The Philippines became, in 1946, the first state in South-East Asia to accede to independence. As early as 1935, however, the U.S. and the elected representatives of the Filipino people had agreed on a ten-year transitional period during which the Philippine Islands would enjoy a large degree of self-government and at the end of which independence would be proclaimed. This dissertation examines the part played by the Philippines in Asian affairs during the years of self-government as well as during the independence era, from 1946 until 1963. Reference is also made to the role devolved by Japan upon the Republic of the Philippines which she sponsored during her occupation of the Islands (1942-1944).

The role of the Philippines on the Asian stage should not be divorced from the leading parts played by those powers which exercised influence in the area. Before the Pacific war, Japanese ambitions were a cause of deep concern among the Filipino elite. Though a small minority were well-disposed towards Japan as the emerging leader of a new and free Asia, there seemed to be agreement among the vast majority (including President Manuel Quezon) that the best course to follow by the Philippines would be to seek refuge in neutrality, not in open defiance to Japan but certainly under the ultimate protection of the U.S. and of the other western powers with a stake in Far Eastern politics.

The Republic has been used to further American influence in
The Pacific war marked the end of the prospect of a neutral Philippines. The U.S. and the Philippine government-in-exile in Washington agreed on the need to maintain a strong American presence in the Far East. Leading Filipinos, such as Vice-President Sergio Osmeña, envisaged for the Philippines an influential position in Asia as a staging post for American enterprise in that part of the world. In the meantime, in Manila, the pro-Japanese regime of President Jose Laurel rather lukewarmly shared in Tokyo's efforts to weld its Asian followers within a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" tightly-knit in the political, economic, and cultural fields.

In the early years of independence (1946-1948), preoccupations in the Philippines were not directed towards international affairs: the tasks of rehabilitation and of finding a solution to internal strife (important parts of the countryside were seething with discontent) were the main concerns of the day. Under the administration of President Elpidio Quirino (1948-1953), however, the Philippines took a more active interest in foreign and, particularly, in Asian affairs. Philippine initiatives evoked very little response. Lack of backing from the U.S. and distrust on the part of India and its followers doomed to failure President Quirino's ambitions to organize South-East Asian states politically and economically. Later failures to take the lead in South-East Asia eventually drove home the point that the Philippines was occupying a second-rate position in Asian politics. It is not surprising that the Republic has been used to further American influence in
therefore that President Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957) entertained far more modest hopes in so far as foreign policies were concerned. Under his administration, the Philippines pursued in fact a client-state policy: Manila seemed to see its involvement in South-East Asian politics as a joint Philippine-U.S. venture rather than as a legitimate pursuit in its own right.

During those years, the Philippines was brought into closer contact with its neighbours at a time when Afro-Asian solidarity was gaining strength and influence on the world stage. Under President Carlos Garcia (1957-1961), the Republic took a more active part in regional affairs, and Philippine diplomacy made a point of stressing the "Asian" character of the country. The American connection remained a source of major concern, however, and the growing awareness of Asia among Filipinos was matched by a strong desire to question some aspects of the U.S. presence in the political, military, and economic fields.

This trend became more pronounced during the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal (elected in November 1961). The new President saw to it that the Philippines played a leading part in the Indonesia-Malaya (and later Malaysia) rivalry, mainly by offering good offices and mediation services. The mood in Manila seemed to favor Indonesian ambitions to impose an "Asian" settlement of the Malaysia issue, namely, to hasten by all means short of large scale war the removal of British influence from the area.

The Philippines has thus pursued varied objectives in Asia. The Republic has been used to further American influence in
South-East Asia, but it has also sought to impose curbs on the presence of western powers in that part of the world. Moreover strong personalities, such as Quezon, Recto, Serrano, and Macapagal, have held constructive views on the part which the Philippines in its own right should play among its neighbours.
Asian Policy of the Philippines, 1935–1963

Jean-Luc Vellut

The work for this thesis was conducted entirely by the candidate.

(J.L. Vellut)

21st July, 1964
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Preface

This dissertation was undertaken with the desire to gain a greater understanding of the relations between the emerging states of Asia, and it is with that in mind that I studied the foreign policy of the first state in South-East Asia to have acceded to independence from colonial tutelage, the Republic of the Philippines.

My first idea was to start this study with the date of Philippine independence, 4 July 1946, but I soon found out that I should include a survey of the pre-independence period of 1935-46 during which the Islands enjoyed a form of self-government. For those years, however, I did not go beyond using published memoirs, official documents and secondary sources. I also decided to study the policy pursued by the autonomous regime which the Japanese sponsored in the Philippines during the Pacific war. In this case, I used all available material including the press. Under the Commonwealth regime as well as under Japanese occupation, the Philippines played a part in international politics, foreign affairs were discussed in the Islands, and there emerged a view of Asia which bore direct relevance to my topic. As a closing date, I have chosen August 1963, date of a summit
meeting in Manila of the Heads of State of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, which seemed symbolic of far-reaching changes in the structure of power in South-East Asia.

The research for this dissertation was carried over a period of three years, thanks to a generous scholarship from the Australian National University. The first year was spent in Canberra, studying available material on South-East Asian affairs and on the Philippines, acquiring some familiarity with English-language material on international politics, and finally learning to speak and to write English. It was not necessary to acquire a working knowledge of an Asian language, all political activities at the national level in the Philippines being carried on in English. I found it useful to have a reading knowledge of Spanish, however, especially for the years prior to the 1950s.

I was privileged to spend the following eight months in the Philippines, attached to the Institute of Public Administration in Manila. During my stay there, I examined material available in libraries in Manila and Quezon City: the Filipiniana division of the library of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, and the library of the Institute of Public Administration were particularly useful. The main primary sources I could take advantage of were collections of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals,
and official documents such as the **Official Gazette**, the **Congressional Record**, and the publications of the Department of Foreign Affairs. I also gained substantial information from interviews with Filipino politicians, government officials, academics: in this respect, I received precious help from the Institute of Public Administration. Both on the outward and homeward journeys, I collected data from Philippine embassies in various countries of South-East Asia, from Foreign Ministries in Djakarta, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur, and from international organizations functioning in the region, such as ECAFE and SEATO. The third year, finally, was spent on writing the thesis.

Two aspects of this dissertation require some explanation. First, as is indicated in the bibliography, there is a substantial body of published research which covers the main features of the Philippine domestic scene in the social, political, and economic fields. I have therefore restricted myself to purely foreign policy matters, and I have sketched brief outlines of Philippine domestic policies only insofar as they directly impinged on my topic or on the clarity of the analysis. In chapter II, however, when dealing with the less well-known war-time period, I felt it necessary to cover internal politics in greater detail.
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAFE</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.P.T.S.</td>
<td>Republic of the Philippines, Treaty Series</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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INTRODUCTION

There is a vast literature devoted to the foreign policies of given countries but most of these surveys seem to fall into a few broad categories. Some are more of an historical type: they relate events, they investigate policies in the perspective of time. For example, R.H. Fifield's book on the "Diplomacy of Southeast Asia" examines in turn the diplomatic relations of South-East Asian countries with one another and with the main powers interested in the area over a period of thirteen years (1945-58)\(^1\).

Other studies of foreign policy tend to be of a sociological type: they investigate the causes bearing on such or such policy. Thus, they aim at expounding some general propositions on the influence of, say, geographical features, or demographic or economic resources, upon the pursuit of a given policy.

There is a third approach to international politics, explored by those who have tried to sort out some general moral principles which should govern foreign affairs. See, \(^1\)

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for instance, President Wilson's views on the part to be played in world politics by international law and collective security, or — in the realistic school of thought — H.J. Morgenthau's plea for an enlightened understanding of national interest and of the balance of power\(^1\).

Other political scientists, for their part, have suggested still other approaches. For example, in his study of the Japanese peace treaty, B.C. Cohen has sought to present a systematic review of the domestic factors weighing on a policy decision\(^2\).

All these categories are, in fact, levels of analysis, and are not exclusive of each other. In some respects the following dissertation will be historical insofar as it will relate certain events such as negotiations, policy debates, etc. Also, like all researches, it will betray, however obliquely, a certain view of what international affairs are and of what they should be. The guiding idea I kept in my mind, however, was to regard Philippine foreign policy not merely as a story to narrate, but more importantly perhaps as

\(^1\) See, in particular, chapters 28–29 ("Peace through Accommodation") in Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1949.

a problem: I wanted to answer the question, what does Philippine policy teach us about emerging states and the environment in which they operate?

To serve this purpose, I tried to take advantage of the growing body of investigations of problems encountered in the field of international politics. At the outset, however, it should be emphasised that this dissertation will be based on a humble view of the field of international relations. In the context of this research, references to 'theory' will mean nothing more than a realization of the need to relate systematically data which have been collected on various aspects of international politics. Thus the arguments which will be advanced in the following pages all refer to a limited number of basic concepts which have been found fruitful in this particular instance.

International system

The first of these key concepts is the international system. This notion has gained wide acceptance since, in 1957, Morton Kaplan published the first book dealing exclusively with theoretical international relations¹. This

pioneering study is dominated by the theory of international systems, so that foreign policies of 'international actors', to use Kaplan's terminology, are determined by their situation in given international systems. For example, members of a 'loose bipolar system' which Kaplan sees as reflecting present conditions, follow rules such as:

- All bloc actors are to increase their capabilities in relation to those of the opposing bloc,
- All bloc actors are to engage in major war rather than to permit the rival bloc to attain a position of preponderant strength, etc.¹

Theorems such as those seem hardly relevant to our purpose. Though being a 'bloc actor', the Philippines, as will be seen later, has little say in military matters, and the Republic is not likely to exercise much influence either on the question of engaging or not engaging in major war ... It seems clear that the nearly exclusive attention paid to the leading powers of the international system and to so-called rules of behaviour for all members of the system is not rewarding when it comes to study, say, the Asian policy of the Philippines. At the high level of abstraction where Kaplan treads, there is danger of not being able to assess systematically the influence which small powers, such as the Philippines, are able to exercise in international society.

¹ Ibid., p. 38.
It seems sufficient for our purpose to adopt a less elaborate acceptation of the concept of international system, not even the one propounded by Raymond Aron: an international system is the set of political units which engage in regular intercourse, and which might be implicated in a general war. By contrast, we need a precise concept which, more readily than the unwieldy notion of the international system at large, would fit the scope of Philippine interest in international affairs: whereas the Philippines is a member of the international system - and as such deals on an equal footing with all other members of the system - its connections are much closer with some states than with others. On the one hand, the Philippines is directly influenced by rivalries among the world powers and by major events happening in the international system at large. On the other hand, the scope of Philippine interest and influence is much narrower: in fact, Philippine foreign policy has mostly displayed interest in the affairs of a definite area of the international system.

To illustrate this point, we might cite here a far-reaching debate held in the late 1920s between two

prominent Filipino lawyers of the time, Claro M. Recto and Professor Maximo Kalaw, on the issue of 'Asiatic Monroeism'. By contrast with Kalaw's more optimistic outlook, Recto argued that a slogan such as 'Asia for the Asiatics' was meaningless, unless one cared to define which Asiatics were to benefit from it. What is an Asian government? asked Recto. One that follows the lead of Japan, or of China (or of the Soviet Union?). In his words:

We small peoples of Asia desire something more than an end to the false caste privileges of the "white man" in the East: ... we desire our complete freedom and for this reason, we detest the idea that other Orientals may afterwards do to us what the Occidentals did before. 1

The 'East' for Recto was a circumscribed arena where 'we small peoples of Asia' were trying to influence a contest for supremacy between China, Japan, the U.S., and other great powers.

Indeed, as the rest of this dissertation will abundantly show, Asia is the arena where the Republic of the Philippines has always tried to exercise a degree of influence, and also where it had to seek adjustment to the pressures of local and foreign great powers. This leads us to the concept which

1 C.M. Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation, Manila, People's Publishers, 1946, p. 134.
seems to serve our purpose best, that of subordinate system (or sub-system for short).

Sub-systems and structures

Several authors have made use of the concept of sub-system, and have illustrated it with examples taken in various regions of the international system, such as the Middle East, South-East Asia, and Southern Asia. There is no general agreement on crucial questions related to sub-systems: for some, great powers are excluded from membership in sub-systems (Modelski, p. 148); others leave the question of structures vague (Brecher uses 'structures' to denote 'the basic features of the pattern of relations between the units of the system', p. 218) or ill-defined (Binder).

In this dissertation, I propose to regard as members of the South-East Asian sub-system those states which, because of their location in the region, or because of their world-wide interests are led to participate actively in the political affairs of that area of the international system.

The distinction between powers with world-wide interests (great powers) and powers with regional interests only (small or middle powers) draws our attention to the problem of a systematic approach to policies of, respectively, small and leading powers. In the following chapters, I will distinguish between several types of small power policies, using as a yardstick the degree of their subservience to leading powers. Ranging from a pole of subservience to influential powers, to a pole of escapism from great powers politics, I will refer to satellites, client-states, followers, and neutral states. This scale of subservience implies that we are dealing with a broad political phenomenon, namely, the acknowledgement of international authority. In this perspective, 'a-political' co-operation (say, of the technical or cultural type) may be as indicative of a political alignment as formal military alliances.

The important point, I feel, is that we should not divorce the analysis of small power policies from the types of arrangements through which great powers exercise their influence. A great power may operate through specific arrangements, such as an alliance directed against some rival power. Or it may exercise influence through a diffuse network of economic interests, military co-operation, cultural ties, political interference, etc. Types of followers thus depend
on the types of arrangements which link them to great powers. In the following pages, I will argue that influential powers exercise their ascendancy over the members of the sub-system through structures. International systems, like all political systems, have political structures by means of which a degree of order and cohesion is maintained: as well as on the global scale of the international system taken as a whole, there are, operating at the level of sub-systems, arrangements which regulate competition among the members by enabling influential powers to make authoritative decisions, or by maintaining a measure of solidarity among the member-states.

Our definition of structure thus centres around the notions of influence and solidarity: an international structure, as we will use the term, comprises the arrangements, organizations, alliances, groupings, etc., through which states exercise influence and maintain solidarity and order.  

1 "There is no such thing as a society which maintains internal and external order, which has no 'political structure' - i.e., legitimate patterns of interaction by means of which this order is maintained", G. Almond, ed., The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, U.P., 1960, p. 11.

2 For this definition I am indebted to Fabrizio Onofri's study of classes, structures, and power: "Classi, strutturi sociali, potere", Tempi Moderni, July 1963, pp. 7-44.
To sum up, I will employ in this dissertation certain key concepts (sub-system and structures, in particular) which political scientists and scholars in the field of international relations have propounded in theoretical studies and which I have found helpful in analysing the Asian policy of the Philippines. In other words, I used theoretical concepts only insofar as they may enable us to gain a fuller grasp of Philippine policies.
CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS: THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND ASIA, 1935-46
"The great danger...is the domination of the Far East by one powerful country".1

1 - 1935-1941

With the election of a Democratic administration in Washington in 1932 (President Roosevelt was inaugurated on 4 March 1933), prospects for the immediate future of the Philippines took a decisive turn. After painstaking discussions both in the U.S. and in Manila, the 'Philippine Commonwealth and Independence Law', known as the Tydings-MacDuffie Act, was finally approved by the President of the United States on 24 March 1934. The act provided for complete Philippine independence after a ten-year period of internal autonomy. So far as foreign relations and defence were concerned, the United States retained formal responsibility. However, the Philippine Commonwealth took initiatives in both fields. Thus, under prompting by President Manuel L. Quezon, a Filipino national defence establishment was progressively set up. In 1935, a military programme was outlined in a

1 C.P. Romulo, Mother America, A living Story of Democracy, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1943, p. 137.
'National Defence Act' and was implemented under the supervision of an American military mission headed by Major-General Douglas MacArthur\(^1\).

The military plan called for a citizen army that would include about 300,000 men by Independence Day in 1946, with two adjuncts, an 'Off-Shore Patrol' of modern torpedo boats and an 'Army Air Corps' for coastal defence. In President Quezon's words, the programme emphasized 'the passively defensive character of the Philippine armed forces'\(^2\).

Foreign relations in the formal sense were carried on only at the Philippine-American level. According to the Tydings-MacDuffie Act, the Commonwealth was represented in Washington by a Resident Commissioner, with right to debate but not to vote in the American House of Representatives. The United States on the other hand was represented in Manila by a High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. Furthermore the practice remained entrenched of special missions commuting between the Philippines and the United States. President Quezon's cabinet included no secretary of foreign affairs, and only in 1945, in anticipation of independence,


\(^2\) As quoted by J.R. Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 739.
were steps taken for the creation of an 'Office of Foreign Relations'.

It would be misleading to induce from this state of affairs a lack of interest in international politics. On the contrary, it was perfectly realized among the politically conscious classes of the Philippines that the problem of safeguarding their country's independence was intimately related to the existing distribution of power in the Far East and it is in that light that they weighed the future connection of the Philippines with the United States. Section 11 of the Tydings-MacDuffie Act dealt with the future status of the Islands in these terms:

The President [of the United States] is requested, at the earliest practicable date, to enter into negotiations with foreign powers with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the perpetual neutralization of the Philippine Islands, if and when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.¹

Notwithstanding this proviso for neutrality, the United States was expected to maintain a 'special relationship' with the Philippines. In January 1933, the United States Congress had passed an independence act (known as the 'Hawes-Cutting-Hare bill') which seemingly carried out the Democratic

¹ Text of the Act in U.S. 73 Congress, 2 session, House Report 8573.
Party's promise of liberty for the Philippines. A fierce political struggle had soon developed in Manila on the issue of the acceptance of the bill. Manuel Quezon, dominant political leader on the Philippine scene, took exception to the bill which had been negotiated in Washington by political rivals, C. Osias, S. Osmena, and M. Roxas.

Whatever his other motivations might have been, Quezon objected to a provision which called for the retention of U.S. military and naval bases after Philippine independence. To quote Quezon: 'I did strenuously and definitely oppose the retention of military establishments, for it destroyed the very essence of independent existence for the Philippines.'

On 17 October 1933, following Quezon's lead, the Philippine legislature rejected the independence act and sent Quezon to the United States to work for a new arrangement. President Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Filipino case and agreed that the maintenance of military reservations in the Philippines after 1946 would suffice to 'make the granting of independence a farce.'

Section 10 (b) of the Tydings-MacDuffie Act (which was the revised version of the Hawes-Cutting-Hare bill) called

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2 Ibid., pp. 151-2.
for negotiations on 'naval reservations and fueling stations' to be opened not later than two years after the proclamation of independence, no further mention being made of 'military establishments'. Quezon did not object to this provision as long as it was made dependent upon the consent of the Philippines. In other words, he accepted the prospect of Philippine neutrality, while giving 'special consideration to the United States'. He made this point clear in the course of a visit to Japan in 1937 when he impressed upon his audience the Philippine desire to maintain the friendliest kind of relation with Japan and 'all foreign countries' but also to give special treatment to America. The Japanese seemed to concur with that view.

Yet the concept of neutrality as it was expounded in the independence act ran directly counter to Japan's policy in the Far East. Quezon's line (neutralization of the islands, entrance of the Philippines into the League of Nations) was by contrast suited to accord with American policies in that area.

The President of the Commonwealth received assurances that Japan "will gladly be a signatory to a treaty that will recognize the Philippines as a neutral territory once it shall have become independent". M.L. Quezon, op. cit., p. 178.
The clearest statement of American policy in the Far East is found in the 'Nine Power Pact' signed in Washington in 1922. On that occasion, the powers claiming interest in Far Eastern Affairs (Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S.) concurred with the American 'Open Door' policy of maintaining the area as a field open to the enterprises of an exclusive international 'club' of advanced countries. But whereas the United States aimed at maintaining the status quo, i.e. a competitive structure of power in Asia, new views came to prevail in Japan. Military circles, in particular, wanted Japan to exercise primary responsibility in Far Eastern politics, and to eliminate all 'foreign' (viz. European and American) influence from the region. As the so-called 'Amau statement' of April 1934 pointed out, Tokyo held that China and Japan shared responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia: more precisely, Japan 'opposed any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan'.

The 'Open Door' policy and the Amau statement represented two irreconcilable views on the distribution of power in Asia.

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The 'Open Door' policy rested on the assumption that certain powers would co-operate in order to maintain an acceptable distribution of power (naval armament, for example) among all signatories. The proposal for an international guarantee of Philippine independence and neutrality must be seen in this perspective of seeking insurance against the aggrandizement of any power at the expense of the others. We call this model competitive: within a given arrangement, several states compete for the exercise of power. Japan, on the other hand, envisaged a retinue of 'friendly' or outright client states, all markedly weaker than Japan herself. We call this system monopolistic: the arrangement is such that one state alone exercises influence.

The Japanese-sponsored system, somewhat lacking in sophistication on the purely political level, was, however, well developed from the viewpoint of solidarity-maintaining devices. Japanese propaganda, tainted with racial overtones, attempted to take advantage of anti-western feelings among the subjected peoples of Asia and it met with some success in satisfying Japan's craving for her recognition as the leader.

1 This is not an exhaustive list: we will have occasions to examine 'oligopolistic' systems, as well as systems which are defined by their devices maintaining solidarity rather than by the distribution of power within the system.
of Asia. By contrast, the Washington *entente* did not go beyond limiting conflicts among the *ruling* powers in the area, and did not care to develop a system-wide solidarity including ruling and subjected nations: hence the great fragility of the system which broke down under the first assaults of the Japanese in 1941-1942.

**The Philippines and Japan**

The discrepancy between these two views of Far Eastern affairs became more obvious in the decade from 1931 to 1941 as the balance of power in Japan was moving towards the militarists. Japanese and western imperialisms soon confronted each other in an interlocking pattern: to the Japanese-held territories in China, Korea and the western Pacific, corresponded European settlements in China and South-East Asia, and American bases in the Philippines. This rivalry for the domination of the Far East appeared to thinking Filipinos and Americans alike as the main problem confronting the Islands.

The alleged threat of Japanese expansion was used in America by those who did not favour Philippine independence: this was one of the motives advanced by President Hoover for returning the Hawes-Cutting-Hare bill without his signature. The same argument was tellingly advanced by the American high commissioner, Paul V. MacNutt, in the course of an address in
March 1938. MacNutt argued that the problem of Philippine independence should not be divorced from a greater problem, the American voice in Oriental diplomacy. As a result of Japanese ambitions, it would be undesirable for the United States to abandon its sovereignty over the only place in the Orient where 'decency, democracy and peace reign'\(^1\). In 1920 already, as recalled by a Japanese lecturer who had toured the Philippines, many Americans held that 'independence cannot be granted to the Filipinos because Japan will step in as soon as the islands are set on their own feet'\(^2\).

Japan's challenge to the established order in the Far East did not provoke apprehensions among American 'imperialists' only. We have mentioned in the introduction the debate carried on through the daily press of Manila in 1927 between a professor of the University of the Philippines, Maximo M. Kalaw, and a representative of the Philippine legislature, Claro M. Recto, on the topic of 'Asiatic Monroeism'. Recto (1890-1960) was to become a familiar figure in Philippine politics. Educated at the renowned Ateneo de Manila and at


\(^2\) Niichiro Matsunami, *Hiripin to Nipon* (The Philippines and Japan), Tokyo, 1921, p. 256.
the University Santo Tomas, Don Claro was well-read in both Spanish and English literature. A lawyer with a successful private practice, regularly elected to the Senate since 1931, the 'distinguished gentleman from Batangas' was co-author of the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution. Under the Japanese occupation, he accepted official positions and eventually became Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese-sponsored Republic of 1943-44. At the end of the war, together with other prominent 'collaborators', a resentful Recto was indicted before a People's Court. His trial was still pending when President Roxas issued an amnesty proclamation (28 January 1948). Recto was soon back in politics, and he was re-elected Senator in the 1949- and 1955 elections.

In 1927, under the title, "The Wolf and the Lambs in Asiatic Monroeism", Don Claro argued that 'Asia for the Asiatics' could only mean 'Asia for Japan' or for that matter, for any leading power of the future. On that occasion, he drew a parallel between the over-riding influence of the United States in Central and South America, admittedly saving these Republics from European interventions, but at the cost of American interference. Recto further pointed out that their position and their weakness made an easy prey of the Islands: he predicted that, once freed from the 'annoying
interference of the Occident', Japan would strike first at the Philippines. To quote:

We do not want the white race to rule the Far East; but we do not want either to have an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine established here under the leadership of Japan or China, because we do not want to be absorbed by any power of the East, as certain small republics of Central and South America have been or will be absorbed by the United States...We desire Western influence to remain in the Far East but only to the extent necessary to effectively check any improper influence by China and Japan.1

Some years later, in August 1934, Recto addressed a society gathering in the presence of the Japanese Consul-General in Manila. By then President of the Convention convened for the drafting of the Commonwealth constitution, Recto again expounded on the 'real danger', a Japanese-inspired Monroeism which would mean for the Philippines 'economic pauperism and political extinction'.2

In sum Recto had engaged in a penetrating analysis of a familiar problem encountered in international relations: the dangers of a monopolistic distribution of power, be it in Latin America or in the Far East. Quezon's and Recto's lines were generally accepted without discussion among the Philippine political elite. There were found, however, those

1 C.M. Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation, Manila, People's Publishers, 1946, pp. 133-5, 143.
2 Ibid., p. 179.
dissenters who willingly envisaged the possibility for the future Republic to chart its course in such a system of monopoly as was decried by the Commonwealth's policy makers. These were members of the pro-Japanese minority, such as Pio Duran, lecturer of law in the University of the Philippines and rich landowner, who was to figure among the prominent 'collaborators' during the war. In a book devoted to the 'high cause of the colored races in the East' and which nicely captures the pro-Japanese mood, Duran convincingly argued that neutrality was inseparable from the wider aspects of western policy in the area. To accept a treaty of neutralization from the Occidental powers would be to treat them on an equal footing with the 'sister nations' of the Orient. In other words, while Japan was claiming leadership in this vast region, this 'Oriental superiority in the Orient' had to be recognized as legitimate not only, on the regional level, by the Oriental powers, but also, on a world-wide level, by this concert of powers which exercised a degree of influence

2 "Japan's interest today is concentrated in having her leadership recognized in the Far East and in eliminating Occidental control and interference in Oriental matters as fast as possible", ibid., p. 128.
over Far Eastern affairs. Duran concluded that a treaty of neutrality under western sponsorship would inevitably weaken any Japanese claim to regional authority.

Of more immediate significance perhaps than brilliant essays, were those dissident movements which were ready to take advantage of Japanese influence in order to challenge more effectively the established Philippine ruling classes. The *Sakdal* (Tagalog verb meaning 'to strike') uprising of 2 May 1935 offers a case in point. Under the leadership of a former employee of the Senate, Benigno Ramos, and after an intensive propaganda campaign directed against the Quezon regime, poorly armed mobs of peasants tried to seize local governments in Central Luzon. Within a few hours, however, the Constabulary had dispersed the mobs. Rumors circulating among the 'Sakdalistas' had it that Japanese troops would aid them to throw off the domination of the native elite and their American supporters.

The incident served as a warning. President Quezon's behaviour during the early months of the war demonstrated how the most thoughtful leaders of the Philippines had realized that their rule would be threatened by any change in the distribution of power in Asia.

The Philippines and the Pacific War

In 1939, when the war broke out in Europe, Quezon had assured President Roosevelt of the resolve of the Filipino people to fight side by side with the United States should the latter become involved in the conflict. The pledge was reiterated in more dramatic circumstances on 30 December 1941, during the ceremonies of the second installation of Quezon as President of the Commonwealth: during the three weeks following December 8, the Japanese had overrun Luzon and were approaching Manila. On 24 December, Quezon and MacArthur, by then commander of all Philippine and American forces in the Islands, had moved to the fortified island of Corregidor in the entrance of Manila Bay.

Increasingly concerned with the spectacular successes marked by the Japanese troops in South-East Asia and despairing to receive reinforcements from the United States, Quezon engaged in a reappraisal of the politico-military situation. His anxiety grew, as on 28 January 1942, a radio broadcast from Tokyo announced the establishment of a friendly government in Manila and its allegiance to the Japanese policy of setting up a 'Co-Prosperity Sphere'. Despite MacArthur's

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1 For the organization of the Executive Commission on 23 January 1942, see Chapter II, The Second Republic of the Philippines.
repeated promises ('I will bring you [Quezon] in triumph on the points of my bayonets to Manila') the President entertained serious misgivings lest a Japanese-sponsored Republic would spell disaster for the established social order in the Philippines. Quezon feared that the 'less educated classes' would respond favourably to Premier Tojo's promise of 'independence with honor' for the Filipinos: should the 'masses of the people fall into the trap', the established leaders would be unable to remain in control.

From the fortress of Corregidor, he envisaged to 'place himself in the hands of the Japanese' and to obtain from both the United States and Japan an agreement on immediate independence and neutralization of the Philippines. President Roosevelt's answer that America would never abandon its efforts 'until the complete and thorough overthrow of the entire Axis system and the governments which maintain them' apparently strengthened Quezon's confidence in the U.S. Himself, together with Vice-President Sergio Osmeña and a few officials soon moved successively to the Southern

1 M.L. Quezon, op. cit., p. 264.
2 Ibid., pp. 255-70.
3 Ibid., p. 273.

Quezon had taken good care, however, to ensure that the leaders of the ruling Nacionalista Party would not fight shy of co-operating with the Japanese. Before embarking for Corregidor, he specifically instructed the members of his Cabinet whom he would leave behind, to 'protect the civilian population' and to 'do what they [the Japanese] ask you to do except one thing - the taking of any oath of allegiance to Japan'.

As it turned out, most political, military and economic leaders of the Philippines accepted positions under the Japanese occupation. On several occasions the occupying power let it be understood that if need be they could choose collaborators among 'other Filipinos'; this threat of recruiting a competing elite proved very effective.

2 - 1942-1946

While the transition was operated as smoothly as possible in Manila, that section of Quezon's cabinet which had followed him in the United States soon formed a

2 Ibid., pp. 8, 64. See also Chapter II.
government-in-exile under the old leader's control. The Philippine Commonwealth established in Washington played its part in the drawing of 'blueprints' for new structures of authority in post-war Asia: it is in that sense that we may speak of an Asian policy of the Philippines at that time.

The Cairo and Tehran conferences of November 1943 brought into focus the main objectives of American policy in the Far East and, indeed, in the whole world. The overall goal of President Roosevelt as he expounded it to the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin was to establish a durable co-operation among the four powers in order to police the post-war international society. To quote the President: 'the Four Policemen would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency'; nations guilty of 'endangering peace' would receive an ultimatum and, if this proved ineffective, would be bombed immediately.

The Far East would be one of the test cases of collective security. With the agreement of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the exercise of power over that region

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would be shared principally between the United States and a friendly, presumably pro-American, China. It was agreed in Cairo, that, in this 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' of sorts, both powers would consult with each other before reaching any decision on matters concerning Asia. *Primus inter pares*, the United States would for its part maintain air and naval bases under its own control in the western Pacific, including the Philippines and Formosa, not mentioning of course the Japanese-held territories\(^1\). A note of triumph is perceptible in Roosevelt's own summary of the Cairo and Tehran conferences which he painted vividly for the benefit of the Pacific War Council\(^2\) meeting at Washington in January 1944: he stated that it was extremely gratifying to him to find that the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin saw 'eye to eye' with him on all the major problems of the Pacific. All had agreed, said Roosevelt, that the 'policing of the Western Pacific

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\(^2\) The Pacific War Council consisted of representatives of those signatories of the Declaration by United Nations which were fighting in the Pacific, viz., Australia, Canada, China, the Netherlands, New Zealand, The Philippine Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Set up with an advisory authority in March 1942, the Council met from time to time at Washington under President Roosevelt as chairman.
and, therefore the necessary air and naval bases should be taken over by those powers capable of exercising effective military control.¹

In short, it was America's and its allies' policy that the structures of power in the Pacific and in Asia be drastically modified after the war. The idea of a balance a la 1922 between all powers concerned was definitely repudiated. Indeed, the international system of 'collective security' as it was foreseen by Roosevelt was oligopolistic in nature, in that a few select powers would allow no rivals to exercise a large degree of authority in world politics. On the regional level, in the Far East for example, the four powers would enter into an arrangement (formal or otherwise) which would reproduce on a limited scale the main features of that world-wide structure. In Asia as well as in other regions of the system, a clientele of relatively small states would gravitate around the large powers, scattered as it were at the 'peripheries' of the system: there was no more mention of neutrality for the small powers, but ominous indications that the status of weak states would deteriorate.

¹ Ibid., Meeting of the Pacific War Council, Washington 12 January 1944, p. 869.
The role of the Philippines in post-war Asia

Roosevelt gave several indications of his willingness to give the Philippines a significant position in this scheme. In particular there were hints that the history of the Philippines would provide a useful pattern for influencing the other small nations and peoples of the world in a direction favourable to American interests. So far as the subjected peoples were concerned, the President envisaged a period of 'education' and 'training', leading eventually to independence under the supervision of the administering power or preferably of an international trusteeship where American influence could be more easily exercised. Along the same lines, President Truman discussing his Philippine policy in 1945, put it in these terms:

I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans...I hoped that by making the Philippines as free as we had

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Roosevelt's speech commemorating the Philippine Commonwealth in October 1943, as quoted by G.A. Grunder and W.E. Livezey, op. cit., p. 241. In 1944, the President confided to C.P. Romulo, resident commissioner of the Philippines, "I have advocated a sort of trusteeship for Indochina preparatory to their independence, and I have proposed that the Philippines be one of the trustees. Your experience there with us will be valuable as a pattern for that entire section", in C.P. Romulo, I Walked with Heroes, New York, Holt, 1961, p. 270.
made Cuba, it would have an effect on British, Dutch and French policy in their Far Eastern affairs.¹

What were the immediate implications of this American policy?

War-time contingencies made it imperative to project an attractive picture of United Nations' policies in the Orient. The Allied Powers were keenly aware of the Japanese efforts to conciliate the peoples of South-East Asia: it was realized that 'Asia for the Asiatics' was a powerful propaganda theme and that, in addition to military efforts, it was necessary to fight Japan in the political sphere². With a view to combating Japanese propaganda, Roosevelt showed unusual deference to the Commonwealth-in-exile. Thus, on 20 February 1943, he authorized Quezon to broadcast to the Philippines that the country had been granted recognition as an independent nation. Among the attributes of 'complete and respected nationhood for the Philippines - not a promise but a fact' Roosevelt cited the Philippine adherence to the Declaration by United

² See Stalin's observations on this subject at the Tehran Conference, op. cit., p. 485. American and British 'psychological warfare' experts met each week in San Francisco to coordinate their propaganda in the Pacific. See R. Dougall, "Philippine-American Relations since 1939", Department of State Bulletin, 20 August 1944, p. 188.
Nations of 1 January 1942, the attendance of President Quezon and Vice-President Osmena at meetings of the Pacific War Council, and their participation in international conferences such as the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. These prerogatives were all the more significant since the Commonwealth had been represented, as a part of the United States, at one pre-war conference only, the International Sugar Conference, held in London in 1937. As another sign of American interest for the Philippines, one must mention in this connection the promise of a thorough rehabilitation programme, also widely advertised in radio broadcasts as early as 1943.

During the war years, it was the Commonwealth's policy, under the leadership of Quezon and, after his death on 1 August 1944, of Osmena, to accept the lead of the United States in the Orient. In an article published in 1943, Osmena opened wide perspectives for the post-war period.

1 "Address by the President to the People of the Philippines", 13 August 1943, Department of State Bulletin, 14 August 1943, p. 91. The Commonwealth adhered to the Declaration by United Nations by exchange of letters on 15 June 1942 (ibid., 20 June 1942, p. 547). Instruments of ratification of the Charter of the U.N. were deposited with the State Department on 11 October 1945 (ibid., 14 October 1945, p. 581).

The Vice-President saw his country as the spearhead of a peaceful liberation movement which would free subjected peoples from exploitation, racial discrimination and other 'social maladies':

This war, in the military sense, may or may not be won without the active collaboration of subject peoples, but an enduring peace cannot be established without their whole-hearted support...The Philippines symbolizes the goal that can be attained, not by distrust, bloodshed, and violence, but by friendship, understanding and collaboration...As a part of whatever international force is established by the United Nations after the war, she can serve as the bastion of law and order in the Far East.1

Osmena was well aware that the main concern of a 'democratic' Philippines lay in the Far East2. It was given to Romulo, however, to discern that the time was ripe for an active Asian policy which would permit the Americanized elite of the Philippines to play a decisive role in regional affairs.

Carlos P. Romulo was born in 1899 to a well-to-do family. In the thirties, he became editor and publisher of an important chain of newspapers and, in this connection, he toured South-East Asia a few weeks before the war. On his

1 Ibid., pp. 27-9.
2 "The immediate concern of the Philippines will be in her own neighborhood, the Far East", ibid., p. 27.
return to the Philippines, he published a series of articles on the region's political situation. Accompanying Quezon to the United States, Romulo became secretary of Information in the war-time cabinet. In a book published during that period (Mother America, A Living Story of Democracy\(^1\)), he drew ambitious plans for a 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' in the Far East, with China and the Philippines playing a decisive role 'in democratic understanding with America'\(^2\).

Speaking with a deep hatred of imperialism, Romulo saw a free Asia emerging from the war, rejecting European rule, but seeking the protective influence of America. Such a pattern would clearly promote the interest of the Philippine elite, argued Romulo: it would allow these 'Christianized', these 'Americanized Orientals' to use his terms, to play an active role beyond their frontiers, over Asia at large.

The place of the Philippines has been and must remain unique. From that position, granted him by America, the Filipino who will represent the Philippines can speak with a full heart, not only for himself but for the Far East. As the only Christian in the Far East, the Filipino can interpret the Orient to the Western world.\(^3\)

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1 Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1943.
2 Ibid., pp. 123-46.
3 Ibid., p. 134.
As Resident Commissioner of the Philippine Commonwealth, (he had been appointed on 10 August 1944 by President Osmena) Romulo had occasions to convey the same ideas to American Congressmen. During the discussion of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, Romulo argued in the House that Philippine-American relations would be watched as a test case: a generous programme of assistance to the Islands might demonstrate to the Orient that friendly co-operation between a powerful western nation and its small eastern ally was not only a workable but also a profitable proposition\(^1\).

We must not look down upon this 'Great Design' as cheap oratory or as a fanciful proposition set forth by a brilliant essayist. Though we are dealing with a 'declaratory policy' aiming at effective impact, Romulo's plan puts into perspective the efforts of post-war Philippine diplomacy to bring about a pro-American regional *entente* in Asia. More importantly perhaps, it points to recurring features of international politics as they obtain in *regions* of the international system. In Asia, for example, after the disastrous Japanese

\(^1\) *U.S. Congressional Record*, 79 Congress, 2 session, April 10 1946, p. 3437 (House). In 1944, Vice-President Osmena had argued that generous help to the Philippines would also reinforce American prestige among the Philippines' *sister nations* of Latin America. *Ibid.*, 78 Congress, 2 session, 19 June 1944, p. 6210 (House).
experience, both local and outside powers anxious to receive wide international approval for their influence on the regional level, have tended to clothe their activities in principles, ideologies, symbols, etc. of universal appeal. Seen in this wide context, the Great Design propounded by Romulo and Osmena appears as an important milestone in the struggle for influence over Asian affairs.

In practical terms, it involved three inter-related objectives which were in fact to shape Philippine policies in the years to come. These long-range goals may be summarized as follows:

1. to avoid any monopolistic distribution of power on the world stage in general and in the Far East in particular: small Asian states should have their say, by contrast with the 1922 system which consecrated the privileged status of the imperialist powers,

2. to ensure continuing American interest in Asia in general, and in the Philippines in particular: the Philippine government-in-exile seems to have accepted as a matter of course that far-reaching concessions in the military and economic fields would be granted to the U.S. even after Philippine independence,

3. to work for friendly co-operation among 'free' Asian powers, in mutual understanding with the U.S.: there
was the hope that the U.S. would pursue a friendly line towards the anti-imperialist movement in Asia. How were these objectives implemented?

Commonwealth policy, 1945-1946

During the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Commonwealth objected to investing any of the great powers with a veto. Yielding to American persuasion, the Philippine delegation eventually came round to the viewpoint of the 'Big Five' but Romulo kept his reservations and, in the following years, he reiterated his criticism against a 'provision virtually disfranchising well over 60 per cent of the peoples of the world'. In this respect, the Philippines (as well as other small countries' delegations to the United Nations) was pursuing objective No. 1.

As far as objective No. 3 (co-operation among Asian states) was concerned, obviously the time was not ripe. By

1 C.P. Romulo, I Walked with Heroes, op. cit., pp. 264-5.
1945, most Asian powers had yet to achieve independence: liberation was a prerequisite to mutual understanding. The Philippine Commonwealth was one of the rare Asian powers to have a voice in international councils and it served notice that its concern lay with the subject peoples of Asia. Romulo made the point at San Francisco that the 'peace which this Conference is seeking to secure...may not be appropriated for the purpose of freezing the political, economic and social order of that part of the world'\(^1\). Meanwhile, in Manila, the Indonesian revolution attracted sympathetic attention. Between 1945 and 1949, the Indonesian Republican government could take advantage of various types of informal assistance: 'shuttle flights' operated between the Philippines and those parts of Indonesia which were held by the insurgents, supplies were purchased and forwarded by an Indonesian mission in Manila, etc. In December 1945, the Philippine Senate passed a resolution 'expressing the sympathy of the Filipino people for the people of Indonesia in their struggle for liberty and independence'\(^2\).


\(^2\) Commonwealth of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 1 Congress, 4 special session, 7 December 1945, p. 40 (Senate).
Before independence, however, it was the second objec-
tive (to ensure continuing American interest in Asia) which
figured most prominently in Philippine policies, namely, the
will to secure for the Philippines a privileged position in
the overall picture of American presence in Asia.

The uniqueness of the Philippines' place in South-East
Asia appeared in a number of fields, such as economic assis-
tance, military arrangements, trade agreements, etc. Immedi-
iately after World War II, for example, apart from relief
assistance, such aid as was provided by the United States in
the Asian area was limited in effect to the Philippines,
through the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946\(^1\). The prob-
lem of military bases should also be mentioned in this connec-
tion.

On various occasions, President Roosevelt had made it
clear that the United States would establish an extensive
network of military bases in the Western Pacific: he now
deemed 'wholly inadequate' the independence act's provisions
for naval bases and fuelling stations in the Philippines\(^2\).
He was supported in this policy by the Congress which passed

\(^1\) C. Wolf, *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia*,

\(^2\) *Department of State Bulletin*, 2 July 1944, p. 17.
a resolution authorizing the United States to 'withhold or to acquire and retain such bases...in addition to any provided by the Tydings-MacDuffie Act as [the President] may deem necessary for the full and mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and the United States.' The Commonwealth-in-exile was agreeable to such an extension of American involvement in the Far East. Thus, the Philippine Resident Commissioner notified the Congress of his government's approval and, in one of his rare declarations on that subject, Osmena mentioned that he was fully satisfied that 'adequate' bases would ensure the mutual protection of the Islands and of America.

On 14 May 1945, Presidents Truman and Osmena signed an agreement to the effect of permitting the United States to retain military and naval facilities in the Philippines, an altogether odd agreement at the time as was noticed by Senator M.E. Tydings.

The allocation of bases had been correctly seen by Romulo as one of the inducements the Philippines had to offer

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1 Senate Joint Resolution 93, signed by the President on 29 June 1944. See U.S. 78 Congress, 2 session, House Report 1497.
3 Tydings noticed the "anomaly of one nation maintaining military installations on the territory of another while not exercising jurisdiction over that country's foreign policies." New York Times, 26 May 1945, p. 3.
to the United States in order to ensure an American presence in Asia: only through America's active involvement could a 'democratic' (pro-American) and 'anti-imperialist' (anti-European) peace be secured in that area and could the Philippines hope to exercise a degree of influence over its neighbourhood. Other inducements offered to 'Mother America' included economic benefits and political influence over a 'democratic' Asia\(^1\). If all were agreed on essentials, there developed, however, a controversy within the ruling Nacionalista Party as to the desirable scope of these inducements. President Osmena tended to resist some American demands for advantages in the economic field\(^2\), but his leadership in the Party was questioned and, in December 1945, Manuel Roxas created a dissident wing which eventually took the name of Liberal Party and which proved more amenable to making concessions to the United States.

The formal approval of the Commonwealth and, after 4 July 1946, of the Republic of the Philippines had to be secured for the fundamental features of Philippine-American relationship to be implemented. Legislation was passed and diplomatic negotiations were held on arrangements concerning

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1 C.P. Romulo, Mother America, op. cit., pp. 135-6.
2 See Chapter III.
trade, military co-operation and foreign investments: these developments straddled over the years 1946-1947 and will be briefly surveyed in the chapter (III) dealing with the policies of the first Liberal administration (1946-1953).

To conclude, the Commonwealth period saw the establishment of the principal features of subsequent Philippine-U.S. relationship. The war disposed of the early plans for a neutral Philippines: instead came the decision to restore the old order and to strengthen Philippine-U.S. ties in all fields - in 1944-46, neither the U.S. Congress nor the Filipino elite were in a mood or in a position to insist on the necessity to ensure the complete independence of the Philippine Republic.¹

The Republic of 1946 was to inherit the somewhat negative view of Asian affairs which had developed during the American regime. Before the Pacific war, with the exception of a small pro-Japanese minority, the Philippine elite saw in great Asian powers the principal threat to the independence of their country, and they appeared bent on maintaining close ties with the U.S. With the prospect of American hegemony after the defeat of Japan, the idea became accepted

in the Philippines as well as in the U.S. that, after the war, Manila could play an active role among the small Asian states well disposed to the West, but here again the connection with the U.S. appeared as the overriding consideration in Filipino minds.
CHAPTER II

THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1943-45
Much pre-war Japanese propaganda was devoted to convincing fellow Asians that their cause of freedom from colonial rule was that of Japan too. And yet, when the Japanese landed in the Philippines in December 1941, they had to fight not only American troops, but a Philippine army as well. Japanese propagandists thus faced a challenging task in Manila. In the case of the Philippines, the avowed aim of liberating colonial areas from the clutches of western imperialism was difficult to uphold; the country was by then largely self-governing under President Quezon’s leadership and due to obtain its full independence by 1946. To make matters worse for Japan, while the Americans had settled on a definite course, the Tokyo government had still to make up its mind on the fate of the 'South Seas' territories which it was about to conquer. Moreover, the daily humiliations and brutalities, and the economic hardship endured by the Filipino people under the heel of an occupation army, cast doubt on the generosity of Japanese aims.

Nevertheless, Japanese propagandists in the Philippines immediately set to work on a few themes and, for three years, kept repeating them in countless 'sermons': Japan will wage
this war to a victorious end; Japan's purposes are selfless; Japan plans to liberate East Asia (where the Filipinos belong, lest they should forget it) from corrupting western influence; in this exalting task, Filipinos must share, since they are 'Orientals by nature and origin, if slightly sidetracked by their unhappy development' 1. The Japanese entrusted the propagation of similar themes to a political 'party', the Kalibapi 2 patterned after similar organizations in Japan (the Yoko Sankai) and Manchoukuo (the Concordia) and destined to integrate all Filipinos for purposes of a totalitarian government. National and local officials were made members 'ex officio' of this organization.

