THE 'NEW EMERGING FORCES' IN
INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

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VOLUME II

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If one sees Indonesia as a nation engaged in a revolutionary struggle aimed at the transformation of Indonesian and world society, as did Sukarno and his supporters, July, 1959 is the point at which the country returned to this challenging pursuit, after nine, and possibly 14 years during which time it had been diverted from its primary task. Evolution, gradualist methods and compromises were replaced by revolution. Having restored the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno set about restoring the ideology of the Revolution to its 'proper' place in Indonesian affairs. In his 17th August address of 1959, Manipol, he restated the principles of the old ideology, emphasising, in particular, the need for national unity and a revolutionary approach and stressing

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1 One could regard the operative changes made in November 1945 to the 1945 Constitution as the beginning of this diversion. Even though, until 1945, the Republic was engaged in the struggle for independence, the less revolutionary 'administrators' such as Hatta and Sjahrir acted as a powerful restraining influence on Sukarno and his fellow 'solidarity makers' with the result that the Republic's revolutionary zeal was more or less confined to the pursuit of independence. Even in this endeavour, compromises, for example, in the Round Table Conference agreements, were made.
opposition to all forms of imperialism. There followed an accumulation of slogans, some elaborating, some summarising the principles and concepts of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution\(^1\). At the same time as the Ideology was being elaborated in more detail, a new emphasis began to develop, the stress on the universal aspects of the Indonesian Revolution, on its subsumption of the other important revolutions and on its leading place in the great Revolution of Mankind\(^2\). The international aspects of the Indonesian Revolution were then given special prominence with the enunciation of the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces\(^3\).

If one regards the political developments in Indonesia after the acquisition of independence as a struggle for national unity, political stability and economic progress, as many Indonesians do, the restoration of the 1945 Constitution in July, 1959 marks an important turning point in that the experiment in western style democracy was thereby formally abandoned in favour of a

\[^1\text{See the discussion of Manipol and the subsequent ideological developments, in Chapter II, pp.137-173 above.}\]

\[^2\text{See the discussion of the development of the concepts depicting the international or universal aspects of the Revolution, in Chapter II, pp.173-221 above.}\]

\[^3\text{Discussed in Chapter IV, below.}\]
system that was both more Indonesian and authoritarian. Simultaneously, moderate, pragmatic methods aiming at economic development were replaced more decisively by radical methods, indicating an end to the rivalry between the 'administrators' and the 'solidarity makers' for control of the independent state. Victory had gone to the latter. This turning point is also significant in other ways. For example, it marks the beginning of the period of Sukarno's dominance in Indonesian affairs, with increasing opportunity to pursue his personal ambitions; the beginning of the period of sizeable PKI participation in government and in policy making; the introduction of a system of government that virtually eliminated the political parties, except the PKI, from effective competition for power; the beginning of a period in which developed a sense of national identity and destiny, fostered by a renewed and revitalised nationalism that was to burst the bounds of the nation, erupting in the form of an arrogant bid for world leadership.

In the above senses, the introduction of Guided Democracy represented a dramatic break with the past, but it was also a culmination of previous developments
and trends and the product of old conflicts. Indeed, as Lev points out, the development of Guided Democracy, beginning in 1957, was 'neither radical nor revolutionary', in that, despite the shifts of power and the changes in political style and institutions, the top leadership remained basically the same, although the rules by which it maintained itself in power were drastically altered.

One conspicuous type of change that occurred under Guided Democracy was the replacement of the institutions of parliamentary democracy by new institutions capable of operating under the new rules. The 1945

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1 See, for example, Lev's 'Introduction' to Transition, pp.1-10.

2 Lev acknowledges that 'A few new leaders entered the stage, mainly from the army, and a few left, mainly from the Islamic party, Masjumi', but there was 'no rush of new people with essentially new ideas'. Lev therefore concludes that, 'To a limited extent, the period of Guided Democracy can be seen as an extension of the period of parliamentary democracy'. See ibid., pp.1-2.

3 Only the most important of the moves and of the new institutions are discussed below. For fuller accounts of the development, composition and functions of the new institutions, see: Kosut (ed.), op. cit., pp.79-81; Lev, Transition, pp.278-289; Hindley, PKI, pp.279-280; Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.361-366; J.A.C. Mackie, 'Indonesian Politics under Guided Democracy' in Australian Outlook,
Constitution provided for a strong Presidency and for a governmental structure that was more authoritarian and hence that gave less scope for liberal democracy than did the 1949 or 1950 constitutions. After issuing his decree of 5th July, 1959, Sukarno moved to establish institutions and procedures that accorded either with the provisions of the re-instated Constitution or with the more recently perceived requirements of Guided Democracy.

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1 See Kahin's discussion of the major features of the 1945 Constitution on pp.564-565 of Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, Feith's discussion on pp.378-379 of Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, and Mackie's account in Mackie, 'Indonesian Politics under Guided Democracy', Australian Outlook, Vol. 15, No. 3, December, 1961, pp.265-267. For an official summary and exposition of the President's powers under this Constitution, see Indonesia 1961, pp.46-48. Although the 1945 Constitution was theoretically in operation until 1949, most of its provisions, particularly its more authoritarian provisions, were not implemented until after the 1959 restoration. See pp.330-331 above.
and Guided Economy\(^1\). The Djuanda cabinet was replaced in July, 1959 by a new type of cabinet, headed by Sukarno as Prime Minister\(^2\). In the same month, members of parliament were required to take an oath of loyalty to the 1945 Constitution in order to retain their seats and two important new institutions, whose members were appointed by Sukarno, were created: the 45-member Supreme Advisory Council (the D.P.A.)\(^3\) and the 77-member

\(^1\) See Indonesia 1961, p.45 for details of the distinction.

\(^2\) One feature of this cabinet was that it consisted of a ten-member 'inner cabinet' which included Djuanda as First Minister and Lt. Gen. Nasution as Security and Defence Minister, a much larger 'outer cabinet' of deputy or junior ministers and a number of 'Ministers Ex-Officio', consisting primarily of the service chiefs and the heads of two new government bodies. What was also significant about this cabinet was that it was explicitly a non-party cabinet. For details of the cabinet and an analysis of its composition, see Lev, Transition, pp.279-282.

\(^3\) This council, headed by Sukarno as Chairman and the Manipol propagandist, Roeslan Abdulgani, as Vice-Chairman, replaced the National Council established in 1957. It included Aidit, the PKI leader, and representatives of the other major parties, but the Masjumi and the PSI were not represented. The bias in party representation was towards the radical, nationalist left. In addition, there were representatives of the regions and of the functional groups, including the armed forces.
National Planning Council\(^1\).

In January, 1960, Sukarno widened his powers by issuing decrees empowering him to ban or dissolve political parties, to establish a National Front and to appoint and dismiss a Provisional People's Consultative Assembly\(^2\). In March, he dissolved parliament and appointed a new gotong-rojong parliament (the D.P.R. or D.P.R.G.R.)\(^3\) which he installed in June. Just over half of the D.P.R.'s 283 members were selected from functional groups, including the armed forces, and just under half

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\(^1\) This council, headed by Mohd. Yamin, the Murba-sympathising Minister for Social and Cultural Affairs, was charged with the task of constructing a national, overall development plan, aimed at bringing into being the 'just and prosperous' society. It consisted of regional and functional group representatives, with 'an implicit political representation distributed among them', Lev, Transition, p.284.

\(^2\) See Kosut's summary of these decrees in Kosut (ed.), op. cit., pp.79-80.

\(^3\) The Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Gotong-Rojong or, more simply, the Dewan, is translated in various ways, e.g., the Council of People's Representatives, the House of Representatives, or, more simply, Parliament. For a summary of Sukarno's reasons for dissolving the old parliament and for replacing it with a new body, see Kosut (ed.), op. cit., p.80, and Indonesia 1961, p.48. The inclusion of the term gotong-rojong (mutual assistance) in the title expressed the new emphasis on collective effort and co-operation for the common good, as opposed to the divisive and 'selfish' practices associated with the role of political parties in the previous parliament.
from political parties\(^1\). At the installation of the D.P.R.G.R., Sukarno made it clear that it was intended to be different from a western type of parliament. He called for musjawarah\(^2\) procedures and unanimous decisions rather than decisions by majority vote and suggested that, if unanimous agreement could not be reached, the issue should be referred to him for resolution\(^3\). In August, 1960, the new Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (the M.P.R.S.)\(^4\) was created, replacing the Constituent Assembly that had been dissolved in July, 1959. At its

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1 Chiefly the PNI, NU and PKI, with no representatives from the Masjumi or PSI. See Table 1 in Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.345.

2 See Chapter II, p.150 above.

3 See the quotation from Sukarno's speech at the installation of the D.P.R.G.R. in Indonesia 1961, p.23

4 The Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat or the Madjelis is translated variously, e.g., as above, as the Provisional People's Congress, as the People's Assembly, or as the People's Assembly for Deliberations. Under the 1945 Constitution, it is the embodiment of the Indonesian people and is therefore the highest deliberative body, empowered to lay down the broad outlines of national policy and to elect the President and Vice-President. It consists of members of the D.P.R., together with representatives of the regions and of the functional groups. Pending elections, which, though still promised, were repeatedly postponed, these additional representatives, like the members of the D.P.R., were appointed by the President and, for this reason, the Madjelis was regarded as 'provisional'. 
first session in November-December, 1960, the M.P.R.S. made a number of important decisions legitimising the new system of government. It endorsed the Political Manifesto as providing the broad lines of state policy, adopted the President's proposals for development, gave to the President full mandatory powers to implement its broad decisions and adopted the first phase (1961-1969) of the development plan drawn up by the National Planning Council. Meantime, Sukarno had taken steps to strengthen his political base by establishing his own National Front\(^1\) and in September, installed a 70-member Executive

\(^1\) The army had sponsored a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian in 1958. Sukarno's National Front supplanted this organization. See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), *Indonesia*, pp.335-336. The National Front was the Guided Democracy expression of Sukarno's pre-independence concept of the 'vanguard party', being intended to unite all revolutionary forces in Indonesia in order to complete the Revolution more efficiently. It included representatives of the major political parties, nationalist, communist and Muslim, thereby giving institutional expression to NASAKOM. Opposition groups were not represented. In addition, the armed forces and other functional groups were represented. See *Indonesia* 1961, p.51. Kahin on pp.649-650 of 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), *Major Governments*, argues that at the time of his Konsepsi, Sukarno saw the National Front as a replacement for political parties and as an organization controlled by himself. Although Sukarno presided over this body, he did not succeed in acquiring total control since his major rivals and partners, the army and the PKI, were also strongly represented and were influential, the
Board, headed by himself as Leader of the Revolution, to control the Front's activities.

By late in 1960, the major institutions of parliamentary democracy had thus been replaced by new deliberative and co-ordinating bodies, all appointed by Sukarno and largely controlled by him. Within these bodies, latter increasingly as the former's influence declined. See ibid., pp. 658-659 & 667-668, Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp. 364-365 and Feith 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, p. 974. Political parties therefore retained their identities, although, by 1962, all political parties and most mass organizations had been enrolled in the National Front which tended to function as a mobiliser of mass opinion and activity in support of the government's policies. See Hindley, PKI, p. 279, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1962 Yearbook, p. 100 and the 1963 Yearbook, p. 125. For a brief account of the steps whereby the National Front was created and brought into operation, see Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp. 196-197. In March, 1963, its status was increased by the decision to include the chairman 'in the group of key functionaries in each province, regency and municipality' (Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, p. 974). For a general review of the development and role of the National Front, See Weatherbee, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

This did not, however, amount to absolute control, since Sukarno had to accommodate his major rival and partner, the army leadership, and, to some extent, the PKI, both of which were represented in the new institutions. See below, pp. 461-474 for a discussion of the Sukarno-army-PKI relationship.
the influence of political parties had been substantially reduced by the new importance given to functional group representation and by the postponement of elections\(^1\), whilst the creation of the President's own National Front provided a potential replacement of political parties as mobilisers of public opinion and mass support. The influence of political parties at the sub-national levels of government had also been reduced as a result of an overhaul of regional government, announced in September, 1959\(^2\). In particular, the chief political party opponents of Sukarno and of Guided Democracy, the Masjumi and the PSI, had been removed from the new deliberative machinery, prior to being banned. Liberal democracy and decision-making by majority vote had given way to Guided Democracy with its emphasis on gotong-rojong and musjara\-\-mufakat procedures\(^3\), combined with the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{ The President's draft electoral bill of 1962 left no doubts about the declining importance of political parties, since it provided that only one third of the members of parliament would be elected. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 1963 Yearbook, p.126.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{ See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.363.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{ See Weatherbee's account of the significance of this emphasis, leading logically to the need for NASAKOM and hence incorporation of the PKI in the Revolution and the Government, and to Guided Economy and Berdikari,}\]
increasing phenomenon of government by Presidential decree.

Associated with the creation of new governmental institutions were a number of developments that furthered the emergence of an authoritarian system of government. One of the most important of these was the imposition of restrictions and controls on the political parties.

Following the restoration of the 1945 Constitution, the new cabinet ministers, top civil servants and senior officials in government enterprises were required to renounce political affiliations and, in 1960, political parties were required to submit a list of party members.

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This development under Guided Democracy was not unprecedented. For example, during the crisis period immediately preceding the introduction of Guided Democracy by Presidential decree, Nasution had banned all political party activities, thereby depriving the parties of their ability to function, even though parties as such were not banned. For details, see Lev, Transition, pp.270-271. For accounts of the development of restrictions on political parties after July 1959, see: Feith, Decline, P.593; Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.362-366; Lev, Transition, pp.282-4 & 287-8; Kosut (ed.), op. cit., pp.81-82; Hindley, PKI, pp.277-279; J.A.C. Mackie 'Indonesian Politics under Guided Democracy' in Australian Outlook, Vol. 15, No. 3, December 1961, pp. 267-275; Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.666-667; Pluvier, Confrontations, pp.55-56; and Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.50-52.
There was also a series of more definite moves, beginning in December, 1959, and designed to 'simplify' the political party system, basically by bringing the parties under Sukarno's control. Broadly, the 'simplification' provisions established conditions which political parties had to meet in order to be legally recognised and empowered the President to order the dissolution of parties that failed to meet the new requirements. Kahin sums up the conditions as follows:

To be legally recognised, all parties were required to be of a certain minimum size and to demonstrate their loyalty to Soekarno's government by declaring themselves in full ideological alignment with Soekarno and giving explicit pledges of unqualified support to his major ideological pronunciamentos.

In August, 1960, Sukarno ordered the dissolution of the PSI and Masjumi on the grounds that they were

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2 Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, p.666. Parties were also required to denounce rebellions and expel members associated with rebellions. For further details of the conditions for legal recognition, see loc. cit., footnote 18, and Mackie, 'Indonesian Politics Under Guided Democracy', in Australian Outlook, Vol. 15, No. 3, December, 1961, p.273, footnote 20.
'counter-revolutionary' and because they failed to take a sufficiently strong stand against the PRRI rebellion. This move was followed in September by his order that all political party activity should be suspended, and, in April, 1961, by his announcement that only eight parties were to be recognised. The rest were dissolved.

These restrictions served not only to remove the pro-western or rightist opposition to Sukarno and to

1 Subsequently, in January 1962, the most important Masjumi-PSI leaders, including Soetan Sjahrir, Subadio Sastrosatomo, Prawoto Mangkusasmita and Mohd. Roem, were arrested. See Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, p.667. Pluvier in, Confrontations, p.56, points out that these moves against the pro-western Masjumi and PSI were interpreted in the west as signs of Sukarno's leftist if not pro-communist tendencies. He argues convincingly against this conclusion pp.56-57.

2 Kosut (ed.), op. cit., p.81, reports that this suspension was intended '(1) to preserve the current Indonesian political balance until a decree insuring Sukarno's control of all political groups became effective Dec. 1, and (2) to halt the suppression of Communist Party activities by Gen. Nasution, army chief of staff, and other anti-Communist military leaders'.

3 These were: the PKI, PNI, NU, PSII (a minor Muslim party), Murba, Partindo (a small party that had, with Sukarno's blessing, split off the PNI's left wing in 1958), Partai Katholik and IPKI (a small party with army connections). Parkindo (Protestant) and Perti (a small Islamic party, chiefly Sumatran) were granted recognition a few months later, bringing the legally recognised parties to a total of ten.
Guided Democracy from the legitimate political scene but also to formalise the political parties' declining importance as independent and policy-influencing agencies. The PKI alone remained influential, partly by keeping up and developing its popular support, partly by adjusting to and supporting the new political system and partly by working to retain Sukarno's favour. The centre parties, such as the PNI and the NU, survived because they too had adjusted to the changed political situation and were of some value to Sukarno, but, lacking the PKI's vigour and still somewhat discredited through their close association with the discarded system of parliamentary democracy, they tended to become mere appendages to the new regime. The opposition parties were unable to survive, even as appendages.

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1. One might have expected political parties to have been removed entirely from the Guided Democracy system, as Sukarno had advocated their 'burial' since 1956 and had shown a preference for functional group representation in his Guided Democracy proposals. A possible reason for the adoption of a 'simplification' plan instead of one involving the 'burial' of political parties is suggested below. See footnote 1, p.D17 of Appendix D below.

2. Nevertheless, although the anti-communist, pro-western parties were deprived of any formal position in Guided Democracy, they were not entirely eradicated as potential political forces. Feith's account of the survival of individuals, from these groups and his assessment of the
The tendency towards authoritarian control and policing of the political parties was matched by similar tendencies in other aspects of Indonesian life. Political arrests, severe press controls and sanctions, supervision of non-political organizations and suppression of those considered to be incompatible with the Indonesian personality, indoctrination, and narrow loyalty demands on government employees became increasingly emphasised features of Guided Democracy. It was not only the governmental machinery and personnel that had to be 're-ordered' or 'retooled', but virtually every aspect

prospects for a subsequent political come-back by Masjumi-PSI elements seem to have been verified by their return to positions of influence and respectability in the New Order, even though Masjumi and PSI have not formally been revived. See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), p.348. For comments on the 'administrator'-type opposition to the 'solidarity maker'-type government, see ibid., pp.386-389.


2 See Weatherbee's explanation of 'retooling' in Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.34-35 and his more detailed account of what this involved, ibid., pp.45-53.
of Indonesian society, both public and private, since the Revolution, now 'rediscovered', was not only building a new Indonesia and a new world, but also new men'. An indication of what was to come was given in Sukarno's Manipol speech:

> We must direct all layers of our national life to the realization of the ideals of the Revolution. And whoever refuses to be directed here, or whoever does not want to be subordinated, is an obstructor of the Revolution.

Guided Democracy was thus an authoritarian system of government, although there were limitations on the extent to which the ruling elite could impose its will.

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1 Sukarno, 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.57. To be classified as an obstructor of the Revolution became increasingly dangerous under Guided Democracy, since it rendered a person so classified liable to 'retooling'. This meant that an 'obstructor', if a government employee, could be demoted or dismissed, and, more seriously, whether employed by government or not, he ran the risk of being arrested.

2 Feith, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics, pp.240-241, provides a very clear account of the inability of the Indonesian government to exercise 'tight controls over its society'. In another work, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.372-383, Feith applies the distinction between the scope, the weight and the concentration of government power to the Indonesian situation under Guided Democracy. The scope, '(how many aspects of the people's activity are affected by its [the government's] decisions)', was considerable and increasing. The weight, '(how intensely its decisions affect these
These limitations arose in part from the composition of the elite, within which no one individual or group had the monopoly of power, and in part from the lack of an effective administrative and coercive governmental machine, capable of enforcing the government's will in all aspects of policy throughout the country. In addition, and perhaps, partly as a result of the above limitations, there was the traditional need for the leadership to work through obtaining consensus, a difficult task in such a diversified society.

Subject to the above limitations, coercion of the police state type was one of the means available to the Guided Democracy leadership to ensure support or, at least, the absence of overt opposition, but it was not aspects)', varied in different spheres of activities and with different groups, but, in general, it was far short of the degree of control necessary for the establishment of an effective totalitarian regime. The concentration, '(how widely the making and implementing of decisions is shared)', is discussed below in terms of an attempt to identify the 'guides' of Guided Democracy. See pp.458-474 below. See also Mintz, Mohammed, etc., p.215. Legge's discussion of the more limited question of whether Guided Democracy was a personal dictatorship by Sukarno is also relevant to this point. See Legge, Indonesia, pp.148-153.
the only device used, nor was it used excessively\(^1\). Other effective means were available to sustain the authoritarian nature of the regime and to ensure the survival of the dominant elite. For example, as in the phase of parliamentary democracy, the distribution of patronage\(^2\) continued to be an important means whereby those in authority could attract and retain support amongst the elite, but, of particular prominence, were the ritualistic legitimising activities aimed at uniting both the elite and the mass of the people in support of the Guided Democracy regime and its policies\(^3\). These activities\(^4\) included the emphasis on ideology and on

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2 See, for example, Feith, *Decline*, p.594.

3 These activities were, in the eyes of Sukarno and his fellow ideologues, aimed at 'nation building and character building'. For an official account of the importance of nation building and character building see *Indonesia Volume IV: Looking Back Over 1964*, pp.27-36.

completing the Revolution, the 'acquisition of the insignia of national power and prestige',¹ the maintenance of an exciting and challenging atmosphere and the provision of scapegoats,² mostly foreign, who could be blamed for the regime's failure and against whom Indonesians could unite in channelling their frustration and aggression. An important aspect of these legitimising activities in general was their diversionary function, since, as Pluvier points out, they 'served primarily to divert popular attention from the domestic socio-economic situation to more dramatic and appealing

¹ Feith, Decline, p.595. These 'insignia' included both material and symbolic items such as the expansion of the Indonesian armed forces and the purchase of expensive military equipment, and such prestige ventures as the building of stadia, hotels and monuments, the staging of impressive international gatherings, the grandeur of Sukarno's 'court' and the pursuit of a flamboyant and messianic foreign policy. Since Sukarno's downfall, New Order supporters generally criticise these insignia as extravagances which the country could not afford, but one sometimes detects a nostalgia for the days when Indonesia and its colourful Sultan-like President were conspicuous on the world stage.

² e.g., the Dutch, the Indonesian Chinese, the rebels, the Americans, the British, the West, the imperialists, the NEKOLIM, the OLDEFO. The search for scapegoats appears to have continued under the New Order and the list since the coup has included the PKI, Sukarno and his Old Order associates, the Indonesian Chinese and Communist China. For an extreme example of the use of the scapegoat tactic, see Grant, Indonesia, p.83.
issues'.

It was the emphasis on the above legitimising activities, rather than coercion, that provided the dominant and distinguishing feature of the era of Guided Democracy. Loyalty to the Ideology of the Revolution and identification with its nationalistic and revolutionary symbolism became the basis for acquiring and retaining political influence and the source of legitimacy for those in power. The old basis on which the 'administrators' tended to claim legitimacy, tangible achievements in the solution of practical problems, was no longer relevant. Even consistency between word and deed seems to have been given less importance for legitimising purposes than evidence of revolutionary zeal, expressed in declarations of intent. Thus, under Guided Democracy, formalism, ritualism, symbolism and verbalism acquired an importance in their own right.

1 Pluvier, Confrontations, p.58. See also Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp.69-70.
Behind the authoritarian facade of Guided Democracy, who were the 'guides' providing the leadership so important to the Guided Democracy system? Theoretically, for example, in ideological or constitutional terms, there appears to be a simple answer: respectively, the National Concept\(^1\) or the President, responsible to the M.P.R.S. In political terms, the answer is much more complex because of practical limitations to the effective use of power by the dominant elite and by each of its constituent parts and because of political pressures operating within and upon the elite. Even at the theoretical level, however, the superficially simple type of answer given above contains complications. These arise partly because, as Sukarno and apparently large numbers of Indonesians saw it, the establishment of Guided Democracy was an attempt to unite the leadership of the Revolution and the leadership of the government or state\(^2\). The

\(^{1}\) i.e., the Ideology of the Revolution as expounded in Pantja Sila, Manipol-USDEK, etc. See Chapter II, pp.172-173 above.

independent state was seen as an instrument or weapon of the Revolution\(^1\) and all activities under Guided Democracy had to be subordinated to the National Concept or to the furtherance of the Revolution\(^2\). The identification of the state with the Revolution and of the revolutionary leadership with the governmental leadership was, of course, something of a myth, but, while the myth was accepted, it expressed and perhaps created one of the 'ground rules' of the system of Guided Democracy.

Given the importance of legitimising activities and, within these activities, the importance attributed to the Revolution and its ideology, one of the qualifications for leadership of the state was revolutionary authority, based on pre-eminence in the leadership of the Revolution. This primarily involved possessing control of or, at least, considerable influence in the formulation and interpretation of ideology and acquiring a reputation as one of the major exponents of the ideology. On the other hand, a successful claim to effective leadership of the Revolution also involved

\(^1\) For example, see the citations in footnote 3, p.271 above.
\(^2\) See Chapter II, pp.170-173 above.
possessing the political means to further the Revolution's progress, in other words, pre-eminence in the leadership of the state. Leadership of the state required more than the possession of revolutionary authority, since it involved having control of, or considerable influence in the deliberative and coercive machinery of the Guided Democracy system and this in turn involved the possession of power. Those who were able to achieve the combination of revolutionary authority and power thus had the best prospects to become and remain the 'guides'. A gain in one respect could promote advancement in the other, but, especially if there were a close competitor, a loss of status in the leadership either of the Revolution or of the state could undermine both the authority and the power of the 'guide'.

On the above basis, the most immediately obvious candidate for classification among the 'guides', perhaps the 'chief guide', was Sukarno, one of the leaders of the nationalist movement, the long-standing President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and, formally from 1960, the acknowledged Great Leader of the Revolution. Sukarno's claims to pre-eminence in the leadership were reinforced by the 1945 Constitution's provisions for a
strong Presidency, by the M.P.R.S.'s endorsements both of Sukarno's power and of his policies\(^1\) and by his popularity repeatedly reaffirmed in symbolic fashion in the titles showered upon him\(^2\), culminating in 1963 in his appointment as President for Life\(^3\). In many ways, Sukarno appeared to be a dictator and, whilst the myth of Sukarno, the Colossus, bestriding the Revolution and the nation, is an exaggeration and an oversimplification, there is an element of truth in the myth\(^4\).

Sukarno's power was, however, far from absolute, and his position far from secure, since he faced serious

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1 The M.P.R.S. was in theory the country's highest sovereign body and the only one to which the President was legally responsible.
2 See, for example, Adams, *Sukarno*, p.312.
3 This appointment was made by the M.P.R.S., the body empowered under the Constitution to elect the President.
4 Grant, *Indonesia*, pp.171-172, whilst acknowledging the various limitations on Sukarno's power and his need to accommodate other political forces, nevertheless draws attention to his resemblance to a dictator, as does Mintz, *Mohammed, etc.*, pp.225-226. Indeed, the latter author, having examined the justificatory claims for Guided Democracy and having found them wanting, (ibid., pp.217-225), concludes that Guided Democracy was 'a cloak for a power struggle, a facade built out of myths and slogans to shield a system of autocratic personalized rule', (ibid., p.225).
competition not so much from individuals\(^1\) but from organizations, primarily the army and the PKI\(^2\). Whilst it is difficult to assess with accuracy the relative strengths of these three elements, and whilst their relative strengths varied from time to time as the outcome of an elaborate series of moves and counter-moves, it would seem that the army leadership was Sukarno's major competitor for control of the state and the PKI his major rival for control of the Revolution, although all three were engaged in various and varying degrees of competition for both power and authority.

The 'guides' of Guided Democracy were therefore

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1 Such individuals as Aidit and Nasution were important largely because of the organizations they represented. Others, such as Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh and Roeslan Abdulganji were not so much rivals of Sukarno as rivals of each other for Sukarno's favour and support and, ultimately, for the authority, prestige and power to succeed Sukarno. In this latter respect, they were also rivals of the organization-backed leaders Aidit and Nasution.

2 In addition to these two major political forces, there were other, less important forces that nevertheless had to be taken into account. Mintz mentions two such forces, the Muslim conservatives and the national communists grouped around the Murba Party, the latter forming the basis of what Mintz calls the 'palace guard'. See Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.198-9 & 210-212. Others included such groups as the civilian bureaucracy, the air force, navy and police, and the other political parties.
Sukarno, the army leadership and the PKI, linked in a triangular relationship involving co-operation, competition and conflict. Paradoxically, Sukarno's major ideological partner in promoting the Revolution was his chief rival in this area, the PKI and, similarly, his major political partner in preserving the Guided Democracy regime was the army leadership. The Sukarno-army partnership for control of the state was, however, complicated by Sukarno's attempts to advance the PKI politically. These attempts indicated a Sukarno-PKI political alliance which became increasingly conspicuous in the later years of Guided Democracy and which ran counter to his partnership with the army. The major conflict in this triangle was between the PKI and the army leadership, with Sukarno acting as a type of

1 Kahin, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, p.651, aptly describes the situation as a 'sort of double marriage of convenience wherein Sukarno is the bigamist'.

2 This conflict occasionally overlapped with and was complicated by other clashes of interest, rivalries and animosities behind the united facade of Guided Democracy, - e.g., the Muslims versus secularists contest, in which the orthodox Muslims and the communists were the bitterest opponents, and the army versus anti-army groups contest, which involved the army, other armed forces, the political parties and the civilian bureaucrats.
referee, whilst balancing the one against the other.

If one sees the 'guides' as those who were leading the Revolution, Sukarno was undoubtedly the dominant figure amongst them. Throughout the period of Guided Democracy, he retained his virtual monopoly over the formulation of ideology and of general, long-term revolutionary objectives, although the retention of this near-monopoly required constant use of his considerable charismatic skill. Whilst the military leadership also claimed revolutionary legitimacy, depicting the army as the guardian of the Revolution, Sukarno's pre-eminence in the field of ideology was never seriously challenged from this quarter until after the 1964 coup. Military spokesmen generally contented themselves with establishing their revolutionary and political respectability in terms dictated by Sukarno, although this was partly because these terms were not totally unacceptable.

The PKI acted in a similar way, avoiding a direct challenge to Sukarno, but playing a more active part in the development of ideology than the army. Although

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1 See Appendix D, pp.D9-D10 below.
it adjusted to Sukarno's ideology, through its indoctrination and propaganda activities and through the allegedly close personal links between its intellectual leaders and Sukarno, the PKI became an increasingly conspicuous source of supplementary ideological exposition. Many Indonesians of New Order sympathies maintain that Aidit and Njoto in particular came to influence Sukarno's views and judgement and that they contributed some of the vocabulary for his more militant slogans. Given Sukarno's preference for dealing in generalities and the ability of such PKI leaders as Aidit to put forward acceptable and more detailed elaborations of Sukarno's general ideas, there would seem to be some truth in this view. It is even possible that the PKI was setting the revolutionary pace, especially after 1962, with Sukarno struggling to maintain his pre-eminent revolutionary status and his hold over the Revolution. This type of view adds

1 Hughes endorses the view that Aidit and Njoto exercised considerable influence over Sukarno in the later years of Guided Democracy. See J. Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, David McKay, New York, 1967, p.10.

2 There is a sense in which the PKI was setting the revolutionary pace politically, even if it were not doing so ideologically. See Appendix D, pp.D50-52 below.
credibility to the assertion that confrontation of Malaysia and of the OLDEFO and, more conspicuously, the creation of the axis with Peking, were PKI rather than Sukarno initiatives.

Sukarno's adoption of an increasingly doctrinaire revolutionary line and the growing similarity of his views to those of Peking did coincide with the PKI's rise to prominence in Indonesian affairs and with the shift towards Peking in the Indonesian party. This co-incidence was, however, as much a reflection of the area of similarity in the views and interests of Sukarno, the PKI and Peking as an indication of communist infiltration of the Indonesian Revolution. The organised mass support which the PKI, and only the PKI, could provide for Sukarno's revolutionary pursuits was invaluable both to Sukarno and to the furtherance of the Revolution as he saw it. Conversely, the PKI leadership realised that it could best increase its influence and power by working through Sukarno, by associating itself publicly with his ideology and by appearing to become the most ardent supporter of the Indonesian Revolution. At the same time, this tactic imposed limitations on the PKI's revolutionary dynamic, but these limitations could be reduced without danger to the profitable
Sukarno alliance if the tempo of the Revolution could be increased and if the Great Leader of the Revolution could be pushed more and more to the left in his ideology and policies. Sukarno was himself interested in increasing revolutionary fervour and in promoting more militant policies at home and abroad. The PKI's increasingly militant activities thus served the communists' interests but were not incompatible with Sukarno's interests, with his ideology or with his growing obsession with revolutionary pursuits.

Although the PKI was far from being a submissive partner in the ideological alliance with Sukarno and

1 Sukarno had indicated his interest in pursuing such an approach and had given clear notice of his intention to do so in his 1959 Manipol speech when the Revolution was 'rediscovered'. As this speech was largely a restatement of his pre-independence views, there is a sense in which notice was given as early as the late nineteen-twenties.

2 e.g., the campaigns to promote confrontation of Malaysia, links with Peking and anti-U.S. postures, the criticism of 'bureaucratic capitalists' in the government (primarily an attack on military elements in the bureaucracy and in the expropriated foreign enterprises), the attempts to create pressure for radical land reform by stirring up the peasants against the landlords and the encouragement of militant action by workers particularly against foreign-owned enterprises.
although it was gaining in revolutionary authority, to
the point at which it was Sukarno's major potential if
not actual competitor for control of the Revolution, this
gain was being made through the successful creation of
an image which placed the party firmly on the side of
Sukarno, his ideology and his Revolution in the cause of
building Indonesia and the world anew. In so far as
the PKI was competing with Sukarno for control of the
Revolution, the competition was on terms essentially
dictated by Sukarno. The PKI could not openly attempt
to replace the doctrines and concepts of the Indonesian
Revolution with those of a purely communist revolution,
without the risk of losing Sukarno's patronage and
protection and without risking a sizeable reduction in
mass support as a result of offended or affronted
nationalist sentiments. Moreover, however much the PKI
sought to promote its own interests, the aspect of
competition was far outweighed by the aspect of
co-operation in a partnership headed by Sukarno. It
seemed unlikely that the PKI would topple Sukarno from
his position of revolutionary pre-eminence, even if it
wished to. What was more likely was that it would
become his heir to the leadership of the Revolution.

Viewing the 'guides' in terms of those who
controlled the state, one finds that the situation under Guided Democracy was more complicated and Sukarno's pre-eminence less certain and less pronounced. Although the Sukarno-army-PKI triumvirate was not threatened from without by any effective opposition, the survival of the Guided Democracy regime depended on the maintenance of a delicate and precarious balance between the three dominant forces. The elimination of any one would profoundly affect the relationship between the other two and would precipitate a fundamental change in the nature of the regime, perhaps accompanied by civil war. The greatest threat to this balance arose from the irreconcilable conflict of interests and of ideology between the army leadership and the PKI, combined with the army's overwhelming power in terms of armed force and the PKI's apparently substantial mass support. Essentially, the PKI's political strength and Sukarno's prestige and.

1 The Sukarno-army-PKI political relationship is here discussed in very general terms. This discussion is elaborated in Appendix D, pp.D1 ff. below. For further details, see the material cited in footnote 1, p.D1 below.
2 This political strength was based on the PKI's apparent mass backing and on its effectiveness as a political party rather than on its independent power within the Guided Democracy machinery. In this sense, the PKI's
stature were aligned against the armed might of the military. Viewed with the wisdom of hindsight, this appears to have been an unequal match, but it was not seen to be so until the coup and its aftermath revealed the army's ability to use its physical power effectively against its political rivals. The relative importance of political and military strength were not put to the test until 1965. By being incorporated in the political leadership of Guided Democracy, the army was generally encouraged to acquire administrative power and to confine its efforts to influence or control government policy to the political arena, in which the three 'guides', if not equally balanced, were at least sufficiently balanced to prevent any one or an alliance of two from eliminating the third.

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political strength was potential rather than actual, although, in the complicated manoeuvres of Guided Democracy politics, in which bluff and an accurate identification of rising stars were important, the PKI's strength was seen as no less important on this account. Lev argues that the incorporation of the army's elite into the political structure of the country and their consequent satisfaction at the situation provided a 'crucial reason' for the absence of a military coup during the period of Guided Democracy. See D.S. Lev, 'The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64, p.360.
Sukarno, as the legitimator for the army's political influence and as the protector of the PKI, remained, throughout the period to 1965, the crucial figure in maintaining the political balance. His task as balancer was to see that neither the PKI nor the army became sufficiently strong to dominate him or the system and, at the same time, that neither became sufficiently frustrated or alarmed at the other's advance to attempt a major challenge to the whole regime. The legitimising activities played an important part in this respect, by sustaining Sukarno's personal prestige and importance, by promoting an ideology broadly acceptable to both the army and the PKI and by diverting the attention of the two bitter rivals from their points of disagreement and competition to an area of apparent consensus and common endeavour.

Although the political balance that sustained the triumvirate was not appreciably disturbed until the upheaval of the coup, there were changes in the triangular relationships, for example, in the dominant patterns of co-operation and competition and in the relative strengths of the partners and rivals. It was very difficult for the participants and for observers to assess the exact situation at any given time, but some
major turning points can be discerned. By late 1960, the institutions and ground rules of the new system were basically established, with competitors other than the 'big three' virtually eliminated. The 'simplification' of political parties in 1960-1961, the arrest of Masjumi-PSI leaders in 1962 and the incorporation of the political parties, mass organizations and functional groups within the framework of the National Front established the triumvirate's control over the political system more firmly. Up to this point, the dominant political alliance had been between Sukarno and the army, although the PKI had made considerable advance with the help of Sukarno. In 1962, however, there were indications of changes in the relative strengths of Sukarno and the army leadership and in the relative importance of his two partnerships. Thereafter, Sukarno appeared to have a firmer control of the Guided Democracy system and to give increasing importance to his alliance with the PKI at the expense of that with the military, as Guided Democracy became increasingly nasokomised.

These changes did not destroy the triumvirate nor did they entirely eliminate the military leadership as a political force to be reckoned with, but the army became
less united than it had been and the military leaders more amenable to Sukarno's wishes. Simultaneously, the PKI came into increasing prominence as the tone and policies of the regime became more radical. Whether because of Sukarno's greater degree of control after 1962, or because of the PKI's greater influence, Indonesia moved to the left domestically and internationally, whilst the terms of the political competition for power became increasingly favourable to Sukarno and the PKI. How far this development would have proceeded before it provoked the military leadership into armed opposition is difficult to say. As the date of the 1965 coup approached, there was increasing talk of the 'Council of Generals', which was said to be alarmed at the trend in Indonesian politics, and there were rumours of an impending military coup\(^1\). When a coup did break out, however, it was not initiated by the generals but by more junior officers headed by

\[^1\] There was also talk of an impending communist coup. For a description of the pre-coup tensions see Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, Chapter I, pp.3-16, Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp.88-100, and A.C. Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago, Pall Mall, London, 1966, pp.291-293. This book will hereafter be cited as Brackman, Second Front.
Lieutenant Colonel Untung, either on their own initiative or with the encouragement of the PKI\(^1\). The murder of the army's top generals spurred the army into action under General Suharto, one of the few survivors of the top military leadership. The army's physical power was applied not only to suppress the coup, but to eradicate the PKI from the political arena, to remove Sukarno from power and to establish a New Order, headed by Suharto.

Although the establishment of Guided Democracy did not result in the creation of a monolithic regime, it appeared to produce a period of relative political stability and national unity\(^2\), particularly when compared with the final years of the period of liberal democracy. The national ideology, based on Pantja Sila, Manipol and dedication to radical change, appeared to be almost universally accepted and the leadership seemed to be united at least sufficiently to avoid the overt fractionalism that had been a feature of government.

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under parliamentary democracy. A political balance between the three main forces, Sukarno, the army and the PKI, was maintained, although precariously at times, and despite rumours of impending coups and occasional signs of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the regime\(^1\), Indonesia was spared any serious threat of civil war and the dislocation of frequent changes of government. Adjustments were more subtle.

The violence of the 1965 coup and its aftermath, however, and the subsequent dramatic changes in the composition of the leadership, in political atmosphere and in policies, indicate that the political stability and the unity amongst the 'guides' and in the nation as a whole were more illusory than real. Instability in the form of overt factionalism, widespread defiance of the government and vociferous opposition to the leadership and its policies was avoided, but dissatisfaction,

\(^1\) See, for example, Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), *Indonesia*, pp.404-409, Feith, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), *Governments and Politics*, pp.248-251, and Grant, *Indonesia*, pp.126-131. The tensions did, however, mount in late 1964 and early 1965 as the illusion of NASAKOM unity became more difficult to sustain. See Appendix D, pp.D52-D56 below.
frustration and the underlying divisions and tensions remained, even though they were kept beneath the surface because of the absence of machinery through which disagreement with the official 'consensus' could be openly expressed. If parliamentary democracy perpetuated disunity through fostering factionalism and dissension, Guided Democracy failed to remove the causes of this disunity, despite the illusion it created. The political price of the type of stability and unity experienced under Guided Democracy seems to have been unprecedented violence once the abortive coup shattered the illusion of ideological and political unity amongst the elite and the nation and removed the restraints on the dissenters, both inside the elite and outside it.

