Except where otherwise acknowledged this thesis is the result of my original research.

Anton E. Lucas
The conflict between the Dutch-trained bureaucratic elite and the revolutionary movement in Pekalongan Residency on Java's North Coast in 1945 had its origins in the impact of Western capitalism in the area, particularly in the way the sugar mills exacerbated existing cleavages in peasant communities. During the Japanese occupation the gap between the bureaucratic elite and the people increased, the elite being forced to become economic supervisors for the Japanese. Compulsory rice requisitioning, forced labour and rationing added new burdens to the peasantry. By 1944 famine conditions existed in many areas of the Residency. The attitude of the bureaucratic elite after the Proclamation of Independence caused fresh tensions with revolutionary leaders, who saw the elite (who openly stated that they were waiting for the Dutch to return) as hindering the struggle for Independence.

The social revolution of October-November 1945 was characterised by violence towards Chinese, Eurasians and officials. The entire bureaucratic elite at the district, subdistrict and village levels was overthrown, in popular actions led by semi-bandits. At the forefront of the revolutionary vanguard, the underground PKI formed a United Front and led what became known as the 'Tiga Daerah' Movement which aimed to democratise all levels of government. For about six weeks the three regions of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang were ruled by local revolutionaries through working committees. Four days after taking over the Residency capital in early December 1945, the Republican army imprisoned the newly appointed communist Resident and all the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries as well, in a subsequent counter-revolution supported by Muslim groups. Locally initiated legal action against the imprisoned revolutionaries dragged on throughout 1946, when the central government finally took over investigations. Six revolutionaries finally brought to trial in April 1947 were eventually released, but the popular figure Kutil became the first Indonesian to be sentenced to death by formal judicial process in the new Republic.
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1945 was a crucial year for Indonesia. The Japanese 'liberators' were defeated and the European colonial powers in Southeast Asia, in particular the Dutch, began trying to reconstitute their authority in their former colonies. In Java the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August began five years of revolution, which only formally ended with the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949.

While the Indonesian Revolution is one of the most studied of Southeast Asian revolutions, paradoxically we know little about its internal dynamics, at the local level. While we now know what happened in the main urban centres of Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and the national capital of Jakarta itself, how cabinets came and went, what the national politicians were thinking and what their priorities were, the same cannot be said for local revolutionaries. We know very little about what happened at the village level, for example. Some quite significant local events, which even then seemed obscure, have been further shrouded in mystery in the 30-odd years since they took place.

Benedict Anderson once remarked that '...the Indonesian revolution is incomprehensible unless one can somehow get inside it... by talking only with people in the top strata, we miss a great deal of what really happened.'¹ So far most studies on the Revolution have been based on the 'top strata'. The reasons for this are not hard to find. Archives and newspaper files are virtually silent on local events. Local revolutionaries are much less accessible to foreign scholars, and for different reasons, also to Indonesian scholars and journalists. Most have moved away from the areas where they played important roles in 1945.

This study began in a small way. In mid-1971 I was on field study, from Hawaii, at the University of Gajah Mada in Yogyakarta.

Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo, whose seminar course I was following, had met the former Bupati (regional head) of Brebes, an area on Java's North Coast, by accident on a train journey from Jakarta. The former Bupati had related how he had been kidnapped for six weeks during October 1945 in which he described as the Three Regions, or Tiga Daerah, Affair. Why was he so obviously deeply affected by what had happened to him? I thought it was important to find out what this experience had meant to him and why.

The most 'accessible' group of participants in the Tiga Daerah Affair 30 years after it occurred were the former members of the bureaucratic elite. Yet as informants these former officials could say little about who had replaced them, or the value of practical leadership. Some called it an 'affair', others a 'movement', while very few of the elite called it a 'struggle'. Most officials talked about it as a 'revolt' or a 'deviation', but from what? Moreover, the perceptions of this group of informants were quite uniform. Usually it was described as 'a movement whose leaders included an executioner called Kutil, a mysterious communist called K. Midjaja, and a medical orderly called Soepangat who became a bupati'.

There are several reasons for the length of time this study took to complete. Firstly, the whereabouts of the group of radical revolutionaries and their former supporters was often not known. After eventually locating them it was simply not possible to sit down and expect them to tell their story in one short interview. It took time to build up a relationship of mutual trust. I well remember the last of about ten talks, which had extended over three years with one informant, when he gave me a key piece of information (quoted in the thesis). 'I have never told you that before, have I?' he said. Yet waiting for these informants to tell me their stories was very important if my idea of trying to see the revolution 'from below' were to succeed at all. I have therefore included a large amount of interview material in the following pages because I believe it is crucial to the understanding of these leaders' perceptions about the Revolution.

After work at the village level in parts of the Tiga Daerah it became clear that this part of the Revolution was not just a
phenomenon of urban, educated youth, but really involved the peasantry. In particular the role of semi-bandits, known locally as lenggaong, was crucial in the mobilisation of popular forces against hated and corrupt officials.

One strong perception of surviving Tiga Daerah leaders was that their revolutionary struggle in 1945 was ignored by nationalist politicians. Some of the remaining Jakarta leadership reinforced the perceptions of local revolutionaries, even 30 years after the event. These leaders remembered little about what had happened at the local level, either in the Tiga Daerah or anywhere else in Java. Were local events unimportant to national level politics then? 'It's not that', recalled a former national leader, 'so many things happened so quickly in four years one had no time to remember local events'. In fact it was army leaders in Jakarta and elsewhere I met who were most aware of the importance of the Tiga Daerah Affair. Here I found their perceptions more coloured by the course of Indonesian history since 1945 than any other group I had interviewed. Because of the army's role in politics in Indonesia since 1945 I have examined the role of the military in the Tiga Daerah closely.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As in any oral history my first debt is to all my informants, all of whom showed great interest in this project, and who all took the time to talk about their experiences with me. While agreeing with Masri Singarimbun's Batak saying: 'Mention all their names or none at all', it would not be practical to mention every informant by name and many would not want it.

In Tegal, the Soemarno family were among the many who offered me the hospitality of their home for many months, as well as their knowledge of Tegal during the Revolution. Wadyono, an ideal informant, introduced me to many former officials and army people; I am grateful to him and Soesmono for comments on early drafts of part of this thesis. Major-General Soedharmo was always interested in, and supported, the research, as did A. Djunaid in Pekalongan. Soewignjo drew the sketches and the picture of Bima in Chapter Seven, using a talent he developed while exiled to Boven Digul prison camp in West New Guinea during the 1930s. The map of Tegal Municipality is based on an original drawn by Maksum, while a local Pekalongan artist drew the original of the map of Pekalongan Municipality and environs.

Other Indonesian scholars have helped in many ways. When Sartono Kartodirdjo originally suggested the topic, he had no idea of its magnitude. Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo gave me the name of a key informant for a study which I suspect, being from Tegal, he had always wanted to do himself. From the History Department of the University of Gajah Mada, Djoko and Kuntowidjojo helped with some interviews and Soeri Suroto commented on earlier drafts. The whole study would not have been possible without the initial sponsorship of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and their support over several years is appreciated.

Many others in Indonesia and elsewhere have been involved in this project. In particular, Peter Paul and Annemarth van Lelyveld helped nurture its early stages, as did the Sudarjadi family in Baciro, and Buddy Prasadja in Tanah Abang II. John Darling originally suggested the idea of a Time Chart. I have benefited much from discussions with many people, including David Lewis, Peter Britton, Ron and Barbara Hatley, Jim Castle, Michael Williams and Harold Crouch. Here in
Canberra Akira Oki, Cheah Boon Kheng and Soeyatno, Rahardjo, James Fox, David Penny and Max Lane have all helped me see different angles on familiar material.

I should also thank Herb and Betty Feith and Ruth McVey for their continued encouragement. Ben Anderson provided copies of his own notes of *Merdeka* newspaper and *Antara* news service items, which no longer exist in Indonesia, and helped with the translation of sections of Appendix H. Parts of this thesis have also benefited from the detailed comments he made on an earlier article about Pemalang.

This thesis would never have reached its final form without the encouragement and support of my supervisor, Tony Reid, to whom I owe a special debt of gratitude. Not only for his interest in my work before coming to the Australian National University, but in particular his critical comments, questions and suggestions on successive drafts of each chapter during the two years over which this thesis was written. Without an ANU scholarship this writing would not have been completed.

David Marr, who was my supervisor for nine months, opened up many new perspectives with his Vietnamese comparisons. My thanks also to Robyn Walker, who typed earlier drafts and helped to get this thesis finished more or less on time. Kim Inskip also helped with the typing, Marian May Owens corrected the final draft, Chris Ledger and Chris Stevenson helped with proof reading. I would especially like to thank Anvida Lamberts, who typed the final copy, for all her helpful suggestions regarding style, spelling and layout of appendices. I am most grateful to Imants Lamberts for drawing such fine maps, a much bigger project than either of us realised.

Lastly I must thank my wife, Kadar, who helped with corrections and re-typing of drafts. Without her amazing forbearance this thesis could never have been written.
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND ABBREVIATIONS

SPELLING of Indonesian place names and words have been standardised using the new spelling, except for titles of published works and newspapers. Personal names have been spelt according to individual preference where it is known. Javanese words have been spelt in indented quotations using an 'o' reflecting speech patterns, although in some cases I have followed previously accepted usage if the spelling follows the conventions of Javanese script, e.g., wedana is now usually spelt with an 'a' rather than wedono, the way it is still often pronounced. Japanese, Javanese and Indonesian words have been spelt without accents. A number of commonly used Indonesian words are italicised the first time, thereafter treated as English. Organisations are not italicised. A glossary of commonly used words and abbreviations can be found at the back of the thesis.

Several abbreviations used in footnotes are:
'Transcript 1/27, 14.2.74' - transcript refers to a typed transcript of a taped interview; the Roman numeral to the side of the cassette; the Arabic numeral is the transcript page; the date is that of recording the interview.
'Answers' refers to informants' written responses to questions by the author.
'Proc.Gen.' refers to the collection of documents relating to the Tiga Daerah held in the Procurator-General section of the Dutch Public Archives.
TEGAL MUNICIPALITY SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 1945
(showing route of demonstrators entering the city on 4 November)

**Legend**

1. AMRI Slawi headquarters
2. Slawi kawedanan office/residence
3. Japanese truck stopped
4. AMRI Adiwerna
5. Pemuda Istimewa, Ujungrusi
6. Adiwerna kawedanan office/residence
7. Burial place of 4 November victims, KNI Vice-Chairman Mardjono
   and others
8. Kutil's house in Pesayangan
9. AMRI Talang (People's Bank Building)
10. Talang kecamatan office/residence
11. AMRI Pagongan
12. Dukuhturi kecamatan
13. Dukuhturi AMRI
14. API headquarters in old Trubels dairy
15. Kardinah hospital
16. Kejambon police barracks (attacked 20 October)
17. Two Japanese killed (one believed to be Tegal Fuku Shuchokan)
18. Another Japanese civilian killed
19. Two members of Bouman family (Eurasian) killed
20. Second Barisan Pelopor headquarters
21. Tegal kabupaten office/residence
22. Third Barisan Pelopor headquarters
23. Tegal City square (alun-alun)
24. Tegal City AMRI headquarters
25. Members of Coster family and other Eurasians killed
26. Tegal Municipal KNI Office
27. Roman Catholic Church Hall, venue of meeting when Mayor and
   Tegal perjuangan clashed 11 September
28. Town Hall
29. Tegal Working Committee Office (former Assistant Resident's office)
30. Police/PKN headquarters
31. TKR barracks (formerly kenpeitai/Hotel Stork)
32. TKR asrama
33. Barisan Pelopor's first office
34. Jail
35. Japanese shipbuilding yards
36. Tegal railway station
37. Tegal PETA daidan headquarters
38. Slerok oval
39. Jawa Textile Co. mill

---Route of masses entering Tegal on 4 November---
CHAPTER ONE

THE NATIONALISTS AND THE BUREAUCRATIC ELITE
IN PREWAR PEKALONGAN

The name of Pekalongan has long been associated with the bright colours and unusual motives of its unique batik, produced in the Residency capital, a contrast with the somber tones and the traditional motifs of the hinterland cities of Yogyakarta and Solo. These contrasts in batik styles and designs are paralleled by no less marked geographic, social and political differences between Pekalongan Residency, located on the western pesisir (coastal region), and other parts of Java.

In 1945 the Residency consisted of four regencies or kabupaten; Pekalongan itself and, moving to the west, the kabupaten of Pemalang, Tegal and Brebes - the last bordering on Cirebon Residency in West Java. The Residency boundary was fixed relatively recently; from 1729 until 1900, then again briefly from 1928 until 1931, the kabupaten of Pemalang, Brebes and Tegal, the so-called Three Regions or Tiga Daerah of 1945, were a separate Residency with Tegal City as its capital.

Each kabupaten was divided administratively into kawedanan (districts) each with its wedana (district head). Below them were the kecamatan (subdistricts) headed by a camat. Together with the lurah (village headmen), these higher officials, the Dutch-trained Pangreh Praja, made up Pekalongan's bureaucratic elite.

The Residency, with a population of just over two and a half million in 1930, had several distinct regions. The Batang area to the west of Pekalongan, a separate kabupaten until the early 'thirties when economy measures and a low population forced its amalgamation with Pekalongan, was the most prosperous in the Residency. In 1920 Batang

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1 See Appendix E and the maps of the three kabupaten of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang at the beginning of this thesis for the names of these administrative divisions and the kecamatan boundaries.
region grew most of the Residency's cash crops (except sugar), namely tea, rubber, coffee, quinine and 37 per cent of Java's cocoa. It was also virtually the only place where indigenous small holders grew any export crops. Bumiayu kawedanan in the far south of Brebes kabupaten also grew insignificant amounts of these crops.

Most of the Residency's rice and its major cash crop sugar was grown in the second distinct region, the coastal plain (vlakte) stretching from Batang to Losari on the border with West Java. The combination of a strong East Monsoon, alluvial flooding, and the famous Comal and Pemali rivers' irrigation works constructed and maintained by the European sugar plantations, made this region the best irrigated and one of the most fertile of all of Central Java. Brebes kabupaten was a rice surplus producing area, and the Residency itself was self-sufficient in rice. In Pemalang the population growth rate before the war was amongst the highest in Central Java, and population densities throughout the coastal plain were very high generally. In 1930 Adiwema kawedanan had a population density of 1,764 people per square kilometre of cultivated land, the highest in all Java. The highly fertile coastal plain also supported 17 sugar mills until the Depression, and Pemalang's sugar yields were among the highest in Java.

The third region was the southern hinterland with poor soils and less sophisticated works, supporting large teak forests around

2 Landbouwlatlas van Java en Madoera (Weltevreden, 1926), Part II, Table VI.
3 Volkstelling 1930, deel II, Inheemsche Bevolking van Midden-Java en de Vorstenlanden, 10 (subsequently cited as Volkstelling).
4 Indisch Verslag, 1939, 377. Pemalang kabupaten had the third highest birthrate in Central Java, after Wonosobo and Pati.
Bantarpolang (Pemalang) and Margasari in Tegal. Densities of population in the southern regions of Brebes, with the exception of prosperous Bumiayu, and of Pemalang, were amongst the lowest in Java. Many of the Residency's Muslim schools (pesantren) were located in the southern areas around Moga and Randudongkal (south Pemalang) and Bumiayu (southern Brebes), reflecting the strength of Islam in these areas.

Income from commercial activity was of considerable importance, and was mainly in the hands of the Chinese and Arab minorities in the larger towns. Tanjung, on the Brebes coastal plain, supported a thriving kretek (clove cigarette) industry – four of the factories being indigenously owned – while to the south Banjaharjo had its own cotton growing and weaving. Textiles were produced in Tegal, Pemalang, and in the Muhammadiyah (modernist Islam) stronghold of Pekajangan to the south of the Residency capital, which the Chinese and Arabs had never been able to penetrate. In fact Pekajangan and the Tanjung clove cigarette industry were remarkable in Java as centres of successful indigenous commercial activity. This and the dominating influence of the sugar plantations distinguished the Residency economically from elsewhere.

Onto this mosaic of geographic and economic contrasts were superimposed social divisions. At the top was an unpopular wealthy class consisting of priyayi (higher officialdom), lurahs and rich traders, all of whom had some Dutch education and Western habits. In Pemalang this group tended to identify with Muhammadiyah, the reformist Muslim movement. The rural counterpart of this elite frequently had the title of haji from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and were usually

7 The kecamatan of Watukumpul (south Pemalang) and Bantarkawung (southern Brebes) both had 390 people per square kilometre of arable land, the lowest densities in the Residency. Volksstelling Table 9, 167.

landlords, having acquired sawah (wet rice fields) by money lending. Members of this class owned three of the Residency's rice mills, and lurahs obtained wealth by renting village communal land as well as bengkok (village sawahs used by officials) to the sugar mills. The 'foreigners' - the Chinese, Arabs and Eurasians - were part of this class in the popular mind. The Arabs, notorious as money-lenders, also controlled and, in practice, owned large areas of land through buying it in the name of their Javanese wives. Ethnic hostility thus reinforced economic cleavages.

The Muslim counter-elite in the Residency was divided into three elements. Firstly, there were the Islamic communists, only a handful of individuals all of whom had been exiled to Digul after the 1926 rebellion. Secondly, there was the conservative orthodox group, the rural kyai (Muslim teacher) with their groups of students between whom there was little communication, although they were often members of NU (Nahdatul Ulama, Muslim Scholars' Union). The third element in Pekalongan Islam were the modernists, who were strongest in and around the larger towns. Their organisations will be discussed shortly.

Lastly, there was the urban-rural division. While some of the larger kawedanan towns such as Comal on the main east-west road, where sugar factories had been established since last century, had Chinese kampungs, most 'foreigners' lived in the urban areas. This was where the bulk of the Residency's Western-educated people lived. The kabupaten capitals had running water, paved streets with electric lamps to light them (at least in the priyayi quarter), hospitals and Dutch-language schools.

9 Sarino Mangunpranoto, the PNI leader, who was head of the Taman Siswa school in Pemalang from 1929 to 1943, recalls that his father-in-law became a landlord with 12 hectares of sawah by deliberately lending money to peasants who owned land higher up the irrigation channels, and then taking the sawah when loans could not be repaid. Sarino Mangunpranoto, Interview, 21.7.76. In other areas, they controlled the water distribution in the village by bribing the irrigation officials. Camat of Tonjong, Interview, 15.10.76.

10 Under the Agrarian Law of 1870 only 'natives' could own land.
In the first part of the introductory chapter, we will look at the economic welfare of the bulk of the population compared to the elite in the last decades of colonial rule, and the crucial role that officials at all levels played in extracting the economic surplus from the population for the colonial power. We will then look at political dissent in the twentieth century, particularly the communist rebellion of 1926 in Pekalongan Residency.

The Socioeconomic Origins of Political Discontent

The impact of European capitalism in Java was felt first on the northern coastal area, which was the centre of foreign economic and political power under the VOC (the Dutch East India Company) during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Apart from the accessibility of the pasisir ports, it was the willingness to cooperate of the regent or bupati (as head of a regency or kabupaten), the highest 'native' official, on whom depended the financial success of the VOC. Although hereditary succession was not to be recognised until the 1854 Constitution for the Indies, before its demise at the end of the eighteenth century the VOC had already promised one of its most loyal vassals, the Reksonegoro family of Tegal, that the Regency would remain in its hands not for the classical period of seven generations but for 12.

The introduction of the Culture System in 1830, with its compulsory cultivation of specified export crops to be delivered at fixed prices to the State, was also administered through the regents and bolstered their power. However, the Tegal region was much more intensively exposed to the system than most other parts of Java because of its port. According to a contemporary observer '...the [economic] situation of the Javanese [in the Cirebon and Tegal areas] is indeed so shocking that it is difficult to present a completely realistic picture...'. In particular the cultivation of indigo on wet rice fields

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11 Mr Besar, Interview, 24.7.73. The latter started his own legal firm in Tegal in 1923 on his return from Leiden, and was an adviser to the Reksonegoro family, which he knew well.
(sawah) near the sugar mills caused great hardship.

In contrast to the hinterland areas of Java, where regents generally did not directly own land but extracted tribute in produce from the peasantry, in this part of the western pasisir they owned land themselves, on which they grew rice or cash crops. The Regent of Tegal had 8,179 hectares, of which less than half was cultivated because of lack of labour. In 1859 this constraint forced the Regent to treat the peasantry generously (giving loans to improve rice cultivation, and later anneulling the debt of f.30,000) for fear they would move away. The Regent of Pemalang was in a similar position, while the Regent of Brebes was probably the richest in Java. As well as personal land holdings like the other Tiga Daerah bupatis, he had hereditary particuliere landerijen (private lands) totalling 2,440 hectares, given by Raffles, a part of which was cultivated with sugar and earned the Regent f.37,000 in 1856. This Regent, '...virtually a rice merchant', needed more than 2,000 pikuls of rice a year for the many entertainments he had to put on for visiting officials, whose numbers he constantly complained about.

Despite the so-called 'Liberal' policy of the colonial government and the 'Ethical' policy which succeeded it in about 1900,

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12 See the report by L. Vitalis, who was Inspector of Forced Cultivation in Tegal Residency in 1834, in Chr. L.M. Penders, Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism 1830-1942 (Brisbane, 1977), 27 (subsequently cited as Documents). On the growing of indigo, van Klaveren, a critical Dutch observer, wrote that 'it never gave profits.... It was cultivated partly on sawahs and did not fit well in a rotation with rice. Indigo was notorious as a soil destroyer and its cultivation brought many hardships for the natives. It was maintained because of better expectations for the future and because it was needed to give the Amsterdam auctions a complete assortment.' J.J. van Klaveren, The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies (The Hague, 1953), 160. A recent study on the impact of the forced cultivation of sugar during this period in East Java concludes that '...it could hardly have avoided exacerbating significant existing cleavages within peasant communities'. R.E. Elson, The Cultivation System and 'Agricultural Involution' (Monash University Centre for South East Asian Studies, Working Papers No.14), 8.

13 One pikul weighs 61.76 kilograms. For these Regents' landholdings, see Onghokham, The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century (unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1975), 139, fn.69 (subsequently cited as Madiun).
the welfare of the peasantry kept on declining in relation to that of the village officials and the Pangreh Praja. One source of security for villagers was weakened by the gradual alienation of communal sawahs into private hands. The Eindresumé (Summary of Native Land Rights) of 1868 had shown that the communal sawah lands given to headmen and other officials in lieu of salary were larger in Pekalongan Residency in relation to other areas and that village labour was extracted to work them.14 By 1903 the bengkok in Pemalang kabupaten were so large as to be considered 'burdensome' in some villages, where headmen had been in office for long periods. The Tegal and Adiwerna kawedanan village officials rented land from their impoverished fellow villagers. Acting as middlemen they then leased this land to the sugar mills.15 Communal land was no longer a resource for the poor, but rather accentuated the polarisation in the village.

Between 1907 and 1927, in line with Dutch economising measures, the number of villages fell by 20 per cent in the Residency, but the bengkok area fell only 5 per cent. The amount of bengkok per village increased substantially. On a population basis, a very small number of people (village officials and headmen made up 0.6 per cent of Pekalongan's population in 1925) controlled nearly a quarter of the communally-owned sawah.16

The gap between the incomes of village headmen and the

14 Hiroyoshi Kano, Land Tenure System and the 'Desa' community in Nineteenth Century Java (Tokyo, 1977), 8. Kano sees the development of a 'public' class relation in parts of Java originating not in the classical landlord-tenant relations but derived from official position, 'a derivative of communal social relations', between village headmen, their officials and the people.


16 Thirty-one per cent of total sawah area was still held communally in 1925, but only a tiny 143 hectares was periodically redistributed within the village, the rest seemed to be almost permanently alienated. J.W. Meijer Ranneft, Onderzoek naar den Blastingdruk op de Inlandsche Bevolking ( Weltevreden, 1926), 122, 124, 128 (subsequently cited as Onderzoek).
average income per head of the population was large and increasing. In Pekalongan Residency the number of lurahs between 1901 and 1924 earning between f.600 and f.1,200 increased from 19 to 40 per cent.\textsuperscript{17} Average income per head of population in Pemalang kecamatan in 1924 was f.25.79.\textsuperscript{18} Boeke’s budget studies between 1924 and 1926 included four families in Pekalongan Residency, one each in Tegal and Pemalang and two in Pekalongan. All but one needed large loans to cover expenditure, but two families ended up further in debt despite the loans.\textsuperscript{19} While the gulf between lurahs’ income and the average income in Pekalongan Residency was not unusually great compared with the rest of Java, the wealth of the village headmen made them functionally part of the government apparatus rather than the village community.

Although there were exceptions, wedanas and camats did not usually own property. A former camat in Brebes kabupaten before the war recalls

\begin{quote}
My own father [a wedana] did not own a house when he was pensioned. I was bred with the ethic that it would be a disgrace if a member of the Pangreh Praja during his career made himself rich by owning lands and houses. Of course at that time we lived far above the standard of the common people.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

This was because salaries were so high. A wedana earned f.500 a month. With the stable rice price of five cents a kilogram, this was the equivalent of 10 tons of rice.\textsuperscript{21} On his retirement a wedana was paid a pension of f.237, still an equivalent of five tons of rice. A bupati earned f.1,250 per month - more than twice what a wedana earned.

‘Nothing about the colonial order seemed to infuriate the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 125.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid, Bijlage VI.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Penders, Documents, 101-06.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Personal communication (in English) from Camat of Tonjong, 21 June 1979.
\item \textsuperscript{21} With the current rice price in Indonesia, a wedana would have to be paid Rp.750,000 or over $US1,000 per month to earn the equivalent today.
\end{itemize}
peasantry more than its taxes' writes Scott.\footnote{22}{James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 1976), 91.} In Java it was the village headmen and their officials who (willingly or not) were put in the role of tax collectors. The abolition of taxes was the goal of the 'folk anarchism' of the Saminists, the Islamic brotherhoods in Banten, and the PKI's rural offshoot the Sarekat Rakyat (People's Unions) in the 1920s. The particularly onerous village corvée obligations were an underlying cause of the uprising in Karangcegak hamlet south of Tegal in March 1926, which will be discussed more fully shortly.

Often the magnitude of the tax was less important than which classes and areas were hardest hit overall by tax. For the peasants what was left over to meet subsistence needs was the important thing. The landrente or land revenue tax was the most hated because it was determined as a fixed charge based on the average yield of graded sawah fields, and had no relation to ability to pay or to subsistence needs. The rate of tax was determined by the village headmen, who administered its collection.

The impact of some of the various taxes on different classes in the Residency show how the taxation burden was distributed. Pekalongan peasants had to pay an extraordinarily high irrigation tax levy\footnote{23}{According to Ranneft, Onderzoek, 139, Pekalongan Residency contributed 96 per cent of Java's total irrigation levy.} while the burden of village taxes fell much more heavily on poor landowners (arme grondbezitters). This group was in fact paying more tax per head and per family in Pekalongan region than in any other area in Java.\footnote{23a}{Ranneft does not explain why taxes in Pekalongan were the highest in Java.} Rich landowners on the other hand were paying in tax the same percentage as the poor, although their incomes were much higher. The percentages of net income paid in land, local and village taxes by various classes in Pekalongan residency were as follows:\footnote{24}{Ranneft, Onderzoek, 21, 141.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village officials</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich landowners</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average landowners</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor landowners</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labourers</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area where taxes were most burdensome in Pekalongan Residency was Adiwerna kawedanan which, as we have seen, had the highest population density per square kilometre of cultivated land in all Java. Here, 17 per cent of rent paid by the sugar mills to the peasants went in tax, although average rent payment per harvest year per bau (0.7 hectares) by the mills was lowest in the Residency. In Pemalang kecamatan land revenue was also a high percentage of total tax.

Malpractice in the collection of village taxes and the land revenue tax, the responsibility of the lurahs, existed on a large scale. A nationalist in the mid-twenties wrote about land revenue that 'the tax imposed is everywhere considerably in excess of the established rates, owing to the selfish interests of the village elders, who get 8 per cent of the tax collection in their respective villages'. Taxes assessed and collected by village headmen had to be paid to the kecamatan office where collections from each village in the kecamatan were recorded. A pre-war camat recalls:

I made a graph from statistics over ten years. I knew that whenever payment of taxes was down, the money was certain to have been used by the lurah. If a lurah couldn't pay [his village taxes to the kecamatan office] it was an open secret that he robbed other areas using hired semi-bandits [lenggaong] to find the money.

Rapid promotion of members of the Pangreh Praja depended on conduct reports, which always commented on the ability of officials to collect taxes. 'My father reached a high position [as a camat] because he

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26 S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Moscow International Agrarian Institute 1926?), 20.
27 Camat of Tonjong, Interview, 15.10.76.
was clever at entering the taxes' recalls a Pemalang teacher.

In the last decades of colonial rule the Residency was becoming more socially differentiated, which in turn reinforced geographic contrasts. On the one hand there was a class of rich peasant small-holders located in Pekalongan kabupaten, including a large number of landowners with subsidiary incomes, particularly in Batang region. At one extreme, growing numbers of people in the Residency had incomes over f.1,000 in 1924. On the other hand, the numbers of landless peasants, both numpang (villagers who own a house which stands on the garden land of others) or nusup (villagers who live in others' houses owning neither land nor house of any kind), were the highest of any Residency in Java, in 1925. Peasant allotments were also very small.

The amount the peasant was left with to meet subsistence needs in the Tiga Daerah was smaller than the percentages of net income paid in taxes given earlier would indicate. According to a Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) leader in Tegal, in 1918 a peasant with one bau of wet rice had to pay 30 per cent of his net income in six different taxes. Because his daily cash needs were not being met, many were being forced to rent their land (at half the net income they would have received if they had worked it themselves) and work

28 Mr Besar's nephew, Transcript, II/16, 3.5.75.
29 Ranneft, Onderzoek, 75. Between 1913 and 1924 the number of assessments over f.1,000 increased by 92 per cent.
30 Ibid, 130. Here the term inwoners, which includes both numpang and nusup is used.
31 Pekalongan peasant holdings were 0.43 hectares in the mid-'twenties, the second lowest in 10 residencies in East and Central Java. Dingley, op.cit., 19. In Brebes kawedanan half the peasants were landless according to one report. 'Pembagian Klas didalam Desa', Bintang Merah, 8 January 1948, 53-54. For a detailed analysis of land tenure in an area similar to Pekalongan in many respects during this period, see F. Buchler, 'Land Hunger and the Growing Power of Village Elites: Cirebon Residency, 1903-1930', ASAA Second National Conference Abstracts, 1978.
as seasonal labourers in the sugar mills. The only alternative way to get cash was to pawn either one's crop before it was harvested or the land itself to the Arab or rich haji usurers. When payments could not be met, the land was seized. The seriousness of the rural debt and land usury was revealed in investigations carried out by the People's Credit Bank in 1935 and by a Commission for the Eradication of Usury in 1936. Usury was on the one hand a cause of increasing landlessness and, on the other, created a growing class of landlords. In Bumijawa (Southern Brebes) one haji owned many houses and sawahs from pawning and lending money for the coffee harvest, and 'became so rich he was appointed a member of the local Landraad [People's Court]'. This was typical throughout the Tiga Daerah.

Usury was not, however, limited to land. The landless poor also needed cash. In Tegal interest on loans was sufficient 'for one thousand Arabs to live on'. The Arabs had replaced the Chinese as money lenders in Tegal City and around the sugar factories, compounding the dislike with which the mills were regarded. On pay days (the first of the month) usurers, waiting outside government workshops and factories for people who owed them money, would be seen accosting women on the streets, pulling off kebaya (Javanese blouses) and selendang (shawls) to get their money back. If nothing

32 After taxes and cultivation costs had been subtracted a peasant with one bau of land could expect to make f.45.80 out of which he still had to pay a house gardens (pekarangan) tax. At the time he was getting only f.30 as rent per hectare for his bau from the mill, which was also taxed. 'Tani dan Sawah', Neratja, 23 November 1918.

33 'Over den Woeker in de Regentschappen Tegal, Brebes en Pemalang', Blaadje voor het Volkscredietwezen, 8, 15 August 1925, 144 (subsequently cited as 'Over den Woeker').

34 Ibid, 139

35 The Arabs, addressed as ndoro tuan (your honour) even by the village officials, sold tasbeh (Muslim rosaries) and perfumes, but were mainly renowned as usurers, as the still-common local phrase 'koyo Arab dadi tukang renten [becoming a money lender like an Arab]' indicates.
could be obtained, the usurers would search whole houses from top to bottom to find anything of value. 36

Even before 1930 loans in arrears in the People's Banks in the Tiga Daerah were larger than any area in Java, except Kediri. During the Depression the dependence by the poor on money lenders increased, because the banks would no longer lend money. By 1938 the Residency banks had reduced their loans by half. 37 So peasants with land pawned their land and landless peasants and the urban poor pawned what little they had. Every kawedanan and most kecamatans had a government pawnshop. The number of unredeemed pawns increased and the average amount paid per pawned article by 1938 (f.1.19) in Pekalongan Residency was the lowest in all of Java, a stark reflection of the grim realities of life in the post-Depression period. 38

Java was second only to Cuba as an exporter of sugar, the most valuable export of the Dutch East Indies until about the mid-'twenties when it was surpassed by rubber. For its comparative

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36 'Over den Woeker', 141.

37 While the number of People's Banks grew from five in 1930 to over 600 in 1938, the total amount lent fell 54 per cent; the average amount borrowed per person fell 68 per cent (to f.23.6) while the number of borrowers increased only 25 per cent. *Indisch Verslag* 1930, Table 136; 1938, Table 135.

38 Ibid, 1938, Table 128. The extent to which the poor resorted to pawnning during this period is shown by the draining off of the population's gold assets. Between 1933 and 1936 f.million 158 worth of gold left the Netherlands East Indies 'mainly via the government-managed pawnshops'. W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (Bandung, 1956), 94 (subsequently cited as *Indonesian Society*).
advantage sugar depended on low ground rent and cheap labour. To ensure that the mills got the amount of sawah they needed for growing cane, quotas were given to each village. To work successfully, the system depended entirely on coercion of the peasantry by the local bureaucratic elite, both the village headmen and the Pangreh Praja.

As Geertz has shown for Java as a whole, sugar, high population density and high productivity per hectare go together. On Pekalongan's coastal plain conditions were ideal for sugar growing. By the mid-twenties the 17 mills had squeezed rice farmers onto even less land or off it altogether, but smallholder sugar growing outside the European estates, as in areas of East Java, was not allowed in Pekalongan Residency. Slawi kawedanan had 31 per cent of its sawah under sugar. Adiwerna kawedanan with its

39 The rent was set by estimating the net proceeds which the peasant was deprived of by renting out his land, on the basis of 'normal' yields of rice and secondary crops which could be grown, rather than the value which the land had for the leasing enterprise. 'The differential ground rent accruing from the much higher level of productivity of the large scale enterprise falls to the European company and via the dividend to the [European] shareholder'. J. van Gelderen, 'The Economics of the Tropical Colony', Indonesian Economics (The Hague, 1961), 154.

40 See C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution (Berkeley, 1970), 70-78.

41 One village headman near Pangkah once planted sugar and milled it himself 'using a buffalo like in Purbolinggo in East Java'. The Assistant Resident of Tegal sent the Patih who angrily told the lurah that 'only the mill with the permission of the government' could plant sugarcane. However the lurah disregarded the Patih's order and grew sugar for one season. Continued threats and intimidation by the armed field-police that he would be dismissed and brought to court if he went on growing sugar finally forced the lurah to abandon the project. Pangkah nationalist leader, Transcript, 1/5-7, 27.11.75.

42 Landbouwatlas van Java en Madoera, Part II, Table IV. This made Slawi one of Geertz's '19 leading sugar districts' in Java, with more than 25 per cent of its sawah acreage rented to sugar mills for cane-growing in a single year. For Java as a whole only 8 per cent of sawah was in cane in 1920. Geertz, op.cit., 72, Table 2, 72.
three mills is a classic case of what had happened by 1930 to the peasantry in these sugar districts. With the highest population density in all Java, only 21.8 per cent of Adiwerna's work force, itself having to bear a heavy tax burden, were engaged in 'native agriculture'; 25.5 per cent in industry, while another 28.9 per cent were 'unskilled labourers' who worked wherever they could find employment. At least until the Depression many found work on the European sugar estates.

In Pekalongan Residency, village headmen who rented the villages' land to the sugar mills were given a percentage of the crop, as an incentive 'to rob the peasants of their rights', as recalled by one Pangkah nationalist born and brought up next to Tegal's oldest mill. The villagers in practice could not refuse the 'gentle command' (perintah halus) of the lurah, even less of the camat. Sugar mills in Pekalongan Residency had a policy of buying off the traditional religious elite, that is the local kyai, by building mosques and prayer houses (surau) in areas where the mill wanted to rent sawahs.

Having no legal redress, a common form of social protest against the mills, at least until the Sarekat Islam took up their cause, was setting fire to the canefields. Arson had become very common in Pekalongan by 1910, as it was in other areas in Java as well. Comal kawedanan and the Private Lands of the Bupati of Brebes had the most fires. One of the main complaints was that the mill, waiting until the cane had the required sugar content (rendement) before harvesting, often returned the fields too late for the peasant

43 Pelzer, op.cit., 167.
44 Interview, 27.11.45.
45 Between June 1910 and September 1911 there were 205 reported cases of arson on canefields in Pekalongan Residency. M. van Geuns, 'Het Rietbrandenvraagstuk in Pekalongan' (reprinted from Soerabajasch Handelsblad 1911), 4-5. Cane burning was also a very common form of protest in the Pasuruan, Kediri and Madiun regions. In Madiun in about 1913 around 3.5 to 8 per cent of canefields 'fell victim to arson' each year. Onghokham 'Madium', 226.
to plant paddy before the next monsoon. In 1910 Resident Obertop began collecting cash contributions from the mills, which was given to local officials to pay villagers to guard the canefields, and spies to catch the cane burners. This system 'which demands so much of the initiative of wedanas and especially camats' for its implementation, made it difficult to recruit reliable spies. Often they were local criminals and village toughs 'whose reliability was doubted'.\textsuperscript{46} Also, there was no way of controlling how the camats spent the money, something which worried the local sugar industry. One overzealous official, anxious to please the local mill, had called out entire villages to plantation guard duty (tuinbewaking dienst), while not paying these unfortunate inhabitants the wages the mills had provided.\textsuperscript{47}

Not surprisingly this additional labour obligation was resisted by the peasantry. If there was a cane fire the whole village, not just those who rented their sawah to the mill, had to turn out to help put out the fires. The people were being turned into 'guards of the mill owners' recalls the national Sarekat Islam leader, Haji Agus Salim.\textsuperscript{48} The sugar mills also had special police (agen polisi pabrik) who had the same authority as regular police to arrest and detain people. Village police spent more time defending mill interests than those of the village. There was no compensation to villages for land used for mill railways. This was a particular source of peasant resentment for two reasons. Firstly, while the mill demanded an eight-metre strip of land for the narrow gauge railway which took the harvested cane into the mill, in practice canefield foremen would often use half this land to plant paddy for themselves. Furthermore, irrigation channels were not allowed to be built under the railway tracks.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} van Geuns, op.cit., 15.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, 17.
\textsuperscript{48} Neratja, 23 December 1918.
\textsuperscript{49} Comal nationalist leader, Interview, 15.12.75.
FORMER SCS HEAD OFFICE IN TEGAL, HEADQUARTERS OF JAPANESE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
From about 1918 Sarekat Islam leaders began to champion the cause of the peasants against the mills. At Pangkah the Sarekat Islam successfully put pressure on the mill to raise wages for casual labour and to increase rents.\textsuperscript{50} Sragi was more typical. There the sugar factory administrator had the Sarekat Islam leader moved because, by always defending the poor peasant, he 'demaged the interests of the plantation'.\textsuperscript{51} On rare occasions when the Pangreh Praja tried to defend the people's interests, they were treated in the same way. The Wedana of Wiradesa, supported by the Dutch Controleur of Pekalongan, told the Sragi mill administrator that rents should be raised at least to the level peasants paid each other when renting the same land. The reply from the mill administrator was that 'I determine the rent with the agreement of the Resident'.\textsuperscript{52} Not surprisingly people recall that the mill administrator, referred to locally as the besar pabrik\textsuperscript{53} was more powerful in his area than the Resident himself.

While low rents and wages affected those whose land was rented by the mills, the distribution of irrigation water between sugar and sawahs affected all cultivators. Sugar needed almost three times as much water as wet rice, and the Sarekat Islam complained about the difficulty of irrigating the sawah, which was only possible at night during the cane growing season. Where cane was grown, the European-manned irrigation service regulated the division of water. The mill was much more likely to have its needs met and '... the competing demands for water from the sugar and the food crops led to

\textsuperscript{50} Pangkah nationalist, Interview, Transcript, I/3, 27.11.75.
\textsuperscript{51} Neratja, 12 April 1919.
\textsuperscript{52} Sarimin, 'Kenang-Kenangan dari Masa yang Silam' TS, dated 1 January 1965 (subsequently referred to as 'Kenang-Kenangan'), 85-86.
\textsuperscript{53} The expression besar pabrik is still common in villages, although grammatically incorrect. Much larger than the kabupaten residences, the huge mansions where the sugar mill administrators lived were referred to as besaran.
endless quarrels and frauds'. Where cane was not planted the so-called 'tertiary' arteries and sluices of the irrigation system were controlled by the village headman through his irrigation official, the ulu-ulu. In 1921 farmers complained that the latter frequently spent more time getting water for his patron, the lurah, than looking after villagers' needs. Hostility between villages about the water ran so high that violence was quite common, and fields had to be guarded day and night to prevent water quotas from being stolen. The peasants' dependence on rich Muslim landlords for loans of money and paddy, especially during the dry season (musim paceklik), prevented their agitating for a better deal with water. As one peasant interviewed said, 'the rich landowner can make us suffer by not lending us any money or paddy'.

The economic depression with the dramatic decline in the sugar industry, was a major crisis for Pekalongan Residency. Investment in maintenance and new irrigation works stopped, wages plunged and seasonal employment in the mills disappeared. The road back towards a subsistence economy was not 'towards idealised rural simplicity but towards misery and pauperism'. What happened to Pekalongan Residency's sugar industry is set out in Table 1.

The fact that the Depression lasted longer and weighed more heavily in Indonesia than in most other countries of the world was of little comfort to the peasants who 'saw their money earnings disappear or shrink to a fraction of their former size'. Income from the sale of agricultural products also declined, often as much

54 van Klaveren, *op.cit.*, 172.


# TABLE 1

Pekalongan Residency's Sugar Industry 1930-38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest Year</th>
<th>No. of Estates</th>
<th>Area Harvested (ha)</th>
<th>Production Sugar (quintals)</th>
<th>Percentage Java Production</th>
<th>Average Daily Wage Paid by Mills (cents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18,195</td>
<td>2,700,329</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>522,790</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,694</td>
<td>666,260</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12,847</td>
<td>2,080,620</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Indisch Verslag 1931, 1935, 1938*
as 70 per cent. On the other hand, expenditure on daily needs declined much less, while interest on loans and taxes still had to be paid. As part of the People's Credit Bank investigations into land usury in 1935, in a detailed survey done in two villages in south Pemalang, it was found that while the price of paddy had fallen by more than half between 1928 and 1931, the land tax almost doubled.

The recovery in the Pekalongan sugar industry and the reopening of many mills in 1937 was not reflected in wages which, in Tegal, remained the lowest in Java. The more rapid revival of sugar-cultivation in Pekalongan than elsewhere was partly because of the lower wage rates there, making it attractive for the mills. As well, little new investment was needed on the existing irrigation network.

The long process of pauperisation over three or four generations was less important in popular memory than the increasing misery of the 1930s. If the future revolutionaries had the sense of having lost the 'good life' at any particular point it was in this decade. For this they blamed Dutch taxes and the sugar mills, and the elite who helped them. The Pangreh Praja's role as 'security and crop overseers' for the Dutch was accentuated in Pekalongan Residency because of the importance of the sugar. The taxation burden, the tremendous population pressure on land, especially in Tegal, and the extent of rural indebtedness made it even harder for the officials to represent the people to the government or help and support the peasantry, on the one hand, while acting as tax collectors and being responsible for security and surveillance of the nationalist leaders (whom they hounded often with greater ferocity than the Dutch) on the other. For the Pangreh Praja were central to the anti-nationalist strategy of the Dutch just as they were central to maintaining law and order, through their network of spies and informants. Camats were judged for

57 Ibid.
58 Soekasno, 'Grondwoeker als gevolg van Crediettransacties in het Pemalangsche', Volkscredietwezen, 24, 1936, 191.
promotion on three things, their general administrative skills, control of criminality, and (as we have seen) success in tax collection.

For the second function the Pekalongan Residency Pangreh Praja were given Geheime Politie Fonds (Secret Police Funds) of f.15 per month to pay for spies. Because this money did not have to be accounted for to the Colonial authorities, some camats who were anxious to demonstrate that they could always 'catch the culprit' and keep down 'criminality' and dissent in their kecamatans, freely admitted using their own salary to supplement the Fund.

The Pangreh Praja did not limit their activities to political surveillance and tax gathering. In an effort to combat the popularity of the Sarekat Islam, Pekalongan's priyayis set up their own organisation called Pirukunan in opposition to the Sarekat Islam. Then, following the success of similar anti-nationalist Pangreh Praja organisations elsewhere in Java, branches of the Mardi Utomo (Excellent Community) were formed in the late 'thirties in areas where a dispossessed rural proletariat was emerging, such as in South Pemalang. With the Camat of Pulosari as Chairman, the entire executive committee consisting of priyayi officials, and most of the membership consisting of village headmen, the Mardi Utomo became active in the areas of health, sports, handicrafts, agriculture and the arts. Its program included planting bamboo and tea to stop soil erosion, eradication of rats, building lavatories in villages, and distributing government medicines to combat

59 This was quite remarkable, considering the usual Dutch fussiness over money matters.

60 Camat of Tonjong, Interview, 7.10.76.

61 Neratja, 29 August 1918.

62 'The Majalengka (Cirebon) based Mardi Utomo which was set up in 1918, quickly spread, with its own monthly journal after 1920. 'A movement of less well-born low ranking officials...most of its leaders and the majority of its members bore the low priyayi title mas and were clerks or assistant clerks'. South Pemalang was one of the few areas apparently where the movement was active in the 1930s. Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite (Singapore, 1979), 75, 123 (subsequently cited as Making).
dysentery and the plague. It also distributed brown rice and Chinese peas to those with hunger oedema. Thus the Pangreh Praja, through their free access to government funds, could and did alleviate the people's suffering, at the same time hoping to increase their power and influence vis-a-vis the nationalist elite, in the latter stages of colonial rule.

There was a strong regional division of loyalties within the Residency also, even amongst the priyayis. In Tegal the Reksonegoros claimed direct descent from the Demak sultans, while the Tegal priyayis discouraged marriage alliances with Pekalongan priyayi families whom they claimed were descendants of an upstart collaborator who had helped the VOC in Semarang. The Reksonegoros were the longest ruling Regent family in Java. The widow of Reksonegoro X, Raden Kardinah (Kartini's sister) founded a hospital, a girls' school and a girls' orphanage in Tegal. Having no children, she brought up three of her husband's by a secondary wife (selir) as her own. One of these, Sumijar, married Soenarjio, while Sumijar's brother, the popular Soesmono Reksoharsono, became Reksonegoro XI on the death of his father. In 1936 he was threatened with dismissal by the Dutch for '...grievously offending European colonial mores by becoming involved with a Dutch woman'. Reksonegoro XI's wife, Srimulat (daughter of the Regent of Batang), demanded a divorce and engaged the Tegal lawyer, Mr Besar, as legal council. Dutch threats did not prevent the Bupati from finally marrying Madam van de Cappelen, after she had obtained a divorce (also with Mr Besar's help) from her own husband, the Pangkah sugar mill administrator. Reksonegoro XI, who believed the Dutch would not dismiss him because of the VOC's promise that the family would rule for 12 generations, was forced to

63 Pulosari leader, Interview, 29.11.74.


65 Sutherland, The Making, 136.
resign with a pension of f.375 a month and moved to Lebaksiu where he managed the family ice factory. He was replaced by R.T. Slamet Kertanegara, former Patih of Purbolingga, until the latter's death in 1944. After a brief six months in the job, Mr Besar was replaced by Reksonegoro XI's brother-in-law, Soenarjio, a complete nonentity. The decline in the authority of the bupati after Reksonegoro XI's dismissal had been as dramatic as the decline of the Sultan of Solo's on the death of Pakubuwono X in 1939. The kabupaten had been made safe against Dutch women, but not, as we shall see, against revolutionary mobs.

Political Discontent

There were muted expressions of popular discontent long before 1945, culminating in the communist rebellion of 1926. Local grievances had for the first time begun to be aired politically by

66 Reksonegoro XI's first ex-wife later married Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, a former Vice-Consul in Jiddah who had been a Camat of Lebaksiu, and was later Deputy Governor of the Netherlands East Indies under van Mook, and led the Dutch delegation at the Renville talks in 1947. Disappointed at not becoming the wife of the Bupati, the lady who had brought an end to the longest ruling dynasty in Java later divorced Soesmono, eventually returning to Amsterdam to run a restaurant. Ironically, Soesmono was later (after the divorce) reappointed Bupati of Tegal by the Dutch on their return in 1948. Kardinah died on 4 July 1971, aged 90. Interviews with Sumijar on 25.9.71; Mr Besar on 29.7.75; Sardjono Reksonegoro (Reksonegoro XI's only son) on 3.7.73.

67 In Solo after the death of the charismatic Pakubuwono X it began to be whispered that 'the palace has lost its wahyu [magic power]'. Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca, 1972), 351 (subsequently cited as Java). The same kind of thing was probably said in Tegal.

68 In Pemalang the position of bupati had been in the one family since 1869 except for a short break from 1909 until 1920, when RAA Soedoro Soerodikoesoemo was too young to hold office. A strong ruler, his oldest son Rahadi, who was to have succeeded him, died when his motor bike hit a dokar (horse drawn cart) just after graduating from MOSVIA in 1932. So after Soedoro's death in 1941, the weak Rahardjo Soeroso Adikoesoemo became bupati, and the kabupaten's wahyu began to decline as well. Sutherland, op.cit., Part II, Appendix I, 34-35.
the active leadership of the Sarekat Islam, which was extremely popular in Pekalongan in the period 1918 to 1920. At well attended mass meetings speakers thundered about the fundamental discrimination between the priyayis and the common people. Members of the pergerakan (national movement) felt very strongly about educational discrimination. Priyayi children were always given preference for the small number of Dutch-language primary school (HIS) places available each year. 69 In the rural areas only those who 'were on good terms with the Camat' had any chance of even applying to such schools. 70 The only government MULO (intermediate school) for the entire Residency was in Pekalongan. This lack of Dutch-schooling encouraged the Muhammadiyah to open its own private HIS in Pekajangan, Pemalang, Slawi, Brebes and Bumiayu. The SCS railway company also ran a HIS and a MULO in Tegal, while a group of nationalists ran another MULO at Ketanggungan south of Brebes.

Coinciding with the end of the Ethical Policy, the national wave of unrest throughout 1919-1920 during the Java-wide rice harvest failures, was felt in Pekalongan Residency. Disturbances on rubber plantations east of the Residency capital in early 1919 71 were followed by a Pawnshop Employees' Union strike at the Ulujami (Pemalang) pawnshop in May. The Dutch manager insulted a Javanese official over a financial account which did not balance. 72 In August

69 In Pekalongan in 1919 there had been 200 applications for only 30 places in the Dutch-language primary school. 'Our children are refused places', a Sarekat Islam leader told a mass meeting in Pekalongan, 'while the priyayi children are chosen'. Neratja, 2 September 1918. Other grievances were the high market rents and entrance fees, and an undemocratically elected City Council dominated by priyayis who do not understand the situation in the kampung as they seldom mixed with the inhabitants.' Neratja, 29 August 1918.

70 Comal primary school teacher and veteran nationalist, Scenarjio, Interview, 16.12.75.

71 Neratja, 18 February, 30 April 1919.

72 Neratja, 26 May 1919. European-'native' relations seemed to be getting worse in Pekalongan Residency during this period. There was a lot of racial trouble in the Pemalang Forestry Service at this time also. Neratja, 14 December 1918.
1920, 300 Tegal Dock Union workers went on strike. In the following month, the PFB Sugar Workers' Union called a strike in the Comal mill. Local leaders sent an accusation to the Governor-General about police interference in Union meetings called to discuss the dismissal of a Union leader by the mill, and the false reporting of the unrest by Dutch officials and the Pangreh Praja.

Mobilisation of the peasantry had begun through the left wing of the Sarekat Islam, strongest in the coastal plain. After the 1923 split, most Sarekat Islam branches went with the Sarekat Rakyat - the People's Unions that the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI had set up for peasant sympathisers of the party outside the urban centres. By January 1926 the Tegal branch of the Sarekat Rakyat had 3,500 members on its books and the Pekalongan branch 3,230 (including 160 Chinese). There were smaller branches in the kawedanan towns in Kedungwungi and Wiradesa (Pekalongan kabupaten), Comal, and Slawi, Pangkah, Balapulang and Jatinegara. The Indonesian Railway Workers' Union (VSTP) strike of 1923 initiated a period of rapid growth for the PKI, with many Sarekat Islam and VSTP members joining it. After the strike, the Pekalongan VSTP had its right of assembly restricted by the colonial government.

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73 The Union demanded a 100 per cent rise in wages, overtime after 4 p.m., time to go to the Muslim Friday prayers, and an annual fortnight's holiday. The employer, the Paketvaart en Prauwenvmeer Maatschappij offered only a 33 per cent rise, but granted the holidays and the overtime. Neratja, 5 August 1920.

74 Neratja, 18, 22 and 25 September 1920.

75 'De Communistische Beweging in de Residentie Pekalongan voor dan na de Beperking van het Vergaderrecht' enclosed in Jasper (Resident Pekalongan) to Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies (GG v NI), 26 January 1926 Mailrapport (Mailr.) 151/26 (a superimposed 'x' = secret, the last two figures refer to the year).

76 Resident Pekalongan (Schilling) to GG v NI, 28 February 1927, Mailr, 354X/27.

77 Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, 1965), 151 (subsequently cited as Communism). Other areas where the vergaderverbot was applied to the VSTP were Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Priangan and Surabaya.
By early 1926 Tegal was one of the most fiery radical centres in Java. Part of this was due to the strong Sarekat Rakyat support of groups opposing burdensome taxes. In Jatinegara, where the Sarekat Rakyat was led by an Islamic communist, Haji Moeklas, the movement spread fast because of its support of small traders' opposition to paying the local market tax. In the middle of 1925 the Tegal internal revenue inspection discovered that because of poor supervision a great backlog in tax payments had built up since 1921. Payment was then demanded but not received, so forcible collections of all unpaid taxes were begun in 1926, as a result of which '...the population as a whole was in a desperate and angry mood'. The Sarekat Rakyat also supported villagers in their opposition to oppressive corvée. Another factor in the strength of the radical support may have been the interaction of the organised railway workers with the poor rural population. Some railway workers had presumably been born and raised as peasants and retained village links. The railway provided the essential link between city and country.

In the formulation of the communist plan for rebellion in Java, 'the ringleaders...were the party units of the northern coastal towns of Tegal, Cirebon and Pekalongan'. Increasing surveillance by the Dutch, including a ban on public meetings, forced the Tegal branch to form an illegal organisation alongside the legal party, to train PKI members as 'fervent revolutionaries'. This was timely for, on 1 March 1926, the entire six-man Tegal Committee was

78 In early 1926, the PKI had about 40 members in Tegal and 20 in Pekalongan. In May 1925 there had been 84 PKI members in Tegal but this had been reduced to 36 on the basis of a party examination of reliability, and the rest were made candidate-members. Mailr. 151/26.

79 Ibid.

80 McVey, Communism, 331.

81 Ibid.

82 This was called the DO or 'Dubbele Organisatie'. Mailr. 354/27.
Two days later a premature revolt erupted in the hamlet of Karangcegak (Karangjati village in Tarub kecamatan), 17 kilometres south of Tegal city. Apart from the tax collections which peasants had been resisting, compulsory labour services in this kecamatan were very onerous. Since 24 February 1926, a new village guard duty and nightwatch duty (ronediensten) had been made compulsory. This duty was opposed by a group calling itself the Faithful Hearts Fellowship (Persaudaraan Setia Hati) led by Soeleiman, a Tegal PKI Committee member, and a dismissed village rice-barn official who led the local Sarekat Rakyat. On 26 February a police detachment under the Patih (Deputy Regent) of Tegal had gone to Karangjati village to enforce the new regulations about village guard duty, and on 1 March the popular leader Soeleimen had been arrested along with other PKI leaders in Tegal. The guard duty was still being resisted in Karangcegak; so on 2 March the Wedana of Adiwerna and the Camat of Tarub went in person to the hamlet.

The only 'resistance' the two officials could find were peasants 'with an audacious attitude [een drieste houding]' returning home from their fields. Because one was 'armed' with a sickle, according to one account, he was marched off to the Lurah. The next morning the two officials returned with a force of six policemen and in another provocative action began breaking down the doors of the Sarekat Rakyat leaders known to be actively leading the resistance against the nightwatch duty. An angry crowd quickly gathered, and besieged the Wedana, who sent a message for reinforcements. However, it was not until the afternoon of 3 March that the Patih arrived with 25 policemen. Later in the evening a crowd of about 200 peasants, armed with cudgels, bamboo spears and chopping knives, shouting the

83 Ibid.
84 Dingley, op.cit., 48-49.
85 Overzicht van de Inlandsche-Maleisch-Chineesche Pers, 16, 17 April 1926, entitled 'De Ongeregeldheden in Tegal'.
Islamic Holy War cry 'Sabilillah' stormed a local haji's house, in which various police and Political Intelligence Service agents were hiding, lightly wounding some of them and wrecking furniture. The Resident of Pekalongan panicked and sent an urgent telegram to the Governor-General in Bogor and police reinforcements from as far away as Sukabumi in West Java, Semarang and Kudus to the east were sent to Karangcegak to put down the 'rebellion'. In a mass roundup which followed, a total of 5,326 members of the Sarekat Rakyat were questioned or detained in nine kecamatans, and 3,510 membership cards were collected by the police.

The situation in Tegal was further embittered in another incident in Bengle village, also in Adiwerna kawedanan, in September 1926. This was caused by the Pagongan sugar mill's refusal to give back rented sawah in time for the peasants to plant their paddy. The canefield inspector would not cut the cane, although the leases had expired, because the sugar content was too low. There was a quarrel, a labour foreman fled and reported the case to the Wedana of Adiwerna. Six people 'standing around with grass knives' were shot down in subsequent reprisals by a force led by the Assistant Resident.

No fewer than three attempts at communist rebellion in Tegal during August and September 1926 failed completely from too
much enthusiasm and too little organisation. The Dutch by now had traced the PKI's operatives and when the final attempt came on 12 November 1926 the authorities had little trouble in preventing it from even beginning. Despite this, the revolutionary tradition had made an indelible mark on Adiwerna kawedanan. In Karangcegak hamlet, at least eight people were exiled to Boven Digul and 60 or more imprisoned elsewhere in Java. Another radical centre was Ujungrusi, the sugar mill settlement west of Adiwerna town. Ujungrusi was the home of Sugono Reksoputro, the brother of the Karangcegak leader Soeleiman who, according to the Dutch, committed suicide in prison in May 1926 after being arrested on his return from Singapore.

The first two, organised in August 1926 by the remaining underground PKI leadership, failed because of a poor turnout of leaders, and because the Resident heard about it and mounted a strong guard at the refinery in Tegal which was to be attacked. The third attempt in late September was better organised, but the cannon shot which was meant to start the revolt either never happened or went off on the wrong night. McVey, Communism, 340.

The arrest of the entire Tegal-Pekalongan PKI leadership at the eleventh hour meant that these places which had pressed the hardest for rebellion, were silent on 12 November.

The names of the Karangcegak people arrested and jailed are recorded in 'Nama-nama Perintis Kemerdekaan dalam Periode 1908-1945 dengan Sedjarah Perjuangan Singkatnya', the membership book of the Tegal branch of the Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of Independence).

Because of Sugono Reksoputro's influence, Ujungrusi was a strong pergerakan centre until 1926. In May 1920 Sugono had been elected to the PKI Central Executive. He played a key role in the May 1923 VSTP strike, became the Union's Chairman, and was vice-chairman of the Pawnshop Workers' Union, and an executive member of the Surabaya secretariat of the Indonesian Labour Unions. By December 1925, the time of the Prambanan conference, he was vice-chairman of the party, and in January slipped out of the country to attend a Singapore conference confirming the decision to revolt. Arrested on his return from Singapore on 2 April 1926, the government's version of his death was that he committed suicide in Malang prison in Semarang six weeks later. His friends claimed he died under questioning as the Dutch allowed only his immediate family to prepare the body for burial and his grave in Ujungrusi was guarded by police for 40 days afterwards. McVey, Communism, passim, especially 478, fn.7. Sugono, together with the other famous Islamic communist Haji Misbach from Solo, always stressed the similarity of Marxist and Koranic teaching, reflecting the area of the North Coast from which he came. His brother Soeleiman, on his return from Australia with other Digul exiles in 1946, became first Secretary of the PKI under Sardjono. Anderson, Java, 346, fn.29.
In the Tegal pergerakan it was believed he had died a martyr's death after being interrogated in prison, and his memory kept the radical spirit alive in Ujungrusi until the revolution.

The PKI revolutionary wave which swelled to a crest too soon and broke prematurely was nonetheless the high point of 1926. Despite the failures and arrests which followed, it established the PKI image as the revolutionary vanguard in Tegal, symbolising successful action against taxation, onerous corvee and the sugar mills.

While Pekalongan was considered by the Dutch to be still one of the two most 'politically active' Residencies in Central Java in 1930, such pergerakan activity was fragmented, being confined to a few small groups in the kabupaten capitals. Their success depended on the extent of surveillance of the Political Intelligence Service and as well the calibre of those not in jail: a handful of Sukarnoists, PNI Baru or Muslim nationalists. The first PNI enjoyed a brief period of activity in Pekalongan City in the second half of 1929, principally because of the leadership of Kromo Lawi, a seaman dismissed from the navy in 1927 for alleged communist inclinations. By December 1929 there were over 500 members, a regular program of courses, and 'very large finances'. A house search of 42 members on 29 December, and the preventive detention of Lawi for five months, saw many of the Minangkabau traders who supported it returning to Padang, and the movement declined quickly.

Tegal during this period had no strong Sukarnoist figure like Lawi around whom the remnants of the pergerakan could rally after the disasters of 1926. Budi Utomo (High Endeavour) led by a

94 Memorie van Overgave (M.v.O.) P.J. van Gulik, Governor of Central Java, 1930, Mailr. 1262/30. The other area was Semarang. If Pekalongan was still considered an 'active area' in 1930, then the rest of Central Java must have been very quiet indeed.

94 M.v.O. J.J.M.A. Popelier, Resident Pekalongan, October 1929-January 1932, Mailr. 399/32, Bijlage: Politiek Toestand. Throughout 1930 the PNI was less active with only a kernel of members, mostly Padang traders, still attending. In May 1930 Kromo Lawi was released from detention and set up several cooperative shops. In April 1931 the PNI was disbanded.
'leftist' lawyer Mr Sastromuljono, and the Muhammadiyah were the only signs of political life there in the late 'twenties.\(^96\) The two nationalist parties of the 'thirties, PARTINDO and GERINDO, had ineffective leadership, indeed if anything the more conservative PARINDRA was more active.\(^97\) The weak state of the pergerakan in Tegal was partly the result of harrassment by the Political Intelligence Service and the police, much more severe than in Pemalang because of the 1926 Rebellion. Even the most active group in Tegal at that time, the Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia), founded and led by a young student from Tegal, Supeno, was finally forced into demise when the police demanded that its members sign a witnessed declaration that they had left the organisation. Some then formed an Islamic Study Club while others in this group joined the Muhammadiyah.\(^98\) Of the two modernist Islamic groups the PSII (Indonesia Islamic Union Party), although not harrassed as much, suffered the same decline as the PNI after a similar brief time of popular success in Pekalongan in 1929. After 1931, when the Residency branch

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\(^96\) The Resident of Tegal noted that everything was 'very satisfactory' and the house searching of December 1929 against the PNI in Pekalongan did not need to be applied since there was no branch in Tegal. Tegal Resident, (J.C. Brinks), M.v.O. Mr Sastromuljono, a partner in Mr Besar's law firm, was a founder of Perhimpoenan Indonesia in Holland in 1922, and a defence lawyer for Sukarno at his Bandung trial in 1930.

\(^97\) PARINDRA was run by one Suwartojo 'the son of a kabupaten secretary, who had studied in Germany and opened a school on his return to Tegal. He always wore a Solo headscarf and batik sarong, ran a magazine called Gong and was clever at making speeches. His nickname was General "Kacamata" [spectacles] and when the Japanese arrived he put up a banner "Banzai" ["welcome" in Japanese] but no one knew what it meant. We thought the Japanese would make him Mayor.' Soesmono, Interview, 20.10.76.

\(^98\) The leadership of Tegal's active Indonesia Muda was taken over by two old HIS friends after Supeno moved to Secondary School (HBS) in Semarang in 1934. In Pemalang the Indonesia Muda was run by another of Supeno's friends from Pekalongan HIS who used to steal Dutch Political Intelligence Service reports and pass them on to Supeno. Also active in Pemalang's Indonesia Muda was Ruslan Wangsa, a PKI leader sentenced to death after the Blitar uprising in 1969. Supeno maintained close contact with friends from the Indonesia Muda group in Tegal throughout the 1930s and during the Japanese occupation.
headquarters moved to Batang, the home of its leader, it was more active. The PSII, the major pre-war Muslim party emphasising all-Indonesian nationalism and non-cooperation which grew out of the Sarekat Islam of the 1920s, had an effective cadre building program in Tegal under Wondoamiseno. In the rural areas local PSII leaders deliberately broke the state salt monopoly, and openly opposed, for religious reasons, the taking of blood samples from corpses as part of the government plague eradication program. This opposition became a popular movement in some places, with leaders going to jail after violent clashes with government health workers.

Apart from its support in the kabupaten capitals, the Muhammadiah had two strongholds in Pekalongan Residency, in the prosperous trading town of Bumiayu (in southern Brebes kabupaten) and at Pekajangan, the textile weaving centre just south of Pekalongan. The main impact of Muhammadiah was in education, providing the opportunity of Dutch-language primary schooling for many who could not get into a government HIS. The conflict between this group and the PSII was quite strong, particularly in Tegal. Apart from religious differences, the most well known PSII leader, Kyai Haji [K.H.] Abu Sudja'i, who led the campaign against taking blood samples from the dead, would not associate with the Muhammadiah because he considered their members 'very moderate and pro the colonial government'.

In Brebes kabupaten the pre-war pergerakan faced different problems being physically divided between Brebes and the more active centre of Ketanggungan on the main southern railway line. In Ketanggungan Taman Siswa was led by pergerakan people while in Brebes it was not. It was the centre of both the modernist Muslims and the NU and also had one of Tiga Daerah's two non-government

99 Mailr. 399/32.

100 Wondoamiseno was later Minister for Internal Affairs in the first Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet in 1947, and second deputy Prime Minister in the second Amir Cabinet, representing the PSII.

101 Soesmono, Answers, 6, November 1972.
intermediate schools.

In contrast, Pemalang had the most active pergerakan in Pekalongan Residency during the 1930s. Pemalang's PARTINDO leaders set up a branch of the PPKP (Persatuan Pengusaha Kaum Penganggur, the Association of Unemployed Businessmen) who tried to help small entrepreneurs who were out of work. A branch of POMER (Perhimpunan Organisasi Memajukan Ekonomi Rakyat, Association of Organisations for the Advancement of the People's Welfare) a cooperative set up by Mr Santosa, a prominent 'Co' (co-operating) nationalist leader in Batavia was also established. Many lurahs had shares in this cooperative which was run from 1930 to 1943 by Sarino Mangunpranoto, head of the local Taman Siswa, and the most influential political figure in Pemalang during the 1930s. Because of his close personal ties with Dutch officials and the police, Pemalang's 'moderate nationalists' were not harassed by the Pangreh Praja, in contrast to many other areas where Taman Siswa and the Pangreh Praja were enemies. Pemalang's Taman Siswa was never reprimanded for allowing

102 'Co' (cooperating) and 'Non-Co' (non-cooperating) were terms widely used among pre-war pergerakan leaders. Being 'Co' meant being willing to sit in regency or provincial assemblies or in the Volksraad, the national parliament. Cooperators directed much of their attention to cooperatives, and scout movements. POMER was a typical 'Co' organisation, headed by a leading official, with government bureaucrats involved at all levels.

103 Although not an official member of PARTINDO (according to a Taman Siswa rule ordinary teachers but not heads of branch schools could join political parties), Sarino encouraged the party as well as POMER and PPKP to hold their meetings in the Taman Siswa buildings. He was an adviser to a cooperative run by the town's orthodox Muslim leaders and ran the KBI (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia, Indonesian Scouts), Interview, 9.7.76.

104 The Controleur of Pemalang and his wife joined the local KBI which Sarino ran, rather than travel the 30 kilometres to Tegal by bicycle, to meet with the Dutch-dominated Netherlands Indies Scouts (NIPV). The Assistant Resident of Pemalang and his wife were theosophists and admirers of Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the founder of Taman Siswa. Police harassment did not occur because the wife of Pemalang's only Political Intelligence Service officer was also in the KBI. The officer of the usually much disliked field police (veldpolitie) was a brother-in-law of the Pekalongan Regional Taman Siswa head, Ki Partohadisutjipto, son of a theosophist teacher in Pemalang, and also a friend of Sarino's. The local Dutch police chief was also a theosophist. Ibid.
PARTINDO or Indonesia Muda to use its premises for meetings, or for deliberately not flying the Dutch flag on Queen Wilhelmina's birthday, nor were any of its teachers dismissed under the 'Wild School' Ordinance of 1933 - a major source of Pangreh Praja/Pergerakan conflict elsewhere.

With most of their leaders either exiled to Boven Digul or imprisoned, and those being released not allowed to be politically active, the Residency's radical nationalists could do little. Most of their efforts went into PERSI (Persatuan Sopir Indonesia, Indonesian Drivers' Union) which with headquarters in Cirebon under Mohamad Jusuf, was active organising oplet (small taxi bus) drivers, first in Pekalongan, then in Pemalang, to protect themselves against the Chinese-owned Moga Bus Company, backed by the police.

That Java's North Coast was one of the 'special areas for outlawry' along with Banten and the Private Lands around Jakarta, was not surprising considering the increasing landlessness and impoverishment of the peasants in the last 50 years of colonial rule. The bandits' important function was to warn the local elite when the government was becoming too oppressive. In South Pemalang, one of the worse areas of suffering, the local version of Robin Hood was Mbah pandung aguna (skilful thief); in times of famine this bandit (whose grave is still a place of pilgrimage today) would steal food

105 It was a precondition of early return from exile in Boven Digul that one signed a declaration promising not to engage in any political activity whatsoever. Intelligence surveillance of released exiles was strict. Among those who refused to sign the promise were the Islamic communists Haji Moeklas, Haji Iskak, and Soeleiman (the Karangcegak leader) all of whom were taken to Australia and did not return to Java until 1946.

106 Pekalongan PERSI was formed by the most 'prominent and extreme' PSII leader in Pekalongan, Soemadi, but declined after he was sentenced to prison in 1929. Mailr. 399/32. Pemalang's PERSI continued to be active throughout the 1930s.

107 McVey, Communism, 467, fn.32.
from the rich and give to those 'whose cries of hunger he heard'.
In the later part of the nineteenth century Gentoloto Nayo Genggong from Pacul village (Tegal) was one of three famous bandits on this part of the western pasisir: he stole water buffalo, changed the shape of their horns so as to make them unindentifiable by their rich owners, then slaughtered them for distribution to the poor.
In 1919, a bad harvest year, banditry was endemic in the Pekalongan coastal kecamatan of Kedungwungi and Wiradesa where the population, on the brink of famine, was mixing chicken feed with the rice they cooked. Robber bands roamed the area, armed with a unique local weapon - a sawn-off shotgun called a blosdrung - and rich people were being robbed of their gold and clothes. The police could do nothing.
In more 'normal' colonial times, these bandit figures acted as power brokers between the village and the outside world, and within the village between the village headmen and the people. They often had a symbiotic relationship with the lurah, safeguarding the security of the village, acting as bodyguard at local weddings and circumcision festivities that were celebrated with a kind of entertainment called a tayuban. People would take turns with dancing girls (ronggeng) often accompanied by a small orchestra. After rice wine had been drunk, wild scenes often occurred. Tayuban enjoyed great popularity, especially with local bandits, who used to gather for mutual protection and solidarity in certain villages - almost every kecamatan had at least one such village. The colonial authorities did not, as might

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108 Lurah of Kreyo (South Pemalang), Interview, 8.2.75.
109 Gentoloto Nayo Genggong was the grandfather of K.H. Abu Sudja'i, the PSII leader. Gento in Tegal dialect means the same thing as maling aguna, or magically skilful thief. Naya Genggong's two famous contemporaries were Samaludin of Indramayu and Sobrang Barang of Kesesi, a kecamatan on the Pemalang-Pekalongan kabupaten border. Abu Sudja'i, Interview, 20.11.75.
110 Neratja, 3 September 1918, 11 January 1919. Reports also mentioned an attack planned on a European coffee plantation manager which was foiled at the last minute. Ibid 18 February 1919.
111 See the discussion of the village jago in Onghokham, Madiun, 63-69.
have been expected, try to 'clean them out', probably because they
realised that they were a rough but necessary part of local elite
control techniques. Certainly the Dutch themselves made use of this
group in the same way, in the local field police.

In the kecamatans where sugar mills were, villages such as
Pacul, the home of Gentoloto Naya Genggong, were known to be 'difficult'
to control. Cheap land could not be obtained easily, and the mill
was careful to return land no later than the lease stipulated. This
was one reason why the Pangreh Praja considered the sugar mill
kecamatans difficult postings where officials were sent to be 'tested'.
The money economy had penetrated more deeply and prostitution,
 gambling, drinking ciu (a brew made from waste sugar) and banditry
were common pastimes of an 'unruly' population.

The word 'bandit' translates many local terms with a
wide variety of nuances. These people were 'graded' in the minds of
local people according to their spiritual power, reflected in the
degree of knowledge (ilmu) of the esoteric arts, or kanuragan, and
the magical power (kasakten) this knowledge gave. Through this ilmu,
the bandit gained various kinds of invulnerability, a kind of sanctity
known as kebal.  At the 'lower' end of the kebal scale were bajingan,
 petty thieves or pickpockets, and simply pencuri, or thieves, while
pencoleng were 'bigger' usually urban thieves or vagabonds, with a
higher ilmu. Wong julig, tukang gelut and tokdeng were known for
their fighting skills, while pantongan and blantongan were gang leaders
who organised lesser thieves; they had better contacts as well as
being more daring than the lesser pencuri. Their amulets (jimat)
were stronger; this gave them the better kebal. While the priyayi
and the colonial authorities referred to these leaders as kecu, garong
and begal - robbers and brigands - this did not reflect the importance
of kebal or the mixture of awe, fear and administration with which local
peasant communities viewed them.

Onhokham writes that '...kebal was part of the whole complex
of the cosmic nature of power but it was especially stressed
within rural leadership and in a sense it was a counter-elite
value when applied at that level.' Ibid, 64.
That they were not peculiar to Pekalongan Residency is testified by the different names for these people in other parts of Java: juawara (Banten), doreng (Sunda), bengseng (Banyumas), warok (Ponorogo), and bromocorah (Kediri), to name a few. In Indonesian they become jago, lit. 'fighting cocks'. There was much regional variation in their role, and the ways they became kebal as well. Within each region there were many further local variations. In Tegal they were called bangkrengan or gento, while in Pemalang they were known universally as lenggaong and the villages from which they came were given the nickname anggaok by the Dutch.113

A nationalist from Comal kawedanan, which had a strong lenggaong tradition, describes them thus:

A lenggaong does not necessarily steal in the way an ordinary thief does. A lenggaong is a person who has physical strength, and deep spiritual knowledge. It takes a long time to become a lenggaong, studying self-defence arts [silat] and obtaining knowledge of inner things [ilmu-ilmu dalam]. If a person has the title lenggaong, his livelihood does not come from stealing, but from other people who need the security of the protection that he can give.... In colonial times the lenggaong were in general looked up to [disegani] by the People. Their actions did not bother the People. It was the colonial administration and the landlords who were obstructed.114

A lenggaong had learnt silat perhaps during time spent in a pesantren, and returned to the village knowing a few Arabic words (which meant in villagers' eyes a superior knowledge of religion), as well as ilmu kanuragan. His body was invulnerable to weapons, he could enter and leave houses unseen (nyirep) and so forth.115 The many kyais in

113 Anggaok and lenggaong mean the same thing, both deriving from the root words gaok. In Pemalang gaok means a crow (cf. burung gagak in Indonesian) i.e., a carrion-eater, reflecting the Dutch opinion and one local view that these bandits were essentially predators on the population. To the majority they were pendekar, fighters or champions. In this study we will use one term lenggaong when referring to these people.

114 Comal nationalist leader, Answers, 15.6.76. Italics in original.

115 For some examples of these arts see George Quinn, 'The Javanese Science of Burglary', RIMA - Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, 9, 1, January-June 1975, 33-54.
the rural areas of Pekalongan Residency were revered for similar reasons, reflecting the strong magico-religious element in rural Islam.

It had been part of PKI strategy to recruit elements 'outside the law' into the party, during the 1920s. They would be attracted to the party '...partly by defiance of authority and not by class interests or by doctrine'. In March 1925 Alimin had urged local party leaders to search the kampungs for criminals (penjahat) who would lead their fellows in robberies, two-thirds of the booty being for the PKI. Many Sarekat Rakyat leaders formed alliances with lenggaongs in the same village during this period.

An important barometer with which to measure the amount of ill-feeling or unrest towards the bureaucratic elite in the Tiga Daerah was the activity of the pokrol bambu, the so-called bush lawyers. If the lenggaongs were power brokers acting on behalf of a growing dispossessed rural proletariat, so the pokrol bambu were law brokers defending the latter both in and out of court from rapacious Arab money lenders and overzealous officials. While there were many kinds of pokrol bambu throughout Java, all shared some knowledge of how the legal system really worked without any formal law degree. In the Tiga Daerah nearly every village had a pokrol bambu. They were in it for what they could get out of it, and often made a lot of money defending or litigating in cases involving loans, pawning sawah, village inheritance, and complaints against both lurahs and

116 McVey, *Communism*, 299.

117 Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey (eds), *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents* (Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project 1960), 3, 10.

118 Origins of the term abound of course; a pokrul was a juru mbombong, someone who makes a person feel braver or bigger against the oppressive officials (W.J.S. Poerwadarminta, *Baoesastra Djawa* (Batavia, 1939), 506. Cf. Daniel S. Lev, 'Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia' in Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, 1972), 259, fn.61 (subsequently cited as Culture).
higher officials. If the litigant had no money 'at the least the pokrol bambu was taken to town to have sate'. They were hated most of all by the Pangreh Praja, as the pokrol bambu was 'light handed' (enteng tangan), his method being to write letters to wedanas about corrupt lurahs or camats. Their role assumed even more significance in a culture where to oppose the ruler was to invite kuwalat, some kind of personal disaster or misfortune. In Pemalang many joined PARTINDO during the 1930s and, at the village level, they helped 'to defend the weak against official corruption'. In Brebes the most famous pokrol bambu was a Eurasian who used to write letters in Dutch to the bupati about overbearing wedanas.120

PEKALONGAN, the rich Residency capital, has long been a flourishing batik centre and is characterised by Tegal people with the proverbial phrase, merak ngigel sinonderan, a 'peacock which dances decoratively' and (by implication) does not dare to fight. Brebes, bordering Sundanese-speaking West Java and the Banyumas hinterland to the south, is not only geographically fragmented but also culturally and linguistically pulled in several directions. Lacking any intrinsic unity it is likened to the large, freely hanging kenong gong of the gamelan orchestra which has become cracked: Brebes, like the kenong gong, is difficult to 'mend' (unite) because 'it is hanging' (kenong sigar ing gantungan)—between Sundanese-speaking West Java and Central Java. Tegal, a much poorer town than either of its neighbours, is proudly likened to a wild bison which can only be mounted and ridden by someone (usually symbolised by a small boy) who understands its character (banteng loreng binoncengan).121

119 Sarino Mangunpranoto, Interview, 21.1.76.

120 The stories about this pokrol bambu, Doeve by name, were legend as was his sharp sarcastic wit in the courtroom. Camat of Tonjong, Interview, 7.10.76.

121 Rather like the cattle boy (bocah ango) 'a legendary figure romanticised in popular local folklore', who looks after the more placid water buffalo lovingly and with great care. Ongkohkam, Madiun, 66, fn.88.
Pemalang, a rich rice growing area (at least in its coastal plain) is compared to a sleek perahu (small boat) which, if the long steering oar snaps, is easily thrown about by the waves (watang putung ing ayunan). The people of Pemalang say they can sometimes then be influenced by one side or the other, by Pekalongan or Tegal. If, however, the oar of the Pemalang perahu is steered with a firm hand, as it was during the 1930s and again during the early revolution (during the Tiga Daerah Affair) it will chart its own course. A second proverbial phrase - bende munggeng tawang, 'the small gong echoes in the heavens' - then becomes applicable: the voice of little Pemalang is heard everywhere.
CHAPTER TWO

THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE

ON 17 March 1942, just nine days after the Dutch had surrendered their beloved Netherlands East Indies to the Japanese, the new political masters arrived in the Residency of Pekalongan to find the region recovering from widespread banditry and social upheaval. This had begun as burglary which had risen sharply after the Dutch authorities began imposing blackouts some months before the surrender. After the initial landings by the Japanese on Java, the colonial authorities tried to implement a hastily prepared plan of sabotage of warehouses, bridges and harbour installations around Tegal, where the BPM refinery storage was also destroyed. In Pekalongan itself the Dutch ordered that all the machinery in local spinning and weaving factories, as well as the local sugar mills, be stripped. Bridges were blown up and people were told to take off their bicycle chains and throw them in the river 'so the bicycles could not be used by the enemy.' ¹ The Wedana of Wiradesa (on Pekalongan's coastal plain) received orders to supervise the scuttling of the small fishing boats upon which the people in this densely populated coastal area depended for a livelihood. Instead he told the fishermen to hide their boats for the time being as far as they could be dragged up the small streams which ran into the Java Sea. ²

As the old colonial order was disintegrating, people began to notice how nervous the Dutch were becoming. The sugar mills in

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¹ Soedjono, Transcript, I, 4, 29.7.73. Soedjono, who at that time was Pekalongan kabupaten secretary, soon after moved to the Residency Economic Affairs Department. During the early revolution he was Residency secretary, and later Resident during the guerilla period. For two photos of him at the end of the revolution see Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia Propinsi Djawa Tengah (Djakarta, 1953-54), 76.

² Sarimin Reksodihardjo, 'Kenang-kenangan', 87.
particular, because they could not be camouflaged, were prime targets for the expected Japanese bombing attacks which never came. People who had Dutch acquaintances began to realise that the colonial masters had no idea what to do or where they would go, so they just stayed optimistically where they were until it was too late. The common people, ordered by the newly created Civil Air Defence Corps (Luchtbeschermings Dienst) to dig trenches big enough for one family to shelter in (three meters deep and three meters wide) around the sugar mills, made fun of the preparations the Dutch were making. 'When the bombs are falling, they won't need to dig another grave for us, we already have a hole to die in'.

For the Residency Pangreh Praja, the departure of the Dutch saw the brief collapse of their authority. Now with no means of enforcing law and order, as the various Dutch-created militias quickly disbanded themselves, they watched helplessly as a 'fever of plunder' (demam merampok) spread like some mysterious contagious disease from kecamatan to kecamatan. In most areas it was the local Chinese stores, the pawnshop or the rice mill - and often all three - which were the main targets, but the Pangreh Praja themselves sometimes barely escaped attack.

There were extraordinary scenes everywhere. As it was right at the time of the first paddy harvest, women streaming along the roads bringing in their paddy still on the stalks would see a group plundering a shop, throw away their paddy and follow suit. The Chinese population fled their shops seeking refuge in local government offices. Hearing rumours that the government pawnshop would be returning all unredeemed pawns free, thousands of peasants poured into the town of

3 So uninformed about the Japanese advance was one Pangkan cane-field supervisor, that he announced on his departure from Pangkah that he was 'going to Aceh'. It turned out he only got as far as Balapulang, 17 kilometers southwest of Pangkah, where he ran into the arriving Japanese. Pangkah nationalist leader, Transcript, I/11, 27.11.75.

4 Ibid, 27.11.75.

5 Sarimin, 'Kenang-kenangan', 88.
Pemalang with receipts to claim their goods. On finding the pawnshop still guarded by a few loyal militia, the crowd began chanting 'Distribute the rice! Distribute the rice!' and the town's three Chinese-owned rice mills were ransacked and the machinery carried off. As many as 15 people were reported killed when a large paddy stack collapsed, then the crowd ransacked over 100 Chinese shops and the contents (including iron safes 1 x 6 meters) were carried back to villages. The Wedana of Pemalang fired shots into the air but to no avail. Without Dutch guards the prisoners in Pekalongan's two jails broke out and joined in the general uprising.

Relations between the people and the Pangreh Praja were reflected in what happened at the Pekalongan kabupaten. After the Municipal Defence Unit (Stadswacht) and the police had disbanded themselves, an angry crowd, described as 'rebels' by an official, entered the kapubaten compound and took down the swords that the police had left hanging in the guardhouse. While the Bupati's wife could be heard screaming for help, the Bupati, Raden Ario Adipati Soerjo, fainted with shock. Automatically, the kapubaten secretary rang the Dutch Resident, who was still in the city, to report that the Bupati had collapsed upon the arrival of robber bands in his pendopo (front office). For the first time in several hundred years of colonial rule, the Dutch found themselves utterly powerless to do anything about the 'lawlessness'. The Peace and Tranquility (Rust en Orde) of the colonial order had gone for good.

Wartime Economic Policies

Whatever other aims the Japanese 16th Army might have said

6 Tailor in the Pemalang market, Interview, 4.12.74.

7 Soedjono, Transcript, I/3, 29.7.73. The pendopo of a kabupaten was the big pavillion in front of a bupati's residence and open on all sides. It was where much of the day-to-day government business was conducted, and where meetings and receptions were held. At the kawedanan and kecamatan levels, the same plan was copied on a much smaller scale. The pendopo was often attached to the official's house, having the appearance of a big square front verandah. There is a sketch of a kawedanan pendopo in Chapter Five.
they had initially in Indonesia, they were soon subordinated to the all important task of the acquisition of resources, particularly Java's foodstuffs, to meet the requirements of Japan's military operations. As the war went on, because of the 'aggravation of communication difficulties', Java became increasingly important as a supply base for the Japanese. In their programme of 'Mutual Exchange of Non-Military Commodities', Java was a source of rice and salt for Malaya, and the latter's only source of sugar and cereals. Cigarettes, quinine and base metals were also essential exports from Java. In the latter part of the war the Japanese adopted a deliberate policy of 'self-maintenance' (genchi jikatsu) for all occupied regions. This policy was necessitated by the fact that transportation, particularly shipping, between Japan and the occupied areas of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere became difficult or impossible by the end of 1943, while many parts still relied on supplies from Japan or surpluses from other regions. As the Japanese war position deteriorated, the authorities ordered all forces in the occupied regions to be self-sufficient. This self-maintenance policy was based on the compulsory acquisition of all plantations by the state, and the appropriation of the surplus product of peasant agriculture, namely rice. As well, it involved the rationing of this and other increasingly scarce commodities (such as kerosene), and the forced recruitment of labour for various projects within each region, as well as outside Java. Because of the apparent continued fear of an invasion from the south, the Japanese began stockpiling munitions and foodstuffs in selected places in Java. With no export markets, the Java sugar industry


9 Miyamoto, Jawa.

10 Ibid.
collapsed, with the number of mills in operation reduced from 85 in 1942, to 13 in 1945. At least two of the 13 (Pangkah and Banjaratma) were in Pekalongan Residency.

On his arrival in the Residency (renamed shu) of Pekalongan, the new Japanese Assistant Resident, Toshio Ota, recalls:

I sense a strong cleavage between the rich and the poor. Only a handful of high ranking officials - western educated - versus the bulk of poor Indonesians. In addition the economy was in the hands of the Chinese, and the population had little opportunity to earn cash, except for manual labour which gave them daily food alone. Dutch plantations owned too much land at the expense of the peasants, thus many inhabitants had to leave their villages to work. It seemed that there were many poor peasants ...I felt our duty was to reduce the difference in wealth as much as possible.

To this end the Assistant Resident and his progressive superior, the Shuchokan (Resident) Tokonami Tokogi set up a cooperative for the production of agricultural implements and woven mats. They also opened a fisheries school (gyongyo gakko) in Batang, 'to stimulate coastal fishing, to encourage a sense of adventure and love of the sea among the youth so they could have confidence in themselves.' Later in the war the Resident set up a six-hectare training farm at the foot of Mt Slamet, to train 200 families from all over Java 'in learning Japanese methods of modern farming and cattle raising' before being settled outside Java.

11 Production fell drastically from 1,326,000 tons in 1942 to 84,000 in 1945. B.R.O'G. Anderson, 'Japan: "The Light of Asia"; in J. Silverstein (ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays (New Haven, Yale University SEA Studies No.7), 17.

12 Toshio Ota, Answers, 10.2.78. (I am grateful to Akira Oki for translating all correspondence with Ota.)

13 Ibid.

14 Fortnightly Intelligence Report No.18, 16-30 September 1944, 33 (subsequently cited as N.I. Intelligence), Department of External Affairs, Correspondence Files, Netherlands Indies Information and Intelligence, 1944-46 (Australian Commonwealth Archives Item PI/46/2/7/1).
In order to implement their self-maintenance policy, the Japanese relied entirely on the Pangreh Praja. Whereas under the Dutch the latter's main economic role had been as tax collectors, now they had both to supervise compulsory rice deliveries, and to be responsible for organising the rationing of cloth and other basic raw materials from the kecamatan level down. They were also responsible for the raising of romusha (forced labour) quotas sent to work on projects within the Residency. As one camat put it: 'The Japanese would come around every few days to see us. We were their economic inspectors [pengawas ekonomi].

Furthermore, the initial goodwill towards the Japanese quickly changed to shock and revulsion at their violent methods. No group in Pekalongan society, not even the priyayi officials, was immune to Japanese insults and violence. People (particularly officials) resented being called kowe or bakero (fool, in Japanese). Being slapped about the head (ditempeleng) for not bowing low from the waist while passing Japanese military guard posts was common, especially during the first six months of the Occupation when the Residency came under direct military administration.

The Rice Delivery System

For the majority of the population, the forced delivery of rice was the most onerous of all the Japanese wartime policies. Before the war the Dutch, who had never compulsorily requisitioned rice, had set up an organisation (the Algemene Voedingsmiddelen Fonds)

15 Kowe is the low Javanese (ngoko) form of the third person singular, only used with close friends and family. People of official-status especially considered being called kowe disrespectful.

16 In an incident indelibly printed on the mind of one official, the head of the Economic Affairs Department, Horizumi (whom, it was thought, had been a storekeeper in Sragen, east of Solo, before the war) began his notorious career on the morning after his arrival in Pekalongan by summoning the Bupati and the Mayor and abusing them, calling them bakero (fool) for not providing mosquito nets. Soedjono, Transcript, III/2, 29.7.73.

17 Ota, the Assistant Resident, writes that 'we tried to persuade Japanese not to touch the body above the neck, which was a common prohibition amongst the Javanese', Answers. For an incident, see my 'Social Revolution in Pemalang, Central Java, 1945', Indonesia, 24 (October 1977), 97. (subsequently cited as 'Social Revolution').
which provided credit for the Chinese to buy rice for a buffer stock. People brought their surplus rice voluntarily to the Chinese-owned rice mills. Dutch regulations prevented the Chinese from stockpiling rice over one ton without permission. The Dutch fixed a maximum or ceiling price only.

Under the Japanese the system changed drastically. Peasants were compelled to make set deliveries of their rice to the state. From a total Java rice consumption of 4,100,000 tons in 1944, 18 74,000 Japanese civilians on Java were estimated to consume 17,000 tons 19 per annum. The 16th army needed another 380,000 tons of which 17,000 were for 'provisions' (i.e., stockpiles). Then in the last year of the war the Japanese 7th Division Headquarters in Singapore ordered the 16th Army to acquire by forced delivery an extra 40,000 tons 'in preparation for a possible decisive war in Singapore'. 20 After the needs of the Japanese civilians and military had been satisfied, rice was requisitioned for what was called semi-military purposes, and rationed out to various groups whose support for the war was considered important, namely the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air - Defenders of the Fatherland), Heiho (the Auxiliaries), romusha, government officials, kinro hoshi (voluntary labourers) and skilled workers. 21

18 Miyamoto, Jawa, gives a consumption figure of 4.73 million tons in his book but this was corrected to 4.1 million in an interview with Akira Oki. The (corrected) 1944 Java rice production is 4.2 million tons. Before the war Java had a rice export surplus of between 150,000 and 240,000 tons, according to Weekly Intelligence Summary, No.75, 16 June 1944, in N.I. Intelligence.

19 Miyamoto, Jawa, calculated this on an average Japanese consumption of 640 grams per person per day 'in normal times'.

20 Ibid.

21 Unfortunately Miyamoto only gives the numbers to whom the Japanese were obliged to provide with rice according to army, navy and gunseikanbu (military administration) categories, not according to region, i.e., the army administered both Sumatra and Java. The total number of people in the different groups obtaining rice (excluding the naval area) was 2,555,992. Assuming a ration of 250 grams per person per day (less than half the Japanese ration), although PETA and Heiho would have got more, these rations would account for about 2.30 million tons of rice requisitioned for semi-military purposes throughout Indonesia.
On the policy (begun in 1943) of creating rice stockpiles in the event of the expected invasion from the south, Miyamoto writes 'It seems that both the army and civilians attached to the army tried to accumulate excessive quantities of foodstuffs...interpreting the order exaggeratedly'. Rice was bought at prices so low that it virtually amounted to confiscation. Given the wartime economic chaos, the lack of supplies and transport, which led to the collapse of the economy and a flourishing black market in rice, it was not surprising that corruption was widespread.

While the total military and semi-military requisitions on paper must have been about 38 per cent of Java's 1944 production, these all-Java figures do not reflect the real situation at the Residency level. In Pekalongan, at any rate, the practice occurred of adding to centre delivery quotas to make up for 'losses' due to corruption. By January 1945, corruption in the delivery system was apparently so widespread that the Residency level had to add an additional 18 per cent onto the delivery quota fixed by the centre, 'to make sure of its estimates' increasing the quota from 80,000 to 100,000 tons. Kabupaten quotas were apparently decided at a meeting of the Keizaibu (Residency Department of Economic Affairs), the Agricultural Department and a shidokan (military advisor). Assuming it was divided equally amongst the four kabupatens this would give

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22 Ibid.

23 The total amount of hulled rice (beras) requisitioned can be calculated from Miyamoto's figures for Java as follows:

- military stockpiles: 17,000 tons
- 16th Army: 363,000 "
- Japanese civilians on Java: 17,000 "
- delivery for 7th Division headquarters in Singapore: 40,000 "
- semi-military purposes: 1,150,000 "
- total: 1,587,000

which is 38 per cent of the total beras production for 1944 (see fn.18).

*Here assuming that half the rice ration calculated in fn.21 went for semi-military purposes in Java. Considering the island's strategic importance as a supply base in the self-maintenance policy, it was probably higher than this.

24 'The Problem of Rice' (trans. with an introduction by Ben Anderson), Indonesia, II (October 1966), 99 (subsequently cited as 'The Problem of Rice').
a quota of 25,000 tons to Brebes, considered to be the rice-bowl of the Residency, with an average annual production of about 38,000 tons. So in Brebes alone 66 per cent of the rice was 'officially' requisitioned.

The impact of the forced deliveries also varied throughout Pekalongan Residency according to the quality and area of land under sawah, yields, and attitudes of local officials, the camat and especially the village head. The new marketing system meant that at the village level farmers would no longer take their harvested paddy home from the fields to hull it themselves. They now had to take it to the kalurahan.

Brebes kabupaten, as previously mentioned, had long been an area of surplus paddy production. In Ketanggungan the farmers had to deliver their quota (which was lower than other areas in the Tiga Daerah) to the village secretary (kushoki). Quotas were based on grades or classes of sawah, derived from the old Dutch classification used in determining taxation. The farmers received a very low price for their rice, being paid only 'half the market price'. While the fixed price in Pekalongan in January 1944 was f.4.00 per kilogram because of various 'deductions' at collection centres, the peasant only received f.1.88. With the black market price initially at f.6.00 per kilo rising to f.40.00 later in the Occupation, it is clear why profiteering in rice was so widespread.

In most areas rice requisitions were made more onerous by being tied to the rationing of cloth. Partly, no doubt, because of the huge military stockpiles, cloth became so scarce later in the Occupation that it became impossible to get except by delivering rice. In some areas the amount of rice delivered determined the quality of cloth received. The hulling of requisitioned rice by the Chinese-owned

25 This figure was given in an interview with Soebagyo, the Camat of Brebes during the Japanese occupation.

26 Some of this was retained by farmers. See below.

27 Other areas where deliveries of paddy were based on the rate of tax payments were Garut and certain kawedanans of Bandung kabupaten. Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', 87.

28 Ibid., 94.
mills also meant that valuable by-products which the farmer normally obtained by hulling it himself were lost. If the farmer required the rice husks used as poultry and livestock feed, as well as the nutritious rice bran and broken pieces, he now had to buy it back from the mill.

The harsh impact of the forced delivery system was somewhat softened in 1945, in Brebes kabupaten at any rate, by an arrangement made between the Bupati, Sarimin, and Horizumi, head of the Residency Economic Affairs Department, whereby part of the kabupaten's rice quota could be delivered as husked rice rather than paddy. Before this, as in other parts of the Residency, all the requisitioned part of the harvest had to be delivered as paddy to the mills, where it was hulled, and what remained after Japanese military and civilian requirements were met was distributed through the agricultural cooperatives (nogyo kumiai).

Under the new arrangements agreed to by the Residency Economic Affairs Department, which controlled rice hulling throughout the Residency, the paddy was pounded (that is, hulled) by hand on the spot in each village. The pounders employed received a 'wage' of hulled rice, plus the husks, bran and broken pieces. Rice traders then collected the rice from the villages and delivered it to various collection centres. 29

In both Taman and Ulujami, two small, but densely populated, kecamatans east of Pemalang, local officials called noji padi 30 were also allowed to hull some of the crop by hand. In Ambowetan village 50 pounders were employed. Apart from getting a wage of one kilogram per quintal of unhulled rice (gabah), they also kept the rice bran, broken pieces and the rice straw (merang).

29 Sarimin, 'Kenang-kenangan', 99.

30 The noji padi was the local official responsible for paddy collection. Noji in Japanese means agricultural affairs and noji iin are agricultural officials.
In Taman kecamatan about 40 per cent of the rice crop was being delivered to the Japanese (see Table 2). Instead of delivering the quotas to the mills in Pemalang, where it lay rotting while waiting to be hulled, the Camat began milling the entire crop on the spot, while the pounders were paid 'the equivalent of a margarine tin' of rice - about 2½ kilograms.

Indeed the Camat of Taman, one of the few Pangreh Praja who had a reputation for honesty, was well known for his efforts in trying to ease the burden of the oppressive Japanese policies. He appointed a five-man committee to be responsible for the distribution of cloth received from the cooperative (kumiai). It was general practice at that time for the kumiai officials to take 20 per cent of the cloth, and the Camat or his wife the same amount. To avoid this, in Taman the Camat had the cloth received from the kumiai made up into pairs of shorts and sarongs for those who had registered as not receiving any cloth, i.e., those who had no rice to deliver. The left over scraps, known as 'self-help pieces' (potongan gotong royong), were made into shorts for children, who could not go to school because they had no cloths, for Seinendan (Youth Corps) members and for the local football team. The remaining unusable pieces were sent to the Pemalang hospital to be made into bandages.

In many areas of the kabupaten of Pemalang the delivery quota was based on the rate of tax-payment, a criteria which took no account of the variations in either the area or quality of the land between kecamatans. Thus the southern hill kawedanan of Belik was an area of poor soils with little sawah land and yields of one ton per hectare were considered good. However, for every one guilder of tax paid (on one-tenth of a hectare of land), the people had to deliver 150 kilograms of rice, or 1½ tons (15 quintals) per hectare, half a ton higher than the average yield in a good season in Belik.

31 Camat of Taman, Interview, 9.11.71.
32 Compare this high delivery in Belik, twice the amount (of only 68-80 kilograms) of paddy delivered for payment of f.1.00 tax in the areas mentioned in fn.29, Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', 87.
TABLE 2

Rice Requisitioning in Various Areas of the Tiga Daerah during the Japanese Occupation

bau = 0.7 hectare; 1 quintal = 100 kilograms; 10 quintals = 1 ton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Average Yield of Paddy</th>
<th>Amount Requisitioned</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brebes kabupaten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes kacamatn</td>
<td>2-2 1/2 ton per ha.</td>
<td>1 ton</td>
<td>Bupati of Brebes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losari kecamatan</td>
<td>2 1/2 tons per ha.</td>
<td>1 ton</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketanggungan village</td>
<td>2-3 tons per ha. (20-30 quintals per ha.)</td>
<td>6 quintals per ha. from 'good' sawah</td>
<td>village Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal kabupaten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumijawa kecamatan</td>
<td>15 quintals per bau (equiv. of 2 tons per ha.)</td>
<td>2 quintals per bau noji padi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talang kecamatan</td>
<td>2-4 tons per ha.</td>
<td>1 ton</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalang kabupaten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belik kawedanan</td>
<td>1 ton per bau</td>
<td>equiv. of 1 1/2 tons</td>
<td>Wedana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cibuyur village (South Pemalang)</td>
<td>1 1/2-2 tons per bau</td>
<td>2-3 quintals</td>
<td>Lurah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taman kecamatan</td>
<td>1 1/2-2 1/2 tons</td>
<td>40-50%</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambowetan village</td>
<td>2-3 ton per bau on 'good' sawah</td>
<td>in theory farmer allowed to keep only 1 quintal or 5% of yield on 'average' sawah</td>
<td>noji padi Seinendan leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampelgading kecamatan</td>
<td>2 tons per bau on 'average' sawah</td>
<td>in practice 50% or 1 ton per bau</td>
<td>Seinendan leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data from interviews.

1 Paddy bulu produces a high quality rice, like Delanggu rice, while paddy cere has a higher yield, but the grain is 'harder' when cooked.
The Wedana promptly told the Japanese that it was impossible to deliver more paddy than was grown in his kawedanan and was told in reply to do the best he could.\(^{33}\)

The same Wedana also tried to take measures to allay the widespread suspicions that officials were enriching themselves, by using the **pendopo** of the kawedanan as a warehouse, which was glassed in so people could see exactly when rations of cloth and kerosene had arrived and how much there was. Cloth rationing was not tied to deliveries of rice, but was the direct responsibility of the three camats. In Belik itself, it was the wife of the Camat who organised cloth distribution. Although the Wedana reminded the latter of the dangers of this and told him to form a distribution committee, 'he agreed but in practice it never happened'. People were naked with no clothes to wear, while 'it was the lurahs and their families who got cloth'.\(^{34}\) In Belik kawedanan cloth was even used as a medium of exchange, the camats' wives exchanging the cloth they should have been distributing for foodstuffs (mainly corn) and even sawahs. While hoarding was common among officials, the people of Belik and many other areas were wearing sacking (**karung goni**) or home-made fibres made from tree bark.

Across the kabupaten border in the neighbouring hill kawedanan of Bumijawa, quotas (as remembered by a former **noji padi**) were not as high as in some coastal areas (see Table 2). However, the burden might have been more onerous as, with poor soils and no irrigation, rice yields were dependent on rainfall alone. The total area of sawah was small and only those who delivered paddy had the right to buy cloth - one 2-meter piece of unbleached cotton (**belacu**) for one quintal of paddy. In order to enforce the compulsory deliveries the Bumijawa kecamatan **noji padi** had a team of six assistants each responsible for three villages.\(^{35}\) Whether or not because of the actions of these

\(^{33}\) Wedana of Belik, Transcript, I/10, 22.5.73.

\(^{34}\) Ibid, I/7.

\(^{35}\) Bumijawa **noji padi**, Interview, 16.2.73.
officials, the deliveries were openly resisted in the village of Jejeg, about which more will be said later.

Opportunities for Corruption

All the sources in Table 2 agreed that corruption of rice delivery quotas was practised on a wide scale during the occupation period. As the chaos of the wartime economy worsened and black market prices skyrocketed, opportunities were harder to resist. Just how widespread malpractice had become can be seen from some figures for Pemalang. According to the Pekalongan representative on the Reporting Committee of the Java Council of Advisors, which met in January 1945 to discuss how the Japanese rice policy could be improved, in Pemalang alone in one month almost 300 tons went 'astray'. While the amount reported sold to the rice mill by the Pangreh Praja was 1,064 tons, the rice mills (according to the government) reported receiving (buying) only 786 tons. The Pemalang rice mills, while admitting this deficiency, claimed that only 140 tons had gone 'unreported'. According to the same report, this corruption was not limited to Pemalang but was widespread throughout the Residency, where in one year as much as 1200 tons was 'lost' at the Residency level. In order to compensate for this, the quota was increased by 18 per cent. This extra rice was then distributed as a ration to local officials.

In the same discussions of the Japanese rice policy mentioned earlier, the report on Pekalongan stresses the role of middlemen in the malfeasance which occurred in the rice deliveries. For a time the Chinese continued to buy up rice for their mills in the villages, but the Japanese became angry that delivery quotas were not being filled. They therefore raised the quotas to almost 40 per cent of the harvest and excluded the Chinese in an attempt to prevent hoarding and profiteering on the black market and to ensure quotas were obtained.

36 Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', 95.
37 Ibid, 99.
Instead of using the Chinese, the Japanese substituted the lurah as middleman in the rice delivery system. In Pekalongan Residency the kalurahan became the collection centre where peasants had to take their rice after harvesting it. It was the village heads, in their new roles as middlemen, who became the lynchpins in the giant Japanese extractive process, with new opportunities to swindle or cheat farmers. Corruption was so widespread at all levels that an old word *tanggem* (meaning literally 'vice-grips') was now used to refer to large scale corruption.

The key role the village heads played can be seen from the working of the delivery quota system in the village of Ambowetan in Ulujami kecamatan on Pemalang's northeastern border. The rice delivery system in this kecamatan seems to have been the most onerous of all the areas in Table 2. Farmers were officially allowed to keep only one quintal of paddy per *bau* for seed and for food, the rest was supposed to be delivered to the kalurahan collection centre. As well as delivering their paddy the people had to plant cassava in their house compounds until 'there were no empty house compounds to be seen in Ulujami'.

The system worked in the following way. The kecamatan received its delivery quota, which was divided amongst the 15 villages. Each kalurahan was made into a collection centre at harvest time, and the village head supervised the delivery of quotas, estimated the weight deduction for moisture content, paid the peasants for what they had delivered, weighed and then dried the paddy and sent it direct to the Chinese rice mill in nearby Comal or to the *noji padi*, to be hulled by pounders. The *noji padi* then reported to the Camat how much *beras* had been hulled from the paddy. If the Camat queried this, the *noji padi* had to justify the low delivery. The Camat decided the delivery quota for each village in his kecamatan and policed

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38 One quintal or 100 kilograms (without subtracting an amount kept for seed) would have lasted a family of six about 100 days, eating rice once a day.