Meanwhile, current administrative tasks had to be performed. Jorge B. Vargas, Secretary to President Quezon, had been left in charge of the administrative machinery of the Philippine government after the departure of the President and of Vice-President Sergio Osmena with retreating American and Philippine forces. Vargas was thus the supreme authority left when the Japanese entered Manila on 3 January 1942. The Japanese High Command instructed him to organise forthwith

1 Tribune, Manila, 13 December 1944, p. 4.
2 Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas, Union for Service to the New Philippines.
the national administration. The Philippine Executive Com-
mmission was thus organized under close Japanese supervision, 
exercising both executive and legislative powers. It com-
prised prominent pre-war politicians selected by the 
Japanese including Vargas (as Chairman), Jose P. Laurel 
(Commissioner of Justice), Claro M. Recto (Education, Health 
and Public Welfare) and Quintin Paredes (Public Works and 
Communications).

Philippine independence

However, this administration was no more than a 
temporary expedient and Premier Tojo lost no time in clarify-
ing Japanese intentions. In January 1942, he told the Diet 
that independence would be granted to Burma and the 
Philippines as soon as these two countries were made to 
understand the intention of his government. As for the rest 
of South-East Asia, it would be divided into Japanese 
territories, protectorates, dominions, and more or less 
autonomous regions, all being part of a 'Greater East Asia'. 
Following Japanese plans, the post-war world would be divided 
into zones of influence, such as a Germany-led 'New Europe', 
the Western Hemisphere under U.S. protection, and of course 
Greater East Asia: this latter constellation, embracing the 
Far East and adjoining areas, would comprise primary
producing autonomous states and colonial territories, all under the close supervision of Japan\textsuperscript{1}. There was no room in this scheme for a neutrality status for small powers.

Japan soon felt the role of Asian leader to be too heavy a burden to shoulder by herself alone. Let us recall that, during the years 1942 and 1943, after the first spectacular successes, the political and military situation progressively changed for the worse from a Japanese viewpoint. China was still fighting, the United States had not made overtures for peace, Germany had not defeated Britain nor the Soviet Union. On the military front, Japan's Navy suffered heavy defeats in the Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942) and, particularly, in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (1-3 March 1943). Presently, the Navy would meet insoluble problems in the transportation requirements of the South-West Pacific.

Hence, Japan's resolve to waste no time, to make use of appealing political aspirations and to make friends among Asian patriots in the name of liberation from foreign exploitation. Thus, Burma's independence was proclaimed on 1 August 1943, Wang Ching-wei's Nanking regime secured the abandonment of Japan's claims in China and entered a treaty

of alliance with Japan on 30 October 1943, and the second Republic of the Philippines was born on 14 October 1943.

Premier Tojo had visited the Philippines in 1943. During his stay in Manila (5-7 May), he conferred with Vargas and other Commissioners. A mass meeting was organized at the Luneta (Manila's central public square) and a resolution of gratitude was presented to the Japanese Premier:

> Be it resolved that this solemn assembly express the undying gratitude of the Filipino people for the chivalrous leadership of the Great Japanese Empire and its unprecedented benevolent policy towards the Philippines and the Filipinos.\(^1\)

Hands raised, Vargas and the Commissioners led the throng in shouting 'Banzai!' and waving Japanese flags. More significant though was this part of the ceremony whereby Premier Tojo delivered his message and stated:

> It has long been an outstanding cause of indignation to me that the great soul and spirit of the true Filipino have been maliciously perverted and debilitated by long years of hypocritical exploitation under the American regime. All traces of reliance on America and sentimental attachment to Americanism are being rapidly liquidated from the minds of the people and a strong Oriental nation is being forged upon the anvils of fortitude enterprise and progress from raw materials which are inherently and essentially Oriental.

> I note with great satisfaction that you are actively forging ahead in your task of creating the New Philippines and under the circumstances I am

\(^1\) Tribune, Manila, 7 May 1943, pp. 2, 6.
convinced more than ever on the propriety of your early independence.¹

After a few inspection calls on military installations, schools and industrial plants, Tojo left Manila and returned to Japan. In Laurel's words, the promise of 'early independence' was received with 'some kind of excitement', but without genuine rejoicing or heartfelt gratitude². In fact, many Filipinos, far from considering themselves as under obligation to the Japanese, despised their conquerors for the 'backwardness in their political and social development' and their 'low, non-Christian civilization'³.

On the other hand, it was felt that, as a matter of national dignity, Filipinos had to be worthy of their ancestors and accept liberty whenever it was attainable. Hence, when Tojo faced a small circle of Filipino leaders with the 'choice between extermination or freedom' (Tokyo, 30 September 1943), they did not back out⁴.

In compliance with Tojo's public announcement of May 1943, the Japanese High Command in Manila ordered the

¹ Ibid.
² J.P. Laurel, War Memoirs, op. cit., p. 11.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
creation of a 'Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence', for the purpose of drafting a constitution. A Convention of the Kalibapi selected the members of the Commission from a list submitted by the Japanese military police. Commissioner of Justice Laurel, who had recently attracted considerable public attention when he was shot at and wounded by a member of the resistance movement, became chairman of the Preparatory Commission.

The work of the Commission proceeded very slowly until a second visit of Premier Tojo. In the course of a trip in the Southern regions, and after visiting Thailand, Malaya and Singapore, Tojo called again at Manila (10-11 July 1943). He conferred with the Commission and urged it to expedite its job. The final draft which was submitted to the Japanese was the work of Recto, Laurel and Roxas, who incidentally had all worked in the drafting of the 1935 Constitution. This explains partly why the new constitution was strikingly similar to the 1935 one. It concentrated, however, more powers in the hands of the President. At any rate, the 1943 Constitution was temporary only, a new one being promised for after the termination of the war.

1 Text in Philippine Commission Official Gazette, September 1943, pp. 29 ff.
This was the first dissonance struck by the Philippines in an environment of totalitarian states. Burma, by contrast, acquired a fascist, totalitarian constitution, not to mention Japan itself or the friendly Axis powers and their satellites. In fact, as will be seen later, Filipino stubborness in keeping, on paper at least, the substance of their democratic institutions - such as the bill of rights - amazed visiting officials from abroad.

Three days after its signature by the Commission (4 September 1943), the new constitution was ratified by the 117 members of the Kalibapi, called specifically for that purpose. The National Assembly met at an inaugural session on 25 September, in the Legislative Building, adorned with Japanese flags. It was composed of 108 members, one-half of whom were provincial governors and city mayors serving in an ex officio capacity, the other half being those who had been elected in the various Kalibapi conventions held a few days earlier throughout the Philippines. It was that body which, on the same day, unanimously elected Dr Jose P. Laurel as President of the Republic.

Shortly after this election, Laurel, Speaker Benigno Aquino, and Jorge Vargas, were invited to go to Tokyo (29 September 1943). After attending banquets, and making official calls, the small party was closeted in a conference
room in the company of Premier Tojo, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Advisor Murata, and other prominent Japanese officials. Two years later, in his prison cell, Laurel recalled the scene as follows:

Premier Tojo rose and read his instructions (translated by Mr Iiamamoto) asking us to declare war against the United States and Great Britain. I was seated in front of Premier Tojo and Mr Vargas was seated on my right while Mr Aquino on my left. It was a shock to all three of us; we did not expect this instruction and we were not prepared to meet it on the spot. I silently prayed and said the Pater Noster. After the translation by Iiamamoto of the speech of the Premier I got up to say as politely as I could that I could not comply with the request. I said that my people would not approve of it; that I could not carry them; that I have never been a popular leader, the three powerful leaders of the country being Messrs Quezon, Osmena and Roxas; that even if I should be willing to do what they wanted me to do, I would be a leader without any following because the Filipinos were opposed to such a step; and that it would not be "decent" for the Filipinos to declare war against the United States that was their benefactor and ally and that only unworthy people could be expected to do that.¹

This courageous refusal was to constitute another distinctive feature of the 'problem child' of South-East Asia. Again, the Philippines was alone in its stand: Dr Ba Maw, 'Adipadi' of Burma, had been told in Tokyo that a declaration of war on Britain and the United States would be a prerequisite to Burma's independence - Rangoon complied on the very day of

¹ J.P. Laurel, op. cit., p. 17.
the proclamation of independence; Thailand had declared war upon the Western Allies on 25 January 1942 and Nanking China on 9 January 1943. President Laurel was made to sign a treaty of alliance with Japan on the day of the Republic's inauguration, on 14 October 1943 (the text of the treaty being brought from Japan by Ambassador Syozo Murata, hitherto highest adviser to the Japanese Military Administration; the ambassador refused to negotiate a single item of it)

On the same day, however, after the signing of the pact, Laurel issued a statement in which he announced:

The pact does not envisage a declaration of war by the Philippines against any foreign nation. No Filipino soldier will be called upon to render military service outside the limits of Philippine territory or to fight except for defense purposes.

Even some of the official speeches delivered on independence day must have sounded unwelcome to Japanese ears. Claro Recto, the newly-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared over Manila radio: 'It should be clear that, we

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1 C.M. Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation*, op. cit., p. 31.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bulletin*, 14 October 1943 - 15 February 1944, p. 11. The treaty was a defensive one, as shown by the "Terms of Understanding" attached to the Pact and which read: "The Philippines and Japan will closely co-operate with each other to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of the Philippines", *ibid.*, p. 8.
Filipinos, owe no allegiance to any foreign power." Even the 'political ideology' adopted by the Laurel government as a concession to the political climate prevailing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere announced a 'government of Filipinos, by Filipinos and for Filipinos, without interference of any foreign power'.

Foreign relations

While the Filipino countryside was growing more and more restive and the resistance movement was gathering an impetus unknown elsewhere in South-East Asia, in Manila itself, the Filipino leaders were set to make the most of their 'independent' Republic. One of the first decisions taken by the Laurel administration was thus to avail themselves at once of the important attributes of sovereignty, viz., the right to enter into official relations with other members of the international society. For such purposes, a Department of External Affairs was essential. During its special session, on 20 October 1943 (it did not meet again), the National Assembly enacted Act No. 1, creating a Ministry for Foreign Affairs, so that the Republic of the Philippines 'may carry on its international relations, not only with Japan
but with the other countries, not only of Greater East Asia but of the entire world'.

Claro Recto was entrusted with the organization of a Foreign Ministry. Formerly Commissioner of Education, Health and Public Welfare under the early stages of Japanese occupation, he had publicly lavished fulsome praises on the 'unprecedented Japanese generosity' but was about to prove his independent-mindedness and even his physical courage in the face of continuous Japanese encroachments on the Republic's sovereign rights.

He quickly recruited assistants from personnel in his law office and established his headquarters in the Finance Building in Manila. It is worth noting here that in the way of appointing public officials, the Republic kept to local traditions of long standing. Following Quezon's expressed desire before his departure from Manila, the political personnel were not changed under the Japanese occupation, nearly all of the high ranking officials being in fact old Nacionalista politicians. 'My cabinet was integrated [sic] by the most learned, competent and experienced Filipinos in the Philippines at the time', wrote Laurel. And it is

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2 J.P. Laurel, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
significant that the President and his cabinet refused to comply with Japanese pressure to include two outsiders, B. Ramos and A. Ricarte, in the high councils of the Republic. As for sectionalism, it is worthwhile noticing that Laurel was a Batangueno and that he had several Batangueños in the high ranks of his administration, such as Recto and de las Alas, to the extent that some people called his term of office the 'Batangas regime'. The personnel of a Ministry such as Recto's was also recruited among a private group of followers. Without any civil service examination, this staff was reappointed in 1945-1946 by President Roxas to the new Department of Foreign Affairs or to other high positions in the government (see table I), although the fact has not been advertised even in scholarly discussions. While the veil of secrecy is rarely lifted from anything connected with these years, such features tend to give the war-time Republic a familiar aspect.

The staff of the Ministry comprised some 140 employees, and was eventually reduced to about 110 when the government implemented its 'depopulation programme' requesting people to

1 M.E. Buenafe, Wartime Philippines, Manila, 1950, p. 218.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1943-1944)(^a)</th>
<th>Roxas-Quirino Administration (1946)(^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claro M. Recto (Minister)</td>
<td>Re-elected, Senator (1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilio Abello (Vice-Minister)</td>
<td>Chief of the executive office of the President (1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States (1949)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staff Officers**

- Querube C. Makalintal (Counsellor)
- Teodoro Evangelista
- Salvador P. Lopez (Press and Publications Officer)
- Francisco M. Africa (Consultant on International Cultural Relations)
- Mauro Calingo (Secretary)
- Jesus P. Morfe

**Philippine Embassy in Tokyo**

- Jorge B. Vargas (Ambassador)
- Francisco Lavides (Counsellor)
- Faustino Sy-Changco (Second Secretary)
- Leon Ma. Guerrero

**Philippine Delegation to the Greater East Asia Conference**

- Jose P. Laurel (President of the Republic)
- Claro M. Recto (Foreign Minister)
- Q. Paredes (Minister of Public Works and Communications)
- Jose B. Laurel, Jr. (Assistant to the President)

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leave Manila for the provinces\(^1\). The Foreign Ministry was thus the smallest in the government. The Foreign Service comprised only the members of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, five persons altogether.

This latter figure indicates at once that the Ministry was 'inwards-looking'. This impression is confirmed by a glance at the organization chart of the Ministry (see Table II): it was less a policy-making body than an administrative machinery whose main activities were to help Filipino citizens in their dealings with Japanese military authorities, up to the point that Minister Recto complained to the Japanese:

> The Foreign Ministry finds itself in the strange role of an embassy trying none too successfully, to protect its nationals in the foreign country to which it is accredited.\(^2\)

Since, on the facade at least, the Japanese military administration had been dissolved on 14 October 1943, when the Republic took charge, the Foreign Ministry was officially in charge of interceding with the Japanese Embassy, on behalf of the Philippine Government. Countless requests were sent out to trace the whereabouts of Filipino citizens, unheard of

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of states, including fellow-members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (Japan, Burma, China, Manchoukuo and Thailand), friendly Axis powers and their followers (Germany, Italy, Vichy France, Denmark, Croatia, Bulgaria, Finland, Roumania and Slovakia), and neutral states (Afghanistan, Argentina, Eire, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the USSR and the Vatican). No neutral state committed itself to a recognition of the Philippine Republic, although Spain addressed a message of congratulation and the Vatican acknowledged receipt of the note. The only messages of recognition were sent by Greater East Asian countries, including the 'Provisional Government of Free India', Germany and some of its satellites (Croatia, Slovakia and Mussolini's Salo Republic). In other words, the Republic of the Philippines was offered membership in an embryonic and yet already battered international fascist society. This came out with certainty when a somewhat plaintive appeal by Laurel broadcast to the United States on 14 October 1943, was left without answer:

We now ask America to recognize and respect our independence and forebear to bring greater sufferings and destruction into our midst and among our

1 This message was deceivingly printed by the Official Gazette under the title: "Message of recognition", 14-31 October 1943, pp. 14-20. The message drew a sharp protest from the U.S. Ambassador in Madrid.
people. All that we ask is to be allowed to work our own salvation in our own way.\(^1\)

As a matter of fact, President Roosevelt had made it clear on several occasions that he considered Quezon's government-in-exile as the only lawful Philippine government, with the same status as the governments of other independent nations.

The scope of international intercourse was thus inevitably limited. When treating with Japan, it seems that Filipino officials tried to compensate for the desultory status enjoyed by their Republic with a combination of wit and more or less open restiveness. On 7 May 1944, for example, Jorge Vargas, Philippine Ambassador in Tokyo, made an address where he calmly asserted that:

> With the swift reduction of a modern fortress [Corregidor], equipped with all the weapons that science could devise and all the advantages that nature could afford, accomplished as it was by a handful of intrepid Japanese soldiers there was no longer any reason for any Filipino to believe that the U.S.A. was an all powerful and invincible nation.\(^2\)

Such statement cannot but appear scathingly ironical when one knows that the Japanese had to use for nearly five

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1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin, 14 October 1943-15 February 1944, p. 15.

2 Quoted in Official Gazette, May 1944, p. 877.
months a large amount of troops before finally overpowering poorly equipped Philippine-American troops in the Philippines.

When, on 22 March 1944, a Philippine Chapter of the Indian Independence League was organized in Manila, 'with the generous assistance and benevolent guidance of the Japanese Military Administration', Recto was asked to contribute a message for the occasion. He complied, while managing once again to avoid any reference to Japan and to the war. And how does one interpret an ambiguous statement as the Foreign Minister's?

These are days of destiny. The mighty struggle between the legions of freedom and the hosts of despotism is fast approaching a decisive climax.

The continuous game of procrastination played by Laurel was also worth noting. As has been seen above, although the Philippines had endorsed the Tokyo Joint Declaration, it had never declared war on the Western Allies. Following some devastating air raids on Manila the President, advised by

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1 Karam Singh Gill, On to Delhi, Manila, 1944, pp. 12-13, 95.
2 Tribune, Manila 5 July 1944, p. 4.
3 The preamble of the Declaration reads: "The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to co-operate towards prosecuting the war of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination", quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin, 16 February 1944-31 March 1944, p. 92.
Recto and Roxas, eventually declared on 23 September 1944 that a state of war existed between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States and Great Britain. The move was hailed by a hopeful Ambassador Murata:

The Philippines has become not only our most dependable ally but a comrade in arms fighting shoulder to shoulder at the Eastern bulwark of Asia.¹

Laurel soon issued a statement, however, which the Japanese, in their own words, 'failed to understand':

The Republic has but one course to pursue, and that is to render every aid and assistance to the Imperial Japanese Government short of conscription of Filipino manhood for active military service.²

This meant war but not army! Short of manpower, the Japanese High Command then proceeded to arm Filipino volunteers, independently from the Republic, and directly under control of the Imperial Forces. This force eventually supplied labour to help in armed operations but did not take part in actual fighting.

¹ Tribune, Manila, 24 September 1944, p. 1.
While the Japanese government was the only one to open an embassy and consulates in the Philippines—the only Filipino diplomatic mission overseas was stationed in Tokyo. The arrival of the four-man Philippine mission, with Jorge B. Vargas at its head, on 10 February 1944, completed the diplomatic representation in the Japanese capital of the five 'independent' nations of Greater East Asia.

Leon Ma. Guerrero, a Recto protege, by then Second Secretary in the Embassy, has noted that, in 1944, the 'brother Oriental' was the object of an odd protective affection in Japan. This sentiment was short-lived, however, and the East Asians soon shared in the Japanese revulsion against all foreigners after the massive air raids of early 1945. Furthermore, Japanese propaganda no longer endeavoured to hide the fact that anti-Japanese guerillas were active in most of South-East Asia.

1 The Japanese embassy was formally opened on 26 October 1943, with a staff of 42. Consulates-General were functioning in Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, and consular offices opened in Legaspi, Iloilo and Bacolod, presumably to provide assistance to Japanese commercial ventures in those areas. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin, 14 October 1943-15 February 1944, pp. 38-9. Foreign communities were represented by private persons, without the status or the prerogatives of members of foreign missions.

Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations

In 1943-1944, however, Tokyo still shared in the pretense that Greater East Asian countries were independent, sovereign states, fully fledged allies of the Japanese. The heyday of this scheme was the Tokyo Conference convened on 5 and 6 November 1943. Japan and the five independent states of the Sphere were officially represented at this 'Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations', as was the 'Azad Hind' Government of Subhas Chandra Bose (five observers). The standard delegation included six members, twelve for Japan, but only four for the Philippines: Laurel, Recto, Quintin Paredes and Jose B. Laurel, Jr. The list of attending delegates included another familiar post-war figure, Prince Wan Waithayakon from Thailand.

In fact, this was the first time that Asian Heads of State were gathered and grouped together in a purely Asian international conference, in a sort of fascist 'Bandung'. But whereas in 1955, the liberation movement was already victorious in Asia and in full swing in Africa, in 1943 the die was already cast against Japan. Premier Tojo was in fact trying to harness the growing anti-imperialist movement for the benefit of his country, or at least to make it impossible for the old western imperialism to return in the Far East.
Hence his plan of challenging the west with an 'Asian Charter' which would leave its imprint for years to come.

One may wonder why the Japanese took such pains to meet some of their satellites' aspirations for respect and equal treatment. One motive certainly lies in Japan's weakness and the need to alleviate as much as possible the plight of her troops in conquered countries. Another reason lies in the contemporary climate of the international society at large. In the protectorates established about half a century earlier in Tunisia, Cambodia, Malaya, etc., the dominating powers were obviously less considerate of local rulers. In these cases, and a fortiori so in outright colonies, equality among the states was not preserved, even on paper. The protectorates resulted from 'Big Stick' policies, they were marginal states which the fast-developing European powers endeavoured to 'police' quickly. International systems of the industrial age favour equality among the states, however, and it eventually appeared that the community of states could not tolerate for long colonial or semi-colonial relationships.

Modern satellite states are a new version of power politics. Being weak, satellite states are kept under the wing of some powerful great power, while face-saving devices carry on the pretence of equal treatment: thus, whereas protectorates tend to disappear from the international stage
the status of small powers has sometimes been impoverished and degraded.

In a matter of months, Japan ran the whole gamut of those great power policies. Late-comers in the field of an old fashioned type of imperialism (one is struck by the similarity of their schemes to those contemplated by the leaders of Germany during World War I.\(^1\)) the Japanese had to resort to the back-firing device of supporting, however half-heartedly, the movement for national emancipation in the territories they had occupied.

At the Tokyo Conference, President Laurel read a speech (checked beforehand and slightly modified by Japanese 'experts') which summarized the main points of Japan's policy as far as colonial territories were concerned. The peoples of Greater East Asia will no longer be subjected to Western rule, they are now united, ready to fight oppression, together with their Japanese brothers. So much so, that the attainment of the aspirations of Asian peoples depends upon Japan's victory; 'Without that victory, there can be no freedom for my country or for any other country in East Asia'.\(^2\)

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1 See review article by K. Epstein, "German War Aims in the First World War", *World Politics*, October 1962, pp. 163-85.

One should not unduly minimize the importance of this Conference. It is hard to think that all was pretence and not genuine satisfaction in Laurel's statement upon his return in Manila when he recalled 'the automobiles flying our flag and the big Filipino flag at the mansion where the delegation was accommodated'.

The 'Joint Greater East Asia Declaration', unanimously endorsed in the Tokyo Conference, was made to appear as a challenge to the Atlantic Charter (let us recall that Churchill had refused to consider the latter as valid for colonial areas). Similarly, the authors of the Declaration intended to contribute to the cause of world peace, by attacking British and American imperialism. Thus the Declaration pledged mutual co-operation, economic development and abolition of racial discrimination. What appealed more to Laurel was that it also guaranteed 'fair and equal treatment to all members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, irrespective of size or strength', an indication among others that there was in the Philippines the tendency to use Japanese libertarian themes against Tokyo.

1 Ibid., p. 22.
2 Ibid., p. 23.
It is well known that these lofty principles were not implemented: there might have been some irony in the assertion of Jorge Vargas to Japanese newsmen that the Joint Declaration was so impressive to the Filipinos that they felt it must be materialized as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Republic's leaders had to bide their time and swallow their pride. In April 1944, for example, at the 'suggestion' of Japanese representatives in Manila, several prominent officials were sent off to Tokyo: this 'Gratitude Mission' included the Speaker of the National Assembly, Benigno Aquino, the Chief Justice, Jose Yulo, two Ministers and the Vice-President, Camilio Osias, concurrently director of the Kalibapi. On its way home the party visited Manchoukuo. In a confidential report, Aquino pointed to the sorry condition of this country as a sad foreboding of the Philippine future in case of Japanese victory.

The Philippines and Greater East Asia

The Republic joined other regional conferences, mainly of this mixed politico-cultural variety which became the fashion in later Afro-Asian meetings. In Tokyo were held a

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1 Ibid., April 1944, pp. 123-4.
2 J.P. Laurel, op. cit., p. 29.
'Physical Education Conference' (8 November 1943) and a 'Greater East Asia Press Conference' (17-18 November 1943). Two Filipino representatives were likewise sent to attend in Nanking a 'Greater East Asia Medical Conference' (25-27 April 1944), which gathered 77 delegates.

Although the Foreign Ministry did not enter into relations with other countries of the Sphere, some delegations called at Manila. After the Tokyo Conference, Dr Ba Maw made a stop-over visit (18 November 1943) during which he availed himself of the opportunity to advertise his craving 'to see the day when the courage of the Filipino people would be used on the side of Asia and not against Asia'.

A few days later, Subhas Bose, Head of the 'Provisional Government of Free India', was guest of the Philippines (22-24 November 1943). His visit was not advertised, the newspapers did not carry any news on his arrival or his departure. A few cheering Indians were nevertheless warned and waved some flags to the passing limousines. At a meeting with the Indian community, Bose took the Filipinos to task and advised them to unite and to adopt a 'new' outlook, meaning to make a more concrete contribution to Japan's war effort.

2 Karam Singh Gill, op. cit., p. 117.
In 1944, Dr Ba Maw sent a three-man research mission to Japan and other sister-nations of the Sphere to obtain amelioration of Burma's economic grievances and to establish direct contacts with other Greater East Asia's states. They called at Manila on their way home, in July 1944, and were reportedly deeply impressed by the unco-operative stand adopted by the Filipino leaders\(^1\). Incidentally, a favourite theme of Japanese propaganda was to contrast Burmese 'all-out collaboration' (sic) with Filipino lukewarmness. Some days after the departure of the Burmese mission, the Tribune produced an unctuous editorial:

"Somehow, we suffer from a sense of exalted envy that the opportunities offered Burma by her geographical position to fight for her freedom side by side with the valiant forces of Nippon have been denied to us.\(^2\)"

Not surprisingly, cultural relations with other countries of the Sphere were almost exclusively carried on with Japan. 'Cultural delegations' called at Manila to carry out the tasks assigned to Tokyo's 'Greater East Asia Ministry', viz., to 'Nipponize' the 'South Seas' countries. During the war, about 70 Filipino government pensionados were


\(^{2}\) Tribune, Manila, 1 August 1944, p. 4.
sent to study in Japan (they met frequent difficulties with the police)\textsuperscript{1}. It is ironical that, far from nipponizing the Philippines, these students eventually served an altogether different purpose since most of them accepted jobs in the occupation's American forces in Japan, as interpreters, guides, censors and so forth.

Epilogue

On 19 October 1944, MacArthur did 'return' and landed his troops in Leyte. By the end of the year, fierce fighting was taking place in Luzon itself. Laurel and several members of his Cabinet were whisked away by the Japanese (21 December 1944) and kept as virtual prisoners in Baguio. It was there that the President formally dissolved the Cabinet. Accompanied by his family, a few high-ranking officials and a Japanese escort, he proceeded on a hazardous trip to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (22 March 1945), and thence by air to Taiwan and Japan which he eventually reached by the end of June. On 15 August, a Japanese Foreign Affairs official

\textsuperscript{1} W.H. Elsbree writes: "According to the report of one Foreign Office member, the Filipino students were the most discontented and were most frequently in difficulty with the police. This was attributed to the fact that they were the 'most advanced' of the students from South-East Asia", Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-1945, Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1953, p. 107.
formally notified the Philippine 'government' of his country's surrender. On the suggestion of Vargas, Laurel then prepared a formal announcement:

In view of the reestablishment of the Commonwealth government and in view also of the surrender of Japan, the Republic of the Philippines has ceased to exist.¹

Kept in custody by the Americans, all were flown back to Manila on 23 July 1946. In the words of Leon Ma. Guerrero, 'the long night of exile was over, though not perhaps the twilight of ambiguity'.²

Ambiguity: The word characterizes best the history of the Second Republic of the Philippines. Between the American-sponsored Commonwealth of the Philippines, the Japanese-sponsored Republic, and the present one, there was no breach of continuity as far as the political personnel is concerned. More particularly, Recto's political figure continued to loom large in the formulation of Philippine foreign policy, especially during the first period of Magsaysay's term, in the years 1954-1955. The tendency now seems to see Filipino leaders who collaborated with Japan as

² Ibid., 1 September 1946, p. 15.
patriots acting in a spirit of national pride. The impression remains that the Philippine elite was (as it perhaps still is) ready to collaborate with any hegemonic power in the Far East, be it Japan or the U.S. (or, say, China or Indonesia tomorrow).

Ambiguous too the acceptance of the hegemony of the great powers while keeping ever present a certain preoccupation with the emancipation of Asia. It is significant that the slogan 'Asia for the Asians' was retained and appeared again in Philippine politics in 1954, at the beginning of President Magsaysay's administration, more than ten years after its endorsement by the Greater East Asiatic Conference. Curiously enough, the slogan was used by Leon Ma. Guerrero, Recto's protege, and by then under-secretary for foreign affairs.

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CHAPTER III

ASIAN POLICY OF THE LIBERAL ADMINISTRATIONS, 1946-53
During the post-war years, the U.S. interest in Asia has described a pendulum-like movement. Depending upon alterations occurring in the international system at large and in Asia in particular, and also upon changing moods in Washington, American policies in the East have gone through successive periods of active involvement and of quasi-retrenchment.

American authority in the Far East was strongly felt during the years immediately following the end of the war. Ever since the Potsdam conference of 1945, it had become President Truman's policy to disregard Roosevelt's views of a world directorate of the 'Big Four' over the Pacific. Of Roosevelt's plans, there eventually remained a Far Eastern Commission established in Washington with legislative powers over occupation policies in Japan, and an Allied Council in Tokyo with advisory powers but with little actual influence.

1 To quote President Truman: "I decided to take no chances in a joint setup with the Russians...We were not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific." Memoirs, vol. I, op. cit., p. 342.
over policy decisions. In Japan it quickly became clear, however, that occupation policies would be shaped by the American authorities with little more than lip service paid to Allied advice.

In line with Truman's policy, the U.S. engaged in consolidating its system of bases and alliances in the Pacific area. In China, it continued until 1948 to bring extensive economic and military aid to the National Government. In the western Pacific, pending international arrangements, it retained control over the former Japanese trust territories and, of course, over the longtime American possessions of Guam and Eastern Samoa. The Philippines finally remained for a number of years the only outpost of American influence in South-East Asia. For all practical purposes, however, American policy in the islands was in line with its general attitude towards the Far East, namely, to discourage competing powers, whether from 'east' or 'west' from exercising influence over the area.

Philippines-U.S. Relations

As mentioned earlier (Chapter I) the United States interest in the Philippines was marked in the economic,
military, and political fields: this is the place to outline the main features of the Philippine-American connection in the post-war years. The political situation within the Philippines proved very favourable to the maintenance of close ties between the two countries. Let us recall that by December 1945, a split had developed within the ruling Nacionalista Party, partly over the degree of influence to be conceded to the United States; Manuel Roxas had directed a section (the 'Liberals') of the party towards complete secession.

A popular figure in pre-war politics, Roxas had remained in the Philippines during the occupation and, in 1944, he accepted an official position in the Laurel regime. In 1945-46, despite his war-time record, 'Manoling', as he was known to his friends, enjoyed support on the part of the American authorities in the Philippines and among the land­-owning and business interests which had traditionally dom­-inated the political scene in the islands. Presidential elections were held on 23 April 1946 and Roxas carried the day against an aging President Osmena, the Nacionalistas, and various liberal or radical elements grouped in a 'Democratic Alliance'\(^1\). Roxas's 'running mate', Elpidio Quirino, was

\(^1\) M. Roxas polled 1,333,000 votes, as against 1,130,000 for S. Osmena. Analysis of the elections in B. Seeman and
elected Vice-President. 'Lawyer, orator, politician and champion of the masses' in the words of the *Philippines Who's Who*, Quirino had not figured prominently in Philippine politics until his election in 1946. He was to become President after Roxas's death on 15 April 1948.

A few days after his election, President Roxas visited the United States where he held talks with the military and with business circles, promising everywhere to follow a strongly pro-American line on all issues.

Less than a fortnight before Philippine Independence, the Congress in Manila discussed the trade relations bill which was to shape the Philippines' trade for a number of years: the bill provided that trade between the United States and the Philippines would be free until 1954, except for quotas allocated by the U.S. to the main Philippine exports. Gradual increases in duty would occur for a period of twenty years after 1954. Controversial sections gave economic advantages to American citizens over all foreigners in the islands, pegged the peso to the dollar, and continued the pre-war export monopolies. Moreover, a section of the Philippine Rehabilitation act ensured that no property damage


Capitol Publishing House, Quezon City, 1957.
payments over $500 be made unless the Philippine government approved the somewhat unattractive trade act.\(^1\)

At a state dinner given in his honour by President Roxas, Romulo urged the acceptance of the trade bill as a price to pay for maintaining the 'unique brotherhood' between the two countries and for ensuring continuing American interest in the Orient.\(^2\) Following Liberal leadership, both Houses approved the bill, exactly by the required two-thirds majority. In March 1947, a plebiscite was held on a constitutional amendment which granted equal business rights to Americans in the Philippines.\(^3\)

Philippine-American military agreements were also sharply debated. After the end of the war, the United States resumed military assistance to the Philippines under the Philippine military assistance act of 26 June 1946.\(^4\) A military assistance agreement was entered into by the two governments on 21 March 1947, for a period of five years.


\(^2\) Philippine Commonwealth, Congressional Record, 2 Congress, 1 session, 2 July 1946, p. 362 (Senate).

\(^3\) Despite pressure brought to bear by the administration, out of 3,096,413 registered voters, only 1,971,000 took part in the vote (1,745,000 yes and 226,000 no). Commission on Elections, Manila.

\(^4\) U.S. 79 Congress, 2 session, H.R.2243.
The agreement reaffirmed the preponderance of American influence: a United States military advisory group (JUSMAG) would have the right to make policy recommendations through the United States ambassador in Manila (Art.15) and another provision stipulated that no foreign (i.e. non-American) personnel would be connected with the armed forces of the Philippines except by mutual agreement (Art.22). After protracted negotiations, a military bases agreement for a period of 99 years was signed in Manila on 14 March 1947.

In the terms of the agreement (6th whereas), the bases would insure the territorial integrity of the Philippines, the mutual protection of the two countries, and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. There was an informal understanding that U.S. troops stationed in the bases would be prepared to intervene in the event of domestic emergency or civil disturbances¹.

While the United States military had originally asked for 70 bases, they eventually accepted 23 bases only, ranging from major air and naval bases, to depots, naval anchorages, recreation areas, etc. This concession announced a changed American outlook in the Pacific. As was noticed by the *New York Times* editorialist on 16 March 1947, 'the Philippines no longer have a very important place in the defensive alignment we [the U.S.] are building in the Pacific'. The new tendency seemed to be to plan a vast system of defence partly under direct American supervision, partly in collaboration with the British Commonwealth, and partly under nominal supervision of the United Nations. Contrary to Philippine expectations, the United States thus seemed wary of further engagements in Asia.

During those years of near exclusive dependence upon the United States, Manila had few opportunities for carrying an active foreign policy. This was the period when 'foreign policy' was considered mainly in terms of practical advantages which might accrue to a ruined economy: relief grants, American loans, surplus goods, reparations due from Japan, etc. In the words of Vice-President Quirino, concurrently Secretary of foreign affairs: 'our sober, prudent and wise
foreign policy is to seek support for our national policies.¹

Yet compliance with American leadership was fraught with dangers. There was the discomforting thought that the country would become a 'servile parasite' and that discouragement could set in amongst the Filipino people ('The war taught us, they say, that the Philippines cannot survive without the protection of America')². Thus, several policy statements were marked by a despondent tone:

Much to our regret we are compelled at this juncture, just when we should exercise the inherent right of sovereignty to project our nation into the concert of free nations, to ask for outside help not only as we have done through the instrumentality of the U.N. but also through agreement with the United States.³

Philippines-China

Despite the focus brought upon American leadership in the Far East, the new Republic's foreign policy denoted awareness of the other countries in the area. On 18 April

² Speech by President Quirino before a convocation of the University of the Philippines, 23 September 1946, ibid., pp. 31-2.
³ Ibid., p. 31.
1947, for example, a treaty of friendship with China was signed in Manila after difficult negotiations. The main difficulties were encountered when the two panels dealt with the ticklish problem of Chinese minorities in the islands. The 1947 treaty bore witness to the fact that the Philippines were not ready to recognize to the Chinese community any substantial degree of influence over the Republic: Chinese citizens were refused any share in the economic privileges which had been conceded to Americans.¹

The Philippines and regional organizations

Philippine independence had not passed unnoticed in Asia. An Indian delegation attended the ceremonies on 4 July 1946, and Aung San, Ho Chi Minh and Sukarno sent congratulations messages. Likewise, the Philippines showed mild interest in Asia and, following the blueprints prepared before independence by the government-in-exile, the Republic tried to enhance the importance of Asia in any consideration of international politics. One may recall in this connection General Romulo's position at the United Nations on the veto

¹ Art.IX of the treaty of amity between the Philippines and China, R.P.T.S., vol. I, no. 2, pp. 168-70: "the stipulations of this treaty do not extend to advantages which are now accorded or which may hereafter be accorded by the Republic of the Philippines to the U.S.A. or its nationals".
issue (see Chapter I). Again in the U.N., the Philippine delegate adopted an 'anti-imperialist' attitude and used to take western powers to task for their 'dangerous and pathetic delusions' in Asia and Africa\textsuperscript{1}. Other supporting evidence of Philippine interest in Asia may be found in the records of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE): during the November 1947 meeting of the Commission in Baguio, President Roxas criticized what he saw as the exclusive attention given to economic planning in western Europe and asked for a 'Marshall Plan' to help Asia to discard its colonial economy and to supplement its agricultural production by industrial development\textsuperscript{2}.

In 1947, Philippine representatives of non-governmental civic organizations and educational institutions attended the proceedings of the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi (23 March–2 April). The conference was organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs under Premier Nehru's inspiration, and it reflected India's aspirations to play its part in an Asia which, felt Nehru, had become important again in world politics. In the course of an informal briefing of

\textsuperscript{1} U.N., G.A.O.R., 2 session, Plenary Meeting, 18 September 1947, p. 62.
Filipino delegates, Romula broached a plan for a 'Pan Asian Union', and argued that an organized bloc of Asian states could make its weight felt in the United Nations debates. No such decision was taken, however, and the conference adjourned without taking political decisions.

There are indications that the Philippine delegation was out of tune with the prevailing 'anti-imperialist' tenor of the conference. In the terms of a Filipino representative,

The delegation from the Philippines has had to swim against the current, so to speak, within the circles of the conference and outside of it. The reception accorded us has been cordial but it has not been as warm as that accorded the delegations from Indonesia and Vietnam...It has been easy to see that the delegates to the conference love a good fight.

The same delegate notes with dismay that a number of persons, including Mahatma Gandhi, expressed doubts about the independence of the Philippines. An American correspondent noted the almost complete silence which greeted the address of the head of the Philippine delegation describing in rosy terms the relationship between the United States and his country. As for a Filipino suggestion for a future

1 Manila Times, 1 March 1947, pp. 1, 2. It is worth noting here that Romulo took no part in the creation of an Arab-Asian bloc in the U.N. (see Chapter V).
2 Manila Times, 19 April 1947, pp. 1, 4.
3 New York Times, 3 April 1947, p. 3.
'Pan-Malayan Brotherhood', an Indonesian delegate commented that, unlike the Philippines, Indonesia considered itself as belonging to the East.

In short, the conference showed in a number of ways that the new states of Asia considered the newly achieved independence of the Philippines as hardly relevant to their own future: the Philippines appeared as a conservative, go-slow member of the club; the experience of India and Indonesia, by contrast, seemed somehow more 'Asia-like'. At Delhi, in short, Filipinos were made to appear as the odd members in a family gathering. Soon Manila would aim at competing with this still embryonic Asian solidarity.

2 - New structures of authority and the 'Pacific Pact', 1948-50

The growing wariness of the United States towards active participation in Asian affairs had been quickly noticed in the Philippines. In 1947, Vice-President Quirino reminded America of what we might call the 'obligations of leadership':

Philippine-American relationship must be intelligently managed. If at this period America neglects to give timely support for the reconstruction of the Philippine economic structure, such neglect may seriously impair the great lesson of democracy in action.1

1 Speech delivered before the Foreign Policy Association of New York City, 15 May 1947, E. Quirino, op. cit., pp. 60-1.
As will be seen soon in further detail, the realization that America was hesitant as to the role it would play in Asia and the Pacific induced some small powers, such as the Philippines and Australia, to bring pressure to bear upon the United States with a view to bringing about a fresh American interest in the East. In Washington too, during the years 1948-50, those who shared General MacArthur's vision of an 'aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership' in Asia, argued that the Truman administration should commit the United States to unwavering support of the anti-communist regimes of the area, precisely as it was doing in Europe.

There were indications, however, that prevailing sentiment in Washington was to adopt a policy of retrenchment from the Pacific defence line, and not to enter into any collective defence arrangement other than the North Atlantic Pact. The most spectacular illustration of this 'second phase' of American policy came with the release on 5 August 1949 of the 'China White Paper' which announced that further aid to the National Government of China would be futile. In January 1950, Secretary Acheson made his oft-quoted statement that the 'defensive perimeter' for the United States did not run

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beyond the Ryukyu Islands, the Aleutians off Alaska, and the Philippines. A few weeks later, the American policy in the Far East was further examined by a meeting of U.S. diplomats in Bangkok (13-15 February): prospects for an Asian alliance against communism were discussed, but it was reaffirmed that the United States would not take initiatives in that direction, and would not run against the mood prevailing in Asia.

Influence over the Philippines was, however, carefully maintained. In 1949, the United States Congress passed the first coordinated programme of military aid, destined mainly to member-states of the recently concluded Atlantic Treaty and to Greece and Turkey. A smaller amount was allocated for Iran, Korea and the Philippines: as far as the latter country was concerned, the Senate's committee on foreign relations advised that a constitutional government in the Philippines was a 'decided asset to American foreign policy throughout the Far East'. Military assistance was thus provided for purely local purposes, without mention of any exercise of regional

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2 U.S. 81 Congress, 1 session, Senate, Report (No. 1068) of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services on H.R.5895 (Military Assistance Program), Washington, 13 September 1949, p. 13.
influence by the Philippines. Ambassador-at-large Phillip C. Jessup's parting words in Manila were only partly re-assuring when he stated (January 1950) that the United States 'in any formulation of a new Asiatic policy would consider the Philippines the show window of democracy and the demonstration area for the attraction of neighbouring countries away from the orbit of Communist influence'.

The Philippines and regional security

Despite such soothing reassurances there were indications of restlessness in the Philippines at the prospect of a hostile China assuming a prominent position in the Far East and of the United States reverting to its war-time policy of 'Europe first'. As the New York Times put it on 14 February 1949: 'P.I. Worried Over China Red Gains'. It was at that time that Claro M. Recto marked his re-entry in Philippine political life by an address delivered at the Arellano University in Manila. The Marshall Plan in 1947, the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact in 1949, followed by the 'abandonment' of China, so many events which, in the opinion of Senator Recto, pointed to America's choice 'for' Europe and 'against' Asia:

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the bonds of race, of a common ancestry, of the same cultural values, are attractions that the Asians cannot hope to match in the rivalry for the primacy in American assistance.¹

In New York, Romulo struck a similar chord when he called on the United States to follow up the Atlantic Treaty with measures in those areas of the Pacific and Asia which were desperately short of economic resources. Yet he suggested that no military alliance was needed at that moment. President Quirino, for his part, indicated interest in a pact of non-aggression among Asian powers.

At the risk of digressing a little, it is worth noting that Australian policies offer an illuminating comparison with those of the Philippines. Since the war-time period, the idea had been cultivated in Australia of establishing the Pacific area as one of several zones of security within the international system. Dr Evatt, in particular, made several references to the primary responsibility which Australia, in close co-operation with the United States and also New Zealand, should have in determining the future of that region. By the late 'forties, as American reluctance to undertake any collective arrangement in the Pacific was

¹ C.M. Recto, "Our Asian Foreign Policy", address delivered at Arellano University, 9 April 1949, Historical Bulletin, Manila, March 1960, pp. 41-9.
becoming increasingly clear, Australia put forward new proposals for regional co-operation and, in 1950, the newly-elected Liberal-Country Party government pressed further the case for an inner core of states which would be able to undertake military commitments in the Pacific, viz., the United States, Australia and Britain. Countries of lesser resources could associate themselves with that nucleus.

In pursuance of that policy, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, P.C. Spender, visited Manila on a goodwill mission (25-28 March 1950) and held talks with President Quirino on the problems of regional security. This visit strengthened Spender's belief in approaching security problems on a 'practical regional basis': according to the Minister, the absence of a common background among Pacific and Asian powers in terms of political institutions, economic structure, etc., militated in favour of a restricted ('practical') view of collective security.\(^1\)

The Philippine approach to regional politics was different in that it did not analyse international politics in terms of a loose 'clique' of politically and economically

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\(^1\) Current Notes on International Affairs, Canberra, vol. 21, 1950, pp. 403-4.
advanced powers, assuming responsibility for a given area. Together with several other Asian states, the Republic rather sought opportunities for taking advantage of the post-colonial distribution of power in Asia. On several occasions, the idea was expounded by Philippine delegates to the U.N. that small powers could wield a tremendous influence in world politics by pooling their strength: better than the great powers, small states could represent the 'true will and the real interests' of the peoples of the world. The aim implicitly announced there was to exercise a degree of influence on world affairs by associating (on favourable terms) with the hitherto silent crowd of new states, rather than to achieve an informal understanding with an inner crowd of established powers. This was an early indication of the subversive, 'anti-imperialist' overtone which the Asian policy of the Philippines was due to carry in the years to come.

Conference on Indonesia, January 1949

In the late 'forties, reawakening Asia offered vast opportunities for new international alignments. Following the Netherlands military intervention in Indonesia (December

1948), several Asian powers, together with Australia, contemplated some sort of collective action. At the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru, a conference on Indonesia convened in Delhi from 20 to 23 January 1949. The aim was to find a solution to the Indonesian problem, but also — to quote the Indian Premier — to consider the creation of a permanent arrangement for effective mutual consultation and concerted efforts in the pursuit of common aims.\(^1\)

The Philippines had been invited to join the conference (the invitation being extended through diplomatic channels in London) and Manila was quick to accept and to endorse the formation of a regional organization. The statement issued on that occasion by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs is worth quoting for its unintended candor:

> the Filipino people should play an important role in the proposed bloc. We formed the first Republic in Asia under the Malolos Constitution. We are the leaders of the Malayan race, of which the Indonesians are the most numerous portion. Moreover, India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Indochina have for the last fifty years been encouraged by our struggles for freedom.\(^2\)

President Quirino appointed Romulo as head of the Philippine delegation and instructed him to support any plan

\(^1\) *New York Times*, 21 January 1949, pp. 1, 12.

\(^2\) *Manila Times*, 4 January 1949, p. 12.
promoting the security and mutual interest of the governments represented at the conference. As a first step in that direction, the Philippines proposed the establishment of a small permanent secretariat in Delhi or Manila which would ensure concerted action by the member states. Other small powers were, however, aiming at types of regional organizations better suited to their own interests. Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan, for example, made a case for an alliance led by Muslim countries ready to act on any question, such as Palestine. Australia, for its part, was keen on strengthening informal co-operation among Commonwealth countries represented.

