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THE LEBANESE CONFLICT

A Sociological Study of its Causes and Resolution

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The Australian National University

November 1992
Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated
this thesis is my own work

[Signature]

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November 1992
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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the existing conflictual tendencies in the Lebanese social structure have generated long term and continued cleavages and disharmony in Lebanese society and polity. Many interpretations have been offered to explain this conflict, but previous research on its genesis and outcome has focused mainly on variables whose main focus lie outside the social structure.

This study deliberately avoids an analysis of external factors. It, rather, concentrates on the role played by domestic factors in the aetiology, dynamism and resolution of the Lebanese conflict. It is assumed that the external factors have played a contributory rather than a causal role in the conflict.

The first premise of the theoretical scheme is that the basic causes of the conflict in Lebanon are inherent in its social structure, which failed to generate a change within itself. The objective is to explore the dynamics, in a historical perspective, of this social structure in order to determine the conflictual tendencies inherent in it.

The second premise is that the persistence of conflictual tendencies in the social structure tends to keep the socio-political order perpetually unstable.

As a corollary to the first premise it is argued that conflictual tendencies are inevitable in pluralist societies. Some systems have evolved successful adaptive mechanisms and strategies to contain destructive responses, but the Lebanese system did not. It is further argued that the endemic nature of conflictual tendencies, compounded with the failure or even flaws of the adjustment mechanisms are sufficient to initiate and maintain conflict.

The premises suggested here are analyzed in relation to conflict theory as envisaged by Marx, Dahrendorf, Coser and Ibn Khaldun. Marx's vision of the economic determinacy of the conflict process, and the supremacy of the economic factor in the generation of conflict had been contested by Dahrendorf's vision of political determinism and the primacy of the authority structure in the genesis of conflict.

The argument developed in this thesis is that Marx's and Dahrendorf's models need to be revised in order to capture the empirical situation in Lebanon. The validity of the revised model is assumed in terms of its ability to explain the formation and behaviour of the conflict groups. For this purpose Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya is offered to supplement Dahrendorf's concept of Authority.
On the basis of a causal analysis of the conflict in Lebanon it was concluded that Marx's doctrine of economic determinism must be rejected in favour of Dahrendorf's concept of 'authority' and by Ibn Khaldun's vision of asabiya and its role in the aetiology, growth and demise of power groups.

In considering the resolution of conflict, this study applies a theoretical strategy developed from conflict management to deeply divided societies such as Lebanon. It explains the manner in which Lebanon managed its communal conflict in three distinct settings: The 1860 civil war, the post independence era (1943-1975), and the 1975 conflict. Each of the three settings investigated exhibited similar conflict management patterns; the first setting established the basis for power sharing, involving authority differentiation and marked communal interdependence.

The second setting witnessed a period of relative and apparent stability due to the implementation of the power-sharing principle within a consociational context.

The third setting manifested analogous conflict patterns and corresponding conflict resolution strategies in spite of the time lapse involved. Power-sharing and communal interdependence remain a viable option for the resolution of the existing conflict.

The three settings provide the study with an empirical base to suggest that pluralist societies are not condemned to continuing conflict as long as they apply conflict resolution strategies based on flexible, but solid, consociational principles. On the other hand such societies cannot free themselves totally from conflict, basically because conflict is a natural phenomenon in human society.
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INTRODUCTION

To explore the root causes and possible outcome of the conflict in Lebanon, one needs to look at an array of interrelated questions, which unmistakably reveal the polymorphous nature of the conflict. What are the causes and the contributory factors in this conflict? What are the conflict issues and who are the main actors? What role does the socio-political structure play in this conflict and vice versa? Why has this structure been vulnerable and unaccommodating? Was it bound to collapse under pressure? What was the source of pressure? Was it ethnicity, religion, class struggle, political ideologies, or was it an external provenance? Is a resolution to this conflict possible? In other words, the queries revolve around causes, issues, participants, and the relation of the conflict to the social structure. The other part of the investigation relates to modes of analysis and relevant conflict resolution mechanisms.

This thesis is concerned with the genesis, growth, sequence and resolution of the conflict within communal groups and between them. It investigates conflict dynamics not only in relation to their structural properties and political motives but also as a challenge to public policy and social engineering. In so doing, it does not seek to direct the attention away from social processes, particularly the conflictual tendencies inherent in that structure. Nevertheless this study is in agreement with conflict theorists such as Marx, Coser and Dahrendorf that any analytical study of social conflict "...must begin with a consideration of the social structure." We shall be examining some of the structural failures which seem to be at the root of communal group tension.

I Causes

In considering the answers to the above questions I reviewed the conventional literature on the subject. Much of this literature is descriptive and has been dominated by three over-riding hypotheses. The first is that the basic causes of the conflict in Lebanon reside in the malfunctioning of its socio-political and economic structure. The second is that the conflict is basically a function of the interplay between the country's domestic, regional, and international environment. The third is that the conflict is caused and determined solely by the intervention of foreign powers.

It is obvious that the proponents of these hypotheses have had different perspectives. They differed from one another in their focus, methodology, and judgment, depending on their ideological commitment and individual academic training. Yet they all had one theme in common: they viewed, with different degrees
of emphasis, but with marked empathy, the socio-political and economic structure as a fundamental variable to be reckoned with in any meaningful analysis of the conflict.

The above classificatory imagery of the conflict in Lebanon does not in itself constitute a valid paradigm to explain analytically the recurrent hostilities among some of the sects in the country. The writers failed to delve into the dialectics of the socio-political structure and the conflict process. Some writers treated the subject as a dichotomous relationship characterized by a simplistic outlook. Their main aim was to expose the causal relationship between the internal conflict and foreign intervention, with the hope of exonerating the Lebanese from their predicament.

This thesis is concerned with the domestic factors rather than the external dimensions of the conflict. This is not to underestimate the influence, or lack of it, of foreign intervention. There is no doubt that the external factors have played a conspicuous role in the conflict, but its domestic bearings are the base. It did not exist in vacuum either. It has been nestled in a milieu of social, political and economic contradictions which, through a dialectical process, nurtured its restive character and hardened it to possible resolutions. The conflict changed in shape, form and direction over the years, but the social structure has remained constant. An analysis of the social structure and its inherent conflictual tendencies would reveal that they are mutually reinforcing. The outcome of such an interplay supports the premise that social structure is the spawning ground for conflictual tendencies and that the conflict itself contributes to the breeding potential of the social structure.

II Theoretical Perspectives

In order to formulate a relevant theoretical perspective for the analysis and resolution of the conflict in Lebanon, it is necessary to review the existing body of relevant theories as well as the empirical work on the subject. The topic under investigation subsumes these theories in two areas: (1) the nature of the social structure; and, (2) the nature of conflict. The first area contributes to the formulation of a conceptual scheme relevant to the analysis of the structural causes of the conflict and provides guide-lines for mediators' and conciliators' considerations of the outcome. The other area directs to aspects of conflict which provide specific answers to questions such as: will the conflict change the existing structural conditions? What is the nature of this change? Is the conflict an ideological, communal, ethnic, or a class struggle over power, status and economic goals?

The study of conflict and its causes lends itself to several approaches and theories. These could be accommodated within two schools of thought: (1) the
structural-functional school with its emphasis on consensus, order, stability and integration; and, (2) the conflict school with its focus on social change, power, coercion, and authority.

In this context the insights of some of the more relevant conflict theorists are examined. Marx’s vision contributes to an explanation of the structural base of the conflict. Parsons’ social action theory provides some answers to the Hobbesian question: How is it possible to achieve social order in a disorderly world? Dahrendorf’s notion of authority as the principal motive in conflictual behaviour sheds some light on the basic aspects of the causes of the conflict. Coser’s concept of constructive and destructive functions of conflict points to an optimistic outcome of the conflict process. Ibn Khaldun’s generic concept of asabiya provides some clues to certain questions on the formation and behaviour of the conflict groups as well as on the rise and fall of the state.

III The Basic Issues

The conflict in Lebanon broke out into a civil war\textsuperscript{3} following two apparently unconnected incidents in 1975. The first was an incident in the southern port city of Sidon in which the army clashed in March of that year, with an organized rally protesting the setting up of a fishing monopoly in Lebanon. A former parliamentary deputy, who was marching at the head of the protesters, was shot dead. Kelidar and Burrell claimed that his death triggered a campaign against the army which was to degenerate into the civil war.\textsuperscript{4} The second incident, several weeks later, was the massacre in Ain al-Rummani, a suburb in east Beirut, where on April 13, 1975, the Christian Phalanges gunmen ambushed a bus and killed 27 of its mainly Palestinian passengers. This incident, judged by Khalidi as the “Sarajevo of the Lebanese war”\textsuperscript{5}, sparked heavy fighting between the Phalangists and the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon. The fighting developed, in stages, into inter-communal clashes, and spread like shock waves to Beirut, and gradually engulfed the whole country.

The conflict evolved in several phases and proceeded in stages, each marked by the emergence of new forces, new tactical issues, strategies and a logic of its own. The first and the last phases of the conflict were the most violent and costly. During the sixteen years of conflict, loss in human lives (estimated at 150,000 persons killed) and destruction of property was matched only by the damage incurred by the social structure in the areas of community relations and nation-building.
The basic issues involved in the conflict stems from three main themes: 1) political reform, 2) the national identity of Lebanon, and 3) Lebanon's sovereignty, with specific reference to the relations with neighbouring Syria. Other issues emerged as the conflict progressed and evolved in form and focus but did not endure. All of these issues have had bearing on the sectarian and ideological relations in the country. Some of them are as old as Lebanon itself, and they were then a source of acute sectarian conflict.

In fact, the Lebanese were at war with each other before hostilities broke out in 1975. Communal tension had been simmering under the surface for decades. "...It had been a feature of the politics of the modern state of Lebanon since its creation."6 In post-independent Lebanon, an earlier crisis shook the sectarian peace in the country. In 1958, the opposition resorted to arms to preclude the extension or renewal of the mandate of the President of the Republic who angered them by tilting Lebanon's foreign policy towards the West7 As a result, a three dimensional armed struggle erupted. It involved the President of the Republic, Camille Chamoun, the Phalanges party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the leftist and predominantly Moslem opposition. The army remained neutral. The capital city was divided along sectarian lines, the predominantly Moslem section fell under the control of the "rebels", as did the other two main cities, Tripoli and Sidon. Clashes continued for six months, raising communal tension to a dangerously high level. The crisis was defused and political consensus was restored as soon as Chamoun retired by the end of his term of office in September 1958.

This crisis was a warning to what might come, and pointed to the cracks in the political system and its basic pillar, the National Pact. Although inter-sectarian relations were restored soon after a new president was elected, stress and strain started to show on these relations. The two main confessional blocs began to drift apart in the early 1960s. This was associated with three phenomena: (1) the rise to power of an organised Palestinian armed resistance in Lebanon, (2) a soaring Arab nationalist feeling in the wider region, and (3) the Shi'a and their demands on the system for greater entitlement. The Palestinian resistance movement aligned itself with the Moslem-leftist bloc.

The rising Arab nationalist feeling among the Moslem masses in Lebanon alarmed the Maronites and their allies. They sensed that such developments might shift the inter-communal balance of power in favour of the Moslems in the country. Their fears were reinforced by the simultaneous rise of Shi'a power under the leadership of Imam Musa al-Sadr.
IV The Conflict Parties

Meanwhile a new configuration of actors started to appear on the arena. Within the two main confessional blocs, several factions organised themselves into self-conscious conflict groups. They fell into two main categories: those who vied for a change of the power-sharing arrangement, upon which the political system was based, with a view to increase their individual share in the power structure of the country, and those who struggled to maintain the status quo.

However it must be admitted that, although the conflict had a sectarian dimension, it was not a conflict basically between Christians and Moslems over religious precepts, or between leftists and rightists over ideological issues, or between Arab and Lebanese nationalists over the identity of Lebanon, or between the poor and the rich, or between the powerful and the powerless over positions of authority. While some of the groups in both camps may have assumed one or more of these dimensions and utilised them as a springboard to achieve their conflictual aims, each camp developed, out of this mix, core issues which set them apart from each other. At certain stages of the conflict the antithesis was greater between its Christian and Moslem components and at another stage it was greater between leftist and rightist and so on, depending on the ebb and flow of the issue in dispute.

Lebanon's political culture was guided, until 1975, by the principles of consociationalism. They provided a workable frame of reference for the diverse ideologies, and sectarian orientations to interact and keep the conflict within a legitimate level. Under the pressure of the war, this political spectrum was transformed into a polarised and dichotomous culture, manifesting itself in the antipodal configuration of the conflict groups.

Lebanon's conflictual environment was dominated before and immediately after the 1975 war by two major conflict groups: the Lebanese Front, formed in mid-1976, and the Lebanese National Movement, which was already in place at the outbreak of hostilities in April 1975. There were few other organisations and significant political personalities outside these two groupings. The Lebanese Front was a coalition of several Christian parties, militias, personalities and organisations. It consisted of the Phalanges and National Liberal parties, whose leaders Pierre Gemayel and former president of the Republic Camille Chamoun coalesced with former president Suleiman Frangie, founder of the Marada militia, Father Charbel Kassis, head of the Order of Maronite Monks, and few other leading hard core Christian intellectuals, to form the Front. There were a few other organisations and parties which remained outside the Front but maintained an alliance relation with it.
The Front's political objectives aimed at achieving: (1) the confederacy or federacy of Lebanon, in case the present system collapsed, (2) the liberation of its national territory, and (3) the redistribution of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon throughout the Arab world.8

The Lebanese National Movement consisted of six major parties and ten organisations plus few personalities, who shared a three dimensional aim: (1) reforming the political system, (2) supporting the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon, and (3) opposing the right-wing militias.9 The constituent groups of the Movement were: The Progressive Socialist Party, the Organisation for Communist Action, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Movement of Independent Nasserists (al-Murabitun), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Ba'ath Party (both pro-Syria and pro-Iraq branches). Other minor groups were: The Arab Socialist Union - Arab Brigades, the Arab Socialist Union, the People's Nasserist Organisation, the Union of Working People's Forces, the Kurdish Democratic Party Organisation, the Arab Socialist Action Party, the Patriotic Christian Front, and the Lebanese Democratic Movement.10 The Amal Movement stood aloof of joining the Lebanese National Movement but coordinated its activities with it. The Moslem Establishment included the Sunni, the Shi'a and the Druze religious organizations.

Following the outbreak of war, the Lebanese National Movement announced its manifesto. This document, known as the transitional program, called for extensive political reform to ensure a more equitable distribution of scarce resources, the secularisation of the representative system, and the restructuring of the balance of power between the three branches of government. It also requested the reorientation of the institution of the Army towards sharper nationalistic aims and the aligning of it with the other Arab armies in defence of the Palestinian cause.11

What seemed to differentiate the two camps from each other were neither the sectarian nor the ideological orientations, for those two trends have been satisfactorily accommodated through various conflict regulation mechanisms, including the 1943 National Pact. The bottom line was their profound divergent interests in changing the political system.

Several writers used different criteria to classify the conflict groups whose numbers and orientations defy easy classification. The pressure of events leading to the 1975 war polarized those groups into two predominant dichotomies which helped in drawing an Ideal Type classificatory model. Depending on the objective factors and their world views these writers classified the conflict parties and forces into two
configurations: right and left-wing, Lebanese and Arab nationalist, rich and poor, and Christian and Moslem. Barakat's heuristic typology may have captured both, the notions of conflict goals and the participants' orientations. He characterised the contending parties as Rightists and Progressives, based on their political platforms. "The most reliable method of classifying the participants in the Lebanese civil war, then, is not by religion or class but by the division between those who seek basic and comprehensive change from those who would maintain the existing order."12

Khalidi shares with Barakat his classificatory imagery of the issues in dispute but differs in his assessment of the participants. He has conceived the conflict as between two forces: the Maronites and the rest of Lebanon, with the former struggling to defend and maintain the status quo and the latter challenging the sanctity and performance of the existing political system and trying to introduce changes to it.13

Rabinovich draws on Barakat's concept and has recognized three conflict groups: the Status Quo defenders, the Revisionists, and the Syrian supporters.14 Demarcation lines between the first two groups were reinforced by the intensity, violence and shape of the conflict. However, as the conflict progressed, the alliances between the subgroups shifted and some of the groups swapped their position between the two camps. Perhaps a more significant change occurred within these groups that left its mark on the progress of the conflict. The Amal movement was split and a new splinter group, the Hezbollah, grew into a fierce competitor, whereas the Maronite Camp witnessed also the atrophy of the Phalanges Party following the death of its founder and president, Pierre Gemayel, and the rise of a new shoot in the form of a politico-military organization: the Lebanese Forces, which emerged from a conflict environment and assumed the leadership of the Maronite community during the spasmodic years of the conflict. The Forces were later dragged into an armed power struggle with the predominantly Maronite break-away Army.

This study draws on Barakat's basis for a distinction of the two camps, those who adhere to the status quo, defend it and reject any call for change in the formula, and those who lost their faith in the veracity and sanctity of the formula and strive to change the status quo in the direction of a more equitable distribution of power and resources. The first category includes the Lebanese Front and the Christian Establishment. The second category is made up of the Lebanese National Movement and the Moslem Establishment.

With the progress of the conflict, the participant groups developed their specific interest goals, but they synchronised them with the mainstream ideology of their respective camps. The religious establishment, on both sides of the conflict, was
instrumental in defining the ideological parameters within which the conflict was enjoined, whereas the affiliated militias pressed their demands on the ground through combat and political manoeuvres.

The conflict groups emerged in stages and appeared at different levels of political organisation. Whereas the religious establishment and political institutions evolved as a result of a historical process which carried in it the seeds of conflict, the militias were the product of the conflict environment which led to the outbreak of hostilities in Lebanon. Each one of the three institutions played a distinctive role in the conflict, at its own level. At certain stages of the conflict the Institutions' role was paramount; at other stages, it was the militias' role which had the upper hand. Most of the time those roles were complimentary to each other. However, it must be stressed that the origin and genesis of the religious and political institutions were determined by the historical and political processes whereas the emergence of the militias and the radicalisation of some political parties were due mainly to the conflict process itself.

The two main camps were not the only actors in the protracted conflict. There were also a number of external participants contributing to the conflict process from a different, sometimes complementary aspect. The most important ones were Syria, the Palestinians, Israel, Iran, Libya and Iraq.

Syria played a major role at almost every stage of the conflict. Its role changed with the variation in the conflict itself, and sometimes it caused this variation. At different times, Syria acted as a mediator, a conciliator, a patron, a provider, and above all a balancer.

The Palestinians in Lebanon, both as a community and as an independent armed resistance movement, were perceived by the Status Quo Coalition, particularly by the Maronites, as a threat to the sectarian balance and the sovereignty of the state. The Palestinians' support of the Lebanese National Movement and their increased raids into Israel, which invited Israeli indiscriminate retaliations on Lebanon, strained the overstretched inter-communal relations. Moreover, Israel's persistent incursions and air raids on the Palestinian bases in South Lebanon, compounded with its support of the Status Quo Coalition, exacerbated the inter-communal tension and contributed to an escalation in the conflict.

Inter-Arab discord and rivalries were another contributory factor. They increased the intensity and violence of the conflict whereas inter-Arab concurrence enabled Lebanon to carry on the peace initiative to a terminal point, after which the conflict subsided and was brought down to a legitimate level. This stage was
accomplished later in 1989 through the Taif Accord concluded between the Lebanese parliamentarians and mediated by an Arab League tripartite committee.

V Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution

This study makes a distinction, on the empirical level, between conflict management and conflict resolution. The existing conflictual tendencies and previous eruptions were managed by means of a power-sharing arrangement which offered each community an opportunity to contribute to the political process in the country. In retrospect, this system lacked the adequate adjustment mechanism and hence was unable to exhibit sufficient flexibility and potential accommodation in the face of mounting pressure stemming from the modernization process and domestic as well as regional variations.

The basic issues in dispute between the two conflict groups were resolved at the Taif meeting. This process evolved from several earlier unsuccessful attempts over a period of fifteen years. Several methods of conflict resolution were attempted in the past but failed. Conciliation and mediation by a high profile and credible tripartite Arab League committee was finally able to put forward viable proposals that were negotiated and approved by the Lebanese parliamentarians in October 1989. An Accord was signed between them under the auspices of the tripartite mediating committee, which brought that episode of conflict to an end, and set the peace process in motion. The Taif accord constituted a conflict resolution model in which communal pluralism maintained its legitimacy in the face of federalist desires, cantonization, and irredentist pan-Arab ideologies. It restored to the political system its structural options and provided the policy makers with a conceptual foundation in their search for the relevant process to end the conflict.

Esman equates conflict management with governance. In managing communal conflicts he recommends a shift in emphasis from the aetiology and progress of the conflict to the public policy that brings the conflict to a manageable level. This, in his view, entails the utilisation of "...all regulatory processes, institutions, and practices." In other words, conflict management is a preventive measure applied to forestall any probable or expected eruption of conflict. Morton Deutsch believes that any regulatory measures applied to a conflict should determine the basic power relations between the disputants. Himes observes that conflict management involves the utilisation of societal measures "...to prevent non-legitimate conflict from developing, and once developed to return it to the level of legitimacy."
Conflict resolution, on the other hand, implies termination of non legitimate conflict and returning the relations to a legitimate level.\textsuperscript{18} To achieve this it is necessary for the conflict parties to agree to join the conflict resolution process and for the results to be agreeable to all of them. The parties involved are to accept all or parts of the resolutions, and the follow-up procedure established by the resolution outcome.\textsuperscript{19} In this regard, the Taif agreement is not only a settlement but an Accord, for it establishes a framework for continuing and formalizing the resolution process.

Chapter One of this thesis provides a theoretical framework with a focus on the identification of the basic causes of the conflict and its resolution. The conceptual scheme is drawn from the visions of five social theorists: Marx, Parsons, Dahrendorf, Coser and Ibn Khaldun. Their views on the basic determinants of conflict have contributed to the direction and analysis of this study.

Chapter Two presents a more specific analysis of the conflict determinants in terms of Dahrendorf's concept of authority and Ibn Khaldun's notion of asabiya. These two concepts were utilised to analyze the causes of the conflict and explain the rise and fall of conflict groups and their behavioural structure.

Chapter Three describes the Lebanese social structure in a historical perspective, highlighting the inherent structural contradictions and their bearing on the existence of conflictual tendencies.

Chapter Four discusses the historical background of the power differentials of the two main conflict groups and the genesis of the conflict process, in the sense that the gain in power of one party was the loss for the other. This shift in the locus of power created the necessary societal conditions for the generation of conflict.

Chapter Five elaborates the theory of power-sharing in deeply divided societies, discusses its applicability to the Lebanese political system and provides an overall assessment of its performance. First introduced by Arend Lijphart as "consociational democracy", the theory has been widely used in fragmented societies as a mechanism to ensure social justice.

Chapter Six describes the various attempts at resolving the Lebanese conflict. It also provides information and a description on how the intervention by the League of Arab States successfully achieved the Taif Accord as a satisfactory means to resolve the conflict. The Taif Accord was the fruit of painstaking third party mediation and possibly the gateway to long lasting peace in Lebanon.
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with significant deductions on the origin and nature of communal conflict, conflict group formation, conflict regulation and resolution, and the future direction of Lebanon. It reveals that communal conflictual tendencies originated in the social structure, and that the conflict itself was over positions of authority and access to power. Although the conflict was resolved, there is still a possibility that it would recur unless some changes are introduced to the social structure itself.
INTRODUCTION

1 This study used the term social structure to refer to the patterned and durable relations between groups who could be identified according to kinship, sect, and region which necessarily differentiates them on the basis of their role, status, and access to power and authority.


3 The term "civil war" has been subject to dispute. Fuad I. Khuri, in his article "The Dynamics of the 1975-1977 War in Lebanon," (Armed Forces and Society 7, Spring 1981, pp. 383-408), suggested that those who fought on the side of the established regime, that is, the Maronites and their allies, referred to the conflict as "war". Whereas the ideologues who attacked both, the regime and the Maronites, called it a "revolution". The Palestinians in Lebanon who fought side by side with the Reformist Camp referred to it as "civil war", implying a Lebanese-Lebanese rather than Lebanese-Palestinian conflict. A fourth category called it "internal war". Reuven Avi-Ran, in his book The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975 (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 1-2), maintained that the fighting which began in April 1975 and ended with the Riyadh and Cairo Conference (October 1976) may be regarded as a civil war in all respects, for it was essentially the product of a deep-rooted intercommunal hostility and in its first stages (until the beginning of 1976) was mainly confined to the rival Lebanese factions. Kamal Salibi, in an interview published in An-Nahar Supplement No. 19, (Beirut, 18 July 1992, p. 6), confirmed that the 1975 conflict in Lebanon was a civil war.


5 Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University, Harvard Centre for International Affairs, 1979), p. 47. In an allusion to the assassination on June 28, 1914, of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austrian throne, while visiting the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo. This event sparked the First World War.

6 Abbas Kelidar, and Michael Burrell, op. cit., p. 3.


11 George E. Delury, op. cit, p. 617.


18 Ibid., p. 235.

CHAPTER ONE
COMMUNAL CONFLICT
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

I Introduction

Scholars have searched for the causes of conflict in many fields by looking at different essential aspects of social reality. Early theories, in particular those of Georg Simmel,1 focussed on the "instinct" and "biological basis" of conflict as a key for an explanation. They assumed that survival is attained through a struggle and this struggle involved competition and aggressive behaviour. Other theories stressed the phenomenon of "tension"2 as a causal force to be investigated. This perspective is based on an individual's interests. It is assumed under this orientation that the interests and needs of individuals are not always harmonious but most of the time are incompatible.

A third group of scholars has based their explanation primarily upon the social structure of society and the interests of the component groups3, assuming that different groups struggle for positions of power and authority within the social structure of society. Marxists contend that this "...interactive process itself is the locale of the causal sources of conflict."4

More recent theories have focused on the area of frustration as a basic causal factor in social conflict. Attention to this area was first drawn by Sigmund Freud. Since then several scholars have built on Freud's conception and applied this concept in a variety of formulations.5

The main concern of those who take the "instinct" and "tension" perspectives is a formulation related to the individual's behaviour. Their contribution to the study of social conflict among collectivities seems to be limited. Group conflict is conceived by these two perspectives to be a single or "...weighted additive function of individual behaviour."6 Moreover, the analysis of these perspectives is at a different level because of the psychological nature which is difficult to integrate into either a structural-functional or conflict model. The other perspectives (structural, interactional and frustration) are not mutually exclusive, although each one of them is committed to a fundamental explanation of social conflict. In spite of these differences they all tend to agree that the genesis of social conflict is in the social structure itself.

This does not mean that they are all equally relevant for all purposes. The problem at hand focuses mainly on conflict and change within the socio-political order.
An approximation to an adequate model in this case requires at least two essential qualifications: a set of explicit substantive and procedural concepts that could adequately capture the notion of conflict and change, and a distinct conceptualization of conflict to help delineate the methodological approach, scope, and nature of the problem and its theoretical orientation.

II Methodological Approach

An adequate methodological approach for the study of conflict in Lebanon has to address itself to the study of conflict in power groups rather than among individuals, in which case a socio-psychological approach could not suffice. The problem at hand is conceived of in terms of group relations, communities, political parties and movements, status groups and social classes. A conceptual scheme is required to explain, in a rational, systematic and deliberate way, purposeful action, such as wars, revolutions, sects and cleavages, rather than non-rational, interpersonal, face-to-face, dyad type of behaviour.

The theoretical orientation upon which such a conceptual scheme is based has to explain conflict as a process of a normal social organism rather than as a pathological lapse of a harmonious and integrated social system, with permanent devastating effects and disruption to the social and political order. Assuming that conflict is embedded in the social structure, a theoretical orientation has to explain social conflict as a structurally based phenomenon, the genesis of which is grounded in social structure and its mechanisms.

In order to construct a relevant model for the study of conflict in Lebanon, an adequate conceptual scheme, utilising well defined concepts and methodologies, and a wide range of theoretical perspectives were examined. The difficult task of selecting the relevant perspective from among many orientations is compounded by the fact that some of them blend into each other, rendering it difficult to utilise them separately. The most feasible solution is to select those perspectives that would provide a cogent matrix capable of capturing the empirical realities of the subject under study. Two theoretical orientations seem to fulfil this requirement, namely structural-functional theory and conflict theory.

III Structural-Functional or Conflict Theory?

To add to the theoretical debate, which contrasts functional theory with conflict theory, calls for a justification. A consequence of such a renewed debate is to push both perspectives further towards ideological and artificially polarized positions. Each
one of these two theories contributes to the imagery of society which is seen by Dahrendorf as having two faces: "...one of stability, harmony and consensus, and one of change, conflict and constraint." The criteria for selecting one rather than the other is related to each theory's conceptual potency to grasp the basic features of the empirical situation under study. How far can a functionalist model explain a structurally generated conflict? To what extent is a conflict model more appropriate and an indisputable scheme for the analysis of the conflict at hand? Could a conflict model claim exclusive and comprehensive applicability or even primacy for the study of conflict in society? Does the conflict model supplant or complement the structural-functional model?

A conflict model could solve the many problems that would have escaped a structural-functional approach in the study of the Lebanese experience, bearing in mind that neither approach is to be utilised exclusively. Neither model can provide all answers to full cognizance of social reality, since society is assumed to be "Janus headed". Nevertheless, there are situations in society that could be analyzed by a functionalist theory and others that require conflict theory. Each theory focuses on specific themes.

Functional analysis dominated most of sociological thought up to the 1960s. Since then it has receded and lost much of its lustre. Its adequacy as a valid paradigm to explain change and development in society has been increasingly questioned. Disenchantment with it stimulated attempts to develop and expand alternative perspectives. Critics of functionalism found in conflict theory, with its array of dynamic concepts of change, power, authority, coercion and restraints, that alternative.

IV Lebanese Social Structure and Conflict Theory

The conflict in Lebanon is obviously an area whose focus appears to require a conflict model to analyse. Nevertheless it is legitimate to contend that a claim of generality of this model is not directed against a claim of competence of the structural-functional approach with respect to the question of stability, equilibrium, and consensus. Yet the functional approach does not grasp the "ugly face" of the situation because of the limitations of its basic assumptions and terminologies. A structural-functional approach would require us to refer to the Lebanese experience as a "social system", meaning that such a system exists within the geopolitical boundaries of Lebanon, and this system consists of sub-systems each of which has a function in terms of other sub-systems and in relation to the system as a whole.
These assumptions have certain basic limitations as revealed in the following socio-historical fact.

Before 1920, there was no geopolitical unit called Lebanon. The Lebanon of today, with its name and present borders, was created on 1 September 1920, by expanding the area of semi-autonomous Mount Lebanon whose main inhabitants were the Maronites and the Druzes. The new incorporated areas were mostly urban communities, inhabited predominantly by Moslems, with an Orthodox Christian minority. By virtue of their urbanism they differed in their outlook from the inhabitants of rural Mount Lebanon, who had a self image of an independent republic of villages. By annexing the coastal cities and the interior areas, Lebanon became a city-state, a concept which did not have much meaning to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. Their contradictory interests and their different conception of what the new Lebanon was and what it ought to be were almost irreconcilable.

The interaction between the various component communities was strongest in the areas of economic and commercial exchanges rather than in social life. This interaction was not strong enough to integrate the various communities into one social system. Each community developed as a social system by itself, with its own belief and value system, communal consciousness, specific interests and stratification system. Moreover each community is now self contained geographically and spatially; the Druzes and the Maronites live in their enclosure in Mount Lebanon, The Shi'a in South Lebanon and the Beq'a valley, the Sunnis in the coastal cities and towns, and the Orthodox Christian in parts of North Lebanon and the city of Beirut. This trend has intensified as a result of the present conflict.

Perhaps a more relevant portrayal of Lebanese society is to underline its pluralistic character. It consists of several social systems that exist side by side, spatially adjacent with apparent harmony but void of a basic central value system and minimum acculturation. Their exposures to a common life style, urban or rural, have brought the communities closer to each other but not enough to create from them an integrated social system. Western values permeated Christian society and influenced its life style but have failed to penetrate Moslem society sufficiently to cause a similar transformation.

Lebanese society has preserved, over the centuries, its pluralistic characteristics. Cobban observes that "...for about a millennium now, the major present-day sects have been living in the Lebanese mountain, each with its own quite
rich and varied inner life..." Even present-day Lebanon is seen by Norton as no more than a grouping of sectarian communities. Petran explains this further:

Each of these communities has its own power structure, its own laws governing marriage, inheritance and other matters of personal status, its own (religious) courts and judicial procedures ... its own schools and distinct educational orientations, often hostile to that of other communities, its own hospitals, health, and social agencies. In other words, it is a system of multiple social units hierarchically structured in which conflictual tendencies are embedded and generated.

No doubt such a system experienced intermittent periods of stability, but behind that apparently smooth functioning system reposed divergent simmering communal interests which pervasively penetrated the social order, and around which a multivariant value system evolved. Between 1864 and 1920 inter-communal relations in Lebanon were symptomatically stable. The cycle of violence through which the two main communities of Mount Lebanon, the Druzes and Maronites, were engulfed for four decades in the nineteenth century, was replaced by an era of cooperation that lasted for seven decades. Yet the conflictual tendencies in each community persisted and were instrumental in defining and sharpening the communal boundaries, interests and goals.

An analysis of the Lebanese conflict and its resolution requires a thorough investigation of the social structures and processes of conflict and their outcomes. It is argued by this study that the genesis of the conflict is the social structure, generated by the communal contradictions inherent in this structure, and exacerbated by external contingent factors. It is further argued that the conflict process is itself a mechanism as well as an outcome of change. The repository of these propositions is the assumption that conflict, far from being a "pathological" phenomenon (Parsons), is both destructive and constructive (Simmel and Coser). It is also assumed that it is ubiquitous (Simmel), and above all a basic law of social life (Marx, Weber, and Dahrendorf). As to the social structure itself, it is proposed that conflict exists in all aspects of social life. Dahrendorf is very firm on this assumption. He postulates that "...wherever there is social life there is conflict....Not the presence but the absence of conflict is surprising and abnormal, and we have good reasons to be suspicious if we find a society or a social organisation that displays no evidence of conflict."17

However, some envisage society as an outgrowth of consensus. Williams believes that every society is the product of both attributes, consensus and conflict,
and as such is held by both, consensus and coercion. Dahrendorf holds similar views. For him society is a "Janus head" but he highlights the conflict aspect of society as being more central to human habitation.

V Major Trends in Conflict Theory

1 Classical and Contemporary Theorists

a Karl Marx

The notion of conflict is a core concept in Marx's theory of change. He saw in it a basic law of life and an all pervasive predisposition of human nature, which exists in almost every type of social relationship. Although he was not the first to recognise the extent of conflict, he was a pioneer in studying its nature, significance and outcome in the dynamics of social relations.

Marx utilised the concept of conflict as a world view through which he analysed contemporary society. He saw conflict and change all around him. Conflict for him was not only a normal condition of social realities but also a "central process in history", which essentially is the history of class struggle. Marx's historical process is carried out, basically but not exclusively, by two classes: "...in every historical epoch two classes are set against each other." In the stage of capitalism he specified these two classes as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat which constitute two hostile camps facing each other. Conflict, as represented by the dialectic process, seemed to be the only common bond that these two classes shared.

Of course, this does not mean that Marx reduced society to two classes only. Both Marx and Engels were aware of the existence of an "intermediary class" whose role in a conflict environment could not be underestimated. Nonetheless, Marx asserted that the relationship between the two classes reveals the "...innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure."²³

For Marx, conflict is not a problem to be solved but an ongoing state of exploitation, that is, domination and suppression, to be terminated by elimination, through transformation of the conditions which nurtured it. Marx's analysis of the class struggle revolved around the notion of conflict grounded, like the rest of his theories, in economic determinism.

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of
their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation, on which rise the legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression of the same thing - with the property relations within which they had been at work before.25

However, Marx's emphatic insistence on the economically based determinants of class struggle does not negate the role of other determinants. "The bourgeoisie and proletariat were in conflict not only because they had different economic interests, they were in conflict also because Marx saw one of them (the bourgeoisie) as the embodiment of Hegel's thesis and the other (the proletariat) as contemporary history's antithesis."26 Nevertheless the concept of class is a cornerstone in Marx's political thought. He regarded it as "...the most important fact in political economy"27, and the basic organisational structure in society. The transfer of power from one phase of historical development to the next is a process carried through the class structure of each society.

Class affiliation, according to Marxist theory, is an objective basis for class interests and eventually for group conflict. Yet ethnic affiliation and assertiveness are to be reckoned with in any group conflict situation. Marx's mono-causal class approach to the study of conflict does not provide a satisfactory model to the present study, for it errs in denying the social relations their basic and intrinsic significance. In analysing society in terms of class interests and solidarity, Marx relegated the communal affiliation and allegiances, and their role in the genesis and emergence of communal conflict, to the lower rungs of the causal ladder.28 Horowitz defended the role of this factor by asserting that: "...ethnic affiliations have considerable power to generate conflict."29 Lenin acknowledged the importance of communal affiliations in conflict but indicated that they should not be allowed to hinder the emergence of class solidarity and the eventual transformation of society.30

Marx's perspective of the genesis, dynamism and resolution of conflict is governed by a profound economic determinism to the exclusion of other societal variables. This perspective leaves out a significant aspect in which history, tradition,
and the normative system play a salient role in the conflict. Parsons' vision of these factors provides a different assessment of the social system, which nevertheless is responsible for the generation, or suppression of conflict.

b Talcott Parsons

Parsons' consensus model of society is based on the assumption that human nature is conflictual while society is consensual,\textsuperscript{31} that is void of overt conflict. Underlying this assumption is the quest for a solution to the question of social order, specifically the Hobbesian problem of order. The question that could be posed is: in the light of the existing contradictions between human nature and society, how is it possible to achieve "social order in a disorderly world?" Hobbes' solution to this problem aims at the manipulation of political arrangements in order to give the dominant group absolute power. He assumed that the world exists in a state of disorder (war of all against all) which needs to be set in order. Parsons, on the other hand, presumed that social order is the normal state of society and the problem is how to explain it.

Parsons' answer to this question is revealed in his theory of social action in which he postulates that for social systems\textsuperscript{32} to survive they have to perform four functions.\textsuperscript{33} The first is pattern maintenance, that is, maintaining the stability of institutionalised values, beliefs and ideas. The second is goal attainment, that is, the process of selecting, ordering and attaining collective goals. The third is adaptation. The fourth is integration, which refers to mutual adjustments of sub-systems to each other and to the system as a whole.

For a social system to be able to perform these functions it needs a structure consisting of the following: a) a value system which would effectively establish the legitimacy of the normative order, b) a differentiated collectivities structure, that is a plurality of actors occupying statuses and enacting prescribed roles, c) a structure of roles, that is a class of individuals who through reciprocal expectations are involved in a particular collectivity, and, d) a normative structure.

It must be clearly stated that integration is a basic survival need for a social system.\textsuperscript{34} However, for the integration process to take hold, a social system must avoid ",...commitment to cultural patterns which either fail to define a minimum of order or which place impossible demands on people and thereby generate deviance and conflict."\textsuperscript{35}

Of particular significance to the analysis of Lebanese conflict is the role of the institutionalized value system. The Parsonian version of consensus theory maintains
that the inherent stability of the social system is due to the presence of a built-in universal consensus of values. Once it is institutionalised, the value system is able to play a predominant role in legitimatizing the normative order. "Legitimating of a society's normative order...operates in the first instance through the institutionalization of a value system... then its sub-values, which are specifications of the general value pattern, become parts of every concrete norm that is integrated into the legitimate order."  

The epicentre of the integrative functions in Parsons' consensus model is the "integrative subsystem" which is the consensual base upon which political integration is built. It refers to that aspect of society in which members are considered "full citizens" and where the normative system is taken as the system of legitimate order. Membership of the societal community presumes a degree of consensus in the value system.

Parsons rejects Hobbes' suggestion that social order can be maintained only by means of force. He believes that the stability of the political system rests on the normative order of the social system, which prevents "...human relations from degenerating into a 'war of all against all'".

In a social system where a consensus of values is absent, the use of power "...can be assumed to be intrinsically the most effective in the context of deterrence." This does not rule out the probability of the use of force, for social order rests on two complementary pillars; "the institutionalized value system and the overt and potential use of force." How does Parsons justify the resort to force in order to maintain social order in a repressive dictatorship? In such cases he maintains that a substantial proportion of the population is either completely or partially integrated into the "societal community".

A "societal community" in a repressive dictatorship consists of members of the ruling group whose consensus of values is the institutionalized values of the social system. The rationale behind it is that the whole process becomes a vehicle of legitimization of the rule of the minority.

From a Parsonian perspective, Lebanese society is organised into two distinct systems whose "societal communities" consist of two substantially different subsystems, the Christians and the Moslems. The "core of more fully integrated" members of one community is different from the "core" of the other. Members of each community possess and manifest a consensus on their own communal values. Those values are perceived to be normatively institutionalized for the whole social system.
Legitimacy of the system is derived from the process of institutionalization. For the Christians "Lebanism" ranks highest among their institutionalized political values. For the Moslems it is "Arabism". Both concepts were reconciled by the National Pact of 1943.

To Parsons' credit the war and the ensuing conflict confirmed this pattern. It hardened the boundaries of the sub-systems, sharpened their goals, demarcated their institutionalized values, and created a well-defined integrated "societal community". The elites were able to carry their masses to adopt their institutionalized value system, and establish a normative order accordingly.

In his explanation of how socio-economic and political structures create order, Parsons emphasized the role of the normative system in this process. According to his perspective, social order is considered a function of the value system and as such falls short of explaining social change. Consensus, however, describes all forms of social relations up to but excluding the overt use of force. This means that violent conflicts are left out of his conceptual scheme, a case Parsons refers to as a residual problem outside his theory.

Parsons' conceptualization of the role of the social system in generating conflict and his theory of social change fail to capture the basic concept of conflict and change in Lebanese society. Ralf Dahrendorf, with his emphasis on the role of authority structure in the generation of conflict, offers an alternative scheme to both Marx's economic determinism and Parsons' normative order for the analysis of the conflict in Lebanon.

Dahrendorf's early contribution to the consensus-conflict debate redirected the interest towards the theme of conflict and its concepts of power, domination, force, coercion, constraint and social change.

Dahrendorf’s conflict scheme was developed in the following areas: a) his refutation of the consensus theory as a basic survival requisite for the social system; b) his critique and expansion of Marx's postulate of class struggle, shifting the emphasis of the sources of conflict from the differential distribution of property to the differential distribution of power and authority; and, c) his development of a conflict model postulating the ubiquity of social conflict and social change. "...It appears that not only in social life, but wherever there is life, there is conflict." Although denying that his model is a substitute to the one-sided consensus model, he yet proceeded to show that it is the only way out of Parsons' "Utopia". In his analysis there is a
persistent hint that his conflict model constitutes a "...more comprehensive theory of society." As the consensus model is equipped to tackle only the problem of stability and order in society, Dahrendorf believes that it failed to explain the phenomenon of change and conflict.

In his assault on the consensus model, Dahrendorf claims that individuals within groups are consensual, yet relations between groups are conflictual. Above and beyond that, the consensus within a group may have been produced by the process of conflict between the groups themselves. In a broader perspective, he rejects the consensus theory on the following grounds:

First, he claims that it is a "utopian" model portraying social change as an organic growth which is seen as an abnormal phenomenon. Social change and social conflict are viewed by Dahrendorf as a normal state of society.

Second, he believes that a consensus model professes that stability in the social system is assumed by the presence of a consensus on values among the dominant group (societal community). These values are institutionalised in the social system and provide it with order and stability by a legitimating of the normative order.

Third, he holds that in such a model non-conformists to the value system are deviants and their behaviour is pathological and leads to the disturbance of equilibrium in the social system.

Moreover the consensus model justifies and serves the status quo in society. All functions and processes of society move in a recurrent and predetermined pattern for the purpose of upholding the existing state of affairs.

In contradistinction to the consensus model, Dahrendorf proposes a conflict model that rests on the following basic assumptions:

a) every society is subjected at every moment to change; social change is ubiquitous,
b) every society experiences at every moment social conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous,
c) every element in society contributes to its change, and
d) every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others.

Dahrendorf qualifies the universality of his model by accepting the argument that "...stability and change, integration and conflict...consensus and constraint are...two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society." Some problems could be analysed through a consensus approach, others require a conflict model. Both perspectives emphasize different aspects. Van den Berghe lends his support to this perspective by stating that consensus "...is a major dimension of social reality, but so
are dissension and conflict.\(^5\) It is a reconciliatory attempt between the two theories at the assumptive level. The main question of which theory is most typical of the social system remains an empirical one.\(^6\) At such a level the question becomes: under what conditions do conflict groups form, enter into conflict, and affect a change in the social structure?

In Dahrendorf's conflict model, Parsons' social system and Marx's class concept are supplanted by the Weberian term of "imperatively coordinated association". Dahrendorf writes:

"Social system" is a very general concept applicable to all types of organizations; and we shall want to employ an equally general concept which differs from that of social system by emphasising a different aspect of the same organisations....It appears justifiable to use the term association in such a way as to imply the coordination of organized aggregate of roles by domination and subjection. The state, a church, an enterprise, but also a political party, a trade union and a chess club are associations in this sense. In all of them authority relations exist, for all of them conflict analysis is therefore applicable....In looking at social organizations not in terms of their integration and coherence but from the point of view of their structure of coercion and constraint, we regard them as (imperatively coordinated) associations rather than as social systems. Because ... they generate conflict of interests and become the birthplace of conflict groups.\(^7\)

The "imperatively coordinated association" is an organization of roles differentiated by power relations. Some roles have enough power to extract obedience from others. These power manifestations tend to become legitimated and are viewed as authority relations in which certain positions become normatively right to be dominant and other positions to be subordinate. Authority is a legitimate relation of supra and subordination and is based on an expectation associated with social position. Failure to obey the command is sanctioned.

Underlying the notion of roles displaying power differentials is the assumption that people have different interests which come in conflict with each other. Some people gain more power and use it in pursuing their interests. Dahrendorf observes that:

In all human societies, there are positions that enable their bearers to exercise power. These positions are endowed with sovereignty- the men
who hold them lay down the law for their subjects. Obedience is enforced, for the most important single aspect of power is the control of sanctions....It follows from this notion of power, and sanctions that there is always resistance to the exercise of power and that both the effectiveness and legitimacy of power- if there is any difference between these two concepts- are precarious. Normally those in power manage to stay in power. Theirs is the stronger group, and society is held together by the exercise of their strength, that is, by constraint.58

In his attempt to opt out of Parsons' utopia, Dahrendorf turned to some of Marx's key assumptions on the notion of conflict and class organization. He reformulated them with a slant towards the dialectics. Nevertheless, he rejected Marx's formulation of class as being determined by the relations of the means of productions. Instead he stipulated that it is the unequal distribution of authority that determines the nature and organization of class.59 Based on this assumption, Dahrendorf postulated a bifurcated model of class conflict which he, unlike Marx, applied to the "imperatively coordinated associations" rather than to the whole society.

In each "imperatively coordinated association" two aggregates can be discerned: those who have general basic rights (the ruled), and, those who have authority rights over the former (the rulers). It is a dichotomous relationship; there is no gradation between them. "Every position in an imperatively co-ordinated group can be recognized as belonging to one who dominates or one who is dominated."60

Different positions involve conflicting interests. The rulers have interest in preserving the status quo, and the ruled have equal interest in redistributing power and authority. Under certain empirically variable conditions awareness of these interests in both groups increases and develops into a conflict over positions of authority.61

Parsons conceded that interests do conflict with each other but he argued that the community-held values could override those conflicting interests and establish social order. Marx gives more weight to interests over values. He affirms that interests determine values62 and are systematically generated through the productive process. Dahrendorf's notion of authority is central to his conflict theory. He considered Marx's postulates of economic determinism as derivatives from the unequal distribution of authority, but he agrees with Marx that conflict has a dichotomous nature.

Dahrendorf's analytical scheme explains the communal struggle in Lebanon over political reform. The Status Quo Coalition, which occupied a dominant position in the Lebanese power structure, rejected demands for a change in this structure lest it
lost its position of authority to the contending party, in a zero-sum formula. The struggle between the rival communities is, in essence, over positions of authority and as such is prompted by different perceptions of communal entitlement in the government's reward system. It is assumed here that those who are in power have better access to this system.

Dahrendorf's analysis of the nature of conflict did not extend into the area of the functions of conflict. This aspect was elaborated by Lewis Coser who revealed that conflict, contrary to Parsons' imagery in this respect, has a constructive dimension and an integrative effect. To what extent do Coser's perspectives of social conflict help explain the Lebanese experience?

Lewis Coser

Coser developed an image of society whose locus is at a mid-point between Parsons' de-emphasis on conflict and Dahrendorf's neglect of the functional aspect of it. Using Simmel's conflict ideas as a starting point he advanced the integrative characteristic of conflict, arguing that the visions of both Parsons and Dahrendorf represent the same realities. Coser attempted to bridge the gap between the consensus and conflict schools. He rejected the dichotomous interpretation of both approaches in favour of a "middle of the road" scheme. "The social scene is neither a war of all against all...nor is it a frictionless Utopian vacuum where strife is banned for ever and men adjust to one another in blissful harmony." He avoided entanglement in some of the thorny issues, such as the social system's needs and functional prerequisites. He disagreed with Parsons' view that conflict is disruptive and dissociative and primarily a disease. By the same token he argued against Marx's and Dahrendorf's emphasis on the consequences of violent conflict. To him conflict is a normal phenomenon that could result in either integration or disintegration.

Coser's efforts to specify, systematize, extend and reformulate Simmel's propositions on the subject of conflict are his major contribution to conflict theory. Simmel, like Marx, regarded conflict as ubiquitous and inevitable but he did not share Marx's recognition of the social structure as being composed of domination and subjugation, but of associative and dissociative processes. These processes are, in his view, essential for the maintenance of the structure. "Groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors."
Simmel's analysis of conflict is oriented in the direction of the role of conflict in promoting solidarity, integration and the orderly change of the system. He formulated a number of propositions on the functions of social conflict.

Coser expanded and developed these propositions into a comprehensive scheme that postulated an explanation of the causes, intensity, duration and functions of conflict. To him conflict could be either constructive or destructive depending on the issues in dispute, and the social structure within which it occurs. Some social structures are less tolerant than others in their reaction to rival communal entitlements and claims to scarce resources. Such structures are rigid and lack safety-valve mechanisms for allowing antagonistic expression.

Another condition which contributes to the nature of conflict is the value systems, goals and interests of the conflict parties. Coser holds that if the social conflict is over goals, values or interests that are compatible with the basic relationship of the conflict groups then it is "...positively functional for the social structure." On the other hand if the conflict is between groups who do not share the same values, then the conflict is disruptive to this system.

Coser reformulated Simmel's proposition in such a way as to analyse not only the functions of conflict but also the causes underlying its integrative potency. This imagery addresses eight major structural themes in the functions of conflict. These themes revolve around cohesion, harmony, identity and boundary of the conflict groups.

Some of Coser's propositions subsumed under those themes are relevant to the Lebanese conflict. Let us look at them now one by one.

Proposition No 1: Conflict establishes a group identity, preserves its distinctiveness and maintains its boundary, solidarity and cohesion.

Historical evidence shows that, since its inception in the fifth century, the Maronite community was involved, first as a sect and later as a community, in constant conflict with other groups; with the Jacobites in Syria, with the Shi'a in northern Lebanon following their settlement there and more recently with the Druzes in Mount Lebanon as a result of their expansion into that area. Its "communal consciousness" and "in-group" feeling was established through these episodes of conflict. Conflict seemed also to preserve the cohesion of the Druze community. Its ego identity was well established around its esoteric religion and closed social structure.
Recent conflict in Lebanon helped to establish the autonomy of participating groups, an "in-group" identity and an "out-group" reference. The Maronites, and to a lesser degree the Sunnis, their partners in the 1943 power-sharing agreement, constituted an out-group source for the Shi'a, and other sects to emulate and resent at the same time. As a less privileged group, the Shi'a, having developed an awareness of their status, looked to the Maronites as a community with a higher educational and economic standard and strove hard to raise its standards to match those of the Maronites. Other communities, such as the Sunnis and Druzes, looked upon the Maronites as their higher partners. Yet the three communities, and probably other non-Maronite groups, once they became more aware of their entitlements, resented the Maronites' privileged status within the state structure. These attitudes preserved and hardened the boundaries between the various conflict groups and they served to establish group identity and behaviour.

Proposition № 2: Conflict may serve a positive function for the relationship of groups. It is therefore vital for the maintenance of this relationship.

The existence of alternative objects of conflict constitutes a safety-valve mechanism to help preserve the social structure. Communal tension had been building in Lebanon for three decades following independence. The 1975 conflict permitted the rival communities to puff the steam, to release tension and maintain the relationship between the communities, though at a price. Conflict in this sense served as a safety-valve to release the pressure from the social structure. However, other outlets to divert hostile and antagonistic attitudes from the original object to a "substitute object" existed.

When the Christian-Moslem communal relations came under pressure following the Reformist Camp's demand for political reform, the Phalanges party and its supporters shifted their hostility from the Moslems towards their Palestinian backers in Lebanon in order to avoid any damage to the principle of coexistence between the two main communal blocs. As the conflict escalated the object of their hostility was expanded to include the Syrians, Iranians and Libyans who were involved on the side of the Reformist Camp. It was always stated by the Phalangist propaganda machine that they had no quarrel with the Lebanese rival camp and if it were left to the domestic parties there would be instant peace. On the other hand, the Reformist Camp displaced their hostilities towards the Status Quo Coalition onto Israel, which was a major ally and provider for the Coalition. The communal relations were maintained and the principle of coexistence was formally saved.
Proposition N° 3: A conflict is more intense if it occurs in a close relationship. Within such a relationship, disloyalty, apostasy and renegadism are not tolerated, because they have disruptive effects on the group's unity. Hostile feeling is suppressed for fear of its danger to the principle of coexistence. Such a suppression of hostile feeling results in greater intensity of conflict once it is acted out.

Lebanon's limited space, coupled with its high population density (300 persons per square kilometre) makes its social structure look like a bee-hive; vigorous and very close. The frequency of interaction between the populations both as individuals and as groups is very high due, among other things, to the system of centralized services in the country. The relationship between the groups is characterized by intimacy and total involvement of their members. This type of relationship generates, in Coser's view, hostile feeling "...since it furnishes frequent occasions for conflict."72

Hostile feelings between the Lebanese communities were suppressed on more than one occasion during Lebanon's independent history. Political crises such as the 1958 civil disturbances and several other inter-sectarian incidences were instantly suppressed for fear of widening the abyss between the various component sects which might have led to intense conflict. This allowed the suppressed hostile feelings to accumulate and fester over the years. When they were acted out in 1975 they were more intense than expected.

Proposition N° 4: Conflict could be a unifying factor if it occurs within the same confessional framework but does not involve the basis of consensus.