39 Noji *padi*, Interview, 28.10.76.
the delivery system. If the village quota (jatah) and the deliveries (setoran) did not match, the Camat would threaten to call in the kenpeitai (military police) to search the village concerned. One reason for the widespread corruption was that while the quota given out to the peasants was in paddy, the rice deliveries made to the Japanese authorities were in the form of hulled rice. This will become clear when we look at what happened when the farmer delivered his paddy to the kalurahan collection centre at Ambowetan village. It was said that the lurah could cheat peasants in four new ways.

First, when a farmer brought in his paddy, a standard weight deduction (called repaksi) of about 25 per cent was made to allow for moisture content. If the lurah decided that a farmer's paddy had a moisture content much higher than this, he simply would not accept it. If the farmer disagreed with the lurah's moisture content estimate, he would be told to 'dry it himself', then, when he brought it back again, it would be refused on other grounds. When the lurah did accept it, he would still always try to overestimate the repaksi to be able to sell the extra paddy on the black market. 40

Second, the lurah could obtain the jejeran gabah (fallen unhulled rice) from sheaves waiting to be weighed in front of his office. This was especially lucrative if the variety grown was padi cempo, which falls more easily out of the sheaves than does padi jowo. For every quintal delivered, the lurah could collect one kilogram of fallen unhulled rice. 41

40 By setting a standard 25 per cent repaksi, the lurah consistently overestimated the moisture content (and thus weight deduction), which was actually nearer 23 per cent. Thus he could subtract an average of three kilograms of unhulled rice for every quintal delivered. For a typical harvest in Ambowetan of about 2,880 quintals, for example, about half of which was delivered to him, the lurah could lift about 43 quintals per harvest. It is important to note that in Pemalang the weight deduction process took place at the kalurahan, not at a separate collection centre. Compare the description of the lurah's role as middleman in the general account of this practice in Pekalongan Residency given in Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', 95.

41 About half the Ambowetan harvest was padi cempo. From the gabah shaken out of the amount of paddy delivered in one harvest he could collect a total of 14 quintals.
Third, the lurah could avoid paying his quota of rice from the bengkok, land which was actually included in the bureaucracy's calculations for the overall village quota. He could do this by claiming that because there had been a 'crop failure' he could only supply his superiors with, for example, 80 per cent of the village quota. The lowered quota was then filled with the villagers' paddy, and the lurah could sell his own crop on the black market.

Lastly, the scales were manipulated. Those used for weighing the paddy at the kalurahan were the colonial government's old iron dacin scales, which could weigh a maximum of 60 kilograms at a time. As it was necessary to make two weighings for every quintal, cheating was all the easier, and by underweighing the lurah could gain a kilogram or two from every quintal he weighed. If the farmer protested, the lurah would say the underweighing was to compensate for losses in paddy when it was later carried from the kalurahan to the noji padi or the rice mill.

Because of these harsh conditions, more than half the farmers were forced to 'steal' their own rice, usually by harvesting it secretly at night. The paddy was then buried or hidden in roof rafters. In so doing the farmers ran the dire risk of being found out by the village police and reported to the lurah or to the dreaded kenpeitai. Searches for paddy by the camat, village police or the kenpeitai (whom the people believed had secret telephones and a special compass which showed where paddy was being hidden) took place more or less every few months.

In a few places, evasion was fairly successful, at least when compared to official demand. For example, while the Camat of Ulujami had ordered that only one quintal of paddy could be kept by a farmer from every bau harvested - about 4 per cent of the average yield from good land - in practice sometimes as much as 30 per cent was held back to be used by the farmer himself or sold on the black market.

42 In Ambowetan the lurah received 12 bau (0.7 hectare) of bengkok land with an average yield of 25 quintals per bau. With an initial local blackmarket price of $6.00 per kilogram (twice the Jakarta blackmarket price), compared to the official price of 10 cents per kilogram, it is clear why profiteering in rice by officials was so widespread.
From the kalurahan the paddy was either sent to the rice mill directly, or to the noji padi who sometimes helped the mill by hulling the rice on the spot. The latter was the system used in the Ulujami kecamatan. The paddy was sent to the village of Ambowetan where another estimate, this time of the ratio of paddy to hulled rice, was made. As there were no standard weight conversion ratios set down, the noji padi could cheat by understating the amount of rice obtained from hulling a quintal of paddy. If queried by the camat, the noji padi could reply that the amount of rice was less than normal. The paddy, he would claim, was cabug (the heads were empty), either because of some disease or because, as a result of being picked too young, it had had to be made into menir (broken rice). On these opportunities for cheating, the noji padi of Ulujami recalls:

I had to provide the Camat of Ulujami with two quintals for his family every month. I only hulled the rice to help the rice mill and got a wage of Rp.10 per month. I also took a small amount illegally ['saya juga tanggem kecil-kecilan'] - about four kilograms from any one hulling for my family - but I never sold any to the middleman, as my assistants would have known; what the noji padi could do depended on having an understanding [ tahu sama tahu ] with his assistants.

In Ambowetan village whenever there was a rumour that a kenpeitai search was imminent the peasants would try to hide their rice. However, neither the lurah or his officials were immune from the wrath of the kenpeitai if 'extra' paddy was discovered on one of these searches.

It so happened that some four sheaves of paddy had been found in the house of a local lenggaong, identified by the owner (a poor widow) and taken to the kalurahan as proof of the theft. The kenpeitai, who were making a routine search in Ambowetan soon after this, found the sheaves and the village head was accused of illegally

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43 The pounders (50 were employed by the noji padi in Ambowetan), apart from getting a wage of one kilogram per quintal pounded, also kept the rice straw, the bran, and the broken grains, as in Brebes.

44 Ambowetan noji padi, Interview, 28.10.75.

45 One sheaf of paddy is equal to about 6 kilograms of hulled rice in this area.
hiding rice and hit about the head (ditempeleng). He was sick for eight days afterwards.46

Another incident also in Ulujami kecamatan highlights how honest officials, in trying to protect the people from arbitrary or over-zealous colleagues, were just as vulnerable to Japanese physical violence as were the people themselves. In the words of the village secretary of Pamutih:

The Japanese had been in Indonesia about a year, when one day the Ulujami kacamatan policeman [mantri polisi] and his assistant [agen polisi] came around on one of their regular searches looking for paddy. They were going to confiscate ten sheaves from a poor farmer which had been saved for a selamatan [ritual meal]. I said to the mantri 'Ndoro mantri,47 this farmer doesn't have any paddy, except for his selamatan'. The mantri took my pleas the wrong way. He thought I was hampering him. As a result they searched my house as well and confiscated about ten quintals, leaving me with only two. I had in fact delivered my quota of 15 quintals and I had a receipt to prove it. ... An argument broke out which ended in a fight. The mantri left, and I heard later he was taken to hospital. Later in the day a jeep arrived with a kenpeitai officer (a Japanese), and I was taken to the kenpeitai headquarters in Pekalongan. I was accused of hampering the collection of paddy and kept there for seven days. While I was there, I was beaten with a rubber whip, given electric shocks through my right hand until I fainted, and made to lie on zinc roofing in the midday sun. I was covered with a board, and people stood on top of me until I fainted. For seven days I was given only a glass of milk three times a day and nothing else to eat. At the end of seven days I was sent home.48

After two months the unfortunate village secretary was brought before a court in Pemalang and sentenced to six months imprisonment for hindering a paddy search.

46 Ambowetan noji padi, Interview, 28.10.75.

47 Ndoro (your honour or your lordship) was still used in addressing officials during the Japanese occupation.

48 Village Secretary of Pamutih, Interview, 4.11.75.
If village officials got such treatment from their own superiors and from the Japanese, the peasants were at the mercy of everyone - the kenpeitai, the camat, their own village officials, and even in one area the Seinendan. A Tegal nationalist recalls:

It was not only the Japanese harshness [kekejaman] which made the people afraid, but we ourselves were to blame. For example, when farmers from Brebes [kecamatan] went to Ketanggungan to join in the harvest, they would be paid maybe one-fifth or one-sixth of what they harvested there. They would return home once a week bringing their rice - they preferred to save rice rather than money. These peasants would be stopped by Seinendan [youths] and ordered to sell their rice to the government, to meet the lurah's quota.49

Rather than believing in the need for rice requisitioning, for the Seinendan members it was a new experience to be able to wield this kind of authority. For the already overburdened peasantry it was yet another humiliation.

Other Requisitions

Besides the compulsory acquisition of rice the Japanese self-maintenance policy also enforced the cultivation of castor oil plants (jarak) throughout the Residency, adding yet another onerous imposition on the people. This cultivation was supervised in each kecamatan by a mantri jarak (castor oil plant supervisor), appointed by the local Pangreh Praja. In the kawedanan of Banjarharjo (Brebes) the castor oil plants were grown on land belonging to peasants, beside rice fields, along the banks of streams and in house gardens, under the supervision of the lurahs, through whom the mantri worked. If peasants did not want to plant or grow castor oil plants, according to a former mantri,

The Japanese would get angry with the lurah. Afterwards the lurah, who was afraid of the Japanese would get angry with the farmers.50

49 Soesmono, Interview, 20.10.76.

50 Mantri jarak, Transcript 1/4, 13.4.73.
Not surprisingly this burden of supervising the cultivation of castor oil plants became very onerous. After a crop failure of over 100 hectares in one village on Pemalang's northern coastal plain the lurah committed suicide, reputedly by jumping from a coconut tree. In the rural areas of the Residency the Japanese tied castor oil plant deliveries to the rationing of kerosene. A peasant who delivered his castor oil plants could buy kerosene at the kecamatan for a 'low' price.

The Japanese also requisitioned other things for various uses. A plant known locally as iles-iles, which had leaves like taro but smaller, was collected, some said for medicinal purposes, while another view was that the plant was used for making gunpowder. The Japanese also collected sunflowers, presumably for their oil content, and a kind of sea fungus (cuwur-cuwur) about which the only thing people remember is that collecting it for the Japanese 'made the hands itch'. While the impact of these requisitions was not as burdensome as rice deliveries or castor oil plant cultivation, they added to anti-lurah feeling in the same way, as it was the latter who coopted peasants to collect the plants.

The Rationing System

With increasing wartime shortages, and as part of the self-maintenance policy, the Japanese instituted rationing for cloth, rice and basic commodities. Like the rice requisitioning and the corvée labour, it was the Pangreh Praja who were responsible for the working of the rationing system. However, while the camats could not benefit directly from illegal dealings in rice (except by taking from what was found in searches), they were directly involved in the rationing system. While the impact of rationing varied between areas within the Residency, the Pemalang kabupaten doctor had this to say about rationing, writing early in 1946:

...rationing, labour service, and the requisitioning of foodstuffs were felt really deeply by the people. The feelings of resentment were harboured against the Pangreh Praja who were carrying out orders [of their Japanese superiors]. The people felt that the rationing, especially, was not carried out in the way that it should
have been. The people did not think about the
difficulties of rationing such small supplies, they
only heard, and saw, how rationing was implemented.
The dishonesty [kecurangan] was a public secret. The
people were in a discontented mood and this created
a state of tension....

Cloth

At the beginning of the Occupation the Japanese military
administration took over Java's textile mills, including the biggest
Dutch-owned firm in Tegal, and confiscated all stocks of cloth. After
it became impossible to transport supplies from Japan, stockpiles in
Java (50 million yards in 1944) were gradually released to the army
and 'it was distributed to the civilian sector only if there existed
a surplus after satisfying military demand'. The military further
tried to increase local production of textiles by introducing machines
and experts from Japan, and by encouraging the cultivation of cotton.
In the Pekalongan Residency cotton growing was a state monopoly, and
local weavers were not allowed to use the cotton themselves. This
successfully destroyed the thriving Banjarharjo textile industry south-west
of Brebes, which turned to weaving kapok instead. The quality of the
cloth made from kapok was unsatisfactory, lasting only for a couple of

51 Dr Moerjawan, 'Ikhtisar' is to be found in documents relating
to events in Pekalongan during 1945 entitled Omnentelingzaak
te Pekalongan, Inventory No.201, Procureur-Generaal bij het
Hooggerechtshof van Indonesia, in the Algemeen Rijksarchief
(subsequently cited as Proc.Gen.).

52 At the beginning of the European war, the Java Textile Company's
cotton spinning and weaving mill in Tegal, representing '...the
most recent branch of the textile industry in Java...was enlarged
by 10,000 additional spindles, so that it was able to furnish
all the yarn needed for its own weaving of a million yards of
greys per month'. As a result of this large capital investment,
it was planned that beginning in 1942, the mill would have spun
15 million guilders' worth of raw cotton annually 'to give
employment to 12,000 native operatives'. See J.H. Boeke, The
Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy (New York, 1947),
119, 122.

53 Miyamoto, Jawa.

54 Known locally as jingkang fabric.
months, and so Banjarharjo kawedanan lost an important source of livelihood as well as its own cloth supply.  

In Pekalongan Residency the deliveries of rice were tied to cloth rationing. Originally there had been a separate ration for those who had no paddy to sell, but in the latter part of the Occupation this was stopped in most areas because of the shortage of supply. The Wedana of Belik had this to say about the policy:

The distribution of cloth was indeed difficult. I think this was one of the reasons behind the protest which occurred [later] in the Tiga Daerah. The letter from Pekalongan only mentioned that 'this is for clothing for those people in real need'. That is very relative, isn't it? When I got a lot of cloth [there were so] many people who wanted to make pants, that I made a '1/4 yard' rule. People had to make do with 1\(\frac{1}{4}\) yards even though it probably wasn't enough. Even my wife didn't get any. It was given to those badly in need, such as servants. I didn't get any [either], I held firmly to the principle 'for those people in real need'. In this way I was able to make do.  

For every quintal of paddy delivered, a farmer was entitled to receive a ration of one standard-sized piece of cloth, which varied between two and three meters in length. In some villages even the quality depended on the amount delivered. From a list made up at the village office of the amount of paddy delivered, the kecamatan office issued coupons to the village heads. After the farmer had delivered his rice he received a coupon from the lurah as proof that he had fulfilled his quota. The village secretary then took the list of those who had delivered paddy (daftar setor padi) to the kecamatan office. One or two months later, when the cloth arrived, the village secretary was summoned to collect what cloth rations were available, based on the list of delivered paddy. There were no checks on the camat to ensure that he really distributed all the rations he received from the kumiai. But the camat was not alone in being able to exploit the system; the village head was well placed to do so by manipulating

55 Banjarharjo Muslim leader, Interview, 12.12.75.
56 Wedana of Belik, Transcript, I/6, 22.5.73.
the rice-cloth exchange as follows. If, for example, a farmer delivered less than a quintal of paddy, he did not qualify for any cloth at all; similarly, if his quota was, say, 1½ quintals, he would only get one standard-sized piece of cloth. In short, the coupon system permitted no fractions of cloth quotas. The lurah then used the extra fractions of rice to collect more cloth at the kecamatan level and kept it himself. An official appointed by the Japanese to oversee the rationing system and paddy collection at the Pemalang kabupaten level in 1944, recalls the situation in some districts thus:

I saw clothing material stacked undistributed in the 'pendopo' of three kawedanans of Comal, Randudongkal and Pemalang, which were full of cloth. In Randudongkal where my brother-in-law was camat, I saw his mattresses were stuffed with cloth instead of kapok; his pillows were also full of yarn.57

Yarn became so valuable that nearly everyone who lived in the three kampungs around the textile mill in Tegal was able to make a living by stealing it. The yarn was catapulted over the mill walls at night, and sold on the black market.58

Rice

In its discussions on the Japanese military government's rice policy the Council of Advisors Reporting Committee points out that outside the Residency capitals and the kabupaten towns, regular rice distribution was limited to civil servants, while distribution of rice to the common people 'is not only irregular but far from sufficient'.

Table 3 shows the rice ration in various parts of Pekalongan Residency. The figure of 230 grams for Pekalongan which is the highest rice ration in all Java, is explained in the Council of Advisors' report by the fact that (as we saw earlier) Pekalongan asked the kabupatens to deliver nearly 18 per cent more rice than had been asked from the central government. However, as Table 3 indicates, the

57 Mr Besar's nephew, Transcript, 1/10, 3.5.75.
58 Soesmono, Interview, 19/10/75.
### TABLE 3
Rice Rations in Some Areas of Pekalongan Residency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Ration (grams per person per day)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pekalongan (^1)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>'The Problem of Rice', 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekalongan city</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Pangreha Praja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalang town</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalang town</td>
<td>30-50</td>
<td>pergerakan leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bojongbata (Pemalang)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>azacho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal city</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>pergerakan leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adiwnema</td>
<td>200 per family</td>
<td>school teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talang</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>pawshop official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>romusha in Pangkan</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>pergerakan leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>romusha in Brebes</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>romusha leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>romusha in Sukowati</td>
<td>200 'official' ration doubled to 400</td>
<td>underground PKI courier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margasari</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>wife of Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes kecamatan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard romusha</td>
<td>50 (mixed with corn or tapioca)</td>
<td>Siddik Kertapati, Sekitar, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>romusha in Banten coal mine</td>
<td>250(^2) reduced to 200 in 1945</td>
<td>Tan Malaka, Dari Penjara ke Penjara, part II, 157, 179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British POW and other internees in Bandung</td>
<td>500 at beginning of the occupation, reduced to 90</td>
<td>Laurens van der Post, The Night of the New Moon, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average Japanese rice consumption on which requisitioning was based</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>Miyamoto, Jawa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. The Council of Advisors Report does not make it clear whether Pekalongan means all-Residency, kabupaten or City - presumably the latter.

2. Those actually working in the mine got 400 grams and f.1.50 per day, the others 250 and f.0.40, according to Tan Malaka, op.cit., 155.

Source: data from interviews
the actual amount of the ration as remembered some 30 years later, while it varied considerably from area to area within the Residency, was nowhere near the figure given in the Council of Advisors Report of January 1944 (except in the case of the romusha rations in projects within the Residency).

For the rationing not only of rice, but of other basic commodities as well, the Japanese divided up most urban kalurahans into a number of hamlets (aza) each with its own hamlet chief (azacho). Each hamlet was in turn divided into a number of neighbourhood associations (tonarigumi) each with its own head (kumicho). Deciding who qualified for a ration of rice and who did not was often done in an arbitrary way, as Mr Besar's nephew recalls:

The townspeople were given a distribution of rice, but the people outside the town were not. Because it was the villages which produced the rice, the Japanese government considered that village people didn't need to have any ration. ... Some funny things happened; for example, the people in this hamlet would be considered townspeople, while the people in that hamlet were not, while it fact it was the one kampung. I became a victim of this, my house was exactly on the border of the town, the house in front of me got a distribution of rice but I did not... but because I was an official, I could contact the rice mill direct.59

The widespread practice of officials obtaining rice from the mills direct may have been one of many reasons for the large discrepancies in the amount reported delivered by the Pangreh Praja and the amount reported by the mills.

Apart from deciding who would qualify for rice rations, there was the problem of the quality of the ration itself. Often to make the ration 'heavier' (and therefore 'go further') gravel and sand and even broken glass (beling) were mixed with the rice ration. 'In 100 kilograms of rice' recalls a doctor who worked in the Pekalongan Residency, 'there was maybe 25 kilograms of gravel. People's teeth

59 Transcript, I/14, 3.5.75.
Lastly, there was the problem of supplies, which were extremely irregular. There was never enough to go around. This in turn put the azacho and the kumicho in a compromising position, particularly with the rationing of basic commodities.

**Basic Commodities ('bahan pokok')**

Supplies of basic commodities were distributed by the kumiai through the azacho, each azacho being responsible for about three neighbourhood associations. Again, it was the village heads who were responsible for the working of the kumiai, and often 'had an understanding' with the head of the kumiai. The azacho and kumicho were little more than the lurah's henchmen (being appointed by the latter), and in the eyes of the people were thus an inseparable part of the oppressive Japanese apparatus. Their main functions were, firstly, the distribution of rations of basic commodities: kerosene, soap, sugar, and occasionally cigarettes and cloth; secondly, to organise the corvée labour, and thirdly, the training of youth.

In the kecamatan of Pemalang, a few kilometers south of the town itself, the former azacho of Bojongbata recalls how the system worked in his area:

The azacho would receive coupons from the kabupaten [i.e., the kumiai] via the lurah, a coupon for each commodity. This amount on the coupon was never reduced; if the coupon said so much, then that amount was received. The lurah would tell me, 'the commodities are at the kabupaten, get them'. On the same day that I got the supplies I would distribute them equally to the three kumicho. At the most, people got from 500-700 millilitres of kerosene which had to last 15 days. Corruption could occur at the kabupaten [kumiai] level, and the azacho could reduce supplies before distributing them. The kumicho could do the same thing.

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60 Dr Sumario, Interview, 8.9.71. Other informants, confirming this practice, give lower estimates, e.g., that 10 per cent of any ration was adulterated in this way.

61 Normally, without electricity, an average family would need about 14 litres per week for cooking and lighting. Instead they were getting two to three litres for two weeks.

62 Azacho, Interview, 17.2.75.
Under this system, as the former azacho pointed out, if the village head and the azacho had an understanding with each other then there was no checking by the lurah to see if rations received matched coupons issued.

In the areas further away from the kabupaten towns, it was usually the lurah and not the azacho who received supplies and decided the actual rations that villagers were to receive. A village school teacher who lived in Sikasur (Belik kecamatan) in southern Pemalang at the time recalls that often the rations distributed by the lurah were only half what the coupons from the kumicho specified. To the question 'when will the rest be distributed' the reply was 'Oh it hasn't come yet' when in fact it had.63

In another area where there was no distribution from the kumiai via the azacho and kumicho system, the camat rotated the appointment of the person in charge of the distribution so that it would not always be the lurah. The Camat of Tonjong recalls:

If there was a report from a village secretary, or a lurah or a santri or a village teacher that there was corruption I would replace the man. Whoever reported the malfeasance was given the job. For example, a santri would come and say 'there is corruption of cloth by the lurah of village A'. I would change all the others [in charge of the rationing] in the 14 villages simultaneously. You could call it the 'rotating spoils' system [sistem penyelewengan bergantian]. At least no one could swindle or cheat for too long.64

In Pemalang some attempts were made, both by honest priyayi officials and leaders of the prewar nationalist movement, to alleviate the shortages in the rural areas by forming cooperatives. One of these was KOPI (Koperasi Indonesia), founded by Sarino Mangunpranoto and based on the prewar POMER. It included the town's top priyayi officials, with the Bupati as patron, the public prosecutor as honorary head, and Abdul Mutholib, the head of Muhammadiyah, as business manager. Using the authority of the Bupati, Sarino was able to raise enough capital from

63 Sikasur school teacher, Interview, 6.2.75.
64 Camat of Tonjong, Interview, 19.10.76.
selling shares in KOPI to various lurahs to buy supplies of soap, sugar, cloth, and cooking oil. These were distributed to each lurah according to local needs. KOPI worked smoothly until 1943, when Sarino moved to Pati; after that, it declined, as Mutholib gradually gained the reputation of being Pemalang's biggest swindler.

KOPI's main competitor was the PEKOPE (Penolong Korban Perang, War Victims' Helpers), a cooperative set up by 'non-Co' members of the prewar nationalist movement. Led by Soepangat, Pemalang's senior medical orderly, the organization's membership included several orthodox Muslim leaders. PEKOPE also ran the Fuji restaurant, which was a favourite meeting-place for santri (strict Muslims) and nationalist leaders alike. Comments one prominent santri: 'I have never eaten sate like it, the spices are unrivalled.' The Fuji also housed the Pemalang headquarters of the underground PKI that was based in the inland forestry plantations (which will be described in the next chapter). It was used as an overnight stopping place for leaders of this underground who had escaped kenpeitai sweeps in Jakarta, Solo, and East Java.

Corvée

The Japanese with their many romusha projects turned the Residency of Pekalongan into a giant labour camp. While the rationale for the romushas within Java was 'to promote the self-maintenance policy in the respective regions', the Japanese army assigned a total of 228,000 to work outside Java, but claimed that transport difficulties, that is, the scarcity of ships, prevented the program from being fully implemented. While the extreme undernourishment and inhumane treatment of the romushas sent outside Java is well known, the actual implementation of the romusha projects within the Pekalongan Residency, as well as the attitudes of pergerakan leaders involved, makes the situation more complicated. Just as with the enforcement of rice delivery quotas and the rationing system, its impact varied

65 Miyamoto, Jawa. Cf. Wertheim suggests 300,000 were sent overseas of which only 70,000 returned alive. Indonesian Society, 262.
according to the attitudes of local Pangreh Praja, and those pergerakan leaders who were in charge of the projects.

The Japanese in theory distinguished between two kinds of labour service, the kinro hoshi, literally 'voluntary labour service', and romushas or 'those who are engaged in manual labour'. Kinro hoshi was organised at the kabupaten level and below, while romushas were organised directly by the central military administration. Recruitment and transportation was the responsibility of the local Romu Kyokai or Institute of Labour Affairs, which was run by a former Patih of Pemalang, and member of the Residency Advisory Council, Mas Soemantri Reksoadidjojo. This office had branches in each kabupaten, which divided up the Residency romusha quota through the kabupaten branches of the Romu Kyokai. At the kabupaten level the same process occurred, each kawedanan was allocated a quota. The kinro hoshi mostly seemed to work on military defence projects, and in practice this too was compulsory. The word 'romusha' was generally used for all corvée. Those who were sent outside the Residency were sometimes referred to as kerjantara. While the Chinese escaped having to work on kinro hoshi civil defence projects, in Pemalang the Japanese used members of the local Arab community to construct shore defences. From 20 to 40 people had to work one day a week driving in piles along the beach. They were also sent on foot once or twice a month to the forestry plantations south of Pemalang to stack teak logs. While they got food rations in the form of a portion of rice wrapped up in a banana leaf (nasi ponggol), it was always inadequate and was supplemented by the Arab workers themselves.

As mentioned previously, the azacho also had to provide labour

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66 While labour affairs also included broader labour matters, the most important job of this organisation in Pekalongan was to recruit romushas for projects outside the Residency.

67 Soemantri was also head of the BP3 (Badan Pembantu Prajurit Pekerja - Labouring Soldiers' Relief Organisation) set up by the Japanese to provide money for romushas' families, and which also organised entertainment for romushas within the Residency.

68 Arab leader, Interview, 5/6.2.75.
for such projects. At Silarang south of Pemalang, people were sent to work on an earth wall. The former azacho of Bojongbata recalls:

The azacho had to provide labour, which was sent [to the project] for 10 or 15 days. No one got paid and food rations were inadequate. The azacho and kumicho had to go with the kinro hoshi. The Keibodan (Vigilance Corps) also had to work on this project. Everyone was terribly afraid of the kenpeitai who were referred to as 'tigers' [macan daratan].

In other areas throughout the Residency the people had to construct various defences, including air raid shelters.

Both the Pangreh Praja and the pergerakan were involved in the romusha programme, but in quite different ways. The Pangreh Praja were responsible for finding romushas to work on projects both inside and outside the Residency (according to the quotas set by the local Institute of Labour Affairs). While kinro hoshi were chosen by local azacho or, as in the case of the Arabs working on Pemalang shore defences, organised by their own leaders. These quotas, as recalled some 30 years later by people who were officials at the time, are shown in Table 4. As well as having to fill these quotas, the Pangreh Praja also had to find much larger numbers of romushas to work on projects within the Residency.

Pergerakan leaders were also involved, but in a different way, in the actual implementation of the projects. As part of the general propagandist role that the pergerakan was given by the Japanese, they also had to try and create enthusiasm for things like romusha projects. In this they were expected to play a 'visible' role in leading the projects to places outside the Residency like the Bayah Kozan coal mine in South Banten. The fact that this did not make them unpopular with the people as it did the Pangreh Praja was due to the nature of their different roles. The Pangreh Praja often used empty promises, or sent those least able

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69 Interview, 17.2.75.

70 In Bumijawa for instance people had to dig large holes as wide as a well, but only one meter deep, along the roadside. In ridiculing such projects, the people said 'these "wells" are for sitting in! (sumure keno nggo njagong)'. Interview, 15.2.73.
## TABLE 4
Romusha Levies on Particular Areas in Pekalongan Residency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Sent outside the Residency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangkah (w)</td>
<td>3-5 per village per day</td>
<td>Pangkah nationalist leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangkah (w)</td>
<td>30 per village per fortnight</td>
<td>Pangkah nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes (c)</td>
<td>100 per week</td>
<td>Brebes Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losari (c)</td>
<td>Increased from 25 to 50, to 250 by the end of the occupation</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal (kabupaten)</td>
<td>100 per week</td>
<td>Bupati (Mr Besar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. For projects within the Residency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes and Wanasari (c)</td>
<td>20 each day from each of 43 villages for Pemali river canah</td>
<td>project leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampelgading (c)</td>
<td>300 each day (20 from each of 15 villages) for Comal Baru butanol project</td>
<td>project leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[c = \text{kecamatan} \quad w = \text{kawedanan}\]

**Source:** data from interviews.
to resist (the destitute) to fill their weekly or monthly quotas.  
Pergerakan leaders on the other hand were usually involved on the 'receiving end' of projects within the Residency. In many cases they used the projects to provide food for the poor who had been sent by the village heads. However, with romushas sent outside the Residency Pergerakan leaders did not have the same opportunities to supervise, or manipulate daily food rations. Certainly in the mind of one local Pergerakan leader there was a world of difference between being sent away 'to die' in Banten and working on the huge romusha project that was logging the teak forests in south Pemalang. This was in order to provide fuel for the Comal factory, piles for a Pemalang shore defences project, and more importantly, to provide wood for the Japanese boat building projects in Tegal, Pekalongan and elsewhere on the North Coast.  

As the Ambonese forester, Holle, recalls:

...I explained to the camats that, rather than be sent as romushas to die in Banten, it was better to send them to Sukowati where I was organising wood cutting. I guaranteed that they could eat as much as they wanted in one day, this was the principle...[as] it was from the kenpeitai.  

Being an Ambonese, the Japanese initially treated Holle warily, suspecting him of strong pro-Dutch sympathies. However, because of his local popularity and apparent zeal in organising the large romusha projects, the initial Japanese misgivings changed and the project was

71 After the requisitioning of rice, the next Japanese priority was the building of wooden ships, with which the Japanese wanted to send medicine to New Guinea, and hoped to land on Morotai. In Java, 44,000 Indonesians supervised by 215 Japanese engineers were employed building 150 ships, mostly diesel powered. In 1943 127 were launched but the target for 1944, an ambitious 700, was later modified to 343 ships. 'To this end [i.e., wooden ship-building] teak trees were hewn down lavishly' recalles Miyamoto. Hence the importance of the Pemalang teak forest romusha project in supplying wood for these ships. Miyamoto, Jawa. They were built at docks in Tegal, Pekalongan as well as Pasar Ikan (Jakarta) and Cirebon to the west, in Semarang Juana and Lasem on the north coast and Tanjung Balai Asahan in Sumatra. Sejarah Tentara Nasional Angkatan Laut. Periode Perang Kemerdekaan 1945-1950 (?. 1973), 27, 53.

72 Holle, Transcript, I/3, 24.6.76.
widely praised. Holle was sent extra supplies of cloth, rice and salted fish for his romushas. Not only this but the kenpeitai brought an entire gamelan set to Sukowati, the main forestry station, for the romushas' entertainment. Exploiting the kenpeitai trust to the full, Holle, himself a member of the underground PKI, was able to provide havens for other underground fugitives from kenpeitai razzias elsewhere in Java throughout the Occupation, as we shall see in the next chapter. Several of these fugitives also helped to supervise the romushas. Underlying Holle's position was the apparent belief of the kenpeitai that he was succeeding (berjasa) where others had not, in organising such an important project with labour from the entire coastal area of Pemalang.

In the Pekalongan Residency there were other examples of pergerakan leaders who manipulated the system in order to obtain a better deal for the romushas. In Pangkah kawedanan romushas were conscripted to work on extensions to the Cacaban dam. Apart from the village trouble-makers and petty thieves, most villages sent to the project the very poor and those who were hungry so they would get something to eat.73 The leader of the local Information Service (Senden In) who organised the Pangkah romusha rations was able to obtain a daily ration of 500 grams of rice from the kumiai, of which half could be taken home to their families. When the Japanese Resident came to Pangkah he complained that 'In the whole of Indonesia no-one eats 500 grams a day, it is far too much',74 but with the support of Mr Besar (at that time Bupati of Tegal), the romushas continued to receive the same rations.

In another large project in Brebes, the leaders fed the romushas well by deliberately 'swindling' the rice rations. The project consisted of building a canal two kilometers long and 50 meters wide between the Pemali river and the sea. For this work, each of 43 villages in

73 Pangkah nationalist, Interview, 10.10.72.

74 Pangkah Senden In leader (later KNI chairman and revolutionary Wedana, Transcript, II/22, 27.11.75. The latter was also involved in sending romushas and had a quota to fill from the Tegal Romu Kyokai office.
two kecamatan (Brebes and Wanasari) had to send 20 people each day. A leader of the project recalls:

From a total of 860 people who were supposed to turn up only about 25 per cent stayed the whole day. Most were in such a bad physical condition that they could not work long hours. Each romusha got a quota of 3 ounces [300 grams] per person per day, for which they had to pay 3 cents. Wages per day varied from 5 to 25 cents. Every morning I would write up on the board how many romushas came from each village. Some stayed the night from distant villages (e.g., 20 kilometers away). Seldom did any village send its full quota of 20, some would send half, others further away 5 or even 3. Krasak [my village] often didn't send anyone! The group leader [hancho] who was always one of the village officials came and collected rice for his full quota of 20 romushas (which was divided amongst those who had come). Those chosen to be sent were usually old people. We were able to give each group its full quota of rice each day regardless of how many actually turned up, because our overseer, the irrigation inspector, always told the Japanese that the romusha numbers were correct.... So he was safe during the revolution and was guarded by the pemudas.75

In contrast was a project to build an overflow channel from the same river. Here, partly as a result of pressure from the Bupati (Sarimin) there was a public kitchen; this was more 'efficient' as the full daily quota of romushas was not reduced by some people having to cook. However, the lurah who was supervising the cooking was sometimes dishonest and would give only half rations to the romushas. During the revolusi sosial period he was attacked by former romusha coolies' recalls the romusha leader.76

Conditions under which romushas worked in the converted sugar mills were probably more typical. Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) members also had to work at the Kemanglen mill in Slawi, and their rations were mixed with sand. In the nearby mill of

75 Interview, 5.12.75.

76 Ibid. The phrase revolusi sosial is used today to describe the period of upheaval during October and November 1945, when the entire bureaucratic elite of the three kabupaten of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang were replaced. See Chapter Five.
Dukuhwringin romushas were making soya sauce (kecap), waterproof rubber food containers (pelembungan makan) and midget submarines. They had to prepare hot sulphur to harden the containers and cook the soyabean in huge vats formerly used for sugar making. The romushas wore clothes made from sacking and were not even paid 'half a cent' (sepesor tidak) to work from 7 a.m. until 5 p.m. Sent from as far away as Surabaya, they had to do all the heavy lifting. Turning one submarine 10 meters in length (with a single torpedo 72 centimeters in diameter) during welding needed 40 to 50 people. 77

In contrast to the romushas was the treatment of the teams of skilled workers from all over Java. 78 The Japanese once held a competition to see which team could build a submarine in the quickest time. A former member of one of these teams recalls:

There was a prize for any 14-man team which could finish a submarine in 7 days. We [the team] got 20 litres [one belik] of dried shrimps, one kilogram of dried meat [abon] and 3 kilograms of peanuts. These submarines usually took one team 10 days to build. 79

The ordinary romushas on the other hand received no additional food for the extra work. 80

Pekalongan Residency's two leading Sukarnoist nationalists were also involved in taking romushas to projects outside the Residency to the Bayah Kozan coal mine in South Banten. Kartohargo, the Brebes leader, took 300 'voluntary' romushas to work in the coal mine

77 The submarines also had eight-cylinder petrol engines made and fitted at the Slawi factory, but the propellers and torpedoes were made elsewhere. The submarines, which could submerge for short periods, were just high enough for the 'suicide' (jibaku) pilot to stand up. Romusha project worker, Interview, 26.11.75.

78 Apart from the 100 or so skilled workers from Tegal, there were 100 each from Surabaya (as well as the ordinary romushas), the Madukusmo sugar factory south of Yogyakarta, and from Ceper near Solo.

79 Interview, 26.11.75.

80 Their daily ration, by comparison, was a portion of rice cassava and corn wrapped up in a banana leaf.
for six months - 'I was following Bung Karno's example', he recalled
without pride or shame, 'one [romusha] got sick and died at Bayah,
and one died in the train. The Japanese firm gave us enough food
while we were there.'

Kromo Lawi, the veteran Pekalongan Sukarnoist, as head of
Pekalongan Residency PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat Concentration of
the People's Power) was involved early in the Occupation in sending
romushas to the South Banten area. Kromo Lawi always went to visit the
Pekalongan romushas in Banten, and as head of PUTERA considered that
he had enough authority with the Japanese to ensure his romushas were
treated reasonably. Also, by rotating the Pekalongan romushas every
fortnight, no group had to stay too long. The important point is
that the romushas these leaders took to South Banten came back safely.

The Comal Baru sugar mill, like the Slawi mill, was closed
down. Then it was converted to making an alcohol called butanol from
ground nut roughage, which the Japanese said they were going to use as
fuel for aeroplanes. In Ampelgading kecamatan where the old mill
was located, people were coerced into working on the project by the
lurahs with the threat of being sent away as romushas outside the
Residency. Each of the 15 villages in the kecamatan had to send between
20 and 30 each day. The romushas were paid 31 cents a day and occasionally gi-

81 Kartohargo, Interview, 16.12.72. According to Tan Malaka, the
so-called 'voluntary' romushas (romusha sukarela) from Pekalongan
and Kedu, were Seinendan members. Tan Malaka, Dari Pendjara
ke Penjara, Part II (Yogyakarta, n.d.), 157. Tan Malaka, who gives
a detailed picture of conditions in south Banten coal mines, where
over 15,000 romushas were working, says that between 400-500
romushas died each month from disease and malnutrition. Ibid,
159-60.

82 Kromo Lawi, Transcript, I/7-8, 29.5.73.

83 Ota says the ship which was bringing the necessary machinery to be
installed in the Comal factory was sunk on its way to Java,
'making the production of butanol impossible'. Answers.
Butanol has the chemical formula C₄H₉OH.
a packet of Kooa cigarettes. The factory provided one meal. What happened if a lurah failed to fill his daily romusha quota?

Later the Camat would call up the lurah, he would get angry: 'If you don't produce the romusha quota tomorrow, look out! I will report you to the kenpeitai.'

In many cases, the lurahs sent the poor and destitute away. It was they who were more easily attracted by promises of money. The noji padi of Ambowetan recalls that officials sent the romushas, mostly gelandangan (destitute) from his village, off to Pekalongan with 'one or two sweet words like "soon you will be given work with a wage that is rather high compared with life here now"'. They were received in Pekalongan by the Labour Institute officials and given 10 or 20 rupiah for out-of-pocket expenses for the journey.

While the lurahs had no alternative but to find the numbers required because of pressure from the camats or the kenpeitai, officials 'higher up' in the government bureaucracy sometimes found ways of filling quotas which reduced the impact of the program in a particular area. The Camat of Brebes lived right beside the Semarang-Cirebon railway, and filled his quota in another way:

The romusha quota for each kecamatan varied, some had 50 or 100 or 150 or 200 [per week]. I had a quota of 100. Ninety of these came from runaways. The train would stop in front of my house, taking romushas from Semarang. The Japanese guards would be asleep and they would escape. I would re-register them as my romushas, thus filling my quota.

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84 The official price of a packet of 20 Kooa cigarettes earlier in the occupation was $1.25. The price did not reflect their real value as by 1944, 'cigarettes are available only for Japanese civilians and military, and not even for Indonesian officials, who are supposed to smoke native maize leaf cigarettes.' Weekly Intelligence Summary No.75, 16 June 1944, in N.I. Intelligence.

85 Ampelgading Seinendan leader, Transcript, II/17, 8.11.75.

86 Ambowetan noji padi, Interview, 6.11.75.

87 Camat of Brebes, Interview, 1.12.72.
The Bupati of Tegal (Mr Besar) had to find 100 romushas a week. He deliberately found old people, and 80 per cent or so were usually rejected.

Probably the most notorious romusha raiser in the Brebes kabupaten was the Wedana of Tanjung. According to a colleague, who was Camat of neighbouring Losari at the time:

Pak\(^{88}\) Slamet [the Wedana] would find romushas by merely intercepting those coming back from Banten; they would be seized and put in a warehouse...
Tanjung had a very good name with the Japanese as an area which sent many romushas to Banten...but the people could not be deceived.\(^{89}\)

The above examples suggest that romusha conditions varied widely between projects, even within the Residency itself. While rice rations could be manipulated by local leaders to the advantage of romushas, all projects were potentially destructive given the bad state of health of the population and the distances that had to be travelled to and from project sites. Most villages apparently sent the worst off, the hungry and unemployed.\(^{90}\) Whether the manipulation of cloth and rice rations by pergerakan leaders involved in these projects was unique to Pekalongan is difficult to say without being able to compare similar projects in other Residencies. Holle's relationship with the kenpeitai in Pemalang was certainly unique. Perhaps local Sukarnoist leaders' perceptions of the romusha programmes outside the Residency changed when they began to discover in 1945 that people elsewhere in Java did not come back and died on the job.\(^{91}\)

\(^{88}\) Pak, an abbreviation for bapak, meaning literally father; in this case a respectful address form for an older person.

\(^{89}\) Transcript, I/12, 22.5.73.

\(^{90}\) In fact one of the few places where poor people could get rice to eat at all in Pekalongan Residency later in the Occupation were the romusha projects as we shall see shortly.

\(^{91}\) If this was so, one would expect that today leaders like Kromo Lawi and Kartohargo would have felt they had to justify their involvement in taking romushas to South Banten, but this is not the case.
Except in a few instances (such as the Wedana of Tanjung, who was kidnapped by the pemudas in October 1945), however, the Pangreh Praja were not hated primarily as romusha raisers. Rather, it was their role as rice requisitioners, and the personal enrichment from corruption, particularly over cloth rations, that people resented most strongly then (and still remember today).

Economic Distress and Disillusionment

The real magnitude of rice requisitioning in the Residency of Pekalongan which caused such incredible hardship, especially towards the end of the Occupation through its impact on rice consumption, is best understood by Table 5.

**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Production</th>
<th>Estimated Population</th>
<th>Amount to be Requisitioned</th>
<th>Rice Remaining</th>
<th>Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>143,884 tons</td>
<td>3,180,557</td>
<td>80,000 tons from central govt. (say 30,000 tons)</td>
<td>increased to 100,000 tons by Residency</td>
<td>63 grams per person per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63 grams per person per day

The production figure is calculated by assuming that Pekalongan Residency's production of rice between 1938-44 increased at the same rate as the all-Java production (which increased by 6.8 per cent from 3,933,050 tons to 4,200,000 tons). Pekalongan's population for 1944 is based on the 1930 census, assuming that the all-Java exponential growth is the same as the all-Java production.

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92 Department of Economic Affairs, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia 1941* (Batavia, 1947), Table 55, 37.

93 Miyamoto, *Jawa* (see fn.18).
rate between 1930-61\(^{94}\) of 1.33 per cent can be applied to Pekalongan for the 14 years 1930-44.

As we have seen, the central government and the Pekalongan Residency authorities between them were supposed to requisition a total of 100,000 tons of rice. Only about 19 tons of this would have been distributed to the 70-80 Japanese military and civilian personnel in the Residency.\(^{95}\) There were rations for various groups such as Pekalongan's two PETA battalions and the romusha projects. As we have seen, Pekalongan Residency officials were supposed to have the highest rations anywhere in Java, and there were big 'losses' through corruption. Some of the requisitioned rice was probably used in the huge military stockpiles the Japanese were setting up all over Java, in anticipation of a prolonged guerilla-type struggle.

Assuming that peasants themselves were able to hold back as much as one third of the Residency delivery quota, say 30,000 tons (even giving the difficulties in hiding large amounts of rice as only so much could presumably be buried or hidden, either as paddy or hulled rice, in roof rafters), there was still a pitiful amount to go around - about 73,000 tons for three million people, or 63 grams per person per day.\(^{96}\) The supply problem was exacerbated by a distribution problem, the prohibition, as part of the self-maintenance policy, of trade in rice between Residencies so the deficit could not

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\(^{94}\) There was no census between these years.

\(^{95}\) Ota, Answers, gives the figure for the Japanese population. Assuming a ration of 650 grams per person per day, the Pekalongan Residency Japanese population would need that amount of rice.

\(^{96}\) Using Miyamoto's figure for Java's rice production (fn.18), less the total amount requisitioned (fn.23), and using the same method to calculate Java's population at 50.24 million in 1944, the all-Java average rice consumption is 142 grams per person per day, more than twice the Pekalongan Residency figure. On the Javanese estimate that 'adequate' rice consumption per day should be about 400 grams (Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', 91, fn.19), the Pekalongan Residency population in 1944 would have needed 464,260 tons, more than six times the estimated amount left after requisitioning in 1944. It is the magnitudes that are important in these calculations, not actual figures.
be made up from surplus areas elsewhere. The 1944 situation was made even worse - if that was possible - by the extremely long hot dry season and late arrival of the east monsoon rains, causing harvest yields to be far below expectations.

What then did the people eat instead of rice?

Here it is important to point out that, in general, the lot of villagers in Pekalongan Residency was worse than that of townspeople, at least until the last year of the Occupation. This may seem paradoxical. Surely the wet rice system was still a buffer for those who controlled land and harvest and were in a position to withhold rice from requisitioning? While this may have been so for a tiny minority of rich peasants, for the smaller middle peasants owning one bau or less, the amount of rice that could have been withheld and hidden could not have lasted more than a couple of months after the harvest. Conditions in the villages during the second half of the Occupation were so bad that people had to fall back on rice substitutes traditionally only eaten in times of famine. What cassava there was had to be made into a porridge (bubur bolit), but many people were forced to eat the root of a kind of taro (badur) which first had to be sliced and soaked in brine to remove the poisonous sap, and the

97 Miyamoto, commenting on this prohibition, says that 'It appeared considerably oppressive in the eyes of the population'. Answers.

98 In Vietnam, where the Japanese rice requisitioning policies were similar, David Marr notes that by 1943 'even landlords without appropriate connections sometimes found themselves going hungry after being forced to sell a specified portion to the government' (see forthcoming article, 'Assessing the Significance of World War II on the Vietnamese Revolution'). van der Plas, writing from intelligence reports on the situation in Java in early 1944, says 'the Japanese are buying up the rice crops leaving 3 months food for the farmers'. van der Plas also says that outside of the rationing system 'no other rice is available'. 'Situation in the Netherlands Indies', 19 February 1944. N.I. Intelligence.

99 Bolit or bodin and puung (prohounced puhung) were local names for cassava.

100 In at least one area, Moga kecamatan, there was an official appointed by the Japanese to supervise the planting of badur, also known as walur or walui. W.J.S. Poerwadarminta, Baoesastra Djawa (Jakarta, 1939), 24, 654.
stalks of another tuberous plant (ubi keladi). Banana root nodules were also boiled up for food, as were the leaves of a tree palm (bulung) used for roof thatching, that were normally fed to ducks.

The Japanese-sponsored women's organisation, the Fujinkai, frequently held demonstrations to encourage the spread of new recipes, using ingredients that had not been commonly used during the Dutch time, but which were considered by the Japanese to have some nutritional value. They demonstrated how to cook snails (bekicot), 'Asia Bread' (roti Asia), which was a black concoction made from palm sugar and katul, and 'Struggle Porridge' (Bubur Perjuangan) which seems to have consisted of sweet potato, cassava and katul. 'It was like eating chicken feed', recalls a Pemalang nationalist leader, 'I wanted to vomit'.

In short 'the people were amazed if they saw rice', recalls a former Seinendan leader, 'hunger oedema and lice were everywhere'. Hunger oedema was so bad in Margasari kecamatan, that the wife of the Camat recalls that there were 'flies settling on the [people's] bones, which were no longer covered with skin.' The chronic malnutrition in the rural areas also produced trachoma and scabies (gudik), while even the plague (eradicated by the Dutch) reappeared in the Pangkah area. As we have seen, people's teeth were ruined by the adulterated rice rations.

In the towns, people could still get cloth until the last months of the Occupation. First, cloth used for wrapping the dead for burial (kain kafan), then gunny sacking and even sarongs of rubber had begun to be worn much earlier in many rural areas throughout the Residency. The sacking was full of lice and the coarse rubber sarongs, painted to look like a kind of woven textile (palekat), stuck to the body when hot, and easily tore. Cloth was so scarce that even head-scarves were made into shorts, and mattress covers into women's sarongs.

101 Katul is the brown skin of unpolished rice, rich in vitamin B₁.
102 Mrs Soelaiman (now head of the Indonesian Archaeological Service), Interview, 22.2.73.
When these ran out, people made their own 'cloth' substitutes from a kind of yarn (waring) extracted from a fibrous leaf, \footnote{Poerwadarminta, op.cit., 657.} from the bark of the pulutan tree as well as other fibrous barks (klotokan kayu). Rats were such a problem that one camat made a prize of a pair of gunny sacking shorts for every 15 rats tails presented to him.

Fuel was also in short supply. What kerosene there was was too thick to burn in lamps. Instead, people used home made wicks in a saucer of kerosene oil, a process which filled the house with soot. 'You could rub your nose and soot would come off', they say. There were no matches or cigarette lighter flints; instead, various coconut tree fibres which would burn for hours were used.

Even in the last year of the Occupation, when rice rations to ordinary townspeople were decreasing in quantity and frequency, the towns still had electricity, schools and cars, while rural people, dependent for transport on the bicycle, had to ride to market with solid rubber tyres (ban mati). A majority of the Western-educated elite of the Residency lived in the towns, and it was this group whose support the Japanese considered important, while the word genjumin, meaning 'native', conjured up their view of villagers as people who did not really matter.

According to a Seinendan leader of Ampelgading kecamatan on Pemalang's northwestern border, from about the middle of the Occupation, people in his area were dying of hunger in rubbish heaps looking for food, and were buried unidentified in the villages nearest to where they died. A leader of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor, writing about similar conditions in the middle of 1945, recalls some 30 years later:

\begin{quote}
Every day living corpses could be seen walking about. Living corpses laden with lice which decorated their clothes, that were in rags, or made from sacking, plant or bark gum. Human corpses were everywhere, in the shelter pits, under bridges, in the Chinese graveyards; there were corpses lying full length where rubbish was thrown away.\footnote{Marsum, 'Ceritaku. Percikan Peristiwa Bersejarah disekitar Hari Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Daerah Tegal dan Sekitarnya', TS, November 1974 (subsequented cited as 'Ceritaku').} 
\end{quote}
In the words of the same observer, the Pangreh Praja seemed to 'remain unmoved and showed no reaction, they never talked about the people's fate'.

The deteriorating relations between the people and lower level officials can be seen from the complaints of hardship received by the Public Welfare Section of PUTERA, which Hatta, in his first Report, suggested '...can be likened to a barometer for measuring the conditions among the people and their general circumstances.' As well as complaints about the burdensome regulations concerning the sale and harvest of rice, and harsh methods of taxation, there were pointed complaints about '...the attitude of the lower-ranking Pangreh Praja towards the people, which is now as bad or worse than it was under the Dutch'. In a second Report in March 1944, Hatta devotes a whole section to problems concerning the Pangreh Praja and the police. These include difficulties with the transportation and marketing of rice, unheeded requests for irrigation water and 'problems of detention, looting and arrest or beating by the police and Pangreh Praja'. Also mentioned is the gathering of village dues and contributions by lower-ranking Pangreh Praja in various districts, 'and...requests for protection from constant harassment by lower-ranking Pangreh Praja'.

Peasant Resistance

As in other parts of Java, in the Pekalongan Residency the Japanese rice requisitioning policies met with a number of protests, as well as passive resistance in the form of refusal to deliver paddy quotas. It was the rice requisitioning policies that peasants

105 Ibid.
107 Ibid, 56.
108 Ibid, 102, 104. Thirty-nine complaints involving police or Pangreh Praja are listed.
covertly and overtly resisted most strongly because they swept away what little security and stability of subsistence income the peasant had left. Being left with so little rice the peasant's guarantee of subsistence was now severely threatened, if indeed he was not forced below subsistence crisis levels. Furthermore, neither the Pangreh Praja nor the village officials could any longer perform their protective role, but in the peasant's eyes they were responsible for the threatening subsistence crisis. Significantly, the peasant uprisings near Tasikmalaya and Indramayu in February and May 1944 were both led by kyais and supported by peasants who 'opposed the excessive forced deliveries of rice'.

In the coastal kawedanan of Comal, rice deliveries had become so burdensome that, by mid-1943, the subsistence crisis level must have been reached. The Seinendan leader recalls:

...the people of Ampelgading at that time were suffering from hunger because there was nothing left for them to eat...all the paddy had been taken away by the Japanese.

The official most obviously responsible for this, the overzealous Camat of Ampelgading, Raden Bambang Basiroen was himself entering houses and climbing roof rafters to look for hidden paddy. Furthermore, he had a reputation for copying his Japanese superiors in using physical violence on people. During air raid practice (koshu) when all lamps had to be immediately extinguished at the sound of a siren, those who were late got slapped across the face.

About midday on one Friday kliwon towards the middle of 1943, a peasant (who had not delivered his paddy quota) returned from working in his sawah to find the Camat and three assistants (the Lurah, 

110 Miyamoto, Jawa.
111 Transcript, II/13.
112 That is how the Seinendan leader remembered the date. Kliwon is one of the five days of the Javanese week.
village secretary and a village policeman) searching his house. An argument broke out; one of the assistants hit the peasant, upon which the latter ran and called for help. A large crowd shouting in Japanese 'Atsumare! Atsumare!' (Gather! Assemble!) quickly gathered, and not long afterwards Basiroen was mobbed and killed with bamboo spears, while his three assistants were chased by the crowd, but escaped. Some time later the Wedana of Comal arrived at the scene, and told the Seinendan leader who was accompanying him to give out Kooa cigarettes to the crowd who were still shouting 'Atsumare!' After the Seinendan leader, shaking with fear, had tried to calm the crowd, the Wedana got up and said 'Don't be afraid, I will see that everything is taken care of'. What this meant was not clear, until about half an hour later when several truckloads of Japanese military arrived and began taking people back to Pekalongan. Over the next fortnight hundreds more arrests were made throughout the kecamatan, while the Japanese never found 'the leaders' they were looking for. Everyone 'confessed' to the killing of the Camat, even those who had nothing to do with the incident.

About a year and a half later, in neighbouring Petarukan kecamatan, a prominent religious leader, Haji Dulgani, began a protest against compulsory rice deliveries by refusing to deliver paddy to the kalurahan of Kendaldoyang. Not only that, but he urged the people to take their harvested paddy home rather than to the kalurahan collection centre. On hearing that H. Dulgani and a group of villagers had gone to harvest their paddy without first reporting it, the Lurah hastily ordered one of the village police to the rice fields to stop the harvest. When no one took any notice the official retreated and reported to the Lurah, Taryo by name, who then went to the rice fields.

113 The Javanese is 'Aku arep beresi sampeyan kabe'.

114 The above account is from interviews with Mochtar (later Governor of Central Java) who was promoted to Wedana of Comal after the 'uprising'; Soedjono, Pekalongan kabupaten secretary at the time (who attended the Camat's funeral), and Soepardjo, Ampelgading Seinendan leader.

115 In Kendaldoyang village, the people could not harvest their own paddy without reporting it first to the Lurah or village officials.
He found some of the harvested paddy had already been carried off, while about 60 people were still harvesting or taking their paddy home. H. Dulgani challenged Taryo's order to take the paddy to the village meeting place (balai desa) and an argument started which ended in a fight. Taryo was beaten and thrown into the sawah, emerging soaking wet and covered in mud. A search by the kenpeitai failed to find H. Dulgani, who was hidden by various villages in the area for the remaining months of the occupation.116

The third incident involving peasant resistance to paddy deliveries occurred in Jejeg, a hill village in Bumijawa District, on Tegal's southern border.117 Peasants, led by a village school teacher, refused to deliver their rice to the noji padi in Bumijawa. The kenpeitai arrested a number of peasants, and the school teacher died later in Tegal jail as a result of kenpeitai torture.118

JAPANESE leaders in the Pekalongan Residence, as elsewhere, saw the need 'to eliminate old establishment groups which had been cooperating with the Dutch during the colonial period on the one hand, and support new forces, i.e., the nationalists and the Muslims'.119 This is reflected in the attempt to create an 'official' leadership by the establishment of Residency Advisory Councils (Shu Sangikai). Of the 12 members of the Pekalongan Council (half of whom were appointed), three were top Pangreh Praja, three were nationalists and five were from the Muslim group.120 While the Barisan Pelopor leadership was

116 One of H. Dulgani's hiding places, recalled today, was the candi or sacred grave of Sigeseng, a well-known meeting place for silat (self-defence) fraternities involving local lenggaongs. On the importance of these graves see Chapter Seven.

117 Until the redistribution of administrative boundaries in 1930, Jejeg was a separate kecamatan.

118 Muh Nuh, 1959 answers to questions from Sejarah Militer Kodam VII, Semarang (subsequently cited as SEMDAM).

119 Ota, Answers.

120 See Appendix B for membership.
evenly divided between the Muslims and nationalists at the Residency level, the majority of the leadership at the kacamatan level and below in Tegal kabupaten were santris. In Pekalongan Kromo Lawi, using the legal front of PUTERA of which he was chairman, as well as his status as member of the Advisory Council, ran political courses and held meetings of PUTERA. In rural areas these were arranged by local camats, to whom Kromo Lawi referred as 'pawns of the colonial government'. Although formally headed by priyayi officials, the day-to-day running of both the BP3 and BP2 (Badan Pembantu Prajurit - Soldiers' Relief Organisation) was in the hands of nationalists - in the case of the BP2 Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI Baru leader.

The nationalist and Islamic counter-elites were not compromised

121 Leaders at Residency level were Kromo Lawi, K.H. Mohamad Iljas (NU), Soedjono (Pekalongan kabupaten secretary) and Ki Partohadisoetjipto, the Taman Siswa leader. Djawa Baroe, II, 20, 29.

122 The Tegal Barisan Pelopor or Suisintai leader (daitaicho) was K.H. Fachruri a well-known orthodox Muslim, while all but one of the five kawedanan level leaders (chutaicho) were Muslims. Of the 19 kecamatan leaders (shotaicho), 13 were Muslims. K.H. Fachruri was to become Wedana of Slawi during the Tiga Daerah, while two of the shotaicho and one fuku shotaicho (deputy leader) became camats. In the kabupaten leadership there were only three active nationalists, one of whom (one of the Residency's few supporters of Tan Malaka) was only appointed fuku daitaicho after the Tegal Muhammadiah leader, Slamet, refused the position. In contrast the radical nationalists were in a strong position in Tegal City Suisintai leadership. The Tegal city fuku daitaicho was a Partindo-Gerindo leader from Madiun, and two of the five chutaicho in the city were ex-Digul.

123 According to a nationalist in Pekalongan at the time, who accompanied Kromo Lawi to many PUTERA meetings, 'local camat were scared...they treated us as if we were Japanese'. Kromo Lawi and his nationalist friends encouraged people at these meetings to express their feelings about the Pangreh Praja and the Japanese. Sarli, Interview, 16.10.76.

124 While Soemantri Reksoadidjojo headed the BP3, Sarli ran the office. Soeprapto, the Pekalongan judge, was BP2 chairman, and Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo from Tegal, a close associate of Hatta's, ran the BP2 office, which organised rations and entertainment for PETA and Heiho.
by working for the Japanese. In fact it was just the opposite. The conflict with the Pangreh Praja worsened as the Occupation progressed, because of the magnitude of both rice rationing and the corruption. The important thing was that the counter-elites were not involved in these harsh policies and were free from the taint of corruption. It was this that distinguished them in the people's eyes, not the fact that they were 'coopted' to work for the Japanese. The people did not feel betrayed because nationalists organised romusha projects in the Residency or led them to Banten. It was simply not considered as bad. The peasantry, on the other hand, felt betrayed by the Pangreh Praja in Pekalongan Residency, where the Occupation was more oppressive than in other parts of Java. Corruption was so widespread that rice delivery quotas had to be increased - the only place this practice was reported as occurring. Officials as a result got extra rice, the highest ration in Java. In Pekalongan the collection centre for delivery quotas was the kalurahan. This and the crucial role of the lurah in the requisitioning of rice sealed the fate of many village heads in October 1945. While the Japanese Resident and Assistant Resident were both educated, enlightened men, Horizumi, the powerful kaizaibucho (Head of the Economic Affairs Department), was something of a tyrant whose strict enforcement of the prohibition on trade in rice and cloth between regions (and even kecamatans) caused great hardship. The Brebes rice surplus which normally fed Tegal's population was expropriated. Tegal kabupaten, where only two out of nine kecamatans had surplus paddy, could not import rice and rations were pitifully small. Also the practice of hulling rice in villages rather than by the mills during the last six months of the Occupation lessened the suffering in Brebes where population pressure was not as severe as in Tegal. In Belik kawedanan (South Pemalang) the method of determining rice requisitions based on tax payments would have been particularly onerous if the Wedana had not protested. Such protests were seldom heard from officials. The burden

125 This is why in Pekalongan Residency there was no '...sense of betrayal among pemuda members of the political elite...', especially over Sukarno's support for recruiting romushas. See A.J.S. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution (Melbourne, 1974), 16 (subsequently cited as National Revolution).
of the compulsory rice deliveries was exacerbated by house searches by camats and wedanas in some areas.

By the end of the Occupation relations between the Pangreh Praja and the people had been damaged irreparably. They had lost the support and sympathy of the pergerakan. The Pemalang kabupaten doctor, Dr Moerjawan, wrote in 1946 that the dishonesty of officials in the distribution system was a 'public secret' at the time, and that the people had strong 'feelings of revenge' towards the Pangreh Praja. Recalling a conversation with a patient, the driver of a dokar about these injustices, Dr Moerjawan wrote 'the dokar driver and the other little people felt they were being exploited by the upper classes, and they were sure that they would take revenge in the future'.

LOCAL-LEVEL Communist opposition and resistance in Java during the Japanese occupation has until now been seriously underestimated. Both Indonesian and Western writers have doubted whether, in fact, an underground PKI ever even existed. If it did, their view is that it was rendered inactive after the arrest of Amir Sjarifuddin, and others. Thus Gatot Mangkupradja, writing of his relations with the Japanese, says:

I doubt that during the period of Japanese rule in Indonesia a real underground organisation existed. If such a movement had actually taken place, surely in twenty years of our independence someone would have written its history, and he would have certainly mentioned the names of its prime movers and the results of their efforts. But until now no-one at all has written about such an organisation.¹

Western writers more or less agree with this view. Anderson describes the PKI during the occupation as a 'tenuous organisation' and accepts the view that this 'planned underground' disintegrated after Amir Sjarifuddin's arrest, after which 'a period seems to have ensued in which little or no underground activities at all took place'.² Even the historian of the PKI, Mortimer writes that '... there was no significant communist underground during the Japanese occupation', and makes this a major reason why communism failed to capture the nationalist struggle.³

¹ Gatot Mangkupradja, 'The PETA and My Relations with the Japanese', Indonesia, 5 (April 1968), 125.
Two Indonesian sources on the anti-fascist underground are a booklet published in Yogyakarta in 1948 by former participants, and Sidik Kertapati's later study of the Japanese occupation and early revolution. Although written twenty years after the events by someone who was not a participant, this account of the Leftist underground is the fullest to date, although the underground PKI's leading role is not made clear.

Briefly the underground PKI in Pekalongan Residency had its origins in the so called 'illegal' PKI founded on the impetus of Musso's clandestine visit to Surabaya in late 1935-early 1936. Musso, with his close connections with the Communist International, brought with him the Dimitrov line which was to build a united democratic front to fight fascism. Before Musso had arrived, older activists from the 1926 period were circulating communist writings disguised as advertisements for various products such as Kalzan, a calcium preparation for children, and bedak Birol, a face powder. In the middle of these advertisements were communist

4 Dokumentasi Pemuda Sekitar Proklamasi Indonesia Merdeka (Pusat SBPI, 1948) is based on notes left by Aidit, Lagiono, Mustapha and Wikana (Anderson, Pemuda Revolution, 139, fn.58). Wikana was the underground PKI CK (Comite Kota, City Committee) leader in Jakarta before and during the Occupation. This source however is selective, written as it was at the time of the kidnapping of many former underground members and the execution of their leader Widarta. As the history of the Java-wide underground PKI during the Japanese occupation and early revolution will be the subject of a separate study, its activities are only mentioned briefly in the following pages by way of background.


6 Jacques Leclerc, 'La Condition du Parti: Révolutionnaires Indonésiens à la Recherche d'un Identité (1928-1948)', Cultures et Development, Vol.X-I, 1978, 6, fn.4. While this is the fullest account to date on the PKI during this period, there is hardly any mention of its activities during the Japanese occupation.
With the Dutch arrests of 1936 including the underground PKI leader Djokosudjono activities were curtailed, although some attempts at cadre-forming continued. After the formation of a Surabaya branch of GERINDO as a legal front by underground PKI leaders in 1937, activities became much more concrete. Pamoedji, now underground PKI leader and treasurer of GERINDO in Surabaya, founded and ran the party propaganda organ *Menara Merah* (Red Tower) which contained articles on Marxism and the international situation. Besides *Menara Merah* there was also a stencilled party bulletin which contained local news. *Menara Merah* was pocket-sized and had different covers advertising, for example, sewing courses or cooking recipes, like *Kalzan* and *Birol*, before it. However, while the earlier propaganda was directed towards the general population, the *Menara Merah* circulation was restricted to members and cadres of the underground PKI. CKs set up in many East Java towns as well as Semarang, Bandung and Jakarta, concentrated on cadre-forming in unions, especially among workers in the BPM refineries in Cepu and other places in East Java, as well as in the railways. The eighth issue of the paper, written in Dutch at the end of 1941, analysed the critical international situation and once again urged the colonial government to form a militia and arm the people against fascism. The issue was sent to the Procurator-General, and reportedly caused a great stir.

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7 M.v.O. J.C. de Vos, Governor of Central Java, November 1933- August 1937, Mailr. 1007/37; former GERINDO activist and West Java CD (Comite Daerah, Regional Committee) leader, who was Widarta's deputy, Interview, 4.7.78 (subsequently cited as West Java CD); Sarli, Interview, 28.8.76. According to one account, Musso himself used the pseudonym 'Kalzan' while in Surabaya.

8 Kertapati, Sekitar, 5, emphasised the importance of the paper during this period in building the united anti-Fascist front in East Java centres.

9 Pamoedji's Dutch was good as he was a graduate of Purwokerto Teachers' School (Kweekschool). West Java CD Interview, 5.7.78.

10 Ibid.
Before the Japanese invasion of Java, money GERINDO received from the Dutch was used by its treasurer, Pamoedji, to print a resolution opposing all trade with the Japanese.\textsuperscript{11} As the Japanese bombed Surabaya underground PKI leaders were preparing to leave the city, taking with them tin trunks packed with broadsheets written half in Dutch, half in Indonesian, urging people to fight the Japanese 'fascist' invaders.\textsuperscript{12}

The manifesto caused a major split at the time between the Surabaya leadership group and the Semarang CK.\textsuperscript{13} Meanwhile, East Java sugar mill workers sabotaged laboratories, supplies of chemicals and foodstuffs, so that when the Japanese arrived these installations were virtually useless.\textsuperscript{14}

Largely because the money the Dutch gave Amir Sjarifuddin and others for the underground was in the form of a cheque rather than cash, the Japanese were readily able to trace it.\textsuperscript{15} With their rapidly expanding system of spies and informers, the Japanese began arresting GERINDO and underground PKI leaders as early as April 1942 in Solo, Surabaya and the rest of East Java. Pamoedji, arrested in this way on information from a fellow Surabaya GERINDO member, died as a result of torture in December 1942 in a Surabaya prison.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{11} Specifically the Surabaya GERINDO resolution opposed the selling of scrap iron and oil to the Japanese, and arms trading.

\textsuperscript{12} Sukisman, Interview, 7.6.78. West Java CD Interview, 5.7.78. The booklet Dokumentasi Pemuda, 44, also mentions this broadsheet and the effect it had on the Japanese.

\textsuperscript{13} The Semarang CK, led by S.K. Trimurti and her husband Sajuti Melik, opposed the contents of the broadsheet (urging the people to fight fascism), instead following a line of cooperation with the Japanese. From then on Sajuti Melik was considered by the underground PKI to be in Tan Malaka's group. Melik in an interview many years afterwards said he could not agree with the underground PKI propaganda in early 1942, because the pamphlet had urged the people 'to kill the Japanese' (Berita Buana, 13 January 1977). The underground PKI later claimed Melik had accompanied the Japanese on house searches of suspects in Semarang. Whatever the reason, Melik himself was imprisoned by the Japanese in Ambarawa later in the war, with other leftists.

\textsuperscript{14} West Java CD, Interview, 5.7.78.

\textsuperscript{15} See the evidence of van der Plas in the \textit{Enquête-commissie}, Vol.II, 1353.

\textsuperscript{16} Penghela Rakyat, 8 February 1946.
Other leaders were sentenced to death and hanged early in 1944, except for Amir Sjarifuddin, whose sentence was changed to life imprisonment. The situation at that time was described later (in 1948) as follows:

Nearly all the [party] branches in East Java were destroyed, cadres were caught and the cruelty [i.e. torture] continued, until it reached Central Java and part of West Java. The revolutionaries had lost almost all their cadres. However, working efficiently, the second generation quickly took the place of those who had been crushed. The movement of cadres from place to place was begun, for example from East Java to Central or West Java and back, so quickly [that] the underground movement was able to build up its strength again.18

The rebuilding of the underground (about which so little has been told) reflected the skill of the so-called 'second generation' led by Widarta, to whom Pameedji handed over the leadership of the PKI, before his arrest while in hiding near Purwokerto,19 and the remaining members of the Surabaya GERINDO leadership. In reorganising the underground PKI in early 1943, the new leaders continued the United Front strategy.

The propaganda campaign was continued via the *Menara Merah*, now under the direct control of Widarta, with a printing run of about 1,000 copies. The size of the CD and CK was reduced to one man each, while contact with other likely anti-fascist groups was made. Some sabotage was attempted: most success was had with trains.20 Lastly a deliberate campaign was mounted to destabilise the economy. Markets of North Coast towns were flooded with worthless money, stamped with the PKI emblem, the hammer and sickle.21 Anti-fascist propaganda was successful amongst railway workers in the Jatinegara and Cipinang railway yards, where trains slowed down, or overheated and broke down from lack of oil.22

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17 Kertapati, Sekitar, 29, and Dokumentasi Pemuda, 45, also mention many of those arrested, tortured and executed.
18 Dokumentasi Pemuda, 45.
19 Sukisman, Interview, 7.6.78; West Java CD, Interview, 4.7.78.
20 Ibid, 5.7.78.
21 Sukisman, Interview, 9.6.78. Lasem courier, Interview, 20.7.76.
22 West Java CD, Interview, 4.7.78.
Other sabotage activities included the destroying of four BPM distillation plants at Cepu, a go-slow campaign among workers building wooden boats at Lasem, and the scuttling of some of these while being towed to Surabaya to have engines fitted. In Surabaya itself, the Japanese fleet air arm (Kaigun Kokusho) was infiltrated, a Madurese was paid to sabotage planes by putting salt in the high octane fuel, and a gunpowder warehouse was blown up. Japanese vehicles and garages were sabotaged, and spare parts stolen and destroyed. The underground also infiltrated PETA companies in Ponorogo, Kediri and Blitar, carrying on discussions about progress of the war in Europe and the rest of Southeast Asia and the need to fight against fascism.

The PKI finances were well organised during the Occupation. Fund raising was a local responsibility. For example, the Surabaya cell financed their activities by stealing machine tools from the kaigun workshop and selling them to the Chinese. On another occasion a whole box of gold jewellery from the environment of the Yogya palace was sold in Jakarta to provide food for the families of couriers. In other areas couriers regularly approached donors for monthly contributions to

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23 Lasem courier, Interview, 20.7.76. See Chapter Two, fn. 71.
24 Sukisman, Interview, 8.6.78.
25 Interview with a former leader of the underground PKI Surabaya Kaigun cell, 18.10.76 (subsequently cited as Kaigun cell interview).
26 Sukisman, Interview, 9.6.78.
27 Ponogoro PETA company commander, Interview, 7.6.78. In Blitar the underground PKI opened a warung Sopan (food stall) opposite the PETA barracks and began 'to educate the Blitar PETA' with anti-Japanese propaganda. The party also had plans to set up a hand press nearby, the parts of which had been stolen from Surabaya. As Kahin notes, however (Nationalism, 114), 'anti-Japanese indoctrination was not accompanied by sufficient infiltration to control a unit's revolutionary impulses...' and underground leaders in Blitar were unable to stop Supriadi's premature revolt. In the aftermath of the PETA revolt, a local cadre, a Madurese, was arrested and under torture told the Japanese that the PETA members often ate at the warung Sopan. This lead to the discovery of the hand press, the arrest of Sukisman in nearby Surabaya some months later, and the decimation of the East Java CD. Sukisman, Interview, 8.6.78.
party funds. Some gave their own money freely. In Lasem on the North Coast, where the one-man East Java CD was based for a time, members ran profitable soap-making and soft drink businesses, which apart from being useful covers, provided employment for fugitives from razzias elsewhere, and funds for their food and living expenses. 'A source of quick ready cash was needed', recalls a Lasem courier, 'fugitives would arrive suddenly and had to be fed. No one knew when the kenpeitai would strike next'.

Sukarno was reportedly approached by the underground PKI and kept informed by A.M. Hanafi (a former GERINDO activist) in monthly meetings about the underground's activities. According to the West Java CD leader, the future President gave regular donations of Rp.25 'not as a communist but as an anti-fascist', which were passed on to the West Java CD by Hanafi.  

All couriers as well as underground members carried mandates - usually a picture of a five-pointed star with a hammer and sickle stamped in the middle of it, written with secret ink on cigarette paper so it could be swallowed in an emergency. Finances and mandates were the responsibility of each CD and all members used codes if they wrote anything down.

Practically, it was the continual movement of cadres, fugitives from kenpeitai razzias, and the search for safer hiding places which occupied the PKI underground for much of this period. Various covers and codes were used to ensure the safe movement of fugitives. In Lasem, for example, cadres who had infiltrated the local railways Keibodan used a kenpeitai training session as a cover. The training, designed to make local keibodan and police more vigilant in 'catching the enemy spy', would involve suspects being 'arrested' and searched until the planted 'enemy spy' was found, carrying a letter signed by the local kenpeitai commander. The underground PKI, knowing beforehand

28 West Java CD, Interview, 5.7.78.

29 Ibid. Lasem courier, Interview, 20.7.76; Kaigun cell interview, 18.10.76; Sumarsono, Interview, 5.6.78.
when these practices would take place, used them as a cover for moving party members. On recognising the PKI courier (by his dress) at the station, he would be 'arrested' without suspicion as part of 'catching the enemy spy' practice. During the ensuing noisy search behind closed doors, the courier would hand over not a kenpeitai letter but his party mandate, and be quietly smuggled away to meet local leaders.  

By the middle of 1944, the kenpeitai razzias in East and southern Central Java had destroyed many of the underground PKI cells, and the underground's headquarters had moved from Surabaya to Jakarta and Bandung. While arrests had also been made in Semarang, the underground's base in Pekalongan Residency was still intact.

The Pemalang Base

Holle, the Ambonese forester who organised the cover for the underground fugitives, is of the view today that 'Pemalang was the only place (in Central Java) that was not cracked by the Japanese... the last and safest cell'.  As the nature of this group's leadership during the Japanese occupation is of vital importance in understanding the political history of the Pekalongan Residency after the Proclamation, its activities must concern us here in some detail.

There are a number of reasons why Pemalang became the meeting place for leaders of the underground PKI, as well as a refuge for fugitives from East and Central Java. Firstly, the Japanese presence in Pemalang kabupaten was minimal. With kenpeitai detachments in both the Residency capital to the east and the larger industrial city of Tegal to the west - with a City garrison (keibitai) in Pekalongan as well - the Japanese felt they had no need to worry about security in Pemalang. The only Japanese there seemed to have been the police chief,

30 Lasem courier, Interview, 27.7.76.

31 Holle, Transcript, I/5, 24.6.76. There were of course other cells the Japanese never discovered, which Holle, not a member of the leadership at the time, could not have known about. This comment rather reflects the importance of the Pemalang as a safe haven for fugitives.
the jailer, and a shidokan (trainer) attached to the PETA company located in the old Sumberharjo sugar mill.

Secondly, there was an active underground PKI cell in Pemalang itself, under the able and experienced leadership of Amir, the veteran from Comal. He was close to other Pemalang radical nationalists with their base in the PEKOPE which ran the Fuji restaurant (the underground's cover in the town). Lastly, there was Holle, whom S. Mustapha, from the Pemalang cell, had contacted and who was found to be sympathetic to the aims at that time. Not only that, but Holle was willing to hide PKI fugitives with the families of his four assistants in the teak forests south of Pemalang.

**Organisation**

Using his position as senior forester at Sukowati, Holle was able to place eight underground PKI members and their families with the four foresters under his authority. While living with the foresters, the members of the underground were made foremen, supervising the cutting down of teak trees by the romushas, and helping to distribute rations of food and cloth. As the Lasern courier recalls:

> The people were sent to cut down trees.... Every day the kitchen near Holle's house would be told how many romushas there were to be fed. If there were 30 people, we made a coupon for 60. The 'official' ration of rice was 200 grams [per person per day] but we doubled that. The kenpeitai never came. If Holle hadn't been in charge no would have dared [double the rice rations]. He controlled everything.32

There was a carefully worked out system to take those arriving by train south to Sukowati:

> When the families arrived from East Java, they got off the train at Comal Baru,33 where the station

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32 Lasem courier, Interview, 27.7.76.

33 Comal Baru, the last sugar mill to be built in the Pekalongan Residency before the Depression, had its own small railway station. Both the mill (its machinery was destroyed by guerillas in 1948) and the station - long since unused - still stand today.
master, Tamdjid, member of the pergerakan since 1926 and our friend, would meet them. He would keep them for the night before sending them south [by bicycle] to the forestry stations.34

Another underground member, a woman, kept the forestry fugitives in touch with the Pemalang cell by riding the 20-odd kilometers by bicycle between the teak forests and the Fuji restaurant, nearly every day.

Amongst the underground leaders a loose hierarchy existed, at least so it appeared to Holle. An inner group consisting of Widarta and the other one-man CDs used to come to Sukowati for regular 'pleno' meetings, which were always held in Mangunsari. The underground's activities on the North Coast were coordinated by K. Midjaja, a veteran labour movement activist, who by 1938 had joined the illegal PKI under Pamoedji and was, in his own words, 'actively opposing Japanese fascism'. In April 1942 he had been forced to flee Solo after the first kenpeitai razzias there for an article he wrote 'which was considered anti-Japanese', and he spent the rest of the Occupation 'being hunted or chased after by the Japanese fascists'.35 In the Pekalongan Residency he began renewing contacts with older members of the union movement, including a former leader of the Talang branch of the PPPB (Union of Native Pawnshop Officials), whom he visited as a salesman using a Sundanese name. The absolutely crucial role K. Midjaja played in Residency politics until 14 December 1945 will be seen in Chapter Nine.

Finances

During the early part of the occupation, fund raising amongst PKI sympathisers was organised on a regular basis. Selected couriers, carrying a special mandate, approached likely donors for promises of support which were collected on a later visit. Later on this activity

34 Ibu (Mrs) Pri, Interview, 2.4.75.

35 From a notebook,'Sejarah Keluarga Djasmadi - Sardjono' copied at the home of his widow, on 18 November 1971 (subsequently cited as 'Sejarah Keluarga'). After 1950, Sardjono used the name Djasrmati, but on the North Coast he was always known as K. Midjaja (or Kamidjaja).
was considered too dangerous, but the Pemalang group was fortunate to have two alternative sources of funds by then.

The Japanese were sending large amounts of money and cloth to Sukowati for the romushas. The latter were paid by the Forestry Department according to the number of teak stacks they cut each day. As well as this 'wage', every three months the kenpeitai sent 'presents', consisting of one month's extra wages, and clothes as well. Kubota, a member of the Pekalongan kenpeitai, used to come himself bringing extra rolls of cloth. It was these 'presents' that went directly to the underground through Holle's foresters, instead of to the romushas. The PKI argued that the romushas got enough rations and were well cared for. Holle, however, did not really agree with this 'corrupt' diversion of the kenpeitai presents by the underground.

Towards the end of the Occupation the Pemalang group received a large sum of Dutch money from a Swiss planter named Victor Stober, who leased a 200-hectare rubber and tea plantation south of Sukowati, at Kali Lanang. Stober was grateful for Holle's protection when his plantation had been threatened by angry villagers in the power vacuum following the Dutch collapse. In early 1945 Stober agreed to exchange the by then much more valuable Dutch money (which he had buried) for Japanese currency. Another gift from the Swiss planter was a double-barrelled shotgun, which Holle used to hunt wild pigs. This was an invaluable source of protein for the romushas at the time after being made into dried spiced meat (dendeng).

Holle today claims that the amount of Dutch currency was f.20,000, an extraordinary sum if correct. However, as Holle's other numerical estimates, e.g., on rations and the romusha numbers, seem also exaggerated, the amount was probably less.

Holle devised a system whereby up to 20 wild pigs (called locally babi geroho) at a time could be run into a makeshift yard and killed. The romushas at first refused to touch the pig, a strict Muslim prohibition, until it was offered as dendeng. Holle, Transcript, V/7-9, 27.6.76.
Codes and Covers

Distinguishing dress and passwords were generally used by the underground PKI in moving people to and from the Pemalang base. On one occasion the Lasem courier travelling from Semarang was to hand over party files and a typewriter destined for Jakarta at Pemalang railway station. Before leaving Semarang he was told that he would first have to identify himself using the Japanese password *banzai* (hurrah), to which the reply would be *arigato gozaimasu* (thank you). The same courier arriving in Pemalang on a second occasion, had to identify himself at the house of a Pemalang cell member with the question 'are you bringing a dove?' to which the correct reply, in high Javanese, was 'Yes, I've got a chook'.

That the PKI was at the time so careful about moving cadres is not surprising considering they faced torture and almost certain death if caught. After the Kroya cell in southern Central Java had been discovered and its leader arrested, tortured and killed, the same Lasem courier was sent to Pemalang with his wife for the rest of the occupation. On arriving by train together in Pemalang, they were met by different people, taken to different places and did not meet again for over a month. 'Where my wife was I didn't know, nor with whom' recalls the former courier. Nor did he ask such details. To do so was to invite immediate suspicion.

PKI members, when they moved about, all had occupations, typically as salesmen. The atmosphere is conveyed in the following description of the activity in a house in Comal, which had been a base for the Pemalang underground before the forestry stations were developed:

I had no house of my own in Comal but lived with my older sister. She likes to gamble so the house was always full of people. Seto, 'Mamik' and 'Badut' were couriers from Kroya and Lasem respectively.

38 Lasem courier, Interview, 20.7.76.
39 Ibid.
40 Seto or Mudiman was a Lasem leader, Slamet 'Mamik' and 'Badut' were couriers from Kroya and Lasem respectively.
often came there, 'Bungkuk' and Mustapha would come
and go as well. During the Japanese time they
would come bringing samples of buttons or metal for
name plates (which were sought after) to sell. So
if there were other guests already there, they could
show them these. If there was a card game on, they
joined in until everyone was involved, then slipped
out the back. On the other hand if guests came while
they were there, they would each start doing something
[either] make a fire, grab a bucket and be getting
water from the well, or grab a broom and sweep the
floor... it was extremely dangerous to hide people,
people were being caught and killed, caught and killed
[ketangkap mati, ketangkap mati] all the time.
There was a typewriter from Dr Moerjawan, they used to
type with pillows under and over the machine to
muffle the noise, writing pamphlets. I never read
them or knew where they went.42

Activities

The Pemalang group throughout the occupation was able to
follow the progress of the war through an illegal radio owned by the
Swiss planter Stober. All radio receivers had been sealed after being
altered by the Japanese so as to pick up only local bands. Seals were
inspected regularly. Holle, however, devised a way of shifting this
seal temporarily, removing the back plate and re-adjusting the receiver
so it could be tuned to broadcasts from outside Java.43 The Japanese
never discovered that the seal had been tampered with. Through the
couriers and Menara Merah news of the progress of the war and the
defeats of the Japanese was relayed to remaining groups and sympathisers
in other parts of Java:

While [living] at the forestry station, I worked as a
courier... sometimes I was sent to Semarang, Solo and
Lasem. In Solo I met Supardi, and stayed two nights,
we talked about preparations for independence so the
people would understand when it came later. If there
were no preparations, Independence would not be
welcomed [by the people]. On the means, we entrusted
this to local leaders, we only gave the broad outlines.

41 'Bungkuk' was the CD leader in southern Central Java. S. Mustapha was
a Pemalang cell member, and secretary of PEKOPE before his arrest,
and subsequent escape to Surabaya.

42 Ibu Pri, Interview, 2.9.75.

43 Holle, Interview, 24.6.76. There were at least three other illegal
radios operating both in Tegal and Pekalongan during this time, so
tampering with the seals could not have been all that difficult.
After Hiroshima had fallen, I went to Semarang to meet Kirman to talk about how we [the PKI] could occupy important positions, such as RK, RT, and lurah, and the leadership of the pemudas. We had to be in the forefront, we had to win influence.

Unlike groups in other parts of Java earlier in the Occupation, the Pemalang group was not actively involved in sabotage of installations. Rather their work involved building up moral support through regular contacts by courier, and disseminating anti-Japanese propaganda and news of the war through the Menara Merah and by word of mouth. During the earlier part of the Occupation the underground had used a primitive hand-operated glass and roller stencilling process to turn out anti-fascist propaganda, which 'showed the evils of Japanese fascism'. After the Pemalang group was established, the Menara Merah, signed by Widarta using Pamoedji's old pseudonym of 'Bomber', was produced in the forestry stations. Paper, roneo ink and carbons were supplied by Holle from the Swiss planter's office. Coming out rather irregularly every three or four months, and stamped with the hammer and sickle, contents included summaries of local news and information about Japanese oppression in other parts of Java, fed to Sukowati by the couriers. 'It was circulated to all the cells', recalls Holle, 'so everyone could follow developments during the occupation'. Menara Merah also had theoretical articles about the nature of imperialism.

Locally Based Opposition Groups

About the middle of March 1945, a group of nine men all in their early thirties held a secret meeting in a house at Jalan Kejambon 16 in Tegal. There, one of the group outlined recent discussions with

44 RK (Rukun Kampung) and RT (Rukun Tetangga) were kampung and neighbourhood associations (called the Tonarigumi), set up by the Japanese to facilitate the distribution of basic commodities, conscription of romushas and so on.
45 Lasem courier, Interview, 27.7.76.
46 The Indonesian is 'menunjukkan kejahatan mengenai fasis Jepang'. Ibid.
47 Holle, Transcript, V/6, 26.6.76. Kertapati, Sekitar, 10.
Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI Baru leader who had been living in Tegal since 1938. Soebagio's analysis of the political situation was that the Japanese would surrender to the Allies before much longer. Preparations must be made for this. Many in the group, which on this night decided to call itself the Negen Broeders (Nine Brothers), had in fact been close associates since the early 'thirties. As the sons of lower-level government officials all had completed HIS and most some years of MULO, and they spoke good Dutch. They had been involved in the founding of the Tegal Branch of Indonesia Muda, and were close associates of Supeno, having been at school with him in Tegal or Pekalongan.

After Indonesia Muda had been harassed to a standstill by the Political Intelligence Service a new group calling itself the Islam Studie Club had been formed, more to ease police surveillance than from any commitment to Islam. Having completed a first aid

48 Soebagio, who became chairman of the PNI Baru after Hatta and Sjahrir were exiled to Boven Digul, went to live in Tegal (his birthplace) in a kind of voluntary 'exile', after the Tjahaja People's University, which he had founded in Bandung, had been closed by the colonial authorities. To make a living, and to evade police surveillance, he began a freshwater fisheries enterprise at Sumurpanggang east of the city, where he lived during the week. On weekends he would return to his home in Jalan Cempaka, where Soesmono (a clerk in the kabupaten office) used to visit him. 'To pass the time' recalls Soesmono, 'he used to talk about the meaning of perjuangan and lent me books.' Interview, 16.10.75. For Soebagio's biography see Anderson, Java, 455.

49 Supeno founded and led Indonesia Muda in Tegal until 1934, when he moved to Semarang to attend the AMS, after which he went on to the Bandung Technical Faculty and the Jakarta Law School. During this period he often visited Tegal and kept up his old Indonesia Muda-HIS contacts, holding discussions about Indonesian Independence. A member of the Working Committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee (BP-KNIP) he was on the leadership council of the Partai Sosialis and close to the Jakarta pemudas. He led the team which defended six Tiga Daerah leaders brought to trial in March 1947 and was later Minister of Youth and Development in the first Hatta Cabinet. 'Biografi Sdr. Supeno, ex-Menteri Pambangunan dan Pemuda Republic Indonesia', TS, written by a member of the Tegal Negen Broeders group and a friend of Supeno's from HIS and Indonesia Muda. See also Anderson, Java, 449, and passim.

50 Although three of the group were santris, i.e., devoutly Muslim, one of whom had taught in modernist Muslim schools in the 1930s.
course in Pekalongan, several had been coopted into the Red Cross section of the Dutch Army and sent to Cilacap to assist in the last minute evacuations in flying boats to Australia.\footnote{Rupert Lockward, Black Armada (Sydney, 1975), 41-48, gives a graphic account of the evacuation from Cilacap of Dutch personnel and some Australian soldiers who had escaped from Singapore. The last ship got away on the night of 1 March 1942; after this a flying boat service operated to Broome (Darwin had been bombed out) for another five days until Cilacap, too, was bombed.} Interned for several months, on their release and return to Tegal, the group had maintained loose contact, occasionally meeting informally at courses run by the Japanese equivalent of the Red Cross (Iryo Kyujo Dan, Medical Rescue Team). They had decided amongst themselves that the best way of opposing Japanese authority was to 'infiltrate' various organisations such as the Seinendan, Barisan Pelopor, the BP2 and BP3, and influence their members. Two of the group even took the dangerous job of being double agents for the kenpeitai based in the Tegal Docks. One of these recalls:

I joined the kenpeitai [as a double agent]. There were several of us involved. We used to go around a lot, listening and talking informally in trains, markets and cinemas. We used to tell people that the Japanese spoiled the morals of our young girls, and about taking all the paddy and the romusha...we didn't blow up bridges, but tried to influence men's minds... I was involved in surveillance of the sea communications from the Comal river to Jakarta. I used to make reports which were sent to the kenpeitai boss. Then I was called up to explain the report. [These activities] did not harm the perjuangan. At Comal river I was talking to people who said they had seen a submarine [which] I mentioned in a report. After a week a submarine was torpedoed near Pekalongan. They [the kenpeitai] called me up and I was afraid I would be killed. 'Your report was right' they told me. We also had to question Chinese barge crews. They trusted us. We didn't write down all we heard, only things that would make the Japanese worried, e.g. about American ships they had met near Bangka and Belitung [islands]. On another occasion [we reported that] a Chinese sailor had seen a submarine near Indramayu. It was hard to keep finding information that would scare the Japanese. I was supposed to ride along the coast from Comal to Jakarta once a month collecting information, but I put the bike on top of a bus for much of the way. Don't make any mistakes in this kind of game! The kenpeitai
were so grateful that they wanted to take me with them when they were leaving Tegal but the news of the surrender came too late, they were confused and I stayed quietly at home... If we had been in an organisation we would have all been caught.\textsuperscript{52}

It should be clearly pointed out that the person involved as a 'double agent' here did not claim to be part of a resistance with a consistent cause in view like the underground PKI. There is an obvious distinction between those who were clearly highly motivated and many cases (like the above), where motives were uncertain.

Urged on by Soebagio's prediction (conveyed by Soesmono) that the Japanese faced certain defeat, the group drew up a plan of action at the secret meeting in Kejambon. Four of the group were to make contacts within the Tegal PETA battalion and Heiho.\textsuperscript{53} Two others assigned themselves the task of finding out which Pangreh Praja were most disliked as a result of the Japanese economic policies. Another was to approach well-known veterans of the 1920s as well as Tegal pemuda figures.\textsuperscript{54} The group aimed to pass on their own analysis of the war situation and to prepare the ground for action after what was now thought to be the inevitable defeat of the Japanese. The secret meeting ended with the Negen Broeders promising that they would remain faithful friends whatever happened.\textsuperscript{55}

About the same time another group of nationalists also began holding secret meetings within the Barisan Pelopor in Tegal. This group included three ex-Digul veterans, two of whom were Marxists, a

\textsuperscript{52} Negen Broeders, Interview. 2.8.76.

\textsuperscript{53} According to one of the group involved (who also kept an illegal radio for news of the war), 'They [i.e. PETA and Heiho] didn't know much about military things, and we told them not to oppress [menginjak] the people, and to be patient. We really hadn't got going when the Japanese had surrendered'. Interview, 11.10.72.

\textsuperscript{54} Slamet Soenarjio, 'Catatan Singkat Slamet Soenarjio dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Pemuda Tegal dalam Enam Bulan Sebelum dan Sesudah Hari Proklamasi R.I.', TS.

\textsuperscript{55} Soesmono, Answers, TS, November 1972.
GERINDO leader, and a pemuda activist. The acknowledged leader of the group was the Marxist Muhamad Nuh. To judge from a later memoir by the pemuda member, the group was not united in its analysis of the war situation, attitudes to the national leadership, or even the strategy to be adopted against the Japanese. The Marxists in the group were critical of the national level leadership, many of whom they considered were still 'feudalistic' and 'tools of Japanese military fascism'. It was essential to establish local priorities in the coming struggle. Because the economic situation had reached a crisis point, people could be easily mobilised against the Japanese. The other view was less quick to criticise the national leadership as collaborators, and placed priority in the coming struggle on seizing power from the foreigners, not on social revolution. This group rejected the comparisons which Muhamad Nuh and the other Marxists made with the Russian and French Revolutions, because Russia and France were free nations. They did not have to throw out the foreigner before their revolutions could begin.

Despite these differences there was agreement that cadre-forming should start immediately, so people would be ready to oppose Japanese authority and 'hit the enemy from behind' as soon as the opportunity arose. It was decided to begin a propaganda campaign amongst the workers of the shipbuilding yards (zosenjo), many of whom were already members of the Suisintai or Barisan Pelopor.

The other underground which operated in Brebes kabupaten was even more directly influenced by the PNI-Baru than the Negen Broeders. Before the war Soenarto, the leader of the group, had taught in a school run by Soegra near Cirebon, and helped found the KRI (Koperasi Rakyat Indonesia, Indonesian People's Cooperative) with Soegra. On moving back to Brebes he set up KRI branches throughout the kabupaten. Under the leadership of Soenarto these cooperatives

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56 For more on this source see my "My Story" and other Sources: An "Oral Approach" to the Indonesian Revolution', Masyarakat Indonesia, Tahun ke-1, No.2, December 1974.

57 Soegra headed the Cirebon Branch of the PNI-Baru. For his biography see Anderson, Java, 445.
sanctioned by the Japanese changed their function. They soon became a loosely-integrated network of informal groups which met irregularly to discuss what was known about progress of the war, and what local initiatives could be taken when the inevitable defeat of the Japanese came. KRI members in Brebes included three village school teachers, a seller of steamed rice cake (ketupat), a carpenter and a Chinese. While the majority were agricultural labourers there were several lenggaongs involved also. An adviser to the KRI was able to travel freely throughout the large kabupaten (as far south as Salem) making contacts and holding meetings. In all there were about eight branches. If local officials wanted to know what went on in meetings the answer was simply 'coop. business'. Inevitably the Japanese, who kept a close watch on all such organisations, began to suspect the Brebes KRI of other aims. A peasant named Karta was arrested after being reported by village police for making certain charm amulets, which were going to be used to oppose the Japanese. Along with two others, Karta was beaten and imprisoned in Brebes jail. Soenarto, the KRI adviser, recalls:

Three [KRI members] were arrested, and beaten up in the prison in Brebes. They [the Japanese] found out that I was anti-Japanese...when I was interrogated they were all called in. They were like corpses. None of them would say they knew me. The Japanese said 'if this is the case you can go home'. When I remember [their courage] I ask myself, 'what did you do?' I did nothing. It was they who deserved merit. They were farmers, and farm labourers but they were consistent in their actions.

IN wartime, resistance groups such as the underground PKI are always feared. Certainly the Japanese seemed to go to extraordinary lengths to root it out. This may have reflected the effectiveness of its anti-fascist propaganda campaign, less probably of its sabotage efforts. More likely the Japanese feared that if the Allies were to successfully

58 On the KRI see also Kahin, Nationalism, 112; Anderson, Pemuda Revolution, 438, fn.23.

59 Soenarto, Interview, 29.7.76.
invade Java from the south, as was expected, the role of such an underground would have become much more important.

The hardships caused by the implementation of Japanese wartime economic policies sharply reduced the ability of the Pangreh Praja to lead the people. By the end of the Occupation, with a few exceptions, most Pangreh Praja were discredited. On the other hand, the PKI-led underground leftists based in Pemalang, emerged free from the taint of corruption as the natural popular leaders after the Japanese collapse.

The other 'opposition' groups, the Negen Broeders, the Tegal Barisan Pelopor group and the Brebes based KRI were not working full time against Japanese fascism. Anderson's comment on the Jakarta situation can equally apply to these local groups: their importance '...is that they were germs of political cliques and groups which were to bud only in the spring-time of independence, not that they undertook any effective opposition to the military government.' The western-educated Negen Broeders with their priyai ties remind one of the pro-Sjahrir resistance group in Jakarta. However, the Barisan Pelopor leadership stands out in one crucial way, and that was the dominant leadership of three older generation nationalists, all of whom had returned from exile in Boven Digul during the 1930s.

Nonetheless, arguing to what extent these groups actively 'opposed' the Japanese military machine is to miss the point here. In the people's judgment they also, like the underground PKI, were not implicated in the Japanese extraction of rice and corruption of cloth like the Pangreh Praja. Also, they were ready to act in August 1945. It remains for us to see, in the following chapters, how these groups seized power after the Proclamation and held on to it until mid-December.

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60 Anderson, Pemuda Revolution, 37.
61 For an analysis of these so-called 'resistance' groups in the capital, see ibid, 35-50.
ON the evening of 14 August 1945, some time after 9 o'clock, a member of the clandestine group within the Barisan Pelopor that had been meeting secretly for the past month, arrived at the back door of a house in Jalan Gilitugel, Tegal. Peering in through the window he saw his friend (also a member of the group) trying to tune in to the illegal short wave radio that had been the Barisan Pelopor source of information about the war. Deciding to teach his friend a lesson for being careless about such a dangerous activity, in full view of anyone coming to the back of the house, he called out 'moshi moshi' (Japanese for 'hullo') in a loud voice. This was followed by 'Is the owner at home?', imitating a Japanese accent. Hearing the greeting the startled man jumped up and raced to the back door, immensely relieved to find not a member of the kenpeitai but only his friend Marsum by himself. The two sat down in front of the radio and continued attempts to get the latest news of the war.

A voice could be heard talking. 'What band is that, Bung?' [Brother] I asked. 'Saigon or Hanoi', he replied. 'It's English with a Chinese accent, I'll change to Australia'. He began tuning the radio knob there was a crackle, and someone was speaking slowly in English, the voice on the station was clearer. 'What band is that, Bung?' I asked again. 'Australia', he replied, 'probably Melbourne'. I complained to myself 'What a pity...why can't I speak English...my own fault ...'. Suddenly my friend sat up agitated and moved closer to the radio, straining every muscle, trying to catch the voice speaking in English. I could only watch him, my mouth wide open, cursing myself inwardly 'Why am I so stupid and don't understand English. I could be helping to translate. What could
EXCITING as the news of the Japanese surrender was for those groups of nationalists within Pekalangan Residency, such as the Pemalang-based underground PKI and others who had been following the progress of the war, the final defeat of the Japanese was only a matter of time. The speed with which various groups which made up the perjuangan (revolutionary movement or struggle) throughout the Residency of Pekalongan responded to the new situation created by the Japanese surrender and the dramatic events of the Proclamation three days later was not only because they heard the news on clandestine radios. Firstly, the capital was easily accessible within eight hours by road. Secondly, all the Pekalongan Residency kabupaten towns were located along the main Jakarta-Semarang railway. Many of the trains coming from Jakarta had been quickly painted with slogans such as 'Merdeka atau Mati' (Freedom or Death). There was also the railway telegraph. Railway activists were thus often the first to hear the news of the latest events in Jakarta.

It was relatively easy then for the Barisan Pelopor, or the Negen Broeders or local communists to contact Jakarta by sending couriers or even by telephone. This is exactly what happened. We see the first response from these groups to the Japanese surrender and the Proclamation was to find out what people were doing in Jakarta. The underground PKI in Pemalang heard via the Swiss planter's radio that the Japanese surrender was a fait accompli early on the

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1 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 46. Although the Emperor's broadcast announcing the Japanese surrender was not received in Jakarta until noon on the following day (15 August), the Sendenbu pemudas were already picking up broadcasts from San Francisco that the Japanese had accepted the Allies' unconditional surrender demand the day before (Anderson, Java, 66). Other groups heard similar broadcasts on the same night throughout Pekalongan Residency.
evening of 14 August. It was the initiative of the underground PKI leader Widarta, which began a series of events leading to the Proclamation in Jakarta three days later.

The Negen Broeders also dispatched two of their group to Jakarta on 19 August. There they spent the whole night with Soepeno at his home in Jalan Lawu 'being lectured on the meaning of the Proclamation'. In a similar way the Barisan Pelopor group, after having the radio broadcast they had heard the previous night confirmed by other sources, sent a courier to Jakarta. He returned saying he had been unable to meet with any Menteng 31 leaders who were out of the

2 As well as this and the Tegal Barisan Pelopor radio, both the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor and the Negen Broeders had access to illegal radios.

3 Wikana, the PKI CK leader in Jakarta, told Sumarsono how he received a message from Widarta about 9 p.m. on 14 August, telling him to seize the opportunity to get the pemudas to proclaim independence, with Amir Sjarifuddin as President. The following evening Wikana called a meeting of all the Jakarta underground groups in Jalan Eyckman, at the back of the Bacteriological Laboratories. At first the meeting agreed with the PKI's argument that because the Japanese had surrendered the Republic must be proclaimed with Amir Sjarifuddin as President. But because Amir was still in jail, the pemuda leader Sukarni argued that to make him President would risk his being killed by the Japanese. At the same time the Proclamation would be discredited 'because the President was killed'. Furthermore, Wikana could not answer queries as to whether attempts were being made by the PKI to rescue Amir from prison. After much further debate it was finally decided to ask Sukarno to make a proclamation (Anderson, Java, 70). Sumarsono, Interview, 6.6.78. This Surabaya leader was very prominent in Republican politics during the revolution and especially in the Madiun Affair of 1948. See Kahin, Nationalism, passim; Anderson, Java, passim; Anthony Reid, National Revolution, 142, 144. After 1950, Sumarsono lived in south Sumatra under an assumed name, until his return to Jakarta in the early 'sixties, when he was again active in politics.

4. Negen Broeders, Interview, 2.8.76.
city at Rengasdengklok. However, on 20 August another courier returned bringing hundreds of printed texts of the Proclamation, as well as other slogans printed on fragile yellow paper made from rice straw (kertas merang), all that was available at the time. The older nationalists in the perjuangan were thus in a strong position, with information from Jakarta confirming local rumours that the Japanese had surrendered. They quickly took the initiative, with firstly a flag-raising and propaganda campaign, then the formation of KNIs (Komite Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Committee).

In contrast, the Pangreh Praja had no access to sources of information other than the Japanese. The attitude of the latter reinforced the natural confusion and doubts that the Pangreh Praja had about the Proclamation. Having no mass organisation and with their traditional basis of support weakened, the Pangreh Praja's real power was now more dependant than before on higher authority. What would happen when that collapsed or was removed? Most Pangreh Praja expected that according to the terms of the Potsdam agreement, the Allies would return to give the Indies back to the Dutch. A few more forward-thinking men, such as Sarimin (the Bupati of Brebes), influenced by the speech of Queen Wilhelmina in 1942, believed Indonesians would have some autonomy within a Dutch type of Commonwealth. During June and July 1945 the well-known priyayi spokesman Soetardjo had been travelling around Java telling the Pangreh Praja that they

5 Here referring probably to Chaerul Saleh and Sukarni, two of the leading figures in the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia (Asrama of the New Generation of Indonesia), set up early in the Occupation as a centre for training activists which would then pass on their education to provincial cadres. The best known of the various groups in Jakarta, Menteng 31, would be the first place to which a courier from a regional Barisan Pelopor would go for information.

6 Pangreh Praja informants say the Japanese in the Pekalongan Residency kept silent about the surrender for at least a week after the Proclamation, refusing to confirm it in public, and often denying it privately.

7 Although newspapers such as Asia Raya carried news of the end of the war the Pangreh Praja were waiting for an official announcement, which they never got.
must 'be prepared' for Independence. Sarimin, writing in 1965, recalls 'as a result of Wilhelmina's promise and Soetardjo's speeches we thought that Independence (Kemerdekaan) was logical, it was the Proclamation that we could not imagine. We had never learned that a country can simply make a Proclamation of Independence'.

The Pangreh Praja were further confused, according to Sarimin, by the fact that there had been no 'official announcement' of the Japanese surrender either over the official radio or from the Pekalongan Shuchokan. Pangreh Praja doubts about the Proclamation were further reinforced by the attitude of local Japanese officials, such as the one encountered by Sarimin:

Japanese officials in the regions kept completely silent [membungkam seribu bahasa]...at the time the news [of the Proclamation] was spreading. I had been on a tour of duty to the inland areas and met a kenpeitai officer who must have known [about the surrender] but he strongly denied the news. Automatically, anxieties arose especially amongst the officials who were in positions of responsibility. They were caught [not knowing how] to follow the wave of unrest, while under the pressure and threat of the still real [Japanese] power.

The Perjuangan Response

Characteristic of the revolutionary struggle during the months after the Proclamation was the springing up of the so-called badan perjuangan or struggle organisations. The main Pekalongan Residency badan perjuangan are set out in Appendix C. Most of these groups could hardly even be called 'organisations' for they were very loosely-structured groups of youthful activists, gathering around an older charismatic figure. We shall discuss briefly the organisation and leadership of these groups before describing their activities.

8 In Tegal, Soetardjo had said at a meeting in the kabupaten pendopo that the Japanese 'would give out independence in stages', implying real independence would have to be struggled for. Ali Warsotohardjo, Interview, 2.13.73.

9 Sarimin, Interview, 23.1.73.

The leadership of these *badan perjuangan*, the revolutionary activists or *pejuang*, consisted of three groups. Firstly, there were the veterans of the 1920s *pergerakan*, former members of the PKI or the Sarekat Rakyat. These included radicals (such as Muhamad Nuh, Soewignjo and Wachtoem from Tegal, Slamet from Brebes and others from Pemalang), who after the 1926 communist rebellion had either been imprisoned in Java or exiled to Boven Digul. There were several Islamic Communists, Haji Moeklas and Kyai Misbah in this group as well.\(^{11}\)

Except for Moeklas they had returned from Digul during the 1930s and had not been active in politics again, owing to surveillance by the Political Intelligence Service as well as promises made to the Dutch. This group also included the older Sukarnoists like Kartohargo and Kromo Lawi, also harassed and occasionally detained for their political activities in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties.

The second group were the 1930s generation. This group included firstly activists of the pre-war pemuda groups, Indonesia Muda, the Indonesian Scouts, or the Solo-based PARTINDO youth PERPRI (Persatuan Pemuda Rakyat Indonesia), and the PNI Baru youth the SPI (Suluh Pemuda Indonesia). Included were Sugeng Hargono (Brebes), most of the Tegal based Negen Broeders group and Sarli, the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader. Secondly, the 1930s generation also included ex-members of the political parties of that period, the PNI Baru, GERINDO, PARTINDO and the PSII, such as Soenarto (Brebes), Ismono and Marsum (Tegal).