The conference eventually adjourned with a resolution on regional co-operation, hopefully expressing the wish that participating governments consult among themselves in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery for promoting consultation and co-operation within the framework of the U.N. Romulo hailed this rather cautious step as demonstration of the new strength and unity of Asia; from any standpoint a 'massive political fact', adding:

The conference very wisely confined itself to the consideration of the problem of Indonesia. But

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1 Statement by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, 26 January 1949, Current Notes on International Affairs (Canberra), January 1949, p. 113.
even now many members look beyond it to the formation of a permanent organization. Political cooperation among the nations of Asia has passed from dream to reality.\(^1\)

A few months later, the Filipino diplomat further assessed the results of the Delhi conference within the broad framework of the emerging structures of authority in Asia. Romulo saw the conference on Indonesia as a response to an awkward situation wherein, in Asian eyes, the United States was not an altogether desirable ally (he mentioned the role of America as one of the preservers of the colonial system), European powers were holding on to some of their colonies, Japan was in the process of being revived and strengthened thanks to American policy, and finally the communist victory in China forecasted decisive changes in the distribution of power in Asia and indeed throughout the world\(^2\). He argued that an Asian Union of the type envisaged in Delhi might develop into a new force, equally opposed to two sets of 'cliques' operating in the international system: the 'renascent imperialists' (European and possibly Japanese) on the one hand, and the 'aggressive totalitarianists' on the

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other. The groups of states led by the United States and 'free Asia' were two other sets, able to make their weight felt in international politics. Romulo saw Philippine diplomacy as moving from one set to the other, anticipating policies on both sides, in short, occupying a strategic position in the region's structure of authority - all in all, a basic policy of many small and middle-sized powers which are always keen to offer mediating services, to perform the important functions of 'interpreters' or 'hustlers' between competing powers, and thus to ingratiate themselves with the powers-that-be of the international system.

Quirino-Chiang Kai-shek conference and aftermath, July-August 1949

As it was defined by Romulo, the Asian policy of the Quirino administration had the establishment of a mutual consultation scheme among Asian countries as one of its primary objectives. The presidential address of 4 July 1949 reaffirmed that 'a real union of the peoples around the Pacific' was the Philippines' 'answer to the threat of red imperialism and of a new slavery'.

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Echoing statements suggesting some sort of regional scheme came at about the same time from Nationalist China and South Korea; in Australia also, similar ideas were in the air. It is thus in an atmosphere of jockeying for roles of authority in Pacific affairs that Chiang Kai-shek paid an official visit to the Philippines (10-11 July 1949).

The objective, on the Generalissimo's part, was to secure a military alliance with the Philippines, calling at least for supply and maintenance facilities to be made available to Chinese troops. There was also, perhaps, the hope, however illusory, of entangling the United States through an *entente* with its protege. This plan failed: presidential elections in the Philippines were in the offing and, as Chiang had asked the Chinese community to help Philippine authorities, President Quirino was accused by the Nacionalista opposition of bartering national security for the contributions of the well-off Chinese. As the Liberal candidate in the elections, Quirino was understandably reluctant to make any concrete commitment.

The joint communique issued after the talks referred to the 'imperative of coordinated full development of the Far Eastern countries' on order to ensure their stability and security. The two heads of state deemed it advisable that those countries organize themselves into a union for meeting
the 'communist menace' and that a preliminary conference be held among representatives of countries desirous to join the union.

President S. Rhee of Korea did not waste time before welcoming a scheme which might lead to a military showdown with the communists. Among government circles there was some jubilation: 'both Generalissimo Chiang and President Rhee are looking up to Mr Quirino as their leader in getting Asians to form a united front against communism'. In a matter of days, Philippine diplomacy launched a full-scale campaign in favour of the 'Pacific Pact' proposals: on 12 July 1949, Romulo was instructed to sound out the State Department on the plan, and to lay the ground for a regional conference among South-East Asian countries; on 16 July, the Philippine government opened a credit line of Pesos 2 million (US$1-m) to the Republican government of Indonesia and allowed the Indonesians to open a consulate in Manila; on 21 July, it was announced in Manila that diplomatic representation of the Republic in Asia would be strengthened. On 22 July, finally, Romulo arrived in Manila and reported on the progress of his negotiations with the United States and the ambassadors in

1 *Manila Times*, 14 July 1949, p. 16.
Washington of Australia, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Thailand.

Romulo's report was negative. The United States as well as the Asian states consulted had expressed wariness in joining any pact. After a two-day discussion with his ambassador, Quirino decided to proceed with his plans but to clothe them in principles which would minimize reluctances among the wielders of authority in Asia. President Quirino aimed at rallying all and sundry around his bid for authority: in a hybrid document he tried to circumvent, on the one hand, the U.S. fear of being involved in an entangling alliance with unreliable regimes and, on the other, the prevailing mood in Asia to fight shy of outside interference. The 'Letter of instructions on the proposed Pacific Union' of 3 August 1949 thus denied any need for military commitments and yet pointed out that there was, in Asia, a parallel with the genesis of the western Union and the North Atlantic Pact. The letter played up the unobjectionable U.N. aspect ('I envisage such a union to be essentially an act of common faith on the economic, political and cultural level, in tune with the work of the ECAFE and the program of the UNESCO').

Full text in E. Quirino, The New Philippine Ideology, Manila, 1949, pp. 303-8. See Appendix IV.
and yet mentioned the great danger of 'the tide of totalitarian subversion and conquest which threatens to engulf the very freedom we have won'.

As a concession to Romulo's views, no direct reference was made to 'communism' by name, or to the somewhat embarrassing support of the unpopular regimes of Nationalist China and South Korea. But Quirino prevailed as far as the general political tenor was concerned and it was in vain that Romulo reiterated his views of an Asia merging into a 'Third Force' and developing into an 'effective counterpoise' against the menace of totalitarianism on the 'left' and of imperialism on the 'right'. The President for his part seemed to feel less desire to conceal the part played in his plan by a friendly United States and he presently embarked for an official visit to Washington. On 9 August, accompanied by the loud if awkward applause of Chiang and Rhee, he addressed the two Houses of Congress.

The timing was bad. As mentioned above, the United States was reviewing its policy in the Far East and, upon his

1 Chiang Kai-shek and S. Rhee had held a conference in Chinhae, Korea on 7-8 August 1949. On the day of arrival of President Quirino in the U.S., they released a statement in which they requested the President of the Philippines to "take all necessary steps to bring about the birth of a union of Asiatic or Pacific countries" and thus "eradicate the menace of international communism", New York Times, 8 August 1949, pp. 1, 2.
arrival in the country, President Quirino was somewhat curtly advised that the Philippines could not expect any new material aid from the U.S. and that the Administration 'did not deem this a propitious time for a discussion, except in a cursory fashion, of the proposal for a Pacific Union'.

In his address to the Senate, President Quirino nevertheless called for something of the 'courage and vision that went into the forging of the democratic defenses in Europe' to be applied in Asia as well. The danger was now pressing, argued the President, of the Philippines (that outpost of American democracy) being 'lost' to communism, together with the rest of Asia. To meet that threat, new arrangements were needed in Asia and, in particular, Asian countries should set up permanent organizations dealing with economic and political measures to halt the advance of communism. It was the President's conviction that, once such a union had been organized, the United States would not fail to back it with all its resources.

The policy of involving the U.S. in Asian affairs by successive stages, so as to forestall international and

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2 U.S. Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 session, 9 August 1949, pp. 11031-2, (Senate).
domestic objections, was popular with the Republican opposition, but not so with the Truman administration. The statement issued after the Truman-Quirino talks referred vaguely to the U.S. continuing to 'watch sympathetically' the efforts of Asian peoples to forge stronger ties of economic collaboration.

That coolness was matched in Delhi. Premier Nehru had views of his own on Asian affairs and made them increasingly known in 1949 and 1950. Only Australia remained in favour of its version of a Pacific Pact. Marshal Pibul of Thailand also suggested a conference with a view to discussing various forms of co-operation in the area, but he soon dropped his proposal and fell in line with Quirino's plans.

The Baguio Conference, May 1950

As the months passed by, Quirino clothed his proposals in an 'anti-imperialist' mould, likely to exert a larger appeal on the international scene and to maintain a degree of solidarity among Asian countries. Thus, in his inaugural address (the Liberal administration had been returned to power in the November 1949 presidential elections) on 30 December 1949, the President placed the Philippines in line with the new emancipated nations:

We salute the newly-born United States of Indonesia, and the emergence of India as a
Republic. Since the inauguration of our own Republic, we have rapidly ceased to be an island of freedom and democracy among the once-called [sic] submerged and under-privileged peoples in Asia. Korea, Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon have become free.¹

That was the area where the Philippines claimed interest: by self-proclaimed authority, the Republic aimed at acting on behalf of the 'free democratic world', and at helping to forestall the entry of subversive ideas in its neighbourhood. However, by early 1950, Philippine diplomacy significantly played down the watchwords of 'subversion', 'communism', etc., and rather concentrated on the more seemly theme of a 'Union of New Democracies in the western Pacific and South-East Asia'².

Even with the broadest terms of reference, it was no easy task to convene a conference in the Philippines. The difficulties encountered until the last minute pointed to the rivalries among competing international arrangements in Asia: followers were keen to indicate preferences among prospective leaders and to claim for themselves some degree of influence, leaders would rather remain in the background, all, great or tiny, old or new at the diplomatic game, watched each other with varying degrees of distrust.

It took Romulo's flair for personal diplomacy to rally hesitants. On 10 May 1950, he was appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs and presently set out on a quick tour of South-East Asia, visiting successively Djakarta (where a Philippine envoy had arrived a few weeks before) and Bangkok, in time to meet representatives of Asian governments attending the annual ECAFE session (16-20 May 1950). Informal exchanges of view on prospects for a conference in the Philippines were held on that occasion, Quirino, for his part, again stressed that the proposed meeting would shun any reference to the spread of communism: the accent would be put on 'common problems'. On the condition that no mention would be made of a 'united front', India eventually agreed to attend what she wished to consider as an informal exchange of views. On 26 May 1950, President Quirino opened the Baguio Conference.

Six countries had accepted the Philippines' invitation: Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand. If one excepts the six-member delegation of the Philippines (composed for the most of parliamentarians, among whom were future Presidents Carlos P. Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal), Indonesia sent the largest representation (five members), while most countries sent two men each. Significant absences
were those of Nationalist China and of South Korea which had not been invited because of their insistence on a military pact.

Though the conference remained the master of its own agenda and had the power by unanimous consent to discuss, or not to discuss any topic, the Philippine delegation came to the meeting armed with proposals 'as broad and far-reaching as the high hopes which had inspired the conference.' President Quirino's opening speech had made a sweeping reference to the many fields, economic, political, and cultural, where the peoples represented could find avenues of cooperation: 'political' aspects were thus very casually mentioned but Secretary Romulo was concrete and, in his opening statement, he referred to the desirability of establishing a permanent organization. However, the Philippines quickly lost control over the proceedings and the conference divided into two sub-committees which were expected to draw recommendations in economic and cultural matters respectively. Romulo made known his disappointment that no political sub-committee had been appointed and indicated that he might

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1 Secretariat of the Baguio Conference of 1950, Final Act and Proceedings, p. 47.
present his proposal for a permanent organization after considera-
tion of the economic and cultural reports.

The conference did not approve the Philippine proposal but authorized the President of the conference (Romulo) to set up a secretariat to keep governments informed of the progress accomplished with respect to the recommendations. Despite all efforts to the contrary, the conference could not deal in an entirely a-political manner with problems loaded with politics. Thus, the final act embodied political recommendations to the participating governments, such as: to act in consultation with each other through normal diplomatic channels, and to exercise joint influence in international organizations. Other recommendations dealt in general terms with economic and cultural co-operation. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Baguio conference was the stress given to the primary responsibility of regional powers over the affairs of 'their' region, a potent theme which was to dominate Asian politics in the years to come. The participating governments, read the final communique, should ensure that:

in the consideration of the special problems of South and South-East Asia the point of view of the people of this area is prominently kept in mind by any conference dealing with such problems, so that better understanding and cordial relations may subsist between the countries in the region and other countries of the world.1

1 Ibid., p. 5.
One is tempted to read in this provision the influence of India and Indonesia. In particular, Dr Soebardjo, Indonesian delegate to the conference had made it clear that Asian countries should claim authority over their region not on behalf of outside powers, but on behalf of a properly Asian movement. To quote Soebardjo, the basis for mutual co-operation in the Asian region is 'determined by the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist character of Asia's struggle for complete emancipation from all forms of foreign domination'. In effect, Baguio forecast the emergence of an autonomous structure of authority in South-East Asia. According to the Philippine delegate to the General Assembly of the U.N. in 1950, this contest for influence between 'outside' and 'local' powers was far more crucial than a conflict of the Korea type. At the core of Asian problems, were poverty and colonial bondage: for meeting these challenges, the established policy of any interfering power should be based on the principle proclaimed at Baguio of 'seeking counsel with the peoples of Asia on matters that concern them'. From that viewpoint, the Korean war was to put the clock back.

1 Ibid., p. 33.
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea was to lead to a general reassessment of the United States commitment in the East. Before June 1950, however, there were signs of a growing American assertiveness in the region. On 6 April 1950, President Truman appointed John F. Dulles as a foreign policy adviser to the State Department: a leading Republican spokesman on international affairs, Dulles was soon in charge of negotiating an early settlement of the Japanese question, with the aim of retaining a 'free' and possibly rearmed Japan as the main counterpoise to China's influence in Asia. As Dulles put it,

Our particular opportunity and responsibility is Japan. We can, if we will, help Japan to be an exhibit in Asia of what a free society can develop in spiritual and intellectual richness and material well-being. ¹

In China, meanwhile, Dulles expected the communist rulers to be unable to solve the economic and social problems of the country.

As far as the Philippines were concerned, American observers were particularly worried by the growing strength of the radical insurgents of the HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalayan Ng

Ill Bayan - People's Liberation Army) in Central Luzon. The deteriorating economic situation also cast doubts on the very survival of the Republic as a reliable, friendly outpost in the Pacific. American concern for the Philippines was shown in a number of ways. In February 1950, after discussions with Quirino, President Truman had let it be known that he was considering the dispatch of a new mission to survey the Republic's economy. In the political field, President Quirino had to reject vigorously informal proposals to allow U.S. forces to join the anti-dissident campaign.

Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war, President Truman announced (27 June 1950) an overall reinforcement of American interest in the Far East, in Formosa as well as in the Associated States in Indochina. As for the Philippines, the President directed U.S. forces stationed there to be strengthened and military assistance to the Philippine government to be accelerated.

1 In October 1946, an American corporation had prepared a development plan for the Republic, upon a request by President Roxas. In early 1947, a joint Philippine-American Finance Commission investigated the fiscal and economic situation of the Philippines.


American assistance to the Philippines was also stepped up in other fields. On 10 July, a Presidential mission headed by Daniel Bell, former Undersecretary of the Treasury, was dispatched to carry out an extensive survey of the Philippine economy. As a prerequisite to further aid, the United States insisted that the Quirino administration formally agree to 'act boldly and promptly' on a far-reaching programme designed to bring about certain reforms in the economic and social fields. After it was satisfied of 'substantial compliance' by the Philippines with the provisions of the agreement, the U.S. government made available financial assistance amounting to U.S.$250 million\(^1\). The degree of American control over the daily operations of the Philippine official agencies was indicated in the field of technical assistance, with American experts exercising responsibilities in almost every category of government, a phenomenon unique in South-East Asia at that time\(^2\).

Equally significant was the strong pressure which the American embassy brought to bear on Quirino in order to

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\(^2\) U.S. 82 Congress, 1 session (Senate), Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services on S.1762; Mutual Security Act of 1951, p. 627.
secure, on 1 September 1950, the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defence. Hitherto a rather obscure Liberal congressman from Zambales, Magsaysay had served as chairman of the House National Defence committee. In April 1950, he went to the United States where he obtained military assistance and, possibly, the promise of political support. As Secretary of Defence, 'Monching' as he was known to his friends, would soon show decisive successes in the anti-dissident campaign and, aided by a powerful advertisement campaign, would soon become a nationally known and very popular figure.

The main change in the structures of authority in the Far East and the Pacific came about in 1951, with the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty and of a chain of 'mutual security' arrangements formalizing American interest in that part of the world. Much of this new alignment of power rested on Dulles's assumption that Japan would provide the crucial test of American influence in Asia and that this policy should not be compromised by the reluctance of India and its friends to see outsiders interfere in Asian affairs. According to Dulles, the fear of western interference was not much more than a propaganda stunt - 'the communists scream that there cannot be a genuine "Asia for the Asiatics" until every
vestige of western influence has been driven out of Asia, leaving, of course, "Asia for the Russians".\footnote{1}

In the western Pacific region, both Australia and the Philippines had to make serious concessions to the United States with regard to the new status granted to Japan, yet in one major aspect at least, Australian policies were vindicated, in that Canberra secured the sort of intimate relationship between the United States and Australia and New Zealand which it had pursued for several years. Due to Japanese reluctances to accept American plans for a regional pact embracing the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, it was announced in April 1951 that Washington would negotiate a series of separate treaties, with the understanding that at some later stage further agreements would receive the sympathetic attention of the U.S. Thus, 'pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area', the United States signed mutual defence treaties with the Philippines (30 August 1951)\footnote{2}, Australia and New Zealand (1 September), and Japan (8 September).

the United States had taken care to placate both countries' opposition to any significant strengthening of Japan's position. To the Philippines, for example, Dulles gave assurances of economic aid from the U.S. and fair reparations from Japan. Yet the Philippines' lower status became apparent in the following year.

'Pacific Council' without the Philippines, August 1952

Following several meetings of western representatives to discuss South-East Asian affairs - without any Asian representation - the Pacific Council established under the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) treaty of 1951, held its first meeting attended by Secretary of State D. Acheson (Kaneohe, Hawaii, 4-6 August). The Council examined the possibility of inviting other governments (such as the U.K. and the Netherlands) to join the alliance. However, despite hints by Philippine diplomats and Manila's activity on the diplomatic front (see below), the Republic was not invited to

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1 "Security conversations" were held in Washington in January 1952, in Paris (May), London (June) and, at a lower level, at Singapore and at the U.S. naval base at Sangley Point (Philippines). Participants usually included American, British and French representatives, with observers from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. See P. Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1952, Oxford U.P., 1955, p. 406.
attend the meeting nor to join an entente which, according to Prime Minister Menzies, should comprise only those members of the Anglo-American 'Hard core of democracy' lying in the Pacific.

Though Art.III of the Philippines-U.S. treaty also referred to the establishment of a council of foreign ministers, the only outcome of Philippine claims for a say in Pacific affairs came in the course of a tour of Far Eastern countries by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs, J.M. Allison. Conversations were held in Manila on 27 October 1952 and dealt with the maintenance of internal stability, rather than with President Quirino's desire to play a leading role in regional affairs. Leon Ma. Guerrero commented bitingly: 'President Quirino, dreaming of the leadership of Asia, had been told to just be a good cop.'

The security treaties of 1951 thus somewhat widened the scope of influence exercised by Australia and New Zealand.

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1 Quoted ibid.
2 As a very mild encouragement to Philippine diplomacy, the conference agreed on the establishment of Philippine diplomatic missions in South-East Asia "in order to coordinate the problems of defense in the western Pacific" (sic). R.P.T.S., vol. II, no. 1, pp. 152-3.
3 Sunday Times Magazine, Manila, 26 October 1952, p. 5.
The Philippines, for its part, though another follower of American lead in that part of the world, failed with respect to its long-range policy of sharing in the 'free world'\textquoteleft s authority in Asia. This failure was harshly indicted by Senator Recto, the most vocal critic of President Quirino\textquoteleft s foreign policy.

Nationalist criticism

During Quirino\textquoteleft s tenure of office, Recto delivered several speeches on foreign affairs, most noteworthy among which were an address at Arellano University in 1949, in the midst of Quirino\textquoteleft s campaign for a Pacific Union, and an address to the University of the Philippines in 1951\textsuperscript{1}. Assuming that the Republic was not pursuing an independent course in foreign affairs, Recto set out to undermine the basic concepts of favour, gratitude, sentimental bonds, etc., which went to make up, according to him, a dependent ('colonial') relationship.

Thus, he stressed the isolation of the Philippines:

We are a small weak nation, surrounded by the most populous races on earth, Christians among

\textsuperscript{1} "Our Asian Foreign Policy" (9 April 1949), in Historical Bulletin, Manila, March 1960, pp. 41-9. "Commencement address at the University of the Philippines (17 April 1951), Manila Times, 18 April 1951, p. 8."
non-Christians, westernized in Asia, conservative in the face of a continental revolution, clinging to a high standard of living among perenially starving masses,

he dwelt on the temporary nature of Philippine alliances with the West;

The abandonment of China and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact emphasize the tendencies which are already apparent in the Marshall Plan. No official announcement is necessary to inform us that the U.S. has reverted to its policy during the war of placing Europe before Asia,

he ridiculed the ingenuousness of Philippine policy:

We have fed upon the fancy that we are somehow the favourite children of America and that, she, driven by some strange predilection for our people, will never forsake us nor sacrifice our interests to her own or to those of others. What keen and unalloyed pleasure some of our countrymen would feel if we were living in the era of America's manifest destiny and dollar and Big Stick diplomacy. Unfortunately, our preferences have been disappointed by so prosaic a thing as geography and so indelicate a topic as race.

We ought not take all Recto's arguments at their face value. It is doubtful whether Quirino or Magsaysay, for example, were less conscious than Recto of the desirability of upholding Philippine independence. Besides, neither side would have questioned the need for the Republic to cultivate the friendship of the United States. Indeed, Recto held that the U.S. remained the best safeguard upon which the Philippines could rely: since radical opposition had been silenced, discussions rather turned on the scope of American
authority over the Philippines. Yet as far as the functioning of the alliance was concerned, Recto's opinions differed appreciably from the Philippine official line. By harping on the 'colonial mentality' of the Philippines, and by pressing for more negotiations with the great allies of the Republic, the senator saw opportunities for the continuous assertion of Philippine independence and for questioning American influence in the Philippines.

According to President Quirino, by contrast, the intimate and understanding alliance between the U.S. and the Philippines was a most significant departure from colonial practice, and it was in fact a source of international influence for the Philippines. It is not surprising therefore that, in the years following the Baguio Conference, Quirino had continued his efforts in the same direction: he wished to see in the Philippines-U.S. defence pact the promise of wider arrangements and he insisted that the course of events was leading to a version of that Pacific Union he had envisaged in 1949.

1 "As our neighbours have gained their well-deserved independence and sovereignty it is to the example of basic Philippine-American relations that they turn when they consider their departure from the colonial status", State of the Nation Message of President Quirino to the Congress of the Philippines, Official Gazette, January 1952, p. 58.
Philippine activity in Asia

On several occasions, Philippine diplomacy took fresh initiatives in order to establish some sort of a permanent machinery to link Asian states. The main efforts were aimed at Indonesia which, together with India, was emerging as a leading power in the concert of Asia's 'non-aligned' states. In 1951, President Sukarno who in all years to come would show great awareness of the Philippines, paid an official visit to the 'sister-Republic' (28 January-3 February). Despite stock references to fraternal feelings between the two peoples, he was careful to insist upon Indonesia's 'independent' foreign policy. The President of Indonesia addressed a poorly attended joint session of the Philippine Congress on the subject of Pantja Sila, the Five Principles guiding the Republic. The only result of the visit was the signature in Djakarta, a few months later, of a treaty of friendship between the two countries\footnote{Signed on 21 June 1951, R.P.T.S., vol. II, no. 1, pp. 131-3.}, and the decision to raise the legations to the level of embassies. The Philippine embassy in Djakarta remained, however, without titular head for long periods of time. It was only in 1952, after repeated inquiries from the Indonesian Foreign Office...
that President Quirino decided on a state visit to Indonesia.

The President of the Philippines was in Indonesia from 16 to 27 July 1952, a few days before the opening session of the 'Pacific Council' and at a time when rumours — hopefully entertained by the Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs, J.M. Elizalde — had it that the Hawaii Conference would transform the ANZUS treaty into a regional Pacific Pact.

President Quirino flew to Indonesia with political ambitions but found himself in the awkward situation of having to disarm Indonesian suspicions: 'I am not on a political or military mission. If at all, it is economic and cultural.'

Yet statements issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila averred that Philippine diplomacy was aiming at forging a 'chain of amity pacts with non-communist neighbours', in line with the President's proposals for a Pacific entente to preserve 'peace, security and freedom' in the region.

Though less bluntly expounded, the same theme occurred time and again in Quirino’s speeches during his tour of Java and Bali. There were references to 'friendship networks',

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1 Radio chat before departure for Indonesia, Manila Times, 16 July 1952, p. 2.
2 Ibid., 18 July 1952, pp. 1, 3.
coordination of efforts, partnership for the maintenance of peace and the production of plenty, etc. President Sukarno, on the other hand, reiterated his well-known preferences in the field of world affairs\textsuperscript{1}.

Quirino's visit to Indonesia should be seen in the perspective of a number of Philippine initiatives towards Asian countries, at a time when the idea of a regional arrangement seemed to be once again in the air. A treaty of friendship with India was signed in Manila on 11 July 1952 ('preparatory to the formation of a Pacific Union' asserted the \textit{Manila Bulletin}\textsuperscript{2}). Secretary Elizalde announced on 17 July that the Philippines would soon have diplomatic relations with Burma, and he instructed C.P. Romulo in Washington to open negotiations with the Ceylonese ambassador for the signature of a treaty of friendship\textsuperscript{3}.

Two incidents pointed, in a symbolic manner, to the failure of Philippine foreign policy to exert the sort of international influence it had pursued. First in chronological order is the already referred-to Pacific Council which

\begin{quotation}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Manila Times}, 18 July 1952, pp. 1, 3, and 22 July 1952, p. 2.
\item \textit{Manila Times}, 18 July 1952, pp. 1, 3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{quotation}
met without the Philippines. The second incident occurred in December 1953, when at Indian prompting, Premier J. Kotelawala of Ceylon extended an invitation for a conference on 'matters of common interest' to Asian heads of government. The original idea was to confine the meeting to the successor states to the British Empire in India, viz., Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan. It was pointed out, however, that Indonesia belonged to the same 'cultural area' and had also shaken off colonialism. Though several other states of the region fitted that definition, they were not invited to send representatives to the 'South-East Asian Prime Ministers Conference' which eventually met in Ceylon (28 April-2 May 1954)1.

Leon Ma. Guerrero, by then Under-secretary of foreign affairs, described the exclusion of the Philippines as a new evidence of the 'dramatic failure of a sterile and negative Asian policy'2. We will turn to President Quirino for drawing conclusions to his unsuccessful attempts to exercise a degree of authority in the international arena. In his farewell radio chat, after his defeat in the November 1953

2 Manila Times, 8 February 1954, p. 4.
elections, he examined the two main components of the 'free world''s structure of authority in Asia, the United States on the one hand, and the still infant movement for Asian solidarity on the other. The outgoing president was led to think that the Philippine-American relationship had been too close to allow the Philippines to carry enough weight in foreign affairs.

By a fluke of destiny we have developed a special relation with the West, particularly the U.S.A. This relation has created its own problems. We are not indifferent to its advantages... But over and above such advantages must remain the primacy of our nation's integrity. We should never again be, in form or essence, a dependency of any foreign power. This determines our usefulness to ourselves, to our neighbours and to the free world.¹

As far as relations with Asian neighbours went, the President stated his view that there existed a broad field, wide open for unlimited exploration and cultivation. He entertained no doubt that co-operation in various fields would be steadily built up among Asian states; this cannot be achieved overnight, 'but we should be happy to help hasten the move forward'.

The administration of President Quirino was confronted with great odds: social unrest and near economic collapse at home; strong regain of American influence in the Philippines;

establishment in China of a communist regime. Quirino's most original contribution, perhaps, was the keen interest he displayed in trying to bring about new alignments among emerging nations in Asia. Neither his western allies nor the most influential among the new Asian states welcomed an Asian policy so much out of proportion with Philippine resources: during the following years, Philippine diplomacy would cultivate far more modest aims.
CHAPTER IV

THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN, 1946-63
The policy of the Philippines towards Japan in the post-war period wavered between two objectives which, at times, conflicted. On the one hand, the Republic aimed at securing a substantial share of Japanese reparations through the imposition of harsh terms on the former enemy. On the other hand, Manila aimed at maintaining in the Far East an international environment favourable to Philippine interests, preferably through the removal of any trace of Japanese influence in the area but, if need be through the granting of a 'generous' peace to Japan. Using the terms coined by Arnold Wolfers one might speak of, respectively, possession goals and milieu goals: the Republic of the Philippines was out to increase its possessions and was competing with other powers for a share in a commodity of limited supply, namely, Japan's resources available for paying reparations. Yet the Republic was precluded from pursuing resolutely that 'possessive' policy by developments in the 'milieu' within which it was operating. After the victory of the Communists in China, it became increasingly clear that the United States's main

concerns in the Far East were to restore Japan to an honourable place in the international community and to ensure that Japan remain aligned with the 'free world' in international affairs. Certain small powers, including the Philippines, were anxious to operate in an environment where American influence was predominant, and this concern led them to grope for a solution which would strike a balance between their desires to (1) accommodate the United States, and (2) exact extensive advantages from a defeated Japan.

A punitive peace?

In the Philippines, hostility towards Japan stemmed from tangible factors. The end of the Pacific War found the islands in a sorry state of devastation. Not a single coconut-oil mill was operable, sugar mills had been destroyed, inter-island shipping was nonexistent, railways were gone, Manila, Cebu and Zamboanga were destroyed in proportions varying from 80 to 95 per cent¹. This list does not even mention the social unrest and banditry rampant in the countryside.

From such havoc arose the Philippine policy of pressing for a punitive peace with Japan, and in particular of claiming

a large quantity of reparations. Manila was led to follow that line by the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 by which the United States and Britain submitted that Japan should be allowed to maintain only such industries as would sustain her economy and permit the exaction of 'just reparations in kind'.

As soon as the war was over, the Allied Powers which had defeated Japan jockeyed to improve their positions of influence in the Far East. Suffice it here to mention that an international agreement proved necessary to regulate this competition. At Moscow, in December 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., with the concurrence of China, agreed upon terms of reference for a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and an Allied Council.

The FEC, meeting in Washington, was to have the authority to formulate the policies to be implemented by occupation authorities in Japan. The 'Big Four' joined the Commission with veto power, the U.S.A. being assured of a dominant position by its right to issue interim directives. Other members, unprivileged, were Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippine Commonwealth. Burma and Pakistan joined the Commission in 1949.

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1 Joint Communique of the Moscow Conference establishing the FEC and the Allied Council in *Department of State Bulletin*, 30 December 1945, pp. 1027-32. For background, see G.H.
The Allied Council, established in Tokyo with an advisory capacity, was open to representatives of the 'Big Four', viz., the British Commonwealth (with one delegate, representing jointly the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and India), China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S., the Supreme Commander (General D. MacArthur) or his representative acting as chairman with a controlling voice on most matters.

In the years preceding the peace treaty, the FEC offered Philippine diplomacy its most useful platform for the formulation and implementation of its policy towards Japan. In the Commission, the Filipino delegate, Carlos Romulo, seized all opportunities to press his case for putting an end to any Japanese claims to a role on the international stage. This policy was pursued in a number of ways. For example, when the question of allowing Japan some external contacts was brought before the FEC, the Philippines took the view that Japanese nationals should not be allowed to travel abroad or to attend any international conference. In January 1950, e.g., the Filipino and Soviet delegates to the Commission were alone in opposing the appointment overseas of Japanese trade agents\(^1\). As late as January 1952, at the Rangoon

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session of the ECAFE, the Philippine delegation alone voted against that part of a draft resolution which recommended the admission of Japan as an associate member of the Commission.\(^1\)

On all other questions, such as demilitarization of Japan, reducing the industrial potential of that country, authorizing fishing expeditions, etc., as well as in the sessions of the International Tribunal for the Far East, the Philippines regularly took a line strongly opposed to any lenient treatment of its former enemy. It was, however, in the question of reparations that Philippine diplomacy invested most of its efforts, so much so as to make of that negotiation its most important enterprise in foreign affairs.

Discussions on reparations loomed largest in the FEC's agenda. In June 1947, the Commission had agreed upon a 'Basic Post-Surrender Policy' according to which shares of Japanese reparations should be allocated to claimant countries by taking into account the scope of material and human destruction and damage suffered, and also by basing the estimates on a 'broad political basis'. Like the other representatives, C.P. Romulo filed his country's estimates of war damages. These amounted to the enormous figure of US$8,000 million (75

years of Philippine government expenditures at the 1946 level ... ): a Commission on Reparations, created on 1 November 1945, had estimated damages to private property at $5,000 million, while the government had a standing claim amounting to over $3,000 million for commandeered goods and services secured by the Japanese during the occupation through the issuance of military notes.¹

These figures, and those advanced by other governments, should not be taken at their face value. They are part of the manoeuvres, jockeyings, etc., which come into the picture once the stage for bargaining has to be set. In the case of the Philippine claims to Japanese reparations, we are dealing with a bargaining situation which did not include merely a question of dollars and cents, but was further complicated by a number of factors. Thus, the two main parties to an agreement (Japan and the Philippines) had to coordinate their expectations as to what would constitute a 'fair' settlement in terms of money, and moreover, they had to answer questions such as: How to reach agreement on the common gains to be expected by both sides? (re-entry into the international community for Japan, on terms advantageous for the Philippines).

¹ M.V. Bernardo, "Reparations - A Philippine View", Department of Foreign Affairs, Quarterly Review, Manila, May 1950, p. 11.
How to avoid concessions which would prejudice other negotiations? (Japanese reparations to other claimants, for example). How to accommodate the views of influential powers in that part of the world? What degree of support might either of the parties expect from, say, the United States?

Bargaining thus involves interpretations of what parties regard, sometimes tacitly, as a mutually advantageous place to compromise. Recent theoretical essays have brought forth useful insight into certain types of attitude encountered in bargaining situations. Thus, it might prove stimulating to examine protracted negotiations for Japanese reparations in terms of a continuum, and to investigate the various gradations from tacit bargaining, through situations of incomplete communication, up to fully fledged negotiations, which all allowed Japan and the Philippines to gain some of their ends.

In the first stage which extended until early 1949, Japan was not directly a party to the negotiations on reparations. It was in the FEC and its committees that representatives of the victorious powers tried to reach agreement on the total amount of reparations to be removed from Japan and on the percentage of this amount to be allocated to each country. In

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1946 and early 1947, inconclusive discussions were held on that subject and, on 2 April 1947, the United States government availed itself of its right to issue 'interim' directives. It unilaterally directed the SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) to start deliveries of advance transfers of Japanese reparations to four claimant countries, China, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the U.K. Under this programme, the Philippines would receive five per cent of the facilities and equipment which the FEC had already decided to be available for reparations removal. Up to the time advance transfers were terminated, the Philippines received from Japan ¥ (Pesos) 24,037,277 (US$12,018,638) worth of machine tools, laboratory apparatus, and other items removed from Japanese Army and Naval arsenals, as following:

TABLE A

Interim reparations received in Manila as of 15 May 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Machine tools</td>
<td>¥22,781,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Laboratory, testing and measuring equipment</td>
<td>306,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 'Residual' materials</td>
<td>949,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>¥24,037,277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One should add to this interim programme the proceeds in cash and in agricultural properties of the seizure of enemy

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properties in the Philippines which amounted to more than ₱10 million (US$5 million), as shown in the following table:

TABLE B
Japanese properties in the Philippines
Proceeds as of 23 April 1952

1. Agricultural lands, aggregate area of 45,600 hectares (mainly in Davao) ₱6,000,000
2. Proceeds of the sale of securities and 'other enemy properties' 4,500,000

Total: ₱10,500,000

Since 1947, a Philippine mission on reparations had been established in Tokyo to collaborate with SCAP for transfers of reparations to the Philippines. In February 1949, the mission pressed the home government to make representations in the FEC in order to accelerate the deliveries of reparations goods and, above all, to forestall an impending change in American policy.

U.S. policy and the peace settlement

By early 1949, however, the United States was already far engaged in a thorough reappraisal of its Japanese policy.

2 M.V. Bernardo, art. cit., p. 12.
Two years earlier, there had been indications that circles within the State Department, and General MacArthur himself, were envisaging that the future Japan should be neutralized - perhaps under U.N. guarantee, or under some sort of supervision by Allied Powers\(^1\); a proposal which bore striking similarities to pre-war American policy towards the Philippines. We have seen earlier (chapter I) that neutrality, when it is propounded and enforced by great powers, should be understood in terms of great power politics: in fact, a neutral Philippines as envisaged in the thirties would have hindered Japanese expansion in South-East Asia and would have granted a privileged position to the U.S. Indeed, when speaking of neutrality (that recurring theme in contemporary Asian politics) one should further ask: neutral 'against' whom? neutral 'for' whom? In General MacArthur's opinion, nothing in Japanese neutrality should preclude the U.S. from keeping a privileged position in the area. Yet in Washington the military departments were bent on securing more advantages than any neutral Japan could have conceivably granted them. Their opinion eventually prevailed when it became clear that the emergence of an economically sound and friendly Japan

would promise the U.S. a position of strength in the Pacific, despite the 'loss' of China to the Communists.

By 1948-1949, plans for neutralizing Japan thus faded away, and the United States gradually began a policy of relaxing restrictions and controls over Japanese trade and industry: 'recovery' became the key word. In line with this lenient approach, the American representative to the FEC announced on 12 May 1949 that further reparations would jeopardize the recovery programme carried out in Japan, and that his government had accordingly decided to bring to an end the advance transfers programme.

This statement and the ensuing protests from allied countries mark an important turning point in the overall picture of Japanese reparations. In the FEC, on 19, 26 and 31 May 1949, Romulo took the U.S. to task for what he saw as a flagrant repudiation of American commitments under the Potsdam Declaration:

The Commission does not need, I am sure, to be told with what jubilation the news of the new United States policy was received in Japan. Nor need I tell you, Mr Chairman, that in Manila the same news was received with dismay, even with bitterness. I can recall, Sir, only one instance in recent years of a news report which created jubilation in Tokyo and consternation in Manila, and that was the news of the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.\(^1\)

\(^1\)G.H. Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
This oratory, and other sections of the speech covered in effect an important question, directed to the U.S. and also, albeit obliquely, to Japan: To what extent will the U.S. support its allies in their quest for 'just' reparations?

The answer of the American government came on June 10, and Ambassador Romulo rejoined by a statement in which he announced that his government took note, among others, of the following points:

- That it is not true that the U.S. feels greater concern for the welfare of its late enemy than for the just reparations claims of its allies,...
- That the Philippines, like any of the Allied countries, continues to have "the authority to claim reparations", and the right and responsibility to submit its own reparations claims.1

Thus the stage was set for the next phase of the negotiations, in the sense that there was an implication of bi-lateral Philippine-Japanese negotiations at some later stage. The U.S., main wielder of authority in the area, had made it clear to all and sundry (Japan included) that it had set low limits on any claim for Japanese reparations. The Philippines for its part rested assured that further negotiation on the reparations issue was not opposed by the U.S. Moreover, by conceding on the point of advanced transfers, Manila announced a reappraisal of the 'milieu goals' of

Philippine policy. Over and above the goal of keeping Japan in an inferior position, the Philippines aimed at making sure that the U.S. would maintain its position of authority in the Far East, even at the cost of a generous treatment of Japan. This basic choice would linger over the rest of the negotiations.

After the discussion of the U.S. statement of May 1949, the FEC did not consider any more the question of reparations, and it was left to the drafters of the peace treaty with Japan to further investigate the matter.

Through 1950, the new American policy towards Japan progressively took shape. As seen earlier, a decisive step was the appointment, on 18 May 1950, of John F. Dulles as foreign policy adviser to President Truman, with the assignment of negotiating a treaty of peace with Japan. Dulles lost no time and soon embarked on an extensive series of discussions in Japan, in the United States, and in several allied countries in order to step up the negotiation of a treaty.

In the meantime, there were indications of the re-entry of occupied Japan in the family of nations, such as the signature in 1950 of barter-trade agreements between SCAP, acting on behalf of Japan, and a number of countries. On 18 May 1950, for example, the Philippines and SCAP signed three interdependent agreements establishing an interim arrangement for
the conduct of trade on a barter basis. Upon recovering its sovereignty in 1952, Japan entered a convention with the Philippines for continuing barter trade between the two countries: pending a formal agreement on trade, the two countries agreed by exchange of notes on quarterly extensions of the barter trade provisions. Under these agreements, the Philippines resumed a profitable trade, exporting to Japan abaca, logs, copra, ores, etc., and importing Japanese machinery, steel, fishing boats, etc.

The Philippines and the Japanese Peace Treaty

The Philippine-SCAP arrangements did not imply that Manila readily envisaged the resumption of peace-time intercourse with Japan. In the course of a tour of the Far East in February 1951, Dulles found bitterness in the Philippines: 'the mood is like that of the French at the end of World War I'. Dulles' observation tallies with those of other commentators on Philippine public sentiment. The policy of exacting huge reparations from Japan was 'popular', there being the misrepresentation of reparations as a large sum of

2 Address over CBS on 1 March 1951, Department of State Bulletin, 12 March 1951, pp. 403-7.
cash to be widely distributed (an image totally at variance with the actual turn of events)¹.

As already mentioned, Dulles made efforts to modify some features of the American version of a peace treaty in the sense wished by several of the U.S.' allies. Romulo, Philippine delegate to the San Francisco Conference of September 1951, pointed out, however, that 'there was lacking in the case of the present treaty the satisfying sense of actual participation in the act of drafting'². In fact, until a few weeks before the conference, it remained doubtful whether the Philippines would be a party to a peace which it felt to be 'soft' on Japan, at the expense of the small powers only. In particular, the Republic vigorously objected to any form of rearmament in Japan. In this respect, the signature of a chain of security pacts in the Pacific went a long way towards appeasing the Philippines, although the possible resurgence of a militarily strong Japan represented a drastic departure from an established Philippine policy, namely to bar Japan from any opportunity for playing anew an influential

² Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, September 4-8, 1951, Record of Proceedings, Department of State Publication 4392, December 1951, p. 232.
role in Asian affairs: as Romulo put it in San Francisco, the first basic objective of Philippine policy towards Japan was 'to make certain that Japan, through genuine political and economic reform, will never again be a menace to the Philippines and other countries'. As a practical step in that direction, the Philippines suggested that some sort of international supervision be kept over the political institutions and the system of education of Japan.

On the question of reparations, the Republic had found unacceptable the first draft of the peace treaty as it had been circulated in July 1951: Art. 14 of this draft read (emphasis added):

It is recognized that, although Japan should in principle pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war, nevertheless Japan lacks the capacity, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make adequate reparation to the Allied Powers and at the same time meet its other obligations.

The revised draft in what was regarded in Manila as a signal achievement of Philippine diplomacy, simply stated:

Art. 14 - It is recognized that Japan should pay reparation to the Allied Powers...

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1 Ibid., p. 226.
2 First draft in Department of State Bulletin, 23 July 1951, pp. 132-8; revised version, ibid., 27 August 1951, pp. 349-55.
The same article stipulated that Japan would promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers 'so desiring' so as to work out a formula for compensation of the damages caused during the war. At this stage, the bargaining situation of Japan and the Philippines reached a new turning point, as was tellingly illustrated by the performance of the Philippine delegation at San Francisco.

Outwardly, the delegation kept to its unyielding stand. Its demands were enormous: on 15 July 1951, a Presidential Committee headed by Salvador Araneta, economic coordinator of Quirino's cabinet, had announced a plan (soon adopted as the official policy of the Philippines) under which Japan would pay the entire Philippine claim of US$8,000 million over a 25-year period. To the conference, Romulo read an incriminatory statement and made it clear to the nations represented (and particularly to the United States and Japan) that, as far as the Philippines was concerned, the past had not been buried yet:

We are eager that the fangs of hatred shall be buried forever between us [sic], but before this is done, before we extend the hand of forgiveness and brotherhood, we shall await some clear sign from you of spiritual contrition and renewal.1

1 Conference for the Conclusion..., op. cit., p. 233.
This we might call a tacit stage of the negotiation, wherein the Philippines was aiming at formulating the problem of reparations in terms most favourable to itself ('signs of contrition' must come from the other party). Simultaneously, members of the delegation were meeting Japanese officials and trying to assess Japanese intentions; we have reached here an explicit stage of the negotiation.

At Secretary Acheson's prompting, the Japanese Premier, Shigeru Yoshida, had visited the delegations of Indonesia and the Philippines to impress upon them Japan's good faith in fulfilling the provisions of Art. 14\(^1\). Later on, answering a series of questions put forth by the Indonesian representative in plenary meeting, Yoshida formally restated that Japan would pay 'adequate' reparations to claimant countries, and that the amount and nature of these reparations would be determined in the course of bilateral negotiations\(^2\).

Immediately after attending the conference, a member of the Philippine delegation, Diosdado Macapagal, stopped over in Tokyo where he had talks with Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda. There were conflicting reports on the issue of the


\(^2\) _Conference for the Conclusion..._, op. cit., p. 278.
meeting, some Japanese newspapers assuring that Ikeda had displayed a 'firm' attitude, while others maintained that Macapagal had received assurances of fair treatment\(^1\).

On 8 September 1951, the Philippine delegates signed the San Francisco treaty. In Manila, however, Congress declined to ratify the document. It has been pointed out that partisan considerations complicated the issue, since in the midst of the discussion of the treaty the Senate had passed under the control of the opposition Nacionalista Party\(^2\). Yet the point should be made that the Quirino administration did not find it difficult to obtain a unanimous (20-0) vote on the mutual defence treaty\(^3\). Beyond any party rivalry, it seems rather that the arguments put forward by President E. Quirino himself and by Foreign Secretary J.M. Elizalde simply did not rally enough support. In short, the arguments for ratification displayed concern for the safeguard of existing alignments in the Far East, while at the same time avowing little confidence in the effectiveness of any Philippine attempt at modifying those alignments.

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3. Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 2 Congress, 3 session, 12 May 1952, p. 1168 (Senate).
The administration's recognition that the gap was widening between some of the milieu and possession goals of the Republic could hardly be called a 'popular' view. As Elizalde skilfully expounded it to the Senate's committee on foreign relations, the main object of the treaty was to 'consolidate the democratic front against communism', a milieu goal par excellence. Through ratification, it was argued, the Philippines would give fresh evidence of its alignment with the 'free world'. This, in turn, would be accomplished at the expense of expectations of large payments of Japanese reparations to countries like the Philippines. Elizalde alleged that this concession would be partly made up by expanding trade opportunities with Japan and also by the promise of American liberality to the most faithful followers of Washington's policies. Besides, the Foreign Secretary was of the opinion that the Philippines was not in a position to drive a hard bargain with Japan, and could not possibly expect better terms.

The opponents of ratification for their part dwelt on the insufficient provisions for reparations (in cash particularly) and disputed the view that Japan would align itself with the

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1 Statement of Foreign Secretary J.M. Elizalde to the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, 4 April 1952, R.P.T.S., vol. II, no. 1, pp. 87-95.
western camp. In both Spanish and English, Claro Recto, who had taken his seat in the Senate a few weeks earlier, made a forceful exposure of the long-range implications of Japan's resurgence as a military power. Sooner or later, argued Recto, America would lose her interest in Asia and Japan would then resume its expansionist policies:

The Americans and ourselves would be as innocent as doves, in the language of the gospel, to believe that 2,600 years of martial and imperial pride, based on the fanatical faith of predestined leadership, which is the hard core of the Yamato race, were washed away by the billions of dollars poured into Japan by the United States and the benevolent and generous baptism administered by John Foster Dulles in San Francisco.¹

Philippines-Japan negotiations

The Philippine Senate declined to ratify the Peace Treaty as long as the reparations issue remained unsettled. In order to reach an accord, Japan and the Philippines entered the stage of explicit bargaining in which each party tried to assess the other's intentions through direct or sometimes tacit communication; for more than three years, negotiations were on and off again in Tokyo and Manila.