Throughout the war years, both conflict groups entered the conflict process on the basis of preserving the fundamental principles of the political and economic system in Lebanon. Both parties shared a common vision of the needs to preserve the consensus over which the basic relationship between them was founded. What helped the various communal groups to uphold, for a while, this end is, in Coser's opinion, their interdependence and crisscrossing goals and interests73 and a social structure equipped with a safety-valve mechanism to direct the hostile feeling away from the consensual values. This led to mutual accommodation between the conflict groups. The 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Taif Accord represented that mechanism.

Proposition N° 5: outside threat strengthens the in-group cohesion. It increases their group consciousness, mobilizes their defences and intensifies their involvement.74 Exposure to an outside conflict has an integrative effect on the group. However, such an effect is predicated by the consensual situation before the outbreak of conflict. If
basic consensus is lacking then outside threat will lead not to integration but to apathy, antagonism and disintegration. The contrasting effect of the Israeli and Syrian intervention in Lebanon on the conflict parties illustrates this.

The Status Quo Coalition perceived in the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese conflict a threat to their power status and to the country as a whole. On the other hand, the Reformist Camp perceived a similar threat emanating not from the Syrians but from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Israel's support of the rival group. Lack of consensus on this issue widened the gulf between the two conflict groups and increased their hostilities towards each other which in turn led to a breakdown of consensus on other issues in dispute.

This leads to the conclusion that the outside threat factor emanating either from across the border or from the domestic rival groups, increased the solidarity of those in-groups who share common values, interests and goals. For instance, the threat to the Maronite power status strengthened their resolve and communal ethos in defence of their entitlement, but a threat to the country's sovereignty did not strengthen the solidarity between component communities. It rather deepened the cleavages and divisions among them.

Coser's conflict theory concentrates on the functions of conflict and its resolution. The conflict groups, their structure and place in the conflict process, attracted little attention in his perspective. This aspect is of considerable importance in any analytical scheme of a communal conflict. The actors are part of the conflict process itself; therefore their formation, structure and behaviour become vital for a comprehensive understanding of the nature and functions of conflict. A remedy to this shortcoming may be found in Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya, a fourteenth century notion of group cohesion in the context of a social network based principally but not solely on blood bonds.

In his analysis of the rise and fall of the state, Ibn Khaldun emphasised the role of asabiya as a determining factor in this process. Equally significant is the role played by this concept in conflict group formation and communal behaviour. This aspect has not been touched upon by the preceding theorists. It is therefore important now to turn to a discussion of Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya and its relevance to the Lebanese situation.

2 Ibn Khaldun

Ibn Khaldun's conception of the rise and decline of states and civilizations revolves around basic factors inherent in the social and economic structure of
society. High among those factors is the concept of *asabiya*, whose significance in the evolution of civilization and in the transformation of the state from a primitive (badawi) to a civilized (hadari) state is, to Ibn Khaldun, an incontestable fact. Al-Azmeh observes that Ibn Khaldun made this concept central to his analysis of the emergence and demise of the state (dawla). "Without dawla, the concept of *asabiya* would be superfluous regardless of its 'real existence'. As a concept it is subject to the exigencies of the concept of the state and cannot exist conceptually without it."  

Ibn Khaldun treats *asabiya* as the most central concept in his socio-philosophical system. He considers it a social force underlying the whole of the historical process. For Ibn Khaldun, "...*asabiya* is the sum total of all the vital energies which hold a community together. It is the actual basis for all human aggregation and the very factor that sets history into action." It is the fundamental bond of human beings to "...assert themselves, to struggle for primacy, to establish hegemonies, dynasties and empires."  

Toynbee's understanding of *asabiya* goes beyond the institution of the state to that of society at large. "It is the psychic protoplasm out of which all bodies politic and bodies social are built up." Al-Azmeh bestows on the concept a universalistic character. He asserts its incontestable endurance, constancy and recurrence in highly complex and sophisticated societies. He goes as far as to consider it a vehicle of transformation of the society from its primitive (badawi) to a civilized (hadari) stage and maintains that it can be "...employed as the basis for the classification of human societies."  

What is *asabiya*, its nature and the role it plays in a conflict theory?

*Asabiya* is a complex socio-political concept that requires careful examination. The term *asabiya* is a pre-Islamic term, which was used to describe a strong bond between members of the same group. This bond would commit its adherents to support one another blindly "...without regard to the justice of the cause." However Islam condemned *asabiya*. Prophet Muhammad himself denounced it as "...contrary to the spirit of Islam." Helping one's people in unjust action is repugnant to Islam. Ibn Khaldun was well aware of Islam's rejection of the concept. He used it in such a way as to explain the conflict in Moslem thought without impairing the orthodox view on the position and role of the successors of the prophet - the Caliphs.
Most Khaldunian writers seem to have failed in reaching a consensus on the precise meaning of the term. This is due, mainly, to the untranslatability of asabiya. Writers of different orientations used different conceptualizations in their translation. Some defined it in a purely sociological context accentuating a causal nexus between asabiya and different cultural contexts. Others focused on its political framework with special reference to its organizational attributes in the rise of power groups, the formation and decline of state. Even Ibn Khaldun did not give a clear-cut and precise definition of it, "...because he was describing a combination of elements and not a single phenomenon." The way he used the term (around five hundred times in his Muqaddimah) was interpreted in different senses to convey different shades of meaning. However, most of the divergent renditions of asabiya point to a widely acknowledged interpretation: solidarity. This interpretation seems to be an acceptable translation, although it is used over a wide range of connotations such as "social solidarity", "group solidarity", "group cohesion", "common will", "esprit de corps", "group feeling", "group instinct", "fanatical solidarity", the "corporate will of the group", "party spirit", "community ethos", "socio-agnatic solidarity", "fellow feeling", "zeal and ardour", patriotism", "tribal spirit", "national spirit", "national feelings", "party strength", "power", "support", "communal ethos", and the "vitality of the state.

This wide range of interpretations implies an equally divergent and discursive meaning of asabiya. Though such connotations are reflected in many shades, yet two basic conceptually articulated aspects of it are unambiguously identifiable and are amenable to cooptation within two empirically defined avenues; a socio-cultural avenue and a political avenue. Ibn Khaldun himself treats asabiya as a "...phenomenon in nature and a power in society."

Asabiya As a Sociological Concept

The lexicographic meaning of the term asabiya is derived from the Arabic root asaba, meaning to bind. The noun is asab, literally meaning nerve. It denotes an intense, vital and indissoluble nexus among members of the group. Ibn Khaldun built the concept of asabiya on consanguinity (silat-al-rahm). He stated that:

Blood tie is something natural among men. It leads to affection for one's relations and blood relatives. It makes for mutual support and increases the fear felt by the enemy. This strengthens their stamina and makes them feared, since everybody's affection for his family and his asabiya is more important.
Yet he did not ignore the *asabiya* that comes through social interaction. He specified and distinguished among three types of *asabiyas*; which, in a tribal structure, emanated from three kinds of relationships: the *asabiya* based on relationship of sanguinity (*silat-al-rahm*), or on alliance (*hilf*), or on loyalty (*wala*). Members of these three types of *asabiyas* constitute an in-group, but not all of them are equidistant from the nucleus tribe, that is, the centre of power.

Relationships based on blood ties (*silat-al-rahm*) represent a focal ideal-type of the group's organizational characteristic, which overshadows and holds down the other two types of *asabiyas*, alliance and loyalty, on lower rungs in the power hierarchy. Nevertheless members of the three *asabiyas* have the same entitlements and enjoy equal rights.

*Asabiya* by alliance is formed either through intermarriage or as a result of one weak *asabiya* seeking protection from a bigger and stronger one. *Asabiya* by loyalty is the result of the attachment of one person or a whole tribe to a more powerful *asabiya* through defeat in war or by voluntary act.

Ibn Khaldun was convinced that any *asabiya* based on blood ties was the most powerful, reliable and intensive in group solidarity. Socio-agnatic solidarity "...has precedence over all other ties that result from relationship other than these ties." He added religion to consanguinity as a cementing factor in the strength and uniformity of *asabiya*: "religion and religious loyalty could provide a more powerful feeling of solidarity". Religion plays a greater unifying role than *asabiya* because it abolishes mutual jealousies and rivalries, and provides a dynasty, at its outset, with another power in addition to that of *asabiya*.

Religion and *asabiya*, in Ibn Khaldun's view, are two essential pillars of a strong leadership. Religion plays a supportive role in the establishment of a strong leadership structure. A common religious faith would be capable of strengthening the *asabiya*. Religion's contribution to the cultivation, preservation and achievement of solidarity has been channelled not only through religious values but also through the regular practice of religious rites. Those rites which symbolize adherence to the community are the ones that last longer.

How is *asabiya* fostered? It is promoted through biological or social milieus. Ibn Khaldun points to blood relations as a primary, but not exclusive, factor. Ritter confirms that the bond between blood relations is strongest among the Semitic nations and particularly the Arabs, "... who even after settling down, kept up the organization of the tribes."
Asabiya emerges also from a relationship of alliance and loyalty. Although he gives more weight to blood ties, Ibn Khaldun confesses that asabiya comes about through social interaction, common occupation and between men who share the same life style.\textsuperscript{101}

The notion of class is implied in the concept of asabiya. Its agnatic aspect is viewed as a classificatory base upon which the group is structured and the power hierarchy is built.\textsuperscript{102} The role it plays in the process of change is similar to the Marxist notion of class function in the process of historical development. Asabiya is a socio-political structure through which the transformation from a primitive stage of culture (umran badawi) to a civilized stage (umran hadari) is carried out, just as the transfer of power from one phase of the historical development is carried out to the next phase through the class structure of society.

In contradistinction to the Marxist notion of development, asabiya affects a transition from a classless society, where equality of status prevails and the leader is the "first among equals", to a society based on class and distinctions.\textsuperscript{103} As the power of the rulers grows it turns its holders into a class, holding contradictory interests to those held by the ruled. These contradictions break out into an open-ended conflict, causing the break up of the group's structure. This break up is progressive and leads to the collapse of the ruling class and the state. The rulers are overthrown by another group who posses a stronger asabiya, free from internal contradictions.

\textbf{b} \hspace{1cm} Asabiya As a Political Concept

As we have seen earlier, al-Azmeh contended that the concept of asabiya has no existence outside the concept of state. Asabiya, being a function, does not survive by itself. It is a notion active only in the context of state formation.\textsuperscript{104} Irrespective of its polymorphous composition, asabiya's vitalizing properties are oriented towards an order whose focus is the state. Therefore its role in the emergence of the state is vital. Baali considered asabiya as one of the two foundations necessary to build a state. The other one is money.\textsuperscript{105}

For Ibn Khaldun a state is established by primitive people whose main asset is the strength of their asabiya. It has a life span of about 120 years. The state's life trajectory, from inception to growth, maturity and decline, follows a "generational path" that passes in five stages and needs three generations to complete, unless a force majeure interferes with this cycle. Each stage has its distinctive characteristic. The initial stage is that of the establishment of the state, followed by the consolidation of
the powers of the ruler, the organization and entrenchment of that power, then contentment and finally decline and demise.106

During the first stage of the establishment of the state, the asabiya is strong enough to generate sufficient powers that would enable the rulers to make the ruled obey them. Religion plays, at this stage, a strong supportive role in persuading the ruled that by obeying the ruler they are obeying God.

Consent and obedience are two prerequisites for the consolidation of the ruler's power. He can remain in his position as long as he enjoys the consent and obedience of his asabiya. However, they would deny him support if their belief in his righteousness is atrophized, due to an unacceptable behaviour on his part. They then would "...transfer political leadership from him and his direct lineage to some other related branch (of his tribe), in obedience to their group feeling".107

At this initial stage the ruler is totally dependent upon his asabiya. He is seen to be not their master and king but as "first among equals". He shares the power with them. As soon as the state evolves towards the end of this stage, the ruler starts to monopolize the power and debar those who propelled him into the position of authority, that is his asabiya, from its fruits. Conflict between them becomes an inevitable outcome. The ruler may start to marginalize his asabiya and resort to that type of needed consent which he derives from his position of authority rather than from his asabiya.

The second stage in the development of the state is marked by a consummation of the process of power consolidation. The ruler who began in the first stage as "first among equals" becomes in this stage an absolute monarch. He replaces his asabiya with mercenaries in a bid to hold on to power. His asabiya starts its long journey towards marginalism and alienation. It loses its role in the preservation of the state, to a paid army of mercenaries.

In the third stage of the development of the state, the ruler, having consolidated his authority, resorts to coercive measures to earn revenues in order to satisfy his lust for luxury and other mundane desires. He succeeds in securing enough revenues to spend lavishly on his followers and on improvements in the state's structure. At this point of the trajectory, the state reaches the zenith of its power, prosperity, luxury and leisure.108

Having settled down as a prosperous and powerful state, it enters its fourth stage with a blanket of contentment and luxury. By then the rulers and the ruled would have traversed a long distance from the time their predecessors toiled to
establish their state. Their generation loses any connection with their progenitors. Their life style contrasts sharply with that of the founders of the state. They indulge in prodigality, self-gratifying activities and a leisurely way of life. The state progressively grows weaker, powerless and becomes less warlike. Thus the vigour and the strength of asabiya are broken.109

The fifth and the last stage of the development of the state witness its senescence, demise and disintegration. A new strong, vigorous, and powerful asabiya takes over, establishes a new state and follows the same trajectory.

The concept of asabiya is at the core of Ibn Khaldun's conflict and change theory. In modern times tribal affiliations and loyalties are in decline. Solidarities of class, party, ethnicity, religion, and even neighbourhoods are on the rise, yet those solidarities have not supplanted the ones of descent and consanguinity.

VI Convergence of the Frameworks

The five analytical frameworks (Marx, Parsons, Dahrendorf, Coser and Ibn Khaldun) utilised in this study concur in providing the conceptual scheme with the following major propositions for the analysis of the conflict in Lebanon; a) The conflict in Lebanon is structurally based, b) In the long term the conflict is as natural and normal a phenomenon as the absence of it, c) Conflict is functional to the social system in the sense that it prevents its ossification and revitalizes its energies, and d) The asabiya factor is a basic component in the formation and rise to power of the conflict groups.

Marx and Dahrendorf envisage society as a stratified structure which enfolds class oriented conflict of interest. Coherence in such a society is maintained through coercion. In contrast to Marx, Dahrendorf contends that authority rather than property is the source of social conflict.

The consensus and order school, Parsons in particular, views conflict as an abnormality in the social system. Its proponents believe that society coheres around normative values. Social order is attained not by coercion but by a belief in the legitimacy of the social system. If conflict occurs it is due to an incidental factor reflecting a pathological strain in the system.

Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser envisage conflict as neither a pathological nor a disruptive phenomenon. It could also serve positive purposes and achieve constructive results; it could strengthen society and reduce its pathological social manifestations.
VII Conclusion

It was argued in this chapter that communal conflict originates in the social structure and that conflict is a natural phenomenon in life. It was further argued that positions of authority and *asabiya* rather than differential distribution of property are the major sources of conflict. Authority with its attributes of coercion and constraint and *asabiya* with its attributes of obedience and consent can lead the analysis towards an explanation of the relations of communal dominance which prevail in the Lebanese social structure. For a demonstration of the analytical potency of the two concepts in identifying the source of conflict, we must now turn to the next chapter.
CHAPTER ONE

END NOTES

1 Georg Simmel holds that conflict is generated not merely by conflicting interests but also by hostile instincts. "... in fact, dissociating factors - hate, envy, need, desire - are the causes of conflict; it breaks out because of them." See Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhart Bendix (New York: Free Press, 1955), p. 13.


6 Jessie Bernard, op cit., p. 36.


22 Marx identifies three classes (capitalist, landowner and wage-earner) but also mentions the small holding peasantry, the farm labourers, the intellectuals and the lumpenproletariat. In his Manifesto he refers to five classes, these became seven in the Class Struggle in France. This enumeration of classes while appearing inconsistent need not be contradictory. It refers to a dynamic account of class relations in specific socio-historical circumstances. See Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Definite Heuristic Models in Marxian Theory," *Social Forces* 64 (September 1985), pp. 36-37; Anthony Giddens, and David Held (eds.), *Class, Power and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debate* (Berkely: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 101-111.

23 Karl Marx, *Capital*, op. cit., p. 772.


32 Talcott Parsons, in his book, *The Social System*, new edition, (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 5-6, defines a social system as "a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to optimization of gratification and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols."

33 Thomas Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147.


38 Thomas J. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 11.


41 Talcott Parsons, in his book, *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1969), part 2, maintains that in well integrated societies the social system is closely associated with the society itself, whereas in poorly integrated societies the social system constitutes an entity within the context of the society.


51 Thomas J. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 3.


56 Jonathon H. Turner, "From Utopia to Where?" op. cit., pp. 243, 244.


60 Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory," op. cit., p. 177.


62 Thomas J. Bernard, op. cit., p. 207.


66 Georg Simmel, op. cit. p. 23.


70 Ibid., p. 80.

71 These postulates are the subject of Lewis Coser's book, *The Functions of Social Conflict*.

72 Ibid., p. 62.

73 Ibid., p. 75.

74 Ibid., pp. 87-95.


76 Aziz al-Azmeh, *Ibn Khaldun: An Essay in Reinterpretation* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1982), p. 28. Ibn Khaldun's main concern was the groups who founded the state, ruled it and dominated other groups. His central theme was the transformation process within the power group from a primitive stage to a civilized stage of civilization and the role asabiya played in this process. See also Yves Lacoste, *Ibn Khaldun: The Birth of History and the Past of the Third World* (London: Verso Editions, 1984), pp. 98-100.


86 Yves Lacoste, *op. cit.*, p. 103.


90 As quoted by Yves Lacoste, *op. cit.*, p. 103.


92 Mohamed Abdulla Enan, *op. cit.*, p. 121.


95 Muhammad Mahmud Rabi', *op. cit.*, p. 50.


103 Yves Lacoste, op. cit., p. 116.


106 Muhsin Mahdi, op. cit., pp. 204-209.


108 Muhsin Mahdi, op. cit., p. 207.

109 Yves Lacoste, op. cit., p. 106.
CHAPTER TWO

AUTHORITY AND ASABIYA: TWO FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE LEBANESE CONFLICT

I Introduction

The concepts of "authority" and asabiya are utilized by this study to identify and explain the causes of conflict. This chapter attempts to analyse the implication of both concepts for the emergence of the conflict groups and the differential distribution of power and its concomitant attribute of domination; and for the role of asabiya in the structure of the conflict groups and the conflict process in general. It will do so under the assumption that authority is a central issue in the structural causality of conflict, and asabiya in relation to the case of Lebanon is a fundamental factor in the rise, growth and demise of the conflict groups.

Three basic interrelated assumptions underlie the main theme of this chapter. The first is that positions of authority in the Lebanese power structure constitute a source of tension which, under certain empirical conditions, can set in motion a process of change in the existing institutional arrangements, that is, in the National Pact, Constitution and conventions of Lebanon's political culture. The second is that as a result of the shift in the balance of power between the various component communities occupying different positions of authority in the Lebanese power hierarchy, and due to the emergence of propitious contingencies, new forces emerged out of the societal structure whose fundamental organisational characteristic revolves around the concept of asabiya. The third is that the notion of asabiya is a structurally anchored phenomenon in the power structure of the conflict groups, and it constitutes a quintessential power source for the leadership as well as for the militias' cohesion and performance.

II Concept of Authority and the Rise of Conflict Groups

Power and authority have been associated with exploitation, tension and conflict in a social system. It is instructive to examine Dahrendorf's, Marx's and Weber's ideas in relation to these concepts.

Dahrendorf agrees with Marx that conflict is structurally based, but in their analysis of the causes of conflict they part company. For Marx, it is the differential distribution of property and power and exploitation that leads to class conflict. For Dahrendorf it is the "institutionalised authority relations."1. Furthermore, Marx argues that differential distribution of property and power lay in the substructure, whereas
authority relations are a superstructure phenomenon established by the dominant classes. Dahrendorf acknowledges and asserts that in every society "...there is a differential distribution of power and authority....This differential distribution of authority invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflict." Such a conflict is structurally based in a cluster of social roles characterized by domination and subjugation. Dahrendorf believes that this is a "...common feature of all possible types of...associations and organizations."  

In his analysis of authority Dahrendorf draws on Weber's definition: "The probability that a certain specific command will (or all commands) be obeyed by a given group of persons." Dahrendorf breaks down this definition into the following elements:

1. Authority denotes a relation of supra- and subordination.
2. The Supra-ordinated side prescribes to the subordinated one certain behaviour in the form of a command or a prohibition.
3. The supra-ordinated side has the right to make such prescriptions; authority is a legitimate relation of supra- and subordination; authority is not based on personal or situational chance effects but rather on an expectation associated with social position.
4. The right of authority is limited to certain contents and to specific persons.
5. Failure to obey the prescription is sanctioned; a legal system (or a system of quasi-legal customs) guards the effectiveness of authority.

Authority as such could be viewed as a scarce resource over which groups fight. This is emphasized by Dahrendorf's contention that "...the distribution of authority in associations is the ultimate 'cause' of the formation of conflict groups, and, ...being dichotomous, it is, in any given association, the cause of the formation of two, and only two conflict groups."  

Dahrendorf chose not to specify the nature of legitimated authority and relations of domination and subjugation. He simply maintained that authority implies domination and subjugation and as such it is a basic source of conflict. This dichotomous nature of authority resides in parallel dichotomous social roles. Weingart
suggested that this type of authority could be defined as "...legitimate institutionalised role-expectation of super-ordination and subordination" or as rulers and ruled, with the rulers' main interests being to preserve the *status quo*, and the ruled is to change it.\(^8\)

The question is: How do opposed groups emerge? How do they arise in the social structure and under what conditions do the legitimated authority relations generate relations of domination and subjugation? Jonathan Turner contends that Dahrendorf's conceptual scheme does not tackle such questions beyond an assumptive level simply because it does not explain how authority emerged. The causal link between the emergence of conflict and authority is absent. It is only assumed.\(^9\) Therefore there is a need for it to be expanded through empirical observation.

Dahrendorf's conceptualisation of quasi-groups and conflict groups is an attempt at a structural explanation of social conflict. A Quasi-group is similar to Marx's class-in-itself and a conflict-group is akin to class-for-itself. Both notions rest on the principle of awareness of true self interest. Dahrendorf's concept implies an element of dominance in its definition. The dominant group strives to preserve the *status quo* whereas the subordinate group struggles to change it. Dahrendorf notes:

In every imperatively co-ordinated group, the carriers of positive and negative dominance roles determine two quasi-groups with opposite latent interests....The opposition of interests has here a quite formal meaning, namely, the expectation that an interest in the preservation of the status quo is associated with the positive dominance roles and an interest in the change of status quo is associated with the negative dominance roles.

Interest groups which originated in this manner are in constant conflict concerned with the preservation or change in the status quo. The form and the intensity of the conflict are determined by empirically variable conditions (the conditions of conflict).\(^10\)

This explanation falls short of answering the question of how do quasi-groups arise and under what conditions the legitimate authority relations which generate relations of domination and subjugation are created.

Authority is present in any type of association and is a "...universal element of social structure."\(^11\) Unlike Parsons, Dahrendorf attributed to it conflictual rather than integrative functions, on the grounds that "...authority is always coercion; the rule of
some over others."¹² On the other hand, authority, in Parsons' consensus model, appears to be a necessary supplement to the normative system which, under certain conditions, fails to guide all action in a prescribed way. By introducing the concept of coercion into the definition of authority Dahrendorf permits the conclusion that authority does not only enforce norms but it can set new norms. It follows that norms are set by the ruling groups who use their authority to create new norms through legislation. Furthermore, one can conclude also that authority has an instrumental capacity for social control and for imposing a value system (defined as interests which have been institutionalised as norms) representing the goals of the ruling minority.

It could be deduced from the above that authority is an abstract concept whose main attributes are roles and interests and which does not exist outside the social structure. Through roles, conflicting interests are manifested and are polarized; thus a society is split into two role aggregates: those who possess authority and those who are excluded from it.

It is further deduced that interests are also correlated with positions of authority and as such they are designated as role-interests. "...Differentially equipped authority positions in associations involve, for their incumbents, conflicting interests."¹³ Those who are in power have an interest in preserving the structure and those who are excluded have an interest in changing it.

Weber delved deep into the concept of power which he defined as: "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."¹⁴ He noted that the two main sources of power are: "a) constellation of interests; and, b) established authority that allocates the right to command and the duty to obey."¹⁵ He defined domination (authority) as "...the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."¹⁶ Weber maintained that men in society interact on the basis of their material and ideal interests and they relate to each other in a relation of authority and obedience which rests on shared beliefs. It may be suggested that Weber considered the conditions of solidarity which is based on interests and the moral order of authority which is based on belief in legitimacy as "...the two perspectives through which a comprehensive view of society could be obtained."¹⁷ The significance of these postulates to the Lebanese conflict can be examined in terms of two questions: Why and how the various communities acted in concert and manifested a highly conspicuous degree of solidarity on both sides of the conflict? Why and how these communities believed in the existence of a legitimate order that imposed obligations upon them? Dahrendorf's concept of authority with its basic tenets of coercion and constraint, and conflict theory...
in general, can provide the answer to the second question. As to the first question we
may find an appropriate answer in the concept of *asabiya* as manifested in the
emergence of the militia organisations and the various conflict groups in Lebanon.

III The Concept of Asabiya and its Implications for the Emergence of
Conflict Groups

We discussed in Chapter One the nature of *asabiya* and its contribution to
conflict theory. We turn now to its role in the organization and emergence of conflict
groups and its relevance in the analysis of the Lebanese conflict. *Asabiya* is best
revealed in a warlike situation. "Group feeling produces the ability to defend oneself,
to protect oneself and to press one's claim. Whoever loses his group feeling is too
weak to do any one of these things."\(^{18}\) The *telos* of *asabiya* is *Mulk* (kingship or
rulership). This implies the existence of the notion of domination. A group with strong
*asabiya* manifests unity and dynamism which helps it gain domination over other
groups. "Only tribes which have developed *asabiya* constitute a political force
capable of making their chieftains heads of states."\(^{19}\) By the same token, for a leader,
or a chieftain, to achieve superiority he has to have a strong *asabiya* behind him to
propel him into that position, which obviously implies authority and power.

Once a group attains the superior position of authority it extends its
domination, by virtue of its stronger *asabiya*, over other groups who become
subservient to the dominant group and obliged to seek coalescence with it. The
dominant group starts to atrophy when its *asabiya* wanes. It does not take long for
another group with a stronger *asabiya* to overthrow the dominant group and replace it
in the authority structure.

This imagery of conflict resembles, in its major part, that of Dahrendorf's and
his classification of conflict groups into two categories. Those who possess authority
and the power that goes with it versus those who are denied authority and are
subservient to the first group. It is a relation of domination and subjugation.
Dahrendorf asserts that this differential distribution of authority is the determining
factor in social conflict.

However, *asabiya* is a normative concept which guides all actions in a
prescribed way. Its functions within the *asabiya* group are integrative and involve
consent and obedience toward the rulers. On the other hand, Dahrendorf's concept
of authority is conflictual by nature, and rests on the notion of coercion instead of
consent and obedience. By resorting to coercion in order to maintain law and order
instead of the precepts of *asabiya*, Dahrendorf is assuming that authority could also
set new norms and create new values, which eventually would reflect those of the rulers.

At a certain stage of the development of the state's structure Ibn Khaldun's leader, who by virtue of his asabiya has reached the position of superiority, tries to introduce changes to the normative structure (usually at the third and fourth generational stage). He would impose these changes on his people by resorting to coercion, with the help of mercenaries if necessary. This leads to a situation of conflict involving his own asabiya who would deny him their consent and obedience due to what transpires to them as deviation from the prescribed communal normative value system. This deviation is seen by his asabiya as degeneration into prodigality, resulting in the eventual dethronement of the leader in favour of a new one with stronger asabiya.

Parsons' notion of order also has an admittedly coercive component. He postulates that the normative system is functionally integrative but if, under certain specific conditions, it fails to deliver on law and order, then authority, with its inherent aspect of coercion, could supplement the normative system in order to restore order and balance to the system. This is in fact an asabiya approach to the Hobbesian question: How is order and consensus possible? Asabiya with its fundamental attributes of consent and obedience accomplishes the same cohesion and integration of the group that authority and its fundamental attributes of coercion could achieve toward the same end. Asabiya is a function not only of lineage affiliation but also of the feeling of solidarity which in turn is itself a function of the cohesion of the group; "...such coherence cannot be maintained without the presence of a dominant element with a mandate to coerce."²⁰

Ibn Khaldun treats asabiya not as a substance, a unit of analysis or a trait, but as an abstraction which points to, rather than explains, a phenomenon. Asabiya is not reified as a substantive cause but is conceived as a vitalizing characteristic of the group.

It is a common understanding among most Khaldunian writers that asabiya is a concept interlocked with tribal structure and is particularly associated with segmentation and clanship. Toynbee and other writers²¹ gave the concept a meaning synonymous with a notion of universality, whereas Lacoste and others have interpreted it in a more specific context.²²

Lacoste rejected the interpretation which turns asabiya into a general sociological concept. He argued that it is a notion associated with a tribal structure
and designed to explain that structure. He furthermore claimed that its applicability was limited to North African society only, citing Ibn Khaldun himself who "...places considerable limitations on its spatial extension." It must be pointed out at this juncture that Ibn Khaldun, indeed, used the concept of *asabiya* with certain specificity to the historical context of Medieval North African society, but Lacoste's rejection of the universality of the concept is inconsistent with Ibn Khaldun's use of this concept, as a general theoretical formulation theory, to explain the establishment of the Mongol Empire in central Asia, and its conquests in the Middle East. In his biographical account of the Jaghatai dynasty and their descendants, Ibn Khaldun saw in their victories in central Asia and their conquest of Damascus in the early 15th century, a "...confirmation of his own theory of *asabiya*, of group loyalty, or solidarity, on which, according to him, the continuity of a dynasty depended." This is an indisputable indication that Ibn Khaldun did not attach any spatial restrictions to the concept of *asabiya*.

*Asabiya*'s specificity to a historical context and its association with the attributes of tribal structure particularly that of segmentation and clan does not proscribe its intrinsic characteristics from claiming universality. Apart from its universality, it is apparent from the analysis of the Lebanese conflict, that *asabiya* consists of five variables: agnatic, classificatory, organisational power and ecological variables.

1 **Asabiya as an Agnatic Concept**

As noted in the previous chapter, this is a natural variable based on relationship by blood or birth. Ibn Khaldun maintains that *asabiya* is a function of lineage affiliation or something that fulfils the role of such an affiliation. However, in his *Muqaddimah* he does not refer to *asabiya* as a concept reflecting pristine blood ties among individuals, but he treats it in terms of stratificatory action leading to centralization of authority. As a genealogical concept it fixes a position, for example, the Arabian Qureish *asabiya* ranks highest in the larger Mudar tribe and the Umayyad *asabiya* is the strongest in the Qureish tribe.

The Lebanese social structure is composed of numerous groups whose consanguine relations are manifested through the expression of *asabiya*. These relations are in fact a precondition for the mobilisation of the group. Militias and conflict groups are structured around basic attributes of *asabiya*. For some of them this is expressed more conspicuously than for the others.
Most of the Druze families, and particularly all of the Jumblatt *asabiya*, contributed in men and money to the formation of the Progressive Socialist Party militias. Because they belong to the same *asabiya* as that of the leader of the militia, their loyalty is first to him. The closer the consanguinity the more loyal they are expected to be.

The same is true of the Amal and Hezbollah militias. Members of these militias are linked by blood ties as well as by ideology and geographical affiliations. Loyalty of the militia members to their kin comrades is the strongest kind of loyalty in the group. It is followed and supplemented, in concentric circles, by loyalty to those who come from the same birth place and region.

The Lebanese Forces militias lean on family ties as well as on group feeling generated by the common experience of its dislocated members and sympathisers. The backbone of the rank and file of the Lebanese Forces Militias consist of followers of its leader, Samir Geagea, who were forced out, with him, from his region - North Lebanon. One thing the three militias have in common is that their members are predominantly recruited from rural Lebanon.

2  *Asabiya* as a Classificatory Concept

In its agnatic aspect, *asabiya* is associated with a certain level of social and political structure within the group. Kinship is not enough to describe the conflict groups. However *asabiya* as a classificatory concept has not become clearly structured in the Lebanese conflict groups. It remains embryonic, yet there are definite indications that *asabiya* is moving the classless Druze sect as well as the Shi'a and Maronite confessions into a class society whose main attributes are wealth, power and prestige. Those with stronger *asabiya* have moved upward in the social ladder and those with weaker *asabiya* may remain immobilised.

3  *Asabiya* as an Organizational Concept

Genealogy is also an organizational principle. It fixes a position which is a precondition for the leader in his mobilization efforts. The Jumblatt *asabiya* was the most capable to unite the Druze factions under its power and consolidate their cause.

The agnatic aspect provided an ideological frame of reference within which order and other activities are maintained. It is also a criterion for the generation of feelings of solidarity. However blood relations are not the only criterion upon which the organisation of a group rest. Leadership is a necessary criterion too. Leadership
without *asabiya* is what Ibn Khaldun calls *Mulk Naqis* (part sovereign power) as opposed to *Mulk Haqiqi* (full sovereign power). Leadership is genealogically conceptualised. In fact this case is illustrated by the politico-historical evolution of Lebanon, for between 1920 and 1980 only 172 families ruled Lebanon.\(^\text{25}\)

### 4 Asabiya as a Power Concept

Ibn Khaldun states that no religious or political cause could be successfully fostered or defended unless backed by *asabiya*. *Asabiya* is needed to establish political power within the group and over the whole community. It helps consolidate the influence of religion. *Asabiya* is to be viewed in this respect as a power group engaged in political and para-political-military-combat for power.

A group with strong *asabiya* manifests unity and dynamism which helps it gain domination over other groups and extend it by force over other groups. The other individual groups which possess weaker *asabiya* coalesce with the strongest one to form one single great *asabiya*. For example, the Lebanese Forces combated the Chamoun group and absorbed it. The Forces coalesced with the Guardians of the Cedars and with the Tanzim. Jumblatt won over the Arsalan factions of his sect and encompassed them.

Once the *asabiya* achieves its aims by reaching the full sovereign power, it shares the fruits of power among its members. As soon as they reach the *Mulk* stage and settle in the position of authority the leaders promote their own men who were either their kin (*asabiya* by blood relations) or their allies (*asabiya* by alliance) or their clients (*asabiya* by loyalty) to positions which entail power and allow them to enjoy the fruits of their victory. Ibn Khaldun maintains that once a ruler is firmly settled in his position he embarks on destroying his *asabiya* who had propelled him to power. This was illustrated in the struggle for power inside the Lebanese Forces militia. As soon as Bashir Gemayel settled in his position as the uncontested leader of the Lebanese Forces, he carried out a campaign of annihilation against the groups which helped him achieve this position. He tried to destroy the Marada militia by having its leader, Tony Frangie, and his family assassinated, after which he turned on the Tigers militia of Camille Chamoun and destroyed it completely.

### 5 Asabiya as an Ecological Concept

How does *asabiya* come about?
Ibn Khaldun mentions a few factors. He stated that beyond blood relationship and loyalty, other factors also contribute to the rise of solidarity feeling among the groups. High among these factors is social intercourse, (sharing of the ups and downs of life, common occupation and location).

Blood relations and geographical location may be strongest among all conflict groups. But some groups differ when it comes to alliance and loyalty. With the Druze militias, expression of loyalty takes precedence over alliance, whereas this picture is, to a certain extent, reversed with the Lebanese Forces Militias.

The geographical space factor is a natural condition for breeding solidarity. Common birth place and native towns engender strong solidarity feeling and arouse defence instincts. The Lebanese Forces, Amal, and Progressive Socialist Party memberships are drawn mainly on the basis of village or neighbourhood formation. If we interpolate these variables on the Lebanese social structure we may end up with the following imagery.

IV Asabiya and the Lebanese Social Structure

In order to determine the relevance of the concept of asabiya for the analysis of the conflict groups it is necessary to analyse first the social structure in which these groups existed or from which they emerged. Ibn Khaldun himself used the term as an indicative phenomenon of the relationship between group members, but did not elaborate on the structure of the groups. The role of leadership, ideology and outside threat in enhancing group solidarity was revealed by the Lebanese conflict to be of considerable significance, yet it was marginalized by Ibn Khaldun. Nevertheless the concept of asabiya, though cradled in a fourteenth century culture, is still relevant to explain ethnic, sectarian and communal conflicts today as it was to the tribal wars in medieval times. One of the main reasons for this relevance is the fact that this concept is interlocked with the notion of segmentation and manifests itself best in a war-like situation.

Lebanese society is segmented along a whole range of social and political lines. This qualifies it to an asabiya assessment. We can now turn to the study of the social structure having in mind its effect on the emergence of conflict groups and their asabiya characteristics.

Lebanon’s population of three million is distributed into a variety of segments along a panoply of lines: sectarian, genealogical, geographical, and political. Its more pronounced segmentation which left an indelible mark on the whole system is the
sectarian line. Lebanon is a great sectarian kaleidoscope in the Middle East. Sectarian distinctions are officially recognised but hardly accepted. Conflict over resources has tended to polarise much more easily along sectarian lines. Nevertheless the conflict in Lebanon could not be attributed solely to sectarianism. Other factors - some of which are a by-product of the sectarian distinctiveness - have interplayed with sectarianism to bring about conflict.

1 Segmentation Along Sectarian Lines

Segmentation of Lebanese society is a function of the origin, nature and basic features of its component sects. In tracing the roots of the various sectarian communities, Salibi reckons that the seventeen officially recognized sects in Lebanon are nothing but "tribes in disguise." According to this contention, they are tribes not only in their social behaviour but also in their historical origins. Salibi goes even further to observe that these sects are in fact solidarity groups possessed by a sense of group feeling which reflects the will of the community for self-assertion, defence and attack. This is a lucid pointer to the existence of asabiya within a group.

Salibi's view of the nature of sects and his observation that their inherent feeling of solidarity reflects the community's will to self defence and attack reflects Ibn Khaldun's assertion that asabiya is the force which impels groups to assert themselves, and struggle for primacy.

Salibi tried to ameliorate the influence of religion on the sects' distinctiveness. He held that group solidarity rather than religion binds the sect together. Religion, in his view, was grafted on to tribes to transform and perpetuate them as sects. Ibn Khaldun held the view that religion is a motivating force superior to that of asabiya, yet his concern with religion does not reflect his status as a devoted Moslem and a dedicated jurist and theologian. He regarded religion as part of the social environment, determining political action and operating in conjunction with the interests of the group. Religion in this sense can be viewed as a factor to explain certain political dispositions like the emergence of self-contained conflict groups or even their militias. In his study of the sectarian system in Lebanon, Crow found that religious conceptualisation provided guidance of far reaching consequences for the organisation of political life in the country. Sectarian distinctiveness in Lebanon is not based solely on religion. Socio-economic factors have played a significant role in sectarian contrasts and in the creation of conflict.

Marxist writers, like Odeh and Farsoun, can take comfort in the existence of economically based sectarian contrasts in the Lebanese society, which they
interpreted as class disparities within the social structure. Figures indicated that four percent of the population of the country earned thirty-two percent of the national revenue, whereas fifty percent earned only eighteen percent of its wealth. In 1971, the per capita income was $803 in the capital, whereas in the South it was $151. This discrepancy is expressed along sectarian lines. In a study conducted in 1975 on the national income and literacy rate in Lebanon it was discovered that the average income earned by the Christians was sixteen percent higher than the income earned by the Druzes, and fifty-eight percent higher than that earned by the Shiites. The Literacy rate among the Moslems ranged between one third to one half that of the Christians. In research done by the Institute of Social Sciences of the Lebanese University in Beirut in 1981-82 on the differential distribution of professions in Lebanon, it was revealed that 67.6 percent of the industrialists were Christians compared to 32.4 percent Moslems. Seventy-one percent of the Bankers were Christians, twenty-nine percent Moslems. Among the proprietors of commercial enterprises 75.5 percent were Christians and 24.5 percent Moslems. The same pattern is true also of the proprietors of transport companies, where 72.6 percent of them are Christian and 27.4 percent Moslems. In the field of insurance, seventy-six percent of insurance agents were Christians compared to twenty-four percent Moslems. The law profession is not an exception; seventy-one percent of lawyers were Christians and twenty-nine percent Moslems. In the field of medicine the ratio was 68.15 percent of the physicians Christians against 31.85 percent Moslems.

These structural flaws have indeed contributed to the emergence of cleavages in the social system and have provided the deprived with the needed material for building up a resistance and dissident movement to challenge the existing system. Yet something beyond economic deprivation must be invoked to explain why people took up arms against each other. The challenge to their sectarian aspiration and entitlements and to their communal consciousness did not evolve from economic disparities only but from a complexity of factors whose main locus lies in the power, authority and asabiya structure. The force that motivated these groups to act and transformed them into a power machine seeking authority and domination, was grounded in their asabiya consciousness. Asabiya loomed large as a factor not only in shaping communal consciousness but in determining whether or not a community would achieve hegemony. The mechanism of its operation was similar to the Marxist mechanism that turns the class from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself, and Dahrendorf's quasi groups into conflict groups.
2 Segmentation Along Genealogical Lines

Lebanon's genealogical segmentation is based on a system of patrilineal descent from a common male ancestor. The family name refers to a common agnatic ancestor. Few family names refer to a place or to a point of origin, some are indicative of religious affiliation.

Each family is segmented into a certain number of branches and each branch is sub-segmented into a certain number of lineages which are sub-segmented further down to the nuclear family level. Loyalty in such a system is expressed in an expanding series of concentric circles. The individual's loyalty is first to his family, then to his lineage, then to the branch, then to the clan, and then to the sect. The descendants of two brothers may fight against each other but they join together if they are attacked by the brother of their cousin. An Arab proverb says, "I against my brothers, my brothers and I against my cousin, my cousin and brothers and I against the world."

Lebanese society is characterized also by horizontal segmentation. The Maronites among the Christians conceive of themselves as descendants from the Phoenicians. The Orthodox Christians share with the Moslems a claim of an Arab ancestry.

3 Segmentation Along Geographical Lines

Segmentation is also observed in the geographical distribution of the various sects. Those who live in the mountains of North, central Lebanon, and east Beirut are predominantly Maronites. Those who inhabit the South, eastern Lebanon, and the southern part of Beirut are predominantly Shi'a and those who live in Mount Lebanon to the east and south of Beirut are Druzes. The Sunnis and Orthodox and other minority sects share the coastal regions and the cities. West Beirut together with Tripoli, the second largest city, and Sidon, are a predominantly Sunni stronghold. The patterns of this geographical distribution are indicated by Table 2-1.
Table 2-1: Lebanese Population by Sect and District (1956)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sects</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Mount</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Beq'a</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>76,116</td>
<td>24,423</td>
<td>118,203</td>
<td>29,889</td>
<td>37,067</td>
<td>286,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiites</td>
<td>17,062</td>
<td>22,716</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>148,446</td>
<td>61,044</td>
<td>250,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>71,569</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6,893</td>
<td>7,193</td>
<td>88,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>18,101</td>
<td>224,921</td>
<td>111,917</td>
<td>39,509</td>
<td>29,260</td>
<td>423,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholics</td>
<td>3,617</td>
<td>21,520</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>23,147</td>
<td>35,630</td>
<td>90,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>25,276</td>
<td>32,239</td>
<td>62,767</td>
<td>10,784</td>
<td>17,861</td>
<td>148,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>5,482</td>
<td>3,945</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>14,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>4,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholics</td>
<td>8,809</td>
<td>3,722</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>14,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>42,762</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>63,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldeans</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Catholics</td>
<td>4,757</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>5,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Orthodox</td>
<td>2,745</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>4,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>5,382</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>6,064</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>7,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>220,849</td>
<td>422,193</td>
<td>307,695</td>
<td>264,716</td>
<td>101,063</td>
<td>1,411,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: An-Nahar (Beirut), 26 April 1956

4 Segmentation Along Political Lines

Lebanon's political culture is equally fragmented along party lines. Almost every Lebanese belongs to, and is affiliated with, or sympathises with, one party or another. The major political parties of Lebanon reflect the political segmentation of the country. The Phalanges party is predominantly Maronite, the Najjadi Sunni Moslem, the Progressive Socialist Party, Druzes, and the Amal Movement Shi'a Moslems. Quite a few smaller parties have also the same sectarian composition, for example, National Liberal Party, Guardians of the Cedars and the Tanzim, have Maronite followers. Followers of the Party of God (Hezbollah) are exclusively Shi'ite, and the Moslem Brethren are predominantly Sunni Moslems.

Among the non Arab ethnic groupings in Lebanon the Armenians are the most politically active. The Armenian population belong to either one of their three parties: the Dashnak (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), the Hunchak (Social Democratic Hunchakian), and the Ramgavar Azadagan Party (Constitutional Democrat).
There are other influential parties who disclaim any sectarian or ethnic composition and orientation, and enjoy considerable influence in the political life of Lebanon, such as the Communists, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Ba'athists. Since Lebanon's independence in 1943 these parties have been trying to send elected representatives to the parliament without success. When vacancies became available, seats were filled in 1991 by appointment rather than by elections. It was only then that the Ba'ath and Syrian Social Nationalist parties were able to be represented in the legislature. Their representatives were not the only appointed deputies though. Almost one third of the number of deputies were appointed by the government pending new elections. However, the 1992 elections brought to Parliament more party members.

It is generally recognised that political parties in Lebanon are used as platforms to air grievances and as means of communication more than a mechanism to achieve power. In this sense they reflect the segmented structure and contribute at the same time to its fragmentation.

V Limitations to the Concept of Asabiya

Ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiya remains a valid scheme to analyse the Lebanese conflict, and particularly conflict among groups and conflict group formation. However, the conflict manifested certain relevant asabiya attributes, which were not elaborated by the theory of Ibn Khaldun. Among these are the following which merit attention.

1 Leadership

Strong leadership bestows on asabiya power and determination. Ibn Khaldun left this concept in the background. Lebanon’s conflict projected and pushed it to the foreground. Under the impact of the war the various warring communities came to see in their leaders the concentration and personification of their solidarity (Lebanese Forces and Druze militias and Amal to a lesser extent). The various communities expect their leaders to reflect their collective feelings and make them prevail. The leader is also expected to show devotion to the community. He becomes a symbol and a subject of idealized fantasies (this is particularly true of Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Forces who was assassinated in 1982). The community reciprocates his devotion. He becomes an object of veneration. This enhances the solidarity between the subjects and rulers.
2 Ideology

Asabiya gains in clearness of purpose and strength when the conflict groups adopt an ideological direction. Ibn Khaldun treats ideology as a form of religion. A common religious faith would strengthen the asabiya.

The significance of religion in the asabiya has waned over the centuries, yet we clearly observe in the Lebanese conflict that quite a few of the conflict groups (particularly among the Shi'a and Maronites) do retain formulas of religious tenets as symbols of their communities. At one stage of the conflict, the Lebanese Forces adopted the slogan: "Christian community's security is above everything else". Other groups do not have an expressed ideology but rather a prescribed line of conduct which is silently understood. In the case of Druze militias, it is publicized if it is infringed upon, but rarely broken.

3 External Threat

The threat from an outside factor is a salient solidarity factor in the Lebanese conflict. It is a motive which acted with extraordinary force with at least two militias. The instincts of defence were immediately activated when the Lebanese Forces threatened the Druze stronghold in the Chouf Mountain in the summer of 1983. The outside threat generated a kind of energy that made not only defence possible but also attack an inevitable course. The Lebanese Forces were able to galvanize Maronite public opinion and secure their support by over playing the Syrian threat to their existence.

VI Application of Ibn Khaldun's Concept of Asabiya to the Lebanese Conflict Groups

The domestic conflict parties who were at the end of 1988 engaged wholly or in part in the conflict in Lebanon are shown in Table 2-2 as follows.
### Table 2-2: Current Major Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamic Groups</th>
<th>Control Sect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>Sh'ia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal Al-Islamiya</td>
<td>Pro-Iran splinter of Amal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Sh'ia fundamentalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Majlis Al Islami</td>
<td>Sh'ia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al Sh'ii al-A'la</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Jama'ah al-Islamiyah</td>
<td>Sunni fundamentalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Grouping</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat Al Tahrir Al Islami</td>
<td>Sunni fundamentalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Movements</th>
<th>Control Sect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
<td>Druze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese National Movement</td>
<td>Non-sectarian claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murabitoun</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Action Organisation</td>
<td>Sh'ia radicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Lebanon</td>
<td>Pro-USSR Greek Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba'ath Party- Iraqi Wing</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba'ath Party-Syrian Wing</td>
<td>Alawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasserite Corrective Movement</td>
<td>Sunni extremist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasserite Forces Council</td>
<td>Splinter of the Murabitoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party</td>
<td>Non-sectarian claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Majlis al A'la</td>
<td>(Division within SSNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Tawari</td>
<td>(Division within SSNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Nasserist Organisation</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(United with the Arab Socialist Union)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Working Peoples Forces</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Confrontation Front</td>
<td>Alawite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian Groups</th>
<th>Control Sect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite League</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Block</td>
<td>Maronite Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Lebanon Movement/South Lebanon Army</td>
<td>Pro-Israel Maronite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marada Militia</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanese Front</th>
<th>Control Sect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Phalangas Party</td>
<td>Christians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>Lebanese Front militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardians of the Cedars</td>
<td>Maronite extremists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Tanzim</td>
<td>Maronite extremists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of these groups have been relevant long enough to carve for themselves a position of authority in the socio-political structure, but quite a few have declined in power or ceased to exist. The surviving groups were able to persist through either merger or transformation into politico-military bodies. At present the most influential of these surviving groups are: the Lebanese Forces, the Progressive Socialist Party, the Amal Movement, and the Party of God (Hezbollah).
The survival and relevance of these groups could be attributed to their *asabiya* characteristics. Each one of them manifested at least one or more attributes of *asabiya* (consanguinity, kinship, group passion or power). The first three groups were, until they were joined by the emerging Hezbollah in 1985, the major actors that survived the turbulence and changes in the course of the conflict since its inception in 1975. Their roots go back to a decade or two before the onset of the conflict. The political consciousness of these groups developed, initially, within the existing structure of their respective religious institutions, but as soon as they became strong enough they, with the exception of Hezbollah, broke away from the authority of the church, mosque and Majlis (the Druze religious institution) and reduced the power of these institutions to a symbolic level. However, the religious factor remains an important component upon which the leadership structure falls back, and solicits to keep the cohesion and vitality of the group intact in case *asabiya* wanes.

Hezbollah's role in the domestic conflict and its overall contribution to the conflict process was less central than the role played by the other conflict groups. This may be explained by the fact that its preoccupation with fighting Israeli and American interests in Lebanon shifted the locus of its concern away from the main conflict issues. However, at a post-Taif stage it re-entered the conflict process by way of politics. As soon as conflict was brought down to a manageable and legitimate level through the Taif Accord, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon in September and October, 1992. Having shed its earlier reservations about the political system, Hezbollah joined the political process, submitted the candidacy of several of its members and won twelve seats out of one hundred twenty eight in the new parliament. One of the most strident issues upon which it fought and won the elections was the termination of Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon and the driving out of Western influence from the country.

While Hezbollah refrained from entering directly the conflict process, except in the case of its violent clashes with its co-religionist Amal movement, the other conflict parties perpetuated the conflict in an attempt to achieve their conflictual aims. The role of authority and *asabiya* as power agencies in ancient and modern conflicts in Lebanon is illustrated below.

**VII Differential Distribution of Power and Authority Among the Main Sectarian Communities**

The struggle for power and authority in Lebanon's political culture bears some resemblance to the children's game of "King of the Royal Mountain". One player dominates a high place and claims authority over the territory. Other players attempt
to remove him and take over the command. The strongest among them may succeed, the rest will resort to every possible means, including banding together, design or even siding with the king to achieve their aim. Some others may seek outside help.

This "high place" in the power structure of Mount Lebanon alternated between its two main communities, the Druzes and Maronites. In the restructured post-1920 Lebanon, the power was shared by almost all component communities. The Sunni, Shi'a, and some other Christian communities emerged as active participants in Lebanon's modern political culture. The shift in the power foci is a result of long historical sequences of communal conflict and reconciliation. We are going to examine in the following section the process through which the major communities came to occupy the "high places" in the power and authority structure.

A The Maronites' Power

The Maronites' ascendency to power and to a dominant position in the authority structure in Lebanon was achieved gradually over a period of thirteen centuries. This historical process marked the emergence and maturation of their religious ethos and communal consciousness, which developed along nationalistic lines. Their ascendency and dominance evolved in three stages, each marked by major turning points leading to new developments.

The first stage that ended in 1861, was marked by intensive spells of inter-sectarian conflict between the Maronites and the Jacobites in Syria, and toward the end of this stage, between them and the Druzes in Mount Lebanon. The Maronite church played a predominant role in the emancipation of the community's consciousness and in forging its social coherence and imbibing in them a nationalistic feeling.

The second stage extended from 1861 to 1920 and was distinguished by a consolidation of the Maronites' power and authority status in the state structure. Their connections with the European powers, especially France, enhanced their domestic political and social status during this period.

The third stage lasted from 1920 to 1975 and was marked by the entrenchment of the Maronites' authority status in the constitutional as well as institutional structures. They reached the apex of their communal power with the attainment of statehood in 1943. A decade later they had to struggle in order to preserve their dominant authority status. They could not maintain the status quo for long in the face of mounting counter-claims to the same rewards. Soon they found
themselves in a conflictual situation with the rival communities and their rising expectations. Toward the end of this era conflict broke out into inter and intra communal armed clashes which ended with the transfer of part of their power to the contending communities and the subsequent reduction in their authority status.

Under the Druze dynasty of al-Ma'ni and particularly their Emir Fakhr al-Din II al-Ma'ni (1590-1634), the Maronites had their first opportunity to entrench themselves in the power and economic structure of the princedom. They were invited into the Chouf area and the Beq'a Valley where they worked the land and established industry. Some of them were enlisted in the Emir's army and his advisory councils. Soon they outnumbered the Druze inhabitants in these areas. Moosa observes that "...the period of Fakhr al-Din II al-Ma'ni, marks the rise of the Maronite community to an unprecedented eminence." This trend continued under Fakhr al-Din's successor. The Maronite community continued to grow, under the tolerant rulership of non-Maronite Emirs, in numbers, power and prestige. In the early eighteenth century two of the most influential Maronite families, al-Khazen and Hubeish, were elevated up the social ladder to the rank of feudal lords and were treated on equal footing with the Druze feudal families.

1 The Chehabi Period

In the mid-eighteenth century, the Sunni Chehab Dynasty, successors of the al-Ma'nis, was converted to Christianity and joined the Maronite Church. The Maronites, who already were enjoying the protection of the French, started to look ahead for a prominent position in the power structure of the princedom. The Chehabi Emirs chose a Maronite as their Mudabber (administrator and chief counsellor whose position entailed immense influence and power in running the affairs of the princedom).

