticized the leaders of the Filipino people,
without whose cooperation he could not render useful and constructive service to the government of the Philippines. (5) He also had made repeated criticisms of the system of mass education in the Philippines and had shown unconcealed enthusiasm for the European colonial systems, especially that of the Dutch in Java, which he had offered to the United States as a model to follow in her effort to establish an efficient colonial administration and to develop the vast resources of the Philippines for the profit of all concerned. (163) (6) The appointment would be received in the Philippines as an indication of a change in the policy which the United States had thus far pursued in the Philippines and the initiation of a utilitarian and selfish policy in the Philippines. (164)

Opposition to Roosevelt's nomination was really due more to hurt racial pride than political considerations. Roosevelt was criticized for his outspoken contempt of the Filipino leadership and scurrilous aspersions on the Filipinos as a race, which were reflected in his book, The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem. The book was published in 1926, after Roosevelt had collected his data from a six-week visit to the Philippines the year before. At

(163) As Vice-Governor, Roosevelt would also be Secretary of Public Instruction. On July 25, 1930, House Con. Res. 60 was introduced in the Philippine Legislature declaring the express intention of the Legislature not to approve one cent of the budget for public instruction in case the US Senate confirmed the Roosevelt appointment.

(164) See letter, Resident Commissioner Quevara to Senator Bingham, July 21, 1930; a similar letter was also addressed to President Hoover, in Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records. See also telegram, Roxas to Secretary of War, July 13, 1930; letter, Davis to Hurley, July 23, 1930; Cable # 400, July 28, 1930, Davis to Parker; and letter, July 31, 1930, Davis to Hurley, all in ibid.
that time, Governor Wood was Chief Executive in the Philippines and Roosevelt's views echoed some of those of the Governor General. In defense, Roosevelt stated that excerpts from his book "do not convey his complete thoughts regarding the Philippines," and he explained to President Hoover that his attitude towards the Filipinos was entirely friendly. (165)

The Roosevelt incident had created a delicate situation. Davis in Manila felt it was necessary that cooperation be maintained with the Filipino leaders. Washington felt it would not be politic to bend to the Filipinos' wishes and permit encroachment by Filipino leaders and the Legislature upon the President's discretionary appointment powers. Roosevelt was also faced with a dilemma. He had resigned from the New York Times, but it looked for certain that his nomination would be turned down by the Senate. A graceful way out must be found.

Roosevelt had long nurtured an ambition for public service and indicated that he would prefer as an alternative to the vice-governorship an Assistant Secretaryship in State. Secretary of State Stimson was approached about this, though the idea was ultimately dropped. (166)


Mercer G. Johnson, Director of the People's Legislative Service, a non-partisan information organization based in Washington, D.C., wrote to President Hoover in connection with the Roosevelt appointment. He described Roosevelt's book on the Philippines, consisting of 300 pages, as averaging "a jibe per page." See his letter dated July 26, 1930, ibid. See also Philippines Herald, August 2, 1930.

(166) Frank McCoy to Stimson, August 11, 1930, McCoy Papers, Box 26.
Quezon, after his arrival in America, made direct representations opposing the Roosevelt appointment. (167)

In a letter sent to President Hoover through the Secretary of War, Quezon in "respectful firmness" stated the Filipino viewpoint:

Let me at the outset disclaim any intention on our part to challenge the power of the President to appoint whomever he chooses. We are only exercising the right of petition, the use of which in this instance and in my case, considering the position I hold, becomes a duty imposed alike by my loyalty to the Government of the United States and to the people of the Philippine Islands. I hope, therefore, that these presentations will be accepted in the spirit in which they are made.

***

I would request you... to realize how humiliating it will be for the Filipino people to have at the head of their Department of Public Instruction and, from time to time, as acting head of their Government, one who has branded them as dishonest and deceitful, and how extremely embarrassing it will be for the Filipinos in public life to deal officially and socially with one who has written of them with contempt.

In recent years I have cooperated, first with Governor Stimson and then Governor Davis, to bring about a better understanding and more cordial relations between the people of the Philippines and the representative of the Government of the United States in the Islands, with the result that not only have these relations very much improved but also the racial feelings — which has always been the thorn in the Philippine problem between Americans and Filipinos. You can therefore very well understand my very serious concern over this appointment which will surely revive racial antagonisms. (168)

(167) See Quezon's correspondence to his American friends for help to block the Roosevelt appointment, for August, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48. He addressed two letters to Stimson, dated August 25, 1930, in Stimson Papers, Box 107 and one to Hurley of the same date, in Quezon Papers, Box 48.

(168) Quezon to Hurley, August 25, 1930, New York Herald Tribune, September 25, 1930, in Stimson Papers, Box 107 and also in Quezon Papers Box 48. The letter was sent for publication at
After this, Roosevelt was prevailed upon to resign his appointment with an offer of a ministerial post to Hungary. (169)

Governor Davis in Manila heaved a sigh of relief that the delicate situation attending the Roosevelt appointment had been happily resolved. He then advised the War Department that in the future he should be consulted in all matters before a decision was made. (Davis was not consulted on the Roosevelt appointment). He had apparently planned to tender his own resignation had the Roosevelt appointment been pushed through, because of his concern at the potential trouble with Roosevelt in Manila due to the "smoldering resentment" towards him. (170)

Roxas arrived in Manila on September 15, 1930, shortly before the Roosevelt "affair" was resolved. Although he was received warmly, he stirred up a furore with what were viewed as "radical" statements made upon his arrival. He censured the independence leaders in Manila because of what he termed their advocacy of independence "with apology or timidity," and he asserted that the desire for independence must be put forward in a "more unmistakable

the initiative of Vicente Bunuan of the Philippine Press Bureau, without prior consent from Quezon, to answer Roosevelt's allegation in his letter of resignation that the Filipinos had misrepresented his views and his writings. See Bunuan to Quezon, September 24 and 25, 1930, ibid.

(169) See BIA Memoranda, August 26, September 18, 24, 1930, in Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records. For letter of resignation, September 24, 1930 and Hoover's acceptance, same date, see in Quezon Papers, Box 48; also Radio # 996, September 24, 1930, Parker to Davis, ibid.; and Philippines Herald September 26, 1930.

(170) See Davis to Hurley, September 30, 1930, Davis "P" file; Cable # 507, September 26, 1930, Davis to Parker, Roosevelt "P" file, BIA Records.
and convincing manner than in the past." (171) Roxas called for a "new nationalism."

Roxas' speech was not enthusiastically received by newspapers in Manila. The Bulletin asked Roxas if he counselled violence. The Herald requested a more concrete idea of his plans for a future independence campaign. The Tribune pointed out that Roxas' important task was to help run the Legislature. (172)

To the War Department in Washington, Roxas' statements were significant in that they suggested: (1) a guarded appeal to action closely approaching opposition by violence to any American policy not in accord with Filipino desires for early independence; (2) an intention by Roxas to capitalize, for political purposes, on expressed hostility to the current insular administration; and (3) an intent on Roxas' part to oppose regulation, by the Philippine Legislature, of Filipino immigration to the United States. (173)

The Parliamentary Mission's Report, written in Washington but only submitted on August 25, 1930, had recommended launching a decisive campaign for freedom through a non-political organization. It would recognize that independence was the supreme interest of the Philippines and would seek to overcome the impression that there were important elements in the Philippines which did not favour

(171) Philippines Herald, September 15, 18, 1930; The Tribune, September 18, 1930. See also Cable # 488, Davis to Parker, September 16, 1930, Roosevelt "P" file; Radio # 492, September 18, 1930, Davis to Parker, Roxas "P" file, BIA Records.

(172) Ibid.

(173) See Memorandum for the SecWar, September 19, 1930, in Roxas "P" file, BIA Records.
independence or were not well acquainted with the inevitable consequences of freedom.(174) It should be recalled that after Roxas returned to Manila in October 1929 from a Mission to Washington, he had recommended reorganization of the independence campaign.(175) The Mission's Report laid the groundwork for a follow-up of that "Roxas plan."

Roxas' "new nationalism" was never defined very clearly, and it took a while before he could formalize his "fiery gospel." In the meantime, in preparation for the formal launching of this new movement, much was made of the alleged uselessness and inefficiency of the current type of independence campaign based on "paper negotiations, sentimental appeals, oratorical explosions, resolutions, legislative manifestoes, orations and other innocuous forms of protest and demand." Roxas was being afforded the opportunity of assuming more and more the position of a national leader.(176)

Perhaps this was in Roxas' mind. For in the long run, if he played his cards well, he would probably "win out", as Quezon was too sick to retain his influence much longer, Osmeña would retire ultimately, and no one of the younger element had come forward to challenge him effectively.

(174) See Report in Philippines Herald, August 25, 1930. See also in Quezon Papers, Box 80.

(175) See supra, pp.461-463.

(176) The Tribune, September 28, 1930.
After weeks of suspenseful waiting, on November 15, 1930, Roxas submitted his plan for "Ang Bagong Katipunan" or ABK (National Association for Independence) to the Independence Commission, which approved it. Its primary concerns were defined as being to unite all elements and to provide funds for the campaign in America. Each member would be assessed P 1.00 (50c US), and it was expected to raise P 500,000 (US $250,000) for the independence fund. (177)

Ang Bagong Katipunan was launched on November 30, the birthday of Andres Bonifacio, the revolutionary who founded the original Katipunan in 1896, in a colourful parade of some 30,000 people, garbed in the Barong Tagalog, the Filipino national dress. It promised that it would be the largest and most powerful civic organization for the "regeneration" of Filipino nationalism. It was meant to be a non-political association of all Filipinos, designed to foster self-reliance and self-respect, and to work for economic as well as political independence through promotion of Filipino culture and industries. The use of the word "katipunan" was obviously intended to appeal to the masses. (178)

(177) Quezon claimed that Roxas did not discuss his "new nationalism" plan with him when they conferred in Seattle before Roxas had returned to Manila in August. See Quezon to Osmeña, November 21, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.
See also Osmeña, Roxas to Quezon, November 19, 1930; Osmeña to Quezon, November 21, 1930, ibid.; Philippines Herald, November 18, 21, 1930; and Ang Bagong Katipunan, BIA Records 4587-B.

(178) See Philippines Herald, December 1, 1930; Philippine Magazine, editorials, December 1930; January 1931; Filipino Nation, March 1931.
The closed coat, or "Americana cerrada" and the Barong Tagalog were adopted as the official ABK garb.
In organization, it bore a close resemblance to the Supreme National Council of 1926. See Philippines Herald, November 21, 22, December 4, 8, 1930.
The aims of the Bagong Katipunan were several, embodied in a National Decalogue, comprising the following headings: national destiny, national unity, economic nationalism, race equality, human resources, veneration of the past, national culture, national discipline, public office is a public trust, and idealism. Probably the most important of these was that of economic nationalism. Roxas extolled:

We hold that our country is the inalienable patrimony of our people. We shall conserve and develop our lands, forest, mines, water power, and other natural resources, and shall insist that their disposition and control be kept in the hands of our people.

We shall practise economic nationalism. We shall organise and struggle for economic self-sufficiency. We shall strive to produce what we need and buy what we produce. We shall encourage the development of our home industries. We shall patronise our countrymen who are engaged in business but condemn those who exploit their customers. We shall buy from abroad only those commodities which we do not produce giving preference to articles coming from countries which buy our products. (179)

The call for economic protectionism drew a storm of protest from American businessmen in Manila, who thought it a crudely camouflaged call for a boycott of American products. Quezon was said to have told Roxas to go slowly on the drive against foreign goods. (180)

Roxas' "new nationalism" caused much discussion at the time, and opinion among the Filipinos seemed to be divided. In some quarters there was initially great enthusiasm for it, especially

(179) Ibid., November 14, 15, 1930, also BIA Records 4587-B.

(180) See J. Rosenthal (shoe businessman in Manila) to Quezon, November 17, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.
among the younger elements. The Democratas, except for Pedro Gil and Teodoro Sandiko, were lukewarm to the Bagong Katipunan, fearing their total disappearance from the political horizon. In fact, they suggested the dissolution of all political parties to test Nacionalista claims that it was not a partisan endeavour. This was a suggestion which General Aguinaldo also proposed. But the Nacionalistas opposed the suggestion. In the end the Democratas adopted an attitude of watchful waiting to see if indeed the ABK was truly actuated by patriotic motives. Aguinaldo severely flayed Roxas because of his willingness to "perpetuate a misplaced, ill-conceived bipartisan political system."(181)

Some were even more critical in their judgement of it as "artificial katipunans shakily held together by synthetic oaths." By many it was regarded as a mere political gesture to enhance the influence of the Nacionalista Party in the coming elections in June 1931. While some accepted at face value its stated intent to raise money more successfully to carry on the independence campaign in the United States, others thought it was a clever move on the part of Roxas to put himself in the limelight as a national leader; still others thought it was a smokescreen to divert the public from the feeling that the last independence mission was a failure.(182)


(182) See personal and confidential letter, Davis to SecWar, November 20, 1930, BIA Records 364-754. See also Philippines Herald, November 15, 17, 27, December 20, 1930.
Washington for a while watched Roxas' "new nationalism" activities carefully, fearful of some indiscreet or hasty action which might result from Roxas' call for use of more "force" in the demand for freedom. (183)

In the final analysis, the "new nationalism" scheme fell flat, in spite of frantic efforts to keep it going. Even among his own Nacionalista colleagues, Roxas had trouble generating much interest. (184)

(183) Ibid., November 3, 1930.
(184) See ibid., November 4, 10, 19, 25, 1930, December 3, 4, 1930.
THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE COMMISSION (1931-1933)
(THE OSROX MISSION)

The period from January 1932 to June 1933, which covers the stay in the United States of what has been popularly called the OsRox Mission, culminated in the passage of an independence act. The passage of the independence bill — the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act — did not end the story of the Missions, however, for a final chapter had to be played out in Manila. Quezon, who had remained in Manila throughout most of this period, mainly due to illness, declared the independence bill unsatisfactory. The Legislature, under Quezon's leadership, rejected the independence bill, and Quezon made the daring gamble to seek to secure what he promised would be a better freedom act. He did "succeed" in securing the Tydings-McDuffie Act, a bill almost identical to the one he had caused to be rejected. The Philippine problem was thereupon laid to rest, and a semi-autonomous Commonwealth government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935. Complete independence, promised after a ten-year transition period, came on July 4, 1946.(1)

(1) There has been more research done on the last two independence missions: the OsRox Mission (1931-1933) and the Quezon Mission (1933-1934). Theodore Friend, in his several works, has examined the circumstances and motives behind the passage of the first independence bill in 1933. This chapter will not go into those matters, except to explain the initiatives taken by, and the response of the Filipino leaders of the OsRox Mission to the situation they found in Washington and in Manila.
Certain interests which had wished to rid themselves of Philippine competition had found congressional sentiment sympathetic to their demand to give the Filipinos their independence. The Filipino leaders, having realized the danger in their "immediate" independence demand, became willing to accept an arrangement for ultimate independence (while publicly maintaining their more radical stand). By 1930 the push for immediate independence in Congress was no longer a threat, and the prospects for some form of congressional action on an independence bill looked good. The American mid-term elections in November 1930 further brightened the outlook for passage of an independence bill, as Congress tilted towards a slim Democratic majority in the House and an even split in the Senate. The Democrats had traditionally been in favour of Philippine independence.\(^{(2)}\)

Roxas had failed in his last mission to secure a definite settlement of the political status of the Philippines. So Quezon went to America (by authority of the same October 1929 resolution

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\(^{(2)}\) Philippines Herald, November 6, 8, 10, 1930.
which sent Roxas) to see what he could do.(3)

Quezon and his family left for America on August 2, 1930, though with Quezon stating that he was going primarily to seek medical treatment, for his health had deteriorated.

In a message "To My People" given before his departure, Quezon made it clear that he was not hopeful of a favourable and early outcome from his trip. "The situation in America is far from encouraging." It might be, he said, "a long stretch," perhaps two or three years, before something definite was done about the Philippine problem. But he was determined, he said, to make this effort, perhaps his last one, on behalf of his people. If he failed, he was prepared to retire from public life and give others the chance to do

(3) Perhaps Quezon had not been too happy with the way his young protege, Roxas, had handled himself during his mission in the United States, especially in relation to the Administration. Roxas' handling of Secretary Stimson during the latter's testimony before the Senate Committee in May 1930 may have caused him some discomfiture. For Stimson was not only an old friend, but a very influential member of Hoover's Administration. He may have also decided to have a direct hand in the current campaign at what he considered a crucial period. Due to Quezon's illness, Osmeña had been the dominating figure in Manila, although Quezon was always consulted on practically all matters of importance. For an insider's report on the conduct of Roxas and the Resident Commissioners in Washington, see letter, Bunuan to Quezon, October 20, 1930, in Quezon Papers, Box 48. See also Stimson Diaries, Vol. 16, May 10, 1931, Stimson Papers.

One other matter bothered Quezon. He professed concern that some Filipinos were using the independence question in party struggles in the Philippines. The uncertainty and continued refusal to grant independence were, he thought, responsible for some Filipinos becoming suspicious of the sincerity and patriotism of their own leaders. Congress, he realized, must also be under the impression that the Filipinos were not doing their best to attain their aspirations for independence. See Quezon to Senator William H. King, February 7, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.
what he could not do. (4)

Quezon had planned to proceed directly to Washington, but illness forced him to stay again in California. From there he directed the independence campaign, with the help of the Resident Commissioners in Washington. It was not until very much later, in May 1931, that Quezon was able to go to Washington. (5)

In the meanwhile, Sumulong, the only member of the last Mission remaining in Washington, urged that the majority leaders in Manila and Quezon consider the attendance of a capable Philippine delegation, perhaps Roxas and Gil, in Congress, to check the anti-Philippine movement which continued in Washington. Sumulong appeared unwilling to shoulder responsibility for defending Philippine interests in Washington. (6) But Osmeña and Roxas were adamant against leaving Manila at this time. Roxas was in the midst of activities for his "new nationalism" movement; the other leaders were too busy with preparations for the forthcoming Philippine elections in June 1931. Quezon remained in California, convinced

(4) Philippines Herald, August 2, 4, 1930; Tribune, July 27, August 3, 1930.

(5) Philippines Herald, August 23, 25, 30, September 6, 15, November 15, 1930; Tribune, September 4, 1930.

(6) Sumulong had reported to Quezon and the Manila leaders that, among other things, arrangements were being made for the appearance of former Insular Auditor Wright before Congress to testify on the Philippine problem. Wright was reportedly planning to testify on alleged rampant graft, corruption, and immorality in the Philippine government. Wright never did testify. See Philippines Herald, November 17, 24, December 3, 1930. Quezon to Osmeña, Roxas, October 31, November 17, 19, 1930; Quezon to Osmeña, November 11, 1930; Osmeña, Roxas to Quezon, November 19, 1930, all in Quezon Papers, Box 48.
that nothing would ensue from the forthcoming short session of Congress, although he was concerned about the immigration question. (7)

The only person who was eager and willing to go to Washington was General Aguinaldo, convinced that all influential elements should cooperate in winning the common cause. Wishing to work for "immediate, complete, and absolute independence," Aguinaldo nevertheless would make the trip only on the condition that he got popular support for his project. This did not come, and the "idol of the Revolution," in disgust, gave up his plan, but not before severely criticizing the political leaders for their lukewarm attitude in the campaign for independence. (8)

(7) Quezon to Osmena, Roxas, November 24, 27, 30, 1930, ibid.; Cable # 1116, November 25, 1930, Parker to Davis, BIA Records 364-741.

(8) Aguinaldo expected municipal councils to pass resolutions endorsing the step he was going to take, but they did not. Even members of the Asociacion de Veteranos de la Revolucion, of which he was president, opposed his planned trip to the US, because Aguinaldo was engaging in active politics by meddling in the independence campaign. And the Association was strictly a non-political organization. Neither did the Legislature offer him an allowance to cover the expenses of the trip. See Philippines Herald, October 16, 22, 23, 1930; also Personal and confidential letter, Davis to Hurley, October 23, 1930, BIA Records 364-746.

Interestingly enough, even former Governor Harrison was puzzled by what he discerned as a change in the Filipino leaders' attitude towards independence. "What has happened to the independence issue in recent years?" he wrote to Senator Jose A. Clarin. "The Filipinos used to be the leaders in the development of self-government in the Orient -- now they are at the tail-end of the procession and almost never heard of in other parts of the world . . . ." See his letter, February 2, 1931, in Quezon Papers, Box 49.
When the final session of the Seventy-first Congress convened in December 1930, economic distress and widespread unemployment made Filipino immigration immediately an issue. A flood of bills embodying restrictive proposals against Filipino labourers was introduced by Pacific Coast members of Congress within two weeks after the opening of that session.(9)

The immigration hearings revealed strong opposition to any restrictions against Filipinos so long as they remained under American sovereignty.(10)

(9) Philippines Herald, November 18, 24, 25, 29, December 2, 3, 4, 1930.

Race troubles involving Filipinos continued in California. One Filipino was killed and two injured in a bombing incident in El Centro shortly before the start of congressional hearings. See ibid., December 10, 1930.

(10) See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Immigration on S.J. Res. 207, (Reed Bill) 71st Cong., 3rd sess. (Hereafter Hearings on S.J. Res. 207).

Senator Hawes did not show any interest in getting behind the move to defeat the Reed Bill. Guevara feared that Sumulong's criticisms of the Hawes-Cutting Bill (in his Princeton address on October 27, 1930, see Philippines Herald, October 28, 1930) may have had something to do with this lack of interest. Guevara and Bunuan apparently tried to dissuade Sumulong from making such criticisms, but Sumulong would not be dissuaded. Bunuan thought Sumulong was playing politics for home consumption. See Bunuan to Quezon, October 20, December 19, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48.

Stimson declared his opposition to the bill as a whole, but declined to comment on the Philippine angle of the Reed Bill, declaring it concerned the War Department. See his testimony in Hearings on S.J. Res. 207, pp. 67-81; Philippines Herald, December 19, 1930.

Stimson did not see fit to plug for the Philippine labourers' cause, probably because of Roxas. When the Mission conferred with Stimson on this matter, Stimson had urged that the Philippine Legislature be given an opportunity to handle the question of immigration itself, and Roxas apparently thought the suggestion had merit, for the Filipino leaders were just as desirous of keeping their own labour at home for economic development. Roxas, however, went back on this stand when he returned to the Philippines and publicly branded Stimson's suggestion as an insult. So Stimson did not touch at all on the Philippine phase of the bill in his testimony.
As expected, the 71st Congress closed without any action on Philippine independence. The Hawes-Cutting Bill was placed on the programme of the Republican Steering Committee of the Senate (on January 7), for preferred consideration, but had not been reached when the 71st Congress came to an end on March 4. The Knutson independence bill was placed fourth in the calendar of the House, but was also not considered. Even in the face of a persistent well-organised campaign, Congress also again refused to set up a tariff wall against Philippine products or to restrict Filipino immigration. Congress confirmed the principle of equal rights for Filipinos and Americans under the American flag. (11)

Hawes and Cutting had considered the time not ripe for urging consideration of the independence question because of congestion in Congress over economic legislation. It was believed, however, that the Administration leaders, opposed to independence, had hoped to bring the Hawes-Cutting Bill out at this session because the possibility of an adverse vote would be better, both because of the brief time and because the 72nd Congress would bring in a large

Quezon understood Stimson's feelings and did not ask him to intervene in the Filipinos' favour. See Stimson to Quezon, December 22, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48; Quezon to Stimson, January 8, 1931, Stimson Papers, Box 107.