Under the Yoshida regime, Japan's policy in Asia maintained a substantial degree of dependence on the U.S. The

¹Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 2 Congress, 3 session, 7 May 1952, p. 1054 (Senate).
main concern seems to have been to make some economic inroads in South-East Asia, while abstaining from 'political' initiatives. In 1955 and 1956, however, under the Hatoyama government, Japanese policies veered towards a more active interest in Asian affairs, an orientation scrutinized with intense distrust by the socialist opposition. A conference of Japanese diplomatic representatives convened in Tokyo in January 1956 and heard Foreign Minister Shigemitsu expound the view that an early settlement of all reparations claims would be a prerequisite step to the re-entry of Japan in the Asian scene.

Little progress had been made in that direction, although in 1952 India and Nationalist China had signed treaties of peace with Japan, waiving the benefit of reparations. The rounds of talks were thus important when seen in the perspective of an array of similar negotiations with other Asian powers. Moreover, there seems to have been the understanding that the Philippines would receive the largest share of Japanese payments, with Indonesia at a point somewhere between the Philippines and Burma. Hence, the realization grew on Japanese negotiators that the Philippines was a

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test case, and that a concession to Manila would prejudice Japan's position in other negotiations.

For the sake of brevity, the following table will highlight the main stages of the drawn-out Philippine-Japanese negotiations. On the Philippine side, one will notice the role of 'fact-finding' missions (June 1953 and May 1954) in providing practical suggestions to the Philippine government. More reasonable expectations, and the realization growing on both parties that a solution ought to be found without much further delay, eventually led to an outcome on 9 May 1956. Art. 1 and 2 of the agreement provided that Japan would supply the Republic of the Philippines with 'the services of the Japanese people and the products of Japan in the form of capital goods' for a total value of $550 million, on an annual average of $25 million during the first ten years, and of $30 million during the following ten years. Some provisions were made in exchanges of notes accompanying the agreement: in particular, (1) long-term loans of $250 million would be extended to the Philippines on a commercial basis, (2) of

the $550 million referred to in Art. 1 of the agreement, $20 million would be credited to the Philippine government for use in Japan (administrative arrangement permitting the Philippine government to receive pesos, without payment by the Japanese government in actual cash), $30 million would be allocated to the payment of services, and the remaining $500 million to capital goods. (3) Japan was released from its obligations to the amount of $6,559,507, paid by the Japanese government for making the survey of sunken vessels.

Some disappointment was expressed in the Philippines, but resignation prevailed. The chairman of the Philippine panel to the talks, Felino Neri, seems to have captured the prevailing mood when he declared that:

The Philippines is aware that these terms do not provide anything like complete restoration of its losses and relief of its injury. Its acceptance of the settlement...was actuated by the belief that such a course would be to the best interest of the two peoples and of the area in which they live.

2 Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3rd Congress, 3rd special session, 16 July 1956, p. 360 (Senate).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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</table>
|                | **Philippine position:**  
|                | - total claim for P16,159,247,959  
|                | - payable in 10-15 years  
|                | - immediate deliveries of interim reparations  
|                | **Japanese position:**  
|                | - takes note of the Philippine claim  
|                | - offer to survey sunken vessels, as 'interim reparations' |
| 28 Apr. 1952  | The Philippine mission accredited to SCAP is accredited as an agency of the Philippine government to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. |
| 27-29 Oct. 1952 | Visit of Assistant Secretary of State J. Allison. The Philippine government makes use of his good offices to urge the Japanese government to set a target date for the beginning of negotiations. |
| 24 Nov. 1952  | In a speech at the opening session of the Diet, Premier Yoshida announces his government's intention to give 'serious consideration to the settlement of the reparations problem'. |
| 20-23 Dec. 1952 | Eiji Wajima, official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, makes a sounding out visit to Manila. He submits a list of services (including salvage of sunken vessels) which Japan is ready to render as part of reparations. The Philippines would provide funds for the purchase of necessary raw materials. |
12 Feb. 1953  Secretary Elizalde suggests Philippine demands should not take into account the $8,000 million figure.

12 Mar. 1953  Signature of an interim agreement on reparations concerning the salvage of sunken vessels between the Philippines and Japan.

6 July 1953  The Philippine government turns over the custody of 114 Japanese war prisoners to the Japanese government.

30 Sep. 1953  Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki arrives in Manila in the course of a goodwill visit to the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma, main claimant countries. He mentions a total amount of $250–300 million, in services and capital goods.

15 Apr. 1954  Vice-President Carlos P. Garcia and Katsumi Ohno, head of the Japanese mission in Manila, announce that preliminary agreement has been reached on an amount of $400 million in reparations, 'with an estimated total value of $1,000 million accruing to the Philippines'.

17 Apr. 1954  Arrival in Manila of a special Japanese delegation to sign the agreement.

20 Apr. 1954  A coalition group of 19 senators insists upon a minimum payment of $1,000 million. President Magsaysay retracts his favourable stand towards the agreement.

May 1954  President Magsaysay appoints a fact-finding mission to ascertain Japan's capacity to pay reparations. The subsequent report mentions that Japan is capable of paying more than $400 million in goods and services.

5 Nov. 1954  Japan signs a reparations agreement and a peace treaty with Burma. It agrees to pay Burma $200 million in goods and services and $50 million in the form of investment in joint Burmese-Japanese enterprises.
President Magsaysay sends a personal message to Prime Minister Hatoyama, suggesting the opening of new negotiations. Japan agrees.

Beginning of Philippine-Japanese negotiations in Tokyo.

Ambassador Felino Neri, Philippine representative to the Tokyo talks, announces that the $800 million formula reached with the Japanese negotiator in Tokyo, Minister of State, Tatsunosuki Takasaki, is acceptable to the Philippine government.

Beginning of salvage operations under the March 1953 agreement.

The Hatoyama Cabinet rejects the payment of $20 million in cash as provided in the June 1955 agreement.

Ambassador Neri denies press reports from Tokyo that the Philippine government is willing to renegotiate the terms of the reparations agreement, despite opposition in Japan.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu announces decision to reach an early settlement of all reparations claims.

President Magsaysay appoints a Philippine panel for formal negotiation of reparations, following the draft initialled by the technical groups in 1955.

Signature in Manila of the reparations agreement with Japan, providing $550 million in direct reparations and $250 million in long-term loans.

Ratification by the Japanese parliament of the reparations agreement.

The Philippine Senate ratifies (19-3-1) the reparations agreement, and (18-3) the peace treaty with Japan.

Exchange of documents in Tokyo.
Implementation

The terms obtained by the Philippines were by no means disadvantageous when they are compared with the amounts Japan is under obligation to pay to Burma ($200 million), Thailand (£st5,400,000), Indonesia ($223,080,000), South Viet-Nam ($39 million), Laos (¥1,000 million), and Cambodia (¥1,500 million)\(^1\). The following table illustrates Philippine receipts during the first years following the agreement:

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\text{TABLE D}
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Reparations received from Japan (1957-1962)
in millions of dollars\(^2\)

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Capital goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government sector</td>
<td>16.65</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>16.43</td>
<td>35.68</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>20.70</td>
<td>23.36</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>38.69</td>
<td>9.88</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total:</strong></td>
<td>125.38</td>
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</tbody>
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\(^1\) See, respectively, U.N.T.S., vol. 251, pp. 201-43 (Burma); vol. 230, pp. 13-17 (Thailand); vol. 324, pp. 248-69 (Indonesia); vol. 373, pp. 128-47 (South Viet-Nam); vol. 341, pp. 26-31 (The Agreement on Economic and Technical co-operation between Japan and Laos, Tokyo, 15 October 1958, provided for Japanese grants, "Considering that Laos has renounced all its claims for reparation against Japan"). Similar provision in the Japan-Cambodia agreement of 2 March 1959, vol. 341, pp.165-77

To relate these figures to Philippine standards, it is worth noting that the total value of reparations goods and services which, by 30 September 1962, had reached Manila under the 1956 agreement amounted to P250,091,396\(^1\), were representing about 2.5 per cent of the Philippine government revenue during those years.

Offhand one would be tempted to regard the flow of Japanese reparations as constituting an advantageous programme of foreign aid. In the first place, the prospect of annual schedules spread over a period of 20 years seemed to offer exceptional opportunities for long-range planning. Moreover, in the case of reparations payments, no foreign agency is endowed with a veto power over the proposals submitted by, say, the Philippine government, and there is none of that corroding effect on national pride which foreign assistance may occasionally entail.

Yet the Philippines has hardly taken advantage of these appealing conditions: in fact, the implementation of the reparations agreement points to some glaring ambiguities of the concept of national interest in a 'developing' nation. In a study of The Idea of National Interest, an American

\(^1\) As quoted in E.F. Basco, "Report on Reparations", Philippine Economy Bulletin, Nov.-Dec. 1962, p. 45. At the exchange rate of 1962, the figure amounts to $64,126,000.
historian, Charles Beard, has tried to set out in systematic form the meaning of that term in U.S. policies. He suggested that there were two main conceptions, which he called Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian, by which influential sections of the community laid rational foundations for the use of the machine of state in order to further their special interests abroad. Under the 'Hamiltonian' scheme of thought, in particular, it was argued that the whole weight of the Federal Government, including its military resources, should be thrown into the promotion of the interests of American traders.

A similar philosophy may be traced in the Philippine view of how to make use of the reparations bounty. As it turned out, the diplomatic resources of the Republic, as well as all support available in the international arena were employed for the benefit of a restricted elite. On 21 June 1957, the Philippine Congress passed an act (R.A.1789), known as the Reparations Law, which set lofty aims for the utilization of reparations goods and services:

It shall be the policy of the Government of the Philippines to utilize all reparations payments in such a manner as shall ensure the maximum possible economic benefit to the Filipino people and in as equitable and widespread a manner as possible.

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Sect. 2, 3, 4 and 14 of the law provided that preferences in the procurement of reparations goods be left to private entrepreneurs and that terms of purchase be as liberal as was consistent with the 'national interest'. On several occasions, however, the allotment of reparations goods became a very 'hot' issue on the always lively political scene of the Republic. In a country where the government commands an extensive influence by its control over a number of profitable careers, contracts, 'pork barrel' allocations, etc., it is hardly surprising that especially during the first years, quantities of Japanese reparations were channeled to a fortunate few who could take advantage of their close connections within the ruling administrations. From July 1956 to December 1958, for example, only 13 firms and individuals shared the private sector's allocations of reparations. It should be pointed out, however, that Japanese reparations play an important part in boosting the import capacity of the Philippines. Moreover, the relative importance of reparations deliveries may be expected to increase if the current downtrend in foreign aid payments to the Philippines continues unabated.

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Philippines-Japan, 1957-63

In the following chapters (V-VI) we will see that the Philippines, particularly under the Garcia administration (1957-61) was anxious to promote solidarity on a regional scale among Asian allies of the west. During the same period, Japan, for its part, made fresh attempts at re-establishing itself as an ordinary member of the society of states and, in particular, at regaining a position of influence in Asia. In December 1956, Japan entered the United Nations and, in the same month it resumed formal relations with the Soviet Union. 1957 was the 'Asian year' as far as Japan was concerned: Nobusuke Kishi, who had become Prime Minister in February of that year, had made it clear that the 'Asia-Pacific area was the central arena for Japanese diplomacy'. The philosophy behind that policy line seemed to be that Japan, though basically a member of the society of economically advanced states, had a special role to play on the Asian stage. A significant step in this regard was the decision of Premier Kishi to tour South and South-East Asia.

It did not escape notice in Japan that the tour took precedence over a visit to the United States. In his first

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goodwill visit, the Japanese Premier called in Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Thailand and Taiwan (24 May-4 June 1957). Later in the year (19 November-8 December) he embarked on a tour of South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya and Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. In all places, he pressed the case for a 'Southeast Asia Development Fund' which would harness Japanese technical capacities to financial aid (mainly American) for the development of South-East Asia's natural resources. The 'Kishi Plan' was designed as an effective way of preventing 'communist subversion' in the area.

In the course of those tours, Premier Kishi called in to Manila on 6-7 December 1957. The solution brought in 1956 to the reparations issue had apparently opened the door for the resumption of normal intercourse between the two countries. Yet the reception granted Kishi was distinctly cold. There were no large crowds, no school children with flags, and Arsenio Lacson, the popular Mayor of Manila, was not on hand to present the keys to the city.

The press reported that Premier Kishi's main concerns were to discuss his economic co-operation scheme with Filipino officials, to press for the early conclusion of a treaty of

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commerce and navigation, and to suggest the relaxation of all restrictions placed upon Japanese nationals in the Philippines. In the joint communique issued after the talks, Kishi assured the Philippine President that Japan would implement 'smoothly and in good faith' the reparations agreement (a matter which, of late, had given rise to some discontent in the Philippines), and he promised 'favourable consideration' on the questions of diverting reparations funds into some important projects, such as the construction of a hydro-electric plant in the Manila area ('Marikina Multi-Purpose Project'). President Garcia, for his part, announced 'favourable consideration' on the issue of travel restrictions. He also gave tokens of goodwill by promising to assist in the recovery of the remains of Japanese war dead. 'Full study' would be made of the Kishi plan.

A year elapsed, however, before any marked improvement became apparent in Philippine-Japanese relations. In 1958-61, President Garcia undertook a series of goodwill visits to pro-western countries in the Far East and South-East Asia. His first visit was to Japan (1-6 December 1958); addressing the Diet, Garcia made the point that the wisest course of

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action would be for Japan and the Philippines to renew cordial relations. The President observed:

It is a happy coincidence that my trip is being made close to the Christmas season which in my country and the rest of Christendom is the season for reconciliation, for forgiving and forgetting.¹

In line with what seemed to herald a new policy, negotiations were started in June 1959 on Japanese draft proposals for an overall treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation. Since 1950 trade between the two countries had been governed by barter trade agreements, extended 19 times until 31 July 1957; from 1 August 1957 on all transactions were conducted on a cash basis in U.S. currency; on 7 January 1958, finally, a trade protocol had provided for non discrimination in import regulations and customs duties².

Some familiar patterns of the reparations negotiations recurred during the Japanese-Philippine trade discussions. It was hoped in Japan that a trade agreement would lead to similar arrangements with other countries in South-East Asia, a feature which reminds one of the intersecting negotiations for reparations carried on simultaneously with several claimants. In the Philippines, on the other hand, there was the lingering feeling that the 're-entry' of Japan into the Far

¹ Mainichi, 3 December 1958, p. 1.
East should be made as difficult as possible, and the conversations were soon called off.

Foreign Secretary Serrano was among the most outspoken advocates of this 'tough' line. In 1960, he still held the view (expounded by Recto years earlier) that the United States could not depend on Japan in the event of a shooting war with the communists in Asia. As he put it to American diplomats convened in Baguio, the U.S. was 'neglecting its friends in Asia, including the Philippines, while pouring aid into Japan'\(^1\).

Formal trade negotiations resumed in Manila on 23 February 1960. Again Japan presented a draft. This time the negotiations were slowed down by what appeared to be technical unpreparedness on the Philippine side, compounded with personal rivalries between Serrano and Jose Laurel, Jr., chairman of the Philippine panel.

Adjourned for a time, negotiations were resumed in Tokyo (18 April 1960), and once again suspended, by order of President Garcia. During this series of negotiations, the main stumbling blocks were the question of the 'most favoured nation', the immigration of Japanese nationals into the Philippines, and the problem of territorial waters. As far

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\(^1\) *Japan Times*, 17 March 1960, p. 2.
as the Philippines was concerned, those three issues boiled down to the fear of highly competitive Japanese enterprises taking advantage of any concession on the Philippine side. Despite the conclusion of the treaty on 9 December 1960, neither President Garcia nor President Macapagal have judged the terms satisfactory: so far (May 1964) there is no sign that the treaty might be ratified by the Philippine Senate.

Conclusion

In the history of post-war intercourse between Japan and South-East Asia, Philippine-Japanese relations stand out for the bitterness and the intensity with which the Philippines has pursued its claims against its former enemy. Three inter-related factors seem to account best for Philippine vindictiveness.

First, when the Pacific war broke out in December 1941, the Philippine Commonwealth was a prospective member of the society of independent states. Definite plans had been drawn for the forthcoming independence of the Islands; internally, the Philippines enjoyed a very substantial degree of autonomy; the U.S. and the Philippine Commonwealth were

agreed on a general course of foreign policy for the future Republic, namely, a pro-American neutrality to be established with the agreement of Japan. Indeed Tokyo itself indicated that it was ready to accept that formula. Thus, whereas in other South-East Asian countries such as Malaya or Indonesia, the war seemed directed mainly against the colonial powers, the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese troops appeared, by contrast, as an attack against an independent Asian country: nationalistic feelings flared up throughout the Philippines, armed resistance flourished, and for many years after the end of the war, anti-Japanese sentiment remained strong in Filipino popular opinion.

Secondly, as seen from Manila, the international situation in the Far East following the surrender of Japan was very favourable. Filipinos wishfully hoped that, because of their close connection with the U.S. - the leading power in the area - huge material benefits would accrue to their country from Japanese defeat, and that they could well afford to be intractable. Though this belief was seriously shaken by the friendly attitude which the U.S. developed towards

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As late as 24 March 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka declared that Japan was ready at any moment to join the U.S. in a guarantee of the territorial integrity or independence of the Philippines, *Foreign Relations of the U.S., Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, Washington 1943, p. 144.
Japan, it remains that some Philippine expectations were vindicated: we have seen that American pressures were occasionally exercised upon Japan to secure generous reparations payments to countries like Indonesia and the Philippines.

A third compounding factor of Philippine intransigence became apparent during the trade negotiations, though it had figured also in the question of reparations, namely, the distrust which lingers in dealings between under-developed and advanced countries. Filipinos fear that Japan might gain disproportionate advantage of any accord with an economically backward country like the Philippines.

These three factors explain why the Philippines has tried to take full advantage of the relatively weak international position of Japan and has proved to be an intransigent party at the conference table.
CHAPTER V

THE PHILIPPINES AND ASIA: CLIENT-STATE POLICY, 1954-1961
Both the Geneva truce agreements, which, in July 1954, brought the Indochinese war to a halt, and SEATO, the collective defence treaty signed in Manila barely two months later, displayed features which for several years to come were to shape international politics in South-East Asia. The arrangements of Geneva and Manila were not unrelated, since the self-proclaimed aim of the latter was to guarantee the settlement reached through the former. Yet Geneva and Manila represent two widely diverging types of international settlement. Whereas the Geneva accords aimed at regulating and curtailing by common agreement (but not abolishing) the interventions of all great powers in the former Associated States, the Manila Treaty, by contrast, aimed at putting on a legitimate footing the interference in South-East Asian affairs of some great powers (the three Western allies, the United States, Britain and France) and of certain of their smaller allies (Australia and New Zealand).

Geneva and Manila are types: similar settlement have become a recurring feature in South-East Asian affairs, to wit the settlement of the Laotian question in 1962 (a 'Geneva' approach to an international conflict), or in 1963 the
creation out of Malaya and the Borneo territories of a state guaranteed by western powers (a 'Manila' approach to a case of decolonization).

These two types of international settlement were bound to exercise a decisive influence on the foreign policies of the small powers located in that region. By joining SEATO, for example, the Philippines as well as the other signatories of the treaty served fresh notice of their commitment to what may broadly be called a western orientation of their policies. On the other hand, such a commitment carried implications on the global stage of world politics. To the great powers which were at the core of SEATO were left the chief concern with extra-regional, global security. The overlapping membership of some of these states in a number of regional organizations has facilitated informal consulations among the leading powers of the western camp.

On the other hand, SEATO and similar regional organizations were established to narrow the gap between the general concern of great powers with world-wide influence, and the facts of power in a particular area, such as South-East Asia¹.

¹ Although in a slightly different context, see G. Liska's observations on the consistency of regionalism with global organization: International Equilibrium, Harvard U.P., 1957, chapter 5, pp. 133 ff.
On a broad political basis, western powers saw their connection with SEATO as a means to assert their interest and their authority in South-East Asian affairs. At the same time, through membership in SEATO, they found it easier to assert their influence on an ad hoc basis as well, say, to rally votes in the U.N. There are, moreover, certain fields of activity which are less readily accessible to direct interference by great powers: no western power was invited to the Bandung Conference of 1955, for instance. In those cases, leading powers may find it convenient to encourage their client-states to play an active role on behalf of an international alignment, such as the 'free world'.

In short, the Philippine membership in SEATO has offered some opportunities for such initiatives on the regional scene as economic or cultural co-operation, political intervention in regional affairs, etc. The central question of this chapter is: what type of initiative did SEATO encourage among its Asian partners?

As was suggested earlier in this dissertation, one may conceive of several types of small powers' policies. These would range from a pole of subservience to leading powers, to a pole of escapism from great power politics. It is the argument of this chapter that some intervention of the Philippines in Asian affairs, during that SEATO era of 1954-1961, are
best understood in terms of client state policy. On the imaginary scale of subservience mentioned above, there is a difference in degree between satellites, client states, and followers. All indicate a degree of subservience to leading powers, the client standing mid-way as it were between the satellite and the follower.

Followers give indications of escapism from the leader's policies: they want to demonstrate their autonomy. Satellites and clients, by contrast, gravitate round their leaders: the connection with the leading power is the crucial feature of their policies. At the centre of this client state-leading state connection there are devices through which hegemonic powers convey their influence to the ruling circles of their client allies. This device may be economic in character. Or it may take the form of political or military treaties and other international agreements which legitimize the great power's authority. In the first part of this chapter, we will briefly review some aspects of the special relationship between the United States and the Philippines under the administrations of Presidents Magsaysay and Garcia. The Philippine connection with SEATO is a good example of this relationship.

Our main purpose, however, is to examine the relevance of a client relationship to the wider field of foreign policy:
how did the Philippine connection with the U.S. and with SEATO influence its Asian policy? To answer this question, we will examine successively how membership in SEATO carried implications for Philippine policies in the U.N., in the Afro-Asian bloc, and in regional policies.

In a subsequent chapter (VI) we will examine the follower's features of Philippine policy, as distinct from its client aspects. No doubt both strands are sometimes hopelessly entangled, and a dividing line is often hard to draw. On the whole, however, President Magsaysay (1954-1957) seemed disposed to stress the client features of Philippine foreign policy and to tone down most of the criticism levelled by some Filipinos at the 'special' Philippine-US. relationship. After Magsaysay's tragic death in March 1957, the administration of President Garcia (1957-1961) proved more restive in this respect. Its policies carried nationalistic overtones and seemed aimed at demonstrating that the interests of the Philippines were indeed distinguishable from those of the U.S. However, the present chapter (V) will deal mainly, but not solely, with the Magsaysay era.
The Philippine-American connection

Writing in 1952, a Filipino observer noted that 'sometimes, even since the achievement of Philippine independence, American "tutelage" has reached extremes reminiscent of the "colonial period"'. He then pointed to the sweeping reorganization of the Philippine Army and the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defence in 1950 as two measures inspired by the U.S. Two years later, there was fresh evidence of keen U.S. interest in Philippine affairs. In 1953, the U.S. threw its weight behind Magsaysay's campaign as candidate of the Nacionalista Party to the presidency. This support took different forms; American business interests in the Philippines contributed $250,000 to the Nacionalista Party; a councillor of the United States Embassy, W. Lacy, and a colonel of the U.S. Air Force, E. Landsdale, gave daily advice to Magsaysay; on election day in November 1953, JUSMAG (Joint United States Military Advisory Group) detached personnel to 'observe' the conduct of the polls, while American warships were anchored in Manila Bay.

2 The most candid account of these interferences is in Time Magazine, 23 November 1953, pp. 22-3. President Quirino
Eventually Ramon Magsaysay won, by Philippine standards, a resounding victory, as he received 2,913,000 votes against 1,314,000 for Elpidio Quirino. While the new president seemed assured of substantial popular support, he could also depend on the full weight of American influence in the country. For example, soon after Magsaysay's election, funds proposed by the U.S. executive for military assistance were increased from $15 million to $20 million, as an expression of confidence in his administration. For his part, Magsaysay continued placing considerable reliance on the American Embassy and on other American officials in Manila: in the words of the President's press secretary, J.V. Cruz, the period was one of 'heavy intrusion of Americans of all description in Malacanang'.

American influence was not felt in the strictly political field only. A distinctive feature of the

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3 J.V. Abueva, Focus on the Barrio, Manila, Institute of Public Administration, 1959, for quotation (p. 346) and case-study of U.S. intervention (pp. 300-44).
Philippine-American connection is the dominant position which the U.S. military continued occupying after the proclamation of Philippine independence. As seen earlier, JUSMAG played an important part in this respect, by making policy recommendations in the military field. In 1954, an incident revealed that JUSMAG exercised such influence as to be able to control reading material distributed to Philippine troops: the case led Senator Peralta to express concern lest the Philippine Army was becoming the 'satellite army of a banana republic'¹. During the Magsaysay administration, JUSMAG even abandoned the practice of consulting Philippine defence planners: in late 1959, General Manuel F. Cabal, Philippine chief of staff, disclosed that, since 1955, the Philippines had not been 'consulted in the programming of military aid and [that] the U.S. had not given any inkling of what form of assistance was due the armed forces until the goods were due for shipment here'².

Besides the advisory group, however, the American services were able to exercise influence through other channels. Thus, Art. XXVII of the 1946 agreement concerning military

1 Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3 Congress, special session, 26 July 1954, p. 70 (Senate).
2 Manila Chronicle, 6 October 1959, pp. 1, 11, and 7 October 1959, pp. 1, 4, 5.
bases, provided that the U.S., as a carry-over of pre-independence practices, had the right to enlist Filipino citizens into the U.S. armed forces, and to exercise over them 'the same degree of control and discipline as is exercised in the case of other members of the U.S. armed forces'; in 1952, exchanges of notes had limited to 1,000 the number of Filipino citizens accepted for voluntary enlistment in the U.S. Navy. In 1954, however, it was decided to recruit annually 2,000 Filipinos for the Navy, and 400 for the U.S. Coast Guard, the Philippine government being informed a posteriori of the names and addresses of those recruited - an unusual procedure in relations between sovereign states¹.

To these figures ought to be added the Filipino citizens employed as labourers by U.S. services in the Marianas, Bonins, Okinawa, and other American bases in the Pacific: for example, the Philippine Consulate in Guam reported in 1952 an average of 16,000 Filipinos working in the island the year round. Most of these labourers are 'recruited and processed' in the Philippines by the U.S. Navy and Air Force without

contact with local authorities\textsuperscript{1}. Finally, U.S. bases in the Philippines employ thousands of Filipino labourers: an estimated 16,000 were working in the Air Force base of Clark Field in 1960\textsuperscript{2}.

To sum up these few observations, in the 1950s, the U.S. government and services (not to mention private interests) were in a measure to exercise considerable influence over the Philippine government, as well as over a sizeable segment of Philippine working population. In 1954, a new treaty was added to the already imposing series of agreement which tied the Philippines to the United States: SEATO was to lend added legitimacy to American influence in the Philippines.

Structure of authority in SEATO

In the first volume of his Memoirs, Sir Anthony Eden recalls conversations which he held in Paris in May 1952 with the Secretary of State, D. Acheson, and the French Foreign Secretary, R. Schuman. In the course of the talks, the French proposed the creation of a permanent military


\textsuperscript{2} American Chamber of Commerce Journal, Manila, November 1960, pp. 573-4.
organization in South-East Asia whose primary objective would be to plan defensive measures for Indochina and for the whole region. Eden adds: 'I was in favour of this plan, which was the genesis of SEATO.'

This recollection introduces us to two crucial features of SEATO. In the first instance, there is an egalitarian element in the alliance: the wish to attract the maximum number of adherents (Asian, in particular) and to create organs in which each would have a voice. In the case of SEATO, however, these egalitarian features were overshadowed by the oligarchic character of the alliance. Thus, the military talks which had started as an informal co-operation between the three main western powers were progressively widened so as to include observers, and later on fully fledged representatives, from Australia and New Zealand, and, occasionally, Canada. It still remained that a caucus of non-Asian leading powers explored, and eventually applied the idea of some sort of arrangement to be applied to South-East Asia.

In 1954, the steadily deteriorating situation of the French and their allies in Indochina led the United States to spare no efforts to secure the concurrence of Britain and France for a 'united front to resist Communist aggression in

1 *Full Circle*, London, Cassel, 1960, p. 84.
South-East Asia' and, generally speaking, for maintaining
tension in that part of the world\(^1\). In late March and early
April, Secretary Dulles conferred to that effect with Asian
ambassadors in Washington, and then in London and Paris, and
later on in Geneva, with the British and French governments.
In the same connection, an ANZUS Council meeting was held in
Geneva. Within a few weeks, under Australian prompting,
military talks were held in Washington, by representatives
of the three great western powers and of Australia and New
Zealand.

The point has been made that SEATO is best understood as
a device through which great powers, and principally among
them the U.S., extend their guarantee to certain small states
of South-East Asia. Australia and New Zealand, runs the argu­
ment, are sharing in the benefits of this guarantee alongside
the Asian members of SEATO. Within the alliance, there is a
'convergence of small-power interests'\(^2\). One could argue,
however, that Canberra and Wellington managed to occupy a

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1 Commenting on the U.S. assumption (expounded in Geneva, on
1 May 1954) that the war of Indochina could still be won, on
a period of years, Lord Reading observed that "this meant
that things would remain on the boil for several years to
come, and Mr Dulles replied that this would be a very good
thing", ibid., p.113.

2 G. Modelski, "Australia and SEATO", International Organi­
privileged position in SEATO, insofar as they enjoyed privi-
lege of access to the thinking and planning of the leading
members of the alliance. Indeed, to understand SEATO in
terms of a great powers-small powers dichotomy might be mis-
leading insofar as this interpretation blurs the crucial dif-
ference in status which, within the alliance, separates the
great powers and their privileged associates from their
Asian partners. The case of the entry of the Philippines
into SEATO and of the Republic's function in the coalition
should make this point clear.

The Philippines and the creation of SEATO

On 18 April 1954, President Magsaysay had somewhat
cautiously indicated his qualified acceptance of the project-
ed U.S. plans for collective defence, and he had instructed
the Philippine delegation to the Geneva conference on Korea
to support moves in that direction. Yet Magsaysay had assort-
ed his answer with several reservations. Fully aware of the
prominent part played by Britain and France in military plan-
ning for South-East Asia, the President insisted that a pro-
vision of the projected treaty should mention the acceptance
of all signatories of the principle of self-government and
independence: such a declaration should be an Asian equiva-
 lent of the Atlantic Charter. Another prerequisite to
Philippine participation was that the pact come close to the North Atlantic Treaty, and provide in unequivocal terms for rapid American help in case of aggression\(^1\). The Philippine Embassy in Washington was presently requested to seek the opening of Philippine-American talks at a ministerial level with a view to securing a firm U.S. commitment to the defence of the Islands\(^2\). At a time of hectic consultations among the major 'outside' powers claiming authority over South-East Asia, the Philippine request aimed at sharing in the making of decisions bearing on regional affairs. These expectations did not materialize.

No doubt, in the following months, some exchanges of views were held on a bilateral level between the United States and the Philippines. Thus, on 25 May, in the course of a visit to American military installations, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Charles E. Wilson, met President Magsaysay in Manila. Both parties agreed on the advisability of creating a joint Philippine-U.S. Council, as was provided for by Article III of the 1951 treaty - a provision which, significantly enough, had never been implemented. A formal decision

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to establish a Council was taken after a Dulles-Romulo meeting in Washington on 3 June, and the Council eventually met in Manila on 4 September 1954. In the meantime, however, the Philippines was kept out of all western security conferences. Bilateral conversations such as those held in June, when General Jesus Vargas, chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, visited Washington, were no real substitute for collective planning.

There are other glaring indications of the limited share allocated to Manila in the negotiations preceding the signing of the treaty. In fact, the Philippines found no real opportunities for negotiating its entry into SEATO. On 20 August 1954, a few days before the convening of the Manila conference, a congressional caucus held at Malacanang, discussed a Philippine draft proposal for a treaty similar to NATO. This ambitious draft, which contemplated provisions in the military, political, social and economic fields, was forwarded to Washington on 26 August, but had to be recalled, following protests by the U.S. Furthermore, the Philippines had to


2 Romulo alleges that Britain opposed an American proposal to invite General Vargas to join the military talks, Crusade in Asia, New York, John Day, 1955, p. 263.
give assurances that it would not 'spring a surprise move' during the conference.

The contribution of Philippine diplomacy was thus of little import. Prior to the opening of the conference, Manila unsuccessfully submitted a few amendments to the Washington draft, such as the securing of a 'NATO-type' commitment, or the limiting of the duration of the proposed treaty to ten years only. Since the main features of Philippine proposals were not adopted, Manila saw the forthcoming meeting of the Philippine-U.S. Council as more important than the type of security pact which was emerging from preliminary discussions. Indeed, there were some who, like Senator Recto, argued that the Philippines should strengthen its alliance with the U.S. and secure direct access to American power, instead of embarking on a scheme which was rejected by the leading 'Colombo powers' such as India and Indonesia.

The role of the Asian partners of SEATO thus became a bone of contention even before the signing of the treaty. The whole philosophy behind the alliance was not favourable to far-reaching initiatives by Asian powers: in May 1954, the

chief architect of collective security in South-East Asia, Foster Dulles, had referred to the slogan of 'Asia for the Asians' as being inspired by Communist propaganda and as running counter to American and European policies. The implication soon became clear that Washington was not inclined to encourage countries such as the Philippines to pursue an active policy on the Asian stage.

Mission of the Philippine Armed Forces

This view was chiefly expounded in discussions about the function of Philippine armed forces. In 1954, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, E.F. Drumright, put it, material and training were provided to the Philippine military in order to enable them to maintain internal security, and to completely eliminate the Huk movement. The Philippine government, for its part, aimed at building up, with American help, an enlarged defence establishment. At the meeting of the U.S.-Philippine Council

1 Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1954, p. 744.
2 U.S. 83 Congress, 2 session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Mutual Security Program for FY 1955, p. 219 (emphasis added). By 1954, it was estimated that 75 per cent of the Philippine Army was engaged in operations against dissidents, C. Bell, Survey of International Affairs, 1954, Oxford U.P., 1957, p. 318.
(Manila, 4 September 1954), it was decided that U.S. assistance would be available for a 'balanced strengthening, reorganization, and modernization of the ground forces of the Philippines', but some Philippine requests for additional aid were forcefully rejected by Secretary Dulles: though the fact was not advertised in the Manila press, the State Secretary seems to have walked out of the conference room in Malacanang, 'annoyed at the extravagant demands' made by the Filipinos for their navy and air force^1.

The issues of military aid and of the tasks to be allocated to locally raised troops was closely related to the question of 'subversion'. This was 'the most urgent aspect of the treaty', according to Secretary Dulles, who gave a broad interpretation of subversion as covering 'internal revolution which might, perhaps, be inspired from without, but which does not involve open interference from without'^2.

This feature was not entirely new in international politics: Art.VI of the Rio treaty of 2 September 1947 already distinguished between armed attack and 'other

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disturbances\textsuperscript{1}. Art. II of the Manila Treaty was more explicit. By openly referring to 'subversive activities', it gave the alliance a distinct conservative flavour. Insofar as it practically applied in practice to political activities in the territories of the Asian countries only, the provision was one more indication of the special position of the Asian members of SEATO.

Economic benefits

The same observation applies to the economic aspects of the alliance. One will recall that the Philippine draft of August 1954 contemplated economic provisions to be included in the proposed treaty. In fact, all three Asian countries sending delegations to the Manila conference took the view that their joining SEATO should bring them special economic benefits that would not go to countries outside the pact. The 'western' powers refused to accede to those requests, and the final version of the treaty had no more than a brief economic clause (Art. III). Yet, though Secretary Dulles stated in 1954 that the treaty did not engage the United States to any

particular programme of economic aid, it quickly appeared that the Asian members of SEATO were actually rewarded for their signing the Manila treaty, especially during the years immediately following the establishment of the alliance. The relative share of Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, as a proportion of total U.S. aid distributed to South- and South-East Asian countries is indicated in the following table, compiled after figures published in Ch. Wolf's study of American foreign aid:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Excluding military support</th>
<th>Including military support</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1954 (prior to SEATO)</td>
<td>27.9 per cent</td>
<td>5.4 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 (post-SEATO)</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Pacific Charter

Although Philippine diplomacy was not successful when pressing its points on the political, military, and economic implications of SEATO, its efforts were apparently vindicated

1 Hearings on the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty, loc. cit., p. 15.
in one respect at least. One will recall that President Magsaysay had wished to introduce a declaration on self-government into any defence arrangement for South-East Asia: the declaration of principle embodied in a preamble to the treaty ('the Parties to this Treaty uphold the principle of equal rights of self-determination of peoples...') and in an appending 'Pacific Charter' has been generally interpreted by Filipino and western commentators alike as a concession to Manila. An American political scientist, N.D. Palmer, assessing the propaganda value of the Charter, has even spoken of the 'unqualified acquiescence' of all eight SEATO members to President Magsaysay's proposal. Let us look more closely at this Philippine 'victory'.

President Magsaysay's draft of April 1954 stated that 'the Foreign Ministers of Southeast Asia and the U.S.' did proclaim 'the adherence of their respective governments and peoples to self-government and independence'. The draft's first resolution repeated without qualification that the parties to the treaty upheld 'the principle of self-rule and the right of peoples to self-government and independence'.

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2 Quoted in C.P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia, op. cit., pp. 280-1.
In August, the drafts of the treaty circulated by the U.S. government did not contain any reference to such a declaration. At the Manila Conference, the Philippines seems to have refrained from pressing the matter wholeheartedly: in his opening address, President Magsaysay did not refer to it, though Senator Francisco Delgado, chairman of the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, and member of the Philippine delegation, stated that his government strongly desired to propose an 'unequivocal declaration' of the principle of self-determination and right to independence for Asian peoples. This proposed provision was criticized by Lord Reading for Britain, as 'unnecessary', as well as by the delegates for France, New Zealand, and Australia - R.G. Casey, Australian representative, being mindful of his country's attitude on New Guinea.

The 'Pacific Charter' which was eventually adopted by the conference appears as a watered-down version of the Philippine draft. Some references were omitted, others were so modified as to actually fall short of some provisions of the United Nations Charter (Declaration regarding


2 Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3 Congress, 2 session, 9 February 1955, p. 154 (Senate).
non-self-governing territories, Art. 73). Thus, the document adopted in Manila refers to the principle of independence for all countries 'whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities'. It further pledged support for self-government of dependent peoples 'in accordance with the constitutional procedures' of the administering powers. Those limitations do not appear in the U.N. document. Yet it seems to have been a matter of general belief (or pretence?) in the West that the SEATO charter was a valuable propaganda asset. How to explain otherwise the decision of the SEATO Council, meeting in Bangkok in February 1955, to propound the Charter as an example to the forthcoming Bandung Conference?¹

The communique issued by the Asian-African conference was, however, markedly more definite than the Manila document: in Bandung, together with all delegations, the Asian partners of SEATO agreed that: 'colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should be speedily brought to an end'².

In fact, although the Pacific Charter went some way towards meeting some demands of Asian countries, the document is basically an indication of the influence exercised by the

¹ Message of Bangkok meeting in Department of State Bulletin, 7 March 1955, p. 373.
² Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia-Africa speaks from Bandung, n.d., p. 166.
western members over the Asian signatories. This was further demonstrated a few months after the signing of the treaty, when the Philippine Senate approved unanimously a resolution expressing its understanding of the Pacific Charter. The resolution, adopted on purpose a few days before the Bandung Conference, was entitled:

Resolution expressing the sentiment of the Senate that the right of self-determination of subject peoples includes their right to decide exclusively by themselves their ability to assume the responsibilities inherent in an independent political status.¹

As will be seen later, the Philippine delegation to Bandung further restated this particular understanding of the Pacific Charter.

To conclude, the Philippines seems to have accepted SEATO without enthusiasm, as was shown by the Senate proceedings on the question of ratification. The Manila Treaty was ratified by the Philippine Senate shortly before the Bangkok meeting, by seventeen votes, two abstentions, and three senators absent².

The oligarchic features of SEATO as we have reviewed them so far have remained very much of the essence of the

¹ Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3 Congress, 2 session, Resolution No. 46, 14 April 1955, p. 687 (Senate).
² Ibid., 14 February 1955, pp. 194-8 (Senate)
alliance's activities during the years following the Manila conference. To cite a few examples, the first meeting of the SEATO Council in February 1955 was unexpectedly convened in December 1954, after tripartite consultations in Paris among the major Atlantic powers, the U.S., Britain, and France. In June 1958, some western members of the alliance took the important decision of supporting the Sukarno administration in Djakarta which was then engaged in a war against military rebels in Sumatra and Celebes: this step was taken without participation of the Asian members of SEATO. In 1961, finally, during the Laotian emergency, we will see that the Philippines showed displeasure towards the prominent role played by its European allies.

2 - Asian policy

The Philippines in the United Nations

What was the incidence of the SEATO connection on the Asian policy of the Philippines? It is not an easy matter to pinpoint those policy decisions of a client-state where great power influence has played a dominant part, but there are some privileged vantage points. U.N. debates, for example, offer such good opportunities for observing the intricate game of pressures, threats, bargaining, etc., which is
carried on between influential powers and the array of their followers, clients, and satellites.

These negotiations have tended to become ever more complex, in proportion with the changing character of the United Nations. It has become common place to point out such changing aspects as the rapidly growing number of member-states. Though the number of great powers able to assert their interests on the world stage has remained limited, the emergence of scores of new states has tended to set fresh limitations to the pressures exercised by great powers on their followers. In particular, the creation of new caucusing groups, such as the Arab-Asian (later the Afro-Asian) group, has made necessary an increasing number of negotiations and adjustments between leading powers and their small allies.

This is to say that we cannot expect a client-state to follow blindly the course chartered by the leader. On a straight East-West controversy (say, Korea), the western powers may safely count on the Philippines' vote. The Korean issue is a case in point: in the early weeks of conflict, President Quirino and Philippine military leaders were agreed not to commit troops (much needed to fight Huk insurgents) outside the territorial limits of the Republic, lest this would appear as a provocative attitude towards China and the
Soviet Union. However, the Philippines eventually followed U.N. recommendations and a Filipino regimental combat team of 5,000 served in Korea since September 1950. The Republic later became a member of the U.N. Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and sent a delegation to the Geneva Conference on Korea in July 1954 with instructions to follow closely the lead of Britain, France and the U.S.

All cases are not as clear-cut as the Korean issue was: on colonial questions, and above all on those issues where anti-colonial feelings are involved together with cold war considerations, the Philippine vote is unpredictable and it is in these cases that the 'know-how' of western (or Afro-Asian) canvassers becomes important. The questions we propose to investigate pertain to this latter category of colonial, and mixed colonial-cold war issues, as offering the greatest chances for observing the pressures brought to bear on the Philippine delegations.

A word of caution might be necessary at this juncture. An exhaustive compilation of given countries' votes in the

General Assembly Plenary Meetings or Committees is fraught with practical difficulties. To record all votes gives unavoidably more weight to some issues than to others, because of a paragraph by paragraph vote occasionally requested for some draft resolutions. Other misleading conclusions can be drawn from the investigation of, say, all votes on colonial issues: how are we going to classify questions such as the Suez Canal dispute, or the disposal of former Italian colonies? It has therefore been deemed safer to examine the Philippine attitude on a few definite issues which could allow us to gauge Manila's relations with leading Asian powers as well as with its SEATO allies.

The Arab-Asian, and after the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Afro-Asian groups, have been instrumental in bringing about U.N. debates on colonial issues. The first meetings of African and Asian delegates to the U.N. were held in 1949, on an ad hoc basis. The Asian and African countries most unequivocally aligned with the West, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Ethiopia and Liberia, did not participate in these first caucuses. In 1951, during the 6th session,

the Philippines formally joined the group. Following the Bandung Conference, the Afro-Asian group was formally organized in 1955 as a caucusing group, meeting when the General Assembly is in session, as well as during the rest of the year. All Asian and African states are members, with the exception of Nationalist China.

For many years, the Philippines has remained a lukewarm member of the group. An adviser to the Philippine delegation, Ramon V. Mitra, Jr., reports that Romulo, who chaired the Philippine delegation to the U.N. from the first special session of 1947 until and including the tenth session of 1955, used to send only his subordinates, if at all, to the meeting of the Afro-Asian group. From 1956 onwards, the relationship between the Philippine delegation and the group somewhat improved, although there remained instances of Philippine aloofness.

Indications are not lacking of Philippine coolness towards some of the most significant moves of the Afro-Asian group. For example, in a letter of 26 July 1955 the group

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requested the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda of the tenth session. This request introduced a precedent, since Algeria had not hitherto been designated as a 'non-self-governing' territory, subject to U.N. action. It is therefore significant that 'right-wing' members of the group, viz., Ethiopia, Turkey and the Philippines, were the only Afro-Asian states which failed to sign the letter\(^1\). In Plenary Meeting, however, the Philippines voted with the Afro-Asians, and against the United States, Britain and France, to include the question of Algeria in the agenda\(^2\).

On the other hand, there were occasions when the Philippines has resisted U.S. requests, and has voted as an Afro-Asian power of strict observance. See, for example, the question of admission of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in 1952. The three Associated States had been recognized in early 1950 by most states aligned with the West. In October 1952, the U.S. officially requested the Philippines to follow suit; yet in plenary meeting of the U.N., the Philippine delegation abstained from voting 'pending clarification on the status' of the Indochinese states\(^3\).

\(^1\) U.N., G.A.O.R., 10 session, A/2924 and Add. 1.

\(^2\) Ibid., Plenary Meeting, 30 September 1955, pp. 196.

These two examples show that on 'colonial' issues, the Philippine voting does not allow of accurate predictions. Generally speaking, however, despite its somewhat half-hearted membership in the Afro-Asian caucusing group, the Philippines has found it difficult to resist pressures brought to bear by western powers. Senator L. Sumulong who sat with the Philippine delegation to the 13th session of 1958, recalls that the request of a SEATO ally - relayed to him by the Philippine foreign office - to be more moderate in the consideration of a trusteeship question, could not have been refused had it not arrived 24 hours late. One might assume that influential western powers would usually endeavour to save an Asian follower the humiliation of casting a 'colonialist' vote. Yet this observation is not entirely valid in the case of such a staunch ally of the West as is the Philippines. As will be seen presently, the West Irian (Western New Guinea) question offers at least one instance of the Philippines 'losing face' because of western pressure.

The West Irian question was first brought to the attention of the U.N. by a letter and an explanatory memorandum from Indonesia, requesting (17 August 1954) the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the 9th session. On Sunday Times Magazine, 5 April 1959, pp. 15-16.
24 September 1954, the General Assembly decided to include the item in the agenda, the Philippines voting in favour together with the Afro-Asian group. In First Committee, Felixberto Serrano, co-chairman of the Philippine delegation, stressed his country's 'equally friendly relations' with Indonesia and the Netherlands, and mentioned that the Philippines shared with Australia a commitment for mutual defence - a significant remark since Canberra held very strong views on the subject. On 30 November, the First Committee adopted a draft resolution recommending to the two parties to 'pursue their endeavours' for a pacific settlement of the dispute: in Committee, the Philippines abstained, 'by deference to the views of the Netherlands and other delegations', whereas the Afro-Asian group voted in favour of the resolution. In General Assembly, however (where the resolution failed to rally a two-thirds majority), the Philippines voted with the Afro-Asians.

The picture was less confused the following year. The Bandung Conference had unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the position of Indonesia in the case of West

Irian, and all Afro-Asian delegations signed a letter (10 August 1955) requesting the inclusion of the question on the agenda of the forthcoming session. In General Assembly, the Philippines voted with the Afro-Asian group.