The successful creation of the illusion of unity was assisted by the circumstances that prevailed at the time of the introduction of Guided Democracy and by the strategies adopted by the leadership once the transition had begun. The proposal for the introduction of Guided Democracy, though not universally accepted,

received the backing of the three rising political forces and of wide sections of the politically active public. In the crisis situation before and during the introduction of Guided Democracy, there was no alternative proposal with sufficiently strong and united backing. The opposition to Guided Democracy was primarily based on groups already largely discredited and subsequently associated with the unsuccessful rebellion of 1958. Disillusionment with the disunity,

1 These three forces, however, tended to interpret Guided Democracy in terms favouring themselves, so that, although agreed on principle, each had different detailed ideas as to what the implementation of Guided Democracy should entail. See, for example, Feith's summary of these different views on p.359 of 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia.

2 In 1960 there was an attempt to create a basis for united opposition to the implementation of Guided Democracy and, in particular, to Sukarno's plans to replace the elected parliament by an appointed gotong- rojong parliament. Masjumi and PSI leaders were joined by leaders of some other minor parties, including the army-backed IPKI, to form the Democratic League. This opposition, however, proved ineffective. The Democratic League was eventually banned in March, 1961. For a brief account, see Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.343-344, Mackie, 'Indonesian Politics Under Guided Democracy' in Australian Outlook, Vol. 15, No. 3, December, 1961 pp. 272-273, Mintz, Mohammed, etc., p.201 and Lev, 'The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64, pp.357-358.
bickering and ineffectiveness of parliamentary democracy had created a situation in which the political public was ready to accept a stronger leadership and more visionary and radical approaches to the solution of the country's still unsolved problems. The initial widespread hopes, that Guided Democracy and Manipol would bring solutions, once again proved groundless, as had the hopes entertained for the 1955 national elections. Dissatisfaction, disillusionment and frustration were, however, kept in check by a judicious combination of coercion, diversionary tactics, ritualism and political and economic manipulation, whilst hope for long term improvements and a sense of revolutionary momentum were generally maintained. The crisis situation, created initially by the West Irian issue and subsequently by confrontation, reinforced the tendency towards authoritarian leadership and radicalism, whilst providing popular unifying

1 See, for example, Feith's analysis of the reasons for the continued acceptance of the Guided Democracy regime, pp.400-409 of Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, and pp.248-251 of Feith, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics. Once the atmosphere of hopefulness had been completely shattered by the coup, however, disillusionment and resentment at the apparent hoax successfully perpetrated by the Old Order, was probably greater than it had ever been in Indonesia's modern history.
causes, foreign scapegoats and justification for increasing hardship\textsuperscript{1}. With the replacement of the machinery of parliamentary democracy by the new, musjara\textsuperscript{w}ah-type institutions and authoritarian measures of Guided Democracy and with the banning of the Masjumi and the PSI, effective opposition to the new system and its values was silenced. Competition for power and influence as well as rewards was virtually restricted to rivalry between the three most powerful elements, Sukarno, the army and the PKI, and to competition for the favour of one or other of these three. As the three dominant forces were able to maintain a fairly stable, though complicated and subtly changing, relationship, a political balance and the system as such were sustained until the 1965 coup.

Because of Sukarno's dominant position in ideology formulation and because of the emphasis on legitimisation by reference to ideology, Sukarno was able to

\textsuperscript{1} In this respect, confrontation of Malaysia appears to have been less successful than the West Irian campaign, in that it was an issue on which Indonesians were less intensely committed. See, for example, Grant, Indonesia, p.172. Nevertheless, it did serve as a reasonably successful rallying cause which could not be publicly rejected without the risk of appearing unpatriotic or a stooge of the imperialists.
direct the political dialogue in such a way that loyalty to the Revolution and its ideology was vital for any person or group desiring to advance his or its influence politically. Thus, for example, once the 1945 Constitution had been reinstated, it was no longer politic to advocate an Islamic state as opposed to one based on Pantja Sila. Nor was it wise to question the priority given to the completion of the Revolution or the emphasis on anti-imperialism. In this sense, Sukarno dictated the terms of the political competition, terms which gave a decided advantage to himself and to such other 'solidarity makers' as the radical nationalists and the PKI's progressive revolutionaries. In

Pluvier in Confrontations, p.55, puts forward the same point slightly differently. Speaking of the decline in the power of political parties, he says: 'Sukarno's exhortation to "return to the spirit of the revolutionary period of 1945-49", and the proposal to reintroduce the revolutionary constitution of 1945 manoeuvred them [i.e., the political parties] into an awkward position in which they could not express any disapproval without running the risk of being accused of opposing the Revolution itself'.

The 'solidarity maker' elements in the army similarly benefited from political competition on these terms. See Feith's application of his 'administrator' versus 'solidarity maker' thesis to the political competition under Guided Democracy in Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.386-389.
such a political environment, with the institutions suitably 'retooled' (i.e., packed), those who did not support the Revolution as it was being led under Guided Democracy could do little more than remain silent, whilst awaiting the development of a situation in which they could take the initiative to bring about a change.

The success of the 'solidarity maker' strategy in creating an illusion of national unity, political stability and revolutionary progress exacted a further price, one that was ultimately to play an important part in creating greater instability than previously and that was to contribute to the discrediting of Sukarno and the Old Order. Whilst the establishment of Guided Democracy removed party conflict as an obstacle to effective government, administration and progress, a number of features of Guided Democracy added to the economic chaos and decline\(^1\), already set in motion by the seizure of

Dutch and subsequently Chinese enterprises and business in 1957-1958. These features were primarily: the emphasis on ideology, symbolism, nation-building and loyalty rather than on pragmatism and efficiency, the pursuit of radical, unrealistic and over-ambitious economic policies, the subordination of economic considerations and objectives to political and ideological ones and the increasing tendency for foreign policy pursuits to take priority over domestic needs. As production generally declined and speculation and corruption increased, the proliferation of economic controls under Guided Economy\(^1\) contributed to further inefficiency and economic decline, partly because the controls were administered by an unwieldy civil and military bureaucracy that was inadequate for the task of implementing the measures called for in the Eight Year Overall Development Plan.

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1 The economic equivalent of Guided Democracy. See Chapter II, pp.156-159 above.
Plan, DEKON and BERDIKARI\(^1\). Economic decline and increasing hardship created the need for even greater emphasis on ritualism and revolutionary legitimising activities and encouraged the adoption of even more desperate and extreme policies, especially of the diversionary type in the foreign policy field\(^2\). Late in 1962 and in 1963, there were signs that economic development with western assistance might be given top priority and that the 'solidarity maker' strategy would therefore give way to a more pragmatic 'administrator'-type of approach to Indonesia's problems\(^3\). With the launching of confrontation, however, ideology-dominated foreign policy ventures were given even greater priority and radical measures against the remaining foreign enter-

\(^1\) For an account of the development from the Eight Year Overall Development Plan, through Dekon to Berdikari, see T.K. Tan, 'Sukarnian Economics', in T.K. Tan (ed.), Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp.34-41.

\(^2\) Apart from the vicious circle of the type depicted in Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.409, there was the added complication of the need to keep the PKI in check. See Pluvier, Confrontations, pp.59-60. There was also the complication of the need to keep the vast army employed. See ibid., p.63.

\(^3\) See pp.516-523 below.
prises in Indonesia were adopted and intensified\(^1\), thereby striking the final crushing blow to Indonesia's ailing economy. The result was that, whilst Sukarno can, with some justification, claim to have bequeathed a nation to Suharto (though not as united a nation as he believed or pretended it to be), it was a virtually bankrupt nation.

The very measures that appeared to build a sense of national unity, self-respect and revolutionary progress and that kept the 'guides' of Guided Democracy in power, not only left long standing problems unsolved but added to the seriousness of those problems, both by encouraging unrealistic hopes and by promoting further economic decline. To the extent that the problems were aggravated by Sukarno's policies, he and his Old Order supporters can be blamed for the country's economic deterioration, as they are by many New Order supporters. In that Sukarno and the Old Order failed to solve the country's economic problems, however, there is nothing unique in the period of his Guided Democracy regime. The failure under Guided Democracy on this

\(^1\) See pp. 523-525 below.
score, though more conspicuous, was similar to that of the governments under parliamentary democracy. The inadequacies of Guided Democracy should, in other words, be viewed in the light of the general failure to develop effective, modern government in Indonesia. All Indonesian governments seem to have encountered the same basic problem and have so far failed to solve it. This problem is to devise a way to combine effective 'administrator' and 'solidarity maker' approaches and skills. The former involve the adoption of pragmatic policies, that produce both quick and effective improvements in the economy and sound, long term development, that are capable of overcoming opposition from vested interests hostile to change and that do not appear to endanger the country's much prized independence\textsuperscript{1}. The latter involve creating and sustaining an inspiring, confident and optimistic atmosphere capable of mobilising and uniting the different sections of Indonesian society, thereby promoting national unity and adequate political

\textsuperscript{1} Any pragmatic assessment of Indonesia's economic problems would seem to require the recognition of the need for foreign aid, investment and technical advice. The difficulty thus becomes one of attracting and holding foreign assistance whilst ensuring that the country remains independent and manifestly appears to do so.
support to ensure the survival of the regime. Either task is formidable in the Indonesian context, and the attempt to do both simultaneously, as seems to be necessary, is indeed Herculean. The 'administrator'-dominated governments of the early period of parliamentary democracy achieved limited success on the first criterion but failed on the second. The 'solidarity maker' regime of Guided Democracy achieved greater, though still limited, success on the second criterion but failed on the first. The New Order appears to have adopted a similar type of approach to that of the early 'administrators', whilst retaining much of the institutional structure of Guided Democracy. Whether the New Order is more successful than its predecessors in attempting to achieve economic rehabilitation and development as well as political stability remains to be seen.


With the restoration of the 1945 Constitution and the 'rediscovery' and 'return to the rails' of the Revolution in July-August, 1959, Indonesia embarked on a more radical path domestically, the furtherance of the Revolution becoming increasingly the official domestic preoccupation. Initially, the erection of
the new institutional structure of Guided Democracy, the eradication of opposition elements and the establishment and consolidation of the regime's power base were the dominant concerns of the leadership, including Sukarno. By late 1960, the basic institutions had been established and the major opponents of the new regime eliminated. Further consolidation occurred in 1961-1962. Whilst Sukarno was influential throughout this whole process and was undoubtedly the dominant force in foreign policy formulation, it was not until mid-1962, when his power relations with the army leadership were adjusted in his favour, that his control over Guided Democracy became sufficiently assured to enable him to launch a vigorous and, in terms of resources, demanding foreign policy, without fears of loss of support either for this policy or for his continued leadership role.

Partly because of the above domestic situation, the introduction of Guided Democracy did not have immediate repercussions in the foreign policy field, although it was a major step towards creating the domestic conditions necessary for a militant and

sustained foreign policy offensive. There was also a foreign policy factor operating against a major initial foreign policy change. In the final years of parliamentary democracy, as in the opening years of Guided Democracy, the dominant foreign policy concern was the struggle for West Irian, a campaign which had already reached a high pitch of fervour by 1957-1958. This campaign merely received further and not unexpected intensification after Guided Democracy had been established. There was thus a delay before dramatic foreign policy developments began to occur, but occur they did, as the influence of Sukarno and the 'progressive' revolutionary political forces increased and as cumulative domestic problems and policy failures required more elaborate and desperate diversionary and legitimising activities on the part of Sukarno and the government. Thus, the Guided Democracy emphasis on the domestic aspects of the Revolution came to be more than matched by the foreign policy obsession with exporting the Revolution. Indeed, although the most immediately obvious results of the events of July-August 1959 were domestic, the pursuit of international revolutionary objectives gained increasing priority over the solution of domestic problems, so much so, that it was ultimately
the spectacular growth of militant, extravagant and aggressive foreign policy activity that provided the most noticeable contrast to Indonesian affairs of preceding periods.

The foreign policy of Guided Democracy may be conveniently divided into two closely related phases¹: the first ending in mid-1962 and corresponding to the period of consolidation both of the Guided Democracy regime and of Sukarno's power within that regime, the second ending at the 1965 coup and corresponding to the period of Sukarno's most conspicuous domination over Indonesian affairs, with the support of the PKI. The dividing point between these two phases is less obvious than those between previous phases, but it may be regarded as lying between June, 1962, when Sukarno gained ascendancy over his chief inhibiting partner and rival, the army, and August, 1962, when the agreement for the subsequent transfer of West Irian to Indonesia was

¹ This is a similar division to that adopted by F.P. Bunnell in his account and analysis of the foreign policy of Guided Democracy. See Bunnell, op. cit. He divides this foreign policy into two major periods: the 'Policy of Confrontation Phase One: August 1960 - August 1962' and the 'Policy of Confrontation Phase Two: Fall 1962-Summer 1965'.
1959-1962. West Irian: Undoubtedly, the most dramatic aspect of this phase of Indonesian foreign policy was the climax of the West Irian campaign, accompanied by the rapid

1 There were a number of changes, the selection of any one of which as the turning point is arbitrary. Clearly the two dates suggested above were significant, but there were complications, for example, in the delay of actual acquisition of sovereignty over West Irian until May 1963, and in the indications between August 1962 and September 1963 that foreign policy would be subordinated to the pursuit of domestic economic development with western aid. The formal declaration in February 1963 of Indonesian opposition to the creation of Malaysia, the introduction of force into the dispute in April, 1963, or the events of September 1963 that resulted in the loss of U.S. sponsorship of aid for the stabilization programme could also be regarded as major turning-points. Like Bunnell, who classifies what he calls the 'watershed' of August 1962 to September 1963 as part of the second phase of the foreign policy of Guided Democracy, like Feith, who regards mid-1962 as a major turning point in Indonesian affairs, and like Weatherbee, who asserts that, 'By mid-1962, at the latest, the flame of the Indonesian Revolution had leapt the artificial boundaries of the Indonesian state to renew itself in the combustibles of international politics', I have chosen mid-1962 as a convenient date at which to divide the foreign policy of Guided Democracy. See Bunnell, op. cit., p.57, Feith, President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, p.969 and Weatherbee op. cit., p.57.
build up of Indonesia's armed strength. Although the acquisition of West Irian was incorporated in the Political Manifesto's statement of the 'principal tasks' of Indonesian Revolution and was included in the Djuanda government's programme, it seemed unlikely in 1959 that Indonesia would succeed in this campaign. In a sense, Indonesia's prospects for success declined in 1960-1961 as the Netherlands proceeded with plans to increase the Dutch forces in West Irian and introduced

1 See Bunnell's account and analysis of these two closely related aspects of Indonesian foreign policy in Bunnell, op. cit., pp.46-54. For further details, see A.C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History, Praeger, New York, 1963, pp.282-300, Brackman, Second Front, pp.95-114, Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.351-354, Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.127-137 and Kosut (ed.), op. cit., pp.53-63. For two official attempts of this period at summarising the Indonesian position on West Irian, see Indonesia 1961 and Indonesia 1962, pp.61-73 and 61-77 respectively.


3 See for example, Lev, Transition, p.282.

4 Repeated Indonesian efforts to obtain UN support for the Indonesian case had failed to attract the necessary votes for a two-thirds majority and future efforts were not likely to be more successful. Similarly, the seizure of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia had not succeeded in forcing the Dutch to negotiate for the transfer of West Irian, had further weakened Indonesia's already ailing economy and seemed to have left the Indonesian government with no further sanctions which could be employed directly against the Dutch.
measures aimed at preparing the territory for independ­
dence outside the Indonesian Republic. Indonesia
countered these moves, however, by a combination of
diplomatic and military pressures aimed at forcing the
Dutch to yield to Indonesia's wishes.

Following the Dutch government's announcement of
its intention to build up its forces in West Irian,
Indonesian students sacked the Dutch legation in
Djakarta, the Supreme Advisory Council officially
adopted the 'principle of confrontation' against the
Dutch, calling for a policy of liberating West Irian
'in a revolutionary manner' and, in August, 1960,
Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with Holland at
the same time as Sukarno reiterated the Supreme Advisory
Council's proposals¹. Soon afterwards, Sukarno put the
Indonesian case on West Irian before the United Nations
General Assembly, depicting the issue in terms of an
anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist struggle and warning

¹ See Sukarno, 'Djarek', 17/8/1960, in Sukarno,
Political Manifesto, '59-64, pp.114-115. For his
review of the progress made to that date in the West
Irian campaign, stressing the adoption of more forceful
methods, see ibid., pp.110-115.
that it presented a serious threat to peace\(^1\). In late 1960 and early 1961, small scale infiltration of West Irian by Indonesian guerillas began and in November, 1961, Sukarno openly threatened military action. To make Indonesian threats more credible, however, Indonesia had to obtain substantial supplies of weaponry and this required foreign assistance\(^2\). In the quest for such assistance, General Nasution, as in 1957, turned first, unsuccessfully\(^3\), to Washington and subsequently to the Soviet Union, with which an arms purchase agreement totalling $450 million was signed in January,

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\(^1\) It was also in this speech that the basic concepts of the New Emerging Forces Ideology were enunciated, although it was not until 1961 that they were given their more characteristic formulation. For Sukarno's reference to the West Irian problem, see Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew', 30/9/1960, in Sel. Docs., pp.54-56.

\(^2\) Whilst the needs dictated by the accelerating West Irian campaign provided the most obvious immediate motivation for building up Indonesian armaments, this development also served other purposes, e.g., increasing Indonesian influence in Southeast Asia and Afro-Asia, and providing a tangible status symbol. See Burnell, op. cit., p.47.

\(^3\) Although refusing to provide arms on the scale requested by Indonesia, America did, however, continue to supply small quantities of arms under previously negotiated agreements.
1961\(^1\).

As a result of these developments, the U.S. government which, so far, had adopted a neutral position on the West Irian dispute\(^2\), became concerned that Indonesia might move more definitely into the communist camp as a result of the West Irian impasse and, possibly worse, that, backed by Russian arms, Indonesia might spark off a regional conflict over the disputed territory. President Kennedy therefore invited Sukarno to Washington for discussions in April, 1961\(^3\).


2 The Indonesian view on this position was, with some justification, that the US supported the status quo and therefore continued Dutch possession of the territory.

3 These discussions occurred during one of Sukarno's many overseas visits which had not originally included America. Brackman regards this invitation as the product of 'an artful technique' on Sukarno's part. At these talks, Sukarno apparently managed to persuade Kennedy that the West Irian crisis was indeed playing into the hands of the PKI and to give the impression
Subsequently and largely as a result of these talks, U.S. neutrality on West Irian was abandoned and pressure began to be exerted on the Dutch to consider Indonesian demands for the territory. Between September and November, 1961, the West Irian issue was once again raised in the United Nations General Assembly, but neither Holland nor Indonesia succeeded in gaining the support necessary for endorsement of their proposals¹. Indonesia's final bid in the United Nations for a peaceful settlement had failed.

In December, 1961, doubtless encouraged in part by India's example of the use of force in Goa, but also

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that, once the West Irian problem was resolved, Indonesian energies would be directed towards domestic reforms, by that time much needed. See Brackman, Second Front, pp.101-103.

¹ The set-back for Indonesia was, however, greater than that for Holland, since the African Brazzaville group sponsored a resolution similar to the Dutch proposal, basically involving ultimate and separate independence for West Irian following a period of UN supervision. This resolution fared better on the voting than did the pro-Indonesian resolution sponsored by India on behalf of the non-aligned bloc and calling for Dutch-Indonesian negotiations under U.N. auspices. Neither resolution obtained the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. As African representation in the U.N. was likely to increase as more African states gained independence, the prospects for an Indonesian victory in the U.N. were declining. For the voting figures, see Brackman, Second Front, p.96. For an official Indonesian assessment of the Dutch tactics in making the 1961 proposal, see Indonesia, 1962, pp.70-74.
because the campaign was reaching a climax, irrespective of India's example, Sukarno ignored Kennedy's appeals for restraint and, whilst privately indicating that U.S. mediation would be welcomed, officially issued his 'three commands' on West Irian¹. In January, 1962, the first sizeable guerilla attacks on West Irian began, corresponding with the first Dutch-Indonesian naval engagement. In February, active U.S. mediation, aimed at producing a peaceful settlement began with the dispatch of Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, to Indonesia and the Netherlands. Since Sukarno would not agree to talks unless they dealt with the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, U.S. pressure was exerted on the Netherlands to accept Sukarno's terms for negotiations.

These efforts, backed by U Thant, the Acting General Secretary of the U.N., culminated in March in the opening of the Dutch-Indonesian talks in Washington, with Ellsworth Bunker, a former U.S. ambassador to India, acting as mediator and as U Thant's representative.

¹ These were known as the 'Trikora' and were 'to prevent the forming of a puppet "State of Papua", to fly the National Flag in West Irian and to make ready for general mobilisation in defence of national independence and integrity', Indonesia, 1962, p.75.
Whilst participating in these negotiations, Indonesia kept up its military and diplomatic pressure, withdrawing from the talks and intensifying the fighting. U Thant and the U.S. continued to urge the resumption of negotiations, while Moscow counselled the continued use of force\(^1\). In July, 1962, however, the talks resumed, following Dutch and Indonesian acceptance of the Bunker proposals as a basis for discussion\(^2\). Whilst agreeing to participate in the renewed negotiations, Indonesia kept up the threat of force by mobilising, thereby creating the impression that a full scale invasion of West Irian was imminent\(^3\). In the face of Indonesia's

\(^1\) Within Indonesia, a disagreement appears to have developed between Sukarno and some army elements during the second quarter of 1962 over whether diplomacy should be abandoned. For details, see Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.353-4. Compare with R.C. de Iongh, 'West Irian Confrontation', in Tan (ed.), Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp.111-112.

\(^2\) These proposals were actually drawn up by the U.S. State Department and put forward by Bunker who, continued to act as mediator. See Brackman's summary and comments in Brackman, Second Front, p.106.

\(^3\) Brackman is doubtful whether an invasion was in fact planned and even more doubtful about its prospects for success if it had occurred. Nevertheless, the threat appears to have been believed by Washington and had the desired effect on the negotiations. See ibid., pp.112-113.
exercise in brinkmanship and consequent U.S. pressure on the Netherlands to avert a full-scale invasion of West Irian, the Dutch yielded to Indonesian demands and an agreement was signed on August, 15, 1962\textsuperscript{1}. Indonesia, through the combined use of tough diplomacy and threats, had succeeded in obtaining U.S. diplomatic support and Russian arms and had thereby achieved eventual victory in the West Irian struggle. As a bonus, Indonesia also emerged from the struggle with substantially strengthened armed forces\textsuperscript{2}. The victory and the military strength were, however, purchased at considerable cost in terms of

\textsuperscript{1} The agreement provided for the transfer of control of West Irian to the UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority) on October 1, 1962, and for the subsequent transfer to Indonesia on May 1, 1963. See Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History, p.297 for a summary of the agreement. It was given the approval of the Dutch and Indonesian parliaments, of the New Guinea Council and of the U.N. General Assembly in September. Indonesia subsequently backed down, in 1965, on its commitment under the agreement to permit the people of West Irian to participate in an 'act of self-determination' before 1970 to decide on whether they desired Indonesian rule to continue. The New Order reversed this decision and arranged such an 'act' in 1969.

\textsuperscript{2} See, for example, Kahin's summary of the strength of Indonesia's armed forces at the end of 1962, footnote 1, p.671 of Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments.
economic decline and hardship. Whilst acknowledging the price that was paid for the victory, Sukarno, in his Independence Day address, 'A Year of Triumph', was jubilant.

The Third World: Although the above campaign was the dominant concern of Indonesian foreign policy during this period, Indonesia was also active in non-aligned and Afro-Asian affairs, partly in order to attract support for the West Irian struggle, partly as a matter of principle of long standing in Indonesian foreign policy, partly in pursuit of international status and

1 For a comment on the economic effects of the West Irian campaign, see, for example, p.170 of Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1963, United Nations. See also Kahin's comment on the effect of this campaign, p.676 of Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments. Kahin also comments on the cost of maintaining the swollen armed forces, ibid., p.673.


3 In particular, the principles of anti-imperialism, independent active foreign policy and good neighbour policy encouraged Indonesia to lean towards the non-aligned and Afro-Asian world in seeking close and reliable international allies.

4 In this respect, these activities were part of the legitimising activities discussed above, pp.455-457.
partly in a bid by Sukarno for personal leadership and for his nation's leadership of the Developing World. It was in this area of Indonesian foreign policy that Sukarno's personal diplomacy and his convictions, combined with ambitions, were most conspicuous.

In September, 1960, in his United Nations address, 'To Build the World Anew', Sukarno launched his crusade for a new world order. This speech was a blend of Indonesian nationalism, Afro-Asianism and non-alignment, whilst also containing the basic concepts of the New Emerging Forces Ideology. This blend reflected the still evolving, transitional and incomplete nature of Sukarno's view of the world and the consequent flexibility of Indonesian foreign policy. Thus, for example, he called for disarmament and an end to nuclear testing and joined with other non-aligned nations in calling for a renewed summit between Kruschev and Eisenhower. Yet, simultaneously, he identified colonialism and imperialism as the major sources of world tension and emphasised the need for their elimination, thereby anticipating the subsequent militant postures

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1 For the full text, see Sel. Docs., pp.33-84.
which Indonesia was to adopt, to the detriment of non-alignment and the pursuit of peace.

What was clear in this speech was that a change in the existing world order was considered necessary, and Sukarno was making the widest possible appeal for international support for this view. He had not as yet worked out which group of nations were to be Indonesia's closest allies in this crusade. At this point, Sukarno saw the world as divided into three camps: the communist bloc, the western bloc and a third, indistinctly defined group of nations which were primarily Afro-Asian, non-aligned, poor and former colonies. Despite the occasional modest disclaimers in the speech, it was clear that Sukarno saw himself as speaking on behalf of this third group, however it was to be defined. He also clearly believed that, by virtue of its colonial and nation building experience and by virtue of its possession of Pantja Sila as the State Ideology, Indonesia was peculiarly suited for leadership of this third group of nations and, indeed, for a leadership role
in creating the new world order\textsuperscript{1}. The platform on which Indonesia was to provide the leadership, Afro-Asianism, non-alignment or militant anti-imperialism, had not yet been decided.

Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism had been an important aspect of Indonesian foreign policy since the beginning of the physical Revolution and Indonesia's anti-imperialist struggle had already become militant and aggressive before the beginning of this period of Indonesian foreign policy. The seizure of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia in 1957 in an attempt to force the Netherlands to yield on the West Irian issue had provided dramatic evidence of this development, which became even more pronounced as the West Irian campaign reached its climax in 1961-1962. Sukarno's and hence Indonesia's growing obsession with anti-imperialism, however, had not yet reached the point at which it totally eclipsed Afro-Asianism, the 'Bandung Spirit' and non-alignment.

Following the success of the 1955 Bandung

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Sukarno even went so far as to suggest that Pantja Sila should be incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations. See ibid., pp.75-76.
Conference, it had been hoped that a second Afro-Asian conference would be convened in 1956, but none eventuated, despite sporadic calls by various nations for such a conference. Afro-Asian co-operation and liaison continued to be attempted, however, for example, in exchange visits between Afro-Asian dignitaries, in United Nations lobbying and in the activities of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and its

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1 See Kahin, A-A Conference, p.34. The New York Times of 31 January, 1956, p.3, reported that the next conference was to be held in the summer of 1956 in Cairo. The Suez crisis, however, put an end to this project.

2 In this type of activity, Sukarno was particularly active, although not exclusively in pursuing Afro-Asian contacts. Between 1959 and 1963, approximately 50% of his time abroad was spent in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as compared to 30% in western countries and 20% in communist countries. See the analysis of Sukarno's travels in Modelski (ed.), The New Emerging Forces, pp.51-53. See also Feith's summary of visits paid and received between 1958 and 1962, p.354 of Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia.

subsidiary organizations\textsuperscript{1}. Although the anniversaries of Bandung were observed in Indonesia, it was not until late in 1960 that the Indonesian government became active in attempting to arrange a second Afro-Asian conference. MMe. Supeni was then appointed as a roving ambassador to visit key Afro-Asian countries to try to gain support and, in March, 1961, Sukarno sent out letters suggesting a second Bandung. The response to these initiatives, however, was unenthusiastic, except in the case of Communist China.

During a visit to Cairo, also in March, 1961, Mme. Supeni made a double proposal to Nasser, suggesting a small neutralist summit conference, to be followed by a larger Bandung style Afro-Asian conference\textsuperscript{2}. This suggestion was made at a time when Tito and Nasser were attempting

\textsuperscript{1} The AAPSO was a communist-backed, increasingly militantly anti-imperialist organization, created largely on Russian initiative as a result of the Soviet Union's exclusion from the Bandung Conference. It was, however, an unofficial organization, purporting to represent the Afro-Asian people as distinct from their governments. For an account of the origins and development of this organization, see Jansen, op. cit., Chapter XI, pp.250ff.

\textsuperscript{2} This proposal was reported in the \textit{Times of India}, 20 May, 1961.
unsuccessfully to enlist Nehru's support for a conference of non-aligned nations before the forthcoming Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations. Such a conference did eventuate, but a second Bandung did not. The preparatory meeting was held in Cairo in June, 1961, and was followed in September by the Belgrade non-aligned conference, sponsored by Tito, Nasser and Sukarno, with Nehru's reluctant blessing, and attended by 21 nations.

At Belgrade, Sukarno reiterated the concepts put forward in his previous United Nations speech, but he placed a stronger emphasis on the clash between the 'new emergent forces' and the 'old forces of domination'. This clash, he maintained, 'cuts deeper into the flesh of man' than does the East-West conflict of the cold

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1 For details of the manoeuvres leading up to and during the Cairo and Belgrade conferences, see Jansen, op. cit., Chapters XII & XIII, pp.278 ff & 291 ff. Compare this with the official Indonesian account, Indonesia and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries: Beograd, September 1961, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1962. This book will hereafter be cited as Beograd.

2 The text of this speech, 'Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice', appears in Beograd, pp.15-38 and in Sel. Docs., pp.121-152.
war. Basically, he was arguing for the identification of non-alignment with anti-imperialism, for the subordination of cold war preoccupations to those of the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism and for an intensification of the latter struggle. His chief opponent was Nehru, who saw the cold war, rather than the attempts to suppress the struggle against imperialism, as the major threat to peace and hence as the prime concern of the non-aligned nations, whose efforts should therefore be directed towards mediation between the two major blocs. Neither view gained exclusive acceptance at the conference, both being reflected in the final communique¹. The basic NEFO stance, advocacy of priority to the anti-imperialist crusade, had thus been launched internationally and, although it had not prevailed over Nehru's more peaceful concept of non-alignment, it had not been rejected. Conversely, neither had Sukarno, as yet, completely rejected non-alignment and the need for mediation in the cold war in the interests of peace.

¹ See Modelski's summary of these two views and his account of the outcome of the clash, in Modelski (ed.), The New Emerging Forces, pp.32-33. For the text of the final communique, see Beograd, pp.39 ff.
He was therefore able to act in a typically non-aligned capacity as one of the emissaries to Washington, bearing a letter from the conference appealing to Kruschev and Kennedy to resume U.S.-Soviet negotiations for an easing of cold war tensions\(^1\). In the following July, Indonesia was represented at and joined other countries in sponsoring the Non-Aligned Economic Conference held in Cairo\(^2\) and, in December, 1962, participated in the so-called 'Conference of Non-Aligned Countries', held in Colombo in an attempt to arrange mediation in the Sino-

\(^1\) In this mission, he was accompanied by Keita of Mali, whilst Nehru and Nkrumah delivered the corresponding letter to Moscow. For the text of the letter, see Beograd, pp.54-55.

\(^2\) This conference paved the way for solidarity amongst the underdeveloped nations at the 1964 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in Geneva. The Cairo economic conference and UNCTAD are discussed in Chapter IV below as possible alternative manifestations of the new emerging forces in operation. See pp.688-692 below. Although Indonesia participated in both the Cairo conference and UNCTAD, the potential importance of this economic aspect of collaboration between the poor and new nations does not appear to have been fully realised by Sukarno at the time, probably because he was more interested in the political aspects of his evolving NEFO Ideology.
Indian dispute 1.

The Drift to the Left: Sukarno's growing emphasis on militant anti-imperialism, the acceleration of the West Irian campaign and the heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for the supply of weapons needed for the West Irian struggle served to encourage a drift to the left in domestic politics and in foreign policy. The Russian willingness to provide substantial loans for the purchase of weapons, contrasted to the American refusal to do so, helped to promote the PKI's influence domestically whilst making a retention of the army's strongly anti-communist position less tenable. The army's difficulties in this respect were increased by the nature and direction of flow of the Russian arms. It was the less strongly anti-communist air force and navy that received the sophisticated equipment and that were substantially strengthened by this assistance. The army was unable to remedy the situation either by obtaining

1 As Jansen points out, this conference was somewhat misnamed 'non-aligned'. See Jansen, op. cit., p.336. The conference and the subsequent mediation efforts by Subandrio and others proved unsuccessful. For background to this conference and for further details on the conference and its results, see ibid., chapters 15 & 16, pp.321 ff.
heavy arms from the United States or, given the
importance of Russian arms for the West Irian campaign,
by attempting to stop the Russian aid. Relations with
Moscow, following Kruschev's visit to Djakarta in
February, 1960, became increasingly cordial as Russian
economic and military aid began to flow in large
quantities. In his gratitude, Sukarno declared that
the Soviet Union was firmly on Indonesia's side in the
newly perceived struggle between the new emerging forces
and the old established forces.

Relations with Peking were also strengthened
during this period, although the cordiality already
established was initially disrupted by the 1959-1960
crisis over Indonesia's treatment of its alien Chinese

1 For further details and comments on these developments,
see Bunnell, op. cit., pp.47-50, Feith, 'Indonesia', in
Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics, pp.266-267, Kahin,
'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.651 &
681-2 & 685, and Pauker, 'The Soviet Challenge in
Indonesia', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No.4, July,
1962, pp.612-626.

2 See, for example, Pauker's reference to Sukarno's
speech of 21/3/62, in Pauker, 'The Soviet Challenge in
Indonesia', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No.4, July,
1962, p.613.
community. This crisis brought to a head the Peking-Djakarta differences that had delayed the implementation of the 1955 Dual Nationality Treaty dealing with the problem of Indonesia's Overseas Chinese.

Communist China had applauded the anti-Chinese measures introduced in 1958 and directed against allegedly K.M.T. supporters in Indonesia, but a government regulation of May 1959, prohibiting aliens from engaging in retail trade in rural areas and an even


2 See p.435 above.

3 This measure was intended to serve the long term goal of breaking the hold of aliens over the Indonesian economy. Since the aliens engaged in retail trade in rural areas were almost exclusively Chinese, it was also in effect an anti-Chinese measure that appealed to Indonesians' anti-Chinese sentiments.
harsher ordinance issued by the West Java military command in August, elicited protests from Peking over the new discriminatory measures. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, visited Peking in October in an unsuccessful attempt to explain the purpose of the regulation and to avert the development of friction between Peking and Djakarta. As army-backed persecution of the Chinese mounted, accompanied by a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment, there were a series of hostile exchanges between Djakarta and Peking over the persecutions and over the activities of Chinese embassy and consular staff in Indonesia. An exodus of Chinese from Indonesia also began after Peking broadcasts, from December 1959, had begun inviting Indonesia's overseas Chinese to return to China.

By the second half of 1960, both Djakarta and Peking seemed to regard a rapprochement as desirable. Sukarno, whilst approving of the regulation restricting alien economic activity, had tried to restrain the army from excessive persecution and succeeded in curbing and ultimately ending the anti-Chinese campaign. Peking, on the other hand, appeared to recognise that its attempts to prevent the implementation of the Indonesian regulation had failed and, worse, had weakened the PKI's
political position, strengthened that of the army and jeopardised relations with a powerful potential ally in Afro-Asia. The hostile posture towards Djakarta was dropped.

The turning point in Djakarta-Peking relations was indicated in December, 1960, by the signing of an agreement on the methods for implementing the 1955 Dual Nationality Treaty, which thereby became operative. Peking had agreed in October to accept largely Indonesia-dictated terms after prolonged negotiation. The new accord was cemented by exchange visits. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, made an official visit to Djakarta in March-April, 1961, at Subandrio's invitation. During this visit, a Sino-Indonesian Friendship Treaty and a Cultural Cooperation Agreement were signed, economic aid for Indonesia's development was offered and Chinese support for the West Irian claim was declared. Sukarno paid a return visit to Peking in June, 1961. In October, 1961, Chinese friendship was given more tangible expression

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in an agreement to provide credit for equipment and technical assistance to the value of US $ 30 million. The Overseas Chinese question was now a dead issue. Instead, Peking began to emphasise the identity of Indonesia's and China's 'fundamental interests' and their unity of purpose in opposing imperialism. In the light of Sukarno's clash with Nehru at the Belgrade conference in September, 1961, over the relative importance of non-alignment and anti-imperialism, it seemed that the latter claim had some validity. Although it was too early to speak of a Djakarta-Peking axis, there were signs that China was beginning to replace India as Indonesia's major Asian ally. There were also signs that Moscow and Peking were becoming competitors for Indonesian goodwill.

The above development of increasingly cordial relations with Moscow and Peking was not, however, unchecked. Indonesian trade was still mainly with the west and Japan, and western and particularly U.S.

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1 See Feith, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics, p.267 and Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.355-6. See also Bunnell's comment on this view in Bunnell, op. cit., p.49.
aid was still substantial. Sukarno also appears to have been aware of the value to the West Irian campaign of American diplomatic support and, from early 1961, this support was forthcoming. Thus, at the end of this period, whilst relations with communist countries had been further strengthened and whilst the elements in Indonesian foreign policy which divided Indonesia from the western bloc had become more pronounced, the period ended on a note of cordiality towards the west and particularly towards America.


It is this second phase of Guided Democracy foreign policy to which the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces, already enunciated during the preceding phase, is of most obvious and immediate relevancy. This is the phase of Indonesian foreign policy which I have chosen to call the 'Era of Confrontation', since this

1 This term is taken from the title of Sukarno's address of 6th October, 1964, at the second non-aligned conference in Cairo. For the text of this address, see The Era of Confrontation, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, undated, pp.7-23. The term 'confrontation' is not a reference to confrontation of Malaysia but to the confrontation between the new emerging forces and the old established forces.
title most aptly describes the dominant theme, quality and tone of Indonesian foreign policy of this period. In a sense, this choice of title is misleading, since it implies that confrontation tactics and the accompanying belligerent and militant attitudes became a feature of Indonesian foreign policy with the commencement of this phase. In fact, militant, if not belligerent attitudes had a place, and an important place, in Sukarno's ideology from pre-independence times and confrontation tactics had become an established part of Indonesian foreign policy methods well before mid-1962.

Conversely, if, as in this discussion, one regards this phase of Indonesian foreign policy as beginning in mid-1962, there was in fact a delay before it became clear that Indonesia was to adopt a confrontation stance in

1 For example, see the discussion of 'non-cooperation', pp. 86-88 above.
2 The following may be regarded as examples of and precedents for confrontation-type policies: the declaration of independence in 1945, the abrogation of the Round Table Conference agreements in 1956, the seizure of Dutch enterprises in 1957 and the final stages of the West Irian campaign in 1961-1962.
3 For the reasons for selecting this date, see pp. 489-490 above.
its post-West Irian foreign policy\textsuperscript{1}. Nevertheless, after an initial period of hesitancy, the attitudes and tactics of confrontation assumed an unprecedentedly high place in Indonesian foreign policy, affecting virtually every aspect of foreign policy and causing long-established concepts, such as those of the good neighbour policy, of Afro-Asian solidarity and of the independent and active foreign policy, to be drastically reinterpreted if not abandoned in practice. For this reason, despite the precedents for confrontation and the initial delay in the adoption of a clear confrontation stance, the period of mid-1962 to 1965 has here been styled the 'Era of Confrontation'.

The pragmatic, pro-western Interlude: With the end of the West Irian campaign, Indonesia reached a major turning point. Sukarno and his government were in a position to choose between two opposing policy alter-

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{1} For example, although Sukarno declared support for the North Borneo rebels in December, 1962, it was not until February, 1963, that Indonesia's 'cold war' against Malaysia was officially launched, April before the cold war became hot and September before confrontation moved dramatically into high gear with the result that the U.S. and western-backed economic stabilization plan was totally scrapped in favour of a foreign policy crusade.
\end{footnote}
natives. One involved the continuation and further development of an aggressive foreign policy aimed at acquiring for Indonesia leadership in a militant international crusade against imperialism. The other involved directing the government's attention and the nation's resources towards an attempt at solving the country's domestic problems, concentrating in particular on the rehabilitation and development of the economy.