Finally, there was the younger '1945 generation', those whose first political experience was in a Japanese youth organisation and whose outlook was moulded by this and other experiences of the Japanese occupation. This group included the younger Pemalang API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia, Younger Generation of Indonesia) leaders Oerip and Karso, and the West Ketanggungan (Brebes) Pesindo leaders. This group had less Dutch education than the two older groups of *pejuang* in Pekalongan Residency, who were often sons of either lower-level government officials

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\(^{11}\) Haji Moeklas was arrested in the May 1926 Karangcegak revolt and exiled to Digul as we have seen in Chapter One. He did not return to Jatinegara until after the Tiga Daerah was ended.
or sugar mill employees. They were not usually in leadership positions in the badan perjuangan but made up the bulk of the active membership of these groups. The vast majority were referred to as pemuda rakyat, the poor non-elite youth from the semi-urban kampungs which made up the bulk of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor and Pemalang API membership. In contrast the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor activists were described by their leader as pemuda sekolah, that is, pemudas with some Western education.

In the groups outside the kabupaten capitals (see Appendix C) the leadership pattern is the same. It is the older activists who dominate, while the santri strength of these groups varied. In Randudongkal, because of the leadership of H. Zaini and the location of several pesantrens in the area, almost all of AMRI (Angkatan Muda Republic Indonesia - Young Generation of the Republic of Indonesia) were santri. In Slawi and Tanjung there were no pesantrens, and the modernist santris were educated not in madrasah but in the government-run Continuation School.

The organisation of these groups also varied enormously from the rather exceptionally structured Tegal Barisan Pelopor, to the more usual loosely-knit groups such as the Tanjung pemudas who did not even have a name. Likewise, groups with the same name often had no organisational connections with their namesakes in the same kabupaten, let alone at the provincial or national level. For example, API groups in Tegal and Pemalang had no connection with each other, although both claimed to be part of the Jakarta group, while AMRI Slawi had no links either with its Semarang counterpart or with the various other AMRI groups in the Residency. Similarly, local groups changed their names, reflecting national level developments, such as the founding of PESINDO (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Youth) in early November, and later, PARSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party). 'Membership' too was an informal affair, and not mutually exclusive. Many Tegal activists such as the KRIS (Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi, Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi) leader were members of both the Barisan Pelopor and their own group. While the Barisan Pelopor apparently kept a Membership Book (as did the AMRI Randudongkal), this was unusual. Names were frequently
borrowed from 'glamour' groups in Jakarta, Semarang, or Surabaya without any organisational link.

Having briefly discussed the organisation and leadership of the main struggle organisations in Pekalongan Residency, we will now look in more detail at the activities of three groups - the Barisan Pelopor, the Tanjung pemudas and API Pemalang - in the context of events immediately after the Proclamation. Spreading the news of the Proclamation and the Japanese surrender, flying the Red and White Indonesian flag (Merah Putih) and organising local security were all important tasks that consumed the energies of members of all groups until the end of August.

The Barisan Pelopor in Tegal

On 20 August Barisan Pelopor couriers had returned from Jakarta bringing hundreds of printed copies of the Proclamation text, as well as slogans and handbills. Mostly printed in English, these were of little use. They read 'Our government is from the People, by the People and for the People', 'Indonesia for the Indonesians', 'Freedom is the Right of Every Nation', 'Freedom for Peace and Right of Self Determination' and so on. While everyone was keen to begin sticking up the handbills in public places and on the walls of government offices, the message couriers brought back from Jakarta was to be careful in dealings with the Japanese as they still had the responsibility of preserving order until the Allies arrived.

Whether on Japanese or other orders, the slogans and handbills that the Barison Pelopor had stuck up all over the town (including handwritten Indonesian translations reading Indonesia Merdeka [Independent Indonesia] and Jagalah Kemerdekaanmu [Guard your Freedom]) soon began to disappear. Some were torn down leaving the remains sticking forlornly to the walls, while slogans were scrawled over with charcoal. As the Barisan Pelopor quickly became the focal point of the city's perjuangan, the office was moved to larger headquarters in Jalan Pangkuran. Some time later, in indisputable control of the city, the group, with the city KNI's permission, took over the former tile-making plant on the city square as their headquarters (see map of Tegal Municipality).
BARISAN PELOPOR HEADQUARTERS ON TEGAL CITY SQUARE

TEGAL CITY SQUARE
Apart from complaints about torn and damaged slogans, there were reports about the reluctance of the Chinese to fly the red and white flag. Another report complained of Chinese disrespect for the flag. Because flagpoles were in such short supply, many people used the long poles kept at the back of houses for knocking ripe mangoes off the trees. A Chinese caught putting one of these poles to its original use, disregarding the Merah Putih now dragging in the dirt at the other end, was detained by some pemuda rakyat, and someone was sent to the Barisan Pelopor to ask how one dealt with a disrespectful Chinese. In another part of the city someone was beaten unconscious for passing a guard post and not replying to the greeting 'Merdeka!' What should be done with him when he woke up? These complaints were brought to the Barisan Pelopor headquarters and carefully written down in a large book provided for the purpose. Surprisingly on 23 August the Japanese flag (Hinomaru, the Rising Sun) also began reappearing in front of some government buildings. Also worrying to the leadership of the Barisan Pelopor was the blank silence from the Town Hall in response to requests for assistance in printing more flags, and handbills as well.

However, with the help of two activists who worked at the town's only printers, 3,000 new paper flags and more handbills were run off. During 24 and 25 August a massive flag action (aksi bendera) took place, demonstrating how the Barisan Pelopor could mobilise different groups in the city's revolutionary struggle.

...the Barisan Pelopor forces, together with the becak [pedicab] drivers, pemudas from the railways and textile factory, activists from the shipbuilding yards, the Health Department, the People's Bank, and everyone else who was part of the younger generation...carried out a mass action together to put up the newly-printed flags and posters. On each house, on walls, in markets and on buildings, in all the busy places, on vehicles, horse drawn carts, becaks, buses, bullock waggons, going...southwards, west and east out of the city. The people helped not because they were ordered to help...no one dared to stop the action.
The Tanjung Pemudas

In Tanjung, a kawedanan town of about 5,000 people on the coastal plain to the west of Brebes, the small revolutionary movement had about 50 activists, with the leader, Soenarto, dividing up the guard duty amongst members. This group included Mudja, a well-known lenggaong from the village of Kemurang. One group manned road blocks to stop any Japanese who passed. Others organised themselves to look after local kampung security, check all vehicles entering and leaving the area, and surveillance of 'suspicious' people. Another group was responsible for security at the railway station. Each night 10 pemudas guarded the headquarters, as well as a two kilometer stretch of main road, through the middle of the town. As transport the pemudas had 20 bicycles that had been 'donated' by the local Chinese at the 'request' of the perjuangan leaders.

As in other areas the attitude of the local government official, the Wedana of Tanjung, quickly became a major issue. In the fortnight after the Proclamation the local perjuangan leader recalls a meeting at the kawedanan:

The essence [of what the Wedana said] was that he would not allow us to proclaim Indonesian independence. There has been a broadcast from the Domei [Japanese news agency] that no decision had been made about this. His intention was to hamper the flying of the Red and White as long as Nippon was still there. He talked [like this] for about half an hour to 100 people at the kawedanan. I went home feeling disappointed. I had already learnt from a friend who had a radio that Japan had fallen. Indonesia Raya [the national anthem] had already been heard. I pondered over the problem. Why was there a prohibition on flying the Red and White. Some time later a truckload of pemudas arrived from Tegal. They said 'now we will start flying the flag'. One of the Brebes activists said later 'this Wedana needs to be removed'. I said if it was necessary then go ahead...

Despite the official's opposition a strategy was worked out for taking over the Banjaratma sugar mill:

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14 Tanjung perjuangan leader, Interview, 29.7.76.
At 9 a.m. five pemudas with bamboo spears surrounded the office of the mill administrator. Others guarded the mill's three telephones. I was able to make contact with the mill workers. I told them that today our intention was to hand over the mill to the Republic of Indonesia, and the workers should go and demonstrate at the [mill] office. After talking to the [Japanese] mill management, they handed over 15 Browning rifles. Then I took the radio from the administrator's house. He had also left clothes... I got a shirt and a pair of pants...the clothes in the mill store were also taken, by the police. There were five Japanese at the mill... Later that day we heard that Eurasian men had been killed and the women interned and taken to Pekalongan. A Batak, Sihombing, was appointed new administrator and another Batak was put in charge of technical matters.15

About six weeks after the Proclamation this was the scene on an afternoon in Tanjung:

My headquarters was in the auction yard of the pawnshop (at the same time we were guarding the pawned goods)... As long as it was for the revolution buildings were handed over.... With no walls or roof, it was like a water buffalo pen. I had a way of attracting the masses, namely a radio, a Phillips which had belonged to the [former] Banjaratma sugar mill administrator. By 5 o'clock in the afternoon everyone began gathering to listen to Bung Tomo. About 500 people came, about 50 of whom were pemudas, including two former PETA, one Heiho [auxiliaries] and about 20 santris. There were also girls, mostly married. I slept there night and day on a chair; I never went home. We even had a telephone, which was rare.16

Local leaders were faced with the strong conservative Muslim antagonism to the Chinese. This expressed itself (as it did in Brebes) in pig killing and attacks on pig owners. The pig problem in fact had been an issue in Tanjung at least since the 1920s.17 Muslim youth, after attacking a pig and beating up a pig owner taking his animal to the slaughtering yard, began a general pig hunt. Some were

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Neratja, 29 September 1920.
let out, others killed. The gundik system, whereby many Chinese who could not afford wives from their own community took Javanese girls as mistresses, was also a source of tension. The Muslims demanded that the system be abolished. The fact that the Chinese did not fly the Red and White increased mistrust between them and the local revolutionary movement.

The Pemalang API/PRI

In contrast to Tanjung, the Chinese in Pemalang, although having their own struggle group, the Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa (Chinese Youth Irregulars) were an integral part of the town's perjuangan. Like the Barisan Pelopor in Tegal, Pemalang's API coordinated the majority of the town's pemudas. API's organisation was divided into four headquarters (markas). Markas I had essentially political functions. It was initially located at the house of Soepangat who, by the end of the Occupation, had emerged as the town's leading nationalist figure, backed by the poor santris (santri rakyat), the PKI underground, and most pemuda elements in the perjuangan. Markas I was composed of representatives of the three groups in the revolutionary movement, the older veterans of the 1920s (like Amir), the activists of the 'thirties, and the younger pemudas (led by Oerip and Karso). During the revolusi sosial period of October 1945, Markas I was to move from Soepangat's house into the old Dutch Assistant Resident's office on the east side of the town square. There, under Amir's tutelage, an asrama (training place) was started, and pemudas were given military-style training and political indoctrination. Markas II, located near the morning market, was responsible for security of the town in general, and of the market in particular. Markas III handled API's finances. Like the other Pemalang struggle groups, API relied heavily on contributions from the town's business community. But since in Pemalang (like other towns in Pekalongan Residency), this community was dominated by Arabs, Chinese and santris, their own struggle groups had obvious advantages (see Appendix B) in raising money from this source. Accordingly, Markas III tried to raise funds by putting
Lastly, Markas IV acted as a kind of social welfare office. A member of Markas IV recalls:

The pemudas would bring in poor people from the kampungs to receive a quota of cloth. They had to come in person, as the cloth would not be distributed elsewhere by the pemudas. The people who came were asked their name and work, and their kampung, and we told them that the cloth had to be used by them and was not to be sold. I had to guard the distribution and no one was dishonest; if two meters per person was being given out, then it was exactly two meters, no more and no less.19

But in addition to distributing cloth bought from the Tegal textile factory with kabupaten funds, Markas IV also attempted to control all economic activity within the kabupaten. The same API member continues:

Any goods sent into the kabupaten capital were detained. Markas IV was informed and it reported to Markas I. Markas I then decided whether the goods were needed for the revolutionary struggle or not. If they were needed, they were bought at two-thirds their value; there was no extortion.20

Similarly, goods could not leave the kabupaten without permission from the leader of Markas IV.

Common to other struggle groups, one of API's main tasks was to organise the town security. Like the Tegal Barisan Pelopor, API proved more effective than the other smaller pemuda groups. As in Tanjung and Tegal, as compensation for turning up for guard duty the poor pemudas received nasi ponggol (rice wrapped in banana leaves) cooked in a public kitchen where many of the activist girls were assigned. Nasi ponggol varied in quality from place to place: in Pemalang and Slawi it was no better or worse than everyday food; while in Tanjung it was quite special. Not all badan perjuangan provided ponggol. It seems that while AMRI Slawi gave out a distribution of rice which had been donated by people grateful for the guard duty, AMRI Tegal was an elite group who were better of socially and had no need of ponggol.

18 These plays will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
19 Pemalang API leader, Interview, 10.2.75.
20 Ibid.
To turn to Pekalongan, there, too, strong opposition was encountered to raising the flag. The Barisan Pelopor leader had heard the news of the Proclamation over the Jakarta radio late on 17 August. Very early the next morning:

I urged two other Barisan Pelopor leaders to come with me to the Town Hall. At 6.30 a.m. no one was there. I changed the Japanese flag for the Red and White. After that we went home and told Kromo Lawi and Bung Bagio.21 Then the row began. At about 7 a.m. I arrived at the municipal offices then suddenly I was called in by Soempeno [the mayor of Pekalongan]. With him were Harso or van de Wil22 the secretary of the Town Hall, and one other. 'Who did this?' they asked. 'I did' I replied. They were very scared and very pale. I was told that as I put the Red and White up, I had to take it down. What if the Japanese got to hear about it? I said that I had put it up and couldn't take it down again, because the Japanese power had ended with the Proclamation. 'We as the Indonesian nation acknowledge the flag. We acknowledge Bung Karno as leader. We are obedient' I told them. Then things became heated. I still wouldn't go and take the flag down. 'Who ordered you to put that flag up?' they kept asking.

'I didn't get an order' I replied, 'it is the Proclamation itself that orders us to act...' Soempeno said he had heard about the Proclamation but had no orders [to fly the flag].23

Unable to mobilise the poor pemudas like its Tegal counterpart, the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor began a more modest campaign to encourage the flying of the flag, and the wearing of red and white home-made badges made of cloth with a cardboard backing. With the cooperation of the railways activists, who had built an enormous tower in front of the station to fly the Red and White, all those boarding trains

21 Bung Bagio is Soebagio Mangoenraharjo, who was head of the office of the BP3 in Pekalongan during the Occupation. See Chapter Three, fn.48.

22 The Dutch rewarded loyal service by Pangreh Praja with European status (gelijke gesteld) which was available to those who met certain conditions - it allowed a person to take a Dutch name, be treated by the courts in the same way as Europeans, and so on.

23 Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader, Interview, 28.8.76.
were checked to ensure they were wearing the red and white badges, which were distributed throughout the town. Together with AMRI they took over a local rice mill and the rice was sold to the people by two Pekalongan KNI leaders. AMRI was in fact referred to disparagingly by Barisan Pelopor leaders as a 'picnic and football movement' because of its bourgeois pemudas, for the most part sons of large batik entrepreneurs. Social backgrounds notwithstanding, in the heady days following the Proclamation AMRI leaders like everyone else were active in raising the flag outside government buildings. Their leader Djunaid flew the flag in front of the Pekalongan court, though it was promptly taken down on the orders of Soeprapto, the city's judge and a leading member of Pekalongan's priyayi corps.

On another night Djunaid, masked, arrived at the house of Tjitrosoewarno, a KNI member, and threatened him with a pistol for refusing to fly the flag. Another small group, the priyayi pemudas from Jalan Permi, went around the town putting up posters which read 'freedom or death' (merdeka atau mati), obtained from or through their leader's brother who had been in the Jakarta medical faculty during the occupation. Their removal of the Japanese flag went without incident until the group arrived in front of the Residency in a truck and hauled down the Rising Sun right before the eyes of startled Japanese officials. Furious at what had happened, the Japanese Resident Tokonami Tokogi called up his Indonesian deputy, Mr Besar, and demanded an explanation. Mr Besar in turn called an urgent meeting of the KNI to say the Japanese were extremely angry over the incident. Even if the officials backed the Permi pemuda action, the Japanese had the arms. It was a big loss of face for the Japanese to see their

24 At the trial of Tiga Daerah leaders in 1947 Supeno the lawyer defending the cases, asked Djunaid, who was a witness, if it was true the Soeprapto had taken down the flag. The question was immediately ruled out of order by the presiding judge, who was Soeprapto. AMRI leader, Interview, 31.9.72.

25 Tjitrosoewarno, a Muhammadiah leader, had been head of the Residency Department of Religious Affairs and a member of the Residency Advisory Council. Ibid. 31.5.73.

26 Permi pemuda leader, Interview, 30.7.75. The Permi pemudas are discussed more fully in the last section of Chapter Seven.
flag taken down, having not yet recovered from the shock of the surrender.

The situation had become very tense in front of the Residency. Other Indonesian officials had gathered as well as the KNI leaders summoned by Mr Besar. The Permi pemuda leaders were asked by the KNI to take down the Red and White and put the Japanese flag back up again, but they refused, confusing the KNI leaders further. Eventually some youths from the Residency Office were persuaded to take down the Indonesian flag, in order to avoid an even more serious clash.

Following this incident another meeting between Mr Besar, the KNI and the Japanese Resident took place. In order to prevent further trouble it was agreed that neither the Japanese flag nor the Red and White would be flown outside the Residency. This situation lasted for another week when the Japanese finally gave way and agreed to allow the Red and White to be flown in front of all buildings.

Having discussed the initial perjuangan response to the Japanese surrender and the Proclamation, let us now look at how the Pangreh Praja reacted to the same events.

Pangreh Praja Reactions

The first response to the first flag raising throughout the residency by the traditional elite seemed to be the same. 'Take it down' the Pangreh Praja told the perjuangan, 'because we have no official orders from the Japanese'. The attitude of local officials during this period was characterised firstly by doubts about the meaning of the Proclamation. The Pangreh Praja outside Pekalongan said the surrender had not been confirmed either by the Japanese Resident or the official Jakarta radio. Secondly, there was fear of Japanese reactions if the revolutionary movement continued the campaign to take down the Japanese flag and replace it with the Red and White. Thirdly, when the surrender was finally confirmed, the Pangreh Praja believed

27 Soedjono, Transcript, V/1-2, 30.7.73.
that the Allies would soon return to hand back the Indies to the Dutch. These attitudes of course were not limited to the Pangreh Praja, but were probably held by the great majority of older Indonesians who were not part of the revolutionary movement. Also some were quicker than others to change their views. But those officials who made their doubts known greatly weakened their own subsequent authority.

Sarimin, who in August 1945 had been Bupati of Brebes for only three months, had achieved what rarely happened under the Dutch. He was a village boy from a family of tobacco farmers, near Dieng. His father's great ambition was that one of his sons would become a priyayi with high status in the colonial civil service. He topped his class in OSVIA (the government training school) in 1924, and was a camat by the age of 28. One of only 13 who graduated from the prestigious Bestuursacademie before the war - a privilege previously reserved for the sons of Regents - in his village Sarimin was known as 'the one who has been spoiled by the gods'. The kind of able and 'modern' priyayi who ruffled feathers in the colonial world, he made extraordinarily rapid progress under the Japanese, being promoted from wedana to patih and then bupati in three years. Yet the gods did not favour Sarimin during his six months as Bupati of Brebes, which turned out to be what he calls the 'calamity' (kemalangan) of his long career as an administrator.

Relations with the perjuangan in the Pekalongan Residency were worsened by the suspected existence among certain Pangreh Praja of a fifth column movement to welcome the Dutch back. In the minds of perjuangan leaders in Tegal at least, this was connected with a movement begun in 1940 (after Germany had invaded Holland) by the then Dutch Assistant Resident A.R. Coert, called the Victory Movement or VVV (Vak Voor Victorie). 28 Many of the group were members of the

28 Negen Broeders, Interview, 27.2.73.
Dutch Freemasons. Furthermore, there were stories about the Wedana of Pangkah (considered to have been a member of the VVV) receiving, after the Proclamation, a large sum of money as part of a Dutch campaign to subvert the Republic. Sarimin was also believed to be involved in this.

In Pekalongan there were also similar rumours about a secret movement or committee, the Comite van Ontvangst, amongst top Pangreh Praja in Pekalongan to prepare to welcome back the Dutch. According to a group within the Pekalongan perjuangan, R.A.A. Soerjo (the Bupati since 1924) was involved, and it included other 'educated people' loyal to the Dutch. As the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader recalls, 'I knew what this group was thinking because I used to go to Soeprapto [the Wedana's] house with Hitami, a friend of Wis Soeprapto, the Wedana's daughter.'

29 The Freemasons were one of the few genuine Dutch-Indonesian meeting places, and many priyayis were members. Sarimin, the Brebes Bupati, and the Resident, Mr Besar, were both said to have been Masons at one time, although Sarimin denied it (Question 15, 'Keterangan', 31.1.46, Proc.Gen.). However this was how their names became linked with the VVV movement. This group also used the slogan of the free Dutch movement throughout the German occupation, 'Nederland zal herrijzen' (Holland Shall Rise Again). Muhamad Nuh, Answers, SEMDAM, 5.

30 One of the Negen Broeders recalls reading notes of an interview, in Muhamad Nuh's private collection of documents, relating to the events in Tegal at that time, which said that the Wedana's chauffeur had been told to hide the money. However, it was never found as proof of the movement. Some considered that this money helped to explain why Tegal API was so 'obedient' to Pangkah, and why its members were supposed to have begun kidnapping local lurahs and KNI members who supported the Proclamation. There were also stories that as many as eight people were ordered to dig their graves near Pangkah and were then killed by API, on the orders of the Wedana. (Negen Broeders, Interview, 27.2.73.) Other interviews confirm the involvement of API in local killings and kidnappings. The Eurasian killings in Tegal kabupaten began at Pangkah on 11 October, with the murder of Henri Gill, a Eurasian sugar mill coolie foreman, by Sidik, younger brother of API leader Mansur and himself a member of API. One theory was that these killings were part of a deliberate plan to discredit the new Republic. The fate of the Eurasians is described in Chapter Six.

31 Sarli, Interview, 27.8.76.
It was Kromo Lawi, Pekalongan's veteran nationalist leader, that this group hated most. In fact relations between some Pekalongan officials and Kromo Lawi, Sarli and the small group of radical nationalists in the Residency capital had deteriorated during the Occupation. Kromo Lawi, it will be recalled, had been given high status by the Japanese, rising to become first chairman of PUTERA, then head of the business section of the Hokokai and leader of the Barisan Pelopor. The Pangreh Praja disliked Kromo Lawi's frequent visits to their becamatans to make speeches about Independence at the courses conducted by the PUTERA, and later the Hokokai. They resented the way he was able to take over the house of the Wedana of Pekalongan as an office of PUTERA. They suspected as well that certain derogatory reports the Japanese had been receiving about the Pangreh Praja resulting in reprimands or dismissals, originated with Kromo Lawi. So the priyayi had tried without success to remove him from positions of influence. At first unaware of the resentment felt against him by the Pekalongan Wedana and his group, Kromo Lawi later sought to protect himself by drawing close to the kenpeitai. This was itself to have repercussions at the time of the kenpeitai clash in Pekalongan in early October when Lawi was arrested by the Permi pemudas, and accused of being a fifth column agent of the kenpeitai.

In the light of the tension that existed between Kromo Lawi and Pekalongan's pro-superiors Pangreh Praja (many of whom were now scared stiff as well), their reaction to the news he brought from Jakarta was not surprising. Kromo Lawi had been in Jakarta at the house of Admiral Maeda on the night the Proclamation was being debated, but had left in the early hours to return to Pekalongan. On 21 August the Residency's Pangreh Praja (including all the bupatis) assembled in Pekalongan for a meeting of the Hokokai and the Residency Advisory Council. Recalling the meeting (which he attended as a member of the Council) 30 years later:

I was laughed at by Sarimin...because [they held the view that] the only people who could give us Independence were those who won the war...they could not believe that we could become independent by a Proclamation. The winners

32 Ibid.
of the war had to give us our freedom. America had won, the Japanese had been defeated and could not grant us Independence. They could not understand that the Proclamation came from the innermost feelings of the Indonesian people themselves.\textsuperscript{33}

Sarimin, in his account of this meeting five months later, wrote

Not a single person at the meeting really knew about all the details of the Proclamation. Mr Kromo Lawi who had just come from Jakarta explained that the contents of the Proclamation had not yet been spelled out. It was an ideological statement without a concrete form.\textsuperscript{34}

Sarimin believed at that time (late August 1945), that the Proclamation would not have any meaning until after the Japanese had formally handed over power to Indonesia. Until this happened, Sarimin envisaged that 'there would be no changes at all'. Moreover, the Bupati was not one of those Pangreh Praja who remained passive. He considered it his duty to make his views known everywhere.\textsuperscript{35}

The nationalist career of Kartohargo, the Brebes veteran, in many ways paralleled that of Kromo Lawi, particularly during the Japanese occupation. While Kartohargo had the better Dutch education (Teachers' School), Kromo Lawi had a broader experience in the pre-war nationalist movement. Both were chairmen of local PARTINDO branches, both ran the local PUTERA and Barisan Pelopor, and both were leaders of the Hokokai in their respective areas. Like Kromo Lawi, Kartohargo was accused of being used as a tool of Japanese imperialism, 'so he could claim to have the support of the people'.\textsuperscript{36}

Kartohargo had two encounters with Sarimin in the month after the Proclamation. On the first occasion he was called to Sarimin's

\textsuperscript{33} Kromo Lawi, Transcript, III/6, 7.6.73.

\textsuperscript{34} Question 1, 'Keterangan', 31.1.46, Proc.Gen.

\textsuperscript{35} This had got him into trouble during colonial times. Once he volunteered his unsolicited views to the Dutch Resident who was visiting Weleri, where Sarimin was Camat, for a meeting of Pangreh Praja. For this he was banished to the poorest kecamatan in Purworejo kabupaten, south of Semarang, to 'teach him a lesson'.

\textsuperscript{36} Sarimin, Interview, 23.1.73.
private office in the kabupaten, where the Bupati told him:

'Mas Kartohargo, I have just come from a meeting of all the bupatis in Pekalongan. According to Mr Besar, we cannot fly the Red and White, but the Japanese flag must be flown. We must obey the Japanese...although they are no longer in power, they have the responsibility for security. The Japanese are to keep law and order in Indonesia until the Allies land. According to Potsdam, Indonesia must be returned to the Dutch'. On hearing this I said nothing and returned to the KNI office.38

The implications of what Sarimin was saying in public appear from the following two accounts of meetings in the Brebes kabupaten pendopo and a nearby kawedanan office meeting.

The [kabupaten] meeting was attended by all the Pangreh Praja from the lurahs on up to the wedanas, office officials, members of the Chinese and Arab communities, and representatives of revolutionary groups. The meeting was led by the Bupati himself. He said that he had just got information about the Japanese surrender to the Allies at a conference with [the vice-Resident] Mr Besar. The Bupati then analysed the War and also the problem of the Proclamation. In his analysis of the Proclamation, the Bupati implied that he did not want to confirm it, and as Regional Head he did not want to announce it. This was clear by his question 'What is the meaning of a Proclamation that has only been signed by two people (Sukarno-Hatta)?'39

After the speech a Masyumi leader again asked the Bupati if, as Regional head, he did not have the confidence to announce the Proclamation. The Bupati replied that he did not. A Barisan Pelopor leader said that the Brebes revolutionary movement would only support

37 An abbreviation of kangmas used by younger siblings when addressing older brothers, or more generally as a term of respect, as in this case.

38 Kartohargo, Interview, 27.2.73.

39 Kartohargo, Question 14, Proses Verbaal, 23.10.46, Proc.Gen. Recalling this meeting 28 years later, Kartohargo said that the Bupati asked that the Japanese flag continue to be flown, and the Red and White be taken down. Interview, 16.12.73.
the Bupati if he announced the Proclamation officially.  

However the Bupati continued to make his views known on tours around the kabupaten. On one such occasion he arrived at the Banjarharjo kawedanan office (southwest of Brebes) about a week after the Proclamation. All the local dignitaries had gathered to hear the Bupati discuss 'the national situation at the present time'. This is part of what a local Muslim perjuangan leader remembered he said:

> Independence depends on the attitude of the Allies; we didn't win the war, the Allies did. You must just wait and see what their attitude is when they land. If they wish us to be independent so we will be. Independence or no independence, what is necessary now is security and order [aman dan tenteram].

Before the end of Sarimin's speech, many had got up to leave saying 'what kind of a speech is this?', and 'colonial stooge'. Then a pemuda leader from nearby West Ketanggungan sugar mill finally interrupted saying 'Excuse me sir, it is better for general orderliness that you finish now'. So the meeting disbanded. The mainly santri pemudas of Banjarharjo were furious about the speech. The Bupati's words were 'so sharp that they wounded' they said. An attempt to kidnap the Bupati some time later as he left the kawedanan apparently failed for reasons that are not clear.

Five months later, Sarimin freely admitted that 'my views and attitudes offended the nationalist feelings of some people'.

Furthermore

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40 After this meeting, the Chinese began to ridicule local pemudas saying 'Independence isn't going to happen'. The Arabs also seemed pleased with the Bupati's attitude, saying 'If the Javanese become independent there will be disturbances because of the plundering that will occur'. Kartohargo, Question 11, Proces-Verbaal, 19.10.46, Proc.Gen.

41 Interview, 6.12.75.

42 Ibid. The most radical of the Brebes rural revolutionary groups, later calling itself PESINDO, came from the Ketanggungan West Sugar Mill settlement, which was formerly part of the Particuliere Landerijen owned by the Bupati of Brebes (see Chapter One).

43 Ibid.
these attitudes and opinions if evaluated now [i.e. January 1946] were indeed completely wrong, but ought to be seen in the light of our understanding at that time also.44

Consistent with his views, it was not until the official handing over of Japanese power on 27 September to the Fuku Shuchokan Mr Besar (who had become Resident only six days earlier) that Sarimin finally agreed to the flag raisings. After this date, 'the difficulties being suffered by the regional heads [i.e. bupatis], having to submit to two different governments, were removed'. 45

Sarimin's sense of having to serve two governments reflects the great distinction between national moves and local reality during this early period of the revolution. At the national level this problem had seemingly been resolved. On 30 August an all-Java and Madura conference of Pangreh Praja was held in Jakarta. This reflected one of the priorities of the older nationalists in the first Republican cabinet. In order to present the Republic as a fait accompli to the Allies they had to demonstrate their popular support from, as well as authority over the population. To this end Sukarno and Hatta were trying to avoid having a system of dual administration and responsibility (Japanese and Republican) side by side. As Hatta put it, 'Orders were issued to every government official to acknowledge himself as an official of the Republic of Indonesia and ready to accept only orders given him by superiors of Indonesian nationality'. 46 Sukarno for his part reassured the Pangreh Praja that they would get 'the proper place they deserved' in the new Republic. 47 This reflected a so-called 'deal' worked out between the Pangreh Praja and the nationalist leadership, whereby the former would stand behind the Republic provided their

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44 Question, 1, 2, 'Keterangan', Proc.Gen.
45 Question 15, ibid.
46 Anderson quoting Hatta in 'Pemuda Revolution', 116.
47 Anderson quoting Sukarno, ibid, 167.
positions and status were guaranteed.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, there was a big gap between these aspirations and their actual implementation at local levels. There the real problem was how officials like Sarimin and their Japanese superiors were going to react. Some waited for Japanese orders validating Independence, others believed the Allies would restore Dutch power. In Banyumas Residency to the south, reaction to the Proclamation was much quicker due to the leadership of the pergerakan Resident, Mr Iskaq. On 5 September he announced that Banyumas was part of the new Republic. Because of his later appointment as Resident Mr Besar did not officially announce 'Indonesian Independence' in Pekalongan until 23 September. Four days later the Japanese formally transferred power to him as the official Republican Resident. Only then was the dilemma of working for 'two governments' solved in the minds of officials like Sarimin.

Also the deal between nationalists and the Pangreh Praja in Jakarta was only possible because of the position of the older moderate nationalists who had worked for the Japanese and who were a majority in the new cabinet. In the Tiga Daerah the older nationalists were the radicals and they did not hold power. While some did join Japanese organisations, they were not involved in implementing Japanese wartime economic policies. They were all aware of the extreme resentment felt by the people because of these policies. So the Japanese transfer of power at the end of September would not have prevented the growing polarisation between the revolutionary movement and the Pangreh Praja. This polarisation reflected local realities, the position of the older nationalists, who were not in power like their Jakarta counterparts, denials of the surrender by the Japanese, and the expressed doubts about the Proclamation. The growing isolation between Jakarta and the Residency was felt by all groups. Feeling left on their own without instructions 'from above' the Pangreh Praja, super-cautious and bureaucratic as always, kept waiting for non-existent orders from above.
Officials like Sarimin were later to blame the Japanese at the Residency level for denying the news of the surrender and refusing to hand over power. Yet there is no evidence that the Residency-level Japanese were in any way prepared to fight for the status quo. Except for being angry about their flag, as a matter of honour, many senior Japanese had come to regard Indonesia as a 'second homeland'. In Bulu Prison in Semarang in the aftermath of the battle when hundreds of Japanese died in a horrible bloodbath on 15 October, one dying Japanese wrote 'Bahagia Merdeka Bahagia Indonesia' with his own blood. Another Japanese, Captain Oka, in charge of the Pekalongan City garrison (keibitai) was also quite sympathetic to the TKR and the revolutionaries' demands for arms. In fact it was only the kenpeitai who showed any inclination to cling to their arms in the Pekalongan Residency, as we shall see.

Rather than the attitudes of the Japanese, it was the late appointment of the Pekalongan Fuku Shuchokan as Resident which more than anything else prevented a quicker formal transfer of power, or an earlier proclamation of the Residency as part of the new Republic. While all the existing Fuku Shuchokan were appointed as residents on 5 September (as part of the 'deal' worked out at the national Pangreh Praja conference), the Residency of Pekalongan was left open (along with the Jakarta municipality) without any reason being given. Most likely Jakarta thought that the new residents should be experienced administrators of the former Dutch Interior Administration (about 90 per cent of those appointed) or pergerakan activists, such as Mr Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo, the Resident of neighbouring Banyumas to the south. Mr Besar may have been a question mark because he was really neither. The Pekalongan reaction to the appointment being left open was a special

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49 Translated literally this Japanese Indonesian would mean 'Happy Independence Happy Indonesia'. Although rather awkward, the meaning is clear. Ota, the Pekalongan Assistant Resident witnessed this incident. Answers.

50 Wadyono, SEMDAM interview, 23.9.67 (TS).

51 See Koesnodiprodjo (ed.), Himpunan undang-undang, peraturan-peraturan, penetapan penetapan pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 1945, rev.ed. (Jakarta, 1951), 88 (subsequently cited as Himpunan).
motion of support from the Pekalongan KNI on 12 September; Mr Besar's appointment was finally ratified by Jakarta nine days later. However, at the Residency level this late appointment was interpreted by the perjuangan in quite a different way. They believed Jakarta must have had doubts about Mr Besar's Republican credentials. These suspicions arose partly because of his real desire to seek a compromise with the Japanese Resident about the flag. At a time when suspicion, rumours and anti-Dutch feelings were rife, his rather Western life style and aloof bearing were also misinterpreted. Mr Besar, the first Indonesian to graduate in law at Leiden, of course spoke excellent Dutch. So did the moderate older nationalists in the new Jakarta cabinet. Like some of them he was also a little sceptical at first about the Proclamation. As his daughter recalls:

"Father was being cautious [about the Proclamation]. He was cautious about everything new. He was never immediately enthusiastic and always waited a while before deciding what to do. I remember saying to father 'You've got to support it [i.e., the Proclamation], there's no other way, it's happened'. He said 'You young people are not going about things in the right way. You're doing things too quickly'. But once he was with you he was always with you no matter what you did or thought."

However, it was a commonly held view amongst the local perjuangan in Tegal at least, that Mr Besar had not been appointed by the Central Government earlier 'because they doubted he could lead the Independence movement in the Residency'.

In Tegal the situation became polarised as quickly as in Brebes, but the conflict did not focus on two men: the determined leader of the local perjuangan against the equally determined Bupati. Instead all elements in the revolutionary movement, the Barisan Pelopor, the Negen Broeders and later the KNI confronted a confused Mayor and

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52 'Mosi Komite Nasional Daerah Pekalongan'. I am grateful to Mr Besar for making this and other Pekalongan KNI documents (subsequently cited as Besar Doc.) available to me.

53 Letter from Secretary of State, A.G. Pringgodigdo, to Dr Soembadji, Pekalongan KNI chairman, dated 21 September 1945, Besar Doc.

54 Interview, 16.10.76.

55 Negen Broeders, Interview, 8.11.75.
Police Chief. The Mayor, still called by his Japanese title of Sicho, had been approached by several of the Negen Broeders in the week following the Proclamation. Their various questions about the flag, about arms and about the Proclamation were all answered with the same reply, that 'government problems are the responsibility of the Pangreh Praja', and that 'you do not need to interfere'.

Three members of the Barisan Pelopor leadership council also went to see the Mayor shortly after the printed texts of the Proclamation and the slogans had begun to be torn down. The leaders requested that the Mayor use the Fonds Kemerdekaan (Independence Funds) to print more copies of the Proclamation text and the flag. The Mayor, who was also the chairman of the Tegal Hokokai, rejected the request saying that 'there was no order to do this from the centre'. The Barisan Pelopor then suggested to the Mayor that he use his own authority to distribute the Proclamation text and order the town's ten lurahs to fly the flag. An argument started which was interrupted by a police official and former member of the Dutch Political Intelligence Service who was also present. He told the Barisan Pelopor leaders:

You are activists for the ideology of Independence; why must you ask agreement and help from the Pangreh Praja? Of course no agreement can be reached. We certainly cannot be any different from the rest of the Pangreh Praja, who are still tied to orders from the Gunseikan [Japanese military administration]. We ourselves (pointing in the direction of police barracks) are still being forced to fly the Hinomaru.

Far from 'seizing power from within', the Republican cause in Pekalongan was forced into confrontation with a government hierarchy

56 Ibid.

57 The Fonds Kemerdekaan were local funds set up in each kabupaten capital. In the Tiga Daerah many local Chinese and Arabs contributed to show their 'support' for independence.

58 Muhamad Nuh, SEMDAM, 5.

59 Ibid.
still tied to its colonial habits.  

The flag incidents in Tegal continued. The Mayor would only agree to allow the Red and White to be flown 'according to the regulations that are in force' beside and to the left of the Japanese flag. Conflicts in government offices between Japanese heads, the Pangreh Praja and the revolutionaries who worked there occurred. The result was that 'sometimes the Merah Putih flew on its own, sometimes with the Hinomaru, sometimes the Hinomaru was by itself, sometimes neither flag was flown'. The Republican flags that were torn down were continually replaced by the Barisan Pelopor. After the Tegal City KNI had received the same kind of answers about the Proclamation from both the Mayor and the Bupati, the perjuangan decided to call a meeting on 11 September, at which the Mayor and the Other officials would be invited to give a full explanation of the government's policy.

The Roman Catholic Church Hall in Kraton Lor where the meeting was due to start at 8 p.m. was packed out. All the officials were sitting in the front rows, behind them the city's businessmen, and at the back of the hall the perjuangan members. Rumours were flying that at the last minute the meeting had been cancelled. Finally Sicho Soengeb appeared about 40 minutes late, wearing the formal dress of the traditional priyayi elite; a courtly blangkon (folded head-dress) in the Solo style, a long kain (batik cloth) folded in pleats which were clipped down the

60 Nowhere is there any record of any incidents of Residency officials publicly (or otherwise) showing their Japanese superiors that they were in charge, as happened in neighbouring Kendal kabupaten between Pekalongan Residency and Semarang. There, in response to a Presidential Decision of 25 September appointing all Pangreh Praja as officials of the new Republic, all Kendal kabupaten Pangreh Praja resigned simultaneously as officials of the Japanese military administration, declaring themselves to be now part of the new Republic. Penghela Rakjat, 1 March 1946. In Pekalongan the only incident was when Soedjono, assistant to Horizumi in the Economic Affairs Department, wrote a report in Dutch and Indonesian at the request of his superiors, then tore it up in front of them, suspecting the Dutch version was for the returning colonial power. Transcript, IV/12-13, 29.7.73. Not even such mild acts of defiance were reported in the kabupatens.

61 Muhamad Nuh, SEMDAM, 6.
front, and sandals. He was accompanied by his young and attractive second wife.

The perjuangan members at the back of the hall studiously ignored the arrival of the Mayor and that of the local Public Prosecutor soon after. Finally the meeting was opened by the Mayor banging his wooden mallet on the table. After welcoming those present and thanking the Church for making the hall available, questions were invited from the audience. Several people asked what was the opinion of the official about Independence. In reply the Mayor told the meeting that as an official under the authority of the Japanese military administration he had not received any 'official instructions' about Independence from his superiors. Not even in the latest edition of the Government Gazette, the Kan Po, was the Proclamation mentioned. The Mayor then produced a copy and held it up before the stunned members of the perjuangan, going on to say that it was dangerous to believe all outside news. Before he had finished, or the other officials had had their chance to speak, those at the back of the hall had risen to their feet. Kadarisman, a member of the KNI group, interrupted the Mayor in a clearly annoyed voice:

Your attitude, Sir, as a person in authority is clearly contradicted by the facts. Because of this the pemudas can no longer believe in you, Sir, and you will feel the result of this yourself. It is quite clear that the Japanese have surrendered to the Allies [but] you are waiting for an official order about this. Does such an enormous defeat have to be confirmed officially?

62 The special sandals (selop), a traditional part of the priyayi dress, together with the topee, epitomised Pangreh Praja values for at least one member of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor leadership council. Interview, 19.9.71.

63 Soengeb Reksoatmodjo's appointment as Mayor after Mr Besar seems to have been a departure from Japanese policy. In Java as well as the Outer Islands the Japanese used intellectuals (such as Besar) or members of the pergerakan as mayor and deputy mayor in most towns since there was no 'traditional' Pangreh Praja stake in city government. As the Mayor of Pekalongan City (Soempeno) was also from the Pangreh Praja, in Pekalongan Residency it appears the Japanese simply extended local priyayi influence to the cities.
TEGAL TOWN HALL (1945)

TEGAL MAYOR' HOUSE
Independence did not come by an official order from the Military administration. Independence was not handed out, like giving sugar lumps to bothersome children....

Kadarisman's voice was drowned by the noise of clapping from the pemudas, and cries of 'That's true, that's right' and 'Don't act like a slave'.

He continued:

Our freedom comes from our nationhood, not from Mr 'Gunseikan'. Are you not an Indonesian, Sir? Are your attitudes and opinions those of a son of Indonesia, or of a faithful servant of the Japanese?64

The clapping was now so deafening that Kadarisman could not continue. Then he apologised saying that he was leaving before the meeting had ended. Soengeb looked as if he had been struck by lightning on a clear day. He tried to speak but it was not clear what he was saying.65

At this moment Soemarno, another Negen Broeder, stepped in with a compromise. If the Mayor would withdraw his previous statement about waiting for orders from the Gunseikan, then the perjuangan would still be willing to cooperate with him and work towards the implementation of the Proclamation. However, Soemarno's voice was drowned out, too, by more shouts from the back of the hall: 'we've had enough'; 'a waste of time'; 'once a slave always a slave', could be heard. Then came the finale:

The Mayor stood up, his hand holding up the wooden mallet. His face went pale then red, sweat began to pour from his brow. Apparently he was going to say something, but did not have the chance to open his mouth, when the voices from the back of the hall continued: 'What more does he want?' 'Let's go home'...'It's already clear'. The pemudas began to move, one, two, three. In the end many left the hall making a great noise as they went. Suddenly there was nobody left at all except those in the front rows - the meeting had disintegrated.66

64 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 74-75.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid, 76.
From that day the Mayor had a new name amongst the members of the perjuangan - 'Tan Sung Eb'. The final humiliation which could be bestowed on him was a Chinese nickname, exposing his notorious business connections with the Tan family, a leading Chinese business clan in Tegal.

In Pemalang there were no flag incidents or open clashes between the Pangreh Praja and the perjuangan as in the other kabupaten capitals. There, after the Proclamation, a group of moderate nationalist politicians and officials, calling itself the Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan Daerah Pemalang (Committee for the Preparation of Independence in the Region of Pemalang) began to suggest flying the Red and White. Because this group, which included the former KOPI leader Abdul Mutholib and the Pemalang Barisan Pelopor leader, was close to the town's Pangreh Praja, there was no opposition from the latter. Undoubtedly the minimal Japanese presence also helped. The Japanese flag near the kabupaten office was hauled down for good on 10 September.

Pemalang was unique too in that the Pangreh Praja set up their own struggle organisation, the Angkatan Muda Kantor or Office Youth, as the Pemalang Bupati called them. A local official and policeman were made the leaders by the Pangreh Praja, and its membership came exclusively from local government offices. Pemalang's Pangreh Praja went even further. They tried to control the town's perjuangan by setting up a Gabungan Angkatan Muda Indonesia (United Indonesian Younger Generation), which was ridiculed by API and never functioned effectively.

The growing antagonisms between the Pangreh Praja-KNI group and the rest of the perjuangan was reflected in Soepangat's kidnapping. While it is not certain why it happened, or who was responsible, several former PETA members were involved in its execution.

According to an API leader, Soepangat was taken to a village near the
old Sumberhardjo sugar mill (the former PETA Company's barracks),
for a day and a night. This provoked an ultimatum from the town's
perjuangan that if the 'father of the people' (bapaknya rakyat) was
not immediately returned to Pemalang, the Pangreh Praja and the police,
'with all their assistants, would be destroyed to the last man'.

After this ultimatum Soepangat was returned to Pemalang unharmed.

This kidnapping affair, insignificant enough in itself,
further polarised the perjuangan from the Pangreh Praja. Soepangat
was a popular figure in Pemalang with a reputation for honesty and
fairness in running the PEKOPE cooperative which helped to alleviate
the wartime economic deprivations. He was well liked by everybody for
his tactful flexibility. While already in his forties like other
older nationalist leaders Kartohargo and Muhamad Nuh, like them too
he was close to the younger pemuda rakyat in the revolutionary struggle.
The intensity of local feeling against the Pangreh Praja after the
kidnapping affair was probably stronger than in Brebes and Tegal,
where the older santris were not such an integral part of the perjuangan
as in Pemalang. Although not as dramatic as the public confrontations
in Tegal and Brebes the kidnapping of Soepangat was a similar turning
point in relations between the two groups. From this point on the
Pemalang perjuangan leaders gave up their attempts to negotiate, convince
or cooperate with the Pangreh Praja.

No less a personage than the Bupati of Pemalang, writing
with hindsight in 1946, blames those who kidnapped Soepangat for
'creating the subsequent movement by the people to change the entire
Pangreh Praja and those in authority'. Indeed the Bupati, along
with all the top echelon of Pemalang's Pangreh Praja, were themselves
to become victims of this movement in less than a month's time.

71 In many ways the conflict between the Pangreh Praja and the
perjuangan in Pemalang had its origins back in early rivalries
between the leaders of KOPI and PEKOPE during the Japanese
occupation. See Chapter Two.
72 Bupati of Pemalang, op.cit.
The Role of the KNIs

On 22 August 1945, Sukarno had announced the decision of the PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence), now calling itself the Komite Nasional Indonesia, to set up the PNI State Party, the BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat, People's Security Force) and local KNIs. With the suspension of the State Party at the end of August, the KNIs in each region were left 'as the representative body linking the [Republican] administration and popular forces at each level' of government. Reid goes on to argue that the KNIs were extensions of the wartime Hokokai branches and as such very much the organs of the older nationalist elite. In some areas, such as Bandung, they retained the initiative vis-a-vis more militant groups, while in other places, such as Surabaya, 'the KNI was never a very effective mediator' between the revolutionary leaders and the British.

The roles of the KNI in the Pekalongan Residency reflected Residency rather than national or provincial realities. There with the passive attitude of the Pangreh Praja towards the Proclamation a power vacuum was developing. The KNIs were seen by the older perjuangan leaders as replacing the colonial administrative apparatus whose weakness and inability to act decisively was threatening the foundations of the new Republic. The KNIs were a new power base from which the older leaders could negotiate with the Japanese for arms, and a focus for the pemudas. They also performed economic functions in many areas.

The effectiveness of these KNIs depended to a large extent on whether they were KNI angkatan, appointed by the Pangreh Praja, or KNI pilihan, chosen - usually elected - by and from amongst members of the perjuangan. Of the six KNIs at the kabupaten and the Residency level

73 Reid, National Revolution, 34.

74 Ibid.

75 The KNIs in the Tiga Daerah were from the beginning similar to Sjahrir's new-type KNIs, set up in late November, which Reid argues were more effective, briefly. Ibid, 71.
four were elected while two were appointed. It was the
Tegal Municipality KNI which played the most important role, successfully
negotiating the withdrawal of the kenpeitai from Tegal. This was
mainly because in the month before the revolusi sosial began (on 7 October)
the KNI's chairman, Taman Siswa schoolteacher Ki Tjitrasatmaka,
was supported by the older radicals in the Barisan Pelopor, the younger
Negen Broeders and the Muslims. In the opinion of a Negen Broeders'
member of the Tegal City KNI, 'it was the KNI which represented the
Indonesian Republican government in Tegal Municipality because the
Pangreh Praja and the police were not tegas (firm, resolute) and doubted
the Proclamation'. Another Barisan Pelopor view was that the KNI
was a place where local perjuangan members would gather, a body through
which the voices of the people could be heard and directed. Ki
Tjitrasatmaka's view was that while the City KNI's main task was security,
the United KNI later in October had to fill the vacuum of authority
left as a result of the revolusi sosial.

Another view comes from Soesmono, deputy chairman of the
Tegal kabupaten KNI, who sees the KNI as unique in the political
history of the revolution. Unlike Pemalang, Tegal did not have a
political figure like Soepangat, with the charisma and the authority
to unite all groups in the perjuangan. Instead it was the KNI (and
later the Working Committee) which played this role in Tegal, forging a
unity of all groups. Soesmono recalls:

At the beginning after the Proclamation it was as if
the pergerakan members gave up their ideological and
organisational ties and accepted fully the KNI as
the centre of the revolutionary struggle in the region.
The KNI was like a kitchen that 'prepared' all the
social and administrative problems that the
perjuangan faced. It seemed as if the business of the
government departments had moved to the KNI offices.
People felt proud, indeed preferred, to enter the KNI,
rather than a government office, so the KNI had to be
open day and night.

Kadarisman, 'Riwayat Perjuangan' written as part of his application
to become a Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneer of Independence), dated
11 January 1978 (TS).

Susmono, Answers, 6.
This role for the Tegal KNIs was not repeated in other parts of Pekalongan Residency. In Pemalang the KNI was a Pangreh Praja creation, composed of high officials, moderate older nationalists and conservative Muslims chosen at a meeting of kabupaten officials. It was attended by a member of the Pekalongan KNI (Tjitrosoewarno) as a 'representative from the Resident's office' but no one from the perjuangan attended. Soepangat, in his absence, was chosen 'to lead the information section' of the KNI, but he refused to have anything to do with it.  

One reason for the Pemalang perjuangan's antagonism towards the KNI can be seen in Appendix D. With the possible exception of Ulujami, all the local KNIs were dominated by Pangreh Praja. This reflected the attitude of the Bupati of Pemalang, R.T. Sosro Adikoesoemo, who believed that the task of these local KNIs was 'to cooperate with the local government and to comply with the wishes of the people to live in freedom'. Their main task was to 'guard the safety and orderliness of the people' and to assist local Pangreh Praja whose job it was to 'improve the welfare of the people'. Because of this it was logical (according to the Bupati), that those chosen as chairmen of local KNIs were all Pangreh Praja. This was necessary 'so the actions of the KNIs would be in line with government departments'. Indeed the Bupati had never heard of a KNI (in Pemalang presumably) which 'departed from the official way' of the government. Not surprising was the Bupati's view also that a main function of the KNI should be to 'calm the people'.

Soepangat and the nationalists in Pemalang (and indeed throughout the Residency) held the opposite view. They believed the KNI should be in the forefront of the revolution, to awaken the people to the call of the Proclamation and Independence. But the KNIs could hardly link the administration and popular forces when the former seemed unwilling to allow the symbol of Independence, the Red and White, to be flown.

78 The Pemalang Bupati gives a good description of the meeting to appoint the KNI in Question 6, 'Jawaban', Proc.Gen.

79 Question 7, ibid.
From Appendix D, we can see that there were slightly more elected KNI members in Tegal kabupaten than in either Pemalang or Brebes. A good example of an elected KNI was in Pangkah, a sugar mill settlement, where the election of KNI Chairman took place at a meeting of the kawedanan office. Each lurah from the kawedanan's 53 villages had to come, bringing with him five 'well-known people'. The large meeting was chaired by the former Camat Abdullah. Each of the seven candidates was assigned a number, and voters wrote down the number of the candidate of their choice on a piece of paper and put the piece of paper in a makeshift ballot box. Sugiono, an assistant teacher and the youngest of the seven candidates, was elected, beating his boss (the local head teacher) and three sugar mill employees, who were also API members. After his election, feeling his youthfulness (he was only 27), the new KNI Chairman got up and made a very unrevolutionary speech 'thanking everyone for putting their trust in me, especially the honourable Wedana, the honourable Camat, and the honourable everyone else'.

The election of the KNI in Pangkah symbolised the subsequent decline in authority of the Wedana as Sugiono the new KNI chairman began to be called 'Pak' Wedana by local people. As we have seen the Wedana was thought to have been a member of the pre-war VVV movement and to have received money to subvert the new Republic. Certainly Sugiono's doubts about the Wedana's loyalties were increased at lunch with the three camats of Pangkah, Kedungbanteng and Jatinegara which the KNI chairman attended after his election. In the middle of lunch the Wedana remarked that yes, indeed, this was Independence, but he was waiting until his 'former boss' (majikan yang lama) returned. Sugiono reflecting later on this remark decided that the arrival of 'the new boss', namely the KNI, was not to the Wedana's liking.

The activities of the Pangkah KNI reflect the economic role some KNIs played during this time. After the election of a new Bupati

80 Soegiono, Transcript, II/25, 27.11.75.

81 These three kecamatans were part of the kawedanan of Pangkah.
in Tegal, Sugiono went to the local textile factory and bought cloth with KNI funds 'at a fair price' for free distribution to the people. Apart from an information section, which Sugiono appointed the 'very influential' Kyai Umar to organise, the KNI included a BKR member (who was also in API) to coordinate the pemudas, and as liaison officer, a former Housing Inspector with the prewar Plague Eradication Program, who had travelled widely throughout the area. We will return to Sugiono's other remarkable achievement in supervising the election of new lurahs in most villages throughout the kawedanan during the revolusi sosial in the next chapter.

In Bumijawa kawedanan, one of the first tasks of the local KNI was to meet the people's demand for cloth. Its economic role went further than this, however, to include the collection and marketing of the local maize crop. By borrowing funds through issuing shares, a simple marketing cooperative was set up. After the corn was sold, the people were repaid.

The effectiveness of local KNIs during the first two months after the Proclamation thus depended on several factors. Firstly, who the chairman was, and how he was appointed. Secondly, to what extent the KNIs took the initiative in trying to alleviate the continued economic distress. All the elected KNIs had some economic functions. Thirdly, the attitude of Pangreh Praja was also important. The views of the Bupati of Pemalang for example about the role of the KNI effectively excluded any members of the perjuangan from joining it. In this respect the Belik KNI was rather unique. The elected Chairman was the new perjuangan-minded Wedana. While this can be explained partly by the lack of strong revolutionary leadership in this area, nevertheless the Wedana quickly sought to legitimise his appointment by seeing to a local cloth distribution.

Another exception was Talang where the Camat appointed a local pergerakan activist from the 1930s, Soewachno, as KNI Chairman. A number of prominent Muslims were also members, reflecting the strength

82 Bumijawa KNI leader, Interview, 15.2.73.
of the local santri community. More typically, local Pangreh Praja chose moderate members of the prewar pergerakan. Thus in Slawi, Ki Partohadisutjipto, Chairman of Pekalongan Residency Taman Siswa (and a Sangikai member), had no ties with either the radicals of the 'twenties or the local pemuda rakyat, and the KNI had no authority. After being dominated by AMRI Slawi for a time it ceased to function.

It is to the role of the urban KNIs in the dramas that were acted out with the Japanese in September and early October that we now turn.

The fate of the Japanese

The last support still holding the crumbling edifice of Pangreh Praja authority in Pekalongan Residency was the Japanese presence, both civilian (in the sugar factories) and military (in the form of the kenpeitai units in Tegal and Pekalongan and the Pekalongan city garrison.

In Tegal the initial confrontation was brought on by the actions of railway activists in hauling down the Japanese flag around the town, after the Red and White was successfully raised at the station despite the appearance of a kenpeitai officer. In the excitement of this psychological victory in defying the kenpeitai the group climbed into two trucks and went around the town, hauling down the Japanese flag whenever they found it, until they reached the Town Hall, which happened to be almost opposite the kenpeitai barracks. In the middle of the street the two trucks were stopped by a kenpeitai officer on a motor bike. They were told to get down and go into the nearby barracks. The pemudas refused point blank, and an argument started. The kenpeitai officer may have tried to force the issue with a pistol. The pemudas then said they could not agree to the request without getting permission from the KNI Chairman first. Apparently the kenpeitai officer agreed to this, and the pemudas were allowed to leave.\(^3\)

\(^3\) This account is taken from part IV of an unpublished history of Tegal kabupaten entitled 'Tegal pada Zaman Kemerdekaan' compiled in 1969 by Ki Tjitrasatmaka and others (subsequently cited as Tegal History). Also Tjitrasatmaka, Interview, 8.12.72.
barely time for hurried explanations to an extremely surprised KNI chairman when about 10 heavily armed kenpeitai officers arrived at the KNI office. Ki Tjitrasatmaka describes what happened:

A kenpeitai guard was posted outside the KNI office with their guns pointed at the building. Their leaders came in extremely angry and wanted us to hand over the pemudas involved in the flag incident, who had said that the kenpeitai was no longer in power.\(^{84}\)

News of the incident spread around the town like wildfire. Within ten minutes according to one report over 100 demonstrators had gathered outside the KNI office. Messages were passed out that rash action would only lead to bloodshed, as the kenpeitai were heavily armed. The situation became very tense as those outside the KNI office waited for the outcome of negotiations. The kenpeitai were still very angry, demanding that the recalcitrant pemudas be handed over. Apparently the diplomacy of the KNI Chairman calmed the situation. Probably he 'apologised' to the kenpeitai for the trouble the pemudas had caused. Whatever was said, upon the leaving the KNI office some of the Japanese returned the salute of 'Merdeka' from the pemudas waiting outside.\(^{85}\)

However, anti-Japanese feeling in the town was still running very high, fed by news of Japanese being captured, paraded, and then killed on the outskirts of the city.\(^{86}\) Soon it became impossible for the Japanese to move outside the towns, even outside their own homes in the towns, so great was the danger of being stopped and taken prisoner by local groups. An eyewitness describes one such incident in Ketanggungan, south of Brebes:

The kecamatan office received a telephone call from Purwokerto to say that a car with six Japanese passengers, and a truck carrying food and clothing would be coming through and could we try and stop it

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84 Ki Tjitrasatmaka, 'Bahan Research' SEMDAM, 5, 18.11.61.

85 Ibid, 'Tegal History'.

86 According to a report received by the Barisan Pelopor, one of the Japanese was a civilian from the shipbuilding yards, while the other was the Assistant Resident (Fuku Shuchokan) of Tegal, 'Ceritaku', 75. For the place where the Japanese were killed see the map of Tegal Municipality.
at the railway crossing. I was waiting there myself, armed only with a short sword. A large crowd had soon gathered. Around 5 o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese car arrived, they had the Red and White flying on the car.... We had closed the railway gates, so they had to stop, thinking there was a train. We asked the Japanese to get out, and we took them along to the local BKR. Some of them started crying, may be they were afraid. The kabupaten office was informed and soon a truckload of pemudas arrived carrying flares and wearing red headbands....

The fate of the Japanese is unknown. In another account of the Ketanggungan incident by the leaders of the BKR in Brebes, on the arrival of the pemudas to escort the Japanese, the people were shouting 'Jepang! Jepang!' (the Japanese! the Japanese!) for the first time - during the Occupation they were allowed to use only the word 'Nippon'. The psychological effect of incidents such as these on the ordinary people was enormous, especially in view of the appalling economic conditions that still existed in the rural areas of the Residency. The rice the Japanese had collected was still stacked - and rotting - outside the Cooperatives, because Pangreh Praja officials would not distribute it without an 'order' from above. But here were the dreaded Japanese whom the Pangreh Praja dared not 'disobey' without an order, surrendering before them.

A similar incident occurred at Slawi south of Tegal. Again the report came by telephone from Purwokerto that several trucks were heading north with an unknown number of Japanese. According to the local BKR leader in Slawi:

The local people on the outskirts of the town collected large boulders from the river, and put up a kind of rough barricade across the main road. Soon the news was confirmed, the Japanese truck arrived and had to stop at the barricade. It was already dark, and they asked for help to remove the boulders. But no one would go near to help, as there were reports that shooting had started. In fact it was only the noise of the truck's exhausts backfiring, as they came down the long slope [from Lebaksiu] towards Slawi.

87 BKR leader, Transcript, I/6-7, 12.4.73.
88 BKR leader, Transcript, I/10, 29.5.73.
Fortunately the local BKR leader could speak a little Japanese. They told him they were on their way to Tegal to surrender, but would be quite happy to do so in Slawi instead. The six Japanese and their truck were taken over by the pemudas while awaiting the arrival of the BKR from Tegal. By this time a huge crowd which had gathered wanted to 'finish off' the Japanese there and then. A difficult situation was averted when a BKR unit arrived and took the Japanese and their truck off to Tegal. The arms confiscated went to the local BKR.

The sugar mills, well away from kenpeitai protection now became the target of a series of actions planned and implemented by local badan perjuangan leaders. The Japanese civilians manning the mills, had supplies of small arms which local revolutionaries wanted to obtain. As the mills were not closely guarded the Japanese could easily be overpowered. Surprise was the key element, and the Japanese never resisted.

At Ketanggungan (Brebes) the Wedana had previously been informed about the planned takeover of the Banjaratma factory, which was organised by Tanjung perjuangan leaders. Only six people were involved. In Comal (Pemalang) a similar 'peaceful' takeover occurred after the mill had been surrounded.

West Ketanggungan was the one remaining sugar mill that had not surrendered, it was furthest away from Tegal and the kenpeitai, who were now on the alert for calls for reinforcements from beleaguered factories. The operation was planned in complete secrecy and under cover of darkness. The two Barisan Pelopor units were kept 'in the dark' (literally as well) about where they were going or what they were to do. At 7.30 p.m. they set out west along the coastal road past Brebes, turning southwards at Tanjung. By 10.10 p.m. they arrived in a small village, where they left the truck with orders to return to Tegal. If by 3 a.m. there was no news, reinforcements should be brought. For the next 2½ hours the two pemuda groups walked in guerilla fashion silently along tiny paths criss-crossing the sawahs until they arrived

89 For the takeover of the Banjaratma factory, see the discussion of the Tanjung pemudas earlier in this Chapter.
on the outskirts of the sugar factory, looming out of the darkness. The two groups split up and were ready to enter the factory at 2 a.m. A mill worker contacted the previous afternoon would be ready to let them in. About 10-11 Japanese had to be overpowered first. Their weapons were kept in a storeroom. Two pemudas were assigned to disarm each Japanese. This whole operation depended for its success on speed – it had to be over in 10 minutes. Crawling on their stomachs (as the Japanese had taught them in the Barisan Pelopor para-military training) they found the Indonesian workers waiting at the unlocked door. The seven Japanese, totally surprised, found themselves being bound hand and foot as they awoke.

...the Japanese were dragged outside by the pemudas. Their anger, hate and desire for revenge – all the result of what they had experienced during the Occupation – had reached its climax, it could be held back no longer. The seven Japanese – I don't know what happened to them...  

There was a great haul of weapons: 2 Japanese carbines, 2 German-made carbines, a 'Bulldog' pistol, a colt pistol, and 8 'FN' pistols all with ammunition, and a Samurai sword as well.

News of the success of the lightning midnight raid quickly spread as the Tegal Barisan Pelopor prepared itself for what now seemed inevitable – a confrontation with the kenpeitai. With tensions heightening between the Japanese and the perjuangan, the spark which ignited the final confrontations was news of the actions of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) in Jakarta. NICA had landed in Jakarta with the British on 30 September 1945, as part of the Allied Military Administration, set up under a formal Dutch Civil Affairs Agreement, signed on 24 August.

Although responsibility for civilian ex-prisoners of war was entrusted to the Dutch NICA personnel (who were also supposed to 'enforce pre-war laws'), NICA was subordinate to the Allied command. Apparently during early October 'roving patrols of trigger-happy Dutch and Ambonese soldiers' attempted to terrorize or provoke the population in the capital.

90 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 67-68.
91 Kahin, Nationalism, 143.
News of these activities of NICA quickly reached the Pekalongan Residency by the railways telegraph. One result was:

Because [of the news of NICA's activities] the 'games' the pemudas had been playing - hauling flags up and down, putting up posters - suddenly seemed irrelevant. The enemy in front of our noses [the Japanese] had to be disarmed immediately - what were we sitting back waiting for? The arrival of NICA? This was heard everywhere amongst the pemudas.92

The municipal KNI, since the initial clash between the kenpeitai and the pemudas, had not been idle:

Many times the KNI as the people's representative and the Government's adviser, had met with the kenpeitai, to try and get them to hand over their weapons. But their efforts had so far failed, always we got the same reply, that they were still waiting for orders from their superiors.93

The last of these meetings was between the KNI Chairman, his deputy, Mardjono, the Tegal kenpeitai commander, Katsuichi Hoshino, and his two assistants, was in progress when a delegation entered the meeting to say a large demonstration was gathering outside. The situation, they said, was serious. Hoshino immediately asked to be accompanied back to his headquarters. A path had to be cleared through the demonstrators outside. On leaving Hoshino apparently gave an undertaking that, as long as there were no rash actions by the Republicans, his men would not take action. The KNI leaders, however, could no longer restrain the crowd. The kenpeitai headquarters was surrounded, the electricity and water supplies were cut off, and no-one was permitted to enter or leave the building.

This siege situation lasted for about a week. In one incident on the second day, an impatient pemuda advanced over the agreed 'demarcation line' that neither side was to have crossed. He was shot and later died. An attempt to burn down the brick building failed even after much petrol had been splashed around. Japanese reinforcements from Purwokerto, including 10 soldiers with hand grenades and machine guns

92 'Ceritaku, 86.

93 Tegal KNI chairman, Interview, 8.12.72.
were stopped at Adiwerna, having got through one barricade set up by AMRI in Slawi. After being besieged for a day by hundreds of people, they transferred from their army truck and reached the **kenpeitai** headquarters in Tegal in safety, minus their weapons.

The situation had reached a stalemate. The **kenpeitai** were sitting it out refusing to surrender, the pemudas were helpless without arms. Then a phone call came through again from AMRI Slawi to say an unidentified sedan had gone through the AMRI road block. It was the Resident of Banyumas, Mr Iskaq bringing the regional **kenpeitai** commander (butaicho) from Purwokerto. The latter's arrival broke the impasse. After meeting with his commanding officer, the Tegal **kenpeitai** chief Hoshino received an official order to surrender. This was conveyed to the deputy KNI Chairman Mardjono. A 'Surrender Reception Committee' (Panitya Penerimaan Penyerahan) was quickly formed, to receive the arms, ammunition and supplies from the Japanese which were duly handed over to the BKR. A 'farewell' breakfast was held at the Hotel Merdeka, at which parting words were exchanged. Then everyone shook hands, and trucks specially provided by the BKR took the **kenpeitai** to the station where they boarded the train to Purwokerto, accompanied by a special BKR escort. 94

While in Pemalang (and presumably Brebes) the fewer Japanese were easily disarmed, in Pekalongan the outcome was different. Negotiations for the transfer of arms from the Japanese to the pemudas had already yielded some weapons held by civilians. But as in Tegal, the **kenpeitai** had refused to surrender their weapons (which included sub-machine guns), without specific orders from their headquarters in Purwokerto.

By October all the Japanese except the **kenpeitai** had agreed to hand over their weapons and these were now stored in the former

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94 The above account of the disarming of the **kenpeitai** in Tegal is reconstructed from Ki Tjitrasatmaka, Interview, 8.12.72 in his 'Bahan Research', 5-6, the 'Tegal History' and Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 85-93.

95 For the incidents in Pemalang, see my 'Social Revolution', 105-06.
Dutch clubhouse, the Societeit. Some weapons had apparently already been obtained illegally by pemudas from raids on the homes of Japanese, and this had not helped negotiations. The railway activists were now demanding that the kenpeitai also hand over their heavy weapons, namely the machine guns. The continued show of force by the kenpeitai around the town was causing tensions as well.

About midday on 4 October, a call spread around Pekalongan to 'attack' the kenpeitai building. A crowd soon gathered outside the kenpeitai building, which had been a hotel in Dutch times, where Mr Besar was negotiating inside with the kenpeitai commander. After about two hours the growing crowd outside was becoming more and more impatient. They began demanding that the kenpeitai agree to hand over all their weapons. Mr Besar was forced to leave the unfinished negotiations, and went out to speak to the crowd. A compromise had been reached whereby the Japanese had agreed to stop their provocative demonstrations around the town, and would surrender enough guns so that there was parity with the City police. The guns would be stored in the Societeit to which both Mr Besar and the Japanese kenpeitai chief would have keys. No weapons could be taken out without the knowledge of the other side. The militant railway activists were not satisfied with the arms part of the agreement. They wanted complete control over the weapons. Just as Mr Besar was about to re-enter the building to continue negotiations for the second time, the crowd surged forward into the neighbouring Residency office compound, right up to the low wall separating it from the kenpeitai barracks.

Exactly what happened next is uncertain. The kenpeitai probably feared the pressing crowd was about to break through and into

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96 The response from the Cikalsari prison to this call was typical. About 25 activists armed with a couple of old Dutch rifles, 10 swords and two pistols got into a truck and drove off to join the crowd in front of the kenpeitai barracks. Former jailor, Interview, 15.10.76.

97 Mr Besar, Transcript II/8, II/3, 24.3.73.

98 Antara, 6 October 1945.

99 Soedjono, Transcript, VI/9, 29.7.73.
their own headquarters as well. It might have been just at this moment that they saw Rahaju, a railways activist, climbing onto the roof of the kenpeitai building and begin hauling down the Japanese flag.

Suddenly there was the sound of rapid machine gun fire into the crowd.... A sharpened bamboo spear was no use against machine guns so I threw mine away, and crawled into the Residency yard. There was pandemonium amongst the Japanese. [I saw] three Japanese had been stabbed and killed with bamboo spears.... Sheltering under a window of the Residency offices I saw Mr Besar jump over the wall...thank heavens he was safe...bullets were flying everywhere, he could easily have been killed...I saw someone on the roof of the kenpeitai building with kerosene trying to set it alight, blood was streaming from a wound in his head, I remember it clearly...the Japanese were shooting aimlessly at everyone, we had to get away as quickly as possible. I crawled around the back of the Residency, got hold of a boat and crossed the river. I went straight to the Public Works Department, and I rang Semarang and Purbokerto to get help.100

Some time later pemuda reinforcements arrived from Semarang bringing dynamite, and a siege was laid on the kenpeitai building. After Mr Besar and the Pekalongan KNI chairman had left the City for Buaran, three kilometers away, the siege was taken over by the ex-PETA/ BKR. 'It was the first time we could practise our military knowledge from the PETA, in a real operation,' recalls Wadyono. 'We set up posts and patrols each with its own well-outlined area of responsibility. Also the [kenpeitai] water supply and electricity was cut off by order of the BKR'.101 The latter also set up two well hidden posts in front of the kenpeitai, giving a cross-fire cover of the main entrance to the building. No one dared moved openly in

100 Ibid. Wadyono, the Brebes BKI leader in Pekalongan at the time, recalls that 'after the burst of machine gun fire the crowd - including the pemudas - fled in panic. One [Indonesian] police officer was known to have run as far as Sragi [12 kilometers away], there throwing away his uniform'. Comment in English by Wadyono on an early draft of this chapter. (subsequently cited as English Comment).

101 Ibid.
front of the Japanese guns which were still trained on the dead or wounded. To try and solve this problem it was decided to form a delegation to approach the Japanese guns under the protection of the Red Cross flag. The Residency medical officer Dr Sumakno, who was also the Red Cross doctor (and Mr Besar's brother) wanted to join the group but his deafness was considered a liability. Volunteers were called for. His four daughters, Sudarmini, Amiarti, Buliastri and Meri pleased to be allowed to go with an Ambonese doctor, Tupamahu - a member of the KNI - and the Wedana's two daughters, Henki and Madalia.

Meri describes the scene:

Eventually we persuaded father to let us go - we left from in front of the kawedanan office. Dr Tupamahu was carrying a small Red Cross flag, actually meant for a car. The six of us were walking behind. We went slowly across Queens Park towards the kenpeitai, hoping their binoculars would pick up our flag. When we got to the barricade, Dr Tupamahu explained that we were from the Red Cross, and wanted to pick up any wounded. We then started work. I remember none of the pemudas had weapons, only bamboo spears. Those still alive [after the fighting] had obviously been speared in the stomach, sometimes two with the one spear, like sate...it was ghastly. They had all been shot at chest level by machine gun fire. Suddenly one of the 'corpses' said 'Help me'. He had been shot in the leg, and had been lying in the heat for a whole day. He said, 'I would have died if it hadn't rained last night.' We took him to the hospital immediately and were allowed to take all the bodies as well, for identification. One of my sisters fainted at the hospital.

The following afternoon Pekalongan buried 32 dead as a result of the fighting, and a number of Japanese as well. Later in the evening the Banyumas Resident Mr Iskaq arrived, accompanied by an interpreter, Saburo Tamuro, and Captain Nonaka from the Banyumas garrison. On their arrival the Banyumas group held immediate

102 Mrs Hugeng (wife of Indonesia's former Police Chief), Interview, 1.8.73. Henki, the Wedana's daughter, is the widow of Hertasning, former Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.

103 Warta Berita, 8 October.

104 The interpreter on this trip, Saburo Tamuro, later wrote an account of the mission in Indonesian. I am grateful to Mr Iskaq for providing a copy of this account, dated 26 September 1971. My account is based largely on Tamuro's version.
negotiations with the BKR, led by Iskander Idris. The BKR demands were that a ceasefire should begin immediately, all Japanese in Pekalongan region should hand over their weapons to the BKR, and that the Japanese should leave the Residency as soon as possible. The two Japanese accompanying Mr Iskaq agreed to the conditions, and said they would try to make contact with the besieged kenpeitai officers. This was done by about 9 p.m. After two anxious hours, a Japanese representative from the former Shuchokan staff arrived at the Pekalongan kawedanan office to say that the kenpeitai had agreed to the conditions. Direct negotiations now began between the kenpeitai, Iskander Idris, the commander of the Pekalongan garrison, Captain T. Oka, and others, which were successfully concluded about midnight on 6 October.

On the following day the Residency's remaining Japanese military personnel were taken to Banyumas in trucks provided by the BKR. Part of the agreement was that Japanese civilians were put under the authority of the Republican Resident of Pekalongan until transport could be found for them to leave for Banyumas as well.

The initial reaction to the departure of the Japanese is well expressed by one government official:

After this all the Japanese were taken away, leaving only their old unusable weapons. We were the first place in Java to get rid of the Japanese, I was amazed, we were so used to having colonial masters, but now they were no more.

Not only was Pekalongan the first region in Java to be free of Japanese by 7 October, it was also well ahead of any Residency in the outer islands. This made it first in all Indonesia.

105 Wadyono emphasises the role of Oka, the senior PETA shidokan (trainer) in bringing the negotiations to a quick conclusion. During the fighting and subsequent siege of the previous two days, Oka had kept the City garrison confined to their barracks. He also advised his former PETA men on tactics during the siege. 'He was a seasoned soldier who had earned distinctions in Manchuria and was respected by many Japanese, including the kenpeitai' recalls Wadyono. 'After escorting the kenpeitai and keibitai to their destination [Purowerto] he stealthily gave us 2 car loads of guns, including machine guns' (Wadyono, English comment).

106 Soedjono, Transcript, VI/12, 30.7.73.
WHAT actually happened below the kabupaten level in areas remote from national politics during the first months after Independence has been neglected in past studies on the Indonesian Revolution. Areas such as Pekalongan Residency, Banten, Solo, and North Sumatra experienced quite violent popular movements lasting from early October 1945 until April 1946, which are generally known as the revolusi sosial (social revolution). This is a general term referring to the processes by which local popular movements swept away the old order - the village headmen and their officials, the camats and wedanas and the administrations of the kabupaten capitals.

In this chapter we shall go deeper into the dynamics of these popular movements at the local level. How did the revolusi sosial begin in the Tiga Daerah? Who led the movement in each area? What happened to officials who had administered the policies of the discredited Japanese regime? Who replaced them and how were they chosen? In particular, what role do the semi-bandits, the lenggaongs, play in overturning the local village administrations?

The month after the Proclamation had provided little relief from the famine conditions and shortages which people had experienced

1 Anderson, in his discussion of some of these movements, does not penetrate below the kabupaten, Java, 332-69. Reid, using a study by Robert Jay (based on fieldwork in the early 'fifties) discusses how pressure was mobilised to force many lurahs out of office in Java. National Revolution, 59-68, especially 61-63. Anthony Reid's new study, The Blood of the People (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), 218-45, analyses in detail the 'social revolution' in North Sumatra, and how the local rulers were eliminated, without describing the process at the village level.

2 The term as used in Indonesia does not necessarily imply a social revolution in the Marxist sense.
during the Occupation. All over the Tiga Daerah there were hundreds of quintals of paddy delivered after the last harvest (May/June), which the Japanese had not been able to utilise. In Jatinegara kecamatan, for example, about 60 per cent of the harvest had been requisitioned, and the paddy was now lying in the rice barns throughout the kecamatan. Demands from hungry villagers that this paddy be distributed went unheeded by village officials as well as camats. The tension this caused is nowhere better illustrated than in Moga kecamatan in southern Pemalang.

During the first week in October, a meeting was called while the Camat was away in the kabupaten capital. The people asked that the paddy be distributed but were told nothing could be done until the Camat returned. The secretary of the Moga branch of the Soldiers Relief Organisation (BP2) recalls that:

A large crowd had gathered in front of the agricultural cooperative storehouse demanding the distribution of the paddy. The Fuku Soncho [Deputy Camat], Deradjat [younger brother of the Bupati of Pemalang], got up to speak to the crowd. He was very scared. He said in Javanese, 'Brothers! Brothers! Be aware of what you are doing'. The crowd got angry and began throwing big rocks which missed the Deputy Camat but fell on the tiled roof which was soon full of holes, though the walls were undamaged. The rocks also hit the tin roof of the shelter in front of the storehouse, then bounced off and rolled down the hill, making a terrific noise. The Deputy Camat fled - perhaps because of the noise. I told the crowd, 'We can't give out the paddy yet'. A voice from the middle of the crowd said, 'You're all women here. You can be beaten by just one man!' I moved into the crowd to find out who had said that. It was someone from Jatinegara who had married and settled in Moga - he ran away. By twelve midnight the sound of the kentongan [wooden signal-drum] was far away.3

The next morning the Camat returned and held a meeting to hear reports of what had happened. The local teacher said 'arrest the troublemakers'. but the Camat preferred to begin a campaign to calm the villagers:

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3 This meant that by midnight the disturbances around Moga had died down, and the kentongan signal for emergencies or danger was by then being sounded in villages some distance away.
I was sent by the Camat with the Lurah of Moga, Haji Mawardi, to villages to give information to the people. The lurahs were becoming scared because people were turning up at the kalurahan with sharpened bamboo spears. We were sent to Sima village. I said to them, 'Be calm; the government will arrange things, don't take action on your own'.

Incidents as a result of popular demands for the distribution of paddy like in Moga were occurring all over the Tiga Daerah, showing that the regional governments had no time to lose if they were to 'arrange things'. By the end of the second week in October it was too late to distribute the surplus paddy. The revolusi sosial had begun.

The first popular action against a local official in the Tiga Daerah occurred at the village level. On the night of 7 October, the day after the victims of the kenpeitai clash had been buried in Pekalongan, the house of Den Mas Hardjowijono the Lurah of Cerih, was surrounded by an angry crowd. Cerih, a village in the south of Jatinegara kecamatan on the Tegal kabupaten border, was a poor cassava growing area (typical of much of the hill country in the south) and a well-known radical centre.

The Lurah and his wife and 15-year-old son refused to come out despite angry threats from the crowd, and so they were locked inside. At 1 a.m. (8 October) the crowd threatened to burn the house down if the Lurah did not appear. Later that morning, 'Den Mas' (as he was called) finally dressed himself in his full Lurah's uniform, faced the crowd who were threatening to kill him, and asked what he had done wrong. He was disarmed and dressed in sacking, while his wife was made to wear a necklace of paddy. Then both were paraded for all to see, to the accompaniment of the Lurah's own gamelan orchestra, the

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4 Moga BP2 secretary, Interview, 4.11.75.

5 Raden and Mas are two priyayi titles.

6 Cerih was the home of several leading Islamic communists including Haji Moeklas. Moeklas was the father of M.H. Lukman, a member of the PKI's politbureau.
whole five kilometers to Jatinegara (the kecamatan town). There they were further humiliated by being treated 'like fowls', made to drink unboiled water from half a coconut shell and to eat rice bran. Then the Lurah and his family were imprisoned in the kecamatan office so that the local perjuangan leaders, including a new Camat (the former official had fled), could keep an eye on them.  

The action of the people in Cerih in parading their Lurah set a pattern which was to be repeated against many officials all over Tegal and Pemalang kabupatens in the next two weeks. Such actions went under the local name dombreng. The word dombreng comes from tong and breng, two onomatopoeic Javanese words for the sounds of banging on wood or metal. Thus to be dombreng-ed during October 1945 in Pemalang and Tegal meant to be paraded around to the accompaniment of clanging tin pots and wooden clappers. 'Tong, tong, tong' is also the sound of the kentongan, the signal-drum which, depending on the number of beats and the rhythm, can be used for calling meetings, giving the time or warning of fire, theft, or other emergencies. It is quite possible that in some cases the 'thief' (the corrupt official) was paraded to the sound of the 'thief kentongan', broadcasting loudly that 'here we have caught a thief!' The dombreng rituals will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

The Lenggaongs

Typically it was local semi-bandits called lenggaongs who led the dombreng actions and the attacks on village officials during the social upheaval in October. We have already discussed the social functions of these bandit types in the Pekalongan Residency during the colonial period in Chapter One. During the vacuum of power in the revolusi sosial they reacted quickly, leading attacks on corrupt officials particularly at the village level. The role of the lenggaongs was not unique to Pekalongan. In the rural areas of West Java bands of jago - an Indonesian term for essentially the same phenomena - exploited 'the widespread hostility toward the Pangreh Praja and village
headmen, and the lack of effective government support for them,... for what amounted to little more than banditry'. Smail goes on to describe a movement around Cimahi in late 1945, where the headmen were 'under heavy pressure from the garongs [robbers] who wanted revenge for what they considered improper and excessively severe acts during the Japanese occupation'. The movement later moved west of Cimahi apparently setting itself up as 'something of a jago republic', with the jago seizing power in the vacuum left by fleeing officials.

The lenggaongs of the Tiga Daerah were already a leitmotiv of the rural revolution in October 1945, at least two months before the old order was overturned and the Pangreh Praja thrown out in the Priangan. As we saw in Chapter One, the lenggaongs of the Pekalongan Residency were often tied to Islam, as well as the whole magico-religious world of Javanism. This is reflected in the leadership of the group based in the village of Cibuyur between Moga and Randudongkal in southern Pemalang. Samsuri, the son of a certain kayi nujum (soothsayer) had spent some time in a pesantren near Cirebon, and during the Japanese occupation he was imprisoned in Nusakambangan. There he was reputedly unaffected by kenpeitai torture because of his jimat (talisman) blunt needles which were inserted under the skin and which circulated in the body. Apart from the invulnerability which the magic power of these jimats bestowed on him, Samsuri as well as the other Cibuyur lenggaongs were renowned for their many women, it being said of Samsuri that 'whenever he saw a pretty girl he asked for her'.

Women for the group signified social ambition and recognition rather than lasciviousness.

It was the lenggaongs who spearheaded the resistance against

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8 John R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-46 (Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1964), 123.

9 Ibid. The same fate befell this 'jago republic' in February 1946, as had befallen the Tiga Daerah two months earlier - suppression by the army.

10 As Hobsbawm says, quoting a Brazilian landlord, 'nobody ever refuses them anything. It would be stupid to'. Bandits (London, 1969), 72.
both Chinese and the corrupt government officials. The conflict with
the Chinese erupted in the rural areas (as it had done during the vacuum
of power before the Japanese arrived) again in October 1945. In
Tanjung kawedanan the hostility was against the practice of the poorer
Chinese taking Javanese mistresses (gundik) and the raising of pigs —
a meat forbidden in Islam. There was no attempt to take over the
Chinese-owned kretek (Indonesian clove cigarette) factories in Tanjung.
In other areas, however, ethnic resentment towards the Chinese was
reinforced by hostility against their class position. Typical of
Java's North Coast, in the Pekalongan Residency so-called totok, or
foreign-born ethnic Chinese, were more entrenched economically than
in the southern hinterland areas, where many more Chinese had intermarried
and spoke Javanese.

In Randudongkal, kawedanan town (South Pemalang) early
in October, Nasro, described as Samsuri's Senopati, arrived
with a group of followers, to demand that prisoners in the local
jail be released and the Chinese shops be closed. While the former
Wedana was still in office, the local head of police had disappeared
and been replaced by a local nationalist. The Wedana had called for
reinforcements and two truckloads of kabupaten police had arrived from
Pemalang armed with bren guns. The situation was very tense. Suleman,
a local perjuangan leader, went to meet Nasro:

I invited Nasro to discuss the problem, and asked what
he wanted. He said he wanted to take his friends from
the jail, and destroy the Chinese shops. I told Nasro
'this is not what Bung Karno wants. He wants to have
good relations between everyone. So it is better to
ask the Chinese to fly the Red and White using big
flags and many of them'. I told him not to destroy
the shops, but to ask the Chinese not to raise prices.

At this stage the Chinese, now all dressed in white thinking they were
to be killed, were called together. They immediately agreed to Nasro's
demands, and the group dispersed.

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11 Senopati was the title of military commanders of the Javanese
kings. The most famous Senopati founded the Mataram dynasty.

12 Suleman, Interview, 15.11.75.
The fact that lenggaongs (a number of whom were hajis) blended into the North Coast religious landscape did not prevent their being destroyed by factional (often Muslim) rivalries, which often led to tests of spiritual strength. Samsuri quickly came into conflict with a well-respected local kyai. Mutual accusations regarding the unfaithfulness of one of Samsuri's wives with a member of the Kyai's family reportedly ended when a stone jimit belonging to the religious leader struck Samsuri down, and he was dragged round Randudongkal to his death.

Hostility towards the Chinese economic position was also expressed by the leaders of the Pemuda Istimewa of Ujungrusi near Adiwerna. Like other so-called pemuda groups in the Bandung area the Pemuda Istimewa had many lenggaong elements in its makeup and its leaders, Chamidun and Samsuri, had much in common with the lenggaong style.

Initially the group included Miad, a cart driver, and Maroeb, an algojo. Meaning literally an 'executioner', an algojo is rather a harsh cruel person, usually an expert fighter, who was often associated with a group of lenggaongs. The Pemuda Istimewa grew rapidly to be quite a large band. Its two targets were the economic wealth of the Chinese and the officials who had been involved in corrupt dealing in rice and cloth during the Japanese time. One of the group's leaders (also called Samsuri) had studied in a pesantren and been on the haj to Mecca in 1921. Its leadership again reflected the strong ties the lenggaongs had with the local Muslim tradition.

One of the first acts of the revolusi sosial in Adiwerna town was the arrival of a newly formed group led by Chamidun, a Pemuda Istimewa leader, carrying bamboo spears and calling itself the Rukun Tani (Farmers' Association), at the kecamatan office on the morning of 7 October. They demanded to see R.M. Suparto, the Camat of Adiwerna. When he finally emerged he was escorted on

13 Smail, Bandung, 89.
14 Although they had the same leader, the Pemuda Istimewa and the Rukun Tani were separate groups.
both sides by angry Rukun Tani members to the Adiwerna kawedanan office. There they demanded that the three local Chinese rice mill owners be called to the office immediately. When they arrived

...in the name of the people, the Rukun Tani demanded the management and control of the mills. The honorable [Paduka Tuan] Wedana, the Camat, and the KNI Chairman Mr Fadjar, looking pale and afraid, signed the agreement, as did the respective mill owners. A new body headed by Chamidun was to carry on the operation of the mills.15

Later on the same day the group held another meeting to form an organisation to run the three rice mills. There was some confusion when it was pointed out that those present were mostly traders while running a rice mill involved finding the necessary capital to buy the paddy from villagers, renting the buildings, keeping accounts and other administrative skills, which no one in the group had. It was thereupon decided to abandon the earlier plan for a large organisation in favour of a small group of 'managers'. Two days later on 9 October a second meeting was held, at which the Pangreh Praja witnessed the formal handover of the three mills with their stocks of paddy and hulled rice by the Chinese mill owners to the Adiwerna Rukun Tani.16

The lenggaongs in other rural areas spearheaded the resistance against hated officials, and the takeover of the sugar mills that during the Japanese occupation had been owned by the State. The famous Barisan Cengkrong or Sickle Corps, which rode around the countryside on bicycles armed with sickles, consisted of a group of about 50 lenggaongs, organised into four platoons. Their leader, a certain Sidris (or Idris), had been famous for many years in the Petarukan area, while his deputy, Tarbu, was a landless peasant. The group liked to eat at roadside stalls without paying. It had as its 'political adviser' a school teacher and former Sarekat Rakyat member, Ilham. Having Ilham as a political adviser reflected another important element in the lenggaong phenomenon, the relationship many groups had


16 Ibid.
with older pergerakan radicals, mostly village school teachers, and former members of the Sarekat Rakyat which began in the 1920s. Members of the Barisan Cengkrong locked up the Lurah of Temuireng village for a day, removed the corrupt Lurah of Petarukan, and distributed the textiles found stuffed in his mattresses. With an algojo, Haji Dimyati (a close friend of Sidris), the Barisan Cengkrong took over the Petarukan sugar factory, while the former Camat went into hiding and was later smuggled to safety in Pemalang.  

After some days a new Camat was acclaimed at a mass meeting. The secretary of a local PESINDO branch later described the proceedings: 

Thousands of people had gathered at the Petarukan soccer field. The local school teacher Soedaju had been carried on shoulders to the field from his house. Idris held up a sickle in his hand and announced, 'I am now the sugar factory administrator. I announce that [Soe]Daju is appointed Camat.' Tears were trickling down Soedaju's face. Then the old assistant factory head Ismail ceremoniously handed over the factory samurai sword. Ilham, a local leader of the pre-war pergerakan, was elected policeman, and Idris's brother as head of the kecamatan office. Ilham then said that any other officials would be appointed when needed. 

The central feature of all the lenggaong phenomena that we have been describing above is not so much their relationship to the law as Hobsbawm would have us believe. While Hobsbawm's different kinds of 'social' bandits all seem to share being on the wrong side of the law, in colonial times the lenggaongs were often on its right side, as we have seen already in Chapter One. Rather it was the readiness to use violence for whatever purpose which was important. In the context of the lenggaong's Javanese rural world, power is always assumed to have magico-mystical source. In this world, it is the

17 Kendalsari PESINDO secretary, Interview, 31.10.75; Transcript, I/2, March 1975. (I am grateful to the Comal perjuangan leader Pandji Soewarso for recording this and a number of other interviews for me early in 1975.) For the Camat's escape, see my 'Social Revolution', 115.

18 Kendalsari PESINDO secretary, Interview 31.10.75. Idris was later shot by the TKR during the action against the Tiga Daerah.
lenggaongs who have access to, and are the specialists in, using this kind of power, with their invulnerability and knowledge of the esoteric, just as the priyayis were specialists in fasting, abstinence, meditation and restraint, the asceticism of the traditional way the ruling class accumulated spiritual power in Java. Once the colonial regime had taken over the use of legitimate force, the only place for jimats and esoteric knowledge for secret oaths at secret graves, was the half-world of the lenggaongs, whether or not they were engaged in robbery.

Having discussed briefly dombreng actions and the lenggaong phenomena in the context of the rural upheaval in the Tiga Daerah, we may now return to the events of the revolusi sosial.

The Collapse of the Old Order in the Countryside

Earlier, we saw that the revolusi sosial or rakyat bergerak (people's action) period had begun over demands that paddy be distributed. On the night of 7 October the first daulat action occurred when the Lurah of Cerih village in southern Tegal had been dombreng-ed to the Jatinegara kecamatan office and imprisoned there.

Two days later, in Warungpring, across the border in Pemalang, the house and store of a Chinese trader, Oei Tjun Lum, was burned to the ground and the head of the market chased out. Early in the morning of 11 October a crowd arrived in Moga parading a person with corn cobs and young jackfruit around his neck. As it was market day and many people were coming into the town, the crowd gathered in strength as it proceeded. Kyai Said from Gendowang, the leader of the group, was carrying the sacred kris of Mandirejo, symbol of the spirit of Javanese independence, sheltered by an umbrella. When they


20 Daulat from kedaulatan rakyat, the sovereignty or authority of the people, in the next context of the revolusi sosial meant the removal of corrupt and hated officials from their positions or functions, by popular forces.

21 Candi Mandirejo was a sacred grave in Moga kecamatan. People who had Mandirejo blood were supposed never to work for the Dutch; and there was a belief that if any official saw the kris, called Kyai Pokal, he would be dismissed from his job. Moga BP2 Chairman, Interview, 4.11.75.
AMRI SLAWI HEADQUARTERS IN THE FORMER DUKUHRINGIN SUGAR MILL ADMINISTRATOR'S MANSION

SAWAHS NEAR CERIH VILLAGE, SOUTHERN TEGAL, WHERE THE REVOLUSI SOSIAL BEGAN IN THE TIGA DAERAH
entered the yard of the kecamatan office, the Camat, Singgih Harsojo, came out and asked what they wanted. 'This man was stealing corn', they said. The Camat stepped forward and said, 'Why have you brought him here like this? You should have handed him over to the Lurah'. At that point, the crowd surged forward and someone struck the Camat in the face with an axe. He ran for the telephone outside the office, but it was pushed off the table and fell to the ground. While running away from the kecamatan, covered with blood, he was hit by a stone and fell in the mud, but finally managed to pick himself up and get away. 

As he told it 30 years later:

Someone hid me behind a rice mortar. After I had been lying there for a couple of hours, a neighbour came and smuggled me into a nearby rice barn. I slept for a time and then must have passed out altogether until about 6 a.m. the next morning. Then I crept out and walked along the road towards Pemalang, but after a while I fainted again. Luckily, someone took me to the local hospital and later to Pemalang. 

It was widely believed that Kyai Said had used the clever deception of dombreng-ing a thief 'caught in the act' to lure the Camat out to meet the crowd. The rest of market day in Moga saw the ransacking of the houses of 11 people who were prominently involved in the distribution system during the Japanese occupation. These included a Mendonese who was responsible for hulling the paddy delivered to the agricultural cooperative; the Roman Catholic head teacher; the head of the market; two Chinese, one who ran the Kakyo Sokai, the other responsible for the castor oil cultivation program; the official who supervised the exchange of kerosene for castor oil plants; 

22 Ibid. This account was given to my informant (who had left Moga earlier in the day) by a Chinese shopkeeper who was there at the time. It is not an eyewitness account.

23 Singgih Harsojo's version is that he was wounded in the face by a bamboo spear as he went to the aid of the kecamatan secretary, who was being overwhelmed by the crowd. His account does not mention the thief ruse, though other versions do. Interview, 2.11.71.

24 In Moga the Kakyo Sokai (the Japanese name for the Chung Hua Chung Hwi, the Overseas Chinese Association) was used for the rationing of basic commodities.
the medical orderly of Moga, the Lurah and the azacho of Banyumodal
(the village where the kecamatan office was located); and Kyai Tartib,
who sat on all the Japanese rationing committees. The kecamatan
office was also ransacked.

From Moga, the chain of popular actions against hated
officials spread north, and south to the hill district of Belik.
Usually, the demand was that paddy be distributed. Hardjowinoto, the
Wedana of Belik, had gone to a meeting in the village of Bulakan.
He describes what happened:

I entered the yard on horseback and saw the
sharpened bamboo spears hidden in the fence.
That made me feel rather frightened, but I went
on, dismounted, and met the people. They were
all asking for the paddy which they had been forced
to sell to the government. I told them, 'It doesn't
belong to me. I cannot give you the paddy without
an order from my superiors. I am only an ordinary
official.' I told them, if they didn't want to
wait for an order, to go ahead and distribute the
paddy, but that it was their decision, not mine.
They formed a committee and I advised them not
to have any junjang krawat [village official] on
it.25

The above position to 'wait for orders' from above was
common to all Pangreh Praja of Pekalongan Residency during September
and October 1945 and reflected the timidity, lack of initiative, and
obsequiousness fostered by their Dutch-bureaucratic backgrounds.
Surviving local perjuangan leaders are convinced that one of the reasons
for the revolusi sosial was the failure of the central and provincial
governments to inform local Pangreh Praja about the policies of Jakarta
or about the guarantees of cooperation their own spokesmen had given
to Sukarno in September. Left on their own, not knowing what the
government wanted them to do (such as whether to distribute the paddy
or not), they reacted in the only way they knew, by waiting for
orders from above.

25 Hardjowinoto, Transcript, II/18-19, 22.5.73. The term junjang
krawat is used only in certain areas away from the central courts
of Yogya and Solo to refer to punggawa desa or village officials.
The Wedana of Belik later met a larger, different demonstration of some hundreds on their way to the central paddy storage place in Belik. Taking a back route to Belik to get there before the crowd arrived, he remembers what happened as follows:

In every village you could hear the sound of the kentongan titir, the most urgent signal—a ceaseless, fast, even beat warning of danger. The Lurah accompanying me wanted to go home. He was afraid for the safety of his family. Then a former member of the Keibodan showed me the quickest way back to the kawedanan. It seemed everyone had left. Someone met me saying it was too dangerous to return, but I wasn't anxious. What happens is preordained [takdir] anyway. ...As I got nearer someone called out 'Merdeka!' [Freedom!] I was relieved; that meant I still had some authority.26

The greeting 'Merdeka' that the Wedana received from the people was a greeting of friendship, not enmity. He was not one of the Pangreh Praja believed to have bought rice up cheaply during the Occupation, or to have traded illegally in fish confiscated on its way through Belik to Banyumas. At least one person was prepared to defend him physically:

A Chinese stepped forward out of the crowd. I recognized him, he had come to me for help during the Japanese time, as the Camat was forcing him to pay Rp.150 as a Foreigner's Registration Fee or be sent off as a romusha. I had told him then to say, if asked, that he had paid me the money, as I knew the Camat wouldn't dare check up. The Chinese said that if anyone dared come near me, he would stab them himself.27

Hardjowinoto stayed on as Wedana until, according to one local account, he left for neighbouring Banyumas Residency in the south. He returned, however, some weeks later, at least by early December 1945.

Returning now to events in Tegal. From Jatinegara kecamatan the social upheaval spread north to Lebaksiu, Adiwerna and Talang kecamatan. In Bumijawa kawedanan to the south, the impetus for the popular uprising came from outside the area, when a crowd arrived from

26 Ibid., I/20.
27 Ibid.
Mandireja near Sima village across the border in neighbouring Pemalang kabupaten saying 'the people of Bumijawa are only sheep'. The Camat and his deputy were told by the local KNI to leave Bumijawa immediately and go into hiding as their safety could not be guaranteed. In the upheaval that followed, the house of a local policeman was destroyed, his clothes burnt, and he was dombreng-ed around the town. The houses of the Wedana and the former agricultural official (noji) were ransacked and the Lurah chased out. A relative of the Wedana, a member of the Committee which had distributed cloth, was dressed in sacking and dombreng-ed also. Anyone else who 'looked rich' (kelihatan mewah) also had his house ransacked.

Taking heed of the KNI's advice the Deputy Camat left with his wife and child and the Camat on horseback for Jejeg, a village about two hours journey away. By this time the Wedana had already left the area to find protection elsewhere. It was an ill-chosen place of hiding. During the Occupation Jejeg was the scene of an uprising by hungry peasants who had attacked the local rice barn. The Deputy Camat had gone to the village to restore order but was forced to return to Bumijawa prematurely with a boil on his bottom. Police from Tegal led by the Wedana had been called in and some arrests were made, and the leader, a village teacher, later died in Tegal jail. It is likely that the other Jejeg leaders had just been released from jail after an agreement had been reached between the Tegal Barisan Pelopor, the Justice Department, the court and the jailor. The peasants, bitter at being jailed as 'rebels' and tortured by the kenpeitai, had returned to Jejeg, eager to avenge the wrong they considered the Wedana had done to them.

Rumours of priyayi officials hiding in Jejeg quickly made their presence there dangerous, and they were smuggled to a nearby

28 Interview, 15.2.73.
29 Bumijawa noji, Interview, 16.2.73.
30 Bumijawa Deputy Camat, Interview, 18.3.73.
31 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 95.
coffee plantation. Believing the Wedana was among those hiding there, the people came after them. The Deputy Camat describes what happened:

The Jejeg people wanted to take revenge on the Wedana. They were told he was hiding in the coffee plantation. I saw the crowd coming and came out to meet them. The crowd said 'we are looking for the Wedana'. I said, 'what do you want?' 'We want to kill him [as] he was responsible for our arrests before. Where is he?' I told them I didn't know (in fact he had already left the district to find protection.) On hearing this the crowd got angry. 'You must know where he is, if you don't we will kill you'. Then I was stripped and wrapped up in mat. Then their leader who had led the rice 'robberies' [during the Japanese occupation] came with his wife. He knew that during the investigations after the upheavals, when the rice barn was being guarded, I would not let the police use their firearms. Also he knew me from addresses I had given during the Friday prayers about Islam (I was a santri). He defended me and the people returned to their village, with us.22

In the foothills of Gunung Slamet below Bumijawa lies the kecamatan of Lebaksiu. One night in the second week of October a meeting between the KNI, led by its Chairmarv Kyai Mohamad, and the Camat, R.M. Soehodo Gondosamito, was in progress. The KNI member in charge of kecamatan security, Haji Toha, recalls:

We told the Camat to be calm and that the paddy should be returned [to the people] for the time being as a temporary loan...the main point was that the people were hungry, they needed rice, the rice is sitting there, so that settled the matter. We reminded the Camat that the Japanese had obtained the rice by force.23

On the following day, tensions were heightened by unsubstantiated rumours rife in Lebaskiu that a policeman in Jatinegara had been killed. The Camat, still uncertain about what to do with the paddy, decided

32 Bumijawa Deputy Camat, Interview, 18.3.73.
33 Interview, 10.4.73. According to an AMRI Slawi source, Soehodo was a notorious 'paddy collector' (tukang tarik padi) who had been too 'oppressive' (ceroboh) forcing peasants to deliver all of their harvest in many cases. Interview, 28.11.72.
to travel the 15 kilometers to see his immediate superior, the Wedana of Slawi to the north, to discuss the matter. His widow recalls:

He wanted to go to Slawi to discuss how to make the people less troublesome [muluk] by distributing the rice. We left at 9 a.m. after breakfast. I wanted to see the doctor as I was seven months pregnant. I took along the three youngest of my six children, aged 4, 3 and 2 years. Just outside of Lebaksiu we were stopped. He was killed with bamboo spears. Someone helped us to the house of Haji Nahwawi nearby, where we stayed for the rest of the day. Later we were met by the BKR chief and taken to Tegal. Our belongings were all seized by the people and we never went back to the kecamatan.34

The band led by the lenggaongs Bugel and Suhar which had ambushed the Camat and his family, then proceeded to where Haji Toha was distributing rice to kampung heads in Lebaksiu, on behalf of the KNI.

Along came Suhar with his band...with a sword shouting 'Be prepared to fight!' [Terus siap gempur!] The distribution was not finished, but we put the paddy in the storage barn. The atmosphere was panic stricken, because Suhar held a drawn sword. He wanted to go on to the Camat's house....35

Toha now acted quickly. Using his authority as head of KNI security, in an effort to prevent plundering of the Camat's house, he worked out an agreement with the lenggaongs. The Camat's personal belongings would be locked up in the local primary school, until the situation had calmed down. The goods would then be divided up, probably the next day. After this guarantee from the KNI leader, the band dispersed for a time. Upon inspecting the Camat's house, 'we found 5 kilograms of silver cutlery and half a kilo of gold' Toha recalls.

The following account of what subsequently happened at Lebaksiu from the Tegal kabupaten KNI Vice-Chairman Soesmono, is also indicative of his ceaseless activity throughout the kabupaten during

34 Mrs Suhodo Gondosamito, Interview, 29.1.73. According to H. Toha, Suhodo the Camat, was armed with a samurai sword.

35 Haji Toha, Interview, 10.4.73.
the revolusi sosial period:

Early in the morning at 6 a.m. news came to the KNI that the kecamatan offices of Margasari, Kedungbanteng and Lebakxiu had been surrounded - although we didn't know why. I left for Lebakxiu with Ali Warsitohardjo driving. When we got to the village meeting place we were stopped by a large crowd...before entering the kecamatan town we had seen the body of the Camat by the side of the road. We saw the contents of his house in the village meeting house. Then we called Kyai Mohamad and asked him to arrange the burial according to Islamic rites. Also we wanted his personal belongings separated from government property. Then I went down the road to Margasari but the crowd had dispersed; the kecamatan office was close to a large police barracks.

On their return the KNI leaders learned that H. Toha had been decided upon as the choice for the new Camat. Soesmono continues: 'After formally installing H. Toha as Camat I told him [his main task was] to look after law and order as best he could.' The KNI leaders then returned to Tegal.

However, the lenggaongs led by Suhar and Bugel were not finished with their work of settling old scores. The local pawnshop, for many a symbol of the suffering caused by rural indebtedness in the last decades of Dutch rule, as we saw in Chapter One, was attacked and looted. Then they took revenge on a local Chinese who had helped the noji official during the occupation.

The anti-Chinese feeling then expressed itself as it had done in Tanjung, Randudongkal, and Adiwerna with the lenggaongs leading the plundering of 14 Chinese shops in the Lebaskiu market. At this stage Kyai Fachruri, the Commander of the Barisan Pelopor, arrived from Slawi and fired shots into the air with a pistol.

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36 Ali Warsitohardjo, a close associate of the Negen Broeders group, had studied in the Jakarta Law School, and had been with Professor Soepomo in the Justice Department before coming to Tegal in 1944, as part of that work. He was also an adviser to the BKR/TKR on legal matters.

37 Soesmono, Interview, 10.3.73.

38 Ibid.
This seemed to disperse the demonstrators for a time. Later in the morning a detachment of the BKR arrived under the command of Parwoto (an API leader) with instructions to arrest the 'troublemakers'. Eleven arrests were made including Suhaar and Bugel, but five were later released.