In 1956 also, the Philippines supported the Afro-Asian group in all votes in General Assembly, as well as in First Committee, although together with other 'right-wing' members of the group (such as Ethiopia, Laos, Thailand and Turkey) it did not co-sponsor the Afro-Asian letter of 8 October 1956 requesting the inclusion of the West Irian question on the agenda of the forthcoming session.

It is during the 12th session that the incident referred to earlier occurred. The usual letter requesting the inclusion of a 'supplementary item' on the agenda had been co-signed by the Philippines. On 20 September 1957, the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly decided to place the item on the agenda by 49-21-11, the Philippines voting 'yes' together with the Afro-Asian group. In First Committee also,

1 Asia-Africa speaks from Bandung, op. cit., p. 166.
the Philippines voted with the Asian countries in favour of a
draft resolution submitted by the Afro-Asian group. Thus
nothing seemed to indicate that in Plenary Meeting on 29
November, the Philippines would fail to participate in the
vote on the resolution adopted by the First Committee\(^1\). The
fact became widely advertised when Senator E. Pelaez,
vice-chairman of the delegation, asked to be relieved of his
duties as delegate to the United Nations. No denial was ever
given to his allegation that:

I was informed that the Philippines had an under­
standing with the Netherlands and Australia that we
would abstain...I was told that I should vote for
the resolution only with the approval of the Dutch
and Australian delegations. I was told further that,
as an alternative course, I could just be absent
when the vote was taken.\(^2\)

Another incident occurred during the 16th session of
1961 when the West Irian question was once more introduced
before the General Assembly. Then again the Philippine atti­
tude was ambiguous: on three occasions in Plenary Meeting,
the Philippines opposed Indonesia. It voted against a draft
resolution submitted by India and supported by Indonesia, but
it supported two resolutions submitted by African countries

\(^1\) U.N., G.A.O.R., 12 session: Plenary Meetings: 20 September
1957, p. 59, and 29 November 1957, p. 547. First Committee:
26 November 1957, p. 252.

of the Brazzaville group: these resolutions which were opposed by Indonesia stressed the importance of self-determination for the Papuans, and envisaged a temporary international administration of the territory. All three resolutions failed to rally two-thirds of the Assembly.

The Philippine delegate to the U.N., J. Elizalde, let it be understood that his votes might be construed as a retaliation upon Indonesia's failure to support the Philippine bid for a seat in the Security Council. A few days later, however, Foreign Secretary Serrano stated that, in fact, he had instructed the Philippine delegation to side with Indonesia and to favour the Indian resolution ...1

This allegation was made to Foreign Minister Subandria, and should perhaps be accepted with caution, since Serrano never made mystery of the fact that he feared any Indonesian aggrandizement. In the case of West Irian, in particular, he insisted that the Philippines should remain uncommitted and should not disturb the status quo in that part of the world, a conclusion which he felt he was sharing with Australia2.


2 Interview with the author, Manila, 3 April 1963.
The Philippine record on the West Irian question should not obscure the fact that, in a number of 'colonial' issues such as Morocco, Tunisia, the racial policies of South Africa, etc., the Republic has been indistinguishable from other Afro-Asian countries. But this record throws light on the wavering attitude of the Philippines once western pressures are brought to bear. The issue also brings into focus Australia's attempts at wielding a degree of influence in Asian politics: on several occasions, the Philippines showed it was responsive to Australian promptings. The SEATO connection proved decisive in that respect.

The Philippine participation in Bandung offers another instance of SEATO's influence over the policies of its Asian members.

The Philippines in Bandung

The Asian-African Conference arose out of a proposal set forth by Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia to the 'Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers' which was held in Colombo and Kandy in April-May 1954. After meeting again at Bogor in December 1954, the five 'Colombo Powers' decided to issue invitations for a conference to be held in April 1955 at Bandung.
At about the same time, after private Dulles-Eden-Mendés-France conversations in Paris, it was announced that a SEATO conference would be held in Bangkok in February 1955. There were speculations that the decision to convene a SEATO meeting was not unrelated to the developments leading to an Afro-Asian conference. The first reactions to the Bogor invitation were mixed in countries aligned with the West: indeed, in Thailand and the Philippines, for example, the climate was hostile. President Magsaysay and Vice-President Garcia made it clear that they were opposed to Philippine acceptance of an invitation, although they contemplated sending unofficial observers\(^1\). This was the line held in Washington by Walter S. Robertson, Assistance Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who favoured a boycott of the conference by the client-states of the United States. Secretary Dulles, for his part, wanted to see pro-western nations like Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan, gather enough strength to neutralize China's and India's influence at Bandung\(^2\).

Dulles's views eventually prevailed, and Thailand, the Philippines and Japan accepted the invitation. There was


\(^{2}\) *Newsweek*, 17 January 1955, p. 32.
some surprise in Manila at hearing of the President's 'second thoughts', but the official motive was that the Philippines had to accept in order to refute 'the more glaringly unjust' accusations which might be brought against the 'free world'. This feeling of mission was sanctioned during the SEATO meeting in Bangkok, when it was agreed that the Asian members of the Council would transmit cordial greetings to the 'other free countries' meeting at Bandung.

Following the line adopted at Bangkok, the Philippines approached the Asian-African Conference in a spirit of defiance to Indian policies in Asia. The appointment of the Philippine Ambassador to the U.S., Romulo, as chairman of the Philippine delegation was all the more significant since the 'Colombo Powers' had invited representatives of ministerial rank to chair their respective delegations. As a token of deference to criticism levelled against this appointment by Senator Recto, Magsaysay agreed, however, to include Senator Emanuel Pelaez in the delegation, a man less open than Romulo to charges of 'subservience' to Washington. For publicity purposes, the delegation also comprised a Liberal congressman,

D. Macapagal, and a Moslem member of the Congress, D. Alonto: Macapagal would give the predominantly Nacionalista delega-
tion a bi-partisan touch, whereas it was hoped that Alonto
would facilitate Philippine contacts with Indonesia's and
other Muslim powers' delegations.

Romulo was instrumental in drawing up instructions for
the Philippine delegation. At his instance, a meeting in
Malacanang of a 'Council of Leaders' (Recto was not invited
to attend) adopted on 13 April 1955 a set of drastic guide-
lines: the delegation to Bandung should oppose any move:
(1) to endorse the admission of Peking in the U.N., (2) to
ask participating states to renounce their military agree-
ments with western powers, (3) to propose the outlawing of
nuclear warfare without safeguard of inspection, (4) to adopt
Premier Nehru's five-point formula for peace (Panch Sheel).
The only indication of agreement covered an expected decla-
ration against colonialism 1.

The Philippine delegation left early for Indonesia.

Peppery as ever, Romulo recalls:

I was on the ground early, and by rallying forces
and laying plans, was able to cut the earth from
under the feet of my Red enemies.2

1 Ibid.
2 C.P. Romulo, I Walked With Heroes, New York, Holt, Rinehart
   and Winston, 1961, p. 317
On 16 and 17 April (the conference opened on the 18th) he held conversations with a number of delegations such as those from Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, Iran, Sudan, South Vietnam, Laos, etc. Later in Manila, Romulo boasted that he was responsible for the anti-communist declaration of Fadhil Jamali, delegate from Iraq.\(^1\)

However effective Romulo's lobbying may have been, the pro-western powers played a prominent role at Bandung. Some concerted approach seems apparent in the policy statements of the three SEATO members (referred to by the Indian Press as the 'Voice of Washington').\(^2\) In the field of symbols, for example, Pakistan suggested that 'Seven Pillars of Peace' replace Premier Nehru's *Panch Sheel* and make specific reference to the 'right of self-defence, exercised singly or collectively'. Thailand and the Philippines, for their part, both referred to the Pacific Charter as a cornerstone of their policies. The special position of Thailand and the Philippines as spokesmen for the West was further brought into focus when an informal meeting was held at Sastroamidjojo's between the five 'Colombo Powers', Premier Chou En-lai, and Romulo and

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Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, for a discussion of the Formosa issue.\(^1\)

In his published account of Bandung (written mostly for American consumption), Romulo sees the confrontation between pro-western countries and all others as the crucial feature of the conference. In his opinion:

It is no exaggeration to say that the anti-Communist states put both communism and neutralism on the defensive, scoring a signal diplomatic triumph for the free world.\(^2\)

According to Romulo, India and the Philippines were on opposite sides of the fence, 'India was the leader of the neutralist states, and the Philippines was among those in the forefront of the democratic alignment'.\(^3\) Indeed, particularly in political committee, Premier Nehru and Romulo clashed bitterly on the subject of regional alliances.

Yet this account does not give full justice to the Philippine attitude at Bandung. It is worth noting, for example, that the Philippines took advantage of its prominent role to give vent to some of its grievances towards the great powers. Thus, in his policy statement to the conference, \(^1\) Sir John Kotelawala, *An Asian Prime Minister's Story*, London, Harrap, 1956, p. 185. \(^2\) C.P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung*, North Carolina U.P., 1956, p. 22. \(^3\) *Ibid.*, p. 31.
Romulo noted that the U.S. was lacking in 'consistency and vigor' in colonial issues and too often leaned in favour of colonial powers. In the same statement, the Philippine delegation gave an understanding of the Pacific Charter which implied a veiled criticism of the western position on self-determination as it had been expounded during the SEATO negotiations in September 1954:

The Philippine delegation is here not only to reiterate the ideals of that charter but to underscore in this conference that it is the sense of the Filipino people that such right of self-determination includes the right of nations to decide exclusively by themselves their ability to assume the responsibilities inherent in an independent political status.¹

Romulo's own account, furthermore, tends to give the Philippine delegation the 'benefit' of having sat at the far 'right-wing' of the Afro-Asian countries. It is significant, for example, that his book contains no mention of the lunch with Premier Chou En-lai. Indeed other commentators have gathered a somewhat more qualified impression of Romulo's performance at Bandung. According to George McT. Kahin, the delegations from Iran and Iraq displayed the strongest concern with 'Communist colonialism', whereas Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, Zorlu of Turkey, and Romulo, were

¹ Asian-Africa speaks from Bandung, op. cit., p. 119.
regarded as more moderate. As far as the Philippines is concerned, this observation tallies with Sir John Kotelawala's, that support for his outburst against Communism came chiefly from Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon. Whatever substance there may be in these impressionistic comments it seems well established that Romulo had been sensible to Chou En-lai's friendliness (on different occasions, the Chinese Premier gave assurances to the Filipinos that China entertained no aggressive designs on the Philippines) and that he had become persuaded that Peking sincerely wanted peace.

To conclude, an alignment pattern emerged at Bandung: one might describe it in terms of (1) a 'left' - the communist countries, China, North Vietnam (North Korea was not invited) - (2) a 'non-aligned' loosely solidary centre group under Indian and Indonesian influence, with Burma, and albeit half-heartedly Ceylon - (3) a far 'right' South Vietnam, Iraq, Turkey and perhaps those 'outcasts' which had received no invitation, Taiwan and South Korea.

Where did the Asian members of SEATO fit in this pattern? Premier Chou En-lai had something to say on this

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subject. Later in 1955, in the course of an interview with Filipino journalists, he was asked why the Chinese press always referred to the Philippine government as a puppet government. The answer was:

We have never said that the Philippine Government was like the governments of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee; we never put the Philippine Government and the governments of Chiang and Rhee on an equal basis.¹

The attitude of the Asian members of SEATO at Bandung seems to corroborate that opinion. During the conference, it looked as if, with American backing, the Philippines was actively trying to use nationalism as a rallying point for building up a new right-wing, somewhere between the Indian line on the 'left' and the rightist dictatorships on the 'right'. As will be seen presently, this was also the line followed by the Philippines in its relations with the former Associated States in Indochina.

The Philippines and Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos

Ever since 1954, international interventions in the Indochinese states have given conspicuous illustrations of those two types of settlement of South-East Asian affairs which we have mentioned earlier. Each, be it in Geneva or

¹ Manila Chronicle, 2 November 1955, p. 11.
the Manila formula, is a settlement international in character. In the case of Indochina there was even created an international organization designed for discouraging foreign powers from exercising hegemonic influence in the region. Its most tangible feature was the establishment of International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in each of the four Indochinese states. Under the Geneva agreement, India chaired the Commissions, and thus exercised some influence in the area: Premier Nehru asserted his interest during the official visits he paid to Vientiane, Hanoi and Phnom Penh in October-November 1954. For their part, all prominent Indochinese leaders visited Delhi between 1955 and 1958. In short, Indian influence proved instrumental in encouraging Cambodia and Laos to follow an independent line in foreign affairs.

By contrast, true to the Manila spirit, the U.S. preferred to solve regional problems without much recourse to the machinery provided by the Geneva agreements. Since 1950, the U.S. had been actively interested in the Indochinese war. This interest was not allowed to elapse: a few weeks after the Geneva agreements, the U.S. announced that it would continue extending aid to South Vietnam¹.

¹ U.S. military assistance to Indochina dated from the agreement of 23 December 1950 signed with France and the three
After the SEATO conference of February 1955, Secretary Dulles reasserted American concern in the Indochinese peninsular by embarking on a tour (26 February-1 March) which led him to Vientiane, Phnom Penh and Saigon. In all places Dulles made offers of military aid which those three states accepted. A series of bilateral agreements resulted from these conversations.

These accords had wider international implications than the word 'bilateral' might connote. Though SEATO was not formally brought into the picture, the 1955 accords were very much part and parcel of the guarantee extended by the protocol appended to the Manila Treaty. The international element of the Indochinese policy of the U.S. was apparent in other ways too. Vice-President Garcia's visit to Saigon (27 February-1 March 1955) in the wake of Secretary Dulles, attracted little comment at the time. Yet, together with the Dulles-Magsaysay conversations, held both before and after the State Secretary trip to Bangkok and the Indochinese


2 Though not signatories, the Indochinese states (except North Vietnam) were covered by a protocol to the Manila Treaty.
capitals, these were noteworthy indications that the U.S. was finding it expedient to associate the Philippines in its efforts to bolster up American allies in South-East Asia.

Thus, in proportion with growing American concern, Philippine interest for South Vietnam appeared more marked soon after the Geneva agreements, even at a time when Manila had not yet extended recognition to South Vietnam. A typical example is the part played by the Philippines in the 'pacification' campaign which followed the withdrawal of French troops: in the course of these operations, the Vietnamese army worked closely with two civilian organizations, the Vietnamese government's 'Civic Action', and the 'Operation Brotherhood' (O.B.) of the International Jaycees (Junior Chamber International).

O.B. was originally staffed by Filipino personnel, doctors, dentists, nurses, who since October 1954 had set up station hospitals, dispensaries and clinics in the Saigon-Cholon area as well as in the countryside. Until it ceased operations in Vietnam in 1956, O.B. employed 235 personnel, chiefly from the Philippines, but also from Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, etc. In 1957, O.B. transferred its activities to Laos where it was still operating in 1963. Financial resources were mainly supplied by American sources\(^1\). O.B.

was a humanitarian enterprise, but carried unmistakable political overtones. The name itself alluded to the Armed Forces of the Philippines' doctrine of bringing about a 'brotherhood' between soldiers and civilians during the Huk rebellion. Secretary Dulles for his part described O.B. as a 'dramatic' response of the 'free world' to Vietnamese problems.

In 1954-1955, there were other indications that Vietnam, as well as other South-East Asian countries acting under U.S. advice, could take advantage of the wealth of experience accumulated by the Philippines in the field of 'psychological warfare': for example, Filipino 'experts' were recruited for mercenary service in Vietnam, whereas Vietnamese officers were trained in the Philippines. Other organizations active in Vietnam were the Philippine Veterans' Legion (PVL), and the Catholic Action.

Pressure was brought to bear on the Philippine government not to delay further its recognition of the government established in Saigon: though President Magsaysay had

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1 Department of State Bulletin, 21 March 1955, p. 461.
recognized Cambodia and Laos on 8 January 1955, no such action had been taken for Vietnam. In the course of an unpublicized visit to Manila in July 1955, the chairman of South Vietnam's 'Revolutionary Committee', Nguyen Bao Tan, and the former right arm of Magsaysay, Col. Edward Lansdale, by then stationed in Vietnam, called at Malacanang and at the Department of Foreign Affairs to press Saigon's bid for recognition. The Catholic Action of the Philippines and the PVL lent their support to that mission.

President Magsaysay extended Philippine recognition to Vietnam on 14 July 1955. This move was bitterly criticized by Recto on the floor of the Senate. Resenting the pressures brought to bear upon Malacanang, he also heatedly accused Diem of being an American puppet. Moreover, he saw in Diem's regime a desperate attempt to implant in Vietnam the same kind of society as the one existing in the Philippines. To quote:

[Diem] is helping to implant in South Viet-Nam another form of Western colonialism more profitable for the colonials perhaps because of prospects of better standards of living, civil liberties and political rights, but, for the very same reason,

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more dangerous in its subtlety for the agelong nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese people.¹

The Philippines, concluded Recto, should refrain from such 'dangerous and provocative entanglements'. Magsaysay chose this juncture to break with Recto. During his weekly press conference, on 26 July, he announced that he would oppose Recto's nomination as senatorial candidate by the Nacionalista Convention².

Recto's outburst was of no avail. In October-November 1955, Manila and Saigon exchanged diplomatic missions: the Philippine charge d'affaires in Saigon was concurrently accredited to Phnom Penh and Vientiane. During the following years, Philippine interest in Vietnam continued to be shown on a small scale. During the Magsaysay administration, the Legation comprised a military attache, Col. Jose Banzon, brother-in-law of the President, who had been sent to Vietnam on confidential missions in early 1955. There were other indications of interest such as the dispatch of a team of Filipino constitutional experts to assist in the drafting

¹ Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3 Congress, 2 special session, 22 July 1955, p. 209 (Senate).
² Despite Recto's efforts, the Nacionalista delegates to the party convention did not nominate him, and it was as 'guest candidate' of the Liberal Party that he was re-elected in the November 1955 elections.
of South Vietnam's fundamental law, or in later 1955, Vice-President Garcia's proposal to include the three protocol states as full members of SEATO. As will be seen later, there were also attempts to draw Vietnam into some sort of regional economic or cultural organization. For service in the Indochinese states, U.S. agencies were allowed to recruit Filipino personnel. To quote some official figures, in 1960, for example, the Philippine Embassy in Saigon estimated at 1,000 the Filipino nationals working under contract with USOM (United States Operations Mission) in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, or with firms under contract with the American services; in August 1961, the U.S. delegate to the Geneva Conference on Laos gave an estimate of 300 Filipino 'technicians' in Laos.

On the whole, Philippine support for South Vietnam and Laos appears as an adjunct to U.S. enterprises in the area: Philippine activities gave something of an international character to the anti-communist struggle, though this support often remained informal and, in some cases, shrouded in secrecy. Extreme quarters, such as the South Korean government,

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or semi-official organizations like the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) have occasionally set forth recommendations for a more overt involvement of the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, and other client-states of the U.S. in the civil war in Vietnam. Though both Magsaysay and Garcia remained wary of such resounding initiatives, Manila has consistently encouraged alignments with the West among South-East Asian states and, generally speaking, it has aimed at undermining the Geneva element in regional policies. The visit to Manila of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia (31 January-6 February 1956) is another case in point.

The Cambodian Premier's visit was accompanied by rumours spread in Manila's press that the Philippines would try to convince Cambodia of the value of joining SEATO. Things apparently came to a head on 3 February when the Prince addressed a joint session of the Philippine Congress. In this speech, he indicated that Cambodia would observe neutrality in international affairs, but at the same time he made it clear that his country would remain pro-western in outlook:

The fact that we are neutral does not mean that we are simple-minded to the extent of being lured by the amiabilities of communist governments towards us. As in the past, we will not tolerate any interference in our affairs, nor threats, nor
pressure on their part. The proof of it is that we have accepted American and French military aid... ¹

According to Prince Sihanouk's own recollections (corrobated in part by Philippine press reports during his visit) it seems that his address to Congress was deemed too divergent from established western policies and that an 'emissary of the Philippine government' asked the Prince to make a more definite pro-Western statement on the occasion of a speech at Camp Murphy (Headquarters of the AFP)². This incident seems to have caused some embarrassment since, immediately after Sihanouk's departure from Manila, President Magsaysay found it necessary to stress that 'no one, not Vice-President Garcia, not Undersecretary Manglapus, or Senator Pelaez, or myself, ever talked to the Prince about Cambodia joining the SEATO.'³

The truth might not be easy to establish (during a visit to Manila in early 1964 Prince Sihanouk made veiled apologies about his 1956 outburst). The relevance of the incident lies elsewhere. On that occasion, it was shown that,

¹ Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3 Congress, 3 session, 3 February 1956, p. 146 (Senate).
² Réalités Cambodgiennes, 28 April 1956, pp. 1, 9, 10. Manila Times, 5 February 1956, pp. 1, 18.
³ Manila Times, 7 February 1956, pp. 1, 6.
in 1956, the general atmosphere in Manila was still conducive to examining South-East Asian politics in the light of the U.S. position: 'At every opportunity, we endeavor to tell our neighboring Asians the facts about our past and present relations with the U.S....to strengthen and further unify the free peoples of Asia and the rest of the World', wrote President Magsaysay\(^1\). Be it in Indochina, or occasionally at Bandung and during some U.N. debates, the Filipino diplomat's search for Philippine influence has thus appeared at times indistinguishable from the search for western influence. It is significant that in the whereass which explain the creation on 27 September 1954 of an 'Asian Good Neighbor Relations Commission', the Philippine mission in Asia is described exclusively in terms of western culture, religion, political ideals, etc.:

WHEREAS, with our Christian religion, Occidental civilization and democratic pattern of life and progress, we have a mission to discharge and a service to render towards our fellowmen in Asia,...

WHEREAS, in keeping with our democratic faith and cherished humanitarian traditions and ideals, we should consider it to be our nation's duty to spread the blessings of freedom in our area and share with our neighbours and racial kin the

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\(^{1}\) R. Magsaysay, "Roots of Philippine Policy", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, October 1956, p. 35.
bountiful legacy which has become ours as the first independent Republic in Asia.\footnote{Republic of the Philippines, \textit{Official Gazette}, October 1954, pp. 4607-9.}

This client policy has had one important side-effect. Coming at a time when Afro-Asian solidarity was gaining strength and influence on the world stage, the Republic was brought in closer contact than ever before with other Asian states. More and more, particularly under the guidance of President Garcia and Foreign Secretary Serrano, the Philippines saw its involvement in South-East Asian politics as a legitimate pursuit in its own right, rather than a joint Philippine-American (or Philippine-western) venture. This is the theme of the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI

"REBIRTH OF OUR ASIAN IDENTITY"¹, 1954–1961

¹ This point figured among the "Ten Constants of Philippine Policy", as stated by Secretary F. Serrano, 27 December 1960. (Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, December 1960, p. 85.)
It is interesting to compare the guidelines of Philippine foreign policy as Secretary Serrano expounded them at an interval of two years. On 11 September 1957, he listed 'Six Cardinal Goals', among which were:

1. Preservation and continuing enhancement of Philippine-American relations,

2. Strengthening of collective defence,

3. Development of closer ties with Asian neighbors on the basis of mutuality of interest and subject to the limitations imposed by ideological differences.¹

The 'Ten Constants' of Philippine policy proclaimed in December 1960 had remained substantially similar to the 1957 principles, but there were some qualifications brought to points 1 and 3. Partnership with the U.S. would be pursued 'within the framework of sovereign equality and mutuality of interests'. The point on Asia was couched in more emotional terms, and read: 'Rebirth of our identity with Asia'².

¹ Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, October 1957, p. 1.
² Ibid., December 1960, p. 85.
One should not attach undue importance to these subtle modifications or to the precise dating of those statements. Yet these guidelines bring our present purpose into focus: to show that over these years, there was a gradual change of emphasis in Philippine foreign policy. This renewal appeared clearly in Philippine efforts at reasserting the Republic’s autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. The 1954 negotiations on trade offer a case in point.

Laurel-Langley agreement, 1955

The revision of the Philippine-U.S. trade agreement of 1946 had been a matter of official Philippine policy since early 1953. On 7 March, President Quirino had formally requested the U.S. government to ‘readjust’ trade between the two countries; it is only with the new Magsaysay administration that Washington agreed to start negotiations\(^1\).

Talks were opened on 20 September 1954 between a Philippine Economic Mission, headed by Senator Jose P. Laurel (with Congressman D. Macapagal as a member of the delegation), and a U.S. panel under James M. Langley, a New Hampshire publisher. Accord was reached on 15 December 1954,

\(^1\) *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 September 1953, pp. 316-8, and 12 April 1954, p. 566.
yielding to the Philippines control over its currency, eliminating some absolute quotas on Philippine articles entering the U.S., etc.¹ Suffice it to examine here the main political features of the Laurel-Langley agreement.

The 1946 trade agreement had not been negotiated: the preamble to the treaty simply provided that both parties accepted the provisions of the Philippine Trade Act. In other words, this was a law passed unilaterally by the U.S. Congress, and signed by President Truman before Philippine independence, 'for a transitional period following the institution of Philippine Independence'² a phrase which carried the reminder that the special U.S.-Philippine relationship was not to end at the proclamation of Philippine independence.

The 1954 treaty, by contrast, was negotiated. It wiped out some of the 1946 provisions which the Philippines regarded as politically offensive. The U.S. for its part took advantage of its great bargaining power to exact some fresh concessions from the Philippines. In particular, the U.S. delegation obtained several concessions to the benefit of the American business community in the Philippines. On the whole,

however, the Laurel-Langley agreement offered the prospect of improved terms for the Philippines during the remaining 20-year 'transitional period' (1954-1974).

As seen earlier, the existence of large U.S. military installations in Philippine territory was another carry-over of the colonial era.

Philippine-U.S. military alliance, 1954-1961

The revision of some aspects of the Philippine-U.S. military alliance encompassed negotiations on a number of issues, such as control over U.S. military activities in the Philippines, assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, jurisdiction in the bases, etc. At the core of these negotiations one finds the question: what is the minimal 'cost' (in terms of loss of freedom of action and prestige, etc.) which the Philippines must meet in order to secure an alliance with the U.S.? Or conversely, what is the highest 'cost' (in terms of economic concessions, sharing of political or military decisions, etc.) which the U.S. is ready to meet in order to maintain its influence over the Philippines?

In the bargaining situation which ensued, each party tended to assess differently the value of bases. For Philippine consumption, the U.S. representatives in Manila
stressed, (1) the security advantages accruing to the Philippines ('any attack on the Philippines would be an attack on the military forces of the U.S. and would cause the U.S. to act immediately'), (2) the political advantages of increased stability in the general area of the South-East Asia (the bases in the Philippines are 'an important factor in the maintenance of peace and security throughout this area'; within the framework of SEATO they fulfil an 'essential function from a supply and logistics point of view'), (3) economic benefits; expenditures in the bases, some $50 million per year, are a net addition to the foreign exchange reserves of the Philippines.\(^1\)

The Philippine side preferred to refer to another set of American arguments, those which were set forth for home consumption. After all, Secretary Dulles himself had no qualms in stating that 'not a single dollar is sought for this [Mutual Security] program for any reason other than an American reason'.\(^2\) In Congress, Senator Recto quoted American sources on an important function of U.S. overseas bases, namely, to act as magnets for enemy attacks, thus


\(^2\) Department of State Bulletin, 18 June 1956, p. 1002.
dispersing and weakening the threat to U.S. cities and military installations.\(^1\)

Listing another cogent argument for the Philippine case, Foreign Secretary Serrano used to point to the low prestige which he felt the Philippines enjoyed in Asia. In this respect the maintenance of close military ties with the U.S. was partly responsible for the grievous misimpression which has gained currency in Asian and European circles that our freedom notwithstanding, we remain a virtual colony of the United States...Our independence did not gain for us the respect we expected from our fellow Asians.\(^2\)

It is thus with a view to improving the position of the Philippines in Asia that a movement to revise Philippine-American relations in the military field gathered momentum in Manila. Suffice it here to indicate the highlights of this long series of negotiations.

The Magsaysay administration took the first steps to negotiate new regulations for the use of U.S. bases. Though informal conversations were held as early as 1954, it was in 1956 that a wave of discontent brought the Philippine-U.S. military agreements into focus.

\(^1\) Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record*, 4 Congress, 1 session, 21 May 1958, p. 1879 (Senate).

In February and March 1956, several incidents occurred which deeply stirred political circles in Manila: a controversy arose about mining rights in the bases, there was news of discriminatory treatment against Filipino workers in Guam and American Samoa, evidence of American manoeuvres to force the Philippines to import Virginia leaf tobacco, etc. On 13 April 1956, the Philippine House of Representatives unanimously called for a re-examination of Philippine-American relations. A few days later, the Speaker of the House, Jose B. Laurel, Jr., made a much noticed speech in Dagupan City in which he alleged that the Republic was 'under the heel of a new oppression, subtler and therefore viler' than in colonial days; the Liberal foreign policy expert, D. Macapagal, followed suit by accusing the President of being subservient to the U.S. and of becoming a puppet of the Americans.\(^1\)

It is in that atmosphere of growing anti-American feeling that Secretary Dulles visited Manila (15-16 March). On that occasion, President Magsaysay called for a re-negotiation of the bases agreement with the U.S. Soon, Vice-President Nixon was sent on a soothing mission to the Philippines. Addressing a public rally in Manila, he stated, somewhat hopefully perhaps:

We are friends. We are allies. We are equals. In our dealings there is not now and there must never be any so-called "big power-little power" or "big brother-little brother" relationship.¹

More concretely, and as a token of the U.S. willingness to improve relations with the Philippines, he expressly reaffirmed full recognition of Philippine sovereignty over the bases, and announced that the two governments would hold formal negotiations on military bases 'in the near future'².

Formal talks chiefly on jurisdiction issues started in August 1956, and have continued on and off. The main stages were:

1. Negotiations held from 13 August to 25 September, and from 12 October to 5 December 1956. The talks were then abruptly called off by the U.S., soon after the Philippine panel (headed by Senator E. Pelaez) had presented a complete draft for a revised bases agreement, and were not resumed until 1959.

2. Agreement signed on 15 May 1958, establishing a 'Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board'³. Terms of reference included consideration of day-to-day operations

¹ Speech of Vice-President R. Nixon, 4 July 1956, Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, August 1956, p. 3.
³ Ibid.
of bases: a Philippine military liaison officer was assigned to the bases in order to facilitate contacts between the base and all Philippine authorities concerned.

3. 25 February-12 October 1959: intermittent conversations were resumed, between Foreign Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Bohlen. An agreement to reduce the duration of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement from 99 to 25 years was announced on 12 October 1959.¹

4. Talks held intermittently since March 1960, but seem to have been interrupted since November 1961. The main issue left pending is the criminal jurisdiction problem. The point has been made that on matters of jurisdiction the Philippine-U.S. agreement is, on the whole, more favourable to the Philippines than similar treaties concluded by the U.S. with other countries; on the question of control over the bases, by contrast, the U.S. had given Iceland, Spain, or Saudi Arabia (but not the Philippines) the power of supervising the size and movements of American troops stationed in the bases.²

¹ Ibid., vol. III, no. 3, pp. 68-75.
In 1958, for example, following disclosures that the U.S. envisaged the establishment of missile bases in the Philippines, the Philippine Senate passed unanimously a resolution expressing its sentiment that no stockpiling of ballistic missiles or establishment of launching sites should be agreed to by the Philippines without previous consent of Congress\(^1\). The matter was taken up in the 1959 round of talks, and the U.S. recognized that the Philippines was entitled to a degree of control over activities in the bases. The 12 October 1959 agreement included a provision that the U.S. would consult with the Philippine government before establishing long range missiles or using bases for missions other than those conducted in accordance with the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and the Manila Treaty of 1954.

The question of military assistance was also debated during the negotiations on the bases. This was a problem fraught with political difficulties: we have already mentioned the determining part played by U.S. military officials in drawing up plans for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This was regular U.S. practice in matters of military aid: to quote Secretary Dulles: 'We give military and

\(^1\) Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record*, 4 Congress, 1 session, Resolution no. 25, 21 May 1958, p. 1871 (Senate).
financial aid to enable the free governments to maintain their own armed forces to an extent which we and they judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression.¹

Philippine-U.S. negotiations turned on the share to be allocated to 'we' and to 'they' in the making of decisions. The issue crystallized in October 1958 when Foreign Secretary Serrano held conversations with Secretary Dulles on the matter of military assistance. The Philippine policy aimed at establishing a large army, with generous American assistance, whereas the U.S. still saw the mission of the AFP as largely one of police control. In the words of Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief Pacific,

> We should create forces in these countries [of South-East Asia and the Far East] to meet their own defense requirements. For example, in the Philippines, I found the Filipinos thinking in terms of World War II, trying to create a large army...The threat in the Philippines today is subversion.²

In October 1959, after negotiations in Manila, Serrano and Ambassador Bohlen agreed to refer the issue of military assistance to the Mutual Defense Board for discussion. By

¹ Department of State Bulletin, 18 June 1956, p. 1000 (emphasis added).
1963, however, JUSMAG, the Commander in Chief Pacific, and the U.S. Department of Defense were still instrumental in determining the equipment 'best suited' for the Philippines and in assessing the AFP's 'ability to utilize and maintain new equipment'.

Another topic of discussion was the extent of Philippine military commitment to U.S. enterprises in Asia. In 1955, the debate on the Formosa issue offered opportunities for nationalist opinion in the Philippines to question American influence over local affairs.

On 3 February 1955, President Magsaysay had officially endorsed Eisenhower's 'Formosa Resolution', whereby the U.S. Congress pledged American support for the defence of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands against 'communist aggression'. This statement made it emphatically clear once more that the United States considered the Western Pacific islands (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines) as not expendable. More particularly, in unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would dislocate the existing balance of forces upon which peace depended in the Pacific.

Magsaysay publicly concurred with this view. His policy statement asserted that it was vital that Taiwan

1 Courtesy of JUSMAG, Quezon City, May 1963.
remain in friendly hands: the Philippines stood 'squarely behind the U.S. to achieve this purpose'\(^1\). On 11 February, the Philippine House of Representatives adopted a Resolution supporting unconditionally this policy statement and, in its turn, the Senate opened a debate on the President's initiative.

The discussion centred on the question of Philippine commitment in Asia. For most of the senators, there was little point in arguing about the wisdom of Magsaysay's statement. They tacitly admitted that the Philippines carried little weight in world-wide struggles between giant powers and their retinues of smaller states. In the words of Senator J.S. Montano, 'whether or not we expressly support the U.S. policy, we are with that country and the rest of the Free World in the common fight against Communism'\(^2\). In this perspective, the alliance appeared as a somewhat informal association, reflecting the legitimate exercise of leadership by the U.S. Public token of Philippine concurrence with American policies were then nothing more than reminders of the alliance's cohesion.

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\(^2\) Republic of the Philippines, \textit{Congressional Record}, 3 Congress, 2 session, 18 February 1955, p. 20 (Senate)
As seen above, Recto took a different view of the alliance. He felt that American leadership should be subject to continuous examination. On this occasion, the Senator expounded the precarious nature of any alignment. Convinced that the U.S. would eventually give up its commitments in Asia, whereas the Philippines was compelled by its geographic situation to co-exist peacefully with powerful neighbours, Senator Recto reasoned that the Philippines should carefully refrain from any war-mongering posture. In his own words:

For the present, all that we can hope for is that America, in defending her own security and self-interest and her position in the Pacific as world leader will incidentally find it necessary to defend us...We, on our part, should wait for developments and restrain ourselves from saying something or doing something until the proper time.¹

In this debate, Recto centred his arguments on legalistic grounds, likely to appeal to a conclave of lawyers (most senators have graduated from Law Faculties). In particular, he dwelt at length on the need to keep strictly to the specific terms of the 1951 and 1954 treaties, neither of which included any reference to the defence of Taiwan.

Few senators seemed ready to follow Recto on the ground that the Philippines precisely because of its weakness should be intransigent with respect to its independence and should

¹ Ibid., 24 February 1955, pp. 292-3 (Senate).
refuse to be drawn into the quarrels of the Big Powers without its explicit consent. Some senators were, in fact, quite agreeable to a compromise solution, leaving to the Philippines a large degree of internal autonomy, while accepting America's lead as far as most of external affairs were concerned. Senator Zulueta, for example, argued that 'Wherever America is, there we shall be...Our foreign policy is the same as that of the U.S., to fight communism everywhere and anywhere.'

The Senate as a whole did not express its views on President Eisenhower's move along such extreme lines. A Resolution concurred, albeit with reservations, with the President's stand. Senator Recto was alone in opposing the Resolution: yet, it is an indication of his influence that the reservations mentioned most of the points he had raised during the discussion. Thus, there were expressed hopes for peace, cautious reference was made to the specific terms of existing treaties, and to circumstances which might call for

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1 In a similar spirit, to Churchill, who urged him to adopt a more conciliatory stand, de Gaulle answered: "je suis trop pauvre pour que je puisse me courber". Ch. de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre, L'Appel, 1940-1942, Paris, Plon, 1954, p. 209.
2 Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 3 Congress, 2 session, 25 February 1955, p. 296.
the Philippines to discharge its commitments:

We let the hope be ours that a peaceful solution of the conflict shall be found and the threat of war in the Pacific area averted. However, should circumstances in the meanwhile arise which call for the fulfilment of commitments under the specific terms of the existing Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the U.S. we declare it to be our firm determination that we shall discharge honorably...our part in those commitments.\(^1\)

To conclude this survey of the years 1954-1961, we might note that the question of the Philippine-U.S. military alliance was increasingly submitted to scrutiny. In military as well as in economic matters, Philippine diplomacy aimed at liquidating some sequels of the colonial era and at reasserting the Republic's autonomy vis-a-vis its great and powerful friend. In this Manila was partly successful: the U.S. made several significant concessions though keeping in the main its privileged position. After this period of revision, the American alliance seemed in fact more secure than ever before if one is to judge by the quantity of international arrangements which guarantee the Philippines from aggression\(^2\).

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1. Ibid., Resolution no. 21, 1 March 1955, p. 367 (Senate) (emphasis added).
2. A fresh addition in 1958 was the Eisenhower-Garcia communique of 20 June 1958, in which the President of the U.S. restated that any attack against the Philippines would involve an attack on U.S. troops and would instantly be repelled. This communique was incorporated in the 12 October 1959 agreement, R.P.T.S., vol. III, no. 3, pp. 72-5.
'Asia For the Asians'

The Asian policy of the Philippines has given fresh evidence of this mood for revision. Philippine policy-makers such as Quirino, Magsaysay, or Romulo, had tended to see Asia as a stage where the Philippines could take advantage of its close connection with the U.S. On the other hand, an increasingly vocal body of opinion, represented by men such as Recto, Pelaez, Serrano, and of late President Macapagal, has found in Asian affairs opportunities for challenging what some had come to regard as an all too exclusive dependence on the U.S.

The 'Asia for the Asians' debate of 1954 is a case in point. The controversy started a few weeks after President Magsaysay's administration began. In a speech in New York, on 30 January 1954, Romulo quoted the 'Asia for the Asians' theme allegedly used by Premier Nehru. This, claimed Romulo, was an indication that the leavings of Japanese propaganda were still alive in Asia.

The gauntlet was quickly taken up by the new under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, Leon Ma. Guerrero. Taking advantage of an academic celebration, Guerrero came out

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1 Manila Chronicle, 2 February 1954, p. 3.
in favour of a foreign policy based on the principle 'Asia for the Asians' as the best defence against communism.

Senator Recto seems to have recognized this exchange of arguments as a heaven-sent opportunity to make his views prevail in foreign policy matters. Like many others he tended to underestimate Magsaysay whom he regarded as an 'ignoramus', and he expected that the Nacionalista party leaders would have no difficulty in making decisions instead of the President. Soon after Guerrero's address, Recto thus issued a statement, announcing that he would do everything in his power to induce the administration to accept the slogan as a basis of Philippine foreign policy.

These declarations were followed by others, and heated arguments with highly personal overtones were soon exchanged. For Guerrero, Recto, and those who subsequently concurred with them including Vice-President Garcia and Senator Laurel the Asian policy of the former administration was sterile, and had resulted in the dramatic failure of the Baguio Conference and, more recently in the exclusion of the

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1 Recto alleged that (before his election) Magsaysay had given assurances that he "would always consult the [Nacionalista] Party leaders on the weighty problems of state as [he] confessed to not being adequately prepared for them". C.M. Recto, *My Crusade*, Manila, Calica and Nicanor, (1955?), p. 148.
Philippines from the proposed Colombo meeting. In Guerrero's words, it was a pressing matter that the Philippines stop looking upon the rest of Asia with 'suspicion, a groundless assumption of superior knowledge and apprehension: we are going to be in Asia for a long, long time, and the sooner we realize it, the better'.

In effect, the slogan 'Asia for the Asians' questioned western influence in Asia and implied that the area should not rely any more on large scale European or American interventions for solving its problems. This implication was quickly understood by those members of the Philippine elite who knew that Manila's type of democracy largely depended for survival on a close entente with America. Romulo, for one, tried at first to assure that he had been misquoted. Later on, however, he came out openly against what he regarded as a 'hate slogan', allegedly discredited by its association with those who aspired - or were still aspiring - to absolute power:

A more meaningless phrase than "Asia for the Asians" could hardly have been chosen, but its connotations had long since been established in other embittered Asian areas and were diametrically opposed to everything in which Magsaysay believed. The Japanese had used the slogan for their co-prosperity sphere, which had brought horrifying disaster to most of Asia, and now the Chinese Communists were using it with murderous intent since

1 Manila Chronicle, 8 February 1954, p. 4.
racial antagonism is always one of the easier rungs on which to mount to absolute power. Therefore, such a slogan could not represent Filipino ideals which are much closer to those of the U.S. than are the ideals of many of the countries nearer geographically to the Philippines.¹

As vividly pointed out by Romulo, 'Asia for the Asians' was a political slogan - intolerable as far as Romulo was concerned, since it expressed coolness towards an American-sponsored community of states in Asia.

But, was such a declaration of Asian policy 'meaningless' (as argued by Romulo), or on the contrary, 'a statement of a reality, an axiomatic fact' (Garcia)? For a few weeks, the controversy remained very much the talk of the day in Manila. The Liberal Party's congressmen, including Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House's Foreign Affairs Committee, tried to take advantage of the issue and to cause division among the Nacionalistas.

A few days earlier, in his 'State of the Nation' address, President Magsaysay had made it clear that he would favour closer economic and cultural ties between the Philippines and Asian countries. This time, however, the President did not express his views immediately, although there were indications that he was not happy with the slogan.

On various occasions during the following weeks, he preferred to issue clarifying statements on the foreign policy of his administration, and to repeat that, under the new leadership, Philippine foreign policy would not incur any significant changes. Significantly enough, the first clarification was made before a predominantly American audience. On 22 February, Magsaysay flew over to the American Air Base of Clark Field, and reassured the American military:

One danger in expressing policy through a slogan is that it is so easy to distort a phrase. Already the slogan "Asia for the Asians" is being trumpeted over Radio Peiping, and by Communist propaganda channels elsewhere as a cry of hostility of our people towards the American people. This is a lie.¹

The second clarification came a few days later at a conference called on 10 March between the President and Nacionalista Congressional leaders. The President had to allow for a few concessions, it being whispered that the legislative branch was keen on having more than a symbolic say in international affairs. It was agreed that 'Asia for the Asians' was an expression of the Philippine government's stand for the right of self-determination and independence of all Asian nations, for closer cultural and economic relations and mutual co-operation among the Asian countries. No

¹ *Manila Chronicle*, 23 February 1954, pp. 1, 2.
incompatibility existed between the friendly relations between the U.S. and the Philippines, and the policy of 'Asia for the Asians'.

On the same day, however, Magsaysay issued a slightly watered-down statement which for the time being brought the controversy to a close. Asian nationalism and co-operation between 'freedom loving Asian countries' were described as the most efficient weapon against world communism. In this statement, the President took up the favourite western theme, that the 'last vestiges of colonialism are now disappearing from Asia'. More importantly, he repeatedly drew a line between 'Free Asians' and hostile forces of aggression and subversion, and held that there was scope for co-operation between the Philippines and other 'freedom-loving Asian states'. Magsaysay concluded by endorsing the Philippine-American military and economic agreements1.

As far as Philippine policy was concerned, the controversy had given a hint of the objectives to be pursued by the new administration. It had soon appeared that, with Magsaysay at the helm, the Philippines would not join the

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mainstream of Asian solidarity but would rather continue acting in line with U.S. policies in that part of the world. We have already investigated the main features of this client policy, but there is another conclusion to be drawn from the 'Asia for the Asians' debate: it showed that there was a movement of opinion in the Philippines which entertained a view of Asia more in line with nationalist feelings in other countries of the region.

Such overtones became perceptible in several foreign policy enterprises of the Garcia administration.

2 - The Philippines in Asia: return to the homeland

In March 1959, President Garcia took advantage of a courtesy call paid by officers of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines to explain his Asian policy. The President felt it necessary to deny that the active interest recently shown by Manila in Asian affairs actually meant 'veering away from the West', 'anti-Americanism', etc.: in fact the Filipinos could 'impart ideas to other Asian countries so that the U.S. would be better understood in this part of the world'.

1 Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, October 1959, pp. 59-60. See President Garcia's views on Asian policy in the Philippines in Appendix VI.
The incident is significant in that it shows President Garcia taking the trouble to give a 'respectable' (meaning wholly pro-American) touch to his Asian policy, while not dispelling all possible doubts that to give a great deal of attention to Asia somehow implied 'anti-Americanism' - a charge never imputed to President Magsaysay. Yet if one investigates the enterprises of the Garcia administration in Asia, one is left with the impression that on the whole the Philippines remained closely in line with U.S. policies in the area. A few examples will make this clear.

In the late fifties, western policies in Asia seemed wary of any new involvement, and rather aimed at consolidating the position of Asian allies of the 'free world'. Thus interest was shown in buttressing the threatened regimes of Diem and of Chiang Kai-shek (1958 was a year of tension in the Formosa Straits); the western camp extended protection and friendship to new friends such as the Federation of Malaya (independent since 1957); it generally followed with sympathy Japanese efforts at re-establishing themselves in Asian affairs; even though, for a time, the U.S. and some of its allies adopted a friendly attitude towards prospective allies of the West, the rebels in Sumatra and Celebes, they soon relented. The period also saw the emergence of a number of western 'front' organizations among Asian countries
meant to increase solidarity among the members of the 'free world'.

The Philippines took some part in all these enterprises. The reconciliation of the Philippines with Japan has been treated elsewhere (chapter IV); later in this chapter we will survey Philippine policies towards pro-western powers of minor import, South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, and finally towards the Celebes rebellion of 1958.

It is doubtful, however, whether most of Philippine relations with friendly Asian powers were carried at the diplomatic level. In fact, from the mid-fifties onwards, 'free' Asian countries have participated in a growing number of regional programmes and of international organizations of a semi-official character. The common function of these schemes is to maintain a degree of solidarity among members of the non-communist world in Asia. We call them 'front' organizations because, though depending mainly on western resources, their western character is under-played; they are made to appear as Asian organizations, likely to appeal to fully fledged members of the western alliances but also to those non-aligned countries which the western camp likes to consider as 'fellow-travellers'.
'Front' organizations

Before examining the diplomatic relations of the Philippines with Asian countries, it is thus worth giving some attention to those 'front' organizations in which the Philippines took an important part. At this point, we may establish a broad distinction between, on the one hand, programmes overtly sponsored by western powers (e.g. SEATO cultural activities) but aiming nonetheless at making a broad, 'a-political' appeal, and programmes where western support is kept more in the background (e.g. EROPA), on the other hand.

