LOYALIST PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES
IN THE SUNG TO YÜAN TRANSITION, CA. 1273-1300

by

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This thesis is based on original research carried out by myself.

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I would like to thank the Australian National University for granting me a postgraduate scholarship and in providing research facilities over the past three and a half years. I am particularly grateful to Professor Wang Gungwu for guiding me through difficult stages of research and for many sessions of stimulating ideas. To him I owe an immense debt of gratitude for personal encouragement. To my other supervisor, Dr. Igor de Rachewiltz, I am indebted for guidance and help on the Mongol Yuan period and for generously lending me source materials. I am grateful to Ho Hon-wai, Dr. Jennifer Holmgren, Dr. Andrew Fraser, and L. W. Preston for reading through the entire draft and making valuable suggestions for improvement. Dr. John Fincher read Chapters Six and Seven and made encouraging remarks. For proof-reading I am most grateful to Ken Wells. During my entire stay in Canberra, Mrs. May Wang has been a supportive friend. Lastly, I thank my family for moral support throughout the course of my studies; I especially owe my son, Trevor, a great deal for putting up with babysitters so I could work undisturbed.

I am, however, solely responsible for errors and misinterpretations in this dissertation.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of loyalists during the Sung to Yuan dynastic succession, ca. 1273-1300. By means of an examination of their background and loyalist activities, and a reconstruction of relationships between individual loyalists, I attempt to obtain a broad view of Sung loyalism and its significance to contemporaries and their response to alien rule. After a critical examination of official histories and the writings of the Sung loyalists, I suggest that Sung loyalism should be observed in terms of a spectrum of relative, rather than absolute, values. In addition, the intensity and duration of loyalty changed over time and through circumstances. I delineate three traditions of Sung loyalists in this spectrum: the chung-i loyalists who died during or for the Sung cause; the i-min loyalists who survived the collapse of the dynasty and/or loyalist resistance and lived some years under Mongol rule, and the marginal loyalists (a subgroup of the i-min) whose conduct during their later years drew strong criticism from traditional historians. Contrary to traditional views of Sung loyalists as individuals totally uncompromising to the new regime, evidence indicates that after the defeat of loyalist resistance in 1279, even among the exemplars accommodation was more often the case than resistance.

In the introductory chapter I briefly outline the divergent interpretations of Mongol rule and its impact on the structure of Chinese society, and indicate the lack of a broad and comprehensive view of the Sung loyalists. Chapter Two is a reappraisal of the events of the end of the Southern Sung and the political circumstances under which the leaders of the loyalist movement planned and carried
out their resistance from 1276 to 1279. I offer some new interpretations, such as showing Wen T'ien-hsiang to have been a newcomer rather than the leading personality of the Southern Sung court and the loyalist movement, contrary to traditional misconceptions that he had single-handedly planned and executed the resistance. In this reconstruction, Ch'en I-chung and Li T'ing-chih are found to be the senior officials who emerged as the unchallenged leaders in 1275-76.

In Chapter Three I examine some aspects of both official and unofficial historiography of the Sung loyalists. Wen T'ien-hsiang's writings, along with his prejudices, are shown to have influenced both the Sung-shih and the works of the Sung loyalists, and accounted for certain discrepancies among the sources. I also discuss the possibility of censorship under the Yüan, concluding that more likely the Sung loyalists, their descendants and editors were cautious and censored themselves. I then look at later writings reflecting a local concern, which produced favourable accounts at the expense of historical objectivity. One example raised is Ch'üan Tsu-wang's research into the contributions his local district and his ancestors made in connection with Sung loyalism. In this chapter I also deal with several myths in the traditional portrayal of the Sung loyalists.

The next chapter deals with the chung-i loyalists (martyrs); in particular, the participation in the loyalist resistance by Wen T'ien-hsiang, Li T'ing-chih, Lu Hsiu-fu, Chang Shih-chieh, and Hsieh Fang-te are discussed in more detail. I also examine the relationships between these key personalities and their loyalist followers, and suggest that the organization and structure of their support was within the traditional mu-fu system.
Chapter Five reconstructs nine i-min loyalist groups (survivors) in the first generation of Mongol rule: Annam (Indochina), Ta-tu (Peking), Kuei-chi (Shao-hsing), Wu-chou (Chin-hua), Lu-ling (Chi-an), Ch'ing-yüan (Ningpo), Jao-chou, P'ing-chiang (Soochow), and Tung-kuan (near Canton). The key loyalist figures active in these centres—Wang Yüan-liang, Chia Hsüan-weng, Wang Ying-sun, Lin Ching-hsi, Hsieh Ao, Fang Feng, Wang Ying-lin, Hu San-hsing, Liu Ch'en-weng, Ma T'ing-luan, Cheng Ssu-hsiao, Kung K'ai, and Chao Pi-hsiang—are discussed with respect to their attitude towards the conquest and life under Mongol rule. I indicate that in most cases the loyalism of these individuals became less intense as they socialized with Yuan officials and gave tacit approval for their sons to seek employment in the new regime.

The Hang-chou (Hangchow) and Hu-chou (Wu-hsing) loyalists such as Teng Mu and Mou Yen are examined in Chapter Six, which is essentially concerned with the activities and interpersonal relationships of Chou Mi, a versatile writer and artist. Among Chou Mi's extensive circle of friends were many in the employ of the Yuan government and a young generation of artists and scholars who later, with deep regret, accepted official appointments. This change was evident in the late 1280s and 1290s, by which time their loyalty had become transformed into accommodating positions disapproved of by some contemporaries and later historians. The concluding chapter discusses the essence and duration of Sung loyalism in view of the research from the previous chapters; in addition, I briefly look at its impact on later generations.
GUIDELINES IN THE THESIS

1. The Wade-Giles romanization is used in this thesis with one exception (Tsin instead of Chin for the 金 dynasty to distinguish it from the Chin.

2. Sung and Yuan place names are romanized in the Wade-Giles, but modern provinces are referred to in the familiar postal system (e.g., Chekiang). However, Fu-chou 福州 in Fukien is referred to as Foochow, in order to distinguish it from Fu-chou 佛山 in Kiangsi. "Hang-chou" is used throughout the thesis, although in the Southern Sung it was called "Lin-an" and "Hsing-tsai".

3. The dates for Sung and Yuan men are according to Ch'ang Pi-te et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tsu-liao so-yin (Taipei, 1976) and Wang Te-i et al., Yuan-jen chuan-chi tsu-liao so-yin (Taipei, 1981). In some cases I have amended the dates by means of the individual's collected writings (for example, Shu Yüeh-hsiang [1217-1298], not [1236-1298] as given in Wang Te-i) and biographies in the Sung-shih and Yuan-shih. For men of other periods, the dates are drawn from Chiang Liang-fu's Li-tai ming-jen nien-li pei-chuan tsung-piao (Taipei, 1970).

4. The translations of offices are mostly from E. A. Kracke, Translation of Sung Civil Service Titles (Paris, 1957) and supplemented by Chang Fu-jui, Les Fonctionnaires des Song: Index des Titres (Paris, 1962). Some exceptions are such as translating ch'eng-hsiang as "chief minister", and not "grand councillor". The title of the office is in lower case letters, but the name of the office or department is in upper case.

5. Chinese characters are given at first occurrence.

6. Notes:
   In order to minimize confusion caused by the large number of personal names and wen-chi collections used in the study, the author's name rather than the title of the work is cited (except where the author has more than one title, in which case an abbreviated form of the title will also be provided). Ch'en Chu, 6.3b refers to Ch'en Chu's Pen-t'ang chi, chüan 6, folio or page 3b. Dynastic histories are cited by title (e.g., SS).
   Full bibliographical Information is given at first occurrence.
   The title of the essay or poem is translated for only Sung loyalist writings and contemporary works. The translation is "free" and not literal to cut down on confusion caused by writers using or being referred to by several styles and sobriquets.

7. No derogatory connotation is intended by the use of the term "barbarians" in this thesis; it is simply a translation of the Chinese terms 北 and hu 北 . The term "northerners" refers to northern Chinese only; foreign peoples are referred to as "non-Chinese".

8. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations in this thesis are my own.
## Abbreviations in the Notes and Bibliography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Chinese Name</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKCSCP</td>
<td>Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen</td>
<td>四庫全書類本</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPTK</td>
<td>Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an</td>
<td>四部叢列</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPPY</td>
<td>Ssu-pu pei-yao</td>
<td>四部備要</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Sung-shih 永史</td>
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<td>YS</td>
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## Cross-Reference of Place Names

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<td>Tsinan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch'ing-yüan</td>
<td>Ningpo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fu-chou (Fukien)</td>
<td>Foochow</td>
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<td>Hang-chou</td>
<td>Hangchow</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Lin-an 鄭和, or Hsing-tsai 行 in Southern Sung)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hu-chou</td>
<td>Wu-hsing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuan-fu</td>
<td>Kowloon/Hong Kong area</td>
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<td>Nan-chien</td>
<td>Yen-p'ing</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In February 1276 the Mongol forces occupied the capital of the Southern Sung 南宋 and three years later suppressed the last trace of loyalist resistance in the southeastern provinces. Reunification of the country was achieved after a century and a half of disunity, but the whole of China was submerged under alien rule for the first time in her history. In contrast to north China which had by then undergone several foreign regimes, Chiang-nan 江南 (i.e., south China, the territory of the Southern Sung corresponding to south of the Huai and Yangtze rivers) had never before been conquered by non-Chinese peoples. How did the southern Chinese intellectuals perceive, respond, and react to the double crisis—the collapse of the Sung and its replacement by an alien dynasty? Many collaborated and surrendered to the Mongol Yuan 元, but not a few felt intense loyalty to the fallen dynasty and resisted the conquest by fighting the Mongols, committing suicide, or withdrawing into self-imposed exile.

The Mongol conquest raises other questions. Did the response of the southern Chinese differ from that of the northern Chinese forty years earlier, when the Mongols violently supplanted the Jurchens? To what extent did racial and cultural factors (ethnic identity and culturalism) dictate the varying types of response among the southern intellectuals? How was the Chinese perception of alien rule modified and rationalized over time? And, what effects did the Yuan government have on the social, cultural, economic, and political structures of society in south China?
The Mongol period in Chinese history has traditionally been seen as a disastrous and uprooting century that brought not only economic exploitation and suffering to the Chinese people, but a drastic interruption in Chinese culture and civilization as well. Those embracing such views dwell on the Yuan practice of dividing its subjects into four social classes in descending order of political and legal privileges: the Mongols; Se-mu 色目 (Central Asians); Han-jen 漢人 (Hsi-hsia 西夏 Tanguts, northern Chinese, and other peoples formerly under Jurchen Chin rule); and Nan-jen 南人 (Chinese formerly under Southern Sung rule). These writers claim that such discrimination based on ethnic origins and the order of submission to Mongol rule relegated the Confucian scholars and former officials of the Sung to among society's lowest strata, one rank above the paupers and one below the prostitutes. Furthermore, social unrest and widespread rebellions in the late Yuan are interpreted as racially instigated risings against the Mongol administration. Likewise, the success of Chu Yuan-chang 朱元璋 (Ming T'ai-tsu 明太祖, r. 1368-1398) in establishing the Ming dynasty is attributed to its indigenous origins. The Ming scholar Wang Chu 王洙 (fl. 1521) took an extreme position: he ignored the entire Yuan period and represented Chu Yuan-chang's ancestors as the legitimate heirs of the Sung mandate. Modern Chinese nationalist critics of Western and Japanese imperialism and, until recently, most authors of general histories of China also deny that the Yuan period had any positive features.

Alternative views have not been absent. After recognizing the permanence of Manchu power, some Ming loyalist scholars in the seventeenth-century looked back at the Mongol Yuan and realized that
culture and civilization had actually survived the Mongol onslaught. Therefore, they somewhat confidently hoped that the same would prevail during the Ch'ing dynasty.

In more recent times, Meng Ssu-ming's pioneer study concludes that, contrary to previous opinions, the Mongol conquest did not fundamentally upset the socio-economic organization of Chinese society in the south. Meng argues that although the Yu'an government superimposed political control over the gentry and former Sung officials who had submitted, it more or less allowed them to retain their economic power and regular administrative functions at the local level. Being economically powerful, this Chinese elite—the large landowners and wealthy merchants—were placed in an advantageous position to exercise some political influence over destitute Mongol nationals. Meng also dismisses the view that reaction against racial discrimination had been responsible for the final destruction of Mongol power in China. He points out that it was the Chinese elite who quickly volunteered aid to the Yu'an court when indigenous rebels threatened the central government. Only when the Yu'an formulated polices that antagonized the Chinese elite in the 1350s did the latter switch sides to join forces with Chu Yüan-chang. Meng feels that to regard the late Yu'an uprisings as a nationalist resistance to foreign rule was tantamount to using the outcome of history to determine the nature of the uprisings. Both he and the Japanese scholar Yanai Watari concur in the view that although Yu'an regulations were discriminatory, the law was sometimes flexible and many northern Chinese did reach prominent government posts; furthermore, the four social classes had not necessarily been perpetuated by ethnic differences, but were less exclusive and rigid than traditionally
assessed. They both assert that economic factors, and not racial and ethnic hostilities, had primarily been responsible for the fall of the Yüan.

Recent regional studies also indicate continuities rather than ruptures in the socio-economic structure of Chinese society in the south. In one case study, the local elite in Fu-chou (Kiangsi) emerged essentially intact through the Sung to Yüan transition. Likewise, Langlois' *China under Mongol Rule* not only contradicts traditional claims of a stagnancy during this period, but shows unbroken traditions and innovations in Chinese civilization, arts and culture in the light of the reunification of the country. In Taiwan, Yao Ts'ung-wu's favourable views about the employment of Confucian scholars by the Yüan regime have been adopted by Li Tse-fen, whose reassessment of the Mongol Yüan as a constructive period appears to have also drawn upon Western studies. Mainland Chinese historians used to subscribe to the Soviet historiography of the Mongol period, which viewed the Mongols as aggressive and expansionist, laying waste whatever territory they conquered. Since the Sino-Soviet schism, however, they have interpreted the Mongol reunification to be a progressive and positive measure, a view that is now very much in accordance with the regime's present policy to win the goodwill of ethnic minorities and to emphasize the multi-ethnic nature of the Chinese population.

These two conflicting interpretations of the impact of Mongol rule on south China reflect in general the divergent focuses of the authors. Alternative views are more interested in the collaborators and cooperators while traditional writings emphasize the role of the loyalists who resisted Mongol rule. In this study, the use of the
term "loyalists" is in the same sense as applied to the United Empire Loyalists and the Spanish Loyalists, in which loyalty to the existing order and authority was retained even when both were about to be toppled and replaced; the term "loyalism" refers to a specific type of loyalty during dynastic change. "Sung loyalists" (similarly "Ming loyalists") describe men who embraced lingering loyalty to the former dynasty, and refer specifically to a subgroup of loyal men who demonstrated their loyalty against various hostile forces (bandits, usurpers, rebels, and alien conquerors) during various periods of the dynasty. It incorporates two types of loyalists: the chung-i (loyal and righteous martyrs) and the i-min (leftover, remnant, or surviving subjects). The chung-i martyrs died during or shortly after the Mongol conquest. In contrast the i-min loyalists survived the Sung demise and withdrew from public office as a form of protest against the new government. In its original sense, i-min generally meant survivors and a "remnant" population remaining after large-scale natural disasters or after a dynasty became defunct. By the Sung to Yuan transitional period, however, it was used in both this general sense and a more specific one to refer to subjects of a former dynasty who refused to serve the new regime. The i-min loyalists are to be distinguished from the i-min that refer to pure recluses and hermits without any specific reference to their political loyalty to the state. It should be pointed out that the chung-i, i-min, and i-min were not exclusive from each other: for instance, a chung-i who did not die immediately during the dynastic collapse could have lived the life of a i-min for the period before he died; and a i-min could have become an absolute hermit, i-min, during his period.
of passive protest to the new dynasty.  

What is generally ignored by the authors of traditional views is the fact that the Sung loyalists comprised a mere minority of the southern Chinese elite, while those who surrendered or collaborated with the Mongols made up the majority. The loyalists, however, left an indelible imprint on the history of the transitional period between the Sung and Yuan. The active participants of the resistance mobilized local and popular forces formidable enough to keep the Mongol army and navy fully employed for another three years. Even after ultimate defeat at the sea battle of Yai-shan and the death of virtually all the leaders, the survivors joined with the other loyalists already in passive protest since the fall of the Sung capital. Among the literati of southern Chinese society in the first generation of Yuan rule they constituted a visible social group. Many rejected public office under the new government and immersed themselves in poetry, arts, scholarship, and teaching.

The legacy of the loyalists is a voluminous amount of extant writings in fields ranging from history to art connoisseurship. These writings provide documentation on their response to dynastic change. In addition, they constitute primary sources on the last years of the Southern Sung, the loyalist resistance, and the plight of Confucian scholars in the early years of Yuan domination in south China. Through teaching, the loyalists also exerted strong influence on their children and students—the second generation of southern Chinese intellectuals under the Yuan. The Sung loyalists excelled in scholarship: Wang Ying-lin (1223-1296) in classical studies, Ma Tuan-lin (1254-1325) in bibliographical work, Chou Mi (1232-1298) in pi-chi (random jottings)
miscellanies, and Liu Ch'en-weng 劉辰翁 (1232-1297) and Wang Yuan-liang 汪元量 (fl. 1270-1300) in poetry. Therefore as a social and cultural group, the loyalists in subsequent periods inspired a large corpus of literature that idealized and glorified the spirit and activities of Sung loyalism. Ming loyalists in particular found ideological precedents from this period of history for moral support of their fierce resistance to the Ch'ing dynasty. In sum, for their significance as a political threat during the loyalist resistance of 1276-79 and as a visible social group during the first generation of Yuan rule (not to mention the ideological impact on loyalists of subsequent periods), the Sung loyalists and the course and nature of their loyalism justify a monograph study.

Traditional Chinese scholarship (pre-1900) on the Sung loyalists has been involved in three overlapping areas: editing and prefacing literary collections of the loyalists, adding biographies of local loyalists to gazetteers and genealogies, and compiling biographies of loyalists as separate works or as sections to be included in private and official histories. In some cases the authors were themselves Sung loyalists or loyalists of later periods, and in all cases they were sympathizers and admirers of loyalist figures. Their chief concern lay in adding entries of those men whom they felt had been left out in previous compilations, and thus their approach was neither critical nor analytical. Modern Chinese historians affected by a deep admiration for the patriotic spirit have been prolific in studies of the legendary loyalist hero Wen T'ien-hsiang 文天祥 (1236-1283), and there exist separate articles on less known loyalists, but to date the group has not been studied in its entirety.

In the 1950s several prominent scholars in Hong Kong debated the
actual routes taken by the refugee Sung court during the loyalist resistance and the site of its last lookout tower. Their interest was in the significance and role of Kowloon in Sung history and not in the overall perspective of the loyalists. Another aspect of Sung loyalism Chinese scholars have paid attention to is the poetry of the loyalists which mourned the demise of the dynasty and which reflected the poetic trends of the Sung to Yuan transition. Several separate studies of these poets have appeared. In the West, scholarship on the topic has also been selective and limited. Mote's study of eremitism under the Yuan provides brief profiles of Wen T'ien-hsiang, Hsieh Fang-te 謝枋得 (1226-1289) and Cheng Ssu-hsiao 鄭思肖 (1241-1318). Art historians have shown interest in the loyalist painters Ch'ien Hsüan 錢選 (ca. 1235-aft. 1300), Cheng Ssu-hsiao, and Kung K'ai 龔開 (1222-1307). In addition, Franke's recently completed biographical dictionary of the Sung period includes a sizable number of biographies of Sung loyalists.

These previous studies either focussed on several prominent loyalist figures whose exemplary conduct won the exaggerated praise and idealization of Chinese historians up to the present century, or else dealt with some aspect of an individual loyalist's achievement in certain fields. Accounts of the Sung loyalists and the resistance battles are brief in most general histories of China, and up to now our picture of Sung loyalism is still vague and incomplete. The popular and general conceptualization of the loyalists as totally self-righteous men who gathered only in each other's company and had no contact at all with the Yuan government and its institutions and personnel is not an accurate portrayal, but rather a myth with grains of truth. The myth becomes further divorced from reality when the
virtues of the loyalists are embellished and their faults ignored to serve new circumstances and events through the writings of the traditional historians.

I propose to study the entire group of loyalists and the full spectrum of their activities and interpersonal relationships in order to gain a broad perspective on the nature, course, and dimensions of Sung loyalism and to reappraise its influence and role in the Sung to Yuan transition and its significance for subsequent periods of dynastic collapse. Through critical use of official sources and the loyalists' own writings, I intend to reassess the last years of the Southern Sung, the sequence of events leading to its surrender by Empress Dowager Hsieh 謙太后 (1208-1282), and the rise and defeat of loyalist resistance in 1276-79. By examining the nature of loyalist writings and the particular aspects of Yuan historiography in regard to the Sung loyalists, I hope to account for certain discrepancies among the sources and discuss some of the myths associated with the exemplary figures. In the process of research on this group of intellectuals highly sensitive to their political and cultural environment, it is hoped that in addition to acquiring some insights that go beyond the popular tradition of Sung loyalism, new light will be shed on the Chinese response to, and the impact of, alien rule in south China.

My initial approach to the topic was to identify as broadly as possible the subjects of the study, that is, decide whom to include and whom to exclude under the term "Sung loyalists". From both primary and secondary sources I compiled about three hundred biographical sketches of men whose loyalist conduct during and after 1273-79 earned them some sort of commendation. These were individuals
who fought the Mongols, died or committed suicide because of the
Mongol conquest; the survivors of the resistance battles; and former
Sung officials and commoners who withdrew from society or politics and
decided to take up office under the Yüan government. Loyalty to the
Sung and refusal to serve in the Yüan was the criterion I used to
identify and define the Sung loyalists. This seemed straightforward
enough, but I soon became aware that the same individuals considered
as loyalists in one source are regarded as collaborators in another.
Their loyalty was doubted because they either served the Yüan under
coercion before retiring or accepted office towards the latter part of
their life. While some writers still classify them as loyalists on
the basis that the offices held were merely teaching positions and did
not entail taking orders from the throne,26 others condemn this
conduct as wan-chieh pu-shou (failure to maintain
integrity to the end) and relegate them to collaborators. Among the
sources there exists a general inconsistency as to whether such
individuals should be included as loyalists. To exclude this subgroup
from a discussion of Sung loyalism would amount to concentrating on
exemplary loyalists and ignoring less absolute manifestations of
loyalism; a broad and comprehensive perspective on the Sung loyalists
would therefore not be achieved. Furthermore, it would succumb to the
shortcomings of traditional scholarship on the topic—resorting to
merely listing the individuals whose conduct ought to be extolled by
future generations.

I consider this group of marginal loyalists a crucial part of the
research, for it is through this middle-ground of loyalism that we can
observe that the Sung loyalists were not a homogenous group with
absolute values and flawless conduct, but were in fact a loose
gathering of individuals who defined their loyalism and life-style according to personal circumstances and experiences. The core of this study will be concerned with identifying and describing three types or traditions of Sung loyalists: the chung-i martyrs who died for or because of the Sung cause, the i-min surviving subjects who lived on and largely maintained their loyalty by not serving the new dynasty, and the marginal loyalists (a subgroup of the i-min) whose loyalty was doubted by certain writers because at some time they reemerged into public office. The chapter on the chung-i will deal with Li T'ing-chih 李庭芝 (d. 1276), Wen T'ien-hsiang, Lu Hsiu-fu 陆秀夫 (1238-1279), Chang Shih-chieh 張世傑 (1236-1279), and Hsieh Fang-te, followed by a brief look at the relationship between these leaders of military resistance and their followers and supporters. In the chapter on the i-min my main purpose will be to identify loyalist groups and leading personages, in addition to reconstructing interpersonal relationships and major activities which occurred in Annam and Champa (both in Indochina), Ta-tu 大都 (Peking), Kuei-chi 總督 (Shao-hsing), Wu-chou 蘇州 (Chin-hua) and Yen-chou 汝州, Ch'ing-yuan 廣元 (Ningpo), Lu-ling 廊陵 (Chi-an), Jao-chou 饒州 and Wu-yüan 庫源, P'ing-chiang 平江 (Soochow), and Tung-kuan 東莞 (near Canton). The marginal loyalists in Hu-chou 湖州 (Wu-hsing) and Hang-chou 杭州 (Hangchow) revolved around Chou Mi; this circle of friends and acquaintances are taken as a case study of the middle-ground of Sung loyalism.

From these three traditions I shall discuss approximately ninety individuals, who either left collected writings or whose loyal conduct featured particular and unique characteristics of Sung loyalism. These men belonged to the adult generations (over twenty years old at
the time of the Sung demise) who may or may not have been in Sung office, but who physically and/or emotionally suffered through the fall of the Sung capital in 1276 and/or the collapse of loyalist resistance in 1279, and afterwards still considered themselves men of the Sung for a period of time. The backgrounds, activities, and experiences of these individuals before and after the dynastic crisis, together with their motivations, aspirations, and interpersonal relationships will be the central concern of this study. The period under study is limited to ca. 1273-1300 in order to focus on the first generation of Mongol rule in south China. By 1300, many of the loyalists had died, or their loyalty had in most cases become insignificant or transformed into a more accommodating acceptance of the new dynasty.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. These foreign dynasties were the T'o-pa Wei 拓跋魏 (386-534), the Northern Ch'i 北齊 (550-577), the Khitan Liao 楚丹遼 (907-1125), and the Jurchen Chin 女真金 (1115-1234).

2. The following statements of the Sung loyalists were quoted to substantiate the claim. The "Brief discourse on Great Righteousness", in Cheng Ssu-hsiao's Hsin-shih, in T'ieh-han hsin-shih/ Hsi-fa chi ho-k' an (Taipei, 1975), p. 129, reads: "In Mongol law, officials are ranked first, clerks second, Buddhist monks third, Taoists fourth, medical healers fifth, artisans sixth, hunters seventh, common people eighth, Confucian scholars ninth, and paupers tenth." The "Preface to farewell Fang Po-tsai returning to San-shan", in Hsieh Fang-te's T'ieh-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi (SPTK), 6.3b, says: Those humorous ruffians who ridicule Confucian scholars say: "In the laws and statutes of the Great Yuan, there are ten classes of people. Officials [belong to] the first class, clerks the second. Those coming first are eminent; 'eminent' means that they are useful to the country. Carpenters [who rank] seventh, prostitutes eighth, Confucians ninth, and paupers tenth, follow and are [decreasingly] lowly; 'lowly' means that they are useless to the country." Cf. Ch'en Yüan, Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols, trans. and annot. Ch'ien Hsing-hai and L. Carrington Goodrich (Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 290-91. Ch'en Yüan and most modern historians now dismiss the above statements as exaggerated complaints of frustrated scholars and do not take them as an accurate portrayal of the Yuan. In a recent study, Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing indicates that Confucian scholars under the Yuan were ranked below Yuan aristocrats, officials, and clerks but above the other social and economic classes. See Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Yüan-tai ti ju-hu: ju-shih ti-wei yen-chin-shih ti i-chang", Tung-fang wen-hua 16:1-2 (1978), p. 169.

3. For example, see Chien Po-tsan's "Lun Yüan-tai Chung-kuo jen-mín fan-tui T'a-t'a ti tou-cheng" in his Chung-kuo shih lun-chi (Shanghai, 1947), pp. 138-62; Sun K'o-k'uan's "Hu-pi-lich shih-tai nan Chung-kuo jen-mín chih fan-k'ang" in his Yüan-tai Han wen-hua chih huo-tung (Taipei, 1968), pp. 338-44; Chin Yu-fu's Sung Liao Chin shih (Hong Kong, 1966), p. 115.


6. For a discussion of the Ch'ing "analogy" to the Yüan situation see John D. Langlois, Jr., "Chinese Culturalism and the Yüan Analogy:


8. See Yanai Watari's Yüan-tai Meng Han Se-mu tai-yü k'ao, trans. Ch'en Che and Ch'en Ch'ing-ch'Yün (Shanghai, 1932), pp. 97-101. Yanai's study shows that the Mongols treated the Central Asians and the Chinese differently due to the earlier submission of the former to Mongol rule.


10. So far the most important reappraisal of the Mongol Yüan period is China under Mongol Rule, ed. John D. Langlois, Jr. The overall theme in the volume is the Yüan contribution to Chinese culture—a theme well supported by the individual studies. The only shortcoming is the lack of studies of local districts. Although I had mostly completed my research and formulated my conclusions when the book came out, I am still greatly indebted to this volume which confirms some of the conclusions presented in this thesis. The most helpful sections are the contributions by Hok-lam Chan, John D. Langlois, Marilyn Wong Fu, and Li Chu-tsing.

11. See for example, Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Ch'eng Chü-fu yü Hu-pi-lieh p'ing-Sung i-hou ti an-ting nan-jen wen-t'i", Wen-shih che-hsvieh pao 17 (1968), 353-79. See also Li Tse-fen, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang (Taipei, 1978). Li's five-volume work is useful in providing detailed source materials on the Yüan dynasty and for an introduction to the period. Much biographical sources are verbatim quotes from the Yüan-shih (YS) and other traditional writings. One should be cautious when using this work, because there are frequent factual mistakes, as for example, the information on Chou Mi (vol. 5, 409-10). Also, the author is overly enthusiastic in advocating positive views and sometimes tenuous interpretations of the Yüan dynasty.


13. This usage is in accordance with the Webster International Dictionary (1971), p. 1342: "a person who is or remains loyal to a political cause, party, government, or sovereign." The Shorter Oxford Dictionary on Historical Principles (1980), p. 1245, also states: "one who is loyal; one who adheres to his sovereign or to constituted authority, especially in times of revolt; one who supports the
existing form of government." The use of the term "loyalists" to
describe loyal men at the end of the dynasty, i.e., a subgroup of all
loyal men throughout the dynasty, is conventional, as applied for
example to the Ming loyalists.

14. This usage concurs with Laurence A. Schneider, A Madman of
Ch'u: The Chinese Myth of Loyalty and Dissent (Berkeley, 1980),
p. 78. On the term "Ming loyalists", see Lynn A. Struve,
"Ambivalence and Action: Some Frustrated Scholars of the K'ang-hsi
Period", in From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in
Seventeenth-Century China, ed. Jonathan D. Spence and John E.

15. Other terms for these men in Chinese historical sources are
chung-lich 唱烈 (loyal and brave), i-shih 义士 (righteous men), and
chung-ch'en 忠臣 (loyal subjects). Because these men maintained their
loyalty to the point of death, the term chung-i 墳它 carried the sense of
martyrdom (thus, loyal martyrs). As a group biography, the chung-i
have been included in dynastic histories since the Tsin-shu 漢書. In
this study we are interested in only those chung-i (loyal martyrs)
who demonstrated their loyalty during 1273-79 and lost their lives.
The chung-i loyalists in Chinese history are normally to be
distinguished from the i-min loyalists who did not perish but withdrew
from a public life. This distinction is also referred to by Langlois,
in his "Chin-hua Confucianism under the Mongols, 1279-1368",
It should be noted, however, that this distinction is not always
consistent and the terms mutually exclusive. Even in the Sung-shih
(SS) biographies of the chung-i there are several individuals who did
not die, but withdrew from society or disappeared.

16. The term i-min was first used in the Tso-chuan and Mencius.
See Tso-chuan, second year of Min-kung, in James Legge, The Chinese
Classics (Hong Kong, 1960), vol. 5, 127; Mencius, "Wan-chang 萬章"
chapter (Legge, vol. 2, 353). The Mencius quote is in reference to
the "Yün-han 雲漢" poem in the Shih-ching.

17. The two terms are not mutually exclusive, as many "leftover"
or "surviving subjects" became recluses, and vice versa. For
the example of Po-i and Shu-ch'i of the Shang, see Chapter Five, p. 173.

18. For examples of these compilations and anthologies see
Chapter Three, pp. 95-96.

19. See for example, Yang Te-en, Wen T'ien-hsiang nien-p'u
(Shanghai, 1939); Li An, Wen T'ien-hsiang shih-chi k'ao (Taipei,
1972). There are a number of separate articles on Li T'ing-chih,
Cheng Ssu-hsiao, Ma T'ing-luan, Hsieh Fang-te, and a few others. Sun
K'o-o-k'uan's "Yi'an-ch'u nan-Sung i-min ch'u-shu", Tung-hai hsüeh-pao 15
(1974), 13-33, ignores the chung-i loyalists and looks at only the
i-min: it lists and categorizes ninety-five i-min loyalists but does
not analyze interpersonal relationships and Individual loyalists. As
for Japanese scholarship, there is surprisingly little done on the
topic, except for studies on Wen T'ien-hsiang such as Kamegei Ryō's
Genminshi gaisetu (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 50-86.
20. On this debate, see Chapter Three, pp. 99-101.

21. Anthologies of Sung literature usually include sections dealing with the poetry of the Sung demise. Recently a number of monographs based on theses have appeared in Taiwan. See for example, Su Wen-t'ing's Sung-tai i-min wen-hsüeh yen-chiu (Taipei, 1979); Wang Wei-yung's "Nan-Sung i-min tz'u ch'u-t'an" (M.A. thesis, Tung-wu University, 1979); on Liu Ch'en-weng, see Huang Hsiao-kuang's Hsü-hsi tz'u yen-chiu chi chien-chu (Taipei, 1973); on Chou Mi, see Wang Ying-hua's Ts'ao-ch'uang tz'u yen-chiu (Taipei, 1978). However, these works are mostly annotations of the poem collections and show little in-depth analysis of the historical times and circumstances.

22. There is a dissertation on Wen T'ien-hsiang and one on Wang Ying-lin: W. A. Brown's "The Biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang in the 'Sung-shih'" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1963) is a translation of Wen's SS biography and a study of the transmission of his writings; C. Bradford Langley's "Wang Ying-lin (1223-1296): A Study in the Political and Intellectual History of the Demise of Song" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1980) looks at the political background of late Sung through the experience of Wang Ying-lin.


26. Ming scholars were especially critical of individuals who served the Yüan, regardless of the nature of the position. However, the Ch'ing scholar Ch'üan Tsu-wang felt that a mere appointment as shan-chang 領 (director of local schools or academies) was a minor post, did not involve communication with the central government and was therefore permissible to a loyalist without sacrificing his integrity. However, higher positions such as chiao-shou 教授 (instructors) in a prefecture would involve collaboration in Ch'üan's view. See Chapters Three and Five, pp. 98, 205. Sun K'o-k'uan's stated views are similar to Ch'üan's, but in fact he includes those who served as instructors in this study of i-min loyalists. See his "Yüan-ch'u nan-Sung i-min ch'u-shu", 23.
I. Background to the Fall of Hang-chou

Since its founding the Sung dynasty was continuously plagued by its neighbours: the Tanguts in Inner Mongolia; the Khitans in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria; the Jurchens who supplanted the Khitans; and the Mongols who in turn took over Jurchen Chin territory before occupying the whole of China by 1279. Due to the weak military foundations of the state, Sung foreign policy from the beginning had to resort to ho-i (appeasement policies). The Treaty of Shan-y'lan in 1005 forced the Sung to acknowledge the Khitan Liao as equals; its heavy tribute demands also drained central government finances.

A century later the Sung collaborated with the Jurchens and crushed the Liao state, but in 1126-27 it was forced to cede to them the Liao tribute as well as north China—the nuclear centre of Chinese civilization. The ultimate humiliation was inflicted with the capture and abduction to the north of Ch'in-tsung (r. 1126-1127) and the recently abdicated Hui-tsung (r. 1101-1126), along with some two thousand imperial relatives and three thousand officials and escorts. Hui-tsung's ninth son Kao-tsung (r. 1127-1162) escaped and mustered enough support from court officials and military men to bring about a restoration that prolonged the Sung imperial house for another century and half (subsequently known as the Southern Sung). Yüeh Fei (1103-1141), the great patriotic general, regained some lost territory but was stopped short and put to death by
Kao-tsung, who at the time was more inclined towards a peace settlement with the Jurchens. As a condition of peace the border between the Sung and Jurchen Chin was drawn roughly corresponding to the Huai River. Against the choice of Chien-k'ang (Nanking), Hang-chou was renamed Lin-an and made the seat of the Sung court. Although soon established in the rich economic zone of the southeast provinces, the Sung court for the remainder of its existence regarded Hang-chou as merely the hsing-tsai so (temporary residence). Nostalgia for the former capital of Pien-liang (Kaifeng) was assuaged by the meteoric development of Hang-chou to a cultural metropolis rivalling its predecessor, but the desire to restore the Central Plain was echoed fervently from statesmen to patriotic poets. In 1234 an alliance with the Mongols eradicated the Chin dynasty and the Sung obtained final revenge against the Jurchens, but removed the crucial buffer state needed to ensure its own security against the Mongols.

The inherent conflict of interests between these two unlikely allies inevitably precipitated hostilities lasting almost half a century. The Southern Sung was ideologically compelled to recover the north, or at least the Northern Sung capitals and imperial mausolea. On the other hand, the Mongols were likewise committed to continue their expansionist policy, now directed against the Southern Sung itself. Initial skirmishes began when the Southern Sung refused to pay tribute to the Mongols and withdraw its forces from former Chin territory, thereby allowing the Mongols an excuse to raid Szechwan, Ching-Hu, and the Liang-Huai regions. These clashes were relatively minor and amounted to the Mongols exploiting and looting territory. However, the second stage of warfare in 1258-60
was executed with much more organization and intensity. Interested in both occupying territory and collecting war spoils, Mongke Qaghan (Hsien-tsung, r. 1251-1259) led the main force from Qaraqorum to Ho-chou in Szechwan. One column branched off to Hsiang-yang in the Ching-Hu area, and Qubilai (Shih-tsu, r. 1260-1294) led a column from K'ai-p'ing (later Shang-tu, near Tulun) to O-chou (Wuchang), where he was to join with the army of Uriangqatai (1211-1272), which was then advancing north from Chiao-chih (Tonkin). Both the Sung and Mongols were suffering heavy losses at O-chou when the latter beat a hasty retreat. Mongke had suddenly died and Qubilai immediately hastened north to stake his claim to the throne. Just before this new development, it appears that at the Sung fort the general in control of the Huai region, Chia Ssu-tao (1213-1275), had proposed a peace treaty.

In 1260 Qubilai must have realized that rivalry for the khanate succession and the consolidation of his power would preoccupy him and his army for a long period. He decided therefore to delay the Sung campaigns and despatched Hao Ching (1223-1275) and several emissaries to the Sung court. Ostensibly it was a friendly mission to proclaim to the Sung his accession to the throne, to conclude a ceasefire agreement, and to warn Mongol generals at the borders to refrain from looting. The party of Hao Ching was, however, never allowed to come to the Sung court, despite the numerous letters addressed to Emperor Li-tsung (r. 1225-1265), Chia Ssu-tao, Li T'ing-chih, and various government departments threatening reprisals from the Mongols. Chia Ssu-tao had by then become chief minister and handed over the administration of the Huai to the veteran general
Li T'ing-chih. For sixteen years Hao Ching and his companions were detained in Huai territory, allegedly under the irresponsible orders of Chia Ssu-tao. Chia has been accused of conceiving such a foolhardy measure to keep secret an agreement with Qubilai that stipulated ceding Sung territory and annual tributes, and to claim full credit and honours for the retreat of the Mongols in 1259 from O-chou.\(^{11}\) In a favourable reappraisal of Chia, Franke convincingly dispels this myth on both counts: there existed no evidence of such a treaty having been concluded, and primary sources indicate that the central government and emperors were aware of the situation at the front.\(^{12}\)

Franke, however, does not explain why Chia Ssu-tao insisted on such an ill-conceived and fruitless strategy. I suggest that evidence points to Li T'ing-chih, rather than Chia, as the person who played the crucial role during the entire duration of Hao Ching's captivity. It was Li, the veteran official and general in command of the Huai regions in 1260-76, who assessed the intents of Hao Ching's mission and probably decided on his own initiative to detain the luckless envoy pending investigation.\(^{13}\) Perhaps through an espionage network which evidently existed on both fronts, Li discovered that Hao Ching had previously submitted to Qubilai a plan to conquer the Sung and on that basis perceived the mission to be hostile.\(^{14}\) Li might also have been skeptical about Hao's background: he was a protege of the general Chang Jou 張九 (1190-1268), who had gone over to the Mongols during the Chin collapse.\(^{15}\) Li most likely recommended further detention to Chia Ssu-tao, who concurred with Li's views. Detaining Hao was actually consistent with Li's suspicious attitude towards emissaries in general: later he even doubted Wen
T'ien-hsiang, his loyalist colleague, and executed other envoys. Li's name, however, has not been drawn into this event perhaps due to the efforts of historiographers to preserve his historical image as an exemplary loyalist.

During his captivity, Hao Ching was not imprisoned in the true sense, nor subjected to ill treatment. He admitted to receiving generous material comfort and food, and he wandered freely in the spacious gardens in the company of his five or six subordinates. He also wrote an enormous amount.16

The detention and even execution of foreign envoys was not an unusual occurrence in the history of Sung foreign relations; at times such acts were sanctioned and praised as loyal behaviour by the Sung court.17 The Hao Ching incident has drawn particular criticism in Chinese sources because it provided the Mongols with a ready excuse to conquer the Sung, and for the Sung with an immediate explanation and scapegoat for the collapse of the dynasty. Had the outcome of the incident been any different, the Sung and Yüan entanglement would not have been resolved differently. Hao Ching's peace treaty would have ceded territory and cash to the Yüan, and such terms, if concluded, would have amounted to merely a pause, not an end, to the Sung conquest. That much Hao Ching made clear in his advice to Qubilai Qaghan. These terms suggested a sort of coexistence of a similar nature to the Sung-Liao and Sung-Chin relations, and coexistence was incompatible with the Cinggis Qan (T'ai-tsu 太祖, r. 1206-1228) heritage of Heavenly-ordained world conquest.18 Thus whether Hao Ching returned to the north with or without a treaty, or as it happened did not return until sixteen years later, was in the long run inconsequential to Qubilai's resumption of campaigns against the Sung
the moment he had settled internal disputes.

During the period of relative calm in 1260–68 there were nonetheless some clashes at the border, with the Sung attempting to reconquer lost territory and the Yuan defending their gains. An incident advantageous to the Mongol side occurred in 1261: the defection of a high level Sung commander, Liu Cheng 魯 (1213–1275), and his surrender of fifteen commanderies and 300,000 households in Lu-chou 滬洲 (Szechwan). Liu Cheng was a northern Chinese who had first defected from the Chin to the Sung. Using discrimination by Chia Ssu-tao and southern Chinese generals as his reason for defecting, he divulged many Sung military secrets to the Mongols. In particular, he advised about the strategic importance of Hsiang-yang and built up the Mongol navy which was at that time inferior to the Sung fleet. The Sung on its side welcomed the defection of Li T'an 李晉 (d. 1262), who submitted to the Sung three prefectures in Shantung. He was the adopted son of Li Ch'üan 李埈 (d. 1231), who forty years earlier had gone over from the Chin to the Sung and then defected to the Mongols. In just a few months' time, the Yuan forces crushed Li T'an's army, executed the traitor, and recovered the Shantung region. While Li T'an's defection gave little lasting advantage to the Sung, the efforts of Liu Cheng and other Sung defectors and collaborators facilitated the Mongol conquest of the Sung.

When war resumed with the Sung, the Mongols first attacked Hsiang-yang and Fan-ch'eng 楚城, the cities on the lower and upper banks of the Yangtze in the Ching-Hu region. This strategy apparently took into account the lessons learned in Mongke's disastrous campaign in Szechwan, and aimed to acquire access to the Yangtze River from the
Ching and Huai regions before launching a multi-pronged pincer attack on the Sung capital, Hang-chou. The Hsiang-yang fortifications had been rebuilt after the Mongol onslaught in 1234-35, and had then become largely impregnable to enemy forces. After a siege of six years with catapults made by Muslim engineers, the twin cities crumbled one after the other, mostly because the Mongols effectively cut off supplies and food, especially salt and firewood. Notwithstanding some relief measures rendered by Li T'ing-chih and the veteran generals Hsia Kuei 虢貴 (1197-1279) and Fan Wen-hu 范文虎 (fl. 1260-1280), the defending commander of Hsiang-yang Lü Wen-huan 呂文煥 (d. ca. 1297) surrendered in March 1273 and subsequently fought on the Mongol side. Meanwhile at the Mongol court, Qubilai had firmly eliminated challenges to his position on the throne and surrounded himself with able Chinese advisers such as Liu Ping-chung 劉秉忠 (1216-1274). Ta-tu was designated as the capital and in 1271 "Yuan" was declared the official name of the dynasty.

The Sung court now had on its throne Tu-tsung 度宗 (r. 1265-1274), and Chia Ssu-tao had dominated the administration for fourteen years. In 1273, the court that dealt with the collapse of Hsiang-yang was not united but divided by personal grievances against state policies. There was a general lack of confidence in the ability of the central government to deal with the barbarian threat. Chia Ssu-tao has been traditionally denounced for being reckless, unconcerned, and inattentive to the Mongol crisis during his entire term in office. He did, however, introduce in 1262 two fundamental measures designed to increase revenues for military defence: the limitation of private landownership and the investigation into
embezzlement and other abuses of military generals. The principle behind the first measure, the kung-t'ien 公田 (public-land policy), was to prevent private hoarding of grain by the large landowners. One-third of privately owned land exceeding the set quota allowed in accordance with official rank and other criteria was to be converted into state land, the revenues of which were to go directly to the army. The owners of the confiscated land were compensated with cash and/or offers of official ranks. To show his sincerity and personal sacrifice in the matter, Chia surrendered to this scheme some ten thousand mou of his own estate in Che-hsi 浙西, an example followed by an imperial relative and several prominent men. In spite of loud protest and resentment by the large landowners, who had the most to lose and who were quite substantially represented among the powerful local elite and central government officials, Li-tsung repeatedly sanctioned the scheme. In the thirteen years of its implementation, this land reform did indeed generate a considerable amount of revenue.

While the large landowners were the victims of the public land policy, military personnel were singled out in the ta-hsuan fa 打算法 (auditing regulations), a scheme to force individual generals to account in detail for all expenditures of previous campaigns. Not a few top military leaders were spending part of their allocated funds in forbidden private transactions such as trade and commerce; some were even drawing extra salaries for fictitious names of nonexistent soldiers. After close scrutiny any amount overspent or spent in unauthorized areas had to be repaid to the state from the generals' own pockets. This measure ruined some innocent victims, including the loyalist hero Hsieh Fang-te. Although these two
schemes were originally conceived in order to strengthen Sung defence, they alienated many central and local officials.

To the credit of Chia, as his contemporary critic Chou Mi admitted, it must be said that when Chia was in power the Sung court was not menaced by the abuses of imperial relatives, eunuchs, and university students—a situation that had affected his predecessors. There is also little evidence that he resorted to nepotism: few of his blood relatives and friends obtained high positions in the Sung court. Nor until 1275 was the court plagued by fierce polarization of the peace and war factions that had characterized earlier Sung reigns. While the war faction advocated an aggressive military policy, the option of peace essentially placed the Sung at the receiving end of attacks from the Mongols. Chia was more inclined to favour this passive policy, and from 1259 to 1274 there existed in the Sung court no apparent opposition in this regard. Intense criticism of his appeasement policy began only after his disgrace in early 1275. Chia, however, had no illusions about the permanence of the relative peace from 1260 to 1273. It was in anticipation of a protracted struggle with the Mongols that he instituted the two schemes outlined above.

What caused dissent in the Sung court may have been the resentment military officials felt against their counterparts in the civil bureaucracy. They seem to have encountered some discrimination in dealings with their civil superiors, especially Chia, who despite his military background, from 1260 acted in the capacity of a civil official, made high level decisions and handed out rewards and punishments for their military endeavours. But if Chia had shown preferential treatment to civil officials, that attitude was
consistent with general Sung policy to undermine and control the military sector. As a result military officials sought to overcome their social stigma by emulating the civil officials in dress and customs, and even aspired to convert their military status to civil ranks. Although a few officials managed to combine a military and civil career, as did Chia Ssu-tao, Li T'ing-chih, Wen T'ien-hsiang, and Hsieh Fang-te, the majority did not. The military sector was itself split by internal jealousies affecting their morale. Military and civil officials accused Chia Ssu-tao of protecting his former subordinates like Fan Wen-hu, who was not severely punished after his failure to rescue Hsiang-yang from the Mongol siege. It seems also that some generals with northern origins like Liu Cheng who later defected to the Mongols and the loyalist Chang Shih-chieh felt discriminated against by the southern generals. The military sector also regarded the auditing regulations applied in 1262 as inequitable. Furthermore, the severe demotions and penalties which often accompanied defeat in battle built up dissatisfaction with the central government. In 1258 and in 1275, even Chia was threatened with serious punishment for losing important battles but the death penalty was mitigated by his long service to the state.

The Sung court appears to have recognized these grievances of the military officials, and did seek to remedy the situation. To open up channels of communication with the generals at the front, it frequently lavished generous rewards to the top and bottom ranks after each successful battle. Generals were often asked to go to court to present strategies and maps. These half-hearted measures, however, did not greatly improve the morale of the military sector.

Apart from the chasm between the military and civil sectors of
the government, another conspicuous feature in the Sung court was a sort of factionalism centred on the personality of Chia Ssu-tao. Traditional and secondary sources allege that Chia purged anyone who did not support him. Indeed, as soon as he became chief minister in 1259 (having been an acting chief minister since 1254), he engineered the disgrace and dismissal of his rivals Ting Ta-ch'üan 丁大生 (d. 1263) and Wu Ch'ien 美潛 (d. 1262). Ting is known in Chinese history as a chien-ch'en 嫉臣 (treacherous official) in the same category as Chia, and Wu is regarded as a good minister. However, it is not strictly true that Chia monopolized state power, for only in 1261-66 and again in 1273 was Chia the sole chief minister, and even during those years he might have been restrained by at least three acting ministers at any one time, such as Ma T'ing-luan 馬廷鸾 (1223-1289), Chiang Wan-li 江萬里 (1197-1275), and Wang Yieh 王亦傑 (d. 1276). During the other years in power he actually shared the chief ministership with the above acting ministers who were then promoted to chief ministers. Ma, Chiang, and Wang are considered benevolent and loyal ministers and not blamed for the country's misfortune. Their biographies and those of almost every upright official invariably contain the statement that they had opposed Chia and consequently suffered career setbacks. Apart from the protest against Chia's land reform, the details of such dissent are vague and never provided in the biographies—an omission that could well indicate their general tacit support of Chia during his administration. After his downfall, one would be hard pressed to find anyone, or any of his opponents' biographers, admitting to this support. The loyalty shown to Chia by his protege Liao Ying-chung 廖營中 (d. 1275) and a monk was an exception.
Other than the alleged crimes of Chia, a more fundamental problem confronting the Sung court during that period may have been the lack of competent alternatives to Chia and the reluctance of men in high-ranking positions to commit themselves to the state. Reading through the Sung-shih annals covering the period, one is struck by the frequency of requests from almost all top civil and to a less extent military generals to retire on pension, citing old age or illness as the excuse. Except in a few cases (such as that of Ma T'ing-luan who was genuinely ill), most of the pretexts were fabricated and did not reflect Confucian humility appropriately associated with declining high appointments. Even Chia many times pleaded to be relieved of his duties, but he alone was accused by his critics of faking modesty while secretly bribing censorate officials to memorialize against his resignation. Nor could such pleadings for retirement be equated with the Confucian practice of withdrawal in adverse times, for the Sung emperors were considered beyond reproach by being frugal themselves but generous to the officials. For some, the reason for seeking retirement was the desire to lead a life of pleasure; for others, it was due to anxiety and uncertainty about the future in the wake of the Mongol crisis. But in all cases, there was great envy for the ideal life of the upper middle class official in retirement. This life was characterized by wine, women, mountains and lakes, ponds, and pavilions, shared with t'ung-chih ("like-minded friends") and yu-yu ("travelling companions") with whom poetry was composed and excursions to historic or scenic sites made. In essence this life-style reflected extravagance in everyday life shared by both the well-to-do and the lower strata of society. It was a byproduct of the economic prosperity and cultural attainments of a highly urbanized
society in the last years of the Southern Sung. This pleasure-seeking life was blamed for selecting Hang-chou (a city endowed with spectacular landscapes) to be the capital, against the choice of Chien-k'ang, which would have been better fortified against invasions.36 A Hang-chou contemporary felt that it was also responsible for making scholar-officials forget about the recovery of the north. In actual fact, however, this life-style was highly popular and familiar to even loyalists such as Chou Mi in Hang-chou and Hu-chou, and Wen T'ien-hsiang in Chi-chou.

The surprisingly calm and unperturbed society and life of Hang-chou just prior to the Mongol crisis was possible because military disturbances over the last forty years had taken place outside the periphery of the southeast.37 Moreover, a sense of deceptive security had been strengthened by the prosperity of the region. In spite of occasional outbursts of panic, the scholar-officials, like the lower classes, had learned to live with sporadic military incursions at the borders, feeling that the dynasty, although long threatened, could not really be in immediate danger of total conquest.

It was during this period of apparent peace that news about the fall of Hsiang-yang was reported to the court by Li T'ing-chih. The first reaction was panic and then, the sudden realization of the irretrievable state of affairs. For individuals and the court, the vulnerability of the capital and its surrounding urban centres was really experienced for the first time. The imperial court immediately cancelled scheduled festivities for a forthcoming state occasion and directed the savings to be used for military defence along the Yangtze River.38 The Huai region was alerted to possible attacks by the
Mongols, and the court issued strict warnings to border generals to hold their defence positions, promising rewards and punishments in accordance with individual military results. It also invited officials and commoners from both the central and local ranks to present strategies of defence. To raise morale, immediate and posthumous rewards were generously bestowed on individuals who distinguished themselves in the Hsiang-yang battles. The generals responsible for the direction and course of the lost battles, Li T'ing-chih, Fan Wen-hu, and Hsia Kuei, were merely demoted a rank or two. It seems that the strict policy of penalizing defeated generals, as was the rule from the 1230s to the 1260s, no longer applied because the court wanted to retain their support rather than alienate it. Even the relatives and friends of Lu Wen-huan (who surrendered Hsiang-yang) were reassured of the throne's confidence in their loyalty. If the Sung court counted on their gratitude motivating them to compensate for their relative's surrender, it was to be greatly disappointed because Lu's nephew Lu Shih-k'uei (d. ca. 1300), his cousin Lu Wen-fu (d. ca. 1300), and his son-in-law Fan Wen-hu (all three top-ranking generals) soon after defected to the Mongols.

To raise the morale of the troops and generals, Chia repeatedly requested to be allowed to lead a force to the front, but was dissuaded by Emperor Tu-tsung. Instead, an ad-hoc department was set up to handle abuses and limitations of the Bureau of Military Affairs: security leaks of campaigns and delays of reports from the front. At the military front, propaganda was stepped up to invite northern Chinese to defect to the Sung side and to counteract Sung defections to the Mongols. The measure seems to have been
successful in winning over numerous defectors, but in contrast to the
Mongol policy of appointing defectors to significant military
positions, the Sung offered only modest sinecures and did not attract
high level defections from the Yuan. The Sung certainly did not make
potential use of informers and *lai-kuei jen* (defectors from
the Chin and Yuan) who consequently did not play a significant role in
the campaigns against their former commands.

These minor changes did not amount to a fundamental face-lift for
the military after the Hsiang-yang collapse. In the civil
officialdom, however, there was a definite turnover of key personnel,
if not in policy. Chia Ssu-tao was still in the limelight, but by
1274, resignations by Chiang Wan-li and Ma T'ing-luan among others had
been accepted by the court. Wang Yueh, Chang Chien (d. aft. 1276), and Ch'en I-chung (d. aft. 1285) now held the
reins of government. The policies of Chia were by and large
continued, and rewards and honours were bestowed on those who showed
valiant loyalty in their defence of the cities against the Mongols.
The new ministers also had to cope with the natural disasters which
coincident with the Mongol advances: the floods in Hang-chou and
Wu-chou, and drought in the Fukien region.

In August 1274 Emperor Tu-tsung died and his four year old son
Hsien came to the throne with Empress Dowager Hsieh (Li-tsung's
empress) designated as regent. Hsien, posthumously known as
Kung-ti (r. Aug.1274-Feb.1276), was actually younger than his
brother Shih, but was chosen as successor because his mother nee
Ch'uan was the empress. Advice was sought from retired veteran
officials, but none responded. In the same month in the Mongol Yuan
empire, Bayan (1237-1295) and Shih T'ien-tse (1202-1275) were
Bayan was assisted by high-ranking military personnel such as Uriangqatai’s son Aju (1234-1287), Arigh Qaya (1227-1286), Tung Wen-ping (1217-1278), and Chang Jou’s son Hung-fan (1236-1280), in addition to the defectors Lü Wen-huan and Liu Cheng. Two major campaigns were planned to take place in the Ching-Hu and Hang-chou surroundings, while a less intense battle was to be fought in Szechwan under Li Te-hui (1218-1280). In October Bayan assembled the naval and army forces (200,000 strong) in the newly conquered Hsiang-yang to execute a strategy of san-tao ping-chin (simultaneously attacking at three fronts). The main force was led by Bayan along the Yangtze; an eastern wing advanced from the Huai-hsi region; and a third battalion fought in the Ching-nan area.

From the start the Yuan had prepared for a difficult campaign, and indeed the first attack on Ying-chou was fraught with difficulties, for the Sung had fortified this city with over 100,000 men. Quite unexpectedly, Bayan abandoned this siege for the time being and moved along the Han River, taking possession of Sha-yang and Hsin-ch'eng after crushing prolonged local resistance. The next important battle took place at the Yang-lo fort and Han-yang, both of which protected O-chou. After a seige of ten days, the Sung defender Ch'eng P'eng-fei (d. aft. 1303) surrendered in January 1275 and joined the ranks of the Sung defectors. At this point Bayan's forces crossed the Yangtze and advanced with relative ease from city to city along the river.

The fall of O-chou and the crossing of the Yangtze by the Mongols
forced the Sung to undertake several measures. In order to generate revenues for the army, the property and estates of the imperial relatives, the aristocracy, monasteries and temples were taxed. The court next followed popular demand for Chia Ssu-tao, as commander-in-chief of the empire's forces, to halt the Mongol advance along the Yangtze. Faith in Chia's military ability as demonstrated twenty years earlier in the Huai seems to have remained deep even at this time. The army led by Chia was 70,000 strong with many generals recruited from the capital reserves. As a result the defence of the capital was much weakened, leading the Sung court to promulgate an empire-wide appeal of ch'in-wang (to raise armies for the defence of the emperor). In particular, the edict appealed to the general populace to rise against the threat of total barbarian conquest.

The late emperor [Tu-tsung] has died, and the successor is but an infant. [In spite of] my old age and decrepitude, I reluctantly took charge of state affairs from behind the curtain....How infuriating are these ugly caitiffs (i.e., barbarians) who have trespassed the Yangtze River! Bypassing our barricades and reaching our hill-tops, they seduced our recalcitrant subjects and violated the obedient. Since ancient times there has not yet been an age of total barbarian conquest [my emphasis]. How has it come to this present state that deviates from the constants of Heaven and Earth?...Three hundred years of virtuous rule—surely that has made an impression on the people. The souls of 100,000,000 pray for the protection of Heaven. In profound grief, I proclaim this edict in order to reverse the precarious state of the country. I have esteem for, and rely on you civil and military officials, who having received the benefits and generosity of the late emperors, will presently not shirk away and try to escape from this plight. Those worthy men with "loyal livers and righteous galls" [i.e., hearts], come forth and combat the forces that plague the throne and submit your skills. The country must exist before the family can exist. Mutual protection leads to the protection of all. I now proclaim these intents as ordained by Heaven, to raise the banner for the various circuits to rise to the salvation of the emperor. Be encouraged by fine strategies and illustrious names; nobility and rewards will be bestowed generously. This edict is thus proclaimed to reassure the empire. I trust you will understand it all.
Simultaneous with this direct appeal to both officials and private citizens to come to the assistance of the empire, veteran generals were appointed to coordinate the ch'in-wang armies raised in each of the nine circuits. Information and details about the armies recruited were to be reported to the court, which would confer ranks and offices on the leaders and communicate to them whether they should await orders from the local centres or proceed directly to the capital. The edict made no provisions for financial resources, but the ch'in-wang units did not appear to have been short of funds. The sources are vague about the details of recruitment but are emphatic about the immediate and effective arousal of veteran officials and newcomers alike who offered their services to the country in dire need. In Hu-Kuang, Li Fei 李芾 (d. 1275) organized 20,000 men; in Yang-chou, Juan K'o-ssu 阮克已 (d. 1276) under Li T'ing-chih's command mobilized 30,000; Wen T'ien-hsiang in Chi-chou and Kan-chou 韓州 brought together 10,000; and Hsieh Fang-te in Jao-chou and Hsin-chou 信州, and many others in various parts of the country assembled troops ranging in size from handfuls to thousands. By March 1275, a few months after the edict was issued, at least 200,000 men had been recruited.

By this time, however, the military crisis had reached an irreversible point, and Bayan and his forces were increasingly helped by the surrender of the Sung generals and the rapid erosion of Sung morale. Huang-chou 黃州, Ch'i-chou 斯州, An-ch'ing 安慶, and Ch'ih-chou 池州 were taken by the time Chia Ssu-tao arrived with his forces to halt the Mongol advance. Just before guns were fired and arrows shot, Chia sent an envoy to negotiate with Bayan for peace, but the latter quickly rejected the offer. In the ensuing battles at
Ting-chia-chou, Bayan inflicted a resounding defeat on the army and naval forces led by Chia. Chia then hastened to Lu-kang, where Hsia Kuei, the commander of Huai-hsi, had already fled without even engaging in battle. Chia's entire force was dispersed and over two thousand ships, along with supplies, maps and seals were captured.

To obtain immediate relief from the Yuan onslaught, the Sung then released the long detained Hao Ching and despatched him home with proper protocol. But Bayan continued his attacks through Chien-k'ang and Chen-chiang. There, he left behind forces to safeguard the gains along the Yangtze, and after instructing the eastern circuit army to continue campaigns in the Huai region, he departed for Ta-tu and Shang-tu to deal with the internal uprising of Qaidu (d. 1301). He did not return to supervise the Sung conquest until November 1275. During his absence from the front, the Sung managed to retake possession of some cities such as Ch'ang-chou, and the Huai region continued to hold out under the intrepid Li T'ing-chih.

Meanwhile in the Sung court the vilification of Chia Ssu-tao began almost immediately after his defeat at Ting-chia-chou and Wu-hu. Memorials from commoners, National University students, and all ranks of officials flooded the court demanding that Chia and his supporters be executed. Reluctantly Empress Dowager Hsieh finally bowed to public pressure and demoted Chia, revoked his honours, confiscated his property, and exiled him to the remote south. In October 1275 Chia was violently murdered in Fukien by a minor official acting on his own initiative. By then Chia had been accused of crimes ranging from wrongly possessing an imperial gift to inviting the
Mongols to conquer the Sung. His former friends did not hold high military and political positions, but they were stripped of all ranks and at least one of them committed suicide.57

The rapid defeat of Chia's large and well-equipped armies increased panic at the Sung court and hastened large-scale desertion. Even well-respected and high-ranking officials such as Chang Chien, Wang Ying-lin and Wen Chi-weng (1236-1291) fled the court.58 The problem was so acute that an imperial rescript was issued chastizing central government officials who fled without permission and local officials who abandoned cities under their charge. The edict stipulated that those remaining in office would be promoted two ranks, while those who deserted would be investigated by the censorate and their names posted for ignominious conduct.59

Among the officials who remained in the court were Ch'en I-chung and Wang Yüeh, the chief ministers now promoted to commanders-in-chief of the army and the navy. They did not get along well, and while Wang Yüeh's activities did not go beyond criticizing Chia, Ch'en I-chung emerged as the most forceful personality at the Sung court. Ch'en, in fact, now brought about a shift in policy in the civil bureaucracy for the first time since the Chia Ssu-tao period. Ch'en's policies were essentially motivated by the apparent need to unite dissident factions and to regain support for the Sung state in the face of alarming large-scale defections to the Mongol side. To placate the large landowners, he abolished the "public-land" scheme that had been enforced for thirteen years. Land forcefully bought by the state was returned to the landowners on the condition that they lead their tenants into battle.60 To win the financial support of merchants and overseas traders, he restored the less rigorous regulations on the
tea and salt monopolies and the commission of ships and overseas trade. On the military side, he injected new enthusiasm for the ch'in-wang campaigns and despatched envoys to surrendered generals to win back their loyalty. He acknowledged that they had cause for discontent under Chia's administration and guaranteed to absolve their crime of surrendering if they would return to the Sung. They would then be restored to their former posts; those who reconquered a lost prefecture or county would be offered the administration of it, with rewards extending from the generals down to the troops. Ch'en also ordered Chia's dispersed troops to return to their duties and instructed local magistrates to provide cash and rice to soldiers and civilians passing through, in return for a suspension of taxes. An amnesty was proclaimed for the release of all but the most dangerous criminals, including military and civil officials who were banished and their property confiscated. Ch'en even urged bandits and rebels to join forces with the central government to repel the Mongol armies. All these measures, however, were conceived too late and implemented in too short a time to have any efficacy in retrieving support for the Sung state.

In August 1275 Ch'en I-chung left the capital for his native prefecture, Wen-chou (Chekiang). When he returned in October, the Sung defences were in ruin and his own position in the Sung court was challenged by Chang Shih-chieh and Liu Meng-yen (1219-1299), the newly appointed chief minister. In contrast to the incompetence and confusion of Sung defence, Bayan coordinated a cautious and highly successful strategy in Chen-chiang where he had returned from the north in November. This strategy, to advance simultaneously from three fronts as earlier applied in 1274 from
Hsiang-yang, now aimed for Hang-chou as the point of convergence. The western wing under Ajirghan (d. 1282) proceeded rapidly to Chien-k'ang and attacked the Tu-sung pass, while the eastern wing under Tung Wen-ping and Chang Hung-fan sailed to the mouth of the Yangtze and advanced along the seacoast. The central army led by Bayan pushed through Ch'ang-chou and Hu-chou.

In a month, Ch'ang-chou, the Tu-sung pass and P'ing-chiang fell in rapid succession. Ch'ang-chou had been taken by the Mongols before, but during Bayan's absence had reverted to Sung control. To punish the city for its obstinate resistance and dubious loyalty, Bayan had the entire population massacred. If he had intended to intimidate Hang-chou into quick surrender by instilling terror, he was immediately successful, at least as far as Empress Dowager Hsieh was concerned. She was determined at all costs to avoid actual fighting in the capital, and from this point on offered increasingly more concessions in suing for peace, but in each case the Yuan side turned a deaf ear. In one mission, the Yuan envoy Lien Hsi-hsien (d. 1275) was murdered, but the Sung court disclaimed responsibility and blamed bandits and unruly generals. In January Lu Hsiu-fu headed another mission to seek relegation of the Sung emperor to the inferior status of nephew to the Yuan emperor, and in addition to agree to provide annual tributes. When rejected in this offer the Sung court sought the status of grandson, but that too was denied. Following that, the empress dowager agreed to surrender as a vassal state on the condition that a small state be granted to ensure the perpetuation of the Sung imperial family. This message and the imperial seals were sent to Bayan, who by then had pressed on to the Kao-t'ing mountains, just thirty li northeast of Hang-chou.
Bayan was still not impressed by this proposal for conditional surrender. In January 1276, to further demonstrate her genuine good faith in seeking peace negotiations, the empress dowager issued edicts to Wen T'ien-hsiang and other generals to cease fighting and disband recruited units.67

The Sung court was not unanimous in supporting peace negotiations with the Mongols, and this dissent not only confused the generals at the front, but seriously undermined the credibility of Sung proposals to the Mongol side. In seeking appeasement at all costs the empress dowager played a personal role: she was not manipulated, but only supported, by officials such as Wu Chien (d. aft. 1276), Hsieh T'ang (fl. 1260-1280) and others who were soon promoted to ministerial ranks. Contrary to traditional accounts which identify Ch'en I-chung with the faction favouring surrender and single out Wen T'ien-hsiang as the one strongly opposed to the move, a close examination of the sources indicates a different situation. I suggest, and will later attempt to show, that Ch'en I-chung and Chang Shih-chieh represented the faction that advocated continued hostilities with the Mongols and even made preparations in the event that the capital collapsed.68

In February 1276, the empress dowager's peace negotiations were leading to unconditional surrender, and a few days before that event Ch'en I-chung, Chang Shih-chieh, Lu Hsiu-fu, and Ch'en Wen-lung (d. 1276) took their forces and left the capital.69 Kung-ti's brothers Shih and Ping had just been appointed pacifying commissioner of Fukien in charge of Fu-chou and administrator in charge of the Court of Imperial Relatives in the South respectively. The two princes were escorted out of the capital by their maternal
uncles and headed for Wen-chou, where they were to be met by Ch'en I-chung, Chang Shih-chieh, and Lu Hsiu-fu.