In 1959, the Political Manifesto, which became the general outline of state policy, had set forth three objectives, broadly, the establishment of a national state incorporating West Irian, the establishment of a 'just and prosperous society' within that state and the establishment of Afro-Asian solidarity in the cause of building a new world devoid of imperialism. The first cabinet appointed after the formal introduction of Guided Democracy had adopted similar goals in its programme: '(1) adequate food and clothing for the people, (2) restoration of security, and (3) anti-imperialism -- including, most importantly, the

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1 See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.13-14.
acquisition of West Irian. By the time of the West Irian settlement, Sukarno and his government could boast of effective progress in the realisation of their declared objectives. Their remarkable achievements in terms of nation building, restoring domestic security and acquiring West Irian were, however, offset by their conspicuous failure to deal with the country's economic decline, let alone to make progress towards building prosperity in Indonesia.

With the West Irian victory, there were signs that this situation would at last be remedied. Government

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1 Lev's summary in Lev, Transition, p.282. As Lev points out in a footnote, the term sadang-pangan was used in the description of the first goal. Whilst the literal meaning of this term is food and clothing, its connotation is wider, implying the 'complete basic needs for human life'. See also Indon. Rev., p.26.

2 This failure could, of course, be justified by attributing it to the government's preoccupation with the other objectives which were considered more urgent. Sukarno did in fact use this type of argument. See, for example, Sukarno, 'A Year of Triumph', 17/8/62, in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.189-226, especially pp.219-221.

3 There were also, however, indications that Indonesia might continue with its radical preoccupation with politics and foreign affairs. The adoption and subsequent rejection of a policy of priority for economic recovery with western assistance are discussed briefly below. For a general summary of the situation in Indonesia at the time, see Feith, 'Indonesia', in
Statements and, subsequently, government actions showed an awareness of the need for a change in policy priorities in favour of an emphasis on the solution of domestic economic problems. Even Sukarno, whilst not abandoning his anti-imperialist theme and his warnings of the need for continued vigilance, also indicated a desire to alleviate Indonesia's economic plight. In March, 1963, he launched his Economic Declaration or 'Dekon'\(^1\) which presented the government's new economic strategy and a short-term policy for rapid improvement of the economy.


\(^1\) This was regarded as the economic equivalent of the Political Manifesto and for this reason was sometimes called the 'Economic Manifesto'. For a summary and analysis of its contents, see Tan, 'Sukarnian Economics', in Tan (ed.), Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp.37-38. For the full text of Dekon, see Indonesia 1963, pp.69-90 and for an official analysis and explanation, ibid., pp.93-112.
The reforms\textsuperscript{1} called for in the Economic Declaration were subsequently implemented in the government's programme of economic stabilization embodied in a set of fourteen regulations introduced in May\textsuperscript{2}.

In his talks with Kennedy in April, 1961, Sukarno had managed to give the impression that the Indonesian government could be expected to concentrate on domestic problems once the West Irian dispute was resolved. In an effort to encourage such a development, the U.S. government not only gave diplomatic support to Indonesia in the final stages of the West Irian campaign, but also indicated a willingness to assist in post-West Irian economic recovery. An American Economic Survey Team was dispatched to Djakarta to explore the needs and prospects for such a scheme. Encouraged by the signs

\textsuperscript{1} These included an improved taxation system and reduced government expenditure, especially in defence, to bring the budget closer to balancing, better incentives for producers and exporters, restrictions on imports and the use of the armed forces on developmental projects.

\textsuperscript{2} For further details, see Tan, 'Sukarnian Economics', in Tan (ed.), Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp.38-39. These regulations also 'reflected many of the recommendations of survey teams of the U.S. government and the International Monetary Fund', Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle Changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August 1964, pp.971-972.
of a new approach in Djakarta, America sought to organise a consortium consisting of Japan and western countries which would provide aid to the value of $250 million to underwrite the first stages of Indonesia's economic recovery. In addition, in March, 1963, as an interim measure, the U.S. granted Indonesia a $17 million stabilization loan. The International Monetary Fund also granted Indonesia a $50 million stand-by credit with the prospects of a total credit of $400 million in anticipation of the introduction of the western-backed scheme. The prospects for a successful change in Indonesia's policy direction were therefore encouraging.

There were, however, a number of factors operating against such a change. As Feith points out:

Transitions from a period of intensely emotional politics to one of prosaic concerns are difficult in any society, and the difficulty was compounded here by the formidable obstacles which would be encountered in any attempt to set the economy moving in a developmental direction.1

The government's difficulties in changing policy direction were also compounded by the growth of opposition to the stabilization programme, particularly,

though not exclusively, from the PKI\(^1\). Sukarno was susceptible to this opposition since, lacking interest in economic matters and possessing skills more suited to crisis management than to prosaic reform, he was only half committed to the new programme\(^2\). He was still prone to extravagances\(^3\), still concerned with his anti-imperialist crusade and suspicious of western aid 'with strings'. He had cultivated friendly and profitable relations with Moscow and Peking and was reluctant to jeopardise these sources of military aid and moral

\(^1\) See, for example, van der Kroef's summary of the pressures operating on Sukarno against the pursuance of this new policy, in van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, pp.270-271. See also Tan, 'Sukarnian Economics', in Tan (ed.), *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*, p.39. For an example of PKI criticism of the whole concept of a programme of economic development backed by western aid, see Hindley's summary of and quotations from Aidit's statement to the Central Committee of the party in February, 1963, in Hindley, *PKI*, pp.293 & 295.

\(^2\) 'Dekon', whilst proposing a concentration of attention on economic development and whilst proposing reforms, was still heavily influenced by the Ideology of the Revolution and by Sukarno's anti-imperialist sentiments. See, for example, his opening explanation on 'Basic Economic Strategy', especially p.69 of *Indonesia 1963*.

\(^3\) For example, having obtained the U.S. stabilization loan of $17 million, Sukarno purchased three luxury jet airliners for $20 million. See Brackman, *Second Front*, p.191.
support for his position on world affairs\(^1\). Having brought the West Irian campaign to a successful conclusion, he also lacked a diversionary issue which could absorb the revolutionary energies of the PKI and the physical strength of the now substantial armed forces, whilst directing attention away from domestic shortcomings. At the same time as the stabilization programme was being planned and implemented, Sukarno's own attention was diverted to a new anti-imperialist issue arising on Indonesia's borders. This crisis was in the form of the British-Malayan moves to create the Federation of Malaysia.

During the initial stages of Indonesian opposition to the creation of the new federation, the pursuit of the stabilization programme remained a possibility, but, with the suspension of trade relations with Malaysia in September, 1963, it became clear that economic stabilization was no longer feasible and western support for the programme therefore ceased. American sponsorship of the consortium proposal was dropped and the I.M.F.

\(^1\) Moscow and Peking were critical of the moves to introduce a western-backed economic programme. See, for example, loc. cit.
withdrew the stand-by credit. America did, however, show restraint by continuing the existing U.S. aid programme in Indonesia, although demands for its curtailment steadily grew in America as Indonesian aggressiveness mounted and as the Indonesian economy declined. Washington began to warn Djakarta that aid would have to cease if confrontation continued. The seizure of British property following the creation of Malaysia in September, 1963, Sukarno's suggestions from March, 1964, that America could 'go to hell' with its aid, the cessation of all direct financial assistance from America in mid-1964 and the seizure of U.S. and other western enterprises during an increasingly vociferous anti-American campaign in 1965 effectively ended any hopes for economic stabilization or for an early restoration of massive western aid. These developments were compounded by the death of First Minister Djuanda in November, 1963\(^1\), and the appointment

\(^1\) Legge describes Djuanda as 'the one man ... who might have attempted to carry the [stabilization] plan through'. Legge, *Indonesia*, p.155.
of Subandrio as First Vice-Premier. Early in 1964, the May regulations were repealed. In April, 1964, Sukarno announced a complete reversal of economic strategy and called for Berdikari or self-reliance, a policy which he declared to be in force in August, 1964, and which was endorsed by the M.P.R.S. in April, 1965. The solution of domestic economic problems was clearly once again subordinated to political, ideological and foreign policy considerations which rendered western and particularly U.S. assistance and investment unacceptable.

Subandrio was by this time one of the staunchest supporters of Sukarno's anti-imperialist foreign policy objectives, of his anti-Malaysia stand and of his renewed emphasis on revolutionary preoccupations generally. Thus, for example, in December, 1963, Subandrio acknowledged that Indonesia was deliberately neglecting the economy in order to concentrate on nation building and character building. See van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, p.284.

Most western assistance and particularly U.S. assistance was seen to involve explicit or implicit political 'strings'. The unacceptability of western aid and investment rested primarily on the danger that it could foster the development of neo-colonialism in Indonesia, for example, by weakening the nation's revolutionary resolve, by leading to compromises and by providing opportunities for foreign interference with Indonesia's revolutionary progress. The verbal commitment to self-reliance was not, however, totally implemented, as some new joint ventures and credit agreements were arranged with western and western-
Confrontation of Malaysia: There is not space here to attempt to deal adequately with the complexities of Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. There has already been a wealth of material devoted to describing and analysing the events and to speculating on the causes of this campaign\(^1\). It is therefore more influenced countries after Sukarno had declared the policy of Berdikari to be in force. Nevertheless, these were the exception rather than the rule. What was also noticeable was the rapid increase of such arrangements with communist bloc countries. See, for example, the analysis of 'production-sharing projects' with Japan, western countries and communist countries between 1963 and 1966, tables 14, 15 and 16, in Tan (ed.), Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp.156-157. For a comparison of foreign aid received from the Soviet bloc, Communist China and the U.S. to 1965/66, see C.B. McLane, 'Foreign Aid in Soviet Third World Policies', in Mizan, Vol. 10, No.6, Nov./Dec. 1968, p.243.

A very useful brief account and analysis of confrontation, set in the wider context of a discussion of Indonesian foreign policy of the period, is provided in Bunnell, op. cit., pp.58-66. Of the considerable amount of other material, the following are amongst the most useful sources of further detail and analysis: B.K. Gordon, The dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, Prentice-Hall, 1966, Chapter III, pp.68 ff, Brackman, Second Front, especially Chapters 10-25, Pluvier, Confrontations, Chapter 6, pp.65 ff, van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Chapter VII, pp.267 ff, D. Hindley, 'Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No.6, June, 1964, pp.904-913, G. McT. Kahin, 'Malaysia and Indonesia', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, No.3, Fall, 1964, pp.253-270 and R. Curtis, 'Malaysia and Indonesia', in New Left Review, No.28, November-December, 1964, pp.5-32. The texts of many of the important agreements and statements may be found in
profitable to devote the space available to comment on what appear to me to be the most striking features of those relevant to this survey of Indonesian foreign policy. Comparison with the West Irian campaign provides a suitable basis for this treatment of the subject.

There are many obvious parallels between the campaign to 'crush Malaysia' and the struggle for West Irian\(^1\), some of which have caused many westerners to misunderstand the nature of Indonesia's confrontation

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\(^1\) The parallels could also be extended to incorporate Indonesia's first revolutionary struggle, the physical Revolution of 1945-1949, to obtain Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence. It was in this first struggle that the basic principles, strategy and tactics of the Indonesian Revolution were first applied with success. For purposes of brevity, however, I am confining this comparison to the later two campaigns, the parallel between which has elicited most comment from foreign observers.
of Malaysia. Both campaigns served as focal points for Indonesian foreign policy, as major justifications for the subordination of domestic needs to foreign policy ventures and as diversions from domestic economic and political problems. Confrontation of Malaysia, however, having provided the immediate stimulus and excuse for a return to radical foreign policy preoccupations, came to be incorporated in and to some extent to be overshadowed by a much larger struggle. This was Sukarno's crusade to build the world anew, to eradicate colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism and, more conspicuously as the campaign progressed, to acquire leadership of the new emerging forces (NEFO) in a more universal confrontation of the old established forces (OLDEFO).

Both the West Irian and the anti-Malaysia campaigns allegedly involved Indonesia's rights and interests, particularly Indonesia's independence. West Irian was considered from the outset of the struggle to be part of Indonesian territory\(^1\), maliciously withheld

\(^1\) This was on the grounds that it was part of the Netherlands East Indies, the colonial territory which the Republican leaders claimed to represent when they declared independence. West Irian was therefore seen as part of the entity to which the Dutch granted
by the Dutch imperialists. Its acquisition was considered essential to complete the national state, a pre-requisite for the furtherance of the Revolution in Indonesia. The connection between confrontation and Indonesia's rights and interests was more tenuous. Primarily, this connection rested on the view that the creation of Malaysia represented a neo-colonialist plot to maintain a foothold in Southeast Asia, an area which Djakarta considered to be Indonesia's legitimate sphere of influence. Closely related to this view was the more extreme opinion that, by creating Malaysia, Britain and the imperialist powers were encircling Indonesia. This latter justification for confrontation became increasingly important for domestic consumption as the campaign dragged on without success and as the cost in terms of economic decline and domestic hardship increased.

Westerners generally found extreme difficulty in independence in 1949. The Malaysians claim that the Indonesian revolutionaries also saw the new Republic as incorporating Malaya and cite statements made at the May-June, 1945 meetings of the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence. The validity of this view is discussed on pp.619-625 below.
taking this claim of imperialist encirclement seriously. How could Malaysia with its ten million people possibly encircle or threaten a giant like Indonesia? This objection, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the Indonesian assessment of the situation. Malaysia as such was not seen as the threat. The threat came from the British presence in Malaysia, combined with the U.S. presence in the region, a presence that appeared the more menacing after the U.S. decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean as confrontation.

1 See, for example, the comment in Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, p.87. He concludes that this concept was for Aidit, 'a convenient political gimmick'.

2 One aspect of the British presence of which Indonesia was particularly critical was the retention of the naval and military base in Singapore, but the Indonesian revolutionaries were no less concerned about the neo-colonialist influence which Britain was believed to retain, largely through the sizeable remaining British economic interests. Malaysia would be a pro-western, capitalist and, unfortunately for Indonesia, a noticeably more prosperous country with an outlook on world and regional affairs opposed to Indonesia's more progressive stance. Ironically, it appears to have been Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia that kept the British military presence in Malaysia. Once confrontation ended, the domestic British pressures for a withdrawal East of Suez prevailed.
escalated\textsuperscript{1}. The perception of an imperialist threat to Indonesia was of long standing\textsuperscript{2} and these fears were regarded as having been verified by western sympathy and apparent support for the PRRI rebels in 1958\textsuperscript{3}. The threat was seen to be the more serious in the sixties because of the Indonesian conviction that the OLDEFO would struggle relentlessly to resist the advance of the NEFO. Indonesia, as the self-appointed leader of this advance, was understandably seen as a major target for the imperialists, since its activities were threatening to undermine the imperialists' position in Southeast Asia and in the world\textsuperscript{4}.

\textsuperscript{1} Aidit made particularly good capital out of this decision. See van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, p.283.

\textsuperscript{2} See, for example, Sukarno, *Sarinah*, pp.407-408 & 420 (1947). In this formulation of the threat, the concept of the imperialist 'encirclement' of Asia is also mentioned.

\textsuperscript{3} Singapore, Malaya and North Borneo were seen as presenting a particularly serious threat to Indonesian security, since they were used by the rebels as basis for smuggling, for supply operations and for sanctuary. See p.430-431 above.

\textsuperscript{4} See, for example, Sukarno in *Reflections*, p.14, Subandrio, ibid., pp.27-28 and Subandrio as quoted in the Indonesian Herald of 1/4/65 (also quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966 Yearbook*, p.184. The intensity, though probably not the validity, of these
Both the West Irian campaign and confrontation of
Malaysia were also justified, especially to Afro-Asian
opinion, on anti-imperialist grounds. Both struggles,
whatever the self interest involved, were also struggles
based on principle. The crusading aspect of the 'crush
Malaysia' campaign was, however, more pronounced than in
the case of West Irian. Indonesia was essentially
coming to the rescue of the victims of neo-colonialism
and not, as in the case of West Irian, asserting a
territorial claim\footnote{There is some justification for the Indonesian claim
that confrontation of Malaysia was a matter of principle, related to its support for other anti-colonialist move­
ments and 'freedom fighters'. Official opposition to
Malaysia, as opposed to PKI and left-wing opposition and
some subsequent official uneasiness about the federation
proposal, began after the outbreak of the Brunei
rebellion in December 1962. This delay may indicate
that Malaysia was not originally seen as a neo-coloni­
alist venture. It was not until the Brunei rebellion
that there was conspicuous evidence of substantial
local opposition in Borneo to the proposal. The out­
break of the rebellion may also have encouraged Djakarta
to believe that Malaysia could be easily destroyed from
within with a little help from Indonesia for the more
frustrate neo-imperialist designs, at first in Malaysia and then, as a result of victory there, in the region, as part of the general world-wide advance of the NEFO. The difference in emphasis is understandable, given the different circumstances surrounding the launching of the two campaigns. By the time that confrontation was launched, Sukarno had already developed the long standing principle of anti-imperialism to the point of calling for a crusade to change the world order.

The choice of the Malaysia project for the first major confrontation in Indonesia's crusade is understandable, since the Malaysia proposal was seen as the most relevant example of OLDEFO-imperialist attempts to contain the NEFO advance. Besides, this attempt to build an OLDEFO stronghold was occurring in Indonesia's sphere of influence and, indeed, on Indonesia's very borders. Herein lies an important distinction in Indonesian thought between Malaysia and Portuguese Timor. The British presence in a nominally independent Malaysia was seen as a much more serious threat to Indonesia, to the region and to the NEFO cause than the continued existence of a Portuguese colony.

This call was first made in 'To Build the World Anew', 30/9/1960 and more forcefully in 'Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice', 1/9/1961. See above pp.500-506 above.
Although the struggle for West Irian was seen as part of the general anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist upsurge in the world, the concept of an anti-imperialist crusade was still largely embryonic, had not taken on its specific NEFO form and was, in any case, dwarfed by the more immediate national interest of acquiring what was seen to be Indonesian territory. When the West Irian campaign was launched, Indonesia was weak and, whilst proud of the example that they had set, the Indonesian leaders had no pressing desire to acquire more for their country than the normal status of a sovereign state. By the nineteen-sixties, Sukarno and his supporters aspired to leadership of the developing world and, chiefly as a result of Soviet bloc assistance

1 Western assistance, both in the form of general economic and specifically military aid, had also played a part, but Soviet and Eastern European aid, though starting later than western aid, had by 1962, dwarfed the latter, more especially in the field of military assistance. See, for example, Grant's summary in Grant, Indonesia, p.84 and Table 1, 'Foreign Aid to Indonesia 1950-1961/2' in Palmier, Indonesia, p.144. The dramatic build-up occurred in the navy and air force with primarily Russian assistance, but, as Kahin and others point out, the U.S. was still the major source of arms for the army. See, for example, Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, p.685.
Indonesia appeared to have the military strength necessary to back up these aspirations, at least in Southeast Asia. Thus, whilst both campaigns were manifestations of aggressive Indonesian self-assertion, the former was primarily of national significance, the latter primarily of regional and international significance.

There was also a remarkable similarity between the strategy and tactics employed in the two campaigns. This is hardly surprising, since the methods of struggle used in the West Irian campaign were seen to have resulted in victory. In the pursuit of both ventures, Indonesian leaders indicated a willingness to negotiate, but balanced conciliatory gestures by tough diplomacy and intimidation in the form of the threat and use of force. The intimidation had two dimensions. Within Indonesia, it consisted of violent mass demonstrations against the offending power, leading to the seizure and/or destruction of that power's properties in Indonesia. Abroad, in the disputed area, intimidation

1. There was an obvious parallel between the 1957 anti-Dutch measures and the seizure of British firms in the wake of the destruction of the British Embassy and British homes in September, 1963, in protest against the creation of Malaysia.
consisted of infiltration, terrorist activities and guerilla warfare, using 'volunteers' and professional military personnel\(^1\), with the additional threat of a possible ultimate invasion involving the use of Indonesia's full armed might\(^2\).

In the diplomatic sphere, Indonesia's willingness to negotiate was qualified by the insistance that negotiation should be basically on Indonesian terms. Indonesia also sought to conduct negotiations from a position of strength, since the use and threat of force continued with varying levels of intensity while

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\(^1\) Professional military personnel were used primarily, though not exclusively, in training and leadership capacities. This was particularly so in the initial stages of the Malaysia confrontation.

\(^2\) In the case of confrontation, the intimidation accelerated more rapidly and acquired the additional dimension of collaboration with local communist or communist-influenced Malaysian rebels. Fighting was also extended from the disputed territory to the Malay Peninsula in mid-1964, a tactical error which served primarily to increase international sympathy and support for the Kuala Lumpur regime, to reduce Philippine enthusiasm for Indonesia's confrontation policies and to reduce Indonesia's following in Afro-Asia. See, for example, Brackman, Second Front, pp. 222-229 & 238-9.
Indonesia was at the conference table\textsuperscript{1}. Considerable diplomatic effort was also made to enlist the support of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned nations and the countries of the communist bloc but, whereas, in the West Irian struggle, western and particularly U.S. support was expected, sought and eventually obtained, in confrontation, Indonesia looked more consistently and increasingly to the communist powers for assistance. Afro-Asian and non-aligned sympathy and support did not live up to Indonesian expectations, but the communists, especially Peking and its followers, responded enthusiastically\textsuperscript{2}. This development further reduced

\textsuperscript{1}Indonesians frequently point out that, through participating in negotiations during both campaigns, Indonesia showed its willingness to seek a peaceful solution. Whilst this aspect of Indonesian diplomacy is frequently overlooked by critics of Indonesia, and whilst, in the West Irian campaign, the resort to force occurred only after protracted and frustrating negotiations, the Indonesian leaders' belligerency and determination to have their own way were apparent throughout the confrontation campaign, even when agreement was reached, for example, at the Manila summit of mid-1963. Sukarno expected greater concessions to be made by his opponents than he was prepared to make.

\textsuperscript{2}Soviet support for Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia was, until June, 1964, more reserved than Peking's. Peking thus emerged as the more militant anti-imperialist and hence as the closer ally of Indonesia. Peking-Moscow rivalry for the support of
the prospects for and suitability of assistance from western and western-influenced sources.

The United States, with Indonesian encouragement, did attempt to play a mediatory role similar to that performed in the West Irian dispute. Thus, when a peace formula, highly favourable to Indonesia, was devised at the Manila summit of mid-1963¹, Washington supported the


¹ This conference between Tunku Abdul Rahman, President Sukarno and President Macapagal resulted in the endorsement of a 'Declaration', a 'Joint Statement' and an 'Accord'. Indonesia and the Philippines agreed to accept Malaysia on condition that, before it was created, a U.N. survey team, accompanied by Indonesian and Philippine observers, should confirm that the people of Borneo did support the idea of the new federation. There was also an affirmation of the three countries' intentions to 'maintain fraternal relations' and to create a 'Maphilindo' confederation. In terms of Indonesia's broader anti-imperialist objectives, Djakarta obtained a particularly significant victory in the agreement concerning foreign bases in Malaya and...
decisions in the face of British scepticism and irritation. Washington also unsuccessfully urged Britain to adopt a conciliatory approach towards Sukarno in the implementation of the procedures accepted at the Manila summit and was critical of British and Malaysian provocation during their implementation. Even after Djakarta had rejected the findings of the U.N. enquiry and had stepped up confrontation, Washington continued to attempt a mediatory role and, although dropping the sponsorship of the aid consortium, continued existing aid to Indonesia.

On August 29, 1963, while the U.N. survey was being conducted, it was announced that Malaysia would be formed on September 16, irrespective of the results of the survey. This provocation was compounded by the dispute over the Indonesian observers to be admitted to Borneo. Djakarta's demands for twenty Indonesian observers and a secretarial staff of ten, to observe the work of the survey team of nine men was unreasonable but, once this issue was resolved by the agreement to admit four Indonesian observers and four assistants, there was a subsequent dispute which resulted in the arrival of the observers in Borneo when the survey was more than half completed.
American conciliation efforts at first appeared to be successful, as Robert Kennedy's separate talks with the Tunku, Sukarno and Macapagal led to a cease-fire called in January, 1964. The cease-fire was, however, ineffective and, while ministerial talks in Bangkok in February and March wrestled unsuccessfully with disagreements over the conditions for a cease-fire and negotiations, the fighting continued. The Tunku's eventual compromise on his condition that Indonesian guerillas should withdraw before the commencement of negotiations enabled a summit meeting to occur in Tokyo in June, 1964, but, although a Philippine proposal for the dispute to be referred to an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission was accepted on principle, the meeting failed to produce an effective peace formula.

While these negotiations were being conducted, there were signs of growing American disenchantment with the Sukarno regime as it became clear that Djakarta was

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1 Both the Tunku and Sukarno made compromises in accepting the principle of Afro-Asian conciliation, but these compromises were not such that they enabled the agreement to be implemented. The Tunku accepted the Philippine proposal on condition that Indonesia's hostile activities should cease immediately, a condition which Sukarno was not prepared to meet, although he did commit himself to accept the A-A commission's findings.
unlikely to be deflected from its confrontation of Malaysia towards a policy of effective economic stabilization. Washington indicated that, under these conditions, U.S. economic aid could hardly be expected to continue. Sukarno's response was to assert that Indonesia could survive without American aid. President Johnson had also expressed U.S. support for Malaysia\(^1\) and, at the conclusion of the Tunku's Washington visit in July, 1964, U.S. support was reaffirmed. The President also agreed to provide military training for Malaysian personnel and 'to consider promptly a sympathetically credit sales under existing arrangements, of appropriate military equipment for the defence of Malaysia'\(^2\). In August, Indonesia extended guerilla activities to the Malay Peninsula and when the Malaysian charges of Indonesian aggression were brought before the U.N. Security Council in September, the U.S. represen-

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tative deplored Indonesia's unwarranted behaviour\(^1\).

By this time it was clear that Djakarta could no longer expect U.S. diplomatic support, but, conversely, there were signs that such support was no longer seen as desirable. In his Independence Day address of August, 1964, Sukarno criticised the U.S. government for its recently renewed declaration of support for Malaysia and warned that Washington would be to blame if U.S.-Indonesian relations worsened\(^2\). This was the signal for the commencement of a virulent anti-American campaign during which the general anti-imperialist theme in confrontation received greater emphasis as Indonesian animosity towards the Malaysian and British governments

\(^1\) The extension of military operations to the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia's arrogant defence in the Security Council of this aggression resulted in a diplomatic set-back for Indonesia. The Afro-Asian and Latin American representatives voted in favour of a Norwegian resolution deploring Indonesia's attack on Malaya. Indonesia was only saved from formal Security Council censure by the Russian use of the veto. For details, see Brackman, Second Front, pp.238-9. For the text of the Norwegian resolution and excerpts from the address by Indonesia's representative, see The Malaysia Issue: Background and Documents, Second Edition, Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, June 1965, pp.89-100.

was extended to include the United States\(^1\). In December, 1964 and early in 1965, PKI-organised mobs attacked USIS libraries which were subsequently closed, there were interruptions in gas, electricity and mail services to some American offices and flats and American films were banned. More serious, in a series of moves reminiscent of the earlier anti-Dutch and anti-British measures, the Indonesian government assumed control of a number of U.S. enterprises, including the major oil companies. These moves were then extended to virtually all remaining western enterprises in Indonesia\(^2\). In April, 1965, in an unsuccessful attempt to check the mounting tension and bitterness in Indonesian-American relations, Ellsworth Bunker was dispatched to Djakarta

\(^{1}\) India also received its share of hostility for taking a favourable attitude towards Malaysia. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 'the anti-India campaign even temporarily overshadowed the anti-U.S. campaign'. *Far Eastern Economic Review 1966 Yearbook*, p.184.

for talks with the President. By mid-1965, however, Indonesia's militant anti-imperialist posture, anti-westernism and violent anti-Americanism had come to dwarf the more specific anti-Malaysian and anti-British aspects of confrontation, even though, militarily, Malaysia remained the target of Indonesian aggression.

Whilst anti-American and anti-western sentiments had been recurring features of Indonesian ideology and verbal diplomacy before confrontation, they had never reached the sustained fervour of 1965. In the past, these sentiments had been in part genuine, but they also appear to have been tactical, playing on the U.S. fear that Indonesia might join the communist camp and thereby pressuring the American government into providing

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1 Little came of these talks except the agreements to withdraw the U.S. Peace Corps from Indonesia, to continue with the rather nominal aid to a few Indonesian universities and to re-assess the U.S. aid programme which was by this time virtually non-existent.

2 These sentiments arose largely from the association of the western world with colonialism, with capitalism and hence with Holland, forming a collective barrier to the fulfilment of Indonesian hopes. They were reinforced by Indonesian disillusionment at the failure of the west to provide prompt and effective assistance to Indonesia in its struggle for independence and subsequently in its struggle for West Irian and by alleged western involvement in the regional rebellions.
support to Indonesia\textsuperscript{1}. In the final stages of confrontation, however, the anti-westernism and anti-Americanism seem to have been more genuine and less tactical\textsuperscript{2}, since Indonesia's conduct after the Tokyo summit of mid-1964 could hardly have been calculated to induce U.S. support, unless it was a very desperate gamble. This hardening anti-American and anti-western line reflected the influence of the PKI and of Peking in Sukarno's calculations\textsuperscript{3}, but it also reflected Sukarno's increasing

\textsuperscript{1} This tactic had succeeded, though somewhat belatedly, in both the physical Revolution of 1945-1949 and in the final stages of the West Irian campaign. Indonesia had also managed to obtain U.S. sympathy, though rather less strong support in the early stages of confrontation.

\textsuperscript{2} i.e., at least in so far as attracting U.S. support was concerned. Sukarno was undoubtedly seeking stronger backing from the communist bloc, particularly from Peking, and the new anti-American emphasis brought Djakarta much closer to the Peking line. Sukarno may have been making a virtue of necessity, since U.S. attitudes towards Indonesia were hardening, rendering further American support unlikely, but this development was in part due to the simultaneous hardening of Djakarta's anti-imperialist line which seems to have been as much a matter of Sukarno's choice, with encouragement from the PKI, as a response to changing U.S. attitudes.

\textsuperscript{3} Brackman and others attribute this development to skilful manoeuvring on the part of the PKI. See, for example, Brackman, Second Front, p.251. Sukarno's launching of the anti-American campaign late in 1964 had been preceded in 1963 by a PKI and Peking campaign, emphasising the general imperialist threat in Southeast
preoccupation with his anti-OLDEFO crusade. Non-alignment was by this time totally irrelevant and western support neither desirable nor necessary, since Sukarno's vision of a bipolar world, divided between the NEFO and the OLDEFO, placed the American and most if not all of Asia and linking confrontation with the wider struggle in the region, particularly in Vietnam and Laos. In adopting this line, the PKI was moving closer to Peking and attempting to take Sukarno and Indonesia in the same direction, whilst making a bid for the party's revolutionary leadership in Southeast Asia and strengthening Sukarno's resolve not to compromise on Malaysia. See van der Kroef's account of this development in van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp.279-294. In attempting to link confrontation with the general anti-imperialist struggle in Southeast Asia, the PKI and Peking were remarkably close to Sukarno's long standing view that the various stages of Indonesia's struggle were part of the wider anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist upsurge. See pp.178-221 above. In particular, there was a marked similarity with Sukarno's 1947 analysis. See Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.481-482 (1947). The difference was that America and Britain had replaced France and Holland as the representatives of international imperialism and this substitution appears to have been as acceptable to Sukarno as it was to the communists.

In accordance with his view of history, Sukarno believed that a NEFO victory was inevitable. He also believed that victory could be achieved more quickly by promoting NEFO solidarity, and one important means to this end was to adopt the principle of self-reliance, non-cooperation or total confrontation. On this principle, the acceptance of support from the enemy was basically undesirable, since it involved co-operation and possible compromise. As a tactic, however, such support could be accepted, but, by 1965, as Sukarno believed NEFO solidarity and hence NEFO strength to be developing rapidly, there was no need for support from members of the enemy camp.
the western governments firmly in the enemy camp. The United States, the arch-imperialist and leader of the OLDEFO, had replaced the Netherlands and Britain as Indonesia's chief opponent, whilst Communist China had emerged as Indonesia's major ally and 'comrade in arms'.

The Third World: Sukarno's growing preoccupation with his campaign to build the world anew was equally apparent in Indonesia's activities in Afro-Asian and non-aligned circles. Increasingly dramatic use was made of Afro-Asian and non-aligned forums to expound the NEFO Ideology in an attempt to transform these movements into

1 It is interesting to note that, following the solution of the West Irian problem, relations with Holland rapidly improved, so much so that the official visit to Indonesia of the Dutch foreign minister in mid-1964 was extremely cordial, at a time when Sukarno was more accustomed to playing host to communist dignitaries. There was also a revived interest in re-establishing Dutch ventures in Indonesia, a development which the Indonesian government does not appear to have discouraged. This new-found cordiality was in part due to the neutral line which the Netherlands adopted during the early stages of confrontation, while Dutch newspapers tended to favour Indonesia in their comments on the dispute. See Pluvier, Confrontations, pp.82-84.

2 Chairman Liu Shao-chi had already referred to the Sino-Indonesian relationship as one between 'comrades in arms' during a visit to Indonesia in April, 1963. See The Nation (Rangoon, 21/4/63.)
suitable vehicles for the development of NEFO solidarity and, incidentally, to gain endorsement for Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. Afro-Asia was clearly preferred for this purpose, but the non-aligned forum was not abandoned. In addition to participating in the activities of the non-governmental AAPSO\(^1\), and sponsoring, hosting or supporting various subsidiary Afro-Asian conferences and organisations\(^2\), Djakarta also attempted to revive the Bandung spirit at the governmental level by intensifying its efforts to arrange a second Afro-Asian conference of the Bandung type. A start was also made in 1963 towards providing the NEFO concept with an organised basis, when, following the first GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces) in Djakarta, a GANEFO Federation with headquarters in Djakarta was established to perpetuate NEFO solidarity in the field of sport by organising subsequent games. Sukarno also began to

\(^1\) The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. See footnote 1, p. 504 above.
\(^2\) e.g., the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference of 1963 and the Afro-Asian Islamic Conference of 1965.
refer to the need for a conference of the new emerging forces (CONEFO). These attempts to provide a tangible organizational expression of NEFO solidarity appear to have been regarded in Djakarta as supplementary activities to those in the existing movements, since the holding of a second Afro-Asian conference remained one of Indonesia's top priority objectives.

During 1964 and 1965, intense international rivalry developed between those who favoured a second Afro-Asian conference and those favouring a second non-aligned conference. Indonesia's efforts on behalf of the former received the greatest support from China and Pakistan, whilst India, U.A.R., Yugoslavia and Ceylon led the campaign for the latter. The non-aligned adherents were the first to achieve success. A preparatory conference was held in Colombo in March, 1964 and was followed by the second non-aligned conference in Cairo.

1 GANEFO and CONEFO are further discussed in Chapter IV as examples of the application of specifically NEFO Ideology. See pp.681-687 below.
2 For an account of this rivalry and the manoeuvres at the Colombo and Djakarta meetings to prepare respectively for a second non-aligned and a second Afro-Asian conference, see Jansen, op. cit., Chapter 17, pp.363-383.
in October, 1964. Indonesia at first indicated disapproval of this development, arguing that an Afro-Asian conference was more urgently needed, but, nevertheless attended both the Colombo and the Cairo gatherings.

At the Colombo conference, Indonesia received a rebuff when the attempt to obtain endorsement for a separate conference of the new emerging forces was rejected primarily on Indian initiative. Djakarta-Delhi rivalry and antagonism, already apparent at the first non-aligned conference in 1961, became more intense at the Cairo conference. In his speech to the conference, Sukarno again emphasised the importance of the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism as the first priority and more firmly rejected the preoccupation of India and others with non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Non-alignment and the attempt to

1 The difference between Indonesian and Indian views was by no means the only source of friction at this conference. For an account of the points of agreement and disagreement that emerged, see ibid., Chapter 18, pp.384-392.

2 For the full text of this address, titled 'The Era of Confrontation', see The Era of Confrontation, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, undated, pp.7.23.
mediate between the two major power blocs, Sukarno argued, were no longer relevant, since Moscow and Washington had achieved a state of peaceful co-existence through mutual deterrence and equal strength. The cold war was therefore no longer a threat to the security of the developing world. The threat came from the efforts of the OLDEFO to interfere in the development of genuine independence in the new states and from the use by the OLDEFO of their dominant position in world affairs to thwart the advance of the NEFO. Peaceful co-existence, desirable as it had been between the super powers, was therefore impossible between the NEFO and the OLDEFO, without accepting an unsatisfactory status quo. Sukarno called for a united confrontation against the OLDEFO.

Sukarno gained considerable support for this line of reasoning, which was reflected in the final communique. In that he gained endorsement for his more militant statement of the NEFO emphasis on the need to eradicate colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, he succeeded in leading the conference towards a NEFO position. He

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1 The text of the communique is reproduced ibid., pp. 27 ff. See especially pp.28, 30-35 & 59.
did not, however, succeed in converting it into a NEFO forum, since the general principle of peaceful co-existence was also endorsed in the final communiqué and specific mention was made of the need to seek peaceful solutions and to refrain from the use of force in international disputes. By implication, confrontation, particularly in the form of Indonesia's actions towards Malaysia, was rejected.

Although out-manoeuvred by the non-alignment adherents in the race to stage a conference, the enthusiasts for a second Afro-Asian conference, Indonesia, Pakistan and Communist China, managed to organise a 22-nation ministerial meeting in Djakarta, in April, 1964, to prepare for a second Bandung. The invitation list for this conference did not include all the 29 countries which had been represented at Bandung. Eleven were dropped and nine new countries were added. Indonesia appears to have 'packed' this conference with nations thought to be favourable to Sukarno's ideas, although some more moderate countries, such as India, were still represented. See Jansen's comments, in Jansen, op. cit., p.378. For a list of representatives, see Proceedings of the Meeting of Ministers in preparation for The Second African-Asian Conference held in Djakarta, Indonesia, April 10-15, 1964, published by the Organising Committee, Djakarta, undated, pp.95-101. This book will hereafter be cited as Proceedings, Second A-A Preparation. For an account of the disputes and manoeuvres at this conference, see Jansen, op. cit., pp.378-383 and F.B. Weinstein, 'The Second Asian-African
it was decided to hold a second AA conference in mid-
1965, to be held in Africa at a site selected by the OAU
(the Organization of African Unity). The conference
proper was to be preceded by a Foreign Ministers'
meeting. A number of more detailed decisions were also
taken, covering the objectives, provisional agenda and
composition of the second AA conference\(^1\), but on what
were probably the most divisive issues whether the
Soviet Union and Malaysia should be invited, the outcome
of protracted and heated argument was inconclusive\(^2\).

Before the second Afro-Asian conference was
scheduled to occur, Indonesia took its most dramatic
and defiant step in the general confrontation of the

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5, No.7, July,1965, pp.361-373. Compare these with the
general official account in Meeting of Ministers in
preparation for the Second African-Asian Conference,
Djakarta, 10-15 April, 1964, The Conference Secretariat,
Djakarta, 1964.

\(^1\) For a summary of the decisions, see the 'Final
Communique of the Meeting of Ministers', in Proceedings,
Second A-A Preparation, pp.77-80.

\(^2\) In an effort to gain African support for the Indo-
enesian position on Malaysia, Indonesia's diplomatic
activity in Africa was subsequently intensified. In
particular Ali Sastroamidjojo visited a number of African
states in late 1964 and early 1965. These activities
were countered by similar Malaysian expeditions.
OLDEFO and, incidentally, shocked a number of Afro-Asian nations, by withdrawing from the United Nations. In a sense, this decision was a culmination of the apparently irrational streak that had been developing in Indonesian foreign policy during this period, since it could not have been expected to enhance Indonesia's international reputation, except with Peking. Even Indonesians appear to have been shocked by this decision. On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why this withdrawal makes sense, if seen through the eyes of Sukarno and his supporters. Initially, Indonesia had been an enthusiastic supporter of the United Nations and its ideals, but the Indonesian experience had been cumulatively disillusioning. The U.N. proved ineffective in assisting Indonesia's struggle

1 Subsequently, in August 1965, Indonesia also withdrew from the World Bank and the I.M.F.

2 Several Indonesians who claim to know maintain that even Subandrio was shocked and alarmed by Sukarno's decision but, apparently true to form, felt powerless to argue against the President's decision.

3 For an official explanation of the reasons for withdrawal, see Indonesia Leaves the United Nations, Executive Command, Tenth Anniversary, First Asian-African Conference, (Djakarta), undated.
for independence and in the struggle for West Irian. In 1960, Sukarno had called for reform of the U.N., objecting to its reflection of the western-dominated world system. These criticisms were echoed by a number of other new states. The calls for reform and, a particular manifestation of reform, the efforts by Indonesia and others to gain admission for Communist China, had proved fruitless. The United Nations had similarly proved unsympathetic to Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia and, in September, 1964, the Security Council had come dangerously close to censuring Indonesia for this policy. The seating of Malaysia in the Security Council was the final insult, indicating Indonesia's low degree of influence in the world body, but, to Sukarno, also indicating OLDEFO domination. Given these circumstances, it was better to withdraw, hoping to damage the organization by encouraging other nations to follow Indonesia's example, or, perhaps, hoping to provoke drastic self-examination and reform within the organization. There was also the further possible motive of freeing Indonesia from its obligation under the U.N.-supervised West Irian Agreement to permit the people of West Irian to participate in an act of self-determination before 1970. The withdrawal from
the U.N. provided a new significance to Sukarno's increasing calls for a CONEFO, especially as Peking was loud in praising the Indonesian withdrawal, in supporting the CONEFO plan and in suggesting that a new, revolutionary United Nations might be created. During 1965, CONEFO began to emerge as more than a supplement to the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements and as more than a replacement therefore. It seemed as if Indonesia was about to launch its own NEFO United Nations.