The cultural programme of SEATO was established in 1957. Four major projects have been implemented since, the award of research or study grants, conferences on cultural and educational problems, special projects, and assistance to various cultural events. The accent in all cases is not on SEATO, but on topics of scientific or cultural interest. These projects chiefly aim at encouraging exchanges among Asian members: between 1958 and 1962, for example, 16 Filipino scholars received post-graduate scholarships for studies in Pakistan or Thailand. SEATO officials are anxious to see nationals of other Asian countries participating in some of those activities. For example, an Indian, a Japanese and a
Vietnamese attended a symposium on culture and technical progress in South-East Asia (Bangkok, February 1958); in 1961, a Laotian and three Vietnamese attended a conference of heads of universities (Karachi, January-February 1961). Students from Burma, Malaya and India are also known to have been trained in the SEATO graduate school of engineering which was established in Bangkok in 1959.\(^1\)

The Philippines plays a more prominent part in other training programmes sponsored by the West. Thus the Republic makes facilities available for training programmes sponsored since 1955 by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) formerly known as the International Co-operation Administration (ICA). From 1955 to 1961, 1,842 trainees have participated in this U.S.-Philippine programme, the main countries of origin being: Taiwan and Indonesia (16.5 per cent each), South Vietnam and Cambodia (14 per cent each), Thailand (13.5 per cent) and South Korea and Laos (12 per cent each)\(^2\).

AID sponsors another training programme in the Philippines: an Asian Labor Education Center has been established in 1959 as a part of the State University of the

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\(^1\) Courtesy of Cultural Relations Division of SEATO, Bangkok, June 1963.

\(^2\) Courtesy of U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), Manila, April 1963.
Philippines. Non-communist countries of Asia are invited to send trade-unions leaders to participate in 'leadership institutes' designed to promote 'free, strong, democratic, and responsible trade unionism'. From January 1960 to December 1961, five institutes were held, with participation from the following countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongkong</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that some of these U.S.-sponsored programmes are sometimes referred to as 'Colombo Plan' aid. Because of its relying mainly on a network of bilateral agreements, the Plan should not be classified as a 'front' organization. Suffice it to mention here that it nevertheless carries far-reaching political implications.

There are regional organizations where western support is not immediately apparent. Among those are the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA) and the Asian Productivity Organization (APO).

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1 Courtesy University of the Philippines, Asian Labor Education Center, Quezon City, May 1963.
Through an ICA contract with the University of Michigan (successfully completed in 1955) an Institute of Public Administration had been established in Manila. This Institute, still supported by U.S. private and official sources, was instrumental in bringing about the creation of EROPA. Following a regional conference on Public Administration (Manila-Baguio, 7-20 June 1958), EROPA was established to promote the adoption of more effective administrative practices in Asia. The member states of EROPA are Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Taiwan and Thailand. The Secretary-General is a Filipino, Carlos Ramos, dean of the Philippine Institute of Public Administration.

Two Asian Round Table Productivity Conferences, held in Tokyo (March 1959) and in Manila (September 1960), led to the establishment of APO on 11 May 1961. Member states are India, Japan, South Korea, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. The chairman of the governing body is here again a Filipino, Cornelio Balmaceda, chairman of the Philippine National Economic Council. The raison d'être of APO is to stimulate national productivity efforts, for example, through training programmes. The headquarters are in Tokyo.

The Asia Foundation, members' fees and unspecified subsidies finance EROPA, whereas AID is the main contributor of
funds to APO which is also supported by a Japanese government grant and by membership fees\(^1\).

The membership pattern apparent in both APO and EROPA (Indonesia, Cambodia and Burma are among the prominent absenteees) as well as their sources of income make it difficult to follow B.K. Gordon's argument that those organizations do not reflect 'bloc' lines\(^2\). It seems more helpful to examine such examples of regional co-operation as expressions of a broad political alignment on the part of a number of states. Membership in, say, EROPA, places powers like Australia or Japan on the side of 'like-minded' states in their region. Political implications are further brought into focus by the active participation of government agencies in those organizations; it is significant, for example, that President Garcia addressed the EROPA assembly of December 1960, and that Secretary Serrano opened the Asian Productivity Conference of September 1960.

The Philippines plays an important part in those schemes: Manila is not infrequently chosen as a meeting place,


or as headquarters, and Filipinos are top office bearers of both EROPA and APO.

One may mention other semi-official organizations linking 'free' countries of Asia and in which the Philippines is taking active interest. In June 1954, the Philippines was a founding member of the right-wing Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL). The League has held annual conferences in South Korea (1954, 1959), the Philippines (1956, 1961), South Vietnam (1957) Thailand (1958) and Taiwan (1960). Membership is not open to governments as such but to 'private' organizations: in the case of the Philippines there was created a Philippine Anti-Communist Movement, Inc. (PACOM), as a chapter of the APACL. PACOM derives extensive support from official circles: in 1960, for example, it held a symposium on communism in the session hall of the Philippine House of Representatives, in the presence of President Garcia and of prominent officials. Private American funds are known to find their way into PACOM and the APACL1.

Another example of regional organization is the compact of students associations of Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Philippines to strengthen and solidify a

1 Courtesy of PACOM, Manila, and of APACL, Saigon, June 1963.
front against communism', established in January 1958 under the auspices of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and of the respective diplomatic missions in Manila1.

On this background of official or semi-official enterprises, diplomatic activities have appeared as supplementary means to indicate mutual concern or, occasionally, to thrash out particular issues.

Philippines-Vietnam

Throughout the period, South Vietnam has been among the most exposed bastions of U.S. influence in South-East Asia. By 1956-1957, however, President Diem seemed firmly in the saddle, and Vietnam set on a diplomatic campaign to gain wider acceptance in Asia. The informal connection linking Saigon to SEATO (South Vietnam participated with observer status in a number of SEATO activities2) offered opportunities for contacts with some members of the western camp, such as the Philippines and Thailand. Moreover, Vietnam indicated interest in other western allies: as shown in the following table, President Diem embarked on a programme of official

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1 Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, April 1958, p. 61.
visits which, in less than three years, took him to most of the pro-western countries in the area, and to two of their 'protectors', the U.S. and India, a non-aligned nation with a stake in Indochina since the Geneva accords of 1954.

Official Visits of President Ngo Dinh Diem (1957-60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>5-10 May</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-19 August</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-9 September</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18- September</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-9 November</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>19-23 March</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>15-19 February</td>
<td>Malaya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have mentioned earlier (chapter V) the part played by the Philippines in the early days of Diem's administration. Official support for Vietnam during the Garcia regime took the form of exchanges of state visits (Garcia visited Vietnam on 22-26 April 1959), followed by a treaty of friendship. Without attaching undue importance to it, it is interesting to note the Catholic flavour perceptible in Philippine-Vietnamese relations: for example, President Diem was awarded a degree at the Dominican University of Santo Tomas in Manila. Or again, the joint communique issued after Diem's visit in

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1958 mentioned the 'necessity of defending the spiritual values of Asia against the expansion of atheistic materialism'.

There were rumours in 1959-1961 that Vietnam would join a projected scheme of regional co-operation: the Garcia-Diem communique of 1959 recommended that South-East Asia 'be developed as a bastion of freedom, peace, and prosperity' and that the peoples of this region 'work out common schemes for the elevation of their standards of living', an oblique reference to the plans then contemplated by Malaya and the Philippines. Vietnam, however, did not join the Association (ASA) which was eventually launched in August 1961. Official contacts do not give the full picture of relations between Manila and Saigon: as seen earlier, most of Philippine-Vietnamese co-operation occurred within western 'front' organizations.

Philippines-Taiwan

The Philippines has always been a keen supporter of the U.S.-sponsored Nationalist regime in Formosa. In 1953,

2 Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, October 1959, p. 19.
according to Felino Neri, acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Philippine friendship for Taiwan was founded on strategic reasons: the island was 'our first line of defense against a possible communist move towards the Philippines'.

We have seen that President Magsaysay reaffirmed that view in 1955; as late as 1963, the same theme was heard during a visit to Manila of Vice-President Chen Chang (20-23 March).

From a Philippine point of view there was another important benefit to be derived from the existence of a friendly 'Chinese government'. Philippine authorities, always anxious to trace any 'subversive' activities, have taken advantage of the tight control exercised by the Chinese Embassy in Manila over its nationals residing in the Philippines. In 1956, for example, with the open sympathy of the AFP and of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, there was organized a 'Philippine Chinese Anti-Communist League' (PCACL) with chapters in most Philippine provinces. The PCACL is pledged to 'strengthen the anti-Communist ideological struggle', 'to render moral, material, and all kinds of support to the Government of the Republic of China for the liberation of the communist-occupied Chinese mainland', 'to combat the "spread

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1 Statement of 1 September 1953, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, Official Text, (mimeo.)
of neutralism" of Communist agents', etc. In effect the League exercises substantial control over Chinese activities, and in particular over the press and the schools\(^1\).

At the diplomatic level, here again official visits were the main indications of mutual interest: President Garcia visited Taiwan on 2-6 May 1960, and Vice-President Chen was received in Manila in March 1963. There are few outstanding issues between the two governments. Until now (1964) however, the question of 'overstaying Chinese' has remained unsolved. The controversy centres around the future of about 3,000 Chinese nationals who entered the Philippines in the years 1947-49 and who refused to leave after their visas had expired. Taiwan for its part has refused to accept the refugees. Negotiations were held intermittently from 1950, but it was only on 28 November 1958 that an agreement 'in principle' was reached between Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Chen Chi-mai. The formula proved, however, impossible to implement, both parties having agreed to take into account 'broad humanitarian considerations', while upholding at the same time the 'majesty of Philippine law'\(^2\).

\(^2\) Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, December 1960, p. 6.
For the sake of completeness, let us mention here that there is a territorial controversy in which Taiwan, People's China, South Vietnam and the Philippines are all involved: the dispute concerns claims of sovereignty over groups of islands in the South China Sea, the Paracel, Pratas, Macclesfield, and Spratly Islands. In March 1956, a Filipino citizen, Tomas Cloma, claimed possession of a group of islets, coral reefs, and shoals, east of the Spratlys, which he called 'Freedomland'. In a letter of 8 February 1957, the Philippine government advised him that those islands, with the exclusion of those seven belonging to the Spratlys, were res nullius, hence open to economic exploitation and settlement by Filipino, or any other nationals. The Chinese Embassy in Manila filed a protest with the Department of Foreign Affairs and, in the same year, South Vietnam and the governments of Taipei and Peking all reasserted their rights. It seems that military units of all three powers are occupying some of these islands.

Philippines-South Korea

Philippine-Korean relations have followed a similar pattern of official statements pledging mutual support, of

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\[\text{Philippine Embassy in Taipei, Annual Report, FY1956-1957, pp. 72-83. See also R.H. Fifield, Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, op. cit., pp. 325-7.}\]
exchanges of students, journalists or occasionally trade
delegations, and of semi-official co-operation within 'front'
organizations.

The Philippines had been among the first to extend
recognition to South Korea (23 August 1948), but there was no
Philippine representative in Seoul before November 1954. In
1958 the legations were raised to the status of embassies,
and as a further indication of good relationship, Secretary
Serrano paid an official visit to Korea (8-11 November 1960).
It was announced on that occasion that trade would be expand­
ed through an agreement to be negotiated\(^1\). A Korean-Philippine
joint committee on trade held conversations in Manila from 25
to 28 February 1963.

There is one common factor basic to Philippine concern
in Korea, Taiwan, or Vietnam: these three countries are all
outposts of U.S. influence, and Philippine diplomacy has
never wavered in its view that such pro-western countries
were a necessary component of an international environment
favourable to the Philippines. On occasions too, as we have
seen with President Quirino, for example, Manila has aimed at
playing a senior role within this small community of client
states.

\(^1\) A Philippine-Korean trade agreement was eventually signed in
The case of Indonesia was, of course, different.

Philippines-Indonesia

From mid-1956 to mid-1958, Indonesia went through a period of transition. Parliamentary democracy was discarded and replaced by institutions of authoritarian tendencies. To the Philippines, inclined to support Asian powers of strongly pro-American leanings, Indonesia presented a new problem: how to co-exist with a regime regarded as disturbingly left-leaning?

During the Magsaysay administration, the relationship with Indonesia had been rather cool. In 1954, there were efforts to settle the main irritant, namely, the question of illegal immigration. A tentative accord was reached in January 1955 to legalise the status of an estimated 6,000 Indonesians who had illegally settled in the Southern Philippines. Objections were raised at the last minute by Senator Recto, however, and the discussions were broken off in early February 1955.

The Philippine delegation to Bandung received instructions to improve Philippine-Indonesian relations, and later

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on fresh efforts were made to settle the immigration question. On 4 July 1956, an agreement was signed in Djakarta whereby each party agreed to establish a system for controlling traffic between the two countries (Art. VI), and to repatriate those nationals residing illegally in the territory of the other who did not qualify for permanent residence status (Art. I and II)\(^1\). This agreement was ratified by the Philippine Senate (23 May 1957) and by Indonesia (19 December 1957) but, as will be seen later, implementation was delayed until 1963.

Philippine-Indonesian relations deteriorated during the early days of the Garcia regime. This was due to several factors, namely, the situation in Indonesia proper, the Indonesian policy of the U.S., and domestic political considerations in the Philippines. The new orientation of Indonesian politics in 1956-58 was brought into focus by the proclamation, on 15 February 1958, of a 'Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia' (PRRI). The PRRI, a regionalist movement enjoying support in parts of Sumatra and Celebes, carried distinct anti-communist overtones and it could take advantage of substantial foreign, mainly American,\(^1\)
support. The Philippines followed the U.S. lead and gave covert support to the rebels. It is worth noting that the Garcia administration was encouraged to adopt this attitude by its wish to play an active role on the Asian stage. Secretary Serrano, in particular, made no secret of his desire to lead Indonesia away from neutralism, or at least to strengthen the hand of President Sukarno's adversaries. Influential elements inside the Philippines concurred with that policy. In 1954, the AFP had felt obliged to accuse some Indonesian immigrants of being communist (a charge later proved to be groundless); in 1956, the services had been instrumental in persuading the Philippine government to open a consulate in Menado, Celebes, for intelligence purposes. Finally, during the 1958 crisis, the chief of staff, General Vargas, never tired of pointing to the rise of the 'Communist spectre' in Indonesia, and to the dangers of infiltration into the Philippines through Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.

Philippine support for the rebellion took various forms. Among the most conspicuous indications of official sympathies


3. See, for example, Manila Times, 1 April 1958, p. 1.
were the open activities of rebel leaders in Manila: on 14 February 1958, for example, on the eve of the proclamation of the PRRI, and during a meeting in Manila of the SEATO council, Col. Ventje Sumual, spokesman of the Indonesian rebels, was allowed to give a press conference. A few days later, Serrano made the ambiguous statement that the Philippines would continue to recognize the government in Djakarta 'so long as it commanded the support of the majority of the Indonesian people'. The Foreign Secretary took also the remarkable step of conveying 'deep concern' to the Indonesian government over reports that the Soviet Union was giving material aid to the central government\(^1\).

We know that, in the meantime, American and Taiwanese pilots, hired by the rebels for bombing missions in Indonesia, were allowed to stop for repairs in U.S. bases in the Philippines. The pro-rebel activities of the Philippine consul in Menado were also widely reported at the time\(^2\).

It soon became apparent, however, that the rebels could not hope to defeat the central government. We have seen earlier (chapter V) that by June 1958, the 'white' members of

\(^1\) Ibid.

SEATO had reached the decision that the western camp would throw its weight behind the Sukarno regime and would rely on its friends inside the central government in Djakarta. A soothing visit of Foreign Minister Subandrio to Manila on 18-19 April 1958 had also eased tension between the Philippines and Indonesia: Subandrio made it a point to emphasize that relations between the two countries should not be allowed to deteriorate and he diplomatically dismissed the past incidents as a family quarrel. He is also reported to have given 'assurance' about the strength of communist influence in Indonesia.

Soon, the Philippines stopped all intervention but, during the following year, Serrano made fresh attempts at leading Indonesia away from its 'left-leaning' line. The instrument, this time, proved to be a proposal for a scheme of regional co-operation.

Towards an Association of South-East Asian States (ASAS)

In December 1958, President Garcia announced that the foreign policy of the Philippines was aimed at uniting the 'free' nations of South-East Asia within a political, spiritual and economic regional association. It seems that

the co-operation envisaged by Garcia was of a formal type, comprising multilateral treaties, a central secretariat, and provisions for consultations at the highest level. The President called his plan 'barangay' after the basic political unit known in the pre-Spanish Philippines, viz., an arrangement linking clans or families.

The Philippine official statements presented this as a 'new line' in the country's foreign policy. At a time when Philippine-American relations were the object of a critical re-appraisal, there was also much talk of a necessary re-orientation of the Republic's foreign policy towards Asia. The implications were less anti-western than nationalistic: there was among the Philippine leaders the wish to assume fresh responsibilities on the international stage, and particularly in South-East Asia.

As a token of this new spirit, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs took steps to reassign its top diplomats to Asian capitals: Secretary Serrano stated that, in the future, key assignments would be in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaya, Japan and India, and not only in the U.S. or the west European capitals as before.

2 It is worth noting that the Philippines drew inspiration from a similar Australian scheme, Manila Bulletin, 26 January 1959, pp. 1-19.
The visit to Manila (3-7 January 1959) of the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, gave fresh impetus to this new course: the Tunku had projects of his own for establishing some form of economic co-operation among South-East Asian countries (in the field of marketing of primary products, for example), the general idea being that prosperity and economic progress were the best guarantees to forestall further inroads of communism in the area.

The Garcia-Rahman communique issued after this visit stated that both countries would seek ways and means to improve the material welfare of their peoples in association with the other countries of South-East Asia. They also expressed the need for frequent meetings among the leaders of the region for 'exchanges of views on matters of common interest'.

This visit, surrounded by considerations of 'pan-Malayan' solidarity, was among the earliest indications that there was in the air some movement for a redistribution of influence in South-East Asian politics. Though it stressed economic and cultural aspects and made no overt reference to political or ideological considerations, the Malayan-Philippine proposal

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1 Department of Foreign Affairs, *Review*, Manila, October 1959, p. 21
implied in effect that local powers should assume more responsibility in regulating regional affairs. Another important political implication was that this regional authority would be exercised in a spirit of friendship with the West. Thus, according to Secretary Serrano, the Philippines supported Rahman's proposal with a view to bringing about Indonesia's participation in a pro-western grouping of states\(^1\).

**Early negotiations prior to ASA**

During 1959-1960, Malaya and the Philippines sounded most South-East Asian governments about their attitude towards a scheme of regional co-operation, but obtained qualified approval from the Thais and the South Vietnamese only. Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and Laos indicated no real interest. To give a few examples of Philippine activity, in March 1959 Secretary Serrano held discussions in Bangkok and in Kuala Lumpur, and in April, during Garcia's state visit to Saigon, he made overtures to the Diem government. At the ECAFE session in Bangkok, in March 1960, there was also much talk of regional co-operation: the Philippine representative, Perfecto E. Laguio proposed a seven-point programme for a South-East Asian 'economic bloc'; he suggested that this bloc

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\(^1\) Interview with the author, Manila, 3 April 1963.
include initially the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, South Vietnam, and 'possibly' Indonesia. Other countries could become members later on. During this session, Malaya made also a plea for a 'free association' to promote economic and cultural co-operation in line with the Garcia-Rahman plan.

No enthusiasm was expressed in the Commission on hearing of these proposals: Burma announced that it would rather see one of the large countries of the area taking the initial step towards regional co-operation, Cambodia would not adhere to any specific economic bloc, Thailand expressed caution, Indonesia for its part indicated that extensive preparatory work would be necessary ... 2

It is interesting to note that, during this period of exploration, Malaya and the Philippines were each bidding for some leadership on the regional level, an attitude which revealed the ambitions of their leaders as well as the political nature of their proposals. For example, President Garcia's executive secretary, Juan C. Pajo, expounded, in a somewhat messianic spirit, that:

Considering that the Philippines had more experience in the democratic processes than any other

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2 Ibid., pp. 64-5, 75, 78-9.
Southeast Asian country, it is but natural that she should be the rallying point in the fight for political and economic emancipation of the region.¹

The Tunku, for his part, stated: 'It is my dream to make this country[Malaya] the leading centre of cultural and other international activities in Southeast Asia².

Whatever the substance of those statements for internal consumption, the decisive steps for launching a regional organisation were taken by Malaya and the Philippines acting in unison. On 6–7 April 1960, Secretary Serrano and Enche' Mohamed Sopiee, representing Malaya, held conversations in Baguio, and proposed a regional scheme which they wished to be devoid of all political or ideological character. There would be no formal treaty but rather a 'co-operative movement for the mutual benefit of participating countries'³. In order to prove more amenable to Indonesia the suggestion to call this loose grouping Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) was later dropped in favour of a name reminiscent of SEATO, viz., the Association of Southeast Asian states (ASAS).

¹ Manila Bulletin, 25 April 1959, p. 11.
² Ibid., 22 August 1959, p. 5.
By July 1960, it appeared that only Thailand would be prepared to participate. Despite some indications of a rapprochement between Indonesia and the Philippines (see chapter VII) all efforts to secure Djakarta's acceptance proved futile. The official visit of President Garcia to Malaya (8-11 February 1961) seems to have decided the question: without waiting any longer, Malaya and the Philippines would agree to launch ASAS if Thailand was willing to join. Soon after, the three countries started negotiations. A Joint Working Party of 22 experts on economic and cultural affairs opened in Bangkok on 19 June 1961. Three committees considered respectively, economic, cultural, and administrative aspects. The delegations were chaired by officials of ambassadorial rank, a choice which underlined the political significance of the negotiations\(^1\). After these preliminary talks, the Foreign Ministers of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand held a conference in Bangkok (31 July-1 August 1961) in which they formally created the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).

\(^1\) Dr Jose F. Imperial, Ambassador in Bangkok, chaired the Philippine delegation. On negotiations preparatory to ASA, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 September 1961, pp. 548-52, 601.
Functions of ASA

Limited as it was to three members only, ASA was destined to fulfil functions of a symbolic character. There was among the founding states a willingness to demonstrate that South-East Asian problems could and indeed should be solved by local powers. To quote the opening statement of the Prime Minister of Malaya, 'our three countries are jointly inspired by a common desire to think and plan for ourselves, adopt and adapt our own ideas for our own area'. This planning would admittedly supplement the work of other organizations such as ECAFE or the Colombo Plan but, continued the Tunku, 'I do firmly believe that the best help of all is self-help'.

As we have pointed out earlier, the same idea was very much part of Philippine thinking. For Serrano, to bring the Philippines back to the common Asian household, and to review some aspects of the Philippine-American connection, were two complementary aspects of the same policy of 'respectable independence'. ASA was thus supposed to function as a demonstration of independence: hence the all-too-often repeated

statements that no great power was working behind the scenes and using the three members as spokesmen for foreign interests. In fact, an editorial of the New York Times pointed to the general disappointment of the Philippines and Thailand with their western allies as among the main inspirations of ASA1.

Another important function of the Association was to make everything ready for a quick integration of other members. Paradoxically, one may argue that ASA was established as much in function of its prospective members as of its present members. Hence the modest, unobtrusive, objectives of ASA, the lack of any central organization, the absence of any treaty (there was issued instead a general declaration of principles, known as the Bangkok Declaration), and the fond hopes that, in time, all of South-East Asia would join the bandwagon.

The Organization of ASA

The founders of ASA established a very flexible machinery. The Association comprised: (1) an annual meeting of Foreign Ministers, as the main political element of ASA; (2) a meeting of a Joint Working Party of officials who report to the Foreign Ministers' conference on programmes of

1 7 August 1961, p. 22.
co-operation; (3) a standing committee which meets regularly (at an average of once every two months) to provide continuing consultation when the Foreign Ministers are not in session: this committee has rotated annually from Kuala Lumpur, to Manila, and thence to Bangkok; it is composed of the accredited ambassadors and of the Foreign Minister of the host country; (4) a national secretariat in each member country: in 1963, these secretariats comprised personnel of seven in Malaya, five in Thailand and only three in the Philippines; (5) finally, ad hoc committees and conferences meeting occasionally, as seen in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASA Conferences^1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Meeting of the Joint Working Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Meeting of the ASA Foreign Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Meeting of the Joint Committee of Economic Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Session of the ASA Foreign Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conference on Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Primary Commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Joint Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1 Courtesy ASA Secretariat, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Manila, May 1963.
Committee on Airline-Civil Aviation  
Bangkok  
October 1962

Committee on Shipping  
Manila  
October 1962

Committee on Trade Policy and Promotion  
Manila  
October 1962

Committee on Tourism  
Bangkok  
October 1962

Second Meeting of the Joint Committee of Economic Experts  
Manila  
November 1962

Second Meeting of the Joint Working Party  
Manila  
November 1962

Second Meeting of the ASA Foreign Ministers  
Manila  
April 1963

Whereas ASA has shown a cumbersome tendency to accumulate 'projects under study'\(^1\), the list of achievements is much shorter. Besides the meetings of ad hoc committees ASA can boast of only a few practical steps, together with several of a symbolic character but without great significance otherwise.

ASA Projects completed for 1961-1962\(^2\)

**Fisheries**

1. Agreement between Malaya and Thailand on fishing grounds.

**Technical co-operation**

2. Study tour on rural development in Malaya by Thai senior officials, July 1962.

\(^1\) See, for example, ASA, Report of the Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Manila, 2-4 April 1963, pp. 1-25.

\(^2\) Courtesy of ASA Secretariat, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Manila, May 1963.
3. **Study tour on social welfare and community developments in the Philippines by Malayan officials, July 1962.**

**Telecommunications**

4. Microwave link between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok through Haadyai.


**Trade Policy and promotion**

6. ASA pavilion at the International Trade Fair, Lima, Peru, in October 1961.

**Transport**

7. ASA Express - through railway coach service between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, April 1962.

**Cultural Projects**

8. Malam-ASA: performance by dance troupes of the three countries.


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Political considerations help to explain the modest significance of ASA achievements. In the first place, the Association could not change its exclusive character of pro-western arrangement: no non-aligned state indicated interest in joining; Indonesia in particular considered the ASA to be at best an unrealistic endeavour\(^1\). Secondly, no member state of ASA seemed very keen to expand the Association's

\(^1\) Dr Subandrio, as quoted in the *Bangkok Post*, 15 February 1961, p. 3.
responsibilities. The point has been made that Thailand was the 'foot-dragging' member, but the same could be said of the Philippines. After the change of administration in Manila in December 1961, President Macapagal obviously considered his territorial claim to North Borneo to be a more pressing question than the maintenance of excellent relations with Malaya. Indeed, ASA ground to a halt during the ensuing Philippine-Malay controversy in 1963.

The significance of ASA is to be found elsewhere than in those modest achievements in the fields of economic and cultural co-operation, of tourism, etc. These, however interesting and well-meaning, should rather be seen as signs of underlying political currents. President Macapagal very perceptively indicated the political functions of ASA when he spoke of the Association as a symbol of the 'aspirations of Southeast Asian peoples for the materialisation of an authentic Asian personality and independence', namely, devoid of any 'foreign' (e.g. western) tutelage; and as a 'laboratory for the forging of closer and ever more fruitful ties between neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia', namely an organization aimed at enticing new members into an all South-East Asian solidarity of states.

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1 B.K. Gordon, op. cit., p. 236.
The Philippines and the Laotian question

If there was in ASA the desire to reassert the primary responsibility of local states for South-East Asian affairs, there have been other indications of discontent with the great powers. In early 1961, in particular, official circles in the Philippines showed resentment about some features of what we have called before the 'Manila element' in South-East Asian politics. The occasion this time was the negotiation of an international settlement of the Laotian crisis.

In 1958, Laos had turned towards the right-wing and, during the following years, the weight of the U.S. and of some of its Asian followers (chiefly Thailand, but also Taiwan and South Vietnam) was thrown behind the attempts of the rightist governments to solve the Laotian question on their own terms. Successive coups d'état led in December 1960 to the formation of a new right-wing government headed by Prince Boon Oum; at the same time, rightist troops under General Phoumi Nosavan mounted an offensive aimed at defeating the pro-communist Pathet Lao and the neutralist forces under Captain Kong Lee.

Those events in Laos exercised the minds of the members of SEATO. In November 1960, during a SEATO military advisers' conference, the U.S. and Thailand held private consultations on measures to be taken to aid Phoumi's troops. Britain,
however, refused to be drawn into this affair and, on 20 December 1960 as a co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, it supported an Indian proposal to reactivate the International Commission in Laos and to convene a new Geneva conference to settle the Laotian Affair\(^1\).

Once more the low status of the Philippines inside the western camp was clear for all to see. The decision to work for the reactivation of the International Commission had been taken without prior consultation with the Asian partners of SEATO, and Secretary Serrano appeared resentful of this snub. On 30 January 1961 he delivered formal protests to the ambassadors of Britain, France and the U.S. In his words: 'the main trouble with SEATO is that it is composed of members, some of which are more NATO-minded than SEATO-wise'\(^2\).

In a spirit of defiance towards the leading powers of the free world, the Philippines announced plans for a Philippine-Pakistani-Thai conference, to be followed immediately by a conference between the Philippines, Taiwan, South Vietnam and South Korea. A joint six-country session would then be held. Pakistan and Thailand declined to attend.

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however, and the meeting eventually comprised the Foreign Ministers of the four latter countries (18-19 January 1961).

These friendly consultations on recent events in South-East Asia and the Far East 'including the Laos situation' summarise the two main aspects of the ambiguous Asian policy of the Philippines during the Garcia administration, first a willingness to play an active role among the small South-East Asian states, fearful of China, and aligned with the West, and secondly, by the same token, to express dissatisfaction with the policies of some western powers. It is significant that, in parallel with this new trend in the Asian policy of the Philippines, there was a loosening of western solidarity (evident in the Laotian crisis). During the Malaysia affair, Philippine diplomacy was to take advantage of similar differences in emphasis among western powers.

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1 Joint Communique in Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, January 1962, pp. 58-9.
CHAPTER VII

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MALAYSIA ISSUE, 1962-3
Since 1962, and even at the time of writing (mid-1964), the Malaysia issue has been amongst the main problems of South-East Asian politics. In particular, the contest for influence among several 'local' and 'outside' powers has brought about a number of international conferences, 'summit' meetings, and other attempts at keeping occasional flare-ups under international control.

The making of authoritative decisions under international auspices is by no means a new phenomenon in South-East Asia: as was abundantly shown in the preceding chapters, interventions in one or another form of foreign powers have continued unabated in the area during the contemporary period. In the case of the Philippines, we have seen that the influence of the former colonial power has remained very strong in various fields and, in the early 'sixties, no spectacular change seemed in the offing. Diosdado Macapagal, President-elect at the November 1961 polls, was generally regarded as pro-American, and he was expected to pursue a policy of close understanding with the United States.

Incidents showed, however, that, by contrast with his Nacionalista opponents' earlier allegations, Macapagal was by
no means a puppet of the U.S. On 15 May 1962, it was announced that the President was calling off his planned visit to the U.S. because of his disappointment over the failure of the Congress in Washington to enact a pending Philippine War Damage Bill\(^1\). It was also decided to celebrate in future Philippine Independence Day on June 10 (anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic in 1898) instead of July 4, a date all too reminiscent of American days.

These were indications among others of the philosophy behind the Macapagal administration. In the following months, the point was repeatedly made in Manila that Philippine arrangements with the U.S. were 'provisional in character', and that the Asian vocation of the Philippines would be earnestly cultivated. To quote Vice-President Pelaez:

> Our role is not to advance the cause of Western democracy in Asia nor to be an outpost of anybody or anything in Asia, nor least of all, to be a leader in Asia. Our role is simply to be ourselves, and as ourselves, instead of being caricatures of our former rulers, to participate honestly and conscientiously in the building of our people's welfare and happiness, and in the greatness of Asia.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Department of State Bulletin, 16 July 1962, p. 109. The bill, which was eventually passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on 1 August 1962, provided for the payment of pending Philippine war claims, for a total amount of $73 million.

\(^2\) Manila Chronicle, 19 July 1963, pp. 1, 16.
These stirrings in the Philippines were not isolated symptoms. By 1962, winds of change were blowing over South-East Asia: there appeared to develop in the area a tendency to shun foreign intervention in the area qua foreign, or at least to set limits to the political activities of outside powers. One may mention in this respect the recurring proposals for the neutralization of Cambodia and perhaps Vietnam, a step designed to keep the activities of great powers under international control. But the most significant hints came from Indonesia's policy of using the Malaysia issue as a test-case for reducing substantially the degree of foreign influence in South-East Asia. This policy was embodied in several statements, declarations of principles, and even in the creation, in August 1963 of Maphilindo, the embryo of what may become a permanent arrangement for regulating 'Malay' (or South-East Asian?) affairs in an 'Asian fashion'. This chapter will examine the part played by the Philippines in that overall review of the exercise of authority in the area.

In this analysis, it has been found useful to draw on recent studies of the functioning of political systems, and

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1 G. Modelski, "Indonesia and the Malaysia Issue", to be published in Year Book of World Affairs 1964, London.
accordingly to analyse Philippine foreign policy in terms of the functions it performed in the events which led to the establishment of Maphilindo. To borrow Easton's and Almond's coinage, we propose to investigate the input and the output functions\(^1\) performed by the Philippines, and to answer questions such as (1) How was the Philippines 'recruited' for activity in the Malaysia controversy? (2) Through which channels did Philippine diplomacy press its demands for certain regional policies? (3) How did it share in the making of political decisions?

We will rely on this set of questions to provide a plan for the chapter. Thus, following paragraphs will examine successively how:

- parochial interests, such as the situation in the Southern Philippines, and Filipino private and official claims to North Borneo, performed an input function (political socialization);

- bilateral diplomatic intercourse carried between the Philippines, and respectively the U.K., Indonesia and Malaya,

\(^1\) D. Easton has suggested that 'inputs' (political demands, and support for all or some of those demands) are converted by the processes of a political system into 'outputs' (authoritative decisions or policies). "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, April 1957, pp. 383-400. G. Almond follows a similar approach in The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton U.P., 1960, pp. 16-17.
as well as specialized international conferences, performed another input function (collection of demands and support);

- an international settlement (Maphilindo) performed, however intermittently, output functions (the making of authoritative decisions).

1 - The Southern Philippines and North Borneo

The South-Western part of the Philippines constitutes in some respects a vast border area. The great majority of the estimated 1,250,000 Muslim population of the Philippines lives in that arc described by the Sulu archipelago, and the coastal provinces of Zamboanga, Lanao and Cotabato on the Mindanao island. Over the centuries, the 'Moros' as they were known to the Spaniards, managed to safeguard a large degree of autonomy and it was only in the 1870s that Spain enforced permanent control over the Sulu Sea. In May 1899, the Spanish administration was withdrawn, and when on 20 August General J.C. Bates concluded a treaty with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, the sovereignty of Sulu passed from Spain to the U.S. On 4 July 1946, the area became part of the Republic of the Philippines.

Up to this date, solidarity among Muslim Filipinos was carefully maintained and further strengthened by a number of organizations (the Muslim Association of the Philippines, the
Knights of Mohammed, the Sulu Islamic Union, etc.) and by the establishment of religious schools even at the college level. In 1950, for example, the Maguindanao Arabic Institute and the Kamilol Islamic Colleges were founded in Marawi City.

For many centuries, the sultanate of Sulu (founded app. 1450 A.D.) had carried on relations with foreign countries. The last treaties signed between the sultan and Spain still specified that Sulu's foreign trade was not submitted to Spanish supervision. Even now, the Muslim community carries on 'international relations' of sorts with the outside world. Since admittedly inter-state relations are not necessarily implied in the sort of contact we have in mind, one could use the term 'transnational' to describe foreign relations such as the recruitment of Egyptian teachers by Moslem communities (11 were employed in the Southern Philippines as of 18 March 1963), or the arrangements of El Azhar University with the Muslim Association of the Philippines under which, by 1959, approximately 80 Filipino Muslim students were studying in Cairo. Another case of 'transnational' relations is the


informal trade carried on between Sulu ports on the one hand, and Borneo and Indonesian territory on the other.

The Philippine government has repeatedly tried to keep informal trade under control in that area. In 1952, for example, President Quirino issued an executive order (E.0.529, 5 September 1952) which allowed Muslim traders to barter, free of duties, ₱1,000 of copra per shipment, with the same value of household items bought in exchange from Sandakan and other foreign trade centres. At the same period, the Philippine Navy established the 'Sulu Sea Frontier' in order to curb piracy and smuggling.

The barter trade privilege proved, however, impossible to keep under control, and the situation was made worse by the unrest on the island of Jolo, due to the activities of armed bands of dissidents. Several administrative measures such as an administrative order (A.0.293, 7 April 1958) creating a Committee on Sulu Affairs, or E.0.293 (10 April 1958) creating PLEUSP (Presidential Law Enforcement Unit for Southern Philippines), or a temporary ban, quickly lifted, on informal trade, all proved ineffective.

The international implications of the conditions obtaining in the South did not escape notice. To quote the third 'whereas' of the executive order creating PLEUSP,

the uncontrolled traffic of persons carrying on their illegal activities through the southern
frontier of the Philippines may provide opportunities for the conduct of foreign-inspired clandestine activities inimical to our national economy, political institutions and way of life and, specially, our national security.¹

Here we come very near to what has been described as the process of political socialization: this is but the transposition to the political field of the concept of socialization, well known in social research. Political socialization refers to the way in which information about a political system is learned by the members of society². This observation is applicable to all political systems, and among them to international systems. In this sense, one may speak of international implications of the situation in the Southern Philippines as performing a function of political socialization as far as the place of the Philippines in the South-East Asian sub-system is concerned: the shape of events in the Sulu Sea provided one more channel for direct experience by the Philippines as a whole of some important aspects of South-East Asian affairs at large.

The privileged speech delivered in 1958 before the House of Representatives by a Muslim member for Cotabato, Salipada

Pendatun, showed that lingering unrest among the Muslim minority did bring one more point to the attention of Philippine diplomats. The congressman pointed to the absence of any close supervision in the border areas, though these regions constituted a 'springboard for economic and political subversion'. - Why have we not established naval and military bases in the South? The probable answer is: 'Never mind the South, it is inhabited by Muslims.' In fact, argued Pendatun, we cannot afford to underestimate this region. If and when the Philippines succeeds in claiming North Borneo, as much of its area and of the Southern Philippines as may be needed for bases should be leased to the United States:

> The geographical location of North Borneo is so strategic that naval or air forces bases there could defend the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and all countries in Southeast Asia which are on the side of democracy.1

The passing reference to North Borneo heralds the activities of an influential Muslim 'lobby' in the House, canvassing in favour of the Philippine claim in 1962-1963. At the time of Pendatun's intervention, however, North Borneo was nothing more than another local issue channelling Philippine interest in the area, and performing the same

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1 Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record*, 4 Congress, 1 session, 21 March 1958, p. 935 (House).
function of 'political socialization' as did unrest in the Sulu Sea.

The first public indication of the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in developments occurring in the North Borneo area, came as early as August 1946 when Vice-President Quirino requested the British charge d'affairs to ascertain his government's views on the status of the Turtle and Mangsee Islands. Both groups were situated at a short distance off the North Borneo coast, and were administered by the British North Borneo Company. An Anglo-American agreement of 2 January 1930 provided for the return of these islands to the United States on one year's notice in case of a request by the U.S. government. As successor state, the Philippines requested, on 19 September 1946, the return of these islands to its administration.\(^{1}\)

The U.K. asked the Philippines to reconsider the matter, alleging the importance of maintaining a lighthouse on Taganak, an island in the Turtle group. A joint British-Philippine committee made an inspection of the islands in mid-1947, but the question of the lighthouse was not solved and, without prejudice to the issue, the Philippine government took over the administration of the islands on 16

October 1947\textsuperscript{1}. A transfer ceremony was held on Taganak on 26 June 1948, with an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr Diosdado Macapagal, hoisting the Philippine flag. Several Sulu officials and Princess Tarhata Kiram of Jolo had joined the party. Following the ceremony, the Philippine delegation proceeded to Sandakan, in North Borneo, where it was treated by British officials and the Philippine community.

By that time, however, officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila (including D. Macapagal) were aware of a considerably more important claim, embracing this time substantial sections if not the whole of British North Borneo. Following the annexation of North Borneo as a British Crown Colony on 15 July 1946, a few days after the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines, a number of unpublished memoranda were prepared at the behest of the Philippine government and were kept in the Department of Foreign Affairs. On 27 February 1947, for example, the former governor of the Philippine Islands, F.B. Harrison, who had remained in the country and exercised the functions of adviser to the President, described the annexation:

\begin{quote}
without any special notice to the Sultanate of Sulu, nor consideration of their legal rights, [as] an
\end{quote}

act of political aggression, which should be promptly repudiated by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.¹

The only indication of public interest in the issue came in the House of Representatives on 28 April 1950 when seven congressmen (among them Macapagal) introduced a resolution 'expressing the sense of the Congress of the Philippines that North Borneo belongs to the heirs of the sultan of Sulu and to the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.² The Resolution which also requested the President to open negotiations on that issue, was not considered by the Senate.

In the meantime, however, the heirs of the sultan had made several attempts to reach a settlement with the British Foreign Office. In 1957, for instance, Nicasio Osmena (son of the former President Sergio Osmena) acting as attorney for the heirs, tried to negotiate for a lump sum payment as full settlement of the claim. In 1962, all the heirs transferred their rights to a 'Kiram Corporation' of which 'Nick' Osmena

² Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record, 2 Congress, 1 session, 28 April 1950, pp. 1624-31 (House).
was the president and the controlling stockholder. In August and September of the same year, Osmena's fresh attempts at reaching a private settlement and his connections with the future Brunei rebel, Sheik Azahari, made of him a very controversial figure. The claim had, in the meanwhile, become a matter of public concern.

The issue had been widely discussed when a well-circulated weekly magazine, the *Philippines Free Press*, published, from December 1961 onwards, a series of articles urging the new administration to take the claim into consideration. On 5 February 1962, the heirs took the decisive step of requesting the Philippine government to intervene in their favour, and, a few weeks later, their move was followed by a new congressional resolution. Sponsored by the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 'Ramos Resolution' urged the President of the Philippines 'to take the necessary steps for the recovery of a certain portion of the island of Borneo and adjacent islands which appertain to the Philippines'. President Macapagal's decision was known a few weeks later when, on 23 June, he requested the British


Government to open negotiations with the Philippines on the North Borneo question.

This is not the place to engage in a thorough legal discussion of the points set forth by the Philippines, or by Britain. Suffice it to mention here that, in its broad outline, the Philippine claim to North Borneo, or to coastal sections thereof, turns on whether (1) Sulu, formerly a sovereign state, ceded (as contended by Britain) or leased (as maintained by the Philippines) territories to a British company in 1878; (2) the British Government which had continued to make annual payments to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, had the right to create a Crown Colony of North Borneo on 10 July 1946; (3) the Republic of the Philippines is lawful heir to any proprietary, sovereignty and jurisdictional rights which the Sultan of Sulu enjoyed over sections of North Borneo. At any rate, there were soon indications that the claim was interpreted in broad political terms rather than as a territorial dispute of local interest. In other words, it became increasingly clear that the Philippines was to play a part in the general reassessment of international affairs which was taking place in South-East Asia. As will be seen in the following paragraph, this important political function of recruitment was performed by those diplomatic negotiations, apparently unrelated at times, which involved the
Philippines with some of the main powers interested in South-East Asian affairs.

2 - Diplomatic negotiations

Philippines-United Kingdom

After Macapagal's request for negotiations, seven months elapsed before Philippine-U.K. conversations were held in London. In the meantime both the Philippines, and in a lesser measure, Britain tried to secure advantages by these various manoeuvres, probings, exploratory statements, etc., which are of the essence in 'tacit bargaining' situations (see above, chapter IV).

British diplomacy, for its part, tried to discourage the Philippines from pursuing its claim by giving a political connotation to what might have seemed hitherto to be a legal issue. Even before the Philippine government had made its position clear, a British aide-memoire of 24 May 1962, suggested that a dispute about Sabah (North Borneo) would have undesirable repercussions in Malaya and Borneo, and would ultimately 'impair the stability of South-East Asia and the capacity of the peoples concerned for resolute united resistance to Communist encroachment and subversion'. The Philippine government were advised that 'a continuance of their present policy of restraint will be as much in the interests
of the Philippines as in those of the peace and stability of South-East Asia.\(^1\)

Manila came to regard this statement as 'patronizing', and indeed seemed ready to question Britain's understanding of the stability of South-East Asia. On 27 July 1962, President Macapagal called for the formation of a Confederation of Greater Malaya 'to supersede the British-proposed Federation of Malaysia'. The Confederation would include the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the three Borneo territories, and, at some later stage, it might be open to Indonesia as well. The accent was put on the merits of an 'Asian project', as distinct from an European one.\(^2\)

There was in Macapagal's proposal the avowed desire to pique the United Kingdom which had abstained from answering the Philippine note of 22 June. There was also some resentment at being sneered at as an importunate trouble-maker: in the President's emotional words, his project was 'a decisive proof against the sophistry and deception of those who would accuse us of trying to sabotage Malaysia'. The formula also reflected the groping for a 'respectable' phrasing of Philippine objections, hence the reference to the 'great arc

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\(^1\) "White Book", op. cit., p. 151.

of islands consisting of the Philippine archipelago, North Borneo, Singapore, and the Malay peninsula. As seen earlier (chapter III), since a similar notion of a 'defensive perimeter running from the Ryukyu Islands and the Aleutians off Alaska down to the Philippines' had been sanctioned ex cathedra by Acheson in 1950, and later on in the fifties by Eisenhower and Magsaysay, thinking on similar terms, Macapagal could hope that his formula could also win acceptance among the standing policies of the 'free world'.

In short, Macapagal was not happy with Britain's attitude. In his own words, the President did not want 'any non-Malay nation to interfere in the formation of Malayan unions. The unity of Malay peoples is the business of the Malay peoples'.

This formula of a 'Malay' solution was later on repeated in various forms. It was to evoke considerable appeal in Indonesia, for it might allow Djakarta to exert preponderant influence in any settlement of the Malaysia issue. Furthermore, the insistence that there was something reprehensible in 'outside' interference - British, in this context - was obviously calculated to weaken the U.K.'s bargaining position. For all its topicality, Macapagal's formula had the additional advantage of being couched in terms likely to secure a degree of international support: was it not a familiar feature of
international politics that powers were considered as entitled to claim primary concern in the affairs of their region.\(^1\)

Macapagal's proposal came as a straw in the wind. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, stopping over in Manila a few days later, commented favourably on the views of the President. In November, a few weeks before taking a public stand on the Malaysia issue, President Sukarno passed through Manila and had an exchange of views with President Macapagal on developments in the Borneo territories.

In another attempt at strengthening its hand vis-à-vis the U.K., Manila offered semi-official patronage to A.M. Azahari, the chairman of Brunei's Party Rakjat. The views of Azahari, as he expounded them in the course of a speech at a Manila university on 21 November, seem to have found favour among those in the Philippines holding anti-Malaysian as well as anti-Chinese opinions. The Malaysia scheme, argued Azahari, would invite, rather than deter communist infiltration, thanks to the large left-leaning Chinese community living in the proposed Federation.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The similar line "of an African solution to African problems" has been forcefully expounded by a number of African nationalists, such as Nkrumah. See his book *I Speak of Freedom*, London, Heinemann, 1961, p. 267.

\(^2\) *Manila Times*, 22 November 1962, p. 4.
The December 8 rebellion in Brunei gave a dramatic turn to the Malaysia affair. Indonesia announced its support for the rebels, and the ambiguous attitude of the Philippines was given prominence by the activities in Manila of the leaders of the movement, Azahari and Zaini bin Ahmad.