At about this time, Wen T'ien-hsiang returned to Hang-chou after an aborted attempt to defend the Tu-sung pass. The court was then virtually deserted by the departure of those who accompanied the two princes to the southeast and by the extensive desertion of civil officials for their native homes. In the absence of veteran officials, Wen, despite his relatively junior status, and Wu Chien, despite his old age, were appointed chief ministers and despatched to resume peace negotiations with Bayan. In this mission, Wen was one of five or six envoys sent by the empress dowager, the others being Chia Hsüan-weng, Hsieh T'ang, Chia Yu-ch'ing, and Liu Pa. Rather than finalizing the details of the surrender, as had been the empress dowager's instructions, Wen reviled both the Yuan generals and the Sung defectors in Bayan's camp. While the other envoys were permitted to return to report to the Sung court, Wen was detained.

Altogether the negotiations for surrender extended over three months, from December 1275 to February 1276. This protracted period may have been responsible for the unhurried and rather orderly submission of the capital. Fighting was avoided in the city itself, concurring with Empress Dowager Hsieh's firm determination not to have the Ch'ang-chou massacre of the entire population repeated. On 21 February 1276 the young Sung emperor assembled what remained of the officialdom to make obeisance to the north, the direction of the Mongol Yuan emperor. The final unconditional surrender statement pleaded only for the lives of the people of Hang-chou and the imperial family. Concurrent with the statement were edicts issued to the
entire Sung empire to cease fighting. One edict was addressed to Li T'ing-chih ordering the surrender of all Huai commanderies and prefectures; another edict was despatched to bring back the two imperial princes in flight.72

The actual transfer of power to the Mongol forces also turned out to be a regulated process in the gathering of war spoils, changeover of administration, and pacification of the population. This was in stark contrast to the arbitrary massacres and rampant looting of earlier Mongol campaigns that took place in other cities.73 Tung Wen-ping was first sent inside the city walls to take inventory of troops, civilians, cash and food supplies. Only then were the imperial palaces entered and the imperial seals, art objects and valuable treasures collected. In the government offices and Sung ancestral temples, appointment notices and government seals, sacrificial and archival material were assembled. The important items were selected for immediate shipment to the Yuan capital, while other pieces were stored in trunks and left temporarily outside the respective offices.74

Soldiers in general were not permitted to enter the city, but patrolling forces were assigned to keep peace in the former Sung capital. Wen T'ien-hsiang's volunteer troops were disbanded and told to go home, while the regular Sung forces were incorporated into the Mongol army. Weapons and arms were strictly confiscated from unauthorized personnel. All Sung offices and departments were dissolved and imperial guards dismissed, but many former civil and military officials subsequently offered their service to the new administration, which was proclaimed as the Regional Government of Che-tung and Che-hsi, under the control of Fan Wen-hu and Mangqutai
The Che-tung-hsi hsüan-wei ssu (Pacification Bureau of Che-hsi and Che-tung) was provisionally set up to attend to affairs relating to the former Sung government. Following the Yüan practice of conciliation, Sung officials who had surrendered and collaborated were assigned to head the bureau.\(^7^5\)

In spite of the orderly change of administration, the anticipation of Hang-chou's collapse nevertheless created restless apprehension in all orders of society from the imperial family to the general population. It is said that local bandits took advantage of anarchy to plunder and loot; it seems also that the Mongol administration was not able to prevent unruly generals and soldiers from demanding san-hua (bribes).\(^7^6\) The surrender notice was circulated extensively to inform the public of the change of administration and to curtail speculation of Yüan intentions. Soon Qubilai addressed an edict to former officials, clerks, civilians, and soldiers of the Sung. It ordered all social and economic classes to continue with their normal professions and refrain from arousing unnecessary suspicion and fear. An amnesty was declared on criminals who had committed offences prior to the submission of Hang-chou. Reassurance of nonpunitive action was given to former officials of the Sung, and archival material, imperial sacrificial and musical instruments, genealogies, astrological charts and geographical maps were to be collected for safekeeping. Descendants of Confucian sages and virtuous men, illustrious Confucian scholars, medicine experts, Buddhist monks, Taoist priests, fortune-tellers and shamans, experts in astrology, and recluses in the mountains and forests were required to register their names with officials in Hang-chou. Famous mountains, great rivers, monasteries and temples, as well as
historical sites relating to formerly distinguished men were forbidden to be destroyed. Widows, orphans, and the disadvantaged were to be assisted with public funds.77

The edict also informed the people of Hang-chou that the Sung imperial family, in accordance with precedents set by defeated rulers, would be required to go to the Yüan capital. In essence this meant that the Sung imperial family was taken into captivity and abducted to the north. Two main Sung entourages journeyed to the court of Qubilai, one consisting of chief ministers (the "mercy-begging" officials) and the other of members of the Sung imperial family. The first one left on 25 February 1276, a few days after the surrender of Hang-chou, and comprised Wen T'ien-hsiang (who escaped after three weeks), Chia Hsüan-weng, Wu Chien, Chia Yü-ch'ing, and Liu Pa. Altogether there were about three hundred former officials and clerks, and three thousand carriers and escorts of gifts.78 The purpose of this journey was to submit seals and the surrender statement to the Yüan emperor. After entering Ta-tu, the gifts were acknowledged and the gift-bearers rewarded with positions in the Yüan government. Chia Yü-ch'ing died shortly upon arrival and an accompanying official, Kao Ying-sung 高應松 (d. 1276), starved himself to death;79 the remaining former Sung chief ministers awaited the arrival of the imperial entourage which had left Hang-chou on 28 March 1276.

The imperial entourage was escorted by Bayan and consisted mainly of Kung-ti, his mother Empress Dowager Ch'üan, his grandfather Prince Fu 福王, princesses and imperial concubines and relatives. Empress Dowager Hsieh left Hang-chou several months later due to serious illness.80 Palace maids, former Sung officials, and students from the three universities also formed part of the large retinue. Some
officials volunteered to accompany the imperial family hoping to acquire positions in the new dynasty, but it appears that the students were forced by the Yuan to embark on the journey.81 Included in the former category was Liu Meng-yen, the former Sung chief minister who later reached high ranks in the Yuan bureaucracy; in the latter category the National University student Hsü Ying-piao (d. 1276) committed suicide with his family of three rather than witness the shameful capitulation of the imperial family in the Yuan capital.82 When the imperial entourage arrived in Yang-chou, the loyalist general Chiang Ts'ai (d. 1276), under the orders of Li T'ing-chih, attempted but failed to rescue the Sung emperor and empress dowager.83 The journey took a little over two months to arrive in Ta-tu, where the Sung imperial family joined the chief ministers to proceed to Shang-tu, the Yuan emperor's summer residence. There, they were received at court by Qubilai and his empress in a grand feast, and the young Kung-ti was formally stripped of his title of emperor and relegated to the Duke of Ying-kuo.84 Compared to the hardships to which the Jurchens subjected Hui-tsung and Ch'in-tsung, the Mongols' treatment of the Sung imperial family has been seen as more compassionate. Empress Dowager Hsieh, who did not arrive until November 1276, was given the title of Lady of Shou-ch'eng. The Duke of Ying-kuo and the two empress dowagers were each granted tax-free property in Ta-tu, where they subsequently lived. Empress Dowager Hsieh died in 1282 and Empress Dowager Ch'i'an later entered a monastery. In 1288 the Duke of Ying-kuo set out for Tibet to become a Lama priest; in 1323 he was ordered by Shidebala (Ying-tsung, r. 1321-1323) to commit suicide.85 Some palace ladies accompanying the imperial family on the journey hanged
themselves rather than sacrifice their virtue by remarrying; those remaining were married off to craftsmen in the north. Imperial relatives, officials, and students who accompanied the imperial retinue were given positions in the government.

Arriving in Shang-tu, Bayan also had an audience with Qubilai in which he presented a laudatory address about the surrender of Hang-chou. Thereupon Qubilai sent officials to the outskirts of the city to proclaim the conquest of the Sung to Heaven, Earth, and his ancestors. Arrangements were also made for the traditional Chinese sacrifices to the sacred mountains and rivers to indicate the legitimate succession of the Ōan to the Sung, again only by proxy, as Qubilai, like his predecessors, did not subscribe wholly to the traditional Chinese concept of legitimate succession. These sacrificial rituals nevertheless show that as far as the Ōan was concerned, the conquest of the Sung was completed in February 1276 with the fall of the Sung capital. Many of the Sung generals and civil officials who had been holding their defence positions no doubt thought the Sung had perished too, when news of the Hang-chou collapse reached them. Thus following many other Sung commanders, Hsia Kuei, the veteran general in Huai-hsi, and Fang Hui (1227-1307), the prefect of Yen-chou, immediately halted their operations and surrendered to the Mongol forces. The general opinion in 1276 was that the Sung had ended: the Sung court had disintegrated, the imperial family had been taken captive, and edicts had been issued ordering the entire empire to lay down arms.

Bayan's role in the surrender of the Sung imperial family has been overwhelmingly praised in Ōan official sources. He was commended for following the instructions of Qubilai to exercise mercy
and strategy rather than rely on sheer force and merciless slayings. And to a certain extent Bayan did avoid some bloodshed by attracting many defections. He applied firmly the policy of conciliation, which rewarded lavishly those who surrendered but punished harshly those who resisted. The surrendered officials were in turn effectively sent as envoys to persuade their friends and relatives to cross over to the Mongol side. Destruction was thus not arbitrary and total in some cities but elsewhere there were indeed acts of violence and ruthlessness, ranging from cutting off the enemies' ears and displaying them at the city gates to exterminating the entire population of Ch'ang-chou. Loyalist writings may have exaggerated or even fabricated stories of Bayan putting diehard Sung loyalists in boiling water to extract oil and grease for catapults, which was a traditional Mongol practice. Although Yuan sources report that "when the troops were sent to occupy the city [i.e., Hang-chou] and when the imperial family was despatched to the north, the people did not even know", the poems and comments of the captives speak otherwise of the great piles of stinking bodies and the heart-rending weeping of bystanders watching the imperial family embark on the forced journey.

Another myth perpetuated by Yuan sources is the ease with which the conquest was carried out: "Taking Hsiang-yang and the Huai was as easy as picking up mustard seeds, and pacifying the south of the Yangtze was as easy as turning [something in] the palm". This gross misrepresentation is refuted by the fact that the conquest took over forty years, the last two of which engaged to full capacity the naval and army forces, involving 123 generals who received rewards and honours for meritorious service. Included in this list were many
Sung defectors who subsequently distinguished themselves in inflicting
defeat on the Sung forces on the one hand, and in luring over
defectors on the other.

Both Sung and Yüan official sources abound in anecdotes and
records of loyalist deeds of Sung military and civil officials in the
face of impending defeat. Chiang Wan-li, a former Sung chief
minister, drowned himself when the Mongol army entered his native
place of Jao-chou; his brother Wan-ch'ing and son also
perished.98 Chao Mao-fa (d. 1275) of Ch'ih-chou and Li Fei
of T'an-chou killed themselves and their families rather than
surrender.99 After the defeat of Chia Ssu-tao in early 1275, Wang
Li-hsin (d. 1275) looked for an "uncontaminated plot of Sung
soil" on which to die.100 There were numerous others who refused
to surrender citing their debt to the Sung as the reason; others
declared in a most uncompromising manner: "Alive, I am a subject of
the Sung; dead, I will remain a ghost of the Sung".101 In fury
some killed the envoys sent to persuade them to surrender and berated
the enemy until their tongues were cut off.102 These patterns of
martyrdom and endurance for the Sung cause and for preserving honour
in the family continued to be emulated among resistance circles in
1276-79. No longer receiving the sanction of the abducted Sung
imperial family and court, the loyalists operated independently in the
southeastern provinces where the Yüan forces had not fully penetrated.

II. Loyalist Resistance in 1276-79

In spite of Empress Dowager Hsieh's edicts ordering the total
submission of the Sung empire, fighting did not cease in parts of the
Huai, Szechwan, Fukien, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung.103 Remnant Sung
forces were soon joined by newly recruited armies to engage in militant resistance to the Mongols. The rise and sustenance of this movement can be attributed to two important events: the ch'in-wang edict promulgated in January 1275 and the flight of the two Sung princes to the southeastern provinces just days before the young Sung emperor formally capitulated in Hang-chou. The ch'in-wang edict had immediately aroused individuals, veteran officials, and commoners to volunteer their assistance to the emperor by raising armies. For some, the summons was interpreted as a personal appeal to save the dynasty from total conquest. By the middle of the year, combined efforts by officials and commoners had recruited a total of over 200,000 men, with operations in the Huai under Li T'ing-chih and Juan K'o-ssu, in Kiangsi under Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te, in Hunan under Li Fei, among others in Szechwan and elsewhere. However, hardly had these new armies made an impact at the military fronts when Empress Dowager Hsieh ordered the disbanding of the units in December 1275 and January 1276, during which time she was deeply involved in peace negotiations with the Mongol Yuan forces. This order was largely ignored and even when the capital surrendered, a substantial part of the ch'in-wang forces was still intact and recruitment was continuing. These units were the result of local efforts and still under the control of local leaders, and scattered throughout Sung territory. It remained an immense task for the loyalist leaders from the central Sung court to rally their support and organize, assimilate, and administer the armies as a single massive force.

While the ch'in-wang campaigns provided the military base, it was the presence of the infant Sung princes, Shih and Ping,\textsuperscript{104} that gave the resistance movement the legitimacy, credibility, and
popularity it received in Kiangsi, Fukien, and Kwangtung. Traditional accounts unanimously credit Wen T'ien-hsiang with the initial conception and leadership of the movement; but evidence suggests that Ch'en I-chung and Li T'ing-chih played the primary roles in both the evacuation of the two princes from Hang-chou and in the assembling of loyalist forces at Wen-chou. In 1275, while Empress Dowager Hsieh and some officials were suing for peace, contrary to traditional views it appears that Ch'en I-chung advocated continued hostilities with the Mongols and even considered alternative plans to restore the Sung state should it perish. From April 1275, after the disgrace of Chia, Ch'en's main thrust was to reverse Chia's policies in order to regain state confidence and strengthen defence. Chia at that time had memorialized the throne to transfer the capital from Hang-chou to a less vulnerable location, but Ch'en, in an effort to dissociate himself from implication with Chia, executed Chia's messenger conveying the proposal. While agreeing with Chia and even making preparations to transfer the Sung court, Ch'en at that moment pretended to concur with general public opinion not to relocate the capital on the basis that the army had just been replenished with ch'in-wang forces and that the Mongols could well pursue the fleeing Sung court. In August 1275, he left for his home in Wen-chou. This departure is inadequately explained by the sources as the outcome of the power struggle between Ch'en and Wang Yüeh, whose son criticized Ch'en in a petition. It seems more likely that Ch'en's trip to Wen-chou from August to October 1275 was intended to investigate the prefecture as a possible temporary capital or as a base for military operations.

Ch'en seems to have plotted with Li T'ing-chih, the veteran
military and civil official in charge of the Huai. Li at that time had been given ministerial ranks and often came when summoned to the Sung court to report the situation at the front; thus ample opportunities existed for the two men to have consulted each other. Li's connection with the Hao Ching affair has earlier been discussed, and now his more elusive role was possibly to supply Huai troops to support Ch'en's evacuation plan. Indeed, Huai troops were conspicuously present among the loyalist forces. Li also provided Ch'en with the able supporters Lu Hsiu-fu and Su Liu-i (d. 1279), both of whom had been his own proteges in the Huai and who later became central personalities in the resistance movement.108

Li was later summoned as chief minister at the enthronement of Prince Shih in June 1276, an indication of his importance at the initial planning stage of the restoration.

The original plan might have been the total evacuation of the Sung court, but as Empress Dowager Hsieh wavered and refused until the last days of surrender to leave Hang-chou, the flight of the two princes was substituted. In order to dispel the suspicion of the Mongols, the plan may have involved departing via different routes to congregate in Wen-chou. This prefecture, apart from being Ch'en's home, had ideological significance as the temporary refuge of Kao-tsung's restoration of the Sung dynasty a century and a half before. Wen-chou was also in close proximity to Foochow and Ch'Uan-chou, which could potentially serve as naval bases for the loyalists and obtain support from the imperial clansmen based in the two prefectures.109

A day or two before the official surrender of Hang-chou, Ch'en I-chung, Chang Shih-chieh, Lu Hsiu-fu, Ch'en Wen-lung, and other
supporters took their forces and fled from the court as planned. At the same time, the princes' maternal uncles and imperial relatives escorted them to Wen-chou via Wu-chou; they were followed by a rearguard sent by Ch'en I-chung. The two princes were accompanied by their mothers, a sister, and other imperial relatives. As soon as Bayan was notified of the two Sung princes' flight, Yüan forces were alerted but the princes managed a narrow escape. Less than two months later, all parties arrived in Wen-chou: Ch'en I-chung came from his home with some land forces; Chang Shih-chieh descended from Ch'ing-yüan where he had just attacked in vain the Yüan occupation forces; and Lu Hsiu-fu and Su Liu-i arrived from other routes. At the Chiang-hsin monastery on a chair which Kao-tsung had once sat on, Prince Shih was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the empire's infantry and cavalry, and Prince Ping his assistant. An appeal to revitalize support for the Sung princes was directed particularly at territories that had not yet surrendered. Several imperial clansmen in the retinue were sent into Fukien to reassure its officials and people, as well as to drum up support from other imperial clansmen. The appeals were immediately effective: many prefectures and counties about to surrender in Fukien, Kwangtung, and Szechwan quickly reversed their decision, and some places which had already submitted reverted to loyalist control. Under pressure from the Yüan generals, Empress Dowager Hsieh recalled the two princes, but Ch'en I-chung ignored her instructions and drowned her envoys. He then sailed from the coast to Foochow with the imperial retinue and most of the loyalist forces.

In June 1276 Prince Shih (posthumously Ti-Shih *) was proclaimed successor to the abducted Kung-ti, and his mother, Imperial
Concubine Yang 楊太妃 was appointed regent. A hsing-ch'ao 行朝 (refugee or loyalist court) was formed with Ch'en I-chung as commander-in-chief and chief minister of the Left, Li T'ing-chih as chief minister of the Right, Ch'en Wen-lung and Liu Fu 劉黻 (d. 1276) as assistant ministers, Chang Shih-chieh as vice-commissioner of Military Affairs, Su Liu-i as attendant of Palace Affairs, and Lu Hsiu-fu as signatorial official of Military Affairs. Among other central government officials who rallied to the enthronement were Teng Kuang-chien 鄧光薦 (1232-1303) and Ch'en Chung-wei 陳仲微 (1212-1283), who later wrote eyewitness accounts of the resistance. The generals Wu Chün 吳浚, Chao Chin 趙溍, Fu Cho 傅卓, Li Chueh 李珏 (all died in 1277), and Ti Kuo-hsiu 翟國秀 ([fl. 1275-1290], who later defected) were despatched to various circuits to recover Kiangsi, Chekiang, and the Huai from Mongol control. In general this group of officials and generals who withdrew from Hang-chou may be said to have constituted the faction in favour of continuing hostilities with the Mongols, a course of action that Empress Dowager Hsieh had opposed since 1275.

Wen T'ien-hsiang was not a key member of this faction at the time. Prior to the ch'in-wang campaign, he was virtually unknown among decision-makers of the Sung court; furthermore, he was in the Sung capital only for brief periods in August 1275 and January 1276, hardly long enough to have made his presence felt. Wen might have been aware of the evacuation plan and even expressed agreement in principle with the removal to the south of the two princes, but he was certainly not involved in nor confided with the details of the flight. Instead, a day before the official surrender of Hang-chou, he found himself in the company of the other envoys in the
Mongol camp, detained and forced to make the journey to the north with the ministers' entourage. During the trip Wen struck up a close relationship with Chia Hsüan-weng, and declared his antibarbarian sentiments to Wu Chien. After twenty days, with the help of eleven followers, he made a desperate escape at Chen-chiang, after which the Mongol forces launched an extensive search for him.

But in the Huai he was not welcomed by loyalist forces under Li T'ing-chih in Yang-chou, who was convinced that Wen was a collaborator and wanted to lure them to surrender to the Mongols. Distressed at Li's instructions to have him killed and in despair over the death and defection of his followers, Wen heard about the arrival of the Sung princes in Wen-chou and hastened south to join the loyalist court.

After a failed attempt to rescue the entourages of Kung-ti and his mother passing through Chen-kiang, Li T'ing-chih, accompanied by Chiang Ts'ai, also set out for Wen-chou to assume the chief ministership at the refugee Sung court. But passing through T'ai-chou, both were captured by their subordinates who surrendered Huai-tung the moment they departed. Unflinching in their loyalty to the Sung, Li was killed by the sword while Chiang was minced to death in September 1276. After his death Li's influence on Sung resistance continued to be felt through his proteges Lu Hsiu-fu and Su Liu-i, who remained with the refugee court to the end.

In June 1276 Wen T'ien-hsiang reached Wen-chou and continued on to Foochow, where the loyalist party had moved. Because Li T'ing-chih was captured and did not assume the chief ministership, Wen was appointed to take his place but did not accept. His companions Tu Hu (d. 1277) and Lü Wu (d. 1277) were despatched to Wen-chou
and Chiang-Huai respectively to recruit local bandits and ruffians. Almost immediately after Wen's arrival, discord was manifested in personality factors and strategy matters. As discussed earlier, Wen T'ien-hsiang was relatively new to the court, and did not participate in decision-making until 1275, whereas the other loyalist leaders had been in the political limelight since the 1250s and some even earlier. Wen was arrogant, blunt and overbearing, and simply could not get along with the other officials of the refugee loyalist court. His sharp criticism threatened their position in the loyalist movement, and even Lu Hsiu-fu, a rather mild-mannered personality known for his integrity, would not take sides with him. Lu Hsiu-fu, on the other hand, was incompatible with Ch'en I-chung and was soon exiled to Ch'ao-chou and writing to Ch'en Wen-lung for reinstatement. To further complicate matters, Chang Shih-chieh and Ch'en I-chung also disagreed with each other. It seems that Ch'en was suspicious of Chang, who many years earlier had defected from the Mongols to the Sung. To contain Chang's power, he put him in control of troops that were not Chang's own, and in charge of naval forces although his expertise was in land warfare. The naval expert, Liu Shih-yung (d. 1277), was on the other hand assigned to land operations.

Strategy considerations, however, finally polarized all the other loyalist leaders against Wen T'ien-hsiang. Both Chang Shih-chieh and Ch'en I-chung considered it top priority to take the coastal regions and secure a strong fleet, but Wen alone insisted on restoring the interior (Kiangsi, of which he was a native) as the base of loyalist power. No compromise could be reached in this regard and in August 1276, Wen left for Nan-chien prefecture (Yen-p'ing) in
Fukien to recruit men and recover Kiangsi. From that point on Wen's hsing tu-tu fu (mobile military government or military headquarters) more or less operated independently from the refugee court of the two Sung princes, which was controlled by Ch'en I-chung and Chang Shih-chieh. Wen was not permitted to join the refugee court during the next three years of loyalist resistance, and thus there existed in fact two major components of the movement: the imperial refugee court which took with it all the loyalist forces rallied by mid-1276, and Wen's mobile headquarters which in August 1276 did not yet have a substantial army. There was virtually no communication and coordination between the two.

Apart from the loyalist court and Wen's headquarters which operated in the southeastern provinces, there were at the time other pockets of resistance, the most significant being in Szechwan under the stubborn general Chang Chüeh (d. 1279), who did not surrender until 1278. In fact, Szechwan was not totally subdued until shortly before the Yai-shan defeat. Although Chang Chüeh and other centres had sent assistance to the refugee court, because of the collapse of the Ching-Hu region following the fall of Hang-chou, communication was completely cut off from Ch'en I-chung, Wen T'ien-hsiang, and the other leaders.

The loyalist resistance suffered severe leadership problems but curiously enough, there was no evidence of financial difficulties. Both the refugee court and Wen's military headquarters had sufficient funds to pay the high numbers of mercenaries and to reimburse the local people for food and supplies. Money was also liberally used to bribe informers. After the final defeat of the loyalist movement, the Mongols still found large sums of gold and treasures in
the defeated Sung fleet. The sources are unclear about the financial aspect of the resistance, but it appears that a great amount of wealth was brought to the south by the two princes. In addition, loyalist leaders and participants contributed their family fortunes to the cause; the local population appears to have also provided resources.\(^{132}\)

In Nan-chien prefecture\(^ {133}\) as soon as the word spread about Wen's recruitment efforts, his old subordinates who had dispersed at the Mongol takeover of Hang-chou flocked back with renewed enthusiasm. There were numerous new personalities who swiftly raised troops and joined forces with Wen. In four to five months' time Wen seems to have amassed tremendous support, and thus moved the headquarters to T'ing-chou where he could supervise more directly the operations to recover Kiangsi. From April to August 1277, he brought under loyalist control Mei-chou, Hsing-kuo county and Yü-tu, while his generals reconquered Chi and Kan counties. Loyalist response was also overwhelming from Heng-shan and Fu-chou.\(^ {134}\) Initial loyalist victories were, however, short-lived as Mongol generals soon caught up with the loyalist movement. By September all of Wen's troops again disintegrated, as did those of his subordinate generals Tsou Feng (d. 1277) and others. At K'ung-k'ang, a locality between Kiangsi and Fukien, his family and almost all of his followers were captured, and some were put to death after torture. With the help of a follower who pretended to be Wen and got captured, the real Wen fled to Hsun-chou in Kwangtung.\(^ {135}\)

Wen continued along Kwangtung territory to Ch'ao-chou and Hui-chou in March 1278, where he again set up his military
headquarters, beginning with only a few survivors. He pleaded desperately to join the refugee court but, although granted honours for his resistance efforts, was turned down. Left on his own, again Wen seems to have received immediate and resounding response in enlisting new troops. He also subdued the local bandits, Ch'en I (fl. 1270-1300) and his four brothers, and earned the gratitude of the local population. Ch'en I may have been recruited earlier by Wen, but shortly after this clash he turned into an informer and led the Yuan general Chang Hung-fan to wipe out the newly recruited armies in January 1279. After fighting in various parts of Kwangtung, Wen was finally captured at Hai-feng. He quickly swallowed poison to avoid being captured alive but did not die; he was then abducted to Yai-shan, the final site of loyalist resistance.

Meanwhile from mid-1276 the refugee court and the two Sung princes were relentlessly pursued by the Yuan forces. The Mongols had expected some resistance in the southeastern provinces which had not submitted, and as early as February 1276 Bayan had invited the Arab P'u Shou-keng (d. ca. 1296), commissioner of Overseas Trade and Ships in Ch'üan-chou, to surrender, but P'u did not immediately reply. The loyalist units sent to Che-tung and Che-hsi, in spite of some initial successes, met with disastrous reverses. In December 1276 the refugee court and its forces were forced to sail from Foochow to Ch'üan-chou. Upon arrival, P'u Shou-keng invited the loyalist forces to land, but Chang Shih-chieh was suspicious of P'u's intentions and rejected the offer. P'u then refused to supply Chang with grain and ships, after which Chang confiscated P'u's property and vessels. P'u retaliated by massacring
the imperial clansmen, officials, and Huai soldiers in Ch'üan-chou. He also formally surrendered to the Mongols in January 1277.141

As Foochow and Hsing-hua collapsed, the refugee court lost an important leader, Ch'en Wen-lung, who starved to death after capture.142 It then sailed south along the Fukien and Kwangtung coast to Ch'ao-chou, Hui-chou, and Ch'ien-wan. Parts of Kwangtung were then recovered by local loyalist efforts.143 In August 1277 Chang Shih-chieh left Ch'en I-chung and Lu Hsiu-fu to guard the imperial retinue, and himself launched an attack on Ch'üan-chou while his generals recovered Shao-wu. The Huai troops in Foochow which were loyal to Chang Shih-chieh mutinied and attempted to kill Wang Chi-weng (d. 1285), the Foochow administrator who defected to the Mongols. They were, however, totally annihilated by the Yuan forces. By October Chang Shih-chieh had suffered utter defeat, as the Mongol forces arrived to relieve P'u Shou-keng; Shao-wu also was recaptured. Returning to Ch'ien-wan by December 1277 and moving to Hsiu-shan, Chang Shih-chieh found the refugee court divided over the next course of action. It appears that Ch'en I-chung could not obtain a consensus to transfer the refugee court and the two Sung princes to Champa (in Indochina) and subsequently left with some forces to first investigate the feasibility of such action. Perhaps because the entire loyalist movement was soon obliterated, Ch'en never returned to the refugee court; he died in Siam a few years later.144

Meanwhile Chang Shih-chieh continued to steer the imperial retinue away from incessant attacks: they reached Ching-au in January 1278 and Kang-chou in April. The months immediately before had witnessed massacres at Ch'ao-chou and Kuang-chou by
the Mongol forces, in order to punish the local populations for their prolonged resistance. At this time the refugee court was joined by a former Sung official, Tseng Yuan-tzu 曾淵子 (d. 1285), who had been exiled to Lei-chou 雷州 in early 1275 for implication with Chia Ssu-tao.145 In May 1276 Ti-Shih nearly drowned during the flight at sea and died of fright. The remaining officials and generals of the refugee court were about to disperse, but Lu Hsiu-fu convinced them to continue the resistance. The younger Sung prince, Ping (posthumously Ti-Ping 帝昺), was then enthroned as the successor to Ti-Shih.146 In July 1278, Chang Shih-chieh took all the loyalist forces to Yai-shan (in Hsin-hui 新會 county, outside Kuang-chou). Yai-shan was situated in the sea between two mountains with a harbour like a gate, a location that Chang thought was strategic and could serve as a camouflage for the loyalists' boats and make enemy entry inaccessible.147 For the next few months the refugee court prepared the Sung fleet for naval warfare. Temporary lodgings were built for the imperial retinue and accompanying personnel and troops, an operation that involved a large number of local inhabitants.148

By late February 1279, however, the Mongol army had forced all the remaining loyalist forces and the refugee court to retreat to the sea. Chang Shih-chieh now made preparations for the Sung fleet to withstand a long siege. The one thousand large loyalist vessels were tied together in the shape of a long line, in order to prevent desertion and eroding morale.149

In early March 1279, the Mongol generals, Li Heng 李恒 (1236-1285), and Chang Hung-fan with Wen T'ien-hsiang as hostage, reached Yai-shan from opposite directions. Together they had at their disposal only five hundred vessels, and these were smaller and swifter
than the Sung fleet. The Mongol crew suffered from seasickness and unfamiliarity with sea warfare. Anticipating this disadvantage and wishing to avoid a violent confrontation, Chang Hung-fan ordered Wen T'ien-hsiang to persuade Chang Shih-chieh to surrender without fighting. Wen refused and replied with a poem that has since become acclaimed: "...In this life since antiquity who can escape death/ Better to preserve a pure heart to illuminate the pages of history".150

For three weeks the Mongol forces encircled the loyalist fleet and effectively blocked off food supplies and fresh water. Many soldiers in desperation drank sea water and became incapacitated. On 19 March Li Heng took advantage of the low morning tide to attack the northern tip of the loyalist fleet, and in the high afternoon tide Chang Hung-fan blasted the southern end. The loyalist soldiers were soon tired out and could fight no longer.151 After one boat lowered its banner to surrender, virtually the entire loyalist fleet followed suit. The battle was lost for the loyalist forces in less than a day—a rather unexpected surprise for both sides—as Wen T'ien-hsiang, who witnessed the fiasco, wrote about the collapse:

...Suddenly this morning the sky darkened and the wind and rain manifested evil, Catapults and thunder flashed; arrows descended. Only yesterday morning the Sung vessels decked the Yai-shan sea, Today only the Mongol boats remain! Last night ships on both sides drummed and clanged, But today all the boats snore lazily away.152

The imperial boat was the largest vessel and securely attached to the entire loyalist fleet, and therefore could not break out of the Mongol encirclement. Realizing the end had come, Lu Hsiu-fu forced his wife and children to jump off the boat before he threw himself and the young Ti-Ping into the sea and died.153 The body of Ti-Ping,
the last pretender to the Sung throne, was discovered the next day loaded with gold and imperial seals to help him sink. Many imperial relatives, officials and soldiers are said to have drowned themselves as well. The Mongols rescued some of these men, including Teng Kuang-chien, who was subsequently forced to become Chang Hung-fan's family tutor.154 Chang Shih-chieh managed to escape and land onshore with sixteen vessels and some remnant forces. The Imperial Concubine Yang also survived the fiasco but upon hearing that Ti-Ping had drowned, ended her own life. Chang was still determined to reorganize the dispersed loyalist forces and seek another Sung imperial clansman to enthrone. But a hurricane capsized his boat and he drowned, dashing any hopes of joining up with Ch'en I-chung in Champa.155 Su Liu-i, another survivor of Yai-shan, also attempted to restore the loyalist movement with Tseng Yüan-tzu and a remnant force; however, only Tseng reached Annam because Su was soon captured and killed.156

The Yai-shan battle thus ended with the annihilation of the refugee court and loyalist forces. Over 100,000 lives (out of a figure believed to be 200,000) were wiped out in this confrontation alone, and over the last three years of resistance greater numbers of men had been mobilized and killed.157 Damage to the society, economy, and landscape of the southeast must have been devastating, in view of the fact that some cities reverted back and forth from loyalist control. Whole families were involved in the resistance, and whole families died one way or another. Popular loyalist accounts of the recruitment and composition of the loyalist forces are vague and tend to generalize. The participants, leaders, and the masses are too often seen as keenly aware of the country's predicament and as taking
it upon themselves to salvage the situation. In actual fact, the details were less glorious.

The loyalist forces had consisted of two major components: the residual Sung regular forces that had been brought to the southeast by Ch'en I-chung and Chang Shih-ch'ieh, and the ch' in-wang units that were continuously augmented during the three years of resistance. The ch' in-wang forces were sometimes regarded as i-ping （volunteer corps), but in practice that was a misnomer. One large group of these forces were aboriginal peoples, the Yao and the She , who inhabited the interiors of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi.158 Together with the Huai soldiers, they were essentially mercenaries.159 A third group was formed by local bandits who were persuaded to join forces with the loyalists. One such unit was led by Hsiung Fei 熊飛 (d. 1278) of Tung-kuan who fought the Mongols until his death.160 Many soldiers had already been on the local defence units, and were reorganized by local leaders and presented as a single force to the loyalists. Some units were formed by civilians and tenants forcibly abducted by gentry members; many more were tricked by local leaders posing as merchants recruiting for labour.161 Some of these leaders praised in their biographies as loyalists who organized armies for the Sung cause may have been opportunists responding to Ch'en I-chung's promise to return their confiscated land (in connection with Chia Ssu-tao's land reform) on the condition that they lead their tenants into battle. Of other participants in the resistance, some admired righteousness and wanted to emulate the righteous; some simply wanted to collect material rewards and titles; some were town ruffians and military adventurers who meddled with everything; some awaited the opportunity to loot; others were
tenants and slaves forced into the barracks by their landlords and masters. In sum, among the loyalist troops few had responded from a sense of cultural and ethnic awareness. Such disparate elements could hardly be expected to remain together without constant leadership and reinforcement of morale. And, indeed, after each battle, these troops wandered off and dispersed, but once summoned, they reassembled again. In particular, the She aboriginals and bandits proved to be unreliable. During the latter months of the resistance they were easily enticed to join the Mongol forces. Wen T'ien-hsiang's capture was likely due to defection by some bandits whom he had earlier recruited. After the defeat of Yai-shan, some of these forces again rebelled against the Mongol Yuan; these revolts have been later viewed as loyalist uprisings. As a combat force, these troops could only be incompetent, poorly trained and inefficient in spite of their large numbers, which even at the Yai-shan showdown, still consisted of 200,000 men. Voluntary and enthusiastic participation of the masses in supporting the Sung cause, as recorded in local traditions and folklore, was thus in many ways a myth.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Sung foreign policy was a particularly controversial topic in the Ch'ing. Wang Fu-chih felt that the barbarian menace should have been nipped right from the start: that is, had the Khitans been dealt with severely, the Jurchens and Mongols would not have had successive turns at invading China. See his Sung-lun (Peking, 1964), 15.262. A contrary opinion was expressed by Chao I, who argued in his Niien-erh-shih cha-chi (Peking, 1963), 26.501, that the Sung had been able to survive only by relying on appeasement policies.

2. This peace treaty is only briefly mentioned in the SS annals. See Toghto, SS (Peking, 1977), 7.127. For the implications of this treaty for Sung foreign relations, see Wang Gungwu, "Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with its Neighbors" (forthcoming in the book ed. M. Rossabi); For a recent, favourable reappraisal of the treaty in the Chinese Mainland, see Chin Shih, "Ch'ung-p'ing Shan-yüan chih-meng", Min-tsu yen-chiu 1981:2 (1981), 30-34. The initial amount of tribute to the Liao was 100,000 oz. of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk, later increased to 200,000 oz. of silver and 300,000 bolts of silk. The Sung also sent silver, silk, and tea to Hsi-Hsia (total amount of 255,000). The Chin first demanded 250,000 each of silver and silk, later changed to 200,000, and then to 300,000. Apart from these official amounts, the Chin envoys also had to be presented with lavish gifts. In 1234 the Sung refused to comply with the Mongol request for 200,000 each of silver and silk. See Chao I, 26.499.


4. The transfer of the Sung to the south was referred to as nan-tu 南渡. Despite its removal to the south, the dynasty continued to call itself the Sung, but the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols often referred to it as Nan-ch'ao 南朝 (Southern Dynasty). The designations Northern and Southern Sung were not used until at least the Yuan dynasty.

5. On Yüeh Fei, see Chapter Four, p. 120-21.


7. Lu Yu 陸游 (1125-1209) and Hsin Ch'i-chi 謝薈 (1140-1207) were the foremost activist and patriotic poets of the time, who advocated a strong and assertive stand against the Chin for the recovery of the north and the reunification of China. Hsin was a northerner who in his youth brought an army with him to the south, hoping to contribute towards attaining that goal. Hsin's biography is in SS 401.12161-67. On Hsin, see Irving Yucheng Lo, Hsin Ch'i-chi (New York, 1971). Lu Yu's best-known patriotic poem "To show my sons"

8. For Mongke's Sung campaigns, see Sung Lien, *Yüan-shih* (YS) (Peking, 1976), 3.51-54. On Uriangqatai, see his biography in YS 121.2979. The strategy of fighting simultaneously on three fronts was a traditional Mongol policy used by Cinggis and Ögödei in north China. This strategy was repeated in the Hsiang-yang and Hang-chou campaigns.


10. These long letters are preserved in Hao Ching's *Ling-ch'uan chi*, chüan 37-39. There are two letters each addressed to Li T'ing-chih, Chia Ssu-tao, the Sung emperor and the Sung Bureau of Military Affairs; three are addressed to Sung chief ministers in general.


13. Li T'ing-chih, apart from controlling the Huai defence, was also responsible for reporting to the Sung court on developments at the front. Li's negative reply to Hao Ching's request for an audience with the Sung court is brief: it states that he dared not convey Hao's message to the throne. Li also makes an indirect but blatant comparison of Hao's mission to the deceptive attitudes of Li T'an, who at that time was fighting on the Mongol side. See Hao Ching, 37.16b. Li actually had personal contacts with Hao, who wrote about Li visiting him and presenting him with Hortensia flowers (Hao Ching, 1.25b-27a). Li also read some of Hao Ching's essays and commented on his scholarship. See "Li T'ing-chih on Hao Ching's prose", in Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien ta-ch'üan chi* (SPTK), 44.18b.

14. This was the "Strategy for the Eastern Campaigns" that Hao submitted to Qubilai in early 1255, shortly after he was recommended to his service. The following is a summary of its contents in Hao Ching, 37.1a-11b: "There are two ways to conquer countries—by the use of force and by the use of strategy. Although other countries have quickly submitted to our rule, the Sung has not been conquered even after twenty years. It is therefore advisable to use strategy in this case, which will require a great deal of patience. The fact that the Mongol army is not skilled in fighting on plains, as well as other reasons, call for a delaying tactic. We should thus buy time and gain the confidence of the Sung and request that they cede to us some
territory and present us annual tributes of cash. When the time is ripe for the conquest we should then first take the Ching, the Hua, and the Yangtze respectively. The attack should be three-pronged in order to weaken progressively Sung fortifications. The Sung must be regarded as a powerful opponent: their ruler and ministers are on friendly terms; there exists no current internal chaos; and since 1234 it has been engaged in rigorous recruitment of soldiers."

15. On Chang Jou, see his biography in YS 147.3471-76.

16. The Ling-ch'uan chi contains much scholarship on the Confucian Classics, mostly written during the early years of Hao's captivity; from 1269 to 1276 there exists only one piece of writing dated 1273. By that time Hao had lost hope of ever returning to the north to see his only son. From his writings, Hao shows hatred of the Chin dynasty and passionate sympathy with the Northern Sung and its loyal men and women during its collapse. He also seems to have been sincerely committed to avoid unnecessary bloodshed in the Sung, as he tried to convince Li T'ing-chih about the enlightenment of Qubilai (Hao Ching, 37.13a). See Chapter Seven, p. 308.

17. In 1004 an imperial edict promised that those who killed Khitans would be sheltered and rewarded (SS 7.125); in 1231 the Sung killed a Mongol envoy (YS 2.31); in 1275 the Yüan envoy Lien Hsi-hsien and his entire party were put to death, although the Sung court denied any sanction of the act (YS 8.164); Li T'ing-chih also slaughtered a few envoys who tried to entice him to surrender.

18. Hao Ching's memorial, cited in note 14 above, clearly shows that a treaty, if concluded, was to be understood only as a temporary measure. See also Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chinggis Khan's Empire", Papers on Far Eastern History 7 (1973), 24; Herbert Franke, From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty (München, 1978), p. 15. Both authors discuss the Mongol conception of world conquest and rule as divine and ordained by Heaven, or Tengri.

19. SS 47.877. For Liu Cheng's biography, see YS 161.3785. Liu Cheng has been regarded as a victim of both discrimination against northerners by southerners and the slighting of military men in favour of civil officials in the Sung court under Chia Ssu-tao's influence. See Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Hu-pi-lieh p'ing-Sung i-hou ti nan-jen wen-t'i", Pien-cheng yen-chiu so nien-pao 1 (1970), 11-13.

20. Both Li T'an and his father Li Ch'uan are given biographies in the section for p'an-ch' en (renegades). See respectively, YS 206.4591-94, SS 476.13817-477.13851. For the narrative of Li T'an's defection and defeat, see SS 45.880-82; YS 5.82-83; Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien (Taipei, 1962) 176.4819-177.4824; Ch'en Pan-chan, Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (Peking, 1977), 104.1123-25. See also Sun K'o-k'uang, "Yüan-ch' u Li T'an shih-pien ti fen-hsi", in his Meng-ku Han-chün yü Han wen-hua yen-chiu (Taipei, 1958), pp. 44-78.

21. SS 46.911; YS 8.147; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih (Chin-tai pi-shu), pieh b.37a-48a. See also Moule, "Quinsai", pp. 70-78 for a discussion of Marco Polo's alleged but doubtful role in the Hsiang-yang battle.
22. On Liu Ping-chung, see Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung (1216-74): A Buddhist-Taoist Statesman at the Court of Kubilai Khan", T'oung Pao 53:1-2 (1967), 98-146. For Qubilai's use of Confucian advisers, see Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Hu-pi-leh p'ing-Sung".

23. On the "public-land" scheme, see SS 173.4194-95, 474.13782-83; Pi Yüan, 177.4831-32; Anon., Hsien-ch'un i-shih (Shou-shan ko), a.1a-2b; Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 3.39-3.41; Ch'en Pang-chan, Sung-shih chi-shih, 98.1083-88. See also Franke, "Chia Ssu-tao", pp. 226-28.

24. Hsien-ch'un i-shih a.1b.


26. SS 425.12688; Pi Yüan, 176.4813.

27. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.11a-13b.

28. Shih Sung-chih (d. 1256) and Ting Ta-ch'üan particularly suffered the abuses of the students of the three universities. For their biographies, see SS 414.12423-28; 474.13778-79.


30. SS 44.863; 474.13786.

31. Wu Ch'ien's biography is in SS 418.12515-20.


33. SS 214.5632-53.

34. Among others, Liao Ying-chung committed suicide. See Pi Yüan, 181.4959; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.21b-22b. In the 1290s Teng Mu met an old Buddhist monk, formerly patronized by Chia, who still wept for Chia's tragic death. Teng remarked that this monk's gratitude was sufficient to shame the eminent statesmen who had formerly been helped by Chia but who abused Chia immediately after the latter's disgrace in 1275. See Teng's "Travelling from T'ao-shan to Yün-men", in his Po-ya ch'in (Chih-pu-ts'ai chai), pu-i.2b-3a.

35. SS 42-46.807-916, passim.

36. Liu I-ch'ing, Ch'ien-t'ang i-shih (Wu-lin chang-ku ts'ung-pien), preface.1; 1.3.

37. For a popular description of this life see Jacques Gernet, Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion.

38. SS 46.912.
39. One response came from the eminent Confucian scholar Chin Li-hsiang 金履祥 (1232-1303), who proposed to despatch a naval force along the seacoast to Hopei in order to relieve Hsiang-yang. It is believed that later the Sung defectors and pirates Chu Hsüan and Chang Ch'ing utilized this plan to help the Mongols conquer the Sung. See Chin's biography in YS 189.4316. See also Chapter Five, p. 196.

40. SS 46.913-14. The two Lüs had earlier submitted resignations to the Sung court in anticipation of their guilt by association when Lü Wen-huan surrendered.

41. SS 46.912.

42. SS 46.912; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, pieh b.48a-49a.

43. SS 46.913-15. These offices were ch'eng-shih lang, ch'eng-hsin lang, and others. On these honorific offices in the civil bureaucracy, see SS 169.4049-58.

44. SS 46.916-18.

45. SS 47.921-22; Pi Yüan, 180.4926-27.

46. YS 8.156; Pi Yüan, 180.4928-29.

47. The Szechwan battles were quite separate from Bayan's campaigns. For an account of this part of the Sung conquest, see the biographies of the Yuan general Li Te-hui (YS 163.3817-19) and the loyalist general Chang Chüeh (SS 451.13280-84).

48. SS 47.922-24; YS 8.157; Pi Yüan, 180.4929-34. For a laudatory account of Bayan's role in the conquest of the Sung see an official, contemporary source: Liu Min-chung, P'ing-Sung lu (Shou-shan ko). This work is the principal source for Bayan's biography in the YS, translated and annotated by F. W. Cleaves, "The Biography of Bayan of the Barin in the 'Yüan-shih'", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 19:3-4 (1956), 185-303.

49. SS 47.924.

50. Wen T'ien-hsiang quotes this text in full in his Chi-nien lu. See Wen T'ien-hsiang, Wen-shan hsien-sheng ch'üan-ch'i (SFTK), 17.10a-b. I have not seen the text of the edict in other sources.

51. Liu I-ch'ing, 6.8; Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 4.53.

52. Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 4.56, in which an imperial relative and student memorialized against the transfer of the capital, suggesting that the large size of the ch'in-wang army was strong enough to oppose the Mongols.

53. SS 47.925-26 and 474.13785-86; YS 8.160-63; Pi Yüan, 181.4940-42.

54. SS 47.926; YS 8.162; Pi Yüan, 181.4942-43. The figure of 130,000 given as the size of Chia's army in the Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao (5.55) is most likely an exaggeration.
55. SS 47.926; YS 8.163; Pi Yuan, 181.4945.

56. Liu Min-chung, b.1a-2b.

57. SS 47.927, 927-35; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin ts'a-chih, hou.13b-14b and hou.21b-22b; Liu I-ch'ing, 7.8-11.

58. SS 47.935-37; Liu I-Ch'ing, 7.8. However, many of these officials (e.g., Ch'en Wen-lung, Hsu Tsung-jen) shown by the Sung-shih to have fled the court in fact went to join the loyalist movement. Tseng Yüan-tzu did not flee the court, but had in fact been exiled to Kwangsi for implication with Chia Ssu-tao's proposal to transfer the capital.

59. SS 47.928. See the full text of the edict in Liu I-ch'ing, 7.8; Pi Yuan, 181.4950.

60. SS 47.927.

61. SS 47.928. For the letter to and reply from Lü Wen-huan in regard to his return to the Sung, see Liu I-ch'ing, 8.3-5.

62. SS 47.926.

63. SS 47.934; 418.12530. Both Ch'en I-chung and Wang Yüeh had recommended this appointment (SS 47.931).

64. SS 47.934; YS 8.170; Pi Yuan, 182.4966. On Ajirghan, see his biography in YS 129.3147-49.

65. SS 47.935; YS 8.170; Pi Yuan, 182.4968; Liu Min-chung, b.2b-3a.

66. SS 47.935-36; Pi Yuan, 182.4970. The Sung had also killed several other Yüan envoys in 1275 (YS 8.165).

67. Liu I-ch'ing, 8.10.

68. See this chapter, pp. 50-52.

69. SS 47.937-39; YS 9.177; Pi Yuan, 182.4978, 4982.

70. SS 47.938; YS 9.177. When he was asked by Qubilai in 1276 why he was still chief minister despite his old age, Wu Chien replied that it was because there was no-one left at court willing to assume the post (Liu I-ch'ing, 9.15).

71. SS 47.937-38; YS 9.178; Liu I-ch'ing, 8.11-12, has this passage in the edict to the Sung empire: "The roots [i.e., Hang-chou] have already been pulled out, and even if the various cities continue to resist, how the population will [become] innocent victims! As soon as this edict arrives, surrender immediately and the population will be spared of calamity." The surrender statement of Empress Dowager Hsieh might have included an inventory list of court treasures in addition to official records on the landmark of the capital. Marco Polo (1254-1324) claims to have seen a copy on which he based his account of the Sung capital. His account of the Sung conquest and the
Sung emperor and empress is totally inaccurate; this erroneous picture shows that the facts of the conquest were not clear to foreigners in the empire. For Marco Polo's account of the Sung conquest, see A. C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *Marco Polo: The Description of the World* (London, 1938), p. 139.309-313; 152.326-27.

72. For the text of the surrender statement, see SS 47.938-39, 421.12602; Empress Dowager Hsieh and Kung-ti both addressed edicts to Li T'ing-chih, urging him to submit and spare the population from further bloodshed. For the texts of the edicts see Liu Min-chung, c.1a-1b. Li burned the edicts and slew the messengers.

73. For example, Ch'ang-chou, Ch'ih-chou, Szechwan.

74. YS 9.179-80; Liu Min-chung, b.7a-9a. A decade later Chou Mi visited the former Sung imperial library and found paintings stored in big trunks, an indication that much of the material never reached Ta-tu. See his *Yün-yen kuo-yen lu* (Pao-yen t'ang pi-chi), 3.6b-7a. This passage is translated in R. H. van Gulik, *Chinese Pictorial Art as Viewed by the Connoisseur* (Rome, 1958), pp. 201-02.

75. YS 9.178-79 and 9.182-83. In June 1276 the pacification bureau was dissolved, but the regional government of Che-tung and Che-hsi remained under the control of Mangqutai (biography in YE 131.3186) and Fan Wen-hu. A month later, the provincial government (hsing chung-shu sheng 行中書省) was set up in 0-chou and Hang-chou.


77. For the surrender notice and the text of Qubilai's proclamation to the conquered people of Sung, see YS 9.178-79; Liu Min-chung, b.7b.

78. SS 47.938; YS 9.178; Pi Yuan, 182.4979-80. The diary of one Yen Kuang-ta 蕭光大, a member of the chief ministers' entourage, provides a day to day account of the journey to the Yuan capital. See Liu I-ch'ing, 9.1-15; for its translation, see A. C. Moule, "Hang-chou to Shang-tu, A.D. 1276", *T'oung Pao* 16 (1915), 393-419.

79. See Kao Ying-sung's biography, SS 454.13347; see also Pi Yuan, 183.4985.

80. YS 9.180-81; Pi Yuan, 182.4981.

81. YS 9.180; Pi Yuan, 182.4981; Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 5.62-63. While the latter source states that there were several hundreds of students, the YS (9.182) indicates that only forty-six arrived at Ta-tu; Chou Mi says that there were ninety-nine; in 1278 only eighteen were left, each of whom had been appointed instructor in a prefecture (Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.9b-10a).

82. Pi Yuan, 182.4981; SS 451.13277.
83. SS 451.13268; Pi Yüan, 182.4982.

84. YS 9.182; Pi Yüan, 183.4985. The generosity of Qubilai towards the Sung imperial family has been praised, for example, by Chao I. See Chao I, 30.634-37.


86. Pi Yüan, 183.4985; "Sung palace ladies were married off to northern carpenters", in Wang Yüan-liang, Shui-yün chi, 19a-b.

87. See Liu I-ch'ing, 9.9-10, for offices awarded to members of the ministers' entourage. Of these men, only Liu Meng-yen rose to high office in the Yüan bureaucracy.

88. YS 9.182.

89. Franke, From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor, pp. 32-33.

90. SS 47.938; YS 9.179; Pi Yüan, 182.4980.

91. See Chapter Three, pp. 103-04, for Ming efforts to legitimize 1276-79 as part of the Southern Sung.

92. YS 8.156 and other sources quote Qubilai's instructions to Bayan to follow the precedent of merciful conquest as exemplified by Ts'ao Pin in the reign of T'ai-tsu (r. 960-976) of the Sung.

93. Liu Min-chung, b.3b, et passim.

94. For accounts of these atrocities, see Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 5.60; Pi Yüan, 182.4968; Wang Ying-lin, Ssu-ming wen-hsien chi (Ssu-ming ts'ung-shu), 5.14b.

95. This passage is in Liu Min-chung, b.10a. For contrary accounts by the captives, see for example "Journey to the north", Wang Yüan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao (Wu-lin wang-che i-chu), 2.1a.

96. Liu Min-chung, preface.1a.


98. SS 418.12525.

99. See the biographies of Li Fei and Chao Mao-fa, SS 450.13255-56, 13259-60; see also Pi Yüan, 182.4972-73.

100. See Wang Li-hsin's biography, SS 416.12475-76.

101. Liu Min-chung, a.5a; see also Fan T'ien-shun's biography, SS 450.13250.
102. For example, Chao Liang-ch'un (d. 1275) of Hu-chou (SS 451.13266) killed Yuan envoys. Huang Wen-cheng had his tongue and nose cut off when he would not yield (SS 454.13343).

103. I am indebted to Paul Buell for making available to me his unpublished working paper, "The Sung Resistance Movement in Southeast China, 1276-79", which was written over ten years ago as the basis for a doctoral dissertation. Buell was at the time interested in local participation in the resistance and his paper presented the first analytical and critical study of the movement. I do not agree with part of his account and conclusions, but on the whole find the paper helpful, particularly in formulating a preliminary picture of the resistance campaigns in the southeast. I am also grateful to the brief discussion of the aboriginal peoples (pp. 4-5).

104. In early February 1276, Shih (Chi-wang) was raised to I-wang, and Ping (Hsin-wang) to Kuang-wang. In June Shih was enthroned (posthumously Ti-Shih and Tuan-tsung); Ping became Wei-wang. The YS, Wen T'ien-hsiang's Wen-shan hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi, and other sources are in accordance with the SS's titles for the Sung princes. However, the Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao (6.65-75) erroneously refers to Shih as Kuang-wang and Ping as Wei-wang (both in fact were titles of Ping). Shih is given an alternative reading of Hsia in the Tz'u-hai (Peking, 1978).

105. This was Han Chen 韓業 (d. 1275), see SS 47.927.

106. This opinion was voiced by a student who was an imperial relative. See Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 5.56.

107. Liu Fu's biography (SS 405.12249) states that Ch'en I-chung had planned to take the two princes to seek refuge in the sea via Wen-chou. According to traditional accounts, Ch'en I-chung, Chang Shih-chieh, and other high-ranking officials disagreed with each other and simply fled the court at the same time that the two Sung princes evacuated from Hang-chou. The presence of Ch'en, Chang, and the others in Wen-chou, where the princes also arrived, is then seen as coincidental. Ch'en is portrayed as particularly irresponsible and untrustworthy, always disappearing at crucial moments (as in 1275 from a meeting with Bayan, and in 1277 from the loyalist court). In one unreliable anecdote, it is claimed that a summons had to be sent to Ch'en's mother to persuade him to return to the Sung court. Another unlikely story has Chang Shih-chieh ordering his mother's coffin to be carried with the refugee court to make Ch'en take part in the loyalist resistance. Ch'en's absence from the Sung court in August to October 1275 is naively explained as hurt pride! My reconstruction of this event attempts to explain the Wen-chou and Li T'ing-chih connections. In the next chapter I shall deal with the role of Wen T'ien-hsiang in the historiography of the event.

108. Li T'ing-chih and his circle of talented proteges are dealt with in Chapter Four, pp. 140-44.

109. Foochow and Ch'üan-chou were respectively the seats for the Western and Southern Courts of Imperial Clansmen (hsi wai tsung-cheng ssu 西外宗正司, nan wai tsung-cheng ssu 南外宗正司). See SS
110. SS 47.939-40; Pi Yuan, 182.4982. The rearguard was led by Chang Ch'üan 張全, who had been protected by Ch'en I-chung but criticized by Wen T'ien-hsiang after his defeat at Ch'ang-chou in December 1275. An imperial son-in-law, Yang Chen 揚鎮, attempted to decoy the Yuan forces to allow the princes to escape. He was later taken captive to Ta-tu.

111. SS 47.939-40; Pi Yuan, 182.4982.

112. SS 47.940. Some of these cities were Fu-chou, Kuang-chou, and T'ing-chou.

113. SS 47.940; Pi Yuan, 183.4984-86.

114. Teng wrote Wen T'ien-hsiang's biography (extant only in parts, in Wen T'ien-hsiang, chüan 17) and the biographies of Wen's followers (in ibid., 19.42b-52a). Ch'en Chung-wei wrote the "Erh-wang pen-mo", which became chüan 6 of the Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao. See also Chapter Three, p. 82.

115. SS 47.940; Pi Yuan, 183.4986.

116. In January 1275 Wen T'ien-hsiang raised troops in his native province of Kiangsi, arriving in the capital only in September; in October he was sent to P'ing-chiang; and in December he was in Hu-chou defending the Tu-sung pass. (SS 418.12534-36).

117. Traditional and secondary accounts, however, credit Wen with first proposing the evacuation of the two princes. But even Wen in one occasion admitted to only helping Ch'en I-chung plan for the transfer of the imperial family (Wen T'ien-hsiang, 13.1a).

118. Regarding Wu Chien, see Wen T'ien-hsiang, 13.13a-b. Chia Hsüan-weng is said to have refused to sign the surrender statement, thus earning the praise of Wen. Chia also bought and freed Wen's younger sister after she was enslaved by the Yuan government. See Chia's biography in SS 421.12598-99. On Chia, see Chapter Five, pp. 181-82.

119. SS 47.940; YS 9.180; Pi Yuan, 183.4983-84; Wen T'ien-hsiang, 13.23b-28b and 17.18a-b.

120. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 13.30b-57a and 17.18a-b; Pi Yuan, 180.4983-84. Li T'ing-chih was suspicious of Wen because the latter's signature was forged on the pacification statement sent to persuade Li to surrender. Wen thought that the Mongols had fabricated and circulated a story that a certain Sung chief minister (presumed to have been Wen) was about to request Li to submit to the Mongols. Li simply could not be convinced that Wen was able to escape Mongol guard with eleven followers. Wen was alerted to Li's intention to kill him and helped to safety by Miao Tsai-ch'eng, the defence general of Chen-chou.

121. See the biographies of Li T'ing-chih and Chiang Ts'ai, SS 421.12602, 451.13268-69; YS 9.183-85; Anon., Chao-chung lu (TSCC).
122. SS 47.940; Pi Yuan, 183.4986.

123. In the SS annals, Wen is mentioned only once before 1274, as top graduate of the 1256 examination. Li T'ing-chih, Hsieh Fang-te, Ch'en I-chung, Chen Wen-lung, and Lu Hsiu-fu appear much earlier and more frequently before 1276 (SS 45-47.871-920, passim).

124. Immediately after his arrival at the loyalist court, Wen antagonized both Ch'en and Chang by his criticism of Ch'en's irresponsibility and Chang's insufficient forces. See Chao-chung lu, p. 19.

125. Lu Hsiu-fu, Lu Chung-lieh kung shu (Ch'ien-k'un cheng-ch'i chi), pp. 2792-93; Pi Yuan, 183.4987.

126. SS 418.12531. Liu Shih-yung later died of excessive drinking caused by grief over the irretrievable state of the Sung. His biography is attached to that of Chang Shih-chieh, in SS 451.13274-75. Ch'en's suspicion of Chang is also said to have been responsible for rejecting a strategy plan conceived by both Chang and Wen in December 1275 (SS 451.13273). Chang was a relative of Chang Jou, who had defected from the Chin to the Mongols. Thus Chang Shih-chieh and his Yuan rival, Chang Hung-fan, were related.

127. Pi Yuan, 183.4990; Chao-chung lu, p. 19; Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.20a.

128. Wen blamed Ch'en for spoiling plans for T'ung-chou 南州 to join in the resistance by not trusting Wen's earlier arrangements with the defence general there. See Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.19b.

129. See the biographies of Chang Chüeh and Li Te-hui (Yuan general in charge of Mongol campaigns in Szechwan), SS 451.13280-84; YS 163.3815-19; see also Chao-chung lu, pp. 28-29.

130. Ho-chou surrendered only in February 1279. See YS 10.208.

131. YS 10.208-09. For example, Wen T'ien-hsiang offered large sums of gold to a crew member and a Mongol soldier, among others, to help him escape in March 1276. See Wen T'ien-hsiang, 13.22a and 23a.

132. For example, Wen and Hsieh Ao donated entire family inheritances to the cause. Ma Nan-pao 馬南寶 was a local magnate who also contributed financial support. On Ma, see Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu (Ssu-ming ts'ung-shu), 7.15-17.

133. Wen had first considered Kuang-chou as the headquarters, but when that city was occupied by the Mongols decided on Nan-chien as the alternative. See Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.20a.

134. See Wen's biography, SS 418.12537-38; Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.20a-22b.

135. SS 418.12538.
136. Ibid. Wen thought that Chang Shih-chieh had spoken against his request (Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.22a).

137. SS 418.12538.

138. SS 418.12538-39; Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.23b. The poison that Wen took cured him of constipation and eye trouble instead.


140. SS 47.942.

141. Ibid.


143. SS 47.942-44.

144. Ch'en I-chung's biography, SS 418.12532.

145. SS 47.944.

146. SS 47.944 and 451.13276.

147. SS 451.13273-74.

148. Chang I, Yai-shan chi (Han-fen lou pi-chi), 15a.

149. SS 47.945, 451.13274; Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.9a-10b; Chang I, 15a-20b; Chao-chung lu, pp. 34-36; Pi Yüan, 184.5025-28.


151. SS 47.945 and 451.13274.

152. "On the sixth day of the second month [i.e., 19 March 1279]", in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 14.1b-2b.

153. SS 451.13276; Chang I, 19a-b; Pi Yüan, 184.5027.

154. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 14.14a-b; see also the biography of Chang Hung-fan, YS 156.3682-83.

155. Chao-chung lu, pp. 35-36; Chang I, 19b-20a.

156. Wen wrote that Su Liu-i and his son had rescued Tseng Yün-tzu from the ocean, all of whom afterwards sailed to the south (Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.11b-12a). For the loyalist connection in Annam and Champa, see Chapter Five, pp. 175-77.

157. SS 47.945; Pi Yüan, 184.5027.

158. The exact role of the She and the Yao peoples is unclear, as

159. Wen's biography (SS 418.12534) states that he ordered his subordinate Ch'en Chi-chou to mobilize military adventurers of the district and to join up with aboriginal peoples. In the Chao-chung lu (p. 34), it appears that many boats belonging to the She aboriginals had been involved in Chang Shih-chih's forces at Yai-shan. That the Huai troops were mercenaries is also indicated in Wang Yen-wu's funerary inscription to Wen T'ien-hsiaung, urging him to die in dignity. See Wang Yen-wu, Wu-wen kao (SKCSCP ser. 9), 4.1b.

160. Hsiung Fei was persuaded by an imperial clansman, Chao Pi-hsiang, to attach his unit to Wen and avoid being labelled as bandits. See Ch'en Po-t'ao, Tung-kuan i-min lu (Chü-te t'ang), a.1b-2a.

161. SS 193.4822.

162. Wang Fu-chih, 10.194.

163. For several of these uprisings in the early 1280s by men who had submitted to the Yüan, see Huang Ch'ing-lien, "Yüan-ch'u Chiang-nan ti p'an-luan, 1276-1294", Chung-yang yen-chiu yüan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu so chi-k' an 49:1 (1978), 51-52 and 85-86.
CHAPTER THREE

SOME ASPECTS OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SUNG LOYALISTS

In traditional Chinese history-writing, as Twitchett puts it, biographies of individuals and groups were intended to "illuminate the actions of men as 'subjects and ministers' and present precepts and examples for future generations of Confucian officialdom". A didactic and moralistic concern is particularly striking in both the official and nonofficial historiography of the Sung loyalists, who were exemplars to be emulated by posterity. This chapter deals with some fundamental aspects of loyalist historiography rather than providing a comprehensive description of the sources available for the study. In particular, I shall focus on Wen T'ien-hsiang's collected writings, which constituted the major source for the Sung-shih biographies of the loyalists. Some biases and discrepancies which have survived in present accounts of Sung loyalism will be examined. Then, an attempt is made to assess the social and political climate under which loyalist writings were produced and circulated, followed by a look at some later writings on the Sung loyalists reflecting a local and limited perspective. Finally, some myths created and perpetuated in loyalist writings are described.

I. Wen T'ien-hsiang's Writings and its Influence on Loyalist Works

The first problem encountered with sources on the Sung loyalists is not the paucity of scholarship, but rather the sheer bulk of it—mostly unsystematized, unrelated, and mutually conflicting. The result is a confusing picture of the last years of the Southern Sung and a traditional, incomplete account of the events and personalities
of the resistance. The Sung loyalists themselves were the first to record their experiences and feelings about the demise of the Sung, and about fifty of these men left extant writings in the form of wen-chi 文集 (prose collections) and shih-chi 詩集 (poetry collections), group biographies of fellow loyalists, and pi-chi miscellanies. The most important literary collection is Wen T'ien-hsiang's Wen-shan hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi, particularly the sections entitled Chih-nan lu 指南錄, Chi Tu-shih 集杜詩, Yin-hsiao chi 吟嘯集, and Chi-nien lu 紀年錄. The Chih-nan lu is a collection of poems with long prefaces and in two parts. The first covers the period from September 1275 to May 1276, and recounts Wen's arrival from his native Kiangsi province at the Sung capital, his detention by Bayan, escape from his first captivity, and his eventual arrival in Wen-chou to join the loyalist forces. The Chih-nan hou-lu 指南後錄 (sequel) extends over the period of his second incarceration through to his captivity and imprisonment in Ta-tu (January 1279–June 1282). The dates and content of the Yin-hsiao chi coincide with the Chih-nan lu. The Chi Tu-shih is a collection of 200 five-word stanza poems with prefaces, completed in 1280. Wen composed these poems by rearranging random lines from Tu Fu's 杜甫 (712–770) poetry to describe his experience in the loyalist resistance and to praise the loyalist men who were under his personal command. Lastly, the Chi-nien lu is a chronological account of his life from birth to the spring of 1282, when he was still in Ta-tu waiting to be executed.5

In these writings Wen's primary objective was to express for posterity his thoughts on the events and personalities of the collapse of the dynasty and the resistance, and thus a highly self-centred tone
pervades every page. Wen repeatedly provides minute details of his narrow escape from death and records in full his eloquent conversations with the Yuan officials Bolot (fl. 1270-1300), Chang Hung-fan, and Bayan. And all too often Wen passes moral judgement on the conduct of other loyalists. To his own followers, friends, and the obscure men who assisted the Sung cause or himself and died in the process he is generous with praise, often devoting an entire poem and preface to each personality or event. To his rivals in loyalist circles he is unfair and overly critical. Li T'ing-chih, he says, "had been in Yang-chou for over ten years: a coward without long range plans, he could only close his gates and rely on defensive measures. He was no help in saving the country..." 6 Although Wen admits that Chang Shih-chieh was indispensable in restoring Fukien to loyalist control, he explicitly blames Chang for lacking any "long range ambition; surrounding himself with large armies and extraordinary wealth, he aspired only to flee far away, thus courting defeat." 7 Su Liu-i is seen as "sulking because his ambitions were not realized; his quick temper made him unapproachable." 8 Wen claims that Ch'en I-chung had no moral principles nor political skills, but disappeared at critical moments. 9 Ch'en's disagreement with Wen's plans to restore the Kiangsi region is illogically interpreted as a selfish attempt to redeem himself for fleeing from the Sung capital. 10

Apart from being a highly subjective account, Wen's work suffers from another fundamental weakness: the selective nature of its material. Wen's activities were limited to his military headquarters, and he received only second hand accounts about the refugee loyalist court. We are thus merely informed in detail about Wen's personal
experiences, which did not in fact involve other resistance centres and cannot be relied upon to yield a comprehensive account of the entire resistance movement. It was Lu Hsiu-fu who recorded the events of the loyalist court in a diary which he had entrusted to Teng Kuang-chien before leaping into the sea with the infant Ti-Ping. Unfortunately the diary is not extant, but Teng's T'ien-hai lu 塡海錄 was based on it and survives in excerpts.11

Teng Kuang-chien, a fellow townsman of Wen T'ien-hsiang, had earlier joined the loyalist court after his whole family perished at the hands of bandits. At the Battle of Yai-shan he had tried to drown himself, but was rescued and forced to become family tutor to Chang Hung-fan, the Yuan general. Teng later found himself making the journey to Ta-tu with Wen T'ien-hsiang, and the two captives composed poetry to each other's rhymes and shared despondent feelings about the collapse of the Sung. They became such intimate friends that Wen instructed his brother to request Teng Kuang-chien to inscribe his epitaph because Teng "entirely knew his mind and intent".12 To fulfil this objective, Teng undoubtedly had complete access to Wen's writings.