Governor Davis shared Stimson's idea on dealing with the problem of Filipino migration to the United States, but he was upstaged by Roxas, who upon his return to Manila in September 1930, gave out an interview (without consulting with the other leaders) opposing all restrictions, whether imposed by Congress or the Philippine Legislature. See Cable # 670, Davis to SecWar Hurley, December 10, 1930, BIA Records 364-741.

(11) Timberlake again offered an amendment to the Tariff Law limiting the importation of duty-free Philippine sugar and coconut oil into the United States. The bill was lost in committee. See Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 74, pt. 1, p. 8. See also Philippines Herald, March 4, 1931.
infusion of Democratic blood expected to support independence.(12)
The Democrats in the Senate were apathetic to the bill, obviously
due to the fact that, having gained greatly in the November
elections, they wanted to defer the issue until they could command
greater numerical strength in the next session of Congress.

To observers on the Washington scene, the chief importance of
the 71st Congress with respect to the independence issue was that it
made clear the paradoxical situation that the political friends of
Philippine independence were in many cases the economic foes of the
Philippines, while conversely, many of the ardent opponents of
independence had been the most earnest in blocking the attempted
trade barriers. This meant that a minority of Democrats who
believed in independence on the ground of political principle or for
historical reasons found as their potential allies the
representatives of sugar, dairy, and cotton-seed producing states,
whose primary purpose was to obstruct imports of Philippine sugar
and coconut oil.

One Filipino contemporary described the case of the Filipino
people in America in this apt phase: "Estamos donde estamos." (We
are where we are). (13)

(12) Ibid., January 8, February 10, 12, 1931. See also BIA
Memorandum for SecWar Hurley, January 10, 1931, BIA Records
364-after-759; Cable # 21, January 8, 1931, Parker to Davis,
BIA Records 364-after-757; Radio # 60, January 27, 1931,
Parker to Davis, BIA Records 364-after-762; Cable # 91,
February 11, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-765; Cable # 116,
February 19, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-765; and Cable # 125,
February 24, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-766.

(13) See Harry Frantz, Philippines Herald, December 22, 1930, March
11, 12, 1931. Eulogio B. Rodriguez to Harrison, February 19,
1931, in Harrison Papers, Box 33.
In May 1931 Quezon made the trip to Washington, reportedly to push the freedom campaign for the forthcoming session of Congress in December, and to confer with the Hoover Administration on important Philippine matters. (14)

Quezon's decision to confer with the Hoover Administration was a great relief to Governor Davis in Manila. From his end, the political situation was becoming increasingly touchy. There was Roxas "dashing wildly" about the country on behalf of his "new nationalism" movement, making fervid oratory "almost on the Red side" and waxing "radical" daily against "foreign domination." Roxas, Davis thought, was the "most dangerous man now." (15)

There was Sumulong, the "brains of the opposition," (who returned to the Philippines in May) proposing a non-cooperative movement similar to the Gandhi movement in India (admittedly a political ploy to embarrass the Nacionalista Party in the

(14) Philippines Herald, March 24, May 2, 7, 1931. Quezon arrived in Washington on May 6th; called on Secretary Hurley and President Hoover on May 11th. See Memorandum for the Record, May 12, 1931, Quezon "P" file, pt. 4, BIA Records.

(15) Philippines Herald, January 17, 24, 27, 1931. See also Davis to Parker, February 6, 1931, BIA Records 28342-16; Davis to Hurley, April 19, 1931, Davis "P" file, BIA Records; Davis to Parker, April 22, 1931, BIA Records 1239-219; James Ross to Harrison, March 13, 1931, Harrison Papers, Box 33; J. Rosenthal to Quezon, February 2, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.

approaching elections), whilst at the same time calling for a more effective campaign for independence.(16)

In view of the situation developing in the Philippines, and to prevent radical elements represented by Roxas from displacing Quezon and Osmeña, Davis advised the War Department that it was important to have Quezon (and Osmeña) feel that Americans were relying on them as representatives of conservative opinion in Manila. If treated squarely and trusted by the authorities in Washington, he thought Quezon could be relied upon to give sound and fair advice regarding the Philippine question.(17)

The feeling in Washington, after the congressional session ended in March, was that Congress was ready to vote independence. This situation greatly troubled Secretary of State Stimson, who felt that independence "would be a source of sorrow and regret later." Perhaps, he thought, a compromise could be worked out.(18)

So Stimson sought out Quezon, to whom he expressed his pessimism about the Philippines. Together Stimson and Quezon discussed a programme such as dominion government, which would forestall congressional action on immediate independence. Quezon was anxious to have something done (and wanted Stimson's help) and

(16) Cable #180, March 19, 1931, Parker to Vice-Governor Butte, BIA Records 364-770; Cable # 176, March 23, 1931, Butte to Parker, BIA Records 364-771; Philippines Herald, March 10, 14, 16, May 25, 1931.

(17) Davis to Hurley, March 16, 1931, Quezon "P" file, pt. 4, BIA Records; Davis to Hurley, April 19, 1931, Davis "P" file, BIA Records.

wished the Administration to take the leadership of the Philippine question. Worried about possible immediate termination of free trade and unable to accept the tariff provisions of the Hawes-Cutting Act, Quezon signified to Stimson his willingness to accept a Philippine plan that might include an immigration quota (with labourers prohibited) and import limitations on sugar and coconut oil (but no tariff). Pleased by Quezon's "reasonable" attitude, Stimson arranged for him a series of conversations with the War Department over the Philippine issue.(19)

Over a period of six weeks, Quezon conferred with Secretary Hurley, Frank McCoy, and Frank McIntyre (20) to find some suitable measure the Administration would be willing to approve which the Filipinos could accept. Quezon stressed the importance of a clear definition of the relationship between the Philippines and the United States, instead of stressing the importance of independence.

(19) Quezon agreed with Stimson that "our" movement for the development of a dominion government by evolution was probably best, although he was disappointed that Davis had not followed up Stimson's initiatives in Manila towards the establishment of a responsible cabinet government. Stimson Diaries, Vol. 16, May 7, 10, 19, 20, 21, 25; June 3, 10, 14, 21, 1931, Stimson Papers; Quezon to Switzer, October 18, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.

It is interesting that while Quezon seemed to agree with Stimson that dominion government was probably best for the Philippines, in his conference with Senator Bingham afterwards, he dismissed the idea as an impractical proposition. He was obviously still making up his mind as to the best political arrangement he could work out for the Philippines. See Bingham to Quezon, June 6, 1931; Quezon to Bingham, June 11, 1931, ibid.

(20) Pedro Guevara, Col. Blanton Winship, former Wood and Stimson aide, and Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur also joined in the talks.
In conferences with the War Department Quezon stated that the uncertainty of the past thirty years had adversely affected every human activity in the Philippines and was seriously impeding the progress of his country. He suggested that the time had come for the Administration to take the initiative and to recommend to Congress the enactment of legislation looking towards the early solution of the Philippine question.

Pending the enactment of such legislation, Quezon recommended that steps be taken to grant the Filipinos more responsibility in their own government under the Organic Act. Quezon suggested that the Filipino people could be induced to accept self-government without complete independence (in place of immediate and complete independence) only on condition that there would be free trade with the United States for a set period of time, with the right to determine at the end of this period whether they should then have complete independence. To counter the demand of certain private interests that they be protected against Filipino competition, Quezon suggested placing restrictions on the entry of Philippine products into the United States and limitation of Filipino immigration. Quezon thought enactment of such legislation as he proposed necessary, for the mere establishment of cabinet responsibility or party government, although a progressive step, could not by any means satisfy Filipino demands for freedom.(21)

(21) Memorandum Embodying the Submission of the Presentation of the Philippine Question, made by Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, to the Secretary of War, Hon. Patrick J. Hurley, in the Conferences Held Between Them in Washington, D.C., May, June, July 1931, 2 drafts, Quezon Papers, Boxes 49 and 81.
In urging legislative action by Congress in the next session, Quezon reminded the Secretary of War that he, Quezon, was already committing himself to something which did not conform to the prevailing sentiment of his people. (22)

The round robin conversations in the War Department ended inconclusively in late July. Quezon and Hurley in their final conference agreed only that they would go to the Philippines together, with no pre-conceived plan but with the idea of working out the situation in such a manner as in their judgement would best serve the interests of both peoples. The Secretary of War would not commit himself nor wanted the Administration to commit itself in advance to any programme requiring legislation from Congress. (23)

Conclusions Reached After Several Conferences Had Been Held Re the Philippine Question Between Secretary of War Hurley and Senate President Manuel Quezon, drafts in Box 81.

Summary of the Views Submitted by Mr. Quezon to the SecWar Re the Philippine Situation, in Box 49; drafts in Box 81.

See also letter, Quezon to President Hoover, June 15, 1931, BIA Records 364-786 1/2; also in Quezon Papers, Box 49; drafts in Stimson Papers, Box 214; McCoy Papers, Box 83.

Also Quezon to Hurley, July 24, 1931, draft in Quezon Papers, Box 49.

(22) Quezon at about the same time conferred with Senator King (June 18), to whom he gave the assurance that the Filipinos had not changed front on independence and they would take independence in any form, in spite of his misgivings about the economic situation. If the choice was between wealth without freedom or freedom with starvation, he would choose the latter. See Memorandum of the conference, with the Resident Commissioners present, ibid., Box 81. Following this conference, King announced he would re-introduce his independence measure in the 72nd Congress. See Philippines Herald, June 19, 1931.

(23) See Memorandum for the Files, July 29, 1931, BIA Records 364-816 1/2.
There was no agreement on legislation because there were several sticky points that could not be ironed out. For one thing, President Hoover felt some initiative should come from the Filipinos, for unless somebody took a "courageous stand," the Administration felt it could not do anything with Congress. The Filipinos felt that they could hardly be expected to volunteer views until they knew what the President would do. Further, the Administration was unwilling to commit itself to Quezon's propositions, especially to setting a specific time for independence, on the grounds that there was no way to forecast when conditions for independence would be favourable. The War Department also wished the Philippine Legislature to take the initiative to enact measures which would remove the threat of Philippine products and labour in the United States; otherwise Congress would do it, and this would be harmful to Philippine interests and embarrassing for Philippine-American relations. (24)

The Administration's stand was probably best expressed in President Hoover's letter to Quezon on June 16. He wrote:

The time and circumstance of independence is the difficult problem [in the declared policy of the American government in respect to the Philippines]. In its determination one dominant fact stands out. The Filipino people cannot, without serious economic and social consequences to themselves establish political independence without first having attained

(24) Stimson Diaries, Vol. 16, May 7, 1931, Stimson Papers; War Department Memorandum: Concerning Certain Proposed Changes in the Relations Between the United States and the Philippine Islands, June 1931; and Secret Memorandum for the Secretary of War Concerning Relations Between the United States and the Philippine Islands, Summarizing Considered Views of All Executive Departments, With Certain Conclusions and Recommendations, June 18, 1931, ibid., Box 214; also in McCoy Papers, Box 83. See also Quezon to Osmeña, August 8, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.
economic independence. The inclusion of the Philippines in the American system involves ramifications which go to the very root and fiber of Philippine life. National economics, standard of living, tariff relationship, immigration, national defense, international credits and foreign contacts are but some of the corollaries involved.(25)

Perhaps, also, the War Department was uncertain of Quezon's stand. Whilst one moment seemingly willing to forego the traditional demand for independence, another moment he would backtrack. For instance, he wanted McCoy to make it perfectly plain to Hurley and Stimson that despite the proposals he had put forward, he had not changed his stand on independence, nor would he oppose any bill providing for Philippine independence.(26)

Also following varied reactions in the Manila press (as reported in some New York newspapers), Quezon felt compelled to deny reports that he had revised his stand on "immediate and complete independence" or that he had made any statement to the effect that Filipino demands must be revised. He took pains to explain that he was still working for an early grant of independence.(27)

Quezon was obviously unwilling to risk political censure at home. Perhaps Quezon need not have worried so. Sober conservative sentiment seemed to be increasingly prepared for a reasonable discussion rather than merely insisting upon immediate independence.

(25) See letter in BIA Records 364-786 1/2; drafts in Quezon Papers, Box 81.

(26) Memorandum, Quezon to McCoy, June 18, 1931, McCoy Papers, Box 27.

Osmeña cabled Quezon that the Tribune and the Herald had not published unfavourable editorials as claimed by the New York papers. In fact, both newspapers had called for a realistic and frank approach and had editorially said that the time had come to shift the campaign for independence to meet the altered situation in the United States and openly to seek a programme of separation that would enable the country to readjust economically. Even the Democrata leader, Sumulong, agreed that immediate independence was impractical and something more practical needed to be worked out.(28)

Quezon also quietly explored a "Philippine Free State" Plan, an independence scheme devised by American sugar businessmen with business interests in the Philippines. The Free State Plan, a rehash of the Fairfield Bill (1924), would establish in the Philippines practically a free representative government, but without complete national sovereignty, which would be exercised by the United States. In a sense it meant virtually permanent retention. Limited free trade with the United States would continue, with quotas placed on certain Philippine products. It would also provide for Filipino exclusion from the United States.(29)

(28) Osmeña to Quezon, May 23, 1931, ibid.; Davis to Hurley, Personal and confidential, May 21, 1931, BIA Records 364-804; Cable # 294, May 22, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-781; Cable # 295, Davis to Hurley, May 22, 1931, BIA Records 364-780; see also Philippines Herald, May 19, 21, 1931.

(29) See Oscar Sutro to Quezon, November 6, 1930, Quezon to Sutro, November 16, 1930, Quezon Papers, Box 48. Oscar Sutro was an old-timer who had set up a law practice in Manila in 1901. He
In the meantime numerous American officials visited the Philippines between May and September — a dozen senators and representatives, Secretary of War Hurley, and BIA Chief Parker — to study the Philippine situation in anticipation of debates on the Philippine question in the December 1931 session of Congress.

Two visitors caused much excitement in Manila — Senator Harry B. Hawes, co-author of the Hawes-Cutting bill, and Secretary Hurley, the first Secretary of War to come to Manila in twenty years.

As he had announced that he came to find out if the desire for independence was unanimous among the Filipinos, the Filipino leaders staged for Senator Hawes "the largest and most stirring

and another old-timer, Alfred Ehrman, were with the Calamba Sugar Company, a Philippine firm. At this time, he was a prominent San Francisco lawyer-businessman with sugar interests.

The Sutro letter was sent to Stimson. Quezon requested Sutro to express his ideas in the form of a bill. The draft of an act to authorize the establishment of a Philippine Free State was sent to Quezon by W.H. Lawrence on May 5, 1931. Lawrence was a law partner of Sutro during their Manila days. See in ibid., Box 49. See also Harold M. Pitt to Parker, November 19, 1931, BIA Records w-25051-117.

Quezon also solicited the opinion of New York businessman John M. Switzer, asking him for suggestions regarding a compromise on sugar (to appease sugar elements in the United States clamouring for independence) and a plan of use of Philippine public lands. See John M. Switzer to Quezon, July 24, 1931, September 2, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.

After his return to Manila in October, Quezon explored some plan to limit, by legislation, sugar production in the Philippines, to minimize the opposition of the sugar lobby in the United States. See for instance, James Ross to Quezon, October 26, 1931; Memorandum for Quezon from Secretary Alunan, recommending establishment of a Sugar Board, October 29, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.
"demonstration" in a Liberty Parade which reportedly counted the participation of some 200,000 people. A Liberty Prayer was read and an independence resolution passed demanding absolute freedom. Thrilled by such an enthusiastic demonstration of the desire for independence, Hawes spent the six weeks of his stay in the Philippines in an impassioned campaign for independence, which literally "left Manila gasping."(30)

Governor Davis himself was unimpressed by Hawes' "outrageous antics" in Manila. He told Secretary Hurley that many thought Hawes' purpose was to commit the Filipinos publicly to a continuing demand for immediate independence, in order to facilitate acceptance of his independence bill. Many Americans thought he had not created a favourable impression among the Filipinos because of his "cheap" behaviour. Naturally, however, he had received popular acclaim in the role of champion for independence and had undoubtedly, Davis regretted, made the situation more difficult for possible compromises.(31)

(30) See Philippines Herald, June 18, July 13, 1931; also "The Independence 'Circus' at Manila," China Weekly Review (Shanghai), September 6, 1931.

"A Senator Runs Amok," editorialized the New York Herald Tribune on July 14, 1931. The paper found Hawes "guilty of a lack of elementary patriotism and decency... without precedent in a public official..." for having "taken part in a great public demonstration against the government of his own country." This was during the Liberty Parade on July 12. See Harry P. Hawes, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records; see also a lengthy piece on Harry Hawes written by D.R. Williams, August 3, 1931, in D.R. Williams, Personnel "P" file, BIA Records. See also New York Times, June 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, July 1, 6 (editorial), 13, 24, 25, 28, 29, 1931.

(31) See Cable # 391, July 16, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-794; also Creed Cox (BIA) to Davis, August 4, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-805.
Secretary Hurley was also extremely agitated by Hawes' performance in the Philippines. In an interview with Hurley after both men returned to Washington, Hawes challenged Hurley to investigate what he had done in the Philippines. When Hurley told him that he had found positive proof of his "treasonable utterances" (for instance, urging the Filipinos to stage their own Boston tea party) and was ready to meet his challenge, Hawes backed off. Secretary Arthur Hyde (Agriculture) said it was clear Hawes had accepted retainers from the farm lobby in Missouri for his job of getting Philippine independence.(32)

Hawes wrote a book after his visit to the Philippines: Philippine Uncertainty, An American Problem. It was a plea for Philippine independence and a sharp critique of American colonial policy. The book was launched on February 12, 1932 while his independence bill was under consideration in Congress, hopefully in time to aid favourable action on the measure.

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Secretary Hurley was supposed to have gone to the Philippines with Quezon, but Quezon suffered a relapse after his trip to Washington, and had to stay at the California sanatorium once more. Hurley's trip was at Quezon's request, to enable the Secretary to study Philippine conditions so that the Administration could formulate a policy that would bring about a final settlement of the

Philippine question. (33)

Staying a little over four weeks (September 1-26), Hurley was received with mixed feelings by the Filipinos. The Herald editorial of August 5, 1931, probably best expressed the Filipino sentiment.

We would wish that the purpose of this mission be one of inquiry into the necessary details of separation. Yet it might be that of gathering an array of facts so devastating as to make a presidential veto of Philippine independence preclude further agitation and argument.

Hurley reassured the Filipinos that he was coming "with an open mind and deep interest in the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people." (34)

An independence parade welcomed the Secretary and his party on September 1, with "perhaps a greater enthusiasm than during the July 12 parade" (for Hawes), and with banners proclaiming "Give us liberty!" A freedom memorial was presented to him by a legislative committee (which did not include Osmeña and Roxas), although Osmeña delivered an address prior to the adoption of the memorial sympathetically calling for immediate and complete independence, and nothing else. (35).

(33) Quezon to Osmeña, Roxas, June 29, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49; Philippines Herald, August 12, 31, 1931.

(34) The Time magazine had accused Hurley of coming to "kill nationalism and "to find deft ways' and means of calming down the Filipinos' agitation for freedom." Quoted in ibid., September 9, 1931.

(35) Ibid., September 2, 24, 1931.

Hurley noted the more conservative phraseology of the demands the resolution contained. See ibid., September 25, 1931; also Diario de Sesiones de la Legislatura Filipina, IX Legislatura, 1 periodo de sesiones, Vol. VI, Num. 51, p. 598.
The Filipinos were bewildered by Hurley's visit — they did not know where he stood, nor where they stood in relation to the Administration's policy on independence. No move was made by Hurley to suggest what might be an independence solution acceptable to the Administration, and he wanted the initiative to come from the Filipinos. There was no discussion of allowing the Filipinos to assume more governmental responsibilities; no legislation on sugar or other products was discussed. On top of this, certain remarks made by Hurley gave rise to heated controversies. In spite of Osmena's call for patience and tolerance, some legislators flayed Hurley, for instance, over a remark of his on conditions in the Muslim areas, and his observation that less than a quarter of the people understood the meaning of independence.(36)

Hurley came back from his Philippine trip in favour of continued retention of the Philippines, and with a rather low opinion of the Filipino leaders he met in Manila. The problem for the Administration, as he saw it, was to reconcile retention with pledges given by preceding Presidents that the Filipinos should have their independence when they wanted it. He was convinced that insofar as the Filipino leaders were concerned, they would continue

Quezon thought that the resolution implied that the Legislature disapproved of the proposals he submitted to the Secretary of War in Washington. Quezon to Switzer, October 18, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.

(36) Philippines Herald, September 11, 14, 16, 17, 1931; Osmena, Roxas to Quezon, September 25 (cable) and letter of the same date, in Quezon Papers, Box 49.

Quezon had suggested to Osmena and Roxas that they prepare for confidential discussion with Hurley a bill such as they would like approved by Congress to settle the Philippine question. See confidential, Quezon to Osmena, Roxas, July 20, 1931, ibid., Box 49.
with complete and immediate independence as their ostensible object, but would seek the maximum they could obtain as regards insular autonomy and tariff relations.(37)

After Hurley's return to Washington and conference with President Hoover, the President declared at a press conference on October 27 the Administration's stand on Philippine policy: "Philippine independence must not come until political and economic stability for the Islands is assured. A set of economic and political objectives, and not an arbitrary period of time, should be the yardstick which should measure the readiness of the Philippines for independence."(38)

There was no strong reaction in Manila to Hoover's statement, which in fact was accepted as indicating a friendly interest in the Philippine problem.(39)

Quezon, still in delicate health, returned to the Philippines on October 22nd, instead of staying on in the United States for the coming December session of Congress, as previously conjectured.(40)

(37) Stimson Diaries, Vol 18, October 27, 29, 1931, in Stimson Papers; see Hurley's Report to the President, draft, BIA Records Special File # 52.


(39) Confidential Memorandum, Davis to Hurley, Cable # 567, October 29, 1931, BIA Records 364-813.

(40) Philippines Herald, September 4, October 22, 1931.
It might have been more logical for Quezon to have remained in the United States to await the opening of Congress in December. But he probably felt it urgent to return to Manila to present to the people what he thought should now be the objective of their independence campaign. This he did in a lengthy report to the Legislature.

Once back in Manila, Quezon thought he found the sentiment for immediate independence among the people and the Legislature stronger than ever, without any concern for the consequences of free trade termination, even though among businessmen there were still many conservatives. Thus, Quezon went slowly in advancing his proposals. Realizing perhaps that his report would be controversial, and to stop speculation, Quezon released on October 28 a preliminary statement outlining the independence proposals he had presented in Washington.

On November 8 he submitted his report at a caucus of the Nacionalista Party, together with his resignation as President of the Senate and head of the party, not really on the grounds of ill

(41) The business community, both American and Filipino, was concerned about free trade, although there was no unanimity in their stand. Some American businessmen were for independence soon, but with free trade to continue after independence (as Hausserman of Benguet Consolidated Mining); others felt that free trade could not continue once the Philippines became independent, and so did not approve of independence (as Pond of Pacific Commercial Company and L.L. Spellman of International Harvester Company). The Philippine Chamber of Commerce declared for immediate, absolute, and complete independence, without any conditions whatsoever. But sugar people, like Vicente Lopez of Iloilo, felt disaster would follow the discontinuance of free trade after independence. See ibid., September 7, 8, 1931.