The Maronites found the Chehab dynasty a personification of their ambition for turning Mount Lebanon into a homeland. Bishop Nicholas Murad went further to claim that the Chehabi princedom was a Christian dynasty and Druze were rebels against the "...legitimate Maronite authority." Conflict between the two communities escalated. The political system itself was embroiled in the conflict process and became a part of the issue in dispute. The Druzes rebelled against the authority of the Chehab dynasty and the Maronites embraced it. Within a period of two decades ending in 1860, the whole political order collapsed and with it the feudal system (iqt'a), which was the backbone of the authority structure in Mount Lebanon.
In trying to resolve the conflict, the Ottoman power, under whose suzerainty Mount Lebanon was placed, divided Lebanon into two districts (Qayem Maqamiyyah) - a northern district under a Maronite ruler (Qayem Maqam) and a southern district under a Druze ruler. This was a form of cantonization which did not last for more than two decades (1842-1860), during which conflictual tendencies proliferated and were intensified by the refusal of the Maronites of the South to accept the authority of a Druze governor. At the same time, the Maronites of the North were afflicted by an intra-communal conflict between the peasants and the landlords. The clergy played a significant role in instigating the peasants in both districts to revolt against their feudal landlord. The spiralling tension finally broke out on 29 April 1860 into a civil war involving the Maronites and the Druzes. The ordeal was resolved by the intervention of the then major world powers (England, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria), which established a new political order whereby the two districts were reunited under a non-Lebanese Christian governor appointed by the Ottoman authorities and approved by the intervening foreign powers. The governor was to be assisted by an elected administrative council representing the sects of the country. This arrangement remained in force until the First World War. The Maronites were granted a significant political role, which brought them closer to the centre of power and guaranteed them an influential position in the new power structure. "It seems that the Maronites got the best of the deal. Under the new regime the Maronites began to mature politically...they came to regard Lebanon as their exclusive homeland." The Administrative Council itself played a central role in the stability of the country.

2 The Administrative Council Period

The establishment of the Administrative Council marked the beginning of the second stage in the Maronites' ascent to power. This Council was established in 1861 and revised in 1864 as a part of constitutional measures taken by the intervening foreign powers in concurrence with the Ottoman Empire. It was meant to serve two objectives: to resolve the communal conflict, and to establish an alternative political system to the defunct feudal system.

This constitutional arrangement disposed of the two Qayem Maqamiyyah regimes in Mount Lebanon and established a single administration for both districts, headed by a non-Lebanese Christian Mutasarref (Governor) appointed by the Ottoman Sultan. The Council was constituted on the basis of a sectarian and geographic distribution of the population. It consisted originally of twelve members: four Maronites, two Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shi'a Moslem and one Sunni Moslem.
The constitutional arrangement of 1861 introduced the principle of confessional representation to the political culture of Mount Lebanon. An earlier attempt by Bashir III in 1841 to distribute political power among the confessional communities had failed. At the request of Salim Pasha, the Governor of Beirut, Bashir III formed an advisory council for himself consisting of ten representatives drawn proportionally from the various component sects of Mount Lebanon; three Maronites, three Druzes, while the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics, the Shi'a Moslems and the Sunni Moslems each had one. The Druzes refused to send representatives to this Council on the grounds that it "curtails their authority and privileges", whereas the Maronite representatives were selected by the church who at the same time lobbied to increase their numbers from three to six.

In 1864, the constitutional structure was revised to give the Maronites more power in the form of an additional seat on the Council. Under the revised arrangement, the Council's membership became as follows: four for the Maronites, three for the Druzes, two for the Greek Orthodox, and one for each of the Greek Catholic, Shi'a and Sunni communities. This arrangement continued from 1864 to 1918. It collapsed with the demise of the Ottoman Empire, but many of the concepts embodied in it were passed on to the political system of the newly formed Republic of Greater Lebanon and were enshrined in its 1926 Constitution.

The Council as an overall institutional framework and an electoral system constituted a venue for the political leadership of the various communities to rise to power. The Maronite community found in it an opportune vehicle for their ascendancy that was achieved, in a zero-sum formula, at the expense of the Druze.

The Maronite claim to position of authority did not end there. The first Mutasarref of Mount Lebanon, Dawud Pasha, who ruled from 1861 to 1868, introduced the post of deputy chairman of the Council and apportioned it to a Maronite. There was no provision for this post in the Reglement Organique of 1861 but it was created by Dawud Pasha and became a precedent for his successors. The position of a deputy chairman entailed power and authority. In the absence of the Governor, he had to chair the meetings and run the affairs of the Council.

With time the powers of the Council were transformed from an advisory nature to actual decision-making. Its authority and influence were enhanced by the increased assertiveness of the Council and its public stature. Slowly but steadily it moved to the centre of politics of Mount Lebanon. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the withering away of the Ottoman administration in Lebanon
and Syria in October 1918, the Council assumed the State functions and ran the
country on its own until September 1, 1920 - the day Lebanon was proclaimed the
State of Greater Lebanon under French Mandate. The Council has been credited
with ushering the country into its early experience in a parliamentary culture.

The end of the second stage in the Maronite ascendancy to power coincided
with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War and the
transfer of Mount Lebanon into the hands of France. Two years later, France was
granted mandatory powers by the League of Nations with instructions to offer
countries like Lebanon "...administrative advice and assist in their political and
economic development until such a time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes
of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the
Mandatory."47

3 The Mandate Period

The third stage was ushered in with the creation of the Republic of Greater
Lebanon on September 1, 1920. This stage was associated with the growth in the
temporal power of the Maronite Church. It was able to fuse the interests of the two
main stratas of the Maronite community, the Mashaykh (aristocracy) and the
peasants, into a unified group that was capable of collective action. It acted as an
agency to build a feeling of deep communal loyalty and to spread communal
consciousness.48 The Maronite community became aware of its objective communal
position when it entered, in the mid-nineteenth century, into a conflictual relationship
with the Druze community in Mount Lebanon with whom they shared a state of
coeexistence. The conflict helped the Maronite community develop from a community-
in-itself, that is a collectivity of co-religionists sharing common values, to a community-
for-itself, that is a community whose members became aware of their true interests.
This awareness, which grew as a result of their conflict with the Druzes, created in the
Maronites a feeling of common identity and deep interest in Lebanon. This interest
was due to their conviction that Lebanon could constitute a shield for their minority
status in the surrounding Islamic countries. Their growing communal consciousness
prodded the Maronites to conclude that their emancipation required their domination
of the Lebanese political order.

Communal consciousness propelled the Maronites further inside the power
circle. Jumblatt attributes their new position of power to two factors: their communal
awakening, and the assistance they received from the French Mandate.49 Smock and
Smock agree with Jumblatt. They note that "...the French created Greater Lebanon in
order to strengthen the position of Lebanon's Maronite community as well as to
reward the Maronites for their faithful allegiance to France." Concurring with this observation, Owen states that the French deliberately created Greater Lebanon "...to secure refuge for their Christian protégé."

The French organised the administration of Greater Lebanon on a sectarian basis. The first French High Commissioner, General Henry Gouraux, appointed in September 1920 an advisory Administrative Council consisting of fifteen members who represented the various sects in the country to assist in the governing of Lebanon. Three weeks later this number was increased to seventeen by adding two Sunni Moslem members, and was composed confessionally as follows: Maronites six, Sunni Moslems four, Shī'a Moslems two, Orthodox three, Catholic one and Druze one. This Council was dissolved and replaced in March 1922 by an elected representative Council whose seats were also distributed proportionally along sectarian lines. The nature of this Council was similar to the earlier Administrative Council of 1864, and was purely consultative and void of any legislative powers. Yet it had a profound influence on the political culture of Lebanon. The final confessional character of the electoral system was established by this Council.

The Council of 1922 consisted of thirty members: ten Maronites, six Sunni Moslems, five Moslem Shī'a, four Orthodox, two Druzes, two Catholics and one other. The Council elected a Maronite, Habib Pasha al-Sa'd, as its first president. He was succeeded in the following two other annual terms also by Maronite candidates: Na'um Labakie in 1923 and Emile Eddé in 1924. In January of the following year, the council was dissolved and a new council elected in July of the same year on the same basis. This council saw the birth of the first Lebanese Constitution, which was promulgated on May 24, 1926. It observed the sectarian composition of the country. It also provided for the establishment of two chambers.

The various sects were proportionally represented in both chambers. However, its first president Charles Debbas (1926-1933) was a member of the Greek Orthodox sect. When a Moslem tried to run for the presidency of the Republic in 1932, the French Governor intervened and "refused to allow the Chamber to select" him. Instead a Maronite, Habib Pasha al-Sa'd, was elected to the post. All subsequent presidents, with the exception of two, were Maronites. These two were: Mr Ayoub Tabet, a member of the Protestant sect who ruled from March 18 to July 21, 1943, and Mr Pedro Trad a member of the Greek Orthodox sect who ruled from July 21 to September 21, 1943. On the other hand a Sunni was elected for the first time as a Prime Minister in 1937 and a Shī'a as Speaker of the House of Representatives, in 1943.
This position of power that the Maronites achieved in 1920 was in 1943 still precarious. They could not persuade the French Mandatory power to enshrine it in the 1926 Constitution. All the Constitution stipulated was that the president of the republic should be Lebanese. "The Maronites and their church were determined that a Maronite should be president..." The Maronites' campaign to achieve this goal was opposed by other communities.

The third stage of the development of Lebanon's political culture and the Maronites ascendancy to power was associated with the attainment of Independence in 1943 and the formation of the National Pact in October of the same year. The Pact institutionalised all power positions of the various communities, including that of the Maronites. What the Maronites could not accomplish constitutionally, they obtained institutionally. Their failure to have their newly gained position of dominance explicitly enshrined in the 1926 Constitution was mitigated by their success in having it institutionalised in the 1943 National Pact.

The Constitution provided for an equitable representation of the component sects in the Cabinet and bureaucracy and aimed at ensuring the representation of the major religious communities, and preventing the dominance of one community to the exclusion of others. However the constitution organized the power structure in such a way that it gave a large measure of authority to the Chief executive who was designated by the 1943 National pact to be a Maronite. Article 17 of the Constitution concentrated in the hands of the president the bulk of the executive functions. Article 18 gave him the power to propose legislation, Article 57 enabled him to veto legislation, Article 55 empowered him to dissolve the Parliament, Article 76 authorized him to propose amendments to the Constitution, Article 53 permitted him to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and any minister as well. Placing in the hands of the Chief Executive such extensive powers involved risks specially if that person was at the same time the leader of one group or community. This would make that particular community the predominant repository of power.

B The Druzes' Power

The power relation between the Druzes and Maronites in Mount Lebanon assumed a zero-sum condition. The Maronites' gains were the Druzes' losses. Furthermore, the locus of power shifted from the Druze community to the Maronites.

The Druze ascent to power started with the Tanukh dynasty, reached its apex with the M'anis, and its nadir under the Chehab Sunni dynasty. During the Mutasarrifiyyah, the Mandate and independence periods, their power was routinized.
but remained vigorous. The rise and decline of their power passed through three stages: the Imarah period, 1519-1842, the Qayem Maqamiyyah period, 1842-1864, and the Mutasarrifiyah, Mandate and independence periods, 1864-1975. During the first stage the Druzes' power reached its zenith. It started its long journey downwards during the Mutasarrifiyah period, and levelled off after independence.

1 The Imarah Period

The Druzes initial appearance as a major political power in Mount Lebanon and the Levant was associated with the Ottoman conquest of the Levant in 1516 and the rise to prominence of the Ma'n dynasty. However, their existence in Mount Lebanon is much older than that.

As a result of the Arab conquest of Syria, many Arabian tribes gravitated into Mount Lebanon as well as other parts of Syria. Among these tribes were the Tannukhs, the first tribe in Lebanon to convert to Druzism. This tribe was sent in the year 763 by the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, Abu Ja'afar al-Mansour, for the purpose of repelling the Byzantine invasions of the coastal regions and putting an end to the harassment of the Maradites who were the Byzantine's domestic allies.

The Tanukhs controlled the whole coastal area that extends from Latakia in Syria, to Acre in Palestine. They established two princedoms, one in Latakia and the other in Beirut, with jurisdiction over the surrounding mountainous area known as the Gharb. The Tanukhs' rule over the Ashwaf (Mount Lebanon) persisted for a period of eight centuries.

Salibi stated that the Tanukh tribes in the Ashwaf accepted in the year 1026 the Druze faith whereas Hamze claimed that they were proselytized earlier, when they received the call at the hands of the special emissaries who were sent in 1017 by the Hakim. In any case, the Tanukhs of Mount Lebanon were the first Druze Dynasty to rule that part of Lebanon. The Tanukhs' and their descendants, the Buhturs, main contribution to the political life of the principedom was limited to their role as protectors of the gateways to the interior. In this capacity, they fought the Byzantine Armies and later the Crusaders in the twelfth century.

Salibi contested the claim that the Tanukhs and their descendants were reigning princes in their own right. He claimed that "...they were simply the most prominent family of Druze notables in the region." In his view their loyalty was given to whichever Islamic regime was established in Damascus. They kept close relations with the Mamlukes of Egypt before and after their conquest of Damascus, and they entered into intense conflictual relations with their neighbours to the North, the
Turkomans of Kisrewan. Abu Izzeddin mentioned that the genealogical register of the Arsalan family showed that the title of the Tanukh’s Chief was Prince of the Mountain and sometimes Prince of the Gharb, and his sphere of influence included Beirut and Sidon as well as their environs.

The Tanukh principedom was ruled by two dynasties: from the middle of the eighth century to the mid-twelfth century by the Arsalans, and from the mid-twelfth to the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516, by the Buhturis. The Tanukh dynasty was credited with the spread of the Druze faith, once the Mamluke’s persecution of non-Sunni sects was lifted.

Sayed Jamal Uddine Abdullah al-Tanukhi (1417-1479), revered by the Druzes as al-Sayed (the master), was recognised as the first to “…institute and head a Council of the Initiates which united the Druzes of the Chouf Mountain under its leadership and exercised moral power over them.” This was a source of political strength to the Druzes. It was the beginning of their organization as a theo-ethnic community and the start of their communal awakening. The Maronite community earlier had a similar organization, namely the church. Such an organized existence was absent from the Shi’a and Sunni structures. The Shi’a had a long tradition of religious scholarship but this was confined to communal politics.

Toward the end of the Tanukhs’ rule, internal conflict broke out between the two main lines of succession, the Buhturis and the Arsalans. The conflict was aggravated by the fact that each one of these two dynasties belonged to a different asabiya, the Arsalan line belonged to the Yemeni asabiya, and the Buhturi to the rival Qaysi asabiya. The feud and the pressure coming from the neighbouring Ma’n dynasty weakened the Tanukhs’ power. The Ma’nis, with the help of the Buhtur line, who belonged to the same asabiya, made few inroads into the Tanukh sphere of influence. The cooperation between the Ma’ns and Buhturs developed into an alliance whose main bond was the inter-marriages between them.

The Ma’n principedom in the Chouf existed side by side with the Tanukh principedom in the Gharb. The Ma’nis were of the Druze faith and claimed descendence from the Rabi’a tribe in the Arabian Peninsula, whose members migrated to Syria following the Arabian conquest of the region. They fought the Crusaders in northern Syria before moving to the Beq’a Valley in eastern Lebanon, and from there to southern Lebanon, at the request of the Mamluke governor of Damascus, in order to assist the Tanukhs in their defence of the region against the Franks. They settled in the Chouf area and were welcomed by their neighbours, the Tanukhs, with whom they entered into an inter-marriage relationship.
The Kisrewan region to the north of the Druze areas was originally inhabited by the Twelver Shi'a. Their co-religionists inhabited also the Ba'albek region in eastern Lebanon as well as southern Lebanon. The Sunni Mamlukes invaded Kisrewan and uprooted the Shi'a and brought in the Sunni Turkoman tribes and settled them in their place.

The Turkoman's presence in Kisrewan created a conflictual situation between them and the Tanukhs of the Gharb who were at the same time Governors of the district of Beirut. The Tanukhs were vying for the control of the Kisrewan region too, expecting the Mamlukes to grant it to them as a reward for their military support. War broke out between the two dynasties. The Turkomans were victorious due to the assistance they received from the Mamlukes but a few years later the Mamlukes transferred their support from the Turkomans back to the Tanukhs, due to the fact that the Turkomans fell up against the line of the Circassian Mamlukes of Egypt. The client tribes in the Beq'a Valley in eastern Lebanon were instructed to give a helping hand to the Tanukhs in their military campaign against the Turkomans of Kisrewan. The Tanukhs won the war and took control of the Kisrewan region. It remained in their hands until the coming of the Ottoman Turks in 1516, then the Turkoman re-emerged, under the Assaf dynasty, (1517-1593) from neighbouring Mount Lebanon to settle in the region and acted as political agents to the Ottomans.

2 The Ma'n Period

The Tanukh power started to wane with the advent of the Ottoman rule in Syria in 1516. The Tanukhs' alliance with the adversaries of the Ottomans, the Mamlukes, cost them their princedom. Internal strife between the two asabiyas of the Tanukh dynasty, the Buhturi and Arsalan and between the latter and the Ma'nis coupled with the external pressure coming from the Ottoman ruler in Damascus, brought the rule of the Tanukh dynasty in 1633 to an end, and heralded the rise to power of the Ma'n dynasty.

At the time of the Ottoman conquest of Syria the Ma'n dynasty was already settled in the Chouf area of Mount Lebanon. The Ma'nis authority over this region was soon recognized by the Ottoman Sultan Salim I on the grounds that the Ma'nis sided with the Ottomans in their wars against the Mamlukes. By the same token, the Tanukhs were persecuted for their support of the Mamlukes. In 1516, Sultan Salim I rewarded the Ma'nis by confirming them as Emirs of the region.

The first ruler of the Ma'n dynasty was Fakhr al-Din I. The seat of his princedom was the Druze town of Ba'akleen. His son, Qarqamaz, inherited the
princedom and ruled it for forty years, 1544-1584. Due to a misunderstanding with the
Ottoman authority, he fled his seat, died in hiding in 1588, and was succeeded by his
son Fakhr al-Din II, who was only 12 years of age. Fakhr al-Din II and his minor
brother Younes were taken away to the Khazen family in northern Lebanon, a
Maronite family which belonged to the same Yemeni asabiya and the two were hidden
there for six years. At the age of eighteen, Fakhr al-Din II returned to the Chouf area
and claimed the principedom for himself. The principedom was administered during his
absence by his uncle who willingly turned over the reigns to him.

Fakhr al-Din II ruled from 1585 to 1635. During this period the power of the
house of Ma'n and with them the Druzes, reached its zenith. Fakhr-al Din II united all
ruling families and assumed supremacy over them. With the help of a strong army of
one hundred thousand soldiers, he established an independent power over all of
Lebanon and part of Palestine and Syria. He established strong commercial relations
with the Grand Duke of Tuscany who helped him in his development projects and sent
him Italian engineers and agricultural experts to help in building roads and improving
agriculture, particularly silk production and olive growing. During this period he was
able to extend his domain from the central parts of Mount Lebanon to Acre in the
South and Antioch in the North, and as far as Palmyra in Syria. He expelled the
remaining Shi'a from Kisrewan and invited the Christian peasantry to settle there. His
control over the Kisrewan region "...directly linked the principal areas of Druze and
Maronite settlement in the Mountain, paving the way for the emergence of an inter­
sectarian system." This step was followed by a few other measures, which improved the status of
the Christians, that is, Maronites, and strengthened the relations between the two
communities. Until then the Christians were treated like second class citizens, but he
elevated two of their notable families to the same rank as that of the Druze notables,
and the rest of the Maronite populace to the same civil status rank as his dominant
group, the Druzes. The nineteenth century Maronite historian, Istefan Duwayhi
remarked that, "...during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II the Christians raised their heads,
they built churches, rode on saddled horses, and wore white turbans...most of his
armies were Christians and his advisers and servants were Maronites."

During his reign foreign missionaries started to descend on his country. In
1625, the Capuchin order sent its first mission to his principedom. It was headed by
Friar Joseph Capuche, the adviser to Cardinal Rochellio, the Foreign Minister of
Louis XIII. It established its first monastery in Sidon followed by three other
monasteries in Beirut, Aleppo and Cairo. Fakhr al-Din II gave the mission ample
In 1631 he authorized the Franciscan Monks to establish a mission and allowed them to preach their faith freely.

It is during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II that the Christians from North Lebanon started to move to the South and inhabited the Druze settlements. He permitted them to practise their religious rites publicly and freely, a right they did not enjoy under the Ottomans. Ma'alouf concluded that Fakhr al-Din's tolerance encouraged the "...Christians to colonise Lebanon and to gain privileges." The influx continued at a faster pace during the reign of the successor dynasty, the Chehabs (1697-1842).

Fakhr al-Din II's policies of expansion riled the Ottoman Sultans. In every step he took he acted as an independent sovereign. He established strong relations between his principedom and that of the merchant princes in Tuscany who were the chief rivals of the Ottomans in the East Mediterranean. In 1635, the Ottomans captured and executed him at Constantinople. The Ma'n reign continued, through his nephew and son, until it came to an end in 1697.

Ma'alouf pointed to another reason for the Ottoman displeasure with Fakhr al-Din II: his patronage and protection of the Christians. As soon as he was deposed the Ottomans lost no time in deporting the Franciscan missionaries and caused some of the Maronites to flee the country to Italy. Upon the extinction of the Ma'n dynasty in 1697, the reign passed to their kin, the Chehabi rulers of Wadi al-Taym, who ruled Lebanon until 1842.

With the demise of the Ma'n dynasty the Druze power started its long decline. The transfer of rulership from the Ma'n line to their agnates, the Chehabis, brought with it three phenomena. The first was a continuity in the gradual build up of the Maronite authority in the traditional Druze power structure and a corresponding decline in the Druze authority within that structure. The second was the growth in the conflictual tendencies between the two communities due to the shift in the power locus from the Druzes, to the Maronites, which created an imbalanced authority relationship. The third was the demographic changes inside the principedom due to the internal conflict and to population movement. Such change influenced the balance of power between the two communities to the advantage of the Maronites.

3 The Chehabi Period

The Ma'n dynasty was not extinguished with the death of Fakhr al-Din II. Of his five sons only the youngest, Husein, was spared. The rest were killed either in battle or hanged. Husein was taken by the Ottomans and brought up in their courts. He ended up as their ambassador to India. Fakhr al-Din II was succeeded by his
nephew Melhim, followed in 1657 by Melhim's son, Ahmed, who ruled until 1697. Following Ahmed's death the male line of the Ma'n dynasty became extinct and the succession passed on, through a process of election carried out by the Druze notables of the Ma'n princedom, to Ahmed's nephew, Bashir Chehab of Wadi al-Taym. The Ottomans objected. They wanted Ahmed's grandson from his daughter, Haydar Chehab, to inherit the princedom, but since Haydar was still a minor it was agreed that Bashir would rule on behalf of Haydar until the latter reached maturity.

Toward the end of the Ma'nis rule internal conflict intensified between the two main asabiyas of the Druze society, the Qaysi and the Yemeni. This conflict continued well into the eighteenth century and broke out into intra-communal clashes in 1711. The Qaysi asabiya was victorious. The rival asabiya had to emigrate to Hawran, in Syria, where it established a Druze colony known as Jabal al-Druze (Mountain of the Druzes). As a result of the expulsion of the Yemeni asabiya from Lebanon the size of the Druze community was reduced and the numerical strength of the Maronites bolstered. This conflict sealed the fate of the Ma'n dynasty and paved the way for the Chehab dynasty in its bid for the succession of the Ma'ns.

The Sunni Chehab family ruled a princedom that was controlled largely by the Druzes. The Maronites of the princedom, and the Christians in general, were numerically predominant, but politically weak. The Christians, who started coming in from different areas to settle in the Ma'n and Chehab dominion, were mostly "...peasants, settling on estates of Druze feudal chiefs. It was their Druze feudal master ...who stood out as the strongest political force in the land."

The Druze hegemony over the princedom remained unchallenged until the middle of the nineteenth century. The Maronites started their journey upwards on the power scale through their bureaucratic influence, but the Druze feudal lords remained the backbone of the polity of the princedom. However, the Maronite ascendancy toward the centre of authority started with their growing numbers and social and economic relevance, whereas the Druze ranks had been weakened by internal conflict, which reflected power rivalries between the two main asabiyas and the notables. The Chehabis did not waste time in exploiting this situation. It is worth mentioning that the Qaysites and their allies supported the Chehabis, whereas the Yemenites opposed them.

Emir Bashir Chehab was murdered in 1707 and succeeded by his cousin Emir Haydar Chehab. The Yemeni asabiya did not support his selection as he was from the rival asabiya. Their opposition to the Qaysi ascendency continued to fester inside
the Druze community until 1711 - the year when both asabiyas fought each other in the village of Ain-Darah, to the east of Beirut.

Following its victory in Ain-Darah, the Qaysi asabiya monopolized the power in the princedom for a long period. However, the Qaysi notables were not the direct beneficiaries of this victory; it was the Chehabi rulers who got the biggest share of it. The weakening of the Druzes allowed the Chehabs to tighten their grip on the feudal lords of the Druzes and were able to enter into a new alliance with the most powerful of their lords, Sheikh Bashir Jumblatt. They distributed the Yemeni lands and property to these notables and elevated some of them in social status to that of sheikhs and Emirs. Among those invested by the Chehabs were the Jumblatts who were given the title of Sheikhs. Their rival family, the Arsalans, were ranked among the Emirs.

The feuds among the Druzes ended temporarily with the battle of Ain-Darah. However, the rift between the two asabiyas reappeared under different designation. It took the form of a Yazbaki-Jumblatti divide in modern times. This cleavage is associated with the Chehab inter family feuds. Haydar's son, Melhim, succeeded his father in 1732 and remained in office until 1754. His brother Mansour succeeded him. This angered his other brother Ahmed who was supported by the Jumblatt asabiya, which included most of the powerful Druze families and had the Maronite Khazen family in the North as their ally. Ahmed enjoyed the support of the discredited Yazbaki families, like the Imads, Talhuqs and Abdel Malik, who had on their side the Maronite Hubeish and Dahdah families of the North. This Druze Yazbaki-Jumblatti division involved all the families in Mount Lebanon. Salibi was not impressed with that. He acknowledged this Druze involvement, but observed that "...the fact that the Druzes could still impose their party divisions on the rest of the country was poor compensation for their steady, and now evident, loss of power. When Emir Melhim retired, the Druzes were already a minority in their own districts." The Druze's loss of power was the Maronites' gain in authority. Emir Melhim Chehab was the last Chehabi Emir to profess the Sunni Moslem faith. His sons and successors were converted to Christianity; so were the other succeeding Chehabs and Abil-alam Emirs. The Maronites' position was further enhanced by the arrival from Syria of Greek Catholic families and the establishment of foreign Christian Catholic missionaries (Franciscans, Lazarites, Carmelites and Jesuits). Of significant consequence for the Druze-Maronite relationship was the treaty signed in 1535 between Francis 1 and Suleiman the Magnificent that gave France capitulary privileges in the Ottoman Empire. This allowed France to patronize the Maronites in Lebanon directly.
The end of the eighteenth century witnessed a shift in the balance of power between the Maronites and the Druzes. As the Maronites grew stronger the Druzes grew weaker until, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Maronites came to replace the Druzes as the predominant political power. "The conversion of Emir Melhimm's sons to Christianity in 1756, and the succession of the Maronite Yusuf Chehab in 1770 finally set the seal to the Druze decline."87

Although the Maronites were now recognized as the predominant sect, the Druze community continued to play a significant political role which the Chehabis could not afford to ignore. The relations between the two communities were peaceful. Salibi claimed that the Druzes did not object to the continuous flux of the Maronites, Orthodox and Catholics into their region and their settlement in their villages. "For a long time they continued to regard the Maronites as allies, and apparently remained without suspicion of Christian political ambitions."88

When Bashir Chehab II came to power in 1788 he was able to manipulate the internal and external forces in his favour and thus successfully maintained power as the uncontested ruler of Mount Lebanon for a record period of fifty-two years, from 1788 to 1840.

At an early stage of his rule Bashir II curbed the powers of his foes, as well as his prospective competitors, the Druze notables. Cobban claims that he robbed the Druze notables of their wealth and reduced them to subservience.99 Of all the Druze families only the Jumblatts, headed by Sheikh Bashir, were able to retain their positions. Chehab's alliance with Sheikh Bashir enabled him to build an unrivalled power base in Mount Lebanon. Abu Izzeddin claimed that the Jumblatt chieftain was more powerful than Emir Bashir in men and money.90 This was a source of worry to the Chehab ruler. He started harassing Sheikh Bashir by his requests for donations, contributions and taxes. Finally the estrangement between the two was inevitably completed. Emir Bashir was able to eliminate Sheikh Bashir Jumblatt and with his demise the destruction of Druze feudalism was achieved. With the disappearance from the scene of Sheikh Bashir, Betts maintained, "...the Druzes entered a period of serious decline as the Chehabis seized Jumblatt's holdings, instituted large scale confiscations of the properties of Druze Shaykhs, forced sales of land and generally impoverished many families..."91

Persecution of the Druzes continued until the downfall of Emir Bashir. His ally Mohammed Ali of Egypt sent, in 1832, an army under his son Ibrahim Pasha, into Syria and Lebanon in an attempt to overthrow the Ottoman Sultan. The Egyptians,
with the connivance of Emir Bashir, tried to impose forced conscription on the Druze youth, but were faced by a strong rejection. The Druzes rebelled against the Egyptian army, and a good number of them fled the country to Jabal al-Druze causing further decline in the Druze population of Mount Lebanon. They were relieved only upon the removal of Bashir II and his exile to Malta in 1840. Following that, the Druze deportees to Egypt and the refugees in Syria returned to their areas and claimed back their lands and properties which Bashir II had confiscated and distributed to the Maronites.

In 1842, the Maronites and Druzes entered into a new era of conflictual relations. The tension between the two communities accumulated over a period of two decades and broke out in 1860 into a civil war that claimed thousands of lives, caused enormous destruction to property, and invited the major powers of the time to intervene and impose a settlement to the conflict. The resolution of this conflict ushered a new political order in which the Maronites' position of dominance was recognized and officially instituted in the constitutional arrangement agreed upon between the major powers and the Ottoman suzerain.

C Other Sects and Communities

a The Sunnites

The contribution of the rest of the communities to the political life of Mount Lebanon was less strident due to their minor numerical strength and to their dispersed demographic distribution. Until 1920, the Sunni community considered itself a part of the larger Islamic Umma (nation) and the Shi'a were obsessed by a perception of marginality. It was only at the turn of the century that the Shi'a began to develop an interest in the national life of Lebanon. Their active participation came only after the creation of the Republic of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and the enlargement of the area of Lebanon to encompass their habitation. However, both communities' contributions helped readdress the balance of domestic power and the distribution of authority in the Lebanese system.

Although the Sunni Moslem community's active participation in the political process came at a later stage, its presence in the region goes as far back as the other two communities. Sunnism in Lebanon dates back to the arrival in 635 of the first Moslem armies in Ba'albek and what is today eastern Lebanon. They settled, at the request of Muaweya, the then governor of Damascus, along the shores, whereas the Christians chose the mountains as their habitat. Encouragement to settle along the coastal region came also from the Abbasides in Baghdad, the successors of the
Muaweya regime, with the purpose of having an Islamic ally keeping watch over the shores and coastal highway against the invasions of the Byzantines and later on the Crusaders.

The Sunnis' contribution to the political and administrative life of Mount Lebanon was not less than that of the other communities. They had one seat out of six on the Advisory Council during the *Qaem Maqamiyyah* period and another seat out of twelve in the Central Administrative Council of the *Mutasarrifiyyah*. However, following the creation of the Republic of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the Sunnis' numbers increased by virtue of the annexation of additional areas populated mainly by Sunnis. Prior to that, the Sunnis perceived themselves as part of the state structure of the Ottoman Empire. Khuri argues that this was a quintessential characteristic of the Sunni ideology. "The Sunni feel religiously lost once they lose central power." During the Ottoman rule the Sunnis of Lebanon felt they were part of the state structure, their authority status was associated with that of the state.

After 1920, as citizens of a newly created Lebanon, the Sunnis found themselves outside the authority structure of the Ottoman state and in an inferior position to that of the Maronites. Their rigorous contribution to Lebanon's political culture became more apparent after 1936. In spite of the fact that the authority structure in an independent Lebanon was not as open to them as it was under the Sunni Ottoman rule, they attained the second highest position in the power structure of independent Lebanon.

b **The Shiites**

The Shi'a's contribution to Lebanon's political culture before 1920 was marginal. Khuri suggests that the reason for that is found in the orientation of their religious ideology and organisation. He maintains that it is adapted to the sovereignty of the religious community rather than the state.

Being a marginalized community, measured by its under representation in government and administration, the Shi'a did not bother to enter the main body politic of Lebanon before independence. The National Pact accorded them the third place in the power structure as far as the legislature was concerned, but they were still under-privileged in the state reward system. In the 1960s, they manifested a marked degree of awakening and organisation and started to develop communal consciousness. Since then, they have become an active player in Lebanese politics, and their share in the power structure has increased.
The change in the power structure, from bi-polar to multi-polar, and the shift of communal power from the Maronite-Druze axis to a Maronite-Sunni axis was brought about by the exigencies of the developing political domestic and regional situation and epitomized by the 1943 National Pact.

VIII The National Pact: A Power-Sharing Arrangement

The National Pact was a verbal agreement concluded in September-October, 1943, between the then Maronite President of newly independent Lebanon, Bechara al-Khoury, in his capacity as the most influential leader of his community, and his Sunni Prime Minister, Riyad al-Solh, the then most authoritative representative of the Moslems in Lebanon. They agreed to establish an independent state and distribute the power on the basis of the numerical weights of its component communities. However, the power-sharing characteristic of the Pact was part of a wider mechanism for resolving the simmering issues of Lebanon's national identity and its foreign policy, which were a significant source of dispute between the two main communal blocs. This aspect of the Pact will be discussed in chapter five, as a conflict resolution mechanism.

The Pact as reported by the Lebanese historian, Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbeck, stipulates the following: 97

1 Lebanon is a completely independent and sovereign republic, unattached to any other state.

2 Lebanon has an Arab face, its language is Arabic, and is a part of the Arab world, but has its particular characteristics. Despite its Arabism, it will maintain its cultural and spiritual ties with western civilization having in mind that those ties helped Lebanon achieve an enviable degree of progress.

3 Having secured a recognition of its independent status within its present borders, Lebanon is called upon to cooperate with all Arab states and become a member of the Arab community. In its relations with the Arab countries, Lebanon should not side with one party against the other.

4 Government posts are to be distributed equitably among the recognized sects. However, in recruitment for technical posts,
expertise rather than sectarian affiliation will be taken into consideration.

The Pact defined formally the political authority in Lebanon as well as its Arab and external policies. The 1926 Constitution instituted confessionalism as a basic principle but did not specify a modality for proportional representation. "In allocation (of) governmental positions, justice will be observed among the sects. For technical posts expertise will be taken into consideration." Based on this principle, the National Pact specified that legislative, administrative, judiciary and army posts were distributed among the two main faiths according to a ratio of six Christians to five Moslems. This ratio was further subdivided to reflect the share of each sect within the two faiths. This formula was based on the 1932 census, which gave the Christian population of the country a majority status, and the Maronites a majority among the Christians, and the Sunnis a majority status among the Moslems. As a result of this census, the top political offices were allocated to the two largest communities: the Maronites and the Sunnis. Since 1933 the Presidency was apportioned to the Maronite community, and since 1936 the Prime Ministership to the Sunnis. The 1943 Pact allotted the Speakership of the House of Representatives to the Shi'a, but this was not implemented until 1947.

The Maronites’ allocation of the position of Chief Executive put them at the core of authority and at the centre of the realm of political power. This position did not only allow them access to the rewards of the state but also "...symbolized the political superiority of the Christians and the deprivation of the Moslems." Aulas believes that the Pact "...institutionalized Maronite political supremacy at the head of the state."

Having proposed an analytical framework based on the two concepts of authority and asabiya for the analysis of the conflict in Lebanon we now need to proceed to an analysis of the social structure. Two issues are central to our analysis and need to be addressed before we do that. These are the significance of the conflict groups versus the significance of the social structure. The question that needs to be answered is whether the conflict could best be understood through the notion of active involvement of the conflict groups or through an understanding of the contradictions and cleavages in the social structure. In other words, have the events been shaped by the values and interests of the conflict groups or as a reaction to the cleavages in the Lebanese society?

This thesis has argued that the social structure is important in so far as it is a generator of conflictual tendencies, but it is insufficient to take the social structure and conflictual tendencies as given, or to assume that conflict groups reacted to them in
an unpredictable way. The social structure has to be analysed in terms of its authority and *asabiya* attributes in order to determine the causal link between its basic characteristic, the conflict and the conflict groups.

The next chapter analyzes the sectarian composition of Lebanese society in order to explain how cleavages and contradictions incapacitated the social structure and made it available for exploitation by the conflict groups, that is, how the quest for positions of authority and the rising *asabiya* consciousness became a source of conflict.
CHAPTER TWO
END NOTES


3 Ibid., p. 169.


9 Ibid., p. 239.


11 Ralf Dahrendorf, in his book Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, op. cit., p. 168, equates association with organisation and defines it as "the coordination of organized aggregates or roles by domination and subjection. The state, ...a church, a political party, a trade union, and a chess club are associations in this sense."

12 Peter Weingart, op. cit., p. 155.


17 Reinhard Bendix op. cit., p. 288.


21 See Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History; Mohamed Enan, Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work; Erwin Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline; Charles Isawi, An Arab
Ibn al-Qila'i and Duwayhi mention that the Maronites emerged as a religious community in the eighth century. Their appearance on the political scene as a structured social community had to wait until the eighteenth century. However at the initial period of their development and up to the late eighteenth century the Maronites were not a coherent social community even though their religion banded them together. They were still far from the center of power. Their ascendance to power was associated with their communal development as an organized and socially coherent community. From the eighteenth century onwards they began to assert their coherence as a community and articulate their power which allowed them, through the help of their church, to develop a communal self-
awareness dubbed by Dao as national conscience. For him Lebanon became synonymous with the Maronite Nation and an extension of this nation.


These three writers believed that the Maronites were an integral part of a political system. Their existence as a community was subordinate to the political system of autonomous Mount Lebanon. However still other writers, particularly clergy intellects, advocated the need for assimilating Lebanon into the Maronite national consciousness. Bishop Nicholas Murad (Bishop of Mount Lebanon, 1841-1845) worked very hard for the establishment of a Christian principedom in Lebanon on the grounds that such an entity existed in the past and the role of the non-Christian inhabitants of the area, that is the Druzes, was insignificant due to their minority status. See Abbas Abu Saleh, *Al-Tarykh al-Syasi Lil-Imararah al-Chehabiyyah fy Jabal Lubnan, 1697-1842* (the Political History of the Chehab Emirate in Mount Lebanon, 1697-1842) (Beirut: Service Press, 1984), p. 338; and Marie-Christine Aulas, "The Socio-Ideological Development of the Maronite Community - the Emergence of the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 7 (Fall 1985), p. 11.


41 *ibid.*, p. 287.

42 Melhim Qurban, *Tarykh Lubnan al-Syasi al-Hadith* (The modern political history of Lebanon), vol. 1, 2d ed., (Beirut: The University Institute for Studies, Publications and Distribution, 1981), p. 120.


45 Abbas Abu Saleh,*op. cit.*, p. 383.

46 David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *op. cit.*, p. 34.


49 Kamal Jumblatt, *Hazh Wasyati* (This is my will), 2d ed., (Al-Moukhtara: Al-Dar al-Thaqafyah, 1987), pp. 71, 72. For the French role in creating an independent Lebanon to accommodate the Maronites' aspirations, see also Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon*

50 David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, op. cit., p. 42.


52 Melhim Qurban, op. cit., p. 187.

53 David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, op. cit. p. 44.

54 For an elaborate description of the efforts to draw the constitution see Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, op. cit., pp. 199-215.

55 ibid., p. 214.

56 Article 95 of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution as amended in 1990.


58 For a thorough study of the Tanukh tribes and their role in the politics of pre-Ottoman Mount Lebanon, see Nadeem N. Hamze, Al-Tanukhyyyun: Ajdad al-Muwahiddun (al-Druze) wa Dawruhum fy Jabal Lubnan (The Tanukhs: Ancestors of the Unitarians and their role in Mount Lebanon) (Beirut: An-Nahar Publishing House, 1984).


61 The area referred to as Mount Lebanon was originally that inhabited by the Maronites at the northernmost part of present day Lebanon whereas the area abutting Mount Lebanon to the south of Kisrewan was known as al-Chouf, later known as the Druze Mountain. Only in the nineteenth century and specifically during the reign of the Chehab dynasty it came to be known as Mount Lebanon. See Nadeem N. Hamze, op. cit., p. 7.


63 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, op. cit., p. 119.

64 Nadeem N. Hamze, op. cit., p. 67.

65 Kamal Salibi, op. cit., p. 121.

66 Nejla Abu Izzeddin, op. cit., p. 192.

67 For an elaborate work on al-Sayyid Abdallah see ibid., pp. 228-238.

68 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, op. cit., p. 144.

69 The Druzes were divided into Qaysites and Yemenite asabiyas. This division had its origin in the rivalry between the north Arab Qaysite and south Arab Yemenite tribes who came to this part of the world as a result of the Arab conquest of Syria. These two asabiyas evolved from their genealogical nutshell into an expression of different aspects of political and social conflict. All Lebanese families in Mount Lebanon belonged to either one of the two asabiyas. Intense rivalry between the two asabiyas led more than once to virtual civil war.
70 Nadeem N. Hamze, op. cit., p. 217.
71 Nejla Abu Izzeddin, op. cit., p. 239.
72 Nadeem N. Hamze, op. cit., p. 145.
75 Helena Cobban, op. cit., p. 38.
78 Ibid., p. 226.
79 Ibid., p. 212.
82 Abbas Abu Saleh, op. cit., p. 33.
83 Kamal Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 4.
84 Ibid., p. 4.
86 Kamal Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 11.
89 Helena Cobban, op. cit., p. 41.
91 Henry Churchill, The Druzes and Maronites under Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860 (London: Quaritch, 1862), as quoted by Betts, op. cit., p. 77.
93 Mohammed Ali Mekki, op. cit., p. 57.
94 Ibid., p. 74.
96 Ibid., Chapter. 5.


Marie-Christine Aulas, "The Socio-ideological Development of the Maronite Community: The Emergence of the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces," Arab Studies Quarterly 7 (Fall 1985), p. 16.
CHAPTER THREE

CLEAVAGES IN THE LEBANESE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

I Introduction

Authority and *asabiya* are two concepts that can explain why and how conflict in Lebanon was generated. They are valuable concepts for focussing our attention on contradictions and cleavages in the social structure, which in turn explain the existence of conflictual tendencies and their bearing on the generation of conflict. Many of the *asabiya* attributes contributed to the rise of communal consciousness, which in turn was a driving force behind the struggle over positions of authority.

This chapter attempts to analyse, within the two concepts of authority and *asabiya*, the structural properties of the main Lebanese sects in order to identify the source of conflict and determine the social process through which it has currently been terminated.

Lebanon is a composite of several large and small religious and ethnic communities organized in an "...hierarchical manner accommodating their own conflicts and interests within the confines of a system that promotes sectarian identification..."\(^1\) Relationships between them have oscillated between accommodation and conflict. None of these communities constitutes a majority. Lebanon is one of the few countries that can claim to be composed totally of ethno-religious minorities, or sects. Seventeen of these sects are officially recognized by the state. Apart from a minuscule Jewish sect, the officially recognized sects are broadly divided between the Christians and the Moslems.\(^2\)

II Historical Development of the Communal Structure

The political significance of these sects lies in the role they have played as social organizations through which political security can be achieved. They have evolved over the years into semi-autonomous socio-political communities with distinctive political and administrative functions. This evolutionary process began in the early seventeenth century under the Ottoman Turks, Lebanon's overlords from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.

The Christians in the Ottoman Empire were recognized as autonomous sects governed by the "millet" system. They were granted independent jurisdiction in the
field of personal status and have maintained it ever since. After the First World War the Ottoman rule over Lebanon came to an end. The Arab territories of the Empire came under the control of France and Britain. Lebanon and Syria came under the French Mandate. The mandatory French Government extended the semi-autonomous status of the Christians to every other component religious group in the country.

Under the Ottoman rule the non-Sunni (Christians, Jews, Shiite and Druzes) communities were held in an inferior but recognized position. The Druzes and Maronites were permitted some autonomy. "All Ottoman citizens defined themselves according to their religions and sects... the religious leadership of these communities represented them at the seat of power and were held responsible for the lawful behaviour of their community." Religion was essentially the frame of reference of one's identity and a major reference point in social interaction. This feeling did not wither away with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the transformation of its spoils into nation-states. Religious organizations are still represented in the legal system of Lebanon as well as in its polity.

Communal distinctiveness features prominently in Lebanon's personal status law. Contracting and dissolving of marriages, guardianship, legitimation of children, religious endowments, inheritance and wills are exclusively the domain of religious courts. Each recognized community has the right to make and alter its own regulations in these matters. Each religious community has the right to set up its own courts and codify its laws. The advantage of such a system is that it allows each group to conduct its own affairs, yet it is "...charged that the official sanctions of these various ways of life hinder the development of even the minimum common basis necessary to hold together a sovereign state." Since personal status matters lie within the precincts of religion, it is the case with some religious groups (Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics) that the final authority is in the hands of religious officials or institutions outside Lebanon and beyond the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Government. For example, the seat of the Greek Orthodox patriarch is in Syria and the seat of the Greek Catholic is in Syria and Egypt.

Communal attachment in Lebanon remains an overriding factor in the present-day conflict. Up to 1975, communal loyalties and national interests were, to a certain extent, reconcilable. The war of 1975 created the conditions that where the communal and national commitments conflict with each other, the balance was tipped in favour of communal loyalties. Basically, Lebanon's political culture draws on the sectarian composition of the country. This does not mean that all things
political in Lebanon are fundamentally religious. Nevertheless the role of religious identification and institutions is to be reckoned with in any analysis of Lebanese politics. This phenomenon is not unique to Lebanon. It is a characteristic of the whole region. In some countries it is latent and well managed by means of a healthy regulatory mechanism. In others, like Lebanon, the system has failed to meet the challenge. Hourani confirms that "...the primary divisions inside the Near East are, as they have been for a thousand years, religious: whether a man is Moslem, Christian or Jew and to which branch of Moslem, Christian or Jewish community he belongs."6

The social structure is the custodian of these loyalties. Political institutions have not only reflected but fostered them. However, a mechanism of balance and checks is institutionalized in the political order of Lebanon to help its various communities adjust to the pressures of political and social competition arising out of the process of change and development. This system was embodied in the National Pact of 1943, as explained earlier. Its direct aim was to constrain the rising conflicting tendencies among the various communities, but its ultimate aim was to accelerate the development of national identity by enabling the numerous component communities to reconcile their divisive issues and establish minimum consensus as a prelude to full national integration. In retrospect, this mechanism proved to be too brittle for the communities to embrace. The reasons lie not in the veracity of its principles but rather in the gneissic boundaries of the communities themselves and their failure to avail themselves of this opportunity to use it as a viable platform for their cross-cutting interests. The strength of communal loyalties and identities eclipsed the integrative potential inherent in the National Pact. As a result the cleavages among the component communities increased in strength and precluded the process of nation-building and the development of a national identity.

How did these ethno-religious communities - sects come to occupy such a definitive and decisive position in the social structure and play such a salient role in the political process? A thorough analysis of the historical development of these sects is necessary to explain their doctrinal differences. It is to be noted that each community has taken a specific path in its development. Certain explicit forms of ideal interests (especially those that constituted centripetal and centrifugal forces in relation to a central value system) have evolved from specific types of historical conditions. These interests have established rather than expressed the communities' behavioural patterns and course of action.
All the sects were involved in the Lebanese conflict, but only four played a decisive role: the Maronites, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Druzes. The Orthodox and Catholic sects played a marginal but active role. Among the major communal actors were also the Palestinians. The role they played before and after the conflict is to be reckoned with.

We turn now to a descriptive analysis of the social structure of each one of these sects, and we will identify and describe the structural aspects which have engendered the conflictual tendencies among them. Identification of these aspects warrant a detailed description of the development of the sectarian structure in Lebanon.

A The Maronites

The Maronites, named after their patron, the ascetic monk St. Maroun (died in 410 AD), appeared in the sixth century AD in the northern parts of present day Syria, which was already inhabited by some christianized Arab tribes. "By the end of the seventh century, a new Christian sect - that of the Maronites - was already becoming organized as a separate communion in the valley of the Orontes and the adjacent hills." Hitti points out that the reason for their settlement in the Orontes Valley was a possible conflict with the Greek Church in Antioch which Maroun's disciples may have had shortly after his death. As their converts swelled they came in direct clash with the Jacobites (an offshoot of the Monophysites) over the interpretation of the nature of Jesus Christ. The Jacobites maintained that Christ was God become man, suggesting that he had only one divine nature; his human nature was merely a form. On the other hand, the Maronites, being Orthodox Melkite, believed that Christ had two natures, divine and human, but one energy (energia) and one will (thelema). In the seventh century, the Maronite Monks "...broke away from the Melkite Church and proceeded to organize themselves separately." In the twelfth century they abandoned the Monothelite formula and returned to the Catholic Church, accepting the Papal supremacy, but like the rest of the Uniate churches in the Arab countries, retained their own oriental rites and customs and were granted autonomy under their own elected patriarchs.

As early as the sixth century, the Maronites came into conflict with other Christian denominations which had adopted Monophysitism. In one of these confrontations, which took place in the year 517, three hundred and fifty Maronite monks were massacred by the Jacobites. Renewed feuds with the Jacobites in the second half of the seventh century, and the failure of the Islamic state, which was established in 638, to provide them with adequate security, resulted in the migration
of a considerable number of them to North Lebanon. Christians and some Maronites were already in existence in this area. In the early fifth century, two disciples of Saint Maroun were sent to North Lebanon to preach the teachings of their Saint.\footnote{1\textsuperscript{2}}

Saint Maroun is the father of the Maronite sect but Yuhanna Maroun was the founder of their community in northern Lebanon and their first elected patriarch.\footnote{1\textsuperscript{3}} It was under Yuhanna Maroun's leadership that the communal organization of the Maronites emerged and developed into an independent community. He mobilized his people in North Lebanon into a fighting force of twelve thousand strong men. In 694 he defended his territory against the invading Byzantine armies under Justinian II who, before invading the Maronite stronghold in northern Lebanon, destroyed their monasteries in Syria and killed 500 of their monks. "Since then the Maronites have isolated themselves and developed the individualistic traits characteristic of mountaineers."\footnote{1\textsuperscript{4}}

The communal existence of the Maronites in Lebanon was completed in the second half of the seventh century. By the turn of the tenth century the basic tenets of their nationhood started to emerge with the completion of the transfer of their headquarters from the Orontes valley in northern Syria to Qannubin, a monastery carved in the solid rocks of the Qadisha Valley in North Lebanon. Throughout this initial period "...there was no sign of social cohesion of a communal type among these highland peasants. Only their common religion bonded them together."\footnote{1\textsuperscript{5}} Father Boutros Dao argues that by this time, the tenth century, the Maronites had become a "nation", for they possessed the main elements of nationhood: land, population, civilization and separate existence.\footnote{1\textsuperscript{6}}

The Maronites found in the invading co-religionist Crusaders of the twelfth century a natural ally. They provided the first invading armies with guides and "...contributed a contingent of archers."\footnote{1\textsuperscript{7}} Upon landing in Acre (Palestine) King Louis IX received a delegation of twenty-five thousand Maronites with provisions, and presents. He rewarded them by bringing their community under France's protection as indicated in his letter dated 21 May 1250.\footnote{1\textsuperscript{8}} They were accorded a privileged position in the established kingdom of Jerusalem and were ranked first among the Christian denominations after the Latins. The involvement of the Maronites with the Crusaders in such a way had a debilitating effect on the Christian-Moslem relationship.

Pressed from all sides (Byzantine persecution, the massacre of their monks by the Jacobites, and the tidal wave of Arab conquests resulting in supplantation of Christianity by Islam), the Maronites found in the Crusaders a convenient protector of
their faith and possibly of their nationhood, although Islam was tolerant toward other religions. "Indeed, from the point of view of religious orthodoxy, the effect of Arab conquest on Syrian Christianity was not unwholesome."19 The Islamic state under the Umayyad dynasty (downfall in 750) was "...on the whole unusually tolerant. Its liberalism and tolerance transcended the political into the religious and intellectual spheres."20 However, Maronite fears were substantiated with a later dynasty, the Mamlukes who were credited with the termination of the Crusaders' occupation of the Orient in 1291. They harassed all non-Sunni groups but were particularly less tolerant toward the Christians and Jews. In 1283, they penetrated the Maronites' stronghold in northern Lebanon and destroyed their villages.21 They also uprooted the Shi'a population from the neighbouring Kisrewan region and forced them to emigrate southward. The few who were left were forced to take refuge in proselytization into the Sunni sect.22

In spite of these pressures, the Maronites in North Lebanon were able to develop their social structure and their communal identity. In the sixteenth century, they started expanding outside their secure habitat. Groups of them ventured into the neighbouring Kisrewan region to fill in the vacuum left by the deportation of its indigenous inhabitants, the Shi'a, whom they encountered when they tried to expand further east to the Beq'a valley. To the South, they penetrated the Druzes' stronghold. Actually the Maronites were lured into the Druzes' region because of their much needed skills and professions. They lived in peace and harmony with the Druzes and under their hegemony until the middle of the nineteenth century. During this period the Maronites' power grew in strength and the Druzes became weaker due to their internal feuds and the Chehabi persecutions.

Around that period the Maronites strengthened their relations with France and established firm relations with the Vatican. Pope Gregory XIII had patronized the Maronite church in Lebanon. A Maronite college was set up in Rome in 1584 to educate Maronite clerics from Lebanon and send them back as missionaries and reformers. As they started to grow in numbers and in power, the Maronites started to challenge the Druze supremacy in the Chouf region, the Druzes' only stronghold.

B The Druzes

The Druze faith originated, after a few years of preparation, in the closing phase of the reign of al-Hakim, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, (966-1021). The divine call was proclaimed in Cairo on 30 May 1017. Tawhid (Unity of God) is the basis of this faith. The Druzes like to be known as Muwahidun (Unitarians). "On the first day
of AH 408 (1017 AD) the Unitarian doctrine was made public with a proclamation in which al-Hakim invited the people to choose freely and practise openly their belief.23

The founder of the new faith was Hamza bin Ali, a Persian missionary born in the province of Khurasan. He was assisted by five missionaries of whom Nashtakin al-Darazi, also of Persian origin, is best known. Nashtakin was a confidant of al-Hakim and the first to offer veneration to him, but later was discredited because of his libertine tendencies, and was denounced and killed. Two years after his death his name became eponymous for the Faith.