Teng Kuang-chien's biography of Wen and the Wen ch'eng-hsiang tu-fu chung-i chuan 又丞相督府忠義傳 (a collection of biographical notices of the loyalists in Wen's recruiting headquarters) were in fact completed years later.13 Teng was to a large extent faithful to Wen's records, particularly in the choice of subjects to be covered and in the selection of information on their fate. All the loyal men commemorated by Wen in his writings were incorporated into Teng's work but the order of listing was not followed.14 For some unknown reason Teng Kuang-chien chose not to
use Lu Hsiu-fu's diary in these biographies and refused to release it to a fellow loyalist and friend of Lu, Kung K'ai. And, Teng's family did not surrender his T'ien-hai lu to the Yuan history bureau until after the Sung-shih was completed.

Kung K'ai, however, had no difficulty obtaining from Teng a handwritten copy of Wen's Chi-nien lu, on which he subsequently based biographies of Wen and Lu Hsiu-fu. Cheng Ssu-hsiao of P'ing-chiang also owned copies of Wen's Chih-nan lu and drew upon it for a biography of Wen in his controversial Hsin-shih 心史. In Annam, where he had fled after the Yai-shan defeat, another loyalist survivor, Ch'en Chung-wei, wrote a postscript to the anonymous Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 晁三朝政要. This postscript, the Erh-wang pen-mo 二王本末 was supposedly brought back to China in the early 1280s. The presence of numerous internal inconsistencies and several stages of editing have rendered the work useless as an historical source. Some editing took the form of direct copying from Wen's Chi Tu-shih. Strikingly similar in many passages to the Erh-wang pen-mo and suggesting that either one copied from the other is another loyalist work, the Ch'ien-t'ang i-shih 畫塘遺事. The anonymous Chao-chung lu 昭忠錄 contains biographies of 130 loyalists (including those who fought against the Mongols in the 1230s); it seems to have utilized independent sources as well as Wen T'ien-hsiang's work. The Chung-i chi 忠義集 is a fourteenth-century anthology of poems accompanied by biographies written by contemporaries extolling the virtues of the individual loyalists. These biographies appear verbatim in the Chao-chung lu.

The liberal use other loyalists made of Wen T'ien-hsiang's
writings on the loyalist resistance points to their extensive circulation and considerable influence on their own works. In contrast, none of Wen's loyalist rivals—Li T'ing-chih, Ch'en Wen-lung, Ch'en I-chung, Su Liu-i, and Chang Shih-chieh—left any extant writings. As a result, Wen's personal biases and interpretations of the last events of the Southern Sung and the loyalist resistance have been transmitted to present scholarship.

However, divergent interpretations and appraisals based on personal connections are responsible for discrepancies and conflicting material among loyalist sources, in spite of Wen's writings serving as a common source. One example is Teng Kuang-chien's biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang. While contemporary and traditional versions are hostile to Chang Hung-fan (a Chinese general in the Mongols' service who inflicted defeat on the loyalists at Yai-shan), Teng sees Chang as a human-hearted person who treated Wen with courtesy and who even at his death-bed pleaded with the Yuan emperor to spare Wen's life. Teng had apparently developed a warm relationship with Chang while in his service as family tutor; he later wrote the preface to Chang's collected writings.  

In another example, the author of Chien-t'ang i-shih appears to have personally known Lü Wen-huan, the Sung general who surrendered Hsiang-yang. Lü is seen in sympathetic circumstances: he had no choice but to surrender in order to spare the lives of the city and his own family after fighting for six years. Cheng Ssu-hsiao's writings are friendly to both Ch'en I-chung and Chang Shih-chieh, but his Hsin-shih has often been rejected as spurious on the basis of much conflicting and inaccurate material about the Sung resistance. Such inaccuracies ranged from the whereabouts of Chang Shih-chieh and Ch'en I-chung to the Mongols devouring Wen
T'ien-hsiang's heart. I think Cheng's work is an example of how the lack of information in the immediate years after the resistance (ca. 1283) could result in pure speculation and groundless rumours circulating in the city markets. In his biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang, Cheng admits that he had not consulted Wen's entire writings and that his sources amounted to hearing about one or two parts out of ten in regard to the whole account. Cheng actually had a personal relationship with a member of the Sung imperial family in San-chiang (Fukien), but because the two friends lost contact after the resistance, Cheng was not able to draw on him as an informant about the events he described in the Hsin-shih. Chou Mi, the versatile talent in art connoisseurship, poetry, and random jottings, also wrote a great deal about the loyalist resistance and the loyalists. His personal informants included the family of Ti-Shih's mother (Imperial Concubine Yang), Yuan officials formerly in Sung service, and northerners sojourning in Hang-chou. Because of his personal loyalty to friends, he did not criticize those among them who surrendered to the Yuan or later served, but satirized cruelly other defectors whom he did not count as belonging to his personal circle.

In sum, although the loyalists drew upon Wen T'ien-hsiang's work and took over its basic contents and biases, the writer's individual point of view was largely responsible for discrepancies and divergent judgements. There are also many cases of conflicting information that are sometimes difficult to prove one way or the other. One example is relatively easy to determine: the unreliable Erh-wang pen-mo is surely wrong in showing Su Liu-i to have died of malaria in 1277, contradicting more reliable loyalist sources which
indicate that Su had in fact survived the defeat at Yai-shan and died later in 1279 while attempting to revive the resistance. Another case is more difficult to assess: whether Hsieh Fang-te fled to Fukien before or after the collapse of Hang-chou (to confirm or deny his participation in the resistance movement after the collapse of the capital). A Ch'ing work, the Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien 續資治通鑑, apparently could not decide and thus made two separate entries of Hsieh's departure to Fukien. As will be indicated in Chapter Four, I use Hsieh's writings to show that he participated in the loyalist resistance for a few months after the surrender of the Sung capital.

II. The Sung-shih Coverage of the Sung Loyalists

The writings of the loyalists as described above do not, however, provide a clear chronological and broad perspective of the events of the last years of the Southern Sung and the resistance movement. The official histories of the period, the Sung-shih and Yuan-shih, are helpful in filling this gap. The "veritable records" for Emperor Li-tsung's reign did not survive, and those for Tu-tsung and Kung-ti were not written; thus, the historical archives collected by Tung Wen-ping upon the surrender of Hang-chou in 1276 had little bearing on the subject. In the absence of these Sung official sources, the Sung-shih compilers had to rely mostly on Yuan official writings (such as the P'ing-Sung lu 平宋錄 and biographies of illustrious Yuan generals who took part in the Sung conquest) to draw up a logical chronology in the annals of Li-tsung, Tu-tsung, and the Duke of Ying-kuo (Kung-ti). An account of the two Sung princes enthroned by the loyalists is appended to the annals of the Duke of Ying-kuo; in
addition, the Sung loyalists are given biographies. Fourteen separate biographies of the loyalists appear in the general biography section, seventy-seven in the chung-i chuan 忠義傳 (group biographies of the loyal and righteous men), and two others are put with the ju-lin 儒林 (Confucian scholars). In these biographies there is strong evidence that the Sung-shih used, among other sources, Wen T'ien-hsiang's collected writings and Teng Kuang-chien's biographies of Wen and his followers, together with the Chao-chung lu. The fourteen separate biographies of the loyalists are scattered in random order, and not all the leaders of the loyalist resistance are among them. All except four loyalists appearing in the chung-i chuan are martyrs who died for or because of the Sung cause in 1273-79. These biographies are interspersed among the remaining 201 chung-i personalities covering various periods in Sung history (a total of 278). They represent 28% of all those applauded for loyalty to the dynasty. The two men appearing in the ju-lin section were not treated as loyalists by the Sung-shih compilers.

Due to the haste with which the Sung-shih was compiled, the general shortcomings of the project have particular relevance to the coverage of the Sung loyalists. Apart from the random appearance of the biographies of loyalists, conflicting material and inaccuracies also occur in the biographies. Another serious problem is the absence of biographies of important loyalists such as Su Liu-i, Teng Kuang-chien, Wang Yüan-liang, and Cheng Ssu-hsiao.

A conspicuous feature of the accounts of the loyalists is the reinforcement of Yüan official views. In the preface of the collective biographies of the chung-i, the Sung-shih compilers state that their instructions were to record without fear of censorship the
loyal acts and personalities of the former Sung dynasty. The biographies were primarily based on private Sung loyalist writings, but evidently some editing was done to make explicit the official Yuan perspective and to tone down anti-Mongol statements of the loyalists. The scholar-official in charge of the project was Ou-yang Hsüan 欧陽玄 (1283-1357) of Lu-ling, Wen T'ien-hsiang's place of birth. Ou-yang Hsüan was sympathetic to the Sung loyalists, as shown by his preface to the collected writings of Wang Yen-wu 王炎午 (1252-1324), loyalist and personal follower of Wen T'ien-hsiang and fellow graduate of Ou-yang's father.37 But although Ou-yang admired Sung loyalism, a pro-Yuan bias is noticeable throughout the accounts of loyalist activities. In the annals, the Mongols are already referred to as Ta-Yüan 元 (Great Yuan) in 1232,38 even though the Yuan was not proclaimed as the title of the Mongol dynasty until 1271. Accounts of the conquest of the Sung emphasize again and again Qubilai's enlightened policies. The loyalists are commended for adherence to moral commitment to the Sung, but the generous sympathy of the Mongol generals is also put into the official record. For example, in the biographies of Pien Chü-i 邊居 (d. 1275) and Chao Mao-fa, Bayan is depicted performing sacrificial rites for the Sung martyrs; Aju, too, is shown admiring Chiang Ts'ai's loyal spirit and courage.39 The loyalists are praised for their efforts to save the Sung, but these acts are interpreted as being against the will of Heaven and totally in vain. Abusive language used against the Mongols and Sung defectors has been edited out of the original biographies. As for the loyalists who did not cooperate with the Mongols and died atrocious deaths such as being minced and mutilated, the biographies merely record "pu-ch'ū ssu 不屈死" (unwilling to compromise they died).
The portrayal of the Sung loyalists in the Sung-shih is not the full picture, but it nevertheless casts some doubts on the official Yuan myth of easy conquest, mild resistance, and bloodless victories as discussed in Chapter Two.

III. Sung Loyalist Writings and Censorship

I shall now consider the political climate under which the Sung-shih and loyalist writings were written and circulated. The ubiquitous presence of the Yuan official view in the coverage of the Sung loyalists indicates that as late as the 1340s when the Sung-shih was compiled, the Yuan was still sensitive on the issue of Sung resistance. There are at present two divergent views about freedom of expression in the Yuan. Traditional and some modern Chinese historians stress that because of the repressive political situation under the Mongols, the loyalists used a veiled language and ambiguous phraseology to convey their thoughts. In the West, Franke and Mote feel that because eccentric loyalists such as Cheng Ssu-hsiao did not constitute a political threat, the Mongol authorities simply paid no attention to what they wrote.⁴⁰

To be sure, the situation under the Yuan compares well with the Ming and Ch'ing literary inquisitions, in which authors of condemned works frequently suffered the death penalty or posthumous disgrace.⁴¹ The closest equivalent in the Yuan was the burning of Taoist books and woodblocks on two occasions (1258 and 1281),⁴² but there are no known cases of wen-tzu yü 文字獄 (literary persecution), in which an individual was arrested and executed for reviling the Mongol rulers and officials. The three years of Sung resistance are even described in the annals of the last Sung emperor,
whereas the Southern Ming movement did not get a mention in the Ming-shih 明史 annals. Furthermore, the Mongols have often been considered generous in their treatment of the Sung imperial family, compared to the savage attitudes of the Jurchen Chin. Loyalty was a virtue admired in Mongol tradition since the time of Cinggis Qan, and when the Sung was conquered, the Mongols sought to employ especially diehard loyalists like Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te. The likely motive for this was to bring the newly conquered empire more readily into submission by persuasive example. Thus, in essence, it was not Yuan intention nor in its interest to be hostile to those who felt a lingering loyalty to the former Sung dynasty.

However, loyalist writings suggest that the climate was not perceived to be completely conducive to free expression. A literatus in 1369 noted that "at the time when the Yuan was first established, those expressing opinions often used concealed and obscure phraseology". Two works discussed earlier in this connection are the Sung-shih and Ch'en Chung-wei's Erh-wang pen-mo. In regard to Wen T'ien-hsiang's work, Cheng Ssu-hsiao writes that he saw both the original and later editions, in which derogatory references to the Mongols had been revised:

The references to the [Mongol] bandits as "Great Yuan" and "Chief minister", and to himself as "T'ien-hsiang" in Wen's prefaces [to his Chih-nan lu] were not the original words of the venerable [Wen]. The earlier editions railed blatantly at the caiffiffs and did not record their chieftains' names. Readers should detect these concealed and falsified words. It must have happened that those misguided by the [barbarian] bandits anticipated catastrophe and thus changed [the offensive language] to innocuous words. The fierce berating of the bandits in the poems [of the Chih-nan lu] have also not been transmitted [to the new edition].

Some loyalists used historical analogies to express their thoughts about barbarian conquest. Hu San-hsing 胡三省 (1230-1302)
was a loyalist in Ch'ing-yüan who revealed his outrage by means of his annotations on the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien.\(^{45}\) When his work was published in the late Yüan, it appears to have been subjected to some editing. However, the revisions were only randomly done, as many pejorative phrases have survived. Hsieh Fang-te also annotated Confucian Classics and T'ang poems to convey his distress about barbarian rule.\(^{46}\) Like Hu San-hsing's work, it would appear that if tampering had in fact occurred, it was not thorough.

There are other indications that loyalists used obscure and allusive language in their writings because they did not feel the political atmosphere to be entirely free of restraint and danger. An incident often described by Sung loyalists in such a manner is the rescue of the Sung imperial remains in Kuei-chi.\(^{47}\) In order to pay last respects to the Sung dynasty while at the same time protecting themselves, poets gathered at this place and wrote highly allusive poetry. In 1284, Hsieh Ao 謝翱 (1249-1295), a follower of Wen T'ien-hsiang, wrote an essay later hailed as a masterpiece of loyalist literature.\(^{48}\) In this essay, Hsieh identifies neither the persons nor events mentioned, presumably in order to protect himself. Several years later, Hsieh served as a judge in a poetry competition held in Wu-chou, in which the theme assigned was allusive rather than straightforward; the entries were couched in obscure language and submitted under pen names.

Of some relevance to a discussion of Mongol censorship is the Hsin-shih of Cheng Ssu-hsiao. Its preface states that the work was completed by 1283; it was enclosed in an iron case and suspended in a dry well, at the monastery in P'ing-chiang that Cheng had lived in. It was not retrieved until 1638, a time coinciding with the impending
conquest of the Ming dynasty by the Manchus. The work is in essence a collection of poetry and prose laced with strong abusive language hurled against the Mongols and barbarian rule, and an appeal to support the Sung restoration. Because of its inaccuracies in describing Mongol customs and the Sung resistance, the relatively well-preserved state of the work, and the timing of its discovery, the Hsin-shih has been dismissed as a Ming forgery intended to arouse nationalist and ethnic emotions and instigate uprisings against the Manchus. This was certainly the view of some Ch'ing scholars and the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu compilers. On the other hand, Ming loyalists such as Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682) and Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692), and modern Chinese nationalists contended that the Hsin-shih had truly been authored by Cheng Ssu-hsiao. In more recent times, the work is accepted as authentic by scholars such as Mote and Kuwabara, but to date the last word has yet to be said. The Ch'ing historian Ch'üan Tsu-wang (1705-1755) wavered: he first regarded the work as a forgery, but later treated it as authentic. Yao Ts'ung-wu puts forth the alternative view that the work was written by a group of patriots who were contemporaries of Cheng Ssu-hsiao. After considering the arguments on both sides and reading the Hsin-shih, I feel that neither its authenticity nor its spuriousness can be proved beyond doubt. I should, however, like to add my reasons for including the Hsin-shih in my discussion of Sung loyalism. To use the inaccuracies of Cheng Ssu-hsiao as an argument against its authenticity seems to be weak in itself. Cheng's contemporary Chou Mi, in depicting Mongol and barbarian customs, also quoted fantastic tales that he had heard at second or third hand; and yet the authenticity of his pi-chi...
miscellanies has never been questioned. The language and repetitive style used in the Hsin-shih can be found in Cheng's other extant writings. In addition, the personality that emerges from the Hsin-shih is consistent with the eccentric personality of Cheng as conveyed by his paintings and by contemporary accounts.\textsuperscript{54}

Cheng explains in the Hsin-shih that his main objective for writing it was "to respect legitimate and orthodox succession, repel the barbarians, praise the loyal subjects, execute the treacherous bandits, and to encourage the world and posterity to become loyal subjects".\textsuperscript{55} His instructions were to destroy the work should it be retrieved before the Sung was revived. Cheng may have been anxious about the Mongols discovering his writings and alerting themselves to a Sung restoration movement, and thus concealed the Hsin-shih.

Although Cheng Ssu-hsiao and traditional historians may have exaggerated the repressive political climate under which the loyalists lived, there is evidence that the Mongol emperor distrusted Sung loyalty in spite of his admiration for it. In this connection, one should mention a written statute forbidding the Chinese to congregate in groups.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, they were not allowed to carry arms, and the penalties for such an offence far outweighed banditry and thievery.\textsuperscript{57} The Yuan authorities certainly suspected subversive activities, and in 1283 Qubilai responded to rumours that the last pretender to the Sung throne, Ti-Ping, was still alive.\textsuperscript{58} He thus executed Wen T'ien-hsiang after a plot to rescue the latter leaked out.\textsuperscript{59} In 1290 there were petitions to transfer Sung imperial relatives to the capital, presumably in fear of their participation in rebellions, or of their being used as figureheads in such movements.\textsuperscript{60} I would suggest that in view of this political climate,
even though there were no censorship laws nor cases of literary inquisitions, there existed fear of the consequences of defamatory language used against the Mongols. The loyalists, friends, colleagues, sons, and disciples may have exercised a certain amount of caution and self-censorship. Perhaps the editors and publishers also saw the need to tone down certain passages and revise a few offensive words. Then there was Lu Hsiu-fu's diary which Teng Kuang-chien never released to his fellow loyalists, and Teng's T'ien-hai lu which Teng's family did not surrender to the Sung-shih compilers. One could speculate that these writings contained unflattering material about the Mongols which Teng dared not reveal and thereby court disaster. For, even if the Mongols did not seem to care what was written or talked about by eccentrics like Cheng Ssu-hsiao, some Chinese officials in Yuan service might attempt to inform on both seditious literature and their authors in order to curry favour with their superiors.

A question to be asked is how extensive this voluntary editing was. Absent in most wen-chi collections of the loyalists is a fierce condemnation of the Mongols, who are merely referred to as Ta-ping 大兵 (Great Army), Ta-Yüan 大元 and T'ien-ping 天兵 (Heavenly Army). The Mongol conquest is simply talked about as ping-huo 兵火 (flames of war), kuei-fu 歸附 (submission) and shih-pien 改变 (the change of dynasties). The epithets used against the Mongols are hu 胡 (barbarians), pei-jen 北人 (northern people), pei-k'o 北客 (northern visitors), lu 蠱 (barbarian caitiffs), and yu 酉 (barbarian chieftains). It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the loyalists later reconciled themselves to alien rule and began using the Yüan reign titles, or their editors changed their
wording. One thing is certain though, such mild language was not used at the beginning of the Mongol conquest in Sung official writings. In imperial rescripts for the period 1273-75, drafted by Wang Ying-lin and preserved in his collected writings, we can easily find the Mongols referred to as ugly beings, swine, and snakes preying on other people's blood.61 As these rescripts survived through the Yuan, we can say that although there is evidence of editing, it was not thorough.

While we might safely assume that the editing of loyalist writings in the Yuan was mostly on a voluntary and cautious basis, the censorship of later periods was not so. The Ch'ien-lung rescript of 1776 emphatically proclaimed that books by Ming authors which opposed the Ch'ing dynasty must be burned; in the case of books dating from the Southern Sung which criticized the Chin, or from the early Ming which criticized the Yuan, the offensive passages must be erased or revised, though not necessarily destroyed.62 Sung loyalist writings would surely have fallen into the second category. As the Ch'ing rulers were descended from the Jurchen Chin, material detrimental to the Chin would have to be revised. And indeed we do find examples of such revisions: in Chou Mi's pi-chi miscellanies we find references to the Chin emperors by their temple names, and to the Chin dynasty as Ta-Chin 大金 (Great Chin).63 Given Chou Mi's antipathy to the Chin, typical of the Southern Sung officials as well as northern Chinese in Yuan service, he would not have used that expression for the Chin, and Yuan editions would not have made the change. In addition to criticism of the Chin, the Manchus were sensitive to derogatory language used against the Khitan Liao and the Mongol Yuan.
IV. Later Writings on the Sung Loyalists With a Local Perspective

It was in view of the deficiencies of the Sung-shih, interest in local contribution to national history, and admiration of loyalism that alternative sources on the Sung loyalists blossomed into a genre of loyalist literature. The Sung i-min lu is a Ming compilation of the writings and later eulogies of eleven i-min loyalists who were not included in the official histories. Its compiler indicates that he was upset at this gap in history and thus compiled their writings to preserve them for posterity.

Efforts to extol native loyalists resulted in works with a distinctly local perspective. Gazetteers and family genealogies collected biographical information on native personalities who had played a role in the attempted restoration of the Sung. The early Ch'ing historian Wan Ssu-t'ung (1638-1702) used such gazetteers and unofficial sources to supplement the list of loyalists in his Sung-chi chung-i lu. The 544 men dealt with in the compilation include all the loyal men who fought against the Mongols, from the 1230s to the collapse of loyalist resistance. In this work Wan appended additional material to the Sung-shih biographies and also altered the text of the annals to make legitimate the reign of the two Sung princes enthroned by the loyalists. The editors of the Ch'ing imperial encyclopedia, Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng, also combed through official and alternative sources to compile records of 684 chung-i subjects of the Sung; out of this figure about one-third are loyalists who fought the Mongols. These records of Sung loyal men take up six chapters and constitute only a small section in its general coverage of loyal subjects since antiquity. The late Ch'ing historian, Lu Hsin-yuan
In his Sung-shih and in his Sung-shih added many biographies of Sung loyalists under the categories of the chung-i and the i-hsien (surviving literati). In his work Lu used gazetteers, funerary inscriptions, and other private sources. In more recent times, Ch'en Po-t'ao (1855-1930), feeling forlorn about the nationalist revolution in 1911, found consolation in the recollection of Sung loyalists in Tung-kuan and in Kowloon. The Tung-kuan i-min lu records the activities of the local loyalists during and after the collapse of Yai-shan.

By compiling and adding biographies of local loyalists and anthologies of their writings to previous collections, the above works primarily sought to record local contributions to Sung loyalism. The Ch'ing scholar Ch'üan Tsu-wang took a more direct and personal approach to show the role his family and local district had played in Sung history and Sung loyalism. Ch'üan is generally recognized as a great historian of the Che-tung school, inheriting the legacy of Huang Tsung-hsi and Wan Ssu-t'ung. Better known for his scholarship on Ming loyalism, Ch'üan's work on the Sung loyalists consists of a number of separate essays discussing certain aspects, events, and personalities of the Southern Sung.

In several essays found in his collected works, Ch'üan excitedly traces his ancestors to the eminent Ch'üan lineage of Kuei-chi in the Southern Sung. From family clan registers and Sung literary writings he proves his clan relationship with Empress Ch'üan (wife of Tu-tsung and mother of Kung-ti). When the Sung capital fell, Empress Ch'üan's family (excluding her aged father) had accompanied the imperial entourage to Ta-tu and later died there. The mothers of Tu-tsung and Li-tsung were also related to the Ch'üan family. Furthermore,
Li-tsung and his brother had been brought up by the Ch'üans. Ch'üan Tsu-wang emphatically points out that although his ancestors had been prominent in the late Southern Sung, they did not take advantage of their position to advance the family. In fact, after the fall of the Sung, not a few relatives who had never served the Sung decided nevertheless to withdraw from political service because of their connections with the Sung imperial family.\(^72\)

In another essay, Ch'üan claims descent from another clan member, Ch'üan Ch'üan-weng 金泉翁 (fl. 1260-1300), a loyalist poet who came ninth in a poetry competition in 1286-87.\(^73\) Ch'üan-weng's loyalty to the Sung through withdrawal from public life is readily praised by Ch'üan, who also credits Ch'üan-weng with playing a crucial role in the recovery of the Sung imperial remains, a role hitherto never recognized. Tai Piao-yüan 戴表元 (1244-1310), a native of Ch'ing-yüan, was an intimate friend of Ch'üan-weng; using Tai's writings together with the family registers, Ch'üan informs his readers that because the new site for the imperial bones had then been in his family's possession, and because Ch'üan-weng was a close companion of Wang Ying-sun 王英孫 (fl. 1260-1300, [the mastermind behind the reburial of the imperial remains]), Ch'üan-weng must have been involved in the planning and should accordingly be commemorated with the other participants of the incident.\(^74\) Ch'üan goes so far as to say that without the participation of his family, the Sung imperial remains would not have been recovered.

In addition to his ancestors' direct participation in the events of the Southern Sung, Ch'üan was also interested in loyalist personalities and places of significance that had bearing on his native place, Ch'ing-yüan. In this respect, he reveals new
information about the loyalists Wang Ying-lin, Hu San-hsing, and others during the first generation of Yüan rule. In addition, Ch'üan's work is valuable in supplementing the historical records relating to the local region. In one instance, he notes that the existing gazetteers did not record the historical significance of Chin-tzu 興子 mountain, in which Chang Shih-chieh had camped with his forces and sought loyalist support in Ch'ing-yüan. Ch'üan explains that the omission had resulted from deliberate suppression by the author of the gazetteer, Yüan Chüeh 表楠 (1266-1327), in order to conceal his father's surrender to the Mongols. Ch'üan also provides additional information about the descendants of the loyalists, with whom he was acquainted.

In his work Ch'üan also expresses general views about the traditional historiography of Sung loyalism. According to him, individuals who survived the change of dynasty but did not serve the new rulers should be considered loyalists; their biographies should be put next to the chung-i biographies. He argues that Liu Yin 魯因 (1249-1293) and Hsü Heng 許衡 (1209-1281), who were born under the Yüan, would not have damaged their integrity if both had served. However, he criticizes Yüan Hao-wen 虞好問 (1190-1257), who lived under the Chin but still recommended over forty former Chin subjects to office in the Yüan. Sometimes this appraisal is not very logical and shows his partialty, as when he chides Tai Piao-yüan for serving the Yüan as an instructor in a prefecture and defends Wang Ying-lin for serving as a local school director, his reasoning being that the latter office was at the local level and received no orders from the Yüan throne. And, as mentioned earlier, Ch'üan has not been consistent in his views about the authenticity of the Hsin-shih.
In arguing for the prominent role his ancestors had played in Southern Sung, he states that although his family had the potential to do so, it did not interfere with court politics; he later contradicts himself by saying that Tu-tsung's accession to the throne was largely due to the efforts of his family (Chia Ssu-tao is traditionally credited with Tu-tsung's enthronement), but it was Chia Ssu-tao who was solely responsible for ruining the empire. Ch'üan also makes faulty conclusions: on the strength of two short surviving poems and ninth-placing in an amateur poetry competition, Ch'üan Ch'üan-weng is considered a giant among poets. In sum, Ch'üan's concern with his family and local history, together with his personal prejudices, definitely undermined his objectivity as an historian.

A more recent interest in local contributions to Southern Sung history is reflected in the debates in the 1950s involving several prominent scholars in Hong Kong: Chien Yu-wen, Lo Hsiang-lin, and Jao Tsung-i. In connection with the role Hong Kong and Kowloon might have played in the events of the loyalist resistance, the key issues raised are the route taken by the refugee loyalist court and the identification of local relics and remains with real or imaginary historical personalities or events, together with the reliability of various sources, including folklore. It is generally agreed that in February 1276, the brothers of Kung-ti, Shih and Ping, left Hang-chou and passed through Wu-chou; in May and June they arrived at Wen-chou and Foochow respectively. In December 1276, pursued by the Mongol fleet, the loyalist court sailed by Ch'üan-chou and Hsia-men (Amoy), Ch'ao-chou, Hui-chou, Kuang-chou, reaching Kowloon in April 1277. For six months in 1277 the loyalist court apparently sojourned in Kuan-fu ch'ang (now identified as Chiu-lung ch'eng
九龍城，Ku-t'a 古塔 (Fo-t'ang men 佛堂門，also in Chiu-lung ch'eng)，and Ch'ien-wan 淺灣 (Tsun-wan 荃灣)，all within present Kowloon territory. For centuries relics have reminded the local inhabitants about this episode in Sung history: the rock used as a dressing table by Imperial Concubine Yang, the Erh-wang tien 二王殿 (palace of the two princes), and the Sung wang-t'ai 宋王台 (a large rock later identified as the remains of a lookout tower located on Sacred Hill). There are also relics traditionally associated with the refugee court which the above authors proved to be imaginative folklore; for instance, the Hou-wang miao 侯王廟 (Temple of Prince Hou) had nothing to do with the brother of Imperial Concubine Yang, and the Chin fu-jen mu 金夫人墓 (Tomb of Lady Chin) could not be the alleged grave of the sister of Ti-Shih. As early as 1899 the site itself was recognized by local inhabitants to have historical significance and successful appeals were made to the British authorities to have it thus declared to prevent commercial development on the premises. At present the original Sung wang-t'ai platform no longer exists, having been destroyed by the Japanese in the Second World War in order to extend Kai Tak airport. But the rock itself with the inscription "Sung wang-t'ai" remains largely intact, and has been relocated at a different site to mark the memory of the Sung princes. In 1958, after the completion of gardens surrounding the rock, Chien Yu-wen was requested by the Chao family clan in Hong Kong (which claims descent from the Sung imperial family) to write a commemorative volume identifying the relics and places of historical interest relating to the Sung imperial princes in Kowloon and Hong Kong. Sparked by this interest, Lo Hsiang-lin's main concern was to add details to many points raised. The primary purpose of Jao
Tsung-i's book was to question doubtful analyses and erroneous sources used by both Chien and Lo.

The three authors disagree on a number of issues, but the main point of contention is the identification of Kang-chou, where the loyalist court had fled from the Kowloon sites in December 1277 and where Ti-Shih subsequently died. While Chien Yu-wen and Lo Hsiang-lin, following Ch'en Po-t'ao and other traditional historians, point to the Ta-yü Shan on Lan T'ao Island (still Kowloon territory), Jao identifies it much further to the west near Hua-chou and Lei-chou (in western Kwangtung). In support of their argument, both Chien and Lo draw from Ch'en Chung-wei's Erh-wang pen-mo, a work that Jao shows to have been drastically edited and therefore unreliable. Jao instead follows Teng Kuang-chien's biography of Wen and the T'ien-hai lu, together with Chou Mi's Kuei-hsin tsa-chih and the Yuan-shih. I think Jao's arguments are very strong, but Chien and Lo have not been convinced by them. It seems that their determination to locate Kang-chou within Kowloon and Hong Kong territory is related to an attempt to enhance the cultural history of this region. There has not been further debate on the issue in the last fifteen years, but interest in the Sung dynasty has not waned, as indicated by the opening of a commercial amusement park in 1979 named "Sung City", which claims to allow visitors to experience the customs, dress, and food of the Sung dynasty.

After several months in Kang-chou, where Ti-Shih died and Ti-Ping succeeded to the throne, the loyalist court sailed back to eastern Kwangtung, and at Yai-shan (located in Hsin-hui district), it anchored and stayed for nine months. Temporary lodgings were built and
preparations made for the final battle in March 1279. This site is still recognized for its historical significance, as noted by a tourist who recently sailed past it. The several sites of interest pointed out by local inhabitants are, however, no more than unsubstantiated folklore. These include the cliff from which Lu Hsiu-fu was thought to have jumped (in fact Lu leapt into the sea from the imperial boat) and a certain island where Wen T'ien-hsiang's boat was to have been tied and from where he watched the Yai-shan battle.

Genealogies also reflect a local pride of participation in national history. We have earlier noted that the compilers of gazetteers were interested in adding names of loyalists to already existing lists. Family registers also sought to put on record any relationship or contact with Sung loyalists and the imperial family. In the case of the Huang family register of T'ai-shan, there is a record of a certain woman née Mi who cured Imperial Concubine Yang of an ailment. The Chao family register claims a continuous descent from the Sung emperors. A large number of Chao imperial clansmen had accompanied the two Sung princes to Kwangtung, and most of these came from Foochow. At present there are branches in Hong Kong, Hsin-hui, T'ai-shan, Tung-kuan, and even in the United States. As for Wen T'ien-hsiang's descendants, several registers available show them to have been spread to Hui-chou, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaya, and the United States. The Hsieh family claims as one of their ancestors Hsieh Fang-te and includes biographies of both Hsieh and his wife in its register. The fact that these genealogies have been vigorously kept up to date shows that connections with the Sung loyalists and the Sung imperial family continue to be regarded with pride. Although these genealogies may
have elements of truth in regard to participation in the events of the end of the Sung dynasty, one can hardly doubt that exaggeration and distortion might well have occurred. This local and family concern of the historian has often constituted a conspicuous aspect of the historiography of the Sung loyalists and contributed to some myths in the process.

V. Some Myths About the Sung Loyalists and the Loyalist Resistance

Above I have discussed the nature of some sources which gave rise to a number of myths associated with the loyalists and their resistance to the Mongols. The accessibility of Wen T'ien-hsiang's writings caused his points of view to be heard above all other loyalists, and thus he emerges from the beginning as the leader of the resistance while the shortcomings of his rival loyalists are highlighted. For ideological reasons, the Sung-shih compilers depicted the conquest of the Sung to have been compassionate and gentle in spite of some obvious Mongol atrocities. Admiration for the loyalist spirit and local interest in history gave rise to the erroneous view that the loyalist resistance was popularly supported by all the soldiers and common people, when in fact many were but mercenaries and tenants forced to join the armies by their landlords.

To take the end of the Sung to be 1279 rather than 1276 is another distortion of historical facts. In February 1276, when Empress Dowager Hsieh surrendered Hang-chou, edicts were despatched to order the entire empire to submit and to bring back the two princes who had fled to the southeast. The imperial family was then taken to the north, accompanied by thousands of officials and gift-bearers. Yuan authorities immediately took possession of imperial archives and
treasures, and set up provisional governments to represent Yuan interests in Hang-chou. The Yuan emperor, by performing the Chinese sacrificial rites to the ancestors (if only by proxy), also formally brought the Sung to an end. He soon after proclaimed that the Sung should henceforth be referred to as wang-Sung 亡宋 (vanquished Sung). As far as the Yuan was concerned, the Sung dynasty was thus terminated for all intents and purposes with the fall of Hang-chou. In the annals of the Duke of Ying-kuo, however, an account of Ti-Shih and Ti-Ping is attached. By this gesture the Yuan perhaps acknowledged the fact that resistance had occurred without according any legitimacy to the three years of its duration. In 1276 many civil and military officials also felt that the Sung had collapsed and accordingly lay down arms and surrendered, or fled to the wilderness to nurse their grief. Some considered themselves i-min loyalists and began writing about the collapse of the country and their personal bereavement. Only a few central officials such as Lu Hsiu-fu, Chang Shih-chieh, and Wen T'ien-hsiang later felt that the Mandate of Heaven had not been withdrawn from the Sung during 1276-79, as indicated in the posthumous will of Ti-Shih drafted by Lu Hsiu-fu: "I have no pleasure in being emperor. It is only that Heaven has not released the Sung [from holding the Mandate of Heaven]!" I feel that the above reasons justify regarding the Sung dynasty to have ended with the occupation of the capital in 1276. Moreover, although the loyalists found support in the southeast provinces in 1276-79, they were not powerful enough to actually begin administering the regions which they held or recovered from the Mongols.

The inclusion of the three years of resistance as part of the Sung dynasty was a consequence of the Ming and Ch'ing rewriting of
Sung history. What gave rise to this interest was general dissatisfaction with the composition of the Sung-shih and the legitimate status given to the Liao and Chin dynasties by writing their separate histories. Most Ming scholars (with the exception of Wang Chu who took an extreme position by denying legitimacy altogether to the Yuan dynasty) wanted to convert the three histories into one, with the Sung commanding legitimacy and the Liao and Chin incorporated into the history of the Sung. They also wished to represent Kung-ti, Ti-Shih, and Ti-Ping as legitimate Sung emperors, and be respectively known as Kung-tsung, Tuan-tsung, and Ti-Ping. In the Ch'ing, while chronological histories such as Pi Yüan's Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien persisted with the Sung-shih convention of ending the Sung in 1276, private writings such as Wan Ssu-t'ung's Sung-chi chung-i lu revised the Sung-shih annals and loyalist biographies to accord legitimacy to the two princes and the three years of loyalist resistance. Most Chinese and Western works now take 1279 to be the end of the Sung, attesting to the success of Ming and Ch'ing revisions of Sung history. I think this is a curious and unjustified measure, especially in view of the fact that we regard the Ming dynasty to have ended in 1644 when the Ming capital was taken by the Manchus, even though loyalist forces continued to threaten the new dynasty for several decades.

Another myth present in historical sources is the fantastic tale of Kung-ti fathering the last Yuan emperor, Toghoon Temür (Shun-ti, r. 1333-1368). In March 1276, the six-year old Kung-ti was forced to journey to the Yuan capital and formally dethroned and demoted to the Duke of Ying-kuo. In 1288 he left for Tibet to practice Buddhism. An early Ming unofficial history, the Keng-shen
states that many years later he was given a Muslim wife, who in 1320 gave birth to a son. It happened that Qoshila (the future Ming-tsung 朋宗, r. 1329) was passing through Tibet, and considering the birth to be auspicious, took with him back to the Yuan capital both mother and child (the future Shun-ti). Another Ming source corroborates the story, but with some minor variation of detail.

Proponents of this story drew confirmation from Qoshila's own admission that Toghon Temür was indeed not his own son. They further sought to verify it with a remark made by the Yung-lo Emperor 永樂帝 of the Ming (r. 1403-1424), that the portrait of Shun-ti bore an uncanny resemblance to the founding Sung emperor. Many Ch'ing scholars such as Ch'üan Tsu-wang and Chao I accepted that Kung-ti indeed fathered Shun-ti, but others believed the rumour to be a myth created by Sung loyalists to compensate for their loss of empire and ruler. It was further argued that Qoshila would not have considered adopting a child, not to mention the Yuan aristocracy permitting a non-Mongol to be enthroned. The renowned late Ch'ing/Republican scholar Wang Kuo-wei 王國維 (1877-1927) also regarded the story as true on the basis of the Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai 佛祖歷代通載 recording the forced suicide of Kung-ti in 1323. His contention is that Qoshila had felt threatened by Kung-ti (who knew about the circumstances of the adoption of the son) and therefore put him to death. This argument, however, does not seem convincing enough to confirm the story as historical fact, and I still think the whole story is largely speculative and more of a myth than reality.

The greatest myth, and one that combines all others, is the
idealistic conceptualization of the Sung loyalists as faultless exemplars and their loyalism as a paradigm of virtues unchanged through the passage of time. Wen T'ien-hsiang, the paragon of loyalist integrity, is praised to the utmost while his faults—arrogance, extravagance, and exaggeration of his own role—are not mentioned. On the other hand, as we have seen in Chapter Two, Chia Ssu-tao's crime as the "last chief minister" is greatly exaggerated. Not only are Wen and Chia portrayed as positive and negative counterparts of each other, but the entire group of loyalists and that of collaborators and defectors also emerge diametrically opposed. A conscious attempt to stereotype and categorize has resulted in deliberate "widening" and contrasting of the qualities of the two groups, and in the process, the middle-ground between the two extremes has been blurred.

Biographies of the Sung loyalists in the Sung-shih include mainly those who died for or because of the Sung cause, and thus they were martyrs whose integrity could not be questioned. Although the Sung-shih preface to the biographies explains that those who survived the disasters but withdrew from society and concealed themselves should also be regarded as loyal men, only four such loyalists have been included. Unofficial historical sources outlined in the previous pages intended to supplement this gap by including biographies and accounts of the i-min loyalists who lived after the collapse of the Sung but who did not eventually serve in the Yüan government. Thus so far two traditions of Sung loyalists have been recognized—the martyrs and the survivors.

These two, however, do not adequately consider those who later served the Yüan in minor education offices and others who found
themselves in compromising positions beyond their control. Some of these individuals have been incorporated in the tradition of i-min, whereas others in exactly the same situation have been censured and lumped together with the defectors and collaborators. The prejudices and standards set by the individual writer determined who should or should not be criticized. Grouping these men with the collaborators in effect ignores the circumstances of their reemergence into public service and the particular type of loyalism they felt. In fact, not a few collaborators and defectors felt loyalty and some changed sides only under difficult situations. Discussing the loyalists and collaborators as polar opposites overlooks the common background and similar sentiments of the two groups. In order to further examine the close connection between the two extremes, a third group--the marginal loyalists--should be examined. Their loyalty was somewhat tarnished by socializing with the Yuan officials, or by taking up office under the Yuan after a period of withdrawal, or by withdrawing from public service only after a period of forced service with the Yuan. The three traditions of Sung loyalism will be discussed separately in the following chapters.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


3. See Bibliography for the extant writings of the loyalists cited in this study.

4. For various editions of the Wen-shan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi, see Brown, pp. 11-14. In the SPTK edition, the sections which have particular relevance to the resistance appear as follows: Chih-nan chien-ku, ch. 13; Chih-nan hou-lu, ch. 14; Yin-hsiao chi, ch. 15; Chi Tu-shih, ch. 16; Chi-nien lu, ch. 17.

5. The SPTK edition of the Chi-nien lu also has commentaries by a member of the Yuan Bureau of Inspection and parts of Wen's biography by Teng Kuang-chien.

7. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.11a-b.
11. Parts of the T'ien-hai lu, together with Huang Chin's comments, are in "Postscript to the biography of Lu Hsiao-fu", in Huang Chin, Huang Chin-hua wen-chi (SPTK), 3.6a-8b.


14. Teng Kuang-chien apparently followed the list supplied by Wen so closely that no biography was provided for the valiant general Ma Shih-lung, who fought in the same capacity as Yin Yu, who was given a biography. The SS also relied on Teng's biographies
so exclusively that it, likewise, omitted a write-up on Ma Shih-lung. See Chao I, 26.520; Brown, p. 34.

15. Kung K'ai's biography of Lu Hsiu-fu, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, Sung i-min lu (Chih-pu-tsu chai), 10.10b-11a.

16. Huang Chin, 3.6a.

17. In his biography of Wen, Kung K'ai says that it was based on a manuscript of Wen's Chi-nien lu, which he saw in Teng Kuang-chien's house. See Ch'eng Min-cheng, 10.7b.


19. Jao Tsung-i, Chiu-lung yü Sung-chi, pp. 3-6. The errors made by the Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao include using the wrong titles to refer to the Sung princes. Wan Ssu-t'ung and the publisher of Su-ming ts'ung-shu, Chang Shou-yung, have also expressed doubt about the reliability of this work. See Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 2.23.

20. Verbatim passages occur in the Chi Tu-shih (Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.11b-12a) and the Erh-wang pen-mo, in (Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 6.67). See also Jao Tsung-i, Chiu-lung yü Sung-chi, p. 3.

21. Liu I-ch'ing's Ch'ien-t'ang i-shih is a more valuable work and covers more events; it has a rough chronological order and is organized under various topics or events. Chou Mi's pi-chi miscellany, Chi-tung yeh-yü (TSCC), seems to have been one of its sources. The Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao is a chronological account.

22. The authorship of the Chao-chung lu is unknown, though the work must have been finished after 1289, after the death of Hsieh Fang-te, whose biography it contains.

23. Chao Ching-liang's Chung-i chi (SKCSCP ser. 9) is an anthology of poems by Liu Hsüan (1240-1319) and his son, as well as by other contemporaries.

24. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 17.37a-b; 17.39a.

25. The preface is in Chang Hung-fan, Huai-yang chi (SKCSCP ser. 3), 2a-3a.

26. Lü's surrender is seen as a difficult decision dictated by famine and the threat of massacres of population, which had just occurred in Fan-ch'eng. Liu I-ch'ing, 6.7, 8.4-5.


28. Cheng wrote a preface to the genealogy of the Chao imperial clansmen in San-chiang, Fukien, in which he recounted his close friendship with a certain imperial relative who joined the loyalist resistance and died some years later. This preface is in Chao Hsi-nien, Chao-shih tsu-p'u (Hong Kong, 1937), 2.12-13.
29. Jao Tsung-i, Chiu-lung yü Sung-chi, pp. 84-89. Chou Mi's informants for his random jottings are either given in the text or listed at the end of entries.


31. Pi Yüan, 182.4974 (for the first month of 1275); 183.4986 (for the fifth month of 1276).

32. The SS (41.783-47.948) and the YS (5.81-10.219) annals provide parallel coverage of the last years of the Southern Sung and loyalist resistance. The YS is sometimes superior to the SS in giving more details, as for example, the exact date of Li T'ing-chih's death (YS 9.185).


34. The fourteen separate biographies are: Liu Fu (SS 405.12242-48); Kao Ssu-te (409.12322-27); Ma T'ing-luan (414.12436-40); Wang Li-hsin (416.12473-77); Chiang Wan-li (418.12523-25); Wang Yüeh (418.12525-28); Chang Chien (418.12528); Ch'en I-chung (418.12529-33); Wen T'ien-hsiang (418.12533-43); Chia Hsüan-weng (421.12598-99); Li T'ing-chih (421.12599-604); Ch'en Chung-wei (422.12618-20); Hsü Tsung-jen (425.12680-81); Hsieh Fang-te (425.12687-90). Wang Ying-lin and Huang Chen are in the ju-lin biographies (438.12987-96). In the chung-i chuan, the 77 loyalists appear in the following random order among loyal men of other periods in the Sung:

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35. The biographies of Wen's personal followers are essentially identical in Teng Kuang-chien's Wen Ch'eng-hsiang tu-fu chung-i chuan and the SS. See for example the biography of Ch'en Tzu-ching in the SS 454.13356 and in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 19.47a. The Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu editors are mistaken in saying that the SS did not use the Chao-chung lu. See Chi Yün et al., Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu T'ı-yao (Taipei, 1971), 57.1274-75). There are verbatim statements in the Chao-chung lu and the SS (e.g., Chao-chung lu, p. 12 and SS 450.12348). In addition, the order of appearance of biographies in SS 450 follows that of Chao-chung lu, pp. 12-14.
36. For the deficiencies of the SS as enumerated by Chao I, among others, see Chao I, 24.464-67. In one example of erroneous information in the SS, Hung Fu 洪福, a servant of Hsia Kuei 資攸, who had surrendered to the Yuan army and later revolted, is seen only as a loyalist martyr (SS 451.13269). For details on this incident, see Li Tse-fen, vol. 3, 177-80. For an account of Ming and Ch'ing criticism of the Sung-shih, Liao-shih, and Chin-shih, see Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese Official Historiography", pp. 88-95.

37. Ou-yang Hsuan's biography is in SS 41.797. For this preface see Wang Yen-wu, preface.2a-3b.

38. SS 41.797.

39. For the sympathy shown by Bayan to Pien Chü-i and Chao Mao-fa, see SS 451.13251 and 450.13260; for Aju's admiration for Chiang Ts'ai, see SS 451.13269.


42. Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung, pp. 3-4.

43. Hu Han's 胡翰 (1307-1381) commentary on Hsieh Ao's 胡澹庵 Hsi-t'ai t'ung-k'ü chi, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 3.7b.

44. Cheng Ssu-hsiao, Hsin-shih, p. 92. It seems that in the Ch'ing there still existed a 1276-78 edition of the Chih-nan lu in five chüan, in which some characters were missing and some passages had been deleted by black ink. See Mo Yu-chih, Sung-Yüan chiu-pen shu ching-yen lu (Taipei, 1967), pp. 71-72.

45. Hu's death is usually given as 1287, but it should be 1302, as shown in Chou Tsu-mo, "Hu San-hsing sheng-tsu hsing-li k'ao", Fu-jen hsüeh-chih 13:1-2 (1945), 113-16. Ch'en Yüan made a thorough study of Hu San-hsing's annotations on the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien by noting concealed meanings and references to the former Sung dynasty. See his T'ung-chien Hu-chu piao-wei (Hong Kong, 1978), pp. 18-19, et passim. See also Chapter Five, pp. 206-07.

46. For Hsieh's annotations, see Chapter Four, p. 149.

47. For this incident in which the loyalists in Kuei-chi reacted to the excavation of the Sung imperial tombs, and for the poetry gatherings which took place in Kuei-chi in 1279, see Chapter Five, pp. 182-89.
48. For this essay and the poetry competition in which the Wu-chou loyalists were involved, see Chapter Five, pp. 191-95.


50. Among those advocating the authenticity of the work are Ku Yen-wu 跡元, Chang Hung 張洪, Yao Chi-heng 湯季恒, Yu Chia-hsi 岳嘉織, P'eng Kuo-tung 彭國棟, and Chou Kuan-hua 周冠華. See Yang Li-kuei, pp. 84-85.


52. Ch'uan Tsu-wang is often believed to have dismissed the Hsin-shih as a forgery. However, I find that he is in favour of its authenticity in some references, (See his Chi-ch'i-t'ing chi [Wan-yu wen-k'u], wai-pien 44.1337; shih-chi 4.1507) and against in others (wai-pien 25.1000; wai-pien 34.1143-44; shih-chi 5.1525).


54. Cheng Ssu-hsiao often painted orchids without soil to indicate his distress at the Mongol subjugation of Sung territory. In his collected works there are many poems and essays reproaching himself for being unfilial and disloyal to the Sung, together with references to his peculiar habits and eccentric nature. See his So-nan wen-chi (SPTK). Among Yüan literati who wrote about Cheng were Wang Feng (1319-1388), "On the Sung National University student Cheng Ssu-hsiao's ink orchid painting", in his Wu-hsi chi (SKCSCP ser. 2), 1.45b-46b; Cheng Yüan-yu (1292-1364), 1.14-15; T'ao Tsung-i (ca. 1316-ca. 1402), Nan-ts'un cho-keng lu (Peking, 1980), 20.246-47. On Cheng Ssu-hsiao, see also Chapter Five, pp. 214-17.


56. YS 7.141.

57. Bandits who robbed and killed suffered only the cane, but those found in possession of weapons were put to death. See Ch'eng Chü-fu, Hsiéh-lou chi (Taipei, 1970), 10.395-96.
58. YS 13.276.

59. SS 418.12539-40.

60. YS 16.336. The provincial government of Chiang-Huai advised against the Sung imperial relatives being moved en masse to Ta-tu, citing the possible restlessness of the population as the reason.

61. See for example Wang Ying-lin, Ssu-ming wen-hsien chi, 5.26b and 5.28b.


63. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.49a; pieh a.37b.

64. Ch'eng Min-cheng's Sung i-min lu compiled the writings and relevant material on the following loyalists: Wang Yen-wu, Hsieh Ao, T'ang Chüeh, Chang I-fu, Fang Feng, Wu Ssu-ch'i, Kung K'ai, Wang Yüan-liang, Li Lung-chi, Cheng Ssu-hsiao, and Lin Ching-hsi. Ch'üan Tsu-wang's comments on the imperial bones incident have been inserted later.

65. Wan Ssu-t'ung (comp.), Sung-chi chung-i lu. This compilation is very liberal and includes many former Sung officials who served the Yuan without any regrets. Wan also compiled material on the imperial bones incident (Nan-Sung liu-ling i-shih); the various arguments about the ethnic background of the last Yuan emperor, Toghon Temür, are collected in the Keng-shen chün i-shih. Both volumes appear together under the title Nan-Sung liu-ling i-shih (Taipei, 1968).

66. Ch'en Meng-lei et al. (comp.), Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng (Shanghai, 1934). Loyal men from antiquity to the Ming appear under the category kuan ch'ang-tien, chung-lieh pu ming-ch'en lieh-chuan, ch. 705-764. The coverage begins with prefaces and essays on loyalty, followed by biographies of loyal men from each dynasty. The loyal men of the Sung take up six chüan while the those in the Ming take up twenty-nine.


68. Ch'en Po-t'ao (comp.), Tung-kuan i-min lu (Chü-te-t'ang).

69. Ch'üan's work on the Sung loyalists consists of about thirty references to the affairs and personalities of the late Southern Sung. They appear in random order in his collected writings, the Chi-ch'í-t'íng chi. For Ch'üan's contribution to the historiography of the Ming loyalists, see Lynn A. Struve, "Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society: The Southern Ming in Ch'ing Historiography" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1974), pp. 202-09.


73. On Ch'üan Ch'üan-weng as a poet, see Ch'üan Tsu-wang, chi 36.468; wai-pien 14.850, 33.1132.


75. For essays on Hu San-hsing, Wang Ying-lin, and others together, see Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 18.906-07; 25.1008-09.


77. For example, Ch'üan was acquainted with the descendants of Fang Feng and Wang Ying-sun. See Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 25.1000; shih-chi 7.1573-74. Ch'üan's daughter became the grand-daughter-in-law of Fang Feng's descendant, Fang Wang-hsi. See Ch'en Yüan, "About Ch'üan Tsu-wang marrying his wife née Ch'un", in Ch'en Yüan shih-yüan hsüeh tsa-wen (Peking, 1980), p. 56.

78. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 42.1299-1300.


80. On Tai Piao-yüan, see Ch'üan Tsu-wang, chi 5.61; on Wang Ying-lin, see wai-pien 19.915-20. On Tai and Wang, see also Chapter Six, pp. 259-60; Chapter Five, pp. 202-06.


82. For the points of debate, see in particular Chien Yu-wen, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch'ien nien-lu k'ao (Hong Kong, 1957) and Sung huang-t'ai chi-nien chi (Hong Kong, 1960); Lo Hsiang-lin, "Sung wang-t'ai", pp. 99-146; Jao Tsung-i, Chiu-lung yü Sung-chi, preface.1-7 and pp. 221-22.


85. Lo Hsiang-lin, "Sung wang-t'ai", p. 112.

86. Chien Yu-wen, Sung huang-t'ai chi-nien chi.

89. Lo Hsiang-lin, "Sung wang-t'ai", p. 139.

90. The Chao-shih tsu-p'u, comp. Chao Hsi-nien (Hong Kong, 1937), is the genealogy of the Hsin-hui branch of the Sung imperial family, which originated from the San-chiang branch in Fukien. In 1980 I met in Seattle a seventy year old gentleman, Willard Jue (Chao), who had in his family collection a 1905 p'u-pan edition of the genealogy of the T'ai-shan branch of the Chao family claiming descent from the Sung imperial family, the Fu-shih Chao-shih tsu-p'u 修氏昭氏族譜. It was brought to Portland by his grandfather in 1907. He also had a 1966 reprint and updated version that had been presented to him as a gift on a recent trip to Hong Kong, having made a donation to the Chao family clansmen association there. Mr Jue also proudly displayed several other books, including a ballad narrative of the Chao family history, an anthology of prose and poems of the Chao family (Hong Kong, 1972), and a book on geographical places in T'ai-shan (1908 edition). Mr. Jue told me that he was taught Chinese characters in Portland by means of the latter book. In Hong Kong the Chao family clan (Chiu Clansmen's General Association) still publishes a quarterly newsletter and distributes it both internally and overseas.

91. See Li An, p. 251, for a preface of the work by a Chao family descendant in New York. For the branch in Hong Kong, see Brown, pp. 53-54; For the Malaya branch, see Cheng Liang-shu, "Wen Hsin-kuo kung tsu-p'u", Ku-kung chi-k'an 14:3 (1980), 53-68.


93. Lu Hsiu-fu, p. 2787.

94. For accounts of the legitimacy debate and Ming and Ch'ing revisions of Sung history, see Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese Official Historiography", pp. 96-104; Chin Yü-fu, Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh-shih, pp. 139-44.

95. For examples of 1279 being used as the end of the Sung, see: Chin Yü-fu, Sung Liao Chin shih, p. 109; Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, p. 467; Hervouet, A Sung Bibliography, p. vii.

96. There are two other similar cases of fantasy: the Chin emperor Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208) being the grandson of the abducted Sung Emperor Hui-tsung and the Yung-lo Emperor of the Ming having Mongol blood. For the Yung-lo legend, see Shao Hsün-cheng, "Historical Significance of the Curious Theory of the Mongol Blood in the Veins of the Ming Emperors", Chinese Social and Political Science Review 20 (1937), 492-98; Cf. Henry Serruys, "A Manuscript Version of the Legend of the Mongol Ancestry of the Yung-lo Emperor", in Analecta Mongolica, ed. J. G. Hangin and U. Onon (Bloomington, 1972), pp. 19-61. For the Chin Chang-tsung rumour, see Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.47a.
97. Ch'üan Heng, Keng-shen wai-shih (Hsüeh-chin t'ao-yüan), a.10a-b. This work has been translated in German: H. Schulte-Uffelage, Das Keng-shen wai-shih (Berlin, 1963).

98. This was Yii Ying's "Huang-Sung fei-lung ko" 黃宗飛龍歌. See Wei Ch'ing-mang, "Yüan Shun-ti wei Sung-i k'ao", in Sung Liao Chin Yüan shih lun-chi, ed. Chou K'ang-hsieh (Hong Kong, 1971), p. 552.

99. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 42.1287.

100. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 42.1289.

101. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 42.1289; Chao I, 30.649-50.

102. Wei Ch'ing-mang, p. 574.


CHAPTER FOUR
THE CHUNG-I TRADITION OF SUNG LOYALISTS:
WEN T'IEN-HSIANG AND THE MARTYRS, 1273-79

The Sung loyalists of the chung-i tradition (loyal martyrs) shared one common feature: they died during or shortly after the collapse of the Sung dynasty on account of their personal commitment to its cause in 1273-79. This chapter first outlines the ideological and historical background to the Sung chung-i loyalists and then presents a composite discussion of the group. Next, the careers and loyalty of Wen T'ien-hsiang, Li T'ing-chih, Lu Hsiu-fu, Chang Shih-chieh, and Hsieh Fang-te are separately described. The interpersonal relationships of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Li T'ing-chih with the less known followers and subordinates are dealt with next, followed by a brief look at the "virtuous women" associated with the Sung chung-i tradition. Finally, this chapter attempts a preliminary examination of some former Sung officials and generals who defected to the Mongols.

I. Ideological and Historical Background

The notion of chung-i (literally, the loyal and righteous) incorporates two fundamental Confucian concepts: loyalty and righteousness (duty or obligation). Chung (loyalty) normally describes a subject's allegiance to the ruler and country, but in the pre-Han era it was more often used in a general sense with other shades of meanings: trustworthiness and sincerity, faithfulness to oneself, and reciprocity with superiors and other men. The reciprocal relationship as hinted in the notion of i
(righteousness, duty, or obligation) between subject and ruler was a key concern to classical Confucian philosophers: while the people and subjects owed loyalty to the ruler, the latter had the implicit responsibility to nourish the former. The eclipse of a reciprocal sense in the relationship and the emergence of an absolute form of loyalty involving allegiance to one ruler and one country was not the original vision of the early Confucian philosophers: Confucius and Mencius both wandered from state to state offering moral teaching to any ruler who would listen. The more restricted view of loyalty—unilateral and absolute duty towards only one emperor regardless of his merits—was emphatically expounded by Northern Sung political leaders such as Ou-yang Hsiu and Ssu-ma Kuang. Both Ou-yang and Ssu-ma severely condemned the disloyalty of Feng Tao who had served five dynasties and ten rulers in succession. Feng Tao's service to successive dynasties and rulers was by no means unprecedented: apart from Confucius and Mencius, I Yin (Hsia-Shang), T'ai-kung Wang (Shang-Chou), and many others served more than one ruler and dynasty without tarnishing their historical image.

In addition to the denunciation of the immorality of Feng Tao, the significance that the spurious Chung-ching assumed in the Sung reinforced the absolute nature of loyalty. Modern scholars have long regarded this short work, attributed to the Han scholar Ma Jung, as a forgery of the Northern Sung period. Like the Hsiao-ching, the Chung-ching is divided into eighteen short chapters; each chapter relates loyalty to the hierarchial subject-ruler relationship and exalts ssu-nan (unilateral and
death-defying allegiance of subjects to the ruler) in the face of national calamities, internal rebellions, and external incursions. The emergence of this narrow notion of absolute loyalty was in fact a parallel development to the trend towards an absolutist monarchy in the Sung; the concept became more exalted and revered to meet the need to counteract the vulnerability of the Sung state to border invasions. It was also a reflection of the emphasis placed on integrity and moral virtue in general during the Sung. The Neo-Confucian philosopher, Ch'eng I （1033-1107), was quoted by Chu Hsi （1130-1200) in a statement that applied to widow chastity in a specific sense but incorporated general concerns of integrity and loyalty: "To starve to death is a very small matter. To lose integrity, however, is a very serious matter." It was within this political and intellectual background that the "absoluteness" of Yüeh Fei's loyalty can be understood. Yüeh, the Southern Sung general of humble peasant stock, was instrumental in regaining some lost territory from the Jurchen Chin. With further victories in sight, Yüeh meekly obeyed his sovereign Kao-tsung to halt operations and be stripped of his ranks and suffer execution. Although Yüeh might have been convinced that Kao-tsung was wrong and unjust, his loyalty did not falter. James Liu discusses Yüeh's loyalty as personal in nature entailing complete submission to his sovereign; as such it departed from "conscientious loyalty" which reflected a primary concern with "cultural-ethnic" and state interests. Yüeh may have been a victim of the peace faction which then had the support of the emperor, or of the powerful minister Ch'in Kuei （1090-1155), or of the insecurity and uneasiness of Kao-tsung in regard to his position as emperor; but he was first of
all a victim of his simple and passionate loyalty.\footnote{10}

In actual fact, the concept of absolute loyalty did not totally originate from the Northern Sung. Rather, it would seem more like a reiteration of the political values which were prevalent in early historical sources. If classical philosophers did not define loyalty to be absolute and unilateral, early pragmatic and moralistic historians certainly exemplified the actions of loyal men as a mirror for history and posterity. Already in early history there were martyrs who died rather than serve the new order, for example, Wu Kuang 華光(Hsia), Po-i 伯夷 and Shu-ch'i 舜'i(Shang).\footnote{11} The basic concepts of martyrdom were willingness to die in order to retain the virtue of pao-kuo 預雨 (to repay or "requite the country"), not to serve two surnames (i.e., dynasties) in succession, and concern for a place in history. In the following passage the duty of the subject is prescribed: "Since a subject receives orders from the ruler, he should face death only and no other alternative".\footnote{12} A passage in the Shih-chi 史記 refers to the concern for one's image in posterity: "If a loyal subject abandons his country, his name will not be clean." In the same work, a more explicit example about the loyal subject risking death for the sake of loyalty to only one ruler reads:

\begin{quote}
The loyal subject does not serve two rulers; the chaste woman does not marry two husbands...Given the alternative of life without righteousness, I definitely prefer to be cooked to death.\footnote{13}
\end{quote}

In a later historical source, the Liang-shu 梁書, Mencius is quoted slightly out of context to lend ideological support to the loyal subject preferring death to a blemished reputation:

\begin{quote}
Life is what I desire; righteousness is also what I desire. If the two cannot be obtained together, I will let go of life and take righteousness.\footnote{14}
\end{quote}
Here, "righteousness" specifically refers to the loyalty and integrity of the loyal subject, even though Mencius's intention had been more general. Although standard histories in addition to the Shih-chi contained biographies of loyal subjects, it was the Tsin-shu which first set aside a separate category of group biographies for loyal subjects who died for the country and who were held up as model men to be praised and emulated by future generations. The preface to the Tsin-shu chung-i chuan states:

The ancients have these sayings: "The moral man kills himself to fulfil his moral sense (benevolence) and does not seek to live and [thereby] harm it." They also say: "Dying is not difficult; it is how to live [properly] that is difficult." How true were such words! This was because they knew a tarnished virtue is easy within reach; how could a righteous man begrudge his death! In sacrificing his body and obtaining a proper abode, the brave man does not begrudge his existence...This is the reason why the former histories praised them highly and the later generations admired their valour.15

This overwhelming concern with posthumous fame became the motivating force for loyal men to lay down their lives for the ruler and country. After the Tsin-shu, most standard histories followed the precedent of giving loyal martyrs group biographies, though with some variations in the titles (Wei-shu 魏書: chieh-i 義節; Sui-shu 隋書: ch'eng-chieh 誠節; Hsin Wu-tai shih 新五代史: ssu-chieh 死節).16 To the traditional historiographers, loyalty and martyrdom for the state were long-ingrained traditions, abandoned only temporarily during the turbulent Five Dynasties period when only three such loyal men were given biographies. (An additional fifteen men were commended in another group biography for proving to be loyal at the end without being thus inclined at first.) In the preface to the biographies of loyal men, the Sung-shih historiographers stress that the Sung loyal figures were outstanding enough to reverse thoroughly
the decadent morals of the Five Dynasties. Sung loyalist behaviour was thus observed as a continuation of a long tradition of loyalty; in addition, it was a unique response to two recurrent themes in Chinese history: the change of dynasty and the threat of barbarian conquest. Questions of surrender and defection or death rather than living under alien rule were paramount concerns of many of the loyal martyrs in 1273-79.

II. Some General Features of the Chung-i Loyalists: Composition and Activities

For a composite study of the chung-i loyalists, the Sung-shih biographies are adequate as a primary source. All except four of the group loyalist biographies in this work are of the chung-i tradition, and they supply sufficient information on the composition and activities of the group.

From the eighty biographies of loyal martyrs in 1273-79 (from the Sung-shih) we observe that the chung-i loyalists were not a homogeneous group. They ranged from high-ranking central officials to an obscure tailor, a Buddhist monk, and a Taoist priest. Many were gentry members who responded to the ch'in-wang edict and recruited armies and local militia to defend the Sung. Of these men, 62.5% (50/80) were civil officials up to 1275; most were degree holders. Upon joining the defence against the Mongols, they temporarily adopted military roles. The other 37.5% (30/80) had a purely military career and included not a few who had earlier committed crimes, or were town ruffians who took the opportunity to redeem their past faults. The key personalities, Wen T'ien-hsiang, Li T'ing-chih, Wang Li-hsin, and Hsieh Fang-te successfully combined a civil career with military
experience and skills. A sizable number were local men who defended their native districts before attaching both themselves and their units to centrally appointed officials like Li T'ing-chih and Wen T'ien-hsiang. One also notices a considerable role played by relatives of the Sung imperial family. The regional distribution of the chung-i is extensive, from several northern Chinese defectors to natives of Kiangsi, Chekiang, Anhwei, Fukien, Szechwan, Hunan, and Hupeh. The presence of Kiangsi men is particularly conspicuous, attesting to the importance of this region in the resistance movement and the attention given to the place of origin of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te. There is an absence of loyalists from Kwangtung and Kwangsi regions, a likely result of local gazetteers of the district being unavailable to the editors of the Sung-shih. Many entries from these two provinces exist in later compilations of loyalists such as the Sung-chi chung-i lu. Age is often a missing entry in the biographies of the less known loyalists, but there is enough information to observe three adult generations—the old, middle age, and the young—ranging from the seventies to the twenties. Families, friends, servants, and other connections were definitely involved with the individual's loyalist activities and martyrdom. In many cases, brothers, wives, sons, and other relations perished by choice with the victim.