Afro-Asianism was not, however, abandoned. In April, 1965, coinciding with an Afro-Asian Journalists' Association celebration, Sukarno staged what was virtually a NEFO extravaganza in Afro-Asian guise. This was the Dasa Warsa, or Tenth Anniversary Celebrations of the first Afro-Asian Bandung conference. The response to Sukarno's invitations to these celebrations was an indication of declining Afro-Asian support for

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1 This commemorated the second anniversary of the founding of the association.
2 For an official account of these celebrations and the major speeches, see Ten Years After Bandung, Executive Command, Tenth Anniversary First Asian-African Conference, undated, but probably 1965. Compare this account with those of Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p.82 and Bunnell, op. cit., p.69.
Sukarno's policies and perhaps for the Afro-Asian ideal as such. Of the sixty nations invited, only 37 sent representatives and, in contrast to the illustrious gathering at the first Bandung conference, only five heads of government attended\textsuperscript{1}. In addition, four People's Movements, including the North Kalimantan rebel government, were present. Sukarno used what was billed as a ceremonial occasion to justify his confrontation of Malaysia and withdrawal from the United Nations, to urge confrontation against imperialism and the OLDEFO and solidarity amongst the NEFO, and to attract support for his CONEFO project, scheduled for 1966\textsuperscript{2}. The tone of the celebrations was undoubtedly militantly NEFO rather than Afro-Asian and the countries that dominated in the celebrations were Indonesia, China and their supporters. The less militant delegations were several time affronted by militant emphasis in the celebrations,

\textsuperscript{1} These were the leaders of the delegations from Communist China, Cambodia, Indonesia, North Korea and North Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{2} During the celebrations the foundation stone was laid for the new CONEFO complex being built with Chinese assistance for the first CONEFO. For the speeches delivered on that occasion, see Ten Years After Bandung, pp.111-121.
particularly by the opportunity afforded to the North Vietnamese delegation to issue propaganda in support of its cause. The Thai delegation, headed by the Thai Foreign Minister withdrew from the celebrations. Sukarno claimed that the triumphal celebrations reflected the degree of Afro-Asian solidarity. In a sense he was right. The Dasa Warsa turned out to be the last large scale official Afro-Asian gathering. It also represented the culmination of Sukarno's crusade to build the world anew. Before the CONEFO could be held and even before the buildings in which it was to be housed were completed, Indonesia was plunged into the coup that ultimately brought Sukarno's world crusade to an abrupt halt.

Before this occurred, the world was to witness the spectacle of Afro-Asian disintegration. The OAU, to which the decision on the site for the second Afro-Asian conference had been delegated, selected Algiers. This was a fatal decision, since the Algerian government was unable to complete the preparations in time for the conference to open on schedule and, more seriously, was overthrown by a coup five days before the foreign ministers were due to assemble for the rescheduled pre-conference meeting in June, 1965. The alleged inability of the new Algerian government to ensure the safety of
the delegates was used as an excuse to postpone the conference, but, by this time, enthusiasm for the conference had waned in the face of serious rifts within the Afro-Asian world, and it seemed fairly clear that many delegations, particularly the more moderate ones, were relieved to find an excuse for a graceful withdrawal. The gathering broke up in confusion, although complete disaster was averted by a seven nation (including Indonesia) proposal for postponement until November. Before returning home, Sukarno initiated a 'Little Summit' in Cairo, but the talks between himself, Nasser, Ayub Khan and Chou En-lai failed to produce agreement on such controversial issues as Vietnam, the Kashmir dispute and the admission of the Soviet Union and Malaysia to the postponed conference. In the October pre-conference manoeuvres, the rifts in Afro-Asia were even more apparent. The major issue was still the question


2 See, for example, Jansen, op. cit., pp.395-399.
of whether Russia should be invited\(^1\) but there was also disagreement as to whether the conference should be held at all\(^2\). When the Algerian government eventually announced its decision not to host the conference, support for postponement became overwhelming. The preparatory conference was adjourned and the second Afro-Asian conference did not eventuate. The myth of Afro-Asian unity had been shattered.

**Development of the Axis with Peking:** In compensation for the disintegration and hence loss for Indonesia of this potentially influential power base in world affairs, Sukarno had, however, acquired the backing of a new and rising world power. Throughout the Era of Confrontation and especially after the launching of confrontation of Malaysia, the already friendly relations

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1. The related question of the admission of Malaysia and Singapore was both less important and less controversial than that of Russia's admission. Despite Indonesia's opposition, it seemed fairly clear that Malaysia and Singapore would be admitted.
2. India, confident of Russian admission, and pleased at the prospect of a consequent victory over Communist China, was initially one of the chief advocates for proceeding with the conference. China, on the other hand, virtually vetoed the conference by setting pre-conditions that were unacceptable to a large number and probably the majority of the potential participants. Even Indonesia, which had meantime experienced the coup, moved for a postponement.
between Djakarta and Peking strengthened rapidly to the point of reaching a virtual alliance\(^1\). Even by mid-1963, when there was a renewed outbreak of anti-Chinese rioting in Java, relations were already so cordial and the Djakarta and Peking regimes so committed to maintaining and strengthening the relationship that, in contrast to the events of 1959-1960\(^2\), Djakarta-Peking relations remained unaffected\(^3\).


\(^2\) Discussed pp.509-511 above.

One manifestation of the developing alliance was the frequency of high level visits between the two countries\(^1\). There were also numerous official and semi-official as well as joint and separate statements by Peking and Djakarta declaring unity in the cause of anti-imperialism and supporting the particular policies of each other. For example, Indonesian spokesmen declared support for the Peking position on Formosa and Vietnam, while Communist China's leaders endorsed Djakarta's confrontation of Malaysia\(^2\), Sukarno's efforts to promote NEFO solidarity and Indonesia's withdrawal from the

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1 Foreign Minister Subandrio in particular became a seasoned Djakarta-Peking traveller. Many therefore regard the development of the Djakarta-Peking Axis as his handiwork, although he is also commonly regarded as being suspicious of and even hostile to Peking. In addition to the government to government consultations that occurred during these visits, there also appears to have been an increase in liaison between the PKI and the Chinese Communist Party as the PKI moved more conspicuously into the Peking-led section of the international communist movement.

2 This endorsement was originally an endorsement on principle, without a very clear commitment to assistance. In September, 1963, however, following Aidit's visit to Peking, the endorsement was made more specific. Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965, p.62 quotes Jen-min Jih-pao of September 9, 1963, as declaring: 'Should U.S. imperialism dare to launch aggression against Indonesia, the Chinese people will back the Indonesian with all their might'. 
United Nations.

Apart from this moral support, Djakarta and Peking were indirectly collaborating in the guerilla fighting in Malaysia, since the Indonesian army and Indonesian volunteers were fighting alongside the guerillas of the Chinese-dominated and Peking-oriented C.C.O. in Sarawak. In the wider diplomatic sphere, Indonesia supported the numerous attempts to seat Communist China in the United Nations, gave diplomatic recognition to North Korea, North Vietnam and to the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, while, in the non-aligned forum, in which, of course, Peking was not represented, Sukarno acted as the spokesman for the Peking-type hard line on imperialism, thereby furthering Peking's

1 The C.C.O. was the clandestine communist organization of Sarawak. Late in 1964, some observers saw indications that Peking-Djakarta collaboration might be increased by attempts at co-ordinating the incursions in Borneo and Southern Malaya with reactivated terrorist activity in Northern Malaya and Vietcong activities in South Vietnam. See Shaplen's report on the alleged suggestions made by Chen Yi during his November-December 1964 visit to Djakarta and on Subandrio's secret strategy outlined to Indonesian diplomats in New York in December, p.80 of Shaplen, Time Out of Hand.
interests while also furthering his own. In the promotion of Afro-Asia as opposed to non-alignment, in the activities of the AAPSO and in the more specifically NEFO ventures, Peking-Djakarta collaboration was especially apparent, reflecting, as in the verbal declarations mentioned above, an area of common objectives and mutual support for each other's separate objectives. Thus, for example, Peking and Djakarta worked together to obtain endorsement for militant anti-imperialism, for opposition to U.S. policies in Asia and more specifically in Vietnam, and for confrontation of Malaysia; Indonesia supported Communist China's attempts to contain Soviet influence in Afro-Asia; and Peking supported Djakarta's efforts to exclude representatives of the Kuala Lumpur

1 Although Sukarno could be regarded as acting as an agent for Peking in the non-aligned movement, he was also acting independently, since the views he expressed were clearly the product of his own convictions and ambitions. Peking was apparently prepared to encourage and support Sukarno's bid for third world leadership in exchange for his good will and his endorsement of Peking-type policies.

2 In the case of official A-A gatherings, to which Russia had not obtained admission, Indonesia supported China against Indian-initiated attempts to admit the Soviet Union. See, however, footnote 1, p. 565 below.
government from participation in Afro-Asian affairs\(^1\). In assisting Sukarno's NEFO activities, Peking matched propaganda and moral support with financial support\(^2\).

The more general declarations of sympathy and support for Indonesia were similarly matched by an extension of tangible assistance already initiated before the Era of Confrontation began. This extension began fairly modestly in 1963\(^3\), but in late 1964 and early 1965 it became clear that Peking was prepared to provide very solid backing to the Djakarta regime, not only

\(^1\) This support was, however, endangered during the manoeuvres for the second A-A conference. Peking apparently decided that support for Malaysia's admission was growing and that continued opposition from Peking would damage support for what the Chinese considered much more vital, the continued rejection of Russian bids for admission. Conversely, Indonesia became less forceful in opposing Russian admission. See, for example, Bunnell, op. cit., p.70 and Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity', in *Asian Survey*, Vol.5, No.9, September, 1965, p.428.

\(^2\) Peking helped finance GANEFO I and provided the assistance necessary for the construction of the CONEFO complex in Djakarta, until the coup and post-coup frictions with Peking brought the work to a halt.

\(^3\) For example, China exported 100,000 tons of rice to Indonesia in 1963 and further supplies in 1964. See Brackman, *Second Front*, p.263.
economically but also militarily. In early November, 1964, Sukarno visited Shanghai for talks with Premier Chou En-lai and, at the end of November, Marshal Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, visited Djakarta for talks with Sukarno. The joint statement at the conclusion of this visit was significant. Mozingo comments: 'Their [i.e., Sukarno's and Chen Yi's] joint press release of December 3, 1964, revealed the harmony of Sin-Indonesian political views with a candor that far exceeded anything found in previous diplomatic statements of either country'. In January, 1965, just after Indonesia had left the United Nations, Subandrio journeyed to Peking, heading the

1 There was also the more personal assistance provided to Sukarno by the Chinese doctors. It is widely believed that it was a Chinese physician who was responsible for increased anxiety about the President's health and who therefore helped to encourage the PKI to precipitate the coup. See, for example, Brackman, Second Front, pp.291-292.

2 See footnote 1, p.568 below.

3 Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965, p.70. Apart from emphasising the common purposes of the two countries, China's full support for Indonesia's 'crush Malaysia' campaign was reaffirmed and Indonesia was offered a U.S.$50 million credit. See loc. cit. See also Shaplen's comments on this visit, pp.79-80 of Shaplen, Time Out of Hand.
largest delegation yet of civilian and armed forces officials\(^1\), to discuss 'military matters'. The joint statement at the end of this visit indicated even more clearly than that of the previous month that Indonesia was assured of future Chinese backing economically and, it seemed, militarily\(^2\). There were even signs that this backing might extend to collaboration and assistance in Indonesia's nuclear programme, with perhaps rather far fetched prospects that Indonesia might acquire its

\(^1\) Significantly, no top army leaders were included in this delegation although the police chief, some navy leaders and the PKI's Njoto were. See U. Ra'an'an, 'The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis', in Problems of Communism, Vol.15, No.2, March-April 1966, p.41.

\(^2\) The joint statement referred to both parties' decision to 'strengthen their technical cooperation, expand their trade, develop maritime transportation...., and strengthen their friendly contacts in the military field', to which end an 'agreement on economic and technical cooperation' and a credit agreement were concluded, an expansion of trade was discussed and a decision reached to 'exchange delegations in economic, military and other fields'. See Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965, p.72, quoting Peking Review, February 5, 1965, pp.6-8. See also Brackman's comments in Brackman, Second Front, p.264 and U. Ra'an'an, 'The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis', in Problems of Communism, Vol.15, No.2, March-April, 1966, p.41.
own bomb with Peking's help. By the time of his 17th August speech of 1965, Sukarno was able to declare that he was 'building an anti-imperialist axis, namely the axis of Djakarta-Pnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang ... the most natural axis formed

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1 Indonesia's nuclear programme was initiated and sustained with U.S. assistance under the 'Atoms for Peace' programme, with subsequent additional assistance from the U.S.S.R. Oddly enough, the U.S. programme was continued during the period of mounting tensions between Djakarta and Washington, and it was U.S. assistance that enabled Indonesia to produce its first sustained nuclear chain reaction at the Bandung reactor on October 17, 1964, the day after China had exploded its first nuclear device. Although Indonesia had signed the nuclear test ban treaty, there were increasing signs in late 1964 and early 1965 that Djakarta desired its own nuclear bomb and hoped to detonate its first nuclear device during 1965. Despite Subandrio's initial criticism of the Chinese explosion, the official Indonesian attitude was one of approval and optimism. At the same time, there were also signs that Djakarta desired to replace U.S. and Soviet assistance in the nuclear programme by Chinese assistance. Rumours began to spread in Djakarta that Peking had agreed to provide the necessary components for an Indonesian explosion. For details of these developments, see Brackman, Second Front, pp.229-231 and U. Ra'anan, 'The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis', in Problems of Communism, Vol.15, No.2, March-April, 1966, pp.41-42. A Japanese source even speaks of a 'secret military agreement' made between Chou En-lai and Sukarno in October, 1964, involving a Chinese offer to supply nuclear weapons to Indonesia. See West Irian's Independence Question, Indonesia Information No.31, Research Association for Asian Affairs, Tokyo, undated, pp.17-18 (in Japanese).
by the course of history itself!' ¹. He was in fact stating what was already apparent, at least in so far as the Djakarta-Peking section of the axis was concerned². Before the axis could take on a more definite form, Indonesia's coup intervened. The allegations of Peking's involvement in the coup, both in terms of encouraging the PKI to rebellion and in terms of supplying arms to the PKI (e.g., reportedly included in the shipment of materials for the CONEFO project), Peking's hostile attitude to the new post-coup regime and provocations by the Chinese embassy in Djakarta led to the suspension of diplomatic relations and yet another outburst of anti-Chinese activity in Indonesia.

Sukarno's claim that the axis with Peking was

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¹ Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance, Department of Information, Djakarta, 1965, p.16.
² Brackman considers that Sukarno may have been premature in including Pnom-Penh and Pyongyang. See his comments in Brackman, Second Front, p.266. In the case of Cambodia, Sukarno did act prematurely. Prince Sihanouk, writing in Sangkum Magazine, No.6 of January, 1966, claimed that the axis was a personal discovery on Sukarno's part and that Cambodia and the other participants had not accepted or even been aware of its existence. Sukarno might have included Karachi with greater justification than Pnom-Penh, since, although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, it had been an ally of Djakarta and Peking in Afro-Asian manoeuvres.
'natural' was not without some validity. It was undoubtedly the product of a growing convergence of the foreign policy interests of Communist China and Indonesia. Indeed, by 1965, if not sooner, Indonesian and Chinese foreign policy seemed virtually indistinguishable, although this did not mean that Indonesia was merely the stooge of Peking. Underlying the collaboration and co-operation was the basically similar commitment to the eradication of imperialism and neo-colonialism by militant methods, in Southeast Asia and in the world. In the regional context, there was agreement on the identification of the U.S. and Britain as the major representatives of imperialism. This broad area of agreement on basic objectives was reinforced by the specific needs of the two regimes and, in the case of Indonesia, by the needs and interests of the dominant elements in the leadership. Sukarno needed moral, economic and military support for his anti-Malaysia campaign, for his campaign to build the world anew and, probably of less importance in Sukarno's eyes, to bolster the country's ailing economy. Peking appeared to have the ability and the willingness to provide this support without imposing unacceptable conditions. The PKI saw itself as benefiting both externally and nationally from the
militant policies associated with the close relations between Djakarta and Peking\textsuperscript{1}, while ideologically this alliance became more commendable as the PKI itself adopted an increasingly pro-Peking line. Subandrio, apparently a figure of increasing importance in foreign policy making in the final stages of Guided Democracy, may even have found in Peking the backing which he needed to counter his lack of organised domestic support\textsuperscript{2}. Of the influential elements in the Guided Democracy leadership, only the army leaders opposed to the PKI and suspicious of China had serious cause for

\textsuperscript{1} The gains made by the PKI domestically as a result of increased radicalisation of Indonesia's policies are discussed in Appendix D, especially pp.D48-D56 below. For further details on the PKI's regional ambitions, see van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp.287-288 & 292 and Brackman, Second Front, Chapter 22, especially pp.252-256.

\textsuperscript{2} This is believed by a number of New Order supporters whom I interviewed. They point out that Subandrio, originally a PSI appointee, was essentially a non-party man who, in his bid for the succession to Sukarno, unsuccessfully sought support from the PNI, the PKI and the army leadership. He seems to have been unpopular and suspect with everybody, except, perhaps, with Sukarno, who found him useful as an efficient administrator anxious to please the Bapak. Closely associated with this view is the view that the Peking axis was Subandrio's rather than Sukarno's idea. Whatever the validity of this view, Subandrio appears to have played a vital role in its creation as Shaplen and others point out. See, for example, Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p.78.
anxiety about the leftwards, pro-Peking drift in Indonesian foreign policy. Peking, on the other hand, needed the support of an Afro-Asian and non-aligned nation to further its aims of organising a militant Afro-Asian and Latin-American grouping that would exclude the Soviet Union. The support of both Sukarno and the PKI was obviously seen as valuable to counter Russian influence in the third world and in the international communist movement.

Thus, the axis with Peking was a marriage of convenience, sanctified by a common ideological commitment. This does not mean, however, that Sukarno was necessarily committed to advancing Peking's interests further than suited his own purposes, or vice versa. The ideological agreement and the convergence of interests were both primarily negative: the eradication of imperialism and its associated evils and the removal of British and U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. Whilst Djakarta and Peking seemed to share a broadly similar vision of the new world order that was to replace the present unsatisfactory one, and whilst they agreed on the revolutionary methods to be adopted to depose the imperialists, it is unlikely that the two regimes would have agreed on the specifics of the new world and that rivalry for leadership of the
progressive forces would have been indefinitely avoided. Similarly, if and when the British and U.S. presence in Southeast Asia had been removed, a struggle for hegemony would have been likely to follow, or, at best, a division of the region into spheres of influence, over which apportionment disagreement was likely to occur. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, an axis between the two nations seemed to be of mutual advantage. The change in the composition of the Djakarta regime, however, drastically changed this situation, rendering each a most unsatisfactory ally for the other.

Indonesia's Isolation: Interrelated with the development of the Peking axis, partly contributing to its development and partly resulting from it, was Indonesia's increasing international isolation. Sukarno's obsession with external adventures at the expense of the economy, his increasingly strident anti-western posture, his seizure of western enterprises in Indonesia, his encouragement of the PKI domestically and his diplomatic support for Peking, his use of force in opposing the creation and survival of Malaysia and his defiance of international law and moderate world opinion all contributed to a deepening estrangement with the west, an estrangement which, by 1965, was all but complete.
Similarly, given the growing divergence between Peking and Moscow as Indonesia's association with Peking became closer, relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, despite the vital contribution which Russia and the Soviet bloc had made to the development of the military basis necessary for Indonesia's aggressive foreign policy stance. Djakarta's support for Peking's attempts to limit Russian influence in the third world and to exclude the Soviet Union from official Afro-Asian activities hardly endeared Sukarno to Moscow. On the other hand, the extent of Russian coolness towards Indonesia should not be exaggerated. It was still to Moscow's advantage to attempt to check the drift to Peking both in the Indonesian government and in the PKI. Although Moscow could have been more generous towards Indonesia, for example, by waiving some of the unpaid debts for military equipment or by providing further equipment as a gift, the debts were rescheduled and

1 See, for example, the summary of the major aspects of Soviet-Indonesian relations between 1962 and 1966, pp.236-238 of C.B. McLane, op. cit. Although by comparison with earlier relations (see ibid., pp.234-236), there was a decline in cordiality and in Russian assistance, the relationship between Djakarta and Moscow during the Era of Confrontation was far short of estrangement or hostility.
Moscow was sufficiently interested in Indonesian goodwill to send Mikoyan, then the Soviet Deputy Premier, to Djakarta in June-July, 1964. During this visit and Subandrio's visit in the same month to Moscow, support for Indonesia's campaign against Malaysia was reaffirmed in more enthusiastic terms than previously and further supplies of weapons were promised. It was also the Russian veto that saved Indonesia from the official censure of the Security Council late in 1964. Nevertheless, Mikoyan's visit and Sukarno's subsequent visit to Moscow were markedly less cordial than such previous visits had been. For Indonesia's part, whilst Peking was increasingly seen as the more suitable ally in the NEFO crusade and whilst the Soviet Union's stake in


3 See, for example, U. Ra'anan, op. cit., p.42, especially Subandrio's statement. At Subandrio's trial, he was criticised over his statements indicating that he no longer considered the Soviet Union capable of providing an 'umbrella' for Indonesia in its confrontation with Britain and America. See 'The Special Military Tribunal Tries Dr. Subandrio, 1-22 October, 1966', Facts and
orderly industrial development and decreasingly militant stand in international affairs began to cast doubts on Russia's status as a NEFO, the deterioration in Djakarta-Moscow relations was considerably less than that in Indonesia's relations with the west.

The most serious setback to Indonesia's international influence was, however, in the area which had long been seen as Indonesia's stronghold, Afro-Asia. Indonesia's decline as an Afro-Asian leader was in part a by-product of the disintegration of Afro-Asia¹, but Indonesia's own policies also served to discredit Djakarta with Afro-Asian leaders². Sukarno's emphasis

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¹ Figures, No.4/FF/PENLUGRI Vol.11, April, 1967, Department of Information, Djakarta, pp.17, 37-38 & 54.
² This disintegration was the result of a number of factors, including the divisive effects in the third world of the Peking-Moscow dispute, the growing rift between A-A moderates and militants, the increasing divergence between Africa and Asia and the outbreak of a number of disputes amongst the African, Arab and Asian members. For further details, see, for example, T.B. Millar & J.D.B. Miller, 'Afro-Asian Disunity: Algiers, 1965', in Australian Outlook, Vol.19, No.3, December, 1965, pp.306-321 and G.J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity', in Asian Survey, Vol.5, No.9, September, 1965, pp.425-432.
³ For a general review of Indonesia's loss of international support, particularly in Afro-Asia, see Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, pp.76-79. For further details emphasising Malaysia's gradual gains in A-A support, see Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy, Chapter 11, pp.170 ff.
on the need for a militant crusade against the OLDEFO was not the major cause of this loss of support¹. Verbal and ideological radicalism directed against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism was not especially repugnant to Afro-Asians, provided it required no commitment to startling action, although India and, to a lesser extent, the UAR and some African and Asian states were not enthusiastic for a continuation of the old anti-colonial line in new post-colonial guise. The real damage was done by Djakarta's actions rather than Sukarno's words, in particular, by the translation of NEFO Ideology into aggressive confrontation and the use of force. The seizure of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia in 1957-58 caused some Afro-Asian eyebrows to be raised, but the final stages of the West Irian campaign, the launching of confrontation against Malaysia, the rejection of the U.N. team's investigation of

¹ Even the non-aligned Cairo conference virtually endorsed Sukarno's general ideological position in the final communique. See pp.551-552 above. On the other hand, the Cairo conference and the 1965 Afro-Asian Islamic Conference did not endorse Indonesian attempts to brand Malaysia as a British neo-colonialist scheme. See, for example, Brackman, Second Front, p.239.
Bornean opinion, the extension of the fighting to the Malay Peninsular and Indonesia's arrogant defence thereof in the Security Council, the talk of acquiring atomic weapons and, above all else, the withdrawal from the United Nations, rendered Indonesian conduct increasingly unacceptable to a widening range of Afro-Asian opinion. Indonesia's military build-up, the government's conspicuous failure to deal effectively with the economic decline, the PKI's apparent rise domestically and the association with Peking further served to reduce support for Indonesia in Afro-Asian circles.

The Era of Confrontation thus ended with fairly

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1 Peking's image in Afro-Asia was originally one of reasonableness as a result of Chou En-lai's conduct at Bandung. This gradually changed, however, as the Peking-Moscow split intensified, invading Afro-Asian preserves to the detriment of A-A solidarity and to the annoyance of many Afro-Asians. Simultaneously, Peking became more conspicuously aggressive in word and deed. The use of force in the border dispute with India was perhaps the example most offensive to Afro-Asian opinion, but China's activities in Africa had also alarmed many African states by 1965. China thus became increasingly a source of suspicion, fear or embarrassment to many Afro-Asian states. The result was that, although Peking-Djakarta collaboration initially proved effective in the AAPSO, by the time of the final preparations for the second Afro-Asian conference, Indonesia's association with Peking appeared to be working to Djakarta's disadvantage. For further details of Peking's growing isolation in Afro-Asia, see Jansen, op. cit., pp.371-374. See also Miller, The Politics of the Third World, pp.35, 41 & 56-58.
predictable results: support from militants, especially Peking and Peking-oriented countries, notoriety with some prestige, and isolation from the less 'progressive' nations. Whether the developing climax in 1965 would have resulted in the creation of an Indonesia-led NEFO nucleus, -- potentially powerful because of militancy, revolutionary fervour and co-ordinated action as typified in the Peking-Djakarta axis, -- was not put to the test. As Indonesia rushed headlong towards the 'inevitable' NEFO victory, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, probably unwittingly, set in motion the events that were to destroy the political balance sustaining Guided Democracy, President Sukarno and the NEFO crusade.

(iv) Post-1965 Reversals.

The post-coup developments in Indonesian foreign policy lie outside the scope of this thesis. Some brief comments are, however, desirable to complete the survey of the phases of Indonesian foreign policy. In the wake of the coup, paralleling the domestic rejection of the PKI and Sukarno, most of the latter's foreign policies were reversed. Thus, the axis with Peking was ended and diplomatic relations were subsequently suspended, confrontation with Malaysia was brought to an end, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations and efforts were
made to restore good relations with the West, whilst attempting to attract foreign aid and investment primarily from the west, but also from the Soviet Union. The attempts at building NEFO solidarity were also suspended, although this aim was not specifically rejected. It was rather regarded as impractical in the light of Indonesia's post-coup needs\(^1\). Only in UNCTAD were efforts continued to force concessions from the developed world, and these were in the less emotional form of tough economic negotiation rather than political confrontation. The bid for world leadership was also toned down to a more moderate bid for regional leadership in the successfully launched ASEAN\(^2\). These changes have reflected a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy, an approach that subordinates foreign policy ventures to

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1 See the June-July 1966 M.P.R.S. session's decisions on CONEFO and GANEFO, p.138 of Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara (The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) 20th of June-5th of July 1966, Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Issue 005/1966, 1966.

2 This is the Association of Southeast Asian nations created on Indonesia's initiative and linking Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand in a primarily economic and cultural association. This organization replaced ASA, the Association of Southeast Asia, which Indonesia had consistently refused to join.
domestic needs. They also indicate a desire on the part of the New Order to restore Indonesia's international and regional respectability. The New Order has depicted these changes as attempts to restore Indonesian foreign policy to its original independent, active path from which Sukarno and the Old Order, under the pernicious influence of the PKI and Peking, had deviated.

(v) Summary.

The phase interpretation undoubtedly provides the most convenient basis for a detailed examination of operative Indonesian foreign policy. It has therefore been used in the above account. This account depicts Indonesian foreign policy to 1965 as consisting of three broad phases, the second and third of which have been further divided, producing a total of six phases between 1945 and 1965, each ranging over a period of from two to four years. This interpretation does not deny overlapping between the various phases or similarities between the policies of different phases, but it tends to emphasise the totality and, to some extent, the distinctiveness of Indonesian foreign policy during each period. What emerges from this interpretation is a mosaic, with
the constituent parts divided by particular though flexible points in time. There are also a number of alternative and not necessarily incompatible interpretations which, though not as suitable for a detailed account of Indonesian foreign policy, deserve brief attention, since they represent attempts to depict operative Indonesian foreign policy as a whole.

(c) Other Interpretations.

(i) Variations on the Phase Interpretation.

The phase interpretation as such does not provide an indication of the way in which the phases are related to each other. There are, however, two similar possible interpretations that do attempt to provide a total pattern which overlays the phases. These may be called the pendulum interpretation and the cycle interpretation.

The pendulum interpretation depicts operative Indonesian foreign policy as developing in one direction and then reversing in the opposite direction. The oscillation is basically between radicalism and an.

1 The analogy between operative Indonesian foreign policy and a pendulum, a cycle or both was made by many Indonesians during interviews.
emphasis on ideology and political concerns on the one hand and, on the other, pragmatism and an emphasis on economic and administrative problems. The former position also involves a closer association with communist and other 'progressive' countries, the latter a closer association with western countries. The most obvious extreme positions of the pendulum have been the signing of the Mutual Security Aid agreement with the United States in 1952 and the development of the anti-imperialist axis with Peking during the Era of Confrontation. These developments represent extreme positions in at least two senses: the pursuit of one type of foreign policy objective to the virtual exclusion of others and the creation of a near-alliance with the bloc or power whose policies most resemble the prevailing Indonesian preoccupation. It would seem unlikely that a swing in Indonesian foreign policy would go beyond these extremes, but a swing may be reversed prior to reaching either extreme position. There is no indication in this interpretation of the point at which a reversal may be expected to occur, short of the

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1 For example, the reversals that occurred under the Burhanuddin Harahap government of August, 1955 to March 1956.
extreme positions, nor is there any indication of the period during which a particular direction in policy developments may be expected to last.

On the cycle interpretation, Indonesian foreign policy began in a revolutionary, defiant way with the declaration of independence and the struggle for Dutch recognition. It then moved through a period of a low posture, pragmatic, rather pro-western stance and, following the controversy over the MSA agreement, once again developed a radical quality, beginning with the intensification of the West Irian struggle and the pursuit of Afro-Asian leadership. Then came the NEFO crusade and the extremes of the Era of Confrontation. By the time of the coup, the cycle was completed and there followed a return to a low posture, pragmatic, rather pro-western foreign policy.

Neither of these interpretations can be adopted very rigorously, since they do not always fit the details, but there is an element of truth in them.

For example, during the physical struggle for independence, radicalism was matched by pragmatism and the attempt to gain communist bloc and Afro-Asian support was balanced by the attempt to gain western support. Similarly, the move towards radicalism from 1953 was checked briefly under the Burhanuddin Harahap
provided they are seen as broad generalizations.

(ii) The Thematic Interpretation.

The phase interpretation and the pendulum and cycle interpretations all tend to draw attention to the elements of change and inconsistency in operative Indonesian foreign policy. The major alternative to this type of interpretation is one that draws attention to the elements of continuity by emphasising basic pursuits and major preoccupations which cut across the divisions between the phases, the swings of the pendulum and the progression through the cycle. This interpretation, except in an unacceptably naive form, does not assert that the preoccupations remained identical in specifics. It acknowledges changes in priority, changes in interpretation and changes in immediate objectives, but tends to regard these changes as subsidiary in nature rather than as fundamental. As the general preoccupations are basically those depicted in declared Indonesian foreign

cabinet (August 1955-March 1956), although it was this government that first abrogated the Round Table Conference agreements, a remarkably defiant action. The pendulum interpretation is better able to take account of the latter, through the possibility of small, irregular oscillations, but neither interpretation provides an adequate assessment of the period 1945-1949.
policy, the thematic interpretation provides the clearest picture of the link between declared and operative foreign policy.

This interpretation is best illustrated by reference to the closely associated preoccupations with furthering the Indonesian Revolution, eradicating colonialism and imperialism and acquiring and exercising genuine independence. During the period of the physical Revolution, the foreign policy preoccupation was to gain international support for the anti-colonial, but essentially inward-looking revolutionary aim of resisting the reimposition of Dutch colonialism. From 1949 to 1953, the emphasis was on strengthening the political and economic foundations necessary for the effective enjoyment of the newly acquired independence. As a result, foreign policy was moderate and pragmatic, aiming at attracting western aid and investment. From 1953 to 1957, revolutionary preoccupations were revived in the radicalization of the West Irian campaign, in the beginnings of Indonesianisation of the economy and in the launching of the Afro-Asian movement.

1 Even the moves to acquire West Irian were moderate, relying on attempts at a negotiated settlement.
From 1957 onwards, with marked intensification after 1959 and 1962, revolutionary pursuits were given increasing importance at home and abroad. Anti-colonialism became submerged in the broader opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism as the importance of 'genuine' independence, embracing cultural and economic independence, came to be emphasised not only for Indonesia but for other new states as well. During the Era of Confrontation, the exportation of the Indonesian Revolution reached the level of an obsession, producing desperate bids for regional and world leadership, as Sukarno's campaign to build the world anew took precedence over all other policy objectives.

As a result of the above developments, other basic concepts of Indonesian foreign policy changed in interpretation. Thus, the independent active concept changed from an assertion of individuality to a universalised principle requiring united opposition with other new states to the 'Nekolim' and OLDEFO. This principle's requirement of formal non-alignment was theoretically retained but, in practice, its application changed from a pro-western bias to a pro-communist bias. Similarly, the good neighbour policy changed from one reflecting a desire for universal peace and friendship to one aiming
at solidarity with an increasingly narrow group of nations, at first the Afro-Asians, ultimately the 'progressive' militants. The perception of the national interest also changed. Narrowly and pragmatically perceived\(^1\), the emphasis on the pursuit of the national interest followed a parallel but inverse course to the above more revolutionary preoccupations. Even Pantja Sila became interpreted as being increasingly synonymous with militant anti-imperialism.

The thematic interpretation can be developed in considerable detail to take account of the specifics of operative policy, but it is inherently unsuitable for this purpose, since it is based on broad and vague generalizations that tend to encourage illusions and oversimplifications. Nevertheless, it should not be totally discarded, since it is an interpretation genuinely accepted by many Indonesians, either exclusively or in combination with a recognition of identifiable phases. It serves a useful purpose in depicting an underlying though vague continuity in Indonesian foreign policy and therefore provides a counter-balance

\(^1\) On western criteria, rationally and realistically perceived.
to an excessively fragmentary picture of Indonesian foreign policy.

(iii) Basic Indonesian Foreign Policy and Deviations.

Mention should finally be made of an interpretation of Indonesian foreign policy frequently occurring in discussions with Indonesians, both of Old Order and New Order persuasions. This interpretation may be related to any of the above interpretations and asserts the existence of a basic, foreign policy from which deviations occur from time to time. Thus, some phases or some parts of the cycle are closer to the basic foreign policy than others. In the context of the pendulum interpretation, basic Indonesian foreign policy is that collection of policies that is located between the extreme positions of the pendulum. Inherent in this interpretation is the idea that there is a point of equilibrium to which Indonesian foreign policy returns from time to time.

When Indonesians speak of basic Indonesian foreign policy, they seem to have in mind the collection of values and concepts expressed in declared Indonesian foreign policy. The difficulty in identifying basic Indonesian foreign policy in specific operative terms, however, arises from the general nature of the themes of
declared Indonesian foreign policy and from the different interpretations given to these themes by different individuals and groups. Thus, the concept of the basic foreign policy, when applied to operative policy, comes to mean those policies that are considered to be compatible with the particular observer's interpretation of declared policy and hence those policies of which he approves, while deviations are those policies of which he disapproves. For example, the MSA agreement, the axis with Peking, or both, may be classified as deviations, depending on the predilections and political associations of the observer.

Implied in the concept of a deviation is also the notion of undue operative emphasis on one or a group of themes and an exaggerated interpretation of declared Indonesian foreign policy as a whole. Basic Indonesian foreign policy, by contrast, is that in which harmony and balance between the various themes has been main-

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1 To an Old Order supporter, the former is the deviation, to a New Order supporter, the latter is, while to those nationalists who give prime importance to the principle of the independent active policy strictly defined, both are deviations. What appears to be agreed, however, is that a full, formal alliance or substantial dependence on one or an allied group of foreign powers is incompatible with basic Indonesian foreign policy.
tained. Once again, however, the assumption of each observer is that his particular overall interpretation of declared foreign policy and his scale of priorities is the 'balanced' interpretation. Since there is no consensus on what is the balanced interpretation the concept remains nebulous.

The basic/deviation interpretation is therefore of little value to an accurate and objective assessment of Indonesian foreign policy. On the other hand, it does reflect the widespread Indonesian preoccupation with harmony, order and continuity in ideas. Its weakness lies not so much in its usefulness for those who deliberately seek to misrepresent their own or their rivals' views and policies, but in its encouragement of self-delusion through promoting the tendency to ignore inconvenient facts. Though nebulous, it remains a popular interpretation of Indonesian foreign policy amongst Indonesians and, for this reason, should not be dismissed as mere propaganda. It does appear to be genuinely endorsed though probably mistakenly.

(d) The Trend.

Whatever interpretation of operative Indonesian foreign policy one adopts, one can discern a general,
overall trend between 1945 and 1965, although there were interruptions and occasional reversals. Broadly, this trend could be described as a transition from an essentially defensive, though originally defiant bid for independence, through a stage of policies aimed at survival and at the exercise of independence, to an outward-looking, assertive and ultimately aggressive foreign policy aimed at securing for Indonesia its 'rightful' place of influence in regional and world affairs. The bid for greater influence started as an extension of the defensive aspect of Indonesian foreign policy. Foreign policy was used at first to promote international support for Indonesian Independence, for the claim to West Irian and for Indonesia's attempts at economic rehabilitation and development, but it was also used increasingly to thwart foreign attempts at interfering in Indonesian affairs. As this last function became more prominent, a shift occurred from a preoccupation with establishing and sustaining effective independence¹ and from furthering the domestic Revolution to a preoccupation with promoting

¹ This task itself acquired broader dimensions as economic and cultural independence were elevated to the same level of importance as political independence.
international revolution under Indonesian leadership. World transformation had long been seen as necessary for effective full transformation of Indonesian society, but it became increasingly depicted as a prerequisite for further domestic progress. Increasing priority was therefore accorded to revolutionary foreign policy pursuits as decreasing attention was given to solving domestic problems. In the purely foreign policy field, the trend was away from moderate policies towards militant, doctrinaire, extremist and aggressive policies backed by the use and threat of force. The original basic assertion of Indonesian foreign policy, the national right of Indonesia to be left to itself to develop and express its national identity was replaced by an arrogant attempt to impose Indonesian views on other developing nations and, indeed, on the world.\(^1\)

The above developments became most apparent during the Era of Confrontation, by which time, having established full independence and sovereignty with the acquisition of West Irian, and having established a

\(^1\) In fairness to the Indonesian revolutionaries, one should also add that this imposition of Indonesian views and values was also seen to be in the interests of other nations and of the world. Missionary zeal was as important as self-interest.
certain control over the political machinery of the state, the revolutionary leaders were in a position to begin a drive for the exportation of the Revolution. The bid for Indonesian leadership of other new 'progressive' nations began in earnest, as the regional campaign to crush Malaysia and the world campaign to eradicate OLDEFO domination of the international system came to dominate all other aspects of domestic and foreign policy. The trend was, however, heralded in pre-independence ideology, in the revolutionary seizure of independence in 1945 and, from 1953, in such phenomena as the intensification of the West Irian campaign and the attempts to establish an Afro-Asian movement. In noticing the excesses of the Era of Confrontation, one can overlook the fact that Indonesian foreign policy began with an assertive, revolutionary and forceful act, -- the seizure of independence. The precedent and potentials for the radicalization of Indonesian foreign policy were thus present from the beginning of Indonesia's history as a de facto independent state, even though the impressive development of these potentials did not occur until relatively late. Thus, in a sense, the trend towards an increasingly revolutionary foreign policy represents a progressive realization of the
original potentials, to Sukarno and his supporters, an approach to the 'true' nature of Indonesian foreign policy.

The effect of the trend was to cause Indonesia to move away from close and friendly relations with the west towards friendly relations initially with the Soviet Union and subsequently with Communist China. This is hardly surprising, since, as Indonesia adopted an increasingly radical stand in foreign policy, the greatest support could be expected to come from other radical nations opposed to imperialism and capitalism. The perception of the move towards Moscow and Peking has caused many westerners to identify the trend in Indonesian foreign policy as a trend towards communism, but this was not so much a conscious objective of the Indonesian leaders, except those of the PKI, as the result of the pursuit of Indonesia's own radical external objectives. It was not the intention of Indonesian leaders that Indonesia should become a satellite of Moscow or Peking but that Moscow and Peking should be used for the furtherance of Indonesia's international revolutionary aims.