Britain chose this moment to attempt, belatedly perhaps, to conciliate the Philippines. On 29 December 1962, it invited a Philippine delegation for consultations in London. The question of North Borneo was not specifically mentioned, but the note suggested that the two governments 'being vitally concerned in the security and stability of South-East Asia' discuss questions of 'mutual interest'.

Together with his ready acceptance of conversations with the British, Macapagal gave a new turn to his manoeuvres designed to weaken the U.K.'s position as he showed indications of his desire to pave the way for a Philippine-Indonesian entente, rather than for a rapprochement with Britain. Thus, on 28 January 1963, while the talks were beginning in London, the President addressed the Congress in the course of his annual 'State of the Nation' message, and engaged in a sharp criticism of the Malaysia scheme. The proposed Federation was not in accordance with the principle of self-determination,
argued the President who seemed to adopt Indonesian views when he further stated that Malaysia was 'a continuation of colonialism based only on an expedient of false security'\(^1\). Meanwhile, in London, Vice-President Pelaez expounded the policy of the Philippines by submitting, alongside the lines previously indicated by President Macapagal, that the Philippine claim 'involves political and security considerations of the highest importance': Malaysia would hardly be a viable federation - the scheme was 'shot through with mutual suspicions and jealousies and animosities and fears', it had already 'brought about disturbances and unrest in our region', worse, it had been sold as an anti-Indonesia venture. In short, there was no reason to hope that Malaysia would be any more successful than British attempts at federal unions in the Caribbean and Central Africa. North Borneo could be more effectively defended 'with the positive collaboration and active support of neighbouring South-East Asian countries'.

The long-range solution would call for a more permanent accommodation among the three Malay countries, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, so that together they may be able to achieve a better life in larger freedom for their peoples through a new found spirit of unity and co-operation. These three Malay countries must rediscover a new

\(^1\) Republic of the Philippines, 5 Congress, 2 session, 28 January 1963, State of the Nation, p. 42.
sense of common destiny and brotherhood, and they can best do so under the inspiration of the Bandung Declaration which committed the free nations of Asia and Africa to the principle of self-determination of peoples and to the final liquidation of imperialism in all its forms and manifestations.¹

The conference adjourned on 1 February without practical results except for some token agreement on Anglo-Philippine naval co-operation in patrolling the Southern expanses of the Sulu Sea. By that time, however, the main objective of Philippine diplomacy was to seek support for its stand among South-East Asian countries. The attitude of Indonesia was crucial in this respect.

Philippines-Indonesia rapprochement

Philippine-Indonesian relations had markedly improved since the quelling of the Permesta rebellion in 1958-1959. It will be recalled that, in early 1959, Indonesia had shown wariness towards the Philippine-Malay proposals to form a Pan-Malayan economic union, which Djakarta regarded as objectionable because of its political overtones. On that occasion, however, the Philippines had given several indications of its willingness to place the relations between the two countries on a new footing. There was, for example, the trip

¹ "White Book", op. cit., p. 19.
to Indonesia of Senator E. Pelaez (11-19 March 1959) in the course of which the future Vice-President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs had opportunities to meet President Sukarno, Premier Djuanda, Subandrio, and other high-ranking officials. Later in the year (22 September-1 October) Senator Recto also made a tour of Indonesia, pressing the case for increasing co-operation between the two 'sister-nations'.

The more significant indications of a Philippine-Indonesian rapprochement are to be found in a number of negotiated arrangements. In 1959 (28 April) there was signed in Manila a cultural agreement between the two countries1. Implementation was, however, delayed until 1962. In October 1959, the Philippines requested Indonesia to open negotiations for the solution of the standing problems of devising ways to check illegal immigration and smuggling in the Southern Philippines. A joint panel was formed in April 1960 and quick progress was registered, especially after the visit to Manila of Admiral Martadinata, chief of staff of the Indonesian Navy. On 27 July 1960, finally, an agreement was announced in which the two governments decided on coordinated enforcement of

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law by the Indonesian Navy and the Philippine Navy in the border area.

The Macapagal administration carried this still cautious 'Good Neighbourhood' policy some steps further. Foreign Secretary Pelaez appeared keen to improve Philippine relations with Indonesia: according to him, his first act in the foreign office in January 1962 was to assure Indonesia that the Philippines would not allow the U.S. to use its bases in the country for helping the Dutch in New Guinea, provided that Indonesia for her part allowed no 'alien' bases in her own territory. But it was later in the year that the Philippine-Indonesian rapprochement took a new significance. Not long after Macapagal's call for a 'Confederation of Greater Malaya', a congressional delegation headed by the Speaker of the House, Cornelio T. Villareal, paid a visit to Indonesia (23-29 September 1962). Another token of goodwill came in February-March 1963, when considerable attention was devoted in the Philippines to the implementation of the 1960 agreement: in pursuance of this accord, an Indonesian Navy transport called at several ports of the Southern Philippines and collected Indonesian migrants who had illegally settled

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in this area; by mid-March, the R.I.Morotai had embarked 1,510 repatriates. Simultaneously, a destroyer repatriated 20 Filipino Muslims from Tarakan to Sulu.

These steps, coming in the midst of the Malaysia issue, as well as the failure of the London talks, gave rise to lively discussions. As is the rule in Manila when the political elite tries to reach a consensus, the debate was carried on in the committees and on the floor of Congress, in addresses at university rallies or before such associations as the Rotary Club, in the newspapers columns, and at breakfast conferences at Malacanang (the Presidential palace). There is no doubt that the preceding years of 'rebirth of Philippine identity with Asia' helped President Macapagal to muster a fair amount of domestic support for his interventions in South-East Asian politics. His policy was, however, widely debated: the failure of the Philippine panel to obtain any concession from the British side during the London talks had dramatized the isolation of the Republic from its traditional western allies. On which unknown courses would Macapagal steer the country?

The signal for self-examination was given by an influential member of Congress, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, Nacionalista chairman of the Upper House's Foreign Affairs Committee. On 5 February 1963, and later on in the course of
a speech to the Senate, he caused a sensation by lashing out at President Macapagal for the 'debacle' of the Philippine panel at London. In the Senator's florid vocabulary, the accusations of colonialism brought against the proposed Malaysia, were nothing but a 'colossal faux pas, another precipitate blunder of President Macapagal'. The claim to North Borneo was judged 'thoughtless' and had unnecessarily jeopardized the 'free world's posture in South-East Asia.'

This criticism drew sharp rejoinders from the President himself (who found the senator's expose 'flimsy, paradoxical, and even ridiculous') and from congressional and press quarters.

However, other vocal critics of the President's policies also made their voices heard. The former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, published some articles in the newspapers; a Quezon City councillor, Carlos Albert, former intelligence chief of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) wrote in the press a 'Warning to All' and testified in congressional committees on what he saw as the 'dangerous course' followed by Philippine diplomacy. Several columnists

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2 Ibid., 20 January 1963, pp. 1, 5, 12.
also joined the fray. On the other side of the fence, the Speaker of the House, Villareal, congressmen Godofredo Ramos and Jovito Salonga, and Ambassador Arreglado, were among the most articulate supporters of President Macapagal's 'pro-Asian' line.

There is no doubt that partisan considerations were prominent: both Serrano and Sumulong were influential members of the opposition Nacionalista Party, whereas Villareal, Ramos and Salonga were all stalwarts of the ruling Liberal Party. Yet the discussion carried wider overtones insofar as, under the cover of scrutinizing the security requirements of the country, it focussed on the problem of 'legitimate' interventions in South-East Asian affairs.

Serrano, for example, based his argument on the assumption that the Philippine claim to North Borneo was essentially amenable to judicial settlement: the dispute, therefore, should be strictly confined on legal grounds, so as not to disrupt the 'free world's alignments in the area. Moreover, Serrano was inclined to think that friendly SEATO partners, like the U.S. and perhaps Thailand, might intercede on behalf of the Philippines, and persuade the U.K. to accept an International Court of Justice ruling on the Borneo case. Were the Philippines to toe Indonesia's line, it stood no chance of taking advantage of these influential mediations. On the
contrary, argued the former Secretary, veiled threats and a 'confrontation' policy would only stiffen British convictions¹.

These suggestions implied that Indonesia, besides being an altogether disreputable bed-fellow, carried no great weight in international affairs, and lacked direct access to the powers-that-be in the area, namely, the U.S. and the U.K. However, it seemed to Serrano that Indonesia posed a long-range threat to its small neighbours, a view not uncommonly held in the Philippines. In January 1963, for example, it became a matter of public knowledge in Manila that some military circles entertained serious misgivings about Indonesia's strength. Shortly after Albert had published his 'Warning to All', Camp Murphy (Headquarters of the AFP) let it be known that a battalion, hitherto stationed in Central Luzon for 'anti-dissident drives', would be redeployed in Mindanao. Moreover, for the first time, amphibious and airborne exercises were announced in the Southern Philippines. Finally, it was disclosed that, at the monthly meeting of the 'U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Board', the Philippine chief

of staff, General Santos and Admiral Welsh, U.S. representative, had studied Indonesia's military capacity.

It was in the midst of these speculations that General Santos left for Djakarta, accompanied by the AFP intelligence chief, Blas Alejandre. Although Santos did not visit any military installation during his seven-day visit (21-28 January), his two interviews with President Sukarno and his contacts with military leaders seem to have satisfied him that, in his words, 'Indonesia has no expansionist ambitions, but is only interested in protecting what is her own'. At any rate, following his return, the Armed Forces spokesmen stopped expressing publicly any lingering worries they may have entertained.

Among the 'civilians' too, the debate drew to an end, at least for the time being. The Free Press carried a good popular account of what it presented as the reaction of the politically informed public, and worth quoting here at some length to indicate something of the atmosphere prevailing in Manila:

Surely, Philippine security is involved in what happens in South-East Asia. Previously, however, the destiny of South-East Asia was being decided by

1 Ibid., 22 January 1963, p. 8.
2 Ibid., 28 January 1963, pp. 1, 16.
everybody but the Philippines; the Philippines was supposed to have nothing to do with it. It was just an American satellite. It thought of itself - let us face it - as just that; and nothing more...

With its opposition, right or wrong, to Malaysia, the Philippines is giving notice to all whom it may concern that what happens in South-East Asia is its affair. We can't bury our heads in the sand, and we won't.

The same argument was repeated elsewhere, sometimes in more sophisticated terms. In particular, an address by Speaker Villareal on 7 April along those lines was generally seen as constituting a turning point in the controversy. By early April, the debate was over. Outwardly at least, a consensus had been reached on the general proposition that the Philippines, together with Indonesia, was destined to play a vital role for the establishment and maintenance of an 'Asian' order in South-East Asia.

3 - Towards an 'Asian' settlement

The function of collecting, aggregating, or otherwise taking account of political demands within a system, may be performed by various types of associations, groups, institutions, or simply by temporary coalitions of interests meeting on an ad hoc basis².

After the failure of the London talks, Philippine diplomacy was set on paving the way for the establishment of a specialized structure of the latter type. Thus, on his way back to Manila, Pelaez suggested (13 February 1963) a South-East Asian 'summit', with Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines working out an 'Asian' (read: non-British) solution to the Malaysia issue. From a Philippine point of view, this proposal was very appealing: it was likely to attract good response from Indonesia; by promoting an all South-East Asian arrangement, Manila could take advantage of Indonesia's growing restiveness towards the Malaysia project, while isolating the U.K. and perhaps securing a degree of American sympathy for a scheme which might deter Indonesia from following an extreme course in international affairs; finally, by setting a pattern for the settlement of local conflicts, Philippine diplomacy could hope to play an instrumental part in bringing parties together, and would thus find support for its claim to a say in regional affairs.

Pelaez' hint did not rally at once all interested powers. Thailand for one would have preferred to entrust the issue to the United Nations. As for Malaya and Indonesia, an intensive diplomatic campaign proved necessary before bringing them together with the Philippines to a conference table. Let us see how all parties concerned made extensive use of
regional organizations (like the Association of Southeast Asia, ASA, and ECAFE) and of diplomatic channels to sort out their views on the possibility of an international settlement of the Malaysia issue.

ECAFE

Despite terms of reference which seem to confine them to economic and technical functions only, some international bodies perform political functions as well. ECAFE, for example, provides a forum for nations anxious to bid for international approval for their development policies: the forceful statements of the Soviet delegates in ECAFE's conferences are typical in this respect. On occasions, a session may also be seized upon as a handy meeting ground for circulating and formulating political demands.

Such a contingency occurred during the ECAFE's 19th session (Manila, 5-18 March 1963), with the Philippines in a good position to offer its mediation services: the 'truly noble and ever loyal city of Manila' was quickly becoming, in the elated terms of President Macapagal, 'a centre for discussion and negotiation of the problems of the region'.

Republic of the Philippines, Malacanang News Release, 2 April 1963, p. 2 (President's Remarks at ASA Dinner).
Indeed the 19th session attracted an unprecedented number of high-ranking officials. Breaking with a well-established tradition, the Foreign Ministers of Australia and of Indonesia, and the Deputy Premier of Malaya came in person while President Macapagal and Secretary Pelaez (though confined to hospital) were, of course, readily available for consultations with the delegates.

There are good reasons to believe that this distinguished rally in Manila was motivated by the new turn taken by Philippine-Indonesian relations, dramatized at the end of February by the announcement of a forthcoming visit of President Sukarno to the Philippines. At any rate, on the eve of their departure for Manila, Tun Abdul Razak, from Kuala Lumpur, and Foreign Minister Subandrio from Djakarta, both expressed confidence in their policy of cementing good relations with the Philippines. The intervention of Australia also worked into the hands of Philippine diplomacy. In Manila, Sir Garfield Barwick held conversations with Philippine and Indonesian officials and, whilst making no secret of Australia's friendship with Malaya, its close Commonwealth neighbour, he endorsed President Macapagal's formula for a tri-partite conference on Malaysia. This plan, made public on 9 March, was based on the assumption that both the Philippines and Indonesia had a 'legitimate' interest in
the Malaysia project:

The projected Federation of Malaysia without consultation with Indonesia and the Philippines would plant the seed of eternal discord because it is strongly opposed by two of the three countries concerned...The future status and security [of Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak] should be guaranteed jointly by the three countries concerned [namely, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines].

In the following days, Malaya and Indonesia announced that they would send representatives to preliminary discussions to be held in Manila at the sub-ministerial level.

ASA

From the moment the Philippines claimed North Borneo, the future of ASA had become the subject of speculative comment. As seen earlier, the Association formally at least was non-political in scope. Yet as early as the April 1962 Foreign Ministers' conference in Kuala Lumpur, Vice-President Pelaez had touched on the question of North Borneo in the course of an informal conversation with the Tungku. At that time, it was by no means certain that the Philippines would dispute sovereignty (as distinct from proprietary) rights on that territory, but the Tungku made it clear that he would welcome the inclusion of North Borneo in Malaysia, on a

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1 Ibid., 9 March 1963 (Malaysia, Borneo).
'clean slate' only. In the following months, the official posture of Malaya remained one of detachment: the dispute involved Britain and the Philippines only, Malaya was not directly concerned. This line was repeated during an informal exchange of views between ASA member countries in New York (4 October 1962)\(^1\).

This outwardly neutral stand did not prevent the Malayan Premier from expressing his displeasure about the turn of events in Manila, and there were hints that he might not attend the forthcoming ASA conference scheduled there for November 1962. The November meeting had finally to be called off. In the following weeks, the activities of Azahari in Manila during the Brunei uprising did nothing to improve the climate between Malaya and the Philippines.

Both sides nevertheless tried on several occasions to use ASA as a means of marshalling support for their respective policies. The Tungku, for one, attempted to secure concessions from the Philippines, in exchange for Malaya's continued participation in the association. He also tried to take advantage of British and American pressures, allegedly brought to bear on the Philippines, for the sake of unity.

\(^1\) *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Bangkok, October-November 1962, p. 178.
among the ASA partners. President Macapagal, for his part, hinted that the Malaysia scheme was jeopardizing the future of the association. Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman also took advantage of the ASA connection to offer its services to the two contending partners.

The process of sorting out Malayan and Philippine policies was carried a step further in the course of the April 1963 ASA ministerial meeting. A few weeks earlier, Indonesia and Malaya had announced their readiness to hold tri-partite discussions with the Philippines. The Premier of Malaya, who had finally agreed to attend the conference, arrived in Manila in the midst of rumours that he would try to coax the Philippine government into siding with the Federation, against Indonesia, during the forthcoming negotiations.

To generate support among the ASA members, the Tungku used the opening session as a platform for airing his differences with Indonesia. In the presence of the Indonesian ambassador in Manila, Nazir D. Pamontjak, he made oblique references to a nation 'embittered by bad treatment in the past which finds it difficult to eradicate this bitterness

2 Ibid., 2 April 1963, p. 1.
from the mind\(^1\). The reaction of the outspoken Manila press was not very favourable: headlines accused the Tungku of uselessly fanning discords in South-East Asia - 'Tungku sparks new crisis', 'ASA Meet off to shaky start', while there were reports that President Macapagal was alarmed by the opening speech of the Tungku\(^2\).

Indeed the President lost no time in making his views clear with respect to the situation in South-East Asia. In the course of a dinner at Malacanang (2 April), he addressed the delegates to the conference on the subject of Asian solidarity. In the President's words, 'the distinctive, significant and far-reaching quality of ASA is that it is an association constituted exclusively by South-East Asian nations'. This was a first step in what Macapagal regarded as the right direction, namely, the making of decisions without the interference of 'foreign' powers. Though he did not cite any country by name, the inference was clear:

While others in their interest or from some other irresistible cause may leave Asia, South-East Asian nations are, by the mandate of God and geography, stuck among themselves and therefore are called upon as early as possible to work out

\(^1\) ASA, Report of the Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Manila, April 2-4, 1963, p. 29.
among themselves their own relationship and their harmonized and aggregate destinies.\footnote{Republic of the Philippines, \textit{Malacanang News Release}, 2 April 1963.}

During the four-day conference, President Macapagal and the Tungku held several private meetings in which they discussed the problems of 'security and stability' in South-East Asia. Apparently, the Prime Minister of Malaya found it expedient to rally to the Philippines' understanding of what constituted a 'legitimate' ruling on the Malaysia issue, namely, only the three countries of 'Malay origin', Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, would be qualified to maintain 'peace and freedom' in their region\footnote{Republic of the Philippines, \textit{Department of Foreign Affairs Press Release}, 4 April 1963.} - a formula which cast doubts on British activities in the area.

Diplomatic channels

By early April 1963, Philippine diplomacy had thus reached a position where all parties concerned in the Malaysia issue had endorsed Manila's claim to take part in the settlement of the issue. Philippine efforts at 'mediating' obtained a first measure of success with the holding of a conference at the sub-ministerial level among the three 'Malay' states.
Meeting in a committee of 12 (each representative was assisted by three advisers), the conference held eight sessions in Manila, from 9 to 17 April 1963, during which it prepared a provisional agenda for a proposed Foreign Ministers' meeting in May. The joint communique issued after the talks referred vaguely to a general exchange of views on common problems.

Although the very holding of this conference was an achievement of sorts, several incidents shortly followed which reminded the observers of the very loose character of any South-East Asian entente. In a matter of weeks, the three countries, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, met with 'foreign' powers to discuss the new developments in the region. These briefings occurred in official conferences, such as the annual meeting of SEATO in Paris (8-10 April), or the British-Malayan talks on defence which opened in London on 13 May. Other exchanges of views were held in the course of official visits. For example, Chairman Liu Shao-shi of China paid a state visit to Indonesia (12-20 April), Vice-President Pelaez and Malaya's Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak made separate trips to the United States at the end of April, and there were several consultations held in Asian capitals as well.

These meetings showed that South-East Asian states were still acknowledging other countries' interest in the affairs
of the region. In Paris, for instance, although the Laotian question loomed large on the agenda, the SEATO powers made an assessment of Indonesian foreign policy goals. In the course of this discussion, Pelaez gave his views on the new Philippine-Indonesian relationship, in terms which caused a furore in Indonesia. On the same occasion, however, Pelaez reminded the western members of SEATO that Asian states resented not being consulted on matters of regional interest, and he complained that the Malaysia project had been undertaken without prior consultation with Manila.

Shortly after the SEATO conference, Pelaez visited Washington and made a call on President Kennedy (23 April), in the hope of obtaining American blessing to Philippine initiatives in South-East Asia. The following day, Tun Abdul Razak, who had declined to meet the Philippine Vice-President, was also received at the White House, with a view to securing American support, for Kuala Lumpur this time.

Amidst these consultations with their 'great and powerful friends', South-East Asian diplomats remained active on the local scene as well. Philippine-Malayan, Philippine-Indonesia, and Indonesian-Malayan exchanges of views were held in quick succession. After the conclusion of the tri-partite

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Manila Times, 12 April 1963, pp. 1, 3, 6.
talks in Manila, Malaya once more attempted to reach a bilateral understanding with the Philippines, in exchange perhaps for a compromise proposal on North Borneo. However, 'political circles' in Malaya still seemed to hold that there was no real opposition to Malaysia from the part of the Philippines.\(^1\)

In the meantime, both Djakarta and Manila were making fresh attempts at cementing their entente. In March 1963, before and after the ECAFE session, Philippine and Indonesian panels held 'exploratory talks' in Manila. Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito Kusumowidagdo headed the Indonesian delegation and Under-Secretary Salvador P. Lopez represented the Philippines. Five meetings were held between 2 and 29 March 1963, 'on the problems raised by Malaysia and the proposed Asian "summit"' and on 'various questions of mutual interest', viz., further implementation of the 1956 Immigration Agreement and of the 1959 Cultural Agreement; promotion of bilateral trade and economic co-operation in the fields of copra production and industrial development; and relaxation of visa requirements for visiting nationals of both countries.\(^2\)

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In line with this courtship policy, various other tokens were exchanged in the political, economic, or simply humanitarian fields. Thus, in March, the Philippines despatched to Bali (stricken by an eruption of the Agung volcano) a rescue team, together with a group of doctors and nurses and three plane loads of medical supplies. Later in April, five Philippine delegates were encouraged to attend the Asian-African Journalists' Conference (AAJC) in Djakarta (24-30 April 1963). This would have passed unnoticed had it not constituted a rare breach in the standing policy of the Philippine government not to allow any Filipino citizen to attend a communist-inspired meeting1. Yet, in this case, President Macapagal even sent a message of greetings to the AAJC.

Finally, for the first time, the Philippine government sponsored an economic and trade mission. Secretary Rufino G. Hechanova, a member of the Cabinet, very close to the President, led a delegation of high government officials and commercial and industrial entrepreneurs to Indonesia (22-27 May 1963), an event the 'historic significance' of which was

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1 The idea for the Asian-African Journalists' Conference was launched at the annual Congress of the International Organization of Journalists, held in Budapest in 1959. Most of the delegates to the Djakarta Conference were of communist leanings, with the exception, however, of the representatives from India, Malaya, and the Philippines. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 May 1963, pp. 421-2.
underlined by President Macapagal. A joint communique signed in Djakarta on 27 May, announced that the two governments had agreed on a number of concrete measures, namely; a trade agreement for a minimum level of total trade of U.S.$30 million annually, an agreement on economic and technical co-operation covering the setting-up of joint ventures in Indonesia on the basis of production sharing, agreements creating a joint Philippine-Indonesian coconut commission, and a joint commission on air transport.\(^1\)

In more direct connection with the Malaysia issue, President Sukarno made a stop-over visit to Manila on 23 May. Invited to a breakfast conference in Malacanang, he agreed with President Macapagal to continue paving the ground for a 'summit' meeting. Both Presidents were reported in complete agreement on 'the goal of understanding and harmony between Malay peoples as the genuine foundation for the peace and stability of their region'.\(^2\)

The Sukarno-Tungku meeting in Tokyo (31 May-1 June) was, however, the most decisive in this series of diplomatic negotiations. It was decided between the two leaders that they

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would thrash out their differences around a conference table in Manila, and would in the meanwhile refrain from 'acrimonious attacks'.

The stage was now set for the opening of high-level discussions, with the Philippines in the position of a mediator. The function of mediating between contestants in international affairs carries great political significance. It is sometimes fulfilled by a third country enjoying a position of authority: for example, in January 1941, Japan offered to act as mediator in the Thailand-Indochina border conflict; the acceptance of this proposal by both parties was interpreted as a signal diplomatic triumph for Japan, and as a major step towards the establishment of a 'new order' under the leadership of Japan in South-East Asia. A mediating state may also rest its case on the desirability of maintaining solidarity among the parties: the Philippine mediation in the Malaysia dispute belongs to this latter category.

This appeared clearly in the tri-partite ministerial conference which opened in Manila on 7 June 1963. In his

1 While in Tokyo, the Tungku briefed Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and Philippine Ambassador, M. Mendez, on the results of the 'little summit', Malay Mail, 4 June 1963, p. 1.
2 M. Sivaram, Mekong Clash and Far East Crisis, Bangkok, 1941, pp. 115-22.
address at the opening ceremony, Pelaez concentrated on mobilizing Indonesian and Malayan acceptance of fundamental norms which should regulate intercourse among 'sister Asian nations'. He tried to marshal support around symbols (the alleged common origin and common destiny of 'Malay' peoples), around desirable long-term objectives (to establish in South-East Asia an area of stability sustained primarily by joint efforts of Asian nations), and around some specific policies as well (a 'Malay Confederation' including the three countries and the Borneo territories which would allow for a just and expeditious settlement of all misunderstandings). As befitted his role, Pelaez refrained from any comment on the divisive elements between the three countries and rather tried to find a basis for unanimous consent.

As their very presence in Manila indicated it, neither Tun Abdul Razak nor Dr Subandrio was disposed to challenge this position of mediation. The conference fell short of Pelaez' more sanguine expectations. After several 'brutally frank' ministerial meetings at the Quezon City residence of Vice-President Pelaez, the three ministers agreed to submit a document ('Report and Recommendations') to their respective heads of government for approval. The 'Report' includes several tokens of recognition of the mediation services provided by the Philippines. Thus, Dr Subandrio and Tun Abdul
Razak brought their support to the so-called 'Macapagal Plan' and they called accordingly for the establishment of machinery enabling the three governments to hold 'regular consultations at all levels'. This new scheme to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo would implement these fundamentals agreed upon earlier by Pelaez and Subandrio, viz., in the words of the 'Report':

the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation.\(^1\)

For all practical purposes, this norm entailed a measure of supervision over Malayan projects. Indonesia and the Philippines declared their readiness to welcome Malaysia, provided that an impartial authority (the Secretary-General of the United Nations) ascertained the support of the people of the Borneo territories.

The Philippines' relationship with the two other parties to the 'Report' was somewhat qualified by some special reference to the North Borneo claim. The Ministers took note of the 'right of the Philippines to continue to pursue [the claim] in accordance with international law'. Furthermore, bridges

\(^1\) Report and Recommendations of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, Manila, 7-11 June 1963 (mimeo.). (emphasis added).
were kept up, since the Philippines expressly envisaged the creation of Malaysia. Art.13 of the 'Report' reads: 'in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation', both governments 'should maintain harmony and the friendly relations' subsisting in the border region. Indonesia was not a party to this undertaking.

By and large, observers seemed puzzled by the outcome of the conference. In Manila, there was elation at the new acceptance won by the Philippines in South-East Asia. The officials at the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs pointed out Indonesia's agreement to join two 'committed' countries within a common consultative body. A leading non-aligned country thus publicly acknowledged that the Philippines was nobody's stooge, but a fully independent country, qualifying for membership in the rally of 'new emerging forces'.

Soon after the conference, however, Indonesia resumed its cold war against Malaya. The occasion was the announcement in London (9 July 1963) that agreements concerning Malaysia had been signed by the Tungku, the Prime Minister of

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1 President Sukarno observed that the Indonesian form of 'guided democracy' was also adopted in other emerging countries, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, *Manila Chronicle*, 6 July 1963, pp. 1, 14.
Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, and the British Government on behalf of Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); for the time being at least, Brunei was not to join the Federation. Soon afterwards, a 'Readiness Fleet' (Armada Siaga) was formally commissioned in Madura on 15 July, and it was presently proclaimed that Indonesia was preparing for combined naval and air forces exercises in the South China Sea under the direct supervision of General Nasution. Sukarno made it clear, meanwhile, that if he was to attend a 'summit' conference in Manila, 'it would merely be in the framework of the confrontation policy Indonesia was practising at the time'. The 'summit' conference would have to consecrate Indonesia's authority in the area by 'wrecking' Malaysia: this would demonstrate that in Foreign Minister Subandrio's own terms, 'changes in countries surrounding Indonesia will not run smoothly unless we are asked to negotiate'.

It seems, however, that the Indonesian government was convinced of the favourable outlook of the Philippines. It is significant, for example, that the government-controlled press in Djakarta reproduced two letters from President Macapagal and Vice-President Pelaez, pleading Philippine

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2 Quoted in *Straits Times*, 7 August 1963, p. 18.
co-operation for the elimination of 'remaining pockets of colonialism' in South-East Asia.

Eventually, on 30 July 1963, President Macapagal was able to open the first conference of Heads of Government of 'Malay' countries. The image was created of Macapagal striving to make Malaya responsive to a certain vision of Asian solidarity, as a prerequisite for Indonesian and Philippine blessings. The President established himself as an interpreter of Indonesian demands, in short as a legitimate umpire in South-East Asia, and this could not fail to strike vividly Philippine imagination. As a popular columnist, I.P. Soliongco, put it:

One can imagine that he [Macapagal] must have spoken in the manner of a seer and mystic of how rosy the future would be for the peoples of Southeast Asia if they lived under the banner of Maphilindo.

Upon his arrival in Manila, President Sukarno had reportedly told Macapagal: 'You will do the work'. How did Macapagal do the work?

The Proceedings of the Conference - both 'summit' and Foreign Ministers' sessions - were held in an informal

atmosphere. Later on, in the course of an interview, Foreign Secretary Salvador P. Lopez has recreated vividly a working session held between the three Foreign Ministers:

Malay diplomacy is unique...Its informality is a racial characteristic...We followed no set rules of procedure. We just let meetings run on; whenever we hit a snag we adjourned. Then we met again after private consultations. Sometimes the three of us would be talking and one would say to another: "Can I have a word with you?" and leave the third one out of it! Now that has never been done before. In Western diplomacy it would be unthinkable, it would be terrible. But Subandrio would tell Kai Boh [Senator Khaw Kai Boh, Minister without Portfolio in the Malayan Cabinet], "Lopez and I would like to work on this", and we would go to one corner of the room and leave Kai Boh waiting alone - and there was no resentment, no hurt feelings. It was informal. When a problem looked insoluble we adjourned to a restaurant or night club. That was the best part of diplomacy. That was why the meetings lasted until late at night. At the night spots, they became more relaxed: the ice was broken.1

This colourful document should not obscure the hard bargaining which took place in Manila, with Malaya vying to cede as little ground as possible to its two partners. There were threatening notices from Indonesia (Indonesian exercises were being held in the South China Sea). At the Conference table, Dr Subandrio made it clear that the aim of Indonesia was to 'take the British flavour out of the establishment of Malaysia'. In this, he was seconded by the Philippines, in

1 Ibid., p. 42.
the conference as well as in the outspoken Manila Press. The Kennedy administration, meanwhile, showed considerable caution as it welcomed negotiation between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, without mentioning the projected Malaysia by name.

These different factors weighted in Malaya's decision to yield on a capital point. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, or his representative, would 'ascertain prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia the wishes of the people of Sabah [North Borneo] and Sarawak', taking into consideration but 'nevertheless further examining and verifying' the recent elections. The survey would be made, pursuant to the United Nations resolution on self-determination, reference to which constituted another Malayan concession. Moreover, observers sent by the three governments would witness the carrying out of this task1.

This resolution meant that neither Indonesia nor the Philippines accepted as completely valid the repeated Malayan contentions that the population of the North Borneo territories had been consulted previously, in February 1962 (during the visit of the 'Cobbold Commission'), in subsequent negotiations among members of an Inter-Governmental Committee

1 Joint statement, Manila, 5 August 1963 (mimeo.) (emphasis added).
representing Malaya and the two Borneo colonies, and finally in the elections in Sarawak and North Borneo. Indonesia's authority was further stated, with the Philippines' seal of approval (the title 'Manila Declaration' is significant in this respect), in a resolution calling for combined efforts of the three nations 'as new emerging forces', for the 'eradication of colonialism and imperialism in the region in particular and the world in general'. All the documents were signed by Sukarno, Macapagal, and the Tungku in that order, unlike the well-established international usage of ordering the states alphabetically.

For all his expressed confidence in a purely Asian machinery of consultation - 'Maphilindo is an effective vehicle for devising Asian solutions to Asian problems by Asians themselves'\(^1\) - the President of the Philippines has remained acutely aware that his ambition to play a prominent role in regional politics must be sanctioned by those who wield influence over world affairs. One should interpret in that light his decision to attend President Kennedy's funeral, followed by conferences with government officials in

\(^1\) Sukarno-Macapagal joint statement of 11 January 1964, sometimes referred to in Indonesia as the 'Macapagal-Sukarno doctrine' (mimeo.). See also the address of President Macapagal on 5 August 1963, appendix VII.
Washington. By paying a surprise visit to Liberia, Tanganyika and the Malagasy Republic (6-14 December 1963), Macapagal also showed awareness of the importance of African votes in the United Nations.

To conclude, the Malaysia issue has offered the Philippines an opportunity to take advantage of the general realignment of influences in South-East Asia. In President Macapagal’s view, the world-wide fragmentation of blocs and alliances offers many opportunities for new choices and alternatives to countries like the Philippines. In his words: 'small and middle-sized nations like the Philippines, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, New Zealand, and even Australia, and the new republics of Africa must be aware of that new situation they are all in'\(^1\). Summarizing Philippine policy during the Malaysia crisis, we may now return to the questions we asked earlier. The state of affairs obtaining in the Southern Philippines performed an **input function**: what started as private demands for a settlement of the North Borneo case developed under the Macapagal regime into a national issue and enabled the Philippines to take a prominent part in negotiations for an international settlement of the Malaysia

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\(^1\) Foreign policy speech, Manila Rotary Club, 9 January 1964 (mimeo.).
affair. In 1962-64, the Philippines could take advantage of divergences among great powers to share more effectively than ever before in the making of authoritative decisions on South-East Asian affairs (output functions).
CONCLUSION
Either on the domestic or on the international stage, politics offer a common characteristic, namely, groups or individuals come into conflict with each other, they jockey for positions of authority or influence, they are torn by continuous differences. Competition is particularly apparent in international society where no established authority seems to keep conflicts and strife under control.

In this dissertation, we have come in contact with two forms of international conflict: the opposition between great and small powers, and the opposition between advocates of change and defenders of status quo.

1 - Great and small powers

The statement we made above that there is no established international authority should be qualified. In fact, by studying the foreign policy of the Philippines, we have encountered one crucial form of international control, viz., the influence which great powers wield over their followers. There is an intricate combination of coercion and consent to be found in the relationship between influential powers and those states which acknowledge their leadership. Of course,
the most obvious indications of coercion are shown by great powers. Japan, for example, used force to coerce the Philippines into joining the Co-Prosperity Sphere. In other cases, the threat of the use of force is as effective as the use of force itself: for instance, the presence of American troops on Philippine soil, and of American advisers among Philippine armed forces, is an implicit threat poised against those who would challenge the U.S. influence over the Philippines and other parts of South-East Asia. No doubt, small powers cannot take advantage of similar means of coercion (there are no foreign bases on the territory of the U.S.); yet if military power is an important way of coercing a state, there are other means of exercising influence. In the case of the Philippines, for example, Filipino lobbies have found influential allies in Washington, such as the Cuban sugar interests in the 1930s.\footnote{G.A. Grunder and W.E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, Norman, Oklahoma U.P., 1951, p. 199.}

Consent also plays a key role in the great power-small power relationship. This is very clear in the case of the Philippine-U.S. connection. In chapter III, for instance, we have seen how the Roxas administration managed (in part through an effective campaign during the 1947 plebiscite, and
in part through violent suppression of dissident movements) to rally a substantial measure of support for a continuing 'special' relationship between the United States and the Philippines. The later attempts at renegotiating parts only of the treaties between the two countries are in themselves indicative of the basic willingness of the Philippine ruling elite to continue to acknowledge a degree of American authority in the military, economic and political fields.

Great powers have also to express acquiescence in the maintenance of their special interests abroad. President MacKinley praying for divine guidance before annexing the Philippines\(^1\), is a classic example of an attempt at giving a religious aura to a political enterprise so as to mobilize widespread domestic support. For the last 15 years, discussions in the U.S. Congress on the allocation of foreign aid have been another indication of the need to elicit public consent for influence overseas.

It is no easy task to measure the degree of coercion or consent existing in a given great power-small power relationship. Indeed it is part of the propaganda warfare waged

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1 After "more than one night" of prayer, MacKinley decided that "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them [the Philippine Islands] all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them" (sic), quoted ibid., p. 37.
between rival international alignments to stress the coercive features in the status of small powers situated in the other camp. In 1946, for example, the Soviet Union refused to recognize the independence of the Philippines which it regarded as a 'puppet state', and we are familiar with the use of the term 'satellite' to describe the status of Eastern Europe. The implication is that small states are graded according to the degree of coercion imposed upon them.

In some cases, coercion is very obvious and there is little room for discussion: the decision, in 1944, of Japanese military authorities to recruit Philippine auxiliary troops without the concurrence of the established Republic of the Philippines is a flagrant example. In other circumstances, coercion is exercised in a much subtler way and it becomes difficult to ascertain systematically the status of certain small powers and to follow changes in that status.

2 - Change vs status quo

It may well be more fruitful to look in another direction if we want to refine and to systematize the notions of small and great powers. In this dissertation, we have proceeded on the idea that the influence of great powers should not be isolated from the environment in which it is exercised: as was suggested in the introduction, the concepts of
international system, sub-systems (as arenas inside the international system) and structures (as arrangements for the exercise of power within a system) are crucial terms of our analysis. The question I have tried to answer is: what place did the Philippines occupy in the structures for the exercise of power in South-East Asia and the Far East?

In the past chapters, I wanted to establish that, inside different types of structures the Philippines has always occupied a position of inferiority. For the last forty years, South-East Asia and the Far East have seen a number of structures established for exercising influence over that area. As was abundantly shown, most international affairs in that part of the world led to either agreement or disagreement among great powers such as the U.S., Japan, China, the U.K., etc. In all cases, those great powers held positions of authority within international arrangements. Thus, we have seen the Philippines a member of:

(1) a monopolistic structure established by Japan during World War II, and directed against western 'imperialism',
(2) a semi-monopolistic structure led by the U.S. immedi­ately after the Pacific war; within this structure, there was little scope for influence by Allied Powers such as the U.S.S.R., Australia, India, etc.,
(3) an oligopolistic structure, once again led by the U.S., but with the active support of the leading members of the western camp and of some of its followers: see the chain of Mutual Defense Treaties concluded in the 1950s, culminating with the creation of SEATO in 1954, all directed against the communist camp,

(4) a semi-competitive structure, established in 1922 among all advanced powers which were recognized a legitimate interest in the Pacific area; though not directed specifically against any one, the Nine-Power pact in effect aimed at hindering Japanese expansion in the Pacific.

In all cases, the Philippines has occupied a subordinate position, ranging from outright domination (1), to a status of client-state (2) and (3), and to the prospect of enforced neutrality and of abstention from power conflicts (4). This first conclusion is important insofar as it enables us to see the Philippines in a perspective of dependence upon great powers. Yet, to stress the world power-local power dichotomy at the exclusion of other basic conflicts would only blur other important issues: as against the view that membership of Asian states in great powers alignment (such as SEATO) implies no problem essentially different from any other great
power-small power relationship\(^1\), we would submit that there are other basic conflicts in South-East Asian politics.

To illustrate this point, it might be worth comparing briefly the status of the Philippines with the position of Australia, which is also a small power involved in South-East Asian politics, but with a difference. With the exception, of course, of the Greater East Asia alliance, Australia has been a member of all the structures mentioned above. Before the war, it was involved in the solidarity of colonial powers in Asia and (we will come back on this point later) it had a strong stake in the maintenance of the status quo in that part of the world. Again, in 1951, Australia's privileged situation by comparison with other small powers in South-East Asia and the Far East became conspicuous when it signed a treaty of alliance with the U.S. and New Zealand. Ever since, Australia has been able to maintain close consultations with the U.S., the leading power in the Pacific area, an opportunity which was denied to Asian countries. As we have noted, military staff discussions prior to the establishment of SEATO, as well as meetings of the Pacific Council, have been kept 'white': a distinction which was clearly not based on racial grounds but rather reflected a feeling of

deep solidarity among members of the hard core of western democracy. The special guarantees extended by Canberra to Malaya (and, in 1963, to Malaysia) are another indication of the situation of Australia in Asia as a junior ally of the main powers guaranteeing, if not the status quo properly speaking, at least the safeguard of a degree of British influence in the area.

By contrast, the Philippine connection with the U.S. has carried quite different connotations. In fact, as seen from Manila, the entente with the U.S. is a case of continuing influence exercised by a metropolis over its former colonial dependency even after the latter has declared its political independence. We have noted as particularly significant in this respect the influence of the U.S. in the military field through programmes of military assistance and the establishment of a powerful advisory group. In the political field also, we have pointed to the share of the U.S. in the anti-Huk campaign and in the reform programme launched by the Quirino and Magsaysay administrations.

During this 'transitional period' following independence (to quote the agreement regulating Philippine-U.S. trade for a period of 28 years after Philippine independence\(^1\)), the U.S.

\(^1\) "Agreement between the U.S.A. and the Republic of the Philippines concerning trade and related matters, during a
has continued to exercise rights which have come very close to the exercise of sovereignty: the recruiting by American authorities of Filipino citizens for service in the armed forces of the U.S. is a case in point.

No doubt, these activities have been rationalized. There is a pervading phraseology which makes abundant usage of terms such as collective security, resistance to aggression, etc., and which tends to disguise the predominant role played by the U.S. in, say, military arrangements\(^1\). That the involvement of the United States in Philippine affairs sometimes presents features hard to reconcile with a meaningful view of Philippine independence, is explained by the fact that the 'decolonization' process is still going on in the Philippines. This is not only a case of great power-small power relationship, it is also a case of colonial relationship. The stability of Philippine political life rests on the stability of a well-organized ruling elite which, since the early days of American rule, holds economic and political power. After the American conquest, this elite strengthened

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\(^1\) U.S. protection is guaranteed to the Philippines by a "Mutual Defense Treaty" which lays stress on the "equality" of the parties. Art.IV, for example, reads: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety", R.P.T.S., vol. II, no. 1, p. 14.
its authority by the part it played (and continues to play) in the
production and export of cash crops destined to the
American market\textsuperscript{1}. In the political field, the Philippine
elite achieved its first objective, political independence.
After 4 July 1946, however, the former metropolis has contin­ued to exercise tremendous influence. Political independence,
has nonetheless decisively reinforced the bargaining position
of the Philippines and has enabled it to hasten the process
of 'decolonization'\textsuperscript{2}: we have noted in this respect the
renegotiation of the trade agreement, the protracted negotia­
tions on bases, etc. In short, the situation of the
Philippines has made of the Republic a force for change.

3 - Asian policy

In the preceding pages, I have argued that it is futile
to speak of small powers \textit{per se}. Where there are small
powers, there are also structures through which influential
states exercise their authority (sometimes reinforced by
features of a colonial type). No doubt, the Philippines is a
small power, but we should qualify this somewhat truistic
statement, and make the point that, with the exception of a

\textsuperscript{1} G. Fisher in S. Rose, ed., \textit{Politics in Southern Asia},
\textsuperscript{2} See G. Fisher, \textit{Un Cas de Décolonisation...}, \textit{op. cit.},
p. 366.
brief period under Japanese occupation, the Republic has always been in the difficult position of being an Asian state, and at the same time a member of structures designed to enable 'foreign' (American or European) powers to exercise their influence over South-East Asia and the Far East. Seen in this perspective, what are the functions performed by the Asian policy of the Philippines?

This question leads us to the problem of the environment within which the Philippines operates. In the introduction, we observed that, within the international system, there are areas which are the object of competition among the states: small powers usually (but not always) limit the scope of their interest to their neighbouring region, whereas world powers, by definition, extend their influence over a number of regions. We have called these areas sub-systems, or arenas, within which powers compete for the exercise of influence. The structures influential powers establish fulfil two sets of functions: internal functions - within a given structure, great powers exercise authority over their followers - and external functions - through this structure, great powers and their followers exercise influence on outsiders, either isolated states, or other competing structures operating in the same sub-system.
We may very simply illustrate this model as following:

Within a sub-system - X - (shaded), structures (A, B, C) compete for the exercise of influence. Within each structure, dominant powers or groups of powers (A_1, B_1, C_1) exercise authority over subordinate powers (a_2, b_2, c_2). Membership may overlap occasionally.

Structure A may represent western alliances with South-East Asian countries, such as SEATO. The leading powers (A_1: the U.S., Britain, France) are foreign to the South-East Asian region.

Structure B may represent communist alignments. Some, but not all the leading powers (B_1: China, the USSR) are outsiders.

Structure C may represent Asian-led solidarity. Leading powers (C_1: Indonesia, e.g.) are situated in the region.

For a large part, the Asian policy of the Philippines is overshadowed by those two sets of functions (internal and external) performed by great powers through the structures they establish.
Client-state

With respect to the external functions of structures, we have seen in the preceding chapters that client-states play an important part in laying out the field for the interventions of great powers in regional politics. Whereas great powers aim at establishing international alignments as bulwarks of their own predominance, all realize that their ultimate success depends, in no negligible part, on the active participation of their weaker allies. We may mention briefly here Japanese efforts to build up international support within the 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' by inviting their satellites to take part in mixed politico-cultural organizations. These attempts were too short-lived to enable us to analyse the types of followers which would have operated in a grown-up Greater East Asian society of states.

Much more relevant to our study was President Roosevelt's insistence on a generous treatment for the Philippines with a view to making of the new Republic a pole of attraction for other dependent territories in the area. This objective became a favourite theme of U.S. propaganda in the Philippines and was repeated time and again during the following years: in 1956, for example, in the course of a public address in Manila, Vice-President R. Nixon stated:
We hope that all the nations of Asia will understand our attitude towards collective security. In this regard, you can play a leading role in interpreting our views and intentions to your neighbors.

You have two great advantages in this regard. First you have been our friends and partners during these years of independence. Second, your culture is a happy blend of the best of the west and the east. You are familiar with the ancient culture of Europe. You know and understand our habits in the U.S.

...With this happy blend of great cultures, you can be a bridge between east and west. You can help to remove the misunderstandings and hostility based on past errors. You can speak for us as one who knows and understands.¹

Generally speaking, the Philippine elite has accepted this line. During the war, blueprints prepared by Sergio Osmeña and Carlos Romulo, and later on the policies pursued by President Quirino, aimed at organizing the emerging states of Asia and at rallying them to a pro-American line in world affairs. Under the administrations of Presidents Magsaysay and Garcia, the Asian policy of the Philippines made more modest claims and Manila did not indicate much interest beyond the restricted field of economic and cultural co-operation among Asian countries already won over to the West.

Throughout those years, Romulo was among the foremost supporters of a pro-western line in Philippine policies towards

¹ Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, August 1956, p. 5.
Asia. We have quoted him describing, in 1954, the slogan 'Asia for the Asians' as a meaningless phrase, diametrically opposed to Filipino ideals (chapter V). Yet Romulo considered himself to be an 'unrelenting fighter for the rights of Asia'\(^1\), and indeed he always proved very much aware of the political importance of the new states in Asia.