The newly appointed Muslim acting Camat of Lebaksiu now set to work. While continuing to resist the initial lenggaong demands that the Camat's personal possessions be distributed (which was easier after the 'arrest' of Bugel, Suhaar and several other leaders), 70 pikuls of soyabeans and 5 pikuls of rice in his barn were distributed, as this was known to have been dishonestly obtained during the Occupation. The acting Camat recalls:

I called all the lurahs and obtained lists of paddy stored in each village. I went around the 15 villages [in the kecamatan] on horseback with two BKR members and a local policeman. The rice was distributed equally and some was given to the pemudas who were responsible for the security. Not one of the 15 villages was short of rice. Everyone was calm because their stomachs were filled. If Soehodo [the former Camat] had given out the rice there wouldn't have been any plundering (penggarongan).39

Meanwhile to the north of Lebaksiu in Adiwerna kawedanan the stocks of rice and the mills had been handed over by the Chinese owners to the Rukun Tani on 9 October. The following day the Camat, R.M. Suparto Sastrosworo addressed a large crowd at Lemahduwur, in front of the ancient graves of Tegalarum. 40 He was young and inexperienced as camat. Accounts vary about exactly what he told the crowd. According to a local teacher he simply said that Sukarno had been arrested by NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) that had just landed with the British in Jakarta on 29 September. However, it was reported to a KNI leader in Tegal that he had said that Sukarno had been killed by a NICA hand grenade. It appears that such reports

39 Haji Toha, Interview, 10.4.73.

40 Tegalarum is where Sultan Amangkurat II of Mataram is buried, as well as all of Tegal's ruling Bupati family, the Reksonegoros.
had indeed been broadcast about this time from Jakarta. Whatever
his exact words, Suparto never left the meeting. He was murdered
immediately after it ended. A local teacher who arrived on the
scene, writing about it 11 years later, recalls:

His body was lying on the road in front of the house
of the Lurah of Lemahduwur. When I arrived there,

it was packed with hundreds, perhaps thousands of
people, who had come and were swarming around the
body, lying on the ground bathed in a pool of blood.

Nearly everyone had brought sharpened bamboo spears,
but others had swords and other weapons as well...

people showed how angry they were [by] kicking and
spitting on the body, and it was dirtied with
dust...the face was unrecognisable.\(^41\)

The Camat's murder signalled the collapse of the old
administration in the entire kawedanan of Adiwerna. The Wedana,

Ismail, had already once been kidnapped by API leaders and taken to

their headquarters, the old Trubels dairy at Kejambon, for two nights.

Presiding at a meeting when the news arrived of his subordinate's
murder he was overcome with fear, and was unable to give any orders
at all. Instead, making a few hasty preparations, he left for the
comparative safety of the kabupaten capital, his belongings piled
high in a bullock cart. However, half way to Tegal at the API
headquarters at Kejambon, the cart was stopped and the 'Japanese
goods', meaning clothing, were taken - as well as furniture and other
belongings. The rest of the kawedanan administration promptly
followed the Wedana's example '...all government officials, Pangreh

\(^41\) Raden Soengkono Wiryosoesanto, 'Riwayat Hidup', Book I, 76-77, TS
(subsequently cited as 'Riwayat'). One person who was deeply
affected by the murder of the Camat was Sjahrir's close associate,
Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI Baru leader who had been head
of the Pekalongan Soldiers'Relief Office during the Japanese time.
'Soebagio was at my house when the news came through about
Suparto's murder' recalls Soesmono. 'He passed this incident on
to Sjahrir as evidence of Sukarno's popularity. Soebagio's
advice to Sjahrir was "Don't kick Sukarno out as a collaborator,
leave him as a symbol at the top"'. Soesmono, Interview, 20.10.76.

\(^42\) Wedana of Adiwerna, Interview, 13.2.73. Ismail had been the
Camat of Tarub in May 1926, when the Karangcegak revolt occurred.
He had worked all his life in the Residency of Pekalongan.
Praja, teachers, police and village heads were running away in confusion (lari cerai bera), and nobody knew where they were going'.

The Wedana's oldest son Slamet (aged 23) later received a letter from the API leadings saying that the family belongings could be collected from the API headquarters. Borrowing a truck from the kabupaten office he left for Kejambon. He never returned.

The situation along the main road leading through Adiwerna at that time was as follows:

There were no vehicles on the roads, because nearly every 25 meters wood or bamboo road blocks had been set up; on the roadsides there were people and children - carrying bamboo spears, everyone who went past gave the greeting 'Merdeka', to these people...at each guard post there were radios, belonging to Chinese, as well as tables and chairs and other belongings [of the Chinese] which had found their way to these guard posts.

Kutil

It was Talang that became the popular prototype during the revolusi sosial in the Tiga Daerah. Talang was the kecamatan which even the AMRI Slawi leader, Soewignjo, said he made wide detours to avoid when travelling to Tegal. Talang was the place where two Tegal perjuangan leaders (one being the KNI Vice-Chairman), going south to explain the Pangreh Praja declaration of support for Independence, were killed on 4 November, and where several others were captured and some killed on the same weekend. Anyone who went through Talang at

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43 Soengkono, 'Riwayat', 78-79. This account goes on to describe how the Camat lost his gold watch and a Raleigh bicycle given to him by a local girl whom he had secretly taken as a second wife and who was several months pregnant. This was apparently without the knowledge of his 'official' wife, a Yogya lady, to whom he had only been married six months, and who was also pregnant. Love letters were found in the Camat's safe.

44 The fate of the Wedana's son was not known for three months. He had been buried between two other victims of the revolusi sosial, Siddik, younger brother of API leader Mansur, and R.M. Abu Bakar's son, Chamzah. Wedana of Adiwerna, Interview, 13.2.73.

45 Soengkono, 'Riwayat', 84.
that time risked his life, people believed. Sukarno, speaking in Tegal on his return to Jakarta after a Presidential tour of Java in mid-December, referred to the Tiga Daerah movement as the 'negara Talang' (Talang state).

Talang's notoriety was largely due to Kutil, the hero of the people of Talang, where life and death are still surrounded by controversy. For some he was an algojo who had 'killed many people', a cruel, fierce person, an anarchist, a tool of the PKI, while others claimed at the time he was an agent of NICA. At his trial Kutil 'confessed' to many killings, to protect his friends in Talang. For this he earned the honour of being the first person in the infant Indonesian Republic to be sentenced to death by formal judicial process by a Pekalongan judge, Soeprapto. The Tiga Daerah Affair is often referred to elsewhere in Java as 'Kutil's movement'. Yet in Talang Kutil was admired and respected, as well as feared, by many. After the old order collapsed a new Muslim Camat elected and cloth distributed, the area was free of the factionalism and unrest which continued in other places.

Kutil (whose real name was Sachjani) means both 'wart' and 'pickpocket' in Javanese. His name derives from the first meaning - when he was young he had tiny black warts on his face, which later disappeared, though the name stuck. The second son of a gold trader from Taman near Pemalang, Kutil is often said even today to have come from Madura. This was because he lived not in Talang itself, but across the Gung river in the neighbouring hamlet of Pesayangan. By the people of Talang he was jokingly referred to as a person from 'across the water' (orang seberang). This was apparently how the confusion with Madura arose, for in Java the Madurese, and indeed all those who come from the other islands are known as orang seberang. Also Madurese have a reputation for fierceness in Java which fitted the myth about Kutil's character.

As a troublesome child (anak bangor) Kutil seldom followed his parents wishes. His father had bought a house in Pesayangan village (a goldsmith centre in Talang kecamatan) for his grandchildren, but Kutil decided he wanted to live there, and arrived with his eldest son to take over the house. Later he opened a barber's shop in nearby
Kajen village on the main road south from Tegal while carrying on
his father's trade as a goldsmith in a small way at the back of the
shop. A long sword (gobang), hung on the wall, beside the mirrors, and soon, rather than fight, the only other barber in the village left. His other business was buying secondhand goods at auction for resale.

In 1937 Kutil had been a candidate in the election for the new Lurah of Kajen but lost, according to his son, by one vote. The successful candidate of that election recalls:

Kutil had maybe finished second grade of village primary school. He could read and write a little but not much. His handwriting was almost totally illegible. There was a story he had gone to Deli on the east coast of Sumatra to work clearing land for plantations, had killed the Dutch foreman and returned to Java.

This story was not confirmed by Kutil's son, who recalls that his father, as a religious teacher (guru agama), used to travel long distances by bicycle to lead the chanting of the Koran often returning in the early hours of the morning undisturbed by robbers who roamed the area. This reflected Kutil's special relationship with the local lenggaongs. 'After learning to chant the Koran with him', Kutil's son recalls, 'they would reform themselves and become religious people, although he did not want to be called Kyai'. He always wore his black pici (the velvet cap worn by Indonesian Muslims) even inside the house. The group Kutil led which met to chant the Koran was the biggest in the area, with about 30 members. He also used the Muslim greeting assalam walaikum (peace be unto you) when entering houses, although he did not always keep the Five Daily Prayers regularly.

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46 According to the Lurah. According to his son, it was a kris.

47 Lurah of Kajen, Interview, 9.2.73. According to the Lurah, who won that election, three previous village headmen had been dismissed in succession by the Dutch for financial maladministration.

48 Ibid.

49 Kutil's second son, Interview, late November 1974.

50 Or in the local Lurah's words, 'setengah santri, tempo² sembayang, tempo² tidak [half a santri, sometimes praying sometimes not]'. 
KUTIL'S HEADQUARTERS IN THE TALANG PEOPLE'S BANK
Local people who referred to Kutil as a santri were using the term in its older (perhaps pre-Islamic) meaning of a holy man. During the Japanese occupation Kutil had the reputation of being a procurer of scarce goods, such as cigarette lighter flints.

During September 1945, when the badan perjuangan were springing up, Kutil formed his own AMRI and took over the Talang People's Bank as its headquarters. All of Kutil's closest followers were AMRI members. These included two traders, one of them a food seller, a tailor, a poor peasant, a blacksmith, and Haji Toyib, a circumciser and medicine seller. Like other badan perjuangan which sprang up during this time, its self-appointed task was to search for remaining Japanese to disarm them. This later became a hunt for so-called 'NICA agents'. In fact the 'anti-NICA' phobia (discussed more fully in Chapter Seven) was very strong in Talang.

The revolusi sosial began earlier in Talang than elsewhere with the killing of a local policeman by an angry crowd (a week before the murder of the Camat of Adiwerna). According to one account the main reason for this was because he had unfairly detained some people for selling cloth. The Talang KNI Chairman recalls:

During the Japanese time Maklani [the policeman] had apart from his other duties apparently been an intelligence agent for the kenpeitai. The kenpeitai often used to come and take people away. These arrests we suspected were based on reports that people were illegally selling melted-down brass. Talang had a brass industry, since the people were driven off their land by the sugar factories. It was illegal to sell melted-down

51 Located strategically on the main road south, during Dutch days the AVB (Algemene Volkscrediet Bank), it had become the Japanese equivalent, the Syomin Ginko.

52 Revolutionary Camat of Talang, Interview, 18.12.72.

53 Talang was encircled by four factories - Pagongan, Pangkah, Kemanglen and Ujungrusi which in practice rented all the available sawahs. The people, having no land to cultivate, had to find another livelihood and the area is still well known for its gold- and brass-smiths, as well as other kinds of metal work, such as cutlery, and making bicycle parts.
brass, but the strange thing was that it commanded a high price in Jakarta, and the Japanese were buying it. Some kyais here traded in melted brass. Kyai Daklan and a woman, Haji Nimah, were often caught trading; also Tanggun, Kutil's close friend. If you bribed Maklani you would not be arrested. He also intimidated the people, arresting or detaining people for all kinds of reasons and confiscating whatever they were selling illegally. 54

The main aim of Kutil's group throughout the revolusi sosial period was the redistribution of wealth. A secondary goal was the elimination of anyone suspected of being a NICA 'agent', in other words a traitor to the Republic. To this end, the houses of former Dutch and Eurasian employees of the local Pagongan sugar mill were ransacked, as they were symbols of the most hated aspects of colonial oppression. On another occasion, the house of a wealthy trader (who lived most of the time in Jakarta) was taken over as a pemuda headquarters. The trader was told to move out but he was allowed to take his belongings with him.

Then the four hectares of bengkok land belonging to the Lurah of Kajen was taken over by Kutil. It was later returned to the Lurah after the TKR counter revolution. Kutil's relationship with the Lurah of Kajen had been an uneasy one. Initially the latter had incurred Kutil's wrath by opposing the ransacking of the house of the official who ran the People's Bank during the Japanese occupation. The Lurah went into hiding, was discovered by Kutil, and dombreng-ed around the Chinese quarter of Kajen. Kutil told the people 'let this serve as an example to you all. This person was my ally but has now proved he is my enemy, he would not help me but instead went into hiding!'
The Lurah subsequently escaped from detention in AMRI headquarters and fled the district. Not implicated in corruption like many of his colleagues, he was later fetched back by one of Kutil's followers, and used to accompany Kutil on visits to various parts of the kabupaten.

It was in the cloth distribution both in Talang and throughout the kabupaten that we get some details of the practical policy efforts 54

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54 Talang KNI Chairman, Interview, 7.12.75.
of the group in relation to the redistribution of wealth and an idea of what Kutil wanted for the future.

Cloth distribution was an urgent matter at the time as shortages during the occupation had left the people wearing clothing made out of sacking and bark fibres. On one occasion the Camat of Talang received 14 rolls of textiles which he asked the kecamatan KNI leader to distribute. The Chairman said he wanted to distribute it to those who were suffering most, according to the principle 'to each according to need'. Kutil disagreed with the KNI view, probably realising that the usual abuses would creep in, and doubting the ability of the KNI to ascertain who were in real need. Instead he demanded that the textiles be distributed according to the principle of 'equality and fraternity' (sama rata sama rasa) which meant for Kutil's group, 'we must be fair'. While we will be discussing this idea more fully in the chapter on Revolutionary Consciousness, here in Talang it meant that each person got a piece of cloth, 10 centimeters in length. The Talang KNI chairman ridiculed the usefulness of this but Kutil had his way.

Later, after the new regime had come to power in the kabupaten and Kutil had become kabupaten police chief, a committee headed by Kutil was formed to distribute textiles stockpiled by the Japanese at the large factory outside the city. Trucks from the kabupaten were used to deliver the white unbleached cloth (belacu) to kawedanans all over the region. Nobody paid any money for the cloth, and there were no records kept. The explanation was 'finishing up the stocks at the mill, so the people will be satisfied' recalls a member of Kutil's distribution team; 'it was done on orders from

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55 One roll at that time was 44 meters.

56 To give a rough idea of what stocks were left: my informant remembers going to about six kecamatan with at least one truckload which could hold 200 rolls, or 8,800 meters. Assuming full truck loads, a total of 52,800 meters was distributed. As well, a special truck was sent to Balamoa, near the place of the 1926 Karangcegak uprising, whose support perjuangk leaders were anxious to have. Textile Distribution Committee member, Interview, 13.6.73.
Previously owning no property himself, Kutil naturally had an interest in opportunities for power and consumption brought by the revolusi sosial. The Lurah of Kajen's bengkok was expropriated. During November Kutil could be seen driving everywhere in a yellow eight-cylinder Ford Mercury which had belonged first to the kenpeitai, then to the KNI Deputy Chairman Mardjono, who was killed near Talang on 4 November. His Chinese chauffeur recalls he never got any wages 'because Kutil was too poor. If we ate anywhere I always paid. Kutil always travelled by himself, sitting beside me in the front seat wearing a colt revolver'.

Kutil was also an intermediary between the religious elite and the semi-bandit groups, as well as having good contacts with Dutch-educated nationalists. Common to the tradition to which he belonged, Kutil acquired his magic power through a well-known local kyai, from whom his group sought advice and obtained various amulets and charms. Kyai Makdum, who possessed 'special powers' and could cure people, was Kutil's closest friend in Kajen. His group often met at the Kyai's house. AMRI pemudas came to Kyai Makdum for special drinks containing magic charms, and bamboo spears were also blessed. The Kyai would take the spear and blow on it, saying in Arabic 'Bi'smi 'llaahi 'l-rahmani 'l-rahim' (in the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate). Many AMRI pemudas also wore slings made of yellow leaves from the young coconut palm called janur kuning. A symbol of opposition (as we shall see in Chapter Seven), such leaves were supposed to give the wearer courage and invulnerability as well as to frighten away evil spirits. Because of the scarcity of firearms (only two other AMRI leaders besides Kutil had weapons) such protection was even more important.

Kutil was also close to the AMRI Slawi leaders, often journeying to their headquarters at Kemantran near Slawi to visit Sakirman. AMRI-Talang's authority was felt further afield than Talang.

57 Ibid.
58 Kutil's chauffeur, Interview, 21.2.73.
K.H. Abu Sudja'i, who became Bupati of Tegal on 6 November, was the candidate of Kutil's group. In fact, members of the group (including Kutil) went to meet Abu Sudja'i at his home in Pacul village and escorted him to the capital to be installed as Bupati. The pinnacle in Kutil's career came when the Tegal Working Committee, which governed the kabupaten in November, appointed Kutil as kabupaten police chief. Before we come to this part of our story, however, we should look briefly at what happened in Brebes kabupaten at the village level.

Brebes

The removal of the old Pangreh Praja in Brebes kabupaten, while just as thorough, took place with less violence than occurred elsewhere. No camats were killed in Brebes. For example, in Ketanggungan kecamatan, the Camat (only 26 years of age, one of the last MOSVIA graduates before the war), sensed the strength of the santri-led demands for a new Camat, and was aware of the fate of his colleagues over the kabupaten border. He quickly held his own 'transfer ceremony' and formally handed over his job to the KNI Vice-Chairman, Partoatmojo, former head teacher of the local non-government intermediate school.

In Brebes, as in other areas, if the new official had been connected in any way with the oppressive Japanese economic policies, or had little popular support, he was soon replaced. Such was the situation in Banjarharjo when the Camat appointed himself Wedana after leading the movement which forced the former incumbent, a favourite of the Japanese Resident Tokonami, to flee the district. However, the new Wedana was not acceptable to local Muslim leaders (there were questions about his close relationship with the kenpeitai as well) and he was daulat-ed out of the area after two weeks in office. North of Banjarharjo were the former private lands, the particuliere landerijen at Ketanggungan West. When the Japanese arrived, the local

59 Camat of Ketanggungan, Interview, 18.3.73.

60 Muslim leader, Interview, 6.12.75; Wedana of Banjarharjo, Interview, 31.7.73.
official called a demang (chief) was replaced and the land was for a
time used for growing sugar by the Japanese. The radical PESINDO
youth, who had taken over the mill as their headquarters, put up
signs reading Milik Negara (owned by the state) on the land used for
sugar growing.

One of the few camats who had to flee with his life in
danger in Brebes kabupaten was Hadisubeno, the Camat of Jatibarang.
Disguised as a village santri, wearing a sarong which had been
rolled down at the top and tied with a belt, he made his escape
in a dokar. In Bumiayu, the southernmost kawedanan of the
Residency, the Wedana was removed in a non-violent way, although his
assistant had to endure humiliations at the hands of local Muslim
leaders. The Wedana's wife recalls:

He [Muljadi] telephoned the Bupati but he was no
longer there. He also telephoned the other wedanas;
there was no one left. But all his camats were
still there. Then there came a delegation from
Brebes, they held a general meeting at the kawedanan.
They informed the Wedana that he and his camats would
be relieved of their jobs.

However, a different fate befell the Deputy Wedana, who was detained
in the jail by the local religious elite. According to one version
the santris used to accompany him to pray at the local mosque.
'The priyayi on top of the mosque drum' (priyayi diatas tabuh) was

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61 Anderson notes that in the particuliere landerijen during the
Occupation 'corvée burdens were somewhat lightened, but the
essential relationships were not altered, the peasants in these
areas remaining almost wholly at the mercy of foreign landlords -
now the Japanese'. Pemuda Revolution, 274, fn.140.

62 Ketanggungan West PESINDO leader, Transcript, I/7, 13.4.73.

63 Lurah of Krasak, Interview, 5.12.75. My informant was greatly
amused by the thought of an upper-class official being dressed
like a poor santri and having to ride in a dokar.

64 Widow of Wedana of Bumiayu, Interview, 27.1.73.
the joke in Bumiayu. He was also made to bathe in the river. This strong santri feeling against nominal Muslims was expressed in a more general way during the revolusi sosial period in another part of the kabupaten, in Losari on the northwest border of Brebes. There santris were reported to be putting people who did not say their daily prayers onto the bier used in funerals for carrying the corpse to the graveyard.

We will now look at those who replaced the old order thrown out in October 1945, and how they were chosen.

Replacing the Pangreh Praja

By the third week in October 1945 the entire upper class elite outside the three kabupaten capitals had been dombreng-ed or had left hurriedly of their own accord. Local perjuangan leaders in each area were now faced with an immediate problem, how and with whom to replace the old Pangreh Praja. There were no instructions from any level of government about how, for example, to choose a new Camat. Local perjuangan groups were left to solve these problems themselves. What happened in practice was that local choices were ratified automatically by the Resident, Mr Besar, with formal letters of appointment. The changes in the elite at the kecamatan and kawedanan levels are shown in Table 6.

In the entire Tiga Daerah only one camat remained during the

65 Deputy Camat (who worked in the kawedanan office), Interview, November 1974. The tabuh was a large drum which called the people to the daily prayers (and still does in the villages) before the introduction of electricity and the loudspeaker. Another version of this story was that when the Wedana used to attend the mosque for Friday prayers as a courtesy (and in recognition of the strength of the local religious elite) he prayed in the front of the congregation on top of the carpet with the kyais and other religious leaders. During the revolusi sosial he had to sit at the back on the floor.

66 For the dates of when these appointments were ratified by Mr Besar, see the Time Chart.
TABLE 6

Composition of New Ruling Elite at the Kawedanan and Kecamatan Levels in the Tiga Daerah after the 'revolusi sosial' (for details see Appendix E)

Source: data from interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kabupaten</th>
<th>No. of kawedanas and kecamatans</th>
<th>Number Changed</th>
<th>'Former Elite'</th>
<th>NEW OFFICIAL 'New Elite'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Village/other officials</td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalang</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20 (?)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61/97%</td>
<td>17/27%¹</td>
<td>14/22%²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1  4 officials also KNI leaders.
2  1 religious leader also a KNI leader, 3 were kecamatan-level Barisan Pelopor leaders (chutaicho).
3  7 teachers also local KNI leaders, including 2 Chairmen, 1 Vice-Chairman.
In Taman, the kecamatan between radical Petarukan and Pemalang itself, Gunodo Surio, managed to 'escape' the revolusi sosial, but not because he was not considered 'upper class'. As the son of R.A.A. Soerjo, the Bupati of Pekalongan, his aristocratic credentials were impeccable. Along with his brother, Surjono Surio, the Camat of Margasari (South Tegal) he was in fact the most well-born of all the camats in the Residency. He was saved for two reasons. The first was because he was not considered corrupt. He worked to alleviate the sufferings of the people in Taman during the Japanese occupation by appointing an honest committee to organise the rationing, and by using the kecamatan cloth quota to make pairs of shorts and sarongs to be distributed to those too poor to get cloth by delivering paddy. Secondly, he had enough political acumen to realise that distribution of rice was the way to stave off the revolutionary wave. In this he was able to exploit his close relationships with two santri landlord families in Taman who owned more than 100 bau of sawah and who had 200 tons of paddy in their rice barn, left over from the Japanese occupation. At the Camat's request, they had agreed to give out rice to the local people and the pemudas after the Proclamation, on the expectation of protection for their property from the Camat.

Other patterns in the transfer of power to 'new elites' emerge from Table 5. The largest number of new incumbents had been former officials, usually village officials (including three lurahs). In the case of Brebes there were several kabupaten officials and three deputies (two wedanas and one camat) as well. In Pemalang where the

67 Apart from Taman (Pemalang kabupaten), the doubtful kecamatan is Losari, on Brebes' north-western border with neighbouring Cirebon Residency. As I did not do any interviews in Losari, this comes from Kartohargo, Question 16, Proces-verbaal, 24 October 1946, Proc.Gen. Kartohargo probably did not know what happened in Salem kecamatan in the south as these southern areas were very remote from the kabupaten capital. He remembered that the former Camat stayed on, but according to my interviews in Bumijawa, this official was replaced.

68 Taman santri, Interview, 16.2.75. Needless to say only one ton was given out to the pemudas.
radical nationalists were strongest, and the conflict with the kabupaten Pangreng Praja sharper, this type of transfer did not occur. Likewise, the absence of new santri camats in Pemalang reflects both the strength of the radical nationalists and the support for them of local santris, particularly for the new Bupati Soepangat.

Within the religious elite group there was a range of political views as well as class backgrounds. At one extreme was the new Camat of Losari (Brebes), Haji Tobari with over 100 bau of sawah, one of the richest landlords in the region. He had studied in Termas pesantren (near Pajitan) and for a time had joined the PSII. Later on he returned to his home in Larangan kecamatan but, influenced by the kyais in the nearby NU stronghold of Ketanggungan, he joined NU. He was appointed by the former Camat as his replacement soon after the Lurah of Pamuliaan (a village in Larangan kecamatan) had been killed. The Camat had arrested some 'troublemakers' but the social unrest had continued. Another difficulty he faced before leaving was a dispute over the distribution of water, with the people threatening to destroy irrigation channels taking water to a neighbouring village. Faced with these problems the former Camat felt he was unable to exercise authority over the population who were 'acting how they liked' (berbuat bebas). The Deputy Camat also ran away after being attacked.  

At the other end of the santri political-class spectrum were the radical kyais in Tegal who were not landowners. A number of these had ties with the Sarekat Rakyat which was so strong in the rural areas of Tegal until 1926. The new Camat of Tarub, Haji Zainuddin, came from the hamlet of Karangcegak, a Sarekat Rakyat and PKI stronghold where the uprising of May 1926 had occurred. A number of the new camats in this group also ran their own pesantrens. They included the new Wedana of Slawi who was head of the Tegal kabupaten Barisan Pelopor. The tendency for local santri Barisan Pelopor leaders to become camats is seen by the fact that four other kecamatan level

69 Haji Tobari, Interview, 16.12.75.
leaders of the Barisan Pelopor also became camats during this period (see Appendix E).

Taken as one group (because they tend to overlap a lot) the teachers and KNI members together make up 28 per cent of these new officials, the largest group. The category of 'teachers' however includes santri teachers in modernist Muslim schools (madrasah), as well as Dutch-educated nationalists such as Sugiono (the new Wedana of Pangkah) who was also the local KNI chairman. This reflects the general trend for village primary school teachers to become leaders or active members of the local KNIs. The ambiguity over whether a new incumbent was 'appointed' or 'elected' is illustrated in the way the new Wedana of Adiwerna came to power. Incidentally, he was the only Muhammadiah member to become an official in Tegal or in the Tiga Daerah during the period and he only lasted four days. The Adiwerna KNI, according to one account, could not cope with all the tasks it had to perform and decided to choose an assistant. 'The method of election was like the election of a bekel (village head) during the Dutch time', recalls a member of the Adiwerna KNI, writing in February 1946, 'except that things were "managed" so that those who were to elect the person were informed beforehand who it was to be'.

Haji Mawardi, nearly 30 years later, tells the story somewhat differently. According to the new Wedana, the problems arose because he had already been appointed by the former Bupati of Tegal. At that time anyone appointed by a member of the Pangreh Praja risked being accused of being pro-NICA. Whoever he was appointed by (the KNI, the Bupati, or both), the Wedana wanted to make it appear as though he had been elected, if not by the people at least by the village headmen. So a meeting of the 80 lurahs of the kawedanan was called, held and candidates selected:

I was not satisfied if only Lurahs were elected. In fact I had already been appointed so I called a meeting of the 80 lurahs. It was completely open and frank [blak-blakan]. There were no secrets, everyone
knew how everyone voted. The names of the candidates were written up on a board. People had to come out and put a mark against the candidate of their choice.\textsuperscript{71}

The lurahs were apparently quite confused at first about the purpose of the meeting. The wedana had always been appointed by the government in colonial times, but now they were being asked to vote for him. After the voting and the victory of Haji Mawardi, the latter admitted to the assembled lurahs, 'I was appointed to work here, but I wanted the agreement of the people'. The lurahs replied that this was not necessary. The new Wedana, however, still thought it was. He told them to hold meetings in their own villages to choose the wedana themselves. But the lurahs said, 'As a government official, you don't need to be chosen by the people. You are appointed from above'.

Despite this view, the Wedana says he had his way, and meetings were held in all villages to discuss the choice of the new wedana. Two villages then put forward different candidates, making the situation awkward for Haji Mawardi who was trying to make it appear that he had been chosen by a genuine popular election. So he told the lurahs to choose another candidate at meetings in each kecamatan. So each kecamatan then carried out its own election for wedana and Haji Mawardi was again elected. These efforts to show he was 'democratically elected', however, turned out to be a futile exercise, for he lasted only four days (until 4 November). Then he was captured by Kutil near Talang on his return from the Muhammadiah conference at Pagongan, and taken to AMRI Slawi, according to one account, for trying to prevent the planned attack on the city by groups in his Kawedanan.\textsuperscript{72}

To the south, in Bumijawa, a similar scenario was acted out. A group of KNI leaders decided amongst themselves the 'best' candidate to be the new wedana, then held an election to ratify their choice. Mohamad Deradjat, their candidate, was the santri son

\textsuperscript{71} Wedana of Adiwnena, Interview, 24.11.75.

\textsuperscript{72} Adiwnena Verslag, 5, Proc.Gen.
of a Bumijawa kawedanan village head and a Taman Siswa teacher. He had been a member of the Semarang Sangikai and, subsequently, a member of Semarang KNI. To ensure that he return to Bumijawa immediately, the KNI sent a telegram signed by his younger brother, saying his parents were gravely ill. On being told about the proposed election for a new Wedana on his arrival, Deradjat's first reaction was: 'Although we now have our freedom, only the President is elected'. Besides himself, there were three other candidates for wedana; the KNI Chairman, and local Roman Catholic schools' inspector, and the local Mosque official. There were three representatives from each of the kawedanan's 35 villages at the meeting - the Lurah, an assistant and a local perjuangan leader. As in Adiwerna, the election was an open one (not by secret ballot), voting being limited to the three representatives from each village. Deradjat's first impression that the results had already been discussed or agreed upon beforehand was strengthened by the fact that the four other candidates only received three votes between them. When the new Wedana-elect objected, saying that he still had unfulfilled obligations in Ambarawa (where he had been a teacher since his return from Kalimantan in 1942), he was greeted with the reply that his refusal would be interpreted that he did not accept Independence.

The KNI Chairman, a former Sarekat Rakyat member, explained that the kabupaten of Tegal, Pemalang and Brebes had dispensations from the central government to elect their own officials in order to 'quieten the people' (menenteramkan rakyat). Deradjat got similar advice, 'Don't refuse!', in turn from the Tegal KNI leader and a Taman Siswa colleague, Ki Tjitrasatmaka, and from the Resident of Semarang, Wongsonegoro, soon to be appointed Governor of Central Java. Quickly learning his job from the former kawedanan secretary, he settled his own salary at 200 rupiah per month, the same as a Sangikai member. This relatively high level was taken as the 'standard' for new wedanas from then on in the Residency.

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73 Interview, 18.12.72.
74 Ibid.
In Talang, to the north of Adiwerna, a more or less free election for a new Camat was held. Perhaps this was because the KNI was more 'revolutionary' - both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman were leaders of the local Pawnshop Employees' Union before the war, and the latter had regular contact with K. Midjaja during the Occupation, if he was not a member of the underground PKI himself. In fact in Talang it was the Muslim voices from the santri village of Kebasen (which had its own Hizbullah group), together with Kutil's AMRI, which demanded that the KNI act immediately to replace the former Camat of Talang who had fled the area after the killing of a local policeman. The KNI Chairman takes up the story:

I held a meeting in the Talang square near the mosque. There were three candidates for Camat: Abdul Latip (a Muslim candidate); the Vice-Chairman of the KNI, Partosoetikno; and a kyai, not well-known, I forget his name. I did not want to be a candidate. About two hundred gathered at the oval. The system of election was quite simple, the people went and sat down behind the candidate of their choice. It was clear that Abdul Latip had a majority behind him. Most of the two hundred-odd people in the oval were from Kebasen (Abdul Latip's hamlet), it was a fait accompli for the Muslim group. The radical nationalist, Partosoetikno, had made no preparations with his main support, that is Sachyani (Kutil) and Tanggun. I asked the crowd 'Who has the biggest support?' 'Abdul Latip', they replied. So it was he that became Camat. Then I reported to the Chairman of the Tegal kabupaten KNI branch what had happened.75

At the kecamatan and kawedanan level in other areas the installation of new officials was not as dramatic as the expression of popular sovereignty in Talang or the earlier case of Petarukan. In areas where there have been few, if any, dombreng actions, the perjuangan leadership (particularly in Pemalang) was still anxious that the people be given the chance to choose new local officials if they wished. The former Wedana of Belik relates in his inimitable style"

Soepangat (I called him Mas Pangat) told me that he had been chosen as Bupati. Ha, good luck to him!

75 Talang KNI Chairman, Interview, 7.12.75.
He said that perhaps the kawedanan of Belik wanted an election, and could I call a meeting? I said yes, certainly I could.... Then Pangat came and told the meeting that he had been chosen as the new Bupati of Pemalang. 'I am now the Bupati of Pemalang, and I was chosen by the people. I have come here because I want to give all the people the same chance. If you don't like your present Wedana, you can choose a new one, I will organize it'. But the people said: 'No, we will keep our present Wedana'. Then I told the meeting that this was a great chance for them, that there had never been a wedana elected by popular choice since the early times. I told them this was their chance to choose someone they wanted. They should not be shy [jangan malu]; if they didn't want to choose me because I wasn't a local person, I would return home. The Camat, trying to encourage the people, said the old Wedana had had to be called master [ndoro] but a wedana who was chosen by the people could be called father [bapak].

Nevertheless the people insisted on keeping their former wedana. As the latter was by himself in isolated Belik, Soepangat offered him a revolver, but the latter declined: 'I told him [Soepangat] that if I was given a revolver my behaviour might change. Then people who didn't like me might say, "what is the use of one revolver against all of us?" So I wouldn't take it'.

From these examples of how new officials came to office, we can see that in the revolusi sosial period there was great ambiguity as to whether officials were appointed or elected. Clearly, there was no revolutionary 'consensus' on how new leaders were to be chosen or what kind of leaders to select. What happened in each kecamatan reflected the attitude of the Pangreh Praja, and the strength of the Muslim group vis-a-vis the KNI, which sometimes represented the radical nationalists, but more often the old establishment.

The tendency for these outside groups to organise the overthrow of officials - for example, the crowd entering Moga and Bumijawa - is another pattern in the rural revolution in some of the southern areas. This outsider group was not necessarily from

76 Wedana of Belik, Transcript, II/16, 22.5.73.
77 Ibid.
the same town, but often from another more 'radical' village with a strong lenggaong element. In order to see the role of the lenggaongs more clearly, we must now turn to what was happening in the villages.

The Village Level Leadership Struggle

'The replacement or pushing aside of the incumbent Pangreh Praja' writes Smail, 'was a symptom of general breakdown of the existing rural political system, whose framework was the Pangreh Praja network, into a tangle of local power struggles.' Table 5 shows the outcome of some of these power struggles at the village level in seven kecamatans in the Tiga Daerah. We will now discuss the nature of the revolusi sosial in several villages, as the old lurahs were thrown out, how competing groups jockeyed for power. In some areas too, villages split up to form two new administrations.

In the second week of October 1945, the day after the first dombreng action had been witnessed by the lurahs of Ulujami at their meeting in the kecamatan, an orderly demonstration of about 200 unarmed people arrived at the lurah's office in Bumirejo. By this time the former Lurah and the other village officials had already gone into hiding. The leader of the crowd, a certain Daris from the pre-war pergerakan, announced their demand that the Lurah and his staff be dismissed because they had 'helped the Japanese'. A set of new officials was then appointed, headed by a new Lurah, Rasid, who was a former school teacher and member of the Sarekat Rakyat. This new village administration did not last long, however, because it did not reflect the strength of the lenggaong element in Bumirejo. Two days later, the list of officials was changed again to include the son of Siwad, the lenggaong leader, as village Secretary.  

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78 Smail, op. cit., 126.
79 For an account of this action, see Chapter Seven.
80 Siwad himself had been made village Secretary during the colonial time, in the hope of inducing him to stop his lenggaong activities.
peaceful reshuffle, presided over by the Chairman of the Ulujami KNI, reflected the ambitions of Siwad and the other lenggaongs from Bumirejo Kidul who wanted Siwad to be Lurah.

There were several factors contributing to the orderliness of the revolusi sosial in Bumirejo. First, during the Occupation, there had apparently been no paddy searches; so popular anger was not as high as in other places. Second, there was a strong pre-war pergerakan core leadership which could quickly respond to local demands. Thus the crowds which assembled came without bamboo spears, carried out no dombreng actions, and did not burn or ransack officials' houses. That Siwad was unable to oust the new Lurah, Rasid, was partly because Soenarjio, the Secretary of the Ulujami KNI and a veteran of 1926 and the Sarekat Rakyat, was Rasid's brother.

Events followed a very different course in Ambowetan, where santris comprised one-third of the village, and there were no members of the pre-war pergerakan. The village had suffered harshly during the Japanese times. As a result, the Lurah's house was ransacked by about 100 people repeatedly shouting, 'Where is the Lurah Sayan?' His clothes were taken and burnt, and one of the four wooden pillars holding up the roof in the inner part of his house chopped in half. Two hundred quintals of paddy were distributed, about 20 quintals remaining from the noji and the rest belonging to the Lurah himself. Each household received between 40 and 70 kilograms. The crowd was led by a 'prominent Muslim' (tokoh Islam), called Bunyamin, who had the largest popular following in the village; Kastam, the lenggaong; and Darum, another prominent Muslim who was son-in-law of a former lurah and father-in-law of Kastam. The former village policeman, Warja, who had been an azacho in the Japanese time, was chased out and fled to the Dieng plateau. Dajani, the hamlet head, was wounded in the head and dombreng-ed in tears around the village. The former village

81 Ulujami KNI Secretary, 'Peristiwa'.

82 Known as bau desa in Pekalongan Residency, and called kamitua in south-central Java.
Secretary, Awal, lost a set of tables and chairs, 5 quintals of paddy, and 15 kilograms of hulled rice, while the walls of his house were left full of holes from bamboo spears. The noji (a former Lurah of Ambowetan) 'had supernatural powers and a special kris', which enabled him to ward off an attack from Bunyamin wielding a rice-pounder. But his 'powers' did not prevent 25 quintals of rice from being taken, which he admits today he had embezzled during the Occupation. He also lost 40 goats, but these were later returned because they had not been obtained by corrupt means.

In the new village administration Kastam, the lenggaong, became Lurah and the other seven positions were filled by members of the lenggaong group, with the exception of two santri followers of Bunyamin. In contrast to Bumirejo, there was no meeting in which the kecamatan KNI leaders supervised the installation of the new village government.

The situation in the village of Krasak, in Brebes kecamatan was different again. The old Lurah Amran had been extremely oppressive during the Japanese time. He had apparently heard about a lurah who had been made a camat in the South Tegal area, and his ambition was to achieve the same promotion. In any event, his regime was renowned for its oppression. He had on occasion, together with other officials, taken rice from a poor widow, the harvest from half a bau, without paying for it. In a second incident, 15 kilograms of rice from the previous harvest kept for seed for the next year's crop, had been

83 Ambowetan noji, Transcript, 1/2, 3, December 1974/March 1975 (Interview recorded by Comal perjuangan leader).

84 The Ambowetan village administration (typical of Pekalongan Residency villages) consisted of a lurah, carik (village secretary), a bau desa (hamlet head), two village policemen, two kebayan (messengers) and a lebe, or Muslim official. Other villages often had an ulu-ulu (irrigation official), as well. The village policemen stayed on in the new administration as his older brother was the new bau. The new lebe was the younger brother of the previous official. No one was removed by the TKR in the counter-revolution, but the entire administration was changed by the Dutch after the First Clash in 1947.

85 This was unheard of during Dutch days.
confiscated from a poor peasant sharecropper. Both these people were accused of hiding unhulled rice illegally. On another occasion, Rasiwan, a lad of about 15 and the son of a poor peasant, had been reported stealing cassava. The Lurah had ordered his arrest and he was paraded around the village, naked, with a container of cassava tied around his neck, with someone beating a small gong. Not content with small scale robberies, the Lurah had taken 400 quintals of paddy stored in the village rice barn. He pulled up villagers' cassava crop without their consent in order to get the next rice crop in early, and sent them away to work as romushas (of which more than 50 have never to this day returned). The village kapok and Arbasiah (shade) trees, planted every 20 meters along all the roads and paths leading from the village, which were 'already old' had been cut down on the Lurah's orders for the Japanese, so that there was no shade along the roads at all. All the brass locks and door handles had been dismantled and taken from the village, as was the iron on the peasants' hoes; the iron sluice gates on the irrigation channels were also removed and taken off by the Japanese. On top of all this the village quota of cloth had been sold by Amran in the market of Lebaksiu. In all this the Lurah's position had been strengthened by the accessibility of Krasak by the main North Coast road to the Tegal kenpeitai.

By the end of the Occupation the people had had enough. At a big meeting held in September, two-thirds of the entire village (of about 3,000 people) came to elect a village KNI chairman, supervised by two kabupaten KNI leaders, including the Chairman. There were three candidates for the position, two officials of the old village administration, the village messenger, and the irrigation official. The third official was Karto, a well-known popular semi-lenggaong who had supervised a large romusha project. Only those who owned land in the village could vote, by the simple system of writing the name of the candidate on a paper which was placed in a rough bamboo ballot box. The lenggaong won. Later during the revolusi sosial, the

86 Krasak KNI Chairman, Interview, 5.12.75.
former Lurah's house was surrounded by an angry crowd, saying: 'the Lurah must resign and give back the paddy, corn and everything else that he gave to the Japanese.' The newly elected village KNI leader used his authority to prevent the Lurah from being killed, but he was ousted from office with several henchmen, including the village school teacher who had organised the distribution system.

A second village election was then held, this time to choose a new lurah:

There were three candidates, each candidate had his own bumbung (round bamboo cylinder), with his symbol (all leaves) above it. My symbol was turi leaves; Saturn (who had been a lurah for 17 months during the Dutch time, but was dismissed for corruption) used janur [young yellow leaf of the coconut palm]; and the other candidate used a kluwih leaf. People used short sticks (piting) [as ballot papers] which they placed in the bumbung. Everyone in the village could vote. 87

Again Karto won. The people remembered that during the Japanese occupation Karto, like the Ambonese forester, Holle, had turned his position - in charge of a large romusha project on the coast - to the people's advantage. By stealing rations from the Japanese he could provide food for the poor and destitute who were sent to the project. 88

Through Pangkah kawedanan lurahs were also elected, under the supervision of the Pangkah KNI Chairman (and later Wedana) Sugiono, who remembers:

There was an announcement written on a board at the village office that the next day there would be 'elections' for a new lurah. The names of the candidates were collected, [from] whoever wanted to be a candidate, there were no conditions (like nowadays) such as education, except that the person had to be over the age of eighteen. In the village meeting place a 'voting booth' was partitioned off. Each candidate had his own voting box, a circular

87 Ibid.

88 See Chapter Two for the discussion on this romusha project.
cylinder made of bamboo on to which was fastened the candidates' symbol. These were mainly leaves, or occasionally flowers, or the Indonesian flag. The candidates stood outside, each holding his own symbol, some had banana leaves, others teak tree leaves, or young coconut leaves (still yellow), the leaf of the kluwih tree, or the banyan tree. The person took a piece of bamboo as he entered the 'booth' and placed it in the voting box of his candidate. It was mostly kyais who were elected throughout the kawedanan [of Pangkah], or else nationalists.®®

The phenomenon of villages splitting occurred in at least four kecamatans throughout the Tiga Daerah: in Warureja (Tegal) and Moga, Taman and Petarukan (Pemalang kabupaten). The significance of villages splitting was that revolutionaries were frequently unable to carry more than half the village, because of the importance of cultural or economic cleavages, or because of the large size of the Dutch created village units (kalurahan).

One reason for this phenomenon then was the unwieldiness of some villages. In at least one village, Pesucen in Petarukan kecamatan (not shown in AppendixF), there was an old tradition that the kalurahan had been two villages in earlier times, but the Dutch, in the interests of administrative economy, had combined them. Dutch policy was certainly in this direction, fostering the development of large and artificial village units, in which the 'election' of lurahs was largely nominal and the cleavages suppressed. This was particularly so in the southern, less densely-populated parts of the Tiga Daerah.

Warungpring, the biggest village in Moga kecamatan, for example, had 27 village officials.®® This village split, the two new villages dropping the name Warungpring altogether in favour of two different hamlet names. Next door to Warungpring is the village of Mereng where the revolusi sosial began in Pemalang kabupaten.

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89 Interview, 27.11.75.
90 That is the Lurah, village Secretary and five of each of the officials mentioned of fn.84.
Here the local lenggaong leader Demad attacked the Lurah's house and the latter fled. Then Demad, an associate of Samsuri's band, attacked the lenggaong stronghold of Cibuyur down the road from Warungpring and installed the lenggaong Santasamad, a follower of Samsuri, as the new Lurah. Two days later, Demad himself was killed by K.H. Dulmanap, a Muslim leader. Having removed the lenggaong element, the village then split with the new lurahs both santris, one of them Dulmanab.

Although Cibuyur village was also unwieldy (with 23 officials), the new lenggaong Lurah, Santasamad, held the village under his authority, partly by replacing the old administration with his lenggaong friends. Renowned since the Dutch days as a place where lenggaongs gathered, the village had the smallest santri group—only 10 per cent—of any village in the kecamatan. Thus the religious elite was no challenge to the lenggaong leadership. The strong, poor abangan (nominal Muslim) tradition in Cibuyur was reflected in the popularity of various forms of wayang, rather than samroh, the entertainment preferred in more santri villages in this part of the kabupaten.\(^91\)

In contrast to the poverty of the village, the former Lurah of Cibuyur was enormously wealthy. In the social upheaval which followed the attack by the lenggaong Demad, the former Lurah fled. All three of his houses were ransacked, two were burnt and the other was occupied by the pemudas. His nine buffalos were slaughtered and distributed to the people. The paddy in his rice barn—about 100 quintals—and his horse were sold. The new Lurah personally harvested the ground nuts, cassava and corn from the three hectares of land the former Lurah owned.\(^92\) Cibuyur now became a base from which members of Samsuri's group ousted corrupt officials in many nearby villages. In neighbouring Rembul, where Nasro, Samsuri's 'Senopati', had settled, Nasro ousted the Lurah and dismantled his house. Later Nasro moved into the reassembled house, having taken

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\(^91\) Lurah of Cibuyur, Interview, 3.9.75.

\(^92\) Ibid.
for himself the former Lurah's gamelan orchestra, his valuable singing birds, and his four buffalos. 93

In Petarukan kecamatan on the coast (not shown in Appendix F), at least three villages split. This might have been the outcome in Bumirejo village (Ulujami kecamatan) discussed earlier, had the Ulujami KNI not stepped in when, after two days, it appeared that Bumirejo Kidul was not satisfied with the first 'popular' village government. In Pesucen (Petarukan kecamatan) where there were fewer active local KNI or members of the pre-war pergerakan supervising the choice of lurahs, and the lenggaong element was much stronger, the village ended up split in two. The old administration fell when a crowd led by the lenggaong Ali Warto and three henchmen ransacked and burned the houses of five village officials. These were the Lurah, two policemen, the village Secretary and an azacho. The Lurah's horse was going to be killed but it was let out on purpose and sold, probably on the suggestion of Ali Warto's adviser, a school teacher and former Sarekat Rakyat activist, who was from a nearby village. At a meeting held in the local school, Ali Warto was acclaimed as the new Lurah, but unlike the new Lurah in Cibuyur he could not hold the whole village under his authority, in particular the santri group and the officials of the former administration. Part of it split off to form a new village called Selumbu. The Lurah was a former hamlet head of Pesucen, while the village Secretary in the old administration retained his position in the new village. The bengkok lands were divided evenly between the two new villages. 94

In Warureja, a small kecamatan on the Pemalang Tegal coastal border, the majority of villages split, two of them along a lenggaong-rich santri cleavage. In the other cases new lurahs were former officials or their relatives. Popular pressure became so strong for the recognition of the new villages, that a delegation was formed to seek the approval of Mr Besar (who was still the Resident).

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93 Lurah of Kreyo, Interview, 8.2.75.
94 Lurah of Pesucen, Interview, 3.9.75.
in Pekalongan. Here is the account of one of the new village secretaries:

After the new lurahs had been chosen, four of the six villages of the kecamatan of Warureja were divided into two, with the bengkok lands also being divided. A delegation including myself and eight others, mainly from the religious group, including Kyai Saleh the Hizbullah leader, went to Pekalongan to ask for formal approval of the people's choice, [i.e.] the creation of an extra four villages. We suggested that the official village stamp rotate between the two villages. But the Resident said that while we could have as many village secretaries as we liked, he could not give permission to divide existing villages. We got nowhere [hasil nol], and had to go home empty-handed. Meetings were held to explain the Resident's decision to the people. We had no choice but to re-unify the villages that had been divided by the people's choice.95

Table 6 shows that the hated established administrators were thrown out almost everywhere. The fact that this happened in fewer villages in the two hinterland kecamatans of Bumiayu and Balapulang is partly due to the lower pressure of population, and the less harsh impact of the Japanese wartime economic policies on the people in the southern kecamatans. Although I did not research the other kecamatans in this part of Brebes kabupaten, my impressions are that fewer lurahs were changed than along the coast. The situation is the same in the three southernmost kecamatans of Pemalang kabupaten, Belik, Watukumpul and Pulosari, but for different reasons. Although these areas had been very poor since Dutch times (the Dutch sponsored welfare organisation Mardi Utomo was formed in and for Pulosari), the santri and lenggaong oppositional elements were missing. There were no santri leaders from the perjuangan, such as Kyai Said from Gendowang. There were also no lenggaong villages in these three kecamatans. Being very poor abangan, the villagers had neither the money nor the desire to send their sons away to pesantrens, as peasants did in Moga and Randudongkal.

95 Lurah of Kedungjati, Interview, 10.2.75.
Composition of New Ruling Elite at the Village Level in the Tiga Daerah
after the 'revolusi sosial' (for details see Appendix F)

Source: data from interviews from 7 out of 49 kecamatan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of villages</th>
<th>No. of lurah changed</th>
<th>'Former Elite'</th>
<th>NEW LURAH</th>
<th>'New Elite'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim religious elite</td>
<td>Family of former Lurah</td>
<td>Former village officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalang</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>26 28%</td>
<td>12 13%</td>
<td>11 12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* usually a veteran from the 1926 pergerakan.

Note: At least one pergerakan school teacher lurah (Bumirejo) and one lenggaong (Cibuyur) were removed by the TKR during the counter-revolution, when all villages that had split were reunited.
In Bumiayu kecamatan there was relatively little upheaval in 1945. Two lurahs had even stayed in office for 'three periods' (tiga zaman), the Dutch, Japanese and Independence periods: this was unheard of in the kecamatans on the coastal plain. There were seven members of the local religious elite in office as lurahs at the end of Dutch rule in 1942. Another four former lurahs had been replaced during the Japanese occupation by santris, and these were not removed during October 1945. The fact that fewer village officials were replaced reflected a different social ecology in Bumiayu compared with the other southern areas. A rich santri trading town, the area was known for its agricultural products, tapioca and cloves. As well as a thriving leather industry, the town was, and is still, famous for its crackers made from cattle skin membrane (krupuk rambak), a delicacy in other parts of Java. Although supporting several Muslim religious schoolsof its own, many students went to study in Termas pesantren, near Pacitan, or Tebuireng at Jombang. 

Bumiayu also had a strong tradition of travelling outside the area (rantau) - many Bandung tailors are from Bumiayu - and sending money back. During the Dutch time, Muhammadiah ran a private Dutch language primary school (HIS) in Bumijawa as well.

During the Japanese occupation there was no hunger oedema in Bumiayu, as in many coastal kecamatans or the southern area of Pemalang. This was in part due to the efforts of the PKO (Penolong Kesengsaraan Oemoem, Relief of General Suffering), a Muhammadiah group which distributed a kind of porridge called wajlam made from pawpaw, palm sugar, and cassava flour, to the needy. Also in Bumijawa kecamatan, rationing of basic commodities was in the hands of a separate committee, not the lurahs. The system of paddy collection was different from the coastal areas. Peasants were not forced to take their paddy to kalurahan collection centres, but could take it home.

96 In a recent survey of student origins at Tebuireng, the largest group came from Bumiayu (not to be confused with Bumijawa in southern Tegal). Personal communication with Zamakhshyari Dhofer.
to pound, later delivering their quota to the kalurahan as hulled rice. The role of the noji was less intrusive, he only 'reminded' people to deliver their quotas. People knew well in advance about paddy searches, which were infrequent in any case. The cloth distribution - 3 meters of belacu for 2 quintals of rice - was also much higher and the camat used extra cloth to make shorts (5 pairs from 2 meters). People who had no sawah always got shorts.  

During the Japanese occupation throughout the Tiga Daerah the religious elite-village priyayi linkage had not really been disturbed, except that while the latter suffered a loss of status and prestige by having to raise romushas and enforce paddy collection, the religious elite did not. If the composition of the Barisan Pelopor in Tegal and Brebes is an indication, it was this group who occupied most of the positions in that organisation at the kecamatan level and below. 

While some lenggaongs had patrons from both the religious elite and the village priyayis during the colonial and Japanese periods, such links did not prevent the same elite figures being overthrown by other lenggaongs during the revolusi sosial. In the role of the lenggaongs who were mostly from poor and middle peasant backgrounds, we see the signs of emerging class conflict. The lenggaongs challenged both the village priyayis and the religious elite. The village priyayis were almost completely overthrown in Ulujami, where only one of 18 lurahs, Haji Sjukur, survived in office, barely resisting a 'coup' organised by the lenggaong Deman. In both Comal and Moga the changes were less drastic but more extensive than in Bumijawa or Balapulang. In Ulujami where more violence occurred slightly more lurahs came from the ranks of the village priyayis. The strength of the religious elite may account for the changes in Moga, for many of the new lurahs there were local Muslim leaders. 

In the 'tangle of local power struggles' and revolutionary factionalism, villages were split between rival santris (as in Mereng in Moga) and between rival lenggaongs (as in Warureja kecamatan), as 

97 The above account is from interviews in Bumijawa on 13 and 14 December 1975.
well as along the lenggaong-santri divide. The lenggaong-santri clash should not really be equated with Geertz's distinction between santri-abangan. In the rural Tiga Daerah the dividing line between santri and abangan was hard to draw. Some lenggaongs had santri (in Geertz's sense) that is pesantren backgrounds, or had been on the haj, and made their appeal to the people using the same magico religious symbolism, as many of the orthodox rural kyais did. Their claim on popular religious sentiment was often as strong as that of the kyais. Rather, in the lenggaong leadership we see signs of emerging class conflict, against the stronger economic position of both the religious elite and the village priyayis.

Table 7 summarises the changes in the seven kecamatans researched. Taking the categories of elite santris and village priyayis (family of a former lurah or former village official), as linked together since colonial times for mutual reinforcement, we can see that 53 per cent of new lurahs came from the established wealthy class, while 32 per cent were from the new groups in the villages who had not held power before the revolution. There were the odd exceptions in the santri group of a santri rakyat, or poor santri, becoming Lurah in which case he would have been closer to the new group than the religious landowning elite.

The signs of class conflict, of the lenggaongs representing the proletariat seizing power, can be seen also in the phenomenon of villages splitting, particularly in Warureja, Petarukan, and Taman kecamatans (not in Table). In Taman, two out of 18 villages split. Again, one section of the village following lenggaongs, another a member of the religious elite. In Petarukan kecamatan, besides Pesucen, two other villages split, Petarukan itself and Karangasem. One of the new lurahs in Karangasem was a schoolteacher, while in Petarukan the village split between a PESINDO leader and a santri.98

98 Petarukan PESINDO leader, Transcript, I/7, March 1975 (recorded by Comal nationalist).
The size of the bengkok lands, the most visible sign of the Lurah's wealth, had been an issue since colonial times. During the revolusi sosial period, as we have seen, bengkok was divided if a village split in two. Kutil, as mentioned previously, took over four hectares of bengkok. The bengkok issue was extremely important, as this was the most obvious and easily accessible land available for redistribution. In the village of Sukowati (one of the forestry stations where the underground PKI leaders lived) the emerging class conflict was sharper than Pesucen. The first demand of the people had been that the paddy in the village barn (requisitioned by the Japanese) be distributed. However, this soon developed into strife about the Lurah's enormous personal wealth. Besides his bengkok the Lurah owned three horses, a dokar and many rice fields.

The bengkok was taken over by the people who wanted to divide it up, and the Lurah was thrown out. An underground PKI courier living near Sukowati recalls what happened:

The bengkok was controlled by the people, who wanted to take it over for themselves. We were able to overcome the difficulties. 'The distribution of the paddy must be just', we said. We asked Pangat [the new Bupati of Pemalang] to come, he arrived with Djing Kwan, Amir and Seto.99 The paddy was collected in the village rice barn, then the people were asked to have a meeting about how to divide it. It was decided that those ten years and over would get the same as adults (25 kilograms per person), those under ten would get half. There was no difference between rich and poor, in principle everyone got a quota. However, the rich were asked to hand over their quotas to add to those of the poor. In general the rich did not dispute this...they were afraid that their sawah would be taken over by the people.100

The Lurah's horses were set free, and his dokar and the paddy from his own ricefields burnt, but the paddy from his bengkok was distributed. Led by the lenggaong Sahid, the people demanded that the bengkok land

99 All three were underground PKI members. Tan Djiem Kwan (known as Djing Kwan) and Amir were from Pemalang. Seto was the leader of the Lasem cell.

100 Lasem courier, Interview, 18.10.76.
be distributed. However, Soepangat, the new revolutionary Bupati from Pemalang said, 'the land belongs to the State'. This apparently did not satisfy the people, at least until the lenggaong Sahid was appointed as Lurah. The following description of Sahid was typical of the lenggaongs who became lurahs during this period.

Sahid was a daring person with special powers; he could disappear and weapons could not pierce his body. A farmer, he only stole outside his own area, and he had two wives in Mangunsari. You could say he was nominally Muslim (abanganlah). He had never killed anyone but had been in jail during the Japanese time. He was clever at silat [martial art of self-defence], belonging to the Cimandi group. He was appointed Lurah on the voices of the people, and a report was made to the Bupati. Then a group of six people including Soepangat, Amir, and Moerjawancame in a car. I just went along with them. Soepangat said, 'Because this person is your own choice, obey all his orders.' Amir backed up what Soepangat said. He said, 'The people and the Lurah are one. Everything must be discussed together (at that time there was no term musyawarah [mutual discussions]).'

After Sahid became Lurah, security of the village was guaranteed.

It was much more difficult to obtain land which had been expropriated by santri landlords than the lurah's bengkok during the revolusi sosial. In Taman kecamatan, as we have seen, two santri landlord families distributed some of the 'hundreds of tons' of paddy in their rice barn, at the request of the Camat, thus defusing the movement against them. In neighbouring Petarukan kecamatan the santri landlords in the village of Kendalsari moved quickly to protect their wealth, by forming a branch of PESINDO. Its leader was the son of a man who had been lurah during the Japanese time, who had three wives and whose family owned 152 bau of rice land. PESINDO office-holders in Kendalsari were all related to one another and all came from landlord families. They and the Kendalsari pemudas who joined PESINDO (all of whom were Dutch-educated) did so as one of their number.

101 Ibid.
a local perjuangan leader put it 'simply and solely to save their families from being disturbed as a result of rapid social change'.

Having looked at the village upheaval in several villages, we can see a spectrum of different 'models' of upheaval emerging. On the one side was Cibuyur, with its relatively weak and assimilated santri group having little choice but to operate with the lenggaong who took over the Lurah's land and replaced all the officials with his own followers. The Lurah of this village was captured by the TKR and spent four years in Nusakambangan prison after the Tiga Daerah. In villages such as Cibuyur, the village priyayis and the weaker religious elite could no longer link up for mutual reinforcement. There were no pre-war pergerakan leaders in this part of Pemalang kabupaten (the Sarekat Rakyat had not been strong in these areas) and therefore no strong local KNIs to supervise elections of new officials.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the kalurahans of Bumiayu where the religious elite controlled the village, the lenggaong were not a challenge, and there was little real change. In the southern areas of Pemalang as well the pre-war pergerakan element (represented by the local KNIs) was weak, the Sarekat Rakyat having had no following in these hinterland hill areas.

In between these two polar types, power in the village passed to a variety of, and often a combination of, the village priyayis, the religious elite, the pergerakan veterans, and the lenggaong. Whether the upheaval was violent or orderly depended on several factors: firstly, the strength of the rivalries between the lenggaong and the religious elite, as in Mereng; secondly, the moderating role of the radical pre-war pergerakan leaders, as in Bumirejo; thirdly, the impact of wartime depredations and the corruption of the old administration (in Ambowetan), as opposed to oppression (as in Krasak).

102 PESINDO Kendalsari Secretary, Interview, 31.10.75.

103 The present Lurah, whose father was thrown out of office and replaced by the lenggaong, used the anachronistic term 'nationalist santri' to describe the Cibuyur santri community. They were not 'fanatical Muslims' as in the neighbouring villages of Mereng and Warungpring, he said. He probably meant they were so 'abanganised' they would vote PNI.
In almost all cases where lurahs were thrown out there was a distribution of the former incumbents' personal wealth; the paddy being divided and sometimes property sold. However, the land and houses were often taken over by the new Lurah. Nowhere did local revolutionaries encourage the redistribution of bengkok lands to landless peasants, although in villages such as Sukowati, control was taken away from the Lurah. In the latter village the Bupati, Soepangat, actively discouraged redistribution. After the TKR-led counter-revolution, this personal property was often returned to the former owner, although the new incumbent usually stayed in office, in some cases until the 1965 upheaval. The fact that many former lurahs were able to go into hiding in the village or its environs also reflected strong village patron client ties. There were still people who were willing to protect the lurahs. At the kecamatan/kawedanan levels (Table 6 the proportion of members of the 'old elite' in power after the revolusi sosial (27 per cent) was much lower than at the village level (53 per cent - see Table 7. The contrast between the two levels is not so much in the percentages of 'new elite' members, although this is 10 per cent lower at the village level. It is in the different classification of santris, as part of the 'old elite' of the village level, but a different kind of new elite at the higher levels. During colonial times as well as the Japanese occupation, these higher positions had been the jealously guarded prerogative of the Pangreh Praja.
CHAPTER SIX

ORDER AND DISORDER

THE violence that often accompanied the removal of hated officials during the *revolusi sosial* was also directed at the Eurasian population. While they had nowhere to flee to safety (some were put in the local jails but were not safe for long as we shall see) the *Pangreh Praja* had several alternatives. Some officials who had been daulat-ed in the Tiga Daerah during the second week in October, or who had fled of their own accord, went to homes of relatives in Banyumas, Semarang or elsewhere in Central Java. The majority, however, went to the relative safety of Pekalongan itself. The Pekalongan kabupaten situation was in marked contrast to the Tiga Daerah. There were no *dombreng* actions; the *Pangreh Praja* were still at their posts. The most that happened in Batang kawedanan, for example, was that officials left for a few days and then returned when the milder protest had died away. The officials who had left from the Tiga Daerah found accommodation with other *Pangreh Praja* in the Residency capital. Their stories about what happened to themselves and their colleagues amazed officials in the Residency capital, as nothing of this violent social upheaval was occurring in Pekalongan kabupaten. There was no NICA-phobia there either.

In response to what now seemed to the Pekalongan capital like total anarchy in the Tiga Daerah, the Resident, Mr Besar, issued three Proclamations (*Maklumat*) in mid-October. The first, apparently directed at the upheaval in Pemalang, began by calling on all people in the Residency 'to stay calm and orderly' and to stand behind the government of the Indonesian Republic. People were 'strictly forbidden' to take matters into their own hands, as this would quickly lead to 'disorder'. The safety of individuals as well as their personal property had to be guaranteed. Strong action would be taken against anyone who either provoked or carried out 'robbery, arson, murder, damage to buildings, factories or warehouses, bridges and anything else'.

1 *Maklumat No.1*, Pekalongan, 17.10.45 [signed], Resident Pekalongan, Mr Besar (Besar Docs.).
The second Proclamation, apparently issued from the Residency police headquarters, but signed by Mr Besar, called on anyone with arms (rifles or pistols) or ammunition to hand them in to the local police station on any day 'between the hours of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m.' These would be used by the TKR which had a 'very heavy responsibility to guarantee the security of the Republic of Indonesia'.

The third Proclamation from Pekalongan on 22 October was virtually a declaration of martial law. From Pekalongan's viewpoint a further 'deterioration' had occurred in the intervening six days. The language in this Proclamation had hardened: the Resident no longer 'expected' that the people would be orderly. The TKR was now given full power 'to take whatever action is necessary to maintain respect for the government of the Republic of Indonesia, so the government can continue to function in the best way possible, to improve the daily welfare of the people'. The entire coastal strip beginning at Petarukan and as far west as Wanasari kecamatan in Brebes was put under the authority of the TKR, as were the kecamatans of Jatibarang, Adiwerna and Talang further inland.

In the context of the growing NICA phobia in the Tiga Daerah, absent from Pekalongan kabupaten, the Resident's Proclamations were disregarded or greeted with suspicion. There had been no public announcement when Mr Besar had firmly and finally been appointed by the central government on 21 September. Perjuangan leaders in the Tiga Daerah were still of the belief that 'Pekalongan had no Resident appointed by the Central Government'.

Moreover, the badan perjuangan guarded their weapons jealously

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2 Maklumat No.2, Kantor Pusat Kepolisian Karesidenan Pekalongan, Pekalongan, 16 October 1945, Resident Pekalongan, Mr M. Besar (Besar Docs). (This second Proclamation is actually dated a day before No.1.)

3 Maklumat No.3, Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Daerah Karesidenan Pekalongan, 22 October 1945 (Besar Docs).

4 Muhamad Nuh, SEMDAM, 8.
and any suggestion that they should be handed over to anyone else was unthinkable. But even if they had agreed, it was unlikely that they would have handed their weapons to the police who (as we shall see in a moment) were just as unpopular as the Pangreh Praja. If anything, the Proclamations only served to widen the gulf between Pekalongan and the rest of the Residency. There were more rumours that Mr Besar had 'tried to save the Indos', that he was associated with NICA, and that the TKR was nothing more than the Tentara Keamanan Residen, the Resident's Security Force.

Meanwhile, the Pangreh Praja remaining in the kabupaten capitals were trying to solve the problem of the continuing social unrest. In Tegal after the Resident's first Proclamation the Bupati called the Barisan Pelopor leadership to a meeting in the kabupaten office. A high ranking official from Pekalongan was present, representing the Resident. Writing some 13 years later the Barisan Pelopor leader, Muhamad Nuh, who also attended the meeting, recalled:

...the Bupati said that there was disorder to the south of Tegal, and it had to be quickly combatted. He asked if the Barisan Pelopor leadership were willing or not to help in combatting the unrest. The Barisan Pelopor leadership replied by saying that it did not see the events south of Tegal as 'disorder'. What was going on was a revolution, which was tearing down [merombak] everything that was tainted with colonialism and fascism. The solution was to be found in a reorganisation which was not just quantitative but qualitative. The Barisan Pelopor had already made efforts to achieve this end, by contacting the existing organisations, namely the heads of the village KNIs that had only recently been formed. There were two ways of looking at the problem [of how to deal with the social unrest] and two ways of solving the problem but during the discussions the attitude of the officials was extremely unbending and officious. Then one official - the one from Pekalongan - just got up and left us and walked from the pendopo to the inner part of the

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Marsum, writing about this Proclamation calling on the people to hand over their arms, says: "...the word "people" had a wide meaning, if it applied also to the [Tegal] Barisan Pelopor weapons, I certainly couldn't accept it'. Answers, 3, 6.8.74.
kabupaten residence while the Bupati wasn't prepared to discuss anything else, and told us to leave.6

Meanwhile what had happened to the police? At the beginning of the Japanese occupation the career police officers, mainly Dutch and Eurasians, had been interned. In their place had been recruited Pangreh Praja officials, for the greater part graduates of MOSVIA, the Secondary Training School for Native Officials. Thus in Tegal the city Police Chief Kadarman was a 1931 MOSVIA graduate, while his kabupaten counterpart Koeswadi was a former Camat of Tonjong (Brebes kabupaten), a 1933 MOSVIA graduate, who although himself the son of a lurah, 'also had the priyayi mentality'.7

In late September 1945, before the removal of the Japanese, Kadarman had been daulat-ed, and given some 're-education', by API at Pangkah. The action, which included the Mayor of Tegal, was inspired by the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta shortly before the Proclamation, and was executed with BKR help. Mohamad Junus, the Tegal API leader, writes:

At 5 p.m. our group, consisting of myself, my brother Annas and Pitoyo the BKR leader left by car with Pitoyo driving. We arrived at the house of Tuan [Mr] Kadarman...luckily at that time Tuan Kadarman was sitting on the front verandah with his wife enjoying the late afternoon air. Our arrival was greeted with courtesy, we were asked to sit down, and Kadarman enquired as to the purpose of our visit. I said we had come to ask him to attend a meeting at the railways to discuss the question of the police weapons that had been given to the kenpeitai. Without thinking a long time about it, Tuan Kadarman agreed to our request, and straight away was taken off in the car. Tuan Kadarman sat in between myself and Annas, and Pitoyo drove away at high speed not to the pemuda headquarters, but to the south. Tuan Kadarman seemed confused and asked 'Where am I being taken?' I answered by grabbing my pistol 'Be quiet, you don't need to ask' I said harshly.8

6 Muhamad Nuh, SEMDAM, 8.
7 Wadyono, English comment. Wadyono replaced Koeswadi as Camat of Tonjong just before the war.
8 Mohamad Junus, 'Riwayat Hidup Ki Moh Junus' (TS), 11.
Shortly after his arrival in Pangkah, the Police Chief was joined by the Mayor and the Tegal textile mill foreman, who had a reputation for harsh arbitrariness in dealing with employees. After being interrogated and made to 'confess' his mistakes, and to swear on penalty of death that he would change his behaviour, the textile mill foreman was allowed to leave, the Police Chief and the Mayor, however, were kept in Pangkah.

For the next three days and nights, the two officials were indoctrinated by API and BKR leaders 'so they would be conscious that Indonesia was already free with its own government, with full power in our hands'. Three days and nights of this had been enough to convince the officials of their mistakes, and the Police Chief had promised to try to get back the weapons that he had handed over to the kenpeitai.

The police problem in Tegal had continued. Maklani, the Talang kecamatan policeman, was killed early in October. On 19 October, the kabupaten Police Chief with the 'priyayi mentality', Koeswadi, sent a detachment of police to the village of Lemahduwur with orders to arrest local leaders to 'settle the disorder' (membereskan kekacauan) once and for all. Lemahduwur was the place where the Adiwerna Camat had been killed 10 days earlier. Included in those arrested was a popular local Hizbullah leader. The people of Lemahduwur, extremely angry, asked the Ujungrusi KNI leaders for help to mount an attack on the kabupaten police barracks and rescue their leader. The Ujungrusi KNI informed all villages in the Adiwerna area, and asked for volunteers. On 20 October, barely four days after the Resident's Proclamation ordering all arms to be handed over to the police 'between the hours of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m.' the Tegal kabupaten police barracks were attacked and a quantity of weapons and ammunition taken back to Adiwerna. These included three M.95 carbines, two pistols, two marechausee swords, as well as a bicycle.

Hostility towards the police then spread into neighbouring Brebes, when a farmer arrived in Ujungrusi from Jatibarang seeking

10 Ibid.
help against police oppression. The leader of the Jatibarang KNI had been seized and put in jail in Brebes, and for two days and nights the farmer had not dared return home, for fear of the police 'who were acting tyrannically'. Haji Samsuri, the Ujungrusi Pemuda Istimewa leader promptly ordered preparations for an attack on the police at Jatibarang and Brebes.

The Brebes police had been particularly unrepentant, with a number of provocative actions against local revolutionary leaders. In September the Japanese flag had still flown over the Brebes police barracks long after it had been taken down for good from in front of other government offices. A large demonstration had assembled outside the barracks demanding that the flag be changed. Because they had no weapons to enforce their demand, the protest came to nothing. The 'police scoundrels [polisi bangsat]' as the demonstration leader called them, did not forget the incident. Shortly afterwards the leader was seized as a 'troublemaker' and thrown into a cell, only to be released shortly afterwards on the intervention of a friend in the BKR.

The catalyst for the Ujungrusi-Talang action against the Brebes police had been the complaints of the Jatibarang farmer. About 9 a.m. on the following day a crowd, some on foot and some riding the narrow gauge sugar mill railway, left Ujungrusi for Jatibarang. All prisoners were released from local detention. When the crowd, now joined by Kutil and others from Talang, arrived in Brebes, they said 'we will clean away all the remnants of the old colonial order'. In the ensuing chaos, Muksaan, the Brebes lenggaong, obtained the key to the cells where the Eurasians were locked for safekeeping in the local jail, and they were taken away and killed.

The TKR which, according to Mr Besar's Proclamation, was supposed to have replaced the Pangreh Praja in keeping law and order,

11 Ibid, 5.
12 Brebes AMRI/PKN leader, Interview, 2.12.75.
13 Ibid.
was as powerless as the police or local badan perjuangan leaders to impose any kind of authority outside the kabupaten capitals. In Tegal, at the initiative of local TKR leaders, a meeting was called at the TKR headquarters. It was attended by Tegal City's top officials and perjuangan leaders. These included a public prosecutor, the Bupati, the Sicho, Soengeb, Kadarman (the City Police Chief), the kabupaten KNI Chairman and two Barisan Pelopor leaders, including Muhamad Nuh. The TKR leader chairing the meeting began by asking why the Municipal police had followed the example of their kabupaten counterparts, who had disbanded themselves after the 20 October attack on their Kejambon barracks. The KNI Chairman expressed his view that the kabupaten police were given no support at that time 'because of the indecisiveness' of the Municipal police. The Barisan Pelopor said this was no reason for them to disband as well, and urged Kadarman to continue as Chief, saying the Tegal perjuangan groups would all give their support.

In reply the Municipal Police Chief said he was 'no longer able to lead the police force, because his followers had taken off their uniforms and given away their weapons (he didn't explain to whom) and stopped doing duty; in general because they were afraid to be police any longer'. As Kadarman could not be persuaded to change his mind, it was decided to form a committee as soon as possible to reorganise the kabupaten security. In the interim period the Barisan Pelopor would be responsible at least for security in the City, using the City's Freedom Funds where necessary.

The new committee of seven local leaders, upon its formation immediately issued an announcement calling all former police to join the new force, as well as asking for new members. The majority of the former police agreed to rejoin on the condition that they were not to be called police. The former Police Chief was asked to stay on as a 'technical adviser' and he agreed, on the understanding that this

14 Muhamad Nuh, SEMDAM, 10.
15 Ibid.
role would not make him conspicuous. However, soon after this he disappeared from the city. The Governor of Central Java, Wongonegoro, was then telephoned in Semarang, and he agreed to send a police officer from the provincial capital to help the new head Wahyudi and his deputy, Tegal AMRI leader Surjono Darusman, in their new tasks. To try to attract back former police officers it was decided the new organisation would be known as the PKNRI (Penjaga Keamanan Negara Republic Indonesia - National Security Guard of the Republic of Indonesia), or just PKN and its members simply as 'security guards' (Penjaga keamanan). 16

Thus in Tegal the PKN became a kind of adjunct to the Barisan Pelopor who had in any case successfully organised municipal security since the Proclamation. It never developed a separate identity or role of its own. This was in contrast to the situation in Brebes where, early in November, the local perjuangan decided to move the Barisan Pelopor headquarters into the old police barracks where it was renamed the PKN. The Brebes PKN symbol worn as a badge by its members was a black bison on a white background, drawn and made by the local pemudas. In the kecamatans, PKN groups, synonymous with the most revolutionary local elements, were formed, some kecamatans sending between 10 and 15 pemudas to the PKN barracks in the kabupaten capital, where over 200 were housed and fed. In short, the Brebes PKN was basically a pemuda group with ponggal (rice packet) rations supplied by the local population, with people acting on the basis of semangat (enthusiasm), doing guard duty without orders, when the spirit moved them to do so. The 'pemuda PKN', as they were called, more closely resembled the Tegal Barisan Pelopor or the Pemalang API/PRI in their ethos without the economic functions of these badan perjuangan, and without their united leadership either. 17

16 Ibid, 11.

17 The Brebes PKN leadership was plagued with the same factionalism for a time as the rest of the Brebes perjuangan. See Chapter Eight on the kabupaten capitals.
The Fate of the Eurasians

'Of all the groups in the Indies', Wertheim once wrote, 'the Indos perhaps suffered most from terrorism in the early days of the Indonesian Republic'. While sentiments such as these were more common in 1947 than today, still no attempt has been made in the intervening 30 and more years to document unemotionally how, or why, the killings occurred.

In 1930 there were 4,200 people of European status living in the Pekalongan Residency, 12 per cent of Central Java's European population. If the all-Java situation is any guide, about 90 per cent of these were Eurasian or 'Indos', a term which conventionally included Indies-born Europeans. About half the Residency's Eurasian population lived in Tegal kabupaten, mostly in the kabupaten capital itself, while another one-third (roughly 600 people in 1930) lived around the kabupaten's six sugar mills. Pemalang's 'European' population was mainly concentrated in the kabupaten capital itself and Comal. Brebes had the smallest group of Eurasians in the Tiga Daerah, most of whom were living on the coastal plain, with a small number - about 20 - in Bumiayu in the hills to the far south.

The most important background factor in the situation of the Eurasians in Pekalongan Residency, in the rural areas at any rate, was that they were seen as aliens occupying a privileged economic position.

18 W.F. Wertheim, 'The Indo-European Problem in Indonesia', Pacific Affairs, XX (1947), 297. Wertheim later clarified this to mean terrorism 'on both sides'. Indonesian Society, 68.

19 Volkstelling 1930, Deel I, 103, 120.

20 J.M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World (Bandung, 1954), 276. By Dutch law, the off-spring of mixed marriages take the nationality of the father, so this figure for 'Europeans' excludes all Eurasians with 'non-European fathers'. The entire Indies Eurasian population was thought to be as high as nine million in 1940.

21 The total Indies European population increased by 25 per cent from 240,000 in 1930 to 300,000 in 1941. Assuming the same increase for Pekalongan Residency this would give some rough idea of relative growth in those years.
Their position depended on the sugar mills which, as we discussed in Chapter One, were symbols of the worst and most hated aspects of colonial economic oppression. The mills exploited the Eurasians' familiarity with the Javanese cultural world, and their language fluency in the difficult job of obtaining labour. Usually they worked as plantation supervisors, labour foremen and contractors, or in the mill itself as chemical analysts or machinists. They were better paid than their Javanese counterparts. Many in these positions considered the Javanese to be 'stupid', 'lazy' and 'dirty'. These feelings of superiority in matters relating to health, education and work efficiency were keenly felt, especially by the more educated Javanese who resented the Eurasians' insistence on being spoken to always in high Javanese, even by Javanese associates with excellent Dutch. In short, racial prejudice further poisoned the already appalling labour relations in the sugar mills, already among the of all Western economic enterprise in Java.

During the 1930s, when many of the mills closed, some of the Eurasians turned to farming, running guest houses in the popular hill station of Tuwel near Bumijawa, and managing the tea and rubber plantations around Bumiayu, where the town's dairy and ice factory was run by a German. Tegal's three dairies were also run by Eurasians. It seems most families in the Tiga Daerah were quite well off and there is no impression of any really poor Eurasians, who have been described as 'living like paupers' on the fringes of the kampungs of Java's larger cities. Furthermore, in the late 1930s, many returned to their old jobs when the mills began re-opening.

With the arrival of the Japanese, the world of the Indo-Europeans was turned upside down. Early in 1942 the Japanese introduced racial classification system based on paternity and every Eurasian

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22 Some of the attitudes held by Eurasians towards Javanese reflecting the contradictions of being caught between two worlds and belonging to neither, are seen in E. Breton de Nijs, Bayangan Memudar (Jakarta, 1975).

was expected to prove his or her descent. However in practice in Pekalongan Residency the Japanese did not apply such distinctions. According to Toshio Ota, the Assistant Resident, all those Dutchmen 'including those of more than 50 per cent Dutch blood' who were working in the sugar mills still operating when the Japanese arrived, 'were ordered to move immediately to Jakarta' leaving Eurasians of '25 per cent Dutch blood', Menadonese and Ambonese working in the factories. However, the Japanese mistrusted this group because of their suspected European loyalties, and later in the war the rest had to report to the authorities each month, while many more were arrested and interned. It was these people, like some of the radical politicians and anyone else over whom the Japanese had this kind of hold, that were used as informers. Although the Japanese propaganda must have had an impact, the immediate impetus for the Eurasian killings in the Pekalongan Residency was the generalised fear that the Dutch would try to re-occupy Indonesia. This fear greatly intensified after the landings of the British and NICA in Jakarta.

It is difficult today to reconstruct the extraordinary phobia aroused in October 1945 by the word NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration). The years of hardship, as long as people could remember, before the war, the appalling suffering brought on by the near famine conditions of the latter part of the Japanese occupation, had built up enormous psychological tensions amongst the population. The symptoms of this tension, fierce suspicions and feelings of intense hostility, were stronger in the poor, most densely populated parts of the Tiga Daerah, especially the Talang-Adiwerna-Slawi areas of Tegal. The Japanese had been the first target for outbursts of such hostile feelings. When they had been disarmed and removed, hostility was focussed on the Pangreh Praja. After the landings of British troops on 29 September and the reports and rumours of NICA atrocities on the population of the capital, the hostility became

24 van der Kroef, op.cit., 286.
25 Ota, Answers.
anti-foreign, and took on the momentum of a separate movement within the revolutionary struggle. This is referred to today as the gerakan anti-NICA (anti-NICA movement). Well into November, several weeks after the Eurasian killings had ceased, this movement still had a strong momentum of its own. Pemudas were stopping people in the street, or boarding trains searching the common people for any red, white and blue (the Dutch colours) clothing. Finding even a single thread of these colours, in coat linings for example, would mean dragging the person off the train and away for questioning. Anything that was feared as strange or unknown was labelled 'NICA'.

The anti-NICA movement in the Tiga Daerah was sparked by reports of events following the arrival in Jakarta of a company of the KNIL 26 - referred to as the tentara NICA (NICA army) - with the British (Indian) forces on 29 September. The KNIL troops, according to one Dutch observer, 'were poorly trained and were joined by a number of ex-internees whose sojourn in camps had made them even more bitter... these troops needed little incentive to become involved in incidents'. 27 At the time of these landings, Jakarta in particular was filled with wild rumours about Dutch and Eurasian ex-internees who were being equipped with arms (from the Japanese) to suppress the Indonesian Independence movement and to kill Indonesian leaders. Many Eurasians carrying guns had been arrested by the British. Unrest was increasing amongst the population who believed the Republic was being threatened by the actions of the ex-internees and the 'NICA army'. 28

At the Residency level open hostility began to occur on the morning of 11 October, when Slawi's entire Indo-European population

26 KNIL, Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, was the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.


was taken to the old Dukuhwringin sugar mill. The impetus for this action came from a certain Mulyadi, about whom little is known. A native of neighbouring Jatibarang, and an ex-Heiho member, he was later involved in the removal of the Camat of that town. The Eurasians taken to the old mill included the Frederiks and Van Dongen families, who ran the local dairy, the Dychton and Van Ooyens families who had worked in the sugar mills, an Ambonese nurse Rizakota, and three Bataks - K.M. Sinambela and his wife Tiurlan and a cousin Mahuddin Pane.

About 2 p.m. people from surrounding kampungs armed with bamboo spears, and saying they were going to attend 'an important mass meeting' began gathering at the mill. Leaders from the API and AMRI pemuda groups were also present but the meeting was led by Mulyadi. After he spoke the crowd demanded that the prisoners be tried by an open people's court as 'the enemies of the people were tried in the October Revolution in Russia'. At about 4 p.m. the Eurasians were escorted out to where the crowd had gathered, and put in some kind of order. Some of the prisoners were taken one by one to the front of the crowd where their 'errors' were read out - that they had 'betrayed the national revolution'. The crowd was then asked three times for the sentence on each person, and three times the people replied by raising both hands above their heads crying 'bunuh!' (death!). Here is a first hand account by Mrs Tiurlan, the wife of one of the Bataks, as she remembered it 28 years later:

My husband [K.M. Sinambela] was number eight, his cousin (Mahuddin Pane) one before him. As each person was taken onto the stage the people shouted 'Bunuh! Bunuh!'. Sister Rizakota (an Ambonese nurse) was still wearing her white uniform. Then they were taken away, blindfolded and killed with bamboo spears. I was at the end with an Indo girl, Meri who was the wife of the Lurah of Kalisapu. I was already on the stage when someone shouted out that I was not an Indo, I was Javanese. It was

29 Soesmono, Answers, 8. The Tegal kabupaten KNI Vice-Chairman got an eyewitness account of what happened later on the evening of 11 October.
a friend of my brother, who was in the TKR. He helped me down and we were taken with Meri to the Lurah's house. 30

While the exact number of people killed will never be known, according to Mrs Tiurlan, 39 died and three escaped. 31 Her father-in-law, Daud Siagan, wrote in his notebook that his son had been betrayed and killed with bamboo spears by the people who said 'that he was NICA, that is, a Dutchman'. 32 In Slawi, during the height of the NICA phobia, a 'Dutchman' could be anyone who was known to speak Dutch habitually or whose way of life was still 'European'. Just three days before the killings, in nearby Adiwerna, the Camat had been killed after telling a meeting that President Sukarno had been arrested or killed by NICA. Trains were going through Slawi with the slogan 'Patenana Kabeh Wong NICA' (kill all NICA people) painted in Javanese on the sides. 33

About six kilometers to the east of Slawi, at Pangkah, early on the same day (11 October) a killing had also occurred. In contrast to Slawi, there were no large crows, and no open 'trials' by people roused to a frenzied anger by cries of 'bunuh!' Henry Gill was a Roman Catholic born in Kediri in East Java. His father, an Englishman, John Gill, had married an Ambonese girl and later settled at Balapulang, working in the local sugar mill. 34 Henry married a Pangkah girl in 1914, and worked as a machinist in the factory there, where his ten children were born and raised. Two of his sons, Harry and Bernard, who had been interned in Cimahi camp in West Java, returned to Pangkah in late September to persuade their father to

30 Interview, 22.4.73.

31 Ibid. Estimates of the numbers killed vary from 28 (son of the radical kyai Misbah, AMRI Slawi adviser), 32 (Secretary, Ujungrusi KNI), while another Slawi resident said 40. These included many women and children, grandparents, and at least one other Batak, Hasibuan.

32 Copy of entry in notebook in possession of Mrs Tiurlan.

33 Widow of Camat of Margasari, Interview, 23.2.73.

34 John Gill's gravestone at Balapulang was removed during the Japanese occupation.
leave for Bandung. Henry Gill refused to go so they took Leo, another brother. Gill had been a close friend of the well-known local Sarekat Islam leader, Kyai Badrun, whose sons Mansur and Sidik were leaders of API. Sidik, and Gill's son Jamie had grown up together, so Gill had some reason for thinking the API youth would project him. Some time in September Gill had been taken to a large meeting at the factory and was pushed up on a stage and made to give a speech. Apparently Henry Gill's attitude to the Proclamation was dubious and this had angered local API members. Ellen, his oldest child, now living in Tegal, recalls:

Papa had found out beforehand that he would be killed. That night he didn't sleep, but prayed the whole night with his Bible. Then he got up and instead of his usual practice of having a hot bath, he had a cold one, about nine o'clock. My brother Jamie went off to get some rice, as he wanted to eat. Papa told my mother that later there would be guests [nanti ada tamu]. Then Jamie came running back out of breath. 'Mama, mama, they are coming to kill papa' he cried. Sidik and the pemudas came, they shot Father in the head, in front of Mother and Jamie. He staggered to his wife but fell. They began to cry and Sidik threatened them 'if you cry you will be killed too'. We were told to go inside but from the window looking out could see Father. They hadn't shot him dead so he was rolled over and bayonetted. He was buried by neighbours in the local cemetery. Someone said that he was a Christian so they put a cross on his grave. Sidik came back and said that Father was not a human being but a dog, and not fit to be given a decent burial.

Early in November Sidik himself was killed, for this and for other acts of violence.

Around other sugar factories in Tegal and Brebes similar scenes were to occur over the next few days. Miss Antoinette Harting, who owned a plantation and farm at Durensawit (between Lebaksiu and Bulapulang) was taken with Reisboom, an old orchardist, to Lebaksiu

35 His daughter relates that he said 'setuju tetapi anti', meaning that while he was forced to accept the Proclamation, he disagreed with it in principle.

36 Interview, 22.4.73.
where local leaders planned to intern them. This did not happen, but on their way back to Durensawit, near the santri village Jomani, they were stopped and killed. This was followed by a wave of killings in nearby Balapulang itself, including Hendriks; Schmidt, his wife and 20-year old daughter; Detri, an Ambonese, his wife and three children; and two other known to their assailants as 'Tuan Belembus' and 'Tuan Latri'. As many as 20 Eurasians were killed in Balapulang kawedanan during the second week of October 1945. Only two escaped - Karel Jonger and Groenberg, who had become a Muslim and changed his name to Djainal Arifin.

The most notorious killings at Balapulang were those of the Wijk children. F.M. Wijk had been a plantation supervisor in the local sugar mill before it was closed for good as a result of the Depression, after which he started a soyabean curd business and began breeding horses. While living an 'Indies' lifestyle with his Chinese wife, he was remembered for harshness towards Javanese plantation coolies, whom he physically ill-treated. He apparently did business with the Japanese who, for this reason, did not intern him until a year and a half after the Occupation began. Two of Wijk's sons, as members of the Dutch military, had been interned in Bandung, but the other 11 children were in Balapulang. These were taken to a well near the centre of the town, where they were beaten. Seven were killed with bamboo spears (including a girl, Si Anne, aged three and the youngest, Siale, aged two years) and their bodies thrown down the well. Four others managed to escape and joined their mother who was put in a local jail. After the Dutch occupation of the area in late 1947, Wijk rode in Balapulang on horseback with two colleagues and shot 11 people, plus a further four outside the town, then moved

37 There were also killings of Javanese at Jomani village during the revolusi sosial.

38 The number of Javanese wives and children of Eurasians killed is uncertain.

39 The Japanese did not know that Arifin was a Dutchman; a farmer whose skin had been burnt brown in the sawah, he was apparently almost unrecognisable as a European.
the remains of his seven children to a nearby sawah, and filled in the well. 40

In the Jatibarang mill, 15 kilometers to the north, which the Japanese had converted into a cement plant, the anti-NICA movement was led by a certain Supeno, like Mulyadi in Slawi an ex-Heiho member. 41 Here is an eyewitness account by a factory employee:

On the day of the killings the people singled out were 'called for' between 3 and 4 a.m. They were taken out and killed on the street. It was finished by 6 a.m. Supeno didn't have the heart to kill the women and children: they were sent to Brebes in the sugar railway trucks and then sent back to Jatibarang that afternoon. We were all called to attend a meeting. I came with an old Haji. A big hole had already been dug beside the railway inside the factory wall. We saw all the women and children there. An algojo [executioneer] came with his sword raised, but he said 'I can't do this' and put it down. Two other algojo did the same thing. That night they slept in the barracks and the next day went to Pekalongan. All their belongings were taken. 42

As many as 18 people were killed at Jatibarang. 43 One was spared because he was on good terms with local santri leaders and was told to go to the Muslim prayers at the time of the killings. The other 'opah' (grandfather) Klavert had been used by the mill in its policy of wooing the local religious elite in order to obtain village land

40 The Balapulang account is from interviews with a niece of Wijk's wife on 21.2.73; interviews in Balapulang on 24-25.11.75.

41 Apart from Mulyadi and Supeno at least one other ex-Heiho member was involved in Eurasian killings in Bumiayu. The strong Heiho-PETA rivalry which prevented ex-Heiho from joining the BKR and TKR, may account for the 'adventurism' of these former Heiho, who had no organisation which could claim their loyalties and energies.

42 Jatibarang mill employee, Interview, 19.11.75.

43 These included Isak, a machinist; Blumhaar, a chemist; Karel and Beren from West Jatibarang; two Ambonese, Niki Luyu and Patalasia; Kakalu, a chemist, and Anton Marsoko, a Menadonese. Anton's father, Franz and brother Hendriks, were killed at Pangkah.
for sugar growing. Klavert had always led negotiations between the mill and local villages for land. If the mill met opposition for an extension of the mill railway through a particular village, for example, the mill administrator would send 'Opah' Klavert and the 'recalcitrant' villagers would always give in. He was careful to observe Muslim rituals and contributed money and food at times of local Islamic festivals. 44

The mill property in Jatibarang was also taken over and the former Indonesian mill employees were summoned. They were accused by Supeno of siding with the Dutch and lined up to be killed. They were apparently saved by the intervention of an elderly Haji who said it would be sufficient if the former officials and employees of the factory 'asked forgiveness'. The mill administration subsequently fled. The keys of the houses of the Dutch and Eurasians officials were obtained by Supeno, and all their contents taken. As we have seen, the Camat of Jatibarang, Hadisubeno, managed to escape in a dokar, dressed like a village santri. Supeno then became the new Camat. 45

Often during the revolusi sosial it is the chief butcher who becomes the chief revolutionary. This was part of the pattern at the height of revolutionary or anti-NICA fervour. The man who has the bravado to resort to violence becomes the leader, partly because for a time at least no one dares oppose him. It took the religious elite of Jatibarang about a week to organise the overthrow of Supeno who was then replaced by a kyai. How soon lenggaong types such as Supeno were opposed depended on the strength of the local village priyayi and the religious elite.

44 'Opah' Klavert stayed on at the Jatibarang mill after 1950, and actively supported the new Indonesian administrator in his opposition to the increasing influence of the PKI. He migrated to South America in the mid-'fifties.

45 According to one account, it was Mulyadi who led the Eurasian massacre in Slawi and who led the popular action against Supeno.
In Brebes the remainder of the Eurasian population of the kabupaten, mainly from the other sugar mills, had been put in the local jail for security. Muchsan, leader of AMRI-I, on hearing a radio broadcast by Bung Tomo about 'the arrest of Dutchmen', apparently went to the police and demanded that the remaining Eurasians and Ambonese be dealt with. The police, and later the Public Prosecutor, prevented this happening. That night a large crowd arrived at the Brebes KNI office, led by Salim, Muchsan's follower, demanding that 'the Dutchmen' be dealt with. The KNI Chairman and local revolutionary leader, Kartohargo, met Salim and read to him an announcement from the Resident, Mr Besar, asking that the safety of all Europeans be guaranteed and their property guarded. The people, denouncing Kartohargo for this, left saying to themselves, 'We don't need to ask anyone what to do, we must take matters into our own hands'. The next night at 8 p.m. the kentongan (wooden signal drum) was heard from the south, summoning the people of the town. The jail was attacked, the keys obtained, and 14 Dutch and Eurasians were taken to the nearby kampung of Pasarbatang and killed.

As a result of radio broadcasts, such as those of Bung Tomo's describing the NICA atrocities, the Tegal Barisan Pelopor had already

46 In Banjaratma factory my informant, the perjuangan leader in nearby Tanjung, said in one interview that 50 had been killed, and later said 30, but only mentioned by name one Menadonese, Lishe who 'had Dutch attitudes' (bersikap Belanda), and two others, Sameren and Hilderbran. As I have no other accounts of what happened at Banjaratma or West Ketanggunan sugar mills but know from Brebes informants that a number of the Banjaratma Eurasians were taken to Brebes, I have included the Banjaratma people in the Brebes total of 14.

47 In the NICA-phobia atmosphere in the Tiga Daerah, this merely confirmed the suspicions of some as to where Mr Besar's sympathies lay.

48 The Javanese is 'saiki wis ora susah pamitan soposopo, ditindaake wae dewe'. Kartohargo, Question 14, Proces-verbaal, 23.10.46 Proc.Gen.

49 These included Ferari, an Italian official of the former colonial administration. Two graves in Pasarbatang have been (recently) marked 'Beren H.', and 'H. Havelaar' - in Jatibarang a mass grave was used. Relatives still visit these graves each year at the end of the Muslim fast month.
held discussions with what police who remained, resulting in a decision to place all remaining Indo-Europeans in the municipality in the Barisan Pelopor headquarters, where their safety could be better guaranteed. Mr Besar's announcement had supported this move, which was further strengthened by a phone call which the Barisan Pelopor received at its headquarters at 11.30 p.m. on the night of 11 October (the same day as the killing of Gill at Pangkah and the Slawi massacre), saying that all Indo-Europeans, Ambonese and Menadonese must be interned because of NICA terrorism in Jakarta.  

Pitoyo, a leader of the Tegal BKR and member of API, later claimed he also received a phone call on the same evening 'from Jakarta'. The message, however, was that all Eurasians should be killed. Caroline Buman, whose father owned the local dairy in Kartini Street, describes what happened to her family.

On the night of 12 October we were all at home, when about 1.00 a.m. some pemudas came looking for my brother, Toni. He was in Semarang, so they took father [J.V. Buman] and my brothers Karel, aged 8, and Adolph, who was 7. Then they came back to get us three girls, myself (then 25), Justine and Marie. We were taken down the street to an office. Father was there and our brothers but we weren't allowed to speak to them. They asked us questions and wrote down our answers. Then father and the boys were taken away. Later we were taken to another office in front of the stadium, we saw father lying dead in the street. Later in the morning, about 6 a.m., we were taken to the tile factory then to the Hotel Stork.  

When we met Karel, he said he had escaped by climbing over the stadium wall and slept inside until six o'clock. He told us that father and Adolphe had died from wounds to the head.  

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50 Diary entry of Andy Penyamin, leader of the Sulawesi pemuda group of KRIS in Tegal.

51 The tile factory was the Barisan Pelopor headquarters on the City square, the Hotel Stork the former kenpeitai headquarters and now the TKR barracks (see map of Tegal Municipality).

52 Interview, 23.2.73.
Earlier in the day (12 October) two members of the Ujungrusi KNI were called to the API pemuda headquarters at the old Trubels dairy at Pagongan on the southern outskirts of the city. There they were given a copy of an anonymous telegram which had been received through the Railways telegraph from Cikampek in West Java. The telegram read:

Because of NICA cruelties in Jakarta, helped by Indos, Ambonese and Menadonese, including the killing of women and children who were not guilty, all Indos, Ambonese and Menadonese in the outlying districts should be exterminated [dibasmi].

The KNI Secretary, who was given a copy of the telegram to show to the Ujungrusi perjuangan, did not question its authority. This telegram became the justification of API and TKR members for initiating the killings in Tegal that evening.

In justifying his actions later to a Tegal KNI leader, Pitoyo said that he had 'received instructions from Menteng 31' to inform all local groups of a plan to assassinate their perjuangan leaders. Outside the urban areas there were many local NICA agents waiting to begin these killings. The order was to be the arrival of a car with the numberplate B-419. These numbers coincided with the letters of the alphabet DAI, an abbreviation which stood for 'Doodt Alle Inlanders' (kill all Indonesians, lit. natives). Altogether during this ani-NICA movement over 100 Eurasians, Ambonese, Menadonese and others who were considered pro-Dutch were killed in the Tiga Daerah, and the number was probably higher. The killings took place over a

53 Siregar, Interview, 5.3.73. The telegram is as he clearly remembered it.

54 Soesmono, Answers, 5, Interview 20.10.76. According to Bung Tomo, the 'Doodt Alle Inlanders' movement was linked, in Surabaya, with Japanese members of a Black Fan (Kipas Hitam) group, the latter being 'very active' in helping the DAI'. 'Bung Tomo: the Road to Independence' English TS (1952), 16.

55 The numbers are Tegal City, 12; Pangkah, 4; Slawi, 30; Balapulang, 20; Bumiayu 7; Jatibarang, 18; Brebes, 14. There could have been another 10 in Slawi (see fn.19 above) and an unknown number in Banjaratma and West Ketanggungan mills.
very short time, from 11-14 October. They were confined to the sugar mill settlements, and the kabupaten capitals of Tegal and Brebes. No similar violence was recorded in either Pemalang or Pekalongan kabupaten itself, where the social upheaval had been much milder.

In Pekalongan only one incident involving a Eurasian was recorded: There was a Dr Peters, an Indo who kept talking about 'Inlanders' [natives] and making other degrading remarks about the pemudas; Rudi Lisapali, Bambang, Sidik and I took him in a car to some kecamatan south of Pekalongan. 'What are you going to do with him?' I asked. They hadn't thought about that. We didn't feel like killing him. Not knowing what to do, we left him with the Camat. After a couple of days the Camat didn't know what to do with him either and sent him back to Pekalongan. After a week he was practising again and probably saying the same things in private.\(^57\)

Such lenience would have been unthinkable in the NICA-phobic atmosphere of the Tiga Daerah.

In Pemalang kabupaten there are no recorded incidents against Eurasians. Either they were still in internment camps (which is unlikely), or Pemalang's more united revolutionary leadership was able to direct popular anti-Dutch antagonisms towards the town's priyayi officials, all of whom were rounded up and placed in the local jail on 20 October. Paradoxically it was in Comal, a kawedanan where the social upheaval had removed many lurahs quite violently, that W.O. McKenzie, one of the Residency's best known Eurasians and Comal's most influential citizen, still had authority to stop violence in the town against those who were considered to be pro-NICA. These people, for the most part former PETA and Heiho members, were in fact 'detained' in McKenzie's house, but in such a way that they

\(^{56}\) The brothers, Bambang and Sidik, were leaders of the Permi permudas. Rudi Lisapali's father was an Ambonese doctor in Pekalongan.

\(^{57}\) Interview with Wibowo, later to become a son-in-law of the Resident, Mr Besar. A member of the Medical Faculty Asrama (Prapatan 10) he had been sent to Pekalongan to try to stop the disbanding of the PETA by the Japanese after the Proclamation and had stayed until early October.
could quietly escape. The latter's authority, in contrast to other Eurasians in Tegal and Brebes, was partly due to what people perceived as his spiritual power - he could 'cure people'. Although a plantation owner of great personal wealth, he ran a free eye clinic each day for the people of Comal and had been instrumental in building the local distillery, the market and the shops. Indeed, he was considered a founder of the town. When the entire kabupaten, as well as much of neighbouring Pekalongan, had been thrown into chaos by the anti-Chinese riots of March 1942, in the vacuum before the Japanese arrived, there had been no ransackings of shops in Comal (one of the few kawedanan towns to have a separate Chinese kampung of its own). This, it is said, was because of his restraining influence.\

THE Eurasian killings were part of the phenomenon of the revolusi sosial in the Tiga Daerah. They began on 11 October 1945 almost simultaneously with the outbursts of violence against the Pangreh Praja and (as we shall see in Chapter Eight) the Chinese, and continued for several days. Such violence was further evidence of the breakdown of elite control, in the broadest sense which includes also the pergerakan. The leaders of revolutionary groups were powerless to protect officials, Eurasians or Chinese from the violence, and some were involved in the Eurasian killings themselves. Army leaders found themselves unable to maintain 'order', because the TKR as an urban-based security group, had no authority outside the kabupaten capital. Afraid for their own safety, because of the intense NICA-phobia, the TKR and the police simply refused to venture into the rural area.

58 W.O. McKenzie, a theosophist, lived on in Comal until his death in the early 'seventies. According to local belief he was over 100 when he died and the photo I was shown of him, a patriarchal Old Testament figure with a flowing white beard, bore this out. He used to tell stories of large ships sailing up the Comal River to the town from the sea, then a distance of only 5 kilometers.
CHAPTER SEVEN

REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS

THIS chapter explores more deeply the values behind the revolusi sosial and its aftermath. Firstly the ethos of the Javanese bureaucratic elite, which emphasised hierarchy and social control, will be outlined. We will then discuss the Javanese tradition of social protest in the twentieth century context; banditry, messianism and the spiritual solidarity of this protest tradition in the Pekalongan Residency. The first months of the revolution provided an extraordinary opportunity for the outpouring of social protest at the local level. One crucial aspect of the conflict between the Pangreh Praja and the perjuangan in the Tiga Daerah was the way the struggle was perceived by those involved, not so much as a conflict between generations but as a conflict in values, which often transcended age or marital status. What both groups - the priyayis and the revolutionaries - have in common as Javanese is that power is essentially spiritual. As Anderson has shown it is the means by which that power is obtained, the rituals by which it is furthered and the objects which demonstrate its possession which vary widely.¹

The 'Pangreh Praja' Tradition

The Javanese priyayi tradition, of which the bureaucratic elite in Pekalongan Residency was an integral part, emphasised hierarchy, control and inner spiritual calm, a belief in privileges and duties and a reluctance to criticise authority. Hence the important to the priyayis of rules of traditional behaviour (unggah-ungguh) which emphasised rukun, rasa halus, ikhlas, sabar and nrimo. Rukun (harmony) stressed concord, avoiding conflicting views, and anonymity in decision making. Rasa halus meant a refined inner sensitivity, emotional equanimity and stability. In order to achieve rukun and rasa halus

in the priyayi view, one had to be ikhlas, detached from the real world so as never to feel disappointment; sabar, patient and nrimo ready to accept one's own fate. In this value system, customary ways of showing respect - known as hormat - which demonstrated control and an inner rasa halus, were of great importance. So was posture and gesture, as well as language and the tone in which it was expressed. The Pangreh Praja themselves were especially bound by uger-uger, rules of conduct upon which depended their success as administrators including, typically, various prohibitions. One high priyayi official's image of the ideal Pangreh Praja was like pandita ratu, the priest-king, 'the ideal Javanese ruler who combines religious authority and wisdom with secular power and majesty', whose words must fit his actions. He must be of good character (berbudi baik) and must be able to mix with all groups in society (ajur-ajer) without sacrificing his authority by doing so. One prohibition he was strongly bound to keep, with dire consequences if he did not, was ngrusak pager ayu, sleeping with women who did not belong to him. The breaking of this prohibition would result in the bringing on of a calamity (sangar) such as natural disaster, sickness, crop failure, and so on.

Dutch pressure of the Pangreh Praja to coerce the peasants into renting their land to the sugar mills in the Pekalongan Residency made them rely on, and even reinforce, the authoritarian hierarchical system of the Javanese bureaucratic elite. The camat was ndoro seten ('lord' assistant), for whom the villagers would '...dismount and walk when they passed his house and squat by the roadside and sembah (gesture of obeisance with hands held above the face) should they pass him by'.

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2 This discussion relies heavily on Sartono Kartodirdjo's paper presented to the ASAA Third Annual Conference, Sydney, May 1978.

3 Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, Mythology and Tolerance of the Javanese (Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1965), 74 (subsequently cited as Mythology).

4 Sarimin, 'Kenang-kenangan', 66.

5 Sutherland, The Making, 25.
During the Japanese time, at least in the Pekalongan Residency, the strict hierarchy was maintained between different ranks of Pangreh Praja and people. The Camat of Tonjong, early in the Occupation, recalls:

During the Japanese occupation I was still called ndoro seten. The form of address ibu [Mrs, mother], I hadn't yet heard during the Japanese occupation. There was no bapak [father], bupati then, it was still ndoro kanjeng [your lordship]. I could never call my superior Pak Dono ['father' wedana], always ndoro Dono, and I was very intimate with him.6

The Pangreh Praja, like everyone else in Javanese society, are able to select the qualities they idealise from wayang kulit (shadow play) puppets. In a poem written alongside a drawing of Kresna a Javanese official compared the administrative priyayis to the warrior seer, 'constant and still in the centre of battle. Though the world is in flux, the good official does not alter his aims, but is everlasting and steadfast in the midst of tumult'.7

The Protest Tradition

Javanese society has also had room for social protest in abundance. An essential part of this tradition was banditry. Historically, Pekalongan Residency has had many famous semi-bandit figures, the lenggaongs (including various 'Robin Hood' types), some of whom have been mentioned in Chapters One and Five.

The lenggaongs' quest for spiritual power was different from that of the priyayis' but also had similarities. Like the elite tradition, a lenggaong relied on his guru (teacher) who was often head of the silat (self-defence) fraternity of which he was a member.