Since the 1965 coup, the trend to the left, to radicalism and to aggressiveness has been arrested and
Indonesian foreign policy has returned to a similar position to that adopted in the early nineteen-fifties. Whether this approach will remain, whether it will lead Indonesia into closer association with the west or whether the trend of the last twenty years will be repeated cannot yet be judged.

To Sukarno and his supporters, the above trend in Indonesian foreign policy from 1945 to 1965 has something of the quality of inevitability. It was part of the inexorable process of history, of the irresistible progress of the Revolution of Mankind, of the unfolding of the Indonesian Identity and of the increasing realization of the aims of the Indonesian Revolution. This type of view adds an aura of sanctity to the assertion that Sukarno's foreign policy was basic Indonesian foreign policy, whilst the policies of his opponents were deviations.

In the above account of the phases of operative Indonesian foreign policy, one does gain the impression of a sense of inevitability, even at the point where Sukarno made what was probably his most conscious choice between policy alternatives, in opting for confrontation
rather than economic development. Whether one goes so far as to accept Sukarno's visions of cosmological inevitability and the operation of forces of history or not, one can discern a peculiar convergence of factors which, despite pauses and occasional reversals, propelled Indonesian foreign policy in the direction indicated above. These factors should now be summarised.

3. GENERAL DETERMINANTS OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

Particular foreign policy actions are, of course, the product of many complex factors. It is impractical here to attempt to deal adequately with these detailed complexities or with the speculation and controversies surrounding them. I am here primarily concerned with general as opposed to specific determinants. The

1 For other surveys and assessments of possible general determinants of Indonesian foreign policy see, for example, Bunnell, op. cit., pp.38-44 and Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.5-9.

2 Some of these have been suggested in the above account of Indonesian foreign policy, where they were considered important and relevant to the account.

3 See pp.255-258 above on this distinction.
generalizations below are not intended to deny the operation of specific determinants, nor are they intended to deny that there have been factors operating in ways contradictory to the influences summarised below. Nevertheless, until 1965¹, a number of long-term factors have tended to push Indonesian foreign policy in the same basic direction and have therefore prevailed over other factors, producing the above trend. Because these factors have converged, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify any one factor as the major determinant. No attempt has therefore been made to ascribe priority to any of the following.

(a) The Indonesian Experience and History.

It is a truism to say that foreign policy is the product of a nation's history, but it is a truism worth stating, particularly in the case of Indonesia. Indonesians themselves, when attempting to explain why

¹ Whilst I think it very likely that a number of these factors still operate, I am much more tentative in applying them to the post-coup situation. It is still too early to assess the extent of the impact of the coup and its aftermath.
Indonesian foreign policy developed as it did, frequently refer to 'the Indonesian experience', a vague concept, roughly synonymous with the Indonesian view of Indonesian history, but also implying that a number of lessons have been learnt from this experience\(^1\). There is, of course, no one detailed Indonesian view of Indonesian history, but there is a surprising degree of agreement on some of the general lessons to be learnt and there is some validity in these lessons, although many of them are over-simplified.

Indonesia, having once been the centre of a number of great empires\(^2\), became a Dutch colony. During the colonial regime, an efficient colonial economy was constructed which exploited Indonesia's natural resources, primarily for the benefit of Holland. No effective Indonesian middle class emerged to participate in the modern sector of the economy. Politically and


\(^2\) The ancient empires of Srivijaya and Majapahit were the most important and are the most frequently cited.
administratively, Indonesians were not generally encouraged to rise into positions of authority. Indonesians were therefore the 'have-nots' in their own country. These factors go a long way towards explaining the widespread rejection of capitalism, the appeal of Marxist and socialist doctrines, the tendency towards radicalism in Indonesian thought and the appeal of nationalist and traditionalist slogans.

When freedom from colonialism was achieved, it came by way of revolution in the face of prolonged and forceful Dutch opposition. The struggle for independence and subsequently for West Irian had a profound effect on Indonesian attitudes towards colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, the west and the international system generally. Broadly, the more radical theories and suspicions were seen to be verified by Dutch intransigence, by the inhibiting conditions laid down for eventual recognition, by United Nations impotence and by the failure of the great powers to provide prompt and effective assistance for Indonesia's struggle. Only the new nations of the then embryonic Afro-Asia were seen to be true allies and their inability to translate sympathy into effective action was seen to indicate both that the imperialists still had control of
the world system and that Soviet bloc support against the imperialists could be relied upon only when such support suited the Soviet's global and cold war interests. Concessions from the great powers and more especially from the imperialist powers could be obtained only through coercion and tough, skilful diplomacy. Suspicion of foreign powers was further reinforced by their apparent attempts at interference in Indonesia's affairs, a suspicion which was stronger in relation to western nations because of their association with capitalism, colonialism and imperialism.

One outcome of these experiences was the adoption of an independent active foreign policy and a good neighbour policy. Another, resulting especially from the bitterness of the struggles for independence and for West Irian, was the development of a strident nationalism and a xenophobia which are never far beneath the surface.

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1 For example, the Soviet Union was considered to have been involved in the 1948 communist uprising and western nations in the rebellions of 1949 and 1957-58. Suspicions were perpetuated by occasional attempts to lure Indonesia into alignment in the cold war with the inducement of aid. The United States appears to have been the worst offender in this respect.

2 See pp.342-344 above.
in Indonesian affairs\(^1\). The circumstances under which Indonesia gained and sustained its independence have also led to a view widely held in Indonesia that Indonesians are experts on the nature of colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism and on the way to obtain and maintain genuine independence\(^2\). This was one of the bases for the Indonesian claim and self-chosen responsibility for leadership of the new nations and of the world Revolution\(^3\).

(b) **Ideology.**

The Indonesian revolutionaries interpreted Indonesian experience largely through Indonesian Ideology of the Revolution\(^4\) and the subsequent NEFO

\(^1\) It is interesting to note in this context that the New Order's view that the axis with Peking permitted China to interfere in Indonesian affairs has led not to acceptance of the leadership of the west, but to a vigorous reassertion of the need for Indonesia to be independent in foreign policy.

\(^2\) See, for example, Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., pp.47 & 50.

\(^3\) The disillusionment after the coup and the perception of the magnitude of Indonesia's unsolved economic problems have shaken Indonesian confidence in this claim, at least temporarily if not permanently.

\(^4\) Discussed in Chapter I above.
Ideology\textsuperscript{1}. The concepts of these ideologies also incorporated the lessons which the ideologues considered to have been learnt from past experience. Experience gained in international affairs was more specifically incorporated into NEFO Ideology and in the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy which, for purposes of this summary may be grouped with ideology.

From the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, the themes of declared foreign policy and, more explicitly, the NEFO Ideology, a world view emerges which, though nebulous and somewhat incomplete, indicates a commitment to a revolutionary role in world affairs, if not a militant one. When one considers that even the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution\textsuperscript{2} declares the aims of abolishing colonialism throughout the world and of building a new world order, one wonders why Indonesian foreign policy did not become more conspicuously revolutionary earlier than it did.

The explanation is to be found largely in the composition of the decision-makers, most if not all of

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\textsuperscript{1} Discussed in Chapter IV below.

\textsuperscript{2} See Appendix A, pp.A1-A2 below.
whom accepted the broad propositions of Indonesian ideology, but with varying degrees of fervour and with varying interpretations. Thus, without denying the operation of the above factors, there is also a case for the view that Indonesian foreign policy was an external product of the changes in the domestic power groupings which in turn resulted from the domestic power struggle.

(c) The Influence of Domestic Politics.

The mechanisms of Indonesian politics are extremely complex, largely because of the myriad of divisions in Indonesian society, producing frequently changing alliances and rifts between competing groups. There have been many attempts to identify the major divisions and rivalries the outcome of which influences the broad direction of Indonesian politics. All of the rivalries depicted in these interpretations are relevant to Indonesian politics, but the contest of most direct relevance to Indonesian foreign policy would seem to be that between the revolutionaries or radicals and the moderates or pragmatists or, in Feith's terms,

1 See the reviews of these attempts in Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.3-9 and in Legge, Indonesia, pp.161-169.
the contest between the 'solidarity makers' and the 'administrators'.

The 'administrators' tended to be concerned primarily with domestic problems and, in attempting to solve these problems, they gave less emphasis to ideology than to pragmatic assessments and practical solutions. In so far as they considered ideology relevant, their interpretation was generally moderate.

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1 For Feith's elaboration of his 'administrator/solidarity maker' thesis, see Feith, Decline, especially pp.24-26 and 113-122. For assessments of the value of this model as a means to an understanding of Indonesian politics, see H.J. Benda, 'Democracy in Indonesia' (a review of Feith, Decline) in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.23, No.3, May 1964, especially pp.452-454 and Legge, Indonesia, pp.165-166. Some observers ascribe to other rivalries not only prime importance for domestic politics but direct relevance to Indonesian foreign policy. Thus, for example, Palmier sees the rivalry between the Javanese and non-Javanese for control of Indonesia as the major political competition and hence regards Indonesian foreign policy primarily as an elaborate cover for Javanese domination. Foreign policy did indeed serve to maintain the hold of the Javanese over Indonesian politics but Palmier's view ascribes undue importance to one facet and probably the least important facet of Indonesian foreign policy and leads to an unnecessarily limited and over-simplified picture. For Palmier's analysis, see Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, Chapters 13-15, especially pp.153-159 & 197-180.

2 For these reasons I have used the terms 'pragmatists' and 'moderates' as synonyms for 'administrators' for purposes of this summary.
The 'solidarity makers', by contrast, were more heavily influenced by ideology which they tended to interpret with a revolutionary emphasis. These leaders were the visionaries who were primarily concerned with working towards an utopian situation in Indonesia and in the world. This division is not exactly one between pro-western and pro-communist leaders, although the 'administrators' tended to be pro-western and the 'solidarity makers' pro-communist.

The foreign policy implications of revolutionary/moderate rivalry for power are obvious. The degree of

1 The 'solidarity makers' may therefore also be referred to as the 'revolutionaries' or 'radicals'.
2 All were first and foremost nationalists with varying degrees of intensity.
3 This difference in alignment tendencies was derived largely from the two groups' different assessments of Indonesia's needs and from their own interests in terms of domestic power. The 'administrators' desired to attract foreign aid and investment which was most readily available from the west and they feared that the influence of communist countries could promote the advancement of their opponents, the radical elements, particularly the PKI. The 'solidarity makers', by contrast, were suspicious of the west and tended to see the rewards of western friendship as outweighed by the threat of increased western influence in Indonesia, with resulting setbacks to revolutionary progress and to their own advancement vis-à-vis the 'administrators'. After all, the west was seen to stand for the status quo and Indonesia was seen to stand for change.
moderation or radicalism evidenced in foreign policy and
the consequent tendency towards a pro-western or pro-
communist international stance has been closely related
to the relative political strengths domestically of the
moderates and the revolutionaries. This was apparent,
for example, in the general radicalization of foreign
policy during the period of liberal democracy as the
'solidarity makers' gained ascendancy over the 'admini-
strators' and became even more pronounced after the
introduction of Guided Democracy after which the
'solidarity makers' became decreasingly restrained by
their opponents.

Although the above classification of the major
contenders for political power is based essentially on
tendencies towards one of two opposing positions and is
therefore rather general, there is little to be gained
from attempting to link foreign policy changes directly
with the rise and fall of particular and more specifi-
cally defined groups or individuals. Political
parties, for example, had no specific alternative foreign
policy programmes and no precise views on foreign

1 Sukarno and the PKI represent the major exception.
See below, pp.610-613.
policy other than the general endorsement of the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy and a tendency to interpret and apply those themes moderately or radically. The army's views on foreign policy appear to have been no less nebulous, except on specific issues that were seen to involve Indonesian security. The political preoccupations of the parties' and the army's leadership

1. The absence of clear alternative programmes on foreign policy was symptomatic of the general nature and weakness of the political parties, with the notable exception of the PKI. See, for example, the comments on the Indonesian party system in Legge, Indonesia, pp.140-141, Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, p.151, Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.111-115, and Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, p.609. One can speak of a tendency for the PSI and Masjumi to be pragmatic and pro-western, for the PNI to be nationalistic and suspicious of the West, for the NU to be suspicious of the communist bloc and for Murba to be inclined towards Moscow whilst being ultra-nationalistic. These were not, however, consistent tendencies. There were differences of opinion within parties and changes in official party attitudes on particular foreign policy issues, reflecting the dominance of different factions within each party and reflecting changing inter-party alliances aimed primarily at increasing domestic political influence on the part of the allies. Soedjatmoko goes so far as to say that the major political competition was a struggle for spoils. See his comments quoted in Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp.180-181.

2. There were important elements in the army leadership, particularly Nasution and his supporters, who appeared to favour friendly relations with the west because of their suspicions of Moscow, their even stronger suspicions of Peking and their fear of PKI advancement. The military leadership's anxiety over foreign policy trends was especially strong in connection with the
were in any case not with foreign policy but with advancing their own domestic political influences and containing that of their rivals\textsuperscript{1}.

The increase or decrease in the political influence of particular parties or of the army was therefore significant for Indonesian foreign policy primarily in so far as it affected the general political tone and the overall dominance of the radicals or moderates in the policy-making process. Thus, the inter and intra-party manoeuvres and the frequent changes of cabinet during the period of liberal democracy did not result in proportionate changes in Indonesian foreign policy, except when the moderate/radical balance was appreciably altered\textsuperscript{2}. Similarly, until after the coup, the changing development of the axis with Peking, since this was seen to present Peking with an opportunity to interfere in Indonesian affairs, both directly and through the PKI.\textsuperscript{1}

This preoccupation was most strikingly reflected in the case of the army's role in the Sukarno-army partnership during Guided Democracy. Although the military leaders did not always wholeheartedly support Sukarno's foreign policies, Sukarno's near-monopoly of foreign policy formulation was left virtually unchallenged, at least publicly.\textsuperscript{2}

For example, when the first and second Ali cabinets came to power and when Guided Democracy was established.
political fortunes of the army did not appreciably and
directly affect the trend of Indonesian foreign policy,
although, until mid-1962, the influence of Nasution may
have restrained Sukarno from embarking on the adven­
turous excesses characteristic of the Era of Confrontation.

The above argument notwithstanding, it is possible
and desirable to examine the link between changes in
Indonesian foreign policy and the changing political
fortunes of at least one individual and one party:
Sukarno and the PKI. Undoubtedly, Sukarno's rise had
a profound direct effect on Indonesian foreign policy.
This was particularly apparent under Guided Democracy
and even more apparent during the Era of Confrontation,
when the imprint of Sukarno's personality on Indonesian
foreign policy became increasingly pronounced as a
result of his formal monopoly of foreign policy formu-

1 If so, the restraint was not particularly pronounced
during the culmination of the West Irian campaign. This
may be largely explained by the fact that the army
leadership was as committed to the acquisition of West
Irian as was Sukarno.

2 This is not to assert that Indonesian foreign policy
was merely the reflection of the influence of Sukarno
and/or the PKI, but it is to acknowledge that these
influences were important determinants.
lation and of his apparent general ascendancy over the main restraining influence, the army leadership. His interest and increasing influence in the foreign policy field was, however, noticeable before the advent of Guided Democracy. His world view and his subsidiary views on foreign policy, though most clearly formulated in NEFO Ideology, were also present in his early writings. His activities and personal diplomacy, particularly from 1956 onwards, reflected these views with increasing clarity. After the brief interlude of flirtation with western-backed pragmatism at the beginning of the Era of Confrontation, his personal role in foreign policy reached a culmination in the virtual subordination of all other policy objectives to the crusade against the OLDEFO. Sukarno's importance in foreign policy thus introduces the specific complications of his personal convictions, his sense of mission, his predilections for crisis creation, crisis management and flamboyant postures and his ambitions for himself and his nation to obtain recognition as world revolutionary leaders. These

1 For example, in his doctrines on the great antithesis and on imperialism and revolution and in his call for an alliance of nations. These are discussed in Chapter I above.
more personal influences were further encouraged by the increasing failure of Sukarno's courtiers to question the Bung's views and directives. This was particularly apparent in the case of Subandrio who, as Foreign Minister, more than matched Sukarno's revolutionary fervour in word and deed.

Of the political parties, the PKI gradually emerged as the most influential and, in addition, was the only party that could be regarded as having clear foreign policy views. These also happened to be remarkably close to those of Sukarno. The PKI leadership, in its encouragement and support for Sukarno's more radical and militant foreign policies, was undoubtedly pursuing its own national and external

1 Adam Malik and Chaerul Salek did so by forming the B.P.S. in 1964 and suffered as a result. See Appendix D, pp.D52-D55 below.
2 For example, his speeches elaborated on Sukarno's basic concepts and his actions, particularly his prosecution of confrontation against Malaysia and his contribution to the creation of the Peking axis, vigorously applied these concepts. Whether Subandrio's enthusiastic support of Sukarno's foreign policy ideas was a matter of conviction or of ambition to succeed the Bung remains a matter of speculation, but the latter seems more likely.
objectives while simultaneously serving the interests of Peking. It is, however, an exaggeration to account for the radicalization of Indonesian foreign policy and for its drift towards Peking merely by reference to the rising influence and pro-Peking tendency of the PKI. The amount of actual independent power exercised by the PKI under Guided Democracy is at best doubtful. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that, within the strengthening Sukarno-PKI partnership, the party's leaders, particularly Aidit and Njoto, came to exercise considerable influence over Sukarno, at least encouraging his militancy and possibly tending to accentuate it, while the party's mass organization activities served to increase the domestic pressures for militant radicalism.

(d) Problems, Diversions and Frustrations.

The rise of the 'solidarity makers' at the expense of the 'administrators' was the product of a number of

1 For further details of these external objectives, see van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp.287-288 & 292 and Brackman, Second Front, pp.252-256.
2 See Appendix D, pp.D41-D56 below.
complex factors¹. Important amongst these and of particular significance for the trend in Indonesian foreign policy was the nature and extent of two basic problems facing the infant Republic and its leaders: that of fostering and maintaining national unity and that of promoting economic development. The first was formidable because of the number of deep divisions in Indonesian society and because of the strength and incompatibility of competing organised groups². The second was no less formidable, given the unrealistic expectations engendered by the struggle for independence, the magnitude of the economic problems, the lack of an effective administrative apparatus and the shortage of capital and skills. The disillusionment and frustration

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¹ The rise of the 'solidarity makers' and some of the reasons therefore are traced in the accounts of the domestic background to foreign policy in the above discussion of the phases of Indonesian foreign policy. This phenomenon was very closely related to the failure of western parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. For accounts of the reasons for this failure, see the citations in footnote 1, p.366 above.

² e.g., the 'administrators' and the 'solidarity makers', the civilians and the military, the army and the communists and the nationalist, Muslim and Communist groups nominally united under the NASAKOM formula.
created by the failure of the 'administrators' to produce the anticipated results by pragmatic, moderate methods, created a political environment suited to the 'solidarity makers' and their radical, utopian solutions. These leaders and Sukarno in particular were adept at using diversionary tactics to unite warring domestic factions and to explain policy failures, thereby sustaining their legitimacy. A revolutionary foreign policy was one of the most convenient and effective of these diversions. A resulting difficulty was, however, that, due to neglect of domestic problems and due to the cost of extravagant external ventures, the problems especially those of the economy, increased, thereby requiring more extreme diversions and desperate measures, which in turn produced further set-backs, ultimately even in the field of foreign policy. It was the frustration and

1 See, for example, pp.455-456 above. As the PKI and the army leadership emerged as increasingly powerful and hostile forces, the diversionary function of foreign policy acquired a more specific importance than the general promotion of national unity. External adventures were used increasingly to absorb the PKI's revolutionary fervour and the army's physical strength, thereby averting a head-on collision domestically until the 1965 coup.

2 The most important of these foreign policy set-backs were the failure of the Malaysian confrontation to destroy the federation and Indonesia's increasing international isolation.
desperation that added a further dimension to the revolutionary dynamism of Indonesian foreign policy, namely, an element of extremism, brinkmanship and aggressiveness which, though not incompatible with Indonesia's revolutionary posture, was not necessarily required thereby. Indonesia's mounting difficulties served to confirm Sukarno's view that effective Indonesian progress could not occur without the prior eradication of OLDEFO world domination and, given the apparent strength of the OLDEFO, more aggressive means were seen to be necessary to achieve this result. This reasoning made a convenient propaganda excuse for policy failures but also appears to have been genuinely believed by the more devout revolutionaries, Sukarno included. Frustration, combined with conviction and diversionary needs thus propelled Indonesian foreign policy to greater and greater extremes.

(e) Responses to International Developments.

However much Indonesian foreign policy was the product of the above factors, it was also a response to international stimuli. These stimuli were of two broad types, one general, the other specific.

As the circumstances of world politics and the
pattern of international conflict changed, thereby changing the international environment in which Indonesia functioned as a sovereign state, the emphases of Indonesian foreign policy changed accordingly. The most obvious examples were the effect on Indonesian foreign policy of the decline in the Moscow-Washington cold war, the virtual disappearance of formal colonialism, the growing gap between the wealth and poverty of the developed and the developing nations and the Peking-Moscow rift. In response, non-alignment and anti-colonialism as principles of Indonesian foreign policy became largely irrelevant and gave way to increasingly militant opposition to imperialism, neo-colonialism and the OLDEFO, as an axis developed with the increasingly militant Peking regime.

In the more limited regional context, Indonesian foreign policy was very greatly affected by the decision to create Malaysia and, more indirectly and less intensely at the operative level, by U.S. policies in Vietnam. The creation of Malaysia, a 'neo-colonialist plot', may merely have provided the pretext for a return to and intensification of an aggressive, assertive and militant foreign policy, but it did serve as the immediate cause of this development and the Indonesian
response, particularly in the light of the circumstances surrounding the birth of the Federation\(^1\), was predictable and consistent with declared Indonesian objectives.

The more specific type of international stimulus to Indonesian foreign policy was the attitude taken by foreign governments towards Indonesian policies and the helpfulness or otherwise of foreign governments' actions. The Indonesian leaders assessed their international friends and enemies largely on the basis of the support given to Indonesia during the struggle for independence, for West Irian and for the destruction of Malaysia. Changing foreign attitudes and actions produced corresponding changes in the Indonesian response\(^2\), but, despite

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\(^1\) Of these circumstances, the most relevant here were the outbreak of the popular anti-Malaysia rebellion in Brunei and British and Malayan provocative behaviour when a negotiated settlement to the dispute seemed likely to succeed after the 1963 Manila conference.

\(^2\) For example, relations with America became cordial following the belated U.S. assistance in the struggles for independence and for West Irian and Netherlands-Indonesian relations improved dramatically once the West Irian dispute was resolved. Conversely, India ceased to be regarded as a friend primarily because of Indian sympathy for Malaysia but also because of Indian opposition to Sukarno's anti-imperialist crusade.
fluctuations in the degree of cordiality between Indonesia and specific nations, relations with the more militant communist and Afro-Asian nations tended to be strengthened as moderate opposition to Indonesia's militant policies increased. Indonesia's changing attitudes to the United Nations reflect a similar type of response, as the United Nations became more conspicuously unsympathetic to Indonesia's policies. Opposition to or criticism of Indonesia tended to produce a hostile reaction.

Such international stimuli as the above thus reinforced the influence of the other foreign policy determinants, promoting the trend towards radicalism and extremism.

(f) Indonesian Expansionism.

Undoubtedly, one factor that, in addition to the above, made Indonesian foreign policy become increasingly aggressive, was a drive that can best be described as Indonesian expansionism¹. This has frequently been

confused with a desire on Sukarno's part, apparently
with widespread domestic support, for territorial
expansion. The evidence for this view rests firstly on
the determined struggle for West Irian. This was not,
however, a case of territorial expansion but one of an
attempt to establish the Republic's sovereignty over
what was considered to be Indonesian territory.

The obvious parallels between the West Irian and
the anti-Malaysia campaigns have led to the view that
the latter represented an Indonesian attempt to extend
Indonesian territory still further, Indonesian protesta-

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tion to the contrary notwithstanding. In support of
this view, the following have usually been cited:

1 See, for example, the statements of 1961 made by
Subandrio and quoted in Brackman, Second Front, p.118.
For the contexts of the two statements made in the
United Nations and quoted in Brackman, see Subandrio,
Indonesia on the March, Vol.2, Department of Foreign
Affairs, Indonesia, 1963, pp.221-227 & 235-237. See
also Sukarno in Reflections, p.19 (1964) and Mohammed
Hatta, 'One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue', in

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This material comes originally from the official
minutes of the meetings of the BPKI, the Investigating
Committee (or Body) for Preparation of Indonesian
Independence which Mohammed Yamin incorporated in his
book Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Jajasan
Prapantja, Djakarta, 1959. The relevant translated
extracts have been printed by the Malaysian Government,
for example, in The Territory of the Indonesian State:
Discussions in the meeting of Badan Penjelidek Usaha
Muhammad Yamin's speech of 31st May, 1945, outlining his Greater Indonesia concept to the Japanese-sponsored Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence, Sukarno's remarks of 11th July, 1945, supporting Yamin's concept before the same Committee and the Committee's decision of the same date defining the extent of Indonesian territory.

There seems little doubt that Yamin dreamed of 'restoration' of Indonesian sovereignty over what was

Yamin's proposal was that the new state should embrace the former Netherlands East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, Portuguese Timor, British Borneo and Papua. See his slightly more detailed summary in Background, p.2.

There appears to have been some confusion in the meeting as to the precise definitions of Indonesian territory on which the meeting was voting. The basic issue was whether Indonesia should consist of the Dutch East Indies or a more extensive area. Subsidiary issues were primarily whether Papua should be included and whether Malaya should be included. Compare the chairman's summaries of the alternatives in Background, pp.28 & 30. To the latter must be added Hatta's intervention on page 31. What is clear from the vote is that the meeting intended to include Malaya and, as summarised by the chairman and endorsed by applause, Papua was also included. See ibid., p.31.
claimed to be the territory of the ancient Srivijaya and Majapahit empires\(^1\). Although Sukarno specifically endorsed Yamin's greater Indonesia concept on 11th July, he seems to have been less firmly committed to it than was Yamin. In a major speech of 1st June, 1945, before the same Committee, Sukarno defined the natural territory of Indonesia as stretching 'from the tip of Sumatra right to Irian'\(^2\), that is, as the territory of the Dutch East Indies. Sukarno subsequently restated this definition categorically at a meeting of 18th August, 1945, of the Preparatory Committee that succeeded the Investigating Committee\(^3\). When on 11th June, Sukarno and others endorsed Yamin's wider territorial proposal, his remarks and those of other speakers indicated a desire not to exclude Malaya rather than a positive desire to include

\(^1\) Soedjatmoko argues, however, that the importance of Yamin's dreams has been exaggerated. See Soedjatmoko, 'II. - Indonesia and the World', in Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No.3, December, 1967, p.290.

\(^2\) See Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila', pp.25-26 of Pantja Sila: Basis of State. It is interesting that this statement was made the day after Yamin's statement.

\(^3\) See Mohammed Yamin, op. cit., p.413, quoting the minutes of the meeting.
it, although the prospect of its inclusion seemed to be attractive. It seems very likely that at this time Sukarno and the Committee were influenced by the drama of the forthcoming acquisition of independence, were anxious not to deprive other neighbouring colonial territories of the opportunity to share in this acquisition and were influenced by the vocal demands of some Malayan groups that Malaya should be included in the new Republic\(^1\). If Sukarno and the nationalist leaders were intent on extending their territory beyond the boundaries of the Dutch East Indies, Sukarno's reversion to these boundaries in his definition of August, 1945 and the acceptance of this reversion is difficult to understand.

Whatever the validity of the evidence dating from 1945, it also seems significant that the emphasis in the Malaysian confrontation was not on territorial

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It is perhaps significant that Sukarno was a little more hesitant at including Papua in the new Republic because, unlike Malaya, there had been no demands from Papuans for inclusion, although he did agree to its inclusion. Even more significant was his specific exclusion of the Philippines, since this was regarded as already independent. (Actually, the Philippines did not become independent until July, 1946.)
claims but on opposition to a Nekolim plot\(^1\). This emphasis may have been a cloak for territorial ambitions, but it seems much more likely that the Indonesian leaders sought to increase Indonesian influence in Malaysia and in the region and that they sought to remove British influence, thereby rendering the Kuala Lumpur regime more amenable to Indonesian views. Maphilindo and, subsequently, ASEAN, represent alternative policies to confrontation and these make much more sense if seen as vehicles for Indonesian hegemony in Southeast Asia rather than as measures to extend Indonesian territory.

The evidence in Sukarno's writings and speeches from his earliest to his last indicates that his ambition was not to rule over a larger territory than modern Indonesia, but that he wished to be accorded the status of a regional leader, a world leader and a revolutionary leader whose exhortations are listened to.

\(^1\) Some of Sukarno's statements and actions during confrontation did indicate a possibility of a reversal to his reasoning of 11th July, 1945, but this is inconclusive. See, for example, the evidence presented in the lengthy footnote on page 124 of Brackman, Second Front. See also Grant, Indonesia, pp.149-150 and Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, pp.86-87.
Similarly his and his supporters' ambitions were for Indonesia to be recognised as a regional, a third world and a world power. The concept of 'merdeka', of Indonesia's being the beacon showing the way to other nations, reflects this notion. Seen in the context of the glory of this historical mission, attempts at territorial expansion would be both unworthy and unnecessary. The self-interest that reinforced Sukarno's and his supporters' missionary zeal was not the aim of acquiring a few more islands, but the aim of removing threats to Indonesia's regional hegemony by destroying hostile neighbouring regimes and by eradicating their backing from foreign powers. In positive terms, the Indonesian revolutionaries wanted respect, influence and power regionally and in world affairs but these were to rest on the recognition of Indonesia's rightful claims to leadership, for which territorial expansion was irrelevant. Indonesia's imperialism and expansionism was ideological and even political, but it was not territorial. Surely, the self-proclaimed experts on neo-colonialism and on the interpretation of history were unlikely to attempt to revive an ancient type of empire.
IV

THE NEW EMERGING FORCES IDEOLOGY

IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:

THE CULMINATION

An account of the verbal and operative aspects of the New Emerging Forces Ideology.
A. TERMINOLOGY

In a discussion of the idealistic aspects of foreign policy and of ideology, particularly an ideology as nebulous as the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces, terminology can present some problems.

For a westerner attempting to understand and evaluate an ideology such as that expounded by Sukarno, perhaps the most obvious pitfall is the temptation to stress the pragmatic rather than the normative aspects of the ideology and, as a result, to regard the ideology as little more than a device used by the leaders for their own political purposes\(^1\). Their terms and slogans are therefore at best suspect and at worst meaningless and insincere emotive noises. If, in the interests of objectivity, one therefore seeks to avoid the use of the ideologues' terminology, there is a considerable risk of loss of verisimilitude, with the result that the ideology appears more hollow and worthless than it is. More

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\(^1\) Benda, in Weatherbee, op. cit., p.iii, refers to this tendency on the part of western students of Southeast Asian affairs. See also Weatherbee's comments on the problem facing the 'nonparticipant in the ideology' in attempting to appreciate the ideologues' views, ibid., p.16.
important, one can fail entirely to obtain insight into the ideologues' values and perception of reality, thereby defeating what is probably the most important purpose of an examination of the ideology.

If, in the interests of verisimilitude, one adopts the terminology and its associated imagery, the danger is that the ideologues' logical lapses and verbal juggling will come to be overlooked and be incorporated into one's own account, with the result that critical judgement is impaired. Alternatively, one can attempt to use the original terminology in a consistent, clear and precise way, thereby avoiding the less honest persuasive tactics of the ideologues. The difficulty in this approach is that one may impose a consistency or a precision lacking in the original ideology, or introduce meanings not intended by its formulators.

The solution adopted in the following account has been that of attempting to use the original terminology, but with as precise and consistent a meaning as possible, whilst coining new derivative terms when these have been

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1 This may operate to the advantage or disadvantage of the ideology, increasing or decreasing the extent to which it is convincing or intellectually respectable.
desirable or necessary. A more precise explanation of the meanings and imagery of NEFO terms is best attempted in the course of detailed exposition of the ideology, but some general clarifications are desirable at this point.

1. THE NEFO THEORY, IDEOLOGY, CONCEPT AND CONCEPTS.

In the literature on Indonesian foreign policy and on the new emerging forces, and in discussion of these subjects, frequent references are made to the 'NEFO Theory', the 'NEFO Ideology' and the 'NEFO concept (or concepts)'. These terms are often used interchangeably. They are in many ways synonymous, but their connotations are somewhat different. It is therefore possible and, for greater clarity in description and analysis, desirable, to distinguish between each of these terms.

The 'concept of the new emerging forces (or the 'NEFO concept') is essentially a vague, all-embracing term that covers the notion that the new emerging forces exist and, by implication, that they may be recognised by certain characteristics and that their existence is of profound importance for world affairs. One could describe the 'NEFO concept' as a type of composite world view. When this term is pluralised (the 'NEFO concepts'), the emphasis is placed not on the total
view but on the individual ideas and propositions of all types that have been brought together to produce the NEFO concept. The term 'NEFO concepts' is thus synonymous with NEFO doctrines, teachings, beliefs and assertions and is most conveniently used when specifications of the type of idea or proposition involved is not necessary.

Given a more formal connotation, the NEFO concept becomes the 'NEFO Ideology' (or the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces'), a term which also refers to the totality of NEFO ideas considered as a whole, but which emphasises that these ideas are part of a more or less organised body of beliefs, teachings, doctrines or assertions. The 'NEFO Theory' is a similarly more formal term that ideally should refer to only part of the NEFO Ideology, namely that part which can be described as a theoretical construct based on the descriptive element in the NEFO Ideology. The NEFO Theory should be distinguished from other elements in the NEFO Ideology and from the ideology as a whole.

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1 See the discussion of the NEFO doctrines as an ideology, pp.635-641 below.
because NEFO writings make this distinction clearly, but because, in an analysis of the ideology, it is at times necessary to refer specifically and unambiguously to the theory as opposed to the other elements in the ideology or as opposed to the ideology as a whole. This type of distinction is particularly important if one is to avoid a major source of vagueness and verbal manipulation in NEFO writings: -- the easy and almost imperceptible transition between the description of what is, the account of what is hoped will be, the advocacy of what should be and the prophecy of what must and hence will be.

2. THE NEFO, THE OLDEFO AND DERIVATIVE TERMS.

There is another terminological problem arising from the absence of a clear and consistent definition of what are the new emerging forces and the old established forces. Sukarno's and other NEFO

1 This is not always so, in which case 'NEFO Theory' and 'NEFO Ideology' are for practical descriptive purposes synonymous.
ideologists' definitions and usages hover between references to nations and non-national entities, such as organizations, unorganised sections of public opinion and even individuals. The term 'the new emerging forces' ('the NEFO') thus embraces both types of entities, national and non-national, that were thought to believe in the NEFO Ideology and/or to support the NEFO cause. The term is roughly synonymous with 'NEFO supporters' and 'NEFO adherents', the former tending to emphasise support for the NEFO cause, the latter, acceptance of the NEFO Ideology.\(^1\) Similarly, the term 'the old established forces' ('the OLDEFO') refers to both national and non-national entities that were said to be opposing the NEFO and is therefore roughly synonymous with 'NEFO opponents' (or 'opponents of the NEFO').

In an analysis of NEFO Ideology, it is occasionally necessary to refer specifically to those nations whose governments were considered to be NEFO supporters. These

\(^1\) There is quite a problem in finding a suitable criterion for determining whether a particular national or non-national entity should be classified as a NEFO, since an absolute basis for determining belief in the NEFO Ideology or support for the NEFO cause was never devised. See pp.658-670 below.
are best termed 'NEFO countries', 'NEFO nations' or 'NEFO states', while their governments may be styled 'NEFO governments'. Similarly, nations ruled by governments allegedly opposed to the advancement of the NEFO are best referred to as 'OLDEFO countries', 'OLDEFO nations' or 'OLDEFO states' and their governments as 'OLDEFO governments'.

The term 'the NEFO' is a collective term, but one emphasising the constituent parts rather than the whole which they constitute. If one wants to refer as a totality to the groups, countries and individuals that allegedly supported the NEFO Ideology and cause, one can use the term 'NEFO camp', which has the connotation of an organised entity engaged in a form of battle. Alternatively and, in most contexts, more appropriately, the term 'NEFO movement' may be used. The latter term has more idealistic connotations, implying a not necessarily highly organised group, but a group nevertheless, united in a common endeavour. The concept of a NEFO movement is analogous to those of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements. Neither of these became

1 It also emphasises the world dichotomy between the NEFO and the OLDEFO postulated by the NEFO Ideology.
effectively organised\textsuperscript{1}, nor were they particularly noted for their unity, despite frequent protestations of solidarity, but both movements did achieve tangible manifestations in the form of conferences and reasonably sustained attempts at diplomatic collaboration. Because Sukarno fell from office before he could effectively promote NEFO solidarity and before he could give the NEFO movement an organisational form\textsuperscript{2}, the NEFO movement was necessarily even more amorphous than the Afro-Asian or non-aligned movements. Nevertheless, the concept and the term are useful as an aid to description and analysis, provided one does not attribute to the NEFO movement greater unity and tangibility than it possessed.

\textsuperscript{1} The AAPSO came close to being an organisational manifestation of the A-A movement, but it was more an off-shoot of the main movement. See pp.503-504 above.

\textsuperscript{2} The GANEFO organization represented an embryonic NEFO organization, but it was concerned primarily with one aspect of NEFO activities, sport. See below, pp.681-685 below.
B. FEATURES OF THE NEFO IDEOLOGY: IN THEORY.

1. THE NEFO DOCTRINES AS AN IDEOLOGY.

(a) The Ideology in General.

The assertion of the existence of the new emerging forces is part of a body of ideas, beliefs or doctrines about the nature of world affairs. This body of ideas presents a view of the world, an explanation of the nature and causes of international conflicts and tensions, a basis for considering these conflicts and tensions as part of one broad tendency, a method of classifying the contestants and a call for action on the part of those who, in this world contest, are on the same side as Indonesia. Viewed as a totality, these beliefs constitute the NEFO Ideology, an ideology containing elements of description, of aspirations, of advocacy and of prophecy.

(b) The Element of Description and the New Emerging Forces Theory.

The descriptive element, component or theme in this ideology purports to describe the pattern of world affairs. In this sense, the ideology deals with what actually is. The descriptive component is formalised in a
revolutionary\textsuperscript{1} conflict theory of international relations, a theory that identifies the determining factor, and thus the fundamental trend, in world affairs\textsuperscript{2}. This theory, which is here called the NEFO Theory\textsuperscript{3}, is the basis of the ideology.

NEFO adherents would argue that the theory is realistic, firmly based on and verified by objective observations of world events. In this sense, the theory is scientific in NEFO eyes. The 'objective' observations, however, have been made by people who look at the world from a particular viewpoint, the NEFO viewpoint, which is broadly that of the poorer, economically less developed, and, in the world context, politically less powerful countries. NEFO adherents do not consider world affairs with the same pre-conceptions and attitudes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} i.e., 'revolutionary' in the sense of advocating revolution or radical transformation rather than in the sense of constituting a new theory, fundamentally different from preceding theories.
\item \textsuperscript{2} See Modelski (ed.), op. cit., pp.ii-iii.
\item \textsuperscript{3} I have chosen to use the term 'NEFO Theory' rather than 'NEFO Hypothesis' on the grounds that the term is frequently used in discussions of NEFO thought and that, to the NEFO Ideology's adherents at least, the hypothesis of the existence and significance of the NEFO has been verified.
\end{itemize}
as do the spokesmen for the richer, more developed and more powerful countries. The phenomena observed, international events, must each be interpreted. In these interpretations, and, even more so, in the conclusions about long-term trends constructed from these interpretations, pre-suppositions and other subjective elements are bound to intrude. The NEFO Theory is therefore more a statement of convictions, influenced by NEFO aspirations and the NEFO viewpoint, than a scientific, detached and purely analytical theory, although it is frequently expressed in analytical terms. The formulators and propagators were concerned with understanding and, having understood, with explaining, the way in which international politics work, so that they and their allies could better promote the interests of the new emerging forces.

(c) The Element expressing Aspirations.

The NEFO Ideology can also be regarded as a proclamation of the hopes, aspirations, ambitions and ideals of the NEFO adherents. In this respect, the ideology is an expression not of what is but of what the NEFO supporters hope will be. Basically, the NEFO aspirations amount to the desire for
a greater influence in world affairs and a greater share in the world's wealth.

(d) The Element of Advocacy.

To the NEFO adherents, the obstacle to the fulfillment of NEFO aspirations is the present world order which serves vested interests opposed to the self-realization of the new emerging forces. The NEFO Ideology asserts that this situation is unjust. As the alternative, the ideology puts forward the NEFO Ideal, the ideal of the new world order based on genuine as distinct from nominal equality among nations and devoid of exploitation of nation by nation. In such a world order, the new emerging forces could take their rightful place and could therefore work unfettered for the fulfilment of their hopes. This ideal is advocated not merely as an aspiration, from the realization of which the NEFO would benefit\(^1\), but as a proposal for change that ought to be

\(^1\) There is also an element of altruism combined with enlightened self-interest in the proposal for the creation of a new world order, since a new order that accords with the NEFO Ideal, would produce world peace by removing what is considered to be the major source of tension, the struggle between the NEFO and the OLDEFO or between the exploited and the exploiters. It is in the interests of all, NEFO and OLDEFO alike, to remove the threat of war.
brought about in the interests of justice. This element of advocacy in the ideology is thus an attempt to provide a transition from the realm of what NEFO supporters hope will be to the realm of what, on disinterested moral grounds, should be.