The philosophy behind the client policy of the Philippines in Asia bears striking similarities to the right wing approach to Japanese foreign policy. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan (1946-47, 1949-55), also saw his country's basic interest in close ties of friendship with the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, Japan could hope to play an active role among its Asian neighbours: 'It surely behoves Japan to act as a "go-between" and strive to allay whatever remaining animosity the [Asian] nations concerned may still entertain towards the West.'\(^2\)

The roles which Japan and the Philippines can expect to play on the Asian stage are too different to enable us to carry this comparison too far. It is argued in the U.S., in particular, that the past experience of the Filipinos with radical insurgency gives an air of relevance to Philippine

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influence in South-East Asia: a book recently published by the U.S. Council of Foreign Affairs makes it clear that the U.S. should encourage a forward-looking Filipino middle-class to come to the realization of the potential role of the Philippines as a leader in a 'social and political revolution in Southeast Asia' which would be favourable to western interests and ideals\(^1\) - a rationale never encountered in the case of Japan.

We have said that great powers use structures to exercise authority over their followers. Indeed, in the case of the Philippines, western powers have not infrequently exercised pressure on the Republic to make it conform to this role of client. The examples we have cited with respect to the Philippine record in the United Nations, or to the making of decisions within the SEATO alliance, are all significant. Yet we should not underestimate the eagerness of the Philippine elite to participate in schemes sponsored by the West in Asia: in fact, the acceptance of a client role implies that for many, the Philippines is 'of the West'. A prolix phraseology pervades Philippine declarations on foreign policy, stressing the westernized, Christian, and democratic features of the Republic in alleged contrast with the other

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\(^1\) G.E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
peoples of Asia. No doubt, this theme has been particularly used in statements for American consumption: to quote President Garcia's address to the U.S. Congress in 1958:

The Filipinos happen to have a culture that is an amalgam of the best in the Asian, Latin, and Anglo-American cultures. By geography and racial affinity we are of the east, and by culture we are of the west...[This] permits us to claim, without being immodest, a fair understanding of both the east and the west and to become a bridge of understanding between the two. This is a role which we would be happy to perform in the higher interest of the Free World and in the service of world peace.¹

Translated in practical terms, however, this language means that Asia does not occupy the first place in Philippine policy. There is in fact a tendency in the Philippines to attach basic importance to the membership of the Republic in the western world. Correspondingly, Asia is then regarded as a region with which it is important to cultivate good relations, but only as far as is consistent with the policy of close understanding with the West.

There are many examples of this western-centred view. The world tour of Vice-President Quirino in April-July 1947 is worth noting in this connection. Then concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Quirino set out on official visits

¹ Address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, 18 June 1958, Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Manila, October 1959, p. 4.
to foreign capitals in order to mark the accession of the Philippines to independence. On that occasion he visited the U.S. (where he spent five weeks), the U.K., France, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. No doubt there were few independent Asian states at that time. Yet, as shown by the New Delhi conference of 1947, other Asian statesmen were displaying then a more acute awareness of developments among their neighbours. In Thailand, for example, Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong showed understanding for the independence movements in South-East Asia and allowed a South-East Asia League with Thai, Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodian membership to establish its headquarters in Bangkok in 1947. Even now, interest for the Afro-Asian world is not a popular theme in the Philippines: as late as December 1963, for instance, Philippine public opinion as it was reflected in the press, found it very odd that President Macapagal should prefer to tour Africa (his visit to the heads of state of Liberia, Tanganyka, and Malagasy was described as a 'safari' ...) rather than to visit Europe.

Among the other indications of Philippine desire to stress the western features of the country is the cultivation of ties with Spain. The treaty of friendship with Spain of 27 September 1947 was among the first signed by the
Philippines. A Philippine legation was opened in Madrid at a time when Spain was the object of pressure on the part of the United Nations. Again, in 1949, the Philippines and Spain signed a cultural treaty.

Censorious follower

It would misleading, however, to lay exclusive emphasis on the western links cultivated by the Philippine elite and on the corresponding client role of the Philippines on the Asian stage: the Asian policy of the Philippines has served other purposes than helping to model western interventions in that part of the world. Indeed, a large part of its significance lies elsewhere, viz., in the fact that the situation of the Philippines in Asia has exposed some basic conflicts inside the structure linking the Republic with the West.

In the first place, the client policy of the Philippines has made it clear that the Republic occupied only a junior status as a member of the western camp. For example, while the Philippines was expected to contribute to the joint efforts of the western alliance in South-East Asia, it was kept outside important decisions taken within SEATO. It is

2 Ibid., vol. I, no. 4, pp. 16-17.
not surprising therefore that the Asian policy of the Philippines has often aimed at inducing the western powers to yield ground. Thus, as early as 1950, during the Baguio conference, it was stressed that Asian powers should be consulted on Asian affairs. In Bandung, the Philippine delegation propounded as we have seen its own version of the Pacific Charter. By creating ASA in 1961 and more obviously in 1963, by playing an active part in the establishment of a Council for South-East Asian affairs, Maphilindo, Philippine diplomacy has stressed the prominence of Asian powers for the solution of regional problems: observers have noted this definite trend in Philippine policy to rely less on the U.S. and more on regional arrangements with other South-East Asian countries and, generally speaking, to curb western influence in the area.

Contact with Asia, in short, gave nationalistic, 'anti-imperialist' overtones to Philippine foreign policy. The Asian policy of the Republic served to demonstrate that Manila did not take at their full face value the slogans which tended to identify Philippine and western interests in Asia. Indeed, at Manila in August 1963, the Philippines joined Indonesia and Malaya in a declaration which stated that:

_1_ New York Times, 5 May 1964, pp. 1, 3.
the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned.¹

We have suggested earlier that international influence is exercised through structures. Does this imply that the Philippines took advantage of existing structures to press its claims for a more respectable position in the western camp?

Solidarity structures

So far, we have examined structures where military and economic factors were predominant. However, this dissertation has drawn our attention to other functions performed by structures, namely the maintenance of solidarity among its members. At the core of most international alignments (the western coalition in South-East Asia, for example), one finds arrangements for making decisions. Among the other important requirements of such alignments is the maintenance of solidarity. On the national as well as on the international levels, there are arrangements promoting cohesion among sections of the body politic, such as parties, classes, nations, etc. For example, we have seen that in the tightly

¹ Joint statement issued after the summit conference between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, Manila, 5 August 1963 (mimeo.) (emphasis added).
controlled Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan made some effort to maintain solidarity among its followers, say, by the exchange of visitors: missions from Burma visited the Philippines, Filipinos were sent to Manchukuo, etc. Solidarity among states members of a structure may be informal. Thus, in the early 1930s, the European powers established in South-East Asia, Britain, France and the Netherlands, seemed to consider that, as a matter of solidarity among colonial powers, the U.S. should retain control over the Philippine Islands. The sentiment in Australia was that the country felt 'fairly safe' so long as the U.S. retained the Philippines:

But if and when we [Americans] withdraw, whether Japan absorbs the Islands or whether they remain under weak native rule, this feeling of security will vanish.\(^1\)

Structures for promoting solidarity may be permanent and in continuous operation or they may function as the opportunities arise. In some alignments, arrangements for the maintenance of solidarity are very much in evidence: this is the case of the solidarity movement sponsored by leading emerging states in the 'Third World'. The insistence of states such as India, Egypt, etc. on a non-aligned foreign policy should be seen in this perspective: to the series of

international structures we have mentioned earlier, we may thus add a solidarity structure functioning mostly on an ad hoc basis (e.g., in international conferences, such as Bandung) under the auspices of leading powers in Asia and Africa (Indonesia, Ghana, etc.).

The study of the Asian policy of the Philippines has enabled us to observe the rivalry between western-led alignments and the Asian solidarity movement. The Philippines has felt torn between its membership of the western camp and its desire to find a compromise with the main currents of Asian solidarity. This dilemma has been reflected in another emotional strand in Philippine foreign policy: the repeated declarations of allegiance to 'Asia'. See, for example, Secretary Serrano's lamenting over the belief in Asia that the Philippines was still a 'virtual colony of the United States':

There is no consolation in being free when people around us think we are not. In such a degrading environment, we cannot pursue our national destiny with honor and dignity. It is in the light of this new outlook that we have set in motion the forces that will enable us to rediscover the roots of our national soul and revive the main-springs of Asian identity.1

1 Speech by Secretary Serrano, Manila, 23 June 1959, Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, October 1959, p. 52.
The difficulty of the choice facing the Philippines was particularly apparent during two periods: during the years 1949-55, when the Philippines sought to adjust to the preponderance of India on the Asian stage, and later in 1959-63, when Manila tried to reach an accord with Indonesia.

The Philippines and Indian leadership

The leading part played by India in Asia after independence had been prepared for many years. Long before the war, the Congress Party and individuals had observed developments in Asia with a view to stimulating Asian solidarity against colonial rule and foreign encroachments. After World War II, more precise plans were set forth. In 1945 and 1946, for example, the All-India Congress Committee issued resolutions demanding close co-operation between India and the South-East Asian countries. In early 1947 (23 March-2 April), at the suggestion of Premier Nehru, an international Asian conference was held in Delhi. Invitations were extended to four observers from the government of each country and to cultural associations and institutions in all Asian countries. It is significant that three quarters of the 39 official observers came from countries close to India politically speaking while none came from the Soviet Republics, the Philippines, Vietnam or the three 'Associated States'. China sent one official
observer only. Significant also was the fact that the Indian preparatory committee had decided not to consider defence and security questions as relevant for discussion during the conference. This was in the tone of Indian policy which aimed at emphasising that India was important in Asia, but never at organizing India's followers.

The Conference on Indonesia which convened in Delhi (January 1949) offered another example of Indian assertiveness in Asian affairs. Premier Nehru has explained the good response to the conference partly by:

...a certain looking in the direction of India on the part of all these countries, the feeling that India might possibly play a fairly important part in bringing Asian countries together.

India also played a decisive role in the meetings of the 'Colombo Powers' in Colombo (April-May 1954), Bogor (December 1954) and Delhi (November 1956). Premier Nehru's most signal diplomatic triumph in this field came when India was allowed to represent informally the group at Geneva during the Conference on Indochina and to act as a liaison between the

1 Asian Relations (Report and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference), Asian Relations Organization, New Delhi, 1948, p. 8.

'Colombo Powers' and People's China. It soon became apparent, however, that the tacit understanding between China and India would not last and that, contrary to Nehru's expectations, China would compete with India for influence over the smaller states of the area.

Towards India, Manila followed a policy of half-hearted collaboration. Thus, private delegates attended the 1947 conference in Delhi, while Romulo represented the Philippines at the 1949 conference on Indonesia. In deference to India, no invitations were extended to Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee for the Baguio conference of 1950. Finally, from 1952 onwards, the Philippines played a minor part in the activities of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations.

The basic line of Philippine policy was irreconcilable with India's, however, as it aimed at creating new solidarity structures to compete with those sponsored by Delhi. This policy took different aspects as it ranged from outright competition with India (the Quirino-Chiang proposals for a Pacific Union in 1949), to attempts at launching an all-embracing Asian alliance, very close to the West (Baguio conference of 1950), and finally to head-long opposition, as symbolised by the heated exchanges between Premier Nehru and General Romulo at Bandung in 1955.
The Philippines and Indonesia

Philippine adjustments with Asian solidarity as it is interpreted by Indonesia offer another interesting example of the dilemmas posed by overlapping membership in rival solidarity and power structures.

Since 1960, Indonesian foreign policy has been increasingly expounded in doctrinaire terms which suggest a fresh view of Asian solidarity. President Sukarno, chief exponent of this doctrine, has tellingly argued the case for a twofold division of world society into two contending groups: the 'New Emerging Forces' comprising the nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the 'socialist countries' and all progressive elements in capitalist countries, confront the 'Old Order' which is based on colonialism and imperialism. Indonesia plays an important part as one of the main spokesmen of the 'New Emerging Forces'.

The changing Philippine response to Indonesia's growing stature in regional affairs represents one of the most significant trends in the foreign policy of the Republic. Under the Garcia administration, the Philippines tried to draw Indonesia into a pro-western arrangement, the Association of Southeast Asia. This attempt met with failure. President Macapagal, by contrast, has struck an attitude of appeasement
towards Indonesia. His position of mediator during the Malaysia dispute, while aimed in part at heightening Philippine prestige, did in fact help Indonesia to establish a basis for its claims to regional authority. It is also indicative of the friendly attitude of the Philippines towards Indonesia that a strong Filipino delegation attended the Games of the New Emerging Forces in Djakarta (November 1963) and the ensuing GANEFO Congress.

To conclude, through its Asian policy, the Philippines has fulfilled varied and complicated functions within the South-East Asian sub-system. As a small power, member of the western alignment in Asia, the Philippines has been used to further the influence exercised by the leading powers of the 'free world' in that part of the world. While this client policy has appealed to a significant part of the local elite, Filipinos have also tried to take advantage of their simultaneous membership in the Asian solidarity movement to impose curbs on the influence of western powers. The accession of the Philippines to political independence, with the ensuing opportunities for diplomatic activity, has entailed a process of questioning of western authority.

There is little doubt that, as the years pass, the trend towards a more vigorous criticism of great powers will
continue to make itself more pronounced. Is this to say that the Asian policy of the Philippines is entirely negative in character? Certainly not. In the course of this dissertation, we have seen how a few strong personalities were responsible for charting the course of Philippine foreign policy: Quezon, Quirino, Romulo, Recto, Serrano, Macapagal, all held strong, constructive views on international affairs and were able to influence the course of events. Though the means have varied, these influential personalities have shared the objective of making of the Philippines a bona fide member of the society of independent Asian states. This desire became more pressing as new influential powers such as China, India and Indonesia, appeared on the Asian stage.

Under the administrations of Presidents Garcia and Macapagal, the assertion of the 'Asian identity' of the Philippines has taken a sense of urgency: fearful of China, Filipino leaders are keen to secure a friendly environment for the Philippines in the South-East Asian region. It is important to keep in mind, however, that strong personalities are inseparable from the ruling elite which they lead: in the Philippine setting this implies that the type of connection to be maintained with the U.S. remains a concern of overriding importance.
This bibliography includes material which was quoted in the course of this dissertation and which has a direct relevance to the topic. For example, I have included only those newspapers and periodicals which I have used extensively for the period covered by the thesis.

There are a few books, however, which I want to single out for their usefulness to the student of the Philippine scene, irrespective of his particular field of interest.

These are:


Hayden, J.R., *The Philippines, A Study in National Develop­ment*, New York, MacMillan, 1945; the best general study of the Philippines available; the author was vice-gov­ernor of the Philippines in 1933-35.
Starner, F.L., Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry: the Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics, Berkeley U.P., 1961; with useful material appended (election statistics, agrarian reform laws, etc.).

Taruc, L., Born of the People, New York, International Publishers, 1953; vivid biography of the leader of the Huk movement, written by an American leftist, W. Pomeroy, who spent two years with the Huks.


On the topic of foreign policy, there is an unpublished dissertation: Meyer, M., Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Ph.D., Stanford, 1959; with good factual chapters on the post-war years, but generally uncritical.

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American Chamber of Commerce Journal, Manila.

Far Eastern Economic Review.


Manila Bulletin1.

Manila Chronicle1.

Manila Times1.


Oriental Economist, Tokyo.

Philippines Free Press.

Sunday Times Magazine, Manila.

Tribune, Manila (1942-44)1.

1 Daily.
APPENDIX I

Chronological table of political events, 1935-63

17 Sep 1935  Election of Manuel Quezon as President, and of Sergio Osmeña as Vice-President of the Philippine Commonwealth.

15 Nov. 1935  Proclamation of the Philippine Commonwealth.


14 Oct. 1943  Proclamation of the Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines, with Jose P. Laurel as President, and Claro M. Recto as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1 Aug. 1944  Death of Manuel Quezon. Sergio Osmeña becomes President of the Commonwealth-in-exile.

23 Apr. 1946  Election of Manuel Roxas (Liberal) as President, and of Elpidio Quirino (Liberal) as Vice-President of the Philippine Commonwealth.

4 July 1946  Proclamation of the Republic of the Philippines. E. Quirino is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

15 Apr. 1948  Death of Manuel Roxas. Elpidio Quirino becomes President of the Republic.

8 Nov. 1949  Election of Elpidio Quirino as President, and of Fernando Lopez (Liberal) as Vice-President of the Republic. The President appointed C.P. Romulo as Secretary of Foreign Affairs (11 May 1950-23 Nov. 1951) and later Joaquin Elizalde who remained Secretary until 1953.

10 Nov. 1953  Election of Ramon Magsaysay (Nacionalista) as President, and of Carlos P. Garcia (Nacionalista) as Vice-President of the Republic. Garcia is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
29 Feb. 1956  Death of former President Quirino.

17 Mar. 1957  Death of President Magsaysay. Carlos Garcia becomes President of the Republic. Felixberto Serrano is appointed acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

12 Nov. 1957  Election of Carlos Garcia (Nacionalista) as President, and Diosdado Macapagal (Liberal) as Vice-President of the Republic. F. Serrano becomes Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

14 Nov. 1961  Election of Diosdado Macapagal (Liberal) as President, and of Emmanuel Pelaez (Grand Alliance, merged with the Liberal Party within a "United Opposition") as Vice-President. E. Pelaez is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

21 July 1963  E. Pelaez resigns his position of Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Salvador P. Lopez is appointed to the position on 27 July.
APPENDIX II

Foreign trips of the Presidents of the Republic of the Philippines, 1946-May 1964

1) Manuel Roxas (4 July 1946-15 April 1948)
   none (- as President-elect, M. Roxas visited the U.S. in May 1946)

2) Elpidio Quirino (15 April 1948-31 December 1953)
   U.S.A. 8-13 August 1949
   7 January-11 February 1950 (partly for medical treatment)
   27 August-25 September 1951
   28 June-7 September 1953 (partly for medical treatment)
   Spain 2-7 October 1951
   Italy 8-9 October 1951
   Indonesia 16-27 July 1952

3) Ramon Magsaysay (31 December 1953-17 March 1957)
   none

4) Carlos P. Garcia (17 March 1957-31 December 1961)
   U.S.A. 18-20 June 1958
   Japan 1-5 December 1958
   South Vietnam 22-25 April 1959
   Taiwan 2-7 May 1960
   Malaya 8-11 February 1961
5) **Diosdado Macapagal** (31 December 1961-+)

Spain, Italy and Pakistan 29 June-17 July 1962

U.S.A. 2-5 December 1963 (funeral of President Kennedy)

Liberia, Tanganyka and Malagasy Republic 6-14 December 1963

Cambodia 8-13 February 1964

Indonesia 22-28 February 1964
APPENDIX III

Co-operation to Establish a Sphere of Common Prosperity

(As the Representative of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency, President Jose P. Laurel delivered the following address on the first day of session of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations, which was held at the Imperial Diet Building in Tokyo on November 5, 1943.)

Your Excellency, Your Excellencies, Gentlemen,

In all humility, I rise to say a few words in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines on this momentous and glorious occasion. My first words shall be those of profound appreciation and gratitude to the great Empire of Japan and to her great leader, His Excellency Premier General Hideki Toyo, who is sponsoring this great convention of leaders of the peoples of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, so that they may discuss the common problems affecting their safety and their general welfare and so that they may also, through personal contact, know one another and thereby hasten the establishment and perpetuation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, for the glorification not only of the Asiatic peoples but of the entire mankind.

My second thought is one of greetings to Your Excellency; to His Excellency the Representative of China, to His Excellency the Representative of Manchoukuo, to His Excellency the Representative of Burma, and if I may be allowed, Your Excellency, to His Excellency Subhas Chandra Bose, who represents a new epoch in world history - the fight of the Asiatics for the freedom of the Indian people.

In fact, as I look back, Your Excellency, and recall the history of human civilization, I feel that this meeting of the peoples of Greater East Asia should have been held a long time ago; but, whereas, in the past we were kept as strangers, one and all, it is really gratifying to note that through the trying efforts of the Great Empire of Japan, for the first time in the history of the peoples of Greater East Asia, we are gathered and grouped together, never again to be
separated as in the past, ready to fight oppression, exploitation and tyranny so that we may proclaim to the world that no longer shall the one billion peoples of Asia be subjected to domination and exploitation by a few Western Powers of the world. At this juncture, will you allow me, Your Excellency, to mention three reasons why, in my opinion, we had not been permitted to meet, unite and discuss our common problems heretofore?

The first reason is that the policy of the Western Powers, especially of England and America, has always been to dominate politically and exploit economically the oppressed peoples of Greater East Asia, with the possible exception of Japan, and, naturally, that policy of exploitation and domination has weakened the peoples of Asia, has sapped their vitality and, therefore, has deterred and dwarfed their initiative; and because of that policy of the peoples of England and America, we have not been able to meet earlier to discuss the common problems of Greater East Asia.

The second reason is that in pursuance of, and as a corollary to that policy, America and England have always intended to divide the peoples of Greater East Asia in accordance with the principle of "divide et impera", in order to weaken the morale, the vigor and the vitality of the peoples of Greater East Asia. America and England have divided these peoples by establishing division in their religion, in their classes and encouraging political differences among them. They have divided, at least, the people of my country. They have divided, I am sure, the people of China, and I am sure they have also divided the peoples in other parts under their jurisdiction and sovereignty, so that the peoples of Greater East Asia, divided and weakened, may not be able to consolidate their forces and rise to uphold the honor and dignity of the Orient.

The third reason is based on the experience of the small and young Republic of the Philippines. America and England have taught us to hate the Japanese on the pretext that Japan is a conquering power, greedy and imperialistic; that Japan desires to expand its authority and prestige and that, when we have come in contact with its people, we shall be exploited and oppressed. Realizing that Japan is the only country in this part of the world which could not be subdued because of its great spiritual and material powers and because its peoples are united, Western diplomacy maneuvered to create a feeling of hatred and suspicion towards the Japanese people,
making us think and believe that they were our enemies and not our friends and brothers. These, in my opinion, are the reasons why the peoples of Greater East Asia had not been able to unite and band together before for the purpose of discussing, as I have said, the common problems affecting their security, their prestige and their very honor.

I was, Your Excellency, very deeply touched the first time that the Representatives of the participating countries were asked to partake of Your Excellency's hospitality. As I entered your reception room, tears flowed from my eyes and I felt strengthened and inspired and said: "One billion Orientals; one billion peoples of Greater East Asia! How could they have been dominated, a great portion of them, particularly by England and America? I wonder!" And so it is really with the utmost pride and satisfaction that I have come to represent a small republic like the Philippines and extend my greeting to their Excellencies who have come in response to the invitation of the illustrious leader of the Great Japanese Empire.

I have listened with attention and enthusiasm to the following words employed by His Excellency, Premier General Hideki Tojo, and I will ask your permission to read just a few lines which I believe express fundamentally the guiding principles which, under the leadership of Japan, will guide and govern the conduct of the Oriental peoples, the peoples of Greater East Asia, and which will make us go on forward until the war is won and until the principles of the Co-Prosperity Sphere shall have been firmly laid. His Excellency said: "The nations of Greater East Asia, while mutually recognizing their autonomy and independence, must, as a whole, establish among themselves relations of brotherly amity. Such relations cannot be created if one country should utilize another as a means to an end. I believe that they come into being only when there is mutual respect for one another's prosperity and all countries give expression to their true selves."

In other words, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is not being established for the benefit of any integral unit of that Sphere. According to His Excellency, the starting point of the establishment of the Sphere is recognition of, and respect for, the autonomy and independence of every integral unit, so that, with that recognition of political independence and territorial integrity, each nation
may develop in accordance with its own institutions, without any particular member monopolizing the resulting prosperity of any given country or nation but with the object in view of extending that welfare and that prosperity of all other integral units, on the theory that the prosperity of all is the prosperity of the integral parts, but that the prosperity of the integral parts is not necessarily the prosperity of the whole.

In other words, co-existence, co-operation, and co-prosperity, if I may be allowed to say so, are the three words, the three magic words, which underlie the sacred cause championed by the Great Empire of Japan and subscribed to by the other peoples and nations of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. To enable the peoples and nations of Greater East Asia to enjoy the natural right to live, the Great Empire of Japan is sacrificing life and property and is staking even her very existence in this sacred war. She is fighting not for the Japanese alone but for all the peoples of Greater East Asia. Japan will not be happy, I know, to live alone and see her brethren in East Asia die. She wants to live, it is true. At the same time, however, she wants her brother orientals also to live and to co-exist with her. Japan lives, China lives, Thailand lives, Manchoukuo lives, Burma lives, India lives, the Philippines lives. And all of us living, we shall endeavor to achieve, not alone the prosperity of China or any other nation or integral unit, but the prosperity of all, and working together for the achievement of the means necessary for national existence, we shall co-operate with each other - co-operate for the establishment of a sphere of common prosperity, no longer to be dominated by Western powers, but occupying a rightful place under the sun, with peoples happy under their own respective laws and institutions, welded together into a compact and solid bloc and contributing to the happiness and well-being, not of Asia and Asiatics only, but also for the entire world as well.

There is another part of the speech masterfully delivered by His Excellency, the Premier, and I should like to obtain permission to quote and to emphasize this passage for my own benefit, and for the benefit, perchance, of the other gentlemen who have been invited to this gathering, so that we may preach to our people and enlighten them when we go back and give them an account of what transpired in this Assembly. The quotation has reference to Oriental culture, to the much-needed spiritualization of Oriental peoples. And I desire to quote it particularly, Gentlemen, because I need it
for my own country. His Excellency said: "A superior order of culture has existed in Greater East Asia from the very beginning. Especially is the spiritual essence of the culture of Greater East Asia the most sublime in the world. It is my belief that in the wide diffusion throughout the world of this culture of Greater East Asia by its further cultivation and refinement lies the salvation of mankind from the curse of materialistic civilization and our contribution to the welfare of all humanity". His Excellency enjoins upon us all to mutually respect one another's glorious traditions and to develop the creative spirit and genius of our peoples and thereby enhance even more the culture of Greater East Asia. This spiritualization, this efflorescence of cultural supremacy of the Oriental type, is something that we shall not only conceive and preserve and transmit as a heritage to generations yet unborn, but as a basic idea, coming as it does from the lips of His Excellency, should also be planted deep in the hearts of all Orientals, especially those coming from a country as weak and small as mine and which languished long under the domination and influence of materialistic Western Powers, under Spain for more than 300 years and under America for forty years. And that is the reason why this spiritualization of the people, particularly of my country, is necessary. Indeed, we the leaders of our respective countries should renovate and change our entire educational systems so that our peoples may feel, think and act as Orientals. This is perhaps the best way of helping the Japanese attain the spiritualization of all peoples of Greater East Asia.

It is needless for me to say anything about the military aspect here. That is taken for granted because we cannot enjoy our freedom — neither Burma nor the Philippines can enjoy the freedom that has been granted to them for any length of time — unless Japanese arms emerge victorious in the current war. We fully realize this, and, while we are undergoing difficulties, we are determined to carry on and forge ahead until the goal of victory is achieved by the Empire of Japan. The fight of China, the fight of Thailand, the fight of all the peoples of Greater East Asia for freedom and integrity depends upon that victory. The establishment of the Co-Prosperity depends upon that victory. The attainment of the supreme aspirations of the peoples of Greater East Asia depends upon that victory. Without that victory there can not be a Co-Prosperity Sphere; nor can there be freedom for my country or for any other country in East Asia. There
can never be prestige for the Orientals and, as in the past, Occidental Powers will try to dominate us more and more unto exhaustion and even death.

May I be permitted, Your Excellency, on this occasion, to pledge my support and the support of my people to Your Excellency; may I offer and pledge also to their Excellencies, the Representatives of the different countries, the sympathy and co-operation of my country, however small and however newly born it may be, and our desire to lend at least the encouragement and sympathy of eighteen million Filipinos who, dominated by a spirit of materialism in the past, in keeping with the general trend of events, have awakened to the consciousness of their true Oriental character and are called upon to play the role which God in Heaven has assigned to them.

Your Excellency, it has been my privilege to join this conference with one single purpose in mind, and that is to contribute in a small measure to the general awakening of the peoples of our part of the globe. At the same time, I desire to express officially the gratitude and appreciation of the Filipino people for the great boon of independence which has just been granted to them and which has enabled me to come and attend this conference and meet the worthy representatives of the peoples of Greater East Asia to this august assembly.

May I express the hope, Your Excellency and Gentlemen, that, linked together as we are, not only in body and in spirit but in all that is needed for the successful prosecution of the current war, after the termination of this war in favor of the Great Empire of Japan, no longer shall we have a bleeding China, a country inhabited by four hundred million divided and exploited Orientals, but a happy and united China which will be a decisive factor, in co-operation with Japan, in trying to make this part of Asia a safe place for Orientals to live in. I hope that when the time comes for us to close our eyes and go to our graves, we can do so happily, knowing that our children no longer would be exploited and dominated by Western Powers. May I also express the hope that no longer shall India, now under the able and inspiring leadership of Mr. Bose, be dominated and divided religiously and politically by the British; that no longer shall India's 350,000,000 strong be subjected to the influence, tyranny and oppression of Great Britain, or any other power for that matter. And may I express the belief, Your Excellency, that with the co-operation of Burma, of Manchoukuo, of Thailand,
of China, and of the peoples of Java, Borneo, and Sumatra whose interests cannot be different from those of other peoples of Greater East Asia - may I express the belief, I repeat - that united with Japan, united together one and all into a compact and solid organization, there can no longer be any power that can stop or deter the acquisition by the one billion Orientals of the free and untrammeled right and opportunity of shaping their own destiny, without the oppressive intervention of any powers of the West.

The East is the cradle of human civilization. It has given to the West its religion and its culture, and yet the West has used the same civilization to exploit the peoples and countries whence that civilization came. God in His infinite wisdom will not abandon Japan and will not abandon the peoples of Greater East Asia. God will come and descend from Heaven, weep with us and glorify the courage and bravery of our peoples and enable us to liberate ourselves and to make our children and our children's children free, happy and prosperous.

I thank you.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Manila, Bulletin, October 14, 1943-February 15, 1944, pp. 18-21.)
Letter of Instructions on the Proposed Pacific Union

August 3, 1949.

My dear Ambassador Romulo:

I have summoned you home to help prepare the necessary groundwork for the prosecution of an important phase of our foreign policy which I consider a timely contribution to the peace of the world: the problem of forging a closer union among the peoples of Southeast Asia dedicated to the maintenance of peace and freedom in the region through appropriate methods of political, economic, and cultural cooperation with one another.

The interest we have taken in this problem is the logical outcome of the ideals that have inspired our national history and of the principles that have animated our foreign policy since the birth of the Republic. For more than three centuries, the Philippines has had the oldest and most aggressive nationalist movement in Asia; it was the first colony in Asia to achieve independence in the post-war period; and it has consistently defended the right to freedom of the subject peoples of the world. It is therefore natural that we should pursue with vigor the foreign policy we have initiated at this crucial time when our own interests as a free nation and the peace and security of a free Asia hang so precariously in the balance.

We have not embarked upon this historic course on the spur of the moment. It is rooted in the deep stirrings of political consciousness among the Asian peoples. In the Philippines, Dr. Jose Rizal and the other heroes of our revolutionary struggle for freedom were its first major prophets. In China, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen initiated a political program of vast magnitude for a people whom he endeavored to lead on the road to freedom through education and democracy. In India, the late Mahatma Gandhi challenged the world's most powerful empire in order to advance the freedom of his people through the equally revolutionary methods of non-violence and civil disobedience. And again, in the Philippines, where the
wave of Asian freedom first started, the late President Manuel L. Quezon gave a regional cast to the libertarian struggles of the Asian peoples through his well-known sympathy for the Pan-Malayan movement, through his concern for the future of India when he served as member of the Pacific War Council, and through his insistence that the benevolent American policy towards the Philippines, which has earned Filipino gratitude and loyalty, should provide the pattern for the ultimate liquidation of colonialism in Asia and an example for other nations to profit by.

Political developments in Asia, and particularly in the Philippines, may therefore be said to provide all the necessary antecedents to justify the course we have taken. Both former President Osmena and the late President Roxas were keenly aware of our special responsibility in this regard immediately before and after the recognition of Philippine independence. As Chairman of the Philippine delegation to the San Francisco Conference you were instructed by former President Osmena to ensure recognition of the right of the non-self-governing peoples to freedom and independence as a logical consequence of the victory of the United Nations. As the first Foreign Secretary of the Republic in the administration of President Roxas, it was my privilege to help set the course of our foreign policy, specifically of our policy in the United Nations, to the end that the rights of the non-self-governing peoples shall receive every assistance that is in our power to give. In accordance with this policy, we have rendered vigorous and effective service to the cause of a free Indonesia and in the defense of the rights of subject peoples in the General Assembly and in the Trusteeship Council.

It was in pursuance of this established policy that I sent you as my representative last January to attend the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, convinced that the Philippines had a special responsibility to support the struggles for freedom of the Asian peoples. As part of your instructions, I asked you to sponsor the idea of establishing a permanent organ of consultation on problems of common interest among the countries of Southeast Asia within the framework of the United Nations. The Conference proved to be an outstanding success, and, mainly as a result of your strong advocacy, a resolution was adopted providing for the establishment of suitable machinery for that consultation. From the New Delhi Conference, you brought home, besides, the observation that the participating countries exhibited keen interest in
establishing a permanent organization to safeguard their common interest. Last April, following the initialing of the North Atlantic Pact in Paris, I declared on behalf of our Government that it was imperative that the free countries of Southeast Asia, with the active support of the United States, should consider at the earliest possible moment the conclusion of a parallel safeguard for Asia.

Today, the need of pursuing this line of thought is pressing and urgent. It was and it still is necessary for the Asian countries to consult and to cooperate with one another in order to hasten their emergence as independent countries. But the great danger that confronts us at this moment is the tide of totalitarian subversion and conquest which threatens to engulf the very freedom we have won or others expect to win. This menace is on the ascendant, and in order to meet it we must forge stronger bonds than exist at present.

It was because of this imminent danger that I conceived in the Baguio conversations last month the necessity of accelerating the process of establishing a Union, predicated upon the independence and sovereignty of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the countries bordering the Pacific so that, masters of their own destiny, they can concentrate their attention to their coordinated full development in order to ensure their stability and security and thus contribute to world peace and advancement. I envisaged such a union to be essentially an act of common faith on the economic, political, and cultural level, in tune with the work of the ECAFE and the program of the UNESCO, and that it would involve no military commitments. For I am convinced that in the long run our strongest defense against totalitarian subversion would lie in providing a life of substance and contentment and promoting higher standards among the Asian peoples. Thus it would be a real union on the basis of common counsel and assistant for the preservation of peace, democracy, and freedom in Asia.

It can thus be seen that there is a sense of historic continuity as well as of contemporary urgency in our vigorous attack upon this problem. Every single act we have taken so far falls in its proper place.

In summoning you home, it is my desire to ask you to take charge of the work that remains to be done in order to carry through to a successful conclusion the foreign policy program upon which we are embarked.
In undertaking this task, you will take due account of all the pertinent precedents and antecedents to the end that our stated goal may be the more speedily achieved. As I conceive it, our immediate endeavor at this stage should be to sound out the attitude of all the interested countries and eventually invite them to a conference in Baguio to discuss methods of closer political, economic, and cultural cooperation between them, the date and the agenda of the conference to be determined by prior agreement among the participating States. To this end you will continue the consultations that I have already authorized you to begin with the representatives of the other interested countries, using such method of approach as you may deem appropriate in each separate instance.

You are authorized to exercise full discretion in achieving this immediate objective with the cooperation of our Foreign Office. You may call upon the leading elements in the country to cooperate with you in this delicate task and have assigned to you such members of the staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs and of the foreign service, here or abroad, as you may require. Decisions on basic questions of high policy will, as usual, be determined in consultation with me. During my absence and if, in the course of this assignment, you should deem it necessary to travel to any of the capitals of Southeast Asia, I am authorizing you to do so. You shall communicate with me and the Department as frequently as necessary in order to ensure complete comprehension of our fundamental policies and objectives.

This is an election year, and I am desirous that this vital question of foreign policy be removed from the arena of politics. The final outcome of this policy so far transcends in meaning and importance the political fortunes of any one man or group of men that we must make a supreme effort to secure for it the loyal support of all sections of our population. To this end, you are further authorized to make the necessary representations to the leaders of other political parties in order to place at the service of this policy a common national front. I dare to express the hope that, recognizing the wisdom and necessity of such a common front, all will forbear from all tendentious polemics which serves only to confuse the people and will accept instead joint responsibility for the forging of the high-minded statesmanship that a question of such paramount importance as this so obviously requires.
I am fully aware that in summoning you to undertake this task, I have for the moment taken you away from equally important work in the United Nations. But this is part and parcel of the great over-all objective of the United Nations itself, and your reward will be not only the knowledge that you have performed a duty properly devolving upon you as our Ambassador to the United Nations, but the consciousness that you have rendered service of incalculable value to the maintenance of the security and freedom of Asia in furtherance of the peace of the world.

I am not unmindful of the difficulties that beset us in this task. The genesis of the Western Union and the North Atlantic Pact over a period of many months provides an object lesson in this respect and should teach us to persevere in the face of the obstacles that confront us. But as the stake is great, so must our patience be inexhaustible and our faith remain undimmed. A seed is being planted, and whether or not we shall be here in the season of its flowering is not important. What is important is that the tree will provide shade and shelter for those that will come after us.

Sincerely,

(Sgd. E. Quirino)

APPENDIX V

Statement of the President on Our Asian Foreign Policy,
March 10, 1954

I am in full agreement with the leaders of Congress in the following statement of our Asian foreign policy:

The Philippine Government stands for the right of self-determination and independence of all Asian nations; for closer cultural and economic relations and mutual co-operation with freedom-loving Asian countries as a group and within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations; and for the proposition that a return to colonialism, of which the last vestiges are now disappearing from Asia, shall not be tolerated in any form.

The colonialism that threatens Asia today is world communism. Nations which have won their freedom from old-style colonialism now face the danger of losing that freedom. A good defence against this threat is a healthy Asian nationalism, a nationalism which defends the right of all Asian peoples to self-determination. We support this kind of nationalism as a rallying point for all free Asians against the forces of aggression and subversion.

The Filipino people can best serve the cause of freedom and democracy by co-operating actively with other Asian peoples in the achievement and maintenance of political independence, economic stability and social justice. We cannot contribute to that cause if we isolate ourselves from other freedom-loving Asian states and are suspected by them of ulterior motives or insincerity in our relations with them. Our Asian policy must, therefore, seek to remove all causes of distrust.

Our Asian policy is not directed against any nation or race. We recognize the fact that to achieve our goals, under-developed countries in this region need the assistance of more advanced economies and that each Asian country should be free to decide for itself whether or not it desires such assistance as well as the conditions it believes compatible with its sovereignty and economic objectives.
For ourselves, we have entered into agreements with the United States of America for mutual defence and special trade relations. There is no incompatibility between the political and economic ties and solidarity of aspirations in peace and in war, which have bound our two countries for more than half a century, and our warm desire to become good neighbours in Asia in a united effort, imposed by geographical propinquity and racial affinities, to achieve the general prosperity of this region. Rather, these two complementary objectives should give us that balanced foreign policy which we have lacked in the past.

I trust that all patriotic Filipinos will agree on this policy of freedom and friendship in Asia.

APPENDIX VI

President Garcia's Statement on Philippine Foreign Policy
Towards Asia, March 29, 1957

Our policy towards Asia is a continuation of that laid down by President Magsaysay. Last October [1956] our late President said that it was one of the objectives of our foreign policy to develop 'our political and cultural relations with countries of the free world, with particular emphasis on our relations with our Asian neighbours'. He mentioned this objective together with the paramount purpose of national security which we have achieved by collective defense arrangements with other free countries, particularly the United States of America.

Taken together these two objectives mean that we seek the strengthening of freedom in Asia for two reasons: first, so that our fellow Asians may enjoy the fruits of real independence, and second, so that we may, by being surrounded with communities of free Asians, be all the more secure from subversion and attack.

To this end, it is our purpose within the limits of our capacity to share in the efforts of giving substance to the freedom of Asians. This is our purpose in intensifying technical and cultural exchanges with such countries as Indonesia, Vietnam, China, Malaya, and other countries of free Asia. This is why we recognized Vietnam and why we want to open diplomatic missions in more Asian capitals, such as Rangoon.

This is our policy in Asia. It cannot be adequately expressed in any single slogan.

APPENDIX VII

Text of the Address of President Diosdado Macapagal at the closing ceremonies of the Conference of Heads of Government of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, Manila, August 5, 1963

ASIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

At the opening ceremonies of this Conference last Tuesday, I was the only speaker. This morning there are three speakers. But although you listen to three voices, these voices speak as one; they speak in harmony, they speak in unison to carry a message of unity and hope to their peoples and to their region.

It seldom happens that one can feel entitled to say that he has participated, even in a modest role, in the making of history. This is one of those rare occasions. With the successful conclusions of this first Summit Conference of the Heads of Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya and the Republic of the Philippines, I feel that we have in a very real sense written a new chapter in the history of Asia.

The accomplishments of this Conference are embodied in the three historic documents we have just signed, namely, the Manila Declaration, the Manila Accord, and the Joint Statement, in which are embodied the agreements happily reached by the three sister states both on the immediate problem of Malaysia and on the long-range project of Maphilindo.

Through the agreements on Malaysia, we have averted a possible catastrophe for the peoples of this area. By launching Maphilindo we have opened up a new road towards a brighter future for our three nations and for Asia as a whole.

In the vital matter of regional security, the Summit Conference took a decision of historic significance. We agreed that foreign bases, which we consider to be temporary in nature, should not be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of our three countries. Furthermore, in accordance with the principle enunciated in
the Bandung Declaration, we agreed that our three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. These are the new guarantees of our common security based upon the conviction that we shall not anymore allow outside influences to divide us.

This Summit Conference is a chapter of profound import for the peoples of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines and, we trust, for their neighbors as well. The Manila Declaration, which President Soekarno, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman and I have just signed, is more than an enumeration of principles and aspirations. It marks the beginning of an important new stage in the development of our three countries as independent states.

The attainment of political independence, of freedom from colonial rule, was the culmination of the first stage of that development. The peoples of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines had first of all to become masters again of their respective countries before progress could be made in other fields of national life. This was the prime objective of their revolutionary struggles against colonialism, the crowning political goal which was achieved in the case of Malaya essentially through peaceful means and in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines through a combination of armed revolution and political struggle.

Having achieved political independence, our three countries are now engaged in the no less revolutionary task of giving it substance through economic and social progress based on social justice. I say this task is revolutionary because it involves the transformation of economies and societies which for centuries had been forced to develop within the stifling and unnatural confines of colonialism. It requires not only a massive re-orientation of national values but also the establishment of a new basis for national growth. The aim is to develop each country's material and spiritual resources for the benefit of its own people in order that they may enrich their own lives and at the same time be capable of making their full contribution to the well-being of mankind in consonance with their native genius and national identity.

The third stage of our development as independent States follows logically from the other two. As sovereign
nations conscious of their duties to themselves and to the world, the peoples of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, represented at this Summit Conference by their respective Heads of Government, have now agreed jointly to assume their rightful share of responsibility for the security, stability and welfare of the region in which they live.

In this sense, the Manila Declaration is a declaration of independence.

It expresses the determination of our three countries to safeguard this area from subversion in any form or manifestation. It contains their solemn pledge to combine their efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations.

At the same time, the Manila Declaration is inspired by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955. It embodies the agreement of our three countries to strengthen fraternal co-operation among our peoples in all fields and to intensify their efforts to help build a peaceful new world dedicated to freedom and justice.

These are the inspiration and the aims of the Manila Declaration. The chosen instrument for their realization is Maphilindo, towards the establishment of which we are taking the initial steps by means of frequent and regular consultations at all levels, including Summit Conference like the present one.

This Conference is in fact the first exercise in mushawarah or brotherly consultation by the three Maphilindo countries. In this first attempt by the Heads of Government of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines to solve their common problems and forge a united approach in discharging their joint responsibility towards their region, the merits of Maphilindo have been severely tested. The difficulties we have encountered and overcome as well as the successes we have achieved constitute Maphilindo's initiation.

For us in the Philippines, and doubtless also for our brothers in Indonesia and Malaya, Maphilindo is an old dream come true. Our national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal, envisaged at the turn of the century a design for bringing together, free from colonial rule, the peoples of Malay origin in Borneo, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. President Manuel Quezon, an ardent nationalist, nurtured the same dream. The
youth of the Philippines led by the patriot Wenceslao Vinzons, under whose leadership I had the privilege as a student to be among the organizers of the Young Philippines in the 1930's, also envisioned Maphilindo under our rallying cry, Malaya Irrendenta. President Elpidio Quirino drew inspiration from the same vision when he convened the Baguio Conference of Asian countries in 1950.

The dream of the unity of the Malay peoples was essentially sound. But the historical conditions for its realization did not mature until our own time. Now the vision has assumed shape and substance in the form of Maphilindo, thanks in large measure to the perception, good will and wisdom of our two distinguished guests and collaborators at the Summit, President Soekarno of Indonesia and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya.

I must point out that we are making only the most modest of beginnings for Maphilindo. This is a decision deliberately and wisely taken. It has its basis in that surest and most dependable of foundations, reality. Considering the varying historical experiences of our respective countries, our differing traditions and political institutions, and our distinctive approaches to many international problems, we are well advised indeed to start as we are starting in Maphilindo: with frequent and regular consultations at all levels in the brotherly spirit of mushawarah, with mutual increase of knowledge and broadening of understanding of one another. This is the most solid and lasting support we can devise for Maphilindo.

We look forward, of course, to its steady growth and development. We are beginning with consultations, at all levels, from national secretariats to Summit meetings. But we envisage in due time the formation of common organs of cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as in the all-important fields of regional security. Accordingly, we have agreed to make joint studies of appropriate machinery for Maphilindo which will facilitate and enhance the effectiveness of such cooperation.

May I conclude this brief address with an earnest appeal to our neighbors in Asia and to the world at large to understand Maphilindo and to welcome it as a new and constructive force for good in this troubled age. Maphilindo does not represent great power in the material sense. But it
does represent a vibrant ideal sustained by a large and important segment of mankind. It is dedicated to peace, security and prosperity not only for its associated nations but for all humanity. Born of the logic of events it now forms part of the mainstream of the history of our times.

At this solemn moment of Maphilindo's birth, I would therefore express the fervent hope that it may be allowed to develop in peace, without obstruction from any one, in order that it may fulfill the great promise of its conception, realize its full potential for creative growth, and make its unique contribution to the building of a peaceful and prosperous Asia serving as one of the main pillars of that better world which we are all striving to build under the aegis of the United Nations.

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister: As you leave our country to return to your own, I would like to point out a matter of personal cherishment. You have come not on a formal State Visit but to a working conference of major political significance. And yet you could not have missed the spontaneous overflow of admiration and affection for both of you which has welled out of the hearts of our people from the mere consciousness of your presence amongst them. For you have honored us greatly with your presence and given us immeasurable joy. In you as our guests, we have upon our soil two of the greatest sons of the Malay race. We shall treasure forever the memory of this unprecedented fraternal confrontation.

I am deeply moved by the opportunity which has been given us to share together the heart-warming joy of this reunion of our triplet-nations. Together we have labored hard to bring about the reconciliation of brothers long separated and estranged from one another. From here our peoples can move together to build in peace and concord a common destiny that shall be a blessing to themselves and a boon to mankind.

(mimeo.)