Among these chung-i loyalists emerged certain patterns of behaviour not unlike those of the other loyal men of previous dynasties. The centrally appointed officials and local commanders fought to the bitter end, even after all supplies had been exhausted and others around them had surrendered to the Mongols. Messengers sent over to persuade them to defect were instantly killed and their
bodies publicly displayed to boost fighting morale and to deter others from capitulating. A large number were individuals who had recruited a unit voluntarily from their tenants, town ruffians, bandit groups, and aboriginal peoples to unite with centrally appointed officials. They willingly exhausted family fortunes to pay mercenaries and supply food and clothing to the soldiers. Wealthy local magnates also donated large quantities of food and provided lodging for the loyalist forces. The majority actually fought at the front face to face against the Mongols while some chung-i served only as clerical assistants.

With few exceptions, all were active participants in Sung defence and loyalist resistance, but both active and nonactive participants met a similar fate—death—as the consequence of their loyalty and support for the Sung. A greater proportion were captured and killed by the Mongols because of their unwillingness to surrender; the rest committed suicide in different ways (by either throwing themselves in the river or into the fire, or strangled, poisoned, starved, and hanged themselves) rather than suffer the indignity of capture and the dishonour of clinging to life after the collapse of the dynasty. A few also died of distress and illness caused by the defeat of loyalist resistance. At the moment of death, most made a point of facing south to symbolize their resolute loyalty to the Sung. Just before dying, almost all berated the Mongol conquerors and Sung defectors for their lack of virtue; some did not stop until their tongues were cut off. They also left written and oral statements and poems eloquently testifying to their loyal spirit at the moment of death. Most of the utterances were but traditional phrases about the duty and obligation of the subject to fulfil his loyalty. One Lin K'ung-chai 林空齋
(d. 1276) bit his finger and wrote on the wall with his own blood:

Alone, I am a loyal and righteous subject; dead, I shall remain a loyal and righteous ghost. Though I can survive in the wilderness, I cannot bear to do just that....

Before leaping into the river, one Hsieh Hsu 謝紹 (d. 1276) wrote about his anguish at the alien conquest:

My ambitions to pacify the barbarians not yet realized—
Do not say let my thoughts flow east in the river.
Who can rescue the innocent submerged in the world?
A thousand years will not erase the regret of one death.
The Hsiang River will not sink the loyal and righteous spirit,
The Huai and Fei Rivers felt ashamed and smashed the Ch'in conspiracy.
The T'iao River flows north, passes through the Ku-sai Mountain,
My loyal heart will be preserved to eradicate the barbarian caitiffs and chieftains.

In prison and awaiting execution, one Confucian scholar regretted being ill and not able to rail at the enemy. His last words were:

In this crisis I will certainly not wish to return alive
And preserve an empty name in the world.
Everywhere has been defiled by barbarian blood,
Be sure to collect my bones at the Shou-yang mountain [where Po-i and Shu-ch'i starved to death].

III. The Martyrdom of the Key Loyalist Personalities

To get a clearer profile of the chung-i loyalists, I shall now examine in more detail the life, career, and loyalist manifestations of the key personalities (Wen T'ien-hsiang, Li T'ing-chih, Lu Hsiu-fu, Chang Shih-chieh, and Hsieh Fang-te) together with the followers and subordinates of Wen and Li.

A. Wen T'ien-hsiang and His Military Headquarters

As an historical figure Wen T'ien-hsiang stands out as the greatest loyalist exemplar both in his time and for subsequent periods of national calamity up to the present century. With virtually no exceptions primary and secondary scholarship on Wen has been
unstinting in praise and glorification, but the following account attempts to be more objective. Wen, the eldest of four sons, was born into a well-to-do gentry family, originally based in Szechwan but which had lived in Lu-ling (Chi-chou) for several generations before Wen. There had been no distinguished officials in the family, but as a child Wen had aspired to emulate prominent political figures from his place of birth, such as Ou-yang Hsiu. At twenty he gained first place in the 1256 chin-shih examination, an event which marked his first entry in the Sung-shih annals. The eminent Confucian scholar and examiner Wang Ying-lin congratulated Emperor Li-tsung for having available such a promising subject. Li-tsung was much impressed and bestowed on Wen the names by which he was later known—T'ien-hsiang and Sung-jui. From this famous examination year also emerged not a few men who later distinguished themselves as loyalists—Hsieh Fang-te, Lu Hsiu-fu, Hu San-hsing, Huang Chen (1213-1280), Shu Yueh-hsiang (1217-1298), and Ch'en Chu (1214-1297). Except for his younger brother Pi (1238-1295) and several obscure individuals, Wen apparently did not maintain contact and close relationship with his t'ung-nien (fellow graduates of the same examination year).

Wen's confidence of his role in history and politics was greatly strengthened by obtaining first place in the examination and by the personal recognition of the emperor. But his political career was interrupted before it developed. His father, who had accompanied Wen and Pi to the capital, fell ill and died; the two brothers subsequently brought the body back to Lu-ling and withdrew into mourning. When Wen returned to the capital after this family matter, his career never seemed to get off the ground. He had few powerful
friends in the capital, most likely on account of his presumptuous airs and lack of influential family ties. In 1259 he memorialized that the eunuch Tung Sung-ch'en (fl. 1250-60) be executed for suggesting the transfer of the Sung capital, but received no support from other officials nor any response from the throne. The offices he held in the 1260s were mostly regional, undistinguished and frequently in his home province of Kiangsi. In the Sung-shih annals he is not mentioned again until January 1275, when he responded to the ch'in-wang edict. After that he rose phenomenally in prestige and responsibilities, from the ranks of 8B to 5B by 1270, to 3B in October 1275 and 1B in January 1276.26

Before 1275 Wen served as a regional official and acquired a wide range of experience dealing with local bandits in Kiangsi. However, he wanted to play a role in the central bureaucracy, and it was perhaps towards this objective that he wrote congratulatory and flattering addresses to political figures of the time, such as the chief ministers Chang Chien, Ma T'ing-luan, and Chiang Wan-li.27 The only prominent statesman with whom he had a relationship was Chiang Wan-li, who in 1273 reassured Wen of a potential role in the central government:

I am old. Looking at the current climate and human affairs, there is certain to be an upheaval. I have observed many men in my time. As to the responsibilities [to ensure] human morals—much will depend on you. May you be encouraged.28

Unlike many of his contemporaries, there is little evidence that Wen directly opposed Chia Ssu-tao and consequently suffered a setback in his official life. In 1271-73, much frustrated and disillusioned with his undistinguished political career, Wen retired to his native Lu-ling and indulged himself and his many guests in extravagance, at
his newly constructed residence in the Wen mountains. Poetry recitals and literary discussions, singing girls and drinking feasts were the routines of the day. Wen was affluent enough to pursue such a life-style, and during this period of retirement his wife and at least two concubines gave birth to several children. Such a life in spite of the Mongol threat was typical of wealthy officials including Chia Ssu-tao. And like other officials, only when news about the collapse of Hsiang-yang became known did Wen reemerge from retirement. He was appointed judicial intendant of Hunan and a year later, was put in charge of the administration of Kan-chou.

But it was with the promulgation of the ch'in-wang edict after the fall of O-chou in December 1274 that Wen's extravagance abruptly came to an end. Overnight his essentially civil career took on a military turn. He gave instructions to subordinates, friends, and relatives to recruit soldiers from Chi-chou and Kan-chou. Included in this 10,000 strong force were Yao and She aboriginal peoples and Huai mercenaries. Just when he was about to set forth for the capital his grandmother died, but Wen obeyed the court's command of ch'i-fu 起復 or tuo-ch'ing 奉情 (to forgo the mourning and resume his duties). Upon arrival in Hang-chou, Wen was despatched to defend P'ing-chiang; after its collapse, he was put in charge of the capital. During this year, among the offices to which he was assigned were those of secretary, then president, of the Ministry of War. Before the collapse of Hang-chou he was offered, but did not accept, the post of commissioner of Military Affairs (IB) to negotiate with Bayan.

During the year 1275 to January 1276 (Wen's first and final entry into central government politics), he was again overly confident of
his abilities and morals, with a vision of himself as the saviour of the Sung imperial house. His speeches were self-assured, proud and intolerant of those with whom he disagreed. Colleagues and veteran officials saw him as an upstart and a newcomer to be distrusted; Wen in turn antagonized them further by pointing out their faults. Wen's lack of political experience is seen in the naivete with which he approached Bayan: the Mongols were about to take the Sung capital, but Wen insisted that they first retreat to the other side of the Yangtze before negotiations could commence! At this time Wen's view of loyalty was an all-consuming passion overriding family obligations and all other commitments. He was convinced that "Since the past the prime concern [ought to be] fulfilling loyalty and not filial piety." So he did not hesitate to abandon the mourning for his grandmother to devote himself to save the Sung state. In February 1275, he could not and would not attempt to understand Lü Wen-huan's anguish over surrendering to the Mongols; instead, he self-righteously lashed out at Lü for protecting his wife and children instead of taking his own life.

In the next three years of loyalist resistance, Wen did not emulate Yüeh Fei's limited loyalty, that is, render absolute loyalty to Kung-ti and Empress Dowager Hsieh, the last sovereigns of the Sung. He did not see it as his sacred duty to accompany them to the Yuan capital, but escaped and repeatedly struggled to survive against the odds in the next few years—his prime loyalty being to sustain the Sung dynasty and not to demonstrate simple allegiance to the emperor alone. Apart from taking precedence over filial piety, Wen's loyalty was inspired and sustained by a cultural-ethnic consciousness. That is, he saw the Mongols as alien intruders and barbarian caitiffs who
violated his country: "The western barbarians [i.e., Mongols] have
taken the Middle Kingdom /Human kind has been extinguished."31 Wen
was indeed commended by the Sung court for "swearing an oath that he
would not coexist with the barbarian caitiffs."32

From the beginning of his active commitment to Sung defence in
1274, Wen was aware that the mission was doomed to failure; he,
however, loudly declared to his Mongol captors that he had to make the
efforts in the same way that a filial son would have wished to
continue medication for ailing parents in the hope that they would
recover.33 He also knew that his course could only lead to death,
but he intended to choose its time and place. Only when the slightest
hope for a Sung recovery was quashed would he resign himself to death
to "requite the country". Though pursued by the Mongols, bandits, Li
T'ing-chih, and other hostile forces, he miraculously survived. Even
when he attempted to take his own life, his decision sometimes
falter at the slightest glimmer of hope for escape and another
chance for a more noble death. In January 1279, after capture by
Chang Hung-fan he swallowed poison but did not die. He later
regretted not taking the opportunity to kill himself in Kuang-chou en
route to Ta-tu because he thought he could escape.34 He also planned
to starve to death at his native place of Lu-ling, but after passing
through it and still not dying, he decided to postpone his death and
resumed eating.35

For three years Wen was incarcerated in Ta-tu and subjected to
much pressure to serve in the Yüan government; even his former
sovereign Kung-ti tried to persuade him to take up a post in the new
dynasty. The Sung-shih records an episode which puts Wen in an
accommodating light. After refusing another tempting offer to switch
his loyalty to the Yuan, Wen made it known that if he were released from prison as a Taoist priest, then he would be willing to serve as a consultant at a later time. Defendants of Wen's integrity vehemently denounce this account as a fabrication of the Sung-shih, meant to cast doubt on Wen's resolute spirit. However, I think the episode should not be so easily dismissed, for it would have only been human for Wen to have felt some misgivings during his long ordeal, when he felt guilty about neglecting his filial duties in the course of his single-minded devotion to the Sung cause. He could also have made such a request in order to escape and revive loyalist resistance or to find a more noble way of death. At the same time, a defector from the loyalist camp, Wang Chi-weng, and nine former Sung officials who had entered Yuan service also petitioned the throne to release Wen as a Taoist priest. The plan was supposedly foiled by the former Sung chief minister Liu Men-yen, who feared that Wen would surely rekindle the resistance and thereby place them in an awkward and suspicious position with the Yuan court.

If Wen had wished to delay his martyrdom in the event of future hopes for a Sung revival, his followers did not. At least two personal friends and loyalists exhorted Wen to die as soon as possible to preserve an untarnished image for posterity. Wang Yen-wu was a countryman of Wen who had joined his ch'in-wang campaigns in 1274 while a student of the National University. Having donated his family fortune to the Sung cause, Wang had urged Wen to do the same in order to build up the army with Huai mercenaries. Shortly after, Wang obtained permission to quit the resistance because his father had just died and his mother fallen ill. During Wen's captivity after January 1279, Wang wrote an essay to urge Wen to accept the finality of the
loyalist defeat and to immediately commit suicide to stop speculation and questioning about his loyalty. Wang then made numerous copies of the essay and with a friend posted them in conspicuous places between Kan-chou and Yen-chou, hoping that Wen would see at least one and thereby hasten his decision to die. 40

In this essay written in the form of an elegy to mourn Wen before his actual death, Wang enumerates the reasons why Wen must as soon as possible take his own life. Firstly, Wen's literary accomplishments had helped to maintain the status of Confucian scholars. Secondly, he had amply fulfilled filial piety towards both his mother and father. Thirdly, by ranking first in the chin-shih examination at twenty years of age and by advancing to military general and chief minister by forty, Wen had not failed to practice what he studied. Lastly, Wen himself had stated that he was repeatedly close to death and expressed anxiety that if indeed he had died during any of those times, his virtue as a subject would not be glorious and untarnished. Wang argues that since Wen had already proven his loyalty in defending Fukien and the Kwang provinces, even if the attempted restoration failed in the end, his integrity was without doubt. What Wen now owed to the Sung should be his own death:

...Surely the chief minister [Wen] does not still wish to escape, or is your mind set at not yielding and your goal aimed at not dying? Or is it because the former ruler [Kung-ti] is still alive and you cannot bear to let go of life?...Men of distinction and mark know what to do at the right moment. If even with the strength of the entire southeast [the Sung] could not prevent the fall of Hsiang-yang, now as one man in a defeated country [how could you] hope to resist the [Yuan] empire? Furthermore, the orphan of Chao [i.e., Ti-Ping] has leapt into the sea....Now the situation cannot be helped, and the country and ruler have both been seized. Regarding the duty of subject and son towards ruler and father, in approaching great virtue and making a decision on a [national] calamity, if nothing can be done, then they should bend their purpose and endure a righteous death....Li Ling [d. 74 B.C.] capitulated but said: "If there is an opportunity I will
then cut my own throat to show my [loyal] ambitions."...Even if the chief minister is now not a Li Ling [turncoat]....but if the days and months accumulate, your ambitions will dissipate and your spirit will rot, and then even if you had not been a [Li] Ling, you might turn out to be [like] him. Would that not be regretful?^41

In Ta-tu while Wen awaited his fate in prison, Wang Yuan-liang, the former Sung court musician and poet who had accompanied the imperial family to the north, also advised Wen to die quickly and become a martyr to the cause:

From Yai-shan you were captured and taken to Yen [Ta-tu];
Here the decision to embrace virtue and attain righteousness is difficult.
Live, you will be shamed next to Po-i and Shu-ch'i for partaking of Chou grain;
Die, you will emulate Chang Hsiin 張巡 (709-757) and Hsü Yuăn 許遠 (d. 757), the T'ang officials.
The snow is levelled, the garrison blocked--where will be the abode of your soul?
The full moon passing through the Heng mountains--the bones are not yet cold.
One strike of the sword is what you, sir, owe [to the Sung];
A pure page of history you must retain for posterity.^42

What is more important than whether Wang Yen-wu and Wang Yuan-liang actually influenced Wen's determination to die is their motive in writing the elegies. They were concerned that Wen, the hero and justification for their loyalty, should not be blemished, but be a shining example to the movement they identified with. His martyrdom would thus lend dignity to the Sung cause that they believed in. It was imperative that Wen become a martyr immediately because they were now resigned to the fate of total conquest and felt not the slightest hope for a Sung restoration. Furthermore, in view of his brother's defection, there may have been genuine doubts circulating at the time about whether Wen could maintain his loyalty to the end.

Wen, however, in his conversations with Yüan authorities insisted on his desire not to serve two dynasties and not to waver from his determination to die. But from 1276 until his first two years of
imprisonment in Ta-tu, Wen vacillated between hopes of escape and a wish for an early death; only by 1281 was he finally reconciled to the hopelessness of a Sung revival. Incarcerated in a small, dark and damp room, he sustained his faith by writing about the personalities and events of the loyalist resistance. What in particular kept his spirit intact was a keen awareness of his historical role alongside praiseworthy predecessors. In his immortal poem, Cheng-ch'i ko 正氣歌 (Song of the upright spirit), he states that the upright spirit had manifestations in the cosmos as well as in human affairs. He enumerates twelve historical personages who served as inspiration and guiding light to his own plight and fate. Among them were the grand historian of Ch'i 鬼谷 and his three brothers who were killed because they had insisted on an accurate portrayal of a regicide; Su Wu 蘇武 (d. 60 B.C.) who did not capitulate after nineteen years of imprisonment even though his erstwhile friend, Li Ling, had defected; Yen Kao-ch'ing 項固 (692-756), who berated the rebels until his tongue was cut off; Tsu T'i 趙 Visitors (266-321), who vowing to return to the homeland, launched a successful battle against the alien invaders; and Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234), whose military campaigns symbolized the reunification of the country. Interestingly, Wen did not mention Sung exemplars (including Yüeh Fei) among his heroes.

In prison Wen also reflected on his losses and sacrifices for the Sung cause. He had used up his personal wealth and involved his entire family in his convictions and loyalist activities. During the years of war he had lost his wife and two concubines, sons and daughters to either death, disappearance, or capture by the Mongols. His two brothers-in-law, Sun Li 孫良 (d. 1277) and P'eng Chen-lung
had perished in battle after joining his armies, and he particularly felt guilty towards his widowed sisters, who together with his wife and daughters were enslaved by the Yuan authorities. Left without a living son, Wen in 1280 adopted as his heir the son of his younger brother Pi. (This adopted son and Wen's descendants later took office under the Yuan.) At this time Wen's guilt towards his family was poignant and he wrote poems to express his distress and helplessness about their fate. Through such personal experience of guilt, Wen now understood the dilemma some of his friends and relations had encountered and why they had capitulated to the Mongols and later served them. Certainly by 1280 his criticism of the defectors had toned down. While in prison he received several visitors, all of whom then had some direct contact with the Mongols: Teng Kuang-chien was in the service of Chang Hung-fan, the general responsible for inflicting defeat on the loyalist forces at Yai-shan; Chia Hsüan-weng was detained in Ho-chien and employed as an instructor; and Wang Yüan-liang was an official at the court of Qubilai. Also, Wen's younger brother Pi had surrendered Hui-chou in 1279 and gone to Ta-tu for an audience with the Yuan emperor. Towards such men who found themselves in these compromising positions, Wen's affections did not change. He acknowledged that Pi, for instance, had to look after family affairs and ensure a proper burial and mourning for their mother, who had died in 1278. In a poem about the meeting, Wen regrets that the two brothers were about to part forever but admits that alternatives existed for individuals, as in the case of the San-jen (Three Virtuous Ministers) of the Shang who remonstrated King Chou for his excesses. Later, Wei-tzu served the conquerors and lived, Chi-tzu pretended to be insane.
and also lived, but Pi-kan resisted and was killed. The poem reads:

Last year we parted and subsequently I took leave from the peaks,
This year you also have arrived at Yen.
Brothers—one imprisoned and the other riding [freely] on a horse,
Father and mother we shared but our fates are [now] different.
Pity us brothers, together and apart
In this life it has not yet been fifty years.
The Three Virtuous [Chi-tzu, Wei-tzu, Pi-kan] lived and died according to their choice,
Distant is the white sun across the grey mist. 46

In sum, in the last three years of his life Wen's loyalism had become less self-righteous than before, harsh experience making him more realistic and pragmatic than disillusioned and frustrated. To former followers and subordinates who had deserted him, Wen's words were not bitter. But to those with whom he had no personal relationship and who appeared to have no morals (such as Liu Meng-yen), Wen remained critical.

Although he experienced some personal doubts and could tolerate a less pure form of loyalty among his friends and acquaintances, Wen himself could not avoid death. In addition to his political loyalty to the Sung dynasty, Wen felt other personal loyalties which would not permit him to have doubts cast on his integrity. Having always been convinced of the great impact his conduct would have on both the present and the future, death had to come sooner or later for the sake of maintaining glory for his family, his native place of birth, and even for his fellow graduates of the same examination year. Two events finally caused the Yuan emperor alarm about keeping him alive. One was of an astronomical nature: the conjunction of Saturn with the constellation of Hercules, interpreted as an inauspicious omen. The second was the revelation of a clandestine uprising which implicated
Wen.47 Suspicious of subversion, Qubilai immediately transferred Kung-ti to Shang-tu and ordered Wen to be executed. Facing death at the market quarters of Ta-tu, Wen showed tranquillity and relief that his long ordeal was about to end. In the evaluation of himself, Wen was satisfied that he had fulfilled the purpose of his life and attained the morality of the Confucian sages.48

When Wen died in early 1283, most of his subordinates and followers had predeceased him. While Wen was unpopular among the veteran court officials and other leaders of the resistance, paradoxically he had no trouble mobilizing support at the lower levels each time his forces were destroyed at battle. The first recruitment campaign took place in January 1275 in Chi and Kan prefectures where he was officially based; in the next few years he launched operations in P'ing-chiang, Nan-chien, T'ing-chou, and Ch'ao-chou, all of which are said to have received popular and local support.

Appendix I (pp. 325-26) contains forty-four personal supporters of Wen who died during their loyalist activities.49 Looking at regional distribution, we observe that most of these men were from Wen's native province of Kiangsi, but others came from Anhwei, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Hunan, and Kwangtung. In most cases they were locally based people who, in 1275-79, responded to Wen's appeal to restore to Sung loyalist control regions which had been captured by the Mongols. Almost two-thirds had civil careers or backgrounds before taking up arms, that is, they had either passed their chin-shih or district examinations, or were Confucian scholars. Only one-third had purely military training or experience, that is, they were either military officials, or town ruffians who had earlier been engaged in some kind of combat. This proportion for civil/military backgrounds
is strikingly similar to the chung-i loyalists with biographies in the Sung-shih (63.6% as compared to 62.5% [see p. 123]). All had a personal relationship with Wen and willingly acknowledged his leadership. Half were "followers", or local men who recruited troops and voluntarily attached themselves to Wen's military headquarters. One-quarter were fellow countrymen with whom he had been acquainted earlier. There were also poet friends and acquaintances made from the 1250s to the early 1270s, fellow graduates of 1256, a teacher, relatives, and colleagues in the resistance efforts. Lastly, in regard to the pattern of martyrdom, two-thirds were killed in battle and the rest died by suicide, or from illness and distress caused by the defeat. The whereabouts of several men were unknown to Wen and the Sung-shih compilers, but in these cases they are presumed to have also perished soon after the collapse of Yai-shan.

The structure of this network of relationships closely suggests the traditional mu-fu system ("tent government"). The forty-four loyal martyrs were part of Wen's personal retinue, which consisted of his k'o (guests), friends, colleagues, classmates, fellow graduates, fellow countrymen, and relatives—relationships which had a social or familial basis. It also consisted of a large number of local officials, scholars, and town ruffians who found it convenient and opportune to attach themselves to his campaigns. Wen used some military experts as consultants in operations and sent others to various cities to recruit aboriginals, mercenaries, town ruffians, as well as tenants and slaves. Because Wen had an official appointment, first as military supervisor of Kiangsi and later as commissioner of military government, he also appointed his personal advisers and stalwarts to various offices. In his writings he
referred to them by their titles. All of these men were personally connected with Wen in one way or another; their loyalty was thus not merely to the Sung state and emperor, but even more so to Wen himself. The relationship was to an extent reciprocal: while his followers remained loyal to Wen, Wen was fair, generous, and protective. He did not criticize severely those who deserted him, but merely remarked that such and such a person had fled with some gold. Such an attitude might have been responsible for the personal devotion that Wen obtained from his supporters, who considered that they owed something to him and must repay it. While in prison he paid final tribute to them by commemorating their loyalist deeds in his writings. Although both Wen and his followers prescribed death as the ultimate end for Wen himself, he permitted other alternatives for his followers, such as resignation if they had certain obligations to meet. But Wen was a strict commander and demanded order among his men: for instance, in 1277 he did not hesitate to court-martial two corrupt generals to restore order and set an example. His strictness with the unruly bandit Ch'en I may have caused the latter to turn against him and become informer to the Yuan general who captured Wen. The sources indicate that Wen's men did not molest the local population but offered payment for food and supplies. It was perhaps partly due to such discipline that the local populations supported Wen's resistance efforts.

B. Li T'ing-chih and His "Little Court"

Li T'ing-chih's role in the Sung defence and loyalist resistance has earlier been reappraised as much more significant and crucial than previously acknowledged. Among the loyalist leaders Li actually had the most distinguished career and the longest experience in his dual
roles as civil and military official, central and local administrator. Li's family was based in Pien-liang but had moved to Sui-chou 隋州 (Hupei). Both his literary talents and military skills were demonstrated early. In 1240 when the Yangtze fortifications were precarious, Li chose to approach the great Sung general Meng Kung 盧珠 (1195-1246) with his military proposals. Meng was immensely impressed and sent him to Szechwan, where in a subprefecture Li excelled in supervising agriculture and recruiting militia units. Several years later he sat for and passed the chin-shih examination, whereupon he returned to Meng's service as an archivist and clerk. Meng was convinced of Li's talents and just before he died, he made a special request to Chia Ssu-tao to appoint Li as his successor; Li in turn was devoted to Meng and spent the next three years mourning him.

Li subsequently became a close associate of Chia, who was then garrisoning the Ching-Hu region. After Li had completed his mourning period, Chia hired him as consultant in the Regulator's office. Li was later transferred to the Huai region, where he had the opportunity to plan its defence and administration with Chia. Ten years later when Chia was promoted to pacifying commissioner of Ching-Hu, he left Li in charge of the Huai and Yang-chou. After the Mongols retreated from O-chou in 1259, Li resigned to mourn his mother who had just died, but was summoned to return to office to take charge of the Huai as regulator, Chia's former position. In 1260-61 Li repelled the incursions of Li T'an; on the domestic side, he brought about a quick economic recovery in Yang-chou after a catastrophic fire and drought.

Li's administration of the Huai throughout the 1260s was considered benevolent and he therefore gained the confidence of
scholars and talented people who flocked to his mu-fu. Himself a product of the mu-fu of Meng Kung, he now gathered around him a personal retinue of individuals whose skills he fostered. Among his men with a background of civil service were Lu Hsiu-fu, Hu San-hsing, Kung K'ai, Yin Ku 尹穀 (d. 1274), and Chung Chi-yü 卓季玉 (d. 1274); those with military training were Pien Chü-i, Chiang Ts'ai, Su Liu-i, and Juan K'o-ssu.59 As Chang Shih-chieh began his career in the Huai, he most likely had a personal relationship with Li T'ing-chih as well.60 Lu, Kung, Pien, and Juan were countrymen of Li; Chiang Ts'ai and Chang Shih-chieh were defectors from the north who had started their career as obscure soldiers in the Huai army that Li controlled. All these individuals later distinguished themselves as loyalists and appear in historical records; all except for Kung K'ai and Hu San-hsing died chung-i martyrs to the loyalist cause.61 After Li's death in 1276, Lu Hsiu-fu, Su Liu-i, and Chang Shih-chieh continued to play prominent roles in the loyalist resistance. With this large group of talents, it was no wonder that Li's mu-fu was called the hsiao ch'ao-t'ing 小朝庭 (little court).62 Apart from developing their special talents, Li recommended them to the Hang-chou court, as he did with Lu Hsiu-fu, Su Liu-i, and most certainly Chang Shih-chieh.63 There can be little doubt that Li influenced his proteges and reinforced their commitment to the Sung; his distrust of Wen T'ien-hsiang in March 1276 must have also affected their attitude to Wen and account for Wen's sharp criticism of Li.

In 1269 Li was ordered to relieve the siege of Hsiang-yang, but his efforts were gravely undermined by Fan Wen-hu. Li thus shared the blame for its collapse and was demoted while his subordinates
including Su Liu-i were banished. When Li was restored to his rank shortly after, he influenced the court to let Hsia Kuei, a veteran general, take charge of Huai-hsi while he concentrated on the defence of Huai-tung. In 1275, after the fall of O-chou, Li and his subordinates incessantly mobilized more men to strengthen Yang-chou fortifications; even several months after the occupation of Hang-chou, they continued to resist the Mongol forces. By then the many years of warfare had taken its toll in Yang-chou: food supplies dwindled and many inhabitants are said to have drowned themselves in the river and starved on the roads. In spite of several edicts by the imperial family to surrender, Li did not relent but continued to resist the conquest with support from Miao Tsai-ch'eng (d. 1276) in Chen-chou and Chiang Ts'ai, Li's dauntless and faithful general. Unlike Yüeh Fei, who would have immediately laid down arms when requested by his sovereign, Li's loyalty was directed at the survival of the Sung imperial house and thus he persisted in that goal to the end. Only in June 1276, after Li and Chiang Ts'ai set out to join the loyalist court in Wen-chou, did Yang-chou surrender under its local administrator. Li's wife was taken hostage to persuade him to surrender. Unflinchingly, he tried unsuccessfully to drown himself; he was later captured at T'ai-chou and taken to Yang-chou where both he and Chiang were executed.

The sources on Li's relationship with the local population of Yang-chou are contradictory. On the one hand we are told that the people were grateful to him for restoring Yang-chou's economy in the 1260s and that after his death they wept profusely for him. On the other hand, the local administration which surrendered expressed its resentment at Li for having put the city through many years of
hardship. The surrendering official declared that Li should be executed in revenge for having inflicted this calamity on the local population. The discrepancy probably reflects different responses to loyalist resistance by at least two sectors of the population. However, one thing is clear: Li was seen more as a central official who put state interests (i.e., Sung revival and loyalist resistance) above local concerns (i.e., loss of lives in the Huai). Li was an irascible person, as indicated by the number of times he killed emissaries who came to persuade him to surrender. His general attitude towards his subordinates, however, was generous and apparently fair. To feed his soldiers adequately he exhausted the grain reserves of the civilians, local officials, and military officers (and perhaps thereby incurred their resentment); the soldiers in return fought valiantly and persistently for him.  

C. Lu Hsiu-fu

Of the talented men patronized by Li T'ing-chih, Lu Hsiu-fu achieved the greatest stature as a loyalist leader. A native of Ch'u-chou, Lu was a fellow graduate of Wen T'ien-hsiang in the 1256 chin-shih examination, but the two did not meet again until 1275 in Hang-chou or 1276 in Foochow at the enthronement of Ti-shih. After attaining his chin-shih degree Lu did not quickly become a distinguished civil official, but later found himself in the personal retinue of Li T'ing-chih. In about 1274 Lu was recommended to and accepted by the central bureaucracy in Hang-chou. He soon advanced to a high position, and in 1275, as vice-president of the Ministry of Rites, his initial mission was to negotiate peace with the Mongols. A year later he escorted the two Sung princes to the southeast and together with Chang Shih-chieh joined Ch'en I-chung in
Wen-chou. Lu was a placid man and got along with most loyalist leaders, even Wen T'ien-hsiang. With Ch'en I-chung he at first had a working relationship because Ch'en relied heavily on his military experience gained from his close contact with Li T'ing-chih. However, in late 1276 the two quarrelled and Lu was exiled to Ch'ao-chou. As a result of Chang Shih-chieh's mediation, Lu was soon summoned back to the loyalist court.

In spite of his military experience, Lu acted only in the capacity of a civil official during the loyalist resistance. Throughout the three years he taught the two princes the Confucian Classics and kept the court records and diaries. After Ch'en I-chung's departure from the loyalist court, Lu was the key personality involved in both financial and personnel administration, drafting edicts and official documents, while Chang Shih-chieh was in charge of military decisions and operations. After Ti-Shih died in April 1278, the entire loyalist court was about to disperse, but Lu rallied sufficient support to enthrone yet another successor, Ti-Ping. At the Battle of Yai-shan, Lu was with Ti-Ping; when defeat was imminent, rather than subject the prince to capture and undignified incarceration, he first forced his own wife and children to jump into the ocean before himself leaping in with Ti-Ping. This was a bold decision, as it could have been regarded by future generations as an act of regicide. Lu's loyalty to the Sung dynasty has not, however, been questioned because he made himself and his family martyrs to the Sung cause.

D. Chang Shih-chieh

Of all the loyalist leaders, Chang Shih-chieh was the only one with a purely military career; biographical details on him are also
the least known. He was a native of Fan-yang, a clansman of the eminent general Chang Jou who defected from the Chin to the Mongols. After committing a crime in the north, Chang Shih-chieh had fled to the Southern Sung as a defector. Like Chiang Ts'ai, who was also a Yüan defector to the Sung, Chang was attached to the Huai army, then under the control of Li T'ing-chih. Chang was already active in the late 1250s, when his military prowess attracted the attention of the veteran general Lü Wen-te (d. 1269). Another loyalist figure, Su Liu-i, was then in Lü's service and perhaps made Chang's acquaintance at this time. Chang also fought in O-chou with Chia Ssu-tao, and from 1268 to 1275 distinguished himself defending Sung fortifications from Yüan advances.

During the period of Sung defence and loyalist resistance, Chang felt that as a northerner he was discriminated against and suspected by Ch'en I-chung. Ch'en was then commander-in-chief of the forces and took Chang's personal troops from his command and assigned him other units; in addition, Chang, who was an expert in land warfare, was put in charge of the naval forces while Liu Shih-yung, the naval expert, was given control of the army. It turned out, however, that the Huai troops which were despatched to Foochow and Ch'üan-chou continued to be loyal to Chang.

Just before Empress Dowager Hsieh surrendered Hang-chou, Chang took some troops to join the two princes, passing Ch'ing-yüan on the way, where he failed to rally support for the loyalist resistance. Chang's crucial role in recovering Fukien and Kwangtung was commended by Wen T'ien-hsiang. However, Chang took the entire blame for conceiving and executing the strategy of Yai-shan, which resulted in a colossal defeat for the loyalist fleet. Chang escaped with some
remnant troops but was soon killed in a typhoon on his way to Champa to seek support to continue the resistance. Because of his valiant record of defence and resistance and his death in pursuit of his goal, Chang's martyrdom has also been greatly praised.

E. Hsieh Fang-te: A "Latent" Chung-i Martyr

Hsieh Fang-te was a native of Hsin-chou and a chin-shih graduate of 1256. Considered together with Lu Hsiu-fu and Wen T'ien-hsiang as the most brilliant and outstanding personalities among the graduates, he did not develop a relationship with either Lu or Wen after gaining the degree. A short and ugly man, Hsieh's outstanding literary talents and eloquent but blunt discourses on politics were well known to his contemporaries. He also acquired military skills from an early age. After several obscure and brief appointments, Hsieh returned to his native Hsin-chou and nearby Fu-chou to persuade and help powerful gentry members to strengthen the local militia. In this endeavour he was later implicated in Chia Ssu-tao's auditing regulations in the early 1260s; he fell into disgrace and ended up repaying expenses denied by the auditing teams. For criticizing Chia and his land reform scheme, Hsieh was more than once demoted and punished.

Hsieh's next appearance in the political scene was in 1274, when, because of his intimate friendship with Lü Shih-k'uei (nephew of Wen-huan and later a defector to the Mongols), he convinced the Hang-chou court of Lü Shih-k'uei's loyalty to the Sung. Hsieh also volunteered to persuade Lü Wen-huan to return to the Sung, the court having agreed to absolve the latter's crime of surrendering Hsiang-yang. To carry out his mission Hsieh was appointed supervisor of Chiang-chou and later pacifying commissioner of Chiang-hsi,
in charge of Hsin-chou. When Lü Shih-k'uei defected to the Mongols and Hsieh did not even meet with Wen-huan, Hsieh was embarrassed but not penalized by the Sung court. He continued to supervise military defence in An-jen and Hsin-chou, fighting against Lü Shih-k'uei and the Yüan army. Hsin-chou collapsed shortly before the capitulation of Hang-chou, whereupon Hsieh went into hiding. When he heard about the loyalist enthronement of Ti-Shih, he reemerged and was appointed regulator of Chiang-tung, relying on the militia units he had earlier built up in his native subprefecture, I-yang. By August 1276 most of his units had disbanded; after handing over the remnants to another loyalist general, he fled to the Kiangsi and Fukien border with his aged mother. There, he changed his name and lived in dilapidated hostels; wearing hempen clothes and straw sandals, he wailed uncontrollably in public—so strange a sight that passersby regarded him as mad. His wife, two sons, a daughter, three nephews, an uncle, and some servant-maids were soon captured and all except for his sons were killed or committed suicide because of their uncompromising attitudes towards their captors. The sons were forced to serve as family tutors to Yüan officials and were released after six years. After having located their father, the elder looked after the grandmother while the younger stayed with Hsieh and sold shoes for a living.

From 1276 to 1289 Hsieh spent his life in Chien-yang (Fukien) as a fortune-teller, scholar, and teacher. In actual fact it was not a drastic change in his life from scholar-official to recluse, for despite the twenty-one year span of his official life from 1255 to 1276, the total length of time he was in office did not amount to
eight months. Now, his primary concern was to look after his mother, and because he made only a meagre subsistence by telling fortunes he gratefully accepted gifts of food, clothing, brushes, and paper. He maintained close contact with loyalist friends in Chien-yang such as Hsiung Ho (1253-1312), a former Sung official who repeatedly refused Yuan employment. Hsieh, however, mostly associated with other fortune-tellers, medical healers, and Taoist priests; he later taught many students. For consolation over the demise of the Sung and personal development of his talents, Hsieh became a literary critic, educator, poet, and annotator of the Confucian Classics and other literary writings. His grief over the collapse of the dynasty is poignantly registered in his annotations on the Shih-ching, in which he described the fall of the Eastern Chou as the great shame of the Middle Kingdom and likened it to the present plight. In this work he also commented on the concepts of loyalty, filial piety, and antibarbarian views.

After living ten years under the new dynasty Hsieh became increasingly sensitive to the abuses of officials and administrators (many of whom were northerners), and personally championed the plight of the former Sung scholar-officials whose economic and social status had sharply declined. He wrote that nine out of ten Confucian scholars had escaped into occupations such as Buddhist monks, Taoist priests, medical healers, and carpenters because the salary of an education official was not adequate to keep one from hunger and cold. He sighed that scholars were currently ridiculed for their lowly socio-economic status, being in the ninth category, one rank above beggars and one below prostitutes. Although this has been proven by several modern scholars to be an unsubstantiated statement,
it would seem that there was no longer as much prestige and privilege attached to the scholar's profession. Thus Hsieh fully applauded his friend's decision to become a recluse to "transcend the ten classes". As the years passed Hsieh associated with a wider circle of acquaintances which also included Yüan officials. In 1286 he farewelled the local subprefect, a northerner from a military family, and commended him for his benevolent administration over the past three years. He highly approved of him proceeding to the Yüan capital to seek a better post and requested him to convey regards to his former friends who were then serving in the Yüan government (e.g., Liu Meng-yen, Lü Shih-k'uei, Chia Hsiian-weng, and Ch'ing-yang Meng-yen 青陽夢炎 [fl. 1270-1290]). Hsieh also wrote to Yüan officials to recommend a great-grandson of Chu Hsi for appointment as a director of a local school. In this case Hsieh already knew the official, for whose father he had written a funerary inscription.

Such a life was typical of a i-min loyalist living under the Yüan but still feeling loyal to the former Sung dynasty. Although Hsieh associated with Yüan officials and condoned his sons and friends serving the Yüan government, his loyalty to the Sung did not permit him to take up an appointment. He had strong sentiments about the Mongol Yüan being a barbarian race, and many times in his writings expressed his resentment that since the "Middle Kingdom was established by the Five Emperors and Three Kings", there had never been a case of total subjugation of the dynasty under alien rule until the Mongol conquest. Secondly, as a subject of the former dynasty, he felt it improper to serve the new conquerors. He considered that his duty should have been to die or kill himself in order to requite the Sung, but for the sake of his aged mother, filial
obligations took precedence over loyalty. His filial commitments were so intense that he felt they were not fulfilled unless the mourning period for his mother was over and some means were found to bury her properly. She died in 1286. Immediately after that came the first of at least five attempts to recruit him for service in the Yuan government, most probably because of his reputation as a scholar and fortune-teller.

Ch'eng Chü-fu (1249-1318) was the Yuan official involved with the 1286-87 mission to recruit southern Chinese. Ch'eng was himself a southern scholar who had been taken hostage to the Yuan capital when his uncle surrendered to the Mongols. Hsieh did not reproach him for serving the new regime but beseeched him to understand the grounds of his own refusal of employment. He would be opposing Heaven and Earth to take up employment while in mourning; moreover, as a subject who had lost his country, he should not even continue to live. Hsieh further asserted that the Sung had collapsed because filial piety was not fostered by the state after 1274: ministers such as Chia Ssu-tao, Wen T'ien-hsiang, Ch'en I-chung, and Liu Fu were not allowed to complete their mourning periods but were recalled for service, thus hastening the fall of the state. Therefore, the Yuan should take this neglect of filial obligations as a lesson to avoid its collapse.

Later, after his former teacher Liu Meng-yen recommended him to office, Hsieh was incensed and sarcastic. In the letter rejecting Liu's offer, Hsieh launched a personal attack on Liu's service to the Yuan despite the high offices he had attained under the Sung:

...The fact that there are no talented men in Chiang-nan has not yet been as shameful as today....You, sir, were a top graduate in your youth; in late life you became chief minister. In merits, titles, wealth, and prestige—it can be said that your ambitions have been fulfilled. You then
galloped four thousand 里 to Ta-tu to pay respects to the Great Yüan—how could it be because you wanted personal gain? Surely it was because you wanted to enquire about the [Sung] emperor and empress dowagers, and let the world and posterity know that the righteousness between ruler and minister could not be deserted....Recently...the provincial government of Chiang-Huai brought down an imperial order to the south to seek good men....Once this order was proclaimed, everyone laughed. Why? It is because there have not been good men, proper men, in Chiang-nan for a long time. Those who say [i.e., you] that there are good men, proper men, in Chiang-nan are all deceiving [the Yüan]....The reasons why I absolutely cannot serve are threefold. Firstly, my old mother died at ninety-three and is still buried in shallow soil...My wife, daughter, and servant-maids died in prison because of their relationship to me...and five [other] persons, my nephews and younger brothers, who died for the country—their spirits cannot be found and their wandering souls cannot be summoned...The second reason is....in 1276 after I was relieved of military power, abandoned my office and fled afar, I did not surrender....Even if Po-i and Shu-ch'i did not serve the Chou dynasty and ate moss at the Western mountains, they must have also known about the grace of King Wu 武王 [of the Chou]....[The third reason why I reject your recommendation is] because the grace I have received from the late [Sung] empress dowager had indeed been great....

In 1288 the local administrator, Wei T'ien-yu 魏天祐 (fl. 1280-1300), wanted to collect a reward for recruiting Hsieh and forced the latter under heavy guard to the Yüan capital. Hsieh escaped once but after recapture, realized that he could not in the end avoid forced employment with the Yüan and thus made his final decision to die and leave his loyalty intact. The historical precedent he used to justify his delayed martyrdom was Kung Sheng 龔勝 (68-11 B.C.), who starved to death fourteen years after the usurpation of Wang Mang 王莽 (45 B.C.-A.D. 23). Po-i and Shu-ch'i also died some years after the Shang collapsed; thus they too became his models for not immediately killing himself and dying a chung-i martyr. On his journey to the Yüan capital, Hsieh's students urged him to take the final step to ensure an untainted reputation in history. One such poem reads:
Thirty years of persistence to perfect your conduct,
Now comes the test to truly show a Confucian immortal.
All others have bent their knees and compromised themselves,
Only you, sir, loudly reviled [the captors] directly [to
their face].
In this journey, be sure to use your three-inch tongue,
If you return [alive] you will not be worth one cash.
To the end your purity is left intact
And a fragrant name is retained for transmission to
posterity.  

By that time Hsieh too saw no alternative to death and loudly declared his reason for dying: "I only wish to die quickly and leave a name...in history, so that I can shame the disloyal subjects of the empire in ten thousand generations."  

Upon arrival in Ta-tu, Hsieh prostrated and mourned Empress Dowager Hsieh; soon after he refused all food and died from starvation.  

For Hsieh, death occurred thirteen years after the capitulation of Hang-chou, and thus he could be called a "latent" chung-i loyalist. Because of this delay in martyrdom, Hsieh was able to feel no guilt about abandoning filial obligations. He angrily scolded those who would not leave him alone and who insisted on recommending him to office:

Let me query you several sirs—to allow one Hsieh to be a lazy man of the Great Yuan—what harm will it do to the government and way of the Great Yuan? To kill one Hsieh to fulfil his martyrdom to the Great Sung—what benefit will it reap for the government and way of the Great Yuan? 

IV. The Women Chung-i Loyalists

Throughout the accounts and biographies of the Sung loyal martyrs, we find numerous cases of whole families dying together for the Sung cause. While the male relatives of the family often have separate or attached biographies, the women are mentioned only in passing. In the Sung-shih six of these women are given biographies in the lieh-nü chuan (group biographies of virtuous women) to commend women for virtuous conduct in regard to chastity, filial
piety to the in-laws, and loyalty to the state. All six cases were wives (except for one concubine) who refused to cooperate with the Mongols and died as a result. Their behaviour fell into all or several items of the following paradigm: they were filial to in-laws and faithful to husbands, sacrificed their lives to help their husbands escape death, refused to have relations with their captors, scolded them, and died or committed suicide. In other sources, daughters followed their fathers to death, as in the case of the university student Hsu Ying-piao; mothers also chose to die with their sons, as in the case of the loyalist leader Ch'en Wen-lung. There were also former palace women who would not submit to the Mongol captors, the reason being that they had already been favoured by the former Sung emperors or princes. In these cases, the loyal conduct of the women was not independently felt, that is, their connection with the Sung and loyalist resistance was through their husbands or fathers, and their conduct can be seen as a fulfilment of their obligations to these relationships rather than to the Sung dynasty. Loyalists such as Wen T'ien-hsiang and Chao Mao-fa were the first to praise their wives for accompanying them in their loyalist mission and for not hesitating to die. The foremost concern of these women was not loyalty to the state, but fulfilling their roles in relation to their husbands or fathers. Their death or suicide can thus be observed as complementary acts to the loyalty of their husbands, as conveyed in the traditional dictum: "The loyal subject does not serve two rulers; the virtuous woman does not marry two husbands."

In other sources, however, some women were directly and independently loyal to the Sung. In one case a She aboriginal woman,
Hsü Fu-jen 詢夫人 (Lady Hsü [fl. 1270-1285]), led a force to fight against the Mongols. One imperial concubine hanged herself rather than consent to have relations with her Mongol captors, after declaring her personal commitment to the Sung dynasty: "If the country cannot escape from contamination/ I can fortunately still avoid tainting my body/ ....Having received the benefits of the Sung/ I will be ashamed to be a subject of the northern [barbarians]." In the writings of contemporary literati, singing girls and prostitutes angrily repelled the advances of the Mongol generals and soldiers because they did not wish to be "defiled by barbarian blood". After affirming their loyalty to the Sung they also committed suicide.

Both men and women loyal martyrs expressed their ultimate loyalty by death after berating the enemy and leaving self-righteous testimonies to their loyalty. For the men in general, loyal conduct was defined as direct commitment to the dynasty, but for the women, involvement in the loyalist resistance was mostly indirect but also voluntary. Except for a few like Hsieh Fang-te, they lived and conducted themselves as if they were still under the Sung and had no contact with the new order. But in all cases death was the final statement of their virtue and the vindication of any doubts on their behaviour. Compared with the chung-i men, a larger proportion of the women committed suicide. Involuntary death and suicide were both salient aspects of the chung-i tradition of Sung loyalists, and both manners of death were considered equally lofty and noble. Suicide certainly had none of the Western stigma of cowardice and mental illness: the long tradition of suicide as a protest against current politics, wronged judgement, and a statement of one's noble
intentions, can be traced to the pre-Shang period, not to speak of the Chou. Ch'ü Yüan's 屈原 (343-277 B.C.) suicide drew the most attention and myth from history as a dignified form of political and personal protest. However, throughout various periods, his act (while greatly praised) has been considered excessive. Even Southern Sung moralists such as Chu Hsi believed that a better alternative for Ch'ü Yüan might have been passive protest or withdrawal from society and politics. During the Sung resistance, there were some to whom the idea of suicide was not acceptable due to other commitments. Hsieh Fang-te's latent martyrdom has been discussed in this connection; in the next chapter the alternative, the i-min tradition of loyalists, will be dealt with.

V. The Defectors and Collaborators

Traditional and secondary sources share a strong tendency to treat loyalists and defectors as polar opposites. A crucial point that has been ignored is that both groups had a similar background in defending the Sung during its last years and in loyalist resistance. Some defectors, like the loyalists, also lost personal fortunes, families and friends in the course of their initial loyalty to the Sung. It was accepting neither involuntary death nor suicide as the ultimate solution that divided the defectors and collaborators from the loyalists. What sustained the majority of the loyalists was their personal attachment to their leaders, and for the leaders, the transmission of their names and conduct to posterity. However, defectors and collaborators have been seen as pure opportunists without morals, who went over to the winning side to reap the most benefits. Thus in traditional accounts of the last years of the Sung
they are depicted as defecting as easily as "the wind sways trees". A list appended to the *Sung-chi chung-i lu* shows that 124 men defected between 1234 and 1279; a modern study indicates 141 names between 1238 and 1279. Both lists have been compiled from official sources, among them the *Sung-shih* and the *Yüan-shih*. It seems that even these are not comprehensive lists. The defectors listed include military and civil officials, although the former group far outnumbered the latter. One reason for the large number of defections and surrenders was the *Yüan* policy of conciliation, which reinstated to high positions those who capitulated, but massacred whole cities that put up prolonged resistance. Faced with these clearly set-out consequences, the opportunists easily made a choice, and many even welcomed the arrival of the Mongols with offers of capitulation miles from their defence posts. These men, pursuing selfish goals and personal gains, subsequently applied their military skills on the side of the Mongols in order to gain trust and further promotions in the *Yüan* government. A large number of defectors went to the *Yüan* capital to surrender and receive a post. A conversation Qubilai had with these collaborators indicates that among them many indeed could be found to be pure opportunists. When queried as to why they had gone over to the Mongols so readily, they replied that it was because Chia Ssu-tao had discriminated against them and favoured civil bureaucrats. Qubilai then retorted:

> Supposing that if [Chia] Ssu-tao had really slighted your group, that was only the fault of Ssu-tao; furthermore, wherein did your ruler let you down? If it was really as you said, then Ssu-tao's slighting you was most appropriate.121

However, sources on these defectors and collaborators are inadequate to show the individual circumstances of each defection and
the dilemma faced by the defector. None has been accorded a biography in the Sung-shih, not even in the sections reserved for treacherous officials and renegades. In the Yuan-shih only several defectors who rose to high ranks in the Yuan have been given biographies. However, in at least several cases, there is enough evidence to show that pure opportunism was not the primary motive for surrender. Instead, the circumstances of the surrender indicate that the differences between the loyal and the disloyal were not as distinct as previously believed. In regard to Lü Wen-huan, his family had been involved in defending the Sung against the Yuan for over twenty years. He was personally responsible for the defence of Hsiang-yang for six years and had no intention of capitulating until the very bitter end. By 1273, supplies and food had all been exhausted, common people were dying on the roads, and cannibalism was resorted to. Lü was well aware that by then there was not the slightest hope of victory, and it was apparent that the whole population would suffer the consequences of continued fighting. For him, surrender was not a private affair, but a decision that had a great impact on the people. Not only would his wife and children be spared atrocious deaths, the whole population of Hsiang-yang would survive. Having made the agonizing decision to surrender, Lü went into the city and wailed, not satisfied with his decision but faced with no other alternative. His heart remained heavy even when engaged in Mongol campaigns to conquer the Sung: in 1276 when the "mercy-begging" officials on their journey to the Yuan capital attempted to curry favour with the Mongols by undignified conduct and criticism of contemporary Sung officials, Lü reviled their fickleness and immorality. After defecting, Lü's participation in the Sung conquest was possibly affected by his son being held
hostage in Ta-tu, a common Mongol practice to ensure the loyalty of their generals. It was perhaps partly this pressure that caused him to attract other members of his family to defect, including his nephew Shih-k'uei, cousin Wen-fu, and son-in-law Fan Wen-hu. In spite of the important role attributed to Lü Wen-huan in the conquest of the Sung, he does not have a biography in the Yüan-shih.

In other cases, it must be pointed out that many military and civil officials surrendered only after Empress Dowager Hsieh had capitulated in Hang-chou. Upon surrender she had issued edicts to defence generals to submit to the Yüan; and thus it could be said that Hsia Kuei and Fang Hui surrendered to comply with her orders. Hsia had been a loyal general with decades of military service to the Sung; he was then already seventy-nine and his son had perished while defending the Sung in 1275. As for Fang Hui, what was unforgivable in the minds of his contemporaries was the fact that he wrote flattering prefaces to official Yüan works praising the conquerors. Fang, however, never renounced his loyalty to the Sung; he justified his surrender by arguing that as the Sung had already perished, it would have been pointless to hold onto a small command. He insisted that by surrendering he had saved thousands of civilian lives. Some of Fang Hui's poems expressed feelings so closely akin to those of loyalists that one was included in an anthology of loyalist writings in the Yüan.

The younger brother of Wen T'ien-hsiang, Pi, was another reluctant defector. He had followed Wen to resist the Mongols, but while Wen had been completely preoccupied with the resistance movement, Pi had always been left in charge of the family which included their mother, Wen's wife, concubines, and children. In
1275 when the grandmother died, it was Pi who returned the coffin to Lu-ling. Later, Pi was appointed administrator of Hui-chou and again he took the whole family with him. When their mother died in 1278, Pi arranged for a temporary burial before returning to his political duties. Only after Wen was captured and Yai-shan fell did Pi finally surrender to the Mongols, his primary motive for staying alive being to carry out his responsibilities to the surviving members of the family and to attend to ancestral sacrifices. Thus like Lü Wen-huan, his surrender was motivated by reasons other than sheer opportunism.

After surrendering and holding office in Ta-tu, many defectors did not forget their former compatriots. Thus Wang Chi-weng petitioned to have Wen T'ien-hsiang released from prison as a Taoist priest, and Lü Shih-k'uei sought to care for Hsieh Fang-te's daily needs (which Hsieh rejected). Others like Liu Meng-yen recommended some loyalists, their children and pupils to office, no doubt thinking that they were doing a favour for their former friends, whose friendship they still valued and whose understanding they eagerly sought.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


3. Ching, "Neo-Confucian Utopian Theories", 41.


5. Wang Gungwu indicates that Feng Tao was singled out for heavy condemnation because he had been repeatedly disloyal. See his "Feng Tao", p. 205. I Yin and T'ai-kung Wang were recluses who despite having lived under former orders became founding ministers of respectively the Shang and Chou dynasties. For the legendary dimensions of these personages see Sarah Allan, The Heir and the Sage (Taipei, 1981), pp. 91-101; 108-17. On Yi Yin and T'ai-kung Wang, see also Herbert A. Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary (Leiden, 1898), nos. 913 and 1862.


8. Kao-tsung has been blamed for being the principal in engineering Yüeh Fei's death. His critics hinted that contrary to his sworn ambition to recover the north, he did not really wish Ch'ing-tsung and Hui-tsung to return for fear of jeopardizing his own legitimacy as emperor. See, for example, Cheng Yüan-yu, 1.23-24; Wen Cheng-ming’s 文徵明 (1470-1559 [Wen T'ien-hsiang's descendant]) poem in the song-title 萬邦輸布, "On Kao-tsung's edict to Yüeh Fei", collected in Wang Jung-ch'ui's Hsi-hu shih-tzu hsüan (Hangchow, 1979), pp. 438-40; Chin Yü-fu, "Yüeh Fei chih-ssu yu Ch'ing Kuei", in Chou K'ang-chih, Sung Liao Chin Yuan shih, pp. 415-18. For Yüeh Fei's biography, see SS 365.11375-95. For a study of his military campaigns see E. H. Kaplan, "Yüeh Fei and the Founding of the Southern Sung" (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1970). See also Hellmut Wilhelm, "From Myth to Myth: The Case of Yüeh Fei's Biography", in Wright, Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, pp. 211-26; James Liu, "Yüeh Fei (1103-41) and China's Heritage of Loyalty", Journal of Asian Studies 31:2 (1972), 291-97.


11. Wu Kuang killed himself rather than serve T'ang, who toppled the Hsia dynasty. Po-i and Shu-ch'i were princes of the Ku-chu state who fled to the Shou-yang mountains and subsisted on moss before dying of starvation--the alternative they took to living under the newly established Chou dynasty. For their biographies, see Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih-chi (Peking, 1973), 61.2121-29. For the legendary dimensions of these men see Allan, pp. 89-91; 111-17. On Po-i and Shu-ch'i, see also Giles, no. 1657.

12. Lü-shih commentary to the Li-chi, "Ch'ü-li" b 禮記曲禮 in Wang Meng-ou (annot.), Li-chi hsiün-chu (Taipei, 1968), p. 31; also quoted in Ch'en Meng-lei et al., 706, vol. 311.36.

13. For these two passages, see the biographies of Yüeh I 楊毅 and T'ien Tan 田彥 in Shih-chi 80.2433; 82.2457.


15. Fang Hsüan-ling, Tsin-shu (Peking, 1974), 89.2297. Other similar categories of moral men in the standard histories are the hsün-li 信吏 (upright clerks), hsiào-i 孝義 (filial sons), and lieh-nü 列女 (virtuous women).

16. See Wei Shou, Wei-shu (Peking, 1974), 87.1889; Wei Cheng, Sui-shu (Peking, 1973), 71.1639; Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin Wu-tai shih (Peking, 1974), 32.347 (for the ssu-shih 興事 biographies, see ibid., 33.3356).

17. SS 446.13149.

18. For a survey of loyal men across the dynasties, see Ch'en Meng-lei et al., Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng, chün 706-763, vols. 311-316. Ch'en and his associates gleaned from various official and local sources the following numbers of biographical sketches of loyal men grouped according to the dynasties to which they directed their loyalty:

<table>
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<th>Dynasty</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shang</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Chou</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>Ch'in</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Former Han</td>
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<td>Latter Han</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>Wei</td>
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<td>Shu-Han</td>
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<td>Wu</td>
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<td>Tsin</td>
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<td>Liu-Sung</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Ch'i</td>
<td>18</td>
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</table>
19. The list of 80 includes 7 separate biographies in the section for outstanding officials (Liu Fu, SS 405; Wang Li-hsin, SS 416; Chiang Wan-li, SS 418; Wen T'ien-hsiang, SS 418; Li T'ing-chih, SS 421; Hsü Tsung-jen, SS 425; Hsieh Fang-te, SS 425) in addition to 16 men in SS 450; 11 in SS 451; 7 in SS 452; 37 in SS 454; and 2 in SS 455. I have left out 4 Sung loyalists from SS 454 (Chang Shan-weng, Huang Shen, Ho Shih, and Ch'en Tzu-ching) because they survived the resistance and became recluses and taught or told fortunes for a living. The composite account is based on the above SS biographies. Unofficial sources such as the writings of Teng Kuang-chien, Chao Ching-liang, and Hsü Ta-cho are used to supplement insufficient details.

20. SS 452.13309.


22. I use Teng Kuang-chien's Wen ch'eng-hsiang tu-fu chung-i chuan, in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 19.51a, rather than the SS version (454.13356), which has a milder tone and was based on the former.

23. SS 418.12533-40. The biographical details in this account have largely been drawn from Wen's biography in the SS in addition to his autobiographical poems. The SS biography has been translated by Brown. Brown's study is the only monograph on Wen in Western languages, although there are more than half a dozen in Chinese. Brown discusses the various editions of the Wen-shan hsien-sheng ch'un-chi, as well as some discrepancies among biographies, in addition to the historical image of Wen across the centuries. It is not, however, a critical study of either Wen himself, nor of his followers and supporters.

24. SS 44.857.

25. The anonymous Sung work, Teng-k'o lu (Yüeh-ya t'ang) lists altogether the names, birthdates, lineage and descent, and places of origin of 601 graduates in descending ranks under five categories. Wen T'ien-hsiang, Lu Hsiu-fu, and Hsieh Fang-te were considered the most outstanding of the group, which also included two defectors to the Mongols, Wen Pi and Ch'ien Chen-sun (d. aft.1290). There is also a large number of imperial relatives who graduated from this examination year. For a comparative study of this list with the 1148 one (when Chu Hsi graduated), which are the only extant Sung lists, see E. A. Kracke, Jr., "Family Versus Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations under the Empire", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 10 (1947), 103-23.

26. These were among the offices that Wen assumed in his career:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Office Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1259</td>
<td>ch'eng-shih lang (prest. title)</td>
<td>8A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>supervisor of Chien-ch'ang chün</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1263</td>
<td>assistant staff author</td>
<td>8A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1264</td>
<td>judicial intendant of Chiang-hsi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1267 secretary of the right (rev. of verdicts)
1268 judicial intendant of Fu-chien
1269 administrator of Ning-kuo 5B
1270 director of military equip. 5B
1271-73 in retirement
1273 judicial intendant of Hu-nan
1274 administrator of Kan-chou
1/1275 responded to ch'in-wang
6/1275 vice-pres. of Ministry of War 3B
9/1275 president of Ministry of War 2B
2/1276 commissioner of Military Affairs 1B

This table is compiled from his biography in the SS.

27. Wen also wrote to Wen Chi-weng, Li T'ing-chih, Ch'en I-chung, among others. These letters are found in Wen T'ien-hsiang, chüan 5-8.

28. SS 418.12534.

29. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 15.4a-5a. The poem is entitled "Mourning Mother at the second anniversary of her death".


31. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 15.9b-10a. The poem is called "To the rhyme of Po-i and Shu-ch'i's 'Song of the Western mountains'". Another poem which expressed his antipathy to the alien nature of the Mongols is "On the road to Kao-sha", in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 15.2a-b.


33. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 17.35b.

34. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 17.39a-b, in a letter to his brother Pi.


36. SS 418.12539.

37. For this account see ibid.; also Wen T'ien-hsiang, 17.41a-b. For Wang Chi-weng's biography, see YS 184.4229.

38. Teng Kuang-chien's account has Ch'ing-yang Meng-yen rather than Liu Meng-yen objecting to the petition. See Wen T'ien-hsiang, 17.41b.

39. "Funeral address to the chief minister Wen (before his actual death)", in Wang Yen-wu, 4.1a-b.

40. Wang Yen-wu, 4.2a-3a.

41. Wang Yen-wu, 4.3a-4a. On Li Ling, see Giles, no. 1171. After reading Wang's essay, the Yuan official and literary figure, Chieh Hsi-ssu, 楊載 (1274-1344), felt that it could not be proven beyond doubt whether Wen in fact saw the essay before deciding to die. Chieh was, however, convinced that Wen was of the same heart as Wang; and even if Wen's mind was not set on dying, the essay would surely...
have moved him. See Ch'eng Min-cheng, 1.2a-3a.

42. Wang Yüan-liang, Shui-yün chi, 35b-36a. This poem is entitled "Mourning the chief minister Wen (before his actual death)". On Chang Hsün, see Giles, no. 63.

43. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 14.39a-40a. For a translation of this poem and brief description of these historical personages see Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought (New York, 1957-62), pp. 348-53. Among some mistakes Chang made are: translating "chien" 竹 as a surname rather than "bamboo slaps" (p. 351) and transcribing "Tsin 竹" as "Ch'in" (p. 353).

44. On Su Wu, Yen Kao-ch'ing, Tsu T'i, and Chu-ko Liang, see Giles, nos. 1792, 2467, 2033, and 459.

45. For some of these poems, see Wen T'ien-hsiang, 14.23a-24a.

46. "Upon hearing the arrival of Pi", in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 15.15a-b.

47. SS 418.12539-40.

48. SS 418.12540. For a translation of this self-evaluation, see Carsun Chang, p. 347.


50. For a broad historical outline of the mu-fu system in traditional times up to the Yüan period, see Kenneth E. Folsom, Friends, Guests, and Colleagues: The Mu-fu System in the Late Ch'ing Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), pp. 1-39.

51. For example, Tu chia-ko 杜黎閭 for Tu Hu.

52. See for example, "Arrival at Yang-chou", in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 13.37b-38a.

53. They appear mostly in the Chi Tu-shih (Wen T'ien-hsiang, chüan 16), which formed the basis for Teng Kuang-chien's Wen ch'eng-hsiang tu-fu chung-i chuan.

54. For instance, Wang Yen-wu was readily released of his political duties to look after his mother. See Wang Yen-wu, 4.1a.


56. Li T'ing-chih's biography is in SS 421.12599-603. Unofficial biographies of Li, such as that in Chao-chung lu, are few and do not add to the SS account. The only modern study of Li is Li Ch'ing-yai's "Shu Li T'ing-chi", in Chou K'ang-hsieh, Sung Liao Chin Yuan shih, pp. 421-29. It is highly laudatory in nature, solely based on traditional accounts, and not useful in providing additional information about Li.
57. Meng Kung's biography is in SS 412.12369-80.

58. SS 421.12600.

59. For the connection with Li T'ing-chih, see the biographies of Pien Chü-i, Chiang Ts'ai, Yin Ku, Lu Hsiu-fu, and Chung Chi-yü (SS 450.13250; 450.13257; 451.13268; 451.13275; 454.13344). For the relationship to Kung K'ai and Hu San-hsing, see Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-ch'i chung-i lu, 15.1; Ch'en Yuan, T'ung-chien Hu-chu piao-wei, pp. 409-10.

60. Chang Shih-chieh and Su Liu-i could well have been acquainted through mutual connection with Lü Wen-te in the 1260s.


62. SS 451.13275. See also Kung K'ai, Kuei-ch'eng sou chi (Ch'ü-ch'ou ts'ung-shu), 13b.

63. SS 451.13275.

64. SS 421.12601.

65. SS 421.12602.

66. SS 421.12600; 421.12602.

67. SS 421.12602.

68. Lu Hsiu-fu's biography is in SS 451.13275-77. There are indications that it was based on a fuller biography by Lu's friend, Kung K'ai, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 10.8b-12a.

69. The SS is mistaken in stating that Lu gained the chin-shih degree in 1260. Lu's name definitely appears in the Teng-k'o lu, the 1256 graduate list.

70. SS 451.13275.

71. SS 451.13275-76.

72. SS 451.13276.

73. Lo Hsiang-lin doubted whether Ti-Ping perished with Lu Hsiu-fu. See his "Sung wang-t'ai", pp. 140-41. Lo drew upon Cheng Ssu-hsiao's Hsin-shih for supporting evidence, yet in another work he emphatically declared the Hsin-shih to be a Ming forgery (P'u Shou-keng chuan, pp. 12, 31-32) I think Kung K'ai's information is accurate, because he obtained it through an eyewitness (although through several other informants). See also Huang Chin, 3.6a.

74. Lu's descendants are said to have survived through a son left behind in Ch'ao-chou, where Lu was exiled for a brief period in 1276. See Chiang I-hsüeh, Lu Hsiu-fu nien-p'u (Taipei, 1977), pp. 6-7.

75. Chang's biography is in SS 451.13272; the fullest account of
Chang is in connection with the Yai-shan defeat in Chao-chung lu, pp. 34-36.

76. SS 451.13267-68; 451.13272.
77. SS 451.13272-73.
78. Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao 5.59; Pi Yuan, 181.4944.
79. SS 47.943.
80. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.11a-b.
81. SS 451.13274. However, Chou Mi indicates that Chang Shih-chieh was killed by a subordinate, Chou Wen-ying (fl. 1270-1290), who then surrendered to the Mongols. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b,18b-20a.
82. Hsieh's biography in the SS (425.12687-90) seems to have been based on the earliest (ca. 1289) account of him in the Chao-chung lu, pp. 36-39. In 1318 Hsieh's son also obtained a biography of Hsieh by Li Tao-yüan 莊道原.
83. Chao-chung lu, p. 36.
84. SS 425.12688.
85. Ibid.
86. There is some confusion as to when Hsieh fled from the Sung battles, either just before Hang-chou surrendered, or in mid-1276 after he had joined the loyalist resistance. I think the latter is correct: Hsieh later wrote that he did not obey Empress Dowager Hsieh and surrender in February 1276 after the capitulation of the Sung imperial family, because he saw it as his duty to continue to defend the country whereas Empress Dowager saw it as her obligation to save lives by requesting her subjects to surrender. See Hsieh Fang-te, Tieh-shan chi, 4.10b (letter to Liu Meng-yen). Hsieh's collected writings survive only in parts (16 out of 64 original chüan). There has also been doubt as to whether all of the surviving 16 chüan were in fact Hsieh's own writings. See Chang Hsin-ch'eng, p. 1161.
87. SS 425.12688.
88. Chao-chung lu, p. 37; SS 425.12690.
89. Hsieh Fang-te, Tieh-shan chi, 4.1b, in a letter to Ch'eng Chü-fu declining appointment to office.
90. Hsieh's collected writings contain many poems and essays thanking his benefactors for their generous donations. See especially Hsieh Fang-te, chüan 3.
91. Hsiung Ho's "Reply to a suggestion to quit drinking", in his Hsiung Wu-hsüan hsien-sheng wen-chi (TSCC), 5.63-64, compares his refusal of Yuan employment to someone who would not give up his drinking to serve an enlightened ruler. For Hsieh's other loyalist
friends in Wu-yüan, see Chapter Five, p. 213.