6 Camat of Tonjong, Interview, 19.10.76.
7 Sutherland, The Making, 163.
8 As powerful natural leaders outside any government structure, along with the haji, the kyai and dukun (healer, seer), the guru is part of '...an unofficial religious elite,...supported neither by the state nor the village budget, but often (with) large and devoted personal followings'. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, 'Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development', in Holt, Culture, 78.
These exclusive fraternities with their secret codes more closely resembled secret society cults than the kebatinan (meditation) groups of the priyayis. The ties of a lenggaong with his guru were also secret; no lenggaong would ever reveal the identity of his guru who was the source of his initiation into the esoteric arts (ilmu kanuragan). A lenggaong would also receive jimat, charms thought to possess magic power, from his guru. After studying for a time, a lenggaong would be initiated into the silat fraternity of which the guru was head, at a local secret grave (candi kramat). These tombs, writes Sartono, 'have special symbolic and magical significance to the surrounding population who often tend to regard these dead saints as peculiarly their own'. In the kecamatans throughout the Tiga Daerah there were many such graves. Each had its own powerful juru kunci (lit. key keeper) who not only tended the grave but who knew the various magico-religious formulae (kata wasiat).

These sacred graves had special significance for the lenggaongs. Firstly, they were often close to villages where the lenggaongs lived for mutual solidarity and support. The lenggaongs maintained their spiritual power by frequent visits to these graves, and from jimat obtained from the juru kunci. Many of these graves had added political significance, especially in parts of the Pemalang and Tegal kabupatens, where those revered were not saints or holy men but rebels against the Dutch. The most famous of these graves in southern Pemalang was Candi Mandireja. It was the revered Mandireja heirloom (pusaka) that was carried into Moga under a payung (umbrella) when the Camat was overthrown, on the day the revolusi sosial began. A payung is a powerful symbol, usually protecting royalty, but as well other objects which have magic power. A typical example of a local folk hero was Baurekso, who was believed to be a rebel during the Mataram dynasty. Nearly every village in the Comal area of coastal Pemalang had its own Candi Baurekso. Near Comal is Candi Sigeseng, revered as the grave of a former Pemalang bupati who 'fought against the Dutch'. In other graves nearby followers of Diponegoro are believed to be buried.

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9 Ibid, 80.
The magico-religious formulae learnt from the juru kunci of these graves reflected opposition to both the village ruling elite and the Pangreh Praja. Thus it was believed that if any Pangreh Praja saw the Mandireja sacred heirloom, Kyai Pokal, he would be dismissed from his job. Similarly, no one working for the Dutch, 'including village officials', dared to make a pilgrimage to Candi Sigeseng for fear that they would be 'burnt', that is destroyed by those buried there. It was in Candi Sigeseng that the Muslim leader Haji Dulgani had been hidden after urging the people not to deliver their paddy to the lurah for requisitioning by the Japanese.

It is quite likely that these holy men had just been dead saints until the early 1920s, from which time the strongly anti-Dutch kata vasiat dated. The politicisation of the lenggaongs as well as the graves by the Sarekat Rakyat beginning in this period can be clearly traced. Several famous silat teachers were also leading members of the Sarekat Rakyat. Instead of a black cap (kopyah), a strong symbol of national identity, they wore a red one, like Sarekat Rakyat members, but sideways as a symbol of opposition. Villages that were known for their lenggaongs were also places where local Sarekat Rakyat leaders lived. A lenggaong always celebrated a wedding or a circumcision with either a wayang golek (puppet) or a tayuban. The lakon (story) of the wayang was not one of the panji cycle of stories traditionally associated with this wayang form. Instead, either the local Baurekso legend was used, or a lakon called 'Semaun', the name of the PKI leader of the 1920s. It was a story about a seller of ices who went about the country tearing up railway tracks - a direct reference to the 1926 rebellion. Such was the popularity of the Semaun lakon, or the influence of the lenggaongs (or both), that according to a local nationalist leader 'village officials during the colonial time didn't dare to report to the government if the Semaun story was played, although it was banned, because they were afraid of the consequences.'

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10 Geseng comes from the word gosong, meaning burnt.
11 See Chapter Two.
12 On tayuban see Chapter One.
13 Comal perjuangan leader, Answers.
Sarekat Rakyat leaders used other semi-religious thanksgiving rituals (hajat) for political discussions. Recognising the lenggaong's fondness for gambling, they popularised a Chinese card game (gonggong) which only had three players. During the game the Sarekat Rakyat leader would fill in the time telling his lenggaong opponents anti-Dutch stories, and making them feel 'a love for the poor'.

Another tradition of social protest deeply rooted in Indonesian history, and indeed throughout the rest of the Austro-Indonesian and Melanesian worlds, was millenarianism. In a European context, such prophecies and dreams were welcomed by people who felt themselves to be oppressed. In the Melanesian context such movements were part of the response to the impact of the West, where land alienation and the vagaries of the European plantation economy together with the introduction of native taxation, made great inroads into indigenous social organisation. Scholars have also emphasised psychological tensions as a background of many millenarian movements, especially in societies where there is a high level of deprivation as a result of social and economic disruption.

In Pekalongan Residency parallel processes were occurring during the last decades of colonial rule as we have suggested in Chapter One. Japanese wartime policies had created tremendous stress and insecurity amongst the famine-stricken rural masses. Not surprisingly, the Japanese occupation is referred to as the zaman edan (the mad age), typically a time of disorder in Javanese eschatological literature. But millenarian predictions, the so-called ramalan, had begun to be heard long before the Japanese occupation in parts of the Tiga Daerah. During the 1930s most political activity was banned under renewed Dutch repression so local pergerakan activists turned to more clandestine

14 Ibid.


activities in their continued opposition to Dutch rule. Thus in the celebration of various slametan (ritual meals) associated with pregnancy, it had been common in the 1930s to sing macapat songs. The local version of Dandanggula, a popular macapat song, predicted the coming of the mad age. Being loosely structured, this art form, like wayang golek, gave radical pergerakan leaders the chance to make up their own words, criticising the current social and political situation.17 Between the songs which were usually in old Javanese, the story was explained. Leaders used this opportunity to talk about Independence and the wickedness of the Dutch.

The traditional ceremony of pasang molo, placing the central roof beams of a new house before the roof is put on, was made use of in a similar way by the nationalist movement. At the slametan for this ceremony, pergerakan leaders would explain the symbolism of the various objects placed under the roof to keep the new house and its inhabitants secure. Part of this symbolism included spices wrapped up in a red and white flag, above which a payung was placed, under the roof pitch. In between macapat verses the singer would tell of the economic evils of colonialism and how 'dogs of the Dutch' ate better food than the village people.18 Those who sang these songs were given money by the nationalists. 'The pergerakan leaders would see what the situation was', recalls one of them. 'If there were village officials present, such commentary was left out'.19

Various other millenarian tembang (songs) were common in the Tiga Daerah during the Japanese occupation, being taught too by members of the local nationalist elite. One such song attributed to

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17 Margaret Kartomi notes that 'macapat song...acted as a form of psychological refuge from the demoralising effect of political and economic control by the colonial power'. See her Matjapat Songs in Central and West Java (Canberra, 1973), 28, and passim for a perceptive analysis of the place of macapat in Javanese popular and court culture.

18 This phrase 'Dogs of the Dutch' (asune londo) often became 'the Dutch are dogs', (asu londo) at these meetings.

19 Comal nationalist leader, Transcript, II/14, 30.11.74.
Ronggowarsito and popularised before the war in local macapat song, was taught by a Senden-In (Information Service) leader. The local version ran as follows:

Living in a mad age
All actions are wrong.
Some don't have the heart to follow the madness,
If they don't follow they will not get anything,
In the end they will be hungry too.
How 'fortunate' are the insane ones who have forgotten themselves,
More fortunate still those who don't forget themselves
And are on their guard.20

This verse had long been popular in Java in times of economic distress and suffering, when the gap between rich and poor widened or exploitation appeared rife. The Senden-In leader recalls telling villagers that 'It was the Pangreh Praja who were following the madness, but the people must not. I deliberately taught this song in villages and kampungs', recalls the Senden-In leader, 'it worked like a Lominal'.21

Returning to Anderson's model, it is in the mad age, the historical epoch at the end of the cycle, that there is a diffusion rather than a concentration of power. Javanese culture is particularly susceptible to millenarianism in times of disorder such as this, when a new concentration of power is about to emerge.22 During such times

20 One of the many local versions of this goes in Javanese

'Menangi jaman edan
Ewuh aya ing pambudi
Melu ngedan datan tahan
Yen tan melu ora komanan
Kaliren wekasane
Sak beja-bejane wong kang lali
Isih bejo wong kang eling lan waspada.'

For another of the many versions of this song see C. Geertz, Religion in Java (New York, 1960), 281.

21 'Lominal' is a brand name for a popular tranquiliser in Indonesia. Pangkah KNI Chairman, Transcript, II/16. Another popular song was about the 'Chinese from Champa' who came to Java and sold jamu, the traditional Javanese medicinal drink, the bitterness of the jamu being an analogy with the sufferings of the Japanese occupation. Ibid, 15. See Sidik Kertapati Sekitar, 34-35 for examples of other tembang.

Joyoboyo prophecies, expressing themselves in the so-called Just King (Ratu Adil) movements are often heard. These prophecies have been an important part of Javanese social history for the last two centuries at least, and have many regional variations throughout Java, being closely connected with local conditions.

Even within the Pekalongan Residency during the Japanese occupation, there were several versions of the prophecy, generally referred to as saumuring jagung, meaning 'the life of corn'. One common interpretation went as follows: a great king (raja agung) or the yellow king (raja kuning) would come and rule in Java for as long as the 'life of corn' then he would be defeated or driven out by the Just King. When the Japanese arrived, it was believed by many that they would only stay for three and a half months, the life of a corn plant. When this proved wrong, the prophecy was reinterpreted to mean the raja agung would rule for the length of time that a dormant seed could be stored, which people said was three and a half years. The identity of the raja agung was not explained in the prophecy, although some said he was the Japanese emperor.

The quest for spiritual solidarity is frequently an important feature of protest movements. In Vietnam, for example, a key idea in the philosophy of the ICP (Indo Chinese Communist Party) was dăng tân, signifying togetherness, of the same spirit, one heart, a mystical union that went beyond mere party loyalties. In Thailand, a

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23 For an extract of one version of J.A.B. Wiselius 'Djajabaja, zijn leven en profetieen' see the translation in Penders, Documents, 183-88. For a brief 1943 version see Brugman's Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting 1942-1945 (Franeker, 1960), 143. See also Sidik Kertapati, Sekitar, 15, on how the Japanese used the Joyoboyo prophecy.

24 Some accounts of these local variations can be found in Sartono Kartodirdjo, 'Messianisme dan Millenarianisme Dalam Sejarah Indonesia', Lembaran Sejarah No.7, June 1971, 15-16. See also his 'Agrarian Radicalism in Java' in Holt, Culture, 92-125.

25 Raja Agung is said to come onomatopoeically from jagung (corn): ja-raja and gung-agung.
parallel concept which played a major role in Thai nationalist thought was samakhi, meaning to have unity, harmony or solidarity. Some peasants in the Philippines also shared this mystical brotherhood in a revolutionary secret society in the late 1890s.

The Sarekat Islam had its own symbol of solidarity, a secret oath for mutual protection. Included in the oath was faithfulness, fraternal love between members, helpfulness in advice and action, and loyalty to the secret symbols of the Sarekat Islam. The oath and the symbols added prestige and a sense of unity and cohesion to the group, '...it bound the members in a pledge of non-betrayal and enforced solidarity against outsiders', particularly the colonial government and the priyayis.

The Revolution

Having outlined on the one hand the priyayi tradition and on the other the protest ethos during the colonial times in Pekalongan Residency, we will now go on to discuss revolution. The revolusi sosial period in the Tiga Daerah marked an extraordinary opportunity for the outpouring of social protest, some of which we have described in the last chapter. However, the rejection of a powerful social hierarchy surmounted by the Pangreh Praja was very difficult. It called for a total rejection and humiliation of the master (majikan); his killing or ritual unmasking in the form of the dombreng actions was an expression of the popular consciousness of the time. In the plays put on by the revolutionary movement during the revolusi sosial period, in the dombreng rituals, in the campaign for more democratic speech levels, the preference for complete equality, and in the pemuda ethos, we see a total rejection of powerful social hierarchy, an

26 Both these concepts were discussed in seminars given by David Marr and Ben Batson in the series on 'The Quest for National Solidarity in Southeast Asia' in the Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History, ANU, during July 1979.


28 For the oath see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Singapore, 1973), 183, fn.75, and for the Secret Code see Appendix IV, 198.
inversion of the old values. In terms of the opposition of 'green' versus 'red' elements (in Alers' sense), it was a rejection of the green, 'hierarchic, elitist, authoritarian, regulative, disciplinary', for the red, 'popular, anarchic, localist, democratic and communal.'

In the Pangregh Praja perspective, these red elements were seen as an inversion of 'normal' behaviour during the revolusi sosial period. The common people, they said, were semrawut (confused), morat-marat (disorganised), srakah (greedy) and pating jilentng (not acting 'properly').

The 'Perjuangan' Plays

As in other areas the plays put on by the Tiga Daerah perjuangan during the revolusi sosial period rejected the old hierarchical values. In Pemalang, these plays were put on by API at the Indra picture theatre. The star singer, a girl named Riftha, sang songs of the revolution reminding the perjuangan of their responsibilities. The three plays which came to be performed in rotation reflected aspects of revolutionary consciousness and echoes of past social protest and rebellion as well as present revolution. Untung Suropati was about the career of a famous late seventeenth century Balinese rebel hero, who fought against the Dutch East India Company in Java. Another favourite was Sumpah Pemuda (Oath of Youth). This recalled the famous Oath of Youth in 1928, a landmark in the nationalist movement's quest for spiritual solidarity. Another, Diujung Bambu Runcing (At the point of the Bamboo Spear) was about the unity of the common people and the youth, whose only weapons were bamboo spears. A later play, composed in November, was Didepan Kawat Berduri (In Front of the Barbed Wire), and told the story of the heroic resistance of the people against the British assault on Surabaya on 10 November.

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29 See Anderson, Pemuda Revolution, 161, fn.235.

30 In Solo, such plays were also popular. See John Thompson, Hubbub in Java (Sydney, 1946), 78-79 (subsequently cited as Hubbub).

31 A play of this name, written by Trisno Sumardjo, about Semarang during this period of the revolution was once made into a film.
A play put on in Brebes even more pointedly symbolised what the revolution was about in the popular mind, the overthrowing of the old 'master', be he the lurah, the Pangreh Praja or the Dutch. There was only one play, 'Bedinda Berani dengan Majikan' (The Servant Dares with his Master), about someone in the service of a Dutchman managing a rubber plantation. The latter was always rude to his servant but one day this abuse was particularly bad, the planter ridiculing the Javanese as universally stupid and destined to be always ruled by the Dutch. Some time after this the servant escaped from the rubber planter and formed a Barisan Pendem (Underground Brigade) which one day ambushed and killed the Dutchman on his plantation. The planter's wife asked the authorities for help; members of the Barisan Pendem were rounded up and imprisoned. While they were in jail the Proclamation occurred and the authorities were defeated, but not before the hero of the story, the servant, was killed.\footnote{In many areas of Pekalongan Residency, village heads were addressed as majikan lurah or just majikan, until the end of the Japanese occupation. Majikan, meaning 'chief' as well as 'master' in the colonial relationship, or (usually referring to the Chinese) 'middleman', was an old Javanese term of address. Thus it can be applied to Javanese servant-master (kawulogusti) relations, at the village level. The Wedana of Pangkah, it will be recalled, said he was waiting for the majikan yang lama, the old master, to return, meaning the Dutch. The specifically anti-colonial associations are also symbolised by the word 'bedinda' (servant).\footnote{Brebes PKN leader, Interview, 2.12.75.}}

Rejection of Language Hierarchy

The role of language in reinforcing the priyayi's hierarchical authoritarian system of values was crucial. While Anderson has pointed out kromo (high Javanese) is essentially an honorific language spoken
'up the social hierarchy' by inferiors to their superiors, the Pangreh Praja, who were very clever at using words as weapons, used kromo, when speaking to villagers, as a means of elite control. Members of the Saminist movement - a radical peasant movement near Blora on Java's north coast - had been known for rejecting high Javanese earlier as part of their rejection of the authority of officials. At Sarekat Islam meetings in Pekalongan in 1919 the speaker would announce that he was going to address the crowd in Jawa Dipo, the name of a movement current at the time to speak only in low Javanese. This movement was unpopular with both the European Civil Service and the Pangreh Praja 'who regarded it as "undermining authority" and dangerously democratic'. Among Western-educated radicals, such as Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, there was the same feeling about Javanese. Tjipto had demanded its abandonment altogether as 'a language of slaves and a barrier to progress'.

Overthrowing the majikan during the revolusi sosial meant also rejection of his language. Soepangat, the Pemalang leader, always spoke in low Javanese at public meetings, for a person can be more direct and emphatic in ngoko, with its great clarity and boldness. Even the most 'high born' revolutionaries of superior status, such as Sakirman the AMRI Slawi leader (a priyayi from Yogya), sometimes spoke low Javanese in meetings with local revolutionary leaders and the pemudas.

33 Anderson writes that high Javanese is par excellence the language of the priyayi...developed largely to emphasise and "build into" the larger Javanese language the increasing hierarchisation of Javanese society and the influence of Dutch pressure and later control'. B.R.O'G. Anderson, 'The Language of Indonesian Politics', Indonesia, I (April 1966), 96.


35 Sutherland, The Making, 91.

During the revolution in the Tiga Daerah, people were constantly encouraged to drop the use of aristocratic titles and forms of address. The only announcement that the radical Resident, Sardjio, issued during his four days in office in December was concerned with how to establish a government based on 'democracy and family spirit' (kerakyatan dan kekeluargaan). As a first step in this direction, in both written and verbal communications between the government and the people, the word bapak should be used in addressing all officials from 'Bapak' Resident downwards; otherwise bung or saudara (brother) were to be used. Feudal terms of address such as paduka and ndoro (your honour and servant) and, of course, majikan, were to be banned forever in the Residency of Pekalongan.

How important the democratisation of language was to the revolutionaries in early December 1945 can also be seen in the following vignette of the visit of Maksum, the Brebes revolutionary and former public prosecutor, to the Pekalongan jail:

Maksum came to the jail during the Tiga Daerah [rule in Pekalongan] as Sardjio's personal representative and spoke to the convicted prisoners: 'This is a new government not like the previous one before. Its main principle is socialist'. The prisoners replied in high Javanese 'Ingqih ndoro [Yes, lordship]'. Maksum said, 'Stop! You must speak ngoko. Now there are no longer any ndoro [saiki wis ora ono ndoro], just speak in ngoko.' Maksum tried to get the prisoners to speak ngoko [pointing to the prisoners in turn he said] 'This is bapak number one, this is number two [iki bapak siji, iki bapak loro]'. The convicted prisoners didn't agree. They said, 'Ingqih ndoro' again. [The former jailer thought this hugely funny].... You can't change the attitude of the people in this way. Besides, Maksum himself was from a feudal background. The servants in his house addressed his wife as ndoro and had to bow [munduk-munduk].


38 Pekalongan jailer, Interview, 15.10.76.
Inggih ndoro had been the traditional response to Pangreh Praja orders, from generations of peasants burdened with exactions and impositions of various kinds by the colonial power. Ndoro was also a term of polite respect for Maksum, a government priyayi who had thrown in his lot with the revolutionaries. Maybe if the jail inmates had been holding a gun outside and had not been in prison their response might have been different.

A language revolution of the kind implied in the above story had to be especially radical in Java because the Pangreh Praja used kromo, not only to maintain social hierarchy, but to restore order and stability in situations which appeared 'insecure'. Thus, the Pangreh Praja were trained, according to the Acting TKR Commander in Pekalongan (a former camat), that if they went to a village where there was a disturbance (kehebohan) they had to speak, first, in kromo. In this way 'we would win because our language was more refined'. At all costs one had to avoid allowing the people to speak first in ngoko in such situations, because in ngoko they could express their demands strongly and with anger, while in kromo they could not. By using kromo first the Pangreh Praja could 'put the people to sleep' (menina-bobokkan), after any trouble, forcing them to speak with 'refined feelings' in high Javanese. 'Kutil was easily beaten in this way' recalls the TKR leader.39

The revolutionary demand for more democratic forms of address is linked to the preference for the wayang puppet Bima. Soewignjo, the AMRI-Slawi leader, when asked to make a drawing which symbolised for him the values behind the revolusi sosial in the Tiga Daerah, drew a picture of Bima, reproduced on the following page. A fearsome warrior, who has the 'strength of the wind, and power to destroy mountains', Bima never walks at a slow pace (a hallmark of a priyayi) but travels over mountains and seas and through deserts and forests with great strides.40 'Merciless to his enemies,

39 TKR acting Commander, Interview, 27.8.71.
40 Hardjowirogo, Sedjarah Wayang Purwa (Jakarta, 1965), 133.
THE "TIGA DAERAH" AFFAIR
gigantic, ungainly, heavily muscled, hairy, with protruding eyes, and thunderous voice...' his behaviour is the complete opposite of the aristocratic refinement of the priyayis, which is epitomised by Bima's elder brother, Judistira. Even more symbolically, he always speaks in ngoko, even to the gods. When speakers at Sarekat Islam meetings in Pekalongan would begin in Indonesian, saying they would continue in Jawa-Dipo, this was greeted with thunderous applause and shouts of 'Mufakat cara Seno!' (we agree with Seno's way!). Seno was another name for Bima.

This rejection of powerful Javanese social hierarchy through the rejection of speech level - the servant talking to the master in low Javanese - was, however, very difficult. What was needed was a total rejection and humiliation - even killing - of the master.

The Dombreng Phenomenon

'Rituals reveal values at their deepest level', writes Victor Turner, '...men express in ritual what moves them most'. A characteristic of the revolusi sosial in the Tiga Daerah during October 1945, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was the dombreng phenomenon, the ritual for overthrowing the master by the servant. The following is an account of a typical dombreng action in Ulujami kecamatan. It was a Wednesday in October and the kecamatan's 18 lurahs had assembled for a meeting at about 10 a.m. Then a parade coming in from the east approached the Kecamatan office. The Ulujami KNI Secretary, who was at the meeting, described the scene thus:

The crowd of people all had bamboo spears and was accompanied by banging on empty kerosene tins, 'breng dong breng'. When the crowd got closer, it appeared that the Lurah of Rowosari was in the middle. His face was smeared with lamp soot and he was wearing a necklace of paddy. The parade almost dropped in at the kecamatan office, but

41 Anderson, Mythology, 12.
42 Neratja, 29 August 1918.
for whatever reason this didn't happen. This put all the lurahs into a great panic, the conference ended in confusion, and they hurriedly returned to their respective villages.  

A typical dombreng action usually followed this scenario: a crowd would arrive at the house of the accused person and break into it. If the person was found, he was taken out, presented to the crowd and paraded around, often with a necklace of hulled rice or paddy, to the 'breng dong breng' of empty tins and sticks being beaten. This always occurred during the day so that the maximum number of people could see the 'corrupter', and he would be as much humiliated as possible.

At one level of meaning then, the dombreng phenomenon exposed the corrupt official in a symbolic public unmasking and shaming rather than out of violence. On another level, the dombreng was a ritual by which the master was overthrown by the servant. A ritual degradation of the master, or a ritual of status reversal.

But it was not only officials that were unmasked and ritually degraded. A pemuda was caught gambling in one village, the cards were made into a necklace and he was paraded around the village by PESINDO. In both urban and rural areas dombreng rituals had a strong moralistic tone about them. In a Pemalang coastal village a man was dombreng-ed for having intercourse with his stepdaughter, while in a Tegal urban kampung an older man discovered to be sleeping with someone else's wife was dombreng-ed around naked. Perhaps these types of dombreng reflected a messianic sense that the new 'golden' age of righteousness (zaman mas), after the mad age, was about to begin.

44 Ulujami KNI Secretary, 'Peristiwa "Tiga Daerah" di Kecamatan Ulujami', December 1975, TS.

45 Such rituals, according to Turner, are a characteristic of liminal or transitional periods when society becomes 'unstructured and relatively undifferentiated'. A second feature of such periods is heightened magico-religious activity, such as the use of charms and amulets for protection. Turner, op.cit., 102, 106, 109. On the theme of reversal or inversion, see also Rodney Needham (ed.), Right and Left. Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification (Chicago, 1973).
Such was the fear of being ritually humiliated by dombreng that urban thieves in Tegal were known to 'give themselves up', join the local BKR and promise not to steal again, for fear of being dombreng-ed.46

'Equality and Fraternity'

Another expression of the egalitarian values which were part of the revolutionary consciousness was the preference for complete equality, as seen in the sama rata sama rasa ideology. In Pekalongan City in 1919 the Sarekat Islam was demanding hak sama rata, the abolition of discrimination between the priyayis and the kampung dwellers. 'If their street is well watered so should ours be, if ours are dark, over there should be without proper lighting, the same treatment [hak sama rata] for everyone' was the demand of the active Pekalongan Sarekat Islam.47 Sama rata apparently did not apply to the priyayis. 'The priyayis do not need equal treatment but we the little people (Kromo) need it'.48

An equivalent to samakhi and dòng tâm for Indonesian nationalists was sama rata sama rasa. Rasa is a rich Javanese word with many connotations, one of which is inner spiritual feeling.49 Sama rasa suggests a sharing of batin (soul, inner being) between those who are in the same struggle together. One could be sama rasa - feeling at one - at a sacred grave, in a silat fraternity, in the Sarekat Rakyat, or speaking Jawa Dipo at Sarekat Islam meetings.

During the height of the revolusi sosial in October 1945 local revolutionaries, who had seized power, were faced with the problem of how to distribute stocks of rice and cloth to villagers. Often this distribution was carried out through local KNIs:

46 Tegal kabupaten KNI Vice-Chairman, Interview, 8.10.76.
47 Neratja, 2 September 1918.
48 Neratja, 29 August 1918.
49 For some examples of what the Javanese mean by rasa, see Geertz, op.cit., 238-39.
The [Talang kecamatan] KNI received between ten and fourteen rolls of textile from the Camat, at the house of Haji Masihi which was the KNI office. A meeting was held with the leaders of the KNI and AMRI to discuss how to carry out the distribution of the cloth. A decision was made that it had to be on the principle of 'equality and fraternity [sama rata sama rasa]'. I thought to myself 'this is a primitive democracy'...their understanding was so literal, it meant that every single person in every village had to get exactly the same amount, regardless of their need! Everyone was to get a piece of ten centimeters. This was the proposal of Sachjani [Kutil]. I was very angry. My intention had been to use the cloth for those who were suffering the most. The KNI leaders were defeated however, as Kutil would not give in. It was a mad decision. I asked them 'what on earth can people use thirteen centimeters of cloth for?' They replied, 'We must be fair'.

Even if the KNI's Chairman's intention had been acceptable, it was probably not possible to distribute the cloth according to need at that time. Talang was a very poor kecamatan where, relatively speaking, everyone was badly off, making it impossible to distribute such a limited supply of cloth according to need.

The sama rata sama rasa populist ideology was taken up in different ways by all the left wing groups at the national level, though at a popular level it may have meant quite different things. One aim of the Socialist People's Party (PARAS) formed in Cirebon in December under Prime Minister Sjahrir's leadership was 'to struggle towards a society of sama rata sama rasa (egalitarian collectivism)'. For the powerful PESINDO it meant 'collective happiness, collective welfare and collective sovereignty'. Here it meant something more than the kind of primitive fairness of Kutil and his followers in the Talang cloth distribution during the revolusi sosial.

50 Talang KNI leader, Interview, 7.12.75.
51 Anderson, Java, 203.
52 Revolusioner, 4, 26 January 1946, 6-7, gives an exegesis of the meaning of the phrase for PESINDO.
Janur Kuning

A long tradition surrounds the symbolism of janur kuning, the young yellow leaf of the coconut palm, beginning, perhaps apocryphally, with the Ramayana. When Rama was going with Hanoman, the white monkey, to burn the city of Airlangga, Hanoman’s house was decorated with janur kuning to ward off danger to himself. The association with the coconut palm itself is significant, as this versatile tree has always been considered as a source of spiritual power in Java. In the Banyumas area, janur kuning is used as a kind of flag (umbul-umbul) fluttering above the paddy doll of Dewi Sri, the rice goddess, which stands with its offerings at the edge of the sawah. In Pekalongan Residency (as elsewhere in Java) janur kuning is traditionally used to decorate the main arched entrance to a wedding reception, whether or not it is Muslim. The Muslims have their own interpretation of janur. In Arabic jā'a nūr means 'the light came' and this is associated with a sign of spiritual power (also called wahyu). Putting a diagonal cross of janur kuning above the mirror in a house, (called tolak bilahi) wards off sickness, or prevents dangerous evil spirits from entering.

During the revolution in the Tiga Daerah, janur kuning came to be used in combat for the first time, as indeed it was in Aceh. For some it was a sign of invulnerability, or the possession of spiritual power, which would 'protect' the wearer during the fighting. Kutil’s AMRI Talang were known by the janur kuning slings, headbands or armbands they wore, especially in the attack on Tegal City on 4 November, and in the takeover of the Residency capital later in December. In the clashes which followed with the 'Pekalongan army' as the TKR was called, villagers in the Tiga Daerah also wore janur kuning.

At the beginning of the violent conflict between the uleebalang aristocrats and their Islamic opponents in Aceh early in 1946, a Japanese captain who had remained in the area after the main Japanese forces withdrew, noticed that the marching lines of demonstrators '...had palm leaves tied around their necks... [which]...were also symbols of combat.' See Ushiyama Mitsuo, Hokubu Sumatora Susen No Ki [Post-Surrender Conflict in Aceh] translated by Akira Oki and Anthony Reid (forthcoming).
Specific Revolutionary Emphases

The new revolutionary consciousness was also reflected in the use of Indonesian language greetings and of nicknames or wadanans, to unite the pemuda rakyat members of the badan perjuangan with the older leaders of those groups. Although the Indonesian language had begun playing a part as a national uniter in the 1920s, it was not until the Japanese occupation that it began to be used at all widely and taught in schools as the National Language. During the revolusi sosial in the Tiga Daerah, words such as Merdeka (Freedom), darah (blood), bebas (personal liberty) and bung (brother) became used as greetings, '...the expression of a hopeful new enterprise and solidarity'.54 Semangat (enthusiasm) underlay everything one did.

The ethos of the badan perjuangan which controlled the kabupaten capitals reflected the new solidarity, and the inversion of the old elite values. The very opposite of hierarchical in structure, loosely knit yet akrab (close), the badan perjuangan made decisions in a non-authoritarian way. People turned up for guard duty when they felt like it, knew what they had to do and where they had to be. Refined feelings, posture, gesture, tone of voice, and all forms of respect were irrelevant, all that mattered now was enthusiasm and being free.

While the younger pemuda rakyat had to learn to say the word Proklamasi,55 the word Merdeka (from an old Malay word, Mahardiker, meaning a free man, not a slave), was not strange. An ABC war correspondent travelling with the Presidential entourage to East Java in early December 1945 recalls:

54 Anderson, 'The Language of Indonesian Politics', op.cit., 105.
55 See Chapter Four.
The first of many surprises came when the train pulled up at Cikampek...amidst a vast roar of 'Merdekas'...two days later roaring along the lines into Eastern Java we moved in an almost unbroken channel of salutes and 'Merdekas'...it seemed that for every individual along the track, it was a fine thing to glimpse the raised palms or fists of his leaders and to have the privilege of shouting 'Merdeka' ten or a dozen times as the carriage sped past. Speeches always ended with a triple 'Merdeka' salute thunderously returned by the crowd.

But what did 'Merdeka' mean? For a Tiga Daerah camat it was a cry 'which united the old and the young.' For Bang Dana, already over 50 years old at the time of the Proclamation, who turned out to man the road blocks in Brebes, it had both an ideological and a personal meaning. While it meant first and foremost 'the Dutch must be destroyed' (Belanda harus lenyap), saying the greeting 'Merdeka' also meant that 'with a bold heart I was not afraid to die' (hati besar tidak takut mati). In Bang Dana's consciousness 'Merdeka' and the news of the Proclamation were inseparable. Hearing the news of the latter 'set my blood on fire' to defend Independence. The cry 'Keluar! [come out!] Merdeka!' was heard everywhere. This meant helping 'to look for the enemy', by manning the road blocks.

One thing which distinguished members of the perjuangan, in particular the younger pemuda rakyat, was the intensity with which they felt certain sorts of things. At the Ikeda rally in Jakarta on 19 September, the thronged masses had sung the song Darah Rakyat (The Blood of the People) while waiting for Bung Karno to arrive.

56 Cikampek the first stop for trains to Central Java after leaving Jakarta.
57 Thompson, op.cit., 73,76. Thompson was one of four Australian, two American and three Indian war correspondents who accompanied the Presidential entourage. He also wrote: "Merdeka" was the universal greeting, the nation-wide salute, the word of acclamation. Our ears were to dim with "Merdeka", our slumbers to be filled with the word before we came back to Jakarta', Ibid, 72.
58 Camat of Randudongkal, TS dated August 1975.
59 Bang Dana, Interview, 6.12.75.
60 Kertapati, Sekitar, 142. This famous song says in effect that the rakyat will come to judge their oppressors.
Beginning with the November fighting in Surabaya, the slogan 'it is better to bathe in blood, than to be colonized' (lebih baik mandi darah daripada dijajah) became popular. In Pemalang the greeting 'darah' said with both fists clenched, raised above the head, became no less important than 'Merdeka'. For some, nunggal darah meant 'one struggle, one heart', the unity of the struggle against the Dutch. For others, it meant the blood of the colonialists if they dared to come back. It could symbolise the daring of young heroes defending their country; it could also forbode revenge for the bitterness and suffering of the Japanese period.\footnote{61}

The word 'bung' was also expressing the new egalitarian fraternity of the revolution during October 1945:

I still remember the Dutch used to call their [male] servants jongen, meaning 'boy', which became jongos. I hadn't yet been made the Acting Commander [of the TKR] when I went to the Hotel Merdeka in Pekalongan with a guest. I called out 'jongos! jongos!' There was a silence. Then a voice called out 'there are no jongos any more [tidak ada jongos lagi]'. Deep down I thought, 'He's right'. I felt I was wrong. I called the servant bung.\footnote{62}

Two other catchwords of the revolutionary consciousness at the time were semangat (enthusiasm) and bebas (personal liberty). According to a contemporary Pemalang observer, 'If a person didn't have semangat he was not considered a pemuda.' He 'just acted like a pemuda' (pemuda-pemudaan saja). The reply to 'Merdeka', at least in the Comal area of Pemalang, was 'Bebas!' with the left hand help up.\footnote{63}

During the revolusi sosial period, several characteristics came to typify genuine membership of the perjuangan. People said one had to participate in guard duty at the meeting place or headquarters. No one ever gave orders about this, it was part of the revolutionary

\footnote{61} Songs and poems using the theme of darah, and even a short story with that title, can be found in many issues of the PESINDO magazine Revolusioner throughout 1946.

\footnote{62} Interview, 19.10.76.

\footnote{63} Revolutionary Camat of Comal, Interview, 1.12.76.
consciousness to understand the need to do guard duty. Anyone not active was quickly suspected of being 'the enemy' and even punished. Yet on the other hand, one was always personally free to come and go when one felt like it. Nothing should be too organised; each person was seeking his own freedom in the exhilaration of looking for new experiences, of acting in new ways, as the following incident illustrates:

The Resident [Mr Besar], Dr Sumbadji [Pekalongan KNI Chairman] and I [the TKR acting Commander] were on our way to see the Governor, Wongsonegoro, in Semarang. Near Batang we were stopped by a group of village youth who stepped onto the middle of the road and put up their hands. Mr Besar asked, 'Who told you to stop us?' 'No one', they replied, 'we are looking for experience [mencari pengalaman].' Everyone in the car laughed but we were allowed to go on. 64

While this new found feeling of personal liberty was part of the revolutionary ethos, the perjuangan demanded also that those who joined a group have some kind of discipline. This is clearly seen in those who manned the road blocks that were set up everywhere in Brebes. To quote Bang Dana again:

In Brebes if it [the vehicle] didn't have identification the driver had to go back to where he came from to get it. He was not ill-treated, nothing was confiscated [tidak main rampas]. Here the pemudas were orderly. 65

Not all pemuda rakyat had this revolutionary consciousness, of course. There were those that used the newly won 'freedom' in anti-social ways; a few, according to a Pemalang leader, turned out for guard duty for the wrong reasons. As compensation for this duty in the larger towns (at least in the three kabupaten capitals), the pemudas received nasi ponggol, 66 rice wrapped up in banana leaves cooked in public kitchens where many of the activist girls were assigned. For elite pemudas who could already afford to eat well,

64 TKR Acting Commander, Interview, 15.10.76.
65 Interview, 6.12.75.
66 Referred to as nasi nuk in some areas.
this nasi ponggol was no better (or worse) than everyday food but for the pemuda rakyat of the poorer kampungs and villages who had drifted into the towns, it was an improvement. There were a few pemudas, nicknamed 'pemuda ponggol' by one leader, because they were reluctant to relieve their fellows on guard duty if the nasi ponggol had not arrived - 'if guaranteed ponggol, he wanted to become a pemuda!'.

Being a pemuda, then, did not depend on age, education or marital status, although traditionally a pemuda was someone unmarried (only single youth could join the pre-war Indonesia Muda). Pemudas were simply people with revolutionary spirit. Those pemuda sekolah who had Western schooling (as all the leaders of the urban and larger rural groups had) were more restrained than the pemuda rakyat caught up in the NICA-phobia. 'I [also] hated the politics of the Dutch', said a Tegal leader, 'but not to the extent of those who were involved in the killings at Slawi'.

Those pemudas who shared the revolutionary consciousness of the time, according to a Hizbullah leader:

...Wanted personal freedom yet didn't understand the meaning of Independence, they were more concerned with military drill [baris berbaris] and sowing the seeds of dissatisfaction against the Dutch [menanam benih ketidaksenangannya terhadap Belanda]. What did the pemudas talk about? Only one thing, defending the country [membela negara].

Those who could not forget about home and family, were not regarded as part of the perjuangan. To quote Bang Dana yet again, a person who shared the revolutionary consciousness 'didn't think about his hoe, or his buffalo, [but] only thought about war. He didn't think of anything but the perjuangan.'

67 Pemalang API leader, Interview, 9.2.75.
68 Tegal Kabupaten KNI Vice-Chairman, Interview, 8.10.76.
69 Pemalang Hizbullah leader, Interview, 16.2.75.
70 Interview, 6.12.75.
The range of attitudes within pemuda ranks is illustrated by the Pekalongan Pemuda Permi, already mentioned briefly in Chapter Four. They were known as the Pemuda Permi because the members - all junior school (MULO) pupils - were sons of Pekalongan priyayi officials who lived in Jalan Permi. The headquarters of the group were at Permi 11, the home of two activists, Bambang and Sidik. Pemuda Permi members were most active at the time of the Proclamation, when Bambang got some posters from, or through, his brother (who had been in the Jakarta medical faculty during the Japanese occupation) which read 'Freedom or Death' (Merdeka atau Mati). These were distributed by the pemuda Permi, who then went around the town with great elan hauling down the Japanese flag in front of the Pekalongan kawedanan office. Unlike the militant Pekalongan railways activists, however, they forgot to replace the Japanese Flag with the Red and White. Indeed, the Pemuda Permi spent more of their time being nakal (naughty) and daring, by taking lights off cars, valves from radios, and writing 'Merdeka atau Mati' on the Japanese Resident's car.71

Kromo Lawi, the veteran pergerakan leader referred to them as a bunch of adventurers whose sepak terjang (behaviour, actions) the real perjuangan pemudas regarded rather cynically. In the words of a Pemalang observer at the time, 'They were pemuda etok-etokan - not real pemudas'.72

Another conservative pemuda group, called the Angkatan Muda, was sponsored, as we have seen, by Pemalang's Pangreh Praja, who appointed its leadership while its membership apparently came exclusively from the various levels of the government bureaucracy. The Pangreh Praja tried to use the AM kantor (Office Youth), as the Bupati called it, as well as the KNI, to control the Pemalang perjuangan and even set up a United Indonesian Younger Generation (Gabungan Angkatan Muda Indonesia) which was ridiculed by the supporters of Soepongat and never functioned. As these two examples show, even privileged elite

71 Pemuda Permi, Interview, 30.7.75.
72 Mr Besar's nephew, Transcript II/19, 3.5.75.
youth shared some features of the pemudas.

While people with revolutionary spirit were mostly pemudas, older people also had this spirit. Most of the pemuda leaders in the Tiga Daerah were married, unlike their counterparts in Jakarta, and many were over 30 years of age. The leaders of the badan perjuangan which sprang up in the Tiga Daerah were mostly older members of the pre-1926 pergerakan, or activists from the 1930s, and a number had been exiled to Boven Digul after 1926. Leaders such as Kartohargo and Slamet (Brebes), Soewignjo, Muhamad Nuh (Tegal), and Soepangat and Amir (Pemalang) to mention only the better known, provided crucial leadership to the younger, inexperienced pemuda rakyat. 'At that time without the older people, the perjuangan would have been weak (lembek)', recalls Bang Dana. It was not just a question of elders leading quietly from behind; in some cases they were at the front in real pemuda-style actions. The Bupati of Pemalang, for example, was kidnapped by 15 pemudas, led by two Pemalang activists, Soemargo and Rustamadji. A member of the Sarekat Rakyat, Soemargo had been dismissed from his job as a village school teacher even before the 1926 communist rebellion and appointed as village secretary by the Assistant Resident, to try and stop his radical activities. Now a PESINDO leader at Banjardawa sugar mill, a fiery public speaker and leader of Pemalang's police, he was 51 years of age in 1945.

People with semangat, even if they were over 50 years of age, still shared in the revolutionary spirit, as this delightful vignette also illustrates:

I [the Pangkah KNI Chairman and Tiga Daerah Wedana] was going in a dokar on a regular tour to villages with the kawedanan Secretary Raden Munawar, who always came to write down decisions. As we were passing the guard post, in the village of

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73 Except for Aidit, Jakarta 'pemuda' leaders such as Sidik, Sukarni, Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh were all in their late twenties.


75 Rustmadji, a second cousin of Soepangat, was about 39 at the time. See Chapter Five for a full description of this incident.
Bogares Kidul, an older man stood up and shouted 'Merdeka!' I stopped the dokar and got down to ask the person 'who are you?' 'I am pemuda Marto', he said standing at attention. Marto was a well-known lenggaong who used to enter people's houses by breaking down the wall with a crowbar during the Dutch time. I laughed, 'You don't mean to tell me you're a pemuda with hair already growing out of your ears?' I teased him. Here was a well-known thief, more than fifty years old saying proudly he was a pemuda! It was funny but true [lucu tetapi nyata]. His reply was only 'ya, Merdeka!' Here was the true pemuda spirit. In reality, he was probably poverty-stricken, and a well-known thief at that! He was joining the others by taking his turn at guarding. I asked him how old he was - he said more than fifty! He had the spirit [jiwa] and feeling [perasaan] of the pemudas.\(^6\)

Ties between the pemudas and the older leaders were further strengthened by the use of nicknames (wadanan) referring to physical traits or eccentric behaviour. A custom originating amongst members of the PKI, it became a kind of code between members of the radical pre-war underground, particularly those in prison, for protection against Dutch spies. Normally such epithets used publicly would cause shame or embarrassment because they usually referred to physical flaws. But in Pemalang, where wadanan were most popular (reflecting the strength of the radical group), one 'had to have the courage to be nicknamed anything' (harus berani diwadani). The communist leader, K. Midjaja, had been known since pre-war days as Jono (his real name was Sardjono) cempluk, so called because he was short like a small lamp (cemplik), with a round protruding stomach (nyempluk). The API leader Sukarso was known as Karso gebog because he was short and slightly plump like the gebog, a storage place for small farmers' paddy. Amir codot, the pre-war communist leader and member of the underground PKI, gained his nickname because, like the codot bird, he loved bananas.\(^7\)

\(^6\) Pangkah KNI Chairman, Interview, 27.11.75.

\(^7\) Anthony Reid has suggested to me that the wadanan style has an interesting similarity to the Mafia and gangsterism in general, as names such as 'Big Louey', 'Bananas' and 'Mugsy' show.
The fact that the pemuda rakyat picked up the wadanan style in Pemalang (and to a lesser extent in Tegal or Brebes) reflects the influence of older radicals throughout the Tiga Daerah, and was in part an inversion of priyayi propriety.

For Soesmono, the Tegal kabupaten KNI leader, this wadanan style reflected something of fundamental importance about the perjuangan in the Tiga Daerah. Unlike in Jakarta, there were few if any pemuda mahasiswa or pemuda terpelajar (tertiary students), say with junior secondary school education (MULO). Because of this it was the older groups in the perjuangan who provided the leadership for the pemuda rakyat. 'It was the older leaders who initially activated the pemudas', Soesmono recalls, 'rather than initiative from within their own ranks. It was the former group who stepped first to the front'.

Priyayi Perspectives

At the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that both the revolutionaries and the priyayis believed that power is spiritual. The Pekalongan Pangreh Praja saw the conflict that developed between themselves and the revolutionaries in two ways. Firstly, as a contest between two different kinds of wahyu (aura or radience) which were manifestations of spiritual power, and, secondly, between the two opposing sides of the wayang. Explaining the defeat of the revolutionaries retrospectively, Kutil and Sardjio were said to have received wahyu tinangkal or 'black' radiance. However, the TKR leader was able to defeat Sardjio because he had received the real, divine radiance, wahyu cakraningrat.

Since the detailed account of the events in December will be left to Chapter Ten, we need only mention the background to a highly significant dream the TKR leader had the night before the army

78 Interview, 8.10.76.

79 Tinangkal means to 'push away or aside', reflecting the Pangreh Praja perception of how the new Resident came to power. Cakraningrat is the real power, wayhu kekuasaan. Wedana of Pekalongan, Interview, 25.8.71.
launched its counter-revolution against the Tiga Daerah, on 14 December 1945. Elements in army headquarters in Yogya, which had earlier ordered the arrest of Mr Besar and the withdrawal of three TKR battalions from the Tiga Daerah, were believed to be sympathetic to the new revolutionary government which had formally come to power on 9 December with Sardjio as Resident of Pekalongan. The Pekalongan TKR Regiment's acting Commander, Wadyono, had reported to his divisional commander, Colonel Djatikoesoemo, in Salatiga that 'It was better if the army adapt [menyesuaikan], and recognise Sardjio'.

On his arrival back in Pekalongan late on 13 December, extremely tired after a long journey from the Semarang front via Salatiga, he noticed strange guards around his house. That night he had a dream:

The dream was a splendid one. I will never forget it. It was in colour, extremely rare for me, but I remember it clearly. I was sitting in front of a big window, looking out over a wide valley, there was a kampung, a village there. Far away there was a Red and White. The scene was very beautiful. Then the flag changed to black with a gold fringe. It grew bigger and bigger, filling the whole sky. Then writing appeared in Javanese script in the middle. It was difficult at first to read [the script] but eventually I could. It was in two lines and it said saka jaba Jawa 'from outside Java'. Then it disappeared. The next day, before the meeting [with TKR officers] I told 3 or 4 of my closest staff (if there was anything the matter I always told them). Soedharmo said, 'this is a good dream, maybe it's an omen!' The writing meant not indigenous, an import. At the time that's what I thought about the PKI.

The black flag symbolism is also very significant in the TKR leader's mind. The black flag of the Yogyakarta kraton, Kyai Tunggul Wulung, was taken out at night and paraded around the town whenever the kingdom was threatened by an epidemic or some other grave external danger. In the TKR leader's mind the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries posed a threat just as serious to the older 'order' and 'stability'.

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80 Interview, 27.8.71.
81 Ibid., 21.11.74, my italics.
The fact that the TKR Commander had received a more auspicious wahyu was further proved when the army went to arrest the new Resident and his supporters and found they had 'lost their strength' (kehilangan bayu) to fight. This was a definite sign to the Pangreh Praja that Sardjio had used his spiritual power in the 'wrong' way. According to the Pekalongan Wedana, in the beginning all wahyu is 'white', but it had been used with the wrong intention, namely personal ambition, so had become wahyu tinangkal. This also reflected, the priyayis believed, the way the new Resident had obtained his wahyu in the first place. It had been given 'reluctantly not sincerely' (dilulu) by the gods. The fact that the TKR won in itself legitimised the wahyu of its leader.

The symbolism of the words 'saka jaba Jawa' also reflects the past use of the Pangreh Praja as a prop for the colonial state and a weapon against new political groups. The Sarekat Islam had been resisted strongly by the Pangreh Praja as a 'foreign', that is Islamic, cultural and political influence. For most of the Pangreh Praja communism was part of this evil continuum, to be resisted even more strongly.

As in the earlier 1926 rebellion, later in the Madiun Affair, and again in 1965, it ought to be noted that in 1945 there were government priyayis attracted to the radical cause in the Tiga Daerah also. All three were from Brebes. Maksum, a former public prosecutor, Mohamad Saleh, the kabupaten Secretary, and Sadikun, the Deputy Wedana of Banjarharjo, all joined the Tiga Daerah social revolutionaries in Pekalongan. That there has always been a number of priyayis attracted to the PKI (Sudisman, Abdulmadjid, Alimin to name a few) indicates the compatibility of Javanism with a type of social

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82 Bayu actually means wind, but the metaphor means loss of spiritual power.

83 Lulu is one of those many Javanese words full of 'deeper' meanings. Something given unhappily or disapprovingly, is dilulu. Giving more than a person is asking for is a sign it is dilulu. Hence the verb ngelulu, exaggerating sarcastically to show disapproval.

radicalism. The Pekalongan Pangreh Praja felt the 'betrayal' of Maksum most strongly, but saw his joining the radicals as a kind of 'aberration', explicable by the fact that he had earlier 'betrayed' the values of the Pangreh Praja by being dismissed by the Dutch for dishonesty over money matters.\textsuperscript{85}

The revolutionaries too regarded their enemies as 'from outside Java'. The Pangreh Praja's social and political base had been the colonial power. Their Western lifestyle, their use of Dutch language, their ignorance of Islam in an area where Islamic culture was strong, made them appear just as 'foreign' as Islam and the PKI were to the Pangreh Praja. Muslim-led opposition to the priyayis had been part of the tradition of Islamic revivalist movements in Java. The anti-priyayi side of the Budiah sect of the 1860s in Pekalongan kabupaten was expressed in their opposition to those whose faith had been corrupted by Javanese beliefs and by working with the colonial government.

The idea of combat between two opposite camps, the Pendawa on the right side of the dalang (puppeteer) and the Kurawa on the left, is a fundamental principle underlying the wayang kulit stories. Not surprisingly, the conflict which came to a head in Pekalongan in December 1945 between the social revolutionaries and the TKR was seen within this wayang framework, just as a later and much more cataclysmic confrontation in 1965 was also seen in terms of the same Pendawa-Kurawa conflict.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, in the conflict with the social revolutionaries, the Wedana of Pekalongan believed that the TKR would win, because in the wayang 'the right side always wins'. The people who followed the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries to Pekalongan came on foot, camping the first night in the Pekalongan City kampungs.

\textsuperscript{85} The acting TKR Commander, writing about Maksum's dismissal, recalls it was '...really a shock and a disgrace to the priyayi corps at that time' and asks 'could his [earlier] "revolutionary" desertion from the priyayi pattern have something to do with this [1945] episode of his career?' (English comment).

\textsuperscript{86} G.J. Resink, 'From the Old Mahabharata to the New Ramayana Order', paper presented to the 6th IAHA Conference, Yogyakarta, 26-30 August 1974.
'After sleeping the night, the next morning I saw all these people leaving to go home', the Wedana recalls. "It's ended [sampun telas]" they said.\textsuperscript{87} They had followed to watch, and the episode had finished, the revolutionaries had won. Just as in an all-night wayang, the outcome of the battles is always known. So the common people who came to view the lakon in Pekalongan knew that the Pendawa (for them, the revolutionaries) would win, and there was no point in staying any longer. In the wayang, a conflict between two powerful elites, the Pendawa always won, without the support of the audience. So when the Pekalongan episode was sampun telas, the audience went home. The Wedana's interpretation, on the other hand, was that the Tiga Daerah lakon would end shortly. We shall see how in the following Chapters.

\textsuperscript{87} Wedana of Pekalongan, Transcript, I/8, 23.8.71.
CHAPTER EIGHT

REVOLUTION REACHES THE KABUPATEN CAPITALS

THIS chapter describes how the social upheaval of the rural areas came to the kabupaten capitals of the Tiga Daerah. It was to the towns that the former Pangreh Praja, who had been removed from office or who had left their posts 'voluntarily', had hastened for safety. As they were soon to discover, the kabupaten capitals did not offer any real security.

In both Pemalang and Tegal the upheaval had begun in the southern hinterland areas, and spread northwards to the coastal kecamatans. Although in Pemalang town word had been received that villagers to the south were gathering for some kind of protest, the main impetus for overthrowing the old order probably came from groups organising within the poorer kampungs of the town itself. In Tegal there was a physical spread of unrest from the south, with a well planned and coordinated mass demonstration marching to take over the City on 4 November. In Brebes the less violent upheavals seemed unconnected and less of a movement. The spread in this case was more one of news and rumour. In Brebes also ethnic hostilities against both Chinese and Eurasians played an important role.

Communications between the countryside and all the kabupaten capitals had been difficult since the Proclamation, for several reasons. Motor vehicles were scarce; there were few buses and even fewer cars. Bicycles were hampered by a shortage of inflatable-rubber tyres. The main means of transport, the railway, linked the kabupaten capitals while slower trains stopped at smaller stations such as Tanjung and Comal. There was one rail link south, running from Tegal to the main southern line at Prupuk. Thus the leaders of the urban badan perjuangan had few links with their rural counterparts. Their own rivalries with other urban groups within the kabupaten seemed more important than their fragile links with the countryside.

During the social upheaval in October communications between the kabupaten capitals and the rural hinterland became even more difficult. Revolutionary leaders like the Tegal KNI Vice-Chairman
PEMALANG KABUPATEN PENDOPO, WITH BUPATI'S RESIDENCE BEHIND

PEMALANG HIZBULLAH HEADQUARTERS 1945 (FORMER KABUPATEN SECRETARY'S HOUSE)
Soesmono, who had a good picture of the rural situation from frequent
visits to BKR posts and to supervise elections of new camats, were
exceptional. Most people were afraid to venture out of the towns
anywhere but along the main North Coast road, for fear of being kidnapped
or losing their lives. Nobody knew how many officials had managed
to escape, or what their fate was. Many local camats had fled and
taken refuge in what appeared to be the relative safety of the kabupaten
capitals, or to Pekalongan city. However, the social upheaval seemed
to follow the fleeing Pangreh Praja relentlessly.

**Pemalang**

In the second week of October there were some reports and
many rumours of villagers preparing to march from the south to attack
Pemalang town. Because of such rumours about what was happening in
the south, Pemalang revolutionary leaders decided that the Bupati would
have to be put in the local jail for the time being for his own
safekeeping. On Friday, 19 October, at 3.30 p.m., R.T. Rahardjo
Sosro Adikoesoemo was sitting in his pendopo, reflecting on what had
been happening in the southern areas of his kabupaten, with his Patih,
Raden Soemarto. Suddenly a bus belonging to the Comal sugar mill
entered the kabupaten compound at high speed and drove right up to the
front of the pendopo. Out jumped 15 pemudas, led by Soemargo and
Rustamadji, and surrounded the building. The surprised Bupati,
acting instinctively according to the time-honoured protocol for anyone
entering the pendopo, asked his 'guests' to be seated. Instead Rustamadji,

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1 For one dramatic example, the escape of the Camat of Petarukan,
see my 'Social Revolution', 115.

2 An official in Pemalang recalls a phone call from his brother-in-
law, the Camat of Randudongkal to say that villagers in
Bantarpolang kecamatan were on the march to attack the town.
Transcript, I/1, 3.5.75.

3 Rustamadji, a graduate from the Prinses Juliana (Intermediate
Technical School in Yogya and a cousin of Soepangat, was from
Randudongkal, while Sumargo, a Sarekat Rakyat activist and
veteran of 1926, was leader of PESINDO at Banjardawa sugar mill.
Both were to become leaders of Pemalang's police under Soepangat.
waving a pistol, said that he had little time to complete his task of getting the Bupati and his Patih to a 'place of protection', namely the local jail. The people were preparing to attack the kabupaten office in the same way as they had other government offices. The Bupati replied by saying that he did not feel he had done anything wrong at all, nor did he feel about to be attacked by the people. He would discuss the need for protection with the Patih first. However, this was roughly refused, as was his request to take leave (pamitan) from his wife. As Rustamaji was by now holding his pistol 'as if he were about to use it', the Bupati and Patih had no choice but to go with the group. Before leaving the Bupati left a message with a servant for his wife, to take great care of Pemalang's famous sacred heirloom, a kris called Mbah Tabah.

The social revolution climaxed on 19 October in a night of violence in which the houses of a lurah and the Camat were set on fire, and many others looted. The only victim was Djoewito, a former agricultural officer, who had been responsible for the distribution of cloth during the Occupation. Djoewito had been having a meal at the market, not knowing that a crowd was waiting for him outside. As he left the market on his bicycle he was stopped and killed with a hammer blow on the head.

That night crowds roamed the streets of Pemalang looking for 'corrupt ones'. In the words of an API leader: 'The people were parading around wearing only shorts or loin cloths (cawat), their bodies blackened with lamp soot. They wore old tires around their necks which were taken off and cut up to make torches, so they could see their way'. About 10 p.m., a mob arrived at the kabupaten office, but found no one home in the residence behind. The crowd then went to the house of the

5 From interviews (all secondhand accounts) in Pemalang in February and November 1975. I have no eyewitness account of Djoewito's death.
6 API leader, Interview, 9.2.75.
kabupaten Secretary, which was broken into and ransacked.

Other leading priyayi officials known to be corrupt were singled out that night. For example, the house of the Wedana of Pemalang, Wijogo Puspojudo, 'who coughed continuously and had a young second wife', was sacked, his furniture collected and burnt. The home of Wadri, the head of the Fisheries Department, met with the same fate. One Pemalang priyayi, a nephew of Mr Besar, who was in the perjuangan, remembers:

Wadri! That rotten-smelling petty thief [bajingan tengik]! He married the Bupati's sister-in-law, a widow, so that he could say, 'I'm married into the Bupati's family'. I was riding a bike with solid rubber tyres, while he was hoarding tubes - he had a whole room full.7

At least one government official from the rural areas was in Pemalang on that night, having earlier been the target of similar action in his own locality. This Camat remembers:

We had left all our belongings behind on Bodeh, had arrived in Pemalang, and were staying in the house of a teacher named Umar. We had just finished dinner about 7 p.m. when a crowd came past the front of the house and stopped. Small children were carrying petromax [kerosene pressure] lamps and small red and white flags, and beating on empty cans, 'tong tong tong'. Then I remembered that Umar had been responsible for the distribution system as head [kumicho] of his neighbourhood association. The mob surrounded his house and tried to enter it, shouting 'Burn! Burn!' We managed to move ourselves and our belongings to the house of the next-door neighbour, Kyai Abdullah. Someone said, 'It's not the house but the man that we want'. Then Umar's house was ransacked and we lost our bicycle and all the belongings that we had brought from Bodeh. Apparently, Pak Umar knew what was going to happen as he had moved his sewing machine and other goods beforehand.8

Natsir, the Pemalang Police Chief, was among those kidnapped that same night for their own safety. Here is his wife's account:

7 Interview, 3.5.75.
8 Camat of Bodeh, Interview, 23.9.71.
During the night he got up and went out to relieve himself, dressed only in a sarong and a singlet, and didn't come back. I hurried to the police barracks, but he wasn't there. Then I went to the pemuda headquarters and was told he was in the jail. I was allowed to see him. He said he had been held up by a man with a pistol. The next day about ten pemudas came to our house. They took all the Dutch books from the shelves, carried them outside and made a bonfire of them, saying this was evidence Pak Natsir had been a NICA agent. They said it wasn't safe for me there and that they would take me to 'safety'.

Mrs Natsir and the wives and families of all the town's top priyayi officials were taken to the former residence of the Japanese military advisor (shidokan) on the north side of the town square. A perjuangan leader today claims that only those families who were willing were moved to safety at the shidokan's house. The Bupati's wife, however, was among those who considered themselves interned:

I took the kabupaten heirloom with me, a small kris called Mbah Tabah. Every night it was washed, the water was kept overnight in a refrigerator and the next day sent in three thermoses to the prison. One was for the guards, so that after drinking they would not be too harsh towards the prisoners; the rest was to give my husband peace of mind while he was in prison.

Haji Busjaeri, the Hizbullah leader, remembers that 'all the officials accused of being corrupt were rounded up, their hands tied above their heads, and were taken to the tennis court in the town square. Between 16 and 18 of the town's officials were put in jail, the only place where their physical safety could be guaranteed. They included the Bupati; Soemarto, the Patih; Natsir, the Police Chief; Wijogo Puspojudio, the Wedana of Pemalang; Sukardis, the head of the Public Works Department; Wadri, the head of the Fisheries Department; 'Meneer' Umar, the teacher and kumicho; and Raden Soewignjo, the kabupaten Secretary. Some of these officials had been arrested or captured as part of the mob violence of the populist uprising.

9 Interview, 23.9.72.
10 Interview, 12.12.71.
11 Interview, 4.2.75.
in Pemalang. Others, like the Bupati and the Police Chief, had been kidnapped by local perjuangan leaders and pemudas for protection.
Abdul Mutholib, the discredited leader of the priyayi-sponsored KOPI during the Occupation, whose name was at the top of the pemuda blacklist, was able to make a dramatic but temporary escape with the help of a member of API, who also belonged to Muhammadiah and was Mutholib's neighbour. Mutholib had gone into hiding earlier in the day at the Camat's house but had later been moved (luckily, for his sake) to this API member's house. The latter recalls:

The people said, 'Whoever is hiding Mutholib will be killed'. When the disturbances had died down, we left by bicycle at about 2 a.m. with Mutholib on the back. He was very nervous and very scared. 'My life is in your hands, little Brother Ali [Hidup mati ditangan dik Ali]' he said. He was on the back because he was so frightened that he reckoned his legs were too weak to pedal, although he weighed between 95 and 100 kilograms while I was much lighter, and he should really have been carrying me! At Bojongbata (south of Pemalang) we were stopped by the village Secretary, Denin. Luckily he knew my voice. I said that Mutholib was my older brother. We finally arrived at the small station of Babatan, having ridden the seven kilometers in about an hour.\(^2\)

Later that morning Mutholib boarded the train to Tegal, but on the way he was recognised by some Arab pemudas and taken back to Pemalang. There he was handed over to the GPAI leaders and ended up on the tennis court with all the other prisoners.

Pemalang santri pemudas from both the GPAI and Hizbullah played a major role in the early part of the social revolution. As the deputy leader of Hizbullah put it later:

The main purpose of everyone was to oppose the corrupt ones, 'Meneer' Umar, Wadri, and their crowd. Ideology was not important then, nobody thought about ideology, at least the Islamic group did not. There were no orders, that is why semangat (enthusiasm) and spontaneity were so important. Someone would point their thumb in the direction of the next house. Everyone would understand and head for that house. At that time, like no other period during the revolution, we were together, we were one. Moreover, we knew nothing about politics.

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12 API member, Interview, 17.2.75.
(buta politik) in those days. Certainly, the Islamic group did not. Most of the leaders of the pemuda brigade were santris. We were united then with the one aim of destroying the corrupt cliques.\textsuperscript{13}

The unity between the Muslim and Western-educated nationalists was a feature of Pemalang kabupaten as a whole. In Randudongkal, South Pemalang, the Islamic nationalists Haji Zaini and his santri brother-in-law Nasron (who was made head of the local police) were close associates of two of Soepangat's cadres, the socialists Suwarko and his cousin Suleman, the revolutionary Camat. The latter had this to say about the nature of the local perjuangan in Randudongkal:

There was no difference between the religious groups and the others. Zaini and Nasron used to sleep at my place and talk until twelve and three in the morning. Were there different concepts about the revolution? There weren't. It was still the time of 'Independence [Merdeka]'. What did merdeka mean? It meant 'being free from colonialism'. We wanted to become a free country. Its form would be decided later. We already knew that Kromo Lawi and the PKI and the Tegal socialists [i.e., the KNI group] were different. In the local areas we followed whoever was progressive.\textsuperscript{14}

Two days after the social upheaval in Pemalang, a new revolutionary government came to power at a mass meeting in the town square. Soepangat was the main speaker, followed by two underground PKI leaders.\textsuperscript{15} Soepangat told the people that there must not be any more arson and no one should be killed. The fact that Soepangat's call for order was obeyed highlights an important difference between the revolutionary movement in Pemalang and its counterparts in Tegal and Brebes. While the latter two movements were fragmented in several ways, Soepangat was able to forge a remarkable unity between the 1926 veterans, his own group of pre-war activists of the 1930s, younger pemuda figures, and the santri leaders. He had begun this work in the PEKOPE and was to continue it until the end of the Tiga Daerah Affair. The relative absence of violence in Pemalang, however, was

\textsuperscript{13} Interview, 16.2.75. See Appendix C, 416.

\textsuperscript{14} Interview, 1.12.76.

\textsuperscript{15} The role of these leaders is discussed in the following chapter.
also due to the fact that Soepangat controlled the urban thieves (pencoleng) and troublemakers (tukang tetek-bengek) through a well-known pencoleng called Madrei, who was imported specially from Randudongkal for that purpose. A former API leader recalls: 'My strongest impression about the period of Soepangat's rule in Pemalang was that there were literally no theieves, pickpockets, or troublemakers operating in the town. They all followed Soepangat's leadership'.

One leader of the Chinese Youth Irregulars attributed Soepangat's success to his reputation for honesty and fairness in running the PEKOPE rationing system. He was also well liked by everyone because of his tactful flexibility (kasupelan), and he was closer to the younger pemudas than many pemuda leaders themselves.

While a full discussion of the economic policies of the new revolutionary governments will be left until the following chapter, here it should be noted that one of the first priorities was the rebuilding of the local economy after the ravages of the Japanese occupation. To this end the new Patih, Dr Moerjawan, formed a group of advisors to help reopen local enterprises. A nephew of Mr Besar, with some pre-war training in an agricultural school, was appointed to run the huge Don Greet kapok and coconut plantation in Randudongkal. Dr Moerjawan agreed with Soepangat's view that in order to keep the wheels of government moving it was necessary to use officials of the old Pangreh Praja. Thus the ousted Camat of Ampelgading was employed in the kabupaten administration while his colleague from Petarukan who had suffered the same fate was appointed by Soepangat as kabupaten Secretary. In reply to the cry of his older radical supporters (the ex-Digul Sarekat Rakyat group) who said, 'Don't leave a single stooge of the Japanese in', Soepangat and Dr Moerjawan urged, 'Let us use the ones who are honest'.

Not having any formal administrative skills themselves, they felt forced to rely on at least two former camats, one of whom seems to have had a reputation for heavy handedness during the Japanese period. Yet the former Petarukan Camat in fact went with Soepangat and Dr Moerjawan to be formally inaugurated in

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16 Interview, 9.2.75.
17 Kendalsari PESINDO leader, Interview, 31.10.75.
Pekalongan city by the Resident, Mr Besar, on 29 October 1945. There they were presented with letters of appointment. This was followed by an official inauguration ceremony in the kabupaten pendopo, which Mr Besar also attended.

La ilaha illa 'llah

The struggle for power and the search for a new leadership during the social revolution, was a much more drawn out affair in Tegal than in Pemalang or Brebes. Unlike Pemalang, the leadership of the revolutionary movement in Tegal was divided between three groups: the KNI group (who had made up the socialist Negen Broeders) led by the pre-war activists of the 1930s; the Barisan Pelopor-AMRI Slawi groups led mostly by 1926 veterans; and the younger, less experienced activists who led the API-BKR-TKR group. The diagram on the following page shows how the three main groups were linked before 4 November 1945. Each group had responded to the rural social upheaval and the Eurasian killings in their own way. Towards the end of October we see a series of political manoeuvres by these various groups.

The KNI group (Box A) was by now feeling itself increasingly impotent and was unable to solve what it considered to be the main problem facing the perjuangan, which was trying to establish some kind of 'law and order' outside the towns. This was because neither of the two Tegal KNI had any law enforcing body, the new police proving as reluctant as the TKR to move outside the city. The dilemma faced by the KNI leaders over the problem of order was keenly felt by its leader Ki Tjitrasatmaka. At the time of the kidnappings of top Brebes Pangreh Praja by some of his own KNI leaders, Ki Tjitrasatmaka was admonished by Mr Besar:

I told the Resident: 'I can't even guarantee my own safety, let alone that of others'. I thought that it was better if I resigned. Mr Besar said

18 Soepangat's letter was No.46/P.P.D. Letter of Attorney-General Tirtawinata, dated 26 March 1947. Proc.Gen. Dr Moerjawan's letter of appointment was lost during the TKR counter revolution.

19 Mr Besar's nephew, Transcript, I/3-4, 3.5.75.
Tegal Kabupaten Revolutionary Movement c. late October 1945

--- Two Negen Broeders also members of Barisan Pelopor during the Occupation
--- Alliance

->->-> Attack on Tegal Municipality, 4 November 1945
..... Two KNI members advised TKR on legal and political matters
->->-> Attack on Pangkah on 4 November 1945
'I don't mean that, but try and find a solution, because these kidnapped people are government officials (alat negara).  

It was about this time that the Tegal _perjuangan_ received a visit by a Pekalongan KNI delegation consisting of the Resident, Dr Soembadji (the Pekalongan KNI Chairman) and K.H. Moh Iljas. Local KNI leaders were called to the kabupaten to report on the situation in the rural areas. As the kabupaten KNI Chairman, Slamet, was unable to be present, Soesmono explained the KNI view:

I reported that the information received by the kabupaten KNI, and from results of [my own] investigations, showed that the camats who were killed had behaved arbitrarily and were corrupt. As an example I mentioned that cloth and food from the government that was supposed to have been distributed to the families of the romushas but was not. I was willing to provide the witnesses and other proof of these actions which had made the people angry. Apart from this the people wanted all the Pangreh Praja from bupati to camat replaced by people who conformed with the situation of national revolution at the time.

In order to consolidate their position vis-a-vis groups outside the town, the two KNIs in Tegal decided to dissolve the separate bodies and amalgamate into one Committee (see Appendix D). However, the new United KNI was ineffective for the same reasons as the earlier bodies. It had no security force, and the older veterans of 1926, prominent in the Barisan Pelopor leadership, were not represented. Feeling increasingly powerless in late October the KNI groups decided to make an approach to Slawi (Box C) to find out what was the AMRI revolutionary strategy. Soesmono recalls the visit:

I asked what their revolutionary plan was. The broad outline was that AMRI Slawi wanted to change the structure of local government completely. They wanted to change the [remaining] heads of various levels of local government. This included the TKR which had to be made up of the common people, they

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20  Ki Tjitrasatmaka, Interview, 30.1.73.

21  Soesmono, Answers, 7; Interview, 8.10.76.
said, and should not include former fascist 
PETA and Heiho elements.\textsuperscript{22}

The third group in the Tegal \textit{perjuangan}, the API/BKR 
(Box E) had two headquarters. One was south of the City at Pangkah, 
and the other in the old Trubels dairy at Pangongan. Even before the 
Eurasian killings, in which at least one API/BKR leader in the city 
had been involved, AMRI-Slawi had passed on complaints to the Barisan 
Pelopor that local KNI leaders had been seized and thrown into Tegal 
jail. AMRI-Slawi wanted to know who were responsible for these 
'counter-revolutionary' activities, pointing out that the municipal 
revolutionary leadership would suffer a severe blow to its legitimacy 
if they continued. An entry in the Barisan Pelopor log book had 
reported that several truckloads of people, including a number of 
local KNI leaders, escorted by API, had been brought into the city 
and placed in the jail. After negotiations with a public prosecutor 
these were released in November.\textsuperscript{23} The KNI group had received other 
unconfirmed reports of harassment of lurahs, and even killings 
around Pangkah.\textsuperscript{24} An indication of the thinking of the API leaders 
at this time is given in the following incident. Shortly after the 
attack on the kabupaten police barracks on 20 October, API leaders 
had gone to Ujungrusi, and made a speech about the basic need of the 
revolutionary struggle to oppose colonialism,'not one's own friends'. 
The arrest of a popular local leader by the kabupaten police (the 
immediate cause of the attack on the Kejambon police barracks) had 
been received 'in the wrong way'. Furthermore, Mansur, the Pangkah

\textsuperscript{22} Soesmono, Interview, 8.10.76. According to another member of the 
KNI delegation, after rejecting the AMRI-Slawi strategy as being 
'too radical' they were going to be detained in Slawi by Soewignjo. 
However, family ties secured their release (Soewignjo was a 
cousin of one of the Negen Broeders group in the KNI delegation).

\textsuperscript{23} Nuh, SEMDAM, 9.

\textsuperscript{24} According to one member of the KNI group, eight people near 
Pangkah had been ordered to dig their graves by API, on the 
orders of the old Wedana. Usually Sidik, younger brother of the 
API leader Mansur, who was involved in the killing of the Pangkah 
Eurasian Gill is also associated with these actions.
API leader, cautioned people not to take matters into their own hands or act 'in an arbitrary way'. Mansur had not finished his speech when the Ujungrusi leader, H. Samsuri, dissolved the meeting and told the people to return home, saying 'This is a phony speech'. After this incident API's role in the Tegal revolutionary movement declined until, on 4 November, most of its members left the area with the withdrawal of the TKR battalion. The gradual discrediting of API was reflected in the fact that it was now being referred to as Anti Pemerintah Indonesia (Against the Government of Indonesia).

The decline of API's fortunes coincided with a rise in the influence of AMRI Slawi, which, in turn, reflected the beginning of a shift to the left in the kabupaten. By November, as the previous diagram illustrates, AMRI Slawi leaders had forged strong links with Kutil's group in Talang and the radical Ujungrusi santris, as well as Balamoa, near the centre of the 1926 uprising. The conception and implementation of the plan to take over Tegal municipality to remove the last Pangreh Praja began in Slawi. On the morning of Saturday 3 November, an invitation reached various revolutionary groups (shown in Box D) to attend a meeting at AMRI Slawi headquarters (Box C). An Adiwerna KNI leader who trained the local pemudas recalls:

About 11.30 [on 3 November] I arrived by bicycle at Dukuhwringin [the AMRI Slawi headquarters] where I saw the TKR section commander from Adiwerna...I asked him: 'Bung, what is the meeting all about?' 'A revolutionary meeting [vergadering revolutionaire]' he replied, and left. I was really pleased to hear this reply, because it made me imagine the broadcasts of the 'revolt radio' in Surabaya, also my similar experiences in Semarang. By about noon revolutionaries from Talang, Ujungrusi and Balamoa, many of whom were armed with kris or clubs (golok), had assembled at AMRI Slawi's headquarters in the old Dukuhwringin sugar mill administrator's mansion. They were moved into a large room, the doors were locked and guards placed outside. The meeting was led by Sakirman, who began by explaining in detail the rights of the lower classes (kaum

26 Ibid, 6.
Marhaen), and how the government must be in the hands of the people. All remaining Pangreh Praja must be captured, examined, and then handed over to the people. At this point, according to one account, Kutil interrupted with 'Just kill them brothers [Dipejah miawon sederek]', whereupon those sitting behind Kutil responded with 'Agreement [mufakat!]' Sakirman then took out a slip of paper and read out the names of eight API leaders who were to be eliminated. The TKR must also be disarmed as their only role was to protect Mr Besar and the Pangreh Praja.

Sakirman went on to outline the four-part AMRI Slawi plan for the kaum Marhaen to take over the kabupaten government. Beginning the following morning road blocks were to be set up in order to prevent any Pangreh Praja from trying to escape. All dokar would be stopped and from 12 noon all cars stopped and their drivers and passengers detained, while all roads leading out of Tegal were to be barricaded. Secondly, all TKR units in Adiwerna, Slawi and Balapulang would be disarmed, also at 12 noon on the following day. TKR members were to be detained and their weapons used for the general attack on Tegal. By 4 p.m. the 'people's forces' should be assembled on the City outskirts with their weapons, obtained from the TKR, to wait for the order for a general attack. After the City had been occupied the weapons would be handed in at the Barisan Pelopor headquarters on the city square. Those mobilised for the attack would come from six kecamatan, namely Slawi, Adiwerna, Talang, Dukuhturi, Sumurpanggang and Kemantran. The last part of the plan was a simultaneous attack on the Pangkah sugar mill, to remove the API leadership. The Balamoa leader, Usup, was to be responsible for the mobilisation of villagers around Pangkah for this attack.

After outlining the AMRI plan and the strategy, the meeting was thrown open for questions. In reply to a query about how the officials

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27 These included Mansur, the Pangkah leader, his brother Sidik, Junus, Pitoyo and O. Ong Samsuddin, all Tegal API/TKR leaders. Ibid.

28 Ibid, 7. Kemantran was the former name of Tarub kecamatan.
to be captured were to be recognised, Sakirman replied that on arrival in Tegal the demonstrators would be met by members of the Barisan Pelopor, wearing a white armband with the initials 'B.P.' who would lead the people to those who were to be removed. The meeting ended at 1.30 p.m. with Sakirman saying to Usup, a former member of the Tegal Sarekat Rakyat and a santri dokar driver, 'Watch out, Bung, for your section in Pangkah, if anyone escapes...'

The order to disarm the TKR caused some conflict in loyalties with one Adiwerna delegate to the Slawi meeting, whose friends were leaders of the local Adiwerna TKR unit. This conflict was resolved by camouflaging the action so the TKR would not realise they were being disarmed. It was decided to bring forward the time of the operation to 8 a.m., not 12 noon as instructed by Sakirman, the reason given being 'to prevent an attack on the TKR by the people'. Furthermore, the operation was carefully disguised as a training practice for the Pemuda Istimewa of Ujungrusi,56 of whom, armed with bamboo spears and led by H. Samsuri carrying a pistol, surrounded the TKR leader's home. It was quickly explained to the surprised TKR that this action was to avoid bloodshed. The people at that time were quick to carry out violent attacks, and villages who did not have weapons were jealous of those that did and would attack the TKR [to get them]. For this reason also, Ujungrusi leaders explained, it was important for TKR members to change out of their uniforms so as not to be attacked on the streets.

The attack on the sugar mill kawedanan of Pangkah was led as agreed by Usup, who disarmed a local policeman to obtain a weapon. He led a large crowd from Balamoa, collecting people from neighbouring villages on the way. By the time they arrived in Pangkah, the remaining API leadership had either fled or gone into hiding.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid, 8.
31 Pangkah KNI leader, Transcript, III/3, 27.11.74.
In the city of Tegal itself, the first warning of what was to happen came when the United KNI Secretary, Soemarno, received a mysterious anonymous letter written in Arabic script, at 2 a.m. on the morning of 4 November, warning that an attack on Tegal by 'the people' was imminent. 32 A Barisan Pelopor leader recalls that Sunday morning nearly 30 years later:

The stillness and quietness in the city at that time was fitting for a ghost town. The place seemed engulfed in a feeling of apprehensiveness [rasa prihatin] which had seized the people. This was not only my impression, but others were feeling the same thing... The city was covered by thin cloud, it was overcast for a while, the clouds would disappear, then return again, and there would be a light shower of rain for a few minutes, as if to wet the roads to settle the dust...the leaves on the banyan tree in the city square were not moving at all...the banyan tree resembled someone in trouble [bersusah hati] bowing his head towards the soil of the Fatherland, or like someone meditating... 33

On the same morning, a mysterious Dakota plane with no markings was seen (some said for the second or third day running) flying in what seemed a suspicious way, low over the city, as if on a reconnaissance flight. Some thought it was trying to land (there was an emergency strip on the coast near Surodadi), others said it was a flying boat. Rumours quickly spread that the plane was trying to make contact with pro-NICA groups within the City - the remaining Pangreh Praja, API or the TKR. The stories about the plane sightings added fuel to the rumours that Tegal was a 'NICA base' (sarang NICA) which had to be 'cleaned out' immediately. 34

32 KNI leader, Interview, 14.12.72.
33 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 96.
34 This chance sighting reminds one of the aeroplane over Nuremberg incident. Several days prior to the declaration of the Second World War, a French commercial plane flew over the city. There were rumours of bombs having been dropped. The German government used the rumours as a verification for war. Mark Bloch, The Historian's Craft (New York, 1953), 99-100.
The Tegal United KNI, beginning to be aware of what was building up in the south, made a last ditch attempt to avert the attack by diplomacy. At 11 a.m. all remaining officials in the town were called together at the KNI office. There they agreed to sign a declaration, which said that the Pangreh Praja stood behind the Proclamation, and would fight together with the people to defend Independence. Mardjono, the Deputy Chairman of the United KNI, decided to take this declaration south immediately, in the hope of preventing further upheaval. He would be accompanied by a well-known santri, H. Iksan, a former Indonesian Vice-Consul in Jiddah and just appointed Wedana Coordinator of Adiwerna by Mr Besar. Before leaving they visited the Barisan Pelopor headquarters. Mardjono explained to those leaders present that he intended to go to AMRI Slawi with the Pangreh Praja declaration. If AMRI Slawi still insisted that all remaining officials should resign, he would guarantee this. However:

The leaders of the Barisan Pelopor that were present did not agree with their comrade with the KNI, remembering that it was a highly dangerous thing to want to do...and the risks were very high. The popular mood outside the city was extremely explosive... Marjono only got angry, and rejected out of hand our warnings, without us being able to offer any alternative to what he wanted to do.35

About 2 p.m. Mardjono and H. Iksan left the Barisan Pelopor headquarters on the City square in the yellow Ford Mercury that had previously belonged to the kenpeitai, but had been used by KNI leaders since the disarming of the Japanese. A Barisan Pelopor pemuda unit, sent out on foot soon after to provide some protection, was unable to find the car. About 3 o'clock the KNI office received a telephone call from Mardjono who had been stopped, and taken prisoner at the old Pagongan sugar mill, by demonstrators awaiting the arrival of groups from the south before joining in the attack on the city. His message was to avoid bloodshed at all costs. This was the last that was heard of Mardjono and H. Iksan. According to their chauffeur (who escaped)

35 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 97. Marsum, a younger pemuda leader, was apparently unaware of the Slawi-sponsored plan to take control of the city.
they were led from Pagongan southwards to AMRI Talang headquarters where they were both killed, while Kutil commandeered the yellow Ford. Soon after Mardjono left, two of the City's well-known orthodox kyais, K.H. Mochtar and K. Mochidin, also decided to go south in the hope of using their influence to prevent further violence but they did not return either.

Some time later five 'rather fierce and wild looking' pemudas arrived at the Barisan Pelopor headquarters, wearing slings of janur kuning fastened across their bodies, and carrying short swords, kris or, in one case, a Bulldog police revolver. They said they were from AMRI groups near Talang, and reported that a huge but orderly crowd had already reached the southern outskirts of the city. One group coming from the west via Dukuhturi kecamatan was heading for the TKR headquarters (see map). The second group coming up the main road from Talang divided into three parts. One group turned west and entered the City via Randugunting and Cikrik, to meet the first group at the TKR barracks. Another group looking for API leaders turned east via Jalan Punkguran, entering the kabupaten compound from the rear. The third group was coming straight along the main road and planning to enter the kabupaten office from the City square.

On hearing this Tegal perjuangan leaders called an urgent meeting of TKR, PKN, Barisan Pelopor and KNI leaders at the KNI office in Jalan Gilitugel, in a last minute attempt to work out a strategy, but no one could agree on what to do. The main crowd soon arrived.

A Barisan Pelopor leader recalls:

At the front was a becak...with Sakirman the head of AMRI Slawi. Beside him was flying a large red and white flag and around him there were walking thousands of people wearing all sorts of clothes and all sorts of weapons. The group in front was wearing slings of janur kuning, those at the back headbands of the same, and another group were wearing it as a belt.

36 Ibid, 97; Kadarisman, 'Catatan mergenai isi tulisan Sdr. Marsum Hr. berjudul "Ceritaku"', TS, 5 December 1975 (subsequently cited as 'Catatan').

37 K. Mochidin, Interview, 31.1.73; K.H. Mohamad Mochtar, Interview, 2.2.72.

38 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 100.
All were chanting fiercely [in Arabic] 'there is no god but Allah' (lā ilāha illā 'llāh) over and over again. Some were waving their drawn swords - it was frightening (serem, menakutkan)... it raised the hairs on the back of my neck, like seeing the mouth of a hungry tiger about to fall upon its victim.39

The group making for the TKR headquarters arrived in front of the former Hotel Stork to find that the TKR had barricaded themselves (perhaps symbolically) behind full sacks of rice.40 In the barracks also were many police who had fled with their families for safety, as well as the Camat of Kramat and his wife, who had been attacked some time before this and had sought the protection of the TKR. The battalion Commander Djoeweni Wimbohandoko recalls:

From the west the crowd was pressing forward [as] the 'lā ilāha' barisan approached....whatever happened we were going to defend ourselves... for the second time we fired warning shots 'tar ter tar ter' over the heads of the crowd which was coming closer and closer. We were [then] forced to give a warning with machine gun fire 'ter ter ter' above the crowd, but instead they shouted [in Javanese] 'the bullets can't hit us, there is nothing to worry about [ora tembus ora apa-apa] and 'ora pasrah peluru' meaning that they thought they were invulnerable to bullets. Because there had been no victims (as we fired above their heads) they assumed they were invulnerable, that with the [Muslim] prayer chant bullets could not perforate their bodies.41

Afraid that bloodshed would be inevitable with the continuing approach of the crowd, the TKR now fired at ground level. Several leaders fell and were dragged behind the barricade, and their wounds were treated. After more machine gun fire into the air, the crowd dispersed, apparently realising that some had been hurt.

Meanwhile, the group which had turned east had jumped the bamboo fence at the back of the kabupaten compound itself where they met the group coming in via the City square (see map). Finding the Bupati

39 Ibid.
40 Tegal TKR battalion commander, Transcript, IV/30, 17.4.75.
41 Ibid, IV/31, 17.4.75.
Soenarjio had left (he had gone to the KNI's office at 8 a.m. that morning and had not returned) the people began turning the contents of the residence upside down. Some of the Bupati's ceremonial clothes were thrown about, but nothing else was damaged or taken. The Bupati's wife and her mother, Raden Kardinah (Kartini's sister), were taken dressed in sacking as the priyayis elsewhere had been. Then with a servant and Kardinah's grand-daughter, they were paraded around the town, ending ironically at the hospital which Kardinah had founded some years before and which still bears her name today. From there they were taken by truck to Talang, and later to the Adiwerna Wedana's house, where they were kept prisoner for a week.  

As the group which had entered the kabupaten compound began to drift out onto the City square, others headed for the homes of at least three priyayi officials: M. Singgih, the assistant Public Prosecutor; Abdul Manaf, a cousin of Singgih, and Deputy Camat of Kramat, and R.M. Abu Bakar, a local 'bush lawyer' (pokrol bambu). The latter, a romusha raiser, was accused of keeping half the romushas' allowance for himself, while followers of K.H. Abu Sudjai from Pacul had an old score to settle with Singgih. Together with Abu Bakar's son, Chamzah, a leader of Tegal City Barisan Pelopor, who tried to stop the demonstrators from entering his father's house, the officials were taken south to Talang and killed. The Mayor's house was also attacked by another group, but Soengeb had already taken refuge voluntarily in the local jail, along with the Patih and Wedana of Tegal, and others. This was the only place where the KNI could attempt to guarantee the safety of the City's beleaguered priyayi officials. 

The various groups which had separated on entering Tegal now began to converge on the City square. There were more demands for the API leaders, several of whom were said to be hiding in the TKR barracks:

42 Mrs Soenarjio Reksonegoro, Interview, 25.9.71.

43 According to a KNI leader, Singgih was accused of (unsuccessfully) demanding favours from Abu Sudja'i's wife before letting her into the jail to see her husband during the Japanese occupation.
The demonstrators were yelling and waving their swords and other weapons in the air, shouting for Junus, Annas, Mawardi, Pitoyo, Mansur and Parwoto [API leaders] to be brought before them, demanding to know where the NICA base was, and asking that several Pangreh Praja be tried - including the Bupati of Tegal, Soenarjio, and Mr Besar.

Urgent discussions now took place between Tegal City KNI leaders and the demonstrators. Finally, it was agreed to send a two-man KNI delegation to TKR headquarters, with the task of asking the army commander for a declaration that the TKR was not the Resident's Security Force (Tentara Keamanan Resident). Secondly, that the TKR would agree to help the demonstrators seek out the 'NICA agents' remaining in the City. The commander readily gave the required declaration which was taken back to the square and read out to the crowd. A Barisan Pelopor leader then told the people that 'the regional government of the kabupaten of Tegal was now in the hands of the people'. While all this had been going on, the Barisan Pelopor had produced large kerosene tins of coffee and tea together with several loads of rice packets prepared throughout the afternoon by women in local kampungs near the square. According to one estimate, about 5,000 people received some kind of refreshment that afternoon.

The more subdued atmosphere in the square was soon shattered however by the arrival of a certain Mohamad Saleh, a leader from Dukuhturi kecamatan. Not very highly regarded by the City's perjuangan, Mohamad Saleh was considered as 'an agitator with leadership ambitions' ambitious for material wealth. As well as defending his brother R.M. Abu Bakar, who had been kidnapped earlier and taken south, he began to make renewed accusations against the TKR which he said repeatedly

44 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 103.
45 Marsum claims he added this. Ibid, 106.
46 The Indonesian phrase is 'penghasut yang ingin dipandang sebagai pemimpin'. Ibid, 105.
'was part of the NICA group'. The demonstrators, after having appeared to accept the TKR Commander's declaration, were on their feet in an uproar, and were soon heading again for the TKR barracks. As santri KNI leaders left to return to the office because magrib (the time of the sunset prayers) was approaching, shots could be heard - it was the TKR once more firing into the air over the heads of the demonstrators. This continued well into the evening, as the army held back the attackers long enough to evacuate the battalion to Regiment headquarters in Pekalongan.

The masses marching on the City of Tegal on 4 November saw the final removal from office of the old order in the city. All the City's top Pangreh Praja - the Mayor, the Patih and the Wedana - went into hiding in the local jail on the advice of the local KNI leaders. Asked by these officials for protection, the KNI leaders replied that the jail was the only place where their safety could be guaranteed. The Bupati meanwhile made a dramatic escape with the API leader Mansur the following evening, dressed as the engine driver of a train. The strong Islamic influence in popular North Coast culture was reflected in the Arabic chanting, which expressed the Islamic Holy War (jihad) ideology. The lenggaong element was seen in the clothes many of the demonstrators were wearing, short black baggy pants, wide sleeved black shirt and black headscarf, while many others were wearing slings of janur kuning.

The Search for a Consensus

The week following 4 November saw the emergence of a new political order in Tegal. By the end of the second week of November


48 Kadarisman, 'Catatan'; API leader, Interview, 10.12.72.

49 As Anderson notes, black clothes are traditionally worn by lenggaong-types all over Java but particularly in Banten, Ponorogo and Madura. The Tiga Daerah is another area where '...there is a particular fondness for this forbidding colour'. Pemuda Revolution, 274, fn.143.
the kabupaten had moved substantially to the left, with real power now in the hands of a nine-man presidium or Working Committee. The role of K. Midjaja in setting up these Working Committees will be discussed in the next chapter. In what follows we will describe other attempts to consolidate a new regime, leaving the discussion of the role of the underground PKI to Chapter Nine.

The part played by Sajuti Melik in Pekalongan Residency politics had begun early in October, when he had come from Semarang as a government emissary after the kenpeitai clash, together with Subandrio and Hugeng. Later he returned to the Residency capital, as representative of both the Governor of Central Java, Wongsonegoro, and the President.\(^5^0\) It was in this latter role that Sajuti Melik made contact with local perjuangan leaders. In Pekalongan he gave some lectures on the meaning of Independence, during which he made reference to corruption in the City Hall, and the need to elect a new Mayor of Pekalongan. This would have raised doubts in the minds of Pekalongan's Pangreh Praja, who anyway had reservations about one of his tasks in Pekalongan. As a representative of the Governor, this was to ratify the appointment of new 'revolutionary' officials in the Tiga Daerah. The Pangreh Praja attitude is summed up by Soedjono, by then Residency secretary:

> I asked Sajuti Melik what his job was, was he sent by Wongsonegoro or from Bung Karno, because people thought that he was sent direct from the central government. He said that he had the power to ratify the appointment of local officials but he didn't have a letter from anyone.\(^5^2\)

\(^5^0\) Sajuti Melik, Interview, 30.10.71. The father of Hugeng (Chief of Indonesia's police early in the New Order) was S. Karioatmodjo, Pekalongan's Public Prosecutor and head of the local Justice Department. Hugeng's girl friend Meri (whom he later married), was the daughter of Dr Sumakno, a former Residency doctor, and Mr Besar's brother. Sajuti Melik was the personal secretary of President Sukarno in this period. For his important role in Republic politics at the national level see Anderson, Java, passim. Subandrio was a future foreign minister.

\(^5^1\) According to one account the Japanese-appointed Mayor, Soempeno, resigned but was later rechosen. While there was some support for Melik as Mayor, he declined, according to some because he wanted the job of Resident. Pekalongan jailor, Interview, 15.10.76.

\(^5^2\) Soedjono, Transcript, VII/5, 30.7.73.
While Sajuti's relationship with Mr Besar was cordial, the latter recalls:

He [Sajuti] used to come to my house, to talk about things. He wanted me to go around everywhere each day in a big car with a big flag on it, but I told him that the village pemudas wouldn't take any notice, so what was the use of that?53

Sajuti himself recalls that he canvassed the possibility of his becoming Resident to replace the beleaguered Mr Besar, but that because he was not a member of the Pangreh Praja this suggestion was received without enthusiasm by them.54 Older moderate nationalists in Pekalongan's KNI also 'politely rejected' Melik's offer 'because he did not have much authority in Pekalongan'.55

Sajuti Melik's main role was helping to establish a true republican government to replace the old order in the Tiga Daerah. His first informal visit to Tegal was on the initiative of Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI-Baru leader, who took him as a 'friend from Digul' to meet Soebagio's friend Soesmono, the Tegal kabupaten KNI Vice-Chairman. At the meeting at the KNI office, lasting nearly four hours, Soesmono answered a series of detailed questions from Melik about the social upheaval which had occurred: 'Eventually Sajuti decided to accept the demands of the people to replace all or most of Pangreh Praja throughout the entire kabupaten and the Municipality'.56 Melik proposed organising a conference which he would attend as the Governor's representative to formalise 'the people's demands' in a resolution, which would then be presented to the Pangreh Praja. Melik would remain in Pekalongan for three days to await an answer from the Tegal perjuangan.

That night Soesmono met with K. Midjaja, and the AMRI Slawi leaders Sakirman and Soewignjo, who happened to be at the Barisan

53 Mr Besar, Transcript, IV/16, 24.7.73.
54 Interview, 30.10.71.
55 Pekalongan KNI pemuda leader, Interview, 24.3.73.
56 Soesmono, Answers, 9. The conflict between the underground PKI and Tan Malaka, and how it affected relations with Sajuti Melik, is discussed in Chapter Nine.
Pelopor headquarters in Tegal, to discuss Sajuti Melik's proposals:

K. Midjaja said in a rather angry voice that he didn't like Sajuti Melik interfering in this problem, because he belonged to Tan Malaka's group. He went on to say that if Sajuti Melik was a genuine communist [komunis sejati] events in the Tiga Daerah would attract his sympathy and he would try to contact his revolutionary comrades in Slawi. But this was not the case; he preferred to come as a big shot [pembesar] acting for the Governor to pacify the revolution which was seething here. Indeed he had already betrayed the communist struggle in Central Java during the Dutch colonial period. Therefore he was not a friend but a foe, and from that day he was not allowed to cross the Pemalang-Pekalongan kabupaten boundary.57

In view of this reply passed on by telephone to Pekalongan the following day Soesmono suggested Sajuti should leave the Residency. The latter expressed surprise saying that the Tegal revolutionaries were lucky that he, as a 'government person', was willing to help them achieve what they were trying to do without the use of force.

Sajuti then apparently took Soesmono's advice and left the Residency, at least for a while. However, he was back in Tegal some time later, on the same train which took President Sukarno to Jakarta from the Allied-Republican conference in Magelang, on 3 November.

In Tegal he met Colonel K.H. Iskandar Idris, Commander of the Pekalongan TKR 17 Regiment, who was in Tegal en route to a Residency Muhammadiah conference, to be held at Pagongan just south of the City. While visiting the area, Iskandar Idris decided he would try and meet Kutil personally. Armed with a sword and a pistol, Iskandar Idris set off by car for Talang accompanied by Sajuti and Kyai Bisri, a Muslim leader from Tegal. On their way south, probably past Talang, the car was stopped, the three occupants were taken out, blindfolded and disarmed. Then they were taken, not to Kutil, but to the former Ujungrusi BKR office, which was the house of one of the local Pemuda Istimewa leaders. Their hands were tied behind their backs, in the belief that they were Pangreh Praya, caught trying to escape from Tegal. However, the three leaders did not know of AMRI Slawi orders.

57 Ibid.
that any cars travelling south from Tegal on that morning were to be stopped, and the occupants, no matter who they claimed to be, taken prisoner. Whether the real identity of the prisoners was revealed, or perhaps because they did not know what to do with them, local Ujungrusi leaders decided to take the prisoners to AMRI Slawi. There Sajuti Melik was immediately recognised by Soewignjo, an old friend from Digul.58

Also in custody in Slawi was another prisoner, Haji Mawardi, the Wedana of Adiwerna, captured while returning from the Pagongan Muhammadiah conference. Later they were joined by the two Tegal City Muslim leaders, K.H. Mochtar and K. Moechidin, who had left Tegal later on 4 November and had not been heard of again by the City's perjuangan leaders. What had happened was that on their arrival in Talang, the two kyais could find no one to take them to Kutil until they met a local Muslim leader. Kutil's first demand was to see their mandate.59 They did not have one. This meant their story that all the remaining Pangreh Praja in Tegal had agreed to resign if the attack on the city was called off, made no impression on Kutil. When they asked if they could return to Tegal, the two kyais were promptly captured and locked in an unused lavatory overnight:

It was decided at a general meeting that we were to be killed, and the next morning we were dragged out. 'What is our mistake?' we asked. Then we were told to get into a truck and taken south. When we approached the 'Red Bridge' - at a place called Singkil the truck began to slow down it seemed there was a difference of opinion amongst the pemudas. Half were shouting 'go on' [terus], the others shouted 'get off [turun...terus...turun...terus]... it was lucky that the driver followed the first order. We did not know at the time but Singkil had

58 Sajuti Melik says that he was taken to Slawi after local leaders in Adiwerna had 'recognised' his name. Interview, 30.10.71. Soewignjo's version is that hearing who had been arrested, he sent a group of AMRI pemudas to Ujungrusi to free them, and bring them to Slawi. See also an interview, published as 'Penyelamat jiwa Sajuti Melik', Berita Buana, 28.4.77.

59 If one wished to travel anywhere during this period, letters of identification or permits to travel, were required from local badan perjuangan in order to avoid suspicion or capture.
been the place where R.M. Abu Bakar and M. Singgih had been killed the day before.60

Sajuti Melik now entered into urgent discussions on the revolutionary situation in Tegal. This mainly concerned the future of the TKR in the Tiga Daerah, and in Pekalongan. It was Melik's view that Mr Besar's position was now completely untenable. 61 The pro-NICA allegations against Mr Besar had intensified for two reasons. Firstly, there was his order to intern all Eurasians and safeguard their property. Secondly, it was said that he had 'welcomed the British' to Pekalongan. What had happened in fact was this: an English major accompanied by a Dutch officer had arrived in Pekalongan on 27 October with a small detachment of about 15 Indian troops in one truck, to observe the conditions of detention of Dutch and Eurasian POWs.62 The group had met the Resident, the TKR commander Iskandar Idris and Residency officials, then returned to Semarang apparently satisfied.63

On the question of the army, AMRI Slawi and Melik agreed that antagonism was so strong against the TKR that it should withdraw from the Tiga Daerah. Sajuti Melik then rang the TKR High Command headquarters in Yogya to convey his view that the TKR be withdrawn and Mr Besar removed from office. This spelled the end of Mr Besar's turbulent 2 1/2 months as Republican Resident. He recalls:

Apparently General Urip's chief of Intelligence, Dr Sutjipto, sent a telegram to Wongsongoro ordering my detention, and this telegram was sent on to the Pekalongan TKR to arrest me.64 The head of the military police, Soedharmo, came and told me about it and said that he just could not carry out the order. At 11 o'clock that night [5 November]65

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60 Kyai Moechidin, Interview, 31.1.73.
61 Melik used the word 'tainted' (berbau), that is by the rumours and accusations that he was pro-NICA. Interview, 30.10.71.
62 Kedaulatan Rakyat, 1 November 1945.
63 TKR acting Commander Wadyono, Interview, 20.11.74.
64 According to Anderson, Dr Sutjipto was not appointed to this position until May 1946 (Java, 372, fn.7).
65 Bijlage NEFIS Periodiek No.2, 4 March 1946 (Proc.Gen.).
I left Pekalongan with my wife and four children. I wanted to meet the Governor and talk about this.  

The next day, 6 November, R.M. Soeprapto, a high official in the Semarang Governor's office, arrived in Pekalongan, with a letter of appointment as the new Acting Resident. He found the top echelon of the Pangreh Praja in the kabupaten capitals of the Tiga Daerah had either disappeared (in Brebes), or taken refuge voluntarily in the local jail as the only safe place (in Tegal), or had been put there by local perjuangan leaders for the same reasons (in Pemalang). The new Acting Resident also found that the three TKR battalions stationed in the Tiga Daerah had withdrawn to Pekalongan on orders from Yogya while the Regiment Commander and Sajuti Melik, whom Soeprapto was most anxious to meet, had last been seen heading south from Tegal on the morning before the city was attacked. There were grave fears in Pekalongan for their safety.

Having received conflicting reports and rumours about events in the Tiga Daerah, Soeprapto upon his arrival in the Residency capital decided to go on immediately to Tegal, to see for himself what the situation was. On his arrival he learned further that some time before, 'the police had vanished completely' in Tegal and Brebes and had been re-formed with the help of two officials sent by request from Semarang, while in Pemalang the new Bupati had re-formed the police himself. The only security forces, Soeprapto noted, were under the control of the local revolutionary leaders, not of Pekalongan.

Soeprapto was also told that Abu Sudja'i had been chosen as the new Bupati of Tegal. This had occurred at a marathon six-hour meeting in the kabupaten pendopo on the same day, with the majority of those attending being from local kecamatan AMRI branches south of the

66 Mr Besar, Transcript, 1/2, 24.7.73. In Semarang Mr Besar was told by the Governor that he had no choice but to carry out the orders of the Yogyakarta military, so Besar was taken there, and put under house arrest for several months. Ibid.

City or kecamatan KNI leaders. Kutil was present as well as leaders from Ujungrusi, now renamed Ujung Baru (New Ujung). According to one Barisan Pelopor account, the redoubtable Sajuti Melik appeared, having been escorted back to Tegal from Slawi, explaining his presence as the Governor's representative 'to try and fill the vacant positions of bupati, mayor and other positions'. There had been several candidates for bupati including Sakirman, the AMRI Slawi leader, while the names of Kadarisman and Soesmono, both from the Tegal KNI group, had also been mentioned. It was AMRI Talang - Kutil's group - that put forward the name of K.H. Abu Sudja'i, a modernist Muslim leader from the village of Pacul, about six kilometers south-east of the city.

Abu Sudja'i was well known to the santri AMRI local leaders from Dukuhturi, Talang, Lebaksiu, Slawi, Ujungrusi, Adiwerna and Pangkah. In these areas there had been strong initial Muslim resistance, on theological grounds, to the colonial government's practice of taking blood from bodies to determine the cause of death as part of the plague eradication program. This opposition had become politicised by the PSII which backed local protest against the practice. Abu Sudja'i, a prominent PSII leader who led the movement in these kecamatan, had been jailed in 1937 for refusing to allow a local health worker to take a blood sample. Abu Sudja'i came from a family with a long tradition of opposition to the Dutch. As we saw in Chapter One his grandfather, Gentoloto Naya Genggong, was the most famous lenggaong in this area of the North Coast during the late nineteenth century. Because Abu Sudja'i's father forbade him 'to sit in a desk in a Dutch school', he had most of his education in pesantrens in Pekalongan, Cirebon, Solo, Jombang and Majalengka. Returning to Pacul in 1930 he founded an Islamic Union, and opened a Muslim private school, one of the first in the district.

68 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 113.

69 Interview, 20.11.75. Abu Sudja'i's influence was weaker in the kecamatan of Jatinegara, Warureja, Kramat, Tarub and Summurpanggang that had not been part of the plague eradication program.

70 The word gento also means lenggaong in Tegal. Once Abu Sudja'i's father was asked why the family had never written anything down about their famous ancestor. The reply was that they were too afraid the Dutch would find out about his activities. Ibid.
Pacul, with its earlier active Sarekat Islam branch, had been successful, where other villages were not, in standing up to the nearby Pagongan sugar factory on such questions as long-term alienation of land by lease to foreigners (erfpacht), and on the question of the distribution of irrigation water between the sugar mill and the village sawahs. Pacul was also well known in its stubborn refusal to accept low rents from the mill. Abu Sudja'i and the PSII were deeply involved in these campaigns as well as trying to reduce the oppressive village corvée obligations. Pacul as a result had a reputation for opposition. Because it was known for its lenggaongs, and as 'a place of disturbances' (tempat onar-onaran) one never made fun of Pacul people to their face, and other villagers were reluctant to have Pacul people stay overnight. In addition to this opposition to blood samples, Abu Sudja'i had been imprisoned for breaking the salt monopoly in 1932, in 1939 for speaking out against the government, and by the Japanese for endorsing the Singaparna revolt at a public meeting. Released from jail early in October 1945, a sick man barely able to walk from malnutrition, he was appointed bupati only 30 days later.

After Abu Sudja'i had been loudly acclaimed by the AMRI delegates as the new Bupati, the Tegal Barisan Pelopor put forward the KNI Chairman Ki Tjitrasatmaka as candidate for Patih, while a member of the former kabupaten staff was chosen as the new kabupaten Secretary to provide some administrative skills for the inexperienced new leaders. On his arrival in Tegal, the new Acting Resident, Soeprapto, immediately ratified the new appointments. He accepted the AMRI Slawi demand that Tegal Municipality be abolished on the grounds that this had been an artificial and expensive creation of the Dutch government, simply because of the large number of Europeans living in pre-war Tegal.

On 8 November Soeprapto returned to Tegal to install the new officials formally, while Abu Sudja'i, who had not been present at the meeting which chose him, was met in his village of Pacul by AMRI

71 The phrase is 'jangan bikin gluwehan dengan orang Pacul'. Ibid.
Talang members and taken to the kabupaten office. Later he was taken to the City square, where a large crowd had gathered to see the new Bupati. Here is Susmono’s impression:

After opening the meeting, and announcing the purpose of calling it, I asked Kyai Haji Abu Suja'i to come up onto the platform. After he stepped up, the atmosphere became very quiet. People were astonished to see such a tall good-looking person simply dressed in long trousers, a white shirt, and wearing a black cap [pici]. He spoke calmly but clearly and fluently, occasionally using a Dutch word which he pronounced correctly and quoting verses from the Koran. Although the people of Tegal knew his name, this meeting was the first time they had seen him. The Muslim group in the city seemed obviously satisfied.

Probably the Western-educated KNI leaders had expected to see a typical 'uneducated' rural kyai in his traditional dress and were surprised at the new Bupati's sophisticated urbanity. The following day, the Acting Resident went to Brebes, to supervise the election there of a Bupati of the 'People's Choice'. We now turn to what had been happening in Tegal's western neighbour.