(42) Ibid., October 28, 1931; Radio # 563, October 28, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-811.
health, he explained, but so other leaders could carry on with the work for independence. Upon Osmeña's motion the resignation was not accepted, but he was asked to take an eight months leave-of-absence to rest and recuperate. The party caucus accepted the report without comment, but Quezon's recommendation that a representative mission be sent to the United States was endorsed, and a resolution was passed for sending a mission to the United States, to be headed by Senator Osmeña. On November 9 Quezon's report was read to the Legislature. (43)

In his report, Quezon frankly admitted that he was "more interested in securing the enactment of legislation beneficial to our country that would definitely settle the Philippine question in line with our national aspirations, even though it did not grant

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(43) Radio # 585, November 9, 1931, BIA Records 364-822; Radio # 592, November 13, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-825; Radio # 595, November 14, 1931, BIA Records 364-827; Radio # 597, November 15, 1931, BIA Records 364-828. See also Philippines Herald, November 10, 17, 1931.

For Quezon's report, November 9, 1931, see draft, October 27, 1931, Quezon Papers, Boxes 80 and 81; see also in Diario de Sesiones, Vol. VI, Num. 86, pp. 1401-1406; and Philippines Herald, November 9, 1931. For Quezon's resignation from the Senate, November 7, 1931, see Quezon Papers, Box 49.

Quezon held up publication of his report till November 9, probably hoping that such action would suggest that he was still supporting "immediate, absolute and complete independence" as the desirable solution, discussion of other rather vaguely outlined courses to be contingent upon failure of the radical programme. In the meantime, he was trying to get the War Department to come forward with a programme of its own.

Manila had a foretaste of Quezon's stand even before the report was made public. Reporting a press interview in Washington on July 17, the Philippines Herald headlined in Manila that Quezon had changed his stand and now favoured an independence programme which permitted economic readjustment. The general reaction then among political, intellectual and business circles was favourable to the Quezon plan, except for Osmeña, who had declared that perhaps Quezon was incorrectly reported. See Philippines Herald, July 18, 20, 1931.
immediate, complete, and absolute independence, than in all the speeches and prospects about immediate independence, however brilliant and sincere, if after all nothing comes of them .... It is high time that we acted more like practical men rather than like theorists."

Quezon presented three independence propositions which he had discussed in Washington:

(1) The immediate establishment of an independent government, with limited free trade between America and the Philippines for a period of ten years, and restriction of Filipino labour immigration to the United States;

(2) The immediate establishment of an autonomous government with all the consequent powers and the restrictions necessary to safeguard the rights of sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines. For a period of ten years, the trade relations between the United States and the Philippines and the labour immigration into the United States would be governed as stated in the first plan. At the end of ten years, absolute independence would be granted or the Filipino people would decide through a plebiscite whether they desired to continue with this kind of government, or preferred to have one that was absolutely independent. In the latter event, independence would be granted forthwith.

(3) If neither of the plans protecting Philippine economic interests shall be acceptable to Congress, the Filipino people would, as a matter of course, accept any law granting independence, even under the most burdensome conditions.

Quezon urged that the independence campaign be continued in the United States, but with "prudence and discretion," so as not to create the impression that the desire for independence was due to a lack of appreciation of or a dislike of America. He recommended that the mission to be sent to the United States not be given
specific instructions, but a "vote of confidence" so that they would be able to "act with entire freedom," "to get the best out of any situation" that might arise. He suggested that the mission take the initiative and formulate and submit its own plan, which should cover in detail all aspects of the Philippine question, instead of following the usual practice of allowing bills to be presented in Congress and supporting those which best expressed the desires of the Filipinos.

Quezon favoured the second of his three independence propositions, because he felt that a settlement which contented itself with ultimate independence was the only door that held any real possibility. To publicly recommend this was a bold move that perhaps no other political leader would have dared make.

In an interview with a Tribune reporter on November 10, Quezon explained his "revolutionary proposals." It was necessary, he explained, that there should be an immediate settlement of the Philippine problem. "The present system cannot continue. It is offensive to the dignity of the Filipino people, and it is full of embarrassment to the American people." He continues:

I should like to have the people realize that my stand as to the independence of the Philippines is unchanged . . . . Independence is bound to come. If we are to choose between independence tomorrow, with all the perils that it will entail, and an indefinite, vague continuation of American control with a promise of a settlement sometime in the future, by all means let us have it tomorrow. But if, in the light of present conditions [economic and international] . . . we can be assured of independence at the expiration of ten years, and can in the meantime take such measures as would best prepare us
for independence, then... let us wait and prepare.(44)

The Quezon Report was approved by the House, but was not acted upon by the Senate. The Senate Democratas objected strongly to the report, protesting against the "downright deviation from the sacrosanct principle of immediate independence." Osmeña blocked the motion of Democrata Senator Montinola that the Senate act on the report right away and the Nacionalistas tabled the Democrata resolution for complete, absolute and immediate independence. Instead, a resolution creating a committee of the Legislature "to petition the government and Congress of the United States for the early concession of independence to the Philippines" was adopted. The Legislature merely referred the report to the Senate Committee on Metropolitan Relations for study.(45)

In defending himself against those who charged him with deviating from his party's platform, he disagreed that he had done so. But granting that he had, "I would not back out," he continued. "This is one of the situations in which the leader of a party or a

(44) Draft of interview, Quezon Papers, Box 31.

(45) The New York Herald Tribune reported that Senator Osmeña stated in an interview that he regarded Quezon's attitude "as unnecessarily antipathetic to the traditional Filipino independence position." New York Herald Tribune dispatch, BIA Memorandum, November 11, 1931, cited in BIA Memorandum, November 11, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-824.

See Concurrent Resolution #12, November 9, 1931, 9th Phil. Leg., 1st sess., in Official Gazette, Vol. XXIX, No. 154, p. 3855. See also Memorandum for SecWar Hurley, November 11, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-824; also November 13 Memorandum, BIA Records 364-after-825; and Philippines Herald, November 9, 10, 11, 1931.

Governor Davis thought the phraseology of the resolution showed how far the Legislature had receded from the demand for complete, absolute, and immediate independence. Davis to Hurley, December 4, 1931, Cable # 635, BIA Records 364-836.
people has to decide whether to follow literally the platform of his party or to deviate somewhat from it because the prevailing circumstances and the welfare of his people so demand . . . . Those who have the responsibility of guiding the destinies of a nation have the solemn duty of harmonizing the lofty ideals of their people with the realities . . . ."

The strongest criticism came from Aguinaldo and the Democrata leaders. Aguinaldo criticized Quezon for making his "autonomy" proposals when the people and his party were committed to complete, immediate and absolute independence. He had thus turned "traitor to the 13 millions of Filipinos who in war as in peace have aspired to our complete liberation."(46)

Democratas Tirona and Montinola denounced the report as "reactionary and as violating the cardinal policy of the majority party." Senator Sumulong found Quezon's freedom proposals "impractical and unacceptable," and positively harmful to the independence cause. There was no provision, he said, for the definition of the future final political status of the country, and

(46) Cable # 578, November 6, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-820; Philippines Herald, November 6, 9, 1931.

Rafael Alunan, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defended Quezon from Aguinaldo's attacks, pointing out that Aguinaldo was inconsistent in criticizing Quezon, as he himself had proposed a similar plan to Senator Hawes. See memorial letter to Hawes, July 25, 1931, in Quezon Papers, Box 49; also Philippines Herald, July 30, 1931.

Opposition came also from the newly-organized Philippine Civic Union, formed specifically to oppose the Quezon plans. Among other things it advocated economic boycott of American businesses in the Philippines as the correct means of obtaining Philippine independence. See New York Times, November 17, 23, December 2, 1931; see also Memorandum for SecWar, November 19, 1931, BIA Records 364-after-829.
this silence would logically be construed as a renunciation, for the present time at least, of such a definition.(47)

In answer to the criticisms of the minority party, Quezon declared he alone was responsible for what he had said and done in Washington and for his proposals, having acted without consulting with, or securing the previous approval, of his colleagues. He had known that whatever might be agreed upon would be subject to ratification or rejection by the legislature. The Democrata leadership, however, argued that Quezon and his party must share responsibility for his proposals, not Quezon alone.(48)

Despite the criticism Governor Davis thought opinion was swinging towards Quezon's propositions. Newspapers editorials were generally favourable; so were businessmen and "thoughtful men outside politics," or the educated minority.(49)

(47) Philippines Herald, November 9, 11, 13, 28, 1931.

Sumulong was concerned about an abrupt or too early termination of free trade. He wanted a definite date set for independence, and no plebiscite.

(48) Ibid., November 10, 11, 1931.

Quezon did confer with the War Department on his own responsibility, although he did inform his colleagues, both in Washington (i.e. Resident Commissioners Guevara and Osias) and in Manila, of the initiatives he had taken. See Quezon to Guevara, July 29, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49; a similar letter was addressed to Osias; Quezon to Osmeña, Roxas, August 7, 26, 1931; Quezon to Osias, Guevara, September 18, 1931 (2 letters) ibid.

(49) Davis thought that the report was probably modified to meet the objections of other leaders, specifically Osmeña and Roxas, although Quezon denied having made any revisions. See Radio # 653, October 28, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-811; Cable # 574, November 4, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 364-818; letter Davis to Hurley, November 4, 1931, BIA Records 364-838; Cable # 587, November 10, 1931, Davis to Hurley, BIA Records 634-823; Radio # 592, November 13, 1931, BIA Records 364-825. See also Philippines Herald, October 30 (editorial), November 11, 12, 14 (editorial), 1931.
What was Washington's reaction to the Quezon proposals? Between October 28 and November 10 Governor Davis transmitted nine messages to the War Department in connection with the activities in Manila.\(^{50}\)

Initially, the Bureau of Insular Affairs was suspicious: Quezon's proposal # 1 was undoubtedly the most radical, which meant that the Administration obviously could not accept it. By offering a less radical solution, proposal # 2, Quezon intended, the BIA felt, to occupy a position where he would be free to claim later that he was imposed upon by the United States to take a less radical solution. Even if new concessions were given to the Filipinos under proposal # 2, the leaders would continue their active clamour and opposition by stating that the new status given them did not represent a solution to which they were committed. Hence they would be free to attack and embarrass at will. This had been Washington's experience with the Filipino leaders in previous non-public negotiations, as in 1924.\(^{51}\)

\(^{50}\) Radio # 563, October 28, 1931, BIA Records 364-811; Radio # 567, October 29, 1931, BIA Records 364-811; Cable # 574, November 4, 1931, BIA Records 364-818; Cable # 578, November 6, 1931, BIA Records 364-820; Cable # 579, November 6, 1931, BIA Records 364-821; Cable # 582, November 7, 1931, BIA Records 374-821 1/2; Radio # 585, November 9, 1931, BIA Records 364-822; Radio # 587, November 10, 1931, BIA Records 364-823; and Cable # 588, November 10, 1931, BIA Records 364-824. All cables and radiograms were from Davis to Hurley.

\(^{51}\) See BIA Memorandum for the SecWar, November 10, 1931, BIA Records 364-826; BIA Memorandum for the SecWar, November 16, 1931, BIA Records 364-828.
At Hurley's initiative, from November 4 onwards, Quezon and Secretary Hurley were engaged in secret communications over a possible legislative proposal for less than immediate independence. However, Quezon wanted the Administration to make a public proposal and Hurley wanted the Filipinos to do so. Neither side was willing to make the first move. (52)

Quezon felt discouraged and deeply concerned over the uncompromising attitude of the Secretary. The Administration's stand of being opposed to independence and insisting on retaining American control, and at the same time placing restrictions on free trade and immigration, would leave the forthcoming Mission of Osmeña and Roxas no alternative "but to swing back regardless of consequences to the demand for complete, absolute and immediate independence." Quezon decided he might just as well quit public life altogether because he did not want to fight the Administration. (53)

(52) See the following communications: Guevara, Osias to Quezon, November 5, 10, 1931; Quezon to Guevara, Osias, November 6, 13, 1931; Secret Cable, November 17, 1931, Quezon to Hurley, sent through General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, Philippine Department, instead of through the Governor General as normally done, all in Quezon Papers, Box 49; also Cable # 582, November 7, 1931, Davis to SecWar, Hurley, BIA Records 364-821 1/2; BIA Memorandum to SecWar, November 17, 1931, BIA Records 364-822; Hurley to Quezon, Secret, November 19, 1931, BIA Records w-364-822.

(53) See draft of his statement to the press, December 1, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49. See also Quezon to SecWar Hurley, November 17, 21, 1931, ibid.
He conveyed this intention on December 1 to Col. van Schaick (who had been authorized by Hurley to confer with Quezon) and acting Governor General George Butte, who then took it upon themselves to present the matter to Secretary Hurley, assuring the Secretary that Quezon was serious.(54)

Secretary Hurley then relented, and on December 2 expressed his desire to conform as far as possible to Quezon's programme, for he wanted Quezon to win his "fight" against those enemies who had accused him of inconsistency and disloyalty.(55)

The Secretary's message lifted Quezon's spirits and he told van Schaick: "I will never be satisfied without independence so long as the present situation is forced on us . . . . But let independence be left to our option, and I am convinced that the best interests of both nations will be served if the link is not completely severed. Let America rule us ever so lightly against our will, and I want to rebel. That is why I resigned yesterday."

As a result of Hurley's December 2nd message, Quezon decided not to release a contemplated statement on the departure of the Mission, using the "immediate independence" slogan. This was despite Roxas' insistence on using the word independence wherever possible.

(54) Cable # 626, December 1, 1931, Butte to Hurley, BIA Records 364-834; also in Quezon Papers; See also van Schaick Journal, December 1, 1931, BIA Records 364-838 1/2.

(55) Guevara, Osias to Quezon, December 2, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49; SecWar Hurley to Quezon, secret, December 2, 1931, ibid.
Quezon and van Schaick then proceeded to agree upon a course of action, which was concurred in by Osmeña and Roxas and transmitted to Hurley on December 3 through Governor Butte. They suggested that the Administration consider the original Fairfield Bill of 1924 as a basis for negotiation, with a proviso inserted restricting immigration and free trade. (56)

On the same day, Quezon received from Secretary Hurley (before the Secretary received the Fairfield proposal) a message setting out the details of a programme which the Administration would support if Quezon approved it. Hurley's programme included: (1) an elective Governor General for the Philippines; (2) an American High Commissioner with power to veto financial legislations; (3) American control of defense and sanitation (control of education to be negotiated between the two governments); (4) eligibility of Filipinos to be appointed ministers abroad, representing both the Philippines and the United States; (5) immigration and trade limitations to be reciprocal, if the Philippine Government so chose; (6) the right to appeal to the United States Supreme Court on judicial cases to be determined by Filipinos; (7) the question of independence to be set aside for the being time; and (8) the Filipinos to decide on dominion status or to state form of government desired. (57)

(56) Van Schaick Journal, December 2, 1931, BIA Records 364-838 1/2; Quezon to Butte, December 2, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49; Cable # 633, Butte to SecWar Hurley, December 3, 1931, BIA Records 364-835.

(57) Personal and absolutely confidential, Hurley to Quezon, through Guevara, December 3, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49. See also in BIA Records 364-968.
Quezon's first reaction to Hurley's programme was enthusiastic—he was particularly pleased with the "splendid recognition of the capacity of Filipinos." However, he worried about the Secretary's silence on ultimate independence. He also wanted a programme that the Mission and the people would get behind, and that must necessarily settle the matter of independence, especially as Osmena was preaching that the people were not interested in autonomy but in independence. He worried that the Mission, which was on the verge of departing, would take action in Washington without heeding his counsel. On the other hand, he did not want to put himself in the position of rejecting any of the programme proposed by the Secretary.(58)

Quezon prepared an enthusiastic reply to the Secretary, explaining, however, his objection to leaving the independence question unsolved.

Van Schaick, to whom Quezon showed the draft of his reply (and who then helped Quezon to redraft it) advised him to accept the entire programme as presented, and then later to work for the changes he thought necessary. The Van Schaick redraft suggested to the Secretary that to his programme should be added, in order to gain the approval of the Mission, a clause stating that, in agreeing to defer the question of independence for the time being, the right would be conferred upon either country to bring up the question of independence after fifteen or twenty years, when the two countries

could decide either on "continued relationship or complete separation." During the intervening years the Filipinos could devote their energies to improvements and economic development without being paralyzed by the continual agitation for independence. A permanent association might even issue from this situation. Quezon would support Hurley's programme even without his amendment if that is what Congress would be disposed to adopt, but he could not pledge the Mission's support, and if a more satisfactory solution were presented, Quezon would support it rather than Hurley's programme.\(^{(59)}\)

At first excited about the van Schaick redraft, Quezon had second thoughts because he had not been able to get Osmena and Roxas, who departed for Washington on December 5, to pledge support to the Hurley programme. He ultimately did not send the van Schaick redraft to Hurley, and instead sent his own draft of December 12, after the OsRox Mission had already left for Washington.

\(^{(59)}\) Van Schaick Journal, December 7, 1931, BIA Records 364-838 1/2. See draft of reply, December 10, 1931; draft corrected December 11; December 12, final draft sent as cable, Personal and absolutely confidential to SecWar Hurley, through Guevara, in Quezon Papers, Box 49.

In the final draft, Quezon omitted a specified number of years before separation, but the right to dissolve the partnership at a certain date should be recognized by either country and the stability of economic relations for a certain period assured.

The suggested addition, Quezon felt, would remove existing irritating questions to present Filipino-American relations — such as racial superiority and Filipino incapacity for self-government, as well as political and economic uncertainties. Quezon did not throw out completely the idea of a continued relationship between the two peoples. Osmena and Roxas seemed to have been in accord with the above views.
Quezon's December 12 cablegram was transmitted to the Secretary of War only partially by Guevara and Osias — and only that portion stating that either nation was free to separate from the partnership and that all matters respecting Quezon's proposals should be taken up with the Mission upon its arrival in Washington. Hurley's response to Quezon was that he would agree to consider immediate independence if the Filipinos really wanted it, but with the United States retaining unequivocally and permanently Mindanao and Sulu and the Mountain Province. Quezon was furious at Guevara and Osias, for he believed their failure to show the Secretary the entire cable had provoked his ludicrous suggestion of independence without the South and the Mountain Province.

Quezon instructed Guevara and Osias to show the whole cablegram to Osmeña and Roxas upon their arrival and to let him know "at once" what they thought of it. But Osmeña and Roxas also decided not to show the cable to Secretary Hurley, and instead negotiated with him on their own responsibility.(60)

Thus, Quezon's efforts to respond constructively to Hurley's programme were completely thwarted.

In subsequent communications between Quezon and Hurley, Quezon clarified to the Secretary of War (through the Resident Commissioners) that indeed a programme without independence was unsatisfactory and would not be supported by the Mission. But if

(60) Guevara, Osias to Quezon, December 22, and 24, 1931, *ibid.*, Box 49.

Osias explained that the decision to transmit only part of the telegram was due to criticisms that Filipinos had changed front. See Quezon to Guevara, Osias, December 26, 31, 1931; Osias to Quezon, December 28, 1931, *ibid*. See also Osmeña, Roxas, January 18, 1932, *ibid.*, Box 50.
the Administration did not want to settle the question of independence, he suggested that the Administration recommend to Congress its own programme reiterating America's pledge, even without the support of the Mission. This would be a sufficiently liberal policy to advance the national cause. In the meantime, however, he advised Guevara and Osias not to take a very radical stand until the arrival of the Mission and until all efforts at reasonable understanding with the Administration and Congress had failed.(61)

Meanwhile, San Francisco and New York business interests were circulating their "Free State" Plan for the Philippines, whispering that Quezon had helped prepare the measure and that it was what the Filipinos now wanted — autonomy without independence. Senator Hawes summoned Guevara and Osias to his office and emphatically said that if this were true, "he would quit and denounce us and consider himself deceived."(62)

Quezon assured Hawes that he had not helped prepare the Philippine Free State bill, nor had he ever seen it. While admitting that he received such a proposal before he went to Washington in August 1930, he claimed he had not pledged support to it. He assured Hawes that the Filipinos would only support a bill

(61) Guevara, Osias to Quezon, December 16, 17, 1931; Quezon to Guevara, Osias, December 17, 18, (2 cables) 1931, absolutely personal and confidential, ibid., Box 49.

(62) Guevara, Osias to Quezon, December 19, 1931; Osias to Quezon, letter, December 26, 1931, ibid., Box 49, Philippines Herald, December 12, 1931.
that settled satisfactorily the question of independence, and invited the Senator to present such an independence bill.(63)

"I am getting tired of misrepresentation or misunderstanding of my stand," he complained to Guevara and Osias. "If in your opinion, due to these misrepresentations and misunderstandings, I am not helpful now there to the national cause, let me know frankly, without party or personal consideration." Hawes was mollified by Quezon's assurances, and he denounced Quezon's detractors on the Senate floor. And the Resident Commissioners assured Quezon his withdrawal would prove fatal to their cause.(64)

To put the Free State Plan to rest, Quezon cabled John M. Switzer, one of the proponents of the plan, advising him that because of the radical attitude of the Legislature, it would be absolutely impossible to adopt a plan unless it provided for ultimate independence. Switzer and Pardee (the Fairfield group of 1924) appealed to Quezon to support their plan for it stood an excellent chance to pass if supported by Filipinos. Otherwise the alternatives would be nothing at all, or immediate and absolute

(63) Quezon must have forgotten that he received the draft of a bill for the Philippine Free State in May 1931, see supra pp. 541. He instructed Guevara and Osias to show Hawes confidentially his cabled messages to Secretary Hurley on his independence stand. Quezon to Guevara, Osias, December 20, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.

(64) Quezon to Guevara, Osias, December 21, 1931; Guevara to Quezon, December 22, 1931, ibid., Box 49; Hawes denounced Quezon and Aguinaldo's detractors in the US Senate, Philippines Herald, December 17, 1931.
independence with economic collapse and the Japanese threat.\(^{(65)}\)

Quezon wrote General Harbord, an old friend, that regardless of what stand he took, he doubted if the Mission or the people would back him up.

The Free State Plan was never introduced in Congress.

The Philippine Independence Commission (the ninth Mission to the United States) left for Washington on December 5, 1931. Officially, Quezon was head of the Mission, but he remained in Manila because of his health as well to tend the home front.\(^{(66)}\)

Osmeña, President Protempore of the Senate, and Roxas, Speaker of the House, led the Mission (subsequently referred to as the OsRox Mission).\(^{(67)}\)

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\(^{(65)}\) Quezon to Switzer, December 21, 1931; telegram to Oscar Sutro and Switzer by Edward Bruce, BIA Records 364-841, December 22, 1931; BIA Memorandum to SecWar, December 23, 1931, BIA Records 364-841; Switzer Pardee to Quezon, December 28, 1931; J.G. Harbord (RCA) to Quezon, December 28, 1931; Quezon to Harbord, December 31, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49.