92. Other extant writings by Hsieh are mostly annotations and commentaries: on T'ang and Sung prose, see his Wen-chang kuei-fan (SKCSCP ser. 11); on T'ang regulated poetry, see his Hsieh T'ieh-shan T'ang-shih ch'üeh-chü chu-ch'ieh (Hong Kong, 1961); on miscellaneous notes about poets, see Pi-hu tsa-chi (Shuo-fu, 19).

93. See in particular his comments on the "Shu-li 留離" and "Yüan-yu t'ao 圓有桃" poems in the Shih-ching, in his Shih-chuan chu-shu (Chih-pu-tsu chai), a.8a-9a and a.18a-19a.

94. "Preface to farewell Fang Po-tsai returning to San-shan", in Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 6.4a.


96. Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 6.4b-5a.

97. "Preface to farewell Subprefect Shih to the capital", in Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 6.2b.

98. "Letter to Administrator Mu of Chien-n'ing recommending School Director Chu", in Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 5.3a-4a.

99. "Funerary inscription for Mr. Mu", in Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 8.1a-4b.

100. "Preface to farewell Huang Liu-yu returning to San-shan", in Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 6.6a-b.

101. Ch'eng Chü-fu's biography is in YS 171.4015-18. His collected writings are known as the Hsüeh-lou chi. For studies of the 1286-87 mission to recruit talented men from south China, see Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Ch'eng Chü-fu yü Hu-pi-lieh p'ing-Sung i-hou", 353-79; Sun K'o-k'uan, "Chiang-nan fang-hsien yü Yen-yu ju-chih", in his Meng-ku Han-ch'un, pp. 345-63; Yuan Chi, Ch'eng Hsieh-lou p'ing-chuan (Taipei, 1979), pp. 41-57; Lao Yan-shuan, "Ch'eng Chü-fu: Some Observations", paper presented at the Conference on Yuan Thought, 1978.

102. Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 4.2a-3b.

103. Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 4.5b, 4.6a, 4.9a-11a.

104. Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 4.11b-14a. Hsieh also wrote to Wei T'ien-yu stating his case for refusal of office.


106. Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 2.7b. This was written by his student Chang Tsu-hui 張子蕙.

108. SS 425.12690; Chao-chung lu, p. 39.


111. These biographies are in SS 460.13489-93.

112. On Hsü Ying-piao, see Chapter Two, p. 45; on Ch'en Wen-lung's mother, see SS 451.13280-81.

113. "Mourning my wife", in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 15.5a; SS 450.13259.

114. See above, p. 121. T'ao Tsung-i's Nan-ts'un cho-keng lu, 3.38-40, discusses and praises the chaste and heroic women at the end of the Sung.

115. Lady Hsü is mentioned with Ch'en Tiao-yen 陳吊眼 in Chang Shih-chieh's biography (SS 451.13272). See also YS 10.206. She appears to have married Chou Wen-ying, whom Chou Mi believed to have killed Chang Shih-chieh. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.20a-b.

116. Chao Ching-liang, 5.17a; Wang Feng, 1.21a-22a.

117. For example, see Hsü Ta-cho, b.20a-b.

118. On Ch'ü Yuan, see Giles, no. 503. For Ch'ü Yuan's biography, see Shih-chi 84.2481-91; for its translation and comments, see David Hawkes, Ch'ü T'zu: The Songs of the South (Oxford, 1959), pp. 11-19. Schneider's recent study of Ch'ü Yuan focusses on the mythical lore surrounding him.

119. Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Chia I (201-169 B.C.) felt that Ch'ü Yuan could have served another state or withdrawn temporarily until the times were more ideal. See Schneider, pp. 21-24. On Chu Hsi's views, see ibid., p. 76.

120. These two lists are found in Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, appendix.12-19; Li Tse-fen, vol. 3, 150-59. Li includes even the Sung sovereign, Kung-ti, as a defector.

121. YS 9.180.

122. For example, these were Liu Cheng, Kao Hsing 高興 (d. 1313), Chou Ch'üan 沈全 (d. 1305), Lo Pi 羅璧 (d. 1299).


124. On Hsia Kuei's son who was awarded posthumous honours for bravery, see Wang Ying-lin, Ssu-ming wen-hsien chi, 5.36a-b.
125. For an example of Fang Hui's flattering address to the Yuan, see Liu Min-chung, preface 2a-3a. For Fang's justification for his defection, see "Farewelling my son Ts'un-hsin to Yen", in Fang Hui, T'ung-chiang hsü-ch'i (SKSCP ch'u-ch'i), 25.21a.

126. See Chao Ching-liang, 6.4a. This is a mourning poem to Lü Wen-huan ridiculing the latter's surrender to the Mongols.

127. From Wen Pi's funerary account of their mother, in Wen T'ien-hsiang, 18.2b.

128. Wen T'ien-hsiang, 18.3a.

129. On the episode in regard to Wang Chi-weng, see this chapter, p. 132; on Lü Shih-k'uei's attitude to Hsieh Fang-te, see Chao-chung lu, p. 39.

130. There exist studies of defectors from other periods of history. In a study of defections to the Mongols during the Chin collapse, Igor de Rachewiltz shows that other than pure opportunism, the defectors were concerned about saving large numbers of lives. See his "Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 9 (1966), 106-07. For a study of the circumstances under which a loyal general turned into a traitor in the T'ang, see Charles A. Peterson, "Pu-ku Huai-en 僕 囯 懐 恩 and the T'ang Court: The Limits of Loyalty", Monumenta Serica 29 (1970-71), 423-55. The sometimes subtle differences and narrow borderline between a loyal and disloyal subject are discussed with relevance to the modern period by Morton Grodzins, in his The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason (Cleveland and New York, 1956).
CHAPTER FIVE

THE I-MIN TRADITION OF SUNG LOYALISTS: REGIONAL
LOYALIST GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES, 1276-1300

The Sung loyalists of the chung-i tradition were killed or committed suicide, and generally had little contact with alien rule because death occurred immediately or shortly after the collapse of the dynasty. This tradition of loyalists is regarded as the more praiseworthy type by the Sung-shih preface to the chung-i biographies.¹ The loyalists who survived and withdrew from society under Mongol rule are mentioned, but only a few such individuals have been given biographies in the Sung-shih. In fact, the actual number of loyalist survivors was large: it included the active participants in Sung defence and loyalist resistance as well as countless former officials and commoners who were nonparticipants. Because these men were largely ignored in the standard historical sources, subsequent nonofficial writings and anthologies on the loyalists were primarily interested in amending this omission. In the Ch'ing, the historian Ch'üan Tsu-wang argued at length for standard histories to include loyalist survivors with the chung-i biographies.²

These loyal survivors are referred to as i-min 遺民 (literally, surviving or remnant people). The term, first occurring in the Tso-chuan 太傳 and in Mencius' allusion to a poem in the Shih-ching, originally applied in a general sense to surviving people at the end of a dynasty after a national catastrophe.³ Only much later did i-min specifically refer to those individuals (mostly former officials) who refused a political career under the succeeding dynasty. In their writings the Sung loyalists used both connotations
of the term. It was perhaps in the Ming and Ch'ing that the more specific meaning took precedence over the original and more general one. The i-min have not been conceptualized as a group in standard histories. Because many of them actually withdrew from public office into mountain or forest retreats, some were put in with the i-min 避民, or yin-i 隱逸 (recluses); and because many individuals were accomplished scholars, some were given biographies in the ju-lin 儒林 (eminent Confucian scholars) or wen-yuan 文苑 (literati) group biographies. Although a certain loyalist could fit into either one or both groups, the i-min tradition of loyalists cannot be totally identified with either the ju-lin or the yin-i.

That loyalty need not be manifested by immediate death was justified in the minds of the i-min loyalists by numerous historical precedents. Po-i and Shu-ch'i were both i-min 避民 and i-min 避民 because they lived in virtual seclusion to protest against the Chou conquest. An example closer in time was T'ao Ch'ien 陶潜 (372-427), who lived as a rustic and loyalist of the Tsin 晉 until he died a natural death. The sentiments of T'ao and his creative genius served as a model which the Sung loyalists emulated. Apart from not taking office, T'ao's protest against the new political order was symbolized by his refusal to use the new dynasty's reign titles. His poverty and "transcendent" attitudes towards worldly affairs and his utopian ideals were regarded as spiritual consolation and guidance to the i-min loyalists. Thus active defence and death for the sake of the country were not the only way to demonstrate one's loyalty to the dynasty; for scholar-officials and literati of the former order, who were essentially Confucian in orientation, passive protest and withdrawal would do.
The i-min loyalists of the Sung continued to exist under the new dynasty after the collapse of the capital and the final defeat of loyalist resistance. Among them were a few active participants in the resistance, but the majority were nonactive participants who nevertheless felt deep grief about the demise of the Sung. Many were former officials, students in the capital, or successful candidates in subprefectural and prefectural examinations. Most returned home just before or during the collapse of the capital city. For individuals who had received a salary or degree from the Sung, withdrawal from public office was "compulsory". However, among those who withdrew were many who did not take office under the Sung; therefore, their act can be considered "voluntary". The i-min group in fact comprised a large number of former officials who were criticized by official histories as having tun (fled); this behaviour was denounced by the Sung court in 1274 as cowardice and irresponsibility. For a few, retirement had been approved by the court, as in the case of Ma T'ing-luan who was genuinely ill; but others like Wang Ying-lin simply left the court. For most of these men, active resistance was not in their minds. The life of the i-min for some began immediately after the collapse of the capital in February 1276; but for others it began after loyalist defeat in March 1279.

A few of these men isolated themselves and so became real recluses as well as surviving subjects of the Sung; but the majority gathered in regional or cross-regional groups to mourn the demise of the country and to soothe their spirits while living under the new political system. Loose networks of relationships were formed in the first generation of Mongol rule in south China and in each regional group or network key personalities emerged while other individuals
gathered around them for leadership and guidance. Regional centres of i-min activities can be located in Annam, Ta-tu, Kuei-chi, Wu-chou and Yen-chou, Lu-ling, Ch'ing-yüan, Jao-chou and Wu-yüan, P'ing-chiang, Tung-kuan, as well as in Hu-chou and Hang-chou. The latter two centres will be dealt with in the next chapter in connection with Chou Mi and his circle of friends. In the following pages the other nine regional groups and leaders are identified and discussed in the light of their collected writings and contemporary accounts.

I. Ch'en I-chung and the Loyalists Abroad

Ch'en I-chung was a key personality in the Sung court before its collapse and in the loyalist court up to his flight to Champa in January 1278. Born to a poor family in Wen-chou, he was among the six National University students who audaciously impeached Ting Ta-ch'iian in the mid-1250s and subsequently suffered banishment. Pardoned by Chia Ssu-tao when the latter became chief minister, he gained his chin-shih degree two years later and quickly advanced in his political career. By 1274 he was promoted to ministerial rank and became the most powerful political figure after the downfall of Chia. I have earlier reconstructed Ch'en's crucial role in the evacuation of the two Sung princes. Like Wen T'ien-hsiang and the other loyalists, Ch'en also involved his family, including his younger brother, in the resistance.

The purpose of Ch'en's departure from the loyalist court in 1278 was to investigate Champa and Annam as future bases for loyalist operations. Thus after the defeat at Yai-shan, Chang Shih-chieh and Su Liu-i attempted to join Ch'en, but died before reaching their destination. Upon arrival in Champa, Ch'en was well-received by the
local authorities but did not have time to amass support before the loyalist fleet was annihilated. Ch'en thus stayed in Champa until 1282 when his host kingdom was attacked by the Mongols; he then fled to Siam with some supporters and died there—a refugee in exile. Other followers seem to have travelled north to the neighbouring kingdom of Annam and some returned to the Chinese mainland.

Survivors of the Yai-shan crisis also came to Annam: they included civil officials of the loyalist court, Ch'en Chung-wei and Tseng Yuan-tzu, together with their families and that of the captured Su Liu-i. The Annamese king welcomed the loyalists and particularly admired the poetic talents of Ch'en Chung-wei and Tseng Yuan-tzu, who both held the chin-shih degree. Ch'en Chung-wei wrote an account of the two Sung princes enthroned by the loyalists, a work that is said to have been returned to China through a diplomatic mission in 1282. This work, the Erh-wang pen-mo, was subjected to repeated editing in the Yuan.

In Annam these loyalists evidently worsened Annamese relations with the Mongols by directly participating in Annam's resistance to Mongol attacks in 1285. That year the Mongol army captured the son-in-law of Ch'en Chung-wei with a Chiao-chih leader, together with over four hundred men (presumably mostly Sung loyalist refugees). Tseng Yuan-tzu and the sons of Ch'en Chung-wei and Su Liu-i also surrendered their forces to the Mongols and incurred the resentment of the Annamese. On the whole, however, the arrival of the Sung loyalists in Southeast Asia has been considered an important phase in the Chinese colonization of the region. They were actually preceded by earlier migrations of people from Fukien attracted by lucrative trade and the desire to escape political
Although they originally sought temporary refuge, the loyalists and their descendants stayed permanently.

Apart from Southeast Asia, there are indications of Sung loyalists dispersing elsewhere after the defeat of loyalist resistance. There is an account of a Ch'iu K'uei 尹葵 (fl. 1270-1290) from Ch'üan-chou who sailed to an island off the Fukien coast rather than live on conquered land. It seems that Ch'iu K'uei continued to be on friendly terms with the brother of P'u Shou-keng, Shou-ch'eng 舒曾, who was blamed for persuading the former to surrender to the Mongols in 1277. After the Sung demise, Li Yung 李用 (fl. 1250-1290) went to Japan from Tung-kuan and never returned.

II. Wang Yüan-liang and the Ta-tu Group

On the journey to the Yüan capital in 1276, the Sung imperial family was accompanied by thousands of both willing and unwilling followers. Of those who felt loyal to the Sung and who did not die or commit suicide on the way, some were appointed to positions in the Yüan government and others were allowed to return to south China by the late 1290s. In Ta-tu, former Sung officials and palace women gathered to mourn the collapse of the Sung. The main participants were Wang Yüan-liang, Wang Ch'ing-hui 王清惠 (fl. 1270-1290), Chia Hsüan-weng, and Teng Kuang-chien. Until his execution in early 1283, Wen T'ien-hsien could also be considered a member of loyalist group in Ta-tu because of his correspondence with Wang Yüan-liang and Teng Kuang-chien.

Wang Ch'ing-hui was a concubine of Emperor Tu-tsung, who, together with Wang Yüan-liang, taught Kung-ti the Confucian Classics.
and poetry during the journey to Ta-tu and thereafter. Endowed with poetic talent and in despair over the demise of the Sung and the unknown consequences of captivity in Ta-tu, she wrote a much-acclaimed poem on the wall of a postal station in Pien-liang in 1276, en route to the Yüan capital. To this _tz'u_ which expressed her desire to remain pure and aloof like the moon, Wang Yüan-liang composed another one in the same song-title and rhymes. Three years later when Wen T'ien-hsiang and Teng Kuang-chien read the poem on the wall, they also wrote poems to the rhymes of the original one to commiserate with her grief. After some years in Ta-tu, Wang Ch'ing-hui became a Taoist nun.

Wang Yüan-liang was a court musician primarily in the service of Empress Dowager Hsieh. A native of Hang-chou, he had volunteered to accompany the imperial family to the north. During the journey and upon arrival in Ta-tu he wrote poems dealing with the surrender of the Sung capital and its impact in the palace quarters, the ravages of war in the particular sites which the imperial retinue passed through, and the reception of the imperial family by the Yüan court. In the Yüan capital, apart from contact with Wen T'ien-hsiang, Teng Kuang-chien, and Wang Ch'ing-hui, Wang Yüan-liang communicated with Chia Hsüan-weng in Ho-chien through poems and letters. He also maintained relations with former Sung officials and members of the imperial family including Kung-ti, the empress dowagers, imperial son-in-law Yang Chen (fl. 1270-1290), and the grandfather of Kung-ti, Prince Fu (fl. 1270-1290). Like the other accompanying officials in the Sung imperial entourage, Wang was given a position in the Yüan court which he occupied for over ten years. His duties were perhaps in the capacity of a court musician and poet,
and were not much different from his former service in the Sung court. In Ta-tu, he witnessed the death of Empress Dowager Hsieh and Prince Fu, whom he mourned in funerary poems. Several years later Empress Dowager Ch'uan entered a nunnery, and in 1288 Kung-ti went to Tibet to become a Lama monk. Immediately after, Wang felt that his duties to the Sung imperial family had been fulfilled and obtained permission to return to the south to become a Taoist priest. Former Sung officials and palace ladies farewelled him and presented him with parting poems. On his return to south China, Wang passed through the same places he had trodden over ten years earlier. He did not hasten to his home in Hang-chou but made side trips to visit his former friends and colleagues as well as loyalists in various regions. He showed them his poetry collections and spoke about the details of the surrender of Hang-chou and the fate of the imperial family. His friends sympathized deeply with his grief and wrote prefaces to his work.

With one notable exception, primary and secondary sources do not mention that Wang Yuan-liang had served the Yuan. Nor has it been noted that his poetry reflects two different moods and personalities. Some poems show the deep grief of a Sung loyalist towards the demise of the dynasty and the humiliation of the imperial family subjected to captivity; other themes dealt with are the oppression of the local people under corrupt officials and clerks, heavy taxation and corvée forcing people to become refugees and to abandon their children. On the other hand, some poems express gratitude to Qubilai for welcoming the Sung imperial retinue in ten grand feasts upon arrival, and for granting tax-exempt property to the Sung imperial family. Qubilai is praised for not taking the imperial
concubines and palace ladies into his harem: he had married them off to carpenters and craftsmen instead. Also, the Mongol general Bayan is commended for restraining himself from arbitrary massacres. Wang also remained friendly to Sung defectors and collaborators such as Lü Wen-huan, the myriarch Huang (fl. 1280), Liu Meng-yen, and Ch'ing-yang Meng-yen.35

Wang Yüan-liang could not explain to his friends the equivocation with which he wrote the poems praising the Yüan, nor could he justify his service to the Mongols—a fact which cast doubt on his loyalty to the Sung. He repeatedly told his friends that he could only look at the present state of the world in a drunken stupor. Realizing that they would never completely understand his experiences in the north, he wrote the following poem to a friend, Hsü Hsüeh-chiang (fl. 1270-1290):

After ten years of high living in the White-Jade Hall,  
I submitted my reasons for permission to return home.  
Under the solitary clouds and setting sun I crossed the Liao River,  
On horseback against the western winds I climbed the T'ai-heng mountains.  
The salary from my office still remains in the knapsack,  
The imperially bestowed clothes still emit the fragrance of the imperial presence.  
Only now it is difficult to answer my guest's query,  
From antiquity the affairs of Central Plain have been long handles for people's talk.36

The poem essentially conveys feelings of gratitude to the Yüan emperor whom he served. Perhaps he was initially forced to take up the position because of his musical talents, or he may have felt that since his sovereigns Kung-ti and Empress Dowager Hsieh, as well as other members of the imperial family had taken Yüan titles and positions, he would be disloyal if he did not follow them into submission. Although he may have been grateful to the Yüan emperor, there is little doubt that his greater loyalty was to the Sung
imperial family. For as soon as Empress Dowager Hsieh had died and Kung-ti had left for Tibet in 1288, he immediately returned to south China. Perhaps because he felt guilty about his compromise with the Mongol court during his sojourn in Ta-tu and because his friends did not understand him in this regard, he subsequently wandered hither and thither—his long beard, and tall, thin figure making him appear more like an immortal than a human being.

Chia Hsüan-weng, a former high-ranking official, was forced to go to the Yuan capital in 1276, even though he had refused to sign the surrender statement that was endorsed by the other ministers at the time of the Sung collapse. It is said that he wept and refused food and drink for several months in protest against the Mongol invasions. He stayed in Ta-tu for two years, where he probably met Wang Yüan-liang. After refusing an office, he was sent to Ho-chien and later took up a position lecturing on the I-ching 易經 and the Ch'un-ch'iu 春秋. When Wen T'ien-hsiang and Teng Kuang-chien passed through Ho-chien in 1279 on their way to Ta-tu, the three met again and shared their grief and experiences.

Chia, however, was the sole southerner and loyalist in Ho-chien; he subsequently communicated with the others only through correspondence. He missed deeply his native place of Szechwan and Hang-chou, which was perhaps a veiled longing for the collapsed Sung dynasty as well. He regarded his sojourn in Ho-chien as chi-yü pei 鷁於北 (forcible detention in the north), rarely used Yuan reign titles, and referred to the Yuan capital only by its ancient name of Yen 燕. Chia's misgivings about alien rule in general was, however, gradually dispelled by his admiration for the high standard of Confucian learning among northern scholars and recluses, whom he
received warmly and considered his "like-minded" friends. He was relieved that "Confucianism was capable of following its own path and not be transformed [adversely] by the change of dynasties", and thus believed that scholarship and learning knew no boundaries between the north and the south. His grief for the Sung dissolved in the course of time, as he observed that reunification of the country now made possible even the "reintegration" of Buddhist and Taoist schools.38 Chia was already sixty-three when he went to the north; after living there for almost two decades, his attitude towards alien peoples also became more liberal than before. In a preface to Yuan Hao-wen's Chung-chou chi, he commended the compiler for regarding non-Chinese individuals as civilized and equal to the Chinese people.39 In 1294 Chia was allowed to return to south China, where loyalists such as Lin Ching-hsi welcomed his return with poems. After his departure, loyalist activities in the north came to an end, as Teng Kuang-chien and Wu Chien (one of the chief ministers who signed the surrender statement and went to Ta-tu with Chia), had already left long before him.40

III. The Loyalists in Kuei-chi and the Recovery of the Sung Imperial Relics

The tombs of the Southern Sung emperors were located near Kuei-chi and were referred to as ts'uan-kung 擧宮 (temporary burial sites) rather than ling 陵 (mausolea), because hopes for repossession of the Central Plain were never abandoned in the Sung period. During and after the defeat of loyalist resistance, these tombs were excavated and looted while loyalists in Kuei-chi attempted to recover the imperial relics. The clandestine nature of the mission to
retrieve the imperial relics is believed to have resulted in conflicting contemporary accounts of the incident (some of which were eyewitness records). Traditional scholarship on the incident does not agree on four main contentious issues: the actual dates of the excavation and the recovery and reburial of the relics; the identity of the personages involved in the incident; the location of the reburial site; and the number of tombs excavated. The account below attempts to synthesize the sources available on the subject.41

Beginning from 1278 until about 1285, the Lamaist monk Yang Lien-chên-chia 楊連真茄 (Byan-spriṅ l Cañ-skya [d. 1292]), in collaboration with the notorious Sang-ko 斯哥 (d. 1291), engaged in a large-scale project to excavate the imperial tombs and the graves of eminent officials. It is said that Yang increased his personal wealth by looting these graves, although many of the treasures thus acquired were turned over to the central government which then allocated funds for the construction of Buddhist temples.42 To his critics the most heinous act committed by Yang was his impiety to the former Sung rulers by exposing the relics to the open air. He also allegedly ordered some relics to be transferred to a site on the former Sung palace grounds in Hang-chou, on which a pagoda named "Pagoda to suppress the south" would be built.43 Yang and his accolites also drained the mercury from Li-tsung's body in order to dislodge a precious pearl in his mouth; the skull was subsequently lost and later retrieved and used as a drinking utensil by them.44 The total number of tombs violated was estimated to be over a hundred by the Yüan-shih.45

Yang's critics over the centuries have condemned without reservation the desecration of the Sung emperors' graves and the
violation of traditional Chinese burial practices. A more objective
look shows that Yang might not have deliberately meant to humiliate
the Sung imperial family and its subjects, but his religious zeal led
him to reclaim the original sites of Buddhist temples which had been
demolished to construct the imperial tombs. It is generally
believed that the excavations had been undertaken without Qubilai's
knowledge. Traditional Chinese scholars in particular blame the
former Sung officials then in the Mongol service for not raising
objections to the excavations. They insist that had there been some
protest in the Yuan capital, the sinicized Lien Hsi-hsien
(1234-1280), the sympathetic Bayan, and the benevolent Qubilai
would not have condoned Yang's misdeeds. In 1291, with the
disgrace of Sang-ko at the Yuan court, Yang was also severely
penalized. It was perhaps the downfall of these two men that
served to totally dissociate the Yuan emperor from the excavations;
for it is hard to believe that Qubilai had not been aware of the
incident, since the funds received from the excavations were submitted
to the Yuan court and later reallocated for the construction of the
Buddhist temples.

As soon as the plundering of the imperial tombs was known, it
appears that a group of dedicated loyal men, mostly natives of
Kuei-chi, embarked upon a daring scheme to recover the imperial relics
and rebury them at the Lan-t'ing site in Kuei-chi. At least half a
dozen personages were involved in this affair: Wang Ying-sun, T'ang
Chüeh (b. 1247), Lin Ching-hsi 林景曦 (1242-1310) and his
companion Cheng Pu-weng 鄭卜翁 (fl. 1270-1300), Lo Hsien 羅說
(fl. 1270-1290), and perhaps Ch'üan Chüan-weng. T'ang Chüeh is
recorded to have been a filial son who used up his family inheritance
to entertain a handful of young men in order to enlist their help to smuggle out the imperial relics and replace them with animal bones. In a separate incident, Lin Ching-hsi and his fellow countryman Cheng Pu-weng disguised themselves as beggars; after bribing the junior Lama monks to let them through, they obtained the relics of Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung (r. 1162-1189). In both cases the recovered bones were then reburied and tung-ch'ing shu (evergreen trees) planted to mark the new location. In the traditional accounts of T'ang Chüeh and Lin Ching-hsi, both appear to have worked on their own without previous knowledge of each other. Ch'ing commentators have, however, supplied evidence to show that the two were house guests of the local magnate Wang Ying-sun, who was in fact the mastermind and financier of the mission. Wang was the son of a high-ranking Sung official and related to the Sung imperial family; for these reasons he did not want to focus suspicion on himself. He, however, may have paid for the assistants and for the bribes needed to ensure a successful venture. The Ch'ing historian Ch'üan Tsu-wang insisted that his ancestor, Ch'üan Ch'üan-weng, had been a participant in the event and should be commemorated together with these "daring" and loyal subjects of the Sung. His argument was based on the grounds that the site for the reburials was situated in the property of the Ch'üan clan which had earlier been granted by the Sung imperial family.

A mass of literature has been produced over the centuries praising the personalities involved in the recovery of the imperial relics. The key protagonists, Lin Ching-hsi and T'ang Chüeh, were the first to refer to the incident in their poems. Their symbol for the entire event was the evergreen tree, which in turn became the
oblique reference for subsequent writings on the subject. Traditional sources suggest that in an attempt to keep a low profile about the mission and their participation, both they and their friends deliberately falsified facts and dates, thus causing the still unsolved controversy about the incident. In the earliest account written by their friend Chou Mi, nothing is said relating to the participation of either T'ang Chüeh or Lin Ching-hsi. Another friend, Hsieh Ao, a survivor of the loyalist resistance and personal follower of Wen T'ien-hsiang, composed a commemorative poem, the Tung-ch'ing shu yin  東青桂引 (Introduction to the evergreen), on which the Ming loyalist Huang Tsung-hsi wrote a commentary. In this piece, Hsieh's information about the dates of the reburial also conflicts with that of Chou Mi and other accounts. Because of the popularity of this poem and his reputation as a Sung loyalist, Hsieh has traditionally been regarded as an active participant in the incident. That, however, has been disproved on the basis that at the time of its occurrence Hsieh was travelling in Fukien and could not have been physically present in Kuei-chi.

In any case, after the incident the individuals involved continued to see each other at social and literary gatherings in which other acquaintances and visitors participated. The best-known meeting occurred in 1279, during which fourteen poets met on five occasions, at five locations in the Kuei-chi mountains, to compose poetry in five song-titles in the yung-wu  詩物 (celebration of the object) subgenre. Altogether thirty-seven of these poems survive in a volume edited by one of the youngest participants, Ch'en Shu-k'o  錢恕可 (1258-1339). At least half the members in the group were natives of Kuei-chi, including Ch'en Shu-k'o, Wang Ying-sun, T'ang Chüeh, Wang
I-sun 王浙 (1232-1291), Wang I-chien 王易簡 and T'ang I-sun 丘藝孫 (both fl. 1270-1300). Five of them apparently owned property in the Kuei-chi mountains and took turns hosting the meetings. The other participants were Hang-chou natives either seeking a sanctuary from the chaos of war, or were travelling through Kuei-chi; they included Chou Mi, Ch'iu Yüan 仇遠 (1247-1327), Chang Yen 張炎 (1248-1320), Lü T'ung-lao 吕同老 and Li P'eng-lao 李蓬老 (both fl. 1260-1300). The poems are full of obscure allusions and oblique references, and recent preliminary studies of them have shown that the major themes were the tragedy of the Sung emperors and empresses, and the collapse of loyalist resistance in Yai-shan. It has also been suggested that the participants may have witnessed the looting of the tombs and that their meetings were conceived as ceremonial acts to pay final homage to the former ruler and dynasty. One notable detail is the absence of Lin Ching-hsi: this can perhaps be explained by his departure for his home in Wen-chou on a brief trip. Actually Lin Ching-hsi may have been a participant, as the poetry volume may not reflect the total number of participants nor the total number of poems produced in the meetings.

Shortly after these gatherings, Chou Mi and the other visitors left Kuei-chi and returned to their respective homes. Of the poets whose works are represented in the volume, several later took up office under Yuan rule, a fact worth noting. They included at least Wang I-sun, Ch'iu Yüan, and Ch'en Shu-k'o, who may have reluctantly taken this decision under difficult circumstances. There is, however, little doubt that in the 1270s, 1280s, and even during their service to the Yuan they remained spiritually loyal to the Sung and expressed genuine sadness and pessimism about the demise of the
of the key personalities in the Kuei-chi loyalist group, T'ang Chüeh is the least known. His poems have been confused with those in Lin Ching-hsi's collection, and even his biography has been laced with myth, presumably to fill the gaps and the sparse details on him. Much more information is available on Wang Ying-sun and Lin Ching-hsi. Wang was by far the most influential in social, economic, and political standing. A former Sung official, he apparently hosted many house guests and patronized not a few destitute scholars such as Lin Ching-hsi. Although Wang did not take up employment under the Yüan, he was wealthy enough to be known as one of the most affluent art connoisseurs. After the fall of the Sung he wrote poetry, painted, and lived the typical life of a political recluse. In 1289 he bought some property on the T'ao mountain on which he built a house and a local academy. Although Wang did not serve the government, he may have maintained an ambiguous attitude and associated with Yüan officials in order to keep his social and economic status. His son also mixed with loyalists such as Lin Ching-hsi and may have later joined the Mongol service.

Lin Ching-hsi is probably the best-known essayist and poet among the loyalist group in Kuei-chi. A native of Wen-chou and former Sung official, he travelled and lived in Kuei-chi with some fellow countrymen, including Cheng Pu-weng, who assisted him with the reburial of the imperial relics. After the demise of the dynasty, he remained for the next twenty years a guest of Wang Ying-sun and travelled frequently to Hang-chou and his native town. In addition, he taught students and associated with Taoist priests and Buddhist monks. In his poetry, loyalty is manifested in repeated
references to the symbols and traditions of loyalty: for instance, the sunflower naturally faces the sun, the bird would rather starve than go to another owner, and virtuous women who would not remarry. Also present are frequent praises of historical loyal figures such as Po-i and Shu-ch'i, Su Wu and Ts'ai Yen (Han), as well as the Sung loyalist martyrs Lu Hsiu-fu, Wen T'ien-hsiang, and Hsü Ying-piao. Lin's loyalism had ethnic and racial overtones. He interpreted strange occurrences of natural phenomena as supernatural reaction to the unnatural state of alien rule:

Thus when human beings lose the constants of human beings, ghosts and spirits practice their strange [ways]; when the Middle Kingdom loses its constants, barbarians conduct their weird [practices]. Strange occurrences are already unspeakable, how much more so when they have been beckoned to come close?

Lin's distress about the imposition of alien rule was not abated by the reunification of the country. He cynically commented on Lu Yu's poem instructing his heirs to inform him about the recovery of the north:

Now that the nine provinces have been reunified, How will you convey that information to your father during the family sacrifices?

In later years, Lin's uncompromising loyalism also succumbed to the passage of time: he associated with northerners and did not condemn his younger brother for his Yuan employment. He himself, however, did not resume a public career.

IV. Hsieh Ao and the Loyalists in Wu-chou and Yen-chou

Hsieh Ao, a native of Fukien and unsuccessful chin-shih candidate, was a personal follower of Wen T'ien-hsiang and a survivor of the loyalist resistance. He had recruited a thousand men from his hometown and turned over his wealth to the loyalist cause. After
Wen's capture in 1278, he escaped and thereafter spent his life travelling through Fukien and Chekiang. In the course of his travels he established close contacts with loyalist groups in Hang-chou and Kuei-chi, but is most often identified with the loyalists in Wu-chou, where the two Sung princes first stopped during their flight to the southeast in early 1276.

In Wu-chou, Hsieh became an intimate friend of Fang Feng (1240-1321) and Wu Ssu-ch'i (1238-1301), and associated with frequent visitors from Yen-chou (Mu-chou). Fang Feng did not take office under the Sung, but although a commoner he was regarded highly by the chief minister Ch'en I-chung. In 1275, Fang was keenly aware of the urgency of the political situation and wrote to Ch'en, requesting that he continue to resist the "conniving caitiffs": "Even a caged animal will struggle, how much more so should a country about to collapse?" After the defeat of loyalist resistance, Fang adopted the sobriquet Tung-yang chün i-min (Loyal survivor of Tung-yang) to show his loyalty to the former dynasty. Fang's loyalism is basically cultural rather than racial in nature, as indicated by a liberal attitude towards non-Chinese peoples and their customs. In the preface to his brief work on foreign customs, he stated:

The customs of the foreigners are really not worthy of mention. But one should consider that they nevertheless are human beings. Those born in alien lands were [merely] ruined by their customs and practices, and although controlled by law, they cannot be transformed [by Chinese culture]. Yet among them there are some who like poetry and books and adhere to virtue and righteousness. They complete three years of mourning [for their parents] and there are no promiscuous and jealous women. Such cases lend support to the fact that the goodness of human nature does not differ between foreigners and Chinese...

Of the non-Chinese peoples, Fang was most impressed with the Japanese
and the Koreans because they adopted the Chinese written language and the Confucian Classics.

Wu Ssu-ch'i was a former Sung official who retired from political life after the demise of the dynasty.\(^7\) Thereafter he called himself Ch'uan-kuei-tzu 生歸子 (Master of total return), an indication of his determination to keep his virtue and loyalty intact. He was a direct descendant of the controversial philosopher-scholar Ch'en Liang 陳亮 (1143-1194) who spoke out bitterly against non-Chinese rule on Chinese territory and who has been regarded by modern scholars as a proto-nationalist.\(^7\) It is likely that Ch'en's antipathy towards alien peoples greatly influenced Wu's loyalism to the Sung.

With these new friends Hsieh shared his grief over the collapse of the Sung, and they perhaps eagerly listened to his accounts of the loyalist resistance in which they did not participate. Hsieh's loyalty first and foremost focussed on his devotion to Wen T'ien-hsiang. Hsieh is usually portrayed as an eccentric and solitary figure who wept alone for his former patron, but in Wu-chou, Hsieh was accompanied by his new friends. Hsieh is best known for engaging in a ritual mourning in order to bring Wen's soul back from the north. The incident took place in the Yen-tzu ling 嚴子陵 (the tomb of Yen Kuang 37B.C.-43A.D.)\(^8\) in T'ung-lu county 桃廬 (Yen-chou). After the event, Hsieh wrote the 西台痛哭記 (Record of weeping at the Western terrace), in which references to Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh's companions are oblique. In a commentary to the work, Huang Tsung-hsi rectified previous annotations and identified Hsieh's companions as Wu Ssu-ch'i (who travelled to T'ung-lu often), Yen Lü 顏侶 (fl. 1270-1300, [a native
of T'ung-lu and descendant of Yen Kuang]) and Feng Kuei-fang (fl. 1270-1300, [a native of Wu-chou?]). Because this essay has often been praised as attesting to Hsieh's loyal spirit, it is translated below in full:

At the beginning when [the chief minister Wen T'ien-hsiang] set up his military quarters [at Nan-chien], I first followed him to battle as a commoner. The next year [1277] I took leave of him at Mei-chou. In the following year the chief minister passed through [the place] that Chang [Hsün] and Yen Kao-ch'ing used to visit. Grief-striken words and heroic spirit were never lacking in his compositions, and the poems on Chang [Hsün] survive and provide material for study. To my death I will regret not seeing the chief minister for a last time, and now I can only recall the parting words. Each time I think about them, I would search in my dreams, or in the mountains, rivers, ponds and pavilions, clouds and forests. Where we parted I have paced back and forth looking forlorn but dared not weep aloud. Three years later [1282] I passed through P'ing-chiang where the chief minister had first set up his military quarters [in 1275]. There I looked over from the Fu-ch'ai terrace and cried for him. Four years later [1286] I wailed for him in the Yüeh terrace, and now five years after [1291] I weep in the Tzu-ling terrace.

At first on a certain day my three friends [Wu Ssu-ch'i, Yen Lü, and Feng Kuei-fang] and I had arranged to meet at Yvieh-chou and stay overnight. The afternoon rain did not cease. We bought a boat at the river [bank] and from it came ashore to visit the temple of Tzu-ling and to rest beside the temple. The monks' quarters were run down and dilapidated, and going inside was like entering a tomb. Upon returning [to the boat], with the boatmen we prepared some sacrificial vessels. Soon the rain stopped and we climbed the Western terrace. In a deserted pavilion corner we set up an altar and bowed, prostrated, and wept three times before rising and prostrating again. I then remembered the time in my youth when each time we passed through here I would always pay my respects at this temple. That was when I first came here while accompanying my late father. Now I am old, and the country and people have all been transformed. As if I had regained what I lost I looked to the east and repeatedly bowed and wailed. Clouds flowed from the southwest and created an air of mystery in the forest, as if they too wished to join in the grief. I then used a bamboo sceptre to beat on a rock, reciting a tune modelled on the songs of Ch'u: "At dawn the soul ascended, how extremely remote! At dusk it returned, the water in the pass is black! Transforming into a red bird...!" When the song finished, both the bamboo and rock were smashed to pieces.

We signed at each other, and then climbed the Eastern terrace. After stroking an old rock we returned to rest in the boat. The boatmen were at first startled by my weeping,
and said a patrol boat had just passed by. We then moved everything back into the boat, and took turns drinking wine and composing poems to express our feelings. In the early dusk, snow fell and the wind was cold, such that we could not stay out [in the river]. Thus we anchored and went ashore, staying overnight at [Yen Lü's] house. At night we again wrote poems to reminisce about the past. The next day the wind and snow were even fiercer. I took leave of Wu Ssu-ch'i at the river and with [Feng Kuei-fang] set off for home [by land]. We walked thirty li and again stayed overnight at Yeh-chou before arriving home.

Later [Wu Ssu-ch'i] sent me a letter saying that on the day we left, the wind and sails were hostile for a long while before settling down. When all was calm he suspected that spirits must have been protecting our return trip back. I sighed: Alas! Since the infantry soldiers of the state of Juan died over a thousand years ago, there had been no weeping in [those] lonely mountains. Whether it had truly been spirits assisting us cannot be known, but this journey has certainly been worthwhile and great. The fact that [Wu Ssu-ch'i] put his thoughts down to show his feelings is certainly grievous. I wanted to emulate the Grand Historian who wrote the events of the end of Han, such as the contending Ch'u and Ch'in states. Then if my contemporaries do not now know my mind, people of subsequent times will be sure to know from this record. Thus I have written the [Hsi-t'ai t'ung-k'u chi] and appended it to my writings on the end of the Han. Since my late father first climbed the terrace until now, it has been twenty-six years. My late father was named so and so, and his courtesy name was so and so. The year when I first climbed the terrace was 1265.

Hsieh Ao, Fang Feng, and Wu Ssu-ch'i also travelled to Hang-chou and Kuei-chi, always writing travel diaries to remind them of the pleasures they had experienced. Fang's student Sung Lien 宋濂 (1310-1381) wrote that hardly a month went by without these three friends embarking on some journey. To finance their travels, they evidently relied on patronage while in Hang-chou (Chou Mi?) and in Kuei-chi (Wang Ying-sun); in Wu-chou they were guests of Wu Wei 呉渭 (fl. 1270-1300), an affluent former Sung official. In addition, they taught students to supplement their income. Fang Feng in particular was known for his outstanding students such as the eminent Chin-hua scholars Huang Chin 黃溍 (1277-1357), Liu Kuan 柳冕 (1270-1357), and Sung Lien. Occasionally times were hard for
Hsieh, when he had to ship firewood to Hang-chou to subsist. Apart from the basic demands of making a living, Hsieh, Fang, and Wu formed poetry clubs (such as the Hsi-she  회社 and the Yüeh-ch'üan yin-she  月泉吟社) and gathered in the company of other "like-minded" poets. In 1286-87, as members of the Yüeh-ch'üan poetry club, they sponsored a poetry competition in order to encourage young amateur poets in Chekiang and nearby districts. Their patron, Wu Wei, provided the funds while Hsieh, Fang, and Wu Ssu-ch'i served as judges. The contest was declared open in the tenth month of 1286; three months later it closed and in a month and a half the winners were ranked. Altogether there were 2,735 entries, out of which 280 obtained honourable mentions. The competitors were required to write a poem on the theme of T'ao Ch'ien's series of poems entitled "Pleasures of farming in the spring". Wu Wei greatly admired the strong character of T'ao and his poetry, and might have chosen the contest title to make an oblique comparison of the present withdrawal of himself and the participants to the political seclusion of T'ao. It has also been suggested that the purpose of the competition was to compensate the young scholars and poets for the suspension of the civil service examinations since the fall of the Sung. It was believed that the competitors, mostly representatives of various poetry clubs in Hang-chou and Wu-chou, submitted entries anonymously or under pseudonyms because they feared political implications (as both the patron and the judges of the competition did not conceal their loyalty to the Sung).

The first sixty winning entries appearing with the judges' comments survive in a volume edited by Wu Wei. Distributed to them as prizes were this poetry volume, silk, brushes and ink, as well as
poems written to them by the judges. Of the winners who became known were Lien Wen-feng (fl. 1280-1300), Ch’üan Ch’üan-weng (Ch’üan Tsu-wang’s ancestor), Pai T’ing (1248-1328), and Ch’iu Yüan, who were respectively ranked first, ninth, eighteenth, and forty-fourth. At the time of the contest the competitors appeared to be Sung loyalist survivors who responded in that capacity. But although they at first had no intention of compromising their ideals and loyalty to the former dynasty, by the 1300s not a few including Pai T’ing and Ch’iu Yüan had taken up Yuan appointments as education officials.92 Fang Feng’s son became a chin-shih under the Yuan and most likely also took office.

Apart from being fellow compatriots, poetry associates, and travelling companions, Hsieh Ao and the Wu-chou loyalists practically became sworn brothers. They taught each other’s children and arranged marriages between them.93 They even made pledges to continue their friendship after death. In the 1280s it seems that Hsieh Ao and the others bought a plot of land near the Tzu-ling terrace where they mourned Wen T’ien-hsiang. The site was significant as indicated by its name, the Hsü-chien t’ing (the pavilion where the sword was promised [and the promise fulfilled even if the other party was dead]), and may have served as spiritual affirmation of their loyalty to the Sung.94 The plot was meant to be a cemetery for the group, and when Hsieh Ao died of tuberculosis in Hang-chou in 1295, he left instructions for his body and writings to be taken care of by Fang Feng from Wu-chou. It appears that Hsieh’s body was indeed transferred to the Hsü-chien pavilion in Yen-chou and buried there. Hsieh’s friends and students came from as far as Tung-kuan and Hang-chou to attend his funeral.95 They included Teng Wen-yüan
Du Wen Yuan (1258-1328), a native of Szechwan who had moved to Hang-chou and later served as a high official in the Yuan, as well as Fang Yu-hsüeh (fl. 1270-1300), a member of the loyalist group in Tung-kuan.

In Chiang-shan county in Wu-chou resided the four recluses of the Ch'ai family, Ch'ai Wang (1211-1280) and his three cousins, who returned home, barricaded their gates and refused to serve another dynasty after the Sung demise. None of the Ch'ai recluses appear to have associated with other loyalists, not even Fang Feng's group in Wu-chou. However, Ch'ai Wang was a former friend of Cheng Ssu-hsiao's father and may have continued a friendship with Ssu-hsiao. Ch'ai Wang was better known as a poet; out of several thousands of poems written, he selected about two hundred that he deemed worthy of transmission and humbly signed his name as the "Refugee subject of the Sung" to the work. A year after Ch'ai Wang's death, his son Hsi-chün (fl. 1270-1290), a former student of the National University, also disdained to serve the Yuan.

A notable Confucian scholar, Chin Lü-hsiang (1232-1303), also retired to Wu-chou and did not enter public office under the Yuan. When the Sung was about to collapse, he had submitted a plan to save the country from the external threat, but was ignored. Living under Yuan rule, he regarded himself as "A scholar employed by the former dynasty" and did not use the current reign titles to register his protest of the new order. Although he shared some students with Fang Feng, there is little evidence that he socialized with him or with the other loyalists in Wu-chou.

In Ch'un-an county (Yen-chou), west of T'ung-lu, lived another group of loyalists in retirement who apparently had no contact
with the Hsieh Ao/Fang Feng group. Fang Feng-ch'en (1221-1291), his younger brothers Feng-chen (chin-shih 1262) and Feng-chia (fl. 1270-1300), Ho Meng-kuei (chin-shih 1265), and Fang I-k'uei (fl. 1270-1300) were the leading figures in the group who refused to serve in the Yuan government and taught students for a living. Fang Feng-ch'en was a top chin-shih graduate in 1250 and had attained senior status in the Sung bureaucracy when he withdrew for over ten years to protest against Chia Ssu-tao's rise to power. After Chia fell into disgrace, he was appointed president of the Ministry of Rites (2B) but declined because of the objection raised by his sick father. Feng-chen and Feng-chia had also been Sung officials who firmly declined recommendations to office. Feng-chen called himself Shan-fang i-min (loyalist survivor of the mountain hut). Ho Meng-kuei was also a high-ranking official who had deserted the Sung court during its collapse. In 1286-87 he was recommended for office by Ch'eng Chü-fu, but declined pleading illness. Both he and a fellow countryman Fang I-k'uei were closely associated with the Fang brothers.

This group of former Sung officials also socialized with northerners and foreigners who held office in the Yuan, such as Hsien-yü Shu (1248-1301) and the sinicized Jurchen Chia-ku Chih-ch'i (d. 1283). Hsien-yü was an accomplished calligrapher; Chia-ku was a scholar and friend of Chang Hung-fan (the Yuan general who defeated the loyalists at Yai-shan), and had participated directly in the conquest of the Sung. Chia-ku and Hsien-yü may well have recommended the Fang brothers and Ho to office, an offer repeatedly declined. Their children, however, did not reject appointments to office. Having never served under the Sung, all three
sons of Fang-ch'en, one of Feng-chen, and the two sons of Ho Meng-kuei later took up positions as education officials.102

V. The Lu-ling Loyalists at Wen T'ien-hsiang's Place of Birth

Wen T'ien-hsiang's personal retinue during the resistance was characterized by a large number of fellow countrymen and personal contacts. Not all of Wen's followers died as martyrs just before or after Wen's own martyrdom. Hsieh Ao, a native of Fukien, had escaped during the Yai-shan battle and subsequently mourned Wen with loyalist groups in Kuei-chi, Hang-chou, and Wu-chou. Among the natives of Lu-ling who survived and returned home were Wang Yen-wu, Chang I-fu 張毅文 (fl. 1270-1290), and Teng Kuang-chien. In Lu-ling they shared their experiences in the north with a former official, eminent scholar and poet, Liu Ch'en-weng.

Wang Yen-wu had originally followed Wen T'ien-hsiang in 1275, but the next year he resigned to mourn his deceased father and look after his sick mother. In addition to the essay urging Wen to commit suicide in 1279, Wang wrote another short elegy praising Wen's loyalty and upright spirit after the latter died in 1283.103 On the strength of these two pieces he is traditionally commended for his loyal commitment. Wang, however, felt his filial obligations to be more compelling: the many funerary addresses to his parents attest to it.104 After Wen's death, Wang lived another thirty years during which his loyalty to the Sung underwent a definite transformation. Like his friend who helped him distribute the essay urging Wen to die, he did not take up public employment under the Yuan. He, however, associated with Yuan officials and even wrote literary pieces for them. He congratulated his son's brother-in-law on obtaining a
position as instructor in a prefecture. Chao Wen 趙文 (1239-1315), a native of Lu-ling, had also followed Wen in the loyalist resistance but later served the Yüan. Wang's relationship with this fellow countryman, however, remained very close.

Chang I-fu, a native of Lu-ling, had voluntarily accompanied Wen T'ien-hsiang to the Yüan capital in 1279. For the next three years until Wen's execution, Chang looked after him and prepared his food, a service for which Wen was extremely grateful. After Wen's execution, it is said that Chang hid Wen's head, collected his nails and hair, and returned them to Lu-ling for burial. He also took with him Wen's writings, and no doubt related Wen's last days to sympathetic loyalists in Lu-ling.

Teng Kuang-chien had been rescued from the sea in 1279 and subsequently forced to go to Ta-tu with Wen. Wen was greatly impressed with Teng and on the journey wrote many poems to him as well as a preface to his poetry collections. Upon arrival in Ta-tu Teng seems to have communicated with Wang Yüan-liang, sharing lamentations about the collapse of the Sung. While in the north, Teng made lasting friendships with former Sung officials and northerners in Mongol service. It was at that time that he may have befriended Ch'eng Chü-fu, whom he saw again in 1289. While in the north Teng's primary student was Chang Hung-fan's son Kuei 張珪 (1264-1327), who was already a prominent Mongol general at the age of sixteen and who later rose to high ranks in the Yüan bureaucracy. In subsequent years Chang Kuei memorialized to allow the Sung imperial family to retain its tax-exempt status; undoubtedly this friendly attitude had been influenced by Teng. After
several years of service in the home of Chang Hung-fan, Teng was released in 1281 and returned to Lu-ling, where he wrote Wen's biography, the biographies of Wen's followers who were killed or committed suicide, and the record of the loyalist court based on the diary that Lu Hsiu-fu had entrusted to him. Altogether Teng was away from his native prefecture for two decades, but soon renewed relationships with old friends such as Liu Ch'en-weng and Chao Wen.

It was Liu Ch'en-weng who appears to have been most intimate with Teng Kuang-chien upon his return to Lu-ling. Liu and Teng, together with Wen T'ien-hsiang, had been former students of Chiang Wan-li and Ou-yang Shou-tao 欧陽守道 (b. 1209). Liu was a child prodigy and gained first place in the chin-shih examination. After fifteen years of service and only one month at the central court, Liu's career ended as professor of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (4A). He did not participate in loyalist resistance, but after the fall of the dynasty did not serve in the Yuan. At the time of the surrender of Hang-chou and the captivity of the imperial family in March 1276, Liu had already returned to Lu-ling. In a tz'u entitled Ping-tzu sung-ch'un 雨子送春 (Farewell, spring of 1276), he expressed his grief over the demise of the Sung and equated the passing of spring to the forced departure of the imperial family to the Yuan capital:

Farewell, spring!
Spring gone—no road left in the world.
Beyond the swings, the fragrance of the grass reaches up to the sky.
Who will despatch the sand in the wind over to the southern banks?
Reluctantly, with deep melancholy,
It randomly reminisces about the catkins at the ocean gates.
The wild crows flew past,
The dipper has changed position and the town is deserted.
No longer can be seen the source from which it arrived at the beginning of the new year.

Spring gone—who is the most piteous?
The messenger geese are silent, the pigeons have no master.
The cuckoo sounds echo at the Long Gate in the dusk. 
Recalling the jade trees in the fallow soil,  
Tears fall as dew.  
In Hsien-yang the guest is sent off but several times looked back—  
The horizon cannot be crossed.  

Spring gone—will it return?  

******  
I sigh at the spirits visiting the former country,  
Even flowers remember the former age.  
Life wanders and falls aimlessly,  
Turning to the children, we talk through the night.  

Despite the sad and desolate sentiments expressed in the poem, there is a glimmer of hope as Liu reminds himself that spring always returns; moreover, he comforts himself with the thought that his family is still intact. At that time and the years after, he considered himself a t'un-min (fleeing refugee) of Lu-ling. Although he was not an active loyalist, he greatly admired loyalist acts and wrote encomia for loyalist figures such as Chiang Wan-li, Wen T'ien-hsiang and less known personages. During these years Liu's eldest son, Chiang-sun (b. 1257), shared with him the grief over the collapse of the country and associated with his loyalist friends.

As Liu Ch'en-weng realized that the Mongol Yuan was due to stay for a long time, his loyalty changed in intensity and form in the following years. His sorrow for the former Sung was assuaged by the reunification of China effected by the Mongol conquest:

Under the empire carts and books [once again] travel between the north and south.  
The pedestrians in big crowds pass through the palaces of Pien-liang.

In the 1290s Liu wrote funerary inscriptions for Yuan officials, who included both Chinese and foreigners. He also conveyed best wishes to his many friends departing for the Yuan capital, presumably in order to seek positions in the Yuan bureaucracy. In addition Liu
accepted non-Chinese students, among whom Hsüeh Ang-fu (fl. 1280-1300), an Uighur, acquired a solid reputation as a poet. Liu's son, Chiang-sun, showed even more strongly ambivalent feelings about the former Sung. In the 1290s he obtained a temporary post as instructor in a prefecture, but a decade later at the age of fifty he was still writing to Yüan officials, hoping to acquire a position in the Yüan government. He was extremely frustrated by the lack of political opportunities for scholars and blamed the suspension of the examination system after the fall of the Sung:

For twenty years there have been no chin-shih examinations

If the [Sung] had not collapsed, it would not have been thus!  

In 1288 the loyalists in Lu-ling were joined by a visitor from Ta-tu. This was Wang Yüan-liang, who was probably introduced to them by Teng Kuang-chien. After reading Wang's poetry relating to the fate of the imperial family and other issues, they wrote prefaces to it.

VI. Wang Ying-lin and the Loyalists in Ch'ing-yüan

Only days before the collapse of Hang-chou in February 1276, the loyalist general Chang Shih-chieh took his remnant forces to Ch'ing-yüan, hoping to muster support to resist the Mongols. On his arrival, the local administrators Yüan Hung (1248-1298), Hsieh Ch'ang-yüan (fl. 1260-1300), and Chao Meng-ch'uan (fl. 1260-1300) betrayed the loyalist Yüan Yung (d. 1276) and surrendered to the Yüan generals. In the next year there was another loyalist uprising, but it was quickly quelled by the Mongol occupation forces. Wang Ying-lin, a native of Ch'ing-yüan and former
high-ranking Sung official and erudite scholar, praised the loyalty of Yuan Yung, who perished along with seventeen members of his family. The tradition of active resistance was, however, not characteristic of the loyal survivors who gathered together in Ch'ing-yüan after the collapse of the Sung. Their loyalty to the former dynasty was a type of lingering nostalgia for the past, and its essence and intensity varied from passive protest to some degree of accommodation. In addition to Wang Ying-lin, the other personages were his son Ch'ang-shih (1267-1327), Hu San-hsing, Shu Yüeh-hsiang, Liu Chuang-sun 劉莊孫 (1234-1302), Ch'en Yün-p'ing 邱元平 (fl. 1260-1300), Huang Chen 黃震 (1213-1280), and Ch'en Chu 陳著 (1214-1297), among others.

This group, natives of Ch'ing-yüan or nearby T'ai-chou, appears to have first met in 1276-79 at the residence of Yuan Hung, who had surrendered to the Mongols. Ch'ing-yüan was then overrun by loyalist uprisings as well as by local bandits from which these scholars and former Sung officials sought refuge. During this period they may have together mourned the demise of the Sung and at the same time shared their scholarly interests in the Classics, history, and geography. Upon return to their respective homes, these friends seem to have continued their relationship and participated in regular gatherings of poetry composition and discussions. Certainly as late as 1294 Wang Ying-lin was still hosting a poetry society, the guests being Ch'en Yün-p'ing, Shu Yüeh-hsiang, and Liu Chuang-sun.

Wang Ying-lin was descended from a family of distinguished political and scholarly men. His political career had spanned over thirty years by the fall of the Sung, but it suffered several
setbacks due to his criticism of Chia Ssu-tao. In 1275 Wang was the chief drafter of imperial decrees, appointment notices, and posthumous awards to officials (some of whom turned out to be ardent loyalists and others defectors). Derogatory terms such as "pigs, swine, snakes, ugly caitiffs" in reference to the Mongols were used in these official writings, reflecting both the official and Wang's own feelings about the Mongol threat. Apart from drafting these documents, Wang criticized Liu Meng-yen and what he considered "mild" punishments for Chia Ssu-tao and the others implicated; he did not offer any constructive proposals to remedy the external or internal situation. At the end of the year, only months before the surrender of Hang-chou, Wang fled to his native home and did not return even when summoned. For this irresponsible behaviour he was criticized by Ming scholars; his defence came from Ch'üan Tsu-wang of the Ch'ing, who argued that Wang was not a military official, and since his counsel was not heeded by the court, his departure should be regarded simply as a resignation. Wang may have left the court for another reason other than fear of chaos created in the event of the capital's collapse: his younger brother, Ying-feng (1230-1275), had just died and perhaps he had to return home to look after family affairs.

Upon his return to Ch'ing-yüan, Wang devoted the last two decades of his life to scholarship and teaching. He added dozens of titles to his previous writings on the Confucian Classics, geography, history, education, and poetry. Among his students were his son Ch'ang-shih, Hu San-hsing, Shih Meng-ch'ing (1247-1306), Tai Piao-yüan, and Yüan Chüeh (son of Yüan Hung). In the 1290s among Wang's students was also a Mongol, Po Hang (1251-1311), whose
surname was Yü-lü po-li 玉魯伯里 (Urlugbayli?). By that time Wang was writing inscriptions and essays on behalf of Yuan officials. It thus appears that as a former high-ranking official of the Sung, Wang had compromised his loyalty. Indeed it was alleged by Ming scholars that he took a position under the Yuan as a school director. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, however, claimed that Wang did not actually serve and even if he did, the position of school director would not be appointed from the Yuan throne and thus should not be regarded as a sacrifice of Wang's integrity. In 1295 Wang's student Yüan Chüeh reluctantly accepted a Yuan appointment, and in 1302 Tai Piao-yüan served. Wang's son Ch'ang-shih did not hold office, but his grandson Hou-sun 厚孫 (1301-1367) did.

Wang's sudden departure from the Sung court at a critical time, the indiscriminate range of associates and students he kept, and the fact that he had accepted office under the Yuan (assuming he did), may have made Wang himself unsure whether he had been disloyal to the Sung. Some doubt about fulfilling his political obligations indeed shows in the humble and uncertain tone of his funerary inscription, his final self-appraisal:

**Self-obituary of the I-min of Chün-i**

Wang is my surname; Ying-lin my name; and Po-hou my courtesy name. My ancestors were men of Chün-i [i.e., Kaifeng], and had lived in Yin 印 [county in Ch'ing-yüan] since my great-grandfather. I-min 我氏 refers to my not forgetting the past....In my studies my late father was my teacher; my younger brother [Ying-feng] was my friend....At nineteen [sui] I became a chin-shih graduate of the second class—that was in [1241]. At thirty-four I passed the po-hsüeh hung-tz'u examination—that was in [1256]. My first appointments were...[lists over twenty positions ending at]...president of the Ministry of Rites...and president of the Ministry of Personnel....I then begged to resign and dwell among the fields—that was in [1275]....My nature was diligent and I had few desires; I was direct and not sociable. I was not used to conforming with current practices. At court I was reserved and assiduous; at home I was simple and thrifty. When administering local
districts, I was honest and benevolent to the people. Such conduct was in accordance with my family's instructions. I drafted altogether forty-five chüan of imperial documents. My talents are limited and my compositions do not reach [the standards of] the ancients. I indulged in learning and even when old did not get weary of it. I have written [fourteen titles]...but they are not worthy of transmission.

I am writing my own funerary inscription....In my life I call myself a recluse, and dead, I address my burial place as "the grave of the former chin-shih Mr. Wang"....The epitaph reads:

In studying antiquity I may have been impractical,
My ambitions consistent but foolish.
In office or in retirement
It was as if [all] was restrained or planned.
If I am not worthy of being called a veteran surviving official [of the Sung],
Perhaps I have succeeded in guarding my moral character.
When I return to my ancestors,
Can I [face them] without trepidation?134

Despite this doubt in his mind, to the end of his life Wang still regarded himself as a man of the Sung. His loyalism was not characterized by active resistance, and his distress at the Sung demise was alleviated by his conviction that civilization and culture would in the end transcend alien rule. He thus compared the Yüan regime with the short-lived Ch'in:

Scholars were not debased by the Ch'in dynasty....the Classics were not destroyed by the Ch'in dynasty....[Chinese] customs and practices were not corrupted by the Ch'in dynasty.135

Among Wang's students, Hu San-hsing, a native of T'ien-t'ai, shared with him a great passion for studies in historical geography. Hu was a successful chin-shih graduate in the 1256 examination that Wang presided at, when the two may have first met. Shortly after, Hu entered the service of the Huai general Li T'ing-chih with his fellow graduate Lu Hsiu-fu.136 While in the Huai, Hu undertook an ambitious project to annotate place names and events in Ssu-ma Kuang's Tzu-chih t'ung-chien. In 1270 Hu left the Huai for Hang-chou where he was hired as family tutor by Chia Ssu-tao's publisher friend Liao
Ying-chung, who promised to obtain Chia's support to print Hu's work. In 1275 Hu seems to have joined Chia's military campaigns; after Chia's defeat he returned home to T'ien-t'ai, where he lost the entire manuscript in the chaotic years of war. He then bought another copy of the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien and recommenced the annotations, completing the entire project by 1285. Part of the work was apparently done when he was a guest in Yuan Hung's house in 1276-79, where Wang Ying-lin and other former Sung officials were also seeking refuge. He also concealed the finished manuscript in Yuan Hung's home, where it survived the disturbances caused by local bandits in 1289. Although Yuan Hung was a defector and Yuan official, Hu accepted his patronage and taught his son, Chueh. His loyalty to the Sung was, however, intense, as evident in his annotations on events of Chinese history. He referred to the Sung as "our dynasty" and the "present dynasty" rather than the "former Sung"; he strongly condemned barbarian rule and disloyal men, while praising the loyal acts of historical figures. In discussing the fall of the Latter Tsin, he conveyed his distressing experience during the collapse of the Sung:

Regarding the country's demise, those speaking about it are already deeply grieved. How much more so is [the grief] for those witnessing [the demise]?

Hu's loyal feelings towards the Sung did not permit him to serve in the Yuan, although he did compromise and continue his relationship with Yuan Hung and other Yuan officials. His son Yu-wen also did not take office under the Yuan, but his grandson could not resist the allurement of office. For the rest of his life Hu did not socialize much; among his few friends were Ch'en Chu, a fellow graduate of 1256 and native of Ch'ing-yüan, who became
Yu-wen's father-in-law. Ch'en Chu seems to have maintained close relations with other fellow graduates including Shu Yüeh-hsiang and Huang Chen, whose grandson married his daughter. Among his last compositions was a funerary address to mourn his friend and examiner Wang Ying-lin, which he wrote in 1296. He died the following year. Like Wang, Ch'en avoided taking office under the Yuan despite his extreme poverty. This decision was more easily reached and adhered to because he was already in his sixties when the Sung collapsed and he did not expect to live much longer. His unwillingness to serve was related to his having been a Sung official; in addition, it seems that his wife was a descendant of the Sung imperial family. After the collapse of the Sung he associated freely with Buddhist and Taoist monks, from whom he accepted gifts of medicine and tea. He also did not use Yuan reign titles until the 1290s, and called himself a former veteran official of Ssu-ming 四明 or Sung-hsi 松溪遺老. Despite his loyalty to the Sung, he remained on good terms with his former friends, Yuan Hung and Chao Meng-ch'uan, who had surrendered to the Mongols and subsequently served under them. He became more accommodating towards the Yuan administration and Yuan officials, and wrote commemorative essays on their behalf. His sons later took up positions as education officials with his approval, perhaps through recommendations from these politically influential friends.

A fellow graduate and companion of Ch'en Chu was Shu Yüeh-hsiang, a native of T'ai-chou, who died a year after Ch'en Chu. Shu was an official in Hang-chou; after its collapse, he returned home where he witnessed the atrocities perpetrated in the Mongol conquest, such as scholars and women being taken captive and driven north en masse with
Apart from the Mongol armies, he also blamed local bandits for extensive destruction and unrest in the late 1280s. In spite of his own impoverishment as a result of the change of dynasties, he felt compassion for the genuinely poverty-striken masses. Though he had to sell family possessions and pawn clothes in exchange for food, he considered himself fortunate in view of others worse off than himself who had to sell their sons and daughters. After the collapse of the Sung, Shu's constant companion was a fellow countryman, Liu Chuang-sun, who sought refuge with him and accompanied him to poetry gatherings with Wang Ying-lin. Neither he nor Shu served in the Yuan despite their poverty, but their friends included many Yuan officials and former Sung officials who reemerged into public office. Shu and Liu both taught students privately in order to eke out a meagre living, but Shu also accepted financial support from Hsieh Ch'ang-yuan, one of the defectors of Ch'ing-yuan in 1276. Perhaps Shu could thus afford to travel occasionally to Hang-chou to renew old friendships and meet new acquaintances.

Shu's loyalty to the Sung thus reflected a certain degree of accommodation, although he did not in the end take up office under the Yuan. His fellow graduate and close friend, Huang Chen, a native of Ch'ing-yuan, was less compromising in his attitude towards the Yuan. Considered an eminent Confucian scholar together with Wang Ying-lin, Huang was a Sung official for seventeen years, during which he was often an advocate for the lower strata of society. In 1275 he became ill and obtained permission to resign his post and return home. After the collapse of the Sung, he felt that as a former Sung official he was obliged to seclude himself from the world. His
friends, Shu Yüeh-hsiang and Ch'en Chu, did not get any news of him for several years and worried about him. It is said that he swore never to enter the city; a year after the defeat of loyalist resistance, he died in dire poverty.

Ch'en Yun-p'ing was the most outstanding poet in Wang Ying-lin's loyalist group. In the 1260s he had already gained a reputation in poetry circles in Hang-chou. But unlike his poet friends, Ch'en played an active role in the loyalist resistance through his connection with the loyalist martyr Su Liu-i. Later, he was suspected and arrested by the Yuan authorities of participating in anti-Mongol activities, but was released through the influence of Yuan Hung. In the 1290s he was recommended to office but declined the appointment upon arrival at the Yuan capital.

VII. Ma T'ing-luan and Loyalists in Jao-chou and Wu-yuan

The Ch'ing-yuan loyalist survivors were at least in their fifties by the end of the Sung, and they died before 1300 without serving in the Yuan. Likewise, Ma T'ing-luan and veteran officials were already old when the dynasty collapsed. Most of them spent the last ten or so years of their life occupying themselves with assiduous scholarship, "writing ten thousand words a day". After the demise of the Sung, Ma and his family returned to their home in Jao-chou, which was also the native prefecture of the great loyalist martyr, Hsieh Fang-te. Ma T'ing-luan came from a distinguished but impoverished scholar-official family. After gaining his chin-shih degree in 1246, Ma steadily advanced to chief minister by 1269. After repeated attempts to retire on account of illness he was granted a pension and a sinecure at his home prefecture in 1273.
the Sung affected his illness adversely, but he still wrote extensively on the Confucian Classics and institutional history. Among his closest friends during this period were Chou Mi, with whom he exchanged correspondence and poems, and Fei Chieh-t'ang, a native of Szechwan who seems to have settled in Jao-chou. Later, Fei's son married the former's daughter. As a veteran official, Ma may have felt some guilt for not being with the Sung court in its last years; he writes of his longing for his sovereign and his "unpaid debt"—death—as expected of loyal subjects. Thus when Ma was summoned to the Yuan capital in 1278 presumably to be granted a post, he did not accept. While reading the poetry collection of Wang Yüan-liang, twelve years after the events Ma was still painfully reminded of his grief over the demise of the Sung and the fate of the imperial family:

Since I parted with [Wang] Yüan-liang in [Hang-chou] it has already been over ten years. One day he came to Lo-p'ing to see me. I was bedridden with illness and although I forced myself to get up to welcome him, I could not. My family led Yüan-liang to the bed. Seeing each other and talking, it was as if we had been separated for a lifetime. Restless, I had deep thoughts. Yüan-liang showed me his Hu-shan manuscript and requested me to write a preface to it. Browsing through the volume and reading about 1275 I started to perspire; coming to [the events of 1276] my tears poured out. Then reading the ten stanzas of the "Drunken song" I held on to the mat and wept uncontrollably, and lost sense of what it said. My family led Yüan-liang out. I had a relapse and could not utter one word for Yüan-liang. I thus describe his [poetry] collection as "poetic history"...