The NEFO Ideology also suggests the means to bring about the transformation of the present world order into an order that accords both with NEFO aspirations and with justice. This is provided in the call to join the NEFO cause or struggle to build the world anew. What is advocated here is solidarity amongst the new emerging forces, unity in a NEFO stand against the manipulators of the existing world order and against the order as such. NEFO solidarity is advocated both as an immediate objective, of worth in itself, and as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of a just international society. The fact that the call for solidarity was necessary indicates that, in this respect, the ideology is prescribing or advocating what should be rather than describing what is. The essential unity of purpose of the new emerging forces is, however, asserted as a fact, as is the gradual, if unconscious trend towards NEFO solidarity. The element of advocacy in the ideology is an endeavour to accelerate this trend by making the new emerging
forces and their leaders more aware both of their essential unity of purpose and of their urgent need to work consciously for solidarity in their policies. The element of description of what is and the element of advocacy of what should be is thus merged into a description of what is in the process of becoming.

(e) **The Element of Prophecy.**

The prophetic element in the NEFO Ideology is contained in the promise of victory for the new emerging forces. NEFO solidarity and ultimate NEFO victory are believed to be inevitable, although not without effort on the part of the NEFO\(^1\). This belief is asserted as a fact, plain to all who see the inexorable march and irresistible trend of history. The new emerging forces must come to see the advantages of solidarity. Mankind, not yet able to understand and appreciate the NEFO viewpoint, must ultimately be won over by the justice of the NEFO cause. NEFO solidarity must therefore become an irresistible force in world affairs, rendering the new

\(^1\) The prophecy of victory for the NEFO is similar to that of victory for the Indonesian revolutionaries in their struggle for independence. See the discussion of 'Revolutionary Leadership and Victory', pp.116-128 above, especially pp.127-128.
world order envisaged by the NEFO Ideal unavoidable. Herein lies the transition from what should be to what must and hence will be. In this guarantee of victory lies the ideology's challenge to the new emerging forces and their sympathisers to unite, as does the challenge to their enemies to abandon the lost cause of attempting to sustain a world order that is doomed to destruction.

(f) The Significance of the NEFO Ideology.

Although the NEFO Theory and the descriptive ideas that follow from it have not been and probably never will be capable of scientific verification, the NEFO Ideology that is based on these descriptive elements represents an important expression of a type of world view held by the dispossessed. It acknowledges the existence of the gap between rich and poor in the world context and gives both an explanation for the continuance of this gap and a remedy, in terms acceptable to many of those who see the world from the position of the have-nots. For a brief period, it provided for some developing countries, and for some groups in OLDEFO countries, a source of inspiration for action and hope for a brighter future. Faced with depressing realities, the NEFO adherents saw in the NEFO Ideology a vision of a better world and a
chance for more promising prospects. The NEFO Ideology may yet again provide inspiration and hope for the dispossessed.

2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEFO IDEOLOGY.

The NEFO Ideology evolved in much the same way as did the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution. Indeed, its evolution may be regarded as initially part of the development of the general ideology. Even by the time it had acquired a distinctive form of its own, its development still paralleled that of the Ideology of the Revolution, affecting and being affected by the general ideological developments. As a result, the NEFO Ideology, although in some respects more precise than the Ideology of the Revolution, still possesses much of the elusiveness of its parent ideology and lack definitive and complete expositions. The cumulative expla-
ations and elaborations have exhibited the same type of quality of subsuming previous formulations, thereby, like the elaborations of the Ideology of the Revolution, retaining an element of continuity that has balanced the elements of change as the ideology has developed. There have, however, been a number of important changes, primarily in emphasis, but also one acknowledged rejection of part of the early formulations of the NEFO Theory. This was a brief deviation from a bipolar view of the world. Before examining these changes, a brief note is necessary on the identification of the Ideology's chief exponent.

(a) Sukarno's Importance in the Formulation of the NEFO Ideology.

Sukarno is widely regarded in Indonesia as the major formulator of the NEFO Ideology and quite rightly so. It was primarily Sukarno who made the major formal and specifically NEFO pronouncements. This is not to assert that Sukarno's NEFO doctrines were especially original or unique or that they were without non-
Sukarnian precedents\textsuperscript{1}. Neither is it to deny that Sukarno was influenced by other thinkers and writers, particularly Marxists, and by individuals who surrounded him politically. Part of Sukarno's 'genius' was his ability to combine and integrate other peoples' ideas to produce a set of doctrines apparently relevant to prevailing needs and acceptable to large segments of the Indonesian people. Pantja Sila provides a good example of this ability\textsuperscript{2}. Other Indonesian leaders, notably Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh, Roeslan Abdulgani, Aidit and even Nasution also made statements on NEFO Ideology, but these were basically repetitions and occasionally

\textsuperscript{1}
For example, an important element in the NEFO Ideology, the division of the world into two camps, the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', was specifically and quite fully elaborated long before Sukarno's formal NEFO emphasis on this aspect of world problems. See, for example, J. Mattern, Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1942, especially the Preface, pp.7-8, Chapter IX, pp.118 ff and the Epilogue, pp.131-132.

\textsuperscript{2}
See pp.132-133 above. The fact that, as van der Kroef points out, Mohammed Yamin may have been the real originator of Pantja Sila, does not appreciably detract from Sukarno's important role in creating Pantja Sila, the State Ideology, since it was Sukarno who put the principles forward in a way that gained virtually universal acceptance. See van der Kroef's comment on Sukarno's role in creating Pantja Sila, in J.M. van der Kroef, 'Sukarno, The Ideologue: A Review Article', in Pacific Affairs, Vol.41, No.2, Summer, 1968, p.245, footnote 4.
elaborations of the broad concepts enunciated by Sukarno. When statements by other leaders are particularly important or provide a useful insight into NEFO doctrines, these are referred to below, but the emphasis in the following account of the evolution of the NEFO Ideology is on the development of NEFO concepts in Sukarno's writings and speeches.

(b) NEFO Origins in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution.

The origins and foundations of the NEFO Ideology, so far as Sukarno's thought it concerned, may be traced back to his pre-independence writings\(^1\). Thus, for example, the principles of socio-nationalism and socio-democracy, which, in Pantja Sila, became the principles of nationalism, internationalism and social justice, provided the basis for Sukarno's vision of the type of world order that would replace the OLDEFO-dominated order. Marhaenism adapted the Marxist concept of the proletariat to the Indonesian environment, essentially expanding the concept and placing a heavier emphasis on the poor, the dispossessed and the oppressed rather than

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\(^1\) See Chapter II above, especially pp.79-127 & 184-187.
the working class. Subsequently universalised, the Marhaen became the notion of the common man, particularly, though not exclusively, the common man of the colonial and former colonial world, again emphasising the unity of the poor, the dispossessed and the oppressed, but in a world context. No new term was coined for this universal Marhaen, but it is one of the concepts implied in the term 'the new emerging forces'. The transition is also implied in the later emphasis on the Indonesian Revolution's speaking with a 'universal voice' and being 'congruent with the Social Conscience of Man'. An unnamed concept thus became, through the universalization of the Indonesian Revolution and through the NEFO Ideology, an international alternative to proletarianism and, incidentally, provided the basis for the extension of Sukarno's claim, to be the 'mouthpiece' of the Indonesian people, to the wider claim of speaking on behalf of the world's dispossessed. Similarly, the

1 See pp.203-204 above.
2 This development was not unprecedented. As early as 1928 Sukarno spoke of his fellow members of the Indonesian nationalist movement as being 'servants of Asia, servants of all the suffering peoples, servants of the world'. See Sukarno, *Bendera I*, p.76.
principles of non-cooperation, power-forming and mass action, the notion of the vanguard party and Sukarno's views on revolutionary leadership and victory were the predecessors of the international NEFO methods of confrontation and of Sukarno's attempts to create NEFO solidarity under Indonesian leadership to oppose the OLDEFO in their attempts to maintain their domination of world affairs.

Although these concepts in the pre-independence formulations of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution were primarily couched in terms reflecting a domestic preoccupation with Indonesian problems, they did indicate an awareness of the link between the Indonesian struggle and a vaguer and, at that time, indistinctly defined world struggle. This was most apparent in the doctrine of the antithesis, in the recurring reminder to the Indonesian revolutionaries that they must employ international as well as national means to achieve their ends and in the specific call for an alliance of nations based essentially on opposition to imperialism, but, in positive terms, with a basis not clearly specified. The international aspects of Sukarno's early ideas later
came into prominence\(^1\) as increasing attention was given to the Revolution of Mankind or the World Revolution and as the more specifically NEFO doctrines were enunciated.

Sukarno's early writings, like the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution which they began to construct, reflected the blend of traditional Indonesian ideas and modern social and political thought\(^2\). The ideological concepts that provided the foundations for the later, more distinctly NEFO doctrines also reflected these influences, more especially the influence of Marxism and particularly the influence of Lenin's doctrines on imperialism\(^3\). This type of influence, with the subsequent addition of Maoism, became more pronounced as

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2. See pp.62-64 above.
the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and the NEFO Ideology developed and as Indonesia became increasingly radical at home and abroad after 1959. Communist influence in Indonesian radical thought should not, however, be exaggerated. The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and the NEFO Ideology were not simply restatements of or borrowings from Marx or Lenin¹ (or, in the case of NEFO Ideology from Mao or Lin Piao).

It is not practical in the space available to attempt to trace specific origins of NEFO Ideology beyond the blend of concepts to be found in Sukarno's early thought. That Sukarno drew on other people's ideas and on non-Indonesian sources is acknowledged, but what is more relevant to this enquiry is the Indonesian and Sukarnian slant given to the blend of Indonesian and foreign ideas and the application of this blend to

¹ MacPherson's comment that the anti-colonial nationalist and revolutionary ideologies of the developing world 'are not formed entirely from either Marxist or liberal-democratic ideologies' is relevant in the Indonesian case. See C.B. MacPherson, 'Revolution and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century', in C.J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos VIII Revolution, p.139. See also the elaboration of the argument that the revolutionary ideologies of the new nations have drawn on sources which predate Marxism and western liberalism and from which these two opposing ideological traditions are also derived, ibid., pp.143-150.
Indonesian problems at home and abroad. One early communist statement on world affairs, dating from 1928, is, however, worthy of special mention, since it comes remarkably close to anticipating both the Lin Piao Doctrine and the central theme of NEFO Ideology.

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1 The Lin Piao Doctrine was an application of Mao Tsetung's theories of people's war to the international context and, in particular, to the situation of the underdeveloped world. As the NEFO Ideology sought to universalize Indonesian experience, so the Lin Piao Doctrine sought to universalize Communist Chinese experience, each asserting the relevance of the respective experience for the new state. Lin Piao put forward his doctrine in an article entitled 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!', in the Peking Review, Vol.8, No.36, September 3, 1965, pp.9-30, especially p.24. This doctrine echoed the analogy that Aidit had drawn in 1964 when he pointed out that 'Asia, Africa and Latin America are the village of the world, while Europe and North America are the town ...' D.N. Aidit, Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat! Eng. ed., Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1964, p.87, quoted in Peng Chen, 'Speech at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences in Indonesia', Peking Review, Vol.8, No.24, June 11, 1965, p.11. As Clark points out, however, the analogy dates at least from 1928 and Lin Piao in his article was merely repeating 'in a slightly different form the Chinese concept of world communist priorities which had already been the subject of debate with the Soviets for many years'. See G. Clark, In Fear of China, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1967, pp.176 & 119.

2 The strategic import of this statement is, however, the inverse to that of NEFO Ideology, since the latter aimed at absorbing socialist countries in the NEFO camp rather than the NEFO countries in the socialist camp. NEFO Ideology, in other words, envisaged Indonesian leadership of the 'progressive' camp, whereas the 1928 statement envisaged Soviet leadership.
Colonies and semi-colonies ... represent the world rural district in relation to the industrial countries, which represent the world city. Consequently the problem of organizing socialist world economy, of properly combining industry with agriculture is, to a large extent, the problem of the relation towards the former colonies of imperialism...

In view of the existence of centres of socialism represented by Soviet Republics of growing economic power, the colonies which break away from imperialism economically gravitate towards and gradually combine with the industrial centres of world socialism... Every assistance [must] be rendered to the economic, political and cultural growth of the formerly oppressed 'territories', 'dominions' and 'colonies', with the object of transferring them to socialist lines1.

(c) Changing Views of the World.

In the pre-independence doctrines of the great antithesis2, Sukarno adopted a bipolar view of the world. He saw this antithesis as taking different forms at different times, but always it was seen as consisting of a conflict between two groups, basically an 'upper' group and a 'lower' group, of which the colonised and colonisers were at the time the most immediately

2 See Chapter II, pp.103-111 above.
relevant manifestation for Indonesia. By the time of the 1955 Bandung Afro-Asian conference, however, Sukarno's vision of the antithesis in world affairs was becoming obscured by the effect of the cold war and by the threat that it might escalate into a hot, nuclear war. Sukarno's opening speech at this conference reflected the transition that was occurring in his thought to a tripolar vision of the world, not yet formulated as such, but anticipated in the concept that Afro-Asian unity, previously seen primarily as solidarity against colonialism, could 'inject the voice of reason into world affairs'. This was essentially a proposal for Afro-Asia to perform a mediatory role in lessening world tensions. Anti-colonialism was not abandoned as an important field of endeavour to Afro-Asia, nor was the assertion of the right of the new nations to a say in regional and world affairs, but an emphasis was placed on the hope that, through their example of tolerance, reason, co-operation and understanding, the Afro-Asian nations and the Bandung conference in particular might

1 For the text of the speech, see Sel. Docs., pp.9-28.
2 Ibid., p.19.
'give guidance to mankind'.

The tripolar world view was consciously adopted in 1958, largely as a reaction to Bertrand Russell's assertion in 1957 that the world was divided by the contest between the followers of the ideologies based on the American Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto, i.e., between the western world, led by the United States, and the communist world. In his contribution to the correspondence that followed Russell's call for an easing of cold war tensions, Sukarno reasserted more forcefully the right of the new nations, particularly of Asia, to be heard on world affairs. In his subsequent 1958 Independence Day address, this was developed into the definite assertion that, in addition to the force of the American Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto, there was a 'third potential', the 'nationalism of the Eastern

1 Ibid., pp.25-27.

world, ... which is anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. This assertion was elaborated in subsequent speeches, the most important being that to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960. In that speech, Sukarno repeated the Afro-Asian demand to be heard on world affairs and asserted more emphatically that Afro-Asian nations had an approach to world problems, independent of that of the west or of the communist bloc and more capable of bringing about world peace than the power politics approaches of the major powers. In particular, as an example of an alternative approach, Sukarno put forward Pantja Sila as an ideology that provides a synthesis of the two conflicting world ideologies. In this respect and in others Sukarno

1 See the quotation from Sukarno's 17/8/1958 speech in Indonesia Volume IV: Looking Back Over 1964, p.19.


4 e.g., his call for disarmament, for an end to nuclear testing and for a renewed summit between Kruscher and Eisenhower.
was speaking as a representative of the third world, rather than as a protagonist in a two-sided conflict. Yet, it was also in this speech that the essential concepts of the NEFO Ideology were enunciated, particularly the identification of colonialism and imperialism as the major sources of world tension, the emphasis on the need to eradicate these phenomena, the claim that victory for the anti-imperialist forces was inevitable and the call to the United Nations to help to build the world anew.

At Belgrade, in September, 1961, it became clear that Sukarno was reverting to his bipolar world view, because of his insistence that the clash between the 'new emergent forces' and the 'old forces of domination' was more important than that between Moscow and Washington. Although this latter clash was still recognised, Sukarno argued that the Afro-Asian role of mediation in the cold war was less important than that of uniting to eradicate colonialism and imperialism in all their forms. In

1 Because of this insistence, one can argue that Sukarno's older concept of the great antithesis was not totally abandoned.
April, 1963, the implications in the Belgrade speech were made explicit in the formal rejection of the tripolar view. Mankind, Sukarno asserted, 'is divided into two communities: the community of the Old Established Forces and the community of the New Emerging Forces!'

This was the position that Sukarno continued to adopt for the remainder of his rule over Indonesia and it became a central part of the NEFO Theory. The effect of the adoption of this view became apparent at the Cairo non-aligned conference in October, 1964, when the Indonesian rejection of non-alignment and of peaceful co-existence, at least in the context of the NEFO-OLDEFO clash, was made more explicit.

In terms of the Revolution of Mankind and the evolution of history, the adoption of this view of the world as part of the NEFO Theory meant that, for Sukarno, the great antithesis that takes various forms at various times had, in the mid-twentieth century, taken the form

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1 See Sukarno's address to the Preparatory Conference for the GANEFO, in The Birth of GANEFO, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1963, pp.7-13.

2 See above, pp.550-552.
of the NEFO/OLDEFO struggle. The furtherance of the World Revolution and conduct that accorded with the evolutionary trend of history thus required NEFO collaboration to overthrow the OLDEFO. The type of world that would result from a NEFO victory was not very clearly spelled out. The most noticeable feature of the new world would, however, be that it would be devoid of exploitation of nation by nation in much the same way as the ultimate Indonesian society would be devoid of exploitation of man by man. The new world order would, in other words, be a universalized form of a Pantja Sila society. At times one has the impression that the product of the NEFO/OLDEFO antithesis would be a synthesis in much the same way as Pantja Sila was regarded as a synthesis of the Communist Manifesto and the American Declaration of Independence. One also has the impression that, being the ultimate revolution and,

1 Sukarno actually argued in retrospect that the NEFO/OLDEFO struggle had already emerged by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. See, for example, the quotation from his speech of September, 1963, to officials preparing for the GANEFO sports, in Indonesia Vol. IV: Looking Back Over 1964, p.21.

2 See, for example, Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/1960), in Sel. Docs., pp.61-76.
being in the forefront of the Revolution of Mankind, the Indonesian Revolution, once completed in its national and international aspects\(^1\), would result in a perpetual state of peace and harmony\(^2\). Sukarno's view that history is a constant evolutionary process\(^3\), moving from thesis/antithesis to synthesis, presumably would mean that, following the creation of the new world, a new antithesis would emerge to oppose the new synthesis. Sukarno does not appear to have looked that far ahead, since the immediate task of organising NEFO solidarity in order to depose the OLDEFO was urgent and absorbing. His self-appointed historical task was that of leading the NEFO to victory.

(d) **The Definition of the NEFO and the OLDEFO.**

The NEFO Ideology and the NEFO Theory that divides

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1 That is, once it has produced the 'just and prosperous society' in Indonesia and the world.


3 See the discussion of 'Dialectics and Historical Materialism', pp.99-103 above.
the world into the NEFO and OLDEFO camps represents an attempt to provide a formulation that is both more specific or precise and more all-embracing than Sukarno's previous formulations of the major struggle and the contestants in world history. Thus, the term 'new emerging forces' subsumes the various progressive groups described previously in Sukarno's expositions of the antithesis in the world, while the term 'old established forces' embraces all their counterparts. The aims, however, of providing a clear basis for distinguishing the contestants in the world struggle and of making both categories as widely based as possible are contradictory, since there are numerous sources of disagreement domestically and internationally and the conflicting groups do not form alliances that are the same for all issues. The result is that, as the characteristics of each camp are defined more precisely, less countries and groups qualify for inclusion.

At first glance, the terms 'new emerging forces' and 'old established forces' give the impression of being more specific and certainly more impressive than

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1 See pp.103-107 above. See also the summary of the basis for Sukarno's pre-independence concept of an 'alliance of nations', pp.184-186 above.
the older terms, the former implying an emphasis on recent emergence from colonial rule, on dynamic dedication to change and on being the forces of the future, the latter having corresponding but opposite implications. When one examines the many definitions of the NEFO and the OLDEFO, however, one finds that, like so many other often repeated definitions and elaborations of Indonesian concepts, the specifics differ. While the definitions are not necessarily contradictory\(^1\), the variations do obscure the essential qualities of each category, rendering a precise identification of the distinguishing features of the two opposing groups difficult if not impossible.

In his Belgrade speech, when the NEFO and OLDEFO camps were first clearly identified\(^2\), Sukarno referred to 'the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination, the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its lifeblood, the other

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1 They are certainly not seen to be so by NEFO supporters.
2 This identification was not, however, in the subsequent NEFO terminology, nor was it as yet an identification that was part of a purely bipolar view of the world.
striving desperately to retain all it can, trying to hold back the force of history. Renamed the 'new emerging forces', the former group was subsequently defined primarily in terms of aspirations and an attitude or ideological position that cuts across national and geographic boundaries. Thus, the 'new emerging forces' was depicted as a term referring to:

... the community of peoples, who want to be free, who want to be independent, who want to be not exploited, who want to be not dominated by other peoples, who want to be of a new world of ... to have a new world of ... prosperity, who want to be standing on own (sic) identity, who want to live up to the idea of ... THE FREEDOM TO BE FREE!

At its most inclusive, the NEFO group was seen to embrace 'all the New Forces in the world which are fighting and struggling, working for a new world. Because they are not content with the present kind of world',

or, more simply, 'all forces which seek a new world, which seek the fall of the old world'. These forces could be summed up as consisting of 'the forces for freedom, the forces for justice, the forces against colonialism, the forces against imperialism, the forces against exploitation, the forces against capitalism'.

The OLDEFO were seen to consist of the opposing forces, i.e., 'the forces of capitalism, of colonialism, the forces of imperialism, the forces of feudalism'. This type of definition came closest to describing the essential quality of NEFO-ism. In more colourful language, the minimum requirement for classification as a NEFO was the following:

... if within your breast there burns the fire of the desire to transform this world into a new world that has no imperialism, that has no colonialism, that has no capitalism, you belong to the group of the New Emerging Forces.

On the above type of definition, the NEFO/OLDEFO conflict was seen as 'a conflict of social forces rather

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2 Loc. cit.
3 Loc. cit. Compare this distinction with that made by Sukarno in The Birth of GANEFO, p.9.
than a conflict of nations'. This was not, however, the total picture, since another type of explanation of the NEFO was also common, one that, with minor qualifications, defined the two contesting groups by reference to national or geographic entities. Thus, the NEFO were also seen to consist of 'all the peoples of Asia, of Africa, of Latin America, of the Socialist countries', or, in more specifically national terms and with an extension to cover the western world, as 'the forces that encompass the trinity of the socialist states, the newly independent states and the progressive forces within the capitalist states'. NEFO countries were thus the socialist states and the nations of Afro-Asia and Latin America; western countries were the OLDEFO nations. This classification did not, however, preclude the acknowledgement that OLDEFO groups may be found in NEFO countries, just as NEFO groups were seen to exist in

1. Ibid., p.13.
OLDEFO countries. As a result, the NEFO/OLDEFO contest was seen to be occurring simultaneously within all nations at the same time as it was occurring in the world arena.

Combined, the above two types of definition become:

The New Emerging Forces is a mighty force that consists of the progressive nations and groups that want to build a New World full of justice and friendship between the nations, a New World that is full of peace and prosperity, -- a New World without imperialism and colonialism and exploitation de l'homme par l'homme et de nation par nation.

The New Emerging Forces is composed of the oppressed nations and the progressive nations. The New Emerging Forces is composed of the Asian nations, the African nations, the Latin American nations, the nations of the Socialist countries, the progressive groups in the capitalist countries. The New Emerging Forces consists of at least 2,000,000,000 people on this earth!

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1 See, for example, Subandrio's statement of December 2, 1963, to the All-China Journalists Delegation visiting Djakarta, quoted in Weatherbee, op. cit., p.70. See also Sukarno's statement on this point in his inaugural address to the April 1964 preparatory meeting for the second Afro-Asian conference, in A-A preparatory Meeting 1964, pp.33-34.

2 See, for example, Indonesia Vol.IV: Looking Back Over 1964, p.13. For an elaboration of this view, compressing Sukarno's more lengthy and piecemeal expositions, see ibid., pp.16-18.

This is a typical and all-inclusive description of the NEFO. Explicitly, and through the implications of its terminology, it incorporates most if not all of what Sukarno and his supporters considered to be the distinguishing marks of the NEFO. It appears to provide a type of check-list that can be used to determine whether a particular country or group qualifies as a NEFO, but the additional specifications serve not to clarify but to obscure the basis for identification of the NEFO. Weatherbee, who also quotes the above description, points out quite correctly that the controlling word in the statement is 'progressive'. Its implication is that the NEFO are the countries that desire a change in the world order, while the OLDEFO desire to perpetuate the status quo. The further implication is that there is a NEFO commitment to radicalism and, in particular, a commitment

1 For example, the term 'oppressed' is taken to indicate not merely political oppression characteristic of colonialism, but also the more indirect type of suffering caused by cultural and economic imperialism and neocolonialism. This term, together with the expressed desires for world prosperity and for the eradication of exploitation implies that the NEFO are being kept relatively poor in comparison with and by the OLDEFO.

2 See Weatherbee, op. cit., p.69. He quotes from a slightly shorter version of the above statement which omits the reference to 'oppressed' nations.
to oppose colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and capitalism\(^1\). The above elaborate definition is thus reducible to the type of definition that identifies attitudes rather than national groupings. Indeed, the NEFO camp is basically the same group as that envisaged in Sukarno's pre-independence concept of the 'alliance of nations'\(^2\), essentially a radical, anti-imperialist alliance. The new concept of the new emerging forces, despite its symbolic appeal, neither extended the camp of Indonesia's allies, nor did it identify the members of this camp more precisely.

The classification of Afro-Asian, Latin American and socialist countries as members of the NEFO community appears to provide a specific identification of that community and concrete evidence of its existence, but, when considered with the proposition that the 'New Emerging Forces is composed of the oppressed nations and the progressive nations', anomalies become apparent. All

\(^1\) Weatherbee goes so far as to argue that General Nasution may have provided the best definition of the NEFO in the statement that, 'Any revolutionary forces which are fighting against NEKOLIM are our comrades'. See loc. cit. While this statement may not provide the 'best' definition of the NEFO, it is remarkably close to the central point of NEFO-ness.

\(^2\) See Chapter II, pp.184-187 above.
Afro-Asian, Latin American and socialist countries are not oppressed and progressive. The specification of the above countries as NEFO does not, therefore, provide a more detailed description of the NEFO community but rather represents an example of the transition from definition and description to advocacy, moralising and, perhaps, wishful thinking. At the time of the enunciation of the NEFO Ideology, a case could be made for the essential NEFO proposition that there are individuals, groups and even some nations which are NEFO in the sense of desiring the type of world transformation advocated by Sukarno. It was even possible to argue that the peoples of the above countries share the NEFO aspirations and therefore are members of the NEFO community. It could not, however, be asserted as a fact that the Asian, African, Latin American and socialist countries as countries were new emerging forces, since their governments were not all 'progressive' and NEFO-oriented. The implication was, of course, that these governments ought to associate themselves with the NEFO cause and that, in advocating this, Sukarno was acting as the mouthpiece for the peoples of these countries.

The attachment to ideals for a better world and the concept of 'progressiveness' similarly fail to specify
the criterion for admission to the NEFO community, since both are capable of widely differing interpretations. This vagueness was in part the product of the attempt to be inclusive rather than exclusive in identifying the NEFO and in part reflected Sukarno's desire to attract support for the NEFO cause from as wide a selection of nations and groups as possible. Even the statement of qualifications for admission to GANEFO I\(^1\) failed to

\(^1\) i.e., the first Games of the New Emerging Forces, held in Djakarta in November 1963. The preparatory conference for these games largely avoided the issue by listing the same type of vague criteria as those above and by providing for admission of those countries and groups that applied to take part in the games. See *The Birth of GANEFO*, p.35. The subsequent GANEFO Charter was no more specific, except in that the participants in GANEFO I were declared to be members of GANEFO unless they officially declared themselves not to be. See *GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces): Its Principles, Purposes and Organization*, Special Issue, Permanent Secretariat of the GANEFO Federation, April, 1965, pp.31-33. The twelve participants in the 1963 preparatory conference for the first GANEFO were also given the status of 'Pioneer Members of GANEFO', ibid., p.33. These countries were thus seen to constitute the core of the NEFO while the list of countries and groups that were invited to attend GANEFO I and that accepted provides a de facto list of the members of the NEFO community, as does the list of those countries and groups that participated in the GANEFO Congress of November 1963 and that joined the GANEFO Federation. For the list of participants in the April 1963 preparatory conference, see *The Birth of GANEFO*, p.3; for a list of the 43 countries' teams that participated in GANEFO I, see Modelski (ed.), op. cit., p.92, quoting the Djakarta Daily Mail, November 6, 1963; for the list of 52 delegations to the GANEFO
provide a clear and specific criterion for testing the credentials of applicants. The result of this vagueness was that Sukarno and his government could adopt an ambivalent attitude towards particular countries, arbitrarily classifying them as NEFO or OLDEFO primarily on the basis of the degree of support indicated for Indonesian policies. This ambivalence was noticeable, for example, in Indonesian attitudes towards the Soviet Union and more strikingly, in attitudes towards India\footnote{The Soviet Union was originally declared to be a NEFO. See, for example, Pauker's reference to Sukarno's speech of 21/3/62, in Pauker, 'The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia', in Foreign Affairs, Vol.40, No.4, July, 1962, p.613. As Djakarta became more militant and more closely associated with Peking the Soviet's status in the NEFO classification became more doubtful. India was more explicitly attacked as an OLDEFO, primarily because of growing differences over peaceful co-existence and the relative importance of non-alignment and anti-imperialism and, more importantly, because of Indian sympathy for Malaysia. See Weatherbee, op. cit., p.70 and the Far Eastern Economic Review 1966 Yearbook, p.184.}. Sukarno's assumption appears to have been that Indonesia was the prototype NEFO and that other new emerging forces should exhibit the same qualities and attitudes as Indonesia. As Indonesian militancy increased, the Indonesian interpretation of 'progressive' became more

extreme. As a result, despite the allegedly wide national membership of the NEFO community, the range of unmistakably NEFO countries narrowed until, in 1965, the only certain NEFO countries were those mentioned by Sukarno when he announced the development of the Djakarta-Pnom-Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang anti-imperialist axis\(^1\). This axis was not intended to exclude other nations from the NEFO community, but it did constitute the core of the NEFO camp.

\(\text{\textbf{(e) The Development of a distinctive NEFO Ideology.}}\)

Although, as has been argued above, the NEFO concept was derived from the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, there was a point at which the NEFO concept began to develop into a distinctive ideology, not completely divorced from the more general Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, but distinctive nevertheless. This development was part of a continuous process of evolution and any point selected as the starting point of the NEFO Ideology's separate existence is, of necessity, arbitrary.

\(^1\) Even amongst these, Cambodia was a doubtful member of the NEFO, given Sihanouk's lack of enthusiasm for the so-called axis.
One can, however, identify 1960, 1961, 1963 and 1964 as major points in the Ideology's development.

Modelski, in his collection of documents on the NEFO\(^1\), includes Sukarno's 1960 U.N. speech, since he regards it, quite correctly, as setting out the basic elements of the NEFO Ideology. Weatherbee, on the other hand, regards Sukarno's 1961 Belgrade speech as the first major exposition of the NEFO Theory\(^2\). Since, in this speech, the struggle between the 'new emergent forces' and the 'old forces of domination' was given definite priority as the major source of world conflict, Weatherbee's assertion is correct; although the specific adoption of an exclusively bipolar world view and the rejection of the third world concept for the new nations came later, most explicitly in his April, 1963, speech to the preparatory GANEFO conference. It was also on his return from Belgrade that Sukarno coined the terms 'new emerging forces' and 'old established forces'\(^3\). In

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1 Modelski (ed.), op. cit.
2 Weatherbee, op. cit., p.59.
3 Bunnell, op. cit., p.57, mentions that, partly as a result of Sukarno's coining of these terms on his return from the Belgrade conference, Indonesian officials tend to regard Belgrade as 'a milestone in the development of Indonesia's foreign policy under Guided Democracy.'
October, 1964, the repercussions of the adoption of the bipolar view were made clear when, at the Cairo non-aligned conference, Sukarno rejected non-alignment in the cold war as being no longer relevant for the developing nations and also rejected peaceful co-existence between the NEFO and the OLDEFO as being impossible, given the power of the OLDEFO in the present world order. For Sukarno, confrontation\(^1\) and militancy thus became increasingly the keynote of NEFO attitudes towards the OLDEFO.

\((f)\) Related Developments in Indonesian Ideology.

Under Sukarno's leadership and especially after 1959, Indonesia was an avowedly revolutionary nation, engaged in furthering both the domestic and the international aspects of the Indonesian Revolution. As Sukarno's NEFO concepts were developing, there was a parallel development of his concept of the World Revol-

\(^1\) Confrontation did not necessarily mean the type of activity involved in the Malaysia campaign. The type of confrontation in which the NEFO were necessarily involved was more abstract and covered a wide variety of attitudes and activities, particularly attitudes. See, for example, Sukarno's explanation of the meaning of 'confrontation' in the context of revolutionary struggle, Sukarno, 'The Forceful Echo of the Indonesian Revolution' (17/8/1963), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.246-247.
ution or the Revolution of Mankind and a growing conviction that the Indonesian Revolution, possessing an ideology (Pantja Sila) capable of universal application, occupied a leading place in that broader revolution\(^1\).

The two concepts of the NEFO/OLDEFO antithesis and of the World Revolution became fused:

Thus the struggle against colonialism-imperialism, the struggles for national independence is (sic) now waged within the framework of this Revolution of Mankind, a Revolution constituting the confrontation between the New Emerging Forces and the Old Established Order\(^2\).

The NEFO/OLDEFO confrontation was therefore seen as part of the dialectical struggle predetermined by history\(^3\) and bound inevitably to result in a NEFO victory. Being engaged in a revolutionary struggle, the world's 'progressive' forces, which, as a result of the above fusion, were also the NEFO, were obliged to seek solidarity with one another and to adopt a militant posture in

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1 The development of this concept and of Sukarno's views on the role of the Indonesian Revolution in the wider revolution is discussed in Chapter II, pp.190-221 above.


the pursuit of their revolutionary aims. The achievement of victory would thereby be accelerated, but militancy and solidarity were also rendered urgent by what Sukarno saw as the increasingly desperate OLDEFO bids to hold back the advance of the NEFO\textsuperscript{1}. It was, therefore, in his view, Indonesia's task to promote NEFO solidarity and NEFO militancy as part of Indonesia's leadership in the World Revolution, a leadership which, to Sukarno and his supporters, was self-evident. The furtherance of the Indonesian Revolution, of the Revolution of Mankind and of the NEFO struggle thus became increasingly inter-related until they were virtually indistinguishable from one another. This development, combined with increasing Indonesian frustration in domestic and foreign policy, and co-inciding with Sukarno's realization that the Revolution of Rising Demands was not leading to prosperity for the developing world, all contributed to the

\textsuperscript{1} OLDEFO efforts to maintain their position of international privilege were blamed increasingly for the failure of the NEFO nations to realise their aspirations, particularly their desire for prosperity, as expressed in the Revolution of Rising Demands. More serious, however, were the attempts at interference in NEFO affairs, manifested, for example, in the retention of foreign military bases, and, in the case of Southeast Asia, in U.S. intervention in Vietnam and British attempts to create a 'neo-colonialist' Malaysia.
promotion of an increasingly militant interpretation and application of the NEFO Ideology.
C. FEATURES OF THE NEFO IDEOLOGY IN PRACTICE.

Like the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy, the NEFO Ideology provided no concrete specifications for policy. It was primarily an explanation of the world situation as seen by Sukarno, a statement of aspirations on behalf of Indonesia and, by extension, on behalf of the developing world generally, and a call for united action to realize those aspirations. Had CONEFO\textsuperscript{1} eventuated, something other than vague generalities might have emerged at the conference, but this was not to be. Given the absence, then, of detailed indications of what NEFO policies should be and given the complexity of factors operating to produce policy actions, it is difficult to identify with any certainty how the NEFO Ideology was implemented in practice\textsuperscript{2}. There are, however, a number of aspects of Indonesian foreign policy that may be regarded as examples of the application of NEFO Ideology to the problems faced by the Indonesian policy-makers, even though these aspects were also the result of the operation of a number of other general and

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\textsuperscript{1} The Conference of the New Emerging Forces.
\textsuperscript{2} A more sceptical view than that adopted here would question whether NEFO Ideology was in fact applied at all.
specific factors.

In attempting to provide leadership to the NEFO\(^1\), Sukarno adopted methods very similar to those which he advocated and adopted domestically. He was essentially applying the principles of struggle which he layed down for the pre-independence Indonesian revolutionaries: non-cooperation, power-forming and mass action\(^2\). In terms of Feith's assessment of Sukarno's domestic role, he was attempting to serve as an international 'solidarity maker'.

1. PROSELYTISING ACTIVITIES.

However much Sukarno's flamboyant declarations in national and international forums served to express his own vanity to divert domestic opinion from domestic problems and to justify Indonesia's foreign policies, they may also be seen as an application of Sukarno's declared revolutionary strategy. Just as effective struggle domestically was seen to require a sound ideology to provide guidance in the struggle, so, inter-

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1 This attempt was made for a number of reasons including personal conviction and ambition.
2 See Chapter II, pp.85-98 above.
nationally, ideology was important to strengthen the mass will and to rouse the oppressed peoples of the world to political consciousness and to radical action. The dispossessed of the world had to be made aware of the reasons for their misery and had to be given encouragement to take effective action to remove the causes of this misery. The NEFO Ideology was seen to provide the type of ideology that was needed for this international struggle. It was seen to be based on a realistic assessment of the 'objective' situation in the world, an assessment provided by the NEFO Theory. The attempts to propagate the NEFO Ideology were also supplemented by attempts to explain internationally the universal significance of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, particularly Pantja Sila. This ideology had provided an effective basis for the Indonesian struggle for independence and was seen to provide the necessary foundation not only for a successful struggle against OLDEFO domination but also a basis for the realization of the ultimate aim of creating a 'just and prosperous' world society.

In his joint role of Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution and of leader of the NEFO struggle, Sukarno was therefore active in propounding the NEFO Ideology and
in explaining Indonesia's revolutionary principles which he believed should be adopted in the wider international revolution. In personal discussions with other leaders, in speeches at home and abroad and in joint communiques, no opportunity was lost to reiterate his call for a crusade to build the world anew. He called constantly for struggle and for a determined united effort to oppose the OLDEFO, and encouraged his fellow-NEFO by constant assurances that victory would be achieved.

2. ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A NEFO MOVEMENT.

Important as he believed ideology to be Sukarno was not content merely to talk about the need to build solidarity amongst the NEFO. He and his supporters also attempted to create a suitable international medium through which NEFO solidarity could be promoted and expressed. Sukarno was not deterred by the failure of his 1960 bid to convert the United Nations into a vehicle for the realization of what were then seen to be Third World rather than NEFO aspirations. There were other international forums that were suitable for this

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1 This was part of the intention of his U.N. speech, 'To Build the World Anew' of September 30, 1960.
purpose. From the early attempts by the 'oppressed' and 'progressive' nations to assert their influence in world affairs\(^1\), the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements had emerged by the time that the NEFO Ideology was enunciated. Sukarno initially attempted to use these forums to gain support for his anti-imperialist NEFO crusade and sought to convert them into NEFO forums\(^2\). These efforts proved unsuccessful, partly because Sukarno's militancy and, even more important, Indonesia's aggressive foreign policies, were unacceptable to a number of members of these movements. His efforts were also unsuccessful because the illusion of Third World unity was already crumbling under the impact of the Peking-Moscow split and the increasing number of disputes among various Asian and African states. Even the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, which was relatively united in militant anti-imperialism, was unable to withstand the divisive effect of the Peking-Moscow rift.

\(^1\) The most frequently mentioned are the 1927 Brussels conference of the League Against Imperialism and Colonialism, the 1947 Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi, the 1949 Inter-Asian Conference, also held in Delhi and the 1954 conference of the Colombo Powers, at all of which meetings Indonesia was represented.

\(^2\) Indonesia's activities in the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements are discussed on pp.499-508 & 547-560 above.
Whilst Sukarno's efforts to convert the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements into NEFO forums continued, a start was also made towards creating an organisational expression of NEFO solidarity. This occurred in the field of sports, primarily as an act of defiance against the International Olympic Committee. In February, 1963, this Committee suspended Indonesia as a result of incidents at the Fourth Asian Games which Djakarta hosted in August-September, 1962. In response, Sukarno announced that Indonesia would organise its own international sports festival, GANEFO or the Games of the New Emerging Forces. A preparatory conference was held in

1 Indonesia's refusal to issue visas to athletes from Israel and Nationalist China, two charter members of the Asian Games Federation, provoked criticism from Sondhi, the Indian Vice-President of the Federation and this criticism in turn resulted in a demonstration against the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.