\(^{(66)}\) There were those who would ascribe other motives to Quezon remaining at home. By not going to Washington, they said, Quezon in Manila would be in a position to disclaim, if he so desired, personal responsibility for the course of action the Mission might take in America. In Manila, without Osmeña and Roxas, he would also be free to veto the Mission's decisions, if that became politically necessary. See BIA Memorandum to the SecWar, November 16, 1931, BIA Records 364-828; see also Friend, thesis, II-17.

\(^{(67)}\) Radio # 640, December 7, 1931, Butte to SecWar, BIA Records 26480-123; also Sergio Osmeña, Personnel "P" file, part 1; Davis "P" file, part 4, BIA Records. See Appendix A for list of other members of the Mission.
The Mission left on a rather uncertain note, with Quezon publicly declaring that "tremendous difficulties" awaited the Mission in the United States, as the Administration had not accepted even his conservative formula # 2. "Grave matters of domestic and international nature which confront the American people," he warned, might be given preferential attention over the matter of Philippine independence.(68)

The more personal cause for concern was probably the fact that the Mission left without really having come to an agreement with Quezon on the programme it would initiate or accept in Washington. Quezon must have felt some uneasiness for he was not sure the Mission would heed his counsel. On his part, Osmeña felt some undefined apprehension about the work that awaited them. Quezon's seeming willingness to accept dominion status for the Philippines would undoubtedly create some problems of credibility for the Mission in Washington.

On the eve of their departure Osmeña asked van Schaick, a Quezon confidant, to help them while they laboured in Washington, by using his influence to restrain Quezon's impetuous and impatient nature. "Please keep thinking of our situation there and influence him not to do things that will make our part more difficult," he asked of van Schaick.(69)

(68) See his farewell message to Osmeña, December 5, 1931, in BIA Records 26480-102 and BIA Records 364-918-B.

(69) See van Schaick Journal, December 4, 1931, BIA Records 364-838 1/2. Pacis, Osmeña's biographer, thought that the strong language which van Schaick used in recording his conversations with the two leaders was out of character insofar as he himself
The Mission thus departed, without advance commitment to a programme for independence, and without the usual fanfare that had attended previous missions. Its only instruction was to petition for the "early concession of independence," by virtue of Concurrent Resolution No. 12 of the Philippine Legislature, much more tempered in tone than that adopted by the Legislature in its Independence Memorial of September 24 which had been presented to Hurley during his Manila visit. The Mission was given a free hand to decide what programme best to adopt and accept from Congress.(70)

The Mission arrived in Washington on January 2, 1932. Almost immediately it issued a formal statement denying any change of front on the part of the Filipinos, asserting that early independence, not autonomy, was their goal. The Mission felt such clarification absolutely imperative in view of the confusion prevailing both in official and private circles in the United States regarding the true aspirations of the Filipinos, confusion created by Quezon's proposals in November 1931. Even the most devoted supporters of the Philippine cause in America had become suspicious as to the sincerity of the Filipino demand for independence.(71)

(70) See Resolution, November 9, 1931, 9th Phil. Leg., 1st sess., BIA Records 364-836; Cable # 635, December 4, 1931, Butte to Hurley, BIA Records 26480-122; BIA Memorandum for SecWar, December 5, 1931, BIA Records 364-836.

The Mission was worried, also, by the attitude of the American press towards the independence issue. With the exception of a few publications in the South and in the West which favoured independence, practically 90% of the American press was opposed to independence legislation. This included such powerful and influential newspapers as the The Washington Post, The New York Herald Tribune, The Chicago Tribune, The Chicago Daily News, The Philadelphia Ledger, The Baltimore Sun, and The New York Times.(72) To combat the propaganda conducted by opponents of independence, the Mission organized a publicity office, which, however, was severely

In Manila, Sumulong of the opposition Democrat Party raised the same issues and asked the Nacionalista leaders to clarify their stand on the independence question. See Philippines Herald, January 5, 21, 1932; for Quezon's answer to Sumulong, draft of January 5, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

(72) At the request of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce, an independent research organization, Ten Eyck Associates, conducted a survey and analysis of editorial opinion in nearly every state in the United States to determine American public sentiment on the question of Philippine independence. The first survey covered a one-year period ending on February 20, 1932. The second survey was completed in April 1933. According to the findings of the 1933 survey, of the 246 major newspapers in the United States which had expressed a clear opinion on the Philippine Independence Act then under consideration, 208 were vehemently opposed to it. In addition, the survey indicated that more than 200 smaller newspapers had also expressed strong opposition to the act. See printed copies of both surveys in BIA Records 634-873 (for 1932) and BIA Records 364-952 (for 1933).

The Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce in New York also circulated extensive publicity tending to show the value of the current economic relationship, which must not be terminated. See for example: "Philippine Coconut Oil, the Biggest Scarecrow in the Field of American Agriculture" and John M. Switzer, "Facts about Philippine Sugar." Both articles were published in the Philippines Herald, February 1932.
handicapped by limited funds available from Manila. (73)

By the time the Mission arrived in Washington, the 72nd Congress had already opened. Despite the unanimity of the press in opposition to independence, the growing sentiment in Congress would be seen in the unprecedented stream of Philippine legislation introduced. No less than a dozen bills and resolutions were presented between December 8, 1931 and January 13, 1932. Some provided for immediate independence and immediate application of American tariff and immigration laws. Others provided for immediate independence and gradual application of American tariff duties. And still others provided for independence at the end of a transition period ranging from five to twenty years. (74)

(73) It will be recalled that the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington was closed down in August 1931, due to lack of funds to support it. Quezon wanted the Press Bureau continued and reorganized to avoid giving the impression that the Filipinos were lying down in their campaign at a most critical period. The Press Bureau, however, had been the subject of severe criticism because it had been lamentably ineffective in its publicity campaign in the United States. While there was felt the need to maintain some kind of publicity office in Washington, especially in view of the effective propaganda being conducted by anti-independence elements, the Filipino leaders found it almost impossible to generate enough enthusiasm to raise funds to maintain the Press Bureau. In fact, the debts of the Press Bureau had to be paid through promissory notes signed by Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas. See Quezon to Osmeña, Roxas, May 19, 1931; Osmeña Roxas to Quezon, August 25, 1931, Quezon Papers, Box 49; Quezon to Sumulong, January 5, 1932, ibid., Box 50. See also Philippines Herald, August 11, 22, 24, 31, 1931.

(74) Among the sponsors of Philippine legislation were: Representative Numa F. Montet (Democrat, Louisiana); Rep. Jose Crail (Republican, California); Rep. Richard Welch (Republican, California); Rep. Adolph J. Sabath (Democrat, Illinois); Rep. Butler Hare (Democrat, South Carolina); Rep. Harold Knutson (Republican, Minnesota); Rep. John Rankin (Democrat, Mississippi); Senator William King (Democrat,
The Mission held conferences with the Secretary of War and other officials of the Administration early in January to seek an indication of the best means of accomplishing their goal, as well to avoid determined opposition by the Administration to an independence bill. Committee hearings were in fact postponed at the request of Secretary Hurley to enable the two sides to negotiate. But as in the past, the Secretary of War wished the Mission to take the initiative in submitting an independence programme to ensure the economic and political conditions which the Administration held indispensable before the grant of independence. The Administration also stood firmly in its opposition to legislation fixing a date for independence or to independence after a plebiscite after a prescribed period of time. The uncompromising attitude of both parties made agreement to any mutually satisfactory programme unlikely.(75)

Utah); Sen. Harry B. Hawes (Democrat, Missouri); Sen. Bronson Cutting (Republican, New Mexico); and Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (Republican, Michigan). See BIA Memorandum, January 20, 1932, BIA Records 364-851; Philippines Herald, December 10, 11, 12, January 9, 19, 1931; Osías and Baradi, op. cit., pp. 42-50. See also Guevara to Quezon, December 21, 1931, reporting on situation in Congress, in Quezon Papers, Box 49; also Osmeña, Roxas to Quezon, Aquino, Alas, January 2, 4, 1932, ibid., Box 50.

(75) Philippines Herald, January 5, 1932; See also News Conference by SecWar Hurley, January 4, 1932, in Patrick J. Hurley, Personnel "P" file, part 1, BIA Records; Davis to Quezon, January 9, 1932; OsRox (Osmeña Roxas) to Quaqual (Quezon, Aquino, Alas), January 15, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, January 18, 1932, in Quezon Papers, Box 50. The abbreviations OsRox and Quaqual were used in cables between Washington in Manila effective January 15 to save on telegraph charges.
What the Administration really wanted was to set a period of time -- about 25 to 30 years -- during which all independence agitation would cease and the entire attention of the Filipino people would be devoted to economic and social preparation. At the end of the stated period the question of independence could then be submitted to Congress. Secretary Hurley also favoured increased autonomy through administrative action under the Jones Act. In exchange, the Philippine Legislature, of its own accord, would limit production of Philippine sugar, restrict Filipino immigration to America, and balance Philippine-American trade benefits by a revision of the Philippine tariff (increasing duties on certain products coming from foreign countries such as textiles and dairy products, which were then underselling American products in the Philippines).(76)

The Filipino campaign for independence, which seemed to gain strength as the Democratic Party acquired a majority in the House, precipitated a counter-movement for the retention of Mindanao in the event of independence. The counter-movement was reportedly initiated by New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago business groups with Philippine connections, and counted support from at least a few conservative Republicans in Congress, such as Senator Bingham, and even Secretary Hurley. This suggestion was naturally rejected by the Mission. The Filipinos had always insisted on the unity and solidarity of the people and they had contended that the Moros desired the same political destiny as the Christian Filipinos. See Philippines Herald, December 11, 22, 1931; also Secretary Hurley's Off-the-record Press Conference, January 18, 1932, BIA Records 364-897.

(76) OsRox to Quaqual, January 15, 1932; OsRox to Quezon, January 18, 1932, in Quezon Papers, Box 50; BIA Memorandum on February 3 conference, BIA Records 364-968; BIA Memorandum for SecWar, February 7, 1932, BIA Records 26480-133; BIA Memorandum on February 7 conference, BIA Records 364-854; BIA Memorandum on February 8 conference, BIA Records 364-854.
In Congress, however, pro-independence supporters were ready for action.

The plan of action adopted by the Mission and the sponsors of independence legislation in Congress was to immediately reintroduce the Hawes-Cutting bill in both the House and the Senate. The Hawes-Cutting Bill (S. 2743) was introduced on January 7, and its companion bill, H.R. 7233, was introduced on January 8 by the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Butler B. Hare (Democrat, South Carolina).

It was agreed that hearings would be held at the earliest possible date, simultaneously before the House Committee on Insular Affairs and the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. In view of the many urgent matters pending before the Senate, it was decided to attempt passage of the measure by the House first.

The Mission was convinced, after conferences with congressional members, that an immediate independence measure (such as the King bill) was impractical and impossible of enactment.

Hurley claimed that he had repeatedly asked to be shown the economic programme which the Filipino leaders proposed to put into effect in the event of independence, but he claimed that no Filipino leader had offered any suggestions as to how an independent Philippines could be adequately financed except through favoured trade relations with the United States. In a statement submitted to the Committee hearings, the Mission refuted this charge, and claimed that their economic programme was embodied in the Hawes-Cutting bill.

(77) OsRox to Alas, Aquino, January 8, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, January 18, 1932 (2 cables), Quezon Papers, Box 50.
The House Committee on Insular Affairs held hearings on H.R. 7233, a bill to provide for the independence of the Philippines, for thirteen days in January and February 1932. Briefly, the Hare Bill provided for a gradual transition to independence over a five-year period, followed by a plebiscite to determine whether the Filipinos wanted to achieve full independence or continue under an autonomous system created by the bill. The transition period provided for a gradual increase of tariffs between the United States and the Philippines until during the fifth year full tariff schedules would be applied. (78)

Besides members of the Philippine Mission and several Congressmen who testified in favour of independence, there were representatives from farm and labour organizations, business interests with Philippine connections, and Secretary Hurley for the Administration. In a sense, the testimonies presented by witnesses during the hearings reiterated that which they presented during the hearings in the previous session of Congress.

The Philippine Mission submitted the case for independence at great length, discussing every phase of the Filipinos' demand for early independence (not autonomy, as Osmeña emphasized), and of the readiness and capacity of the Filipino people to maintain a free and

(78) For record of hearings, see Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs on Philippine Independence (H.R. 7233), 72nd Cong., 1st sess., January 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, February 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 1932. (Hereafter Hearings on H.R. 7233.) See also Notes on Hearings in BIA Records 364-914.
stable government.(79)

The Mission at first did not commit itself either in favour of or against the Hare Bill, but merely submitted a case for the grant of early independence. On January 26 the House Committee requested the Mission to submit such amendments to the Hare Bill as it might desire to propose. These amendments, approved by the Manila leaders, were submitted on January 28 and included the following: (1) elimination of the plebiscite and automatic recognition of independence after five years; (2) classification of Filipino immigration on a Western hemisphere basis and fixing the annual quota at 100 (except Hawaii); (3) maintenance of current trade relations, except limitations on duty-free refined and raw sugar, coconut oil, and cordage.(80)

On February 2, Representative Hare reintroduced his bill as H.R. 8758, with the amendments suggested by the Mission, and the hearings were continued.(81)
The Mission met stiff opposition from the farm bloc, labour organizations, and representatives of American investments in the Philippines, organized as the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce (New York). The farm and labour elements wanted drastic limitations on those Philippine products which competed with their own as well as immediate exclusion of Filipino labour from the United States. They favoured progressive imposition of tariff duties on Philippine imports into the United States, although they were disposed to accept reasonable arrangements. The Mission found it imperative not to antagonize the farm and labour groups as they could be helpful in pushing through an independence bill.

Representatives of American business in the Philippines (both in New York and San Francisco, and in Manila) declared the transition period too short to enable them to liquidate their investments, especially in sugar and coconut oil, without losses. They urged a transition period of not less than twenty or thirty years, during which time annual imports of duty-free Philippine sugar entering the United States could be limited to 25% of that which the United States consumed. (82)

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(82) See OsRox to Quaqual, January 29, February 6, 1932; OsRox to Quezon, March 21, 1932, in Quezon Papers, Box 50. See also Radio # 57, February 1; Radio # 61, February 2; Radio # 65, February 5, 1932, Parker to Butte, in BIA Records 364-after-851. See also letter, Spencer Kellogg and Sons, Inc. to Manuel Roxas, March 28, 1932, in BIA Records 364-881-B; letter to Hawes in BIA Records 364-881-C; Philippines Herald, February 1, 3, 8, 1932.
On February 10, 1932, Secretary Hurley testified before the House Committee. Following the line he had advanced in past official utterances, he stated that it was unwise to consider Philippine independence at that time owing to the political chaos in the Far East (i.e., the Sino-Japanese crisis). Hurley asserted that the promise of independence was conditioned by what he called a composite objective, which included capacity for self-government, economic independence, and high social standards. Unless such conditions were met, he gloomily predicted "revolution and anarchy" and "widespread suffering and a distinct drop in the standard of living," ultimately to be followed by domination of the Philippines by some foreign power. He dismissed the "steady and vociferous clamor for complete independence" as the work of a small band of politicians who did not represent the "fundamental sentiment of the Filipino people." "Complete and effective self-government on the basis of popular representation will not be possible," he explained, "until there is developed, as a constructive influence in public affairs, a more informed and influential public opinion than now exists in the islands."

Hurley criticized severely the proposed legislation. "It is destructive . . . There is not one purpose in the bill that is courageous. It is a surrender to every fear from which the world is now suffering . . . ." None the less, the Secretary avoided offering any plan, except to suggest preparatory legislation looking towards independence, by restricting Philippine duty-free imports and Filipino immigration to the United States, and by the revision of the tariffs of the Philippines by the Philippine Legislature to
balance what he termed "reciprocal trade advantages" between the two countries. (83)

Although not entirely unexpected, the Secretary's testimony was phrased in stronger language than had generally been expected. The Filipino leaders in Manila reacted strongly to Hurley's comments that the Filipinos were incapable of governing themselves, especially in view of a personal request from Quezon that Hurley not assert Filipino incapacity for self-government in his testimony. Quezon publicly criticized Hurley's statements. The Secretary, through an AP despatch, denied he made any such statements except in reference to the Muslim and non-Christian Filipinos. Hurley assured Quezon of his friendship for him and his people. Mollified, Quezon retracted his comments on the supposed offensive statement of the Secretary. (84)

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(83) See Hearings on H.R. 7233, pp. 385-424; 466-469; also in BIA Records 364-856; OsRox to Quaual, February 10, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; Radio # 76, February 12, 1932, Parker to Butte, BIA Records 364-856.

For BIA's objections to the independence bills under consideration, see Memorandum for the SecWar, February 6, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-852; BIA Memorandum, February 7, 1932, BIA Records with-364-854.

The BIA thought the Vandenberg Bill the least objectionable of the bills pending in Congress. The bill provided for limitation through quantitative limitations rather than progressive tariff increments on Philippine products. See BIA Memorandum for SecWar, February 5, 1932, in BIA Records with-364-968.

(84) The particularly offensive statement is in p. 387 of the records of the Hearings.

For Quezon's cable to Hurley (charged to his personal account) see Quezon to Hurley, February 8, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; also in BIA Records 364-857. Hurley gave no assurances to Quezon that he would heed his request.
On March 4, the House Committee tentatively agreed to report the Hare Bill.

The bill as it stood on March 4 provided that during the first year of the five-year transition period provided by the bill, raw sugar importations to the United States would be limited to 800,000 tons and refined sugar to 40,000 tons; cordage to 5 million pounds; and coconut oil to 300,000 tons. Beginning with the second year of the transition period there would be a 10% yearly reduction in the above quantities. Filipino immigration would be restricted to a quota of 50 annually, effective immediately upon passage of the act and including Hawaii. Withdrawal of US sovereignty was to be conditioned upon agreement on the part of the Philippine government to sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations.(85)

For Filipino reaction to Hurley's statement, see Philippines Herald, February 12, 13, 15, 1932; New York Times, February 12, 13, 1932; also Radio # 74, February 12, 1932, BIA Records 364-858; Radio # 77, February 12, 1932, Parker to Butte, for Quezon, in BIA Records 364-858; Radio # 78, February 13, 1932, BIA Records 364-859. For Quezon's statement to the Press, February 15, 1932, see in Quezon Papers, Box 81 and New York Times, February 14, 1932.

For Statement of Philippine Commission on Views Expressed by the Secretary of War, see Hearings on H.R. 7233, pp. 442-448. The statement endorsed the Hare and Hawes-Cutting Bills and rejected the economic proposals made by the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War commented on the statement presented by the Philippine Commission, see in Hearings on H.R. 7233, pp. 466-469.

(85) See OsRox to Quaqual, March 4, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.
No sooner had the majority of the Committee tentatively agreed on these provisions, however, than some of the members sought and obtained changes through Committee amendments. (86)

On March 15 the House Committee, by a practically unanimous vote, agreed upon the final form of the Hare Bill. Annual duty-free raw sugar importation from the Philippines was set at 800,000 tons, refined sugar at 50,000 tons, coconut oil at 200,000 tons, and cordage at 3 M pounds. The period of transition was increased to eight years. The previously agreed 10% yearly reduction in import quantities was eliminated, and Hawaii was exempted from the immigration clause. (87)

The Hare Bill was approved by the full House on April 4, 1932, though only by bringing up the bill with rules suspended — i.e., forty minutes debate, no amendments, two-thirds vote necessary for passage — did Speaker Garner prevent the farm bloc from inserting in the bill amendments providing for immediate independence and immediate tariffs. The vote on April 4 was 306 to 47 for passage. All the votes against it were Republican. (88)

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(86) OsRox to Quaqual, March 10, 1932, ibid.
(87) House Report 806, to accompany H.R. 7233, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 18 pages. See also OsRox to Quaqual, March 14, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.
(88) OsRox to Quaqual, April 1, 4, 1932; Osias to Quezon, April 4, 1932, ibid.; Radio # 174, April 4, 1932, Parker to Governor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., BIA Records 364-after-866; New York Times, April 3, 5, 1932; Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7401-7412; 7622-7632. See also Gründer and Livezey, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
The sentiment of those who opposed the passage of the bill was dramatically expressed by Representative Underhill of Massachusetts, who exclaimed in disgust: "What a travesty, what a tragedy. Forty minutes to found a nation . . . . I have to go to Calvary and quote the words of the Great Master of men . . . . 'Father, forgive them, they know not what they do.'" The New York Herald Tribune editorialized: "This bill sentences the Philippines to eight years of political turmoil, and then to economic ruin, if not extinction." The New York Times stated that if the bill should become "law the Philippine people would be made the victims of American selfishness and stupidity." Secretary of State Stimson thought the passage of the bill "a terrific blow to our position in the Far East, the most irresponsible act of Government that I think I have ever come in contact with . . . . Thirty years of careful foreign policy wiped out at one blow by mad lunatics who don't know anything about it."(89)

In the Senate a new Hawes-Cutting Bill was re-introduced on January 28 as S. 3377, embodying in substance the proposed amendments to the Hare Bill submitted by the Mission. To save time, the Senate Committee agreed to incorporate into its records all evidence submitted to the House Committee on the Hare Bill. Senate Committee hearings on the Hawes-Cutting Bill were thus short.

(89) For debates on the bill, see Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7401-7412; 7483-7490; 7517-7519; 7529; 7264-7625; 7628-7631; 7772-7773; 7827-7828; 7832-7833; 8502; 9045. See also New York Herald Tribune and New York Times, April 5, 1932; Stimson Diaries, Vol. 21, April 6, 1932, Stimson Papers.
lasting only for two days.(90)

The star witness during the Senate hearings was again Secretary Hurley, whose testimony was essentially a repetition of his statement before the House hearings.(91)

It was a stormy session with Secretary Hurley, who was subjected to severe questioning by the Committee. Insisting that no date could be fixed for granting independence pending the outcome of means devised to increase the Philippines' economic self-sufficiency, he said:

The proposal in the Hawes-Cutting bill is merely an attempt at a temporary palliative — it does not go to the root of the trouble for it involves no progress in adjustment of the present unbalanced state of Philippine-American trade relations.

* * *

The fulfillment of that obligation [to grant complete independence] should not be attempted on the basis of expected fulfillment at some particular day or hour. The question should not be stated in terms of time. It should be stated in terms of achievement — of the accomplishment of the objective.

He called the Hawes-Cutting bill a "cowardly" attempt to tear down in five years all that had been accomplished in the Philippines in over thirty years of American sovereignty, expended in "treasure

(90) The Hawes-Cutting Bill, however, retained the plebiscite provision and omitted mention of refined sugar because of strong opposition from American refineries. See Philippines Herald, January 29, 1932. See also Radio # 55, February 2, 1932, Parker to Butte, BIA Records 364-after-851.