The Druzes differ from the Sunnis and Shi'a in their approach to the message of Islam. They contend that by the year 1017, the task of the Shi'a Imams was almost completed. With al-Hakim, the allegorical interpretation of the religious law was terminated. A new era was to start. Prophet Muhammad delivered the religious law. The Imams, after him, interpreted it allegorically. Now it was time to convey the truth (al-haqiqa) without allegorical interpretation.24 This haqiqa is the knowledge of the One, the knowledge of the Unity of God (tawhid). It is the goal of all knowledge. Religion is only a means to attain the reality of the divine message.

The Call was met by opposition in Cairo, both from followers of the other sects and from the successor of al-Hakim, who persecuted the believers and forced them into hiding. However, outside Egypt, mainly in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, the Call met a positive response. Five years after the proclamation of the Faith, al-Hakim mysteriously disappeared, then shortly afterwards Hamza himself went into concealment leaving the Faith in the hands of one of his disciples, al-Muqtana Bahauddin. For a time al-Muqtana lived in concealment. "He addressed Epistles to his followers or prospective ones all the way from Byzantium to India..."25 The Faith was overwhelmed with persecution. All who would not recant were killed. Al-Muqtana spent seventeen years as a missionary (da'i) trying to keep his followers under control.

Al-Muqtana himself may have "...compiled one hundred and eleven letters, many of them his own, some of them by Hamza and by Isma'il Tamimi, and certain pieces by al-Hakim, into a cannon which has since served as Druze Scripture, called Rasa'il al-Hikmah, the Book of Wisdom."26 Towards the end of his life, al-Muqtana decreed that no part of this religion should be divulged, a decision probably dictated by security concerns. The Call was closed to new converts in 1043.

The ethical principles of this Faith are probably one of its most significant aspects. It prescribes a sevenfold set of commandments for all Druzes to follow: to
speak the truth, to defend and help one another, to renounce all former religions, to recognize the unity of our Lord (God), to be content with whatever he does, and to submit to his orders.27

By then Druzism was well established in Lebanon, working its way from the southern tip of the country northwards, limiting its expansion to the mountainous areas. "Here its adherents acquired those national traits that have characterized them throughout their entire career: intense community loyalties, high sense of solidarity, vigorous spirit of independence, endurance in the face of adversity."28 Albert Hourani describes them as "...mainly an agricultural community...socially the most solidly organized of all the communities. They have a double organization: the religious with its hierarchy, and the feudal with its gradation of ranks."29

Of particular interest to this study are the historical incidents the Druzes have experienced. The events contributed, as was the case with the Maronites, to the building up of their asabiya consciousness and strong communal and conflictual tendencies. Since its establishment the Druze faith has met antagonistic reception, and its followers were subjected to various kinds of oppressions and persecution. As a result of continuous persecution over the years, the Druze communities in Egypt, northern India and some other parts of the world, have disappeared. Only the Druze community in Lebanon has remained with a central presence in Wadi al-Taym, at the foot of Mount Hermon, as well as in satellite communities in Syria and Palestine.

The Druzes were exposed to three historical incidents that have strengthened their group solidarity and sharpened their conflictual propensity. The first was during the 13th century when the Mamluke rulers, who belonged to the Sunni sect, subjected them to the harshest of discriminatory measures on the grounds that they were unorthodox Moslems. The second was in the nineteenth century when they were exposed to physical persecution at the hands of the invading Egyptian Army commander, Ibrahim Pasha. Six hundred of their notables were massacred because they refused conscription in his army. The Druzes of Syria rose against Ibrahim Pasha. To crush their uprising he armed 7000 Maronites and sent them to fight the Druzes. The third was the three decades old conflict between the two communities that culminated in the 1860 civil war. The episodes of fighting took a sectarian form, but the issues were void of any religious connotation. By then the two communities developed a separate mature social structure with distinctive social characteristics and distinct political orientation.
The Shi'ites and the Sunnis

The Shi'a is a large Moslem sect whose departure from the mainstream Sunni Islam was spurred mainly by the question of the prophet's succession. Following the death of the prophet Muhammad, the community of Islam was divided into sectarian groups with contrasting views on who should succeed the prophet and what was the nature of his role. The Sunni Moslems argued that Islam was a religious and a political phenomenon, as its Rasul (Messenger) was a prophet and a statesman. Therefore the head of the community of Islam should continue after him to be a religious personality elected by the community and empowered to implement the religious law (Shari'a), to defend the community of the faithful, and to propagate the religion of Islam. This implied two themes. The first was that the head of the community ought to possess two main qualities, religiosity and statesmanship. The second was that it was a religious duty on the part of every Moslem to owe the head obedience as long as the observance of religion and the performance of the state functions were duly afforded by him. The head of the community of Islam came to be known as the Caliph or Imam. His elevation to this office ought to be by ikhtiyar (selection). The Shi'a on the other hand, claimed that the prophet's successor had to preside over the community and to interpret the divine message allegorically. Only Imams, designated by the prophet through his successors, were capable of grasping the intrinsic and esoteric meaning of the Message. The Imam was not only a leader in prayers but he was the epitome of religion, a means for salvation and a model to imitate: "whosoever dies without knowing the true imam of his time dies the death of an unbeliever".

An Imam in the Shi'a doctrine was a divinely illuminated person who acquired his divine insights from the prophet Muhammad by succession. Though the message of Islam was sealed with Muhammad, yet allegorical interpretation of its inner meaning is a continuous process of divine revelation. "For the contact between God and man is not at a point of intersection but in a continuous line, not in a single individual but in an uninterrupted series of Imams." The Sunnis, on the other hand, reject the divine powers of an Imam and the principle of allegorical interpretation of the Koran and hold the view that "...salvation is officially and externally sought through the observation and application of divine law" and that a mujtahid, a "legalist-judiciary" intervention, could officiate on divine law in accordance with one of the four recognized interpretations in Islam: The Hanbalis, the Shafi's, the Hanafis and the Malikis. In his interpretation of the Divine Message, the Mujtahid had to comply with the following four sources: the Koran, the Hadith (prophet's tradition) al-Qyas (analogy with the Koran) and Ijma' (consensus).
The dogmatic difference between the two sects is reflected as well in their organizational structure and their conception of the principle of legitimacy. The Sunnis have identified themselves with the state structure and the centrality of authority, whereas the Shi'a have over the years associated themselves with the sovereignty of the community, and have attuned themselves to a diffused rather than specific type of religiosity. Religious achievement to the Shi'a is positively correlated with social achievement, and their religious ranks reflect simultaneously a social status position. The gradation in their religious structure starts at the level of imam, then ayatollah, mujtahid akbar and hujjat al-islam. These titles carry with them an inherent religious value as well as a social status position. Movement along the religious and its concomitant social ladder is characterized by a high degree of flexibility. This explains how the highest echelon of power became tenable to the Shi'a religious leaders in Iran as well as in Lebanon.

On the other hand, mobility in the Sunni structure is circumvented by the dictates of the state bureaucratic system. The Moslem officials who are designated to officiate on divine law are part of the bureaucratic structure and elite class. The grand mufti, the head of the Islamic Shi'a Superior Council, and Sheikh al-Akl are all government appointees.

The question of succession to the prophet was the point of departure between the Shi'a and Sunni Moslems and a source of friction and conflict. Upon the death of the prophet in AD 632, the Sunnis elected one of his companions, Abu Bakr, as the Caliph and Imam of the community of Islam, a position that embodied both religious and political functions. The Shi'a reluctantly recognized the Imamate of Abu Bakr but considered Ali Ibn Abi Taleb to be the true imam, on the grounds that he was the prophet's first cousin and son-in-law, and was senior to all other companions in his adherence to Islam. They claim that he deserved the position for his piety, learning and bravery and above all for the mere fact that the prophet himself had designated him as his successor.

The institution of the Caliph came into existence with the election of Abu Bakr as the first of four pious Caliphs. The other three who succeeded him were Umar, Othman and Ali Ibn Abi-Taleb. Their combined rule extended over a period of forty years. Under the first two Caliphs, the party of Ali (Shi'ite Ali) remained inconspicuously active. It was only under the rule of the third Caliph, Othman bin Affan, that they started to show impatience and restive behaviour. Othman was accused of nepotism and partiality to the Sunni Umayyads who were the adversary of the followers of Ali. This was a major cause of his downfall. He was succeeded
by Ali in the year AH 35 (AD 656). The desire that the Imamate in Islam should be kept for Ali and his descendants was never fulfilled. A conflict broke out between Ali and the Umayyad governor of Syria, Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufian. This conflict developed into a civil war between the two groups but soon was resolved by arbitration, much to the chagrin of Ali's followers, in favour of Mu'awiyah. Ali lost his position as a result of which he was assassinated by one of his dissatisfied followers.

The Umayyad House ruled supreme in the Moslem world for a period of almost a century. The Shi'a never acquiesced, and denied the Umayyads any legitimacy. They contended that the house of Ali was the rightful heir to the Caliphate, and that the Umayyads were usurpers of power. Their refractory attitudes towards the house of Umayyads and their successors, the Abbasides, brought on them further misfortune. Ali's son and heir, al-Husein, together with his family and supporters of two hundred, were massacred in a battle with the Umayyad troops in Karbala, Iraq, on Muharram 10, AH 61 (10 October 680 AD). It is claimed by most historians that the death of al-Husein marked the birth of the Shi'a. "The blood of al-Husein...proved to be the seed of the Shi'iite church. Shi'ism was born on the tenth of Muharram...Yaum (the day of) Karbala gave the Shi'a a battle-cry summed up in the formula vengeance for al-Husein, which ultimately proved to be one of the factors that undermined the Umayyad dynasty." It marked a turning point in their future attitude towards any form of legitimacy. It further strengthened the passionate motive in their political and religious involvement and commitments.

1 The Shiites

Shi'ism arrived in Lebanon from its chief centre in Iraq in the middle of the 7th century AD. It struck its roots in two main regions, the south and eastern part of today's Lebanon. Their arrival was broadly contemporaneous with the arrival of the Maronites from northern Syria.

The Shi'a and Sunni population of Lebanon have lived outside Mount Lebanon, the nucleus of the present day state. The southern and eastern parts of the country, as well as a few sporadic places in the north, are predominantly Shi'a of the "twelver" denomination. Under the Umayyads in Damascus and their inheritors, the Abbasides in Baghdad, the Shi'as were subjected to persecution, but their co-religionists, the Fatimides, who themselves were a victim of Abbaside persecution, established their state in Egypt and extended their patronage to the Shi'a of Lebanon. This lasted until the thirteenth century. Their previous oppression by the
Umayyads and Abbasides moulded them into a compact unit which was instrumental in the preservation of their distinctive features.

The protection came to an end with the demise of the Fatimide rulers at the hands of the Crusaders in the early 13th century when two new successive dynasties of the Sunni Faith, the Ayoubides and the Mamlukes, were able to expel the European Crusaders and unite the Islamic world under their Sunni leadership. The Shi'a once again were subjected to fresh persecution and were dispersed from their native regions in the northern and central part of present day Lebanon to the southern and eastern regions of the country. A good number of them converted to Sunnism to escape persecution. The Sunni rulers of the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries persecuted the Shi'a not only because of their heterodox religious views, but because of their disloyalty to the Sunni state at its apogee of *jihad* (war against the Christian crusaders).

The Shi'a lived in south and eastern Lebanon with virtually no connection to the political system of the country until 1920. They were marginalized by their lifestyle and political culture and the neglect of the central government. They were basically a peasant society characterized by social immobility and subject to a feudalistic social structure tempered by a parallel structure of clerics. "In the rural areas, the Shi'ites remained the poorest and most exploited, and politically, the least represented and socially the least educated group in Lebanon." However, urbanization and the destabilization of their normal life due to the Israeli invasions and incursions forced a great number of them to emigrate from their regions in East Lebanon and the South to the capital city of Beirut. "There the Shi'ite new-comers jostled for living space and jobs with the Maronites whom they often found had arrived before them. Three particular areas near Beirut quickly became transformed into vast Shi'ite dominated suburb-slums." These particular areas were the spawning grounds for the emergence of the Hezbollah (Party of God) and the Amal movement.

As a result of their prolonged persecution, suffering and deprivation, the Shi'a grew as an undercurrent of discontent and a movement of protest. In Lebanon, they had lived as a marginal community, separated and withdrawn, until the French Mandate coaxed them into the new state, created in 1920. They were a reluctant contributor to national life and were distant beneficiaries of national rewards. Even after the birth of the state of Lebanon and their formal incorporation into it, they kept a profile of partial identification and sustained their own culture and cultivated their own ethnicity. Memories of persecution and suffering could not be abandoned in
favour of the new national status, which offered them nothing substantial towards the improvement of their lot. Their participation in the newly created entity did not give them enough security and comfort to venture out of their cultural enclave and be subjected again, not to physical persecution, but to norms that were not their own. Furthermore, their Feudalistic style of social life isolated them from the main-stream of political culture; they remained socio-cultural exiles in their own national state, strangers in their own polity. On the other hand, the newly created state did not do enough to persuade them to enter the political process and make a contribution to national life.45

The persistent feeling of deprivation growing out of their marginality in the political structure continued to shape the attitudes of the Shi'a in Lebanon towards the state and its legitimacy until the late 1960s, when they began to experience a kind of political awakening under the leadership of Imam Mousa al-Sadr. Al-Sadr was able to mobilize them, to air their grievances, and to crystallize their demands for restructuring the power system in line with their communal aspirations. Al-Sadr, together with the clerical hierarchy of the Shi'a of the South, founded in 1975 the Amal movement.46 It succeeded an earlier movement, also founded by al-Sadr in 1974, known as The Movement of the Disinherited. The "Movement's" power grew from strength to strength. The traditional authorities as well as other communities had to reckon with the rising new power. The movement questioned loudly and noisily the Maronite's ascendancy at the expense of what they called the disinheritors' rights, and demanded extensive changes to the political system in order to restore the balance to the communal structure.47 The Shi'a's political awakening and their first contribution to national life are concomitant with the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon.

2 The Sunnites

The term sunnah and sunni Islam became well defined during the rule of the tenth Abbaside Caliph, al-Mutawakkil (846-61). Various interpretations of the divine law appeared prior to the al-Mutawakkil period. The controversy was not over the source of law, which was the Qur'an and the Tradition (precedents based on the prophet's own decisions and utterances), but over its use. On the basis of both the Qur'an and the Tradition, the jurist made his legal decision using two methods, the analogy (Qiyas) and consensus (Ijm'a). As there was no standard method for achieving consensus, several schools emerged, each professing its own version of the implementation of the shari'a. The Shi'a sect developed its own Ja'afary school, and the Sunnis followed the Sunnah (the Tradition of the prophet), which implies
compliance with the authority of the state as long as it rules on what is Islamically orthodox. Against this background of Islamic Sunni ideology, one can trace the presence and structural relations of the Sunni to other communities in Lebanon.

The majority of the Sunni Moslem population of Lebanon have lived outside the area known as Mount Lebanon, the sanctuary of Maronite and Druze habitation. Mekki claims that their existence is associated with the invasion of the region in the 7th century by the Arab-Islamic armies between the years 634 and 639. The increase in the Moslem population of Lebanon continued under the rule of the Umayyads and the Abbaside Sunni dynasties. During their reign, 660-750 in Damascus and 750-1258 in Baghdad, consequentially, many Arab tribes settled in the Beq'a Valley, Wadi al-Taym, the southern part of Lebanon, Beirut and the Chouf Mountain.

With the demise of the Sunni Abbaside dynasty in Iraq, and its replacement by the Selucide dynasty and the rise of the Shi'a Fatimide dynasty in Egypt, loyalty to Eastern Islam (including Lebanon) split into two divisions. One division declared its allegiance to the Fatimide and these were the Shi'a, and the other expressed their loyalty to the Sunni Selucides, and these were the Sunnis. Since the middle of the 11th century, Lebanon fell under the competing influence of both the Fatimides and the Selucides. This resulted in the establishment of several autonomous domestic suzerain Emirates in Lebanon and the region catering for both influences.

The Shi'a of Lebanon grew stronger and more numerous in number under the Fatimide rule, but their superiority came to an end with the demise of the Fatimide dynasty and the rise to power of the Sunni Mamluke dynasty in Egypt, which wrested the country from the Crusaders and established its rule in the region for three centuries (1261-1517). The Sunni power was further enhanced under the Ottomans who succeeded the Mamlukes in their rule of Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world (1517-1918). Salibi attributed the Sunni growth and strength in Lebanon mainly to the patronage they received from the Mamluke rulers as well as to the state’s reprisals against the Christians and other sects. He ascribed this situation to three factors.

The first was the high rate of conversion among the Christians and Shi'a into the Sunni ideology in order to avoid the state's persecution and oppression. As soon as the Mamlukes established themselves firmly in power in the region following their defeat and expelling of the Crusaders from it in 1291, they fell on the Christians for their support of the Crusaders against the Moslem armies and on the Shi'a for failure to contribute to the holy war against the Crusaders. In their attempt to escape the
wrath and further persecution of the Mamlukes, members of both communities adopted Sunnism as their new religious ideology. The Mamlukes also persecuted other sects, like the Druzes, the Isma'ilis and the Nusayris. The Mamlukes insisted on conformity and could not tolerate schism within their own community.

The second factor for the increase in the number of Sunnis in Lebanon, according to Salibi, was the migration of traders and businessmen from the interior of Syria, Egypt and Morocco to Lebanon. They settled in the urban centres mainly in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon.

A third factor was the resettlement of the Turkoman and Kurdish tribes along the coastal areas and in North Lebanon by the Mamlukes in order to help the state in establishing order in the country, and to guard against any turbulence in the hinterland.

At the encouragement of the Sunnite Moslem chiefs of the region, many Maronite families from northern Mount Lebanon settled in the Kisrewan region. However, the new Sunni chiefs helped in establishing and developing a Sunni community in Lebanon which was further strengthened by Ottoman patronage.

The Sunni Moslems of Lebanon enjoyed security under Ottoman rule, by belonging to the religion of the state, a situation not possible for the Christians and the rest of the Islamic sects. Christian citizens of the Ottoman Empire were governed by the millet system which gave them autonomy and security in matters of personal status law, but locked them into an inferior status position compared to the Sunnis, in matters of state authority and power.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, its Arab territories were divided as mandates between the French and the British. Lebanon and Syria came under the French mandate, while Iraq, Jordan and Palestine came under the British.

In response to pressures from the Maronites, the French Mandatory power annexed, in 1920, the Ottoman administered provinces of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and the Beq'a Valley to the territory of Mount Lebanon and created on 1 September, 1920 the State of Greater Lebanon within its present frontiers, reconstituted as the Republic of Lebanon in 1926. The annexed areas had a majority of Sunni Moslems who resented this annexation presumably for fear of losing their majority status and becoming a subservient minority in a Christian dominated state.
These are the main stages in the emergence of the Sunni community in Lebanon. With the creation of the modern state of Lebanon they suffered a transfer of political status. Under both the Mamlukes and the Ottomans they had a sense of belonging to the ruling class which enhanced their majoritarian perception. They treated other communities from a position of strength and benevolence. This perception changed with the creation of Lebanon in 1920. Instead they found themselves embroiled in a three dimensional role-diminishing situation. First, they lost the majority status that they had enjoyed until then by virtue of being a part of the community of Islam. Second, with the loss of this status, they lost their proximity to the positions of authority in the state. They had to accept a diminished role in the affairs of the state and eventually received less of government rewards. Third, they had to accept a new identity which would restrict their parochial loyalties and allegiances and constrain their ties with the world of Islam and Arabdom.

Following the establishment of the Republic of Lebanon in 1926, the Sunni Moslems found themselves on a collision course with the Maronites over the terms of their share of power. The 1943 National Pact managed to resolve this issue, but not for long. The issue of power sharing (al-Musharakah) resurfaced in the late 1960s and persisted throughout the war years. These conflictual relations, sometimes latent and other times explicit, shaped Lebanon's political culture since its creation.

The Sunni community in Lebanon entered the conflict process with minimum militaristic preparedness. Their contribution was predominantly of a political nature. Their militias were localized and scattered: Qulilat's Murabitoun militia in Beirut, the Sha'aban Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli, Sa'ad's Popular Nasirist Organization in Sidon, and two other minor Sunni neighbourhood based military groups, in Beirut. The "Sixth of February Movement" led by Shakir Birjawi, and the "Islamic Military Council", led by Sheikh Abdul-Hafiz Qasim, the head of the Moslem Ulama Association, appeared briefly on the scene and disappeared without a successor.

The Murabitoun militia played an effective role in repelling the assaults of the Phalangist forces at the sea front hotel areas in Beirut in 1976, and was an active member of the Lebanese National Movement. It had strong relations with the Palestine Resistance Movement. In the enforced departure of the PLO and other Palestinian factions from Lebanon in 1982, the Murabitoun lost its life line. Three years later it was decimated by Amal and Progressive Socialist Party militias who, following the Murabitoun's defeat, established their hegemony over the predominantly Sunni West Beirut. The other two minor Sunni militias withered away.
The Sunni community in Beirut resented the Shi'a control of West Beirut. The Sunni Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Sheikh Hasan Khaled, openly criticized the Shi'a for their intrusion into the Sunni stronghold. He "...charged that Amal and 'gunmen' were waging war against the Sunni community in west Beirut to compensate for their defeat in their war against the Palestinians in the camps."55

In Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city with a predominant Sunni population, Sheikh Said Sha'aban founded in 1982 the 'Islamic Unification Movement' which entered into a conflictual relation with the Shi'a Alawi community and the communists in the city, and adopted a fundamentalist platform calling for the establishment of a Moslem state in Lebanon.56 The "Movement" did not last long. In 1985, it was defeated by its many local foes with Syrian help.57

In the southern port city of Sidon, the Sunni militia of Mustafa Sa'ad joined with the Palestinian armed resistance in controlling the city. It is worth mentioning that in the early stages of the war in Lebanon, the Sunni community cultivated strong relations with the Palestinians in Lebanon, to the extent that, as Norton observes, the PLO became the militia of the Sunnis.58 Sa'ad's conflictual partners were mainly the Christian Lebanese Forces in areas to the east of Sidon.

The Sunni community's contribution to the political conflict was most prominent in the conflict areas of Lebanon's Arab identity and the political reform. They played a leadership role in the first and a substantial one in the second.

D Other Communities

The contribution of the above four communities to the Lebanese conflict, its intensity and duration, is an essential criterion to distinguish them from the other thirteen sects59 that make up Lebanese society. These sects have made little input to the conflict. Nevertheless, the mere fact that they were part of the conflict environment makes it necessary for this study to acknowledge their role.

Of these thirteen sects, eleven were Christians, one Alawite and one Jewish. The Greek Orthodox Sect60 was the largest of the Christian groups, numbering around 300,000 and were, like the Sunnis, geographically scattered between the urban centres and rural areas. They flourished in the al-Koura district, south of Tripoli, and the el-Metn area to the north east of Beirut, with a good number of them in Beirut itself. For the most part they lived as minorities in other Christian or Moslem areas.
The Greek Orthodox sect is part and parcel of the overall communal structure of Lebanon. Its existence in the region pre-dated the advent of Islam and its habitation of Lebanon was centuries old. The Greek Orthodox perceive their community in Lebanon to be part of a wider community that extends to Syria where they have a dense presence as well as elsewhere in the Arab world. This may explain their flexibility and absence of inhibition in relating to Arab culture. Their national church maintains links with other centres of orthodoxy like Moscow and Athens.

Like the other communities the Greek Orthodox contributed to the administrative and national life of contemporary Lebanon, but unlike other communities it refrained from taking up arms in the 1975 civil war. Its contribution to Lebanon’s political life goes back as far as the middle of the nineteenth century. It was represented in the Administrative Council of 1864 by two members out of a total of twelve. It contributed to the national awakening against the Ottoman rule of Lebanon and the Arab world.

The First President of the Republic of Lebanon was a Greek Orthodox. Nevertheless it is appropriate to indicate that a good number of the Orthodox were drawn into Lebanon’s national life and politics after 1920 by virtue of being residents side by side with the Sunni majority and Shi’a of the annexed territories. Irrespective of the size of their overall contribution, their role in the political matrix of Lebanon’s culture was governed by their historical links to Islam and the Arab world as well as by their fear of marginalization in a larger Moslem dominated state.

On the question of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Zamir observes that the Orthodox, like the Druzes and the Shi’a, “...lacked the passionate emotions and total identification of the Maronites towards Lebanon, and they felt less obliged to defend its independence and territorial integrity. On the other hand they did not adopt the hostile Sunni attitude (towards the creation of the new state) and were willing to accept their inclusion in Lebanon as long as their vital interests were safeguarded.”

The Greek Orthodox sect and communities in the Arab world were closely associated with Islam by virtue of their symbiotic existence with the Sunnis. Cobban contends that their harmonious coexistence was due to the skill of survival the Orthodox came to master in an overwhelmingly Sunni society. They identified themselves with their Arab environment, but at the same time preserved their own identity.
In the 1975 conflict, the same direction of the Orthodox community's orientation was maintained. However, Petran reports that the community's bourgeoisie stood with the Maronite right, whereas the other levels sided with the secular and progressive side. It is worth observing that a few community members played a significant role in the Status Quo Coalition militias and media, while some others joined the Reformist Camp at the elite level.

The remaining sects, such as the Greek Catholic, the Alawites, the Protestants and other Christian minorities, like the Nestorians and Assyrians, as well as ethnic groups such as the Armenians and Kurds, have indeed contributed to the conflict environment by providing money and sometimes fighters for the three main contending militias. Some of these communities made their own brief appearance on the scene of conflict, like the Armenians and the Assyrians, but their independent intervention was swept by the rise of the main warring factions, and they had to merge with them.

The structural analysis of the basic causes of the conflict in Lebanon would remain incomplete if the Palestinian factor was excluded. In terms of their organization and ideology, the Palestinians came to occupy a position in Lebanon's political and social hierarchy similar to that occupied by the militant communities. Although they represented an external cause, their existence in Lebanon was nestled, briefly but intensively, in the web of Lebanese society to such an extent that it became one of the domestic factors in the conflict.

2 The Palestinian Community

As a result of the Arab defeat in the 1948 war in Palestine, and the subsequent exodus of 780,000 Palestinians from their land and their dispersal in the Arab countries, Lebanon admitted over two hundred thousand of them. They were settled around Lebanon's major cities in sixteen camps, which were administered by a specially created UN agency, the United Nations Relief and Work for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). The 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 1970 Jordanian-Palestinian clashes in Amman, capital of Jordan, brought to Lebanon fresh scores of Palestinian combatants as well as P L O infrastructural elements.

It was not the first time Lebanon opened its borders to refugees. Thousands of Christian Armenians, who fled the 1894-5 Turkish massacres and the 1915-21 campaign of deportation from Alexendretta, were offered a sanctuary in Lebanon. Homeless Kurds (Sunni Moslems) and stateless Assyrians (Christian Orthodox) found a home in Lebanon. The Armenians and Assyrians were legally and socially
integrated but the Palestinians were not. By a tacit understanding, the Arab host countries denied the Palestinians the opportunity of political integration or assimilation on the grounds that their permanent stay in the receiving states would compromise their ultimate aim of return to their homeland. Other factors also prevailed. "Many refugees in Lebanon were integrated into the Lebanese economy, but political integration proved impossible, because the Moslem element [i.e. Sunni] totalled about 95 percent of the Palestinians, and to have given them citizenship \textit{en masse} would have upset the very delicate politico-confessional balance in Lebanon."\textsuperscript{66}

It did not take more than a decade and a half for the Palestinians in Lebanon "...to develop their own social and cultural institutions, organs of self-government and security and a powerful economic presence."\textsuperscript{67} In the early 1960's they began to establish political institutions and military bases inside their camps. "...In the camps they did not live in fear of the Israeli occupation army or the Arab regimes' secret police as did Palestinians elsewhere; they could speak freely and openly; and they were participating in a relatively open political process."\textsuperscript{68}

In 1965, the Palestinians in Lebanon found themselves catapulted into the Lebanese political arena. Their organization and military power grew in strength; so did their involvement in Lebanon's domestic affairs. This expansion was encouraged and facilitated by Arab politicians "who retained deep and abiding support" for the "sacred cause" in compensation for their "failure to save their Palestinian brothers from exile"\textsuperscript{69}, and by Moslem communities in Lebanon.

The mushrooming growth of Palestinian power in Lebanon and the adverse internal developments eroded the credibility of Lebanon's political, economic and military institutions. The Moslems pressured the Maronite-dominated legal authority for political reform, and power sharing adjustment. This pressure was augmented by the Palestinian \textit{raison de revolution} and their concrete support of the Moslems. The Legitimate Authority was finally flouted through a number of clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian resistance movement, whose organized military force "...amounted to extra-territorial authority in the country."\textsuperscript{70}

A succession of clashes between the Army and the Palestinians and their sympathizers, coupled with pressure coming from some Arab states, Syria, and Egypt in particular, nudged the Lebanese government to conclude in 1969 a secret agreement (known as the Cairo Agreement after the place where it was negotiated and signed) with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Under the provisions of this agreement, Lebanon relinquished its sovereignty over parts of the southern region
and in the refugee camps, in return for some control over the activities of the Palestinians throughout the country. It gave legal cover for the Palestinian growing power in the South. "Many Christians believed it damaged Lebanon's sovereignty. From the Lebanese government point of view, the main aim of the Agreement was to regulate and supervise the armed Palestinian presence in the country. This was not accomplished. A Protocol to the Agreement was subsequently concluded between the two sides setting out strict limits to the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. However, the Agreement and the protocol were notorious for their breach rather than their adherence. An understanding was worked out between the Lebanese Government, the PLO and the Syrians at Shtaura (a town in eastern Lebanon) in July 1977 for the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The main provision of this understanding was the suspension of PLO operations against Israel across the Lebanese borders, and the retreat of PLO away from the borders. The implementation of this understanding was to be carried out under Syrian surveillance.

The Palestinian pressure in the country, and their rigorous activities, increased the tension between the two camps and led to more political polarization of Lebanon's official policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

III Political Institutions

The structural preconditions for the emergence and perpetuation of conflict were incessantly manifested also in the political institutions of the country. These institutions, in turn, were instrumental in encouraging a conflictual environment between some of the main component communities.

The political parties and movements in Lebanon have been numerous but ineffective in the legislative life of the country. In contradistinction to the political systems of majoritarian societies, Lebanon's political culture has developed a marked tolerance towards all sorts of political parties. Nevertheless these parties seem to have been less oriented towards capturing seats in the legislature than being a communal template reflecting and preserving the sectarian value system. No more than one third of members of the 1991 parliament, which was elected in 1972, are members of a political party.

Political parties in Lebanon have been distinguished by their ideology and orientation rather than by their organization. Ba'aklini distinguishes between two kinds of political parties: The Parliamentary political party and the cadre political...
party. The first kind strives to win an election and campaigns for this aim, whereas the second aims to spread its ideology and increase its membership.76

This classificatory scheme does not explain the inherent conflictual tendencies embodied in the structure of these parties, nor can it provide any analytical insight into the relations of these political institutions to the main conflict issues. This scheme is a mere explanation of an electoral mechanism through which Lebanon’s political institutions operated at a certain point in time.

Zuwiyya77 utilizes a sectarian classificatory system to describe the political parties in Lebanon. According to him, these parties are either Christian dominated or Moslem dominated. In the first category, parties such as the Phalanges, the National Liberal and the National Block are included. The second group includes al-Najjade, the Progressive Socialist Party, the National Appeal and the National Organization Parties. However, he excludes from his scheme a third group of parties for their extra-Lebanese characteristics. This group includes the communists, the Ba’athists, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the three Armenian parties. Such a scheme falls short of capturing a conflict-prone situation in which these parties play a significant role in generating conflict.

A third classificatory scheme proposed by Suleiman78 elaborates parties’ communal structures, ideologies and platforms from which it tackles some of the present day conflict issues, such as the identity of Lebanon, political reform and some other issues. He classifies these parties into four categories: transitional parties, exclusively Lebanese parties, religious organisations and movements, and ethnic parties.

The first category includes the Communist Party of Lebanon, the Communist Action Organization, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party whose main aim is to recreate Greater Syria, with Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine as integral parts of it, the Ba’ath party whose aim is to unify the whole Arab world under the ideology of socialism.

The second category consists of Al-Najjade party which started as a Moslem boy-scout group and developed into a political organization, working to establish Lebanon’s Arab character, the Progressive Socialist Party founded, in the late 1940s, by Kamal Jumblatt, an influential sophist Druze politician. Its main objective is to reform and possibly to create a new society in Lebanon based on the principles of socialism. The Phalanges Party (al-Kataeb) which was established in 1936 as a youth organization by Pierre Gemayel “to foster and safeguard the Lebanese
homeland" in the face of the other centrifugal forces represented by some Lebanese and non-Lebanese based parties. Constitutional Union Party, which was the party that led Lebanon into independence from the French in 1943. Its leader, Bechara al-Khoury, became the first President of independent Lebanon. It was an elite party with a flexible organization. It supported a democratic republican system with free enterprise. Its ties with the Arab world were stronger than the rest of the Christian parties.

Among this group of parties is also the National Liberal Party which was formed in the early 1960s by a former President of the Republic, Camille Chamoun, following his departure from the presidency. It appealed to those Maronites who were disillusioned with the Phalanges Party as well as to the wider Maronite audience.

The third category includes Hezbollah (party of God); Ibad al-Rahman (Worshipers of the Merciful); al-Ikhwan al-Muslemin (Moslem Brethrens); Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) and al-Jama'a' al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic group). Their membership is drawn strictly from the Shi'a and Sunni Moslems.

The fourth category consists mainly of parties whose followers are ethnic migrants such as Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians. The Lebanese socio-political structure absorbed and offered these groups equal access to the country's resources. Consequently, the Armenian community has been able to consolidate its ethnicity into political parties. The Armenians' earliest migration to Lebanon followed their 1895-96 massacres by the Turks and the subsequent deportation of them from Turkey. In 1915 and 1921 thousands of them settled in Lebanon. In 1924, the French Mandatory Power granted them Lebanese citizenship despite the opposition from the Moslems "...who accused the French mandatory government of deliberately increasing the Christian population of Lebanon." In 1937, and as a result of the annexation of the Alexandretta region by Turkey, some twenty-seven thousand Armenians came to Syria and Lebanon. Similar waves of Armenian immigrants came to Lebanon from Palestine in the wake of the Arab Israeli war in 1948. The Armenian community in Lebanon numbers today around one hundred and fifty thousand, the majority of whom belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Lebanese government acknowledges, in the context of the existing confessional system, two Armenian communities, the Orthodox and the Catholic groups.

The Armenians have been politically active and their influence is significant. They belong to three main political parties which were formed outside Lebanon and aim at liberating their fatherland from foreign rule. When the Armenians came to
Lebanon they brought the parties with them, but failed to gain legal recognition by the Lebanese authorities. The Armenian Parties resisted assimilation because they considered themselves to be parties in exile who one day would return to their fatherland. These parties are: the Dashnak, which was established in 1890 in Russia as an anti-Marxist party with the aim of maintaining and vitalizing Armenian culture; the Hunchak which was formed in 1887 in Geneva, with the aim of liberating Turkish Armenia and establishing a socialist regime. Though it has a Marxist ideology it operates independently of the Communist Party in Lebanon. Finally, there is the Ramgavar Azadagan, which was formed in 1921 with the aim of liberating Armenia and restoring its historical boundaries.

Although the ideologies of these parties are distinctively detached from a Lebanese context, they have contributed to the political process of the country and participated actively in its political activities. Their contribution to the conflict environment was not direct but rather of a supportive nature. The Amal Movement and few other political groupings appeared on the stage immediately before or during the conflict years.

IV Conclusion

The structural base which has been described in this chapter constituted a spawning ground for the generation of conflict in Lebanon. It embraced the intractable communal conflictual tendencies, which were kept alive over the years by asabiya communal consciousness and sectarian thrust towards positions of power and authority. The politicization of communalism in Lebanon was a product of the correlation between asymmetrical communal entitlement and the socio-economic and political power distribution, that is, inter-communal inequalities. Communal entitlement and actual power distribution were themselves a by-product of the authority structure and asabiya. It is a two-way relationship. Authority and asabiya, the latter being an agency of power, propelled their communities into positions of power and domination. This differential distribution of power, in turn, created inequalities and asymmetry in communal entitlement and deepened asabiya consciousness.

However, this situation was exacerbated by exogenous factors that contributed to the intensity and violence of the conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli incursions and invasions of Lebanon, inter-Arab discord and the armed Palestinian presence in the country have all added more strain to the inter-communal relations within Lebanon - issues which will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE


2 Decision No. 60/L.R. dated March 13, 1936, enumerates these sects as follows: Christians are composed of the Maronites, Greek orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Gregorian, Armenian Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholics, Nestorians, Chaldeans, Latin and Protestants. The Moslem sects are made up of Sunnis, Shiites, Druzes, Alawites and Ismaelites. The Jewish sects are composed of Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut synagogues. The unrecognised sects are: Protestants, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah Witnesses and the Bahais.


7 See Kamal Salibi, in his chapter "Tribal Origins of the Religious Sects in the Arab East," in Halim Barakat (ed.), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 15-26. argued that the Maronites had taken their name from their first patriarch, Yuhanna Marun al-Sarumi rather than from St. Maron, the fifth century Syrian saint.


10 Kamal Salibi, in his book Syria Under Islam, op. cit., p. 29, maintains that the immediate cause of their breach with the Melkites might have been a contest over the succession to the principal Syrian Patriarch.


12 Ibid., Chapter 3.

13 Ibid., p. 358.

14 Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., p. 249.


16 Boutros Dao, op. cit., p. 389.

Nous sommes persuadés que cette nation que nous trouvons établie sous le nom de St Maroun est une partie de la nation Française.


Encyclopaedia of Islam, New edition vol. 1, s.v. “Druzes”.


Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., p. 262.


Shi’a in Arabic means party.

Caliph in Arabic means successor.


The Sunnis of Lebanon Syria and Egypt follow the Shafi’ school, the sunnis in North African follow the Malik, in Saudi Arabia the Hanbali, and in Turkey the Hanafi (this school is the most permissive in relation to the rights of non-Moslems in an Islamic state).

Fuad I. Khuri, “The Ulama,” op. cit., p. 293.

The “designation took place on 18 dhi al-Hijja of the year 10 hijira, in what is known in Shi’a sources as hadith al-Ghadir where the prophet had said: he whose master (mawlah) I am, Ali is his master (man ana mawlah, fa Ali Mawlah).” Ibid., p. 303.

It is known in the annals of islam as al-Fitna, the first civil war in Islam.

The Shi’a observe the first ten days of Muharram as days of lamentation in which a variety of rituals depicting this massacre are enacted. The rituals involve a passionate self-inflicting act of pain, stressing the suffering of al-Husein. The presiding mullah would start the function by recalling events of a particular Imam focusing on instances of oppression and persecution by the authorities, then he would move on to narrate again and again the story of the battle of Kerbala and the mutilation of the body of al-Husein and the decapitating of his head until everyone in the audience goes into a deep trance and sighs and cries.
115


40 The twelver shi'as are those who follow the line of Imamate from Ali to Muhammad bin Hasan al-Askari, the twelfth Imam who disappeared in AH 260 (AD 874). His followers claim that he went into occultation (Ghaibat) and are awaiting his return as the expected Mahdi. The twelvers, numerically, the majority of Shi'as. The majority of the people of Iran, about half of Iraq, the absolute majority of the Shi'a in Lebanon, and about half of those of Syria are Twelver shi'a. See Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 45-46.

41 Albert Hourani, op. cit., p. 7.


43 David McDowall, op. cit., p. 8; and Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle For the Soul of Lebanon (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 16-18.


46 Amal is an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniya (Lebanese Resistance Battalions). In its abbreviated form, Amal means hope. Essentially it is a protest movement but its main aim is to reinvigorate the Shi'a role in Lebanon's political life and to raise its stakes in the government's rewards.

47 For the Charter of the Amal Movement see Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, op. cit., pp. 144-166.

48 Fuad I. Khuri, in his book Imams and Emirs: State Religion and Sects in Islam, (London: Saqi Books, 1990), Chapters 12 and 13, distinguishes between the Sunni ideology and other Moslem ideologies on the basis of their adaptation to state authority: Sunni Islam is adapted to the sovereignty of the state, whereas the Shi'a is adapted to the sovereignty of its communities.

49 Kamal Salibi, Tarykh Lubnan, op. cit., p. xii, contends that before the eighteenth century neither the term "Lebanon" nor "Mount Lebanon" were used to denote a formal political entity. The term Mount Lebanon where rulers were, until 1841, known as the Emirs of the Druzes to mean a part of the territory, extended from the Chouf in the South to the district of Bsharri in the north.

50 Mohammad Ali Mekki, op. cit., Chapter 2.

51 Ibid., p. 70.

52 Kamal Salibi, Tarykh Lubnan, op. cit., p. 17.

53 For an elaborate account of the pressure exerted by the Maronite clergy and politicians over the French Mandatory power to enlarge Lebanon's territories and grant it independence, see Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1985), Chapter two; and Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), Chapters 1-5.

54 Ibid., pp. 99-100.


57 Ibid., p. 139.

58 Ibid., p. 136.

59 Fuad I. Khuri, in his book *Imams and Emirs*, op. cit., chapter 6, makes a distinction between sect and minority when discussing the different confessional groups in Lebanon. He defines sect as a geographically compact instrument of moral control operating in peripheral territories lying outside the domain of state authority. He contends also that all sects in Islam appeared as a rebellious groups against the sunni dogma. Sects are not to be studied as a religious phenomena but rather as a historical reality. Minorities in the Arab-Islamic societies differ from the sects in form and context (organization, ideology and general orientation). They normally are geographically dispersed, live in cities and relate to the state more than to the community. On this basis he contends that there are in Lebanon only three sects; the Maronites, the Shi'a and the Druzes. Accordingly, the Sunni Moslem, as well as the rest of the seventeen sects are religious minorities.

60 The progenitors of the Greek Orthodox church, the Melkites, are one of the oldest Christian communities in the region. The Melkites, nick-named by their rivals in the times of Justinian II (685-695), the Syrian followers of the Byzantine church, accepted the resolution of the Council of Chalcedon (451) which professed the doctrine of the unity of the two natures, divine and human, in Christ. The Melkite Church was until 1724 traditionally headed by a Greek patriarch and served by mostly Greek bishops. In 1683 the Melkites split into two factions. The first faction, recognized the supremacy of the Roman Pope and came to be known as the Greek Catholic, and the other faction who became known as the Greek Orthodox, remained loyal to their head, the Patriarch of Antioch, and paid special reverence to the Patriarch of Constantinople. In the eighteenth century, the Greek Catholics elected a Syrian Arab as their Patriarch and in the nineteenth century, the Greek Orthodox followed suit. For more details on the Greek Orthodox sect, see Philip Hitti, *Lebanon in History*, op. cit., pp 254, 255.

61 Meir Zamir, op. cit., p. 132.


64 Gibran Tweini, Greek Orthodox editor-in-chief of the *Arab and International An-Nahar* magazine, has applied himself to the Lebanese Forces ideology and outbided any Maronite in his support of this ideology. Also some members of the Armenian and Assyrian ethnic groups fought alongside the Lebanese Forces and the National Liberal Party militias. Among the Greek Orthodox politicians who were associated closely with the reformist camp such as Michel al-Murr, Fouad Boutros, Abdallah al-Raci, played a predominant conciliatory role.

65 The figures on the number of Palestinians in Lebanon are not precise. The Department of State estimates them to be 400,000, of whom 239,000 were registered with UNRWA as of 30 June 1983.


68 Ibid., p. 258.


For the full text of the Agreement see Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, 1979), pp. 185-186.


This agreement, the protocol and the Shtaura accord, were abrogated by the Lebanese Parliament in 1987. Law No. 25/87 to this effect was promulgated in the official gazette No. 25 dated 18/6/1987.


Ibid., pp. 153, 154.

Jalal Zuwiyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 12.


An ethnic group is defined as a distinct category of population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. H.S. Morris, *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, vol. 5, s.v. "Ethnic Groups", p. 167.

CHAPTER FOUR
COMMUNAL RELATIONS AND THE
GENERATION OF CONFLICT

I  Introduction

We noted in the previous chapter how the historical development of the main
Lebanese communities created a segmented social structure. Going into lengthy
historical details was necessary in order to identify those historical events that were
responsible for the creation of cleavages in Lebanese society and link them with the
basic socio-economic and political factors that caused and maintained the 1975
conflict.

Throughout our historical analysis we have noted that the segmentation of the
social structure reinforced the asabiya consciousness of the various component
communities and strengthened their stamina for power and authority. However, it
must be stressed that asabiya and authority were not passive recipients of conflictual
reflexes emanating from the social structure. They were active participants in and
contributors to the conflictual tendencies and their formation. Their role in the transfer
of these segments into power groups is corroborated by al-Azmeh who maintains that
asabiya is a "cohesive force" and a medium through which the group gains power and
domination.1

Having analysed in the previous chapter the segmentation of Lebanese
society, we shall turn in this chapter to analyse the impact of socio-economic and
political discrepancies on the concepts of asabiya and authority and try to investigate
their role in the generation and perpetuation of conflict. External factors, as
contributory causes to the conflict, will also be investigated.

II  Basic Causes of the Conflict

Lebanon's political culture2 has been shaped by the interplay of historical and
social processes. The civil war of 1975 was but a historical stage in a continuous and
ubiquitous process of social conflict in the country. The nature and causes of the war
have been the subject of numerous works by a variety of writers, ranging from
scholars to media reporters. Most of the conventional literature on this subject is of a
descriptive nature and has been dominated by three overriding hypotheses. The first
stipulates that the basic cause of the conflict in Lebanon resided in the malfunctioning
of its socio-political and economic structure. The second claims that the conflict was
basically an outcome of the interplay between the country’s domestic and regional environment. The third contends that the intensity and violence of the conflict was shaped by the intervention of outside powers.

There is no doubt that foreign intervention, military as well as political, intensified and prolonged the conflict; but the basic causes were inherent in the socio-political structure whose historical evolution produced certain conditions and behavioural patterns that engendered conflictual tendencies in the system. These tendencies in turn set the process of segmentation of the socio-political structure in motion. They created segmental loyalties and hardened communal boundaries.

Conflictual tendencies found in the pluralist composition of Lebanese society a spawning ground for their growth and spillover. Those tendencies, in turn, weakened the social structure and made it vulnerable to further pressure emanating from the outside. The structure grew vulnerable, rigid and impregnable and fell prey to its own weakness. It was not able to resist or absorb the pressure coming from within in the form of seminal socio-economic change and from outside in the form of regional political variations.

The conflict process itself was set into motion by a multiplicity of internal, compounded by external, factors. While internal factors manifest social, economic, educative and political attributes, the external factors were basically political in nature and played a supportive and catalytic role, by determining the balance of forces, intensity, and duration of the conflict. Let us now look at the internal and external factors separately.

A Internal Factors

An assessment of the internal factors reveals a three dimensional disposition of their nature: structural, provocative, and catalytical.

1 Structural disposition

Structural preconditions and value perceptions of the contending parties have been evident factors in the Moslem-Christian relations in Lebanon. The Moslems of the Republic of Lebanon believed that they were in an inferior position deprived of status, power and the rewards system in a Christian dominated state. The Christians perceived of the Moslems as peripherals to the core value system of an independent state. Equal access to the vestiges of power was seen by the Christians, particularly the Maronites, as a threat to their communal political status, and to the independence
of Lebanon. These value perceptions were governed by three basic factors: economic asymmetry, educational imbalance and political disparity.

a Economic Asymmetry

The principal economic institutions that emerged during thirty-two years of independence, and those which were inherited from the French mandate and Ottoman rule, failed to function as expected. The deregulated privatized economic system created many discrepancies and inequalities in Lebanese society. Table 4.1 summarizes the findings of a study carried out in 1975 of the national income in Lebanon distributed by sects. The figures show that sixty-one percent of the Christians earned an annual income of less than LL. 6000, compared to eighty-two percent of the Shi'ite, seventy-nine percent of the Sunnis and sixty-nine percent of the Druzes. The table also indicates that thirty-four percent of the Christians earned an annual income of between LL 6001 and LL 25000, compared to twenty-seven percent of the Druzes, seventeen percent of the Sunnis and sixteen percent of the Shiites.

Table 4-1: Average National Annual Income of Major Sects
Figures in Lebanese Pounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECT</th>
<th>NATIONAL INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics and Maronites</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christians</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiites</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druzes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Les Fiches du Monde Arabe, No. 335, Beirut, July 1985

Quoting figures from a study entitled The Entrepreneurs of Lebanon,3 al-Jisr reported that against 105 Christian employers in industry there were twenty-one Moslems. For every eleven Christian employers in banking there were two Moslems and for every forty Christian employers in the services sector there were five Moslems. Still another industrial study reveals that in twenty-five big industries there were seventeen Christian owners against seven Moslems. The Christians were also represented in twenty-four other big industries against twelve Moslems. Referring to the same study Nasr and Nobar concluded that the Moslems were not represented in medium industries located in the suburbs of Beirut.4
At the time of independence the economic structural conditions of Lebanon manifested this sectarian disparity. The Islamic component of the society was predominantly small businessmen and petit bourgeois peasants, whereas the Christians have had a relatively larger middle class, a higher literacy rate and were more involved in the public sector activities, companies and banking. Prior to that the "...bulk of economic, including commercial, activity remained mainly in the hands of native Lebanese, mainly Christians."

b Educational Imbalance

The diverse educational system was also a cause and an outcome of the divergent sectarian composition of Lebanese society. Since their establishment in the second half of the nineteenth century, foreign universities and schools nurtured the conflictual tendencies by instilling in the Lebanese population a diversified value system which in some parts catered for foreign influence. The structure of the educational system reflected the country's social and ideological division. Lebanon has enjoyed the highest educational level among the Afro-Asian countries. The present system has a long tradition that extends back over a hundred years. Many schools were established by religious institutions, foreign missionaries and religious orders as early as the turn of last century.

A wide range of schools and colleges mushroomed in post-independent Lebanon. Everyone of these educational institutions belonged to one of four categories: government, religious (both Christian and Moslem) non-government non-religious schools and foreign schools. The first three categories were supposed to conform to the government curriculum. The fourth category, foreign schools, catered for foreign nationals and their dependents who resided in Lebanon while the head of the household worked in the region. These schools followed a distinctive curriculum. The diverse natures of these schools, their curricula and their educational philosophy precluded them from imparting in their students the feeling of national unity and identity. "...They act to perpetuate the sectarian differences."7

In mid-1970s, the illiteracy level among the Moslems remains higher than among the Christians. Among the Shi'ite males, the rate of illiteracy is thirty-one percent compared to thirteen percent among their Christian counterparts, and it is seventy percent among the Shi'ite females as against twenty percent among their Christian counterparts. Among the university degree holders, the figures are eight percent for the Christians and two percent for the Moslems.8
This inequality in educational attainment has created a feeling of injustice, deprivation and denials on the part of the Moslems of the country. "...The educational attainment of the Christians, particularly the Maronites, are much better than those of the Moslems....The Moslem population feels out of favour and demands more public schools... to provide more educational facilities for their children."\(^9\)

In the nineteenth century, the Moslems sent their children to schools and universities in Constantinople, whereas Maronites and Catholics used to send theirs to France and Italy. In the 1830s, French Jesuits and American Protestants established schools and printing presses in Lebanon. In 1866 the Americans established the Syrian Protestant College, which in 1920 was renamed the American University of Beirut, and the French followed suit by establishing in 1875 the University of St Joseph. In 1960, a Moslem religious endowment opened a private university, the Arab University of Beirut, which was sponsored by the University of Alexandria in Egypt. These three establishments have carried with them an apparent sectarian overtone. The students of St Joseph University are predominantly Maronites, whereas those of the American University of Beirut are Sunnis, Shi'as, Druzes, Orthodox and Protestants. Enrolment at the Arab University of Beirut has been dominated by Moslem students.

\(\text{c Political Disparity}\)

Despite the fact that the heterogeneous ethno-religious composition of Lebanese society constituted a veritable base for the rise of inter-confessional friction and conflict, Lebanon has enjoyed some long periods of communal tranquility. The eighteenth and the last four decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a period of quietude and inter-confessional peace. This was mainly due to a strong central authority vertically linked to the grass roots by a well-defined feudal system, an equitable distribution of political power based on a confessional system that roughly approximated the confessional system of modern Lebanon, a class feeling that cut across religious lines providing a basis for inter-confessional cooperation, and opposition to foreign rule, first to that of Egyptian control of Lebanon between 1832 and 1840 and later, more significantly, to the suzerainty of the Ottomans.

This stability continued throughout the major part of the 18th century despite the late appearance of some evidence of sectarian self consciousness. However, this stability was shaken in the middle of the nineteenth century as a result of the collapse of the feudal system and the ensuing 1860 civil war. Inter-communal tranquility was restored through the intervention of foreign powers who imposed a new power structure on Mount Lebanon. The Druzes suffered under the new order, a loss in their
authority status and the Maronites achieved substantial gain. In spite of that, both communities lived in peace with each other for a long period. However, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the constitutional and demographic changes to Mount Lebanon, both communities started to drift apart particularly in relation to the newly created Republic of Lebanon and the distribution of power among the component communities.

The newly created Republic of Greater Lebanon meant different things to the two main communal blocs. The Moslems saw in it a total violation of their aspirations, for until 1920, they were a majority in an Islamic environment. They regarded the new state as a setback to their desire for a united and independent Arab Moslem world. The Druzes, however, were a special case. They exhibited a highly particular orientation of their own. On the other hand, the Christians, particularly the Maronites, envisioned in the new state a realization of their national aspirations for independence and a guarantor of their economic interests. Smock maintained that:

In large measure the French created Greater Lebanon in order to strengthen the position of Lebanon’s Maronite community as well as to reward the Maronites for their faithful allegiance to France. By separating Mount Lebanon from Syria the French assured that the Maronites would not be engulfed by Syria’s predominantly Sunni population. By annexing additional territories to Mount Lebanon to create Greater Lebanon, the French saw themselves securing the economic viability of the new state.10

Zamir attributed the basic causes of conflict in Lebanon to the expansion of its borders in 1920 and the disruption of the existing confessional balance in Mount Lebanon to the disadvantage of the Maronites.11

The creation of the State of Lebanon satisfied the historical aspirations of the Maronites for a national home, but fell short of providing them with long term security against political and cultural assimilation into the surrounding Moslem world. In extending Mount Lebanon’s borders, the French Mandate created a problem for the Moslem inhabitants by transferring them into a minority, consumed by fear of loss of identity, status and cultural links in a predominantly Christian state. These fears were strengthened by the fact that “…many Christians particularly Maronites, ....continue to believe that Lebanon was primarily a Christian state linked more to the Christian West than to the Muslim East.”12.
Such fears and suspicions led both communities to seek allies outside Lebanon to enhance their security and status position. The Maronites turned to France for protection and the Moslems sought enhancement of their status in getting closer to the surrounding Arab world.