Brebes

In Chapter Four we saw doubts about the Proclamation on the part of the Brebes Pangreh Praja, led by Sarimin, who had refused to allow the Indonesian flag to be flown in front of the kabupaten until the end of September, and announced that the Allies would shortly be reoccupying Java. We saw how this had led the Bupati into several open clashes, in particular with the Brebes perjuangan leader Kartohargo. Even after the Bupati had finally accepted Indonesian Independence the scepticism of the 'MOSVIA group' as the Brebes pemuda Sugeng Hargono called the Pangreh Praja, continued. Sugeng recalls the words of the Patih of Brebes during a trip to inaugurate the Tanjung KNI, that 'at the longest, the Indonesian Proclamation will last for

72 Lurah of Kajen, Interview, 9.2.73.
73 Soesmono, Answers, 7.
Pangreh Praja opposition to the revolutionary movement continued in other ways. Besides the 'official' BKR/TKR which was set up in September in Brebes, Raden Sudirman, the Wedana of Brebes, was believed to have formed a 'clandestine BKR' (BKR gelap), ostensibly to protect the Pangreh Praja. Kartohargo, the senior perjuangan leader, recalls:

The 'clandestine BKR' consisted of people who were not popular with the people because of their behaviour - the majority were thieves [bajingan]. These people because they felt they were close to the Pangreh Praja acted in an arbitrary way [berlaku sewenang-wenang].

Alongside the Brebes AMRI led by Kartohargo, a group including several lenggaong-types led by a certain Muchsan, formed its own AMRI-I (Angkatan Pemuda Republic Indonesia-Islam: Islamic Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia). This group was in conflict with both the Brebes BKR/TKR and AMRI. Its leader claimed his AMRI-I was a branch of AMRI Slawi, and took control of a local rice mill. There was also a continuing conflict between AMRI-I with its headquarters in the Muslim quarter (kauman), and the official BKR located at the opposite end of the town in Brebes Lor, where Brebes AMRI headquarters was also located. The official BKR/TKR was considered by both AMRI-I and the Muslim quarter as 'a bunch of playboys' who were not devoutly Muslim. This polarisation between opposite ends of the town partly reflected in the physical geography of Brebes itself, spread out along the main North Coast road and railway. Typical in this respect was the separateness of both the Muslim quarter and the 'unruly' kampung of Pasarbatang to the north of the railway, where well-known lenggaongs, pickpockets and various so-called 'trouble makers' lived.

74 Interview, 16.12.72.
75 Sudirman recalls in his diary that during the 'examination' by perjuangan leaders after his kidnapping, he was asked if he had formed a Barisan Gobed, literally 'Knife Brigade', referring to the clandestine BKR. Diary entry.
The social upheaval in Brebes was sparked off in Pasarbatang in what became known as 'the affair of the burnt pigsties'. The large Chinese population kept their pigs near this kampung on the edge of the town. At 10 a.m. one morning the pigsties were all burnt to the ground, together with the pigs. The complaint was that the pigs regularly got out (or were let out) of their sties and spoiled neighbouring crops and house gardens. Chinese shops were then looted. It was a typical case of starting a period of violence by attacking the Chinese. Soon after AMRI-I leaders, spurred on by Bung Tomo's anti-NICA radio broadcasts, went to the Jatibarang sugar mill. They were involved in the killings of Eurasians there, and subsequently at the Banjaratma mill. As we have seen in Chapter Six the group also managed to obtain the keys to the cells in the local jail, where some Eurasians had been placed for safety, and they were taken away and killed at Pasarbatang.

The following day, in response to the deteriorating social situation, the Patih of Brebes arrived at the KNI office with a letter from the Bupati. The letter said that the Brebes Pangreh Praja, from the Bupati down, were prepared to resign 'if the people didn't like them'. The Bupati requested that someone on the KNI make a public announcement, and explain it at a meeting of the 'leaders of the people'. Coincidentally with the arrival of the Bupati's letter, an AMRI-I leader arrived at the KNI office to demand 'payment for the killing of the Dutch' from the KNI Chairman Binadji. It was Kartohargo's job, as head of the KNI's information section, to call a meeting of the Brebes KNI for 2 p.m., to explain the Pangreh Praja offer.

The meeting of the Brebes KNI was a turbulent one, being continually disrupted by Muchsan. After explaining the Pangreh Praja offer of resignation, Kartohargo went on and said 'while this is a time of revolution, don't take matters into your own hands. If you want an official to be changed, pass this on to a member of the KNI'. Muchsan tried unsuccessfully to disrupt the meeting, saying that he,

77 Santri leader of Pasarbatang (K.H. Achmad), Interview, 3.12.75.
not Kartohargo, had authority in Brebes. He then left, returned with one of his followers and angrily drew a sword, but was quickly overpowered. Later the police sent a guard to Kartohargo's house and detained Muchsan for questioning about the KNI meeting.

The Wedana of Brebes now stepped in to protect Muchsan, for several reasons. The AMRI-I leader had been a prominent figure in the Wedana's 'lifeguard'. Muchsan wielded considerable authority amongst the population of Pasarbatang kampung, and as AMRI-I leader could muster considerable support for the Wedana, who felt the position of the officials was becoming increasingly isolated from the perjuangan. As well as the general feeling against the Pangreh Praja, the Wedana had been personally discredited by two incidents. Firstly, it was well known that he had seduced the virgin daughter of a prominent haji after a Fujinkai (Women's Association) meeting in the kawedanan. Then he borrowed the piano from the local girls' school for his daughter. This was another arbitrary action during the Japanese occupation for which retribution came after the Proclamation. After AMRI had received a complaint that the Wedana was refusing to return the piano, two AMRI leaders had arrived with a bullock cart at the kawedanan residence, removed the piano and returned it to the school.

In defending Muchsan, Sudirman was aware of the serious threat the former's detention was having on the town's security. The night of the AMRI-I leader's arrest the Wedana reported to the KNI leader Kartohargo that 'the town was threatened' as Muchsan's son, a member of the BKR, was going to run amuck with his friends if his father were not released. The Wedana asked Kartohargo to use his influence to get the AMRI-I leader released, and went himself

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79 Ibid.

80 AMRI/PKN leader, Interview, 2.12.75. Sudirman's version is that he had taken the piano to the kawedanan residence 'so it could be used by everyone'. He claims to have confronted single-handed a demonstration 'of about 200 people' who arrived at the kawedanan office to take back the piano but, after hearing his explanation, had disbanded. 'Peristiwa Tiga Daerah Di Daerah karesidenan Pekalongan, Jawa Tengah, Tahun 1946', TS, dated 18 October 1972, (subsequently cited as 'Peristiwa'). This written account received unfavourable reactions, when it was read (in 1972), from two other former Pangreh Praja, the Wedana of Pekalongan (Soeprapto) and the Pekalongan TKR acting Commander (Wadyono).
with the Patih to the kabupaten Police Chief with the same request. However, the police who had been conferring about the whole question of the AMRI-I group decided to arrest the others as well. This included Supeno, the leader of the Eurasian massacres in Jatibarang, who had subsequently appointed himself Camat. Muchsan was held in jail for some days until he escaped during the attack on the Brebes police by groups from Ujungrusi and Pangkah. It was the newly formed PKN (the National Security Guard), formed to replace the police in the second week of November, which finally recaptured Muchsan and several of his followers and dombreng-ed them to the PKN barracks headquarters. There they were smeared with horse dung and sent off to the Tegal jail.

The Bupati's offer that the Brebes Pangreh Praja would resign had come too late. Another priyayi official, Maksum, a former Public Prosecutor who had joined the revolutionaries, had contacted friends in the Tegal KNI group suggesting that the only solution to the continuing conflict was to remove the officials from the town altogether.

On the evening of 18 October, two cars left Tegal. Surjono Darusman and one other member of the KNI group in one car were to kidnap Sarimin, while the second car was to pick up the Wedana of Brebes, the Patih and his brother, the Wedana of Tanjung. These operations went without a hitch. The Wedana of Brebes, writing some 27 years later remembers (from a diary kept at the time):

Two pemudas got out of a car and met me in the pendopo and said: 'Tuan Wedana is asked to come to Tegal to attend a meeting of all the representatives of the people from Tegal and Brebes'. With polite words [they continued] 'when the meeting is over, we will accompany Tuan Wedana home'. Already then I had the feeling that something no good was going to happen to me, but thought about it for a while, and decided to go with them. Then I went and got dressed formally with a coat and tie... I thought that I could refuse the pemudas' request and escape to the TKR guard headquarters but realised this

81 This incident has been described in Chapter Six.
82 AMRI/PKN leader, Interview, 2.12.75.
would start a dispute between the pemudas and the TKR....

Having thought that he could rely on the protection of the local TKR, the Wedana was surprised to find himself taken first to the Tegal TKR headquarters, where he was handed over to (later General) Parwoto, who was also an API leader. This was partly explained by family ties, as Parwoto was a brother of the Brebes pemuda leader, Sugeng Hargono. From there the Wedana of Brebes was taken straight to the API headquarters in the Trubels dairy, ushered into a room and told to 'wait for the meeting'. When the door was locked behind him the increasingly suspicious Wedana realised finally that he had been captured. After spending two nights at Pagongan, on 21 October he was taken blindfolded to another API headquarters in the Tegal kampung of Pangkuran and, two days later, 25 kilometers south to Durensawit to the estate of the Eurasian Reisboom, who had been killed several days earlier. There the Wedana and, unbeknown to him, the other Brebes Pangreh Praja as well, were put in a small room with a sleeping mat and a chamber pot. On 29 October, a group of Tegal Barisan Pelopor leaders conducted a kind of examination of the 'prisoners'. These were taken out of their rooms blindfolded, one by one. Then they faced a kind of tribunal which asked such questions as 'Do you still want to work?' and 'Are you prepared to get rid of your feudal ways?' For Sarimin the tribunal was a reminder of the examination board of the Administration School.

We asked the Bupati about his attitude towards Independence and whether he would cooperate. The pemuda guards wearing 'ku klux klan' masks were noisily sharpening their swords to scare the prisoners.

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83 Wedana of Brebes, 'Peristiwa', 2.
84 Ibid., 3.
85 Andi Penjamin, Interview, 28.8.71. Penjamin, from Sulawesi, was later to found a branch of KRIS (Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi, Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi) in Tegal.
On 10 November, the Pangreh Praja prisoners were released for the first time without blindfolds and taken back to Tegal, where they were placed in the City jail. There they met the Patih and the Wedana of Tegal, the kabupaten Secretary, and two other officials, who had gone voluntarily to the jail on the advice of the KNI leaders on 4 November as the only remaining safe place in the city. Later the Pekalongan Residency capital and the army were to accuse the revolutionaries of 'imprisoning' these officials, possibly because they were together with the kidnapped Brebes Pangreh Praja. However, as a Barisan Pelopor leader later commented:

> These officials were in jail not as detainees [tahanan] or as prisoners [tawanan] or as criminals [hukuman] nor had they been put there for safe keeping [titipan] by any pemuda group. They were staying in a room there because they did not feel safe anywhere else. At that time the jail was quite literally the only safe place to be.86

The jail turned out to be a more tolerable place than expected. To pass away the time Sarimin and Sudirman re-wrote the famous song 'River Solo' (Bengawan Solo) which had become popular throughout Indonesia under the Japanese. The new Pangreh Praja version reflected on what these officials felt like to be in prison for the first time, away from

86 Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 86.
family and friends. No one expected to be working again in a job 'with nice status' (kedudukan yang enak). The Patih of Brebes decided he would ask his wife to open a roadside stall and he would become a barber and have a shop next to it. These expectations were not fulfilled. The Patih of Brebes ended his career as Bupati of Grobogan, his brother the Wedana of Tanjung died as Bupati of Brebes, Sarimin became a Governor of the Lesser Sundas, and Sudirman himself ended up as acting Mayor of Magelang.

THE revolusi sosial that swept from the south and engulfed the three kabupaten capitals apart from leaving the entire Tiga Daerah without

87 The *Pangreh Praja* version of *Bengawan Solo*:

I. Inside jail this is how it feels,
   All our life, only now we feel it,
   Era of Great Change, however things are normally,
   We Sons of the State now feel it also.

   Refrain: According to the Joyoboyo prophecy,
   We will have to suffer,
   Blessed by the Almighty,
   We have been saved from disaster.
   We carry it out with a willing heart,
   This action is a call of *Ibu Pertiwi* [the Motherland].

II. In our hearts always remembering,
   The fate of our women, children and true family,
   Us alone,
   Foresaken by those friends and relatives.

   Refrain: But we always believe,
   That the Almighty,
   Will not forget his servants,
   Who are suffering.
   Certain are we that God will look after
   Our much loved women, children and family.

88 Sudirman, 'Peristiwa', 5. These reappointments were indicative of what happened to the Pekalongan Residency *Pangreh Praja* thrown out during the revolusi sosial period. All were reappointed to posts either in the civil service, the police, or the army in other parts of Java.
an administrative apparatus, effectively sealed off the area from the Residency capital and from elsewhere in Java. After 19 October (the day of the Pemalang upheaval) communications between the Tiga Daerah and the Residency capital were cut off. There was no mail from outside the Tiga Daerah, although post offices remained open, and no one would travel the roads for fear of the unrest in the rural areas. From that day no official instructions or information arrived from the central government. Newspapers were few and seldom read, and one perjuangan leader - Kartohargo of Brebes - complained that he never even had time to listen to the radio. Moreover, there were no linkages with the central government, at least until November when political parties began to be formed. The KNI group had links with Supeno, but even he seems to have had little contact with his Tegal friends after their initial visit to Jakarta to see him at the time of the Proclamation. In short, the only effective way of communicating with the centre at this time seemed to be to go in person to Jakarta. This Kartohargo did some time towards the end of October because the KNI was no longer an effective body to deal with the social unrest. He left Brebes with Maksum to visit the Ministry of Social Affairs, which they felt could give some explanation on 'how to stop the chaos in Brebes'. There they were told to go to the Home Affairs Ministry, where Mr Kosasih advised them that the Brebes situation could only be solved by the local KNI, 'because the centre was not yet able to manage the [regional] situation'. After meeting Ministry Information officials who asked about the situation in Brebes the local leaders were then given a letter and told to see the Governor of Central Java in the provincial capital of Semarang. In the Semarang Governor's office Kartohargo was told to wait for instructions 'from above'. As soon as the situation in Ambarawa - where Republican forces were fighting the British troops - was resolved, 'Brebes would receive its turn for attention' it was explained. Kartohargo returned to Brebes ready, as a result of his visits, to maintain the KNI's role while waiting for instructions, and would try to maintain contact with the central government.

90 Ibid, Question 5, 14.1.47.
One answer to the Brebes leader would have been a 'Political Announcement' from the Jakarta government, if he had known about it. Dated 27 October and signed by Sukarno/Hatta, it warned against 'the people acting by themselves', which would result in anarchy, and perhaps the collapse of the Republic. The 'sentence' (hukuman) for officials and authorities who had done wrong was only to deprive them of their jobs. These demands should be made 'via the Government or with the mediation of the National Committee as the temporary representative of the people'. 91 The problem in the Tiga Daerah was that the government apparatus was discredited and local KNIs were powerless in October to play the role envisaged for them by the centre. The reasons for this throughout the Tiga Daerah varied; in Pemalang, because the KNI was stacked with discredited Pangreh Praja, elsewhere because although popularly chosen (in Tegal) or consisting of perjuangan leaders (in Brebes), they had no security force effective outside the urban area. All the Tegal KNI leaders would do prior to 4 November was to direct Pangreh Praja to the local jail as the only place where their safety could be guaranteed.

However, there were other reasons why the central government could not make its tenuous authority felt in the Tiga Daerah. In the eyes of the more radical Tegal and Pemalang leaders Jakarta was suspect for backing (after some hesitation) the Residency priyayi-dominated KNI in its determination to have the now discredited Mr Besar's appointment as Resident ratified. Communication with higher governmental levels was not improved when Sajuti Melik arrived as the Governor's representative. He found his task hampered by the fact that the local revolutionaries, with whom he had to negotiate, mistrusted him for political reasons.

It is in the light of the complete breakdown in communications between the Tiga Daerah and the revolutionary struggle in the rest of Java, that the arrival of personal envoys of the Minister of Information in the person of Widarta and K. Midjaja must be seen. Their impact was great on those leaders such as Kartohargo who, whether aware of

91 Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan, 68. Italics in original.
their political identity or not, were struggling with intractable rival local groups. This was because they spoke with the authority of the central government who at last seemed to be providing the long-awaited 'instructions from above'. These were to set up Working Committees to replace the old, unworkable KNIs. While this was K. Midjaja's work, Widarta's influence was mostly felt through the united front, the GBP3D. The strategy of the underground PKI and its impact on the revolutionary movement in the Tiga Daerah is discussed in the next Chapter.
We were not sure of our own strength, we followed every voice. The party was dependent on whom? On the masses. Yet when the masses rose up unafraid, the party itself became afraid! We dared take up arms against the Dutch, we hesitated about the Dutch trained officials and police, and the colonial apparatus that remained. This was a mistake!

In August 1945, after hearing over the clandestine radio about the atomic bombs being dropped on Hiroshima, the underground PKI made a fundamental decision at a meeting in the forestry station of Sukowati. Rather than adopt a sectarian approach by declaring themselves openly, the party decided to continue as a secret underground, working through other bodies. At this meeting a leaflet was prepared, subsequently referred to as the sebaran Sukowati, urging the masses to oppose the Japanese in every possible way. It was arranged to distribute the pamphlets through every railway station 'from Anyar to Banyuwangi' on the same day. The leaflet was to be unsigned, and the PKI was not mentioned. Thus it would be individuals acting on behalf of the nationalist movement, and not the underground PKI, who would seize power from the Japanese.

The PKI had three reasons for remaining a secret underground in 1945. The first consideration was that the party had no candidate of its own for President. The only real possibility was Amir Sjarifuddin, a leader of GERINDO who had joined the Illegal PKI in 1939. Amir was prominent but still young and a Sumatran. Besides this he was still in jail in Malang in East Java, although the

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1 CD West Java leader, Interview, 6.7.78.
2 On the extreme western and eastern ends of Java respectively. Ibid.
underground PKI would try to get him out some time in September. Tan Malaka was unacceptable for reasons to be discussed later in this chapter, while the other prominent leaders of the Left were all still overseas, either in Holland or Australia. A second reason for remaining secret at the time was that the PKI believed that if the underground leaders played a more open role the pro-Dutch Pangreh Praja would be even more suspicious of the new Republic than they already were.

The third reason given was that the underground was uncertain about the international situation in August of 1945. The Anti-Fascist Front had included the Dutch as one of the Allies. All Allied countries except the Soviet Union were capitalist and, so the underground reasoned, would be unsympathetic to an independent Indonesia with a strong communist party. In their situation, the Indonesian underground PKI was not as fortunate as its Vietnamese counterpart, which, because of the Vichy regime could be both pro-Allied and anti-Colonialist. The problem of what attitude to take towards the Dutch was heightened by the defeat of Fascism. What was now the aim of the United Front? At the Sukowati meetings, underground leaders decided to continue the United Front with 'bourgeois nationalism', only the target would no longer be Fascism but 'feudalism and capitalism'.

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3 Two other possibilities that the underground PKI were thinking about for President at that time as alternatives to Sukarno were Iwa Kusumasumantri and Muhammad Yamin. Iwa was certainly once a real Marxist, and during the 'thirties had been living in exile in Banda, returning to Jakarta in 1941 when he joined the Anti-Fascist Front. Yamin had helped found GERINDO with Amir Sjarifuddin in 1937, but left to form his own party in 1939. As a prominent 'collaborator' in 1944-45, he was probably unacceptable for other reasons. Also he had never been a member of the PKI. The point in the minds of PKI leaders seems to have been less their credentials as Marxists than 'how well known they were' from the pre-war nationalist movement. Ibid. This was not contradictory to the United Front line of 1945.

4 David Marr makes this point in an article assessing the significance of World War II on the Vietnamese Revolution, to be published in a forthcoming volume on the Japanese occupation edited by Alfred McCoy.

5 CD West Java leader, Interview, 6.7.78.
While these reasons why the party decided to remain a secret underground may not appear altogether convincing now, they are the ones given by the underground leadership at that time. Musso on his return to Indonesia in 1948, with the advantage of hindsight, in his Koreksi Besar (Important Self Correction), described the decision to remain secret as 'a mistake of tactics not of principle'. Musso argued that with the defeat of Fascism, the rationale for an underground was removed. If the PKI was a party of the lower classes, how were these classes to know about the party which represented their interests if it continued to be organised as an underground? 'Its advice was heard, its writings were heard, but its members did not exist' Musso had said.6

Again with hindsight it seems there were other probable reasons for this decision. One was that political parties had not been declared legal. The Japanese were still seemingly powerful. When the Republic declared itself on this on 21 August, it was for a single state party. Despite their amazing resistance record, habits of caution, as well as the memory of the crushing blow received after 1926, help to explain the decision.

The underground PKI resistance during the Occupation had been out of all proportion to its membership. In August 1945 the PKI was numerically small and weak. According to Widarta's deputy, the entire Residency of Pekalongan, regarded as an area where the party was 'strong', had only eight people who had actually been members of the underground PKI - one in Pekalongan, three in Pemalang, two in Tegal and Brebes.7 One of the Pemalang cadres, S. Mustapha, arrested in Pemalang early in the Occupation, had escaped to Surabaya where he became a leader of the underground. He returned once to Pemalang after the Proclamation, with Widarta. Of the seven others, K. Midjaja (in Tegal) and Amir were the most active. Of course

6 Ibid, also SiauwGiok Tjhan, Interview, 20.5.78; Sumarsono, Interview, 6.6.78.

7 CD West Java leader, Interview, 6.7.78.
this numerical strength did not reflect the much larger group of supporters of the party, including the older veterans of the PKI of the 1920s and many former Sarekat Rakyat people. The fact that the underground party did not have more cadres was due to a line adopted in 1938 and still followed. This was the decision that whoever was arrested by the Dutch automatically lost their 'illegality' and on their release, would not be contacted or used by the party again. In this way the Dutch could go on arresting leaders but would not be able to destroy the organisation. However, in terms of the number of cadres, it weakened the party considerably.  

Following on from this analysis, at the Sukowati meeting the underground PKI decided on a policy of creating local fronts with other progressive elements. This was based on the analysis that although the party had no national leader, it had prominent people at the local level.  

These leaders would be key figures in the creation of local United Fronts. These United Fronts would contain members of other progressive groups. 'Progressive' in the August 1945 context meant simply someone who 'agreed with Independence'. Apart from those in Pekalongan the underground PKI considered its cadres were influential in Banten, Purwodadi and Bojonegoro regions. These cadres should first evaluate local KNIs and where they had the support of the people, the United Front strategy could be carried out from below, working through the existing bodies. However, where this was not possible new groups should be led 'from above' by underground PKI cadres. After the KNIs in Pemalang and Tegal had ceased to function effectively, it was this strategy that was implemented by K. Midjaja in Pekalongan Residency.

After the Proclamation, most of the PKI leaders who had been living in the forestry stations in and around Sukowati left on party business elsewhere. Widarta was a key figure in planning the spreading

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8 Ibid. The Pemalang underground PKI leader, Amir, was an exception to this line, as he had been arrested and jailed after 1926.

9 Ibid.
of the news of the Proclamation to other regions. He also sent the Pemalang veteran party member Amir and his wife, Ibu Pri, to arrange for the release or escape of Amir Sjarifuddin from Lowok Waru prison, near Malang in East Java. From members of the radical pergerakan who had fled Pekalongan Residency to escape arrest after the 1926 rebellion and who now worked in the prisons in East Java (including Ibu Pri's brother-in-law) it was learned that Amir Sjarifuddin's life was again under some kind of threat by the Japanese. There are two versions of what happened in Malang. According to Amir, the mission failed because their party mandate, the only means by which they had to prove their identity to local leaders, was lost when their belongings were stolen. Ibu Pri recalls, however, that they were able to persuade the deputy prison warder to move Amir from where he had been kept by the Japanese to another cell from where he could not be kidnapped. Amir Sjarifuddin himself, together with several friends, was freed unharmed at 8 a.m. on 1 October, arriving in Jakarta by the night train the following afternoon.

About a fortnight later the Pemalang leader Amir, now back in Jakarta, received an urgent telegram from Tan Djiem Kwan, a Pemalang cadre, asking him to return to Pemalang immediately to help coordinate the revolutionary movement. The kidnapping of Soepangat by Pangreh

10 I am grateful to Benedict Anderson for this information.

11 Amir, TS (from answers to my questions, written up by Amir's son), November 1975.

12 Ibu Pri, Interview, 3.12.74. While Amir returned to Jakarta, Ibu Pri stayed on in East Java, at Klakah where, on 6 October, the Pangreh Praja were thrown out by local revolutionaries. After disagreeing with the local leadership about this - 'the officials can be our tool' Ibu Pri said - she returned to Jakarta on 10 October. There she had some difficulties without the party mandate which had earlier been lost. Later Widarta sent her back to Malang, Klakah, and Surabaya. The Surabaya underground PKI sent her to Banyuwangi to distribute pamphlets. By 7 November she was in Solo for a conference of left wing groups, where she met her arch political foe, S.K. Trimurti. On 10 November, after news of fighting in Surabaya, she returned to Comal via Semarang.

13 Soeara Asia, 5 October 1945.
Praja with the support of TKR elements had polarised the situation further in Pemalang. Feeling against the officials was running high.

Amir, together with Widarta, returned on Pemalang on 15 October, in the middle of the social revolution, and the latter went straight to Padurekso, the forestry station where his family were. On his arrival Widarta found the house where he had been staying had just been ransacked, and the family moved to the comparative safety of Sukowati. Ironically, Widarta's arrival in Sukowati sparked off local suspicions that he was a runaway government official and more threats were received that houses of other foresters would be attacked. Widarta had to send an urgent letter via Holle to Amir in Pemalang, asking for help. The next day a bus arrived, carrying about ten pemudas, four of whom were armed with carbines, led by Amir, Tan Djiem Kwan and Soepangat. As we have already discussed in Chapter Five, Soepangat spoke to local villagers about order and several lenggaong leaders were taken back to Pemalang to be given a course in revolutionary ideology at the API/PRI headquarters.

At the meeting on 20 October in the town square, Soepangat spoke to the people of Pemalang for the first time as their new Bupati. S. Mustapha (or Darmo as he was known in Pemalang), who had escaped from detention in Pemalang to Surabaya early in the Occupation, spoke first about 'strengthening and consolidating the power of the pemudas and the people to face the Dutch'. Then Widarta, who was introduced as the delegate of the Minister of Information, Mr Amir Sjarifuddin, spoke to the people of Pemalang:

I counselled the people not to go around committing robbery, murder or arson on houses and belongings. I explained the political, economic and social meaning of 'Popular Sovereignty' which if correctly implemented would lead to happiness for the people. At the meeting it was announced that API had changed its name to become the Pemalang branch of PRI.16


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.
For those underground PKI couriers who had remained in the forestry stations after the Proclamation, Widarta's speech is still remembered as a high point in the early revolution and a great day for the underground PKI. It was a culmination of a lonely but relentless three years' struggle against Fascism. The Lasern courier recalls: 'It is clear that the party had done a big service...we were able to overcome the disturbances and form a new government...when the revolution broke out, Pemalang was in our hands.' Later that night both Widarta and S. Mustapha attended a meeting of API/PRI which was followed by another meeting in Pemalang jail, to discuss the policy of the new leaders in regard to the Pangreh Praja. Widarta advised Soepangat to treat the detained officials well. Soepangat replied that they had been put in jail 'at the people's request' and would be released as soon as the situation had calmed down.

The next day Widarta accompanied Soepangat to the villages near the forestry stations to observe the election of new lurahs. On 22 October, leaving his wife and family in the care of Holle, the chief forester, he left for Surabaya with S. Mustapha. On 7 November he returned to Pemalang again, to find the problem of the Pangreh Praja unsolved. Pekalongan had requested that the officials be moved to the Residency capital, but Soepangat was afraid for their safety because of threats from the people. He asked Widarta to take up the matter with authorities in Jakarta. He also requested a letter of support from Widarta with his authority as assistant to the Minister of Information, and this Widarta provided. After visiting his family in Sukowati again for two days Widarta returned to find that the Republican Attorney-General, Mr Kasman Singodimejo, had visited Pemalang to find out why the Bupati and the rest of the town's Pangreh Praja had been placed in the local jail, and what was to be done with them. Soepangat had argued that they were not there as prisoners (tahanan) but only temporarily as internees (tawanan) because of

17 Lasern courier, Interview, 27.7.76.
19 Question 5, Ibid.
Meanwhile, K. Midjaja was active in other parts of the Tiga Daerah. Midjaja, whose real name was Sardjono, had a depth of experience in the radical pre-war pergerakan elsewhere in Java that was unique in Pekalongan Residency politics. Passive resistance leader, journalist, newspaper editor, pemuda leader and labour unionist par excellence. From 1939, when he joined the Illegal PKI, he was 'actively opposing the Japanese fascists'. In April 1942 he was forced to flee Solo after the first kenpeitai razzias began, and spent the rest of the Occupation 'being hunted or chased after by the Japanese fascists'.

In charge of the North Coast region of the underground PKI, he had kept up contacts with labour unionists throughout Pekalongan Residency, including the head of the Talang Pawnshop Employees Union, whom he visited using the cover of a trader with a Sundanese name. He also played a leading role in building up the underground PKI in Pemalang. In order to understand how this remarkable revolutionary managed to achieve what he did in two short months, we shall trace his activities closely, first in Brebes, then in Tegal.

Midjaja's first move was to create a linkage between the radicals in Pemalang and the increasingly influential AMRI Slawi, led by Soewignjo and Sakirman. Soewignjo had been a station clerk at Comal and leader of both the local VSTP and the PKI at the time of the 1926 rebellion. Through Soewignjo, Amir, who was working at the local sugar mill, had earlier joined the party. Midjaja used this old friendship between Amir and Soewignjo to introduce the other radicals from Pemalang - Tan Djiem Kwan, Widarta's deputy (the CD West Java leader) and himself. In mid-October, Amir arrived at the AMRI Slawi headquarters at Dukuhwringin, bringing these three friends whom Soewignjo had not met. K. Midjaja and Widarta's deputy were introduced as assistants of the Minister of Information, Mr Amir Sjarifuddin, and both carried

20 Question 7, ibid.
21 K. Midjaja, 'Sejarah Keluarga'.
22 Amir, Answers. See the Biographical Appendix.
mandates signed by Sjarifuddin. The letters gave the two people authority to take whatever steps necessary to restore order and establish a genuine Republican government in the region. Midjaja then explained to Soewignjo their plan. This was that AMRI Slawi should recognise Pemalang's leadership of the revolutionary struggle in the Tiga Daerah from then on. Because the two leaders carried mandates from Amir Sjarifuddin, Soewignjo agreed. After this Midjaja made frequent visits to Slawi, taking part in the political courses conducted by AMRI.  

About the same time K. Midjaja was also visiting the nearby Jatibarang sugar mill. An employee of the mill recalls:

K. Midjaja and Darmoprawiro came and held meetings in the sugar mill. Maybe K. Midjaja came three times. He said 'beginning now there are no longer any Raden Mas, Kanjeng Gusti or Raden-Tumenggung. Everyone is the same now. If you mention the President you don't need to use Your Excellency [Paduka yang Mulia]', it is enough to say Bung Karno. Likewise other important people should be called Bung [brother]. You should not be afraid of others, all are the same. Kromo [high Javanese] is no longer necessary. You should all use just ngoko [low Javanese] and Indonesian.

As part of the United Front strategy, Midjaja also played a key role in the setting up of Working Committees in both Brebes and Tegal.

23 Soewignjo, Interview, 25.8.76; Transcript, I/4, 26.3.73.

24 Sulaiman Darmoprawiro had been Chairman of the Petarukan Sarekat Islam. Subsequently a leader of the Bandung Sarekat Rakyat, from 1923 he was Chairman of the Bandung and Priangan branches of the PKI. After returning from Digul in 1932, he became a journalist for the Tegal paper, Het Norden. Arrested for a time by the Japanese early in the Occupation, he later became a member of the BP2. During the Tiga Daerah Affair he founded and edited a newspaper, Pelita Rakyat, which ran until the First Clash, no copies of which have survived. He later controlled the Trade Union Council SOBSI in Tegal, but was not arrested in 1965 because he was a cripple. Letter from Soewignjo, 17 April 1973; 'Daftar Nama-Nama Perintis Kemerdekaan dalam Periode 1908-1945 dengan Sejarah Perjuangan Singkatnya'. TS.

25 These are high priyayi titles.

26 Jatibarang sugar mill employee, Interview, 19.11.75.
The United Front - 1. The Working Committees

On 16 October the Central Indonesian National Committee, the KNIP, had been given new legislative powers, partially in response to the need to give a more democratic image to the outside world in the face of Allied accusations that the Republic was merely a Japanese puppet. Between full sessions of the KNIP, now a legislative body, the new powers would be exercised by an elected Working Committee (BP-Badan Pekerja). In Jakarta the BP-KNIP was really a manoeuvre whereby the 'anti-fascist' leftists took over from the establishment largely left over from the Japanese.

In the Tiga Daerah, where the balance between Sjahrir-type and Amir-type Marxists was more favourable to the latter, Working Committees (Appendix G) were the principal instruments in the PKI's united front strategy. The replacement of the by now impotent KNIs by these Committees reflected the influence of the underground PKI, which was rapidly gaining the political initiative. Unlike their Jakarta counterparts, the two kabupaten Working Committees in Tegal and Brebes were not responsible to enlarged KNI assemblies. In Brebes, where Working Committees were also set up at kawedanan and kecamatan levels, they simply replaced all local KNIs. The Working Committees in Tegal and Brebes combined legislative and executive powers in a kind of presidium of nine men, at the kabupaten level, or five men at the two lower levels. Before discussing the economic policies of the radicals once in control, we will first describe how they took power through the Working Committees, first in Brebes, then in Tegal.

It was at Ketanggungan, the centre of the kabupaten's pre-war pergerakan and home of Brebes' best-known ex-Digul communist, Slamet, that K. Midjaja held his first meeting. According to a Tanjung perjuangan leader who attended, Midjaja told the meeting 'We need to take full control of the government as the Japanese are on their knees'. The meeting decided that the revolutionary struggle would be strengthened by uniting the two centres under a single leadership. After the Ketanggungan meeting Kartohargo was asked to attend a meeting at the house of a young leftist member of the

27 Tanjung perjuangan leader, Interview, 29.7.76.
Brebes KNI where he met Midjaja for the first time. Here is his account of what happened:

K. Midjaja said he had met with KNI members from all over Brebes at Ketanggungan, where it had been decided to dissolve the KNI's and replace them with Working Committees. Meetings to establish these committees throughout the Residency were being held at 4 p.m. that afternoon. K. Midjaja decided that I should lead the Brebes meeting. I said that I did not yet have a clear idea of the status of the Working Committee. I was not prepared to lead the meeting, as I did not know what I had to say. I was told that as the leader of the meeting I only needed to open and close it. I was amazed at the number that attended as I had not heard any announcement beforehand.\(^{28}\)

However, Kartohargo was chosen as the Chairman of the nine-man Working Committee set up on Midjaja's initiative. The other members (see Appendix G) included a member of the local religious elite, a pemuda figure, three radicals from Ketanggungan, and two 'renegade' members of the priyayi corps, the kabupaten Secretary, Mohammad Saleh, and the Public Prosecutor, Maksum. Perhaps because of the wide range of representation on the Working Committee, as well as its imaginative policies, some at the time considered it a model of social government to be emulated in other areas.\(^{29}\)

Several days after the Brebes Working Committee was formed, Kartohargo received a phone call from Barisan Pelopor leader Muhammad Nuh in Tegal to say that K. Midjaja would be coming to Brebes at 9 that evening to hold a meeting in the kabupaten. Midjaja duly arrived with Muhammad Nuh, Pemalang leader Amir and a person introduced to Kartohargo as Widarta, a representative of the Minister of Information in Jakarta. The question of the new Pekalongan Resident was among the topics of discussion. Mr Besar had left the Residency


\(^{29}\) E.g., Letter of the Tegal Branch of the Indonesia Workers Party (PBI - Partai Buruh Indonesia) to the Attorney-General, Mr Kasman Singodimedjo about the political situation in Brebes, dated 12 December 1945. Proc.Gen (subsequently cited as 'PBI letter').
several days before and his replacement, Soeprapto, besides being a temporary appointment, was not from the pergerakan. Budisutjitro, the Secretary of the PKI in 1924, was suggested but Midjaja's recommendation was Sismadi, a journalist from Solo. The meeting agreed, and Mohamad Saleh, the Working Committee (and kabupaten) Secretary was asked to send a telegram to the Central Government. After introducing K. Midjaja to the meeting, Widarta gave his views about 'society in a time of revolution' and described in detail what had been happening in other areas.

On 8 November, Kartohargo received an invitation from the newly formed Tegal Working Committee, which will be described below, to attend the installation of Abu Sudji'i as the new Bupati of Tegal. Kartohargo recalls:

I was able to meet the acting Resident and the Governor's representative for the first time. They asked when the new Bupati of Brebes was going to be installed. I replied that Brebes had not chosen a new bupati. Then I was pressed by the new Acting Resident to carry out elections as quickly as possible for the Pangreh Praja positions that were empty, because the governmental functions could not be carried out properly if there weren't any local heads.

The following day Kartohargo discussed the problem with the Brebes Working Committee, which was of the opinion that 'only the government has the right' to appoint new Pangreh Praja. However, after more urgings from the Governor's envoy Sayuti Melik, by telephone, the Working Committee finally agreed to ask local revolutionary groups and bodies to submit a candidate for bupati. After the voting papers had been counted five days later, Kyai Haji Syatori, the Vice-Chairman of Masyumi and a local mosque functionary (naib), had the most votes.

30 On Budisutjitro, see also Appendix H, fn.11. Sismadi Sastrosiswoyo had also been a teacher, and was ex-Digul.


The other Pangreh Praja vacancies were filled by the Working Committee.33 Again the acting Resident Soeprapto and the Governor's representative, Sayuti Melik, arrived in Brebes for an official inauguration, together with members of the Tegal Working Committee, and all the kabupaten officials. After the installation Sayuti Melik gave a speech about the international situation, and later in the evening Soeprapto prepared and signed all the letters of appointment of new officials chosen by the Working Committee before returning to Pekalongan.34

After the replacing of the Pangreh Praja, the most pressing problem facing the Brebes Working Committee was economic. Markets had to be found quickly for Brebes' most important and lucrative cash crops - onions, chillies, ground nuts and soyabeans. It was decided by the Working Committee to send small shipments to Jakarta under the seal of the Bupati, to benefit from the higher prices in the capital. Dried fish, salted eggs and terasi (a fish preserve) were also traded in Jakarta. With a small staff in an office behind the station the Working Committee member in charge of Economic Affairs also supervised the distribution of supplies of basic commodities throughout the kabupaten. As the head of the kabupaten Fisheries Department had been daulat-ed, his department was replaced by a fisheries cooperative.35

The Brebes Working Committee was also active in social affairs, holding various women's courses two afternoons a week in the local primary school. These in part aimed to explain the wider implications of the revolutionary struggle, as well as what the Working Committee was doing, so the women 'would know the character of someone who defends their country'.36 This was the only perjuangan

33 Kartohargo does not name which 'groups and bodies' submitted candidates for bupati, how many there were, who or what their names were. The word stembiljet is used for voting paper, but no information is given on who was eligible to vote. Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 The cooperative at Sawojajar is still running today. Tanjung perjuangan leader, Interview, 29.7.76.
36 Ibid.
group in the Tiga Daerah which had a special program to bring women into the revolutionary movement. At lower levels also, Working Committees had economic and political functions. In nearby Klampok, local farmers had taken over the Chinese-owned rice mill, and the five-man Wanasari kecamatan Working Committee formalized this 'takeover' on behalf of the farmers who had occupied the mill premises in an orderly manner.37

Brebes kawedanan also had its own five-man Working Committee. One of its members recalls:

Our main task was to appoint a new camat. There were other less well known candidates (I can't remember whom) but the Working Committee choice was a former lurah of Brebes village during the Dutch time. The kawedanan Working Committee acted instead of the Wedana, it was the Wedana's substitute.38

This role reflected a view on the kabupaten Working Committee which eventually sought to abolish the position of wedana altogether.39 In other areas, for example Banjarharjo and Bumiayu, wedanas were also replaced by Working Committees. Whether a new wedana was appointed depended on local opinion.

Then there was the question of whether it was necessary to form political parties. Kartohargo, the Brebes Working Committee Chairman, believed that political parties would facilitate cadre forming. However other members, including the Tanjung perjuangan leader, believed that 'taking power' from the old administration should be the first priority. It was not the right time to be setting up political parties according to this view. They argued that the Working

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37 Wanasari kecamatan is situated at Klampok. The Working Committee was led by the local station master, and its members included the leading orthodox kyai, a modernist Muslim teacher and a nationalist. Those who did work for the Committee were given a wage of hulled rice. Muslim teacher, Interview, 6.12.75.

38 The Brebes kawedanan Working Committee consisted of an official of the pre-war pest eradication program from Jatibarang, a Brebes schoolteacher, a pemuda leader, and the former Lurah who became the new Brebes Camat. Schoolteacher, Interview, 10.12.75.

Committee could fulfil several of the most needed functions of a political party such as propaganda work. As well, the Working Committee had the power as an executive to appoint local officials which a political party did not. There were the economic tasks mentioned earlier as well. However, Kartohargo persisted in this view for a time, even holding a discussion at the kabupaten office about Hatta's announcement of 3 November, giving the 'go ahead' to political parties. There were no real results from these discussions, and the only party in Brebes until the end of the social revolution was Masyumi.

K. Midjaja played an even more crucial role in determining the membership of the nine-man Working Committee in Tegal. The Tegal committee was not formed at any public meeting of groups within the perjuangan as in Brebes. Soewignjo, the Chairman, recalls 'I was chosen by K. Midjaja and his group'. Other prospective members whom Midjaja thought suitable were also approached to join the Working Committee. A KNI leader recalls that some time after the KNI group had visited AMRI Slawi for discussions about revolutionary strategy he received a visit from Midjaja at his house:

He [K. Midjaja] introduced himself as a member of the PNI-Baru who knew Bagio [Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo] very well. He asked me what my political leaning [aliran] was. I said PNI-Baru. Then he repeated what Wignjo [Soewignjo, AMRI Slawi leader] had said several days before in Slawi. This was that radical changes had to be made, and all remaining officials from the Colonial period and the tools of the fascists must be swept aside. That should be our purpose.

On thinking over the discussion with Midjaja afterwards the KNI leader recalls:

40 Tanjung perjuangan leader, Interview, 29.7.76. Hatta's announcement (Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan, 76), endorsed one made three days earlier by Sjahir and the KNIP (Anderson, Java, 176).

41 Interview, 9.11.71.

42 Interview, 8.10.76.
I didn't agree wholeheartedly with this for two reasons. Firstly, I saw their lack of preparations in Slawi; they did not really have any trained cadres. Also I did not accept the principle of radically changing the local government without any guide from the centre. Changing officials was easy. Everyone wanted to become a camat, wedana or whatever. But what was their revolutionary leadership ability? It was clear that K. Midjaja did not have any followers.43

In the week following the mass demonstration from the south, the nine-man Tegal Working Committee held its first meeting. Another member of the KNI group, who had been made Secretary, recalls what happened at this first meeting:

As well as the nine members of the Working Committee there was a tenth person present. As a point of order I said 'before the meeting starts I would like an explanation as to who is the tenth person'. The tenth person himself, not the Chairman of the meeting, replied. 'You don't need to know who I am or what my status is on this Working Committee' he said. 'If that is so, then I can't continue as a member.' If at the first meeting the rules are broken I thought they would go on being broken. Only after I left did I find out that the tenth person was K. Midjaja. He wore Japanese drill shorts, a grey long-sleeved shirt, and had short hair.44

How often K. Midjaja sat in on meetings of the Tegal Working Committee is not known. The Chairman could not remember his coming at all after it was set up. Apart from the three PKI leaders from 1926 (Soewignjo, Soelaiman and Muhamad Nuh) - all of whom had been exiled to Digul - the Working Committee membership included two of the KNI group, Sakirman, the AMRI Slawi leader and the Barisan Pelopor younger pemuda figure, Marsum. It was far more representative of groups in the Tegal perjuangan than the three previous Tegal KNIs had been.

Despite the KNI group's reservations about Midjaja's strategy, two of its members decided to join the radicals on the Working Committee. One replaced Soemarno as Secretary, the other was in

43 Ibid.
44 Soemarno, Interview, 18.12.72.
charge of government affairs. The KNI group realised they were in the same position as they saw Midjaja to be in - neither had a mass following, unlike the Barisan Pelopor leaders in Tegal:

We were impotent by ourselves, we didn't have any power. K. Midjaja received us well. I was given the task of looking after government matters. At several meetings in Slawi I made them change a lot of their plans. For example, I disagreed with the division of tasks on the new Working Committee. The people who were being given the tasks were not up to the job. Because there was never any agenda given out beforehand, one could not bring along any draft proposals.45

The problem of lack of administrative skills or experience with money matters was felt by all revolutionaries who were now in government positions. In Pemalang this was solved by using officials from the old regime, including two camats from the Japanese occupation, one of whom became kabupaten Secretary in the new administration. In Brebes the old kabupaten Secretary Mohammad Saleh joined the revolutionaries and was himself a member of the Working Committee, while one camat from the Japanese time was employed in the kabupaten. In Tegal, however, the view of the older radicals in the Tiga Daerah 'Don't leave a single Japanese stooge in' had more influence.46 Only one member of the Working Committee had any administrative experience, as a clerk in the kabupaten office. None had any knowledge of money matters, including Soelaiman, the Treasurer of the Working Committee, who at the first meeting proceeded to close the accounts of all government offices. This was probably in order to make an assessment of the kabupaten financial situation as part of the business of combining the kabupaten and the now abolished Municipal administrations. Closing of accounts caused difficulties, however; the doctor at Kardinah hospital complained that he could no longer get medical supplies because money had run out.

45 Interview, 8.10.76.
46 Kendalsari PESINDO leader, Interview, 31.10.75.
The hospital was in serious difficulties, as just about everything was in short supply. The hospital doctor came to the Working Committee, and we had discussions on what was most urgently needed.47

Next the Working Committee made an inventory of all the remaining sugar and rice stocks in the kabupaten. This led to the discovery that one rice mill on the road to Pemalang was still hoarding rice that was meant to have been distributed during the Occupation. This rice was confiscated and later distributed to the people in the city.48

Apart from ensuring adequate supplies of food for the Working Committee worked out a cloth distribution program. Cloth had been scarcer than rice during the Occupation, and the Proclamation had not changed the situation. The local textile factory - the biggest in Java - held stockpiles which were still undistributed in November. Kutil was coopted to help in this distribution as we have seen.49 Pemalang kabupaten also obtained supplies from the Tegal factory early in October, but the Pangreha Praja-dominated KNI in Pemalang could not think of a way of paying for it until the Wedana of Belik (who was a KNI Vice-Chairman) suggested using village funds. When the old administration in Pemalang fell, revolutionary leaders found the cloth undistributed as the KNI 'didn't know how'.50 The Wedana of Belik helped the new Bupati Soepangat in this task:

This distribution strengthened the Tiqa Daerah movement. People were saying 'Lho,51 together with an uprising there is a distribution of cloth; in other areas where there is no uprising there is no distribution... The money from the distribution was used for the pemudas doing guard

47 Tegal Working Committee Chairman, Transcript, I/8, 26.3.73.
48 Ibid.
49 See Chapter Five.
50 Wedana of Belik, Transcript, II/23, 22.5.73.
51 Lho is an interjection expressing surprise or astonishment.
duty, to buy good food. Each meal they got at least one egg; lho, just imagine, in those times.'52

The Tegal Working Committee, like its Brebes counterpart and also the API/PRI in Pemalang, had social welfare functions. A campaign to 're-educate' the city's prostitutes with the help of the pemudas was begun. The prostitutes were given a rice ration and sent to join their compatriots who had been sent earlier by AMRI from Slawi to work in the textile factory.53 The Committee also filled vacant positions created by the October revolusi sosial. The Chairman can recall personally appointing two new camats in Slawi and Kedungbanteng; these appointments were later ratified by the Acting Resident. As the railway workers in the Tegal repair shops had no union, a Bandung unionist was brought in to set up a local Railwaymen's Union.

The Working Committee also supported the navy in its plan to set up a base in Tegal. Known as Base IV (Pangkalan IV), this unit was officially inaugurated on 7 November and set up its headquarters in the former kenpeitai barracks which had been used by the TKR until its withdrawal on 4 November.54 The founder of the base, a Dawis Djarmin from Sulawesi who had arrived from Jakarta with an official letter, came to the Working Committee asking for funds to buy weapons and other supplies, including food. Help in recruiting was also sought.55 Later in November Darwis came to a full session of the Working Committee, with the proposal that some of the kabupaten sugar stockpiles be sold to help finance the navy base. The Working Committee probably agreed because, after the end of the Tiga Daerah Affair, Darwis took control of the sugar stocks. The sugar stocks were to be a continuing

52 Transcript, II/23, 22.5.73. While each person got 70 centimeters, the Wedana was given an extraordinary 14 meters 'for myself and my family' by the local distributing committee. Only part of this was payment for the distribution work. How much other officials received is not known.

53 Tegal Working Committee Chairman, Interview, 16.11.71.

54 Before this there had been a naval TKR (TKR laut) but this group had quickly changed its name after the third battalion of the TKR had withdrawn early on the morning of 5 November. For a full discussion of the military, including the navy presence in the Tiga Daerah, see Chapter Ten.

55 Tegal Working Committee Chairman, Transcript, I/8, 26.3.73.
source of friction with the TRI 13th Regiment in Tegal (formed in
January 1946) until 1947, once almost leading to outright conflict
between the navy and the army.

Other previously autonomous groups outside the town accepted
the authority of the Working Committee, including the fiercely independent
Pemuda Istimewa at Ujungrusi. This was perhaps because the Committee
had agreed to local demands that the name be changed to Ujung Baru
(New Ujung), and that electricity be connected to the former sugar
mill settlement. However, Kutil still remained outside all authority.
Now that the Working Committee had established itself in Tegal,
Kutil was an embarrassment. In an effort to control him the Working
Committee appointed him kabupaten Police Chief. According to the
Chairman, when Kutil moved into the police barracks with his followers,
the plan was to detain him. Kutil accepted the new position but refused
to move permanently into the barracks. The Working Committee's difficulties
in this regard were not made any easier when its Chairman, Soewignjo
fell out with the PKN leader on whom he was relying to capture Kutil.56
In the end Kutil remained as Police Chief but stayed in Talang.

What of the relationship between the Islamic bupatis and the
Working Committees? The Tegal Bupati feels today that he was not
kept informed about how decisions were made. 'I was just a puppet',
he recalled 30 years later, 'affairs were not in my hands'.57 A
more contemporary view about Brebes was that 'the Bupati's job was
to sign things, everything originated with the Working Committee'.58
It may have been that the Working Committees decided that the Bupatis
were even more inexperienced in government than they were (which was true).
Feeling quite strange in their new jobs, not to say residences, they may
have appeared to be rubber stamp regional heads while in fact they
were learning their new jobs. The concerns of the two kabupaten

56 Ibid. Soeprapto, the Acting Resident, mentions the disagreement
between the Tegal Working Committee and the PKN. Proc.Gen.

57 Abu Sudja'i, Interview, 20.11.75.

Working Committees were after all those of any executive. Their decisions were not particularly radical, but more ad hoc responses to the needs and challenges of local administrative and political problems. Their priorities reflected the political realities of November 1945, not the adherence to any ideological line. However, the Left, which was now in control of the kabupaten through the Tegal Working Committee, was aware of the need to work in cooperation with as many Islamic nationalists as possible. It was essential political realism to forge a working coalition between the two groups if the radicals were to survive in office.

The radicals believed that by having santri bupatis the Islamic group would be satisfied and the latent Marxist-Muslim social and intellectual antagonisms could be largely overcome. There were no santri members on the Tegal Working Committee or the United Front, which we shall discuss shortly. This may have been because genuine 'Islamic communists' in the Tiga Daerah were few in number despite the mass support for the Sarekat Rakyat in the early 'twenties. The most well known was M.H. Lukman's father, H. Moeklas. However, he was still in Australia where he had been sent, along with the other unrepentant Digul exiles, in 1942. He did not arrive back in the area until mid-1946. Kyai Misbah, a former Sarekat Rakyat leader, was an adviser to AMRI Slawi but his role was not significant. While other Islamic leaders sympathised with the radicals, they were not committed Marxists.

In retrospect, the Left too easily assumed that the appointment of two popularly chosen santri bupatis solved all the problems between Islam and Communism. They did not seem to be aware that the holding of two well-known Muhammadiyah figures - the TKR Commander Iskandar Idris and the Wedana of Adiwerna - as well as two leading orthodox kyais from Tegal was not helping their cause. Iskandar Idris was particularly well known to santri groups. Part of the problem in his case was who was responsible for him. After two meetings between Slawi and Ujungrusi (where Idris had been captured) had failed to decide what to do with 'Mr Besar's horse' as Iskandar Idris was called. The matter was finally handed to the AMRI Slawi.59 It was agreed that Idris should

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59 According to an Adiwerna pemuda leader 'kudanya Mr Besar' was the phrase Sakirman used. 'Adiwerna Verslag', Proc.Gen.
stay in Slawi until the social situation was calmer. Although in Pekalongan the TKR now believed that Idris had been 'imprisoned', after a week he was in fact allowed to live outside the AMRI headquarters in an unguarded house (as long as he stayed in Slawi) and was able to bring his family from Pekalongan. According to the Tegal Working Committee Chairman, Idris chose to stay in Slawi rather than risk travelling back through Adiwerna and Talang to Pekalongan. He was taken to several pemuda training sessions, visited the textile factory and was treated well. However, it was a politically naive move. Kyai Fachruri, the Wedana of Adiwerna, recalls: 'after Idris was detained santri pemudas came to ask me what was going on. They began to doubt AMRI's intentions'.

AMRI Slawi also antagonised Muslim groups in other ways. Pemudas from Adiwerna sent for training in Slawi resented having to do marching practice 'as if they had never done it before'. By early December AMRI Slawi could no longer hold Adiwerna under its authority. The day before the army intervened, the Adiwerna Working Committee changed its name to Masyumi, and AMRI Adiwerna became the GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia - Islamic Youth movement of Indonesia). There was trouble for AMRI Slawi from Islam to the south as well. According to the new santri Camat of Lebaksiu, on 1 December a large group of ulama (Muslim teachers) met together and began fasting during the day and praying at night in opposition to AMRI. The ulama believed that AMRI Slawi was 'a danger to religion'. The main purpose of the revolutionary struggle was 'to be united against the Dutch returning as

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60 Iskandar Idris, 'Sedikit Catatan Sekedar Yang Saya Alami dan Ketahui', Notes of Interview of the armed forces museum team, 26 July 1972. This was one of several interviews conducted as part of the creation of a series of dioramas depicting various events during the revolution in the armed forces museum. The diorama of the Tiga Daerah was to show the Acting Resident Soeprapto being daulat-ed by Sardjio. (I am grateful to Maj.Gen. Soedharmo for making copies of these interview transcripts available to me.)

61 Ibid.

62 K.H. Fachruri, Interview, 15.12.72.

a colonial power'. Instead, said the ulama, anyone who had helped the Dutch before was being killed. 64

In short, the radicals seem to have assumed that no special strategy was needed to gain the support of Islam. Perhaps the memory of the extraordinary success of the Sarekat Rakyat in Tegal made them think that this was unnecessary. It was hardly sufficient for K. Midjaja to introduce himself to the new santri Bupati of Tegal as Abdul Hamid 'as though he was from a pesantren'. 65 Many of the local KNI leaders had been kyais and four were now camats. The intellectual conflict between Islam and communism had already been expressed once in the bitter split in the Sarekat Islam in 1919. The Left now needed all the support it could muster, including the Muslims.

The United Front - 2. The GBP3D

The GBP3D (Gabungan Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah - Federation of Resistance Organisation of the Tiga Daerah) was set up by underground PKI leaders on 16 November in the headquarters of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor. It was a direct implementation of the underground PKI's United Front line decided on at the Sukowati meeting just before the Proclamation. At that meeting it was decided that in local situations, wherever possible, the strategy should be 'what can be carried out together should not be done alone by the party'. 66

The formation of the GBP3D reflected this strategy. Of the ten members (Appendix G), three were from the underground PKI (two of whom, Amir and Soewignjo, were veterans of 1926) and two were ex-Digul, while the four non-communist members included two from the PNI-Baru and a Sukarnoist. The chairman, K. Midjaja, identified the goals of GBP3D with those of Amir Sjarifuddin's party PARSI, namely to galvanise peasants, workers, army and pemudas towards a socialist

64 K.H. Toha, Interview, 10.4.73; K.H. Fachruri, Interview, 15.12.72.
65 K.H. Abu Sudja'i, Interview, 20.11.75.
66 West Java CD, Interview, 5.7.78.
society. Specifically, the GBP3D was sympathetic to PARSU because of its 'orientation to Moscow'.

The first concern of the GBP3D was the appointment of a perjuangan Resident, to replace the government official Soeprapto. Sismadi, the candidate decided on at an early meeting, had agreed but Sajuti Melik had spoken to the GBP3D members expressing doubts about his suitability, saying he would be unacceptable to the majority of the Residency's population on religious grounds, as he was a Christian. K. Midjaja believed that Sismadi's letter, withdrawing his initial agreement to his appointment on these religious grounds, was sent 'at Sajuti's instigation'. Midjaja then suggested that Sardjio from Purworejo be approached. Initially a member of the PNI Baru, during the Japanese occupation he had been an elected member of the Kedu Residency council and later represented the Residency on the Java Advisory Council. He was arrested (with his brother) as a suspected member of the underground PKI and sentenced to 13 years' jail in 1944. He had been serving this sentence in the same Ambarawa prison as Sajuti Melik at the time of the Proclamation, and was released in late September 1945.

The strategy, economic program and ideological orientation of the GBP3D can be clearly seen in the Minutes of the second meeting held in Brebes on 25 November 1945, which are translated in Appendix H. The meeting, which lasted the whole day, was attended by most members except the Tegal PNI Baru delegate. There were two 'outsiders' - a Chinese representative from Tegal and Widarta.

The PKI line in the debates at the meeting was represented by the chairman Midjaja and by Widarta. Widarta's last speech mentioned how the economy was being run in Pemalang through the struggle group PRI (that is API), as an example of how the Tiga Daerah

70 Sardjio's brother-in-law, Answers, 20.6.73.
could organise the local economy. Widarta's other two speeches, however, were concerned with people and events outside the Residency, politics at the national and local levels in other areas, and the lessons to be learnt from Surabaya. Not surprisingly Surabaya weighed heavily on Widarta's mind at this time. Fierce fighting was going on there when the meeting was held (25 November), and calls for help were going out from Surabaya all over Java.

In economic affairs the underground PKI leaders had little to say. The debate was led by the person with most experience in economic matters, the PNI Baru delegate from Brebes. It was he who had helped set up cooperatives before the war with PNI Baru leaders in Cirebon, and who subsequently used these cooperatives in Brebes as an underground against the Japanese. The style of democratic centralism in economic affairs is apparent from the report of the economic affairs committee. The economy should be cooperativised under the control of a central body. There was no discussion about land redistribution, how the sugar estates were to be run or how the sugar stockpiles were to be used. Even in a village where members of the PKI underground had been living, south of Pemalang, the party seemed caught during the revolusi sosial without a policy on the vital question of the distribution of bengkok, just at a time when there was a never to be repeated opportunity to redistribute, or at least reduce, some of the huge amounts that some lurahs had. If these matters were in the minds of PKI leaders, they were not being given priority at that time.

One question on which opinions differed was the role of the army in the Tiga Daerah movement. Three alternatives were under consideration at the meeting. Firstly that the Pekalongan TKR should simply be asked to return, which was the view of Kartohargo the Brebes leader. Secondly, discussions had been held with representatives from the Yogya TKR about establishing a new TKR presence in Tegal - presumably an independent battalion or regiment. Pekalongan would provide half the weapons and some manpower but Tegal would have the say in selection. Believing that the TKR was a fundamentally conservative force the meeting decided on a third alternative, the creation of their own armed force or 'standing army'.

The example of Mao Tze-tung's revolutionary government in Yenan seemed to be well known to the underground PKI at this time, as
Widarta suggested that government in the Tiga Daerah should be based on the Chinese model. As Alimin was the only PKI leader with firsthand Chinese experience and he had not yet returned to Indonesia, the underground PKI most likely had learnt about Yenan from newspaper reports. Even before the war Chinese Peranakan newspapers frequently reported Mao and Yenan, and the post-October 1945 papers - nationalist as well as Chinese - often had news items about Yenan and the reopening of the Chinese Civil War. Since the Russian revolution was 30 years old, the Chinese model was much more immediate. China was still fighting the revolutionary struggle. Widarta might have also seen an analogy between Pemalang and Yenan. The underground PKI found a haven or refuge in Pemalang, just as the Mao and Chinese communists had done in Yenan.

The main strategy of the PKI at this time was to work 'invisibly' within existing bodies. As Widarta said, 'our struggle strategy is to defend the Republic and we shouldn't act openly too quickly', and reveal communist plans. Instead the PKI should be well in the background of a broad United Front. On the other hand, Widarta and K. Midjaja did not seem concerned with covering up the PKI basis of the GBP3D, despite the August decision that the underground PKI would remain secret. Widarta talked openly about PARSi being '100 per cent pro Moscow', and PESINDO being 100 per cent 'under our control'. It was assumed that the non-communist members of the United Front were basically sympathetic.

The underground PKI was also frankly sectarian in their very hostile attitude to Tan Malaka. This hostility had its origins in the disagreement over strategy in 1926, when Tan Malaka split with the Comintern. The antagonism of underground leader K. Midjaja to Sajuti Melik must also be seen in the context of this ideological antipathy towards Tan Malaka and his People's Front, which the underground PKI opposed at this time. Melik, although he had been a member of the Illegal PKI, disagreed with the anti-Fascist propaganda put out by the party when

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71 The Peranakan press was run by, and reflected the interests of, locally-born Chinese.

72 Benedict Anderson pointed this out to me.
the Japanese landed, as we have seen. Later, probably after his arrest, Melik became an informer, leading the Japanese to houses of underground PKI members he knew in Semarang. In the Tiga Daerah, the practical problem of including Tan Malaka people in the GBP3D did not arise, as there were none active in the local revolutionary movement at that time. The PKI united front included everyone except fellow communists it seemed.

The main priority of the GBP3D at this point was to gain power in Pekalongan, as quickly as possible. To this end the GBP3D General Secretariat on 28 November issued a letter to all struggle organisations in the Tegal region urging them to prepare to support the move to Pekalongan. This was followed by the decision of the GBP3D meeting on 2-3 December, to print a leaflet for distribution throughout the Residency which set out the demands of the Tiga Daerah (see Appendix I for translation). Three demands contained in this leaflet, dated 5 December 1945, were that Sardjio be appointed as Resident, that remaining Pangreh Praja who were heads of government departments should be replaced, and that all those who supported NICA should be purged. The leaflet, distributed throughout the Residency, ended with an ultimatum that if Pekalongan did not reply within three days, the GBP3D would be forced to take 'definite action'.

Midjaja's later justification for ending on such a note of urgency was that the GBP3D had been receiving disturbing reports about unrest in Sragi (on the Pemalang-Pekalongan kabupaten border) and in Batang to the east of the Residency capital. These reports indicated

73 See Chapter Three, fn.13.
74 An informant recalls that while he was hiding in a house in Semarang, Sajuti Melik arrived with Japanese who were searching for members of the underground. Lasem courier, Interview, 20.7.76.
75 Virtually the only Tan Malaka supporter in Tegal who was active was in the leadership of AMRI Slawi, not in the GBP3D. Interview, 12.2.73.
that a social upheaval of the kind the Tiga Daerah had experienced in October was about to occur. Furthermore the passivity of the Residency capital was endangering external security. There were rumours that enemy ships had been sighted off the coast, that landings were imminent, and that before it had withdrawn, the TKR 4th battalion caught a spy distributing Dutch money. A good tactic at this point might have been to appeal either to the Central Government, as the underground PKI expected help from Mr Amir Sjarifuddin, at that time Minister of both Information and Defence, or to Sjahrir personally. Widarta had access to the Prime Minister through a member of the Socialist Party who was in the underground PKI. However, the GBP3D reasoned that the Central Government was at the time completely involved in areas of fighting, such as Surabaya and Ambarawa, between Allies and Indonesians. It was better, therefore, to await Pekalongan's reaction to the Tiga Daerah demands of 5 December before appealing to the Centre.

**The Conference in Pemalang**

The leaflet which contained these demands reached the acting Resident Soeprapto in Pekalongan on 6 December. Because it was directed to the Struggle Organisations of Pekalongan kabupaten, and after advice from Sajuti Melik, Soeprapto called a meeting of the Pekalongan Struggle Council (Badan Perjuangan Pekalongan), which represented local groups, for the following day. Melik's advice to the meeting, that the Pekalongan Council should meet with the GBP3D to discuss the demands, was accepted. By mutual agreement a telegram was sent off to Tegal,

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76 K. Midjaja, Question 13, Proces-verbaal.

77 Question 19, ibid.

78 According to S. Karioatmodjo, the Public Prosecutor, in 'Laporan Tentang Keadaan Dewasa Ini didalam, Karesidenan Pekalongan' dated 19 December 1945 Proc.Gen. (subsequently cited as 'Laporan'), the Pekalongan Struggle Council was in fact set up in response to the 5 December GBP3D leaflet. Ten groups represented by the Council were the branches of PESINDO in Batang, Pekalongan and Sragi, the Pekalongan police, the Sragi and Pekalongan Hizbullah, and the Barisan Banteng, BPRI, and Badan Pemberontakan Alim Ulama groups, all from Pekalongan.
asking for Pemalang as the venue, at a date and time to be suggested by the GBP3D. The telegram also asked that Melik and Soeprapto be invited to attend. 

About 9 a.m. on Sunday, 9 December, Soeprapto received the GBP3D's reply. The meeting was set for that afternoon at 4 p.m. By 1 p.m. a delegation had assembled at the Hotel Merdeka in Pekalongan. It included K.H. Sjirat, a leader of the orthodox Muslim Teachers' Insurgents Corps (Badan Pemberontakan Alim Ulama), K.H. Syafi'i, from the Muhammadiyah stronghold of Pekajangan, south of the City, representing BPRI, the Pekalongan Residency police chief, a local KNI leader, and a representative from the local Indonesian Workers League (BBI-Barisan Buruh Indonesia). As Sajuti Melik had again left the Residency the Acting Resident judged it better for the negotiations if he stayed away himself. If there were no government officials 'the people would be meeting with the people'.

At Ulujami, on the Pekalongan-Pemalang border, the group was stopped by people armed with bamboo spears, and told to get out of the cars. This happened 'about 15 times' during the 20 kilometer journey to Pemalang. On arrival the mainly santri delegation went off to the mosque for the late afternoon prayers. The GBP3D leaders were already waiting in the kabupaten pendopo to welcome the Pekalongan delegation. A Takeover Staff (Staf Pengoperan), chosen at the GBP3D meeting the previous day, was waiting to hear the outcome of the meeting in the Fuji restaurant, not yet renamed, on the town square. The Brebes delegation to the Pemalang Conference had been stopped and searched after crossing the Pemalang kabupaten border in exactly the

79 Acting Resident Soeprapto, Question, 6, 15.7.46. Proc.Gen.

80 Ibid.

81 Members of the Takeover Staff were: from Brebes, Mohamad Saleh, Maksum and Sadikun; from Tegal, two members of the KNI group and Muhamad Nuh; from Pemalang, Tan Djiem Kwan, Rustamadji and Soewarno; and from Pekalongan, Suparmo. Kartohargo, Question 10, Proces-verbaal, 23.10.46. Proc.Gen.
same way as the Pekalongan party. The Brebes leader Kartohargo was in fact struck by the complete contrast between Pemalang and the rest of the Tiga Daerah, both in the number of road blocks and the fierceness of the pemudas manning them.\footnote{Kartohargo, Question 12, Proces-verbaal, 14.6.47. Proc. Gen. My account of the Pemalang conference is based on this source. Besides being the most detailed and contemporary available it is also the least biassed. A non-communist member of the GBP3D, he was by no means in agreement with the way things were going, was uneasy about the dominance of the United Front by Midjaja, and felt the whole move to Pekalangan was too rushed.} The GBP3D had also organised a pemuda Escort Company (Kompi Pengawal) for the new Resident and his Takeover Staff, consisting of 25 pemudas from Tegal and Brebes, who had also arrived in Pemalang. They were later to be joined by 25 local pemudas guarding the kabupaten.

Reports from delegates from Sragi to the west and Batang to the east of Pekalongan were also interpreted by GBP3D to mean that the social upheaval in the Pekalongan kabupaten was beginning. Homes of village heads were being broken into and only the previous day a camat south of Batang had fled, after a Japanese-appointed head of the Barisan Pelopor was paraded around the town.\footnote{Batang Working Committee Chairman, Suwito, Question 12, Proces-verbaal, 27.11.46. Suwito had been leader of the Pekalongan PSII and was a friend of Abu Sudja'i, the Bupati of Tegal. After the 5 December GBP3D leaflet setting out the Tiga Daerah demands was circulated, Suwito was called to Tegal to discuss the contents with Abu Sudja'i. S.M. Kartosuwirjo, the leading protagonist of the Muslim State ideal in Java, and a friend of Abu Sudja'i's from the PSII, who was in Tegal at the time, also did not agree with the leaflet's contents. Question 9, ibid.} These reports reinforced the GBP3D view of the urgency of the situation. Hence the need to press Pekalongan to democratise the Residency level government by the creation of Working Committees at all levels before the spontaneous social upheaval got out of control as it had done in the Tiga Daerah.

On the arrival of the Pekalongan delegation from the nearby mosque, the conference began. The Tiga Daerah people sat facing the Pekalongan delegation around a table, while there were about 10 other Pemalang guests' sitting at the back of the two delegations - including Soepangat, the Pemalang Bupati. A few of these were armed,
but no more than was usual for that time during the revolution. Among the two delegations only a Pekalongan delegate from the Barisan Banteng carried a weapon. The pemudas carrying weapons stayed in front of the pendopo and did not take part in the discussion.

Here is a firsthand account of the Brebes nationalist leader, Kartohargo, written 13 months later:

The Conference was opened by K. Midjaja in an informal way, using previously thought out, mild-tempered words. Before the opening proceedings, K. Midjaja had reprimanded Pekalongan in a friendly way for the absence of the Acting Resident, when in fact he had been asked to come. K. Midjaja went on to explain the revolutionary struggle in the Tiga Daerah and events leading up to the [present] Tiga Daerah demands. K. Midjaja also explained that in view of the fact that the demands were supported by the majority of the voices of the people of the entire Residency of Pekalongan, it was proper that Pekalongan agree to them. After this the representatives from Pekalongan were asked to reply to K. Midjaja's address one by one. Everyone agreed, only the [Pekalongan] PESINDO delegate seemed to be rather dissatisfied. In short, Pekalongan accepted the demand, and later during the rest for prayers, a written agreement would be made.84

Contemporary Pekalongan source asserts that at the time the Pekalongan Struggle Council agreed in general with the proposals of the Tiga Daerah, provided that the changes that were going to be carried out meant 'an improvement for the development of the nation', that it helped Pekalongan's contribution to the fighting on the Semarang front and was 'in line with the wishes of the central government'.85

84 Ibid.

85 The current Pekalongan view of the Pemalang meeting is too coloured by events of the following week to be reliable. There are several claims. Firstly, that the Pekalongan delegates were threatened that if they did not agree to the GBP3D demands they would not be allowed to return to Pekalongan. Also, only two of the Pekalongan delegation were allowed to speak. Then the request that they take back the GBP3D demands to Pekalongan to discuss it more fully with local leaders was refused by K. Midjaja, who said he could not guarantee their safe return from Pemalang if they did not agree.
While the Pekalongan delegation was considering further the suggestion of a written agreement about Sardjio's appointment, the Acting Resident Soeprapto arrived. Leaving Pekalongan at 4 p.m. after receiving a phone call from a KNI leader in the Pekalongan delegation, he had been stopped continuously by the Pemalang road blocks, one of which had detained him for over half an hour while local leaders had asked Pemalang whether the Acting Resident should be allowed to proceed. Finally arriving at the kabupaten office at 5.30 p.m., he saw the Pekalongan delegation crossing the town square and joined them at the mosque. After the prayers he was told that the conference had virtually finished and that Sardjio had been accepted as Resident. The following day, Monday, 10 December, the Residency government would be formally handed over to Sardjio.

The Pekalongan group then returned to the pendopo where K. Midjaja reconvened the conference and gave the Acting Resident a friendly rebuke for not coming with the Pekalongan delegation. The Chairman then summarised the earlier discussions for the Acting Resident. The GBP3D then circulated a 'letter of agreement' for all delegates to read (see Appendix I for translation), after which Soeprapto made a short speech. This letter, then signed by representatives of both the GBP3D and the Pekalongan Struggle Council and witnessed by Soeprapto spelled out the agreement which had been made. These were that 'the government of Pekalongan Residency must be handed over to the people immediately that Sardjio be appointed as Resident', that those officials 'who were not able to follow the way of revolution' would have to resign and those who had already done so would not be allowed to leave their homes until the situation was under control. The handing over of all government affairs to the GBP3D Takeover Staff should be completed at 2 p.m. the next day, Monday, 10 December. Before the staff had got things running smoothly, the Acting Resident would guarantee the safety of the Takeover Staff and the security of the region.

86 The journey from Pekalongan to Pemalang usually takes half an hour at the most. Although Soeprapto asked for an escort from Petarukan to Pemalang, they were stopped a further two times. Question 6, Proc.Gen.
Although not written into the agreement, it was decided with the Pekalongan delegates' approval, that the new Resident and his Takeover Staff would be accompanied by an Escort Company of about 50 armed pemudas as a propaganda device to inspire the people to join the war of independence. K. Midjaja also asked Soeprapto to continue working in Pekalongan until the transfer of power was complete.

The meeting then having ended, the GBP3D went off to join the Takeover Staff in the Fuji restaurant for dinner, and the Pekalongan delegation returned to the Residency capital. Sardjio, his personal secretary Muroso, and Widarta were also at the restaurant. The Left had reason to be satisfied with the meeting with the Pekalongan Struggle Council. K. Midjaja's authority was obvious from the way he had conducted the serious meeting, and most people seemed relieved that the situation had been resolved. The 'seriousness' of the atmosphere led the Pekalongan delegation to claim later that they had not been free to give their views. This was due to the tense revolutionary atmosphere in Pemalang heightened by the road blocks everywhere which made both delegations uneasy. As Kartohargo, the Brebes nationalist pointed out, it was the Pekalongan side which had chosen Pemalang as the place for the meeting. If they were put off by the revolutionary atmosphere there they could hardly blame the GBP3D.

The Residency United

Accompanied by a 60-strong Escort Company from the Tiga Daerah, the Takeover Staff left Pemalang at noon on Monday, 10 December.

87 K. Kidjaja, Proces-verbaal.
88 Muroso was on the Jakarta CK (City Committee) of the underground PKI.
90 The leader of this company was Soentoro, a member of the Pekalongan PETA daidan, who had joined the TKR's second battalion stationed in Comal. One version has it that he was on leave in Pemalang when he joined the new Resident's Escort Company as its commander. Earlier he was said to have been involved in Soepangat's kidnapping.
On arrival in Pekalongan, the group went straight to the Hotel Merdeka, where they set up their headquarters. By 2 p.m., the Takeover Staff had arrived at the Residency offices (just up the road from the hotel), where they were received by Soeprapto. Contemporary Pekalongan sources differ on the behaviour of the Escort Company. The Acting Resident saw them positioned at entrances to the Residency office building and along certain main roads leading out of the city. The Public Prosecutors thought they took up positions around the Residency like an 'occupying army'. According to the same source, the group also had its own red flag, with a white star in the centre.  

At the Residency office the heads of all departments of the Municipal and Residency government were gathered, and Soeprapto handed over the Residency government (the Public Prosecutors department and the Court did not send representatives) to Sardjio, in a brief ceremony. Shortly after this, members of the Tiga Daerah Takeover Staff arrived at the various government departments, and all petty cash was placed under seal. That evening all Residency officials were invited to a 'goodwill' gathering or silaturrachim at the Hotel Merdeka, to meet the new leaders and hear the aims of the GBP3D - the democratization of the Residency Government. According to the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor, the officials, who had been feeling 'very threatened' by the takeover of the Residency government by the Tiga Daerah group, were reassured by the meeting. Other local observers also felt that there was a 'good atmosphere' at the meeting.

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91 This is similar to the PESINDO flag except that the latter was red and white (that is the colour of the national flag) with the star in the middle. S. Karioatmodjo, Report, Proc.Gen. No other accounts mention this flag.


93 The term 'sosialisasi' is used by the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor.

94 Ibid.

95 TKR Divisi Istimewa, Yogyakarta, Bagian Penerangan. 'Peristiwa Pekalongan Pemalang/Tegal/Brebes' dated 18 December 1945. This report was made to TKR headquarters by two Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leaders, and the Indonesian Workers Party representative on the Pekalongan Struggle Council. The report is initialled by the Division Commander, Maj.Gen. Soedarsono. Proc.Gen. (subsequently cited as 'Yogyakarta TKR report').
Throughout the second day, Tuesday, 11 December, the Takeover Staff continued the work of transferring the Residency administration to the new revolutionary government. An investigation of the financial situation of the various government departments was begun under the direction of Soelaiman. Another member of the Tegal Working Committee was to make an inventory of the contents of the government warehouses, which would also be closed if any irregularities were found.

A similar review of the administration of the various Residency offices was begun by Mohamad Saleh, the Brebes kabupaten Secretary. Two Tegal members of the GBP3D undertook the tasks of providing information to local revolutionary groups about why the GBP3D had arrived in Pekalongan, and organising guard duty. Members of the Tiga Daerah Escort Company were sent to the municipal telephone exchange, post office, electricity and water supply, and vehicles leaving and entering the Residency capital were stopped for questioning. The administration of the jail and the police were also put under the authority of the Takeover Staff. Prisoners dating from the Japanese occupation were released. Meanwhile, the former Acting Resident Soeprapto continued to hand over the contents of the Resident's office, including all secret files, to Sardjio. Apparently nothing was destroyed.

After the closing of the government offices on the Tuesday, the Takeover Staff returned to the Hotel Merdeka to hear reports of what had been achieved in the two days of the new administration, and to plan the next moves in their 'democratisation' strategy. The creation of Working Committees, now called Dewan Pekerja, at the kawedanan, kecamatan and village levels as in the Tiga Daerah, was to

96 Soelaiman was treasurer of the Tegal Working Committee.

97 A member of the Tegal KNI group, as head of Information and Government Affairs on the GBP3D, organised the propaganda campaign. Muhamad Nuh was responsible for the Escort Company, and Amir and K. Midjaja planned meetings to explain the aims of the Tiga Daerah throughout Pekalongan kabupaten.
begin in Pekalongan.\textsuperscript{98} The situation in Batang kawedanan immediately to the east of Pekalongan was probably discussed. The previous evening K. Midjaja had received a delegation led by the Chairman of the Batang Working Committee and had learnt of the situation to the south where a local camat had fled from his post the previous Saturday. K. Midjaja had advised that if the people did not like their camat they should form a Working Committee 'to replace the camat' and carry on the administration. There was also a plan being formulated to divide the huge Pekalongan kabupaten into two, with a new kabupaten capital at Batang.\textsuperscript{99}

Aware of the importance of cadre forming in the rural areas the GBP3D also tried with what few cadres it had in Pekalongan to form PESINDO branches in the Pekalongan coastal kecamatans. The responsibility for this was given to Ibu Pri, a trusted underground PKI courier, who knew the area well. In line with the 'democratisation' strategy of the GBP3D, earlier in the day (11 December) Sardjio had issued his first (and last) public announcement (see Appendix I for translation). This explained that on 9 December the Pekalongan Residency government had 'surrendered' and had fallen into the hands of the people, and went on to announce the replacement of old priyayi titles with more democratic forms of address.\textsuperscript{100}

The following day, Wednesday, 12 December, the Takeover Staff continued their inventory work, while K. Midjaja and Sardjio discussed with Soeprapto the question of the official ratification of the new Resident. K. Midjaja explained that he had already sent a telegram to the central government asking for Sardjio to be formally appointed.\textsuperscript{101}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98} Kedaulatan Rakyat, 15 December 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Soewito, Question 12, Proces-verbaal.
\item \textsuperscript{100} This announcement is discussed in Chapter Seven, in the section on language hierarchy. See Appendix I for the translation of this announcement.
\item \textsuperscript{101} This telegram had been sent after the meeting between the GBP3D and the Badan Perjuangan Pekalongan on Sunday, 9 December. K. Midjaja, Question 22, Proces-verbaal; Kartohargo, Question 19, Proces-verbaal, 15.1.47.
\end{itemize}
It was agreed that Soeprapto (the former Acting Resident) should do the same. Sardjio also requested that Soeprapto stay on in the new Residency administration, as the new Resident would have to be spending a lot of time away from Pekalongan City. The ex-Acting Resident agreed, but said he wished to make a report to the provincial Governor (now in Purwodadi), about what had happened in Pekalongan.  

That afternoon, K. Midjaja (as leader of the GBP3D) held a public meeting in the Pekalongan City square, in order to introduce the new Resident to the people of Pekalongan.

The attendance was very satisfying. People of all political persuasions came wanting to see what Sardjio looked like, and who the leading people [gembong-gembong] from the Tiga Daerah were. Most important, they wanted to know the plans of the Tiga Daerah leaders. The atmosphere at the meeting was peaceful until the end and there were no incidents of any kind.  

Copies of Sardjio's printed Announcement of 9 December were handed out. While the meeting seemed satisfied with Sardjio, K. Midjaja made what turned out to be a tactical error. In his speech he pointed out that the Pekalongan Muslim pemudas (and Pekalongan Muslims in general), were not as revolutionary as those in other areas such as Surabaya, East Java, and in West Java. In fact this was hardly justified as Pekalongan Muslim pemudas had gone to the Semarang front to fight the British along with other groups and the TKR. He also said that Working Committee members in the Tiga Daerah were emphasising that in view of the importance of the revolutionary struggle, 'religion could be put aside' (boleh disampingkan) at this time.  

103 Soeprapto also asked Midjaja for confirmation of Sardjio's request that he stay on from the GBP3D. Midjaja at first agreed but then said Soeprapto should leave.  
104 Answers, 10.  
105 Ibid.  
106 Unsigned letter from the Tegal branch of the Indonesian Workers Party, entitled 'The crisis in the region of Pekalongan Residency' dated 20 December 1945, Proc.Gen. According to the Yogyakarta TKR report the speeches were 'very extreme' (sangat extremis).
HOTEL MERDEKA, PEKALONGAN

PEKALONGAN RESIDENT'S MANSION
In the evening the by now routine meeting between members of the Tiga Daerah Takeover Staff was held in the Hotel Merdeka. A Tegal member of the GBP3D in charge of propaganda had begun to receive disturbing reports from Pekalongan pemudas, officials and others who had come to him with complaints. Firstly, officials were not happy with the frozen office funds, which had stopped much of the day-to-day government business. Officials from outlying areas in Pekalongan kabupaten with payrolls to collect had to return home empty-handed. Office heads in particular were worried that they might have to be responsible to court if employees were not paid. Similarly, those government departments with warehouses, especially the Department of Health, were worried that essential supplies of medicines to hospitals and health clinics were not being provided. Another problem was the behaviour of Tiga Daerah pemudas. There were local complaints that guards around the city 'were behaving like drunken Japanese soldiers'. Those who walked past the guardposts had to show respect (hormat). Those who did not, people said, were slapped, in exactly the same way as the Japanese had done.

Of more fundamental concern was the attitude of the Pekalongan TKR and of Muslims. The TKR was not happy, as all the vehicles leaving the city (many on their way to the Semarang front) were stopped one by one and searched for runaway officials and for equipment which it was forbidden to take from the city, such as typewriters and adding machines. The TKR viewed these searches seriously. To them this was hindering their efforts fighting the foreigner at the Semarang front. Arguments had broken out at the guard posts. According to a Pekalongan report a request from the TKR, to the GBP3D for assistance in fighting

107 The two members of the Tegal KNI group who had joined the Takeover Staff decided not to stay in the Hotel Merdeka with the rest of the Tiga Daerah people. Instead they sought lodgings with Sarli, the local Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader. They did this so as to be freer to seek out the views of local groups. Tegal GBP3D leader, Answers, 12.


the foreign enemy in Semarang was met with the reply that 'the foreign threat was not in Semarang but in Surabaya'.\textsuperscript{110}

Furthermore, rumours were being spread quickly amongst santri groups about the remarks K. Midjaja had made at the public meeting about the Pekalongan Muslim pemudas. It was being said now that K. Midjaja had 'ridiculed' Islam, had said that the Koranic oath was no longer any use, and worse.\textsuperscript{111} A counter-movement was beginning and mobilising dissent.

One of the Tegal GBP3D leaders, realising this, tried to impress on his colleagues the seriousness of these various reports at the Thursday meeting at the Hotel Merdeka. However, because the reports originated with Pekalongan people, K. Midjaja was unwilling to accept their validity and asked that they be checked first by Tiga Daerah people. Thus the meeting closed without any positive action being taken. One of the Tegal GBP3D leaders, who was not taking lightly the negative reactions of the Pekalongan community, decided he would try to meet Hizbullah and TKR leaders himself:

I approached Muhamad Nuh and Soehardjo\textsuperscript{112} to get them to evaluate my report again seriously. After a fierce debate, I asked Nuh to try his utmost to ensure that the members of our militia not act as if they were an occupying army. [I impressed on him that] the strength of our militia was not much compared with the army and the Pekalongan pemudas' paramilitary groups [barisan]. Especially if the army branded us as obstructing and hampering their effort at the [Semarang] front, this would not help us psychologically, and we could be suspected of being a tool of NICA or at least as a movement opposed to the national revolution.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} The Pekalongan Residency police chief, Suwarno, who said he attended the meeting, told me K. Midjaja said that Islam was the 'poison of the people' which 'hinders progress'. Interview, 22.9.71. The Public Prosecutor wrote in his report that Midjaja had said that the people could 'cut the throats of those leaders and officials who had made mistakes.' 'Laporan', Proc.Gen.

\textsuperscript{112} Before the war Soehardjo was Chairman of the Tegal branch of GERINDO and had founded a Union of Workshop Employees in 1940. He was a chutaicho of the Tegal municipality Barisan Pelopor, and a member of the Tegal Working Committee. Interview, 12.12.72.

\textsuperscript{113} Tegal GBP3D leader, Answers, 12.
In the discussions between the three Tegal leaders which lasted far into the night Muh Nuh finally agreed also to meet the following day with officials who were worried about the sealing of warehouses and government funds.

With the Islamic groups now upset, and the TKR concerned about being hampered fighting the foreigner, the GBP3D had reason to be concerned about the way the situation was developing. It was particularly important to have good relations with Islam. With the support of Islam the differences with the TKR could probably have been ironed out. The Pekalongan priyayis for their part were confused. Initially they believed the Tiga Daerah was strongly Islamic, because of the two santri bupatis (in Tegal and Brebes) and the many kyais chosen as camats. Now Maksum, the head of Social Affairs in the Takeover Staff, was lending a copy (in Dutch) of Das Kapital to a high priyayi, his counterpart in the old regime.114

While the Muslim groups in Pekalongan city were not initially antagonistic, it was a different matter with the Muhammadian batik-making community of Pekajangan, the home of many small batik and textile entrepreneurs, some kilometers to the south of the city. Their economic status and conservative religious outlook made their community suspicious, not to say afraid, of radical revolutionaries. It was from Pekajangan that the Japanese had chosen K.H. Iskandar Idris to be Commander of the Pekalongan PETA battalion, who later became Commander of the Pekalongan TKR XVII Regiment, and who had been captured while attending a Muhammadian conference near Tegal and was now, so Pekajangan believed, 'imprisoned' in Slawi.

It was Iskandar Idris' brother, Hassan Ismail, also a leader of the Muhammadian Pekajangan community and head of the local school, who paid a visit to the Pekalongan Police Chief, on the morning of 13 December.

Hassan Idris said: 'We have heard that Islam has been made a mockery of [diperolok] by Sardjio at

114 Dr Soeyono, Transcript, 1/2-3, 27.8.71.
a mass meeting. If they held a large meeting, we want to prove that the Muslim people [ummat Islam] can hold a Muslim meeting that is just as big.' I told him if he could guarantee the security I had no objection. 115

The Muslim meeting went ahead later in the day (Thursday, 13 December), 116 followed by a parade which marched past the Hotel Merdeka (the leaders' headquarters) which it was explained was to 'honour' the new Resident. The crowd were chanting the familiar lá ilāha illā 'llāh (there is no god but Allah) and 'Allahu Akbar' (God is most great).

The following morning, Friday, 14 December, Sardjio and a small staff set out in three cars to visit several southern kecamatans. In the first car was Sardjio, his secretary, Maksum, the Brebes leader and two pemuda bodyguards. In the second car was K. Midjaja, the Pekalongan vet, Dr Soeyono, who had been head of the kabupaten welfare office, with three bodyguards, and in the last vehicle Pekalongan police. 117 The Pekajangan santri leaders had got word of the fact that the Resident and staff would be passing and made plans to intercept the car and capture the 'communist' Resident. Hassan Ismail, the leader of the Pekajangan-based counter-movement who had organised the mass meeting and parade the previous day, called in several ex-PETA and Heiho to help in organising the ambush. A pupil at Hassan's school recalls:

Hassan let the school out early and we as children were enjoying it all immensely. It was very exciting to see our religious teacher with a pistol. He had no military education and no practice with firearms. Another teacher also had a pistol. Then there was the excitement of seeing a car, a rare

115 Pekalongan Residency Police Chief, Soewarno, Interview, 22.9.71.

116 According to a priyayi account, S.M. Kartosuwirjo, who was 'passing through' Pekalongan, spoke at the mass meeting which began the counter-movement against the Tiga Daerah. Dr Soeyono, Transcript, I/5, 27.8.71. See also fn.83. The Muhammadiyah former Wedana of Adiwenra also recorded in his diary meeting Kartosuwirjo in the main Pekalongan mosque on 22 December.

117 Dr Soeyono, Transcript, I/6, 27.8.71.
event in those days: there were never more than three a day. A road block was put up so they couldn't get past. Hassan Ismail took cover behind a tamarind tree and pointed his pistol down the road. An old car came into sight and everyone started firing. Hassan was firing madly at the car, he must have finished off two rounds (24 bullets). The driver acted instantly and with great skill [ulung] swung the car around to drive back the way he came.118

Accounts differ as to exactly what happened next. It seems that at least one vehicle could not be driven because the tyres had been shot. The only casualty in the shooting was K. Midjaja who was wounded in the knee. Another account has Sardjio getting out of a car, looking very pale and telephoning to Pekalongan119 to send a car to pick up the group.

News of the shooting incident quickly got back to Pekalongan. Exaggerated rumours spread like wildfire reaching the TKR Regiment staff, meeting with their Commander Wadyono who had just returned from the Semarang front and Division headquarters the night before. About 1.30 p.m.

We were having a meal, when the TKR entered [the Hotel Merdeka] and we were told we were under arrest, and to surrender our arms. According to the Buginese adat law, a person who surrenders his arms is no longer a man, it was far more honourable to die. But I thought to die in vain is to die needlessly [mati konyol mati percuma].120

The four-day-old revolutionary government had come to an abrupt end.

118 Pupil of Hassan Ismail, Interview, 24.6.73.
119 Ibid.
120 Tegal KRIS leader, Andi Penyamin, Interview, 28.8.71.
THE acting TKR Regiment Commander recalls that the decision to arrest Sardjio was made by all members of the Regiment General Staff, 'at least all the section heads, especially those officers whose parents had been detained'. In another interview Wadyono recalls that:

...all those [Pangreh Praja] who had been detained, were known to me, and highly respected. At least this had an influence. Natsir [Pemalang Police Chief] and Sudirman [Wedana of Brebes] I knew well ...nearly all the others I knew individually as well. In our judgment their detention was not just.

The first part of this chapter analyses the social background of the Japanese created defence, the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, Fatherland Defence), in Pekalongan, and the connections of its officers with the Pangreh Praja. The better living conditions in the PETA compared with the rest of the famine-stricken population were part of the background to the Tiga Daerah animosity to the TKR. We will then resume the account of events after 14 December to show how the army, with Pekalongan Muslim groups, decided to launch a full scale counter-revolution against the Tiga Daerah and why it was successful.

Social Origins of the Pekalongan TKR

To understand the class loyalties of Pekalongan TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat; People's Security Army) officers, we must look briefly at the composition of Pekalongan Residency's two PETA battalions (daidan). The social origins of the two upper ranks of these battalions, the two battalion commanders and seven of the eight

1 Wadyono, Interview, 26.8.71.

2 Ibid. In subsequent talks, Wadyono's view of the influence of these family connections on the way the TKR acted, changed. He later played them down.
company commanders (chudancho) are given in Appendix J. At first glance it may appear that the choice of battalion commanders followed what in the past had been considered a Java-wide policy of the Japanese, in choosing santris who were prominent in the Muhammadiah movement, usually teachers. However, the two Pekalongan Residency battalions were exceptional in the western half of Central Java, as commanders in neighbouring regions were all Pangreh Praja. While Iskandar Idris was well known around Pekalongan, he could hardly be called 'an Islamic leader influential enough to be able to attract 500 men' (the number in each daidan). The same was true of the Tegal battalion commander, K.H. Doerjatman. He was imported from Cirebon by the Japanese after the first choice, K.H. Abdul Gafi, the Muhammadiah leader from Bumiayu, a strong Muhammadiah centre in southern Brebes, resisted Japanese pressure to take the job.

In the appointment of company commanders, the Japanese followed a policy of using former Pangreh Praja. In Pekalongan

3 Kanahele writes that '...by profession many if not most of daidancho [battalion commanders] were principals or teachers in Muhammadiah or other Islamic schools'. The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence (unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1967), 124 (subsequented cited as Japanese Occupation).

4 I.e, Martosubeno, the commander of Weleri battalion between Semarang and Pekalongan was a former wedana; in Kedu Residency at least two of the four commanders (Mohammad Susman and Mokahar) were from the Pangreh Praja; in Banyumas Residency it was the same, R.M. Susalit, Kartini's son and a former camat was commander of one of the battalions. Wadyono, Interview, 7.10.76. See also 'Bagan Susunan Organisasi PETA di Jawa-Tengah' in the official Central Java Diponegoro Division History, Sirnaning Yakso katon Gapuraking Ratu (Semarang, 1968), 14-15.

5 Kanahele, Japanese Occupation, 122. In choosing Iskandar Idris the battalion commander, the Japanese selectors passed over Soedjono, at that time head of the Pekalongan kabupaten economic affairs section. Having been assured informally by a Japanese that he would get the job, he recalls his chagrin at seeing the Japanese provide Idris with a pair of spectacles so he could pass the eye test during the medical examination. Transcript II/12, 29.7.73.

6 Abdul Gafi, Interview, 13.12.75.
battalion only one company commander (Tjiptowiduro) was not from the Pangreh Praja, while in Tegal battalion the three company commanders whose backgrounds are known were all from Pangreh Praja families.\(^7\)

None of the seven company commanders known seem to have had any strong Islamic affiliations, although one had been a teacher at a Muhammadiyah school.

What data is available on platoon commanders (shodancho) indicates that the Japanese also tended to recruit this group from the priyayi class.\(^8\)

**Contrasting Living Conditions**

For the officer corps, living conditions in the PETA were probably not very different to what they had been used to as government officials. While a camat entering PETA as a company commander would have received a drop in salary, a school teacher (such as Djoeweni) would have jumped from Rp. 67.50 to Rp. 170 per month. Furthermore, a whole month's salary was paid after the first week of training. This was sent to family or parents, by special mail transfer bearing the seal of the Japanese military headquarters.\(^9\) As there were no expenses during the six months' training - food and uniforms were provided free - one commander, Isnaeni, was able after the training ended to take home three months' pay to his parents who were 'terribly pleased'. When the PETA was disbanded shortly after the

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7 Tjiptowiduro was the son of a peasant who owned 0.7 hectares of sawah near Pemalang. He was able to complete teachers' training school in Salatiga with financial help from a teacher. Interview, 19.2.75.

8 From the data I have on five shodancho who joined the TKR 17th Regiment, one was a former lurah, two were sons of wedanas, and two others had fathers who had been lower level government officials. Cf. Kanahele's claim (echoing Benda) that as a requirement for lower grade officer candidates '...one's Islamic affiliations were still sine qua non'. Japanese Occupation, 122.

9 Djoeweni's parents on seeing the seal got a great shock, thinking it was a message to say that their son had been killed in action.
Proclamation he recalls: '...we got six months' pay if I remember correctly. I bought a large house in Pekalongan, completely furnished, with a radio, and an electric refrigerator.'

For the ordinary soldier, however, living conditions in a PETA company were extremely attractive, especially when compared with the bulk of the Residency population. This was not just due to good pay. As well as paying salaries, under the self-maintenance (genchi jikatsu) policy already discussed in Chapter Two, capital provided by the Japanese through each battalion headquarters (hon bu) was used by PETA companies to acquire various economic assets. These assets were then managed by the company commander for the benefit of himself and his men. How this worked out in practice depended a lot on where the company happened to be stationed, as well as the entrepreneurship of its officers. The Pekalongan battalion, for example, had only two milking cows (which meant fresh milk only for the sick), a fish pond and some cassava fields.

Amongst the companies of the Tegal battalion, however, a flourishing barter system operated. The first company, stationed at the battalion headquarters at the old Kemantran sugar mill, had half a hectare of fish ponds, the produce from which was bartered for goats from the second company in the old Sumberharjo mill, south of Pemalang.

The second company took the self-maintenance policy seriously. One one of the company's three sections was training for combat. The remaining two were employed full-time in implementing the self-maintenance policy. The agriculture section, which consisted of 40 men 'whose education was poor', was given the job of cultivating the hectare of wet rice fields, and a second hectare of ground nuts, chillies and other vegetables. The economic affairs section was in

10 Isnaeni, Interview, 18.10.75.

11 The PETA monthly wages according to Isnaeni were: daidancho, Rp.270; chudancho, Rp.170; shodancho, Rp.70; bundancho, Rp.271/2; while an ordinary soldier got Rp.17. Interview, 18.10.75.
charge of looking after the company's flock of 100 goats (which enabled the company to eat meat nearly every second day), and 120 ducks, which produced 70-90 eggs each during the laying season. The company also ran very productive fishponds, and the barter system which operated between companies ensured that other needs were supplied. Whether as part of the self-maintenance policy or not, the Japanese also supplied free electricity, cigarettes and clothes, as well as sugar, rice and vegetables.

On top of all this the Japanese-sponsored women's organisation, the Fujinkai, sent food parcels occasionally, and the BP2 (Soldiers' Aid Organisation) chaired by Abdul Mutholib (heavily involved in the corruption of the Pangreh Praja cooperative KOPI), provided free entertainment as well. As a company commander of the Pekalongan daidan recalls: 'During the Japanese time everyone suffered, but we in the PETA didn't. Communications with the people were limited because the PETA lived in barracks [asrama].'

The appalling gulf between PETA affluence and popular misery was not peculiar to Pekalongan (although indeed the gulf there may have been especially wide for reasons discussed in Chapter Two). The attempt to do something about it by identifying more with the people was one reason behind the PETA revolt in Blitar. For example, plantation warehouses and storerooms were opened to let the people take food and clothing so desperately needed. The nature of

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12 Villages in this area of Pekalongan Residency specialised in intensive duck husbandry involving the 'shepherding' of ducks along the irrigation channels and waterways of Pemalang's coastal plain. A soldier who had deserted, was fetched back from his village and put in charge of the company's duck husbandry by the company commander, Djoeweni. Transcript, II/5, 17.4.75.

13 Djoeweni, Transcript, II/15, 17.4.75.

14 To combat VD, the men in this company were also issued with free condoms. Djoeweni, Transcript, II/16, 17.4.75.

15 Wadyono, Interview, 20.11.74, 15.10.76.

Pekalongan priyayi relations with society meant that Pekalongan PETA battalion officers were comparatively more indifferent to conditions around them than their colleagues elsewhere. They were more accustomed to the division in wealth between priyayis and the masses than were PETA leaders in Blitar.

On receiving instructions to disband his company after the Proclamation, it was the intention of the Pemalang company Commander, Djoeweni, to hand over the company's assets to the Bupati of Pemalang. However, after the company had been disarmed in a brief ceremony at Pemalang's Widuri Beach, the battalion barracks, eight kilometres south of the City in the old Sumberharjo sugar mill, were attacked:

Our property was attacked; the people wanted the goats, they wanted the ducks, and they began pulling up the plants. ...the men started being afraid, they were mostly from the villages, so we moved quickly to defuse the situation. [After the men were sent home] a few of the really heavy pieces of barrack furniture were taken to the kabupaten but the rest was taken by the people on their shoulders [dipikul] to the kampungs, the local government was not able to cope with the situation.  

The BKR

On 20 August the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence announced that a voluntary People's Security Organisation (BKR, Badan Keamanan Rakyat) would be formed, under the authority of local KNIs. However, it was not until early September that former PETA members, disarmed and sent home after their battalions had been disbanded by the Japanese, began to meet to form local BKR units.

Before this the Tegal Barisan Pelopor had sent a delegation to meet Kyai Doerjatman, the commander of the Tegal battalion, stationed in the old Kemantran sugar mill to the east of the city.

17 Djoeweni, Transcript, III/21.

18 Anderson, Java, 103-04.
They suggested to the Kyai that the PETA battalion should keep its weapons, and form a new BKR group. They were too late. Most members of the battalion had already returned to their villages and kampungs, and the Japanese had taken the weapons to Bandung, saying that 'they were to be replaced with new ones'.

About 80 per cent of the two former Pekalongan Residency battalions subsequently joined local BKR groups in the kabupaten capitals and in kawedanan towns. At this level the BKR was led by former section commanders. These groups were similar in some respects to the other badan perjuangan. They were loosely knit, with no ranks, and no formal structure and, like the other struggle groups, perceived their basic task was to organise local security. Membership of the BKR and other badan perjuangan often overlapped. At Balapulang, for example, the local API group and the BKR had almost identical membership.

However, the BKR enjoyed special facilities that these other groups did not have. The local BKR units took over or were given the offices and finances of the former BP2, now called the BPKKP, whose funds the Pangreh Praja had obtained from the people for families of PETA and Heiho. BP2 buildings served as local BKR headquarters, and funds were used to provide food and uniforms. The Slawi BKR leader describes the situation there:

We took over an empty house which had a telephone, as a base. Our first priority was to contact various leaders or well known people in the town and get them to organise the local security for their own districts. I had no idea at the time the extent of our 'area' of responsibility. I considered the BKR to be like a guard post, from which we could organise security in the villages and where people could ask about anything that came up....

19 Muhamad Nuh, SEMDAM, 6; Marsum, 'Ceritaku', 70-73.
20 The Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (Organisation for Aid to Families of War Victims) was formed on 20 August, as a reconstituted version of the BP2 (Anderson, Java, 103). In Pekalongan Residency the BPKKP Chairman was Dr Maas, the Pekalongan representative on the Central Advisory Council and a Pekalongan KNI member.
21 Wadyono, Interview, 10.10.71.
22 Slawi BKR leader, Transcript, I/9, 29.5.73.
The TKR

It was the siege of the kenpeita, beginning on 4 October, that brought BKR leaders together in Pekalongan for the first time since the disbanding of PETA. While Sukarno had announced the setting up of the TKR in Jakarta on 5 October, it was not until some days later, after BKR units had returned from accompanying Japanese soldiers and civilians to Purwokerto, that the Pekalongan TKR was formed. The TKR 17th Regiment along with regiments in other North Coast towns of Kendal, Purwodadi and Pati, was part of the 4th Division with headquarters in Salatiga under Colonel Djarikusumo. It consisted of four battalions, in each of the kabupatens of the Residency. This organisational structure thus marked a clear departure from PETA, in that there was now one centre (in the obvious government capital) instead of two.

Of the two ex-PETA battalion commanders and eight company commanders in Pekalongan Residency only two did not join their friends in the TKR 17th battalion. These were both from the Tegal battalion. Following the capture of the Commander, Iskandar Idris, and the withdrawal of the battalions from the Tiga Daerah, the Regiment General Staff was reorganised (see Appendix J). Wadyono became acting Commander, and Soedharmo, the Chief of Staff, replaced Boestomi, who had left without notice for Yogyakarta. Regiment General Staff was increased from four to eight, with several new sections.

Two results of this General Staff re-organisation in early November need to be mentioned. The dominance of former Pekalongan PETA battalion members meant that the Regiment General Staff was more loyal to local Pekalongan municipality and kabupaten political

23 These were the Tegal battalion commander, K.H. Doerjatman, and Rasimin.

24 According to the acting Commander, Boestomi and Wilujo Pospojudo both 'ran away' to Yogyakarta after Iskandar Idris was captured, without telling any of the General Staff or the acting Commander, but Wilujo decided to return to Pekalongan before reaching Yogyakarta. He was then made Head of Intelligence. Interview, 26.8.71.
sentiments than to Tegal, whence the Tiga Daerah got its main support. Tegal now had no 'voice' at Regiment headquarters. Secondly, two new members of the General Staff, the Head of Intelligence (Wilujo Pospojudo) and Head of Organisation (Sugito) had fathers in the Pangreh Praja in the Tiga Daerah. The Bupati of Brebes (Sugito's father) had not been heard of since 18 October, while Wijogo Pospojudo the Wedana of Pemalang, was being kept in Pemalang jail. Pangreh Praja ties with the TKR were further strengthened with the appointment to the General Staff (as head of the Regiment secretariat) of the Camat of Brebes, who had sought the safety of the Residency capital during the revolusi sosial.

While the reasons for the withdrawal of the three TKR battalions from the Tiga Daerah are fairly certain, who gave the order is still a matter of speculation. The order 'not to fire on the people' and to withdraw came as a telegram, which was relayed to the three battalions in the Tiga Daerah. According to Wadyono this was signed by General Oerip Sumohardjo, the TKR Supreme Commander. Wadyono believes that the leftist General Djokosoejono had an important influence on the attitude of Yogya headquarters at the time. Sajuti Melik claims that after discussing the critical situation in Tegal with Slawi AMRI leaders after his capture at Adiwerna, he telephoned TKR Yogya headquarters. According to the TKR acting Commander, the withdrawal was ordered by Yogyakarta 'to prevent further armed clashes'...

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25 Isnaeni, the only Tegal daidan member of the General Staff, was moved to a battalion after this reorganisation. See Appendix J.

26 Soebagyo was a graduate from MOSVIA in the same year as Wadyono and was a close friend.

27 Djokosoejono came to Pemalang at least once during the Tiga Daerah Affair with Sayuti Melik, and stayed with Soepangat; Lasem courier Interview, 27.7.71. He later became head of the Army's Struggle Bureau (Biro Perjuangan) under M. Amir Sjarifuddin. See Anderson, Java, passim.
between the TKR and the people. An early attempt by the 17th Regiment to obtain reinforcements of one more battalion from Gatot Subroto, Commander of the Banyumas Regiment, failed.

The order to withdraw was carried out fairly smoothly by the TKR from Brebes. A special train had been sent from Pekalongan to take the fourth battalion back to regiment headquarters. Although the Brebes KNI Chairman, Kartohargo, tried to persuade the battalion commander not to leave, it was to no avail. He was told that 'this was a military order' from Yogyakarta headquarters passed on by the Regiment command. The train stopped in Tegal and Pemalang, but there was no attempt to interfere with the withdrawal of the Brebes battalion even though it was the last of the three to go.