(91) See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs on Philippine Independence (S. 3377), February 11 and 13, 1932, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7-43; 113-145. (Hereafter Hearings on S. 3377).
and blood." Hurley was getting back at Senator Hawes who, during the House hearings, had termed Hurley's proposals for limits on immigration and for duty-free importation without the grant of independence "politically immoral". (92)

The hearings before the Senate Committee on February 13 were terminated when Secretary Hurley flew into a rage and walked out in indignation after rigid questioning by Senator King, who had accused him of making untrue statements. Hurley charged King had distorted his statements. King charged Hurley had been emphasizing the economic factor and subordinating questions concerning political independence. The incident with Senator King was the culmination of a series of questions by members of the Committee which suggested an attitude favouring suppression or distortion of all testimony opposed to the proposals included in the bills before the Committee. (93)

The misunderstanding between the Senate Committee and the Secretary of War was considered to have eliminated the Administration from participation in the writing of whatever Philippine legislation Congress might finally come up with. The


(93) *Philippines Herald*, February 15, March 23, 24, 26, 1932; New York Times, February 14, 1932. See also Cable #83, February 16, 1932, Parker to Butte, BIA Records 364-after-860. Secretary Stimson himself felt the Senate Committee had deliberately suppressed a good deal of material against independence.
Secretary's personal attitude may also have increased the popularity of Philippine independence legislation with anti-Administration forces.

Secretary of State Stimson was invited by Senator Bingham (Chairman of the Senate Committee) to appear before his Committee to give his views. Stimson declined, and instead sent his views in a letter. In it he reiterated his stand as expressed in his testimony in the 1930 hearings, emphasizing the effect which the movement for immediate independence was having on US foreign relations in Asia. It "would be a demonstration of selfish cowardice and futility on our part" to every foreign eye, and "agitation for a change of status of the Philippines can only inflame most dangerous possibilities."(94)

The Senate Committee accepted the basic philosophy of the Hawes-Cutting bill — i.e., a fixed date for independence after a transition period permitting the adjustment of economic and other relations between the two countries. Two matters, however, posed much difficulty, namely, the length of the transition period and the

(94) See letter dated February 15, 1932, in McCoy Papers, Box 83.

The independence partisans in the Senate Committee did not like Stimson's letter. Stimson would have liked to have given his letter out to the press, but held it back in order to give Hurley "a chance for his tactics." Also, President Hoover had asked him to hold it so it could come out contemporaneously with a bill to be introduced by the Administration or its supporters, which might serve as a rallying point. Both Hurley's tactics and the bill rather faded away. See Stimson Diaries, April 2, 1932, Vol. 21, Stimson Papers.

Stimson's letter was published after the Hare Bill passed in April, through the efforts of Representative Robert Bacon of New York, leading the anti-independence forces. See BIA Records 364-A-w-873, pt. 5, Washington Star, April 4, 1932.
nature of the trade relations during that time. The period of time was intimately related to economic adjustments, the prevailing world depression, and the unsettled conditions in the Far East.

Finally, the Senate Committee voted overwhelmingly to write a Philippine bill providing for a plebiscite in fifteen years after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution, with complete independence to come in about 19 years. (95)

On February 24 the Committee formally voted to report the amended Hawes-Cutting Bill. On March 1, the Philippine independence bill in its latest form was favourably reported by the Senate.

(95) New York Times, February 21, 1932; Philippines Herald, February 22, 1932; OsRox to Quaqual, February 18, 20, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

Osias wrote Quezon on March 2, 1932, informing the latter that while Roxas and Osmena had obviously acquiesced in the fifteen-year transition period, he had stuck to the five-year transition provision of the original Hawes-Cutting Bill. Senator King, he said, was very much disgusted, and had been quite severe in his criticism of Osmena and Roxas. Osias accused the Mission leaders of pussy-footing and being unwilling to define their views with certainty, as well as of a lack of sincerity and courage.

Osias may have sincerely disapproved of a longer period of transition as he reported to Quezon. Sometimes, however, it is possible to detect in his correspondence a strong desire to promote his own political career by ingratiating himself in Quezon's favour. He wrote often to Quezon on his own activities, or secretly reported on the activities of the other members of the Mission. Quezon did ask Osias to keep a record of everything happening in Washington. See Osias to Quezon, February 24, March 2, 4, 29, 31, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

Osmena and Roxas may indeed have worked for a longer transition period — they at least did not press too strenuously for a shorter period. To the Manila leaders, they wrote that "a point had been reached where the preferences of the Filipinos as to the time when independence was to be granted should be subordinated to the exigencies of the situation in Congress if the difference did not involve a great length of time." See OsRox to Quaqual, March 10, 1932, ibid.
Committee and placed on the regular calendar. (96)

The main features of this amended Hawes-Cutting Bill were:
(1) free trade for ten years, except for sugar, coconut oil and cordage in excess of existing trade; (2) a progressive export tax on Philippine imports after the first ten years, to increase 5% yearly, and full tariffs applied after the fifteenth year; (3) an independence plebiscite fifteen years after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution; (4) Filipino immigration to be limited to a maximum annual quota of 100; (5) the United States to retain military and naval bases in the Philippines; and (6) provisions of the act to take effect upon acceptance by the Philippine Legislature or a convention called for the purpose. (97)

(96) Senate Report 354, To accompany S. 3377, 72nd Cong., 1st sess. Hurley thought the report drafted by Hawes was inaccurate and misleading. The new Hawes-Cutting bill, he thought, was "a hodge-podge, made up by throwing together a group of provisions calculated to secure support from various special interests both in the United States and the Philippines, but reflecting no carefully considered or adequate solution of the questions at issue." See Hurley to Governor Davis, March 8, 1932, in BIA Records 364-872.

(97) The quota limitations on Philippine products were the same as those in the Hare Bill. The quota on sugar was less than the estimates provided for the Mission by Secretary Alunan, and endorsed by the Philippine Sugar Association. Quezon had urged a quota of 200,000 to 250,000 tons on coconut oil. The cordage people in Manila wanted not less 7 million pounds limitation. See Quezon to OsRox, February 17, 1932; OsRox to Quaual, February 25, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, March 3, 1932; Philippine Sugar Association to Quezon, March 2, 1932; Ynchausti and Company (through Quezon) to OsRox, March 17, 1932, all in Quezon Papers, Box 50; also Philippines Herald, February 19, 25, 1932.

The change in the time period was made -- from five to fifteen -- because Senator Hawes was convinced that to secure presidential approval, the bill should be at least for 10 years transition. See Hawes to Quezon, March 18, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.
On April 26 the Hare Bill, which had been referred to the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, was reported out with an amendment making it substantially identical with the Hawes-Cutting Bill as already reported by the Senate Committee. (98)

On April 29 the Philippine bill reached its turn in the regular calendar. By this time, two important amendments in the nature of substitutes to it had been introduced in the Senate. One was the King substitute, fashioned after the original King bill introduced in December 1931 and providing for independence within about three years; and the other was the Vandenberg substitute, providing for independence after twenty years, during which period the existing government of the Philippines was to continue, and there was to be a gradual application of the American tariff on Philippine exports to the United States. (99)

(98) OsRox to Quaqual, April 27, 1932, ibid.; see also Radio # 220, April 27, 1932, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-after-901.

(99) OsRox to Quaqual, April 29, 1932; March 28, 29, 1932, Quezon Papers; see Vandenberg statement on his bill, March 29, 1932, BIA Records 364-882.

The Vandenberg Bill represented in the main a modification of the Hawes-Cutting Bill in the direction of conservatism by providing for a programme of progressive economic preparation for the Philippines. Vandenberg first presented his bill in January 1930 and had amended it several times by the time it was reintroduced in January 1932 as S. 3080. The Vandenberg substitute, presented on March 29, 1932, was apparently drafted after numerous consultations with Hurley and Osmeña. See Arthur Vandenberg, Personnel "P" file; see also in BIA Records 364-848 and BIA Records 364-850. For history of the Vandenberg proposal, see Vandenberg to Hurley, June 15, 1931, BIA Records 364-801; Hurley to McCoy, June 22, 1931, McCoy Papers, Box 28; McCoy to Hurley, July 3, 1931, ibid; BIA Memorandum for SecWar, July 28, 1931, BIA Records 364-802; BIA Memorandum for SecWar, July 30, 1931, BIA Records 364-800; BIA Memorandum, January 7, 1932, BIA Records 364-850; BIA Memorandum for the Record, March 8, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-872; Parker to Vandenberg, March 28, 1932, BIA Records 364-886; Radio # 191,
As a filibuster was immediately mounted which stopped action on the bill,(100) Senator Hawes, with the concurrence of the Mission, sought to enlist the support of prominent Republicans who might in some measure counteract the opposition expressed by Secretary Hurley. Early in May, Senator Hawes conferred with W. Cameron Forbes, who had returned from his post as Ambassador to Japan. He asked Forbes to offer suggestions concerning the bill.(101)

Forbes, with the assistance of Frank W. Carpenter, who had been Executive Secretary in the Philippines, prepared amendments to the independence bill remedying what he thought were its defects. Forbes' offer of his amendments did not imply, as he himself explained, that he favoured the independence bill. He supported the Hawes-Cutting bill conditionally as a compromise measure, if Congress was determined to change the relationship with the Philippines. He felt that his amendments to the bill offered one way of avoiding the independence issue by steering the Filipinos into a sensible relationship, perhaps even a permanent relationship, with the United States.(102)

April 11, 1932, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-after-894; Radio # 195, April 11, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-895. See also Filipino Nation, March, July 1932.

(100) Senator Royal Copeland (Democrat, New York) conducted a successful filibuster against the bill when it reached the regular calendar on April 29. Further action on the bill had to be postponed. Copeland's pet theory was that Congress had no right to alienate American territory except by constitutional amendment.

(101) OsRox to Quaqual, May 6, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

(102) Forbes' speech, June 2, 1932, to the Chamber of Commerce, N.Y., clarifying his stand, see copy in Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 17.
Forbes' amendments sought to clarify the powers reserved to the United States during the period of transition, during which time American sovereignty would continue. After consultation with Osmeña, Senator Hawes and Cutting submitted the following Forbes amendments: (1) authorize the President of the United States to take such action as his judgement would dictate in pursuance of the reserved right to intervene in fiscal and international matters; (2) enable the President to delegate additional functions to the American High Commissioner (in Manila) without these being expressly stipulated; and (3) establish a financial controller who would receive duplicate copies of the Insular Auditor's reports and hear appeals from the Auditor's decisions. (103)

There was an apparent disagreement between Quezon and the OsRox Mission on the Forbes amendments. Quezon opposed the amendments because they would nullify, in effect, the powers granted the autonomous Philippine Commonwealth. He expressed himself in favour of the political status quo and no bill, instead of a Senate bill with the Forbes amendments. (104) The Mission had also objected to the Forbes amendments, and Forbes had modified them somewhat. The Mission still found them unacceptable, but Senator Hawes found them a necessary appendage to his bill if they wanted approval.

(103) Forbes to Senator Frederic C. Walcott, (Republican, Connecticut), May 2, 1932, superceded by May 7 letter; Forbes to Hawes, May 27, 1932; Forbes to Walcott, May 31, 1932, in Forbes Papers; see also Outline history of Forbes Amendments, BIA Records 364-after-936; OsRox to Quaqual, May 22, June 3, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

(104) Quezon to OsRox, May 25, 1932; Quezon to Alas, May 25, 1932; OsRox to Quaqual, May 26, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, May 28, 30, 1932, all in ibid.
Consequently, the Mission acquiesced somewhat, particularly as they were also concerned with time running out in Congress. However, the Mission advised Forbes and Hawes that they reserved the right to oppose the amendments.\(^{(105)}\)

It was not until June 29, after much maneuvering, that the Philippine bill was finally called up. Debate on the Philippine bill continued on June 30 and July 1, for a total of fourteen hours, usually with an average of only six senators present. Much of that time was spent approving committee amendments to the bill, such as the Forbes amendments, and entertaining the filibustering of Senators Vandenberg and Copeland, who were determined to block action on the bill before adjournment.\(^{(106)}\)

\(^{(105)}\) See OsRox, Montinola, Sabido, Tirona, Guevara, Osias to Quaqual, May 28, 1932, \textit{ibid}. Note that this cable was signed by all the members of the Mission, perhaps by way of showing the Manila leaders the unanimity of all the Mission members with regard to their stand on the Forbes amendments.

In fact there did not seem to have been general opposition to the Forbes amendments in Manila, except from Quezon and a few Nacionalista and former Democrata leaders. Speaker Protempore de las Alas was not opposed to the amendments and shared the views of the Mission in that respect. Some of the objections to the Forbes amendments were voiced by Senator Recto, Senator Aquino, Francisco Varona (Acting House Majority Leader), and Francisco Delgado (Chairman, House Committee on Metropolitan Relations). See \textit{La Opinion}, June 2, 1932, \textit{BIA Records} 364-A-873-B; also Quezon to OsRox, June 7, 1932, \textit{Quezon Papers}, Box 50.

\(^{(106)}\) Among those who offered amendments of one sort or another were Reed (neutrality treaty), Copeland (constitutionality of US Congress' grant of independence), Johnson (Filipino exclusion), Broussard and Long (sugar quota), Vandenberg (six amendments along the lines of his bill), and Hawes (jurisdiction of US Supreme Court on Philippine judicial appeals). See Radio \#312, June 24, 1932, Parker to Roosevelt, \textit{BIA Records} after 364-912; OsRox to Quaqual, June 25, 29, 30, July 11, 1932, \textit{Quezon Papers}, Box 50.
Faced with the filibuster and the danger of the Philippine bill losing its privileged status, the Senate Committee, after consultations with the Mission, agreed for Senator Joseph T. Robinson (Democrat, Arkansas) to present a motion asking that the Philippine bill be postponed for consideration until 2:00 p.m. on December 8. This motion was carried on July 1. The debate on the Philippine bill would be continued in the second session of the Seventy-second Congress as unfinished business. (107)

To secure the passage of the bill in the forthcoming December session of Congress, the Mission, upon the advice of Senators Hawes, Pittman, and Cutting, and Representative Hare, decided to remain in the United States. (108)

Senator Copeland's filibuster was aimed at postponing consideration of the independence bill until the next session of Congress when "in all calmness" Congress could "deal wisely and conclusively with this great problem." See the interesting report on the debates in the Senate in "How the Hawes-Cutting Bill Came to be Shelved," Filipino Nation, August, September-October, November, 1932; New York Times, April 30, 1932.

(107) See Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., pp.14864; 14868; also Radio # 329, July 1, 1932, BIA Records after 364-913.

Some other important matters demanded the attention of the Mission during this session. Bills affecting immigration restrictions were again considered in the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, which the Mission succeeded in blocking, stressing the fact that an independence measure was pending in Congress and this question should be considered as part of the settlement of the entire Philippine problem.

In the discussion of the Administration's economy bill, President Hoover suggested the transfer of the cost of the Philippine Scouts (part of the standing army of the United States in the Philippines) to the Philippines as an economy measure. The section affecting the Philippines (involving US$5 million) was subsequently eliminated through the efforts of the Mission. See OsRox to Quaqual, April 10, 12, 24, 25, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, April 11, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

(108) OsRox to Quaqual, July 6, 1932 (2 cables), ibid.
Throughout the recess of Congress, the Mission noted subtle, organized propaganda to defeat the independence measure. Despatches from Manila correspondents were published in major American papers alleging that the Filipinos had changed front and were no longer in favour of independence, and were not in sympathy with the stand and activities of the Mission in Washington. The New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, and Washington Post charged that selfish and sordid motives were behind the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill.

The Mission tried to counteract this propaganda through statements to the press and letters and circulars to newspaper editors. The Mission also maintained contact with representatives of labour and agricultural groups, as well as members of Congress.

Conferences with Secretary Hurley were also resumed during this interval, with the aim of securing approval by the Administration of the independence measure. However, Secretary Hurley was adamant in his opposition to any bill fixing a date for independence, or

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(109) See New York Times, August 8, 1932, Russell Owen's despatch; also OsRox to Quezon, August 10, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, August 11, 1932; Osias to Editor, Sunday News, August 10, 1932, in Quezon Papers, Box 50; Roxas to Editor, Washington Post, August 3, 1932, in Key Pittman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 151.

(110) OsRox to Quaqual, November 7, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50. The farm bloc was not terribly pleased with the trade readjustment provisions of the independence bill. They wanted earlier independence (five years), with progressive tariff levies on sugar and coconut oil. In fact, they tried to obtain support for their plan from Filipino groups which were also dissatisfied with the provisions of the bill, such as the Veterans group (of Aguinaldo) and the Philippine Civic Union. See OsRox to Quaqual, September 26, 1932, ibid.
permitting American authority and responsibility, both real and apparent, not to be recognized and maintained in undiminished measure. Consequently, no agreement was reached.(111)

In view of this situation and the Mission's feeling for the need for Quezon's counsel and cooperation, Quezon was invited to come to Washington. He declined.(112)

This was a presidential election year, and the Mission took the opportunity to attend the national conventions of both parties in Chicago, to obtain declarations in their platforms in favour of independence. The Republican Party avoided any mention of the Philippines or Philippine independence, through the efforts of Secretary Hurley, who was a member of the party's platform committee. The Democratic Party declared in favour of Philippine independence. However, the Philippine question did not really come up seriously during the presidential campaign.(113)

(111) See Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, p. 21; BIA Memorandum, November 18, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-916.

(112) OsRox to Quezon, September 10, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

(113) OsRox to Quaqual, June 10, 12, 15, 25, 1932, ibid. Both presidential contenders, Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, briefly indulged in an exposition of their Philippine views. Roosevelt committed himself to Philippine independence as stated by his party (Salt Lake City, September 17); Hoover on two occasions, in beet sugar country, directly referred to the Hawes-Cutting Bill as the "Democratic proposal" and criticized it for its failure to give protection to American sugar producers. He promised farmers protection by scaling downward duty-free Philippine sugar. Forbes took Hoover to task for his speech. OsRox to Quaqual, November 7, 1932, ibid; Forbes to Hoover, November 18, 1932; December 5, 1932 interview with Hoover, Forbes Journals, Second Series, IV, p. 504.
On December 8, 1932, the Senate resumed consideration of the Philippine bill. Debate on it lasted continuously until December 17, when the bill was passed without a record vote. (114)

By that time, the Mission had already presented to the Senate several amendments in conformity with the reported wishes of the leaders in Manila. These touched on (1) the use of Malacañang Palace by the Filipino Chief Executive (rather than by the US High Commissioner); (2) the length of the transition period (not in excess of 10 years); (3) the plebiscite; (4) retention of reservations by the United States after independence; (5) trade provisions, especially quotas on sugar and coconut oil; and (6) the Forbes amendments. Some of these amendments were accepted during the Senate debates on the bill; others were disposed of, either by acceptance or rejection, in conference, a parliamentary strategy the Mission and the sponsors of the bill adopted in order not to unnecessarily arouse opposition to the bill among elements and groups whose support were necessary for passage of the bill.

During the protracted debate on the bill, an almost endless stream of amendments was presented to the Senate by partisans eager to insure protection of their interests. This was accompanied by further filibustering (by Copeland and Huey P. Long, Democrat, Louisiana) in an effort to prevent final action by the Senate. The transition period, the plebiscite, immigration, and restriction of imports were the subject of amendments. The farm bloc asked for

(114) OsRox to Quaqual, December 8, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; Radio #573, Parker to Roosevelt, December 17, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-920 1/2.
immediate protection; accordingly, duty-free quotas on Philippine products were sliced down and the transition period reduced. Amendments on sugar limitations were a cause of serious concern for the Mission, and especially for Quezon in Manila.\(^{(115)}\)

After considerable manoeuvering, the much-amended bill passed the Senate after the third reading on December 17, without a record vote. The Senate eliminated the plebiscite on independence (to avoid giving the Filipinos the chance to reconsider their decision

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\(^{(115)}\) See OsRox to Quaqual, December 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, December 10, 1932 (2 cables); Quaqual to OsRox, December 16, 1932 (2 cables); Aquino to Quezon, December 13, 16, 17, 1932, all in Quezon Papers, Box 50. See also Radio # 555, December 9, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-919; Radio # 556, December 9, 1932, BIA Records 364-912; Radio # 557, December 10, 1932; Radio # 558, December 12, 1932; Radio # 561, December 13, 1932; Radio # 564, December 14, 1932; Radio # 567, December 15, 1932; Radio # 568, December 16, 1932; Radio # 569, December 16 1932; Radio # 570, December 17, 1932, all from Parker to Governor Roosevelt (Manila), in BIA Records 364-after-920. Also Radio # 575, December 19, 1932, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-after-920.\(^{\frac{1}{2}}\)

Senators Long and Broussard were particularly anxious to reduce the quota limitations on sugar and coconut oil. Senator Dickinson (Iowa) also spoke for the farmers. Senator Johnson of California and Senator Robinson of Arkansas proposed immigration amendments. Senator Reed (Pennsylvania) proposed an amendment on neutralization. Senator Byrnes presented an amendment on the plebiscite. Senator Vandenberg, who was the author of an amendment which sought to substitute his bill for the Hawes-Cutting measure, sought to accomplish his purpose by presenting a motion to recommit the bill and rewrite it, placing adoption of a new constitution at the end of transition period of 20 years instead of at the beginning. Senator King submitted his substitute amendment for independence in three to five years. See debates in Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 170-171; 174; 180-181; 250-251; 261-262; 266-270; 312; 317; 319; 326-335; 338; 373; 381; 386-387; 424-425; 432; 436-437; 459-460; 464-465; 455-456; 485; 537-540; 554-555; 612-616; 645; 657-658; 663. Also New York Times, December 10, 12, 14, 16, 16, 17, 18, 1932.
for independence), reduced the transition period from seventeen to
twelve years, provided for total exclusion of Filipino labour, and
reduced the limitations on Philippine sugar (to 585,000 long tons)
and coconut oil (to 150,00 long tons). The bill also provided that
the act would not be operative until accepted by the Philippine
Legislature or a convention called by the Legislature to decide that
question.(116)

On December 19, the House of Representatives rejected the
Senate amendments to the House Bill and asked for a conference. On
the same day, the Senate accepted the conference and appointed their
committee.(117) By this time, Senator Benigno Aquino had arrived in
Washington as Quezon's special envoy, and he assisted the Mission in
presenting the Filipino position to the conference committee.(118)

On December 22 the Conference Committee formally reached an
agreement on all the provisions of the bill and unanimously agreed
on a conference report recommending approval of H.R. 7233. The
Conference Report was adopted by the Senate without a record vote.

(116) Quezon, Roxas and Osmeña were all actually opposed to a
plebiscite. See Quezon to Osias, February 15, 1932, Quezon
Papers, Box 50.

No limits or tariffs were applied to American products
entering the Philippines during the transition period. The
quota limitations on sugar and coconut oil were a great deal
more generous than the amount demanded by the farm bloc, but
considerably under Filipino desires.

(117) Radio # 573, Parker to Roosevelt, December 13, 1932, BIA
Records 364-after-920 §; Radio # 577, December 20, 1932,
ibid.; OsRox to Quaquial, December 19, 1932, Quezon Papers,
Box 50.

(118) OsRox to Quaquial, December 21, 1932; Aquino to Quezon,
December 21, 1932, ibid.
The Conference Report was submitted to the House of Representatives on December 28, and on the next day Representative Hare, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, asked consideration of the Conference Report. The House approved by 171 to 16 the Conference Report on the bill, granting independence to the Philippines in ten years. On January 3, the bill was formally transmitted to President Hoover for signature.