This predicament was confounded by the failure of the French Mandate to create an appropriate atmosphere for both groups to cooperate and make a meaningful contribution to national unity. Zamir asserted that the gap between the Christians and Moslems was far more difficult to bridge than had been supposed:

The mutual suspicions, fears, prejudices and centuries-old hostilities were so deeply rooted that they could not be overcome by a compromise between a limited number of bourgeois political and economic elites from the various sects...13

Nevertheless the Mandatory power promulgated, in 1926, a constitution and enshrined in it a clear reference to the communities' entitlements in the power structure.14 This became a rule which has had an adverse impact on the political system of Lebanon. It gradually led to a congealment of these communities within well defined boundaries. By recognizing the rights of the different communities and their concomitant access to the power hierarchy, the legitimate authority not only relinquished part of its functions to those communities but promoted intra-communal loyalties and allowed communal identities to grow unabated. An ethno-religious intra-group feeling was thus unleashed.

By 1943, the diversity of communal interests had become a leviathan threat to national accommodation. The 1926 constitutional provision did not specify any precise formula for the equitable distribution of political resources. It was insufficient to placate contradictory communal interests and diffuse the burgeoning conflictual tendencies. However, the issue was addressed by the National Pact.

The atmosphere of mistrust and fears engulfing both communal blocs was further enhanced by the change of political regimes in some Arab countries in the late 1950's and early 1960's. A succession of coups d'etat in Syria and Iraq, and the 1952 Egyptian revolution brought into the leadership structure of these countries a new generation of young leaders, genuinely and seriously committed to Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, the establishment of Israel in 1948 created a Palestinian refugee problem, which had an adverse input into the inter-communal relations in Lebanon. The impact of these regional developments left an indelible
mark on Lebanon’s domestic politics by exposing the country’s already vulnerable socio-political structure to external pressure.

It is therefore appropriate to conclude that the Lebanese structure failed to transfer the contradictory tendencies in the Lebanese system as manifested by the anti and pro-status quo parties into a dynamic force of change. It also failed to activate the accommodative mechanism inherent in the National Pact and development policies when the domestic and regional situation became untenable. Instead, this mechanism was allowed to be relegated to the status of anodyne measures intended to appease the anti-status quo forces. The structure, thus, lost one of its effective safety valves that could have served not only to release the stress from the system but to be utilized as a vehicle of propitious change.

The subsequent events have also revealed that the failure of the integrative mechanisms of the Lebanese system (the National Pact) caused radicalisation of the anti-status quo forces and the emergence of such movements as the Amal, the Lebanese Forces, and other militant organizations and groups. They also confirmed that cultural pluralism strengthened the divergent dissonant value system by precluding the normal communication of ideas between the various ethnic groups, increased their discriminatory tendencies and accentuated their we-group feelings among the various components of Lebanese society.

2 Provocative Disposition

The provocative factors of the conflict process are grounded in the social structure also. These factors represented an abstract reflection of the frustration mechanism that evolved into a prime mover in the conflict. The Shi'a sect experienced frustration under the political system, and developed an increased perception of deprivation, for they "...were the bearers of a tradition of lament and submission".15

Frustration with the system and deprivation were not the only motivation for the rise of the Shi'a communal consciousness and its subsequent involvement in the conflict. The Israeli invasion of their hinterland and Palestinian disregard for their plight came to be added factors.

Other ethnic groups experienced similar situations of economic disparities16, denials, and loss of substantive rewards. The system’s failure to address their grievances lured these groups into an alliance with the Shi’a.
3 Catalytic Disposition

Given the fragility of the political structure, it took a minor incident to set the conflict process in motion. A few weeks prior to the outbreak of the war, a series of incidents occurred that added to the underlying grievances of the anti-status quo forces. Some of these incidents were physical, such as demonstrations, protests and riots in Beirut and Sidon, while others were political, such as the dismissing of the Cabinet and the appointment of an unacceptable Prime Minister. Frustration and tension were built up with each successive incident, culminating in the incident of 13 April 1975.

Of course, on the other hand, there was the role of external factors. The impact of these factors, regional and international, merits a separate investigation. Their input into the conflict process came by way of their effect on inter-communal relations.

Although this study is concentrating on the operative internal causes of the conflict, it is necessary to seek a linkage between the external factors and the conflict process. This linkage is suggestive of an intrusion of external stimuli, mostly regional, on the inter-communal relations that adversely affected the domestic balance.

B External Factors

External pressure and outside influence on Lebanon's domestic politics are not new. History continued to produce parallel political templates that often revealed a continuity of behavioural patterns. As outlined in Chapter two, the 1860 civil war in Mount Lebanon, (between the Druzes and Maronites) invited the intervention of the Great Powers of the time which played a decisive role in bringing about a solution that provided Lebanon with inter-communal peace for seventy years.

In the present conflict, the regional component of the external factors contributed to the intensity of the conflict and influenced its direction and duration. With the benefit of hindsight, we can delineate these influences as those exuding from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, Israeli incursions into Lebanon, and inter-Arab discord.

1 The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict, with its Palestinian component, had its impact on the Lebanese scene through rising Arab expectations of Lebanon's capabilities, and in straining the precarious sectarian relations.
Lebanon's contribution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was basically of a non-militaristic nature. Its role in the four wars fought with Israel since 1948 was minimal compared to that of the frontline Arab states of Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Lebanon's diminutive military capabilities were a contributory cause for its reluctance to join forces with other Arab armies to fight Israel. Its policy orientations were based on the much publicized Phalangist notion that Lebanon's weakness is its strength. The 1948 Arab-Jewish war in Palestine caught Lebanon's masses off guard as it came on the heels of the attainment of Lebanon's independence, at a time when their social energies were directed mainly towards nation-building and the fulfilment of their national goals.

However the Lebanese army did contribute a contingent to the Arab military efforts to thwart the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, but in the following two wars of 1967 and 1973, it refrained from joining the hostilities. This failure incited demonstrations and riots from the Moslem masses "...protesting the decision not to aid Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic". Thus the relation between Sunni Moslem political elites and the predominantly Maronite Army command was further strained. However, the Christians, mainly the Maronites, embraced the view that Lebanon ought to continue to seek security through weakness by taking a "no threat" position towards Israel and seek protection from the West and the UN.

The former President of the Republic, Amine Gemayel (1982-88), regretted this policy. He stated that:

One of the assumptions we made was that Lebanon's weakness is its strength. The Lebanese believed that the creation of a strong Army would be seen as a threat by others. The absence of such an army would be an earnest of our dedication to peace, it was believed, guaranteeing that we would remain outside regional hostilities. This philosophy left us unprepared, unequipped and unable to deal with the anomic forces that exploded in Lebanon in the early 1970s.

The Moslem masses rejected the above policy, considering it callous and dishonourable, and proffered instead an active policy of self-defence and reliance on the Arab states instead of the West. The Moslem insistence on Lebanon's active participation in the Arab-Israeli wars might have been spurred by two aims: to bring the country closer to the Arab fold which would result in a payback in support of their status and demands for a more equitable power sharing arrangement; and to preclude the socio-political structure, with its Maronite conceptual base, from becoming
ossified, and eventually relegating the Moslem's status permanently to the lower rungs of the political ladder.

2 The Palestinian Problem

The Christian groups publicly expressed their wariness of the emergence of an organized Palestinian military presence in Lebanon. Their anxiety was compounded by the inability of the government to contain the upsurge of Palestinian power and to foreclose its collaboration with the anti-status quo forces. The failure of the Lebanese government to control this situation prompted the Lebanese National Front to claim for itself the responsibility of curtailing the rising Palestinian power, declaring publicly that the Palestinians in the country had become a "state within the state" and their behaviour had become incompatible with Lebanon's sovereignty.

The latent cause for the Lebanese Front's attack on the Palestinians in Lebanon sprang not only from their concern for Lebanon's sovereignty but from their anxiety over the disruption of the communal balance of power. As they became conscious of their minority status, the Maronites felt that the presence of about four hundred thousand Palestinians, 95 percent of whom were Sunni Moslems, in Lebanon would tip the balance of power in favour of the Moslems. Their fears were enhanced by the Moslem's empathetic and sedulous brooding over Palestinian aspirations. Khalidi, a Palestinian, acknowledged the Maronites' fears. He confirmed that "the appearance of the Palestinian Resistance on Lebanese soil had many consequences. Objectively, it upset the Christian-Moslem balance of power in favour of Moslems. It offered not only a model to the radicalized Moslems but also a protective umbrella against Maronite high-handedness."

Furthermore, the Palestinian involvement in Lebanese internal politics strengthened the irredentists' claims of pan-Arabism. This gave the Maronites legitimate grounds to claim that they were the only community that could guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty and deliver it from the comprador.

Three important phenomena have transpired from the Maronites' attack on the Palestinians. First, the Christians' conflictual aims were deflected from the Moslems to a substitute object, the Palestinians in Lebanon. Second, by redirecting their conflictual attitudes towards the Palestinians, the Christians attained a substitute satisfaction through more tension release. Third, the Maronites had vested interests in defending the existing socio-political order.
3 The Israeli Incursions and Invasions

Israeli violations of Lebanese territory, particularly the border areas of the South, had incessantly increased in frequency and intensity after 1968. These violations had created havoc in the border area and caused a massive stampede of the population, who were predominantly Shi'a Moslem. The incursions had a centrifugal effect on the inhabitants. They interrupted and curtailed the sources of their livelihood and forced thousands of them to desert their homes and lands in the South and move northwards to settle in the shanty-towns of Beirut. This displacement created slums infested with squalor and misery.

Statistical data kept by the Lebanese Army shows that between 1968 and 1974 Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory averaged 1.4 violations per day. This increased in 1974-75 to seven violations per day. For the first eight months of 1975, the following violations were recorded: air space 1101; territorial waters 215; artillery shelling 2150; machine-gun firing 303; air and naval raids 40; temporary installation inside Lebanese territory 193; road buildings 3; land incursions 151. This averages out to 17 violations per day.

The Shi'a migrants to Beirut's slum areas were largely tenant farmers, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers. They were poorly educated, unskilled and lacking in financial resources. Up to the early 1960s, the Shi'a community as a whole was ignored by the central government. Their regions were deprived of substantial development projects. Norton remarked that "Lebanon's Shi'a had long been considered the most disadvantaged confessional group in the country". They had been dismissed as politically irrelevant; part of their prescribed share of power in the 1943 confessional arrangement was allowed to slip into the hands of the Moslem Sunni.

However, the Shi'a were able, over a period of two decades, to transform themselves from a non-participant community to a highly politicized sect. Their emancipation was associated with two factors: societal disruption which was caused by Israeli incursions into their hinterland, and the process of modernization, which Lebanon experienced since the mid-1950s.

Both factors contributed to the social mobilization of the Shi'a and their eventual politicization. Karl Deutsch wrote that "... as people are uprooted from their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, from their old habits and traditions and often from their old patterns of occupation and places of residence, they experience drastic change in their needs" and become available for mobilization.
The poverty belt around Beirut was inhabited mainly by the Shi'a from South Lebanon, and their co-religionists from the Beq'a Valley, in eastern Lebanon, who migrated voluntarily in search of better opportunities. Those urban quarters constituted a spawning ground for the political mobilization of the Shi'a. The impact of urbanization on the new comers served what Lerner termed a stimulant of needs and a take-off towards widespread participation. Huntington argues convincingly that urbanization is instrumental in lifting the ceiling of the new comers' aspirations and their spectrum of expectations, and offering an accoutrement of enhanced status. Failure to achieve this would induct individuals and groups into politics.

Before the establishment of the Movement of the Deprived in 1974 and the Amal Movement in 1975, a large number of the Shi'a joined the Lebanese communist party, the Socialist Ba'ath Party and other anti-establishment organizations which were instrumental in the Shi'a awakening. Many Shi'a also joined the different Palestinian splinter groups. When the Amal movement rose to power and started to dominate the Shi'a politics in Lebanon, most of the secular parties' Shi'a recruits shifted towards it. The politicized Shi'a, in and around Beirut and in the South, were capable of translating their incipient politicization into political action for greater shares in the power structure. They used the Amal political agenda to achieve their goals. Norton observed that "...the Shi'a were beginning a political awakening that would play an important role in shaping the destiny of Lebanon."

4 Inter-Arab Discord

Following the 1948 Arab armies' defeat at the hands of Israel, a series of coups d'etat swept Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. The armies' disappointment with their political leadership for failure to combat Jewish militarism and designs, and the loss of Palestine to non-Arab settlers, prompted these coups and set the process of political change in the Arab world with a snow-balling effect. In a quick retortion, the other Arab countries resorted, in self-defence, to a policy of appeasement by lending credence to Palestinian grievances and by embracing their demands.

The rift between the nascent military regimes and the rest of the Arab regimes grew wider as the former introduced sweeping reforms to their political institutions and economic organizations. These changes have set the military regimes on a collision course with the conservative Arab countries. Lebanon was left out of the game of tug-of-war between these two camps, but not for long.

Lebanon's relations with the Arab world had been clearly defined and institutionalized by the charter of the League of Arab States of which Lebanon was a founding member. A special resolution was introduced into the protocol at the
Founding Conference of the League in Alexandria in 1944, pledging unanimous respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers.

The formal recognition granted to the Lebanese system and the acceptance of its side role in inter-Arab affairs did not immunize its polarized population from reacting to the pervasive political changes in the region. The Lebanese Moslem masses' dreams of glorious pan-Arabism and their yearning for a unified Arab world were inflamed by the incendiary slogans of Arab Unity of the new revolutionary military regimes and specifically that of Nassirism. This constituted a source of tension between the Moslem and Christian communities in Lebanon. The Christians accused the Moslems of going back on their pledge to relinquish their advocacy of unifying Lebanon with Syria or any other Arab state, but the Moslem community was not deterred by the Christians' claims. They were galvanized by the upsurge of pan-Arab nationalism, a concept utilized by the military elite themselves to manipulate events in the region. Soon the Arab world was revolving around two axes: the new radical progressive and socialist oriented regimes, represented by Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and the newly independent Algeria, which was joined in the late 1960s by Libya, and the conservative regimes, headed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco.

On the other hand, the rise in the mid-1960s of the PLO to prominence gave credence to the Palestinian cause, and further attenuated the links between the two main communities in Lebanon. The Lebanese Moslems discovered in the revived pan-Arabism and the throes of change in the region a lacuna through which they could assert their endemic demands for political reform. By leaning on the surging Palestinian power in Lebanon, they were able to upgrade their conflictual tendencies and challenge the existing confessional arrangement and the National Pact itself. This upsurge in Moslem radicalism was met by a calculated quintessential response from the Maronites. They fortified themselves inside their armour and expressed their tenacious and trenchant attachment to the National Pact, the confessional system and their perception of the inviolability of the Lebanese State. Simultaneously, they also preserved a close link with the Arab conservative regimes as much as with non-Arab foreign powers including Israel, with whom functional relations were quickly cultivated.

The progressive states of the region could not hold for long as a unified front. Differences between them soon started to erode their cohesive posture. Their cooperation began to wither away as soon as the euphoria dissipated, and their traditional rivalries re-emerged.

During the decade preceding the war in Lebanon, the Arab world was chequered with conflicts and rivalries: between Egypt and Libya, between Algeria and
Morocco, between Iraq and Kuwait, between Egypt and Syria, between Syria and Iraq, and between Iraq and Iran. Some of these rivalries had marginal effects on Lebanon’s communal and state politics but others were of long duration and intense impact. Syria seemed to be the centre of a network of rivalries. Most of its quarrels with other Arab countries had their effects on Lebanon. Its ideological rift with the co-ideological Ba’ath regime of Iraq split the Lebanese Ba’ath Party and its sympathizers.

The aftermath of the 1973 October war and the Sinai accord caused a deep division between Syria and Egypt. Failing to convince Syria of concluding a comprehensive settlement with Israel, Egypt moved alone towards separate peace. This infuriated Syria but above all caused much consternation in both communities in Lebanon. By this time, numerous ideological movements in the country - the Ba’athists, Syrian nationalists, the Nasserites, Arab nationalists, socialists, and Moslem brethren - had rallied behind the Palestinian movement in Lebanon.

The Palestinians and their allies in Lebanon felt that a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel did not augur well for their cause. They began fortifying their front in Lebanon by helping their allies establish their own militias. They also established a functional relationship with the Syrian regime to thwart Egypt’s drive towards an Egyptian-Israeli agreement. The Christian rightists were alarmed by the Palestinian close cooperation with the Lebanese National Movement and Palestinian-Syrian collaboration. Further tension between the two groups developed into further fights with the conclusion of the second Sinai Agreement.

The Palestinian-leftist-Syrian collaboration was further enhanced by the "...continuing Arab consensus that Lebanon must remain an active front-line state in the struggle against Israel." This deepened the anxieties of the Lebanese Christian rightists and spurred them to seek help from foreign sources.

The various Lebanese conflict groups failed to insulate themselves from regional influences; they rather developed an affinity with external patrons and a disposition to espouse and reflect the conflictual policies of these patrons. Ajami added that:

Lebanon has always been a theatre for the ambitions of more powerful Arab states and interests; all of them have been, in one way or another, involved in recent crises either as backers of certain movements or as anxious intermediaries trying to patch up the system and keep it together.
C The Syrian Factor

Syria has a long history of involvement in the internal affairs of the Republic of Lebanon by virtue of its geographical proximity and the historical and economic ties between the two countries. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon and Syria were both placed under the mandatory power of France. They both achieved their independence around the mid-1940s. As independence took on firmer contours, both countries developed different goals in their foreign policy orientation. In 1949, Syria opted out of the French currency zone, while Lebanon remained attached to it. Until then, both countries had one central bank, a custom union, one railway administration, complete coordination in their farm policies, and a common labour market. In 1951, a complete severance of these institutional ties followed, and each country developed its own infrastructure, domestic and external policies. Lebanon kept a Western style multi-party system. Syria experienced a succession of coups which transformed it into virtually a one party state.

To delve into a lengthy investigation of Syria's historical involvement in Lebanese affairs, and to explore the full complexity of its intervention in the conflict is beyond the limit of this study. We shall confine our enquiry to the implications of its intervention for the inter-communal relations and limit it to the war years, that is from 1975 to the present time.

Syria's intervention in the Lebanese conflict, and in its resolution, progressed incrementally in stages: from mediation to interference by proxy to direct military and political intervention.\(^{31}\) This pattern was in keeping with the progress of the conflict and its effect on the inter-communal balance.

With each new stage Syria found itself plunging deeper and deeper, whether by design or inadvertently, into the Lebanese "quagmire". As the conflict proceeded on the ascending rungs of the violence ladder, Syria's role gained centrality and predominance. Similarly, in the regional conflict resolution efforts, Syria played an effective role.

Syria's objectives in the Lebanese crisis have attracted a wide range of opinions: President Assad himself revealed in his speech in Damascus on 20 July 1976, to members of the newly elected Syrian provincial councils, that he interfered in the crisis to prevent the partitioning of Lebanon along sectarian lines, and to thwart the establishment of a radicalized regime in Lebanon that could destabilise the political system in Syria and draw it into a war with Israel for which it was not prepared.\(^{32}\)
The various domestic conflict parties assessed the Syrian intervention each from its own world view and interests. While it was welcomed initially by the Status Quo Coalition, it was opposed by the Reformist Camp and the Palestinian Resistance. At a later stage this situation was reversed. Syria backed, for most of the conflict years, the Reformist Camp but restrained it (by holding back military assistance) from administering a crushing defeat to the Status Quo Camp. The leadership of the Coalition, already suspicious of Syria's designs on the territorial integrity of Lebanon, accused the Reformist Camp, particularly the Moslem component of it, of yielding its influence to the Syrians. Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalanges Party and a pillar of the Coalition leadership, accused Syria of harbouring ulterior motives on the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. He requested the withdrawal of their troops from the country.33

This posture reflected the attitudes of the entire Status Quo Coalition and was not only maintained throughout the conflict years but intensified and was allowed to snowball into military confrontation with the Syrian troops in Beirut and its environs.

Syrian intervention in Lebanon, as well as that of Israel and to some extent other regional actors, such as Iraq and Iran, polarized the conflict environment. By the time the civil war officially ended in October 1976, the Status Quo Coalition was still backed by the Syrian forces in Lebanon. Shortly after that, and throughout the subsequent conflict period, Syria shifted its support towards the Reformist Camp whereas the Status Quo Coalition intensified its relations with Israel and established during the last years of the conflict strong relations with Iraq, which replaced Syria as its principal Arab backer. Hudson believes that the civil war of 1975-76, passed through four stages.34 Rasler detailed those stages in the following table.

Table 4-2: Dominant Conflict Groups and Axes in the Four Phases of the Lebanese Civil War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Conflict Axes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>February 1975 - May 1975</td>
<td>Palestinians vs. Phalangists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>June 1975 - December 1975</td>
<td>Lebanese Front vs. National Movement/radical Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>June 1976 - October 1976</td>
<td>Syrian Army/Lebanese Front vs. National Movement/Lebanese Arab Army</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

During the first three phases of the conflict, and prior to that, Syria's role was basically intermediatory. It was only in the third phase of the civil war that Syria clandestinely introduced into Lebanon contingents of its militia, al-Sai'qa (the lightning rod) and that of the Syria-stationed Palestine Liberation Army "...in order to prevent the rightists attempt to partition Lebanon." At the same time, it continued its mediation and was able to persuade the Status Quo Coalition to accept some amendments to the power-sharing agreement in which the Moslems' stake in the government rewards would be slightly raised. The Lebanese National Movement and its allies rejected this settlement on the grounds that it did not address the socio-political grievances and fell short of their basic demand for a total secularization of the state.

The fourth stage witnessed direct and massive Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. On 1 June 1976, up to 15,000 Syrian troops entered Lebanon and penetrated, amid occasional fierce resistance, into the Lebanese National Movement main areas. Their presence tilted, for the time being, the balance of forces in favour of the Coalition, which went on the offensive achieving considerable gains mainly against the Palestinians. Heller discerned a major contradiction in Syria's intervention. He stated that:

It should be noted that by siding with the Maronite Christians at this time against the Palestinian-Lebanese leftists, the stated goals of the Syrians-to prevent the partition of Lebanon (sought by the Maronites), to preclude the installation of a Palestinian-backed leftist regime...and to achieve peace - tended to nullify each other.

Nevertheless, this intervention brought the clashes between the two groups to an end. The Syrian military involvement was declared legal by the newly elected President of Lebanon, Elias Sarkis. Regional legality was also bestowed upon it by the Mini-summit meeting of six heads of Arab States in Riyadh in mid-October 1976, and was endorsed by a full Arab Summit Conference in Cairo on 25 and 26 October of the same year. One of the main resolutions of the conference was to create an Arab Deterrent Force to supervise the ceasefire and oversee the disbanding of the militias. It was agreed that this force was to be composed of 30,000 troops drawn from several Arab countries. Syria contributed half this number, its total contingent that was already in Lebanon. However, all Arab forces later pulled out of the ADF, leaving it purely Syrian.

Although the civil war officially ended in October 1976, the conflict persisted for fourteen additional years, during which new issues and conflict groups emerged, and
old ones disappeared. The conflict itself changed its form and direction. Between October 1976 and October 1989 (the resolution of the conflict), significant developments, in which the Syrian factor played a salient role, emerged in the conflict environment.

The first of these developments was the Syrian reassessment of its support of the Status Quo Coalition. In 1978, Syria broke its relations with the Coalition and shifted its support back to the Palestinians and the Reformist Camp. Hinnebusch attributed this shift to the fact that the Coalition "...threw in its lot with Israel at the expense of its already badly frayed Syrian connection." From then onwards the forces of the Status Quo Coalition embarked on a confrontation policy with the Syrian troops in Lebanon. The Coalition demanded the eviction of the Palestinians from Lebanon and challenged the Syrian Army in their areas. Syria retaliated with force and vengeance. It attacked the predominantly Maronite militia's position in East Beirut and the rural town of Zahle, inflicting heavy damage on it, but, due to Saudi pressure and Israeli threats, the Syrian army retreated from East Beirut and the Kibruwan area, the main Maronite heart-land.

At this stage Syria reconstituted its relations with the Reformist Camp and transformed it into an elaborate alliance, which brought together all anti-status quo forces. This shift brought about a change in Syria's role from that of a mediator and arbiter to a participant in the Lebanese conflict.

The second development was the 1978 massive Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in retaliation for an earlier Palestinian commando attack on a bus in Tel Aviv in March of that year. The immediate effect of this invasion on communal relations was to sharpen the polarization of both camps over the Palestinian and Syrian presence in the country. Khalidi concluded that the invasion "...strained to the limits the relations between the Maronite hawks and Syria." The "Hawks" hoped to liberate Lebanon from both the Syrians and the Palestinians. The rising tension developed into armed clashes in the suburbs of Beirut between the Lebanese National Movement and Coalition forces. Under such circumstances the Reformist Camp dropped its opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and moved closer to them. Former President Frangie disengaged himself from the Lebanese Front and joined the Reformist group. A new alignment of forces based on political rather than sectarian issues emerged. This added vigour to the newly formed Syrian-PLO strategic alliance that was directed also against President Sadat's peace plan with Israel.
The third development was the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. It took place at a time when polarization of the domestic conflict was at its apogee. On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon from the south and south east, and advanced northwards towards the capital. Within a week they laid siege to West Beirut, the Chouf mountain and part of the Beq’a Valley. Israel's basic aims were to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon, to establish a Phalanges dominated central government that would sign a peace agreement with Israel and to oust the Syrian forces from the country.44

There were claims and counter claims that the Lebanese Forces militias collaborated with the Israeli invaders. Schiff reported that several Christian leaders met in 1981 "with the then Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and asked Israel to send its army to Lebanon as far as Beirut in order to get rid of the PLO and force the Syrian Army to leave."45 Petran states that "...the Lebanese Forces and other rightist militias acted during and after the invasion as auxiliaries of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces]."46 Meanwhile Abu Khalil reports that the Lebanese Forces were not privy to the Israeli invasion plan. As a matter of fact they asked not to be implicated in the forthcoming battle.47 Haddad confirms that "...the Lebanese Forces refused to be directly involved or even associated with the Israeli."48 The militias of the Reformist Camp and the PLO resisted the invasion but were encircled and trapped together with the 600,000 inhabitants of West Beirut by the invading army.

Israel achieved one of its three declared objectives of the invasion: the destruction of the military and political infrastructure of the PLO. It pushed the Syrian Army from Beirut and part of the Chouf mountains and placed itself in a position to conclude a peace agreement with the Lebanese Government as a price for its total withdrawal from Lebanon.

Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon for the withdrawal of Israeli forces began towards the end of December 1982 under the auspices of the United States. An agreement was drawn up and signed by the heads of the three participating parties (with the USA as a witness) on 17 May 1983, but was never ratified,49 and later was abrogated by the Lebanese Government. The Reformist Camp was traumatized by the invasion and took an uncompromising stance against the proposed agreement. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and worked diligently, with considerable success, for its abrogation.

Thus, the conflict re-polarized around the Agreement. The Reformist Camp, supported strongly by Syria and the wider Arab audience, opposed the agreement and demanded its annulment as a precondition for reconciliation, and the Status Quo
Coalition hawks held on to it as a negotiation chip in return for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Finally the treaty was blocked by Syrian and domestic pressure. President Gemayel was forced to renounce it. Ball surmises that this development gave Syria and the Moslem groups in Lebanon a win, and it reduced Maronite power. As for the invasion itself, he concludes that it failed in all its three objectives. He specifically refers to Israel's attempt to impose an Israeli influenced Maronite regime on the country as a delusion.50

Initially, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon eclipsed the Syrian role in the Lebanese crisis, but as soon as Israel withdrew from Beirut and the Agreement of 17 May 1983 was annulled, Syria regained its prominence as a central player in the domestic conflict environment. The invasion reinforced the communal disputes and sharpened their bipolar resolve.

In 1984, the Lebanese Army was split along sectarian lines, almost all of the Shi'a and Druze elements and some Sunnis broke away and refused orders from the central command, leaving it predominantly Maronite. The conflict process continued unabated with intermittent violence until the last quarter of 1988. Political confrontation between the two camps escalated, causing total immobilization of government functions. The cleavage in the communal structure crept into the Cabinet. The Sunni Prime Minister, supported by the Reformist Camp ministers, boycotted the Maronite President. No cabinet meetings were held from mid-1985 to September 1988.

On 22 September 1988, the Presidency was rendered vacant. A rival military government, headed by the Maronite Commander of the Armed Forces, General Michel Aoun, was appointed by the outgoing President to fill the vacuum, without dismissing the existing government headed by the Moslem Sunni Prime Minister, Dr Salim al-Hoss. This step was denounced by the Reformist groups and declared illegal. They refused to recognize the government of Aoun or submit to its authority.

From September 1988 to October 1990, Lebanon had two rival governments but no President. The Moslem-led government representing the Reformist Camp, was fully supported by Syria, the Arab countries, except Iraq and the PLO, and the world community. The rival-appointed Maronite-led government could not extend its authority beyond the Maronite enclave in East Beirut and the Kisrewan region. With the presence of two rival governments, each claiming legitimacy to itself, the conflict escalated into unprecedented intensity and violence. It further changed direction and involved new participants.
General Aoun, who commanded the loyalty of five out of eleven well equipped and highly trained predominantly Maronite brigades, attempted to impose his authority over the Christian militias in his enclave and extend it to the rest of Lebanon. He had to fight a two-pronged battle: at first with the Lebanese Forces militias, which shared his turf, and subsequently with the Reformist Camp militias supported by the break-away sixth Brigade and the Syrian troops in West Beirut. The clashes had a devastating effect on the Maronite community and on East Beirut in particular. Aoun’s war with the Lebanese Forces lasted four months, from February to May 1990. The confrontation ended without a victory for either side, but with enormous destruction to East Beirut, and a loss of over one thousand persons in the Christian enclave.

Fighting between Aoun and the Lebanese Forces left both parties weakened. Its impact on the Maronite community was devastating. However Aoun’s popularity rocketed while his political predicament became more acute. During this period Aoun shifted the conflict focus from his co-religionist Lebanese Forces to the Syrians. He entered into fierce battles with the Syrian troops in Lebanon and demanded their total and complete withdrawal from the country. In his battles, he was able to mobilize popular support, but this was not enough to give him political gains.

Meanwhile, Arab mediation efforts intensified and an Accord was concluded in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia, between the Lebanese parliamentarians, who represented the various conflict groups. The Accord was expected to usher in a new dawn of peace in Lebanon. Aoun rejected this Accord and precluded its implementation. Finally, in October 1990, he was forced out of his enclave, paving the way for the restoration of political legitimacy for the new government and eventual peace for the country.

III Conclusion

In conclusion it must be stressed that the failure of the social system to provide equal opportunities to Lebanon’s component communities was due mainly to the nature of the social structure and to the impact of some external factors on it. The social structure itself became less creative, lost some of its social energy and became immobilized under the pressure of the evolving domestic and regional environment. Its adjustive mechanism could not cope with the demands of the fast developing situation. It collapsed under the stress and released all the latent communal tensions into an already explosive situation. We now should turn to conflict regulation and conflict resolution.
CHAPTER FOUR
END NOTES


2 Political culture is defined by Verba, as a "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics". Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.


5 Bassim al-Jisr, *op. cit.*, p. 234.


8 Bassim al-Jisr, *op. cit.*, p. 79.


14 Article 95 - (before its amendment in 1990), stipulates that: "As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Cabinet, such measure, however, not to cause prejudice to the general welfare of the State."


20 Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Centre for international affairs, 1979), p. 94.


32 Hafez al-Assad's speech, Radio Damascus, July 20, 1976. Excerpts of the speech were reported by all Lebanese newspapers of July 21, 1976.


35 Karen Rasler, op. cit., p. 431.


39 For the full text of the Resolution, see Munir Abu Fadel, Lubnan Al Qadyyah Fy Al-Mahafel Al-Arabyyah Wa al-Dawliyyah (Lebanon; the cause in the Arab and international forums) (Beirut: al-Khailil Press, 1984), pp. 135-139.

40 Ibid., pp. 121-125.


42 Ibid., p. 9.

43 Walid Khalidi, op. cit., p. 140.


47 Joseph Abu Khalil, op. cit., p. 197.


49 The agreement would have ended the state of war existing between Lebanon and Israel since 1948. It envisaged a security zone in the region adjacent to the Israeli borders. It gives Israel certain rights within this zone. The Israelis undertook to withdraw from Lebanon. In a secret exchange of letters between the contracting parties it was expressed that the Israeli withdrawal is conditional on the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. See Helena Cobban, op. cit., pp. 195-196.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONFLICT REGULATORY PRACTICES BEFORE
THE WAR: THE NATIONAL PACT

I Introduction

The emphasis in the first part of the thesis was on the aetiology, sequence and manifestation of communal conflict in Lebanon. Our main concern was to find an answer to Gurr’s question “Why men rebel?” Answers to this question were sought in a matrix of relationships between the social structure, conflict process and conflict groups. The nature of the social structure was analysed in the light of the two generic concepts of authority and asabiya. The main argument was that both concepts can explain the differential distribution of power and the rise and fall of conflict groups. However it was not claimed that these concepts could dictate the nature, form and direction of conflict, but they were variables that produced the requirement for the generation of conflict.

In this chapter the emphasis will be shifted to an equally important aspect of conflict: the institutions and political processes through which communal conflict can be brought under control and resolved. Our aim is to find an explanation to the vital question: How men can contain rebellion?

We will first present a summary and evaluation of the consociational democracy theory. The major emphasis will be on its regulatory aspect as proposed by Eric Nordlinger in his model on conflict regulation. Second, the various attempts at managing the Lebanese conflict will be outlined in the context of consociationalism. Third, the chapter will conclude with some remarks on more theoretical questions which are prompted by the regulatory schemes attempted, but which failed to resolve the Lebanese conflict during the years of civil war.

II The Intractability of Conflict

The Lebanese conflict, like most other communal conflicts, is an amoeba-like shape. It is an amorphous blot with little apparent structure. Over the years it changed shape, direction and goals, making it more difficult to be resolved. However, no conflict is ever completely resolved.¹

Some aspects of certain intractable communal conflicts may be managed by one of several methods: sweep them under the carpet and pretend they are not there, physical elimination of one of the conflict parties, partitioning of the country along
communal lines, or adopting a long term conflict management mechanism that would blunt communal boundaries and reduce communal friction. Lebanon tried a combination of the first and last method. The disputant parties, by mutual agreement, sidestepped the sensitive issues, thus allowing them enough time to fester and surface again. Amine Gemayel, President of the Republic of Lebanon from 1982-1988, confessed that this method was Lebanon's choice for many years. "The government in Lebanon tended to steer away from the large controversial issues, allowing major political problems to develop largely on their own and to ultimately threaten the state and the citizens."2

Conflict itself is never solved. Sandole and Sandole-Stanoste remarked: "We talk of conflict resolution, not conflict solutions...conflict incidents or episodes may be solved, but conflict per se is never solved. Each solution creates, in a Hegelian sense, a new plateau or a new synthesis against which the next conflict scenario is played. Society never 'solves' conflict totally. Conflict incidents or episodes are solved and then resolved and resolved."3 To use a Hobbesian terminology, conflict ceaseth only in death. Coser agrees with this contention, but qualifies it by intimating that if "...no mutual agreements are made at some time during the struggle."4 Rapoport maintains that resolving a conflict depends on its nature as well as on the core issue involved. Conflicts void of issues cannot be resolved. "Only conflicts in which substantive issues of some sort are an integral part, can be resolved."5 He also maintains that resolution of a conflict depends also on the expected outcome and the cooperation of the conflict groups. It is only when the outcome is jointly determined,6 that is, both parties achieve some degree of satisfaction, that a resolution can be applied to a conflict. In other words, if a conflictual situation involved a zero-sum possibility then conflict resolution cannot be applied to it.7

III Diverse approaches to Conflict Regulation

Resolution is not the only approach with which conflict is tackled. There is a wide range of orientations oscillating between repression and amicable understanding. Those who occupy a position of authority and have better access to facets of power view conflict as a threat to their interests vis-a-vis conflict's potential disruption of the status quo. They would like to keep the system the way it is. It is in their best interests to suppress the conflict. On the other hand, those who are deprived of power find it in their best interest to change the status quo. They resort to various means ranging from agitation and instigation to revolution. Between these two positions there is a wide range of other alternatives with which one could approach conflict; we may tend to ignore, forget, avoid, regulate, manage or resolve it.8
Conflict theorists of every orientation are in agreement that conflict cannot be eliminated from society. At best it can be regulated, at worst it cannot. "... Particular disputes may be settled or brought under control, the underlying conflicts are not likely to be resolved, but will reappear in other forms and in other issues..."9. Boulding is of the same opinion. He envisages any situation void of conflict as a dull and featureless situation. He believes that the significance of conflict is its resolution. "We must look at the ways in which conflicts are resolved...what we must look for here is ways in which a particular conflict process moves towards an end. This is not to say, of course, that conflict itself comes to an end, for conflicts are continually being recreated."10

This apparent unanimity over the impossibility of eliminating conflicts from society is not applicable to conflict regulation, management and resolution. There exists a bewildering number of conflict models and a large volume of literature on conflict management and resolution which deal, in the majority, with individuals, dyads, small groups, or international situations. Conflict within nation-states has attracted less attention.11 Only recently, work on communal conflict has shifted the limelight from the problems of nationalism, minorities and self determination to alternative models in which communal pluralism is a legitimate structural option.12

Theories and models of conflict resolution and conflict management are numerous, but those which are relevant to communal politics are few. Furthermore those which are concerned with problems of cultural diversity, cleavages, segmentation and sharp division, are relatively recent. Literature on communal pluralism as a legitimate and feasible structural option of healthy political systems began to appear since the 1960s with the rise to prominence of consociational thinking.

In its early development, consociational thought was mainly preoccupied with carving a place for itself in the face of political integration and nation-building theories which were a natural propensity in Western political thought. The emergence of Lijphart's consociational democracy theory and Nordlinger's conflict regulation practices have given rise to an alternative approach to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies (other than being treated as deviant cases). Their theories led to an extensive debate on, among other things, the methods for conflict regulation.

Another set of conflict resolution models that have gained some acclaim from conflict regulation theorists are the Game Theories. These theories have their drawbacks. They are mathematical constructs that can explain neither the contents of conflicts nor the genesis of conflict. They assume that decisions are made in a
situation of perfect rationality. Their main concern is the "...logical structure of conflict situations." They are synthetic statements and difficult to test empirically. A fundamental assumption of these theories is that parties to the conflict are completely rational and that "negotiations are assumed, a priori, to end in agreement."

The analysis of communal conflict and violence cannot be captured by the game theories' conflict resolution models. Nor can conflict be explained by models designed to apply to individuals and to international conflict. Lijphart's consociational democracy theory and Nordlinger's conflict regulation practices provide a valuable insight into communal conflict resolution approaches which are made use of in this study.

The fundamental principle upon which theories of consociation rest is that any society characterized by deep divisions and cleavages can achieve a sufficient degree of stability if it can harness and learn to live with these divisions and schisms.

A Consociational Democracy Theory

Lebanon's socio-political system has manifested certain characteristics of apparent stability, which could lend itself to consociational explication, within two perspectives: the first is "half the glass is full," focussing on coherence and stability of the system (Weber and Parsons); and the second is "half the glass is empty," pointing to a conflictual and immobilized deeply divided society, yet with an apparently stable system. What needs to be explained is not the disorder in the society but the stability and the persistence of such a system over time. The question that comes to mind and puzzles students of Lebanese affairs (that is, students of deeply divided societies) is how to explain the stability of Lebanese society up to 1975, even though it continued to be characterized by deep division and cleavages, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

Although Coser's conflict approach might be an adequate explanation inssofar as it stresses the impact of criss-crossing conflicts and multiple loyalties on the amelioration of the conflictual tendencies, it does not constitute an adequate model for the explanation of stability in the system. Integration models are also incapable of offering the adequate framework since they stress socialization and assimilation and assume the eradication of inter-group differentiation as a prerequisite for social and political stability, a situation not tenable to Lebanese society.

Consociationalism is an alternative explanation to the above, for it takes as its starting point the problem of the deep divisions and segmentation in society, as well as the existence of competition between these segments, that is, a state of affairs in
need of regulation and resolution. A whole school of consociationalism emerged since Lijphart’s innovative approach to the study of stability in deeply divided societies and Lehmbuch’s research on the concept of accommodation of deep political cleavages.\textsuperscript{15} The emerging concept of consociationalism\textsuperscript{16} contributed vigorously to the debate on the maintenance of political stability in deeply divided societies and the search for a possible alternative to the concept of majoritarian democracy as a model suitable for pluralist societies. “The theory is a very useful instrument in suggesting alternative ways of accommodating conflicting interests in deeply divided societies.”\textsuperscript{17} Daadler suggests that consociational democracy theory was “...developed as a deliberate counter model to the Anglo-American [majoritarian] type of democracy.”\textsuperscript{18} Lijphart uses it as a classificatory concept to analyse the decision-making process in societies characterized by “deep divisions” and “segmented pluralism”.\textsuperscript{19}

Lijphart uses consociational theory not only to explain stability in deeply divided societies, but also to “...challenge the pessimistic view that democracy [stability] must fail in ethnically divided Third World countries.”\textsuperscript{20} The prevalent view in political science was, until then, dominated by the contention that social homogeneity, and its corollaries of political consensus, are conducive to political stability, whereas deep divisions and cleavages within a pluralist society inevitably lead to instability and breakdown of the system.

Lijphart’s new and original consociational theme successfully, though not without criticism, challenges the majoritarian proposition in political science by establishing that it is possible to forge and maintain political stability in pluralist, sharply divided, and communalist societies, through consociationalism. He endorses the conclusions of Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe that stability in a pluralist society is threatened not by the existence of a structure characterized by communalism, that is pluralism, but by the failure of the existing institutions to recognize, accommodate and, regulate the cleavages and the ensuing divergent interests\textsuperscript{21} which this particular structure spawns.

Lijphart defines Consociational Democracy as “government by 'elite cartel' designed to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.”\textsuperscript{22} The role of the elite is vital in achieving and maintaining the required stability. In fact, Lijphart imputes the success of consociational arrangements to the elites’ “...deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilising and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation.”\textsuperscript{23} He identifies four basic characteristics that are key factors in a consociation:\textsuperscript{24} grand coalition of all component communities (elite cartel), mutual veto in decision making, proportionality in representation and allocation of resources and civil service, and segmental autonomy as manifested in federalism.
The presence of these four factors in a pluralist society indicates the possibility of a successful management of conflict and the stability of the system. However certain conditions in the social structure must prevail before the above devices can carry through any consociational arrangement to its completion. Even though he recognizes the effectiveness of historical (Lehmbruch and Daalder), structural (Lorwin), and cultural (Daalder) conditions in establishing and maintaining consociational democracy, it is the "creative and constructive act of free will by the elites" that can bring about democratic stability. Even in the presence of sharp societal divisions, close cooperation between the elite can diffuse societal conflict. They cooperate to counteract the perils of cleavages, assuming that such cleavages translate themselves into conflicts.

Lijphart's definition of consociational democracy points to a crucial theme in his theory which indicates that it is a basically elitist model designed for a type of society characterized by centrifugal tendencies turned into centripetal outcomes by means of consociational arrangements. He stated that for any consociational arrangement to succeed the following conditions must be present: a distinct line of cleavage between subcultures, a multiple balance of power among the subcultures, popular attitudes favourable to government by grand coalition, external threat, moderate nationalism; and a relatively low total load on the system.

Lijphart elevates the role of elite in a consociation above that of the institutions. "The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institution arrangement as overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aims of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system. Joining in a grand coalition or national unity cabinet represents such cooperation." In order to create a situation conducive to elite cooperation, Lijphart suggests that the following four prerequisites must be present: ability to recognize the cleavages inherent in a fragmented system, commitment to system maintenance, ability to transcend subculture cleavages at the elite level, and ability to forge appropriate solutions for demands of subcultures.

**B Other Conflict Regulation Devices**

Consociation as a system of compromise and accommodation serves two functions. First, it enables all communal groups to play a meaningful role in the national life of their society. Second it keeps communal conflict in deeply divided societies within manageable limits.
There are other similar methods to maintain stability in deeply divided societies, such as Dahl's six possible ways for dealing with sub-culture conflict, Esman's four regime objectives, Dekmajian's nine categories of prescriptive constitutional engineering, Salem's consociational imagery for maintaining peace in Lebanon and the suppression of sectarian loyalties and identities, and Nordlinger's conflict regulation practices. Several of the conflict management devices proposed by these models are similar to and identical with the consociational model. Following is a brief discussion of the main principles of these methods.

In managing sub-culture conflict, Dahl suggests six possible ways to bring "sub-cultural conflict" under control: violence and repression, secession and separation, mutual veto, autonomy, proportional representation and, assimilation. Out of these six only mutual veto and proportional representation are applicable to the Lebanese case.

Milton Esman limits the number of conflict regulation devices to four, which he calls "regime objectives": institutionalised dominance in which one community subjects other communities to a permanent status of inferiority, induced assimilation squeezing subordinate groups into the dominant group through induction, acculturation and reward procedure, syncretic integration eliminating ethnic pluralism by shaping a new national identity, and balanced pluralism, which involves proportionality, territorial autonomy including federalism, and legal cultural autonomy. Proportionality, out of the whole scheme, was applied in Lebanon. Implementation of the rest of the devices would have created more divisions and deepened the cleavages.

Drawing on Lijphart and Nordlinger, Dekmajian lists nine factors as conducive to the establishment and maintenance of stability and peace in a Middle Eastern society such as Lebanon. The factors are: the elite cartel, controlled competition, cohesion in subculture, multiple balance of power, circumscribed state power, system legitimacy and elite effectiveness, passive electorate - private bargaining, high encapsulation - low mobilisation and minimal environmental turbulence. All of these factors contributed, in different degrees, to the success of the consociational experience in Lebanon. The reference to environmental turbulence is an allusion to the regional climate and its impact on the Lebanese communal balance of power. This factor is absent from other consociational models.

Salem's assessment of Consociational Democracy Theory and its application to Lebanon, produced seven categories: government by Grand Coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, segmental autonomy, neutrality or restricted foreign policy, predominance of elites, and cooperation of elites. On a most-effective minimum-
effective continuum, the government by grand coalition ranks highest and segmental autonomy lowest in the Lebanese consociational experience. Cooperation of the elites played a limited role as it was circumscribed by the rise of encapsulated communal loyalties and the emergence of new leaders who, due to the exigencies of the war, have had virtually no contact with their opposite numbers.

Nordlinger's six successful conflict regulating practices are applicable to "intense conflict and open regimes." His bottom line in consociationalism or conflict regulation is his basic conviction that deeply divided societies have to live with their cleavages. "In Ar-rchey Road whin a married couple get to th' pint where 'tis impossible f'r thim to go on livin together they go on livin together." Every deeply divided society happens to have its Ar-rchey Road. Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Cyprus, Malaysia and Sri Lanka are plagued by intense divisions, fragmentation and diversity. Yet their component communities go on living together. Under what circumstances do they have to live with their communal differences in peace or be at each other's throat?

Consociation writers are in agreement that efforts to regulate conflict or exacerbate it, to establish stability or destabilize a system, must begin at the top, through the "free will of the elite" whose cooperation is an important step towards accommodation. Nordlinger, while giving considerable weight to the actions of political leaders in any consociational solution, maintains that the nature of political institutions and practices are equally salient in regulating conflicts in deeply divided societies.

The prominence given to the role of the institutions in conflict management is based on the assumption that communal differences and the ensuing divisive issues penetrates the every-day problems of communities' life.

Nordlinger's conflict regulation model has been constructed on the basis of data drawn from six deeply divided "open" societies which succeeded in bringing their intense conflict under control. Lebanon was one of these societies. His generalizations consist of six conflict regulation practices: stable governing coalition, principle of proportionality in representation and allocation of resources, the mutual veto open to all major conflict parties, purposive depoliticization, compromises, and granting of concessions by the stronger to the weaker. The two areas in which purposive depoliticization was applied in Lebanon are religion and citizenship law. Due to their sensitivity, these two areas were treated as terrae incognitae and mutually blanketed by both conflict blocs by a kind of an "avoidance scheme".
Nordlinger ignored deliberately one more conflict regulation practice, federalism, though he believes it may facilitate conflict regulation by providing certain insecure groups a greater measure of geographical security. He excluded it from his scheme on the grounds that it constitutes a desideratum for certain conflict groups rather than a conflict management process. Moreover federalism could indeed become an outcome of the application of the above mentioned six practices. Above and beyond that, he believed that federalism may contribute to the failure of conflict regulation.

On the other hand, Nordlinger rejects as ineffectual the conflict regulation practices which aim at creating an integrated national identity, cross-cutting divisions at the mass level, and the separation of conflict groups. Included in his list are only successful devices in conflict management.

Esman's first, second and third categories are, as far as policy analysis is concerned, of dubious utility. A consistent criterion for evaluation of a conflict regulation device is whether it proved successful in resolving the conflict or whether the arrangement broke down. Lijphart's criterion is whether "a given device may make a situation better or worse or the same".

Nordlinger, on the other hand, considers that a conflict is successfully regulated if its outcome is "the absence of widespread violence and governmental repression..." Esman's assessment of the ultimate aim of conflict management is "...the authoritative allocation of scarce resources and opportunities among competing communal actors and the prevention or control of overt hostility and violence. A secondary purpose may be to reduce the long-range political salience of communal solidarities."

The Lebanese political system has attracted the attention of several consociational scholars. Lijphart, Nordlinger and Lehmbruch included Lebanon among some European and a few third world countries in their studies of the conditions under which such communally divided societies managed their conflicts. They viewed consociationalism in Lebanon as a successful experience. Dekmajian and Salem produced a relatively optimistic view of the consociational experience that the country has had. Whereas Hudson was critical of the consociational arrangement developed by the system. He even went as far as to claim that it was instrumental in "exacerbating the divisions and hastened the collapse of the state."

Did consociationalism, as a conflict regulating mechanism, fail in Lebanon as Hudson suggests? If it did, what is the alternative mechanism to resolve Lebanon's
perennial conflict? If it did not, would it still be a remedy to bring the present conflict under control and restore stability to Lebanon, or would it act only as a political placebo until a different conflict regulation model emerges?

IV Conflict Regulation in Lebanon

In order to find meaningful answers to the question concerning the utility of consociational devices as a conflict regulating mechanism, we have to direct our search towards specific historical circumstances under which consociationalism was applied to the settlement of disputes in Lebanon. Lehmburuch informs us that "...under certain historical circumstances fragmented political cultures generate methods of conflict management which permit the survival and continued existence of the political system..." 43

Some conflict management devices in the modern Lebanese political system had their roots in the Ottoman tradition of the millet system whereby religious communities were granted autonomous powers to administer their internal affairs, and in the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon of 1864, which provided for a multi-confessional system of representation. This Council represented a long tradition of elite accommodation. The recent consociational model of Lebanon recognized the pluralist tradition as a significant foundation to build upon, rather than as an obstruction to overcome.

Consociationalism in Lebanon successfully bridged the polarizing effect of asabiya and prevented the bifurcation of Lebanese society. It provided the power groups with an accommodating mechanism in their competition for positions of authority.

A The 1943 National Pact

As a conflict management mechanism, the 1943 National Pact exhibited a two dimensional conceptual bearing: a consociational device for achieving a just communality, and a nation-building mechanism. Let us look at these dimensions separately.

1 The Pact as a Consociational Device for Achieving a Just Communality

The confessional distribution of government positions and Lebanon's foreign policy were the two main areas of contention between the two Lebanese communal blocs. The Pact's main theme was to bring down the conflict in these two volatile
areas to a manageable level. It was designed to be both a consociational mechanism for achieving social justice and a fine tuning of a compromise between the two ideologies: Lebanism and Arabism.

The Pact laid down the foundations for sharing the power not only between the two communal blocs - Moslems and Christians - but among the various component sects within each bloc. It also defined the parameter of Lebanon's external relations and specified its foreign and Arab policies. Interestingly enough, this agreement was never committed to writing, but, nevertheless, became a "given", a "fact of life", which conditioned political behaviour and dictated government policies until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975.44

The distribution of government and civil service posts as well as the overall power sharing arrangement were, before the concluding of the Pact, a source of discord among the various confessional communities in Lebanon. The 1926 constitution provided for equal opportunities of employment and representation in the government as well as its institutions.45 However, in practice the equal opportunities provided for in the constitution and established as a norm by the Pact, were not without flaws. The aim of balancing the interests of the various confessional groups became a source of constant friction among the confessional groups and strained the relations between their elites. It frequently spurred the less privileged communities to seek, by means bordering sometimes on violence, a remedy for the nuances in the law, which were used as a conduit for an unbalanced distribution of government rewards and resources. The Pact was meant to address, among other things, this aspect of communal relations.

The Pact as an instrument for distributing social justice was perceived to mean that government posts, parliament seats, bureaucratic, military and judicial positions were to be divided proportionally between the various Lebanese confessional communities on the basis of the 1932 census, which gave the Christians a slight majority. As such the presidency of the Republic was allocated to the Maronite Sect, the speakership of the House of Representatives to the Shi'a Moslems, the prime ministership to the Sunni Moslems, and the rest of the sects would share the ministerial portfolios according to their numerical strength. The parliament's composition as well as the civil service, army, and judiciary enrolment were established on the basis of a 6:5 ratio (against every six positions allocated to the Christians five positions were allocated to the Moslems).

Foreign policy constituted an area of great discord between the two communal blocs. The Christians, specifically the Maronites, passionately sought to keep an
independent Lebanon under French protection, while the Moslems, mainly the Sunnis, did not conceal their fervent desire for a union with the Arab world, particularly with Syria. The Christians' rationale was based on their minority status and their co-religionist relation with the West and in particular with France. Being a trickle in the sea of Islam, the Maronites argued that a union with Syria or with any other Arab country would, unquestionably, destroy their identity and actually their very existence as a nation. The Moslems advanced the view that they were stripped of their majority status by being detached from their natural habitat, the wider umma (community) of Islam, and being grafted onto a small country under Christian domination.46

The Pact offered both communal blocs a settlement through which they were able to preserve their interests within an independent and sovereign Lebanon. This was envisaged to be realized through a trade-off of concessions in which the Moslems were made to give up their demand for making Lebanon a part of a larger Arab Islamic State, and to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. The Christians reciprocated by accepting the Arab character of Lebanon, and by agreeing to share power with the Moslems.47

These trade-off concessions produced a national settlement that explicitly rested on the assumption that both blocs had abandoned whatever loyalties they had to external powers in conformity with the concept of independence and sovereignty. In arriving at this settlement, the Pact succeeded in overcoming the disintegrative effects of the asabiya power. This power was apparently cloaked in communal cleavages and manifested in religious and ideological divisions.