2 For a brief account of the background to and the development of the GANEFO, see Bunnell, op. cit., pp.66-67. For further details, see E.T. Pauker, 'GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta', in Asian Survey, Vol. V, No.4, April, 1965, pp.171-185. See also Modelski (ed.), op. cit., pp.87-95 for comment and selections from relevant documents. The following official publications are also of interest: The Birth of GANEFO, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1963; Documents on the Preparatory Conference for the GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces) held in Djakarta 27, 28 and 29th April, 1963, no publisher or date listed, printed by Dittop, Djakarta; The Inauguration of the Headquarters for the
Djakarta in April, 1963, attended by representatives of Indonesia and eleven other invited countries. At this conference, Sukarno attacked the International Olympic Committee as an OLDEFO organization and frankly proclaimed his intention to 'mix politics with sport'. The degree of enthusiasm for this attitude varied amongst the participating countries, since they were mostly reluctant to jeopardise their chances of participating in the 1964 Olympic Games. China, already excluded from the Olympics, was an enthusiastic supporter for Sukarno's militant line. The Soviet Union was more cautious.

GANÉFO I, the First Games of the New Emerging

1 These so-called sponsoring nations were Cambodia, Communist China, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Mali, North Vietnam, UAR, the Soviet Union, Ceylon and Yugoslavia, although the last two sent observers only. Official GANEFO publications nevertheless speak of twelve sponsoring nations.

2 See 'Keynote Address of H.E. Dr. Sukarno', in The Birth of GANEFO, pp.11-12.
Forces, was subsequently held in Djakarta in November, 1963 and teams from some fifty countries reportedly participated. Acceptance of the invitations was encouraged by the fact that 'forces' and not nations were represented and by Indonesia's offer to pay the travel expenses of the participating teams. Communist China again emerged as a keen supporter of the venture, allegedly contributing up to $1.5 million towards the cost of the games. The festival brought considerable prestige to Indonesia, as well as providing Sukarno with an opportunity to speak on behalf of the NEFO crusade and to justify Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. Brackman assesses the significance of GANEFO I as follows:

GANEFO was not so much an athletic triumph as a striking illustration of the weakness of the great powers in Indonesia; in addition to the Chinese financial contribution, the Russians built a

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1 Models (ed.), op. cit., p.87. See ibid., p.92 for the list of the 43 countries whose teams had entered events by November 4, 1963.

2 This enabled those countries wishing to be represented but anxious to retain the right to participate in the Olympic Games to circumvent the International Olympic Committee's threat of expulsion, by sending unofficial teams.

stadium and the Americans provided the clover-leaf access roads.

The widespread representation at the games may in a sense be taken to indicate the broad support for the NEFO cause and, in particular, to verify Sukarno's assertion that NEFO were to be found even in the capitalist countries, since groups were present from such countries. On the other hand, many such groups were far from representative of majority opinion in their home country and attendance at the games did not necessarily indicate wholehearted support for Sukarno's ideas. Since the games were a festival of 'forces' rather than countries, there were also interesting anomalies created, as, for example, in the reappearance of the Dutch flag at an Indonesian-sponsored function. This type of anomaly and the underlying problem which it symbolised, that of identifying what precise entity was represented by each team, provided a foretaste of the type of problem that would arise at a formal political gathering such as the projected CONEFO (Conference of the New Emerging Forces).

1 Brackman, Second Front, p.262. To put the same point in the opposite way, GANEFO showed Indonesian skill at playing off great powers against one another to obtain assistance needed to further Indonesia's own objectives.
Following the games, a GANEFO Congress was held, attended by delegates drawn from 52 countries\(^1\). At this Congress, it was agreed to give the GANEFO idea permanent expression through the creation of a GANEFO Federation with headquarters in Djakarta. A GANEFO Charter and details of the organization were worked out and the task of organising GANEFO II, to be held in 1967, was entrusted to the UAR, with Communist China as a stand-by host.

An alternative and potentially more important vehicle for the promotion and expression of NEFO solidarity was also envisaged in Sukarno's proposals for a CONEFO. This appears originally to have been seen as a supplement for Indonesia's activities in Afro-Asian and non-aligned forums, in the same way as was GANEFO. The proposal for a conference of the new emerging forces was, for example, made unsuccessfully at the March, 1964 Colombo preparatory meeting for a second non-aligned conference. There were increasing signs, however, that Sukarno was beginning to adopt an exclusivist view that

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\(^1\) For the list of delegates, see Documents on the First GANEFO Congress, Djakarta, 24th-25th November, 1963, pp.75-80. Only 36 delegations, however, signed the official communique. See ibid., p.103.
favoured a small but militant group of nations rather than a large and variegated group as the international basis for the NEFO crusade. This was perhaps reflected in the invitation list for the Djakarta conference of April, 1964, held to organise a second Afro-Asian conference. It was also indicated in the uncompromisingly militant stand adopted by Indonesia at the October, 1964, non-aligned conference, at the April, 1965 Tenth Anniversary Celebrations of the Bandung Conference and in Sukarno's statements of June, 1965, which specifically declared that he preferred the forthcoming second Afro-Asian conference planned for Algiers to be a small but militantly anti-imperialist conference.

Meantime, Indonesia had begun to prepare for a 1966 CONEFO with the enthusiastic support of Communist China. At the Bandung Anniversary celebrations, the foundation stone was laid for the new CONEFO complex that was being built in Djakarta with Chinese financial and technical assistance. By this time, following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, the CONEFO concept

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1 See Jansen, op. cit., p.378.
seemed to be assuming the form of a rival to the United Nations rather than as a rival to the Afro-Asian movement. Sukarno still appeared to be attempting to direct the Afro-Asian movement towards a more militantly NEFO position. Whether CONEFO would have proved a triumph, indicating massive and united support for the NEFO cause, will never be known, since the Indonesian coup put an end to the project. The attendance at the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations indicates that support, at least from governments, would not have been very substantial and the frictions that developed during the preparations for the abortive Algiers Afro-Asian conference indicate that NEFO solidarity may have proved as illusory as was Afro-Asian solidarity.
3. UNCTAD: THE ALTERNATIVE.

While Sukarno was unsuccessfully attempting to forge a militant NEFO solidarity through the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements and through GANEFO, an alternative, less dramatic but more effective example of solidarity and co-operation among the developing countries was emerging, with Indonesian, but not, significantly, Sukarno's, participation. This was the development in UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

This development began with the so-called 'non-aligned' economic conference held in Cairo in July, 1962\(^1\), under the sponsorship initially of Yugoslavia and the UAR, subsequently joined by a reluctant India and later still by eight other co-sponsors, including Indonesia. Although this was called the 'non-aligned' economic conference, it was in fact a conference on the underdeveloped nations, of the have-nots and, in a sense, of the economic NEFO, although this does not appear to have been realised by Sukarno at the time. The

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1 For further details of this conference, see Jansen, op. cit., Chapter 14, pp.308 ff.
invitation list eventually agreed upon represented an attempt to bring together virtually all of the developing countries, irrespective of geography and of political attitudes. This objective achieved only limited success, but, nevertheless, 31 underdeveloped countries, most of which were Afro-Asian and/or non-aligned\(^1\), met to discuss the growing gap between the world's rich and poor nations and, in particular, the adverse effect on developing countries of the ECM\(^2\) and its Eastern European counterpart, COMECON. The conference was marked by the relative unity achieved by participants, although this was at times accomplished with difficulty, and by the moderation of the views expressed in the decisions of the conference. Nothing effective came of the conference in terms of Afro-Asian economic co-operation, but, what proved later to be significant, was the demand for a proposed UN Conference on International Trade to be called as soon as possible.

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\(^1\) It is interesting to note, however, that this Cairo conference 'drew more Latin American governments into co-operation with the Afro-Asians than did any previous conference', Jansen, op. cit., p.319.

\(^2\) The European Common Market.
This demand was met in 1964 in the form of UNCTAD I\(^1\), held in Geneva. This conference was largely the result of sustained Afro-Asian pressure in the United Nations to bring the rich developed nations to the conference table with the poor underdeveloped nations to discuss ways of reducing the gap between their respective shares of the world's riches. What emerged at Geneva was surprising unity amongst the 'seventy-five' (subsequently 77) underdeveloped nations represented at the conference\(^2\) and disunity amongst the developed nations in the face of this unity. Whilst the informal bloc of developing nations did not succeed in obtaining the type of substantial concessions they desired from the developed nations, particularly changes in the terms of


\(^2\) See the 'Joint Communique of the Meeting of Representatives of the African and Asian Countries in Geneva on 16th and 17th of June 1964' and the 'Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development' in *Documents for the Second Afro-Asian Conference*, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, undated, pp.25-28 & 29-32 respectively.
international trade to favour the primary producing countries\textsuperscript{1}, they did manage to obtain the conference's endorsement of the proposal that a new organization for the promotion of international trade as an instrument of economic development be established under U.N. auspices, thus providing new institutions oriented towards the needs of developing rather than the developed nations.

The emergence of a relatively effective bloc of underdeveloped nations in UNCTAD has not so far produced a dramatic change in the distribution of the world's wealth, but what was significant in this development was that the developing countries which, in the more consciously political forums, had failed to achieve unity, were able to do so to a remarkable extent when dealing with the more prosaic problem of economic interests \textit{vis-à-vis} the industrialised nations. UNCTAD in a sense was an example of NEFO confrontation of the

\textsuperscript{1} These demands appear to have been influenced by the views of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Dr. Raul Prebisch, who had long maintained that the terms of world trade and the lack of industrialization in the developing nations were major causes of their continued backwardness. For an example of his views, see R. Prebisch, 'Commercial Policies in Underdeveloped Countries' in American Economic Review, Vol.XLIX, No.2, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1959.
rich OLDEFO, but confrontation without the emotional and arrogant displays characteristic of Sukarno's attempts at creating NEFO solidarity. What is ironical is that the most effective example so far of solidarity amongst virtually all of the underdeveloped countries against the developed states occurred without Sukarno's leadership. The events at UNCTAD may be said to have verified Sukarno's NEFO Theory, but it also showed that his methods of applying that Theory in foreign policy were ineffective and, indeed, prejudicial to the NEFO cause.

4. THE PEKING AXIS: THE VANGUARD OF THE NEFO MOVEMENT.

Weatherbee describes Indonesia's relationship with Peking during the Era of Confrontation as 'the model for NEFO political solidarity'. He adds that 'The Indonesians saw the Chinese connection as the nucleus of the

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1 See Weatherbee, op. cit., p.73.
NEFO\(^1\). Whatever other motives Sukarno may have had in collaborating with Peking and in announcing the development of the Djakarta-Pnom-Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang Axis\(^2\), this development did represent an attempt to form an effective basis for solidarity between what Sukarno considered to be the most militantly anti-imperialist NEFO. This axis, especially in its Djakarta-Peking aspect, provided the international equivalent to Sukarno's pre-independence concept of the vanguard party required for victory in Indonesia's struggle for independence. Co-operation between Djakarta and Peking and their common and militant hostility towards the OLDEFO did indeed provide a 'model for NEFO political solidarity', but it was partly because of the militancy of the model and fear of China that other potential NEFO were discouraged from following the example set by Djakarta and Peking. Instead of becoming a vanguard, Peking and Djakarta tended to become united in splendid isolation.

\(^1\) Loc. cit.

\(^2\) This development and possible reasons for it are discussed on pp.560-573 above.
5. MERTJUSUAR: THE INDONESIAN EXAMPLE.

The Axis with Peking, though important, was only part of the increasingly radical, militant and extremist example which Indonesia in its own right was setting for the NEFO in word and deed. As the Indonesian conception of the NEFO narrowed in ideological range to embrace only the militants of the communist and third worlds, and as Sukarno's pronouncements became more strident and doctrinaire, Indonesian policies at home and abroad became increasingly extreme. Thus, for example, domestically, the concept of building revolutionary unity through NASAKOM became the means for an apparently substantial increase in the PKI's influence, while the emphasis on nation building and character building, together with the preoccupation with foreign policy ventures, seemed to be leading Indonesia to an ever accelerating economic decline. When this trend culminated in the adoption of Berdikari or self-reliance, with the consequent rejection of western aid and investment, Indonesia had gone too far for those developing countries which depended heavily on western assistance. Indonesia's conspicuous failure to deal effectively with economic problems caused the less militant and more
pragmatic new and developing nations, potential recruits for the NEFO camp, to become sceptical of the example which Indonesia was setting. To doubts about the suitability of the Indonesian example for their own efforts to modernize and develop was added alarm and disapproval as Indonesia's confrontation of the OLDEFO acquired the element of armed aggression against an Asian neighbour and of arrogant withdrawal from the U.N. This latter example was not followed, as Djakarta had hoped it would be.

In terms of Sukarno's views on leadership\(^1\), he had apparently misjudged the 'objective' situation prevailing in the world and thereby, had failed to create the 'subjective' situation that would lead to a NEFO victory. His own enthusiasm for NEFO militancy and his conviction of the relevance of the Indonesian experience to other NEFO countries had led him to become insensitive to the views of his potential allies. The result was not the development of NEFO solidarity as Sukarno claimed and, presumably, believed was occurring, but the isolation of Indonesia.

\(^1\) See above, pp.116-128.
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APPENDIX A

PREAMBLE OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION

Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice.

And the struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now reached the hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the gateway of the Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous.

Thanks to the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to lead their own free national life, the People of Indonesia here by declare their independence.

Following this, in order to set up a government of the State of Indonesia which shall protect the whole of the Indonesian People and their entire native land of Indonesia, and in order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to

1 Extracted from The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Issue No. 001/1966, pp.5-6.
contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice, the structure of Indonesia's National Independence shall be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian State which shall have the structural state form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the People, and which shall be based upon: Belief in the One, Supreme God, just and civilised Humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, meanwhile creating a condition of social justice for the whole of the People of Indonesia.
APPENDIX B

REAFFIRMATION OF THE BASIS OF
INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1966¹.

DECREE

PROVISIONAL MADJELIS PERMUSJAWARATAN
RAKJAT REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

concerning

Reaffirmation of the Basis of the Foreign Policy
of the Republic of Indonesia

with the blessing of God Almighty

the Provisional Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat
of the Republic of Indonesia

Considering:

a. That, in the period of prologue to the contra-revolutionary action of the "30th September Movement"/Indonesian Communist Party, there clearly existed implementations in the field of Foreign Policy that did not reflect the objectives of the

¹ Extracted from Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara (The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) 20th of June - 5th of July 1966, Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Issue, 005/1966, pp.15-18.
Indonesian Revolution that is based on Pantja Sila, and that automatically did not reflect execution of the Message of the Sufferings of the People;

b. That in the context of implementing the 1945 Constitution consistently and in all its purity, uniform interpretation is necessary to avoid deviations;

In view of:

1. The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution;

2. Clause (2) Article 1, and Clause (3) Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution;

3. Provisional MPR Decree No. I/MPRS/1960;

4. Provisional MPR Decree No. IV/MPRS/1963;

Having heard:

The deliberations in meetings of the Provisional M.P.R. from 20th June to 5th July 1966 inclusive;

Hereby resolves:

To decree:

Decree concerning Reaffirmation of the Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Indonesia.
Article 1.

Basis.

The basis of Foreign Policy is founded upon:

1. Pantja Sila as the ideal basis, the formulation of which appears clearly in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution;

2. The 1945 Constitution in all its purity as the Constitutional and Structural basis.

Article 2.

Character.

The character of Foreign Policy is:

1. Independent and active, opposed to imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations, and participating in implementing a world order based on independence, abiding peace and social justice;

2. Serving the national interest and the Message of the Sufferings of the People.

Article 3.

Aim.

The Independent and Active Foreign Policy is aimed at:
Defending the freedom of Indonesia against imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations and establishing the three components of the objectives of the Revolution namely:

1) The forming of a State of the Republic of Indonesia with the structure of a Unitary State and a National State that is democratic with a territory under its authority from Sabang to Merauke;

2) The building of a society that is materially and spiritually just and prosperous within that Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia;

3) Establishing sound friendship between the Republic of Indonesia and all countries in the world, especially with Asian and African States, based upon co-operation to build a new world that is free from imperialism and colonialism, progressing towards perfect world peace.

Article 4.

Guides to struggle.

The Guides to Struggle of the Foreign Policy are based upon:

1) The Dasa Sila (Ten Principles) of Bandung that reflect the solidarity of Asian and African States,
the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations, and that are characterised by non-intervention;

2) The principle that Asian problems should be solved by the Asian Nations themselves in an Asian way, and Regional co-operation;

3) Restoration of the confidence of other Countries/Nations in the aims and objectives of the Indonesian Revolution by means of increasing friends rather than enemies and of eschewing contradictions by means of seeking harmony in conformity with the Pantja Sila Philosophy;

4) Implementation should be carried out with flexibility in approach and response so that it is directed towards the National interest, especially giving priority to the People's economic interest.

Decreed at : Djakarta

on : 5th July 1966
PROVISIONAL MADJELIS PERMUSJAWARATAN RAKJAT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Chairman
(Sgd.) A.H. Nasution, General

Vice-Chairman
(Sgd.) Osa Maliki

Vice-Chairman
(Sgd.) H.M. Subchan Z.E.

Vice-Chairman
(Sgd.) M. Siregar

Vice-Chairman
(Sgd.) Mashudi, Brig.-Gen.
## APPENDIX C

### CABINETS 1945-1959

<table>
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<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Basis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>1945-1949</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Presidential Cabinet</td>
<td>Aug. 1945-</td>
<td>Business</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nov. 1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. First Sjahrir Cabinet</td>
<td>Nov. 1945-</td>
<td>Business +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 1946</td>
<td>Sjahrir's supporters in the Socialist Party</td>
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</tbody>
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1. This list of cabinets covers the period during which cabinet composition was relevant to foreign policy decision making.

2. This column is an attempt to indicate the group or groups that formed the nucleus of the cabinet. In the case of business cabinets, no groups are indicated except when some tended to dominate. In the case of basically coalition cabinets, the major partners in the coalition are indicated, although this generally represents a simplification of the situation. For fuller analyses of the composition of the cabinets, see the footnotes below.


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<td>3. Second Sjarifuddin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>March 1946-</td>
<td>Sjarifuddin's supporters in the Socialism 1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 1946</td>
<td>Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Third Sjarifuddin</td>
<td>Oct. 1946-</td>
<td>Socialist-Masjumi-PNI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>June 1947</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. First Sjarifuddin</td>
<td>July 1947-</td>
<td>Sjarifuddin's supporters in the Socialist Party, PNI &amp; PSII 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>Nov. 1947</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Second Sjarifuddin</td>
<td>Nov. 1947-</td>
<td>As for 5 with addition of Masjumi 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>Jan. 1948</td>
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</table>

1. See ibid., pp.176-177. The President assumed emergency powers after the kidnapping of the Prime Minister. It should be noted that this cabinet was more widely based, incorporating representatives of other parties, e.g., PNI and Masjumi.

2. This was only a coalition cabinet in a limited sense. See ibid., pp.194-195.

3. See ibid., pp.210-211.

4. This cabinet was essentially a reshuffle of Sjarifuddin's previous cabinet in order to include Masjumi members. Indonesia 1961, p.179.
<table>
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<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tr>
<td>1945-1949 (Cont.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. First Hatta Cabinet</td>
<td>Jan. 1948-</td>
<td>Business,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 1949</td>
<td>Masjumi-PNI&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Second Hatta Cabinet</td>
<td>Aug. 1949-</td>
<td>Business,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dec. 1949</td>
<td>Masjumi-PNI&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>1950-1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Hatta Cabinet</td>
<td>Dec. 1949-</td>
<td>Business&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 1950</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Natsir Cabinet</td>
<td>Sept. 1950-</td>
<td>Masjumi + small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 1951</td>
<td>parties&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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1. See Kahin, *Nationalism & Revolution*, pp.231-232. This cabinet, like the second Hatta Cabinet, was a presidential cabinet and, although the Masjumi and the PNI were dominant, it was not seen as a coalition cabinet. See Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), *Major Governments*, p.571, and Feith, *Decline*, p.50.

2. This cabinet was essentially a reshuffle of Hatta's first cabinet. See Kahin, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), *Major Governments*, p.571.

3. Members of the cabinet were essentially those who were supporters of Hatta, whatever their party. For details, see Feith, *Decline*, pp.46-54.

4. See ibid., pp.150-151.
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<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950-1959 (Cont.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Sukiman Cabinet</td>
<td>April 1951-</td>
<td>Masjumi-PNI(^1)</td>
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<td>Feb. 1952</td>
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<td>4. Wilopo Cabinet</td>
<td>April 1952-</td>
<td>Masjumi-PNI(^2)</td>
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<td>June 1953</td>
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<td>5. First Ali Sastro-amidjojo Cabinet</td>
<td>July 1953-</td>
<td>PNI-NU + small nationalist parties(^3)</td>
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<td>July 1955</td>
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<td>March 1956</td>
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<td>7. Second Ali Sastro-amidjojo Cabinet</td>
<td>March 1956-</td>
<td>PNI-Masjumi-NU(^5)</td>
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<td>March 1957</td>
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1. See ibid., pp.180-182. The Masjumi element in this cabinet consisted of followers of Sukiman as opposed to the followers of the rival Masjumi group led by Natsir.
2. See ibid., pp.228-230. The factional groups of the Masjumi and PNI represented in this cabinet were different from those represented in the Sukiman cabinet.
4. See ibid., pp.418-421.
5. See ibid., pp.469-471.
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<td>1950-1959 (Cont.)</td>
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<td>8. Djuanda Cabinet</td>
<td>April 1957-</td>
<td>Business,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July 1959</td>
<td>PNI-NU¹</td>
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¹ This was primarily a business cabinet, although it was based on the PNI and NU. See ibid., pp.578-580, Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.320, and Lev, Transition, pp.20-22.
APPENDIX D

THE SUKARNO-ARMY-PKI POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
UNDER GUIDED DEMOCRACY

The three dominant political forces in the Sukarno-army-PKI triumvirate, which provided the political 'guidance' for Guided Democracy, were linked in a complex triangular relationship containing elements of co-operation, competition and conflict. The alliances were between Sukarno and the army leadership and between

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Sukarno and the PKI, the former partnership declining in importance as the latter increased, whilst there was more or less constant rivalry and conflict between the PKI and the army leaders, despite the nominally monolithic nature of the Guided Democracy regime. The alliances were themselves complex, as they were not of a wholly co-operative nature.

- The Sukarno-Army Partnership.

The relationship between Sukarno and the army leaders, headed by Nasution, contained all three elements of co-operation, competition and conflict. It was, in other words, '... a "stable conflict" relationship characterised by both common endeavour and continuing competition and tension between more or less equally matched partners'.

The co-operation was in evidence at least from the

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time of the imposition of martial law throughout the Country in early 1957. On Sukarno's part, it was manifested, for example, in the decision to decree martial law, thereby increasing the military's legitimate influence in civilian affairs, in the incorporation of army representatives in considerable numbers within the deliberative and administrative machinery of Guided Democracy and in the heavy reliance on the army for the implementation of authoritarian measures. On the part of the military, it was manifested in the army leadership's acceptance of Sukarno as a powerful President and in the endorsement given to his ideology, to his broad policy objectives and frequently to his more specific policies.

This co-operation rested in part on each partner's need of the other. Sukarno's importance in the partnership was based on his reputation and popularity as a leader and on his prestige and stature as the 'chief

1 Feith, Decline, p.602, dates the beginning of this co-operation as October, 1955, when Nasution was reappointed as the Army Chief of Staff.
legitimator of government\textsuperscript{1}, especially once the parties, parliament, the regionalists and the whole system of liberal democratic government had been discredited. His importance in this respect was reinforced by his successful claim to be the leader of the Revolution, the 'mouthpiece of the people' and hence to be the chief exponent of the nation's ideology, to which everything had to be subordinated\textsuperscript{2}. In addition, Sukarno combined his skilled manipulation of ideological symbols with an extraordinary ability at identifying political forces and trends and at manoeuvring and balancing individuals and groups within the army and in the wider political arena to further his own ends\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{1} Feith, Decline, p.591. This Sukarno remained, even after the coup, although he declined as a source of legitimacy as the post-coup reaction and disillusionment mounted and as the students and sections of the Army conducted a campaign to discredit him. The fact that such a campaign was considered necessary before he could be deposed was an indication of his authority as a legitimator.

\textsuperscript{2} For an eloquent description of the effectiveness of Sukarno's pose as the symbol of the people, the Revolution and the state, see Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, pp.90-91.

\textsuperscript{3} See Feith's comments on Sukarno's manipulatory skill in Feith, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics, pp.241-242 and Mintz's comments in Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.208-209 & 212.
In the manoeuvrings within the deliberative machinery, Sukarno was assisted both by the need for ideological loyalty and by the emphasis on musjawarah-mufakat procedures which, in the pursuit of consensus, tended to obscure dissension. Because of his revolutionary authority and his strong constitutional position, Sukarno was the best placed person to direct the musjawarah process by providing the guidance necessary to bring out the 'inner wisdom' in deliberations. With help of those who shared his views, Sukarno therefore could generally manage to have emphasised what he wanted emphasised in the 'consensus' that emerged from the musjawarah process, whilst his opponents were limited in the extent to which they could openly criticise the alleged consensus because of their need to maintain an appearance of loyalty to the Revolution and to Manipol-USDEK. For this reason, the deliberative machinery tended to function as endorsement machinery for Sukarno's views, although the retention of this advantage required that Sukarno maintain the appearance of working through obtaining consensus.

The army, on the other hand, was not without legitimacy and revolutionary authority and was the most important source of organised power. It had played a
leading part in the physical Revolution and in the formation and preservation of the new, independent state, but, under parliamentary democracy, its power and authority had been overshadowed by that of the civilian leadership and the political parties, whilst it was weakened by internal disunity and rivalries. Towards the end of the liberal democratic period, however, as civilian government became more ineffective, the army began to emerge as a relatively united, disciplined body under a forceful leadership. Its acquisition of legitimate civilian power under martial law and its successful handling of the PRRI rebellion in 1958 added to its importance and reputation. The army leadership was thus able to contribute to the partnership organised power and considerable prestige. There was, however, sufficient fear of and opposition to a purely military dictatorship to necessitate the presence of Sukarno in the post-parliamentary government leadership in order to ensure the legitimacy of the regime. There is also considerable force in the argument that the military, like the nation, needed a rallying symbol, Sukarno, since, though relatively united, the army and, even more so, the armed forces were not monolithic. The army had not previously been capable of maintaining unity when
attempting to play an unaided political role.

Sukarno and the army thus complemented each other and needed each other's support, neither being able to dispense with the other. For this reason, co-operation between them in maintaining the Guided Democracy regime was not only possible but necessary, or was perceived to be so. Co-operation was also promoted by various common attitudes and interests which they shared. For example, on the principle of the acceptance of Guided Democracy they were united, primarily because of their common conviction of the need for strong leadership and because of their shared 'hostility to parties, liberalism, and factional bickering'. Both also tended to emphasise 'the importance of the revolution as a source of legitimate authority', each having 'an interest in

1 See Feith's brief elaboration of this argument, pp.328-329 of Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia. Besides, as Lev points out in Transition, p.287, the army 'lacked a political program and ideology of its own'. See also Kahin, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.660-661.

2 For a fairly full account of the early views of Sukarno and the army leadership on Guided Democracy, see Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.636-643. Basically, these views did not appreciably alter during the Guided Democracy regime.

3 See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.327.
maintaining the argument that those who led the struggle for independence have a moral right to govern ... 1.

Foreign policy was also an area of 'tacit agreement' 2, although the maintenance of the agreement on foreign policy became more difficult to sustain in the later years of Guided Democracy as elements in the army became less enthusiastic than Sukarno over confrontation and over Indonesia's drift towards Peking.

Despite shared attitudes and interests such as those mentioned above, Sukarno and the army leadership were not completely united or in complete agreement, even on fundamental values. Thus, for example, whilst they agreed that parliamentary democracy should be replaced by a system incorporating stronger leadership, they did not agree on the way in which the stronger leadership should be exercised 3, and, whilst agreeing on

1 Loc. cit.
2 Ibid., p.350. For further elaboration, see ibid., pp.350-358.
3 See Feith's summary of Sukarno's and the army leadership's different orientations to government, ibid., pp.330-331.
the importance and validity of the Revolution as a source of legitimate authority, they tended to differ in ideological emphasis, the army leadership tending to be anti-communist, though supporting the Revolution, and Sukarno tending to be at least sympathetic towards the communists¹. The result was that, in addition to the co-operation, sustained by shared hostility towards liberal democracy, by the common interest in retaining control of the Guided Democracy system and by each partner's need of the other, there were also elements of competition and conflict in their relationship.

Disagreement and rivalry was to some extent kept in check by the two partners' acceptance of a division of function and power between them, both 'tacitly recognising each other's rights over certain types of power and certain areas of its exercise'². Broadly, the army largely left unchallenged Sukarno's dominance in foreign policy making and his 'initiative in most public politics', as well as his virtual monopoly over 'the articulation of values, the formulation and inculcation

¹ See ibid., p.330.
² Ibid., p.327. The following quotations are from the same paragraph, ibid., pp.327-328.
of state ideology, the fashioning of symbols, and the maintaining of a sense of momentum'. In exchange, Sukarno permitted the army to be 'the predominant power in regional government, in the running of the former Dutch enterprises, to some extent in administration generally, and in the handling of rebellions'. This division of power into spheres of influence was by no means rigid and was not always strictly observed, but, despite occasional attempts at encroachment, it formed the basis of an agreement upon which Sukarno and the army could live and let live.

Nevertheless, the above arrangement did not eradicate competition and conflict from the Sukarno-army relationship. These elements were manifested, for example, in Sukarno's moves to check an increase in the political power of the army and in his countermanding of military-initiated authoritarian measures which worked to the advantage of the army leadership or which ran counter to his views. Conversely, the army tended to forestall or weaken and, in some areas, to ignore instructions to implement Sukarno-initiated measures that would increase his power or that of another rival to the army. Disagreement between the two partners was
particularly marked on such issues\(^1\) as the military's civilian powers, the place of the PKI and of the pro-western and anti-communist groups in the Indonesian political system and the extent to which measures against the Chinese in Indonesia should be pursued. There was also competition for support from other groups, which could be used to strengthen the one partner against the other\(^2\). From this aspect of Sukarno-army competition these other groups were able to benefit politically by providing support in exchange for concessions, favours or protection.

In so far as his relationship with the army was competitive, Sukarno suffered from a number of disadvantages. One arose from the fact that, although he was necessary to Guided Democracy as the chief legitimator, and although he was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he was not able to ensure his control over the military's physical, administrative and political power.

\(^1\) For further details of the Sukarno-army disagreement on these issues to 1962, see ibid., pp.331-350, and Kahin, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.655-658.

\(^2\) See Feith's comments on this aspect of Sukarno-army competition on pp.247-248 of Feith, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics.
On the other hand, the army was not completely united and, as a result, one of the devices available to him to increase his influence and to weaken the army's independent power was to play off rival factions and individuals against one another. The major problem with this strategy was to keep the army sufficiently disunited to tame it, without destroying its capacity to serve Sukarno as an administrative and coercive organisation.

One of the obstacles to Sukarno's effective control over the army was the wide powers conferred on military commanders by the 1957 imposition of nation-wide martial law. Once the threat posed by the PRRI rebellion had been reduced to guerilla warfare proportions, however, Sukarno moved to decrease this basis of independent power and, in December 1959, he succeeded in reorganising the martial law system so as to make the military commanders more directly responsible to him as the head of a new Supreme War Authority (Peperti). Soon afterwards, he also managed to reduce the extent of the independent civilian powers held by regional military

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1 See, for example, Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.650-651 and Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.201-202.
authorities, at least in the more secure areas\textsuperscript{1}. These moves did not result in a dramatic reduction in the army's power but they did indicate a possible threat to the army leadership's position in the Guided Democracy system as the need for emergency controls declined.

With victory in the West Irian campaign by August, 1962, and with a greater degree of internal security than ever before, the threat to the army's special position based on martial law conditions increased. In October, a committee was established by the cabinet to draw up a timetable for the elimination of the emergency situation. In November, the President announced that martial law would end in May, 1963, the date for the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. This in fact happened, but it did not lead to a noticeable increase in freedom or a reduction in authoritarianism, since the main arbitrary powers created under martial law were rapidly given a new basis under presidential decrees\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} For further details, see Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.332-335.

\textsuperscript{2} The Far Eastern Economic Review, 1964 Yearbook, p.178, lists the following as the most important: 'bans on strikes and lockouts, restrictions on the press, and draconian penalties for "subversive activities"'.

Whilst the army was still likely to be important in the enforcement of authoritarian restrictions, Sukarno's control over the coercive machinery was considerably enhanced.

Another of Sukarno's difficulties in controlling the army arose from General Nasution's influence as Army Chief of Staff, combined with his firm anti-communist position and his unwillingness to yield to Sukarno's wishes when these were unacceptable to him. In June, 1962, this situation was remedied by Nasution's appointment to the new position of Chief of Staff of the Armed Services, a 'promotion' which removed him from a position of direct influence over the army¹. His replacement as Army Chief of Staff was Major-General Yani, a man more

¹ Nasution's political authority was subsequently reduced in the cabinet reshuffle of November, 1963. See G.J. Pauker, 'Indonesia in 1964: Toward a "People's Democracy"?', in Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No.2, February, 1965, p.91. In May, 1964, he suffered a further decline in power when PARAN (the Committee for the Retooling of the Government Apparatus), headed by Nasution, was replaced by KOTRAR (the Supreme Command for the Retooling of the Apparatus of the Revolution), headed by Sukarno, with Subandrio as Deputy Commander. These bodies had the task of supervising the loyalty of state officials and Nasution's loss of this supervisory power was both a defeat for him and a victory for the PKI. See loc. cit.
amenable to Sukarno's influence and a man less firmly anti-communist. One of the results of this change in the army's leadership was a number of other changes in senior military personnel, changes which tended to reduce the influence of anti-communists within the army.

Feith sums up the developments following Nasution's 'promotion' as follows:

Thus the nine months after the Yani appointment saw a quick increase in the political ascendency of the President, a rise in his influence in the army and a corresponding decline in the army's unity and effectiveness as a political organization.

Sukarno's success in 1959 in reducing the military's political independence under martial law was to some extent countered by the army leadership's success in building a political base for its role in the new system. By establishing a measure of control or

1 Yani was also appointed Chief of Staff of KOTRAR.
2 For examples of these changes, see Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, pp.970-971. Similar changes occurred in top civilian posts. See, for example, ibid., p.973.
3 Ibid., p.971.
influence over a number of functional groups, by securing
direct army representation in the deliberative machinery
of Guided Democracy, by expounding a doctrine of
territorial warfare which justified army leadership
politically and militarily, and by implementing this
doctrine through the establishment of an army-led system
of military training and indoctrination for civilians,
the army established a right to a powerful political role
in addition to its already acquired administrative and
purely military functions. These activities, parti-
cularly those involving the functional groups, were not
unchallenged. Both Sukarno and the PKI were active in
building their support amongst these groups which were
acquiring increasing importance politically in the
deliberative machinery of Guided Democracy. One of
the most important challenges to the army's power in
this sphere was the creation of Sukarno's own National
Front, which absorbed the army-initiated National Front

In this competition with the army leadership for

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1 For a brief account of the nature and development of
this doctrine, see Lev, 'The Political Role of the Army
in Indonesia', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No.4,
Winter 1963-64, p.362.
control of the Guided Democracy system, Sukarno was plagued by a further disadvantage. Although he had considerable popularity and prestige amongst the masses and even within the army's ranks, he lacked organised political support controlled exclusively by himself. The formal deliberative machinery of Guided Democracy and the National Front, both of which he largely, though not completely, dominated, were not sufficient in themselves to provide a strong political basis for a certain and effective advantage over the military. These bodies also included army and army-influenced representatives. Sukarno therefore sought the support of anti-military groups, for example, the civilian bureaucrats, the rival armed forces, particularly the air force, individuals and groups of radical nationalist persuasions and the political parties, particularly his old allies, the PNI and the PKI. He also attempted to build what

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1 Sukarno's awareness of his need for a counter-balance to the army and of his inability to produce a single, powerful group, probably explains why he came to favour 'simplification' of political parties rather than their 'burial'. By reducing their number, by dissolving his most vocal opponents and by subjecting the survivors to ideological, political and administrative controls, the 'simplification' strategy accomplished what total eradication would have, whilst leaving the most ideologically and politically acceptable parties intact. The
Mintz aptly calls the 'palace guard' or 'palace clique', primarily composed of nationalists of Murba affiliations or sympathies.

Until mid-1962, Sukarno and the army seemed to be fairly evenly matched in this political competition. The replacement of Nasution by Yani, however, and the ending of martial law gave Sukarno an advantage, a tendency reinforced by other developments.

The acquisition of West Irian brought credit to Sukarno and his Foreign Minister, Subandrio, who, aided by Adam Malik, negotiated the settlement. Victory had been due primarily to skilled diplomacy. Although Indonesia's large army had been necessary for the brinkmanship employed in the final stages of the

major disadvantage with this strategy from Sukarno's point of view, was that it also gave the military leadership opportunities to suppress or hamper the PKI as part of the general control over parties, although Sukarno was generally able to keep military interference with PKI affairs down to a level acceptable to him.

1 See Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.210-212. This 'guard' was to some extent a counterbalance to both the army and the PKI, but it was far less important than either because it lacked the physical power of the former and the organised mass support of the latter, even though it contained a number of prominent individuals. These included Mohd. Yamin, Chaerul Saleh, Adam Malik, Roeslan Abdulgani and Idham Chalid. Aidit and Njoto (both PKI) appear to have gained admission to this clique in later years.
diplomatic campaign, and although force was used, the military's actual role was comparatively unimportant. The army's attempts to gain credit for the West Irian victory were therefore largely unsuccessful. Sukarno was more conspicuously the victor.

By the end of 1962 there had also been a dramatic build-up in the air force and navy which began to acquire formidable equipment\footnote{For details, see, for example, the \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, 1963 Yearbook, pp.126-127. For details of later acquisitions, see the same Yearbooks for 1964, 1965 and 1966, pp.180, 176 & 183 respectively.}. The army's monopoly on coercive power was thus being undermined at the same time as the need for its existence as a large organisation was declining. The PKI became vocal in pointing out that the military had not helped in the furtherance of the economic and social goals of the Revolution, despite its political and administrative power and despite the substantial sums spent on the expansion and maintenance of the military establishment. The army's problem was increased by the signs in late 1962 and early 1963 that, with the successful conclusion of the West Irian campaign, attention would be directed to economic development. In addition to PKI criticism of the army,
there was also mounting political pressure for the army to be reduced in size and professionalised, aiming at higher standards rather than massiveness. One measure devised to improve the military's image, to reduce the risk of sizeable unemployment as a result of demobilisation and to justify the military's continuation as a large organisation at a time of emphasis on economic development, was the plan for 'civic missions'\(^1\) in which army personnel would be employed in developmental projects. Perhaps Sukarno hoped that such projects would also keep the military occupied in useful but politically harmless pursuits thereby diverting its energies from areas of competition with himself for political power.

The launching of confrontation against Malaysia in 1963 helped to reduce the military's quandary, since it provided renewed justification for continued military strength and for military training of 'volunteers' under army direction, but it also diverted the army to an external target and, to the extent that military

personnel were actively engaged in the confrontation campaign, the army's resources for domestic political activity aimed at keeping Sukarno and the PKI in check were proportionately reduced. Probably more important, the launching of confrontation, by accelerating economic decline, by promoting radicalism in ideology and policies as a patriotic duty and by increasing Indonesia's dependence on the communist bloc, created an atmosphere conducive to Sukarno's and the PKI's advance. In the build-up of armed strength with the help of the Soviet bloc, the army's superiority continued to be undermined by the sophisticated equipment acquired by the air force and the navy. The army's numerical superiority was increasingly countered by the technological strength of the two services which appeared to be more amenable to Sukarno's influence and less consistently anti-communist.

Thus, after mid-1962, Sukarno appeared to be gaining ascendancy in the Sukarno-army partnership. Meantime, his political partnership with his major ideological ally, the PKI, was becoming more conspicuous.