To the end of his life Ma refused to use Yüan reign titles. In prefaces and funerary inscriptions, Ma marked the dates by referring to the cyclical years, his own age, and historical events.

Ma T'ing-luan's collected writings were compiled by his son, Tuan-lin, who is better known as an historian and historiographer. Tuan-lin had passed the subprefectural
examinations and taken office, but in 1273 he resigned to look after his sick father. The next year he was dissuaded by his mother from sitting for the chin-shih examination due to family responsibilities. In Jao-chou he did not socialize much with either his own or his father's friends, but for the next twenty or thirty years he devoted himself to study T'ing-luan's rich historical documents and utilize his intimate knowledge and experience of government and court affairs to write an institutional history extending from the remote past to the beginning of the Southern Sung. It has been noted that Ma Tuan-lin intended his work, the Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao (published in 1319), to be used as a guide to future government with its concealed criticisms of both the Sung and Yuan dynastic systems. He quotes his father's works and opinions so frequently that the final product reflects to a great extent T'ing-luan's own attitudes. While his father was alive, Tuan-lin seems to have felt obliged to follow his example of not serving another dynasty. Towards 1300, however, after the completion of his work, the passage of time made it easier for him to accept an appointment with the Yuan first as a school director, then as an instructor in a prefecture. His teacher, Ts'ao Ching (1234-1315), also served as an education official to supplement his income.

Both Ts'ao Ching and Ma Tuan-lin's mother were natives of the nearby subprefecture of Wu-yuan (Hui-chou). Ts'ao's close friend and fellow countryman was Hu Tz'u-yen (1229-1306), who passed the chin-shih examination in 1268 (the same year as the loyalist martyr Ch'en Wen-lung who graduated at the top of the list). Hu had been a prefect of Kuei-ch'ih in 1275;
when the general defending the district surrendered he fled home with his mother. For the rest of his life he taught private students for a living and repeatedly declined appointments to public office. He, however, maintained close relations with his former friends Ts'ao Ching and Ch'en Li (1252-1334), as well as with Fang Hui. Ts'ao and Fang took up employment in the Yüan. However, Hu refused to serve another ruler and explained his decision in two long poems, in which a middle-aged widow is unsuccessfully persuaded to remarry. Hu's position in regard to serving the Yüan is obvious through the widow's reply, in which gratitude is expressed for the matchmaker's good intentions, but since the widow had married in middle age despite her lack of looks and talent (Hu first served the Sung in his middle age), she could not forsake her deceased husband after his death. In adhering to this stand, Hu was looking at the example of Hsieh Fang-te, whom he admired greatly but did not know personally.

Ch'eng Ch'u-weng (d. 1289) was a poet and countryman of Hu Tz'u-yen. After surviving the loyalist resistance, he travelled through south China, visiting Ma T'ing-luan, Liu Ch'en-weng, and Hsieh Fang-te, who wrote prefaces to his poetry. When Hsieh was taken captive to the north in 1289, Ch'eng voluntarily followed him and died on the journey. Another Wu-yüan native and former friend of Hsieh Fang-te was Hsü Yüeh-ch'ing (1216-1285), who had been a Sung official. After the collapse of the dynasty, Hsü cut himself off from the world and did not speak for three years. When he recovered his speech, he was so grief-striken that he became deranged and died several years later.
VIII. The Painters in P'ing-chiang: Cheng Ssu-hsiao and Kung K'ai

P'ing-chiang, one of the last prefectures to collapse before Hang-chou surrendered, did not play a role during the ensuing loyalist resistance, nor was it the centre of loyalist gatherings during the first generation of Yuan rule. However, in P'ing-chiang lived two eminent loyalist artists who apparently did not associate with each other. Cheng Ssu-hsiao was a native of Lien-chiang (Fukien) who had accompanied his father, Chen (d. 1262), to P'ing-chiang on an official appointment. Although the family subsequently settled there, Cheng continued to correspond with his old friends in Fukien, among whom were some imperial relatives. In 1275 Cheng was a National University student who petitioned the throne to increase defence measures, but he soon returned to P'ing-chiang to look after his ailing mother, who died the next year. As the only son, he felt compelled to go into mourning for the full period and, therefore, to his great regret, he did not participate in the loyalist resistance. He never married and produced no heir, a situation which compounded his guilt and regret.

As a result of his profound sense of guilt, Cheng completely withdrew from political and social life; even when walking with others and talking to people, his solitude was total. His eccentric character, reflecting his extreme attachment to the Sung, was known to his younger contemporaries in the Yuan. He did not face north, but covered his ears at the sound of foreign speech and wailed in the wilderness on special occasions to express his grief about the demise of the dynasty. His original name is not known because he adopted names and styles that conveyed his longing for the Sung (for example Ssu-hsiao means "to pine for the Sung house"). Cheng
was a Confucian scholar, geomancer, poet, and essayist, but after the Sung collapsed, he rejected appointments even as a private tutor. According to contemporary accounts about him, his loyalty featured a singular devotion to the former dynasty: "Not knowing today's day and month, I dream only of the mountains and rivers of the Sung" and "In this life apart from ruler and father, I have not received any benefit from another source".

Cheng's paintings reflect most sensitively his attitude towards the Sung: his favourite subjects were bamboo and orchid, both symbols of purity and integrity. Later accounts of Cheng describe his ink paintings of orchids as symbolic of his intense hatred of alien rule. It is said that orchids appeared stemless and rootless in his work, and when questioned about this peculiarity, Cheng impatiently explained that he wished to stress the point that Chinese territory no longer belonged to the Chinese. He was a generous man who gave away property and paintings to others, but when approached by prominent men for his work, refused adamantly.

However, it is in the Hsin-shih that Cheng's loyalism is most outspoken and full of racial and ethnic prejudices. The Mongols are compared to swine, dogs, and other lowly animals. References to Mongol customs and history are vastly inaccurate, attesting to the fact that Cheng had no personal contact with foreigners and wrote down only the general misconceptions circulating at the time. In an essay on legitimate succession in Chinese history, non-Chinese rule is denounced as against tradition and nature:

The rule of legitimate succession came from the sages...If a subject conducts himself as ruler, and the barbarians conduct the affairs of the Middle Kingdom--of the inauspicious occurrences of the past and the present, none is comparable to that! For barbarians to rule the Middle Kingdom--that is not the fortune of the barbarians. [The situation] can be compared to cattle and horses, which once
they understood human language, clothed their fur and tails, and dressed their four hoofs. If a three-feet child saw them, he would only consider them evil manifestations of cattle and horses, and would not dare call them human beings....

Cheng further declared that mere possession of the Middle Kingdom through military conquest did not mean legitimate succession to the Middle Kingdom.

In sum, Cheng's response to the Mongol conquest and the essence of his loyalty to the Sung was total seclusion. As indicated in his autobiographical essay, the only way he could look at the present state of the world was in total seclusion and forgetfulness. It appears that he sought consolation in Buddhism and Taoism, but at the end of his life was equally disillusioned with them, as well as with Confucian studies, to which he had been devoted in his early years. He called himself San-chiao yeh-jen (Outsider of the three teachings). For the rest of his life he did not stop blaming himself for neglecting his filial and loyal obligations; at his death, he left instructions that his epitaph should read "Cheng so-and-so, the disloyal and unfilial person of the Great Sung".

Despite the mutual interest in painting, Cheng does not appear to have known Kung K'ai, a writer, calligrapher, and painter of some renown. Kung was personally acquainted with the loyalist personalities of the resistance such as Lu Hsiu-fu, with whom he had served in Li T'ing-chih's staff. When the Sung collapsed, Kung was in Szechwan but soon returned to Hang-chou where he spent some years in the loyalist circles of Chou Mi and Teng Mu; he also searched for eyewitness accounts and records of the loyalist resistance. By 1292 he appears to have settled in P'ing-chiang, where he wrote the biographies of Lu Hsiu-fu and Wen T'ien-hsiang, and painted landscape
and horses. Like his other friends, Kung was destitute and sold paintings and essays to support his family. His loyalty is best expressed in his horse paintings: the portrayal of the emaciated horse glancing ahead in a dignified posture symbolizes well his own spirit of protest and resistance to the new dynasty despite his poverty. Kung K'ai is also noted for writing encomia with a preface on Sung Chiang and the thirty-five bandits of the Water Margin, who were active in the early Southern Sung. By focussing attention on these bandits Kung K'ai apparently recognized their potential power, which, in his opinion, might have been harnessed by the Sung government to strengthen its defence against usurpers and foreign invaders. Kung K'ai avoided official employment under the Yuan, but continued friendships with people who surrendered and subsequently served in the government, such as Fang Hui, to whom he gave one of his paintings.

IX. Chao Pi-hsiang and the Loyalist Circle in Tung-kuan

During the loyalist resistance in the southeastern provinces, at least two branches of the imperial Sung family migrated to the south. In Tung-kuan, one family of imperial relatives and at least three locally based lineages formed a loyalist circle in the first generation of Yuan rule. The key personality was Chao Pi-hsiang 趙必琅 (1241-1291), who associated in poetry gatherings and excursions with an inner group of eight others, from a circle of thirty to fifty loyalist survivors. Chao's family, descendants of the son of the first Sung emperor, had originally been transferred to Fukien; after three generations there, the clan had moved to Tung-kuan where it became established gentry. In 1265 Chao Pi-hsiang
and his father both passed the chin-shih examination, and after serving for a period, returned to Tung-kuan. When the loyalist court moved to the south, Chao Pi-hsiang approached Wen T'ien-hsiang's brother Pi to offer his support, but shortly after, left on account of family responsibilities. Before resigning Chao persuaded the local ruffian leader, Hsiung Fei, to respond to the Sung banner and raise an army for its cause. After his father died in 1278, Chao went to see Wen T'ien-hsiang in Hui-chou and the two became instant friends and composed poetry to each other's rhymes. Upon final defeat of the loyalist forces, Chao, as an imperial relative, was offered an appointment in the Ylian government but he declined and returned home. He would lament the demise of the Sung at the sites of the resistance battles and prostrate and wail in the direction of Yai-shan. He also drew a portrait of Wen T'ien-hsiang, to which he bowed morning and night. It is said that for the rest of his life he gathered only in the company of other loyalists and imperial relatives; relationships within the group were cemented by marriage and teacher-disciple arrangements. Of the imperial relatives who became part of Chao Pi-hsiang's circle, Chao Tung-shan 趙東山 (fl. 1270-1300) and Chao Shih-ch'ing 趙時清 (fl. 1270-1300) were the closest. After the Sung collapsed, Tung-shan covered his ears when others talked about the Yüan dynasty and Shih-ch'ing became a virtual recluse. Pi-hsiang's sons were also part of the loyalist circle, and in spite of their poverty, they did not take up employment under the Yüan.

One of the families with which Chao had relations was that of Li Yung and his two sons, Ch'un-sou 史叟 and Te-ming 德明 (both fl. 1270-1290). Li Yung was a recluse whose son-in-law, the local loyalist personality Hsiung Fei, had been sent by him to support
the Sung. Li Yung himself eventually went to Japan to teach the
Confucian Classics, never returning to the Chinese mainland after the
Mongol conquest. Complying with his last wishes, he was buried in
Chiao-chih rather than in subjugated Sung territory. While Li Yung
never served the Sung, his sons were former Sung officials. When the
Mongol troops entered Tung-kuan, Ch'un-sou is said to have pleaded
with the Yu'an generals not to destroy the town and massacre the
people; when offered the administration of the district as his
reward, he firmly declined. Thereafter the two brothers did not take
up employment, but taught students to make a living.

One of Li Ch'un-sou's students was Ch'en Keng 陳庚 (fl. 1270-1290), who with his father, I-hsin 益新 (d. 1289), and
brother associated closely with Chao Pi-hsiang's loyalist
circle.189 His son, in fact, married Chao Pi-hsiang's daughter.
Chang Heng 張衡 (fl. 1270-1300) was also a core member of the
loyalist gatherings.190 His elder brother, Yüan-chi 張元吉
(fl. 1270-1290), played a compromising role with the Mongols. In 1278
Yüan-chi went with Li Ch'un-sou to dissuade the Mongol army from
destroying the town, but whereas Ch'un-sou refused an office, the
former agreed to take over the administration of Tung-kuan as his
reward.191 Both Heng and another brother did not serve the Yu'an,
and their children intermarried with Chao Pi-hsiang's family.

Apart from these families, there were other individuals in the
group who expressed some protest to the Mongol conquest. One local
magnate advised the loyalists in his district not to overburden the
common people, and himself donated money to help the loyalist
cause.192 Another cried until he fell ill and died soon after the
Sung demise, having forbidden his children and grandsons to serve the
Yüan. During the resistance, a clan relative of Wen T'ien-hsiang advised Wen Pi to rebuild walls and garrisons to prepare for the Mongol advance, and when Pi surrendered, upbraided Pi for shaming the Wen family. He then took his sons to settle in the eastern part of the district and vowed never to go into the city. He grew vegetables to make a living. There was also one Fang Yu-hsüeh, a former Sung official whose wife was a descendant of the Sung imperial family. Fang and his three brothers did not accept appointments under the Yüan, and apart from being active in Tung-kuan, maintained friendship with loyalist personalities in other regions such as Hsieh Ao and Fang Feng in Wu-chou.

Like other loyalist circles discussed earlier in the chapter, the loyalism of the Tung-kuan men varied in intensity and character with each individual, entailing a certain degree of accommodation in addition to resistance. They did not criticize Chang Yüan-chi and Li Ch'un-sou for negotiating with the Mongols, nor did they break off relations with Yüan-chi who took office under the Yüan. In fact, Li Ch'un-sou is included as a member of the loyalist group. His "negotiation for peace" with the Mongols to avoid a massacre of the district was actually a euphemism for "surrender" and even Chao Pi-hsiang, the leading loyalist personality in the group, appears to have taken part in the deliberations. This compromising role, however, has been suppressed by the genealogies and gazetteers which constitute our major source for these local figures.

In this chapter I have attempted to reconstruct and discuss the major themes and personalities of nine loyalist groups which gathered after the demise of the Sung. Except for the groups in Annam, Wu-chou, and Ch'ing-yüan, up to now the other centres have not
received attention from modern scholars. While dealing with Ch'en I-chung and the loyalists who sought refuge in Southeast Asia, I touched on overseas colonization as one consequence of loyalist resistance. With Wang Yüan-liang and the loyalists in north China, we looked at their ambivalent feelings towards the Yüan emperor and regime despite their loyalist orientation. With the Kuei-chi loyalists, the major loyalist activities focussed on the recovery of the imperial relics, as well as on allusive poetry mourning the Sung collapse. While examining the Wu-chou loyalists, I discussed the nature of Hsieh Ao's grief and devotion to Wen T'ien-hsiang, in addition to his friendship with Fang Feng and Wu Ssu-ch'i. Through teaching these three compatriots made a positive impact on the second generation, who played an active role in the Yüan government. They also fostered the young scholars and poets, as shown in the poetry competition which they sponsored and judged in 1286-87.

Liu Ch'en-weng, the notable poet, is generally associated with the Lu-ling loyalist group. Both he and Teng Kuang-chien, a survivor of the resistance and fellow countryman, became less distressed with the Sung demise over time and through contacts with northerners. The key feature of the Ch'ing-yüan group was scholarship combined with teaching. As they gradually realized the positive effects of reunification, loyalists like Wang Ying-lin also showed a change from pessimism to confidence in the future. In Jao-chou and nearby Wu-yüan, loyalism to the Sung centred around Ma T'ing-luan and his son Tuan-lin. In P'ing-chiang, the talented artists Cheng Ssu-hsiao and Kung K'ai expressed their loyalism through their paintings, some of which are extant. Lastly, with the loyalists in Tung-kuan, we observed more clearly the mediating role they played between the
established gentry and the Mongol conquerors.

Of the many loyalist personages discussed in this chapter, some are well-known figures and others are obscure men. This examination of their life and activities under the new political order has revealed practical and pragmatic aspects of their response to alien rule, in spite of their lingering loyalty towards the former dynasty. In most cases, their loyalty to the Sung can be observed to undergo a change over time, and ranged from passive resistance to some degree of accommodation, a process that has been ignored by their contemporaries and later biographers. Each individual, opting out of voluntary death as the ultimate solution, worked out a satisfactory alternative, or modus vivendi,\textsuperscript{199} that was not absolute in nature nor drew great criticism from their contemporaries and later critics.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. SS 446.13150.

2. Ch'Uan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 42.1299-1301.

3. See Chapter One, p. 16, note 16.

4. See especially the writings of Wen T'ien-hsiang, Hsieh Fang-te, Wang Yuan-liang. Their contemporaries, Liu Yin and Fang Hui, also used both connotations of the term.

5. For T'ao Ch'ien's official biography, see Tsin-shu 94.2460-63. Hsieh Fang-te shows that T'ao already used the kan-chih (cyclical reckoning) to record the years in 401 (not 405 as conventionally taken in Hsieh's time) because at that time T'ao already predicted the fall of the Tsin. See Hsieh Fang-te, Pi-hu tsa-chi, la-2a, in Shuo-fu, 19. On T'ao Ch'ien, see among other studies, James Robert Hightower, The Poetry of T'ao Ch'ien (Oxford, 1970).

6. For Mote's distinction of "voluntary" and "compulsory" varieties of Confucian withdrawal, see Mote, "Confucian Eremitism", p. 258.

7. SS 47.928; Liu I-ch'ing, 7.8; Pi Yuan, 181.4950.

8. This list of eleven loyalist centres does not claim to be comprehensive. The major loyalists (again not meant to be an exhaustive list) in each group are discussed in order to outline the main features of Sung loyalism in 1276-1300.

9. The following account of Ch'en I-chung is based on his biography in the SS (418.12529-33). Liu Fu, another key participant of the resistance movement who died shortly after the enthronement of Ti-Shih, was one of the other students involved in this political incident (SS 405.12242-49). Liu Fu's collected writings, the Meng-ch'uan shih-chi, are in Liang-Sung ming-hsien hsiao-chi 362 (SKCSCP ser. 6).

10. This was Ch'en Tzu-chung 陳自中. See Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 8.16.

11. Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese Refugees in Annam and Champa at the End of the Sung Dynasty", Journal of Southeast Asian History 7:2 (1966), 2. Chan says that alternative accounts show Ch'en to have gone to Java, Cambodia, or Japan. I follow the SS account.


13. For Ch'en Chung-wei's biography, see SS 422.12618-20. Tseng Yüan-tzu does not have a biography in the SS.

15. In the preface to Erh-wang pen-mo, in Sung-chi san-ch'ao cheng-yao, 6.65. For Jao Taung-i's comments about the drastic editing of the work in the Yuan period, see his Chiu-lung yü Sung-chi, pp. 3-6.

16. YS 209.4644.

17. SS 422.12620; YS 209.4645. The YS shows Ting-sun instead of Wen-sun as Ch'en Chung-wei's son.

18. For the economic and political background to the Chinese migrations, see Ch'en Chu-t'ung, Chi-nan hsiieh-pao 2:1 (1936), 125-49.


20. On Ch'iu K'uei, see Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 15.20. Ch'iu K'uei's collected writings, the Tiao-chi shih-chi 釣磯詩集 (photolithic reprint of manuscript by Ch'iu K'uei shen wei-yüan hui, 1970), is extant but I have not seen it.

21. Ch'iu K'uei was a student of the loyalist martyr Lü Ta-kuei (d. 1277), a Confucian scholar who was killed by P'u Shou-keng for refusing to draft the surrender statement to the Mongols. It has been pointed out that Ch'iu K'uei's collected writings do not support the traditional view that Shou-ch'eng had taken part in the surrender of his brother, Shou-keng. See Ch'en Yuan, Western and Central Asians, pp. 16-17; Lo Hsiang-lin, Pli Shou-keng chuan, pp. 57-58.

22. "Biography of Li Yung", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.1a-2b


24. "Man-chiang hung, to the rhyme of Wang Ch'ing-hui", in Wang Yuan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao, 5.5a-b. There are many poems exchanged with Wang Ch'ing-hui in his poetry collections. See for example, Hu-shan lei-kao, 2.7b; 2.8b; 2.10b-lla; 2.14b-15a.

25. Wang Ch'ing-hui's original tz'u, along with two composed by Wen T'ien-hsiang and one by Teng Kuang-chien to the same theme, song-title, and rhyme perhaps appeared the earliest in Chou Mi's Hao-jan chai ya-t'an (SKCSCP supp. ser.), c.9b-10b.

26. See the accounts about him by his friends and contemporaries, such as Wen T'ien-hsiang, Liu Ch'en-weng, Ma T'ing-luan, Chao Wen, and Hsieh Ao. They appear together in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 11.1a-10a; Wang Yüan-liang, Shui-yün chi, appendix.a-c; Hu-shan lei-kao, 5.9b-11b.

27. See in particular the long ballads, "Song of Hu-chou" and "Drunken song", in his Shui-yün chi, la-10a; 13a-14a.

28. For poems to Chia Hsuan-weng, see Wang Yüan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao, 2.6b-7a; to Wen T'ien-hsiang, see Wang Yüan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao, 2.9b-10a, 2.16b; Shui-yün chi, 35b-37b; to Wu Chien, see Hu-shan lei-kao, 2.6a.
29. He also wrote a poem mourning Qubilai's empress Cabi (d. 1281) (see Wang Yüan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao, 3.7b-8a). Her biography is in YS 114.2871-72; for its translation, see Francis W. Cleaves, "The Biography of the Empress Cabi in the 'Yüan shih'", Harvard Ukrainian Studies 4-5 (1979-80), 138-50. Cabi is praised in history as being sympathetic to the Sung imperial family. On her attitude towards the Sung empress dowagers, see Morris Rossabi, "Khubilai and the Women in His Family", in Studia Sino-Mongolica: Festshrift für Herbert Franke, ed. Wolfgang Bauer (Wiesbaden, 1979), pp. 169-70.

30. For poems mourning Empress Dowager Hsieh and Prince Fu, see Wang Yüan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao, 3.8a-9a; on Empress Dowager Ch'üan entering a nunnery and Kung-ti departing for Tibet, see ibid., 3.9-b.

31. On the farewell by eminent men of Ta-tu, see Wang Yüan-liang, Hu-shan lei-kao, 3.9b-11a. The farewell poems by the palace women of the Southern Sung, including Wang Ch'ing-hui, are collected in the Wang-Sung chiu kung-jen shih-tzu, appended to Wang Yüan-liang's Hu-shan lei-kao. In it are eighteen poems written by seventeen palace women. Wang Kuo-wei, on the basis that Wang Ch'ing-hui was supposed to have already died at the time of Wang Yüan-liang's return to the south (because of a mourning poem Wang Yüan-liang wrote to Wang Ch'ing-hui), thinks that the volume was a forgery by loyalists (Wang Kuo-wei, 21.1061). I think Wang Kuo-wei does not have enough evidence to make that claim, because the mourning poem on Wang Ch'ing-hui is undated and could have been written years after Wang Yüan-liang's return to the south.

32. The prefaces by Liu Ch'en-weng and Ma T'ing-luan are extant in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 11.2a-4a; those by Hsieh Fang-te, Teng Kuang-chien, and Chang Chien have not survived.

33. The one exception is Wang Kuo-wei, 21.1061. Wang Kuo-wei states that it must have been a high position if he was released from service as a Taoist priest.

34. See in particular the poems "Journey to the north" and "Drunken song of I-shan" (Shui-yün chi, 18b-19a; 22a-23b; 32a-b). The contrast of the two moods sometimes occurs in the same poems. See especially "Song of Hu-shan" and "Drunken song" (Shui-yün chi, 1a-10b; 13a-14a).

35. On poems referring to Qubilai and Bayan, see Wang Yüan-liang, Shui-yün chi, 19a and 13b. On the Sung defectors and collaborators, the myriarch Huang, Liu Meng-yen and Tsan Wan-shou 章文秀, see Hu-shan lei-kao 2.7a, 2.9b, and Shui-yün chi, 28b-29a, respectively.


37. For Chia Hsiian-weng's biography, see SS 421.12598-99. This discussion is mostly based on his collected writings, which exist as the Tse-t'lang chi (SKCSCP ch'u-chi). Almost the entire collection was written during his forced stay in Ho-chien; it consists of many "descriptive essays" of studios and halls written upon request, describing his experience with northern scholars. For his homesickness and unhappiness about being detained in the north, see
the poem "To former friends in the south" and "Descriptive essay on the Ching room", in Chia Hsüan-weng, Tse-t'ang chi, 6.11a; 2.4b.

38. For these statements, see "Preface to farewell Yang Shan-chang", "Funerary essay to mourn Liu Wen-wei" and "Descriptive essay on the Jui-yün monastery", in Chia Hsüan-weng, 2.38a; 4.27b; 2.28b.

39. This preface, "On the 'Chung-chou chi'", is not in Chia's Tse-t'ang chi, but in Su T'ien-chüeh (comp.), Yüan wen-lei (Shanghai, 1936), 38.509-10. For a partial translation, see Ch'en Yüan, Western and Central Asians, pp. 294-95.

40. Chia Hsüan-weng was permitted to return home in 1294 (YS 18.385). Wu Chien had already begged to return on account of his old age upon arrival in Shang-tu in 1276 (see Liu I-ch'ing, 9.15).

41. The earliest record of the looting of the imperial tombs is perhaps by Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü a.38a-b; pieh a.44a-50b. Part of this material, in addition to other traditional sources on the incident, is collected in Wan Ssu-t'ung's Nan-Sung liu-ling i-shih (Taipei, 1968). For secondary sources on the subject, see Yen Chien-pi, "Nan-Sung liu-ling i-shih cheng-ming chi chu ts'uan-kung fa-wei nien-tai k'ao", Yen-ching hsüeh-pao 30 (1946), 27-50; Paul Demiéville, "Les Tombeaux des Song Méridionaux", Bulletin d'École Francaise d'Extreme-Orient 25 (1925), 458-67; Herbert Franke, "Tibetans in Yüan China", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, pp. 321-25.

42. For Yang's ethnic origins, see Franke, "Tibetans in Yüan China", p. 321. For the submission of the wealth of the tombs to the throne, see YS 13.269; 13.271-72.

43. See Lo Yu-k'ai's biography of T'ang Chu'eh, in Wan Ssu-t'ung, Nan-Sung liu-ling, 7b.

44. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, pieh a.47a-b.

45. YS 202.4521.


47. Demiéville, 461.

48. See for example, Wen Jui-lin's preface to Wan Ssu-t'ung's Nan-Sung liu-ling, 1b-2a; Yanai, p. 76. On Lien Hsi-hsien's adoption of Confucian mourning, see Ch'en Yüan, Western and Central Asians, pp. 245-47. See also Chapter Six, p. 261.


50. See YS 13.269.
51. Lo Hsien was a eunuch, and Wan Ssu-t'ung suggests that it was because of this reason that he was not normally included as one of the participants. See Wan Ssu-t'ung, Nan-Sung liu-ling, 47a.

52. Lo Yu-k'ai's biography of T'ang Chüeh, in Wan Ssu-t'ung, Nan-Sung liu-ling, 7b.


54. See for example Huang Tsung-hsi's annotations to Hsieh Ao's poem "Introduction to the evergreen tree", in Wan Ssu-t'ung, Nan-Sung liu-ling, 39b-40a.


56. These were the "Written while dreaming" poems in Lin Ching-hsi, Chi'shan chi (Peking, 1960), 3.103-04. In Lo Yu-k'ai's biography of T'ang Chüeh, several lines of T'ang's poem are identical to Lin's. It has been suggested that they were originally Lin's, later mistakenly attributed to T'ang.

57. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, pieh a.47a-b.

58. This poem, with annotations by Chang Meng-ch'ien and Huang Tsung-hsi, is in Hsieh Ao, Hsi-fa chi, pp. 247-49; Wan Ssu-t'ung, Nan-Sung liu-ling, 36b-40a. A popular Ch'ing dramatization of the Sung Loyalists also uses the evergreen tree as the symbol of Sung loyalty. This is Chiang Shih-ch'üan's 蘇士銓 Tung-ch'ing shu (Taipei, 1971).

59. Yang Wei-chen (1296-1370) was the first to include Hsieh Ao among the participants in the recovery and reburial of the imperial relics, which Ch'üan Tsu-wang showed to have been unlikely. See Ch'üan Tsu-wang, chi 33.416-17.

60. Ch'en Shu-k'o (comp.), Yüeh-fu pu-t'i (Chih-pu-tsu chai).


62. Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, pp. 379, 382.

63. Wang I-sun apparently served as director of a local school in the 1280s. See Chia-ying Yeh Chao, 62-66. On Ch'iu Yüan's service, see Chapter Six, p. 267.

64. The writings on T'ang Chüeh, including the biographies by Chang Meng-ch'ien and Lo Yu-k'ai, are collected in Ch'eng Mín-cheng, 6.1a-15b.
65. Wang Ying-sun's collections are frequently mentioned by Chou Mi. See in particular Chou Mi, Yün-yen kuo-yen lu (Pao-yen t'ang pi-chi), 2.3a-4b. Wang Ying-sun was also a painter; see Hsia Wen-yen, T'ü-hui pao-chien (Chi-ku ko), 5.5a.


67. In Lin Ching-hsi's collected writings, Cheng Pu-weng and Ch'en Cheng-kuang are particularly mentioned as his friends from the same district and with the same mind and ambitions as himself. See for example, his Ch'i-shan chi, 1.3-4; 4.111-13.

68. In the Ch'i-shan chi there are frequent references to poetry exchanges and travelling with Buddhists and Taoists.

69. Lin Ching-hsi, 1.2; 1.12-13; 1.23; 1.24-25; 2.67-68; 3.104-05. Ts'ai Yen is particularly noted for a poem in eighteen stanzas (Hu-chia shih-p'ai) showing her distress during her forced sojourn among the Hsiung-nü. On her, see also Giles, no. 1983.

70. "Discourse on the flitting light", in Lin Ching-hsi, 4.128.

71. "Postscript on the poetry volume of Lu Yu", in Lin Ching-hsi, 3.100-01.

72. On his friend from Ta-tu, see Lin Ching-hsi, 4.120-21; on his younger brother, see his preface to farewell him on a posting, in ibid., 5.136-37.

73. Hsieh Ao was a staff in Wen's recruiting headquarters who survived the resistance. Sources on Hsieh are collected in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 2.1a-5.13b. Hsieh's extant writings are in his Hsi-fa chi (Taipei, 1975); he also edited a volume of poems by former Sung subjects, entitled T'ien-ti chien chi, appended to the Hsi-fa chi, pp. 243-45.

74. In Hang-chou, Hsieh associated with Chou Mi's circle of friends which included Teng Mu, Tai Piao-yüan, and Teng Wen-yüan. For references to the two Tengs, see Teng Mu's biography of Hsieh Ao, in Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 13a-b. In Kuei-chi, he associated closely with Lin Ching-hsi, T'ang Chiieh, and Wang Ying-sun.

Material on Fang Feng has also been included in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 8.1a-11b. The first to write his biography were his students Sung Lien and Huang Chin.

75. Fang Feng, Ts'un-ya t'ang i-kao (Hsü Chin-hua ts'ung-shu), 3.1a-2b. For reference to Fang Feng's calling himself Tung-yang chün i-min, see Fang's preface to Ch'iu Yüan's poetry, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 8.11a.

76. Fang Feng, I-su k'ao (Pao-yen t'ang pi-chi), 1a.

77. On Wu Ssu-ch'i, see Ch'eng Min-cheng, 9.1a-12a. See
especially the biographies by Sung Lien and Jen Shih-lin, in ibid.


80. On the ritual of chao-hun (summoning the soul), see Hawkes, pp. 101-14. On Yen Kuang, see Giles, no. 2468.

81. The original annotations were done by Chang Meng-ch'ien. As Huang Tsung-hsi has shown, they are not convincing in identifying Hsieh's companions. My translation relies on Huang Tsung-hsi's corrections in Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 11.8-15.

82. Hsieh Ao had aspired to write a history of the last years of the Han dynasty. See Fang Feng's biography of Hsieh, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 2.7a-b.


84. Fang Feng and Hsieh Ao also coauthored travel diaries, for example the "Travels in Chin-hua" in 1289, of which only one chüan out of nine survives. See Hsieh Ao, Hsi-fa chi, b.233-39; Fang Feng, Ts'un-ya t'ang i-kao, 4.1a-5.4b. The titles vary slightly in the two works.

85. Sung Lien's biography of Wu Ssu-ch'i, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 9.5a.

86. On Liu Kuan and Huang Chin, see their biographies in YS 181.4189, 181.4187-88. On Sung Lien, see Mote's biography of him in Dictionary of Ming Biography, ed. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang (New York, 1976), pp. 1225-31. On the scholarship and political thought of these Chin-hua scholars, see also Langlois, "Political Thought in Chin-hua", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, pp. 178-82; Sun K'o-k'uan, Yüan-t'ai Chin-hua hsüeh-shu (T'ai-chung, 1975).

87. Teng Mu's biography of Hsieh Ao, in Teng's Po-ya ch'in, 12b.

88. The results of the poetry competition with the sixty winning entries are given in the extant volume edited by Wu Wei, Yüeh-ch'üan yin-she (Yüeh-ya t'ang). For a modern study of the name of the competition and the background of the contestants, see Terutoshi Yokota, "Getsusen ginsha ni tsuite", Hiroshima Daigaku Bungaku Kiyō 14 (1958), 99-125.

89. See Wu Wei, la. On Wu Wei, see Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 14.16-18. Such poetry competitions, in which wealthy patrons hired established poets as judges, were common in south China during the Yüan. The Yüeh-ch'üan yin-she competition is the best-known of such events. See Yokota, 99-100.

90. As noted by Liu Ch'en-weng in 1286, in "Preface to the poetry collection of Ch'eng Ch'u-weng" (in Liu Ch'en-weng, Hsü-hai chi [SKCSCP ser. 4], 6.9b): "After the examinations were suspended" [In
there was not one scholar who did not turn to poetry." See also Yoshikawa, Gennainshii gaisetsu (Tokyo, 1963), p. 81.

91. Ch'üan Tsu-wang believed that the multiple entries of the same person and the use of pseudonyms were either due to deliberate concealment through fear of censorship, or to confusion resulting from the transmission of the volume through such a long period. See Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 34.1143; Yokota, 112-119.

92. On Pai T'ing and Ch'iu Yüan entering Yüan service, see Chapter Six, p. 267.

93. For example, Hsieh Ao taught Fang Feng's sons (see Fang Feng's biography of Hsieh, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 2.9a) and Wu Ssu-ch'i's daughter married Fang Feng's son.

94. On the allusion to the "promised sword" by Chi Cha 章 (6th c. B.C.) to the Prince Hsü 禧 (a promise that should be kept whether the other party is dead or alive), see Giles, no. 287.

95. On Teng Wen-yüan and Fang Yu-hsiieh who attended Hsieh Ao's funeral, see Fang Feng's biography of Hsieh Ao, in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 2.8a. On Fang Yu-hsiieh, see also this chapter, p. 220.

96. Ch'ai Wang's collected writings exist as the Ch'iu-t'ang chi (SKCSCP ser. 5). The following account is based on the funerary inscription written by his fellow countryman Su Yu-an 素幼安 (fl. 1270-1290) in 1281, and Ch'ai's own preface to his collected poetry: "Funerary inscription of the historian-official of the Sung, Ch'ai Wang" and "Preface to the poetry collection of Tao-chou T'ai-i", in Ch'ai Wang, appendix 1.1a-5b and appendix 2.1a-b.

97. On Chin Lu-hsiang, see YS 189.4316-18. His extant collected works are known as the Jen-shan chi (TSCC). On Chin's writings before and after the Sung collapse, and his response to the Mongol conquest, see Langlois, "Political Thought in Chin-hua under the Mongols", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, pp. 151-55.

98. YS 189.4316.

99. Despite his high rank in the Sung dynasty, there is no biography of Fang Feng-ch'en in the SS because the compilers could not obtain an account of conduct on him. See the SKCS preface to Fang's collected writings, Chiao-feng wen-chi (SKCSCP ser. 4), 1a-b. The writings of Fang's younger brother, Feng-chen, are appended to the Chiao-feng wen-chi.

100. Ho's biography in his family records shows that he left the court after realizing that the conquest of the Sung was inevitable. See "Family biography", in Ho Meng-kuei, Ch'ien-chai wen-chi (SKCSCP ser. 5), 11. Fang I-k'uei's poetry, including poems to Ho Meng-k'uei and Fang Feng-ch'en, is extant and known as Fu-shan i-kao (SKCSCP ch'u-chi).

101. On Hsien-yü Shu, see Chapter Six, pp. 261-62; for Chia-ku Chih-ch'i's biography, see YS 174.4061-62. For contacts between
Chia-ku and Fang, see Fang Feng-ch'en, Chiao-feng wen-chi, 6.8b, wai-chi 3.33a; for examples of poetry exchanges between Chia-ku and Ho Meng-kuei, see 10.13a.

102. On Fang's three sons, see his biography by Hsü Yu-jen 許有壬 (1287-1364), in Fang Feng-ch'en, wai-chi 3.29a-b; on Ho's two sons, see Ho Meng-kuei, 11.22a.

103. Writings by and on Wang Yen-wu are compiled in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 1.1a-12b. The two elegies mourning Wen, "Essay mourning the chief minister (when he is still alive)" and "Essay mourning the chief minister from afar" are also in Wang's own collected writings, in Wang Yen-wu, 4.1a-7b. Wang Yu-sun 王幼孫 (b. 1223), also a native of Lu-ling, has also been credited with writing an essay to mourn Wen (before his actual death).

104. Wang Yen-wu, 4.5a-8b; 9.7a-15b.

105. See "Descriptive essay on the Chu-ching hall" (for the myriarch Liu) and "Congratulating the elder brother of my son's wife who obtained a position as instructor", in Wang Yen-wu, 3.7a-9a and 7.8b.

106. For Chao Wen's collected writings, see his Ch'ing-shan chi (SKCSCP ch'u-chi). He served in the Yüan first as director of a school and later as instructor in a prefecture. For Wang Yen-wu's letter thanking Chao's condolence over his mother's death, see Wang Yen-wu, 7.7a-11a.

107. Wen T'ien-hsiang was the first to refer to Chang I-fu looking after him. See Wen T'ien-hsiang, 16.1b. Sources on Chang, including T'ao Tsung-i's biography of him, are located in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 7.1a-3b.

108. Chang is believed to have searched and found Wen's wife nee Ou-yang in Ta-tu; he then accompanied her to cremate Wen's body. See Ch'eng Min-cheng, 7.1a-b. However, from poems written by Wen and Wang Yüan-liang, it would appear that Ou-yang had actually predeceased Wen.

109. See Chapter Two, pp. 81-82. For Wen's poems to and in reference to Teng, see especially Wen T'ien-hsiang, 14.11a-12b and 14.14a-15b; for Wen's preface to Teng's Tung-hai chi, see Wen T'ien-hsiang, 14.14a-15a. Neither the Tung-hai chi nor the T'ien-hai lu have survived.

110. On Ch'eng Chü-fu's relationship with Teng Kuang-chien, see Yüan Chi, p. 92; For Ch'eng's reference to Teng's death and his mourning poem to him, see Ch'eng Chü-fu, 24.12b-13b; 28.3a.

111. For Chang Kuei's biography, see YS 175.4071-83. On Chang Kuei's memorial, see Chao I, 30.636. Chang is listed as belonging to Ou-yang Shou-tao's school of studies (Sun-chai hsüeh-an) through relationship to Teng Kuang-chien. See Huang Tsung-hsi, Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an (Shanghai, 1934), 88.101. It appears that Teng had already returned to Lu-ling in late 1281, when Liu Ch'en-weng wrote the tz'u in the song-title of mo yü-erh and to the rhyme of a tz'u by Teng. See Liu Ch'en-weng, 10.28b-29a.
112. On Ou-yang Shou-tao, see his biography in SS 411.12364-66. His collected writings are known as Sun-chai wen-chi (SKCSCP ser. 2). On Liu Ch'en-weng's early literary success, see "Descriptive essay on the Li-hsin Hall of the subprefectural school in Lu-ling", in Liu Ch'en-weng, 3.53b.

113. This poem, in the song-title lan-ling wang, is in Liu Ch'en-weng, 9.5a-b.

114. For the reference to this sobriquet that Liu Ch'en-weng adopted, see Huang Hsiao-kuang, p. 11.

115. For the encomia for Chiang Wan-li and Wen T'ien-hsiang, see Liu Ch'en-weng, 7.34a-35a. For other loyalist personages, see "Funerary inscription for Huang Ch'un-fu" and "Funerary inscription for Ch'en Li-pu", in Liu Ch'en-weng, 7.1a-7b; 7.15a-19a.

116. Liu Chiang-sun was a prolific writer: thirty-two ch'uan of his collected writings survive under the title of Yang-wu chai wen-chi (SKCSCP ch'u-chi). His father's colleagues, acquaintances, and companions became his own friends. Liu wrote the funerary inscription for Chao Wen, in Liu Chiang-sun, 29.12a-16a. Wang Yen-wu's collected writings also contain correspondence with Liu Chiang-sun. See "Reply to Liu Chiang-sun who wrote the funerary inscription for my eldest son", in Wang Yen-wu, 3.

117. These are the first two lines of the poem "Sending off Li Ho-t'ien to his travels to Hang-chou", in Liu Ch'en-weng, 7.50b.

118. For example, Liu Ch'en-weng wrote the funerary inscription for a high-ranking Yuan official who administered Lu-ling for only forty days before his death. Liu no doubt exaggerates when he states that there was no scholar-official who did not weep for the deceased. See "Funerary inscription for the chief minister Mang-ha-tai-mei-t'ang", in Liu Ch'en-weng, 7.24b-28a.

119. The poetry of Hsueh Ang-fu, which did not survive, was praised highly by Chao Meng-fu. See "Preface to the poetry collection of Hsueh Ang-fu", in Chao's Sung-hsueh chai wen-chi (SPTK), 6.64. For a partial translation of Chao's preface, see Ch'én Yuan, Western and Central Asians, pp. 132-34.

120. "Descriptive essay on the Shuang-feng school in Nan-chien", in Liu Ch'en-weng, 2.7a; "Letter to the administrator Yao Sui", in Liu Chiang-sun, 8.5a-b.

121. "Returning from a visit to Yen-p'ing...", in Liu Chiang-sun, 7.11a-12b.

122. Prefaces to Wang Yüan-liang's poetry were written by Liu Ch'en-weng, Teng Kuang-chien, and Chao Wen. Wang Yen-wu and Liu Chiang-sun's collected writings also refer to Wang Yüan-liang's poetry. See Ch'én Meng-cheng, 11.1a-5a.

123. On loyalist resistance in Ch'ing-yüan, see the biographies of Yuan Yung (Wan Su-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 8.9) and Chao Meng-lei 趙孟類 (d. 1277) (SS 454.13356). Wang Ying-lin's poem
praising Yuan Yung is in Wang Ying-lin, Ssu-ming wen-hsien chi, 5.47b-48a.

124. See Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 18.906.

125. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 25.1008-09. The poetry of this group was later put in a volume, and the gathering itself was compared by Yuan Chüeh to the Loyang Poetry Society of Wen Yen-po (1005-1069) and eleven veteran officials. "Preface to the poetry volume 'Shih-lun t'ang ya-chi'", in Yuan Chüeh, Ch'ing-jung chü-shih chi (TSCC), 50.5b.

126. For Wang Ying-lin's biography, see SS 438.12987-91, in the section for eminent Confucian scholars. There are three chrono-biographies of Wang by the Ch'ing scholars Ch'ien Ta-hsin, Chang Ta-ch'ang, and Ch'en Chin. They are appended to Wang Ying-lin's collected literary writings, the Ssu-ming wen-hsien chi. There is a recent study of Wang by C. Bradford Langley, "Wang Ying-lin (1223-1296): A Study in the Political and Intellectual History of the Demise of Song" (Ph.D diss., Indiana University, 1980). The title is misleading, since Langley studies at length Wang's career from the 1240s to the 1260s and deals only briefly with the years after the collapse of the Sung.

127. For the occurrence of these terms, see the official decrees especially in Wang Ying-lin, chüan 5, passim.

128. For Wang's flight from the Sung court and his refusal to return, see SS 47.935-36.

129. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 19.916.

130. See the chrono-biography by Ch'ien Ta-hsin, 9a-b. Wang Ying-feng had passed the chin-shih examination in 1256 with Wen T'ien-hsiang and Lu Hsiu-fu. Ying-feng wrote the preface to the first family genealogy of Ch'üan Tsu-wang. See Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 25.1009.


133. Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 19.916.


135. Wang Ying-lin, (Weng-chu) K'un-hsieh chi-wen (SPPY), 1.6a-b; Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 19.916. Cf. the translation in Langley,


138. On the storage of the work, see Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 18.906. On Yüan Chüeh as Hu's student, see "Mourning my teacher Hu San-hsing", in Yüan Chüeh, 43.731-32.

139. During the Sino-Japanese War, Ch'en Yüan identified his distress about foreign invasions with Hu San-hsing's loyalty to the Sung. As a result he undertook a thorough study of Hu's annotations, which are interspersed in relevant sections in the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien; he then divided the annotations according to topics, such as the references to the Sung dynasty, to barbarian rule, and to a subject's integrity and duty to the dynasty. See Ch'en Yüan, T'ung-chien Hu-chu piao-wei, passim.


141. "Preface presented to son-in-law Hu Yu-wen", "To Hu San-hsing" and "To son-in-law Yu-wen", in Ch'en Chu, Pen-t'ang chi (SKCSCP ser. 2), 38.3b-4b; 79.2a-3b.


143. "Essay mourning Wang Ying-lin", in Ch'en Chu, 89.9b-10b.

144. This assumption is based on the fact that the ming of his wife and her siblings starts with Pi' and that of their father starts with Chung 晉, the same as the corresponding generations of the Sung imperial family. For the names of his wife and father-in-law, see Ch'en Chu, 35.5a; 65.5a-6b.

145. On writings to Yuan Hung and Chao Meng-ch'uan and relating to them, see, for example, Ch'en Chu, 80.9b-10a; 89.5a-6b. For a letter to a Mongol, see "To the district's high official Meng-ku Ch'i-chuan", in Ch'en Chu, 73.2b-3b.

146. For writings sending off his sons to their employment as education officials, see Ch'en Chu, 33.1a-2b; 33.4b-6a; 33.9b-10b.

147. Shu Yueh-hsiang's writings, mostly poems, exist under the title Lang-feng chi (SKCSCP ser. 3). On the suffering of the common people as personally witnessed by Shu, see "Ravages of war in 1276...", "Receiving a report about the northern army...", and "Last year the Yuan army entered T'ai-chou", in Shu Yueh-hsiang, 1.23a-b; 1.14b; 3.6b-7a.


149. On Liu Chuang-sun, see Wan Su-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 13.21. Ch'üan Tsu-wang believed that both Liu and Shu ought to be...
commemorated for their refusal to reemerge in public office; however, he was not aware that Shu received financial support from defectors. See Ch'üan Tsu-wang, chi 5.61.

150. "Remembering the 'Bamboo cane' poem", in Shu Yüeh-hsiang, 2.14a-b.

151. Huang Chen's biography in the SS is in the section of eminent Confucians (SS 438.12991-94).

152. "My fellow graduate Huang Chen", in Shu Yüeh-hsiang, 1.28b-29a; for Ch'en Chu's moving poems to Huang, see Ch'en Chu, 90.1a-b.

153. Ch'en Yün-p'ing's poetry collection is the Jih-hu yü-ch'ang (Yüeh-ya-t'ang). On Ch'en's relationship with Chou Mi's circle of poet friends, see Chapter Six, p. 244. On Ch'en's arrest, see Ch'üan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 47.1386; "Account of my late father", in Yüan Chüeh, 33.568-69.


155. On Ma T'ing-luan, see also Chapter Two, p. 28. For his biography, see SS 414.12436-39. In his official biography (SS 414.12436-39) Ma's retirement is not attributed to illness; furthermore, it states that Ma was summoned in 1274 to return to the Sung court but did not comply.

156. Most of Ma T'ing-luan's writings have not survived. His Pi-wu wan-fang chi (SKCSCP supp. ser.) was compiled by his son Tuan-lin, but only a small portion of the original is now extant. For a study of Ma T'ing-luan and his lost writings, see Huang Hsiu-min, "Ma T'ing-luan chi ch'i i-wen", Shu-mu chi-k'an 5:2 (1970), 43-66.

157. On poems and essays to Fei Chieh-t'ang and relating to him, see Ma T'ing-luan, 18.11a-14b; 24.1a-2b; for prefaces for and poems to Chou Mi, see Ma T'ing-luan, 15.2a-4a; 22.2b-3a.

158. See especially Ma's poem to Chou Mi, Ma T'ing-luan, 22.2b-3a.

159. Ma was summoned with Chang Chien. See YS 10.206.

160. Ma T'ing-luan's "Preface to Wang Yüan-liang's poetry", in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 11.3b-4a.

161. For example, "On Fang Ching-yün's manuscript" and "Descriptive essay on Lao-hsüeh-tao court", in Ma T'ing-luan, 15.4a-5a; 18.4a-6b.

162. For studies on Ma Tuan-lin's historiography, see Pai Shou-i, "Ma Tuan-lin ti shih-hsüeh ssu-hsiang", in Pai's Hsüeh-pu chi (Peking, 1961), pp. 210-52; Hok-lam Chan, "'Comprehensiveness' (T'ung) and 'Change' (Pien) in Ma Tuan-lin's Historical Thought", in Yüan Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion under the Mongols, ed. Hok-lam Chan and Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York, 1982), pp. 27-87.
163. Ma T'ing-luan's "Funerary inscription for my wife", in Ma T'ing-luan, 19.15b-16a.

164. Ma Tuan-lin's own preface to the Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao (Shanghai, 1936), in Su T'ien-chüeh, 32.427.

165. Ma Tuan-lin acknowledges his father's influence, see Hok-lam Chan, "Comprehensiveness!", p. 37; Pai Shou-i, p. 211.

166. Hu Tz'u-yen's writings survive as the Mei-yen wen-chi (SKCSKP ch'u-chi). Ts'ao Ching's poems and letters to Hu are appended to this work (Mei-yen wen-chi, 9.1a-3b; 10.1a-14b).

167. Hu's other close friend was Ch'en Li, whose writings survive under the title Ting-yü chi (SKCSKP ser. 2). Ch'en Li also wrote a local genealogy of his native prefecture. For a recent study, see Harriet T. Zurndorfer, "Hsin-an ta-tsu chin' and the Development of Chinese Gentry Society (800-1600)", T'oung Pao 67:3-5 (1981), 154-215.

168. "To the widow by the matchmaker" and "To the matchmaker by the widow", in Hu Tz'u-yen, 2.3a-6b.

169. On Ch'eng Ch'u-weng, see Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, 15.10. On prefaces to Ch'eng Ch'u-weng's poetry, see Liu Ch'en-weng, 6.9-10b; Ma T'ing-luan, 22.8a; Hsieh Fang-te, T'ieh-shan chi, 6.8a-9a (this preface has Han-weng 漢 Mourinho instead of Ch'u-weng 楚 Mourinho, although it seems to be the same person).

170. Most of Hsü Yi-ch'ing's writings which survive were written before the collapse of the Sung. They exist as the Hsien-t'ien chi (SPTK), which contains few, if any, loyalist sentiments.

171. Cheng Chen's writings, Ch'ing-chun chi (SPTK), were edited by Ch'u Yuan and prefaced by Ch'ai Wang's brother in 1301. Appended to the work are Cheng Ssu-hsiao's poetry and prose collections, Cheng So-nan hsien-sheng shih-chi, wen-chi. Cheng Ssu-hsiao also wrote a preface to the genealogy of a branch of the Sung imperial family located in Foochow. See Chao Hsi-nien, p. 26.

172. "Declining Wu P'an's appointment as Confucian tutor", "Descriptive essay for the Buddhist hall of Shih-fang ch'ian-sa", in Cheng Ssu-hsiao, So-nan wen-chi, 48b; 56b.

173. Cahill is mistaken in saying that his name was Cheng Mo; he apparently misread and took mou (so-and-so) as Cheng's name. See Cahill, Hills Beyond a River, p. 16. The earliest accounts of Cheng Ssu-hsiao (excluding his own writings and the controversial Hsin-shih) were by Yuan literati, such as Cheng Yuan-yu, 1.14-15; Wang Feng, 1.45b-46b; T'ao Tsung-i, Nan-ts'un cho-keng lu, 20.246-47. For modern accounts of Cheng, see Mote, "Confucian Eremitism", pp. 284-86. Li Chu-ts'ing's biography of Cheng is more detailed but contains several mistakes, such as Cheng wishing himself to be called "loyal and filial" when, in fact, he wanted the exact opposite (Franke, Sung Biographies, Painters, pp. 15-23). On Cheng, see also Chapter Three, pp. 90-92.
174. For the long treatise on geomancy and related matters, see "Reply to Recluse Wu asking about travels and geography", in Cheng Ssu-hsiao, So-nan wen-chi, 11b-47b. For his refusal to be employed, see "Declining Wu P'an's appointment as Confucian tutor", in Cheng Ssu-hsiao, So-nan wen-chi, 47b-49a.

175. Wang Feng, 1.46a-b.


177. The quote is taken from "Discourse on legitimate succession in the past and present", in Cheng Ssu-hsiao, Hsin-shih, pp. 94. On Cheng's opinions about territory-based legitimate rule, see ibid., p. 96.


179. Cheng Ssu-hsiao, So-nan wen-chi, appendix.2b.

180. Kung K'ai's writings have been collected in his Kuei-ch'eng sou chi (Ch'ü-chou ts'ung-shu). Some pieces also appear in Ch'eng Min-cheng, 10.1a-21b. For modern studies of Kung, see James Cahill's biography in Franke, Sung Biographies, Painters, pp. 64-69; Lee and Ho, pp. 93-95.

181. In his writings Chou Mi frequently mentions his friend Kung K'ai. In 1287 Kung joined one of Chou's art connoisseurship parties and contributed a long colophon to Chou's new acquisition. See Yeh Shao-weng, Su-sch'ao wen-chien lu (TSCC), postscript.183-84. Kung also presented Chou with at least one painting, named "Chiang-ch'i t'u" (江磚). Teng Mu was a close friend of Chou and could have been introduced to Kung in the 1280s.

182. See Lee and Ho, Chinese Art under the Mongols, pp. 94-95, where the "Emaciated Horse" is reproduced. On sources on Kung K'ai's art, see Ch'en Kao-hua, pp. 287-99. For Kung's extant paintings, see Cahill, An Index, pp. 295-96.

183. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü a.30a-37a. In the late Yüan novel by Shih Nei-an and Lo Kuan-chung, Shui-hu ch'üan-chuan (Shanghai, 1975), these bandits appear as heroes rather than bandits.

184. "Poem to Fang Hui", in Kung K'ai, 1a-b.

185. Chao Pi-hsiang's writings are known as Fu-p'ou chi (SKCSCP ser. 8). The following account of the Tung-kuan loyalists is based on Ch'en Po-t'ao's Tung-kuan i-min lu, compiled while Ch'en was seeking refuge in Kowloon after the 1911 Revolution. Ch'en gathered a group
of friends who, like himself, felt deeply about the change of political order and sought consolation in the memory of the Sung loyalists. The poems and essays composed during these gatherings have been compiled in a volume by Su Tse-tung, entitled Sung-t'ai ch'iu-ch'ang (Chü-te t'ang).

186. "Biography of Chao Pi-hsiang", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, a.1a-3a. For the poem composed with Wen T'ien-hsiang, see ibid., a.3a-b.

187. For the biographies of these two loyalists, see Ch'en Po-t'ao, a.34a-35b.

188. For the biographies of Li Yung and Li Ch'un-sou, see Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.1a-2b; b.3a-5b.

189. For the biographies of Ch'en I-hsin and Ch'en Keng, see Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.14a-16b.

190. "Biography of Chang Heng", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.36b-37a.

191. Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.4b.

192. "Biography of Ti Ho", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.25b-26a.

193. "Biography of Ho Wen-chi", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.27a-28a.

194. "Biography of Wen Ying-lin", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.41b-42a.

195. "Biography of Fang Yu-hsüeh", in Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.38b-39b.

196. Ch'en Po-t'ao, b.25b.

197. These were the sources Ch'en Po-t'ao used in his compilation. See Ch'en Po-t'ao, postscript to the index.

198. On the loyalists in Annam, see Hok-lam Chan, "Sung Refugees". Hsieh Ao, Fang Feng, and Wu Su-ch'i of the Wu-chou group are discussed in connection with the second generation of scholars under Mongol rule in Langlois, "Chin-hua Confucianism", pp. 45-73. The loyalists in Ch'ing-yüan are mentioned in Langley's account of Wang Ying-lin's students after the collapse of the Sung. See Langley, pp. 463-73.

199. This is Langlois' term. See his "Introduction", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, p. 11.
Absolute loyalism to the Sung ruled out any kind of contact with the Yuan regime or its officials. The martyr loyalists who died during or shortly after the Sung demise were absolute in their loyalty because they did not live under the new regime, nor did their loyalty need to be tested over the passage of time and changed circumstances. As for the i-min loyalists discussed in the previous chapter, the cases of Cheng Ssu-hsiao and Hsü Yüeh-ch'ing were exceptional: the former kept his loyalty unblemished by total withdrawal and the latter by insanity. As a result of their behaviour, both were considered irrational and eccentric even in their own times. The others could not avoid some contact with the Mongol dynasty in their social, economic, political, and personal life. With them, loyalism could not exist in a vacuum, but had to take into account social and family responsibilities. For these men who lived ten, twenty, or even thirty years after the fall of the Sung to adhere to the narrow and absolute dimensions of loyalty from 1276 to 1300 was virtually impossible and rarely accomplished.

For a detailed study of the connection between absolute and marginal manifestations of loyalty, Chou Mi and his circle of friends in Hang-chou and Hu-chou provide a rich source. Among the chung-i and i-min loyalists, Chou was the most sociable, versatile, and intriguing personality. He is traditionally considered the key loyalist figure in Hang-chou in the same ardent manner as Cheng Ssu-hsiao in P'ing-chiang. A prolific writer of random jottings,
poet, art connoisseur, artist, historian, and official—his personal experiences embraced the loyalist centres in Hang-chou and Hu-chou. In addition, he was perhaps the only loyalist who had contact with almost all other loyalist groups discussed in the previous chapter. Many of these "like-minded" friends and "travelling companions" reemerged into public office after a period of withdrawal, but Chou Mi resisted taking this crucial step and preserved his integrity as an unblemished loyalist in the eyes of traditional historians. Apart from former loyalists who became Yuan officials, Chou socialized openly with northerners and even non-Chinese personalities, often bringing together loyalists and nonloyalists. Excited by the positive impact of political reunification on culture and the arts, Chou's antipathy to alien rule gradually dissipated. This chapter examines the life of Chou Mi before and after the dynastic collapse in order to observe the transformation of his loyalism and that of his many friends and associates. A reconstruction of his activities and interpersonal relations, followed by a study of the dilemma of accepting employment faced by individual members of his circle, may provide a new perspective on the marginal loyalists—the middle-ground of Sung loyalism between the exemplars and collaborators.

I. Chou Mi's Life Before and During the Sung Demise

Chou Mi's life before the Mongol conquest was carefree and extravagant, typical of well-to-do scholar-officials of his times. He was born to an eminent clan originally based in Ch'i-chou (Tsinan) of which six generations of distinguished ancestors could be traced. When the Sung transferred its capital to the south, Chou's great-grandfather, who held office as executive censor, moved...
the family base to Hu-chou. Chou's grandfather and father were both officials, but by the latter's time, the family wealth was already in decline. No doubt much of it was spent on the some 42,000 books and 1,500 rubbings and other art objects acquired over three generations. In Chou's time, the family still owned the former Hu-chou residence of the disgraced chief minister Han T'o-chou (1152-1207); its grandeur ranked alongside those belonging to the imperial clansmen and high officials. One such home had previously belonged to Chou's maternal grandfather Chang Liang-neng (d. 1214), also a distinguished official.

Chou Mi grew up in Hu-chou but spent a great deal of his childhood, youth, and early adulthood travelling through Chekiang and Fukien while accompanying his father on official duties. Chou Chin (d. 1265?), himself a calligrapher, poet, and connoisseur, exerted a singular influence on his only son's life, especially on his feelings for family roots, passion for the arts, and choice of friends and acquaintances. Chou Mi's mother was conversant with poetry and he may have inherited that enthusiasm along with her family's interest in antiques.

In his youth Chou had already met through his travels some of his lifetime friends including Mou Yen (1227-1311), Chao Yü-yin (1213-1265), father of the eminent Yuan artist and official, Chao Meng-fu (1254-1322), and his wealthy father-in-law Yang Po-yen (d. 1254). Both the Mou and Chao families also lived in Hu-chou. Yang's family home was one of the most prominent and affluent in Hang-chou, where Chou stayed in the early 1250s. He was then attending the National University and did not approve of the abuses committed by his fellow students who...
accepted bribes and ganged up to disgrace even honest officials. 13

Soon Chou passed and ranked thirteenth in an examination held at the Ministry of Personnel, whereupon Yang sent congratulations to Chou's father. 14 Shortly after he appears to have married Yang's daughter, and in 1255-57 he accompanied his father to T'ing-chou (Fukien) where the latter was appointed prefect. 15 Chou Chin may have died soon after the termination of his post, whereupon Chou Mi went into mourning. 16

Chou Mi passed the chin-shih examination in 1260, before he turned thirty. 17 However, in about 1261 he launched his official career through the merits of his grandfather, who had been a third rank official. His first appointment was in the Treasury Department in Chien-k'ang, where his honesty and diligence impressed his superiors. 18 In 1263 he was promoted to supervise Chia Ssu-tao's "public land" scheme in Ch'ang-chou, where the private hoarding of grain by large landowners was most acute. 19 By acting upon the instructions of the central government, Chou incurred the hostility of the powerful local magnates who suffered most seriously from the policy. Soon he resigned to look after his ailing mother, who died the following year. 20 During and after the mourning period, Chou for the first time felt the burden of family responsibilities.

In 1267 Chou seems to have resumed his political career, and until 1274 was based in Hang-chou, where he worked in the Water Transport Department, the Imperial Pharmacy, the Feng-ch' u Granary, and other offices. Among his colleagues were Yuan Hung, Ch'en Kuo 陳遇 (fl. 1270-1290), Kao Ssu-te 高斯得 (chin-shih 1229), Li Lai-lao and his brother P' eng-lao (both fl. 1260-1300). 21 In 1270 he befriended the chief minister Ma T'ing-luan. 22 In spite of
patronage by Ma, distinguished family background, and influential marriage connections, Chou's seventh and final official post was subprefect of I-wu (Wu-chou) from 1275 to the surrender of the subprefecture just before Hang-chou collapsed. This means that with a public service of twenty-five years less the mourning periods, Chou merely reached the sixth degree rank—certainly not an impressive record.23

Chou later claimed to have done his utmost to advance his political career to bring glory to his family; he attributed his lackluster performance to the collapse of the dynasty.24 That however, accounts for only part of the truth. During the entire length of time he held office, he displayed greater interest in literary activities than in administration. It was through his father that Chou entered the literary world at a young age. In Hu-chou and wherever Chou Chin was posted, father and son entertained the best scholars and illustrious men of the day; in return, they were invited to similar social functions. In the company of singing girls and amidst a serene setting of "plum trees, bamboo, ponds, willows and lotus plants" they would in this state of drunken euphoria "write poetry and discuss prose, make music and sing songs".25 During these "pleasures of the brush, inkstone, lute and cup—not a day passed without them", Chou poured wine and composed poetry with his seniors.

But it was in Hang-chou, where the eminent poets gathered, that Chou explored the literary scene on his own. There, in the late 1250s he met Wu Wen-ying (1200-1260), the leading tz'u poet who was then patronized by the wealthy Chang Shu 張福 (fl. 1250-1280).26 Both Chang Shu and his son Yen became Chou's lifetime friends.27
In Hang-chou, Chou also studied tz'u from Yang Tsuan 葉斡 (d. 1268), founder of the Yin-she 咏社 (Recital society) to which belonged the Li brothers as well as friends and colleagues of Chou's father. Yang's daughter was in the imperial harem; she later became the imperial consort of Tu-tsung and mother of Shih, the half-brother of Kung-ti and the first prince enthroned by the loyalist movement in 1276. Yang's son, Liang-chieh 光節, also occupied a high position in the Sung court; he later escorted Shih and Ping to the southeast in anticipation of a loyalist restoration. Yang Tsuan was probably also related to Chou's father-in-law, who may have first brought Chou and Yang Tsuan together.

Yang Tsuan's school of tz'u concentrated on elegance and refinement in composition, achieved by strict adherence to set musical patterns and painstaking choice of language. His poetry society, one of the many that gained popularity in Southern Sung upper class society, had as its major activity poetry readings combined with pleasure outings, often in the West Lake or the K'an-pi garden owned by Chou's in-laws. Poems were written to each other's rhymes, usually describing in minute details objects such as plums, daffodils, chrysanthemums, and breath-taking scenes. With the death of Yang in 1268, the Yin-she dissolved but Chou maintained close relations with the Li brothers who became his colleagues in the Transport Department. The three went on excursions to scenic spots in Hang-chou and Hu-chou, where Chou frequently returned in spite of his official appointment in the capital.

During the 1260s Chou also exchanged poems with Yang Tsuan's former students. Other close poet friends were Ch'en Yün-p'ing of Ch'ing-yüan and Wen Chi-weng of Hu-chou, and the Taoist priests Chang
Jo-hsü 張若虚 (fl. 1270-1290) and Liu Lan 劉瀾 (d. 1276). In the early 1270s he also met Wang I-sun of Kuei-chi, a poet usually ranked the best among Chou Mi's circle. Even before the demise of the Sung, Chou Mi was recognized as a talented poet and his tz'u were considered among "the most marvellous in the world". By 1276 his poetry volumes were compiled and most likely published with prefaces contributed by some of the friends mentioned above.

Apart from poetry, Chou also developed a budding antiquarian interest. In the late 1250s he inherited some antique objects from his maternal grandfather and father-in-law. These treasured acquisitions added substantially to the already impressive family collection. At this time he was already known to eminent artists and connoisseurs: in 1260 he invited the imperial clansman, eminent calligrapher and painter Chao Meng-chien 鍾孟堅 (1199-1267) to an outing on the West Lake where, in the company of other art-lovers, they inspected and commented on objects from each other's collections.

Thus up to the fall of the Sung, Chou Mi's life was one of pleasure outings, poetry gatherings, and antiquarian exhibitions combined comfortably with an official career. This life-style was typical of upper middle class officials of the day—the essence of which was to enjoy life, generally unperturbed by political events. Although the Mongols had posed a threat over the last forty years, Chou, like most officials from Wen T'ien-hsiang to Chia Ssu-tao, never quite believed that the Sung would be totally conquered. His poetry up to 1274 certainly did not reflect this concern, although some close friends in political circles such as Ma T'ing-luan and Wen Chi-weng would surely have kept him informed on current developments.
By late 1274, however, Chou found the Hang-chou bureaucracy apprehensive with rumours about the impending Mongol crisis, which happened to coincide with two unexpected natural disasters—a great flood in Hu-chou and a landslide in the capital. Returning to Hang-chou from Hu-chou that autumn, his colleague Ch'en Kuo told him about his nightmares concerning the Sung demise:

"In the first month of spring I [i.e., Ch'en Kuo] repeatedly dreamed about arriving at a large palace hall....Approaching close I saw on the imperial bed a strange creature squatting. Next to it was a child in mourning clothes. Just at that moment I woke up in fear. Now the successor is in fact an infant, occupying the throne because the late emperor has passed away. The child in mourning clothes [thus] turned out to be an accurate premonition—nothing could be more inauspicious than this!" I [i.e., Chou Mi] at the time thought it unreliable, being merely a dream. And yet during that winter, the crossing [of the Yangtze by the Mongols] in fact took place.37

It was only after the Sung had collapsed that Chou realized the full impact of the event. He was not an eyewitness of the last days of Hang-chou as the Sung capital, since he was then engaged in a short-lived assignment as subprefect of I-wu. After the news of the Sung surrender arrived he apparently went to Ch'ing-yüan, visited a cousin, and met Tai Piao-yüan and his friends. The meeting might have been arranged by his friend and colleague in the Transport Department, Yüan Hung, also a native of Ch'ing-yüan. In the first half of 1279, shortly after the total annihilation of loyalist resistance, Chou was in Kuei-chi with thirteen other poets mourning the fall of the Sung and expressing outrage at the violation of the Sung imperial tombs.38 Out of thirty-seven poems in the anthology compiled on these occasions, Chou contributed three. The other participants included local Kuei-chi men and central figures involved in the mission to recover the imperial relics, half of them being previously acquainted with Chou. The latter group included his cousin Wang
Ying-sun, the two Li brothers, Chang Yen, and Ch'iu Yuan.