The situation in Tegal was more confused. We have seen in Chapter Eight how the demonstrators who marched on the city on 4 November attacked the TKR battalion headquarters believing, mistakenly, that API leaders were hiding there. The TKR had barricaded itself in, firing shots over the heads of the demonstrators until well into the night. Reinforcements coming to relieve the third battalion under the command of Soedharmo were stopped in Pemalang, and had to turn back. At this stage the beleaguered battalion

28 The earlier, more detailed Central Java Diponegoro Division's published history of the revolution (up to and including the Banteng Movement, the army's campaign against the Darul Islam in Tegal and Brebes kabupaten in late 1950), entitled Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro (Semarang, 1964?) (subsequently cited as Sedjarah Tentara Nasional) which was never released, does not mention the withdrawal of the battalions at all in its discussion of the Tiga Daerah Affair. The later revised version of this history, published in 1968, says the reason for the instruction via radiogram from Yogyakarta headquarters was to avoid further armed clashes with the people. Sirnaning Yakso katon Gapuraning Ratu, 60. Nasution says that the withdrawal was a direct result of the clash between the third battalion and the people in Tegal on 4 November, and it was to prevent a continuation of these incidents. A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, 2, Diplomasi atau Bertempur (Bandung, 1977), 548 (subsequently cited as Sekitar Perang).

29 No reason was given to Wadyono's adjutant, Soemantoro, who went to Banyumas with the request, for the refusal. Wadyono, Interview, 27.8.71.

30 Third battalion Commander, Interview, 6.3.73.

31 Maj.Gen. Soedharmo, Transcript, I/2, 26.3.73.
received orders from Regimental headquarters by telephone to withdraw immediately to Pekalongan. A boat was found with enough petrol, and at 2 a.m. on 5 November one company slipped quietly down to the harbour and set off, without food or water, arriving in the Residency capital at 8 p.m. the following evening. Meanwhile the remainder of the battalion was waiting to see if the demonstrators would disperse. By 4 a.m. all seemed quiet, and the third battalion marched in formation to the station, where they boarded their special train for Pekalongan.

Military Elements Remaining

While couriers had been negotiating with the railways for a special train to take the battalion to Pekalongan, an urgent meeting was held to decide who would go. A group within the battalion, which had recently been formed into a sea company (kompi laut) under the command of Lieut Jusuf, decided to stay. There were several reasons. Firstly, most of the members of this sea company seemed to have homes in Tegal itself. Secondly, they were not from either of the Residency PETA battalions and did not feel the same loyalty to their former PETA officers now in the 17th Regiment. Instead, they were former students from one or other of the Nautical Schools (Sekolah Pelaut) which the Japanese had set up along the North Coast, including Tegal and Pekalongan. There were also several section commanders (bundancho) from PETA units outside the Residency who stayed behind in the sea company.

Quite separate from the sea company of the third battalion was the Naval TKR (TKR Laut). This had begun as the BKR Laut soon after the BKR was founded in September, and were led by former students of the Intermediate Navigation School (Sekolah Pelayaran Tinggi) in Semarang. After the Five Day War between Japanese and Republican forces in Semarang ended on 19 October, the British occupied the Semarang harbour thus forcing the newly formed TKR Laut to move to

32 Third battalion commander, Transcript, IV/32, 35, 17.4.75.
Tegal under the leadership of one Darwis Djarmin from Sulawesi. Like many other badan perjuangan, the 30-strong TKR Laut 'had no plan of action' at that time, except to obtain weapons. These were obtained from Demak, via Solo, although the hoped for return of boats, which had been moved from Semarang harbour to Jepara during the fighting with the Japanese, did not eventuate. On 26 October the TKR Laut received a grant of Rp.10,000 from the Governor of Central Java, to provide food and equipment for the unit. After the 4 November attack on Tegal, the group decided that having the letters TKR in front of their name was a distinct disadvantage, and on 7 November with agreement from Jakarta, changed its name to simply Base IV. Strengthened by the arrival of Jakarta Nautical School students and others from Surabaya and Australia, the base took over the now empty TKR third battalion headquarters.

In their efforts to re-establish a military presence in the Tiga Daerah, revolutionary leaders worked with both the sea company and the navy base. We have already seen how the Tegal Working Committee was approached for funds by the navy leader Darwis Djarmin, with a proposal to sell off some of the sugar stocks to buy weapons and food. The base was reorganised during this period and enlarged to include shipping, accommodation, administration, recruitment, transport intelligence, and personnel sections. Military training was also carried out in the hill station of Tuwel, in the mountains to the south of the City.

33 The story of the formation of the Naval BKR/TKR is fully described in the weekly newspaper, Djangkar, published by the information section of the navy in Tegal, 31 October-7 November (Nos 19-20), 1946.

34 Ibid.

35 The writer of the history of the TKR Laut recalls 'at that time the TKR name was not liked in Tegal municipality'. Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.
The sea company was also used by the Tegal Working Committee to train pemudas and to help maintain law and order. On one occasion Kutil, as the new kabupaten Police Chief, was unable to deal with a band who were kidnapping village officials in Sumurpanggang kecamatan and asked the sea company for help 'to catch the robbers [perampok]'. One of the section commanders arrived at Margadana village but the robbers 'scared of the Japanese army' were able to escape.

The Western Front

While the navy was training itself to fight the enemy in Tegal, two battalions of the 17th Regiment from Pekalongan were doing duty (with battalions from other TKR regiments) at the Semarang front. Located at the small town of Kaliwungu about 15 kilometres to the west of the provincial capital, the TKR had set up a western headquarters (Markas Medan Barat) to block the British if they attempted to extend their occupation from Semarang, where they had landed troops on 20 October. On 30 October, three days after the British had sent a small force to Pekalongan to observe places of detention of foreigners, fighting broke out in Semarang and quickly spread south to Magelang. A subsequent truce was negotiated but this was soon broken, and after more fierce fighting Indian troops were forced to abandon Magelang on 21 November. By the end of November, Ambarawa itself was evacuated. The western front at Kaliwungu was part of the Republican military strategy to keep the Allied presence confined to Semarang. Probably on account of British logistics, and political considerations, rather than the strength of the Front, after the withdrawal from Magelang the British never tried to venture out of Semarang again.

Ever since his appointment as acting Commander of the regiment in early November, Wadyono had been at the Semarang front,

38 Slawi BKR leader, Interview, 27.4.73.
39 Sea company section commander, Interview, 16.8.71.
40 See Chapter Eight.
returning only briefly with the rotation of the 17th Regiment battalions. On hearing about the GBP3D leaflets of 5 December setting out the Tiga Daerah demands, on 7 December Wadyono had sent as the TKR's reply a telegram from the Kaliwungu front to AMRI in Tegal. It stated quite clearly that the army was not going to become involved in matters concerning the Residency civilian government. Before returning to Pekalongan again on 13 December, Wadyono reported to Division Headquarters in Salatiga. There he discussed 'the new Resident appointed by Bung Karno' and the latest political developments in Pekalongan with the Commander of the third division, Colonel Djarotusomo. In relation to the new government in Pekalongan, Wadyono recalls:

I was asked for advice [by Colonel Djarotusomo]:

'What is the best thing to do [bagaimana enaknya]?'

'It is better if the army just adapts [menyesuaikan] and recognises Sardjio' I told him. ...Colonel Djarotusomo just laughed when he heard that I wanted to help the [new] Resident...he did not agree but said that I could do what I liked.42

After the meeting in Salatiga, Wadyono had returned to Pekalongan. We have already seen (in Chapter Seven) how that night the TKR Commander had an important dream in which the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries were depicted symbolically as being 'from outside Java'. Next morning he discussed this with fellow TKR officers. The TKR officers were also finding irksome the posting of guards from the Tiga Daerah around the Residency capital. It showed 'that the TKR was not trusted and was considered as a hostile movement' by the new Resident. Wadyono was also told by his regiment staff of the counter-movement that had started amongst Muslims, led by the Pekajangan leader, Hassan Ismail, brother of the captured TKR Commander, Iskandar Idris. However, what was annoying the TKR more was the sealing of warehouses so that supplies of rice were locked up. Permission had to be obtained before vehicles could leave the City.

42 Wadyono, Interview, 27.8.71, 10.10.71.
And most serious of all, a train leaving with supplies for the Semarang front, had been stopped. The TKR had also been refused permission to try out newly repaired machine guns. Further rumours had been heard that the new Pekalongan government was going to disarm the TKR and the Pekalongan police force as well on 17 December.  

Wadyono was also influenced by two former colleagues from MOSVIA, the Pangreh Praja training school for government officials, namely the Residency and Pekalongan city police chiefs:

At the Muslim meeting against the Tiga Daerah in the city square, two old MOSVIA friends whom I respected, Soenarjio (killed in the Dutch clash) and Soewarno attended. If these two supported the growing movement against the Tiga Daerah then I felt more justified in acting.

What had also shocked Pekalongan's priyayis, including the TKR officers, was the way revolutionaries from Adiwerna had dombreng-ed Karinah and her daughter (wife of Soenarjio, the then Bupati of Tegal) around the City, dressed in sacking, on 4 November. 'This news really had an effect on those of us who had been in the PETA', recalls the TKR acting Commander, 'those who dombreng-ed the Bupati's wife were not acting according to the norms of Javanese culture'.

At the meeting of the Regiment General Staff on the morning of Friday, 13 December, the Commander was urged on by the younger pemuda-type hotbloods, in particular his adjutant Sumantoro, the chief of staff, Soedharmo, and the Head of Intelligence, Wilujo Pospojudo. The latter had a special relationship with the acting Commander. As his PETA superior officer, Wadyono had acted as a sponsor in Pospojudo's marriage. News of the shooting incident involving the Resident and Iskandar Idris' brother, Hassan Ismail, and the wounding

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43 These are the reasons given by Soeprato, the ex-acting Resident, for arrests made 'by the army, helped by Hizbullah and Sabilillah', in a handwritten note dated 25.12.45. Proc.Gen.

43 Wadyono, Interview, 28.7.71.

CIKALSARI PRISON IN PEKALONGAN

THE PEKALONGAN SOCIETEIT
of K. Midjaja finally made the Regiment staff decide in favour of immediate action. Wilujo Pospojudo was chosen to lead the force to arrest Sardjio and the Tiga Daerah staff at the Hotel Merdeka.

Military Intervention

By the initial action to disarm about 50 Tiga Daerah guards and arrest the Resident and his staff at the Hotel Merdeka, the TKR probably did not consider that it was committing itself further. Initially, it may have thought of Sardjio's arrest as a daulat or dombreng type of action in reverse. However, it soon became clear that the military intervention had wider ramifications than at first realised, as was to become clear when the extent of the arrests became known. According to the list supplied by the Public Prosecutor, 178 people who had come to Pekalongan from the Tiga Daerah were arrested and thrown into the City's two jails on 14 December.46

This list also gives an indication of the social backgrounds of Sardjio's supporters who came to Pekalongan from the Tiga Daerah. The biggest single group was classified by the Pekalongan authorities as 'peasants' (tani), and most of these (37 out of 52) were from Tegal and Pemalang, with only five from Brebes. Of the remaining 10, eight were from the sugar mill town of Sragi on the Pekalongan-Pemalang border, and one was from Kesesi southwest of Pekalongan. After peasants, the next biggest group were petty traders, including a rice merchant. There were also government officials from the kabupaten office, the railways and the post office; village officials, including the Lurah of Slawi; five former Heiho members (also from Slawi); a plantation foreman, two medical orderlies (from Pemalang), and five policemen. As well there was a sprinkling from the urban proletariat, tailors, weavers, mechanics (including a bicycle repair man), peddlars, drivers, a shoemaker and a goldsmith. The majority of these supporters of the Tiga Daerah movement were under 25.

46 These included all of the members of the Takeover Staff, see Chapter Nine, fn.81.
and from either Tegal or Pemalang. 47

The Muslim led counter-movement now exploited the TKR intervention to its own advantage. The leader of the Pekajangan Mudammadiah community, who had organised the ambush of the Resident's entourage and led the shooting in which Midjaja had been wounded in the knee, arrived at TKR headquarters demanding that his group now be armed. The reason given was 'because it was he who had begun the opposition movement against the Tiga Daerah at Pekajangan. The TKR acting Commander replied that he did not depend on Pekajangan for support and furthermore had not been told beforehand of the plan to ambush the Resident. 48

Meanwhile, Pekalongan PESINDO issued two printed announcements. The first some time after the TKR action on 14 December called on the people to 'remain calm' as the Tiga Daerah guards 'had been arrested by the TKR'. There was no mention of the Resident also having been arrested. This was quickly followed by a more formal announcement, now admitting that the new Tiga Daerah government had been 'ended' by the TKR and that a People's Representative Council would be formed as soon as possible. With the agreement of the TKR, the announcement went on, a meeting on the following morning (Saturday, 15 December) at 10 a.m. would set up a steering committee to implement the People's Representative Council proposal. 49 However, this attempt at local democracy was thwarted by further army and Muslim action.

The members of the GBP3D remaining in the Tiga Daerah now held an emergency meeting in Pemalang. Soewignjo reported that he had tried to negotiate by telephone with the TKR acting Commander for the release of Sardjio and his staff. This had come to nothing (kandas), as Wadyono had refused to release any of the prisoners. The meeting, attended by AMRI Slawi leaders Soewignjo and Sakirman,


48 Wadyono, Interview, 10.10.71.

49 PESINDO printed statements to be found in Proc.Gen.
Kartohargo and another leader from Brebes, and Soepangat, decided to send a force (laskar) from Tegal and Pemalang to mount a demonstration in Pekalongan for the release of the prisoners. 50

Meanwhile in Pekalongan, the TKR attitude was hardening. Rumours about an attack from the Tiga Daerah to free the Resident and the other 170 prisoners were circulating. Pekalongan had also been informed that the Presidential entourage, which included Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, the Prime Minister Sjahrir and the Minister of Defence, Mr Amir Sjarifuddin, would be arriving in Pekalongan at the end of a whistle-stop tour through Java in a week's time (23-24 December). The Regiment General Staff felt that action was necessary to prevent the rumoured Tiga Daerah attack on Pekalongan which would throw the Residency into political chaos on the eve of the Presidential visit.

However, according to two sources at opposite ends of the political spectrum, Wadyono was still reluctant to involve the TKR in further action. An underground PKI courier who had avoided capture and was staying in the Hotel Merdeka at the time, recalls overhearing a conversation during a meeting at the Hotel. This took place between the Residency Police Chief, a Pekajangan leader and the redoubtable Sajuti Melik, now back in Pekalongan yet again with his wife S.K. Trimurti, who was also at the Hotel Merdeka 'plotting to overthrow the Tiga Daerah so her husband could become Resident'. In reply to Wadyono's expressed doubts about further action, Melik asked if he were going to change his mind with the job half finished, especially in view of the rumours about an attack on Pekalongan by the Tiga Daerah. Finally Pekajangan offered to take responsibility for financing the logistics of further action against the Tiga Daerah, and the TKR

agreed. Another Pekajangan santri source is also critical of the acting Commander at that time for 'keeping silent and not wanting to fight'.

Between the arrest of the Resident and the meeting three days later to decide what further action to take, the Thermidorean reaction against the Tiga Daerah in Pekalongan had strengthened. This was mainly because of the rumours of an imminent 'attack' from the Tiga Daerah, which were increasing. At a TKR-led meeting, a plan for a clean-up operation (pembersihan) 'to attack rather than be attacked' was drawn up, and a joint TKR-Hizbullah-Sabilillah force was formed. This was divided into several groups which would enter the Tiga Daerah from two directions, under the leadership of two ex-PETA/TKR men, Soegijono and Moechlis. One of these units, which was

51 Ibu Prioasmoro, Interview, 2.9.75. Wadyono himself does not mention (and probably does not recall) this meeting with Melik and Pekajangan leaders in the Hotel Merdeka. For ideological reasons the underground PKI were quick to blame Sayuti Melik for what happened in Pekalongan, saying today that it was his propaganda 'that Pemalang was being governed by the PKI' that started the counter-movement in Pekalongan. West Java CD leader, Interview, 4.7.78.

52 Pekajangan santri, Interview, 19.12.72.

53 Sedjarah Tentara Nasional, 33. Soegijono had been a shodancho in Kasman Utojo's company in the Tegal daidan. Moechlis was regarded as rather an eccentric by fellow officers. A former lurah before joining the PETA and a shodancho in Pekalongan daidan staff, he was believed to have magic power. As commander of the Pekalongan military region he supported the Revolutionary Council in 1965 and was imprisoned in Nusakambangan.
to enter the Tiga Daerah from the south, was led by Ali Murtopo.54

One large force led by Lieut Soegijono was to go along the main North Coast road to Tegal and Brebes, as far as Tanjung. A part of this group was to go by sea as far as Tegal.55 The second force under Lieut Moechlis was to turn inland at Pemalang and proceed via Balamoa, Adiwerna and Slawi to the southern areas of Tegal. However, because of the many groups which joined in, the implementation of the original plan with a coordinated command was difficult. Rendezvous times were mixed up, and fighting broke out between a Hizbullah unit at Kedungwungi, to the west of Pekalongan, and a 'force from the east' which turned out to be a group of Pekajangan. Two Hizbullah youths were killed. Recalls a participant: 'You must realise that the enthusiasm of the cry of siap [be ready!] was all there was'.56

54 Lieut.Gen. Ali Murtopo's role in the army-led counter-revolution against the Tiga Daerah has remained a mystery until recently, even to local TKR leaders themselves. Originally from Blora, in 1945 he was an official of a Foodstuffs Collection Committee (PPBM, Panitia Pengumpulan Bahan Makanan) and a member of the local Hizbullah in Pekalongan. On 2 September 1979 at a large reunion of the TKR 17th Regiment, attended by over 600 former members, Ali Murtopo revealed what his real role had been for the first time. 'In his own unique way, mentioning as witnesses a number of those attending the reunion, Ali Murtopo explained at great length how, although officially a member of Hizbullah, he was also clandestinely living in the barracks of the TKR as an ordinary soldier. Outside the barracks he used the badges of the rank of Sergeant Major, also clandestinely. In the clean up operation against the Tiga Daerah as a member of Hizbullah [Ali Murtopo] led the force that went south through Kesesi. He was able to mention the names of those who were with him, and the incidents which occurred. It was very convincing'. Personal communication from Wadyono, 4 September 1979. At the height of the Malari Affair in January 1974, a Jakarta newspaper (which was banned shortly afterwards) in its Corner (Pojok) Column referred to the 'prominent personality' who had played an important role in the Tiga Daerah Affair, who was also expert in psychological warfare. This was a direct reference to rumours circulating that Ali Murtopo had started the anti-Japanese riots to discredit the opposition movement against the Suharto government. Indonesia Raya, 16 January 1974.

55 Ibid, Sedjarah Tentara Nasional, 33.

56 Pekalongan TKR battalion staff leader, Interview, 18.10.75.
According to one contemporary account, the first opposition the TKR-led force encountered was at Sragi, the sugar mill town on the Pemalang-Pekalongan border. Fighting broke out and seven people were wounded. A participant from Pekajangan in the Hizbullah group recalls that '15 different weapons were found stored in the Sragi sugar mill, but no ammunition'. These were immediately taken by Hizbullah.

While the exact movements of the different pasukan (forces) are confused, the main Pekajangan group under the leadership of Hassan Ismail went with a TKR force along the North Coast road, the shortest route to Slawi, where Ismail's brother Iskandar Idris was being held. The group, in two trucks and a bus, included a well-known Pekajangan figure, Haji Ramli, who had dressed himself up 'to look like a traditional painting of Diponegoro', in long flowing white robes. Ramli stood in the back of a truck brandishing a long sword at people along the way in a wild frenzy of excitement. This sword-brandishing, and even the robes, have Koranic associations, representing a militant Muslim tradition, as well as symbolising Diponegoro in the popular mind.

Further clashes occurred at Comal with a group wearing the janur kuning, a symbol of opposition and invulnerability, and chanting Allahu Akbar, the Muslim Holy War chant. Some were armed with short swords and 'hand grenades' that they had made themselves.

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57 This figure is contained in an unsigned copy of a letter on the letterhead of the Tegal branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party, the PBI, giving an account of recent events in Pekalongan Residency, dated Purwokerto, 20 December 1945. Proc.Gen.

58 Pekajangan santri leader, Interview, 19.12.72. This leader, a close friend of Hassan Ismail, leader of the Pekajangan counter movement against the Tiga Daerah, was 25 at the time. He recalls first learning that firearms had different calibres after seeing the weapons confiscated at Sragi.

59 Anthony Reid has pointed out to me other instances of sword brandishing (and even the robes) in a militant Islamic context - in North Sumatra and even in contemporary Malaya.

60 TIR leader, Interview, 14.10.71; TKR Intelligence Officer, Interview, 5.10.71.
After three warnings the groups continued to advance so, at a distance of 25 metres, the TKR opened fire, with machine guns, over their heads. A number of bullets must have strayed low because as the group scattered, jumping into the muddy sawahs to hide, a number of dead and wounded were left.\(^{61}\) People were then asked who were their leaders and these were rounded up, disarmed, questioned, and some were sent back to Pekalongan. There they were put under a hosepipe in the City square as a 'punishment', told 'not to follow the Tiga Daerah movement any more' and sent home.\(^{62}\) Most who were armed with krisses lost the enthusiasm to fight after losing their weapons, which were a symbol of spiritual power and had special magical properties.\(^{63}\)

Sragi and Comal were the only places where the Tiga Daerah put up any group resistance to the TKR assault. In Petarukan, the next town to the west from Comal, the lenggaong Idris was shot and killed for resisting, and another popular PESINDO leader at Banjardawa sugar mill suffered the same fate.\(^{64}\) No more casualities are reported after this. From then on the TKR was able to simply pinpoint leaders of the popular movement and 'mop up' their supporters in each town, disarm them and send them back to Pekalongan. As well as being better armed, the TKR enlisted the help of a well-known lenggaong from a village south of Pekalongan as their algojo. Talib by name, he was still in jail in December 1945, sentenced to death by the Japanese according to one account:

> Late at night at 12 a.m. I was taken out and swore an oath to be willing to fight against [memberantas] the Tiga Daerah and to free Iskandar Idris...I stayed in Tegal and each day went to guard the [army's] prisoners in Slawi, 200 people'.\(^{65}\)

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61 Pekajangan santri leader, Interview, 19.12.72.

62 Wadyono, Interview, 27.8.71.

63 At the end of the TKR operation against the Tiga Daerah, the TKR was left with 'three cupboards full' of krisses. TKR Intelligence Officer, Interview, 5.10.71.

64 During the revolusi sosial Idris, who was leader of the Barisan Cenkrong had been proclaimed as Petarukan sugar mill administrator, as we saw in Chapter Five.

65 Interview, 13.12.72.
Because of the complete disorganisation early in the offensive amongst the Hizbullah units, on the arrival of the force in Pemalang at 11 a.m. on Thursday, 20 December, a major reorganisation occurred. The Hizbullah was regrouped into units (regu) of 15 men, each with one weapon (a carbine), and each under the command of a TKR member. At 1 p.m. Wilujo Pospojudo released his father and the other Pangreh Praja from the town jail, while local perjuangan leaders were being rounded up and taken to the town square. One of these, from Bojongbata south of Pemalang, recalls:

I had just begun my afternoon sleep, when a member of the TKR arrived. I was told to get up, my hands were tied, then I was beaten in my house; then I was told to run, while I was beaten with a sword handle from behind. I had to run two kilometres to the Pemalang police headquarters, where I was beaten again in my cell. There I stayed for five days. Then I was moved to Pemalang jail which was full up, where I stayed for a year.66

Other arrests followed in Pemalang and through the Tiga Daerah on a fairly massive scale. A former jailer relates:

People were being taught a lesson [dihajar] by the TKR. They were lined up in the town square and whipped until they were half dead. People were screaming, 'Tolong! Tolong! [help!]. The jail was right on the square so I could see what was going on.67

On the following day, 21 December, the Tiga Daerah Wedana of Adiwerna for four days, H. Mawardi, wrote in his diary that 'the Pekalongan army came to Tegal'.68 It was a common perception at the time for people to refer to the antagonists as 'Pekalongan' and the 'Tiga Daerah' rather than in any class, aliran or functional terms. The conflict was essential between different pasukan or armed groups. Whatever the initial (partly ideological) motivations, people now seemed to perceive the struggle as between the forces of two different

66 Interview, 17.2.75.
67 Pemalang jailor, Interview, 17.2.75.
68 Copy of diary entry.
areas of the Residency, 'Pekalongan' against the 'Tiga Daerah' - a situation close to warlordism.

On Saturday, 22 December, the Pangreh Praja in Tegal jail were released by Sugito, Sarimin's son, and taken to Pekalongan. 69 When the TKR arrived in Tegal, the revolutionary Bupati, the Patih and the kabupaten Secretary were out of town, on their way Purwokerto to meet the Banyumas Resident, Mr Iskaq. 70 The TKR had found out that these revolutionary officials had left for Cirebon by train and sent word that they be captured and sent back. On their arrival back in Tegal:

The [Tegal] stationmaster had a car waiting to take us to the kabupaten office. From the crossroads leading to the City square, we saw there was a public meeting in progress there. The Bupati [K.H. Abu Sudja'i] went straight to the square, where someone was making a speech (he was in a military uniform and wearing a helmet). Abu Sudja'i spoke, rejecting what the TKR had said about the Bupati and the Patih running away. Haji M. Iljas had also spoken saying that he had been appointed to replace the Bupati of Tegal. We only then learnt that there had been an attack on the kabupaten office from Pekalongan but the kabupaten was quiet.

The search for Tiga Daerah leaders continued in Brebes, where the veteran perjuangan leader, Kartohargo, was very badly mistreated by TRK elements. This may have been prompted by two incidents which had occurred a month earlier when the TKR was withdrawing, although Kartohargo had no connection with either incident personally. The day before the withdrawal the wife of one of the company commanders was being driven home to her parents' house in

69 Wedana of Brebes, Diary entry.

70 Mr Iskaq had been on his way to Tegal to help the Bupati make preparations for the presidential visit, but had been stopped by activists at Balapulang and had to turn back. The Tegal leaders were on their way to Purwokerto to apologise for this embarrassing incident. Ki Tjitrasatmaka, Interview, 30.1.73.

71 Ibid.
Tanjung in a jeep when they were stopped by one of the many pemuda roadblocks. The vehicle was confiscated, but the lady was taken to the station and got home safely by train. The second incident was the disarming and 'imprisonment' of the battalion chief of staff Moh Kasim Iljas. In reality he had not been imprisoned, but while on leave in Brebes had been willingly placed in the local jail by a Brebes perjuangan leader anxious, because of an earlier kindness, to protect TKR officers from the possibility of being captured by local people who had threatened to attack any 'Pekalongan army' on leave in the town.

It seems to have been for the above reasons that one TKR pasukan leader (the former company commander) was determined to get his revenge on Kartohargo. Kartohargo had been urged to leave Brebes, first walking to the small station of Larangan and sleeping there overnight, and leaving with one other follower by the westbound morning train. At Cirebon they were asked for identification papers, and taken to a local office guarded by a local TKR unit. Two policemen arrived, and took them to the police station, where they were picked up by the TKR officer from Brebes. Then:

After being tied up and kicked [ditendangi] we were taken back to Tanjung and ordered to get out of the car. Our bodies were burnt with lighted cigarette ends, then we were taken in front of the house of his [the TKR officer's] father-in-law. There we were handed over to Hizbullah pemuda guards who accused us of being Dutch Intelligence. I felt thirsty, but was not given a drink, instead I was taken [the 40 kilometres] to Brebes. There all our clothes were searched. I again asked for a drink, and was left in the WC to get a drink from the tap there. Then I was put in a cell. In the morning I was taken out and tied up with rope. On each side was a person with a machine gun. We were paraded [diarak] and beaten with a whip [dipecuti] and made to run until we were bleeding [sampai bercucuran darah].... A Chinese was given the whip

72 In an earlier incident, the Brebes KNI leader, Ramlas, had been imprisoned by the police, and was let out by Iljas. Interview, 2.12.75.
and told to beat us but he only pretended. My wife and children were told to watch. [Then] we were made to go around the town, while someone in front of us shouted out 'Ayo! [come on!] this is your leader! Help him if you dare! Then I was hit in the face with a rifle butt. Since then I have been partially blind in the right eye. I was then thrown back into a cell, and not given anything to eat or drink for three hours.  

Later that day the main TKR force arrived in Brebes, and one of the leaders, a nephew of Kartohargo, gave him coffee. Later the Chairman of the Brebes Working Committee, and veteran leader of the Brebes nationalist movement for 20 years, was taken to Pekalongan and thrown ignominiously in prison, the first of many in which he was to languish over the next 19 months while undergoing repeated examinations and trials, before finally being released in July 1947.

The fate of other revolutionary leaders in Brebes was not much better. Ramlas who, for a few days, had been Secretary of the Brebes Working Committee and also leader of the PNI, was taken by AMRI from Brebes to the former Tegal Societeit building. About a week after being arrested Ramlas was called out of his cell by a TKR member:

A [member of the] TKR came, already wearing a green uniform. Mudasir called out 'Where is Ramlas'? I came out of the door, and was hit with a rifle butt, [then] more or less one platoon [regu] beat me up, shoes [were used] and rifle butts with the sights. [He made a motion with his head as if to show me the scar]. After they left, I was taken to a room and beaten again, so that I fainted in the bathroom. I was then asked: 'Do you confess or not?' by an Intelligence officer from Pekalongan - I didn't know his name. I didn't answer yes or no; so I was beaten again, and fainted again (I fainted twice). I shitted in my pants and said 'Kill me, I'm willing to be killed'. 'No' he said, then the man left. I went back to the bathroom and then to the cell. Mas Sugeng saw me and said 'Kasihan Mas Ramlas' [poor Ramlas]. Kromo Lawi said [they] were like an occupation army [seperti tentara penjajahan].

73 Kartohargo, Interview, 16.12.72. Mas Sugeng is Sugeng Hargono, the Brebes Barisan Pelopor/AMRI leader. See Appendix C, 414.

74 Interview, 2.12.72.
Kromo Lawi's imprisonment in Tegal by the TKR for supporting the Tiga Daerah is yet another bizarre aspect of local politics during the Tiga Daerah Affair. It will be recalled that Lawi, as the Residency's most prominent Sukarnoist who had high positions as leader of PUTERA and the Jawa Hokokai during the Occupation, was accused of being an agent of the Japanese during the kenpeitai clash in early October, and had been imprisoned by pemuda supporters of Mr Besar, although a member of the Pekalongan KNI. When Mr Besar left the Residency, Kromo Lawi was released by the Acting Resident Soeprapto, at Sayuti Melik's instigation. (Some sources say Kromo Lawi also wanted the Resident's job.) Then, while visiting Pemalang in early December, he was arrested by local leaders and taken via Randungkal to Slawi, where AMRI leaders hoped to win him over to the Tiga Daerah side. However, Lawi considered that the 'revolutionary left' who wanted to form a government in Pekalongan based on 'the Communist Proletariat' was not in line with the ideology of the central government. Furthermore, Lawi, although not unsympathetic to some of the Tiga Daerah leaders' aims, believed that they were in too much of a hurry, trying to do too much too quickly, that the national political revolution must take precedence over the social revolution. Lawi believed that the wording of the Proclamation about matters concerning the transfer of power being executed in 'an orderly manner' precluded a 'revolusi sosial' for the time being. By implication the Proclamation condemned the 'kegaduhan' (commotion, disturbance), which had been going on in Pekalongan, and which was part of any social revolution. 75

However, when the TKR arrived in Slawi to free Iskandar Idris and found Kromo Lawi there, they believed he had joined the Tiga Daerah and was being detained only as a camouflage. For this

75 Lawi's analysis is rather ex post facto, reflecting the events of the Revolution since 1945. It is the kind a nationalist like Sukarno or Sayuti Melik would make. Sukarno himself made much of the argument for national, not social, revolution after the Madiun Affair of 1948, although in 1945 he was talking of combining both. Transcript VII/3-6, 7.7.73.
suspicion he was to spend the next 13 months in Pekalongan and Yogyakarta prisons, without trial or examination of any kind.

Iskandar Idris' release in Slawi caused the TKR considerable embarrassment, as he wanted to resume command of the army immediately, in the middle of its 'clean up' operation. This signalled the end of Idris as the Commander of the TKR 17th Regiment. Idris had been appointed by the Japanese because of his religious affiliations. This, his age and lack of understanding of 'army matters', made him more and more incompatible with the young Dutch-educated priyayis who made up the Regiment General Staff and who had only appointed him Regiment Commander as a 'father figure' out of loyalty to their former PETA commanding Officer. They were critical of his allowing the Japanese to disarm the former PETA battalion (after Kromo Lawi had told them it was a trick) and of his indecisiveness in the kenpeitai fighting in early October. They also resented his attempt to get the TKR to take holidays on Fridays (the Muslim day of prayer) and work on Sundays:

He [Iskandar Idris] was not an 'army man', he was only made Commander of the PETA daidan because he was a kyai. He didn't understand the army, and didn't know about organisation regulations [aturan organisasi]. He mixed up his own interests with those of his organisation.  

For these reasons, after the Tiga Daerah Affair was over, Iskandar Idris was never reinstated as the Commander of the Pekalongan TKR Regiment. Shortly after, Wadyono was officially installed as Commander at a ceremony at army headquarters in Yogyakarta.

The army strategy towards the Muslim revolutionaries was also clear cut. The Bupatis of Tegal and Brebes - both santris - were left in power while the leftist Bupati of Pemalang (Soepangat) who managed to escape south to the Residency of Banyumas before the TKR arrived, was replaced by a leading local Islamic nationalist, K.H. Makmur, at a mass meeting in the town square on 30 December 1945.  

76 Wadyono, Interview, 27.8.71. It is interesting that the anti-santri caste of the army should appear so early in its history.  
77 Diary of Salim Bassiyul, a Pemalang Arab trader.
Wherever the TKR felt it was supported in the counter revolution by 'true' Muslims (Islam yang sungguh) these were left in office. As there were very few Islamic communists, none of whom had been appointed as officials, all the santri camats were left in office, 78 while several nationalist kyais from Randudongkal (south Pemalang) were amongst the 1,600 people jailed in Pekalongan by the end of the third week in December. 79 Many more who were taken back to Pekalongan were put under a hosepipe in the City square as a 'punishment' and sent home.

REFLECTING on the TKR intervention much later in his life, long after leaving the army, Wadyono recalled:

I did not ever meet Sardjio face to face; if I had I would have come off second best. We would have left Sardjio be, we weren't interested in politics. Soedharmo, Soemantri and Soehadi were 'politically illiterate' [buta politik], but hot blooded. We only acted because Sardjio stopped the train going to the [Semarang] front, with supplies for part of the Regiment there. Also we were stopped and searched [in Pekalongan]. Because of the inheritance from the Japanese we were top, had high status and couldn't be pushed around by anyone. Secondly, we felt we were at war [tugas perang] with the English and thus the stopping of our supplies we viewed even more seriously. It was really this factor, not the political question, that worried us. We weren't bothered by Sardjio's politics. I was afraid of him...all the key Tiga Daerah people [such as] Muhamad Nuh, Sardjio and K. Midjaja were a lot older than us. We wouldn't have dared act if Sardjio had not stopped the train. 80

78 These were the Camats of Lebaksiu, Margasari, Tarub, the Wedana of Slawi and the Bupatis of Tegal and Brebes, and the Camat of Larangan in Brebes, H. Tobari. There were no new santri camats or wedanas in Pemalang and only one camat in Brebes. See also Appendix E.

79 Lasjkar, 2-3 January 1947.

80 Wadyono, Interview, 10.3.73. Soemantri and Soehadi were members of the TKR 17th Regiment General Staff. See Appendix J, 445.
The age factor was indeed of considerable importance. Together with their seeming understanding of the revolutionary situation, the seniority of the older radical revolutionaries was a big factor in the way they could miraculously get support from the younger militants. Of course the younger people often disagreed politically with each other and with the older leaders. They lacked the confidence to act against the older radicals unless they could do so in the name of perjuangan. This was the highest single criterion for young activists such as the TKR officers. Politics may or may not have been in their heads, but as Wadyono says, they would not have 'dared act' on the basis of politics alone. While they had the useful blessing of older Pekalongan KNI members as well, it was the Tiga Daerah leaders who ironically provided the TKR with the really legitimate reason to act: the perjuangan against the foreigner at the Semarang front was being hampered.

The TKR-led counter-revolution signalled the re-establishment of the powerful social hierarchy, after only four months. When the TKR, together with Pekalongan Muslim groups, entered the Tiga Daerah they met with local revolutionaries. As the TKR Commander recalls:

When we met Sardjio's followers in the villages, they spoke to us using refined words [i.e., in high Javanese] 'Lho', I thought, 'these are decent people after all, a sign that they had become good Javanese again.'

Like the Wedana of Pekalongan (as we saw in Chapter Seven) the acting TKR commander also saw the TKR-led counter-revolution as a lakon or episode of wayang. After the all night performance the dalang (puppeteer) puts all his puppets back in a large wooden box or kotak. So the TKR acting Commander recalls: 'When they [the revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah] were defeated, I realised that I had to masuk kotak [lit. 'go into the box'] again, my role had ended'.

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82 Ibid. 27.8.71.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE TIGA DAERAH ON TRIAL

IT now remains to describe what happened in the Residency of Pekalongan after the TKR intervention, and why the Presidential mission which arrived in Pekalongan took no action. The attitudes of Sjahrir, Amir Sjarifuddin and Sukarno partly explain why Widarta's group, feeling betrayed by their comrades, were forced to go elsewhere for help. The legal battles which followed, first in Pekalongan then in Yogyakarta, and the well-publicised debate which surrounded them, for and against the Tiga Daerah, will be discussed in the last part of the chapter.

Visits from the Centre

During the most dramatic events of the Tiga Daerah revolution and counter-revolution, the central government's attention had been elsewhere. For the past month the government had been preoccupied with major conflicts between Allies and Republican forces. During the four days that Sardjio and the GBP3D held power in Pekalongan the British had burnt the town of Bekasi near Jakarta and, after weeks of fierce fighting, Ambarawa, on Semarang's southern perimeter, was finally retaken by Republican forces. A glance at the leading daily newspapers in Java during this period shows how preoccupied the new nation and its leaders were with these struggles and their outcome. Of the already quite large Republican daily press, only Yogyakarta's Kedaulatan Rakjat bothered to report on Sardjio's appointment and the new government in Pekalongan, although ironically the news item was not published until 15 December, by which time the TKR had arrested the new Resident and his staff. Apart from lack of interest in the internal affairs of Pekalongan Residency, there was also a communications problem for the national press and the government. The bigger dailies in the larger urban centres had been sending their correspondents to report on the fighting with the foreigner. Surabaya was the focus of the nation's struggle for survival. Communications between the Tiga Daerah and the Residency capital, let alone elsewhere in Java,
as we have seen in Chapter Eight, were almost non-existent. On 18 December it was announced that a new Socialist Party (PS, Partai Sosialis) had been formed by two leftist parties at a Fusion Congress held in Cirebon, the capital of the neighbouring Residency to the west. The Prime Minister, Sjahrir, and many of his cabinet were in Cirebon for the Congress. Members of the government, preoccupied as they were in deciding who would lead the new Socialist Party, were first alerted to what was happening in Pekalongan Residency by the arrival of the Brebes representative on the GBP3D's Economic Affairs Committee. This representative had not gone to Pekalongan with other Tiga Daerah leaders. After hearing that Sardjio had been arrested by the TKR, he had left immediately for Cirebon to meet his PNI-Baru associate, Sugra. On arrival in Cirebon the Brebes leader was detained at the railway station, but managed to get word to Dr Sudarsono (Socialist Party Minister for Social Affairs), whom the Brebes leader had known from KRI. Sudarsono secured his release. After hearing what had been happening in Pekalongan, government leaders decided to send a delegation to mediate between the Tiga Daerah and its opponents. Dr Sudarsono, accompanied by Subadio Sastrosatomo, was to go to the Residency capital to impress upon Pekalongan leaders generally, and the Pangreh Praja in particular, that as a 'people's movement' the Tiga Daerah had the central government's support. Djohan Sjahroezah, a nephew of Sjahrir, had been in contact with the underground PKI during the Japanese occupation in Surabaya and in the Cepu oil refineries where he had organised his own underground. He was chosen to go with Murad, the Deputy Minister for Security, to Pemalang. There they would explain the government's view to Tiga Daerah leaders, that Sjahrir 'wasn't supporting feudalism', but that 'he could not tolerate the lawlessness of the social revolution'.

1 For a full account of the formation of the PS, see Anderson, Pemuda Revolution, 303-06.

2 Dr Sudarsono had been actively involved in the Koperasi Rakyat Indonesia in Cirebon. Kahin, Nationalism, 112.

3 Sumarsono, Interview, 5.6.78; Kahin, Nationalism, 113.

4 Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Interview, 7.8.72.
Nothing came of these visits from the centre, mainly because the government leaders arrived too late in Pemalang and in Pekalongan. The TKR had already intervened, launched its counter-revolution and removed Soepangat as Bupati of Pemalang. If the four Socialist Party leaders, including the two government ministers, had gone to Pekalongan to support Sardjio a week earlier, the Resident's appointment would have been legitimised and very difficult to reverse. As it was, all that happened was that in the atmosphere of intense suspicion in Pekalongan in the third week of December, the Minister for Social Affairs was kidnapped:

One morning a strange-looking Indian fellow with a long beard arrived at the PESINDO office. Margono\(^5\) said 'Look at this chap; he's a NICA spy if you ask me', and off he went to get his followers [anak buah]. It was his own fault, he didn't show us any identification or letter. So they detained him and locked him up. Then there was a call from the kabupaten office. When I arrived they asked what had become of Dr Sudarsono, the bearded Minister for Social Affairs. I was horrified and hurried back to let him out. He was very angry. 'What sort of revolutionary struggle is this [Ini perjuangan apa]?' he roared.\(^6\)

Several days later, on 23 December, the Presidential mission, including the Vice-President and the Prime Minister, arrived in Pekalongan at the end of a whistle stop tour of the major towns and cities of Java.\(^7\) Also in the entourage were the deposed Bupati of Pemalang, Soepangat, the leader of the underground PKI, Widarta, and Sardjio's secretary, Muroso, also a member of the underground PKI. All three had escaped arrest by the TKR, and had gone to Madiun to seek help from PESINDO to free the Resident. They had then boarded the Presidential train when it stopped in Madiun on 21 December on the way back from Malang.\(^8\)

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5 Margono was the deputy leader of Pekalongan PESINDO.
6 PESINDO leader, Interview, 31.5.73.
7 For a marvellously vivid first-hand account from the ABC's war correspondent in Java who went on the trip, see Thompson, Hubbub, 71-91.
8 West Java CD leader, Interview, 4.7.78.
On their arrival in the Residency capital, Sjahrir called the TKR acting Commander, Wadyono, to the walled inner part of the kabupaten (pringgitan) formerly reserved for the Regent to entertain his honoured guests. There he was asked to explain the TKR's actions. Another source close to Sjahrir confirms that the Prime Minister demanded to know who had told Wadyono to act in the way he did. According to Wadyono, Sjahrir had nothing to say in reply at the time.

In his official speech at the subsequent public meeting, however, Sjahrir said: 'I have had many difficulties in dealings with the international world, but these problems are nothing like Pekalongan'. He went on to express his disapproval with the revolutionary struggle in Pekalongan by analogy with building materials. There were two kinds, he said, those which had passed and those which were not. 'It was as if Pekalongan had not passed the quality test'. Although Sjahrir's speech was long and rather dull it made the atmosphere tense. Sukarno then got up and relieved the situation somewhat by referring to Sjahrir as 'a small hot green chilli' (cabai rawit). While 'it was not easy to catch the meaning of Sjahrir's sentences' and 'his voice made people sleepy...the old, the young, the women and the children' could understand Sukarno.

It was during this meeting in the kabupaten, however, that a highly embarrassing incident occurred. Soepangat, the deposed Bupati of

9 Although Iskandar Idris had already been taken back in Pekalongan by the TKR, as we saw in the previous chapter, he did not become Commander of the 17th Regiment again. Wadyono was later formally appointed to this position.

10 Subadio Sastrosatomo, Interview, 7.8.72.

11 Wadyono, Interview, 10.10.71.

12 Soedjono, Transcript, VIII/10, 30.7.73. The difficulty which people had with Sjahrir's speeches on this trip is well illustrated by Thompson who records, '...Sjahrir's speeches must have been highly idiomatic, highly Indonesian, for our guides seemed to have peculiar difficulty in translating them.' Hubbub, 91. If those Dutch-educated people (such as Soedjono, Pekalongan Residency Secretary), had trouble understanding Sjahrir, how much more so the ordinary uneducated Javanese.
Pemalang, who was sitting in the audience, was recognised by either a TKR officer or a member of the Pekalongan PESINDO, and along with Widarta and Muroso was dragged out of the meeting right in front of the Presidential party. The Bupati of Pemalang and the underground PKI leader were promptly thrown into jail to join the rest of the Tiga Daerah people captured during the TKR-led coup. This direct challenge to central leadership was not completely ignored. Later a PESINDO leader involved was called up by Sukarno and roundly abused (dicaci maki) over the incident. However, no attempt was made by either the President or the Prime Minister to free those languishing in Pekalongan's jails. This failure to intervene by the top Republican leadership, especially Amir Sjarifuddin, who avoided visiting Pekalongan by getting off the train before it got there and returning direct to Jakarta alone, reflects the attitude of the national-level leadership at the time.

Let us first examine the reasons for Sjahrir's inaction. Part of the answer lies in the conflict between his international moderation and his domestic reformism. It is argued by those admirers of Sjahrir, who were close to Supeno in the Tegal KNPI, that the GBP3D strategy towards the Pangreh Praja was in line with the ideas expressed a month earlier in Sjahrir's historic pamphlet, Our Struggle. In this pamphlet Sjahrir had urged the development of a democratic Indonesian revolution, and a social revolution led by 'revolutionary democrats, not by nationalist groups who have kowtowed to fascists, whether Dutch colonial or Japanese military fascists.' Yet it was these very 'revolutionary democrats' who had led the revolution in the Tiga Daerah for three months who were now languishing in jail in Pekalongan. Moreover, they had been put there by the group on which Sjahrir was afraid the legacy of fascism had left its mark most deeply - the military. Sjahrir, in his pamphlet, had also vehemently attacked the remaining colonial apparatus - the Pangreh Praja and the police in particular. For the Pangreh Praja, Sjahrir had

13 Pekalongan PESINDO leader, Interview, 31.5.73.
14 Our Struggle (Cornell University Modern Indonesia project, 1968), 28.
15 Ibid, 37.
strong words. They were '...nothing more nor less than an instrument fashioned by Dutch colonialism from the feudal heritage of our society', a view which was in complete accord with those of K. Midjaja and Sardjio. However, this domestic reformism was always tempered in Sjahrir's mind with what he saw as the need to attract the sympathy of the Western powers for Indonesia's struggle. As Subadio Sastrosatomo, a member of the BP-KNIP and a close associate of Sjahir put it: 'He wanted to show the world he was in control of Indonesia's domestic situation, and this needed a strong hand against internal disturbances.'

Yet this conflict is only part of the answer to Sjahir's abnegation of responsibility. The other part is his inherent weakness, which is apparent in all his dealings with foreign powers as well as within the country. He not only appears to have suffered from an acute lack of experience in political leadership but also from a realisation, perhaps even exaggerated, of his lack of political muscle. In some ways one might have expected more from Amir Sjarifuddin or Sukarno himself.

Sukarno himself apparently made no reference to the turbulent political events of the previous fortnight in any speeches in Pekalongan. However, in a short stopover in Tegal on his return journey to Jakarta, Sukarno referred in a speech to the Tiga Daerah as the 'Talang State' (negara Talang). Talang was the power base of Kutil, now the Tegal police chief, where many people had been killed during the revolusi sosial. It was a direct reference to what Sukarno and others considered to be the separatist nature of the Tiga Daerah movement. Sukarno, who had to deal with separatist movements throughout his Presidency, saw this tendency in the new Republic as early as December 1945.

However, it was Amir Sjarifuddin rather than Sjahir or Sukarno who was really the crucial figure from the Central Government in the Tiga Daerah Affair. The failure of the Minister of Information and Defence to

16 Ibid, 26.
17 Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Interview, 7.8.72.
18 First in Holland in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, then in the PNI Baru, Sjahir was always more of a back-room strategist. At the time of the Proclamation he did not play an active role either.
come to the aid of his underground PKI comrades in Pekalongan needs further explanation.

The first reason has to do with internal leadership rivalries between Sudisman and Widarta within the underground PKI, which, here, we can discuss only briefly. Very early in the Occupation, Sudisman had been arrested, along with the other top leader of the underground PKI and Amir Sjarifuddin. While Amir's death sentence was changed on the intervention of Sukarno, Pamoedji the underground PKI leader and several others were subsequently executed. After his release from prison in September 1945, Sudisman claimed to have received a testament or mandate in 1943 from the party leaders, who knew they were to be executed, to carry on the leadership of the PKI. Sudisman had then formed a committee of those PKI members who were in jail, including, presumably, Amir Sjarifuddin. On his release with the latter, Sudisman remained in Surabaya where, at the request of Widarta, Sumarsono placed him in a leadership position in the Surabaya PRI. However, Sudisman went to Widarta and demanded, on the authority of the executed pre-war PKI leadership, that he be included in the underground PKI leadership. Widarta refused for various reasons, one of which was that only a party congress had the power to decide the leadership question.

This internal rivalry was in turn influenced by the return of former members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the small but influential communist group in exile in Holland, led by Abdulmadjid, who had been flown back to Indonesia at Dutch expense. Ironically, this was because, adhering to the Netherlands Communist Party's interpretation of the Moscow line, they shared the view that the Republic was a

19 According to Siauw Giok Tjan this mandate was a written one, while Sumarsono says it was some kind of coin. The underground PKI West Java CD leader rejects the idea that there was ever such a mandate.

20 Sumarsono, Interview, 5.6.78. The leadership of the party was in fact decided at its Surakarta conference in April 1946, when the veteran communist leader, Sardjono, replaced the self-appointed Jusuf from Cirebon (Kahin, Nationalism, 159, fn.18). By this time Widarta and Midjaja were in jail in Pekalongan.
Japanese creation. These Leftists returning from long exile in Holland hoped for a continuation of the 'shared ideological struggle' and the 'warm egalitarian relationship' they had had with their Dutch comrades in the wartime resistance against the Nazis. Widarta, who had held discussions with this group at Amir Sjarifuddin's house in Jakarta in early December, had rejected the international line that they had brought from Holland. Although both groups had been engaged in essentially the same fight - the struggle against fascism - during the war, there the similarity between the two groups ended. Instead of the accommodation with the Dutch government, Widarta demanded that after the anti-fascist united front had succeeded in toppling Japanese Fascism, it must continue the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. In reply the communists from Holland said that Widarta did not have any 'international experience'. However, Widarta would not accept this view. 'There is no compromise', he told them, 'the masses are ready and want to resist the return of the colonialists, why should they be asked to compromise?'

Amir Sjarifuddin's deliberate withdrawal from the Presidential entourage and his return to Jakarta alone without visiting Pekalongan was interpreted as a 'betrayal' by the underground PKI. They felt he had 'sold out' his colleagues in Pekalongan, because of the influence of Sudisman and the communists from Holland. It may be open to question whether in fact Amir was ever really on side with Widarta earlier, as opposed to Sudisman, although this group had always assumed he was. Amir's acceptance of van der Plas' money in 1942 implies that he was always on the other end of the spectrum to Widarta's group, at least on the question of cooperation with the Dutch.

One further factor that needs emphasizing is the real gulf between Amir, Sjahrir and Widarta on the question of political violence itself. When Amir and Sjahrir said that matters had to be settled peacefully, they were not being simply hypocritical. Nor were they merely thinking of the international reaction to internal upheaval.

21 Anderson, Pemuda Revolution, 309.
22 Sumarsono, Interview, 5.6.78.
23 Ibid.
MONUMENT TO KENPEITAI VICTIMS IN PEKALONGAN (pre-1965)

PEKALONGAN COURT
Dutch-educated leaders like Amir and Sjahrir were simply not accustomed to, or happy with, bloody revolution except in a very theoretical sense. As elite intellectuals they probably had an instinctive distrust of mass violence of the type which occurred in the Tiga Daerah. Despite the bold theory, Sjahrir's *Perjuangan Kita* comes down extremely hard on undisciplined violence.

Feeling betrayed by their comrades, Widarta's group sought elsewhere for help - to PESINDO. At the national youth congress in Yogyakarta on 10 November, Widarta had been elected to one of PESINDO's Working Committees, set up at the congress. The Working Committee for Struggle (Dewan Pekerja Perjuangan) as it was called, 'was entrusted with full responsibility for the organisation of all popular military units outside the regular army including their mobilisation, supply and training...'\(^{24}\) It was headed by Sumarsono, the Surabaya PRI leader and close associate of Widarta. The underground PKI leader headed the information section while one of the Party's Surabaya cadres S. Mustapha, originally from Pemalang, was the Committee's liaison officer. The powerful Working Committee for Struggle was the one group outside the regular army which in a short time could muster a force large and well equipped enough to mount an offensive against the Pekalongan TKR to free the leaders of the Tiga Daerah Movement.

After the arrests of Sardjio and his staff on 14 December, Widarta had gone to Madiun to discuss the situation with PESINDO leaders there. He came back to Pekalongan with the Presidential entourage and, as we have seen, was himself arrested on 23 December and imprisoned along with Sardjio and the other Tiga Daerah leaders. In Madiun S. Mustapha got word of what had happened, and sent an urgent call for help to Sumarsono 'to attack the Pekalongan TKR'.\(^{25}\) Sumarsono contacted the Surabaya Defence Command (Komando Pertahanan Surabaya) which organised a regiment of four battalions, a total of 2,000 pemudas, under the command of Sidik Arselan. Leaving Surabaya by

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24 Anderson, Java, 257.

25 Sumarsono, Interview, 5.6.78.
special train, they passed through Madiun and Solo to Purwodadi (about 70 kilometres east of Semarang), en route for Pekalongan. There the train was stopped and prevented from proceeding, on the direct intervention of the Minister of Defence, Amir Sjarifuddin, who summoned Sumarsono to Yogyakarta. The Surabaya leader recalls:

He convinced me not to solve the problem with force, but that it would be resolved through government channels [lewat saluran Pemerintah]. He guaranteed that the Widarta problem [masalah Widarta] would be taken over by the Attorney General's Department of the Central Government in Yogya.  

Amir Sjarifuddin assured Sumarsono that the government intended to move all the prisoners from Pekalongan to Yogyakarta. The matter would then automatically come under the direct jurisdiction and responsibility of the central government.

Because the legal screening of the prisoners in Pekalongan was taking so long, six months passed and Widarta and the other leaders still had not been moved to Yogyakarta. This prompted a second rescue attempt, but a force of 400 PESINDO pemudas which was mobilised in Surabaya was stopped in Solo, this time by Maj.Gen. Djokosoejono and Ngadiman. Its leader was taken to Madiun where again it was repeated that the matter of the Pekalongan prisoners could not be solved by force. Instead the government would form a Committee, the members of which would be allowed to visit prisoners in Pekalongan, and would also be able to appear as witnesses in the preliminary legal proceedings. This Committee known as the P4 (Panitya Pemberesan Penahanan Politik, Committee for the Settlement of Political Prisoners) was chaired by Tan Ling Tjie (the Secretary of the Socialist Party), with Widarta's deputy, Sudoyo and Supeno. The latter had maintained a keen

26 Ibid.
27 West Java CD leader, Interview, 4.7.78.
28 Boeroeh, 2 October 1946, and Penghela Rakjat, 11 October 1946, mentioned the P4. Muhamad Nuh in 'Peristiwa Tiga Daerah', Penelitian Sedjarah Maret 1962(No.1 Th ke-III) 29, calls it the Panitya Pembela Perkara Politik Pekalongan (which would be P5), while Widarta's deputy remembers it as Panitya Pembela Peristiwa Perjuangan Tiga Daerah. I have used the name given in the two earlier newspaper reports. The P4 may have meant to investigate the 3 July Affair political prisoners as well.
interest in events in Pekalongan since the TKR intervention and several of his friends from Tegal were still in jail. Supeno played a leading role as spokesman for the prisoners in the political debates and legal manoeuvres that went on until the trial finally began in Pekalongan in March 1947.

**Legal and Political Battles**

What had been happening in Pekalongan after the imprisonment of 1,600 activists from the Tiga Daerah in the third week of December 1945? On 16 April 1946, Pekalongan's fourth Resident appointed by the centre in four months, Wali al-Fatah, arrived to take up his position. The appointment of his predecessor, Soemitro Kolopaking, a former Bupati of Banjanegara, was considered by the central government for over a month. However, Kolopaking, in office only three months, alienated the Pekalongan Muslim community just as his predecessor, Sardjio, had done but for different reasons. That the government saw the importance of the position of Resident of Pekalongan is seen in the fact that both Kolopaking and al-Fatah were substantial figures nationally - as indeed was Sajuti Melik - who might have been expected to carry some weight. Sumitro was later named Defence Minister in 1951, and Wali al-Fatah was the most prominent radical national Muslim leader, as Masjumi Vice-President and prominent Persatuan Perjuangan leader.

Processing of the prisoners taken during the TIR counter-revolution had been started by the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor's

29 R.M. Soeprapto, the former acting Resident, had been called back to Pekalongan by the right-wing PESINDO there, and had taken up his duties again on 17 December. Question 6, Proces-verbaal, Proc.Gen. On 23 January 1946 a big public meeting was held in Pekalongan to greet Kolopaking, who was from an old Banyumas priyayi family. Besides officials from the Department of Home Affairs, and the Governor's Office, the Resident of Banyumas, Mr Iskaq, also attended. Antara, 25 January 1946.

30 Kolopaking wanted to replace the santri bupatis and other kyais, who had been in office since the revolusi sosial, with his own appointees - all old MOSVIA graduates and former Pangreh Praja.

31 For a biography, see Anderson, Java, 455.
Department, which began releasing people in January 1946. On 30 April 1946 the Public Prosecutor publicly refuted rumours that Tiga Daerah leaders were 'NICA agents', announcing that detainees would instead be charged according to sections of the criminal code relating to seizing power by force, confiscating state monies, burning warehouses and homes and 'indiscriminate killing'.

However, from the beginning, the Public Prosecutor's Department itself was not in agreement on how the prisoners should be treated. Two jaksa, Karioatmodjo and Moertolo, held very different views on how to conduct the examinations, who should be released, and who should be charged. More will be said about the implications of their different views shortly. It was Karioatmodjo's decision, too, that each prisoner should be made to write down what he knew about the Tiga Daerah movement, while others were cross-examined by members of an Investigation Team. This process took many months because of the number involved. Furthermore the comments and behaviour of the team towards the prisoners left many of them feeling that the results of the investigations would not be impartial, because Karioatmodjo used former members of the Pangreh Praja, who had been thrown out of the Tiga Daerah, to cross-examine the prisoners. This was apparently a continuation of a Dutch colonial practice, when camats acted as assistant prosecutors. The investigators included the former Camat of Moga (South Pemalang) and the incumbent of the same office across the kabupaten border in neighbouring Jatinegara. A Tegal revolutionary leader recalls:

Siggih [Harsojo], the [former] Camat of Moga examined me before Moertolo. His question was: 'Do you know why you have been arrested?' I replied: 'I would like to know for what reason I was arrested'. 'Don't hedge around or it will be bad (for you)'. I said nothing, because I remembered when Tan Djing Kwan was interrogated, he was given electric shocks [distrom].

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32 One of the first to be released was the Tiga Daerah Camat of Randudongkal, Soejatno. His Statement from the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor's Department signed by S. Karioatmodjo is no. 1/PmP' (Pamong Praja) dated 4 January 1946.

33 Penghela Rakjat, 9 May 1946.

34 Soesmono, Interview, 8.10.76.
The former Camat of Jatinegara had old scores to settle with a member of Tegal KNI group who had joined the GBP3D, and so prolonged his imprisonment. The same official also physically mistreated one of Kutil's followers, a santri leader from Talang.

Moertolo's views on how the investigations should be conducted brought him into increasing conflict with his superior, Karioatmodjo:

Because the head of the Public Prosecutor's Department was from the older generation he could not follow the direction of our interrogations. This became clear when I proposed the concept 'it is best to free the followers, while detaining those who are responsible'. He thought that I was defending them! Eventually it came to the point that I was excluded from the investigations. Then the matter was reported to the Attorney General [who said] 'He has his own opinion, why not?... [Karioatmodjo] wanted to keep everyone in detention, strictly according to the law, he could not see that the matter had to be viewed from an understanding of the nationalist movement. His view was a relic of the Dutch time when the jaksa was just an underling of the Assistant Resident.

At the end of September 1946, the Republican Attorney General took responsibility for the remaining 32 prisoners, against whom the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor wished to lay charges. These were moved by train from Pekalongan to the Wirogunan prison in Yogyakarta, where a whole new series of investigations was begun. Soon afterwards the decision was made to lay charges against Sakirman (the AMRI Slawi leader) and Soepangat, the former Bupati of Pemalang. Both were sent back for trial to Pekalongan on 23 October 1946. The court, which had finished hearing evidence in the trial of Kutil and his followers on 21 October, now began Sakirman's trial. On 11 November he was sentenced to four

35 Ibid.
36 Interview, 30.11.75.
37 Moertolo, Transcript, I/6, 23.3.73.
38 For a complete list of the prisoners moved to Yogya, see Letter from Attorney General (Mr Tirtawinata) to Pekalongan Public Prosecutor, 17 December 1945. No.218KA. Proc.Gen.
39 Penghela Rakjat, 10 November 1946.
years' imprisonment (less the time already spent in jail in detention). This was the maximum penalty under Article 160 of the Criminal Code — inciting revolt. Sakirman promptly appealed against the sentence. After this the trials stopped again, but more arrests were made on the Attorney General's request. In response to growing pressure on the government from various quarters, the Yogyak examinations were speeded up. Twenty-one of the 32 detainees were released on 30 December, while the remainder were moved to the Benteng prison in the centre of the city.

Three more months were to pass before it was decided that as 'there was no forum' for the case to be tried by the Attorney General in Yogyak, the six Tiga Daerah revolutionaries who were finally to be committed for trial would be sent back to Pekalongan, while Sardjio was released on 26 March 1947. On 4 April it was announced that three well-known Socialist Party lawyers, Tandiono Manu and Mr Usman Sastroamidjojo (a brother of the PNI leader Ali Sastroamidjojo), together with Supeno, would act as defence counsel for the revolutionaries

41 For those who were released see Penghela Rakjat, 31 December 1946; Laskar, 3 January 1947.
42 Those brought to trial in Pekalongan were K. Midjaja, Soewignjo, Kartohargo, Amir, Tan Djiem Kwan and Muhamad Nuh. Boeroeh, 16 April 1947. They were being charged under section 107 of the Criminal Code, 'attempting to change the structure of the government by force [makar]'. The maximum penalty was life imprisonment. Yap Sin Fong, Kitab-Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana Indonesia (Jakarta, 1954), 50.
being brought to trial. Supeno and Manu arrived in Pekalongan on 11 April, a fortnight before the trial was due to begin, to work their briefs. Before the trial began, Supeno visited the families of prisoners in Tegal and Brebes.

When the trial finally got underway on 24 April 1946 it attracted much attention locally, if not nationally. The courtroom was packed out, with police mounting a strict guard outside the building and in the courtroom itself. Soeprapto, the Chairman of the court and also the presiding judge (hakim), was a former member of the Pekalongan KNI, and an experienced legal man, who was later to serve as Attorney General of the Republic for ten years. He had already presided over the trials of Kutil, Sakirman and Rustamadji the previous September and had sentenced Kutil to death. While the army considered that he was 'on their side' a Pekalongan revolutionary close to Mr Adicondro, the lawyer who was preparing briefs for the defence team, recalls:

44 Penghela Rakjat, 17 April 1947.

45 Tandiono Manu was born in Jember on 2 July 1913, the son of an irrigation official. After MULO and AMS he entered the Jakarta Law School in 1936. During the Japanese occupation he worked in courts in Semarang. Active in Jong Java Bond and IM before the war, during the revolution he was on the Yogyakarta KNI and was for one year its Chairman. He was on the executive committee of the BTI (Indonesian Peasants League) until 1947 when he was appointed Resident of Bojonegoro. In 1950 he became Minister of Agriculture in Natsir's cabinet, and from 1952 a member of the PSI's central committee. Mr Usman Sastroamidjojo, who was born near Magelang on 11 May 1910, had an LL.B from Leiden, was Indonesia's first envoy to Australia from 1946 until 1950, and later Ambassador to Canada and Brazil.

46 R. Soeprapto (not to be confused with the former Pekalongan Acting Resident) was born at Trenggalek in East Java on 27 March 1897. After finishing Law School in Jakarta in 1917 he worked in courts in East Java, as well as the Raad van Justitie in Semarang. Before the war he had been Chairman of the courts in Pati, Banyuwangi, Singaradja, Den Pasar, Negara and Mataram, and Extraordinary Chairman in Cirebon, Kuningan, Salatiga and Boyolali. During the revolution he was Chairman of the military High Court in Cirebon and Yogyakarta, and was Chief Judge of the High Court before being appointed Attorney General in 1950.

47 Wadyono, Interview, 10.10.71.

48 Mr Adicondro is married to a sister-in-law of Mr Abdulmadjid Djojoadingrat. He is the father of Tempo journalist George Junus Adicondro.
Soeprapto wanted to emphasise the Tiga Daerah as a rebellion against the legal government. He was 100 per cent a government official in spirit, 100 per cent a good ambtenaar. He had a strong [ulet] dedication to his superiors, and always followed the letter of the law [pegang teguh peraturan]. He was not interested in the ideology of the Tiga Daerah.49

According to a Tegal account on the opening day of the trial, after the Public Prosecutor read out the charges, there was a fierce debate between counsel and the prosecution, as to whether or not the court should be hearing evidence on the criminal charges. Counsel's view was that it was first and foremost a political trial. Repeated questioning about this apparently unsettled the Judge and the Public Prosecutor.

On the second day the main defendant K. Midjaja was cross-examined. Soesmono, sitting behind one of the defence lawyers, recalls:

At first the courtroom, which was crammed to overflowing [berjejal-jejal], was rather on the side of the Public Prosecutor. But Supeno's questions to K. Midjaja about what he had been doing during the colonial time and the Japanese occupation gave him a free opportunity to describe his whole perjuangan record. His story made people feel sympathetic when it became clear that he had been an unyielding fighter in the nationalist movement since the beginning.50

During the second day hostility mounted outside the courtroom from militant Muslim groups. Rumours that Islamic pemudas were going to attack the court culminated in an incident inside the courtroom itself, but the Judge quickly restored order.51 However, the tension aroused by the trial forced the Resident, Wali al-Fatah, to call a meeting of both defence counsel and prosecution to ask that the proceedings be postponed because 'there was an unsettled atmosphere amongst Muslim groups' in Pekalongan.52 The Defence would only agree to a few

49 Sarli, Interview, 28.8.76.
50 Soesmono, Answers, 15.
51 Someone came racing into the Court, unannounced and, without asking permission, went up to the Judge and delivered him a letter. Soeprapto ordered him out. Tandiono Manu, Interview, 22.8.73.
52 Ibid.
days' adjournment. However the Judge wanted to finish examining the accused first and tried to speed up the proceedings instead. In sessions held on 25 and 26 April, the other five accused were all cross-examined. Kartohargo, the Brebes leader, told the court that he personally had seen several of the flag incidents involving officials named by K. Midjaja in his defence. The court then decided to call an extra 13 witnesses (apart from the 14 already summoned), mostly from the Pangreh Praja, including the former Resident Mr Besar and Sarimin, the former Bupati of Brebes. A request for an adjournment by the defence counsel for two days so as to study 'new evidence' produced by the prosecution was granted.

Cross-examination of witnesses began on 28 April and produced fresh confusion by the testimony of the first witness, the TKR Commander Wadyono. He said that the army had arrested the Resident and the Tiga Daerah leaders on its own initiative without an order from the Public Prosecutor. Defence counsel demanded that the accused be released immediately. The court hastily adjourned for 15 minutes, but the request was rejected with no reason given.

Although he never graduated from the Jakarta Law School because of its closure by the Japanese Supeno's Tegal friends were pleased with his performance as defence counsel with his first brief. During his cross-examination of Mr Besar, the ex-Resident and a lawyer of 20 years' experience a Tegal KNI leader recalls:

I remembered [two of] Supeno's questions to Mr Besar during the trial (which I attended for three days in Pekalongan), ... '...According to the witness what is the meaning of revolution?' 'A sudden change', replied Mr Besar. 'If that is so, why didn't you bring about this change?' Then Supeno asked, 'Where should a graduate be during a revolution?' 'I don't know,' replied Mr Besar. 'Well, if you don't know that, it means you don't know the meaning of Independence', said Supeno.

53 Boeroeh, 5 May 1947 gives the fullest account of the trial proceedings.
54 Ibid.
55 Antara, 5 May 1947.
56 On stepping down from the witness box, Mr Besar patted Supeno on the shoulder and said 'You've passed, Pen'. Sumarno, Interview, 16.4.73.
On 5 May, after hearing the remaining witnesses, the court was adjourned again for several weeks. Soeprapto at first agreed to Supeno's request that the accused be detained outside the jail, (with the exception of Midjaja and Tan Djiem Kwan), but on 17 May Tandiono Manu was told that the whole case was now out of the hands of the Pekalongan Justice Department. A decision was promised on 6 June. Unable to find out when the trial would resume, Supeno went to see President Sukarno about the matter 'but the latter was unable to give a decision as to whether it would continue or not'. It did finally resume in Pekalongan on 10 July by calling ten more witnesses for the prosecution and several for the defence. On 15 July 1947 the court had finished examining witnesses. Supeno's summing up of the defence case was heard on 18 July. Five of the six accused were released on 21 July, as a result of an amnesty announced over the Republican radio on 21 July by President Sukarno. Because of the Dutch attack on the Republic the verdict on K. Midjaja, due to be handed down on 1 September 1947, was never given.

The Political Debate

The debate about the imprisonment of the Resident of Pekalongan and the other Tiga Daerah revolutionaries by the TKR is the most extensive and publicised discussion about the legality of revolutionary action, and is important for the whole Indonesian Revolution. Central Government leaders were directly involved in the case as they were not in other social revolutions. Here we will look at the way different individuals and groups lined up for and against the Tiga Daerah movement and the reasons they adduced.

The Pekalongan Public Prosecutor, Karioatmodjo, represented the conservative legal view, also held by most of the Pekalongan Pangreh Praja. This view was well put by the rather right-of-centre

57 Penghela Rakjat, 20 June 1947.
59 Iwa Kusumasumantri, Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia (Jakarta, 1965[?]), 68. Biography of Amir (the Pemalang leader) in 'Daftar Nama-Nama'.
journalist Rosihan Anwar, in the newspaper *Merdeka*. In late December, he had noted that the TKR had 'cleaned up the disturbances' in the Pekalongan area. Early in January, Anwar in a much longer article commented on the 'brutal and atrocious fascist actions' by self-appointed leaders in the Brebes-Tegal-Pemalang area. Anwar went on to describe the mode of seizing power of these leaders, aligning himself strongly with the TKR interventions.

Initially those opposed to the Tiga Daerah movement claimed to believe that Sardjio and the other leaders were part of a NICA plot by van der Plas and others to subvert the Republic. However, this was discounted by Karioatmodjo in April. From then on the Public Prosecutor in Pekalongan concentrated on a narrow legal interpretation. The leaders would be charged under 9 sections of the Criminal Code, including confiscating government funds, murder and arson.

Views in the national level leadership tended to support this interpretation of the Tiga Daerah. Sjahrir kept silent when he went to Pekalongan, for reasons discussed earlier. Hatta was later reported as saying that there was 'too much popular sovereignty' in Pekalongan. The people could not get rid of the Pangreh Praja just like that, said Hatta, only the government had that right. Dismissing Pangreh Praja was also a key part of the Public Prosecutor's case against Tiga Daerah leaders.

Another view from the centre comes from a former Attorney General at the time of the Tiga Daerah Affair, Mr Kasman Singodimejo.

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60 *Merdeka*, 29 December 1945.
61 *Merdeka*, 9 January 1946. Much of what he describes as purporting to happen is wrong.
62 These allegations seem to have begun in a long *Antara* report of 5 January, printed verbatim in Nasution, *Sekitar Perang*, 549-52. This *Antara* report was the basis of long articles in *Merdeka* on 7 and 10 January 1946.
63 *Penghela Rakjat*, 9 May 1945, and *Antara*, 10 October 1945, list the charges.
64 Quoted by Anwar in *Merdeka*, 29 December 1946.
His view in a lengthy report prepared for the government represents the 'law and order' view of the early domestic revolution. The report said that the main problem during October and November was the passive attitude of officials who appeared 'weak and confused' in many areas. On the other hand, the government had never bothered to explain the meaning of 'popular sovereignty' to the people. No one took any notice of officials; so the government had no way of acting to stop the growing anarchy. So-called leaders of the people who were 'too active' caused excesses, such as unlawful appropriation of property and kidnappings. The 'pure spirit of the pemudas and the People', the real motor of the revolution, must be distinguished from the 'egotistical' trouble makers, and agents of 'the enemy' who were exploiting the state of unrest at that time.65

Amir Sjarifuddin's views on the social revolution are of most significance for the Tiga Daerah Affair because of his links with the underground PKI. Although he never made any public comments on the Tiga Daerah Affair itself, he was the really crucial figure, much more than Sjahrir. In April 1946, when Amir flew to Medan with another prominent 'international' Marxist, Abdulmadjid, he told local revolutionaries that as a Marxist he wanted '...an egalitarian society with fair distribution'. Amir quoted Mao Tse-tung approvingly: 'Our struggle now must be directed to the first phase, with the second phase delayed for the time being'. Amir also believed that social revolutionaries in East Sumatra were guilty of Lenin's 'infantile disorder of radicalism', and that 'unity, discipline and the power of the state were all important'.66 Undoubtedly the Tiga Daerah Affair four months earlier was really the formative experience in adopting this position towards the revolusi sosial.

The views of the Government were further influenced by the so-called 3 July Affair in 1946. The failure of a coup by dissident army and radical elements to bring down the Sjahrir-led

65 Antara, 6 January 1947.
66 Amir's speech and comments are quoted in Reid, National Revolution, 75.
socialist cabinet and its commitment to negotiations with the Dutch (largely because Sukarno refused to give his support) led to over 100 arrests. These included leading opposition politicians, among whom were Sajuti Melik and Tan Malaka. The 3 July Affair prisoners found themselves in the same Wirogunan prison in Yogya as revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah. Although the Attorney General agreed that the two affairs were quite different politically, he argued that from the legal viewpoint they were the same. Both groups of revolutionaries were being accused of attempting to change the structure of government by force (makar) through kidnapping, intimidation, and depriving others of their freedom (vrijheids veroving). 67

Having discussed the various negative views within the government about the Tiga Daerah and the reasons given for bringing the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries to trial, we shall now discuss the views of those who supported the Affair.

If the newspaper Merdeka presented the conservative views of journalists like Anwar, the Magelang-based PESINDO paper, Penghela Rakjat, took up the cause of the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries with enthusiasm from the beginning. It began on 8 February, completely refuting the 5 January Antara allegations that Sardjio was a NICA stooge by giving a full account of the pre-war pergerakan record of both the Resident and K. Midjaja. 68 Four days later, the national newsagency Antara felt obliged to apologise for calling various people in Pekalongan NICA agents. This had been quite wrong. Antara then went on to reproduce in full the earlier Penghela Rakjat account of the pergerakan record of Sardjio and K. Midjaja. 69 The PESINDO newspaper continued its campaign against what it considered was the unjust detention of good revolutionaries for basically political reasons throughout 1946. The secretary of the P4 entered the debate in September, arguing that when the earlier political charges (of being NICA agents) had been proved wrong, the charges were changed. Now the Pekalongan

67 Soesmono, Answers, 14.
68 Penghela Rakjat, 8 February 1946.
69 Antara, 12 February 1946.
leaders were accused of being 'criminals and robbers'. However, the replacement of corrupt government officials, which was what the Tiga Daerah Affair was all about, was a political not a criminal matter. The P4 went on to argue that if the government did not view it in this way, then at least it should do the utmost to ensure that investigations carried out should not be based 'on revenge' and that members of badan perjuangan involved should be allowed to attend all examinations of political prisoners.\textsuperscript{70}

In response to the government's announcement that 32 prisoners would be moved to Yogyakarta from Pekalongan, the P4 again entered the debate, impressing upon the government and the BP/KNIP the results of various investigations it had made. During the loss of life at the height of the revolusi sosial in October 1945, the GBP3D did not exist. Neither did Sardjio arrive in the Residency until over a month later. Why then were he and the other GBP3D leaders being accused of inciting the people to commit criminal acts? The government should look further at the economic, social and psychological reasons behind the violence which took place. Indeed it was these leaders who were in jail, and not the Pangreh Praja which had tried to establish a rapport with the people at the time.\textsuperscript{71}

Supeno, as a member of the P4, was also actively pushing the government either to release the detainees or to try them quickly. At the BP/KNIP meeting on 4 January in Purworejo the matter came up for lengthy debate. Supeno completely rejected the report of the former Attorney General (discussed earlier) saying it 'bore no resemblance to reality' and was nothing better than a piece of 'journalist propaganda'.\textsuperscript{72} The officials described as 'passive' towards

\textsuperscript{70} Cilik, 'Mempertegak Republik Indonesia', a series of six articles in Penghela Rakjat, 23-28 September 1946.

\textsuperscript{71} The secretary of P4 also mentioned allegations of torture in the two Pekalongan jails where the prisoners were being held, and complained that the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor's investigation team was stacked with the very officials who had been thrown out of office in the Tiga Daerah nearly a year before. Ibid, 24 September 1946.

\textsuperscript{72} Antara, 7 January 1947.
the Proclamation were in fact opposing it by refusing to allow the Red and White to be flown. The Minister of Justice was unable to reply when the BP/KNIP Chairman asked him on whose orders Sardjio had been arrested. Wider issues came up for debate during the discussion. How did the government view the whole affair politically? Had the reasons behind the popular actions against the Pangreh Praja been fully investigated? Was it just because during the Japanese occupation they had oppressed the people? In the people's eyes at that time, throwing out the Japanese had meant throwing out their henchmen the Pangreh Praja. Were not the daulat actions which characterised the beginning of the revolution a legitimate part of the national revolution? The Minister of Justice replied that indeed the actions of the people until November 1945 against 'cruel officials' would be considered 'pure' (tetap dianggap suci) and would be pardoned. However, the government's fine distinction between revolutionary and criminal action could be argued about indefinitely, and was a weak basis on which to build a legal case.

The widening of the split between Widarta and Amir which had begun in late 1945 did not help the cause of the revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah either. After May 1946 the leadership of the PKI was in the hands of Sardjono, one of the group of ex-Digul communists exiled to Australia, who returned to Java in March 1946. The Digul group had the same 'international' perspective and sided with the Marxists from Holland. The PKI, whose principal orientation was now international and who supported Republican negotiations with the Dutch, was quite happy to have Widarta and other underground PKI leaders '...whose experience and sentiments were primarily or entirely Indonesian' in jail, where they could not cause trouble by opposing

73 Ibid. The government never denied that Sardjio's appointment was not formally ratified by telegram from the Central Government. As to who actually signed it, opinions differ. The TKR Commander Wadyono believed it was from President Sukarno, others said Hatta, while the Tiga Daerah group in Pekalongan say it was from Amir Sjarifuddin. More likely it was from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

74 These wider issues were brought up by Tan Ling Djie, secretary of the PS. Ibid, 4 January 1947.

75 Reid, National Revolution, 81.
such negotiations. However, the influence of the Left on government attitudes went further than the PKI's attitude. After Widarta was jailed in 1945, a new underground PKI (PKI gelap baru) also called the 'semi-illegal' PKI, came into existence. This group led by Amir Sjarifuddin was a loose coalition of younger Marxists who had followed Sudisman in the split with Widarta (Tjugito and Wikana), or who had left Widarta's underground PKI during the 15 months he was in jail (S. Mustapha and Seto). It included Tan Ling Djie, the secretary of the PS, and the CPN people who had joined the Labour Party (Partai Buruh) such as Setiadjit, Maruto Darusman and Abdulmadjid. This loosely knit new group had no sympathy for Widarta's views, particularly after he had joined with other radicals from the 3 July Affair in the same prison in Yogyakarta in signing a statement opposing the Linggajati agreement with the Dutch, in late 1946. Widarta also disagreed with the existence of the other parties on the Left, arguing that the rationale for these groups (such as the Labour Party and the Workers Party) did not exist now that the PKI was a party again. Having PKI people spread over several organisations was 'a waste of cadres', they should be in one Marxist party, the PKI. After his release from prison, Widarta's supporters from the Occupation and the Tiga Daerah signed a declaration asking for a meeting 'between groups' within the PKI to make clear what the political line was. A trap was set at the meeting, Widarta, his deputy and many others were captured and 'tried' on charges of having 'made a faction in the Party over Linggajati and broken the united front in the Tiga Daerah leading to a conflict with the army'. Widarta was sentenced to death and shot at Parangtritis south of Yogyakarta in 1948.

If the PKI washed its hands of its responsibility for those now in jail who had led the resistance against Japanese fascism, some

76 The 'legal' PKI stamp was used on letters of introduction and official party directives, while the smaller 'semi-illegal' stamp was used on mandates (which were still used). Directives from this group were signed by Amir Sjarifuddin.

77 CD West Java, Interview, 5.7.78; Sumarsono, Interview, 6.6.78. These conflicts will be discussed further in my forthcoming monograph on the underground PKI.
Socialist Party members did not. The team of three defence lawyers defending those on trial were all prominent members of the Socialist Party. Supeno, as we mentioned earlier, had close connections with the KNI group from his home town of Tegal. However, he was careful to distance himself from any charge that he was leading the defence for ideological or party political reasons. He told a Barisan Pelopor leader:

...whether or not they [the six defendants] are solicitors or communists doesn't concern me. I am not trying to get them to join my party by defending them...whether they are members of a political party is entirely their own affair. The most important thing is to assure the outside world that those responsible for justice in the Pekalongan Residency are really doing their job properly....

The interesting point here is that Supeno, and the two other Socialist Party members of the defence team went with Sjahrir not the PKI in the PS split of 1948. The cruellest cut for the radicals in the Tiga Daerah was that their fellow communists failed completely to support them.

Kutil's End

While the debate had raged around the political and legal issues outside the Residency for more than a year, no one who joined in the debates questioned the death sentence which had been passed on Kutil in September 1946. The press ignored it also. Yet Kutil had been maltreated more than any of the prisoners. During the trial his son, then aged 15 (also sentenced by Soeprapto to 15 years' jail), swore on oath that his father had never hurt anyone, let alone those killed during the October revolusi sosial in Tegal. However,

On the contrary several times during the court examinations Kutil confessed that he himself had committed all the killings. Here, those Tiga Daerah people who really knew Kutil, understanding his generosity of spirit [kebesaran jiwa], knew he was only confessing [to the killings] to lighten the sentences of his friends. In fact those who were really close to him knew that Kutil had never killed anyone at all.

78 Interview, 2.6.73.
79 Susmono, Answers, 15. While this may be true, it is probable that Kutil gave the nod to several killings in Talang in early November 1945.
The death sentence passed on Kutil by Soeprapto at a separate session of the Pekalongan court on 21 October had not been carried out by the time of the First Clash (July 1947). The prisoners were evacuated along with the Residency Republican government to the mountains south of Pekalongan. Soeprapto (the Judge) who had left all his belongings behind in the hurry to leave Pekalongan before the Dutch arrived, took only two tin trunks, the transcripts of the pre-trial interviews and the court proceedings. Kutil, ever resourceful, made his way to Jakarta, where he went back to his old trade as a barber in Kebun Kacang Gang II. Towards the middle of 1949, he was recognised by a man from Slawi, called Kasbi, arrested by the Dutch police (Jakarta then being under Dutch administration), handed over to the Republican police on the transfer of sovereignty in January 1950, sent back to Semarang and from there to Pekalongan, arriving on 13 February 1950. After Soeprapto, now Attorney General, had been called from Jakarta as the only witness to confirm Kutil's earlier sentence, on 8 April a Declarator or reaffirmation of the Pekalongan's court's sentence passed on 21 October 1946, was made. On 1 August Kutil appealed directly to President Sukarno for an amnesty, but on 21 April 1951 this was rejected. A fortnight later he was taken to the beach near Pekalongan, the place chosen for the execution by the local army garrison commander. Ironically, it was Soedharmo, the man who had been Chief of Staff of the TKR 17th Regiment in Pekalongan during the Tiga Daerah Affair and who had played a leading role in the intervention which ended it, who was Commander of both the Pekalongan garrison and the firing squad at that time.

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80 Declarator of Pekalongan Court No.1 1950 (SEMDAM).
81 Interview with Soeprapto's widow in Jakarta on 28.7.73.
82 Dutch police report, SEMDAM.
83 Declarator, SEMDAM. All documents relating to Kutil were obtained from a former head of SEMDAM VII.
84 'Keputusan President Republic Indonesia No.336/G, 1951', SEMDAM.
Asked for his last wish, Kutil replied 'nothing'. Choosing not to be blindfolded and squatting down on his sandals, he died before a firing squad on 5 May 1951.

The Revolution could not come to a decision as to how it viewed the Tiga Daerah. The only thing it could agree about was to make a scapegoat of a lenggaong, a representative of the peasant tradition of revolutionary violence.

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RADICAL political change in the Tiga Daerah in 1945 had deep-seated economic causes. The intrusion of Western capitalism on the North Coast had a profound and far-reaching impact on the peasantry. In Pekalongan Residency in particular the existence of 17 sugar mills by the second decade of this century affected economic relationships within the village (which need to be examined in much greater detail than in this thesis). On the coastal plain where the mills were located, the bureaucratic elite were often forced into becoming functionaries of European capitalism. This and their role as tax gatherers and law enforcers gradually isolated the elite, who found themselves unable to defend the interests of the peasantry on the one hand and be good colonial officials on the other.

The Japanese occupation saw the further erosion of patron client ties between the Pangreh Praja and the people. The new colonial masters turned the Pangreh Praja into economic supervisors. While the impact of the rationing system and the corvee scheme was varied between areas according to the attitude of local officials and nationalist leaders, rice requisitioning proved a most onerous burden on the entire population. Village headmen played the role of landlords extracting rice from the peasantry. Corruption occurred at all levels of the system, forcing the Pekalongan Residency administration to raise delivery quotas even higher. By 1944 famine conditions existed. Suffering was appalling, with people dying of hunger in both the towns and the rural areas. People were forced to eat snails and various fibrous roots that were eaten as a last resort only in times of famine. The peasantry and the urban proletariat blamed the bureaucratic elite rather than the Japanese for causing these hardships, especially because of the harsh and arbitrary way the rice requisitioning was administered.

Thus one of the short term causes of the violence during the revolusi sosial period of October 1945 in the Tiga Daerah was the aggressive role the local elite had played, particularly in extracting rice from the peasantry. One camat was killed in 1944 while carrying out a house-by-house search for what paddy farmers had hidden and
not delivered. In the coastal plain where these policies were deeply felt, few village headmen and only one higher official survived in office. The early revolution in the Tiga Daerah was marked by exceptional violence against the Chinese in the early stage; against the Eurasians, over 100 of whom were killed, and against officials. It is the attack on officials which had most profound implications. The revolusi sosial saw the total overthrow of bureaucratic power in the Tiga Daerah. The payung, symbol of the priyayis' spiritual power, was in tatters. The counter-elites which replaced the former Dutch-trained wedanas and camats, were often Muslim leaders, a fundamental break with the past. At the village level it was the lenggaongs, an important social force during the period, who swept away the old order. The religious elite were to stay in office until the Revolution was over, when many joined the local Department of Religious Affairs. Many village headmen elected by popular choice during the October 1945 revolusi sosial stayed in office until 1965.

In a real way the Tiga Daerah Affair was a microcosm of the conflicts in Indonesian political life which came to the surface when the Indonesian Republic was born. As Geertz has written, 'On the one hand everything looks like a clutter of schemes and surprises; on the other a vast geometry of settled judgements'. In the Tiga Daerah what joined '...such a chaos of incident to such a cosmos of sentiment' was a shared set of perceptions, or revolutionary consciousness, which united older radicals, pre-war activists, with younger pemudas as well as the lenggaongs and religious leaders. Rather than being defined by a minority of urban, educated pemudas, this consciousness had been moulded by a much older protest tradition of which the lenggaongs in the rural areas were a key element. This tradition was in total opposition to the priyayi world view, which in turn viewed the leadership of the revolusi sosial as something alien from outside Java. In one sense what was happening in the Tiga Daerah was the beginning of a cultural revolution. In the minds of those who shared the revolutionary consciousness, this included

abolition of social hierarchy, the most visible sign of which was language levels. The revolutionaries wanted to abolish all aristocratic priyayi titles and forms of address, and speak in low Javanese, a profoundly radical move in the Javanese context.

Initially suspicious and afraid of, or totally opposed to, the new revolutionary consciousness, some officials were eventually changed by it quite radically. The Bupati of Brebes could say, looking back in 1973, 'We became patriots because we were kidnapped in 1945. Maybe if this hadn't happened things would have developed differently.' Sarimin was from then on a staunch Republican, later becoming Governor of Bali and the Lesser Sunda Islands. Of course some former Pangreh Praja went back to work for the Dutch when they reoccupied the North Coast after the First Clash in 1947. But others refused to do this, went south in the general evacuation and joined the Residency government 'in exile', supported by guerillas. The Tiga Daerah revolusi sosial experience thus moved many members of the bureaucratic elite into more exposed leadership roles after 1945.

The perceptions of local revolutionaries were very different from their national leaders in 1945. I believe it is extremely important to consider what these participants themselves thought about what they were doing, not necessarily the same thing as the social results they achieved. A revolution cannot be understood without examining the motives and attitudes of the revolutionaries.

The most significant political force during the Tiga Daerah Affair, out of all proportion to its numerical strength, was the underground PKI. This influence can be directly traced to the party's activities during the Japanese occupation. Seen in its own terms, what degree of success did the PKI have? The definite goal of its leaders in 1945 was to seize political power first. They put this priority before everything else, including land redistribution. In terms of their own united front line of 1945, this was not contradictory. The withdrawal of the Japanese after the surrender saw the collapse of the State. With only a handful of disciplined cadres they had no choice but to join with what they saw as other progressive elements, using the existing KNIs to carry
out their first priority, which was democratisation of local government structures. Seen in terms of their own aims, the success they achieved with the few cadres they had was remarkable. The Working Committees the PKI set up in Tegal and Brebes, which governed these two kabupatens for about six weeks in November and December 1945, worked well and united diverse elements within the revolutionary struggle. The Muslim bupatis chosen coincidentally in Tegal and Brebes also helped relations with Islam. In Brebes in particular, the setting up of working committees at the kawedanan and kecamatan levels was evidence of the success of the PKI in the implementation of its democratisation strategy.

In general the army had been a conservative force in Indonesian politics since 1945. The Tiga Daerah Affair was the first of three major clashes between the military and the PKI in Independent Indonesia (the other two being the Madiun Affair in 1948 and the attempted coup of 1965). Four days after the radicals had come to power, the military showed for the first time that it would come to the defence of 'order' and the status quo if what it perceived as its short and long term interests were threatened. Its officer corps, with its deep loyalties to the priyayi class which had been overthrown during the revolusi sosial, also felt threatened by both the PKI and radical Muslims from the Tiga Daerah. PETA/BKR officers of Muslim background lasted for a much shorter time in the TKR than in the bureaucracy, and there were none of nationalist background. Their response was also in part a learned military concern for order, and the result of Japanese ideology.

What is the significance of the Tiga Daerah Affair for this region of Java today? Many of the administrative changes that Tiga Daerah leaders were planning in line with their democratization strategy, or had implemented, have since taken place. Batang is now a separate kabupaten within the Residency, a goal of the revolutionaries at that time. The position of wedana which was also abolished in many areas in 1945 has now been downgraded throughout Central Java. This official is now simply the bupati's 'assistant'. In Central Java, also, village heads have a retiring age, after which they receive a pension. The PKI continued as an important force in local politics, with Islam, until 1965. They would
perhaps have been stronger in the 'fifties if they had not provoked the army backlash in 1945.

The revolutionary spirit which united various groups and burnt so fiercely during October and November 1945 was not limited to a small minority. The revolusi sosial allowed important, if often suppressed, elements and values in Javanese society to come to the surface. These elements have been difficult to perceive in the climate since 1965, but we would be mistaken to think they had vanished.
APPENDIX A

Location of the Sugar Mills of the Residency of Pekalongan c.1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kabupaten</th>
<th>Mill</th>
<th>Kecamatan</th>
<th>When Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BREBES</td>
<td>Ketanggungan</td>
<td>Ketanggungan</td>
<td>1942(?) Land still used for sugar (milled in Losari, Cirebon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banjaratma*</td>
<td>Bulakamba</td>
<td>Still operating today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(after 1911)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jatibarang</td>
<td>Jatibarang</td>
<td>Still operating today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(opened 1911)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEGAL</td>
<td>Pagongan</td>
<td>Talang</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kemantran</td>
<td>Tarub</td>
<td>1932(?) (used by PETA Tegal daidan headquarters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ujungrusi</td>
<td>Adiwerna</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pangkah</td>
<td>Pangkah</td>
<td>Still operating today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(opened 1885)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kemanglen</td>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>1942 Used by Japanese for making midget submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dukuhwringin</td>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balapulang</td>
<td>Balapulang</td>
<td>1930 (first to close)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMALANG</td>
<td>Sumberharjo*</td>
<td>Pemalang</td>
<td>1942(?) (used as PETA company base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(after 1911)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banjardawa</td>
<td>Taman</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comal Baru*</td>
<td>Comal</td>
<td>Converted to making butanol during Japanese occupation. Machinery destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(opened 1922)</td>
<td></td>
<td>by revolutionary guerrillas during Dutch Republican war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEKALONGAN</td>
<td>Sragi</td>
<td>Sragi</td>
<td>Still operating today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tirta</td>
<td>Wiradesa</td>
<td>1944 (milled one season: then closed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wonopringgo</td>
<td>Kedungwuni</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalimati</td>
<td>Batang</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/ In 1934, the number of estates was reduced to four, by 1939 12 were operating again (see Table 1).

* Banjaratma and Sumberharjo were the last two mills to open, after 1911.

x When Comal Baru opened, the old mill was converted to a distillery.
APPENDIX B

Membership of Pekalongan Residency Advisory Council (Shu Sangi kai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointed Members</th>
<th>Position/Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.M.Z. Effendi</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah (?) leader from Pekalongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Maas*</td>
<td>Head of Pekalongan hospital, Residency doctor, Pekalongan representative on Java Central Advisory Council, later PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A.A. Sosrowerdoyo</td>
<td>Former Bupati of Indramayu forced to resign over corruption, living in retirement in Pekalongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Soemantri Reksoadidjojo</td>
<td>Former Patih of Pemalang, head of Residency Romu Kyokai office, also head of BP3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A.A. Soetirto Pringgo haditirto</td>
<td>Bupati of Brebes from 1932-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Tjitrosoewarno*</td>
<td>Head of Residency Office of Religious Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chosen Members</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.M. Abu Bakar</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, from Tegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.H. Mohamad Iljas*</td>
<td>NU from Pekalongan (later Minister of Religion in the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet 1955-56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardjosoeedarto</td>
<td>From Pemalang (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ki Partohadisutjipto</td>
<td>Head of Tegalarum (Pekalongan) Taman Siswa Region, from Slawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Sahadat</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, from Brebes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kromo Lawi*</td>
<td>Pekalongan pergerakan leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subsequently Pekalongan KNI members

Source: Interviews, Djawa Baroe, I, 21, 5; Almanak Soeara, 2604 (1944), 191
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group &amp; Area of Operation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leadership Age (in 1945)</th>
<th>Pre-August 1945 Background</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Organisation/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BREBES KABUPATEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI</td>
<td>Hardjo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Pemudas</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ketanggungan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESINDO</td>
<td>Dusman</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Seinendan, Castor oil plant cultivation supervisor</td>
<td>Pemudas</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ketanggungan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanjung pemudas</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>PNI-Baru/KRI</td>
<td>50 pemudas made up of about 20 santris, 2 PETA, 1 Heiko, 20 Seinendan</td>
<td>Unstructured, no long hair (except former PETA). Listening to Bung Tomo's speeches, security at railway station, kampungs, guard duty at night, one lenggaong an active member. Posting broadsheets. Taking over local sugar mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketanggungan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisan Pelopor</td>
<td>Haji Fatoni</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>GERINDO</td>
<td>Majority of pemudas were from Ketanggungan Taman Siswa</td>
<td>Organised local security. Gotong Royong from people for food for pemudas. Slogan was 'Merdeka atau Mati'. Many activists had been working in Jakarta but returned home after the Proclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes Barisan Pelopor/AMRI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kartohargo*</td>
<td>Jong Java/Budi Utomo/ PARTINDO/VIPIM/PUTERA Barisan Pelopor</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Brebes pemudas</td>
<td>First Brebes flag raising by Sugeng Hargono. PKN replaced Barisan Pelopor as main security keeping force in Brebes town after police disbanded and TKR withdrew.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugeng Hargono</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Brebes pemudas</td>
<td>No weapons. Military drill with bamboo spears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKN</td>
<td>Soepardi*</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>VIPIW</td>
<td>Brebes pemudas</td>
<td>Took Eurasians from Brebes jail and killed them. Enemy of Kartohargo. Anti-revolutionary activities. Leader finally arrested by Brebes PKN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramlas</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes AMRI-I2</td>
<td>Muchsan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Muhammadiah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEGAL MUNICIPALITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisan Pelopor/PARI</td>
<td>5-man Leadership council:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Included PSII members, non elite kampung youth, also many government office employees</td>
<td>Organisational structure consisted of a five-man Leadership Council, eight-man Dewan Harian, 20 troop leaders. Everyone of Tegal's ten kalurahan had a troop leader. In all government offices, city businesses, where more than five members, a group leader was appointed. Flag and poster campaign. Took over Banjaratma sugar mill from Japanese. In November changed name to PARI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmad Nuh*</td>
<td>(7) 40</td>
<td></td>
<td>PKI/Digul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismono*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>PARTINDO/GERINDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soelaiman*</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>PKI/Digul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhardjo*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>PARTINDO/GERINDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsum*</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>PARTINDO/GERINDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 VIPIW - Vereeniging van Inlandse Personeel Irrigatie Werken - Union of Native Irrigation Works Employees
2 AMRI-Islam. * Arrested by the TKR during the counter-revolution
* See Biographical Appendix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group &amp; Area of Operation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leadership/Student</th>
<th>Age (in 1945)</th>
<th>Pre-August 1945 Background</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Organisation/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMRI</td>
<td>Slamet Soenarjo</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Indonesia Muda/KBI, Negen Broeders</td>
<td>Elite group with Dutch education included Surjono Darusman and Sasulit (Kartini's son), no girls, no santris</td>
<td>Headquarters in Al Irsyad school in Jalan Kepatihan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRIS</td>
<td>Andi Penjamin</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulawesi activists</td>
<td></td>
<td>Formed after Bambang Soeprapto, Semarang AMRI leader visited Tegal. No connection with other AMREIs. Disbanded after 4 November. Involved in kidnapping of Bugati of Brebes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda Al Irsyad</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Involved in 'examination' of Brebes Bugati, after his kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEGAL KABUPATEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Virtually ruled Talang from mid-October to mid-December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI Talang</td>
<td>Kutil</td>
<td>about 52</td>
<td>barber, guru agama</td>
<td>Talang proletariat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Headquartes in old Adiwerna (Ujungrusai) sugar mill employee's house. Took over Adiwerna's three ricemills from Chinese in September. Helped form Barisan Pemuda in villages with AMRI Slawi planned 4 November attack on Tegal City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda Baru or</td>
<td>Chamidun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1921 to Mecca, in Surabaya Pesanten 1923-26, trader, dokar driver</td>
<td>Militant santri pemuda included several lengsaongs and one algojo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Over 200 activists, on 20 reu (group) of about 10 pemudas. Group leaders met directly with Soewignjo and Sakirman, kampong guard duty, rice distribution. Also acted as a moral 'watchdog', paraded people for 'immorality'. Prostitutes found work. Kyai Misbah went to villages and spoke to the people about democratising the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda Istimewa Ujungrusai hamlet</td>
<td>H. Samsuri</td>
<td>over 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offshoot of AMRI Slawi, Wachtoem and Soewignjo close friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI Slawi</td>
<td>Soewignjo</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>PKI/VSTP/Digul</td>
<td>Predominantly rural youth. No pesantrens nearby so mostly from Continuation or Village School</td>
<td></td>
<td>Connection with Jakarta API via Mansur, who knew Menteng 31 group, Hauling down Japanese flag in Tegal, kidnapping Mayor, police Chief. Discredited by anti-revolutionary kidnappings and killings. Disbanded after 4 November, when leaders left the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sakirman*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>PKI/Yogy aristocrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Misbah</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>PKI/Sarekat Rakyat, adviser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI Balapulang</td>
<td>Wachtoem</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>PKI/VSTP/Digul</td>
<td>Eight-man inner group 17 members, including two Seinendans, three FETA/BRK, six Pangkah sugar mill officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API Pangkah-Kejambon</td>
<td>Mansur</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Son of Pangkah Sarekat Islam leader. In Jakarta Sendenbu, Kepentaiho member Railways Seinenden leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junus</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pitojo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>PETA Yuekital or Special Guerilla Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMALANG KABUPATEN</td>
<td>Soepangat</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>PARTINDO/GERINDO(?)</td>
<td>Majority of Pemalang activists - Oerip later claimed about 1,000 members throughout Pemalang Kabupaten</td>
<td></td>
<td>Formed in July 1945, called Barisan Pemuda Marhaen Indonesia, underground group with five-man leadership, 20 August 1945 became API. October 1945 became PRI reflecting contact with Surabaya via underground PKI. Organised four headquarters responsible for politics, security, social welfare and finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oerip</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sukarso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Arrested by the TKR during the counter-revolution
* See Biographical Appendix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group &amp; Area of Operation</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Pre-August 1945 Background</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Organisation/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Randudongkal AMRI/PESINDO/</td>
<td>Haji Zaini</td>
<td>Local santri leader</td>
<td>Majority was santri youth</td>
<td>Propaganda in villages about Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>Nasron</td>
<td>Local santri leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soewarko</td>
<td>Adviser/strategist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deradjat</td>
<td>Head of Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalong Hizbullah</td>
<td>H. Busjaeri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalong Laskar</td>
<td>Dan Djiem Kwan</td>
<td>Keibodan/Seinendan</td>
<td>Santri pemudas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tju Liep Goan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalong GPAL</td>
<td>Hilabi</td>
<td>Arab activists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mubarak</td>
<td></td>
<td>Smallest of Pemalong's badan perjuangan. Disarming Japanese jailers, guard duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalong kabupaten Office Youth (A.M. Kantor)</td>
<td>Soejitno</td>
<td>kabupaten office official</td>
<td>Pemalong kabupaten office officials</td>
<td>Bupati and Pangreh Praja tried to control Pemalong pemuda through A.M. Kantor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Police Station Clerk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PEKALONGAN MUNICIPALITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Pre-August 1945 Background</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Organisation/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barisan Pelopor</td>
<td>Sarli</td>
<td>PARTINDO/ PERPRI, PHI-Baru, GASBI (Solo)</td>
<td>60 pemudas, former Suisintai, pemuda 'sekolah'</td>
<td>Flag raising at Hokokai office, had five weapons. Five members died in clash with kampesitai. Helped take over electricity and railways from Japanese, made and distributed red and white cloth badges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI/PESINDO3</td>
<td>A. Djunaid</td>
<td>'Bourgeois pemudas', sons of batik business owners. No prewar activists</td>
<td></td>
<td>Considered by Barisan Pelopor to be a 'pengkh' and football movement. Flew flag in front of Pekalongan court, forced Pekalongan Bupati to fly flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda PERMI</td>
<td>Two brothers</td>
<td>Sons of a Dutch-decorated school inspector. Bambang went to Semarang HBS</td>
<td>MULO pupils, sons of Pekalongan priyayis, including Judge Soeprapto's son, Tisin</td>
<td>Base was PERMI No.11, 29 members, distributed handbills, hauled down Japanese flag in front of kawedanan and Residency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bambang Soesilo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sidik</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 According to Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader Sarli, Pekalongan PESINDO's credentials were not recognised at the pemuda congress in Yogya on 11 November, and its delegates were not admitted to meetings.