2 The Pact as a Nation-Building Mechanism

The State of Lebanon created by the French was seen by the majority of its Moslem inhabitants as an artificial state.48 It took more than fifteen years to convince them of the viability of the new state. Until then, the Moslems were insisting on their demand for Lebanon's union with Syria.49 France retaliated by drawing up an agreement with the Lebanese Government in November 1936 granting Lebanon independence within its existing borders and tying it up by a friendship and alliance agreement to the French Republic.

In order to ameliorate the effect of this measure and to constrain the Moslems' opposition to it and to reduce their fear of a French backed Christian hegemony in the new republic, the then President, Emile Edde, exchanged letters50 with the French High Commissioner, expressing explicitly the readiness of his government to guarantee equality of civil and political rights to all confessional groups in Lebanon.
without discrimination, and to ensure a just proportional representation in public affairs.\textsuperscript{51} It was only then that the Moslems became inclined to acknowledge the majoritarian status of the Christians in exchange for recognition of Lebanon's Arab affiliation and the equitable distribution of government rewards and resources between the two major sectarian blocs.\textsuperscript{52}

The 1936 agreement was not ratified by the French parliament and the provisions of the exchanged letters were not implemented. However, their spirit was retained, particularly in relation to civil and political rights and equal distribution of government rewards. It was a trenchant motivation for the Moslems to move closer towards the 1943 National Pact settlement.

The year 1936 was a turning point in the relations between the Christians and Moslems in Lebanon. For the first time both communities moved closer to a mutual understanding on the new Lebanese entity. This rapprochement was evident in the Maronite Patriarchate relations with Syria, and in the emergence of a new trend among the Sunni Moslem community calling for the total independence of Lebanon. These events were crowned with the appointment, for the first time, of a Sunni Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{53}

The Pact's fundamental preoccupation was with the question of how to bring the conflict in the two most volatile areas, social justice and national identity, under control. Some students of Lebanese politics attached more weight to the question of Lebanon's identity than to the question of social justice. They imputed to the Pact a leading role in settling this issue. Hudson\textsuperscript{54} and Maksoud\textsuperscript{55} acknowledged the importance of the constitutional arrangement and the 1936 exchanged letters that promised Moslems an equal share with the Christians in the government rewards. Yet they believed that this issue was secondary to that of national identity. For them, the 1943 National Pact was meant to settle the more profound issue of the national identity of Lebanon.

The Pact's resolution of the question of Lebanon's identity was supposed also to resolve the question of loyalty to the nation. The specific provision on this issue stipulated unequivocally that members of the two main confessional blocs ought to dissociate themselves from any external loyalty in favour of an independent Lebanon. It was furthermore implicit in this settlement that loyalties to the various confessions ought to be subordinate to the loyalty to the nation.

The National Pact was a clear attempt to construct such a loyalty by inducing overarching loyalties to the nation as a whole, over and above communal loyalties.\textsuperscript{56}
3 The Pact as a Mechanism for Integration

The Pact's embodiment of overarching loyalties intimates an integrative value to it. President al-Khoury's inaugural speech to the parliament on 21 September 1943 gave credence to the notion of integration in the Pact. He declared that:

The National Pact was not merely a settlement between two confessional communities but the fusion of two ideologies: one that called for melting Lebanon into another state, and the other called for its retention under foreign protection. It was assumed that, by mutual understanding and agreement, the Pact would transform the two conflicting trends into one national Lebanese Faith.  

Prime Minister al-Solh, on the other hand, did not consider that his faith in an independent Lebanon was "...incompatible with his own adherence to Arabism." For him, "Lebanon is a country with an Arab face that enjoys the good emanating from the West." He shared President al-Khoury's confidence in the integrative value of the Pact by giving credence to the existing sectarian institutions. Al-Solh believed that the institutions of a just communal representation would facilitate integration in due time. In his ministerial statement to the parliament on 7 October 1943, in which he launched the National Pact, he stated that the eradication of sectarianism was a decisive stage towards the attainment of integration. In his subsequent address to the parliament he described sectarianism as the first evil and considered it a hindrance to national progress and a poison to inter-confessional relations. He pledged to seek its abolition. He believed that once the national feeling enveloped the nation, sectarianism would disappear. "...The hour in which sectarianism vanishes is a blessed national awakening in the history of Lebanon."

Loyalty to the system, national unity, harmony and cohesion, the basic themes of the National Pact, were continually emphasized by almost every ardent politician of an independent and sovereign Lebanon.

In his policy statement of 4 August 1958, President elect Fouad Chehab (1958-64) called on the Lebanese citizens to do their "...level best to restore to the country its national unity....It is from this unity that the National Covenant emanated. This Covenant which has outlined for us a purely national policy, a brilliant policy, and an independent foreign policy, will always remain the constitution which guarantees Lebanon's glory and the prosperity of its people." Lebanon's permanent representative to the United Nations, Charles Malik, advised the world community in his address to the UN on 19 August 1958 that "the National Covenant...was a free
agreement among all of the elements of the population. They would all, from the point of view of independence, cease to look outside and, firmly clasping hands together, they would all hence-forth trust one another and work harmoniously together as equal citizens whose only political loyalty would be to one independent and sovereign state called Lebanon..."62

Upon his election to the presidency of the Republic, President Chehab pledged, in his swearing-in speech on 23 September 1958, loyalty "to the unwritten constitution, our National Charter, because this is what has bound us and still binds us..."63

Following the 1958 political crisis in Lebanon, Prime Minister Karame stated in his address to the nation on 25 September 1958, that the "...ordeal has proved that there is no way of rebuilding Lebanon as a free, sovereign and independent homeland except by once again uniting our hearts, joining our hands, and embracing the aims of the National Covenant [Pact] which was, is and will continue to be the pillar of Lebanon's structure and its cornerstone."64

The integrative tendencies existed in Lebanese society side by side with disintegrative forces long before the birth of the National Pact. Al-jisr observed that the negative tendencies were usually harnessed in the direction of integration but were never institutionalized in a formal text. The 1958 conflict and 1975 war revealed how the successive settlements, including the 1943 National Pact, were not as benign or innocuous as often assumed. It is indeed an advantage that their informality gave them the advantage of flexibility, but their intended ambivalent characteristics exposed their weakness65 at times of extreme political tension, and turned them into a source of conflict.66

4 Disintegrative elements in the Pact

A re-examination of the National Pact in the light of the 1975 war has revealed to some young students of Lebanese consociationalism that the Pact, in retrospect, contained palpable federalist tendencies. In their view, the protagonists of the National Pact were too ambitious in their vision of creating an integral society out of two distinctive cultures. The Pact was no more than a consociational attempt at resolving the conflict in Lebanese society and a mechanism for transferring the various conflictual tendencies, particularly those related to the question of loyalty and national identity, towards the direction of integration.

As a consequence, the National Pact laid the foundation for an integrated society, and it was up to the political process to translate this goal into reality. It was
not an easy endeavour, for asabiya consciousness was a distinctive characteristic that
defined and separated the component communities. Moreover, Lebanese society
rested on a tripodal of power structure: the Christian bloc, the Moslem bloc and the
State. The State was supposed to maintain a balance between these two blocs.
However, the Christian bloc was, by tradition, closer to the position of authority than
the Moslem bloc. This made the Christians a habitual ally and ardent supporter of the
State. The Moslem bloc came face-to-face with the alliance of the State and the
Christian bloc. The State lost its claim of neutrality and became a party siding with
one confessional group against the other. The State, by losing its credibility as a
meeting point for all sects, became the subject of conflict and a divisive factor in a
volatile situation.67

In the area of government rewards, the Moslems' main inveterate fear about
Christian hegemony, and the latter's embrace of the authority structure were
ameliorated by the Pact's distribution of government and civil service posts in which
the Christians were allocated a ratio of 1:6 over the Moslems. Although the Pact
"...did not challenge the clear primacy within the system which the Maronites had
enjoyed since 1861, it now for the first time allotted the 'second place' in the system to
the Sunni Moslems."68

The State in its function as a focal point for all communal groups and as a
balancing mechanism for their interests was supposed to invite all sects to join the
nation-building process. The step would have reduced the confrontation tendencies
between the different sects and strengthened the power of the State and its
legitimacy. The State would have been able to act as a buffer zone between the two
contending communal blocs, but the State's involvement caused the conflict to shift
from the area of inter-communal relations to the area of legitimate authority. The
conflict became a fight over the political system with the Christians striving to maintain
it, and the Moslems struggling to change it.

The State was expected to carry on with the integration process for the
following reasons:69 firstly, as a counter balance to the duality in the Lebanese society.
It was therefore assumed that a centralized administration could bring together under
its umbrella all confessional groups; secondly, as a mechanism to incorporate the
diverse communal components in the state structure and harmonize their output. This
may have led gradually to the integration of the Lebanese society. The State failed to
achieve this goal. It was left to the National Pact to assume this responsibility.

Two possible outcomes were envisaged by this process: the erosion of the role
of the confessional groups as independent and dynamic forces, and the fading away
of the role of the confessional groups as a means by which their members could obtain their rewards from the state. However, thirty-two years later the Lebanese society was still a pluralist society. Neither the State nor the National Pact could effect the desired integration for reasons discussed below.

5 Failure of the Integrative Mechanism in the Pact

An interesting trend in the political thought of some post-1975-war students of Lebanese politics alludes that the integrative process was blocked before it started. In a re-evaluation of the National Pact, Charaf discovered that by inviting the Moslem bloc to become a full fledged partner in the power structure of Lebanese society, the Pact created a bond of vague federalism of confessional groups which replaced a central government concept envisaged by the 1926 constitution. Segmental autonomy, for him, is a kind of federalism, in the sense that it is not limited to territory but extends to religion, culture and ideology. This federative interpretation of the Pact reflects to a large extent the new direction of Maronite thought after the war. Suleiman finds in the unity created by the Pact no more than an alliance between the various confessional groups and political parties.

Perceived federalism was not the only weakness in the Pact's integrative features. Other deficiencies appeared and were attributed by Charaf to the basic assumptions upon which the concept of integration was based. He contends that two aspects of communal reaction should have been explored before an integrative role was assigned to the pact: the communal coefficient of resistance to change, and the communal ability for adaptation to exogenous stimuli. Neither of these was investigated. If they were, Charaf contends, then Lebanese society would have revealed three characteristics that are not conducive to integration.

The first is that confessions have existed prior to the State. They are self sufficient and can survive on their own. The second is that the confessional grouping is not a political grouping where continuity is derived from its individual's interest. Confessionalism is a national society in its own right whose sum total is different from that of its individuals. The third is that various confessional structures in Lebanon originated from different sources and developed different ideologies.

6 Success of the Consociational Mechanism in the Pact

The National Pact may have failed as an integrative mechanism, but it succeeded as a conflict regulation device. The consociational arrangement embodied in the National Pact brought inter-communal conflict in the areas of national identity and power sharing to a manageable level. In foreign policy, which is a concomitant of
the identity issue, the two Noes formula ('No' to Arab irredentism for Moslems in exchange for 'No' to western protection for Christians) made the two communal blocs attenuate their ideological excesses and acquiesce in a negative consensus which required unflinching loyalty to the newly independent and sovereign State of Lebanon.

In the area of power sharing the aim of consociationalism was to establish a balanced system of rewards. It offered the restive communities the best possible opportunity to make a contribution to the political culture from within the system. In his analysis of the public administration in Lebanon, Crow observed that:

since independence, the Lebanese public service has been reasonably open to all segments of society both in terms of the various communities and social classes....It serves as an adjustment mechanism which brings particularistic elements of society together into a working relationship without overriding interests or submerging their identities.\textsuperscript{75}

The power-sharing concept was also applied to the legislative body. Individual communal entitlements were well observed but could only be realized in cooperation with other communities. An electoral law was established to supervise this process.

\textbf{B The Electoral Law}

The Lebanese electoral system embodied an electoral strategy which was oriented towards cross-cutting differences. The system, which was amended three times, encouraged moderation, competition and cooperation\textsuperscript{76}, and prevented the polarization of parliamentary sectarian loyalties. Horowitz found in this system a cogent vehicle for inter-ethnic competition and cooperation, "...rarely in a severely divided society has there been a system that placed as high a premium on inter-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic cooperation"\textsuperscript{77}. The electoral arrangement took into consideration the numerical strength and geographical distribution of each sect. Suleiman described it as a "...preset proportional representation system on a communal or religious basis."\textsuperscript{78}

The confessional composition of the parliament was prescribed also by the fixed ratio of 6:5 Christians to Moslems, regardless of the number of deputies. The sectarian-regional distribution of members of parliament was also assigned. Table 5-1 shows the number of deputies in each region and by sect. The total number of members, as well as the constituencies, were changed four times since
independence. The ratio of 6:5 remained constant for the first three times but was amended in 1989 to 6:6. The voting process was changed too. In the 1943 election, the whole of Lebanon was one constituency sending forty-four deputies to the House of Parliament, and candidates were packed in one "Grand List". This system underwent gradual changes. The constituencies are now twenty four within the five provinces and the number of deputies has been increased from forty-four to 108, and lately to 128.

Table 5-1: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect and Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sunnite</th>
<th>Shiite</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Alawite</th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Anglican</th>
<th>Armenian Catholic</th>
<th>Armenian Orthodox</th>
<th>Minorities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bek'a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ticket composition reflected the sectarian structure of each constituency. At the same time it cultivated sectarian cooperation. For example, the voters in Mount Lebanon selected slates of thirty-five representatives that included two Sunnis, three Shi'as, five Druzes, nineteen Maronites, two Catholic, three Orthodox, and one Armenian Orthodox. This structure promotes compromise and harmony because for a candidate to be elected he needs the votes of his communal group as well as the votes of the other sects.

One of the major consequences of the list system is that it encouraged sectarian moderation. Lijphart finds in this aspect a drawback for consociationalism because it does not "...bring together the real segmental spokesmen at a site suitable for political accommodation."

Competition takes place within each reserved office. A Sunni cannot compete with a Maronite for the presidency, but another Maronite can. A Sunni aspirant for the prime ministership would cooperate with a Maronite aspirant for the Presidency by trading off support. The Maronite candidate to the Presidency has a chance of winning only if the Moslem deputies vote for him. This is the case in parliamentary
elections where mixed tickets in a multi-communal constituency require cooperation among the various candidates who belong to different sects.

However, the electoral law in itself was insufficient to placate the conflictual tendencies which came under increased pressure as a result of the process of change and development. Population mobility and change created new electoral realities and economic needs which could not be accommodated by the provisions of the electoral law and existing legislation. The Shi'a increased in number and multiplied around Beirut, leaving their original constituencies in South and East Lebanon and moving to new areas where they have no right to vote or to be represented by one of their sect. Moreover, they created in their new abode a socio-economic problem which added to an already volatile situation of unbalanced development in the country. The government had to introduce new measures to meet the challenges of the evolving situation which included, among other things, a threat to sectarian harmony. A developmental policy with an explicit aim of bridging the gap between the sects' entitlements and rewards was introduced in the early 1960s by President Fouad Chehab. Some aspects of this policy are discussed below.

C Developmental policies

The National Pact's main conflict regulation attributes were translated by subsequent governments into policies, which aimed, among other things, to achieve some measure of accommodation and harmony between the confessional groups. Immediately following his election in 1958, President Chehab introduced massive economic and social reform programs ostensibly to cope with modernization, but in reality they aimed at maintaining social justice and eventually communal harmony.82

A central Committee for Administrative Reform, consisting of twenty four members drawn from the bureaucracy and the private sector, was set up. The Central Committee spread itself over seven subcommittees and instituted a number of work committees in each ministry "...to study the needs and make recommendations to the Central Committee."83 Within a six month period the committees and subcommittees drafted 162 legislative decrees covering the bureaucratic structure. A number of laws were amended within this concept and a few "...autonomous councils having developmental objectives were also founded."84

In his approach, which came to be known as Chehabism, President Chehab was able to accommodate the demands of the less privileged communities for social justice within the context of the existing formula of political sectarianism.85 He did the next best thing, under the circumstances, to appease the Moslem bloc: top positions
in the bureaucratic structure were redistributed between the two communal blocs on the basis of a 6:6 ratio instead of 6:5. This gave the Moslem bloc parity with the Christian bloc. Before that the Moslems were under the impression that "...the Christians hold the bulk of key government positions, with the power of the presidency and a Christian majority in the Chamber of Deputies." 86

Chehab's reforms were not limited to the administration. In the areas of economic and social development he commissioned the French Institute Internationale de Recherches et de Formation en Vue de Developement (IRFED) to diagnose the social and economic problems of the country in order to determine the basis of sectarian suspicion and socio-economic tension. 87

These policies succeeded in stabilizing the communal relations for a while. As modernization took its effect in Lebanon it exerted pressure on the social structure. Pressure was also coming from the regional environment in the form of political change and the challenges of the Palestinian problem. These policies could not withstand such pressure; nor could the social structure itself. The demographic change and the rise of communal consciousness in Lebanon which was associated with modernization as well as with the Palestinian influx into the country following the creation of Israel have revealed the weakness of the social structure and the conflict regulation mechanism in the form of consociationalism and the developmental policies. Inter-communal problems were exacerbated by these developments in spite of the above conflict regulation devices. Nevertheless they were responsible for the maintenance of communal peace for a period of thirty two years.

D An Overall Assessment of the National Pact as a Consociational Device and a Conflict Management Mechanism

The Pact has been the subject of criticism from almost every quarter. Its consociational aspect attracted most of the criticism. Some writers went as far as to claim that the Pact was the source of conflict. Enver Khoury believes that its power-sharing arrangement was the main cause for the 1975 civil war. 88 The cleavages in Lebanese society along sectarian lines were at the core of the Pact's concern. Shemesh claimed that it failed to bridge the gap between the sects. He maintained that paradoxically enough it bolstered those processes which it was intended to abolish. Instead of achieving a just communality the Pact fostered and encouraged political communality that led to the civil war. 89
This view was shared by a number of students of Lebanese post-independence politics. Yamak thought that the National Pact could not be regarded as a sound basis for national solidarity; instead of transcending what divided Lebanon, it consecrated that sectarian division by recognizing the sects as legitimate representatives of the population.90 Horowitz claimed that what appeared to be a fair and just distribution of opportunities between the two confessional blocs proved to be a rigid standard incapable of keeping up with changes in the underlying facts on which it was based.91 Mackey agreed about the rigidity of the Pact. She observed that the formula used in the dispensing of government rewards was based on the 1932 disputed census and was assumed to remain static.92

At the time of its conclusion, the Pact was considered a victory for the Moslems93, but with the passage of time it was reinterpreted differently. In 1958 the Christians were defending it vehemently: by 1972 the Moslems were deeply dissatisfied with it,94 and in 1976 the Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Sheikh Hasan Khalid, declared:

we are with the Lebanese formula that unites the Lebanese not with the formula which distinguishes and discriminates between them. They understand the formula as such: the president is a Maronite and so is the foreign minister, the president of the higher judicial council and the commander of the Army. The Moslems ought not to exceed their limits...we request a Lebanese formula that entails a democratic environment, and equality between the citizens in rights and duties.95

Most of the politicians and the major political parties criticised the Pact on the grounds that it did not fulfil the dreams of its progenitors in building a unified and cohesive nation. The Moslem politicians who supported it in 1943 because its power sharing arrangement would give them some security, criticised it in 1975 because it ossified the social structure and became a covenant of Christian hegemony.

In general, three main factors contributed to the immobilisation of the Pact.96 First, It could not transfer itself from an elite contract into a social contract involving the majority of the population. Second, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 as a homogeneous ethnic nation-state negated the concept of coexistence of a multi-sectarian society. Furthermore, a massive Palestinian influx into Lebanon disturbed the sectarian and overall social, economic and later on political balance which the Pact fostered. Third, the emergence in the surrounding Arab world of ideological trends calling for Arab unity and socialism forced the Pact's ideology of "Lebanon first" into retreat.
On a more specific level the Pact attracted criticism for its failure to establish a dialectical relation between the two notions of Lebanism and Arabism and between the two notions combined and the socio-cultural diverse structure. Jean Suleiman agrees that the two ideologies of Lebanism and Arabism were originally void of any dialectic potential. The compromise arrived at in 1943 did not go further than establish an alliance, a *modus operandi*, a grand settlement which succeeded in balancing group interests. However it failed to achieve consensus on communal goals.

The contradiction inherent in the ideological aspect of the Pact constituted a negation of its integrative goals as envisaged by its founders. "In its attempt to combine between Arabism and Lebanism, between pure sovereignty and Arab solidarity...the pact preserved the contradictions which negated each other." Instead of interacting with each other in a thesis-antithesis manner with an expected outcome of cohesive and independent entity, they negated each other, and the natural outcome was more cleavages and fragmentation.

Unlike the settlement of national identity, the Christian-Moslem power sharing arrangement did not entail a reciprocal concession structure. As such, its repudiation by one side did not entail reciprocal action from the opposite side. For instance, the Moslems' rejection of the 6:5 ratio in the distribution of the Government's rewards did not invite from the Christians a reciprocal reply as did the sectarian agreement on national identity.

Despite its deficiencies, the Pact was a vital means to assure communal harmony and amicability, and establish stability and peace that lasted for thirty-two years. Retrospective evaluation of its weakness and pitfalls should not obscure the importance of its conflict regulation achievements in a deeply divided society such as Lebanon.

As a consociational device and a conflict management mechanism, the National Pact formula, the Pact-based electoral law, as well as the developmental policies constituted a body of successful conflict management practices in Lebanon. To illustrate, between 1920 and 1979, seventy-seven governments were formed, all on a coalition basis. The political leaders of the major communities cooperated in a coalition cabinet. The composition of the cabinet reflected the segmental and regional division of the society and ranged in size from a very small cabinet made out of four members to a large cabinet composed of twenty-two members. The "grand coalition" or "stable governing coalition" is an effective conflict regulating practice. Salem and Dekmajian argued that the characteristics of an effective coalition
cabinet in Lebanon, during the above period, were present and were responsible for the success of Lebanon's experience with consociationalism. Hudson, on the other hand, was sceptical about the effectiveness of the grand coalition factor in the stability of the country. He, in fact, was of the opinion that the elite cartel encouraged sectarian hostilities in order to maintain its power base.\textsuperscript{112}

Apart from "government by coalition", three other consociational characteristics were also present in the Pact's structure which contributed to the management of the conflict in Lebanon before 1975, such as "Mutual Veto," the principle of "Proportional Representation," and "Segmental Autonomy,". Among these factors, the principle of proportional representation was viewed by Nordlinger as of limited value in the sense that it served as an effective conflict regulation practice insofar as it reduced the degree and scope of competition for governmental power, administrative positions and scarce resources.\textsuperscript{113} Lijphart regarded it as a source of conflict. While expressing his satisfaction with the performance of consociational democracy in Lebanon for a period of thirty two years, he observed that, "...allocation of the highest offices and the preset electoral proportionality, both of which favoured the Christian sects, were incapable of allowing a smooth adjustment to the gradual loss of majority status by the Christians to the Moslems."\textsuperscript{114}

Salem makes a similar argument. He maintains that "...the reluctance of the Christian elite to grant real parity of representation to the Moslem community greatly contributed to the breakdown of the political order in 1975."\textsuperscript{115} On the other hand, Horowitz suggests that the system of representation was too static to allow development and change. "What appeared to be a reasonable and objective means of distributing opportunities...proved to be a rigid standard incapable of keeping up with changes in the underlying facts on which it was based."\textsuperscript{116}

Segmental autonomy is a salient feature of Lebanese society. The various sects have had autonomy in certain major areas since independence. The personal status laws as well as some aspects of the education policy have been left to the sects' exclusive concern.

V Consociationalism and Lebanese Social Structure

The Lebanese conflict, viewed as a single empirical case, offers the different theoretical perspectives a chance to be studied from conceptually different points of view. Four distinct cases can be selected from such studies, and are now discussed briefly.
A Lebanon as a Bi-polar or Multi-polar Society

From a distance, Lebanese society appears to be a bi-polar configuration: Christians versus Moslems, Leftists versus Rightists, Conservatives versus Liberals, Lebanese nationalists versus Arab nationalists, the haves versus the have-nots, and mountain culture versus city culture. However, at a closer look the situation turns out to be more complex. In the first place, it is meaningless to talk about the existence of only two communities or two communal divisions in the country, that is Moslems and Christians, for these two configurations are the peak of a pyramid of a panoply of sects and denominations which differ markedly in the perceptions of their national identity and loyalties. The conflict has deepened the sectarian loyalties and identification and increased the alienation of the various communities from each other.

B Lebanon as a Sectarian Society

Is the conflict in Lebanon defined by religion? It is an obvious fact that religion is a salient factor in Lebanon's socio-political culture. Religious differences mark clearly the boundaries not only between Christians and Moslems, but also among the seventeen officially recognized sects of the country. Some of the more influential political parties are encapsulated within their own sectarian shells. The Phalanges Party is predominantly Maronite, the Progressive Socialist Party is mainly Druze, the Amal Movement is almost exclusively Shi'ite as is the Party of God. However, this phenomenon cannot be attributed to the tenets of the different religions. There is nothing in the basic nature of the above religions to link them with party conflict. The weight of religious cleavages has been misused by self-interested leaders. In the absence of other avenues for power, such leaders found no advantage in minimizing the religious asabiya.

Moreover the two conflicting groups do not fight each other over matters of faith. Bigots may exist on both sides but religious bigotry is not the root cause of the conflict.

C Lebanon as a Pluralist Society

Inspite of the above comments, we have to recognize that religious differences coincide with different political orientations, allegiances and national loyalties. A person's membership in a community is decisive in his assignment to a political affiliation. The conflict has demarcated the boundaries in such a way that a person who adheres to the position of other than his community is denounced. A Maronite who adopts a Moslem ideology or visa versa is for all practical purposes seen as a
defector. Communal distinctions and political orientations pervade the whole social structure and render it plausible to pluralistic assessments. Such a kind of pluralism is best described by Dahl as conflictive, in the sense that the system is characterized by enduring cleavages\textsuperscript{123} whereas Barakat goes beyond this assessment to claim that Lebanese society is closer to a "mosaic" rather than a pluralist type. For him pluralism refers to harmonious relationships of several interest, religious, and/or ethnic groups within a clarified social order. A society is pluralist in as much as it allows for the participation of all groups so that no one group, or an alliance of a few of them, can possess a monopoly of rewards, nor dominate others and dictate to them what they should do.\textsuperscript{124} On the other hand, a mosaic society is characterized by a system of checks and balances among its various component groups. In a pluralist society there is consensus on fundamental principles whereas in a mosaic society this consensus is absent.\textsuperscript{125}

Messera, quoting several Christian political party platforms, and Moslem political and social organizations, concludes that Lebanon is characterized by cultural pluralism. By this he means essentially the same as cultural or social diversity, and infers that the various Lebanese communities (sects) have come to acquire, during their historical development, distinctive features and different norms, values and patterns of behaviour.\textsuperscript{126}

D Lebanon as a Classless Society

The Marxist writer Samih Farsoun agreed with Barakat's description of the pluralist system in Lebanon and remarked that consensus is absent from the social structure. He defined the problem in economic rather than political or religious terms. He envisaged it as a failure of the labour movement to unite the factions around a common value system and attributed this failure and the persistent diversity and absence of a central value system to western economic penetration and patronage of a favoured sect from among seventeen others. He claimed that this particular action stratified the sectarian system and transferred it into social classes antagonistic to each other.\textsuperscript{127}

The economic interpretation of the Lebanese problem is not a novel one. Farsoun's perspective was preceded by another Marxist writer, B. I. Odeh, who postulated that what appeared a sectarian conflict was in reality a class conflict.\textsuperscript{128}

There is no doubt that there is disparity in the economic status of the various component communities in Lebanon, and particularly among the four major ones. Yet the political attitudes among the communities reflect communal affiliation rather than
class behaviour. In Lebanon, identification with social class is almost non-observable except among the few committed intellectuals whose class and status behaviour defies their affiliation. Any conflict regulation mechanism will be distorted by tying it to a class-struggle theory in Lebanon.

Consociational arrangements were instrumental in regulating, for a certain period of time, the above structurally-based disparities, but were ineffective in fortifying the social structure against domestic and regional pressure. Under the impact of the changing situation, both internally and externally, the communal conflictual tendencies erupted into a dramatic civil war in 1975. The first victim of this war was the National Pact and its consociational implications.

Attempts to resolve the conflict continued unabated throughout the war period. A countless number of proposals and schemes were negotiated through third party mediators. Schemes such as federalism, political and administrative decentralization, cantonization, even secession, were contemplated but failed. Finally, the conflict parties realized that the only feasible and workable solution to this problem was to revive the National Pact, introduce some changes to its power-sharing formula to reflect the evolving communal changes, and amend the Constitution accordingly. This was what underlined the formulation of the Taif Accord - the subject matter of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
END NOTES


23 Ibid., p. 212.


27 Ibid., p. 21.

28 Ibid., pp. 22-23.


33 Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, 1972).

34 Ibid., p. 6.

35 Ibid., Forward.

36 Ibid., p. 31.

37 Ibid., p. 32.

38 Ibid., p. 117.


40 Eric Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 11.


Gerhard Lehmburgh, op. cit., p. 93.

Antoine Messarra argues, in his booklet Prospects for Lebanon: The Challenge of Coexistence (Oxford: Centre For Lebanese Studies, 1988), that the provisions of the Pact were still operative during the war years.

Article 95 of the 1926 Constitution as amended on November 9, 1943, stipulated that "as a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the State."


George Charaf, "Nahwa Sighat Jadidah Lil-Dawlah Fy Lubnan" (Toward a new formula for the State in Lebanon), Panorama of Events, no. 29 (Winter 1983), p. 21.

For the creation of the State of Lebanon and the attitude of the Moslems towards it, see Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985).

In 1928 and 1933 Moslem leaders held a conference known as the Coastal Conference in which they unanimously called for the return of the annexed areas back to Syria. This conference was held again in 1936 and reaffirmed their initial demands. See Kamal Salibi, Tarykh Lubnan, op. cit., p. 226; and Raghid Solh, "The Attitude of the Arab Nationalists towards Greater Lebanon During the 1930s," in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds.), op. cit., pp. 149-165.

In mid-1943 and as a reaction to the President's attempt to diminish the Moslem representation in the House of Parliament by manipulating the Christian Moslem ratio, the Moslems expressed their rejection of this move by declaring their intention to rejoin Syria. In 1936 the parliament consisted of 42 members, divided equally between Christians and Moslems. President Thabit decreed on 17 June 1943 that the total number of deputies be increased to fifty four, of which thirty two seats were allocated to the Christians, an increase of ten seats, and twenty two to the Moslems, an increase of two seats. On June 21, 1943, the Moslems held a conference in Beirut in which Lebanon's Arab identity issue was invoked. Riyad al-Solh went in his reaction as far as to declare that Lebanon was unequivocally Arab and must find its strength in the Arab world. The former Mufti of Tripoli, Abdul Hamid Karami, a dedicated supporter of unity with Syria, added that no force on earth could prevent the integration of Moslems in the Lebanese entity unless Lebanon became an inseparable part of the Arab world. See Bassam Namani, "The 1943 National Pact: The Balance of Domestic, Regional and International politics," Panorama of Events, no. 29 (Winter 1983), p. 21.

These two letters are known in Lebanon's political history as "6 bis". The first letter pledged equality in civil and political rights for all citizens, a just distribution of public offices among the various confessional groups and a just distribution of government resources among the different regions. The reply letter which carried the number 6 bis, promised to give the local governing bodies wider powers and the creation of regional administrative councils with some administrative and taxation powers. See Bassim al-Jisr, Al-Sira'at al-Lubnanyyh wa al-Wefaq, 1920-1975 (Lebanese conflicts and detente 1920-1975) (Beirut: An-Nahar Publishing House, 1981), p. 233.


56 R.S. Milne, in his book *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States* (Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), intimates that overarching loyalties do not need to replace existing loyalties to groups smaller than the state, they may rather supplement them, p. 125.


59 The Ministerial Policy statement of the al-Solh Government to the parliament in its extraordinary meeting, third session, on October 7, 1943. Minutes of the meeting as recorded in the Gazette, pp. 11-25.

60 *ibid.* p. 16.


62 *ibid.*, p. 358. Quite a few students of Lebanese politics do not share the same view that the Pact was a free agreement among all elements of the population. Salibi contends that the National Pact did in fact represent a sort of consensus. However, it was a consensus arrived at principally, at the level of standing political leadership, which did not represent all social levels of the Lebanese population. See Kamal Salibi, "The Historical Perspective," in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 11. In fact the Pact was concluded between the elite of the two main confessional communities, the Maronites and the Sunni Moslems, whereas the Shi'a, the Druzes, the Orthodox and Catholics were left out from the initial negotiations, nevertheless they accepted subsequently its outcome.

63 *ibid.*, p. 387.

64 *ibid.*, p. 389.


67 George Charaf, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

68 Helena Cobban, *op. cit.*, p. 73.


70 *ibid.*, p. 20.

71 *ibid.*, p. 28.

73 George Charaf, op. cit., p. 25.

74 Ibid., p. 25.


77 Donald L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 633.


80 Arend Lijphart, op. cit., p. 149.

81 Bassim al-Jisr, op. cit., p. 271.

82 Bassim al-Jisr, op. cit., p. 276.


84 Ibid., p. 95.


87 In his book, The Precarious Republic, op. cit., Hudson described in details Lebanon’s social and economic problems which were researched and analyzed by IRFED.

88 Enver Khoury, op. cit., p. 57.


91 Donald L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 587.


93 Donald Horowitz, op. cit., p. 588.

94 Michael Hudson, op. cit., p. 194.

95 As quoted by Jean Suleiman, op. cit., p. 45.

Jean Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 53-56.

Michael Hudson, op. cit., Chapter 1.

Jean Suleiman, op. cit., p. 54.


Donald L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 583.

Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 286.

Jean Suleiman, op. cit., p. 55.

For a thorough discussion of the failure to establish a link between Lebanism and Arab Nationalism, see Clovis Maksoud, op. cit., Chapter. 13, and Raghid Solh, op. cit., Chapter 8.

Donald L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 587.


Rashid Karami's government served from 14 October 1958 to 14 May 1960, and was comprised of four members only. Two Sunni Moslems and two Maronite Christians.

Taqiueddine al-Solh's government served from 8 July 1973 to 31 October 1974.

Eric Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 21.

Paul E. Salem, op. cit., p. 34.

Richard Hrair Dekmajian, op. cit., p. 254.


Eric Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 23.

Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, op. cit., pp. 149 and 150.

Paul E. Salem, op. cit., p. 36.

Donald L Horowitz, op. cit., p. 587.


122 Almost every study on the social structure of Lebanon refers to this state of affairs.


CHAPTER SIX
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE TAIF ACCORD

There had been numerous cease-fires in the Lebanese war since its eruption, followed by as many initiatives to resolve it. However, the quest for its termination and the establishment of permanent peace in Lebanon remained elusive until October, 1989, when a breakthrough was achieved by the conclusion of the Taif Accord.

In retrospect, it is evident that the earlier attempts at resolving the conflict were no more than stopgap measures to halt the bloodshed and create cooling-off periods to allow further negotiation and reconciliation. These attempts started as early as the outbreak of hostilities in April 1975 and took two forms: direct negotiations between the elite of the conflict groups or their representatives, and indirect negotiations through third parties.

At the outbreak of hostilities, conflict groups, particularly their intelligentsia, initiated a flurry of stylized proposals for a termination of the conflict, but none of them produced a solid solution. The reason for this failure was mainly due to the fact that some of these initiatives focussed on lateral causes and ignored the basic issues, the underlying determining factors as well as the relevant venues for their resolution. Instead of identifying the appropriate elements of a resolution to the conflict, some of these attempts confused these elements with the conflict itself. The end result was a one-sided view counteracted, usually, by an opposite view from the contending party. This increased rather than eliminated the tension and sharpened the contradicting views among the conflict groups. On the other hand, the Taif attempt succeeded in terminating the war and brought the conflict down to a legal and manageable level.

Why did the Taif endeavour succeed whereas the preceding attempts failed? What made the conflict parties agree to conditions for terminating the struggle?

This chapter deals with the major attempts to resolve the basic issues of the conflict and the proposals of the main conflict parties as well as those of the successive Heads of the State. It ends by a thorough analysis of the Taif Accord, the conflict environment that preceded it and its implications for the Lebanese socio-political system.

It was assumed that a conflict resolution process could start if the contending parties meaningfully understood the views of each other through an understanding of how each of the conflict issues was viewed by them. It was further stipulated that a
resolution of the conflict could be achieved if the conflict parties altered their positions with regard to the issues under dispute. The Taif Accord is a case in point.

I Basic Issues and Proposed Schemes

As outlined in the introductory chapter, the 1975 conflict in Lebanon revolved around three basic issues: reform of the political order which implied an amendment to the power-sharing agreement of the National Pact, the National Identity of Lebanon and its implications for inter-communal relations as well as for the country's relations with the Arab world, particularly with Syria, and sovereignty of the state and the presence of foreign troops on Lebanon's national soil. The conflict parties coalesced around two main groups, vis-a-vis these issues: the Reformists who were struggling to change the political system and make it more accommodative to social and political variations, and the Status Quo defenders, who fought back to preserve and maintain the system.

Both groups, as well as third parties, submitted definite proposals and programs of action for resolving the basic issues of the conflict. The following is a descriptive analysis of these proposals and an assessment of their impact on the conflict process.

A The Issue of Political Reform

The Lebanese National Movement, which was the more influential partner in the Reformist Camp, announced on 18 August 1975 a comprehensive program of political reform, suggesting, among other things, an amendment to the existing political order in the areas of confessionalism, parliamentary representation and authority structure. It demanded the abolition of confessionalism as a first step to be followed by total secularisation of the political system, and proposed an amendment to the representative system, the electoral law, and regional and local representative bodies. The demand for a reformation of the authority structure was aimed at restoring the equilibrium to the various state organs and at shifting some of the powers invested in the president to the Prime Minister and cabinet. The program of the Lebanese National Movement included also some proposals covering other areas, such as, the public administration, the army, the judiciary, civil rights and liberties.

The Lebanese National Movement pressed this platform on the Status Quo Coalition in an attempt to extract from it an acquiescence in establishing a more balanced democratic political order which would allow the fullest participation of all component communities. To achieve this, it suggested an amendment to the
Constitution and to the National Pact, which it thought would satisfy, if amended as such, the communities' entitlements to government positions, parliamentary representation, the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army. Such an amendment would also address the overall question of disequilibrium between the three Estates as well as within them.\(^2\)

As the conflict ebbed and flowed, the Lebanese National Movement remained firm in its demands and was determined to obtain concessions from the opposite camp. As this was not forthcoming some members of the Reformist Camp reacted by lifting the ceiling of their demands to include the overhauling of the whole political system.\(^3\) Other members kept their options open, but insisted on the deconfessionalization of the political system as a minimum acceptable requirement and on the amendment of the electoral law to insure wider popular representation.\(^4\) The Lebanese National Movement was not alone in its demands for change in the political system as a way for settling the conflict. Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss requested an increase in the powers of the Prime Minister, a devolution of the Administration, an amendment of the electoral law to ensure parity in the parliamentary representation between the two confessional blocks and a mild form of administrative decentralization.\(^5\)

The Moslem Establishment's proposals were similar to those of the Lebanese National Movement, except in one major area; they accepted deconfessionalization but denounced secularization, as they regarded it a contradiction of a basic religious tenet related to personal status domain. Nevertheless, the Establishment was very critical of the political order and the 1943 formula of power-sharing. Its proposals revolved mainly around the amendments to the Constitution, the National Pact, and several other facets of the socio-economic system to ensure a more equitable distribution of power and resources between the two main confessional blocks. Its acceptance of confessionalism was limited. It proposed partial confessionalization of the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army requesting that the upper ranks of these three bodies ought to be confessionalized together with the three highest government positions.

In this respect, the Moslem Establishment worked hand-in-hand with the Lebanese National Movement to change the system. Bearing in mind the Establishment's rejection of the principle of total secularization, the Lebanese National Movement ameliorated its stance on this issue in order to appease the Moslem Establishment. As for the other issues, the spiritual leaders of the three main Moslem sects (Sunni, Shi'a and Druzes) reiterated, on 21 September 1983, their views on decentralization and confessionalism which were in full agreement with those of the
Lebanese National Movement. They strongly rejected all forms of political decentralization (federalism, confederalism, cantonism), but welcomed administrative decentralization. They argued that political decentralization is a form of partition and would lead the country to fragmentation. They also demanded the abolition of confessionalism in all its forms from the state organs.

However, the sects had individually articulated these demands to suit their specific community’s requirements. The Sunni spiritual and temporal leaders thought that deconfessionalism rather than secularization was a good enough solution to the present ills of the political order, and that there was an urgent need to conduct a population census in the country and amend the citizenship law. The Shi’a demand went beyond deconfessionalism to request a total overhauling of the national pact, for it had become an instrument for consecrating privileges of some communities at the expense of others. Their proposals aimed at abolishing the confessional arrangement from all walks of public life, amending the electoral law, defining clearly the relations between the branches of government and particularly between the president and prime minister, changing the authority structure to give more powers to the prime minister, and extending the term of office of the Speaker of the Parliament to four years. They also proposed an amendment to the laws governing the army, the administration, education, information and the economy.

Both spiritual and temporal leaders of the Druze community suggested a four-fold reform package. The first was the creation of a senate to share with parliament the legislative powers. It was proposed that within the senate the six largest sects of Lebanon will have an equal number of seats but the presidency should be allocated to a Druze. The second was the redistribution of highest posts in the administration, the judiciary and the army in such a way that equilibrium between the spiritual families would be maintained. The third was the institution of administrative decentralization in the state structure. The fourth was the demand to conduct a new population census within a maximum period of three years and abolish the laws on dual citizenship rights.

Other prominent politicians in this camp who chose to maintain an independent posture made their contributions towards a resolution of the conflict. Former prime minister, Saeb Salam, proposed a reform package which featured high in the final text of the Taif Accord. Most importantly, he proposed that the prime minister be elected by the parliament rather than appointed by the president, subject to the parliament’s approval. The raison d’être was that the prime minister ought to be liberated from the president’s hegemony and act in matters of state as a co-equal to the president. He also suggested that the prime minister, rather than the president, be granted the
power to form governments subject to the president's endorsement and the parliament's vote of confidence. He also suggested a separation between the ministerial appointments and parliamentary status. As for the reform of the Legislative Body, his proposals included a suggestion to increase the number of parliamentary seats and have them equally divided between the Moslems and Christians.

In reforming the Administration, Salam requested the abolishing of the confessional system and the decentralization and devolution of the system. His proposals for economic reform revolved around the creation of a Social and Economic Council with wide powers to create situations in which the elimination of communal, regional and economic discrepancies in Lebanese society could become feasible. He also called for an extensive program of revising the education system and the unification of the curriculum throughout the country.\textsuperscript{11}

Salam's proposals were supported by the then Prime Minister, Salim al-Hoss, in his capacity as one of the prominent outspoken proponents of the Reformist Camp. He called for a broad base decentralization of the Administration\textsuperscript{12} but recommended that the deconfessionalization process be carried out gradually.\textsuperscript{13}

The political parties of the Lebanese Front as well as the Christian Establishment opposed any change to the existing power structure embodied in the National Pact of 1943. This was clearly indicated by the Memorandum of the Phalanges Party on political reform published in December 1975, that is eight months after the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon. It stated unequivocally that the Phalanges leadership espoused the above formula and could find no substitute to it. Nevertheless, it admitted that the power structure needed improvement in order to cope with the requirements of modern times.\textsuperscript{14}

The Phalanges Party's pious adherence to the formula of the National Pact at this stage was a function of the Maronites' fear about losing their majority status to become a negligible minority. The existing power-sharing arrangement gave them an edge over the rest of the component communities, but the underlying assumption upon which the Maronites built their stance differed from other partners. To them these advantages were granted as a reward for their disengagement from their Western and particularly French connection. This disengagement was perceived by members of the opposite camp as a temporary measure, good for a limited time, when Lebanon could achieve a certain degree of integration and survive as an independent entity. The decision to share power in that formula was implicitly temporal and subject to demographic changes. As such the Pact was seen as a temporal necessity.
dictated by the exigencies of the process of transformation from tutelage to independence.\textsuperscript{15}

Conversely, the Phalanges Party as well as its sponsors, the Christian Maronite and Catholic Establishments, felt, at this stage of the conflict, that the 1943 power-sharing arrangement and the distribution of power between the three estates, is a permanent security for their very existence.\textsuperscript{16} It perceived in this arrangement the needed guarantees for their secure status as a minority rather than as transitory reward for their disengagement from the French patronage and their acceptance of the closer relations with the Arab world. For the Party, this arrangement should not be a function of the rising expectations of other component communities or of the demographic and political changes in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{17}

The notion of "guarantees" and privileges of the Maronite community was implicitly accepted by all parties in the first few years following independence but came under pressure later on. In no more than two decades the very idea of privileges and its basic premises became repugnant and was totally rejected by all members of the Reformist Camp. The Reformists' basic platform was oriented towards the abolishing of such an idea.\textsuperscript{18}

As the pressure to amend he National Pact grew, the Phalanges party as well as the Christian Establishment lost their zeal in supporting the Pact. They started shifting their emphasis from a rejuvenated National Pact that would retain a more balanced political structure to a decentralized federative form which, in their view, could provide them with greater security. As a part of their agenda for the resolution of the conflict, they announced in 1984 a program of action which revolved around the concept of decentralization. This program stated in its preamble that the guarantees, which were granted to the Christians under the existing power-sharing structure, had lost much of their expediency, therefore, no Christian-Islamic coexistence was possible if the Christian presence was not consciously strengthened and reinforced. It was also maintained that Lebanon as a collectivity of spiritual families ought not to be governed by the rule of numbers and by the logic of numerical majority. There was a need for a genuine balance of powers, and that decentralization must be adopted in order to reconcile the security requirements of the Lebanese sects with the need for mutual trust.\textsuperscript{19}

Based on the above insight, a working group from the Phalanges and the National Liberal parties drafted a program of action whose main feature was a strong tendency towards federalism as an option in case they could not hold on to the guarantees they enjoyed under the National Pact.\textsuperscript{20}
The proposed federative solution to Lebanon's communal problem was the lesser of the two evils. To some of the Maronite leaders, partition was a more favoured option. They argued that the population was already divided into distinctive sects with a marked degree of geographical self-enclosure. Partition in this case would solve the problem of security, for it would provide a retreat into more secure sanctuary for them. This idea did not get beyond the flare up of communal passion. Nor, on the other hand, was it abandoned completely. Rather, it was transformed into a federative design, but rejected totally by the Reformist Camp.

The Lebanese Front posed the question "what Lebanon do we want?" In reply to this question they outlined a comprehensive program for the resolution of conflict and for the rebuilding of the country. The major features of this program stressed that Lebanon was an independent and sovereign democratic pluralist state unavailable for merger with any country in the region, and that the conflict and the political developments leading to it made the basic principles of the 1943 National Pact obsolete. Therefore a new structure would have to replace the Pact. This structure would have to take into consideration the widespread sentiments within the Christian community for a decentralized, or even a federal form of government. In this type of structure sectarianism would have to be maintained and preserved against all eventualities, particularly, against demographic changes. The program also maintained further that Christianity in Lebanon would remain for the foreseeable future "free, secure, and sovereign master of its values and fate".

The Christian Establishment's vision of a resolution of the conflict ran almost parallel to that of the Phalanges party and the Lebanese Front. The Order of Monks issued, on 9 October of that year, a statement demanding permanent guarantees for the Maronites' minority status, "...because Islam is a religion and a state." The Moslem intellectuals profess that acquisition of authority remains an essential goal of Islam." In their view recognition and acknowledgment of Lebanon's permanent independence would constitute the required guarantee.

The Order of Monks demanded also total secularisation instead of deconfessionalisation. This request was in line with the main platform of the Maronite Establishment. This stance was projected as a defence line in the face of the Moslems' attack on the National Pact. The Order strongly rejected any amendment to the Constitution or to the existing power-sharing arrangement and insisted on devout adherence to the Pact and its provisions. It went as far as to request the institutionalisation of these guarantees and the neutrality of Lebanon.
These proposals were rejected by the opposite side. However, another attempt was made by the Order of Monks in conjunction with the Maronite League.25 A compromise reform program was submitted. Its main theme revolved around the need to preserve the status quo with slight amendments to appease the other side but with apparent rejection of a diminishing status of the Christians, particularly the Maronites.26 The Reformist Camp dismissed this and refused to discuss its contents.

In October 1976, new proposals were put forward by the Order of Monks. They embodied four different formulae for resolving the conflict and rebuilding Lebanon.27

The first formula was to retain the National Pact as amended by the Constitutional Document of February 1976. This construct had the advantage of preserving the basic characteristics of Lebanese society, that is, pluralism and its corollary notion of "unity in diversity". It also incorporated some of the basic demands of the Reformist Camp.

The second formula was to transform the present pluralist state into a unitary one and introduce secularism into its political system. Implementation of the formula required certain basic prerequisites which were non-existent in Lebanese society, the most significant of which was the acquiescence of the Moslem community for turning a highly confessional society into a secular one without passing through a transitory stage. The Order of Monks reply to these reservations was to suggest a cantonization or a federation of the country whereby each community could adopt the system it found more appropriate to its needs and requirements.

The third formula suggested an elaborate cantonized state in which autonomous administrative entities with a homogeneous population and veto powers apportioned the authority structure between them and enjoy a high degree of domestic self rule. This was perceived as a pragmatic solution that would provide the required security of the component communities.

The fourth formula called for the strict implementation of a pluralist policy in every aspect of Lebanese society. Such a formula could solve the problem of hegemony and would allow both communal blocs to contribute to the political process.

None the less, instead of resolving the conflict, these proposals increased the tension between the two conflict groups. Federalism and cantonization became issues in themselves rather than solutions to the conflict. As a matter of fact they took precedence over the three main issues of conflict. This was due probably to the fact that a substantial number of Christian inhabitants moved, at that stage of the conflict,
out of the non-Christian areas to their co-religionist regions, and conversely most of the Moslems in the Christian areas were forced out into the mainly Moslem inhabited areas. Thus federalism or cantonization, as a likely solution to the conflict, became an attractive option to the Christians for, they argued, it would provide them with the conjectured security.

Federalist propositions became issues of widespread public debate. They embodied views ranging from mild decentralisation of the administration and economy to a full fledged federative system. Among the frequently discussed proposals were those suggested by the National Liberal Party and The Order of Monks, which recommended a two tier system: federal and confederal. These were subsequently superseded by new proposals, most notably Saiyydah al-Bir (Lady of the Well) caucus proposal, the Lebanese Forces comprehensive program, and a European proposal. All these proposals revolved around the theme of a federal solution to the present conflict. They based their premises on the assumption that Lebanon was a pluralist sectarian society, that its present socio-religious structure was a permanent fact of life; that each sect was a self-conscious cultural, and distinct entity, and that the sectarian characteristics of the component groups precluded any process of integration. Only a federal system could provide Lebanon with its best chance to keep its "unity in diversity" and avoid partition.

The Reformist Camp reacted strongly to these propositions. It considered them partition in disguise and found in them an irrelevant prescription for Lebanon's ills. Al-Hoss responded to the proposition by indicating that a federal solution to Lebanon's conflictual issues was not feasible for the simple reason that federalism was workable in situations where the society consisted of independent, heterogeneous, separate, and self-sustaining groups. Federalism would bind them together and might lead to their unification. He maintained that a federative solution to the Lebanese conflict could lead to the division of the country into geographic and sectarian entities incapable of surviving on their own, that federalism was the first step down the road towards partition, and that existing socio-political structure of the Lebanese society could not sustain a federal system.

In rejecting the above propositions, the Reformist Camp propounded an alternative course for the resolution of the conflict. This course rested mainly on the assumption that Lebanon was a unitary state and ought to remain so, and the sectarian structure was a fact of life and needed to be maintained, but within limits. Therefore any solution to the conflict should aim at preserving the unity of the country and the basic characteristics of its sectarian composition, and at reforming the political system in the direction of a more equitable and just power-sharing formula. To
achieve this, al-Hoss, echoing the thinking of the Moslem Establishment, suggested a
decentralised administrative system and a gradually deconfessionalised political
order.\(^{40}\) The political reform issue revolved around these two main themes for most of
the duration of the conflict. The second main issue was that of the national identity of
the country and its sovereignty.

B The Issue of National Identity

The question of Identity is linked to the problem of loyalty, and both are
inextricably associated with the basic causes of the Lebanese conflict. As noted
earlier, most of the Christians, and the Maronites in particular, "...reject Lebanon's
pan-Arabism which they tend to see as a mask for pan-Islamism."\(^ {41}\) The Maronites
have perceived of themselves as a "nation"\(^ {42}\) in possession of all elements of
distinctive cultural, religious, and communal values.\(^ {43}\) They were convinced that such
characteristics could be preserved by an independent Lebanon. This belief may shed
some light on their emphatic and tenacious attachment to Lebanon, for by conducting
themselves accordingly they presumed that they avoid "...the fate of being submerged
as a tiny minority in a predominantly Sunni Moslem state..."\(^ {44}\)

It follows that Lebanon would become meaningless to them if it would not
reflect their ethos. Eventually, "they have tended to equate Lebanonism with
Maronitism, and both with a paramount Maronite political and economic status in the
country."\(^ {45}\) Their notion of an independent Lebanon and their acceptance of it
reflected their fear that they may lose their majority status if Lebanon joined the Arab
world, and eventually lose their community's distinctive characteristics in a
predominantly confessional Islamic society.\(^ {46}\) Tewfik Khalaf remarked that, while the
Moslems of Lebanon currently have forsaken their Moslem and Arab loyalties in
favour of an independent Lebanon, the Maronites' loyalty to Lebanon is predicated on
their traditional identity, aspirations and structure as a community. "Maronites'
Lebanonism of 1975 was the Lebanonism of 1920, i.e. Maronitism."\(^ {47}\)

Beneath this ideological assertion lies the claim that the Maronites are the
descendants of the Phoenicians\(^ {48}\) and that they are culturally akin to the other
Christian Mediterranean countries.\(^ {49}\) Hence, in their opposition to pan-Arabism, they
argued vociferously that Lebanon is a sovereign state with a distinct identity.
Conversely the Moslems of Lebanon perceived of themselves as part and parcel of
the Arab nation, and maintained that Lebanon is culturally, religiously and historically,
part of the Arab world.\(^ {50}\) Radical Arab nationalists contend that such a conviction is a
good enough justification for the "... erasure of [the] existing national boundaries and
the creation of a pan-Arab state."\(^ {51}\) For them Lebanonism is equated with Arabism.
In between these two ideologies there was a cluster of some particularistic national trends which lie outside the above spectrum. The Kurds, the Assyrians, and the Armenians have their own national personalities, loyalties and aspirations, but because of their numerical inferiority they were overshadowed by the other two main trends. Moreover each of the two main identity orientations included nuances and tendencies which, over the years, were instrumental in narrowing the gap between the two main identity poles. The Greek Orthodox sect, for example, had no difficulty in associating itself with Lebanon's Arab Identity. The Shi'a sect had not shown much enthusiasm for pan-Arabism. The Druzes tended to be pragmatic in their ideological involvement, with a belated tilt to pan-Arabism.