- The Sukarno-PKI Partnership

Of all the groups which Sukarno used to balance the army's power, the one that combined the qualities
most needed in an effective ally for this purpose was the PKI. Sukarno was therefore concerned to protect the PKI against Nasution and the other anti-communist military leaders who sought to reduce the PKI's influence or to destroy the party. As a result, Sukarno intervened on a number of occasions to check the army's anti-communist moves, whilst conducting an increasingly vociferous campaign against 'Communist-phobia' and in favour of the NASAKOM concept. Indeed, Sukarno not only protected the PKI against army suppression but actively promoted an increase in PKI influence, so much so, that, in addition to the Sukarno-military partnership discussed above, there was also a Sukarno-PKI political alliance, both pursued simultaneously, but with an

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1 The PKI was the best organised of the parties, appeared to have the strongest mass support and seemed to be ideologically in harmony with Sukarno. The Partai Murba, also an enthusiastic supporter of Sukarno's ideology, was too small. The other political parties were largely discredited and demoralised or of doubtful ideological reliability, and the civilian bureaucracy and air force were no match for the might of the army.

apparent priority given increasingly to the latter after 1962. Because of this alliance, because of Sukarno's suppression of pro-western political groups and, in the later years of Guided Democracy, because of Indonesia's drift towards Peking in foreign affairs, it seemed as if Sukarno was a willing party to a plot to make Indonesia into a communist state.1

1 Sukarno and Indonesia were not unique in this respect. Kautsky puts forward an interesting thesis that nationalists in underdeveloped countries and communists have shared substantially the same type of values and aims and have sought to pursue similar basic policies, broadly aimed at rapid transformation of society. That nationalist leaders have acted in ways approved by communists or have regarded communists as allies is thus hardly surprising. Kautsky draws an analogy between the Russian Revolution and the nationalist, anti-colonial revolutions of the developing world. He argues that, although Lenin's doctrines, especially those on imperialism, expressed embryonically the elements of similarity between the former and the latter, the communist emphasis on proletarianism tended to obscure the similarity until the impact of neo-Maoism, the cold war and changes in the Soviet Union rendered non-communist regimes in underdeveloped states acceptable allies in the struggle against imperialism and against American influence internationally. See J.H. Kautsky, 'An Essay in the Politics of Development' in Kautsky (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, John Wiley, New York, London, Sydney, 1967, especially pp.57-89. The complications caused by the Peking-Moscow rift and by Peking's advocacy of a more militant communist posture in relation to most non-communist regimes do not destroy this analogy, although they caused Peking-led local communist parties to become the nationalists' rivals for power, even though the values and the broad social aims of the communists and the more
Sukarno's activities in support of the PKI did not, however, necessarily indicate that Sukarno was a communist or that he was consciously promoting communist advancement as an end in itself. It is more likely that he was promoting the PKI to the extent that this was necessary for his own purposes. In addition to his need of the PKI to balance the army, Sukarno did not see PKI influence as a threat to himself or to Indonesia, while he set the limits to its power. Indeed, Sukarno appears to have been convinced that the communists, being progressive revolutionaries, were his allies and the allies of the Indonesian revolutionaries and, from as early as the mid-nineteen-twenties advocated an alliance

radical nationalist leaders remained similar. For a critique of Kautsky's argument, see R. Lowenthal, 'Communism and Nationalism', in Problems of Communism, Vol. XI, No.6, November-December, 1962, pp.37-44.

with the communists in order to strengthen the progressive revolutionary camp, of which he saw himself as the leader. Sukarno was also well aware of the increasing popularity and hence political importance of the PKI. From the final stages of parliamentary democracy, he was therefore an ardent advocate of the inclusion of the PKI in the government. This was seen as desirable, partly to harness the PKI's energy and resources to the cause of nation-building and transforming Indonesia, and partly to maintain and strengthen the alliance that had developed between the nationalists, Sukarno and the communists, thereby reducing the risk of independent PKI activity aimed at establishing a purely communist state by overthrowing the Guided Democracy regime.

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1 See the discussion of revolutionary unity in Chapter II, pp.161-170 above. This type of reasoning is not to be confused with a suggestion that the communists should be helped to obtain a monopoly of power. In Sukarno's thought the basic assumption has always been that the Indonesian Revolution subsumes communism, not that communism subsumes the Revolution.

2 He made particularly strenuous though unsuccessful efforts to persuade Ali Sastroamidjojo to include PKI representatives in the second Ali cabinet. From 1960, these efforts were intensified under the slogan of NASAKOM. See, for example, Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.339.
involvement in the Guided Democracy government would thus help to balance the military's influence, would render PKI criticism of government policies less likely and would tend to promote PKI acceptance of Sukarno's leadership of both the state and the Revolution.

Restraint on efforts to suppress the communists in Indonesia was also a domestic corollary of the independent foreign policy. Support from the communist bloc was desirable to reduce Indonesia's dependence on western nations and this support would be less likely if the PKI were systematically suppressed, particularly if the PKI, as a result of suppression or frustration, adopted a hostile stance towards the Indonesian government. As the West Irian campaign and the subsequent confrontation stance towards the OLDEFO increased in importance, support, or the absence of hostility, from the communist bloc became increasingly desirable if not necessary for Indonesia's foreign policy objectives.

The PKI leadership was generally willing to co-operate with Sukarno under Guided Democracy¹, partly

¹ There was some opposition from within the PKI to this strategy of co-operation, particularly from the Lukman-led left-wing, which tended to look increasingly towards Peking for inspiration. There were also instances when
because the communists needed Sukarno's protection against possible army suppression and partly because this strategy of co-operation with Sukarno, already successful before the introduction of Guided Democracy, gave the communists a great deal of respectability and prestige in the national Revolution, whilst enabling the PKI to gain in strength and to some extent to influence ideology and policy. The outlook and objectives of Sukarno and the PKI were largely the same. Their joint revolutionary venture had not reached, and was unlikely for some time to reach, the point at which the two allies would clearly need to part company. While the PKI-Sukarno alliance could be used to advance both the PKI's and Sukarno's interests more effectively than independent action, it served its purpose for both partners.\footnote{This does not mean, however, that the PKI was necessarily committed to an alliance with Sukarno. See the discussion of PKI tactics, pp.D33-D39 below. Increasingly after 1963 and especially in 1965 as the pre-coup...}
The PKI-Army Conflict and Competition for Power

It was Sukarno's support for the PKI that provided the major and most consistently recurring source of disagreement between the President and the military leadership, although, until after the coup, this disagreement was never sufficiently strong to destroy the Sukarno-army partnership. The dominant section in the military leadership was unwilling to risk open and total confrontation with the President on this issue¹, but preferred to use its influence under Guided Democracy to restrict the PKI's advance in much the same way as Sukarno used his influence to restrict advance by the army. Nasution and his supporters, and particularly the Muslim elements in the army, were however, unmistakably anti-communist, partly on principle and partly because they saw in the PKI both a rival to their own
tensions built up, there were signs of growing PKI impatience for power. See pp.D35-D36 below.

¹ For a summary of the reasons for this reluctance, see Lev, 'The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64, pp.358-359.
power and a threat to national security\(^1\). In the early stages of Guided Democracy, the PKI-army conflict was primarily a struggle for power between two incompatible forces. Increasingly, however, it became a struggle for succession\(^2\), especially as Sukarno grew older and as his health appeared to decline. It seemed fairly clear that, once Sukarno, the balancer, was no longer part of the leadership, control of the Guided Democracy system

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1 See Kahin's summary of the Nasution-led army leadership's attitude to the PKI, pp.641-642 of Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments. See also Lev, 'The political Role of the Army in Indonesia', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64, pp.353 & 357.

2 The struggle for succession was not simply that between the PKI and the army, although these were the two most important power groups apart from Sukarno. The rivalry was complicated by competition between a number of individuals, some of whom were not directly linked with either the PKI or the army. The most important individual contenders for Sukarno's position were Djuanda (until his death), Leimena, Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh, Aidit, Nasution and Roeslan Abdulgani. As no Vice-President was appointed under Guided Democracy and as, after Djuanda's death, the position of First Minister was replaced by a presidium of three vice-premiers (the first three above), there was no formal indication of who was the most likely successor, although Subandrio was the 'First Vice-Premier'. Whoever was to be the individual who succeeded to Sukarno's position, it was clear that he would have to accommodate himself to the two dominant forces contending for control of Guided Democracy. He would therefore either have to continue Sukarno's balancing act or choose to side with either the army or the PKI against the other.
could pass to only one of the two major contenders. Increasingly after 1962 and especially by 1965, there were signs that, should the system without Sukarno be unable to continue to accommodate the PKI and the army as was feared, Sukarno would prefer his successor to be the PKI\(^1\). Probably the post-coup army leadership's belief that this was the case combined with Sukarno's continued efforts to protect the PKI, in part explains why Suharto felt obliged to remove Sukarno as well as the PKI in the post-1965 adjustments to Indonesian politics.

In the PKI-army competition, the army had an initial advantage. The military was established as

\(^1\) One indication that Sukarno favoured the PKI as his successor was provided in May, 1965, in his speech to the forty-fifth anniversary PKI rally. See Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p.85 and J.L.S. Girling, People's War: The Conditions and the Consequences in China and in South East Asia, Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, p.35. See also Shaplen, op. cit., pp.80-81. Another indication was provided by Sukarno's declaration in a CBS-TV interview in January, 1965, that he had no objections to the PKI's coming to power in Indonesia, provided this was done without threatening the Indonesian state. See Brackman, Second Front, pp.101-102. Feith discusses some probable reasons why Sukarno would be likely to prefer the PKI to be his successor. See Feith, 'President Soekarno, the army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, pp.978-979. See also Brackman, Second Front, p.245.
part of the leadership of Guided Democracy, even though it did not have a monopoly of power. In terms of armed strength, it also faced no effective competitor. The army leadership was therefore competing from a position of actual power and its task was to maintain and, if possible to increase that power, whilst resisting any advance in influence, politically or within the armed forces, by the PKI or Sukarno. The PKI, on the other hand, was unable to match with armed strength the physical might of the army and was not so firmly established in its own right within the leadership of Guided Democracy. Although it was represented in the deliberative bodies and although it had increasing political resources at its disposal (e.g., its prestige, mass backing and sound organisation), it was essentially competing from a position of indirect influence and potential power. Its task was therefore to promote a change in the existing system in such a way that its potential power could be converted into actual power and applied to further PKI interests either within the Guided Democracy framework or in the framework of a
purely communist state. If Guided Democracy was to be retained substantially unchanged, Sukarno and the army had to be persuaded to accept the PKI as an equal partner in the Guided Democracy leadership, apparently an increasingly easy task in Sukarno's case, but an extremely difficult one in the case of the army. If Guided Democracy was to be replaced by a communist

1 That the PKI wanted to obtain control of Indonesia is beyond doubt. What is not clear is whether this control was to be acquired through peaceful means or by force and whether the Guided Democracy system was to be retained under communist control or formally replaced by a communist state. Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp.86-87, refers to 'uncovered' PKI documents which put forward 1970 as 'the year of ultimate victory'. One such document, dated 23/12/63 and titled Resume of Programme and Activities of the PKI at the present Time, mentions such a timetable as having Aidit's endorsement and makes the point that, from the PKI's point of view, the Revolution will not be completed until the PKI has achieved a 'People's Democracy'. The strategy which this document puts forward emphasises the need to work for increased legitimate power (e.g., through demands for nasakomisation of all governmental institutions including the cabinet), whilst increasing the party's mass support and infiltration of other organisations, but does not rule out the resort to force, if the PKI's enemies initiate an armed contest. PKI initiation of a coup is, however, rejected. When, early in 1964, Chaerul Saleh accused the PKI of being traitors and referred to this document, its authenticity was denied by Aidit. Nevertheless, the strategy which it puts forward bears a marked resemblance to what in fact happened between 1963 and 1965. I have not seen the original document but only a duplicated document of anonymous origin and marked 'copy of a copy'.

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system, Sukarno and the army had either to be eradicated as political forces or persuaded to subordinate themselves to communist leadership, either of which tasks would be indeed formidable.

The PKI's strategy in its struggle for power was by no means simple. It seems fairly clear that, in the early stages of Guided Democracy, the PKI continued with its 'national united front' strategy, initiated in 1952 under the Wilopo government. This strategy, applied to the situation under Guided Democracy, involved loyalty to Manipol-USDEK, the acceptance of Sukarno's leadership of the Revolution and of the nation, cooperation under the NASAKOM formula with the nationalists and the less orthodox Muslims, the 'progressive' elements in Indonesian politics, and cooperation with and participation in the government. The major exception to this pattern of cooperation was the PKI's attitude to the influence in government of the anti-communist military leadership which tended to bear the brunt of the criticism which the PKI desired to make of

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1 See above pp.358-359. For a fuller exposition of this strategy, see Hindley, *PKI*, Part Five, pp.233 ff.
the government and of its inadequacies. On this strategy, the aim of the PKI was to come to power in Indonesia by peaceful means, working within the constitutional framework. This appears to have been Aidit's preference, at least until the final stages of Guided Democracy.

There were, however, more extreme elements in the PKI favouring the militant and Peking-type approach of confrontation with the government and ultimate acquisition of power by force. This group appeared to gain

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1 There was an occasional variant of NASAKOM, namely 'NASAKOMIL', which extended the concepts of unity and co-operation to include the armed forces. This received less emphasis than NASAKOM and was even less realistic since, however much there was suppressed rivalry between the communists, nationalists and religious groups, the rivalry between the communists and the army was so great that the illusion of co-operation was very difficult to sustain.

2 Even when the PKI showed signs of moving towards a more militant approach, Aidit still had not abandoned the peaceful strategy, at least publicly, and remained confident of victory by constitutional means. See, for example, his statement of April, 1964, quoted in Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, p.980.

3 See p.D26 above, footnote 1.
ascendancy as the PKI, apparently with Aidit's blessing, moved from a neutralist position in the Peking-Moscow dispute to a pro-Peking position. This trend became particularly marked from 1963. Nevertheless, the political alliance with Sukarno remained, partly because he was amenable to the greater part of the PKI's views, including those reflecting the pro-Peking development, partly because his protection against possible army suppression was still necessary and partly because the PKI continued to advance its political fortunes under Sukarno's rule. There were, however, increasing signs between 1962 and 1965, especially during the tense period leading up to the 1965 coup, that the PKI was becoming restless, impatient for more rapid advancement and confident of its chances of success in a bid to assume power by force\(^1\). If the New Order's allegations

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\(^1\) If the document referred to in footnote 1, p.D32 above is authentic, the PKI was considered to be 'combat ready' even in 1963. Shaplen, *Time Out of Hand*, pp.90-91, accepts the view that post-coup investigations have revealed that the PKI decided in the spring of 1965 that the original timetable of control of Indonesia by 1970 needed to be speeded up and therefore began preparations for a coup. The reasons for this change in strategy and the steps taken are outlined ibid., pp.90-110. Even if the view that the PKI did not initiate the 1965 coup is correct, there was a marked increase in PKI militancy as the party became more Peking oriented,
that the PKI initiated the coup are correct, the strategy of advancement by peaceful means was clearly abandoned, although it is not certain that the coup was in fact initiated by the PKI\textsuperscript{1}. Even if it was so initiated, it was not necessarily directed against Sukarno. The army leadership appears to have been the prime target. Part of the 'national united front' strategy, the alliance with Sukarno, may thus have survived a PKI victory, although such a post-coup alliance would have been one dominated more conspicuously by the PKI.

The adoption of a strategy of loyalty to the Guided Democracy regime did not, of course, preclude the simultaneous preparation for a subsequent more forceful bid for power\textsuperscript{2}. Whilst furthering its influence as a loyal and useful member of the Guided Democracy political system, the PKI could also attempt to increase indicating impatience for acceleration of the Revolution, if not a specific commitment to the use of force. See pp.D50-D52 below.

\textsuperscript{1} For a brief discussion of this issue, see Girling, People's War, pp.35-37. For a fuller consideration of possible instigators and their motives, see Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, Chapter 9, pp.103 ff., and Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp.86-114.

\textsuperscript{2} See footnote 1, p.D32 above.
its own mass support, infiltrate mass organisations, the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy, attempt to arm PKI supporters for an eventual show-down with the army, and foment discontent with the government, concentrating, in particular, on discrediting its major competitor and enemy within the elite, the army leadership surrounding Nasution.

The PKI does, in fact, appear to have adopted both strategies, and, whilst the emphasis seemed to shift from the united front strategy to a more independent line and from peaceful methods to more forceful methods as the period of Guided Democracy progressed, there were indications of both approaches throughout the period and, indeed, preceding the introduction of Guided Democracy. Thus, in many ways, the PKI's function under Guided Democracy resembled that of a member of a coalition government, supporting and co-operating with its actual and potential allies\(^1\) and supporting and associating itself with those government policies of

\(^1\) For example, Sukarno, Partindo and the more radical elements in the PNI.
which it approved\textsuperscript{1}. In other ways, the PKI functioned as a 'loyal opposition', criticising the leadership and, in particular, the army elements therein, for such short-comings as the failure to improve the economic situation, to introduce an effective programme of land reform and to check corruption and the arbitrary use of power. Meantime, it worked to increase its own mass support and to infiltrate other organisations.

The simultaneous adoption of the peaceful strategy and of the more forceful strategy was perhaps most strikingly indicated in the PKI's support from 1956 for Sukarno's efforts to have the PKI represented in the cabinet\textsuperscript{2}, whilst simultaneously advocating the creation

\textsuperscript{1} This was especially apparent in the PKI support given to such foreign policy ventures as the campaign for West Irian, confrontation, the NEFO crusade and the axis with Peking. Approval could be based either on compatibility with the policies advocated by the PKI or on their tendency to advance PKI interests directly or indirectly. The above foreign policy ventures were acceptable on both criteria.

\textsuperscript{2} Sukarno's efforts were originally directed towards establishing a 'four legged' government, i.e., one representing the four main parties as revealed by the 1955 elections - the PNI, NU, PKI and Masjumi. From the time of the enunciation of his Konsepsi in 1957, PKI inclusion in the government was advocated in terms of creating a gotong-rojong cabinet and, from 1960, a NASAKOM cabinet.
of armed volunteer units, originally to fight in the West Irian campaign, subsequently to crush Malaysia and ultimately to form a 'fifth force'. The latter type of campaign was, of course, expressed in terms of loyal, patriotic sentiments, but there can be little doubt that the PKI hoped to create armed units of its own, particularly amongst its youth groups, independent of army control. These two campaigns represent the opposing two extremes of possible PKI tactics and neither was particularly successful, either because of effective resistance from the army, or because of Sukarno's reluctance to let the PKI become too powerful to manage.

Although alleged PKI sympathisers were given posts in the Djuanda cabinet formed in 1957, it was not until 1962 that the first PKI representatives attained the positions of ministers and, even then, they were not given portfolios. Whether this delay and the ultimate

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1 See the summary of the PKI's early attempts at creating legitimate armed units independent of the army, in Mintz, Mohammed, etc., p.204, especially footnote 15. The fifth force proposal is discussed briefly below. This force, fifth because there were already four armed forces, -the army, navy, air force and police, - was to be based on workers, peasants and the youth.

2 See p.376, footnote 1 above.

3 see p.D44 footnote 1 below.
award of nominal positions without real power were due to Sukarno's intentions or to army resistance to more thorough PKI advance is not clear, but probably both factors were involved. The PKI's efforts to create a basis for armed and trained units under its own control were more successful, but still inadequately so for the party to challenge the army's might. Volunteer units were established but, although the PKI was active amongst the volunteers, particularly those involved in confrontation operations against Malaysia, the party did not succeed in wrestling control of the volunteers away from the army. To judge from Sukarno's expressed support for the fifth force proposal and from his alleged part in negotiations with Peking to obtain arms without the knowledge of the military leadership, the main opposition to this scheme appears to have come from the army leadership which was adamant in resisting both

1 See p.D45, footnote 1 below.
2 See Mintz's assessment in Mintz, Mohammed, etc., p.155.
the fifth force idea and the related proposal for the 'nasakomisation' of the armed forces\(^1\). The fifth force was never created, but the presence of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat groups at Halim air base when the coup broke out indicates that a start had been made towards creating such a force, since these groups were receiving training with the help of the air force. Had the coup not broken out when it did, this beginning might have led to the development of a sizeable PKI armed force, whilst nasakomisation of the services might have weakened the army's anti-communist unity sufficiently for the PKI to challenge the army successfully. Such a move at the time of the coup was, however, premature.

When one comes to the general question of how successful the PKI was in advancing its political influence, the situation is less clear. Was the PKI approaching the point at which it was strong enough to take over the government either from within by peaceful,

\(^1\) See, for example, the Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966 Yearbook, p.183, Brackman, Second Front, pp.290-291, Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p.86 and Weatherbee, op. cit., p.53. The nasakomisation of the armed forces would, of course, have improved the PKI's chances of successful infiltration of the existing four armed forces.
legitimate means, or from outside by the use of armed
force and mass violence, or had it become tamed or
'domesticated'?  
Partly because of Sukarno's protection and support
and partly because of its own organisational strength
and skill at political manoeuvring, the PKI seemed to
make substantial advances under Guided Democracy, even
in the early stages when the Sukarno-army partnership
appeared to be dominant. The party survived despite
the army's efforts to suppress it, strengthened its
organisation and increased the membership both of the

1 For two contrasting types of view on this question, see G.J. Pauker, 'Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia', in Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 3, May, 1961, pp. 26-34, Pauker, 'Indonesia in 1964: Toward a
"People's Democracy"?' in Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 2
and van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia,
Chapter VIII, pp. 295-304, as compared to Hindley, PKI,
pp. 286 & 300-304 and Hindley, 'President Sukarno and the
Communists: the Politics of Domestication', in The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4,
December, 1962, pp. 915-926. See also Feith's summary
and assessment of these contrasting types of view,
pp. 339-342 of Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in
McVey (ed.), Indonesia.

2 These gains are summarised below. For further
details, see, for example, Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided
Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp. 339-342;
Hindley, PKI, pp. 277, 280, 282-286 & 300-304; Mintz,
Mohammed, etc., pp. 221-222; and Brackman, Second Front,
Chapter 22 (reviewing the situation to 1965).
party and of its front organisations, principally SOBSI (the trade union federation), the PTI (Peasant Front) and Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani (the youth and women's organisations respectively). In addition, it stepped up its indoctrination efforts and extended them to the general public, despite the restrictions and controls on the activities of political parties, and continued in its attempts to infiltrate other organisations, including the armed forces.

1 The PKI claimed to have increased the membership of the party from 1.5 to over 2 million and of its mass organisations from 7.8 to 12 million between July, 1959 and April, 1962. See Hindley, PKI, pp.284-285. This rendered the PKI the third largest communist party in the world. By mid-1964, membership of the party was claimed to be 2.5 million (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966 Yearbook, p.175), and by 1965, three million. For figures showing alleged party and mass organisation membership, see Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p.83.

2 Whilst there is no doubt that the PKI tried to infiltrate the armed forces and to win the sympathy of junior and senior personnel, it is not clear how successful these attempts were. What is clear is that at no stage was PKI infiltration sufficient for a take-over of the armed forces. Neither was it sufficient in the case of the army to stop attempts at suppression of the PKI, although the PKI's possession of the sympathy of some elements in the armed forces probably contributed to the success of Sukarno's frequent intervention to keep suppression attempts in check. Hindley argues that, from 1956, Nasution had successfully removed communist sympathisers from positions of influence amongst the army officers. See Hindley, 'President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication', in The
gained representation to an unprecedented and increasing degree in the deliberative machinery of government as party members and sympathisers rose to prominent positions in national, provincial and local government.

American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, December, 1962, pp.918-919. On the other hand, it is by no means clear that Nasution managed to stop PKI penetration of the lower ranks and there appears to have been a decline in the influence of anti-PKI elements in the army after 1962, when Major-General Yani replaced General Nasution as the Army Chief of Staff. See, for example, Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, pp.970-971, 973 & 977. Other branches of the armed forces, particularly the air force, but also the navy, seem to have had a less consistently anti-communist orientation than the army, indicating probable PKI success in winning sympathy in these other services, if not successful infiltration. For a general review of PKI influence in the armed forces, see Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.202 & 204. See also pp.D56-D58 below for a comment on the developments towards the end of the Guided Democracy period.

Feith sums up the situation at the sub-national level by 1962 as follows: 'Close sympathizers of the party are now deputy governors of Central Java, West Java and Djakarta; and party members are mayors of important cities and towns', Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.339. At the national level, in addition to its strong position in the National Front, the PKI was represented in all the important official deliberative and planning bodies of Guided Democracy, with the notable exception of the cabinet. In March, 1962, this exception was removed by the appointment of Aidit and Lukman as ministers, although they were not given portfolios. On the other hand, at the same time, they were appointed to the newly formed State Leadership Consultative Body which consisted of the President, First Minister, eight deputy first ministers and the heads of four of the state's highest
These advances were not, however, in the form of immediately increased PKI power vis-à-vis that of Sukarno or the army within the Guided Democracy machinery. Moreover, such gains as were made were not without cost. Despite its growing support and internal strength, the PKI was still dependent on Sukarno and, because of this dependence, had to subordinate its own ideology to that of Sukarno, whilst accepting his leadership both of the nation and of the Revolution. The PKI's survival as a legal political party exacted a price, the acceptance of councils. Aidit was already a deputy chairman of the M.P.R.S. and Lukman a deputy chairman of the D.P.R.G.R. In the cabinet reshuffle of August, 1964, Njoto was made a minister seconded to the Cabinet Presidium consisting of Sukarno, the three Vice-Premiers (Subandrio, Leimena and Chaerul Saleh) and six ministers. Aidit and Lukman remained ministers without portfolio.

Hindley argues that 'the positions given PKI close to the center of government [were] without power', Hindley, PKI, p.282. This he ascribes to Sukarno's aim to use the PKI but, at the same time, to contain it, without giving to the communists the opportunity to usurp power. See loc. cit. and ibid., pp.276, 297 & 302-303. See also Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.652 & 658 and van der Kroef, The Communist Parts of Indonesia, pp.261-263. Pluvier, Confrontations, pp.56-60, also adopts the view that Sukarno and the army were both attempting in their own ways to contain PKI influence, but is doubtful about the success of their attempts. On the other hand, ibid., pp.84-85, Pluvier concludes that the PKI's prospects for taking over the government declined during Guided Democracy.
governmental surveillance (i.e., supervision by Sukarno and by the military) and other restrictions, at least in so far as its overt political activities were concerned. Survival as a legal party also required some degree of caution in covert activities lest these were discovered, with possible disastrous results to the party's position. The price of representation in the leadership of Guided Democracy was perhaps even higher. This involved restraint on the degree of militancy and independence which the PKI could exhibit, otherwise it could jeopardise the alliance with Sukarno and its gains within the governmental structure. Besides, by accepting positions in the high deliberative bodies, the PKI was to some extent associated with the government and its policies, especially after it gained admission to the cabinet. It was therefore less able to adopt a consistently hostile and critical anti-government line. Despite the PKI's addiction to revolutionary slogans, it was also to some extent restrained from militant action because, having some opportunity to participate in the policy-making deliberations, the party lacked the spur of frustration, particularly as some of its leaders were able to enjoy the delights of high positions. As the PKI gains within the system increased, it had more to lose from
precipitate action. In these senses, the PKI was tamed or 'domesticated'.

When one attempts to assess the PKI's strength and prospects under Guided Democracy, one is thus faced with something of a paradox. It did seem to have been domesticated and to have been barred from positions of real power in the Guided Democracy structure. Similarly, the PKI remained powerless to abandon completely the 'national united front' strategy which both contributed to the party's advance and held it in check. On the other hand, the acceptance of domestication and of the continuation of the alliance with Sukarno imposed no great hardships on the PKI, provided that the party leadership was not impatient for independent power. With Sukarno's amenability to PKI views, the party, though domesticated, had greater opportunity than ever before to influence government policy and to acquire positions of at least nominal importance for its leading members. The trend of political developments seemed to be in the PKI's favour, since, as time went by, the party gained in prestige, in size, in support, in reputation and in influence, even if that influence, so far as policy was concerned, was chiefly through Sukarno. The longer the army could be restrained from suppressing the PKI, the
more difficult it would be for effective suppression to be carried out. Given time and a continuation of the existing trend, there was even a possibility that the PKI, as the major and best organised party, would eventually take over the government by peaceful means, especially if a serious political crisis arose at a time of high prestige and internal strength on the part of the PKI. Such a development was likely, for example, on Sukarno's death or retirement. Thus, the PKI's potential power and prospects were improving, even if the party was not appreciably closer to gaining control over the Guided Democracy machinery.

There was a rapid improvement in the PKI's position during and, increasingly, after 1962. The appointment of Aidit and Lukman as ministers early in 1962, though providing no real advance in PKI power, was symbolic of the change that was occurring in the political balance.

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1 In order to gain control of Guided Democracy, the PKI had to overcome a number of obstacles, and to do this, much more substantial gains than had so far occurred were necessary. See, for example Brackman's assessment of the situation in 1962 in the 'Epilogue' to his Indonesian Communism: A History, pp.301 ff. For a later summary of the obstacles to the PKI's acquisition of control of Guided Democracy or of Indonesia see Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, pp.979-980.
within the Guided Democracy triumvirate. It was the first successful step towards the 'nasakomisation' of the government and an indication of the change in priority from the Sukarno-army partnership to that between Sukarno and the PKI. The appointment of Njoto to a more important, though still largely powerless, ministership in August 1964 brought the process of 'nasakomisation' closer to completion. After mid-1962, however, there were far more substantial advances by the PKI than the above limited gains would indicate. The developments which promoted Sukarno's ascendancy over the army leadership also promoted the PKI's advancement, partly because Sukarno was better able to express politically his sympathy for the PKI and partly because these developments also helped to create a situation of which the PKI could itself take advantage. The conditions for political competition were considerably improved for the PKI by the declining influence of anti-communists within the military leadership and by the lifting of martial law in May, 1963. There was a brief set-back for the PKI when it appeared that priority would be given to economic development with western aid and when there was a corresponding rightwing trend in domestic politics,
particularly between March and August, 1963\textsuperscript{1}, but the launching of confrontation of Malaysia quickly reversed the situation and an accelerated drift to the left began.

One sign of the new trend was the lifting of a three-year ban on a number of PKI periodicals in September, 1963, thereby indicating a reduction in the limitations to the PKI's proselytising activities. By mid-1965, the controls over the press had come to be exercised in such a way that rightwing opposition to the government was suppressed, whilst the majority of papers were communist, pro-communist or 'progressive'\textsuperscript{2}. The PKI made full use of its opportunities, applying its formidable organisational skills to increasing its influence over mass organisations and the National Front, making strong bids for support and sympathy amongst such social groups as workers, peasants and the lower ranks of the armed forces and increasingly employing agitational tactics to seize political initiatives\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{1} For details, see Feith, 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. 4, August, 1964, pp.971-972.


\textsuperscript{3} For further details, see van der Kroef, \textit{The Communist Party of Indonesia}, Chapter VII, pp.267-294.
Thus, for example, the PKI and its mass organisations played an important part in opposing the retention and, later, the reimposition of martial law, in opposing the 1962-63 plans for western-backed economic development, in promoting popular and official opposition to the creation of Malaysia and in the consequent launching and sustaining of confrontation\(^1\), in the fostering of anti-British, anti-American and anti-western sentiments and in the seizure of British and subsequently U.S. enterprises and property. All these ventures became officially sanctioned by Sukarno and his government, some because of PKI pressure which could not be

\[^1\text{This is not to argue that confrontation was launched solely as a result of PKI initiatives, although both the PKI and communist parties outside Indonesia reacted swiftly to the Malaysia proposal before Indonesia took a firm stand. For details, see, for example, Brackman, Second Front, Chapter 7 and pp.127 & 148. Brackman does, however, acknowledge other reasons for Indonesian opposition to Malaysia. See ibid., pp.150-156. See also van der Kroef's account of the circumstances surrounding the launching of confrontation and of the motivations of the various groups which opposed Malaysia and supported confrontation, in van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Chapter VII, pp.267 ff. Pluvier, Confrontations, pp.74-76, provides an assessment of the view that confrontation was a communist scheme.}\]
effectively resisted\textsuperscript{1}, but most if not all because they also accorded with Sukarno's increasingly militant interpretations of the Ideology of the Revolution. The heightened revolutionary atmosphere, combined with the accelerating economic decline that followed the launching of confrontation, and the subsequent foreign policy emphasis on building NEFO solidarity provided still further opportunities for the PKI to gain respectability whilst using its agitational skills to promote militancy under the guise of fervent patriotism and loyalty to Manipol-USDEK\textsuperscript{2}.

As the trend to the left in ideology, in political

\textsuperscript{1} For example, Feith argues on pp.975-976 of 'President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle changes Shape', in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, August, 1964, that the government did not originally approve of the seizures of British firms and estates in late 1963 and early 1964 but was powerless either to stop the takeovers, despite a decree issued by Sukarno forbidding workers to take over British concerns without authorisation, or to return the seized firms to their foreign owners. The enterprises were eventually taken over in the guise of boards to 'protect' and 'exercise control' over the seized concerns. Van der Kroef holds a similar view. See van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp.280-283.

\textsuperscript{2} Van der Kroef argues that, by early 1964, the PKI had achieved a major 'breakthrough' in terms of influence and freedom to manoeuvre. See van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp.293-4.
atmosphere and in government policy became more pronounced, non-communist and anti-communist political groups showed signs of concern and disapproval. In particular, the 'Tan Malakkists'\(^1\) felt their position as revolutionaries and supporters of Guided Democracy and Manipol to be threatened. One manifestation of this concern was an unsuccessful bid to merge the existing political parties into a single party which would check the growth of the PKI's influence\(^2\). Following Sukarno's 17th August speech of 1964, 'A Year of Living Dangerously', in which the President endorsed the PKI's position on many issues, the Marxist-oriented but anti-PKI intellectuals of the Tan Malakkist group formed the BPS (the Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism)\(^3\), which launched

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\(^1\) i.e., the nationalist-communists or radical socialists grouped primarily around the Murna party and forming the original core of the 'palace guard'.


\(^3\) The name of the organization, Badan Pendukung Penjebur Sukarnoism, has been translated variously as the Body for the Promotion, Upholding, Preservation or Protection of Sukarnoism. It was clearly intended to fulfill all of these functions, chiefly by reducing the PKI's influence as an exponent of Manipol-USDEK. The originators of the BPS managed to obtain support from otherwise widely
an attack on the PKI for having violated the 'true teachings' of Sukarno.

Despite Sukarno's emphasis on revolutionary and NASAKOM unity, it was clear by late 1964 that there was in fact considerable rivalry between the NASAKOM partners, so much so that Sukarno summoned the leaders of the ten parties to his Bogor Palace in December and there managed to have them declare their loyalty to confrontation and to NASAKOM. A few days later, apparently under pressure from the communists, Sukarno ordered the differing political groups. For further details see Brackman, Second Front, p.244 and Pauker, 'Indonesia in 1964: Toward a "People's Democracy"?', in Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No.2, February, 1965, pp.92-94.

1 Quotations from the resolution emanating from this meeting may be found in Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966 Yearbook, p.179. See also Pauker, 'Indonesia in 1964: Towards a "People's Democracy"?', in Asian Survey, Vol.5, No. 2, February, 1965, pp.93-94.

2 Sukarno was not necessarily reluctant to take this step, since he had long criticised those who suffered from 'communist phobia'. Whilst these criticisms were normally directed against army elements, orthodox Muslims and groups tending to be pro-western, it was equally applicable to radical revolutionaries who sought to deny or reduce PKI participation in the Indonesian Revolution. Doubtless, however, PKI resentment at BPS and Murba criticism played an important part in encouraging Sukarno to make this move against one group of his supporters.
dissolution of the BPS and in January, 1965, temporarily banned the activities of the Murba Party and its affiliated mass organisations and agencies. In September the Murba Party was dissolved. The outcome of the attempt, even by revolutionaries, to contain PKI advance was thus the eradication of the major instigating groups, Murba and the BPS, the closure of a number of papers that supported these groups and the demotion of Malik and Chaerul Saleh, two of the important spokesmen for the marxist-oriented but anti-communist revolutionaries. The suppression of the BPS and Murba was followed by 'a wide purge of all "deviators" in political parties, State agencies and organisations'.

Despite these measures, and the creation in April, 1965 of a 'Body to Assist the President to Implement the Supervision of Political Parties', rivalries and frictions between and within the parties persisted, in part encouraged and exploited by the PKI. The general result was a further decline in the influence of the non-communist parties and in the influence of anti-

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1 Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966 Yearbook, p.179. Aidit was delighted with these developments and cabled the President, thanking him for this 'New Year's Gift', loc. cit.
communist leaders within those parties¹. By mid-1965, with the army apparently less able to restrain Sukarno and with the anti-communist political elements largely isolated, weakened or suppressed, there seemed to be no sizeable and effective check on PKI advance other than Sukarno, who appeared to be in favour of the trend to the left. Sukarno, by design or by necessity, was failing in his role as balancer. As a result, one of the conditions for the survival of the regime, that no major group should become sufficiently frustrated or alarmed by a rival's advance to risk an outright challenge to the whole system, was rapidly being undermined as pre-coup tensions built up.

The above improvement in the PKI's prospects within the Guided Democracy system did not necessarily commit the party to a permanent rejection of a militant strategy of seeking power by force and mass action. Since all political groups and leaders who wished to

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The exception was the NU which became consolidated as a strong Muslim party and which united with four other Muslim organisations in a declaration of their intention to maintain 'Islamic unity to accomplish the Indonesian Revolution...'. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1966 Yearbook, p.181 for further details of the manoeuvres within Muslim and other political parties.
survive had to manifest loyalty to the Revolution and to Manipol-USDEK, an obsession with revolutionary activity was an asset rather than a liability. The PKI was therefore able to promote militancy and organise mass demonstrations, even to the point of supporting a sizeable revolt (the peasant revolt in Central Java in June, 1964)\(^1\), without endangering its position as a loyal supporter of and leader in the Guided Democracy regime. Given propitious circumstances, this mobilising potential could be directed towards a seizure of power by force, particularly if the army's physical strength were nullified, for example, by substantial PKI infiltration of the armed forces, by the PKI's acquisition of independently controlled armed and trained groups or by the dissipation of the army's strength through internal rifts or foreign engagements. At the same time as the

\(^1\) This was probably the most defiant of the PKI's activities, showing the PKI's ability and willingness to organise militant mass action. Even Aidit, the champion of the peaceful strategy, encouraged this peasant revolt. See Girling, *People's War*, p.34 and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1965 *Yearbook*, p.175. Shaplen, *Time Out of Hand*, pp.89-90, interprets this move as an attempt on the part of the communists to 'reassure themselves of their hold on the Javanese masses'. After mid-1964, the PKI was also involved in an increasing number of isolated clashes with the army and with the NU. See Brackman, *Second Front*, p.240.
PKI was uninhibitedly demonstrating its ability as a mobiliser of mass action, it also appeared to be making progress in nullifying the army's strength, through infiltration\(^1\), through obtaining training for some of its groups and through the army's involvement in confrontation activities\(^2\).

\(^1\) To what extent infiltration did occur in the later stages of Guided Democracy is still something of a mystery, but the fact that Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani members were receiving military training at Halim air-base when the coup broke out indicates that communist sympathy in the air force must have been considerable. That Suharto, after the coup, succeeded in establishing and maintaining his control over the armed forces and used this power to wipe out the PKI, at least as an overt political force indicates that PKI infiltration was not as great as anti-communist pessimists thought it to be. On the other hand, the participation of some armed forces elements in the coup on the side of the plotters, and the periodic post-coup arrests and interrogations of officers and junior personnel for alleged PKI connections or sympathies are a reminder that the armed forces are not monolithic and are not immune from communist influence.

\(^2\) There is probably some validity in the view, frequently expressed by military spokesmen, that one of the PKI's motives for advocating and attempting to sustain the confrontation of Malaysia was the desire to divert the military's attention and resources away from domestic affairs, thereby leaving the PKI a freer hand to manoeuvre and perhaps to make a successful bid for power by force.
The chief danger in a change in PKI tactics to an all-or-nothing bid for power was that party's leadership could miscalculate, overestimating the strength which they could muster or underestimating the army's ability to remain united and effective in suppressing a coup attempt by the PKI. This assumes, of course, that, having used the peaceful, co-operative strategy for so long, the PKI leaders and cadres had not succumbed to 'bourgeoisification', thereby depriving the party of its ability to lead effectively a militant and armed bid for power. The pro-Peking wing of the PKI's post-coup survivors argue that the pursuit of the 'national united front' strategy did in fact weaken the party in this way, with the disastrous results of 1965. Their analysis

1 See the quotations from the PKI Politburo's 1966 'Self-Criticism' in Girling, People's War. Moscow, on the other hand, has been anxious to place the blame on Peking and Peking's militant and violent methods. See, for example, John Hughes's account of the Peking-Moscow rivalry for influence over the remnants of the PKI in the Christian Science Monitor, 18th September, 1968, p.19. See also Pauker's review of the dispute between the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow remnants of the PKI, in G.J. Pauker, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-5753-PR, February, 1969, pp.52-59. Both these explanations are, of course, over-simplifications. For a fuller explanation for the coup's failure, on the assumption that it was PKI-initiated, see Shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp.110-114.
may well be correct but, whether this is so or not, and whether the PKI initiated the coup or not, the army's successful suppression of the PKI in the aftermath of the coup suggests that the political rise of the PKI, the strengthening of the Sukarno-PKI political alliance at the expense of the Sukarno-army partnership and Sukarno's simultaneous increasing political ascendency over the army were not sufficient to keep the army's physical strength in check. A continuation of competition on terms favourable to the PKI and Sukarno could therefore not be guaranteed. Had the PKI-army conflict been confined to the political arena, the outcome may well have been different, but neither the PKI nor Sukarno was able to force the acceptance of a political solution. The army under Suharto seized the initiative and retained it, thereby acquiring not only victory against its arch enemy, the PKI, but also release from the long-standing partnership with Sukarno. The triangle was dismantled.