Being with friends during this time helped Chou alleviate the pain and sorrow of the Sung demise. But upon returning to his family home in Hu-chou later that year, Chou was unprepared for the personal suffering that awaited him. Hu-chou was the last Sung stronghold before Hang-chou surrendered; prolonged resistance and subsequent plundering resulted in extensive destruction and waste. Gone were the residence, library, and gallery owned by his family for many generations; his concubines and servants were also dispersed and lost in the chaos. Fortunately his first wife, son, and daughter, who probably accompanied him in his travels, were still alive. At forty-seven and destitute, he took his family to Hang-chou, never returning to live in Hu-chou.

In Hang-chou, Yang Ta-shou 楊大受 (fl. 1270-1300), his wife's relative, provided the family with lodging in the Kuei-hsin quarter. Yang's residence and gardens were a familiar sight, where Chou had spent much time during the last three decades. Since fighting did not take place in Hang-chou during the Sung conquest, and perhaps because Yang Ta-shou cooperated with the Mongols, the Yang family did not lose its wealth and status. Shortly after, Chou was given land and presumably money with which he built his own residence and several studios "among mulberry trees and bamboo, pavilions and ponds". Having a generous and affluent relation spared Chou the frustrations and hardships involved in making a meagre living from private tutoring, selling essays, and attracting patrons—a fate from which many of his friends could not escape.
II. After the Sung Collapse: Among Loyalists in Hu-chou and Hang-chou, 1280-98

For a brief period after settling in Hang-chou, Chou seems to have withdrawn from his usually large circle of colleagues and friends to ponder over his personal suffering. His losses—an official career, wealth, and home—were made worse by premature old age and ill health. The most poignant wound inflicted on him was the nagging feeling of being permanently relegated to a "sojourner" of Hang-chou. Writing poetry was no longer a frivolous and purely convivial pastime, but became a private and compelling activity to which he turned for solace, reaching the point where "it was not that he could write poetry, but that he could not abstain from [it]". The two volumes produced during the early 1280s are no longer extant, but the profound emotional impact of dynastic change may be sensed through the prefaces to these poems by his friends Ma T'ing-luan, Tai Piao-yüan, and Teng Mu (1249-1306). As if they themselves were experiencing the same emotions and turmoil, they observed that Chou's poetry had surely matured and become skilled through personal tragedy, aging, and poverty. The poems of his youth were described as "talented", those of his adulthood "erudite", but the work now produced was "deep-feeling and explosive, disquietingly pensive and sadly sublime".

Like his early poetic styles, his carefree and extravagant life also belonged to the past. Although earlier he had often complained about premature aging and frequent illness, now ill health (and probably lack of funds) restricted his travels. His last concubine left him by 1281, at which point Chou rationalized that it was healthier for him to have fewer desires of the flesh and in the long
run, better to relive pleasures and travels through fond and vivid reminiscence. An anthology of travel notes by T'ang and Sung literati, the Ch'eng-huai lu 慶懷錄, was perhaps edited in this quiet and pensive state of mind.

The introspective period seems to have ended by 1282, and on the whole helped Chou to make and abide by the major decision of his life—not to seek appointment in the new government. This move was a "compulsory withdrawal" for him, as it was for former officials of the Sung. The fact that his family had been in Sung service for several generations put additional responsibility on him to preserve its honour and integrity as loyal subjects. Such feelings, rather than a strong ethnic repulsion towards the new alien regime, were the essence of his loyalism. Unlike Wen T'ien-hsiang, he did not feel committed to take up militant resistance and, if that failed, to die in order to "requite the country". His friends and colleagues were of a similar mind. And unlike Cheng Ssu-hsiao, he did not interpret political withdrawal to mean total exclusion of social and cultural life. In fact, for the next two decades he was preoccupied with an extensive network of former friends and new acquaintances, whose companionship alleviated his suffering and developed his versatile talents.

In the 1280s, reemerging into society after a period of introspection, Chou naturally found himself among former friends, their children and associates, many of whom had been Sung officials. Having suffered a fate similar to Chou's during the dynastic collapse, they initially could not reconcile themselves to the situation and serve the new government. Chou maintained relations with and communicated his loyalist sentiments to his former colleagues and veteran officials including Ma T'ing-luan and Ch'en Kuo, who had
returned to their respective homes after the Sung demise and were relieving their boredom by writing commentaries on the Confucian Classics and copying Buddhist sutras. Through Ma he was apparently introduced to Fei Chieh-t'ang, a native of Szechwan who had gone to live in Jao-chou and Hang-chou after the dynasty fell. Fei became his principal informant on Szechwan in his random jottings. With these old veterans of the Sung court Chou seems to have held discussions on the collapse of the Sung and shared the remorseful feelings of being displaced persons.

Chou Mi was perhaps the only loyalist personality who had some contact with almost all the loyalist centres described in the previous chapter. Regarding the refugees in Annam, he apparently knew a Chiang Ta-ch'eng (fl. 1280-1290) who gave him information about that group. Chou Mi may have heard about the events of the loyalist resistance through returned members of the Yang family, who had accompanied the two princes to the southeast and with whom Chou was acquainted through his former teacher Yang Tsuan. In connection with the Ta-tu group, he shared a friend with Wang Yuan-liang, viz. Hsü Hsüeh-chiang. It was perhaps through Hsü that he learnt of the exchanges of poems between Teng Kuang-chien, Wen T'ien-hsiang, Wang Yuan-liang, and Wang Ch'ing-hui. With the Kuei-chi group Chou had plenty of contact through direct participation in poetry gatherings in 1279; in addition, he was a cousin of Wang Ying-sun and a close friend of Wang I-sun. With Fang Feng and Hsieh Ao in Wu-chou he shared a number of intimate friends including Teng Mu and Tai Piao-yüan. Chou was acquainted with the Lu-ling group through Liu Ch'en-weng and his son Chiang-sun; furthermore, Chou was a colleague of Tseng Feng (d. 1277), Wen T'ien-hsiang's former teacher who
died in the loyalist resistance. Chou's connection with the Ch'ing-yüan personalities can be traced to his friendships with Ch'en Yün-p'ing and Tai Piao-yüan, as well as to his former colleague Yüan Hung. He is also said to have had a cousin or uncle in the prefecture. As for the Jao-chou group, Chou maintained contact through his mentor Ma T'ing-luan and Fei Chieh-t'ang. Kung K'ai, who was living in P'ing-chiang, was also an intimate friend; he participated in Chou's gatherings, inscribed his art possessions, and gave him presents of paintings. Finally, the connection with the Tung-kuan group was most likely made through Fang Yu-hsüeh, a close friend of Fang Feng and Hsieh Ao.

Chou was personally connected with another loyalist centre in Hu-chou, his native home before the collapse of the dynasty. Although he resettled in Hang-chou, he returned at least once a year to tend the family graves. There he renewed old friendships with his former colleagues and friends Kao Ssu-te, Ch'en Ts'un 隆存 (chin-shih 1247), Wen Chi-weng, and Mou Yen; in addition, he mixed with the imperial scion Chao Meng-fu and his circle.

Kao Ssu-te, a veteran official, was the son of a celebrated loyal martyr who sacrificed his life in the 1230s fighting the Mongols. Influenced no doubt by his father's patriotism, Kao went to Hu-chou to live after the surrender of Hang-chou. Ch'en Ts'un, also a veteran official, returned to his native prefecture of Hu-chou and mourned deeply its loyalist martyr, Chao Liang-ch'un. It is said that he refused Yüan employment seven times, and instead, taught students for a living. In addition, both Ch'en Ts'un and Kao Ssu-te occupied themselves by copying Confucian Classics and Buddhist Sutras.

Wen Chi-weng claimed Szechwan as his native home, but did in fact
live in Hu-chou and knew Chou Mi before 1275, when he contributed a preface to Chou's early poetry volume. A veteran high-ranking official, he was criticized by the Sung court for fleeing from his responsibilities during its collapse. Returning to Hu-chou, Wen devoted his time to scholarship on the Classics and repeatedly turned down recommendation to office. Wen apparently did not socialize much, but corresponded with his student Ho Meng-kuei and his former colleague Fang Feng-ch'en, both of whom had retired to Yen-chou. Like their sons, Wen's son served as an instructor in a prefecture under the Yüan.

Of the Hu-chou personages, Mou Yen was closest to Chou Mi. Mou's family was originally based in Szechwan, but he had lived in Hu-chou as a child. A childhood friend of Chou Mi, he was almost as gregarious as Chou; in addition, his family connections were even more influential. His father was a chief minister, and he himself was on intimate terms with Prince Fu, Tu-tsung's father. In spite of its political prominence, his family was poor; after the collapse of the Sung, Mou was often cold and hungry and depended on donations from his friends. A former official of the Sung, after its demise he returned to Hu-chou and for the next thirty-six years of his life did not leave the prefecture. Instead, he taught students and associated with old and new friends, and gladly responded to their requests for "descriptive essays" and poems. He wrote at least four pieces for Chou Mi, commenting on Chou's changed life-style and devotion to his past.

In the late 1280s, through Chou Mi and his friends, Mou Yen appears to have been introduced to other acquaintances including Chang Chung-shihi (1260-1325), who subsequently became his son-in-law.
Chang Chung-shih and Mou's other friends, Teng Wen-yüan and Tai Piao-yüan, later took up positions with the Yüan, as did Mou's three sons, Ying-lung 應龍 (1247-1324), Ying-fu 應復 and Ying-kuei 應奎 (both fl. 1280-1335). Mou also remained on friendly terms with Fang Hui (Chou's enemy) and Liu Meng-yen, the former Sung chief minister who rose to high rank in the Yüan and recommended Mou's children to office.

In Hu-chou, Chou Mi and Mou Yen both related to a younger group of scholars, poets, and painters, who in the first decade of the Sung collapse were also in political withdrawal. Known as the Eight Talents of Wu-hsing, they included Ch'ien Hsüan 蕭子中 (ca. 1235-aft. 1300), Chao Meng-fu, Mou Ying-lung (Mou Yen's eldest son), Hsiao Tzu-chung 蕭子中, Ch'en Wu-i 陳無逸 (grandson of Ch'en Ts'un), Ch'en Chung-hsin 陳仲信, Yao Shih-姚式, and Chang Fu-heng 張復亨 (all fl. 1270-1300). Along with their teacher Ao Chün-shan 敖君善 (fl. 1270-1300), they were natives of Hu-chou and previously associated with Chou Mi directly or through their fathers or friends. For instance, Chao Meng-fu's father Chao Yu-yin, an imperial relative and official of the Sung, had been a close associate of Chou. With this circle Chou Mi shared a passionate interest in painting and calligraphy as well as poetry. Returning to Hu-chou once a year, Chou appears to have joined them and pursued his artistic interests. Although none of Chou's paintings and calligraphy have survived, he is known to have practiced calligraphy and excelled in painting plums, bamboos, orchids, and rocks. Chou Mi in turn may have imparted his skills in poetry to the other members of the group. It is possible that during these gatherings, the group lamented the fall of the dynasty, its members having withdrawn from public service.
None considered it his duty to join the resistance, but in the early 1280s they did not entertain thoughts of reemerging into public life in the new regime. In gathering with friends to talk of the past, compose poetry and pursue their artistic passions, they were not unlike the other loyalist groups discussed in Chapter Five. Beginning in 1286 with the recruitment of Chao Meng-fu by Ch'eng Chü-fu, all of the Eight Talents except for Ch'ien Hsüan eventually entered Yuan employment. Thus with the exception of Ch'ien, the entire group has traditionally been classified as collaborators rather than Sung loyalists, ignoring the fact that for an entire decade from 1276-86, their life-style was identical to that of Chou Mi and and the other loyalists.

Ch'ien Hsüan, considered by art historians as the most important of the loyalist artists, was a generation older than Chao Meng-fu and the other members of the group. After the collapse of the Sung, as a chin-shih and former official of the conquered dynasty, Ch'ien felt deep sorrow and could not respond to the summons to office. Subsequently, Ch'ien preferred to keep his own company; he is said to have painted only in solitude and when drunk. His protest against the new regime is said to have been manifested in his archaic styles, in which he showed nostalgic longing for the past and for the cultural roots. In spite of the different road he took from Chao Meng-fu and the others, the rumour about his rupture with Chao seems to have been groundless. On the contrary, Ch'ien showed keen interest in Chao's acquisitions of paintings and art objects in the course of the latter's official travels under the Yuan.

However, it was in Hang-chou that Chou became the focus of a loyalist group that embraced his old friends: the Li brothers, Ch'iu
Yüan, Chang Yen, Pai T'ing (Ch'iu Yüan's friend), and Chang Chung-shih (Mou Yen's son-in-law). With the exception of the Li brothers, it appears that most of his earlier friends from Hang-chou had died or returned to their respective homes after the collapse of the Sung. Chou's companions at this period thus belonged to a younger generation. Chang Yen was related to him through his father Chang Shu; Chang Chung-shih came from the same lineage as Chang Yen and could well have been a cousin. Chang Yen, Ch'iu Yüan (a native of Hang-chou), and Pai T'ing (a native of Ch'ing-yüan whose original surname was Shu) were young, promising poets in Hang-chou. Chang Yen and Ch'iu Yüan had accompanied Chou to Kuei-chi in 1279 and participated in the poetry gatherings deprecating the looting of the imperial tombs. In the early 1280s Chou wrote poetry and went on brief excursions on a modest scale with these young friends, sharing with them the sorrowful sentiments towards the collapsed Sung. Of these young companions, Chang Yen was the only one who did not serve the Yüan. From an aristocratic family which in its heyday patronized eminent poets, after the collapse of the dynasty Chang Yen appears to have suffered the most from the loss of material wealth. For the next four decades of his life he became a pathetic figure, wandering through various parts of the country to seek wealthy patrons, the only alternative to selling essays and teaching. In 1286-87 Pai T'ing and Ch'iu Yüan participated in the Yüeh-ch'üan yin-she poetry competition held in Wu-chou, where they became acquainted with the loyalist circle of Hsieh Ao and Fang Feng, as well as Lien Wen-feng, the top winner of the competition. Upon returning to Hang-chou, Ch'iu and Pai most likely brought these new friends to Chou Mi, Chang Chung-shih, and Chang Yen. A new friend that seems to have been made in Hang-chou at
this time was T'u Yüeh 屬約 (fl. 1260-1300), a native of Hang-chou and scholar-poet. At the end of the Sung a few Buddhist monks and Taoist priests took up the loyalist cause; after the dynasty collapsed, it appears that some former Sung officials entered monasteries to assert their loyalty to the Sung. Wen Jih-kuan 溫日觀 (fl. 1270-1300) was a Buddhist monk, a skilled painter of grapes, who expressed indignation at Yang Lien-ch'.en-chia's desecration of the imperial tombs. The Sung loyalists were in general eclectic in their religious views, but Chou Mi and his circle tended to favour Taoist teachings and associated with a large number of Taoist priests. In 1289 Chou was accompanied by Ch'iu Yuan, Lien Wen-feng, and Chang Chung-shih on an outing (his second) to the nearby Ta-ti Mountain Taoist retreat, where he met Teng Mu, a native of Hang-chou, Taoist recluse and Confucian scholar. Having never served the Sung, Teng's withdrawal to the mountains was a purely "voluntary" gesture prompted by loyalist feelings to the Sung. In his allegorical autobiographical essay, he shows that he could tolerate life (presumably under Mongol rule) only if he had no knowledge of anything, including the names of Heaven, Earth, and Man. Like Chou, the change of dynasties convinced him of the ephemeral nature of material things, and taking the concept a level higher, he felt that the change itself was activated by the incessant transformation of all matter. Chou seems to have been impressed with Teng's loyalist feelings as well as his intimate knowledge of Taoism; he felt close enough to request a preface to his poetry collection. But the two occasionally differed in opinion: while Chou attributed the collapse of the Sung to the so-called wei-hsüeh 僞學 (spurious learning) and "empty talk" of
Neo-Confucianists, Teng compared the Sung demise to a foolish man who shared his killings with a dog whose greed was not appeased and later gobbled up its benefactor. Another parallel was drawn in which a ghost oppressed the common people until the god of Heaven destroyed it and eradicated its evil doings. While Chou Mi's loyalism was not racist in substance, Teng felt strongly about barbarian rule and argued against the concept of sharing territory with barbarians whose greed was supposedly insatiable.

Teng has been considered the only philosopher and political thinker among the Sung loyalists on the basis of his two political essays, Chün-tao (The Way of the ruler) and Li-tao (The Way of the magistrates). In the former, he set forth the premise that in the ideal era of the sage kings the throne was not considered a prestigious position and nobody wished to be king. At that time the sage kings were only concerned with what they could do for the people, and not what the people could do for them. Since the Ch'in dynasty (often compared with Mongol rule by the Sung loyalists) the throne became coveted and the opposite became true. The latter essay states that because the virtuous disdained society and withdrew from it, it was no longer possible to employ only the virtuous and the talented in government. Thus corrupt and evil officials came to power and exploited the common people. It concludes by advocating the abolition of officials and prefects so that people could rule themselves, suggesting something akin to democracy and anarchy. In his criticism of despotic rulers and corrupt officials who exploited the common people, and in his advocation of revolutionary action to abolish these evils, Teng was voicing his protest against the Yüan bureaucracy as well as the late Sung absolutist state and its
magistrates. Since the ruler did not have "four eyes, two beaks, a scaly head, and wings", any ordinary person could potentially become ruler. Teng, however, did not despair like his loyalist companions, but exhibited an optimism in the future, in which he looked forward to playing an active role. This intention is clearly stated in his preface to his collection of poems and essays (of which only one-third has survived):

These poems and essays I have collected are entitled "The Lute of Po-ya". Although Po-ya 邦野 [Spring and Autumn period] was a skilful lutist, after Chung Tzu-ch'i 鍾子期 [his patron] died, he did not play [the lute] for the remainder of his life. This shows that it is difficult to appreciate the lute. Now the world has no appreciator, and my playing the lute without ceasing is foolish indeed. But Po-ya smashed his lute and broke the strings because Tzu-ch'i died. As I have not yet met [my] Tzu-ch'i, how can I know whether he has died or not? Thus I have kept these [poems and essays].

Teng Mu compared the former officials of the Sung who withdrew permanently from official life to Chung Tzu-ch'i's loyal lutist, Po-ya. As for himself who had never served the Sung, he could morally cooperate either with a new regime or a Sung restoration if the new order proved to be benevolent.

Teng Mu was intimate with a fellow Taoist recluse, Yeh Lin 嚴林 (d. 1306); the two seem to have lived and died together in the Ta-ti mountains. It has been suggested that Teng and Yeh both committed suicide to resist an attempt by the Yüan bureaucracy to recruit their services in 1305. I feel, however, that there is insufficient evidence supporting this assertion, particularly in view of the above preface which expressed Teng Mu's wish to await an opportunity to serve an enlightened ruler.

During the last two decades of his life, Teng met many of Chou's friends in other loyalist circles, in particular Wang Ying-sun, Lin
Ching-hsi, Hsieh Ao, and Shu Yüeh-hsiang, most of whom visited the Ta-ti retreat; Teng Mu also went often to Kuei-chi to see them. Chou apparently introduced Teng to Wang Ying-sun, through whom he might have met Hsieh Ao in 1294. Hsieh commuted to Hang-chou often to see his wife and through Teng Mu, Chang Chung-shih or Chou Mi, met Teng Wen-yüan, a native of Szechwan and resident of Hang-chou after the Sung demise. At that time Teng Wen-yüan was sharing a house with Chang Chung-shih and his brother.

Chou Mi, together with Teng Mu and Hsieh Ao, have often been considered the key loyalist figures in Hang-chou. Although Chou and Hsieh shared many friends, there is no direct evidence showing the two personally knew each other. Chou's role was not so much in being a key loyalist personality in Hang-chou as in supplying a link with other loyalist groups and in providing a venue for loyalist visitors passing through Hang-chou. One of these occasions took place in 1288, when Chou Mi invited fourteen friends, including natives of Hang-chou and temporary residents, to celebrate the completion of his pond. On that day his guests were urged to compose poetry and forget about the sorrows of the day. Chou Mi also displayed his art objects for his friends to admire and write colophons on.

Tai Piao-yüan was the most significant visitor to Hang-chou and he became a popular personality among Chou Mi's coterie. A fellow countryman of Pai T'ing (whom he met in Hang-chou) and Chou Mi's friend Ch'en Yün-p'ing, Tai came from a scholar-official family of modest means. When his official career terminated with the collapse of the Sung, he was left virtually destitute; during 1276-79 he sought refuge among the Ch'ing-yüan loyalists. A man of strong commitment to his family, he immediately hired himself out as a
private tutor, selling essays to supplement a meagre living. At times he actually tilled the land and begged for donations. His teaching duties took him frequently to Hang-chou, where he resided for many years in the 1280s and 1290s next door to Chang Chung-shih and Teng Wen-yüan. Chou might have initially introduced Tai to the latter two; in any case, Tai soon found himself most welcome in Chou's circle and established many lifelong relationships. Among these were Ch'ao Meng-fu, Chang Yen, Ch'iü Yüan, Pai T'ing, T'u Yüeh, Hsien-yü Shu, Wang Ying-sun, Hsieh Ao, and Teng Mu. That Chou was the first point of contact is documented; Tai recorded that it was through Chou that he had first heard about Pai T'ing, from whom he made the acquaintance of Ch'iu Yüan. Tai was a participant in many of the activities surrounding Chou's circle, but he often stood outside the circle to allow him to observe objectively the effects of dynastic change on the Hang-chou literati. These comments are extant in the form of "descriptive essays" on studios and academies associated with these men, as well as in prefaces and postscripts on his contemporaries' travels and writings. He also wrote prefaces to most of Chou's later poetry and pi-chi collections, commenting on the impact of the Mongol conquest on Chou Mi's work and life-style. Unlike Chou and his helpless friends in the 1280s who lamented the fall of the dynasty, Tai exhibited a practical and rational acceptance of the change. He did not whine about his poverty, nor did he feel embarrassed about accepting donations of food and money. After witnessing the decadence of writings and the piteous decline of the social and economic status of the Hang-chou literati, it was this rational, calm and objective attitude that made him take upon himself the task of ch'ung-chen ssu-wen 重振斯文 (to maintain and revive the standard of culture
and the status of the literati).

III. Chou Mi and His Contacts with Northerners and Non-Chinese

Southern scholars like Fang Hui and Chou Mi often complained about ill-treatment and oppression by northern Chinese and foreign peoples serving in south China. However, in spite of this general resentment, several northerners counted conspicuously among Chou Mi's circle. Beginning in the mid-1280s, he expanded his network of friends while pursuing his interests in art, and came into contact with northern Chinese in the employ of the Yuan government who chose to settle in Hang-chou, or whose official duties took them nearby. One outstanding personality among them was Hsien-yü Shu, who as administrator witnessed the destruction of Yang-chou and showed sympathy for the Sung loyalist movement. A notable calligrapher and art connoisseur, Hsien-yü Shu shared with Chou a passion for the arts and became closely acquainted with many of Chou's friends. Another close companion was Li K'an (1245-1320), a native of Chi-chou (Hopei) and skilful ink painter of bamboo. Li K'an was Chou Mi's principal informant about northern art styles, foreign customs, and unusual occurrences. Apart from Li K'an and Hsien-yü Shu, there were other northerners and non-Chinese who became connoisseur colleagues and "travelling companions" of Chou Mi, a circle drawn together by mutual interest in painting and art connoisseurship. They included the Central Asian Kao K'o-kung (1248-1310), the northern Chinese Kuo T'ien-hsi (fl. 1270-1320) and Ch'iao K'uei-ch'eng (fl. 1270-1320), and an Uighur, Lien Hsi-kung (1240-1300). The latter was the younger brother of Lien
Hsi-hsien, known inter alia for his adherence to Confucian mourning for his mother. To these new acquaintances Chou introduced his Hang-chou art collector friends, among them Wang Chih (fl. 1270-1300). Among the loyalist groups scattered in regional centres Chou Mi played an integrating role by introducing his friends to each other. Now, within this enlarged circle, Chou brought his new acquaintances into contact with his old companions and colleagues. It seems that Chou knew Hsien-yü Shu and Li K'an first, who along with others, were introduced to Chao Meng-fu and his painter friends in Hu-chou. Mou Yen and Tai Piao-yüan were similarly befriended by Hsien-yü Shu and the others. The setting for these introductions was in the form of social gatherings, during which all of Chou's friends, Yuan officials and loyalists, were invited; Chou Mi also accepted their invitations and thus met new arrivals to Hang-chou. The participants have recorded at least three such events.

In 1287, Chou acquired a rubbing of Wang Hsien-chih's (344-388) Pao-mu chih (Epitaph to the governess) and invited his friends to view it and write colophons on the scroll. Among the guests were Hsien-yü Shu, Ch'iu Yüan, Pai T'ing, and Teng Wen-yüan. Other friends who were not present at the unveiling were later invited to view the new acquisition and contribute a colophon: these visitors included Chao Meng-fu, Wang I-sun, Wang Ying-sun, Wang I-chien, and Lü T'ung-lao. Another gathering occurred in 1293, at Hsien-yü Shu's residence, for a viewing of a "translucent" bronze mirror acquired by Hsien-yü. In 1298, Hsien-yü Shu held another private exhibition to examine a piece of calligraphy by Wang Hsi-chih (321-379). Again during these occasions northerners and
southerners, loyalists and nonloyalists gathered in close companionship through their common interests.

Beginning in the late 1280s and even more so in the 1290s, Chou’s activities centred primarily in art connoisseurship rather than poetry gatherings. They took the form of visits to private collections and libraries, accompanied by Hsien-yü Shu and Wang Chih in particular. Without some contact with high Yuan officials, it is unlikely that Chou and his friends could have had the opportunity to view collections such as the former Sung imperial library. The visits were thorough and systematic, so that Chou was able to make notes in the Chih-ya t'ang tsa-ch'ao志雅堂雜抄 and enter them as catalogues in the Yun-yen kuo-yen lu雲煙過眼錄. With the generous patronage offered by his relative Yang Ta-shou, and the influence of Yuan officials, Chou Mi was not destitute but he often regretted no longer owning a substantial private collection. During the visits to these private collections his objective was two-fold: to appreciate the art objects per se, and to describe them in detail so that he needed not actually possess such articles to recapture their beauty. He consoled himself with the thought that in the final analysis it was better to own a catalogue, and not to worry about coveting treasures and then fearing their destruction or loss through theft. Through these outings, Chou’s network of relationships extended to other Yuan dignitaries like the myriarch Fei Kung-ch’en費拱辰(fl. 1270-1300), whose collections he was invited to view and perhaps catalogue. He may also have been commissioned by them to acquire various art objects, acting in some respects as a dealer.
While Chou was freely mingling with both loyalists and those serving the Yüan bureaucracy, the majority of the former group gradually reemerged from their political withdrawal and broke away from the decision not to serve two dynasties. Like Chou Mi, they had suffered loss of material wealth and of political and social status during the uprooting years of the Sung collapse. Up to that time they had been relying on private teaching or family savings, patrons or donations to support themselves and their families. Drinking and composing poetry among friends were diversions rather than the fulltime occupation for many in Chou's circle. Chao Meng-fu was the first to reemerge into public office in 1287, during the well-known Ch'eng Chü-fu mission to recruit men of talent to the Yüan court.\(^94\) The fact that Chao Meng-fu had spent a decade in compulsory eremitism in Hu-chou, in the company of the Eight Talents of Wu-hsing, is often forgotten in the light of this "unforgivable" service to the Yüan. The guilt of deserting his principles was considerably exacerbated by the fact that he was an imperial clansman; he felt it intensely for the rest of his life and carried it into his paintings and poems. But right from the time that he was recruited, he hesitated and showed uneasiness about the position that he did not initially seek nor happily accept. In a preface to farewell Wu Ch'eng (1249-1333), who was returning to south China instead of taking up a post in Ta-tu,\(^95\) Chao expressed envy for Wu's return and asked him to explain his dilemma to his friends in Hu-chou and Hang-chou, who might not understand why he had responded to the summons:

Scholars when young maintain their studies at home; many wish to come out and make practical use of their studies for the country. That would allow the wisdom of the sages and the virtuous to extend all over the empire. That was the original motive of scholars. And yet often they
stay in seclusion and feel satisfied among the vegetation and the cliffs, and even though dying in old age, they would still not regret it. Is that not fearing the will of Heaven and grieving over one's poverty? If truly one withdraws and ponders over what he studies, what is useful and what is not useful to the current times? When can studies be put into practice and when not be put into practice? Thus the plans for our emergence are clearly determined by our wishes. It is not for the purpose of settling and finding an abode. In recent years, the [Yüan] emperor sent envoys to inspect the area south of the Yangtze to seek the virtuous and talented in order to plan for and rule the empire. And so the censor Mr Ch'eng [Chü-fu] was also despatched. Mr. Ch'eng understood well the emperor's desire for talented minds, thus he got Mr Wu Ch'eng of Lin-ch'uan to return with him [to Ta-tu]. Mr Wu is widely learned and knows many things: the Classics are thoroughly understood by him and his conduct is impeccable. He is up to date and knows about current affairs—a truly excellent choice. I was somehow also put on the list of the recommended.

After arriving at the capital, Mr. Wu changed his mind and wished to return, saying: "My learning is of no practical use here; it cannot be put into practice." I then composed a poem on T'ao Ch'ien and two on Chu Hsi, and returned [to my quarters in Ta-tu]. Mr. Wu's heart is the same as mine. My talents cannot measure up to his by one hundredth. When he is gone, what will become of me?

In my native district there is my teacher, Mr. Ao Chün-shan. Ch'ien Hsüan, Hsiao Tzu-chung, Chang Fu-heng, Ch'en Chung-hsin, Yao Shih, and Ch'en Wu-i [i.e., six of the Eight Talents] are my friends. With these several friends in my native home I have travelled among the mountains and the waters—and was happy indeed. Reading books and strumming the lute I now entertain myself. How could one have suspected that the Creator would not spare me? And how can I be of any use?

The day Mr. Wu left [for south China], he said to me: "I shall soon leave and travel down the Yangtze and seek your friends." I then presented him with my three poems as a parting gift and listed the names of my teacher and friends for him to visit and inform them of my situation. "Tai Piao-yüan, a native of Ch'ing-yüan, and Teng Wen-yüan, a native of Szechwan, are also my friends. When you arrive in Hang-chou, to them also convey my feelings."

We observe from the preface that Chao would have been happy to remain in Hu-chou had he not been summoned. Apparently Chao's acceptance did affect for a short time Chou Mi's friendship for Chao, which may have been the reason why Chou was not mentioned among the string of acquaintances Wu Ch'eng was asked to visit. The break in relationship did not last long; three years later Chao was writing to
Chou conveying his weariness in office and his longing to resign and return to south China among his friends:

In the dusk the deserted streets emit a white mist,  
On the way home, the prized horse cannot gallop fast enough.  
Tomorrow morning—rise again at the rooster's crow,  
Disappointed again—my desire to doze in the shade of flowers at high noon.  
Three years wearily have I served as secretary in the Ministry of State,  
Even in dreams my heart is never away from my native place.  
This longing I communicate to Master Chou of Hang-chou,  
Burning incense in his Soul-searching Studio.97

The relationship was perhaps restored by Chou Mi's avid interest in the cultural and artistic opportunities opened up by the reunification of the country, which Chao Meng-fu was able to take advantage of in the capacity of a Yuan official and artist. Chao Meng-fu often visited Hang-chou and brought back examples of northern trends and styles of painting, calligraphy, and other art objects. Through Chao, Chou also heard about customs and practices of northerners and foreign peoples. In view of Chou's deep concern for his ancestral home in Ch'i-chou, when Chao Meng-fu returned to Hang-chou in 1295 he painted from memory the landscape of Ch'i-chou and presented the painting to Chou to enable his friend to visualize the place of origin he had never seen but always claimed as his.98

In a poem written to Chou after the meeting in 1296 Chao indicated his relief that Chou was among the few friends who really understood him.99 Through Chao, Chou met other Mongol dignitaries and northern Chinese, including the above-mentioned myriarch Fei (father-in-law of Chao's daughter), who had defected to the Mongols in 1275.

After Chao Meng-fu, Chou witnessed other friends leaving to take up positions in the Mongol court. These included Wang I-sun (in 1288), Ch'en Yün-p'ing (1291), Yuan Chüeh (1295), T'u Yüeh (1296), and Teng Wen-yüan (1298).100 Few responded to the summons without
misgivings, but reassurances by northern friends already in Yüan employment such as Li K'an, Kuo T'ien-hsi, and Hsien-yü Shu allayed their scruples about accepting office. These Yüan officials and artist friends had first recommended them to office. In about 1300 the young poet Pai T'ing finally accepted an office from Li K'an, after rejecting Bayan's offer in 1275 and that of Ch'eng Chü-fu in 1286-87. Among those recommended by Kao K'o-kung were Teng Wen-yüan, Ao Chùn-shan, Yao Shih, and Ch'en Wu-i. Those who finally entered the Yüan government reassured others on their visits home, arguing that the anticipated obstacles to adjusting to a new style of life were insignificant. In virtually all cases, the stated excuse for hesitating to serve was the fear of being incompetent, but it appears that the real reason for former Sung officials was uneasiness about serving another dynasty. Nevertheless, Wang I-sun reluctantly took office but resigned a short while later, while Ch'en Yün-p'ing arrived at Ta-tu and returned without serving. T'u Yüeh and Yüan Chüeh declined office several times before accepting at the urgings of Tai Piao-yüan. It is noteworthy that after Chou Mi's death in 1298, many more in his circle became Yüan officials, and these included Ch'iu Yüan, Pai T'ing, and Tai Piao-yüan. Like many of his friends, Ch'iu Yüan was most unhappy in his service as an instructor in a prefecture, and explained to them that his decision to accept office was due to poverty and hunger, and not because he wished to become eminent and wealthy:

Before serving I longed always to serve;  
When serving I wish to return home.  
It then became clear that it is proper to return  
And I realize that my seeking employment was wrong.  
I took up employment basically due to poverty,  
And not due to envy for great wealth.  
.....

The times are hard with scholars losing employment,  
Out of ten families nine are cold and hungry.
How could I not think of the concerns of Yü and [Hou]-chi [i.e., plight of the empire]? My strength limited—my will opposed.  

For the same reasons, Tai Piao-yüan wanted to take up a post and in 1302 was recommended to office. However, he served for only five years and returned home.

Most of these former Sung officials and degree-holders served as education officials; their offices ranged from t'i-chü (superintendent of schools, 5B), chiao-shou (instructor of a prefecture, 8-9), to unranked positions such as haüeh-cheng (supervisor of schools), shan-chang (director of schools or academies). Ranked positions were appointments from the Yüan court, while unranked offices were appointed at the provincial or local level. It seems that some loyalists finally accepted unranked offices but rejected appointments from the central bureaucracy. For those who felt guilty about serving, the price was indeed high, for even positions as instructorships fetched a meagre remuneration of only thirty to forty ounces of silver; thus in spite of their service they did not end up much better off than before. In exceptional cases, however (e.g., Chao Meng-fu, Yüan Chüeh, Teng Wen-yüan, Pai T'ing), more distinguished and financially rewarding positions were reached.

V. The Loyalism of Chou Mi, 1276-86

After the collapse of the Sung, Chou's loyalism was first characterized by his close association with loyalist personalities active in various regions in south China. As a former subject, his loyalism was not so much directed to the Sung ruler as to Sung culture and civilization. Chou felt compelled to make use of his extensive
cultural and political experience to record the customs, culture, and arts of the former age. The Wu-lin chiu-shih 武林舊事, Yun-yen kuo-yen lu and Chueh-miao hao-tzu were written expressly for this purpose. The first was an attempt to update and supplement previous regional records of Hang-chou; it contains rich material on court protocol and imperial festivities since the transfer of the Sung capital to the south, graduation ceremonies of chin-shih graduates, popular festivals and entertainment centres, and even the names of dishes served in Hang-chou restaurants. Chou's sources were unofficial and private. As stated in his preface, the work recorded material he had heard from retired officials when he was a child; the details were supplemented by practical experience gained when he was an official. Only after the change of dynasty did he feel the ephemeral nature of the pleasures and customs described in the work which, like the companionship of old friends, were subject to the vicissitudes of the times: "I thought life was always like this; earlier I did not realize that peace and pleasurable things are difficult to come by." He often related these events to his children, who did not believe him, and thus in order to preserve at least the memory of the past age and its glories, he wrote them down for posterity. Following the same intention, the Yun-yen kuo-yen lu is a description of forty-five private art collections (i.e., all private except for that of the former Sung imperial library), and the Chueh-miao hao-tzu is an anthology of almost four hundred tz'u poems by over a hundred Southern Sung poets. Without Chou's writings, some of these sources on the Southern Sung period would not otherwise have been preserved.

Chou considered himself a serious historian and felt compelled to
supplement certain historical events by the particular views of his family. After reading through the records and diaries of his maternal and paternal grandfathers who were both prominent statesmen, he believed (as his father did) that official versions were biased and not up to the standard of his family's records. Because the family library was completely destroyed and he was the last person to have read the books therein, he felt an obligation to draw on his memory to reproduce the contents. Such was the motivation under which he wrote the Ch'i-tung yeh-yü.

Chou was particularly annoyed at the current historiographical tradition of evaluating a person's merits or crimes through his final victory or defeat. Thus he opposed the extra incrimination heaped on the disgraced "treacherous officials", Chia Ssu-tao and Han T'o-chou, because imperial objects had been found in their residences after their fall from power. He admitted that his wife's family also owned such objects through the spontaneous generosity of the emperor. Although Chou, like his contemporaries, blamed Chia for the Sung collapse, he attempted to be objective and just. Thus he considered that despite his other faults, Chia did manage to control the abuses of the imperial relatives, eunuchs, and university students. To be fair to Chia, Chou allocated partial blame for the fall of the Sung on the so-called Neo-Confucian philosophers, who, in Chou's opinion, concentrated on "pure discussions" rather than practical methods to retrieve the precarious state of the country.

A combination of his historical inclinations and loyalist standing is seen in his views on the legitimacy of the Yuan succession to the Sung. He agreed with his former colleague Ch'en Kuo, who
elucidated seven breaks and six continuations of orthodox succession from the disintegration of the Chou dynasty up to the collapse of the T'ang.\textsuperscript{117} It seems that both Chou and Ch'en were hoping for a continuation after the present break (Mongol rule), an indication of optimism in their outlook for the future.

Chou's loyalist feelings were also evident in his outrage at the excavation and desecration of the Sung imperial tombs. Apart from condemning Yang Lien-chen-chia, he denounced the Chinese monks who curried favour with Yang by first giving him the idea to loot the graves. In these accounts he used supernatural and retributive elements to prove his point that a bad end would befall those responsible for the infamous incident.\textsuperscript{118}

Chou stood as an ardent loyalist in his harsh criticism of defectors and collaborators. His accounts of their undignified defection all follow the same pattern of ridicule and censure. Before the Mongols set foot in the district, each of these officials made a public declaration of their loyalty to the Sung and determination to repel the enemy forces, and to die if that mission failed; later they could not be found and when the common people assumed that they had died for the Sung cause and mourned them, it turned out that they had left their defence posts to welcome the Mongol army.\textsuperscript{119} The criticism of Fang Hui, who surrendered to the Mongols in early 1276, was severe and extended to Fang's disloyalty to Chia Ssu-tao and to his allegedly debauched private life.\textsuperscript{120} Despite his attempts to be fair in portraying individuals (as in the case of Chia Ssu-tao), Chou's depiction of Fang Hui was highly prejudiced and most likely resulted from a feud between them. The two actually shared many friends in Hang-chou and in other prefectures, from the loyalists Ma
T'ing-luan and Mou Yen to the northerner Yüan official Li K'an.

If Chou was excessive in his mockery of Fang Hui, he was silent about his friends who also surrendered to the Mongols. They included Yüan Hung and Fei Kung-ch'ên, with whom he continued to be friends in the next two decades. Later, when his friends departed for the Yüan capital to serve the new regime, although he might have been displeased he did not criticize them in public or in his writings. The double standard he applied is evident in his record of the incident in which Chao Meng-fu composed a poem to mock the disloyalty and expediency of the former Sung chief minister Liu Meng-yen, at the time when Chao and Liu were both serving at the Yüan court. Thus Chou's historical objectivity was adversely affected by his personal relationships and feelings.

The defectors were criticized for their disloyalty to the Sung, but a more serious issue to Chou was their general fickleness and hypocrisy. Chou particularly upbraided scholar-officials in Hang-chou whom he felt were friendly and approachable when one was of equal social and economic status; however, once the other party fell into dire straits, the turnabout was brutal and total. In contrast, Chou applauded the obscure individuals such as a physician formerly in the employ of the Empress Dowager Hsieh who continued to show loyalty to the former sovereign years after the collapse of the dynasty. Chou's friend Tai Piao-yüan also expressed his indignation at prominent men in Hang-chou, who were arrogant and superficial. Such criticism of the lack of morals and integrity among Hang-chou men reveals the tensions present among the elite circles of the former Sung capital. Perhaps, indeed, there were not a few collaborators who turned against former friends and colleagues who had suffered a
drastic decline in social and economic status.

VI. Chou Mi's Loyalism: Transformation in the late 1280s and 1290s

It would be a serious mistake to regard Chou Mi's loyalty as unchanging and only concerned with the preservation of Sung cultural and art history. Beginning in the late 1280s, as his circle of friends expanded to include northerners and Yuan officials, the content and orientation of his writings took on new dimensions and showed a transformation of his loyalty and an unevenness in the historical accuracy of his writings. The work to be discussed in particular is the Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, a pi-chi miscellany written from 1280 to 1298. Through his connoisseurship activities undertaken with friends of diverse backgrounds, Chou was exposed to the positive effects of the reunification of the country. From these new friends, he eagerly elicited information about Szechwan, north China, and even foreign territories, their customs and practices. Apart from poetry gatherings and art exhibits, Chou considered informal visits by friends of different backgrounds and political views the highlight of his later years. With them Chou shared memories of the past era and the glories of the former dynasty, and exchanged the latest gossip about the literati and historical figures. The topics of these conversations ranged from the arts, poetry and poetics to culture in general, archaeological excavations, fantastic tales, freakish occurrences, local customs, historical and political marginalia, autobiographical and biographical observations, and mere gossip. Because such conversations provided some introspective moments, brief laughter and enjoyment, Chou Mi felt the urge to write them down so they could be reread and he could thus recapture the laughter and
pleasures of the visits. Thus to amuse himself and relieve his boredom became the major motivation for his writing the Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, unlike his earlier sole concern to preserve the memory of a past age.

Chou Mi, in fact, was often engaged in writing several miscellanies at the same time, which accounts for the duplication of information. Because some items were entered after conversations with friends, it follows that his visitors could also record the same item, as in the case of one appearing almost verbatim in Pai T'ing's collected writings. In a preface to his writings, Pai T'ing, like Chou Mi, stated that he was merely recording what he and his guests were discussing earlier. Thus Chou's influence on his younger contemporaries extended from poetry to their pi-chi works.

Chou indicated in his preface that the entries were made at night when he was feeling lonely and sad. As they consisted of recollections and reminiscences of earlier talks, mistakes regarding dates and other details are therefore frequently present. To be sure, Chou stated that he was often forgetful and could only recall a small part of the whole. The historical reliability of an item is also dependent on its nature and the informant. Hsien-yü Shu, Chao Meng-fu, and Li K'an were the major informants on the arts, culture and customs of north China and foreign lands. If the material was reported at second hand and dealt with something the informant was not familiar with, the item can be dismissed as hearsay and unreliable. An example of this is the fantastic tale about promiscuous Mongol women having sexual intercourse with the offspring of a wild horse and a dragon. Often a credulous person, Chou Mi sometimes exercised common sense in rejecting as groundless rumours stories like the
killing of albino children by Muslims in order to obtain pearls from their brains. Material dealing with poetry and art collections, of which both Chou Mi and his informants were familiar with, are undoubtedly highly accurate. Given Chou's familiarity and personal experience, the social customs and culture of Hang-chou in the late Southern Sung can be regarded as reliable portrayals. As for historical and biographical information, each case must be determined separately. Regarding the additional information on historical events drawn from his family library, even accounting for his family's bias against the Neo-Confucian school of Chu Hsi, one can perhaps still assume a reasonable standard of reliability.

A crucial point to consider when evaluating Chou Mi as an historian is the nature of pi-chi miscellanies, which consisted of items entered casually as in a diary. Anything that came to mind was jotted down without thought to organization or relevance to the previous entry. Thus the content of these works was not the result of meticulous research, but merely an opinion of the moment. To draw on Chou Mi's work for events of the Sung and Yüan periods as reliable simply because he was a contemporary is thus not always sound policy. Modern historians, however, have often indiscriminately quoted Chou for elucidation and support of certain facts and records to supplement other historical sources. To account for some errors (such as the wrong people, dates and facts) in Chou Mi's work, a modern scholar has simplistically suggested that Chou deliberately "mixed history and gossip" in order to avoid Mongol censorship. It is clear from the above discussion that these mistakes resulted from a combination of Chou's forgetfulness and the circumstances under which he wrote.

Chou Mi's writings have traditionally been interpreted as
supporting evidence of his passive resistance to Mongol rule and uncompromising loyalty to the Sung, in addition to a desire to "requite" the former dynasty by preserving its relics and culture. After an examination of his various sources and informants as well as his motives for writing, this view of Chou's loyalism appears to be exaggerated. As stated earlier, jotting down miscellaneous notes was often an activity that relieved his boredom and allowed him to recapture the earlier pleasures of conversations among friends. By the 1290s few of these friends remained staunch loyalists but were in fact about to enter, or already in, Yuan employment. Perhaps in the years immediately after the Sung collapse, Chou genuinely intended to record the history of the Sung as a passive protest to Mongol rule, but towards the mid-1280s and increasingly more so in later years that was no longer his sole motivation in his random jottings.

Chou Mi's life after the Sung demise was both typical and atypical of his scholar-official contemporaries. Like them, he lost his financial independence, but in his case he found a generous patron (his relative, Yang Ta-shou) who provided him with a comfortable living. He thus avoided the need to teach or to compose essays on commission, a situation that confronted his many friends who had been Sung officials. It has been suggested that Chou was commissioned by Yuan officials and local magnates in Mongol employ to catalogue their private collections of paintings and art objects, and so in the course of his work he could not avoid socializing with these nonloyalists and thus undermined his reputation as a loyalist. Chou does not seem to have been genuinely destitute, as he could afford to have several studios and acquire art objects. Some acquisitions may of course have
been gifts from Yuan dignitaries to repay services rendered.

Chou Mǐ's life was atypical in another area—the nature of his surviving writings. His friends left collected prose and poetry, including numerous prefaces and "descriptive essays" written for contemporaries. Many of these writings on Chou Mǐ's works survive, but there is no record that Chou wrote any preface and essay in return. While many of his friends taught privately and made lasting teacher-pupil relationships, Chou had few or no students after the collapse of the Sung.

Contrary to previous assumptions, it should be noted that Chou's decrepitude (except for the brief period of introspection in 1280-81) did not set in until a decade after the Sung collapse because, as noted above, he maintained a rather lively life-style with old and new friends. But as the years passed and more of his friends left Hang-chou to take up appointment as education officials, Chou Mǐ became less active, his aged appearance and frequent mood changes contrasting sharply with his earlier gay and colourful life. Though he still participated in connoisseurship outings, he became increasingly concerned with the past and with his roots, a sentiment which took on a more personal and poignant significance. He thought incessantly about his ancestral home in Ch'i-chou as well as the destroyed family home in Hu-chou. The sobriquets adopted in this late phase of life reflected his mental anguish in feeling distant and detached from these two places.

In 1291, with this nostalgic and sensitive frame of mind and contemplating his death, Chou had a mountain hut constructed next to his ancestors' graves in Hu-chou. He even composed his own funerary inscription and epitaph, instructing his cousin Wang Ying-sun to fill
in the dates of his death. In the epitaph he evaluated his life and justified parts of it that needed qualification:

The old man of Pien-yang, Chou Mi, was styled Kung-chin. My ancestors were natives of Ch'i [Shantung]....I was first hired in the Treasury Department in Chien-k'ang through the merits of my grandfather. I was honest and diligent, and regarded as talented. Thus six times there were appointment letters, and I was transferred to the transport and pharmacy offices in the capital, and the military governments. From the Feng-ch'u Granary I was promoted and soon the court despatched me to administer I-wu in Wu-chou. My life ambition to bring glory to the family can thus be said to have been fulfilled. And yet the times were constantly in transition, and my goals were not realized even at an old age. Was that not the doing of Heaven!

During [1261-64] when the limitation of land [i.e., Chia Su-tao's land reform scheme] was carried out, Ch'ang-chou was most seriously affected. The court ordered me to supervise it; upon arrival [in accordance with central government policy] I confiscated three-tenths of the excess land above the limit allowed, and thus greatly opposed the wishes of the powerful [local] officials.

Before trouble descended on me, it happened that my mother was taken ill and I immediately returned to look after her. For the next year I attended to her health diligently but she died the next year. During this experience of bereavement, I arranged the funeral to the best of my abilities and then edited the Shen-chung pien in five chapters. My three younger sisters were all born from my father's concubines, but I tried my best to marry them to prominent families. To distant relatives who were poor I gave assistance generously; to those who became ill I disregarded any inconvenience and sent them medicine and remedies. Even with small living creatures such as insects and worms, I wanted to sustain their life. I was unyielding and abhorred crimes. If I heard of anything unjust, my hair bristled and I knocked my fist, and would not condone it. From a tender age I was bright and quick at learning, and I admired and respected the lofty. My family owned many books, many of which I copied by hand; even when old I did not abandon this....As for the causes of orderly government and chaos, I would examine the truth and not like to follow the [current opinions] and echo them...My family collected many famous paintings and calligraphy books, all of which I have catalogued in a volume. Now not one-hundredth [of the collection] has survived, and yet my hobby to dwell in antiquities is still as strong. My nature is humorous....I mingle easily in common circles, and yet defiled men cannot contaminate me [my emphasis]. During the change of dynasty my old home collapsed....and I thus became a man of Hang-chou....I have written [eight books]....I have roughly cultivated my virtues and refrained from shame....With the veteran men whom I met, appreciated, and [who] helped me [and] with prominent men of the time, I
soared up and down for over twenty years. But in my life I have not turned against my integrity and have not rebelled against the instructions of my family. In my office and associations, from beginning to end I have not deviated from the norm, and can almost [without guilt] face my parents in the underworld...  

In this self-appraisal, Chou was certainly much more confident than the erudite scholar Wang Ying-lin towards his conduct after the collapse of the Sung. The statement that he remained pure even among the contaminated was most likely provoked by current criticism of him mingling with Yuan dignitaries, which cast doubt on his loyalism to the Sung. He was certain that he had fulfilled his filial commitments by being in office for a long period, but blamed the change of dynasty for an undistinguished political career. Chou felt no remorse for what he did or did not accomplish in his life, and ended the epitaph with a note of confidence, claiming that in a thousand years, his mind would be known and understood by posterity. He seems to have been prepared for death and was certain that he would feel no shame or guilt when facing his ancestors.

After composing the inscription and epitaph, Chou asked his lifetime friend Mou Yen to write prefaces for the inscription and for the mountain hut. Mou was impressed with Chou's feelings for his ancestral homes and for the past; and he marvelled at his readiness to cope with death. Chou also requested a preface from Yuan Chüeh, son of his former colleague and friend, Yuan Hung. In contrast to the personal and intimate tone of Mou Yen's prefaces, Yuan's piece is flat and impersonal, a large part of it quoting Chou Mi. This might have been an indication that Yuan Chüeh was not pleased about Chou's indiscriminate circle of friends, for he later wrote about him: "In his late life [Chou Mi] mixed with prominent men through connoisseur activities and slightly blemished his character."
Chou died in 1298, just after another art connoisseurship gathering at Hsien-yü Shu's house. Ironically, in spite of his many friends, his death was not commented on, nor were there any funerary inscriptions written for him. The one exception was a mourning poem composed by Lien Wen-feng, not one of his closest friends. The silence over his death is responsible for the current controversy about the date of his death (1298, 1299, or 1308). I take 1298 as the most likely, on the basis of a colophon on the Pao-mu chih scroll and Liu Kuan's postscript to a painting by Kung K'ai. Chou was probably buried in Hu-chou, in accordance with his wishes to be interred at his place of birth among his ancestors. He was survived by a son, Yung (fl. 1290), and a daughter (who married in 1287). Chou Yung apparently did not inherit the literary skills and artistic talents, nor the popularity of his father. Soon Chou Mi's prized art possessions were given away or sold, and the family passed into obscurity.

In this chapter we have observed the loyalism of Chou Mi and his "travelling companions"—the essence of which was not total passive protest to Mongol rule but a subtle accommodation with the new era, regime, and institutions. Chou might have begun as an ardent loyalist in 1279, refusing to accept the new rulers and writing about Sung institutions to preserve the past and ignore the new order. Soon, however, through his interest in art and because of the reunification of the country, he came into contact with Sung defectors, northerners, and Yüan officials and through them developed a keen interest in other regions under Mongol domination. Through his passion for the arts and trends in the north, Chou unconsciously played the role of mediator and integrator between his loyalist friends and the Yüan dynasty.
Through the gradual reemergence into the political arena of Chou Mi's friends we observe that absolute loyalism (i.e., refusal to cooperate with the new government under any terms) dissolved and was transformed into a more accommodating variety. The exact dimensions of change varied with the personal circumstances of individual loyalists and the length of time that elapsed since the collapse. Although many of his friends eventually took up employment under the Yuan with deep regret, Chou Mi did not go as far as that. However, even Chou's liberal associations with Yuan dignitaries drew some criticism from a young contemporary. Chou Mi's attitude towards those who served was dictated by personal relationships rather than by strictly objective views. His loyalty towards his friends enabled him to condone their reemergence into public office by means of silence, but he ridiculed harshly those who surrendered whom he did not like. As for himself, his withdrawal from politics was influenced by filial commitments, but he did not see any need to exclude Yuan officials from his network of friends. In time his feelings of loyalty to the former dynasty mellowed and by the 1280s and 1290s it was no longer recognizable as resolute passive protest to Mongol rule. By then, Chou's loyalism was not as inflexible and unaccommodating as previously thought; had he lived after 1300 and been in more dire straits he might have himself accepted an appointment in the Yuan government. Of greater importance is the insight that Chou Mi's loyalism and its transformation over time and circumstances gives to the second generation under the Yuan, i.e., men who were not yet adults at the time of the Sung collapse and who never served the Sung. In spite of their descent from loyalist fathers and their tutelage under loyalist teachers, they did not see a contradiction in their
admiration of Sung loyalism and their attempt to play a more active role in the non-Chinese regime. In sum, Chou Mi's loyalty was a workable compromise with Mongol rule without sacrificing his integrity; that of his many friends was an individual choice necessitated by various circumstances.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. The primary sources for a biographical study of Chou Mi consist of his pi-chi collections and poetry, in addition to prefaces on these writings by his contemporaries. Among art historians in the West, Chou is known for his art connoisseurship and special relationship to Chao Meng-fu, the eminent Yuan artist and official. See Robert van Gulik, pp. 200-15; Li Chu-tsing, The 'Autumn Colors on the Ch'iao and Hua Mountains': A Landscape by Chao Meng-fu (Ascona, 1965), pp. 21-22; Li Chu-tsing's biography of Chou Mi in Franke, Sung Biographies, pp. 261-68. In modern Chinese scholarship Chou is considered a poet of the yung-wu subgenre and associated with Chang Yen and Ch'en Yün-p'ing. For a recent annotation of Chou's tz'u, see Wang Ying-hua, Ts'ao-ch'uang tz'u yen-chiu. Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao's chrono-biography of Chou Mi, "Chou Ts'ao-ch'uang nien-p'u" (pp. 315-82), first written in 1935 and based on the Ch'ing scholar Ku Wen-pin's earlier work, is still the most thorough study of Chou's life. But in both Chinese and Western scholarship, Chou is best known for his pi-chi, of which there are six major extant collections, all written after the fall of the Sung. For example, Gernet, in his Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, makes about forty references to Chou's works. To date, however, there is no separate study of Chou Mi in Western scholarship.

2. "On the portrait of Chou Mi" (dated 1366?), in which Wang Hsing 王行 (1331-1395) states that neither Chou Mi nor Cheng Ssu-hsiao compromised their integrity in any way. See Cheng Ssu-hsiao, So-nan wen-chi, appendix.5a-b.

3. The sixth generation ancestor Fang芳 was a hermit in the Li山 mountain; he refused a summons to the court in ca. 1070. The fifth generation ancestor Hsiao-kung 恁 was a second degree graduate and senior secretary in the Ministry of Personnel. Chou's great-great-grandfather Wei 未 received posthumous honours. His great-grandfather Pi 皮 moved to Hu-chou with sixteen family members during the transfer of the capital to Hang-chou. His grandfather Pi 皮 was senior secretary in the Ministry of Justice. See "Self-obituary of the old man of Pien-yang", in Chu Ts'un-li, Shan-hu mu-nan (Taipei, 1970), vol. 5, 428-32.

4. As evidence of the declining family fortune Chou Mi talks about his father not being able to afford some rare books in Hang-chou, which later went into the collection of Ch'ai Wang, a i-min loyalist. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.2b. On Ch'ai Wang, see Chapter Five, p. 196.

5. On Han T'o-chou, see his biography in SS 474.13771-78. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, ch'i'en.5b-12b, is a description of the famous Hu-chou gardens and residences whose magnificence appears to have declined by Chou Mi's time.

6. Ibid., ch'i'en.7a. There are also many references to him in Chou Mi's Ch'i-tung yeh-yü, 11.140; 16.211; 18.239. He seems to have been a third rank official and one of the ten top officials in the 1210s. See Charles A. Peterson, "First Sung Reactions to the Mongol Invasion of the North, 1211-17", in Haeger, Crisis and
Prosperity, p. 217, note; Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, pp. 317-18.

7. In Ch'ien-ning (Fukien) Ch'ou Mi caught golden-backed turtles and in Hang-chou watched performances by snake and animal charmers. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.17b and hou.27a-28b. The latter reference is partially translated in Gernet, pp. 224-25.

8. Chou Mi does not seem to have had any brothers; there were three half-sisters by his father's secondary wives (Chu Ts'un-li, 430). He also seems to have had a cousin or uncle who lived in Ch'ing-yüan, where Chou might have owned some property (Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 347).

9. Chou writes about himself and his mother being plagued by frequent illnesses. See his Ch'i-tung yeh-yü, 14.184-85.

10. Mou Yen was the son of Mou Tzu-ts'ai (chin-shih 1221), a chief minister in Li-tsung's reign (biography in SS 411.12355-61). Mou Yen and Chou Mi first met in 1246-47 in Ch'ü-chou, where their fathers were holding office and keeping company with Yang Po-yen and Hung Shu-chai (fl. 1250-1270). See Chou Mi, P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u (Chih-pu-tsu chai), 2.1a-1b; "Postscript to Chou Mi's self-obituary", in Mou Yen, Ling-yang chi (Wu-hsing ts'ung-shu), 16.9b.

11. Chao Yü-yin, an imperial clansman, owned and lived in the prominent residences of Hu-chou. In Chou's Ts'ao-ch'uang yü-yü (Taipei, 1973) there is a mourning poem for him (5.190-91). His son, Chao Meng-fu, was probably introduced to Chou later in the 1260s, when both Chou and Chao Yü-yin found themselves involved with Chia Ssu-tao's "public-land" scheme. Yü-yin was appointed the official in charge of the scheme in Hu-chou. Liu I-ch'ing, 5.2; Hsien-ch'un i-shih, 1.1b-2a.

12. Yang Po-yen was a descendant of Yang I-chung, a meritorious subject enfeoffed as "Yang-ho-kung wang" by Kao-tsung. Yang Po-yen was also an official and scholar of the Classics: his extant writings are entitled Chiu-ching pu-yün (Hsüeh-chin t'ao-yüan). Chou and Yang may have shared a mutual interest in poetry and art.

13. Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 317. The abuses of the students were most rampant in 1253-60: they would raise the example of the Ch'in burying the scholars if they did not get what they wanted. Neither the emperor nor the ministers dared reprimand them too severely; they intimidated also the city merchants. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.11a-13b. Chou admits that only Chia Ssu-tao managed to curtail their power and abuses; he particularly upbraids them for flattering Chia while he was powerful and criticizing him when Chia fell into disgrace. In 1275-76, however, these students seem to have played a loyalist role: they mourned loyalist martyrs such as Chao Liang-ch'un, submitted memorials to the court about taking an aggressive defence policy, and they were forced to accompany the imperial entourage to Ta-tu.

14. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.31b-32a. Yang Po-yen had also ranked thirteenth in an earlier examination.

16. Chou Chin's activities after 1257 are not known. It is certain, however, that he predeceased Chou Mi's mother, who died in 1264. I suggest that his death occurred most likely at this time, as the date fits in with Chou Mi's activities. Contrary to the occasion of his mother's death which he discusses at length, Chou mentions neither the date nor the mourning period for his father.


19. See Chapter Two, p. 25 for reference to the "public land" scheme.


21. For the colleagues of Chou and Yuan Hung, see "Former teachers and friends of my late father", in Yuan Chih-eh, 33.570-74. The collected writings of the Li brothers exist as *Kuei-hsi erh-yin chi* (Chiang-ts'un ts'ung-shu) and contain many poems to Chou Mi. Chou and the Li brothers may have been family friends for generations.

22. Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 341; Ma T'ing-luan, 15.3a. Chou states that in 1274 he was often visiting Ma who was plagued with illness. See Chou Mi, *Kuei-hsin tsa-chih*, hou,15b.

23. A study of the careers of T'ang officials indicates that it normally took an official 23.6 years from first posting to chief minister (at least 3B). Sun Kuo-tung, "T'ang-tai chung-yang wen-kuan ch'ien-chuan shih-chien yü jen-ch'i t'an-t'ao", *Hsin-ya shu-yüan hsüeh-shu pien-k'an* 16 (1974), 334. If this study is somewhat indicative of promotions in the Sung bureaucracy, then Chou Mi's record is certainly not impressive.


27. Chou Mi wrote many poems to Chang Shu. See Ts'ao-ch'uang yü-yü, 3.120-21; *P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u*, 1.11b, 1.21b-23a, 2.4a-b. Chang's "Chi-hsien" studio was a popular meeting place among Chou Mi and his friends at this time. On Chang Yen, see this chapter, p. 255.

28. The teacher Chou had as a youth was Yao Jung (fl. 1240-1270) from Fukien. See Chou Mi, *Ch'i-tung yeh-yü*, 14.182-84. Yang Tsuan is credited with creating two hundred new metres of tz'u form, now lost. On Yang's relationship with the Sung imperial family through his daughter, see Jao Tsung-i, *Chiu-lung yü Sung-chi*, pp. 84-90.
29. Wu Tzu-mu, Meng-.liang lu (in Tung-ching meng-hua lu, with four other works [Shanghai, 1956]), 19.299, says these Hang-chou societies were popular and unique in the empire.

30. Chou Mi's P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u records such excursions. See for example, Chou Mi, P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u, 1.10a-11b.

31. For poems to Li Jo-hsü, see Ts'ao-ch'uang yün-yü, 4.156-59; to Liu Lan, see P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u, 2.19b-20a. For poems to Ch'en Yün-p'ing, see Ts'ao-ch'uang yün-yü, 6.230-31; P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u, 1.19a-21b. Wang I-sun wrote several poems to Chou Mi. See Chou Mi, Chüeh-miao hao-tz'u chien (Shanghai, 1957), 7.14b-15b; 7.17a-b. On Wang I-sun's poetry, see Chia-ying Yeh Chao, "Wang I-sun and His Yung-wu Tz'u".

32. In the modern period, Chou Mi and his circle of poet friends (Ch'en Yün-p'ing, Wang I-sun, Chang Yen, Ch'iu Yüan, and others) are not usually considered great poets, although anthologies of Sung poetry normally include selections from their work. Wang Kuo-wei states that Chou and his group were limited by their experience; in their search for exquisite forms and refined words, their poems fall short of expressing spontaneity and emotions. He opines that their poems could be written by the hundred in a day. On Wang Kuo-wei's evaluation of the literary merits of Chou Mi, see Adele Rickett, Wang Kuo-wei's "Jen-chien tz'u-hua" (Hong Kong, 1977), pp. 59-61, 79-81, 83, 89.

33. The tz'u and shih collections are respectively known as P'ing-chou yü-ti p'u and Ts'ao-ch'uang yün-yü. Calligraphic prefaces by Li Lai-lao, Li P'eng-lao, Ch'en Ts'un, and Wen Chi-weng are found in the latter, preface, pp. 1-14.

34. In 1259 Chou obtained a rubbing of a tripod from his father-in-law's studio (Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 330). The collection of his father-in-law's family was substantial and listed in Chou Mi, Yün-yen kuo-yen lu, 3.1a-3b.

35. Chao Meng-chien's collected writings survive as the I-chai wen-pien (SKCSCP ser. 3). A modern study establishes his date of death to be 1267, thus proving the alleged hostility between his distant cousin Chao Meng-fu and himself (based on the former serving the Yüan) to have been utterly groundless. See Chiang T'ien-ko, "Pien Chao Meng-chien yü Chao Meng-fu chih-chien ti kuan-hsi", Wen-wu 1962:10 (1962), 26-31.

36. There are only several poems with political content in his poetry before 1275 (Ts'ao-ch'uang yün-yü, 6.228-29; 6.231-32; 6.235-36). Two are about the flood in Hu-chou and one is about Tu-tsung's death.

37. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, ch'i'en.5a.

38. See Chapter Five, pp. 186-87.

39. Chao Liang-ch'un was the defending general in Hu-chou. See his biography in SS 451.13265-66.
40. "Preface to the poetry composed at the banquet at the Yang family pond", in Tai Piao-yüan, 10.91-92; Chu Ts'un-li, 431.

41. "Preface to the 'La-chi chi', in Ma T'ing-luan, 15.2b.

42. The two poetry collections, La-chi chi and Pien-yang shih-chi are no longer extant; the former was still listed in the Ming catalogue, Yang Shih-ch'i's Wen-yüan ko shu-mu, p. 436, while the latter was listed in the Ch'ing catalogue, Cheng Yüan-ch'ing's Hu-lu ch'ing-chi k'ao (Taipei, 1969), 2.29a-b. For prefaces to these collections, see Ma T'ing-luan, 15.2a-4a; Tai Piao-yüan, 8.76-77; Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 30a.

43. Tai Piao-yüan, 8.76-77.

44. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, ch'tien.30a-31b.

45. Chou calls this mood "ch'eng-huai kuan-tao", which appears in the above reference as well as in the preface to the Ch'eng-huai-lu (Jung-yüan ts'ung-shu), is an allusion to Tsung Ping (Liu-Sung period), who travelled through the country for thirty years; when he was old and sick he sketched the landscapes he had visited on his walls in order to relive the pleasures of his earlier travels. See also Giles, no. 2051.

46. Chou Mi, Chih-ya-t'ang tsa-ch'ao, b.21b.

47. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü a.8a-9a.

48. Hsü Hsüeh-chiang was a member of the Yin-she to which also belonged Chou Mi in the 1260's. For the reference to Chang Yen's Tz'u-yüan on this information, see Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 334. Hsü was a close friend of Wang Yüan-liang when the latter returned from the north. See Chapter Five, p. 180 for Wang's poem to Hsü.

49. Liu Chiang-sun, 12.18a-19b. On Liu Ch'en-weng, see Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, pieh a.37b-38a; pieh a.42a-b. On Tseng Feng, see Ch'i-tung yeh-yü, 14.184-85.