The Lebanese Moslem communities of today, although not willing to forsake their religious and cultural bond with the world of Islam, are not inclined, either, to advocate Lebanon's merger with the Arab world. They espouse an independent and sovereign Lebanon built on the principles of justice and equality, as a final home for all of its citizens.

The significance of the issue of identity was construed differently by each side. The sects refused to surrender their cultural and total political identities to the new norm created by the Pact. They found in the 1926 constitution, in which sectarian loyalties were recognised, a reinforcing mechanism for their contentions. The National Pact was supposed to thrust both camps and the trends between them into an integrative nation-building process, but both communal blocks remained in a state of ambivalence with regard to the question of identity. The Moslems could not rid themselves of greater Moslem sympathies for the Arab causes, such as the Palestinian issue, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Christians, particularly the Maronites, could not venture out of their "ideology of the mountain" to lure back their Moslem partners from the sphere of pan-Arabism into the sphere of a Lebanese nationalism.

The Arab-Israeli conflict generated enormous pressure on the Lebanese system. Pressure emerged from the radicalization of the Arab masses as a result of the outbreak of a number of successive coups d'etat in the neighbouring Arab countries, starting in the early 1950s, and from the rise of Nassirism throughout the whole Arab world. This polarized the political scene in the country and brought to the surface the Christian-Moslem cleavage over the identity of Lebanon. Thus, once again, Lebanon's national identity became a divisive issue in Lebanon's inter-communal relations and a prism through which the two communal blocks viewed the Palestinian cause and Lebanon's relations with the Arab and Western worlds.
The Constitutional Document of 14 February 1976 addressed this problem. So did the Geneva National Dialogue Conference of October 1983, and the Tripartite Agreement of December 1985, and the Taif Accord of October 1989. In each and every one of these documents it was affirmed that Lebanon is an Arab state by identity and affiliation. This assertion featured high in every policy statement made by the government to the parliament.

The Maronite intelligentsia took issue with this concept when it first appeared in the Constitutional document. Their rejection of Lebanon's Arab identity did cast some doubts over the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory solution to the other issues of conflict, namely, political reform and the sovereignty of the country.

In the Geneva and Taif Conferences this issue was brought up again. The Geneva conference managed to draft the concept in an acceptable formulation in which all the parties acknowledged that "Lebanon is...[an] Arab country by identity and affiliation and a founding and active member of the Arab League fully committed to the League's Charter."

At the Taif meeting, the Lebanese parliamentarians endorsed the concept and enshrined it in the final document which was later adopted by the parliament as the national constitution of the "second" Republic of Lebanon.

C The Issue of The Sovereignty of Lebanon

The breakdown of the overall political and social system into a plethora of factions, militias, and political movements created an environment of spiral and endemic fragmentation of the underlying value system. As the conflict surged, the proliferating conflict groups found themselves polarized into two hostile camps. Their polarization around one issue catapulted them, in a domino-like manner, into disagreement on almost every other issue. The discord over political reform and the national identity of Lebanon descended to a similar dispute over the issue of the sovereignty of Lebanon and the presence of foreign forces on its territories. It must be admitted that both camps held identical views as to the inviolability of Lebanon's sovereignty, integrity and independence, but they differed in their perception of what constituted a breach of sovereignty of the country.

For the Status quo Coalition, the Establishment in particular, Lebanon was an eternal entity, a homeland for the Christians, a meeting place of civilizations and religions, and a crucible for confessional coexistence but with a strong Christian presence.
The Reformist Camp, particularly the Sunni Moslem component of it, perceived the post-1920 independent Lebanon as a politico-religious extension of the Moslem Arab world. It asserted that its links with the world of Arabdom ought to be judged as benign and innocuous.

Both Camps held different appraisals of each other's view on the question of sovereignty. These views were governed, to a great extent, by a stereotyped perception of a pre-independent Lebanon. In post-independent Lebanon the concept of sovereignty gained international legality which was instrumental in convincing both Camps, in particular the irredentists in the Moslem Camp, of the authenticity of the new entity. Nevertheless, the threshold of sovereignty was interpreted differently by each Camp. To the Status Quo Coalition "...the concept of sovereignty derives not from international status but from the degree of internal control exercised (by the government). Thus sovereignty originally described states where control over their territory was paramount." It follows that, from the point of view of the Status Quo Coalition, Lebanon lost its sovereignty from the 1960s, to such armed groups as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party militia, the Marada militia, the South Lebanese Army, as well as to Syria, Libya, Iran and Israel.

The Status Quo Coalition formulated its policies with regard to this question on the assumption that any one of the above groups, particularly the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, was a breach and a threat to the sovereignty of the country. The Palestinians turned themselves into a state within the state and precluded the national government from exercising its authority over all of its territories. Moreover, the Palestinians' raids into Israel from southern Lebanon invited Israel's disproportionate retaliation and its frequent incursions into the country in pursuit of the raiders.

Furthermore, the Coalition held the view that for Lebanon to regain its sovereignty the Palestinians should be disarmed and relegated to their refugee status, and brought under the control of the Lebanese authorities or dispersed in the Arab countries.

The Coalition also believed that the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis, and particularly the Syrian Army's entry in 1976 into Lebanon, was a flagrant breach of its sovereignty. It persistently kept pressing world public opinion for the Syrian troops' withdrawal, arguing that this intervention served Syria's long-term interests rather than Lebanon's. It contended that the conflict failed to dissipate after the Syrian intervention, and the role of the Syrian Army in Lebanon changed from peace-
keeping to occupation. Furthermore, the Coalition insisted that the help received by
the rival militias from across the border was also a violation of the sovereignty of the
country.

Conversely, the Reformist Camp, particularly the Lebanese National
Movement, defended, in the early stages of the conflict, the Palestinian presence in
Lebanon claiming that such a presence enjoyed Arab legality and “it is fighting not
only for the liberation of its homeland....but also in defence of Lebanon.”68 It also
maintained that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was legal as it was invited by the
then legal authority in the country69 and subsequently endorsed by the League of
Arab States.70 Furthermore, it maintained that Syria’s role was always that of a
balancer, and that the arms supply to their militias and the financial assistance
received from external sources were justified on the grounds that the forces of the
opposite camp were receiving superior help, in arms, money and training from Israel
and some western sources.

The polarization of the conflict issues polarized their resolution. Efforts to
resolve the conflict continued throughout the war years, but were kept revolving in a
vicious circle. The basic point became an issue in itself. The basic question was
where to start, and which issue to tackle first: political reform, Identity or the
sovereignty of the country? Both camps made some principled concessions to each
other. The Coalition accepted in principle the indispensability of introducing political
reform to the political system, and the Reformist Camp acknowledged the need for the
withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. But the burning question was which
comes first? The Coalition insisted on the withdrawal of Syrian troops before it
committed itself to a constructive dialogue over the issue of political reform. It argued
that the presence of these troops in Lebanon presaged an unbalanced outcome.

The Coalition maintained also that there could not be a meaningful dialogue
between the parties as long as the fighting raged throughout the country. Its attitude
was one of “let us stop fighting first and then we are willing to discuss reforms.”71 The
Reformist Camp charged that peace and security could be achieved through an
agreement on political reform which must come first.

The same “chicken or egg” approach was applied to the issue of sovereignty.
The Coalition’s attitude was represented by the slogan “let us get all foreigners out
and then the Lebanese can agree on domestic issues in no time.”72 The Reformist
Camp disputed this and reiterated its demand for a settlement of the issue of political
reform first, and maintained that this would eventually lead to the liberation of the
country.73
This impasse was the subject of numerous attempts at outside mediation resolution. Prior to 1989, the Lebanese successive Heads of State and several Western and Arab mediators tried to resolve the conflict but their efforts went in vain. They even failed to restore the relationship between the conflict groups to a minimum level of legitimacy, that is a cessation of the use of force and consent to a trade-off. All mediatory efforts were aborted by the intransigence of the conflict parties. The process of conflict resolution could not be started because the conflict parties would not take the decision that they wanted their conflict resolved. Nevertheless these efforts and some objective elements of the relevant proposals created the necessary conditions for the conflict parties to enable them to enter the conflict resolution process at Taif. Let us turn now to the first four proposals and analyse their effect on the final process of conflict resolution.

II Conflict Resolution Programs

Mediation efforts never ceased. Proposals for the termination of the conflict were abundant but the outcome was negative. The Status Quo Coalition pressed for the internationalization of the conflict hoping that this would bring in a sympathetic backing of its demands from the West. The Reformist Camp strived to keep mediation efforts within the ambit of the League of Arab States for similar reasons. Amid this struggle, it fell to the Lebanese parties themselves to find a viable mechanism for the desired settlement. Several individual and collective initiatives were contemplated. The most significant were: 1) the proposals of President Suleiman Frangie on constitutional reform (the Constitutional Document of February 1976); 2) President Sarkis’s 14 Points National Entente Program of 5 March 1980; 3) The National Dialogue Conference of Geneva and Lausanne of October 1983 and April 1984; 4) the Tripartite Agreement of December 1985; and, 5) The Taif Accord of October 1989.

The first four devices did not produce any substantial results for a resolution of the conflict, but the Taif Accord succeeded in establishing a workable and effective conflict resolution mechanism.

The reason for the failure of the first four attempts to terminate the hostilities and shift the conflict groups away from a strategy of incorrigible animosity towards an environment of conciliation and enhancement of mutual understanding was due to the inherent characteristics of these devices, as well as to the conflict environment of the warring factions.

The Constitutional Document, initiated by the then President Suleiman Frangie, with the help and endorsement of the Syrian side, contained some elements
of a compromise settlement and aimed at a limited political reform package. Its seventeen points program accommodated some of the basic demands of the Reformist Camp, such as amending the sectarian representation ratio in parliamentary seats to give both confessional blocs equal numbers, the abolishing of confessionalism as a means for selecting candidates to the lower ranks of bureaucracy, army, and the judiciary, and a mild decentralisation of the Administration and lastly an acknowledgment of Lebanon's Arab identity. The confessional characteristics of the three highest political positions, the presidency, the speakership and the prime ministership was, much to the consternation of the Lebanese National Movement, confirmed and formalised.74

The Document was received by the various warring factions with marked interest but little support. Although it offered the Reformist Camp some concessions, it retained many of the provisions of the vilified National Pact. The Lebanese National Movement saw in the Document nothing "...more than a travesty of their hopes."75 The Status Quo intelligentsia rejected it in toto, claiming that beneath its Lebanese facade were Syrian markings.76

The initial rejection of the Document, as well as the dramatic developments on the ground which lead to the break up of the Lebanese army, eclipsed the Document and dashed every hope of reconciliation. On 11 March 1976, the Commander of the Army's Beirut garrison attempted a coup d'etat, demanded the resignation of the President and appointed himself the military governor of Lebanon. A new role was thrown at an already demoralised army. The coup failed but the army's atrophy continued. The sudden and long-dreaded disintegration of the army accelerated.77 This obliged President Frangie to abandon his initiative, and to concentrate on the evolving situation.

Hopes and efforts to resolve the conflict were augmented by the election of a new president of the Republic to replace President Frangie whose term of office expired in September 1976. Yet no systematic conflict resolution device emerged until March 1980. Four years after he assumed office as successor to president Frangie, President Elias Sarkis announced his National Entente Program for the resolution of the conflict. During those four years the conflict evolved new forms and took a different direction due to the active involvement of the Palestinians and the Syrians in the crisis. Two issues came to the forefront of the conflict: Lebanon's sovereignty, and the settlement of the Palestinian refugees in the host countries, including Lebanon. The Status Quo Coalition raised the alarm and brought these issues forward. Sarkis's 14-points program addressed these two issues as well as the issues of identity and political reform.
To dissipate the fears of the Status Quo Coalition, the National Entente Program affirmed the sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, and strongly rejected the much debated intimations of the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The Program addressed also some of the basic demands of the Reformist Camp. It reaffirmed Lebanon's Arab identity and acknowledged the distinctiveness in the relations between Lebanon and Syria.\textsuperscript{78}

The Sarkis 14-points Program was accepted, in principle, by both parties, but with some reservations by the Maronites\textsuperscript{79} Yet this Program could not bring the parties to the negotiation table nor could it terminate the fighting. It was abandoned sooner than expected.

With the help of some member countries of the League of Arab States, a National Dialogue Conference was organised to find a solution to the conflict. It included the main protagonists of both camps, and was held in two stages, the first stage was in Geneva in October, 1983, and the second, in Lausanne, Switzerland, in April 1984. In attendance were the then foreign Minister of Syria, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and the Saudi Arabian Minister of State, Ibrahim al-Mass'oud. Their apparent role was to reconcile the different views of the parties. Their role fell short of that of an official mediator. The conference was chaired by the then President of the Republic, Amine Gemayel, who succeeded President Sarkis in September, 1982, upon the expiry of the latter's term of office.

In his opening address, President Gemayel underlined the basic issues which were then pertinent to that stage of conflict: "Rescue of Lebanon, unify its people, recover its sovereignty, strengthen the bonds of brotherhood between the Lebanese and with their Arab brothers."\textsuperscript{80}

In Lausanne, the same themes were reiterated. However, both attempts were no more than a platform for releasing tension. Each one of the participating leaders aired the grievances of his faction and returned, at the conclusion of the conference, to his enclave. Nevertheless, the Geneva phase of the Conference was a step forward towards reconciliation and communal confidence-building. The two most important resolutions taken along this line were the confirmation of Lebanon's Arab identity, and the annulment of the 17 May security draft Agreement with Israel.\textsuperscript{81}

The Lausanne phase of the conference continued the trend of confidence building between the warring factions. It resolved to establish a committee to draw up a new constitution\textsuperscript{82}. These resolutions, which were supposed to demonstrate their
effectiveness as conflict resolution mechanisms, could not even influence the course of the conflict, or its escalation.\textsuperscript{83}

Two years later, another attempt to resolve the conflict was made by the conflict group leaders themselves. In December 1985 the leaders of the three strongest militias, Elias Hobeika, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Lebanese Forces, Nabih Berri, President of Amal Movement, and Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party's militia, negotiated an agreement to settle the conflict. It was signed in Damascus under the auspices of the Syrians.\textsuperscript{84} The Tripartite Agreement aimed at the abolition of the confessional system, altering the power-sharing structure in the direction of a more equitable distribution of government awards between the two main communal blocs. It also provided for the increase of parliamentary representation, the establishment of a Senate and a constitutional court, decentralization of the administration and lastly, upholding and confirming Lebanon's Arab identity.

The Agreement contained also a section on Lebanon's relations with Syria which it described as distinctive and complementary. It also envisaged a program of action to translate these two features in the relations into government policies. The agreement was opposed vehemently by important sections of the Maronite community, like the elite of the Lebanese Forces, The Order of Monks, the Maronite President of the Republic and a few other Maronite political leaders, like Camille Chamoun, and Raymond Eddie. It was received relatively well by the Shi'a, and half-heartedly by the Druze leadership\textsuperscript{85}. However, the Agreement fell apart soon after it was signed.

Failure of this Agreement was due to two factors. First, the leader of the Lebanese Forces militia lost his capacity to commit his community to a new political order which relegated its status and authority to that of an ordinary component community. Second, the architects of the Agreement sought to secure the endorsement of the President of the republic without allowing him involvement in its formulation. This move was rejected by the President for its lack of procedural conformity.

However, the President and the state lost much of their means of coercion-control, during the conflict, over the force which commands respect for legitimacy. The crucial implication of this was that the political institutions were in no position to establish limits to the conflict nor provide for its resolution.
As a result of the collapse of this Agreement, disruption and violence intensified. The people's increased frustration and their loss of direction became a basic source of demand for the termination and the resolution of the conflict. The State was unable to provide authoritatively stabilizing limits for the settlement processes to occur, for most of the implicit as well as explicit societal mechanisms for conflict management were debilitated or incapacitated. Nevertheless, the extensive experience gained from the unsuccessful previous attempts, and the upsurge in the intensity of the conflict, prompted third party mediators and conciliators to act. The League of Arab States managed, after a laborious, extensive, and time-consuming endeavour, to devise a strategy for the termination of the fighting. By then the conflict had escalated and became independent of its initiating causes. Expansion of the conflict incorporated new dimensions. The Presidency was rendered vacant by the expiration of the term of office of the President and the inability of the Parliament to choose a successor. Minutes before the expiry time on 22 September 1988, the President, invoking his prerogatives, appointed a bi-sectarian six-member interim military government composed of three Christian and three Moslem generals, (a Maronite, an Orthodox, and a Catholic, a Sunni, a Shi'a and a Druze) headed by General Michel Aoun, the Maronite Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to rule until a new president was elected. Gemayel's appointment of a Maronite to the post of prime minister, a post reserved by the National Pact and convention to the Sunni community, outraged the politicians of the Reformist Camp. The three Moslem ministers declined to serve in this cabinet. Aoun was left with two Christian members who assumed the vacated portfolios.

By his appointment of an interim military government, President Gemayel ignored the existence of an already established civilian government, headed by Dr. Salim al-Hoss. On 23 September 1988, Lebanon found itself with two governments but with no president. Soon it plunged into a constitutional crisis. Each government claimed legitimacy to itself and denied it to the other. The conflict took a new turn and a new face, though the conflict groups remained the same. The Status Quo Coalition supported Aoun, and the Reformist Camp supported the government of al-Hoss. The relationship between the Coalition and Aoun soon became problematic. The focus of the conflict shifted from the original issues in dispute to a conflict over power and authority. Fears sprouted that the existence of a dual authority could lead to formal partitioning of the country into Christian and Moslem cantons.

This crisis triggered a chain of events which hurled the country into more intense conflict episodes. This development was compounded by the failure of the parliament to elect a successor to its Speaker, or renew his mandate, upon the expiry
of his term in October 1988. In the following month, the Minister of Defence in the al-
Hoss government, dismissed General Aoun as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
appointed in his place a Moslem Sunni General, which was a retaliatory violation of
the convention.

III The Conflict Environment Before the Taif Accord

Such was the conflict environment prior to the commencement of the Taif
mediation efforts. The tension increased with every new step taken by the rival
governments. The conflict became so pervasive that it engulfed not only the militias of
both sides, but also their wider audience. The Lebanese Forces seized President
Gemayel's party bases in his home town and region. The Amal militia clashed with
their co-religionist Hezbollah in the southern suburb of Beirut. The rival groups were
vying for the control of their respective communities.

In his drive to consolidate his authority over the Christian enclave and the rest
of Lebanon, General Aoun turned on the Lebanese Forces, which shared with him the
same territory. In an attempt to subdue them and bring them under his control, he
fought them in street battles with some initial success but no decisive victory. The
outcome of the battles helped in restoring, to a certain degree, the fast eroding
authority of the army but fell short of achieving his original aim.

Aoun's second move was to expand his version of legality outside the Christian
enclave, declaring that he intended to liberate the country from Syrian occupation. He
imposed a naval blockade on the illegal ports in west and south Beirut. This act was
countered by the al-Hoss government, which took similar measures against the ports
of the Christian enclave. Fighting between the rival forces positioned on either side
of the green line, dividing west from east Beirut, soon erupted. Aoun was helped by
the Lebanese Forces, in spite of the animosity between them. The Reformist Camp
militias were helped by the Syrian troops stationed in west Beirut. The gruesome
clashes went on for six months with daily exchanges of artillery fire. Several cease-
fires were arranged by third party mediators, but the hostilities persisted.

Aoun's main strategy at this stage was to expel the Syrian troops from
Lebanon. On 13 March 1989, he declared a "war of liberation" on the Syrians, but
many "...doubted whether [he] had ever realistically expected to expel the Syrian
troops from Lebanon. Rather he was believed to seek the internationalization of the
Lebanese conflict to force their withdrawal."86
The escalation in the conflict placed more pressure on the mediators to renew their attempts at terminating the war and resolving the conflict. In addition to the mediation of the League of Arab States, France, the Vatican, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations offered their offices to end the fighting.\textsuperscript{87} None the less the League’s efforts met with some initial success. It was able to break the deadlock and achieve some positive results. A six member ministerial committee consisting of the foreign ministers of Algeria, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates, chaired by the foreign minister of Kuwait, was formed to hold exploratory discussions with leaders of the conflict groups and report back to the League on its findings. The Committee spent three months listening to the two prime ministers of the rival governments, leaders of the warring factions and heads of religious denominations. It held its meetings at the headquarters of the Arab League in Tunisia, in Kuwait and in Beirut.

As soon as the report of the Committee was submitted, King Hasan II of Morocco invited the Heads of Arab States to a summit conference in Casablanca, to discuss its contents and devise a conflict resolution strategy. The summit held its meeting in May 1989. A tripartite committee consisting of King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, King Hasan II of Morocco, and President Chazli Benjedid of Algeria, was appointed to mediate in the conflict. The committee members in turn mandated their foreign ministers to carry on the required mission.

The Tripartite Committee set itself the task of mediation and conciliation to achieve an immediate cease-fire followed by a meeting of all warring factions under the auspices of the Arab League, to deliberate over peace proposals. It appointed the League’s Assistant Secretary-General, Lakhdar al-Ibrahimi, as its emissary and mediator. Al-Ibrahimi kept shuttling between the adversaries until he was able to obtain and enforce a cease-fire. This cease-fire, like the many that preceded and followed it, did not endure for long. In the meantime, the Foreign Ministers of the Tripartite Committee drew a “plan of action” for resolving the conflict. It was largely based on the findings of the six member ministerial committee. To give their plan credibility and support, they sought the comments and approval on its draft from several sources: The United States, the then Soviet Union, Syria, the rest of the Arab States, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, some Western European leaders, the permanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{88}

Following these extensive consultations, the Committee drafted a peace plan for Lebanon, which called for: a) an immediate cease-fire; b) the formation of a Lebanese security committee, headed by Lakhdar al-Ibrahimi, to supervise the cease-
fire; c) the lifting of the Syrian-backed land and sea blockade of east Beirut; d) the reopening of Beirut International Airport; e) an embargo on arms shipment to the warring factions; and f) the summoning of the Lebanese parliament to meet outside Lebanon to discuss the "Document of National Reconciliation" drawn up by the Tripartite Committee in compliance with the Casablanca directives.

IV The Taif Accord

The draft "Document of National Reconciliation" addressed the basic issues in the dispute and prescribed the appropriate solution to them. On political reform, the Document provided for the balancing of communal interest and a redistribution of power and authority in Lebanon between the two main confessional blocs. For this purpose, it endorsed the transfer of some of the executive powers from the President to the cabinet, while the ministerial portfolios were equally divided between the two communal blocs. The term of office of the Shi'a Speaker of the House of Representatives was increased from two to four years. The parliamentary seats were increased from 99 to 108 and, in a subsequent amendment to 128 and were to be shared equally by the two confessional groups. Earlier distribution was in the ratio of six Christians to five Moslems. The Sunni Prime Minister's powers were expanded as well. For instance he acquired the right to call the cabinet to its meetings; the president would attend and chair these meetings, but would not have the right of vote.

The Document also called for the phasing out, in principle, of the confessional system, and the abolition of the requirements of sectarian qualifications for appointments in the lower ranks of government positions, the army, judiciary and public enterprises, but retained it for the higher ranks.

Other aspects of political reforms were also included, such as broadening the powers of the governors of the seven regions of Lebanon, and an increase in the local participation of the people in the administration of their regions and localities. The Document envisioned also the creation of a Senate with limited powers, and a constitutional council for the explication of the Constitution and for watching over the constitutionality of the laws. On the national identity of Lebanon, the Document stated clearly that Lebanon was an Arab country by identity and affiliation, and that the state embodied this principle in every aspect without exception.

The question of sovereignty of the country was dealt with within the context of the Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon and the usurpation of the powers and authority of the State by the militias. The Document requested the
implementation of the Security Council Resolution number 425 of March 1978, and other resolutions related to the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

A further provision in the Document was the implementation of a security plan in Lebanon in which all militias were to be disbanded within six months following the election of a new president, and the formation of a new government and the endorsement of the political reforms by the parliament. The Syrian troops in Lebanon would continue assisting the government in keeping law and order for up to two years from the day of endorsement of the reforms by the constitutional bodies. At the end of this period, the Governments of Lebanon and Syria would decide to redeploy the Syrian troops to the Beq'a valley in eastern Lebanon and the adjacent areas if necessary. Both governments would also negotiate the size of forces and period of their stay in the above areas as well as their relations with the Lebanese authority.

The relations between Lebanon and Syria were portrayed in the Document as "distinctive", acquiring their strength from kinship, history and common strategic interests. These relations should be nurtured in cooperation and coordination between the two countries within the context of mutual respect for the sovereignty, unity and security of each country.89

V The Conflict Resolution Process

At the invitation of the Tripartite Arab Committee the Lebanese parliamentarians met on 30 September 1989 in the Saudi Arabian resort town of al-Taif to deliberate over the draft Document of National Reconciliation. The meeting was attended by sixty-two deputies (thirty-one Christians and thirty-one Moslems) out of seventy-two remaining able-bodied members of a ninety-nine-seat parliament whose mandate resided in the 1972 elections. The meetings were chaired by Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister. At the opening session, prince Saud read a message from King Fahd to the conferees, urging them to discuss the provisions of the Document in a spirit of cooperation and amicable understanding.90 It took the parliamentarians three weeks of intensive, heated, and often broken negotiations to agree on the draft Document. Finally, on 22 October 1989, they agreed on the Document with some minor amendments. The issue of Lebanon's sovereignty consumed most of the conference's time and efforts as well as the skill of the mediators before a compromise formula was accepted. Fifty-eight out of sixty-two parliamentarians voted in favour of the new "national charter that would divide political power equally between Moslems and the long-dominant Christians and take other steps to eliminate many of the causes of fifteen years of civil war."91
Before their departure to al-Taif, the Christian deputies, in particular those associated with the Status Quo Coalition, had promised General Aoun to apply themselves to the task of trading-off concessions on political reform for the Syrian troops' withdrawal from Lebanon, or at least secure a confirmed timetable for their withdrawal.\textsuperscript{92} This was not achieved as intended and "...the agreement was, to a great extent, facilitated by the cooperation of Lebanon's Maronite leaders, most notably Georges Sa'ade, the leader of the Phalanges party".\textsuperscript{93} The conclusion of the agreement changed the environment among the negotiating parties, their supporters and the majority of the Lebanese population drastically. Tension subsided, hostilities ceased and cooperation replaced confrontation between the majority of the conflict groups. The participants in the resolution process started looking forward to implement the provisions of the Accord in a spirit of cooperation and understanding.

VI The Conflict Environment After the Taif Accord

Following the agreement on the Document, the Tripartite Committee called on the Lebanese Parliament to meet as early as November to ratify it and elect a new president of the Republic. The Parliament met on 5 November 1989 in the Northern town of Qlai'at, instead of Beirut, to avoid intimidation by General Aoun, who a few days earlier, dissolved the parliament as a punishment to the deputies for their approval of the Taif Accord, and as a means to subvert the election process. The legislators elected their colleague Rene Mouawad as President of the Republic, endorsed the Taif Accord and re-elected Mr Husein al-Huseini as Speaker of the House of Representatives for a period of four years. On 13 November, President Mouawad invited Dr. Salim al-Hoss to form a government of national reconciliation as stipulated in the Taif Accord.

President Mouawad was assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb on 22 November. Two days later the Parliament met again, outside the capital, and elected deputy Elias al-Hrawi as his successor. Al-Hoss formed a new government of national reconciliation that included representatives of the two main confessional blocs.

General Aoun condemned and rejected vehemently the Taif accord for failing to include a provision on a scheduled withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. He declared: "This solution is a trap to all Lebanese regardless of their sects because it is nothing more than submission to Syria's will under cover of solving the Lebanese crisis."\textsuperscript{94} His objections were not limited to the Syrian presence in the country only, but included the issue of political reforms as well. He glibly declared: "this plan will lead us to hell."\textsuperscript{95}
The Christian deputies who approved the agreement rationalised that "...to reject the Accord would have meant the return to a state of war and we cannot take on ourselves that kind of responsibility." Dr. Salim al-Hoss, Prime Minister of the existing civilian government, observed that, "...there is no substitute for this agreement except suicide."

General Aoun escalated his opposition to the Accord. He mounted a campaign of terror against the Christian deputies who lived in areas under his jurisdiction. They had chosen not to return to their homes for fear of persecution. Even the Maronite Patriarch was not spared. He was subjected to scathing harassment from Aoun's followers because he declined to declare his opposition to the Accord. Aoun demanded the same thing from Samir Geagea, Leader of the Lebanese Forces, who in turn refused to comply with the request because he had already given his tacit approval to the Accord. The environment in the Christian enclave became intolerably tense. Shortly after that, armed clashes broke out between the well equipped forces of Geagea and Aoun, and developed into a full fledged armed confrontation that left more than eight hundred persons killed and two thousand five hundred wounded, and caused extensive damage to the infrastructure in the Christian enclave.

Aoun's intransigence and the pressure he exerted on the Christian partners in the Accord to abandon it, stalled the peace process. The Parliament could not muster a quorum to approve the amendments as stipulated by the Accord. In July, the government called on General Aoun to reconsider his position, relinquish his hold on the army, either to join the cabinet or to go into the opposition from within the system. He refused the offer as well as all other mediation attempts, especially those by the French and Vatican sources, to resolve the impasse. The Parliament finally managed to meet in August 1990, and passed the amendments to the Constitution in accordance with the Taif Accord. With the passing of these amendments, President al-Hrawi declared the birth of Lebanon's second republic.

Aoun remained adamantly opposed to all efforts of mediation and reconciliation, although he was, by now, completely isolated internally and internationally, with the exception of his open channels to Iraq. Finally, on 13 October 1990, the Lebanese Army, now under its new Commander-in-Chief, General Emile Lahoud, with the help of the Syrian troops and air force, bombed Aoun out of his headquarters in the presidential palace at Ba'abda. He escaped to the nearby French Embassy where he sought, and was granted, political asylum. He called on his faction of the army to surrender and obey the orders of General Lahoud. His faction of the army immediately declared loyalty to the new Commander and was
reunited with the main army corps. The capital city of Beirut and all government institutions on either side of the Green line were subsequently reunited.

VII The Taif Accord and the Issues of Conflict

The Taif Accord appears to have succeeded as an instrument for resolving the conflict. This brings up the obvious question of why did it succeed? Furthermore, it is appropriate to go beyond this question and ask what are the criteria by which success can be measured. Has it served ends other than individual communal interests, or the ends of peace, justice, equality and stability?

For the Accord to be judged as a success, it is not enough to establish that it brought the most violent aspects of inter and intra communal war to an end. There are more profound criteria to take into consideration. One needs to answer four questions. With the signing of this Accord, has the probability of war between the conflict groups been increased, diminished or eliminated? What has been the effect of the Accord on the authority status of the conflict groups? Have the underlying causes of the conflict been eliminated or at least rendered dormant over the short and long term? Finally, has the Accord contributed to the techniques and theory of conflict resolution?

An assessment of the success or failure of the Taif Accord vis-a-vis these four criteria is based on inferences and deductions obtained from its resolution of the three main issues of conflict, that is, political reform, national identity and sovereignty of the country as indicated in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1: Conflict Issues and Their Degree of Contribution to the Criteria of Success of The Taif Accord as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism

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<th>Political Reform</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Sovereignty of Lebanon</th>
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<tr>
<td>Probability of War</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
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<td>Authority Status of</td>
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<td>Communities</td>
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<td>Underlying Causes of</td>
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<td>Conflict</td>
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In examining these three issues in the light of four criteria the following conclusions can be drawn.
A  Political Reform and the Probability of War

The Accord brought together a set of political reforms which appeased and propitiated the Reformist Camp. The new power-sharing arrangement which gives the Moslems equal share in the country's political and social structure seemed to be acceptable to the major parties in both camps, but not without remonstrances. The new arrangement reflected to a certain extent the new demographic realities of Lebanon, which had stirred the Maronites' anxiety. Any demographic changes in the country are no support to their inveterate status as a dominant community. The power-sharing formula of the National Pact was accepted by them on the tacit understanding that the domestic demographic elements were not built into it.

By the same token, the Shi'a spiritual and temporal leadership, which accepted the Accord as an "out of necessity settlement", felt that its power was not reflected sufficiently in the new political formula as envisaged by the Accord. Its claims on the system were still unsatisfied and the newly designed mechanism had not pacified them. Other communities which shared similar feelings expressed their concern over a number of issues, most prominent of which were those related to their security requirements and authority status. The Taif Accord re-arranged the political power distribution of the 1943 National Pact. It enabled the Moslem component of the Lebanese society to secure for itself an expanding role in the political decision-making process at the expense of a shrinking Christian role.

Some critics may find in the Accord a moderate adjustment to the 1943 National Pact. This was shown in the slight increase of the Moslem share in the power structure, from a ratio of 5:6 to a ratio of 6:6. It is also claimed that the Accord resembled President Frangie's Constitutional Document of 1976. Assuming that this is the case, the National Pact and the Document's apportionment of the top administrative posts were changed under the Taif Accord. The allocation of certain posts to specific communities was abolished under the Accord.100 This ultimately will lead to a loosening of the grip of the Maronites and the Sunnis on some positions of authority.

B  National Identity and the Probability of War

The Accord endorsed, in unequivocal terms, what the elite of both communities earlier had agreed upon: that Lebanon is an Arab state by identity and by affiliation. Yet the Maronite masses and intelligentsia disavowed themselves from this dictum, attributing their roots to a Phoenician rather than Arab origin. This issue may not in
itself be a direct cause of open violent conflict; at the same time, it does not diminish or eliminate the probability of war. It may trigger some other issues which could start a chain reaction leading to tension-building and conflict-sustenance.

C Sovereignty of Lebanon and the Probability of War

The Taif Accord is strikingly explicit on the question of the sovereignty of Lebanon. This featured as article number one in the Accord: Lebanon is an independent and sovereign country. The Document referred to the Israeli occupation of parts of southern Lebanon as a flagrant breach of the country's sovereignty (section 3 entitled the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation). It did not say much about the presence of the Syrian forces in Lebanon- an issue of major concern to the Status Quo Coalition, particularly the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party, General Aoun, and to a certain degree, the Phalanges party.

Consequently, the Reformist Camp impassionately rejected the Coalition's interpretation of Syria's role in Lebanon and refused to equate the Syrian presence in the country with the Israeli occupation of the self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, it argued that the Syrian troops were in the country at the invitation of the Lebanese legal authorities. Above and beyond that, it maintained that Syria is a sister country whereas Israel is an enemy, and Israeli forces occupied parts of Lebanon by the use of force.

The Accord failed to make a firm commitment on the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanese territory, except a phased withdrawal from Beirut and its environ, within two years following the endorsement of the political reforms by the parliament. Moreover, the Accord singled out Syria, from among the Arab countries, for its "distinctive" relations with Lebanon, and requested that this distinctiveness be embodied in bilateral agreements between the two countries (section 4 of the Accord). This particular clause strengthened the radical Maronites' suspicion of Syria's design on Lebanon. They insisted on a complete and total withdrawal of the Syrian troops from all of Lebanon. Since the elites of the Coalition parties have already accepted, most probably temporarily, the presence of Syrian troops in the country, it is likely that a condition may arise in the not-so-distant future when this issue might resurface and become a subject of acute conflict between the two Camps. Aoun supporters and the Lebanese Forces as well as the Maronites' grass roots have not given it up. When the time comes they will thrust this issue back into political debate.
VIII Implications of the Resolution of the Basic Issues on the Authority Status of the Conflict Parties

A Political Reform and Authority Status

Have the approved political reforms affected the authority status of the conflict groups and their respective communities within the authority structure of the state and in the society at large? The answer to this question resides in the domain of the structural relations within and between the conflict groups themselves, and between them and the state.

1 Relations Within the Conflict Groups

Within each community, antipathy towards the militias developed in conjunction with the Militias’ growth in power and the expansion of their authority. However no effective alternative leadership structure emerged to countervail the assertive political and military role of the Militias. In the Status Quo Coalition there is virtually only one bona fide militia: the Lebanese Forces. In the Reformist Camp, there are numerous militias and armed groups, but the most effective ones are: the Shi’a militias of Amal and the Hezbollah, the mainly Druze Progressive Socialist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Ba’ath, and the Communist parties. The Shi’a and Druze Militias are in the forefront as far as actual military and political presence is concerned. However, the militia solidarity and cohesion started to wane as far back as the 1980s. This phenomenon was due to loss of group feeling on which the military power was built. Around that time the Shi’a community was divided in its support and loyalty between the secular movement of Amal and the religiously oriented Hezbollah. Conflict between the two for the control of their community had been violent and costly. The Druze and Shi’a Amal Militias clashed over the control of west Beirut. Amal attacked the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and southern Lebanon. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party was split into two factions, as were the Communists.

The Militias of the Status Quo Coalition were not spared the infighting that plagued the Militias of the other side. The Lebanese Forces attacked and eliminated the Militia of the National Liberal Party. They were also accused of massacring the leader of the Marada Militia, Tony Frangie and his family, in his home town, Ehden. The predominantly Maronite Aoun faction of the Army fought a devastating battle with the Lebanese Forces.

A dialectical relation had developed between the Militias and the inter-communal conflict. In order to survive the Militias had to perpetuate the conflict which
provided them with power and material rewards. They weakened state authority and presented themselves as a persuasive alternative state. Their rationale was that since the state functions had withered away, they had to take over those functions that are vital for the survival of the population.

The Lebanese Forces Militia had developed a semi-state structure as far as services to the community were concerned. They introduced a rudimentary type of welfare system for their adherents and turned their Militia into a regular army-like structure. The other two main Militias, Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party, were not able to match the Lebanese Forces with their services but, nevertheless, developed an organisational structure that perpetuated their existence for the whole conflict life cycle.

A basic component of the reforms envisaged by the Taif Accord was the disbanding of the militias within six months of the resumption of state authority (Section II of the Accord). This provision created a favourable atmosphere within the communities themselves and reflected positively on inter-communal relations, but was reluctantly accepted by the Militia leadership.

2 Relations Between the Conflict Groups

The combined Moslem Communities' authority status was enhanced by the increase in their share of power. Conversely the Christians', in particular the Maronites', authority status was diminished and diffused throughout the state hierarchy. The release of the top authority positions from the fetters of confessionalism would loosen the Christians' grip on the highest ranks in the authority hierarchy and allow other communities to rise in power and authority.

The Taif Accord proposed a clearly defined formula for power-sharing based on the existing realities of the evolving social structure of the component communities, but did not provide for any future changes to accommodate new variations in the demographic and socio-political balance of these communities. Failure to foresee and plan for those changes may create similar conflictual conditions in the future.

3 Relations of The Conflict Groups to The Centre of Authority

The Maronite, and to a certain degree, the Sunni communities were seen as encompassing the state much to the estrangement of other communities. The National Pact allowed them to occupy the most influential administrative and political
positions, such as the Presidency of the Republic and the Prime ministership, the Governorship of the Central Bank, the Army command, and other important posts in the administration. On the other hand, communities like the Shi'a felt that they were an antipodal outpost belonging to another part of Lebanon. This situation was remedied, to a certain extent, by the Accord by granting them a bigger portion than what they had of the state rewards. At the same time, it allowed the Sunni Moslems to retain, more or less, the same status position they enjoyed under the National Pact. The Taif Accord has not granted the Druzes any substantial change of status. Their share in the power formula was increased slightly within the general increase allocated to the Moslem group.

**B National Identity and Authority Status**

The issue of Lebanon's national identity, which seemed to have been officially settled by the Accord, was, in fact accepted as a best available preference. The people's affiliation, which had been shaped over the centuries, could hardly be changed by an elite decision taken under the pressure of a package deal. Yet it was an issue of central significance to the mainstream conflict situation since the 1920s.

To the Moslems, and particularly the Sunnis, and to the Greek Orthodox, affiliation to Arabism is not a disorienting exercise, and as such should not be used against them in the loyalty criteria for Lebanon. This means that they could be entrusted with the highest political office in the land. To the Maronites such an affiliation poses a traumatic prospect for their status as well as for their independent existence.

Regardless of its centrality, the identity issue did not gain predominance in the deliberations that led to the conclusion of the Taif Accord. The fact that it had been resolved by the agenda of previous attempts, would make its impact on the authority status of the various communities negligible at best. Lebanon's Arab polices are usually formulated on the basis of a whole matrix of factors. The identity consideration is but one of them.

**C The Sovereignty of Lebanon and Authority Status**

Each one of the two Camps was at variance with the other over what constituted a breach of sovereignty of the country, but none of them claimed the authority to define it. Each one had its own perceptions and tried to explain the concept of sovereignty and its breach accordingly. However, it is well known that both Camps tried to augment their authority status by soliciting the support of foreign powers. The Reformist Camp turned to Syria and some other Arab countries for help,
and the Status Quo Coalition turned to some European countries, Israel and Iraq for the same purpose.

The Accord pin-pointed Israel as the source of breach of Lebanon's sovereignty. Conversely, it called on the Syrian authorities to help maintain law and order in the country until Lebanon's own forces are rebuilt and become ready to take over this function. The effect of this on the conflict parties was considerable, since the whole issue of foreign interference could tip the domestic balance of power and enhance the authority status of either Camp, or community to the detriment of the other.

IX The Resolution of the Basic Issues and its implications for the Underlying Causes of the Conflict

A Political Reform And The Underlying Causes of The Conflict

Political reform is a cornerstone in the conflict resolution process. As a matter of fact, the Taif Accord is mainly about reforming the political system, a demand vital to the Reformist Camp and perturbing to the Status Quo Coalition. The reform package as envisaged by the Accord had been assessed by "many Christians as a half-hidden attempt to return to the days of the Maronite-Sunni alliance"101, a situation rendered implausible by the increased demographic Shi'a power. The reforms did not satisfy every party but were acceptable to all. The Reformist Camp accepted it on the understanding that it constituted an interim useful settlement and a means to end the war, which might usher a new era of peace and stability in the country and bring tranquillity to its exhausted and war-weary communities. This could be a situation that may eventually lead to better conditions for lifting their stakes in the future.

B National Identity And The Underlying Causes of The Conflict

The issue of National Identity of Lebanon was resolved at the elite level. However, this issue lost much of its power as a determinant factor in the conflict situation due to a change in the regional environment and its implication for the domestic politics. The present regional variables, unlike those of the 1940s and earlier, created a situation in which the concept of Arabism regressed from a notion of common Arab will into a concept of expediency of the individual Arab states.

Since the demise of Gamal Abdul-Naser in the early 1970s, the Arab masses turned from a belief in the super legitimacy of the collective Arab will to a belief in the legitimacy of the state. Coser explains this phenomenon by pointing out that if a
conflict group fights for an ideology or supernational cause, then the conflict is likely to be intense and violent.\textsuperscript{102}

The Moslems' tendency to affiliate with the world of Arabdom has been overshadowed by their evolving allegiance to Lebanon, and thus has given the Christians some peace of mind as to the future of an independent and sovereign country. In spite of this, the intelligentsia of both camps, who tacitly disagree, might cause this issue to surface again and play a contributory role in any future communal conflict.

C The Sovereignty of Lebanon and the Underlying Causes of the Conflict

The threat to, and actual breach of, Lebanon's sovereignty created an atmosphere of consternation and apprehension among the Lebanese. According to Haddad, the violation of the country's integrity came from the armed Palestinians in Lebanon, the Israelis, the Syrians, and other external powers which extended a helping hand to the warring factions. Haddad depicts Lebanese sovereignty as a victim of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the clash between Lebanon's western orientation and its Arab ties, the growing Palestinian militancy, and the Syrian ambivalent designs. "What sets the Lebanese case apart is the regularity of foreign intrusion....the continuity of foreign physical control of the national territory, and the openness with which Lebanese nationals accept the intervention of various non-Lebanese in Lebanon."\textsuperscript{103}

Lebanon's breached sovereignty is quite a significant problem in itself, but equally important is the perception of the various conflict groups of what constitutes a breach of sovereignty. Their definition of it differs and, therefore, their acceptance or rejection of it depends on their perception. As we have seen earlier, the Syrian presence in Lebanon is not a breach of its sovereignty to the Reformist Camp but it is very much so to the Status Quo Coalition. It could be stated that their position on this issue is derived mainly from their perceived interests rather than from the provisions of international law. As long as they have contradictory demands on the system, foreign intervention would be sought by the weaker party, an act which, as experience has demonstrated, would elicit a reaction in kind from the rival party.

Events of the last sixteen years have revealed that foreign intervention and the violation of Lebanon's sovereignty were crucial factors in the intensity and violence of the conflict and its resolution. At a certain stage, the Status Quo Coalition agreed to discuss the issue of political reform but only after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops
from Lebanon. The Reformist Camp rejected the condition for fear of losing the
leverage if Syria withdrew before the settlement of this issue. They put equal
demands on the Lebanese Forces Militias to sever their relations with Israel before
they will accede to any dialogue with them.

The Taif Accord's formula on Lebanon's sovereignty seems to have addressed
the problem in the short term. It will remain a source of conflict as long as national
unity and its corollary of a shared value system is not attained, and as long as the
state authority remains weak. However, the problem is tied up to a constellation of
regional and international circumstances. This does not relegate to irrelevance the
structural factors inherent in Lebanese society which give rise to opportunities for
foreign intrusion and domestic erosion of the state authority.

The "distinctive" relations between Lebanon and Syria is not a new topic.
What is new is the association of this concept with the Syrian military presence in the
country and its support of the Reformist Camp. The Accord laid down the conditions
for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and defined clearly the points at which the
interests of both countries meet.

An area of considerable bearing on the conflict was omitted from the Accord,
that is, the Lebanese-Palestinian relations. As noted earlier, these relations were,
before and at the early stages of the conflict, a core issue in inter-communal relations.
The Palestinian armed resistance played a contributory factor in the conflict.
However, towards the end of the conflict's life cycle, its input into the conflict process
receded. Since the forced departure of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, it ceased to
be a factor of any significance in the over all conflict situation. Nevertheless, the
Accord, being a mechanism for the resolution of Lebanon's internal problems,
included the Resistance in its provision for the disarming and disbanding of Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias.

X Conclusion

The Taif Accord is a successful attempt at resolving the Lebanese conflict by
restoring consociationalism to the management of its pluralistic structure. The
creation of Lebanon within its existing borders may be seen as an accident of history,
yet it cannot be reversed. Its people have to decide under which system they have to
live.

The divided people of Lebanon were faced in their struggle for national survival
with the question of how to coexist peacefully with each other. Esman suggests two
strategies for this problem. The first is "... to eliminate or reduce pluralism. The
second is to legitimize and manage it." Both approaches were attempts to resolve Lebanon's predicament. The first strategy was utilized by the conflict groups themselves during the war, but failed. The second was a government designed strategy used before and after the war with initial success. Methods suggested under the first option included genocide, expulsion of minorities, partition and assimilation.

Instances of massacres and expulsion were evident throughout the conflict years, but more numerous and widespread during the early stages of the conflict. The Lebanese Front militiamen massacred, in August, 1976, Palestinian and Lebanese inhabitants of the Tel al-Za'atar refugee camp, and of the Nab'a and Karantina slum areas. About 2500 persons were reported to have died defending these areas. In retaliation, the Palestinians and their Moslem and Druze allies overran the Christian coastal town of Damour and the neighbouring village of Na'ame. Their inhabitants were either murdered or evacuated. The survivors of Tel al-Za'atar were installed in these two villages.

Following the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in March, 1977, his Druze followers retaliated by murdering more than one hundred Christian inhabitants in the Chouf area. Perhaps one of the most violent days in the whole war epoch was a Saturday in December 1975, when Christian militiamen set up roadblocks in their areas in east Beirut and pulled Moslems out of their cars and murdered them on the spot. "At least 300 Muslims were butchered in this way; an equal number of Christians probably met the same fate." The massacres of Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila, following the death of president elect Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, remains a most notorious incident of mass killing in the whole war period.

Instances of massacres were also evident in the power struggle for the control of the Maronite community. In a surprise onslaught, the Lebanese Forces under Bashir Gemayel, annihilated the militia of the National Liberal Party, the Tigers.

Expulsion of unwanted minorities was also practiced by the conflict parties. Serious outbreaks against the Moslems in eastern Beirut, and against Christians in the Chouf district and eastern Sidon, resulted in the flight of minorities to safer areas. Expulsion on political and ideological grounds took place also in north Lebanon, whereby members of the Phalanges party and Lebanese Forces militia were expelled from the Zghorta district as a result of the murder of Tony Frangie by the Phalanges militias.
Partition as a strategy of eliminating pluralism was also contemplated by the leaders of the Lebanese Front, but abandoned in the face of mounting pressures from the opposite parties and the Arab countries as well as from lack of support from the international community. This attempt was, at a later stage of the conflict, replaced by a call for a federative system of government in Lebanon. This attempt also failed but remained a deferred option on the agenda of the Lebanese forces and their sympathizers.

Other methods suggested by Esman to eliminate or reduce pluralism, such as assimilation and acculturation, may have been pursued, with a certain degree of success, in other Middle Eastern countries, but proved to be inapplicable to the Lebanese model of pluralism. Religious differences and sectarian loyalties and solidarities constituted a barrier to crossing the communal boundaries. Moreover, none of the component communities could claim to be a sufficient majority in the country to be entitled to set the appropriate norms. However, the Maronites perceived themselves as the most authoritative representatives of a Lebanese ethos and they encouraged acculturation and assimilation into their own perception of a "Lebanese political order".

These methods of eliminating or reducing pluralism failed in Lebanon. They intensified the conflict and increased the cleavages between the communities. The alternative strategy of dealing with pluralism is to manage and control it. This was the Government's option. Esman suggested that such a strategy could be implemented through four different venues: allegiance to the state, consociational policies, regional autonomy of ethnic minorities, and religious and cultural autonomy of the component communities. There is enough evidence to suggest that Lebanon utilized, with a considerable degree of initial success, consociationalism and cultural diversity as a method of managing its pluralist structure.

Allegiance to the State and its institutions was a long term aim of the National Pact. However it was not achieved for two main reasons. The first is that the State had recognized sectarian pluralism and granted the various component sects control over their own affairs, mainly in the area of personal status matters. Individuals, in this case, could not transcend their sectarian allegiance to that of the State. The second is that the State itself, and some of its major institutions, such as the army, could not maintain neutrality among the various sects. For much of the conflict years, the army was seen by the Moslems as a defender of the Christian sects in the country.
The architects of the Taif Accord were well aware of the saliency of sectarian loyalties. They tried to restore to the State the allegiance it lost to the sects, by restoring equilibrium to the state structure and neutrality to its institutions. In his attempt to persuade the Maronite Patriarch to support the Accord, Husein al-Huseini, Speaker of the House of Representatives and godfather of the Accord, argued that the outcome of the meeting of the Lebanese parliamentarians in the city of Taif was not a zero-sum result, and that the Accord "... will not take away powers from one community and give it to the rival community. All communities will make concessions to the State and its institutions." 113

Consociational policies were the corner stone of Lebanon's political order particularly since independence. They were adopted in the National Pact formula, upgraded by the Chehab regime in the early 1960s, but collapsed at the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. The Taif Accord resurrected the concept of consociationalism and reintroduced it into the states' ethnopolitics. Consociational policies succeeded in incorporating every sect into the state institutions according to a specified formula of communal representation.

In conclusion, the Taif Accord terminated the immediate hostilities, and restored to the social structure, for the time being, its tranquillity by restoring legitimacy to the concept of pluralism and efficiency to consociational management. However it fell short of providing an all inclusive conflict resolution mechanism to Lebanon's sectarian loyalties. Although it acknowledged the necessity of phasing it out in stages, the Accord retained confessionalism as a foundation of communal relations. This remains a core issue with significant implications for the political system. If unresolved Lebanon will remain in the danger zone of repeated episodes of conflict. A solution to this aspect of communal relations needs to be sought outside the Taif concept of conflict resolution. We may have to search for it in a welfare-state concept whereby the individual associates himself with the state rather than with his sect. In this case, the state rather than the sect, the family or the feudal lord would be able to provide for all his needs. In other words, the state needs to liberate the individual from his or her sectarian subservience and commitments as a first step towards the establishment of an appropriate social and political order.

The conflict process, as well as its Taif resolution, revealed that the underlying causes of the conflict in Lebanon were generated by the social structure, and the conflict itself was about positions of authority and access to government rewards. The determining factors were social and political in nature rather than economic. The civil war was not a class struggle prompted by economic determinants, but was a power struggle between communities and within them.
It remained to be stressed that in the beginning we posed the question of what were the causes of the conflict, what was the relevant theoretical framework to analyse them, and what was the most appropriate method for resolving the conflict. We have demonstrated that the main causes of the conflict lie in the social structure. We accepted Marx's argument of the structural basis of the conflict but rejected his interpretation of class struggle and economic determinism in the conflict process. Instead we have made the argument that Dahrendorf's notion of political determinism and Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiya are determining factors in the rise and fall of states and that they give an adequate interpretation of the conflict in Lebanon.

The resolution of the conflict became possible when it addressed the problem of power and authority in the social structure, that is, when it restored balance to communal entitlement and recognized the deep cleavages resulting from asabiya consciousness. This was achieved through a revived consociational remedy to a pluralist social structure. However, the redistribution of power between the various component communities is governed by a multiplicity of factors that are subject to change.

We have argued that the Taif Accord, among the numerous attempts to resolve the Lebanese conflict, has been the most successful so far. It has taken into account those factors which have largely been responsible for the perpetuation of conflict in Lebanon.
CHAPTER SIX

END NOTES


3  Nabih Berri advocated the Shi'a leadership demand for a rotating collective presidency, and a new census which would ultimately change the demographic picture of the country and put the Shi'a population in the forefront.