3 Arrested by the TKR during the counter-revolution
### APPENDIX D

**1. Composition and Role of Pekalongan Region and Kabupaten KNIs**
(Source: data from interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Membership (how appointed)</th>
<th>Main Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pekalongan region (i.e.</td>
<td>Dr Soembadjii</td>
<td>Ten members appointed by Mr Besar. Majority worked for the Japanese and/or Sangkai members. Kr Lawi only perjuangan member, Barisan Pelopor not represented. Included the Judge, Soeprapto</td>
<td>Secured the ratification of appointment of the Fuku Shuchokan Mr Besar as Resident. Involved in negotiations with Japanese about flying the Red and White. In Mr Besar's view to 'help the Resident make regulations'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabupaten)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemalang kabupaten</td>
<td>Soemarto (Patih)</td>
<td>Ten or eleven moderate nationalists, and Muhammadiyah figures. Chosen at a meeting of kabupaten officials, no perjuangan present. Soepangat as head of information section refused to participate</td>
<td>Abdul Mutholib, leader of KOPI, seemed to be only active member, telling villagers they had to demonstrate 'social orderliness'. Other Pemalang leaders either say 'it didn't exist' or that they had 'never heard of it'. Bupati's view: KNIs should 'calm the people'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal Municipality</td>
<td>Ki Tjitrasatmaka</td>
<td>Chairman chosen from nine candidates, with power to appoint five members. Kr Lawi attended meeting from Pekalongan. Included two Negen Broeders</td>
<td>Tried to talk with the Tegal Sicho about flying the flag. Successfully negotiated end to siege of kenpeitai, and removal of kenpeitai to Banyumas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal kabupaten</td>
<td>Slamet Reksoатmodjo</td>
<td>Nine members, including three Negen Broeders, Also included Surjono Darusman (brother of Maruto Darusman, the prominent leftist), and Ali Warsitoharjo, close associates of the Negen Broeders group</td>
<td>Inactive except for Vice-Chairman, who supervised election of new officials during the revolusi sosial. A Barisan Pelopor view was that it was 'ineffective'. Ki Tjitarasatmaka of same opinion: 'unable to overcome problems it faced'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Membership (how appointed)</td>
<td>Main Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegal</td>
<td>Ki Tjitarasatmaka</td>
<td>Chosen at meeting of all kecamatan KNIs. Given power to appoint seven members. All but one had been on previous KNIs</td>
<td>Partly on advice of Pekalongan KNI member, Tegal's two KNIs disbanded, to form one single KNI for entire kabupaten. Amed to unify leadership in face of deteriorating social situation in late October. Vice-Chairman Mardjono killed on 4 November while taking a signed declaration that all remaining Pangreh Praja would resign, to show Talang and AMRI slawi leaders. Soon after the Chairman was appointed Patih of Tegal. After this ceased to function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brebes</td>
<td>Binadjji</td>
<td>Chosen at small meeting of Brebes perjuangan. Chairman was a local official, later became Wedana of Brebes, Kartohargo was Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Active in supervising election of KNIs in villages. Registered all radios and vehicles in Brebes. Selection and screening of TKR members. Sarimin's view was that it 'tried to take over from the Bupati'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabupaten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Composition and Role of Kecamatan and Kawedanan KNIs in Pekalongan Residency
(data from interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawedanan (W)</th>
<th>Kecamatan (C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chairman</strong></td>
<td><strong>Membership (how appointed)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BREBES KABUPATEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumiayu (W)</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketanggungan (C)</td>
<td>Slamet (ex-Digul, Teacher of local Sriwidaya non-government intermediate school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjarharjo (W)</td>
<td>Fuku Guncho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEGAL KABUPATEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talang (C)</td>
<td>Soewachno (pawnshop official/Seinendan leader) Chairman appointed by camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adiwerba I</td>
<td>Fadjar (teacher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEGAL KABUPATEN (cont)</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adiwerna II</td>
<td>Chamidun (Ujungrusi leader) Partohadisutjipto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slawi (W)</td>
<td>Ki (Taman Siswa leader Sangikai member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebaksiu (C)</td>
<td>Kyai Mohamad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangkah (W)</td>
<td>Sugiono (later became Wedana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balapulang (W)</td>
<td>Wachtoem (VSTF/PKI, Digul, later Wedana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumijawa (W)</td>
<td>R. Singgih (fugitive from Tegal SR after 1926)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMALANG KABUPATEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulujami (C)</td>
<td>local health official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantarpolang (C)</td>
<td>Camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belik (W)</td>
<td>Wedana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randudongkal (W) (C)</td>
<td>Head of Forestry Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

420
Changes in the 'Pangeran Praja' at the Kabupaten, Kewedanan and Kecamatan Levels, During the 'Revolusi Sosial' Period, October–November 1945
(Source: data from interviews)

### 1. PEMALANG KABUPATEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Official</th>
<th>New Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bupati:</strong> R.T.A. Rahardjo Soeso Adikoesoemo (25.6.41-19.10.45) (MOSVIA?)</td>
<td>Soepangat* (20.10.45-23.12.45) (medical orderly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patih:</strong> R. Soemarto (1942-19.10.45) (AMS, Police School)</td>
<td>Dr Muriawan* (20.10.45-20.12.45) (kabupaten doctor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police Chief:</strong> Natsir (?) (AMS)</td>
<td>1. Rustamadi* (20.10.45-20.12.45) (FJS, from Randudongkal) 2. Soemargo* (20.10.45-20.12.45) (Banjardowo PESISINDO leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kabupaten Secretary:</strong> R. Soewignjo (?)</td>
<td>Soejetno5 (29.10.45 - ?) (MOSVIA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Kawedanan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former</th>
<th>Includes Kecamatan of</th>
<th>Comal</th>
<th>Pemalang</th>
<th>Wijogo Pospojudo</th>
<th>Randudongkal</th>
<th>Belik</th>
<th>Hardjowinoto (1944–November 1945) (OSVIA 1919)</th>
<th>Replaced by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mochtar2 (May–November 1945) (MOSVIA 1930)</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>Replaced by</td>
<td>left but returned (?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mocthar2 (May–November 1945) (MOSVIA 1930)</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>Replaced by</td>
<td>left but returned (?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pitojo</td>
<td>Petarukan</td>
<td>Umar</td>
<td>Randudongkal</td>
<td>Soejetno7 (irrigation official)</td>
<td>Belik</td>
<td>R. Hudojo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Katik Suroso (MOSVIA 1939)</td>
<td>Sudaju (24.10.45 - ?) (teacher)</td>
<td>Soejetno5 (MOSVIA 1930)</td>
<td>Soejatno* (irrigation official)</td>
<td>Belik</td>
<td>R. Hudojo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdullatlief (1944–October 1945) (HLS 1921)</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>not replaced</td>
<td>Soejetno* (irrigation official)</td>
<td>Belik</td>
<td>R. Hudojo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marno (local policeman)</td>
<td>Marno (local policeman)</td>
<td>Marno (local policeman)</td>
<td>Soejatno* (irrigation official)</td>
<td>Belik</td>
<td>R. Hudojo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sadeli</td>
<td>Bodeh</td>
<td>Bodeh</td>
<td>Bodeh</td>
<td>Bodeh</td>
<td>Bodeh</td>
<td>Bodeh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes

1 The police were run jointly by these two revolutionaries.
2 Mochtar was Governor of Central Java from 1959 to 1966.
3 Suleman's authority weakened by various factions. Was considered 'too close' to Pekalongan. Sent back to Randu dongkal by Soepangat.
4 Young brother of Suleman, managed family sawahs (5 hectares) in Randudongkal.
5 Soejetno, after escaping from Pelajaran was appointed kabupaten secretary by Soepangat.
6 Son of Regent of Pekalongan, a brother of Camat of Margasari probably the only Japanese-appointed official to remain in office in the Tiga Daerah.
7 A brother-in-law of AMRI Slawi leader Sakirman. Widely known in the area, was considered to have lenggaung qualities: daring and lack of respect for authority.

* Arrested by the TKR during the counter-revolution
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawedanan</th>
<th>Former</th>
<th>Replaced by</th>
<th>Includes Kecamatan of</th>
<th>New Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tegal</td>
<td>R. Basiroen (4.11.45) (OSVIA 1927)</td>
<td>Kadarisman (6.11.45-31.3.46) (MULO, Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td>R. Roesnadi (4.11.45) (KNI group)</td>
<td>Kyai Haji Abu Sudja'i (6.11.45-First Dutch Clash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adiwerna 7</td>
<td>Soemardjo (1943-10.10.45) (OSVIA 1916)</td>
<td>Taman Siswa teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mustoplo 7</td>
<td>R.M. Suparto (9.10.45) (Mosia)</td>
<td>Position of Mayor abolished along with Tegal's Municipal status. Instead Kadarisman held position of 'Acting Special Wedana'. Resigned 31.3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tarub 7</td>
<td>Paksoepe (1944-1946)</td>
<td>Police forces disbanded, reformed as PKN (Penjaga Keamanan Negara) under Wahyudi who was replaced by Kutil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N. Nawardi 7</td>
<td>H. Maksum (1943-10.45) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td>Basuki (6.11.45-First Dutch Clash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Iksoan 7</td>
<td>Soenarto (1943-10.45) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pangkah 7</td>
<td>Soemardjo (1943-10.45) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jatinegara</td>
<td>Soedardjo (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kedungbateng</td>
<td>Soewignjo (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Siangkang</td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paksoepe (1945-1945) (Muhammadiyah teacher)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

1. Captured near Talang, spent rest of November at AMRI Slawi headquarters.
2. Former Vice-Consul in Jeddah, appointed by Mr Besar as Wedana coordinator, not accepted by people, killed 4.11.45.
4. Danumartono was the brother of the Wedana of Brebes (Sudirman).

* Arrested by the TKR during the counter-revolution.
2. TEGAL KABUPATEN (cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawedanan</th>
<th>Including Kecamatan of</th>
<th>Lebaksiu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kresno Sudianto</td>
<td></td>
<td>Soehodo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OSVIA 1921)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1944-12.10.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.H. Fachruri</td>
<td></td>
<td>K.H. Toha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Commander Barisan Pelopor)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(KNI leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Barisan Pelopor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumijawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bojong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.M. Kusomo Winoto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OSVIA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sumartono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td></td>
<td>(MOSVIA about 1932?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamad Deradjat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Umar Kasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Taman Siswa teacher, Semarang KNI member)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rebge 12 October 1945

3. BREBES KABUPATEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Official</th>
<th>New Official</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bupati: Sarimin</td>
<td>H. Syatori (October 1945-November 1947) - killed by Dutch during First Clash (HIS, Tebuireng and Tremas pesantren, Brebes naib, kumicho, and Masjumi (Vice-Chairman 1944)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path: Palal Pranoto</td>
<td>Sutjak Sastrowijoto (October 1945-First Dutch Clash?)</td>
<td>(teacher Brebes HIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Chief: Sumarno</td>
<td>FKN led by Supardi* (November-20.12.45) and Ramalas* (November-20.12.45)</td>
<td>continued under new Bupati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabupaten Secretary: Mohamad Saleh*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OSVIA 1923)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawedanan</th>
<th>Includes Kecamatan of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brebes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td>Slawi (1941-11.10.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soedirman</td>
<td>(OSVIA 1944-18.10.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OSVIA 1918)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td>Binadjji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OSVIA)</td>
<td>(Public prosecutor, KNI Chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanjung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td>Slanet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OSVIA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td>(Pawonshop official, KNI leader)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Brebes           | Brebes (1943-Oct.1945)  |
|                 | (OSVIA 1937)           |
| Jatibarang       | Soebagyo                |
| (MOSVIA 1938)    | (MOSVIA 1937)          |
| Wanasi-Klampok   |                        |
| Bochim           |                        |
| (MOSVIA 1939)    |                        |

| Tanjung          | Bulakamba               |
|                 | Broto                   |
|                 | 1.Supeno                |
|                 | (Lurah)                 |
|                 | Sutoyo                  |
|                 | (Heilo)                 |
| 2.Kyai Fatkurajab |                        |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ketanggungan Barat-Kersana</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Losari</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(former official stayed on)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Kurdoko</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(see over page for notes)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawedanan</th>
<th>Includes Kecamatan of</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banjarharjo</td>
<td>Banjarharjo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td>(1942-Oct.1945)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td>Sadikun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MOSVIA 1939)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ketanggunan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moenarso&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt; (1944-Oct.1945)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MOSVIA 1939)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partoatmojo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(KNI Vice-Chairman, head teacher of non-government intermediate school)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Larangan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudiono</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Tobari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Masjumi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bantarkawung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td>Bantarkawung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ismail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(village head, KNI member)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ismail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(teacher, killed by DI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dadimau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(AMD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siramog</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paguyangan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suwito</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marwoto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Deputy Wedana)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bumiyu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former:</td>
<td>Bumiyu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced by:</td>
<td>Mujiadi&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt; (1943- 7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OSVIA 1917)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudjarwo (OSVIA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sukirtam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K.H. Ashari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sutanago</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Kabupaten official)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Deputy Chairman)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>local KNI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Arrested by the TKR during the counter-revolution

1. The Patih and the Wedana of Tanjung were brothers.
2. Hadisubeno was the son of R.A.A. Sosrowerdjo, former Bupati of Indramayu, forced to resign by the Dutch over financial irregularities. He was a member of the Pekalongan Residency Advisory Council (see Appendix B).
3. Supeno, a lenggaang figure, was in office only a week, then ousted by local santris.
4. The Demang, who governed Private lands, was replaced by Japanese. This official also removed from office by local PESINDO.
5. Sadikun was unacceptable to local santris. He was not replaced during the Tiga Daerah.
6. Resigned on own initiative, handed over his job to local leader.
APPENDIX F

Changes in Village Headmen in the Tiga Daerah during the 'Revolusi Sosial' of October 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of villages</th>
<th>Number of lurahs changed</th>
<th>Lenggaong</th>
<th>Santri</th>
<th>Family of former lurah</th>
<th>Former village officials</th>
<th>School teacher</th>
<th>'tani' (farmer)</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brebes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 uncertain</td>
<td>1 PETA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumiayu</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8 uncertain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) Data from two of the 21 kecamatan in Brebes kabupaten

| Warureja           | 6                         | 6 + 4*    | 2      | 4                       | 1                        | 2             | 1 uncertain   |       |
| Balapulang         | 19                       | 10        | 1      | 2                       | 3                        | 1             | 3 uncertain   |       |
| TOTALS             | 25                       | 20        | 3      | 6                       | 4                        | 2             | 4 uncertain   |       |

(ii) Data from two of the 19 kecamatan in Tegal kabupaten

| Ulujami            | 18                       | 17        | 4      | 2                       | 1                        | 5             | 1 trader      | 2 uncertain |
| Comal              | 17                       | 13        | 4      | 4                       | 1                        | 3             | 1 uncertain   |       |
| Moga               | 18                       | 13 + 2*   | 2      | 6                       | 3                        | 1             | 2 uncertain   |       |
| TOTALS             | 53                       | 45        | 6      | 12                      | 8                        | 7             | 6             | 6       |

(iii) Data from three of the 13 kecamatan in Pemalang kabupaten

Source: Interviews in the three kecamatan in February and November 1975

* Villages split
APPENDIX G

1. Composition of Working Committees (Badan Perkerja) in the Three Regions During November 1945 (until 14 December)

(A) BREBES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Former Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chairman</td>
<td>x+* Kartohargo, Brebes</td>
<td>Sukarnoist-type veteran nationalist, teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vice-Chairman &amp; Head, Information Section</td>
<td>+Slamet, Ketangunggan</td>
<td>PKI 1926, Digul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secretary</td>
<td>°Mohamad Saleh, Brebes</td>
<td>SPI, kabupaten Secretary, Secretary of Bojonegara residency and Bupati of Kediri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Treasurer</td>
<td>°Kusnadi, Ketangunggan</td>
<td>Communist(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic Affairs</td>
<td>+Tanjung leader</td>
<td>PNI Baru, perjuangan leader from Tanjung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Education</td>
<td>°Santosa, Ketangunggan</td>
<td>Taman Siswa, teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. General Affairs</td>
<td>°Maksum, Brebes</td>
<td>Priyayi, a former Brebes jaksa, dismissed by Dutch over money matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Religious Affairs</td>
<td>°Abbas Abdullah, Brebes</td>
<td>Later resigned because of work in GPII (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pemuda section</td>
<td>°Sugeng Hargono, Brebes</td>
<td>Pre-war Indonesia Muda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Biographical Appendix.

+ After Ramlas, AMRI/PKN leader, who lasted three days as secretary, because he 'did not like sitting behind a desk in an office'.

° Members of a Badan Penghubung (Liaison Committee) to coordinate all affairs with Tegal and Pemalang.

o Members of BP Secretariat.

x Former Brebes KNI member.
## Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Former Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chairman</td>
<td>*Soewignjo, Slawi, 39</td>
<td>VSTP, PKI 1926, Digul AMRI Slawi leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secretary</td>
<td>*KNI leader, Tegal, 30</td>
<td>Negen Broeders/Indonesia Muda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Treasurer</td>
<td>Soelaiman, Tegal, 41</td>
<td>PKI 1926, Digul, Barisan Pelopor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administrative Affairs</td>
<td>KNI leader, Tegal, 32</td>
<td>Negen Broeders, PNI Baru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>*Sakirman, Slawi, 39</td>
<td>AMRI leader, PKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Suhardjo, Tegal, 39</td>
<td>GERINDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>*Muhamad Nuh, Tegal, 40</td>
<td>PKI 1926, Digul, Barisan Pelopor leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>*Marsum, Tegal, 31</td>
<td>PARTINDO/GERINDO, Barisan Pelopor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Information Section</td>
<td>Ismono, Tegal, 33</td>
<td>GERINDO, Barisan Pelopor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Average Age 36)

* See Biographical Appendix.

† Replaced Sumarno
2. Composition of the GBP3D (Gabungan Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah - Federation of Resistance Organisations of the Three Regions) (Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang - 16 November-14 December 1945)

General Secretariat

Chairman, K. Midjaja* - Underground PKI leader - veteran of pre-war labour movement

Secretary, Soewignjo* - VSTP-PKI 1926, Digul, Chairman Tegal Working Committee

(a) Federated Economic Affairs Committee (Gabungan Badan Ekonomi)

Brebes: Tanjung leader, PNI-Baru
Tegal: Abdoelrachman
Pemalang: Tan Djiem Kwan* (underground PKI)

(b) Federated Defence Committee (Gabungan Badan Pertahanan)

Brebes: Slamet, PKI 1926, Digul, Member Brebes Working Committee
Tegal: Sakirman*, AMRI Slawi leader, Member, Tegal Working Committee
Pemalang: Amir*, PKI since 1924

(c) Federated Information Committee (Gabungan Badan Penerangan)

Brebes: Kartohargo*, Nationalist-PNI, Chairman Brebes Working Committee
Tegal: Member of Tegal, KNI group (PNI-Baru)
Pemalang: Amir*

* See Biographical Appendix.

Note:

GBP3D held six meetings during its one month existence.

The four non-PKI members of the GBP3D were the Tanjung leader and Kartohargo (Brebes), Abdoelrachman and the Tegal KNI leader.
APPENDIX H

Minutes of the GBP3D Meeting of 25 November 1945

The following is a translation made by comparing two slightly different versions of minutes of the third (of six) meetings of the Federation of Resistance Organisations of the Three Regions (the GBP3D) held in Brebes on 25 November 1945. They are to be found in the Procurator-General Inventory No.201 in the Dutch State Archives (Algemeen Rijksarchief). These minutes are unique because none like it relating to Residency level politics during this period of the Indonesian revolution have survived. It clearly shows the immediate priorities and problems facing a group of radical revolutionaries only three months after Independence. One copy of the notes of the minutes apparently belonged to Soewignjo, the Tegal Working Committee Chairman. The original notes are very abbreviated, often only a jotting between dashes to remind the writer what topic came up next. The translation follows this format, an asterisk between topics denotes a separate discussion. Where the meaning is not clear it is elaborated in square parentheses or in a footnote. Names of people and organisations are identified wherever possible.

Copy of a Report of a Meeting on 25 November 1945
from the Accused Soewignjo

The [minutes of the] GBP3D [meeting] in Brebes on 25.11.45 commenced at 10.30 a.m. with K. Midjaja as Chairman; Widarta representing the Minister of Information; and Oei Wan Yoe representing the Chinese in Tegal.


Absent: Tegal KNI leader


Absent: Rustamadji

1. Kartohargo  2. Slamet

Absent: Tanjung leader

1 That is of the Minister of Information, Mr Amir Sjarifuddin.
Continuation of [agenda] discussions held on....

The unification of Tegal, Brebes and Pemalang in matters relating to the economy, information and security. Relations between the central government in Jakarta and Pekalongan. * Each region is forced to be independent. * One ideology. * Tegal and Brebes have set up working committees [to deal with] civil administration. Many of our people have been brought in [to these bodies] so the manpower strength of the GBP3D is weakened. We are worried that the kabupaten working committees will be controlled by people who do not see things our way. The GBP3D is the political organ of the revolutionary struggle. [Some] will hold two jobs, on the GBP3D and on the kabupaten working committees. * The workers' tasks * Our tasks and our concepts * Sjahir's proposal [for] Representative Bodies. * Groups and aliran must prepare themselves [for] parliamentary government. * Out attitude: AMRI Slawi should be the People's Representative Council. AMRI [should act] as the organisation which controls other bodies and organisations in Tegal. Is this dictatorial? The status of the kabupaten working committees vis-a-vis the GBP3D. What we should be discussions is [the role of] the GBP3D [which] controls the kabupaten working committees in the interests of the Tiga Daerah.

Notes of the [last] meeting [of the GBP3D] in Tegal on 16 November were read

K. Midjaja: Is there a quorum? Present: enough [are here]
K. Midjaja: At the moment we are meeting as the GBP3D not the Tegal kabupaten Working Committee. Defence, Information and Economic aspects of the struggle.

Agenda

1. Defence Committee Matters

Suggestion of Mr Muhammad Nuh: * On 21.11.45 [two representatives] from army headquarters in Yogya, Markas and Untung [came to Tegal?]
* Does the TKR need to be established [again] or not? * Why was the TKR attacked by the people? This was considered as a rebellion against the Army. * [To establish the TKR again in the Tiga Daerah] Pekalongan will provide manpower and 50 per cent of the weapons.
* Tegal would have the right of selection [of men]. * The barracks.
* Recruitment and so on. * A building for a barracks [is needed] and the houses of [former] TKR officers in Tegal, Brebes and Pemalang [could be used].

The notes on the formation of the Civil Committee (Comite Civiel) were read.

.1 Petrol must be conserved as communications with Cepu [the East Java refinery] have been cut.
.2 Vehicles should be kept in one place.
.3 Arms should be registered according to each region. * Who should use these arms? * Any excess left over should be given to the TKR.
K. Midjaja: I ask the Defence Committee to discuss [these matters].
Amir: What are our policies? What should be our attitude? How strong are we? The weapons situation. The economic situation?
K. Mijaja: I ask those attending to discuss these things.
Widarta: The basic thing [we have to concentrate on] is the concrete situation. * International theory is fine, but it is not always good [in our local situation]. From a military perspective, our leaders' strategy is [theoretically] correct, but they're not in accord with realities [that is we should fight a guerilla war, but we don't yet have the means to do so.] * We're short in every department. Our defence must be guerilla warfare, [these guerillas are to be organised] from the poor (jelata) People, who can be mobilised by [the prospect of] an improvement in their lot. See the example of the TKR and the People in Surabaya. * Assembling of arms. * The example of Semarang. * In Surabaya the English want to disarm us, but arms continue to be distributed to the People [by the Japanese]. * The army in Russia. * Yenan. * The TKR should only be a camouflage vis-a-vis the outside world.

Sakirman: [and] Slamet: Agreement on a People's Front.
Soewignjo: Agreement on a People's Front and the TKR.
Amir: A standing army and a People's Front.
Widarta: [There are] three groups: Firstly those who really defend the interests of the People; secondly, NICA; thirdly, the Japanese. Be careful of the latter group, as they are very cunning.
Amir: We reject leaders who worked for the Japanese. We will accept arms and advisers.
Kartohargo: Can the Pekalongan TKR come and reestablish itself?

The response from the meeting was that the People will form their own (army) asrama.

Amir: The Barisan Pemberontakan, Madam S. has handed over to Sutomo, 

2 This may mean that in the fighting with the English, Surabaya was a success, but Semarang was a failure, and what to do about arming the people.

3 This means that inside the liberation army the party is quietly at work out of view of the Powers. The TKR was depicted even by Cabinet members at that time as a sort of para-police, not to alarm the Allies. This phrase could also be translated as 'is only a camouflage' in which case it would mean that armies everywhere tend only to act in the interests of foreign powers.

4 Referring to BPRI (Barisan Pemberontak Republic Indonesia) based in Surabaya.

5 'S' here means either Sosrok or Susuk names which refer rather derogatively to S.K. Trimurti, Sajuti Melik's wife.
their agent in Pekalongan is Soewarso Danusaputro. * Arms have been promised to Weleri and Kendal and Tegal, Pemalang, Brebes, the Pekalongan TKR and Yogya TKR have [all] been asked for arms. * [Because of] the infiltration of traitors, those delegates from Tegal and Pemalang were arrested. Soewignjo: Who are the traitors? Widarta: NICA and the Japanese will topple the Sjahrir cabinet. * The Japanese are using Tan Malaka (Husin-Hasan) in Jakarta, in Surabaya they're using a fake Tan Malaka. * Madam Sosrok Melik. * The traitors [are] Tan Malaka, six months before the surrender; Sajuti Melik, Mr Gatot [Tarunamihardja] Subardjo, Djojopranoto, Budisutjitro. * Sajuti Melik caused many victims in Semarang. * The GRI. * PRI Asia. * Partai Rakyat

6 Weleri and Kendal were close to the TKR's Semarang front where the TKR was fighting the English.

7 Husin was the name Tan Malaka used in pre-August 1945, in the Bayah coal mines in South Banten, and on missions to Jakarta. Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh knew him by that name then (they did not know his real identity). Hassan Murba was the pen-name of someone who wrote anti-Sjahrir pamphlets towards the end of 1945. Many thought it was Tan Malaka but he always denied it.

8 See fn.6.

9 Gatot Tarunamihardja was close to Subardjo and was the Republic's first Attorney-General.

10 Djojopranoto was a member of the Kaigun group, a participant in the Rengasdengklok kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta, a member of the first KNIP, a member of the Nishijima-Evart Lankay-Jusuf Hassan team that went to Surabaya to help Bung Tomo get BPRI started.

11 Budisutjitro was probably the Secretary of the PKI in 1924, who fled to Singapore in 1925, and was a Socialist Party member of the KNIP in early 1946. He was an emissary of the KNIP in August 1945 to organise a KNI in Bojonegoro, and also an emissary of Hatta in mid-October, sent to ensure that KNIs and Residents carried out Hatta's special instructions on law and order. His name was suggested as a candidate for Resident of Pekalongan in early November 1945.

12 This may be the Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Movement) usually referred to in PKI biographies as Aidit's wartime underground GERINDOM. It may also be an error for GERPRI (Gerakan Pemuda Republic Indonesia) Lagiono's Yogyakarta radical pemuda group.

13 There were many PRIs (Pemuda Republic Indonesia) in Indonesia during this time, mostly unconnected with each other.

K. Midjaja: The questions of a standing army, vehicles, arms, a People's organisation, fuel supplies, will be further discussed by the Defence Committee. Now to economic matters.

Widarta suggested the organisation of government along the lines of the Yenan model.

\begin{itemize}
\item The questions of a standing army, vehicles, arms, a People's organisation, fuel supplies, will be further discussed by the Defence Committee.
\end{itemize}

2. War Economy Matters

K. Midjaja: We will reopen the discussions begun on 16 November 1945. I ask for suggestions from each area, beginning with Brebes Mr [Tanjung leader]\textsuperscript{17}

Brebes: ...Views. (1) the Japanese economic system must be changed according to our strategy. Our people must take over the economy in a cooperative way. (2) Foodstuffs must not be allowed to

\begin{itemize}
\item Kartomoehari was a Jakarta pemuda type, maybe from Menteng 31, one of the group Sjahrir took to Serang to see Tan Malaka in September 1945. He and a Suparman started a Partai Rakyat Revolusioner (Revolutionary People's Party) in Cirebon on 10 November. Possibly Soebagio wanted to set up a branch in Pekalongan.
\item This may refer to a plan to return to Indonesia.
\item Probably referring to Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle Union).
\item This leader arrived at the meeting late, as he is listed as absent at the start.
\end{itemize}
fall into the hands of NICA (exports must be limited).

**Tegal:** Firstly we must decide [how to organise] the economy, *
(1) using cooperatives? (2) The economy [must be run] for the people. * Should [private] traders be allowed to continue or not? Businesses that are not owned by the State, what about them? * (3) Before Mr Besar fell from office (as Resident) there was PTE [Persatuan Tenaga Ekonomi, Concentration of Peoples Power], what was its political background? The finances in Tegal are still not in order because communications with Pekalongan are severed. Is it possible to distribute food between the city and the villages? Actual stocks are: 5,000 tons of paddy, 2,000 tons of beras [hulled rice] to feed 700,000 people which would be enough for about two months.

**Pemalang:** The same as Tegal.

**Widarta:** In Pemalang all manpower is in PRI [API]. * In the [local] government there is a union of all forces except the Arabs. * The economy is also in PRI hands. [It's being] assisted by the State. * In Surabaya, the resistance has no time to handle the economy. * Our struggle strategy is to defend [the Republic of Indonesia and we shouldn't act openly too quickly [that is reveal communist plans]. S.R. and in Yenan private entrepreneurs were still permitted. Our stance is to create a block against particularism. * If possible businesses should be rented [by the Tiga Daerah Movement]. We take a hard line against obstructionists. * Our attitude towards the PTE. * The situation in Surabaya. * We must have cooperatives in the villages.

**Tegal:** An organisation [is needed] to buy up foodstuffs, [also] in times of scarcity before the harvest.

**Brebes:** There is no PTE or policies like the Japanese had. * In Brebes functions [of the PTE] are in the hands of the government. There is a committee which organises distributions for the People.

**Tanjung leader:** Government-run cooperatives. * Trading should be left in the hands of the People. * The problem of scarcity of food before the harvest. * Road safety committee(s). * Each region should have this as a base.

**K. Midjaja:** Summarising: (1) The government of the Tiga Daerah [should] determine prices. (2) Block exports [of foodstuffs]. (3) Cooperatives [should be set up] in towns and villages.

---

18 The PTE existed in Pemalang, but as far as I know not in Tegal or Brebes. There was a large branch in Bandung and one in Solo under Subchan.

19 The line at that time was to create a broad united front with the PKI well in the background.

20 It is not clear what this refers to.

21 This means being against people pursuing their own interests outside the broad struggle.
Tanjung leader: [There should be] an effective economic program.
Tegal: Can cooperatives be set up before the pre-harvest shortages?
Soelaiman: The matter of finances. Money is piling up in the banks [in Tegal] because communications are severed. * Supply of two and a half million [rupiahs?] must be removed.

3. Matters Relating to Information

Soelaiman: * 5,000 litres of benzine are left.
Pemalang: * Don't worry, Comal factory can make aeroplane fuel.22
K. Midjaja: The Committees should discuss these matters themselves.

REST: 2.30 p.m. THE MEETING BEGAN AGAIN AT 4.00 p.m.

Reports of the Committee discussions were received.

Defence Committee

Fuel: 1. Urge the Comal factory to make as much petrol as possible. 2. Create reserves using whatever equipment is available for storage of benzine, to be located in the Pemalang area. 3. Pemalang is the place of all reserves. 4. The road [south] to Purwokerto [from Pemalang] should be closed by digging as big a trench as possible at Kepetek village (Belik).

Transport: Vehicles should be kept in one place. The sugar mill railways from Batang to Cirebon should be made use of, [also] bullock carts and horse carts.

Military: 1. Army [units] must definitely be established in Tegal, Adiwerna, Slawi, Balapulang and Margasari [Tegal kabupaten]. Slawi is the centre of power in the Tiga Daerah.23 2. The headquarters of the 3 Daerah [is] in Slawi. 3. A Barisan Algojo [Executioner's Brigade] should be formed. * 50 [members] from Tegal. * 50 from Brebes. * 100 from Tegal.24

22 Referring to the conversion of the Comal Baru sugar mill by the Japanese for the manufacture of butanol, an alcohol for aircraft fuel.

23 The Indonesian 'Pusat M.Kw. di Slawi dari 3 Daerah' (Italics in original) is unclear. M.Kw could be 'markas kekuwasaan' - words were often spelt as they sounded in that time.

24 K. Midjaja later said the purpose of this Barisan Algojo was to oppose NICA and NICA agents. Question 36, Proc. verbaal, Proc.Gen.
4. Educate the soldiers, particularly ideologically. * The pemudas must be able to man the Telephone and Telegraphic Communications equipment.

5. If threatened benzine reserves must be destroyed, and the cost met by the Tiga Daerah.

**Economic Affairs Committee**

1. Economic management should be centralised in the Tiga Daerah. * The place to be decided by the united voices of the region. *
2. Purchase and distribution of foodstuffs etc. is to be organised by the Central Body.
3. Businesses with a head office should be decentralised.
4. Fisheries must be run as cooperatives and put in the hands of the lower class (kaum belah). Pranjoto from Pekalongan is to be responsible for technical matters. * Freshwater and sea fisheries.
5. Kounso should fall into the hands of Parit. 25
6. The Freedom Funds should also be widened to include funds in kind as well as in money, and there should be perjuangan funds [as well] consisting of foodstuffs.
7. Agricultural production should be increased. Factory production should (be adjusted to) meet current needs.
8. The department of economic affairs should change its name to the Kantor Pekerjaan Rakyat - KPR (Office of People's Employment).
9. The sending of foodstuffs and money outside the Tiga Daerah must have permission from the local KPR office.
10. Increasing the production of house gardens (*tuin industri*) is recommended; for example, the planting of cotton in house gardens.
11. There should be a BPKPL formed in each village. 26
12. All existing economic bodies should be incorporated into one organisation the Badan Koperasi Rakyat Indonesia [Indonesian People's Co-operative Association].
13. Production tools should be rented out by the government.

**Information Committee**

1. Train pemudas to give information throughout the whole region.
2. The aim of this information should be to make the People aware about political, economic and social matters.
3. [What should be] the attitudes and responsibilities of the People as members of an independent nation.
4. Propaganda is the frontline of the army, because the army's actions must be in accord with propaganda principles, as must the government's actions.

---

25 Parit may be an abbreviation for Palu Arit, hammer and sickle, the symbol of the PKI. Kounso is not clear.

26 The name of this organisation is unknown - it may be a cooperative.
5. Propaganda must be carried out in areas occupied by the enemy.

6. A press car is necessary.

[Concerning this matter] Muhamad Muh suggested using the drivers of the confiscated RAPWI cars.

Those present agreed.

Widarta's suggestion: Arrest those who are trouble makers (pengacau masjarakat).

Those present agreed.

K. Midjaja: Is a Secretariat needed?

Those present agreed.

Decision: I [Secretariat would be] in Slawi
Secretary General: K. Midjaja
Legal Adviser (hakim tinggi): Amir
General Affairs Committee: Muhamad Muh

II Attitude towards Pekalongan
Sardjio as candidate for Resident. * K. Midjaja will go to Purwokerto [to see Sardjio] on 26.11.45. *
Financial and administrative relations with Pekalongan to be severed.

III The problem of internees 27
Their transfer depends on the Chairman of the GBP3D. Information to be given to local people. A Committee [to be formed?] on the matter of internees.

IV Attitude towards the 'Barisan Pemberontak' [BPRI] with its headquarters in Surabaya. * A branch in Pekalongan and a sub-branch in Tegal. Should be blocked and its members arrested. *
Defence, Economic and Information Committees to work with [GBP3D]-secretariat in Tegal.

V AMRI as the People's Representative Body ('Badan Perwakilan Rakyat')
Widarta: Following international law as the form and substance of foreign diplomacy. * Tan Malaka's group are trying to get B.W. to bring down the Sjahri cabinet. 28*

27 These were the detained officials being kept in Tegal and Pemalang jails at the time.

28 'B.W.' is not clear.
PARSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) is one hundred per cent Moscow [orientated]. * PESINDO [is] a federated body one hundred per cent under our control. * AMRI should remain as AMRI, and a branch of PARSI should be formed immediately.

[The Barisan] Pelopor [in Tegal] should change its name to PARSI.

VI Concerning the TKR in Tegal
The GBP3D authorised Muhamad Nuh and the Tegal KNI leader to hold discussions with representatives from Yogyakarta. This proved to be a mistake.
To reply [rejecting the offer to help establish the TKR in Tegal] with a telegram in the name of the Tiga Daerah.

THE MEETING CLOSED AT 6.30 p.m.

29 This was Mr Amir Sjarifuddin's Party set up on 1 November 1945.
APPENDIX I

The Demand of the People of the Three Regions of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang for the Settlement of the Conflict in Pekalongan Region

Remembering that our revolutionary struggle daily becomes more intense, each region must consequently become secure, steadfast, strong and ready in its resolve to destroy each and every enemy who seeks to colonise our motherland. Together we will build an orderly government based on socialism.

Bearing this in mind we, the people of the Tiga Daerah, deliver our demand that the kabupaten and city of Pekalongan should be brought into line with the Tiga Daerah so that the region of Pekalongan can continue to be part of the one residency, sharing the same ideology. This demand is delivered to the regional government of Pekalongan, the TKR, the Barisan Pelopor, PESINDO, Hizbullah, Sabiliarah, Barisan Pemberontakan, the Police, the farmers' and workers' militia, and all citizens. This can be achieved in the following ways:

1. SAROJO from Purworejo, a former member of the Chuo Sangi In should be appointed as Resident of Pekalongan immediately.

2. The Pangreh Praja and heads of other departments should be replaced, based on the sovereignty of the people.

3. Those who act like NICA or who are pro-colonialist shall be purged.

We have prepared staff to help implement the above.

If, within three days beginning with the date of this letter of demand, we have not received an official undertaking, then the 3 Daerah Resistance Organisation and the people of Batang and Pekalongan who are of our line of thought (aliran) will be forced to take a firm hand (terpaksa menentukan sikap yang pasti), while the regional [Pekalongan] government will be responsible to the people for the consequences.

Tegal, 5 December 1945
FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE ORGANISATIONS OF THE 3 DAERAH
C/- A.M.R.I. Headquarters, Tegal
Pemalang Agreement of 9 December

Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah
(Tegal, Brebes dan Pemalang)

Pemalang, 9 December 1945

TO
R.M. Soeprapto, acting Resident
Pekalongan PEKALONGAN

MERDEKA!

At a meeting between the Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah (Tegal, Brebes and Pemalang) and the Pekalongan and Batang struggle council with representatives from PESINDO, Hizbullah, Masyumi and other bodies from Sragi, Batang Pekalongan and the Barisan Banteng in Pekalongan, in the Pendopo of the kabupaten of Pemalang on Sunday, 9 December 1945, the following was decided:

1. The government of Pekalongan Residency must be handed over to the people immediately
2. Sardjio is to be appointed Resident of Pekalongan
3. The Pangreh Praja and heads of government offices who are not able to follow the way of Revolt (susunan Pemberontakan) must resign
4. The leadership of the [Pekalongan] government must follow the organisation of the Government of the Tiga Daerah (Tegal, Brebes, Pemalang)
5. The handing over of political, social and economic functions of government must be settled tomorrow, Monday, 10 December 1945
6. The Pangreh Praja and those heads of Departments who have resigned will not be allowed to leave their residences until their security can be guaranteed
7. Before the Tiga Daerah struggle Transfer Staff can get everything in order, the acting Resident Soeprapto it asked to guarantee their safety and the security of their Region.

(Signed)

The Tiga Daerah Joint Struggle
(Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang)
Secretariat
(Chairman) (Secretary)

In mutual agreement and with understanding (to implement these decisions)
(signed)
acting Resident Soeprapto
PESINDO Batang
PESINDO Pekalongan
PESINDO Sragi
BI Pekalongan
Pekalongan Police
Pekalongan Hizbullah
Sragi Hizbullah

Struggle Council of Pekalongan and Batang
(Chairman) (Secretary)
Pekalongan Barisan Banteng
Pekalongan Badan Pemberontakan
Pekalongan Badan Pemberontakan Alim Ulama
Announcement of the Republican Government of Pekalongan
Residency Region
No.1/B

MERDEKA!

Implementing the desires of the people of Brebes, Tegal
and Pemalang regions in their letter of demand of the 5th of this
month, on the 9th December the regional government of Pekalongan
surrendered and fell into the hands of the people.

In accordance with the people's wishes, the regional
government of Pekalongan Residency must be based on democracy and
family spirit (kekeluargaan)

Because of this, in day to day social contact, in
conversation and in writing, we must always speak in such a manner
so as to engender affection and camaraderie. For example, Bapak
Resident, Bapak Bupati, Bapak Assisten [Camat], saudara*, bung
and so on. Such phrases as your honour and servant are not permitted
to be used at all.

The above changes do not mean that we must depart from
normal standards of politeness.

Pekalongan, 11 December 1945
Bapak Resident

S A R D J I O

* Saudara is a close form of address for friends or equals.
APPENDIX J

1. Social Origins of Pekalongan TKR 17th Regiment Officer Corps

a. Pekalongan PETA Dai Itji Daidan (First Battalion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Position in BKR/TKR</th>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.H. Iskandar Idris</td>
<td>battalion commander (daidancho)</td>
<td>Commander 17th Regiment Pekalongan</td>
<td>Teacher of religion in Pekalongan</td>
<td>Retired as Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukardjo</td>
<td>company commander (chudancho) first company</td>
<td>Leader of Pekalongan BKR commander 1st battalion Pekalongan</td>
<td>kecamatan Secretary Geringsing, South Pekalongan</td>
<td>Lieut.Col.; died after 1950 while involved in putting down Gerakan Banteng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboe Abjid Boestomi</td>
<td>chudancho second company</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>b. Rembang, Camat Adiwerna, Tegal</td>
<td>Brig.Gen., director of PEPABRI (Persatuan Perwira ABRI), the ABRI Pensioned Officers' Organisation (1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjiptowiduro</td>
<td>chudancho third company</td>
<td>Leader of BKR, Pemalang commander 2nd battalion Pemalang</td>
<td>b.1911, Beji, Taman Pemalang, Normal School, Primary schoolteacher* in Pemalang; son of a small peasant</td>
<td>Retired in 1958 as a captain; then became a dukun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadyono</td>
<td>chudancho fourth company</td>
<td>Leader of BKR Brebes head of General Affairs acting Commander</td>
<td>b.1915, son of a wedana, Tanjong Brebes</td>
<td>Lieut.Col. pensioned 1951 - business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tjiptowiduro was the only chudancho in the Pekalongan daidan who was not a member of the Pangreh Praja and the only one of seven chudancho not from a priyayi background.
b. Tegal PETA Dai Ni Daidan (Second Battalion)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Position in BKR/TKR</th>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.H. Doerjatman</td>
<td>didanco</td>
<td>Captain in Solo TKR Regiment (?)</td>
<td>Teacher of Koranic chanting in Cirebon area. Wife Sutjirah active in Muhammadiyah in Tegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isnaeni</td>
<td>chudanco</td>
<td></td>
<td>b.1917, Pemalang. MULO HIK, Teacher, son of a police hoofdagent (sergeant)*</td>
<td>Major, Pension 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Djoeweni</td>
<td>chudanco</td>
<td>Leader of BKR Tegal. For 3 days Camat Talang</td>
<td>b.12.7.18, Karanganyar, son of Wedana of Tegalrejo, Magelang, Purbolinggo, MULO, NIK. Teacher in Muhammadiyah school</td>
<td>Demoted to Lieut I after the Tiga Daerah(?) ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wimbohandoko</td>
<td>second company</td>
<td>commander 3rd battalion Tegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasman Utoyo</td>
<td>chudanco</td>
<td>Deputy-leader BKR Brebes Commander 4th battalion Brebes</td>
<td>b.19.10.18, Gemuh, Weleri, son of Irrigation Official. HIS Kendal, Europeasche Amberschool. THS (Technis Haven School) Machinist Kaliwungu sugar mill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasmin</td>
<td>chudanco</td>
<td>was only chudanco, not to join Pekalongan TKR from the two PETA battalions</td>
<td>Hospital aid (juru rawat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ So called because it was formed after the Pekalongan daidan. The two daidan were not linked organisationally.

* One of maybe ten Indonesians in all of the NEI who had this position
2. Pekalongan TKR 17th Regiment General Staff  
(first formation, 10(?)) October-3 November 1945, when Commander was captured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>PETA Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>K.H. Iskandar Idris (Lieut.Col.)</td>
<td>Daidancho Pekalongan daidan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>Boestomi (Major)</td>
<td>Chudancho Pekalongan daidan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of General Affairs</td>
<td>Wadyono (Major)</td>
<td>Chudancho Pekalongan daidan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bagian Umum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>Isnaeni (Major)</td>
<td>Chudancho Tegal daidan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tata Usaha)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Intelligence</td>
<td>Soedharmo (Major)</td>
<td>PETA Surabaya (shodancho in Dr Mustapha's battalion) on leave to see family in Pemalang - fought against kenpeitai and earned his place in TKR 17th Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bagian Satu)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Only one former chudancho from the Tegal PETA battalion (Isnaeni).

The former daidancho had rank of Lieut.Col., while chudancho were given rank of Major in the Pekalongan TKR. This represented a promotion. (PETA company commanders were made TKR battalion commanders and platoon commanders were made company commanders.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acting Commander</td>
<td>Wadyono</td>
<td>chudancho, Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>see PETA table a</td>
<td>Lieut.Col. pension 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant</td>
<td>Sumantoro</td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed kenpeitai officer Hiyashi in Pekalongan clash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Intelligence</td>
<td>Wiljo Pospojudo+</td>
<td>shodancho, Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Finance</td>
<td>Soemantri</td>
<td>Pekalongan daidan headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Organisation</td>
<td>Soegito</td>
<td>PETA Banyumas</td>
<td>Son of Bupati of Brebes (Sarim)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Logistics</td>
<td>Soehadi</td>
<td>Pekalongan daidan headquarters</td>
<td>Pemalang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Munitions</td>
<td>Soeprapto</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Pekalongan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Transport</td>
<td>Slamet</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Wiradesa, Pekalongan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>Sukamdono</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Soebagyo</td>
<td>Pangreh Praja</td>
<td>b.2.3.16, Pajitan, Camat Brebes</td>
<td>1948 Captain, Head of Finance Logistics. Rejoined Pangreh Praja, under Dutch administration, 1948-49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Most of whom (except Iskandar Idris) were present when decision to arrest Sardjio, the Resident of Pekalongan, was made on 14 December 1945.

+ Before his death Wiljo Pospojudo was a Deputy Chairman of the MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly), with the rank of Coordinating Minister in the Dwikora Cabinet of 1964.
### b. 1st Battalion (Pekalongan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Soekardjo</td>
<td>chudancho, Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>see PETA Table b</td>
<td>Lieut. Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Commanders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartono</td>
<td></td>
<td>shodancho, 1st shodan Tegal daidan</td>
<td>from Batang</td>
<td>Killed by Dutch mortar near Wonosobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskandar Ranu</td>
<td></td>
<td>shodancho, 2nd shodan Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>from Pekalongan</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Kodam VII, Semarang Chief of Staff under Surjono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahmono</td>
<td></td>
<td>shodancho, 3rd shodan Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>from Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Taught in Yogyakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iksan Sugianto</td>
<td></td>
<td>shodancho, 4th shodan Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>from Blora; son of pawnshop official (?)</td>
<td>Maj. Gen., until December 1977 Fourth Assistant (Logistics) in Central Army Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### c. 2nd Battalion (Pemalang-Comal Baru Sugar Mill)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Tjiptowiduro</td>
<td>chudancho, Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>see Table 1</td>
<td>Pensioned 1958 with rank of Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Commanders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahwono</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>from Pemalang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumantoro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>from Comal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumardono</td>
<td></td>
<td>Heiho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3rd Battalion (Tegal) (former kenpeitai headquarters and Hotel Stork)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>R. Djoeweni Wimbohandoko</td>
<td>chudancho, Tegal daidan</td>
<td>see PETA Table b</td>
<td>Retired in 1950 with rank of First Lieut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Ayub</td>
<td>Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieut.Col. retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Masih*</td>
<td>shodancho, Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>son of headmaster of primary school</td>
<td>Retired as Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subechi</td>
<td>shodancho, 4th shodan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieut.Col. in DETSUS (Direktorat Khusus, Special Directorate) in Semarang Governor's office (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sajidiman*</td>
<td>shodancho, Cirebon</td>
<td>son of Wedana of Bumijawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(batallion Abdulgani)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Commanders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parwoto(?)</td>
<td>shodancho, Tegal daidan</td>
<td>Bumiayu, South Tegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jusuf*</td>
<td>shodancho, Tegal daidan</td>
<td>a secretary in Bumiayu kawedanan Office, then Tegal kabupaten</td>
<td>Lieut.Col. KODAM VII Semarang Household adjutant to Division Commander (1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(sea company)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martomo</td>
<td>shodancho, Pekalongan daidan</td>
<td>MULO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Stayed on in Tegal after main body of the battalion had withdrawn.
**e. 4th Battalion (Brebes)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in PETA</th>
<th>Birthdate, Education, Previous work, Place</th>
<th>Recent TNI-AD Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Kasman Utoyo</td>
<td>chudancho, Tegal daidan</td>
<td>see PETA Table B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Moh Kasim Iljas</td>
<td>Headquarters, Pekalongan daidan (had been an adjutant of Iskandar Idris)</td>
<td>Pekalongan</td>
<td>Major, Diponegoro Division, Nusakambangan Island prison (1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Commanders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soemariono</td>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarters, Tegal daidan (adjutant to K.H. Doerjatman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjiptono</td>
<td></td>
<td>shodancho, Tegal daidan</td>
<td>b.22.10.22 (father was in forestry service)</td>
<td>Lieut.Col. (1973) Diponegoro Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HIS 1938, MULO 1941, Budancho training in Cimahi, then shodancho Bogor, joined Tegal daidan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwarso (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>bundancho, Tegal daidan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaiman (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>shodancho, Tegal daidan(?)</td>
<td>Cirebon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** According to its commander, the 4th battalion had the best logistics, supplied by Pekalongan Regiment headquarters. Also obtained arms from the Purwokerto TKR Division. 4th battalion had more ex-PETA, with only 105 ‘new’recruits. (3rd battalion had a much higher percentage of non-PETA.)
AMIR was born at Songgom (Brebes) on 12 August 1907, the son of Noto Atmodjo, a land surveyor who later moved to Pemalang as local inspector of the government's Opium and Salt Monopoly. Amir was educated at HIS Pemalang (with Soewignjo). About 1923, while working as a clerk in the Comal Baru sugar mill, he joined the Comal sub-branch of the PKI which was headed by Soewignjo. Arrested on 12 November 1926, he was sentenced to six years jail, which was spent in Pemalang, Glodok, Jakarta, Pemakasan (Madura), Tangerang and Cipinang prisons. After his release he was a key member of the small radical pre-war pergerakan in Pemalang throughout the 1930s when he earned his living as a goldsmith. In late 1941 he was arrested and put in preventive detention by the Dutch Assistant Resident for 'illegal activities', but was released by the Japanese. During the Occupation he was the leader of the Pemalang cell of the underground PKI. In 1945 he gave political courses to Pemalang API/PRI pemudas, and represented Pemalang on the GBP3Ds Defence and Information Committees and was the GBP3D Secretariat's legal adviser. He joined Resident Sardjo's Transfer Staff in Pekalongan in early December 1945, was arrested by the TKR, was one of the six brought to trial in Pekalongan in March 1947, and was finally released when the charges were dropped on 18 July 1947. During the First Dutch Clash he joined the TNI masyarakat and fought with the guerillas. After the revolution Amir returned to Comal, began giving courses on Marxism, and helped rebuild the Pemalang branch of the PKI in 1951. From 1951-59 he ran a National Secondary School in Comal, and was a PKI candidate for the Provincial Assembly in the 1955 elections. A delegate to the 1957 Constituante (Constitutional Congress) in Bandung, he was also a member of Pemalang's Regional Representative Council (Dewan Permerintah Daerah) during this period. From 1959-61 he travelled overseas, visiting Albania and Moscow. On his return he taught at the PKI's Aliacham Academy and worked in the Yayasan Pembaruan as a translations adviser. From December 1965 he lived in Cirebon, where he died in May 1978.

K.H. ABU SUDJA'I was born about 1904 in the village of Pacul, the 13th of 18 children. In 1912 he was taken on the haj by his father. Because his father would not let any of his children 'sit at a desk in a Dutch school', Abu Sudja'i's education was in various pesantrens in Cirebon, Solo, Jombang and Majalengka until 1920, when he entered a Sarekat Islam school in Tegal. In 1922 he joined the famous pesantren of K.H. Moechlas in Panggung, Tegal, but left it in 1925 to wander between pesantrens in Kaliwungu, Semarang, Solo, Jombang and Tebuireng. In Majalengka he entered a private Teachers' Training School for two years, joined the PSII-sponsored Perserikatan Ulama, which had been set up in 1927 in Pekalongan, Tegal and Cirebon. In 1930 he returned to Pacul village and founded a school. Active in the PSII, in 1932 he was jailed for seven months for breaking the state salt monopoly by making his own, again in 1937 for 40 days for opposition to the taking of blood samples from corpses, and again for three months in 1939 for speaking against the government (spreekdelijk). He refused to work under the Japanese, who wanted him to join the Tegal Department of Religious Affairs. In November 1945, 33 days after being released
from jail he was taken by AMRI Talang and installed as Bupati of Tegal where he remained until the First Dutch Clash, evacuating from Tegal with the republican government. Accused of being a Darul Islam supporter he was 'dishonourably' dismissed from the government in 1950, with loss of pension and was imprisoned in Nusakembangan island prison from 1950 until 1955.

MR MAS BESAR MARTOKOESOEMO was born in Brebes on 8 July 1894. He was given the name 'besar' by his father because he was born in the tenth month of the Muslim calendar, the bulan besar or bulan aji. From the age of six he was brought up and educated in Tegal by a Dutch woman, Maria Hellvie. She sent him to ELS in Pekalongan for seven years and then on to HBS in Semarang. After completing two years, he entered the newly founded Law School in Batavia in 1913, in the first enrolment. From 1919 until November 1923 he studied Law at the University of Leiden and was the first 'native' to graduate. Returning to Tegal in 1924, he became the first Indonesian pengacara (defence lawyer) to practise there. During the Japanese occupation he became first Mayor, then Bupati, of Tegal. In May 1945 he was appointed Assistant Resident (Fuku Shuchokan) in Pekalongan, then Resident in September 1945. He left the Residency on 5 November 1945 after the Pekalongan TKR had received orders from Yogyakarta to detain him, and was taken to Yogyakarta and kept under house arrest for some months. He was then appointed to the Ministry of Home Affairs (then in Purwokerto) as secretary to Mr Sumarman, where he worked for the rest of the Revolution. After the Revolution he was Secretary-General of the Department of Justice for many years.

K. HOLLE was born on 9 September 1914 in Ameth village, on the island of Nusalaut, in Ambon. His father, Jonathon Holle, was a minister and expected that his son would be called to the same profession. After graduating from the Christian MULO in Ambon in 1932, he was sent to Malang to repeat Dutch before going on to the Protestant Missionary Training Centre at Oestgeest in Holland. However, because his Dutch did not improve, he entered the Forestry School in Bogor. He was working the teak forest plantations in Pemalang when the Japanese arrived. During the Occupation he joined the underground PKI. In 1948 the PKI wanted to make him head of the Ambon Comite Daerah Besar, representing Ambon on the CC-PKI but he could not forget what the party had done to Widarta. Like other underground PKI leaders he joined the union movement, helping to found a Forestry Workers' Union in 1951. He was active in the leadership representing the Union in SOBSI until 1964, when he resigned.

K.H. ISKANDAR IDRIS was born on 17 February 1901 in Kedunghalang village, Semplak, Bogor kabupaten. He was educated at a Jamiyad Kair school and an Al Irsyad school, and came to Pekalongan in 1921 to teach in the local Al Irsyad school there. In 1925 he set up a batik business in Kedungwuni, and from 1931–36 taught at the Muhammadiyah HIS in Tegal, and then taught Arabic at an Arabic school in Pekalongan. From 1936 he worked as the local agent for the Bumi Poetera Insurance Company. During this time he published commentaries on the Koran, and other religions books, in both Indonesian and Javanese. On the committee of the Pekalongan branch of Muhammadijah from 1924, he was its chairman from 1929 until 1931 and again in 1938. In 1931 he became
chairman of Pekajangan Muhammadiah and founded a business association which taught its members business practice. He was chosen by the Japanese as a daidancho of the Pekalongan battalion. At the time Pekalongan priyayi circles considered the appointment of a 'bill collector' (rekening loper) to this position inappropriate. He was made commander of the TKR 17th Regiment in Pekalongan, a position he held until his capture in Talang on 3 November 1945. He did not return to the TKR after the counter-revolution, but during the guerilla period was a leader of Hizbullah in Wonosobo. He now lives in Jakarta on a Lieut.Colonel's pension.

KARTOHARGO was born on 14 July 1904 at Bantarpolang (Pemalang), where his father Kartotanoyo was the Camat. After completing HIS in Pemalang in 1917, he finished his education at a private Teachers' Training School at Gunungan, Jakarta, run by the Associatie van Oost en West. During his stay in Jakarta (1917-23) he was a member of Jong Islamieten Bond, then on the committee of Jakarta branch of Jong Java and knew Mohamad Yamin and Mr Sartono. In 1924 he returned to Brebes, joined Budi Utomo, and taught in its school there. In 1926, at the request of Pemalang Taman Siswa, he taught in their primary school in Pemalang, before moving to Weleri (Kendal) to teach in a Budi Utomo school. In Weleri he disagreed with a parade to celebrate Queen Wilhelmina's birthday, returned to Brebes and became a journalist for a time. After teaching in an Arjuna School in Bantul (Yogyakarta) he opened one in Sidarja (Cilacap). Returning to Brebes he taught in a Muhammadiah HIS, then founded a Taman Siswa School 'because I liked Ki Hajar's lectures'. Late in 1934 he founded Taman Siswa branches in Ketanggungan and Tanjung, and founded and led a branch of PARTINDO in Brebes. He left teaching for a time and went into business as a building contractor, then he started a timber firm which went bankrupt. In 1934 he took down the picture of Queen Wilhelmina, which was hanging in a Kalurahan where he was giving a course, and tore it up. He was summoned by the Wedana and his house was searched. The authorities found an article by Kartohargo on the death under suspicious circumstances of a village vaccinator, written for Pemandangan at a time when he also wrote articles for Lokomotief on improving the education of lurahs. The Wedana detained Kartohargo for three months. In 1936 he returned to teaching, first at a HIS in Randudongkal, run by the PGB (Persatuan Guru Bantu, Union of Teachers), then back in Muhammadiah HIS and WNI School in Brebes, and HIS in Adiweru. In 1939 he was working as head of the Duren Sawit (Balapulang) irrigation system, and founded a branch of VIPIN. During the Japanese occupation he was Chairman of PUTERA, head of the Suisintai (Barisan Pelopor), and also the Hokokai, a kumicho and an azacho, was head of the local kumiai warung, and led a party of romushas to South Banten. In 1945 he was Chairman of the Brebes KNI, Chairman of the Brebes Working Committee, and on the Information Committee of the GBP3D. Arrested by the TKR in Brebes and one of six brought to trial in Pekalongan, he was released on 21 July 1947. After the Revolution he went back to schoolteaching and died in January 1973.

K. MIDJAJA (or Kamidjaja) whose real name was Sardjono, was born on 7 August 1909, the son of Sadiman Kromoredjo, a tani kecil (small peasant) in the hamlet of Bareng or Kauman, Garak kecamatan, Kartosuro, Solo. After finishing fifth class of village primary school in 1923.
he was a conductor of the NIS railway in Semarang from 1926 to 1933 and was imprisoned for two years after the 1926 revolt. He was on the executive of the Semarang branch of the PBKI (Persatuan Buruh Kereta Api) under Djokosoejono and in 1933 was dismissed from the NIS railway, for engaging in passive resistance against the order banning any NIS employees from joining the PBKI. By 1935 he was on the executive committee of the PPBI (Persatuan Penganggur Bangsa Indonesia) also based in Solo. During the 1930s he often visited Comal (Pemalang) to build up contacts with pergerakan people there, including Ibu Pri and her husband, the Pemalang PERSI leader. From 1935 until 1941 K. Midjaja edited the newspaper Mimbar Boeroeh in Solo and was chairman of COBI (Centraal Organisasi Buruh Indonesia). In 1939 he joined the Illegal PKI and was a Solo commissary of the Semarang based GASPI (Gabungan Sarekat Buruh Partikulir Indonesia). From April 1942 until 1945 he was responsible for the activities of the underground PKI on Java's North Coast forming 'City Committees' (Comite Kota) in Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang 'and several kecamatan'. In 1945 he coordinated the perjuangan in Pekalongan Residency, was founder and Chairman of the GBP3D and is generally considered as the 'auctor intellectual' of the Tiga Daerah movement. Brought to trial in Pekalongan, he was released in October 1947 because of the Dutch attack on the city. During 1947-48 he was in the Information Bureau of SOBSI, was kidnapped by rival communist factions and imprisoned for three months as a follower of Widarta. In 1948-49 he was back in the Tiga Daerah again, actively organising underground PKI opposition to the Dutch and in other places in Central and West Java. These groups came under the authority of the Central Committee of the PKI in October 1950. He was a member of the executive of the SBST (Sarekat Buruh Bea Tjukai) in 1950. In 1953 he travelled extensively in Sumatra and went to Macassar. In March 1954 he formed RKS (Rukun Kerja Sama) for government officials, was acting secretary and delegate member (to SOBSI?) and also actively involved in the Ministry of Finance, coordinating Sarekat Buruh and Sarekat Sekerja members. On 21 January 1958 he became a member of the executive committee of the Working Committee (BKS, Badan Kerja Sama) of Central Labour (Buruh Pusat), first chairman of the Department of Economic Affairs BKS branch and a member of the pleno session of the Dewan Pertimbangan Buruh, representing the central office of the RKS. On 10 February 1958 he was appointed pleno member of Front Nasional Pembebasan Ir Ian Barat (FNPIB). In May 1959 he went to China as the delegate representative of RKS central office, visiting Peking, Hangchow, Wuhan, Nanking and Canton amongst other centres, travelling via Manila, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Singapore. In the early 'sixties he wrote a thesis about the Tiga Daerah Affair for the Aliarcham Academy. On 24 May 1965 he was made Pioneer (Perintis) of the Indonesian Independence Movement by the Ministry of Social Affairs. After six months' detention in the Manggarai CPM camp, K. Midjaja died on 6 March 1966, the day he was to be released.

MUHAMAD NUH was born in Tegal and joined the PKI in 1925. On 17 November 1926 he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in Pekalongan, Glodog, and Pamekasan. In 1931 he was sent to Boven Digul, but returned in 1935. Until 1942 he was engaged in what he himself described as 'subversive activities'. In 1942 he was arrested by the Japanese in Semarang for being part of the 'anti-fascist movement' and imprisoned in Jurnatan prison. After his release he was a chutaicho
of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor and, as the result of a leadership reshuffle after the Proclamation, he became chairman of the leadership council of the Barisan Pelopor, the largest badan perjuangan in Tegal City. He played a leading role in reforming the police in that city, was a member of the Tegal Working Committee, the GBP3D and in charge of the General Affairs Section of the GBP3D Secretariat. Arrested by the TKR he was one of the six to be tried in Pekalongan and was released on 18 July 1947. From then until 1949 he lived in Bandung, and in 1950 returned to Tegal where he worked at his trade as an optometrist and opened a Taman Pendidikan Guru/Taman Dewasa, which he ran until 1956. He was not an active member of the PKI. From 1958 until his death he was head of the Tegal Branch of the Perintis Kemerdekaan. In 1962 he wrote a series of articles about the Tiga Daerah Affair for the leftist historical journal, Penelitian Sedjarah. He was shot on 9 January 1966, near Tegal, by Muslim elements in the aftermath of the attempted coup of October 1965.

KROMO LAWI (Lawi Sumodiharjo) was born in Batang in 1900 and educated in a 'Second Class Native School' in Purworejo and HIS Pekalongan. After this he spent a year in the Foresty School in Sukabumi, then left and worked on the SCS railway in Batang and Comal. In 1920 he entered the 'Native Sailors School' in Makasar, and on graduating in May 1925 formed a Native Sailors League (Marine Bond) one of the aims of which was to campaign for increased pay for 'native' sailors. Arrested with other IMB members in November 1926 and accused of supporting the PKI revolt in Surabaya, Lawi was dismissed from the navy. In 1927 he founded a branch of the first PNI in Pekalongan, and joined the Muhammadiah youth as a cover for his activities. In August 1929 he tried to set up a branch of the Workers' Union (Sarekat Kaum Buruh) but was frustrated by police. In 1930 he was held in preventive detention, and later became a troop leader of Hizbul Wathan, the Muhammadiah scouts, also as a cover for pergerakan activities. He disbanded the PNI in April 1931 and gave the party funds to Taman Siswa, but in June became the first Chairman of Mr Sartono's new PNI, and was jailed again in 1934. Chairman of Pekalongan GERINDO during the Japanese occupation, he rose to prominence as head of PUTERA, and the business section of the Jawa Hokokai, and was on the Residency Advisory Council. A member of the Pekalongan KNI, after the kenpeitai massacre he was arrested and accused of being a member of the ultra nationalist Japanese-sponsored Black Fan movement (Kipas Hitam) and jailed, but was later released through pressure from Sajuti Melik. Sent by Melik to contact Tiga Daerah leaders, he was detained in Pemalang and taken to AMRI Slawi, where the army found him, accused him of joining the Tiga Daerah movement and jailed him until January 1947. In 1947 he was a member of the army's Struggle Bureau, and during the First Dutch Clash led the Barisan Banteng guerillas in Dieng plateau, as part of the TKR 17th Regiment. Accused of being pro-PKI at the time of the Madium Affair, he was detained in Yogyakarta. After 1950 he returned to Pekalongan and led the PNI until after the 1955 general election.

MARSUM HR (Hardjoprajitno) was born on 14 April 1914 in Kebumen, the son of the Lurah of Kedung Winangan. After finishing Schakelschool (Link School) in Jakarta, he went to a commercial school, later working in the government medical laboratory making vitamin tablets with a wage of Rp.3 per month. Wanting to be a journalist, he worked for a
Jakarta news service and also for the newspaper *Pemandangan*. After a year he gave up the idea as 'too many of my stories were being rejected'.

In Jakarta he was in the KBI. In 1932 he joined the BPM and went on an oil exploration expedition to West Irian for two years. On his return he got a job as a medical orderly, and had the choice of working in Serang, Garut or Tegal. He chose Tegal because the pay was higher.

In 1934 he was Secretary of the Tegal branch of PARTINDO and then GERINDO. During the Occupation he was a chutaicho in the Tegal Municipality Barisan Pelopor and, after the leadership reshuffle in September 1945, was a member of the five-man leadership council. For a time he was on the Tegal Working Committee but evaded capture by the TKR. In 1950 he joined the Tegal City government and was later deputy head of its political section. In 1955 Marsum was secretary of the general election committee for Tegal municipality. He became Camat of Geringsing in 1957, then Wedana of Wiradesa and retired in 1970. He died in 1976.

**IBU PRI**, as she was known in the Pemalang pergerakan, or Mrs Amir, does not know when she was born. Her father was a tailor in Comal market, and she had no Western schooling. In 1933 when she thinks she was 'about 15' 'Bu Pri was attracted to the local pergerakan after hearing the song, *Indonesia Raya*, and joined the local PARTINDO although the minimum membership age was 19. 'I wanted to learn the song, which meant writing it down which meant that I had to learn to write' she recalls. Soon after this she was arrested on orders of the Wedana of Comal, for breaking the prohibition on holding a public meeting, while leading the singing of the song. From then on she was harassed by the police and told to take her trade of dressmaking elsewhere. After 1935 'Bu Pri was active in the Comal underground radical movement, led by K. Midjaja, building up revolutionary consciousness under the cover of a funeral association. For a time she was married to an activist in Pemalang's PERSI, and later married Amir. During the Japanese occupation she went to Jakarta, where the underground PKI suggested she do a political course organised by PUTERA, together with four other women and 37 men. For some time she worked in PUTERA but left because 'she could not bear to see the suffering of the ordinary person in Jakarta'. The underground then put her in the women's section of the Jawa Hokokai with M.H. Lukman's younger sister Rollah. Bored with 'just playing with a telephone' and wanting 'to be in contact with the people' she was trained as a spinner and weaver then sent to Indramayu in 1943 by the underground PKI, shortly after the uprising, to become a leader of the Jawa Hokokai there. After six months she was to be moved to Banten but Widarta wanted her to return to Comal to work in the underground PKI. With Amir she built up contacts in the Pemalang Forestry Service to provide a base where the underground could send its fugitives. She also raised funds for the underground. After the Proclamation she was sent with Amir to East Java to try to secure the release of Mr Amir Sjarifuddin, but the mission failed because all their belongings, including party mandates, were stolen. But Ibu Pri remained in East Java at Klakah until the revolusi sosial began. She then returned to Jakarta but was sent back to Surabaya by Widarta. She attended an East Java PESINDO congress in Malang on 6 November, then went to Yogyakarta for the national PESINDO congress shortly afterwards. Later returning to Comal she was active in setting up PESINDO womens' groups in the area during the Tiga Daerah Affair. Interrogated by the TKR she was allowed to stay on in the Hotel Merdeka. After the 32 prisoners were moved to Yogyakarta in December 1946 she was instrumental in sending food parcels to the prisoners. She was active in Comal local politics until 1965.
SAKIRMAN was born in Prambanan, Yogyakarta, in 1906. After his studies he won a scholarship (of £30 per month) to the Prinses Juliana School (PJS) an intermediate technical school in Yogyakarta. With other graduates of the PJS he worked at the Kebonan sugar mill and became Yogyakarta's first 'native' health inspector. 'All his friends were Dutch' recalls his wife. After 1932 he moved to Pekalongan, where he worked under the Residency doctor who was Mr Besar's brother. In 1936 he was appointed a health inspector at Moga (southern Pemalang), then moved to Slawi as Inspector of Housing as part of the government's plague eradication program. Sakirman's brother, K.R.T. Prakosodiningrat had the rank of a bupati in the Kepatihan (government offices) in Yogyakarta. Sakirman himself had a large kris collection and was a strong kebatinan adherent. From September to December 1945 he was leader of the militant AMRI Slawi, playing a key role in the planning of strategy to take over Tegal City on 4 November which forced the remaining Pangreh Praja to resign. Both Sakirman and his wife were arrested by the army. According to one account his wife had a mental breakdown in prison. Later in the Revolution Sakirman was in the logistics section of the army in Yogyakarta. After the Revolution he worked in the water supply section of the City's Public Works Department. Retired in 1962 he died (as his wife put it) on 'Hari Pesta Rakyat' (1 May) 1965.

SARDJIO (whose full name was R. Sardjijo Kartodihardja) was born in the village of Bagelen, in the kecamatan of that name, in Purworejo kabupaten, in June 1909. He was one of four children of Raden Tjokrodirado, a bekel or assistant village headman of Bedug (whose genealogy showed him to be a seventh generation descendant of Sultan Amangkurat II's son-in-law, R. Adipati Danuredjo). Sardjio attended HIS in nearby Kutoarjo and finished MULO in Purwokerto in 1927. He then studied modern foreign languages (English, German and French) for two years at the Volks Universiteit at Gang Kenari 15 in Jakarta, run by members of the pergerakan. For a time he worked in a government travel office, then for Harrison and Crossfield, a British tobacco company. He was an important figure in the Purworejo pergerakan before the war, and a member of the local PNI Baru. In 1933 he was sentenced for a week's jail for holding a party meeting 'without permission' and later banned from teaching in a local private school. In 1941 he was elected as a member of the Purworejo Regency Council (Regentschapraad) as a non-party member. After the Japanese arrived he was again an elected member of the Kedu Residency Advisory Council and later chosen as Kedu Residency's representative on the Central Advisory Council in Jakarta. Later in the Occupation he joined the underground PKI. The combination of cooperation with the Japanese and membership of a United Front against Fascism did not seem to be a matter of controversy amongst the PKI faithful at the time. Arrested early in 1945 by the kenpeitai he was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment. His brother, Soekarto, arrested at the same time, died in Magleang jail as a result of kenpeitai torture. After his release from Ambarawa prison in mid-September 1946, Sardjio was active in the revolusi sosial in Purworejo, forming a branch of Amir Sjarifuddin's PARSI there in November. Early in December he went to Pekalongan at the request of the GBP3D and was Resident for four days from 12-15 December, before being arrested with other Tiga Daerah people. Released in early 1947, he joined the Biro Perjuangan section of the army with the rank of
Lieut. Col. and was then a member of the TNI Masyarakat under leftist Djokosoejono. On 21 December 1948 he was accused of being a supporter of the Madiun Affair and, as head of the local FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakyat), was shot near Bagelen.

SARIMIN REKSODIHARDJO was born on 17 July 1905 in Kalidesel village on the Dieng plateau. After HIS in Wonosobo he entered OSVIA in Magelang in 1917, graduating with a diploma to join the Interior Administration in south Central Java in 1924. In 1930 he moved to the kabupaten of Kendal, west of Semarang, and was surprised to find that the sembah (gesture of obeisance with hands held before the face, performed squatting [congkok] to the bupati) was 'still the custom' on the north coast. The Dutch Resident of Banyumas had already abolished the practice. In 1931 Sarimin attended the Bestuursschool (Administration School) and was then appointed a camat in Weleri at the age of 21. In 1938 he went to the Bestuursacademie (Tertiary Level Administration College), from where he graduated in 1941. During the Japanese occupation he was promoted rapidly from wedana to bupati in 18 months. Kidnapped during the revolusi sosial, he rejoined the civil service in the Ministry of Home Affairs in March 1946, later heading its Agraria Department. He was Governor of the Province of Nusa Tenggara (or Sunda Kecil as it was then called) from 1952-57.

SOENARTO was born at Ketanggungan West about 1913, the son of a clerk (boekhouder) in the local sugar mill. After HIS in Brebes and MULO in Cirebon, the Dutch sugar mill administrator offered him a position at the mill, which he refused because of the long hours. In Jakarta he had various jobs before joining the pergerakan after having been dismissed from the Jakarta Resident's office for passing on classified information to HIPA (Handel in Pers Artikelen), a type of news service run by a former Digul exile. For a while he sold the newspaper, Daulat Rakyat, for Mohammad Bondan, and later enrolled in courses in the PNI Baru school Taman Kemajuan, where he later taught. Threatened by the Political Intelligence Service that his father, now a village Secretary, would lose his job unless Soenarto left Jakarta, he went to Cirebon, and taught in a school run by PNI Baru leader Sugra at Walet. He became a commissioner of the Cirebon branch of the PNI Baru, and helped Sugra form the Koperasi Rakyat Indonesia (KRI). During the Japanese occupation Soenarto, like Sugra, used the KRI as a front for underground activities. In 1945 he led the revolutionary movement in Tanjung and was a member of the Brebes Working Committee and the GBP3D. He evaded arrest by the army, and after the Revolution worked in the Jakarta Municipality government.

SOESMONO was born on 3 July 1913 at Subah (Batang) the fifth of eight children of a mantri lumbung (rice-barn supervisor) of the local People's Credit Bank. In 1929 he finished HIS in Batang, but for financial reasons the family was not able to educate him any further. He worked in a bank in Brebes, then in Cirebon, and in 1938 became a clerk in Tegal kabupaten. It was in this period that he first became interested in nationalism via Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo (the PNI-Baru leader) who was living in Tegal in this period and whose sister Soesmono married. During the Japanese occupation he was able to travel widely all over the kabupaten because of his membership of the BP2 and BP3 and became well known. Early in 1945 he was part of the Negen Broeders
(a group of Socialist-leaning former Indonesia Muda members and friends of Supeno). In 1945 he became deputy Chairman of the Tegal kabupaten KNI, and was on the Information Committee of the GBP3D. He joined Sardjio's Transfer Staff in Pekalongan, was arrested by the TKR, and released on 15 August 1946. In 1947 he formed the Gerakan Plebiscit in Tegal with Dr R.V. Sudjito, in 1948 was in Jakarta, and in 1949 returned to Tegal as a liaison officer between the republicans in Tegal city and the army to the south. In 1950 he moved to the Governor's office in Semarang at the request of the Minister of Home Affairs, to work on the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia movement in Banyumas and Pekalongan Residencies. He retired in December 1969.

SOEPANGAT was born in Banyumas in 1903, and worked in Semarang and Ambarawa before coming to Pemalang after 1936 as a medical orderly (mantri verpleger). His skills soon became well known in the small town. During the Japanese occupation he earned a reputation for honesty as the leading figure in PEKOPE, which distributed supplies of scarce basic commodities and which ran the popular Fuji restaurant, where good cheap food could be obtained. An excellent public speaker, after the Proclamation he was popular with the younger pemuda figures and the older radicals alike because of his combination of tactful flexibility and revolutionary spirit. A leader of Pemalang's API, he became something of a local hero after his kidnapping by Pangreh Praja/TKR elements. He was the underground PKI's choice as Bupati of Pemalang, and was a 'unifier' of the kabupaten revolutionary movement, including the lenggaungs who all followed his leadership. He escaped from Pemalang when the TKR occupied the town. He later arrived in Pekalongan with the Presidential entourage, was seized in front of the official party at a meeting in the kabupaten pendopo, and thrown into jail by the army. After being released in early 1947, he became an official in Supeno's Ministry of Youth and Development in 1948. He was never a member of any political party after the Revolution and died of jaundice in Ambarawa in December 1958.

SOEWIGNJO was born on 19 March 1906 at Bobotsari, Purbolinggo, the son of M. Wirja Atmadja, who later moved to Comal as head of the 'Second Class Native School' there. After completing HIS in Pemalang in 1920 he sat for the petty officials' examination (the qualification for lower levels of government employment), but decided to join the SCS instead and worked as a station clerk in Comal. A local VSTP member, and leader of the Comal section of the Pekalongan PKI branch, he disobeyed the order to revolt on 13 November 1926 'because the Pekalongan party leadership had been infiltrated by the Dutch.' Sentenced to 41/2 years' imprisonment in Pamekasan and Glodok, he was exiled to Boven Digul, West New Guinea, in 1929 but was allowed to return in 1932. Unemployed until 1935, he then got a job in the Residency Finance Department and in 1938 was appointed a tax inspector in Slawi. When the Japanese arrived he left Slawi to live for a time in a village in southern Pemalang, and did not work for the Japanese. In 1945 he founded AMRI in Slawi with Sakirman and in November became Chairman of the Tegal Working Committee and a member of the GBP3D. Imprisoned by the army, he was one of the six brought to trial in March 1947, but was released on 18 July. He was evacuated with other Republicans, losing all his books when the Dutch occupied Slawi. Later he was a titular major in the TRI Yogyakarta headquarters and in 1948 moved to a base at Sleman. After 1950 he was not active in politics and worked as an official of the Ministry of Education and Culture, retiring in 1970.
WADYONO was the son of a wedana, and it was intended that he follow in his father's footsteps. He entered MOSVIA in Magelang in 1934. A graduate with a diploma he worked as an official of the Interior Administration in Banyumas Residency, also doing a stint as a police mantri under Kartini's son, Susalit, who at that time was head of Purwokerto's Political Intelligence Service. By the time the Japanese had arrived, Wadyono was Camat of Tonjong, Brebes. Sensing the growing unpopularity of the Pangreh Praja he left Tonjong in 1943, and was accepted into the PETA as a company commander in the Pekalongan daidan under K.H. Iskandar Idris. After PETA was disbanded he was for a time police detachment commander at Margasari, but decided against a police career and joined the BKR in Brebes. He joined the new TKR 17th Regiment in Pekalongan as head of General Affairs, and became acting Commander after Iskandar Idris was captured in Talang and taken to Slawi on 3 November 1945. He helped plan the TKR counter-revolution against the Tiga Daerah, and soon after became the Regiment commander. After the First Dutch Clash he evacuated with the Regiment to Wonosobo, where he was again associated with Susalit who was also in the army. Leaving the army after the Revolution, he nearly returned to the civil service in 1951 as secretary to the Governor of Central Java, Boediono, 'but I wasn't considered PSI-ish enough'. He became a businessman in Semarang and is Chairman of the Central Java provincial branch of the Indonesian Red Cross.

WIDARTA, whose full name was Subandi Widarta (known as 'Bandi' to his friends) was born about 1913 in Kediri. He was a member of the Surabaya branch of SPI (Suluh Pemuda Indonesia) which was led by Tasmidjan (Widarta's older brother) from its foundation in 1933, and was also active in the KBI (the Indonesian Scouts). After Musso's visit to Surabaya he was selected to be sent out of Java to a place of his choice by the Illegal PKI to gain experience in the labour movement. He chose Sumatra, and left for Palembang in mid-1936. There he worked in the BPM's Plaju refinery at Lubuklinggo, founded a union and organised a strike over the appalling working conditions. Put under house arrest for three months, he escaped and went to Sambu island to BMP's distillation plant. The Dutch had censored letters between Widarta and his brother, Tasmidjan, now head of the Illegal PKI front GERINDO in Surabaya. After the Dutch learned Widarta was in Sambu, he was given 12 hours to leave the island. He returned to Surabaya via Jakarta and was not directly under the guidance of Pamoedji and in charge of the party's activities in Central Java. He wrote for a Semarang newspaper, Pesat, edited by Sajuti Melik during this time. After the Japanese had arrested the top leaders of the Illegal PKI, including Pamoedji, in mid-1942, Widarta took over the leadership and directed the underground throughout the Occupation. He helped spread the news of the Proclamation from Jakarta to the regional areas, was active in Pemalang during the Tiga Daerah as the representative of the Minister of Information, Mr Amir Sjarifuddin, and was arrested by the TKR on 23 December 1945. While in prison he joined, with other radicals, in signing a declaration opposing the Republican-Dutch Linggajati Agreement. Released in April 1947, he asked, with other Tiga Daerah leaders, for a Party Congress to resolve internal disagreements. Instead he was kidnapped, with K. Midjaja and others, and accused of causing friction within the party over his opposition to Linggajati, and for not correctly following the United Front line in the Tiga Daerah. This had led to conflict with the army. He and other underground PKI members from the Tiga Daerah
were 'tried' by a party committee set up with the authority of the PKI gelap baru leader, Amir Sjarifuddin. The 'judges' included 'returned students' from Holland (Jusuf Mula Dalam), Ngadiman Hardjosubroto, Sudisman and others from the underground PKI who had left Widarta's group. Aidit was also involved initially but withdrew from the committee after hearing the 'defence' of the Tiga Daerah people. The committee sentenced Widarta and three others to death, the order was signed by Sudisman. Widarta was taken to Madiun by Fatkur Hadi and Tjugito, and later shot at Parangtritis beach, south of Yogyakarta. Because many of Widarta's judges and executioners later became leaders of the large PKI of 1948, and because Musso condemned the execution on his return to Indonesia, the PKI for many years kept silent about the underground, and Widarta's role in the Tiga Daerah Affair, leading people to believe that it never existed.
Time Chart of Events in the Residency of Pekalongan
August-December 1945

The sequence of events in a period so short as the first five months of the Indonesian revolution in one small region of Java can leave the reader quite bewildered as to what was happening when and where. The following Time Chart has been constructed to facilitate following the course of events during those turbulent four months from mid-August until the end of December 1945. It may also help to relate what was happening in the Pekalongan Residency in the context of events in other parts of Java. It becomes clearer from this Chart why the government seemed to local leaders to be unconcerned about events in Pekalongan Residency, as they saw the Republic under real threat of extermination from outside forces.

AUGUST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friday, 17</td>
<td>Proclamation of Independence in Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday, 20</td>
<td>Japanese flag hauled down, replaced by Red and White in aksi serentak (spontaneous joint action) by Brebes pemudas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 21</td>
<td>Meeting held in Pekalongan in house of Japanese Resident, Tokonami Tokogi, attended by all bupatis in Pekalongan Residency, mayors (of Tegal and Pekalongan), Judge Soeprapto, Pekalongan Public Prosecutor S. Karioatmodjo, members of Residency Advisory Council including Wedana of Pekalongan, Kr Lawi and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday, 22</td>
<td>Meeting held at Brebes kabupaten pendopo to discuss Proclamation of Independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, 23</td>
<td>Meeting at Brebes kawedanaan pendopo also to discuss Proclamation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 28</td>
<td>KNI formed in Pekalongan. Moh. Saleh attended from Brebes representing Bupati, Sarimin, who had just returned from Pekalongan from meeting about setting up of KNIs. Banyumas KNI formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday, 29</td>
<td>Bandung and Banyumas KNIs formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, 30</td>
<td>Announcement of formation of BKR. All-Java and Madura Pangreh Praja Conference convened in Jakarta.</td>
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SEPTEMBER

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday, 2</td>
<td>First Cabinet (the cabinet bucho) of 10 ministers of new Republic sworn in. Five kabupatens in Priangan Residency held simultaneous meeting to form KNIs. Meeting in Brebes to form kabupaten KNI.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lord Mountbatten instructed Field Marshall Terauchi in Saigon to dissolve Republic.

Kedu Residency KNI formed.

All former Japanese appointed Vice-Residence (Fuku Shuchokan) promoted to Resident with exception of Jakarta Municipality and Residency of Pekalongan. Mr Iskaq Tjokrohadisoerjo, as Resident of neighbouring Banyumas, announces that region is now part of Republic. Brebes Hokokai is dissolved.

At the meeting in Roman Catholic Church hall in Tegal, Mayor and the perjuangan clash about validity of Proclamation.

The Pekalongan KNI passes a motion asking President Sukarno to appoint Mr Besar (the Fuku Shuchokan) as Resident of Pekalongan.

Ikada Square meeting in Jakarta, where Sukarno speaks to huge crowd despite Japanese disapproval. First violence erupts in Java with flag incident over Hotel Yamoto in Surabaya.

Secretary of State, A.G. Pringgodigdo, in reply to Pekalongan KNI motion of 12 September says that Mr Besar has now officially been appointed Resident of Pekalongan.

Mr Besar announces 'Indonesian Independence' in Pekalongan.

All Japanese-appointed officials formally declared civil servants of the new Republic by the government.

Japanese formally transfer power in Pekalongan.

Parade in Pekalongan to welcome Mr Besar's announcement that Pekalongan Residency is now formally part of Republic. Parade began at 7.30 a.m. and was 'no less than three kilometres long'.

First British battalion landed in Jakarta.

Sarekat Sekerja Kereta Api formed in Pekalongan.

Fighting in Pekalongan after kenpeitai opens fire on people while Mr Besar is negotiating the transfer of arms. Thirty-seven Indonesians and about 17 Japanese killed.

The Pekalongan kenpeitai is under siege.

Formation of TKR consisting of ten divisions. The 17th Regiment in the Residency of Pekalongan along with
Semarang, Pati and Salatiga regiments is part of TKR Fourth Division with headquarters in Salatiga under Colonel Djatikusumo. Siege of the kenpeitai continues.

Saturday, 6

4 p.m., 32 of those who died during the battle with the kenpeitai are buried in Pekalongan. Later in evening kenpeitai finally surrenders and hands over all arms 'including several machine guns'.

Three Chinese-owned rice mills in Adiwerna taken over by Rukun Tani leaders from Ujungrusi.

Sunday, 7

11 p.m. House of Lurah of Cerih village, Jatinegara kecamatan in south Tegal, surrounded by large crowd. Pekalongan city garrison and kenpeitai leave Residency for Banyumas accompanied by BKR.

Monday, 8

Lurah of Cerih dombreng-ed 15 kilometres to Jatinegara. Camat flees. First such action in Residency, signals beginning of revolusi sosial.

Wednesday, 10

Camat of Adiwerna is killed after addressing a meeting at Lemahduwur village. Wedana of Adiwerna flees. Oei Tjun Lam's shop and house in Warungpring village (Pemalang kabupaten) burnt to ground, beginning revolusi sosial in Pemalang kabupaten.

Japanese take back control of Bandung after fierce fighting. AMRI formed in Semarang.

Thursday, 11

5 a.m. Killings at Jatibarang sugar mill.
11 a.m. Henry Gill, Eurasian sugar mill employee, killed at Pangkah.
5 p.m. Slawi massacre in which more than 30 Eurasians, two Bataks and a Menadonese died.
11.30 p.m. Tegal Barisan Pelopor headquarters announce that all Eurasians, Amboinese and Menadonese must be interned because of NICA atrocities in Jakarta.

Friday, 12

Wedana of Slawi leaves. Camat of Moga (Pemalang) is attacked by angry crowd, wounded and flees for his life. Camat of Lebaksiu (Tegal) dragged from dokar and killed while travelling with wife to meet superior, Wedana of Slawi.
3 p.m. Camat of Slawi leaves by bicycle for Tegal. His wife and four children follow by dokar, leaving behind all their clothes and belongings.
Two Adiwerna perjuangan leaders go to API headquarters at old Trubels dairy at Pagongan and are shown telegram ordering all Eurasians, Menadonese and Amboinese to be killed. Preparations in Brebes for interviewing TKR candidates. Wongsonegoro becomes Governor of Central Java.

* Some informants say 11 October.
Saturday, 13
1 a.m. F.V. Buman taken from his house in Jalan Kartini, Tegal, along with members of his family by API members. Later killed with son Adolph, aged 7.

Monday, 15
In Brebes interviews for second TKR intake begin, organised by Brebes KNI (not Bupati), at former's request supervised by TKR officers from Pekalongan. In Semarang bloody five-day battle begins with massacre of hundreds of Japanese.

Tuesday, 16
First Proclamation of Pekalongan Resident (Mr Besar) requesting population to remain calm and orderly, and threatening strong measures to prevent further 'lawlessness'. In Jakarta KNIP is given new legislative powers, and 15-man Working Committee, Badan Pekerja or BP-KNIP formed. Mr Besar's second proclamation, ordering all weapons and ammunition handed over to police 'between the hours of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m.' One hundred Arab pemuda members of AMRI Pekalongan will 'defend Indonesia as Indonesians'. British troops occupy Bandung.

Thursday, 18
Bupati of Brebes (Sarimin) and Patih (Pranoto) go to Banyumas to get arms for Brebes TKR. That night these officials together with Wedana of Brebes and his brother, Wedana of Tanjung, are kidnapped by Tegal KNI group and taken back to Tegal.

Friday, 19
3.30 p.m. Bupati of Pemalang 'arrested', taken to jail for safe keeping, with rest of town's priyayi officials. That night social upheaval in Pemalang.

Saturday, 20

Monday, 22
Resident of Pekalongan's third proclamation, giving wide powers to TKR to take 'whatever action is necessary' in certain parts of Tiga Daerah to control the unrest.

Wednesday, 24
Reshuffle of Tegal KNI leadership, in new United KNI. Letter of appointment (besluit) No.35 P.F.D. from Mr Besar, formally appointing R. Soedaju Wiroatmodjo as Camat of Petarukan.

Thursday, 25
British land in Surabaya.

Friday, 26
Mr Amir Sjarifuddin's PARSI formed in Yogya.

Saturday, 27
English major comes to Pekalongan from Semarang with small unit 'to observe places of detention of foreigners',
and is met by Mr Besar and TKR acting Commander, Wadyono. Returns to Semarang on same day.

Monday, 29
Bupati of Brebes and Wedana of Bantarkawung are 'examined' blindfolded at Ketanggungan. Letter No. 44/P.P.D. from Mr Besar formally appointing Soejatno as Pemalang kabupaten secretary under Soepangat. Letter No.46/P.P.D. from Mr Besar formally appointing Soepangat Bupati of Pemalang.

Tuesday, 30
Chinese in Brebes reported to have contributed f.10,000 to Freedom Funds. Letter No.57/P.P.D. from Mr Besar appointment Haji Toha Camat of Lebaksiu. Fighting with British in Semarang spreads to Ambarawa.

Wednesday, 31
Haji Mawardi becomes Wedana of Adiwerna.

NOVEMBER

Thursday, 1
Sukarno and Amir Sjarifuddin fly to Semarang, then to Magelang and Yogyakarta to discuss military situation.

Friday, 2
Ceasefire between Allies and Republican forces arranged, Sukarno returns to Jakarta by train via North Coast, stopping in Tegal to make brief speech at station, is welcomed by Barisan Pelopor leaders. Sajuti Melik travelling with Sukarno's party leaves train in Tegal.

Saturday, 3
Muhammadiah regional conference begins in Pagongan south of Tegal. K.H. Iskandar Idris and Sajuti Melik captured near Talang and taken to Slawi.

Sunday, 4
a.m. Chairman of Tegal United KNI and Wedana coordinator of Adiwerna captured while going south, and killed near Talang. Haji Mawardi, Wedana of Adiwerna captured near Talang while returning from Muhammadiah conference. p.m. Huge crowd marches on Tegal, one group attacks TKR barracks, occupies city square and takes off former Public Prosecutor Singgih, R.M. Abu Bakar, a romusha raiser, and his son Chamzah. Two leading orthodox Muslims K. Mochidin and K. Mochtar also captured while trying to meet local Talang leaders. Brebes Working Committee formed.

Monday, 5
Mr Besar left the Residency. 5.30 p.m. Bupati of Tegal, Soenarjio left Tegal disguised as engine driver of train, accompanied by two API leaders, Mansur from Pangkah and another.

Tuesday, 6
NOVEMBER

Thursday, 8
Election of new Wedana of Bumijawa. K.H. Abu Sudja'i officially installed as Bupati of Tegal by acting Resident Soeprapto at ceremony in Tegal. Tegal Working Committee formed (?). KRIS formed in Tegal.

Friday, 9
'Temporary Letter of Appointment' of Ki Tjitrasatmaka as Patih of Tegal, signed by new Bupati of Tegal.

Saturday, 10
After another examination, Wedana and Bupati of Brebes and others moved blindfolded from Durensawit, near Balapulang, to Tegal jail where they are 'reunited' with Tegal Pangreh Praja.
Fierce fighting between British troops and Indonesians in Surabaya.

Sunday, 11
Wedana of Pangkah kidnapped.

Monday, 12
Wedana of Pangkah taken to Pemalang and placed in town jail.

Wednesday, 14
First parliamentary Sjahrir cabinet formed.

Friday, 16
Formation of GBP3D (Federation of Resistance Organisations of the Three Regions) in headquarters of PARSI (formerly Barisan Pelopor) in Tegal.

Saturday, 17
Letter No.462/P.P.D. from acting Resident of Pekalongan formally appointing Ki Tjitrasatmaka Patih of Tegal as from 12 November.

Wednesday, 21
English withdrew from Magelang to Ambarawa where fighting has been fierce since 15 November.

Sunday, 25
Second meeting of GBP3D in Brebes

Friday, 30
H. Mawardi (Wedana of Adiwerna), Kyai Bisri and Kyai Mohidin (captured on 4 November near Talang) left AMRI Slawi and returned home escorted by Kutil.

DECEMBER

Sunday, 2
Third meeting of GBP3D in Tegal (PARSI office) to plan strategy for taking power in Pekalongan, decision to send a printed ultimatum setting out demands of Tiga Daerah to Pekalongan.

Wednesday, 5
GBP3D ultimatum released. Ambarawa retaken by Indonesian forces.

Thursday, 6
Sardjio visits Tegal at request of GBP3D.

Friday, 7
Wedana of Brebes moved from Tegal jail to office of PARSI (Barisan Pelopor)

Sunday, 9
Conference between GBP3D leaders and Pekalongan Struggle Council in Pemalang kabupaten pendopo attended
by acting Resident. Letter of Agreement signed by all groups, appointing Sardjio as Resident.

Monday, 10
2 p.m. Sardjio accompanied by takeover Staff and Escort Company arrives in Pekalongan. Welcome ceremony held at Residency office. Acting Resident Soeprapto formally hands over his job to Sardjio.

Wednesday, 12
Mass meeting in Pekalongan city square addressed by Sardjio and K. Midjaja. Sardjio's appointment ratified by telegram from Central Government.

Thursday, 13
Muslim leaders organise a large demonstration past Hotel Merdeka where Sardjio and staff have headquarters. TKR acting Commander returns from Semarang-front via Division HQ in Salatiga. Fighting breaks out in Bekasi, British burn town.

Friday, 14
(Satria)
Sardjio visits southern areas, car ambushed at Pekajangan on return journey, K. Midjaja wounded slightly on knee. Later TKR surrounds Hotel Merdeka, and Resident and staff captured and imprisoned.

Saturday, 15
Ambarawa falls into Republic forces after ten days of fierce fighting.

Monday, 17
Socialist Party founded in Cirebon. Pekalongan TKR and Muslim groups launch full-scale counter-revolution against Tiga Daerah.

Thursday, 20
11 a.m. Pekalongan force entered Pemalang. Former bupati and other Pangreh Praja released from Pemalang jail. Arrests of revolutionary leaders.

Friday, 21
TKR from Pekalongan arrives in Tegal.

Saturday, 22
Wedana of Brebes and others freed from Tegal jail. Presidential entourage arrives in Pekalongan at end of tour of Java.

Sunday, 23
Mass meeting in Pekalongan city square, in evening Soepangat and underground PKI leaders Widarta and Muroso seized in kabupaten pendopo during meeting with presidential entourage, imprisoned.

Sunday, 30
At mass meeting in Pemalang town square Haji Makmur appointed Bupati of Pemalang.
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IXc Overzicht van de Uitkomsten der Gewestelijke Onderzoeken naar de Economie van de Desa en daaruit gemaakte gevolgtrekkingen. Deel III: Bijlagen van 'T Eigenlijk Overzicht (IXa)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>nominal(ly) Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipati</td>
<td>high priyayi title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>algojo</td>
<td>lit. 'executioner', fierce, daring person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda, Younger Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM Kantor</td>
<td>see Angkatan Muda Kantor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambtenaar</td>
<td>government official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia, Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRI-I</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Republic Indonesia-Islam, Islamic Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Algemeene Middelbaar School, General Middle [upper secondary] School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>angkatan</td>
<td>generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angkatan Baru Indonesia</td>
<td>New Generation of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angkatan Muda Kantor</td>
<td>lit. Younger Generation of the Office, i.e., Government offices youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia, Younger Generation of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arigato gozaimasu</td>
<td>thank you (Japanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ario</td>
<td>high priyayi title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asrama</td>
<td>training place, or dormitory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>azacho</td>
<td>hamlet head (Japanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badan Pemberontakan Alim Ulama</td>
<td>Muslim Teachers' Insurgents Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>badan perjuangan</td>
<td>struggle organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bajaingan</td>
<td>petty thief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>banzai</td>
<td>welcome (Japanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisan Cengkrong</td>
<td>Sickle Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisan Pelopor</td>
<td>Pioneer Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bau</td>
<td>0.7 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBI</td>
<td>Barisan Buruh Indonesia, Indonesia Workers League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bebas, kebebasan</td>
<td>free, freedom (i.e., personal liberty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>becak</td>
<td>pedicap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belacu</td>
<td>calico, unbleached cotton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
bengkok  a usufruct of village land (usually sawah) used by officials
beras  hulled rice
bestuursacademie  tertiary level administration school
BKR  Badan Keamanan Rakyat, People's Security Force
BP2  Badan Pembantu Prajurit, Soldiers Relief Organisation
BP3  Badan Pembantu Prajurit Pekerja, Working Soldiers Relief Organisation
BPKKP  Badan Penolong Korban Perang, Organisation for Aid to families of War Victims
BPM  Bataviasche Petroleum Maatschapij, Batavian Oil Company
BTI  Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants' League
'b'bu  see Ibu
bucho  department chief during the Occupation
Budi Utomo  High Endeavour, an early 'native' political association
bung  lit. 'brother', an egalitarian form of address

camat  subdistrict head, below wedana
candi  sacred grave
CC-PKI  Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party
CD  Comite Daerah [Besar] [PKI] regional committee
chudancho  PETA company commander
chutaicho  kawedanan level Barisan Pelopor leader
CK  Comite Kota [underground PKI] City committee
comite van onvangst  the reception committee (to welcome back the Dutch)
controleur  Dutch official, below assistant Resident

daidancho  PETA battalion commander
daiteaicho  kabupaten Barisan Pelopor leader
daulat (daulat-ed)  forcibly remove from office (during revolusi sosial)
dewan pekerja  working committees
Dewan Pertimbangan Buruh
Workers Review Council

Digul
Boven Digul, the prison camp on the upper reaches of the Digul River in southeastern West New Guinea, where so-called communists from the 1926 rebellion were exiled

dokar
two-wheeled horse drawn cart
dombreng (dombreng-ed)
lit. 'to be paraded around', public unmasking, usually of corruptors during the revolusi sosial

Domei
Japanese News Agency
dukun
Magician, healer, seer

f.
Dutch guilder sign
Fujinkai
[Japanese] Womens' Association
fuku guncho
deputy wedana [under Japanese]
fuku soncho
deputy camat [under Japanese]

gamelan
Javanese orchestra
gabah
unhulled rice (off the stalks, i.e., threshed)
genchi jikatsu
Japanese 'self-maintenance' policy
GERINDO
Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, Indonesian People's Movement (pre-war)
golok
club
gotong royong
mutual assistance
GPAI
Gerakan Pemuda Arab Indonesia, Indonesian Arab Youth Movement
GPII
Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement
gundik
(Javanese) concubine, or mistress (of Chinese)
Gunseikan(bu)
head of [Japanese] military administration

haj
pilgrimage to Mecca
H. (haji)
person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBS</td>
<td>Hoogere Burger School, lit. Higher Civil School (secondary school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heiho</td>
<td>auxilliary soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinomaru</td>
<td>the sun circle, Japanese national flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIS</td>
<td>Hollandsch-Inlandsche School, Dutch (language) native (primary) school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>Army of Allah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
<td>Hollandsche Lagere School, Dutch (language) elementary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokokai, Jawa Hokokai</td>
<td>Service Association (Japanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibu</td>
<td>mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Indonesia Muda, Young Indonesia (pre-war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iryo Kyojo Dan</td>
<td>(Japanese) Medical Rescue Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jaksa</td>
<td>public prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jalan</td>
<td>street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>janur kuning</td>
<td>young yellow leaf of coconut palm (which gives the wearer magic power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jarak</td>
<td>castor oil plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jimat</td>
<td>talisman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaigun Kukusho</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm of Japanese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanjeng Gusti</td>
<td>high priyayi title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kan Po</td>
<td>Government Gazette during Japanese occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kanuragan</td>
<td>science of the esoteric arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kata wasiat</td>
<td>magico-religious formulae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaum Marhaen</td>
<td>the little people, i.e., lower classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kawedanan</td>
<td>administrative division below kabupaten, under a wedana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBI</td>
<td>Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia, Indonesian Scouts (pre-war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kebal</td>
<td>invulnerability (sign of spiritual power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kecamatan</td>
<td>administrative division below kawedanan, under a camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keibeitai</td>
<td>City garrison during Japanese occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keibodan</td>
<td>Vigilance Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kenpeitai</td>
<td>military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kenpeitaiho</td>
<td>Indonesian members of <em>kenpeitai</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kentongan</td>
<td>wooden signal drum in a village warns of danger, theft, calls to meetings, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kertas merang</td>
<td>paper made from rice straw early in Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kasakten</td>
<td>magic power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ki</td>
<td>title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kinro hoshi</td>
<td>'voluntary labour', corvéé within kabupaten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kliwon</td>
<td>one of the five days of the Javanese week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNI</td>
<td>Komite Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KODAM VII</td>
<td>Komando Daerah Militer, [Central Java Diponegoro Division] 7th Regional Territorial Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOPI</td>
<td>Koperasi Indonesia, Pangreh Praja cooperative in Pemalang during Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kretek</td>
<td>Indonesian clove cigarettes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Koperasi Rakyat Indonesia, Indonesian Peoples Cooperative (in Brebes during Occupation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kris</td>
<td>Javanese dagger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRIS</td>
<td>Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi, Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kromo</td>
<td>high Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.R.T.</td>
<td>Kanjeng Raden Temenggung - high title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kumiai</td>
<td>cooperative (Japanese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kumicho</td>
<td>head of tonarigumi (neighbourhood association) of about ten households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kweekschool</td>
<td>teachers' training school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. (kyai)</td>
<td>the title of respect for orthodox Muslim scholar or teacher, for holy persons or sacred objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kyai nujum</td>
<td>soothsayer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'lä ilâha illâ 'llâh  'there is no god but Allah'

laskar                | force                                                                      |
| Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa | Chinese Youth Irregulars                                                  |
| lurah                | village headman                                                           |
lumbung  village rice barn
LPT  see Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa

macapat  popular song genre in Java
madrasah  modernist Islamic school
mantri  supervisor, inspector
Mardi Utomo  Excellent Community, a pre-war 'native' official welfare association with branches in South Pemalang

markas  headquarters or post
Markas Medan Barat  TKR Western Front Headquarters at Kaliwungu, west of Semarang

M. (mas)  low priyayi title
MASYUMI  Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Muslims
MBAD  Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, Army headquarters
Menara Merah  Red Tower, the underground PKI paper
Merah Putih  Red and White, the Indonesian flag
Merdeka  Independence
MHS  Middelbaar Handel School, secondary commercial school
MOSVIA  Middelbaar Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, Secondary Training School for 'native' Officials

Mr  Meester (academic title of the holder of a Dutch law degree)
Muhammadiah  modernist Islamic social and education association
MULO  Meer Uitebreid Lager Onderwijis, more extended education (intermediate school)
musim paceklik  (time of) scarcity of food, at end of dry season

Nahdatul Ulama  Council of Muslim scholars
naib  religious official
nasi ponggol  rice packets (wrapped up in banana leaves)
ndoro  your honour, lordship
NEFIS  Netherlands Forces Intelligence Sources, Dutch army intelligence
Negen Broeders 'Nine Brothers', a socialist-learning group in Tegal
ngoko low Javanese
nogyo kumiai agricultural cooperative
noji padi local official responsible for paddy collection under Japanese
NU see Nahdatul Ulama

OSVIA Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, Training School for Native Officials

PAI Partai Arab Indonesia, Indonesian Arab Party (pre-war)
pak see bapak
Pangreh Praja 'rulers of the realm', Dutch trained bureaucratic elite
PARINDRA Partij Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia Party (pre-war)
PARSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party (of Mr Amir Sajrifuddin)
particuliere landerijen private (i.e., privately owned) land
PARTINDO Partij Indonesia, Indonesia Party (pre-war)
pasisir (northern) coastal region
Patih deputy to a bupati
payung umbrella - symbolising priyayi authority
PBI Partai Buruh Indonesia, Indonesian Workers Party
pejuang (revolutionary) activist
PEKOPE Penolong Korban Perang, War Victims' Helpers (Pemalang pergerakan organisation in the Occupation)
pemuda youthful activist
pemuda rakyat poor non-elite youth
pemuda sekolah urban youth with some Western education
pencuri thief
pendopo large open pavillion in front of residence of official, the office
perintis kemerdekaan pioneer of independence
pergerakan (pre-war) Nationalist Movement
perjuangan revolutionary struggle or movement
PEPABRI Persatuan Perwira ABRI, armed forces officer association
PERPRI Persatuan Pemuda Rakyat Indonesia, Union of the Youth of the Indonesian People (Pre-war PARTINDO Youth)
pesantren traditional rural Islamic school
PESINDO Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Socialist Youth of Indonesia
FETA Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the fatherland
PID Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst, Political Intelligence Service
pikul 60 kilograms
pilihan (popularly) chosen (officials)
Pirukunan Pekalongan priyayi organisation set up in opposition to the Sarekat Islam about 1918
FJS Prinses Juliana School, Intermediate Technical School, Yogyakarta
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party
pokrol bambu bush lawyer
pondok Muslim boarding school
pongol see nasi ponggol
PNI Baru Partai Nasional Indonesia, New Indonesia National Party
P.P.D. Pangreheh Prodjo (i.e. Pangreh Praja)
PPKI Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence
PPPBPerserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumiputera, Union of Native Pawnshop Officials (pre-war)
priyayi member of the governing elite of Java
PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party (pre-war)
PUTERA Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, Centre of People's Strength

Raad van Justitie High Court (in Semarang)
R. (raden) priyayi title
rakyat the (common) people, the masses
revolusi sosial 'social revolution', the period of October-November 1945
RK  
RKs  
R.M.  
Romu Kyokai  
Romusha  
Rp.  
RT  
R.T.A.  

Rukun Kampung, Kampung Association  

Rukun Kerja Sama, Cooperative Association  

Raden Mas, Priyayi Title  

Institute of Labour Affairs (Japanese)  

Forced Labour  

Rupiah, Unit of Currency  

Rukun Tetangga, Neighbourhood Association  

Raden Temenggung Ario, High Priyayi Title  

Sabilillah  

'S Path of Allah' (Corps)  

Sama Rata Sama Rasa  

'Equality and Fraternity'  

Sangikai, Shu Sangikai  

Residency Advisory Council  

Santri  

Strict or Devout Muslim  

Sarekat Islam  

Islami Union  

Sarekat Rakyat  

People's Union  

Sate  

Barbecued Shish Kebab  

Sawah  

Wet Rice Fields  

SBBT  

Sarekat Buruh Bea Tjukai, Union of Customs and Excise Workers  

SCS  

Semarang Cirebon Steamtram Maatschapij, Semarang Cirebon Railway Company  

Seinendan  

Youth Corps  

Slametan or Selamatan  

Ritual Meal  

SEMDAM  

Sejarah Militer Kodam (Vii), Military History Section of Central Java Diponegoro Division  

Sendenbu  

Department of Propaganda  

Senden In  

Information Department  

Shidokan  

Military Trainer (Attached to Peta)  

Shodancho  

Peta Section Commander  

Shotaicho  

Kecamatan Level Barisan Pelopor Leader  

Shuchokan  

Japanese Resident  

SI  

Sarekat Islam, Islamic Union  

Sicho  

Mayor (Japanese)  

Silat  

Martial Art of Self-defence  

SOBSI  

Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesian Federation of Labour Organisations  

SPI  

Suluh Pemuda Indonesia, Torch of Indonesian Youth (Pre-war)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Suisintai</td>
<td>(see Barisan Pelopor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taman Siswa</td>
<td>lit. Garden of Students, Nationalist school system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tayuban</td>
<td>village entertainment with dancing girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKR</td>
<td>Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, Peoples' Security Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI Masyarakat</td>
<td>'Peoples' Army, under Amir Sjarifuddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRI</td>
<td>Tentara Republic Indonesia, Indonesian Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuan</td>
<td>Mr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulama</td>
<td>Muslim teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulu-ulu</td>
<td>village irrigation official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIPIW</td>
<td>Vereeniging Van Inlandse Personeel Irrigatie Werken, Union of Native Irrigation Works Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volksraad</td>
<td>National Indies Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSTP</td>
<td>Vereeniging van Spor en Tramwegpersoneel, Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wahyu</td>
<td>divine radiance or light, a sign of spiritual power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warung</td>
<td>roadside food stall or small restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wedana</td>
<td>district head, below bupati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zosenjo</td>
<td>(Japanese) shipbuilding yards in Tegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>