The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act provided that a limited independence would be granted the Philippines after ten years. The plebiscite clause was eliminated, but the measure would be submitted to the Philippine legislature for approval. Limits on duty-free sugar, coconut oil, and cordage would be 800,000 long tons of raw sugar, 50,000 long tons of refined sugar, 200,000 long tons of coconut oil, and 3,000,000 pounds of cordage. Beginning in the sixth year of the ten-year transition period, a graduated export tax would be imposed, the proceeds of which would be applied to the liquidation of Philippine bonds. A constitutional convention would be called to draft a constitution which would have to provide for certain stated limitations on autonomy and have to be submitted to the President for approval. After the constitution was approved the President would call for an election of the officers of the Philippine Commonwealth. After the transition period, independence would

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(119) OsRox to Quaqual, December 22, 1932 (2 cables); Aquino to Quezon, December 22, 1932, ibid.; Radios # 585 and 586, December 23, 1932, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-after-920 $. See also New York Times, December 23, 1932.
become effective on the following fourth of July, but the United States would reserve commercial, military and naval bases in the Philippines, although the President was also requested in the bill to negotiate treaties with foreign governments for the neutralization of the Philippines. Full United States tariffs would apply after the ten-year transition period. (120)

The approval by the House of the Conference Report on December 29 was the signal for a nation-wide attack on the independence bill by a large number of newspapers in the United States, including practically all of the great metropolitan dailies.

There was no unanimity among the newspaper editors as to the grounds of their opposition. Many newspapers attacked the motives of Congress, charging that passage of the bill had been actuated mainly by selfish motives — a desire to free American agriculture from the alleged injurious competition by Philippine free imports into the United States. Others charged Congress with sacrificing vital interests of American agriculture in favour of an ungrateful and unappreciative people. Still others alleged that the independence bill was the work of the American Federation of Labor, merely to achieve Filipino exclusion from the United States.

(120) House Report 1811, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. See also New York Times, December 30, 1932; OsRox to Quaquall, December 28, 29, 1932; Quezon Papers, Box 50; Radio # 594, December 29, 1932, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-after-924.

The higher House quotas of duty-free imports of sugar and coconut oil were accepted. So was the House provision putting the Philippines on an immigration quota basis of 50 a year. The Senate amendment providing for acceptance of the bill by the Philippine Legislature as condition for establishment of the transition period was adopted. The ten-year period was a compromise between the House's 8 and the Senate's 12 years.
Editorial opinion also alleged that it was unwise to grant independence to the Filipinos and that the transition period was too short to adequately prepare them for the responsibilities of independence.(121)

With the bill finally passed by both houses of Congress, speculation immediately centered upon what action President Hoover would take. The President called Secretary Hurley into conference, and asked him to make a report on the bill. Staunch foe of independence, Hurley told newspapermen that the bill "does not solve the inherent difficulties of the Philippine problem, but merely accentuates them." That Hurley would recommend veto of the bill seemed likely.(122)

President Hoover vetoed the independence bill on January 13, 1933. His veto message was put together taking into consideration the arguments presented by the four Cabinet members most concerned with the Philippine affairs: Roy Chapin of Commerce, Arthur Hyde of Agriculture, Patrick Hurley of War, and Henry Stimson of State. Their views were generally quite unfavourable.(123)


(123) SecWar Hurley to President, Memorandum, December 22, 1932, BIA Records 364-with-925; SecWar to Hoover, December 30, 1932, McCoy Papers, Box 83; SecWar Report to the President on H.R. 7233, January 11, 1933, Hayden Papers; 5th draft in McCoy Papers, Box 83; Stimson to Hoover, January 3, 1933, BIA Records 364-with-968; SecCommerce to Hoover, January 9, 1933, BIA Records 364-926-A; also Congressional Records, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1925-1929.
Hoover's outspoken veto was based on three grounds: the shortness of the period for economic adjustment to independence, not only for the Filipinos but for American farmers, workers and businessmen; the responsibility without authority which devolved on the United States during the Commonwealth period; and the dangerous and ambiguous status which the Philippines would have in such a chaotic period as that through which the Far East was then passing. He said:

Our responsibility to the Philippine people is, that in finding a method by which we consummate their aspiration we do not project them into economic and social chaos, with the probability of breakdown in government, with its consequences in degeneration of a rising liberty which has been so carefully nurtured by the United States at a cost of thousands of American lives and hundreds of millions of money. Our responsibility to the American people is that we shall see the act of Philippine separation accomplished without endangering ourselves in military action hereafter to maintain internal order or to protect the Philippines from encroachment by others, and avoid the very grave dangers of future controversies and seeds of war with other nations. We have a responsibility to the world that, having

Governor Roosevelt in Manila was also opposed to some of the provisions of the bill, especially the economic provisions. The farm bloc requested Hoover's veto for the bill's economic provisions failed to solve their need for protection. They were also lukewarm to an extended trial period. Among those who besought Hoover to sign the bill were the AFL and W. Cameron Forbes, who found the bill reasonably satisfactory. The Philippine Mission, in an interview with Hoover on January 11, also sought Hoover's signature. Hoover later declared that Osmeña and Quezon (rather than Roxas) had asked him for a veto. See Cable # 651, Roosevelt to Parker, December 28, 1932, BIA Records w-364-925; OsRox to Quaqual, January 11, 12, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; Forbes Journals, January 12, 1933, Second Series, IV, p. 361; Mission’s letter to Hurley, December 22, 1932; The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, II (New York MacMillan, 1952), p. 361.

Theodore Friend, in analyzing the circumstances and documents attending the Mission's interview with Hoover tends to believe that the Mission did ask Hoover to sign the bill, and when he refused, worked to overthrow the veto. See his October 1964 article, Philippine Studies, pp. 673-680.
undertaken to develop and perfect freedom for these people, we shall not by our course project more chaos into a world already sorely beset by instability.

He reiterated America's pledge of independence, but he preferred that it be achieved over a period of at least fifteen more years, with increasing autonomy during that period. In conclusion, he stated:

We are here dealing with one of the most precious rights of man -- national independence interpreted as separate nationality . . . . It is a goal not to be reached by yielding to selfish interests, to resentments or to abstractions, but with full recognition of our responsibilities and all their implications and all the forces which would destroy the boon we seek to confer and the dangers to our freedom from entanglements which our actions may bring . . . . This legislation puts both our people and the Philippine people not on the road to liberty and safety, which we desire, but on the path leading to new and enlarged dangers to freedom and freedom itself.\textsuperscript{(124)}

President Hoover waited until the next to the last day of the 10-day period allowed by law and vetoed the bill on Friday, January 13. Immediately after receipt of the veto message, the House started debate on whether to override the veto. After an hour's debate, the House voted by a thumping majority of 274 to 94 to override the President's veto. In the Senate, however, the decision to override the President's veto was much closer, 66 to 26. On

\textsuperscript{(124)} See Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd sess., p. 1759; also House Document 524, 72nd Congress, 2nd sess. See also OsRox to Quaqual, January 13, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; Radio # 19, Parker to Roosevelt, January 13, 1933, BIA Records 364-928; and Foster Rhea Dulles, "The Philippines and the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act,"Foreign Policy Reports, IX, 22 (January 3, 1934), pp. 247-256.
January 17, 1933, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill became law. (125)

Newspaper reaction to the congressional action overriding the President's veto was bitter. The New York Herald Tribune, which had consistently opposed every move toward Philippine independence declared: "For clouded vision, atrophied minds and ignoble motives, nothing in our history has equalled the performance of the Senate and the House in passing by a two-thirds vote the measure to haul down the American flag." The New York Times made the caustic comment: "In the name of the Prophet, sugar and coconut oil!" (126)

Final disposition of the Act was now in the hands of the Filipinos.

(125) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 1768-1769; 1820; 1827-1828; 1838; 1859-1867; 1911-1920; 1924-1925. OsRox to Quaqual, January 13, 14, 16, 18, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; Bunuan to Quezon, January 17, ibid.; Radio # 19, January 13, 1933, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-928; Radio # 26, January 17, 1933, Parker to Roosevelt, BIA Records 364-after-928; Osmeña, Roxas to Pittman, January 16, 1933, Pittman Papers, Box 151.

CHAPTER XII

THE LAST INDEPENDENCE MISSION (1933-1934)

Anyone who makes a superficial inquiry into the Philippine independence movement among the Filipinos themselves finds it a howling wilderness of contradictions.

This New York Times despatch was dated July 30, 1932 and a review of the Manila press during the six or eight months preceding this statement would bear out the truth of the situation. During the months that followed, the situation became even more confused, and frustrating, especially to those concerned with Philippine affairs in Washington.

The passage of an independence bill, its veto by President Hoover, and its subsequent repassage, should have been the most dramatic event in the history of the Filipino campaign for independence. For the OsRox Mission finally came back with a definite programme that positively would pave the way for independence. But October 1933 was an even more dramatic event -- when the Filipinos rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act.

Perhaps the event was not unexpected, for by carefully following the trend of events from the departure of the Mission in December 1931 through the congressional action on the independence bill in January 1933, it was possible to perceive the gradual parting of the ways between Quezon in Manila and the Mission in Washington. A collision course developed between the two political
forces as each side tried to reconcile divergent views and sway the other by a lavish use of cable and radio.

The split between Quezon and Osmeña was probably brewing since Quezon returned from the United States in October 1931. On the surface everything seemed peaceful and quiet, but there was an undercurrent of rivalry, each side being on its guard.

It will be recalled that after Quezon returned from Washington, he presented three propositions regarding the settlement of the Philippine problem. Heated debate followed Quezon's report, especially with reference to his proposition No. 2, which failed to fulfill the slogan of "immediate" independence. The Democrata Party, the Philippine Civic Union, even Osmeña, were all opposed to the compromise plan, proposition No. 2, which Quezon favoured.

The OsRox Mission left Manila in December 1931, essentially unable to agree with Quezon on an independence programme to present to Washington. The Mission reached Washington on January 2 and promptly issued a denial of reports that the Filipinos had changed front and were now seeking autonomy.

Both Quezon in Manila and the Mission in Washington begged for unity and cooperation, as they recognized the importance of presenting a common front on independence. In Manila, Quezon and other leaders set up a Finance Committee to collect money to support
the campaign for independence.(1) The Democrata Party dissolved itself in January 1932, at least partly due to the belief that the independence campaign in the United States would fare better if a united front were shown.(2)

After hearings on the Hare Bill were begun in January 1932, a group of prominent Filipinos calling themselves the Independent

(1) Among the prominent citizens involved in this project were Miguel Unson, Chairman, formerly Secretary of Finance; Ramon Fernandez, former Mayor of Manila; Francisco Benitez, academic; Carlos P. Romulo, journalist; Gonzalo Puyat, businessman; and Wenceslao Trinidad, sugar executive. The Philippine Sugar Association was the biggest contributor. See Quezon to OsRox, March 2, 1932; OsRox to Quezon, March 2, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; Record of Executive Committee Meeting of the Independence Commission, January 28, 1932, ibid.

The independence fund drive was kicked off by Quezon's contribution of US$500 and Osmena's US$300. See Philippines Herald, January 20, 28, February 9, 12, March 22, 1932.

(2) The decision to dissolve the party was reportedly led by Senator Claro M. Recto, assisted by Vicente Sotto (who had founded the Philippine Civic Union), and Alejo Mabanag. The principal reason for this move was undoubtedly the feeling that the maintenance of the party was futile, because it had become hopelessly in the minority and torn by internal dissension. The proceedings were marked by bitter debates. See ibid., February 1, 1932.
Citizens Federation cabled Hare that the "great majority of Filipinos desire to obtain from American people and government self-executory grant independence on date certain as early as possible subject only to such delays as are indispensable for orderly transfer sovereignty." The signers included such men as General Aguinaldo, Juan Sumulong, Ramon Fernandez, Claro M. Recto, Felipe Agoncillo (President of the Philippine Independence League and former Secretary of the Interior in the Wood administration), and Vicente Sotto. (3)

Quezon interpreted the cable as an endorsement of the Mission and possibly a willingness to accept his proposition No. 2, and took advantage of the occasion to invite the group to join the independence drive — either by sending a mission to the United States to assist there or to help in the collection of funds for publicity in America. The Federation was pleased with Quezon's personal appeal for cooperation, except for General Aguinaldo. Ever eager to distance himself from Quezon, Aguinaldo clarified his stand on independence and emphasized that he differed with Quezon's autonomy plan. (4)

Up until March 1932 the Mission in Washington seemed to have the full endorsement and support of the Filipino leadership, despite its having quickly concluded, like Quezon, that compromise was the ____________________________


(4) See Quezon's letters to Fernandez (January 25), Sumulong (January 26), and Recto (January 30), in Quezon Papers, Box 50. See also Philippines Herald, January 27, February 6, 1932.
only road to success. Several cables transmitted to Washington assured the Mission that the Legislature and the people in general would stand by the decisions it would make in relation to an independence bill. The Mission, in fact, received no indication up to that time of any opposition to any of the provisions of the independence bills then under consideration. The amendments to the Hare Bill submitted by the Mission were approved by Quezon, who said they "have the general approval of the people." Quezon was also reported to have said that they were in accord with instructions given by the Legislature.(5)

However, as the independence bill begun to take shape in Congress, opposition was vigorously expressed by some quarters against "absurd" provisions of the independence bill, and political leaders in Manila became increasingly unwilling to endorse the Mission's work. Osmeña and Roxas found the criticisms and opposition aired in Manila a constant source of difficulty and embarrassment in Washington. It was no consolation to the Mission that privately Quezon continually restated his confidence in their

(5) See Quezon to OsRox, February 19, 22, 24, March 12, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, January 30, March 1, 1932, in Quezon Papers, Box 50; see also Philippines Herald, January 29, 30, March 1, 19, 1932.
The Hare Bill passed the House on April 4. Quezon immediately sent a message of congratulations to the Mission, but the Legislature did not endorse this achievement. Public reaction was also subdued. Press reports in the United States stated the news was received "with sober silence throughout the city." It was suggested that the imminent prospect of increased economic difficulties caused general sobriety and prevented any large public demonstration, although the Filipinos were said to be gratified by the action on the bill. Despite the absence of public display, the Philippines Herald thought the reaction was one of "great elation," and politicians in Manila explained the lack of public exuberance as being due to a wish to avoid premature jubilation, as well as to a fear that extremists would propose a boycott to protest against some of the provisions of the bill, thus arousing American antagonism. (7)

(6) OsRox to Quaqual, February 18, March 4, 10, 1932; Quezon to OsRox, June 5, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50. See also Philippines Herald, March 26, 1932.

(7) OsRox to Quaqual, March 4, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, March 1, April 5, 1932, Quezon Paper, Box 50. See also Philippines Herald, March 5, 8, 16, April 5, 6, 7, 8, 1932; Philippines Free Press, January 21, 1933; New York Times, April 6, 1932.
Nevertheless, there was strong opposition to the bill from several quarters: from General Aguinaldo and Juan Sumulong of the Independent Citizens Federation; from the Philippine Civic Union; from sugarman Secretary Alunan, among others. The objections centered around the provisions for the maintenance of American commercial and military bases, the length of the transition period, and the sugar restrictions. Attacks on the bill continued, and during his visit to Manila in October, Representative Hare expressed surprise at the opposition he found, since there was none expressed at the hearings.(8)

The Hawes-Cutting Bill, introduced in the Senate on January 28, had likewise been denounced in Manila, principally on account of the long period preceding independence (as well as provisions on the plebiscite and reservation of military bases). Former members of

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(8) See opinions expressed by Aguinaldo, Sumulong, in Philippines Herald, March 2,5, April 4,7, 1932; see also editorial, Philippine Magazine, written by A.V.H.Hartendorp, in Philippines Herald, April 9, 1932.

Sotto of the Philippine Civic Union charged the Mission with "having betrayed the people." See also telegram to President Hoover demanding immediate independence and threatening a boycott of American business in Manila. The Philippine Civic Union had expressed itself in favour of economic protectionism, an anti-imperialist boycott, and a general strike and civil disobedience until the restoration of the Philippine Republic (of 1898). See Quezon to OsRox, March 16, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; Philippines Herald, March 13,22, 1932; New York Times, March 14, 1932.
the by-then-defunct Democrata Party lambasted the Nacionalistas for having accepted it. Both Quezon and Acting Speaker de las Alas had to issue denials that the Nacionalistas had, or would, endorse any particular bill, stating that that was left to the Mission.\(^9\)

Opposition to the Hawes-Cutting Bill was greatly accentuated by the introduction of the "atrocious" Forbes Amendments late in May. Speaker de las Alas declared in favour of them and expressed his continued faith in the Mission, but Quezon cabled the Mission that the political leaders in Manila, including himself, were strongly against the Hawes-Cutting Bill with the Forbes Amendments.\(^10\)

In June, when it became evident that the Senate would fail to pass the bill in that session, distinct symptoms of relief were noted in Manila. General Aguinaldo was reported as thinking the current status was better than the passage of the bill as it stood. In July, following the postponement of consideration of the bill to December, it was reported that there was "great rejoicing among the people."\(^11\)

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\(^9\) See Philippines Herald, March 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 1932; New York Times, June 2, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, March 1, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.


\(^11\) Philippine Magazine, July 1932; Cebu Progress.
During the recess of Congress (between July and December), there was considerable sentiment in the Philippines for scrapping the Hawes-Cutting Bill and starting all over again. The opposition stemmed mainly from the economic restrictions, which were considered quite burdensome. "The average Filipino wants internal liberty but not independence," Governor Roosevelt wrote Forbes, "because he very naturally did not wish to face a future in which he is definitely relegated to a position where through not handling his internal affairs, he accepts inferiority, but if he cannot get internal liberty without independence he is prepared to take independence as well." (12)

Rumours were rife that Commonwealth status was preferred. Quezon was in fact quoted as having expressed the feeling that "freedom was more important than independence." Slowly, also, there was developing a split on policies between the Legislature/Independence Commission and the Mission. (13)

To some observers of the Philippine scene, the opposition in Manila seemed really directed not so much against the Hawes-Cutting Bill as against Osmena and Roxas. Forbes from afar wrote Governor

(12) Theodore Roosevelt Jr. to Forbes, September 6, 1932, T. Roosevelt Papers, Box 17. See also New York Times, August 27, 1932; Philippines Herald, August 8, 10, 1932.

(13) OsRox to Quezon, August 10, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; Osmena to Pittman, August 15, 1932, Pittman Papers, Box 151; Washington Post, editorial, August 8, 1932; New York Herald Tribune, August 28, 1932, BIA Records w-26480-102.
Roosevelt that the Mission's bringing home of the independence bill was not so greatly relished by certain elements in Manila. (14)

Following the deferral of the independence bill in Congress (in July) the Manila papers began to predict the early return to Manila of the Mission. There was a hot exchange of cables between Quezon and the Mission, marking the first major disagreement between Quezon and the Mission. Quezon favoured the return of the Mission, and tried to convince Osmeña and Roxas to come home, offering various reasons such as, for the economy's sake (the Mission offered to reduce its per diems), to help in the reorganization programme being implemented in the government, to work out a new party platform. When it became apparent that the Mission did not intend to return, Quezon took up the matter with the Independence Commission. A majority conference on July 21 upheld the Mission in its desire to remain in the United States. Quezon did not press the matter, and the Mission stayed in Washington. (15)

(14) Forbes to Roosevelt, August 1, 1932, T. Roosevelt Papers, Box 17.

(15) See OsRox to Quaqual, July 6, 9, 11, 18, 20, 1932; OsRox to Quezon, July 6, 13, (2 cables); Quezon to OsRox, July 6, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, July 9, 11, 19, 22, 1932; OsRox to Philippine Legislature, July 16, 1932, all in Quezon Papers, Box 50; see also Philippines Herald, July 7, 9, 18, 19, 21, 25, 1932; Manila Daily Bulletin, July 9, 19, 22, 1932, in BIA Records w-26480-102; and BIA Memorandum to SecWar, July 21, 1932, in Quezon "P" file, pt. 5, BIA Records.
The Mission was also asserting a strong stand on another matter: it wished the Legislature to leave the Mission's hands free and not express a stand on the pending bills. Senator Recto, opposed to the Hare and Hawes-Cutting bills, was insistent that the Legislature declare its position on the independence bills. Quezon succeeded in convincing Recto not to press for this, and defended the Mission, saying "We cannot doubt the patriotism of the Mission." Though the Legislature, under Quezon's direction, officially refrained from taking a public stand on the independence bills, it nevertheless sought an expression of public sentiment. It decided to hold public hearings on the bills commencing on September 3.(16)

At the September hearings the preponderant opinion was against both the Hare and the Hawes-Cutting bills, the former, however, being considered less objectionable than the Senate bill. The decision to hold hearings constituted a partial withdrawal of confidence in the Mission. The Mission had asked that no declaration of attitude should be made public in Manila on the measures. The public hearings placed the Mission in an embarrassing position in Washington in view of the preponderant opinion against the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill.(17)

In order not to further embarrass the Mission or to anticipate the action of Congress, the legislative committee (which was instructed to report its recommendations before October 25) decided

(16) Philippines Herald, August 26,27,29,30,31, 1932.
(17) See ibid., September 2,3,6,7,12,16,22,26,29, October 1 (editorial), 1932.
not to make any recommendations. Towards the end of the Philippine legislative session in November, the Legislature cabled the Mission "an expression of the sense" of that body on an acceptable bill. The requisites were (1) a fixed date for independence; (2) elimination of the Forbes Amendments; (3) a minimum sugar quota of 1.2 million tons; (4) exception of principal Philippine ports for use as military and naval bases; and (5) no plebiscite. (18)

The public hearings resulted in a decision to send Quezon to Washington to inform the Mission that the Legislature and the people were opposed to the Hawes-Cutting Bill. The news of Quezon's going to the United States while the Mission was there was reportedly not welcomed by the Mission, although they did invite Quezon to come on September 10. Sensing how the Mission would take his trip, Quezon decided to send Senator Aquino, an Osmeña man, to inform the Mission of the opposition in Manila to the Hawes-Cutting Bill, and to bring the Mission in line with sentiment in Manila. (19)

(18) Ibid., October 5, 28, 1932; New York Times, October 5, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, November 2, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.

(19) Quezon said no to the Mission's invitation to come to Washington, stating that the objectionable features of the bill could be improved by the Mission with or without him. See OsRox to Quezon, September 10, 1932; Osias to Quezon, September 19, 1932; Quezon to Osias, September 19, 1932; Quezon to Philippine Legislature, November 7, 1932, all in Quezon Papers, Box 50. See also Philippines Herald, July 7, August 30, October 25, 1932.
The despatch of Aquino came after the November elections, which saw the Democrats installed both in the White House and in Congress. Quezon had a change of attitude after the elections — he now urged immediate liberty with a ten-year period of free trade, or a ten-year delay with real autonomy. He instructed Aquino to work for the King Bill (although Osmeña and Roxas had earlier cabled that it had no chance of passage at all), and if passage was impossible, to work for a bill providing for a period of preparation not exceeding ten years, with restrictions on the power of the American President to intervene during the transition period and a sugar quota of 1.2 million tons at least. Unless these conditions were met, the Mission should wait for the incoming Democratic Administration and demand immediate independence. (20)

When the new session of Congress opened in December 1932, the Mission was convinced that their only chance to secure an independence bill was to see the Hawes-Cutting Bill through. Aquino realized the wisdom of this decision and worked with the Mission to perfect the independence bill, much to the annoyance of Quezon, who reprimanded him for ignoring instructions. (21)

(20) Concurrent Resolution No. 19, 9th Phil. Leg., 2nd sess., November 9, 1932, BIA Records 364-641; OsRox to Quaqual, November 14, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50. See also Philippines Herald, November 7, 14, 1932; Manila Daily Bulletin, November 15, 1932, BIA Records w-26480-102.