50. See Chapter Five, p. 237, note 181.

51. Kao Ssu-te's biography is in SS 409.12322-28; his collected writings, Ch'ih-t'ang ts'un-kao (SKCSCP supp. ser.), contain some exchanges with Hu-chou personalities including the Taoist monk and poet Liu Lan, also Chou Mi's close friend. On Ch'en Ts'un, see Lu Hsin-yüan, 34.8a. Mou Yen's Ling-yang ch'i contains several essays and poems to him (e.g., 4.12a; 6.15a-b).

52. Wen Chi-weng has no biography in the SS, in spite of his 2B rank. These biographical details are based on Lu Hsin-yüan, 34.9b.

53. Ho Meng-kuei was in contact with Wen Chi-weng and his sons after the Sung demise. See "On Wen Chi-weng's diet" and "Preface to Wen Pen-jen's poetry", in Ho Meng-kuei, 5.9a-b and 5.21a-b. Wen Chi-weng considered himself as close to Fang Feng-ch'en as his own brother and wrote a lengthy funerary inscription for Fang: "Funerary inscription for the former president Fang Feng-ch'en", in Fang
54. Mou Yen's *Ling-yang chi* contains some personal addresses, including birthday wishes, to and for Prince Fu (e.g., 19.8a-b; 20.7b-8a; 21.6b-7b; 21.8b).

55. Chou Mi talks about Mou Yen being extremely poor and gratefully accepting charcoal to warm his hands. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.21b.

56. "Encomium on Chou Mi", "Descriptive essay on Chou Mi's Fu hut", "Preface to Chou Mi's 'Ch'i-tung yeh-yü'", and "Postscript to Chou Mi's self-obituary", in Mou Yen, 7.2b; 10.1a-2b; 12.5a-6a; 16.9b-10b.

57. Mou Ying-lung has a biography in *YS* 190.4337-38. Ying-fu was pacifying commissioner of Che-tung when he wrote the preface to his father's *Ling-yang chi* (Mou Yen, preface.1a-b). On Ying-kuei, see Tung Ssu-chang, Wu-hsing pei-chih (SKCSCP ser. 9), 12.39b.

58. Fang Hui wrote several poems to Mou Yen, who was born the same year as Fang. See Fang Hui, T'ung-chiang hsü-chi, 21.4b-5b; 21.28a-b. In 1299 Mou wrote a poem to Liu Meng-yen (his former teacher) when the latter was eighty years old. See Mou Yen, 4.7a.

59. On the names and brief biographical sketches of the Eight Talents, see Tung Ssu-chang, 12.33b.

60. Chou Mi states that his father was skilled in calligraphy, but he himself failed in attempts to emulate the styles of the masters. See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, ch'ien.44b-45a. On Chou Mi's reputation as an skilled painter, see Hsia Wen-yen, 5.2b.

61. On Ch'ien Hsüan, see among other studies James Cahill, "Ch'ien Hsüan and His Figure Paintings", Archives of the Chinese Art Society of America 12 (1258), 11-29; Lee and Ho, Chinese Art under the Mongols, pp. 92-93; Ch'en Kao-hua, pp. 309-25; Hsia Wen-yen, 5.3a. On Ch'ien Hsüan's extant paintings see Cahill, *An Index*, pp. 264-70.

62. For a comparison of the art of Ch'ien Hsüan and Chao Meng-fu, see Li Chu-tsing, "The Role of Wu-hsing in Early Yüan Artistic Development under Mongol Rule", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, pp. 346-57.

63. Chang Ying is referred to as Chang Chung-shih because his ming is given as Mo by Tai Piao-yüan and Mou Yen (e.g., "Postscript on the genealogy of the Chang family of Hsi-ch'in", in Mou Yen, 16.9a). On Chang Chung-shih, see among many prefaces to his writings, "Descriptive essay of Hsüeh-ku studio", in Tai Piao-yüan, 2.33-34; "Admonition to the Hsüeh-ku studio", in Mou Yen, 7.3a-b.

64. Chang Yen's poetry collection is the Shan-chung pai-yün tz'u (Chiang-ts'un ts'ung-shu). On Chang Yen's travels to seek patrons, see "Preface to farewell Chang Yen on his travels to the west", in Tai Piao-yüan, 13.116-17. For its translation, see Lin Shuen-fu, pp. 195-97.
65. On T'u Yüeh, see "Preface to farewell T'u Yüeh to Wu-chou", in Tai Piao-yüan, 13.109-10; "Preface to farewell T'u Yüeh to Lin-shui as instructor", in Mou Yen, 5.7a.

66. SS 455.13382 contains the biographies of a Taoist priest and a Buddhist monk who perished in the loyalist resistance. On former officials withdrawing into monasteries, see Cheng Yüan-yü, 1.2-4; 1.9.

67. Wen Jih-kuan was befriended by Hsien-yü Shu. On Wen, see Cheng Yüan-yü, 1.8-9; Ch'en Kao-hua, pp. 300-08.

68. Teng Mu's collected writings are entitled the Po-ya ch'in. Chou Mi and his companions composed poems at the Taoist retreat during both visits (the first one was in 1265). See Teng Mu (ed.), Tung-hsiao shih-chi (Chih-pu-tsu chai), 5.3a-b; 9.7b-8b; 10.8a-9b.

69. "Biography of no such man", in Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 11a-12a.

70. For Chou Mi's attack of wei-hsüeh, see John Winthrop Haeger, "The Intellectual Context of Neo-Confucian Syncretism", Journal of Asian Studies 31:3 (1972), 505-09, 512.

71. "A man of Yüeh meeting a dog" and "A ghost flattered in Ch'ü", in Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 10a-11a.

72. Teng Mu has also been credited with the theory of a plural galactic universe. See Joseph Needham and Wang Ling, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge, London, 1959), vol. 3, 221. For discussions of Teng's political philosophy, see Fu Lo-shu, "Teng Mu", 35-96; Ch'iü Shu-shen, "Teng Mu ho ta-ti 'Po-ya ch'in'", Yüan-shih chi pei-fang min-tsu shih yen-chiu chi-k'an 3 (1978), 8-14.

73. "The Way of the ruler", in Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 3b-5a. For its translation into English, see Fu Lo-shu, "Teng Mu", 67-71.

74. "The Way of the magistrates", in Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 5a-6b. For a summary, see Fu Lo-shu, "Teng Mu", 71-72. Many scholars believe that the Ming loyalist Huang Tsung-hsi was greatly influenced by the Po-ya ch'in in his own work, the Ming-i tai-fang lu 明熹宗侍從錄 (Peking, 1955). See for example, Fo Lo-shu, "Teng Mu", 71-90; Ch'iü Shu-shen, 8. For an analysis of Huang's work, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, "A Plan for the Prince: The 'Ming-i tai-fang lu' of Huang Tsung-hsi" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1953).

75. Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 4b.

76. "Self-preface", in Teng Mu, Po-ya ch'in, 1a.

77. In 1305 Wu Ch'üan-chieh 吳載澄 (d. 1246) was commissioned to seek talented men in south China and obtained the names of Teng Mu and Yeh Lin, both of whom declined to serve. See Wu's preface to Teng Mu's Tung-hsiao t'u-chih (Chih-pu-tsu ch'ai), la-b. Fu Lo-shu strongly feels that Teng Mu and Yeh Lin committed suicide by starvation on the basis of a statement that the two recluses died "without illness" (Fu Lo-shu, "Teng Mu", 40 and 42).
78. On Teng Wen-yüan, see his biography in YS 172.4023-25. His collected writings are Pa-hsi chi (SKCSCP ser. 3).

79. Tai Piao-yüan, 10.91-92.

80. Tai Piao-yüan was almost as sociable as Chou Mi in intellectual circles in Hang-chou and other prefectures after the collapse of the Sung. He also wrote many colophons on art objects, but does not seem to have been an art collector himself. His collected writings, Shan-yüan chi, provide rich material on the life of the scholars, especially on the contrast before and after the collapse of the Sung. For his biography, see YS 190.4336-37. To date the only substantive work on this interesting personality is Sun Fu-hou's Tai Shan-yüan nien-p'u (Shanghai, 1936). I plan to undertake a thorough study of him in the future.

81. "Preface to the poetry of Pai T'ing" and "Preface to the poetry of Ch'i'u Yüan", in Tai Piao-yüan, 8.79-80; 8.75.

82. For these prefaces, see Tai Piao-yüan, passim. For prefaces to Chou Mi's writings, see for instance Tai's "Preface to the 'Ch'i-tung yeh-yü'", in Chou Mi, Ch'i-tung yeh-yü, preface.1; "Preface to Chou Mi's 'Pien-yang shih'", in Tai Piao-yüan, 8.76-77.

83. For complaints about northern Chinese and non-Chinese oppressing southerners and being arbitrary and arrogant in south China, see for instance Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin ts'a-chih, hsü a.5a-b; "Preface to farewell Ching-wen", in Fang Hui, T'ung-chiang hsü-chi, 12.15b-16a. For a preliminary examination of the problem of discrimination against the southerners, see Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Ch'eng Chü-fu yü Hu-pi-lieh".

84. Hsien-yü Shu's collected writings, K'ün-hsüeh chai ts'u-lu (Chih-pu-tsu chai), are extant. Hsien-yü is frequently mentioned in Chou Mi's references to art collecting; his private collection is listed in Chou Mi, Yün-yen kuo-yen lu, 1.2a-b. For a study of Hsien-yü, see Marilyn Wong Fu, "The Impact of the Reunification: Northern Elements in the Life and Art of Hsien-yü Shu (1257?-1302) and Their Relation to Early Yüan Literati Culture", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, pp. 371-433. On Hsien-yü's sentiments in regard to the invasion of the Sung, see Marilyn Wong Fu, p. 402.


86. For sources on Kao K'o-kung, see Ch'en Kao-hua, pp. 1-29. There is a recent study of the art of Kao by Curtis H Ansman Brizendine, "Cloudy Mountains: Kao K'o-kung and the Tradition of Mi Fu" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1980). It was unavailable to me. On the private collections of Kao K'o-kung, Kuo T'ien-hsi, Ch'iao K'uei-ch'eng, and Lien Hsi-kung, see Chou Mi, Yün-yen kuo-yen lu, 2.7a; 2.2a-3a; 1.1a-b; 2.5b-6a and 4.1b-2a. Like Li K'an, they were on official duties in the provincial government of Chiang-Ché and took the opportunity to mingle with Hang-chou connoisseurs. On Lien
Hsi-kung's relationship to Lien Hsi-hsien, see Cheng Yüan-yu, 1.1.

87. Wang Chih was a native of Hang-chou and owned a substantial private art collection. See Chou Mi, Yün-yen kuo-yen lu, 1.4a-6a. He was recommended for office by an eminent official towards 1300. See "Preface to farewell Wang Chih", in Tai Piao-yüan, 13.114.

88. This scroll with the colophons by Chou Mi's friends is now in a private collection and was seen by Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao. See Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 356. The colophons inscribed while the scroll was in Chou Mi's possession are also given in the postscript to Yeh Shao-weng's Ssu-ch'ao wen-chien lu (TSCC), postscript 177-86. See also Marilyn Wong Fu, pp. 396-97.

89. Marilyn Wong Fu, p. 395. See also Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü b.31a-b.


91. These visits are recorded with dates in Chou Mi, Chih-ya-t'ang tsa-ch'ao, chüan a, et passim.

92. For a visit to the myriarch Fei's collection, see Chou Mi, Chih-ya-t'ang tsa-ch'ao, a.4b. On Fei, whose funerary inscription was written by Hou Yen, see "Postscript to the funerary inscription of Fei's ancestors", in Huang Chin, 30.25b-26b.

93. Chou Mi, Chih-ya t'ang tsa-ch'ao, a.7a-b.

94. For Chao Meng-fu's biography, see YS 172.4018-23. On sources on Chao, see Ch' en Kao-hua, pp. 30-99. Among many studies on Chao Meng-fu, see Herbert Franke, "Dschau Mong-fu, Das Leben eines Chinesischen Staatsmannes, Gelehrten und Kunstlers unter der Mongolen herrschaft", Sinica 15 (1940), 25-48. Li Chu-tsing, in his studies of the art of Chao Meng-fu, has in particular dealt with Chao's guilt in regard to his reemergence into public life. See Li's 'Autumn Colors on the Ch'iao and Hua Mountains', pp. 81-85, and "The Freer Sheep and Goat'and Chao Meng-fu's Horse Paintings", Artibus Asiae 30 (1968), 314-22.


96. "Preface to farewell Wu Ch'eng's return to the south", in Chao Meng-fu, 6.62-63.

97. "On returning from the office, to be sent to Chou Mi", in Chao Meng-fu, 5.54.

98. This painting, "Ch'iao-Hua ch'iu-se" is the subject of a monograph study by Li Chu-tsing, 'Autumn Colors on the Ch'iao and Hua Mountains'.

99. "To the rhyme of Chou Mi's poem", in Chao Meng-fu, 3.28.
100. On Wang I-sun's service to the Yiian, see Chia-ying Yeh Chao, "Wang I-sun and His Yung-wu Tz'u", 62-66. Chou Mi wrote a tz'u in the song-title kao-yang t'ai, to farewell Ch'en Yün-p'ing on his journey to the north in response to a summons to office. See Chou Mi, Chüeh-miao hao-tz'u ch'ien, 7.4b. On the appointments of Yüan Chüeh, T'u Yuhe, and Teng Wen-yüan, see the prefaces to farewell their departure, in Tai Piao-yüan, 12.108-09; 13.109-10; 14.118-19.

101. On Pai T'ing's recommendation to office by Li K'an, see Sung Lien's epitaph of Pai, in Sung Wen-hsien kung ch'üan-chi (SPPY), 19.9b. On Kao K'o-kung's recommendation of Teng Wen-yüan and some of the Eight Talents, see Teng Wen-yüan's account of conduct of Kao, in Teng Wen-yüan, b.23b-24a; also in Ch'en Kao-hua, pp. 7-8.

102. For example, Teng Wen-yüan advises his friend, a Yiüan official, to accept a higher appointment. He argues that he himself had been through the same doubts ten years previously, when deciding whether to serve or not. See his "Preface to farewell Kuo Wen-ch'ing to assume the administration of Fu-liang", in Teng Wen-yüan, a.16a.

103. For feelings of incompetence, see the above cited prefaces by Tai Piao-yüan.

104. This is from a stanza in a series of poems sent to Hang-chou friends. See Ch'iu Yüan, Chin-yüan chi (Wu-ying tien chü-chien), 1.20a. Ch'iu Yüan's other collected writings are known as Shan-ts'un i-chi (Wu-lin wang-che i-chu). Pai T'ing also accepted Li K'an's offer of employment due to poverty. See Sung Lien, 19.9b.


106. On these positions, see YS 91.2312; 91.2316. See also Chou Tsu-mo, "Sung-wang hou shih-Yüan chih ju-hsüeh chiao-shou", Fu-jen hsüeh-chih 14:1-2 (1946), 196-97.

107. In his study of Confucian scholars in south China who served the Yiüan as instructors, Chou Tsu-mo indicates three reasons for their reemergence: to gain tax-exemption status, to avoid racial discrimination, and to alleviate poverty. See his "Sung-wang hou shih-Yüan", 204-08. With the group of former Sung officials we looked at in the last two chapters, the last reason seems particularly relevant.

108. For a list of Chou Mi's extant and lost writings, see Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, pp. 371-76. Previous unofficial regional records which Chou wanted to supplement included Meng Yüan-lao's Tung-ching meng-hua lu. See "Self-preface", in Chou Mi, Wu-lin chiu-shih (Pi-chi hsiao-shuo ta-kuan), preface.1a.

109. For his motives in writing the Wu-lin chiu-shih and for this quote, see ibid.

110. Cf. Marilyn Wong Fu (p.398, note 54), who says there are forty-one collectors listed. This work also includes the collection of zithers found in north and south China, as well as a list of skilful lutists.
111. Many of the entries by Chou Mi's friends (e.g., Wang I-sun, Chang Yen) in the Chüeh-miao hao-tzu are personal poems written to him.

112. "Self-preface", in Chou Mi, Ch'i-tung yeh-yü, preface.1 Mou Yen's preface to the work comments on the unofficial nature of Chou Mi's work, while that of Tai Piao-yüan discusses Chou Mi's concern with his ancestral home. See Mou Yen, 12.5a-6b; Tai Piao-yüan's preface in Chou Mi, Ch'i-tung yeh-yü, preface.1.

113. Chu Ts'un-li, 430.

114. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.13b-14b.

115. Ibid., hou.11a-13b.

116. Ibid., hsü b.4b-6a; for Chou Mi's attack of Neo-Confucianism, see above, p. 289, note 70.

117. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hou.41a-45b.

118. Ibid., pieh a.44a-50b; hsü a.37b-38b.

119. See the accounts of the defections of Fang Hui, Chien Ts'ai-wang and Hung Ch'i-wei 池起, in Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, pieh a.32b-37a; hsü a.24b-25a; hsü b.18a-b. Fang Hui's collected writings are T'ung-chiang chi (Taipei, 1970) and T'ung-chiang hsü-chi.

120. For a monograph study of Fang Hui, see P'an Po-ch'eng, Fang Hsü-ku yen-chiu (Taipei, 1978). See also Igor de Rachewitz' biography of Fang in Franke, Sung Biographies, pp. 349-55; Sun K'o-k'uan, "'Kuei-hsin tsa-chih' chi Fang Hui shih shu-cheng", in Sun's Meng-ku Han-chün, pp. 107-32.

121. Chou might have also criticized Yüan Hung for defecting, although his writings do not give evidence of it. This criticism may have prompted Yüan Chüeh's uncomplimentary remarks. See this chapter, p. 279.

122. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, hsü a.39b.

123. Ibid., hsü b.15a-16a.

124. See "Descriptive essay on the Ch'ien-i studio", in Tai Piao-yüan, 2.35.


126. This is the item on "pien-chang" (chief minister). See Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, ch'ien.45a-b. Cf. Pai T'ing, Chan-yüan ching-yü (Chih-pu-.tsu chai), 2.17b.


128. "Self-preface", in Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih,
129. In the Kuei-hsin tsa-chih the informant's name is often given in the text or at the end of the relevant entry.


131. Ibid., pieh a.40a.

132. For example, in regard to the flight of the two Sung princes, see Jao Tsung-i, Chi-lung yu Sung-chi, p. 6; in regard to the imperial relics, see Yen Ch'ien-pi, 46-48.

133. Fu Lo-shu, "Teng Mu", 53.

134. For example, see Chi Yün et al., 165.3454-55; Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 357.

135. Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, pp. 357, 369.

136. See for example, Lin Shuen-fu, pp. 194-95.

137. During his lifetime Chou Mi adopted many styles and sobriquets. In his youth and adulthood he used "Kung-chin 云亭", "Ts'ao-ch'u'ang 草窗" (Grass Window) and "P'ing-chou 靈洲" (Duckweed Island). The names adopted after the Sung collapsed reflect his preoccupation with his place of origin, Ch'i-chou, and his home, Hu-chou: to the former belonged "Ch'i-jen 池人", "San-ch'i 三齋" (Man of Ch'i), "Hua-pu-ch'ü shan-jen 華浦主人" (Recluse of Hua-pu-ch'ü) and "Li-jen 麗人" (Man of Li Mountain); to the latter belonged "Pien-yang lao-jen 晴陽老人" (Old Man on the Sunny Side of Pien Mountain), "Ssu-shui ch'ien-fu 四水潜夫" (Hermit of the Four Rivers), "T'iao-jen 調人" and "Cha-jen 駕人" (Man of Hu-chou). Chou's contemporaries also referred to him as Chou I-wu 仇義武, I-wu being the last location he held office in.


139. Ibid., 432.

140. Mou Yen, 16.9b-10b; 10.1a-2b.

141. "Inscription to the Fu hut", in Yuan Chüeh, 17.312-13.

142. "Former teachers and friends of my late father", in Yuan Chüeh, 33.574.

143. "Poem to mourn Chou Mi", in Lien Wen-feng, Pai-cheng chi (SKCSCP supp. ser.), b.7b-8a.

144. See Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 366.

145. The late Ch'ing scholar Ku Wen-pin argues that Chou Mi died in 1298 on the basis of the colophon written on the Pao-mu chih scroll in 1307, which states that Chou Mi had died nine years previously. See Ku Wen-pin, Chou Ts'ao-ch'u'ang nien-p'u (Kuo-yün lou shu-hua chi), 18b-19b. There is additional evidence that Chou Mi died many years
before 1308. In a commentary on Kung K'ai's painting formerly owned by Chou Mi, Liu Kuan writes that when Kung died in 1307, Chou had predeceased him by several years. See "Postscript to the 'Chiang-chi' painting", in Liu Kuan, Liu Tai-chih wen-chi (SPTK), 18.16b-17a.

146. The Pao-mu chih scroll and Kung K'ai's painting, among other prized possessions, passed shortly from Chou Mi's son and grandsons into other hands. See Hsia Ch'eng-t'ao, p. 469; Liu Kuan, 18.17a.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SUNG LOYALISM
AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

I. Sung Loyalism: Essence, Intensity, and Duration

In a broad perspective, this thesis has been concerned with the historiography of the Sung loyalists, particularly in exploring myth-making and reality with regard to loyalty, dynastic succession, resistance to foreign conquest, opportunistic collaboration, and the varying response of the intellectuals and their followers. Conquest and resistance are common themes in history; at the time of the Sung collapse and conquest in 1273-79, official and unofficial sources combined to make Sung loyalism and loyalists appear unique and unprecedented in Chinese history.

Traditional views of Sung loyalism give a one-dimensional image of the Sung loyalists as uncompromising individuals who struggled against Mongol rule in either militant or passive resistance. These loyal sentiments have been conceived as unchanging and absolute in nature, and this conception has even been more so in exemplary loyalist figures such as Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te. Traditional history-writing on the loyalists has been chiefly concerned with identifying, classifying, and rejecting individuals as loyalists. In this respect, the collaborators and defectors have been seen as the loyalists' polar opposites and censured for their lack of integrity.

In this study I suggest that this popular tradition of Sung loyalism was largely the result of the loyalists' favourable portrayals of themselves and their cause, and uncritical admiration by
their contemporaries and sympathizers in subsequent ages. These writers searched history for models of behaviour and historical parallels to bring relevance into their times and consolation for their own plight. Their writings are responsible for several myths about Sung loyalism and present an incomplete picture of the loyalists. Until now, attention focussed on heroic examples of loyalism and consequently many loyalist personalities have been neglected. The suppression of unflattering details and embellishment of favourable facts has resulted in the representation of Sung loyalism as absolute and uncompromising. Very little is known about the more obscure individuals commended for their loyalist activities. Contrary to popular tradition, rather than loyalty to the Sung being the prime motivation in loyalist behaviour, their participation in the loyalist resistance was more often due to personal loyalty to an individual leader like Wen T'ien-hsiang. Relatives, friends, tenants, and mercenaries took part in the resistance for reasons other than political loyalty to the Sung.

This study shows that the centres of strong military resistance were rarely the centres of i-min gatherings after the collapse of the Sung. For instance, Hsiang-yang, Ch'ang-chou, and Yang-chou resisted most resolutely the invading Mongol armies, but after 1276 these prefectures do not appear to have been regional centres in which loyalist survivors were active. The obvious deduction might be that there were no loyalist personalities in these districts after the defeat of the resistance, but it could also be supposed that many accounts of local loyalism depended on the enthusiasm of local historians. To be sure, many traditional writings on the Sung loyalists were greatly influenced by local perspectives and interests.
For example, our knowledge of the loyalists in Ch'ing-yüan has been enriched by Ch'üan Tsu-wang, whose interest in the role of his ancestors and locality in loyalist resistance led him to carry out extensive research on this subject. More recently, the debate of Hong Kong scholars in the 1950s on Sung loyalist activities in that region was much affected by a keen concern to establish Hong Kong's significance in Sung history. The information thus collected often carries a strong provincial bias which reduces its value as source material.

Sung loyalism has traditionally been conceived as a single body of values opposed to dynastic transition and alien rule. After a critical study of official histories and the loyalists' own collected works, I suggest that Sung loyalism was not so simple. In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, three separate traditions are delineated: the chung-i loyalists who died for or because of the Sung cause, the i-min loyalists who survived the Sung collapse and loyalist resistance and lived during the first generation of Mongol rule, and the marginal loyalists whose loyalty to the Sung was doubted by traditional historians because of some compromising act. Sung loyalism embraced a range of conduct from absolute intransigence to grudging accommodation: from active participation in military resistance, indignation at the violation of the Sung mausolea and participation in the recovery of the imperial relics, poignant sentiments about the demise of the Sung and imposition of alien rule, refusal to use Yüan reign titles and to associate with Yüan officials and Sung defectors, to withdrawal from political life and an initial refusal to serve the Yüan. The intensity and duration of loyalism also varied, and loyalist behaviour gradually eroded and became transformed over time.
We find that even the loyalism of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te—the paragons of loyalist virtue—was not absolute but involved a degree of compromise. Wen T'ien-hsiang associated with Wang Yüan-liang and Teng Kuang-chien who were in Yüan service. Moreover he showed some doubts about his determination to die and become a martyr. Hsieh Fang-te would have been happy to remain a loyal survivor and continue his friendships with northern scholar-officials in Yüan office had he not been forced to take up Yüan employment. With few exceptions, most loyalists socialized with Yüan officials, wrote commemorative essays for them and regarded some as close friends. Not a few fully approved of their children serving the Yüan.

Changed circumstances such as extreme poverty and a perception of Yüan rule as permanent also transformed Sung loyalism over time. The intensity and duration of loyalism in many loyalists decreased to the extent that they accepted Yüan rule. Traditional historians ignored this fact and praised only the exemplary loyalists, dismissing those who later served. They also overlooked the fact that for those who died shortly after the Sung collapse and whose loyalty need not be tested through changed circumstances, it was much easier to retain a reputation as an ardent and intransigent loyalist. For others who lived ten, twenty, or thirty years after the imposition of alien rule it was more difficult to adhere to the same uncompromising loyalty without being seen as an eccentric or neglecting family and social commitments. For instance, whereas Lu Hsiu-fu (who died in the resistance), Ma T'ing-luan (a retired veteran Sung official), and Chou Mi (who had a wealthy patron) did not have to worry about eking out a living, Ch'iu Yüan and Tai Piao-yüan endured poverty and served the
only after 1300. Through a gradual rationalization of Mongol rule over time, it was much more acceptable in the eyes of the loyalists themselves and society to take up service in 1300 than in 1280. As indicated in the study of Chou Mi and his extensive network of friends, the acceptance of the new regime became a salient feature of Sung loyalism in the late 1280s and 1290s. By 1300, Sung loyalism was no longer recognizable as resolute adherence to absolute loyalty to the former dynasty. Loyalist activities had more or less lost direct relevance and what remained was a nostalgic memory of admirable loyalist conduct.

The loyalists and their contemporaries recognized that relative degrees and a wide range of loyalist activities existed, but they criticized what they considered to be unacceptable loyalist behaviour. The followers of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te prescribed for their leaders the utmost unblemished and absolute form of integrity and loyalty. In order to obtain that goal, they exhorted them to commit suicide and leave no doubt to posterity about their exemplary conduct. At the same time, they demanded of themselves less absolute manifestations of loyalty and continued to live decades after the collapse of the Sung. Chou Mi mocked the defectors for fickleness and disloyalty; however, he in turn was criticized by Yüan Chüeh for keeping company with eminent Yüan officials. But Yüan Chüeh himself took up employment with the Yüan government and became friendly with higher Mongol dignitaries. Fang Hui was treated with contempt by Chou Mi for surrendering and prostrating himself in front of northern Chinese and foreigners; but a few years after resigning his Yüan post Fang chided Ch'eng Chü-fu for being in the employ of the Yüan government.¹ Chao Meng-fu, himself an imperial clansman and in
Yüan service, criticized Liu Meng-yen, a Sung chief minister, for deserting the Sung cause. Apparently, by upbraiding others for dubious loyalty and lack of integrity, those who were themselves criticized on the same basis consoled themselves that their conduct was nevertheless more honourable than that of others. One former Sung official who later served the Yüan was exceptionally honest in evaluating his flight from the Sung court during its last days: even though he did not "flee a hundred paces", he admitted that the pertinent point was that he did after all flee from his responsibilities.¹

Efforts to minimize their guilt about disloyal behaviour caused some of these individuals, who still felt loyalty to the former Sung, to resign their Yüan positions after a brief period of service. Teng Kuang-chien and Wang Yüan-liang, who may have been forced to serve in the first place, also resigned and returned to south China in order not to further compromise their principles. During the first generation of Mongol rule not a few loyalists, because of poverty and a commitment to keep up the tradition of scholarship in China, compromised their integrity and wrote essays for Mongol officials and taught non-Chinese students; some taught in official schools and took up positions as directors of local schools. They served because they felt that teaching positions did not involve them directly with the Yüan government and thus did not mean compromising their loyalty to the Sung. With this view some loyalists thus refused promotions to instructors in prefectures, as this position would weigh more heavily on their conscience.² This type of rationalization was also evident in the cases of Ch'iu Yüan, Tai Piao-yüan, and many others who served as instructors but still considered themselves subjects of the
former Sung by calling themselves "chin-shih", "surviving subject", "fleeing", or "refugee subject" of the former dynasty. Simply to dismiss these men as not being able to maintain their integrity to the end is to ignore the whole range of loyalist behaviour and its transformation over time and circumstances.

Among the loyalists, the meaning of loyalism also varied according to the following traditional concepts: chung (loyalty), hsiao 肝 (filial piety), cheng-t'ung 王統 (legitimate or orthodox succession), and hua-i 華夷 (Sino-barbarian views). The notion of loyalty was the most significant among the chung-i loyalists such as Wen T'ien-hsiang, Lu Hsiu-fu, Li T'ing-chih, and Chang Shih-chieh. In general they rejected the narrow and myopic vision of loyalty to one ruler and sovereign (as was the loyalty of Yüeh Fei) in preference for loyalty to the dynasty and its survival in the face of total conquest. Had their loyalty been directed solely towards their sovereigns (Kung-ti and Empress Dowager Hsieh), they would have obeyed the last Sung edicts to surrender immediately and accompany the imperial entourage to the Yüan capital. As Hsieh Fang-te noted, Empress Dowager Hsieh wished to perform her duties as sovereign by preventing further bloodshed and harm to her people, but as a subject of the Sung, his commitment and duty were to exert himself to sustain the empire. In the same way Wen T'ien-hsiang replied to criticism of his abandonment of the captured sovereigns to enthrone the two Sung princes, declaring that his greater responsibility was to the survival of the Sung empire. To some leaders loyalty meant that the Sung state took priority over all other commitments and the consequence of their devotion to this principle was death. Many personal followers and family members died with them but the nature of their loyalty was
different. Whereas Wen T'ien-hsiang and Li T'ing-chih saw it as their political duty to die for the country, those who voluntarily accompanied them towards their death did so not out of similar sentiment to the state, but out of a personal loyalty and duty to their leaders, husbands, fathers, patrons, and masters.

Among the i-min loyalists, the loyalty of Hsieh Ao was personally directed to Wen T'ien-hsiang; his commitment to the Sung state was of secondary importance. Thus Hsieh Ao's lavishly praised essay was actually a personal mourning tribute to his leader and patron, to whom he was grateful for showing interest in himself, a mere commoner. For the majority of the i-min, the loyalty they felt to the Sung did not necessitate actual participation in military resistance, but simply a feeling of loyalty and nostalgia towards the former dynasty, and quiet withdrawal from direct political cooperation with the new regime. This type of loyalism was exhibited in the early years of Mongol rule by Wang Ying-lin and the personalities and groups described in Chapter Five. Some of these were veteran officials of the Sung who had been criticized by the Sung court for deserting it just before or during its surrender. At the start of Mongol rule, they defined their loyalty to the former dynasty by devotion to its culture and civilization, and thus spent a great part of their life in scholarship and teaching. Chou Mi's efforts to preserve the memory of the customs and practices, arts and poetry of the former era, and Wang Ying-lin's prolific writings on textual criticism and the Confucian Classics are examples of this dedication and ideal of loyalty.

To account for some former officials who later served the Yuan, or communicated with its officials and Sung defectors in some aspect of their social, economic, and personal life, it could be said that
they showed their devotion to Chinese civilization by attempting to sinicize the non-Chinese in the hope of softening alien rule. As one such former Sung official who took up a Yüan appointment quotes from the ancient Confucians: "When medicine is practiced, people live; when Confucianism is practiced, the empire and posterity survive."4

Also indicative of the variant forms of loyalty are the different historical heroes adopted by the loyalists to justify their conduct (or misconduct) and raise their morale. For instance, Wen T'ien-hsiang admired greatly the heroic generals and advisers who defied death and opposed the enemy to the end. To justify his "latent" martyrdom Hsieh Fang-te drew a parallel between himself and Po-i and Kung Sheng, who died by starvation many years after the dynastic crisis. As for the i-min loyalists who survived into the first generation of Mongol rule, they followed the example and inspiration of T'ao Ch'ien, who did not disdain poverty and refused to use the reign titles of the current dynasty.

Filial piety to one's parents and ancestors and loyalty to the ruler have traditionally been seen as complementary concepts and as harmonious with each other: "To be loyal is to be filial" and "The loyal subject must first be a filial son". However, among the Sung loyalists the demands of filial piety and loyalty conflicted and necessitated a conscious choice of one over the other. Wen T'ien-hsiang and the martyrs who participated in military resistance and died instead of surviving to look after their parents or undertake a mourning period considered their loyalty to the state their first priority. But for Hsieh Fang-te and Wang Yen-wu, filial piety took precedence; thus they quit the resistance to attend to their filial
commitments. In fact, Hsieh Fang-te did not approve of Wen T'ien-hsiang, Li T'ing-chih, Ch'en I-chung, and the others who during their mourning periods responded to court summons to resume their political duties. The choice of filial piety over loyalty was also made by defectors such as Wen T'ien-hsiang's brother Pi and Lü Wen-huan. For Chou Mi and the i-min loyalists, filial piety meant attaining high political office and ensuring that the family name and honour were not blemished through personal misconduct. To serve the succeeding dynasty would have amounted to a serious betrayal of Chou's family, which for many generations had been Sung officials.

At the end of their life most loyalists were satisfied with their choice between filial piety and loyalty, but Cheng Ssu-hsiao was unusual. He desperately wanted to join the resistance in 1275, but his mother's illness and death interrupted his ambitions to engage in physical combat with the Mongols. After mourning his mother for the whole compulsory period, Cheng spent the rest of his life in political and social seclusion out of intense devotion to the Sung. At his death he regretted being the most "unfilial and disloyal" subject of the Sung because not only did he not play an active role in loyalist resistance, but he had no heir to continue the family name and attend to the ancestral rites.

Because south China had never been under alien rule, the outlook of the Sung loyalists is of particular interest for understanding Chinese response to foreign conquest. Their collected writings, with the exception of Cheng Ssu-hsiao's Hsin-shih, are in general mild towards the Mongols and foreign peoples, who are merely called barbarians, barbarian caitiffs, chieftains, northern peoples, or northern visitors. In contrast the Sung imperial edicts of 1274-75
(drafted by the erudite loyalist Wang Ying-lin) contain much stronger language, referring to alien peoples as swine, dogs, and snakes. The collected writings of the loyalists in general discuss the barbarian peoples and alien rule in more subtle tones by the use of historical analogies. For instance, the virtues of Ts'ai Yen and Su Wu, whose loyalty to the indigenous Han dynasty remained unchanged over many years, are often alluded to in order to reinforce the loyalists' antipathy to the alien regime. Some, but not all the loyalists, expressed ethnic and racial prejudices against non-Chinese peoples, whom they consider could never become restrained and behave like Chinese. These views contrasted with earlier traditional beliefs of culturalism, a conviction that barbarians could be assimilated into Chinese culture and civilization.

At the start of the resistance, it was the threat of unprecedented alien conquest and foreign rule that motivated active loyalists such as Wen T'ien-hsiang and Wang Li-hsin, as well as other obscure figures, who swore to die rather than be "contaminated by barbarian blood". There were also several who sought unoccupied territory on which to die or left instructions to be buried in other lands. Apart from Wen, both Empress Dowager Hsieh and Hsieh Fang-te perceived early that the Mongol conquest, if victorious, would be an unprecedented disaster. In appealing for widespread support for the throne, the 1275 edict for the ch'in-wang campaigns in fact emphasized that never before in Chinese history had the whole of China been conquered by an alien people.

The i-min loyalists, however, had diverse views. Some, like Chou Mi, simply lamented the change of dynasties but showed little fierce antibarbarian sentiments in their writings. Others like Lin Ching-hsi
and Teng Mu displayed deep emotions about barbarian rule, albeit using allusions rather than outright condemnation. However, in his *Hsin-shih*, Cheng Ssu-hsiao abused without restraint the Mongols, whom he regarded as nonhuman beings, untrustworthy and insatiable. His racist views on foreigners call to mind scholars like Ch'en Liang, who earlier held similar opinions, and anticipated those of Fang Hsiao-ju 方孝孺 (1357-1402). In general it is difficult to assess in definite terms the ethnic and racist content of Sung loyalism because of the uncertainty whether the loyalists' writings have survived intact from self-censorship in the Yuan and from the literary inquisitions in the Ch'ing. One thing is certain: some racist and ethnic hostility did exist among individual writers during and immediately after the Sung conquest. However, most loyalists who survived and lived under Mongol rule (including Hsieh Fang-te before his martyrdom in 1289) were gradually impressed by the degree of sinicization in the Yuan dynasty and among its officials. Former Sung officials like Chia Hsüan-weng, who was forced to live and teach in Ho-chien, modified earlier antibarbarian sentiments as he became aware of the high standard of Confucian learning in north China despite centuries of foreign rule. Such warm sentiments towards northern Chinese friends and scholars reduced to an extent the resentment southerners in general harboured against northern Chinese and foreign peoples, who they felt were better treated by the Mongols. The political reunification of the country also caused the loyalists' objection to the Yuan to dissipate gradually. The dejected feelings about the Sung demise, already decreasing and healing in time, were further abated by opportunities for people to travel and for cultural and scholarly traditions to reintegrate between the north and south.
Except for a few loyalists such as Lin Ching-hsi, the others looked at reunification positively and thereby mollified their antipathy to foreign rule.

After some years, loyalists such as Wang Ying-lin often compared the Mongol Yuan to the short-lived Ch'in dynasty. They became convinced of the permanence of Chinese culture and civilization through the transmission of Confucian teaching, and after a period of adjustment looked confidently to the future. In that respect, their feelings were not much different from some northern Chinese scholars who served the Yuan and felt that the foreign origins of the ruling dynasty were irrelevant; what was of crucial importance was the enlightenment of the ruler. Thus in 1260, the Yuan envoy Hao Ching advised the loyalist martyr Li T'ing-chih:

"At present, he who can employ scholars and practise the way of the Middle Kingdom should be regarded as the ruler of the Middle Kingdom. If scholars in this [favourable] time do not apply themselves, then our people will be subjected to the executioner's knife and abandoned in dejection; there will not be half a survivor left."

The concept of legitimate or orthodox succession constituted the final component in Sung loyalism. Traditionally it was regarded as Heaven's prerogative to grant the Mandate of Heaven to a dynasty, which must thereupon be worthy of it by carrying out benevolent rule. Only when rulers were evil and depraved was the mandate withdrawn and given to another imperial house. Many unanswered questions were created by the collapse of the Sung. Since the Sung emperors in general were considered thrifty and benevolent rulers, the cause for their dynasty's collapse was perplexing to the loyalists. Hsieh Fang-te blamed the negligence of filial piety among officials during the last years of the Southern Sung, but most loyalists, like their contemporaries and traditional historians, put the major
responsibility on Chia Ssu-tao. Paradoxically, Chia's close relationship with the loyalists is not easily evident as a result of efforts to disclaim previous association with him. In fact, many key loyalist figures had been his proteges or at one time benefitted from his patronage: they included Li T'ing-chih, Liu Fu, Ch'en I-chung, and Hu San-hsing. Even Chou Mi appears to have been a former, intimate friend of Chia, as shown by Chou's writings. The loyalists also blamed the defectors and collaborators but they did not rail against those with whom they were personally acquainted. In their opinion, Chia and these renegades, and not the Sung imperial house, were responsible for losing the Mandate of Heaven.

The succession of the Mongol Yuan dynasty posed a problem of legitimacy to the loyalists. The conquest of north China by the Jurchens necessitated the removal of the Sung capital to the southeast and the relocation of the Sung court. With another ruler enthroned, the legitimacy of the Sung continued in south China; in that respect, the loss of the north—humiliating as it was—did not amount to losing the whole of Chinese territory to barbarian rule. But after the defeat of loyalist resistance in 1279, for the first time in history there was no Chinese-ruled territory. In response to this situation, Hsieh Fang-te, Wen T'ien-hsiang, and Empress Dowager Hsieh declared that never before had China seen total barbarian conquest and hinted that in their opinion the Yuan, despite its military superiority, was not legitimate. Again, Cheng Ssu-hsiao's statements in the Hsin-shih were more direct and bold. He rejected reigns by non-Chinese rulers, together with those by women and usurpers, as illegitimate and equivalent to the rule of animals who pretended to be human beings. He argued that legitimate succession need not be based on territory;
the Middle Kingdom should be regarded as still in existence and legitimate despite the fact that its territory was totally occupied by conquerors. The barbarians who then possessed the Chinese empire should be regarded as illegitimate and considered on the same basis as usurpers. He felt that since the Mongol dynasty was alien it did not have the Mandate of Heaven and would pass away shortly.

By the late 1280s and 1290s it was evident that there was no hope for a revival of the indigenous Sung. Most loyalists had, therefore, rationalized permanent alien rule. Their use of Yuan reign titles by that time indicates their acceptance of the dynasty's legitimacy. Certainly by 1300 it would seem that the Sung loyalists no longer formed a separate and visible social group, and were not much different from the larger sector of southern scholars (including many collaborators) in their perception of loyalty to the Sung and changing attitudes towards the Yuan dynasty.

A question asked at the beginning of this study was whether the southern Chinese responded differently than their northern compatriots when the Jurchen Chin occupied north China in 1126-27. At the time the Jurchens had remarked that there were few loyalists in the Sung compared to the conquest of the Liao.9 Emperor Shih-tsung of the Chin (r. 1161-1189) also commented on the different attitudes between the northern and southern Chinese:

Since the past, those among the natives of Yen who were loyal and honest have been few. When the Liao army came, they submitted to the Liao; when the Sung came, they submitted to the Sung; and when the present dynasty (i.e., Chin) arrived, they submitted to the present dynasty....[Thus] although they have undergone several dynastic changes, they have not been ravaged for these reasons. The southerners are unyielding and intransigent. Those who dare to speak and admonish frankly are many; [if through such conduct] one man is put to death, there will follow another who will still admonish. [This attitude] is highly esteemable.10
The acceptance of the northern Chinese to Mongol rule was thus partially explained by the course of its history: they had been subjected to alien conquerors for a long period and were accustomed to the situation. In addition, because the Jurchen Chin treated its Khitan and Chinese subjects cruelly, military and civil officials found it easier on their moral conscience to submit to the Mongols. Although many Sung contemporaries wrote about the hopes of the northern Chinese to reunite with the Southern Sung and their great disappointment during its collapse, by that time the northern Chinese who had submitted to the Yüan or were born under its rule felt loyalty to the Yüan and not to the Sung, in spite of the common ethnic and cultural identity with the south.

This is not to say that there were no loyalists during the Mongol conquest of north China. Indeed, there were some northern Chinese who felt loyal to the Chinese race and civilization and joined Taoist sects both to protest and as a means of preserving Chinese values and culture under Mongol threat. However, like northern scholars and Chinese generals under Chin rule, they soon felt it a more constructive alternative to cooperate with the Mongol rulers in order to soften and transform alien rule into a more compassionate system. Compared to these northern brothers, the Sung loyalists were more profoundly affected by the Mongol conquest, and thus put up a relentless resistance for three years. However, in time they also adjusted to the idea of alien rule and a generation later they had come to terms with it. An important factor towards this end may have been the high degree of sinicization they perceived as possible in their Mongol conquerors and the bureaucracy by the time of the Sung collapse.
But in spite of decreasing antipathy towards the Mongol dynasty, in each individual the essence and significance of loyalism to the Sung remained unique and varied with particular circumstances. For instance, the martyrdom of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te was inspired by different historical figures. To them, as to other loyalists such as Hsieh Ao, Chou Mi, and Cheng Ssu-hsiao, loyalty and filial piety meant different commitments and resolutions. As a group, however, the Sung loyalists realized that they were only stepping into the shoes of exemplary heroic figures of the past and would in this way attain some name in posterity; they did not consider that they were setting a precedent with their loyalty to the Sung.

II. Impact of Sung Loyalism on the Later Generations

In the popular tradition the Sung loyalists generally forbade their children to serve the Yüan dynasty as an affirmation of their loyalty to the Sung and a reinforcement of their resistance to the new political order. The tradition further shows that only with the establishment of the Ming dynasty did their descendants take up service. Such biographies are easily found in sections of gazetteers dealing with loyalist personages. As shown in this study, however, these cases were the exception rather than the rule. Although many loyalists would not themselves reemerge from political withdrawal due to their commitment to the former dynasty, they allowed their children and pupils to accept official appointment in the new regime. Even Mou Yen, who never left his home for thirty-six years after the Sung demise, saw nothing wrong with his sons and son-in-law entering Yüan service. The sons of the exemplary loyalists Hsieh Fang-te and Wen T'ien-hsiang also held office under the Yüan. While restricting
themselves to political withdrawal or martyrdom, they perhaps saw it as their filial duty to ensure that the family did not lose its scholar-official gentry status. In this respect, they possibly even played an active role in arranging their sons' appointments through former colleagues like Liu Meng-yen who had risen to high ranks in the Yüan bureaucracy.

Although some i-min loyalists accepted office themselves due to poverty and other reasons, many others did not but continued nevertheless to engage in teaching and scholarship. In that capacity they definitely influenced the young generation's attitudes towards alien rule, sharing with them at the same time their own political experience before the Sung demise. Their students and sons developed an admiration and nostalgia for the upright spirit of Wen T'ien-hsiang and other exemplary loyalists. In this way the loyalists provided the younger generation with a bridge to the future as well as to the past. Through their offices and contacts with other Yüan officials in the 1290s and 1300s, sons and pupils may have in turn helped the more stubborn loyalists come to terms with the new dynasty.

In subsequent generations Sung loyalism existed only in the memory of stories told to the grandsons and young pupils of the loyalists. While they were influenced by the loyalist spirit in general, their loyalty was not to the Sung but to the Yüan dynasty in which they were born, and under which they subsequently served. These men admired greatly the Sung loyalists and wrote of their virtues and zeal, but their sympathy did not mean they were anti-Yüan. Thus in the long run the Sung loyalists' impact on the younger generations lay essentially in the teaching and transmission of Confucian values and culture.
After the defeat of loyalist resistance in 1279, the Yuan was confronted with banditry and rebellious uprisings which were most rampant during the reigns of Qubilai and Toghon Temür. The unrest in the late 1270s and 1280s was particularly alarming in Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, which had in fact been centres of loyalist resistance under Wen T'ien-hsiang and Chang Shih-chieh. Several uprisings claimed connection with the Sung imperial family and one was led by Ch'en Tiao-yen (fl. 1270-1290), a former associate of Chang Shih-chieh. On that basis certain scholars in the Ming and Ch'ing and modern nationalistic historians have hailed these bandit and rebel movements as organized patriotic pro-Sung activities. Some even asserted that they were secretly planned by the i-min loyalists. This claim, I believe, is tenuous and uncorroborated by evidence. After 1279 most of the active participants in the loyalist resistance had died; some loyalist forces were incorporated into the Mongol armies while the bandit groups simply dispersed as quickly as they had been assembled for short-term profit. Many such movements claiming to be pro-Sung were in fact instigated by men who had taken up Yuan office but who later rebelled. Among the loyalists included in this study, there is only one or two who are said to have been participants in these later rebel movements. The uprisings of Ch'en Tiao-yen, the She aboriginals, and several others invoking the Sung banner were but isolated incidents operating without the support of the i-min loyalists. In fact loyalists such as the Ch'ing-yüan scholar Shu Yüeh-hsiang often condemned these bandits and outlaws who caused chaos and suffering.

The notion that these uprisings were related to the Sung loyalist resistance might first have arisen because the Yuan government
overreacted, suspecting without sufficient cause that the last Sung pretender to the throne, Ti-Ping, had not drowned but had fled safely to Champa. After 1279 the Yuan court did not really fear a revival of loyalist resistance but wanted to prevent Sung clansmen from being used as figureheads by rebel groups to instigate revolt. A fact not considered when these uprisings are claimed as loyalist activities is that more natural disasters occurred per year during Mongol rule in south China than in any other dynasty. Such calamities as floods and famine could have partially accounted for the recalcitrance of the times. To allocate full responsibility to the Sung loyalists is to misinterpret reality and create myths such as the "moon-cake" campaigns to drive out the Mongols in the late Yuan.

Although late Yuan rebel leaders (including Chu Yuan-chang, founder of the Ming) often used the Sung banner as the cause for revolt, again few, if any, of the Sung loyalists and their descendants included in this study can be shown to have taken part. On that basis I argue that the Sung loyalists did not play a military role after the defeat at Yai-shan. In fact, in the late Yuan many individual scholars of the third or fourth generation under Mongol rule supported the alien Yuan despite the establishment of the indigenous Ming dynasty. The generation of scholars who experienced the collapse of the Yuan dynasty had not lived under Sung rule but were led to admire Sung loyalty through the writings of the loyalists. These men loyal to the Yuan included, besides Mongol nationals, Central Asians as well as southern Chinese. There were many cases of Chinese gentry who recruited their tenants, family servants and slaves to repel recalcitrant movements.

The i-min loyalists—the scholar-officials who survived the
collapse of the Yuan—lived a life-style very similar to that of the Sung loyalists during the first generation of Yuan rule. Individuals such as T'ao Tsung-i 陶宗儀 (ca. 1316-ca. 1402), Yang Wei-chen 楊維禎 (1296-1370), and Tai Liang 戴良 (1317-1383) considered themselves subjects of the former Yuan and refused to serve the Chinese rebel leaders. What impressed these men the most about the Sung loyalists, whom they wrote about extensively, was their loyalty to the collapsing dynasty and not their antibarbarian sentiments about Mongol rule. Thus they later declined to serve the Ming ruler. Men like Sung Lien who entered Ming service, instead of showing exhilaration about the restoration of an indigenous Chinese dynasty, very often expressed in their writings a nostalgic sadness about the end of the Yuan dynasty and an uncertainty about the future of Ming rule. Even the Ch'ing scholars, Chao I and Ch'üan Tsu-wang, remarked about the large number of individuals who died for the Yuan cause or refused to serve the Ming dynasty, in spite of the different racial and ethnic background of the Yuan rulers. Ch'üan felt that this phenomenon reflected the influence of Sung loyalism and morality on the men of the Yuan, rather than an indication of the gratitude they expressed to the Mongol rulers for their questionable benevolent rule. The loyalty of these Yuan literati thus refutes the view that the late Yuan rebellions were the culmination of ethnic nationalistic resistance against the alien dynasty. Instead, they show that in the Yuan to Ming transitional period, scholar-officials influenced by Sung loyalism were more affected by loyalty to the ruling house than loyalty to the Chinese race.

Recent scholars have in fact indicated that the racial factor
during the dissolution of the Mongol Yuan was overemphasized by Ming, Ch'ing, and modern nationalistic scholars. They show that during the early Ming period there was no blatant racial discrimination nor xenophobic sentiment expressed towards the Mongols, many of whom chose to stay under Ming rule rather than follow the Mongol court in its flight to the steppes.26 In spite of the racist overtones in Chu Yüan-chang's proclamation of succession to the Yuan,27 the founder of the Ming dynasty admitted the legitimate status of the alien regime. According to these scholars, it was the T'u-mu Incident in 1449 (a reckless venture in which the Mongols inflicted a humiliating and catastrophic defeat on the Ming court) that caused anti-Mongol feelings to intensify.28 This incident also led to the revision of the histories of the Sung, Liao, Chin, and Yuan dynasties to deny foreign reigns legitimate status.29

Although Sung loyalism had some impact on the Yuan loyalists, it was in the Ming to Ch'ing transition that a number of parallels may be drawn. The obvious one is that both the Sung and Ming loyalists were confronted with alien rule. As with the Sung loyalists, the Ming loyalists also put up a fierce military resistance to the Manchu conquerors, but they received even more popular and local support than during the Sung collapse and posed a greater threat to the succeeding dynasty.30 The Ming loyalist movement was much more widespread and involved many more personalities. While the Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng recorded almost seven hundred names and biographies of Sung loyal subjects, over five thousand biographies of Ming loyal personages are included.31 We earlier discussed the dissent in leadership during the Sung resistance which undermined its strength, but this cannot be compared in magnitude to the contentions and rifts
in the Ming loyalist court. Many martyrs and survivors of the Ming loyalist resistance compared themselves to the Sung loyalists and looked to the Sung for precedents and ideological support. It was alleged for instance that Cheng Ssu-hsiao’s Hsin-shih was forged by Ming loyalists to spark loyalist resistance during the Ming collapse. If they were not responsible for the forgery, they certainly hailed its discovery and responded to its appeal to resist foreign conquest. In their writings, the loyalist personalities frequently referred to Sung loyalist exemplars such as Wen T'ien-hsiang, Hsieh Fang-te, Hsieh Ao, and Cheng Ssu-hsiao. In particular the antibarbarian views of Wang Fu-chih and Ku Yen-wu bring to mind Cheng Ssu-hsiao’s strong statements about the "nonhuman" nature of the non-Chinese peoples. Huang Tsung-hsi was deeply influenced by Hsieh Ao in loyalist sentiments and by Teng Mu in political thought. His writings on this subject have been referred to in the present study.

Lü Liu-liang (1629-1683) is an example of a "latent" loyalist who developed racist feelings against the Manchus after he had obtained a degree from the new dynasty. In that respect he was like Wang Yüan-liang and Teng Kuang-chien who resigned after a period of service to the Yuan. Among the Ming loyalists, there were eccentric painters like Cheng Ssu-hsiao and poetry circles which lamented the end of the dynasty. Ming loyalists also spread to other parts of the empire in the course of their military resistance, the most noteworthy among them being Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung 鄭成功 [1624-1662]), who operated in Taiwan. Following the example of Li Yung from Tung-kuan, who went to Japan after the Song collapsed, the scholar Chu Shun-shui (1600-1682) departed for
Japan and Annam where he taught and served.\(^{38}\) As in the case of
the Sung loyalists, voluminous scholarship poured from the pens of the
Ming loyalists; but unlike the relative freedom of expression during
the Mongol period, strict censorship during the Ch'ing proscribed many
of their writings. Even in the mid-Ch'ing, Ch'üan Tsu-wang still had
to be cautious about what he wrote; it is possible that one reason
for his high praise of the Sung loyalists was to make disguised
favourable statements about the Ming loyalists.

In regard to the changing nature of their loyalism, the Ming
loyalists appear to have drawn examples from the Sung loyalists. One
instance was the decision to reemerge into public service. While Ku
Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, Wang Fu-chih, and Lü Liu-liang did not
actually take up appointments in the Ch'ing, they encouraged their
children, relatives, and disciples to do so.\(^{39}\) Although Huang
Tsung-hsi refused to participate in the Ming history project, he did
not forbid his student Wan Ssu-t'ung to take part; he actually made
available his private library collection to ensure a thorough job.
This accommodating attitude undermined their loyalism in the eyes of
contemporaries, who criticized each other for less than adequate
manifestations of duty to the former dynasty and ruler. In fact, the
Ming loyalists were more strict in their demands of unchanging
loyalty. For this reason many saw Sung loyalism as more absolute and
Sung loyalists as more resolute than had actually been the case. For
instance, Wang Ying-lin, who was not criticized in his own time for
being wanting in loyalty, came under fierce attack by the Ming
loyalists.

During the last dynastic collapse—the end of the Chinese
imperial system—a new set of factors changed the significance of
loyalism. Sung and Ming paragons of loyalism became exclusively identified as ethnic and nationalist heroes. Those who embraced traditional models of loyalism towards the former dynasty may have felt socially displaced, because loyalist sentiments to the Manchu rulers were not regarded in a positive light, nor respected in the midst of China's turbulent struggle to enter the modern era. The eminent scholar Wang Kuo-wei felt loyalty to the Ch'ing which he had served, and in 1927 drowned himself in the former Ch'ing palace grounds. This loyalist act, and those of others like him who showed a lingering loyalty to the Ch'ing, have not received traditional praise, and no group biographies of these men are likely to be compiled. However, the Sung loyalists have been drawn upon as a source of spiritual inspiration in the present century to respond to Western and Japanese imperialism as well as to the current political division of modern China. This transformation of loyalism to apply to situations of national significance other than dynastic change presents a stimulating problem for further study.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN


3. For further remarks on this issue, see Lao Yan-shuan, "Southern Chinese Scholars and Educational Institutions in Early Yüan: Some Preliminary Remarks", in Langlois, China under Mongol Rule, pp. 121-23, 132.


6. Hao Ching, 37.13a, in letter to Li T'ing-chih to convince him about Qubilai's enlightened rule.

7. For a survey and discussion of the concept of legitimate succession in Chinese history and in particular in regard to the Sung and Yüan periods see Hok-lam Chan, "Chinese Official Historiography", pp. 68-74; Jao Tsung-i, Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh shang chih cheng-t'ung lun (Hong Kong, 1977), pp. 28-42, 105-62.

8. Surprisingly there is relatively little on this issue among loyalist writings. Chou Mi quotes his friend Ch'en Kuo's theory of legitimate succession based on seven breaks and six continuations, but it covers only up to the T'ang dynasty.


10. Chin-shih 8.184. See also Yanai, p. 95.

11. A primary reason for Chin defections to the Mongols was the general hatred of the Chin by Khitan and Chinese subjects. See de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities in North China", 142. For a study of the eminent Khitan personality Yeh-lü Ch'ü-ts'ai who switched his loyalty from the Chin, see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'ü-ts'ai (1189-1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman", in Wright and Twitchett, Confucian Personalities, pp. 189-216. Hao Ching's Lin-ch'üan chi also expresses deep resentment of the Chin regime. After the collapse of the Chin, it is said that common people massacred large groups of Jurchens whom they hated. See Chao I, 20.589.

12. See, for example, Chao Meng-fu's poem "The grave of Yueh Fei", in Chao Meng-fu, 4.42. The modern scholar Sun K'o-k'uan remarks
that Liu Yin, as a northern Chinese, was disappointed with the Mongol conquest which dashed any hopes of reunification with the Southern Sung regime. Liu Yin was sympathetic to the Sung, but his refusal to serve the Yuan was not related to loyal feelings towards the Sung. See Mote, "Confucian Eremitism", pp. 262-79.

13. For studies of these Taoists sects and their concerns with preserving Chinese civilization, see Ch'en Yüan, Nan-Sung ch'ü Ho-pei hsìn tao-chiao k'ao, Pu-jen ta-hsüeh ts'ung-shu 8. (Peking, 1941); Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Chin-Yüan Ch'üan-chen chiao ti min-tsu ssu-hsiang yu chiu-shih ssu-hsiang", in his Tungpei shih lun-ts'ung (Taipei, 1959), vol. 2, 175-204.

14. For example, the writings of Yang Wei-chen and T'ao Tsung-i are pro-Sung but not anti-Yuan. See Franke, "Some Aspects of Chinese Private Historiography", pp. 118, 128-29.

15. For a list of these rebellions extracted from the annals of Qubilai in the YS, see Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, appendix.6-12; Ch'en Pang-chan, Yuan-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1888 ed.), 1.1a-7b.

16. One such incident was led by Huang Hua in 1283 and occurred in Fukien. See Ch'en Pang-chan, Yuan-shih chi-shih, 1.3a.

17. This was the 1280-83 revolt led by Ch'en Kuei-lung and Ch'en Tiao-yen. The latter is mentioned to have responded to Chang Shih-chieh in 1277 during the latter's siege in Chang-chou (SS 451.33274).

18. For example, Ch'en Pang-chan, Yuan-shih chi-shih, 1.6b; Wan Ssu-t'ung, Sung-chi chung-i lu, appendix.12.

19. For example, see Sun K'o-k'uan, Yuan-tai Han wen-hua, p. 342; also by the same author, "Yüan-ch'u nan-Sung i-min ch'u-shu", 14.


21. Tradition has it that in the late Yuan the Sung loyalists, in a widespread effort to drive out the Mongols, sent secret messages about the date and time of revolt in pieces of paper hidden inside moon-cakes, which were traditionally sent as presents to friends and relatives. See also Henry Serruys, The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu Period (1368-1398) (Brussels, 1959), p. 22.


23. On T'ao Tsung-i's loyalist views, see F. W. Mote, "T'ao Tsung-i and His 'Cho Keng Lu'" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1954), pp. 20-22. On Yang Wei-chen and Tai Liang see the biographies by Edmund Worthy and Langlois respectively, in Goodrich and Fang, pp. 1547-53 and 1234-37. Some of these later loyalists treasured former possessions of the Sung loyalists (such as Wen T'ien-hsiang's inkstone and Hsieh Fang-te's lute) to inspire their own loyal spirit.


25. Chao I, 30.645-46 and 32.677-78; Ch'uan Tsu-wang, wai-pien 18.907-08 and 18.908-09. On Yuan loyalists, see also Li Tse-fen, vol. 4, 109-56. It seems that a descendant of Ch'en I-chung, Ch'en Ta 陳達 (fl. 1368), refused to serve the Ming and tried to drown himself (Li Tse-fen, vol. 4, 156). On Mongol nationals who preferred to stay in China during the Ming, see Serruys, The Mongols in China, pp. 34-46.


27. For the text of this statement proclaimed in 1367, see Meng Ssu-ming, quoting from Ming-ta cheng-yao (1.17a-18a), p. 222. For a partial translation, see Wiens, 3-4.


30. On Ming loyalist activities, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan: The Tragedy of Chiang-yan", in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Wakeman and Carolyn Grant (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), pp. 43-85; Jerry Dennerline, "Hsü Tu and the Lesson of Nanking: Political Integration and Local Defence in Chiang-nan, 1634-1645" and Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case of T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei", both in Spence and Wills, From Ming to Ch'ing, pp. 89-132 and pp. 239-76.

31. Even allowing for the question of a higher degree of survival of sources on the Ming period, the figures for the Ming loyalists are still impressive. These biographies are in Ch'en Meng-lei et al., 735-63. See Chapter Four, pp. 162-63, note 18.


34. On Huang Tsung-hsi, see de Bary, "A Plan for the Prince". Huang Tsung-hsi's Sung-Yuan hsüeh-an, completed by Ch'uan Tsu-wang, is a monumental work on the intellectual schools of the Sung and Yuan. The Sung loyalists discussed in this thesis are mostly classified
under the following schools: Shui-hsin 水心 (ch. 54-55); Lung-ch'uan 龍川 (ch. 56); Ta'sang-chou 濃州 (ch. 69-70); Pei-shan 北山 (ch. 82); Shen-ning 深寧 (ch. 85); Tung-fa 東發 (ch. 86); Sun-chai 導齊 (ch. 88).


36. See in particular the articles of a symposium on Ming loyalist painters edited by Jao Tsung-i, Ming i-min shu-hua yen-t'ao hui chi-lu chuan-k' an, Hsiang-kang Chung-wen ta-hsüeh Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu so hsüeh-pao 8:2 (1976).


41. On Wang Kuo-wei's loyalist feelings and suicide, see Schneider, pp. 97-98. However, Chia-ying Yeh Chao states in a recent study that Wang's suicide was motivated by purity of ideal and general disillusionment with the times rather than loyalty to the Manchu regime. See her Wang Kuo-wei yù ch'i wen-hsüeh p'i-p'ing (Hong Kong, 1980), pp. 71-84.

42. At present in Taiwan, Wen T'ien-hsiang and the exemplary loyalists are interpreted to have been more fiercely anti-Mongol than had really been the case. In the People's Republic, they are also seen as praiseworthy men, but the nature of their loyalty and ethnic views are downplayed to comply with present government policy to stress the multi-racial features of the population in order to develop goodwill with minority groups. On the other hand, the landlord-gentry status of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Teng Mu and their group is exaggerated and the limited visions of their loyalty to the Sung dynasty criticized. This conceptualization of Sung loyalty and the loyalists in an ideological framework is the latest in history to interpret their significance to accord with current historical circumstances.
## APPENDIX I
Chung-i Loyalists in Wen T'ien-hsiang's Mu-fu
* indicates biography also in SS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Relat. Wen</th>
<th>Martyrdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chao Shih-shang</td>
<td>Ho-chou (Anh.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>colleague</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kung Hsin</td>
<td>An-feng (Anh.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>colleague</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsou Feng</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1277 suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Pien</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>military</td>
<td></td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Lung-fu</td>
<td>Ch'uan-chou (Fuk.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>colleague</td>
<td>1278 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lü Wu</td>
<td>T'ai-p'ing (Anh.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao Ch'ao-tsung</td>
<td>Huai-fu (Kiangsi or Anh.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yin Yü</td>
<td>Ning-tu (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>colleague</td>
<td>1275 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Tsu-chün</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Ch'ing-che</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Chü</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu Hu</td>
<td>T'ien-t'ai (Chek.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1279 captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Chi-chou</td>
<td>Ning-tu (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>colleague</td>
<td>1276 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Ch'i</td>
<td>(Fukien)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1278 captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsieh Ch'i</td>
<td>(Fukien)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Wen-ping</td>
<td>(Fukien)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Tung</td>
<td>(Fukien)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Ch'in</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tseng Feng</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Yün</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1276 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Li</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>countryman</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'eng Chen-lung</td>
<td>Yung-hsin (Yung-hsin)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>brother-in-law</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Ching-fu</td>
<td>Yung-hsin (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>poet friend</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao T'ao-fu</td>
<td>Yung-hsin (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>poet friend</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Tzu-ch'ing</td>
<td>Kan-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>poet friend</td>
<td>1278 whereabouts unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Fan</td>
<td>Heng-shan (Hun.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1278 whereabouts unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang T'ang</td>
<td>Ch'ang-sha (Hun.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1278 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiung Kuei</td>
<td>Hsiang-t'an (Hun.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1278 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Hsi-pi</td>
<td>Yu-hsien (Hun.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Tzu-ch'uan</td>
<td>Yu-hsien (Hun.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'en Hsin</td>
<td>Jao-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu Cho</td>
<td>Hsü-chiang (Anh.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>follower</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Shih</td>
<td>Fu-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>&quot;same year&quot; grad.</td>
<td>12802 died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Background</td>
<td>Martyrdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo K'ai-li</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
<td>29 killed by Mongols in battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Po-wen</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
<td>7 died of distress or illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Tzu-fa</td>
<td>Nan-an (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>military?</td>
<td>1279 suicide with whole family</td>
<td>4 committed suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Che-chai</td>
<td>T'ai-chou (Chek.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>1278 killed with son</td>
<td>4 whereabouts unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Liu Shih-chao</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>tailor</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
<td>276 died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Wang Shih-min</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>1277 killed</td>
<td>279 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ang Jen</td>
<td>Nan-an (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>1277 died of illness</td>
<td>1279 died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao Hsing</td>
<td>Nan-hsiung (Kwangt.)</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>1278 whereabouts unknown</td>
<td>1276 died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Chin Ying</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>1276 died of illness</td>
<td>1279 died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hsiao Tzu</td>
<td>Chi-chou (Kiangsi)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>1279 died of illness</td>
<td>1279 died of illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Chen</td>
<td>Wen-chou (Chek.)</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>1279 died of illness</td>
<td>1279 died of illness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

1. There are 44 biographies altogether of those who died or presumed to have died during or shortly after loyalist resistance. (There were two survivors, Wang Meng-ying and Chung Chen, who have not been included in this list). Hsieh Meng-te has also been left out because the information is suspiciously mistaken for Hsieh Fang-te. The source from which this table is compiled is Teng Xuantchien's Wen ch'eng-hsiang tu-fu chung-i chuan. 27 out of the 44 men also have biographies in SS 454; Yin Yu has a biography in SS 450. Ch'en Lung-fu, Chang T'ang, and Chang Yun are listed as having biographies, but in fact, only their names appear. In the SS, Chang T'ang is written as T'ang T'ai; Liu Chu as Mo; Chen Hsin as Ta. 

2. Place of origin
   Most of the men came from Kiangsi; others were from Anhwei, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung where the loyalists also fought in.

3. Background
   Most of the men joined Wen in 1274 to 1278. Of these 28 had a civil career; 15 had a military background; and 1 was a tailor.

4. Relationship to Wen
   20 followers, or local men who independently joined Wen
   12 fellow countrymen
   5 colleagues
   3 friends
   2 relatives
   2 cograduates in 1256

5. Martyrdom
   29 killed by Mongols in battle
   7 died of distress or illness
   4 committed suicide
   4 whereabouts unknown, but presumed dead
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