7  "Text of a Document issued by the Islamic Council of Lebanon, 3.10.1974," Ibid., p. 509. The Moslems and particularly the Sunnis rejected the proposal of complete secularization of future Lebanon on the grounds that it a) calls for a separation of the State from religion whereas Islam is a comprehensive order that includes both the State and religion, and b) it legalized intersectarian marriage. See Husein al-Qouwatly, "Islam and Governance," in the as-Safir newspaper (Beirut) 18.Sep.,1975. The "Ulama Council in Lebanon" expressed the view that the call for secularization conceals an invitation to a) the erosion of the Islamic personality in Lebanon by means of sectarian intermarriage, b) encourage the emergence of a hybrid generation to destabilize the Islamic family relations, c) destroy the only protection moslems have against assimilation, and d) transfer the Moslem society in Lebanon into a Scandinavian style society. See the statement entitled "Islam and Secularization" issued by the Council of Ulama in Lebanon, al-Anwar newspaper (Beirut) 25 March, 1976. For a non partisan view of confessionalism and Secularization in Lebanon see Dr. Edmund Rabbat, "A Paper on Confessionalism and Secularization in Lebanon, 12.11.1975," in Chronicles, vol 5, pp. 208-213; and Dr. Sobhi al-Mahmasani "Observation on Secularization," raised to the National dialogue body. Ibid., pp. 213-216

8  On numerous occasions the Vice President of the Moslem Shi'a Supreme Council, Sheikh Mouhammad Mehdi Shamsuddine, and Mr Nabih Berri the leader of Amal Movement declared their disappointment with the Representation Formula of the National Pact. Shamsuddine believes "... that the Formula failed because it is unjust, debauched and it is a sin to abide by it. It destroys the Maronite community as well as Lebanon." Panorama of Events, no. 45 (November 1987), p. 141 Item no. 42, and page 216 Item no. 401. Berri annotated Shamsuddine's convictions by adding that the 1943 Formula is not only unjust but a "...form of a Christian Republic in Lebanon, even a Maronite Republic..." Ibid., p. 206, Item no. 354.


10  Ibid., pp. 527-531; and Chronicles, vol. 4, pp. 126-128.
In a memo dated 31.10.1983, raised to the National Dialogue Conference during its first meetings in Geneva, from 31 October to 4 November, 1983. The interlocutors were: Former presidents Camille Chamoun and Suleiman Frangie, Saeb Salem, Rashid Karame, Pierre Gemayel, Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, and the President of the Republic, Amine Gemayel as moderator. It is worth noting also that the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Abdul Halim Khaddam and Saudi Arabian Minister of State, Sheikh Mohammad Ibrahim al-Masoud, attended the meetings as observers. See *Lebanon; the cause*, pp. 575-580.


*Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 213-216.

A draft working paper of the Islamic Conference published in the newspapers of November 15, 1976, in *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 97.

From a speech by Pierre Gemayel, President of the Lebanese Phalanges Party, on December 24, 1975, in *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 230.

See the Document "Lebanese Expectations," issued by the council of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops, on December 8, 1983, and the reply of Dr Salim al-Hoss, Prime Minister of Lebanon, in *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 147-151. The Catholic Bishops stated in the above document that "the so-called privileges are not in fact privileges. They were guarantees accepted by everyone and a means to appease the frightened community from the domination of a neighbouring majority," in *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 147-50.

The Lebanese National Movement Program of 18 August, 1975, in *Lebanon; the cause*, p. 554.

The final draft of a program for the settlement of the conflict in Lebanon announced by the Vice President of the Phalanges Party on 18.7.1984, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 454.


The Declaration of the Permanent Conference of the Lebanese Order of Monks, held on October 8, 1975, *Chronicles*, vol. 5, p. 219.


Memorandum of the Lebanese Research Committee of the Congress of the Lebanese Order of Monks (in Arabic) (Beirut: 3 November, 1975).

See Memorandum prepared by the Lebanese Research Committee with regard to reforming the general state of affairs within the context of the existing Lebanese Formula. (In Arabic) (Beirut: 11 December, 1975).

The Constitution of the Maronite International Federation that was approved by the International Maronite Conference held in New York from 8 to 11 October 1980, maintains that its fourth objective is "to safeguard Lebanon and consider it the homeland of the Maronites and the mother country for the Maronite emigrants, and affirms the distinctiveness, national identity, and particularistic character of Lebanon as well as its cultural diversiy. Moreover it is the seat of the Maronite Church". See Antoine Khoweiry, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
See Memorandum of the Political Sub-Committee of the Conference of Lebanese Research in regard to Four possible Formulae for the Building of a new Lebanon (in Arabic) (Beirut, October 1976).


The Lebanese Forces' proposals for the transformation of Lebanon into a Federal State, (in Arabic), al-Telegraph (Sydney) 10 January, 1990.


The series of "the Lebanese Cause" issued by the Political Committee of the Conference of the Order of Monks, no. 7 (Keslik, Lebanon, 1976).

"The Federal State and the Political Sharing Order," issued by the Political Subcommittee of Lebanese Research, in October, 1976, Chronicles, vol. 4, pp. 81-84.


Ibid., pp. 161-165.

As reported in al-Telegraph (Sydney) 10 January and 26 February 1990.


An-Nahar (Beirut), 8 January, 1990.


Yahya Ahmed al-Ka'ki, op. cit., p. 112-114.


Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, 1979), p. 146.


Walid Khalidi, op. cit., p. 146.


This notion was propagated for the first time by Tannous al-Chidyaq in the middle of the 19th century, but was refuted by the contemporary historian, Kamal Salibi, who argued that the original birth place of the Maronites was the Yemen. See Kamal Salibi, "Tribal Origins of the Religious Sects in the Arab East," in Halim Barakat, Toward a Viable Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 15-26.

50 Walid Khalidi, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

51 David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

52 In their communiqué issued on October 17, 1983, the leaders of the Greek Orthodox sect declared that Lebanon’s Arab affiliation (*intima*) is a permanent truth. *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 145.


54 Articles 9, 10 and 95 of the 1926 Constitution.

55 See *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 232-234.

56 For the criticism of the Maronite intelligentsia of this aspect of the Constitutional Document, see *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 235-252.

57 See the minutes of the meetings in *Chronicles*, vol. 5, pp. 237-483.


59 See the full text of the Taif Accord in Annex.

60 "The Existing Lebanese Reality and the Lebanese Monks’ View of it," in *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 8.

61 The Memorandum of the Lebanese Front delivered to the various world personalities who visited Lebanon in the first half of 1977, among them were Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State in the U.S. Administration, Louis Dagarengou, French Foreign Minister, and Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations. It is entitled "the Lebanon we want". It stated that the new Lebanon they would want to build ought to "allocate Christianity a distinctive presence in it and to grant it societal, cultural and spiritual autonomy, which would enable it establish organic permanent relations with the sources of thought and spirituality in the Christian world." Lebanon as they understood it "is the homeland of all Christians who are living in the surrounding Moslem world," *Chronicles*, vol. 1, pp. 212 and 213; See also Antoine Khoweiri, *Hawadith Lubnan 1979*, vol. 7, 1981, p. 171. In his address on April 11, 1981, to the besieged Lebanese forces militias in Zahle, eastern Lebanon, Bashir Gamayel indicated to them that in their steadfastness they were defending ". . .the Christian identity of Lebanon". *Al-Telegraph* (Sydney), 15 October, 1990.

62 The final communiqué of the Maronite Congress held at Bkirkie on 31 January, 1984. See *Chronicles*, vol. 4, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

63 The Declaration of the Lebanese Front on 23 December 1980, entitled "What sort of Lebanon do we want?" it was stated in this declaration that the Front "rejects every attempt to melt Lebanon in its environment." "The borders of Lebanon we want is its present borders. Since Christianity...we enjoyed a continuously free existence in Lebanon. We would want to see in a new Lebanon, a free and secure Christianity, master of its values and fate. This freedom ought not be subject to demographic or political changes." *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 336.


65 The Maronite Patriarch contended that "...the primary cause for Lebanon's tragedies is the dense and armed Palastinian presence on its territory". See the Patriarch's Memorandum to the Council of Bishops in the Vatican on 6 October, 1983. *Chronicles*, vol. 1, p. 275.
The Syrian Army entered Lebanon on 31 May, 1976, at the request of the then President of the Republic, Suleiman Frangie. See the Minutes of the second session of the Geneva National Dialogue Conference of 31 October 1983, in which former President Frangie stated, unequivocally, that his government requested from Syria to intervene. Here is a translated excerpt of the relevant paragraph:

"Frangie - I would like to correct the information of President Chamoun and tell him ...and President Chamoun was a member of the government when we requested the intervention of the Syrians."

Karamé: "Official Lebanon, at the time when President Chamoun was the Minister of Interior, was the one who requested the intervention following the 1975 sectarian battles." See Chronicles, vol. 5, p. 267. The Status Quo Coalition denied that there was an official request for the intervention of Syria. They intensified their attack on the Syrian presence in the country. In the late 1980s they referred to the Syrian troops as forces of occupation.

On September 1st 1983, President Amine Gemayel sent to President Hafez al-Assad of Syria a formal letter requesting him to withdraw the Syrian troops from Lebanon. The letter was never made public. It is classified material in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beirut. A similar letter was sent by the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Elie Salem, to the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, on September 1, 1983, in which he explicitly requested the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon, a declaration of withdrawal of all non-Lebanese armed forces from the country, a declaration of the permanent freezing of Palestinian activity in Lebanon and across its borders, the termination of the armed presence of the Palestinian Organizations in the country, and a declaration of the termination of the mission of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. (Syrian Army). See Chronicles, vol. 1, p. 255. Since then the Syrian presence in Lebanon became a target for the Status Quo Coalition and an ongoing problem that led in 1989 to a declaration of war on Syria by the former commander of the Lebanese Army, General Michel Aoun.


See endnote no. 66.

Arab League Decisions, nos. 3456 and 3457, dated 9 and 10 June 1976., in Lebanon; the cause, pp. 207-208.

Wadi Haddad, op. cit., p. 39.

Ibid., p. 40.

Ibid., p. 40.

For the full text of the Constitutional Document see Chronicles, vol. 4, pp. 232-234.

Waild Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 53.


In early March 1976, a Moslem Lieutenant, Ahmed al-Khatib, led a group of insurgent soldiers and seized a number of army barracks, leading to the first split in the army along sectarian lines.

For the full text of the document. see Chronicles, vol. 4, pp. 334-335.


84 For comments on the role played by the Syrian Government in brokering and endorsing the Agreement see the interview with former president of the Republic, Amine Gamayel, in Al-Telegraph (Sydney), 7 March, 1991, p. 5.

85 Sheikh Mohamad Mehdi Shamsuddine, the Vice President of the Islamic Shi'a Superior Council, declared on 10 January 1980, that "we did not approve the Tripartite Agreement which was signed in Damascus on December 27, 1985 and we will not approve of any settlement project." See Panorama of Events, no. 45 (Winter 1987), p.141.


87 Ibid., p. 621

88 In a statement by prince Saud al-Faisal, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, published in the Saudi Arabian newspaper, Al-Yaum 2d ed., (Dammam), 2 October, 1989, p. 1

89 Section "Fourth" of the Taif Accord.


91 Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 24 October, 1989, p. 10

92 Financial Review (Sydney), 20 October, 1989, p. 14

93 The Middle East and North Africa 1991, op. cit., p. 621

94 The Australian (Sydney), 23 October, 1989, p. 8

95 The Age (Melbourne), 24 October, 1989, p. 1

96 The Australian (Sydney), 23 October, 1989, p. 8

97 Ibid., October 25 1989, p. 9


99 Iraq's patronage and support for Aoun is described in details in Sarkis Naoum's book, Michel Aoun: Helm Am Wahm (Michel Aoun: Dream or Fantasy), (Beirut: Published privately, 1992), pp. 181-185.

100 Section II, sub-section G of the Accord.


103 Wadi Haddad, op. cit., p. 34-35.


110 For a detailed description of the massacre see memoirs of Patricia Chamoun, divorcee of Danny Chamoun, the leader of the Tiger Militia, in *al-Bairak* (Sydney), 16 June, 1992, pp. 16-17.


113 *Al-Bairak* (Sydney), 25 September, 1990.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The war in Lebanon came to an end officially with the conclusion of the Taif Accord. Two interrelated basic goals were achieved by this Accord: the termination of hostilities, and the resolution of the three main issues around which the conflict revolved and persisted, namely, political reform, national identity and sovereignty of the state. The resolution of these issues did not necessarily mean that the basic causes of the conflict had been solved, as in principle conflicts are never solved but resolved. It could be legitimately claimed that this episode of conflict was solved but the conflict itself was not. What has been resolved at the Taif Accord is the political aspect of the problem rather than its social origins. The balance of communal power within a consociational system was restored but the underlying causes which may have been dormant, have not been addressed directly. These causes are harboured by the social structure and they will erupt whenever the contradictory societal conditions become salient again.

This study demonstrated that although the conflict in Lebanon have appeared to be of a political nature, in the sense that it involved the State and the exercise of authority as an object of the conflict groups' perception, its underlying causes are social, in the sense that they originated in the social structure, and emanated from its existing contradictions.

I Social Structure or Social Processes

The focal point of this study was not the social structure per se but the social processes, in particular the conflictual tendencies inherent in this structure. Yet the approach is in agreement with conflict theorists such as Marx, Coser and Dahrendorf who postulate that any analytical study of social conflict must "...begin with a consideration of the social structure." Alluding a principal role to social structure in the generation of conflict does not mean that the influence of external factors is relegated to the lower rungs of importance. Nevertheless, the results of this study could not support the argument that the socio-political structure was just a passive recipient of an external stimulant. External factors exacerbated but did not cause the conflict. The dynamism of the conflict process itself and its causal historical antecedents revealed that the social structure was the source of the conflictual tendencies.

The failure of the social structure to regulate these tendencies and to manage their spasmodic nature led to their eruption into a violent and intense inter-communal conflict. The social structure failed also to absorb influences emanating from the changing regional environment. This rigidity in the social structure was challenged by the rising communal consciousness of the less privileged communities and their ascending awareness of their communal entitlements.
Failure of the social structure to respond to the exigencies of change and the emergence of the conflictual tendencies is a two-way relationship. Each one fed on the other. The conflict weakened the social structure to such an extent that social structure could not preclude the eruption of the conflictual tendencies. To analyze the nature of this relationship and the ensuing conflict process, its dynamism and outcome, this study resorted to conflict theory and found in it a relevant conceptual scheme which served the purpose.

The findings of the research were arrived at by analyzing the historicity of the social determinants of the conflict. It was evident that an explanation of the recurrent historical events in the life of the component communities would help elucidate their present power structure. Their conflictual tendencies, being a part of this structure, were the focus of the investigation.

II Theoretical Framework

A conflict theory approach captured the empirical situation under investigation more effectively than a consensus and order approach. It directed the research towards a problem area of social interaction instead of a structure area within which a particular conflict on values, interests and power existed. A structural-functional approach would have missed or ignored the conflictual tendencies, or treated them as a pathological phenomenon in need of cure. Underlying the functionalist approach would be the assumption that Lebanese society is an orderly, stable and equilibrated social system. The conflictual episodes it experienced would be seen as deviations from this state of affairs.

The functionalist assumptions as well as the applicability of the major premises of a structural-functional theory were deficient in providing this research with a viable conceptual scheme to analyse the Lebanese conflict and its basic causes. A conflict theory approach was the alternative. For this reason the insights of Marx, Dahrendorf, Coser, Ibn Khaldun, as well as Parsons' structural functionalism were helpful in constructing a conflict model that would capture the empirical situation at hand. Parsons' insights in this area were useful in elucidating the inapplicability of a consensus, order and stability framework to the analysis of a conflict structure.

The proposed model was based upon the premise that conflict is endemic, ubiquitous, a basic law of life, constructive and destructive by nature, and is embedded in the social structure. Two basic generic concepts were utilized in this model: Dahrendorf's concept of authority and Ibn Khaldun's notion of asabiya. Both concepts were utilized, complementarily, to analyze the causes of social conflict and describe the formation, rise to power and demise of power groups.

Marx's conception of the role of the social structure in generating conflict was illuminating in promoting the basic hypothesis of this study. However, his theory of class struggle could not be applied to the Lebanese conflict simply because class consciousness does not constitute a power base in the Lebanese society, as Khuri observed. Family and sect interests, not class interests, dictate the course of political
rivalry. Conflict groups fought over access to the power structure, about positions of authority, and communal entitlement to the overall reward system. Analysis of this phenomenon needs concepts other than the class concept to grasp the various dimensions of the problem.

Authority and *asabiya*, as political and organizational concepts, were useful tools in describing the dynamism of the conflict process. As a political notion, authority is manifested as a communal goal over which the conflict parties fought. The Reformist Camp struggled to introduce political reform to the existing political system in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of power and authority between the component communities. The Status Quo Coalition retaliated by holding on to the existing system for fear of losing its dominant authority status. Both groups had the same evaluation of the authority structure, but different perceptions of the social structure. For the Coalition the social structure was immutable. If changed it would have been destroyed. For the Reformists it was always changing, always in motion. These two different interpretations were prompted by the two groups' perceptions of the power and authority attributes of the social structure.

Authority as a classificatory concept delineated the conflict groups as those who had the power and authority as against those who were deprived of it. Dahrendorf maintained that the first group tried to shut off the rival group from the main source of power, and the second group tried to penetrate the closed circle. In the Lebanese context, the Maronites have the exclusive rights to occupy the position of the President of the Republic, as well as a few other power yielding bureaucratic posts; the Shi'a had the same exclusive rights to the Speakership of the House of Representatives; and the Sunnis had a similar right to the Prime-ministership. The desire to possess authority and power on the part of the communities which lacked them sets in motion a process of struggle and counter-struggle that developed into a full-fledged conflict.

Nevertheless, the notion of authority fell short of describing, comprehensively, the structure of the conflict groups. This deficiency was rectified by introducing the notion of *asabiya* into the analysis of this area of social conflict.

*Asabiya* is an organizational as well as a social and political concept. As a classificatory concept it differentiates between the groups which have *asabiya* and those which lack it. Those groups which have strong *asabiya* have also the power and usually the reign. The groups with weak *asabiya* are usually subservient to the strong *asabiya* groups.

The major militias in Lebanon are structured around at least one of the attributes of *asabiya*; they coalesce around blood relations, alliances or loyalty to the chieftain. The Lebanese conflict revealed that religion, sect, and geography are essential elements in the definition of *asabiya*. As indicated earlier, each one of the main militias has a sectarian and geographic dimension in its structure. The Lebanese Forces are predominantly Maronite. Their members are drawn mainly from
the Christian villages in North Lebanon, el-Metn area and the dislocated inhabitants of the Christian villages in the Chouf. The Marada militia was a Maronite group whose members were mainly from the Zghorta town and its environ. The Amal militia was predominantly a Shi'a organization whose members come from south and east Lebanon, and southern Beirut. The Hezbollah was exclusively a Shi'a militia whose members were mainly from eastern Lebanon and the South. The Progressive Socialist Party militia was a Druze group whose members were recruited from the Druze inhabitants of the Chouf, el-Metn, and Hasbaiya regions.

Authority is based on coercion and *asabiya* on consent and obedience. Voluntary organizations, such as the militias which saw themselves as volunteers not mercenaries, were kept solidly coherent by appeal to the attributes of *asabiya* rather than by the use of authority. The combative will of these groups, as well as the will of the community for self assertion, was best explained by the concept of *asabiya*.

1 Significance of the Framework

The significance of this theoretical framework can be assessed in terms of its relevance to three types of settings: a) to sociological theory; b) to conflict theory; and, c) to society at large.

Sociological theory has provided the theoretical framework with the necessary means to analyse the social structure. Other disciplines, such as psychology, political science or history lack the relevant concepts which would enable the research to focus on the social structure. On a more specific level, conflict theory is best equipped to analyse an inherently conflictual social structure, which has until recently been treated as a pathological phenomenon, mainly because of the deficiency in theoretical concepts.

This framework contributes to the development of the conflict theory approach by testing the two concepts of authority and *asabiya* in a conflict situation. The analysis indicated that *asabiya*, though a fourteenth century North African concept associated with tribal structure, remains a relevant concept to analyse the rise and fall of power groups in a Middle-Eastern society such as Lebanon. This had a significant implication for the decision makers, particularly mediators of conflict, and for the society at large.

2 Applicability of the Framework

The question that poses itself in this context is whether this theoretical framework is unique to the analysis of conflict in Lebanon, or is it applicable to other societies. The answer to this query is to be sought at two levels of generalization: first at the assumption level and second at the empirical level. Generally speaking, this framework is valid for the analysis of a communal conflict irrespective of time or space limitations. But on a more practical level, the basic assumption underlying the main hypothesis will determine whether the framework is the appropriate one to be utilized.
or not. If our focus is the social structure and its inherent conflictual tendencies then this framework is a valid scheme for analysis of irreducible conflicts, such as the four centuries old Northern Ireland conflict, and the ethnic conflict in traditional societies, such as those existing in Yugoslavia, between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or in Pakistan between Baluch, Pashtuns and Sindhis, or in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and Sinhales, or in Malaysia, between the Malays and the Chinese, or in Sudan between the Arab Moslem north and the mainly African Christian south.

As for the principles of treatment and resolution of the conflict, the practices used by Lebanon are not unique. They have been tried in several European and Third World countries with a good measure of success. Whether the conflict is ethnic, racial, sectarian or linguistic, it can be reduced to a conflict over positions of authority and a commanding place in the power structure. A power-sharing system such as the one adopted by Lebanon could bring any conflict of such nature within a legitimate manageable level.

III Conflict Parties and Issues

Conflict groups are identified by their authority and asabiya structure. However, for the purpose of resolution of the conflict, other criteria may be utilized. In the conflict situation at hand, mediators were able to identify and work with two contending parties, the Status Quo Coalition and the Reformist Camp. Within these two broad based groupings there were a number of parties which coalesced at different levels of political organization. The parties of the National Movement became more independent and self-centred after the assassination of their leader in 1976. They felt free to pursue their conflictual aims which sometimes diverted from the central aim of the defunct Lebanese National Movement.

Comparable conditions existed in the rival groups. The Lebanese Front, though more coherent than the National Movement, experienced similar conditions. Following the demise of two of its influential leaders, Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel, the Front's leadership passed into the hands of a less experienced generation which was unable to hold it together. Even inside the Lebanese Forces organization divergent views at the elite level caused a split in its leadership structure. In December 1985, the chairman of the executive committee of the Lebanese Forces was toppled by his lieutenants because they disagreed with him over a draft agreement to resolve the conflict with the rival Amal and Progressive Socialist Party militias.

This anarchism in conflict groups configuration dragged on for some time before a clearly defined bi-polar conflictual structure re-emerged in between these two contradictory camps, namely, the Status Quo Coalition and the Reformist Camp. During the course of the war several issues were countered; some were resolved, others withered away, new ones emerged, but what endured were mainly three: the political reform, the national identity, and the sovereignty of Lebanon with a special
The Reformist Camp considered the issue of political reform as a major cause of the conflict, and made its resolution a main objective of its political agenda. However, not all members of the group held identical or even similar views on this issue. The most reformist minded group in this Camp was the Lebanese National Movement. It demanded radical changes to the sectarian system. It wanted it to be totally abolished and replaced by a laicist system. The Moslem establishment proposed, instead, a system based on a deconfessionalized order. Other aspects of the requested amendments, such as abolishing the sectarian basis of parliamentary representation and the redistribution of power between the communities to restore the equilibrium to the social structure, attracted consensus among members of the Reformist Camp members.

Conversely, the Status Quo Coalition rejected most of the demands of the Reformist Camp in this area, but they acquiesced in the demand for total secularisation. Their reluctance to yield to the reform proposals stemmed from three considerations: first any change to the existing system would be detrimental to their dominant position; second, the abolishing of the sectarian basis of the representative system would erode the power base of the Maronite political parties; third, the requested changes would produce a shift in the loci of power from the Christians to the Moslem bloc.

The second issue of contention was the determination of the national identity of Lebanon and its implications for Lebanon’s relations with the Arab world. Having rejected earlier attempts by the Moslem pan-Arab irredentists to associate Lebanon with Arabism, for reasons discussed in this thesis, the Coalition, particularly the Maronites, had towards the end of the conflict’s lift cycle, renounced their objections and accepted Lebanon’s Arab identity. Their acquiescence in this resolution was tacitly encouraged by a declaration from the opposite side that Lebanon is an independent and sovereign state.

The third issue of Lebanon’s sovereignty stemmed, partly, from the contending parties’ perceptions and, partly, from objective factors. Each group had its own vision of what constituted a breach of sovereignty. The Coalition took the view that the state's loss of control over its territory was tantamount to the loss of its sovereignty. As such, Lebanon’s sovereignty for the Coalition, was compromised by the presence of the armed Palestinian resistance movement as well as by the Syrian troops and Iranian and Libyan armed groups which were in virtual control of the areas they occupied. On the other hand, the Reformist Camp emphasised the objective factors as exhibited in the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the latter’s recurrent incursions into the country. For the Reformists, the presence of the Syrian troops in Lebanon was not a breach of its sovereignty, for they entered the country at the request of the legitimate government of the day. Their presence therefore did not constitute a violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon. The Coalition parties also incorporated the

reference to the presence of foreign troops on its soil. Each one of the two conflict groups aligned itself against the other vis-a-vis these issues.
Israeli occupation in their definition of sovereignty, but they treated it as equal to the presence of other armed groups in Lebanon, especially the Syrian troops.

The core value of these issues to the conflict parties varied. At the outbreak of hostilities, the issue of political reform occupied a primary position in the conflict agenda of both groups. Towards the end of the conflict’s life cycle, the issue of Lebanon’s sovereignty became a front-line piercing issue, whereas the national identity question maintained a steady value throughout the conflict years.

IV Conflict Regulation: Theoretical Implications for Three Kinds of Theories

The above three basic issues were successfully resolved by the Taif Accord. A new set of conflict regulation practices in the areas of sectarian equilibrium and communal entitlement were also envisaged by the Accord. These practices were not dissimilar to those conceived by the National Pact, and employed by the successive governments since independence. Some of these regulatory practices, especially the ones subsumed under consociational democracy theory, worked well for a limited period of time, such as elite cooperation which ceased with the generation of militia leaders, and the jointly exercising government which practically came to an end with the Gemayel regime. Moreover, at least one of the basic characteristics of consociationalism was not fully applicable to the Lebanese situation; that was the required high degree of autonomy of the ethnic groups. It is a fact that the sects in Lebanon enjoyed a high degree of religious legal autonomy, mainly in the area of personal status, but the cleavage line was not as sharp and deep as to warrant total ethnic separation between them.

Segmentation and cleavages in Lebanon have emerged along sectarian lines. This has engendered strong ideological and political divisions in the country. Consociational politics succeeded in bridging these cleavages but failed in establishing a more enduring political system which would self-regulate, manage and resolve the underlying conflictual tendencies. Other compatible devices were also utilized to ensure harmony and concordance in the Lebanese society; the electoral law, for example, established a cross-communal distribution of electoral power whereby a representative of a certain sect may be chosen by another sect instead of his own. This violated the basic principle of representation in consociational politics.

Irrespective of whether consociationalism succeeded or failed in Lebanon, the experience itself is worth investigating from the point of view of its contribution to the main theoretical conceptions. The two conflicts Lebanon has had in its thirty-two years of independence, 1958 and 1975, as well as that of a century ago, provide an ample scope for testing three groups of conflict and conflict related theories: political stability, cross-cutting cleavages, and power-sharing theories.

A Political Stability Theories

Political stability, according to its proponents, is positively correlated with consensus. Consensus is a prerequisite for a politically stable government to govern.
The absence of consensus will create an atmosphere which would allow strife and instability to grow. The two conflict experiences in the post-independence era of Lebanon could provide an augmentation to this theory. However, in between these two episodes the relations between the Lebanese communities were generally peaceful and the government was in control in spite of the fact that value consensus was virtually absent. The power-sharing system produced an environment of stability that allowed governments to govern.

B Cross-cutting Theories

Cross-cutting theories stipulate that overlapping opinions, characteristics, and communal belonging, create stability in a system by procuring moderation and conciliation among the various actors. Cross-pressures can, if properly communicated between the conflict groups, clear the misconceptions which would otherwise exacerbate communal conflict.

The more influential pre-1975 political elites in Lebanon shared a greater degree of overlapping background, characteristics, and political experience than the post-1975 turbulent era elites. They had an historical experience represented by their struggle for the 1943 independence of Lebanon and their common effort to establish a viable and stable state. Compromises were made and concessions were traded in an atmosphere of cooperation and amicability, for the sake of the stability of the system.

However, cross-cutting theories proved to be of limited analytical value in the analysis of the inter-communal relations at the masses level and of diminished power at the elite level. In a prolonged conflict, where the emergence of new issues and new leaders is not uncommon, cross-cutting currents keep changing with every new phase of the conflict process. To be able to generalize, one has to study a single episode of the conflict.

C Consociational Democracy Theory

The consociational arrangements, adopted immediately after independence in 1943, brought to Lebanon relative stability in the areas that matter most: communal relations. The elite settlement, the National Pact, between the leadership of the Maronite and Sunni communities, introduced a power-sharing formula which defined clearly, for the first time, the relations between all component communities of Lebanon vis-a-vis their numerical weight in the body politic of the country. The National Pact stipulated a course of action in which each community was given a chance to contribute to the political process of the country within a clear-cut framework which guaranteed each party an appropriate share in the parliament, government, bureaucracy, judiciary and the army.

Some writers believe that the introduction of these measures was conducive to the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy in Lebanon. Others maintained that Lebanon indeed attempted a consociational solution to its perennial problems but failed to achieve the desired results that other similar societies achieved.
Lebanon's pluralist characteristics and its deeply divided society can provide the consociational theory with a valuable testing ground for verifying the impact of pluralism on the basic tenets of stability. The Lebanese consociational experience manifested certain attributes which were conducive to consociational democracy as well as other attributes which indicated that the theory requires substantial modifications.

We discussed earlier the factors that contributed to the success of a consociational solution in Lebanon. Now we shall turn to the factors which appear to be present in Lebanese society that were conducive to the establishment and maintenance of consociationalism but require that the theory be modified. It is important to notice that the civil war in Lebanon highlighted some of these factors which otherwise would not have been so conspicuous and might have remained dormant. Among the factors are the impact of segmentation on elite control and the emergence of an external threat.

a Segmentation of Society and Elite Control

Consociationalism stipulates that a distinct line of cleavage presumes the success of consociational arrangement on the grounds that good fences make good neighbours. It is further assumed that cleavages promote cohesion within each group, and this subsequently strengthens the bargaining power of its leader. The leaders' power to negotiate, cooperate, and make compromises is of vital significance for the success of any consociational solution under negotiation.

The war in Lebanon has indeed deepened the lines of cleavages between the communities by increasing their asabiya consciousness and the sense of distinctiveness in some of them. By the same token, it created the necessary conditions for the emergence of new leaders with roles that were compatible with the war aims of their communities. Thus, the role of the leader as a spokesman for his community was clearly established. So was his power base. This committed him to his community's wishes. In a sense, he became a hostage of his community's aims. His powers and latitude for consociational initiatives became contingent on his community's objectives rather than on his own visions and designs. Therefore a modification is required to take into account the power of the masses and their influence on the decision-making process of the elites.

b External Threat

Consociationalism proposes that an external threat produces an incentive towards cooperation among the elites and impresses upon them the need for unity. Lebanon had been under severe external threat from across its borders, including Israel's tacit claim to the Litani River in the South. Furthermore, Israel's continuous incursions into southern Lebanon and its occupation of a slice of the country has not created a situation in which the elite in the various communities would cooperate in their response to this threat. On the contrary, it exacerbated the divisions and
deepened the cleavages among them. Some factions saw in the Israeli threat a support mechanism to press with their factional claims. The situation with the Syrian role in the Lebanese conflict is similar. One faction finds in it a friendly and brotherly helping hand while the opposite factions consider it a quintessential source of threat to their very existence.

A modification is required to take into consideration the group cohesion and its relation to an external threat. For such a threat to be a unifying factor, it has to be perceived by all parties as a common danger and a threat to the whole group.

V Conflict Resolution

The resolution of the conflict in Lebanon defied the efforts of peace makers over a period of sixteen years. From the outset the conflict process was counterpoised with persistent attempts to terminate it. But these attempts failed for three reasons: the first is related to the conflict parties and their perception of their conflict aims; the second is linked to the issues of conflict; and the third is due to the conflict resolution approach.

The conflict groups, on both sides of the conflict, had their own interests which sometimes varied from that of their blocs. To resolve the conflict does not mean that every party's interests were met. The Taif Accord was satisfactory to the Phalanges party and the Lebanese Forces, but did not meet General Aoun's concern for Lebanon's sovereignty.

Moreover the conflict process delivered a new generation of leaders who had different perceptions, goals and approaches from their progenitors. Nevertheless, most of them saw in the conflict an opportunity to advance their own interests. They pursued their conflict aims to the very end reckoning that there is more to be gained from pursuing the conflict than from resolving it. The Coalition's concern over the possible loss of their dominant status, and the Reformist Camp's desire to have a bigger share of the pie prompted both of them to pursue the conflict to the end of its life cycle.

The metamorphosis in the conflict issues jeopardized also the resolution efforts for ending the conflict. Each stage of the conflict brought with it either a new issue or a new version of the same issue. The fighting broke out first between the Phalanges party militias and the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Beirut. It ended with pitched battles between the predominantly Maronite break-away army of General Michel Aoun and the Syrian troops in Lebanon. In between these two stages the conflict parties changed as well, as did the conflict issues. Maronites fought Maronites and Shi'a fought Shi'a over the control of their respective communities.

Resolving the issues in dispute under such conditions was a close to impossible mission. Yet several attempts were made. The conflict parties themselves put forward their proposals but they proved to be no more than structural techniques to reduce the tension. The Coalition, for example, suggested an institutional format
based on the principle of federalism, or regional autonomy, but was totally rejected by the Reformist Camp on the grounds that it ran contrary to Lebanon's social structure and would lead to partition and the exacerbation of communal tension.

With the escalation of the conflict both camps became convinced that a third party was needed to resolve the conflict. The Coalition tried to involve European and Western mediators but the Reformist Camp thwarted this attempt and, in turn, insisted on Arab mediation. Finally, an Arab brokered mediation succeeded in resolving the conflict. It was the Arab League Tripartite Committee consisting of three heads of states, that of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria, which succeeded in resolving the conflict issues at the Taif meeting of the Lebanese parliamentarians in October, 1989.

Their approach was a classical third-party panel mediation approach with certain innovative methods in crisis management. The mediators who delegated this mission to their respective foreign ministers enjoyed the respect and confidence of the conflict parties, and obtained their authority from the Arab League and their power support from the international community, particularly, the five permanent members of the Security Council.

After apprising themselves of the views held by all warring factions, a set of proposals was drawn up, based on the perceptions of the conflict groups themselves, as revealed to the Arab League committee of six. The Tripartite Committee decided to invite the Lebanese parliamentarians rather than the leaders of the warring factions to a meeting in the summer resort city of Taif in Saudi Arabia to discuss the proposals. The choice of parliamentarians was based on the assumption that they represent all the different factions and were nominated as their representatives to engage in direct discussions in the presence of mediators. The parties negotiated the proposed solution in a spirit of cooperation and with minimum interference but intensive caucusing from the mediators, allowing them to create jointly the new appropriate structure.

The new structure satisfied both groups. The previous perception held by either side that any solution to the problem would have a zero-sum effect were turned into a positive-sum outcome in which both sides can claim the attainment of their minimum objectives. The provisions of this agreement were enshrined in the constitution as amendments to the 1926 constitution of Lebanon.

VI Future Directions

Resolving the present conflict through the participation of the conflict groups and to everyone's satisfaction is not in itself a guarantee that at some future unspecified date conflict episodes will not recur. This is due to the fact that the social structure, which bred the conflictual tendencies, has not changed significantly as a result of the amendment to the political system. The nearest thing to a change in the social structure was the phenomenon of communal entitlements. Such entitlements have come to possess a normative quality in Lebanese society. Like any other norm,
they have developed a certain degree of fixity. They have constituted barriers among
the communities and taking them away would be possible only at a price. The
Maronites struggled to keep their entitlements as endorsed by the National Pact. The
rival communities have not been bereft of counter claims. A compromise was worked
out through the Taif Accord whereby the problem of communal entitlement was
readdressed and a balance was restored.

The old agencies of change and development in Lebanese society were re-
accredited by the Taif Accord. The Accord retained the same political and social
institutions which were operative under the National Pact. The state structure
retained its sectarian basis, with participation in the political process requiring formal
sectarian affiliation. Patron-client relationship retained its centrality as far as the
distribution of government awards is concerned. Distribution of positions of authority
and resources is still done on the basis of the same stratification system of the
National Pact. Each community is entitled to a certain predetermined quota for
government rewards and resources. The same political institutions of the pre-war era
are entrusted, in the Second Republic, to regulate the use of and access to power.
The question of national identity and ongoing political reform are handled by the same
political parties who fought over it for sixteen years.

The same social institutions were also retained. Their saliency in the new
Lebanon was reinforced by the Taif Accord rather than diminished. The family is still
the main source of material and non-material security for its members. It kept its role
as the primary socializing agency of the young. In other words, the sixteen years of
war did very little to liberate the ordinary Lebanese from his or her dependency on the
same structure which generated the conflict. Asabiya consciousness and sectarian
identity continues to be emotively strong factors. The question that comes to the
forefront of this study is what are the future directions that Lebanon should take to
eradicate conflict.

First, it is too optimistic to assume that conflict can be eradicated. Conflict
itself is neutral. It can either be regulated, suppressed or resolved. However, the
conflict phenomenon needs a milieu, a habitat to metamorphosize. That habitat is the
social structure. It follows that where the structural conditions are right then conflict
will erupt. This means that unless the social structure is changed we will keep
experiencing a recurrence of conflict episodes and probably a different kind of conflict
which varies in nature, shape and form but not in intensity and violence.

Second, what would a restructured Lebanon look like? A new Lebanon ought
to develop a new set of regulatory and integrative institutions which will ensure the
separation between political conflict and social development. In more specific terms,
certain basic features of the social structure ought to be changed. High among these
features is the sectarian regime and communal relations vis-a-vis the authority
structure. An important feature of sectarianism in Lebanon is its asabiya component.
The decision makers have to look into the possibility of transforming Lebanese society
from a tribal-like structure, exhibiting such attributes as feudal patronage, familism,
sectarianism and regionalism to a more diffused type of society in which the citizen is liberated from all these attachments and feels free to connect directly with the state and state apparatuses, and to have direct access to their rewards and resources without the help of the intermediaries.

Secularization, in the sense of elimination of social and political sectarianism, may solve part of the problem. The problem with this solution is that it is not attractive to either of the two conflict groups. The Maronites, and the Christians in general, support social secularization. The traditional Moslems reject it. They in turn advocate deconfessionalization of the political system. The Christians reject it. In taking such a position on this issue, both groups are driven by a perceived regime of benefits and loses in the power and authority structure.

Secularization will not also solve the problem of the individual’s ontological needs for economic, political, social and psychological security. These problems are part of the social fabric of the society. They are governed by social factors and need to be solved at that level.

A welfare system ought to provide a viable framework to address this problem. Under the existing system, the individual’s ontological needs, particularly those in the areas of security, identity and even basic human rights, are pursued through the individual’s membership in an ethnic group, political organization, or kinship system. If the State can guarantee these needs, then the above institutions would become irrelevant as agencies for winning their entitlements. A welfare system would enable the individual to become a citizen, whereby communal loyalty becomes a matter of choice and sectarian identity a personal matter.

The findings of this thesis have demonstrated clearly the difficulty of resolving a conflict situation, which is embedded in authority and asabiya. No conflict resolution can occur without taking into account the basic roles of these two factors in generating conflict. Their power must be diluted in any conflict resolution process.
END NOTES


7 The Phalanges, the Lebanese Forces, Guardians of the Cedars and the National Liberal Parties.

8 The Lebanese National Movement parties.

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ANNEX

DOCUMENT OF
LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

FIRST - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REFORMS

I GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1 Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country. It is a final homeland for all its citizens. It is unified in its territory, people, and institutions within the boundaries defined in the Lebanese Constitution and recognized internationally.

2 Lebanon is Arab in its identity and its association. It is a founding and active member of the League of Arab States and abides by its pacts and covenants. Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception.

3 Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination.

4 The people are the source of authority and sovereignty: they shall exercise these powers through the Constitutional institutions.

5 The political system is established on the principle of separation, balance, and cooperation amongst the various branches of Government.

6 The economic system is free and ensures private initiative and the right of private property.

7 The even development among regions on the educational, social, and economic levels shall be a basic pillar of the unity of the state and the stability of the system.

8 Endeavouring to achieve comprehensive social justice through financial, economic and social reform.
9 Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese shall have the right to live in any part of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. There shall be no segregation of people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, partition, or colonization.

10 There shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the 'pact of communal coexistence'.

II POLITICAL REFORMS

A The Parliament

The Parliament is the legislative power which exercises full supervision over government policy and acts.

1 The President of the Parliament is elected for a period equal to the life of the Parliament.

2 The Chamber may, once only, two years after the election of its President and his Deputy, and in the first session it holds, withdraw its confidence from the President of the Chamber or his Deputy by a Decision of two thirds of the Chamber, based on a petition signed by at least ten Deputies. The Chamber, at such point, must hold an immediate session to fill the vacant post.

3 Every bill sent by the Council of Ministers to the Parliament, in an urgent capacity, ought not be promulgated unless it is inscribed in the agenda and read in a general session, and the time limit specified in the constitution lapses without deciding on it and after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

4 The electoral constituency is the Mouhafaza.

5 Until such time as the Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non-confessional basis, the distribution of seats shall be according to the following principles:

   a Equal representation between Christians and Moslems.

   b Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each religious community.
c Proportional representation among geographic regions.

6 The number of parliamentary seats is increased to 108 to be divided equally between Christians and Moslems. Exceptionally, and for one time only the seats that are currently vacant, as well as the new seats that have been established by this Document, shall be filled by appointment, all at once, by the prospective Government of National Unity.

7 With the election of the first Parliament on a national non-confessional basis, a Senate shall be established in which all the religious communities shall be represented. Its authority shall be limited to major national issues.

B President of the Republic

The President of the Republic is the head of the state and the symbol of the nation's unity. He shall safeguard the Constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. He is the Command-in-Chief of the Armed Forces which fall under the authority of the Council of Ministers. He exercises the following powers:

1 presides over the Council of Ministers when he wishes without participating in voting.

2 presides over the Supreme Defence Council.

3 issues decrees and requests their promulgation; he has the right to ask the Council of Ministers to review any Decision that the Chamber has taken within fifteen days of the decision's transmission to the Presidency. If the Council of Ministers insists on the Decision or if the time limit passes without the Decree being issued or returned, the Decision or Decree shall be considered legally operative and must be promulgated.

4 promulgates the laws after they have been approved by the Chamber. He also has the right, after notifying the Council of Ministers, to request a reconsideration of the laws in accordance with the time limits specified by the Constitution and its provisions. In case the time lapses without its promulgation or return the laws are considered executed and ought to be promulgated.
5 forwards to the Chamber of Deputies Bills that are delivered to him by the Council of Ministers.

6 designates the Prime Minister in consultation with the President of the Chamber of Deputies based on Parliamentary consultations which shall be binding and the content of which the President shall formally disclose to the Prime Minister.

7 issues alone the Decree which designates the Prime Minister.

8 issues in agreement with the Prime Minister the decree appointing the Cabinet and the decrees accepting the resignation of Ministers.

9 issues, on his own authority, the decrees accepting the resignation of the Cabinet or considering it resigned.

10 accredits (Lebanese) Ambassadors (abroad) and accepts the credentials of (foreign) ambassadors, and grants official decorations by Decree.

11 negotiates and ratifies international treaties in coordination with the Prime Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified except after agreement of the Council of Ministers. They shall be made known to the Chamber whenever the national interest and security of the state permit. However, treaties involving the finances of the state, commercial treaties, and in general treaties that cannot be renounced every year shall not be considered ratified until they have been approved by the Chamber.

12 addresses, when necessary, letters to the Chamber of Deputies.

13 calls by Decree, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the parliament to extraordinary sessions.

14 may introduce, from outside the agenda, any urgent matter to the Council of Ministers.

15 may, in agreement with the Prime Minister, call the Council of Ministers to an extraordinary session, whenever he sees it necessary.

16 grants particular pardons by Decree, but a general amnesty cannot be granted except by a law.
17 during the execution of his mission, the President is not responsible unless he violates the constitution or commits an act of treason.

C The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister is the head of the Government and its representative and spokesman. He is considered responsible for executing the general policy that is set by the Council of Ministers. He exercises the following powers:

1 heads the Council of Ministers.

2 conducts the Parliamentary consultations involved in forming a Cabinet. He signs, with the President, the Decree forming the Cabinet. The Cabinet must present its general statement of policy to the Chamber and gain its confidence within thirty days. The Cabinet shall not exercise its powers before it gains the Chamber's confidence nor after it has resigned or is considered resigned, except in the narrow sense of managing affairs.

3 presents the Government's general policy statements before the Chamber of Deputies.

4 signs, along with the President, all decrees, except the Decree which designates him the head of the Government (i.e. Prime Minister), and the Decree accepting the Cabinet's resignation or considering it resigned.

5 signs the Decree calling for an extraordinary parliamentary session, decrees issuing laws, and requests for reviewing laws.

6 calls the Council of Ministers into session and sets its agenda, and informs the President and the Ministers before hand of the subjects included on the agenda and of the urgent subjects that will be discussed, and signs the minutes of the sessions.

7 supervises the activities of the public administrations and institutions and coordinates among the Ministers and provides general directives to ensure the proper progress of affairs.

8 holds working meetings with the competent authorities in the Government in the presence of the concerned Minister.
he is, ex officio, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Defence Council.

D The Council of Ministers

Executive authority shall be vested in the Council of Ministers. Among the powers that it exercises are the following:

1. sets the general policy of the Government in all fields, prepares Bills and Decrees and makes the decisions necessary for implementing them.

2. watches over the execution of laws and regulations and supervises the activities of all the Government's branches including the civil, military, and security administrations and institutions without exception.

3. The Council of Ministers is the authority to which the armed forces are subject.

4. appoints Government employees and dismisses them and accepts their resignations according to the law.

5. has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies upon the request of the President of the Republic if the chamber of Deputies, for no compelling reasons, fails to meet during one of its regular periods and fails to meet throughout two successive extraordinary periods, each longer than one month, or if the Chamber returns an annual budget plan with the aim of paralyzing the Government. This right cannot be exercised a second time if it is for the same reasons which led to the dissolution of the Chamber the first time.

6. whenever the President of the Republic is in attendance he chairs the meetings of the Council of Ministers.

7. The Council of Ministers meets in a locale specifically set aside for it. The legal quorum for a Council meeting shall be a two-thirds majority of its members. It shall make its decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it shall make its decisions by vote of the majority of attending members. Basic national issues shall require the approval of two thirds of the members of the Council named in the Decree forming the Cabinet. Basic national issues are considered the following:

The declaration of a state of emergency and its termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the annual Government budget,
comprehensive and long-term development projects, the appointment of Grade One
government employees and their equivalents, the review of the administrative map,
the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, electoral law, nationality law, personal
status laws, and the dismissal of Ministers.

E The Minister

The powers of the Minister are strengthened in accordance with the general policy of
the government and with the principle of collective responsibility. He is not to be
dismissed except by a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a vote of no
confidence in him personally by the Parliament.

F Resignation of the Government and Considering
It Resigned and the Dismissal of Ministers

1 The Government is considered resigned in the following circumstances:

a If the Prime Minister resigns;

b If it loses more than a third of the members specified in the Decree
forming it;

c If the Prime Minister dies;

d At the beginning of the term of the President of the Republic;

e At the beginning of the term of the Chamber of Deputies;

f When it loses the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies based on the
Chamber's initiative or based on the Council's initiative to gain the
Chamber's confidence.

2 Ministers shall be dismissed by a Decree signed by the President and the
Prime Minister, after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

3 When the Council resigns or is considered resigned, the Chamber of Deputies
shall automatically be considered in extraordinary session until a new Council has
been formed and has gained the Chamber's confidence.
G  Abolition of Political Confessionalism

Abolition of political confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a gradual plan. The Chamber of Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee shall be formed headed by the President of the Republic, including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures. The tasks of this Committee shall be to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan.

During the transitional phase:

1  The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies shall be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents shall be excepted from this rule, and the posts shall be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence.

2  Removal of mention of religion and sect from the identity card.

III  OTHER REFORMS

1  Administrative Decentralisation

   a  The Lebanese state is a unitary and unified state with a strong central authority.

   b  The authority of the heads of the Muhafazat and the heads of the Qada's shall be broadened, and all the branches of the government shall be represented in the administrative districts at the highest level possible in order better to serve the citizens and to respond to their needs locally.
c The administrative map shall be reconsidered in order to ensure national integration while preserving coexistence and the unity of land, people, and institutions.

d Broad administrative decentralization shall be adopted on the level of small administrative units (the Qada and smaller) by electing a council for each Qada headed by the Qayem Maqam (the appointed governor of the Qada) to ensure local participation.

e A unified and comprehensive development plan for the nation shall be adopted. The plan should lead to the development of the various Lebanese regions economically and socially. The resources of the Municipalities, of the joint Municipalities, and the Municipality Unions shall be enhanced through appropriate financial support.

2 The Courts

a In order to ensure that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to secure the harmonious functioning of both the legislative and executive authorities with the requirements of coexistence and with the basic rights of the Lebanese as specified by the Constitution:

i A supreme council stipulated by the constitution shall be formed. Its function is to try presidents and ministers. A special law to this effect should be legislated.

ii A Constitutional Council, as prescribed in the Constitution, shall be established to supervise the constitutionality of Laws and to arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential elections. The President, the President of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, along with any ten Members of Parliament, have the right to consult this Council on matters that relate to the constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of religious communities have the right to consult this Council only on laws relating to personal status, the freedom of belief and religious practice, and the freedom of religious education. The rules governing the organization, operation, composition, and modes of appeal of the Council will be decided by a special law.
iii The following bodies have the right to petition the Administrative Council in matters related to the interpretation of the Constitution and the supervision of the constitutionality of the laws:

- President of the Republic
- President of the Parliament
- Prime Minister
- A certain proportion of the members of Parliament

b To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of religious communities have the right to consult this Council in matters related to:

i Personal status
ii Freedom of belief and religious practices
iii Freedom of religious education

c In strengthening the independence of judiciary a certain number of the Supreme Judicial Council are elected by the judicial body.

3 Electoral Law

Parliamentary elections shall be held according to a new electoral law on the basis of the Muhažarat. The new law shall respect the principles which ensure coexistence among the Lebanese communities, political representation for all classes and age-groups in the population, and the effectiveness of that representation, after redrawing the administrative map within the framework of the unity of the land, the people, and the institutions.

4 The Establishment of an Economic and Social Development Council

An Economic and Social Council shall be established to ensure the participation of representative of the various sectors in the formulation of the economic and social polity of the government by providing advice and suggestions.

5 Education and Teaching
a Education shall be provided for all and shall be made obligatory, at least for the elementary classes.

b Freedom of education shall be ensured according to the law and general rules and regulations.

c Private education shall be protected, and the supervision by the government of private schools and school textbooks shall be increased.

d Public, vocational, and technical education shall be reformed and shall be reinforced and developed in a way that meets the nation’s developmental needs. The Lebanese University shall be reformed and supported, especially in the faculties of applied fields.

e Educational programs shall be re-examined and redesigned to reinforce national identification and integration, to ensure spiritual and cultural openness, and to unify history and civic education textbooks.

6 The Media

All the media shall be re-organized in line with the law and within the framework of responsible freedom to serve the goals of national reconciliation and the termination of the state of war.

SECOND - EXTENDING THE LEBANESE STATE’S AUTHORITY OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY

As agreement was reached among the Lebanese protagonists on the establishment of a strong and able state based on the principle of national concord, the Government of National Reconciliation shall put together a detailed security plan to be implemented within one year, the aim of which shall be the gradual extension of the state’s authority over all Lebanese territory by the state’s own means. The broad outlines of this plan shall be as follows:

1 The dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the handing over of their weapons to the Lebanese state within six months beginning after the ratification of the Document of National Reconciliation, the election of the President of the Republic, the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation, and the amendment of the Constitution to include political reforms.
2 The internal security forces shall be reinforced through:

a Opening of conscription to all Lebanese without exception, training them, and distributing them to units in the Muḥafazat where they will continue to undergo regular and organized training programs.

b Reinforcing the security apparatus to tighten the control on the entry and exit of individuals by land, sea, and air across the nation's borders.

3 The reinforcement of the armed forces.

a The main task of the armed forces is the defence of the homeland and, when necessary, the preservation of general order when the threat to that order goes beyond the capabilities of the internal security forces.

b The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in order to maintain security when the Council of Ministers so decides.

c The armed forces shall be unified, equipped, and trained to assume their national responsibilities in facing Israeli aggression.

d When the internal security forces are capable of assuming their security responsibilities, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.

e The intelligence branch of the armed forces shall be re-organized to serve only military purposes.

4 The problem of displaced persons shall be solved in depth, and the right of each Lebanese person displaced since 1975 to return to the place from whence he was displaced shall be recognized; laws that will ensure these rights shall be enacted and the means to help in their return shall be provided.

As the objective of the Lebanese state is to extend its authority over all of its territory by its own means, first and foremost by its internal security forces, and based on the reality of the filial relations that tie Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian armed forces shall (with Lebanese gratitude) help the legitimate Lebanese forces to extend the Lebanese state's authority during a specified time period not to exceed two years beginning after the ratification of the Document of National Reconciliation, the election of the President of the Republic, the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation,
and the incorporation of the political reforms into the Constitution. At the end of this period, the Government of Syria and the Lebanese Government of National Reconciliation shall agree on the redeployment of Syrian forces in the Beqa', at the entrance to the western Beqa' in Dahr al-Baydar, and down to the Hammana-Mdayrij-Ayn Dara line, and, if necessary, to other locations to be agreed upon by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. The two Governments shall also agree on the size and duration of the deployment of the Syrian forces in the locations mentioned above and the specification of the relationship between these forces and the Lebanese authorities in the areas of their deployment. The Higher Tripartite Arab Committee is ready to help the two states in reaching this agreement if they so wish.

THIRD - THE LIBERATION OF LEBANON FROM ISRAELI OCCUPATION

Reinstating Lebanon's authority all the way to its internationally recognized frontiers requires:

1. Working toward implementation of UN Resolution 425 and all other resolutions of the UN Security Council which demand the full withdrawal of Israeli forces.

2. Insisting on the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon on March 23, 1949.

3. Taking all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation; extending the state's authority over its entire territory; deploying the Lebanese Army to the internationally-recognised Lebanese border area; and endeavouring the reinforce the presence of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Lebanese South to ensure Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

FOURTH - LEBANESE-SYRIAN RELATIONS

Lebanon, which is Arab in its belonging and identity, has close filial ties to all the Arab states; there exist between it and Syria distinctive relations which derive their force from the roots of propinquity, history, and common filial interests. This is the foundation on which coordination and cooperation between the two countries shall be based. This shall be embodied in agreements between the two in various fields which shall realize the interests of the two filial countries within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each. Based on this, and because the
consolidation of security provides the atmosphere required to develop these special ties, Lebanon must not be a source of threat to Syria's security - or Syria, to Lebanon's security - in any way whatsoever. Lebanon shall not allow itself to be a passageway or haven for any force, state, or organization that aims to threaten its own security or the security of Syria. And Syria, which cares greatly for Lebanon's security, independence, unity, and the concord of its citizens, shall not allow any activity that will threaten Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.