(21) Aquino to Quezon, December 13, 17, 19, 21, 22, 1932; Quezon to Aquino, December 15, 18, 23, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, December 17, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50.
The Hawes-Cutting Bill came under a fire of unfavourable comment in Manila as soon as the Senate began considering it in December 1932. As it went through its final stages in Congress, opposition mounted, and Quezon began to criticize it publicly. A public demonstration was held to protest against the bill (which Quezon, however, declined to attend). The most common opinion expressed was that the bill would give only the shadow and not the substance of independence. It was a "grudge independence" that the bill was conceding. (22)

Quezon objected particularly to the presidential powers to be retained and the proposed retention of military and naval bases. Extremely agitated by proposed amendments on the sugar quota and immigration exclusion, Quezon instructed the Mission to work for immediate independence and "if this is impossible in this session, let there be no bill." The Mission, however expressed its determination to fight for what it thought was "right and patriotic" (i.e., to secure this independence bill), irrespective of any dictation from Manila. (23)

Quezon became increasingly persistent in his denunciation of the bill. On December 16, he branded the Hawes-Cutting bill as an anti-Philippine bill. "The fight in the US Senate," he charged, "is not to give independence and freedom to the Philippines but to close

(22) Philippines Herald, December 20, 21, 23, 1932.

(23) Quezon to OsRox, December 10, 1932; Quezon to Aquino, December 21, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; OsRox to T-V-T Publications, December 21, 1932, BIA Records w-26480-102.
American doors to Filipino labor and Philippine products." "It is not an independence bill at all," he said in an interview. "It is a tariff bill directed against our products; it is an immigration bill directed against our labor." "It is a joke," he said in late December, and announced boldly that "If my opposition to the bill causes a division of the Nacionalista Party, let there be a division." Having officially declared that he would oppose the Hawes-Cutting Bill, he insisted that the Mission require that any bill passed by Congress should be submitted to the Legislature.(24)

The vociferous opposition being ventilated in Manila did not please the Mission in Washington, which felt that those intemperate criticisms and accusations as to the motives of Congress were creating embarrassing situations and hampering their efforts in Congress, besides increasing the danger of presidential veto. The Mission requested the Filipinos to express their views "firmly, but calmly, deliberately, and dispassionately."(25)

(24) Quaqual to OsRox, December 16, 17, 19, 1932; Quezon to Aquino, December 18, 1932; OsRox to Quaqual, December 31, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; Philippines Herald, December 16, 19, February 11, March 13, 1932; New York Times, December 20, 1932, January 18, 30, 1933; Press statement, December 16, 1932; Press releases, Sunday Tribune, December 25, 1932; Speech before Independence Commission, December 27, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 81; Radio Speech, January 30, March 16, 1933, ibid., Box 82.

(25) OsRox to Quaqual, December 19, 1921, ibid., Box 50; OsRox to T-V-T Publications, December 21, BIA Records w-26480-102.
The OsRox Mission wanted support from Manila for presidential approval of the bill. They requested Quezon to urge Governor Roosevelt to prevail on President Hoover to sign the bill. This request was overruled by Quezon. They then appealed for support from the Legislature. That body was clearly opposed to the bill in the majority, but sitting as the Independence Commission, it cabled the Mission that "although the compromise bill is not in full accordance with the statements of and instructions given by the Commission or the Legislature (lately to Senator Aquino), the Commission would be willing that the President sign the bill for the purpose of giving the Legislature or the Filipino people the opportunity to express opinion on the bill . . . . reserving full liberty of action to accept or reject it."(26)

The Independence Commission's action was clearly a compromise -- though the legislators did not endorse Quezon's proposal that they request Hoover to veto the bill, in expressing a willingness to have Hoover sign the bill they also explicitly endorsed Quezon's earlier instructions to Aquino as to what would be acceptable in the independence bill.

(26) OsRox to Quaqual, December 22, 1932; Quaqual to OsRox, December 23, 30, 1932; Aquino to Quezon, December 27, 1932, Quezon Papers, Box 50; BIA Memorandum to SecWar, December 30, 1932, BIA Records 364-after-924; Tribune, December 24, 1932, BIA Records w-26480-102. See also New York Times, December 24, 30, 1932.
While awaiting presidential action on the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, Quezon announced he would join the Mission in Washington, ostensibly to ascertain prospects under the incoming Democratic Administration. The decision to go was to show unity of purpose, "however much we differ in appraising the situation," he told the Mission.(27)

Strong disaffection developed among the members of the Legislature with respect to Quezon's decision to join the Mission. A poll of the Philippine Legislature had shown that 15 out of 22 senators and 69 out of 96 representatives favoured rejection of the independence bill. Quezon's decision to go to Washington was taken to mean he was looking towards cooperation with the Mission and softening in his opposition to the bill.

After Congress overrode the presidential veto on January 17, Quezon announced he was abandoning his planned trip to the United States. He called instead for the return of the Mission, so the issue of acceptance or rejection of the bill could be resolved immediately. But the Mission invited Quezon to join them in Washington, to see for himself that nothing more could be done from that end. Meanwhile, while the question of his trip was being resolved, Quezon proceeded to reorganize leadership in the Legislature: Senator Jose Clarin was elected President Protempore; Senator Elpidio Quirino as Majority Floor Leader; and

(27) Quezon to OsRox, January 2, 7, 9, 1933; OsRox to Quezon, January 6, 8, 10, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; Philippines Herald, January 9, 1933.
Representative Quintin Paredes as Acting Speaker (to succeed de las Alas, who was appointed Secretary of Public Works and Communications).(28)

On January 30 Quezon announced he would definitely leave for the United States (following cabled advice from Osias and Switzer in the United States urging him to consult with the new administration). Quezon hoped to convince Congress that the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was unfair and to seek a better law. He suggested a "Mixed Mission" composed of representative groups. In an interesting departure from the past, Quezon invited Aguinaldo to join the mission, and he at the same time suggested that each member of the mission pay his own way, or receive help from his group. He ruled out popular subscription.(29)

Quezon's "Mixed Mission" had no official status (except for a resolution of the Independence Commission on February 18, 1933).

(28) OsRox to Quezon, January 20, 1933; Quezon to OsRox, January 30, 1933; Quezon to Osias, January 24, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; La Opinion, January 12, 1933, in Quezon "p" file, pt. 5, BIA Records.

(29) Osias to Quezon, January 25, 1933; Quezon to OsRox, January 27, 1933; Switzer to Quezon, January 27, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; also New York Times, February 3, 12, 14, 28, March 8, 16, 1933.
But its objectives did seem to be in tune with public opinion. (30)

Osmena met Quezon's Mission in Paris and there attempted to explain the contested provisions on the American High Commissioner and American reservations. At one point in the conversation, Quezon broke out passionately: "Sergio, . . . Do you realize the tremendous responsibility you and I would be shouldering in accepting a law the effects of which will be to tie the hands of posterity?" To this Osmena replied: "Do you realize the tremendous responsibility we will assume in rejecting the act -- as a result of which America may stay in the Philippines forever?"

Preparing to leave for Washington, Quezon proposed that the independence act be accepted with reservations, with amendments required to make the act fully acceptable. On April 25 in

(30) See Appendix A for membership of the Mission. See also the following BIA Memoranda for the SecWar: April 21, 1933, BIA Records 26480-161; April 22, 1933 (2 memoranda), BIA Records 26480-162 and BIA Records w-26480-102; Tribune, March 17, 18, BIA Records w-26480-102; Quezon's statement, April 1, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51. For copy of February 18 Resolution, see Radio # 139, April 22, 1933 (Acting Governor General) Holliday to Parker, BIA Records 364-948.

An independence bill straw vote conducted by the Philippines Free Press revealed that 56% of the votes polled were against the bill; 44% for the bill. Ten thousand ballots were mailed out, 65-70% of which were returned. See in April 1, 1933 issue.
Washington the two missions signed an agreement specifying changes to be sought. In the meantime, in private despatches to Manila, Quezon had urged the continuation of the campaign against the independence act. (31)

In Washington, Quezon soon was made to realize that Congress and the Roosevelt Administration would not act further on Philippine independence. (32) After scarcely four days in Washington (April

(31) See Philippine Magazine, June 1933, p. 3. See also Quirino to Quezon (Paris), April 8, 10, 1933; Quirino to Quezon, May 12, 16, 1933; Quezon to Alunan, April 16, 1933; Quezon to Clarin, Paredes, May 2, 1933; Felipe Buencamino to Quezon, May 5, 1933; Paredes, Quirino to Quezon, May 24, 1933, all in Quezon Papers, Box 51.

Senator Benigno Aquino had by this time returned to Manila from Washington and immediately launched an attack on Quezon's leadership. Accusing Quezon of insincerity and of leadership "not at all intelligent," he and several pro-independence bill proponents spoke out in favour of the act. See Clarin to Quezon, March 22, April 22, 1933; Paredes to Quezon, April 25, Quirino to Quezon, May 16, 1933, ibid.; also New York Times, March 20, April 18, 1933.

For copy of April 25 agreement, see Diario de Sesiones, July 25, 1933, p. 90; August 1, 1933, p. 214.

(32) See statement by Senator Key Pittman, Philippines Herald, April 8, 1933.
24-28), Quezon suddenly decided to return to Manila.

At a conference between the two Missions and five US Senators on April 27, Quezon had aired all his objections to the bill. Quezon told the Senators that unless he was assured that certain changes would be made in the independence act, he was afraid that the Filipinos would reject it. Senator Joseph Robinson, apparently designated as spokesman for the group, told Quezon that his colleagues were not prepared to give Quezon such an assurance — they were busy men and had devoted already far too much time to the Philippine question. And "with a pointed finger, a menacing mien, and all the forcefulness he could muster," he told Quezon: "... we cannot understand you. We are giving you what you asked for when you were here the other time and now you don't want it. Why don't you come clear and be frank? We believe you don't want independence. If so, why don't you say so? Go ahead, Mr. Quezon, and do what you want with the bill in the Philippines. We will do our duty here as we see it."(33)

(33) See James Wingo, "Back Stage in Washington," Philippines Free Press, June 10, 1933; see also ibid., June 17, 1933, for Carlos P. Romulo's version of the Robinson incident; and ibid., July 29, 1933, for Roxas' version. The other senators at the meeting were McNary, Tydings, Pittman, Cutting. See also Pacis, op. cit., II, pp. 34-35.
Quezon was completely overwhelmed by Robinson's outburst — and naturally quite embarrassed in the presence of Osmeña and Roxas. Any thought of rapprochement between the two missions was abandoned as Quezon made up his mind to fight the bill in the Philippines, and announced his return to Manila.(34)

Quezon's sudden decision to return created a sensation in Manila.

Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas returned to Manila on June 11, 1933. Osmeña and Roxas upon their return strongly advocated acceptance of the independence act, thus setting the stage for a bitter political struggle.

Each side accused the other of acting only to promote its own selfish purposes and of adopting tactics which betrayed the national interests. "The law is a real threat to the liberty of this country," the Philippines Herald declared, "but the efforts to obtain its acceptance by application of the methods of the criminal gangster and racketeer is a more immediate and pernicious menace still." On the other side, Senator Quezon was charged with abandoning the independence goal entirely, and having thereby made the issue "a mere toy which he utilizes for the satisfaction of his

(34) See Key Pittman to newly-appointed Governor General Frank Murphy, April 14, 1933, Pittman Papers, Box 151; see also Quezon to Clarin, Paredes, April 25, 27, 1933; Quezon to Senator Hawes, May 6, 1933, Quezon Papers, Box 51; and Quezon's farewell statement, Radio # 213, April 28, 1933, Parker to Holliday (Manila), BIA Records 26480-158.
Quezon knew that if the question of acceptance or rejection of the act were submitted to the Legislature it would be rejected. Yet he nevertheless agreed with Osmeña that it be submitted to the people through a plebiscite.(36)

Osmeña and Roxas brought the case for acceptance to the people in a rigorous public campaign. They had the advantage of having brought back an independence act, rejection of which would, in the eyes of the American people, constitute a denial of the Filipinos' desire for independence. They also counted the support of President Rafael Palma and Dean Maximo M. Kalaw of the University of the Philippines and the backing of the T-V-T (Tribune-Vanguardia-Taliba) newspaper chain of Alejandro Roces.

Quezon on his part mobilized not only loyal partisans in the Legislature and the government, but also wealthy friends. Those who wanted a longer transition period, or no independence at all, gave Quezon funds to carry on his campaign. With one newspaper chain clearly against him, he rounded up a group of backers to purchase the other -- the D-M-H-M (El Debate-Mabuhay-Herald-Monday Mail) -- and installed Carlos P. Romulo to run it. But Quezon's net was much wider than this, and he also gathered around him such disparate opponents of the bill as General Aguinaldo, Bishop Gregorio Aglipay (Philippine Independent Church), Juan Sumulong, and the Communist

(35) See Philippines Herald, July 8, 31, 1933 (Editorials written by Vicente Albano Pacis).

(36) Ibid., June 19, 1933; Philippines Free Press, June 24, 1933.
Party. Quezon's faction was able to marshall a list of objections to specific provisions of the independence bill—on the powers of the American High Commissioner, trade relations, immigration, military reservations—which carried overpowering weight.

Quezon was completely victorious from the first. He quickly reasserted his hold over the divided Nacionalista Party and on July 20 succeeded in having Manuel Roxas ousted as Speaker of the House. In his place, Quintin Paredes was elected Speaker, and Jose Zulueta was elected Majority Floor Leader.

Osmena had challenged Quezon to resign as Senate President as would he as Senate President Protempore and Majority Floor Leader, so that as private citizens they could appear before the people to present their views, without government pressure. In a resignation speech to the Senate, Quezon stated that he had sought to avoid the impasse between the Legislature and the Mission, because he believed the Mission had acted in good faith, even though it did not comply with some of the instructions of the Legislature. He denied that the reorganization of the Legislature was part of a plan to

(37) See campaign speeches in Philippines Herald, July 8, 11, 25, September 14, 18, 1933. See also Friend, book, pp. 114-122.
Quezon's financial backers were wealthy businessmen and sugar entrepreneurs, such as the Elizaldes, Andres Soriano, M.J. Ossorio, and Rafael Alunan.

(38) Philippines Free Press, July 8, 22, 29, 1933; Diario de Sesiones, July 20, 1933, pp. 46; 48.
persecute the members of the Mission. "We need unity in counsel and action and we cannot have that by keeping men at the helm who cannot agree. . . . We are all before the bar of history. The eyes of the world are upon us. These are anxious and fateful days. The future of our country hangs in the balance. Let him who dares shirk his duty. As for me, never, never, never."(39)

Osmeña replied, on July 25, in a lengthy speech full of bitterness, defending the Mission's action in securing approval of the independence measure. Explaining why he could no longer follow Quezon's leadership "without betraying my duties to our country," he explained that he would vote "yes" upon Quezon's resignation as a protest against "a personal leadership gained through intrigue and secret machinations, . . . against this new regime of opportunist and clandestine combinations, . . . and against this policy of vacillations and contradictions in relation to the independence law."(40)

On July 31 the Senate rejected Quezon's resignation as President by a vote of 16 to 5. A vote of confidence was subsequently passed. The Senate then accepted Osmeña's resignation as Senate Protempore and Majority Floor Leader by a vote of 15 to 2. Senator Jose Clarin was elected Senate President Protempore and Senator Elpidio Quirino was chosen Majority Floor Leader.

(39) Ibid., July 20-22, 1933, pp. 12-14; 51-54; 56-59; also Philippines Free Press, July 29, 1933.

(40) Diario de Sesiones, July 25, 1933, pp. 84-95; Philippines Free Press, July 29, 1933.
Over the protest of the Osmena-Roxas minority, the House then initiated a concurrent resolution, later extensively amended by the Senate, but declaring in both versions that immediate, complete and absolute independence was the "ideal" of the Filipino people. The Senate resolution also stated that the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act would not grant this. (41)

A plebiscite on the independence bill had been agreed upon on June 18. On September 21 the House passed a plebiscite bill presenting the electorate with a simple question to be answered "yes" or "no": "Are you in favour of the Independence Law?" After at first agreeing to this straightforward question, Quezon changed his mind. Quezon proposed, and his Senate majority agreed, that the electorate be allowed to indicate what it wanted in place of the

(41) Diario de Sesiones, July 31, 1933, pp. 188-190; August 1, 1933, pp. 209-215; Philippines Free Press, August 5, 1933. See also BIA Records 3427-a-w-46 and BIA Records 364-961. The independence resolution was prompted by an unfriendly slur in a Washington Post editorial charging that the Filipinos were putting sugar before independence. At this time a Sugar Conference was being held in Washington and the Philippine Sugar Association, through ex-Senator Harry Hawes as its representative in Washington, was bargaining for a larger sugar quota. See Friend, book, pp.128-129.

See also "President Quezon Attacked and Defended in Senate Speeches," and "Quezon-Osmena Debate on Leadership," (Newspaper clippings, July-August 1933, University of the Philippines Library).
independence act, should it reject the law. However, the Senate was unable to agree on a formula, and the plebiscite was abandoned. "Every time President Quezon sees a crowd, he changes his mind," mused Osmeña.

Osmeña next presented a resolution for the acceptance of the independence act. It was defeated in both Houses by decisive majorities. A resolution was then passed in the Senate on October 12 and in the House on October 17 declaring that the Philippine Legislature "declines to accept" the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in its present form because (1) the provisions affecting trade relations between the United States and the Philippines would seriously imperil the economic, social, and political institutions of the country and might defeat the avowed purpose to secure independence to the Philippines at the end of the transition period; (2) the immigration clause was objectionable and offensive to the Filipino people; (3) the powers of the High Commissioner were too indefinite; and (4) the military, naval, and other reservations provided for in the act were inconsistent with true independence, violated dignity and were subject to misunderstanding.

A joint legislative committee, to be headed by Quezon, was then directed to proceed to the United States to petition the President and Congress for such changes in the act "as will fully satisfy the aspirations of the Filipino people to become at the earliest practicable date a free and independent nation, under conditions and circumstances that will not imperil the political, social and
economic stability of their country."(42)

Quezon left for America on November 4, 1933, without Roxas, who was not invited, and Osmeña, whom he invited as a gesture of reconciliation, but who flatly refused to join unless the rejection resolution was repealed. With Quezon on this mission were Senator Elpidio Quirino and former Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon. General Aguinaldo was invited to be honorary chairman but never went. Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara was included in the list, but not Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias (who had taken the side of the "pros"), because the majority in the Legislature had lost its

(42) Diario de Sesiones, September 22, 1933, pp. 486-487; October 6, 1933, pp. 686-682, 696-699; October 9, 1933, pp. 703-709; October 12, 1933, pp. 736-749; also Philippines Free Press, August 26, September 30, October 14, 1933, Radio # 359, October 11, 1933, BIA Records 364-963; Radio # 364, October 12, 1933, BIA Records 364-964; Radio # 969, October 18, 1933, BIA Records 364-966; Cable # 420, November 25, 1933, BIA Records after-364-971, all cables from Murphy to Cox (BIA). See also lengthy BIA Memorandum on Filipino Objections to Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, November 22-24, 1933, BIA Records 364-973. For Concurrent Resolution No. 46, 1933, see House Document 209, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess.
confidence in him. (43)

Seeking to prepare the ground for his arrival, Quezon asked Governor Frank Murphy to intercede on behalf of his mission. He wanted, he said, independence in two or three years, accompanied by reciprocal free trade for fifteen or twenty. Quezon also conferred with Henry Stimson in New York, who subsequently wrote to President Roosevelt advising him to hear Quezon and to work out "an honorable solution of the Philippine problem." (44)

Quezon arrived in Washington on December 7 and found little
enthusiasm for his mission. (45)

In conferences with Secretary of War George C. Dern and the Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief Creed Cox, Quezon proposed that the President and the Secretary take the lead on the independence law and make recommendations. The bureau felt that Quezon should submit his own proposals or amendments in writing. (46)

Quezon's request, through the Secretary of War, that President Roosevelt refer in his annual message to Congress on January 3 to the rejection of the independence act and recommend appropriate legislation, was ignored by the President, at the suggestion of Secretary Dern and BIA Chief Cox. (47)

(45) For samples of congressional opinion, see statements of Senator Millard Tydings (Maryland), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs; Senator Key Pittman; and former Senator Hiram Bingham, in Manila Daily Bulletin, October 7, November 25, December 12, 1933. See also letter, Key Pittman to Frank Murphy, September 8, 1933, Pittman Papers, Box 151.

(46) Memorandum, December 18, 1933: Conversation between Secretary of War and Senator Quezon; Comments by General Cox, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, New York (Official File 400: Philippines). See also BIA Memorandum for SecWar, November 24, 1933, BIA Records 364-after-971; letter, Francis LeJ. Parker to Creed Cox, December 14, 1933, Francis LeJ. Parker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 11.

(47) Quezon to SecWar Dern, December 19, 1933; transmitted to President Roosevelt, December 20, 1933, F. Roosevelt Papers.
President Roosevelt, when he met with Quezon on December 27, invited him to submit concrete proposals for amendments to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act or for new legislation that would be acceptable to the Filipinos. (48)

On January 15 the Quezon Mission presented the President with two alternative proposals: (1) independence in two or three years with limited free trade until then based on the average volume of exports during 1932 and 1933 and with reciprocal trade relations after independence; or (2) independence in 1940 with a more autonomous government in the meantime and the privilege of exporting to the United States 1 million tons of sugar, 200,000 tons of coconut oil, and 6 million pounds of cordage, with special trade relations to be established after independence. Both plans contained certain provisions for neutralization. (49)

(49) See letter, Quezon to President Roosevelt, January 15, 1934, with Memorandum on United States-Philippine Trade Relations, Quezon Papers, Box 52; also BIA Records w-364-1050; New York Times, January 18, 1934.
Isauro Gabaldon, member of the Mission, disagreed with Quezon's proposals, and presented a programme for independence in three years. See his memorandum, January 8, 1934, Quezon Papers, Box 52; also BIA Records 364-990.
In the meanwhile, Congress, busy with other issues, tried to keep the Philippine question in the background. There was apathy, if not resentment, among congressional leaders at the rejection in Manila of the independence act. "Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act now, or nothing for a while" was their sentiment. (50)

Resident Commissioner Osias had by this time returned to Washington, and he openly denounced Quezon and his mission as "assassins of independence." (51)

The only concession Congress appeared willing to consider was extending the life of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill Act (H-H-C) an additional nine months (the deadline for acceptance was January 17, 1934), giving the Filipinos another chance to accept it. Quezon

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(51) Manila Daily Bulletin, December 25, 1933; Speech in the House, January 23, 1934, BIA Records 364-990; see also his letter to SecWar Dern, January 6, 1934, BIA Records 364-985-A.
not approve of this, although the "pros" in Manila of course
did. (52)

On February 3 Quezon conferred with Senator Tydings, who stated
that his committee was opposed to reopening the independence issue
unless pressure was brought from the White House.

Quezon then announced he would return to Manila to allow the
Filipino people to decide on the act in the coming June elections,
and also to mend dissension in Filipino ranks. Senator Quirino was
designated to remain in Washington to attend to Philippine matters
that might come up. Quezon's announced return pleased the "pros" in
Manila. Osmeña declared that Quezon was "retreating" from
Washington "convinced of the futility of continuing his opposition
to the extension of the Hawes Act which can not be interpreted in

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(52) See Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 639-640;
see also BIA Records 364-986 and Millard E. Tydings, Personnel
"P" file, BIA Records; Stimson Diaries, Vol. 27, January 24,
Osias, Osmeña, and Roxas desired the extension. Guevara
approved of it too. In Manila, Aguinaldo and Sumulong
supported it. See Quezon's letter to Tydings, January 24,
1934; letters sent by Osias and Guevara to Senator Tydings and
the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, January 29,
1934, Legislative Section, Sen 73A-F25, 125-126, Record Group
46, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; also letter to SecWar
transmitting resolution adopted at mass meeting in Manila
any other way than an effort on his part to prevent the Filipino people from deciding for themselves their future."(53)

Desirous to bring the Philippine issue to its conclusion, President Roosevelt and Senator Tydings decided to explore the feasibility of a compromise between Congress and Quezon, and between Quezon and Osmeña factions in Manila, in an effort to find a common meeting ground upon which final independence could be obtained. During February Senator Tydings and Representative John McDuffie (Alabama), Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, conferred with Quezon and communicated with Osmeña, Roxas, and other leaders in Manila. In view of these developments, Quezon postponed his return trip to Manila. The programme being worked out consisted of a revival of the H-H-C Act and an "ironclad agreement" among opposing Filipino leaders to support congressional action, so that Congress would not again have its action repudiated in the Philippines. Tydings agreed to amending the military reservations provisions and making naval bases and refuelling stations subject to

(53) Quezon to Quirino, February 16, 1934, Quezon Papers, Box 52; Manila Daily Bulletin, February 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 1934; New York Times, February 3, 17, 20, 1934.
negotiations within two years after independence. (54)

Senator Tydings cabled the substance of his compromise plan to Filipino leaders in Manila: General Aguinaldo, Senator Osmena, Speaker Paredes, Representative Roxas, Juan Sumulong, Senator Recto, and Senator Clarin, among others. All agreed to the congressional plan, as did Quezon. (55)

On March 2 President Roosevelt in a special message asked Congress to revive the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, amended to eliminate provisions for military reservations, and substituting a provision for "ultimate settlement" as to naval bases and fueling stations.

(54) Undated list of conditions upon which Tydings would negotiate, with Memorandum attached from Joseph P. Tumulty (Philippine Sugar Association), received by Senator Tydings on February 2, 1934; Memorandum of Conversation and Exchange of Letters between Quezon and Tydings, Legislative Section, RG 46; BIA Memoranda on Filipino objections to H-H-C Act, February 12, 14, 17, 19, 1934, BIA Records w-364-1050; Jose de Jesus to Quezon (New York), February 25, 1934, Quezon Papers, Box 52; Philippines Free Press, March 17, 1934.

(55) Tydings to Roosevelt, February 26, 1934, with memorandum attached, F. Roosevelt Papers; Tydings to Paredes, Clarin, Recto, Osmena, Roxas, Aguinaldo and Sumulong, February 16, 22, 1934; Osmena, Roxas to Tydings, February 19, 24, 1934; Aguinaldo to Tydings, February 18, 1934; Paredes to Tydings, February 18, 25, 1934; Recto to Tydings, February 18, 24, 1934; Clarin to Tydings, February 26, 1934, all in Legislative Section, RG 46.
"Where imperfections or irregularities exist (in the other provisions), I am confident that they can be corrected after proper hearing and in fairness to both peoples," he added. Representative McDuffie and Senator Tydings their introduced the Philippine Bill. "Our hope is that we get entirely out of the islands," McDuffie declared.(56)

On March 19 the House passed the amended, revived H-H-C (without considering the Mission's request for modification of some of the economic provisions), rules suspended, without a record vote. The Senate on March 23 passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act by a vote of 68 to 8. "Well, you are on your way now," Tydings told Quirino. On

(56) Radio # 100, March 2, 1934, BIA Records 364-after-992; Radio # 104, March 3, 1934; Radio # 108, March 6, 1934; Radio # 117, March 12, 1934; Radio # 119, March 14, 1934; all BIA Records 364-after-993; Radio # 120, March 15, 1934, BIA Records 364-after-994, all messages from Cox to Murphy. See also New York Times, March 3, 1934; Philippines Free Press, March 17, 1934.

Isauro Gabaldon denounced the compromise agreement and supported the King independence bill, again introduced in the Senate. See Gabaldon to Tydings, February 16, March 6, 1934, Legislative Section, RG 46; Manila Daily Bulletin, February 12, 19, March 8, 1934.
March 24 President Roosevelt signed the bill.(57)

On April 12 Governor Murphy issued a proclamation, upon Quezon's request, calling the Philippine Legislature to a special session on April 30, to consider the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Quezon's Mission returned to Manila on that day, in time for the opening of the special session. Conspicuously absent from the welcoming crowd were prominent minority leaders. From a specially erected "liberty arch," Quezon spoke of the "real and complete independence" which the Tydings-McDuffie Act would give the Philippines.(58)

On May 1 the Philippine Legislature unanimously accepted the Tydings-McDuffie Act, thirty-six years after the Battle of Manila Bay which brought the United States to the Philippines, stating "because the Filipino people can not, consistent with its national dignity and love of freedom, decline to accept the independence the said act grants," although certain provisions of the act needed


(58) Radio # 154 Quezon to Murphy, April 4, 1934 BIA Records 364-1002; Proclamation No. 680, April 12, 1934, BIA Records 364-1004; Philippines Herald, April 30, 1934.
"further consideration." Quezon had a sobering admonition to his people: "... we have taken one more step forward in our onward march to the realization of our national ideal... In this solemn moment let there be no exultation of victory. Let it be a moment of consecration." Would the Philippines fare well as an independent nation? The burden of responsibility was now in Filipino hands.\(^{59}\)

\(^{59}\) Concurrent Resolution No. 52, May 1, 1934, 9th Phil. Leg., 3rd special session, BIA Records 364-1013; Manila Daily Bulletin, May 1, 2, 1934.
SUMMING UP

The formal approval of independence in 1934 was a unique event in the history of colonialism, yet in the Philippine-American context it was much delayed. The Clarke Amendment to the Jones Act of 1916 would have allowed the President of the United States to fix a date for the granting of Philippine independence, from two to four years from the passage of the bill, and the Senate actually approved the amendment. It was blocked in the House only by a very small margin. Had it passed, it would have bestowed independence by 1920, at the latest.

Although the Jones Act in its final form advanced Philippine autonomy, it left the issue of Philippine independence for some future date: "as soon as a stable government can be established." The future date for independence was very nearly determined in 1924. In that year a House Committee would have reported the Cooper Resolution providing for independence in 1926 if administration manoeuvres had not sidetracked the measure. There was a strong probability that had the bill come to a vote, it would have been approved. The Coolidge Administration as a last resort inspired introduction of the Fairfield Bill, offering Philippine autonomy, as a compromise measure to head off independence.

In 1934 the United States was the first nation to voluntarily relinquish sovereignty over a colony after a little over a generation of tutelage. Like her contemporary sovereign powers, the United States acquired the Philippines partly for power and glory:
because of the desire to expand American trade in Asia and to play a role in Pacific power politics. But there was also much idealism in American imperialism. The United States wanted to duplicate in the Philippines her ideals of democratic self-rule and to build the Filipino nation into a true democracy. The United States would play the role of an understanding tutor, administering the affairs of the Filipinos for their benefit, and by a process of ever-increasing self-governnment, prepare them for independence in the future. So the United States took concrete actions to prepare the Filipinos for independence.

As early as 1901 the Filipinos were allowed to assume elective positions in the municipal and provincial governments. A Filipino was appointed Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1901, and by 1907 when the Philippine Assembly was inaugurated, prominent Filipino ilustrados were sitting in both the executive and legislative branches of the insular government. In 1916 an all-Filipino bicameral legislature had replaced the Philippine Assembly, and by 1934 the Philippine Government was very nearly in Filipino hands, except for the positions of the Governor General, the Vice-Governor, the Insular Auditor, and other top positions reserved for Americans.

An educational system was likewise set up, quite unlike other systems in other colonized countries. The American ideal of education as a value in itself and an avenue of social mobility was accepted enthusiastically by the Filipinos. Education was for the masses, not merely for a colonial elite, with access to quality
education available at all levels.

The opportunities for political participation and education provided the Filipinos with the tools and training necessary for self-government. For all the faults and self-interestedness which manifested themselves on the road to independence, the starting point had been unique.

From 1919 to 1934 when the independence missions were sent to Washington, the outstanding political figure in the Philippines was Manuel L. Quezon. The portrayals of Quezon have heretofore tended to be one-sided. To Filipinos he is a nearly unblemished national hero who led them to independence. To many Americans, both contemporaries and scholars of today, he was a master politician, but a politician whose actions appeared to be characterized by expediency, inconsistency or even duplicity, and an absence of ideals or goals other than the consuming one of remaining in power.

A careful reading of historical records shows he was far more complex than either version would suggest.

He was unquestionably a political realist, one of whose goals was political survival. If a politician is to lead, he must remain in power. Therefore, Quezon was very careful that he did not espouse in public any position that would discredit him as leader among his people. Opposition to Quezon's stand on independence came from those with more extreme views on independence, not from those more conservative, a reality he had to deal with.
Filipinos were sensitive -- by necessity -- because of their peculiar status under American sovereignty. Quezon was particularly sensitive to racial slights, and this influenced him to actions best understood as an expression of emotion rather than of self-interest or calculated strategy. A good part of Wood's difficulties with the Filipino leaders was due to racial sensitiveness, just as a good part of Stimson's success in his short term in Manila was due to the fact that he was aware of this sensitivity among the Filipino leaders. The Filipino leaders wanted to be treated as equals.

The appeal for independence of the Filipinos was consistently opposed by the Washington authorities, who held the view that independence was merely a matter of the heart -- "a mistaken emotionalism" -- for which the Filipinos were not prepared. The sentiment, they believed, had been fostered by the political leaders who came into power by its use, and who, having stimulated the desire for freedom, could not drop the demand. The difference between the politicos' public declarations and their private sentiments vexed Washington authorities, who felt that independence was not the real desire of the Filipino leadership.

Quezon was, however, consistent in wanting the reality of independence, if independence was defined as the ability of the Filipinos to manage their own affairs without interference from the United States. Much of the debate over whether the Filipinos did or did not want independence misses this central point. As Quezon said: "I will never be satisfied with independence so long as the present situation is forced on us . . . . But let independence
be left to our option, and I am convinced that the best interests of both nations will be served if the link is not completely severed. Let America rule us ever so lightly against our will, and I want to rebel..." (see Chapter XI, p.557). The Filipinos wanted to control their own destiny.

Quezon was genuinely concerned with the future well-being of the nation he expected to lead to independence. In backing away from demagoguery and the pursuit of independence when it could have been obtained, he clearly was placing long-range goals ahead of the short-term approbation which immediate independence would have achieved for him. In the period before the OsRox Mission left for the United States in 1931 to obtain the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, Quezon displayed considerable courage in going public with a compromise proposal for a transition to independence. The furore which his proposal stirred up demonstrates very clearly the reality of the more radical views with which he had to deal all along. It was in deferring to the reality of this aspect of opinion that he made himself seem to many detractors guilty of saying one thing in public and another thing in private.

What the Philippines experienced in the end appears to have been very close to what Quezon wanted all along: a prolonged period of gradually increasing autonomy culminating in independence, either de facto or absolute. Indeed, Quezon's appraisal of what was desirable appears to have been highly perceptive. Had not the war intervened, the political transition to independence in 1946 would have been nearly painless, with the country in excellent condition.
for the tests of independence. As it was when one compares Philippine developments since 1946 with the turmoil, wars, and economic distress which afflicted other Asian nations -- China, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaysia with its long Emergency while British rule continued -- the Philippines weathered the reconstruction period and transition to independent nationhood remarkably well.

The independence leaders have been faulted for thinking almost exclusively in political terms -- i.e., political independence from the United States -- and ignoring almost entirely the restructuring of society to eliminate the socio-economic inequities which have oppressed the masses of Filipinos. In approaching this issue, one must guard against the temptation to apply present-day moral values to the social milieu of the 1930's. It seems clear that settling the political issue was the logical first step to the assertion of nationhood. Certainly, also, there were tremendous competing needs in many fields -- education, health and sanitation, road-building -- whose undeniable contribution to social betterment is today taken for granted in the Philippines because of achievements in the pre-independence period. Some of the leaders did demonstrate concern for social improvements in these and other more contemporary areas during the short Commonwealth period. But at the same time, preoccupation with the independence issue was politically compelling.
Likewise the United States has been faulted for giving the Philippines independence with a selfish eye to its own welfare. Having identified the Philippines as an economic burden and a strategic liability, the United States freed itself from the Philippines. As the London Sunday Express declared in May 1931: "The politicians of the United States have resolved to throw away the American empire. It is said the Filipinos have won their independence. Nothing of the sort! They have been given the sack. . . . The Philippines are being thrown out."

The solution of the Philippine issue was not as simple as that. More accurately, Theodore Friend's words summed up the situation: "Allowing economic selfishness and prejudice all their weight, still no independence act would have passed, even in the dismal lame duck session of 1933, without a desire for disentanglement from the Orient and without the cumulative impact of the anti-imperial tradition." (Friend, book, pp. 107-108). It was time for America to relinquish its sovereignty to the Filipino people.

The role of the independence missions in the political process leading to independence can also not be overlooked. The independence missions brought the Filipinos' petitions on the Philippine issue directly to the American Government for open and frank discussions. The close contact and first-hand exposure to American official and public opinion undoubtedly played a major part in aiding the Filipino leaders to base their decisions and plan their moves on a realistic perception of the American scene. By the very persistence and repetition of a position in favour of
independence over a period of nearly two decades, the independence missions made of Philippine independence an issue that Americans could not ignore.

Thus, independence came to the Philippines as the result of a peaceful political process. To the Filipino leaders it must have been somewhat satisfying to realize that they stood almost alone among colonial leaders in having the opportunity to discuss with the highest officials of the colonizing power in a cordial manner the future of their country. Other colonials were not so fortunate as to have enjoyed that sense of importance. Indeed, Quezon was reported to have once remarked: "Damn the Americans. Why don't they tyrannize us more?" (Friend, book, p.4). And though the absence of a more exploitable rallying point may have been frustrating, the attainment of independence through prolonged parliamentary process influenced Philippine political developments profoundly.
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APPENDIX A

The First Independence Mission, 1919

Manuel L. Quezon, Chairman
Rafael Palma, Vice-Chairman

Representing the Philippine Legislature:

Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Senate
Rafael Palma, Senator, fourth district, Manila
Pedro M. Sison, Senator, second district, Pangasinan
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, Senator, first district, Ilocos
Rafael Alunan, Representative, Occidental Negros, Majority floor leader
Emiliano Tria Tirona, Representative, Cavite, Minority floor leader
Gregorio Nueva, Representative, Tayabas
Mariano Escuela, Representative, Bulacan
Manuel Escudero, Representative, Sorsogon
Pedro Aunario, Representative, Mountain Province

Representing the Cabinet:

Rafael Palma, Secretary of the Interior
Dionisio Jakosalem, Secretary of Commerce and Communications

Members Ex-officio:

Jaime C. de Veyra, Resident Commissioner to the United States
Teodoro Yangco, Resident Commissioner to the United States
Pablo Ocampo, former Resident Commissioner to the United States

Representing Agricultural Interests:

Filemon Perez, former Representative, Tayabas
Jose Reyes, former Governor, Misamis
Delphin Mahinay, former Representative, Occidental Negros
Ceferino de Leon, former Representative, Bulacan

Representing Commercial Interests:

Mauro Prieto, General Manager, Germinal Cigar and Cigarette Factory
Juan B. Alegre, hemp merchant
Carlos Cuyugan, Vice-President, Compania Mercantil de Filipinas
Marcos Roces, general merchant

Representing Industrial Interests:

Tomas Earnshaw, Earnshaw Docks and Honolulu Iron Works
Pedro Gil

Representing Labour:

Crisanto Evangelista
Technical Advisers to the Mission:

Quintin Paredes, Attorney General
Jose Abad Santos, Assistant Attorney General
Conrado Benitez, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of the Philippines
Jorge Bocobo, Dean, College of Law, University of the Philippines
Camilo Osias, Assistant Director of Education

Others:

Gregorio Singian, Physician and Surgeon
Gabriel LaO, Lawyer
Jorge B. Vargas, Major, Philippine National Guard, aide-de-camp to Chairman of the Mission
Maximo M. Kalaw, Assistant Professor, University of the Philippines, Secretary of the Mission

Members of the Press (guests of the Mission):

Arsenio N. Luz, Editor, El Ideal
Francisco Varona, Associate Editor, El Debate

Members of the Clerical Staff:

Guillermo Cabrera
Julian LaO
Bernabe Bustamante, Captain, Philippine National Guard, Disbursing Officer of the Mission

The Philippine Parliamentary Mission, 1922

Manuel L. Quezon, Chairman on the part of the Senate
Sergio Osmeña, Chairman on the part of the House of Representatives
Pedro Guevara, Chairman Protempore on the part of the Senate
Jose G. Generoso, Chairman Protempore on the part of the House

Senator Antero Soriano
Senator Santiago Fonacier
Senator Ceferino de Leon
Senator Teodoro Sandiko
Senator Proceso Sebastian

Representative Guillermo F. Pablo
Representative Pedro Abad Santos
Representative Celestino Gallares
Representative Vicente Llanes
Representative Emilio P. Virata

Teodoro M. Kalaw, Secretary of the Interior, honorary member
Jorge B. Vargas, Director of Lands, Secretary of the Mission
Technical Advisers to the Mission:

Maximo M. Kalaw, Chairman of Technical Advisers
Wenceslao Trinidad, Collector of Internal Revenue
Jorge B. Bocobo, University of the Philippines
Antonio G. Sison
Arsenio N. Luz
Dr. Justo Lukban

Benito M. Razon, Merchant, Assistant Secretary of the Mission
Dr. Jose Albert, Physician
Ricardo Summers, Clerk of the Manila Court of First Instances,
Secretary to Quezon
Francisco Zamora, Private Secretary to Osmena
Pedro de Guia, Bank Examiner, Disbursing Officer
Carlos P. Romulo, Assistant Editor, Philippines Herald, Publicity
Agent

The Roxas Special Mission, 1923-1924

Manuel A. Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chairman

Jaime C. de Veyra )
Jorge Bocobo  ) all technical advisers
Catalino Luvadia  )

The Third Parliamentary Mission, 1924

Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Senate
Sergio Osmeña, Senator
Claro M. Recto, Representative

Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara
Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon

Benedicto Padilla
Francisco Zamora
Manuel E. Gonzales
I.S. Reyes
Hadji Gulam Rasul
Dr. Peregrino Paulino

The Osmeña Legislative Committee, 1925-1926

Sergio Osmeña, Senator, Special Envoy

Jose S. Reyes, Technical Adviser
Teodoro M. Kalaw, Technical Adviser
Matias Gonzales, Attache
Francisco Zamora, Secretary

Jose Abad Santos, Special Adviser to Osmena
The Quezon-Osmena Mission, 1927

Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Senate, Chairman
Sergio Osmena, Senator, Chairman

Members Accompanying Mission:
Arsenio N. Luz
Dr. Miguel Carvajales
Rafael Trias
Severino Concepcion

The Tariff and Parliamentary Mission, 1929-1931

The Legislative Committee, February 1929

Speaker Manuel A. Roxas
Senator Sergio Osmena
Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias
Rafael Alunan, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Urbano A. Zafra, Technical Adviser
Manuel de la Rama, Secretary
Jose Fernandez, Secretary

The Parliamentary Mission, December 1929

Speaker Manuel A. Roxas
Pedro Gil, House Minority floor leader
Manuel C. Briones, House Majority floor leader
Senator Juan Sumulong, Democrata

Manuel L. Quezon, left Manila August 1930

The Philippine Independence Commission (OsRox), 1931-1933

Senator Sergio Osmena, President Protempore of the Senate, Chairman
Manuel A. Roxas, Chairman

Resident Commissioner Pedro Guevara
Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias

Senator Ruperto Montinola, Minority floor leader
Senator Pedro Sabido, Majority floor leader
Representative Emiliano Tria Tirona, Minority floor leader

Maximo M. Kalaw, Technical Adviser
Marcial P. Lichauco, Secretary of the Mission
Jose Fernandez, Stenographer

Benigno S. Aquino, Senator, joined Mission November 1932
Vicente Bunuan, Technical Adviser
Quezon's "Mixed Mission", left Manila March 1933

Manuel L. Quezon
Senator Francisco Zulueta
Senator Juan Nolasco
Senator Jose Veloso
Representative Francisco Varona
Governor Vicente Formoso (Cagayan)
Carlos P. Romulo, representing the press
Jose Nava, representing farm labour
Felipe Jose, representing industrial labour
Amando Avancena, President, Federation of Sugar Planters
Urbano Zafra, Philippine Sugar Association
Maximo Rodriguez, representing coconut planters

Dr. Antonio Sison
Dr. Maria Matias
Guillermo Cabrera, Secretary to Quezon

The Joint Legislative Committee, 1933-1934

Manuel L. Quezon, Chairman
Senator Elpidio Quirino, Majority Floor Leader
Isauro Gabaldon, former Resident Commissioner to the United States
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, Acting Secretary of Finance; Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
Jose P. Melencio, Technical Adviser
Jose de Jesus, Secretary to Quezon and Special Disbursing Officer
Dr. Catalino Gavino, personal physician to Quezon, Technical Adviser
Antonio Quirino, Technical Adviser
Mrs. Carmen A. Melencio, (Aguinaldo's daughter) Technical Adviser
APPENDIX B

STATEMENT SHOWING APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENSES OF THE INDEPENDENCE COMMISSION AND THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO SUBMIT PETITIONS TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

(Philippine Currency)

<table>
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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Acts Nos.</th>
<th>Independence Commission</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2785</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2875</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>2933 (a)</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>2933 (a)</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>2933 (a)</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>2933 (a)</td>
<td>69,862.20</td>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>2933 (a)</td>
<td>16,359.75</td>
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<td>1926</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2933 (a)</td>
<td>49,396.99</td>
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2,439,958.08  2,247,537.44

Note:
(a) An Act to provide for a standing appropriation of one million pesos per annum for the Independence Commission
Legislative Committee to Submit Petitions to the United States Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Acts Nos.</th>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1925</td>
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<td>100,000.00</td>
<td>36,854.87</td>
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<td>1926</td>
<td>3227</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
<td>23,441.34</td>
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<td>1927</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
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<td>1928</td>
<td>3355</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
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<td>1929</td>
<td>3459</td>
<td>85,000.00</td>
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<td><strong>738,200.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>511,768.96</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,178,158.08</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,759,306.40</strong></td>
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BIA Records 26480-146-C